The Commission On Elections

THE COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS
Composition, qualifications and terms of office

1987 Constitution, Article IX (C), sections 1(1) and (2)
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Section 1. (1) There shall be a Commission on Elections composed of a

Chairman and six Commissioners who shall be natural-born citizens of the
Philippines and, at the time of their appointment, at least thirty-five years of
age, holders of a college degree, and must not have been candidates for any
elective positions in the immediately preceding elections. However, a majority
thereof, including the Chairman, shall be members of the Philippine Bar who
have been engaged in the practice of law for at least ten years.
(2) The Chairman and the Commissioners shall be appointed by the President
with the consent of the Commission on Appointments for a term of seven years
without reappointment. Of those first appointed, three Members shall hold
office for seven years, two Members for five years, and the last Members for
three years, without reappointment. Appointment to any vacancy shall be only
for the unexpired term of the predecessor. In no case shall any Member be
appointed or designated in a temporary or acting capacity.
(Cayetano vs Monsod)
Facts: Respondent Christian Monsod was nominated by President Corazon C. Aquino to
the position of chairman of the COMELEC. Petitioner opposed the nomination because
allegedly Monsod does not posses required qualification of having been engaged in the
practice of law for at least ten years. The 1987 constitution provides in Section 1,
Article IX-C: There shall be a Commission on Elections composed of a Chairman and
six Commissioners who shall be natural-born citizens of the Philippines and, at the
time of their appointment, at least thirty-five years of age, holders of a college
degree, and must not have been candidates for any elective position in the
immediately preceding elections. However, a majority thereof, including the
Chairman, shall be members of the Philippine Bar who have been engaged in the
practice of law for at least ten years.
Issue: Whether the respondent does not possess the required qualification of having
engaged in the practice of law for at least ten years.
Held: In the case of Philippine Lawyers Association vs. Agrava, stated: The practice of
law is not limited to the conduct of cases or litigation in court; it embraces the
preparation of pleadings and other papers incident to actions and special proceeding,
the management of such actions and proceedings on behalf of clients before judges
and courts, and in addition, conveying. In general, all advice to clients, and all action
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taken for them in matters connected with the law incorporation services, assessment
and condemnation services, contemplating an appearance before judicial body, the
foreclosure of mortgage, enforcement of a creditors claim in bankruptcy and
insolvency proceedings, and conducting proceedings in attachment, and in matters of
estate and guardianship have been held to constitute law practice. Practice of law
means any activity, in or out court, which requires the application of law, legal
procedure, knowledge, training and experience.
The contention that Atty. Monsod does not posses the required qualification of having
engaged in the practice of law for at least ten years is incorrect since Atty. Monsods
past work experience as a lawyer-economist, a lawyer-manager, a lawyerentrepreneur of industry, a lawyer-negotiator of contracts, and a lawyer-legislator of
both rich and the poor verily more than satisfy the constitutional requirement for
the position of COMELEC chairman, The respondent has been engaged in the practice
of law for at least ten years does In the view of the foregoing, the petition is
DISMISSED.
(Brillantes vs Yorac)
The petitioner is challenging the designation by the President of the Philippines of
Associate Commissioner Haydee B. Yorac as Acting Chairman of the Commission on
Elections, in place of Chairman Hilario B. Davide, who had been named chairman of
the fact-finding commission to investigate the December 1989 coup d'etat attempt.
The petitioner contends that the choice of the Acting Chairman of the Commission on
Elections is an internal matter that should be resolved by the members themselves
and that the intrusion of the President of the Philippines violates their independence.
He cites the practice in this Court, where the senior Associate Justice serves as Acting
Chief Justice in the absence of the Chief Justice. No designation from the President
of the Philippines is necessary.
Issue:
Whether or not the President has the power to designate an acting chairman of the
Comelec
Held:
Article IX-A, Section 1, of the Constitution expressly describes all the Constitutional
Commissions as "independent." Although essentially executive in nature, they are not
under the control of the President of the Philippines in the discharge of their
respective functions. Each of these Commissions conducts its own proceedings under
the applicable laws and its own rules and in the exercise of its own discretion. Its
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decisions, orders and rulings are subject only to review on certiorari by this Court as
provided by the Constitution in Article IX-A, Section 7.
The choice of a temporary chairman in the absence of the regular chairman comes
under that discretion. That discretion cannot be exercised for it, even with its
consent, by the President of the Philippines.
A designation as Acting Chairman is by its very terms essentially temporary and
therefore revocable at will. No cause need be established to justify its revocation.
Assuming its validity, the designation of the respondent as Acting Chairman of the
Commission on Elections may be withdrawn by the President of the Philippines at any
time and for whatever reason she sees fit. It is doubtful if the respondent, having
accepted such designation, will not be estopped from challenging its withdrawal.
The lack of a statutory rule covering the situation at bar is no justification for the
President of the Philippines to fill the void by extending the temporary designation in
favor of the respondent. This is still a government of laws and not of men. The
problem allegedly sought to be corrected, if it existed at all, did not call for
presidential action. The situation could have been handled by the members of the
Commission on Elections themselves without the participation of the President,
however well-meaning.
Disabilities, inhibitions and disqualifications
1987 Constitution, Article IX (A), Section 2
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Section 2. No member of a Constitutional Commission shall, during his tenure,

hold any other office or employment. Neither shall he engage in the practice of
any profession or in the active management or control of any business which, in
any way, may be affected by the functions of his office, nor shall he be
financially interested, directly or indirectly, in any contract with, or in any
franchise or privilege granted by the Government, any of its subdivisions,
agencies, or instrumentalities, including government-owned or controlled
corporations or their subsidiaries.
Independence
1987 constitution Article IX(A), sections 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, and 6
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Section 1. The Constitutional Commissions, which shall be independent, are the

Civil Service Commission, the Commission on Elections, and the Commission on
Audit.
Section 2. No member of a Constitutional Commission shall, during his tenure,

hold any other office or employment. Neither shall he engage in the practice of
any profession or in the active management or control of any business which, in
any way, may be affected by the functions of his office, nor shall he be
financially interested, directly or indirectly, in any contract with, or in any
franchise or privilege granted by the Government, any of its subdivisions,
agencies, or instrumentalities, including government-owned or controlled
corporations or their subsidiaries.
Section. 3. The salary of the Chairman and the Commissioners shall be fixed by
law and shall not be decreased during their tenure.
Section 4. The Constitutional Commissions shall appoint their officials and
employees in accordance with law.
Section 5. The Commission shall enjoy fiscal autonomy. Their approved annual
appropriations shall be automatically and regularly released.
Section 6. Each Commission en banc may promulgate its own rules concerning
pleadings and practice before it or before any of its offices. Such rules,
however, shall not diminish, increase, or modify substantive rights.
1987 Constitution Article IX(C), Sections 1 and 2

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Section 1. (1) There shall be a Commission on Elections composed of a

Chairman and six Commissioners who shall be natural-born citizens of the
Philippines and, at the time of their appointment, at least thirty-five years of
age, holders of a college degree, and must not have been candidates for any
elective positions in the immediately preceding elections. However, a majority
thereof, including the Chairman, shall be members of the Philippine Bar who
have been engaged in the practice of law for at least ten years.
(2) The Chairman and the Commissioners shall be appointed by the President
with the consent of the Commission on Appointments for a term of seven years
without reappointment. Of those first appointed, three Members shall hold
office for seven years, two Members for five years, and the last Members for
three years, without reappointment. Appointment to any vacancy shall be only
for the unexpired term of the predecessor. In no case shall any Member be
appointed or designated in a temporary or acting capacity.
Sec. 2. The Commission on Elections shall exercise the following powers and
functions:
(1) Enforce and administer all laws and regulations relative to the conduct of
an election, plebiscite, initiative, referendum, and recall.
(2) Exercise exclusive original jurisdiction over all contests relating to the
elections, returns, and qualifications of all elective regional, provincial, and
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city officials, and appellate jurisdiction over all contests involving elective
municipal officials decided by trial courts of general jurisdiction, or involving
elective barangay officials decided by trial courts of limited jurisdiction.
Decisions, final orders, or rulings of the Commission on election contests
involving elective municipal and barangay offices shall be final, executory, and
not appealable.
(3) Decide, except those involving the right to vote, all questions affecting
elections, including determination of the number and location of polling
places, appointment of election officials and inspectors, and registration of
voters.
(4) Deputize, with the concurrence of the President, law enforcement agencies
and instrumentalities of the Government, including the Armed Forces of the
Philippines, for the exclusive purpose of ensuring free, orderly, honest,
peaceful, and credible elections.
(5) Register, after sufficient publication, political parties, organizations, or
coalitions which, in addition to other requirements, must present their
platform or program of government; and accredit citizens' arms of the
Commission on Elections. Religious denominations and sects shall not be
registered. Those which seek to achieve their goals through violence or
unlawful means, or refuse to
uphold and adhere to this Constitution, or which are supported by any foreign
government shall likewise be refused registration.
Financial contributions from foreign governments and their agencies to political
parties, organizations, coalitions, or candidates related to elections, constitute
interference in national affairs, and, when accepted, shall be an additional
ground for the cancellation of their registration with the Commission, in
addition to other penalties that may be prescribed by law.
(6) File, upon a verified complaint, or on its own initiative, petitions in court
for inclusion or exclusion of voters; investigate and, where appropriate,
prosecute cases of violations of election laws, including acts or omissions
constituting election frauds, offenses, and malpractices.
(7) Recommend to the Congress effective measures to minimize election
spending, including limitation of places where propaganda materials shall be
posted, and to prevent and penalize all forms of election frauds, offenses,
malpractices, and nuisance candidacies.
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(8) Recommend to the President the removal of any officer or employee it has
deputized, or the imposition of any other disciplinary action, for violation or
disregard of, or disobedience to, its directive, order, or decision.
(9) Submit to the President and the Congress, a comprehensive report on the
conduct of each election, plebiscite, initiative, referendum, or recall.
Powers and functions
Omnibus Election Code, Article VII, Section 52
- Sec. 52. Powers and functions of the Commission on Elections. - In addition to the
powers and functions conferred upon it by the Constitution, the Commission shall
have exclusive charge of the enforcement and administration of all laws relative to
the conduct of elections for the purpose of ensuring free, orderly and honest
elections, and shall:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
(a) Exercise direct and immediate supervision and control over national and
local officials or employees, including members of any national or local law
enforcement agency and instrumentality of the government required by law to
perform duties relative to the conduct of elections. In addition, it may
authorize CMT cadets eighteen years of age and above to act as its deputies for
the purpose of enforcing its orders.
The Commission may relieve any officer or employee referred to in the
preceding paragraph from the performance of his duties relating to electoral
processes who violates the election law or fails to comply with its instructions,
orders, decisions or rulings, and appoint his substitute. Upon recommendation
of the Commission, the corresponding proper authority shall suspend or remove
from office any or all of such officers or employees who may, after due
process, be found guilty of such violation or failure.
(b) During the period of the campaign and ending thirty days thereafter, when
in any area of the country there are persons committing acts of terrorism to
influence people to vote for or against any candidate or political party, the
Commission shall have the power to authorize any member or members of the
Armed Forces of the Philippines, the National Bureau of Investigation, the
Integrated National Police or any similar agency or instrumentality of the
government, except civilian home defense forces, to act as deputies for the
purpose of ensuring the holding of free, orderly and honest elections.
(c) Promulgate rules and regulations implementing the provisions of this Code
or other laws which the Commission is required to enforce and administer, and
require the payment of legal fees and collect the same in payment of any
business done in the Commission, at rates that it may provide and fix in its
rules and regulations.
Rules and regulations promulgated by the Commission to implement the
provisions of this Code shall take effect on the sixteenth day after publication
in the Official Gazette or in at least daily newspapers of general circulation.
Orders and directives issued by the Commission pursuant to said rules and
regulations shall be furnished by personal delivery to accredited political
parties within forty-eight hours of issuance and shall take effect immediately
upon receipt.
In case of conflict between rules, regulations, orders or directives of the
Commission in the exercise of its constitutional powers and those issued by any
other administrative office or agency of the government concerning the same
matter relative to elections, the former shall prevail.
(d) Summon the parties to a controversy pending before it, issue subpoena and
subpoena duces tecum, and take testimony in any investigation or hearing
before it, and delegate such power to any officer of the Commission who shall
be a member of the Philippine Bar. In case of failure of a witness to attend,
the Commission, upon proof of service of the subpoena to said witnesses, may
issue a warrant to arrest witness and bring him before the Commission or the
officer before whom his attendance is required.
Any controversy submitted to the Commission shall, after compliance with the
requirements of due process, be immediately heard and decided by it within
sixty days from submission thereof. No decision or resolution shall be rendered
by the Commission either en banc or by division unless taken up in a formal
session properly convened for the purpose.
The Commission may, when necessary, avail of the assistance of any national or
local law enforcement agency and/or instrumentality of the government to
execute under its direct and immediate supervision any of its final decisions,
orders, instructions or rulings.
(e) Punish contempts provided for in the Rules of Court in the same procedure
and with the same penalties provided therein. Any violation of any final and
executory decision, order or ruling of the Commission shall constitute contempt
thereof.
(f) Enforce and execute its decisions, directives, orders and instructions which
shall have precedence over those emanating from any other authority, except
the Supreme Court and those issued in habeas corpus proceedings.
(g) Prescribe the forms to be used in the election, plebiscite or referendum.
(h) Procure any supplies, equipment, materials or services needed for the
holding of the election by public bidding: Provided, That, if it finds the
requirements of public bidding impractical to observe, then by negotiations or
sealed bids, and in both cases, the accredited parties shall be duly notified.
(i) Prescribe the use or adoption of the latest technological and electronic
devices, taking into account the situation prevailing in the area and the funds
available for the purpose: Provided, That the Commission shall notify the
authorized representatives of accredited political parties and candidates in
areas affected by the use or adoption of technological and electronic devices
not less than thirty days prior to the effectivity of the use of such devices.
(j) Carry out a continuing and systematic campaign through newspapers of
general circulation, radios and other media forms to educate the public and
fully inform the electorate about election laws, procedures, decisions, and
other matters relative to the work and duties of the Commission and the
necessity of clean, free, orderly and honest electoral processes.
(k) Enlist non-partisan group or organizations of citizens from the civic, youth,
professional, educational, business or labor sectors known for their probity,
impartiality and integrity with the membership and capability to undertake a
coordinated operation and activity to assist it in the implementation of the
provisions of this Code and the resolutions, orders and instructions of the
Commission for the purpose of ensuring free, orderly and honest elections in
any constituency. Such groups or organizations shall function under the direct
and immediate control and supervision of the Commission and shall perform
the following specific functions and duties:
A. Before Election Day:
1. Undertake an information campaign on salient features of this Code and help
in the dissemination of the orders, decisions and resolutions of the Commission
relative to the forthcoming election.
2. Wage a registration drive in their respective areas so that all citizens of

voting age, not otherwise disqualified by law may be registered.
3. Help cleanse the list of voters of illegal registrants, conduct house-to-house
canvass if necessary, and take the appropriate legal steps towards this end.
4. Report to the Commission violations of the provisions of this Code on the
conduct of the political campaign, election propaganda and electoral
expenditures.
B. On Election Day:
1. Exhort all registered voters in their respective areas to go to their polling
places and cast their votes.
2. Nominate one watcher for accreditation in each polling place and each place
of canvass who shall have the same duties, functions and rights as the other
watchers of political parties and candidates. Members or units of any citizen
group or organization so designated by the Commission except its lone duly
accredited watcher, shall not be allowed to enter any polling place except to
vote, and shall, if they so desire, stay in an area at least fifty meters away
from the polling place.
3. Report to the peace authorities and other appropriate agencies all instances
of terrorism, intimidation of voters, and other similar attempts to frustrate the
free and orderly casting of votes.
4. Perform such other functions as may be entrusted to such group or
organization by the Commission.
The designation of any group or organization made in accordance herewith may
be revoked by the Commission upon notice and hearing whenever by its
actuations such group or organization has shown partiality to any political party
or candidate, or has performed acts in excess or in contravention of the
functions and duties herein provided and such others which may be granted by
the Commission.
(l) Conduct hearings on controversies pending before it in the cities or
provinces upon proper motion of any party, taking into consideration the
materiality and number of witnesses to be presented, the situation prevailing
in the area and the fund available for the purpose.
(m) Fix other reasonable periods for certain pre-election requirements in order
that voters shall not be deprived of their right of suffrage and certain groups of
rights granted them in this Code.
Unless indicated in this Code, the Commission is hereby authorized for fix the
appropriate period for the various prohibited acts enumerated herein,
consistent with the requirements of free, orderly, and honest elections.
Powers and functions classified
(Filipinas Engg Machine Shop vs Ferrer)
Facts:
In preparation for the national elections of November 11, 1969, then respondent
COMELEC issued an INVITATION TO BID calling for the submission of sealed proposals
for the manufacture and delivery of 11,000 units of voting booths.
Among the seventeen bidders who submitted proposals in response to the said
INVITATION were the herein petitioner, Filipinas Engineering and Machine Shop,
(Filipinas for short) and the private respondent, Acme Steel Manufacturing Company,
(Acme for short).
The respondent COMELEC Bidding Committee Chairman and Members submitted their
Memorandum stating that Acme's bid had to be rejected because the sample it
submitted was "made of black iron sheets, painted, and therefore not rust proof or
rust resistant," and that, "it is also heavy - 51 kilos in weight." The Committee instead
recommended that Filipinas be awarded the contract to manufacture and supply the
voting booths, but that an "ocular inspection be made by all members of the
Commission of all the samples before the final award be made."
After an ocular inspection of all the samples submitted was conducted by the
COMELEC Commissioners, and after the Commissioners noted that Acme submitted the
lowest bid, the COMELEC issued a Resolution awarding the contract (for voting booths)
to Acme, subject to the condition, among others, that "(Acme) improves the sample
submitted in such manner as it would be rust proof or rust resistant.
On October 16, 1969, Filipinas filed an Injunction suit with the then Court of First
Instance of Manila, docketed as Civil Case No. 77972, against herein public
respondents COMELEC Commissioners, chairman and members of the Comelec Bidding
Committee, and private respondent Acme.
Issue:
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Whether or not the lower court has jurisdiction to take cognizance of a suit involving
an order of the COMELEC dealing with an award of contract arising from its invitation
to bid
Held:
The Commission on Elections shall have exclusive charge of the enforcement and
administration of all laws relative to the conduct of elections and shall exercise all
other functions which may be conferred upon it by law. It shall decide, save those
involving the right to vote, all administrative questions affecting elections, including
the determination of the number of location of polling places, and the appointment of
election inspectors and of other election officials. x x x The decisions, orders and
rulings of the Commission shall be subject to review by the Supreme Court." (Section
2, Article X, 1935 Philippine Constitution, which was then in force)
It has been consistently held9 that it is the Supreme Court, not the Court of First
Instance, which has exclusive jurisdiction to review on certiorari final decisions,
orders or rulings of the COMELEC relative to the conduct of elections and enforcement
of election laws.
An order of the COMELEC awarding a contract to a private party, as a result of its
choice among various proposals submitted in response to its invitation to bid comes
within the purview of a "final order" which is exclusively and directly appealable to
this court on certiorari. What is contemplated by the term "final orders, rulings and
decisions" of the COMELEC reviewable by certiorari by the Supreme Court as provided
by law are those rendered in actions or proceedings before the COMELEC and taken
cognizance of by the said body in the exercise of its adjudicatory or quasi-judicial
powers.
It cannot be gainsaid that the powers vested by the Constitution and the law on the
Commission on Elections may either be classified as those pertaining to its
adjudicatory or quasi-judicial functions, or those which are inherently administrative
and sometimes ministerial in character.
The order of the Commission granting the award to a bidder is not an order rendered
in a legal controversy before it wherein the parties filed their respective pleadings
and presented evidence after which the questioned order was issued; and that this
order of the commission was issued pursuant to its authority to enter into contracts in
relation to election purposes. In short, the COMELEC resolution awarding the contract
in favor of Acme was not issued pursuant to its quasi-judicial functions but merely as
an incident of its inherent administrative functions over the conduct of elections, and
hence, the said resolution may not be deemed as a "final order" reviewable by
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certiorari by the Supreme Court. Being non-judicial in character, no contempt may

be imposed by the COMELEC from said order, and no direct and exclusive appeal by
certiorari to this Tribunal lie from such order. Any question arising from said order
may be well taken in an ordinary civil action before the trial courts.
(Baytan vs Comelec)
Petitioners, Reynato Baytan, Reynaldo Baytan and Adrian Baytan were on their way to
register for the May 1998 elections when they met the newly elected Barangay
Captain, Roberto Ignacio, in Barangay 18, Zone II of Cavite City, who led them to
register in Precinct No. 83-A of Barangay 18.Upon realizing that their residence is
situated within the jurisdiction of Barangay 28 not Barangay 18, petitioners proceeded
to Precinct 129-A of Barangay 28 and registered anew. Subsequently, petitioners sent
a letter to former COMELEC Assistant Executive Director Jose Pio O. Joson requesting
for advice on how to cancel their previous registration. Petitioners Voters
Registration Records were forwarded to the Provincial Election Supervisor, Atty.
Juanito V. Ravanzo, for evaluation, who, subsequently, recommended filing an
information for double registration against petitioners. The COMELEC affirmed
Ravanzos resolution. Petitioners moved for reconsideration, which, was denied by
COMELEC en banc. Hence, this petition.
Issue:
WON the COMELEC en banc committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction in recommending the prosecution of petitioners for double
registration despite clear and convincing evidence on record that they had no
intention of committing said election offense
Held: The Petition is without merit.
It is well- settled that the finding of probable cause in the prosecution of election
offenses rests in the sound discretion of the COMELEC. Generally, the Court will not
interfere with such finding of the COMELEC, absent a clear showing of grave abuse of
discretion. This principle emanates from the exclusive power of the COMELEC to
conduct preliminary investigation of all election investigation of all election offenses
and to prosecute the same.
There is no question that petitioners registered twice on different days and in
different precincts without canceling their previous registration. Aside from this, the
COMELEC found certain circumstances prevailing in the case sufficient to warrant the
finding of probable cause. The COMELEC also pointed out that since double
registration is malum prohibitum, petitioners claim of lack of intent to violate the
law is inconsequential.
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Under Sec. 2, Art. IX-C of the Constitution, the COMELEC exercises both
administrative and quasi-judicial powers. The administrative powers are found in Sec
2. (1), (3) to (9) of Art IX-C. The Constitution does not provide on whether these
administrative powers shall be exercised by the COMELEC en banc or in division. The
COMELEC en banc therefore can act on administrative matters, and this had been the
practice under the 1973 and 1987 Constitutions. The prosecution by the COMELEC of
violations of election laws is an administrative power.
The COMELECs exercise of its quasi-judicial powers is subject to Section 3 of Article
IX-C which expressly requires that all election cases, including pre-proclamation
controversies, shall be decided by the COMELEC in division, and the motion for
reconsideration shall be decided by the COMELEC en banc. It follows, as held by the
Court in Canicosa,[23] that the COMELEC is mandated to decide cases first in division,
and then upon motion for reconsideration en banc, only when the COMELEC exercises
its quasi-judicial powers.
The COMELEC is empowered in Section 2(6), Article IX-C of the 1987 Constitution to
prosecute cases of violations of election laws. The prosecution of election law
violators involves the exercise of the COMELECs administrative powers. Thus, the
COMELEC en banc can directly approve the recommendation of its Law Department to
file the criminal information for double registration against petitioners in the instant
case. There is no constitutional requirement that the filing of the criminal
information be first decided by any of the divisions of the COMELEC.
In sum, the second sentence of Section 3, Article IX-C of the 1987 Constitution is not
applicable in administrative cases, like the instant case where the COMELEC is
determining whether probable cause exists to charge petitioners for violation of the
provision of the Election Code prohibiting double registration.
Indeed, the COMELEC acted in accordance with Section 9(b), Rule 34 of the 1993
COMELEC Rules of Procedure governing the prosecution of election offenses in
meeting en banc in the first instance and acting on the recommendation of
Investigating Officer Ravanzo to file charges against petitioners.
History of functions
(Loong vs Comelec)
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The COMELEC was organized under Commonwealth Act No. 607 enacted on
August 22,1940. The power to enforce our election laws was originally vested in
the President and exercised through the Department of Interior. According to
Dean Sinco,[29] the view ultimately emerged that an independent body could
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better protect the right of suffrage of our people. Hence, the enforcement of
our election laws, while an executive power, was transferred to the COMELEC.
From a statutory creation, the COMELEC was transformed to a constitutional
body by virtue of the 1940 amendments to the 1935 Constitution which took
effect on December 2, 1940. COMELEC was generously granted the power to
"have exclusive charge of the enforcement and administration of all laws
relative to the conduct of elections x x x."[30]
Then came the 1973 Constitution. It further broadened the powers of COMELEC
by making it the sole Judge of all election contests relating to the election,
returns and qualifications of members of the national legislature and elective
provincial and city officials.[31] In fine, the COMELEC was given judicial power
aside from its traditional administrative and executive functions.
The 1987 Constitution quickened this trend of strengthening the COMELEC.
Today, COMLEC enforces and administers all laws and regulations relative to
the conduct of elections, plebiscites, initiatives, referenda and recalls.
Election contests involving regional, provincial and city elective officials are
under its exclusive original jurisdiction. All contests involving elective
municipal and barangay officials are under its appellate jurisdiction.[32]
Our decisions have been in cadence with the movement towards empowering
the COMELEC in order that it can more effectively perform its duty of
safeguarding the sanctity of our elections.
Administrative Powers
1. Power to enforce administer election laws
1987 Constitution, Article IX (c), Section 2(1)
functions:
(1) Enforce and administer all laws and regulations relative to the conduct of an
election, plebiscite, initiative, referendum, and recall.
(Sandoval vs Comelec)
FACTS:
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Petitioner and private respondent herein were candidates for the congressional
seat for the Malabon-Navotas legislative district during the elections held on May
11, 1998. After canvassing the municipal certificates of canvass, the district board
of canvassers proclaimed petitioner the duly elected congressman. The petitioner
took his oath of office on the same day. Private respondent filed with the Comelec
a petition, which sought the annulment of petitioner's proclamation. He alleged
that there was a verbal order from the Comelec Chairman to suspend the canvass
and proclamation of the winning candidate, but the district board of canvassers
proceeded with the canvass and proclamation despite the said verbal order. He
also alleged that there was non-inclusion of 19 election returns in the canvass,
which would result in an incomplete canvass of the election returns. The Comelec
en banc issued an order setting aside the proclamation of petitioner and ruled the
proclamation as void. Hence, this petition for certiorari seeking the annulment and
reversal of the Comelec order.
ISSUES:
1. whether the COMELEC has the power to take cognizance of SPC No. 98-143 and
SPC No. 98- 206
SPC No. 98-143 an "Urgent Appeal from the Decision of the Legislative District
Board of Canvassers for Malabon and Navotas with Prayer for the Nullification of
the Proclamation of Federico S. Sandoval as Congressman."
SPC No. 98-206. The petition sought the annulment of petitioner's proclamation as
congressman.
2. whether the COMELEC's order to set aside petitioner's proclamation was valid.
RULING:
On the first issue, we uphold the jurisdiction of the COMELEC over the petitions
filed by private respondent. The COMELEC has exclusive jurisdiction over all preproclamation controversies. As an exception, however, to the general rule, Section
15 of Republic Act (RA) 7166 prohibits candidates in the presidential, vicepresidential, senatorial and congressional elections from filing pre-proclamation
cases. It states:
"Sec. 15. Pre-proclamation cases Not Allowed in Elections for President, VicePresident, Senator, and Members of the House of Representatives. For purposes
of the elections for President, Vice-President, Senator and Member of the House of
Representatives, no pre-proclamation cases shall be allowed on matters relating to
the preparation, transmission, receipt, custody and appreciation of election
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returns or the certificates of canvass, as the case may be. However, this does not
preclude the authority of the appropriate canvassing body motu propio or upon
written complaint of an interested person to correct manifest errors in the
certificate of canvass or election returns before it."
The prohibition aims to avoid delay in the proclamation of the winner in the
election, which delay might result in a vacuum in these sensitive posts. The law,
nonetheless, provides an exception to the exception. The second sentence of
Section 15 allows the filing of petitions for correction of manifest errors in the
certificate of canvass or election returns even in elections for president, vicepresident and members of the House of Representatives for the simple reason that
the correction of manifest error will not prolong the process of canvassing nor
delay the proclamation of the winner in the election. This rule is consistent with
and complements the authority of the COMELEC under the Constitution to "enforce
and administer all laws and regulations relative to the conduct of an election,
plebiscite, initiative, referendum and recall" and its power to "decide, except
those involving the right to vote, all questions affecting elections."
We now go to the second issue. Although the COMELEC is clothed with jurisdiction
over the subject matter and issue of SPC No. 98-143 and SPC No. 98-206, we find
the exercise of its jurisdiction tainted with illegality. We hold that its order to set
aside the proclamation of petitioner is invalid for having been rendered without
due process of law. Procedural due process demands prior notice and hearing. The
facts show that COMELEC set aside the proclamation of petitioner without the
benefit of prior notice and hearing and it rendered the questioned order based
solely on private respondent's allegations.
Taking cognizance of private respondent's petitions for annulment of petitioner's
proclamation, COMELEC was not merely performing an administrative function.
The resolution of the adverse claims of private respondent and petitioner as
regards the existence of a manifest error in the questioned certificate of canvass
requires the COMELEC to act as an arbiter. It behooves the Commission to hear
both parties to determine the veracity of their allegations and to decide whether
the alleged error is a manifest error. Hence, the resolution of this issue calls for
the exercise by the COMELEC of its quasi-judicial power. It has been said that
where a power rests in judgment or discretion, so that it is of judicial nature or
character, but does not involve the exercise of functions of a judge, or is
conferred upon an officer other than a judicial officer, it is deemed quasi-judicial.
The COMELEC therefore, acting as quasi-judicial tribunal, cannot ignore the
requirements of procedural due process in resolving the petitions filed by private
respondent.
16
(Loong vs Comelec)
Facts:
Automated elections systems was used for the May 11, 1998 regular elections held in
the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao (ARMM) which includes the Province of
Sulu. Atty. Jose Tolentino, Jr. headed the COMELEC Task Force to have administrative
oversight of the elections in Sulu.
On May 12, 1998, some election inspectors and watchers informed Atty. Tolentino, Jr.
of discrepancies between the election returns and the votes cast for the mayoralty
candidates in the municipality of Pata. To avoid a situation where proceeding with
automation will result in an erroneous count, he suspended the automated counting
of ballots in Pata and immediately communicated the problem to the technical
experts of COMELEC and the suppliers of the automated machine. After the
consultations, the experts told him that the problem was caused by misalignment of
the ovals opposite the names of candidates in the local ballots. They found nothing
wrong with the automated machines. The error was in the printing of the local
ballots, as a consequence of which, the automated machines failed to read them
correctly.
Before midnight of May 12, 1998, Atty. Tolentino, Jr. was able to send to the
COMELEC en banc his report and recommendation, urging the use of the manual count
in the entire Province of Sulu. COMELEC issued Resolution No. 98-1750 approving,
Atty. Tolentino, Jr.'s recommendation and the manner of its implementation.
Issue:
WON the Comelec has the power to order for the shift to manual counting
Held:
A resolution of the issue will involve an interpretation of R.A. No. 8436 on automated
election in relation to the broad power of the COMELEC under Section 2(1), Article
IX(C) of the Constitution "to enforce and administer all laws and regulations relative
to the conduct of an election , plebiscite, initiative, referendum and recall."
Undoubtedly, the text and intent of this provision is to give COMELEC all the
necessary and incidental powers for it to achieve the objective of holding free,
orderly, honest, peaceful, and credible elections.
The order for a manual count cannot be characterized as arbitrary, capricious or
whimsical. It is well established that the automated machines failed to read correctly
the ballots in the municipality of Pata The technical experts of COMELEC and the
17
supplier of the automated machines found nothing wrong the automated machines.
They traced the problem to the printing of local ballots by the National Printing
Office. It is plain that to continue with the automated count would result in a grossly
erroneous count. An automated count of the local votes in Sulu would have resulted in
a wrong count, a travesty of the sovereignty of the electorate.
In enacting R.A. No. 8436, Congress obviously failed to provide a remedy where the
error in counting is not machine-related for human foresight is not all-seeing. We
hold, however, that the vacuum in the law cannot prevent the COMELEC from
levitating above the problem. . We cannot kick away the will of the people by giving a
literal interpretation to R.A. 8436. R.A. 8436 did not prohibit manual counting when
machine count does not work. Counting is part and parcel of the conduct of an
election which is under the control and supervision of the COMELEC. It ought to be
self-evident that the Constitution did not envision a COMELEC that cannot count the
result of an election.
Omnibus Election Code, Article VIII, Section 52(a)
Sec. 52. Powers and functions of the Commission on Elections. - In addition to the
elections, and shall:
(a) Exercise direct and immediate supervision and control over national and local
officials or employees, including members of any national or local law enforcement
agency and instrumentality of the government required by law to perform duties
relative to the conduct of elections. In addition, it may authorize CMT cadets
eighteen years of age and above to act as its deputies for the purpose of enforcing its
orders.
The Commission may relieve any officer or employee referred to in the preceding
paragraph from the performance of his duties relating to electoral processes who
violates the election law or fails to comply with its instructions, orders, decisions or
rulings, and appoint his substitute. Upon recommendation of the Commission, the
corresponding proper authority shall suspend or remove from office any or all of such
officers or employees who may, after due process, be found guilty of such violation or
failure.
Comelec control, grounds, implications, duration
Comelec resolution no. 9583, Dec. 18, 2012 (wa ko nani giapil kay kinda taas sya. For
info about this, pls search nalang sa net)
18
2. Power to conduct plebiscite, initiative, referendum and recall

Plebscite defined
1987 Constitution, Article XVII, Section 4
Section 4. Any amendment to, or revision of, this Constitution under Section 1 hereof
shall be valid when ratified by a majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite which shall
be held not earlier than sixty days nor later than ninety days after the approval of
such amendment or revision.
Any amendment under Section 2 hereof shall be valid when ratified by a majority of
the votes cast in a plebiscite which shall be held not earlier than sixty days nor later
than ninety days after the certification by the Commission on Elections of the
sufficiency of the petition
RA 6735, section 3(e)
Sec. 3. Definition of Terms. For purposes of this Act, the following terms shall mean:
(e) "Plebiscite" is the electoral process by which an initiative on the Constitution is
approved or rejected by the people.
Initiative defined
1987 Constitution, Article XVII, Sections 1 and 2
Section 1. Any amendment to, or revision of, this Constitution may be proposed by:
(1) The Congress, upon a vote of three-fourths of all its Members; or (2) A
constitutional convention.
Section 2. Amendments to this Constitution may likewise be directly proposed by the
people through initiative upon a petition of at least twelve per centum of the total
number of registered voters, of which every legislative district must be represented
by at least three per centum of the registered voters therein. No amendment under
this section shall be authorized within five years following the ratification of this
Constitution nor oftener than once every five years thereafter.
The Congress shall provide for the implementation of the exercise of this right.
RA 6735, Sections 3(a), (f), 4 and 5
(a) "Initiative" is the power of the people to propose amendments to the Constitutions
or to propose and enact legislations through an election called for the purpose.
19
There are three (3) systems of initiative, namely:

a.1 Initiative on the Constitution which refers to a petition proposing amendments to
the Constitution;
a.2 Initiative on statutes which refers to a petition proposing to enact a national
legislation; and
a.3. Initiative on local legislation which refers to a petition proposing to enact a
regional, provincial, city, municipal, or barangay law, resolution or ordinance.
(f) "Petition" is the written instrument containing the proposition and the required
number of signatories. It shall be in a form to be determined by and submitted to the
Commission on Elections, hereinafter referred to as the Commission.
Sec. 4. Who may exercise. The power of initiative and referendum may be exercised
by all registered voters of the country, autonomous regions, provinces, cities,
municipalities and barangays.
Sec. 5. Requirements. (a) To exercise the power of initiative or referendum, at least
ten per centum (10%) of the total number of the registered voters, of which every
legislative district is represented by at least three per centum (3%) of the registered
voters thereof, shall sign a petition for the purpose and register the same with the
Commission.
(b) A petition for an initiative on the 1987 Constitution must have at least twelve per
centum (12%) of the total number of registered voters as signatories, of which every
legislative district must be represented by at least three per centum (3%) of the
registered voters therein. Initiative on the Constitution may be exercised only after
five (5) years from the ratification of the 1987 Constitution and only once every five
(5) years thereafter.
(c) The petition shall state the following:
c.1. contents or text of the proposed law sought to be enacted, approved or rejected,
amended or repealed, as the case may be;
c.2. the proposition;
c.3. the reason or reasons therefor;
c.4. that it is not one of the exceptions provided herein;
c.5. signatures of the petitioners or registered voters; and
20
c.6. an abstract or summary in not more than one hundred (100) words which shall be
legibly written or printed at the top of every page of the petition.
(d) A referendum or initiative affecting a law, resolution or ordinance passed by the
legislative assembly of an autonomous region, province or city is deemed validly
initiated if the petition thereof is signed by at least ten per centum (10%) of the
registered voters in the province or city, of which every legislative district must be
represented by at least three per centum (3%) of the registered voters therein;
Provided, however, That if the province or city is composed only of one (1) legislative
district, then at least each municipality in a province or each barangay in a city
should be represented by at least three per centum (3%) of the registered voters
therein.
(e) A referendum of initiative on an ordinance passed in a municipality shall be
deemed validly initiated if the petition therefor is signed by at least ten per centum
(10%) of the registered voters in the municipality, of which every barangay is
represented by at least three per centum (3%) of the registered voters therein.
(f) A referendum or initiative on a barangay resolution or ordinance is deemed validly
initiated if signed by at least ten per centum (10%) of the registered voters in said
barangay.
(Santiago vs Comelec)
Facts:
On 6 Dec 1996, Atty. Jesus S. Delfin filed with COMELEC a Petition to Amend the
Constitution to Lift Term Limits of elective Officials by Peoples Initiative The
COMELEC then, upon its approval, a.) set the time and dates for signature gathering
all over the country, b.) caused the necessary publication of the said petition in
papers of general circulation, and c.) instructed local election registrars to assist
petitioners and volunteers in establishing signing stations.
On 18 Dec 1996, MD Santiago et al filed a special civil action for prohibition against
the Delfin Petition. Santiago argues that 1.) the constitutional provision on peoples
initiative to amend the constitution can only be implemented by law to be passed by
Congress and no such law has yet been passed by Congress, 2.) RA 6735 indeed
provides for three systems of initiative namely, initiative on the Constitution, on
statues and on local legislation. The two latter forms of initiative were specifically
provided for in Subtitles II and III thereof but no provisions were specifically made for
initiatives on the Constitution. This omission indicates that the matter of peoples
initiative to amend the Constitution was left to some future law as pointed out by
former Senator Arturo Tolentino.
21
ISSUE:
Whether or not RA 6735 was intended to include initiative on amendments to the
constitution and if so whether the act, as worded, adequately covers such initiative
HELD:
RA 6735 is intended to include the system of initiative on amendments to the
constitution but is unfortunately inadequate to cover that system. Sec 2 of Article 17
of the Constitution provides: Amendments to this constitution may likewise be
directly proposed by the people through initiative upon a petition of at least twelve
per centum of the total number of registered voters, of which every legislative
district must be represented by at least three per centum of the registered voters
therein. . . The Congress shall provide for the implementation of the exercise of this
right This provision is obviously not self-executory as it needs an enabling law to be
passed by Congress. Joaquin Bernas, a member of the 1986 Con-Con stated without
implementing legislation Section 2, Art 17 cannot operate. Thus, although this mode
of amending the constitution is a mode of amendment which bypasses Congressional
action in the last analysis is still dependent on Congressional action. Bluntly stated,
the right of the people to directly propose amendments to the Constitution through
the system of inititative would remain entombed in the cold niche of the constitution
until Congress provides for its implementation. The people cannot exercise such right,
though constitutionally guaranteed, if Congress for whatever reason does not provide
for its implementation.
(Lambino vs comelec)
Facts:
Petitioners (Lambino group) commenced gathering signatures for an initiative petition
to change the 1987 constitution, they filed a petition with the COMELEC to hold a
plebiscite that will ratify their initiative petition under RA 6735. Lambino group
alleged that the petition had the support of 6M individuals fulfilling what was
provided by art 17 of the constitution. Their petition changes the 1987 constitution by
modifying sections 1-7 of Art 6 and sections 1-4 of Art 7 and by adding Art 18. the
proposed changes will shift the present bicameralpresidential form of government to
unicameral- parliamentary. COMELEC denied the petition due to lack of enabling law
governing initiative petitions and invoked the Santiago Vs. Comelec ruling that RA
6735 is inadequate to implement the initiative petitions.
Issue:
22
Whether or Not the Lambino Groups initiative petition complies with Section 2,
Article XVII of the Constitution on amendments to the Constitution through a peoples
initiative.
Held:
There is no merit to the petition.
The Lambino Group miserably failed to comply with the basic requirements of the
Constitution for conducting a people's initiative. Thus, there is even no need to revisit
Santiago, as the present petition warrants dismissal based alone on the Lambino
Group's glaring failure to comply with the basic requirements of the Constitution. For
following the Court's ruling in Santiago, no grave abuse of discretion is attributable to
the Commision on Elections.
Section 2, Article XVII of the Constitution is the governing constitutional provision that
allows a people's initiative to propose amendments to the Constitution. This section
states:
Sec. 2. Amendments to this Constitution may likewise be directly proposed by the
people through initiative upon a petition of at least twelve per centum of the total
number of registered voters of which every legislative district must be represented by
at least three per centum of the registered voters therein. x x x x
The framers of the Constitution intended that the "draft of the proposed
constitutional amendment" should be "ready and shown" to the people "before" they
sign such proposal. The framers plainly stated that "before they sign there is already a
draft shown to them." The framers also "envisioned" that the people should sign on
the proposal itself because the proponents must "prepare that proposal and pass it
around for signature."
The essence of amendments "directly proposed by the people through initiative upon
a petition" is that the entire proposal on its face is a petition by the people. This
means two essential elements must be present. First, the people must author and
thus sign the entire proposal. No agent or representative can sign on their behalf.
Second, as an initiative upon a petition, the proposal must be embodied in a petition.
These essential elements are present only if the full text of the proposed
amendments is first shown to the people who express their assent by signing such
complete proposal in a petition. Thus, an amendment is "directly proposed by the
people through initiative upon a petition" only if the people sign on a petition that
contains the full text of the proposed amendments.
23
The full text of the proposed amendments may be either written on the face of the
petition, or attached to it. If so attached, the petition must state the fact of such
attachment. This is an assurance that every one of the several millions of signatories
to the petition had seen the full text of the proposed amendments before signing.
Otherwise, it is physically impossible, given the time constraint, to prove that every
one of the millions of signatories had seen the full text of the proposed amendments
before signing.
Moreover, "an initiative signer must be informed at the time of signing of the nature
and effect of that which is proposed" and failure to do so is "deceptive and
misleading" which renders the initiative void.[19]
The proponents of the initiative secure the signatures from the people. The
proponents secure the signatures in their private capacity and not as public officials.
The proponents are not disinterested parties who can impartially explain the
advantages and disadvantages of the proposed amendments to the people. The
proponents present favorably their proposal to the people and do not present the
arguments against their proposal. The proponents, or their supporters, often pay
those who gather the signatures.
Thus, there is no presumption that the proponents observed the constitutional
requirements in gathering the signatures. The proponents bear the burden of proving
that they complied with the constitutional requirements in gathering the signatures that the petition contained, or incorporated by attachment, the full text of the
proposed amendments.
(Garcia vs Comelec)
Facts:
Enrique T. Garcia was elected governor of Bataan in the 1992 elections. Some mayors,
vice-mayors and members of the Sangguniang Bayan of the twelve (12) municipalities
of the province constituted themselves into a Preparatory Recall Assembly to initiate
the recall election of petitioner Garcia. They issued Resolution No. 1 as formal
initiation of the recall proceedings. COMELEC scheduled the recall election for the
gubernatorial position of Bataan.
Petitioners then filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition with writ of preliminary
injunction to annul the Resolution of the COMELEC because the PRAC failed to comply
with the "substantive and procedural requirement" laid down in Section 70 of R.A.
7160 (Local Government Code 1991). They pointed out the most fatal defect of the
proceeding followed by the PRAC in passing the Resolution: the deliberate failure to
send notices of the meeting to 65 members of the assembly.
24
Issues:
1) Whether or not the people have the sole and exclusive right to initiate recall
proceedings. 2) Whether or not the procedure for recall violated the right of elected
local public officials belonging to the political minority to equal protection of the law.
Held:
1) No. There is nothing in the Constitution that will remotely suggest that the people
have the "sole and exclusive right to decide on whether to initiate a recall
proceeding." The Constitution did not provide for any mode, let alone a single mode,
of initiating recall elections. The mandate given by section 3 of Article X of the
Constitution is for Congress to "enact a local government code which shall provide for
a more responsive and accountable local government structure through a system of
decentralization with effective mechanisms of recall, initiative, and referendum . . ."
By this constitutional mandate, Congress was clearly given the power to choose the
effective mechanisms of recall as its discernment dictates. What the Constitution
simply required is that the mechanisms of recall, whether one or many, to be chosen
by Congress should be effective. Using its constitutionally granted discretion,
Congress deemed it wise to enact an alternative mode of initiating recall elections to
supplement the former mode of initiation by direct action of the people. The
legislative records reveal there were two (2) principal reasons why this alternative
mode of initiating the recall process thru an assembly was adopted, viz: (a) to
diminish the difficulty of initiating recall thru the direct action of the people; and (b)
to cut down on its expenses.
2) No. Under the Sec. 70 of the LGC, all mayors, vice-mayors and sangguniang
members of the municipalities and component cities are made members of the
preparatory recall assembly at the provincial level. Its membership is not apportioned
to political parties. No significance is given to the political affiliation of its members.
Secondly, the preparatory recall assembly, at the provincial level includes all the
elected officials in the province concerned. Considering their number, the greater
probability is that no one political party can control its majority. Thirdly, sec. 69 of
the Code provides that the only ground to recall a locally elected public official is loss
of confidence of the people. The members of the PRAC are in the PRAC not in
representation of their political parties but as representatives of the people.
By necessary implication, loss of confidence cannot be premised on mere differences
in political party affiliation. Indeed, our Constitution encourages multi-party system
for the existence of opposition parties is indispensable to the growth and nurture of
democratic system. Clearly then, the law as crafted cannot be faulted for
discriminating against local officials belonging to the minority. Moreover, the law
25
instituted safeguards to assure that the initiation of the recall process by a

preparatory recall assembly will not be corrupted by extraneous influences. We held
that notice to all the members of the recall assembly is a condition sine qua non to
the validity of its proceedings. The law also requires a qualified majority of all the
preparatory recall assembly members to convene in session and in a public place.
Needless to state, compliance with these requirements is necessary, otherwise, there
will be no valid resolution of recall which can be given due course by the COMELEC.
Local Government Code of 1991, sections 69, 70, 71, 72, 73 and 74
Section 69. By Whom Exercised. - The power of recall for loss of confidence shall be
exercised by the registered voters of a local government unit to which the local
elective official subject to such recall belongs.
Section 70. Initiation of the Recall Process. (a) Recall may be initiated by a preparatory recall assembly or by the registered
voters of the local government unit to which the local elective official subject to such
recall belongs.
(b) There shall be a preparatory recall assembly in every province, city, district, and
municipality which shall be composed of the following:
(1) Provincial level. - All mayors, vice-mayors, and sanggunian members of the
municipalities and component cities;
(2) City level. - All punong barangay and sanggunian barangay members in the city;
(3) Legislative District level. - In case where sangguniang panlalawigan members are
elected by district, all elective municipal officials in the district; and in cases where
sangguniang panlungsod members are elected by district, all elective barangay
officials in the district; and
(4) Municipal level. - All punong barangay and sangguniang barangay members in the
municipality.
(c) A majority of all the preparatory recall assembly members may convene in session
in a public place and initiate a recall proceedings against any elective official in the
local government unit concerned. Recall of provincial, city, or municipal officials shall
be validly initiated through a resolution adopted by a majority of all the members of
the preparatory recall assembly concerned during its session called for the purpose.
(d) Recall of any elective provincial, city, municipal, or barangay official may also be
validly initiated upon petition of at least twenty-five percent (25%) of the total
26
number of registered voters in the local government unit concerned during the
election in which the local official sought to be recalled was elected.
(1) A written petition for recall duly signed before the election registrar or his
representative, and in the presence of a representative of the petitioner and a
representative of the official sought to be recalled and, and in a public place in the
province, city, municipality, or barangay, as the case may be, shall be filed with the
COMELEC through its office in the local government unit concerned. The COMELEC or
its duly authorized representative shall cause the publication of the petition in a
public and conspicuous place for a period of not less than ten (10) days nor more than
twenty (20) days, for the purpose of verifying the authenticity and genuineness of the
petition and the required percentage of voters.
(2) Upon the lapse of the aforesaid period, the COMELEC or its duly authorized
representative shall announce the acceptance of candidates to the position and
thereafter prepare the list of candidates which shall include the name of the official
sought to be recalled.
Section 71. Election on Recall. - Upon the filing of a valid resolution or petition for
recall with the appropriate local office of the COMELEC, the Commission or its duly
authorized representative shall set the date of the election on recall, which shall not
be later than thirty (30) days after the filing of the resolution or petition for recall in
the case of the barangay, city, or municipal officials. and forty-five (45) days in the
case of provincial officials. The official or officials sought to be recalled shall
automatically be considered as duly registered candidate or candidates to the
pertinent positions and, like other candidates, shall be entitled to be voted upon.
Section 72. Effectivity of Recall. - The recall of an elective local official shall be
effective only upon the election and proclamation of a successor in the person of the
candidate receiving the highest number of votes cast during the election on recall.
Should the official sought to be recalled receive the highest number of votes,
confidence in him is thereby affirmed, and he shall continue in office.
Section 73. Prohibition from Resignation. - The elective local official sought to be
recalled shall not be allowed to resign while the recall process is in progress.
Section 74. Limitations on Recall. (a) Any elective local official may be the subject of a recall election only once during
his term of office for loss of confidence.
(b) No recall shall take place within one (1) year from the date of the official's
assumption to office or one (1) year immediately preceding a regular local election.
27
RA 9244, Section 3
SEC. 3. All pending petitions for recall initiated through the Preparatory Recall
Assembly shall be considered dismissed upon the effectivity of this Act.
Comelec Resolution no. 7505, June 6, 2005 (To be searched)
(Paras vs Comelec)
Facts:
Petitioner is an elected barangay chairman of Pula, Cabanatuan City in 1994.
Sometime in October 1995, A petition for his recall as Punong Barangay was filed by
his constituents. Public respondent COMELEC resolved to approve the petition and set
the recall election on November 13. In view of the petitioners opposition, COMELEC
deferred the election and rescheduled it on December 16, 1995. To prevent the recall
election from taking place, the petitioner filed a petition for injunction before the
RTC. The trial court issued a TRO. After conducting a summary hearing, the court
dismissed the petition and lifted the restraining order. The public respondent on a
resolution date January 5, 1996, rescheduled the recall election to be held January
13, 1996. Hence, this petition for certiorari. The petitioner argues the pursuant to
Section 74b of the Local Government code: no recall shall take place within one (1)
year from the date of the official's assumption to office or one (1) year immediately
preceding a regular local election", petitioner insists that the scheduled January 13,
1996 recall election is now barred (SK) election was set on the first Monday of May
1996.
Issue:
Whether or not the recall election in question is in violation to the provisions of
Section 74b of the Local Government Code.
Held:
It is a rule in statutory construction that every part of the statute must be interpreted
with reference to the context, that every part of the statute must be considered
together with the other parts, and kept subservient to the general intent of the whole
enactment. Paras interpretation of the law is too literal that it does not accord with
the intentions of the authors of the law. The spirit rather that the letters of a law
determines its construction. Hence, it was held that the regular local election
refers to an election where the office held by the local elective official sought to be
recalled.
(Angobung vs Comelec)
28
Facts:
Petitioner won as the duly elected Mayor of the Municipality of Tumauini, Isabela in
the local elections of 1995. Private respondent de Alban was also a candidate in said
elections.
Sometime in early September, 1996, private respondent filed with the Local Election
Registrar, a Petition for Recall[3] against petitioner. Subsequently said petition was
forwarded to the main office of COMELEC in Manila, for approval.
Acting on the petition, Deputy Executive Director for Operations Pio Jose Joson
submitted to the COMELEC En Banc, a Memorandum recommending approval of the
petition for recall filed by private respondent and its signing by other qualified voters
in order to garner at least 25% of the total number of registered voters as required by
Section 69(d) of the Local Government code of 1991.
In turn acting on the abovementioned Memorandum of Deputy Executive Director
Joson, the COMELEC en banc issued the herein assailed Resolution No. 96-2951.
Petitioner now attacks the aforementioned resolution as being unconstitutional and
therefore invalid, on two main grounds: (1) that the resolution approved the Petition
for Recall albeit same was signed by just one person in violation of the statutory 25%
minimum requirement as to the number of signatures supporting and petition for
recall; and (2) that the resolution scheduled the recall election within one (1) year
from the May 12, 1997 Barangay Elections.
Issue:
WON the call of recall election is proper
Held:
Section 69(d) of the Local Government Code of 1991 expressly provides that recall of
any elective x x x municipal x x x official may also be validly initiated upon petition of
at least twenty-five percent (25%) of the total number of registered voters in the local
government unit concerned during the election in which the local official sought to be
recalled was elected. The law is plain and unequivocal as to what initiates recall
proceedings: only a petition of at least 25% of the total number of registered voters,
may validly initiate recall proceedings. We take careful note of the phrase, petition of
at least twenty-five percent (25%) and point out that the law does not state that the
petition must be signed by at least 25% of the registered voters; rather, the petition
must be of or by, at least 25% of the registered voters, i.e., the petition must be
filed, not by one person only, but by at least 25% of the total number of registered
29
voters. This is understandable, since the signing of the petition is statutorily required
to be undertaken before the election registrar or his representative, and in the
presence of a represetantive of the official sought to be recalled, and in public place
in the x x x municipality x x x.[17] Hence, while the initiatory recall petition may not
yet contain the signatures of at least 25% of the total number of registered voters,
the petition must contain the names of at least 25% of the total number of registered
voters in whose behalf only one person may sign the petition in the meantime.
We cannot sanction the procedure of the filing of the recall petition by a number of
people less than the foregoing 25% statutory requirement, much less, the filing
thereof by just one person, as in the instant case, since this is indubitably violative of
clear and categorical provisions of subsisting law.
Our legislators did not peg the voter requirement at 25% out of caprice or in a
vacuum. They knew that this is the requirement under a majority of the constitution
and recall statutes in various American states to the same extent that they were
aware of the rationale therefor. While recall was intended to be an effective and
speedy remedy to remove an official who is not giving satisfaction to the electorate
regardless of whether or not he is discharging his full duty to the best of his ability
and as his conscience dictates,[18] it is a power granted to the people who, in
concert, desire to change their leaders for reasons only they, as a collective, can
justify. In other words, recall must be pursued by the people, not just by one
disgruntled loser in the elections or a small percentage of disenchanted electors.
Otherwise, its purposes as a direct remedy of the people shall be defeated by the ill
motives of a few among them whose selfish resort to recall would destabilize the
community and seriously disrupt the running of government.
Referendum defined
RA 6735, Section 3(c)
(c) "Referendum" is the power of the electorate to approve or reject a legislation
through an election called for the purpose. It may be of two classes, namely:
c.1. Referendum on statutes which refers to a petition to approve or reject an act or
law, or part thereof, passed by Congress; and
c.2. Referendum on local law which refers to a petition to approve or reject a law,
resolution or ordinance enacted by regional assemblies and local legislative bodies.
Revision defined
30

(1) The Congress, upon a vote of three-fourths of all its Members; or
(2) A constitutional convention.
(Lambino vs Comelec)
Facts:
Held:
The Lambino Group's initiative springs another surprise on the people who signed the
signature sheets. The proposed changes mandate the interim Parliament to make
further amendments or revisions to the Constitution. The proposed Section 4(4),
Article XVIII on Transitory Provisions, provides:
Section 4(4). Within forty-five days from ratification of these amendments, the
interim Parliament shall convene to propose amendments to, or revisions of, this
Constitution consistent with the principles of local autonomy, decentralization and a
strong bureaucracy. (Emphasis supplied)
During the oral arguments, Atty. Lambino stated that this provision is a "surplusage"
and the Court and the people should simply ignore it. Far from being a surplusage,
this provision invalidates the Lambino Group's initiative.
Section 4(4) is a subject matter totally unrelated to the shift from the BicameralPresidential to the Unicameral-Parliamentary system. American jurisprudence on
initiatives outlaws this as logrolling - when the initiative petition incorporates an
unrelated subject matter in the same petition. This puts the people in a dilemma
since they can answer only either yes or no to the entire proposition, forcing them to
31
sign a petition that effectively contains two propositions, one of which they may find
unacceptable.
Thus, the present initiative appears merely a preliminary step for further
amendments or revisions to be undertaken by the interim Parliament as a
constituent assembly. The people who signed the signature sheets could not have
known that their signatures would be used to propose an amendment mandating
the interim Parliament to propose further amendments or revisions to the
Constitution.
However, the signature sheets do not explain the reason for this rush in amending or
revising again so soon the Constitution. The signature sheets do not also explain what
specific amendments or revisions the initiative proponents want the interim
Parliament to make, and why there is a need for such further amendments or
revisions. The people are again left in the dark to fathom the nature and effect of the
proposed changes. Certainly, such an initiative is not "directly proposed by the
people" because the people do not even know the nature and effect of the proposed
changes.
Amendment defined
(1) The Congress, upon a vote of three-fourths of all its Members; or
(2) A constitutional convention.
(Lambino vs Comelec)
Facts:
32
Held:
Article XVII of the Constitution speaks of three modes of amending the Constitution.
The first mode is through Congress upon three-fourths vote of all its Members. The
second mode is through a constitutional convention. The third mode is through a
people's initiative.
Section 1 of Article XVII, referring to the first and second modes, applies to "[A]ny
amendment to, or revision of, this Constitution." In contrast, Section 2 of Article XVII,
referring to the third mode, applies only to "[A]mendments to this Constitution."
The framers of the Constitution intended, and wrote, a clear distinction between
"amendment" and "revision" of the Constitution. The framers intended, and wrote,
that only Congress or a constitutional convention may propose revisions to the
Constitution. The framers intended, and wrote, that a people's initiative may propose
only amendments to the Constitution. Where the intent and language of the
Constitution clearly withhold from the people the power to propose revisions to the
Constitution, the people cannot propose revisions even as they are empowered to
propose amendments.
In this jurisdiction there can be no dispute that a people's initiative can only propose
amendments to the Constitution since the Constitution itself limits initiatives to
amendments. There can be no deviation from the constitutionally prescribed modes
of revising the Constitution. A popular clamor, even one backed by 6.3 million
signatures, cannot justify a deviation from the specific modes prescribed in the
Constitution itself.
Revision broadly implies a change that alters a basic principle in the constitution,
like altering the principle of separation of powers or the system of checks-andbalances. There is also revision if the change alters the substantial entirety of the
constitution, as when the change affects substantial provisions of the constitution.
On the other hand, amendment broadly refers to a change that adds, reduces, or
deletes without altering the basic principle involved. Revision generally affects
several provisions of the constitution, while amendment generally affects only the
specific provision being amended.
3. Power to decide all questions affecting elections
functions:
33
(3) Decide, except those involving the right to vote, all questions affecting elections,
including determination of the number and location of polling places, appointment of
election officials and inspectors, and registration of voters.
(Domino vs Comelec)
Facts:
Petitioner Domino filed his certificate of candidacy for the position of Representative
of the lone legislative district of the Province of Sarangani indicating that he has
resided in the constituency where he seeks to be elected for 1 year and 2 months.
Private respondents filed a petition seeking to cancel the certificate of candidacy of
Domino, alleging that Domino, contrary to his declaration in the certificate of
candidacy, is not a resident, much less a registered voter, of the province of
Sarangani where he seeks election.
Thereafter, the COMELEC promulgated a resolution declaring Domino disqualified as
candidate for the position of representative of the lone district of Sarangani in the
May 11, 1998 polls for lack of the one-year residency requirement and likewise
ordered the cancellation of his certificate of candidacy based on his own Voters
Registration Record and his address indicated as 24 Bonifacio St., Ayala Hts., Old
Balara, Quezon City.
Issue:
Whether or not respondent COMELEC has jurisdiction over the petition a quo for the
disqualification of petitioner
Held:
DOMINO's contention that the COMELEC has no jurisdiction in the present petition is
bereft of merit.
As previously mentioned, the COMELEC, under Sec. 78, Art. IX of the Omnibus Election
Code, has jurisdiction over a petition to deny due course to or cancel certificate of
candidacy. Such jurisdiction continues even after election, if for any reason no final
judgment of disqualification is rendered before the election, and the candidate facing
disqualification is voted for and receives the highest number of votes[38] and
provided further that the winning candidate has not been proclaimed or has taken his
oath of office.[39]
It has been repeatedly held in a number of cases, that the House of Representatives
Electoral Tribunal's sole and exclusive jurisdiction over all contests relating to the
34
election, returns and qualifications of members of Congress as provided under Section

17 of Article VI of the Constitution begins only after a candidate has become a
member of the House of Representatives.[40]
The fact of obtaining the highest number of votes in an election does not
automatically vest the position in the winning candidate.[41] A candidate must be
proclaimed and must have taken his oath of office before he can be considered a
member of the House of Representatives.
In the instant case, DOMINO was not proclaimed as Congressman-elect of the Lone
Congressional District of the Province of Sarangani by reason of a Supplemental
Omnibus Resolution issued by the COMELEC on the day of the election ordering the
suspension of DOMINO's proclamation should he obtain the winning number of votes.
This resolution was issued by the COMELEC in view of the non-finality of its 6 May
1998 resolution disqualifying DOMINO as candidate for the position.
Considering that DOMINO has not been proclaimed as Congressman-elect in the
Lone Congressional District of the Province of Sarangani he cannot be deemed a
member of the House of Representative. Hence, it is the COMELEC and not the
Electoral Tribunal which has jurisdiction over the issue of his ineligibility as a
candidate.
(Sarmiento vs Comelec)
This special civil action for certiorari seek to set aside the Resolutions of Respondent
Commission on Elections (COMELEC) in the following Special Cases:
1) G.R. No. 105628 SPC No. 92-266
2) G.R. No. 105725 SPC No. 92-323
3) G.R. No. 105727 SPC No. 92-288
4) G.R. No. 105730 SPC No. 92-315
5) G.R. No. 105771 SPC No. 92-271
6) G.R. No. 105778 SPC No. 92-039
7) G.R. No. 105797 SPC No. 92-153
8) G.R. No. 105919 SPC No. 92-293
9) G.R. No. 105977 SPC No. 92-087
Issue:
35
Whether the challenged Resolutions above specified (the SPC) as having been issued
with grave abuse of discretion in that, inter alia, the Commission, sitting en banc,
took cognizance of and decided the appeals without first referring them to any of it
Divisions.
Held:
The COMELEC en banc acted without jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion,
when it resolved the appeals of petitioners in the above mentioned Special Cases
without first referring them to any of its Divisions. Section 3, subdivision C, Article IX
of the 1987 Constitution expressly provides:
Sec. 3. The Commission on Elections may sit en banc or in two divisions, and shall
promulgate its rules of procedure in order to expedite disposition of election cases,
including pre-proclamation controversies. All such election cases shall be heard and
decided in division, provided that motions for reconsideration of decisions shall be
decided by the Commission en banc.
Said Resolutions are therefore, null and void and must be set aside. Consequently, the
appeals are deemed pending before the Commission for proper referral to a Division.
A resolution directing the COMELEC to assign said Special Cases to the Divisions
pursuant to Section 8, Rule 3 of its Rules on assignment of cases would, logically, be
in order. However, Section 16 of R.A. No. 7166 6 provides that all pre-proclamation
cases pending before it shall be deemed terminated at the beginning of the term of
the office involved. The terms of the offices involved in the Special Cases subject of
these petitions commenced at noon of June 30 1992. These cases have thus been
rendered moot and such a resolution would only be an exercise in futility.
Therefore, the instant petitions are DISMISSED but without prejudice to the filing by
petitioners of regular elections protests. If the winning candidates for the positions
involved in the Special Cases subject of these petitions have already been proclaimed,
the running of the period to file the protests shall be deemed suspended by the
pendency of such cases before the COMELEC and of these petitions before this Court.
(Pangarungan vs Comelec)
Facts:
Petitioner and the private respondent were candidates for the Office of the Provincial
Governor of Lanao del Sur in the synchronized elections of 11 May 1992.
During the canvassing of the certificates of canvass for provincial offices by the
Provincial Board of Canvassers (PBC) of Lanao del Sur,[6] private respondent objected
36
to the inclusion of Certificate of Canvass of the Municipality of Madamba, Lanao del

Sur; petitioner opposed this move. Consequently, both parties submitted their
evidence to the PBC.
The PBC unanimously decided not to include in the count/canvass the Certificate of
Canvass of Madamba said having been substituted and spurious. This ruling is based
primarily on the Investigation Report of Atty. Clarita Callar who was directed by the
Chairman of the PBC to investigate the Madamba incident.
Petitioner filed an appeal to the comelec. Instead of assigning the appeal and the
related cases to a Division pursuant to pertinent provisions of its Rules,[10] the
COMELEC en banc took cognizance thereof and set the case for hearing on 6 August
1992. At the said hearing, the parties, through their respective counsels, upon
suggestion of the COMELEC en banc, agreed to submit their respective Position
Papers.
Taking heed of Our Resolution of 6 August 1992 in Sarmiento vs. Commission on
Elections, et al. (G.R. No. 105628) and companion cases, the COMELEC raffled the
case. And the First Division got it. On 18 September 1992, the First Division
promulgated a joint Resolution in these consolidated cases affirming the PBC's ruling.
On 23 September 1992, petitioner filed a Motion For Reconsideration. The COMELEC
en banc promulgated the challenged Resolution[20] affirming the Resolution of the
First Division and finding the errors imputed to the latter to be without merit. As to
the report of Atty. Callar, the Acting Provincial Election Supervisor of North Cotabato,
the COMELEC held that the same was prepared in the performance of official duty,
per instruction of COMELEC Regional Director Teresita Llaban, and is therefore
presumed to have been performed with regularity. The COMELEC further stated that
it "would be so absurd for this Commission to have its field personnel perform their
task and at the same time question their actuations."
Issue:
WON the Comelec deprived the petitioner due process when it resolved the appeal
from the ruling of the PBC of Lanao del Sur without any semblance of a hearing to
assess the factual findings of said PBC and merely on the basis of the report of Atty.
Callar who was never interviewed, questioned or interrogated by the COMELEC.
Held:
We find no merit in the petition.
37
Before the subject cases were raffled off to the First Division, the parties, upon
the suggestion of the COMELEC en banc, agreed to submit the appeals on the basis
of their position papers. Petitioner extensively discussed in his position paper the
issues raised and the evidence to support the latter's thesis that the COC in question
is clean, clear, authentic and duly signed and executed. Thus, the factual issue raised
at that point was whether the questioned COC is spurious or not -- a question which
must be resolved on the basis of the evidence adduced by the parties before the PBC
pursuant to paragraph (e), Section 9, Rule 27 of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure.
The records do not disclose that the petitioner had moved before either the COMELEC
en banc or its First Division that he be allowed to present new evidence on the ground
that he was deprived of due process by the PBC. In any case, he could not have done
that because the PBC had in fact allowed him to present his evidence. That he was
not allowed to cross-examine Atty. Callar did not in any way whittle down the validity
of the proceedings of the PBC for paragraph (e), Section 8, Rule 27 of the COMELEC
Rules of Procedure provides that:
"(e) Where evidence is to be offered, reception thereof shall be done summarily. Oral
testimonies shall be dispensed with and the parties shall be required to present their
affidavits or counter-affidavits within twenty-four (24) hours from the presentation of
the written objection. The evidence adduced shall form part of the proceedings of
the Board."
The PBC faithfully complied with the mandate of this provision; moreover, the parties
voluntarily and unconditionally observed the same by submitting their evidence which
included the affidavits of their respective witnesses.
It is precisely for this reason, and his awareness of the legal consequences thereof,
that the petitioner carefully avoided characterizing the Callar report as "hearsay".
Nowhere in his pleadings are We to find any objections to the Callar report on that
ground. Petitioner purposely omitted such argument because he knew only too well
that the Callar report is an official act of an officer of the COMELEC made after an
investigation conducted in the performance of a lawful official duty. It thus enjoys
the presumption of regularity.[24] Besides, by the parties' compliance with the
aforesaid paragraph (e), Section 8, Rule 27 of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure,
petitioner was estopped from objecting to the admission in evidence of the Callar
report, in effect leaving to the PBC -- and then the First Division of the COMELEC on
appeal -- the determination of the factual issue concerning the validity of the COC in
question.
By agreeing to submit his position paper for the resolution of the appeal, petitioner
effectively agreed to dispense with the formality of a hearing, the purpose or
38
objective of which was better subserved by the submission of the position papers
where the parties could incorporate all that they wanted to place on record; a formal
hearing may not adequately achieve such purpose because of the time constraints,
the unpreparedness of counsel, the emotions of the moment and the distracting
atmosphere.
Having thus made such findings, it was well within the power of the Commission,
through the First Division, to determine what must be done to ascertain the elusive
"true and genuine results of the votes casts (sic) for provincial and municipal
candidates in Madamba."
(Diocese of Bacolod vs Comelec)
Facts:
On February 21, 2013, petitioners posted two (2) tarpaulins within a private
compound housing the San Sebastian Cathedral of Bacolod. Each tarpaulin was
approximately six feet (6) by ten feet (10) in size. They were posted on the front
walls of the cathedral within public view. The first tarpaulin contains the message
IBASURA RH Law referring to the Reproductive Health Law of 2012 or Republic Act
No. 10354. The second tarpaulin is the subject of the present case. This tarpaulin
contains the heading Conscience Vote and lists candidates as either (Anti-RH)
Team Buhay with acheck mark, or (Pro-RH) Team Patay with an X mark. The
electoral candidates were classified according to their vote on the adoption of
Republic Act No. 10354, otherwise known as the RH Law. Those who voted for the
passing of the law were classified by petitioners as comprising Team Patay, while
those who voted against it form Team Buhay.
COMELEC Law Department issued a letter ordering the immediate removal of the
tarpaulin; otherwise, it will be constrained to file an election offense against
petitioners.
Concerned about the imminent threat of prosecution for their exercise of free
speech, petitioners initiated this case through this petition for certiorari and
prohibition with application for preliminary injunction and temporary restraining
order.
Issue:
Whether or not the Comelec violated the petitioners right to freedom of expression
Held:
Procedural Aspect
39
Respondents allege that petitioners violated the principle of exhaustion of

administrative remedies because petitioners should have first brought the matter to
the COMELEC En Banc or any of its divisions.
The argument on exhaustion of administrative remedies is not proper in this case.
Despite the alleged non-exhaustion of administrative remedies, it is clear that the
controversy is already ripe for adjudication. Petitioners exercise of their right to
speech, given the message and their medium, had understandable relevance
especially during the elections. COMELECs letter threatening the filing of the
election offense against petitioners is already an actionable infringement of this right.
In the context of this case, exhaustion of their administrative remedies as COMELEC

suggested in their pleadings prolongs the violation of their freedom of speech.
Political speech enjoys preferred protection within our constitutional order.
Even assuming that the principle of exhaustion of administrative remedies is
applicable, the current controversy is within the exceptions to the principle: (b) when
the issue involved is purely a legal question; (g) when to require exhaustion of
administrative remedies would be unreasonable; or (k) when there are circumstances
indicating the urgency of judicial intervention.
The circumstances emphasized are squarely applicable with the present case. First,
petitioners allege that the assailed issuances violated their right to freedom of
expression and the principle of separation of church and state. This is a purely legal
question. Second, the circumstances of the present case indicate the urgency of
judicial intervention considering the issue then on the RH Law as well as the upcoming
elections. Thus, to require the exhaustion of administrative remedies in this case
would be unreasonable.
Substantial Aspect
COMELEC had no legal basis to regulate expressions made by private citizens.
Respondents cite the Constitution, laws, and jurisprudence to support their
position that they had the power to regulate the tarpaulin. However, all of these
provisions pertain to candidates and political parties. Petitioners are not
candidates. Neither do they belong to any political party. COMELEC does not have
the authority to regulate the enjoyment of the preferred right to freedom of
expression exercised by a non-candidate in this case.
Respondents cite Article IX-C, Section 4 of the Constitution, which provides:
40
Section 4. The Commission may, during the election period, supervise or regulate the
enjoyment or utilization of all franchises or permits for the operation of
transportation and other public utilities, media of communication or information, all
grants, special privileges, or concessions granted by the Government or any
subdivision, agency, or instrumentality thereof, including any government-owned or
controlled corporation or its subsidiary. Such supervision or regulation shall aim to
ensure equal opportunity, time, and space, and the right to reply, including
reasonable, equal rates therefor, for public information campaigns and forums among
candidates in connection with the objective of holding free, orderly, honest,
peaceful, and credible elections.
In Sanidad v. COMELEC, we held that the evil sought to be prevented by this
provision is the possibility that a franchise holder may favor or give any undue
advantage to a candidate in terms of advertising space or radio or television
time. This court found that [m]edia practitioners exercising their freedom of
expression during plebiscite periods are neither the franchise holders nor the
candidates, thus, their right to expression during this period may not be regulated by
COMELEC.
Similar to the media, petitioners in the case at bar are neither franchise holders nor
candidates.
When private speech amounts to election paraphernalia
Regulation of speech in the context of electoral campaigns made by persons who
are not candidates or who do not speak as members of a political party which are,
taken as a whole, principally advocacies of a social issue that the public must
consider during elections is unconstitutional. Such regulation is inconsistent with
the guarantee of according the fullest possible range of opinions coming from the
electorate including those that can catalyze candid, uninhibited, and robust debate in
the criteria for the choice of a candidate.
This does not mean that there cannot be a specie of speech by a private citizen which
will not amount to an election paraphernalia to be validly regulated by law.
Regulation of election paraphernalia will still be constitutionally valid if it reaches
into speech of persons who are not candidates or who do not speak as members of a
political party if they are not candidates, only if what is regulated is declarative
speech that, taken as a whole, has for its principal object the endorsement of a
candidate only. The regulation (a) should be provided by law, (b) reasonable, (c)
narrowly tailored to meet the objective of enhancing the opportunity of all
candidates to be heard and considering the primacy of the guarantee of free
41
expression, and (d) demonstrably the least restrictive means to achieve that object.
The regulation must only be with respect to the time, place, and manner of the
rendition of the message. In no situation may the speech be prohibited or censored
on the basis of its content. For this purpose, it will not matter whether the speech is
made with or on private property.
This is not the situation, however, in this case for two reasons. First, as discussed, the
principal message in the twin tarpaulins of petitioners consists of a social advocacy.
Second, as pointed out in the concurring opinion of Justice Antonio Carpio, the
present law Section 3.3 of Republic Act No. 9006 and Section 6(c) of COMELEC
Resolution No. 9615 if applied to this case, will not pass the test of reasonability. A
fixed size for election posters or tarpaulins without any relation to the distance from
the intended average audience will be arbitrary. At certain distances, posters
measuring 2 by 3 feet could no longer be read by the general public and, hence,
would render speech meaningless. It will amount to the abridgement of speech with
political consequences.
Powers not given
Pungutan vs Abubakar
Respondent Abubakar and the other candidates filed a petition alleging that in the
towns of Siasi, Tapul, Parang and Luuk, no elections were in effect held in view of
massive violence, terrorism and fraud. The respondents named therein, including now
petitioner Pugutan, answered to the effect that the elections were duly held in the
above-mentioned municipalities and denied the allegation as to the existence of
massive fraud, terrorism and serious irregularities.
After reciting the relevant facts, respondent Commission concluded that the elections
in said municipalities were just as bad if not worse than the elections in Karomatan,
Lanao del Norte. Actually no elections were held in said municipalities as the voting
was done by persons other than the registered voters while armed men went from
precinct to precinct, prepared the ballots and dictated how the election returns were
to be prepared. The same reasons which compelled the Commission to reject the
returns from Karomatan and to consider said returns as no returns at all or spurious or
manufactured returns not one notch above returns prepared at gunpoint compel us
with much greater justification to find that the returns from Siasi, Tapul, Parang and
Luuk are spurious returns or manufactured returns and no returns at all and that the
elections in said municipalities are sham.
Hence, this petition.
42
Held: (Wa ko kasabot hanu gibutang ni sya under sa topic na Powers not given)
What is contemplated in the law is that the electors in the exercise of their free will
can go to the polls and exercise their right of suffrage, with the boards of inspectors
crediting each candidate with the votes duly obtained after an honest count. It is on
that basis that election returns are to be made. Where no such election was in fact
held as was found by respondent Commission with respect to the four towns, it is not
only justified but it is its clear duty to stigmatize the alleged returns as clearly
spurious and manufactured and therefore bereft of any value.
Clearly, there was care and circumspection to assure that the constitutional objective
of insuring that an election be "free, orderly and honest" be realized. If, under the
circumstances disclosed, a different conclusion were arrived at, then certainly there
is a frustration of such an ideal. Moreover, this Court has not displayed any
reluctance in yielding the imprimatur of its approval to the action taken by
respondent Commission in the discharge of its constitutional function of the
enforcement of all laws relative to the conduct of elections.
As was so well put by Justice, later Chief Justice, Abad Santos: "The Commission on
Elections is a constitutional body. It is intended to play a distinct and important
part in our scheme of government. In the discharge of its functions, it should not
be hampered with restrictions that would be fully warranted in the case of a less
responsible organization. The Commission may err, so may this Court also. It
should be allowed considerable latitude in devising means and methods that will
insure the accomplishment of the great objective for which it was created free,
orderly and honest elections. We may not agree fully with its choice of means,
but unless these are clearly illegal or constitute gross abuse of discretion, this
court should not interfere."
(Montejo vs Comelec)
Facts:
Petitioner Cerilo Roy Montejo, representative of the first district of Leyte, pleads for
the annulment of Section 1 of Resolution no. 2736, redistricting certain municipalities
in Leyte, on the ground that it violates the principle of equality of representation.
The province of Leyte with the cities of Tacloban and Ormoc is composed of 5
districts. The 3rd district is composed of: Almeria, Biliran, Cabucgayan, Caibiran,
Calubian, Culaba, Kawayan, Leyte, Maripipi, Naval, San Isidro, Tabango and Villaba.
43
Biliran, located in the 3rd district of Leyte, was made its subprovince by virtue of
Republic Act No. 2141 Section 1 enacted on 1959. Said section spelled out the
municipalities comprising the subprovince: Almeria, Biliran, Cabucgayan, Caibiran,
Culaba, Kawayan, Maripipi and Naval and all the territories comprised therein.
On 1992, the Local Government Code took effect and the subprovince of Biliran
became a regular province. (The conversion of Biliran into a regular province was
approved by a majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite.) As a consequence of the
conversion, eight municipalities of the 3rd district composed the new province of
Biliran. A further consequence was to reduce the 3rd district to five municipalities
(underlined above) with a total population of 146,067 as per the 1990 census.
To remedy the resulting inequality in the distribution of inhabitants, voters and
municipalities in the province of Leyte, respondent COMELEC held consultation
meetings with the incumbent representatives of the province and other interested
parties and on December 29, 1994, it promulgated the assailed resolution where,
among others, it transferred the municipality of Capoocan of the 2nd district and the
municipality of Palompon of the 4th district to the 3rd district of Leyte.
Issue:
Whether the unprecedented exercise by the COMELEC of the legislative power of
redistricting and reapportionment is valid or not.
Held:
Section 1 of Resolution no. 2736 is annulled and set aside.
The deliberations of the members of the Constitutional Commission shows that
COMELEC was denied the major power of legislative apportionment as it itself
exercised the power. Regarding the first elections after the enactment of the 1987
constitution, it is the Commission who did the reapportionment of the legislative
districts and for the subsequent elections, the power was given to the Congress.
Also, respondent COMELEC relied on the ordinance appended to the 1987 constitution
as the source of its power of redistricting which is traditionally regarded as part of
the power to make laws. The Ordinance is entitled "Apportioning the Seats of the
House of Representatives of the Congress of the Philippines to the Different
Legislative Districts in Provinces and Cities and the Metropolitan Manila Area." Said
ordinance states that:
Section 2: The Commission on Elections is hereby empowered to make minor
adjustments to the reapportionment herein made.
44
Section 3 : Any province that may hereafter be createdThe number of Members

apportioned to the province out of which such new province was created or where the
city, whose population has so increases, is geographically located shall be
correspondingly adjusted by the Commission on Elections but such adjustment shall
not be made within one hundred and twenty days before the election.
Background of this Ordinance:
The records reveal that the Constitutional Commission had to resolve several
prejudicial issues before authorizing the first congressional elections under the 1987
Constitution. Among the vital issues were: whether the members of the House of
Representatives would be elected by district or by province; who shall undertake the
apportionment of the legislative districts; and, how the apportionment should be
made.[14] Commissioner Davide, Jr., offered three (3) options for the Commission to
consider: (1) allow President Aquino to do the apportionment by law; (2) empower
the COMELEC to make the apportionment; or (3) let the Commission exercise the
power by way of an Ordinance appended to the Constitution.
Minor adjustments does not involve change in the allocations per district.
Examples include error in the correct name of a particular municipality or when a
municipality in between which is still in the territory of one assigned district is
forgotten. And consistent with the limits of its power to make minor adjustments,
section 3 of the Ordinance did not also give the respondent COMELEC any authority to
transfer municipalities from one legislative district to another district. The power
granted by section 3 to the respondent is to adjust the number of members (not
municipalities.)
Prescinding from these premises, we hold that respondent COMELEC committed grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction when it promulgated section 1 of
its Resolution No. 2736 transferring the municipality of Capoocan of the Second
District and the municipality of Palompon of the Fourth District to the Third District of
Leyte.
It may well be that the conversion of Biliran from a sub-province to a regular province
brought about an imbalance in the distribution of voters and inhabitants in the five
(5) legislative districts of the province of Leyte. This imbalance, depending on its
degree, could devalue a citizen's vote in violation of the equal protection clause of
the Constitution. Be that as it may, it is not proper at this time for petitioner to raise
this issue using the case at bench as his legal vehicle. The issue involves a problem of
reapportionment of legislative districts and petitioner's remedy lies with Congress.
Section 5(4), Article VI of the Constitution categorically gives Congress the power to
reapportion, thus: "Within three (3) years following the return of every census, the
45
Congress shall make a reapportionment of legislative districts based on the standards

provided in this section."
4. Power to deputize other governmental agencies
functions:
(4) Deputize, with the concurrence of the President, law enforcement agencies and
instrumentalities of the Government, including the Armed Forces of the Philippines,
for the exclusive purpose of ensuring free, orderly, honest, peaceful, and credible
elections.
(People vs Basilla)
Facts:
After the May 1987 congressional elections in Masbate, complaints for violations of
Section 261 of the Omnibus Election Code (B.P. Big. 881) were filed with the Office of
the Provincial Fiscal of Masbate against the private respondents.
After preliminary investigation, the Provincial Fiscal of Masbate filed in the Regional
Trial Court, Branch 49, Cataingan, Masbate, three criminal complaints. However,
respondent Judge Henry Basilla motu proprio proprio dismissed the three (3)
informations giving the following justification:
The Constitution of the Republic of the Philippines says:
'Sec. 2(6) of Art. IX (C). The Commission on Election shall exercise the following
powers and functions:
x x x; investigate and, when appropriate, prosecute cases of violation of election
laws, including acts or omissions, constituting election frauds offenses, malpractices.'
The Omnibus Election Code of the Philippines (B.P. Big. 881) says:
'Sec. 265. Prosecution. The Commission shall, through its duly authorized legal
officers, have the exclusive power to conduct preliminary investigation of all election
offenses punishable under this Code, and to prosecute the same. The Commission may
avail of the assistance of other prosecuting arms of the government; Provided,
however, that in the event that the Commission fails to act on any complaint within
four months from his filing, the complainant may file the complaint with the office of
46
the fiscal or with the Ministry of Justice for proper investigation and prosecution, if
warranted. (Sec. 182, 1978, EC; and Sec. 66, B.P. 697)'
Consistently, and lately, in Corpu[s], et al. vs. Tanodbayan of the Philippines, et al,
No. 62075, April 15, 1987, our Supreme Court rules:
'An examination of the provisions of the Constitution and the Election Code of 1978
reveals the clear intention to place in the COMELEC exclusive jurisdiction to
investigate and prosecute election offenses committed by any person, whether
private individual or public officer or employee, and in the latter instance,
irrespective of whether the offense is committed in relation to his official duties or
not. In other words, it is the nature of the offense and not the personality of the
offender that matters. As long as the offense is an election offense jurisdiction over
the same rests exclusively with the COMELEC, in view of its all embracing power over
the conduct of election.'
IN THE LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING, inasmuch as the election offense was not
investigated and prosecuted by the COMELEC, the case is motu proprio dismissed."[
Hence, the instant Petition.
Issue:
WON the respondent judge is correct
Held: No!
Section 265 of this Code reads as follows:
"Sec. 265. Prosecution. The Commission shall, through its duly authorized legal
officers, have the exclusive power to conduct preliminary investigation of all election
offenses punishable under this Code, and to prosecute the same. The Commission may
avail of the assistance of other prosecuting arms of the government: Provided,
however, That in the event that the Commission fails to act on any complaint within
four months from his filing, the complainant may file the complaint with the office of
the fiscal or with the Ministry of Justice for proper investigation and prosecution, if
warranted. (Sec. 182, 1973 EC; and Sec. 66, B.P. 697)" (Italics supplied)
We note that while Section 265 of the Code vests "exclusive power" to conduct
preliminary investigation of election offenses and to prosecute the same upon the
Comelec, it at the same time authorizes the Comelec to avail itself of the
assistance of other prosecuting arms of the Government. Section 2 of Article IX-C of
the 1987 Constitution clearly envisage that the Comelec would not be compelled to
carry out all its functions directly and by itself alone:
47
"Section 2. The Commission on Elections shall exercise the following powers and
functions:
(4) Deputize, with the concurrence of the President, law enforcement agencies and
instrumentalities of the Government, including the Armed Forces of the Philippines,
for the exclusive purpose of ensuring free, orderly, honest, peaceful, and credible
elections.
xxx
deputized, or the imposition of any other disciplinary action, for violation or disregard
of, or disobedience to its directive, order, or decision.
The contention of private respondents that the deputation by the Comelec of the
prosecuting arms of the Government would be warranted only before the elections
and only to ensure free, honest, orderly, peaceful and credible elections, that is, to
perform the peace-keeping functions of policemen, lack substance. There is nothing
in Section 2 (4) of Article IX-C of the Constitution which requires such a pinched
and niggardly interpretation of the authority of the Comelec to appoint as its
deputies, officials or employees of other agencies and instrumentalities of the
government. The prompt investigation and prosecution and disposition of election
offenses constitute an indispensable part of the task of securing free, orderly, honest,
peaceful and credible elections. The investigation and prosecution of election
offenses are, in an important sense, more important than the maintenance of physical
order in election precincts. Without the assistance of provincial and city fiscals and
their assistants and staff members, and of the state prosecutors of the Department of
Justice, the prompt and fair investigation and prosecution of election offenses
committed before or in the course of nationwide elections would simply not be
possible, unless, perhaps, the Comelec had a bureaucracy many times larger than
what it actually has.
Omnibus Election Code, Article VII, Section 52(b)
Sec. 52. Powers and functions of the Commission on Elections. - In addition to the
(b) During the period of the campaign and ending thirty days thereafter, when in any
area of the country there are persons committing acts of terrorism to influence
people to vote for or against any candidate or political party, the Commission shall
48
have the power to authorize any member or members of the Armed Forces of the
Philippines, the National Bureau of Investigation, the Integrated National Police or
any similar agency or instrumentality of the government, except civilian home
defense forces, to act as deputies for the purpose of ensuring the holding of free,
orderly and honest elections.
5. Recommendatory power
1987 Constitution, Article IX (c), Section 2(7) and (8)
functions:
(7) Recommend to the Congress effective measures to minimize election spending,
including limitation of places where propaganda materials shall be posted, and to
prevent and penalize all forms of election frauds, offenses, malpractices, and
nuisance candidacies.
deputized, or the imposition of any other disciplinary action, for violation or
disregard of, or disobedience to, its directive, order, or decision.
(Tan vs Comelec)
Facts:
Petitioner, as incumbent City Prosecutor of Davao City, was designated by the
Commission on Elections ("COMELEC") as Vice-Chairman of the City Board of
Canvassers of Davao City for the 11th May 1992 synchronized national and local
elections.
On the basis of the votes canvassed by the Board of Canvassers, Manuel Garcia was
proclaimed the winning candidate for a congressional seat to represent the Second
District of Davao City in the House of Representatives.
Private respondent Alterado, himself a candidate for the position, filed a number
of cases questioning the validity of the proclamation of Manuel Garcia and
accusing the members of the City Board of Canvassers of "unlawful, erroneous,
incomplete and irregular canvass." Still pending is an administrative charge, the
case now before us, instituted in the COMELEC against the City Board of
Canvassers, including herein petitioner, for "Misconduct, Neglect of Duty, Gross,
Incompetence and Acts Inimical to the Service."
49
Petitioner moved to dismiss the administrative complaint against him on the

ground that he is the City Prosecutor of Davao City. His office belongs to the
executive branch of the government, more particularly to the Department of
Justice. As such, he is under the administrative jurisdiction of the said department
and not of respondent COMELEC. The COMELEC denied petitioner's motion to
dismiss.
Hence, the instant petition.
Issue:
WON the petitioner is correct
Held: No!
The COMELEC's authority under Section 2(6-8), Article IX, of the Constitution is
virtually all encompassing when it comes to election matters. In respect
particularly to sanctions against election offenses, we quote:
"SEC. 2. The Commission on Elections shall exercise the following powers and
functions:
"(8) Recommend to the President the removal of any officer or employee it has
deputized or the imposition of any other disciplinary action, for violation or
disregard of, or disobedience to its directive, order, or decision."
Additionally, Section 52, Article VII, of the Omnibus Election Code, provides:
"SEC. 52. Powers and functions of the Commission on Elections. - In addition to the
have exclusive charge of the enforcement and administration of all laws relative
to the conduct of elections for the purpose of insuring free, orderly and honest
"a. Exercise direct and immediate supervision and control over national and local
officials or employees, including members of any national or local law
enforcement agency and instrumentality of the government required by law to
perform duties relative to the conduct of elections. In addition, it may authorize
CMP Cadets eighteen years of age and above to act as its deputies for the purpose
of enforcing its orders.
"The Commission may relieve any officer or employee referred to in the preceding
paragraph from the performance of his duties relating to electoral processes who
violates the election law or fails to comply with its instructions, orders, decisions
50
or rulings, and appoint his substitute. Upon recommendation of the Commission,

the corresponding proper authority shall suspend or remove from office any or all
of such officers or employees who may, after due process, be found guilty of such
violation or failure."
It should be stressed that the administrative case against petitioner, taken
cognizance of by, and still pending with, the COMELEC, is in relation to the
performance of his duties as an election canvasser and not as a city prosecutor.
The COMELEC's mandate includes its authority to exercise direct and immediate
supervision and control over national and local officials or employees, including
members of any national or local law enforcement agency and instrumentality of
the government, required by law to perform duties relative to the conduct of
elections. In order to help ensure that such duly deputized officials and employees
of government carry out their respective assigned tasks, the law has also provided
that upon the COMELEC's recommendation, the corresponding proper authority
(the Secretary of the Department of Justice in the case at bar) shall take
appropriate action, either to suspend or remove from office the officer or
employee who may, after due process, be found guilty of violation of election laws
or failure to comply with instructions, orders, decisions or rulings of the COMELEC.
Unavoidably, the COMELEC, prior to making its recommendation, must first
satisfy itself that there indeed has been an infraction of the law, or of its
directives issued conformably therewith, by the person administratively
charged. It also stands to reason that it is the COMELEC, being in the best position
to assess how its deputized officials and employees perform or have performed in
their duties, that should conduct the administrative inquiry.
Observe, nevertheless, that the COMELEC merely may issue a recommendation
for disciplinary action but that it is the executive department to which the
charged official or employee belongs which has the ultimate authority to
impose the disciplinary penalty. The law then does not detract from, but is
congruent with, the general administrative authority of the department of
government concerned over its own personnel.
51

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THE COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS

Composition, qualifications and terms of office

Section 1. (1) There shall be a Commission on Elections composed of a

Section 2. No member of a Constitutional Commission shall, during his tenure,

Section 1. The Constitutional Commissions, which shall be independent, are the

Section 2. No member of a Constitutional Commission shall, during his tenure,

1987 Constitution Article IX(C), Sections 1 and 2

Section 1. (1) There shall be a Commission on Elections composed of a

2. Wage a registration drive in their respective areas so that all citizens of

certiorari by the Supreme Court. Being non-judicial in character, no contempt may

2. Power to conduct plebiscite, initiative, referendum and recall

There are three (3) systems of initiative, namely:

instituted safeguards to assure that the initiation of the recall process by a

1987 Constitution, Article XVII, Section 1

election, returns and qualifications of members of Congress as provided under Section

to the inclusion of Certificate of Canvass of the Municipality of Madamba, Lanao del

Respondents allege that petitioners violated the principle of exhaustion of

In the context of this case, exhaustion of their administrative remedies as COMELEC

Section 3 : Any province that may hereafter be createdThe number of Members

Congress shall make a reapportionment of legislative districts based on the standards

Petitioner moved to dismiss the administrative complaint against him on the

or rulings, and appoint his substitute. Upon recommendation of the Commission,

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