[G.R.

No.

71169.

August

25,

1989.]

JOSE
D.
SANGALANG
and
LUTGARDA
D.
SANGALANG, Petitioners, FELIX C. GASTON and DOLORES
R. GASTON, JOSE V. BRIONES and ALICIA R. BRIONES, and
BEL-AIR VILLAGE ASSOCIATION, INC., intervenorspetitioners, v. INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT and
AYALA
CORPORATION, Respondents.
[G.R.

No.

74376.

August

25,

1989.]

BEL-AIR VILLAGE ASSOCIATION, INC., Petitioner, v. THE

INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT, ROSARIO DE JESUS
TENORIO,
and
CECILIA
GONZALVES, Respondents.
[G.R.

No.

76394.

August

25,

1989.]

BEL-AIR VILLAGE ASSOCIATION, INC., Petitioner, v. THE

COURT
OF
APPEALS,
and
EDUARDO
and
BUENA
ROMUALDEZ, Respondents.
[G.R.

No.

78182.

August

25,

1989.]

BEL-AIR VILLAGE ASSOCIATION, INC., Petitioner, v.

COURT OF APPEALS, DOLORES FILLEY and J. ROMERO &
ASSOCIATES, Respondents.
[G.R.

No.

82281.

August

25,

1989.]

BEL-AIR VILLAGE ASSOCIATION, INC., Petitioner, v.

COURT OF APPEALS, VIOLETA MONCAL, and MAJAL
DEVELOPMENT
CORPORATION, Respondents.
[G.R.

No.

60727.

August

25,

1989.]

NEMESIO I. YABUT, Municipal Mayor of Makati, ARTURO R.

GABUNA, Secretary to the Mayor for Administration,
Makati; JOSEFO S. LINGAD, Acting Municipal Engineer;

NELSON ERASGA of the Municipal Engineers Office,

Makati; and RUPERTO ACLE; Station Commander, Southern
Police District, Makati, Petitioners, v. THE COURT OF
APPEALS
and
BEL-AIR
VILLAGE
ASSOCIATION,
INC., Respondents.
J. Cesar Sangco and Renato L. Dela Fuente for G.R. No.
71169.
Funk & Associates for G.R. Nos. 74376, 76394, 78182 &
82281.
Sergio L. Guadiz, Gruba, Tanlimco, Lamson & Apuhin Law
Office; Tee Tomas & Associates and Castillo, Laman, Tan &
Associates for G.R. Nos. 74376, 76394, 78182 & 82281.
DECISION
SARMIENTO, J.:
I
Before the Court are: (1) two motions for reconsideration (G.R.
No. 71169) of our Decision, promulgated on December 22, 1988,
the first one having been filed by Atty. J. Cezar Sangco on behalf
of the spouses Jose and Lutgarda Sangalang, and the second, by
Atty. Raul Sison, counsel for Bel-Air Village Association (BAVA);
and (2) a motion for reconsideration and/or motion for
clarification filed by Atty. Richard Funk (G.R. Nos. 74376, 76394,
78182,
and
82281)
of
the
said
Decision.
The motion for reconsideration (G.R. No. 71169), filed by the
Sangalangs, is anchored on two grounds: (1) that contrary to our
decision, Jupiter Street is for the exclusive use of Bel-Air Village
residents; and (b) that the Ayala Corporation did contrive to

acquire membership at the Bel-Air Village Association (BAVA)

purposely to bargain for access to Jupiter Street by the general
public. Subsequently, BAVA informed the Court that it was
adopting the Sangalangs motion for reconsideration. The motion
for reconsideration (in G.R. Nos. 74376, 76394, 78182, and
82281) raises more or less the same questions and asks
furthermore that we delete the award of damages granted by the
Court
of
Appeals.
The Court: (1) DENIES the motions filed by both the Sangalangs
and BAVA with finality, no new arguments having been presented
to warrant reconsideration, and (2) DENIES Atty. Richard Funks
own motion for the same reason, with the further word that the
grant of attorneys fees has been deemed to be just and proper
under Article 2208, par. II, of the Civil Code.
II
The lone issue in G.R. No. 67027 is whether or not the Mayor of
Makati could have validly opened Jupiter and Orbit Streets to
vehicular traffic. The facts, as stated in the assailed decision of
the respondent court, in CA-G.R. No. 11803-SP, entitled, "Bel-Air
Village Association, Inc., Petitioner, v. Hon. Celso L. Magsino,
Presiding Judge of the Court of First Instance of Rizal, Branch XX,
Pasig, Metro Manila; Mayor Nemesio Yabut, Municipal Mayor of
Makati, Metro Manila, Arturo R. Gabuna, Secretary to the Mayor
for Administration, Makati, Josefo S. Lingad, Acting Municipal
Engineer, Nelson Erasga, of the Municipal Engineers Office,
Makati; and Ruperto Acle, Station Commander, Southern Police
District, Makati, Respondents," are as follows:chanrob1es virtual
1aw
library
In its chronological sequence, the petition avers as follows: On
October 24, 1979, petitioner instituted a petition for prohibition
and damages with preliminary injunction with the respondent
Court docketed as Civil Case No. 34948. On October 25, 1979,
the respondent court issued an order directing respondents to

answer and denying the issuance of a temporary restraining

order. Petitioner filed an urgent motion for reconsideration of the
denial of its prayer for the issuance of a temporary restraining
order, adding as new ground the continuation of the commission
of acts of dispossession by the respondents. The said urgent
motion
was
denied.
On November 6, 1979, the parties were directed to submit their
affidavits and counter-affidavits as well as memoranda as basis
for resolving the application for preliminary injunction. In due
time, the parties complied. On December 11, 1979, respondents
filed
their
answer
to
the
petition.
On March 4, 1980, the respondent Court denied the application
for preliminary injunction. On November 14, 1980, an order was
issued
denying
the
motion
for
reconsideration.
It is alleged by petitioner that by its orders of March 4, 1980 and
November 14, 1980, the respondent Court has unlawfully
deprived the petitioner of its right to due process to which it is
entitled under the Constitution, and that respondents acts are
tantamount to grave abuse of discretion and in excess of
jurisdiction.
In their comment, respondents allege that prior to January, 1977,
upon the instructions of respondent Mayor Nemesio T. Yabut of
Makati, Metro Manila, studies were made by the other
respondents on the feasibility of opening streets in Bel-Air Village
calculated to alleviate traffic congestions along the public streets
adjacent to Bel-Air Village. The studies revealed that the
subdivision plan of Bel-Air Village was approved by the Court of
First Instance of Rizal on condition, among others, that its major
thoroughfares connecting to public streets and highways shall be
opened to public traffic. Accordingly, it was deemed necessary by
the Municipality of Makati in the interest of the general public to
open to traffic Amapola, Mercedes, Zodiac, Jupiter, Neptune, Orbit
and Paseo de Roxas streets. On January 28, 1977, a meeting was
held between representatives of the Municipality of Makati and

petitioner.
At this meeting, respondents claim that the representatives of
petitioner, particularly Rufino R. Santos, president of petitioner,
had agreed to the opening of Bel-Air Village streets. Regarding
Jupiter Street, the Municipality opened it because public welfare
demanded its opening which allegation the petitioner never
questioned. With respect to Orbit Street, whose opening was
temporarily suspended until the flood control project from
Buendia Extension up to the mouth of the Pasig River, was about
to be completed, it was opened only after another meeting
attended by Rufino R. Santos who agreed to the opening of the
street from J.P. Rizal Avenue up to Imelda Avenue and later up to
Jupiter
Street,
subject
to
certain
conditions.
To bolster their side, respondents cite: specifically, Section 44 of
the Land Registration Act No. 496, as amended, the deeds of
donation of Jupiter and Orbit streets executed by and between
the Ayala Corporation and the petitioner, Presidential Decrees No.
957, Secs. 22 and 29 thereof, and No. 1216, Sec. 2 thereof, and
Municipal Ordinance No. 17 of the Municipal Government of
Makati, Metro Manila, as amended by Resolution No. 139, dated
November 21, 1948, and contend that the opening of the two (2)
streets was demanded by public necessity and in the exercise of
its police powers, and, ultimately on the argument that petitioner
has not shown a clear legal right to the writ of preliminary
injunction.
With leave of court, petitioner filed a reply to the respondents
comment. They assert that the streets mentioned in the
comment, other than Jupiter and Orbit streets, have always been
kept open voluntarily by the Association, that Rufino R. Santos,
president of petitioner, has never agreed on the opening of
Jupiter and Orbit streets, and that the Torrens titles covering
these streets do not contain similar conditions as those titles for
the
other
street
lots.
Petitioner relies on its ownership of the streets of which it should

not (be) deprived without due process of law, and without just
compensation, Article 539 of the Civil Code, an existing Ordinance
of the Metro Manila Commission No. 2, Sec. 14 thereof, and the
concurrence of all the requisites for the issuance of a writ of
preliminary
injunction.
1
The Court of Appeals found that the certificates of title (Transfer
Certificates of Titles Nos. S-76020, S-76021, S-76022, S-76024,
and S-76055, for Jupiter Street, and 206824, for Orbit Street) do
not contain the restrictions imposed by Section 44 of Act No. 496,
now, Section 50 of Presidential Decree No. 1529, for which
reason, and so the Appellate Court held, the Mayor of Makati did
not have the legal right to open them up to traffic.
In Sangalang v. Intermediate Appellate Court, 2 we held that
Ayala Corporation, the former owner of the Bel-Air subdivision,
can not be held responsible for the opening of Jupiter Street,
among other things, because it was the Mayor of Makati who
ordered such an opening. 3 The issue herein, as we indicated, is
whether or not the Mayor could legally have done it. With respect,
specifically, to Jupiter Street, Sangalang avers:chanrobles
lawlibrary
:
rednad
Among other things, there is a recognition under both Ordinances
Nos. 81 and 81-01 that Jupiter Street lies as the boundary
between Bel-Air Village and Ayala Corporations commercial
section. And since 1957, it had been considered as a boundary
not as a part of either the residential or commercial zones of
Ayala Corporations real estate development projects. Thus, the
Bel-Air Village Associations articles of incorporation state that
Bel-Air Village is "bounded on the NE., from Amapola St., to de
los Santos Ave., by Estrella St., on the SE., from Estrella St., to
Pedestrian Lane, by E. De los Santos Ave., on the SW., from
Pedestrian Lane to Reposo St., by Jupiter Street.." Hence, it
cannot be said to have been "for the exclusive benefit" of Bel-Air
Village
residents.
4
Sangalang also had occasion to invoke Ortigas & Co., Limited

Partnership v. Feati Bank and Trust Co. 5 We reiterate Ortigas

herein:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
x

2. With regard to the contention that said resolution cannot

nullify the contractual obligations assumed by the defendantappellee referring to the restrictions incorporated in the deeds
of sale and later in the corresponding Transfer Certificates of Title
issued to defendant-appellee it should be stressed, that while
non-impairment of contracts is constitutionally guaranteed, the
rule is not absolute, since it has to be reconciled with the
legitimate exercise of police power, i.e., "the power to prescribe
regulations to promote the health, morals, peace, education,
good order or safety and general welfare of the people."
Invariably described as "the most essential, insistent, and
illimitable of powers" and "in a sense, the greatest and most
powerful attribute of government," the exercise of the power may
be judicially inquired into and corrected only if it is capricious,
whimsical, unjust or unreasonable, there having been a denial of
due process or a violation of any other applicable constitutional
guarantee. As this Court held through Justice Jose P. Bengzon in
Philippine Long Distance Company v. City of Davao, et. al., police
power "is elastic and must be responsive to various social
conditions; it is not confined within narrow circumscriptions of
precedents resting on past condition; it must follow the legal
progress of a democratic way of life." We were even more
emphatic in Vda. de Genuino v. The Court of Agrarian Relations,
Et Al., when We declared: We do not see why public welfare
when clashing with the individual right to property should not be
made to prevail through the states exercise of its police
power."cralaw
virtua1aw
library
Resolution No. 27, s-1960 declaring the western part
54, now E. de los Santos Avenue (EDSA, for short)
Boulevard to the Pasig River as an industrial and
zone, was obviously passed by the Municipal

of Highway
from Shaw
commercial
Council of

Mandaluyong, Rizal in the exercise of police power to safeguard

or promote the health, safety, peace, good order and general
welfare of the people in the locality. Judicial notice may be taken
of the conditions prevailing in the area, especially where Lots
Nos. 5 and 6 are located. The lots themselves not only front the
highway; industrial and commercial complexes have flourished
about the place. EDSA, a main traffic artery which runs through
several cities and municipalities in the Metro Manila area,
supports an endless stream of traffic and the resulting activity,
noise and pollution are hardly conducive to the health, safety or
welfare of the residents in its route. Having been expressly
granted the power to adopt zoning and subdivision ordinances or
regulations, the municipality of Mandaluyong, through its
Municipal Council, was reasonably, if not perfectly, justified under
the circumstances, in passing the subject resolution. 6
The Bel-Air Village Association can not therefore rightfully
complain that His Honor, the Mayor of Makati, in opening up
Jupiter
Street,
had
acted
arbitrarily.
In connection with Orbit Street, the Court reaches the same
conclusion. We repudiate, therefore, that part of the assailed
decision of the Court of Appeals insofar as it held that the
condition imposed by Section 44, of Act No. 496, now Section 50,
of Presidential Decree No. 1529, 7 that "no portion of any street
or passageway .. shall be closed or otherwise disposed of by the
registered owner without approval of the court of first instance
(being first) had ." 8 does riot apply for lack of an annotation of
such a condition on the certificate of title (Transfer Certificate of
Title No. 206824). To begin with, Transfer Certificate of Title No.
206824 does contain the annotation in question:chanrob1es
virtual
1aw
library
. . . subject to such of the encumbrances mentioned in Section 39
of said Act as may be subsisting, and the condition that the above
lots are subject to the conditions imposed by Republic Act 440. 9
Furthermore, the very Deed of Donation executed by the Ayala

Corporation 10 covering Jupiter and Orbit Streets, amongst

others, and so we found in Sangalang, effectively required both
passageways open to the general public. We quote:chanrob1es
virtual
1aw
library
The alleged undertaking, finally, by Ayala in the deed of donation
(over Jupiter Street) to leave Jupiter Street for the private use of
Bel-Air residents is belied by the very provisions of the deed. We
quote:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
x

"IV. That the offer made by the DONOR had been accepted by the
DONEE subject to the condition that the property will be used as
a street for the use of the members of the DONEE, their families,
personnel, guests, domestic help and, under certain reasonable
conditions and restrictions, by the general public, and in the
event that said lots or parts thereof cease to be used as such,
ownership thereof shall automatically revert to the DONOR. The
DONEE shall always have Reposo Street, Makati Avenue, and
Paseo de Roxas open for the use of the general public. It is also
understood that the DONOR SHALL continue the maintenance of
the street at its expense for a period of three years from date
hereof. (Deed of Donation, p. 6, Exh. 7).
x

The donation on the contrary, gave the general public equal right
to
it.
11
As regards Orbit Street, it was stipulated:chanrob1es virtual 1aw
library
1. That the property donated shall be used and maintained as
"private roads or streets for the use of the members of the
Donee, their families, personnel, domestic helps and under

certain reasonable conditions and restrictions, by the general

public;
2. In the event that the properties covered by this donation are
no longer used as such, the same shall automatically revert to
the
Donor;
and
3. That the Donee shall always have Reposo Street open for the
use of the general public and shall transfer its present gate
barrier located in the intersection of Orbit and Jupiter to the
southern boundary of street Lot 8 of the Plan (LRC) Psd-77820."
12
As we asserted in Sangalang, the opening of Jupiter Street was
warranted by the demands of the common good, in terms of
traffic decongestion and public convenience. 13 We also uphold
the opening of Orbit Street for the same rationale.
There is no merit in BAVAs claims that the demolition of the
gates at Orbit and Jupiter Streets amounts to deprivation of
property without due process of law or expropriation without just
compensation. 14 There is no taking of property involved here.
The act of the Mayor now challenged is, rather, in the concept of
police power. In the case of Philippine Association of Service
Exporters,
Inc.
v.
Drilon,
15
we
said:cralawnad
The concept of police power is well-established in this jurisdiction.
It has been defined as the "state authority to enact legislation
that may interfere with personal liberty or property in order to
promote the general welfare." As defined, it consists of (1) an
imposition of restraint upon liberty or property, (2) in order to
foster the common good. It is not capable of an exact definition
but has been, purposely, veiled in general terms to underscore its
all-comprehensive
embrace.
"Its scope, ever-expanding to meet the exigencies of the times,
even to anticipate the future where it could be done provides
enough room for an efficient and flexible response to conditions

and circumstances thus assuring the greatest benefits."cralaw

virtua1aw
library
It finds no specific Constitutional grant for the plain reason that it
does not owe its origin to the Charter. Along with the taxing
power and eminent domain, it is inborn in the very fact of
statehood and sovereignty. It is a fundamental attribute of
government that has enabled it to perform the most vital
functions of governance. Marshall, to whom the expression has
been credited, refers to it succinctly as the plenary power of the
State "to govern its citizens."cralaw virtua1aw library
"The police power of the State . . . is a power coextensive with
self-protection, and it is not inaptly termed the law of
overwhelming necessity. It may be said to be that inherent and
plenary power in the State which enables it to prohibit all things
hurtful to the comfort, safety, and welfare of society."cralaw
virtua1aw
library
It constitutes an implied limitation on the Bill of Rights. According
to Fernando, it is "rooted in the conception that men in organizing
the state and imposing upon its government limitations to
safeguard constitutional rights did not intend thereby to enable
an individual citizen or a group of citizens to obstruct
unreasonably the enactment of such salutary measures calculated
to ensure communal peace, safety, good order, and welfare."
Significantly, the Bill of Rights itself does not purport to be an
absolute guaranty of individual rights and liberties "Even liberty
itself, the greatest of all rights, is not unrestricted license to act
accordingly to ones will." It is subject to the far more overriding
demands and requirements of the greater number. 16
Unlike the power of eminent domain, police power is exercised
without provision for just compensation:chanrob1es virtual 1aw
library
Art. 436. When any property is condemned or seized by
competent authority in the interest of health, safety or security,

the owner thereof shall not be entitled to compensation, unless

he can show that such condemnation or seizure is unjustified. 17
However, it may not be done arbitrarily or unreasonably. 18 But
the burden of showing that it is unjustified lies on the aggrieved
party.
19
Our considered opinion is that BAVA has failed to show that the
opening up of Orbit Street was unjustified, or that the Mayor
acted unreasonably. The fact that it has led to the loss of privacy
of BAVA residents is no argument against the Municipalitys effort
to ease vehicular traffic in Makati. Certainly, the duty of a local
executive is to take care of the needs of the greater number, in
many
cases,
at
the
expense
of
the
minority.
The next question is whether or not the Mayor, by himself, is
vested with the power to order the demolition so questioned,
without the backing of a proper ordinance. On this score, the
Mayor submitted in evidence Municipal Ordinance No. 17, as
amended by Resolution No. 139, dated November 21, 1948, 20
requiring a Mayors permit to erect construction anywhere in
Makati. The respondent court rejected, however, the Mayors
reliance on the Ordinance. We quote:chanrob1es virtual 1aw
library
Respondents also invoke Municipal Ordinance No. 17, as amended
by Resolution No. 139, dated November 21, 1948, requiring a
Mayors permit before any construction of any kind shall be built,
erected or constructed in any place in the Municipality, and
empowering the corresponding authorities especially the Mayor to
remove and demolish any such illegal construction. For a long
time the gates and fences removed by agents of respondents
have been in the sites where they were removed. We fail to
comprehend why the respondents did not invoke the Ordinance
much earlier. They cannot pretend ignorance of a condition or
situation which was never concealed from respondents and their
agents. At any rate, the Torrens titles of these street lots which
bore no restrictions whatsoever was authority for its owner to

close

them.

21

Quite to the contrary, the Court is convinced that Ordinance No.

17 is a valid justification for the questioned act of the Mayor. The
fact that some time had elapsed before the Mayor acted, can not
render the ordinance uneforceable or void. At any rate, the gate,
the destruction of which opened Orbit Street, has the character of
a public nuisance, 22 in the sense that it "hinders or impairs the
use of property," 23 which the Civil Code disposes of as
follows:chanrob1es
virtual
1aw
library
Art. 699. The remedies against a public nuisance are:chanrob1es
virtual
1aw
library
(1) A prosecution under the Penal Code or any local ordinance; or
(2)
(3)

A
Abatement,

civil
without

action;
judicial

proceedings.

or
24

In The Homeowners Associations of El Deposito, Barrio Corazon

de Jesus, San Juan, Rizal v. Lood, 25 we held:chanrob1es virtual
1aw
library
At any rate, the decisive point is that independently of the said
ordinance, petitioners constructions which have been duly found
to be public nuisances per se (without provision for accumulation
or disposal of waste matters and constructed without building
permits contiguously to and therefore liable to pollute one of the
main water pipelines which supplies potable water to the Greater
Manila area) may be abated without judicial proceedings under
our
Civil
Code.
26
In addition, under Article 701 of the Code, summary abatement
may be carried out by the Mayor himself.chanrobles.com : virtual
law
library
Although estoppel is a valid defense against abatement of

nuisance, 27 judicially or summarily, the Mayor is not being

condemned for estoppel here, but, rather, for inaction. Under,
however, the Civil Code:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
Art. 698. Lapse of time cannot legalize any nuisance, whether
public
or
private.
28
Other than BAVAs claims that the opening of Orbit Street led to
the loss of privacy of BAVA residents, there is no showing that the
Mayor, in carrying out the demolition of the Orbit gate, had acted
in disregard of due process or, as the respondent court would put
it, with a "show of arrogance." 29 As we said, the gate in
question was a nuisance, which could have been legally abated by
summary means. The fact that it was accomplished summarily
does not lend to it a "show of arrogance" because, precisely, a
summary method is allowed by law. In any event, there is a
showing that the Mayor notified BAVA that Orbit (and Jupiter)
Streets would be opened up. 30 The Court finds that such a
notice is compliance enough with
due process.
31
What has been left unsaid is that the nation today is witnessing
profound changes occurring in its midst. A decade ago, we were a
people of forty or so million. Today, the number is knocking on
sixty million. We are reaping the cost that population explosion
carries with it. Housing the homeless has been one of the first
casualties. And so has been the transport system. Giving the
homeless homes and bringing them there safely is a formidable
burden and the task of the hour. Parochial concerns can not be an
impediment to the greater needs of the greatest number.
WHEREFORE, the petition in G.R. No. 60727 is GRANTED; the
motions for reconsiderations in G.R. Nos. 71169, 74376, 76394,
78182,
and
82281
are
DENIED
with
FINALITY.
IT

IS

SO

ORDERED.

Fernan, (C.J), Narvasa, Melencio-Herrera, Gutierrez, Jr., Cruz,

Paras, Gancayco, Bidin, Cortes, Medialdea and Regalado, JJ.,

concur.
Feliciano, Padilla and Grio-Aquino, JJ., took no part.