NegCommunicative Engagement

Kevinif you have additional case cards/impact turns +

analytics to add to this from todays research, feel free to do
so. SA

Procedurals

TCommunicative Engagement1NC
A. Interpretation Increase requires specification
OED, 89 (Oxford English Dictionary, 2nd edition, Online through Emory)
increase, v.
3. To become greater in some specified quality or respect; to grow or advance in.

Engagement is a strategy that depends on positive incentives

Haass and OSullivan, 2k - *Vice President and Director of Foreign Policy Studies
at the Brookings Institution AND **a Fellow with the Foreign Policy Studies Program
at the Brookings Institution (Richard and Meghan, Terms of Engagement:
Alternatives to Punitive Policies Survival,, vol. 42, no. 2, Summer 2000 ,
http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/research/files/articles/2000/6/summer
%20haass/2000survival.pdf

The term engagement was popularised in the early 1980s amid controversy about
the Reagan administrations policy of constructive engagement towards South
Africa. However, the term itself remains a source of confusion. Except in the few
instances where the US has sought to isolate a regime or country, America arguably
engages states and actors all the time simply by interacting with them. To be a
meaningful subject of analysis, the term engagement must refer to something
more specific than a policy of non-isolation. As used in this article, engagement
refers to a foreign-policy strategy which depends to a significant degree on
positive incentives to achieve its objectives. Certainly, it does not preclude the
simultaneous use of other foreign-policy instruments such as sanctions or military
force: in practice, there is often considerable overlap of strategies, particularly when
the termination or lifting of sanctions is used as a positive inducement. Yet the
distinguishing feature of American engagement strategies is their reliance on the
extension or provision of incentives to shape the behaviour of countries with which
the US has important disagreements.

B. Violation they dont specify and therefore cant be an

engagement strategy their use of the term communicative
engagement without describing what actually SPECIFICALLY
CHANGES between the US and China is vacuous
Litwak, 7 Vice President for Scholars and Director of International Security
Studies at the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars (Robert, Regime
Change: U.S. Strategy through the Prism of 9/11, p. 107)

Sound target-state analysis provides policymakers with the basis for selecting an
appropriate strategy along a continuum of choice, which ranges from total regime
change (or rollback) to containment to engagement. These terms have become
standard reference points in the American foreign policy debate, but officials and
policy analysts often use them without precision, almost as shorthand to indicate
their positive or negative attitude toward a particular state. George observed that
each of these terms encompasses an array of alternative strategies:
It should be recognized that "containment" and "engagement" are general concepts
that require specific content in order to become strategies. Each of these
concepts is capable of generating significantly different strategies. Policy planning
and the development of policies for dealing with rogue states must develop a
specific containment strategy and/or a specific engagement strategy. The question
that must be addressed is, "which type of containment strategy" and/or "which
type of engagement strategy" and "which particular combination of containment
and engagement strategy?" Unless this question of how to transform these general
concepts into specific strategies and tactics is adequately and clearly answered,
they are likely to encourage inconsistent, even contradictory behavior toward the
rogue state.

C. Standards
1. Limits not requiring the aff to specify explodes the
literature base it frees them from having to find specific
solvency advocates or defenses of particular communicative
engagement strategies and allows them to dodge links
through vagueness
2. Negative Ground if they dont specify, it prevents us from
accessing most of the literature written against engagement
which is geared towards contrasting strategies theyve
destroyed legitimate CP ground
D. Voters
T is a voter for pedagogical reasons.

2NC Specification Key

The aff fails to specify the exact mechanism for engagement
this model of debate crushes education and justifies an unfair
expansion of the topic
Hayden 13 (Dr. Craig Hayden is an assistant professor in the International
Communication Program at American University's School of International Service.
Engagement is More Convenient than Helpful: Dissecting a Public Diplomacy
Term., http://intermap.org/2013/06/20/engagement-is-more-convenient-thanhelpful-dissecting-a-public-diplomacy-term/
I think this tension is readily apparent in efforts to use social media for public
diplomacy.Case in point how does the use of Facebook or Twitter constitute
engagement? Does the larger base of people who Like an embassy page indicate
a successful campaign of engagement? Or, does it reflect a productive use of
advertising techniques to recruit likes, while not necessarily providing the implied
more meaningful connections that social networks can sustain? When an
ambassador uses Twitter, does this constitute a robust effort to sustain dialogue
with publics, or, does it represent a kind of performance that humanizes the chief of
mission? Im not suggesting one is better than the other. What I am saying is that
there a few clear parameters for what constitutes engagement. In my research on
US digital public diplomacy, I have heard a lot of critiques about what is being done
from a practical standpoint, but not so much on the bigger question of why. What
does this mean for practitioners? For starters, it makes it harder to design the kind
of formative research needed to plan an effective public diplomacy program that
takes into account both the contextual factors and the strategic needs that the
program will serve. The conceptual ambiguity also makes it difficult to pin down
how and when a program can be deemed effective in post hoc evaluation. While I
readily acknowledge that measurement and evaluation imperatives can ultimately
distort the practice of public diplomacy or even conceal the less democratic forms
of communication involved in public diplomacy outreach, I think its also important
to acknowledge that the ambiguity of a term like engagement makes it potentially
about everything all the touch-points, communications, and connections that are
involved in public diplomacy. I dont think this helps practitioners, policy-makers, or
commentators. Instead, it perpetuates jargon, and elides more persistent questions
about both the purpose and the operative theories that underscore efforts to reach
foreign publics.

Specification is key their decision-making model makes any

true engagement policy education impossible
Wallin 6/11/2013 (Matthew, Masters in Public Diplomacy at the University of
Southern California in 2010, Fellow and Office Manager at the American Security
Project, Engagement: What does it Mean for Public Diplomacy?,
http://americansecurityproject.org/blog/2013/engagement-what-does-it-mean-forpublic-diplomacy/

If anything, using the term engagement can sometimes provide the user with a
perceived ability to forgo one of the most difficult parts of public diplomacythat is
demonstrating metrics which indicate whether or not ones efforts are succeeding at
influencing the target audience. In other words, the user of engagement may feel
as though they neednt actually explain the effects of their activities because they
are engaging by nature of the word. This is why analyzing the content of
engagement is vital. Is a forum post engaging? Is a billboard engaging? Is a TV
advertisement engaging? This can be difficult to determine, and cannot be
assumed. What practitioners and policymakers should understand is that core of
public diplomacy is not really about undefined engagementit is about building
relationships. By focusing on relationship-building, and eliminating engagement
from the PD lexicon, practitioners and policymakers may begin to better employ the
thinking that is required for better public diplomacy. Rather than speaking about PD
in abstract terms, emphasizing relationship-building forces those participating in the
PD debate to consider the types of activities that are necessary to gain influence.
Rather than counting one-off twitter postings as engagement, practitioners should
focus on substantive, comprehensive and continuing dialogue. One of the biggest
problems in public diplomacy is that few understand what it is, and the terminology
itself doesnt help. Soft power, public diplomacy, and engagement all need to be
explained in order to be understood. These terms have no immediate recognition
like war, peace, freedom or competition. For this reason, perhaps building
relationships should be used more often by those exploring or explaining the
subject.

Hold their feet to the fire vague approaches to engagement

strategies destroy the discipline and avoid the most difficult
and essential questions behind the topic
Hayden 13 (Dr. Craig Hayden is an assistant professor in the International
Communication Program at American University's School of International Service.
Engagement is More Convenient than Helpful: Dissecting a Public Diplomacy
Term., http://intermap.org/2013/06/20/engagement-is-more-convenient-thanhelpful-dissecting-a-public-diplomacy-term/
Lord and Lynch are right to note that the practice of public diplomacy may be
disconnected from strategic imperatives. It is a call to think about public diplomacy
as not an end in itself but a means to policy objective. But as is evident, the
definition seems not all that different. Strategy is implicated in practice, whether
implicit or explicit. It seems that in the case of engagement, the meaning is
almost always deferred, implied, or left open to suit the argument of the moment. I
dont think this helps build a broader constituency for the practice of public
diplomacy. This little diversion into deconstruction is important, because I think the
term the term engagement conceals as much as it reveals. It implies distinctions
between efforts of persuasion and relation-building, yet retains the connotation of
influence. Engagement also amounts to a bit of rhetorical rehabilitation for the
ethics of public diplomacy. To engage is better than to advertise, message, or brand.
Engagement is a kind of image repair for public diplomacy itself. Yet the
ambiguity of engagement also provides cover for policy-makers seeking some relief

from the mandate of measurement and evaluation. One of Wallins arguments is

worth quoting at length: If anything, using the term engagement can sometimes
provide the user with a perceived ability to forgo one of the most difficult parts of
public diplomacythat is demonstrating metrics which indicate whether or not
ones efforts are succeeding at influencing the target audience. In other words, the
user of engagement may feel as though they neednt actually explain the effects
of their activities because they are engaging by nature of the word. If
engagement is something that unfolds over time, and involves a number of
intervening moments that cumulate into something like influence it doesnt fit
neatly into existing measurement models that test specific theories of persuasion,
attitude change, or whatever the user wants out of engagement. But just because
measurement is hard doesnt mean we shouldnt think clearly about how acts serve
the strategic ends of public diplomacy.

T USFG

1NCNo Plan
Interpretation: Resolved means to enact by law
Words and Phrases 64

vol 37A

Definition of the word resolve, given by Webster is to express an opinion or

determination by resolution or vote; as it was resolved by the legislature; It is of
similar force to the word enact, which is defined by Bouvier as meaning to
establish by law.

USFG is the three branches

USA.gov 13 ("USA.gov is the U.S. government's official web portal"
http://www.usa.gov/Agencies/federal.shtml)
U.S. Federal Government - The three branches of U.S. governmentlegislative,
judicial, and executivecarry out governmental power and functions.

Should in the resolution means the policy is desirable

Freeley and Steinberg 9 Austin J. Freeley, former prof. of communication,
John Carroll Univ, and David L. Steinberg, prof of communication, Univ of Miami,
Argumentation and Debate: Critical Thinking for Reasoned Decision Making, 2009,
12th edition, pp 68-9 googlebooks
Most propositions on matters of policy contain the word "should" for example,
"Resolved: That such-and-such should be done." In a debate on a policy
proposition, "should" means that intelligent self-interest, social welfare, or national
interest prompts this action, and that it is both desirable and workable. When the
affirmative claims a policy "should" be adopted, it must show that the policy is
practical but it is under no obligation to show it will be adopted. The affirmative
must give enough detail to show it would work. It may be impossible, within the
time limitations of the debate, for the affirmative to give al the details, but it must
at least show the outline of its policy and indicate how the details could be worked
out. For example, in a debate on federal aid to education, the affirmative could not
reasonably be expected to indicate how much money each state would receive
under its plan, but it would be obliged to indicate the method by which the amount
of the grants would be determined. It is pointless for the negative to seek to show
that the affirmative's plan could not be adopted by demonstrating that public
opinion is against it or that the supporters of the plan lack sufficient voting strength
in Congress.

ViolationThe Aff doesnt defend policy action enacted by the

USFG.

1. Decision-making without defending hypothetical

implementation of the plan, the Aff doesnt provide a stasis
point for rigorous testing which forces them to make quick
decision on the spot. Uh.. come back to this
2. Advocacy SkillsThe Aff artificial isolates themselves from
the Negs best and well prepare offense. Not reading a plan
allows them to spike the out of the preparation makes it
difficult to research specific Affs since they could constantly
shift This means the aff never rigorously tested have to defend
their position against a well prepare opponent. Learning to
defend the proposition that matters or else their advocacy will
get crushed by hegemonic forces in the real world.
3. T Version of the Aff solvestheir own author indicates that
communicative engagement needs to be carry out by the State
Lynch 02 (Marc Lynch is a Professor of Political Science and International Affairs
at George Washington University, where he is also director of both the Institute for
Middle East Studies and the Middle East Studies Program, Why Engage? China and
the Logic of Communicative Engagement, p190)
When norms break down, however, or when the appropriate norm governing a situation is unclear, actors can
engage in what Risse calls a logic of arguing aimed at re-establishing common expectations and understandings

communicative
engagement as a dialogical process of exchanging reasons for the purpose of
resolving problematic situations that cannot be settled without . . . coordination and cooperation (1996: 27).
When two states recognize that neither can act effectively without taking into
account the other, communicative engagement aims at establishing common interpretations and mutual
expectations governing both cooperative and competitive behavior . The ideal of
(Risse, 2000). Drawing on James Bohmans theory of public deliberation, I define

communicative engagement is a dialogue in which both actors enter into an open-ended discourse across multiple
levels aimed at arriving at communicative consensus on these foundations. This does not mean, of course, that
dialogue produces an automatic harmonization of preferences. It does mean, however, the construction of a thin
common lifeworld within which it becomes possible to maintain more cooperative interaction. This clarifies the
nature of the game being played, building common knowledge which stabilizes the intersubjective understandings

Communicative engagement presumes only that states might prefer

cooperation to conflict and seek ways to overcome the security dilemma and
strategic information problems.
of the interaction.

T is a voter for pedagogical reasons.

TPP Disadvantage

1NC
TPP will pass during the lame duck
Corsi 7/4 (Jerome Corsi: Harvard Ph.D., author of No. 1 N.Y. Times best-sellers,
Obama advances stealth plan to pass TPP, 7/4/16,
http://www.wnd.com/2016/07/obama-advances-stealth-plan-to-pass-tpp/, Accessed:
7/12/16, RRR)
The Obama administration is betting on a stealth plan to secure final
passage of the massive Trans-Pacific Partnership, or TPP, before Obama leaves office by
pushing the bill through Congress in the lame duck session between Election Day Nov. 8, and
NEW YORK

Jan. 6, 2017, the date the new Congress is sworn in, despite growing voter opposition that now has Hillary Clinton
joining Donald Trump in opposing the bill. Tactically,

the Obama administration has decided to

postpone a TPP vote until after the election, concerned that pushing TPP passage
now would risk damaging Clintons chances , given her enthusiastic support for TPP during her
tenure as secretary of state. The push to pass TPP is consistent with a New York Times
report published Sunday by Mark Landler in his White House Letter, indicating President Obama
plans to travel this week to North Carolina, where he joins Hillary Clinton, campaigning with her for the first time
this year; and to Europe, where he joins Britains lame-duck prime minister David Cameron, who ended his political

Obama is expected to press the globalist message that

Americans and Europeans must not forsake their open, interconnected societies for
career opposing Brexit. In both trips,

the nativism and nationalism preached by Donald J. Trump or Britains Brexiteers.

Obama needs all his PC to get it done

Hufbauer 15 (Gary Hufbauer, senior fellow at the Peterson Institute for
International Economics, Will Congress Unravel the Trans-Pacific Partnership? , Oct
16 2015, The Dialogue, http://www.thedialogue.org/resources/will-congress-unravelthe-trans-pacific-partnership/)
Gary Hufbauer, senior fellow at the Peterson Institute for International Economics: While Hillary Clinton may have
reversed her prior enthusiastic support of the TPP, if elected president, she can rediscover the geopolitical virtues
that led her to embrace the TPP project when she served as secretary of state. And Clinton can toss in a couple of
side agreementsreminiscent of NAFTAto nudge the TPP closer to her concept of a gold standard. But

between now and 2017, the TPP must survive a perilous journey through Congress .
The timelines specified under Trade Promotion Authority mean that the soonest President Obama could sign the TPP

Meanwhile, Obama will need to agree with his Congressional

counterparts Senate Majority Leader Mitch McConnell and probable House Speaker
Paul Ryanon the text of the TPP implementing legislation, including any
sweeteners inserted to attract the votes of wavering congressmen . Then, in the midst of
text will be late January 2016.

the presidential election campaign, the House and Senate must vote the implementing legislation up or down,
without amendments. If he sees no clear shot at reaching yes, President Obama can elect to not submit
implementing legislation to Congress, and instead leave the task of securing ratification to his successor. On

it appears that President Obama will use every ounce of his dwindling
political capital stock to secure Congressional approval of the TPP in 2016 and, at
the same time, secure his own historic legacy. But if the critical vote is postponed until 2017
balance,

when ratification seems all but certain, provided that Sanders and Trump remain far from 1600 Pennsylvania
Avenuethe TPP will still enjoy a fine launch into the annals of path-breaking trade agreements.

Communicative engagement not only forces policy makers to

spend PC in both in Congress and for the public but also
prevent China from engaging due to negative viewtheir own
author.
Lynch 02 (Marc Lynch is a Professor of Political Science and International Affairs
at George Washington University, where he is also director of both the Institute for
Middle East Studies and the Middle East Studies Program, Why Engage? China and
the Logic of Communicative Engagement, European Journal of International
Relations 2002 vol 8(2) accessed http://citeseerx.ist.psu.edu/viewdoc/download?
doi=10.1.1.467.185&rep=rep1&type=pdf DDI KC )
The publicity inherent in international deliberation creates something closer to costly signaling,
and therefore can be a viable means of revealing state preferences. Shifting to a communicative mode of analysis
allows us to see a wider range of actions within the generic category of cheap talk. Communicative engagement

will be politically charged and be viewed as an important interest in a relatively

constrained time frame. In a high profile, public dialogue over international order, such as between the
United States and China, it can be assumed that there will be considerable public attention. As Haass and OSullivan
point out, engagement

requires policymakers to expend at least as much energy in

the US domestic political realm as they do working with the target country (2000: 178
80). Because public deliberation requires consistency across multiple public spheres,
actions consistent with deeds in order to prove sincerity and high audience costs, it
more resembles a costly signal than it does cheap talk. It can also be comfortably assumed that there will be

Engagement will be subjected

to severe public scrutiny on each side, and will have to be defended with reasoned
argument. When the Clinton Administration maintains engagement in the face of extraordinarily high levels of
political criticism, this acts as a credible signal of American commitment to the relationship. The regular give
and take of argument before a public audience, by requiring consistency across
arenas and at least the appearance of truthfulness, can provide more reliable
information than signaling through deeds.Strategic analysis has difficulty accounting for the
entrenched, strong opposition to the normalization of ties on both sides.

empirically observed importance of audience costs, since the common knowledge of the effectiveness of costly
signals makes the generation of audience costs the preferred strategy for a state which wishes to bluff (Eyerman
and Hart, 1996; Schultz, 1999).17 The existence of a public sphere renders audience costs
involuntary, however, inherent in the political system rather than generated strategically by the state actor. Such
costs allow the targeted state to read the engagers real preferences more accurately regardless of whether the
engager would prefer to misrepresent (Schultz, 1999; Ritter, 2000). For example, when both Congress and the
President risk significant political costs by publicly pressuring Israel to cancel a weapons sale to China, this action

any words
claiming that the US views China as a friend or a partner . The logic here is that hotly
contested domestic political battles will be of higher salience to a democratic
leader, and therefore she will be less likely to hold real strategies or winning arguments in reserve. The public
sends a far more compelling signal of American conceptions of China as an enemy than do

nature of international deliberation also acts as a check on misrepresentation, by reducing the potential for tailoring
different messages for each audience and by forcing each state to justify and defend its position to both audiences.
Public deliberation forces consistency in two senses between words and deeds, and across domestic and
international public spheres. Publicity therefore gives speakers a greater incentive to be truthful, since audiences
will be able to compare words and deeds and will form conclusions about the actors reputation for reliability and

As transparency increases, so does the potential for unintended feedback

effects between public spheres (Final and Lord, 2000). As Clinton argued, we cannot allow a healthy
trustworthiness.

argument to lead us toward a campaign-driven Cold War with China; for that would have tragic consequences . . .
the debate were having today about China is mirrored by a debate going on in China about the United States . . .

and we must be sensitive to how we handle this.18Similarly, when China seeks to shore up nationalist credentials
through propaganda aimed at a domestic audience while simultaneously sending reassuring messages . . . to
foreign audiences, American readings of Chinas domestic public sphere can undermine Chinese efforts at signaling

As domestic opposition in one public sphere highlights

the negatives of the other for its domestic political objectives, their counterparts
appropriate the hostile discourse and use it to build hostility in their own public
sphere by claiming that the hostile public statements , not the benign policies, reveal the
underlying preferences of the other. Increasing information can render it difficult to
distinguish signal from noise, reducing the quality of that information for making
inferences about preferences. Strategic interaction theorists have therefore suggested that as noise
(Downs and Saunders, 1998/99: 122).

increases bad information drives out good. By contrast, the communicative approach might suggest that the
distinction between bad and good information is overstated. Should a Chinese leader pay more heed to President
Clintons calls for strategic dialogue or to the Weekly Standards escalating calls for confrontation? From the
Presidents perspective, the Republican noise represents bad information clouding his attempts at signaling
American intentions, but the internal debate provides important information to Chinese observers about the

domestic American debate about

engagement provides evidence that the US is attempting to mask strategic goals
within its communicative talk, then this involuntary revelation of American preferences should be seen
indeterminancy of those intentions. To the extent that

as a success, not a failure, of engagement. Communicating preferences is better served by the ability of one state
to observe the argumentation used by the other states leaders in a fiercely contested domestic political arena .

transparent and highly contested public sphere may make it more difficult for a
state to act strategically, but it will make its signals more reliable for exactly that reason. Arguments such
as National Security Advisor Sandy Bergers assertion that the Communist party is committing slow-motion suicide
by accepting economic liberalization and Clintons description of the WTO agreement as a poison pill for the
Communist system help to win domestic debates, but also offer China perspective on how Americans view the
ends of engagement. On the other hand, the constant, well-articulated arguments made by Clinton and his chief

advisors that the United States prefers a strong, stable and healthy China playing an active role in the
international system are less effective at winning domestic debates even if they more accurately reflect Clintons
thinking.19 For a state trying to establish understandings about long-term trajectories of the others real
preferences, the winning arguments in the domestic public sphere usefully reflect societally embedded rather than
personally idiosyncratic ideas. Since the objective of communicative engagement is to reach rational agreement,
not to maximize relative gains, the difficulty of strategic misrepresentation is an important positive rather than a

If Chinese leaders learn from public deliberation that the U nited States really does
prefer to change the Chinese regime, constrain its foreign policy behavior and limit
the scope of its international actions, then a more conflictual approach would be rational.
negative.

TPP key to US climate leadershipsolves global warming

Richardson 16-[Bill Richardson, Bill Richardson is a former governor of New Mexico and U.S.
ambassador to the United Nations, 5-31-2016, "Congress should ratify the Trans- Pacific Partnership agreement,"
miamiherald, http://www.miamiherald.com/opinion/op-ed/article80915612.html]

[MB]

If youre following the 2016 election campaigns, you might be under the impression
that international trade is an unmitigated disaster and its time for America to turn
inwards. But as former U.S. ambassador to the United Nations, I know that trade
and economic relationships are the foundation for U.S. influence abroad. So as
Congress considers whether to vote on President Obamas major trade deal, the
Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP), they should turn off the cable news and consider the
cost of inaction, because it is far more significant than you might think. Recently,
the U.S. International Trade Commission (ITC) released its economic impact report
on TPP. After an extensive, 6-month, independent review, the report confirms that
President Obamas trade agreement with 11 Pacific Rim countries, representing 40

percent of world GDP, will open new markets, set fair rules of trade, and drive
demand for Made in America products. But TPPs benefits reach beyond wage and
job gains for the U.S. economy. It also furthers important U.S. interests like higher
labor standards, reduced wildlife trafficking, and cooperation to combat climate
change. Access to clean energy technology is a cornerstone to solving the global
climate change problem. TPP will boost international adoption of clean energy by
cutting tariffs on renewable energy technologies and committing member countries
shift to low-emission economies. TPP will eliminate taxes on wind turbines, solar
panels, and other renewable energy products : making it cheaper and easier for
these growing economies to switch to clean energy and reach their climate change
goals. In an increasingly complex global economy, governments must be
empowered to put in place regulations that account for climate change. TPP does
this by securing the right of each member country to create laws and regulations in
the public interest, like addressing carbon pollution and climate change. Countries
need the freedom to take decisive action on climate change and the TPP protects its
members rights to do so. But most importantly, combatting climate change requires
leadership. Last year, President Obama led the world to a groundbreaking global
climate agreement in Paris. American leadership, including significant domestic
policy achievements like the Clean Power Plan, allowed the United States to bring
other major world powers to the table and achieve this landmark deal. TPP is
another opportunity to exert American leadership. It fosters strong economic and
trade relationships in the fast-growing Asia Pacific region, home to countries
responsible for over 25 percent of global carbon emissions. Deepening ties to the
region renews U.S. commitment to its Asian allies, and adopting the same standards
as its TPP counterparts establishes U.S. credibility as a global leader to advance
other international issues, like climate change initiatives.

Warming causes extinction.

Flournoy 12 -- Citing Feng Hsu, PhD NASA Scientist @ the Goddard Space Flight
Center. Don Flournoy is a PhD and MA from the University of Texas, Former Dean of
the University College @ Ohio University, Former Associate Dean @ State University
of New York and Case Institute of Technology, Project Manager for
University/Industry Experiments for the NASA ACTS Satellite, Currently Professor of
Telecommunications @ Scripps College of Communications @ Ohio University (Don,
"Solar Power Satellites," January, Springer Briefs in Space Development, Book, p.
10-11
In the Online Journal of Space Communication , Dr. Feng Hsu, a NASA scientist at Goddard Space Flight Center, a research center in the forefront of

The evidence of global warming is alarming, noting the potential

for a catastrophic planetary climate change is real and troubling (Hsu 2010 ) . Hsu
and his NASA colleagues were engaged in monitoring and analyzing climate changes on a
global scale, through which they received first-hand scientific information
and data relating to global warming issues, including the dynamics of polar ice cap melting. After discussing this
research with colleagues who were world experts on the subject, he wrote: I now have no doubt global
temperatures are rising, and that global warming is a serious problem
confronting all of humanity. No matter whether these trends are due to
human interference or to the cosmic cycling of our solar system, there are two basic facts that are crystal clear:
science of space and Earth, writes,

there is overwhelming scientific evidence showing positive correlations

between the level of CO2 concentrations in Earths atmosphere with respect
to the historical fluctuations of global temperature changes; and (b) the
overwhelming majority of the worlds scientific community is in agreement
about the risks of a potential catastrophic global climate change. That is, if we
humans continue to ignore this problem and do nothing, if we continue dumping huge quantities of greenhouse
gases into Earths biosphere, humanity will be at dire risk (Hsu 2010 ) . As a technology risk assessment expert, Hsu says he
(a)

can show with some confidence that the planet will face more risk doing nothing to curb its fossil-based energy addictions than it will in making a

the risks of a catastrophic anthropogenic

climate change can be potentially the extinction of human species , a risk that is simply too
fundamental shift in its energy supply. This, he writes, is because

high for us to take any chances (Hsu 2010 )

2NC

Link Wall
Their own authors points to two reasons communicative
engagement would drain PC consequently prevent TPP from
passing
Communicative engagement forces policy maker to spend pc to
win over both the public and other policymakers
Lynch 02 (Marc Lynch is a Professor of Political Science and International Affairs
at George Washington University, where he is also director of both the Institute for
Middle East Studies and the Middle East Studies Program, Why Engage? China and
the Logic of Communicative Engagement, European Journal of International
Relations 2002 vol 8(2) accessed http://citeseerx.ist.psu.edu/viewdoc/download?
doi=10.1.1.467.185&rep=rep1&type=pdf DDI KC )
The experience of USChina engagement, however, reveals substantive discourses over precisely these issues. The
intense American political struggle over granting China Normal Trade Relations involved considerable self-interested
bargaining, but it also reflected real uncertainty about the nature of the strategic relationship and real arguments

Americans disagreed about the threats and

opportunities posed by China, the likely impact of each American policy decision on
Chinas future policies, and the overall American national interest. Public sphere
debates explicitly weighed human rights against economic interest, weapons
proliferation against cooperation on regional security, an interest in Chinese
economic growth against the dangers of rising Chinese power. In other words, this public
over the definition of collective interests.

debate openly contested precisely the preferences and expectations which rationalist theory takes as given.

These substantive public debates about the nature and record of engagement, with
deep disagreement reflecting real conceptual and political differences , formed an integral
part of the communicative process. A similar debate inside China about the nature of the
opportunities and threats in the changing international order has been carried out
quietly inside government and military institutions (Deng and Wang, 1999; P. Saunders, 2000a).
A model in which a domestic audience punishes leaders who back down from their public positions fails to capture
the complexity of these communicative acts in the public sphere. Weighing the audience costs models against a
communicative action approach to the public sphere therefore produces very different conceptions of the role of
communication in strategic relationships (Calhoun, 1993; Elster, 1998; Bohman and Rehg, 1999). Rationalist models
conceptualize deliberation as cheap talk within strategic bargaining which might help to solve coordination games
but not cooperation games. The public matters primarily as an exogenous constraint on the pursuit of fixed
interests by state leaders. The introduction of audience costs shows that it makes a difference whether negotiations
are carried out in public or are kept hidden from public view (Elster, 1995). Private diplomacy, outside the scrutiny

Where bargaining is
carried out before public scrutiny, the nature of the constraints shifts, as actors
must provide compelling reasons for their positions .
of the media and of public opinion, follows the dynamics of strategic bargaining.

War hawks in both China and America oppose the increasing

communicative engagementempirics prove

Lynch 02 (Marc Lynch is a Professor of Political Science and International Affairs

at George Washington University, where he is also director of both the Institute for
Middle East Studies and the Middle East Studies Program, Why Engage? China and
the Logic of Communicative Engagement, European Journal of International
Relations 2002 vol 8(2) accessed http://citeseerx.ist.psu.edu/viewdoc/download?
doi=10.1.1.467.185&rep=rep1&type=pdf DDI KC )
Domestic political criticism of engagement on both sides escalated in this period.
American critics, long focused on its moral shortcomings, increasingly emphasized its supposed
willingness to overlook Chinese threats to American security. It was precisely the
more empathetic and communicative tone of American approaches to China which
infuriated American hawks as signs of weakness . Realist warnings against appeasing rising
Chinese power dovetailed with sensational discussion of a Chinese threat to create an
atmosphere of impending confrontation. The May 1999 Cox report on Chinese nuclear espionage,
while devoid of convincing evidence, profoundly shaped popular perceptions of China as a threat.10 Over the

for their part, Chinese officials began to construct a coherent

image of an American preference to exploit its dominant power position to constrain
Chinas growth and contest its interests. This reading of the US type drew on a wide range of signals,
second half of the 1990s,

including the AmericanBritish unilateral bombings of Iraq in December 1998, the 1999 NATO war in Kosovo without
Security Council authorization, American statements and actions towards Taiwan and the escalating attacks on

The NATO bombing of the Chinese embassy in

Belgrade led not only to massive popular demonstrations against the U nited States, but also
to Chinas suspension of military, political and human rights dialogues (Gries, 2001).
China in the American domestic political arena.

Failure to reach agreement on Chinas WTO membership during a visit by Zhu Rhongi humiliated Chinese
moderates. After tensions peaked, both sides looked for opportunities to restart the dialogue. By the autumn of
1999, tensions had cooled sufficiently for a cordial meeting between Clinton and Jiang Xemin, and in May 2000
Clinton secured approval for Normal Trade Relations with China. Over the summer of 2000, however, the American
move to develop and deploy a National Missile Defense generated tremendous opposition from China, which felt

Bush brought to office an American administration

notable for its hawkish views on China and its criticism of the policy of engagement .
Within a month, USChina relations experienced a major crisis over the crash of an American spy
plane in Chinese territory, which was resolved only after tense diplomacy and which drove
the spiraling mutual mistrust and hostility. Bush spoke of China as a strategic competitor, in a
both threatened and ignored. The election of George W.

direct repudiation of Clintons search for a strategic partner. This historical overview suggests the persistence of
engagement strategies even in the face of severe domestic political costs on both sides as well as the low
perceived success of the policy (Haass and OSullivan, 2000). The focus on these moments of crisis, as well as on its
most visible success, masks much of the underlying, less publicized substance of engagement, however. Within the
ups and downs of high-level challenges and threats, Chinese and Americans engaged in a wide range of substantive
discourses over matters of shared concern in the security realm. These dialogues led to clear changes in Chinese
understanding of

its interests in nonproliferation, military transparency and arms control .

Political Geography K

1NC

1NCLong
By engaging the PRC through Communicative Engagement, the
1AC only legitimizes Chinas own internal colonialism and
suppress the alternative claims to sovereignty.
Callahan 9 (William A, Chair Professor of International Politics and China Studies in the Politics Department
at the University of Manchester, Research Director at the Centre for Chinese Studies. The Cartography of National
Humiliation and the Emergence of Chinas Geobody. Public Culture 21:1, November, doi 10.1215/08992363-2008024.p 156-172)
With the eruption of World War II in Asia in 1937, the normative cartography of national humiliation was displaced
by the massive national crisis of the Japanese invasion of China proper, which eventually led to the Communist
revolution in 1949. Although maps of lost territories continued to be published in history and geography

the PRCs new national and historical maps generally followed a different path, to highlight the
more affirmative ideological politics of class struggle and revolutionary victory .32 This is
what makes the reemergence of national humiliation maps in the PRC after a fifty-year hiatus
remarkable: they became popular again in Chinas modern history textbooks in the 1990s as part
of a wider policy of national humiliation education, which is part of patriotic education policy. As I
textbooks,

have argued elsewhere, national humiliation discourse reemerged after the June 4 massacre as part of the Chinese

which aimed to refocus the Chinese youths critical

ire on foreign enemies rather than on the internal corruption of the party-state .33 The
Communist Partys multimedia campaign,

best example of recent national humiliation maps is the book Maps of the Century of National Humiliation of Modern
China (1997), which contains eighty-six pages of maps, pictures, charts, illustrations, and explanations.34 It shares
many themes with similar maps from the early twentieth century. The way Chinas territories were lost to Russia, for
example, is recorded on the Map of Czarist Russias Occupation of Chinas Sovereign Territory much as it is on the
Map of Chinese National Humiliation (1916)down to the details of the different styles and colors of shading to
mark territories lost at different times (see figs. 8 and 5).35 But the 1997 atlas of national humiliation raises the
stakes, because it argues its case much more forcefully and in much greater detail than earlier wall maps. While
national humiliation maps from the early twentieth century were published by geographic societies, provincial
governments, and commercial presses, the 1997 atlas of national humiliation was edited by the Cartographic
Department of Chinas official Peoples Press and was distributed as a mass-market publication through the official
network of New China Bookstores. Moreover, the book launch of this official publication was a major media event
timed to mark the return to Chinese sovereignty of a key lost territory: Hong Kong. Interestingly, the tone of Maps of
the Century of National Humiliation does not follow the official slogans to celebrate the return of Hong Kong to the
bosom of the motherland. Rather, the cartographic agony of the early twentieth century is republished as a new
anxiety about Chinas geobody in 1997. This concern is manifest in the map Imperialisms Division of China into
Spheres of Power in the Late Nineteenth Century (see fig. 9), which revives the turn-of-the-twentieth-century
theme carving up China like a melon and gobbling it up for the turn of the twenty-first century.36 This resonates
both with the map of the unraveling of China on the cover of Chinas Road (1999) analyzed above (see fig. 2) and
with a famous 1898 Chinese cartoon of European, American, and Japanese empires dividing up Chinas territory
(which is duly reproduced in the 1997 atlas).37 To drive home the continuing importance of the cartography of
national humiliation in the twenty-first century, Maps of the Century of National Humiliation was republished in
2005, on higher-quality paper and with a sturdier binding, to mark the sixtieth anniversary of Chinas victory over
Japan in World War II. Like maps from the 1910s 1930s, post-1989 maps of national humiliation also combine the

cartographies of imperial domain and sovereign territory to naturalize the borders

of the PRC. Indeed, to claim unbounded frontiers as sovereign national territory, these national humiliation
maps all employ the three discursive strategies outlined above. The maps very directly deploy the first
strategy of denying the difference between imperial domains hierarchical
unbounded space and sovereign territorys homogeneous bounded space to craft
Chinas modern geobody as a clearly defined national sovereign territory. Following the
second strategy of placing territorial changes in the context of the modern international politics of foreign
imperialism, both early and recent maps frame the struggle as between China and the imperialist powers from
Europe, America, and Japan that stole Chinas territories. This Western imperialist framework suppresses an
alternative story: China, Russia, the West, and Japan were rival expansionists, fighting over the same territorial prey
the vassal states, semistates, and frontier zones on the periphery of the Qing imperial domain, such as Mongolia,
Korea, Vietnam, and Siberia.38 Indeed, spaces marked as lost territories on twentieth-century maps were
conventionally marked as gained territories on Qing dynastys eighteenth-century maps.39 Generally, these

national humiliation maps employ the Westphalian international systems grid to

reduce, classify, or exclude the voices of these quasi states and allow only the story
of the great unity of the emerging Chinese nation-state to be heard . This, then, is a
prime example of the third discursive strategy: read territoriality exclusively from Beijings point
of view, thus suppressing any rival perspectives that would produce alternative
geobodies. The result of these cartographic strategies is paradoxical: rather than evidence of a loss
of national territories along Siberian, Central Eurasian, Northeast Asian, and South
Asian frontiers, these national humiliation maps show how China has asserted
national sovereignty over an ambiguous imperial domain, transforming the
periphery into an integrated sovereign territory that includes some , although not all, of
the former Qing realm. National humiliation maps and impassioned discussions of
lost territories therefore have actually helped China strengthen its claim to frontier
zones in Xinjiang, Tibet, Manchuria and Taiwan. Both dismembering and re-membering thus are
key biopolitical strategies in the production of a geobody. Comparative Cartography 2: National Maps and National
Humiliation Maps While these maps of national humiliation are certainly interesting and raise serious questions

it is easy to dismiss them as the exception to the rule

of Chinas standard practice of national sovereignty . Yet an examination of a wider
selection of Chinas official and popular maps from the early twentieth century and the
turn of the twenty-first century shows that these national humiliation maps are an
integral part of the emergence of nationalist cartography in China. The same geographic
about the proper size and shape of China,

societies and commercial presses that published national humiliation maps often simultaneously published
national maps containing the same images and information. Figure 6s Map of Chinas National Humiliation is
actually the second map in the Atlas of the Republic of China (1930)the first map is simply labeled the Republic
of China. Moreover, most normal and official maps of the ROC contain important references to Chinas national
humiliation: they characteristically mark lost territories and list unequal treaties, treaty ports, and territorial
concessions. The Latest Detailed Complete Map of the Republic of China (1923) is literally framed by the
cartography of national humiliations now familiar inset maps, annotations, and charts. Its inset maps, for example,
show the details of particular lost territories, while the main map labels surrounding countries like Korea and
Annam (Vietnam) as countries that used to be our vassals and now are Japans or Frances vassals.40 As in the
Geography of Chinas National Humiliation (1930), an impassioned statement is written along the bottom margin of
the Latest Detailed Complete Map, declaring that Chinese people can cleanse their national humiliation only by
studying this map, which shows how their countrys sacred territory was lost to Europeans and Japanese. The
Patriotic Map: National Humiliation and National Assets in One View (1929) shows how the cartography of national
humiliation informs mainstream national maps in China in a different way.41 This fascinating map shows how
recording and publicizing Chinas territorial humiliations has always been closely tied to patriotism, national pride,
and campaigns for national salvation. Alongside annotations celebrating the strength of Chinas industry and
infrastructure (Chinese-owned factories, mines, orchards, etc.) are red-dotted notes to treaty ports and lost
territories. Altogether, these cartographic strategies produce Chinas national geobody by linking imperial domain
with sovereign territory. The dual pattern of cartography at the turn of the twenty-first century is similar. Like those
of the 1920s and 1930s, recent national humiliation maps are not only very similar to the standard maps found in
the Atlas of Modern Chinese History (1984); the editors of Maps of the Century of National Humiliation (1997) credit
this and other modern Chinese history atlases as their main sources.42 Although it does not use the phrase
national humiliation, the monumental and comprehensive History of Chinas Modern Borders (2007) uses the
same hybrid logic to combine the cartographies of imperial domain and sovereign territory in the service of
asserting Chinas great unity; it also employs the now familiar maps of Chinas ancient borders and czarist
Russias subsequent theft of Chinese territory.43 Recent national humiliation maps also overlap considerably with a
patriotic education atlas produced by the partys central propaganda department: the Atlas of One Hundred

the cartography of
national humiliation is an integral part of official, scholarly, and popular
imaginings of Chinas geobody. These national humiliation maps are more than
historical curiosities. They show how scientific cartography has paradoxically reenchanted China, producing
Patriotic Education Sites (1999).44 These and other Chinese maps thus show how

a modern geobody that is at the same time a sacred national space. Border Diplomacy These national maps and
national humiliation maps have shown how, starting with the Opium War in 1840 and continuing through the
Republican revolution against the Qing dynasty in 1911, the Communist revolution in 1949, and economic reforms
in 1978, China has experienced dramatic changes not only politically but also spatially.

Modernity

introduced not only contingent concepts to China but also contingent borderlands .
Indeed, both the imperial era and the Cold War were characterized by border wars for China; from 1949 to
the 1970s the PRC engaged in a series of border wars with almost every
neighboring country, most famously with India (1962), Russia (1969), and Vietnam
(1979). After the PRC fired missiles in the Taiwan straits confrontation (1995 96), many were again concerned
about Chinese irredentism.45 Maps are a key part of such border disputes: after the Sino-Indian
War (1962), Delhi complained about Chinese aggression in maps, and in the 1990s Beijings Southeast Asian
neighbors worried about cartographic aggression after China published official
maps that include a historic claim line that digs deeply into the South China Sea and
is reminiscent of national humiliation maps.46 But Allen Carlson and M. Taylor Fravel have separately argued that a
close analysis of border disputes shows that the PRC often prefers to negotiate solutions with its neighborseven if

the PRC shifted from

military coercion to a policy of normalizing borders through diplomacy and
international law as the economic reform policy took hold in the 1980s. This was part of
Beijings broader understanding that acting as a responsible member of
international society would contribute to the peaceful international environment
that is crucial for the success of Chinas domestic economic reform project. Fravel argues that the positive
this means giving up more than half of the disputed territory.47 Carlson explains that

policy of negotiating boundaries began much earlierin the early 1960sand has less to do with economic reform

China
compromised in border disputes when it faced internal threats to regime security
from transnational ethnic groups that straddled international borders. The PRC thus
often made territorial concessions to its neighbors in Central Eurasia in exchange for cooperation
in stopping cross-border ethnic movements, which Beijing saw as separatist movements. Whether
policy than with Chinas national security problem of stabilizing ethnic politics along its frontiers.

because of economic reform policy or national security concerns, China has settled seventeen of its twenty-three
border disputes and is dealing with the remaining disputes largely in a noncoercive spirit.48 Yet Carlson notes that

alongside this cooperative diplomatic strategy there is a significant undercurrent

among Chinas national security and foreign policy experts of memories of the
contraction of Chinese territory during the century of humiliation. 49 The PRCs
boundary disputes since 1949 thus are an imperial legacy that continues to be informed by much broader
historically grounded understandings of the legitimate scope of Chinas territorial sovereignty.50 Although the
PRC has negotiated most of its disputed boundaries, yearnings to recover a vast collection of lost territories
continue to emerge in official, semiofficial, and popular discourse. Because it is located at the crossroads of various
empires, Manchuria exemplifies the cartographic complexity of colliding geobodies .51
Indeed, the only regional map of national humiliation represents Manchuria as a lost territory after Japans 1931
invasion.52 Manchurias uneasy status thus provokes various forms of resistance both inside China and abroad. So,
for example, soon after China and Russia signed an agreement in 2004 to settle the disputed sovereignty of islands
at the confluence of the Amur and Ussuri rivers, Beijing was harshly criticized on the China Dailys online forum for
the treasonous act of ceding Chinese territory. This critique, which was traced to the Web site of the China
Cartographic Press, posted several very detailed satellite photographs of the islands and the controversial boundary
settlement. Not surprisingly, the Chinese government quickly removed these Web pages.53 Other critiques of the
Sino-Russian border continue to percolate among Chinas netizens, including items on the PRCs premier search
engine, Baidu, which renamed the Russian Far East Outer Manchuria. This Web site marks Outer Manchuria as an
area of lost territory on a national humiliationstyle map, and the text explains that it has been Chinas sovereign
territory since ancient times and was lost when it was invaded and occupied by czarist Russia.54 Moreover,
Maps of Chinas National Humiliation from the early twentieth century are continually rediscovered and posted in
chat rooms to provoke patriotic discussion of lost territories among Chinas youth: one participant declares that
we must recapture the homeland, while others argue over the status of Mongolia and Korea.55 On the Russian
side of the border, there are palpable fears that Chinas Yellow Horde plans to employ demographic pressures to
reclaim the Russian Far East from the dwindling ethnic Russian population.56 The cartography of national
humiliation thus continues to animate Chinese (and Russian) popular understandings of Chinas proper geobody and
provokes scattered protests on the Web. While we cannot rely on Wikipedia-like sites for objective truth, they do
show how activist groups are governing the production and distribution of alternative knowledges about Chinas

Koguryo controversy, by comparison, is a prime example of how the

cartography of national humiliation is framing more official academic and diplomatic
proper geobody. The

understandings of the geobody.

As it does with Russia, China has discursive disputes with South Korea
over Manchurian territories. While Chinas imperial and national humiliation maps commonly mark Korea as a vassal
state, South Korean elites look to ancient history to claim what we now call Manchuria as Korean territory. These two
discourses, which had largely bypassed each other for decades, collided when both North Korea and the PRC
applied to the United Nations Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) to recognize tombs from
the ancient Koguryo Kingdom (37 BCAD 668) as world heritage sites. Popular opinion was inflamed on July 1, 2004,
when UNESCO recognized tombs in both North Korea and China as Koguryo world heritage sites. This led to a
serious diplomatic dispute: on August 5 Seoul sent a senior diplomat to Beijing to protest Chinas ongoing
distortion of the history of Koguryo, and later that month Beijing sent a vice foreign minister to Seoul to iron out a
five-point reconciliation plan.57 Several years later the controversy continues to smolder, with newspaper articles
and scholarly works regularly reigniting it.58 On the Chinese side, the UNESCO application was part of the
Northeast Asia Project launched in 2002 by the same group that published the standard-setting History of Chinas
Modern Borders (2007): the Center for the Study of Borderland History and Geography, which is part of the official

The projects research on the Koguryo Kingdom,

whose territory straddles the current PRCNorth Korean border, concluded that this
Korean dynasty was a vassal state in Chinas empire. Koreans thus are refigured
from an independent nation to one of Chinas many ethnic minorities. The Chinese
media refers to this kingdom as Chinas Koguryo (analogous to references to
Chinas Tibet), and Chinas Foreign Ministry removed Koguryo from its Web page on Korean history.59 On
Chinese Academy of Social Sciences think tank.

the Korean side, Koguryo is central to national identity: the name Korea comes from this ethnic Korean kingdom.
Koguryo thus is a foundational site of Koreas ancient history, not only for cultural reasons: this dynasty is
particularly famous for resisting imperial China. Although the world heritage site is in North Korea, the controversy
became a matter of national humiliation for South Koreans; patriotic citizens were enjoined to once again resist the
threat of Chinese aggression. As an editorialist in Seoul writes, This Chinese attempt to include Goguryeo as part of
the history of China should be criticized for what it really is: an example of China-centered great-power
chauvinism.60 South Koreas National Assembly called on China to cease its efforts to distort history, and the
prime minister was pressured to set up the Foundation for the Study of Goguryeo as a direct response to Chinas
Northeast Asia Project.61 While Chinese scholars look to imperial and national humiliation maps that list Korea as a
vassal, Koreas scholar-activists not only look to ancient maps to argue their case, but many have now drawn their
own expansive maps of the Koguryo Kingdom and posted them on the Web (see fig. 10).62 Northeast Asias early
history thus is the focus of heated debates over the nontraditional security issues of national identity. But these
historical issues frame the very traditional security issue of the proper international border between Korea and
China. Indeed, strategists on both sides agree that the Koguryo controversy is less about correctly recording
historical facts than about the strategic intentions of the PRC and Korea in the twenty-first century. While some
South Koreans worry about Beijings plans to dominate Northeast Asia, many strategists in Beijing see the Northeast
Asia Project as preempting any territorial claims that a reunified Korea would make on Manchurian territories,
where the PRCs nearly 2 million ethnic Koreans live.63 Thus, although the Northeast Asia Project and the
Foundation for the Study of Goguryeo are on opposite sides of the Koguryo controversy, China and South Korea are
both employing the strategies of the cartography of national humiliation. And Korea is not alone in using Chinas
cartographic strategies to claim territory. While scholar-activists in South Korea argue that much of Manchuria is
actually Korean, Thailand likewise has a history of seeking to claim its former vassals in Laos, Cambodia, Assam,
Burma, and Yunnan as integral parts of a sovereign pan-Thai geobody.64 Hence South Korea and Thailand use a
similar dual cartographic logic in their own narratives of lost territories to inspire normative and aspirational
geobodies that encroach on Chinas own national map. While Chinas diplomats are busy negotiating solutions to
international border disputes, alternative voices continue to emerge both in China and abroad. This is evidence of

nativists all continue

to crave the return of what they see as lost territories. In a way, the cartography of
national humiliation is too persuasive; the biopolitics of this geobody actually
exceeds Beijings diplomatic strategy that seeks to map China as part of the world.
Alternative Geobodies Resistance to Chinas expansive geobody also emerges on the
domestic front in the frontier areas of Xinjiang, Hong Kong, and Taiwan. Artisans in
the effectiveness of maps for patriotic education in China and other countries: these

Northwest China, for example, have woven the PRC out of a carpet to highlight Xinjiang as its own entity (see fig.
11).65 The carpet plays with the tension between two conflicting geobodies. On the one hand, the carpets meaning
is very official, because the design is based on a road map of

the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous

Region found in any Chinese atlas. On the other hand, the carpet subversively portrays Xinjiang as separate from
China, because the design obscures the difference between internal provincial boundaries and external

assert the geobody

of Xinjiang; it does not contest the logic of borders so much as reframe them from
international boundaries. This carpet thus uses the cartography of sovereign territory to

internal boundaries to external boundaries. Resistance in Hong Kong and Taiwan,

however, calls into question the cartographic conventions taken for granted on this Xinjiang carpet map. Rather
than argue over the correct borders of sovereign territory, in The Atlas: An Archaeology of an Imaginary City the
Hong Kong novelist Dung Kai Cheung discusses the return of Hong Kong as a conceptual issue. While Maps of
Chinas National Humiliation (1997) stresses the geopolitical and legal aspects of how Britains gunboat diplomacy
and unequal treaties stole Chinese territory, the Atlas treats the territorial border as a site of aesthetic
performances. Thus Dung does not resist British or Chinese sovereignty in the expected way of asserting Hong Kong
as an independent sovereign territory. Rather, he takes a conceptualand frankly satiricalapproach to understand
Hong Kongs contingent historical and geographic position. The Atlas thus makes sense of Hong Kongs messy
history at the intersection of two empires by deploying a set of eccentric cartographic concepts: counterplace,
commonplace, misplace, displace, antiplace, nonplace, extraterritoriality, boundary, utopia, supertopia, subtopia,

Dungs complex approach to cartography thus

shifts from the conventions of a two-dimensional map to create an overlapping and
multiple space that undermines the hegemonic understanding of the modern notion
of territorial sovereignty.66 The Atlas therefore is quite good at capturing Hong Kongs transnational
transtopia, multitopia, unitopia, and omnitopia.

dynamic, which is difficult to represent on standard maps. Indeed, as in Susan Sontags On Photography, one of
Dungs tactics for resisting the discourse of territorial sovereignty is to refuse to display any maps at all. While the
carpet cartograph uses a standard map to resist the PRC, and Dung theorizes against maps to locate Hong Kong in
transnational space, resistance in Taiwan employs both mathematical maps and critical cartography to contest
Chinese hegemony. During the Cold War, maps of the ROC (whose government fled to Taiwan with the founding of
the PRC in 1949) reflected the ROCs political aspirations to reconquer the mainlandand Mongolia too. Yet with the
rise of Taiwans independence movement, which seeks to separate the island from Chinese sovereignty, new maps
have appeared to sketch out a new autonomous geobody. In addition to simply drawing Taiwan island as an entity
separate from the mainland, at times Taiwans maps have resisted the conventions of modern Chinese cartography
to assert their own perspective. Following the hegemonic cartographic practice of the Mercator projection, official
maps in Asian put the North on top and the West on the left, thus generally valuing the North over the South and
the West over the East.67 On Chinas national maps, Taiwan is located in the worst symbolic quadrant: the
Southeast. In 2004 Taiwans secretary of education unveiled a new Series of Maps from Taiwans Perspective for
use in the islands middle schools, including the Change the Perspective to View Taiwan map (see fig. 12).68 This
fascinating map very deliberately challenges cartographic conventions to put Taiwan at the center of the map as an
independent maritime nation rather than as a peripheral province of a continental power. As its notes tell middle
school students: Perhaps this map is confusing to people because it shifts from the normal situation where the
North is up and South is down to one where the Southeast is up and the Northwest is down. This map enables us to
see our neighbors more clearly, from Japan on the left to the Philippines and Indonesia on the right. These East
Asian countries are not only our neighbors; in terms of their geological environment, they are Taiwans brothers.
Many proponents of Taiwans reunification with China were outraged by what they saw as a politicization of
Taiwans map. But what is most interesting about the Change the Perspective to View Taiwan map is how this
strange image highlights how we have to work very hard to interpret not only this map but any map. The purpose of
this map thus is not only to represent Taiwan; its notes instruct us that its goal is to critically interrogate
cartographys system of tools, which includes determining the maps scope and position, the way it is projected,
how its content is selected, the choice of map symbols, and so on. While national humiliation maps fudge the
contradictions between imperial domain and sovereign territory and thus obscure their own relations of production,
the perspectival map of Taiwan is much more honest about how it uses conventions to create political meaning.
While the national humiliation maps annotations of lost territories (which we are told have been Chinese since
ancient times) tend to naturalize ambiguous space as national territory, the annotations on the Change the
Perspective to View Taiwan map underline how it is created by and for a particular Taiwanese point of view; that is

As in Xinjiang and Hong Kong, people in Taiwan

creatively employ cartographic strategies to challenge Chinas simple conversion of
imperial domain into national territory. In particular, these three alternative geobodies
resist the last discursive strategy of drawing maps exclusively from Beijings point of
view. These last two sections on border diplomacy and alternative geobodies underline the biopolitical nature of
why it is so controversial and so successful.

the cartography of national humiliation. They show how the overlap is not only between imperial domain and
sovereign territory; managing sovereign territory also is intertwined with managing ethnic(ized) populations both on

While we assume
that we can easily locate China on the map, these fascinating and perplexing
maps show that the debate over where China begins and ends is ongoing , especially in
the periphery and at the center. Conclusion: Geopolitics and Biopolitics in Creative Tension

domestic discussions among Chinese intellectuals. These maps graphically show that the transition from imperial
Chinese cosmology to modern scientific geography has not been complete. Indeed, Chinas geobody actually
emerges from the interplay of the otherwise contradictory cartographic conventions of imperial domain space and

Chinas geobody is still neither stable

nor hegemonic; it faces counterdiscursive resistance on many fronts . The Chineselanguage materials examined here rarely emerge in Western language analysis of
China. Although it is not necessarily the dominant view, it is necessary to
understand how the cartography of national humiliation still animates official,
scholarly, and popular understandings of national territoriality in China. Most important,
sovereign territory space. Yet after a century of crafting,

these maps show a strangely anxious popular countercurrent to Beijings current positive images of the PRC as a
peacefully rising power. But this is not to say that China has irredentist geopolitical ambitions for the twenty-first
century. The goal of national humiliation maps is no longer primarily to recover lost territory; it is to cleanse the
stains of lost honor and pride. The desire is not so much for material territory as for symbolic recognition,
acceptance, and respect. The challenges that China faces thus are more biopolitical than just geopolitical; rather
than emanate from some grand Western conspiracy (see fig. 2), these challenges arise in Chinas own backyard
through its symbolic and cartographic relations with Russia, South Korea, Thailand, Vietnam, the new Central Asian

Beijing is
most concerned with the biopolitical challenges posed by ethnic minority groups
like Tibetans that occupy borderlands already inside Chinas sovereign territory . The
cartography of national humiliation is uniquely prominent in China, yet the
biopolitical struggles of its national geobody resonate beyond its borders. On the
one hand, activists in other countries are also crafting aspirational geobodies to
reclaim lost territories: Ireland, Israel, Mexico, and so on. On the other hand, some
transnational groups are imagining normative geobodies as a way to get onto the
current geopolitical map: Kurds, Basques , and so on. These alternative geobodies not only imagine
states, and Taiwan. If anything, these maps suggest that, rather than look abroad for more territory,

new territorial boundaries but also manage the hopes and fears of populations. Hence, while many are declaring a
grand shift from geopolitics to biopolitics, the cartography of national humiliation shows how geopolitics and
biopolitics are intertwined in a creative tension that promotes the management of territorial borders as it regulates

national humiliation maps (like all maps) tell us not simply where
we are but also how to feel. In this way, national maps are part of the broader discourse of national
the flow of populations. Hence

security, which generally tells us less about the geopolitics of defending territorial boundaries than about the
biopolitics of tell[ing] us

who we must be.69 And where we must be.

Geography is political, not neutralthe myth of China as a

geobody is premised on the biopolitics of internal colonialism
Callahan 9 (William A, Chair Professor of International Politics and China Studies in the Politics Department
at the University of Manchester, Research Director at the Centre for Chinese Studies. The Cartography of National
Humiliation and the Emergence of Chinas Geobody. Public Culture 21:1, November, doi 10.1215/08992363-2008024. p141-150)
Like a debutante on the world stage, China has been modeling national images for its ongoing coming-out party.

After decades of revolutionary diplomacy that challenged the international system ,

since the 1990s the Peoples Republic of China (PRC) has worked hard to ease the concerns of
countries that used to be targets of its revolutionary activities . China as a
peacefully rising great power that aims to create a harmonious world is Beijings
latest narrative that seeks to present the PRC to the world as a cuddly panda rather
than a ravenous dragon. Maps are an important part of the continual self-crafting of any
nations image. As the Chinese maps examined here will show, the very material borders between
foreign and domestic space are the outgrowth of the symbolic workings of historical
geography and the conventions of Chinese cartography. These maps do much more than celebrate
the extent of Chinese sovereignty; they also mourn the loss of national territories through a cartography of national
humiliation. In this way, the messy geopolitics of disputed borders is informed by the contingent biopolitics of
identity practices. The maps in figures 1 and 2 give a sense of the complexities of Chinas engagement with the
world. The map in figure 1 is evidence of China as a confident world power that has global influence. It charts the

Ming dynasty voyages of Admiral Zheng He from China to (what we now call) Southeast Asia and the Indian Ocean,
eventually reaching Africas east coast. What is noteworthy about this particular map from 1418, which was
discovered by a Chinese collector in 2001, is that it also charts Zhengs voyages to the East, suggesting that the
admiral discovered America before Columbus.1 And as we know, discovering America is part of the symbolic
politics of being a great power.2 If figure 1s map asserts a confident outward-looking China,

then figure 2s map

represents Chinas fears of national disintegration . This map, which was published on the cover
of the best-selling hypernationalist book Chinas Road under the Shadow of Globalization (1999), presents
China as the victim of an international conspiracy to divide up the PRC into a clutch of
independent states including Tibet, Manchuria, Inner Mongolia, East Turkestan, and
Taiwan.3 The authors tell us that this is a popular map in the West and have the original English-language
version of this unraveling of China on the back cover, with a Chinese translation on the front cover. This map
thus is taken as evidence of Western plans to keep the PRC from achieving its rightful
status as a major power on the world stage. Although both maps assert their authenticity
as evidence of either Chinese discovery or Western conspiracy, it turns out that neither map
is authentic in the sense of representing what it purports to represent. Because it is full of anachronisms and
has an unclear provenance, there are serious doubts about the authenticity of the world discovery mapmost

no
one has been able to track down its source .5 Yet a search for authenticity misses the point of
such maps: they are not reflecting reality so much as asserting a normative image of China. These two maps
are aspirational, first in the positive sense of presenting China as a united and great
power with global influence, and second in the negative sense of what China does not
want to be: carved up like a melon, to use a popular Chinese phrase from the early twentieth century.
Indeed, this is not strange; even many official Chinese maps are actually imaginative and
aspirational, inscribing territories that are not under state control but could and
should be part of Chinas sovereign territory : PRC maps record Taiwan as a province
people now see it as a hoax.4 Although the authors of Chinas Road say that it is a popular map in the West,

of China, and until recently Republic of China (ROC) maps included Outer Mongolia as well. This illustrates how

national maps are not simply scientific reflections of the territory of the real world;
maps are technologies of power used for political projects . Chinese atlases from the early
twentieth century, for example, characteristically state that the new Republic (founded in 1912) needed national
maps to know just what it was ruling.6 The title of a recent academic article describes the enduring goal of Chinese
cartography: A Century of Anticipating the Unification of the Motherland.7 Here I follow those who treat maps and
cartography as political practices that seek to produce what Thongchai Winichakul calls the national geobody,
which is not merely space or territory. It is a component of the life of a nation. It is a source of pride, loyalty,
love, . . . hatred, reason, [and] unreason.8 As massproduced visual artifacts, maps are more than scientific
representations of reality; they constitute a symbolic discourse that can mobilize the masses. In this way, maps

when they inscribe space as a

geobody, maps also tell us about the biopolitics of national identity practices . Maps
and cartography thus are deployed in the dynamic of cultural governance and resistance in China and Asia.
In this sense, the region is not unique; it is participating in the process of capitalist
modernity, where the state seeks to match territorial and cultural boundaries not
only through military coercion and fiscal regulation but also through a management of
identity practices. Since the state can never exhaust cultural production,
resistance to these centralizing efforts takes the form of alternative cultural
productions, including alternative maps that inscribe various alternative geobodies .9
In this sense, producing and regulating the geobody is a technique of biopower,
which, as Michel Foucault explained, expanded the notion of politics from juridical
concepts of power that restrict action under the threat of death to a productive
understanding of power that emphasizes the fostering of life. 10 Biopolitics is especially
useful for understanding the emergence of a national body politic in China because
the country was known as the Sick Man of Asia, whose life needed to be saved
not only tell us about the geopolitics of international borders;

re-membering territories that had been dismembered (fenge) is a

key way of imaginingand then managing Chinas geobody in a way that combines
biopolitics and geopolitics. Hence the borders of the Chinese geobody are neither
obvious nor fixed; they are contingent on historical events and are framed by
cartographic conventions. Chinas borders are the product of debate and struggle as the country has gone
(jiuguo). As we will see,

through major transitions first from an empire to a nation-state in the early twentieth century, and now from an

the struggle
about the proper size and shape of China is not only with foreign countries along
frontier zones but within China in debates among different groups, which each draw
different national maps to support their preferred geobodies . While it is popular to analyze
isolated revisionist state to an engaged superpower at the turn of the twenty-first century. Hence

Euro-American images of China to critique Western orientalism, this essay is more concerned with the identity
politics of Chinese images of its own region, which as we will see grow out of the collision of imperial Chinese
cartography and modern scientific maps. Thus, rather than just trace the geopolitics of how the shape of China has
changed in its encounter with modernity, the maps discussed in this essay raise a set of conceptual issues. To
understand the Chinese geobody, we need to engage in comparative cartographybut rather than compare East
and West, we need to consider Chinas uneasy shift from premodern unbounded understandings of space and
territory to bounded understandings of space and territory in the early twentieth century. Simply put, I question the
common argument that there has been a shift from the late imperial Chinese concept of unbounded domain
(jiangyu) to a modern understanding of bounded sovereign territory (zhuquan lingtu).11 The maps will show how

imperial domain and sovereign territory both still workoften in creative tensionto inscribe
the PRCs twenty-first-century geobody on the Chinese imagination . This creative tension
is manifest in a set of Maps of Chinas National Humiliation, which as I argue form a link between imperial Chinas
unbounded cartography and its modern maps of sovereign territory. These national humiliation maps help us
understand the emergence of Chinas geobody because they are produced for mass education to chart how China
lost territories to imperialist aggressors as it was dragged into modernity starting with the Opium War in 1840.12
Yet these national maps do more than publicly register Chinas aspirational claims to various neighboring territories.

normative national maps actually tell us more about the fragile

biopolitics of Chinas new identity as a great power than about the geopolitics of
Asian security. To understand how Chinas geobody emerges at the confluence of unbounded imperial domain
and modern sovereign territory, it is helpful to see how Thailand used three discursive strategies to
claim many of its vassals as sovereign national territory.13 The first strategy for
claiming imperial possessions as national territory is to deny the difference between
imperial domains hierarchical unbounded space and sovereign territorys
homogeneous bounded space. The second strategy is to establish the stories of
Chinas sovereign territoriality in the context of modern international politicsparticularly
colonialismas opposed to Chinas own history of imperial conquest . The third strategy
is to read territoriality exclusively from Beijings point of view , and thus suppress any
rival perspectivesfrom Lhasa, Kashgar, or Taibeithat might dispute the scope of
Chinas normative geobody. As we will see, Chinese cartography employs these three
discursive strategies to essentialize the Qing dynastys imperial domain into the PRCs
national sovereign territory. This essay has two general aims: (1) to demonstrate how Chinas current
I argue that these

national maps have emerged through the creative tension of unbounded imperial domain and bounded sovereign
territory, and (2) to show how the cartography of national humiliation informs the biopolitics of the geobody. The
goal of the essay thus is not to determine Chinas correct boundaries in legal discourse or geopolitical space.
Rather, it seeks to examine what Chinese maps of China can tell us about their hopes and fears, not only in the past
or present but also for the future. The analysis therefore is not limited to the standard questions of political
geography and border disputes; it examines the biopolitics of how Chinas image of itself interacts with its image of
the world. As I suggest later in the conclusion, Chinas often unique experience can show us how cartography is an
important site of struggle in a broader biopolitics of geobodies. Comparative Cartography 1: Imperial Domain and
Sovereign Territory Normative maps certainly are not exclusive to China. Mappamundi in late medieval Europe also
represented normative space: not how the world was but how it should be. The map Europe as a Virgin (1592), for
example, presents a literal geobody of Europe with the Iberian Peninsula as the queens head and Denmark and
Italy as her arms, with a medallion over her heart in Bohemia where the map was produced.14 Starting in the
sixteenth century, Europe used more scientific maps both to conquer the world and to create the world map to

Mignolo argues
that the symbolic politics of drawing maps to claim imperial space and sovereignty
was a key part of conquering the world, because this new cartography coloniz[ed]
the imagination of both the conquered and the conquerors. 15 To understand the interplay of
divide up the globe into sovereign territories divided by clear boundaries. Thus Walter D.

imperial domain and sovereign territory on twentieth-century Chinese maps, we need to consider late imperial
Chinese cartography. Figure 3s Untitled Map (1743) presents a good example of one of the key genres of imperial
Chinese cartography; it reflects the style of a Huayi tua map of civilization and barbarism.16 If we look closely
at this large and complex map, we can see that the borders are not between territories so much as between
peoples and cultures: civilization and barbarians. This genre of imperial map presents China at the center of the
world, and often as the world itself. On such maps, foreign countrieseven Vietnam and India, let alone Portugal,
England, and Americaappear as small and insignificant islands off Chinas coast. It is difficult to read late imperial
maps if you do not know the conventions of Chinese cartographywhich suggests that reading modern
mathematical maps is not natural, either, but depends on unspoken conventions.17 Simply put, the main
convention of imperial Chinese maps is hierarchy. Such maps represent not a homogeneous space of equal
sovereignty and legitimacy but a hierarchy of concentric circles with diminishing sovereignty as one travels from
the imperial capital out to the periphery of provinces, vassal states, and finally the barbarian wilderness. The result
of this style of cartography is that imperial maps of Chinas domain are very detailed at the center but very vague
at the margins. Rather than the single line boundaries that define the sovereign territories of the Westphalian
international system, imperial Chinese cartography often mapped an ambiguous and unbounded domain of empty
or overlapping frontiers. While normative maps are a curiosity in Euro-American cartography, they have enduring
value in China: the first truly modern map of China based on scientific surveys was published for public
consumption in 1934.18 Hence any clear division between late imperial aesthetic maps and modern scientific maps
is misleading; China presents a case where normative mappamundi of imperial domains inform and overlap with
scientific cartographs of sovereign territory. Chinese cartography thus inscribes a coalescence of the two distinct
worlds of cosmography and geography; Chinas twentieth-century maps exemplify the simultaneous appeal to two
quite different readings of space: the ambiguous frontiers of the imperial domain and the clear national boundaries
of the international system.19 To chart the emergence of Chinas geobody, I analyze a set of

Maps of Chinas

National Humiliation that first were published in China between the founding of the ROC in 1912 and Japans
all-out invasion of China in 1937, which then reappeared after the Tiananmen movement (1989) as
part of the PRCs patriotic education campaign. These national humiliation maps are important for
three reasons. First, they graphically show the tension between the two ways of mapping China outlined above;
they thus provide a colorful link between the cartographies of imperial domain and sovereign territory. Second, they
are very deliberately published as part of patriotic education campaigns for public edification. In the
Republican period these large wall maps of national humiliation were an important part of the emergence of
nationalist geography education in China; they were

published by government bodies, geographic

societies, and commercial presses for classroom use and public consumption alongside
mainstream national maps. National humiliation maps published at the turn of the twenty-first century are likewise
very public artifacts that are part of the PRCs multimedia patriotic education campaign. Third, national humiliation
maps not only make expansive and aspirational claims to huge tracts of land as Chinas national territory; they also

an
obsession with unity is not simply a modern concern that arose in reaction to
Chinas tragic modern history, which is seen as a history of European, American, and Japanese
imperialist aggression. While Euro-American philosophy asserts a solid objective reality
that needs to be deconstructed, in the Chinese cas e, in contrast, it is of a dispersed
reality, in the face of which a reconstructive need has often struggled. 20 Similar
national humiliation maps from the turn of the twenty-first century suggest that this search for
great unity (da yitong) not only is part of Chinas enduring political culture but continues to be one of the
main theoretical frameworks for historical geography in the PRC .21 To see how the three
address the enduring Chinese anxiety of falling apart seen in figure 2. Indeed, many have noted that

discursive strategies of the cartography of national humiliation crafted Chinas geobody, we need to look at how the
interplay of positive and negative images actually constructed the map of China that is familiar today.

Colonial biopolitics necessitates genocide and symbolic death,

as global war becomes a permanent relation
Harting 6 Associate Professor of English at the University of Montreal (Heike, Global Civil War and Postcolonial Studies, from the Globalization and Autonomy Online Compendium,
globalautonomy.ca/global1/servlet/Xml2pdf?fn=RA_Harting_GlobalCivilWar)

global civil war affects society as a whole . It

"tends," as Hardt and Negri argue, "towards the absolute" (2004, 18) in that it polices civil society through
elaborate security and surveillance systems, negates the rule of law , militarizes quotidian
space, diminishes civil rights to the degree in which it increases torture, illegal incarceration, disappearances, and
emergency regulations, and fosters a culture of fear, intolerance, and violent discrimination .
Hardt and Negri, therefore, rightly argue that war itself has become "a permanent social relation"
and thereby the "primary organizing principle of society , and politics merely one of its means or
The Necropolitics of Global Civil War As with other civil wars,

guises" (ibid., 12). What Hardt and Negri suggest is new about today's global civil war is its biopolitical agenda. "War," they write,
"has become a regime of biopower, that is, a form of rule aimed not only at controlling the population but producing and
reproducing all aspects of social life" (ibid., 13). For example, the biopolitics of war entails the production of particular economic and
cultural subjectivities, "creating new hearts and minds through the construction of new circuits of communication, new forms of
social collaboration, and new modes of interaction" (ibid., 81). The ambiguity of Hardt and Negri's notion of biopower subtly resides
in their adaptation of the language of social and political revolution, for it seems to be the regime of biopower, rather than the
multitude, that absorbs and transvalues the revolutionary, that is, anti-colonial, spirit inscribed in the rhetoric of "new hearts and

a biopolitical definition of war "changes war's entire

legal framework" (ibid., 21-22), for "whereas war previously was regulated through legal
structures, war has become regulating by constructing and imposing its own
legal framework" (ibid. 22). If none of this, at least in my mind, is marked by a particular originality of thought, then
minds." At the same time, they argue, that

this may have to do with Hardt and Negri's reluctance to address the historical continuities between earlier wars of decolonization
and contemporary global wars, the legacies of imperialism, and the imperative of race in orchestrating imperial, neo-colonial, and

biopolitical global warfare might be a new phenomenon on the sovereign

is hardly news to "people in the
former colonies, who," as Crystal Bartolovich points out, "have long lived at the 'crossroads' of
global forces" (2000, 136), violence, and wars. For example, in Sri Lanka global civil war has been a permanent,
today's global civil wars. In fact, while

territory of the United States of America, specifically after 11 September 2001, it

everyday reality since the country's Sinhala Only Movement in 1956, and become manifest in the normalization of racialized
violence as a means of politics since President Jayawardene's election campaign for a referendum in 1982, which led to the stateendorsed anti-Tamil pogrom in 1983. Similarly, according to Achille Mbembe, biopolitical warfare was intrinsic to the European
imperial project in "Africa," where "war machines emerged" as early as "the last quarter of the twentieth century" (2003, 33). In
other words, although Hardt and Negri argue convincingly that it is the ubiquity of global war that restructures social relationships
on the global and local level, their concept tends to dehistoricize different genealogies and effects of global civil war. Indeed, not
only do Hardt and Negri refrain from reading wars of decolonization as central to the construction of what David Harvey sees as the
uneven "spatial exchange relations" (2003, 31) necessary for the expansion of capital accumulation and of which global war is an
intrinsic feature, but they also dissociate global civil wars from the nation-state's still thriving ability to implement and exercise
rigorous regimes of violence and surveillance. As for the term's epistemological formation, global civil war has been sanitized and no
longer evokes the conventional association of civil war with "insurrection and resistance" (Agamben 2005, 2). Instead, it has become
the effect of a diffuse new sovereignty (i.e., Hardt and Negri's Empire), a sovereignty that no longer decides over but has itself
become a disembodied, that is, denationalized and normalized, state of exception. Yet, to talk about the disembodiment of global
war not only reinforces media-supported ideologies of high-tech precision wars without casualties, but it also represses narratives
about the ways in which the modi operandi of global war come to be embodied differently in different sites of war. In her short story
"Man Without a Mask" (1995), the Sri Lankan writer Jean Arasanayagam describes the global dimensions of a war that is usually
considered an ethnic civil war restricted to internally competing claims to territorial, cultural, and national sovereignty between the
country's Sinhalese and Tamil population. Told by an elite mercenary who clandestinely works for the ruling members of the
government and leads a group of highly trained assassins, the story follows the thoughts of its narrator and contemplates the
politicization of violence and death. As a mercenary and possibly an ex-SAS (British Special Air Service) veteran the Sri Lankan
Government hired after the failure of the Indo-Lankan Accord, the narrator signifies the "privatization of [Sri Lanka's] war" (Tambiah
1996, 6) and, thus, the reign of a global free market economy through which the state hands over its institutions and services to
private corporations, including its army, and profits from the unrestricted global and illegal trade in war technologies. Like a
craftsman, the mercenary finds satisfaction in the precision and methodical cleanliness of his work, in being, as he says, "a hunter.
Not a predator" in his ability to leave "morality" out of "this business" (Arasanayagam 1995, 98). He is an extreme and perverted
version of what Martin Shaw describes as the " 'soldier-scholar,'???the archetype of the new [global] officer" (1999, 60). As a selfproclaimed "scholar or scribe" (ibid., 100), the mercenary plots maps of death. Shortly before he reaches his victim, a politician who
underestimated the political ambition of his enemy, he comments that bullet holes in a human body comprise a new kind of
language: "The machine gun splutters. The body is pitted, pricked out with an indecipherable message. They are the braille marks of
the new fictions. People are still so slow to comprehend their meaning" (ibid., 100). These new maps or fictions of global war, I
suggest, describe what Etienne Balibar calls ultra-objective and ultra-subjective violence and characterize how global civil war both
generates bare life and manages and instrumentalizes death. According to Balibar, ultra-objective violence suggests the systematic

"naturalization of asymmetrical relations of power" (2001, 27) brought about, for instance, by the Sri Lankan government's
prolonged abuse of the Prevention of Terrorism Act, which, in the past plunged the country into a permanent state of emergency,
facilitated the random arrest of and almost absolute rule over citizens, and thus created a culture of fear and a reversal of moral and
social values. As the story clarifies, under conditions of systematic or ultra-objective violence, "corruption" becomes "virtue" and
"the most vile" man wears the mask of the sage and "innocent householder" (Arasanayagam 1995, 102). In this milieu, the
mercenary has no need for a mask, because he bears a face of ordinary violence that is "perfectly safe" (ibid., 102) in a society
structured by habitual and systemic violence. But the logic of the "new fictions" of political violence is also ultra-subjective because
it is "intentional" and has a "determinate goal" (Balibar 2001, 25), namely the making and elimination of what Balibar calls
"disposable people" in order to generate and maintain a profitable global economy of violence. The logic of ultra-subjective violence
presents itself through the fictions of ethnicity and identity as they are advanced and instrumentalized in the name of national
sovereignty. The mercenary perfectly symbolizes what Balibar means when he writes that "we have entered a world of the banality
of objective cruelty" (ibid.). For if the fictions of global violence are scratched into the tortured bodies of war victims, the
mercenary's detached behavior dramatizes a "will to 'de-corporation'," that is, to force disaffiliation from the other and from
oneself ??? not just from belonging to the community and the political unity, but from the human condition" (ibid.). In other words,

while global civil war becomes embodied in those whom it negates as social beings
and thereby reduces to mere "flesh," it remains a disembodied enterprise for those who manage
and orchestrate the politics of death of global war. It is through the dialectics of the
embodiment and disembodiment of global violence that the dehumanization of the
majority of the globe's population takes on a normative and naturalized state of
existence. Arasanayagam's short story also casts light on the limitations of Hardt and Negri's understanding of the biopolitics
of global civil war, for the latter can account neither for the new fictions of violence in former colonial spaces nor for what Mbembe

the "necropolitics" (2003, 11) of late modernity. Mbembe's term refers to his analysis of
global warfare as the continuation of earlier and the development of new "forms of
subjugation of life to the power of death" and its attendant reconfiguration of the "the relationship between
calls

resistance, sacrifice, and terror" (2003, 39). 4 Despite the many theoretical intersections of Hardt and Negri's and Mbembe's work,
Mbembe's notion of necropolitics sees contemporary warfare as a species of such earlier "topographies of cruelty" (2003, 40) as the

the ways in which global

violence and warfare produce subjectivities cannot be dissociated from the ways in
which race serves as a means of both deciding over life and death and of
legitimizing and making killing without impunity a customary practice of imperial
population control. If global civil war is a continuation of imperial forms of warfare, it must rely on strategies of
plantation system and the colony. Thus, in contrast to Hardt and Negri, Mbembe argues that

embodiment, that is, of politicizing and racializing the colonized or now "disposable" body for purposes of self-legitimization,
specifically when taking decisions over the value of human life. After all, on a global level, race propels the ideological dynamics of
ethnic and global civil war, while, on the local plane, it serves to orchestrate the brutalization and polarization of the domestic
population, reinforcing and enacting patterns of racist exclusion and violence on the non-white body. In contrast to Hardt and Negri,
then, Mbembe invites us to articulate imperial genealogies for the necropolitics of today's global civil wars. In other words, if
imperialism was a form of perpetual low-intensity global war, the biopolitics of imperialism aimed at creating different forms of
subjectivization. For example, while in India, the imperial administration sought to create a functional class of native informants, in
Africa and the Caribbean, the British Empire created the figure of homo sacer. The latter, as Agamben argues, refers to the one who
can be killed but not sacrificed. Homo sacer, Agamben clarifies, constitutes "the originary exception in which human life is included
in the political order in being exposed to an unconditional capacity to be killed" (1998, 85). Thus, the native is included in the
imperial order only through her exclusion, while, simultaneously her humanity is stripped of social life and transformed into bare life,
ready to be commodified on slavery's auction blocs and foreclosed from the dominant imperial psyche. Agamben's understanding of
bare life derives from his reading of the Nazi death camps as the paradigmatic space of modernity in which the distinction between
"fact and law" (ibid., 171), "outside and inside, exception and rule, licit and illicit" (ibid., 170) dissolves and in which biopolitics takes
the place of politics and "homo sacer" replaces the "citizen" (ibid., 171). While the notion of bare life is instrumental for theorizing
biopolitics and the normalization and legalization of state violence under the pretense of, for example, protective arrests and
preemptive strikes, it also suggests that the human body can be read as pure matter or in empirical terms. What goes unnoticed is
to what extent the production of bare life depends on ideologies of race, that is, on the racialization of bodies, citizenship, and the
concept of the human. For instance, under imperial rule, bare life is subjected to death and its politics in ways slightly different from
those suggested by Agamben. More specifically, the killing of natives or slaves as bare life ??? then and today, as Rwanda's racebased genocide clarifies ??? not only configures human life in terms of its "capacity to be killed" (Agamben 1998, 114), that is as

homicide and genocide outside of law and accountability, but also measures the value of human life on grounds of
race. The making of bare life is a racialized and racializing process rooted within the
necropolitics of colonialism. For, killing the native or slave presupposes the remaking of the human
into bare life both through ideologies of pseudo-scientific racism and by subjecting them to what Orlando
Patterson calls the "social death" (1982, 38) of the slave, that is, to a symbolic death of the human as a
communal and social being that precedes physical death. 5 Thus, imperialism's necropolitics involves
the making of disposable lives through practices of zombification and the "redefinition of death" itself (Agamben 1998, 161). In this

imperialism not only facilitated the extreme forms of racialized violence

characteristic of global civil war, but it also helped create the conditions for making
sense,

bare life the acceptable state of being for the present majority of the globe's
population. Not unlike Jean Arasanayagam's short story, Mbembe's account of the Rwandan genocide and the Palestinian
intifada suggests that the new global subjectivities are not so much the networked multitude Hardt and Negri imagine. Rather,
emerging from the "new fictions" of global war, they are the suicide bomber, the mercenary, the martyr, the child soldier, the victim
of mass rape, the refugee, the woman dispossessed of her family and livelihood, the mutilated civilian, and the skeleton of the
disappeared and murdered victims of global civil war. What these subjectivities witness is that, on one hand, living under conditions
of global civil war means to live in "permanent???pain" (Mbembe 2003, 39) and, on the other hand, they refer back to the dialectical
mechanisms of colonial violence. For under the Manichaean pressures of colonialism, colonial violence always inaugurates a double
process of subjection and subject formation. Frantz Fanon famously argues that anti-colonial violence operates historically on both
collective and individual subject formation. For, on the one hand, "the native discovers reality [colonial alienation] and transforms it
into the pattern of this customs, into the practice of violence and into his plan for freedom" (1963, 58), and on the other, a violent
"war of liberation" instills in the individual a sense of "a collective history" (ibid., 93). Thus, as Robert Young suggests, anti-colonial
violence "functions as a kind of psychotherapy of the oppressed" (2001, 295). Yet, it seems that read through the necropolitics of
imperialism, global civil warfare no longer aims at the "pacification" of the colonial subject or the "degradation" of the "postcolonial
subject" (ibid., 293) but, as I suggested earlier, at the complete abolishment of the human per se. We may therefore say that if
global civil war produces new subjectivities, it does so through, what I have referred to as a process of zombification. Understood as
sustained acts of negation, zombification ??? a term that harks back to Fanon ??? refers to a dialectical process of the embodiment
and disembodiment of global war. The former refers to the exercise of ultra-objective violence ??? that is, the systematic
"naturalization of asymmetrical relations of power" (Balibar 2001, 27) ??? in order to regulate, racialize, and extinguish human life at
will, while the latter suggests the production of narratives of "de-corporation" (ibid., 25) and detachment by those who manage and
administrate global civil war. The notion of zombification, however, connotes not only the exercise of, but also the exorcism of, the
ways in which global war is scripted on and through the racialized body. Thus, a post-colonial understanding of global war needs to
think through the necropolitics of war, including the uneven value historically and presently assigned to human life and the
politicization of death. The latter issue will be addressed in the last section of this paper. The next section examines the cultural
production and perpetuation of normative narratives of global warfare. The Rhetoric of the Archaic and Michael Ondaatje's "Anil's
Ghost" Published shortly after Sri Lanka's civil war became entangled with the global politics of the South and the rise of the Sri
Lankan nation-state to one of the war's principal and most corrupt actors, Ondaatje's novel Anil's Ghost dramatizes both the
transformation of the country's civil war into a permanent state of exception and the failure of global non-governmental
organizations (NGOs) to intervene in the war's rising human rights abuses and violent excesses. While the novel presents an
extraordinary search for social justice through narrative and seeks to understand the operative modes of violence beyond their
historical and social configurations, it also tends to sublimate and aestheticize violence by treating it as a normative element of
human and, indeed, planetary life. My purpose here is to indicate that the novel's own project of dramatizing the complicity between
religious and secular, anti-colonial and nationalist agents of war, and civilians and global actors (i.e., NGOs) remains compromised
by the novel's aesthetic investment in a particular rhetoric of the archaic. The latter, I argue, unwittingly coincides with normative
narratives of global war and facilitates the reader's detachment from the ways in which the Global North has reconstructed global
life as a permanent state of exception. Ondaatje's novel (2000) opens with an Author's Note that locates the narrative at a time
when "the antigovernment insurgents in the south and the separatist guerrillas in the north???had declared war on the government"
and "legal and illegal government squads were???sent out to hunt down" both groups. In this instance, the Hobbesian rhetoric of a
"war of all against all" is more than a clich??. In fact, it is symptomatic of the novel's ambiguous critique of the role of the Sri Lankan
nation-state and its elaborate, modernist discourse of violence. The Note foreshadows what the narrator later repeats on several
occasions, namely that Sri Lanka's war is a war fought "for the purpose of war" (ibid., 98) and for which "[t]here is no hope of
affixing blame" (ibid., 17). In short, the "reason for war was war" (ibid., 43). At first glance, the narrative's emphasis on the war's
self-perpetuating dynamics implies a Hobbesian understanding of violence as the natural state of human existence. At the same
time, it translates the actual politics of Sri Lanka's war into the Deleuzean idiom of the "war machine." For, according to Deleuze and
Guattari, armed conflict functions outside the control and accountability of the "state apparatus???prior to its laws" (1987, 352), and
beyond its initial causes. Although such an interpretation of Sri Lanka's war reflects what the political scientist Jayadeva Uyangoda
calls the "intractability of the Sri Lankan crisis" (1999, 158), its political and ethical stakes outweigh its gains. 6 To begin with, the
novel's leitmotif of "perpetual war" situates Sri Lanka's conflict within a general context of global war, because, as the narrator
reports, it is fought with "modern weaponry," supported by "backers on the sidelines in safe countries," and "sponsored by gun-and
drug-runners" (Ondaajte 2000, 43). In this scenario, the rule of law has deteriorated into "a belief in???revenge" (ibid., 56), and the
state is either absent or part of the country's all-consuming anarchy of violence. This absence suggests that the state no longer
functions, in Max Weber's famous words, as "a human community that (successfully) claims the monopoly of the legitimate use of
physical force within a given territory" (2002, 13). It is of course possible to argue that the novel's critique of the Sri Lankan nation-

that the narrative's tendency to locate the dynamics of Sri

Lanka's war outside the state and within a post-national vision of a new global order generates a normative
narrative of global war. On the one hand, it resonates with the popular ??? though
misleading ??? notion that the "appearance of 'failed states'," as Samuel Huntington argues in his
controversial study The Clash of Civilizations, intensifies "tribal, ethnic, and religious conflict" and thus "contributes to
[the] image of a world in anarchy" (1996, 35). On the other, situating Sri Lanka's war
outside the institutions of the state re-inscribes a Hobbesian notion of violence that
helps legitimize and cultivate structural violence as a permissive way of
conducting politics. Such a reading of violence, however, overlooks that in a global context violence has become
state lies in its absence. It seems to me, however,

"profoundly anti-Hobbesian" (Balibar 2001, xi). Balibar usefully suggests that the twentieth century history of extreme violence has
made it impossible to regard violence as "a structural condition that precedes institutions." Instead, he maintains, "we have had to
accept???that extreme violence is not post-historical but actually post-institutional." It "arises from institutions as much as it arises
against them" (ibid., xi). Thus, in such popular post-colonial narratives of war as Anil's Ghost, the normalization of violence figures as
a forgetting of the institutional entrenchment and historical use of violence as a state-sanctioned political practice. If Ondaatje's

novel presents Sri Lanka's war as an "inherently violent" event (Das 1998), it is also an event narrated through the symbolism and
logic of archaic primitivism. For example, in the novel's central passage on the nature of human violence, the narrator observes,
"The most precisely recorded moments of history lay adjacent to the extreme actions of nature or civilisation ???Tectonic slips and
brutal human violence provided random time-capsules of unhistorical lives???A dog in Pompeii. A gardener in Hiroshima" (Ondaatje
2002, 55). The symbolic leveling of the arbitrariness of primordial chaos and the apparently ahistorical anarchism of violence create
a rhetoric of the archaic that is characteristic, as Nancy argues, of "anything that is properly to be called war" (2000, 128). He
convincingly argues that archaic symbolism "indicates that [war] escapes from being part of 'history' understood as the progress of
a linear/or cumulative time" and can be rearticulated as no more than a "regrettable" remnant of an earlier age (ibid., 128). In that,

the "war on terror" employs a medievalist rhetoric of

just and unjust wars that moralizes rather than legitimizes the use of global violence by putting it
outside the realm of reason and critique. In Nancy's observation, however, two things are at stake. First, what
Nancy's observation coincides with Hardt and Negri's that

initially appears to be a postmodern critique of the grand narratives of history in fact demonstrates that a non-linear account of

violence is
normalized as a transhistorical category that fails to address the unequal political
and economic relations of power, which lie at the heart of global wars. Second, Nancy
history may lend itself to the transformation of extreme violence into exceptional events. In this way

rightly warns us against treating war as an archaic relic that is "tendentiously effaced in the progress and project of a global
humanity" (2000, 128). For not only does war return in the process of negotiating sovereignty on a global and local plane, but the
representation of war in terms of archaic images also repeats a primordialist explanation of what are structurally new wars. As

the primordialist hypothesis of global wars merely

reinforces those mass mediated images of global violence that dramatize ethnic
wars as pre-modern, tribalist forms of strife. Huntington's notion of civilization or "fault-line" wars as
theorists such as Appadurai and Kaldor have argued,

communal conflicts born out of the break-up of earlier political formations, demographic changes, and the collision of mutually
exclusive religions and civilizations presents the most prominent and politically influential version of a primordialist and bipolar
conceptualization of global war. In contrast to Huntington's approach, however, the narrative of Anil's Ghost contends that all forms
of violence "have come into their comparison" (Ondaatje 2000, 203). Notwithstanding its universalizing impetus, the novel thus
insists on the impossibility to think the nation and a new global order outside the technologies of violence and modernity. Indeed, in
the novel's narrative it is the suffering of all war victims that "has come into their comparison" and suggests that the new wars
breed a culture of violence that shapes everyone's life yet for which no one appears to be accountable. On the one hand, then, the
novel's self-critical humanitarian project seeks to initiate a communal and individual process of mourning by naming, and therefore
accounting for, in Anil's words, "the unhistorical dead" (ibid, 56). On the other hand, read as its critical investment in the war's
politics of complicity, the novel's humanitarian endeavor is countered by the narrator's tendency to articulate violence in archaic
and anarchistic terms. For, to revert to the symbolic language of "primitivism and anarchy" and "to treat [the new wars] as natural

the rhetoric of the

archaic not merely dehistoricizes violence but contributes to the making of a
normative and popular imaginary through which to make global wars thinkable and
comprehensible. Thus, their violent excesses appear to be rooted in primordialist
constructions of the failed post-colonial nation-state rather than a phenomenon with deepseated roots in the global histories of the present. Such a normative imaginary
of global war is produced for the Global North so as to dehistoricize its own
position in the various colonial processes of nation formation and global
economic restructuring of the Global South. In this way, as Ondaatje's novel equally demonstrates, the
disasters," as Kaldor observes (2001, 113), designates a common way of dealing with them. Thus

Global North can detach itself from the Global South and create the kind of historical and cultural distance needed to accept ultraobjective violence as a normative state of existence. Conceptualizing war as a phenomenon of criminal and anarchistic violence,
however, may do more than merely conform to the popular imagination about the chaotic and untamable nature of contemporary
warfare. Indeed, anarchistic notions of violence tend to compress the grand narratives and petite recits of history into a total,
singular present of perpetual uncertainty, fear, and political confusion and generate what the post-colonial anthropologist David
Scott sees as Sri Lanka's "dehistoricized" history. Given the important role the claiming of ancient Sinhalese and Hindu history
played in the violent identity politics that drive Sri Lanka's war, Scott suggests that devaluing or dehistoricizing history as a founding
category of Sri Lanka's narrative of the nation breaks the presumably "natural???link between past identities and the legitimacy of
present political claims" (1999, 103). This strategy seems useful because it uncouples Sri Lanka's colonially shaped and glorified
Sinhalese past from its present claims to political power. We need to note, however, that, according to Scott, dehistoricizing the past
does not suggest writing from a historical vacuum. Rather, it refers to a process of denaturalizing and, thus, de-legitimizing the
normative narratives of ethnicized and racialized narratives of national identity. Anil's Ghost engages in this process of
"dehistoricizing" by foregrounding the fictitious and fragmented, the elusive and ephemeral character of history. Indeed, as the
historian Antoinette Burton suggests, the novel offers "a reflection on the continued possibility of History itself as an exclusively
western epistemological form" (2003, 40). The latter clearly finds expression in what Sarath's brother, Gamini, condemns as "the
last two hundred years of Western political writing" (Ondaatje 2000, 285). Steeped in the imperial project of the West, such writing

is facilitated by and serves to erase the figure of the non-European cultural Other in order to produce and maintain
what Jacques Derrida famously called the "white mythology" (1982, 207) of Western metaphysics. The novel
usefully extends its reading of violence into a related critique of knowledge production, so that the latter becomes
legible as being complicit in the production of perpetual violence and war . This critique is perhaps most articulated
through the character of Palipana, Sarath's teacher and Sri Lanka's formerly renowned but now fallen anthropologist. Once an agent

of Sri Lanka's anti-colonial liberation movement, Palipana represents the generation of cultural nationalist who sought history and
national identity in an essentially Sinhalese culture and natural environment. Rather than employing empirical and colonial methods
of knowledge production and historiography, Palipana had left the path of scientific objectivity, tinkered with translations of historical
texts, and "approached runes???with the pragmatic awareness of locally inherited skills" (Ondaatje 2000, 82) until "the unprovable
truth emerged" (ibid., 83). Now, years after his fall from scientific grace, Palipana lives the life of an ascetic, following the "strict
principles of" a "sixth-century sect of monks" (ibid., 84). To him, history and nature have become one, for "all history was filled with
sunlight, every hollow was filled with rain" (ibid., 84). Yet, Ondaatje's construction of Palipana and his account of the eye-painting
ritual of a Buddha statue ??? a ritual that assumes a central place in the novel's cosmopolitan vision of artisanship as a practice of
cultural and religious syncretism in the service of post-conflict community building ??? are themselves built on a number of historical
texts listed in the novel's "Acknowledgment" section. As Antoinette Burton astutely observes, "the orientalism of some of the texts
on Ondaatje's list is astonishing, a phenomenon which suggests the ongoing suppleness of 'history' as an instrument of political
critique and ideological intervention" (2003, 50). Rather than effectively "dehistorizing" the character of Palipana, then, Ondaatje
bases this character and the eye-painting ceremony on a central Sri Lankan modernist text, Ananada K. Coomaraswamy's Mediaeval
Sinhalese Art (1908/1956). Cont For Hardt and Negri, then, the state of exception functions as the universal condition and
legitimization of global civil war, while positioning the United States as a global power, which transforms war "into the primary
organizing principle of society" (2004, 12). They rightly observe that the state of exception blurs the boundaries between peace and
war, violence and mediation. Yet, curiously enough, Hardt and Negri's understanding of the state of exception largely emphasizes
the concept's regulatory and pragmatic politics, so that the United States emerges as a sovereign power on grounds of its ability to
decide on the state of exception. By exempting itself from international law and courts of law, protecting its military from being
subjected to international control, allowing preemptive strikes, and engaging in torture and illegal detention (ibid., 8), the United
States instrumentalizes and maintains war as a state of exception in the name of global security and thus seeks to consolidate its
hegemonic role within Empire. Although Hardt and Negri openly disagree with Agamben's reading of the state of exception as
defining "power itself as a 'monopoly of violence' " (2004, 364), it seems to me that Agamben's theory of the state of exception, as
put forward in Homo Sacer rather than in States of Exception, might be usefully read alongside Hardt and Negri's crucial claim that
global civil war as well as resistance movements depend on the "production of subjectivity" through immaterial labour (2000, 66).
What this argument overlooks is that, according to Agamben, the state of exception constitutes an abject space or "a zone of
indistinction between outside and inside, exclusion and inclusion" (1998, 181), where subjectivity enters a political and legal order
solely on grounds of its exclusion. Moreover, the sovereign ??? albeit a nation, sovereign power, or global network of power ??? can
only transform the rule of law into the force of law by suspending the legal system from a position that is simultaneously inside and
outside the law. Through these mechanisms of exclusion and contradiction, subjectivity is not so much created as it is deprived of its
social and political relationships. Thus the "originary activity" of global civil war is the violent conflation of political and social
relationship and thereby the "production of bare life" (ibid., 83), of life that need not be accounted for, as is the case with the civilian
casualties of the US-led war against Iraq. The state of exception, however, also figures as a prominent concept in post-colonial
theory, for it raises questions not only about the ways in which we configure the human but also how we understand imperial or
global war. In 1940, Benjamin famously wrote, "the tradition of the oppressed teaches us that the 'state of emergency' in which we
live is not the exception but the rule. We must attain to a conception of history that is in keeping with this insight" (1968, 257).
Benjamin's statement, as Homi Bhabha reminds us half a century later in his essay "Interrogating Identity," can be usefully
advanced for a critical analysis of the dialectical ??? if not revolutionary ??? relationship between oppression, violence, and anticolonial historiography. Indeed, "the state of emergency," as Bhabha says, "is also always a state of emergence" (1994, 41). Read in
the context of today's global state of exception, namely the recurrence and intensification of ethnic civil wars across the globe and
the coincidence of democratic and totalitarian forms of political rule, Bhabha's statement entails a number of risks and suggestions
for a post-colonial historiography of global civil war. First, Bhabha's notion of emergency/emergence reflects his critical reading of
Fanon's vision of national identity and thus reconsiders the state of emergency as a possible site of "the occult instability where the
people dwell" (Fanon 1963, 227) and give birth to popular movements of national liberation. In this context, the state of exception
might be understood as both constitutive to the alienation that is intrinsic to liberation movements and instrumental for a radical
euphoria and excessive hope that create and spectralize the post-colonial nation-state as a deferred promise of decolonization. It is
through this perspective that we can critically evaluate Hardt and Negri's endorsement of what they call "democratic violence"
(2004, 344). This kind of violence, they argue, belongs to the multitude. It is neither creative nor revolutionary but used on political
rather than moral grounds. When organized horizontally, according to democratic principles of decision making, democratic violence
serves as a means of defending "the accomplishments" of "political and social transformation" (ibid., 344). Notwithstanding the
concept's romantic and utopian inflections, democratic violence also derives from Hardt and Negri's earlier argument that "the great
wars of liberation are (or should be) oriented ultimately toward a 'war against war,' that is, an active effort to destroy the regime of
violence that perpetuates our state of war and supports the systems of inequality and oppression." This, they conclude, is "a
condition necessary for realizing the democracy of the multitude" (ibid., 67). In one quick stroke, Hardt and Negri move anti-colonial
liberation wars into their post-national paradigm of Empire and divest them of their cultural and historical particularities. Moreover,
translating explicitly national liberation movements into a universalizing narrative of global pacifism precludes a critique of violence

a post-colonial analysis of global war

must tease out the intersections between the ways in which racialized violence
constitutes colonial and post-colonial processes of nation formation and helps
construct an absolute enemy through which to legitimize global war and to abdicate
responsibility for the dehumanizing effects of global economic restructuring . Second,
within its particular historical and philosophical formation. In contrast,

while Bhabha's pun is symptomatic of the resisting properties that he sees as operative in the various practices of colonial
ambiguity, it also, despite Benjamin's opinion, draws attention to the possibility that oppression alters the linear flow of Western
history and challenges "the transparency of social reality, as a pre-given image of human knowledge" (Bhabha 1994, 41). Here,
Bhabha rightfully asks to what extent do states of emergency or acts of extreme violence constitute a historical rupture and, more
importantly, call into question the nature of the human subject. It is at this point that a post-colonial reading of the state of

the focus of inquiry is the

construction of disposable life through the logic of necropower and the collapse of
social and political relationships that enable the exercise of particularly racialized
exception fruitfully coincides with Agamben's notion of exception. For in both cases,

forms of violence, including torture and disappearances . Third, Bhabha's notion of the double
movement of emergency and emergence envisions an anti-colonialist historiography in terms of a dialectical process of perpetual
transformation. It is at this point, however, that the coupling of emergency or exception and emergence becomes problematic for at

combining both terms prematurely translates the violence of the

political event into that of metaphor and risks erasing the micro- or quotidian
narratives of violence ??? such as Arasanayagam's account of war ??? that both legitimate and are
perpetuated by political and social states of emergency . In order to examine the relationship
least two reasons. First,

between global and communal forms of violence, a critical practice of post-colonial studies, I suggest, must reassess the term
"transformation" and, concurrently, the assumption that acts of extreme global violence can be advanced in the service of "making
history" (Balibar 2001, 26). In other words, if, as Hannah Arendt argues, there has been a historical "reluctance to deal with violence
as a separate phenomenon in its own right" (2002, 25), it is time to examine the possibility of employing post-colonial studies in the
service of a non-dialectical critique of global war. This kind of critique must ask to what extent those on whose bodies extreme
violence was exercised are a priori excluded from articulating any transformative theory of violence. How, in other words, does bare
life ??? if at all possible ??? attain the status of subjectivity within the dehumanizing logic of exception or global civil war? Fourth,

we need to take seriously Benjamin's insight into the intrinsic

relationship between violence and the conceptualization of history. Notwithstanding
like Bhabha,

Bhabha's pivotal argument that the violence of a "unitary notion of history" generates a "unitary," and therefore extremely violent,

what enables today's

global civil war is that even "its opponents treat it as a historical norm" (Benjamin 1968,
"concept of man" (1994, 42), I wish to caution, alongside Benjamin's analysis of fascism, that

257). What is at stake, then, in dominant as well as critical narratives of global civil war is their representation as natural rather than
political phenomena, and the acceptance of globalization as a political fait accompli. Both of these aspects, I believe, contribute to

the
enormous rise of violence inflicted by global civil wars requires a post-colonial
historiography and critique of global war that questions notions of history based on
cultural fragmentation, rupture, and totalization . Instead, such a historiography must
seek out patterns of connection and connectivity . But more importantly, as I have argued in this paper,
it must trace the post-colonial moment of global civil war and begin to read contemporary war through
the interconnected necropolitics of global and imperial warfare . Thus, to understand the logic
the proliferation of dehistoricized concepts of the global increase of racialized violence and war. It seems to me, however, that

and practice of global war we need to develop a greater understanding precisely of those civil wars and national liberation wars that
do not appear to threaten the new global order. Furthermore, a post-colonial critique of global civil war should facilitate the decoding
and rescripting of both the normalizing narratives and racialized embodiment of global civil warfare.

The alternative is a genealogy of semi-colonial catachresis

intrinsic to the 1ACthat undermines the stable, univocal
narrative of the nation-state and rewrites history towards
emancipatory outcomes
Barlow 97 (Tani E. Barlow, historian of modern China at the University of Washington, Colonialisms Career
in Postwar Chinese Studies, in Formations of Colonial Modernity in East Asia, edited by Tani E. Barlow, 1997, pg.
398-401)

One alternative for post-Cold War historical scholarship might be a social

history of catechretic tropes in specified discourses. Inevitably such a project must
confront the massive history of global European colonialism because it would require the construction of critical
genealogies across national boundaries. CCASs earlier critique pointed out the problem: where Fairbank saw
synarchy as Historys way of preserving the Chinese state, subsequent readings have criticized Fairbanks

The
alleged stability of the center must always become, in critical reading, a deeply
suspect political claim. Indeed in each basic category that Cold War China studies
claimed to grasp in all their stable, empirical facticityHistory, Society, Nation,
Nature, Woman, Man, Familythe post-Cold War critic can very profitably read a colonizing
effort to establish a European presence ... ras] the spread of a political order that inscribes in the social
world a new conception of space, new forms of personhood, and a new means of manufacturing the
experience of the real:86 But what does destabilizing basic categories mean, and how can that exercise be
preoccupation with transcendental Law and reduced it to apologetics for the claims of British imperialism.

useful in the effort to derail Cold War formulations of China? I end with three suggestions. Rethinking Modern

The
destabilization of society means, Bernard Cohn and Nick Dirks have argued, that we drop
the notion that every human community is exactly the same and the
assumption that, like body parts, civil societies can be transplanted some how from nation body to nation body. Modernity is not a historical stage. It is a
cultural project. Loosely speaking, modernity is an effect of the media of modernity which reproduce
moralized, civilized, rational, sensible, patriotic, productive, responsible, obedient, law
abiding citizens.87 Global colonialization, the modernization touted by Cold War discourses,
produced ideological constructs termed modern society. The insight that modernity
is a discourse, however, an ideological formation and not a stage or
building block, simply undercuts strategies like Pyes which posit singular,
ideal-typical, unitary, unfolding teleologies. Rethinking the cor relation of
modernity and colonialism actually highlights the collusion of European
modernity and colonial society in the same historical pro cess.88 The question
Society. Without Pyes reified society modernization narratives lose some of their attractiveness.

then becomes, what shape did colonial modernity assume in the regions I am calling East Asia? Rethinking
Orientalism. The argument I have offered above expanded on the earlier CCAS imperialism debates, while steering
charily between economism to the one side and, on the other, an Orientalism-style reduction that erases all
inventory of traces from times and peoples who existed before the colonial encounter and within its systems of
representation. What Aijaz Ahmad calls the history of humanisms complicity in the history of European
colonialism remains largely unwritten for East Asia studies.89 But to say so is not to advocate its replication in a
new context.

Postcolonial critiques work by analogy from India and West Asia,

regions that were outright European possessions. Certainly, two decades
worth of South Asia debates have shaped the way engaged scholars of
East Asia reconsider the relation of locale and globalizing theory. But
dangers remain. The emphasis on otherness, so prominent a part of colonial
discourse criticism, makes it difficult to exceed an autocritique of the West .90 A more
appropriate postCold War agenda might include an interrogation of the complexity of
Chinas semicolonialism and begin the project of generating analytic strategies for theorizing Japanese
colonial expansion, thus both revivifying studies of the region as well as rereading earlier Saidian totalizing notions of colonial discourse.91 Rethinking Nation. The question of Chinese
nationalism was a staple of Cold War studies for decades .92 Recently, in area
studies and elsewhere, arguments are emerging that cast the nation as a
shared product of imperial and colonial forces.~3 The so-called particular
(colonial or not-Western nation) and the so-called universal (colonizer) turn out not
to be opposites after all, but rather a married pair that endorse each others
defects in order to conceal their own ?94 The insight that universal and particular depend on each
other, in turn, effects the ways that questions about national and local difference must be formulated. Critics can
now unravel Japanese imperialist nationalism, for instance, as neither essentially derivative (that is, incomplete) nor
essentially indigenous (reducible to the native archaic tradition), but rather as a will to power that universalizes the
selfs own circumstance into a general ground of human existence. While posing nationalisms against each other
taxonomically, in the manner of Cold War area studies, no longer suffices, it is still necessary to track colonial

That is because new subjects of

historical study emerge when the general category of colonialism is
valorized. When cultural codes are unraveled, the signifying economy or
systems of codes and ideology that characterize that time and that place
are revealed to be very complex. The significant figures that emerge, as a consequence, from
modernitys signs as they move from context to context.95

texts and documents requiring explanation are precisely master words like woman, intellectual, nation, and so on

masterwords Spivak argues, are [always]

catachreses.... [T]here are no literal referents, there are no true examples of the true worker~ true woman,
the true proletarian who would actually stand for the ideals in terms of which youve mobilizecV96 When the
that I will, following Spivak, term catachreses. The

signifying economy is complex, enigmatic local figures emergelike renmin/the people, or

nuxing/woman, and quingnian/youth that are not definably one thing (Chinese) or another (Western). Then the
national frame falters. But finding these enigmatic social figures requires
a degree of willingness to engage in explicit, critical theorizing projects.
The social genealogies of semicolonial catachreses remain to be written .

2NC

2NCLink Wall
Well do the link debate here
the PRC as a monolith link:
The affirmatives method of communicative engagement with
the PRC perpetuates an oriental view that homogenizes 53
different ethnicities as Chinese This erase their claims to
sovereignty and fortifies necropolitical colonialism in Xinjiang
and Tibetthats our Callahan 09 evidence
We access an external impact
By engaging with the regional hegemon, the affirmative
naturalizes Chinas artificial borders created through its own
imperialist ambition in Central Asia. This recreates maps of
humiliation that fortifies the structures of necropolitical
colonialism that necessitates the elimination of the Other. We
turn case because they re-inscribe a hegemonic discourse
which their Eagle-Pierce 11 indicate is 1AC resolves
narratives of PRC as a coherent whole securitizes against
the aforementioned dissident ethnicities. This also show the
1NCs genealogy access their evidence betterwe are the only
ones in this debate that counter-hegemonic knowledge which
translate into political change.
Wounded attachments link:
Communicative engagement is a manifestation of wounded
attachment to Americas neoliberal securitization of China
their 1AC gets coopted by China so that she may play the role
of victim instead of colonial perpetratoronly the alts
genealogy solves
Shih 10 (Shu-mei, Professor in Department of Comparative Literature, Asian Languages and Cultures, and
Asian American Studies @ UCLA, Theory, Asia and the Sinophone. Postcolonial Studies Volume 13, Issue 4, 2010.
Special Issue: Contemporary East Asia, in theory)
The three terms in the title of this essaytheory,

Asia, and the Sinophoneappear to be disparate or

far from completely discrete entities, and may be more
entangled and interconnected than we might assume. If the purpose of genealogical work ,
following Foucault, especially in light of his interpretation of Nietzsche, is to reveal the multiple and
contradictory paststhe details, accidents, reversals, faults, fissures,
discontinuities, errors, petty malice, disguises, etc.that are wilfully misinterpreted or
obliterated so that our current knowledge formation can be so thoroughly structured
by power, then I would like to posit that genealogical work is inherently a comparative endeavour
on multiple scales and levels involving non-traditional agents, and that its goal is to bring
unrelated. They are, I would like to propose,

view those relationalities repressed and obscured by both material and symbolic
interests of the power/knowledge dyad. What is disparatethe notion of disparity in
Foucaultmay be events in the world of chance, but they are nonetheless the
events that make up what Foucault has called, after Nietzsche, real history (wirkliche
Historie), which differs from the antiquarian history that traces back to an origin,
constructs a linear narrative of certainties and absolutes, is teleological and,
therefore, ultimately metaphysical. This article is a modest attempt at a non-metaphysical
history of disparity through a juxtaposition of these three terms in their apparent
discontinuities. Following Foucault, my task in this article is that of an effective historian with a historical
sense that is parodic and dissociative, and which seeks to shed the cloak of universals and to
attend to details and accidents that help the face of the other to emerge.1 The perennial
other to the construct that is called the Westnamely the Rest, the entity to which
Asia has been consignedis logically, then, a subject of important consideration in this
article. The explication of the relationship between the first two terms of this article, theory and Asia, must
into

consider this distancing of Asia from the domain of theory as a wilful forgetting of historical crossings that
necessarily constituted the formation of what we call theory today, and more specifically, what is known as
poststructuralist theory. We need to recall the aftermath of the global 1960s in terms of the interrelatedness of May
'68 in France, Maoism and the Cultural Revolution in China, Marxist humanism in Eastern Europe, global decolonial
movements led by Third World peoples, and the Civil Rights Movement led by racial minorities in the United
States.2 But this opposition or dichotomy between West ern theory and Asia is, I argue, a
majoritarian opposition between two major formations, even though the two are positioned in an uneven and

In our critique of and exclusive attention to this majoritarian

opposition, we end up systematically displacing the voices of minor and minoritized
peoples who are not authentic subjects either in the West or in Asia , but who also
theorize and who are also constitutive subjects . Western critical and cultural theory
seldom takes into account the standpoints of the internal others in its midst, ignoring,
for example, the complex conjunctures of the global 1960s in which racial minorities played a crucial
role. And in much the same way, the Asian critical tradition turns a largely deaf ear on the
voices of its racialized or ethnicized minorities and other peripheral subjectsselfobsessed, as it were, with its own wounding by the West. This wounding by Western
colonialismpolitical as well as epistemologicaland Asia's response to it through
something that can be generally called nationalism has persistently allowed Asia to exercise
domination over the various others within its own midst. A key example of this dynamic is
hierarchical relationship.

Japanese imperialism in the first half of the twentieth century, which presented itself as the saviour of Asia from
Western aggression, but was actually a force of violent domination across large swathes of the continent. Japanese
civilizing projects vied with Western civilizing projects in the colonies in a relationship of competition and mimicry,
while Japan's internal minorities (the Okinawans, the Zainichi, the Ainus, etc.) and its colonized subjects (in Korea,
Taiwan, Southeast Asia, and the Pacific) endured colonial violence and control. Twentieth-century

Chinese

nationalism is another example of the obsession with such wounding which has been
euphemistically celebrated as the obsession with China and its simultaneous oppression of ethnic
minorities and other peripheral subjects . The transition from the officially
multilingual empire of the Qing to the officially monolingual nation of modern China
(whether Republic of China or People's Republic of China ) has been explained in
nationalistic terms of victory over Western and Japanese incursions; but the history
of conquest of lands and peoples on the peripheries of empire cannot be explained
away by this nationalist narrative, and neither can the suppression of the religions,
cultures, and languages of China's minorities. As Mayfair Yang writes in a forthcoming essay,
Chinese anti-colonial nationalism was itself colonial vis--vis its religious population through its
insistence on secularism. She calls this, appropriately, the disenchantments of

sovereignty.3 I would further add that this secularism was especially targeted at ethnic minorities and their
religionsas the cases of Islam and Tibetan Buddhism make abundantly clear . Similarly,
so-called theory in the West can be readily faulted for its strategic indifference to the
dynamics of internal colonialism. The rise of poststructuralist theory in American
academia is historically contemporaneous with what Omi and Winant have called the
neoconservative racial reaction against the gains of the Civil Rights Movement led
by the racialized populations of African Americans and other minorities .4 Backlash
politics, charges of reverse discrimination, the rise of the new right, and the
elimination of affirmative action through the 1970s and 1980s set the stage for
neoliberalism in the ensuing decades. All the while, however, many American
academics in the humanities were struggling with the aporia of meaning in words and
texts, the death of the subject, the substitution of reality by simulacra, and
other cerebral quandaries. Shortly afterwards, many such academics, this time including some social
scientists, became sympathetic with the fate of the colonized in far-flung British and French ex-colonies rather
than with the plight of the internally colonizedthe racializedin their own
midst. There is, therefore, a more than compelling rationale for examining the ethical implications of this
displacement of minorities within the United States academy in area studies and postcolonial studies, not to
mention the traditional social science disciplines where theory is becoming increasingly dominant. This article is an
attempt to scatter the majoritarian dichotomy of the West (theory) and the Rest (Asia) in order to account for the
multiplicity of power/knowledge formations on variegated scales that are further articulated along the intersecting
axes of language, culture, ethnicity and geography. In this unorthodox history of disparity,

I present the

Sinophone as a loose network of minoritized voices as one of the most crucial absent others
routinely elided by the West and Asia, both of whom conveniently and simplistically
categorize it as the Chinese diaspora and thus explain it away . To put it differently,
the Sinophone speaks to that which is disavowed by the fantastic, powerful, and
collusive opposition between the two major material as well as symbolic entities
that we call the West and Asia, and it scandalizes that opposition with
irreverence from within. I analyse the potential of this scandal in the second section of the article after first
explicating what interests the more specific formulation of the dichotomy, Western theory versus Asian reality,
may serve. Theory and Asia The pairing of the two terms, theory and Asia, may be considered oxymoronic. Theory
as we know it is Euro-American, if not French, by definition, and Asia has not been considered the location or
producer of theory. In Asian studies, it has become customary, whether acknowledged or otherwise, for scholars to
apply Western theory to Asian reality or Asian texts. In the United States, literary scholars in Asian studies have
generally been informed by trends in literary theory from New Criticism to Deconstruction, and from feminism to
postcolonialism; while social scientists have either explicitly or implicitly applied theories ranging from
modernization theory (even those who claim to be merely empiricists) and Marxism, to rational choice theory and
poststructuralism, just to name a few. This current state of widespread and naturalized usage of Western theory has
not been achieved without debate, and it has much to do with the victory of the so-called disciplines over area
studies, or rather, the still-yet-to-be- evaluated upgrading of area studies from the Cold War model of information
retrieval (in the social sciences) and the old Orientalist model of culturalism (in the humanities). While social
science disciplines have declared that they no longer need or want to hire area experts, humanities disciplines
continue to struggle with the Orientalist legacy, especially in studies of pre-modern Asia. Hence it is far from
surprising that it was modern studies which first took the plunge into theory, much to the consternation and
disapproval of the gatekeepers of culturalism. The assault by theory understandably occurred first in Chinese
studies, the oldest and largest Asian area studies field in the United States, and it took the form of a contest in the
early 1990s between scholars of pre-modern and modern China, which later developed into a further dispute
between the theorists, the culturalists (pre-modern humanities), and the empiricists (social sciences). Multiple
provocations took place, including Jonathan Chaves criticism of Stephen Owen's use of deconstructionism as
throwing open the portals of Chinese poetry studies to the gremlin progeny of Derrida's febrile brain,5 and Zhang
Longxi's claim that Rey Chow was theorizing about China without a deep enough engagement with Chinese reality.
Even though Zhang Longxi himself advocated the use of theory as the first step in an effort to get out of the
cultural ghetto, in his critique of Rey Chow he appeared to be advocating authentic knowledge about Chinese
reality. 6 His article was tellingly entitled Western Theory and Chinese Reality, and all subsequent conflicts
whether revealed in public or notbetween the modernists and the pre-modernists, between younger scholars and
older scholars, between theorists and culturalists, or between theorists and empiricists, are variations on this

theme, which can also be described as Western Theory versus Chinese Texts. A similar debate also occurred in the
field of Chinese history, and was framed as nothing less than the paradigmatic crisis in Chinese studies by the
chief editor of the journal Modern China, Philip Huang, in an article by that same name. Huang then organized a
symposium at UCLA which was by all measures a showdown between the theorists and the self-styled empiricists,
with some of the articles later published in a special issue of Modern China in 1993.7 By the time Rey Chow's edited
volume Modern Chinese Literature and Cultural Studies in the Age of Theory: Reimagining a Field was published in
2000, it was difficult to say whether the battle had been won or the conflict simply buried. In giving this cursory
account of the earlier debates, and without going into the complexity of the arguments, I hope to underscore the
continuing perception of the disjunction between Western theory (as method) and Asian reality (as object of study),
even though that perception is largely suppressed from public scrutiny. Theory is universal because it can be
applied to different objects in different geographical locations. Asia is particular because it is a geographical
location, and not a set of concepts and ideas. It follows that concepts and ideas can travel, but the location, bound
geographically as it is, can only await them passively, even if it then might become the space in which those ideas
and concepts are modified or retooled. Hence, even in Asia, Western theory is a coveted genre of knowledge; and
the universities, in their frenzy to globalize, are increasingly requiring their faculty to publish in English-language
scholarly journals based in the United States or Britain, a process which, needless to say, requires fluency in the
theoretical lingo of specific disciplines and in the specific orientations of the various journals. In a recent analysis of
the ways in which Western theory has been appropriated by Chinese practitioners of Comparative Literature in the
past few decades, Serena Fusco has noted that it is almost as if the appropriation of Western theory were serving a
new moment of Chinese cultural/national self-strengthening, referring ironically to the importation of Western
learning (especially military knowledge) for national strengthening in nineteenth-century Qing China.8 The current
formation of the relationship between Western theory and Asian reality has been in place since at least the midnineteenth century, and it coincides neatly with the rise of modern Western empires, or to borrow Eric Hobsbawm's
phrase, the Age of Empire. It is not an exaggeration to say that the configuration of Asian critical thinking over the
last 150 years has found its inspiration or provocation in Western knowledge in a range of fundamental ways. The
so-called crisis of Chinese consciousness during the mid-nineteenth century was the immediate consequence of
defeat in the Opium Wars, which exposed the Qing empire's weakness vis--vis the British. The intellectual
formations ensuing from that point up until the present day have been, in one way or another, attempts to manage
and overcome this crisis via anxious appropriations of Western knowledge or Western theory. From late-Qing
reformist thinking to the May Fourth enlightenment, from Chinese Marxism to the so-called second enlightenment of
the 1980s, and right up to recent developments in (neo)liberal and postsocialist thought, we can identify specific
Western theories as having been crucial legitimizing discourses or persuasive spectral interlocutors for these
formations. In Japan, too, the Meiji Reform of the mid-nineteenth century was in large part a Westernization
campaign, and intellectual formations since then can also be viewed as variegated responses to Western knowledge
or Western theory. Many have noted and lamented this uneven itinerary of theory, and the massive absorption of
Western epistemologies across Asia which it has entailed, while admitting that not much traffic is going in the other
direction. China historian Joseph Levenson vividly metaphorized this asymmetry half a century ago, arguing that
China has helped to enlarge the West's vocabulary without significantly changing the character of Western culture
or its worldview, while the West has brought such fundamental changes to the grammar or language of Chinese
culture that its worldview has been fundamentally transformed.9 Here, the crucial point is that the two directions of
travel vary not only in quantity and intensity but also, and more significantly, in their quality or nature, leading to
dramatically different consequences: the West transforms China's worldview; China adds details and the occasional
vocabulary item to the West. Here we can see that the binary between Western epistemology and Chinese
content is no longer merely a conceptual formulation or a technique of Westernization, but a material consequence
of historical practice. In trying to dispute this binary, we may consider the argument that is often made in
discussions of the uneven, unequal, and asymmetrical traffic between Western theory and Asia: namely, that
Western theory contains within it ample traces of Asia. For instance, it may not be a gross exaggeration to say that
there is an important link between Marx's theorization of the Asiatic mode of production and the Marxist
legitimation of Western imperialism, between Weber's celebration of the Protestant ethic and his critique of its
apparent lack in Oriental religions, between Hegel's conception of the dynamism of Western-led world history and
his views on Asian stagnation, and between the arguments about European racial superiority and the corresponding
inferiority of Asians and blacks that we find in Kant's early work on anthropology. Using more recent examples, it is
also possible, if somewhat far-fetched, to suggest that there would have been no Derridean grammatology without
the Sinitic written script celebrated most famously by Fenollosa and Pound, no Foucaultian archaeology of
knowledge without the Chinese encyclopaedia, and perhaps even no linguistic turn in later twentieth-century French
thought without the disillusionment with Maoism. Perhaps Roland Barthes work would not have transitioned from
structuralism to poststructuralism without a trip to and a book about Japan, and Heidegger might never have
learned about Daoismwhich some claim is the basis of his notion of Daseinwithout his conversations with the
Japanese philosopher Kuki Shz, one of the founders of the Kyoto School of Philosophy. In all of these examples,
however, traces of Asia do not change the character of Western theory so much as function as illustrations or
details which support it; and those details are often conjured up in the Western imagination with their residues of
Orientalism more or less intact. A better example for this argument of Asia within the West is probably postcolonial
theory, which has focused predominantly on theorizing the effects of British colonialism in South Asia and was
pioneered by immigrant scholars from South Asia working in US institutions. This Asia, however, is the one most

thoroughly and explicitly touched by the West, and the colonial mediation (almost always seen as Western, despite
the fact that Asia has known other colonizers) has been the legitimizing mechanism for the relevance and success
of postcolonial theory as a school of thought in the American academy. This Asia became theorizable, so to speak,
precisely because it had been intimately touched by the West. And if South Asia had not been postcolonial theory's
predominant focus, Gayatri Spivak would not have had to promote the pluralization of Asia in her recent book,
Other Asias. What is more, postcolonial theory as it has developed thus far has a distinctly American history and,
we may argue, a correspondingly American character. It has received institutional support in American academia
when such support continues to elude postcolonial scholars in Britain. Its genesis is partially attributable to Spivak's
translation of Derrida's Of Grammatology, which helped usher in the age of theory in the US academymore
properly called the age of translated theory, or even the Americanization of French thought. Yet even in Other Asias,
Spivak subtitles two of the chapters testing theory in various locations in Asia, a move which tacitly acknowledges
the American-ness or Western-ness of postcolonial theory. The formula Western theory, Asian reality still operates
here, albeit only implicitly. For all practical purposes, postcolonial theory is travelling the same itineraries to Asia as
did any other Western theory; it is written in English; it travels on the might of global English sanctioned by the
American empire; and it is highly coveted within Asia. Can Asia be the location of theory? Takeuchi Yoshimi, the
Japanese Sinologist and cultural critic, tried to offer some answers to this question half a century ago. He begins his
discussion in the influential 1948 essay, What is Modernity?, by positing an implicit binary between the West and
Asia in dialectical fashion.10 For Takeuchi, Asia can achieve modernity and enter history only via European invasion.
This invasion is inevitable due to capitalism's inexorable expansionist drive, and it is through resistance to European
encroachment that Asia acquires self-consciousness.11 This self-consciousness allows Asia to reject its recalcitrant
tradition and to incorporate Western modernity as thoroughly as possible, while simultaneously resisting the West.
Based on this conception of Asian modernity, Takeuchi offers a model for negotiating the relationship between
Western theory and Asian reality: When in Europe a concept become[s] discordant (i.e. contradictory) with reality (it
always becomes contradictory), a movement occurs in which accord is sought by the overcoming of that
contradiction, that is to say, by the development of place. Here it is the concept itself that develops. However, when
in Japan a concept becomes discordant with reality (this is not movement, so not a contradiction), one abandons
former principles and begins searching for others. Concepts are deserted and principles are abandoned. Writers
abandon words and search for others. The more faithful these writers are to scholarship and literature, the more
fervently they abandon the old and incorporate the new.12 Thus one borrows concepts from Europe, tests them
against local reality, and then solves the contradictions that arise so that the concepts can develop properly. Here,
the origin of conceptual thinking is still Europe, but it is the mode and attitude of reception that become Takeuchi's
point of focus: namely, critical negotiation in correspondence with local reality as the basis for development.
Takeuchi laments that his compatriots in Japan have failed at this; many tend instead to import and then discard,
while others simply imitate the West slavishly without mounting even a token resistance. In the works of Lu Xun,
however, Takeuchi finds a perfect combination of grafting from the West while maintaining an attitude of resistance.
The sign of resistance which he identifies in Lu Xun is the despair that comes from the slave's full comprehension of
his own predicament and from his recognition that salvation is impossible. Unlike the Japanese who are slaves to
the West without knowing it, Lu Xun acknowledges the condition of the self as slave, and hence shows a critical
spirit that promisesquite paradoxicallya future beyond subjection. In this way, despair becomes a form of
resistance.13 If Takeuchi ended up articulating a poetics and politics of despair in his essays from the 1940s and
found himself stymied by the Western theory, Asian reality binary, he returned to the problem with renewed vigour
in an influential essay from 1961 entitled Asia as Method. The title of the essay clearly implies that Asia can be the
base from which methods are derived, in opposition to the notion that the West must always serve as the origin of
concepts and methods. What is intriguing in his seemingly resistant formulation, however, is the fact that Takeuchi
considered this to be a possibility only after Asia had engaged fully with the West. To be more precise, Asia must reembrace the Westespecially after Japan's defeat in World War IIand help transform it in order to allow for the
creation of a truly universal humanity: [...] the Orient must re-embrace the West, it must change the West itself in
order to realize the latter's outstanding cultural values on a greater scale. Such a rollback of culture or values would
create universality. The Orient must change the West in order to further elevate those universal values that the
West itself produced [...] When this rollback takes place, we must have our own cultural values. And yet perhaps
these values do not already exist, in substantive form. Rather I suspect that they are possible as method, that is to
say, as the process of the subject's self-formation. This I have called Asia as method, and yet it is impossible to
definitely state what this might mean.14 Asian cultural values are possible as method, and they are not so much
material or substantive as they are processes of the subject's self-formation. As vague as this statement sounds,
the core point relates to agency and Asia's ability to subjectivize itself. In other words, it is the agency and
subjectivity of Asia that are at stake if Asia is to become the site of method. Ultimately, then, Takeuchi is dealing in
notions of political economy: in the binary between Asia and the West, Asia must learn from the West and critique it;
and it is through this very process of criticality that Asia becomes a subject and an agent, who can then theorize.
Asia as method is projected into the future as a potentiality that can be realized only when Asia has achieved this
kind of critical subjectivity. Seeing through the political economy of theory is one of Takeuchi's key contributions in
this piece. Unlike those Asiacentrics who claim that Asians should take comfortable recourse to Asian values and
theories, he[Takeuchi] considers the question from perspectives that emerge after the inevitable Western incursion
into Asia has taken place. In a sense, then, one might say that Takeuchi is an early precursor of postcolonial theory:
indeed, although he was initially supportive of the cause of the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere during the

war, he later became a strong critic of Japanese imperialism precisely because it mimicked Western imperialism,
and was thus an expression of the slave mentality on the one hand, and a means of strategically displacing internal
contradictions on the other. His theory of mimicry is particularly powerful because it does not concern itself with the
colonized who mimics and then resists the colonizer, but instead critiques the self-colonized who mimics the West in
order to colonize and dominate others. It is a layered and multi-angulated theory of mimicry that encompasses
many agents. In critiquing Japanese imperialism, then, Takeuchi fractures the singularity of Asia into a plurality with
its own internal and variegated dynamics of colonialism and resistance, a perspective quite lacking in contemporary
American postcolonial theorywhich largely ignores both modern and historical East Asian empires. In analysing Lu
Xun's particular form of resistance, he further fractures the symbolic construct that is the West by referencing the
margins or others to this putative entity. He notes, moreover, that Lu Xun chose to translate not mainstream
Western literature, as the Japanese tended to do, but rather works from smaller, oppressed nations, such as Poland,
Czechoslovakia, Hungary and the Balkans, in addition to Slavic resistance poetry.15 Lu Xun's sympathies lay with
minor works of literature, and these sympathies show his resistant spirit, because they are not dictated by a
slavish importation of what is considered the best of Western literature. This idea of the best guides the Japanese
impulse for modernization, always hopeful, optimistic, and blithely unaware of its own slave mentality. Japan rushes
off after the latest things in order to overcome [its] own backwardness.16 Asia as method, for Takeuchi, entailed
the kind of confident choices that Lu Xun made of minor literatures (even if his overall tone was one of despair), the
overcoming of mimicry and the slave mentality, a non-essentialist understanding of European and Asian concepts
and values, and the forging of a true universalism. In these ways, we can say that Takeuchi overcame the Western
theory, Asian reality binary. But this binary is a historical product that will continue to exist as long as certain
interests are still served by it. These are the selfsame interests that served Japanese imperialism, which deployed
the binary of Asia versus the West as a tactic to legitimize its hegemony and displace the claims to identity by
internal and colonized subjects. In short, it mobilized the discourse of wounding by the West as a self-righteous
justification for wounding others. Chinese nationalism, as it resisted Japanese and Western imperialism, enacted a

when riots erupted across Tibet

and Xinjiang during the first decade of the twenty-first century, the Chinese
government and several prominent intellectuals pointed fingers at the West for
instilling wrong ideas among the Tibetans and the Uighurs, chastising this supposed
rhetoric as the updated expression of the West's age-old colonial ambitions towards
these regions, and as a further example of a Western Orientalism that continues to
demonize China. China emerges from this framing as the victim, not as the
hegemonic agent against whom the Tibetans and the Uighurs were rioting. Edward
Said could not have foreseen how the critique of Orientalism, articulated in the
language of wounding, can end up flipping so easily into its opposite: a discourse of
power.
similar strategy of hegemony through the discourse of wounding. And

The disconnect objective narration link:

Communicative engagement creates a disconnect objective
narration that promotes an ethic callousness towards the
racialized Other because it views deliberation as purely
rational, and open to compromises, as opposed to considering
cultural antagonismsthis effaces internal colonialism and
erases the voices of suffering.
Mignolo 9 (Walter, Prof of Humanities at Duke, Epistemic Disobedience, Independent Thought and DeColonial Freedom, Theory, Culture, & Society 26(7-8)]
ONCE UPON a time scholars assumed that the knowing subject in the disciplines is transparent, disincorporated
from the known and untouched by the geo-political configuration of the world in which people are racially ranked

From a detached and neutral point of observation (that

the knowing
subject maps the world and its problems, classifies people and projects into what is good for
and regions are racially configured.

Colombian philosopher Santiago Castro-Gmez (2007) describes as the hubris of the zero point),

them. Today that assumption is no longer tenable, although there are still many believers. At stake
is indeed the question of racism and epistemology (Chukwudi Eze, 1997; Mignolo, forthcoming). And once upon a
time scholars assumed that if you come from Latin America you have to talk about Latin America; that in such a
case you have to be a token of your culture. Such expectation will not arise if the author comes from Germany,
France, England or the US. In such cases it is not assumed that you have to be talking about your culture but can
function as a theoretically minded person. As we know: the first world has knowledge, the third world has culture;
Native Americans have wisdom, Anglo Americans have science. The need for political and epistemic delinking here
comes to the fore, as well as decolonializing and decolonial knowledges, necessary steps for imagining and building
democratic, just, and non-imperial/colonial societies. Geo-politics of knowledge goes hand in hand with geo-politics
of knowing. Who and when, why and where is knowledge generated (rather than produced, like cars or cell
phones)? Asking these questions means to shift the attention from the enunciated to the enunciation. And by so
doing, turning Descartess dictum inside out: rather than assuming that thinking comes before being, one assumes

it is a racially marked body in a geo-historical marked space that feels

the urge or get the call to speak, to articulate, in whatever semiotic system, the urge that makes of living
instead that

organisms human beings. By setting the scenario in terms of geoand body-politics I am starting and departing
from already familiar notions of situated knowledges. Sure, all knowledges are situated and every knowledge is
constructed. But that is just the beginning. The question is: who, when, why is constructing knowledges (Mignolo,
1999, 2005 [1995])? Why did eurocentered epistemology conceal its own geo-historical and bio-graphical locations
and succeed in creating the idea of universal knowledge as if the knowing subjects were also universal? This illusion
is pervasive today in the social sciences, the humanities, the natural sciences and the professional schools.
Epistemic disobedience means to delink from the illusion of the zero point epistemology. The shift I am indicating is
the anchor (constructed of course, located of course, not just anchored by nature or by God) of the argument that
follows. It is the beginning of any epistemic decolonial de-linking with all its historical, political and ethical
consequences. Why? Because geo-historical and bio-graphic loci of enunciation have been located by and through
the making and transformation of the colonial matrix of power: a racial system of social classification that invented
Occidentalism (e.g. Indias Occidentales), that created the conditions for Orientalism; distinguished the South of
Europe from its center (Hegel) and, on that long history, remapped the world as first, second and third during the
Cold War. Places of nonthought (of myth, non-western religions, folklore, underdevelopment involving regions and
people) today have been waking up from the long process of westernization. The anthropos inhabiting nonEuropean places discovered that s/he had been invented, as anthropos, by a locus of enunciations self-defined as
humanitas. Now, there are currently two kinds or directions advanced by the former anthropos who are no longer
claiming recognition by or inclusion in the humanitas, but engaging in epistemic disobedience and de-linking from
the magic of the Western idea of modernity, ideals of humanity and promises of economic growth and financial
prosperity (Wall Street dixit). One direction unfolds within the globalization of a type of economy that in both liberal
and Marxist vocabulary is defined as capitalism. One of the strongest advocates of this is the Singaporean scholar,
intellectual and politician Kishore Mahbubani, to which I will return later. One of his earlier book titles carries the
unmistakable and irreverent message: Can Asians Think?: Understanding the Divide between East and West (2001).
Following Mahbubanis own terminology, this direction could be identified as de-westernization. Dewesternization
means, within a capitalist economy, that the rules of the game and the shots are no longer called by Western
players and institutions. The seventh Doha round is a signal example of de-westernizing options. The second
direction is being advanced by what I describe as the decolonial option. The decolonial option is the singular
connector of a diversity of decolonials. The decolonial paths have one thing in common: the colonial wound, the fact
that regions and people around the world have been classified as underdeveloped economically and mentally.
Racism not only affects people but also regions or, better yet, the conjunction of natural resources needed by
humanitas in places inhabited by anthropos. De colonial options have one aspect in common with de-westernizing
arguments: the definitive rejection of being told from the epistemic privileges of the zero point what we are, what
our ranking is in relation to the ideal of humanitas and what we have to do to be recognized as such. However,
decolonial and de-westernizing options diverge in one crucial and in disputable point: while the latter do not
question the civilization of death hidden under the rhetoric of modernization and prosperity, of the improvement of
modern institutions (e.g. liberal democracy and an economy propelled by the principle of growth and prosperity),
decolonial options start from the principle that the regeneration of life shall prevail over primacy of the production
and reproduction of goods at the cost of life (life in general and of humanitas and anthropos alike!). I illustrate this
direction, below, commenting on Partha Chatterjees re-orienting eurocentered modernity toward the future in
which our modernity (in India, in Central Asia and the Caucasus, in South America, briefly, in all regions of the
world upon which eurocentered modernity was either imposed or adopted by local actors assimilating to local
histories inventing and enacting global designs) becomes the statement of interconnected dispersal in which
decolonial futures are being played out. Last but not least, my argument doesnt claim originality (originality is one
of the basic expectations of modern control of subjectivity) but aims to make a contribution to growing processes of
decoloniality around the world. My humble claim is that geoand body-politics of knowledge has been hidden from
the self-serving interests of Western epistemology and that a task of decolonial thinking is the unveiling of
epistemic silences of Western epistemology and affirming the epistemic rights of the racially devalued, and
decolonial options to allow the silences to build arguments to confront those who take originality as the ultimate
criterion for the final judgment. 1 II The introduction of geo-historical and bio-graphical configurations in processes

of knowing and understanding allows for a radical re-framing (e.g. decolonization) of the original formal apparatus

it is not enough to change

the content of the conversation, that it is of the essence to change the terms of the
of enunciation. 2 I have supported in the past those who maintain that

conversation. Changing the terms of the conversation implies going beyond disciplinary or interdisciplinary

As far as controversies and interpretations

remain within the same rules of the game (terms of the conversation), the control of
knowledge is not called into question. And in order to call into question the
modern/colonial foundation of the control of knowledge, it is necessary to focus on the
knower rather than on the known. It means to go to the very assumptions that sustain locus
controversies and the conflict of interpretations.

enunciations. In what follows I revisit the formal apparatus of enunciation from the perspective of geo and biographic politics of knowledge. My revisiting is epistemic rather than linguistic, although focusing on the enunciation
is unavoidable if we aim at changing the terms and not only the content of the conversation. The basic assumption

modern
epistemology (e.g. the hubris of the zero point) managed to conceal both and created the figure
of the detached observer, a neutral seeker of truth and objectivity who at the same time controls
the disciplinary rules and puts [themselves] himself or herself in a privileged position to
evaluate and dictate.
is that the knower is always implicated, geo and body-politically, in the known, although

The macro-micro link:

By only engaging China, the 1AC foregrounds great
geopolitical powers like the nation-state to the detriment of
local, non-state actors thatre treated as footnotesthis
silences the voices of Uyghurs and Tibetans who live under
Chinese colonialism
Kramer 11 (Paul, Associate Professor of History at Vanderbilt University, where he specializes in the history
of the late-nineteenth- and twentieth-century United States in global context. Power and Connection: Imperial
Histories of the United States in the World. The American Historical Review (2011) 116 (5): 1348-1391. doi:
10.1086/ahr.116.5.1348)

the readiest tools for understanding U.S. imperial history has been the
seductive dichotomy of formal and informal. These can divide specific imperial practices,
formal indicating state-territorial control and informal referring to either forms
of economic control or the primacy of private-sector actors. They can also distinguish
Among

national-imperial styles, with modern European empires gathered and homogenized as formal empires and the
United States (and the British Empire, in part) depicted as informal empires.73 Both adjectivally and nominally,
the pair is crucial to U.S. exceptionalist history-writing. Historiographically speaking, Britain was the first informal
empire, named so by historians trying to capture its pursuit of commercial power outside of politico-military
conquest and rule. Britain's exemplary informal empire involved the dominance of its investments and trade in Latin
America in the nineteenth century, an empire of capital built in other peoples' nation-states. While invented by
British imperial historians, the formal/informal dichotomy was imported by New Left historians of the United States,
for whom informal empire was not only a concept but a problem. In their persuasive account of the United States as
an informal empire, they identified the universal pursuit of overseas export markets for American products as the

there
were problems with the scholarship of U.S. informal empire. It was too static and
monocausal to make sense of the multiple and contradictory ideological, practical, and
institutional expressions of U.S. imperial power over time . In its admirable effort to overturn an
earlier, exceptionalist literature on the aberration of 1898, it reduced U.S. formal colonialism to a
strict function of informal empire: whatever the conquest of the Philippines,
Guam, or Hawaii might have meant to their inhabitants or historians, they were
defining feature of U.S. global power, while reframing this process, so often naturalized, as imperial.74 But

stepping-stones to the China market. Like other research on elite subjects, histories of informal
empireas a subset of diplomatic historywere also positioned badly when it came to the
social- and cultural-historical turns.75 The New Left scholarship differed in
politics but not in methodology from the maps and chaps schools of U.S.
diplomatic and British-imperial history. These literatures foregrounded elite,
metropolitan actors, voices, and decisions to the exclusion of local actors,
intersections, and impacts; privileged agents of the state over what foreign
relations historians called (tellingly) non-state actors; and valued politicalhistorical over social- and cultural-historical modes. It was partly for such reasons that
historians taking these varied turns chose to turn away from the New Left
framework.

Case

1NC

1NCU/Q take out

Strategic engagement and communicative engagement are not
mutually exclusivetheir author proves this is the STATUS QUO
Lynch 02 (Marc Lynch is a Professor of Political Science and International Affairs
at George Washington University, where he is also director of both the Institute for
Middle East Studies and the Middle East Studies Program, Why Engage? China and
the Logic of Communicative Engagement, European Journal of International
Relations 2002 vol 8(2) accessed http://citeseerx.ist.psu.edu/viewdoc/download?
doi=10.1.1.467.185&rep=rep1&type=pdf DDI KC )
Engagement could follow either strategic or communicative logic, or a mixture of both.
The problems troubling the USChina relationship had to do less with the shifting balance of power than with the
breakdown of the mutual understandings and expectations that governed relations prior to 1989. Faced with the

the US and China sought to reconstruct the

foundations of a relationship based upon common understandings, perceptions and
expectations. The Clinton Administrations policy of engagement followed a logic of
strategic action, defined in terms of changing China through non-coercive means
rather than as arriving at mutually acceptable outcomes through the exchange of
reasoned argument. Engagement was widely understood as a hedging strategy, in which the United States
breakdown in these norms and expectations,

attempted to reassure China about its intentions while attempting to bind and shape its behavior (Johnston and
Ross, 1999). The American strategy of engagement, because of its unacknowledged rationalist theoretical
premises, fell short of the international public deliberation necessary to recreate the foundations of common

The introduction of more

communicative modes of action into engagement, particularly after the Taiwan Straits crisis of
1996, helps to account for Chinas relatively recent (post-1995) embrace of multilateral
institutions, particularly in the security sphere (Shambaugh, 2001: 28). The empirical record suggests that
where engagement has followed a more communicative logic, it has been more
successful in achieving its avowed goals, if not the more ambitious goals of its critics. This can
be seen in Chinas recent willingness to accommodate its behavior to prevailing international
norms in the realm of nuclear arms control, including signing the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, military
expectations and understandings necessary for normal interaction.

transparency, conventional and nonconventional arms sales and nuclear proliferation (Johnston and Evans, 1999;

intensive, high-level,
strategic dialogue with Chinas leaders was conducted . . . progress was made in shaping
Chinese thinking. Over time, Chinese perceptions can be influenced through
dialogue, provided the Americans in turn are willing to listen carefully to Chinese views. Crucially, the dialogue
Gill, 2001). A recent Council on Foreign Relations report concludes that when

cannot be a lecture (Economy and Oksenberg, 1999: 18).

1NCCE Fails
Their own author admits that communicative engagement is
likely to fail in the real worldthree reasons
The practical implemental of communicative engagement
rarely lives up to the theory
Lynch 02 (Marc Lynch is a Professor of Political Science and International Affairs
at George Washington University, where he is also director of both the Institute for
Middle East Studies and the Middle East Studies Program, Why Engage? China and
the Logic of Communicative Engagement, European Journal of International
Relations 2002 vol 8(2) accessed http://citeseerx.ist.psu.edu/viewdoc/download?
doi=10.1.1.467.185&rep=rep1&type=pdf DDI KC )
The practice of engagement rarely fully lived up to this communicative ideal , of course.
The American policy of engagement has been eminently purposive and instrumental in its ends. At no point
have China and the United States entered into a serious dialogue predicated on
coming to a reasoned consensus about the nature of their interaction, in which each
side is prepared to change its mind in the face of new information. China has not
been notably more communicative in its orientation than the United States. Deeply
suspicious of American intentions, and consumed by a sense of regime insecurity,
the Chinese leadership has shown little inclination to open itself up to serious
dialogues (Deng and Wang, 1999). At the same time, both sides have recognized the instrumental value of such
dialogues and have pursued them even in the face of severe domestic criticism. Dialogues on specific issues in the
security realm have come far closer to the communicative conception. A more nuanced evaluation of the empirical
record suggests that the success of engagement closely tracks its communicative rather than strategic orientation.

Communicative engagement sharpens differences in the public

sphere which constrain policymakers from making on
beneficial deals
Lynch 02 (Marc Lynch is a Professor of Political Science and International Affairs
at George Washington University, where he is also director of both the Institute for
Middle East Studies and the Middle East Studies Program, Why Engage? China and
the Logic of Communicative Engagement, European Journal of International
Relations 2002 vol 8(2) accessed http://citeseerx.ist.psu.edu/viewdoc/download?
doi=10.1.1.467.185&rep=rep1&type=pdf DDI KC )
Communicative engagement assumes only that actors might prefer cooperation to
conflict. It does not assume away conflicts of interest. Public deliberation might in fact clarify the
extent of differences and hostility. Recognition of clashing interests does not preclude the utility of
communicative engagement, however. McCarthy points out that when public discussion, rather than
leading to rationally motivated consensus on general interests and shared values, instead
sharpens disagreement by revealing particular interests to be ungeneralizable . . . we can still
reach a reasonable agreement by moving discussion to a higher level of abstraction (1994: 56). For example, the
United States almost certainly will not persuade China to change its views on Taiwan, but the two states can

converge upon the more general principle that the islands fate should not be settled by force. The long-standing
policy of strategic ambiguity on Taiwan allowed the US and China to continue interacting despite their inability to
agree on its status or future. An underappreciated argument for public deliberation is that it can transform
conflicts of identity into conflicts of interest (H. Saunders, 1999). Conflicts of identity, with institutionalized social
relationships of enmity, are not readily amenable to negotiated solutions ; hence, students of
ethnic conflict find that symbolic issues of seemingly little material value tend to be the deal-breakers which
prevent resolution. The USChina relationship has been bedeviled by such symbolic issues (Downs and Saunders,
1998/99). Internal processes of scapegoating and rhetorical attack , such as the explosive rage
of Chinese nationalists over the embassy bombing (Gries, 2001), or the anti-China mobilization surrounding the Cox

constitute the background assumptions and expectations at the public

level. It should not be assumed that actors want to overcome conflicts of identity; any move towards
reconciliation with a bitter enemy threatens both the identity and interests of many
individuals within each society, invoking deep historical memories and traumas which they may prefer
to continue to embrace. Furthermore, those whose interests are threatened by engagement
will often strategically invoke symbolic issues, which provide the most effective
means for mobilizing public opinion against materially beneficial engagement
policies. Existential conflicts based on incompatible identities are far less amenable
to negotiated resolution than are distributional conflicts. Bringing these issues into
the public domain in order to defuse them is playing with fire, since this could lead
to ideological war and prevent any possibility of agreement.
report, deeply

China doesnt have an open public sphere which means they

access communicative engagement through public
deliberation.
Lynch 02 (Marc Lynch is a Professor of Political Science and International
Affairs at George Washington University, where he is also director of both the
Institute for Middle East Studies and the Middle East Studies Program, Why
Engage? China and the Logic of Communicative Engagement, European Journal
of International Relations 2002 vol 8(2) accessed
http://citeseerx.ist.psu.edu/viewdoc/download?
doi=10.1.1.467.185&rep=rep1&type=pdf DDI KC )
Regime type makes an obvious difference, although the key variable is not so much
democracy as the existence of an open, contested public sphere . The constant public
exchange of argument and discourse about foreign policy provides greater
transparency. The involuntary character of this transparency conveys more convincing signals about state
preferences, crucially because governments cannot easily control whether or not information becomes public
(Schultz, 1999). When only one of the states has such an open public sphere , information of
this sort is distributed asymmetrically meaning that one side has information that the other side cannot observe

agreeing on a mutually beneficial bargain can be problematic . . .

asymmetries are compounded by a strategic environment that
encourages concealment, deception, and bluff. (Schultz, 1999: 236) Despite real disagreements
within the Chinese ruling elite, for example, the United States puts out considerably more information
[so] identifying and
informational

about its preferences through its open public debate. While China is not a democracy, it has developed an

has allowed some public contestation about

societal issues, however (D. Lynch, 1999; Gries, 2001; Polenbaum, 2001). Nevertheless, the closed
nature of the Chinese system left the United States relatively dependent upon a
increasingly open and contentious press which

restricted universe of cues.

In contrast to the conventional wisdom that American domestic disputes

open
debates] give the US an advantageous position. You can argue that confrontational
remarks do not reflect official policy, but they still have an effect (P. Saunders, 2000a: 51).
detract from American policy, Phillip Saunders quotes a Chinese analyst as complaining that [your

1NCNeolib
Alt causes to neolibNAFTA, the WTO, and government deregulation overwhelm1AC Brown ev is about how welfare
policy is neoliberalthey read no reverse causal evidence that
communicative engagement between US and China is sufficient
to solve neolib.
Neoliberalism creates a new paradigm for sustainable green
growththis drives job growth, technological innovation, and
reduces poverty.
Shear 14 (2014/2/16Boone Shear is an Associated Professor of Anthropology at
University of Massachusetts Amherst Making the green economy: politics, desire,
and economic possibility
http://www.communityeconomies.org/site/assets/media/BooneShear/ShearJPE2014copy.pdf)
On a global scale, and from the perspective of international policy-makers, the
mainstream green economy project attributes economic and ecological crises to a
"misallocation of capital", a mistake that can be rectified through the proper market
incentives and the right policy prescriptions (UNEP 2011). These ideas are not
altogether new; the green economy as a named, political project can be understood
as both incorporating and extending other, interrelated global-environmental
initiatives and discourses that have intended to capitalize and commodify nature
including sustainable development, biodiversity conservation, and ecological
modernization (Brockington and Duffy 2010; Escobar 1996; Escobar 1997; Igoe et
al. 2010; MacDonald 2010; West and Brockington 2006). Brockington and Duffy
explain that while conservation and capitalism have always had a "close
relationship", in recent decades "capitalist conservation" and its "aggressive faith in
market solutions to environmental problems" (p.470) have become increasingly
commonsensical; "the idea that capitalism can and should help conservation save
the world now occupies the mainstream of the conservation movement" (470). In a
similar vein, Escobar explains that the discourse of sustainable development
proposes to commodify nature in order to facilitate conservation efforts and manage
the ecologically destructive externalities of capitalist production and exchange
(Escobar 1996). In contrast, Macdonald (2010) identifies ecological modernization
as posing a "challenge" to sustainable development, pushing it past its ostensible
imperative of limiting growth through the market and towards a vision that weds
ecological responsibility with technological fixes and "new strategies of
accumulation" (p.519). Ecological modernization "refuses to see the supposed
trade-off between environmental concerns and growth" and instead tends to looks
for "win-win" situations (Harvey 1996: 378). A similar marriage of economic growth
and ecological health is at the heart of the green economy project. While the green
economy includes ideas of conservation and sustainability, it is promised as a
remedy to ecological crises while at the same time is "pro-growth, pro-jobs, and pro-

poverty-reduction" (UNEP 2010: 6-7). In addition to regulating markets, the green

economy finds solutions to social and environmental problems through the
expansion and creation of new markets for capital investment, technological
innovation, and job creation (ETC Group 2011; Pollin et. al. 2008; UNEP 2011).

1NCChina Threat Real

No solvencyeven if they create new communicative
engagement, they dont solve China Bashing from Trump and
Clinton in the election cycle, or public animosity towards
China.
China Rise is a threat to regional stability empirics prove
Liff and Ikenberry 14 (Adam P. Liff is Assistant Professor of East Asian
International Relations at Indiana Universitys School of Global and International
Studies, a postdoctoral fellow in the Princeton-Harvard China and the World
Program, and Associate-in-Research at Harvard Universitys Reischauer Institute of
Japanese Studies and Fairbank Center for Chinese Studies. G. John Ikenberry is
Albert G. Milbank Professor of Politics and Inter- national Affairs at Princeton
University in the Department of Politics and the Woodrow Wilson School of Public
and International Affairs. His most recent book is Liberal Leviathan: The Origins,
Crisis, and Transformation of the American World Order (Princeton University Press,
2011). Racing toward Tragedy? Chinas Rise, Military Competition in the Asia
Pacific, and the Security Dilemma, International Security. Vol 39 Issue 2, pg. 52-91,
Fall 2014.)
The Asia Pacific is a region in geopolitical transition. For decades, regional stability
has been maintained primarily through a U.S.-led alliance system. Since the turn of
the millennium, however, the shifting political and economic terrain has led many
observers to expect an upsurge in military competition, arms races, and the
possibility of a catastrophic military conflict. The rapid transformation of the region
is not exclusively a story about China. Indeed, the economies and militaries of the
countries in Southeast Asia, as well as Chinas large neighbors India and Russia,
have also experienced rapid growth. Meanwhile, U.S. allies South Korea and
Australia are significantly strengthening their militaries and becoming increasingly
active players in regional security. For its part, Japan remains the worlds thirdlargest economy, has considerable wealth and military capabilities, and has begun
to gradually increase its defense spending. More generally, Japans traditionally lowkey security profile appears to be undergoing changes of potentially immense longterm significance. Yet the rapid rise of China, the resulting shift in the
distribution of regional material capabilities, and uncertainty about Chinas
future trajectory are arguably the main forces driving concerns about
possible arms races, now or in the future. In 2010 China became the worlds
second-largest economy. Its official defense spending has nearly quintupled in
nominal renminbi terms since 2002 and now ranks second only to that of the
(globally distributed) U.S. military. Chinas defense spending remains largely
constant as a percentage of its (rap- idly growing) gross domestic product, though
that long-term trend has re- versed itself for the last several years, including a
twice-as-fast projected increase in 2014.Widespread concerns about the
objective reality of Chinas rapidly increasing military capabilities are
exacerbated by its low military transparency, which deepens general
uncertainty and speciac worries about its capabilities and intentions. Chinas

worsening relations with its neighbors may exemplify the challenge that any state
with such rapidly increasing material capabilities has in signaling restraint. As
Chinas leaders state, Beijing may be modernizing its military forces primarily to
compensate for decades of neglect, and its leaders may sin- cerely view its policies
toward its neighbors as reactive and defensive. Yet the more important point is
that regardless of Chinas actual intentions, to other states the objective
reality of Beijings growing military power, coupled with its rapidly
expanding military capabilities and recent policies vis-a-vis dis- puted
territory and features on its periphery, appear provocative and newly
assertive, even aggressive. As a case in point, however controversial and
destabilizing, Chinas vast claims over islands and features in the South and East
China Seas predate its current rise by decades. Yet as Chinas military capabilities
grow, Beijing is increasingly capable of asserting these claims in a manner that it
was unable to only a few years ago. Similarly, the growing frequency and
geographical scope of its patrols and exercises worsen tensions by creating far
more opportunities for a clash or incident, as Chinese vessels and aircraft
increasingly cross paths with foreign militaries in interna- tional waters. A decade
ago, Chinas leaders appeared far more sensitive to the dilemma their country faces
as a rising power; the slogan peaceful rise and Chinas engagement and
reassurance of neighboring states of its peaceful intentions encapsulated this selfawareness. At least seen from Beijing, Chinas intentions may continue to be
peaceful and its military policy defensiveboth now and in the futureas its
leaders often assert. Yet its future intentions are unknowableeven to the most
prescient of Chinese leaders. Under anarchy and in the context of Beijings
rapid enhancement of military capabilities, this uncertainty can create or
exacerbate regional instability. To the extent that Chinas intentions are truly
peaceful and defensive, if Beijing is unable to credibly convey them, its rise is likely
to increasingly elicit backlash and counter- balancing from its neighbors. The
perhaps unintended result will be to worsen, rather than enhance, Chinas security
even to the point of self-encirclement. The net result is high costs all aroundin
terms of wasteful military spending and an increasingly unstable region even if a
military conflict does not occur that leave all parties worse off.

2NC

2NCU/Q take out

The combination of strategic and communicative engagement
solves the Clinton administration proves.
Lynch 02 (Marc Lynch is a Professor of Political Science and International Affairs
at George Washington University, where he is also director of both the Institute for
Middle East Studies and the Middle East Studies Program, Why Engage? China and
the Logic of Communicative Engagement, European Journal of International
Relations 2002 vol 8(2) accessed http://citeseerx.ist.psu.edu/viewdoc/download?
doi=10.1.1.467.185&rep=rep1&type=pdf DDI KC )
Domestic pressure to demonstrate results forced the administration into a
strategic logic of behavioral change, undermining efforts at communicative
engagement. The Clinton Administration emphasized consistently that engagement aimed at the pursuit of
American interests which were best achieved through cooperation rather than conflict.23 Engagement
generally remained dominated by the behavioral logic of enmeshing China within
institutions and interests which would automatically change its preferences,
combined with attempts at persuasion through rhetoric. In addition to the strategic
nature of the dialogue, the discussions rarely if ever were insulated from power considerations. Some
of the more technical dimensions of engagement in the security realm have come closer to the
communicative model. Involving China in multilateral institutions , from the ARF to highly
specialized arms control organizations, has been a major avenue by which the goals of
communicative engagement have been advanced. The advances in nonproliferation and nuclear
arms control policies followed dialogues and exchanges of information among experts. In these dialogues,
both sides were able to articulate common interests in international security and
stability which gave credibility to the institutional and technical solutions proposed.
Chinas dramatic shift of policy towards North Korea , in which it began to cooperate with the US
on nonproliferation and encouraging the North to engage in dialogue with the South,
followed from such dialogues, in which common interests and understandings were
developed (Gill, 2001). High-level military and academic exchanges have been a particularly important area for
the building of common understandings.

2NCCE Fails
No SolvencyElites in the PLA hinders effective communicative
engagement by shutting down the flow of information in the
public sphere.
Lynch 02 (Marc Lynch is a Professor of Political Science and International Affairs
at George Washington University, where he is also director of both the Institute for
Middle East Studies and the Middle East Studies Program, Why Engage? China and
the Logic of Communicative Engagement, European Journal of International
Relations 2002 vol 8(2) accessed http://citeseerx.ist.psu.edu/viewdoc/download?
doi=10.1.1.467.185&rep=rep1&type=pdf DDI KC )
the PLA elite remain rare and are
tightly scripted, while an extremely low level of transparency further obscures the
perspectives and capabilities of the PLA (Shambaugh, 1999/2000: 54). Human rights, while beyond the
scope of this article, have been a highly public arena of international dialogues with China
Despite some tentative steps, however, direct interactions with

(Foot, 2000). While few would cite Chinas human rights behavior as a success for engagement, the approach

China steadfastly resisted,

and ultimately defeated, American attempts to coerce Chinese human rights
behavior by linking trade with change in human rights practices . At the same time, China
developed here brings some important points out of the empirical record.

cares deeply about being perceived as a legitimate great power, which made it susceptible to shaming in
international institutions (Foot, 2000: 1820; also see Johnston and Evans, 1999). In contrast to its firm rejection of
bilateral pressure, China has joined numerous international treaties and agencies, and has accepted the relevance

After
forcing the United States to delink trade and human rights, China moved to replace
confrontation with dialogue. In the context of the argument advanced in this article, it is quite striking
of human rights norms even if it has not internalized or complied with them (Kent, 1999; Foot, 2000).

that non-strategic dialogue emerged as Chinas preferred approach (Kent, 1999). In summit meetings in Washington
(1997) and Beijing (1998), Jiang Xemin agreed to public debate over human rights, signaling to domestic and
international audiences that China had become a fully fledged participant in that discourse China (along with other
Asian countries) responded to the universalizing claims of Western human rights activists, in a substantive and

these dialogues did provide the opportunity for regular openended bilateral discussions, they lacked the key characteristic of publicity, making human
rights activists suspicious of the lack of transparency and accountability as well as
the notable lack of tangible results (HRIC, 1998).
ongoing (if not fully satisfying) discourse. While

There cant exist communicative engagement where there

exist mutual hostility
Lynch 02 (Marc Lynch is a Professor of Political Science and International Affairs
at George Washington University, where he is also director of both the Institute for
Middle East Studies and the Middle East Studies Program, Why Engage? China and
the Logic of Communicative Engagement, European Journal of International
Relations 2002 vol 8(2) accessed http://citeseerx.ist.psu.edu/viewdoc/download?
doi=10.1.1.467.185&rep=rep1&type=pdf DDI KC )
The empirical claims made for communicative engagement rest on theoretical
arguments about each of engagements goals revealing preferences, shaping

preferences and creating stable institutions. This conception of engagement begins

from the goal of achieving communication, rather than the goal of non-coercive
manipulation. Communicative engagement more effectively reveals the preferences
of each side regardless of whether an actor would prefer to bluff. Change in beliefs
which is internalized through persuasion, the accepting of reasons or some other
mechanism of socialization will be more likely to produce durable changes in state
behavior (Checkel, 1997; Cortell and Davis, 2000).1 Finally, dialogue offers an
important route towards the development of mutually acceptable institutions,
although the nature of these institutions contrasts sharply with the goal of the
socialization of a weaker state (China) into norms and institutions established by the
stronger.USChina dialogues have generated such hostility and skepticism in large
part because of this tension in the underlying theoretical assumptions about
engagement. Conservative critics raged that appeasement doesnt work (Charles
Krauthammer), dismissed it as a sham (Michael Kelly), blasted it as fundamentally
dishonest (Arthur Waldron). Robert Kagan and William Kristol dismiss military to
military contacts as unequal exchanges where we share a great deal of information
with them while they share nothing with us (2001: 11). At a more academic level,
David Shambaugh concludes that dialogue may increase clarity and understanding
even if it does not narrow differences but those Americans who interact with
the PLA, officially or unofficially, should be under no illusion about the depth of
Chinas suspicion and animosity toward the United States

And, Communicative dialogue create comprises that holds the

Chinese government to a low threshold for actual change
Lynch 02 (Marc Lynch is a Professor of Political Science and International Affairs
at George Washington University, where he is also director of both the Institute for
Middle East Studies and the Middle East Studies Program, Why Engage? China and
the Logic of Communicative Engagement, European Journal of International
Relations 2002 vol 8(2) accessed http://citeseerx.ist.psu.edu/viewdoc/download?
doi=10.1.1.467.185&rep=rep1&type=pdf DDI KC )
communicative engagement rest on theoretical arguments about each
revealing preferences, shaping preferences and creating stable

The empirical claims made for

of engagements goals

institutions. This conception of engagement begins from the goal of achieving communication, rather than the
goal of non-coercive manipulation. Communicative engagement more effectively reveals the preferences of each
side regardless of whether an actor would prefer to bluff. Change in beliefs which is internalized through persuasion,
the accepting of reasons or some other mechanism of socialization will be more likely to produce durable changes

dialogue offers an important route

the development of mutually acceptable institutions, although the nature of
these institutions contrasts sharply with the goal of the socialization of a weaker state (China) into
norms and institutions established by the stronger. USChina dialogues have generated
such hostility and skepticism in large part because of this tension in the underlying theoretical
assumptions about engagement. Conservative critics raged that appeasement doesnt work (Charles
Krauthammer), dismissed it as a sham (Michael Kelly), blasted it as fundamentally dishonest
in state behavior (Checkel, 1997; Cortell and Davis, 2000).1 Finally,
towards

(Arthur Waldron). Robert Kagan and William Kristol dismiss military to military contacts as unequal exchanges where

we share a great deal of information with them while they share nothing with us (2001: 11). At a more academic
level, David Shambaugh concludes that dialogue may increase clarity and understanding even if it does not
narrow differences but those Americans who interact with the PLA, officially or unofficially, should be under no

Human
rights campaigners express concerns that bilateral dialogues are an ineffective
alternative to international pressure through multilateral action which is marred by
a lack of transparency, accountability or clear benchmarks for progress (HRIC, 1998;
illusion about the depth of Chinas suspicion and animosity toward the United States (1999/2000:

Kent, 1999). To evaluate these claims it is necessary to rethink both the theoretical foundations and the empirical
record of engagement. These criticisms of the practice of engagement should not be taken as a fatal critique of
engagement itself. The inadequacy of practice represents a point of entry for a critical theory of engagement.

The Affs notion of communicative engage is utopian better

argument wont change international relations.
Lynch 02 (Marc Lynch is a Professor of Political Science and International Affairs
at George Washington University, where he is also director of both the Institute for
Middle East Studies and the Middle East Studies Program, Why Engage? China and
the Logic of Communicative Engagement, European Journal of International
Relations 2002 vol 8(2) accessed http://citeseerx.ist.psu.edu/viewdoc/download?
doi=10.1.1.467.185&rep=rep1&type=pdf DDI KC )

communicative action, which

does
not rely on the purposive rationality of the respective individual plans of action but
rather on the rationally motivating power of feats of reaching understanding, that is,
on a rationality that manifests itself in the conditions for a rationally motivated
agreement. (1998: 222) In other words, communicative engagement involves an orientation towards coming
He distinguishes mere communication the exchange of information from

can . . . be distinguished from strategic action in the following respect: the successful coordination of action

to understanding over the conditions of interaction rather than an orientation towards achieving immediate self-

dialogue, only the force of the better argument should prevail, as

actors abstract from their identities and set aside power considerations in
their joint pursuit of understanding.
interest. In such a

Even their notion of public deliberation is utopian there exist

not ideal speech condition where their can be a free exchange
of reasoned argument among equalsdoesnt Trump prove.
Lynch 02 (Marc Lynch is a Professor of Political Science and International Affairs
at George Washington University, where he is also director of both the Institute for
Middle East Studies and the Middle East Studies Program, Why Engage? China and
the Logic of Communicative Engagement, European Journal of International
Relations 2002 vol 8(2) accessed http://citeseerx.ist.psu.edu/viewdoc/download?
doi=10.1.1.467.185&rep=rep1&type=pdf DDI KC )

Public deliberation under conditions approaching conditions of the free

exchange of reasoned argument among equals which produces working
consensus on underlying principles of interaction but not necessarily on distributive outcomes
offers the route most conducive to establishing cooperative and mutually
beneficial relations. Where most analysis of public deliberation presumes the
existence of a common lifeworld, international engagement strategies
distinctively involve states which lack these common experiences and
understandings (Risse, 2000: 1416; Muller, 2001). The engagement of China, a state which
had been particularly alienated from international society and thereby lacking in
most elements of a common international lifeworld, served to build these layers of
background knowledge, understandings and expectations

2NCI/T: Neolib/Warming
Neoliberalism motivates individuals to seek the economic
benefits of shifting towards an economically friendly paradigm
Shear 14 (2014/2/16Boone Shear is an Associated Professor of Anthropology at
University of Massachusetts Amherst Making the green economy: politics, desire,
and economic possibility
http://www.communityeconomies.org/site/assets/media/BooneShear/ShearJPE2014copy.pdf)
In the U.S, green economy policy makers have focused on economic growth and job
creation in the renewable energy sector, energy efficiency, and green building
construction as part of a "clean energy economy". Massachusetts has positioned
itself at the forefront of these happenings. In 2008 Massachusetts passed the Global
Warming Solutions Act which mandates an 80% decrease in greenhouse gas
emissions by 2050 (below 1990 levels), passed the Green Jobs Act which
encourages and supports clean energy work, and created the Massachusetts Clean
Energy Center"the first state agency in the nation dedicated solely to facilitating
the development of the clean energy industry"
(https://www.facebook.com/MassCEC/info). "In addition, Massachusetts based
companies and research institutions have received 17%- or $62.8million- of the
federal dollars awarded through the first year of the US Department of Energy's
Advanced Research Projects Agency-Energy (ARPA-E) program." (BW Research
Partnership 2011: 2). Employment in the industry in Massachusetts grew by 6.7%
from 2010 to 2011 compared to a 1% overall growth rate (BW Research Partnership
2011: 4). And in 2011 Massachusetts jumped ahead of California as the country's
most energy-efficient state (ACEEE 2011). It's interesting to note the different
economic philosophies that surface and intermingle, even in this limited recounting
of the mainstream green economy project. On the one hand, we can see a
concerted shift Shear Making the green economy in away from some of the ideology
and dogma associated with neoliberal capitalism. The very premise of the green
economy concedes that "business as usual" resulted in economic and ecological
crises, and thus we now need something different. Indeed, as a recent UN report on
the Green Economy states, "unfettered markets are not meant to solve social
problems" (UNEP 2011: 01 citing Yunus and Weber 2007). Instead of leaving
markets alone, the green economy would regulate and reallocate capital through
government intervention. In addition, the green economy has often been put
forward as a Green New Deal (Dipeso 2009; Pollin 2009; UNEP 2009), in which
government intervention, spending, and policy changes would create new jobs and
save the (capitalist) economy. This idea, which also suggests a class compromise in
which social antagonisms are resolved through economic growth, job creation and a
redistribution of resources, has been attractive to organized labor and progressives
(Baugh 2009; Apollo Alliance 2008). On the other hand, the green economy can
appear as a neoliberal project, proposing that it is the role of government to create
new markets for capital investment and to use markets to manage nature and
climate change. Despite its association with laissez-faire economics, neoliberalism

involves the active creation of the conditions that will support new markets
including the production of particular types of people, "subjects whose moral
quality is based on the fact that they rationally assess the costs and benefits of a
certain act as opposed to other alternative acts" (Lemke 2001: 201). At a November
2011 state legislative hearing dealing with the growth in the energy efficiency
industry in Massachusetts, a state official suggested that the green economy would
be built through individual, self-interested decision making, "as people learn they
can save money [by doing energy efficiency measures] people are doing it because
it makes sense." In sum, we can see that the green economyin its state-projected
constructioncan accommodate elements of both Keynesian regulation and
neoliberal development discourse. And it should be no surprise then that both poles
of the mainstream economic spectrum can support the creation of the green
economy (for example, compare Friedman 2008 and Krugman 2010). Though not a
cohesive project, the coordinates in this frame are precisely creating and
incentivizing capitalist markets for investment and the creation of wage labor jobs.
It can be useful to understand this state-sponsored green economy projectwhich
envisions a marketeconomy animated by homo-economicusas a form of
governmentality that seeks to discipline and produce people that will then
reproduce capitalism. Though not completely cohesive or singular, the mainstream
green economy project can aptly be characterized in terms of neoliberal
environmentality (Fletcher 2010)6 , a form of governmentality that mobilizes and
incentivizes people to address "environmental problems as issues that require
cost benefit analysis" (p.176) and in which "economic growth is the chief
mechanism through which the aims of bio-power are pursued" (p.175

2NCChina Threat
US threat construction justified- 5 reasons
Yee and Storey 02
Herbert Yee and Ian Storey, 2002 (Herbet Yee is a Professor of Politics and
International Relations at the Hong Kong Baptist University. His research interests
are Chinas foreign policy, political culture, political development, and national
minorities. His recent publications include China in Transition: Issues and Policies
(co-editor, 1999) and Macau in Transition: From Colony to Special Autonomous
Region (2001) Ian Storey is a Lecturer in Defence Studies at Deakin University,
Geelong, Australia. His research interests include Asia-Pacific defence and security
issues, international relations, and ASEAN-China relations. He has published articles
in Contemporary Southeast Asia, Parameters and Janes Intelligence Review )The
China Threat: Perceptions, Myths and Reality RoutledgeCruzon
https://books.google.com/books?hl=en&lr=&id=FmQAgAAQBAJ&oi=fnd&pg=PP1&dq=china+%22threat
%22+usa&ots=osYfI2mS6u&sig=_3jb6acyZ9eHOCl_PHJlOz2uN0#v=onepage&q=china%20%22threat%22%20usa&f=false
The issue of the China threat emerged in early 1993 in the United States. The
background to the issue was the PRCs rapid economic growth following the
introduction of economic reforms in the late 1970s. From 1978 to 1992, China
recorded an average growth rate of 9.5 per cent, which further increased to 10.2
per cent during the four-year period of 19921995. In fact, China was the worlds
fastest growing economy in the 1980s and 1990s. According to a 1992 World Bank
report, in purchasing power party (PPP) terms, Chinas total GDP was already
approaching that of major Western developed states. It was projected that should
the PRC maintain its growth rate, by 2020 its GDP would surpass that of the United
States and become the worlds largest economy.7 Some analysts in the West are
unnerved by Chinas fast growth rates, believing that the country will one day
become a powerful competitor. They also believe that Chinas rapid economic
growth will quickly translate into increased military power. The second factor
contributing to the China threat issue is the PRCs authoritarian socialist political
system. Since the collapse of the USSR in 1991, China has assumed the position of
the last major communist power. At the same time, the third-wave of
democratisation overturned a number of authoritarian regimes in East Asia. South
Korea, Taiwan and the Philippines made good progress in their democratisation
efforts in the early 1990s, whilst in 1998 Indonesia became the worlds third largest
democracy. By comparison, the PRC has made little progress in the sphere of
political reform: it refuses to adopt Western democratic values or to share its
centrally controlled political power with the people. Those who were desirous of peaceful political reform in China have
been disappointed and frustrated, especially when liberal democratic ideas and values have prevailed in other parts of the world. As far as the West is concerned, socialism is no longer a
viable political system and the PRCs continuous resistance to democratisation is simply unacceptable. The June 4 1989 Tiananmen Square incident was a turning point in Western
perceptions of China, and policies towards the PRC became a controversial political issue. During the 1992 US presidential election, the direction that Washingtons China policy should
take became a campaign issue for the first time in two decades. The basic tenets of Americas China policy debate were deeply affected by the crushing of the prodemocracy movement
and the different political systems and ideologies of the United States and the PRC. As a presidential candidate, Bill Clinton criticised the Beijing leadership and swore he would not

In the West, the image of China was greatly tarnished by the

Tiananmen Square incident; politicians and the general public alike urged their
respective governments to adopt a hardline towards Beijing, thereby forcing the
compromise with the Chinese government.

Chinese government to liberalise its political system and improve its human rights
record. As a result, the debate lacked an objective and rational assessment. A few Western Sinologists posited that the PRC might follow the Soviet Union, and disintegrate after
the death of Deng Xiaoping. It was feared that a military regime might seize power in post-Deng China.8 In the early 1990s, other China specialists pointed out that the Chinese
government was under severe domestic political pressure and that the prime concern of the communist regime was to consolidate its rule and maintain political order and social stability.
Few China watchers doubted the crucial role of the Peoples Liberation Army (PLA) in Chinese politics: political reforms cannot be conducted in the PRC without the support of the PLA,
which is generally regarded as the stronghold of conservative political forces. Moreover, despite Chinas large land mass and diverse regions, there was a strong belief among provincial
and local governments that it was in the interests of the country as well as the regions for China to remain unified under a central, authoritarian government.9 It was thus very unlikely
that any drastic political reforms would be affected in the PRC. In short, there was no sign that political liberalisation was imminent, which was very frustrating to those who wished for

Among Western international relations scholars, it is widely held that

democracies never fight each other.10 In other words, democracy means peace and
dictatorship means war. Thus, an undemocratic socialist state like China remained a
threat to regional and world peace. The third factor contributing to the China threat
debate is the PRCs increasing military capability and its impact on regional security.
There is little doubt that Chinas capability to influence regional affairs has
significantly increased over the past few decades. A number of developments have
contributed to the PRCs increasing influence in the region: (1) China has increased
its share of the regional economy and hence its impact on economic development in
the region; (2) Chinas territorial disputes with other countries in the region have
intensified; (3) Chinas rapid economic development has also accelerated its
military modernisation process; and (4) China has elevated reunification with Taiwan
as a higher priority following the retrocession of Hong Kong in July 1997 and Macau
in December 1999. The last three factors are sometimes interpreted as signalling
the beginning of Chinas strategic expansion in the region. The PRCs territorial
claims in the region, especially on the islets in the South China Sea, are often
interpreted by its neighbours as evidence of strategic expansion. Likewise, Chinas military modernisation
swift democratisation.

programme, such as the purchase of state-of-the-art fighters, surface vessels and submarines from Russia, have been perceived by some observers as indications of the PRCs strategic
desire to dominate the region. Beijings hardline policy towards Taiwan, especially its refusal to abandon the threat of military force, has strengthened the image of China as awar prone
state. Moreover, Beijings pursuit of the retrocession of Hong Kong and Macau was perceived by some observers as proof positive of an ambition to build a Greater China. Some linked

The fourth factor contributing

to the perception of a China threat is the fear of political and economic collapse in
the PRC, resulting in territorial fragmentation, civil war and waves of refugees
pouring into neighbouring countries. Naturally, any or all of these scenarios would have a profoundly negative impact on regional stability.
Today the Chinese leadership faces a raft of internal problems, including the
increasing political demands of its citizens, a growing population, a shortage of
natural resources and a deterioration in the natural environment caused by rapid
industrialisation and pollution. These problems are putting a strain on the central
governments ability to govern effectively. Political disintegration or a Chinese civil
war might result in millions of Chinese refugees seeking asylum in neighbouring
countries. Such an unprecedented exodus of refugees from a collapsed PRC would no doubt put a severe strain on the limited resources of Chinas neighbours. A
fragmented China could also result in another nightmare scenarionuclear
weapons falling into the hands of irresponsible local provincial leaders or warlords. 12
From this perspective, a disintegrating China would also pose a threat to its
neighbours and the world. The fifth factor contributing to the notion of a China
threat is rising Chinese nationalism, especially rising anti-American feelings. During the first
the Greater China concept to Beijings alleged attempt to restore the historical greatness of the Chinese empire.

decade of Chinas open door policy, the Chinese admired almost everything Western, from rock and roll to arts and philosophy. Thousands of young people went abroad to pursue
graduate studies in the United States, Canada, Australia and Europe. Some liberal Chinese intellectuals, such as the famous dissident Fang Lizhi, even openly advocated the complete
Westernisation of China to hasten the countrys modernisation drive. However, this love relationship with the West was short-lived. After the 1989 Tiananmen Square incident, and the
subsequent economic sanctions imposed on China by Western countries, pro-Western voices inside China were silenced. Meanwhile, anti-Western and anti-American nationalist feelings
grew stronger following Beijings failed bid to host the 2000 Olympic Games, an outcome which is INTRODUCTION 5 generally believed in China to be the result of a Western anti-China
conspiracy and the face off13 between the PRC and the United States in the Taiwan Straits in the spring of 1996.