Estrada vs.

Sandiganbayan
G.R. No. 148560. November 19, 2001
Petitioner: Joseph Ejercito Estrada
Respondents: Sandiganbayan (Third Division) and People of the Philippines
Ponente: J. Bellosillo
FACTS: Section 2 of R.A. No. 7080 (An Act Defining and Penalizing the Crime of Plunder) as
amended by R.A. No. 7659 substantially provides that any public officer who amasses,
accumulates or acquires ill-gotten wealth through a combination or series of overt or criminal acts
in the aggregate amount or total value of at least fifty million pesos (P50,000,000.00) shall be
guilty of the crime of plunder. Petitioner Joseph Ejercito Estrada, being prosecuted under the said
Act, assailed its constitutionality, arguing inter alia, that it abolishes the element of mens rea in
crimes already punishable under The Revised Penal Code; and as such, a violation of the
fundamental rights of the accused to due process and to be informed of the nature and cause of
the accusation against him.
ISSUE: Whether or not the crime of plunder as defined in R.A. No. 7080 is a malum prohibitum.
HELD: No. The Supreme Court held that plunder is malum in se which requires proof of criminal
intent. Moreover, the legislative declaration in R.A. No. 7659 that plunder is a heinous offense
implies that it is a malum in se. The predicate crimes in the case of plunder involve acts which are
inherently immoral or inherently wrong, and are committed willfully, unlawfully and criminally by
the offender, alleging his guilty knowledge. Thus, the crime of plunder is a malum in se.

TAER, vs. CA
G.R. No. 85204 June 18, 1990
Petitioner: Jorge Taer
Respondents: The Hon. Court of Appeals and The People of the Philippines
Ponente: J. Sarmiento
FACTS: Cirilo Saludes slept in the house of his compadre accused Jorge Taer, whereat he was
benighted. At about 2:00 o'clock dawn, accused Emilio Namocatcat and Mario Cago arrived at
Taer's house with two (2) male carabaos owned by and which Namocatcat wanted Taer to tend.
The said carabaos were left at Taer's place. After searching in vain for the carabaos at the
vicinity, Dalde and Palaca reported the matter to the police. Reyes informed Dalde that he saw
the latter's lost carabao at Datag, Garcia-Hernandez. Forthwith Dalde and Palaca went on that
day toDatag and there they found their missing carabaos tied to a bamboo thicket near the
houseaccused Taer. Upon query by Dalde and Palaca why their carabaos were found at his
place, accused Taer, replied that the carabaos reached his place tied together without any person
in company.
According to accused Taer, what he told Dalde and Palaca was that the carabaos were brought to
his place by the accused Namocatcat who asked him to tell anybody looking for them that they
just strayed thereat. Taer was convicted for the crime of cattle rustling, later affirmed by the CA in
toto, finding the evidence of the prosecution that conspiracy indeed existed between Emilio
Namocatcat and Taer. Taer appealed arguing that the extent of his participation did not go beyond
the participation of the original defendants Saludes and Cago. Therefore, he submits that the
acquittal of these two by the trial court should also lead to his acquittal and the only evidence
proving the alleged conspiracy between him and Namocatcat was the confession of Namocatcat,
however this should not be considered as admissible because the same is hearsay under the rule
of res inter alios acta
ISSUE: Whether or not there conspiracy was proven beyond reasonable doubt to convict
theaccused as principal for the crime of cattle rustling as defined and punished by PD 533
HELD: No. Conspiracy must be established not by conjectures, but by positive and conclusive
evidence. The same degree of proof necessary to establish the crime is required to support a
finding of the presence of criminal conspiracy, which is, proof beyond reasonable doubt. Thus
mere knowledge, acquiescence to, or approval of the act, without cooperation or agreement to
cooperate, is not enough to constitute one a party to a conspiracy absent the intentional
participation in the transaction with a view to the furtherance of the common design and purpose.
At most the facts establish Taer's knowledge of the crime.
And yet without having participated either as principal or as an accomplice, for he did not
participate in the taking of the carabaos, he took part subsequent to the commission of the act of
taking by profiting himself by its effects. Taer is thus only an accessory after the fact. The most
cogent proof that the prosecution could ever raise was the implication made by the accused
Namocatcat (he did not appeal his conviction to the Court of Appeals) in his affidavit of
confession. However, the settled rule is that the rights of a party can not be prejudiced by an act,
declaration, or omission of another. The testimony, being res inter alios acta, can not affect
another except as provided in the Rules of Court. This rule on res inter alios acta specifically
applies when the evidence consists of an admission in an extrajudicial confession or declaration
of another because the defendant has no opportunity to cross-examine the co-conspirator
testifying against him.WHEREFORE, the decision rendered by the Regional Trial Court of
Tagbilaran and affirmed by therespondent Court of Appeals is hereby MODIFIED in that the
herein JORGE TAER is convicted as an accessory of the crime of cattle-rustling as defined and
penalized by PD No. 533 amending
Arts. 308, 309, and 310 of the Revised Penal Code and he will serve the minimum penalty within
the range of arresto mayor medium, which we shall fix at 4 months imprisonment and the
maximum penalty of prision correccional minimum which we shall fix at 2 years.

MALLILLIN vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES

G.R. No. 172953,April 30, 2008
Petitioner: Junie Mallillin Lopez
Respondents: People of the Philippines
Ponente: J. Tinga
FACTS: That on or about the 4th day of February 2003, at about 8:45 in the morning in
Barangay Tugos, Sorsogon City, Philippines, the said accused did then and there willfully, unlawfully
and feloniously have in his possession, custody and control two (2) plastic sachets of
methamphetamine hydrochloride [or] shabu with an aggregate weight of 0.0743 gram, and four empty
sachets containing shabu residue, without having been previously authorized by law to possess the
same. Accordingly, petitioner was charged with violation of Section 11, Article II of Republic Act No.
9165, otherwise known as The Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002. On 20 June 2004 the
trial court (RTC) rendered its Decision declaring petitioner guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the
offense charged. Petitioner was condemned to prison for twelve years (12) and one (1) day to twenty
(20) years and to pay a fine of P300,000.00. The trial court reasoned that the fact that shabu was
found in the house of petitioner was prima facie evidence of petitioners animus possidendi sufficient
to convict him of the charge inasmuch as things which a person possesses or over which he
exercises acts of ownership are presumptively owned by him. It also noted petitioners failure to
ascribe ill motives to the police officers to fabricate charges against him.
Aggrieved, petitioner filed a Notice of Appeal.In his Appeal Brief filed with the Court of Appeals,
petitioner called the attention of the court to certain irregularities in the manner by which the search of
his house was conducted.
On 27 January 2006, the Court of Appeals rendered the assailed decision affirming the judgment of
the trial court but modifying the prison sentence to an indeterminate term of twelve (12) years as
minimum to seventeen (17) years as maximum. Petitioner moved for reconsideration but the same
was denied by the appellate court. Hence, the instant petition which raises substantially the same
issues.
ISSUE: Whether or not the presumption of regularity in the performance of official functions can be
overcome the constitutional presumption of innocence.
HELD: No. The presumption of regularity in the performance of official functions cannot by its
lonesome overcome the constitutional presumption of innocence. Evidence of guilt beyond
reasonable doubt and nothing else can eclipse the hypothesis of guiltlessness.
In our constitutional system, basic and elementary is the presupposition that the burden of proving the
guilt of an accused lies on the prosecution which must rely on the strength of its own evidence
and not on the weakness of the defense. The rule is invariable whatever may be the reputation of the
accused, for the law presumes his innocence unless and until the contrary is
shown.In dubio pro reo. When moral certainty as to culpability hangs in the balance, acquittal on
reasonable doubt inevitably becomes a matter of right.
WHEREFORE, the assailed Decision of the Court of Appeals dated 27 January 2006 affirming with
modification the judgment of conviction of the Regional Trial Court of Sorsogon City, Branch 52, and
its Resolution dated 30 May 2006 denying reconsideration thereof, are REVERSED and SET
ASIDE. Petitioner Junie Malillin y Lopez is ACQUITTED on reasonable doubt and is accordingly
ordered immediately released from custody unless he is being lawfully held for another offense.