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Abstract
Discourse Markers (DMs) have been a topic of research for 30 years under many dierent names.
The present paper presents an account of one view of DMs with the aim of providing researchers
in the eld with a coherent denition of DMs and a presentation of the syntactic and semantic
properties of this functional category that will enable them to compare their work on DMs with
other researchers. In addition, an analysis of the uses of the DM but supports the claim that there
is one core meaning relationship, contrast, with the interpretation of the more than 10 dierent
uses of but being signalled by context and pragmatic elaboration.
Keywords
Discourse Markers (DMs), procedural meaning, pragmatic markers, pragmatic elaboration
though prepositions and conjunctions, etc. are names well known in grammar,
and the particles contained under them carefully ranked into their distinct subdivisions; yet he who would show the right use of particles, and what signicance
and force they have, must take a little more pains, enter into their own thoughts,
and observe nicely the several postures of his mind in discoursingneither is it
enough, for the explaining of these words, to render them, as is usual in dictionaries, by words of another tongue which come nearest to their signication; for
what is meant by them is commonly as hard to be understood in one as another
language. They are all marks of some action or intimation of the mind; and therefore to understand them rightly, the several views, postures, stands, turns, limitations, and exceptions, and several other thoughts of the mind for which we have
either none or very decient names, are diligently to be studied (John Locke, An
Essay Concerning Human Understanding, 1959: 521).
1. Introduction
This paper presents an account of Discourse Markers (DMs), lexical expressions such as those in italics in the following examples.1
1
Most of the examples in this paper are constructed rather than taken from corpora.
DOI 10.1163/187730909X12538045489818
294
(1) a. Jones died last night. But he had been very ill for a long time.
b. I went to Boston rst and later on, went to Cape Cod.
c. The water wouldnt boil, so we couldnt make any tea.
I say an account, not the account, since there is considerable variation in what
might be labelled Discourse Markers. On the one hand, researchers do not agree
what falls under the term Discourse Markers. For example, Schirin (1987),
motivated by her interest in the coherence of discourse, considered the term to
embrace a large, imprecisely dened group of expressions, including interjections such as oh and now, and non-verbal expressions, whereas Fraser (1990,
1999, 2006b), concerned with the pragmatic role played by terms expressing a
semantic relationship between messages, considered Discourse Markers to be
far more constrained. Blakemore (2002), while agreeing that DMs signal a
semantic relationship between utterances, was interested in only those which
contained procedural meaning as opposed to conceptual meaning. The group of
terms labelled as Cue Phrases by Knott and Sanders (1998) is a subset of those
above plus then again and admittedlybut, not considered by the others to be
DMs at all. And many researchers, interested in the properties of a specic
expression such as well (e.g. Foolen, 1993), labelled it as a DM, even though
most researchers wouldnt consider it as such.
On the other hand, the labels given to the group of expressions generally
considered to be DMs vary widely. For example, one nds Cue Phrases
(Knott and Sanders, 1998), Discourse Connectives (Blakemore, 1987, 2002;
Hall, 2007), Discourse Markers (Blakemore, 2002; Iten, 2000; Schirin,
1987; Fraser, 1999, 2006; Mosegaard-Hansen, 2008; Lenk, 1998), Discourse
Operators (Redeker, 1990, 1991), Discourse Particles (Schourup, 1999;
Abraham, 1991; Kroon, 1998; Fischer, 2006; Aijmer, 2002), Discourse
Signalling Devices (Polanyi and Scha, 1983), Indicating Devices (Dascal and
Katriel, 1984, 1977), Phatic Connectives (Bazzanella, 1990), Pragmatic
Connectives (van Dijk, 1979), Pragmatic Expressions (Erman, 1987), Pragmatic Markers (Fraser, 1996; Brinton, 1990; Erman, 2001), Pragmatic Operators
(Ariel, 1998), Pragmatic Particles (stman, 1995), and Semantic Conjuncts
(Quirk et al., 1985), to name just a few.
Moreover, the researchers involved may have used a common term but were
interested in very dierent goals. Under the term Discourse Connectives van
Dijk (1979) was primarily interested in showing how semantic and pragmatic
connectives were dierent, Schirin (1987, 2005) was interested in illustrating
their use in discourse coherence, Fraser (2006b) was concerned with their role in
pragmatic interpretation, Sweetser (1990) was concerned with their function
in pragmatic ambiguity, Ducrot (1980) used them to illustrate the subtleties of
argumentation, while Blakemore (2002) was interested in them for how they
illustrate the conceptual/procedural meaning distinction in relevance theory.
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2
There are also instances of syntactic and phonological pragmatic markers which I do not
discuss here. See Fraser (1996) for further discussion of this point.
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297
3
Exclamation particles (Wow!, Gosh!, Damn!, Yippee! ) and interjections (Hey, You there, )
are not part of a host utterance, are separate discourse segments, and are treated as pragmatic
idioms.
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c. We know that the employees cannot make changes to contracts without agreemtents. *We, on the other hand, realize how dicult it is to
use the law to bring these rogue employees to task.
Condition 3: A DM does not contribute to the semantic meaning of the segment but signals a specic semantic relationship which holds
between the interpretation of the two Illocutionary Act segments, S1 and S2.
This is in contrast to other pragmatic markers such as I promise, frankly, allegedly, and incidentally, which like DMs, are not part of the propositional meaning, but make a qualication or a specic comment on S2 (Fraser, 1996). I shall
say more below about the types of semantic relationship signalled by DMs.
The three Conditions on the denition of a DM exclude the following types
of expressions, either because they do not represent a semantic relationship
between adjacent Illocutionary Act segments, S1 and S2, as in (18),
(18) a. Interjections (damn, hey, wow, gosh,)
I like it here. Damn! I really like it here.
b. Sentence adverbs (certainly, surely, denitely,)
John is very nice. Denitely, we should invite him over.
c. Modal particles (few in English; German: doch, ja, eben,)
She is pretty. Indeed, she is.
d. Focus particles (just, even, only,)
Everybody is ready. Even Harriet is on time.
e. Evidential adverbs (allegedly, reportedly, according to,)
People are angry. Allegedly, its because of Bush.
f. Attitudinal adverbs (frankly, stupidly, cleverly,)
The weather is lousy. Frankly, I dont care.
or the relationship is grammatical or discourse, not semantic, as in (19).
(19) a. Complementizers (grammatical relations such as that, in order that, so
as, for,)
I believe that John is right.
He xed the door in order that the cat could get out.
b. Topic Orientation Markers (discourse relations specifying relationships within the discourse such as rst, later, incidentally, oh that
reminds me,)
Susan had to do the dishes. First, she did the glasses, as she had been
instructed.
I have to go now. Oh, that reminds me, we were invited to Johns for
dinner.
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6
These three classes closely parallel those of Blakemore (2002) who writes that DMs fall into
three groups,
i) By allowing the derivation of a contextual implication (e.g., so, therefore, too, also);
ii) By strengthening an existing assumption by providing better evidence for it (e.g. after all,
moreover, furthermore);
iii) By contradicting an existing assumption (e.g. however, still, nevertheless, but) and has rough
parallels to the analysis in Halliday & Hasan (1976) and to Quirk et al. (1985)
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the DM in each can be absent with the sequence retaining the interpretation
it had if the DM had been present, although the prosodic features of the second segment are often altered to signal the absent DM. The conclusion to be
drawn from this, as Schirin (1987) proposed, is that a DM does not create
the relationship between two successive discourse segments, but it provides
clues which inform the hearer of the relationship intended by speaker. To be
sure, in some cases it is unlikely that a relatively implausible relationship would
be recognized, absent the appropriate DM, but that doesnt bear on the
denition.
There are, however, a few cases such as those in (24),
(24) a. Fred, a gentleman? On the contrary, hes a bastard.
b. Harry didnt arrive on time. In addition, the meeting was late in
starting.
c. We dont like Harry. On the other hand, he doesnt seem to care.
d. He arrived well after the start time. As a result, the Committee cancelled the meeting.
where the absence of the DM leaves an odd, if not unacceptable, sequence.
Second, some researchers have proposed that the fact that a DM does not
contribute to the truth conditions of the host segment should be part of its
denition (e.g. Schourup, 1999). This claim is superuous. Since DMs function as a relationship between two segments, not as part of the meaning of
either, it follows that a DM does not contribute to the truth conditions of the
host segment.
Third, in some cases the meaning of a DM is exactly the same as the expression when it is used as an adverb, for example in (25).7
(25) The meaning of DM and a homophonous form are the same:
a. DM: He didnt brush his teeth. As a result, he got cavities.
b. Adverbial: The substance suddenly hardened. This wasnt what we
expected as a result of our work.
In other cases, the meaning of the DM and its homophonous form is quite
dierent.
(26) Conceptual meaning of DM and a homophonous form are dierent:
a. We stopped. On the other hand, there was little point in continuing.
It doesnt feel right. Try it on the other hand.
7
Adherents to relevance theory would reject as a result, among others, from being a DM
because it contains conceptual rather than procedural meaning. I address this issue in Section 4.
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The verbs say, look and see are not DMs according to the denition used here.
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(33) He drove the truck through the parking lot and onto the street. Then he
almost cut me o. After that, he ran a red light. However, these werent
his worst oences.
where the three segments referred to by these are all embraced in the scope
of however. The second case is where the scope consists of the prior segment
and segment hosting the DM, but subsequent segments as well, as in (34).
(34) S1: The boss is on vacation today and everybody played.
S2: So, let me guess: John stayed home; Jane went to the movies; and
Harry and Susan reported to work but did nothing.
There may be multiple arguments for both S1 and S2, but I have not found
any to date. I suspect they would be rather cumbersome.
The third case is where S1 is interrupted by another segment, either spoken
by the speaker of S1, as in (35a), or another speaker, as in (35b).
(35) a. I dont want to go. Its such a nice day outside. However, I really do
have an obligation to show up.
b. A: I dont want to go.
B: Well, why dont you stay home?
A: But I have an obligation to be there.
Lenk (1998) suggests that there is the relationship of DMs proposed to distinguish between local coherence, relationships between adjacent segments (with the alternatives just presented above), and global coherence,
relationships to segments mentioned earlier or intended to follow. However,
her denition of DMs is far broader than the one proposed here and I will
not address it.
4. The Semantic Meaning of DMs10
4.1. Framework
I now turn to perhaps the most controversial aspect of DMs, their meaning.
I start from what is known as a semasiological approach, whereby one takes
10
One approach was suggested by Grice (1989), who noted that DMs such as but, moreover,
and on the other hand, do not contribute to the propositional meaning of what is said, but seem
to convey information about non-central or higher-level speech acts, which comment on the
interpretation of the ground oor speech acts. For example, in Three is a prime number but four
is not, the function of but, what Grice calls a conventional implicature, is to signal that there is a
contrast between the interpretation of the two segments. It has been pointed out that this contrast notion of but would not cover all the uses, and that this use of the term speech act is very
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dierent from the usual use. Iten (2000: 203) suggests that Grice might have seen but as indicating the performance of an illocutionary act of contrasting, but provides no further commentary. I will not pursue this alterative.
307
Sweetser (1990) also took this position for her discussion of DMs, as in
(37), though she didnt explain how one was to distinguish between the three
uses.
(37) a. Content Causation: fact of S2 caused fact of S1.
He came back because he loved her.
b. Epistemic Causation: belief in S2 caused conclusion of S1.
He loved her because he came back.
c. Speech Act Causation: fact of S2 gave reason for speech act of S1.
Would you like to go out for dinner tonight, because I know youre
tired.
With polysemy, a single expression has more than one semantic meaning but
these meanings are related in a motivated, if not fully predictable way. These
related meanings may reect a chain, a radical category, or a network of interconnected nodes (Mosegaard-Hansen, 2008). One challenge of this approach
is to separate out the dierent uses of a DM so that it is the meaning of the
DMs which is dierent, not the context. In the three approaches just discussed, it is essential that the tokens under consideration be all of a single
syntactic/functional category. If not, then a fourth approach, heterosemy, a
type of polysemy, can be employed, where the phonetic form remains the
same but the syntactic analysis changes.
I am treating DMs as monosemous, since most DMs have a single meaning
relationship and for those which have more than one, it appears at this point
that they can be dealt with by pragmatic interpretation. The challenge for
those DMs that have more than one use, for example but, so, instead, and
rather, is to determine a single core meaning that can be further elaborated on
by rules of interpretation, yet not be so broad as to be meaningless. In these
cases, I attempt to create a path guided by linguistic context and pragmatic
principles to signal which of the uses of the DMs is occurring on a given
occasion.11
In agreement with Blakemore (2002) and other relevance theory adherents,
I assume that meaning involves (at least) two types: procedural and conceptual (Blakemore, 2002; Hall, 2007). However, I am in strong disagreement
with Blakemore, Hall, and others who consider every expression as having
either a conceptual meaning, or a procedural meaning, but not both. With
regard to DMs, proponents of relevance theory argue that DMs are only
11
such.
Relevance theory also takes the view of monosemy, though researchers dont label it as
308
expressions such as but, however, so, nevertheless, and thus which allegedly are
without any conceptual meaning. For example, you cant say what they mean
or combine them with other expressions (Rouchota, 1998). They specially
exclude as DMs the many expressions such as in contrast (but), as a result (so),
and as a consequence (thus) which have conceptual meaning as well as procedural meaning, and in some cases, precisely the same uses as their procedural brothers. They conclude that because of this dierence among DMs,
they do not form a meaning functional class, a counterintuitive conclusion to
my mind (Blakemore, 2002).
It is my view that the mutual exclusion proposed by relevance theory is too
strong and misguided, and that each class of expression in a language may
have both conceptual and procedural meaning, some having a greater emphasis on procedural meaning (e.g. the past tense marker ed ), some a greater
emphasis on conceptual meaning (e.g. the noun justice). I analyze DMs as
potentially having both conceptual and procedural meaning, though not in
equal proportions (as a result would have far more conceptual meaning than
thus). Both the DMs as a result and thus would contain procedural information to the eect that both DMs signal that S1 is the cause of S2, or that S2
was caused from the action/state of S1, but thus would have the added conceptual requirement that the causality is assumed to follow logically. I see no
way to incorporate the logical requirement of thus into a procedural instruction without reference to the concept logical.
Armed with both the assumption of a core meaning from which variations
of use are derived through pragmatic elaboration, and the assumption that a
DM can potentially contain both procedural and conceptual meaning, I now
present what the semantic meaning and pragmatic interpretation of but might
look like.
4.2. The DM but
I propose that the DM but signals the semantic relationship contrast.12 It
follows that for every use of but as a DM, there is a relevant contrast to be
found between the segments of the S1-but-S2 sequence. Of course, the segments which are compared and contrasted are not always the same. Sometimes
they are the explicit interpretations of S1 and S2, which I shall call direct
contrast, sometimes one or both of the segments involved in the comparison
12
Blakemore makes the same claim using the term contradiction rather than contrast.
I point out the two segments are in contrast if there is a dierence between them, in contradiction if they are in contrast but are incompatible in that context.
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contrast/contradiction, and a sense of incompatibility. I shall use this somewhat weaker notion of incompatibility in these less precise cases of comparison of implications.
In the following I present many uses of but as a DM, attempt to make clear
what linguistic context characterizes a specic use, and to identify what interpretation emerges. The examples are fairly straightforward and more complex
ones may give rise to issues I have not considered. I take no credit for discovering these uses and present them for others to assess and rene. The order of
presentation, having the direct contrast before the indirect contrast, is not
intended to suggest any theoretical priority, nor is the order within the groups.
I have labelled the explicit contrast examples EC-1, EC-2, and the implicit
contrast examples IC-1, IC-2, and appended the names often given in the
research literature, where relevant.
4.2.1. Explicit Contrast
These uses of but all involve the explicit contrast of the interpretation of segments S1 and S2 but in dierent linguistic contexts.
EC-1 (Simple Contrast). In examples such as,
(41) a. Three is [Positive] a prime number. But (in contrast), four is not.
b. Exterior paint is very tough but (in comparison), interior paint is relatively soft.
c. John likes to dance, but/whereas I like to read.
d. A: What we gain in speed we lose in sensitivity. B: But (conversely),
what we gain in sensitivity we lose in speed.
(41a), for example, there is one speaker, the segments are declarative, are parallel in form (active-active), and there are two SCSs for comparison, shown in
italics in the example. The interpretation for these examples is that S1 and S2
are in contrast.14
Abraham (1979: 112) discusses sequences like,
(42) a. There was no chicken but I got some sh.
b. He doesnt have much endurance, but (to make up for that), he has
long legs.
which have 2 SCS each. He suggests a dierent use of but, calling it compensatory, or negatively concessive with the but being translated by dafr in
German. He further suggests that the predicate of the second clause is signalled
14
I have included the other contrastive DM such as in contrast to reinforce what is clear to me
that examples like these are really in contrast.
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as preferred to that of the rst, and the second clause is dominant, i.e. the
second clause receives the stronger accent of the two events (Abraham 1979:
113). That may be the case, but I nd no evidence for it in English, nor do I
nd these examples dierent than the other one-speaker contrast cases just
discussed (Iten, 2000: Ch. 5).
EC-2. In the following examples,
(43) a. He plays basketball but he also plays ping pong.
b. Jones works as an engineer. But, in addition, he consults for the FBI.
c. I like Bach, but I like The Beatles, too.
there is a single speaker and one SCS. A comparison of S1 and S2 results in a
relevant contrast (Note: the DM also does not play a role in this determination) but this contrast would ordinarily result in an unacceptable sequence
with but (though it is acceptable with and), for example,
(44) *He plays basketball but he plays ping pong.
since but precludes positing contrasting properties of the same object. However,
in these sequences there is a second, Elaborative DM, (also, in addition, too, as
well, neither,) which signals that what was expressed in S1 is not a unique
case. Here the interpretation of the but sequence, taken with the EDM, is that
the segments are in contrast but are compatible.
EC-3. In examples (45),
(45) a. A: John is brilliant. B: But he is NOT brilliant.
b. A: We are not going to move to the library. B: But we ARE going to
move to the library.
there are two speakers but one SCS: polarity. S2 and S1 are in contrast. S2
denies S1, with the interpretation that the speaker of S2 is posing a challenge
to the message of the rst speaker.
EC-4 (Correction). A fourth case is shown by (46),
(46) a. A: Im going to a conference in Berlin tomorrow.
B: But that conference is not in Berlin but Boston.
b. A: I see you brought your niece with you today.
B: Shes not my niece but my daughter.
c. A: Oh, my, Nancy fell down.
B: But Nancy didnt fall down, but tripped.
where it is the prior contribution from speaker A who, in the view of B, makes
a factual mistake. The second speaker, in uttering S1, rejects the mistaken
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15
This use of but, which is rendered as sino rather than pero in Spanish, as sondern rather than
aber in German, has been examined by Schwenter (2002), among others. There is an interpretation of rather in all these cases, giving rise to the speculation that an alternative form would have
rather in it, for example, That conference is not in Berlin. Rather, its in Boston.
16
Notice that except, with the exception of, apart from, aside from, excluding, save, among others, may be used in this construction without any meaning change. Their status as DMs has not
been examined to my knowledge.
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315
IC-5. The next use of but involves two additional logical implications.
(55) Challenge to entailment of S1.
A: John murdered Smith. (E=> Smith is dead) B: But Smith is not dead.
A: Some of the boys left. (E=> At least two boys left) B: But only one of
the boys left.
A: Consider this bicycle. (E=> A bicycle has two wheels) B: But this bike
has 3 wheels.
(56) Challenge to presupposition of S1.
A: Damn the King of France. (P=> There is a King) B: But there is no
King of France.
A: Has John stopped smoking. (P=>John smokes) B: But John doesnt
smoke.
A: All the boys left. (P=> At least 3 boys left) B: But only two boys left.
Here, as in IC-4, S2 denies the entailment or presupposition of S1, thereby
creating a contrast between the two. The resulting interpretation is that the
speaker of S2 is implying that the act conveyed by S1 is defective. Again, nothing is eliminated.
IC-6. The nal set of examples, in (57), are similar to IC-2 in that there are
three variations.
(57) a1. Tom is supposed to be here, but he isnt, since he missed his train.
a2. Tom is supposed to be here, but he isnt.
a3. Tom is supposed to be here, but he missed his train.
S1 consists of a (usually positive) segment, which contains a verb of desiring
(wishing, wanting, hoping), of expecting (supposing), or conditional modals
(would, could), and the full S2 consists of the implied negative assertion that
corresponds to S1, followed by a justication for this negative assertion. For
the rst two variants of (57a1-a2), S2 (he isnt) contrasts with an implication
of S1 (he is here).
The third variant must be handled dierently. S2 in the sequence (57a3),
He missed his train, implies that Tom is not here. When this implication
is compared with the implication of S1 (Tom is here), there is a contrast.
The interpretation is that the S2 implication is validated, given there was a
justication to support it.
4.2.3. Some Other Cases
I want to briey mention several other cases which dont seem to t within the
contrast meaning of but. The rst is the topic change use of but (Bell, 1998;
label it as Discourse or Sequential but, as illustrated in (58)).
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(58) a. A: I had a lovely evening last night with Harry. B: But did he repay you
the money?
b. Its good to see you so well, Jane. But lets talk about the real reason
I came by.
The fact that there is no contrastive result from comparing S1 and S2 follows
from the fact that this case is not a DM use of but. Whereas DM signals a
semantic relationship holding between S1 and S2, the but in these examples is
signalling a change in discourse topic, not a semantic notion. This but is analogous to pragmatic markers such as incidentally, on another topic, to return to the
former topic, etc. (cf. Fraser, 2009).
The examples in (59),
(59) a. Its unbelievable, but John got married last night.
b. You may not be aware of this, but Mark is a very ne pianist.
c. Im reluctant to say this, but I dont like the dinner Mary has planned.
pose a very interesting case. They have been considered by Lauerbach (1989)
and Fretheim (2005), the former not considering the specic meaning of but,
the latter attempting to place these examples within the relevance theory of
contradiction and elimination, but with a lack of success. What is to be contrasted is not clear to me, if this use of but is even a DM.
The nal case is illustrated in (60), a case for which I have no adequate
analysis,
(60) a. A: Is it done? B: But of course its done.
b. A: He doesnt want to leave. B: But of course he doesnt. Would you?
c. A: Can I help? B: But of course you can.
where the but may or may not be functioning as a DM and it requires the of
course to accompany it with this use.
I list here for the sake of completeness a number of additional sequences
containing but which I, at the moment, do not have acceptable analyses for,
whether they be DMs or otherwise.
(61) a. The tyranny of the multitude is but a multiplied tyranny.
b. He would have gone, but for the mess on the garage oor.
c. She speaks either French or German, but I dont know which one.
d. Who arrived at the stroke of midnight but the long lost relatives.
e. He has all but/nearly clinched the championship.
f. It never rains but (that) it pours.
g. He is but a child. (only, simply, just, merely)
h. Ill get you but good.
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17
318
Another area is the extent to which all DMs operate in the three domains
proposed by Sweetser (1990). While most DMs appear to, there are some such
as for example, as a result, in contrast, that is to say, and moreover for which
I cannot nd sequences in which they function in the epistemic and/or speech
act domain.
Finally, a third area worth looking at is the extent to which at least the primary DMs (and, but, so) have the same uses across languages. I have conducted a preliminary investigation into this matter with but, using sequences
which favoured the dierent interpretations of but as a DM in English, such
as the examples in (64).
(64) a. John is tall but Mary is short.
b. I left the house late but I arrived on time.
c. Shes not my sister but my mother.
d. Its unbelievable but no one in the class has a middle name.
e. I would kiss you but I cant.
f. Jack is but a child.
The results from over 20 languages indicate that they all share the functions of
but illustrated in (64a-b), most use but for (64c) although some languages
have an alternative form for but (Spanish: pero, German: aber), but the languages vary considerably for the other functions which were discussed above.
A more thorough, systematic study should be conducted to ascertain just how
universal the functions of the Primary DMs are.
To conclude, in the foregoing I have attempted to sketch out an account of
DMs with sucient precision that researchers working in this area will be able
to assess and compare their results with others. The section on the meaning of
but is a rst attempt to set out an alternative to relevance theory and certainly
will undergo revision. Indeed, it is possible that data from other languages will
cause revision of parts of my account presented here. I certainly hope not.
However, I do hope this paper will be the basis for a more productive analysis
of DMs than we have experienced to date.
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