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Constitutional Law II Midterm Reviewer

Part 1: Fundamental Powers of the State: Police Power,
Taxation and Eminent Domain
Constitutional Bases:
Police Power
Art II, Section IV
Section V

Section XV

The prime duty of the government is to

serve and protect the people
The maintenance of peace and order,
the protection of life, liberty, and
property, and the promotion of the
general welfare are essential for the
enjoyment by all the people of the
blessings of democracy.
The state shall protect and promote the
right to health of the people and instill
health consciousness among them.

Taxation
Art. VI, Section XVIII (1)

The rule of taxation shall be uniform and

equitable. The Congress shall evolve a
progressive system of taxation

Eminent Domain
Art III, Section IX
Art. XIII, Section XVIII

Art. XIII, Section IV

Art. XIII, Section V

Private property shall not be taken for

public use without just compensation.
The State may, in the interest of
national welfare or defense, establish and
operate vital industries and, upon
payment of just compensation, transfer
to public ownership utilities and other
private enterprises to be operated by the
Government.
The State shall, by law, undertake an
agrarian reform program founded on the
right of farmers and regular farmworkers,
who are landless, to own directly or
collectively the lands they till or, in the
case of other farmworkers, to receive a
just share of the fruits thereof. To this
end, the State shall encourage and
undertake
just
distribution
of
all
agricultural lands, subject to such
priorities and reasonable retention limits
as the Congress may prescribe, taking
into account ecological, developmental,
or equity considerations, and subject to
the payment of just compensation. In
determining retention limits, the State
shall respect the rights of small
landowners. The State shall further
provide incentives for voluntary land
sharing.
The State shall recognize the right of

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Art. XIII, Section VI

Art. XIII, Section VII

Art. XIII, Section VIII

Art. XIII, Section IX

farmers, farmworkers and landowners, as

well
as
cooperatives,
and
other
independent farmers organizations to
participate in the planning, organization,
and management of the program, and
shall provide support to agriculture
through appropriate technology and
research,
and
adequate
financial,
production, marketing and other support
services.
The State shall apply the principles of
agrarian
reform
or
stewardship,
whenever applicable in accordance with
law, in the disposition or utilization of
other natural resources, including lands
of the public domain under lease or
concession
suitable
to
agriculture,
subject to prior rights, homestead rights
of small settlers, and the rights of
indigenous cultural communities to their
ancestral lands.
The State may resettle landless farmers
and farmworkers in its own agricultural
estates which shall be distributed to
them in the manner provided by law.
The State shall protect the rights of
subsistence fisherman, especially of local
communities, to the preferential use of
the communal marine and fishing
resources, both inland and offshore. It
shall provide support to such fisherman
through appropriate technology and
research, adequate financial, production,
and marketing assistance, and other
services. The State shall also protect,
develop, and conserve such resources.
The protection shall extend to offshore
fishing grounds of subsistence fishermen
against foreign intrusion. Fishworkers
shall receive a just share from their labor
in the utilization of marine and fishing
resources.
The State shall provide incentives to
landowners to invest the proceeds of the
agrarian reform program to promote
industrialization, employment creation,
and privatization of public sector
enterprises. Financial instruments used
as payment for their lands shall be
honoured as equity in enterprises of their
choice.
The State shall, by law, and for the
common good, undertake, in cooperation
with the private sector, a continuing

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Art. XIII, Section X

Art. II, Section VI (1973

Constitution)

Art. XIV, Section XIII (1973

Constitution)

Cases
Constitutional Supremacy
Manila Prince Hotel v. GSIS

program of urban land reform and

housing which will make available at
affordable cost decent housing and basic
services to underprivileged and homeless
citizens
in
urban
centers
and
resettlement areas. It shall also promote
adequate employment opportunities to
such citizens. In the implementation of
such program, the State shall respect the
rights of small property owners.
Urban or rural poor dwellers shall not be
evicted nor their dwellings demolished,
except in accordance with law and in a
just and humane manner.
No resettlement of urban or rural
dwellers shall be undertaken without
adequate consultation with them and the
communities where they are to be
relocated.
The State shall promote social justice to
ensure the dignity, welfare, and security
of all the people. Towards this end, the
State shall regulate the acquisition,
ownership,
use,
enjoyment,
and
disposition of private property, and
equitably diffuse property ownership and
profits.
The Batasang Pambansa may authorize,
upon payment of just compensation, the
expropriation of private land to be
subdivided into small lots and conveyed
at cost to deserving citizens.

Doctrine
A constitution is a system of fundamental
laws
for
the
governance
and
administration of a nation. It is supreme,
imperious, absolute and unalterable
except by the authority from which it
emanates. It has been defined as the
fundamental and paramount law of the
nation. lt prescribes the permanent
framework of a system of government,
assigns to the different departments their
respective powers and duties, and
establishes certain fixed principles on
which government is founded. The
fundamental conception in other words is
that it is a supreme law to which all other
laws must conform and in accordance
with which all private rights must be

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determined and all public authority
administered. Under the doctrine of
constitutional supremacy, if a law or
contract violates any norm of the
constitution that law or contract whether
promulgated by the legislative or by the
executive branch or entered into by
private persons for private purposes is
null and void and without any force and
effect. Thus, since the Constitution is the
fundamental, paramount and supreme
law of the nation, it is deemed written in
every statute and contract.

Kilosbayan v. Morato

Stare decisis is usually the wise policy.

But in this case, concern for stability in
decisional law does not call for adherence
to what has recently been laid down as
the rule. The previous ruling sustaining
petitioners intervention may itself be
considered a departure from settled
rulings
on
real parties in interest because no
constitutional
issues
were
actually
involved. Just five years before that ruling
this Court had denied standing to a party
who, in questioning the validity of
another form of lottery, claimed the right
to sue in the capacity of taxpayer, citizen
and member of the Bar.

Morfe v. Mutuc

By its nature and scope, police power

embraces the power to prescribe
regulations to promote the health,
morals, education, good order, safety, or
the general welfare of the people
(Ermita-Malate Hotel, etc. v. City Mayor of
Manila, supra). It is that inherent and
plenary power in the state which enables
it to prohibit all things hurtful to the
comfort, safety and welfare of society.
(Rubi v. Prov. Board, 39 Phil. 600). Earlier
Philippine cases refer to police power as
the power to promote the general welfare
and public interest (U.S. v. Toribio, 15
Phil. 85); to enact such laws in relation to
persons and property as may promote
public health, public morals, public safety
and the general welfare of each
inhabitant (U.S. v. Gomez Jesus, 31
Phil. 218)

Police Power

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Ermita-Malate Hotel and Motel v.
Manila

A Manila ordinance regulating the

operation of hotels, motels and lodginghouses is a police power measure
specifically aimed to safeguard public
morals. As such, it is immune from any
imputation of nullity resting purely on
conjecture and unsupported by anything
of substance. To hold otherwise would be
to unduly restrict and narrow the scope
of police power which has been properly
characterized as the most essential,
insistent and the least limitable of
powers, extending as it does "to all the
great public needs"
On the legislative organs of the
government, whether national or local,
primarily rests the exercise of the police
power, which is the power to prescribe
regulations to promote the health,
morals, peace, good order, safety and
general welfare of the people. In view of
the requirements of certain constitutional
guarantees, the exercise of such police
power, however, insofar as it may affect
the life, liberty or property of any person,
is subject to judicial inquiry. Where such
exercise of police power may be
considered
as
either
capricious,
whimsical, unjust or unreasonable, a
denial of due process or a violation of any
other applicable constitutional guarantee
may call for correction by the courts.

Rubi v. Provincial Board

The police power of the State is a power

coextensive with self-protection, and is
not inaptly termed the "law of overruling
necessity."
The Government of the Philippine Islands
has both on reason and authority the
right to exercise the sovereign police
power in the promotion of the general
welfare and the public interest.

Ortigas and Co. v. FEATI Bank

With regard to the contention that said

resolution cannot nullify the contractual
obligations assumed by the defendantappelleereferring to the restrictions
incorporated in the deeds of sale and
later in the corresponding Transfer
Certificates of Title issued to defendantappelleeit should be stressed, that while
non-impairment
of
contracts
is
constitutionally guaranteed, the rule is

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not absolute, since has to be reconciled
with the legitimate exercise of police
power, i.e., the power to prescribe
regulations to promote the health,
morals, peace, education, good order or
safety and general welfare of the
people. Invariably described as the
most essential, insistent, and illimitable
of powers and in a sense, the greatest
and
most
powerful
attribute
of
government, the exercise of the power
may be judicially inquired into and
corrected only if it is capricious,
whimsical, unjust or unreasonable, there
having been a denial of due process or a
violation
of
any
other
applicable
constitutional guarantee.

Ichong v. Hernandez

There is no question that the Act was

approved in the exercise of the police
power, but petitioner claims that its
exercise in this instance is attended by a
violation
of
the
constitutional
requirements of due process and equal
protection of the laws. But before
proceeding to the consideration and
resolution of the ultimate issue- involved,
it would be well to bear in mind certain
basic
and
fundamental,
albeit
preliminary,
considerations
in
the
determination of the ever recurrent
conflict between police power and the
guarantees of due process and equal
protection of the laws. What is the scope
of police power, and how are the due
process and equal protection clauses
related to it V What is the province and
power of the legislature, and what is the
function and duty of the courts? These
considerations must be clearly and
correctly
understood
that
their
application to the facts of the case may
be brought forth with clarity and the
issue accordingly resolved.
It has been said that police power is so
far-reaching in scope, that it has become
almost impossible to limit its sweep. As it
derives its existence from the very
existence of the State itself, it does not
need to be expressed or defined in its
scope; it is said to be co-extensive with
self- protection and survival, and as such
it is the most positive and active of all
governmental
processes,
the
most

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essential,
insistent
and
illimitable.
Especially is it so under a modern
democratic
framework
where
the
demands of society and of nations have
multiplied
to
almost
unimaginable
proportions; the field and scope of police
power has become almost boundles3,
just as the fields of public interest and
public welfare have become almost all
embracing and have transcended human
foresight. Otherwise stated, as we cannot
foresee the needs and demands of public
interest and welfare in this constantly
changing and progressive world, so we
cannot delimit beforehand the extent or
scope of police power by which and
through which the State seeks to attain
or achieve public interest or welfare. So it
is that Constitutions do not define the
scope or extent of the police power of the
State; what they do is to set forth the
limitations thereof. The most important of
these are the due process clause and the
equal protection clause.

Lutz v. Araneta

The basic defect in the plaintiff's position

is his assumption that the tax provided
for in Commonwealth Act No. 567 is a
pure exercise of the taxing power.
Analysis of the Act; and particularly of
section 6 (heretofore quoted in full), will
show that the tax is levied with a
regulatory purpose, to provide means for
the rehabilitation aiid stabilization of the
threatened sugar industry. In other
words, the act is primarily an exercise of
the police power.
This Court can take judicial notice of the
fact that sugar production is one of the
great industries of our nation, Sugar
occupying a leading position among its
export
products;
that
it
gives
employment to thousands of laborers in
fields and factories; that it is a great
source of the state's wealth, is one of the
important sources of foreign exchange
needed by our government, and is thus
pivotal in the plans of a regime
committed to a policy of currency
stability. Its promotion, protection and
advancement, therefore redounds greatly
to the general welfare. Hence it was
competent for the legislature to find that
the general welfare demanded that the

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sugar industry should be stabilized in
turn; and in the wide field of its police
power, the law-making body could
provide that the distribution of benefits
therefrom be readjusted among its
components to enable it to resist the
added strain of the increase in taxes that
it had to sustain
Once it is conceded, as it must, that the
protection and promotion of the sugar
industry is a matter of public concern, it
follows
that
the
Legislature
may
determine within reasonable bounds
what is necessary for its protection and
expedient for its promotion'. Here, the
legislative discretion must be allowed full
play, subject only to the test of
reasonableness; and it is not contended
that the means provided in section 6 of
the law (above quoted) bear no relation
to the objective pursued or are
oppressive in character. If objective and
methods are alike constitutionally valid,
no reason is seen why the state may not
levy taxes to raise funds for their
prosecution and attainment. Taxation
may be made the implement of the
state's police power.

Tio v. Video Regulatory Board

It is inherent in the power to tax that a

state be free to select the subjects of
taxation, and it has been repeatedly held
that inequities which result from a
singling out of one particular class for
taxation or exemption infringe no
constitutional limitation. Taxation has
been made the implement of the states
police power.

Gaston v. Republic

The stabilization fees collected are in the

nature of a tax, which is within the power
of the State to impose for the promotion
of the sugar industry (Lutz vs. Araneta,
98 Phil. 148). They constitute sugar liens
(Sec. 7[b], P.D, No. 388). The collections
made accrue to a "Special Fund," a
"Development and Stabilization Fund,"
almost identical to the "Sugar Adjustment
and Stabilization Fund" created under
Section 6 of Commonwealth Act 567, The
tax collected is not in a pure exercise of
the taxing power. It is levied with a
regulatory purpose, to provide means for
the stabilization of the sugar industry.

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The levy is primarily in the exercise of the
police power of the State (Lutz vs.
Araneta, supra)

Assn. of Small Landowners v.

Agra Reform

There are traditional distinctions between

the police power and the power of
eminent domain that logically preclude
the application of both powers at the
same time on the same subject. In the
case of City of Baguio v. NAWASA, for
example, where a law required the
transfer of all municipal waterworks
systems to the NAWASA in exchange for
its assets of equivalent value, the Court
held that the power being exercised was
eminent domain because the property
involved was wholesome and intended
for a public use.
Property condemned under the police
power is noxious or intended for a
noxious purpose, such as a building on
the verge of collapse, which should be
demolished for the public safety, or
obscene materials, which should be
destroyed in the interest of public morals.
The confiscation of such property is not
compensable, unlike the taking of
property
under
the
power
of
expropriation,
which
requires
the
payment of just compensation to the
owner.
The cases before us present no knotty
complication insofar as the question of
compensable taking is concerned. To the
extent
that
the
measures
under
challenge merely prescribe retention
limits for landowners, there is an exercise
of the police power for the regulation of
private property in accordance with the
Constitution. But where, to carry out such
regulation, it becomes necessary to
deprive such owners of whatever lands
they may own in excess of the maximum
area allowed, there is definitely a taking
under the power of eminent domain for
which payment of just compensation is
imperative. The taking contemplated is
not a mere limitation of the use of the
land. What is required is the surrender of
the title to and the physical possession of
the said excess and all beneficial rights
accruing to the owner in favor of the
farmer-beneficiary. This is definitely an

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exercise not of the police power but of
the power of eminent domain.

PNB v. Office of the President

As for objections about a possible

violation of the impairment clause, we
find the following statements of Justice
Isagani Cruz enlightening and pertinent
to the case at bench: Despite the
impairment clause, a contract valid at the
time of its execution may be legally
modified or even completely invalidated
by a subsequent law. If the law is a
proper exercise of the police power, it will
prevail over the contract. Into each
contract are read the provisions of
existing law and, always, a reservation of
the police power as long as the
agreement deals with a matter affecting
the public welfare. Such a contract, it has
been held, suffers a congenital infirmity,
and this is its susceptibility to change by
the legislature as a postulate of the legal
order.

Lucena Central Terminal v. JAC

Liner

As with the State, the local government

may be considered as having properly
exercised its police power only if the
following requisites are met: (1) the
interests of the public generally, as
distinguished from those of a particular
class, require the interference of the
State, and (2) the means employed are
reasonably necessary for the attainment
of the object sought to be accomplished
and
not
unduly
oppressive
upon
individuals. Otherwise stated, there must
be a concurrence of a lawful subject and
lawful method.

Miners Association v. Factoran

Well-settled is the rule, however, that

regardless of the reservation clause,
mining leases or agreements granted by
the State, such as those granted
pursuant to Executive Order No. 211
referred to in this petition, are subject to
alterations through a reasonable exercise
of the police power of the State. In the
1950 case of Ongsiako v. Gamboa, where
the constitutionality of Republic Act No.
34 changing the 5050 sharecropping
system in existing agricultural tenancy
contracts to 5545 in favor of tenants
was challenged, the Court, upholding the

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constitutionality of the law, emphasized
the superiority of the police power of the
State over the sanctity of the contract.
The economic policy on the exploration,
development and utilization of the
countrys natural resources under Article
XII, Section 2 of the 1987 Constitution
could not be any clearer. As enunciated
in Article XII, Section 1 of the 1987
Constitution,
the
exploration,
development and utilization of natural
resources under the new system
mandated in Section 2, is geared towards
a
more
equitable
distribution
of
opportunities, income, and wealth; a
sustained increase in the amount of
goods and services produced by the
nation for the benefit of the people; and
an expanding productivity as the key to
raising the quality of life for all, especially
the underprivileged. The exploration,
development and utilization of the
countrys natural resources are matters
vital to the public interest and the
general welfare of the people. The
recognition of the importance of the
countrys
natural
resources
was
expressed as early as the 1934
Constitutional Convention. Accordingly,
the State, in the exercise of its police
power in this regard, may not be
precluded by the constitutional restriction
on non-impairment of contract from
altering, modifying and amending the
mining leases or agreements granted
under Presidential Decree No. 463, as
amended, pursuant to Executive Order
No. 211. Police power, being co-extensive
with the necessities of the case and the
demands of public interest, extends to all
the vital public needs. The passage of
Executive
Order
No.
279
which
superseded Executive Order No. 211
provided legal basis for the DENR
Secretary to carry into effect the
mandate of Article XII, Section 2 of the
1987 Constitution.

Carlos Superdrug Corp. v. DSWC

This raises the question of whether the

State, in promoting the health and
welfare of a special group of citizens, can
impose upon private establishments the
burden
of
partly
subsidizing
a

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government program. The Court believes
so. The Senior Citizens Act was enacted
primarily to maximize the contribution of
senior citizens to nation-building, and to
grant benefits and privileges to them for
their improvement and well- being as the
State considers them an integral part of
our society.
The law is a legitimate exercise of police
power, which, similar to the power of
eminent domain, has general welfare for
its object. Police power is not capable of
an exact definition, but has been
purposely veiled in general terms to
underscore its comprehensiveness to
meet all exigencies and provide enough
room for an efficient and flexible
response
to
conditions
and
circumstances,
thus
assuring
the
greatest benefits. Accordingly, it has
been described as the most essential,
insistent and the least limitable of
powers, extending as it does to all the
great public needs. It is [t] he power
vested in the legislature by the
constitution to make, ordain, and
establish all manner of wholesome and
reasonable
laws,
statutes,
and
ordinances, either with penalties or
without,
not
repugnant
to
the
constitution, as they shall judge to be for
the
good
and
welfare
of
the
commonwealth, and of the subjects of
the same. For this reason, when the
conditions so demand as determined by
the legislature, property rights must bow
to the primacy of police power because
property rights, though sheltered by due
process, must yield to general welfare.
Police power as an attribute to promote
the common good would be diluted
considerably if on the mere plea of
petitioners that they will suffer loss of
earnings and capital, the questioned
provision were invalidated. Moreover, in
the absence of evidence demonstrating
the alleged confiscatory effect of the
provision in question, there is no basis for
its
nullification
in
view
of
the
presumption of validity, which every law
has in its favor.

Agustin v. Edu

The broad and expensive scope of the

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police power, which was originally
identified by Chief Justice Taney of the
American Supreme Court in an 1847
decision, as nothing more or less than,
the powers of government inherent in
every sovereignty was stressed in the
aforementioned case of Edu v. Ericta
thus: Justice Laurel in the first leading
decision after the Constitution came into
force, Calalang v. Williams, identified
police power with state authority to enact
legislation that may interfere with
personal liberty or property in order to
promote the general welfare. Persons and
property could thus be subjected to all
kinds of restraints and burdens in order
to secure the general comfort, health and
prosperity of the state. Shortly after
independence in 1948; Primicias v.
Fugoso reiterated the doctrine, such a
competence being referred to as the
power to prescribe regulations to
promote the health, morals, peace,
education, good order or safety, and
general welfare of the people. The police
power is thus a dynamic agency, suitably
vague and far from precisely defined,
rooted in the conception that men in
organizing the state and imposing upon
its government limitations to safeguard
constitutional rights did not intend
thereby to enable an individual citizen or
a
group
of
citizens
to
obstruct
unreasonably the enactment of such
salutary measures calculated to insure
communal peace, safety, good order, and
welfare.

White Light Corp. v. Manila

Police power, while incapable of an exact

definition, has been purposely veiled in
general
terms
to
underscore
its
comprehensiveness
to
meet
all
exigencies and provide enough room for
an efficient and flexible response as the
conditions warrant. Police power is based
upon the concept of necessity of the
State and its corresponding right to
protect itself and its people. Police power
has been used as justification for
numerous and varied actions by the
State. These range from the regulation of
dance halls, movie theaters, gas stations
and cockpits. The awesome scope of
police power is best demonstrated by the

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fact that in its hundred or so years of
presence in our nations legal system, its
use has rarely been denied.
That the Ordinance prevents the lawful
uses of a wash rate depriving patrons of
a product and the petitioners of lucrative
business
ties
in
with
another
constitutional requisite for the legitimacy
of the Ordinance as a police power
measure. It must appear that the
interests of the public generally, as
distinguished from those of a particular
class, require an interference with private
rights
and
the
means must
be
reasonably
necessary
for
the
accomplishment of the purpose and not
unduly oppressive of private rights. It
must also be evident that no other
alternative for the accomplishment of the
purpose less intrusive of private rights
can work. More importantly, a reasonable
relation must exist between the purposes
of the measure and the means employed
for its accomplishment, for even under
the guise of protecting the public
interest, personal rights and those
pertaining to private property will not be
permitted to be arbitrarily invaded.
Lacking
a
concurrence
of
these
requisites, the police measure shall be
struck down as an arbitrary intrusion into
private rights. As held in Morfe v. Mutuc,
22 SCRA 424 (1968), the exercise of
police power is subject to judicial review
when life, liberty or property is affected.
However, this is not in any way meant to
take it away from the vastness of State
police power whose exercise enjoys the
presumption of validity.

Taxicab Operators v. Board of

Transportation

The Board's reason for enforcing the

Circular initially in Metro Manila is that
taxicabs in this city, compared to those
of other places, are subjected to heavier
traffic pressure and more constant use.
This
is
of
common
knowledge.
Considering that traffic conditions are not
the same in every city, a substantial
distinction exists so that infringement of
the equal protection clause can hardly be
successfully claimed. As enunciated in
the preambular clauses of the challenged
BOT Circular, the overriding consideration

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is the safety and comfort of the riding
public from the dangers possed by old
and dilapidated taxis. The State, in the
exercise of its police power, can prescribe
regulations to promote the health,
morals, peace, good order, safety and
general welfare of the people. It can
prohibit all things hurtful to comfort,
safety and welfare of society. It may also
regulate property rights.

Tablarin v. Gutierrez

There is another reason why the

petitioners' arguments must fail: the
legislative and administrative provisions
impugned by them constitute, to the
mind of the Court, a valid exercise of the
police power of the state. The police
power, it is commonplace learning, is the
pervasive and non-waivable power and
authority of the sovereign to secure and
promote all the important interests and
needs in a word, the public order of the
general
community.
An
important
component of that public order is the
health and physical safety and well being
of the population, the securing of which
no one can deny is a legitimate objective
of governmental effort and regulation.
Perhaps the only issue that needs some
consideration is whether there is some
reasonable
relation
between
the
prescribing of passing the NMAT as a
condition for admission to medical school
on the one hand, and the securing of the
health and safety of the general
community, on the other hand. This
question is perhaps most usefully
approached by recalling that the
regulation of the practice of medicine in
all its branches has long been recognized
as a reasonable method of protecting the
health and safety of the public. That the
power to regulate and control the
practice of medicine includes the power
to regulate admission to the ranks of
those authorized to practice medicine, is
also well recognized. Thus, legislation
and administrative regulations requiring
those who wish to practice medicine first
to take and pass medical board
examinations have long ago been
recognized
as
valid
exercises
of
governmental power. Similarly, the
establishment of minimum medical

1
6

[REM SERRANO]
educational
requirementsi.e.,
the
completion of prescribed courses in a
recognized medical school for admission
to the medical profession, has also been
sustained as a legitimate exercise of the
regulatory authority of the state. What
we have before us in the instant case is
closely related: the regulation of access
to medical schools. MECS Order No. 52, s.
1985, as noted earlier, articulates the
rationale of regulation of this type: the
improvement of the professional and
technical quality of the graduates of
medical schools, by upgrading the quality
of those admitted to the student body of
the medical schools. That upgrading is
sought by selectivity in the process of
admission, selectivity consisting, among
other things, of limiting admission to
those who exhibit in the required degree
the aptitude for medical studies and
eventually for medical practice. The need
to maintain, and the difficulties of
maintaining, high standards in our
professional schools in general, and
medical schools in particular, in the
current stage of our social and economic
development, are widely known. We
believe that the government is entitled to
prescribe an admission test like the NMAT
as a means for achieving its stated
objective of "upgrading the selection of
applicants into [our] medical schools"
and of "improv[ing] the quality of medical
education in the country." Given the
widespread use today of such admission
tests in, for instance, medical schools in
the United States of America (the Medical
College Admission Test [MCAT]) and quite
probably in other countries with far more
developed educational resources than
our own, and taking into account the f
failure or inability of the petitioners to
even attempt to prove otherwise, we are
entitled to hold that the NMAT is
reasonably related to the securing of the
ultimate end of legislation and regulation
in this area. That end, it is useful to
recall, is the protection of the public from
the
potentially
deadly
effects
of
incompetence and ignorance in those
who would undertake to treat our bodies
and minds for disease or trauma.

1
[REM SERRANO] 7
Didipio Earth Savers v. Gozun

The power of eminent domain is the

inherent right of the state (and of those
entities to which the power has been
lawfully delegated) to condemn private
property to public use upon payment of
just compensation. On the other hand,
police power is the power of the state to
promote public welfare by restraining and
regulating the use of liberty and property.
Although both police power and the
power of eminent domain have the
general welfare for their object, and
recent trends show a mingling of the two
with the latter being used as an
implement of the former, there are still
traditional distinctions between the two.
According to noted constitutionalist, Fr.
Joaquin Bernas, SJ, in the exercise of its
police power regulation, the state
restricts the use of private property, but
none of the property interests in the
bundle of rights, which constitute
ownership, is appropriated for use by or
for the benefit of the public. Use of the
property by the owner was limited, but
no aspect of the property is used by or
for the public. The deprivation of use can
in fact be total and it will not constitute
compensable taking if nobody else
acquires use of the property or any
interest therein.

Gerochi v. Department of Energy

The power to tax is an incident of

sovereignty and is unlimited in its range,
acknowledging in its very nature no
limits, so that security against its abuse
is to be found only in the responsibility of
the legislature, which imposes the tax on
the constituency that is to pay it. It is
based on the principle that taxes are the
lifeblood of the government, and their
prompt and certain availability is an
imperious need. Thus, the theory behind
the exercise of the power to tax
emanates from necessity; without taxes,
government cannot fulfill its mandate of
promoting the general welfare and well
being of the people. On the other hand,
police power is the power of the state to
promote public welfare by restraining and
regulating the use of liberty and property.
It is the most pervasive, the least
limitable, and the most demanding of the

1
8

[REM SERRANO]
three fundamental powers of the State.
The justification is found in the Latin
maxims salus populi est suprema lex (the
welfare of the people is the supreme law)
and sics utere tuo ut alienum non laedas
(so use your property as not to injure the
property of others). As an inherent
attribute of sovereignty, which virtually
extends to all public needs, police power
grants a wide panoply of instruments
through which the State, as parens
patriae, gives effect to a host of its
regulatory powers. We have held that the
power to regulate means the power
to protect, foster, promote, preserve, and
control, with due regard for the interests,
first and foremost, of the public, then of
the utility and of its patrons.
It is a well-established doctrine that the
taxing power may be used as an
implement of police power. In Valmonte
v. Energy Regulatory Board, et al., 162
SCRA 521 (1988), and in Gaston v.
Republic Planters Bank, 158 SCRA 626
(1988), this Court held that the Oil Price
Stabilization Fund (OPSF) and the Sugar
Stabilization Fund (SSF) were exactions
made in the exercise of the police power.
The doctrine was reiterated in Osmea v.
Orbos, 220 SCRA 703 (1993), with
respect to the OPSF. Thus, we disagree
with petitioners that the instant case is
different from the aforementioned cases.
With the Universal Charge, a Special Trust
Fund (STF) is also created under the
administration of PSALM.
In his Concurring and Dissenting Opinion
in the same case, then Associate Justice,
now Chief Justice, Reynato S. Puno
described the immensity of police power
in relation to the delegation of powers to
the ERC and its regulatory functions over
electric power as a vital public utility, to
wit: Over the years, however, the range
of police power was no longer limited to
the preservation of public health, safety
and morals, which used to be the primary
social interests in earlier times. Police
power now requires the State to assume
an affirmative duty to eliminate the
excesses and injustices that are the
concomitants
of
an
unrestrained

1
[REM SERRANO] 9
industrial economy. Police power is
now exerted to further the public
welfare a concept as vast as the good of
society itself. Hence, police power is
but another name for the governmental
authority to further the welfare of society
that is the basic end of all government.
When police power is delegated to
administrative bodies with regulatory
functions, its exercise should be given a
wide latitude. Police power takes on an
even broader dimension in developing
countries such as ours, where the State
must take a more active role in balancing
the many conflicting interests in society.
The Questioned Order was issued by the
ERC, acting as an agent of the State in
the exercise of police power. We should
have exceptionally good grounds to
curtail its exercise. This approach is more
compelling in the field of rate-regulation
of electric power rates. Electric power
generation
and
distribution
is
a
traditional
instrument
of
economic
growth that affects not only a few but the
entire nation. It is an important factor in
encouraging investment and promoting
business. The engines of progress may
come to a screeching halt if the delivery
of electric power is impaired. Billions of
pesos would be lost as a result of power
outages or unreliable electric power
services. The State thru the ERC should
be able to exercise its police power with
great flexibility, when the need arises.

Compania General de Tabaco v.

Manila

The
term
"tax"
appliesgenerally
speakingto all kinds of exaction which
become public funds. The term is often
loosely used to include levies for revenue
as well as levies for regulatory purposes.
Thus license fees are commonly called
taxes. Legally speaking, license fee is a
legal concept quite distinct from tax; the
former is imposed in the exercise of
police power for purposes of regulation,
while the latter is imposed under the
taxing power for the purpose of raising
revenues
(McQuillin,
Municipal
Corporations, Vol. 9, 3rd Edition, p. 26).

Physical Therapy Organization v.

As to the authority of the City Board to

enact the Ordinance in question, the City

2
0

[REM SERRANO]
Manila

Churchill v. Rafferty

Fiscal, in representation of the appellees,

calls our attention to Section 18 oi the
New Charter of the City of Manila,
Republic Act No. 409, which, gives
legislative powers to the Municipal Board
to enact all ordinances it may deem
necessary and proper for the promotion
of the morality, peace, good order,
comfort,
convenience
and
general
welfare of the City and its inhabitants.
This is generally referred to as the
General Welfare Clause, a delegation in
statutory form of the police power, under
which
municipal
corporations
are
authorized to enact ordinances to provide
for the health and safety, and promote
the morality, peace and general welfare
of its inhabitants. We agree with the City
Fiscal.
There can be no doubt that the exercise
of the police power of the Philippine
Government belongs to the Legislature
and that this power is limited only by the
Acts of Congress and those fundamental
principles which lie at the foundation of
all republican forms of government. An
Act of the Legislature, which is obviously
and undoubtedly foreign to any of the
purposes of the police power and
interferes with the ordinary enjoyment of
property, would, without doubt, be held
to be invalid. But where the Act is
reasonably within a proper consideration
of and care for the public health, safety,
or comfort, it should not be disturbed by
the courts. The courts cannot substitute
their own views for what is proper in the
premises for those of the Legislature. In
Munn vs. Illinois (94 U. S., 113), the
United States Supreme Court states the
rule thus: "If no state of circumstances
could exist to justify such statute, then
we may declare this one void because in
excess of the legislative power of this
state; but if it could, we must presume it
did. Of the propriety of legislative
interference, within the scope of the
legislative power, a legislature is the
exclusive judge."
The numerous attempts which have been
made to limit by definition the scope of
the police power are only interesting as

2
[REM SERRANO] 1
illustrating its rapid extension within
comparatively recent years to points
heretofore deemed entirely within the
field of private liberty and property
rights. Blackstone's definition of the
police power was as follows: "The due
regulation and domestic order of the
kingdom, whereby the individuals of the
state, like members of a well governed
family, are bound to conform their
general behavior to the rules of propriety,
good neighborhood, and good manners,
to be decent, industrious, and inoffensive
in
their
respective
stations."
(Commentaries, vol. 4, p. 162.)
It has been urged against ministering to
the sense of sight that tastes are so
diversified that there is no safe standard
of legislation in this direction. We answer
in the language of the Supreme Court in
Noble State Bank V8. Haskell (219 U. S.,
104), and which has already been
adopted by several state courts {see
supra), that "the prevailing morality or
strong and preponderating opinion"
demands such legislation. The agitation
against the unrestrained development of
the billboard business has produced
results in nearly all the countries of
Europe. (Ency. Britannica, vol. 1, pp. 237240.) Many drastic ordinances and state
laws have been passed in the United
States seeking to make the business
amenable to regulation. But their
regulation in the United States is
hampered by what we conceive an
unwarranted restriction upon the scope
of the police power by the courts. If the
police power may be exercised to
encourage a healthy social and economic
condition in the country, and if the
comfort and convenience of the people
are included within those subjects,
everything, which encroaches upon such
territory, is amenable to the police power.
A source of annoyance and irritation to
the public does not minister to the
comfort and convenience of the public.
And we are of the opinion that the
prevailing sentiment is manifestly against
the erection of billboards, which are
offensive to the sight.

2
2

[REM SERRANO]
But we have not overlooked the fact that
we are not in harmony with the highest
courts of a number of the states in the
American Union upon this point. Those
courts being of the opinion that statutes
which are prompted and inspired by
esthetic considerations merely, having
for their sole purpose the promotion and
gratification of the esthetic sense, and
not the promotion or protection of the
public safety, the public peace and good
order of society, must be held invalid and
contrary to constitutional provisions
holding inviolate the rights of private
property. Or, in other words, the police
power cannot interfere with private
property rights for purely esthetic
purposes. The courts, taking this view,
rest their decisions upon the proposition
that the esthetic sense is disassociated
entirely from any relation to the public
health, morals, comfort, or general
welfare and is, therefore, beyond the
police power of the state. But we are of
the opinion, as above indicated, that
unsightly
advertisements
or
signs,
signboards, or billboards which are
offensive
to
the
sight,
are
not
disassociated from the general welfare of
the public. This is not establishing a new
principle, but carrying c well recognized
principle to further application. (Fruend
on Police Power, p. 166.)

MMDA v. Bel-Air Village

Association

Clearly then, the MMC under P. D. No. 824

is not the same entity as the MMDA
under R. A. No. 7924. Unlike the MMC,
the MMDA has no power to enact
ordinances for the welfare of the
community. It is the local government
units, acting through their respective
legislative
councils
that
possess
legislative power and police power. In the
case at bar, the Sangguniang Panlungsod
of Makati City did not pass any ordinance
or resolution ordering the opening of
Neptune Street, hence, its proposed
opening by petitioner MMDA is illegal and
the respondent Court of Appeals did not
err in so ruling. We desist from ruling on
the
other
issues,
as
they
are
unnecessary. Esmso
We stress that this decision does not

2
[REM SERRANO] 3
make light of the MMDAs noble efforts to
solve the chaotic traffic condition in
Metro Manila. Everyday, traffic jams and
traffic bottlenecks plague the metropolis.
Even our once sprawling boulevards and
avenues are now crammed with cars
while city streets are clogged with
motorists and pedestrians. Traffic has
become a social malaise affecting our
peoples productivity and the efficient
delivery of goods and services in the
country. The MMDA was created to put
some
order
in
the
metropolitan
transportation system but unfortunately
the powers granted by its charter are
limited. Its good intentions cannot justify
the opening for public use of a private
street in a private subdivision without
any legal warrant. The promotion of the
general welfare is not antithetical to the
preservation of the rule of law.

MMDA v. Garin

The petitioner correctly points out that a

license to operate a motor vehicle is not
a property right, but a privilege granted
by the state, which may be suspended or
revoked by the state in the exercise of its
police power, in the interest of the public
safety and welfare, subject to the
procedural due process requirements.
This is consistent with our rulings in
Pedro v. Provincial Board of Rizal on the
license to operate a cockpit, Tan v.
Director of Forestry and Oposa v.
Factoran on timber licensing agreements,
and Surigao Electric Co., Inc. v.
Municipality of Surigao on a legislative
franchise to operate an electric plant.
Petitioner cites a long list of American
cases to prove this point, such as State
ex. Rel. Sullivan, which states in part
that, the legislative power to regulate
travel
over
the
highways
and
thoroughfares of the state for the general
welfare is extensive. It may be exercised
in any reasonable manner to conserve
the safety of travelers and pedestrians.
Since motor vehicles are instruments of
potential danger, their registration and
the licensing of their operators have been
required
almost
from
their
first
appearance. The right to operate them in
public places is not a natural and

2
4

[REM SERRANO]
unrestrained right, but a privilege subject
to reasonable regulation, under the
police power, in the interest of the public
safety and welfare. The power to license
imports further power to withhold or to
revoke such license upon noncompliance
with prescribed conditions.
The common thread running through the
cited cases is that it is the legislature, in
the exercise of police power, which has
the power and responsibility to regulate
how and by whom motor vehicles may be
operated on the state highways.
Our Congress delegated police power to
the LGUs in the Local Government Code
of 1991. A local government is a political
subdivision of a nation or state, which is
constituted by law and has substantial
control of local affairs. Local government
units
are
the
provinces,
cities,
municipalities and barangays, which
exercise police power through their
respective legislative bodies.
Metropolitan or Metro Manila is a body
composed of several local government
units. With the passage of Rep. Act No.
7924 in 1995, Metropolitan Manila was
declared as a "special development and
administrative
region"
and
the
administration of "metro-wide" basic
services affecting the region placed
under "a development authority" referred
to as the MMDA. Thus:
The powers of the MMDA are limited to
the
following
acts:
formulation,
coordination, regulation, implementation,
preparation, management, monitoring,
setting of policies, installation of a
system and administration. There is no
syllable in R. A. No. 7924 that grants the
MMDA police power, let alone legislative
power. Even the Metro Manila Council has
not been delegated any legislative
power. Unlike the legislative bodies of the
local government units, there is no
provision in R. A. No. 7924 that
empowers the MMDA or its Council to
"enact ordinances, approve resolutions
and appropriate funds for the general
welfare" of the inhabitants of Metro

2
[REM SERRANO] 5
Manila.

Eminent Domain
Republic v. Tagle

The expropriation of real property does

not include mere physical entry or
occupation of land. Although eminent
domain usually involves a taking of title,
there may also be compensable taking of
only some, not all, of the property
interests in the bundle of rights that
constitute ownership.
In the instant case, it is manifest that the
petitioner, in pursuit of an objective
beneficial to public interest, seeks to
realize the same through its power of
eminent domain. In exercising this power,
petitioner intended to acquire not only
physical possession but also the legal
right to possess and ultimately to own
the subject property. Hence, its mere
physical entry and occupation of the
property fall short of the taking of title,
which includes all the rights that may be
exercised by an owner over the subject
property. Its actual occupation, which
renders academic the need for it to
enter, does not by itself include its
acquisition of all the rights of ownership.
Its right to possess did not attend its
initial physical possession of the property
because the lease, which had authorized
said possession, lapsed. In short,
petitioner wanted not merely possession
de facto but possession de jure as well.
It is well settled that eminent domain is
an inherent power of the State that need
not be granted even by the fundamental
law. Section 9, Article III of the
Constitution, in mandating that private
property shall not be taken for public use
without just compensation, merely
imposes a limit on the governments
exercise of this power and provides a
measure of protection to the individuals
right to property. Thus, in J.M. Tuason &
Co. and Cuatico, the Court merely
enforced the constitutional limitation
regarding
the
payment
of
just
compensation. Clearly, an ejectment suit
ordinarily should not prevail over the
States power of eminent domain.

2
6

[REM SERRANO]
Jesus is Lord Christian School v.
Pasig

The right of eminent domain is usually

understood to be an ultimate right of the
sovereign power to appropriate any
property within its territorial sovereignty
for a public purpose. The nature and
scope of such power has been
comprehensively
described
as
follows: . . . It is an indispensable
attribute of sovereignty; a power
grounded in the primary duty of
government to serve the common need
and advance the general welfare. Thus,
the right of eminent domain appertains
to
every
independent
government
without the necessity for constitutional
recognition. The provisions found in
modern
constitutions
of
civilized
countries relating to the taking of
property for the public use do not by
implication grant the power to the
government, but limit the power that
would, otherwise, be without limit. Thus,
our own Constitution provides that
private property shall not be taken for
public use without just compensation.
Furthermore, the due process and equal
protection clauses act as additional
safeguards against the arbitrary exercise
of this governmental power.
The exercise of the right of eminent
domain, whether directly by the State or
by its authorized agents, is necessarily in
derogation of private rights. It is one of
the harshest proceedings known to the
law. Consequently, when the sovereign
delegates the power to a political unit or
agency, a strict construction will be given
against the agency asserting the power.
The authority to condemn is to be strictly
construed in favor of the owner and
against the condemnor. When the power
is granted, the extent to which it may be
exercised is limited to the express terms
or clear implication of the statute in
which the grant is contained. Corollarily,
the respondent, which is the condemnor,
has the burden of proving all the
essentials necessary to show the right of
condemnation. It has the burden of proof
to establish that it has complied with all
the requirements provided by law for the
valid exercise of the power of eminent

2
[REM SERRANO] 7
domain.
The Court declared that the following
requisites for the valid exercise of the
power of eminent domain by a local
government unit must be complied with:
1. The local legislative council authorizing
the local chief executive, in behalf of the
local government unit, to exercise the
power of eminent domain or pursue
expropriation
proceedings
over
a
particular private property, enacts an
ordinance. 2. The power of eminent
domain is exercised for public use,
purpose or welfare, or for the benefit of
the poor and the landless. 3. There is
payment of just compensation, as
required under Section 9, Article III of the
Constitution, and other pertinent laws. 4.
A valid and definite offer has been
previously made to the owner of the
property sought to be expropriated, but
said offer was not accepted.
The subject property is expropriated for
the purpose of constructing a road. The
respondent is not mandated to comply
with the essential requisites for an
easement of right-of-way under the New
Civil Code. Case law has it that in the
absence of legislative restriction, the
grantee of the power of eminent domain
may determine the location and route of
the land to be taken unless such
determination is capricious and wantonly
injurious. Expropriation is justified so long
as it is for the public good and there is
genuine necessity of public character.
Government may not capriciously choose
what private property should be taken.

Eslaban v. De Onorio

As this provision says, however, the only

servitude which a private property owner
is required to recognize in favor of the
government is the easement of a public
highway, way, private way established by
law, or any government canal or lateral
thereof where the certificate of title does
not state that the boundaries thereof
have been pre-determined. This implies
that the same should have been preexisting at the time of the registration of
the land in order that the registered
owner may be compelled to respect it.

2
8

[REM SERRANO]
Conversely, where the easement is not
pre-existing and is sought to be imposed
only after the land has been registered
under the Land Registration Act, proper
expropriation proceedings should be had,
and just compensation paid to the
registered owner thereof.
Indeed, the rule is that where private
property is needed for conversion to
some public use, the first thing obviously
that the government should do is to offer
to buy it. If the owner is willing to sell and
the parties can agree on the price and
the other conditions of the sale, a
voluntary transaction can then be
concluded and the transfer effected
without the necessity of a judicial action.
Otherwise, the government will use its
power of eminent domain, subject to the
payment of just compensation, to acquire
private property in order to devote it to
public use.

NPC v. Gutierrez

The trial courts observation shared by

the appellate court show that x x x
While it is true that plaintiff are (sic) only
after
a
right-of-way
easement,
it
nevertheless
perpetually
deprives
defendants of their proprietary rights as
manifested by the imposition by the
plaintiff upon defendants that below said
transmission lines no plant higher than
three (3) meters is allowed. Furthermore,
because of the high- tension current
conveyed through said transmission
lines, danger to life and limbs that may
be caused beneath said wires cannot
altogether be discounted, and to cap it
all, plaintiff only pays the fee to
defendants once, while the latter shall
continually pay the taxes due on said
affected portion of their property. The
foregoing
facts
considered,
the
acquisition of the right-of-way easement
falls within the purview of the power of
eminent domain. Such conclusion finds
support in similar cases of easement of
right-of-way where the Supreme Court
sustained the award of just compensation
for private property condemned for
public
use
(See
National
Power
Corporation vs. Court of Appeals, 129
SCRA 665, 1984; Garcia vs. Court of

2
[REM SERRANO] 9
Appeals, 102 SCRA 597, 1981). The
Supreme Court, in Republic of the
Philippines vs. PLDT, thus held that:
Normally, of course, the power of
eminent domain results in the taking or
appropriation of title to, and possession
of, the expropriated property; but no
cogent reason appears why said power
may not be availed of to impose only a
burden upon the owner of condemned
property, without loss of title and
possession. It is unquestionable that real
property may, through expropriation, be
subjected to an easement of right-ofway. In the case at bar, the easement of
right-of-way is definitely a taking under
the
power
of
eminent
domain.
Considering the nature and effect of the
installation of the 230 KV Mexico-Limay
transmission lines, the limitation imposed
by NPC against the use of the land for an
indefinite
period
deprives
private
respondents of its ordinary use.
The price or value of the land and its
character at the time it was taken by the
Government
are
the
criteria
for
determining just compensation.

Ayala de Roxas v. Manila

This doctrine will be found far more

vigorous at present upon reference to the
principles of the law now in force.
According to article 349 of the Civil Code,
no one shall be deprived of his property,
except by competent authority and with
sufficient cause of public utility, always
after proper indemnity; if this requisite
has not been fulfilled the courts must
protect,
and
eventually
restore
possession to the injured party.
Under section 5 of the act of Congress of
July 1, 1902, no legislation shall be
enacted in the Philippine Islands which
shall deprive any person of life, liberty, or
property without due process of law; and
the due process of law in order to deprive
a person of his property is, according to
the Code of Civil Procedure, reserved to
the judicial authority. The refusal to grant
a license or the enactment of an
ordinance whereby a person may be
deprived of property or rights, or an
attempt thereat is made, without

3
0

[REM SERRANO]
previously indemnifying him therefor, is
not, nor can it be, due process of law.
And, considering that the easement
intended to be established, whatever
may be the object thereof, is not merely
a real right that will encumber the
property, but is one tending to prevent
the exclusive use of one portion of the
same, by expropriating it for a public use
which, be it what it may, can not be
accomplished unless the owner of the
property condemned or seized be
previously and duly indemnified, it is
proper to protect the appellant by means
of the remedy employed in such cases,
as it is the only adequate remedy when
no other legal action can be resorted to,
against an intent which is nothing short
of an arbitrary restriction imposed by the
city by virtue of the coercive power with
which the Same is invested. The question
involved here is not the actual
establishment of an easement which
might be objected to by an action in
court, but a mere act of obstruction, a
refusal which is beyond the powers of the
city of Manila, because it is not simply a
measure in connection with building
regulations, but is an attempt to
suppress, without due process of law,
real rights which are attached to the right
of ownership.

Republic v. PLDT

The Republic may, in the exercise of the

sovereign power of eminent domain,
require the telephone company to permit
interconnection
of
the
government
telephone system and that of the PLDT,
as the needs of the government service
may require, subject to the payment of
just compensation to be determined by
the court. Normally, of course, the power
of eminent domain results. In the taking
or appropriation of title to, and
possession of, the expropriated property;
but no cogent reason appears why the
said power may not be availed of to
impose only a burden upon the owner of
condemned property, without loss of title
and possession. It is unquestionable that
real property may, through expropriation,
be subjected to an easement of right of
way. The use of the PLDT's lines and

3
[REM SERRANO] 1
services to allow interservice connection
between both telephone systems is not
much different. In -either case private
property is subjected to a burden for
public use and benefit. If, under section
6, Article XIII, of the Constitution, the
State may; in the interest of national
welfare, transfer utilities to public
ownership
upon
payment
of
just
compensation, there is no reason why
the State may not require a public utility
to render services in the general interest,
provided just compensation is paid
therefor. Ultimately, the beneficiary of
the interconnecting service would be the
users of both telephone systems, so that
the condemnation would be for public
use.
The Public Service Commission, under
the law, has no authority to pass upon
actions for the taking of private property
under the sovereign right of eminent
domain.
Furthermore,
while
the
defendant telephone company is a public
utility corporation whose franchise,
equipment and other properties are
under the jurisdiction, supervision and
control of the Public Service Commission
(Sec. 13, Public Service Act), yet the
plaintiff's telecommunications network is
a public service owned by the Republic
and operated by an instrumentality of the
National Government, hence exempt,
under Section 14 of the Public Service
Act, from such jurisdiction, supervision
and control.

People v. Fajardo

It is contended, on the other hand, that

the mayor can refuse a permit solely in
case that the proposed building "destroys
the view of the public plaza or occupies
any public property" (as stated in its
section 3) ; and in fact, the refusal of the
Mayor of Baao to issue a building permit
to the appellant was predicated on the
ground that the proposed building would
"destroy the view of the public plaza" by
preventing its being seen from the public
highway. Even thus interpreted, the
ordinance
is
unreasonable
and
oppressive, in that it operates to
permanently deprive appellants of the
right to use their own property; hence, it

3
2

[REM SERRANO]
oversteps the bounds of police power,
and amounts to a taking of appellants
property without just compensation. We
do not overlook that the modern
tendency is to regard the beautification
of neighborhoods as conducive to the
comfort and happiness of residents. But
while property may be regulated in the
interest of the general welfare, and in its
pursuit, the State may prohibit structures
offensive to the sight (Churchill and Tait
vs. Rafferty, 32 Phil. 580), the State may
not, under the guise of police power,
permanently divest owners of the
beneficial use of their property and
practically confiscate them solely to
preserve
or
assure
the
aesthetic
appearance of the community. As the
case now stands, every structure that
may be erected on appellants' land,
regardless of its own beauty, stands
condemned under the ordinance in
question, because it would interfere with
the view of the public plaza from the
highway. The appellants would, in effect,
be constrained to let their land remain
idle and unused for the obvious purpose
for which it is best suited, being urban in
character. To legally achieve that result,
the municipality must give appellants
just compensation and an opportunity to
be heard.

Manila v. Chinese Community of

Manila

There is a wide distinction between a

legislative declaration that a municipality
is given authority to exercise the right of
eminent domain, and a decision by the
municipality that there exists a necessity
for the exercise of that right in a
particular case. The first is a declaration
simply that there exist, reasons why the
right should be conferred upon municipal
corporation, while the second is the
application of the right to a particular
case.
Certainly,
the
legislative
declaration relating to the advisability of
granting the power cannot be converted
into a declaration that a necessity exists
for its exercise in a particular case, and
especially so when, perhaps, the land in
question was not within the territorial
jurisdiction of the municipality at the
time the legislative authority was

3
[REM SERRANO] 3
granted.
Whether it was wise, advisable, or
necessary to confer upon a municipality
the power to exercise the right of
eminent domain, is a question with which
the courts are not concerned. But when
that right or authority is exercised for the
purpose of depriving citizens of their
property, the courts are authorized, in
this jurisdiction, to make inquiry and to
hear proof upon the necessity in the
particular case, and not the general
authority.
The general power to exercise the right
of eminent domain must not be confused
with the right to exercise it in a particular
case. The power of the legislature to
confer, upon municipal corporations and
other entities within the State, general
authority to exercise the right of eminent
domain cannot be questioned by the
courts, but that general authority of
municipalities or entities must not be
confused with the right to exercise it in
particular instances.. The moment the
municipal corporation or entity attempts
to exercise the authority conferred, it
must comply with the conditions
accompanying
the
authority.
The
necessity for conferring the authority
upon a municipal corporation to exercise
the right of eminent domain is admittedly
within the power of the legislature. But
whether or not the municipal corporation
or entity is exercising the right in a
particular case under the conditions
imposed by the general authority is a
question, which the courts have the right
to inquire into.
The conflict in the authorities upon the
question whether the necessity for the
exercise of the right of eminent domain is
purely legislative and not judicial, arises
generally in the' wisdom and propriety of
the legislature in authorizing the exercise
of the right of eminent domain instead of
in tide question of the right to exercise it
in a particular case. (Creston Waterworks
Co. vs. McGrath, 89 Iowa, 502.)
By the weight of authorities, the courts

3
4

[REM SERRANO]
have the power of restricting the exercise
of eminent domain to the actual
reasonable necessities of the case and
for the purposes designated by the law.
(Fairchild vs. City of St. Paul. 48 Minn.,
540.)

TELEBAP v. COMELEC

Petitioners contend that 92 of BP Blg.

881 violates the due process clause and
the eminent domain provision of the
Constitution by taking airtime from radio
and television broadcasting stations
without payment of just compensation.
Petitioners claim that the primary source
of revenue of the radio and television
stations is the sale of airtime to
advertisers and that to require these
stations to provide free airtime is to
authorize a taking which is not a de
minimis temporary limitation or restraint
upon the use of private property.
Section 92 of BP 881, insofar as it
requires radio and television stations to
provide
Comelec
with
radio
and
television time free of charge is a flagrant
violation of the constitutional mandate
that private property shall not be taken
for public use without just compensation.
While it is inherent in the State, the
sovereign right to appropriate property
has never been understood to include
taking property for public purposes
without the duty and responsibility of
ordering compensation to the individual
whose property has been sacrificed for
the good of the community. Hence,
Section 9, Article III of the 1987
Constitution which reads No private
property shall be taken for public use
without just compensation, gives us two
limitations on the power of eminent
domain: (1) the purpose of taking must
be for public use and (2) just
compensation must be given to the
owner of the private property.
In this case, the assailed law, in my view,
has not failed in meeting the standards
set forth for its lawful exercise, i.e., (a)
that its utilization is demanded by the
interests of the public, and (b) that the
means
employed
are
reasonably
necessary, and not unduly oppressive, for

3
[REM SERRANO] 5
the accomplishment of the purposes and
objectives of the law.

Republic v. Salem Investment

The power of eminent domain is an

inherent power of the State. No
constitutional conferment is necessary to
vest it in the State. The constitutional
provision on eminent domain, Art. III, 9,
provides a limitation rather than a basis
for the exercise of such power by the
government. Thus, it states, Private
property shall not be taken for public use
without
just
compensation.
Expropriation may be initiated by court
action or by legislation. In both instances,
the courts determine just compensation.
It is only upon payment of just
compensation that title over the property
passes to the government. Therefore,
until the action for expropriation has
been
completed
and
terminated,
ownership over the property being
expropriated remains with the registered
owner. Consequently, the latter can
exercise all rights pertaining to an owner,
including the right to dispose of his
property, subject to the power of the
State ultimately to acquire it through
expropriation.

Estate of Salud Jimenez v. PEZA

Expropriation proceedings involve two (2)

phases. The first phase ends either with
an order of expropriation (where the right
of plaintiff to take the land and the public
purpose to which they are to be devoted
are upheld) or an order of dismissal.
Either order would be a final one since it
finally disposes of the case. The second
phase concerns the determination of just
compensation to be ascertained by three
(3) commissioners. It ends with an order
fixing the amount to be paid to the
defendant. Inasmuch as it leaves nothing
more to be done, this order finally
disposes of the second stage. To both
orders the remedy therefrom is an
appeal.
Petitioner cites cases, which provide that
upon the failure to pay by the lessee, the
lessor can ask for the return of the lot
and the ejectment of the former, this
being the lessors original demand in the

3
6

[REM SERRANO]
complaint. We find said cases to be
inapplicable to this instant case for the
reason that the case at bar is not a
simple ejectment case. This is an
expropriation case, which involves two
(2) orders: an expropriation order and an
order fixing just compensation. Once the
first order becomes final and no appeal
thereto is taken, the authority to
expropriate and its public use cannot
anymore be questioned.
This Court holds that respondent has the
legal authority to expropriate the subject
Lot 1406-B and that the same was for a
valid public purpose. In Sumulong v.
Guerrero, this Court has ruled that, the
public use requirement for a valid
exercise of the power of eminent domain
is a flexible and evolving concept
influenced by changing conditions. In this
jurisdiction, the statutory and judicial
trend has been summarized as follows:
this Court has ruled that the taking to be
valid must be for public use. There was a
time when it was felt that a literal
meaning should be attached to such a
requirement.
Whatever
project
is
undertaken must be for the public to
enjoy, as in the case of streets or parks.
Otherwise expropriation is not allowable.
It is not anymore. As long as the purpose
of the taking is public, then the power of
eminent domain comes into play . . . It is
accurate to state then that at present
whatever may be beneficially employed
for the general welfare satisfies the
requirement of public use. [Heirs of
Juancho Ardona v. Reyes, 125 SCRA 220
(1983) at 234-235 quoting E. Fernando,
the Constitution of the Philippines 523-4
(2nd Ed. 1977) The term public use has
acquired
a
more
comprehensive
coverage. To the literal import of the term
signifying strict use or employment by
the public has been added the broader
notion of indirect public benefit or
advantage.
Furthermore, this Court has already ruled
that: . . the Legislature may directly
determine the necessity for appropriating
private
property
for
a
particular
improvement for public use, and it may

3
[REM SERRANO] 7
select the exact location of the
improvement. In such a case, it is well
settled that the utility of the proposed
improvement, the existence of the public
necessity for its construction, the
expediency of constructing it, the
suitableness of the location selected, are
all
questions
exclusively
for
the
legislature to determine, and the courts
have no power to interfere or to
substitute their own views for those of
the representatives of the people. In the
absence of some constitutional on
statutory provision to the contrary, the
necessity and expediency of exercising
the right of eminent domain, are
questions essentially political and not
judicial in their character.

Taxation
Osmena v. Orbos

Hence, it seems clear that while the

funds collected may be referred to as
taxes, they are exacted in the exercise of
the police power of the State. Moreover,
that the OPSF is a special fund is plain
from the special treatment given it by
E.O. 137. It is segregated from the
general fund; and while it is placed in
what the law refers to as a "trust liability
account," the fund nonetheless remains
subject to the scrutiny and review of the
COA. The Court is satisfied that these
measures comply with the constitutional
description of a "special fund." Indeed,
the practice is not without precedent.
What petitioner would wish is the fixing
of some definite, quantitative restriction,
or "a specific limit on how much to tax."
The petitioner on the premise that what
is involved here is the power of taxation,
but as already discussed cites the Court
to this requirement this is not the case.
What is here involved is not so much the
power of taxation as police power.
Although the provision authorizing the
ERB to impose additional amounts could
be construed to refer to the power of
taxation, it cannot be overlooked that the
overriding consideration is to enable the
delegate to act with expediency in
carrying out the objectives of funds of the
government." (1987 Constitution, Art. VI,

3
8

[REM SERRANO]
Sec. 28[3]).

Tan v. Del Rosario

Uniformity of taxation, like the kindred

concept of equal protection, merely
requires that all subjects or objects of
taxation, similarly situated, are to be
treated alike both in privileges and
liabilities (Juan Luna Subdivision vs.
Sarmiento, 91 Phil. 371). Uniformity does
not forfend classification as long as: (1)
the standards that are used therefor are
substantial and not arbitrary, (2) the
categorization is germane to achieve the
legislative purpose, (3) the law applies,
all things being equal, to both present
and future conditions, and (4) the
classification applies equally well to all
those belonging to the same class (Pepsi
Cola vs. City of Butuan, 24 SCRA 3; Basco
vs. PAGCOR, 197 SCRA 52).
What may instead be perceived to be
apparent from the amendatory law is the
legislative intent to increasingly shift the
income tax system towards the schedular
approach in the income taxation of
individual taxpayers and to maintain, by
and large, the present global treatment
on taxable corporations.

Pepsi Cola v. City of Butuan

Independently of whether or not a tax

imposed pursuant to section 2 of our
fundamental law in general, does not
forbid Republic Act No. 2264, when
considered in relation to the sales tax
prescribed by Acts of Congress, amounts
to double taxation, on which we do not
express any opiniondouble taxation. We
have not adopted, as part thereof, the
injunction against double taxation found
in the Constitution of the United States
and of some States of the Union (De
Villata v. Stanley, 32 Phil. 541; City of
Manila v. Inter-Island Gas Service, 99 Phil.
847, 854; Syjuco v. Municipality of
Paranaque, L-11265, Nov. 27, 1959; City
of Bacolod v. Gruet, L-18290, Jan. 31,
1963). Then, again, the general principle
against delegation of legislative powers,
in consequence of the theory of
separation of powers (U.S. v. Bull, 15 Phil.
7, 27; Kilbourn v. Thompson, 103 U.S.
168, 26 L. ed. 377) is subject to one wellestablished exception, namely: legislative

3
[REM SERRANO] 9
powers may be delegated to local
governmentsto which said theory does
not apply (State v. City of Mankato, 136
N.W. 264; People v. Provinces, 34 Cal.
520; Stoutenburgh v. Hennick, 129 U.S.
141, 32 L. ed. 637)in respect of matters
of local concern.
It is true that the uniformity essential to
the valid exercise of the power of
taxation does not require identity or
equality under all circumstances, or
negate the authority to classify the
objects of taxation. The classification
made in the exercise of this authority, to
be valid, must, however, be reasonable
and this requirement is not deemed
satisfied unless: (1) it is based upon
substantial distinctions which make the
real differences; (2) these are germane to
the purpose of the legislation or
ordinance; (3) the classification applies,
not only to present conditions, but, also,
to
future
conditions
substantially
identical to those of the present; and (4)
the classification applies equally to all
those who belong to the same class.

Commissioner of Internal
Revenue v. CA

Because taxes are the lifeblood of the

nation, the Court has always applied the
doctrine of strict interpretation in
construing tax exemptions. Furthermore,
a claim of statutory exemption from
taxation
should
be
manifest
and
unmistakable from the language of the
law on which it is based. Thus, the
claimed exemption must expressly be
granted in a statute stated in a language
too clear to be mistaken.
The term educational institution or
institution of learning has acquired a
well-known technical meaning, of which
the members of the Constitutional
Commission are deemed cognizant.
Under the Education Act of 1982, such
term refers to schools. The school system
is synonymous with formal education,
which refers to the hierarchically
structured and chronologically graded
learnings organized and provided by the
formal school system and for which
certification is required in order for the
learner to progress through the grades or

4
0

[REM SERRANO]
move to the higher levels. The Court has
examined the Amended Articles of
Incorporation and By-Laws of the
YMCA, but found nothing in them that
even hints that it is a school or an
educational institution.

Phlex Mining v. CIR

In several instances prior to the instant

case, we have already made the
pronouncement that taxes cannot be
subject to compensation for the simple
reason that the government and the
taxpayer are not creditors and debtors of
each other. There is a material distinction
between a tax and debt. Debts are due to
the Government in its corporate capacity,
while taxes are due to the Government in
its sovereign capacity. We find no cogent
reason
to
deviate
from
the
aforementioned distinction. Prescinding
from this premise, in Francia v.
Intermediate
Appellate
Court,
we
categorically held that taxes couldnt be
subject to set-off or compensation, thus:
We have consistently ruled that there
can be no off-setting of taxes against the
claims that the taxpayer may have
against the government. A person cannot
refuse to pay a tax on the ground that
the government owes him an amount
equal to or greater than the tax being
collected. The collection of a tax cannot
await the results of a lawsuit against the
government.
The power of taxation is sometimes
called also the power to destroy.
Therefore it should be exercised with
caution to minimize injury to the
proprietary rights of a taxpayer. It must
be exercised fairly, equally and uniformly,
lest the tax collector kill the hen that lays
the golden egg. And, in order to maintain
the general publics trust and confidence
in the Government this power must be
used justly and not treacherously.
Uniformity of taxation merely requires
that all subjects or objects of taxation,
similarly situated, are to be treated alike
both in privileges and liabilities. (Tan vs.
Del Rosario, Jr., 237 SCRA 324 [1994])

CIR v. Johnson and Son Inc.

The

above

construction

is

based

4
[REM SERRANO] 1
principally on syntax or sentence
structure but fails to take into account
the purpose animating the treaty
provisions in point. To begin with, we are
not aware of any law or rule pertinent to
the payment of royalties, and none has
been brought to our attention, which
provides for the payment of royalties
under dissimilar circumstances. The tax
rates on royalties and the circumstances
of payment thereof are the same for all
the recipients of such royalties and there
is no disparity based on nationality in the
circumstances of such payment. On the
other hand, a cursory reading of the
various tax treaties will show that there is
no similarity in the provisions on relief
from or avoidance of double taxation as
this is a matter of negotiation between
the contracting parties. As will be shown
later, this dissimilarity is true particularly
in the treaties between the Philippines
and the United States and between the
Philippines and West Germany.
The RP-US Tax Treaty is just one of a
number of bilateral treaties which the
Philippines has entered into for the
avoidance of double taxation. The
purpose
of
these
international
agreements is to reconcile the national
fiscal legislations of the contracting
parties in order to help the taxpayer
avoid simultaneous taxation in two
different jurisdictions. More precisely, the
tax conventions are drafted with a view
towards the elimination of international
juridical double taxation, which is defined
as the imposition of comparable taxes in
two or more states on the same taxpayer
in respect of the same subject matter
and for identical periods. The apparent
rationale for doing away with double
taxation is to encourage the free flow of
goods and services and the movement of
capital, technology and persons between
countries, conditions deemed vital in
creating robust and dynamic economies.
Foreign investments will only thrive in a
fairly
predictable
and
reasonable
international investment climate and the
protection against double taxation is
crucial in creating such a climate.

4
2

[REM SERRANO]
Double taxation usually takes place when
a person is resident of a contracting state
and derives income from, or owns capital
in, the other contracting state and both
states impose tax on that income or
capital. In order to eliminate double
taxation, a tax treaty resorts to several
methods. First, it sets out the respective
rights to tax of the state of source or
situs and of the state of residence with
regard to certain classes of income or
capital. In some cases, an exclusive right
to tax is conferred on one of the
contracting states; however, for other
items of income or capital, both states
are given the right to tax, although the
amount of tax that may be imposed by
the state of source is limited. The second
method for the elimination of double
taxation applies whenever the state of
source is given a full or limited right to
tax together with the state of residence.
In this case, the treaties make it
incumbent upon the state of residence to
allow relief in order to avoid double
taxation. There are two methods of relief
the exemption method and the credit
method. In the exemption method, the
income or capital, which is taxable in the
state of source or situs, is exempted in
the state of residence, although in some
instances it may be taken into account in
determining the rate of tax applicable to
the taxpayers remaining income or
capital. On the other hand, in the credit
method, although the income or capital,
which is taxed in the state of source, is
still taxable in the state of residence, the
tax paid in the former is credited against
the tax levied in the latter. The basic
difference between the two methods is
that in the exemption method, the focus
is on the income or capital itself, whereas
the credit method focuses upon the tax.

Part II
A. Private Acts & the Bill of Rights
Cases

Doctrine

4
[REM SERRANO] 3
Private Acts & the Bill of Rights
US v. Dorr

The act of Congress of July 1, 1902,

entitled "An Act temporarily to provide
for the administration of the affairs of
civil government in the Philippine Islands,
and for other purposes," in section 5
extends to the Philippine Islands nearly
all of the provisions of the Constitution
known as the Bill of Rights. But there was
excepted from it the provisions of the
Constitution relating to jury trials
contained in section 2, Article III, and in
the sixth amendment.
It becomes necessary for us to determine
whether
these
provisions
of
the
Constitution of the United States relating
to trials by jury are in force in the
Philippine Islands. It is difficult to
determine from the general statements
contained in these decisions what are
"those fundamental limitations in favor of
personal rights which are formulated in
the Constitution and its amendments and
which exist by inference."
It seems fairly deducible from all that has
been said upon this subject that such
provisions are negative in character
rather than of a direct positive or
affirmative nature, denying to Congress
the power to pass laws in contravention
with such principles of the Constitution.
If this is their nature and this be the true
distinction, it can not be said that either
Congress or the Philippine Commission
have passed any laws which would come
within the inhibition of the Constitution,
or which tend to impair the right to trial
by jury in these Islands.
All that can be said is that, in extending
the various provisions of the Bill of Rights
here, Congress has failed to extend those
provisions guaranteeing the right to trial
by jury.

People v. Andre Marti

In
the
absence
of
governmental
interference, the liberties guaranteed by
the Constitution cannot be invoked
against the State. As this Court held in
Villanueva v. Querubin (48 SCRA 345
[1972]: 1. This constitutional right

4
4

[REM SERRANO]
(against
unreasonable
search
and
seizure) refers to the immunity of ones
person, whether citizen or alien, from
interference by government, included in
which is his residence, his papers, and
other possessions. xxx xxx There the
state, however powerful, does not as
such have the access except under the
circumstances above noted, for in the
traditional
formulation,
his
house,
however humble, is his castle. Thus is
outlawed any unwarranted intrusion by
government, which is called upon to
refrain from any invasion of his dwelling
and to respect the privacies of his life.
xxx), the Court there in construing the
right against unreasonable searches and
seizures declared that: (t)he Fourth
Amendment gives protection against
unlawful searches and seizures, and as
shown in previous cases, its protection
applies to governmental action. Its origin
and history clearly show that it was
intended as a restraint upon the activities
of sovereign authority, and was not
intended to be a limitation upon other
than governmental agencies: as against
such authority it was the purpose of the
Fourth Amendment to secure the citizen
in the right of unmolested occupation of
his dwelling and the possession of his
property, subject to the right of seizure
by process duly served. The above
ruling was reiterated in State v. Bryan
(457 P.2d 661 [1968]) where a parking
attendant who searched the automobile
to ascertain the owner thereof found
marijuana
instead,
without
the
knowledge and participation of police
authorities, was declared admissible in
prosecution for illegal possession of
narcotics. And again in the 1969 case of
seizure clauses are restraints upon the
government and its agents, not upon
private individuals, (citing People v.
Potter, 240 Cal. App. 2d 621, 49 Cap.
Rptr. 892 (1966): State v. Brown, Mo.,
391 S.W. 2d 903 (1965): State v. Olsen,
Or., 317 P.2d 938 (1957). x x x The
contraband in the case at bar having
come into possession of the Government
without the latter trangressing appellants
rights against unreasonable search and
seizure, the Court sees no cogent reason

4
[REM SERRANO] 5
why the same should not be admitted
against him in the prosecution of the
offense charged.
That the Bill of Rights embodied in the
Constitution is not meant to be invoked
against acts of private individuals finds
support in the deliberations of the
Constitutional Commission. True, the
liberties guaranteed by the fundamental
law of the land must always be subject to
protection. But protection against whom?
Commissioner Bernas in his sponsorship
speech in the Bill of Rights answers the
query, which he himself posed, as
follows: First, the general reflections.
The protection of fundamental liberties in
the essence of constitutional democracy.
Protection against whom? Protection
against the state. The Bill of Rights
governs the relationship between the
individual and the state. Its concern is
not the relation between individuals,
between a private individual and other
individuals. What the Bill of Rights does
is to declare some forbidden zones in the
private sphere inaccessible to any power
holder.
(Sponsorship
Speech
of
Commissioner Bernas; Record of the
Constitutional Commission, Vol. 1, p. 674;
July 17, 1986; Italics supplied) The
constitutional
proscription
against
unlawful searches and seizures therefore
applies as a restraint directed only
against the government and its agencies
tasked with the enforcement of the law.
Thus, it could only be invoked against the
State to whom the restraint against
arbitrary and unreasonable exercise of
power is imposed.

Phil. Bloom Emp. Org. v. Phil.

Bloom Corp.

The Bill of Rights is designed to preserve

the ideals of liberty, equality and security
"against the assaults of opportunism, the
expediency of the passing hour, the
erosion of small encroachments, and the
scorn and derision of those who have no
patience with general principles." The
purpose of the Bill of Rights is to
"withdraw subjects from the vicissitudes
of political controversy, to place them
beyond the reach of majorities and
officials, and to establish them as legal

4
6

[REM SERRANO]
principles to be applied by the courts..."
The rights of free expression, free
assembly and petition, are not only civil
rights but also political rights essential to
man's enjoyment of his life, to his
happiness and to his full and complete
fulfillment. Thru these freedoms the
citizens can participate not merely in the
periodic
establishment
of
the
government through their suffrage but
also in the administration of public affairs
as well as in the discipline of abusive
public officers. The citizen is accorded
these rights so that he can appeal to the
appropriate governmental officers or
agencies for redress and protection as
well as for the imposition of the lawful
sanctions on erring public officers and
employees.
While the Bill of Rights also protects
property rights, the primacy of human
rights over property rights is recognized.
Because these freedoms are "delicate
and vulnerable, as well as supremely
precious in our society" and the "threat of
sanctions may deter their exercise almost
as potently as the actual application of
sanctions," they "need breathing space
to survive," permitting government
regulation only "with narrow specificity."
Property and property rights can be lost
thru prescription; but human rights are
imprescriptible. If human rights are
extinguished by the passage of time,
then the Bill of Rights is a useless
attempt to limit the power of government
and ceases to be an efficacious shield
against the tyranny of officials, of
majorities, of the influential and powerful,
and of oligarchs political, economic or
otherwise.
In the hierarchy of civil liberties, the
rights of free expression and of assembly
occupy a preferred position, as they are
essential to the preservation and vitality
of our civil and political institutions; and
such "priority gives these liberties the
sanctity and the sanction not permitting
dubious intrusions."

Serrano v. NLRC

This is not the first time this question has

4
[REM SERRANO] 7
arisen. In Sebuguero v. NLRC, workers in
a garment factory were temporarily laid
off due to the cancellation of orders and
a garment embargo. The Labor Arbiter
found that the workers had been illegally
dismissed and ordered the company to
pay separation pay and back wages. The
NLRC, on the other hand, found that this
was a case of retrenchment due to
business losses and ordered the payment
of separation pay without back wages.
This Court sustained the NLRCs finding.
However, as the company did not comply
with the 30-day written notice in Art. 283
of the Labor Code, the Court ordered the
employer to pay the workers P2, 000.00
each as indemnity. The decision followed
the ruling in several cases involving
dismissals which, although based on any
of the just causes under Art. 282 were
affected without notice and hearing to
the employee as required by the
implementing rules. As this Court said: It
is now settled that where the dismissal of
one employee is in fact for a just and
valid cause and is so proven to be but he
is not accorded his right to due process,
i.e., he was not furnished the twin
requirements of notice and opportunity to
be heard, the dismissal shall be upheld
but the employer must be sanctioned for
non- compliance with the requirements
of, or for failure to observe, due process.
The first is that the Due Process Clause of
the Constitution is a limitation on
governmental powers. It does not apply
to the exercise of private power, such as
the termination of employment under the
labor Code. This is plain from the text of
Art. III, 1 of the Constitution, viz.: No
person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or
property
without
due
process
of
law . . ..The reason is simple: Only the
State has authority to take the life,
liberty, or property of the individual. The
purpose of the Due Process Clause is to
ensure that the exercise of this power is
consistent with what are considered
civilized methods.
The second reason is that notice and
hearing are required under the Due
Process Clause before the power of

4
8

[REM SERRANO]
organized society are brought to bear
upon the individual. This is obviously not
the case of termination of employment
under Art. 283. Here the employee is not
faced with an aspect of the adversary
system. The purpose for requiring a 30day written notice before an employee is
laid off is not to afford him an opportunity
to be heard on any charge against him,
for there is none. The purpose rather is to
give him time to prepare for the eventual
loss of his job and the DOLE an
opportunity
to
determine
whether
economic causes do exist justifying the
termination of his employment.
Not
all
notice
requirements
are
requirements of due process. Some are
simply part of a procedure to be followed
before a right granted to a party can be
exercised.
Others
are
simply
an
application of the Justinian precept,
embodied in the Civil Code, to act with
justice, give everyone his due, and
observe honesty and good faith toward
ones fellowmen. Such is the notice
requirement in Arts. 282-283. The
consequence of the failure either of the
employer or the employee to live up to
this precept is to make him liable in
damages, not to render his act (dismissal
or resignation, as the case may be) void.
The measure of damages is the amount
of wages the employee should have
received were it not for the termination
of his employment without prior notice. If
warranted, nominal and moral damages
may also be awarded.
We hold, therefore, that, with respect to
Art. 283 of the Labor Code, the
employers failure to comply with the
notice requirement does not constitute a
denial of due process but a mere failure
to observe a procedure for the
termination of employment which makes
the termination of employment merely
ineffectual. It is similar to the failure to
observe the provisions of Art. 1592, in
relation to Art. 1191, of the Civil Code in
rescinding a contract for the sale of
immovable
property.
Under
these
provisions, while the power of a party to
rescind a contract is implied in reciprocal

4
[REM SERRANO] 9
obligations,
nonetheless,
in
cases
involving the sale of immovable property,
the vendor cannot exercise this power
even though the vendee defaults in the
payment of the price, except by bringing
an action in court or giving notice of
rescission by means of a notarial
demand. Consequently, a notice of
rescission given in the letter of an
attorney has no legal effect, and the
vendee can make payment even after
the due date since no valid notice of
rescission has been given.
As specifically provided in Art. 283 of the
Labor Code, the employer may terminate
the employment of any employee due to
redundancy by serving a written notice
on the worker and the DOLE at least one
(1) month before the intended date
thereof. In the instant case, ISETANN
clearly violated the provisions of Art. 283
on notice. It did not send a written notice
to DOLE which is essential because the
right to terminate an employee is not an
absolute prerogative. The lacks of written
notice denied DOLE the opportunity to
determine the validity of the termination.
We are of the view that failure to send
notice of termination to Serrano is not
tantamount
to
violation
of
his
constitutional right to due process but
merely constitutes non-compliance with
the provision on notice under Art. 283 of
the Labor Code.
From the foregoing, it is clear that the
observance of due process is demanded
in governmental acts. Particularly in
administrative proceedings, due process
starts with the tribunal or hearing officer
and not with the employer. In the instant
case, what is mandated of the employer
to observe is the 30-day notice
requirement. Hence, non-observance of
the notice requirement is not denial of
due process but merely a failure to
comply with a legal obligation for which,
we strongly recommend, we impose a
disturbance compensation as discussed
hereunder.

5
0

[REM SERRANO]

B. Due Process
Constitutional Bases
Article III, Section I

Article XIII, Section I

No person shall be deprived of life,

liberty, or property without due process
of law, nor shall any person be denied
the equal protection of the laws.
The Congress shall give highest priority
to the enactment of measures that
protect and enhance the right of all the
people to human dignity, reduce social,
economic, and political inequalities, and
remove cultural inequities by equitably
diffusing wealth and political power for
the common good.
To this end, the State shall regulate the
acquisition, ownership, use, and
disposition of property and its
increments.

Cases
Due Process

Doctrine
Manila v. Laguio

Procedural due process, as the phrase

implies, refers to the procedures that the
government must follow before it
deprives a person of life, liberty, or
property. Classic procedural due process
issues are concerned with what kind of
notice and what form of hearing the
government must provide when it takes a
particular
action.
Substantive
due
process, as that phrase connotes, asks
whether
the
government
has
an
adequate reason for taking away a
persons life, liberty, or property. In other
words, substantive due process looks to
whether there is a sufficient justification
for the governments action.
The police power granted to local
government units must always be
exercised with utmost observance of the
rights of the people to due process and
equal protection of the law. Such power
cannot
be
exercised
whimsically,
arbitrarily or despotically as its exercise
is subject to a qualification, limitation or
restriction and regard due to the
prescription of the fundamental law,

5
[REM SERRANO] 1
particularly those forming part of the Bill
of Rights. Individual rights, it bears
emphasis, may be adversely affected
only to the extent that may fairly be
required by the legitimate demands of
public interest or public welfare. Due
process requires the intrinsic validity of
the law in interfering with the rights of
the person to his life, liberty and
property.

Ynot v. IAC

The closed mind has no place in the open

society. It is part of the sporting idea of
fair play to hear "the other side" before
an opinion is formed or those who sit in
judgment make a decision. Obviously,
one side is only one-half of the question;
the other half must also be considered if
an impartial verdict is to be reached
based on an informed appreciation of the
issues in contention. It is indispensable
that the two sides complement each
other, as unto the bow the arrow, in
leading to the correct ruling after
examination of the problem not from one
or the other perspective only but in its
totality. A judgment based on less that
this full appraisal, on the pretext that a
hearing is unnecessary or useless, is
tainted with the vice of bias or
intolerance or ignorance, or worst of all,
in repressive regimes, the insolence of
power.
To sum up then, we find that the
challenged measure is an invalid exercise
of the police power because the method
employed to conserve the carabaos is
not reasonably necessary to the purpose
of the law and, worse, is unduly
oppressive. Due process is violated
because the owner of the property
confiscated is denied the right to be
heard in his defense and is immediately
condemned
and
punished.
The
conferment
on
the
administrative
authorities of the power to adjudge the
guilt of the supposed offender is a clear
encroachment on judicial functions and
militates
against
the
doctrine
of
separation of powers. There is, finally,
also an invalid delegation of legislative
powers to the officers mentioned therein
who are granted unlimited discretion in

5
2

[REM SERRANO]
the
distribution
arbitrarily taken.

Ermita-Malate Hotel and Motel v.

Manila

of

the

properties

On the legislative organs of the

government, whether national or local,
primarily rests the exercise of the police
power, which is the power to prescribe
regulations to promote the health,
morals, peace, good order, safety and
general welfare of the people. In view of
the requirements of certain constitutional
guarantees, the exercise of such police
power, however, insofar as it may affect
the life, liberty or property of any person,
is subject to judicial inquiry. Where such
exercise of police power may be
considered
as
either
capricious,
whimsical, unjust or unreasonable, a
denial of due process or a violation of any
other applicable constitutional guarantee
may call for correction by the courts.
There is no controlling and precise
definition of due process. It furnishes
though
a
standard
to
which
governmental action should conform in
order that deprivation of life, liberty or
property, in each appropriate case, be
valid. The standard of due process, which
must exist both as a procedural and as
substantive
requisite
to
free
the
challenged
ordinance,
or
any
governmental action for that matter,
from imputation of legal infirmity, is
responsiveness to the supremacy of
reason. Obedience to the dictates of
justice. It would be an affront to reason to
stigmatize
an
ordinance
enacted
precisely to meet what a municipal
lawmaking body considers an evil of
rather serious pro portions as an arbitrary
and capricious exercise of authority. What
should be deemed unreasonable and
what would amount to an abdication of
the power to govern is inaction in the
face of an admitted deterioration of the
state of public morals.

Rubi v. Provincial Board

"Due process of law" is defined and

analyzed in the opinion. A statute does
not infringe the pledge that no person
shall be denied the equal protection of
the laws, which is applicable to all of a

5
[REM SERRANO] 3
class.
Due process of law and the equal
protection of the laws are not violated by
section 2145 of the Administrative Code
of 1917 since there exists a law; the law
seems to be reasonable; it is enforced
according
to
regular
methods
of
procedure; and it applies to all of a class.

Smith Bell Co. v. Natividad

The guaranties of the Fourteenth

Amendment and so of the first paragraph
of the Philippine Bill of Rights are
universal in their application to all
persons within the territorial jurisdiction,
without regard to any differences of race,
color, or nationality.
We are inclined to the view that while
Smith, Bell & Co. Ltd., a corporation
having alien stockholders, is entitled to
the protection afforded by the- due
process of law and equal protection of
the laws clause of the Philippine Bill of
Rights, nevertheless, Act No. 2761 of the
Philippine Legislature, in denying to
corporations such as Smith, Bell & Co.
Ltd., the right to register vessels in the
Philippines coastwise trade, does not
belong to that vicious species of class
legislation which must always be
condemned,
but
does
fall
within
authorized exceptions, notably, within
the purview of the police power, and so
does not offend against the constitutional
provision.

Villegas v. Tsai Pao

Requiring a person before he can be

employed to get a permit from the City
Mayor of Manila who may withhold or
refuse it at will is tantamount to denying
him the basic right of the people in the
Philippines to engage in a means of
livelihood. While it is true that the
Philippines as a State is not obliged to
admit aliens within its territory, once an
alien is admitted, he cannot be deprived
of life without due process of law. This
guarantee includes the means of
livelihood. The shelter of protection
under the due process and equal
protection clause is given to all persons,

5
4

[REM SERRANO]
both aliens and citizens.

El Banco Filipino v. Palanca

It will be observed that in considering the

effect of this irregularity, it makes a
difference whether it is viewed as a
question-involving jurisdiction or as a
question involving due process of law. In
the matter of jurisdiction there can be no
distinction between the much and the
little. The court either has jurisdiction or
it has not; and if the requirement as to
the mailing of notice should be
considered as a step antecedent to the
acquiring of jurisdiction, there could be
no escape from the conclusion that the
failure to take that step was fatal to the
validity of the judgment. In the
application of the idea of due process of
law, on the other hand, it is clearly
unnecessary to be so rigorous. The
jurisdiction being once established, all
that due process of law thereafter
requires is an opportunity for the
defendant to be heard; and as
publication was duly made in the
newspaper, it would seem highly
unreasonable to hold that the failure to
mail the notice was fatal. We think that in
applying the requirement of due process
of law, it is permissible to reflect upon
the purposes of the provision, which is
supposed to have been violated, and the
principle underlying the exercise of.
Judicial power in these proceedings.
Judged in the light of these conceptions,
we think that the provision of the Act of
Congress declaring that no person shall
be deprived of his property without due
process of law has not been infringed.
The idea upon which the decision in
Pennoyer vs. Neff (supra) proceeds is
that the process from the tribunals of one
State cannot run into other States or
countries and that due process of law
requires that the defendant shall be
brought under the power of the court by
service of process within the State, or by
his voluntary appearance, in order to
authorize the court to pass upon the
question of his personal liability. The
doctrine established by the Supreme
Court of the United States on this point,
being based upon the constitutional

5
[REM SERRANO] 5
conception of due process of law, is
binding upon the courts of the Philippine
Islands. Involved in this decision is the
principle that in proceedings in rem or
quasi in rem against a nonresident who is
not served personally within the state,
and who does not appear, the relief must
be confined to the res, and the court
cannot lawfully render a personal
judgment against him. (Dewey vs. Des
Moines, 173 U.S., 193; 43 L. ed., 665;
Heidritter vs. Elizabeth Oil Cloth Co., 112
U.S., 294; 28 L. ed., 729.) Therefore in an
action to foreclose a mortgage against a
nonresident, upon whom service has
been affected exclusively by publication,
no personal judgment for the deficiency
can be entered. (Latta vs. Tutton, 122
CaL, 279; Blumberg vs. Birch, 99 Cal.,
416.)
In the progress of this discussion we have
stated the two conclusions; (1) that the
failure of the clerk to send the notice to
the defendant by mail did not destroy the
jurisdiction of the court and (2) that such
irregularity
did
not
infringe
the
requirement of due process of law. As a
consequence of these conclusions the
irregularity in question is in some
measure shorn of its potency. It is still
necessary, however, to consider its
effects considered as a simple irregularity
of procedure; and it would be idle to
pretend that even in this aspect the
irregularity is not grave enough. From
this point of view, however, it is obvious
that any motion to vacate the judgment
on the ground of the irregularity in
question must fail unless "it shows that
the defendant was prejudiced by that
irregularity. The least, therefore, that can
be required of the proponent of such a
motion is to show that he had a good
defense against the action to foreclose
the mortgage. Nothing of the kind is,
however, shown either in the motion or in
the affidavit, which accompanies the
motion.

Samartino v. Raon

There being no valid substituted service

of summons, the trial court did not
acquire jurisdiction over the person of

5
6

[REM SERRANO]
petitioner. It should be emphasized that
the service of summons is not only
required to give the court jurisdiction
over the person of the defendant, but
also to afford the latter an opportunity to
be heard on the claim made against him.
Thus,
compliance
with
the
rules
regarding the service of summons is as
much an issue of due process as of
jurisdiction. The essence of due process
is to be found in the reasonable
opportunity to be heard and submit any
evidence one may have in support of his
defense. It is elementary that before a
person can be deprived of his property,
he should first be informed of the claim
against him and the theory on which
such claim is premised.

Bautista v. CA

Petitioners contention that they were

denied due process is not well taken.
Where a party was afforded an
opportunity
to
participate
in
the
proceedings but failed to do so, he
cannot complain of deprivation of due
process. Due process is satisfied as long
as the party is accorded an opportunity
to be heard. If it is not availed of, it is
deemed waived or forfeited without
violating the constitutional guarantee.

Alba v. Nitorreda

Petitioner assails the constitutionality of

Section 27 of R.A. 6770 and Section 7,
Rule III of Administrative Order No. 7 for
their failure to provide for the right of
appeal in certain cases from the decision
of the Ombudsman, maintaining that the
same is tantamount to a deprivation of
property without due process of law. As
regards this threshold matter, suffice it to
say that this Court has consistently held
that: The right to appeal is not a natural
right nor a part of due process; it is
merely a statutory privilege, and may be
exercised only in the manner and in
accordance with the provisions of the
law.
Apparently,
therefore,
the
constitutional requirement of due process
may be satisfied notwithstanding the
denial of the right to appeal for the
essence of due process is simply the
opportunity to be heard and to present
evidence in support of ones case.

5
[REM SERRANO] 7
Apparently, therefore, the constitutional
requirement of due process may be
satisfied notwithstanding the denial of
the right to appeal for the essence of due
process is simply the opportunity to be
heard and to present evidence in support
of ones case.
Hence, a formal or trial type hearing is
not, at all times, necessary. So long as a
party is afforded fair and reasonable
opportunity to explain his side, the
requirement of due process is complied
with.

Ang Tibay v. CIR

The Court of Industrial Relations is not

narrowly constrained by technical rules of
procedure, and Commonwealth Act No.
103 requires it to act according to justice
and equity and substantial merits of the
case, without regard to technicalities or
legal evidence but may inform its mind in
such manner as it may deem just and
equitable (Goseco vs. Court of Industrial
Relations et al., G. R. No. 46673). The
fact, however, that the Court of Industrial
Relations may be said to be free from the
rigidity
of
certain
procedural
requirements does not mean that it can,
in justiciable cases coming before it,
entirely
ignore
or
disregard
the
fundamental and essential requirements
of due process in trials and investigations
of an administrative character.

Agabon v. NLRC

Procedurally, (1) if the dismissal is based

on a just cause under Article 282, the
employer must give the employee two
written notices and a hearing or
opportunity to be heard if requested by
the employee before terminating the
employment: a notice specifying the
grounds for which dismissal is sought a
hearing or an opportunity to be heard
and after hearing or opportunity to be
heard, a notice of the decision to dismiss;
and (2) if the dismissal is based on
authorized causes under Articles 283 and
284, the employer must give the
employee and the Department of Labor
and Employment written notices 30 days
prior to the effectivity of his separation.
From the foregoing rules four possible
situations may be derived: (1) the

5
8

[REM SERRANO]
dismissal is for a just cause under Article
282 of the Labor Code, for an authorized
cause under Article 283, or for health
reasons under Article 284, and due
process was observed; (2) the dismissal
is without just or authorized cause but
due process was observed; (3) the
dismissal is without just or authorized
cause and there was no due process; and
(4) the dismissal is for just or authorized
cause but due process was not observed.
In the first situation, the dismissal is
undoubtedly valid and the employer will
not suffer any liability. In the second and
third situations where the dismissals are
illegal, Article 279 mandates that the
employee is entitled to reinstatement
without loss of seniority rights and other
privileges and full back wages, inclusive
of allowances, and other benefits or their
monetary equivalent computed from the
time the compensation was not paid up
to the time of actual reinstatement. In
the fourth situation, the dismissal should
be upheld. While the procedural infirmity
cannot be cured, it should not invalidate
the dismissal. However, the employer
should be held liable for non- compliance
with the procedural requirements of due
process.
To be sure, the Due Process Clause in
Article III, Section 1 of the Constitution
embodies a system of rights based on
moral principles so deeply imbedded in
the traditions and feelings of our people
as to be deemed fundamental to a
civilized society as conceived by our
entire history. Due process is that which
comports with the deepest notions of
what is fair and right and just. It is a
constitutional restraint on the legislative
as well as on the executive and judicial
powers of the government provided by
the Bill of Rights.
Due process under the Labor Code, like
Constitutional due process, has two
aspects: substantive, i.e., the valid and
authorized
causes
of
employment
termination under the Labor Code; and
procedural, i.e., the manner of dismissal.
Procedural due process requirements for
dismissal are found in the Implementing

5
[REM SERRANO] 9
Rules of P.D. 442, as amended, otherwise
known as the Labor Code of the
Philippines in Book VI, Rule I, Sec. 2, as
amended by Department Order Nos. 9
and 10. Breaches of these due process
requirements violate the Labor Code.
Therefore statutory due process should
be differentiated from failure to comply
with
constitutional
due
process.
Constitutional due process protects the
individual from the government and
assures him of his rights in criminal, civil
or administrative proceedings; while
statutory due process found in the Labor
Code and Implementing Rules protects
employees
from
being
unjustly
terminated without just cause after
notice and hearing.
The unfairness of declaring illegal or
ineffectual dismissals for valid or
authorized causes but not complying with
statutory due process may have farreaching consequences. This would
encourage frivolous suits, where invoking
due process rewards even the most
notorious violators of company policy.
This also creates absurd situations where
there is a just or authorized cause for
dismissal but a procedural infirmity
invalidates the termination. Let us take
for example a case where the employee
is caught stealing or threatens the lives
of his co-employees or has become a
criminal, who has fled and cannot be
found, or where serious business losses
demand that operations be ceased in less
than a month. Invalidating the dismissal
would not serve public interest. It could
also discourage investments that can
generate employment in the local
economy. The constitutional policy to
provide full protection to labor is not
meant to be a sword to oppress
employers. The commitment of this Court
to the cause of labor does not prevent us
from sustaining the employer when it is
in the right, as in this case. Certainly, an
employer should not be compelled to pay
employees
for
work
not
actually
performed and in fact abandoned. The
employer should not be compelled to
continue employing a person who is
admittedly guilty of misfeasance or

6
0

[REM SERRANO]
malfeasance
and
whose
continued
employment is patently inimical to the
employer. The law protecting the rights of
the laborer authorizes neither oppression
nor self-destruction of the employer.
The violation of the petitioners right to
statutory due process by the private
respondent warrants the payment of
indemnity in the form of nominal
damages. The amount of such damages
is addressed to the sound discretion of
the court, taking into account the
relevant circumstances. Considering the
prevailing circumstances in the case at
bar, we deem it proper to fix it at
P30,000.00. We believe this form of
damages would serve to deter employers
from future violations of the statutory
due process rights of employees. At the
very least, it provides a vindication or
recognition of this fundamental right
granted to the latter under the Labor
Code and its Implementing Rules.

While Light v. Manila

The primary constitutional question that

confronts us is one of due process, as
guaranteed under Section 1, Article III of
the Constitution. Due process evades a
precise definition. The purpose of the
guaranty
is
to
prevent
arbitrary
governmental encroachment against the
life, liberty and property of individuals.
The due process guaranty serves as a
protection against arbitrary regulation or
seizure.
Even
corporations
and
partnerships are protected by the
guaranty insofar as their property is
concerned.
The
due
process
guaranty
has
traditionally
been
interpreted
as
imposing two related but distinct
restrictions on government, procedural
due process and substantive due
process. Procedural due process refers
to the procedures that the government
must follow before it deprives a person of
life, liberty, or property. Procedural due
process concerns itself with government
action adhering to the established
process when it makes an intrusion into
the private sphere. Examples range from
the form of notice given to the level of

6
[REM SERRANO] 1
formality of a hearing. If due process
were confined solely to its procedural
aspects, there would arise absurd
situation of arbitrary government action,
provided the proper formalities are
followed.
Substantive
due
process
completes the protection envisioned by
the due process clause. It inquires
whether the government has sufficient
justification for depriving a person of life,
liberty, or property.
The question of substantive due process,
more so than most other fields of law,
has reflected dynamism in progressive
legal thought tied with the expanded
acceptance of fundamental freedoms.
Police power, traditionally awesome as it
may be, is now confronted with a more
rigorous level of analysis before it can be
upheld.
The
vitality
though
of
constitutional due process has not been
predicated on the frequency with which it
has been utilized to achieve a liberal
result for, after all, the libertarian ends
should
sometimes
yield
to
the
prerogatives of the State. Instead, the
due process clause has acquired potency
because
of
the
sophisticated
methodology that has emerged to
determine the proper metes and bounds
for its application.

People v. Nazario

GMA v. COMELEC

As a rule, a statute or act may be said to

be vague when it lacks comprehensible
standards
that
men
of
common
intelligence must necessarily guess at its
meaning and differ as to its application.
It is repugnant to the Constitution in two
respects: (1) it violates due process for
failure to accord persons, especially the
parties targeted by it, fair notice of the
conduct to avoid; and (2) it leaves law
enforcers unbridled discretion in carrying
out its provisions and becomes an
arbitrary flexing of the Government
muscle.
It is a basic postulate of due process,
specifically in relation to its substantive
component, that any governmental rule
or regulation must be reasonable in its
operations and its impositions. Any
restrictions, as well as sanctions, must be

6
2

[REM SERRANO]
reasonably related to the purpose or
objective of the government in a manner
that would not work unnecessary and
unjustifiable burdens on the citizenry.
While the Court has acknowledged the
Comelecs wide discretion in adopting
means to carry out its mandate of
ensuring free, orderly, and honest
elections, this discretion cannot be
unlimited and must necessarily be within
the bounds of the law under the
prevailing rule of law regime in our
country. The legal limitations include
those imposed by the fundamental law,
among them, the right to due process
where governmental action has been
substantively unreasonable or its
procedures
and
processes
are
unduly harsh. The Comelecs failure to
sufficiently explain the basis for the
change of interpretation it decreed under
Resolution No. 9615, in my view, falls
within this limitation. Even without going
into the niceties and intricacies of legal
reasoning, basic fairness demands that
the Comelec provides a reasonable
justification, considering particularly the
Comelecs own knowledge of the
dynamics of campaign strategy and the
influence of the radio and television as
medium of communication.
Parenthetically, the need for prior notice
and hearing actually supports the
conclusion that the Comelecs discretion
is not unbridled. Giving the petitioners
prior opportunity to be heard before
adopting a new interpretation would have
allowed the Comelec to make a
reasonable evaluation of the merits and
demerits of the 2004-2010 interpretation
of airtime limits and the needs to satisfy
the demands of the 2013 elections. In my
discussions below, I shall supplement the
ponencias observations (which cited the
case Commissioner of Internal Revenue
v. Court of Appeals, 257 SCRA 200
[1996]), that prior notice and hearing are
required if an administrative issuance
substantially adds to or increases the
burden of those governed. I do so based
on my own assessment that the validity
or invalidity of the assailed Comelec

6
[REM SERRANO] 3
Resolution essentially rises or falls
on the Comelecs compliance with
the legal concept of due process or,
at the very least, the common notion
of fairness. In the latter case, the
prevailing
circumstances
and
the
interests at stake have collectively given
rise to the need to observe basic fairness.
The quasi- judicial power of the
Comelec embraces the power to resolve
controversies
arising
from
the
enforcement of election laws, and to be
the sole judge of all pre-proclamation
controversies; and of all contests relating
to
the
elections,
returns,
and
qualifications. In the exercise of quasijudicial power, the Comelec must
necessarily ascertain the existence of
facts, hold hearings to secure or confirm
these facts, weigh the presented
evidence, and draw conclusions from
them as basis for its action and exercise
of discretion that is essentially judicial in
character. When exercising this power,
due process requires that prior notice
and hearing must be observed. The
remedy against an improvident exercise
of the Comelecs quasi- judicial power is
provided under Article IX-A, Section 7, in
relation with Article IX-C, Section 3 of the
Constitution and with Rule 64 of the
Rules of Court.
While the petitioners do not have any
absolutely demandable right to notice
and
hearing
in
the
Comelecs
promulgation of a legislative rule, the
weight
and
seriousness
of
the
considerations underlying the change n
implementing the airtime limit rule,
required a more circumspect and
sensitive exercise of discretion by the
Comelec, in fact, the duty to be fair that
opens the door to due process
considerations. The change touched on
very basic individual, societal and
even
constitutional
values
and
considerations so that the Comelecs
failure to notify and hear all the
concerned parties amounted to a due
process violation amounting to grave
abuse in the exercise of its discretion in
interpreting the laws and rules it

6
4

[REM SERRANO]
implements.
While
the
Comelec
admittedly conducted a hearing after
promulgating Comelec Resolution No.
9615, this belated remedy does not at all
cure the resolutions invalidity.
By holding that the Comelec must have
reasonable basis for changing their
interpretation of the airtime limits under
RA No. 9006 and that, impliedly its
absence in the present case constitutes a
violation of the petitioners right to due
process,
the
ponencia
in
effect
recognized the Comelecs duty under the
circumstances
to
provide
for
a
reasonable basis for its action, as well as
its competence to adequately explain
them as the constitutional body tasked to
enforce and administer all elections laws
and regulations. This recognition is
consistent with the Courts similar
recognition that the Comelec possesses
wide latitude of discretion in adopting
means to carry out its mandate of
ensuring free, orderly, and honest
elections, but subject to the limitation
that the means so adopted are not illegal
or do not constitute grave abuse of
discretion. Given this recognition and in
light of the nullity of Comelec Resolution
No. 9615, the Court, for its part, should
also recognize that it should not preempt
the Comelec from later on establishing or
attempting to establish the bases for a
new interpretation that is not precluded
on other constitutional grounds. The
Comelec possesses ample authority to so
act under the provision that airtime
limits, among others, may be amplified
on by the Comelec.