Grant Reynolds

Term Paper: The Near Success of the White Movement in the Russian Civil War
Historians cannot afford to look at the world in terms of black and white. It robs the
past of the detail needed for proper understanding. In that regard, success and failure
cannot be drawn so harshly in the sand as to prevent us from seeing pyrrhic victories or
fruitful defeats. In the long, human history of failed revolutions and counterrevolutions, the
story of the White Movement in Russias Civil War is often told as a meritless, hopeless
uprising that was no serious threat to the unstoppable rise of Bolshevism.
After the 1917 October overthrow of Russias Provisional Government by the
Bolsheviks, party policies and socialism quickly became the law of the land. While many
welcomed the Revolution, some stood up to fight back. In general, the success of a
revolution, or in this case a counterrevolution, is usually a factor of how much support one
can rally and how much damage one can inflict on your foe. While most uprisings fall short
in one or both of these regards, the White Movement showed a good measure of success in
both. Around the borders of the Old Russian Empire, independent armies, peoples, and
governments grew in strength and authority, eventually uniting under the causes of the
White Movement. Despite many histories that paint the counterrevolution as a little more
than a directionless revolt, the White Movement was an organized, state-like, professional,
effort with unsung success that nearly ended Bolshevism in its cradle.
The Siberian Army
In the October Revolution, the Bolsheviks climbed to the top of the pack by stepping
up on the back of the Provisional Government, specifically the Social Revolutionaries (SR).
Almost overnight the SRs were marginalized in key cities like Petrograd and Moscow, but in
more obscure Eastern Russia, SRs didnt fade away so easily. In the eastern city of Tomsk,
Social Revolutionary Committees denounced the Bolshevik coup and rejected their new Red
government. Instead of conforming to the Bolsheviks leadership, they created an all

socialist Siberian Regional Duma, and eventually, a Provisional Government of Autonomous

Siberia.1 The Social Revolutionaries had no intention of bending to a new Red master,
especially in a region where they had popular support.
As is often the case in history, it is one thing to gain power and another to keep it. The
Social Revolutionaries knew their actions would mean war and they quickly prepared
themselves for it. The SR officer Arkady Krakovetsky was placed over the military and
tasked with raising an army. Recruitment was slow at first, mostly men from other various
anti-Bolshevik groups, but once recruitment changed from a volunteer to a conscriptionbased system, the ranks swelled to around 184,000 by October 1918. 2 This substantial
fighting force was simply named the Siberian Army to reflect the land its people came from.
The Provisional Government of Autonomous Siberia and the Siberian Army underwent a
great deal of structural change in November of 1918 when unity with the Komuch created
the Provisional All-Russian Government and placed the Siberian Army under the control of
the Czech Legion. In general though, it is worth pointing out the White Movement started
out as a civilian, not a military affair. Where most uprisings around the world begin and end
with total control of warlords and generals, White forces in Serbia actually started around
somewhat egalitarian lines of bureaucracy and governance.
The Komuch
Komuch is short for the Committee of Members of the Constituent Assembly. The
members of the Constituent Assembly were a body in Russia that had known a brief
moment of political acceptance under the Provisional Government, but were then soon
dispelled by the Bolsheviks. Their democratic ideas had no place within the new socialist,
party state. Like the Social Revolutionaries in Tomsk, SRs and Constitute Assembly
1 Norman Pereira, White Siberia: The Politics of Civil War (Montreal: McGill-Queen's
University Press, 1996) 50.
2 Pereira, White Siberia, 54.

members in eastern cities had enough local support to declare their independence. In June
of 1918 after the Czech Legion drove off the local Red forces in the city of Samara, the
Komuch was formed.3
The Komuch declared its authority to be the highest of any White Movement in Russia. It
was a rather bold claim that wasnt taken very seriously since nearly all other White groups
had much larger military forces. However, the Komuch acted as if it had the authority it
purported. The Assembly issued proclamations, reinstated freedoms, reestablished free
enterprise and private ownership, and stripped away Bolshevik laws in the territories
surrounding Samara.4 Some of these changes however were met with resistance. Much of
the peasantry who had thrown out the land owners and the wealthy kulaks were aghast to
see the Komuch returning land to these aristocrats.
To keep order and prevent any sort of Green movement, the Komuch formed the Peoples
Army in the summer of 1918. Under the commissioned monarchist Kappel, the Peoples
Army never grew to much more than 3,000 troops and although the Army captures a
number of Bolshevik cities, it plays more of a defensive role in the war. 5 This defensive role
should not be underestimated however, for by keeping the region open, the Peoples Army
would allow the Eastern Front of the White Armies to push towards Moscow.
With the creation of the Provisional All-Russian Government in November 1918 the
Komuch was absorbed into the Provisional Government of Autonomous Siberia, as was its
Peoples Army into the Serbian Army. 6 The Komuch is noteworthy for helping launch the

3 Ibid 99.
4 Edward Action, ed., Vladimir Cherniaev, ed., and William Rosenberg, ed., Critical
Companion to the Russian Revolution 1914-21 (Bloomington and Indianapolis: Indiana
University Press, 1997) 65.
5 Action, Russian Revolution 1914-21, 65.
6 Ibid 96.

counterrevolution, but also because it shows the ability of the White Movement to govern.
The Komuch controlled nearly all the Volga Region and the millions of people that inhabited
the critical region. And while there were numerous problems with production and military
recruitment, the Komuch kept society functioning, proving the Whites could run a state.
That is a lot more that can be said for the average warlord whose rebellion takes over a city.
The Czech Legion
The White army with the most military success by far, was not even ethnically Russian, but
rather Czechoslovakian. Russia had been home to populations of ethnic Czechs and Slovaks
for centuries, and at the start of WWI, many of them were all too eager to defend their
Serbian brethren from Austria-Hungary. The Czech Legion was formed in 1914 and quickly
became battle hardened on the Eastern Front. 7
After the October Revolution, the Bolsheviks were desperate to make peace with Germany.
The Czech Legion was being redeployed by ship to France to fight on the Western Front, but
per Germanys orders, the Legions trains were detoured through Siberia to Vladivostok. The
Bolsheviks then capitulated even further to Germany and ordered the 60,000 man Legion
disarmed and interned.8 In May 1918, after a train of Czech soldiers crossed paths with
recently released Austro-Hungarian Soldiers, a riot broke out resulting in the capture of the
city of Chelyabinsk and the expulsion of all Red forces there in. 9
Word spread through the Legion and with rapid military efficiently the cities up and down
the Trans-Siberian Railway were captured. Once the immediate areas around the railways
were secured, the Czech legion quickly expanded into the Siberian countryside, linking up

7 Ibid 712.
8 Russian
9 Pereira, White Siberia, 60.

with other White forces, such as the Komuch and the Siberian Army. 10 They captured Red
armories, artillery, and armored trains, and no Bolshevik force in Siberia was prepared to
stop them. By the summer of 1918 the Czech Legion was to be thanked for the total White
dominance of Siberia and the Eastern Front. 11
The Eastern Front of the White Movement would suffer a number of blows, but one of the
biggest came in 1919. By that time WWI had officially come to a close, and the Central
Powers had clearly been defeated. With no war to get back and fight for, the Czech Legion
no longer had much of a stake in the Red-White struggle. Whats more, on October 28, 1918
Czechoslovakia was made its own state out of Austria-Hungarian territory. 12 With a new
homeland and new purpose, the men of the Legion no longer saw the point of fighting in
Russias war.
The Czech Legion pulled back to their fortified Trans-Siberian Railways and opened
communications with the Bolsheviks. In order to leave Russia in peace they agreed to hand
over a large amount of stolen gold and to betray the White Movement. 13 The Legion did this
in two ways: They tried to start a rebellion in numerous White cities, but more drastically,
the Legion captured the supreme White Movement Commander, Aleksandr Kolchak, and
delivered him to the Bolsheviks. Kolchak was promptly killed and the White Movement
suffered another deadly blow. In the end, the Czech Legion evacuated the last of its troops
through Vladivostok by 1920, eventually making their way to Czechoslovakia. 14
While the fatal flaw of the Czech Legion proved to be their lack of vision or
commitment to the White cause, that doesnt mean we should discount them as a non10 Ibid.
11 Evan Mawdsley, The Russian Civil War (Boston: Allen & Unwin, 1987) 47.
12 Mawdsley, The Russian Civil War, 67.
13 Ibid 94.
14 Action, Russian Revolution 1914-21, 550.

serious threat to the rise of Bolshevism. This was a fighting force that not only had years of
combat experience, but experience working together under the same command and with
the same companions. They were able to work effectively with Russians for a shared goal
and conquer half of Russia. Its fair to say that had the Czech Legion been more committed
to working with the other White Armies and to overthrowing Bolshevism, there may have
never been a USSR.
Northwestern White Army
While some White armies didnt prove to be as professional as others, some could still come
as close to success as any other. For many, the October Revolution was the final signal to
leave Russia entirely, or to at least lower ones public status. This was exactly Tsarist
General Nikolai Yudenichs goal as he went into hiding in Estonia and Finland in 1917.
Yudenich, however, chose to be more proactive while he was away, and by June 1919 he
made contact with the All-Russian Government in Omsk. 15 He was promptly given
permission to raise a Northern Army and, more importantly, was given the funds to do so.
Traveling around Latvia, Estonia, and Finland, Yudenich recruited nationalists, freed Russian
prisoners, Mensheviks, German supporters, and any other anti-Bolsheviks he could find.
Yudenichs Army even received foreign support as the British offered money, guns, and six
tanks.16
In October 1919 the Northwest White Army, as it was named, marched on Petrograd
with almost 20,000 men. It was a smaller force, but Yudenich hoped to make up for their
size with a rapid, surprise attack. His army did manage to fight its way to Petrograd rather
quickly and promptly besiege it, but the Whites forces failed to capture a critical railway
that served as a lifeline between Moscow and Petrograd. 17 The siege continued for a number
15 Pereira, White Siberia, 302.
16 Mawdsley, The Russian Civil War, 116.
17 Ibid 196.

of weeks while the citys forces remained under-manned, but Trotsky refusing to surrender.
To rally the citizens of Petrograd in taking up arms, Trostky stated, If the White Guards
break through into this enormous city they will be plunged into a labyrinth of buildings,
where every house will face them with an enigma or deadly danger... 18 However, such
measure were unnecessary since Yudenichs supplies quickly decreased and Petrograds
actually increased via rail.
When Yudenich decided to break the siege, his army is promptly chased out of Russia
by the Red Guard. However, as the Army returned to Estonia in late October 1919, a
problem arose. While, the White Movement didnt have an official dogma or constitution,
many of its followers tend to be Tsarists of the Imperial Empire. This meant that many of the
Whites hope to one day restore the original empire of Russia and end the recent
independence movement of nations like Estonia. It was for this very reason that Finland had
given Yudenich no support during his recruitment efforts. Having grown wary of the White
Armys intentions, once Yudenichs troops crossed back into Estonia, the Estonian military
disarmed and arrested the entire army. The White soldiers were eventually forced into
exile.19
The Bolsheviks had moved the capital at the start of the war from Petrograd to
Moscow, for a more central location, but Petrograd was still the heart of Russia. It is quite
incredible to think that a nearly undetected force was able to sneak across the border, into
this most emotionally significant area, and almost pull the rug out from under the
Bolsheviks. It is hard to say what would have happened, but perhaps capturing Petrograd,
or simply securing the railway, could have won the war for the Whites. The morale of your
troops and the demoralization of your enemy has won and lost countless conflicts
throughout history.
18 Evan Mawdsley, The Russian Civil War (Boston: Allen & Unwin, 1987) 164.
19 Mawdsley, The Russian Civil War, 200.

The Volunteer Army

After the failed coup and imprisonment of Kornilov, a fellow general of the Imperial Army,
Mikhail Alekseyev, took the few remaining troops of Kornilovs and retreated south to the
Cossack region of Don in November 1917. Alekseyev was unable to rally immediate support
however, since the near independent Cossack regions werent terribly concerned with the
Revolution.20 It became necessary for Alekseyev to form an all-volunteer force to battle the
Reds. Slowly a small force of 4,000 men developed, mostly of cadet and tsarist military
personal. But small as it was, it was enough to take the fight back to the Bolsheviks.
It has often been argued that the greatest failing of the White Movement was the lack of a
unified voice or cause for the people to rally behind, leading to lackluster support. However
General Anton Denikin of the Volunteer Army would argue differently. Officially the aims
pursued by the army were published in a proclamation by the General Staff. These were: to
struggle, to fight against anarchy and the Germano-Bolshevist invasion, and to steer the
country to the Constituent Assembly, the army pledging itself implicitly to submit to the
Government legally elected by the former.

21

This was not a tsarist or Marxist pledge, but a

pledge for democracy and the voice of the Russian people. Not for power or control but,
stated clearly, for the people. History seems to support idea that revolutions based on
ideology tend to be more successful.
On November 19, 1917, Kornilov and a number of his followers actually managed to escape
their imprisonment and met the Whites in Don. Kornilov assumed command and had to face
the challenge of holding off repeated Bolshevik advances into Don Territory with a static
supply of White troops.22 With the Don Cossacks proving unwilling to fight, Kornilov turned
20 Anton Denikin, trans Catherine Zvegintozv, The White Army (United States: Academic
International Press, 1973, reprint of 1930 edition) 27.
21 Denikin, The White Army, 34-35.
22 Ibid 40.

his attention to the neighboring Eastern Kuban Cossacks. The entirety of the White force
was told to retreat, abandoning the Don to the Bolsheviks. After a long frozen trek (known
as the Ice March), the Army reached the Kuban region and proceeded to attack the
Bolshevik occupiers.23 Driving all the way to the capital city of Ekaterinodar, the Whites
began to encounter heavy Red resistance, with only 3,000 Kuban Cossack volunteers came
to the Whites aid. On April 10, 1918, Kornilov himself was killed by artillery fire, leaving
General Denikin to command the Volunteer Army. 24
Denikin, unable to fend off the Bolsheviks or secure the volunteers he needed pulled the
Army north, out of Kuban Territory. At this point, after the failed rallying of the Kuban and
Don Cossacks, one could cynically think that the White cause was impractical, unwanted, or
that of a fringe minority. However this was not the case. News arrived from the Don Territory
of a dramatic change of spirit that had Denikin marching his army straight back home
again.
After the Volunteer Army pulled out of Don, the Bolsheviks flooded into the region
and started a regional Red Terror. Firstly, the Red Guard plundered, destroyed, and
executed. Then any semblance of Cossack independence was stripped away as party
leadership was established, lands were divided and collectivized, private property was
seized, conspirators were arrested, etc. 25 Shocked by the suicide of Dons Military
Commander, Alexi Kaledin, and outraged at the Bolshevik rule, the Don Cossacks rebelled in
massive numbers in April 1918.26
The entire experience converted the Don Cossacks to the White Movement. They shared the
same cause as stated by General Denikin above, to fight against anarchy and the
23 Ibid 45.
24 Ibid 95.
25 Mawdsley, The Russian Civil War, 86.
26 Ibid.

Germano-Bolshevist invasion. While it took living under the effects of Bolshevism to come
to that decision, both groups were eventually united by ideology. To unite
culturally/ethnically different groups under a common banner is a strong indication of
successful leadership. And the Don supported the White ideology with a new Cossack Army
52,000 strong and thousands of recruits for the Volunteer Army. 27
The summer of 1918 was the Volunteer Armys most successful, transforming them into a
force capable of destroying Bolshevism. With fresh troops and supplies the Army set out on
the Second Kuban Campaign. Much more successful this time (in large thanks to Don
Cossack recruits) the Army completely liberated the territory from Red control. 28 White
control of Kuban offered even more recruits and resources, but more importantly, it offered
access to the Black Sea, making it possible to receive greater aid from foreign supporters.
Foreign aid played a critical role throughout the White counterrevolution, just as it is usually
required in any successful rebellion.
Denikin made a very wise move at this point. Although his army was then stronger
than ever, instead of turning it north towards Moscow, he turned it south towards the
Caucuses. Unable to be easily reinforced, the Reds in the Caucuses quickly fell to the
Volunteer Army. By dividing his forces, and using a healthy dose of propaganda, Denikins
forces neutralized 100,000 Red soldiers, liberated the Northern Caucuses, and swelled the
Army with some 35,000 men.29
In 1919, from Don, Denikin assumed the title of Commander-in-Chief of the Armed
Forces of South Russia. In all, he commanded around 73,000 troops and a small naval force
on the Black Sea.30 However Denikins new title was now under the self-proclaimed Supreme
27 Ibid 88.
28 Denikin, The White Army, 162.
29 Denikin, The White Army, 204-212.
30 Ibid 214.

White Military Commander Admiral Alexander Kolchak. Kolchaks November 1918 coup
over the White government in Siberia had given him supreme authority over all groups that
identified with the White Movement. Kolchak would keep Denikin in the South and would
ultimately use the very organized and formidable Volunteer Army in the final move on
Moscow.
The amazing turnaround of the Southern White forces is astounding. From 4,000 men
in one city, to 73,000 men and all of Southern Russia in only fourteen months is incredible.
Denikins forces were now a broad spectrum of soldiers, from Caucasians to cadets, and had
to be managed carefully. In a personal letter Denikin reflected, If I raise the republican flag,
I lose half my volunteers, and if I raise the monarchist flag, I lose the other half. But we have
to save Russia.31 Great commanders can find common cause when little exists and by
turning his men into the saviors of Russia, Denikin created a united and committed military.
Supreme Commander Kolchak
One of the greatest defining factors in a revolutions legitimacy is its leaders. Unwise,
unprofessional, and uncommitted leaders have turned uprisings into riots and militaries into
militias. Sadly, for the White movement, the November 1918 creation of the Provisional AllRussian Government quickly brought political dissidence. Social Revolutionaries and
Constituent Assembly members failed to compromise on most issues. This stalled political
track began to seriously affect the peoples and the war effort of the Eastern Front.
In order to end the political stalemate, the SR White leadership in Omsk was arrested
by a troop of British-sponsored, White Cossacks. The remaining government leaders looked
to a single strong leader to grant emergency powers to, and the unanimous decision was
Alexander Kolchak.32 Admiral Kolchak had only arrived in Russia a few months prior, and
arrived in Omsk a few days before the arrests, but his reputation as an intelligent, strong,
31 Action, Russian Revolution 1914-21, 209.
32 Pereira, White Siberia, 100.

Imperial Officer preceded him. Whether begrudgingly or premeditatedly, Kolchak accepted

the nomination to be the Supreme Commander of the Provisional All-Russian Government,
in what some would call an un-planned coup.
In many respects Kolchaks effective and professional leadership defines the legitimacy of
the White Movement as a whole. In a general proclamation inside White territory Kolchak
states, My chief aims are the organization of a fighting force, the overthrow of Bolshevism,
and the establishment of law and order, so that the Russian people may be able to choose a
form of government in accordance with its desire and to realize the high ideas of liberty and
freedom. Again, instead of the tsarist/imperialist/monarchical ambitions often associated
with the Whites, we see more general ideals of choice for the Russian people. This was
mostly likely said in the hopes of uniting a diverse population behind the cause of Russian
freedom from Bolshevism.
However, in creating a military state prepared enough to face the Reds, Kolchak used
the stick just as much as the carrot. All communists were expelled from White territory or
executed. Most, if not all trade unions were disbanded. Farmland was taken back from the
peasantry and returned to the landowners who had lost it during the Revolution. This often
led to deadly confrontations between White troops and farmers. 33 More than a few civilians
met their end under Kolchaks reign.
By December 1918, Kolchak was secure enough in his position to press his forces forwards
again. The combined force of 110,000 White soldiers directly under Kolchaks command
quickly pressed back the inferior Red Army. Cities fell rapidly as his Eastern Front pressed all
the way to the Volga River by March 1919.34 At Samara, the Whites were only a little more
than a weeks travel from Moscow. Finally connecting the two fronts, the Eastern and
Southern, was becoming a real possibility. Had this happened, needed troops, supplies, and
33 Pereira, White Siberia, 116.
34 Mawdsley, The Russian Civil War, 135.

information could have easily been exchanged between the White Armies, greatly
increasing their odds of victory.
As would be the case however, Bolshevik commanders refocused their tactics, making
Kolchaks Eastern Front their number one priority. With a fresh supply of new troops, the Red
Army smashed into the White line at Ufa in 1919, only to see the line crack like an egg
shell.35 While Kolchak had expertly and professionally organized and deployed his forces, he
had simply been too successful too fast. His forces were completely over extended trying to
maintain the vast territory they had recently conquered from the Reds. The front line was
often cut off from supply lines, leaving the men without food, clothing, medicine, and
ammunition. Most devastating was the extremely poor recruitment rate the Whites were
having in these new regions, especially compared to the fresh recruits the Bolsheviks were
fielding.36 Trotsky himself later said, We owe these victories, first and foremost, to the
soviets of Petrograd and Moscow, in the shape of the proletarians they hurled into battle on
the Eastern Front.37
Most inferior rebel armies quickly turn an initial retreat into a total route after the first few
defeats, but the White Army of the Eastern front put up some of its toughest fighting as it
the Bolsheviks advanced. The Red push was halted at the Tobol and the Ishim rivers until
October, but without fresh recruits and the abandonment of the Czech Legion, the Whites
simply couldnt hold out.38
Kolchaks reign and the reality of an Eastern White Russia came to a close on November 14,
1919, when the Red Army captured the White capital of Omsk and some 50,000 White

35 Ibid 137.
36 Ibid.
37 Leon Trotsky, How the Revolution was Armed: Volume 1
38 Ibid 139.

soldiers.39 Having lost the confidence of the reaming White Movement, Kolchak resigned his
office to General Denikin on the Southern Front and transferred control of his remaining
forces to the Cossack Commander Semyonov.40 As mentioned above, Kolchak was
eventually betrayed by the Czech Legion. Without central leadership the Eastern Front fell
apart, and while some pockets of resistance in Serbia continued on for nearly a decade, the
Red Army reestablished near total control by 1921.
Southern Front Marches on Moscow
In the beginning of May of 1919, when Kolchaks Eastern Front had made its greatest gains,
Denikin began his march north to take advantage of the opportunity. With his substantial
forces, he was able to split off Cossack, Caucasian, and Volunteer units in a sweeping line of
advance to capture cities and push back Red forces as they marched. Denikins forces
captured cities all the way up to Saratov on the Volga River, and were even supported by a
flotilla from the Black Sea.41
While, the Southern Front had advanced even closer to the Moscow than the Eastern Front,
here also they ran into similar problems. While the White Army was gaining plenty of
recruits, they were over extended and couldnt supply them themselves nearly as well as
the Reds could supply their new recruits. The lack of industrialization and weapon
production in the countryside had always been an advantage for the Bolsheviks. 42
Most rebel armies flee completely at a counterattack; good armies at least put up a
fight, like Kolchaks, professional armies counter counterattacks. This is exactly what
Denikins forces are able to do. After three weeks of heavy fighting, the Reds pushed
39 Ibid 149.
40 Ibid.
41 270 white armies
42 Ibid 272-275

Denikins line back some eighty kilometers, but with great officers and Kuban Calvary, the
Bolsheviks were driven out and the line was restored. Later on, the Volunteer Army was able
to repel a massive surprise rear-attack from a Red unit, saving the entire line. Critical
supplies on the way to Moscow were also captured by Don Cossack Calvary, saving many
White soldiers, and demoralizing many Red. 43
By mid-October 1919, the three month battle seemed to turn against the Bolsheviks.
The Whites had actually managed to expand their line, capturing more cities, and start to
encircle the region around Moscow.44 Leaders and citizens in Moscow grew worried as talk of
evacuation became serious conversation. The critical mistake Denikin makes in this process
however was capturing Kiev and Ukrainian territory as he expands his battle space. Ukraine,
while it was no friend of the Bolsheviks, had its own independence movement with the
February Revolution and many there didnt wish to see any kind of Russian influence return.
The Ukrainian anarchist Nestor Makhno led his Black Army of tens of thousands of
guerilla fighters against Denikins forces. This first attack on September 25, 1919 led to the
total route of a White Army regiment. 45 After a few direct confrontations, the Black Army
settled into constant raids of White Army supply lines. Denikin had to divert thousands of
his best troops from the front to fight of the Ukrainian Nationalists. Thus, with the Whites
deprived of needed supplies and troops, the Bolsheviks began to make ground. 46
Over the coming months the Southern Front was pushed back steadily and split in
half. Denikin retreated through Don, but he and 40,000 remaining troops were forced to
evacuate to the Crimea. In Crimea, Denikin gave command up to another officer and the

43 Ibid 274-276
44 Ibid 282.
45 Ibid 324.
46 Ibid 328.

White Army regrouped until 1920.47 In mid-1920 the last of the White Forces did make one
last attempt to break north out of Crimea, but there efforts were futile. The end of the White
Movement in Russia came in November 14, 1920 as the last White resistance to Bolshevism
sailed from Crimea to Constantinople.48
Conclusion
Fighting for what one believes in has been, and will always be, a noble cause, but the
success of revolutions can still be measured to some extent. For example, the Republic of
West Florida in 1820 lasted for a total of 90 days. The Anglo-Zanzibar Rebellion of 1896 only
lasted 45 minutes. History seems quick to forget the failed revolutions of Hungary, Tibet,
and Czechoslovakia in the mid-20th Century. So too do many histories downplay the
significances of the White Movement, calling it failed and therefore un-noteworthy.
By looking at the history of the various White Armies in the Russian Civil War we can
see that the White Movement was the greatest threat Bolshevism ever faced, second only
to Hitler perhaps. Unlike the disorganized, militia-based, leaderless, mobs that have made
up so many uprisings around the world, the White Movement was led by professional
officers and statesmen who could organize government, pass laws, build armies,
coordinate, and lead with vision. The White Movement had numerous flaws that led to their
eventual downfall, but they did not fail until they made the extermination of Red Russia a
real possibility. Trotskey was besieged for three weeks in Petrograd, Kolchak was days from
Moscow, Denikin mere miles outside of Moscow for months, total control of Siberia and
Southern Russia was in White hands. These were accomplishments of a worthy opponent to
the Red Army. Despite their shortcomings, the White Armies of the Russian Civil War should
be remembered for their near success in a failed counterrevolution and how close they
came to drastically altering world history as we know it.
47 Ibid 345.
48 Ibid 366.

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