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Vor. S I

M A R C H . I&#

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lion, ham, io iteelf, involved a v a t deal of labor. It ia, perhnpn, not

much to my that a hietory of the cavalry of tho Army of t h e
Pwmac might very easily have filled three times & maoy pages
M pave here been devoted to i t ; and the writor baa, mucb agaiiiet
by will, been oompelled to cut o u t matter of the greatest interest.
AtitbeMme time, while he h s s borne in mind thnt t h i s history i n
ioqoded to be a faithful ehronicle of t h e life of the Fedornl cnvalry,
he b~ tried not to loee eight o f t b e fact thnt a mere record of e r e n t s
is certain to be moootonouA reading.
tog

I.
Atthebreakingout of the Warof t h e h b e l l i o u , the caralry force
at tbe diepoeal of the United States &overnrnent, coneistod of the
Secund Regiments of Dragoone,onu regiment of XourJted
d t h e First and Second Regiments o f Cavalry. When
NWLN iesued his a l l for three months volunteer*,
ent, t h e Third, wae added to the five othors, but, for
wan t h e extant of the increme i n thecavalry. Volunod artillery poured into Washington from nll perta
b a t volunteer cavalry neither came, nor were encour. Abaord an i t now appeare., i t wae the intention of
otboritiee to conhe the cavalry to t h e a i r r e K u l n r
regi eob. T h e North cootidently expected to crueh the Rebollion
8%O&.
CaVSlry W . 8 an expeneive arm, and experienced otacerd
yearn were required to produce a n etIlcient trooper.
a veteran M General Soon gave it ae bie opinion that
d wooded character of t h e 6eld of operations,
io rilled firearma, tho rBle ot t h e carnlry
and e e a o d a r y . MCCLELLANS
report of t h e
i o weat Virginia. a y e : 6CCavtrlry wae abe governon, of the Staten complied with my
a few compaoiee whicb were finally mustored
wroioe, a n d proved very ueeful.
ioa of aavalry took part in the battle of Bull
abieh tbey dieplayed while covering the preera1 army, probably wved a large pmporihilatioa by ~ T J ~ ~ A Bcavalry,
T~
and haa
e moogaition which i t deeerved.
1861, IK~JCLSLLAR
aeaomed command of
llod t h e Army of t h e Potomac, a n d tho
I

. L a .L.

. U.

regular r a r a l r y regiments were reorganized. siid rcnun,hered conrecutirelr from ooe to &&Bix.*
With the organization of the Army of the Potoniac, begin8 t h e
real nidtory of it@caralry. but for two long yeam,-until
i t a reorganization under HOOKEB,itA hiNtory i @ one o! neglect, dieone idea of the shortorganization, and miruse. HCCLBLLASS
cominpe ofthe c a r d r y . w8a that i t was not IarKe enough. Moanwhile it furniehcd guider, orderlieo, and yroome for Rtsff ot6cerrr;
ntid wn.q 00 divided u p anlonp cnrpp. diririon. and bripaac corn.
mandern an to completely subvert its true value. bringing mrcasm
and iynomlny on what n h n u l d hare beeu one of t h e rno*t powerful
fnctom i n the overthrow of the Rebellion.
The drill rcgulationa of the caralr- at the breaking out of tho
of tbo
war -called at t h a t time*tactics-wel.e modified from thFrench JragoonR, and had becn found unauitcd LO the needa of
caralry operating i n the United State8. General P H I L I P ST. G .
COOKEhad accordingly prepared a new nyalem whicl, wna approved
by the War Department i n October. 1861. but did not come into uau
on account of the conditione which ohteined rit the t i m e . ThiP,
without doubt, proved a great reRtriction upon the udulnenn of the
arm.
The armament of the rolunteer reginicntn. a1tic.h were m u o t e r e d
i n w i t h m m e Rhow of intereot afler t h e di*a*ter at Bull Ijun, were
along the same lines as that of t h e rcpular regimtsnto of t h a t day,
and was i n charge of Goncral STONKHAS. Though suffering from n
deficiency i n cavalry arm8 and equipnientn, every cavnlry eoldier
was armed with n saber a n d reoolrer as s o o n an circumstances perm i t t e d . and n t least t a n q u a d r o n n i n every rc.pimcnt were armed
with carbine*.
One rolunteer regiment, the Sixth Pennwylrariia cavalry,
(Rvsas Lancers) was armed with the lance, i n addition to the
piotol, t w e l v e carbines being afterwnrd8 added to the equipment of
each company, fnr picket and e r o u t i n p dntien. The lances were
carried from December, 1861. nntil May, 1863. when they were diecarded for the carbine, ae b e i n g ill-adapted tor use i n the wooded
country through which tbe command operated.
The carbinee iusued were of rarioor patterns, generally tbe
Sharpee, u n t i l the advent of the Spencer i n 1863. The rerollcet
WM the Colts.
The eaddle wss the McClellan. and with the remaining horse equipmenta, had been adopted throngb recommends.
tion8 mado by General MCCLxLLAN- a b r h i s oaticial eoropean tour i n

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Tbe eaddle, however, ww corered with rawhide instead of

le+mr,

a n d became v e r y uncomfortable wben split.

T b eoriginal regolatione governing t h e niuetering in of volunteer regiments, reqoired t h e cavalry to furnish tbeir own homce aa
weian h o w eqaipmenta;
b u t t h i s WBB later moditied, a n d t h o
godernmeof fomisbed them, M t h e y bad done to tho rogular regimepta. Bat the bofarnisbed were in most c m e very poor a n i make, d u e to h a d on t h e part of govoroment contractors, a n d t h e
o v h x e d meourcen of the Quartermaetere Department.
bn the 16th of October, 1861, t h e organization of t h e cavalry
00pbisted of a emull brigade u n d e r General STOWBYAN,
a n a Rome
elejen or twelve o t h e r regimenta. attached to divieione of infnntqlt Ita s t r e a g t b , November 12th, aggregated 8,126, of which b u t
4.7 3arewportedaspreeent for dnty,equipped. It wasconstantip
dril ed d a r i n g t b e fall a n d winter, with enough ecooting a n d outpoet
d o t i i n t b e Virginia bills to g i v e t h e cavalry regiments a foretaste
toal service. A n d j o r t preceding t h e Peniiiaular campaign,
Of
(3e ral STONENAN
w i t b a brigade made a reconnaiaearlctt along t h e
0 4 g e a n d Alexandria Railroad aa far aa Cedar R u n .
fa h r c b , 1862, t h e Penineolar a r m y wtu traneported Sooth,and t b e siege of Yorktown wan begun. The c a v a l r y re,oerte,
WM o n d e r t h a t veteran cavalryman, Geoeral P. YT. G. COOICE,
wre,organisedan two brigadee o n d e r Generale E m s Y a n d BLAKE,
aad/coneieted of eix regiments.$ T h e r e a of t h e cavalr. waa
ed ap a m o n g t h e a r m y corpe, a n d the varionw beudquartew.
available h o u r spared from outpoet d o t y , was etill utilized
b r &ill, a n d wben t h e e n e m y abandoned hie-lines at Y o r k w w n ,
WM oalled a p o n to pureoe.
neral COOK. e n m o n t e r e d t h e e n e m y in force at Fort Magrube Wiled to be supported by HOOKIBB
divimion t h r o u g h
which have beoome historic, ho was obliged t o fall back.
before t h e Firnt U. 8. Cavalry bad mado two brilliant
, o a p t a r i n g a regimental etaodard. Major W I L L I A Yfour
~~
of the S i x t h
8. Cavalry, whicb wae cut of b y a large
enemy, eaved itself by promptly wheeling a b o u t by
and charging t b e parsuere.
there been a larger foro0 of Fedenrl cavalry, or had it been
by the i n f a n t r y divieione, i t is probablo t h a t

u.

foad

mu u. a a*.

8~.th
u. a e d ~a.tb
. hnm~-h adv.
0.a o w .lplbta Palvrhok CLnilry. BAUWII qludron 1111-

t h e Battle of Williameborp, whicb followed, wonld n e v e r have been

fought. L O N M B I ~had
~ not intended to 6 g h t here, but d o d i n g his
r w r g u a r d eoccelreful, a n d poeted in a strong poeition, and a large
portion of hie force involved, be g a v e battle.
T h e c a v a l q took little part in thie battle. Willinmeburg WM
abandoned by t h e e n e m y on t b e 6th, a n d Colonel AVEPBLLwitb
portionm of t h e T h i r d Pennsylvania. a n d Eighth Illinoie Cavalry,
premed o n in pareoit ae f a r ao h e r Keot, recovering flve piecee of
artillery a n d c a p t n r i o g twenty -one prisoners.
From t h i s t i m e OD, ae a d i e t i o p i e h e d cavalry ofacer hae m i d ,
*af?airs with tbe cavalry, t b r o o g h no fault 01 i t a own, went from
bad to woree. Detacbmenta from ita strength were constantly i n c r d , a n d i t W M bampered by inetrodtione which crippled i t for
all useful action. But in &pitaof t h e d i n a d v a n t a p u n d e r a b i c b
i t labored, i t dieplayed t b e Bame b r a v e devotion to dntp which WM
afterwards to be put t o such pod account d u r i n g t h e t w o Iant years
of tba war.
D a r i n g the next few d a p , t h e cavalry w m almoet constaotly
eo@
in reconn.isslrnce d o t y , a n d although t b c r e were nomeroue
minor skirmisbee, n o t h i n g of importance occurred ontil t h e t a k i n g
of H a n o v e r &art Houee, (May 27-?9) wben t b e Fifth und S i x t b
United Stattm Cavalry, sopported by t h e Seventeenth New Tork
Infantry, c u t off a n d captored t h e g r e a t e r p a r t of an e n t i r e regiment-the
Tweotp.eightb N o r t h Carolina I n f a n t r y --continuing
the parsuit t w o a n d one.half milee beyond t h o town.
In pumuance of t h e general plan of c u t t i n g t h e enemye commnoicatiooe with S o r t h e r o Virginia, cavalry brigades o o d e r General EYOETa n d Colonel WAPRBX,deetroyed t h e b r i d p over t h e
South A n n a and P a m u n k e y R i v e n , and engaged io many creditable
ekirmiehee with t b e enemy. Some of t b e v o l o n k e r c a v s l ~ d, r r n o g
t h e m operatione, w e r e o n d e r fire for the 6mt time.
The cavalrya part in the brttle of Fair Oaks (May 29th), WM
insignificant. N o t b i a g else coald be expected, cooeidering ita dirunited condition nnd anomaloas Btatoa; eo t h a t wben, t w o weeks
later ( J o o e l 3 t b ) S r C 4 ~ ~ , w i taboat
h
1,2oOcavalry,psseed completely
aroond the Foderal a r m y and fell on t h e weak r i g b t flank of t h e
cavalry, rbere could be b o t one result. The cavalry wan blamedfor
n o t b a v i o g g i v e n notice of STUABTE
a p p r o a c h ; s o d when Ganeral
Coost, with a small cavalry force was tacked ooto an i n f r o t r y
division a n d told to catch SIUABI,his failore to s t r i k e bis s r i R
moving a d v e m a ~r y c r i t i c i d in theee words:
bave 8880 00
energy or epirit i n t b e p a m a i t by Geoeral Coos. of the enemy, n o r
11

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IIW he exbibiced the chanrcterietice of a nkillful arid active guardian

of, our d.DLa"*

,Time hrre shown t h a t General COOICE receired positive orderu

from tbe oommanding general of the loft w i n g to regulate hie purby the march of the infantry colomn, and on no account to preit. 6' The ofacer Of to.d8y, even thoagb he han had no experience

in ~ a r , w i t htbe reoord of cavalry marches before h i m , can imapinc

th$ edtemt of aucb an order on a dashing, chivalrouo, enthusiastic
08 dry odJcec, chafing ander Jhe rentrainte that had alroady been
p
up00 him by a moldier who bad learned from the booke tliut
a @med march for cavalry for one day WOB twenly-five milen." t
pa tbe poserr~eof the Army of t h o Potomac over the Chickaholpiny, General PORTER,
with t h e Fifth Army Corps, was charged
wit+ covering tbe movement an6 keeping the enemy i n check. AI1
thqcardry waa placed under hie ordern, nnd the battlo of Gaines'e
Ull, abich followed (Jane 27th) is remarkable for the etubborn
reebtanoe of the cavdrp under General CWRE.
@he line of hattlo formed the arc of a circle, almost parallel to
tbe IChickahominy, and COOKC'S division, conaieting o f two Rmall
, WM placwd behind tho breaka of a plateau. i n rear of the
le@of the line. During the day the Confederate army, 1-eby the army of STONEWALL
JACKKIN
from northern Vir.
gini ,mads four denperato acuurulfn an tbe Union lines, and erery
ava able infrntryman waa brought i n t o nction. I n rear of the lett
of e line there WM not a ningle reserve. save the cavalry and connide ble artillery. The day wan fact drawing to a clone. when the
000 emtee made a final effort to force t h e left dank nnd cat it off
ver the Chickahominy. Thoconter and left of
under ovorwhelming nambera. many of the reEidemoraliced. The reeerve artillery, left
u n tu limber up, when, by order o f Genwere o r d e d to maintain their psition, and were
cavalry woold eupport them. Tbe artillery will
p e d a bmvy fire on the advancing infantry
cloee foran effective charge, General COOKS
WIUTXMO,
commonding tho Fifth U.S. C I L F ~ I I t-o~ ,
re@ment. Numbering but 220 nsber8, the little
mder 8 beavy 5r0, and a portion of the line etruck
ere only #topped by tbe aoode at the botThe orrsualtieo i o the cbarge were tifty-eight,

mtJOQpare
h J O O ~ AU.La C A V A U T AIIOCIATIOX. JUmC.

m.

I)

R i t 11 t we r i ty .fou r horees killed, a sscrifice that w a s well worth tbe

reeults uttained. Vnder corer of the charge the artillery wau safely
ritlidrnwn, its bnld atand haring delayed tbe enemy'e advance long
(silough for the re-forming of the best dieciplined infantry regimente.
Had this determined ptand not been made, the eeioore of
tllu Chickahominy bridge, nnd the rapture of at least a portion of
t'orrca's command, w-oulil undoubtedly here Rjllowed. And yet
Gencral POETEU
reported that t h e cavalry cauueed the Ions of the
Febaction. The COMTED E PARIS.i n a letter to tieneral COOICE,
has raid' -The eacriticc ot' some of the brareat of
ruary 2. I$:;,
the carnlry. certainly w r c d s part o f t h e artillery; BR did. on a
larger wale, t h e .\ustrian cavalry on the ercning of .%dowa. The
rnain fact i s t h a t w i t h Four cavalry. you d i d all that caralry could
do. to ptop the rout."*
Sot n mor0 glorioue act occurred during the entire war, than
t h i s mioreprenented charge of t h e FiRb U.P. ('avalrj, BB B sacritice
for the withdrawal of tbe artillery. The survirore Rhould hare
brrn decorated. and had they belonged to a French or German army,
they would undoubtedly bare b e e n t h o a rewarded.
About June 24th. General STOXEMAXW n 4 placed i n command of
nil the cavalry on the right of the 8~mf(abclUt 2,000 io all), and
\\*a@charped w i t h picketing t h e country toaarde Ifanooer Coart
liouse.
Dlving the S e v e n Days Hattlce, he w ~ c lgoarding the
region from the Meadow Bridge to the l'amiinkep. with tbe Seventeenth Sew Tork Infantry and Eigliteenth Yatwtchueetta i n eop.
port. T h e inccneurvring of the enemy wae poch DB to cut oU STCIYBY A X ' B command from PIJBTEE'B
m r p . s o d after falling hack on
\Vhite IiouAe, where he deetroyed immense quantities of storm to
prevent their fallinu i n t o t h e er.ernc'* h a n d o , he retreated to Yorktown, arriving there t h e 29th inatant. These cavalry regiments
attached to the army corpe during this movement. performed
:trdaoiiR nnd painstaking duties.
By an order pablished July@.1863, part of the volonteer cavalry
of t h e Army of the Potomac was organized by Gcneral STO?~BMAH
i n t o two brigades, commanded by Colonele .\VEBBLL and G s M a . t

08.W-

tnra w

m d Lad.lr of Cbe CtVll W u . Vol. 11. pI.844.

e (Al-'sl:
Thlrd ~ n s y l r r o l r F. l n c S e t York. ?oanh f w ~ z w y l m ~

Cwalry.
W
d 8( 1 . G.PWi*a; 2 P U U A F T U X ' ~ ~m
: btb Illlmk XlgPlhlh Rnmlml..
Slxlh New York.
To B r s b u ' a -BrUU'S.p-dnrP.
To H u w z ~ ~ A S morp
%
D U I I L T ' S q o d r o U . RfU pComylrmhp.lllry
To R n r a ' harp.. 00. . p o d r o o B1.hta Illloolm C a r J I 7 .
m e q d n M R d I- Y w k Cb.lllV.
To r O . m ' #
To FUN SUN'^ a a ~ OD.
* qDdmn nr* N.r Y o r t C a w .

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P R I Z E ESS.4 I-.

To A V ~ ~ U waa
L L atwiped the task of t h o r o o g b l y patrolliog t h e
q n t r y i n front of the rigbt wing and flank, .ad b Colonel Gsroa
wqb dven eimilar datim on tbe lea hnk D i m i n n t i v e M t h i s force
nap, & tbe maay doti- it w called upon to perform, it per.
f o e 4 them rdL But again wae tbe cavalry called upon t o

nigh useless. l ' h r mounted force3 o f BASKSand McDClwELL were

in tuoch t h e name micnrablu condition. T h e coneolidated m o r n i n g
~ p rof
t J o l r 31,18f;S, s h o r n that oat of 8,738 u v a l r y in the tbrce
corps. 3.000 nre deducted as d n 6 t for eervice." S a c b a proportion
ia a conimcritary o n tlie condition of t h e cavalry of t h e A r m y of
Virginia at t h i s time.
And pot t h i s little force did excellent service, partly perbape
t h r o u g h t h e cbfficiencj- of those who commanded i t , bot principllp
on account of ita w i s e U R C by the c o m m a n d i n g g e n e r a l .
Pope'* general instructions directed him to c o r e r l'i-mhington,
a n d pending t h e transfer of > f C C L E L L A S ' J troop from IIsrrisoa'e
L a n d i n g to Aquia Creek, l'a.. h e waa charged with rclristinp at'all
hazard a n y powibie adoanco of t h e e n e m y .
Accordingly General K ~ n o .a t F r v d e r i c h b u r g . wt18 directed to
.wnd o u t detnchments of h i n cavalry to opernte o n t h e line o f t h e
Virginia Central Railroad and destroy communications between
Richmnnd a n d t h e Shennndoah. T h e cavalry expeditions eent out
were highly rucceesful.
- i t t h e t a m e time BASICSwao directed t o push all hin cavalry
towsrdn Ciordonsvillc. a n d ita executioo was intrueted to General
JOEN I. HATCH,an ofscor of t b c r e g n l a r cavalry. But thin odcer,
instead of pushing forward with all haete, hurdened himself with
i n f a n t r y , a r t i l l e r y , and wagon t r a i n s , so that when POP&suppoaed
t h e bridgee and railroad doetroyed i n t h e vicinity of Cbarlotteaoille
und Gordonsrille. IIATCE'S command had just *bed
Yadieon
Court House. This m o r e m e n t illustrates t h e common idea of t h e
w e of cnvslry a1 t h i s period. HATCH'Sdelay allowed J A C K ~ O S ' ~
a d v a n c e t o occupy Gordonsrille. and the m0vcment.e contemplated
hccnnie i mprncticable. HATCA
WM
relieved lrom c o m m a n d , a n d
wa.9 ~ u c c c e i l e dby BVPOBD,
a s chief of cavalry of BASKS'Scorpr.
O n August i t l i . tlie cnvalrr ot' t h e .4rmy of Virginia aae dietribritctl as follows: Rrroan'a brigade. a t Madieon Court Honae,
Ijicketinp t h e Rapidan from Barnolt'a Ford to the Blue Ridgc;
I ~ A Y A R D ' ~hripadc at Rapidan Station. picketing from Barnett's to
fhccoon Fords. ( BCPOUD
a i d BAYARD
w e r e yoong otecere of t h e
r e g u l a r cavalry.) Piekotn were also eatablished from Raccoon Ford
to t h e fork8 o f t h e Rappnhatinock. The whole dispoeitioo of t h e
csvalry WIIR admirably arranged an a ecreening force, and o n August
rd7th a n d 8 t h performed v s l a s b l e service i n retarding JACKBON'S
vance a n d k e a p i n g POPEinformed of t h e enemy's movementb.
At t h e battle of Codnr Mountain,* wbich occurred the folloriog
...
. " 8r A p p . n d l r 4.

hr@hbgoidee,$r#outa, orderlies and BBcortd, ontil t h e regimente

dar)ndb down to mere notbinga In her. aa General Msnwrr hns
mi(. (*After M n m Mill, t b e oaralry of t h e A r m y of t b e P o t o m a c
b.4 no hietory of wbich i t h a d raw00 to be prond, until tlie reor(paiwtion of tbe army, with E O O Ci n~ B
command."

11.
On tbe 26th of J u n e , G e n e r a l JOEN POPShnd been a m i g n c d t o
tbe command of the Army of Virgioia, compoeed of t h e c o m m a n d e
of &aemls BAM, IFllrom, and McDowrm Farmom had sucin command of t b e Mountain D e p a r t m e n t , Afarch
ie adminietration a n d thoee of his p r e d m r s ,
in Weet V i r g i n i a had performed 00 cooepicuoue
T b e coontry waa ill-euited for m a n e a v d r i n g large bodies of
; bat for ocouting and reconnoitering, emall bodiee mold be
ery tuethl, .LI e b o r n by t h e v a l u e b YCCL~LLAI,
of tbe
commaode k n o w n UI McMottrr'o Bun
t h e RINWOLD
and BUEDISALL'~
Cavalry. In fact,
fertore of tbe operatione in Weet
I
war4

A year r h r

11

tbe beginning of t b i war, the Mountain DepartWest Virginia, cootained thirty-eix companiee

meet, w b i c h included

~ 2 , 7 4 1mea; bat t h e y were poorly equipped

of tbem diemouoted. And t h e m , w i t h t h e
nd a r t i l l e r y forma, guarded a frontier 350
eo of railrod, and 200 milee of water c o m m u o i -

'bl rep14 of tbe battle of Eernetowa (March 23,

1862)t b e brigbt spta in the eacceeeive midortooea of the Union

in the Sbenandoah Valley, .&neral SaxxLmr -ye: *'My
io very ioedeotive. If I bad one regiment of excellent
, armed with aubinee, I could have doubled the eoemy's

e O S Vwbiob
S I ~FBXXOWP
broogbt to the Army of Virginia,
p diemoonted ; and tbe boxwe of tboeo wbo were mounted,
p a t meamre eo broke0 down and rtarved aa to be well-

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PRIZE ESSA Y.

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,

detachmoote at brigade and division beadqoartcra M report for duly

to t h e i r chiefe of cavalry, and greatly reducing t h e number of orderliee, marke a decided change in the condition of the cavalry, but tbe
time was etill far distant when i t wae to be given a emtue i n keepiog with ita importanm, and when it waa able to vindicate iteelf i n
the ejen of thoee who "never eaw a dead cavalryman."

day, the o~valry fell doalp back

ne the onemy advanced, and

reqdered effective w i o e tbroogboat tbe dey, a equadron of the

PennrylvaniaCavalry making a most gallant cbarge a p i n a t a

y of tbe enemy wbiob waa about to obarge the Union batteries.
Tb q o a d r o n loat an regate ate of 93 men out of t b e 164 who par
tioitplrtad in the cbuge.
Aa JAIYJKWN
fell bask acm the Rapidan, the cavalry kept touch
wi* him, a n d redocopied tbeir old picket line, Rtretching from Raccoon Ford to the bme of the Blue Ridge. k n n a i e e a n c e e , too.
porbed forward, and' a cavalry command oent out on Augunt
uptnred General STUABT'B
Adjutant General with important
wbioh BbI'OHgly influenced POPEin hie decithe Rappabannock, which be did Anguat

/,

/,

'

111

t h i e time the cavalry WM greatly fatigued. POPE

sap: (1 Our
on paper about 4,000 men, but tbeir b o w were
letely broken down, and tbere were not 600 men capable of
M rbould be oxpected h r n cavalv." Tbat

to leading o p to, a n d culminating in the battle of Bull Run,

expected from tbeir mieerable condition. Witb brokenit WM impocuible to cover the front of the army, o r to
nditioa of t h e cavalry on

Run, Popr up: 'ITbe artillery

.
n

arduooaand hacthe drst to tbe Iaot day of the campaign, ecrrrcely a day
them odiaera did not render aervice which entitlea them
rode of the governmenL"*

t'
I

y, ib troe employment, WM beginAn order ieeoed by General POPE,

Mountain, directing tbe crvalry

1 :I

inetead of attacking Washington, and the Army of tbe Potomac.

wbile ehialding the Sational Capital, endeavored to keep touch w i t h
the army of invanion. Had MCCLLLLAS bad a t bie diepoeal a t thie
time an adequate cavalry force, his taek would have been made i n finitely more eimple.
But the cavalry, eepecially t h a t portion which bad paared
through P o ~ r ' eesmpaign, wae i n deplorable condition tor aggreeeive
action. PLEAUAWTOX'~
caralry divieion. weakened though i t W*PB by
it0 experience on the Penineola, wae best able to take the field, and
early i n September waa reconnoitering tbe forda of the Potornnc.
On tbe 9 t h , i t occupied Barneeville, and captored the battle-dag of
tho Twelflh Virginia Cavalry. 00 t h e 1 3 t h . the r i g h t r i n g nod
center of tbe Federal a r m y baviog reacbed Frederick, the cavalry
clenred the pawage over the Cstoctin Hilla, and early on the morniog of t h e 14tb, found i b e eoemy occopyiog adrantageoua p i t i o o a
nt Soutb !donatain,on either side of tbe g a p througb which the
National road psesed.
The enemy w m routed from hie poeitiooe by the Federal army.
but the cavalry took little part in the battle. PLEABANTON
deployod
a portion of bin cavalry dismounted during tbe day, a u r i n g t h e
enemy to m.aa a coneiderablo force on the right of t h e Confedemte
position,
L E E 'army
~
withdrew 80 ae to cover the Sbepberdetowo Ford of
t h e Potomac, and t h e cavalry, followed by t h r e e a r m y corpe, pureued by way of Booneebomugb. A t the latter place t h e cavalry
caugbt up with tbe eoeruy'a m r guard, and c b a r d n g repeatedly,
drove the enemy two milea beyond t h e town. The eoemy left t h i r t y
dead and fifty wounded opon the &Id, beaides two piwee of mrtillery and 250 priaonere c a p t u r d ; wbile the loes to the ITnion cavalry
wna b u t one killod. and 6R-n
rounded.

PRIZE ESBA Y

14

OD the llth, the date of t h e battle of Antietam, tho cavalry

red to Antietam bridge, whioh WM found to bo u n d e r a c r o ~ w f i r c
T t b e enemfr artillery. Cavalry rkirmiehere were t h r o w n forward.
a ' d aided by the hone btteriee of t b e division, t h e enemy'd batter.
1

were driven h m their poeitione.

T b e main battle waa between

Lbe iohotry and artillerg of both armies, a n d resulted in the withd&wal of La'r army i n t o Virginia.
'I 00the Mtb, the cavalry wm feeling t b e enemy and collecting
em; on the l Q t b , puehing t h e eoemy'e r e a r guard at tho
he Potomac; a n d thereafter, for eome time, i t wae so die-

..
I

to oover the principal forde, m a k i n g frequent r u c o n n a i s to Virgioia t o d e v e l o p t h e eoemy'e p e i t i o n a n d moveniuntu.

s t r e n g t b of t h e cavalry was found to bo i n O v e r w o r k a n d dieerrse had broken down the horses to
on Ootober l l t h , General STUABT
made a
with 2,000 men, MCCLILLAN could mount
bqt 800 men to follow bim.*
e& tbir raid, AVKUELL,
t h e n on the u p p e r Potomac, moved
e north aide of t h e river, while PLBABANTON,
taking t h e
-Yeabanicatown road, w a s diepoeed to c u t otT t h e raiding
Id it orow by any of t b e forde below t h e main a r m y .
t Meobanicetown, PLEMANTON
learned t h a t t h e
an bomr ahead of him-retreating
towarde t h e
noorr~y;and althomgb hie o w n force numbered
t one-fomrtb t b a t of tbe enemy, h e poreued v i g o r o n e l p i a n d
& r n r r ' 8 rear guard with ruch e n e r g y tbat t h e latter was
itom orocllliog tbe Yonocacy Ford a n d wau forced to move
ford, three milee below. Had t h e latter ford been occuM wan originally ordered, i t ia q u i t e probable t h a t
bave been captored or badly crippled. A larger
r even a s o p p l y of eerriceable horses for t h e A r m y
M
I O,
might b a v e prevented thie raid, which had t h e
drawiaK a ooaeidemble force from LBB'Stired a r m y , prot oonstem8tion among t h e people of t b e Nortb, a n d led
n

September loth, General BUPOBD

had been annoonced ne
of tbe Army of t h e Potomac, b n t the otlice WM
and wan attended witb v e r y littlu, if any,
So far ae the cavalry was concerned tbe

chief-of-cavalry w w t h e executive officer of the coninlanding g e n .

eral.
00 October Int Genoral BAYABD
was asaigned to t h e command
of all t h e mralry about Washington, e o u t h of t h e Potomac; niid on
t b e ?let General PLEASA.*~>S
wae Riven a cavalry brigade consieting of t h e Sixth U. S. Cavalry, t h e Eighth Pennuylvatiia, t h e
Eighth Illinoie, t h e T h i r d Indiana, a n d t h e Eighth S e w York
Cavalry regi mente.
On t h e '76th PLM~ANYVX
crocraed t h e Potomw at Berlin, a n d
d u r i n g t h e next few d a p wae employed, as wne aluo t h e brigade of
BAYABD.i n p i n i n g information of t h e enemy's movement& reeulti n g io akirmishee at Snicker'u Gap, I'pperville. -4Idie. Mountvillr,
Philomoot a n d M a o m s Gap.
On S o v e m b e r 5th hie brigade
command
fought a n action at Barbee'a C ~ O Mb a d e . with STCART'S
of about 3,000 cavalry, accompanied by four piece# o f artillery.
Gsroo. with t h e E i g h t h P a n n e ~ l v a n i aa n d t h e Sixth United States.
turned the enemy's r i g h t ; DAVIS, with t h e Eighth ,Yew York.
attacked the lea; a n d FAENSWOBTE,
with t h e Eighth Illinois. mooed
a g a i n a t t h e c e n t e r . D a r i n g t h e engagement I ) A V I Uwsh met by a
moch saperior force. about to charge him. He quickly overcame
t h e disproportion i n numbera by dinmountirig acvcral o f his companiea behind a atone wall, a n d t h e i r galling front and Bank are
won threw t h e e n e m y i n t o c-nfunion.
This necomplished. DAVIS,
with t h e remainder of t h e regiment, mounted. charged, routed t h e
e n e m y a n d d r o v e him from t h e field. T h e Confaderatm lefl t h i r t y seven dead upon the field, while t h e Union loaa wau but 6ve killed
a n d eight wounded. T h i e rnaneover of tigliting dinmounted behind obataclee with a portion of a command, e n d c h a r g i n g t h e
onemy i n t h e dank with t h e remainder mounted, became a very
common a n d offective method of 6 g b t i o p t h m o g b o o t the war.
O n November 7 t b General SICCLELLAS
wab superseded as corn.
m a n d e r of t h e A r m y of the Potomac by General BL-BNSIDR,
and the
riKbt, center
a r m y W*(YI o r g a n i d into three g r a n d disiaions-the
a n d FBANKLIX.A n
a n d left, commanded by YCYNLR, HOOIXLB
order of t h e 21st i n s t a n t rseigned t h e cavalry division8 of PLEASAXTON, BATAED
a n d AVBBBLLto the three Rrand dirieione respec.
tively.
BUILN~IDI
moved hie a r m y down t h e north side of the Rappa.
bannock on November 1 5 t b , a n d r e a c h e d Falmoutb on t b e 20th.
Altbongb t b e r i v e r wae fordable a few milee above the town, and
DEB'Sarmy bad n o t y e t reached Falmoutb at tbie date, B ~ - E X ~ I D I
did not croua t h e river until tbe 11th of December. T h e pacwrge

I
P R I Z E ESS.4 Y .

PRIZE E S S A Y.

16

WM
eflected witbout much oppoaition, bat i u the aut)
eqoent atternpte to turn t h e enemy's position o n t h e heiphte i i i
r+ar of Redericksbnrg, tbe Federal army waa obliged to fall back.

oftbe river

m t b armiee remained in position until the night of December 13th,

when General BUBN~IDE
withdrew h i s forcea to t h e north bank of
tlbe Rappabannook.
Daring the advance along the north bank of the river, begun on
November l b t h , the cavalry waa in rear, employed i n covering the
&ds,&d t b b duty gave rim to much ekirmiehinp;. On November
14th at the United States Ford, and o n t h e 28th at Hartwood
Cbomh, B A Y A m ' e and AvrsrLL'e cavalry division8 were engaged,
and on tbe 28tb to 30tb of t b e month t h e brigade attached to the rcm e grand division, wb& headquarters were near Fairfnx, n d ranted to Snickersville and Berryville aod muted the enemy'a
q v a l r y , (WEITS'S) captaring t h e i r colore and meny prisonere.
t Bot the cavalry took very little part i n the grander movements
of t h e army. When SUMNEB'S
grand division crossed tbe river on
A m b e r 1%b, PLSASA~FI.~N'S
cavalry division was meeeed i n rear
o(tbe ridKe commanding t h e approacbes to t h e npper bridgea
Abd when FBAHKLW
croeeed below t h e city, h e wan preceded by
B + Y A ~cavalry
' ~ divinioo, which reconnoitered the country s o u t h wqd.
This wan the extent of t h e cavalryoperatiooa, t h e exhauetin a n d u n c ~ a s i n gpicket doty, monopolizing almost the entire time
attantion of oiEoere a n d men.
l After the Union army fell back acrotm the Rappabannock, the
tT u m i e s ooofhmted eaoh other, euch endeavoring to recuperate
9 m the terrible struggle at Frederickeburg, and each hesitating to
*e
the initiative. There were diseeosioos i n t h e A r m y of the
Pvw,and diffemaoee of opinion. BUUN81DE w88 for a geoorsl
a d p n o e , b u t WII) o p e i n thie by hie grand division commandAnd Me CommandingGeneral'a viewu eo fur took shape that a
e 7
09 dry expedition, propoeed and organized by General AVEILLLL,
pot on foot (December 28tb), only to be recallud at the last
ment by ordem Aom the President, instignted by general ol3irera.
M to tbe wiedom of aggreaaive
w y differed witb General BUBN~IDE
q i o o at this time.
AVBBBU propoeed to take a t h o u a n d picked men,wltx$ed from

&
*-

--

hTuO-mlhd
8.

00 t
b
ub7

PhOO Of r b r l l , r b i l O

mm?h m d ?BANK-

b$ cdocrsl D. YcY. O W . SI#.htb P.np111vanL.

:~d~odhosuc.~mraosad
10 .rd
k o o a m n a o r ~ h e ~ g o uer-0
d
VI
u.yOe W l h a e ~ m d r r ( o e tobeamoalebmted
d
lothembe
-at*...J.l.
?or lk -om
d I b e amby at Pml0dahbuq. me Appaodlr R.

bdq-

1;

niw rugiriicrita, w i t h four piccca

ot' artillcry. Iwocwd by Kclly'rr

Ford on the Ibppahaniiock, and hccoori Ford on t h e Ibpid:in, to
t h e J a m e s River, arid by c r o w i n g o n ttic bridyc at C'arterville, to
proceed to Suffolk, or goin the Fetlcral forceo i i i S o r t \ > Caroline.
under G c i i c r d FOSTER. The cxpdition WRY e.ul)c-cted t o dwtroji the
railroads, bridge*, atid tclr-graph lince b c t w c c n t h c Fcdcrsl arniy
and Ricliinond. end w:id to d c p i ~ dupoii t t i c couiitry for au$tcirnric'e.
I u many reapccts it did not dirfc-r i n w r i c c b l ) t i o n from the STWEMAS
raid ot' six niontlis latcr.

I\-.

On J:inuary " t i t t i . General B r . t i s + l i i E \VIL.- rclir,rt.ll froni coni

inuod of the A r m 1 of the Potomac. and s : -ucceetied
~
by General
1Ioonc:R. -1 few day* later ( Fcbrmiry t i . l < t i . 5 ) the organi~atioohji
erand diridionu was abolished? and [lint by nrmy c o r p ~substituted,
w i t h G e n e r a l STOXENAS
to command all ttic cavalry.
This consolidation of the cavalry was by far the moat important
step that had yet bcetr taken to increasc i t + ctl5cienc.v. and enable it
LIJ a c t i n its true role.
The cavalry corps wa* orpaciu-d i n t h r w d i v i a o n a , cornmaoded
by Generals PLEASANTOS,
. \ V E B E L L and ( i R t c w , w i t h the Reserve
Brigade i n tomniand of General B~'FORII OII Febroary 10, IN%,
t h e corps had an aKyregatc of 13,452 otBcc.i-s and men present for
duty --the prewnt and a b s n t numbering 17.16ti. These Bguree
Kive bome idea of the large number of absentee*. The regular regim e n t a , cspecially, w e r e depleted i n n u m b e n
Regular ufBcera were
coo*taiitly rreaigned to d u t y w i t h voluiiteer c o m m a n d a . as well as to

many atsff poeitione, and i n the mutter ot recruiting. t h e govern.

riierit could not aucceaufully compew w i t h the Statea.
A t tirnee t h e
*treiigth of t h e regular regiments did riot arerage more than 2590
m e n present for duty.
A equndroo - t h e tactical u n i t of organization --contained anywhere from sixty to one hundred mcn.and was
only bn>uglit up to the required Jtrength by t h e a d d i t i o n of extra
com pan ies.
During the rnoiitlia o f January and February, t h e cayslr wae
kept conljtantly employed, reconnoitering the encmy.'a
ition,
w a t c l i i n g the for& of the Ksppahannwk, and enpage
[I almost
cowlant akirmiahing.* M u c h of this wnu done i n
em winter
weather, w h i l e the infantry was being made comfortable i n winter
quartera.

slrc

*Grove Chorcb. F U u . Ylddkbnrg. R.pp.)unoork Bridge. ~ m e r r l l l e .

PRIZE ESSA Y.

18

T h e enemy's cavalry w a s v e r y bold a n d aggrcmive. On Fell

mury 24th General FITZEUQE
LEE,
w-ith 400 of hiu cavalry, crosued
*e

river at

Kelly'e Ford, drove bnck t h o Federal picket8 at H a r t

sood Cbarob, and brongbt on a ekirmieb with AVBUBLL'Scavalry.

IJnder the impreeeion t b a t the onemy were in force, General STONBimmediately p u t t b e diviaions of PLEASANTON
a n d AVERELLin
motion, followed by the Reeervo Brigade ; but after encamping for
L n i g h t at Morrisville, t h e e n e m y oluded their pomuers b y recrom
ing t h e Rappabannock.
00 March l l t b , however, un engagement KM fought at K o l i y ' ~
I)ord, which made t h e Confederate cavalry more wary, and did much
wwarda m a k i n g t h e Union cavalry more aggremivc.
General AVEBBLLrocc-ired orders to crouw tho rivor with 3,000
c.valry a n d s i r pieeee of artillery, a n d attack a n d destroy t h e liircen
of General FITZEUOE
LEE. supposed to be near Cnlpepcr Court
qooee.
T b e Union general eturted from Morrieville with a b o u t 2,100 men
all told, a n d a r r i v i n e at Kelly'R Ford, b o n d the crossing obetructcd
with abatie, and defended by about e i g h t y Aharpehootera, covered
bp rifle-piteand houseson tbe oppoeite bank. After eevoral tltternptfl.
$be o m i n g waa gallantly effected by Lieutenant BBOWN
with t w e n t y
men of tho Firet Rhode Idaod Cavalry, who took twqnty-five prino*ere. The cmmning could easily havo h r i forced b y t h e owe of
astillery, b u t i t wee n o t desired to g i v r notice of t h e m o w m e n t to

WAN

tbe enemy.

Weetward from the ford, the g r o c n d was cornparativoly clear for

bqlf a mile, followed by woodo; a n d beyond t h e Inttor, waq a n open
B Id. Tbe cavalry oolamn reached t h e Brat line of woods without
o , p i t i o n . wheo t h e eoemp wae diecovered a d v a n c i n g in lioo. T h e
FTurtb New York waa directed to form lino to t h e riglit of the road,
tbp F o a r t h Pennsylvaoia to the left, with u wction of artillery bet4-n t h e two. I n front of tboee t w p e wae B broad, deep ditch,
ered by a heavy stone wall; a o d from behind thia obatrrcle tho
binee of t b e cavalry a n d gun8 of the artillery delivered a brisk
Forther to t h e right, t h e T h i r d Peiineplvania aod Sixteenth
P n q l v a n i a bad come i n t o p i t i o o ; while to tho left, the F i r s t
ode Island and S i x t h Obi0 bad aleo formed line. Ae t h e e n e m y
ad anced under the gulling ire of t h e diemoaoted men, Colonel
m i , commaodiog t b e B r a t brigade, led t h e r e g i m e n b on t h e left
of the Line in a mont rucceesfal cbnrge. Tbie cbarKebwaa closely
k o o w e d by that of Colonel MCIRPOSIZ.
w h o s t r u c k t h e left flank of

3.

.,

:inother ( J f the enctuy'e columns just arriviiig on thc f i c b l i i . an(l the

c r ~ i i r ebody of Confederate cavalry U'L- d r i v e n back i n g r c n t c o n fusion.
The Federal line boing ro.formcd. i t q n i t i atlrnncetl t h r c c q u u r
ter* of a niilc, driving t h e cncniy through 3 wvond line o f wtwdb.
Beyond these wood.*, and difltant about half a mile. the (_'onti'deratrw
n u d e anotlicr stand, and :ittemptc.ri to adrancbe under cover of II
heavy nrtillery tire. but w e r e a<:iirr repuleed a i r t i tlrirerr fmrii t h e
ticld. .I* it wus then quite late i n the day. tinti t h c Iiorsc?r o f ' thc
Fctleral cavalry were much cxhausted. t h e divi9ion wn?i witlidraaii.
:inti recrossed Kelly'r, Ford without. opposition. T h e otficirrl return
a r i ~ ftiw t h e C'onfedcrntcs.
ot'cusualties w m for the I'nioii f o r c e r . i*;

133.
Thia engugement has been described w i t h sonic degree of tlc*uiil.
because of its i i n p o r ~ a n c eLM being tlic tirrt time the Fedcrirl cavalry
war, made to feel itr, auperiority-. or u t l e a s t , equality-, with t h v
%plclididcava1i.y of STCART.*It w w a n o t h e r step in t h e incrcnaiilg
fccling of confidence in themwlsea and i n tlwir leaders, which wlrw
t o manifest itself in u still greater degree a t the Rubsequent battle ot'
Rrundy Station.
Hut the interrninnble picket d u t y of the cavalry atill went 0 n . t
I L ~ tliouKh none but mounted troops werz cnpnblc of perforaiiog
sucli service.
During t h i n period. too, t h e Federlil v a v a l r r i n W e ~ tVirginia,
were kept more than usually bury, due to t h e cxpcdition of the
Confedcram General IMBODEXinto t h a t State ( A p r i l 2 0 th to Hay
14th). and also tho raid of General 1V. E. JONESon t h e Raltimore
h Ohio h i l r o a d (.ipril 2 1 s t to May e l s t ) . IendiriK to skirmishes a t
Ileverly, J a o e l e w , and Summerville, W Va.
I n addition to tbcse atternptu to frustrate t h v more i m p o r t a n t
raids of Confederate troopa i n tho State, the Cnion cavalry i n Weat
Vircinia bad particularly arduoue rervice d u r i n g the ontiru year, in
: & [ I . :npte to break up t h e depredations of t h e guerrilla band8 of
.\IOSBY a n d GILXOES. D u r i n g the wiuter ot* 1 7 6 2 4 3 . movernenb

.__
.
-

.Gene& SWAWHand F m . L u ' i oUkW nporm of tbb clUIpcmcol dwell 00 cbe hci
that Lha Uoloo toroa w e n .Ida to meet U w l r oppooeoo Lo she open. and %Battbe mounted
lroop 60oUnaslly fell b k . w h e n h u d placd. (0 (be PrwCecllOD of (belr ulllbry M d d l ,
mouoten Q l r m b h e n
tThe sklrmbhem 01 I b e m v d r y rh lle upon IhU dolr werc Of dally O T r O m O d C . -08 ol
Ih-m very rtere--8crlrton @tallon.Ilerndon. Oceoquoo. LliUc Rlvcr Toroplkc.B d Ron.
Y l d d l r b U ~ .Burllogton, hrgltarllle, Rappbmoock Hrldge. Kelly'& Wellord'a urd k t d y
Ford* idkltmirh of Aprll 14-1s)

;1

'I

., .

1
PRIZE .ESSA.'2
of troope were eepecially oneroae on account of tlic uerortty of the
winter weather in t h e mopntuioe, and the extont of the territory to
be guarded.
During the Bpring of 1863, M well l~ll during the auccecding
aummer. t b e cavalry in Weat Virginia fought a number of minor
D
CODItt6ted, reflected no p e a t
ekirmiehee, which, though O ~ bravoly
credit on the cavalry arm. As General HALLBCK
etatee i n his re.
P r t (November 15,1863): "The force (in WoatoVirginiir) boing too
small to attempt any cumpaign by itself, has acted morely on t h e
defeneire i n repel ing raids and breakiug up guorrilla baode."
The name ma$:
mid of the cavalry of General M I L R o r , o p r atin# in the Ybendndoeh Valley at thi8 time. Though kept continn J l y buey, reconnoitering, patrolling, arid picketing this part of
Virginia, ita operationn were of a minor charackr.*
On April 27, 1863, WM inuugurated the C'haocellomville canicrowing the Rappahannock dnd Ihpidan
poign, General HOOKBE
above their junction. A t tho eame time the major portion of ttie
cr)valry corps under S T O N ~ Ncroesed
A N ttie upper Rappaharinock Ibr
a raid on the enemy's communiatione with Richmond.
8 r o N l H A N ' S instroctione tiom HOOKICE
were framed with t h e
i+ in view that the coming encounter between t h e Army of the
Pbtomac and the A r m y of Northern Virginia would bs gained by
the Federal army.
3
'1 You will march," saye the order,
with all your available force.
eqcept one brigade, for the purpoee of t u r n i n g the enemy's poai.
tipn on hie left, and of throwing pour command between him and
B/chrnond, aod ieolding him from hie suppliee, checking h i s retreat,
aqd iollictiug on him every p i b l e injury which s i l l lend to Iiir,
d i m m 6 t a r e und defat. * * * You may rely upon tbo General
( ~ O O K K B ) being in connection with yoa before your eupplios a r c
e? baouted."

6'

h a v i n g D8vr~'sbrigade of P L E A S A N T O Nfor
' Sduty
~ ~ ~with
~S~~~
Army of tbe Potomec, STONEMAN
crowed the Rsppshsonock on
April m t b , by way of t h e railroad bridge and Kelly's Ford. Three
ratione and tbree daye' allowance of short forage worc taken
o t b e troopere' bo-;
while t h r e e days' sukieteoce and two dapa'
e rt forage were taken upon pack moles. With the exception of
t
artillery. not a wheel of any deecription accompanicd tho corn
m nd.

we'

F
i

*Tb.a m l w Ioawht .LlrmLha at BwL* Fmnt Royal. .od Barry'# Forb.

.-\tter crowring the r i w r . General %oaEwas

.
:
i

A.1

to

Virginia Central Railroad from Gnrdonsrillc. for cighterri m i l e n

eastward. together w i t h all railmad bridgtw traillri. tlelm.*, proviyionN anti telegraph lines. PaNsinp o n . a 1:irce portinri of tllc
.\quia and Richmond b i i r o a d waq destroyed. all t h r tirillqzw acrethe S o u t h A n n a . anli *ercral acrow8 the Sorth Anna
cnmtn:iriding one of tile
On May 3d C!oloiiel JI.DWX KILPATRICK.
tirigadeta, wiirl w n t w i t h his own regimrnt (. ~ ~ A H R I *Light) t o
dewtroy the railroad bridge over the ( ' t i i ~ ~ k ~ l ~ o ~ i Bot
i i ~ i ybeing
unable to rejoin .'jToXEMA?l. K I L P A T R I I ' K took rt.t'ilg!e w i t h i n t h c
I'nion linea on the I'enii~sula. haring ~ i i i r 1 i t - 1 l1l i c l)riii,gcs o r e r the
('hickahoniiny. r u t i a t r a i n n f cur* i l l t o t l i t - r i r r r , ticstroyccl tlir
t'erry at Iianovcrtown i n timt. t n c h w k a piir*tring force. *iirpri*cd IL
('enfederate torce M L Aylctis. hrlrned fitty 9ix w z i p n u t i n t 1 21 d c p t
containing I;O,IN)O t)u*tielw of corn, dwtroycll the ferry ovc'r tlic
I \ I a t t a p n y . a* wt.ll 11- F I ~ L L q n n l i t i t i c a o f clcrtllirig ;tntl cc)mrniPwary
dtores.
A s to S T O S E M A S 'main
~
command. t h c J i x clsyw haviap expired
< l u r i n g which Guric~.til1I0tit~p.11u-n* t o t i u v v npc11<*0
r.onirnunication.
and supplies bccomirlg scarce. STOXEMAS
dct~idedto m a k e the beet
ot' h i r way to t h e Army ot' the Potomac. whic.li he rcaclieti i n
.safety. He then learned t h e reeult ot ttie sanguinary battle of
chance I I orR v i I le.*
As a moral factor and a n e n g i n e of de*truc.tion, the Sro?rrwr?r
raid wan a great nuccecla. I t destroyed million6 of dnllars worth of
('onfederate property, and. although f9r a e h o r t time only, c u t LCI'R
cornmunicstionn. Itc, moral effect, judging fmm the Confederate
correspondenco ainc-e publiehed, wus much greater than WSR at tbe
time beliered to be the caw. It. moreover. taught tbe Union cara l r r how to cut looee from tbeir base of dUpplie@,and gavu them a
new con6dence i n their mobility never before experieoced.
.

*For o ~ L . . U o nd am-.

_.*,'A

turncd nrer

AVER ELL^ command- which considtell of t)ne diri*intl. #)ne brigade.

aiid six piece* of artillery -the ta*k of dcfentinp any torccb of the
encniy likoly to impede the operation* o f the railling f4irc.r. H u t
A V E R E L L had not gone fur when l i e wits recallecl I)c un o r d e r tion1
( k n c r a l H O O K E R . leaving sTOXEM.4.* w i t h one ~ ~ i v i * i ~I)>nn t, ' bricade.
ani1 six pieces of artillery. aggregating 4,:%!9 men.
The ILpidnn wad crropned at Morton'* a n d 1Liwnon Ford# on the
:Wth, and thereafter u n t i l Yay 8 t h thcb coniniatiI1 *iibai*tcd entirely
o n the country tbruuyti which i t p u w d . .\t\er t d i k i n g pnmewaion
I,ouirrlr Court IFouw. SrosEMAS p n w c l l oil :tti~I de.itroyed the

mA

hL

P R I Z E ESSA I-.

P2

Bat ma p u t of h e main operations, t h e raid w w ill-timed. ItR

oomplete auoeeee, depending sa it did o n a Federal victory at C h a n cellolaville, WM frutrated through no fault of t h e cavalry or ita
dnimander. T h e detaching of STONZMAN'~
command, deprived
4 o o r r ~of wvalry at 8 time wben he particularly needed a coveri a g force to coned the movement6 of hie right, as well as to g i v e
tibely information of t h e Confederate concentration against l i i a
right &nk. T h e C ~ Y T E
DE PABIShas s a i d : **Theabaeoco of
@ONSHAN'~ 6ne cavalry bad probably been tho cause of HOOKZR'H
dofat OB he had deprived himeelf of all meane of o b h i n i n g informrtion wben aboat to e n t e r a n impenetrable foreat. Such was
J~CXBO
opinion,
N ' ~ expreeaed a few days before his dearti. * * *
From the moment be (HOOKER)
lied failed to compo1 LEEto r c treat, tbe r b l e m i g n e d to STONBMAN
lost almoet all ita importance. '*
Bat the cavalry brigade left with tho Arm)-of t h e Potomac p w formed moat valaable service.
On Yay 2d, General L B ~h:a v i n g concluded that u direct attack
upon the Union forces would provo futilo, determined to t u r n t h e
F d e n l riRht flank, a n d it6 execution wall entrueted to Genornl T.
J. JACKSON.
By 8 flank march along t h e F u r n a c e a n d Brock rond,
e&taally aooered by the h e a v y woods a n d by tho movemont8 of
FITZEUOELBX'S cavalry, JACKSONsucceeded i n placing t h r e e
divisions oppoeite t h e Union right.
On the afternoon of t h i s day, Generul PLEABARTOX
with t h r e e
8-11
cavalry rogimenta, the Sixth New York, E i g h t h Pennnylvania.
*all S e r e n t e e n t b P e n n a ~ l v a n i awae
,
orderod to amiet General SICKLES
in pomuiug tho enemy'a w q p n traine. F i n d i n g tho t i m e i n o p p o r t u p for a cavalry attack, PLUANTON
took position north of Scott'a
R a n , on t b e left of the Eleventh Corpe (HOWARD'S).
) J ~ o r e o n ' sattack o n this corps waa a completo surprise, a n d
in a demomliaiag rad panic stricken retroat o n i t s part.
waa notified, and tho E i g h t h
Anltbie WIM t a k i n g plaae PLMSANTOR
YeenayJvanir Cavalry wou dispatched at a gallop to check t h e
enqmg'e atmk at aoy wt, until preparatiooe could be made to
ioe them. W h e n t h i s regiment reached t h e acme of action,t
ABD had f.llen b k , and the enemy'e ekirmiah line had crowed
the road along wbiah the cavcrlry wua movinE. Lod by Colonol
E T, the regiment made m deeperato cbarge in column, at r i g h t
an lea to JACIKBOII'B
d a m n , losing three ofhem out of the five with

t
a

d tb.c*o W.t. VOL IV.

llb (amM PA-)
m rapaswsll(a pard..V d . U V . pur I

the regiment, a n d a b o u t t h i r t y men. but c . l i ~ k i ~ fioyr t t i p time bo.

i n g tho (.'onfederate a~lvarice.
Meanwhile PLEAS AX TO^, to wiiom t.vt-r>- r n c i n i r n t ' * delay wa..: i l l .
ralunble. had bcrn *training c o c r y effort to conc.erltnrtr arLillerr to
meet the advancing l i n e n . and before t h e enerny cainr i n e i g h t . had
suvctbeded in plecine twenty-three picce- of artillery ill p s i t i o n .
h u b l c . n h o t t c d with canister. aril1 supported by t w o tarnall cavslrj.
q u a d r o n n . The fugitivw from t h e Elerenth Gorp $warmed from
the wooda.and swept frantically over t h e field-. t h e e x u l t l l l y enemy
:at their heeln.
But as t h e latter d r c s near. t h e Federal artillery
opcned with tcrriblc cbffect. The C o n h i e m t r liuer. were thrown b a r k
i n di*orrier. and w i t h t h e arrival of reint'ort v n i c * r o t i t o 1 t h c I - n i n i i lint..
:riilcd by darknem, t h e e n e m y withdrew
It i8 irnpoRsible to 5ay what might harz happcrletl t d riot the
:Ittack of JA~-K.WS
s r i c t o r i o u n divisions b e e n ciler.kthtl. 'l'he .wcri.
6 c c of the brave cuv:rlry regiment well rcpsld t h e result* gained.
and illustrates tiow very oflrctire aa a c*iiier 01. tirne ttif ctiarRe i n
tlntik of e v e n B *inell body 01' cavalry ni:iy be. w h e n prwecutcd
w i t h vigor. I t war). periiepr. the nio*t i r n I ~ ~ ) r i i r t 1l t 1 i ~ tof
.
mourltr(j
work by n n i r i g l c t 4.zivaIr-v regiment diirtiic t h ~ <. ~ i i t i r t *w - a r

\'I
After ('naricc.llor*:rilto thc. O p l u w i r i g nrmic? rt*ctt,L1 trir a r i m e 0 1 1
"ppositc side3 ot' t h e liappaliannock. near Frtvlcrick-hurg.
During the e n t i n - month o f May Itit. cavfiiry 1*u* yrcatly
:tnno.;ed by l f 0 S R f . s niten. On tlic :hi. >fn?iHV aril1 othC.rw *urn~untIed
t i t ~ ym e n of t11(, Fir*[ Wefit Virginia. but t t i v Ixttcr w r r c rescued b r
3 brilliant c h n r p ut t h e Filth Sea- York.
Townrris t h e iniddlq of
the month the Fiwt S c w York ball a ukirrni-tl w i t h a portion of
>foseY'a w n m n l r d a1 t - p p r r ~ i i k O!ay
.
1?-14'1; and again on t h e
3 0 t h XOSBY
attacked t h e t r a i n of t h e Eiyhtli Michigan near C i t Iett.9 $tation, burninq i t . nrid e n p q i n g i i i :i q i r i t e d cavalry Bghc
w i t h t h e Fimr Vermont. Piftli N e w York. a n d a detachment of the
Serenth Michigan. Partly as an o t k t to t h e s e raids, t h e Eigbth
I I . i i i o i n Cnvalry WM w n t on a raiding expedition (May 20-26) ioto
King George. Westmoreland, Richmond. S o r t h u m b c r l a n d a n d
1,aocastcr counties. deetroying property e*timateci at onc million
d 0I lam.
Early in June STCABT'~
caralry were holding the forde.of tbe
upper Rappnhannock, t h e main body being near Culpepper Court
tiolrae arid Brtllldy Stntiou. I L retained ita diviaioii orKnoisation,
being conipoeed of 6 v e brigadee, a g g r e g a t i n g &lay 31st, 9,b36 men.

,I,:

'I
s4
1

.
To t b e r i g h t r e a r of

t h e A r m y of tbo Potomac, was t h e Federal

mtalry, m
d at Warrenton Junction under General PLEASANTON, who bad May 22d rteeomed command. It wae still organized
a s m 00of t h r e e dioisione, nombering in all 7,981 inen, a n d wa8

abc~gadwith outpoet d u t y from t h e neighborhood o f Falniouth to

warrenton, with o c w i o n a l expedition8 i n t o t h e c o u n t r y nbovc tlie
appr hpidan.
I I n Lm'e plan of invaeion of t h e S o r t h e r n ShllC6, hie first objcc
live WM Colpeper Coort House. HWKCBg u e w d LEE'Sintcationn,
a04 PLWWN wan ordered to make B reconnaieennco i n f i m e ,
b a y i n g fa ita object to diecover t h e ntrengtb, position, a n d possible
intgntiona of a n y body of Confederate troopn on t h e FredericksburpCu(peper road. But tho corps was hampered by tho addition of
t a g i n f a n t r y briKufee-acocoording
to t h e still prevailing idea as to
t h e employment of cavalry.
00 Jooe Sth, one diviep'n of t h e c a r d r y corpa ( B ~ P o B D ' s ) .
accompanied b y drre'e i n f a n t r y brigrde, WUB to crose the I h p p a b84nWk at Beverly Ford, und move by way of St. J a m c a Church, to
Brqndy Station. T h e eecond column, Gsroo'e a n d L)ITFIt'Y dil-ieioqs, a i t b RISIJBLL'Si n f a n t r y brigade, wae to croes a t Kelly's Ford,
and e e p m t i n g , GBMO WBB to proceod past Mount Dumpling to
B m d y Station, while DUFF^^ WM to tnko the left hand road to
Stetensburg.
By a etnnge coincidence, i t was STUART'~
intention on this m m e
d q to crom t h e r i v e r rt Beverly Ford and tho upper forde, a n d
dip&% t b e uttention of t h e Union forcee from Lee's movementa
nor$hnard--lrrter information nhowing t h a t he intended to invade
ICPt!yhnd.
*he order8 for the Federal cavalry divieione directed tbem to
o w t h e r i v e r at d a y l i g h t on t h e 9th, a n d poeh rapidly on to
Bra dy Station. U n d e r cover of Y heavy fog, a n d t h e noiee of a
nei bboring mill-dam, Bnrom'e c a n m a n d crowed t h e river at
4 0' look, surprieed t h e enemy,* a n d woold have captored bie guna,
badlit not been for t b e ontimely death of t h e brave Colonel B. F.
DA~UB
E i, g b t h N e w Yorlc Cavalry, wbo WM killed while c h a r g i n g
the oemy at the bead of hie brigade. T h e enemy'd force confronti n g be Federal aolemn waa superior in numbern, but in spite of'
tbie rot P L B A M M ~ Nhad formed line o f battle, croeeing t h e ford in
leu ban an boor. Bat t h e Coofederatee were in each force that no
ad nce WM d e anti1 O m ' r gens were beard on the enemy'H
left, hen a general a d v a n c e WM ordered.

1T-

P R I Z E E S S A Y.

P R I Z E ESSA I*.

wm-

k m s w so U.Cm#mcr r * T h e u r p r k "

25

T h e enemy fell back rapidly. a n d General S T ~ A I ~ head.

T'S
quarters. with all his papers, waa captured. .i junction W M m o n
fornied n it 1 1 GRIM. nnci w i t h heavy 10to both nidew t h e cncnijw:i!a pushed back to Fleetwood Ridge. It n m t h e n f o u n d that t h e
cncniy's infantry was a d r n o c i n g from Brandy Station a n d Culpepcr
Thc object ot t h e reconnaissance h a v i n g been partly pained. t h r o u g h
the tlcrelopiiient of t h e Confederate i n t a n t r y from t h e direction o f
c'iiIIwpt*r. aiid t h e information gained from t h e papera captured i n
tlic Confederate camp, o r d e w were given to Withdr21w-(;REGq
by
t l i c wny o f t h e ford at Rappahanriwk B r i d p . and BUFORDat
I h v e r l y Ford. B u t m t l i i a o r d e r wad b e i n g put into execution. t h e
~'onli.tlcr:iten mnde n heavy attack on t h e Union right, reeultinp i i i
t l i c mow[ aeriou..i t i g h t i n g o f t h e dag. The mounted chargoa. rallicrr,
:)rid counter.charges by t h e cavalry of b o t h side@. made this prc.
t w i n e r i t l y a cavalry fight of the mmt deepcrate character
A t 4 o'clock P. Y . a nuperior infantry force being about 1 0
:rdvaricc. I'LEAYAXTO?I ordered n withdrawnl, which waL* executed i n
coed order, tlie re c.rokding of t h e ricer being cfferbted about 7
tb'tlock P. Y .
T h e conteet had lapted for t e n bourn. end t h e wauoltiee a m o u n t iiig to Sdt; for t h e Federal troope, a n d 485 for t h e Conft.derates,*
attent t h e desperate character of t h e fighting. Although t h e battle
i I I u3trated all kinds of cavalry figb ting,-moun ted a n d diemou n tcd,
i t WILY principally mounted. STC-AUT
had t h e advantage i n poeition,
but t h e condition8 were most favorable for c a r a l r y operations: men
: I I I ~t,orac.a were i i i prime condition for actire eervicc; t h e groond
wa..i undulutiog. r i e i n g s l i g h t l y f r o m the river townrcls Brandy Station ; a n d t b e infantry on b o t h Riderr served priocipally a8 a rewrve.
13randy Station rounded u p t h e mccesafiil experienren of t h e
Federal cavalry at KELLY'JFord in March, a n d with t h e raiding
columii ot' S T O S K M A N i n April. I t was t h e firpt Kreat carairy cornbat of t h e s u r , a n d w a d reall? the t u r n i n g point i n the fortones of
tlic I'nion c a r a l r y . The Confederate cavalry had hitherto held
their opponent* i n contempt, a n d the latter b a d had doubtR ot'
themselvch.
B u t the experience of J u n e 9 . 1868. m7de t h e I ' n i o n cavalry. and
henceforth no one could doubt i t a eficiency, moonied or dismounted.
MCCLILLAX
l i mid:
~
&'Onem a l t of incalcolabla importsiicv w r tainly did follow thia battle- it made t h e Federal cavalry. Up
this rime confeaaedly inferior to t h e h o t h e r o hornmoil, they p i n e d
-~

.Omew -Io.

mpscclmly.

RcbslllOm B.aDld* VOL X x V I I , hIU I M d 11. pill IX M d 119

-7
I

P R I Z E E S S A I-.

PRIZE E3SA Y.

on, tbie day tbat 00nfide0~0in tbemeelvee and their commander#,

wbioh enabled t h e m to contest BO fiercely, t h e eubeequeat battle60lde of June, J n l p and October. "*

VII.
Ln'a s e e o n d a b j e c t i v e waa the forda of t h e o p p e r Potomac,

and

thew he proposed to reach by t b e Valley of t h e Shonandoab, where,

Mcsrrled h m obeervrtion by t h e mountain ranges on bie r i g h t ,
biri&ety could be eecared by holding the moaotaia puuroe connecking the valley with t b e main theatre of o p e r a t i o n a He entrr&ted thie duty to STWAtKT'e cavalry, enpported by LOIPOBIRCET'B

iowntry oorpe.

!By J a n e 16th STUABT

had puehed forward to t h e Bull Run
Mopntains, and held Thoroughfare a n d Aldie Gape, trammed
m o p c t i v e l y by the main m a d f q m Winchester to -4lexandria, a n d
tbe,MaMssrre Gap Railway. He ale0 occupied Rectortown, a n d
lam on, Middleborg, from which poiote be could reinforce eitbcr
on81 of the two pawee, ae occasion required.
On J o o e 13th t h e cavalry corpe of tbe A r m y of tho Potornnc w m
conwntmtod at Warrenton J n n c t i o n , a n d h m t h o 14th to t h e l f t b ,
wad oovering t h e movement of the main army north ward.
f i d e movements were, however, M) well concealed, that on the
llt& the cavalry corps waa eent to obtaio ioformntion. Thie WBR
o n e l o f t b e very t h i n e t h a t STUART
had been inetrnctod to prevont.
PLWANTON
p r o p e d to move to Aehbp'e G a p i n tho Blue
Rid& by w a y of Aldio. To do thia, be moved on Aldie w i t h

BWBD'S
and GBUM'Bdivieione --BABNW'~ divieion of

i n f a n t r y in
detached Dn~rrLwith hie regimerrt, the F i m t Hhode
Ielabd Cavalry, to march to Middleburg, by way of Thoroughfare
It wae expected t h a t D U P F Iwould
~
rejoin t h e main command,
aRe4 i t had p a d tbrougb Aldio, by way of Union, Purcellville,
rop)ort-and

Old

and (Nolan'sFerry.
MUNFOBD'~brigade of STUABT'R
cavalry WM a t Aldie, a n d
G~cm+o'edivieion encountered his o o t p o ~ l so n t h e 17th in&. A
Bpiengagement eoened,in which t h e a d v a n t a g e remnined with
t h e (Federal aavalry, the e n e m y w i t h d r a w i n g from tbe field a n d
0000 y i n Middleborg
~
tbat night. T h e cmualtiee were q u i t e h e a v y
tb sides, aggregating for the Federal troop 305 killed,
woo ded and miming, and for the Confederatee, 119. There waa
moonted a n d diemounted f i g b t i n ~on both eidee., t b e greater
O0
num r of orredtiw on tbe Federal aide, being doe to tbe obetioate

f3I

-a I3JimSm'd8Ru(%arnlrY,kp

1
';

rcsiatnncc of the Confederate abarpahooters. p a t 4 behind *tone

wall^. Y r r A R r , in hi3 report of t h e engagement. pronounced Aldic
. . O I W of t h e most aarryuinary battlea of the war."
Meanwhile, D I ' F F I E hod proceeded through Thoroughfare Gap,
rvlicrc h e encotantered t h c oncmy'c outpostcl. Ae his o r d e m direcicd
Iiiin to procecli to Middlcburg. he kept on. a n d wap nltimatelr *orrouiiilcd by Clf.4MBLIL*'S and ROB~?RTSOS.S(-'onfederate brignclce.
L ) I . F T I C . witti f<>urotticem and taenty.serrin men only. Yucccetled i n
tlscupi ng.
On t h e l!*th P L E A S A X T
advanced
~S
againat the ('onfeclcrntc.; a t
Mi4ltllcburg. T h r e e brigades under ( i R l l l i O mor-ed on the town.
ntiilt. , ) n e brigade w w s e n t to outdnnk t h e encmy's position.
Thc.
tig1itin.g was of t h c moat desperate character, t h c Fedchral forccp,
:w I'L E A ~ A S T OXstated in a letter to ~ I O O K B R* -, really f i ~ t i t i n ginfailtry heliiritl stone =all*.'' T h o euemy's ripht Aank was tinally o u t flanked b c Jisniounted akirmishem. a n d fell bark to a 3troogcr
poaition. halt'a mile to t h e rear.
The twine evening STC-ART
wae rcinforced b y Jo~um's hrizade
from Vnion ; and 011 t h e l'Oth, b v HAMPTOS'S
bripnde. which relieved
(.'HAYBLISS on t h e Uppcrville h a d .
011the 213t S T ~ A R T
liiic
' ~of
~ fire brigade3 extended from Middlebiirg to Union, confronted b y eix brigades of Fedcral cavalry, pop.
Ibitrted by a diriaion of infantry. Camo's ditieion moved tqsinmt
the enemy's right, while BCIOBD'Y advanced toward raion to turn
the Coilfedcrate ien. .%a EO oReo happened, ~ ~ R E G G ' movement,
S
tlttlugh iittendcti oa n feint only. developed into t h e principal fight
of tho day. Protected by the heights, the e n e m y stubbornly r c 4 c t r d
c;REoO'S adotrace, but were etcrdilg driven back to Vpperrillc.,
wliere the first division ( B c F o R D ' ~ ) which
,
had cloeed i n o n t h c
wcontl diriaion o n ita left, cooporated w&h i t in thc attack on t h e
towii.
I I e r c t h e enemy had masaed hia c a r a l r y , .witb his artillery
i i i position at Adlrbg'm G n p ; b u t after repeated chargee a n d countcrch;,rgos, W ~ L +d r i v o i i from t h e town. a n d his *Leads withdrnwal map
tinally chrrnKed to a headlong retreat towarda Aehbg's Gap.*
T h a t night a portion of IAOSOaTREXT'S infantry corpe ~ ~ . c . u p i e ~ l
the gap; a n d STI.-ART'S
command, BJ t h a t general any* i n his report.
W W I '*ordered farther back for rest and refrealiment, of wllicli it
WIIS sorel-r in need."
And on J u n e P2d. h a v i n g accomplislled tlie
objects of t h e expedition. PLEAJAXTOX
fell back to Aldie, arid a few
daya later joined tho A r m y of t h e Potomac.

28

PRIZE ESSR Y,

I n tbeet. operations, t b e cavalry corps had admirably pcrformed

t h e dntiee of screening t b e movements of t h e A r m y of t h e Potoniac,
aotl of reconnoitering t h e enemfa movements. Some of B u ~ o s n ' s
t
scoots o n t h e heighte of t h e Blue Ridge had actually Reen a Contbderate i n f a n t r y camp, two mTlm io length, in t h e ValleF of t h e
Shboandoah. A t the s a m e time, LEE was uncertain o f t h e m o w mmta of t h e A r m y of t h e Potomac. T h e success of t h e engage.mento at Aldie, Middleborg, a n d Upporville, brought increowing
cm~fidenceto t h e ofaccra a n d mon of t h e Federal cavalry.
Within 6 v e days it had driven t h e Coofedorate cavalry t h r o i i g h
a q u n t r y capable of a moat stubborn defense, as far RR t h e base of
t h a B l a e Ridge; hud proved itR ability to cope,mounted or dismountod,
wit& it43 formidable urrtagonish; a n d had been ablo to fut-niali i n fortnation of a most important character to t h e commrnder.in chief.
During this t i m e t h e Army of tbe Potomac had, under cover
of the cavalry, moved from Fredericksburg northward, covering
Wsehington a n d Bultitnoro. a n d on J u n e 25th and "th, had croaded
the Potomac at Edward's Ferry. Upon reaching Frederick, G c n era1 Hoorra w w , u t hie own requeet, relieved from commarid of
t h e army, a n d General ~ A D WBB
E appointed in biw stead.
w h e n PLEASANTON,
on J u n e 22d, withdrow from contact with
tbe eoemy he employed t h e few d a y s in which hie corps was o n out
poet d u t y i o re6tting. His horae8 nocdod shooing badly, atid hi9
aoqmand reqoired both ratione and forage. O n J u n e 27th the
divbioos o f B U F O ~and
D Gama croeed t h e Potomac in rear of t h c
infiPtry, a n d o n t h e following d u g P now cavalry division, c'ompnsod
of tbe clrvalq- hitherto guarditig Waahington under General STAHEL,
wpPe/.Ilaigned to t h e cavulry c o y p ae t h e T h i r d Division. General
N KILPATEICRWUR aerrigried to command it, with Generals
FA BWOBTB ( a n o6Iccr promoted from t h e E i g h t b IllinoiR Volunteer
Ca-lry) uud Cnmrr as his brigade commandore.*

JT

VIII.

o Jnoe 24th STUART'S

cavalry started on a raid which WZIU
dea ned to have 8 moet i m p o r t a n t effect upon t h e battlo of Gettlynbo ,aboot to follow. Ita parpoee wpc) to c o t t h e commonications
oft 8 Federal army, destroy t h e immense wagon train8 i o rear of
t h a t army, and create a moral eiTect by throutening the national
tho

I
I

d chs a
-

at tu&

JW la.trotd,re ~ p p o d l x
10 and 11.

30

PRIZE E S S A Y .

about, a n d b y

(L counter-charge- ropulsod thu u i b c k

Mciriiwhilc.
tho Sixth Michigan, which had been left for awbilo at LitLlceto\on,
LEE'S
w b hurried up, a n d was attacked on roota by FITZEUOH
brlgde. A b o u t noon t h e e n t i r e division wae united at H a n o v c r ,
rad a o t i l dark kept u p a viRorooe ekirmiehing with t h e e n e m y ,
now holding t b e hills eoutbweet of t h e town.
STUABT'II
dispoeitione, i n g n a r d i n g t h e long line of wagon* hc
had oaptured, wore eocb an to prevent hie rapid doploymcnt
Orberaise, he m i g h t have overcome t h e rear of RILPATUICK'J
columii
b&re i t could h a v e beeo reinforced .4a it waa, STCART'S
elongatccl
oolhmn gave a 600 opportunity for a encceaafirl attack b y tho Fed
e d oommander, whioh b e fuiled to cake complete rrdvantnge of.
p h o i p a l l y b u e e he WM unable to concentrate hie scattered
~ ~ f Bot
b .J~LPATEICK'B Bnal atand had t h e effect o f atill f u r t h e r
efforts to join LEE.
delbyinR STUAIIT'II
T h i s enoouuter, couplod with hie eflorta to aave t h e wugon
train which ehbarraased hie movements, a n d t h e fact t h a t tic
belh~edLIB tb be near the Sueqoebnnoa, forced STUARTto make u
dewor to t h e eest, F i n e ; tlimogh Jefferson a n d Dover, a n d o o dworing b carry oat hie original ihetructions aa to keeping in
bubb with Ewlru'e right. S w i n g i n g northward to C a r l i d e on July
ht,l8TUIDT learned to h i s dismay, t h a t t h e Confederate a r m y was
at b t t p b o r g , and t h a t , in s p i t e of the exbansted condition of Iris
m m m a n d , he most push eouthwrrrd with all haete, in o r d e r to be
He
p-ot
at the expeoted enwontor of t h e two great armiem
themfore moved rapidly toward8 Gettyabnrg, while I(ILPATRICK,
wbd had meanwbile been a c t i n g on interior linea, marched to
Ber in, by way of Abbobtown, for t h e purpose of throwing hiniaclf
k A 8 T ' I I path, but the Confederate commander aucceedcd i n

-+

e h ag bim.

*Pbile L L ~ L P A T S I ~ had
~
been fbllowing STIJABT,
t h e Firet Cuvlrlry
Dioibion (Bumno's) bad marohed to Middletown, cooorin< tlie lett
of t)e army, aod wrhhiog the enemy in the diroction of Ilagcreb r d . While in oamp at Middletown, Bnmm improved tlic o p p r tnai p to 8bW bin horses and m6t The h o d Divieion ( G R c ~ ~ o ' J )
11tationed at d i m r e n t poiota h m Frederick City to Ridguville

P R I Z E 6.3s. 1 I-.

31

ut Fnirtiold.
The Second C a r s l r y D i v i g i t J n o n t t i : r i 1l:ry nitlvcd to
Wontminstcr oii tho right flank of t h e a r m y . p ~ t r o I I ~ tthi e~ c8)untry
between Tork and C'nrlisle.
011J u n o 30th B ~ F O U D 'Fimt
S
and Second Briqadt-s ii1orcd t,).
ward*: Gettysburz, mecbting e n route t w t ) Coiit.(lerate i n f a n t r y
regimc.ntn, with artillcry, and bt'caruc i n r o l c t ~ ~i ili :L *kirini*h. But
iiaJt wiNtiing t o uue h i $ artillery. le.* hc c a u w :r iwv-iiaturt. coiicentration of t h c orioniy'q torcva, a i d t h u a di*:rri.aiagc ( ; c n u r a I 3 l e . t .*~ ~
plana. BCFORL,t o r n r d aqido and pny*ing tIirou:Li
Eti~n~itt..ibnr~.
rcaclicd Gt.tty..ibur< d u r i n g ttbe ntteriinoti. I I i - nrrivxl w8.1 mout
t i m e l y . T h e enemy'* udraiice \va* ju-t c ~ i i t c r i i i thc
~ town. anlj
BL-PORII
WBS ablu to drive it 1iac.k i i i t h r . t l i r t * ~ ~ t i ot'
~ ) l l('.t-htowii
before i t gairiell a foothold.
~
3 I ) t t i sci)ciliii.' Icirtic- I r ~ ~ i 1<TFOR1)'6
ii
I)uriiig the. night I I Juiic
tlivitriori patrollell t h e c o u n t r y i n a l l dirct.tit)ii* So iiitbrnirrtioil of
value could be obtained from ttic itihahit:ribtq. : r t ~ * l i t w a * only
through the untiring exertion* of t h c w p i t n i l * tti:rt t h e c.svslry
cornmaric1t.r learnod b y daylight o f July I*[. that i l i t , i . ?i t'orlv of t h c
C'oiifucivratc a r m y had r t w h e d CuditI~vFii. :in(] tll:it I 1 i . r picketn.
compoqed of itifantry and artillcry. w r - w w i t l i i i i -i<III 01' ttic Fa.dei.nl
picket*. BCFoRD s c c o r d i n c ~ yfnnde c'\-ery effort
1141111
Itit, enemy
i n check until byllolda corps. encamped t i r e mile* *tpitth of him.
could a r r i v e oil t h e groun'i. IIia traiiic.11 cyt. tiaal O w n oiruck a t
once with t h e atrategic importance of Gctty*t)urg. From 1 1 i ~ -town
nt lenat t e n roada radiutrd i n differeiit dirtsctioiih, arid thc coniman(1
i n g g n u r i d above the town offered extraortlinary udrantapcp to the
a r m y which should t i n t gain poewaeioii. I t riecrnn apparent that
were a t the time aware of
ncitlwr General I,Br nor General YCADC
the atrateqic importance of t h o p k e . * TO B I . F O R D beloagd ttte
taredit of t h e s e l e c t i o n of Gettj-sburg as a field of battlc,t slid the
cool equanimity witb which be dispoecd h i s t w o insignificant
brigadea, wbon h c p i t i v e l y knew that t h e whole of tionera1 A . p.
HILL'Sforce waa a d v a n c i n g againet bim. m u n t excite t b e admiration
of aoldiera t b e world over.

' 'I
32

PRIZE ESSA Y.

P R I Z E E S S A Y.

IX.

~ J r ~ l i ~1r1i) dp r o c ~ 4to \VcutniiiiJtcr to a 4 s t i r i guarding t t r r *upply

tr:biiirj art t1i:rt point.
Mc-anwliile tlic Secoiiti Cavalry Divi5ion under GBF.IM had beeti
moving n l ~ i i gt h o riglit flank of the Fcdersl army. On Juric 2:)tti
it covcrsd tlic couiitry bctwceii York : r i i d Carlicle with patrota. 011

BUWW bad plaoed G A H B L Bbrignde,

'~
to which was atmctiud
O r e u ' e battery OF t h e Second United Stotoe Artillery, on tho IcIt,
comwdng witb Drvrr's brigade acroes tbe Cbambereburrr Road.
about one mile in front of tbe eeminary. One eection uf ('ALEY'S
bafiterywan p b e d on each side of t h e Casbtown Road, covering the
Pp~rfxwhe13,aod the tbird eection was on tbe right of the left rogimmt. DBVIN'Sbrigade WRI)Bon the left of tbe Fimt Brigade, ita
rigbt reetiog o n the Yummauburg Road.
dioiaioii of thtb
,Between 8 and 9 o'clock in tbe morning HETH'S
Coafederate army advanced along the Caubtowri Road, and BCPORD
eeok a sqoadron from each brigade, part of which wae dianiountcd,
to bploy ao etirmishere, and support the pickets. Groduully the
abble of tho cavalry, dismoanted, became involved, and arl BCFORII
bad Mid: "The line of battle moved off proudly to meet the
eneby."
In a ebort time t h e enem'y'a fire becoming unbearable
thrbogb ever iocnureing numbom, the l i n e of battle w a s moved
bwk about 200 yarda Here w i n the disrnouiited cavalry fought
deepmtely, and CALEI'Bbattery did tremendooe execution i n tlic
fmtl of an overwbelming 5re. Indeed, at one time twelvu ot' the
enemy'r guns were concentrated on tbie battery. For orcr two
b o w t h e enemy WUI beld i o check by tbie little forco of lesa thari
3,oqO eB'tive
men, when tbearrioal of the Firet Corpa under Gcne& BXTNOLW,
mrved to relieve the cavalry from ita perilous
puoikion. During t h e grerrter part of the remainder of tho day,
b o T v e r , t h e cavalry continued to fight side by eido with t h o i n fantpy; and portione of the Eighth New York, Third Indiana, and
Twdlfth Illinoia regiments, poeted bebind a low stone wntl within
eboatt carbine m o p of t h e enemy, did tremeridoue orocution and by
tbei/-Bre prevented t b e turning of tbe loa dank of General DOUHLEDAY a oommand.*
Part of t b e Third Indiana Cavulry found homohol43re, borrowed mumketa, and fought witb t h e Wieconain Regiment
t to relieve tbem.
First C . v a l a y Division bivooacked that night on the field
th ita pieleta extending a l m o s t to Fairfiold. Early nest
ng, wbile reoonnoitering t b e onomy'e rigbt, it bccanic c u with Confederate sbarpebootere, but uucceeded i n holding ite
ion until relieved by the Third Corpa Then, at the riak of
be Fedeunl army's left flank unprotected by cavnlry, i i W U R
O m m u % noon y.: ''bo

h a k boa bang brood, aod m

33

t l r s : 3 0 t l i s due tu tlic crieniy's conwntr:ttion u t Gcttyaburg. i t I ~ f i

I)rig:ttlc ( I I ~ . E Y ' s ) to covcr the depot at Wcetniinritt.r. aiid w i t h
tlis t w o otlicr I)ri:,.adzc, moved t o n positioii 4 1 1 1 the t r i r e m e ri,glit
tilriik of t l i c * Ftdcrnl titic. of'battlc. w i t t i q,rticn to prevent t l ) c cncrny
t'i-)ni turning the fluiik ur gaiiiirig t h e rear.
The jio3ition of this divisi~~ri
:rt the iiitt,r*cction t ~ ft l i v c;cttys.
burg arid I h n o v s r turnpike w i t h the ro,ntl i n rear of ttic Federal
line of battle. w a s takc*ii about noon July L'd. A lint, of pickcttt
u a s i~stablisli~d
LO the t'ront, conncctinc \vi111 the right of t h e i n -

i)iit>

t:hiitry line. 'rt)wZrdri cvcniug :In attcnil~twas made to dialodp

w m e of t l i c ericiiiy'rr aharpaliooters. po.;tcll i n tront of t h e division,
r c 9 u l t i n g i r i t l i c enciny's wilding 3 regiment of infsntry (.%cond
Virgiiiia) to nicet tlic diamourited cavalry The key to the p a i t i o n
WLJ :I well b u i l t stone wall running along the top of the ridge, tu
tlic riplit of tlic Ilanorsr road. Each side raced for the wall at full
i p c c ~ l .but tlic tire from RASK'S battery, Third Pcnnsj-lrania Artillery. iiclnyed the cncrnj- long ciiough for t h e dismounted cavalry
t o reach thc wall first and pour R withering firo from their breechlt)aditig carbines i n t o tlic Confodcrntc infantry line, not more than

twenty ! k t distant. The result was decieive.

The Ibllowing day. J u l y 3d. t h i e caralry division which bad for
a time been withdrawn tioni it* poaition of the previous day, w m
:train orticred to the right of the line. with ordere to make a demon-trntion againFt t h e enemy. T b o First and Third Brigade8 were
:igai[i poetcd on thc right of the infantry, this time about threeIourtha of a mile nearer the Baltimore and G e t t p b u r g turnpike. for
tlic reason that CCSTBR'S
brigade of the Third Cavalry Divieion had
h e n detached front that division and warl occupying the ground
i i t b l d the dny bcfi)ru hy t h e Sccorid Cavalry Divieion.
Dismounted
.ikirmislicre from the Sixteenth Pennsylvania Cavalry were deployod
through the wood?r i n the diroction of Gclty-8burg.
About noon a dirrptltcli reached General GBEOO,saying that a
I:trgc Imdy o f the enemy's cavalry were observed from Cemetery
Hill. : t i i d u-crs niooirig:qainrrt the right of the line. In conaoqucnce
.if t l i i a inforniatioii, CI-STER'Sbrigade, w h i c h had been ordered back
!IJ
K I L P . ~ T ~ ~ ~ command
x's
on the left of t h e line, wap held by
(.icncral C;sec;ri u n t i l after t h e e n e m y ' s a t l a r k

rhleh we nude y.lnst the enemy. pm

a dlrLlon ol oar Inhatry."

t
P R I Z E ESS.1 Y.

PRIZE E S S A 1'.

34

Thie Confederate colorno, moving to t h o nttack, wnlr STUART'*

h v a l r y , wbiob, belated by obstacles already mentioned, WDR 311
vanainpt i n h n t of EWELL'S
corpe. STUART
took ponition upon :I
ridge which controlled a wide area of coltivntod fiulda. His plan,
( ~ eteted
8
i o hie of3cial report, wae to employ the Fedornl troops i i i
front with ehrrpebaotere, while a cavalry force wan movod again4
cavnlry
tbeir dank. He aye: 6 ' 1 moved this command (JCNKIN'S
brigade) and W.H. F.L d e secretly through the woods to a ponition, r o d hoped to effect a eurpriee u p o n tho onomp'a rear." Taken
famous charge, STUART'S
diaponitionq
io combination with PICKBTT'~
were euch that h e hoped t o ~ e i a otheopportune momont to profit by it.
To meet this attack t h e Fitat Now Jersep was posted aa mouliietl
ekirmishere to t h e r i g h t and front i n a wood, tho Third Peiinuylvania wna deployed a8 dismounted skirmiShorn to the leA and front
in open 6elds and t h e First Maryland Cavalry W M placed on the
Hanover Tornpike, io position to protect tho right of tlio line.
Io a ebort time the skirmiehing bocame very briek, and thc nrtillery fire 00 both eidee very heavy-the
Federal artillcry under
RABDALLand PIINIWOTON,
deliverinp an extremely aecumto fire.
To eouoteract the advance of the Federal skirmiah line, about to cut
off 8 portion of bia sbarpebootem, YTUABT caused a regiment of W.
H. F. LII's brigade to charge. This waa met by the Seventh
Yiobigan, bat without apparent advantngo. both regiments d i u
obargiog their carbines acrose a stone and rail fence, face to face.
Tb'e First Michigan Cavalry, aided by firing from CEESTEB'Sbatterp, made a obarge which, followed by n deaporate hand-to-haiid
Bgbt, drove the Confederate line back in confusion. Thon followed
conotercbarges by the Coofederatee, until a large part of b o t h commaode were involved i n t h e m e l d , and whilo withdrawing peat a
wood toward8 bie leR, the enemy was cbnrged io flank by tho
First New Jersey Cavalry. I n tbia torrible cnvalry combat, ovcry
poeerile Wneapoo was utilized. I o a dash for a Confederate battlch p t e i n NIWEALL
wae received by ita bearor upon the poiot of'
the BpBBr head, which hnrled NBWEALL
to the ground. And after
the b t t l e mea were found interlocked in each othor'a arms, with
tin80 6rmly imbedded io the flesh w to require force to remove
therm* T h e Confedernte brigades crumbled away. retiring behind
their artillery, and a h r dark withdrew to the York Road. The
Federal crreualtiee bad amounted to 254, and the Confederate to 18l.t

___L

-and

tpbbrllbn
bum. (WU-

Lrdenol rhe Clrtl W u ,VoL 111. p 40%

%
vel.
1. P.
h I ( 11. P. 714

=vu.

Om'.

FiKbl at c , r l i ) a

LrrlsnOf 8beCivtl WU.)

Md

'I
'

A,' l h ,
.,

I.

, 1 1 1 1,

..

..

:
1:

TIiiH ,graiitl cavalrc combat.* on the right of the FcJcrlrl linu of

tiartlc, ha*. l i k e Br-Foeo'a glorioua e t a n d i n t h c tiret day'* figlat,
Iwvcr received the rcco:nition which it.- importance derervctl. IIud
STUART'S
plari o r striking the rear of thc Cnion army simullancoriuly
w i t t i t l ~ cdcwpct-ut0 c*harg,* of I ' r c K m on C'ernetcry R i d g e , > U c c C c d d .
the r w u l t of the battle cit' G e t t p b u r g would cortainly have bccbri
iliffercrit.
Tlic occti*iori !or STL-ART'S
at1at.k wnc n i w t opportune
Tlic
tide of b n t r l c twtwceri the Ion? liocs of irifnritry, had been wavering, first o11c way and then the other. IIad S T I ' A R T . w i t t i h i *
vetereii c:tvulry, gairicd the re:ir of t h e linc of b:rttlc. t h e P S I I I C .
which would I i s r c undoubtcdlg t'ollowcd, would h a v e bcvtr itiorc
tharl rrutlicicut i o win LIIC day for the Coufederatc' c'auw.

s
thc Fcdcr:rl lett another great cavalry battlc w a s takinA t t c r K I L I ~ A T H I C ciicountcr
E'~
w i t h STL'AHT'?;
cavalry ut
l h n o v c r , J u t i c :Wth, i t w i l l be rcniciubcred that t h c Third Cavnlr?.
Divi*ion marched on thc following dag to Berlin v i a .\bbottatow~~.
tor [tic purpow of intercepting STUART.Sot finding h i m there, a
tlctuctinicnt uiidcr I.icutcnnat-Colonc1 . \ I . E X A S D C B followed STUART
to 1to.uaviIlc.. On J u l y L'd, the accond day of tlic battle ut' Gcttgoburg. K ~ L I ~ A ~ Rreceived
I C K orders to march as quickly D*I poasiblc
to [ t i c buttleticl~l. Ilere he received furtlicr orders to move over
t h e C;ettgaburg.Abbotstown Road. and see thwt t h e ciieniy did not
turn the Federal lelt flaiik. While noarinp: Huntcretown. KILPATRICK
WLH attncked by a heavy cavalry force i r i po3ition. which proved to
CVYTEE~,
*-bow brixudc WRM lead
tic HAMITON'S
a n d L E ~ brigadah.
S
iiig, at oiicc covered tlic road with a line of mounted akirmiehcrs,
w b i l c dismounted ekirniishcrn n e r c thrown out on each aide bchirid
the fences wbich flanked the road. T h e leading equadron of the
Sixth Micliigari Cavalry charged down the road. and t w o q u n d r o n s
werc diamountod and deployed along a ridge to t h e right. PE?Isisarox'r] battery took p d t i o n io tbeir rear. T h i a gallant c h a r , p
of t h e lending squadron was futile against t h e suporior force which
i t cncountered, but it gained time. A counter.charge, wbich the
enemy attempted, wad repelled by t h e diRmountcd skirmiaheru willi
their Spencer repcatiog carbinea.
TIic po*ition w f a held until near midnight. nhcn KILP.4TBlrK
received orders to marcb to Two Toverna. Reaching there enrly i n
0 1 1

plncc.

'

__

..

*Known CI Rurnrncl'a P u m

35

PRIZE E S S A I*.

36

tho morning of J u l y 3d, tho tirod troopers wurc nllowc~lo .rIicjrt

bivouac. Bot hardly had tho mon of CUSTER'Sbrigade strctchcd

themrrolroe on t h e ground, when ordersarrivcd, deurching them, : r n t I

directing the brigado to take position on tho CTnion right,* w h c r r ,
an haw been seen. t h e y roiidored such signal aid to the .Second
Cavalry Dirinion.
T h e Union left had boen duprivud of protectioii by the tietaching of BUFORD'S
division LO \ V o ~ t m i r l ~ l con
r July ?vi, 40 tt1:rt
at 8 o'clock t h o morning of Jiily 3d K l L P A T R l r K received order*
from General PLEASANTON
to move to t h e loft of tho lino w i t h h i *
whole command a n d t h e Rusurvu Brigado, mcnnwhilc ordcrud u p
from Emmittsburg. T h e purposo was to attack the cncmy'u rigtit
a n d rear, at tho aame time prcvonting, if possible, tlic t u r n i n g I)!'
t h e Federal left.
The result of tho Confudcratu operation9 of the tiny befibre h:id
induced them to believe t h a t another attack on t b e Federal rlclit
would succwd. The column of attack was to consist of P I C K E T T ' S ,
RETE'S, a n d a p a r t of PENDEB'6 divisionn, PICRETT being on t h c
right.
General FARNSWORTH
ruachcd hi8 position to t h o left a n d tiorit
of the Round Topn." a b o u t 1 o'clock P. Y., a n d became cngspeil
with hie mkirmishere, t h c Coilfederato divieion immodiatcly oplio*cd
to him being HOOD'U
division under General LAW. About t 1 i i . r
t i m e ( 1 o'clock) began tho g r a n d cannnnadc from 115 piecen of'
artillery, which wa6 to procede tho aananlt of t h c Coiifoderntc i n fantry column. T h o arrival of FARNSWORTH'Y
brigade had ttic
effect of coiietantly threatening LAW'S
riKht, a n d greatly crnbari-acsctl
t h a t general's movomente. t
6'

Maowbile, the Roeerve Brigade under MERRITT,having marchcd

tiurn Emmitteburg, did not reach itn po8ition on FARNSWORTfi'Y left
until a b o u t 3 o'clock.
T h e n , advancing along tho Gottyaburg Road,
ItfEEBm'e dienionnted ekirmiahem caused LAW to dotach a l u r p
force from his main lino in o r d c r to protect his flank a n d rear.

"

38

P R I Z E E.KS.4 1'.

PRIZE E S S A 1'

K I L P ~ T R I C diri4ion
K'~
tiad rn:irc.lrcd 1111 .I uly 4111 from
Etirniitraburc. w h e r c i c u'a* j o l n v d t i ? 11 l'E1"S brigade
s b t ' G R E W ' L diri3inri.
~
a114 fmjm theii1.c i t niovcd towarmis >Iotitcrer.
witti i t i c i r i t r ~ i t i o r i of ~ i e s t r o y i n the.
~ c . 1 1 e r n ~ ' -aa:un trvit~?iriear
II:igemt,iwii. -1tIcr a -erica of conitiat- witti S T ~ A Rcavalry.
T'~
the
Thin1 Divi-ion reached S m i t h b u r g on J u l stti.
~ tlariri: entirely de*trnyccl I large waKon ti-ain of E W E I . L
<. a i 1 4 tinving captured l . 9 t i O
priuoncr3. uiie battle-flnp nnd a large riurnbc-r ot hones nnd mules.
0 1 1 J u l y 6 t h . whilc BUFORD
W M a t u c k i r i g \Villiarnsport. K I L I'ATRIVK attacked STC-ART
at UaKcr-towu. rwultiiig ii! that general's
3urpri-e and retreat toward9 Circencutle, K i I . i B A T R i t * K then enlfcav.
orccl to cooperate with U ~ F O R aDt \'Yilliani-p~.~rt.
b u t !ailed to gain
aiiy material advantage. T h e euemy, tionever. was forced t o burn
1
a large train nurttiwe*t 01' IIagerutowri.
From the i t l i until t h e 14th ot' J u l y . K I L P A T R ~ C Kd'i?o r ~ i o nW B ~
coristantly engaced wiLIi t h e enemy 011 r t r c right ot the Federal
nrniy. :LS aw B t . F O R D ' S division o n t h e I d , and 1 l i . E \ - ' $ briqade of
(;Rruci's division i n the center.
Meaowtiile (;REGO had followed the cricrny hy uay ot Ca*Iitonn.
whore L) nunibcr t ) t ' priaoncrs w e r r captured
Ttic d i r i ~ i o nthen
~ lkmiicfiboroueli :
proceeded by way of Mariori and ~ ' t i s r i i l w r - b i i r to
.\lf-I?rToSFi'J b r i g a ~ I ctwiny platwl nt EiiirniLta1)urc
prevcnt raid- -.
$11 the Contcderute cavalry towurds tlic Fcderal reur.
O n July 1 4 t h . GREI~O.
w i t h > l c I s T O d E ' s a1111 I R V l S GREW;L bripades, cm~ncdt h e I'otoniuc at Harper'e Ferry. and being reinti)rced
by IC-ry'sbri,cnliv. marched t o Stici,tierddto\r-n w i t h n r i c a of
atriking tht. ciic.rny in flank and rear On the ltith. I I r r ~ ' sbricatle
not being p r c w n t . C;REGO am attacked by the enemy i n Ibrcc.
After a spirited engagement. l s a t i n r r 811 day. t h e e n e m y withdrew.
und KILPATRICK
s JiriPions followed
On t h e Pame dny BL'PORD'S
the cricrny closely to FallinC Watcb. capturing many pri.sonem.
three b:ittlc.flar-. a n d a Iarce q u a n t i t y of stores.
After July 15th t h e pursuit ot' the e n e r n r through tlie Loudon
Valley. and acrow t h e Rappahannnck River. w a s macle by detacbliincntn. and the Gcttywburp: campaign. ao far aa the moremerit* of
the cavalry corpa aw concernud. proporly closed at t b a t date.
I3y t h e end of J u l y t h e e n t i r e cavalry c o r p naa concentrated
about Warrenton, K a r r e n t o n Junction. a n d Fayetterille, Virginia.
and aas again engaged in picketing tho Kappabannock. T h e CBRualtie* o f tlie corpe from J u n e 28th to July 31*t, conawtect of 1,949
killed, wounded, and miming.
Mviinaliile

to, was entirely eorrouoded, bot aocceodod in c u t t i n g itn wny back

with a loee of but five killed a n d four wounded, bringing with i t
a nombem of priaonere.
All t h i n g s considered, i t . aeems wonderful t h a t tliowe four re@men- did not nuffer a qreater percentage, of killed, wounded nnd
miming.* It can, perbsp, beet be accouotod for by the mnral
effect of the charge, a n d the fino horsemanship w i t h w h i c h t h e
ferrleee bmpere leaped t h e obntaclea a n d eaberod tho infantrymen
io t h e i r poeitioos. Of tbie, t h e Confederate General LAW has raid:
&'ItWM impoeeible to uae oar artillery to a n y rrdvantagc. o w i n g to
t h e close q u a r t e r e of t b e a t t a c k i n g cavalry with o u r own mcn, the
leading aqudroos forcing thoir bomea u p to t h e verj- muzzle# of
t b e rifle8 of o u r infantry."

(;etcysburg

XI.
T h e Federal victory at t h e battle of G e t t p b u r g OWCR m u c h
t h e cavalry. BUFOBD
at O a k Hill, Gsroo on t h o Foderal right. and
KILPATBICK
o n t h e left, performed doeds which huve n c r e r been
excolled by t h e cavalry of a n y nation. An Gctty-nburg w w tlic
t u r n i n g p i n t i n t h e fortunecr of t h e Union army, it a l ~ omarked a n
u p c h in the development of cavnlry, trcrinod in rnctliods which
were evolved from 00 foreign t e x t - W k n , b u t from storn experience
on the battle6olde.of t h e great Civil War.
By t h e morning of t h e 4th of July Goneral LEE'Alines were
evacuated, hie a r m y WM in full rotreat, and t h e Frdernl cavnlry
a n d t h e S i x t h Army Corps w e r e i n h a t pumuit, atriving to gain \ \ i n
rear, cat hie lines of communication, a n d b a r n s a n d annoj- him in
t a b

to

t d )

every manner poeeible.

Tho F i r s t Cavalry Division moved from Wmtminster to F r e d on
erick, ahem it w ~ j o i n e dby the Reeorvo Rrigado uiider MBBRITT
J u l y 6th. On t h e following day i t moved towards \Villinrnnport. to
destroy t h e enemy's trains, reported to be crowing the l'otomac
t h e town tbo Confoderatc pickets were
i n t a V i r g i n i a Upon n e a r i o ~
driven i o ontil t b e easmy'a line of battle beclrme too s t r o n g for
f u r t h e r program. In an a t t a c k on GAYBLB'Bbrigado on tlic Federal
loit t b e e n e m y w m eeveroly punished, b u t t h e deRtraction of tlic
enemy's &rains in t h e hoe of t h e a t r o n g force g u a r d i n g them proved
too diisoult a task for tbe division, with t h e exception of a Rmnll
trail,of grain with aboot forty mulee.
-were
IDla F u a m ~ r m ' rebar@3,md d . t ~ - O v e c u o d t l a
mo~ln~.ndLedWsdtbcClrilWu)

3!3

((*pula P A R

40

P R I Z E E S S A Y.

XII.
During the l r a t two yeare of the war 281,WO homes were t'uroiehed the cavalry, when the maximum number ot' caralrymen i n
the Beld at any time dnriog this period did not exceed 60,000.
Tbe enormow number of wualtiee among the horncR W ~ IIUC
N
to maoy o a ( ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ,which
amon
were,
g
ignorance of purrlla*in,g ofliver.
ae to tbe proper animals f9r cavalry sorvice; poor horseinailship on
t h e part of the raw cavalry troopere, muatered i n a t the beginninr
of the wmr ;t h e c o n t r o l of the cavalry movoment8 by otHccrM of' otlicr
arms, ignorant of t h e limit of endnraoco of cavalry homes ; the tiardehipe ioeeparable from the duties of t h e cuvalry upon such d u t i e s
ae the STOHEMAN
raid, the campaign of the Army of Virgiiiia.
and tbe aampaigo of Gettyeburg; and laet bnt not I c I ) ~ ~ , ignorance
and groes inefhiency on the part of many ottlcors and m e n as to tlic
condition of tyle home' backe and fwt, carc a y to food and clcaiilineaa,mnd the proper t r e a t m e n t of the many discace to which liorws
on active eervice are eabject.
Cavalry, of all arme, reqnireu the greateat lorigtb ot' time t i l
aoqnire e l c i e n c y , a n d it' t h e reduction ot' tho regular cst:rblisli.
rnentcof the army of the United Statou ie ever contcinplatctl. tlic
esperienog of t h e iovernment during thuao first t w o years of tlic
War of the Rebellion with horae8 alouo should Bcrvc 05 t~ warnin::.
,
Given,.men poweasing unbounded patriotiem, intolligencc, arid
pbpeical excellence-aa wero t h e volunteera at tlie beginning of ~ h i a
war, pot thaw qualitiee, while quickly combining to make excellorit
infantry and artillery soldiere, required many times tho length of
time to mdke good cavalrymen. Training and discipline, backed
by tbe unlimited tiorncee of (L groat government, prcvnilcd i n tilo
eod, bot tbe leeeon, Lo my the least, was a hnmiliating and coatly
one, which ebonld never be repeated.
I n encb a tremoodone machine as the Quartormaeter'e Dcp:irtmentof the A r m y of the Potomac,contoining at t h o beginning of tlic
war, many otkere witldabeolutely no expricncc an qanrtormaetcr3,
there was oemt3fmnly many voxatioue dolays in purchaning and forwarding eoppliea, and many disappointments i n the quality of 8 1 i p .
pliecl hrninbed too oRen by ecbeming contractors.
The tardinean, too, with wbicb cavnlry remonnta wcre forwartled
to t h e regimente w- a fiequent eubject of complaint. Io October,
1862, aben eervice i n t b e Peoinsnler campaign and t h a t of t l l c
Army of Virgioie, bad brouKbt tho nnrnbers of monnted cavalry
down to lean tbao a good eimd regiment, General M d L L L L A N wrote

--

PRIZE ESSA T.

44

be nnder cbarge of tbe chief of army staff; the dutiee pertaining

to organization, equipment a n d ioepection of cnvalry being performed by a cavalry ofacer, while thoee of t h e purchase, innpcction.
enbairtenee a n d transportation of horaoe were performed b y an
omcer of t h e Quartermuater'a Departmeot.
T h e eetnbliehment of thie bureau worked a deeidcd irnprovem e o t in the aupply eyetern of t h e mounted nrni, a n d much of the
auccem of t h e Federal cavalry is to bo attributed to the Pystematic
and etRcient manner in which tho officere of t h e bureau performed
t h e i r dutioe. T h a t i t wss dit8cult for even the Cavnlry Bureau t o
kecp t h e eupply of n m o u n t e op to t h e n u m b c r required, i w Rhown
frOm t h e fact t h a t General S a E s l D A N states in tiin Memoir*. that
"only 1,900 horsew were furninhed t h e A r m y of t h e f o t o m n c from
April 6 t h to Aupuet 14th. 1864-not onough to meet c.ntwaltien--and
t b a t it wae necessary for him to eeod hie diemounted nicn into

camp."
XIII.
e

T h o months of'August a n d September were marked by ncvcral

i m p o r t a n t reconnaiwncecl b y t h o cavalry.*
advanced from Rnpidsn Station
O n A u g u s t l e t Geiiural BUFOBD
witb hie cavalry diviaioii rrnd d r o v e tho enemy's cavalry townrtlh
Culpeper Court Houee. The enemy'e i n t a n t r y cnueed t h e dividit)ii
to retire, b u t t h e r o c o n n l i i w n c e had the effect of' cauwing LEEto
d n w bie i n f a n t r y muth of t h e Rapidan. Toward* t h e end of t1ii.i
montb regimenta of t h e Socoiid Cavalry Divieiori engaged tho eneniy
at Edward's Ferry, Hartwood Church, Barboo'e Croes Rosda untl

Rixey'e Ford.
Again, on September lat, General KILPATBICK
with t h e Third
Cavalry Divieioii march to Port Conway o n tho lower Rappahannock, w h e r e h e drovo a force of t h e enemy's cavalry a c m w t h e
r i v e r a n d , with hie artillery, dttatroyed the gunboat8 '' Reliatiw
a i d '4 Satellite.''
A n o t h e r r a v a l r y 6 g h t took plnco Soptembcr 13th to 17th. I t
had been reportod t h a t tbe e n e m y waa m a k i n g a retrogrsdc niore
with all t h e cavalry, sopported by
meot, a n d &nerd PLWANTON
t b e h o d A r m y Corps u n d e r General WABBEN,croeeed t h e rivcr
at 8 n u m b e r of p i n t a , d r i v i n g t h e eoemy'e cavalry a c r o w t h c

"

;
~

A
Yort

Brigade wm ordered to Qlaboro Polnt (0 reOL On

.On &ha1Mh of Augrm tbu
m lpLb the &?eo- Brlm&.&amd C.nlry DLrLLon w u broken np; the Semnd New
to U Flmt -0.
Thlrd MTWOU;tbe Fourth New York (0 tba Becoud W e .

' Irln( D i m : and the lrins Bho& bland, 8IxL)I Ohio and Eighch P c n ~ l r m l to
a the
-PLY
a
-a
rn-Won.

110

r* I

I '
46

J'RIZE E S Y i i Y.

T h e noxt day the Firct 1)ividiori with S c w w l c K' a c o r p , niaile ii

mconnaiReanco in forco t o B r a n d y Station, trod accomplished ita p u r pose of diecovering t h e coomy's strength a n d position.
Mesowhilo t h o &cond Cavalry Divieion had procoodcd from
Calpeper Court Houae on tho l l t b inatant, to Sulphur Sprinpn, with
o r d e m to feel t h e onomy towards Sperryville and Littlo Washington
T h i s wae succo~sfullyaccornpliahod, b u t tho division w u cornpulled
by nuprior numbcrs to recrone to tho o u t side of tbo river. A8 thc
enomy advancod, tho carcrlry fell alowly back to Auburn, coverintbe rear of t h e Second Army Corps.
A t daylight on t b o 14th instant t h c c n c m y attucked GBECX;'>
division, b u t bo hold liia p e i t i o n tenaciously, whilc, Gencriil W A N BEN p t t h e Sec-nd Corps across Cedar Run. Attur tliie 8tubboru
contelrt t h e cavalry fcll back slowly, aud after d a r k nioved 10
Brenteville to awiat General BUPOBD
with tho wagon trains.
Duri n g tbis arduous rcar-guard d u t y , tho F i m t Nlainc Cavrrlrg, which
had b u n cat off it1 itn roturii from S p c r r y v i l k , made a circuitous
march of ninety miles, a n d reported i u a a t b t j at I3ristoc Station.
T b e T h i r d Cavalry Diviaion WM, at tho beginning ot' the oncmy'n
movement acrow tho Rapidan, pickcting from Gritllinaburg ticar
H a d R a n , through Russol'a Ford on Robertaoo's Rivur to t h e
vicinity of Jamelr City.
On the lOtb of Octobor the encniy moved tbrougb Crcglcr's
Mills, Ruseell's Ford. a n d Creglersvillu. a n d althougli ita trdoaoco of
artillery a n d cavalry presented a bold front, tbo T h i r d Cavalry
Division succeeded i n holding ib poaition throughout tho day. A t
3 o'olock i n t h e morning of tliu following d a y , t h e d i v i i o n
koeping with tliu goocral withdrawal of tbc
roceived orders-in
A r m y of t h e Potomac-to fall back to Culpepper Court House,
covering the rear of tho T h i r d and Fiftb Army Corps. As tho
enemy approachod Culpepor, PCNNIXOTON'~
b a t t e r y opened U P O O
t h e m from the hill6 north ot' t h e town, a n d t h e e n t i r e cavalry
divieion fell back on B r a n d y Station. &re it WIU found t h a t t h e
enemy had taken o p a pollition irnmodiatcly in f r o n t of tho division,
and ww ale0 approaching t h o left flank. T h e command wak accordi n g l y maesed in colamn of q u a d r o n n , Goneral DAVICS having t h e
r i g h t and G e n e i d CUSTBEtho left. A charge of' a largo forco of
tbe enemy's cavalry wae met a n d broken b y a counter-charge, a n d
tbe division continuing to advance i n good ordor, t h o enemy brokc
a n d !led in groat confuoion. P a w i n g on, KILPATEICK
offcctod II
junction w i t h BUWRD'H
diviaion, and c r o w d t h e ltappalian n w k
thi.
ubout H o'clock in t h e evening. O n the morning of the 12~11,

PRIZE ESYA P.

PRIZE ES.5-A Y.

t h e Fruderickaburg RUilr0;rJ. Thia plan not bcing approved, 11 W;LF

ducided to foro0 t h o passage of tho Bsppahannwk.
advancocl t u
Accordingly on November 7th General SEDOWICK
Bi.ppahannock Ststion with t b e Finh and Sixth Arrriy Corps, f i n d .
ing the enemy strongly iotrencbed 00 the north bank ot' t l i t . river.
General FmNaE, with the Fimt, Second and Third .irniy C o r p .
marched to Kelly'e Ford.
SICD~WICK
attacked and carried the enemp'a works on tlic iiortli
bank, capturiog four piecee of artillory and 1,600 priwrierq ; ani1
the Third Corpe of FBBnoH's commaod, likowisc ~ a l l a r i t l ytbrccd t l i c
paasage of t h e river at Kollp's Ford.
During theee operations the First Cavalry Dirision undw B o .
FOBD moved on t h e right tlank, crossing at the upper forila : i t i ( I
forcing t h e p m g e of Hazel River at Rixeyvillc, thus coopcratitig
with Srrwtwxqrc
KIGPATBIOK'B division operated similarly on the le & H : i n k, cro*xing the river at Ellis's Ford, and coiiporating with FREWII'r left i n fantry column. GBgoo's division was held i n rcncrre, gu:irdiny t h t .
trains at Bealeton and Morrievillo.
T h e cavalry took part i n the pursuit of t h e cncrny to Rruriilp
Station, and as far as Culpeper. Tho Army ot' the Potom:ic thcri
took p i t i o n from Kelly's Ford through Brandy Station to \\.elford'e Ford; and t h e work of repairing the Orang' arid Alesandria
Railroad to t h e Rsppshannock WILB h o p " immediately. ny L l i t ,
16th of November t h e railroad and a bridge o r e r ttic kippi1i:irinnck
WSO(LB
completed; and by t h e 19tb sidiiiga and o dcpot, a t 13raridy
Station, wbore suppliea for the army wero brought tijrwarcl snit

(;REGc;'$ divi*ion WIW ordewlt Lo operatc o n t h e let1 flank of t h e

nrniy. HI.YORD'S* oii t l i c right, to w o c r the rnorornctlt. sod KIL.
I ~ A T R I C K ' S IO ti111d t l i e itjr'id of t h e Rapidan u n t i l f u r t h e r order-.
I)ot.ac.l~nicv~t*of' c.:Julry. each IOU ~ t r o o g were
.
a l a or,Jcrc.d to re
,
the ad.
port ti) ( ; o r i c . r : i l ~ F R E S C HS. Y K E Sarid W A R R E S cornrnan~iin::

48

delivered.

XIV.
By t b e end of November, tbe Army of ttic Potornuc w:is rcadjfor aootber advance southward. A front uttack was tleenicd impracticable, ae the poeition of the memy rrloog tlic 1kipid:tti W ~ Y

etrongly intrenched. Preparations wore lrccordi ngly n i d c tor 8 1 1

advanoe on tbe enemy's b n k . On November Otitb t h o Fc(1crnl
army cmeeed t h e Rspidao in threo columna-at Jacoba, Gcrni:itioa,
and Culpeper Fords. The Third Corps (FRexcn's) ct-oqred at
Jambs, followed by the Sixth Corprl (SEWWICK'LI);
the Sccoti~l('ibrp
(WABBEN'S) crowd at Germanna; and the Filth Corps ( S Y K E ~ ' )
c&
at Culpeper Ford, followed by the Fiiat Corps ( S E W T O A ' ~ ,

49

t.orp
G R E I N ' Si l i r i s i u n crosaed tlle Itappnhennock at ElIi3.N FIirtl on the.
24th i i i s t : A i l l . ~ r n dproceeded tCJ Ely's Forti o n t h e Rapidail The ad
v : i i i w gci:iral <,ra)--**qi
1 1 t i 8 l w o k po-*e-.diori of tlic hei<Iit-. b u t later
tlic eritirt. a l i v i - i o n w':I*wi(hdrau.tl t o l ~ i ~ l i : i r d * v iunt.1
~ l c f.;lli-..r Fo1-d
On t h e ? l i t t i ttic divi3iori c r o J 4 the Rapidan, and operaitc'cI i i i t h e
direction ot' thc t i c i d water* of the Po Hirer O n t h e 27th it
111issc11
tliroucti Parker's Store. and took poiitioii on the Orari<c
l'lank I h n d . i t i : i ~ l o . s t ~ cof
e thc Fifth .\rmy Corp3. .kt S e a Hop
Meetiilg Iiouw. tlic eriernr'r skirmishers were cucouoterod snd driven
rsriccil

h i c k w i t h loa.* by tliree of t h e ndvance rcqiioenta of t h r d i v i * i o n

The cavalrr tlivisiuti's casualtiea this day were 106.

On the 3 1 t h D c v i s ' s brigade ot' this d i v i s i o n , which had bccrl
protcctirig the wagon trains of t h c nriny. j o i n e d GBILOO'Jd i r i - i o n . an11 WBS p).ired a t ttic Wildernew
T h e First Brtgadt' mor-ed
to I'arkcr'x Sitjre.
JIt.anwliile. the Third C'avalrF Division. under C'~-STER,had, 0 1 1
the L'tith in*tant, left camp nenr d t e r o n ~ h u r y ,a n d moved LO t h e
Ibpidrrn River, I?A).IC?;
brigade t a k i n g pu.iition nclar Kacccton
Ford. and Towx's brigade at Morton's Ford. The First Weet Virginia ('noalry was sent to guard the to& between Germeniia and
Xorton'rr; and t h e Sixth M i c h i o n t o Sorneroille Ford, to patrol
t h a t :ti111 adjriccnt fords. Crsrta's inatructions requirtxi h i m to
rnakc &monziratioii~w if tn crow fr~iniNorton's Ford opwsrds. tho
moincnt lie h a r d cannonading below.. Thiy he d i d . as uoon as be
heard t h e artillery. aiid sucwuded i n drawioe 'the firc of thirty of'
the ciierny'6 gun* upon t i i s force, accompanied by the moving for,
ward 0 1 a large body of the enemy's infantry. The dcrnonatratiori
W a s highly ruccessftll, and kept t w o sntirc diriaions ( ~ D E ' Ea n d
EARLY'S)
of EWELL'Jc o r p . standing to arms all night. Bot i n the
morning of the 'Stti, having diwovertd the intentione of the Fed-

* I n Sorcmkr l k n c n l Bcmu)
permltmd u) p LO W u t l ~ for
o aumd t-1.
rncnt.and dtirlog the Y ~ O Roo
C
a m w o . G c o c r r l WMIUI
Y~aturrcornnuodd the nnt
C a r d r y DITMoo. and Colouel A U R U ) GIthe Bscm a w e . Gewd B C ~ U hI d brC0
wo~indr*9.aodhls mNU0t work 10 Ihe 4cId bd (old ~ T U upoo
~
Y h b a)Ptltotbo. l u
l ~ ~ * h l w ( ohe
o R m d u l I Y Crew r a m m i 00 Ds+mb.r 14 1 ~ Lac. r e v d a y th.1 the PIU.lent dgoed hlammrnlr(oo Y Y q l o r G ~ O e n lhe
. d i d -the b a u Ida: 01 a a r . l r l o I l b r . 0 0
tho thrabold of

atlll more b r t l l h t mmr.

:'I"

I"

I
no

PfiIZE ESSA Y.

P R I Z E ES.5.I Y.

en1 army, the Confederate irifaotry

a n d a r t i l l e r y between Morton'*
a n d Baacoon Fords WM w i t h d r a w n .
T h e b n d Brigade o f t h i s c a v a l r y division accordiiigly crossed
the river, a n d , o o c a p y i n g t h e e n e m y ' s intrcnchtiients, d r o v e t h e i r
D u r i n g the remainder of t h e day and
I a v a l r y back several milee.
t h e following day, s k i r m i s h i n g cwcnrred with t h e enemy's cnvnlry
a n d d u r i n g the n e x t five d a y s t h e command merely watched t h e

fords.
T h e campaign WM u failure, so f a r as flanking t h e e n e m y ' s
poeition WM concerned, General MCADE a t t r i b u t i n g it to the fact
t h a t t h e T h i r d C J r p (FBENCE'S)
t h r o u g h t a k i n g t h e w r o n g roiul.
WM 110 slow m o v i n g out t
o Roberbon'e Tavern on the P i t h inst
t h a t t h e o t h e r corpe became e n g a g e d betore tho T h i r d wan within
e u p p o r t i n g dietance. T h e e n e m y w a s so etrongly intrenched tliirt.
rather t h a n risk a n assault o n t h e i r works. i t was decided to again
fall baok behind t h e Rapidan.
Tbie wan accomplished on t h e n i g h t of December l a t , t h e arrny's
movemeate b e i n g covered by t h e Second Cavalry Divieion, L)CVI?I'S
brigadeof the Firnt Divieion, and t w o brigade8 of i n h n t r y from
the T h i r d Army Corpe, t h e w h o l e o a d e r t h e c o m m a n d of Gciieral

ol#lo.

A g a i n bad the A r m y of the Potomac retired without effecting

ita objeot. W i n t e r W M at h a n d , a n d t h e troop w e n t i n t o w i n t e r
qaartera. F a r l y i o J a n a a r y t h e g o v e r n m e n t offered a furlough arid
agreed to pay a b o o t y to eoldiere who would roenlist for t h r e e
yeare. A l a r g e nnmber o f cavalrymoil did ))o. a n d w e r e sent home
on fhrloagb.
The c a v a l r y troops i n w i n t e r quarters made thomnelces a s omfortable an t h e i r e a r r o u n d i n g 8 permitted, b u t t h e i r anticipntcd r w t
ftom a c t i v e d u t y h a r d l y materialiced. I n ndditiori LO t h e fatiguing B
pioket and outpost duty, there were contiounl E C O U rcconnais~,
aanoBB, a n d several raids, to keep the c a v a l r y busy, while tlic
i d n t r y WM recaperating for tbe npring campaign.
original
A n d here it may be pmper to say t h a t General HOOKER'S
plan of coneolidating t h e c a v a l r y a n d g i v i n g i t a leader i n d e p e n d en08 of action bad not been completely realized. The e v e r present
oritpost duty still contiiiaed, and this, with c o n t i n t i d detached
eervice on m i n o r reconnaiseancee, g u a r d i n g wagon truino, could not

but result i a lack of unity i n the cavalry corpe.

Late ip:December the Second, E i g h t h a n d Sixteetith

Pt?llIlNJI-

vaaia and F i r s t Maine C a v a l r y regiments, u n d e r t h e command

of'

Oolonel CUAILLW
A. S M I T H , marched from Bealeton to Luraj-, Vir

51

giciia. ~ u r p r i s i n gY n u m b e r of .inial1 dc.ttrchmt.nt- of t h t - c.nzniy M I 1 1 1

uapturiiig a n u n i l e r of p r i ~ i i c ~ r A~t. 1.11ray t h e ) . t l r r t r ~ > y c du l a r r e
,
re.
:rmount o ! propert? u*e!'ul to thc Cont'e leratta c o r c r n n i c i ~ t ant1
Iiuridrell niilcs wittiollt H single
turrird i n rutbty, tisrin;: nlnrcllell
('asuaI t p .
Early i n J:inuurj- Firziii.citt L E E .wit11 Y large cavtilry commarid.
i n \-adest 1 I I u iiips ti i rc- a I I d 11trr11y Co u I i I it-+, \\-c*t V i rpi 11 i Y
(;en cral
li E I. L Y , corn i n M rid i II < t I I C Dc 1):ii.tI n e 11 t o f \V~.-I V I rci 11 i 3. c'oI I ticrn ttv 1
the cnciny wit11 :ill h i - aruliYblc. t i > r c e , trtic-r 0ie-trt)yirb:
:I ~ i u i n h c r
ot' w a p i i * :irrd scv.uriiig such *upplics n- lit' ~ o i i I t 1 t i i ~ ~ lI .. E E ' ~ ~ 0 1 1 1
iiiiiiid withqlrew. 1b:hviilg s u t k r c d .wrcI\.c,rcIy t'rtjni t h c ~ l i t c r i * c l > - coI11
weattier. I.atcr i l l t h c m o n t h t h e w u n i t . counties were sut,ject t o
cuvthlrj- forccba o f W r a t
:rnoitier ruiql by General E A R L Y . i n whicll
Virginia, the. Firbt S e w York, t h e Fitteclatli S e w T o r k . t h e T w ~ l l t y .
tir.st s e w y u r k . C'o1.E's I Jfarylaild ) C * ~ v ~ i l :rild
r y . detac~hments01' t h e
& a n d Unrxlrrnd. S i x t b ! d i c t i i p l i ;rnd First Connccticut C s v n l r y
were engaged. Thc main object ot' ttic cneiny, t h e cal'fure of t h e
girrrinon u t l'etersburg and t h e d e s t r u ( . t i ~ ~ rof
i t h e Hnltirnore troll
Ohio Iisilrotrd. wa* urinucceaaf'ul ; but t l i c Confederate Gerirral
I:<,SSER
sur.ccwl.:d i n c a p t u r i n g a l a r p w - i i g o r ~ t r a i n . 'The hamperi n g of t h e cirvnlry try o r d e r s from t h e i n f a n t r y officer c o m m a n d i n g
ttic i n f a n t r y s u p p o r t s t r n d t h e great ditticulty ot' aucceaafully c o n c e n t r a t i n g troops i n w rough a c o u n t r y . coritributed to t h e safe
withdrawal ot' the erieniy's forcus.
Although a n u m b e r of' minor e n r q p r n c n t ~occurred d u r i n g ttic
nii~nttiot' J n n u a r y . n o t h i n g of yrc'at i m p r t a n c . c tmbk place until
F e b r u a r y 6tl1, when a d c ~ m o n s t r a t i o twas
~
nicltlc d o n g the I L p i d a n ,
i i a r t i c i p t e d i n by tlic First t r n d .Sec~)ndA r m y Corps. a n d t h e Fir-t
;ind T h i r d C a v a l r y l)ivi*ion*.
While t h e i n f a n t r y was e n g a g i n g tlic enemy at Morton's nnd
Itticcoon Fords. t h e Firbt ( ' n r s l r y 1)ivision ( MERRITT'N'I crowed the
Iiotwrtunn Hivcr i n t w o column*. a t Smoot'n a n d Ayler'a Fords: rill1
t!ic T h i r d Cavalry DiviJion (, KILPATRII-K'Scrowed at Culpt*pcr,
Ely'a, a n d Germaiinn Forcis.
On t h e 7th t h e F i m t Ciiriilry Dirisicin moved to Rarriett'w Fortl.
a n d brisk akirniishing ensued. T h e demonstration on t h i s ford
continued until about 1 o'clock F. Y . . r e w l t i n g i n t h e d e p l o y m e n t
of R Confederate i n f a n t r y brigade. Tlic T h i r d C u r n l r y DiviPiabn
reconnoitered i n all directitins, a h r c r o w i n g t h e Rapidan, findii)?:
the o n e m y i n muvh tho s a m e p o s i t i o n a* durinK the precc(linK
S o v e m tier.
t1i.h

'1

I
During this m o n t b t h e cavalry w a s g r e a t l y annoyed b y ~ u c r r i l l : i ~ ,
large n u m b e r of small detachment8 being ambushed ntid cithcr
phot down or captored. So serious did those Iossea become, t h a t IL
generul order WM iaeaed, threatening with court.martiul officerr

g o d men w b o allowed tbemselvee to be aurpriaud a n d crrptured

while on d u t y . Weet Virginia a n d weetern Virginia wtfcretl greatljfrom t h e w irregular marauding forcee, a n d o n F e b r u a r y I ltli G I L .
YO.IC'S
guerrillu, t b r e w a Baltimore a n d Ohio oxprens truiii froiii
bhe track at Eearoeyeville a n d robbed the paaaungorn A n d on
pobruary 2Otb, i n a n a t t e m p t to capture t b e noted Nujor M(ISBY
at
U p p r v i l l e a n d F r o n t Royal, a m v e r e skirmish took' placu between
~ a e e ~ command
' s
a n d a portion of t h e cavalry brigade ot' tlic. I)cp a r t m e n t of Weet Virginia.
On t h e 28th of F e b r u a r y CWST,T~B'S
cavalry division uniicrtooh
p r a i d i n t o Albemarle County, Virginin. T h e commund i t ~ u r c l i t d
by w a y of &dieon C o a r t Houao aud Standardaville without oppo-Icion a n d took t h e road to Charlotteeville, wherc FITxaculi LEE'force wua i n a m p . The divieion approached within t h r e e niilw ot
the place, wben, d o d i n g tho e n e m y in euperior number-, C'LSTEK
haithdrew,borning t h e bridgesover t h e R i v a o n a River a n d d C b t r o y l l l ~
m u c h property. Near (Jtandardeville hie force h a v i n g been rcd u d to 1,000 men t h r o u g h a mieunderetanding, b y which a portioii
pf the command bad marched beyond t h e Rspidun, be w'as charged
by t h e F i r s t a n d Fifth Virginia Cavalry, led b y General STUART
III
pereon. The c h a r g e threw the advance guard-ono squadron 01
the Fifth United StatesCavalry-back upon t h e main body, b u t tlic
potire regiment c h a r g i n g forward, d r o v e t h e enomy back i n grcrit
Yiearder. Cumnu pursued with bis wbolo command to 13aiik'n Ford.
n d then wheeling about, eluded t h e enemy, who had concentratctl
em, by moving rapidly to t b e ford uod crossing. The cominaiid
parobed on0 hundred and fifty miles, captured one buttlo-atundard,
flay prisonem, five hundred boreee, and eix cainwons, a n d deatroycd
gn immenrre a m o u n t of property.
1
Tbie mid was made to distract attention from a n o t h e r raid o f
p t e r proportione, begun t h e m m e d a y b y General KILPATBICY,
nd having ao ita object the t a k i n g of the City of Richmond nnd
e liberetion of tbe Union prisoners confincd there. Iticidentally,
he Preddeat's p m a l a m r t i o n of amnesty waa to be dietributed
hrooghout tbe haetile territory.
1t-b.d been learned t h a t Bichmond was, a b o u t this timo, coin.
Uvely defenseleee. a n d i t WBB t h o u g h t t h a t , by a rlrpid atid
ret march, t h e c i t y might be captured a n d t h e priaoncr!, released

L
t

:k?
'

P R I Z E E.<S:t I-.

PRIZE E S S A Y.

62

5:i

ttt-filrc reiiifhrccnictIts t'rorn either P r t c r s b u r g o r I.EE'* a r m y could

there
( k f w r s l K I L P A T R I V K kft his tamp :it Stcrenebury at 7 n'clcsck
M . b'ehrii:iry % t h , with 3.595 pic.kcd men a n d HaXscbn'R horse
The utlrericr, conristiriy 01' 4r;0 nicn under Colonel Y m i r
hitter!.
I ) A H l . ( i R E ? i . cro*wd a t E l y ' ~Ford. c:rpturing the enemy's picket.
'l'lien. Icaviiig t h c main b d y 9it praweedetl through Spottq-lvania
('ourt I I o u w to Frrderickshali. where it captured a Confederate
gchneral court-ninrtiul. c.oilsif.tirig of thirteen officers. I t tbcn procccdctl tlirough tlciise w o o d ~ and swamp8 to t h e J a m e s River.
which i t reached alwut iA. H. oil .\lclrch L'd. haring destroyed c o n Aiderublc. ('onfederate property en routc. Rut, through t h e alleged
trcuchcry of a guide, t h e little ccmmand had been led o a t of itn
c n u r w , a t i d inste:iO 1 , f h r i n g near Richmond, the latter w a s ntill
continued his mnrch
eizhteen miles a\vuy. I I o a c v e r . DAHLORBS
e n d CVCII p w l tliv o u t e r line of t h e city's work@,when he w u a t .
tacked froin I ) o t h -ideh of t h e road and froin t h e front. A dwpenrte
tight f o l l o w c ~ l . C1oloncl DAHLORES
with about 150 men pushed 011.
Iiopin,g to gvt throuyh t h e Confederate line* by nay of t h e J a m r n
R i v e r ; but abut mitlnight the coniinurld l i . 1 1 into an ambuscade.
I ~ A H L O R E Swas killetl. together with ti number of his nicn. and thc
rernaindc.r cclptnrctl. The o t h c r part o ! I ) A I ~ L G R E Y ' S force iincier
('icptnin .\IIT('HEI.L, %cond S e w y o r k ('avalry. succeedctl fii~ally~ I I
joining BILPATBICK
at Turisinll's Station. with forty.four ca*tialtie*
Sleanwliilc K I L P A T R I C Kafter
,
pawing through Spottaylvania
Court Horist., had Inktan a twutheuterIJ' cnume. crowed t h e South
Annri nt G r m i i d Squirrel Bridge, a n d reached the o u t e r litle of
workn alioiit I<ic.Iinioud without reriouH npposjtion. T h e firrt line
of defeiiw wtw succenalully pawed, and prepnrationR were made to
n**ault the main m-orks; but naithinp liaring been heard from D A H L .
(IHES'S p a r t y w h i c h WBR to h a v e niatle a GrnuJtaneoun attack froni
tlie o t h e r side, and the enemy beiiig hearily r e i n f i w e d , KILPATEICK
deemed i t prudent to retire.
KILPATRICK'Sattack was made some three hours earlier t h a n
I)A HL OE E X 'So. w i n g to t h e latter's delay i n reaching Richmond, and
t h u s the Confederates were prepared to meet DAELOREX
when he
rt.iich

IS.

finally reached their aorke.

HILPATEICK
withdrew acroaa t h e ChickabominF and eocceedcd
i n reaching General Br-rLrB's linea on t h e Peninsula March 3d.

-INila conimander a f t e r a u r d s reported:

id

T h e expedition failed

i n it* g r e a t object, b u t IhrooRh no fault of t h e otlicera and men

uccompanying it. All did their dotg brarcl3.. promptly. nod well,

64

PRrZE E S S A Y .

for wbicb tbey d w r v e the bigheet praiee. Consideraljle property

destroyed, a n d eevenl t h o u m u d of t h e Prcsitlent's proclamations mattered t b m u g h t h e c o u n t r y . I f Colonel 1 ) A H L O R E N had n o t
lfailod i n c m i n g t h e river, which ha did e i t h e r t h r o u g h tlie ignomom or t w s o b e r y of his guide, or had the e n c m y a t Bottom's
Bridge been forced to remain at t h a t point by n thrcaterietl a t t a c k
from t h e d i m t i o n of Yorktown, I eliould ha\**. cntercd t h e rebel
capital aod releaeed oor prieonere."
'
Confirmatory of t b i s opinion, a l e t t e r written by Genercll W A D E
HA-N
to General STC'AET
March Gth, contnined t h e following:
'"Myobeervatione convinced me t h a t t h o e n e m y voulti liiivc t a k e n
Ricbmond, a n d io all probnbilitv would h a v e doiic so biit fbr t h e
' f a c t t h a t &lone1 JOENEON
intercepted a diepatch from I)AHf.4JREN t n
RILPATBICK,
s e k i o g w h a t h o a r t h e lattor Iind f i x o d tor i r n a t t n c k o n
t h e city, eo t h a t both a t t a c k e m i g h t bo simultancou*."
Ae part reprial for the killing of D A i a L o R E x . Gencra! RL'TI.ER
o n Merch 9 t h sent a n expodition consisting of H brigitdo of ilifnntry
I und a b o o t 700 ~~'KILPATUICK'B
cavalry t o KinK nnil (Juccii Chtuntics.
T h e m t b e y d r o v e t h e Firth a n d N i n t h Virginin Cnvalry l'i.4ini t$cir
camp, b u r n e d t h e lutter with much Confodcrntc propcriy. : t i i t 1 took
a u u m b e r of prieonom.
WM

xv.
Doring t h e winter m p n y c h u n p e i m p o r t n n t t o tlic cnonlrv nr)
well an to the entire army had t a k e n plnce.
On the 12th o f March Lioutenant-General ULWWES S. C;RAXT
I had beem .wiped
to c o m m a n d t h e armiee of t h e United SmteH. w i t h
, General HALLNIXae chief-ot HtaH in Wunhington. And o n the 255th
I of t h e eame m o n t h Goneral PLEASANTON
w a s relieved froin commnnd
I of the cnoalry carps, General Gssoo tnkirix temporary c o m m a n d .
and WM enperceded o n April 4th by Mnjor-(iellcral P i i i I . i p I.
S~~=RIDAN.
General A. T.A. TOBBBBT
wo8 placed in commnnd of' tlic FirRt
Cardry Dioieion, bia b r i g a d e commnndere b e i n a CUATER
nncl D E V I X .
w i t h Y s o ~ l ni n c o m m a n d of t h o Renerve Bripnclc. Tlic Second
cavalry l)ioieion remained i n commund of Chiera\ GRE(I(I,w i t h
D A V Iand
~ IBVINGBH~K)
an b r i g a d e commanders. T h o T h i r d Cardry Dioioion wan erniRned to General JAN- H. ~VILSON,with Colooele BETANa n d CBAPMAN
ae b r i g a d e commandern.
8amDas f o e n d t h e horeen of t h e cavnlrycorps much riin d o w n ,
80d one oP tbe ant and mont i m p o r t a n t thinga that lie did was LO

I ' R I Z E E.KS.4 I'

55

iniprencr u p o n (icncral ! ~ F . A I ~ Et h e wlwtetulnws ol rvileIt!riilg iin~,.r.

viceable ru) iaiat~y th.iusand hor*e* hy uniit.ccs..sry
pil.ket d u t y .
..c.or-criog a diwtaiicc- 011 a coiitiriuoll. l i u c o f riwrly s i x t y miles.
with hsrtily a mcluntc4l C.onfcderate coiIfrontiilg i t a t a n y p o i n t . "
S H E R I D Aulvo
N iiisisted that ttw c a v a l r y rhoold be coiicentratt4 i o
-right t h e enemy's c ~ i r d t y .\I E A D E cxpreesed tlic traditional v i e w of
~
a r m y comniander*. when, in reply. tic fniled IO see w h o W - C J U ~protect t h e flanks of t h e army. the t i o n w of mm-inK infantry cc~lumns,
: r i d t h e wagon trnins, i f ttw cavalry were conceritrstt.ti.
Xltllough MEADEp r o m p t l y relieved t h e c a v a l r y from niuctl of t h e
:rrduo& picket d u t y i t w a s perforruiiiK. h c g a v e little encourageinent at the time to ~ i a E R l D . * S ' S plans tor e n i i i t i c p i d e ~ i tc a v a l r y
t'orpa-a
c o r p i n fact w well a5 i n name. B u t the ctjrps comrnaiider bidet1 his tinie. coofitleut t h a t an o p p o r r u a i t y would at
Icngth Come h r i t i t , r e a l i u t i i o ~ot
~ hi* v i e w * . 'rile opportutiity came
quieklg u n o q h .
Ou May 4th tlic A r m y of the E'otomac aKain nioved a g a i n s t t h e
.\rniy of S o r t h e r n Yiryinia, then occupying uii enirenchecl position
routti of t h e I l a p i h t n . General C ~ E A X T p I i $ n r l ~ * t Ihy moving by t h e
Ictt Bank, to conipcl 1 . E s to come o u t t'n~niliir iiitrcnchmenia along
Miiie R u n : anal a l t h o u g h a #eriou* coriFidcration was tlie wooded
c o u n t r y of t h c \vilderoew, tlirou#h which h e iiiu*t p : ~ s )the
.
ninrlcurer tiad [tic advanragea of using Brandy Stntioii a d a baac of
-upplies, a n d a t the aanic time (If corerin!: Wushiugtoti.

SHERIDAX
had i n t h e i w i g h h r h o o d 01 1 0 . 0 1 ~c)a v a l r y , *

GuEOci's

a 1 1 4 \Vi~.so.u's divi-ion* took t h t . advance by wa?- 01' Ely'* a n d

G e r m a n n a Fortid. preceding the Secund and Fifth A r m y Corps reRpectively, w h i t e TORBERT'S

dirision renitriiied i n rc3r t o ( ' o r o r the
t r a i n s a n d reserve a r t i l l e r y .

O n the 5th WII,.WN'S diviaion a d ~ a n c e c lfroin Parkcr'p Ston! to

('raig's Ueeting House w h e r e he met the enemy'* a d r a n c c . a n d a l though at first @uccesafuIhe finally withdrew, !or lack of a m m u n i tion, to Todd's T a v e r n , w h e r e h e formed a junction with (iaroo's
division. The combined c a v a l r y then d r o v e t h e e n e m y back to
S h a d y G r o w C h u r c h , a n d SHERIDAX
wg disposed t h e force as to bold
t h e Brock Road beyond the Furnaces a n d a r o u n d t h r o u g h Todd's
T a v e r n t o P i n e y Branch Church.
B o t on t h e 6 t b , a l t h o u g h CIJSTEBhad defeated t h o enemy at the
Furnaces, MSADE became alarmed for t h e eafety of his left flank and
ordered SHERIDAX t o w i t h d r a w tbe advanced c a v a l r y t o w a r d s C b a n -

PRIZE E S S A I-.

56

cellorevillo, abandoning a poeitioo that w a ~to be r e p i n e d later

ai heavy coet to botb infantry a n d cavalry.
That SEXBIDAN
chafed aoder tbie order is Been from hip lctter to
General HUMPEBBYE
of M a p 6tb:
W h y cannot infantrF," he e a p .
&&bewet to guard the trains, and let me take the offensive?'
On tbe 7th the army advanced with P piow to t a k i n g SpottAylvania Court Honee, and the traine were inored tnwarde Piney
Branch Charch, now, unknown to MEADE,lield by tho enemy. ThiR
11

led to the httle of Todd'e T a v e r n between HAumon's a n d Frizncae

LSdS commands of S r n ~ B r ' s cavalry (abooi 8,000 m e n \ a n d

Gluoa's division, F i s t e d b y t w o brigades of TOUBZRT'S
dirision *
Iirvzn ~ 8 1 ~ 3 0 'brigade
8
attaoked the enemy on t h e C a t h a r p i i Rond,
M~surrr'ak r v e Brigade on t h e Spotteylvania Road, and D A v i e s '
brigade an the Piney Branch Road, uniting with M ~ a ~ r r r left.
'a
Aftar eevere fighting, in which tho enemy Rhowed the grcatcet resistance io Bfbranm'e fkont, t h e Confuderaten p v o way nnii wcre
pursued alrnoat to Spqttaylvaoia Coort Houee.
I n keeping aitbTGBAm'.8 purpose of thrcstetiing: I~ee'*cornI monieatione by moving the army to Ypottaplrania Court ~TOUSO,
SEBBKJAN
directed Gar00 and YIBBITPto gain posacRsion 01 S N E L L ' ~
Bridgo over the Potomac River, early on t h o 81h, while \VILUON
was odered to tako poaaeesion of Spottaylvania C o u r t I l n ~ i n o nnd

actadly reached and held that place till directed to fall back from
it.

MMDE had

90

amcnded S E B I D A N ' e orders a8 to direct G R c w to

simply hold the Corbin Bridge, and M a s a ~ nto a c t aa ntlvance

gaard tor tbe advancing d u m a of infantry.
H a d SeeRrDan'N
ordere not been thue r n d i b d , it ia quite probable t h a t t h e cavalry
would have eo delayed tbe march of the Confederaten, mho hold o n
to Spotteylrnnia Court Hooee, till the Federal i n t a n t r y liad a d .
1 vaoced and made good their poseoeeion of that place. An i t wtm, t h c
enemy bad time to fortify the latter place, a n d the bloody battle of
Spott&vaoia Court Honee was fought while t h e w o r k of the csv.
airy was practically inelTetctive.
SEBBIDAN'S
anailliagnees to nee his cavalry i n thin disjointed
manner, compled with additional distuete that YEEEITT'S
tliviaion
sbould have bsen a w a d of dolaging tbe march of' the Fitkli A r m y
Corps, led to tbat farnorre interview between M E A D B and S E E B I D A S .
i n which the latter told his senior' that h e could wbip STUART
if
allowed todo so,and tbat henceforth YEADB
m o l d command the

00 Qaneml

~R
WIM M Dl Om ck
lor(.Oh and cbo command of hlr dlvldon devolved
ypurr tbr follorlnl &I.

58

PRIZE ESSAY.

This engagement gave BE-DAN complete control of' t h e road to

Richmond. The casualtiee on both aides were quite wvere, bot the
Confederate loae included Generale STUABT
and JAMESB. GOBDON.
Finding the road planted with topodoee, and there beinK no road
AR
between tbe enemy's worke and t h e Chickahominp, S ~ E B I Dgave
up t h e attempt a n d croeeed to t h e north aide of that river by the
Meadow Bridge. This bridge waa repaired, under severe fire, by
h m ' e brigade, which abrwards pursued the enemy to GaineR's
Mill. But while the bridge wae being repaired, the Confederateeadvanced from their iotrenchmente with a brigado of infantry and
larp numbere of diemounted cavalry, while GOBDON'Scav
threatened SammDAn along t h e Brook Road. Aher
mevore
teet tbe enemy wan repuleed and the infantry d r i v e k i n
works.
On the aRernooo of tbe lZth t h e Cavalry Corpe
Walnut Grove a n d Gaioee's Mill; on the 13th st Bottom
the 14tb it pseeed through White Oak Swamp and en
tweeen MaxaWe Landing and Sbirley on tbe Jamee Rive
ing there until the l?tb, the return march wae begun.
by way of Baltimore croee Roade, SEEBIDAN crowed t h
at White House, repairing t h e partly deatroyed r a i l
and then by way of Aplett'e, be rejoined the Army of t h e PotoTac
near Cheeter6eld on the 24th instant.
T h e raid bad accompliehod important reaultcl. It had materially
affected Lms's retrogmde movemente, had drawn off STCABT'S
cavalry and thus increased the ease of movement of the immeme
t n i n e of the Army of tho Potomcrc; had brought eigrlal defeat to
t h e Coofedemte cavalry; bad seriously threatened Richmond and
might have taken it; had cut the railroad8 which connected LEE
with Bicbmoad, and had deatroyed immeaee quantities of utmea
wbicb, with t b e etmioed r e e o u r c ~of~ the Confederacy at t h i s time,
mast, no doubt, b a r e exerted a powerful influence on the rcsult of
t h e war.

XVI.
Spottnylvaoia's b a t h had been fonght when SEBRIDAN
re
turoed,asd t b e Army of the Potomac waa maneuveriog to crow thc
Nortb Anna.
00 the Z6th instant W I L ~ ~ cavalry
N ' ~ division was ordered to
make a reconnaiesrrncw acmw this river aa far se Little River; and
from tbe Wtb to t b e 30th t b e dioirion WUI en&
in tbie duty, at
the mme time oorering the right dank of the army. O n the 3 1 e t

PRIZE RSP.4 Y.

59

the south eideof the Pnmunkcy. defeating n divi*ioo

encmy-'s cavalry under W. H. F. LEK Pushing on the -me
#lay, i n accordance with an order from General MEADE. W I ~ S
awcupied Hanover Court H o u s e . after a sharp tight. i n which tht.
c'sinfedemte General P. 31. B. Tor-so WIIP a-oundwl. and on the fol
I0)wing day. J u n e I s t , dewtroyed the brld#e* over the South .\nna
Simultaneouely therewith he had a nharp t ~ n p g e m c r l t with the
('onfederate cnvalry, but the latter being reinf'orceti by infantry.
:rnd WILMN h a v i n g nccornplishcd the object of' his rnoremtbnt, he
withdrew by the head of the Totopotoiny t o Hawes's Shop. where h e
:ic:iin came within supporting distance of the army.
.\[canwhile GREOO'Sand ' r 0 R B E R T . S division.i. slipported by R1.s.
.EI.L'LI d i r i i o n of the S i x t h Corps. were ctivcring thc c.rosniny of the
:irmyover the Parnunkey. I n effecting thi* cror*inc. ( ; R E O ~ I made a
tcint of crowiny at Littlepagc'a, and T ~ R R Eat
R Taylor's
T
Ford. Hot11
t h e n . after dark, diwrectly retired, a n d *uccemfuIIy crrmwd nt H a n 4,wrtown Ford on the 27tli, CCSTER'S
hrignde i n the Icnd. P u s h i n g
i*:iliidtyon to l h n o r e r t o n n . T O R B E R T ' S tiivi*ion enrv)unrered C ~ R
POS'S brigade of Confederate cosalry. and drove i t i n confosion i n
the direction of Hanover ('ourt Hooae. G R E O ~d S
i r i n i o n rnooeci up
t o t h i a line; 1tcsRKI.L'n dirieion of infantry encampcd near the river
c.rosainR, i n support, and behind the screen t h u - formeal tht. .krmy
i d t h e Potomac crowed the river on the 28th instant unimpedtd.
A s Gencrnt GRAXTWBR now uncertain of LEE'* cxnct position.
( ; R E G O w a r ordered to reconnoiter toward3 Yectianicsritle.
.it
II:iwcs'a Snop he found confronting h i m I~AwMos.'.;
ant1 F I T Z R ~ - G I I
],RE'S cawdry dirieiona,* mpportod by BITLER'Scavalry briprcdc.
:imi he attacked t h e m dismounted at once. Tht. 6yhr w h i c h f o l
Il)wed was very severe. and continued late into t l w evening. ae t h e
p13ition contended for w a n o n e of prrnt * t r n t r . g i c i m p l r t r n c e t o
h t h armies. C'I:~TER'S b r i p d c , which had rrinhrced (;REO<;, was
tinally diemounted. and seslrultiny through a n o p e n i n g ncnr thc
I.enter of the line. the temporary works were carried by the entire
l'nion line. ana tbe poeition W)'BA won. .Ilthough the battle tmk
Illace immediately i n front of t n e Federal infantry, General MEAI,E
SIcclined to put the latter into action. and t h e battle was a n n by
the caoalrj alone. The result gave p a i e a i o n of the crow made.
: i n t i nhowed GEAXT t h a t LEE'S
army waae r e t i r i n g by t h e r i K h 1 flank.

\ \ ' I L ~ o ? Jc r o w d

,it' the

* A h 4 B~'ABT'B
drrh cb.Cankdcnte arrlry w u n0-nlo t h e ~ ~ V U
andOM
P.L.K. clue lo r W O f O m m c O K by B t - r m ' r adg b r i p d e

l i i l p m ! a . PrrZBrOR L R and W.R .

from @oathm l l o l .

i
I

PRlZZE E S S A Y .

60

I.

.
/,

i'

Tbe night following the battle SIIZalDaN withdruw the t w o

a v a l r y dioidoae to the left rear of the army, and, marching t o Old
towardn Cold Harbor. the porrecssion o f
CboMb, threw out
which W.B
White Houee as n btwe. The enemy
tight enNUed n t blatrrdequin Creek, i n
wbich tbe Confedemte force wa9 fiarlly driven to Colcf I l n r h r . that
town being taken the followiog day (bIny 31at) nfter a hard fouKht
battle.
The cnmlry a t Cold Hnrbor wan now 8 0 inolatod, being nine
tliat SHERIDAN
wns making prepara.
milee.from the nenre
Word from S f e a D E to liold thc
tionr to withdraw,
town at a l l hazards. Ita capture by the cnralrj- had not been an.
ticipated by GMRT.
Accnrdinq\y SEWlXDAN made every preparntion diiriny the night
to hold the town; nnd OD the following day, behind hiw temporary
breantworks, euccecurfolly met and repiileed the Confoderato infalltry
under ~CWBSEAW. About 10 o'clock A. Y . th6 cavalry wn7 r e l i e v r ( l
by the Sixth Army a r p , and wae moved to n poaition nt Bottom'*
Bridge, on tho north eide ol' the Chickahnminy, whore i t reAteci i n
cump anti1 l o n o 6th.
WILRON,having meanwhile d r i r c n the cneniy out of HaweR'd
Sbop and psRRed w far around Lgt's leR flnnk a8 to deccirv hini
into tbe belief that he w u threatened hy n largo force, alter taking
a number of primnem, f e l l back the next day and q u i e t l y went inti)
a m p at New Cnntle Ferrr.
G u m ' e uneucceraful attack upon t h e enemy.9 rtrong po*ltiori
a t Cold Harbor made h i m decide to axnin move hin army forwnrtt
by the left flank. To draw off the enemy'e cnralry during thidangernus maneuver, B e a a ~ u areceived
~
innlruclinuw on June 6111
p@
with two cavalry diviniona via CltarIottenville to break
up t h e V i r g i n i a Central &ilroad. find nfterwartlN t o unite. i f pofw
ble, w i t h rho army advancing thrnuRI1 Weet Virginia under Genernl
E U ~ Etowardn
II
Lynchbarp.
W ~ ~ Ndivision
' U
wan dirccrcd to reinnin w i t h t h e A r m y of th,
Pnlomrc, r-ioiiiy
i t a iitstriwtions direct from a r m j he.n(lqunrtc\r.
TOBB~BT'B
and ( 3 ~ ~ 0divinione
' 0
accordingly etarted on the i t 1 1
June, takiog w i t h them three days' rations i o havoraacke to laet
five days, t w o days' forage on the pommels o f nsddleo, and l o o
roande of ammunition to each man.
*
Tbe line of m m h carried the eornninnd thrnogh New Caetl
f i ~ t

and P0l-t

.h!, I

'd

h,.!

Station dong tbe north

C...

il

1 ,

11

bank of the North Ann:!

PRIZE E S S A Y.

62

YAHOIIL,acnt down from Petemburg on the Weldorr Railroad, and

and about 3,000 contrabands were eent to White Houeu, while thc
corps marched-to Dankirk, reaching White Houea on the 20th ot
June.
A t t h e latter place SEEEXDIN
found ordera dirocting him to break
up tbe supply station tbere, and cooduct t b e 900 wagone to Petereburg. Tbis was euccesefully accomplisbed, but not without sovernl
eevere engrgemeote with the Coofderate cavalry, which had ngain
gotacror~lbin line of march. Gsroo's division had a aevere engagement at St. Yary'e Church. parlicnlarly creditable to the cavalry.
I n combioatioo with t h e operations of the Army of rho Potomac
t h e Army of theJamee, uoder General BUTLEB,
hnd m e a n w h i l e
moved up t h e Penineul*; and on May 6th General KAUTZ.with II
cavalry force of nearly 3,000 men,* had been detached for II raid
against the Petereburg a o d Weldoo Railroad. KAUTZforcod tlit
Blaokwater, burned t b e railroad bridge ab Stoney Creek bolos
Petemburg, cat the Danville Railroad at three poiota, cut tho Peter.
burg and Lyncbburg railroad at tbree poiob, cot tbe Petembur::
and Weldon Railroad, and deetroyed property of immenm valuc
Tbe command reached C i t r Point i n d e t y on May 1 7 t b , hnvin;:
mambed ttom thirty t o forty milee (L day for six days.
00June 9th Genenl KAUTZ,
with 1,300 cavalry, took active part
in tho movement whiab General BUTLEE
had plaoriud for t h e capturc
of Petemburg, then defended by a force of about 1$00 militia. It
wae arranged t h a t KAUTZebodd make a detour to the left, attack
ing t b e city from the Jerasslem Road, while t b e infantry forcenoder General GILLYOBX,
e b o d d cooperate on the Jordan'r, Point
aod City Point Roads, EAOTZ'S
cavalry-a portion mounted a i d
I
t b e remainder dismoanted-g8llantly charged Lhe enemy's intvench
'
menta, tmpturing the worhe-and approaching very near thu city
but owing to lack of aapport from the infantry the cavalry wuobliged to fall back.t
1
Wnaon'e dioieion, augmented to 5,600 meii by the addition 01
I
tbe oavalrf. from t h e Army of t h e Jemw. had, during the abacnck
of the ocher divieione of t h e Cavalry Carp ut Trovilian Sbtiori
' made a raid (Joly 22d) m a t h of PetorebarR, deetmyinp: the PctorI
borg Bud Lynohburg,and Richmond and h n v i l l e Ebilroada. u~poll
1 m h i n g the lett of t b e army on hi6 return. W r ~ e o nwae atttrckc I
1 in front by a large for- of CoufederaLe infantry under Guoeral

by the Confederate a v a l r y , w h i c h had dropped SHEBIand marched rapidlr LO t h i s point. The itnpssit)iIity ot
hreakinp: the intuntry line which confronted it, cau*ed the divisiorl
K O fall back a c r m the S o t t o w a y and Mehcrrin Rirem. and s w i r l <
cast n c r m t h o Blackanter. losing i n t h e retreat a great nurnbcr
0 1 horses t h r o u g h heat and fatigue
XiLtws had prcrional?
t.xprewed h i a doubts of being able to return aat>ly. onlew ttlc
Lbnemy's cavalry and infantry were kept engaged by tienerRI S A E R ,,n tho flank
VA?~

'

-FtmtBrJ#ule: Third

New Yatk b d r y , PI*

Cnlorbb (ZvalrY. eceoi I

0.rJrr. s r l o s o l EIgh

'I

of U b a t l l led to chugs @os1 blo

U h b own r s g ~ L

'emllaged bd

bro
t -asdb b r b q m n '

M.rr(ec d

mild lror am-

I
L

. .

B u t the deatruc.
coilsidered by General (;BAST
to haro more than compenatrd for the *evere 1o.mc.n which t h e
, . a v n l r y diviaion s u r t a i n e d . Had i n t i n t r y IW.ci1 promptly wnt. u
rcquoated, to meet WILSO.~
at J~.WIJ'R S k b t i o n . only fipur mikw from
M c A D r ' a headquarters. and o p r l t h e door tnr hi* rctnrn. he could
have eafely withdrawn hie command and rejoined tllc- army without
niaterinl low.
From the 2d to the 26th of July S H E E I r l a s was at Light Houec
I'tJint recoperating hid hard worked command.
IIcbrca 1.500 home5
wero reCoived i n addition to the 4 0 0 receired at W h i t u Ilonric
'That the L-nioo cavalry had learned to take k t t e r care of itci
ht)rsefleeh is ohown from the fact that ihere 1.904) reniounm were
dl that tho Cavalry C o r p received from t h e Quartermsetcr'a Department of the army while Q R t E I D A l l had personal c-onlmand. that
i * , from April 6 t h to August 1st.
The minfortonee of tho national a o a l r y during this period was
Jue to ite division i n t o two parts.and although i t had hccrl roughly
handled, i t wns &n ready for active operation*. O n the anernwort
of Joly 26th the Firet and Sccond Cardry Ili&ion* rnovcd norttl
ot the Jamea. the %and Army C a r p coopemtii1q. w i t h ordem to
mid, if opportunity orered, t h e Virgiiaia Cciitral Railroad. anti
destroy the bridgecl over the S o r t h and South A i i n r Rivers. T h c
.ippomattor w a s trod at Broadway I.an,.iinq, and at U w p Bottom K A C T Z 'emall
~
cavalry division joinotd the raiding force, the
.G;econd Army Corpe taking t h e advance.
A portioo of HAXCOCK'S
corpe aoon became engwycn' 1 . and SHBRII ~ A Wwith two dirisions of t h e cavalry accordingly inored u, the.
right u p o n tbe etrongly fortified N e w Market and Centla1 h a & .
leading to Richmond. In advance of Ra5n'e Houw on the S e w
Jlarket Rocrd, the First and Second Cavalry Divinion- tbrmeci lirleo!
h t t l c , bot were driven back over the h i g h Crclunll by the &nfc*,l.
rrate infantry divisions of KIWSHAIF,\viLcox and HcarH. b a c h .
I I I A N and

t h e Army of the Potomac rwpcctirely.

t i o n of the r a i l r o d e o n t h i s m i d

YBP

64

PRIZE E S S A Y.

I'K I 2E E S S J Y.

i n g t h e emtern extremity of a ridge, tbe cavalry wew quickly diamounted and directed to lie down about tifteen yarde from the creet.
. W h e n t h e enemy's infantry arrived, such a galling fin! wae detivered f b m t h e cavalry's repeating carbinee that tbe Confudenrtc
divisions gave way io dieorder. Tbe Federal cavalry quickly followed, captaring 260 prisoners and two battle-tlagi. T h i d adaptsbility to d g h t mountad or diemounted had now become a marked
obarrcteristic of the Union cavalry.
The long line presented by the cavalry and t h u Second Army
&rpe deueivd General La8 into tbo boliaf that Geanr had t r a n a ' f e d a large part of his force to the north aido of the Jarnca. LEE
Bcoordingly moved a large body of hie troops froin Petoraburg to
the vioinity of New Market. This was onu of the very object*
wiehed to obtain by tliia domotletration north of tbc
whioh GBANT
*I James, an the exploeion of tho m i o o at Peteraburg was nearing con.
summation, by meane of which ho hoped to gain poesaaion of the

initcd i n it* rriorc important opc.ratioo.1 of hreaklne rip t h o enciuy'.

tbmmunication- it would have cwaped all defeat. 3 u i J would tiart.
ltcen much more auccc*sfuI

s\-I I
The Fcdcral government Iisd. w i t h an incorisiderablc fiJrce. beerr
t i o l i l the State of West Virginia. *ubject though it via3 nt all
'imes t o gucrriltsoperations aild to bold raid* of theeriemF'.i caralry
.\&de from t h e moral effect of keeping t h e State w i t h i n t h e Vnion.
!he Baltimore and Ohio Railroad i n the northern part.-nisin l ~ n c
iietween the East and West. the Virginia Central Railroad. penctmt i n g the. Rlire Ridge at Iiockfial, Gap, and t h e V i r g i n i a and T e n n r o s e c
Itailroad. juct beyond We3t Virqinia's wuthern boiindary. wvre all
of immense *trategic i m p o r t a n c e
But although the State hail by extrsoraliiiury exertton* baeo
Iicdd, t h e operations of t h e cavalry had been inconapicuous. \Vith
the advent of G R A N T ' S control of the Federal armiee. the cavalry <it
the .\rmy of W e s t Virginia came intc) inore prominence.
I n the .;prlng of IS64 the Departmerit of \Vest \-irgiiiis+ which
iricludetl the Shenandoah Valley. w a s i n c o m m a n d of Genenrl SicicL
whu. under orders from GRAXT,despatched an expedition under
lienera1 C'ROOK to cut t h e Virginin and Tennessee Iirrilroad at S e n
I:iver Hriilrfe. and destroy the Salt work.; at Saltrille .\a a diver.
-ion S t C i E L prriplJaed to menace the Virginia C'cntral Kailroaci a t
Staunton.
CBWK cntru$ted t h e destruction o f t h e work* at . S a l ~ v i l l cto ( ; e o .
cral A V E R E L Lcavalry
'S
division. while h e himseli marchcd a p i n r a t
Sew Hirer RridKe. It i a with the cavalry coinn~and that w c arc
I tiiefly intoreeted.
AVERELL
was at Charleston, \V V a , w i t h 2,479 officer* a i d men*
\vlien CROOK'$orderu reached h i i n . Marching o n May lfit over
pathlow mountains AVERELLiound S:iltville too stroncly guarded
to be taken without infantry and artillery. Approachin:: \\'?.the.
v i l l e on the l o t h , b e w a s confmritcd by 5,000 of t h e enemy u n d e r
cknerals MORGAX
and Jonm, whom h e succeeaiullr sttacked and
held a t bay for the purpoee ( J f preventing their concentration o n
4;eoeral CBOOK'Ycolumn. Proceeding to S e w Rirer, . \ V E R E L L
c.rossed at n n opportune tinil,. t h e river riding i n ' time to check
!dot!~;a~'e putrruing ,force. .\t Christianburp: Aveacr.L took t w o
.:.inih u n a and deeimycd t h e railroad to a p o i n t four mile* ea*t of
t h c d n . On the 15th instant. the little coninland rejoined C;t.neral
~ I i l eto

dty.
Giviog ap all idea then of the original objects of lhu expedition.
~ o w and
r SEXBIDAN bent all their roBource8 towarda keeping
ap t b e deception without giving battle. This waa accompliahed
' uotil the Z9th instant, when t h e Second Corpa was withdrawn to
take part in the aaeault on Petemburg the following day.
This witbdmwal of t h e infanrry left tho cavalry corpa i n a poai-

tioo where it could h a r e been annihilated had the enomy neon fit
to attack. But nbortly after daylight on thc 30th the cavalry aafulr

.,

b:>

followed t b e infantry, and moved with a view to operating oii t h e

eoemy'e left tlrnk, ebould the mine oxploaion be uuccerwful. Thc
faihre, however, of the latter causud thia movomont of tho cavulry
to be at 0008 arrested. On Aagust let, two daya attar the minc
was reliovoct from personal command
exploeioo, General SEEBIDAN
of the Cavalry Corps, and waB ordered to t h e Shonandoah Valley.
The I W O P
tho8
I~~
far accomplished by tho cavalry under SHBWDM had bee0 moet dietingaiebed. With tbe idua over boa(' i n view
&at t h e Usvalry Corps sboald be organized and used to fighi thc
enemy'e c a d r y , h e bad succmded io almoat a n n i h i l a t i n g what hail
heretofore bean t h e moet oniformty eucceeeful a r m of the Coofod
emte rump. Beoidea accompliuhing the deetruction of million* ot
dollare worth of property, t b e Cavalry Corps had, in all imporfalit
movemeole, mted UI a mreen to tho main army, and by itcl hoetill.
demoortrations bad time aner time forced the Confuderate corn
maoder-io-cbief, maub -against hin will, to dolach much ntwde.1
k p k m his already hard pressed army. Had it beon keltl

-1..
OAvxam.~.'sb-0

I.'4

i
L

copnunden r e r e G e w d D c r n r and CoLoDtl

P c P a ~ Z m ~ I c L

PRIZE ESAYAS.

66

iiifantry. charyed their i n t r ~ ~ n c t i n i ~ :1i1#1

~ i i t ~(rrrrlt-,i til,,
work% t s u t finding L p i c h b u r g heavily reinIbrc.cai. I I 1 - S T v . R tlecidt-l
to witlitlraw townrd hi* base by way of Buford'- p a s . T h i $ hc nc.
(~onipli*bcdsuci.ewfully. E A R L Y following. und repulled t h e e n e m y
wlicnever uttacketi. I I e reuc.hc.d Salt3111o n t h e 'Ilrt in-rant. w h e r e
t h e ericniy abancioiiell t h e Iicirsuit. and urrired, balt'$turved. at
(;ruiiley'* Isridyc on t h c 2 i t t I
I I L S T E R ' Z campaign had t h e efftlci of Iiraainp off B portioll of
I.EE'S ICtrct- t o reinforce 1,ynchburp. :LiIqi catize*l s Lfrcut low o f prop.
e r t y t o tlie C'oritbdemte p v r r n m e n t . I n t h e w HUCCWSCS. t h e C n v airy divi-il)iis of Ciencrul* . \ V E R E L L s11~1
I)I.FFI~:
t o o k u prominent
part.
But E A R L Ydid n o t l u n g reniairi idle .\t\cr forcing IICSTERi n i o
the Sheiiiiiilloah--n nianruver which freed 1.yricliburq a n d let? the
l o w c r S l i r n a n ~ l o s h open - h e u n i t e d Gerieral R R E C K O X R I ~ I E
i n' -L ;
fantry tiivision aud t h e cavulrJ- of (;enera1 ROBERT I < A S ~ L ( ) S IJ. r . . t l i
hi* o w n corps and moved d o w n t h e valley
Resctiiriy \Vinctirntcr
on July ?(I. arid 3 l a r t i n e b u r g t w o day7 later. he tiru*hcai * I * i E 1 , ' S a n d
\VAI.I,AI-C'S troops a..ride.crowed t h e Potomuc. s n ~ threatelled
l
\Va-hT h i n movement w alarmed t h e Federal uultioritics thut t h e
irigton
Sixth nnat xiricteenth A r m y Corps were i-apiJl)- traneferred from
the . i r m y of the Potomac to Washington. resulting i n EARLY'+
Duriny this
r e t i r i n p t t i r t i u g t i I.ee*burp. Winchexter an,! S t m b u r p
retreat E A H L Yw n a continually haracw-J by D r r r i ~ . ?cavalry
;
diri* i o n . which atiucked hia t r a i n s a n d enynpcd 111 w v e r u l bcvrre J k i r I~ROOK'*

at Uuion, having marched with uncomplaining fortitude :is()

milea through a n r l m o e t impaaaable region d e s t i t u t e of s u p p l i w .
t h i r t y mil- of the journey b e i n g i o s i n g l e Ble, o n foot, over u n t r o -

Cmr

qaented p a t b a
While t b i e aamprrigo of t b e K a o a w h a wtw t a k i n g place, SIOEL
bad, with 6,000 men. of which 1,000 were cavalry u n d e r Generul
&UIL
(an otscer of foreigo birtb), h K u n operation# in the Slienaodorh Valley. He reporta: ' . T h e few troops I h a v e b e m ( u t
, Winobeeter) are excellent, with t b e exception of tho cavalry."
On May 1 6 t h h e met the Coofedorate force u n d e r BBL(XE?IRIL)OE.
I at N e w Market,* and tbe Federal covulry, poeted on the left of t h e
' line, were rooted early i n the actioo. Although tho rcniainder o t
the Union troop conteeted t h e g r o u n d bravely, t h e y finally gave
wry.
S l a B L wao niRnrlly defeated, and waa accordingly relierecl
I firom command of the D e p a r t m e n t of Woet Virginia, boinr: succeeded
on M a y O l m t by General -Enrrr~.
On A f a y 2 6 t b EUNTSU
b e p n from C e d a r Creek the canipniKn
whioh bad for ita object t h e occupation of L y n c h b o r g . His t w o
cavalry divieiona wero u n d e r c o m m a n d of D I J ~ P( aI ~h LL foreigner)
8od AVBRBLL.
The Federsl command encountered noopposition until i t reached
Enrrioonbarg, where IY~ODXFJ
was found o c c u p y i n g u s t r o n g p o n i tion. The F e d e r a l cavalry aacceeded in c a p t u r i n g a large supply
t r a i n at t h i s point. O n t h e 6 t b of J u n e WYNCOOP'S
cavalry brigade
took (LO =rive a n d i m p o r t a n t part in the battle of Piedmont. b v
wbiab tbe Confederate Geoeml Jonm WM defeated; on the r;th
EUWTBB
o w u p i e d Stcronton, a n d o n t b e 8th h e WM reinforced by t h e
i n f i n t r y aoder C m n a n d t h e c a v a l r y u n d e r AvBsrrLL.
. I

).

ic
I

I n m t t i n g oat from Staunton, DurPri'e cavalry diviaion wah

ordered to demonstrate w i n a t t h e e n e m y at Wayneeborough, b u i
finding t h e Confederate force v e r y strong, h e croseed the Blue Ridge
and oat tbe Cbarlotteeville and L y n c b b o r g Railroad at Arlington
Station. IXDODXN followed h i m , bat WM repulued with lorn, D U F ~ I L
oaptarinll one b a n d r e d primonere, including eeventeeo otflccrs
While tbeee operntionq were b i g b l y saccBBBful, D I J F P I failure
~ ' ~ to
retmn to the main o o m m a n d c a a d HUNTSRa long d e l a y at Yteunton, and tbe m.ain objeotive, L y n c h b o r g , wae roinforced before thc
F-mpl,amVed.
w
On tbe 17th AVBBELL,s u p p o r t e d b y . Durrifi. c a m e upon thc
enemy at Quaker <3hurch, 6ve milea f r o m L y n c b b u r g , and, aidcd b~
pd 6#W men, b b
a d r y bdW commanded by IMB*,DKS. The mrp
d ?ba Pl@mh YtIIDy IWtm.t*ondo?Colowl Sur??. mot p u s In l b b betlle.

.BPD..IRI#S

ni i* ti e * .

On the 2+th of July EABLYt u r n t d a i Iieriirtuwri on ('ROOK'S

w h i c b wan followiry h i m , a n t i t r s i i ~ i l r ~i ti
w v c r e l y thut
CROOKWZIN obliged to retire to H a r p e r F e r r y . I n [ t i t + b a t t l e both
L)l'FPI&'H anti A V E R E L L 'cavalry
S
waa- w v e r e sercice. b u t llilrl t h e i r
efficiency was not w h a t i t sboiild hurt. been 1 4 Nhttwn tlv HCSTCR'S
. * T h ecavalry anli t h e
letter to ~ I A L L E C
written
K.
about t h i e time
diamounted men in t h e late Bphtrr behaved i n the mo*t diwracet'ul
m a n n e r , t h e i r 0facer.e in m a n y inb1nncr.N leuclinr: then1 i r f f u n < l * t a r t i n g all k i n d s uf lying r e p r t r , tendirip to demoralize the a h o l e corn.
mood." A l t h o u g h upplicabte to t h c di*mounted m e n , r h o w e r e t h e
odd8 and end9 or' various r e g i n i e a t ~about waahiilgton. t i i i * *tale
ment waa unjust to t h e main cavalry force. which with f e w excel,
tions, f o u g h t gallantly.
T h e way was aeain o p i i fur E A B I . ~unci
, s ~ l r a r i c i n yi i i t o M a r y land he detached MCCAI-~LAWII
to t ' h o m l x m b u r g . Peniin . I s i d t h a t
town in whew. and fell aack towards Stranbury.
vommand,

UI

PRIZE E S S A I-.

EABLY'S
m n d m i d caused aacb coneternatiori in t h e S o r t h thtrt
command, but by d e .
p ~ w r r d e t e r m i o e dto not only c r a s b EABLY'S
vaetating the fertile valley of the Ybenandoab. to prevent i t c being

wed in fobon, aa a baee of supplies for the Confederate armies.

C3ened BEBEIDANr a e selected to carry out this ditecult tank, in a
w o n where m a n y generals had already failed.
W h e n SHEKIDAN
aaaumed oommand of the A r m y of tlio Stlensitdoah, ita s t r e n g t h uomprised the S i x t h A r m y Corps, one division
bf the Nineteenth Army Corps, two diviaions of infantry from \ V w t
p i r g i o i s . and TOBESET'S
division of cavalry. I n the cxpcctntion
)bat AnruLt's cavalry division would soon join him. StleRir).rs
qppointed TOBBSBT
chief of cavalry, a n d aesiRned McRtTln t o t h c
+ommand of TOEBCET'I,
old division.
BHXBIDAN'Sioetroctions directed him to maaa his troop at liarperk Ferry, a n d follow and attack t h e raiding force wtierercr
bond. And, a l t h o o g b protecting all baildioge, to t a k e a n d dentroy
i l l forage a n d stock i n t h e valley which might invite t h e enenir.a
teJtarn.
Tbe dret 6ve weeks of SEEBIDAN'N
valley campaign were apen t
maneoverioge, offensive a n d defeosivr, which, though enlivened
by nameroas wvere cavalry ekirmisliee, b r o u g h t on no general
4otion.
The Federal army set out h m Harpr's F e r r y on Augunt l O t h ,
g n d between t b 8 t date s o d the 13th mooed with atratcyical prv.
oision to Stmeburg. Here SEBBIDAN
received a delayed letter froni
QMNTto HALLLCE,
informing him t b a t EABLYhad been reinforced
l?yi n f a n t r y a n d artillery from the Confederate army a t PeterHburp.
q n d directing YECBIDAN to sat on t b e defeimive. T h e latter accordipgly w t n d hie fbrw8rd movement with t h e dame precision which
dad marked his advance, a n d left'in bis w a k e a devmtated valley.
@y AaRaet 18th be WM -io
i o t h e vicinity of Charleetown,
osely followed by EABLY;
b u t toward, t b e end ot' t h e month t h e
ofdente general fell back towards Brucetowo a n d B u n k e r Hill.
h d later to t h e vioinity of Stepbenson'a Depot, near Winchester.
I f o e n p p m e n t of importance occurred,* SFIZBIDAN etantiing strictly
the defenrioe, M hie orden, required, io apito of g r o a t political
ore employed to force b i m i n t o aggremive action. But the
.IO well employed.
As SEEBIDAN
mportn: '*Thecavalry an*

'*

i n haratwing t h e eneniy. , L + o p p ~ n c ~ n k
t ii n g
Iirincipally intitntry. In tbeoe ekirnii*hr* ttic cavalry w a - bec.om~ i i g
educated to nttack infantry liner."
learned
N
t h r o u g h -pie* that GCRSEAW'S
September 1 fith S H K R I D A
8 1 i v i c i n n tiad returned to the Army of S o r t h e r n Virginia. and he
, l w i a l ~ 4that the t i m e for active o p e n t i o n * bali at t c o q t h come.
1Iij oripinnl plan of' action contemplated t h r o w i n g his a r m y
:i('rti*.- t h c Vallc?- Pike at S e s t o w n . eoutb o t lTinche9ter, bot hear.
IIIL. I'rnni A V E R E L :hat.
L
n n t h e Iyth, E A R L ? h a d attacked him a t
I{iinkt*r Hill w i t h t w o infantry divi*iona. a n d had afterward9 proa ~ c . c t l c . tnwardrr
~l
M a r t i n s b u r g . h e determined t o a t t a c k the two m.
:iiniriinp ('onfederate d i r i ~ i o na~t S t e p h e o w n ' * L k p o t . a n d t h r n
turn. i n tiriic t o m e e t thoae a t Bunker IIill and Martinrburg.
But E A R L Y euspecting
.
t h a t S H E R I D A =Xa * about to move,
iwnniptly withdrew t h e w divisions. cio t h a t on t h c 15th inetant
G ~ I R I W O(lirieion
N'S
was at B u n k e r Hill. R A M $ E ~ - Rtwo
' s mile* e m t nt
\Vinctiester IWPOAS I tie 13erryviIle Pike. \ Y H A R T O S . 'at
~ 5it~~ptic.nwn'c.
; i i i 1 1 R O I * E S 'division
~
near there. T h e c a r a l r y 01' I,om.*x. JACSSOS
:anti J ( I E I % W w
V a s tn t h e r i g h t of ~ W ~ E I . Ra . .l i i l c . F l T z H 1 . a f i I.Ec
o r w c d Stephenson'$ Depot. westward
rm
' *y wan u p anti movOn t h e l ! h l i of Septemlwr S E K R I I P AaY
ing a t :I o'c,lock i n t h e morning
\Vil,so!u.s ~ l i r i * i o ncrowed t h e
Optvfuon nt tlie Rcrryville crossing. a n d charginC u p t h e canon
Ili r o 11g h w h ic.h the Re r ry r i I le. W i n c heater I ti r n pi ke r u n P. c ~ it u red a
- i i ~ : i I l work o n t h e open ground a t it8 mouth hetbre t h e Confederates
t.oiild recover from their wtoniahment.
. i l l effortcl to.;di+Ilotigc
\ V i i . i c ) s proved fruitlee*. a n d h e beld it u n t i l t h e n r r i r a l of t h c Sixth
.lririy L'orp. This corps a n d t h e S i n e t e e n t h . which were following
\ V l i . s i s . were so long pawing the defile alreafly referred to. that it was
]:Ate i n t h c forenoon before they were able to form line of battle,
:And in t h e nieanwbile EARLYhad ti me to tiring RODES'Sand GORim.y's infantry dirieione clown from Stephenaoo'e. and from the high
ground i n front WM able to e n f i l a d e t h e Union t r o o p 8 4 they adcineed. With t h e arriral of t h e infantry. W i u r ~ r rmoved to t h e leA
troni hi* pcriloua poeition in f r o n t a n d took position alonR t h e eoutli
Iiank of Abraham Creek, covering t h e I'nion left.
Line of battle formed, t h e Union infantry a d v a n c e d - G m u ' w
Ilivi&on of the Sixth Corpe to t h e left. arid R i c g m ' s division to t h e
right of t h e Berryville-Xinchester P i k e ; GBOVXR'Ldivieion of t h e
Sineteenth Corps to t b e r i g h t of RicKETT'a, with R ~ W C L L 'and
S
I)WIOET'S divisions i n reserve. in rearof their reepeetire corps. T h e
:r~lvancuwn+ ~ucc-ewfullyaccompliebed ou t b e lett. but retarded on

, ~ n i p l o j - e t i tsvery da-

SVIII.

PRIZE ES.q.4 2'.

70

PRIZE ESSA Y.

the rigbt; and an GBTTYand R I C K ~ TpTi n e d ground to tlrr left, ;I

serious break occorred at the center of t h e line, w h i c h was oppor
l
taoely dllod by RGMBLL'S
reeOrve division.
bad advanced from Darkerille wnuth ward.
Meanwhile AVBUELL
C U ~ bad
B cmesed tbe Opeqoon at Lock'e Ford, while I.OWELI.
ani1
DIVINhad o
d at Ridgwap's Ford, all three comniard- prcwing
forward towards Stepbeneon'e Depot.
brigatle
To oonfroat t h i s force, the Confederatea had PATTON'S
of infantry and mme of FITZEUOELEE'Scavalrj. but with
AVBBBLL'S
division on t h e wost of t h e Valley Pike, arid MERRITT'.
I
on t b e east, TORBEET
w i l y drove thie force towarda Winchcster
Tbe p u n d in front of the Federal cavalry wtul well atlapteti for :I
cbarge, and while AVSUWJ.pressed rapidly towards tlic Confcdcrate M, Yucam'e division cbargod forward w i t h auch siiccew 11to break the Confederate left and capture a battery of f i v e p i i and 1,200 prieoners.
Almoet eimultaoeoue with this, CBOOE'Bdivicionn. which IuitI
been mawed at the Berryville croeeing of the Opeqaon, were hurlell
against tbe Confederate left, on the right of the Ninctcentli Arm?
This, together with t h e brilliant e u ~ c e e n of' TORBERT
Corpe.
1 cavalry along the Valley Pike, stampeded t h e whole Confederatta
1 line, r h i c b fell back in confusion towards Wincheater i n apite of
, t b e repeated efforta of ite commandere to rally their demoralize11
1 unita.
,
SEERIDAN
bad hoped to retain C ~ o o ~ ' e d i v i a i o ni na reeerve, u n t i l
1 ao opportunity woold oc'car to use t h e m i n taking polureoeion of t h t
1 Valley Pike, eoutbward, tbos cutting off the enemy'e rotreat. Bur
I
under t b e oiraumetaocee i t had eeemed best to place CROOK'S
coni
Accordingly I'i-iuo\
I maod io tbe main line of-t!attlo to tbe ri+.
1 wao directed to perform alone, aa well M he was able, w h a t has1
1 been intended for C m E ' e entire command-to prevent the retrcirt

of the Confedelrte army 8lOnR t h e Valley P i k e towards Straeburg

Wrtsoa'e demonstratione on tbe extreme Coafuderate riglit ball
LEE'Sca\
earlier io the battle, caused EAELY
to weaken FITZEUOH
dry d i r i d o n on t h e left by detaching WICKEAX'Ubrigade for t h , .
purpoee of m u r i n g a mote for retreat; but t h i n brigade wi* lart
neet broL b the Confederate len to confront AVEEELL,
M)
tli:~r
WILEON advanced witboot ditsculty, ecattering WICKEAM'S
brigaii
and ooncinoing hie adounoe till .iter oight.
When t h e Confederato line fell back panic-ptricken, SHEBIDA
c a d the Si8tb a n d Nineteenth Army Corpe to move towarde tl,..
left to d e t WllsoN in taking poseoesion of t h e Valley Pike. U It

51

I ~ A Y S E L - R ' J (:onfederate division, ahicli still retained ita mor&. a&

i n poaition to delay nioveriienta i n t b i a direction t i l l the Cdnfeder.
ate* had *wept by t h e p o i n t of danycr and darkness had pot an e n d
to hoetile operations.
Tlic Union low i n t h i s battle of the Opequon war from 4,500 to
.-i.oW m c r ~ or'
. w h i c h t h e cavalry lost but MI. The Canfedemte
low ainounted to about 4.0U0, of which nearly 2,000 n e w prieoners.
Tht. -1i.my of t h h shenandoeh alw c a p c a r d five piece@of artillery
3 rid ni n e battle-f l a p .
The victory canie at a time when ita moral edect WIU) most
needed, a n d crowneci w i t h cuccene a long eeriee of miefortonea to
the Federal arm8 i n the %enandoah \-alley.
It reemred the lower
rnlley to Federal control. and relieved Xaryland, Pennsylvania and
t h e national capital f r o m forther fears of inrasion, and it i s eafe k,
wiy could n o t have been-gained but for the part taken by the capslry both i r i securing ant1 driviog t h e enemy from it. '
XIX.
We hare j u * t writ them whir1in.c through Winchester. and w e
a r c a r t d them to-morrow," wired J ~ I E R I I ) anti
A S . his word* sent a

thrill of joy t h r o o g h the Sorillern Statee.

order9
*S
the cavalry corpn W ~ after
H
In obedicnve to S R C R I D A X
the rctreatiiig Confederatew at daybreak. .September 20th -Mrus~rr
*traipht down tbe Valley Kosd towarda S t m b u r g ; \.FIIW)N to Front
Royal by way of Steven*barp;. and AvEusr.L along the Bark h a d .
nkirting the ealge ot'ttie m o u n t a i n ranye to t h e west. towarda C'edar
C'reck. Thc infantry followed, t h e Sinetcenth Corpe on the riglit
of t h e pike. the S i x t h on the left, aod tbe Eighth Corps in the rear.
E A R L Yhad taken hiR stand at FiMber'r Ilill,tao milee Moth o f Stnu.
bury: and beyond a little etream called Tumbling R a n . S o effort
was for the preeeat made to dielodge him, tor his peition WM probably t h e * i r o n p a t t b a t be could have selected.

At

Ptraaburg the valley is divided loogitudinally by the

MM-

Little S o r t b M o u n taine to t h e west ie barely foar miles. With h i e right rwting on t h e

Unmanatten apure and t h e north fork of the Shcnaodoah, bis infantry l i n e of battle extended acFOBn the valley. and waa prolonged
nn the left by L ~ N A cavalv,
x'~
dismounted. The whole Confederate
line was intrenched, and 80 sure WM
SLY of t h e etreogth uf h i s
position tbat the ammunition chests were lifled from the mbono
a n d p l u c d b e h i n d t h e works.

s a l l u t t e n Range, nod b e t w e e n t b i e rroge a n d the

PRIZE ESSA Y.

72

An the Union troop arrived on t h e evening of t h r L'Oth, \ V R i u i i i

and EYOBTwent i n t o poeitioo on tbe heigbte of Strasbiirg, CROOK
north of W a r Creek,und tbe cavalry to the rigbt and rear ot
WBIOETa n d EYOBT,
extending to tbe Back Road.
A r e a o n o h n c e setidled SHERIDAN
that the enemy's right WIIimprsgMble, sod be determined to 088 the mme turning tactics he
bad aeed at Opeqaon.
o n tbe Zlet ~ E B R I D A N puebed tbe enemy'w skirmishem buck
towardr Firber'e Hill, and aRer a eevore engagement of the i n f a n t r j
necared an advantrgeoae poeition on the right. The night of the
21st CROOK
w m concealed in t h e timber near Straaburg. T h e aanit'
d a y TOBBBBT,
witb Wrrsor'a and Massrn's cavalry clivinionn, W ~ S ,
diepatcbed up tbe Luray Valley w i t h orders to defeat the enemy
cavalry, crow over tbe Yamsmitten Range to Sew Market, and
tbos gain t h e eoemy'e mar, ehoold SHEUIDAPJ drive him south troni
Fiaber'e Hill. .
On the eZd CpooK moved eecrctly to a position i n the timber
near Little Nortb Moontain, and t h e Sixth and Sinctccnth C o r p
were tn.esed oppoeite t b e r i g h t center of t h e enemy's line, k c x 6 T T +
divieioa opposite the left center, and AVERELL'S
cavalry on I ~ I V K E T T ' ~
right.
Tbe maneaver of CWR WM eminently eucceaafol Jioring o u t
from tbe timber lata io tbe &rooon of September 44d, lie struck
tbe enemy's left and rear with unexpected and irresistible force
t h e infantry in t h e main line of battle swung irito the turning
a r m y was
movement at tbe proper timo, and the rout of EARLY'S
complete.
All d a r i n g the oigbt of the 22d t h e Federal infantry with
Dmrr'e brigade of cavalry puebed on i n parsuit of the demoralizctl
enemy. DEVINetiock the enemy oortb of Mount Jackeon, and lint1
be been properly eopported by AVCRRLL,
would doubtlene harts
taken tbotmsodr of prinonern. But for eome unaccountable rewon
AVBBBLLbad gone i n t o camp immediately a n e r the battle of
I
I Firber'e Hill, leaving !be infantry and DBvxn'a emall caonlry brigudc
1 to make the all-nigbe poreait. Ee reinforced Drvrrv about 3 P H
/on tbe r'3d at Yoont Jackmn, but bie attack was indimerontl?
I made,and be WOO a h r w t r r d e witbdrew into a m p near H a w k i n r
S,

'

'

I bag.
I Meanwhile TOEBEET
wi

b his cavalry bad pawed np the Luray

YilADrd, and dnding this place in poeeeeeioo of the Con
/fedemto cavalry under WZOIHAY, tbe b r i d p d m t r o p d and t 1 1 ~
lcoantry impmuriaable for cavalry o a t h e tornpike, it wae impossi

1 Valley

(0

PRIZE ESSii 1..

74

PRIZE EP.c-4 Y.

i5

The enemy's cavalry, now u n d e r General ROSEER,*

became exceed
i n g l y a n n o y i n g to t h e rear g u a r d d u r i n g t b e n e x t few dape, a n d .
on October 8tb, TOBBIBT
w.8 directed by SarRrDan l 6 to g i v e b8(3ck
a d r u b b i n g next m o r n i n g or get whipped himaelf" A t tbie tinit.
Md.rurrr waa in camp near R o u n d Top, n o r t h of Torn's l h o k , an11
CUISTEB-me eix miles northwest, n e a r T u m b l i n g Run.
D u r i n g t h e night Coerra was o r d e r e d to retrace his atepa by tht,
Back Road, j o i n i n g h i s l i n e of b a t t l e w i t h MERUITT, who was ton
attack a l o n g t h e Valley P i k e , ooly a b o u t t h r e e miles aeparating
theee parallel made.
Aboot 7 A. Y. October 9th, C u s r r ~ ' e u c o u n t o r e d ROSSEE wit11
t b r e e b r i g a d e s near Tom'e Brook Croeeing, a n d 8oon after MERBITT
s t r u c k Loxax a n d JOENEONop t h e Valley P i k e , t h e Federal linc ot'
b a t t l e e x t e n d i n g wroes t h e valley.
The B ~ h t i n gwae d e e p r a t e on both eidoe. On t b e Federal si&
t h e r e WY a d e t e r m i n a t i o n to m a i n t a i n t h e preetige of tho cavalr!
in the valley, a n d to make u p for TORBEET'S
failure to pnnieh thew
name Confedentg dioiaionm at Milford a few weeke before. On t h e
Confederate s i d e it WM hoped tbat ROESEU,
whom previous efforts
had bee0 spccweful, would reeetablish t h e e u p r e m a c y of t b e Colifederate cavalry, and t h e e i g h t o f t h e devastated valloy b y meii.
many of w h o m w e r e f r o m thia region, eyurred t h e m to etubborii

I,,

# ) p e r a t i o n s o f c a o a l r j t h a t it 1s impossible for o o r r to compeic

with his. LOMAX'S
cavalry a r e armed e n t i r e l y with rides, a n d h a v e
110esbers, a n 4 tlie consequence is t h a t they c a n n o t tight on borwIBack, and i n t h e open c o u n t r y t h e y C U I I I I ~ )euccerutully
~
t i y h t on foot
:,<sinst lnrye bodies ot' c a v s l r y
I t w o u l d be better if t h e y could
: t l l be piit i i i t h e i n f a n t r y , but if that were tried. I atxi afraid they
{wold t i l l r u n off."*
SEERIDAX
had specially halted t b e I-nion i n f a n t r y one thy in
< ) d e rto I i a r e the battle of Tom's B t F k fought. 00t h e Ibllowinp
(lay he agnin moved forward across ('edar Creek arid occiupied t h e
Iieighta. t h o c a v a l r y on the flankz, and t h e S i x t h C'orps c o n t i o u i n g
I C R marcli i n F r o n t Iloyal. with II r i c w of j o i n i n g t h e A r m y o f t h e
I'otomoc. O n t h e 13th. however, i t waa recalled i n coneeqtience of
the e n e m j . ' s a r r i v a l a t Fiaber'a Hill. I t was S H E R I D A S ' S iriterltion at
the t i m e to aend all t h e c a v a l r y o n a raid t h r o u g h Cbeeter Gap to
t h e Virginia C e n t r a l Railroad a t Charlottceville, a n d it lied actualljIirocceded na tar ae Frotit Royal, but i n c o n w y u r n c e of ancontirmed
iiiformation ttint h ? c t i S T R E l r W a a about to Join E A R L Y . t h e e x p e d i t i o n was yiveti up. T h e c a v a l r y w a ~
accordingly ordered back to
('edar Creek, and General \VBIOAT was directed LO make hie pouition
*trong urid be w e l l prepared for any a d v a n c e of t b e enemy. T b i s
X
to \Vcrehington to consult with t h e Seedorie, S H E B I D Aproceeded
retary of War in r e g a r d to f u t u r e operations.

reeistmnce.

Tbe Bgbt
. .

was eeoeotially a eaber contest.

Agaiti and ugaiii

were ohargea g i v e n a n d received on both aides, s o d f o r t w o hours

t h e booom were almoat eqesrlly divided, the Coofederatee holding
the uenter w i t h ~ucceas,wbile the Federal c a v a l r y pushed back tlle
f l a n b Thin finally proved too much for t h e e n e m y , and as bot11

Coofderate da04a gave way, MEMITT and CVSTERordered a chargr

a l o n g the wbolefline. T h e retreat of tbe Confederatee wbicb immckd i a t e l y followed, degenerated i n t o a panic-etricken r o u t , which colit i n u e d for twenty-eix miles up the valley, t h r o u g h Motrot Jackatm
and Collrmbia Furnaw. Eleven piocee .of artillery. 330 prisonet.?i,
ambaiaooui, aieclone, srni even t h e becrdquurtere WagOtJ8 ot' tlle
Confederate commanders, w e r e captured.
TOBBBET
hm ntated t h a t of all t h e c a v a l r y victoriee, t h a t ab!'
Tom's Brook was tbe most brilliant o n e of them all, s o d the mimit
deoimive the coaotry baa over witueeeed."
Of thir reveree to t h e Coofederate a r m s EABLYw r o t e to LEE,
Outober 9th:
ood knows I have d o n e a l l in my p o w r

* * *
i

bd joined m

r on Oomba 6th.rtth

a..lrl br@&
r r b o a u m l ~ p o a t l u d-.lh.rdorol b e ? '

a v e r t t h e disasters which h a v e befallen t b e c o m m a n d , but t b e

!'act is, t h e enemy'a cavalry is ~3 m u c b superior to ours, both i n

,,~~mLw.rn
a n d e q u i p m e n t . and t h e c o u n t r y is M) favorable u) t h e

sY.
S o t h i n p PunpiciouJ wne Reen or heard by t h e Federnl a r m y at
c'edqr ('reek to indicatc a f o r t h e r advance by EARLY. I n fact, a
recoiinnie*ance on October 1 8 t h reported tho e n e m r an having re.
treated up t h e valley. But it is to be observed t h a t no cavalry
ncouta o r picketu were k e p t i n a d v a n c c to observe t h e enemy'a
rnovemente.
On tho n i g h t of t h e 18th t b e Arm? of the S h e n a n d o a b wa,q en.
camped on t h e bloffe a l o n g t h e north bonk of Cednr Creek, aa folIowb: CRMZ'S A r m y of west Virginia was on Lhe e x t r e m e left, his
t w o divisioiirc oa each eide o f t h e pike; on hia right wa.a t h e S i o e toentb Corpe, reparated from t h e S i x t h C o r p s f u r t h e r to t h e r i g h t
by a rivulet -Meadow Brook; YERRIIT'~
&valry d i v i a i w w a s 011

from Blcbmond. aod

.._~

Bcbelllon l&cordr. py SI,Y O ~XU11,

.
M I.

-I .

t b e r i g h t of t b e Sixth Corps at Middle M a r a h Brook, r i n d ('I JTCH P

a mile a n d a half beyond MBBRITT, watcliiirg t h e forth (it' ttrc Rack
a n d Mine B a n k Roada; POFILLLL'W
First BriKatle war) O U L o n thtb
Front Royal Pike, a n d hie b o n d Brigade was g u a r d i n g Burton's
Ford o n t b e Sheoaodosb.
The e n e m y attacked tho left of t h e line, in n h e u r y fog hcforc
daylight, Ootober IStb, a n d with n t u r n i n g moreiiient which w:ivery effective, d r o v e t b o i n f a n t r y back from ponition to position
T b e cavalry wna in t b o saddlo a t t h o Urst alarm, a n d was put i n
poeition o n the r i g h t of the infantry. T h o First Brixade, Second
DivisioB, beinn at Burton'e F o r d , wns cut off by t h e enemy's attick. o
b u t pa&ing k m p l e t e l y about t b e Confederate d a n k , joined the left
bf t h e a r m y at h i d d i e t o w n . T h e eecond brigade ot' this divieiori
moved elowly backward o n the F r o n t IioynI Winchester Pike, arid
bocceeded admirably i n e n g a g i n g LOXAX'S
cavalry nncl in p r e r c n t .
I n n him, t b r o u g b o u t t b e d a y , from a t t a c k i n g tho Pcdernl rear. Tliv
raloe of t h i s stubborn y h & n c o can beet be eetimatcd by t h i n k i n g
of t h e coneternation t h a t would bavo follotved a n attack on t h e war.
in additioo to the confusion in front.
Of M E E ~ I T T 'division.
~
the Renorve Brigade, hari n g revcivet1
ordem for a recoanaieennce t h e n i g h t beforo, had nlrcady udrancctl
to tbelineof pickets, when tbe l a t t e r wero attacked, b u t wubrcqiicntl~
fell back, a n d jpve w a p ' t o t h e Firet Brignde. CUSTLR'R
dirision.
R Copp'c
wbicb bad at d a y l i g h t - b e e n focbly attacked by I ~ O ~ Y I E at
Ford, WM with YEBEITT'~
division. deployed in l i n e of tmttlc on tht
Cigbt of t b o infantry. The infantry linea .won aftcr gave way i i i
gonfueion, a n d t h o Fifth United Stater, Cnvalry was deployed nLcrois
the 6elde in t b e almost neelees a t t e m p t to stop ntraggl&and
!'oral
a line. D r v r s ' ~brigade wae eent to t b e -left of t h e l i n c , with
ordere .to bold t b e pike, a n d a b o u t 10 o'clock tlic Firwt and Tbiril
L)irieione* were traneferred to t h e left of t h e line, wrow t h e pikc
jnat'nortb of Middletown, t h o Firat Divinion being ao dinpoecd 8s to)
onnoct with t h e line of the infantry. T h e Firfit Brigade, Second
ivieion, WM on t b e left of tlie Third Diviainn, a n d tho Third Divi)ion WUI 00 the left of the First.
I
T h e c a q a l r y k o g b t p l l a n t l y . Even at times, when, by backard movements of t b e infantry line o n t h e right, t b e Firut i'aralr?
'virion was subjected to a galling crom-Bre, tho division S ~ Q O ~ I
rm, a n d both divisions e n d e d grcatlj- from a murdoroue a r t i l l e r ~
1

i
i

AI

.! .,

78

PRIZE ESSA Y.

PRIZE E P . V . 1 >-.

perfect t e m p t of %re at clom roriye. In this chargt.

tho hrbr and chivrlrio LOWILL
received a mortal wound.
Tbe m ~ a l r on
p botb * a h continued t b o p u r e u i t acroee Cedar
Creeh, and e v e n after d a r k obarged a n d broke t h e last line t h e di*
portr, m i d

\':t~~t*y
for ttie purpoee of o p e r a t i n g a g a i n 4 )fcr?;By. snri o r rerl(ier.
iig thu r a l l r y ueelesa a e a bof suplb1ic.s for t h e C u c r r i l l a 4 i n t h e
suture.
T h e division paased t h r o u g h Arhby'a Gap of t h e Blue R i d g e ,
.inti m i d i n g column* were then detacbcai which (Icrmtarc4 the
o u n t r x o n each Jide of t h e general line o f march
T h e guetrillu.
v;elit wfely a t n distan1.e an11 avoided c a p t u r c , but t h e de61ruc.tio1,
p i p r o p e r t y a m enormoust h a t dc*trc,yed hy t h e I i w e r v c Rrigadtu
:rlooe a g g r e g a t i n g $41 1.621)
I n *pite of the bitter cold weather t h e cat-alry a a - k t a p t m o v t n c
,Iiiriri<
December. On t h e l!*th TORHERT.
w i t h MERRITT'+ nnC.1
l'iiwELt,'* division.. m a r c h e l thrnuph ('he-ter G n p for t h e purpo-c
of * t r i k i n g t h e Virginia Central I L i I r o n ~ ia t (;nr~.Ionst~illc.,r h i l \ .
( ' U T C P , ILO a diversion. procede~iu p t h e ralley. TORBEET
dmrt:
JACKIWY'Scavalry diri*ion o u t of Madi*~>n('nurt I I o u w . ant1 t11t.
latter formed a j u n c t i o n with JI~-('a~act..4svn'.;division a t [.ihertr
M i l l s , . hut t h e combined !ortic. (;enoral LI)H4s cornmatlaling, wau
4 g n a l l r defeated by T o E R e R T a n d driven w r w - t h c Rapioisn. T h e
Ibridpe had been mined. a n d WLL* blown u p while thc Feqlrral cavalry
were crooeinp in p u r m i t . but b r c r o w i ~ l pby iorql* a h r e a n d below
'TORBERT captured t w o pieces of* artillery
tIc tllt.n prot.waieei to.
n a r d s (.;urdonwille. but found t h e e n e m y ' * infantry in %Itch force
t h a t he returned. (:USER
had m e e n a h i l e b r r n zurpriueoi in hi*
L-amp at L a q ' a Spring*. both I<o~*cR's and I'AYsE'?; forcrs a t t a c k .
i i i g him a t daylight. a n d h e w a * obliged to rztirl..
The a c a t h c r WBA so intenriel?. cold d u r i n g thcsc- operations t h a t
horses a n d m e n auffered a e r e r c l ~a. n d many me11 were badly frwtbitten. The expeditions prlrcticsllp cliwed t ht . operatione of t h e
winter. a n d SHERIDAS'S
t r o o p went i n t o canrc>omrnt rlear {Tin.
cheater. T h e S i x t h Corps had been sent to P e t e m b u r p e a r l y i n
December, o n e dioiaion o f CROOK'*
carp to W e s t Virginia, a n d t h e
remainder to L'itj- P o i n t . leaving S E E R I D A
a iN
l t t l h u t one division
of t h e S i n e t c e o t h A r m y Corpa and t h e cavalrj-

organixed Confedoratee a t t e m p t e d to form. D a r k n e w alone aavcll

the greater part of EAELT'Sarmy from capture.
Tbe clrvalry alone c a p t u r e d forty.five pieces of artillerp, t h i r t y
two d f m n e , f o r t y - s i r army wagons, 672 primnem-more
than
b a l f tbe total number orrptored -and a great deal of o t h e r p r o p e r t y
Tbe rervices of t b e cavalry d o r i n g t h e e n t i r e d a y w e r e moHt
d i d i n g o i n b e d a n d valuable, and i n decided contrast to thoee of t h e
Cootrederatecavalry. N e r t b e r ROMBBn o r LOYAX,
a l t h o u g h etrikin;:
for t b e U n i o n linea at a t i m e wben t h e Federal i n f a n t r y waa mocIt
d e m o d i d , were able to reach t h e P i k e ; t h e t o r m e r being easily
repabed by Cumrr, and the latter held st bay during tbe e n t i r c
d a y by POWELL. The fact tbat t w o o f t h e cavalry divieione werc
about to depart upon a raid to the V i r g i n i a C e n t r a l Railroad, and
that tbeir ordere wem countermanded at t h e last m o m e n t by
8EtluDm at Front Boyal, shore bow the smallest happening8 may
aWwt the ate of the greatest battles.*
f i B t r ' s , d i s o q p n i s e d army reseeembled at New M a r k e t , whilt
S E W A Np-ed
to Kerostawo. From S t e p h e n m n ' e Depot ti
Harper's Ferry t b e railroad WM reconstructed a n d arrangerneott
made to d e t w b troop to General GBANT. On t h e n i g h t of Novem
bem l t t h 6eneral EABLT
made a reconnaissance n o r t b o f Cedar Creek
bot bmtily retired on t h e nigbt of t h e following d a y , before troop
could be rent a g a i n a t him. H i s cavalry, however, were not so for
tanate. On the day following t b i s reconnaiwance General POWELL'
crsvalry d i v h i o n a t t a c k e d LONAX'S
c a v a l r y at N i n e v a h , routin;
tbem, p u r s u i n g tbem t w o miles m a t h of Front Royal a n d cap
turing all tbeir a r t i l l e r y (two g u n s ) , t b e i r o r d n a n c o trairi a n d 181
prisoners. On tbe r m e d a y General Cummi, m o v i n g o n tli
Middle and Bsck W e , eng8-d RO~WER'S
c a v a l r y diviaion n o r t h o
Cedar Creek,r o u t i n g i t , d r i v i n g it a c m Cedar C r w k a n d captui
ieg Si-0
prironera T h e enemy'e i n f a n t r y wae also nuccessfull,
engaged on t b e Valley Pike by a portion of t h e First Cavalry Dir

eion under &seral YSBBITL

Late in November (November 28th to D e c e m b r 3 d ) Gener:i
wu sent witb two brigudes on an expedition into t h e Lurir
mm#dUU (h.ar.lq alone aptwed Lme pri.oaem 71
D w b g (Iw
bonr lp00 hol.. eqalpaco(.. and 7.lSt b
~babl)lcIodlo(y.I* Urlarclr It
thlOSa 4'M.74!2 b-&
of r h a L
hare.. and 7 0 0
Md amr0dtbo

;r,

XXI.
While t h e w stirring eveote had been taklnK place in t h e
J h e n a n d o r b Valley, GREW'S cavalry d i r l s i o n (*till k n o w n ~ ) c lthe
k x o n d ( h v a l r y Division) on d u t y witli t h e A r m y of t h e Potomac.
hall no1 k e n idle. I n d e e d , in cowcquerlce of t h e withdrawal of
the o t h e r cavalry divisions to t b e Shennnlloati V a l l q . it had r u t h c r
inore t h a n i t a s h a r e o f c a v a l r y d u t y tn pcrkmtl1

P R I Z E ESSA Y.

P R I Z E E S S d Y.

W h e n ESIWHAW'U
division of LES'LI
a r m y wae witbdrawn to r c t h e Second Cavalry Divieion, with t h o Second A r m y
i t i f o m EABLY,
i&rp (HANwK'~)cnnwed t h e Jamee at Deep Bottom August 14tb.
( O n t b e 16th the Federal cavalry met t h e enemy'e cavalry on the
C h a r l e s City b a d , a n d d r o v e t b e m ae far ae Wbite'a T a v e r n . In
Ithecle e~gugementaGenerale CEIAMBLISJS
a n d GIBARDLY,
o f t b e Coil.
L
federate a r m y , were killed.
D a r i n g t b e deetructioo of t b e Weldoo Railroad wbicb followed,
fho:caoalry W M on picket duty, but a portion of it, diemoaoted,
(tookdctivo part in t b e engagement at Ream'e Station on Auguat
Wtb, which resoltad i o t h e broaking of HANCOCK'S
line a n d t h c
kapture of boo piwee of hie artillery.*
N o movementa of eonaeqaeoce, except roconnaiseencee, now oct ~ r r e duntil September tOth, when a demonetration WM orderod on
$be left of the line, to prevent tbo enemy detacbiop lroope to the
ortb e i d e o f t b e Jumee. I n t h i s movement t w o divieione of t h e
ittb Army Corpe u n d e r General WARBIN, a n d t w o of t h e N i n t h
kfmy Corpe u n d e r General PABKL,moved from t h e left towards
koplar S p r i n g Charclr and Poeble'e F a r m ; t h e cavalry division at
the -me t i m e moved to t b e le& a n d rear. On October l e t GBEOO
pan a t t a c k e d by a large force of the e n e m y on t h e Doncan Road,
?bere b e WWJ g u a r d i n g t h e rear and le& of the movoment, but h e
fepeleed t h e a t t a c k with great loee, General DUNOVAPJT
being a m o n g
the @ofdentee killed. For some weeke t h o t m p e were employed
(n holding a n d fortifying t h e position t b u e gained.
00 October 27th the cavalry divieioo wae placed under t b c
drdom of General HAWCOCK,
a n d together with part of t h e N i n t h ,
t i f t b a n d Second Corpe, moved towarde t b o left in recmnsiaeance.
h e Second Carp a n d t h e cavalry c
d Hatcber'a Run on t h e
a u g h a n R o d , with eligbt oppoeition' from t h e eoemy'a cavalry.
n a r r i v i n g at Gravelly Run t h e e n e m y wae found porltod on t h c
ride i n a poeitioo of great natural etrongth. The F i r s t Maine
nd Bixtb Ohio were diumouotect a n d , m i s t e d by t h o Twenty-Brat
enoryylvaoia, moeoted, d r o v e the onemj's lino back beyond tlic
,t h e enemy breaking in confusion at tbe advance of the
d Corpa. I o the e u k q u e n t operatione on t h e Boydton P l a n k
tbe cnvalry WM on t b e left of t b e b o n d A r m y Corpn, and
alrnoet t h e e n t i r e divieioo dismounted, repeatedly held t h r
e again& eaperior numbere of t h o e n e m y u n t i l be retired. On
(ober 28th t h e troop were again w i l h d m w n to the linen o f i n t enohmanta.

During S o v c n i h r the division waa cmploycd on picket a n d

reconnaitwenrlrc. and on December f t h , numbering 4 . 2 ~ 0sdectivc
men, it waw sent. unl1c.r Gcrrcrrrl \ V A R R C ? ~w. i t h t h r e e divieione of
tbo Fifth C'orpa. M O T T ' ~divkion of t h e .Second Corps, and four
batteries of artillery. d w t r o j - the Weldon Railroad a n d i n t e r r a p t
r h e enemy's communication*
A a t h e command reached t h e vicinity 01' t h e railroad General
GBCQO detached a fi)rve to t h t r o y t b r railroad bridge over t h e
Sottowrc, a n d the cavalry continued t b e partial destruction of t h e
railroad nR f a r BR J a r r n t t ' a S t s t i o n . 0 0 Dzceinber 9th t h e work of
aloetraction continued. the c a r d r y c l e r r i n c t h e e n e m 7 o u t of t h e
way a o u t h a a r d . a n d pivkcting the country north a n d e8.w A t
Three Creeks t h e ('onfederate* hati poateal on the Joutb bank t w o
.mall field g u n s a n d two hundred cavalry. t h e tjridces h a v i n g beeu
deetmyd. and t h e forda ob*truc.td; but distnounttd men crossed
and drove the e n e m y a w a y . The railroad waa destroyed for eeventeen o r eighteen miles when, the vommand's Rupplies not justifying
further operation$. i t returned to c a m p on December 12th.
Earl? i n February t h e %cond Cavalry Diririon proceeded via
Ream'!, Station t o Dinwiddie Court IIouse without finding t h e
cnerny i n any considerable fnrcc On t h e following da?. however,
the divi.rion forrntd a junction with General \VARRIIS at (;ravelly
l i u n , a n d coven4 his movements to Hatcber'a Run. the e n e m y
fbllowing. With tlw Fiwt anti Third Bripsde* dismounted a n d t b e
Second Brigade mounted. t h e e n e m y was d r i r e n acrom t h e r u o . and
t b c command bivouacked on t h e field of battle.
On Ftbbruary !Itti General D A ~ I McM.
D
GRCOO.W I I O h a d for do
Ioiig a time been M) prominently and illuatrioualj- identified with
the cavalry of t h e A r m y of t h e Potomsc. wge relieved from command, through t h e acceptance of hi# reeignrtioo, and General JUEX
1. GREW WUmCd t a m p o m r y command. Getleral Divrw, r e t u r n ing from leave later in t h e month. aaeumed command,and on March
X t b h e in torn wacl relieved by G e n e r a l CBOOS,w h o retained per.
rnanent command of t h e division.* D u r i n u this period tittle of
importance occurred, t h e division reporting on the 27th to Goneml
SEEBIDANfor duty with tbe First a n d T h i r d Cavalry Divieions,
which had again joined t b o ArniF of t h e Potornac.+
T h e latter divieions had meunwhile, on F e b r u a r y t'Ttb, enterod
upon tbe final campaign which wa8 to clear t b e vnllcy onco for all.
of organized Confederate t r o o p

HO

;i

-t-I

* I b r l l ~ ~ o r p o ( r t l o o otfb a a v a l n . ~
Appeadlx 13.

-1

111

-~

*Wlm) a m a n w h i l e bartog bbcn ordcmd w a t to r e o f g u ~ l and

r
oommand R I I U M A . * ~
c,a?alry.
h
t For tho eU.eUre L o r n of Flnt end Thlrd L)lrllloos Pcbroui a l h . rn AppcodIx I&

PRIZE E 8 8 A Y.

82

General YIP PIT^, wbo bad performed uuch distinguished servicw

M

a diviakn commander, e u c d e d Genoral T o B B l a T aa cbiof of

cavalry. TOEBSBT
bsd dieuppointed SEERIDAN
during the battle
of Fisber's Hill, a n d iu tbe later oxpedition to Gordoneville. He
eeemed to lack -If-reliance rt critical timeq,aud one of YBEEIDAN'S
-ita of obareoter WM that he took no chance. SararDan'a original
plans, .B directed by GMNT, contemplated the deatruction of the
Virginia Centrul Railroad, ttre cuptui*u of Lynchburg if practicable,
victorioua ormy i n North Carolina.
and a junction with SEIBYAN'B
A small f o m of B~WBB'N
cavalry WUI ericounterod March 1st at
Mount Clraford, but WM emilly driven to Klinu'a Mille. At tbia
time EABLTwm at Staunton, but M SUEEIDAS'N
command app m b e d tb8t place be retired to \vaynwboro, whero he occupled a
lineof b t e r e t w o r k e d o n p I ) ridge weet of the town. CFBTGBw u
diepatobed towards Waynmboro, cloeely followed by DEVIN,and
tloding tbe Confederate len eomewhat e x p w d , lie writ diurnouuted
regimento around thia flank, wbile be, with two brigadoe, part
moanCed and part diemounted, aeslrulted i n front.
The h o k i n g movemont WIW succewful, sild onabled CUSTER'S
line of battle tocarry the b r w t w o r k e . The E i g h t h New Tork and
Firs&cConneotioot ohurged in wlamrl t h r o u g h t h e enemy's line, and
tbe town of Wnyneaboiw, and held the east bank of the South
River, tbae ontting olf tho enemy'a lino of retreat. A l l the Confed,eratee eorrendemd except h M B f t ' 8 command und o few general
Iodaoem, t b e cavalry capturing eeventeen battle flap, 1,600 prieonon,
land eleven piof artillery.
Continuing t h e march Cumrlr's division reached Charlottesville
Ion t h e 3d ioetant, hat t h e moddy rosde delayed t h e wagon train
innti1 t h e btb. On t b e 8 t h CU~TIR
deetroyud t h e railroad aa far (LA
/Amberet Court EOOBB,
sixteen miloo from Lyncbburx, while DSVIN.
/wbo bad proceeded alsng t b e Jameu, deetroyed the canal.
The Confedemtee had meanwhile destroyed the bridgoe over the
1 amm,
and, t b e river being M) erollen ILB to be unfordnblu, SEXRIDAN
emned a janation. with SEIBMAN
ieppracticable. He therefore
Peoided to etill fhrtber deetroy t h e Virginia Central Railroad and
rmee River Canal, and then join t h e Army of the Potornac i n f r o n t
PelemborK.
on tbe lOtb of Marcb, where P halt of a
Colombia WM -bed
J WM made to allow t h e traine to catch up. From thio point
m, with Cnnfr'e division, proceeded to Louisa Court Hooae
eetroying tbe Virginia C e n t r a l sa far ILB Frederick'n Hall, while
ETBB destroyed i t from the lrrtter place to Beaver Dam Stution.

If

P R I Z E ESSAY.

9.1

Ikcciriiig word that PICKETT'S

Confcdcrntc divisiiin w i t h FITZ.
LEE'Sc a v d r y , were mooing east froin Lynchburg. and that
I . O N ~ ~ T R E E T waerusernblinga force a t Richmond to cut off SEERIDAS'S
junction with GEANT.the raiding force now puahed ~ i to
i dshland.
~ f E B E l T T liurinp marched from Frederick'e Hall tbrough Hanorer
and CVETGB
croueing tbe South Anna o n t h e Grorind
Court HOUBC,
.Sq u i rrel Bridge .
The command reached White Hou$e v i s K i n g \Villiarn Court
I i o u ~ eon March 18th. where supplica were fourld which S H E H I D A N
had requeated tu h a r e ready.
Thc expedition bod caused an immense amouot 01 ,iamngc to the
Confederate cause, w i t h but B l i g h t loss to S E C R I D A Scomnianif.
'U
But owing to the inccuennt rain8 which laettd for eixleen darn and
riighta. t h e itlmort impassable roads and t h e h i e h water i n t h e
*traarna, t b c murch wae one of the grentwt hardship
.It White H o u ~ ethe cornniatid rested for tire daya. arid + t i a d the
Iioma. Bot the march from Winchester liad been M, .levere u p o n
the latter that therc WOB not a eudlcicnt number of rcninuilta at
White lfoutw to replace t h e diuabled. *o t h a t t h e dismoilrited men
were ncnt i n t o camp n e a r City Point.*
HLWII

SSII
On Marcli 2 4 t h (;crwrnl S U E B I D Amoved
N
from White Ifouw,
rowed the James River n~ Jones Landing, and joined the Army of
the Potomac i n f'roilt of Petereburg on the 27th instant. Bot him
h r c e waa etill reynrded as a separate army. and be roceived b i s
ordere direct from Gonercrl GRAST.
Tho effective force o f t h e three divisions o f cavalry sgqregated
:1,000 men.) StiraiDa?r'a general instructions f r o m G a A n wore lo
move n e s r or t h r o o g b Dinniddie, reaching tbe rigbt and rear of the
Confederate a r m y ae Boon an poeuible, b u t with n o intention of attacking tbe enemy i n h i e iotrencbed poeition. Should h e remain
wan to cut loose arid deetmy the h n v i l l e and
intrenched, SEIBIDAS
Soatb Side h i l r o a d n - t h e only 8 v e n o w o f supply Lo L l B ' E 8rmy.
and then either return to the Army of the Potomsc. o r join SEE&
HAN'I army i n S o r t b Cnrolicia.
Tbe goners1 movement .pinat the ('onfederate army bemn
Marcb 2 9 t h The e v e n i n g of'that day t h e cavalr? tiad m h e d D i n siddio Court Houee, on the extreme left 01' the line, the nearwt c x 4

*?or a b u w c ol mum of cb.aWry la Y u r b I-. ra Appcadlx

t For ~ n l m r l n aMarch
.
%h (0 A M I 9th. cc ApprodL. 16.
e

15.

PRIZE ESSA E

84

tremity of tbe iofaotrp line being new the intersoction of tho Quakur
aord with the Boydroo Plank Road. The Firet a n d Second Divi.
moor went into ortap, covering t h e Vaugbao, Flatfoot, Ehydton
Plank aad Five Fork Road@,-all intenwcting at Dinwiddie-CcsTBIL'S division

remaining ut Xalone'e Croming to guard t h e traine

The nextday DBVIM'E
divieion w m eent by Goneral M Z U E I to
~~
get pomession of Five Forks, l ) ~ v 2 = ' brigade of CFIOOK'S
divieion
in rapport.. The reeoooaiesrroao showed t h e e n e m y to be i o force
at Five Forks o n the W b i t e Oak Road, nnd tbero wae severe ekirmisbiog. 00the following d a y , March 31at, Mmarrr, with t h e First
Divimioo aad DAW-' brigade of t h e T h i r d Divieioo, again ntlvancetl
on Five ForJte, while CBOOK,
with his two o t h e r brigades, mored to
the left aod enaoantered t h e e n e m y at Chamberlain's Creek. B u t
i o the meantime W ~ a s m ' aa r m y corps, which WIW n e r l on t h e
right of the cavalry, w.8 driven back, leaving t h e cavalry at F i v e
Forks to bear the brunt of t h e attack. I n t h e very obatinate battle
whioh emaed, the enemy WM niiablo, witb t w o divisions of infantry
and all hi cavrlrp, to push back t h e five cavalry brigadee, which
were dismoalrted on t b e open plrin i n f r o n t of Dinwiddie. T h e
, tlgbting continued aatil after d a r k , a n d t h e oppoeiog linea of bivouac
that night were aot separated by more than a hundred yarde.
AN
Of this b y ' s battle General GEANTsays: u Here S H E R I DdieInstead of retreating with his whole
played e t goneralehip.
oomammd on the main army, to tell t h e story of euperior force8 encoonbred, be deployed hie oaoalrg on foot, leaving o n l y mounted
men enough to take charge of tbe borecH1. Tbia compelled rbe
enemy to deploy over a vast e x t e n t of wooded a n d broken country,
and made hie p m g m slow."

00 tbe morning of the let of April HREBIDAN, reinforced by the

FUtb Oorp. and later by MA~EBNZIB'S

cavalry divieioo* ( I ,000 e0w-

'the
I
men) from the Army of the Jame8,advaoced again against
, Five Forks.
His plaa ofattack Wm to muke a h i n t with tbe cuvalry, to t u r n
/the enemy'r right, but meantime b r i n g i n g u p t h e entiro Fihb Corps
to SLrike theenemy's leftdsak a n d crash tbe wbole force if poeeible.
Tbe movement w m ha8teaed by the fact t h a t t w o divisions of t h c
Fiitb Gorp. were at the time i n rear of t h e enemy. T b e enemy'e
(infantrybad, in t h e hot p u r s u i t of SEEBIDAN
to Diuwiddie, isolated
t d f , and .WM moreover oatside tho Confederate line of worka.

k.Q

I*L

KAWX .IYnllevd

amemem w eemra~B a Y~CCSNZIK

from mmmaod of thh ar.lr'j dlrblon. M d

mar or
not IO^
oi W-C

P H I 2 E ESS.4 I'.

slow petting UD. but n e e r t h e h DEVIS'>

.,nd C m r m ' s division3 a c r e all t h e morning. under MKERIYT'S
iirection. preaeinp t b c cnvmy ateadit? backward. until tit 2 o'clock
. h e Confederates were driven behind t h e a o r k e on t h e W h i t e Osk
Ilnad.
I n furtherance of the plan of attack H I S ~ R I Tclocicly
T
engaged
ihe e n e m r , arrd W A R R E R 'corps
$
=a* ordered up on t h e G r s r e l l y
( ' h u r c h Wa4. ~ ~ h l i q i i10
e t h e W h i t e Oak Ihul anti a b u t one milc
I'rom Five F o r b . H i i t \ V A R R C R wag tlcain d n w i n g e t t i n g into
.

l w e ition.

About 4 o'clock W A R R E S began t h e infnntry attsck. hi6 right

dank covercd by ~ ~ A C K E S Z I E ' Scavalry, a n d at t h e mmc time
made a lively demonstration against t h e eoemp'e
(;enern1 YKBRITT
right. A l t h o u g h t h e two )esdiiIg iofantrj- diriaioos barel- eecaped
tliaanter through g e t t i n g weparatcd, t h e e r r o r was rectified i n time,
and ae t h e infantry swarmed over t h e IeA a n d rear of t h e 'enemr'e
crorke, doubling up t h e Confederate line i n confusion. D t v d s car:rlry division w e n t over t h e work* in front * T h e boetile artillery
irm captured and wnA quicklF turned on the demoralized e n e m r .
. i t t h e same t i m e CCSTEBwas Iiavinp an obstinate battle on t h e left
infantry a n d it-. H F. LICE'*cavalry.
with C'OES~C'Sand TERRY'S
After the t i n t line wtw carried t h e c n c m y made no serious Rtand.
. ~ n dt h e spoils of t h e battle w t w n i x gun'. thirtecn battl+flagr, a n d
riearly six thouaand prisonera.
~
a geneml m o l t on
F e a r i n g LEEwould ewcape. G B A ordered
the eoemy's wor R t h r next day and t h e intrencbmente werecarried
:it Peveral p i n t a . MERRITTon t b e same day waa moving westward,

and drove B cooeiderable force of t h e enenlp'a c a r d r y from a p o i n t

rlorrh of l h t c b e r ' e R u n to Scott'm Cornem.

D u r i n g t h e n i g h t of t h e Sd General LEK evacuated Richmond

and Peternburp; a n d moved towards h n v i l l e .
On tho 3d the cavalry resumed their pursuit, t h e Fifth Corps
support, a n d five pieces of artillery aod bondreds of prisonem
\cere taken. T b e e n e m y ' s i o h n t r y rear g u a r d wne overtaken st
Ih.ep Creek, w h e r e a aevere fight took place, a n d MXRBITTam
iiirected to a w a i t CIBOOK'J arrival a n d t h a t of a division of the Filth
1 'nrpe.
in

1
PRIZE ESSA Y.

J'H Is? E E S S d Y.

Be LBB*eumrrci to be besding for Amdin Court IIouw, CROOK

m u ordered uo the 4th to pueb ahead and etriko t h e Danville I b i l r o d , whieb be did near Jetereville; and the F i f l h Corpa folloaiiig
plbebind, iotrenched iteelf at t b a t point.
While 8t Jetereville, 8 telegram from LEE'^ Commieaary Chneral
to the eupply depertmenb at Daaville and Lynchburg WIW inter.
pepted, ordering 3,000,000 ratione e e n t to Borkcville. The telegrani
pru rr-tmoemitted by SEEBIDAN who dotermined forthwith to accure
the ratione for hie own army.
On the morning of the 5th Genoral DAW- made a recoonaie-

)f threw hundred priwnt.re. and with the arrival o f the other

~.
by
,.ripadem t h e cneniy'* line, wa* brokcw. T h i ~~ u c c e noplmrted
tho p i t i o n ot CR(W)K'*
cavalry division. which had been planted
-quarely acrow the eiierny'* line of m3rc.h. had the effect of cutting
6 three of the enemy'* inl'untry division*. and a* the Sixth Corpe
rnoved up i n the enern>-'* rear. nearly the entire force a a u captured.
. .pix of h i n generaln. fiftteen g u n n .
This included Geiienrl E ~ E L Iand
tliirty.one battlc flag:*. and from nine to ten thon*lrnd primonem.
The battle had u1*o the e f f w t of tlefleclin,g I , o ? t l l * T R E a ' s c o r p from
t t u march towaril* 1)anrille. Y I I I L i t morc(l t o Farmrille. north C I ~
.\ ppomnttox.
SHERIDAS
at t h i a tinic w r o t e to G R A X T .* . I f ttic thing is p w ~ e t i .
1 think that LEE will 3urrendcr." And President I , I Y C ~ ~ L
tcleN
:rapbed GUST t h e Itacl>nic. mewage, I' Let thc t h i n g be prewed."
It a m preraed On the 7th ('ROOK'S cliriJion PW posbetl on tn
Furmville; i i n l l c YERRITT
and l l A ( x E x z I K to prince FAwardz Court
Ilouse to prererlt any movement o f tlie enern- toaarde Danville.
C B ~ overtook
R
thc rear guard 01' the enemy rt train j m t ncmm
ilie river at Farinrillc. n n d i n a .pliarp tielit h! (;RF,(w'~: bripade, wan
rc-puI eed .*
This action indicatctl cle:wl?. t h t I,Err'r ot)jective wan 1,ynch.
liiirg. Thie being the ciuw. SHERIIIAS determined to throw all hin
a 3vaIry acrom the enemy'* path. :tnd Iiclld h i m if powihle u n t i l the
trifantry could arrive.
E
recalled. joining
Accordingly MIKRRITTa n d H A ~ K E S Z Iwere
('ROOK a t daylight, April * t h . n t Prospect Station, and all the
I.aralr1 were hirrrictf on toward., A p p m a t t o x Depot, twenty-eight
riiilee awny. ('I'YTLE having the advance, detached t w o regiment8
to cut off f o u r i train* of rtorw destined for 1 , ~ ~ 'army,
s
which
\\-ere found o Rhort dietance out of Appomsttox. and then, t u r n i n g
his attention to t h e depot. charged the enemy'* adrance yuard juet
approacliing.
T b e First DioiRion w w soon brought np by MCRRITT,and being
~leployed, diemoonted, on the right nf the Third. it cro&
the
road along which t h e enemy wan attempting 10 move. and efectually
IIlocked hie retreat.
The enemy waa driven in this fight. which rantinned u n t i l aRer
(lark, towards Appornaitox (:oort H o u ~ eand
,
twenty foor piece0 of
wtillery. an immenw t r a i n , and many prisonem, fell i n t o tbe hsnda
(pf the cavalry.

06

gsnoe towarde Payne'e Cme8 h a d e and diemrered that LEE'Sarmy

W M attempting to eecape in tbat dircction. DAW= eucceeded i n

burning nearly two hundred of the enemy'e wagone, and rejoined

the eupporling brigade8 of SMITEand GuEoo near Flat Creek, eludi o g a etrong force of Confederate infantry, which had been Rent out
to cot oil hie retreat.
It beccrme npparqnt to SEERIDAN on t h e following dnp that the
pntire maen of LBr'e army wae attompting to oncape. Hie trainn,
bwvily oecorted, were found moving towards Burkeville, and thcrc
were other evidencee of a general retreat. A t thie time, bfEADK'f3
plan of ~ttaclrwas to adoaoce hie right dank to Amelia Court
Bo-,
but after carrying out tbie maneuver h e found LEEgone, juet
pe ~ E B S I D A N bad predicted, when, on April 4th and bth, tho cavalrF
leader wished to .&tack LBBwith hie cavalry and the Second Army
corpe.
drooE WMwOtagain8t L d e train on the Deatoneoille Road, bot
Found tbem strongly goaded. So SEBBIDAN
shifted the cavalry
p o r o a , ~ ~ u pmlkel
n~,
to LBB'Sline of march, boping to find a
jwerlr p o i ~ in
t hie colamn. To proveat the d e w h i n g of any of the
boemy'e l o w , t h e Michigan brip;.de (STAW'~)
of the First DiviJoioo,with MILWO'~battery, remained a few milen s o u t h of Dentonslville r o d made 8 etrooE demomtratios. Thie gained t i m e for the
rmval of tbe Sixth A.rmy Corps, tben marching to join S ~ E B I D A N
I A E.voraRle opportunity for t b e attack of t h e long Confederate
h l u m n ocorrred at Sailor'. Creek, where Cnmgu, with the Third
Wvdry D@hioo, obtbe force guarding the trains, routed it
nd oaptared over tbree bundred wrCpoa Wbile Cumin w m tho#
tbe ConfederaLao were reiafomed by KEBSEAW'~
and
uemm L d a i n h a t r y dividone aoder EwELL. T b e Firet Cavalry
rkion WM p w b d f o r w v d by Y B w n to C u a n i s Msistaiice, and
(kr0e'a
of tbb divuion movnd up OD tbe leR of the Tbird
vidoo, i t made B bhlliaot charge, wbicb resulted io tbe capture

,
i

1 ,

!,

"

C m ww aptnrsd. and tbc 8 m m m d of hlr br(gdc drrolrd

- B. Y.General
Youro. l o o n h Pconsyl~~~L.
Camlry.
t Rxumr up fonr WIU.Y-

and Crrm N
-

shhra.

-1000

cahocl

1
88

PRIZE ESSA Y.
SSIlI
The development of the cavalry of t b c Arm?- of t h e E'~~tomac.
~ r perhap@
n
the moYt aonllcrful utijc.t.t 1t>3son of t h t , cntire war
G i v e n a n i u a of citizen wldieF. undincililiiitvl. undrilled, many
them ignorant of arm3 arid nt hor?;eP. men froiii ttie fiictory atid
Inen f r o m thc counting-houw. t-ngiricwr?;off t h c railrtciri and [iroie*-orw fron, c.olleges. t o t a k e t h e r e . : i n d i n f o u r ytx:trnioulal tht.m
Into tlbat magniticcnt l~odyof Ii~Irwnicr.wtiii.tr c * l r i * t i 1 u t c - i i ~ H L R I [ I A N ' S c,oniniaiid a t .\pi oniattox. 1 6 w i i ~ t ~ t h i ti l ii n~ t :- diGtiiictivtbly ;I
prmltrction of the active. ptiy-ic.al a n d n l r n t i i l t.nr.rgy, tlic intclli.
gencc. t h e nhs0urc.e.i. an,rat)olrv all. t t i t - jmatriG>ti-ni.o f t l i t - :\iiizric.aii
nut inn.
I t w o u l d be abeurtl to drnw conipariet)ris t w t n t . c n t t i c courage of
tile soldiem of' P T ~ A B nnd
T t b o e c 01' P L E . \ S A S T I Ii >Sc,t n t . c n tliope of'
FITZ.LEEand those of S H L B I I I A SThey
.
acre :rll .\ nicric:rnn. nrid
wtlethcr born hcneoth Southern sun; (vr Sorthcrri -tar-. p ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ c c l
Ctqunlly .imerican p l u c k . endurance and Iirarzry.
R u t the .Southern rioldiero were natur:rl tiurzeriit.n. aiid under tlic,
vise patronage of General L E E . n n d the dashing leadership of
JTCABT,
tlie Confederate cavalry from t h e bcginniop c x h i b i t d that
independence of action. whether m o u n t d or di.imountcv1. ahicli
. i t the bcyinninp
macle them m formidable to the FcJcral nrriiy
of t h e Gettyaburg campaign. n o tincr t y p of cavalry could tw found
nnywhere than the cavalry of S T C A B Tand
,
tJic 3 t i m u I u J o f +uch a
.tandnrd of excellence contributed not n l i t t l e toward3 producing a
Federal cavalry which coo111 succeduliy (:ope with tticir a d r c r -sriea. Bot t h e yreate*t i n f l u e n c e i n making the Sntii.rnal Cavalry
was i t 9 concentration under one conipeteiit coniiiisn&r
and the solwriority arow
That it did RO ie a m a t t e r of hiator!.
irom a number of cauwa. T h e tiret t w t ) y t a r s of- t h e w a r . thoogh
vearu of' inferiority for the Federal cavalry. a c r e tilled with r a l u :il)le leesone, far reaching i n their effectr. Ttir ucz of arm@and the
s 3re
horsee-natural
from birth to the, S>utherner--aaa h a m rnercd i n t o tho daily life of t h e Sortherricr w i t t i a pcrai?ltrnt thor.
tioghneea wbicb W*'M a remarkable chnmcteri*Lic of h i 5 nature; and
this constant attention to the minutia? of a caralrynian'a life Bad
i t s ultimate eflect i n producing men equally skillful w i t h saber,
p i p t o 1 and carbine. The naber =as considered the fir*t = - p a of
the I'nioo cavalrr, bot i n tbe use of the repeating carbine it ahowed
that its etrective fire-actio0 w w not leseened by itcl cfftwtive s h o c k :rctioo.
Tbe fact too, t h a t in tbe Army of S o r t h r r n Virginia em11

of

B o t opoo r e d i n g &utb Boston, on tbe Dan River, SEEBIDAN

reoeived word of &nerd JOENUTON'B
eormnder, and the cavalry
retraoed ita rtep to Petembarg, from whence, by eaaj stages, it
marobed b Washington. 00 Yay 23d, mid t b e cbeera o! tboueanh,
i t took puL in '6Tbe Qrand Review," M fine a body of cavalry au

.so

--

PRIZE ESSA Y.

trooper WM requirtnl te luroiab bra horw), undoubtedly liad it8 etrect

upon t b e d e g e n e l r c y of t h e Confederate cavalry. O t h e r sumthe loea of & m m r a n d the riem of SEXEIDAN,
an well ae the gmdoal
d r a i n i n g of t b e reaourcw of t h e Confederacy, men a n d materials,
all tbese oontributed to tbe final reeult
It i s beet now to t b i n k of t h e cavalry of botb great armiee 80
,exempliFging to t b e e n t i r e world nII t h a t wae grcateet nnd best i n
t b e organisation. equipment, a n d use of t h e mounted arm. To be
nure, a certain clam of European critice continue, with almost willful
pemistence, to mierepreeent t b e true character of o u r cavalry a n d
ita uoe during tbe greatest of modern ware. That our cavalry cast
aeide t h e mose-growo traditions o f European tacticiann, rejecting
all t h a t WM obeolete. retaining all t h a t wae beet, a n d developing
I t b a t r b i c b their nound common aenm indicated =odd a d d to t h e i r
,fighting e l c i e n c y , i s to t b e i r lasting credit. T h e y created a new
role for t b e mounted a r m , a n d proved to t h e i r own satiefirction, M
IKWATE~OSbaa a i d , T b a t c a v a l r y can tIgbt a n y w h e r e , except trl
~

Ma.

h y i n g reide tbe queetioo of cavalry raide, those independent,

,eeIl-moeteising operations which we- a dietinct prodaot of t h e
1 W u of t b e Rebellion, examplee are not w e n t i n g of the most glerioas
one of t b e cavalry, both rnol~nteda n d dismounted, throughout the
1 WMr.

8ide by aide r i t b tbe cbarge of the German cavalry at Yare-la/Toor, we u a plioe t b e ewective Charge of t h e E i g h t h Peoneylvroia
/Cavalry under HULY,at Chnncelloreville. For the c h a r g e of t h c
lEnglisb L i g h t Brigade at Balaclava, we can n a m e t h a t of t h e
/lamented FABIWWOBTR
upon t b e Confederate rigbt flank ut Gettyeburg. Witb the c b a r g e of t b e F r e n c h c u i n s e i e r e at .Sedan, we can
icluw t h e devoted c h a r g e of t b e F i r s t a n d Fiflh United States Carlaky at Gaineee Mill. or t h a t of t h e S i x t b United S t a b a n d Sixth
IPeonaylvania upon the Confederate artillery at B r a n d y Station.
Wan there ever a finer or more eflective cavalry charge againet
nhntry t b a n t h p t of$lrlllurrs division upon t b e Confederate left
nk at Opeqoon? WM there ever a g r a n d e r cavalry battle t h a n
bbat of Beverly Ford,or tbe desperate Bght of G B B division
~ ~
tapon t h e r i g h t f i n k at Uettysburg?
1 And waa e v e r a f o r e m e n t b e spectacle of theee same cavalry
)t3oop, dismounted, holding io obeck l o n g lines of t b e enemys
n b t r y M d i d t h e troopere of the gallant BUFORDat Gettyeburg,
or.tbe cavalry u n d e r t h e pearlees Saurpur at Dinwiddie Court
X b n e ~ ? Does %be world believe tbat cavalry RIB none t h e leea

The following pagca of tlir .\ppcndis arts aImo*t tsntirelj- ntntita

tical, a n d a r e merely added for rcfercrwe 1 1 1 n d e r t o mnkr the e n t i r e
Iiintory of t h e c a r a l r y it- roniplcic S H po-.iblr i n itticlt

.ii

PRIZE ESSA Y.

95
b

I
4

APPENDIX 7 .
Report of otlicers, ealiated men and horspe in the cxtvslty and light
.

a;tillery. Army of the I'otomac. h'overutwr 1. 186%

...

4
L

'

.
96

P I I l Z E ESS.4 I-.

PRIZE ESSAY.

'I;

-7
Ip

PRIZE ESSA Y.

98

r
APPE.VDIX I.:
Abstract from the w t u m of the Cavalry

mnirnao~lrdby %fajor.Cieneral

PHILIP
H.SHERIDAX.
V. S. A., for the month of March. I&.
__
_-

iqaulen

-I

.......................

i-I-

--I-

5 1

5 1

--

-I

........................
.......................
........... 141.1'1#.rpIeorcri
I

-1

=-I(11.019--

. ,

---a
100

PRIZE ESSA Y.

PRIZE E S S A Y

101

P A TR-OL D I - T P .

The exerciuee i n patrolling on the m a p are intended to confirm

men i n the elementary koow1edl.e and to prepare the w a g for
i d r o l l i n g i n the terrain. They offer advantagen i n the facilitr
iritb which the work map be obeerred and the number of exerciw*
,hat c a n be condncted a t the eame t i m e ander euperrinion of one
netroctor, t h u e economizing a great deal of labor and utilizing a
- c m n o f t h e year unfavorable for outdoor work. During t h i e part
I f the couree the men are expected toask questions *bout all doubtI'UI p o i n t s that may a r k i n their minds. the object being to render
:hem familiar with the details of t h e elcrnentary knowledge, tbe
leet and application or' w h i c h will corne i n the practical esercieen
, n the terrain.
The couree of inetroction i n patrolling preeented berewith ron.iiete m a i n l y of a trnnelation of t h e work of E VOX ~ ~ ~ ' R L I S W I I A en,
titled *iDcr C'ntmieht irn Puttouillcnpng.'. w i t h such changea and
adaptions ae were deemed deeirable.
.i number of works dealing with the subject of patrolling to
Y greater or le- extent h a r e bee0 consulted.
A liat of tbe more
valuable ones will be found i n the bibliographical nota, and are
recommended to tbe student for additional reading &r
he has
made himeelf f a m i l i a r w i t h rbe authorized guide on eoch subjects,
..The Service o f Security a d Infonnr?tlon:' hy Major AnrHra I,.
\FAONBE,c'. S. A r m y .
It was considered advantageouw to submit a eet of an8were to the
questione atated in the exercieea. It muot be distinctlF onderatood
rhst tboee anewere do not cooetituta the only eoluiione of tbe prob.
lema .prceented, nor is it pretended tbat they a r e the beat. They
:ire intended to Mrve simply ae examples of eolutione for tbe guid: L O W of begionera
Altboogh this ~ w o r n cw m devised primarily for infantry, it c a n
be applied to cavalry m well. Tbe principles are the mme. Some
Inareby groond practicable for iafaotry would be i m p x k b l e for
avalry; i n m m e placee wbere there i s aufecieut cover for infkntry
IUWOIS, csvalry would be expoeed On t b e otber haod, the elements
apace and time would have to be increased and redoced, respec' i v e l y , for cavalry putroln.
After the meu ooder ioetructioo are well groonded io the elernenrary knowledge, theoretically and practically, they should be taken
throogh the w a r n i n patrolling on the map. Theee exercises cao
be carried oot on the map herewith, but it would be better to cnlargedt to a -1s of 1:3OOO. Solations shoold be written in pencil
and auitable r n e s ~ g e ebe acradly mado out r o d addressed. Tbe
he

11

..
'

'

'

PATROL DUTF.

\ O N E of tbe moet important elemeob of eucceseful field cicrciees

I
.foand in the proper performance of patrol doty. Ae long
I

m e n and odaeete are not familiar with t-mentary

detaile,
M a whole cannot prove aatisfabtory. Occasional
ereruieee for enlietad men in t h e dutiee of mntinele and patrols art'
of little value. Io order tobeof mal beneet the inetruction must be
eptematic.
The dotieo of wntioela 00 outpoet a r e acquired with comprrratire ease, for they are rather simple, sod mietakee o r nogligence
oan he d i l y o b e e w e d and corrected. Thorough inetruction i n
p.trollioK, however, require0 labor and patience on the part of the
inotruotor.
After tbe ooo-commiseiooed odtcera have been instructed they
mmt be held to etrict responsibility for the conduct of individual
membere of their patrole, otherriee t h e coume will be n failure.
l a every efllcieot u m g the otlloere must be the iostructors. I n
the eubjCt of patrolling, thio duty will fall to the captains and
lieoteoaotr. ds no instractor &a become proficient ontil be bnr
hlmllelfpractioed what be irendeavoriog to teach,young odlcers upoii
joioing sboold be required to perform these duties, oaoallp aaaigned
to non oommidoned ellhere or even to intelligent privates. The
pmutiorl knowledge and erperience thue acquired will he specially
vdoable fo them io.soperoisioK a ooume of instroction in time of
peace and in oondrtoting olbete' petrole in time of war.
Inlkrtq odlaere will not be ariled upon frequently to conduct
patrole, h h m tbey be cyclbt ptrole, of which cooeiderable PRO
will be made when the conditione are hronble; bot i n the grtut
and imporc.ot mtegid t6b of orrvalry such duty will be of daily
oooarreoae. upan the yoanK 0d8aere will mt the borden and honor
ot chi8 m
o
a

6eld eremian

-UaOd.n#r

103

11

PATROL UUTL:

'ATK(jl. D ( * T Y .

w i s t a r WMOD, wben t b e g r o u n d ie covered with m o w and ice, can

be ntilised for t b e theoretical part nf t h e c o u r ~ cand the map exer
oieee, which ehould be completed -re
apring opena. However
aootb of latitude .LOo there are many days in the winter monthwben, OD .ocoudt of too1 t e m p e r a t o r e e n d abeencc of mud. thc
w e r t b e r in well eoited for outdoor work, ospecially for infantry.

iiit'ri,
i n c u e uf n e c c ~ i t ~
art'
. incapal)lt* of proper intiependent
action, or elae that they w i l l cliriy t o tticir leader. i n bit11('Bee* t h e
,ibjec-tof t h e instruction i?i dt.feated
What. t h e n , ir tbe p u r p w 10 l w ux,>rnplinhd by B ('oiirw of i n .
t r u c t ion i n pat ro I I i r 1 . g "

104

The inetrnctor ebould have io readineee at ttiia time a number

of ontdoor exemisee in patrolliog. T h e solutions rhould be disc a d OD t b e balf day tollowioR t h e exerciec, R map of t h e rescrrntion, or of the g r o a n d oporated on, being ueed lor thie porpoec
T b e o b j e c t o t tbiedisceeeion ehould not be to find fgult with t h e condoot of h i o n e r a , but to eobourago them i n the habit of independent t h o a g b t and to get them a8 f u r away am poeeible from mcrc
l e a r n i n g by rote.
The odicer io cbargo muet necesnarilg be familiar with all thc
detail0 of t h e ~ ~ u r e e A. l i t t l e induatry w i l l do tho rest and lead to
valuable a n d i n b r e e t i n g inetruetion for the compgny or troop

To which we ancwer Tt> i r i - i r i i t , t t h n w N Z I t)f

~ t l ~ ccnnipany
who hare a good knowlcdce o t ' tlieii. or'linsry 11utic.i i t )
I

The object

I# .I

lO9nffLlOO

Of

.\
INSTRUCTIOS IN PATROLLISti.

(a) The O&t of the .Course of Instnrction and Zta*Atrangment.

T b e duty of patrollinK makes the highost demand8 on the soldier
-eait.ble
and ekillful execution of a tank, independent action
0011raprod determination.
Thin reqairee t h e otmoeb erertioo of hie physical and intellectual
powern; t$e latter muet, moreover, bo epecially trainod for t h i e por-

poee.

To instruct only t b e clevereet meo of thc compaoy i n patrolling

roald be oontrrrry to t b e n a t u r e of t h e d o t s itself, for i n many c a s e d

npe0i.l work io migod to each member of o patrol ; osch ooe may
be p b e d in a poeitioo requiring iodepondent action, and, BB doring
the performance of the d u t y sseigned, t h e leader can no longer
enter into explrnatiooe to t h e o t h e r members, all momt be eqoally
well traioed. The ablest man of the party ehoold bo deeignated a tbe oornmaader. H e rcleigne the doties of t b e other members, con
daote &em, u 5 r UI pamible, by meane of t h e voice aod eignalr

a n d b bimrelf d w r p futhwt i o advance.

W b e only
~
the leadem are thoroughly instructed in thie b r a o c h
of a roldier'n datiw, t h e consequence will be either tbat the other

I)rrtroIr
o n d u i t:ns H p i r n l . snd tllc

r l i r i t l ~ ~ f

fi>ll~>wa

Elementary k n o n l v d g e

h ) Patrolling on t l i e ninp
Practical exvrc i3ee

'2.

double IN& N l l m j

__.

Thc prepai-atory cxcrciFc.3. conil~ri-iiig

j

d t b Boltoo -Fay'.

I f

rncttild <IC

The Course nf in-tructi(>ri rti;iy a c ~ortliiicly

( o ' j

A W O d O Q U, map--8cacbO bOruC NO. M.

CornIlbh~W.

ant1 rnipl<Bymt.iit <

The dctailr of thr

r n c a n 8 available.

2.

Pstrollirlz i n t h c terrain f<br j>~:rlw*cof in$truction.

Patrollirig agairiat a repreaviitc~fcr-ic~rny

Ttie preparatorr t,xerci-ea art' n w e - a r y to acquaint thc moldier.

I d o r e car qi i i g out exerciwe i n Ilatroliitip. w i t h the a o r k required
q>f h i m and w i t h the niennj at h i 3 d i s p i u l , ant.1 also to cnablr him
to obtain practice i n map ren'iing nrid i k c t c h i n g
-\ better oppor.
tuiiity ie t h u b a l ~ oafforded to diwu** an exercise i n patrnlling w i t h
the w h o l e detachment i n a more comprehell-irc way anti i n lecw time
than would h-p s * i b I t * on t h e grounai
The practicd exercise- c o m p r i r

I . Obeervation
the whole ~Jetuct i r n c n t ,.lf t 1 i t . b operation* n f ' n
1lntrol. after preceding tnstructiori w In tlle tIafurt> of the terraiii
: s i 1 4 the m e t b m i a ot' r a k i n y adrantnjie of i t

2. Execution of actual crerciwi i n patrn1lin.r nyainrt a reprc-ented enemy. and criticism a n e r each txcrciw. :ilivantagct b t b i r i :
taken of the nccaeion to c o t ~ i ~ i a r n
nic-*.uKw
~
rta(,eived and rt.pcrrlrr
Sent i n .
I%

6)

Prepirutory Ezcrci.w.

The preparations for exereisen i n patrolling sn? made during the

half of the period allotted tor t h e inrtruction of the conipan>-.
The weather at tbat time of the r e a r will u*uallj- conrine the i n .
*truetion to w h a t can be given i n barmckp. nlthough occaJional1~it
can 8e eopplemeoted by leeeons i n t b e t e r m i o .
rirpt

108

PATROL DUTY.

P A TR!)?. D I ' T S .

1
O r i r n t d t o n ~ i t ti
h mop.
.%t\er t h e necelrsary explanation3 t h e .%Idier i u given a map ot
: , C vicinity and ia r q u i r e t l to determinr t h e r e o n h i 5 o w n location.
_ . - well a* to compare thc terrain reprewnted on the mnp with
I ~ t u r e to
. etate t h e direction of di-tant point.+. e t c
2
Orientntion by o6.ecrrtifzonr
T h e various method., of o r i e n t a t i o n i n t h e t e r r a i n . t h a t is. of
: X i n g t h e direction ot' one of' the p o i n t $ of t h e cornpans and from
* , a t t h e location of varioua p i n t * i n t h e t e r m i n . o r t h c direction in
i s tiich t r o o p a r e marching. art' 11e.t diwubws.1 a n c l explained
For
I \sinpie.
Finding the direction ot' ii,>rth by t i i e w r r * o f t h e big d i p p e r and
pile s t a r . a n d finding t h e w u t h hy mean* t)f the F U I I . o r f m m pha*e*
: , * i i I p a i t i o n 9 of t h e nioon
T h e direction o f we*t i - iridicate~.i1)- r h e pwition of the *teepic
old churclies ( a t the s e - ~e n d
T h e C r o w t h of niow to be foond
( ~ i iIioi~nen.rocka and tree* I u a u v l l y o n t h e n o r t h ride. t h e rinpe
annual q r o a t h Been i n tree s t u m p u r l ' clowr togethcr 00 t h e
rlorth eide. Finally. t h e ea*ie*t metho(1 i n i ' o r i e n l n t i o n . v h i c b is by
.~riipms.is e x p l e i o e d

Tbeoe p p p a r a t i o n s will begin with inetruction in

1. S N O W L . D O B OI TEE OROUND A N D MAP RSADINQ.

W
h a t ie meant by g r o a n d , or terrain?
Q.
A. T b e eorfam of t b e e a r t b , ita forme-bills, m o o n u i n s , ridges.
doper,v d l e p , troagbe, ravines, e t c . 4 well u) ita coooriog aiid
oultivation--ro(rde,
railrode, rivere, a n a l e , lakes, swurnpe, foreeta.
boildingr, etc.
Q. 10 *at I.enpect.9 ie terrain of military i m ' p r t a n c e ?
A. The terrain may aUord both adoantrrgee a n d dieadvantage*
totroop. Advantages1. By maeking oar own movemente, t h a t is w i t h d r a w i n g them
Prom the epemy'e view ;
2. By lrfording natural cover, t b u e saving or facilitating C O I I etruction of arti6ci.l c o v e r ;
3. By interposing obatcrclee such (LB rivem, s w a m p , dennc
foreeta, e&., t b o e d e p r i v i n g t h e enomy of a portion of hie strength
Didvarrt.gee, however1. By permitting t h e e n e m y to execute movements bidden from
ear view;
8. By economizing his exertions o indicoted abore noder (27,
3. By dimioirhing our s t r e n g t b through necepeity of overcorni a g or t u n i n g obetmclea
After tbeee ideaa have been explained to Lhe soldier, the various
f a t u m of tbe g r o u n d will be pointed o o t - g e n e p l l y a hill or
mountain i o t h e vicinity o f t b e garrison will afford a m p l e opportonitiaa for tbie pur-.
The military importanco o f t h e various feataree will be etatecl,
a n d i n c o n o w t i o n t h e r e n i t b t h e conveotiooal eigne will be ehown.
if possible, by d r a w i n g t b e m o n e t h e blackboard.
Now r b a n t b e m e a h a v e i n t b i r w a y obtained a knowledge of
the more i m p o r t a n t featarm of p o n d a n d t b e objects to'be found
.r e l l .I) of t b e proper conventional s i g n s to repreeent
therein, I
t b e m , w e can proceed to pnrctice in map d i n g , a n d in connection
w i t b &belatter t b e military importance of t h e vurioue feutures atitl
t h e we to be made tbereof a n be m o r e fully elucidated.
Tbir practice begior witb
OEIIIITATION,

t b e ioatrocbr will lrelect a higb point i n the

hrwbiob
vioinity of t h e guri.orr.'

1 0;

( . I

3. Description of the o h . W r r ~ ~ t i o nrrA1t.h

.~
moy be mode d u r t n g 171)
zrrrcide an potrolling nnd the mrtAo4 o l f i n J i n p rhe hid ? r , i d .
T h i s is particularly importailt tecrcci-r i t ma?- n o t orily be a
tliicb*tion af t h e patnd'n ability to find ita sa\- hack. but frequently

-.-c*pecially a t night enterprircn-large bodice of troops may iirve

trust themselves completely t o t h e guidance of patrol, a h i c t i
11:ive been over thc ground before
((I)
T h e greatest variety of m e a m i s avadnblc ior t h i 9 p n r p o w ;
t i l e skill of each member mar be of g r c a t benetit.
The eimplcut
itrcathod i* to imlirwu o n t h c memory the i p p e a r a n c c of Iwcoliar
atitjccia in t h e terrain, u u c h ua treee. corner) of wood*. encloeuren,
~ p ) n d s elc.
,
( b ) It may a l ~ p) r o w ureful to makc a note o f the n u m b e r s o n
it,ilecltonrs along n highroud. i n order to dtbterrnine. h r example,
alia( byway ono ought to take. Orientation i n a Rlrwt is mom
(1 *cult.
By blnzinRtreea-pref~~rably on one Rideonly of t h e m d .
t h u o indicating t h e direction o f the advance-hreakiog
off f m h
t,ranches r1iic.h may be laid acroee t b e road. placing of sniall pilea
0' a
d or *tone* near crow-made in the new direction, mncb
a-rriatnnce m a y be derived.
cc) It is especially dimchit to mark our rooit' at o i g h t , o r wbeo
t . e return t r i p is not tu be made uotil a l t e r nigbtfall.
Tbe signs

*I

PATROL DUTY.

108

m o s t i o such caeen be m a d e quite conepicoooe tm t h a t t h e y will

e h o r op i o t h e d a r k ; l i g b t cotore obtained by m a r k i n g witb lime or
chalk are to be uemd if practicable. T h e uee of Ianterne i n suck
oases in to be condomned, for t h e b r i g h t ligbt not only blinds t b c
eyee no t h a t norrounding objecta can aot be w e n , b u t aleo b e t w J s
oar preeence to t b e enemy. Moreover t h e homnn eye soon become*
eo well aocoetomed to d a r k n e s s t h a t objecte can be tolerably well
dieti ngaished a n y way.
It may become a m a t t e r of importance to 6x a proposed
(tf)
roate for a patrol which cannot be traveled in d a y time. For e x ample, from a place of concealment we may have been able to eec
t h e eoemy'n picket, a n d desire to 6. t h e direction. Thie i s done
by eetmblisbiog t w o directing rods, nach ae younR trees, eticks, or
latbs, a b u t t w o yards apart on t b e line to t h e object. T b e rod*
should be marked witb stripe of paper or wieps of utraw. A t night
the direction i s t a k e n from these rode a n d prolongation of t h e line
is uo-ugbt in a dietant ligbt, or better still, a etar. T h e march i b
then mmde s t r a i g h t acrose country. A good w a y of m a r k i n g our
trail, eepecially at night, is by meane of paper cuttinge which can
be easily prepared a n y w h e r e a n d carried alonfi in a bag. I n o u r
o w n ooaotry t h e assistance of t h e inhabitanta ie sdvisable on eurh
m i o o s ; t b e best Raiden will be foond a m o n g rangern, deputy
eberitlb, e&.*
T h i s i s followed by ioetruction i n thu
1

ues OF rovma,

io which t h e soldier in t a o g b t how to m a k e o w of tho advantages

offered by t h e g r o o n d io t h e execution of t h e task aeaigned him.
A brief explanation ie 6rst made of w h a t the soldier ehould look
for io t h e terrain, namely, Laver a n d good pointa of view; tbeee
are generally to be found on high groond, hill tope, dikee, edges
of p m i p i c e s aod w d s , etc. After a brief d i e c w i o n these p o i n u
are shown i n the field, a n d 'in connection tberewith w e briog out
instroction io the soitability of positione for defense, good point8
fbr attaak, t b e sectiorie of a defeneive position, linea of obwrvatiori
aod.of d e t . n a e .
Io th'ir way the men receive practice in j u d g i n g t h e dietaoce a n d

SemiingWetachmcnt
rn

I'

i
t

'

Location

Wate

nnae

PATtlOL D U T Y .

1 ng

dimcnsiorie of objects in the terrain, and even a t t h i s early stuge

n-e begin to require
REPORTS A N D SKETCHES

reforring to the ground i n view; qratlual progress is to be made

from the simplest to the more difficult claw of exercises of h i s
nature.
From the very beginning ono must insist tli:rt each man formulate h i s own report, and t h a t i t be bused on wliat he has seen h i n i self; for otherwise, if i t bc permitted once, tho n i n n will eaeily full
i n t o the habit of making reports witliout Iiiiving himself inspected
the points i n the terrain to which lie rcfors.
It is recommended that c i t t 1 T C W pru1iinin:iry cxci*cises a beginn i n g be made i n outlining the position of' thc cncrny; for instance,
we may establish double sentinels; we cibn then set problems which
will accustom the men to keeping n sharp l o o k o u t and tench them
to take advantage of what they have leurnetl concerning cover and
points of view. Subsmuently a conipnrison can be .made with
reports received from the sentinels ribnut what they ltave seen of
tbe patrol, aiid any doubtful points can thus be cleared up.
The men a t the same time receivc priictice i n writing such a
report i n few words, and if necessary i n illustrating i t with a
sketch.
SKETCHING.

The sketch to accompany a repdrt must be cupublc of execution

i n a very ahort time, and must thkrefore be simple and n o t go too

much into detail. As it can not be drawn accurately to scale, the

eketcher ehould at least acquire sufllcient skill l o enter the relative
dimensions of objects approximately, importurtt dietencce being
paced off and then drawn. T h e direction of north should always
be indicated by drawing the arrow.

Exercises :
1. Copying on the blackboard from a mnp and demription of
the ground represented ; designation of the distances which might
prove to be important and which should therefore be paccd'off.
2. Drawing on t h e blackboard according to dictation; irt t h i s
exercise t h e student must acquire the ability to reproduce diHtanCeR
from nature i n their proper proportions.
After the elementary principles have t h u s been acquired, we next
proceed to instruction i n
PATROLLING,

beginning with
C l a w of patrols, their object, and the general principles governing
theirlconduct.
\

1
110

PATROL DUTY.

PATROL DC'TY.

.
. .

r.

&<Par.
143. Patrols within the chain of twntinclfi, which occa.ionally aro necessary to visit the poclts, to search ground o n which
sentinels are posted, and to keep up communication with adjoini:rg pickets, are osually composed of only two men (including thc
! esder) ."

Pst&le.areclmified according to the uee to be made of them i n \ . )

1. . Small dank patrols and combat patrols;
2: ,.Outpost ptLtd8:
The former, composed of two or more men, are pushed out to til..
right-front and-bft front of marching bodiue of troops for the pur
pose of exploration and to protect the flanks; when the troopscntvv
into a bombat theeo"patro1s remain i n observation towards thc frorl:
and ilruk.,
=
. The jatter are used for the service of exploration nnd the security
of troops at a halt,.and i n connection with the supervieion of O U I poet daty.
In regard to these patrols the German Ficld Service Regulatioit.;

Although it would be a mistake to exercise patrols i n ccwnin

I ulep and fixed schemes which hinder the independent action of
ilidividual men, .yet a number of general principles may be set
! ; i y t b which will apply to all kinds of patrols and the knowledge of
u.hicb would be of advantage to the soldier i n any c a likely
~
to

:irise.

, fI*pte:

6gPak. 140. The system of' patrols must be so arranged t h a t

intorpiption i n expIorat.ion will mot occur.
. 436oeeqneotly' we muat, us a rule, continually have c a ~ v a l ~ y
patmls out to the !mot, even at night."
'&Par.141. 'Cbcalry patroln should be supplonieoted, up to :I
eafe diatahcs. by 'infantrp patrols.
6dTbe inbtractions.of such patrols a n d their conduct wi!l r:iry
scbording towhether they are to be employed beyoud the chain ol'
eeotinele or within t h e =me, and t h u e have greater or less prospect
of coming i o costact with the enemy.
6 1 1 0 every caee. y e shall obtain a better gqaranty of good results
by making.* carefol selection of the men, rnd especially of t h e
I d e r e , tbao by exbauat' e instructions."
"Par. 142. Special importance attaches to the selection of
t d e eent out beyond the chain of s e n t i n e l s , towards t h o enemy.
&ey &i, compoeed of .at leaet two meu under a skillful leader, who
io important WE,
Rhoold be an of8cer. The knack of quickly
fiodiog one's way in strange country; indefatigability born (it'
pleasure in the work i preveuce of mind and sbrewdneus which i n
.moment8 of denger a \ w a p manages to got out of the scrape, ilrr
desirable qualitiee for tbie kindkof duty.
patrols move aautiously 6nd silently; they halt froqeentlj I11
order to liateu; they make themwelres familitir with t h e ground -u
SB to be,able to raport on it, and, if nece.semy, to act as guidc-.
they gaaM w i n s t tbe danges of being cut off, porhaps by taking :I
different mtarn route. It m a F be judicious to indicate the hour t t w
their retarn io a general way. Under certain circumstances t1it.y
*may be m o t oot in light marcbingorder.
-"All patrole, whoo they cross the line of observation, must L'OIII
, maoicste 'to tbe, nesrest sentinel the direction i n which they ;I' c'
n b h t to ativande; OD their return they must report wbat they II:I
'
&ea of tbe endmy witbio the sentinel's range of obeerratiou."
=
I

111

(2

These refer to
(a) The arrangement of t h e patrol, t h e relation of the nicn to
their leader, issuance of orders and thc beginning of the movement.
(6) T h e stepe to be taken during the progress of t h e patrol
:~ndupon contact with the enemy.
1. One man of the patrol is designated as t h e leodor; he is the
wmrnaoder, and tbe others must obey hid order8. Tbe leader rect,ives hie instructions: repeats them to the other men, and gives
. his orders. The most important condition is that the leader muat
clearly understand bis instructions; to prove this he will i n every
('as0 repeat tbem, altb'ough h e may not hare bee11 called upon to do
SO.
I t would be advisable for tbe superior officer to require carefu!
esplauation of tbe more important points and a statement of tbe
intended course of action.
Similarly tho leader will cause tbe members 3f the patrol to rep . a t the orders be may have given.
2. If time is available, the instructions are furnistied to the
lender i n writing. If he is familiar with the ground he will ieRue
h i 3 orders at once; if not, h e m u s t first get his bearings eittier from
il map or by looking over the ground from a high point.
3. During t h e progress of the patrol the m e n - b y no meam
remain close together., bat each one eeeks n sheltered way for b i m self, or darts from cover to cover.
4. I n order to be able ti, issue newordera the leaders must designate points, not too far apart, at which all the menibere are to
rcassernble.
5. A few preconcerted signal8 will fucilitato iwuance of orders
i l i ~ c lobviate too frequent assemblaKe; but these eignals m u s t have
bwn uniformly practiced i n the conipany so a s to avoid errore.
6. Tbe men must atway8 remain near enough for the whintle
or *harp voice of t h e leader to be heard, a r d i f posaiblo each one
dlould be able to .WC h i m . Wheu i n certain caws this is imprac-

I.I .

113

$ '
6. ,

1.-

P A TROI. r i m y .

PATROL DUTY.

:ire anywiso important and which probably w o i ~ l dcausc

ticable,for iistance, while eearching a foreet, connoction must be re

tnakbliebed ae soon ae poeeible; under no circumstances slioul~l

;I

chuI1gc

the dispositions of the recipient, muRt be diupatched arid delivored

with t b e grcatcst practicable celerity.
ill

interruption of communication be permitted for protracted period-

of time.

((7.)

After the patrol is well on its way-ae a flank protectioii

foe t h e security of a marcMng column, or a s a n outpost patrol sent
out beyond t h e chain of sentinels to look for the enemy-ita priri
oipal endeavor must be to avoid being discoverea b y t h e e n e m y before
i t hrre ascertained hie presence; for thie purpose rapid perception
r a n d correct eetimatioo of the enemy, combined with cautiou an(1
'gdbdjudgment i o t h e movemonts of tbe patrol, are requisite.
8. T h e manner i n which a patrol accomplisbee t h i a object will
depend upon whether i t 5nds t h e enemy halted or i n motion ; t h e
former will be t h e role with outpost patrols, t h e latter on t h v
marcb.
9. One rule, bowever, is applicable to all casea of contact with
the enemy: avoid firing if poeeible. Only in the rarest:cases
woald patrols be juetified i n discharging tneir pieces; for example.
in caae of extreme personal danger, or to wnrn t h e troops of t h e
approach of the enemy when a message could .not reach them i n
time. In moet otber cases, unless i t is expressly prescribed, firing
would be an error.
10. O n e of t h e most important duties of patrols ie the rendering of reports. Correct appreciation of the situation, and a brief
and clear report of the state of affrrira a s we understand i t , are t h e
7.

main conditiona.

11:4

PATROLS F O R T H E S E C C R I T Y O F T H E M A R C I i , A N D COYBAT PATRbLI.

When a body of infantry t n k e 8 up t h e march it sends forward

:ind leaves behind certuin frartionv of i t a force to provide for the
wcurity.of the main body; thesc i n turn send out flank patrols,
which shoiild bo regarded a8 sm:ill flank guards.
Their principal duty coneists i n the exploration or careful
Iclrrching of terrain to the r i g h t and front, left and front, and flanks
of the advanco party. T h e object of this exploration is to prevent
is marching i n close order
thc aurprisc of the main body-which
:tnd consequeotly is not ready for battle-by
tlic sudden appear: I I I C C of t h e enemy o n i t s f l a n k .
To utit3wcr t l I i 3 rcqi1ircnicilt the
d a n k patrols must already have truverned Rectionu of the ground to
t l l c front and flanks which might afford cover to the cneiny when
tho auppori of the advance guard arrives abrcaHt of them. These
Imtrols arc sent out from the advance party -if it bo large enough,
abttiarwise from the support-.and
maintain unbrokcn conimunication with tbase bodies. I n order to enable s u c h patrols t o perform
their duties propcrly i n very close country demanding conuidcrtrblc
delay, two points niust be borne i n mind by t h e comniander:
1. Strength of patrols to be udspted to t h e character of tho
torrain.

2. Timely despatch of the patrols and regulation of t h a m t e of

march so as to afford thcm ample opportunity to perform their

The following p d n t e must tberefore be impreseed upon the mcii :

In tbe m-ge
a sharp diebinctioo must be m a d e between wh:it
baa actually boen seen by the bearer of t b e dispatch or another
member of t h e patrol, a n d w b a t is merely matter of eurmiee o r i n ference from t h a t which hae beeo eeen. The man who actuall?
made t b e observation should oeually be selected to carry t h e meseagt'.
T h e meeeage muat be brief but exhaustive. I n reporting oo t h c

duties thoroughly.

Now, although in t h i u caee also it is impossible to lay down fixed

rules governing the action of patrols so as to cover every eituation
likely to arise, the knowledge of certain general principles will bo
found to be of advantage.
1. The patrol must maintain connection with the main body, as
far a8 possible, and muHt be able to transmit important information
rapidly by m e a n s of the voice or s i g n a l s , without firing. This is
;rccompliehed by means of a connecting man, who ie aelected and
instructed by t h e leader of the patrol, and placed about bulf day between t h e patrol and the troops on t h e march. It will also be t h e
d u t y of this connecting man to tranamit orders from the cornmander to the leader of the patrol and to give notice of halta,
changes of direction, etc.

festnrea of t h e terrain t h e inutractione received innet be strictly

complied witb. In furniebing informabion concerning t b e enem>-,
everything moat be reported which might possibly be of importance ;
for example, wbetber t h e enemy is at rest or in motion, whether i n treoebed or nof, t h e direction of hie march a n d ita rapidity, tlie
meaeares be bas taken for eecurity, hie strength, t b e kind of t r o o p ,
t b e mze of t h e tactical unite, etc.
11. Neither tbe sender of the meeesge nor the beare can 110
made reepooeible for its timely arrival; bowever, all mesea@reswhich

'i

PATROL D U TY.

PA1TK0L DUTY.

2. I n order to fulfill their purpose as abc ve indicatod the patrols mast endeavor to maintain their pouition head of and to t b c
flankof the moet advanced troops-that
is, the oint; if, on account
of careful searching of woods, enclosures, etc., the point has arrived
abreast of them, they mumt regain their fDrmer relative position by
marcbing at an accelerated rate, at double time if necessary, so a*
to prevent the surpriee of the troops at the head of t h o column by
tbe enemy.
3. N o eection of country within tbc prescribed field of obeerva
tion most be left unexplored; an efort must be made to reach :ill
p i n t a , each ^as hills, buildings, etc., atfording a good view, for i n
this way the inspection of large arom ia simplified, and much time
is aaved.
Ae soon aa detachmentu of tlrc enemy-even
if they are oiily
patrole-are diecovered, a messaxe must be sent to t h o commander,
i n eane of great danger rapid firing is resorted to.
4. Hoetile patrola mast be pushed back as far as practicable.
and special pain4 m t y t be taken to drive them away from places
where they eonld intlict low on the column by firing a few shots
and tliae delay tbe march. The variorae covering detachments, wcll
awwe that they can count upon support w i t b i n a abort time, munt
always remember that i t ia their duty to force the enemy back as
long aa his numbera are clccidedly inferior, i n order tliat the marcli
of the main body may be continued without interruption.
6. It would be improper for these tlank patrol8 to rtop their
advance an soon as the point of the advance guard halts; for
the point halts upon orders received from the rear, i t
will be of dvantuge if tbe country i n advance has already beeti
explored
en the march is resumed, and tbus another delay i o the
1
ture ie avoided.
immedia
( 6 ) If tbe enemy hae forced the point to halt, then i t become3
necemary to obtain more accurate information concerning his position and strength and the chances for approach under cover, etc , a'
soon .B poseiblo.
If the march of t h e colamn be stopped by the appearance ot
relatively large bodies of tbe enemy, them flank patrols at oncc
ansome tbe functions of

-which threaten our flank; i n cuso of great danger they w i l l

commence firing.
( b ) T h o disposition of tho enemy's supports and reserveN.
The gcnernl rules mentioned above are applicable to the method ot
i s e u i n g orders to flank patrols and also to ordere ismod by tho leadcrs of such patrols.

114

!i

COMBAT PATBOLB.

As such they must endeavor, from thoir advanccd poaition, t(8

attain a point affording a good view, from which they must obserrc
and report aoncerning
Tbe rnovementa of t h e enemy-wpecially
(Q)

..

,!
I

of his cavulr?

(b)

115

OI'TPOYT PATROLS.

Patrol duty i n connection with outpostti is much more sovere

tlian when t h o forces arc on tlie march.

Althouglr 'there are but fcw occasions whon iufaotry marchcrl

done, and while cavalry asatimes by tar t h o greater part of the
wrvice of sccurity, which, on account of its mobility it is better
fitted to discharge, the duty of outposts, the qrcator half of which
IS performed a t night, falls more to thc l o t of infantry.
And,
:ilthough a fcw troopcrs aro usiially aaeignell to iiifatlLry picketa,
they are cmployed only as messengere. and thc norvicc of exploration at night (and also in daytime when sufficient cavalry is not
:ivailable) is principally performed by infantry patrols.
INFANTRY PATROLS.

According to the German Field Service Regulutiotis, outpost

patrols are divided into
Patrola within the chain of sentinels,
Patrols against the enemy.
1. Patrol6 within the chain of' sentinels w e composed of two
meu (including the leader) and are used to viait the sentinels, to
support them in case of noise or firing within the outpoetjto maintain connection witb adjoining picketa, and to search close country
lying between the posts of sentinels.
2. Patrols against the enemy are Lwrnposod of three or more
men (leader included); in important cases they are commanded by
ail oacer. These patrols are characterized by the difference i n the
duties required of them, which may relate
( a ) To tbe enemy,
(6) To the terrain,
T o the enemy and the terrain.
(c)
During the instruction in this part of the course the practical
exercises will go hand i n hand with the theoretical instruction, eo
that tbe latter may bo illtiatrated and fixed i n the minds of the men.
Immediately aftcr this we have a brief repetition of the general
Ijrinciples of outposts a n d of t h e dutien of t h e separate u r i i b , wpet+dly of sentinels and patrols. Morc advanced instruciion ie not

I
1

PATROL DUTY.

P A TROL DlrT Y.

taken OD uutil the inatroctor ie satisfied tbat the men nro familiar
with t h e elementary principlh of thie branch o f a soldier's duties.
While going through with the repetition of the general principiee applicable to patrole, the difference in t h e nature of their
datiee (throe general claeees above mentioned) is explained nntl
illoatrated by examplee, beginning with the simplest; and the men
are then mked how thepwonld perform their duties i n various p o i
tiooe aa membere of the patrols employed, and their nnawers arc'
approved or corrected.
This is followed by inatruc io11 i n the terrain, on which occasion
much probleme ae, for example, eearching a n enclosure or n amall
wood, are c a r r i d out by the patroln.
Special valae muet in these caeee bc attached to the sending 01'
proper rneeqpe; errors, inaccuracies. etc., are to be corrected at
once and the meanage onder consideration muet be so thoroiiglily
diecowed with t h e whole patrol that each individual member lcarn3
how to make out a n absoliitsly correct meesape.
To lap down rules, even if only approximately definite, for exel'.
cines i n pntrollinp;, would be a mistake. Each problem hno itta ow11
p o l i p r i t i e a , aod throngh'the different w a p of looking at it on t h e
pnrt of the leadere, a etill groater variety is introduced. The i n Btroctor ie by no means permitted to incline towards u one-eided
*.
d a t i o n , for a problem which, for apparently valid reasons, wns
aolved .in a manner diflering inaterially from the views of thc
ioetructor, bas better served its purpose than when the leader.
witbout macb tbought, brrppene to h i t upon a correct eolution.
h t b e instructor nover knows beforehand t h e exact location
and all t b e c i r c h e t a n c e e which have a bearing on the execution ot'
a n exercine, in order ta form a correct opinion as,t," the action ot
t h e patrol,.he mu& take all these factore into consideration, COIISC'
qoeotly h e most learn them o n the q h t , or have tbem explained t o
bim. I n this connection the time to be allowed for the exercise I S
a matter of some irnporurnce.
Aacording to paragraph 142 of the German Field Service Rcgui t may be deeirable to fix, in a general way, tlic
'Iationa,
time 8t which patrole eent against a n evemy are to return."
.Bat i t certainly woold;be a n error to do tliiu nu a rule, for ( 1
-!
all peeible oircumetnoces c a n n o t be ,@ken into consideration, anal
(2) 't iodaceo the men to retorn when'the timc allotted Iiaaoxpireil.
I
in'
t$ ite of a complete, or at learnt a partial, failure to perform tht.
Ii
dotiea expected of tbem. How often doee it not occur that a wholi,
I patrol, ne R o n aa i t hru, M e n pometliing of t h e enemy, comes bucli
a

lli

io report, i l i a t a d of' contiiiuing itN obaervation and contact with

the enemy, and uonding back only one innn with a m e m g e . It
should be made the duty of' ptrtrola, on tlie contrary, never Lo loae
Jight of an enemy nfter he is once discoverud.
If we fix a detinite time for the rciurn of the patrol we prescribe a termination of the fuiictiona of t h e patrol, whereas, w h e n
t h e enemy is encountered, the w o r k sliould not be abandoned until
the latter withdraws from obacrvution.
I
Ouriog the course of insiructioo we talioul~l simcially taee to it
tbat the mon are tducated to bear i l l mind constantly the work
assigned to them. Wtieir no eneniy ia encountered, the taek ehould
be performed promptly; but when, through contact with the enoniy.
special circumstances arise, then such progresa as i R poeoible nitrrrt
be made.
To correspond w i t h the cluaaificlrtion g i v e n above (enemy, t e r ruin, enemy tirid torrain). the problems Rhould follow each other i n
:tboiit the following order:
Let US assume tlilrt the comrnaltd has halted a t tlie conclusion 1 1 1 '
i t s inarch, a i d that contact with the enenby h a s uot..yet
~ W I I
obtained. Tlic aecurity of t h c vomnialld is provided tor by me;lt1*
of outyoats, a i d to cover thc cst:rblinlllllcnt of' the outpotat, patrtdrr
:ire sent out.
Instructions are giGen to these patroia concerning
1. The direction iii which they arc to advance.
2. The diatance to which they c a n go to seek a PORL of' obeer
ration.
3. The tiinu nfter which, i n ease nothing ita seen of the enemy,
they are permitted to return.
Should tlictae patrole como i n contact with the enemy the rule
hid down above will apply: they remain i n touch with the enemy.
The object ut' these F t b h O l U ia to form a pTelimin&ryscreen to the
outpost and nlno to prcrent interference w i t h t h o eatablisbment ot
the line ot' sentinels. Consequently, penetration by hostile patrols
or detachmei!ts muei be energetically wnrdid off.
As eoon as the location of tbe line of observation bae been complcted the outpoet commander sends out additional patrole to ineurc

"* * *

Exploration of the Terrnin in the Direction of the & m y .

The orders for thie purpose would read about ae followe: "To
aearch. carefully t h e section of ground in advance of the n th sentinel
poet td a distance of about t w o milee and a half, und to report if any
aigne of the enemy are diecovered."

II

a
Y L

118

P A W O L DUTY.

The leader s d v a n c e e to t h e line of sentinclR w i t h his patr61 in

c l ~ a r + wand p m e out
~ ~ at t h e deeignatod post a f t e r o b t e i o i ? g
ibom the mentinela all t h e information they

poSEed6

c o n c e r n i n g the

natnn, of the p n a d a n d indications of t h e enemy.

Tbe prrol t h e n Jooke for a p o i n t from which i t can o b t a i n a
goOa view of ihe g r o u n d to t h e f r o n t a n d moves i n that direction.
esoh member p i c k i n g o u t (L way u n d e r cover for himself. After
arrival at the p o i n t nought n careful general s u r v e y IS m a d e and
then a rearch is instituted of all t h e places o n t h e m u t e a n d i n t h e
vicinity alRwdiIrq; cover, auch ne farmyardn a n d otlicr enclosures,

'.

tbickBtq runall w d e , etc.

If* glimpee is obtained of t h e e n e m y , ob+errAtion i l c o n t i n u e d .
only 0ne o r e being m t OBw i t h a message.
If nothing i8 seen of the enemy, the patrol r e t u r n s , h n v i o g ac-

oornprtaea its m i k o u . In r e w i n g t h e line of sentinels &e l e r d e r , '

or tbe meseeolpr, inOMcae tbe eentioele of what has been ascartaioed
in regsrd to the e n e m y within t h e field of view of t h e s e n t i n e l p0.9'.
WitL ref;srsoco to the semdiag of meesagee t h e leader sbonld be
that, if possible, be should eelect his meseenger
ftoc tmea r b o h a v e actually seen w h a t is reported in t h e

freqoedy m i & d
m--

I n each case t h e patrol will now bc carefully instructed i n t h e

way in which porCioos, of the terrtrin not Open to view UFO to bc
eeacched. Tbe poia&aof epeciol i m p o r t a w e are pointed o u t to tlic
1po4a d t h y a n reqoired to anewer qaestione l i k e t h o following

c4Wb8tare the moat i m p o r t a n t points

to bo searched i n t h e terrain'
iaLorcg? io voode? Where waa the enemy s e e n ? W b a t WM his
etrength? Did you count t h e enemy or estimate his force by t h e
d.et, ab.? Ia w b a t tbrmstion was be. aa sentinels, patrols, or l a r g e r
&-tat
In what direction did'he r e t i r e ? Can the preeencr>
of tbe emmy be inferred from t h e locality or i t a condition, etc.?
h w i i S g meesse;ea, t& great p a i a e c a n n o t be t a k e n i n keeping
nuUar OC sru&
separated from what h a a c t u a l l y boen aeeu
violatiom of thin rple m a t be sternly reproved, for t h e y r e n d e r a
meeslyle rortbleor and might w e e greet d a m a g e i n war.
A p3rel would p
d in precisely t h e same way i n case con
tact rrlth t h e enemy bse already been established, and o n e patrol, s;
to
reRevee another which hae discovered t h e presence OF
enemy. BPr0l.e tbe men p r e o i o d y 00 duty w i t h d r a w t h e y muet
kdkm & m e r d
d of the state of sffairs, beirg pa-rtic
&L
t..r v t e A t they Lave Pctdly seem from what
%heyonly e u e p t .

@,

Pd TROL D U " .

119

An advanciiig pntrol niiiNt endeavor to keep ollt of v i e w p f Fhe

enemy i n o r d e r to a r o i d interferonco with t h e execution of ite mission ; tbie is d o n e by t a k i n g advalltage of' t h e t e r r a i n a n d b y d a r t i n g
tiom cover to cover. At'ter croasing a n o p e n @pace t h e y ahonld
observ: carefully to sce w h e t h e r t h e y h a v e boen noticed by t h e
enemy. A r o t r e a t requires HR much caution a.. t h e advance. I f it
he carelessly executed, we i n c u r tlne d a n g e r of bctrrrying o u r poeition
to the enemy, in f'uct, of s h o w i n g him t h e way for a sudden a t t a c k .
Thereforc, cautious m o r e m c n t u n d e r cover i n e n j o i n e d ; a n d in
order to diminish t h e danger i l l C ~ E Ct h o patrol has becn observed
by t h e e n e m y , i t will be well to t a k e a n indirect course, t o c h a n g e
direction frequently, a d , i t ' poseiblc, to r e t u r n by a r o u t e not urred
r ~ ythe patrol before.
Finally, w e niny now assign special work to ptrtrOlE. Ordinarily
this would relate t u vceonnaissnnce of ccrtain g r o u n d to ascertain
whether troop8 could paw ovcr i t ; reconnaissance of a road as to
w h e t h e r i t i n prncticuble tor all a r m s ; of a r i v e r with reference to
the n u m b e r a n d condition of' bridges, foot-bridges a n d fot-dn, or t h e
nature of t h e b m k R ; or to t h e laying o u t of a route to be followed
by a n o t h e r d c t n c h m e n t Nubscqiicntly, b y dny o r by n i g h t ; etc.
I n o r d e r to accomplieh siich w o r k ( f o r which g e n e r a l rules can
not be g i v e n ) in a satinfactory mnnncr-, a n d to be a b l e to r e n d e r a n
exhaustive report, the men milst \IC informed t h a t tho following
points are of special importuricc :
T h e i r width, d c p t h , niitriru of bottom, c h a r a c t e r of t h e
Rivers.
banks, foyd*, bridgeq, foot-bridges, a n d r a p i d i t y o f
c ti rre n t .
( Capacitg, age, a n d c h a r a c t e r of mnterinls, leogth.
Bridges.
- b r e a d t h , stag#, props, poets, handrails, n a t u r e of the
rainpa.
Width,- foundation, e m b a n k m e n t s , cuts, bridges, a n d
I~oods.
t h e i r nature, grades.

'

Hooeee,
referenceto
defeneibility.

View a n d field of fire, thicknese and c h a r a c t e r of

walls, or o t h e r cover, situation of t h e f r o n t with
reference to t h e direction of a t t a c k , materials for
barricades.

i Character of the borders, density of growth,

{ of IaneR a n d roade.

nature

The dutiee o f a patrol may be changed by t h e appearance of the

A s far 08 practicable t h e s p i r i t of t h e inetrnctions rocoivcd
inoet continuo to bo the g u i d e for t h e patrol, w h m e &Id o f actiou
will, however, be contracted b y t h e preeence of t h e enemy; on t h e

c.nomy.

i%o

PATHOL DUTY.

other hand the additional duty which wo have juwl explained.

namely, msiotenvnce of contact with the enemy

P d m l Nu&.

after it hm once

>

On t b 8 turn. About 400 yards to the

pike from A to north, etc.
B, 4 inilem north

lof-

Applied Exercises.

It is only b i means of written messages a n d subsequent cornparithereof that effective instruction can be secured. The diecusZion must never be omitted and should take place as soon after the
vxe;cise as practicable, for then the soldier still remembers the general situation, the instructions received by him, the r u n n e r i n which
they were carried out, and the errors he committed.
son

T E E PBEPABATION

SXSRtXeSS IN PATBOLLINO WITH A BEPRESENTED ENEMY.

(d.)

Hontile diepoeitious consisting of eeutinels, or patrols. or both,

are oatlined and patrols eent against them. The enemy should bc
eapplied with blank cartridges, and be instructed to fire on the patrol
i o order to'attract ita" attention to errors committed (although i r i
actiial warfme t b e patrol would probably not be fired upon).
I n them exercieee with a representell enemy we niu*t obacrrv
t h e following feataree:
( a ) The exercises must begin with the easiest; t h a t is, we send
oat patroh3 against a sentinel poet without interference from hostile
patrole. Obeervation, aceorate judgment of t h e enemy's position.
concealment from view of the hostile sentinels, and correct messagcare t b e main p i n t a
Cb) Sabmqaent exercimes are to be rendered more difficult !b
the preeeoce of hoetile patrole. Conduct of the patrol is the sanw
( ~ 8
before, with t h e additional featurea of attention paid to hoRtiIc
patrole, concealment from them, avoidance of f i r i n g , remembrancc
of origioal ioetractione, and withdrawal in such a way as not to
lend t b e enemy to oar O W D pioket.
( c ) Maintenance of alertness of observation by making u r i
expected chaogee io the enemy's diepositione.
It ir recommended t b a t a non-commiseione4 o63ccr bc detailed
keep a reoord of t b e memagee according to soap such system an tlic

1. Simple
.2. More dificuIt

Examples on the Map.

description of the terrain.

?. Going over a fixed route and making a record of the features

I)y which the route m a y be found again.
4. Attempt to approach a fixod point undor cover.
5. Flank patrols.
6. Flank patrols with interruption.
7. Combat patrols.
8. Patrols to corer establishment of outposts.
9. Patrola to search a section ot' terruiti.
IO. &ai n s t senti ncln.
11. Against writiiielr, and p t r o l s .
12.
enemy.
12. Sameuw 11, witl~chnngwofpoaitioil.
13. Reconnaissance.
11. Reconnsiwance with interfei.el1c.c by tllc cncmy.
15. Explanation of the profile.

'

K:

PATROLLINCI.
EXEBCIEEB ON THE MAP.

10

following:

P. M.

1,

for tbeee exerciws goes hand i n hand with the theoretical instruction. Special sttention is to be paid to the exorvines i r i orientatioll
mplaioed in Part B.

2.

Corp'l A 6:30

1.

(IN TEE TPBRAIN.)

1.

wenla.
-

been gained, arise* to increase the work o f tbe patrol.

After completion of the recoonaimnce one man is sent wit11 ti
meuaage; t b e otbora rernaio to observe the enemy. Culm deliberntion and reeolute energy are tbe main conditions for success.
(e.)

Pdni o j Departwe.

nme.

No. 1.
>

Simple Deamption of the Terrain.

POBITION
:
Near Se tioo House
race north.

No. 2 , 460 yarde northwest of Char o m ;

.!.

12e

PATROL DUTY.

PATROL DC'TY.

Q. 1. Whet do you obeerve to the east, north, and weet ot

your poaitipo?
2. Ie it poasible to get to Proepect Hill under .corer ?
3. What route to t h e hill e h o d d be takon?
4. Ie your poeition eoitable.for defense?
What advantages doee i t offer?
What diesdoetagee?
W h a t i e t h e nature of t h e field of fire? . Are there a n y dead
epncee ?
How may the etrength of the position bo increamd?

I
4

NO. 2.

'

_ .

M&e D i w t Description of the Tarnin.

Pmrora :
On t h e windmill on Prospect Hill.
Q. 1. Give a deeaription of t h e vieible terrain, including t h e
villagee, ya& a n d boildinge that can be men.
2. How is i t pamible to gain acceeR under covor to:
( u ) The village to the north of your poeition?
(b) Fafa Bridge?
*
(e) The railmadebridge to the weet?
3. Ie your poeition euitable for defeoRive action? What advati
tagem doea it olYer? What are ita diaadvantrrges? What in t h e character of t h e 5eld of 5reP Are there a n y dead spaces? How may
ita defeneibility be improved?
No. 3.

Going Over a Fixed Route and Mnking a Record of the F u t u m hy

Which tire Route Na+ be Found Again.

A dataohmeat atatibned at a point eonthrest of Birch Hill i'i

directed to destroy t h e milroad at variooe poiote between Addieoti
and Soction Houee No.b4.
PBOBLKM:
A patrol from tbe!picket at Fielding Hooae ie ordered to select
and mark a mbte, aodnr cover p far ae practicable, to t h e portion
of track to be destroyed. 'Whatwill be t h e march and conduct ot
t h e patrol?
Q 1. Why eboald the patral aroid tho Hineeborg Road ea*t
of t h e wood.?
8. Can the village northeaat of t h e woode be dieregarded ?
3. Will t b e detachment for the night expeditioii be permitted t o
p m tbroqh the village?

3!

I
I

I
!

I
I

j
I

* J m c T l u qumUOm ahodd be
ula by a l r p 4 t u Uw-t

permltlsd

a; ach new padtlon

123

4. What marks are necessary?

5. I e i t necessary to remember the features of the terrain with
reference to defenee? TO what position would the dotachment retire
i n case of attack?
s o . 4.
Attempt to Approach n Designated &nt Crnder Cover.
PROBLIX :
The stone bridge 160 y a r h north of Fay's Corners hos been
aiestroyed. T h e etrcam is to be crossed about 700 yards lower down.
.I patrol is soot out from Prospect Hill to determino the character
# I f the banks of the strcani below the bridge, nnd will endeavor to
reach that portion of the stream without boing seen from the rinej-arda on Bellevue Hill.
Gire the detaile of the Aovements of' the patrol.
Q. 1. Would a direct m a r c h on the objcctirc be possible i n
this case?
2. Would cover be available for the moreincnt as required i n
the problem?
3. Under what circumstance8 could sucli direct march be nned?
NO. 5 .

Flonk Patrol.
A detachment leaves Colcheeter a t the northern exit to march
along t h e r i g h t bauk of the river. A pnirol for tlic right flank w a s
sent out with ordera to accompany the udvnncc 011 the ridge to the
cast and north.
Q. 1. What is the most important direction for thc obserrnLion of t h e patrol?
2. Is obeervation of the coiintry bctw\.c.cn thc dutnchment and
t h e patrol obstructed i n a n y way?
3. Can the patrol acconiplish ils piirpow if' it alwayR keep8 the
R i m e distance from t h e detachment?
4. How far forward and i n what dircctioll shotlid the coancct-

i n g m a n move?

5. How far should the patrol have advanced when tho point of
the advance guard leaves the town?
A t t h e croee roade north of Colchester tlic direction of the march
is changed, a n d inetead of continuing a l o n g t h e river t h e c umn
tiirne NNE. The patrol hse received no orders concerning this
change of direction.
Q. 6. What ehould the connecting man do under them circnmatmcee?
The patrol e w e that t h e new route leads up to Birch Hill.

-1

124

PATROL DL'TY

PATROL DUTY.

Q. 7. I n what direbtion ehould it now turri?

8. What should t h e poeition of the patrol be when tho point ot
t h e detachment'e advance guard reaclies t h e north-and-eouth roail
along Sacker Brook and etarta to go north?
9. How should the aonnecting man obaerve the actions of tlic
detacbment in Einesburg?
10. Suppose the detachment advancoa toward t h e north, when.
ehoald t h e patrol and the connecting man croee Sucker Brook?
11. Soppoee that the dotachment halta at t h e Copper LMines.
what duties ehoald.the patrol now ltrke up?
Nu. I-'.
Flank Putrot With Hostile lnterference.
A detachment leaves Hineeburg i n a northeaaterly direction. A
flank patrol is at Section H O U H
No.
~ 2, of the single-track railroad.
T b e detachment receivee intelligence t h a t a hoetilo force from tlic
north is croeeing t h e riper, and changes direction to meet it. Tlic
connecting man signale t h e change ot' direction to the patrol.
Q. 1. Where should t h e patrol crosr) the brook?
2. Prom whlrt p o i n t will it first be able to obttiin a view?
3. A t what rate should i t march to t h a t point?
The enemy is advancing from Fay'e Corners on tho railroad C U I ,
Q, 4. From what point will t h e patrol be able to obaerve ~ r i l i .
seqaent movemente of the enemy?

,YO.

Patrol to Cover Establishment of an Orrtpost.

"-A-

The patrol obscrrea i n the western edge of' the wood; north of
Essex Hill, a hostile infnntrJ- patrol w h i c h is moving i n n northerly
direction toward the wooden bridge across the brook.
Q. 5. What position would our patrol take for observation, or
how far would i t advance o r retire?
6 . What meesage should be sent i n this c:ine?

NO. '7.

hie adran-

and marcbee off

d t h e eaet?

. 6. Aaeaminp t h e eitnation to be t h e eamo ne at t h e beginning

of the exeroiee, what woald be t h e duties of a combat patrol on tlic
left h n k , in t h e h e d p about 166 yards eaet of Soction Houee SO.
64, in 0.ge approaching hoetile oavalry ie obmrved math of B o l t o n ' a
FIOtoTJ?

8.

A picket h a s arrived a t ite etation near the fork6 of t h e road

: I I J O U t 200 yards south of the soutlieakt end of the tunnel northcaet
of' Colclie*ter. The advance party is about $35 yards farther e:rst.
011 t h e ridge.
The commander receives orderN to utilize hiw purty
1,) cover t h o establisbment of IL line of sentinels.
The ridge affords
:I good view townrd t h e east, but portion8 of t h e vnllcy of Sucker
Krook east of Soction Houae Xo. 4 , are hiticfen from view. %.
1ntrol is sent to explore the valley.
Q. 1. How far muRt this patrol go to fulfill ita mission?
2. Where should specially careful suarcli be made?
3. How long IllURt it stay out i n front i n case no trnccs of the
_.rriemy are discovered?
4. What should i t report after its return, concerning presence
' of the enemy and the character of the country with rcfcrcnco to
cover and practicability?
4

hro 9.

Conbat Patrols.
' A hostile ekirmieb line.hae been deployed in the railroad cui
math of,Fay's Corners. O a r detacbment ie i n position between tlic
Copper Mines and P r o s p e c t ~ i l l . C . d " c o m b e patrol
t
liolds the Cernetery. The enemy receivee reinforcementa. Our detachment will
have to retire.
Q. 1. Wbat ebould t h e combat patrol do?
2. On what road and in what direction will bhe patrol retirc'!
8. H o w long eboald it remain on tho hill?
4. Where will i t crom t h e brook?
5. What will be t b e dutiee of t h e patrol in case the enemy 6 t O ) I .

125

Patrols to Search a Section of Termin.

A picket occupies a position east of Birch H i l l , nortli o'f tlic
Iiighwap, on the left bank of Sucker Brook, facing south. As the
ground o n t h i e bank c a n n o t all be s e e n , rr patrol is eenL forward
w i t h instructions to march t b e terrnin or1 a front of ahout 800
p r d e to the south and southeast, but not to go farther t h a n about
1,000 yards. T h e c h a i n of sentinels will be crossed going out at the
enrid pit.
Q. 1. What a r e the principal features to be scarcbed?
2. What diepoeition does the leader m:ike of the niembora o f
the patrol for these varioiin datiea?
3. Where ehould t h e patrol be divided?
4. W h o r e will it reassemble?
5 . W h a t would be done in c a w tlie unerny interfere8 with the
propwed operatione of t h e patrol?

__
Nw&-The

pmlrol aalulata of nlne

men snd lader.

' '.

.*

PA,TROL P U T Y .

126

NO. IO.

7. Whst is the tenor of t h e mewage?

1'

8. hs t b e whole valley can be eeen from Birch Hill, are

precautione to be obeerved d u r i n g tlie retreat?

~ I I J

NO. 11.

,
,

Patrob Against the Enemy's Outposts. (b. Against sentties and Pit.
trob.)
The 'leader of t h e patrol (Exerciee No. lo), recoivee ordere to
pam thrqngh'the wood*-north of Birch Hill, t h u s t u r n i n g t h e erwmy's sentinels, a n d

to

endeavor to g a i n a view of t h e enemyl'a

diepitions fnrtber S a t h e rear.

Q. 1. On w h a t rootee a n t h e patrol reach t h e wooda?
2.

..
- Pd~oblsl+inst
the Enemy's Outpoets.
tion.)

ltli

No. 12.

west. It aende out a patrol towarde tho ridge a b o u t 1,700 p r d e 11)

t b e weet, w i t b t h e following ordere: "The enemy'e eentinele arc
mid to be poeted on Birch H i l l ; arecertain their poeition ae far a*
poesi ble."
Q. 1. In what formation ebould t h e patrol crom tho chain ol'
sentinele a n d advance towards t h e e n e m y ? W h a t point i n t h c torrain will probably afford a good view?
2. W h a t features'of t h e terrain afford cover?
F
W b e o t h e y reach t h e bnebee on t h e left b a n k of t h e brook thc
members of t h e patrol obeerre individual hoetile infantrymon i t t
t h e emtern corner of t h e woode 00 Birch Hill, and alao in t h e buelie.
at t b e mathern e n d of t b e hill, a p p a r e n t l y t w o moo in each place,
a hoetlle boreeman ie eeen to disappear behind t h e hill, south ot tbc
buehee referred to.
3. W h a t concheion m a y be d r a w n from t h i s fact?
4. Hae t h e w o r k o f t h e patrol now been entirely accompliehod'
5. W h a t inveeligatione remain to be made?
Who i s eent back w i t h a meeeage?

PATROL DUTY.

'

Patrob AgniMS the Enemy's Outposts. (a. _-jainst'Sentrres.)

A picket is stationed i n t h e weetern edge of Charlotte, fncillr:

6.

W h a t ie ita method of advancing i n t h e woods?,:

3. While i n t h e woods it meote with a etronger hostile patrol.

ebould t b e patrol retire, remain etatiooary, or endeavor to force i t s
way tbrough i n t b e intended direction?
4. Will t h e patrol be able o n d e r t h e present circumetances 10
work out a perfect solution ?
6. T o w h a t will i t oventually have to confine iteelf?
,
6. W b 8 t report ehould be made?
7. How does t h e meeueoger regulate hie mov-ementa?

( c . Incdving change of Direc-

The patrol (Exercise No. 11) obscrves t b a t t h e hostilo patrol

opposed to i t doee not pursue; at the eame timo Ri#nuIe aro m s d c
by tbo man left in t h e bushes on t h e river bank thot t h e ecntinelw
rcferred ta in Exercise No. 10 have dieappeared from thuir poata.
C& 1. W h a t can thu patrol conclude from this:'
2. Can i t now through energetic action s t i l l secure i n f u r n i a t i o n
concerning t h e strength a n d p s i t i o n of t h e encniy P How '?
After arrivnl at Birch Hill tho ptrtrol ~ e e st h e encmy-who
is
rctreating-in t h e e n c l o m r e about '300 yards aouthwust of tho h i l l ,
and in t h e a c t of forming a rear g u a r d , a n d observes columne of
hostile infantry aecending t h e elopes on t h e woat bank of t h e river.
3. W h a t concluajon is d r a w n by t h e patrol ?
4. What ahould i t r e p o r t ?
5 . H o w ehould tbe messenger proceud in thi3 case?
..YO. I 3.

Reeonna issnnce.
From Soction Houae No. 2, a t intereection of railroad a n d highwyay northwest of Charlotte, a patrol is s e n t o u t to ascertain the
condition of the road ae far as the village, a b u t 1,300 yards to tho
northwest, to determine t h e degreeof practicability of' t h e adjoining
terrain, a n d to reconnoiter t h e village witb reference to dofeneibility
on t h e weetern a n d eouthwecltero edgee.
The e n e m y is enppoeed t o be advancing from t h e northwest, b u t
not t
o have croeaed t h e r i v e r aa yet.
I m p o r t a n t pointa for t h e advance :
1. The advance m u s t be made under cover and with Kreat
cnution i n o r d e r that t b e e n e m y may not discover tho r e c o o n s i a n c e
' and fruetrate it.
3. The exarninstion of tho adjacent terrain must be made d u r ing t h e 6m1,part of the undertaking, while t h e patrol is i n march.
Q. 1. H o w are t h e men divided for t h e w purposes?
2. W h a t featuree ebould be carefully observed with reference to
( a ) The march of lateral colurnnB?
( 6 ) Vegetation lining t h e road?
(c)
Ditch- a l o n g t h e road?
(d) Opportnnitiee for defemivo action?
A f t e r a r r i v a l i n t h e village t h e loader divider, t h e patrol into
parte wbich make t h e reconnaissance, arid o t h e r parts which pro1t.t d t h e men m a k i n g t h e reconnaiwance.

PATROL D U T Y .

PATROL DUTY.

128

PdTROLLING.

3. W b a t are t h e i m p o r t a n t points i n this reconnaissance?

4.

W h a t reporb will be m a d e after completion of reconnaissancc'7

NO. 7 4 .

EXERCISES O N T B E Y A P .

Anslcers to

Becannaissance with Hostile Interference.

Atter t b e patrol (Exercise No. 13) has entored tho village,

1.
.I

s t r o n g hostile detachment -apparently a company-emerges frorii

cover eouth of Fay's Corners a n d adoances o n tho highway toward^
Addison.
Q. 1. Will t h e patrol still be able to accomplish t h e second
part of ita miesion?
2. R o w m i g h t i t be c u t off?
3. How should it witbdraw?
4. W h a t meeeage should be sent?
I n w b a t manner should t h e messago be curried?

NO. 1 5 .

Eqdanation of I+o~les.

1. W h a t is a profile? W h a t i s i t intended to e x h i b i t ?
2. W b a t military importance h a v e elevations, depression..
slopee,,and plains?
3. Of w h a t importance, consequently, is a profile with refere n c e to a c1-r conception of t h e terms, Beld of fire, dead space, etc.
4. P o i n t o u t a concave slop on t b e map. State w h a t points
would be i n view from eacb other. To w h a t e x t e n t would trees or
o t h e r objecta on the*dope afford pratection to a n e n e m y ?
6. Point out B convex slope on t b e map. I n w h a t respectwould i t favor a n enemy?
6. W b a t is t h e ditrereoce betw en >he actual crest a n d t h e millpry oreet? Illaetrate by d
o
n t h e map.
7. P o i n t out t b e direction8 i n which t h e rivers a n d brooks on
the map run.
8. H o w m n c b of S w a n t o n i s visible from t h e top of Prospect
Hill, mppoeing t b e trees i n t h e fork of t h e roads between Ywanton
forty feet high?
Woods and Sipley Woods
\

1")

:IlJOUt

No.1.

.,:

-_

T h o rnlley of a brook which comes froin t h e southwest and

430 y a r d s from me t u r n s to t h e north, a n d t h e n , beyond the

txilroad bridge bends towardn t h e northweat; t h e valley dropa off

wpidly at t h a t point a n d I a m therefore unable to follow t h e course
of t h e stream farther. Towarde t h e east tho g r o u n d riaea g r a d u a l l y
srid is almost entirely without c o v e r ; in tho northwest, beyond t h e
rdloy, thore is a ridge of high g r o u n d culminating i n two hills;
there are some small woods towarda t h e west; elsewhere t h e high
g - o u n d is without cover. I n case t h e f a r t h e r slopes of t h e hills a r e
tvithout cover the summits would afford good p i n t * o f observntioii.
111 t h e wost, nt n distarlco of from 750 to WO ytli'd~,I see a hamlet;
A t J O U t 550 yards to t h e northwest n farmyard ; ncar t h e bridgeabout
MO y a r d s to t h e north, a mill ; a n d near t h e railroad, a section house.
.\c tbere is a windmill on t h e hill farihest to t h e southwest, a n d au
ttiis is also the higher one, i t will probably be t h e better suited for a
]joint of observation.
2. T h e c o u n t r y is 80 open t h a t i t would be irnposnihle to roach
tlie bill without exposure,"except at night, or in foggy o r in s t o r m y
weather.

3. M a k e a dash, individually,* for the c l u m p of tree8 nbout 200

yards to t h e northwest; then observe t h e h i l l carefully to uee if any
pcmons can be discerned thereon. No rnovoiiientA being observed,
make a dash for the brook and lie down in t h e weeds near ita bank ;
then d a r t u p the lane toward Joms's farm-house a n d ascend tbe'hill
by the road a n d trail leading west.
4. Naturally, t b c position is not well suited for defensive action
bccause of commanding g r o u n d at distance of 700 yerd8.f It offers.
the a d v a n t a g e t b a t fire from t b e position would swoep t b e h i g b w a y
to Booth's Mill a n d also the radiating c o u n t r y roads. I t s dicladvant:tges are t h a t it is exposed to view a n d fire from sheltered I'onitione
which might be occupied b y the enemy.
T h e field of B r o is excellent in all direciions to the east, ilorth,
arid to t h e west aa f a r as the hill range. T h e r e iw a dead xpaco
iiortheaet of Gravel E l l .

*Movement#

O p e n ground Ibotrld. M Nle. bc made IndiVidtully.

t AI1 the l a t u r n mntrlbutlng (0 the strength of a po.lUon a n . of OOumO. not

0:)

J
0

lbe mnp. bot for pntpamem of p&OS

be .horn
t h a e qUmLlOM M (0 be .P..rered U (u U m a l e .

PATROL DUTY.

130

The etrengtb of the poeition could be increased by artificial COTW

against 61-0 from t h e hills, cutting down trees near highway t o
Booth's Mill, Boding mngee uccurately, etc.
Answers to No.9.
1. Before me there is the valley of a r i r e r which flow# froill
P

eouthweet to northonst, paeeing at about 700 yards northwest 4 ) f in?

position ; the valley becomes wider towurds the lower course of t l i t
stream. Both banks a r e flat and rise gradually, the opposite bnnh
being tho lower; a range of hills, distant about 1,400 yardw, runparallel to the river o n tho other side of t h e valley ; in the riortli
weet there is a depression over which a highway passes In 111,
nortbweet there la aleo o bridge across the fiver for tlie highwny j i i - t
mentioned; and i n the wee) there i H a bridge for the railrond whi( t i
'isenee from a tunnel farthar wcat. T h e brook which fiows nrouiiil
m y p i t i o n , em
'nto tho river about 1JOO yards to the north
T h e opposite ri e is covered with wood*, and on the soutberil
elopen there are vineyards; t h e slopes on t h i s nide of' ttic vnllc?
preRent scarcely a n y cover.
The railroad issuing from the tunnel i n the west paascs aloii:
t h e hither bank of the river; a branch o f this railroad passea u 1 ~
t h e valley of Sucker Brook. Along tho near bank of the rivci
there ie ale0 a highway; t h e highway from the northwest anal
another one from the eouthenst paeeing through the rslleg of t l i c
brook, come into tbie road.
The village of Addieon ie plainly vieible; aleo Bolton's factor!
Fay'e Corners, Corbio'e, Hart'e Mill, and eeveral smaller buildingnorth of Fay'+ Corners.
2. (a) Proceed along t h e eoutheaetern slopes of Prospect am1
brawl Hille; tbencq northeaet i n the ravine about 300 yards to t l i t
highway; thence tbrougb the cut i n t o the emall wood &bout eight!
yards ecret of Addieon. A t this point the members of the patrol
can await a fhvorable moment and dash acroes to the nearest housc-

iodividually.
( b ) The patrol under t u ) will proceed west, past the Cernetcrr

and t h e leet bonsee neet of Addieon, then make a dash separatel?

for Fay'e Corner's; from the latter point dart across the open tipncc
to t h e we& eide of .the bridge.
Proceed along t h e s o u t h e r n elope of ProRpect B i l l , cro(E)
t h e ,mddle at t h e g u a r r y , and from the Copper Mines dart acro-.
individually, to Daytan Wood. Aaaemble i n Dayton Wood. Thcil
pmceed narthwent rrlatig t h o hedge Lo Section Houeu No. 54, nnd t i l

PATROL DUTY.
tllc railroad embankment individually; aHsemblc behind t h r
birnkment and proceed along the southern face to the bridge.

131

cm-

3. The position is well auitcd for defensive action against

troops corning from the iiorth and west, the country being open for
ovcr 1,000 yards; t b o r e i s t h u s a free field of fire to t h e liniit of

accurate range of the rifle. A detachment not supported by other

troops to t h e right and left could bo easily turried. aa there a r e
n o features i n the terrain protecting the flanka. The position is
uiso expoeed to artillery fire at close range froiu Ripley and Bellevue Hills. The enemy could find cover 100 yards southwest of
F ~ y ' Corners,
s
and in the railroad cuts near the Hinesburp, Fay's
Corners road. There are several cuts and embankments on the
r;iilroad and wagon roads o a t and northeast of Addison.
The strength of the position map be incrensed by iiitrench.
fire on
nicnts and gun-pita, and by arraugement3 tiw u~~iiccntiuted
tliu approaches to tlic village and points uflurding cover LO the

memy.
Ansirers to No.8.
Work of the Patrol.
The patrol will p i w lhc chain of sentinela a t ttie ~'1'088 roads
west ot Birch Hill and groups of men will be ordered to nitrrc.h on
tlie points ot' wooda to ttie north, The individual nienibers of' t h c
piitrol will advance by eeparate routes, when possible by r u h ? a
Alter arrivul in the woode a halt is made; the advance hereafter is
i n s k i r m i s h line with extended interrala, t h e leader beiug i n the
middle as he iR tho8 better able to communicate by nignalz ProgresA
through the woode continuea until arrival a t the northern h r d c r .
Ttic patrol should then aasemble lor further inatructions. Another
wiiy of reaching Hineaburg Woods without danger of exposure 0 1 1
tlic northwest slopes of Birch Hill, would be to proceed west by
Fielding to eastern edge of Beekman Woods, and thence uodcr
cover of fringe of trees past H u n t i n g Lodge. The. patrol ahoulii
tlwn examine Hioeaburg Woods and aeeemble as above.
The direction of Dayton Wood mutit be fixed by marking a
couple of trees which a r e on the proposed liric ot' inarch. or by
nietlne of small piles of stones or other arrangements. T h e w inarka
would be neceaeary on very dark n i g h t s to atart the detachment i n
tho right direction. AR the country from now on is open. t l w patrol
is divided into two partR. nnd thuR proceeds to tho Stonr Quarry
and to qayton Wood; all come together again i n Dayton Wood.
Tlie border of Dayton Wood aud the weBt a i d emt corners most be
irtipreeeed on the men's minds.

-.l

PATROL DUTY.

PATROL DUTY.

Tbe I d e r will t h e n determino w h a t part of t h e t r a c k ehould l l v

a t t w k e d tirat, t h e c u r v e or t h e cut, a n d fix t h e direction. Tile
bedge giree a o a t u m l line to t h e western end of t h e curve. Tlic
patrol may t h e n retire in a southerly directioh,;but while in t111,
wood8 it must 888 whothor the m a r k s eet up are still i n place. .
A. 1 . By moving o n t h e H i u e s b u r g Road t h e pntrol woul,l
expose itself unnecesesrily.
2. The village mu": not be disregarded, especially in a liostiic
w a n t r y . Two men s h e & Icft in concenlmont a t a point nib:ir
t h e northern border of
woods, from which t h e y can observe tilc.
village a n d also t h e c o u n t r y to t h e northeast, a n d warn the rt'.
mainder of the patrol of t h e appronch of danger.
3. T h e detachment o n ita n i g h t expedition should not pat h r o u g h t h e village, i t s inission being a secret o n e , to be ncc'oiiiplished as quietly a4 poerrible. A small patrol should bo left iii
obeerration and tocurer retrentof the detachment i n cnse of ntt;tcli
4. T h e point o f e n t r a n c e i n t o t h e wood# and t h e roadn i n t l i c
woods should be marked as far 88 tho e x i t nt the northern e d p . .
t h e line of direction (above mentionod) to Daytoii \Vood, uiitl
thence st line of d i r w t i a n o n t h e railroad ebould a l w be establialical
5. Al l t h e ofacere a n d non-conimiaaionod oficera of t h e patrid
, a n d of the detachment should endeavor to i m p r e w upon their iiiiri1l.i
t h e fataree of t h e terrain faroruble for defeuee a n d retreat.
The refrest of t h e d e t a c h m e n t would depend somewhat 0 1 1 tlic
'direotion of t h e attack. A n effort ehould be made to regain tlic
sa qaickly aa V i b l e . Inetructioos to t h e patrol left i n
observation n e a r Hineeburg, a n d to t w o other men stationed i i t w
t h e oortbero border, for instance, at t h e northweet c o r n e r of tlic
w a d e , tu show a l i g h t i n case i t i 5 e v i d e n t that t h e detdcbnlent Ii:i*
bewn attacked, would facilitate retreat, especially o n ' very dark
, OD t h e light, but to
oighta Tbe d e t a c h m e n t woqld retreat, not
'one Bide of it.

r:iilroed c u i ot the single.track road northcadi of' the village, stoopif neceaeary, and t h a n rcaclics t h e yards o n the highway n o r t h
I I ~tho village.
T h e whole patrol is assembled in t h e smnll wood
h. tween t h e village and t h e river. From the northweet corner of
tiit! wood t h e patrol darts i n t o t h e buuhee a n d finally reaches t h e
river. From this point t h e patrol sees thnt t h e river bae steep
1):Lnks; n farther ndvance, therefore, is not necesmry. T h e patrol
rtatires with t h e snme precautions. E v e r y time an open spnce is
crossed t h e patrol will pausc in observation to see if' any niovementA
of the e n e m y t a k e place io t h e vineyards.
1. A direct march on t h e objective in precluded by tlw condit i o n s of t h e problem., for
4. T h e n o r t h w e k e r n elopes of Prospect a n d Gravel IIillrr >Ire
n i t h o u t YuWcierit covcr, uiid t h e patrol w o u l d be expoeed t o r i c w ot'
l~rwmyo n h l l c v u e Hill.
3. The direct route might be used i n urgent ( ' a s c ~a. t night, or
i i i hggy 01.
s t o r m y weather.

132

Ansurers to No.4.

Wution of Robkm.
Y[arob mder wver

OD' tho Routheastern elopes of Proepect ;riid

Gravel IFl9; thpo paat curnd pits a n d i n the r a v i n e i n a northeu-terly direatloo J o a t 300'yards. Tbe membera of t h e patrol will
drvr .omoll the b i g b w a y individually, for t h e portion on embnrikmeot a n bfi p n from B e l l e r n e Hill to the northweet. T h e patrol
then -par&%
i n t o t w o parte. O n e part proceeds d o n g t h e northern edge of t h e cat, reach- t h e little wood southeast of t h e vi1la.v)
and t h e n d a r b i n t o t h e village itself; the o t h e r part move6 to tlio

133

ill,<

AnSlct1.Q to

1.

AVO.5 .

J-

'l'o tire h o t and r i g h t flank o f t h e advancing detachment,

v ~ ~ i t w q u e n t itowarde
y
the n o r t h and northwent; specifically. at t h r
i i i l m c i t t when t h e detachment lenres (Wcheater, t h e pntrnl should
IN*rcwIy to leave Birch Hill.
2. Observation of t h e coutitry between t h e detachment nnd t l w
p:itrol iii it8 progress from Fern's H i l l to R i r d i Ifill ia not obntructed
iii :iny wny b y vegetntion, depressions, a b r u p t slopes, or o t h e r
IkLtures of the terrain. It i s presumed t h a t t h e railrond cut and
tunnel northeant of Colchester h a v e nlrendy heen carefully inspected.
:3. 'So; for t h e summit of t h e high ground doen not continue&
rtiii parallel to t h e propoaed line of march of t h e detachment.
4. The connecting man should maintain himself aboot half
n:ry between t h e patrol a n d t h e detachment, a n d a b o u t on a Atraight
line joining t h e m ; he should endeavor to occupy p e i t i n n s from
liich both t h e pntrol a n d detachment are vinible.
1.
5. T h e patrol should be leaving Birch Hill on t h e road to
Ehlton '8.
6. T h e connocling rnao ehould m a k e eignal to a t t r a c t t h e attvittion of t h e patrol to t h e obanged state of affaire i n t h e detachnirnt, and start toward Birch Hill.
7. A a wooii au tlie patrol obaervoe t h e cbaoge of direction on
tlio p a r t of tlie detachment it will endeavor to reach quickly a

PATROL DUTY.

PATKOL D U T Y .

p i t i o n from which i t c a n obeerve the ground to t h e front a n d right

h
a
a
t of t h e detacbmeot on ita new route. I n thie case i t would

4. Marching by JONES'Sf h r n i at N rapid pace it will take a

3traight route for Section Houec? No. 4,crossiug the brook w h o r e v e r
i t may strike it, as illere will probably be little tirnc to be lont.

134

aws Sucker'Brook snd proceed in t b e direction of Youngtown and

Charlotte.

W h e n $be point of the advance guard of the detachmerit

starte north along Sacker Brook, the patrol ehould be on the road
a n d near to Section Hdnm No. 2, oorthweet of Charlotte.
9. The connecting 'man c a n beRt observe the operations of tho
8.

detachment fmm tbee,clump of trees which ie half way befwccn

Hineeburg and Section House No. 2.
10. T h e patrol ehodd crow Sucker Brook at Booth's Hill, and
t b e connecting mao sooth of JONES'S
farm-home.
11. The patro1,after examining Gravel Hill and the feature*
of ita northern dopes, continoes exploration iqAddifion and vicinitJ-.

135

5 . I n case the enemy does n o t pursue t h o detachnicnt towards

Iiinesburg, but tnarchee off towards the east, the patrol will engleavor to guin a favorable position to observe t h e enemy's moveiiiente; the location will also depend on the action of its own
~Ietachment,which may halt, continue to retire, change i t n line of
retreat, or make demonstrations against t h e enemy's flank.
6. The patrol should commence f i r i n g a t once i n order to warn
tho detachment a t the Copper Xiuee,snd should then retire into
Ihyton Wood. A messenger should also be sent to make Rure that
the detachment learnn of thie new danger and t o p p o r t , upproxiIiintely, t h e strength of t h e enemy's cavalry. If t h e roinforoed
iiemy h a s conimenced his advance from the railroad cut, the patrol
will have to leave Dayton Wood to avoid being c u t off. It e h o u l d
r e t i r e towards the Copper Mines and afterwards take poRitiori on thc
IiiKIi g r o u n d west of Hineeburg; or, the movements and strerigth
ad' the enemy's cavalry, a n d t h e circumstanceR of the terrain might
lie rruch ae t o juetify a n attempt lo reach the northwest cornor of
llinesburg W o o d s by a dash of 250 ynrds acrom open ground.
I

Answers to No.6.
1. The pntrol would crose the brook on the line to JONES'S farnrhoam and t h e n take,the rosd to the n o r t h .

Ita firet view will be had on t h e ridge east of Donton Wooti.

3. AB first as podble, keeping in good- wind.'
4. From Denton Wood.

2.

Anewers to

Anstcers to No. 8.

No. 7.

1. The p i t i o n of t h e patrol is a dangerous one. It elloultl

keep a sharp lookout in all directiooe to eee whether any parties of
t h e enemy have been detscbed againet i t or are approaching its
poeition, at the name time endeavoring to ascertain the strength and'
d i e p i t i o n s of t h e enemy. Ae BOOO ae i t becomee eridetit that tlic
reinfirced enemy intende to advance and t h a t our detachment will
be forced to retire, or when the patrol ie menaced by superior
putiee of the enemy with intention to cut off ita retreat, the patrol
should withdraw,ite rateof march being governed b y circumetanccq.
e. Tbe patrol eboald retire through Addison a n d gain the crit
op the nortbern spur of Gravel Hill, thue avoiding expoeure to view .
a n d to the enemy's 6re at rather short range. It woold t h e n ascend
Brave1 Hill in t h e ravine, take position in or near the Sand Pit3,
e n d OOII~~DPB
observing t h e enemy.
3. The patrol remsior on t h e hill until i t knows from t h e dircction of tbe wood $f the drhg, or other evidences, that tbe detacliment h w retreated fmm ib p i t i o n at t b e Copper Mines.

1.
Ilill.

By way of Vinton and Harper's to Eamx Hill; later

to

k'ork

3. The patrol examines Vinton and the copses along Holton'n

Brook and then the enclosure at Harper's on i t s way to Essex Hill.
The WOO& on Essex Hill, enclosures and embankments i n t h e valley
ot Sucker Brook, and ernall woods on York Hill would reqoiro
a.:irefiil examination. On i t a way back t h e patrol s h o u l d explore
tlic vicinity of Section House No. 4. and the long railroad cot to
the weNt. The Bret object of such patrole ehould be to roach hi&
zrnund affording a good general view; details can be examined later.
3. The patrol may return as e o n as i t hap completed ita exploration, for the outpost will have been thoroughly organized in
tlie meantime. Ordere fixing the IenKtb of time the patrol ie to roinnin out would, of coorse, be compliod with,
4. Under the aeeumption contained in t b e preceding queetion,
the patrol should report upon ita return t h s t no traces of the enemy

:.
PATROL DUTY.

PATROL DUTY.

bave been diecovered, and that the inhabitante of the country seeill
to be ignorant of hie wbereaboata. The country on the northerib
elope d,
Emsex Hill, the made, Sucker Brook and ite banks, tlit.
thereto, all should bo described witli
bridgea and approachsuacieot detail to convey to higher authority o clear idea as to
prscticability of the terrain f o r the various arms, and the cover and
okhcles tbewin.
5. h u m i n 5 tbst the patrol gained ita first intimation of tlie
enemys preslence at Earpers, the leader should proceed cautiously
to the crest of the spur near the crom. roads east of Harper# nntl
continue obeervation of the enemy.
6. The following measage would be sent a t o,nce:

5. If the enemy baa not beeq seen i n this part of the country
hefore, a message ehould a t once be sent to tbe cornmarider of the
Ilicket. The patrol ebould endeavor tu maintain tonch with the
memy, withdrawing m h o n he advanceu in superior numbers, and
ti>llowingcautiously when he retires.

136

BEPORT.

.;&msQI-

Loedlol.

Ca:C, 20 Id. Hu j s Farm, 300 pards N. E.

No. 1.

of Enton.

M.

1.

rime.

12 Oct. 98. ! 4.10 P

11.

.. ....... . .....

Received ......_...._......

To LinJorrmf F-,
Fmr -Hid.
Hoetilc infantry pcrtrol, dve mon counted, seen in western - e d g ~
of Eamx Woods, cautiously moving north towards bridge OVCI
Sncker Brook.
ANMOP;,
Se-gmnt, h p a n a , C.

Answers to No.9.

1. h i l m s d cut, eection honse, embankments, bridges across

Sacker and Holtons Brooks; small wood about 300 p r d s south ot
railroad bridge; thm tbe latter careful observation of the village tn
tbe southeast and of the encloeuws east. Next p c c e d to Ferns
Eill sod obeerve the valley of the r i v e r b t h e weet. Return on
ea&eJro slope ofFerns Hill and by north and eouth road past Sei.tion Hwre No. 1.
M. Immediately atter croaeing the lineof aeotinels a group of
&me man ie &tmcbed$~&vtbmagh railmad cat; the patrol march1S.s
eaet and then Lotheds tothejunction of Holtona and Sacker Brook>.
The vicinity will be carefully explored, and a group of men sent t o
e m b a n b e a t i n tbe valioy of Sackei Brook about 300 yards
farther mt, with ordem te rejoin about 300 yards farther south by
way of Harp$& Tbegroup semt tbroagb the c u t will examine tlia
cepm 309 y u d . m3ubbweet.of Seation H o w Np. 4. All will a+
semble on erdero slope of FernsHi11 near summit.

*-

,.

Y
., .

Answers to

137

No.10.

The patrol more8 i n close order until it arrivoe a t the chain

T h e commander obtains from t h o
.cntinels the latest infordation concerning the enemy and the
riature of t h o ground. AAer crossing the line of sentinels thc
patrol at once looks for a good p o i n t of observation; tho mmt
.uitablc one would probably be found on some h i g h building iii
\-oungtow n.
2. The country o n the western and northweatern elopes of
\-ark Hill is quite open. If there are any trees, bnahes, or even
tolegraph poles along the Charlotte-Toungtown highway they would
:Ifford snme cover, considering t h o supposed direction of the enemy.
Ihe patrol sbould advance by individoal men, taking advantage
of what cover chore may be and bringing the buildings of Youngt o w n i n linc with Bircb Hill as soon as practicable. Aneemblageof
patrol in.Youogtown. Then, darting from buildiug to buildiug the
inernbereof the patrol finally cross Sucker Brook aud come together
in the bushee on t h e left bank. Another route, requiring rather
long detour but affording better cover would be an follows: From
Charlotte south on road io York Hill, acroae aummit, individually,
to wdode 00 ~ o u t h e r nslope; to Sucker Brook; to junctiou witb
lioltons Brook. At t h i a point the patrol would be divided, one
party proceeding along brook and the o t h e r tbrough railroad cut.
.\sseinble bebiod railroad bridge orer Sucker Brook and then advance to the bnebee along the brook, north of higliway.
3. That the enemy baa a line of double sentinels on Birch Hill;
that our presence hae been diecovered, and that. information to tbar
cffect ie b e i n g conveyed to the commander of the picket.
4. T h e patrol so far has touched only one part of t h e enemys
line of observation and haa not completed ita duty by any means.
5. An attempt must be made to 6nd other sentinels and aleo
the troops eopportiog them.
6 . The man who firet saw the enemy is eent back with a measage as follows:
1.

,,f sentinels, and tben is halted.

6.

L w .

Left Bank Sucker Brook,300

y

d math of finesburg.

No. 1

l-rlz
15t) Oct.

OD

____
-

-.

So. 2.
To Lieutenant Williamr, Charlolle.

JOHNSOS,

Received

Tbe meaeesger will move ne rapidly as possible, taking prc

prpteat bimeelf from t h o enemy's fire while withii:
range. By peeing rapidly down tbe vatley of Sucker Brook IIC.
8.

6od -me oover a n d can crow tbe brook eouth of JONES

hrm. Tbje would ale0 b e 4 q;ocrd line of retreat for the patrdl i i i
cam t h e commander decidee to retire; tbe direction gives no indic:iA n a to t h e enemy.
. Answers to No. 12.
1. Thew ami eeveral matesopen to t h e patrol, if i t is eonvinrcil
t h a t it is oppueite tbe left h n k of tbe enemy's lino of obeervatioii
It could make for tbe highway at once a n d t h e n move straight oil
the
oornec of Hineeborg Woods,provided sufficient Covw
oan be h o d fa t h e tornbin to avoid q d n e expoenre to fire. It will
, probably be neceeesry to go rsrtber down atream, perhaps as far ais
Eincmbarg, and tben cut wroea toatbe nortbeaut cornor of t h e wood@
If 00 mntinele are d i m v ?
on tbq higb'ground west of Hinosburrr
' it beoomee bmt c e r a t b a t tbe. nortbern limit of' the enemy
line baa b s e ~ceuuhed, a
t b e patrol wonld then enter the wood*
with'intention.of toroing he p i t i o n .
2. Wbile i n the wood8 t h e patrol will move cantionsly, the men)berm remaining within view or whistle call of eaqh other. Tlic
ridge &odd be c
d while'nnder cover of t h e woode.
3. Tbe patrol will begin retire if i t ie evident that it has becii
d m e r e d ; K i t remined stationary it might be cut off by Ruperiiqi
numbem, s o d to advance woald bring OD Y B g h t by wbicb notbiii:

eould be gdned.
4. A perf&&mlabiorwof t b e probldm aseigned does not seeiti
e l e rpder tbe $rcumrrtanoea
. 6. All *at csn be d o a e ' b to maintain contact with tbe enemy
umd take ample preoeuriow egsineLbt$ng a u t off. ,

'.c
.

8.

; *.

. . .

1)

...............................
JOHNSON,
Sergeant, Company "C."

8000

Forced to give way beforo stronger hostilo patrol in the woods.

Obnervation will be continuod as long as possible.

caatiooe to

d
.

l -

of Hineeburg.

S e r p n t , Cmpang "C."

will

Lualtbr.

i'atrol,Co."C," ?o Inf. Ih woods 300 yards eoiithweet

Bmemy's infentry sentinel8 diecovorod in enatern edgo of woo(1.

Bird H i l L a n d in bnahee farther aotitli. Mounted man wx.

eeen ~ l l o p i b g
to the weet eonth of Birch Hill.

REPORT.

10:30

.............................

Received

A muasage informing the proper officer of the new Rituation

practicable Meesagc ae followe:

as soon as

T o m - . - :
, P

139

1 4 sent

"ah CO. '0," 8ah

d.

PATROL DUTE:

PATKOL DUTY.

138

i. The morement8 of tho mossenger would be govern'ed by t h e

wtions of the enemy. H e should proceed 3 s quickly aa poasiblo;
Iiin beet lino w;,uld probably bo straight on Section Hoiise N o . 2.

Answers to No. 12.

4

1. Tbe circumstances indicate that the enemy inteBds to retreat.

2. Tbe patrol can now afford to be bolder and should endeavor,

by a rapid movement. to reach a position affording a view of the
votrograde movements of t h e enemy. T h o patrol, i n open formation, will make a dash for the north edge of the woode n e a r the
summit of Birch Hill, so as to g a i n tl view of the country to t h e
\V06t.

3. That a general retreat is i n progress.

4. A ~neasageshould immediately be eciit to t h e commander of
tlic picket, preferably i n duplicate, onc ,verbal, thc other written, a#
f0llowrr :
BEPORT.
M f n g -1.

tsoHol.

Patrol, Co. '' C,"

2U Inf.

Summit of Birch Hill near

Hinesbnrg-Fielding Road.

DoLC.

,6 act. 99i.

me.

I y.:,"p

I40

'
1

'

PATROL DUTY.

6. veeaenger makes 6 r the highway and proceede ae rapidly a.:

poetaible. A boreeman, or, if available, a bicycliet would be utilized
at once to o o n v e y t h b important information to the proper ofticel.
.
with t h e b t practicsble delay.

dnsurers to No.IS.
1.. Three mtive and intelligent men are s e n t to Gravel Hill
I
, with tibe mal prwmntione. T b e y ecrntioize the country carefully.
1
abd inibrm the commander at Section House No. 2 by meseago 01'
I
by dgnd whether any of t h e enemy are to be Been i n the valley
, of tbe river, and if 80, what p i t i o n e they occupy. Another small
'
party will reconnoiter towarde t h e right flank, east of the railroad.
1 a n d report on tho woode, railroad crossinge, roade, fordr, etc., cmt
and north of the 'railroad track, gradually working dong embankment. and onte, a n d tben down etream to t h e croesiup; of doublt.
ksak r o d over Suoker Brook. T h e commander of t h e main patrol
will move on t h e highway towards Booth'e Mill, aa emn m he ie ccr- t dn tbat no enemy i s i n a dangerous poeition likely to interfere with
t h e reconncriasenoe. H e notea carefully the ground to the right a n d
lelt, wndn indioidaale to donbtfnl p i n t a , cornparen the ground
with bin map, a n d f i l l n in detaile, or eketcbee a new map if necee&y.
Afbr M i v d at the small wood eest of Addieon h e waitR for
hie right &oh, -1
to come in, and for a preliminary exaininatioii
,oftbe viUrge b be completed. He utiliGes thie timo to make O U I
ord wad in bin preliminary report. The patrol on Gravel Hill hail
-better be ordered to remaio.there for careful observation of thc
elopes beyond the river.
I
8. Whether t h e march of 'the lateral columna would bo facili
tded or impeded. Whether t h e road is lined with, trees or hedge.
and of what kind they are (also beigbt and deneity). Lateral
dit&-,
their width, depth, wet or d r y ; whether they can LM, ,
chmaed. Good defensive p i t i o n e near the road.
. 3. Qenend mttlation in the,terrain; whether it ( t h e village
commaadg the lfound to t h e front and flanke; whether the grountl
ie open rod tbe view unobetrncted, and to whet extent i t ie practi
acrblehrkoopa
Ita fbrm: Whether within P eingle wall, or consisting of inn

Lstederoluaree.

T b e r d b ,Whether oonnected and forming oncloauree; whetbei

of brhk or of &ne; their height, tbickneea, condition, tower..
kr h o k i n g are. The height, tbickneee, and elopee of
mmp?vu, 4tbe aoadition of difches and bedgee are aleo required.
--la

%Uigng Ddachmt.

uomon.

Patrol, Co. " D," 20

Inf.

Addison.

' P a l e

16 oct.'97.

nu.
10 ~

.m.

5 . The bearer of the meaaage ehoold proceed ae rapidly ae

1 msible on the- highway.

Y'
L-.

Anatom8 to

No. 16.

1. A prollle ie the repreeeqytion, i n outline, of a suppoaod w r

tical eection of a portion of terrain ; it is intended to exhibit clearl?
I
I

I
1

I
!

!
I

PA TROL .&UT Y.

PATROL DUTY.

142

t h e carvatom of t h e earthe eurfuce, known aa billa, valleye, elopc4

pl~bine,e&., in the ground under coneideration.
2. Elevation8 a m of importance in aaording good pbinte of
view and oommanding poeitione for artillery a n d tong-range infuntry fire; tbey elm mrve to ecroen the march of bodies of trOOph
and t b e reveree e l o p e often afford cover for tt-oope i n rear of t h c
$ring line. Depreesione also, tboagh i n a lees degree, a r e utilizeti
i n tbe concealment of t m p ~ led
, horees, ctc., to obtain cover foi
reeervea on t h e defpneive, and to facilitabe approach to the enemy +
line on the ofleneive. Slopes and plaine a r e of material importance
in determining t h e practicability of t h e ground for troop8 of thc
qhwe m e , and in aeoertaining tho character of the field of fire.
3: By meane of a profile we eball be able to ascertain whether
from an ieeumed position, all p i n t a 00 t h e earthe eurface in a cer
tsin direction ( t b a t of t h e profile) up to the limit of vieion 9 1 1 br
88811, O r a b e t h e r , on i c c o u n t o f elevation6 or depressione, certaiii
portion8 are hidden, and would therefore afford cover to the enemy
to 8 greater or)eee exlont, wbicb also cao be determined from t l i c
pro6le. By neing two or more pm6lee we can dotermine not onlj
t b e depth, but also the widtb of t h e ground screened from our view
By restricting oar obaervations to the extremo profituble range of
modern weapon8 we determine tbe same factom with reference to
tbe 6eld of fire. Spacee within the range of firerrme in wbicli
troop a n not be m e n Qn
aount of intervoning feature8 of tlw
6
line drawn
called *deud spaces. I n auch ~ 8 8 a~straight
pond
from tbe position of t h e obeer er to t h e euppowd poeition of t h c
enemy woald cut t h e proale of the intervening Kround.
4. From t h e woods on top of Birch Hill looking west to thv
limit of the map, we b a r e a coocave dope. It ie evident t h a t froin
the top of t h e hill we can e m nnd brioK under tire all p o i n t a of t h v
dope to bbe wed, except the portion weat of Beekman Woods. I1
w e know the height of the troee, t h e width of t h e covered apact
we& of h k m a n Wood8 can be determined from the profile. Frorii
Beeknun r e can ale0 eee all p i n t a of the elope to the top of Birch
Hill,
5. From the cmea m a d e on h e x Hill to the ground at the
&em end, of t h e Youngtown-Charlotte road, there ia 8 c o n w \
do*. Tbe bigb ground 00 York Hill wonld ecreen Charlotte ari I

ricinity from view.

143

It i8 evident that an enemy could assemble bie

top of York Hill

witbont being expoeed to tire from E w x Hill. lnepection of a
map will generally unable ne to determine whether a elope ie convex
o r concave. When the contoure a r e close together at the top and
gradually bcconie farther apart t o w a r d s t h e bottom, tbe dope ia
c,)ncave; when the contoure a r e fur apart at the top and there a r e
Itiacee whcrc they are close together towards the bottom, tbe elope
i- convex, and consequently will present dead epaces. I n doubtful
c . t i e e draw a profile.
ti. Tlic crest, or actual crest, of an elevation ia marked by u
liiie joining the aummib of profiles pnrnllel to the direction of firu.
O n oppowite sidea of he rrcet water will Bow i n oppoaite direckione.
rtoops near Charlotte and advance almost to the

The military crest, which very ueldom coincidee with the actual
but generally is found below it, ie marked by the line joining
the highest pointn on profiles parallel to the propoeed directioo of
tire from which all, or neurly all, of the dopee below can be men
and brought under 6re.
7. Orange River, northweet; Onion River, northeast; Sockor
Brook, general course, north, etc.
8. Swanton .weald not be vieible. A cborch nbeple over
seventy feet h i g h would project above t h e tops of the trees. From
a position on Gravel Hill near t h e Sand Pita t h e roofs of houeoe i n
Swanton could be Been through t h e g a p io the wooda made by the
Smnnton-Fays Cornere road.

uiet,

EXAMPLES OF EXERCISE8 IN THE TERRAIN.

(seemap of nnrthsrn podon or Port Lrrsnronb rasrr.uOo pnbllrbsd In C A V A L ~ Y
J o r R N A L lot Jnnb, 18111.

PATROLLING.

Exerehe No.3.
A Brown force encamped near t h e Taylor whmi house has orders
t o blow u p the treatlee a n d dumage the milroad n o r t b of Fort Leaveriworth under cover of darkoees. Small putrola ore mot out about
two houm before eunaet to eetablieh the route to be followed by tbe
night detachmat.
Orders for Patrol Leader B .
1. From a poeition a b o u t 100 yard6 s o u t b of fork6 of road juet
of Point Lookout proceed iiortbeuat until arrival o a r railroad.
Look for treatlee ( s o u t h .of Weeton Crowing) and select the beet
liiiu of approach thereto under cover.
6

.d

PATROL DUTY.

144

8. Betorn over Beme mute to s t a r t i n g point.

3. Aibr darkneee bse eet i n c o n d a c t d e w - m e n t o v e r rout,

~l0OtUl.
CAVALBY P?TBoLB.

aEercisc No.a.

A 50- of Brown cavalry bas arrived at Kickapoo with ordcrto d l m t forage there for .use of t h e a r m y .
Small ptrole are seat out io vsrione directions to locate tht.
&rage 8nd report on t h e mqet convenient roade for ite t r r n e p o r

tation.
4
Ordm to Patrol Leader A .
E a r n i n e the large f a r m i o t h e bend of t h e Miaeouri River nortl)
of Fort Leavennortb, and eubmit a report (on mewage blank)
sbowing tbe amount, kind, quality, a n d location of accumnlatione of
tbrryl~poa may Bnd. %port also upon w h a t roade tho fortrgc
sbodd be baaled; a sketch SbowioR location of forage a n d t h e r o d thereto, oonaectinq; with some well defined feature in t h e m a p i n
yoar potmedon will also be required.

W:
From

t h e point w h e r e Millwood Rord croaaee western

boaodary o f reservation.

TIIE SUPPLY O F SM.lLL ARM .l!dJlUSITlOS TO THOOI'S

IN THE FIELD.
BY SecoSD L I E L ' T E ~ A SGEORGE
T
D. GI'YER. SIXTEESTIII S F . ~ S T H Y .
-Toute la guerre tlent deux mob: du pain et de 1. poudre"
STATEMENT OF THE OENEBAL PBINCIPAL OF S1;PI'LY.

r 1HE

first g r e a t principle which niodern expcriencc hae poiiitctl

o u t , is t h e d i r k i o n of t h e whole eubject ot' r u p p l y i n t o two
great branchcs: First, T h a t which works in t h e r e a r of t h e a r m y ;
Swond, T h a t which accompanies t h e a r m y . T h i s applies to all
ptcires, as amniuriitioii, o r d n a n c e , *ubsi.*tence :ind q i i u r t e r m a ~ t e r
*tore@. The function of t h e firnt i n to look nftcr : i r i d forward 8torcs
m:i*Red i n large depotn or magazines. The furiction of t h e eccond ie
11) bring u p t h e #upplies from these advanccd mttL[:izinee or depots t o
t l ~ rarmy. It i e munife8t t b a t t h e servicc i n rear may be Ycmi-civil,
w h i l e tliat in f r o n t must be performed by bodicbs h a r i n g a m i l i t a r y
organization.
T h e working oirt of thie first great principle ha5 b r o u g h t a b o u t
the following organization :
1st. T h e g e n e r a l t r a m p o r t w o r k i n g along the line8 of c o m m u nication from t h e baRe to t h e most advanced rnagazinen. T h i s t r a n s port from ita i n t e r i o r poeition may often be made o v e r m i l r o a d 8 or
waterways. A l l magazines contain a q r c a t reservo of a m m u n i t i o n .
2d. D e p a r t m e n t a l t r a n s p o r t s , which c o n v t y t h e w p p l i e n from
thc advanced magazines to t h e a r m y . With r e f e r m c to t h e a m munition s u p p l y t h e y a r e k n o w n as o r d n a n c e trains, a r m y c o r p s
parks, etc.
3d. T h e regimental or a r m y trannports which follow t h e a r m y
and obtain t b e i r supplier from t h e d e p a r t m e n t a l t r a n s p o r t s . I n
this case choy are k n o w n a* a m m u n i t i o n columns, regimental wagon
train.
T h e first principal of upp ply. therefore, ia clear e n o u g h ; t h c
fighting troope i n h a t t l e niunt h a v e full pouches or b e l t s ; t h e first
reserve (regimentnl wagono) milst ~ e to
c ttiie, while each ochelon i n
r w r sappliea t h e deficiencies of thoae in front.

,
.b

SMALL A R M AMMUNITION.

146

A11 military powere have about the eamo

idea8 und cmploy tils,

eame meane, ae:

EN~LAND
:
1. By the aoldier.
2. By battalion baggage wagona, a m m u n i t i o n cart*, pack

11111

male.
3. By a m m u n i t i o n columns.
4. By army corps a m m u n i t i o n columns.
GEEMANY
:
1. By t h e soldier.
2. By tbe company baggage a n d ammunition wagor18.

(?)
(b)

to

FBANCE:
By t h e eoldier.

2.. By battalion a m m u n i t i o n wagons.

3. By ammuoition parke.
RUESIA
:
1. By the soldier.
2. By battalion a n d r e g i m e n t a l carts.
3.

By 6eld a m m u n i t i o n parks.

The total upp ply of a m m u n i t i o n available t o a n a r m y will, then..

fore, be stored or carried :
1. By t h e soldier.

2.

By regimental wagons or carts.

3. By a m m u n i t i o n columns.
4. By a m m u n i t i o n parks or o r d s n n c e trains.
6.

Bymagazinea.

'

5 t h . Echelon.
YAOAZl NEt3.
4

When, circametancee oompel U A to m a k e preparation for actiro

war operatione, t h e 6ret measure which d e m a n d s a t t e n t i o n ie til,.
eelection of a eaitable baee. Here depotu are formed to receive vi1.t
arnouote of warlike etoree opon which tbe a r m y munt m o r e or IC-.
depend daring the couree of t h e wur. As t h e troops p e n e t r a t e inla)
the enemy's coontry, a r r a n g e m e n t e m u s t be m a d e for mottiodicnllv
p u h i n g op large q u a n t i t i e s of tbeee rdeonrces within eaay reach
the combatanta
All p h o n the linea of oommaoicatioos i n which tlleeo reservt
are colleoted are called rnegacinee.

1. Base Magmines, those oetablishcti a t tho bneo o f operationn.

2. Intermediate Magazines, chiefly intended to facilitate t h o
gmdurrl tranefer o f t h e reserves from t h e front to t h e rear.
8. Advance Magazines, or d e p o t s ; t h e m art) t h o nearest m a g a zinen to t h o combatants, a n d o n which t h e y m u s t p r i m a r i l y depend.
T h i m g r a d u a l l y a d v a n c i n g of o u r reaorvee ia a v e r y rational proceeding a n d offem several v e r y i m p o r t a n t a d v m t a g o s :
I t prevente a n e m b a r r a s s i n g accumulation of article8 i n o n e

locality.

3. By a m m u n i t i o n columns.
4. By an a r m y park.

1.

They are generally classified a8 :

I t facilitates t h e i r transmiasion, for one tiiagnzirio passes o n

t h e n e x t w h a t ie needed to k e e p i t a ntock from falling low.

(c) It limit8 tho lose which would accrue by the cspturc ot'riny
one of them.
(d) P a r t i e s m o v i n g back a n d forth w i l l experience n o difflculty
i n o b t a i n i n g eupplien.
( e ) Should t h e nrmy be forced to retire, t h e troopa g r a d u a l l y
fall back o n their resourcee.
T h e object of all magazines on t h e line of' communication ie t h o
w m e , t h e ditferent namee t h e y bear are simply uacd to indicate t h e i r
position nnd relative importance.
Base .tfagarines.-r%i6 magazines aro f r e q w i i t l y fortn or fortified
places.
Intermediate ~ulla=ines.-Intermediate magszinoe a r e also fortilied placee. T h e y c a n n o t well be diepensod with, even when a
railroad line i n a r a i l a b l e , a e i n case of willful d a m a g e or accid e n t to h e line t h e troops in f r o n t m i g h t be c u t off from t h e i r
nearest source of supplies, poesibly for eeveral days.
Advance Magnrines.-The a d v a n c e depots a r e , as n rule, twenty,five to t h i r t y miles ib rear of t h e combatants. T h i s exprosees w h a t
is deeirable, t a t h e r t h a n w h a t is a l w a y s obtainable. An t h o troops
niove forward, new' advanced magazines muet be locatod, while t h e
bane a n d i n t e r m e d i a t e magazine8 remain s t a t i o n a r y .
P r u d e n c e ticmanda t h a t we should not place t h e a d v a n c e mnguzines i n a too forward position, yet we should facilitate t h e e u p p l y
to t h e troops by locating t h e m at a convenient distnnco from the
front.
HAOAZINE B U I L D I N O I .

T h e tjtructuree bent a d a p t e d for magazinee are large, d r y , well

aired o n e - s t o r y buildinge, ae f r e i g h t houeee, m a r k e t buildings, otc.
The varioun article8 m u s t be Atacked i n separate piles, with p l e n t y
of room between each pile i n which to work.

..
1

148

SMALL A R M AMMUNITION.
Position, Personnel and Duties.--Tbe

S3fAL.L ARM AMMt!rNlTIOS.

iignify to w h a t e x t e n t the park hae to suffer; a perfect park ia ueeless unless t h e columns, in front are supplied. The replenishment
of t h e p a r k m u s t come from the rear. a n d not be secured b y t h e
*ncrifice of t h e troops in front.

lose of any magazine, b u t

aboveall, bhoeecontainiog warlike storea, will be aeverely felt by t h e

army. T h e y m a e t be well defended b y having an adequate g u a r d ,

and ehoald occupy a s t r o n g position. T h e advanced magazine
reqairee to be guarded with greator jealouay than the rest, for i t i s
more exposed. a n d ie the p r i m a r y Rource of s u p p l y to t h e troop.
T h e ordnuoae atores at each magtrzinu a? usually in charge of
ab o r d n a y ~oacer, there beilig a senior ordnance store officer iri
charge over ail. Thie senior olficer is oiie of the principal aclminietrative aeeietante of t h e general in charge of t h e lines of cornmunication, takes hie ordere from him, iind supervieeo t h e custody,
tranemieeion, a n d ieeae of all p i l i w y stores.
H e muet eee t h o t t h e reeerves are paeeed o n in time, a n d should
keep an wcarate record of all receipt8 a n d ieeuee from the commeoaement of t h e campaign.
4th.

3d.

Echelon.

AMMUNITION COLGMNS.

T h e ammunition column usually marched at t h e r e a r of t h e

main body though a p a r t m a y be with the wagon baggage train.
The column contains t h e ammunition for the artillery, a n d an extra
.;upply of 44.4 cartridges per rifle for t h e infantry. It is usually
tlivided i n t o sections, each section in charge of a n officer, and a n
artillery officer in command of all.
These section8 would preferably march in colnmn i n tne o r d e r
of t h e i r regiments or brigades.
the
Personnel of the Ammunition Column and Duties.-Ordinarily
personnel of t h e ammunition column Rhould be equivalent to t h a t
of t w o batteries.
Updn t a l t i n g before battle its commnndcr should at once repopt
its position to t h e chief of artillery a n d to t h e senior infaiitrj- cominandera.
Iasfies o f ammunition should, aa far a* possible, be noted in
writing, as :

Echelon.

AMMUNITION PARES OR ORDNANCE TRAINS.

T h i e echelon of eupply i s called b y various names, 118, nmmunition park, eecond e c h d o n a r m y corps park, ordnance train, anti
even incorrectly, ammunition column.
Tho aeoal dietinction between ammunition c o l u m n a n d %nim a n i t i o n park, i8, t h a t t h e ammunition column is protected by tlic
twpe i t euppliee mid accompauies, while t h e p a r k depeuds for
active protection apon a eeparate g u a r d or escort.
. The park is oeually divided i n t o sections in o r d e r to facilitate
t h e maroh. I n t h e Englieh army t h e p a r k baR five sections; t h c
$ret t h r e e being for the eopply of t h e t h r e e divisione, t h e fourth for
% t h ecorp troops, a n d t h e Bftb for t h e cnualry.
T h e different kinde of etorea are k e p t together, a n d t h e relative
poeition t h e y occupy i s baeod on rliu principle t h a t thow storea
come B r s t which will be needed first.
Paeonnel of tAe Amrnlrnrtion Park tcnd Uuties.-The men of the
ammanition park eboald be:%gularly enlisted, a n d would ordinarily
be thoee wbo were not e t r o n g enoagb to be in front d u e to e x b a a e t i o n Q c o n v 9 l m e n c y . Theue men being accnetomed to military
diecipline will be more emcient a n d truetworthy thnn memi-civilian
employew. W h e r e more t h a n ordnance etorem are present t h e offlcer
i n cbaiyp should be a n otticor of t h e general etaff unconiiected with
1 any adminirtrstive department.
T h e a m m a n i t i o n park replace8 all deficienciee in t h e amniuuition
wlamn. So long a~ t h e a m m a n i t i o n column ia complote i t does not

149

m.

Isued at.. ..............................

Time............................................

i
I

xraapl.

Rewired from Lt. D ......E ...........

in chaly(e of 5th division ammunition
Date ...............................................
colurnu two ammunition wagons,
TO oraltar of .... ..COI. A.. .... B ........... brnptete.
( Signer1 ),

Two ammunition yagons, complete.

S.

B.-Receircd
~
_
_

t a_b empty wagons.

T.SMITH,

Rcgf Ord. ,%gf.,

28th

Infy.

A n y system adopted, however, should be of t h e simplest poeaiblo

description, not demanding too much clerical labor in t h o field.
T h e r e must never be n n y delay from t h e ammunition colomn in
t h e upp ply to t h c f r o n t in caeeot need. It Reemsa+qoet unnecessary@
1 0 emphasize t h i o point, b u t a n y ot3lcer i o charge of a u n i t is a p t to
think firet of t h e 0faCienC~-ot his own command, a n d io tbie case
would neglect t h e only cause of hi8 existence, which i e to m a k e t h c
tigbtiug portion efficient.
After n battle reporte should b e sent in nhowing t h e a m o u n t of
:immunition required to re8etabliah the normal eupply.

I n the W a r of 1870-71, w h y a battle appeared i m m i o c n t , a telem was mnt to t b e advanOed magosinea w h e r e t b e reeerve a m -

m u n i t i o n w a s stored, to w a r n the ofllcer i n c h a r g e to prepare for a

convoy.
I m m e d i a t e l y t b e b a t t l e was over, w i t h b u t a g e n e r a l idea o f t h e
reqoiremeota, a second t e l e g r a m was m o t , o n receipt of whicb the
convoy was eent forward.

MANEUVEBINO OP THE THIBD AND FOUBTE ECEELONS.

Position and Management of the Ammunition Parks and Ammuni-

tion

Cdurnns.-Tbe
poeition a n d m a n a g e m e n t o f t h e a m m u n i t i o n
p a r k a n d a m m u n i t i o n column d e p e n d s upon t h e n a t u r e of t h e o p e r a t i o n s of t h e army it i s eupplying. Four cases a r i s e :
1. The normal poeition w i t h o u t fear o f immediate a t t a c k .
2. T b e nnpredneditated action.
3. T h e offensive action.
4. T b e defensive action.
l a . A defensive position t a k e n n p to meet a n a t t a c k in
which i t ie intended to fight to t h e laat.
46. T b e rear g u a r d action.

Case 1st. The NofmaZ Po8ifion.-Tbe ammunition column is i n

rear of t h e m a i n body; t b e a m m u n i t i o n p a r k ia a b o u t o n e d a y ' s
m a r c h , or mven to fifteen miles i n rear of t h c main bodF. I n action
t h e ammunition column would b e from 1,100 y a r d s to 1,600 y a r d s in
rear of t h e % r i n g line.
Case 9 d . T116 Unpremeditated Action.-The
normal position
would be m a i n t a i n e d 88 far .B possible, b u t m u c h m u s t be left to t h e
d e v e l o p m e n t of evente. It m i g b t be a d v a n t a g e o u s to increase t h e
normal dietaoces i n o r d e r to be well o u t of t h e w a y o f maneuvering troop and not to block t b e road i n case t h e troope w e r e d r i v e n
baok temporarily.
I n a dioieion t h e rear of the m a i n b o d y ie five to six miles* in
rear of t b e advance party. T b e p r e l i m i n a r y s t a g e s of t h e action
aeoally give ample time to make good any lost groond.
. caSe3d. The Ofkn8ive Action.--In which ai1 enemy i n Ruth n

* -

161

As tbe troops

in rear move forward tho upp ply of a m m u n i t i o n i n

a m m u n i t i o n column must move forward also in o r d e r to be n e a r
tile troops t h e y h a v e t o s u p p l y , otherwise t h e distances m a y become
~ ( J great.
O
T h e a r m r a m m u n i t i o n p a r k Ahould also close u p to one-half
(l:iy's m a r c h , b u t its position will probably be defined by t h e g e n e r a l
?
<.ommanding.
t!ie

Case 4th.

The Defensive P o s i t i o n . 4 n . A defeoeive position

r:tken u p to meet an a t t a c k in which i t is intended to fight to t h e

ht.

In t h i s case much c a n bo a r r a n g e d beforehand. E v e r y t h i n g deIbcnds upon m a i n t a i n i n g a conRtant controlled fire upon t h e enemy
tmrn t h e moment t h a t h i s column8 come i n t o s i g h t u p to hie final
attack. It is reasonable to suppose t h a t in a defensire position
tliere will be coyer near t h e fighting line for t h e a m m u n i t i o n car&.
Them c a r t e rhould be n e a r a rond to permit of escape i n rase of
retreat.
Troope o n t h e firing line can oflen be a m p l y a n d eontinuously
supplied from wmall t e m p o r a r y magazine*.*
Most authoritiew a g r e e t h a t the reserve amniunition c a r t s should
Ibc from 1,100 y a r d s to 1 . W O y a r d s in real. of t l i e f i r i n g l i n e .

poeitioo as "4s" is being systematically a t t a c k e d . A n attack p r e suppoaee & p r i o r i t y o n t h e part of t h e am6ailants, a n d thin will allow
t h e ammunition supply of t h e troops destined for the'ottack to be
cloee to them.

T h e object b e i n g to get q u i c k l y beyond s t r i k i n g dietance of t h e

r o e m y , all delays should be avoided. Therefore, c l e a r roads are
vssential a n d t h e a m m u n i t i o n p a r k t r a i n nhonld bo s e n t as far to

The army park can be a d r a n c o d t o within tive or nix. miles to

fwilitate t h e filling of t h o a m m u n i t i o n c a r t s i n front. AH the troope
:ire concentrated in f r o n t tlie ro:rde will be q u i t e clear.
If, however, a n y r e a r g u a r d position t i m been selected in case
of defeat t h e a m m u n i t i o n p a r k train Rhould be behind t h i s .
Case 4b. The Renr G t i n t d Action.-In ' t h e r n ~ eof a rear g u a r d
menaced b y a t t a c k all ammunition reRerve c a r t e ehould be with t h e
main body, preferably at ita head. If the regimental w a g o n s of t h e
troops of t h e rear g u a r d h a v e n o o p p o r t u n i t y d u r i n g a halt to refill
Itom t h e renerve w a g o n s (i. e., ammunition, column wagons), t h e n
home o f these w a g o n s should bo left behind'for t h e ' f i g h t i n g u n i t s at
some p o i n t s on t b e line of retreat. B a t t l e s a r e n o t money.aaving
institutions.
In u n d o u b t e d cases of need e v e v w a g o n , e v e n to t h e last o n e ,
h o n l d be loft w h e r e it could be m a d e available r a t h e r t h a n a single
company should r u n ont of a m m u n i t i o n .

.lbOPL*sL

S M A L L A R M AMMUNITION.

SMALL ARM AMMUNITION.

150

See BEACB'~
Field

En&. page 90.

'

S M A L L -4 RSf AJfNJfI S I T I O S .

SMALL ARM AMHUNTTION.

152

the rear aa possible 80 that it may riot impede the retreat or embar
rcuu, t b e

j p n e r a l i n commsnd by hie h a v i n g to take precaution8 fo.

ita safety.

Depots of meerve ummu ition can often be left at k n o w n place-

b2 9 .

. for t h e troop of t h e rear gu

Bhelon.

TEE BkGIY&TAL WAGON TBAIN.

Position of the Ammunition D a i n Normally.-The regimental nnimunition wagon t r a i n ehoold always murch in rear of its regiment
N o battalion or regiment o u g h t e v e r t h i n k of moving or going
into actiqn without i t s ammunition wagone. T h e drivers o f cacti
ebonld belong respectively to t h e companiew to which t h e wagonmay be regarded 88 assigned to, a n d they ehould also me88 with their
respective companies.
Who Hus Charge of the Train.-The
e n t i r c train, both on t h r
march a n d in action, i s u n d e r the Jharge of a regimental ordoauce t w q e a n t w h o superintends t h e issue of ammunition and t l i v
replenisbment of e m p t y wagone. He ehould be appointed and
practiced in his wcjrk i n t i m e bf peace a n d not detailed for tlie first
time in war.
Position ofthe Train in Action.-In action t h e rogimental wagon.
5
relhain aa n e a r t h e line aa poeaible.
Russian Regnlationa &ate: 348. IAB eoon ae a serious engagem e n t je foreeeen, or PE s o o n WI it comrnencoe, the commanding
oflwre of t h e principal units o r d e r u p t h e ammunition sectione ant1
push t h e m forward aa far aa tliu 6eld of battle iteelf. 349. As EOOII
aa troops are to move forward into action, t h o content8 of t h e cart
r i d g e w l y o n e are to be diatributed a m o n g t h e men. T h e cartridgc
wagons, attar being replenished, are to t a k e a slieltercd poaitioli
88 cloee to t h e i r units, a n d bebind them, aa poaeible. I n urgent
-8
t h e wugooe are pushed forward irreepective of loeeee, to t l i , .
v e r y v e r g e of t h e firing line.
T h e imrnenae importance of having
O A L L , M OTactioe:
~~~~
8 eupply within eaey distance of t h e fighting line will juntify gre:it
rich b e i n g incurred io g a i n i n g such a poeition.
+

let.

Echelon.

BY TEE SOLDIE&

The burden horae by a noldier ia logically divided i n t o twII

dietioct and independent parte :
B

1st.

163

Tboac ~Iiiiqpn1iic.b rclatc tu sccuriirg his Ileultti and

COUI-

iiirt.

2d. Those which relate to his fiinction

:IS :i

fighting machine.

The t w o arc correlntire i i n d alternirte i n tlicir iniportance, beariig in u c b t h e w i n e r c - l n t i t p i i to cacli o t l i t * i * t h a t itifbriii:Ltion does to

.tscurity, or tactica to organization.

I n battle t h e second reigns auprenic. but :It o t h e r tiiiica tlie Brst
i of momentous consideration.
I f man had tlic necessary cntlursnce, tlie q r i c n t i o i i of subsistence
:,nd ammunition supldies W O U I ~ be rnucli siiiiplifictl, for w e coutd
\
t,stimate t h e maxinium q u a n t i t y of eactlr rcquired. nnd let hiin cnrry
tliem.
But t h e phy-riical limitations of ni:in compel u s to tletcrmine tlie
createst weight lie can carry ani1 riot I)rchak d o w n , arid tRcn apportion t h e load EO t h a t he may m:iint:iin t h e first a n d fulfill the secalnd. I f there a r e portions still rcninininp. but :ib?iolutclg necoy.:iry, we must introduce an indiwpensnblc eril-the wagon train.
We cannot wisely pliice upon tlic soldier t l i e entire :irniament
K C shou1.d wish h i n i to h u r e i n battle, and then f i l l out hiH pack to
(lie maximum weight with rations alii1 clotliiiig. For t h e g r e a t e r
1l:irt of his career i n t h e tield ili spent i n strategicnl and tactical
rnovements, attended with exposure. privation arid h a r d s l i i p .
T h e loeaes from fcver, hiingcr and want tiir outweigh those of
the battlefield. To p r c r e n t these losses is one of tlie most i m p t:rnt queetions of the art of war. for 113 war is t h e a r t ot being
.trongeRt a t a n y given place, t h a t portion of tlie a r t of w a r t h a t
keeps t h e greatest number of i i w n i i i t h e r a n k s is surely not to be
tlcspised.
S a y s General DE BRACK: & * I trequirt-s iiiorc s k i l l t o keep inen
i n condition to fight t h i t i i to conduct t h e tiglit.
FREDERICK
T H E GREATOt)-riCI.FC(I W :ill i l X i O l l l tll:it IlUllgS1. Would
rubdue a miin more thorougtilx tlinn t h e coiiriigc of l i i R :iilvcrsnry.
For every tboiixlit n gencrnl l i c s t o ~ von
~ l i i s c.ilcniy lie bcatoas
ovo on his E U P ~ qI x~ t e m .
T h i s a r t o f b e i n g etroiigert H I H O requires iiiol~iliiy,:I qrinliticirtion
i l f g r e a t e r importance that1 foimerly.
I t is cvidcnt that 11s t h e
yiiccese of etrategy is mainly dcpcndent I ~ I Iaccuriite i*tllculation ot
t l ~ epowers of marching, t h e nioat brilli:iilt conccptiona a i d inolit
Irofound combinationa must fail if t h e troops do not m o r e over the
tlistances calculrrted on and d not o c c u p ~ttic prewribed poRitioiin
ta) each
- _ _ other.*
.8ee The Pnoco-German War-

hmvy pack.

~)ORLWACU+.p. i x .

French delwt due

w l o d of

SMALL A R M A MiU UNITION.

154

Ooe of t h e chief caueee t h a t impede t h e q p i d movement of

i n f a n t r y i e h e a v y burdens. I n e s t i m a t i n g t h e m a x i m u m load a n d
ita p r o p o r t i o n a t e diviaiona we must,therefore consider t h e t w o aider.
of the qoeetioo eimultaneonely. .
4
. Hence t h e questione arise:
l e t . W h a t n u m b e r o f r o u n d s should a eoldior ordinarily c a r r y .
of neceseity r e g a r d i n g h i a total b u r d e n ?
2d. W h a t n u m b e r of r o u n d s should h e b e g i v e n upon going
ioto b a t t l e ?

BSl'IMATION OF N U Y B E S OF ROUNDS ORDINARILY CARRIED, WITH REQARP

TO E18 TOTAL BURDEN.

T h e load c a r r i e d by moldier8 of o t h e r a r m i e s is:

Austria ...................................................
France ...................................................
Rueeia ...................................................
England ..................................................
Germany ..........................................................

56 pounds

E x p e r i m e n t s i n G e r m a n y i n September, 1895, s h o w t h a t sixt>pounde* in a b o u t t h e mnxilnunl w e i g h t t h a t a soldier can carry w i t h oat serioos i n j u r y .

It wm oleo foond t h a t a load which could be c a r r i e d w h e n t h e
temperature wae 60, o v e r a distanco of twenty-five milee, would if'
carried w h e n t h e t e m p e r a t u r e wae higher, h a v e a t e m p o r a r y bail
effect. Hence we will eetimste t h e load lor over 60' F a h r e n h e i t .
We m u 8 t . a l e o m a k e t h e w e i g h t of t h e i r p a c k e o low t h a t w e
hay feel reaeonably s u r e t h a t U n i t e d S t a k e moldiere-regnlrrr*.
volunteer@a n d militiamen-will
k e e p i t w i t h t h e m a n d not t h r o w
i t away.
T h i e requirea jndiciou8 selection on oar part a n d education a n d
inetruction on theirs. I n o u r service an outfit deemed neceaeary
for field Bervice ie as follows: .

'

............ ..............................................
1 rubber r h o..............................................
1 half ehe ter tent .................. .: ................................
1 ovenan& ...............................................................
& pair ehaea ...................................................
1 a k e map................ ..
..............................

2 blankets

Pound..

weight,
"
"

1 pair trouBer6....................................................

,,
I

I ehirt. ................................................................
1 pair drawera. ................................................
................................................
1 pair no&1 towel ..A. .......................................................
1 blanket peg ................................................

-1'7.IX,
.."

18.50

5.00

"
"
"

''

3
1

...
...

...
2

51
4tji.
.;til.

:i.;ti

"....

2..-,4

14 I:. 4

:w.>
........

2.4)

T ~ ~ ~ a b o......................................
ut.
.! ........................32.6 pounl Id

The haversack. meat can, knife, fork, spoon, 3 dayP' rations ... ! 8 . 0 pounds
Rifle, bayonet, field belt, scabbard: ....................................
12.3 pounds
Canteen filled and cup.............................................
1.5 pountls
Ammunition, 100 rounds ..........................................
ti.0 pound@
Total .......................................................................

ti4.3 pounde

This doee n o t include t h e weight ot' ttle clotliing on him a n d

itividentals, a1 pocket knife. p i p . t o h c c o . i n o i i c y , etc., which would
ni;tke t h o total n e a r e r seventy pounds. I t is criclent t b n t it is o u t
of t h e que8tion for men b e a r i n g aucli a loid t o rnake rapid or long
i1i:irches. In E u r o p e w h e r e t h e roads arc brobd :it111 smooth a n d
a~llshaded, a n d w h e r e for a good p a r t ot' the year t h e troops a r e
&lily exercised in heavy m a r c h i n g order, i l l tictire w r v i c e inarclies
fntm fourteen to eighteen mile8 p c r tl:iy a r e made. B u t the speed
is *low a n d when rapid inarching beconier neceaa:iry the knapsackA
arc' left behind. In w a r on such occaisions t h e y are grncriilly lout.
A eoldier cau. without further e x p e n d i t u r e of force: cover a di9tniico o n e - t h i r d longer t h a n u n d e r o r d i n a r y conditions whcn u n burdened with a pack.

In t h e Civil W a r the trtmpe on both *idc* were supplied with

knspencke, y e t in t h o second p a r of tlic w i r II kntips:ick w a s r a r e l y .
~ e t ' ni n t h e field except in t h e ncw rcgiiiientta tliut had not y e t done
anj- marching. T h e first Confederate troops orgatiize<l sbuodonetl
thc knapeacke ae soon as t h e y got into tlic tield ant1 began t o march,
and at n o t i m e did they carry the loada us borne by,the Union
eoldiers. D u r i n g t h e last years of t h e war GRAST'Sa n d S~AERHAN'R
troops marched without a n y load e x c e p t t h e b l a n k e t roll, rifle nnti
aiiimunition.
O t h e r nations h a v e had the same exprricnce. G R E E H Es t a t e s :
,.From t h e t i m e t h e movement w a s well uticicv way (lifter t h e fhll
of P l e r n a ) t h e meu never snw tlirir kn:ipsackrr, which reni:rined
north of t h e B a l k a n e til! some t i m e alter the armistice."

(hrnrP>.

10

...

?,I,

We k n o w that f u t u r e w a r s must be of short dutwtion and t h a t

m a g n i t u d e of the forces t h a t will be lwought into
acll ae t h e r a p i d i t y of movement now intli*lwn*;iblc i l l
opcratioo8, require a smaller pack t h a n e v c r .
ttic

itic
it11

field, as
niilit:rry

Enough h a s been cited to sliow t h a t :

T h e total wei@t borne muat be w n i e l l .
( . b ) T h e pack must contain only a r t i c l w of' vital riecesRity.
( c ) T h a t if too heary t h e Roldier will liglitcn the pack by tllrowirig thing8 a w a y and will not always t l i ~ c a r djudiciously.
10)

.Or onethM hb w d g k A n n a 'Report,1896, Illmnm. p.gc 4, Docnmeat L

. .

SMALL A R M AMMLTNITION.

156

SMALL A R M ~ N L ' A ~ x l x u s .

.Y

T h e following pack ia auyyoated :

r;

1 blanket.

.........................................................
............................

powdr.

weight,

......

ti

.....

...

...
r trousers ..........................
,1 campaign bat ........................................................
*

Total weight about .....................................................

0uru.r.

1
1
3

...

.....
9:Y)
14:4
n.4)

:%:I4

......

4.110
4 XI

52 pounola

No dietinction ie made as t o whether the weight is carried i'r

worn on him, for i t must i n either'Cas5,Ee liftecl, at each step.
It will also be noticid that, but fifty cartridgee a r e carried i i i
the belt. Ttiia eeems to be autborized by the recent and growing
change in opinion on hhia k?bject.
Ae before stated when not engaged in battle the eoldier's C O I I a healtby a n d hardy animal must be first considered atid
dition
hie deetiny as a fighting machino or unit put second.
A battle of any magnitude ae between corps (which on a single
road occapiee a length ot' fitteen miles) would take one day's rnarc,li
If tbe aervice of aecurity a n d infornia.
to extend i n lino of battle.
Cion ha8 been properly performed a surpriee ehould be impomible, a i d
therefore ample time is always found i n which to fill outI\tile amiiiu
u y i o n eopply of eacb sbldier to t h a t required in the aolution of I I I ~ .
most diflcult caeo-the frontal attack acting on the offenaive.

*The overcont hu oftqn been d l # p e a d wltb by udng the blanket Indlan d o n or u

a shawl. Tbh m done o o a d o l u l l y daring the Clvll War and thorn perrnltted an cstn
blanket bdng d e d . IWAYIn " Prbonen of W u ; ' demcrlbem the A r m y of the Potomac l o
u# taking pp i m n u c h towud BIchmond: " h e w mmn pat M Ilttle bnrden upon hlmrell
m# p0rlhlQ.nothlng that he could do rlthoor If noe had8 preferenm for a blankel
be lelr behlnd 6L orencvLor If the overcoat WM thought Indbpen&Ae the b h k c l vu
cluorn 00%''
tTas -n
.Inmlnnm fleld mesa k1t (reA o y and Yaw# J o u n ~ a lMag
.
'23. I*.)
r..m
prLr annm a t a.
Un cup. knlfe. fork. and mpoon In one can.-rered
cornL..re!
6W.7XrsX Inohen. WeiqhL empty. 8 5 pound.: r a l g b t of the artlclea I t .lis.
pwoel.
p W &om& 0 poandm ; -In of 2.6 pound&
:QUI@
h l r aotrenchlng tool can be formed rlth the knlfe. bayonet and meat a n .
8 Eome'a Fled6 of Yodm Tactla: " X i hrgm bodla of Iroop. M to be fed In the t i * . l d ,
they m d v m U o M wlth thm wd the mUoM ooMU!Uad during the day m u ( be rephod
by the tmln d d a g tbe night. #ot h t the men dull move off the nfut day alth the wmc
nmmbw ol Ir(l0l.I prsrlouly. BOld1em if tbw u e not to rntuvo. m M c u q ~ U O M . "
,
.
I

15;

This reduction to fifty cartridges is simply a separation of t h e

phasoa and making each predominate i n i t a ow11 sphl.rc, :rltllt)ugh tho field belt should h a w capacity tor 1 0 0 n ) u i i d ? as at preaC'I I obtains i n the United States army.
The Germans have reduced by thirty the riuinbcr that IIUA
11. retofore been considered necossary.
M A W E states: . ; I t cannot be thought ot'with the prcwrit : i m n l u 11 lion to m a k e the nien always carry t h e f u l l aupl~ly
neccs.;ary n o w a4i:iys (100 to 120 rounds a t Icast) i t h e I i u ~ I s oto carry his rifle.
k i l n p a c k and contents, overcoat, clothing. cntrcncliirlg tool. bayonet,
witer and food. The problem to be nolv-ed is Ilnw to incrctrPc the
wl)ply of ammunition carried b y each soldier o f t l i r attacking t r o o p
(jiibt before attack) without increasing h i s load durin,g n1:irclics arid
01 le ra tions."
If the commander of the aoldier takcs the offensive. the assumpof the offensive allows a choice of t iJm e . uwu:rlly o f Iwginninfi
i R , permits of t i m e to supply t h c full :rriiourlt dwmed
nciion-that
nct:es*ary. If the army is obliged to hnntily DRAUIIIC tlie defensive,
t l i c stationary character of the fight permits aniniuriition to be e:isiIy
supplied. Fifty roundn per man with the great tlctetisire p)w-er of
tlic new rifle, would seem, therefore. ample to begin with.
This di.scus8ion applie8 to troops of the m:iin tmiy. not to those
of rear guards, adranco guards, otc., which should of tour-e have a
h c l t full.
trio

tilbn

WIIAT NUMBER

O F R O U N D S S H O C L D H E O l V E S T I I E S O L I ) I E R CI'CIN O O l N O

INTO B A T T L E ?

Whatever may be decided concerning the numbcr of rounds to

ordinarily carried by t h e soldier, i t is unqninlously aqrccd that
tlic number which can be suppliod him should be within his reach
atit1 Rufflcient to enable h i m to do a n y work required.
Food may be obtained by requisition, but ammunition cannot.
.i wldier may be hungry and yet fight, but A soldier without arninunirion is helpless and useleer.
he

B.\-Is

OF

CO.PlP'urATIO?r

FOR O B T A l N I N O T H E M A X I M U M

NUSIBER

OF

ROUNDS P E B R I F L E REQUIRED UPON GOING INTO B A T T L E .

T h e eRtimste must not be for the avertlge, but for the maxiexpenditure in one day.
'1. The numhcr must tic deduced tlieoretic~:rlly.fi)irrideti o n ?iounci
Iwiiriplcn. The c n n d i t i o n a of modern wnrs due to the change i n
1.

miiiii

F'
YT

. .
168

,.

Shf-4 I, I, A it M r l M H I -.\-I

S H A L L A R M ,lMML'.VITIO.V.

;r

fir0 tactics and urmament are so diferent that the experieiiccs

TEEOBETICAL EBTVATION OF TEE YAXIXUY N U M B E R OF ROUND*

Wbetber tbe force be a brigade, division or corps, the battaliim

is the tactical unit. Tberefore the battalion ia tbe u n i t which w e
mast study to supply with suficient ammunition to onable it to
accomplish ita purpose.
.O
*A regiment may be formed for attack i r i two or tlirec line-,
according to the nature of the attack and the front to be occupied
If formed in two lines the first lin consist8 of two batLalioii3
and the eeeond of one. If formed i n t h r e lineaeacti line consist* 01
one battalion. Three lines niay be considered as the normal fornirtion of atregiment.
8

Just before entering tbe firnt zone of artillery fire (3,000 yard3 I
the regiment is formed front into line i n three lines.: Tlic objvct
of the w o o d lino is principally for shock action or to carry the
first line to final amault which it joins during rapid fire actitit]
Tbie reiinforcement may not be necessary if the reservos of the fir31
liao are entlicierit.
'If 6re be opened buyorid 1,000 yard6 from the objective it will
be nuder peculiar circumstance8 atid need n o t be considered.
a4To m a t quealloar ablcb may be asked on nny mlllmrg subject we can turn for an
-er

to the experlenoer of many wan lor e r n e nnilwoun OUB: from these correct deduc

UOM my be formed. provided wu mu jirdge wblvlr slde Ls supporled by the welglit 01

!'

avidand ab0 ae c l a r l p the locrl clrcumet8nca cawlug SUor hllure. In tbt

prment
're hnve llttle or no expcrlencr In war to refer to. a c e fire d k l p l l n e . amiiiiinl
Mor d a m n r mnd parb Y at p m e n t ma.titnted nre nltogether new lnveotloos. called I U ~ I
-to
meet the dlmeulty of rupplylnq tmopm expending uowulnys enormous qiranri

tlsr or .mmanltlon."
tCompmy omown bg expldoing nnd rnlnlng tbelr men thoroughly In fire dlseir*:ini
.od tbe -on
of dlr(.nea can do much tu help solve tbe ammuultloa queatioti A I
nnllmltedmpplyof ammualrloa I s not tbecntln problem.
tesS orgnlptloo and Twrlrr. pama In and 1s.

13'9

Such fire will no doubt be "fire of position" and does not coo-

tJf

paat w a n are of little help.*

3. The number fired mu& be within t h e limit of physical ~ - I I durance of t h e mldier.
4. Tbe possibility of the troops being engaged for several WII
eecutive days must be considered.
5. Secondary causes which affect the expenditure of ammuilltio n .
(a) Lack of due artillery preparation, which conipela loti;r a n g e 6ring.
( b ) Lack of fire diacipline, which eauaes waste a t all rnnyun.
(c) Nature of the fire tactics employed.

TI os.

.-c)ruthe consumption of trmmuuition by t b c firing l i n e .

By "fireof position"is meant long range fire (1

to 1.001)y:irdR)
<.secuted by stationary troops abundantly supplic.d w i t h ilinrnurii.
:ion for the purpose of facilitating the advance of thc troops of tlic
:1ssault.

Beyond 1,500 yards no infantry fire should be uwcl -this ~ l i o u l d

180

l e f t to t h e artillery.

I t should be the object of tbe aeeailalltH to reach a s rvpilily :is

Ibossible a poeiiion from which really cfEcacioti* tirc c:in bc opciicd.
The objections to firing beyond 1,000 ylirds arc :
1. DitEculty of estimating tbe range.
2. Limitation of vision.
3. Results not commensurate with the ainount of urnmunition
,.xpended.

If the value of fire bc t a k e n a a unity s t 5 0 0 y a r d s i n oriicr to

produce the same effect at 1,200 yards. ten times as m u c l l aiiiniunition and a t 1,iOO yarda tbirty times ne much a n i n i u n i t i o n m u s t be
wed.
To meet any pomibilitg of firing being uilrrvoid:tble bctwecn
1.000 yards and 1.500 yards, it ia recommended t o give these troops
Ileatined for the attack (the first line) two belts of 1 0 0 rounds cuch
i n addition to tbe fifty roundn they ordinarily carry.
From 1,000 yards to 600 yards tbe ndrancc niay bc taken a t 40
Fards per minute:or 1.3 miles per hour.* This advance of 400
yards will therefore take t e n minutes; a l l o w i n g t w o a h o ~ s per
rliinute, twenty rounds will be expended.
From 600 yards to P O 0 yarda the advance will hnrc to bo by
rushes? of say thirty yards eacb or 4 0 0 + 3 0 = 1 3 t 1 : i l t H . If they
halt one minute and a t the end of each rush fire tlirec Nhots they
w i l l consume thirty-nine rounds. T h e pauses should be short SO as
t o give the attack all tho vigor and dash posnible. and to avoid losse~,
which are tlie greateat a t the halta. A n nvcrage length of about
one minute permits the Rights to be adjusted to the range ana tbree
lots fired with deliberation.
A,

y- * T h b may be crlllclmd on the ground that Mop. might not be able to make any ruch
thegretlcal rap14 advmnce; the objectloa la fact d o a ~ . L a t .but It ma? be r l d that when a
nttack 1.Intended It ihould be curled out in the ahortd.1 lime pomlbie and alrb tbe
grertat delermloatloo. lor a long drawn OUI. halratlng nttack b b m l IO the offenuve aplrit
a:14 IO victory. Clearnem of d d g a nod energy of executlou are -ntInl
to s u m
t'In order that the flre may proceed Unlnlemptedly durlus the runha, It wnuld r e m
inriiog to tbe manaer In whlch men bold thelr p l m . that the beqt metbnl would genemll):
h. Io adv8nW the rlgbt echelou flnt.aud then brlng the left up 10 the lume Iloe."

r r h q

I
1
'

SHALL ABM AMMUNITION.

160

I n addition w e m u s t allctw for t h e n u m b e r required for rapill

.

am, say

forty ronnde, a n d t w e n t y more to tinieh t h o victory or CO&I

t b e defeat, m a k i n g n t o t a l of 119 rounds, or allowing for cartridgcdropped, 125.
T b e second and t h i r d line8 would not require t h i s a m o u n t , but
to be o n t b e eafe side w e will assume 400 r o u n d s t o b e supplied ta,
all a l i k e , a n d t h i s will p e r m i t t h e ammunitioli of t h e firing line tcb
be s o m e w h a t replenished b y t h e w e x t r a cartridgen.
T h i s a m o u n t i s computed for an e x t r e m e case, t h e frontal a t t a c k .
which would n o t be w e d if t h e r e is a n y o t h e r plan possible.
MAYNIC:"A frontal attack a g a i n s t a ,well-posted, disciplined and
u n s h a k e n enemy is almost imposeible.*.T:Flank. a t t a c k s are now t h c
p r i n c i p a l rneansofoffense a n d t h e f r o n t a t t a c k I U a n a u x i l i a r y m o w rneot, intended to hold the e n e m y while tlie o t h e r is in progress.
PE Y SICAL ENDCRANCE.

1.

T h e fact t h a t tlie physical ,endurance of t h e soldier hah n h m i t

' .need hardly be stated: A n y o n e w h o b a s fired 100 rounda i n a m o m ing's ebooting knows t h a t shooting is h a r d work.
". Cseee are mentioned i n which e v e n s i x t y rounds, tired i n succen~
eion, caueed s o m e of t h e inen to bo disabled. T w o h u n d r e d round*
eeern8, tberefore, to reach t h e limit of' phyuical endurance.
TUB POWIBILITY OF TBOOPS R E I N 0 ENOAOED FOR S E V E R A L D A Y S .

To p r o v i d e for tbe poeaibility of more t h a n o n e d a y ' s action, this

number 200, is h a b i t u a l l y increased b y h a v i n g reserve nmmunitioti
in acceeaible ecbelons i n rear.
NUYBEB OP CARTRIDGES CABBIED IN EACH ECHELON A N D N U M B E R

OF

WAOONS REQCIRED.

T b e regiment coosista of 1,'2OQ men. threo battalions, 400 meti

eacb. E a c b soldier o r d i n a r i l y carries tifty cartridges. T h e regi.
m e n t a l w a g o n s ebould h a v e 200 rouridn per rifle, a total ot'240,OO~~
per r e g i m e n t , 20,000 per c o m p a n y . T w e n t y thousand cnrtridge.
w e i g h 1,200 pounds. A four4iowe team c a n haul 3,000 p o u n d s ;
beoce t b e r q i r n e n t a l t r a i n i s composed of six double c o m p a n y fourhorse wrypne, c a r r y i n g 40,000 r o u n d s each.
A Y Y U N I T I O N WAoO%S.

&b
a m m u n i t i o n wagon is vomposed of t w o partn, t h e 1inibc.r
a n d body, joined b y au eye a t t h e ox'troniily of t h e pole of t h e bod!
'wbhh ate on to a s p r i n g honk o n the limber.
WON

DL. OOLm Conduct of W u . p. 187.

.i two-wbcel vehicle or cart b a s b e c n adopted by many Europear1

1t:ttions for tlie transportation of small a r m animunition. O l i account
~ ~ ' b o i nmoro
g
easily managed o n t h e battlefield.
O n t h e o t h e r h a n d , in t h e column of niarrh. a w : q o ~ i is lcsw
troublesome t h a n a cart. a n d will, for t h e name rwmbcr of ;rnimulj.
t:.nnsport much more ammunition. T h e t y p e wagon herein deb ~ i b e dn i e e b both requirements, for a c a r t is o b h i n e d by unlini\,taring.*
Each wagon has t h r e e chests, one 011 t h e limber and t w ) 011 tltc
c.:iisson body. T h e s e chests a r e not p e r m a n e n t l y t i w d , but h;ive on
ttlcir under side appliances for a t t a c h i n g t h e m to the +ttyon frttnie.
.I11 chests a r e interchnngeable.
All a m m u n i t i o n wsgona are d i a t i n c t l j marked ?io thltl they may
bc recognized as such at a distance.
Each douhlc. cl)rnp:iiiy w:igoti
\ \ i l l bc accorupnnied by two m c n , o n e froin each company. Tlicy
r11aya l t e r n a t e an d r i v e r a n d assistant.
Cttrtridges, Rou Packed.-The
cartridpea ahoulil bc put u p i l l
*trong, coarae, cotton belts, holding 100 round* c * n c l ~ . * Thie style
I ) ! p a c k i n g to be uned p r i m a r i l y in w a r nervicc. but t r o o p sIIould
be made familiar with this form d u r i n g peace.
Ammunition Boxes.t--.hnmunition p a c k i n g h l x e a sh0uI11 hsvc a
t u p fautoned with a single t h u m b screw. wadge. o r wire loop. etc.
They should fulfill t h e following conditions :
1. T h e weight a n d s h a p e of t h e package Jboulcl bt. d c h an to
:illmit of r e a d y h a n d l i n g b y one man.
2. No tool or f i s t r u m e n t o t h e r t h a n those which e v e r y ooldicr
cxrries should be necessary to eactily a n d quickly olwn tlic c:ise.
3. T h e material of which t h e p a c k a g e i R made should bc . * I I C ~ I
:I- would a s s u r e t h e i n t e g r i t y o f t h e w n t e n t a u n d e r all conditions
o t transportation. storagc and handling.
4. A m m u n i t i o n boxes for i n f a n t r y ahould be etained 11 light
I l l u c , for c a v a l r y a light yellow, i f t h e cartridgeu for tlic t w o armu
are different.
With o u r prcnent packing caws it would be highly a d v a n t a g e o u s
i l l yane'of w a r or active scrvice to rcmoc'e t h e scrctc.3 before packiriS
ttizm i n trannportation wagons. Also. as a n y e x t r a ammunitiorr
bt.yond w b a l t h e belt will Iiihl will probably be carried o r diatributzd i n t h e paper boxer. t h e i r color shoiild be a brilliont red inntcsd
o! tbu p r e s e n t brown.
.-ea

P h t e 111.

t fke Plate 11.

f
.

SMALL A R N d 1 V X L-NI T I O X .

162

T h e y could t h e n be eaeily,seen if dropped.

u m d , t h a t should aleo be red.

If' a sack o r b a g

, # n wheels or o n pack a n i m a l s , i t ie a question t o ba decided by coni.

'lion senso a n d tlie n a t u r e of t h e roads. 11' t h e roads.:ire good

t ~ n o u g h .w a g o m are a eaving of horses, uttendafits arid h i d , :LII 11
two-horse c a r t carries a t least a* much rn eight pack trniiiiiils. It'
ihc roads are bad a n d c a r t s or wagons cannot travel. pac.!i aiiitiiulr
tliuat be uscd.

AMOUNT CARRIED I N THE OTHER ECHELONS.

On Win.

- ..............
............

France
Germany

E n q h d . , .........
United Ststea

(per aeesy )-..-..

120
120

1
-I

R q ' t Cam
-

76100

Amm. Cdumn.

G
i0

tw

u)

u)

I
I

A n n . Park.

(.'A Y A L R Y C A RBI S E A M U L S 1TIO S .

xo

49

3)
1

200

50

44.4t

<%H

F r o m compurison und modern exigency it is reco~niiie~itlecl

t li:ri
t h e a m m u n i t i o n column should a u p p l y 44.4 r o u n d s per rifle, IJ;IW.~I
on t h e following organizations: T h r e e regimenre one briy;hiiq.
tbrtw b r i d e s one division, or nine regiments, equals 1 0 . ~ ~ 1 1 ~
m e n ; 10,800 X 44.4 = 480,000 a p p r o x i m a t e l y ; 480,01)0 +4O.llOCl - 11
wagons, which are of t h e same p a t t e r n a n d capacity as t h e reginieiit:it

w i t h one wagon per b r i g a d e e x t r a to bo aunt to any p a r t w l i e i ~

firing i s t h e thickest.

The ammanition carried i n the ammunition coluniri, it sliould I v

noted, i s available for battle.

Hence, total, 294.4-t

AMMUNITION P A R E OR ORDNANCE TRAIN.

As.previouely enunciated, provision i b usually made for i t rclilt~it.

i s h m e n t of a m m u n i t i o n for a fight of m o r e tlino t w o coneecutitt.
daye. T h i s i s p a r t l y , bot notcwbollg nr reliably secured from tlic.
fact t h a t all troops do n o t consume t h o a m o u n t allotted to t h e i i i
Exact preparation is made for tbis emergency by e s t s b l k h i n g :in
a m m u n i t i o n park. As tbis p a r k is a b o u t one dny'e march i i i r e a r , 1 1 1 ~ .
supplyitcarriee ie not o r d i n a r i l y available for tho first day's tight I t
may be laid d o w n ae a n axiom that troops muat not r u n out of' alii
munition. T h e a m m n n i t i o n p a r k should therefore contain i r b i b i i t
88.8 additional r o u n d e per rille, a n d t h i s will require, per diviaioil
t w e n t y - f o u r wagons. *The u m m u n i t i o n column und p a r k would alw
have revolver ammunition.

-t Sea_A n a d Beport. Ym&m

T h e great mobility of t h e c a v a l r y makes it tiifficult

3)

wagons. .
An ammunition column of twelve wagon6 is enqily divided i n l . ,
m t i o n e , each b r i g a d e Rotting f o u r wagons, a r e g i m e n t o n e waicoii

With regard t o t h e mode of c o n v e y i n g t h e ammutiition. w h e t h e r

I-

; Dacumeot I. p. 4.

lie

t t p
~ rc-crih
ponitioii of i t s first echelon.
I n g e n e r a l t h e actions in which curalry wniild tw ciiyaqcd are :
1. S c r e e n i n g a n d reconnoitering tight.*.
2. F l a n k tighte.
3. Purnuit a n d rear g u a r d tighta.

Just before t h e b e g i n n i n g of a battle t h e e a v a l r y would p r o b a l n l y be in front, rind after t h e battle began would retire to t h e flanks.
To eupply thia v e r y mobile a r m wbile in action in :almost hope
Icsc(. T h e w a g o n s coiitaining c a r b i n e reserve aniniunitiun will c
remain in r e a r near w h a t e v e r flrink t h e c a v a l r y may be a c t i n g .
'
T h e c a v a l r y will of neceasity h a r e to rind ita anitnunition
wagons.
Each trooper when o n uctive d u t y *hould bc plciitifully
Itrovided with animunition, a fair estimate beirip l U U r o u n d s p e r
rarbine.
The g r e a t importancw of h a v i n g t h o rifle ctnd c a r b i r J viirtridgw
of the 8ame pattern can be readily seen, as it permits cavalry t o
Icylenieh trom any i n f a n t r y r e e r r r e wagoiis. On,, c,rrfritfye ,fljr ( i l l
#rrnls sboiild be t h e rule.

Tbere are t w o ways i o which troops dcatined for the attack can
I W mupplicd w i t h

them 21)0 r o u n d s of e x t r a cartridgeu:

l e t . M a k e t h e men themaelvea c a r r y t b e needed wupply of' 2~

nmnde i n t o action, t h i s a m o u n t b e i n g di8tributed before deploying.
2d. Dietribute 100 roiinae before deploying i n t o battle fijrinirtion (3,000 y a r d a ) a n d ~ ~ p p tbe
l y r e m a i n d e r by cart* or cerricrw
,luring. t h e action.
DRaooNrRov:

4 6 L ) u r i n gt h e wnr of 1877 neither t h e r c ~ m e n t a l

1:rrts nor t h e flying packs could be depended upon to r r p l e n i s b

SXALL ARM AYAfUNZTION.

164

rupidly t h e a m m u n i t i o n carried by t h o men, a n d i n coiisequenc

from niaety to one h u n d r e d r o u n d s w e r e e e r r e d out bofore an :ha

. .

tion."

MAYNE: 'ITbe difeculty of eupply a f t e r t h e tight han coinnlcnce4;

makee i t i m p o r t a n t to i e s u e e x t r a cartridgee to t h e men before it 11,
@e. T h e i n f a n t r y , which come8 firet i n t o action, c a n n o t pcrforiil tll
d u t y required of i t with thusninety rounde which t h e y c a r r y i r i OII
eervice, and i t will be a l m o s t impoaaible to upp ply then1 with ;III;
!arger q u a n t i t y , at leaet o v e r open g r o u i d T h e beet nictliod o f :II
for i n e a r i n g to a soldier a sufficient Rupply of aniniuriilion for t l i ,
fight ie to g i v e h i m froki t h e lirat the fill1 ~ i i p p l yconsidered n e w wry a n d maintain t h o strictest fire discipline. not to l e t h i m H'ILII~
a r o u n d of it." '
HOHLNLOAE:
'*If tr akirmiah liiic r u n s out of' curtriilgt- ! l i t . i * .
eupply i s impoeeiblu. Men as carriors will n o t do. Supposc~:L I I I ; I I ~
w i t h the neceeeary c o u r a g e a n d good fortune nhould rcach t h e tiriii:
line with u bag c o n t a i n i n g 500 r o u n d s ( t h i r t } p o u n d s ) , wlint !vi,
500 c a r t r i d g e s m a t t e r to n c o m p a n y ? It ie b u t tlircc v n u 1 i i l s pci.
man; and bow, pray, will you diutribute it to t h e m ? "
a m m u n i t i o n cannot bc. b r o u p h t u p tlur
Rueeian Regulations: &'If
i n g a n action t h e troops m a y cnll upon t h e i r nupporta in r e a r :tri,i
tbeee i o t u r n upon t h e reeerves."
T h e only t m o p e i n rear w h o h a r e es:rr :tInmunitiori nre t h o - , ,

of t h e e e c o n d , line. T h e eupporta sod rwerverr, broadly apeakiiir.

u r e a part'of t h e fightiiig l i n e , s n d have none toepare. T h e s i i p p o r ~ .
a n d reservo8 m u s t rleo r e m a i n i o r e a r iii o r d e r t o maintnin t l i c i r
4
tactical object. It would seogr t h i m e t h i d of stipply by curt* t 1 1 i 1 .
i n g attack i s o n l y applicable tdcanes wlieruin the btittlc laata sc.ver:iI
d a y s aad t h e a m m u n i t i o n call be eupplied uiitlcr cover of darkrieFELNCE:
&'Tho oiily c e r t a i n supply oii wliic.11 the combatnrir.
may depend are t h e r o u n d s carried on t h e pernone. To e m p t y tli..
wagons before t h u f i g h t muat be the iiivi~riable rule. Any otllv,'
metbod of e u p p l y which compels meii tind wagons to cross a tin .
swept zone for tbe mere purpow! of t r a w p i , r t m g a m m u n i t i o n , ia in1
practicable, c a n n o t be relied upon. Assintanca 3 e p e n d e n t on
m a n y accidente c a n n o t be rolied u p o h "

Quotatione m i g h t be multipliod to ahow t h a t n o reliance can

p l a d on a n y wliemee for s u p p l y i n g troops w i t h a n i n i u n i t i o ~ i1 1 1 i :

1 . 8

i a g t h e 6 n a l atugea of a n a t t a c k .
T h e regiment, thdwfore, is formod froirt i u t u line,

'

at 3,000

pards,

ail$

ill

tlircc I i i w

the ammanition wagon8 give e v c r p two

nice

t i : r w bcltw. o r every mail ut ttir tirwt lint. K W O bcltri I J 1~ ( 1 ( 1 cartridKe.

c.icl1. Thcbsc belts c:in be tied about t h e naiFt o r t h e end* united.
:I i d t h e belt n l u n ~
o v c r ttie h o u l d e r . So a m m u n i t i o n should be
I Lrried in the k n a p * n c k ~ . Soldiers a b a n d o n t h e i r knapsack* on a
I :irch rit t h e i r tirst o p p o r t u n i t y . and marly nuthoritit.9 consider it-,
I ,,cessar\- just before a.;snult. i n nr4li.r to ennhlc n n e n e r c c t i c ~
attack '
i ' bc cnrried o u t . to have t h c men 'iblierctl of t h c i r knapwckP. es.
I .bc4slly after n long m s r c h
Eve&)luestion i u war sIioliIcI Iw coilsidcred i n tile m p c t of
liat men call 110 wlicn faticucd
.Is before s k t c d . no regiment
ight e r c r to t h i n k o f mricing or cering intc, a c t i o n Xittinut it.. a n i II irriition wagt)riri
it.

1 4

RESUME.

T h e w o h ~ e r s a t i n n :ind
s
propositibne can be formulated

I.

*
IIN

fnlloaa:

The division of a soldier's k i t into two parts, the o n c that

ip

ri,w*Aary for ctmtmt, t h e o t h e r t h a t ip nrcwwwy fnr Rwotl. shelter

:riltl

clothing..

2. The reductinn of t h e burden bornc by tlic w l d i e r t g ) t h n w

srticles absolutrly r q u i r e d . anal which he will not throw a w a y
3. The detinite adoption o f a p a t t e r n bottalion a m m u n i t i o n
u-:qon.
4. Tlic ncce.witF of a p p o i n t i n g d u r i n r t i m e of pcac.c II rt>gi.
nivritol o r d n a n c e nergeant, for nnimunition duticta, a* alao thrit of
wlccting tlie conductom of t b e wagone exclusirely from the r a n k 9
o t t h e battalion to which t h e r a r e attached. ant1 of exorcipiog therii

J u r i n g peace i n t h e i r special dutier.

5. T h e position of t h e b n ~ t a l i o n wagons d u r i n y action to be
iwlicrrted by a fiignal placed on a flank.
6 . Constaiit communicationn to exist between c o m m a n d a n t * 01'
h r t d i o n s , regiments a n d all echelons of eupply b. mt>ao+of mounted
o i ,lcrIie*.
T. T h e best method of all for e n s u r i n g to a soldier a rruficirnt
*iiliply of a m m u n i t i o n , is to give him from t h e b e g i n n i n g of the
k l i t t h e f u l l s u p p l y considered neckeeearc. a n d to maintain t h e
*ii'ictest Bre discipline not to let him waete a r o u n d of it.
d.
T h e establishment in the ccwe of defensive actiou of depotut :inimunition in rear of tlie firing line.
!I.
I n t h e replenishment of empty wagone those of t h e ecliclon
I:I w a r go forward an required a n d e x c h a n g e e i t h e r rchiclcn o r cliestcl,
b e t not drivers.
#'

166

SMALL ARM AiU+UNITION.

10. T h e adoption o f a better ammuiiitioo case a n d a coame belt

for packing cartridgee in the original, t h u s dispensing with t h e
valoable time:now required tr, tranefer cartridgen from the paper
box- to t h e field belt, a n d (LB ejipecially forming a convenient vehicle for cartridgee beyond w h a t t h e 6eld belt will hold.
11. * One cartridge for all arms.
12. . T h a t t h e ecbelone of eupplp of a m m u n i t i o n would properly
be: (1) By t h e moldier, (2) by a regimental wagon train, (3) b y
a n ammonitioo colomn, (4) by a n ammunition p a r k or ordnance
train, (6) by m a p i n e e .
13. T h e poeition pf t h e ecbelone of eupply will depend npon
the nature of the operation8 of t h e troope t h e y are supplying.
14. The eRtabliebmeot d o r i n g peace of eome detinite and clonr
principles of orgaoizntion ; details however i m p o r t a n t quickly arr a n g e themeelvee, if t h e framework ie b a d on m o o d principlee.

PLATE I.

March of a Division.
T h i e plate ehowe t h e relative poeition of the infantry a m m u o i tion wagone to tho units t h e y enpply. T h e fundamental principle

for t h e relative p e i t i o n of the different elernente ie that those euppliee and tro& como fint which will be needed 6 r a t a n d io t h e
order of their. relative importance; alw, t h a t all regimenta of
i o f a n t r y are immediately Sollowed b y their regimental ammunition
wugone (page 6 ) .
I
"Orgaoication a n d Tncticd' etatee t h a t forty t w o round6 per gun
of each battery are carried i n t h e ammunition column. For a division tbie extra eupply would require e i g h t (8) wagons.
It m a y be noticed t h a t the ammunition wagone of t h e infantry
t m o p e i n t h e eupport are separated from thoir battalione by too!
w q p n e and machine g u m I o the case of an a d v a n c e g u a r d (page
11, lioe 32) the m e n have t h e i r 6eld b o l h full r e a d y for action a n d
t h e near preeence of t h e i r wagooe ie n o t EO i m p o r t a n t IU t h k good
p i t i o n of the machine guns.
' I n t h e main body t h e men habitually carry a emaller a m o u n t of
ammunition (puge lo), a n d a f u r t h e r eupply muet be immediately at
hand. IftrOOpE m u s t march w h e r e t h e i r wagons c a n n o t aleo go.
t h e aoldiern of t h e main hody ehoold be givcn a full upp ply froiii
ttieir wagons or pack animal8 ueed (page 16).

>.

S M A I, Id A h!M A A f M UNI T I 0N.

167

PLATE 11.

Ammunition Packing Boz and Battle-Issue Cartridge Belt.

Figure 1 ehows the geueral appearance of the propoeed ammunition packing box; capacity, 1,000 cartridges; weight, a b o n t 8 Ibs.;

inside measurement, 6.25 x 6 x 26 iochee. A finger notch on each

e n d of the case furniehee 8 mesne of raieing the caae from the
ground.
Figure 2 shows i n detail the device recommended (after a trial
o f thumb-ecrewe, wire loope, epring catches, etc.) for eecuring the
cover to the box, and y e t permitting the cover to be quickly op.ened
i n the field by such tools as a soldier will have. Thia funtening i e
strong, permi of sealing aud allowe the boxes to "stack" beeidee
poseeasing Rimp icity and rapidity of manipulation. , A tbnmbscrew requires
re time to operate and projects above the ~urface
of the box.
Figure 3 shows i n detail the method of making t h e case. A
case 80 made is water t i g h t throughout and 'not more diflicult to
rnauufacture than the present box.
Figure 4. Detail of inner eorface of the cover of t h o case.
Figure 5. T h e propoeed battle-issue cartridge belt. It ie
formed o t fifty ebort paper cylinders threaded on two stringe ae
shown. By eliding the paper cylinders along the atringe the belt
can be aobdivided, or thie belt form of carrier can be made in
blocks of twenty aartridges each, i n which caee by tying together
the free eoda of the projecting stringe a belt carrying any deeired
number of cartridges may be formed. Tliie belt is cheap and very
strong. Cartridgee can be packed i n ammunition plrcking w e e
slmoet if not qoite 88 compact a8 if they were looee. The belt c a n
be tied about the waiet or the ende of one or two belta nnited and
thrown over the shoulder, giving a secure and portable supply of
100 to 260 rounds.
After. con'eiderable experimenting the aample attached ia regarded aa the moet euitable material out of which to manufacture
these paper cylindere. I t ie a Atout wrapping paper mounted on
clieeee cloth, the paper giving the oeceesary etiffneee and t h e cloth
the tenacity and reeietance to rnoieture and fraying. It ie contemplated that theee belte can be thrown away when emptied, ne are the
Frankford paper boxee whose plnce they take. One belt replaces
five paper boxee and c a n therefore coat five timee what a paper box
costa without making any greater espense to the government io
using t h i s nystern.

'$.

168

SMALL ARM A M M L-NITIOX.

SMALL ARM AMMUNITION.

PLATE 111

*.

Ammunition Wagon.

This plato gives a plan n n d elevation of t h e ammunition wagon

tjutlined on page 160. It is really two cartR, one carrying one chest
:lid the other t y o cbesta, or both together forming the familiar
.\iiiericati caisson and limber. The caisson is SO made t h a t a polo
~ . t i i be locked between the two forks and another cart or limber
t$wmed much like t h e limber proper. This peimita e i h r half' of t h e
:tinmunition wagon to be saved in retreat, or used i n action directly.
It is believed that the most euitable place
the ueoof ammnnit i o n packing boxes is during t h e shipment or cartridges from the
the front, when
:irscnala to t h e magaziuea, o r from magazines
transported in ordinary wagons. The packing case is here indisIensable. But in transporting cartridgee in the ammunition wagons
the packing cases cenae to be useful, as the wagon cheats are s t o u t
and waterproof. Therefore it would be advisable i n filling tbe
cliesta of t h e ammunition wagons to remove the filled buttlo-issue
balta from the packing boxes a n d place t h e m directly i n t h e chesta.
A n ammunition wagon 80 loaded can easily c a r r y b e 40,000 rounde
propoeed above.
A distinct type of ammunition wagon poasesees theRe advantages
over an ordinary wegod for tranmporting ammunition :
1. It can always be recognized ae such by its color and ehape.
2. It is more compact; a n ammunition wagon can accommodate
40:000 cartridges with room to spare.
3. Economy of weight and expense. The ammunition boxes
Iirrving been discarded, there is less weight to transport. If tho
ammunition wagone are loaded at a n arsenal o r magazine, the empty
boxes can be returned to the manufacturing arsenal for further ow.
Khen carried in a n ordinary wagon into the field the boxes would
probably be loet.
4. Rapidity in iwning an extra supply to t h e troops.
5. Greater mobility i n following troops over broken ground.
.\n ammunition wagon c a n be dirided into two carts, t h u s moving
its load i n se$tione, which could only be accomplished in a n ordinary
wagon by unloading. Likewise greater ease of turning about on a
n:irrow road.
ti.
A eupplyof 40,000 rounds ie 600 pounds under the weight of
loud tbe animals can pull. This margin may be osed to carry
tijrage or aa a factor of safety.

br

p.

4.

'.

..

.:i

f
S M A L L A R M AMMUNITION.

170
0

BlBLIOGBAPJiICAL NOTE
ib

T H E HAWAIIAN ISLANDS.
P

BY S m n D LIELTESANTJ. H. REEVES. SIXTHCAVAI.RY.

article ie of necessity entirely a compilation, a n d no origii n geth i o g literature t h a t could be at all depended upon. T h e publications
of t h e Military Information Division were not to be had from t h a t
bureau, t h e W a r D e p a r t m e n t library, or t h e poet library. F i n a l l y ,
after m m e weeks of correspondence a n d more t h a n a month of waiti n g , eome Conpeeeional Records a n d president'^ meeeagee were
obtained from t h e W a r D e p a r t m e n t library. T h r o u g h t h e conrteey
of t h e Hawaiian legation i n thie c o u n t r y I was furniehed with m m e
.eight or t e n pamphlete, bearing more or lees upon t h e eubject. To
t w o of theee p a g p h l e t a I wieh to ackoowledge special indebtedness,
viz: *Harn8iian, Handbook, iwued -by the Buroan of Americaii
Ilepublice,,$nd LA Handbook on t h e Annexation of Hawaii, by
!dr. L. A. TELBPTON.I h a r e also freely need t h e War D e p a r t m e n t
library, Coogreasionnl Docnmeut No. 3180.
Tbie articde doen not p u r p o r t to advance a n y a r g u m e n t for or
againet t h e annexation of H a b i i . T h e deeiro ie merely to give a
*uccinct account of t h e ielande, t h e i r people, t h e i r resources, a n d of
the relatione of t b e U n i t e d States with them.
An apology for t h e length of tbie paper would n o t eeem entirely
nut of place; b u t w h e n t h e g r o n n d attempted to be covered i n tbie
one paper ie remembered, t o g e t h e r with t h e vital intereat felt in t h i s
Pubject b y t h e Amorjcan people, I trnet t h a t t h e length m a y not be
(eioeidered extreme.
General Orders No. 18, D e p a r t m e n t of the Plette, October 14,
1896, says: Mattere with which ofEcers are k e p t familiar by con*rant practice, ehould be taken u p only, if at all, by w a y of review;
a i d in a n y e v e n t o u g b t not to ooeupy time to t h e exclusion of eubjucta, such
5eld engineering, military topograpby, minor W o s

T H Inality
S
ie claimed for it. Much trobble was experienced

Sopply d AmminitSon 0 the Flrlng Line (DUNCAN).

Prppll of Spru-Arm AmmnnlUoo to Troop. In the Fleld (CUAIGIE).
of Roop and mpplla ( HOLABIRD).
The PlvproL mad the Army SbW (DOWQUBETY).

I
1
i

i
I

I
I

TEE EA

,179

-1

a n d military hietory, wiiicli suein to require greater attention

A n d again: SaTbe proper c o m m a n d i n g oilicere will assign, aftel
consulting his preference, to each. line offlcer u n d e r t h e i r immediatc
command a suitable profeeeional subject." While t h e eubject yhosen
for tbik article L i g h t n o t ooneidered atrictly profeseional, in t h a t the
military service nor ita intereets come u p - f o r diecueaion. n t i l l a e :I
m a t t e r of military hietory ( t b a t has not influenced us in tile pas:
s o t may g r e a t l y i n t h e n e a r future) I t r u s t this subject niay not bc
considered ooteide t b e limit allowable for essays. T h e n again, I do
not beligye in t h e niurowoeesof t h e viewe held b y most military men
ie.
i n days g o n e by a n d eveo now held by q u i t e a percentage-that
t b a t t b e y ebould k n o w nothing b u t of t h e i r sword, of their w a r horse a n d t b e use of them. I n fact, t h a t view may be said t~ have
p.eeed away M fsr as English epeaking people were concerned with
WABwIaK, t h e "Laat of t b e Bnrone," a n d since t h a t d a y it baa been
beld t b a t a military m%m should be well informed on all t h e questions of t h e day in a n y w a y affecting t h e policy or t h e welfare of'
t h e g o v e r n m e n t of bis country.
Eapially may t h i s be held to be true of those queetiom of 80
vital importance as the acquieition of o u t l y i n g territory, when t h e
policy of bis country bae always been agaioet rather t h a n in favor

of cooqaest.
It is now propeed to consider t h i s subject briefly under t h e fol
lowing eub heade, v i s : Historical sketch, area, topography, climate
a n d popaltion, ~eaoorces:agricultural a n d commercial, commercial
a n d naval importance, relatione with the United Statee, including
a side g l ~ n c at
e certain a n o e x s t i o u qoeetione.
HIBTOBICAL SKETCH.

Tha H a w a i i a n Ielaode may be conmidered ae consisting of only

e i g h t islaode-the re& being mere rocks-and
comprieiog an are21
of about 6,740 equare*milee, or nearly equal to t h a t of N e w 3erecy
Theee islands are situated between longitndo 1 5 1 O 40' andJ60 30'
west frbm Green]Ricb, a n d latitude 1 8 O 55' a n d 22' 16' Zorth, and
ran from nortbweet to rmutbeaet, a distanoe of 380 milee. T h e y arc
t h w jwt within t h e tropics. (See M a p A.)
Tbe p i g i o n will tbne be ew_o to be a central o n e in t h e N o r t h
Paoide, 2,069 nautical m i l q eouthweet o f San Francieco; 4,640 from
P a n a m a ; 3,800 fmm Aacklaud, N e w Zealand ; 4,960 from Hongkoog
and 3,440 h m .Y&ob~&-a
location of great importance from
both 8 milibrp s a d odmmer&l view, na we shall eee later on.

THB H A W A I I A N ISLANUIS.

WAILIN
ISLANDS.

'

173

They aro separated from each o t h e r b y cbanncls, as follows:

<

,ahu and Molokai .............................................................

23 milea

. . .

\lolokai and Lanai ............................................................. 8

\lolokai and Maui ...........................................................
8
..
\Iaui and Lanai ................................................................
8 ''
:,Iaui and Kahoolawe ...........................................................
6
llaaaii and Maui ......
...................................
Kauai and Oahu .......
.................................
Siihau and Kauai .....................................................
The iiame b y which these islandn wa8 tiisst known was T h e
,Sandwich Ielande, a narno g i v e n t h e m b y t h e i r discorerur, C a p t a i n
C'OOK, in honor of hie patron, t h e Earl of Sundwich. then First Lord
4)f t h e Adrnirality.
It ia claimed t h a t they were first sighted b y u Spanish n a r i g a t o r
:IH early ae 1555 A. D., b u t t h e firet real visit to t h e ialanda was by
Captain COOKon t h e 18th of J a n u a r y , 1773-the samo year t h a t saw
Fratice come to t h e aid of tho America0 colonies. s t r u g g l i n g for
independence from England.
O n t b e 18th of J a n u a r y Captain C*OOK discovered O a b u a n d
I b u a i ; t h e next d a y he [anded A t Waimea (Oarhu); he finlrlly eailed
tor Alaska. R e t u r o i n g t h e following winter, hc landed again at t h e
Hawaiian I s l a n d s on J a n u a r y l i , 1579, j u s t o n e year after his firat
sigbting of tbem. He etayod a r o u n d for .some time, but became i n volved w i t h t h e natives, a n d was killed February 1 4 , 1779.
Neither bo nor his crew seem to have made any effort to lay
claim to t h e islands in behalf of t h e Crown of England, hased on
the r i g h t of diecovery. Nor does England herself, alwlry6 on the
lookout for new territory. seem to have laid a n y claim to the ielandn
at this time, nor at a n y o t h e r time, based upon COOK'S
diecovery.
For seven yoare after C&K'S death no foreign veeeel wtw again
w e n in t h e watere of theee ielancls. F r o m after t h a t time, however,
vcaeele engaged in the f u r trade 011 t h e northwtxt coast of N o r t h
d m e r i c a called at. these islands for supplies, or ran down there to
*pond t h e winter, s e l l i n g tlroarms, otc., to t h o nativm.
engagud in survuying t h e northweet coaet
Captain VANCOUVER,
of North America, visited t h e islaode t h i w timun between 1793 and
li94. He ref'ueed to sell t h e natives tirearma, b u t g a v e them their
tirat cattle, a n d furnished t h e m aleo w i t h useful seed.
On t h e 25th o i February, 1794, tho Island of Hawaii, alono, w a s
v a l u n t p i l y placed under t h e protoction of G r e a t Brituin by tho
cliiefs of t h a t island, a n d t h e British dirg was hoisted at Koalake.
liua. Thia protection givuii b y t h e British Hzrg'suurna k i liave been
tluuu for the benefit of, or through t h e aupyosed protecLiou givon b y
c

-',

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<-

1i

*.e
4

. hi

174

TKE H A W & W

THE H A W A I I 4 . N ISLA,VDS.

SLANDS.

the two Englieb membaotmen then in port. They were mixed u p

i n the aid1 war then prevailing, and no notice by t h e borne govern
ment amma to have been taken of thie action.
A t tbe time of dieaovery by Captain COOK,and for many g e n e r
ations previow, t h e governmenta of t h e different ielande, and eveii
prta of tbe same bland, were i n t b e bande of petty kinge anrl
obi& wbo w d title to all t h e lande by a mrt of feudaliem. But
tewards the oIoee of t h e l s r t century t b e whole group came under
the away of one ruler EAYIHAMIEA,
who, by force of arms brought
all his r i ~ ~
into
b &n jection. H e waa not only a mighty warrior.
b.t a a n of great sdminietrative ability, s o d wag quick to avail
b i d ? of t b e wbite mane inetrumentaand methods of warfare.
While he paemad many of t b e f a d & of bie race, he wan both
moralLy a n d mentally rnperior to bie predeceseore, and he did s
great work for bie people in putting an end to the petty wars
whieb bad hiiherto prevailed, in coqeolidatiog tbe kingdom and
fbandiag a dynasty.
me decreaee io popnlatioo during tbie period of civil war a n d
d m r d was very rapid-due
partly to the waral but etill more to t h e
dimeme a n d .&en introduced by the foreip;nere. Before 1800 they
b i d leuped the art af.dietilling liquor, and drupkenneea became
very prevalent. Ia 1894 a peetilence, euppoeed to have been
abolerm, carried off half of the inhabitants of Oahu.
. In 1816sD r . h m waa aent to t h e islands by tbe Rneeiaii
wbicb t h e RUE.
governor of A l h . H e bailt a fort at Waimea,
ei.n oolore were displayed, a n d urged t h e cbief on- t h a t ieland to
eent &;
plsoe himeelf under the p r o t 8 t i o n of Rueeia KAXIHAMIGHA
forw to build a fort
Honolulu, and ordered tbo cbief of Oahu to
expel Dr.
wbicb ww done. Tbie king, t h e first of t h e
famousdynasty bearing bfe nape, died May 8,1819. Hie work w a j
dene. H e bad connblidkted t h e group under n etrong government,
pot a n end to feudal anarchy a n d petty ware, and tbna prepared
the way for civilization a n d Chrietianity.
Hie son moceeded him, and tbie reign ie eepecially worthy of
pention h m the fact t h a t during t h e firet y e w of bie reign the
fire&mieeioDariee ( t h e y were from Boetoo) landed in t h e Hawaiian
lelenb; and here it maybe remarked, from tbeee mimionariee hare
-&e
obe predominating inlleenoee of; t h e wbite man (Unitcd
&am) YI it exbta i n thoee ielande to-day. Tbeqe rnit3aionarit.s
Ismded April 4, 1820. They foand theflawaiiaoe an aminble arid
b i i b 6 m p t i v e m, eager for k n o w l v , and easily in0uenccd
for p o d or evil.
I

w-

This king and his queen both died while on

in

I
visit

175

to Englaiid

1825.

Hie younger brotber succeeded him a8 KAMEHAMEEA

111. I n
JONES,of the United Staten navy,
visited the islands and concluded the first treaty between the United
States and the Hawaiian Islands, which was the first treaty made
by the ielande with any foreign power, and antedates the first one
with England by ten years. Tbie treaty grants to each of the con-~
tracting parties all privileges granted by either of them to the moet
favored natione.
Now began a eeriea of pereecution for miueionaries and native
converte. Theee perawutiona seem to have been confined to miscionaries from foreign nations other than the linited States, princi1)dy tbe French. Tho declaration of rights and the Kinga edict
, t f toleration were finally ieeued i n June, 1839, after three yea
or
more of persecution, but the mischief had bean dorw and re ibution wae already upon them, for the Frencb frigate ArLet iae
immediately sent tho
irrrived J u l y 9, 1839. Captain LAPLACE
government a peremptory letter demanding that full religioun
d that the s u m of $20,000 be brought on
liberty be proclaimed,
board by noon of tb& l o t h , or hosLilitie8 wouid commence. Tbe
required treaty WILB sigoed and the money promptly paid, and on
the 17th a commercial convention with France wa8 ala0 uigned.
The declaration of rights, mentioned above, which guaranteed
religious liberty, produced a feeling of eecurit. unkno-n before,
and formed the first etep toward establishing individual property
i n land.
The firat conetitntion wae proclaimed on October 8, 1840.
It constituted a Legislature, consisting of a house of hereditary
nobles, and repreeentativee to be chosen by the people, who voted
a8 a ueparate hooee., It also delined the duties of the governors,
and provided for a eupreme court.
I n 1842 tbe French/ corvette *Embuacade was eent oat to i n vestigate complaints of the violation of the Laplace Convention.
Tho King giving a courteooe mply to Captain MALLETSdemands
the matter wua pawed over.
I n July, 1842, an e m b w y was dispatched to tho United States
to eubmit t b e application of the Hawaiian government for recognition by the United S t a m .
I n replying to thia application, DANIEL
WEBSTERwrote 011 Derwnber 19, 1842, a8 follows: The President is of tho opinion that
the intereeta of all commercial natione require thnt that governi w n t (Hawaii) ahall n o t be inkrfered with by foreign powere.
the next year, 1826, Cammodore

I.

TEE E A WMIAN ISLANDS.

176

* *

/.

. *,

I
!

I
.

I
I

-1

* *

T b e United States,
i s more i n t e r e e b d i n t h o fate 01
t h e islaode a n d t b e i r g o v e r n m e n t t h a n a n y o t h e r nation can be, anal
tbie ooneideration inducee t b e President to be quite willing to dc.
Clare, sa t h e 88088 of t h e g o v e r n m e n t of t b e United Statee, t h a t tht
government of the Sandwich Ielande ought to be reepected; t h a t n o
power o n g h t e i t h e r to take poeeeeaion of t h e ielande au a conquest
or for t h e pnrpoBB of coloniszation, a n d t h a t no p o w e r o u g h t to scel,
for any undue control o v e r t h e existing g o v e r n m e n t Ar a n y exclu
eive privilegee or preferemcee in matteru of commerce.
On December 31, 1842, Preeident TYLEReent a special mcsmgts
to t h e Senate, relating to t b e Hawaiian Ielande, in which he Raid
It c s o n o t bot be in conformity with the intereeta a n d wiehee ot
t h e g o v e r n m e n t anddthe people of t h e U n i t e d Statee that t h i s cornmnnity
ebould be reepected, a n d all ita righta strictly and
conecientiooely regarded. * 8 * Far remote from t h e dominion8
of Earopean powem, ita g r o w t h a n d proeperity ae an independent
eta may yet be i o a high degree oeeful to all whose trade ie extended to those regiooa, while ita near approach to thie continent,
aod the ioterconree wbich American veeeele have with i t (suclr
veseele cooetitoting five-sixths of all wbicb a n n u a l l y vieit it) could
not b o t create dieeatisfaction o n t h e part of t h e United Statoe at
any a t t e m p t by any o t b b power, ehould such &tempt be threat
ened or fesred, to take p o w m i o n of t h e islands, colonize them, and
subvert t b e n a t i v e government. These worde were written b y
Ab.W m m and Pddemt TYLERbefore our p e e e m i o n s were extended to the cotsat.
T b e eending of tbie embaeay to t h e United States, coupled with
the aoarteoaa reply g i v e n Captain MALLET,Boon caused t h e m free11
trouble. For, aboot t h e year 1842, Great Britain, e v e r t r u e to her
to have awakened to t b e fact t h a t a weak
national policy, -ma
nation, wbicrh m i g h t be h a d for t h e taking, waa l y i n g in t h e north
Paoibu, a n d d e e m i n g it h e r d u t y to protect t h e weak, ebe etarted
oatto annex t h i s temtory. There b e i n g no pretext for doing eo.
one WM formed wibboat much trouble, which i t wae t h o u g h t would
nerve the purpose. The Britieh w n e u l , ooe IKr. CEABLTON,went t t ,
Inodoo t b a t year a n d made such repreeentationn. t b a t t h e frigatc
Ouydord W ~ B
ordered out a n d a r r i v e d February 10, 1848. The
PAWLET,
made eix demands, threatening
oornmander, Lord GLOIKIB
war if they were not g r a n t e d by 4 P. Y. t b e n e x t day. Tbeae dtmroda ohbew related to a land h i m of CEABLTONS, a n d to d c
obione of tbe m u r t a in civil euits between foreigners. Before t I i l *
Lour uet for boetilitiee had arrived, the K i n g acoeded to t h e demand*

* *

I.

THE H A WAZIAN ISLANDS.

1i 7

under proteet, nod appealed to t h e British g o v e r n m e n t for dainagee.

But thie w a s not t h e o p p o r t u n i t p l h a t wae wanted, HO a fresh mriee
of demande h a v i n g been made, t o g e t h e r w i t h claime for damngce
nrnoonting to $80,000, t h e K i n g decided b y Dr. J C D D B advice, to
forestall t h e intended eeizure of t h e island by a provisional ceesion;
pending an appeal to t h e justice of t h e home governmen$ E n g I:tnds policy h e r e ie perfectly evident, and no r6marku are neceewry. It may b e mentionod t h a t tho Dr. JUDDhere referred to wae
U I I American citizen, a n d surgeon of t h e American Mission in t h e
i-lands, w h o had been prevailed upon by t h e K i n g to aeeist%im ae
ad Fi eer.
Thie ceseion was made in F e b r u a r y , 1843. T h e BritiRgag
took the place of t h e Hawaiian for five months, a n d a body of
ire
troops was organized a n d drilled by British officere. T h e c o u n t r y
~ - n sgoverned by a mixed commieaion, L o r d GIGOBOE
PAULET
being
at t h e bead of it. Admiral T R ~ M At hSe. commander-iu-chief of t h e
British naval forces i o t h e Pacific Ocean, a r r i v e d in July, 1813. He
immediately iseued a prociamation declaring in t h e n a m e of h i s
government t h a t h e did not accept of t h e provisional ceeeion of t h e
Hawaiian Ielande, a n d on t h e 31et reetored t h e national flag with
impreeeive ceremonies. T h e giet of t h e whole farce c a n easily be
graeped when it is remarked t h a t t h o law advieere of t h e Crown
decided in favor of t h e Hawaiian IalandA on e v e r y point except t h e
CRABLTON l a n d claim.
H o w tar Englande action in t b i s rnattor w a s iiiflueoced by t h e
a n d Mr.WEBSTER,we can
sentiniente expreeeed by President TPLEB
only conjecture. But it ie eignidcant t h a t d e n L o r d GEOROE
PAUL= wae s e n t out, E n g l a n d wae not a w a r e of these public utterances, b u t she moet have been a w a r e of t h e m before Admiral
THOMA8 pulled down t h e English a n d reetored t h e Hawaiian flag.
The l a w advieera of t b e Crown in m a k i n g t b e i r deciRioo had t h e
advantage of a more poaitive public utterance than those quoted
above, for Secretary of State LEOARE,on June 13, 1813, wrote
EDWABDE V E B ~ ~Unitod
T T , Statee Minister at L o n d o n , t h a t , aiICis
well known t b a t * * * we have no wish to p l a n t or acquire
colonies abroad. Y e t t h e r e i s eomething so entirely pecnliar.in t h e
relatione between thie little commonwealtb of H a w a i i a n d ourselves
t h a t w e m i g h t even feel joetified, conaiatently w i t h o u r o w n principlee, i n interfering by force to prevent ita falling into the bande of
any of t h e great powere of Europe.
A commission bad in tbe meantime ale0 visited F r a n c e a n d
England, a n d t h e i r . w o r k waa eo eac&ul,
t h a t on t h e 28th of

\I

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178

T H E HAIVAIIA~LVI S L i l N D S .

THE HAWAIIAN ISLANDS.

November,1883, tbe two governmente of France and England ieeiic I

a joint declaration, in which they recognized the independence c,t'
the islands, and reciprocally eng&
never to take poeseeeion, eithc r
direatJy or under t h e title of 8 protectorate, or under any othir
form, of o n y pert of the territory of which they are compoeed.
To make t h e government more permanent, tho native and foroigri
elementa were now combined into one organization. The executi\ e
a n d judicial departments of the government were organized by a
group of men of remarkably high character and ability. Thc
ancient land tenure waa r y n after aboliebed and the foundation laill

of individnal property in land.

In 1848, tbe old diapnte with Frauce waa reopened by the new
consul, apparently for no better reason than to keep bin hand i n .
In Auguet twg Frepch veseele arrived, and the Admiral, DETROVEBZN, eent tbe King ten demande, which wero drawn up b y the Con-

sul, M. DILLON. The demands being refueed, he landed a force on

the 25tb, took poeaeeqion of the deserted fort, cuetom house and
otber boildinge, and blockaded the hwbor for ten daye. The fort
W M dismantled and the King'e private Facbt destroyed by way of
reprisal, after which he left, taking the Coneul with him. Dr. J U D D
W M eent with a special commieeion to Parie, but could effect nothing
there. They did, however, agree upon the baeie of a new treaty
with England.
A French veaeel w i n landed in December, 1850, h a v i n g
French Commieeioner, Y.PIBBIH,
on board. He preeonted the same
old ten demande, and reeamed t h e policy of interference i n t h e affairs
of t h e kingdom. Hie attitude became 80 menacing that t h e King
ieeu$ a proclamation placing t h e ielande provieionally under t h o
protectorate of the United Statee. Hie action was ratified by the
Legielature. Altbongh tbie ceeeion wau finally declined by the
United Statem, the Frenoh demande were dropped.
A new woetitotion waa adopted i n 1852, wbicb wau very liberal,
and has formed the b d e for all eucceedbg conetitotione. The
nobles we-' to be appointed by tbe K i n g for life, t h e membere of
the Legielature, twenty-four in nnmber, were to be elected b y u n i versal suffrage.
I n 1853 occurred the great emall pox epidemic which carried off
eeveral thouaand of tbe inhabitants of Oahu. IIIt h a t year and tile
next t b e m was an active agitation in favor of annexation to tho
United States This K i n g died in 1864, a n d waa encceeded by h l s
son, PI KAMAEAMBEA
IV. Hia reign WM uneventful. I n 1 8 1 2

1i 9

Bishop STALEYarrived and founded the Anglican Mission. The

King died in 1863 and was eacceeded by h i s brother as K A X E U A YEEA

\*.

This reign was one of activity. H o changed tbe'couetitution

nrbitrarily. The right of euffrage was mado to depead on. a emall
property qualification and ability to read and write; t h e noblee and
repreeentrtivee were to eit and vote in one chamber; the board of
education wae conetitnted ; the bureau of imtnipntion wae founded;
the act to eegregate t h e lepers was passcd, and IL reciprocity treaty
w i t h the United Statee wae negotiated. The dest?-uction of the
whaling fleet in 1871 wae a serious blow to t h o prosperity of the
islands. This King died in 1872.
The King had appointod no enweedor (which was i n hie power
a8 King.
to do), 80 the Legislaturo elected hie couein, LCNALILO,
During this reign tlicre came up the question of ceding or leasing
Pearl Harbor to the United States. T h i s with t h e enforcement of
tbe act for the eegregatiou of t h e lepere brought on a mntiny of
bis household troops, but'did not rerch eo fnr as to overthrow t h e
died i n 1874. He left hie real estate to
government. LUNALILO
found a home for t h e aged Hawaiians.
Tho Legielature was again called u p o n to elect a ruler, and their
the r i d candidate being the
choice was DAVID BALAKACA,
Queen dowager. A riot followed, and a t the request ef the
cnbinet, a body of marines landed from the t w o Ilnited S p t e e ships
in the harbor, dispersed the rioters and guarded the public buildings
for a week.
The low ebb which the people had reachcd i n keeping the constantly vacated throne filled, was etrikingly illustrated i n the choico
of KALAKAUA.lie reputed grandfather had beou hnnged fir
poieoning h i s wife; he had himself becomo a defaulter ma government oficial. Hie family wae known to the native8 ae a n idolatroue
one, and under t h e former monarche he had been an advocate of

absolutism. His career as King did not belie his antecedents. As

w i t h this King commenced the eequence of events leadiug us directly
up to t b e present status of affairs, we will notice hie reign more
in detail. The commercial treaty of 1875 with the United States

wae adopted. I n 1881 be made a tour of the world. Retarning

seerne to havo determined to t r j hin band
from this t o u r , KALAKAUA
at governing under t h e "Divine righte of Kings."
Unlike hie predecettmre, KALAKAUA
eeemed to regard himself 88
merely's king of the native Hawaiians, and foreign reeidente ae
alien invadere. It rleo seemed to be hie chief aim to change the

THE E A WAIIAN ISLANDS.

180

e p t e m of g o v e r n m e n t into a pereonal autocracy. He twice dism i d t b e minietry without aeeigning. any reaeon, immediatcly
after i t b a d been sustained by a vote of t h e Legislature. On tile
second oocrreioo be waa forced to yield, T h e ?national dobt g r e w
from $389,000 i n 1880, to $1,986,000 in 1887. A t t h e m m e time.
t u n d e r t b o existing law, no foreigner could be naturalizcd without
of 1886 t l 1 3 K i n g
t b e E i o g ' e approval. After t h e legislative&+ion
wae virtually hie own Prime Minister, a n d w e n t from one rash act
to anotlrer, u n t i l bie alleged acceptance of bribes i o connection with
t b e a m i g n m e n t of an opium license precipitated the revolution of
1087. Overawed hy t b e unanimity of t h e rn&ement, a n d deserted
by hie followore, t h e K i n g yielded witbont a etruggle. T h e constit u t i o n which he eigned on t h e 7 t h of J u l y , 1887,w a ~a) revision of
t b a t of 1864, intended to p u t an e n d to mere personal g o v e r n m e n t ,
a n d to make t b e executive responsible to t b e repreeentatives of
t h e people. Otllce holdere w e r e made ineligible to seate i o t h e
Legislature. Tbe ministere were henceforth to be removable only
upon a vote of w a n t of w n 6 d e n c e paeeed by a majority of all t h e
elective .memoere of the Legislature. T b e nobles, instead of being
appointed .by t h e King, were to be elected for terme of six years
by elwtore w b o should be poeeeeeed of taxablo property worth
$3,O00,or io receipt of an annual income of $600. The opposition
of t b e wort and of o t b e r adberenta of t b e old regime to t h e reforms
of 1887 led to an inearrectioa (headed by R. W.WILCOX)on t b e
30th of Joly, 1889, which WBB promptly put down, b u t not without
bloodebed. Seven of t h e riotere were killed a n d a large n u m b e r
wounded. In order to recmit hie health, t b e King vieited California
in November, 1890,and died i n San Francisco on January 20, 1891.
Hie remaine w e 6 taken to Honolulu by t b e U.S. S. CharieNton, arriving t b e r e JanPlrry 29th.
On the mme day hi6 sinter took t b e oath to maintain t h e conatitation, and waa proclaimed Queen, u n d e r tbe title of ~ I L ~ I J O K A L A N I .
T b e M i o n of tbe S a p r e m e Court t b a t the t e r m of t b e laet Cabinet
expired d t b t h e K i n g , gave t b e Queea an opportunity to dictate
tsrme in advance to t b e incominRCabinet a n d topaecuw control of
I dl appoiatmente. The legialrtiie eeeaion of 1892 waa protracted to
1 eigbt mootbe, obieiy, it is claimed, by h e r determination to retain
oontml of the eucecutive, aa well aa ta carry t h r o u g h t h e opium a n d
1 lottery bill.. Meanwhile e b e bad caaeed a new constitution to be
I h w l r up. Objedion WM d e e d to i t on t b e g r o u n d t b a t i t would
e d l y bare t r a n d o r m e d t h e g o v e r n m e n t f m m a limited to an
( a b l a t e mooamby, beeidea didhochimag a claaa of citizens w h o

I
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4.

THE H-4 Il*AIIAN I S L A N D S .

161

paid tw*thirds of t h e taxes. T h e a t t e m p t to put t h e constitution

i n t o etfect precipitated an outbreak. F r o m this i t will be Been t h a t
the Queen had t h e < % d i v i nrei g h t " mania as bad or worse than h e r
brother.
As with t h i s revolution commenced t h e active participation of
the United Stntes in t h e affairs of Hawaii. we will here drop t h e
subject, to bc considered more fully under the subhead of LiRelations

w i t h t h e United States..'
A R E A , TOPOORAPIIY. ETC

T h e d i m o n e i o n s a n d areti of the eight inhabited islands a r e as

f'ollows:
Ifawaii. !MI by i4 miles ..........................................
1,210 q u a r v milMaui. 46 by 30 miles :..................
. . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 6 0 q u a r e milea
Oahu, 46 by 2.5 inilea
..........................
ti00 .square miles
Kauai, 25 by 22 miles. ..........................................
Molokai, 40 by 7 milee ................
Isnai. I i by $3 miles.. ..................................................
Siihau, ?O by 5 milts .....................................

Kahoolawr, I t by 8 milrs

Total area of group is

......................................
therefore ..............................

.5!m m l u a r r miles
270 q u a r e miles
150 square miles

97 egiiare mil(E; aluare miles

-

1i.740 q u a r e miles

T h e bulk of t h e p o p u l a t i o n . as well as the chief induatries, are

named.
All these i d n n d s are volcanic. S o o t h c r rocks than volcanic are
found upon a n y of the'm, excepting a few r e m n a n t s of rnisod sea
bcschee, composed of cooeolidatcd coral aande. All t h e larger one8
:ire very m o u n t a i n o u s .
M r u n a Hen is 1 3 , Y O O a n d Y a u n a Loa
13,700 feet high. O n t h e Island of Hawaii t h e volcanic forces are
still active, b u t are extinct on all t h e othem.
The great centrnl pile is Mauna Loa, whic-b is Certainly t h e monarch of modern volcanos. 30 other in t h e world approaches it i o
the vastnees of its mass, o r in t h e magnitude 0s its eruptive activity.
There are m a n y volcanic peaks bighcr, b u t node approach t h e magnitudo of Mauna Loa. -Etne and all ita adjuncts are immeasurably
inferior, wliilo Shaata, Hood a n d Rainier, if melfed d o w o aod run
together into one pile, would s t i l l fall much below t h e volulne of
the island volwno.
It i s a g e n t l y riaing dome, whme steeper slopee are only about
seven degrees> wbilo ita longer ones are only four degrees. Moat
volcanoes h a r e slopes r a n g i n g from BReen-to .forty degrees.
Io g e n e r a l the island g r o u p consist6 of tbe s u m m i t of a g i j p n t i c
m b m a r i n e mountain chain, projecting its -loflier peaks a n d domes
i n L I I firat
~
five i a l r n d a a e

.
9
<
above the water; b u t none of t b e mountains are of sufficient height
to reach t h e lineCof perpetual snows.
Only a small portion of tbe area of tbe islands is capable of supporting a den- population. T h e most babitnblo tracts are near t h e
riea shore, a n d only a part or even a small part of these are really
fertile. The interior portiooe are mouotainoue and craggy, with n
thi8. mil, admirable in (L few localities for pasturazo, but unfit for
agricultare. Deep, rich mile, at altitudoe adapted t&tho growth of
sugar osne, probably form I o v thou &A fortietb part of the entire
area.
The ielunds tbat intOreet the intending immigrant art. Hawnii.
??&sui,Oabu and Kauai.
It ie on these islande tbat coffee, fruits, potatoes, corn and y e g c tablee can be raised by the small investor clod land can be obtained
o n reaeonable terms.
T b e island of Eawaii is the largeet in the group, and preseots
great varietioe of soil and climate. T b e windward (northeast) sidc
is copiously watered by d o e ; t h e leeward side ie not exposed t o
such strong rains, b a t a n ample t ~ ~ p p of
l ywater falln i n the raiu
beli. On this island are now situated numcrouR sugar plantation..
The Kona district bas given t b e coffoe product a namc io the marketa of t b e world. There are tboueande of acres at preeent uncultivated and,only awaiting tbe enterprise of t h e temperate zone to
develop tbem.
h n i ie also .a very fine ieknd, with augar and coffee plantations
and on the wealern side ate small farms where are raised potatoes.
corn, beans, pigs, etc.
The Island of Oahu contains much land uudevoloped, as the
industry ban gone to t b e developing of tbe eugar land of the other
ielands. A line of railroad has been conetructed u p the coast for
thirty milee from Hooblulo. It ia proposed to continue thia clear
aroand t h e bland. This will open u p much good coffee and farmt i n k produce to t b c
iop; land4 a o d offere alm a ready mean6 of

capital,

T H E H A WAIL4N I S L A Y D S .

TEE HAWAIIAN ISLANDS.

1e2

EOIOLVLU.

which is d t a a t e d on the island of Oaba aod is the principal city.

It is sitmated 00 a small but d e harbor, and bas a popnlatios ot
30,OOO. The baeioeee portion is woll built of stone and brick; thta
reeidewee am of wood.
The dty hre sixty-eeoen miles of etreeta and drivee, of which
twenty milee are m a c a d a m i d ; hae a etreet railway eyetem, public

183

:,nd private electric light ~ p t e r n e a, telephone system extending

illroughout the island and ueing 1;300 telephones; a well regulnted
.[ate prison, handsome executivo buildings, custom house nnd court
i.ouse, an insane asylum, public hoepital, Maternity Home, Old
Folks Home, public library, a well equipped P.M. C. A. building,
i,anks, churches, public and private schools; public water works,
Isnth a reservoir and pumping plant; a paid fire department,
t quipped with the most modern Rteam and chemical engines; has a
4;. A . R. Post, branches of the Societies of Sons and1Danphtere
tdthe American Revolution, and numeroue Masonic, Odd FellowR,
and other similar lodges. I n other words, it bas the appliancesand
tonveniences o f an up-to-date American city.
Bauai is called the Garden Island. being 80 well watered. and
3,) luxuriant i n vegetation.
It is largely evoted to sugnr, tliough
rice cuts a large figure in its agricultur
Tho climrto of these ielande is the climate of Paradise. It ie
ncver hot, and except a t considerable altitudes. is n e v e r cold.
Ihirely has the thermometer been known to reach : M I o a t the sea
c o u n t or to fall below 65O. But while the temperature i n uny given
locality is uniform, t h e w is wonderful variet? i n the climate as we
piw from one place to another. Indeed. there are almost as many
climatcs as there arc square leagues.
Relative to human comfort, thc climate is perfection. -1merienns
and Europeans can a n d do work i n the open air a t all Reasons of
the year, as they cnnnot i n countries I c i n g i n t h e Rame lntitude
elsewhere. To notice an instance, Calcutta lie@a little to the north
of the latitude o f Kauai, the most borthcrly ieland, and i n Calcutta
t h e American and European can only work w i t h h i s brain; hard
physical labor he cannot do and lire. On the Hawaiian Ialands
he can work and thrive.
Aa a general rule tho windward eidev are excessirely+ny,
the
It,eward sidoe art) generally arid, but to t h i s there i r e some s t r i k i n g
csceptions. The prevailing winds come from the northeant, and
tilow for about n i n e montbe; tho rest ot tho time they are variable,
Iiiit cliiefly from the soutb. From the above i t is evident that the
climate of the Hawaiian Idande is generally that ota mild summer.
The bottest montbs a r e July and August, when tbe thermometer
somotimce rises to 90, bnt tbis is considered unusual. Frost ib*unknown, rains are warm, and the days and n i g h t a a r e 80 nearly t h e
8:irne iemperature tbat little daily change of clothing is necessary.
Earthquakes occur, bot tbeir water of dieturbance ia in Hawaii,
rind tboy aeldom cause any deotruction.

L
t

THE HAWAIIAN I S L A N D S .

THE HAWAXIAN ISLANDS.

islr

Io tbe PnciEc islands two very dintinct races are fonnd. T h e

Hawaiian& which is the -me raco au inhabita t h e Samoan, Society,
S a v i g a t o r s a n d Friendly Islanda, nleo S e w Zeeland, form one a n d
by far t h e better type, being superior physically, mentally a n d
morally. Phyeically, they are r a t h e r large, a n d have a light brown
color, s t r a i g h t hair and are bandmmely formed, of ~ o o dbearing a n d
well featured. T h e women a r e comely a n d pleaaunt. T h e r e is
nothing a b o u t t b e m navorinp; of t h e equaw, bog o r wench, wbicb is
almost riniveraal a m o n g so m a n y of thd primitive, d a r k skinned
race*. A t the time of discovery by Cuprain COOK,thew people were
by no moans savages. T h e i r w i a l ejetom was as much above ~ U L I
agery on o n e hand as i t w a s below civilization on t h e otber. T h e
3rts possessed b y these people were few and simple. T h e r e were no
metals, a n d even t h e s m n e they had for m a k i n g implements was of
3 poor quality.
So cooeidering t h e i r want of mnterials, their a r b
were hardly to be despised.
T h e i r houses were large a n d commodious structurcs of interwoven grass with a framework of poles, a n d scrupulously neat.
Agriculture was practiced wptematicslly, h n r i n x canals for irrigation, etc. T h 2 y were wonderfully oxpart fishermen and bold a n d
skillrul navigators, v i s i t i n g in t h e i r small canoes t h e Society or
Tahiti Ielands, 2,400 miles d i a b b t . How t b e y could m a k e each
seems m p t e r i o o s , bot t h e y bad a knowledge of astronomy
.omelhing like the old Egpptione a n d Chuldeanw. Tbey bad a Rood
calendar with 365 day8 in t h e y e a r of twelve months, eleven of which
had t h i r t y d a y s a n d oue thirty-fire daya. T h e y had a primitive
arithmetic and a eystem of n a m e m l e by w h i r h they could n u m b e r
to hundred8 of thousands. T h e religion was io 8ome respecte anali g o u a to the Greeks.
0

Csptain Coor'e eetirnate of the population (400,000) i n his d a y

tuby b a v e been eurgprated, b u t t h e first census, t a k e n in 1832.
efter terrible plaguee and ravagee of disease, showed a popolation
of 130,000. To fmr yeam th e c 8 0 8 u ~marked a decreaeo of 109,500.
io 1860 t h e inhabitante h a d dimioiehed to 84,000; i n 1853 to 73,000.
i n 1860 to 69,000, a n d i n 1872 to 66,000. Soon after tbie latter
date, the government, u n d e r the stimulus of t h e increased s u g a r
production, began t h e i m p o r u t i o n of foreign laborers io large n u m be-, a n d t b e population m p i d l y ' i n c r e d , b u t t h e oativo race continued rdsrdily to decceoge, and in 1890 i t w a s reduced to 34,000
pur0 H s w a i i a n e sod 6,OOd .half-castee. Io 1896 t h e population was
sl, followt3;
,

Ma.

..................
.i .............
..........
:......
...........
...;....._.........
Briti.h .....................................
German....................:. .............
Norwe@an..................-..._.......
Porcugueae.................................
Japan-. ............. ........._........
chinem...........,.........................
h a t h Beer lelrrqde ............- ........
Other Nataonal~ths............_.......

Hawaii-

put Eawaiian.......
American
k..

.
1p75

14,620

16,399

423ti

4,249

1,111

1.m

8u
688

218
8,202

162

868

19213
19.ltiX

33 1
448

2%
2,449

1%
158

Giriog a total of 109,020 a g a i n s t 89,990 i n 1890, a gain of approximately t w e n t y - t w o per cent., practicPlIF all by immigration.
M t h e decrecrse a m o n g t h e Oativee since 1890 ia ten per cent. Exprembd in perceotqp, t h e population i s ae follows:
Native Hawaiian..................................................................._28 per cent
Japanem

0
..=..........
................................................................

E per c e n t

......;................................................................ ......"... 'L per cent

Americsuu and Enropecurr, (Portuguese)birth and descent ...... E per cent
Mired blood ...................................................
i ..................... 8 per cent

Ohinem

The origin of the Polynesian race has alwaye been r mystery.

The viow most favored is, t h a t t b c y came from t h e EMLIndiee at a
remote period.
I f not from Southeastern Asia, they had at least communicated
w i t h tbem i n one w a y or anothar.
For when Captain Coo= discovered t h e i e l m d e t h e y had pige, dogs and cbickeoe of Aeiatic
origin, but tbe a t t e m p t to make tbem deeceodaota of Asiatic ~ p l a
wo far as language, m y t h s a n d legendary lore goee, utterly hila.
T h e language is very largely made u p of voweld. g i v i n g to t h e
spoken tongue a pleasant, liquid eound, somewhat ditacult to acquire.
The cooeonants all have t h e English sound, t h e vowel8 t h a t of t h e
German vowel, except i, which i s t h e asme aa tbe G e r m a p ia. There
are no silent letters i n t b e written Hawaiian language. Eogliab ie
very generally epokeo t h r a u g b o u t the g q p .

Wbb tbe cootinaed r a p i d .incream of imported laborband t h e

a t e d y deolime of t h e

native raoe.

it

m a y readily be m e n . unless

obecked by &me caam not now to be anticipated, t h e early extinction of %beE a w a i i n mmst inevitably occur.
Tbe alimate, however, ie a bealtby one. T b e r e are no virulent
fevpm Bpidemim d d o m vieit t h e ielanda They now have a careh l a p t e m of qaaraatioe. LOOR
a n d oheat troublee are almost o n kmoWin to t h e natioca. Leproey,noa largely under medical control.
Is being graddlp stamped out. O n tbe island of hfoloksi a districr.
of about 5,000 sore@ baa been eet .side f o r the Leper settlement.
I

iI

185

/-

THE H A WAITAN ISLANDS.

THE HAWAIIAN I S L A N D S .

The transition of t b i s poople from barbariem to civilization baa

been wooderfolly r a p i d and complete. It i s a r e m a r k a b l e fact, t h a t
i t in t b e only dark ekinoed race t b a t bee e v e r been b r o u g b t i n t o
a n t a & and relafioo w i t h c i v i l i n t i o n w i t h o o t war a n d g e n e r a t i o n s
of bloodehed, eodiog in subjugation. There c a n be little question
t h e t a i t i s tbe fluest and moat i n t e l l i g e n t race of d a r k ekinned

where t h e r e 'is aofecient moisture. T h e yield o f f r u i t from tbie

] , l e n t ie aetouishing. T h e cocoa tree grows a n d b e a m well i n moat
I.Inces. T h e tea p l a n t g r o w s well a n d yields n tea of p o o d quality.
A m o n g fodder plants g r o w i n g well nnd useful for a n i m a l s m a g
1 c mentioned : Tcosinto reana, a n a t i v e of Guatemala, which ie a
I.irge p l a n t , r e q u i r i n g eixteen fect o f g r o u n d for ite d e r e l o p m e n t .
..;\so t h e G u i n e a grass, o n e of tlre grandest fodder plants. f o r m i n g
1.,rge bunches which grow to t b e height of e i g h t feet. a n d furniehea
:,ii a b u n d a n c e of sweet a n d t e n d e r feed.
I n moist places it can be
t ut e v e r y t w o Ihontbs.
Caffir corn, E g y p t i a n millet a n d s o r g h u m

186.

people i n tbe'world. Aod a g a i n , t b i e wae d o e i n a great rneAeure to

t b e taot, w i d o m a n d good -nee of t h e firat miesionariee.
The o a t i v e s ere i n tbemeelvee a good tempered, light-hearted,
plscurare-loving people, not inclined to turbulence, n o r incvned to
rovolt e g a i n s t any form of w v e r o m e n t . T b e y are b r a v e individually, bet .B a nation are p c e ~
l a v i n g , a n d i n a military eenee a r e
-not worth cooeideratioo. pxcept p o l i t i a l l y , t h e natives are b u t an
u n i m p o r t a n t e l e m e n t of t b e people, and t b e i r conse-or
opposition
wold havt'but little influence on t h e ~ m m
of cvbnte.
~
Little
rooistame could be expected from t h e m evep i n defenee of t h e i r
coontry.

,crow well.
A m o n g fiber jdantp may bc mentioned particularly tho Rim1
Iltsrnp, which. will prow a n d flourish on lands t h a t a r e too dry for
; ~ n y t I i i n gelsc. The bow s t r i n g h e m p requireti w e t , rich Innd, but
yielde the best fiber of all fiber plantr. T h e r a m i e p h n t grows
yl~lendidlc,a n d afler being w c l l established. will Field from four to
F I X crops per a n n u m .
T h e mainstay of t h e Hawaiian Islands hns for tlic last t h i r t y - t i r o
v w r s been t h e e u g a r i n d u s t r y . B u t t h i s required l a r p capital for
expensive maclrincry, a n d bas n e v e r p m r c d r e i n u n e r n t i r e to tlJe
r i n s l l investor. Rice, n e i t h e r t h e European nor .inicricnn can cult i r a t e a8 Inborem. I t requires w o r k i n g i n niarphy lands. arid t h o u g h
tin t h e islands i t yields LWO crops p e r year. none b u t tho C h i n a m a n
can cultivate i t ~ u c c e a n l u l l ~ - .
The m a i n s t a y a f t e r rice and nugar. is coffee. T h i s is eaventially
the c r o p of the future. a n d bids fair to become as i m p o r t a n t n staple
i t s sugar.
Coqee doe8 not require t h e a m o u n t of capital t h a t s u g a r
does. a n d can be worked r c m u o c r a t i v e l y o n a small a r e a . It ie
ehtiruated.that t h e r e t u r n at t h e end of t h e fourth p e a r on a s e v e o t y tive-acre coffee .plantation will p a y r u n n i n g expenses for t h a t year,
and from t h a t $me o n a r e t u r n of from $8.000 to 810,000 per
a n n u m may be iealized. Rice ie t b e s t a p l e food of n e a r l y all t h e .
laborers on the icoffee plantatioos. h dry land rice is now being
tried in t h o coffee dietricte, a n d t h e r e i s no d o u b t b u t t b a t t h e rice
used by t h e laborer on t h e coffee plantation can be raised on the
.
spot, r e d u c i n g t b e coet of living to t h o laborers. a n d m a k i n g them
niore contented.
Only those who h a v e been b r o u g b t d i r e c t l y i n t o contact w i t h
the commercial relations between Elraaii a n d t h e United States
realize ire importance. T h e firat q u a r t e r of t b e present c e n t u r y the
s;rndal wood t r a d e WIM at i t a height. T h e wood wae in great req u h t n t Canton, w h e r e i t waa Rold for incenee a n d t h e manufacture

LQ~XCULTUEIIAND COYYERCB.

Almoet all k i n d e of vegetables of t h e fineet q u a l i t y and g r o w i n g

i n t h e greubtest profoeion c a n be had e v e r y d a y i n the year. S t r a w berriee, wpberries, ctc., can bo h a d all t h e year a r o u n d . Beeiden
orangee and limee, w b0i c h g r o w to perfectioo i n t h i e coontry, m a n y
fhib p e c o l i u t o tropical and nemi-tropieal climstee flourieb. A m o n g
the more importan) may b e . m e n t i o n e d t h e alligator pear, which
bean$fruit in spleodid q u a n t i t y i n from t h r e e to five y e a r e from t h c
seed.. The m a n g o ie a tropical f r o i t tree t h a t g r o w s i n t h e greatest
pr~fhniooaod bears eoormoos c r o p of delicious fruit. T h e g u a v a
g r o w s wild i n all parte of t b e ielnnde below 3,000 feet. T h e poha is
a qnick growing shrub bearing a b e r q t h a t m a k e e excellent jelly
a n d jam. Pineapplee are at home on t h e s e islands. A n o t h e r valuable f r u i t iodigeooue to the c o u n t r y i s the papaia. T h i e can bc
d e e d i o enormous ,qaaotitiae, aod is fine for f a t t e n i n g p i p a n d
*
obichena Tbe m i l k y joice of t b e u n r i p e frnit, even if d i l a t e d with
*r,wndere
any Umgb meat t b a t in washed in i t quite tender. .I
eiinall pieoe of the onripe fiait p l a e i o t h e w a t e r i n which :a
obiohm or tough pi- of meat i s boiled makes i t tender and eaeily
dip&.
The tam is a valoable food p l a n t a n d i s indigenous
Tbe CU.P.
bm-beeo i n t m d o d , a n d i s i m p o r t a n t for food, and
T h i s ie t h e plaot much need for food b r thc
* pieldr ebondaotly.

ppulntieo of Brasil.
B e n a ~ io
s grest v a r i e t y

I P7

are grown i o all parts o f t b e ielrnd-

.
**

188

of fadcy articlae. It

WIM

parchwed by d e pkal of 13% poundq

tbe prim varying from $8.00 to $10.00 for the picul. T h i s tra&
emonnted mme y&re to aa much IW $400,000. T h i e wood, a h f l e i t
laeted,*WM therefore a v e r i t a b h m ne of wealth for t h e chiefs, b?
mesne of which they were e118
to b u y drenrms, liquors, boat..
a n d baboonem, M well M d k a , a n d o t h e r Chineae goods, for whicli
they paid exorbitant pricee.
The 6rsb whale ship called at t h e inlands in 1820, a n d was ROOII
followed by many others. T h e i r n u m b e r Boon increased to 101,
every year, a d t h e furnishing of suppliee for them became the
ahief ~ ~ ~ nofr t hc o eislands as t h e sandal wood becafile exhausted
IC wae estimated t h a t eacb s h i p s p e n t t h e s u m of $80,000 annually
In 1845 t b e r e w a r e 500 Rbipa arrived. By 1878 t h e whaling trade
had died ont.,
. The treaty m a d e by Commodore JONESin 1826 is entitled
6 Treaty of
friendebip, commerce a n d navigation between t h c
U n i t e d State8 a n d Sandwich I d a n d e , a n d wa8 signed at Honolulu
December 23, 1826, In thie are provisions for tile protection of
t h e eubjecta of t h e t w o contmactinp; parties when engaged in cornm e d a l i o t e m n m ; each & d o n a g r e e i n g to g r a n t to all citizen*
and sobjeccts of t h e other, all privilegea g r a n t e d to tbo most favored

nation.
B e t k e e n the yearg 1850 n n d 1860 ( t h e liberal constitution heretofore referred not& 1862), a large part of t h e g o v e r n m e i t land
WM mold to t b e h q r n o n people i n small tracts at nominal pricee.
The rapid settlement of California opened a new m a r k e t for t h e
prodacfiope of t b e blende, and g a v e u great etimulus to agriculture
For a time large pro6ts were made raising potatoes for t h e CaliWheat wae cdltioated i n o n e or more dietrich, a n d
a s b m florrring mill waa erected i n Honolulu i n 1854. T h e next
year 463 barrels of Hawaiian flour wore exportod. A coffee plantation w a e started in Kauai in 1842, a n d promisod well, but way
attecked by b l i g b t aher t h e eevere d r o u g h t of 1851-2. T h e export
dooffee row to 208,000 pound6 i n 1850,b u t then fell off. T b e
export of.epp;.r ooly &ached 500 tooe in 1863. The s o g a r mill9
were pnemllp worked by o x e n or mulea, a n d the molseeee d m i n e d
in theold-flrehioned way.
In 1866-7 a reciprocity treaty with t h e United Ytatee was negotiated, bmt failed of.rati8cation by t b e United States Senate. T h c
dmoet total d d r a o t i o n of t h e whaling deet i n 1871 WBB a aevwc
blow te the prosperity of the ielanda.
In 1875 a treaty of commercial reciprocity wae ratitled with

fornia market.

THE H A 119 IZA A* ISZ, A X D S .

THB E A ~ A I I A Z V
ISLANDS.

1RP

the United States, a n d w e n t into effect in September, 1 8 i 6 . The

Hawaiian treaty was negotiated for t h e purpose of securing control

of t h e islands a n d m a k i n g t h e m industrially a n d commercially a

part of t h e United Statee, a n d prerentitlg any o t h e r g r e a t power
from acquiring a footbold tbere. which might be a d r e r s e t o t h e welt i r e a n d safety of o u r Pacific coaRt in time of war. By thia t r e a t y
e w h party agreed to a d m i t all t h e articles nsmed i n a certain
?;,.hedule,t h e same boing t h e g r o w t h a n d manufacture or produce of
the o t h e r party, i n t o all its porta free of dutF. a n d no expdrt
charges were to be charged by either p a r t y on said articles. And
further, - I t ie agreed on t h e part of his Hawaiian Majesty t h a t YO
long as this t r e a t y shall remain in force he will not lease o r otherwise dispose of or create a n y lien upon a n y port. harbor, orcother
territory in bia dominions, o r g r a n t a n y rpecial privileges or r i g h t s
ot use therein to any o t h e r power, state or government, nor mnke
any t r e a t y b y which any o t h e r nation sh:rll obtain t h e s a m e p r i r i leges, relative to t h e ndmiaaioii of any articles free of d u t y , hereby
secured to t h e United States. T h i s to r e m a i n i n force for seven
years, a n d after t h a t t o b e terminated by either p a r t y on a Fears
11 o tice.
T h e development of t h e resources of t b e islands which hru, resulted from this treaty baa surpassed all expectation.
Prior to t h e
negotiation of tbia treaty, t h e commerce of t h e islands was inconsiderable a n d was in a Ianguinhing condition, having decreased a8

follows :

Ymr.

Impwta

kp 18.

cwcon

Re-.

.VO.O~

v&

Eaieirp.

IN!)
1\74

............................
.............................
... .,... .....................

S!?,M.MNi$1.743.000
I,IO,(KU

!.w,ooo .

IS!.V~

1*%

- .

...........................

r,164,000

1.6?2,oOo
8,~1,000

15n15,W

8215.000
183,oooI
~4.000

tj.-3j,OOO

j,

127
ILW

386
t,

Of these imports seventy-eix per c e n t came from the United

States. F r o m t h e d a y t h e reciprocity treaty w e n t into operation
the island trade. in all ite braoches, itlcreaeed rapidly, a n d to-day
Hawaii ie t h e beat consumer which our Pacific coast bas; t h e largeet
consomer of United States prodacteof any single mantry bordering
on t h e Pacific. T h e r e is not a n i a d u s t r y i n t h e United States
wliich is not bene6ted by t b e Hawaiian t m d e , a n d wbich would
no1 be injnred by the abrogation of t h e treaty, or dirorsion of
Hawaiis t r a d e eleewhere.

44

,a

.
c

. .'
T f f E E A WA1141V ISLANDS.

190

T H E Hirl WAIIA N ISLIIAVDS.

Tbe 6oancial statue of t b e public of t o - d r y ie etrong. TI'?

.country i s self-aup&rting, aolveot a n d prosperous.

Jaonary 1,1897,
011 band

C&

8tatii.i

WU:

The

nscCpIm.

January 1, 1896 ...............................................

2,49(j .;O

m e revwnue for 1896 wee : ,

Fmm Custom ;..............................................................658,895 .'?

Fmpl PoetofEce- ........................................................
77.488 , 4
From Internal Revenue .............. ......................
.......... 1.%0,937 i'l

Total..........

...... ...........................
B

.............. .SI,W7,818 13

BXPEIIBFS.

General expenm.for 1898 -...............................................

.....................
I n w e 011 dl Imos, ..........................-..............

Yl,&il .&?I :;:1

236,&j.i9s!)

..;...................................................... 16,100 (10

.
.
ntalexpenaee ................i .......................................
a b n d December 31, 1998_............................................ $1,90%1wtl?
93,6?7 %:
TF _................................................................gi,s97,eis i a
bonds paid _..,

~.

t=

; Tbie shows aner p a y i n g a l l r u n o i o g expenees, intereet on d l

loa?e, and r e d k m i n g $16,000 worth of bonde falling d u e , tlie
treaadry closed tbe pear with a caeh surplus of o v e r 871,000 greater
t h a n at \he b g i n n l n g .
. T h e total debt January 1, lkgi, was $3,879,608.35. With tlic
exw3ion of $222,000 of fire per cent bonds which are redeemable
io 1901,all of the debt con be taken u p at a n y time. With t h e exoeptioo bf $1,000,000 held in L o n d o h practically nll of t h e bond9
are held io Hawaii. T h e w t i m a t d value of public lands in lb!U
waa $4,389,550, the income from n b i c h i o 1896 wae 8137.779.

!.

h .

-,

OOMYEBCIAL A N D NAVAL IYPOBTANCE-DUB

TO POSITION OF HAWAII % S

ISLANDS.
I

* ,

1
'

I
I

,
, .
0 . .

'

I
1

Tbe r e m a r k s with reference to t h e naval importance of tlioIe

ieiaode are taken from a n article by Captain A. T. MAEAN,U. S.S ,
and publiebed in !t"Ae Poturn, March, 1893.
The commeroial importance baeed up00 imports a n d exports Iias
jU6& been c&dered.
Tbere is, however, unother sido to thi.ir

cotnmemial importrrnce which ia w o r t h y of brief notice. T h e i m portanae of the relation of H a w a i i to the commerce of th.6 Pncifie
i e demonstrated by t h e tlret t h a t of tbe eeven trane-PacificPeteamst~~p
I*
lb? plying between tbe North American Continent and Japio,
ia
WWbioa,
and Amstralia,all bat o
. Upon tbe opening of the

191

all of t h e ebippiog bound for Asia, m a k i n g use thereof. wil stop a t

Honolulu for coal a n d aupplice.

Hawaii ie to day t h e mainetnp of t h e Americnii merchant marine
engaged in deep R e a foreign trade. D u r i n g tlie p a r e n d i n g J u n e
30, 1896, t h e number of .4merican vessels e n t e r i n g American porte,
wae, from H i r w a i i , 191, from ull o t h e r foreign c o u n t r i e s only 298.
T h e total number of voeaels,entering Hawtriinn ports in t h e same
time w a ~386, of which 247 wero Americnn. niid twenty.aix w e r e
Hnwniinn, which nre pructically owned by A m c r i e a n ~also.
T h e total Hawaii:in trndo (importa a n d cxporra) i n 1896. was, as
we have seen. 822.679,?91, of which 92 46 per cent. w s with t h e
Uuited Stntce, a n d 82.55 per cent. of t h i a in America veeeels, 5.26
per cent. i n Hawaiian, givinK a total of 85 81 per cent. of nll trude
practically bnuled. b y Americnn merchantmen. I t is t h e o n l y
foreign commcrco to-day t b a t w e can cnll o u r own.
R u t t b i s ie of amall importaiice r h e u compared to ite etrnt@gical
position. H n p i i is t h e only spot in t n e v a s t territory of t b e Pacific,
from t h e equator o n t h e cloritb to Alatrkn a n t h e nortb, a n d between
America 00 t b e eirat a n d Asia on t b e weet, w h e r c a ton of coal, n
pound of bread, or a d r i n k of w s t e r can he obtnined, lience ita great
importance ae P port of call for aU vcuaels. / Broadly epeaking, Hawaii &y be w i d to lic a b o u t one-tbird of
the distance on t h e accustomed route from Snn Fiancieco to J a p a n -

ese o r CbioeRe porta, from S a n Francisco to Aua ralie. fiom ports of

British Colombia to Austrrlia or Britieh Indin. od alrnoclt one-bnlf
the
from tbo of
I ~at hs hmi pu sof
Panama
Theway
construction
canal
a c r wto tTokoham
b e iathmoeund
( a nHongkong.
d it is eure

to conit)) would at once extend this gcograpbical relation to the

ports of t b e Gulf of Mexico a n d of t h e Atlantic seaboard of' S o r t b
and South Americu.
" D u e to t h e development of British Columbia in t h e Northenqtern Pacific nod B o w Zealand io t b c southwestern, we find G r e a t
Britain holding t w o extremities of a l i n e between which ehe niuat
ioevitably deeiro t l i a i n t c r m e d i a t e l i n k s ; nor i e there any good rea.y)n why'she ebould not have tliem, except t h e superior, more urgent,
more vital neceeeitiee of a n o t h e r people-our own. Of these links
the Hawaiian g r o u p p"easee udique importance. not for i t s intrin-ie commercial value, b u t for i t s formidable position for maritime
and military control."
&&The
military e r eirategic value of a n a r a L position depends
upon ita position, upon i t s etrengtb a n d u p 0 0 ita reaourcwa. Of t h e m
three t h e first ie of r b e moat consequence, becnuee i t rceulie from

c-

192

THE HAWAIIAN ISLANDS.

T H E HAWAIIAN ISLd,VDS.

193

tbe. natoro of tbinge; whoreas tbe two lattor, whon deficient, can $e
a r t i d d a l l y eopplied, io wbole or i n part. Forti.6cations remedyqhe.
nemkoeee of a poeition, foreeigbt accnmolatee beforehand t h e rewnrceo w b i c b n a t u r e does not yield on t h e a p t ; b u t i t i e not within
i t b e * p o w o r of m a n to c b a n g e t b o geop;rnpbicrl eiturtion of a point
wbicb lien ooteide tbe limit of strqtegic effect."
*&Toa n y h e viewing a m a p t h a t ebows the full e x t e n t of thc
'Pacific ( e w map&.B')Ocean, witb it6 ehoree on either aide, t w o
circumetaocee will be etrikingly a n d immediately apparent. He
will oee at a glance t b a t t h e Sandwicb Jelands s t a n d by themselves.,.
! io a etate of epmparntive isolation, amid a vaut ex$anee ot'sea,qndr'
a t p i n , tbat t h e y form t h e c e n t e r of a l a r p circle, whom radiue is
approximately a n d v e r y clowly t h e dietance from Honolutu to San
Fmncieco. T b e circumference of tbie circle, if trouble ie taken to
deecribe i t w i t b cornpan@ on t b e map, will be Been o n t h e west and
SOP& to paes t h r o u g h t b e o n t e r f r i n g e of the syetem of archipelr.
'goes, wbicb, from Australia a n d New Zealand, extond to t h e northeaet toward t h e American continent. W i t b i n t h e circle a few
Rcattered islets, b a r e a n d unimportant, seem only to ompbaeize t h e
failere.of n a t u r e to bridge, t b e interval neparatinp; E a w a i i from ber
peere of t b e Southorn Pacibc. - Of t h w , bowever, i t m a y be notod
t b a t eome, like F a n n i n g a n d Chrietmae Ielande, have within a few
yeare been taken. i n t o British p e e e i o n . T h e diatance from Snn
Fraobisoo to Hooolulu, 2,100 miles eaey s t e a m i n g dietance, ia eubstantially tbe %me ae t b a t from Honolulu to t b e Gilbert, Yareball,
&mono, Booiety and Marqueem p o u p ~all
, u n d e r Eoropean control,
except &mor, i o wbicb we bavd a part infloence."
'#Toh v e a-caotral poeition encb ae thie, a n d to be alone, bari n g QO khal and a d m i t t i n g no alternative t b r o u g h o u t an exteneire
tract, are conditione t b a t at once I x t h e attontion of t h e e t r a t e g i e d
i t m a y be added of t b e etateaman of commerce likewiee. B u t to
.tbie striking combinstion ie to be added t b e remarkable r e l a t i o m
borne by t b e w eingnlarly placed island6 t o t b e great commercial
matem traversing t b i e vaet expanse known to 06 ae t h e Pacific; not
only, bowever, to tboee now actoally i n nee, i m p o r t a n t 86 t h e y are.
bat deo to tboee'tbat m e e t necessarily be Called i n t o being b y that
fbtore to wbicrb t b e H a w a i i a n incident compele oor too unwilling
attention. Ciraornstancee, ae wae before tritely r arked, createc
oenterq between whiub communication neceeearily ifnllowe, a n d in
thd vista of tbe futmre all, bowever dimly, diecern a new a n d great
ambr that m a m t l y mdditp e x i r t i e g ~ B Iroutee,
I
as well am b r i n g
mew 00- into ?xielenoe, W b e t b e r tho canal of t b e Central Ameri-

' I

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L

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. TEE E A W b I A N ISLANDS.

THE HAWAIIAN ISLANDS.

can Ietbmne be'eveotnrlly at Panama or Nicaragua matters little to

ground for nationnl *elf-assertion. It is unfortunate, doubtless, for

t h e question n o w io b a n d , altboogh, i n c o m m o n w i t h y e t A m e r i cane who b a v e t h o u g b t upon t b e subject, I believe i t w i l r s u r e l y be

at the latter point: W h i c h e v e r i t be, the convergance thtere of eo
m a n y s h i p from t h e A t l a n t i c a n d Pacific will constitute a c e n t e r ot'
commerce, i n t e r s c o s n i c , a n d inferi f to any, i n t h e world.
one wboee approaches will be j e a l o u d y w a t c h e d a n d whose relation?
to the other centers of t h e Pacifio by linea j o i n i n g i t to t h e m must
be 'carefully examined. Such sta'dy of t h e commercial routes a u d
their rehti00S to the H a w a i i a n Islands, &ken t o g e t h e r w i t h t h e
o t b e r etrateflc considerations provionsly set forth, completo t h e
syoopeis of f r r c t a n b i c h d e t e r m i n e t h e v a l u e of t h e group for conferring e i t b e r commercial or n a v e l control."
,
" b f e m o g a g a i n to t b e map, i t will bo men t h a t while t h e
ehorteet rootee from t h e I s t h m u s to A u s t r a l i a a n d N e w Zealand, as
well tu tboee to S o u t h America, go well clear o f any p r o b a b l e connection w i t h or interference from E a w a i i , those directed t o w a r d s
C b i n a or Japan, pass e i t b e r t h r o u g h t h e groop or i n cloee proximity
to it. ~ e s n e l sfrom Central A m e r i c a b o u n d to t b e porb o f North
America oome, of course, w i t h i n t h e influence o f o u r o w n coast.
Tbeee cirOumstances, and t b e e x i s t i n g recognized distribution of .
political p o w e r in t b e Pacific, point n a t a r a l l y to an international
acquioeence in certain defined apheres of influence for our own
. c o u n t r y a n d for others, sach as Bas a l r e a d y been reacbed by G r e a t
Britain, Germany a n d Holland i n t h e S u t h w e s t e r n Pacific, to
avoid conflict t b e r e between t h e i r rospective claims. Though
artifioisl in form eocb recognition would, i n t h e caee here suggested,
depend upon perfectly n a t u r a l ae well am indisputable condition8
T h e United Statee is by far t h e greatest i o numbers, intereeta a n d
power of bbe communities b o r d e r i n g upon t h e N o r t h Pacific; a n d
the r e l a t i o n s to t b e H a w a i i a n I s l a o d e to hef would be, a n d actually
are, m o r s n u m e r o u s and m o r e i m p o r t a n t t h a n they. can be to any
otber etate. T b i s i s true, a l t h o u g h unfortunately for the equally
natural rishem of G r e a t B r i t a i n a n b e r colonies, t h e d i r e c t route&om British Columbia to h t e%I
A u s t r a l i a a n d ?Sew Zealand.
w h i c h d e p e n d u b n no b u i l d i n g o f a f o t o r e c a n a l , paea as neni
t b e i s l a n d s M thoee a l r e a d y mentioned. S u c h a fact, t h a t t h i additioml b i g b w a y runs close to the g r o u p , b o t h a u g m e n t s a n d
smphasixem t h e i r strategic i m p o r t a n c e , b u t i t does not affect tb&
statement j u s t m a d e tbat t h e i n t e r e s t of t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s i n them
in greater t h a n t h a t of Gpat B r i t a i n , a n d d e p e n d e n t upon a naturnl
ab ob^, nearnew, which brre a l w a y s been a d m i t t e d ae a reasonable

t h e wishell of British Columbia a n d for t h e communications, Com.mercial a n d m i l i t a r y , d e p e n d i n k upon the Canadian Pacific Railwuy, t h a t t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s lies botween t h e m a n d t h e S o u t h Pacitic,
and i s t h e statu nearest to H a w a i i ; b u t t h o facta boing so, t h e
intereeta of our 65,000,000 people i n a position 80 vital t o o u r role
in t h e Pacific, m u s t be allowed to outweigh thoae of t h e 6,000,000
of Canada."
"Prom the foregoing considerations may be inferred t h e importnoce of t h e H a w a i i a n IeltrndR as a position powerfully influencing
t h e cacnmcrcial a n d military control of t h e Pacific, a n d p p e c i a l l y
of t h e N o r t h e r n Paci6c. i n which t h e U n i t e d States, geographically,
lirs t h e e t r o n p s t r i g h t tq assert herself T h e s e are t h e main a d vantages which c a n be termod positive, those, namely, w h i c b
ilirectly a d v a n c e commercial s e c u r i t y a n d n a v a l control. To t b e
negative a d v a n t a g e s of poasession, b y r e m o v i n g conditione whicb,
if t h e islands wore i n t h e h a n d s of a n y o t b e r power, would constituto to u s disadvantages a n d thrents, alluAion only will be made.
T h e serious menace t o our F'nci6c coast a n d o u r Pacific t r a d e , if so
i m p o r t a n t a position w e r e b e l d . b y P poeeiblc e n e m y , ' h a s boen frcq u e n t l y mentioned i n t h e press a n d d w e l t upon in t h e diplomatic
papers which are f r o m t i m e to t i m e given to t h e public. It may b e
assumed t h a t i t ia generally acknowledged. P p o n one particular,
Iiowevor, .too much stress c a n n o t be laid, one to which naval officers
c a n n o t b u t be inore sensitive t h a n t h e g e n e r a l public, a n d t h a t is
t h e immenso d i s a d v a n t a g e to us of any marjtimc e n e m y h a v i n g a
coaling etation wcll within 2,500 miles, tw t h i s is, of e v e r y p o i u t of
o u r coast line from Puget S o u n d to Y e r i c o . W e r e t h e r e m a n y
others available, we m i g h t 6 n d i t difficult to exclude from all. T h e r e
is, however, but one. S h u t out from t h e Sandwich Islande as a
coal base, a n e n e m y is t h r o w n back for eupplios o f fu+ to didtancea
of 3,50Q or 4,000 miles, or between 7,000 a n d 8,000 going a n d coming, an i m p e d i m e n t to sustained maritimo operationo well n i g h
prohibitive.
T h e coil mines of British Columbjp cbnstitute, of
coiirse, a qualification to this s t a t e m e n t , b u t upon t b e m if need
iirooe, we m i g b t at least h&pe to impose oome t r a m m e l s by action
from the land side. It is rarely t h b t so i m p o r t a n t a factor i n t h e
a sea f r o n t i e r -is conccntrated
attack or defense of a coast line-of
i i i a single position, a n d t h o circumstances r e n d e r d o u b l y i m p e r a t i v e upon u s to secure i t i f we righteously can."
'-ULet us start from t h e f u n d a m e n t a l t r u t h , w a r r a n t e d by history,
t h a t t h e control of t h e seas, a n d especially a l o n g t h e g r o a t e r lines

194

195

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THP H A W A I I A ~IALANDS.
:
drawn by national interest or:oatioosl commorce, is cbief among the
196

merely material *mente, io t h e powor and proepbity of nations.

h a m tbe aen is t h e world's great medium of circulation. T h e w
ie, bowever, one caution to be given from t h a t military point ot
view beyond the need of which t h e world ha8 not yet passed. M i l i 1
tary positione, fortified poata, by land or by sea, however strong or
admirably aituatod. do not by themeelvec confcr control. People
.often m y tbat eucb an island or harbor will give control of such :I
body of wator. It is a n utter, deplorable, ruinouk mietake."
Contrast witb t h e words of thie able strategist, those of C A R L
~SCEIJBZ,
when he s a p : .'.It would rstber be apt
/x tile powere a vulnerable point which we do
absence of which is 80 diecouraginp to a
to us.
We shall by annexing Hswa' simply acquire :L
int." It eeeme the h e i g h t of folly o h e a r o n e of o u r
e p k thue, for I would m y m t b e r that we have no i n point, all our aerr coast, including the Great Lakes, being
allr vu1,oerable. And wbo can doubt b u t that this exof t b e Interior, and present paid political writer, does not
' influence ten voting men for every one tbat listons to t\;e words ot'
t h e ableat exponent of the eea power among English rpcakiog
natiooe.
Tho provision8 of the treaty leasing oraceding us Pearl Harbor.
will-be referred to directly. B u t i t may not be amiss to briefly
describe Pearl Harbdr, quoting from tbe reportc of Generals SPEO
~ E L D
and ALIXANDIB,
made in 1873 : (See Y a p '' C.")
''Honolulu is. the only good commercial barbor in tho whole
group. T h e barbor of .Honolulu can not be dofended from tlir
shore. An ooomy cpold take u p bis poeition outaide the entrance
and command t b e entire anchorage, ae well aa the .$own itself. T h e
barbor of Pearl B i b ie t h e only one on t h e ielande tbat can bc
made to satisfy alF the conditione necessary for a harbor of refuge i I I
t i m e of war. Pearl River is a fine ehtwt of deep wator extending
inward about six m i l e from the moutb, wbore it could be completcly
defended by shop batteries. T h e depth of the water after passing
tbe bar is amp$ fyr any vessel. It i s divided into three portioncalled locks, t b e eaet, middle and weet lock. T h e euat lock is t l i (
beet, bariog .the most room,tbe deepest water and presenting tlic
p e s t e a t facilities 'for ehore improvements. I n the middle of thi,
lock ie an ieland called 'Rabbit leland,' baving deep water CIOW to
its sboree a n d 600 anchorage all around it. Tbie island and t b c
adjacent shore to t b e north and weat of it afford :the most advnn-

* * *

THE H A WATIAiV I S L A N D S .

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197

198

THE @LWAIIAN ISLAXDS.

TEE E A W d I A N ISLANDS.

tageons location for a n a v d e p o t of supplies a n d eqoipment i n a l l

tbeee w a t e r a B u t t h e r e is o t b mcieot w a t e r at present for heav?
vegseb to enter t b i s P e a r l
r harbor. A t t h e entrance t o t h t a
b a r b o r ie a coral reef some 250 or 300 y a r d s in width, with :I
deplbaf w a t e r of only two or t h r e e fatborns (a fatbom, six feet) 011
t h e reef at low water. I t e sides are vortical, or n e a r l y so, the depth
of w a t e r increaeing i n a few feet to four or five fathoms. A t a di-tance of half a mile outside the reef t h e r e is a d e p t h of fifteen
f8tbOmE. wbile a t t h e anme distance inside t h e reef t b e d e p t h is only
e i g h t f a t b o m a If t b i s coral b a r r i e r were removed Pearl H a r b o r
wodd seem to h a v e all, or neurly all t h e necessary properties to
enab18sit40 be converted into a good harbor of refuge. It could bc
completelf defended by inexpensive batteriee on either or both
sborca, dring acrose a narrow channel of entrance. Its w a t e r s artdeep eoosgb for t b e largest veesele of war,and its locks particularly
around Rabbit Island, are spacious enough for a large n u m b e r ot
vessels to ride at a n c b o r in perfect security against all storms. 11.
shores are suitable for building proper establishment6 for sheltering
t b e necessary supplies for a naval establishmeot, such as magazine.
of ammunition, provisions, coal, s p a g ~ ,rigging, etc., whilo the
Island of Osbo, upon which i t i s Fituated, could fornish fresh pro.
visions, meata, frnits and o o p t a b l e s in l a r g e qlrrtntitiea.
8 o c b b e i n g t h e properties of t h i s harbor, a n d i t being t h e only
one on tbese islands p o s d s s i n g all t h e reqnisitee except d e p t h of
water o n the bar, t h e queetion arises, can t h o coral rcef at itc
e n t r a n c e be removed? If so,a t w h a t cost? A n d if removed, woulal
gives i t a.
t b e cbannbl 611 up or remain open? Colonel ALEXANDER
bie o$oion t h a t t b e a m o u n t of coral to open a channel 200 y a r d s i n
w i d t h and w i t b a d e p t b of twenty-six feet a t low water, would be
a b o u t 260,OOO yards ( c u b i i ) a n d t b a t i t could be removed for $1 per
c u b i c yard, or for a s u m of a b o u t $250,000. We e& no reason ai
preaeot to fear a d l l i n g u p on t h e bar after a passage throogh the
coral reef at ita mouth sball have been secured.
e
If it obould become the policy of the government of t h e Unitell
8tat.m to obtaia posaedon of t b i s harbor for n a v a l porposes, jurisdiotioa over all t h e wetere of Pearl R i v e r w i t h t h e adjacent shore3
to the dietance of four miles frbm any a n c b o r a g e should be ceded to
the United States by the H a w a i i a n government.
It io to be o h r o d t h a t i f t b e U n i t e d States are e v e r to bave a
harbor of rehge aad uavd station i n t h e H a w a i i a n b l e n d e , i n the
e v e n t of war, t h e h a r b o r moet be prepared i n a d v a n c e by t h e r e moval of Pearl Eire? bar. W b e n w a r b a s begun i t will be too latz

199

to make thiR harbor available, a n d there is no other suitable barbor

i n these islands.

RELATIONS OF T E E C N I T E D

STATES WITH H A W A I I .

The first intercourse p a when vessels euguged in f a r trade 0 0

northwest coast of S o r t h America used to r u n down for the w i n t e r .
T h e next w a s in 1820, y h e u t h e first missionaries l a n d e d ; also t h e
first whaling vessel came t h a t uame year. T h e n came the treaty witb
Commodore JOXES in 1826, w h i c h waa noted above. I n 1842 a n
embassy c a m e to t h e United States seeking some sort of recognition.
The first aesertion of t h e superior interests of t h e United States wae
made on t b e visit of this embassy. T h i s assertion w m made both
a d h a s been
by Secreta& of S t a t e WEBSTEBa n d President TYLER
quoted above.
From this time(Decetnber, 1842) on, t h e relations ofthe Hawaiian
I s l u o d e w i t h t h e United States developod s t e s d i l y i n t h e d i r e c t i o n
of ultimate annexation. I n 1893 Secretary of S t a t e FOSTERwrote :
F r o m a n early d a y t h e policy of t h e Gnited States h a s been u o n aiwtontly rrud conabiitly declared against a n y foreign rrggreeclion in
t h e Kingdom of Hawaii inimical to t h e necessarily paramount r i g h t 8
and interests of t h e American people there, a n d t h e uniform contemplation of their annexation as a contingent necessity. B u t beyond
t h a t i t is shown t h a t annexation has been on more than one occasiou
a v o d u e a policy a n d nttompted as a fact. S u c h a solution wae
admitted as early as 1850 by 80 far-siphtod a statesman as Lord
PALYEWTON,
when he recommendod to visiting Hawaiian commission t h e zontingency of a p r o t e c u t e under t h e United States or of
becoming an integral part of t h e nation i n fulfillment of destiny
due to clase neighborhood a p d commercial dependence upon Pacific
Statos.

W h e n t h e islands were seized by Lord GRANGE

PAL-LET
in 1843,
t h e Secretary of State for t h e United States wrote to t h e U n i t e d
States Minister i n London t h e most positive statoment 80 fur made.

This s t a t e m e n t b a s been quoted above, and will n o t be here repeated.

When t h e F r e n c h were backing n p t h e F r e n c h Cone01 (DILLON)
i o 1849 a n d 1850, CLAYTON,
t h e thon Secretary of State, wrote to t h e
United States Minister at P u r i s : 6.The D e p a r t m e n t will be elow to
believe t b a t t h e French bave a n y i n t e n t i o n to adopt, w i t h reference
to t h e Sandwich lslands, t h e same policy which t h e y have pursoed
in regard to Tahiti. If,however, in j o u r j u d g m e n t it should be
w a r r a n t e d by circumstances, you may take a proper opportunity to
intimate to t h e Minister for Foreign Affaire for France t b a t tbe situa-

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THE EA WAIIAN ISLANDS.

800

tion of the Sandwich Islands, in respect to onr poseeasione on t h e

PaoiBo and tbe bsnds, commercial a n d of other descriptio&, between
t h e m a n d tho United Statee, are enoh t b a t we conld never w i t h indifferem& allow t h e m to paw u n d e r t h e dominion or exclueive control of any o t h e r power."
.
In la1 DANIEL
WIDISTEEw r o t e t h a t f n r t h e r enforcement of t h e
-noh
d e m a n d s against h w a i i , 6 ' w o ~ l dbe t a n t a m o u n t to a subj b t i o n of the islaode to t h e dominion of France. A etep like t h i s
aould not fail to be viewed by t h e g o v e r n m e n t a n d people of t h e
United States w i t h a diseatiefaction whicb would t e n d eeriouely to
d i s t u r b our existing friendly relations with t h e French g o v e r n *
It uannot be expected t h a t the g o v e r n m e n t of t h e
ment.
United States could look on a course of t h i n g s leading t o such n
reienlt with indifference.
It can. never conbent to EBB thoee
ielancle +ken pdeseeeion of by oither of t h e great commercial powere
of Earn+, nor can i t consent t b a t d e m a n d s manifestly nnjuet a n d
derogatory and inconsintent with a bona 6d
ependence shall be
e n f o d a g a i n s t t h a t government."
He f u r t h e r m i d :
t r u e t t h e F r e n c h will not t a k e poeeeeeion;
b u t if t b e y do, t b e y will b dislodged, if my advice ie t a k e n , if t h e
whole power of t h o p v e r n m e o t is reqnired to d o it."
Early i n 1861 a contingent deed o f ceeaion was d r a w n a n d
eigned by t h e K i n g a n d placed emled i n t b e h a n d s of t h e Commiew h o wae to open i t a n d act upon ita
eiooer of t h o
shot fired by F r a n c e i n eubversion of

* * *

annexation, a n d a d r a f t of t h e

e, a n d finally defeated b y t h e death

h a v i n g h o m e a d v i d d of a etrong a n n e x -

annexation should conflict with t h e policy

i aa dwirable, 6'until t h e people of

988, at no dietant d a y , voluntarily a p p l y

for a d m i d o n to th
pril, President GBANT,
i n a epecial meee expreeeioo of the viewe of t b e

T H E H A ITSXIAN ISLANDS.

201

I n an inatroction of Nlairch 25, 1873, Yr. F I ~ H

coneidered t h e
neceeeitj of a n n e x i n g t h e ielande id accordance w i t h t h e wise foresight of tboee w h o see a future t h a t must extend t h e jurisdiction
a n d t h e limita of t h i s nation, a n d t h a t will require a resting spot i n
mid-ocean, between t h e Pacific coast a n d t h e vast domaine of Aeia,
which are now opening to commerce a n d civilization. And he
.. :
directed o u r Minister not to discourage t h e feeling which m a y exist *
1
i n favor of annexation to t h e United state^, but to seek a n d even
invite information touching the t e r m s a n d conditione upon which
t h a t objoct might be effected.
SCHOFIELD
a n d ALEXANDER
in 1873 has
T h e vieit of Gene&
:i
Iready b
e
6
.
Since t h e on ueion of tho reciprocity t r e a t y of 1875,it haa
been the obv
policy of t h e succeeding administrstione to assert
rind defen
ainst o t h e r powers t h e exclusive commercial rigtic8"
States, a n d to fortify t h e maintenance of t h e existing
of t h e Uoi
Hawaiian g o v e r n m e n t throogh t h o direct support of t h e United
States, EO l o n g as that govornment shall prove able to protect our
paramount r i g h t s a n d intereete.
I n 1881 Jlr. BLAINE
eaid: * * I ft h r o u g h any cause t h e maintenance of a poeition of benevolent neytrality should be f m n d b y
Hawaii to be impracticable, thie government would then unhesitatingly meet t h o altered s i t u a t i o n by seeking no avowedly A m e r ican solution for t h o grave issues presonted."
T h e t r e a t y of 1873 t h a t w e n t into effect in September, 1876, had
run ite seven yenra, when a n extension wae negotiated in 1884, but
this WMI not ratified by the .Senate until 1887. It extended t h e
original tresty for a furtber period of eeven yeara from t h a t date,
with like p r o v i e o h r terminafingon one year'e noticg from t h a t time.
T h i s t r e a t y contained t h i s furthor i m p o r t a n t proviso: His Majesty,
the K i n g of t h e Hawaiian I e h d e , granta to t h e g o v e r n m e n t of t h e
United States t h e exclusive r i g h t to enter tke harbor of Pearl
River, i n t h e Island of O a h u , a n d to establish a n d maintain t b e r e a
coaling a n d repair etation for t h e uee of veseele of t h e United
a n d to t h a t c n d t h e U n i t e d States may improve t h e
entrapce of a i d harbor, a n d d o all o t h e r t h i n g s needful to t h e
pu+m

aforeaaid."

As you will notice, t h e seven years explred S o v e m b e r , 1894, a n d

t h e only hold t h a t w e have o n t h e island6 is one t b a t m a y be terminated on a year'e notice by the de facto government in tboee
islaode.

202

THE HAWAIIAX ISLAYDS.

%.

Nothing baa since been d o n e to avail ou l r e e of t h e concession

The innemtion of t h i s laurn may have aro sed t h e jealousy ot' Germany, a n d led to th sobsequent complicatione in Samoa. T h e
wemion of Pearl Ear r bad a fartbey effect of eliciting a note from
the Britieb Yinieter i n Waabingtoo, i n which he montioned the
English-French a g d m e n t of 1843, a n d proposed t b a t England.
G e r m a n y a n d the United Statee e n t e r i n t o a similar agreement b!
t h e neutrality a n d equal acceeeibility
which ebould be g
of the islande and
m to the ehipe of all nations without
needlees to my, waa declined.
preference ;" whi
a r i n e cable to t h e islands waa laid aside
The plss to lay
sident, i o hie meesage in December.
i n Congress;altb
1888, said: "In t h e vaat 6eld of oriental commerce now unfolded
f h m oar Pacidc bnrdera, 00 feature reprosent8 etrooger recommendations for Congreeeional action t h a n t h e eetabliabment of communi.
a t i o n by eubm8rine legrapb witb Honolulu."
T h e laying of t b e propoaed cable m i g h t have been effected a t less
than tbe met of a
n-of-war, a n d would have been of immense
+neat 88 soother artery of communication, i n bringing t h e ielande
ol-r
to ne., commercially a n d politically.
I o the ebort historical eketcb given above, t b e record ~ 8 . carried
3
down to t h e outbreak a p i n e t the Queen. The evonte e i n w t h e n
am eo h h i n everyone's i n d a n d heing a subject of constant d k
t b e poriodicnle, etc., t h a t but a passcnmion i a a I I t h e daily Jm,
ing menlip, is neceeesry. On S a t u r d a y , t b e 1 4 t h of J a n n a r y , 1893.
the capiW waa wholly controlled by t h e roynl troops, including n
l a r g e a d d i t i o n a l force of over 600 a r m e d men n o t authorized by
H a w i r i a n l a w . On tho same day t h o first call to armn i u oppoeition
to the Qoeeo WM iesoed, a n d t h e citicene' Committee of Safety wa*

,"

*.eloped.

' Dnring the 14tb, 16tb, and moet of t h e 16th, t h e t w o partiee confhmted eaob o t h e r in angrS hostility, w i t h e v e r y indication of an
a r m e d oondiot at a n y moment. It waa not until late i n t h e afternoon of Monday, the M t h , after roqoest b a d been made by maor
dtisene of &be U D i y Statee reeiding in Honolulu, t b a t a force of
marina WM' landed f h m t h e Boston, by direction of t b e Yiniater.
and i n aonformity . d t b the s t a u d i n g inetrnctione which for m a o c
yeam l u r e autbori
t h e naval foreee of t h e 1Jni.W State8 to cn
operate w i t h the H i ister for the proteotion of t h e livee and prop
erty of imdiorrn oitbme. i n caw of immioent. disorder. T h e maria- w h e n landed, took no part w h a t e v e r towardn influencing the
oourw of evoota.

, *

I
i

203

T h e provieional governipent formcd by t h e forces a r r a y e d against

the Queen, wae proclaimed J a n u a r y IS, 1893. B y t h e advice of
her Yioisteru t h e Queen reeigned u n d e r protest a n d decided to a p peal to t h e g o v e r n m e n t of t h e Uuited States.
On F e b r u a r y lst, snbsequent to t h e d e p a r t u r e of t h e Hawaiian
special commimionerp, t h e United States Minister at Honolulu, a t
t h o request of t h e provisiooal p r e r n r n e n t . placed t h e Hawaiian
government u n d e r t h e protection of t h e United States to Becure t h e
protection of life a n d property d u r i n g t h e pending negotiations at
\Vaahington a n d without interfering with t h e administration of public affairs by t h e said government. - I n i n s t r u c t i o n --ab s e n t hint,
commending his action i n RO f a r a s it 1:ty within t h e provieo of
standing instructions to the legation a n d nayal commandera. b u t
disavowing a n y steps in CXCBS of such instructions.
On t h c 15th of February. 1893. President HARRISON
acnt'a mea *'
sage t o t h e United Statca Senate. subniittiug B treaty for t b e a n n c x a t i o n of the H a m - u i i n n I c l a n d s .

TIir rspidity w i t h w h i c h t h i s w a s

done-less
than a month from t h e overtbrow to t h e aubmissionm i g h t give a euopicion that i t w a s i n a n a d r n n c e d state of preparat i o n before t h c r e v o l u t i o n . T h o u y h 3fr. FOSTEB.
Secretary ot State,
diplomatically remarks: **Thec h a n g e of governinen: in the hn a i i s c IRlands w a s entirely unsuspected so far ss t h i s yovernment
was concerned. The change was in fiict a b r u p t a n d unlooked lor
by t h e United Statcs Minister or the n a r a l commander." I n hid
ineusage t h e President s a i d : . * T h e overtbrow of t h e monarchy w m
not in a n y way promoted b r this g o r e r n m e n t , but had i t s origin in
w h a t eeems to h a v e been a reactionary a n d revolutionary policy on
t h e part of Queen L r L l v a K A L a x l . which p u t in serious peril not only
t h e large a n d prcpondorating i n t e r e s p of t h e United States in t h e
islands, b u t all foreign interenta, and. indeed. t h e decent administration of civil aflaire and t h o peace of t h e ielairde. OnlF t w o coureee
are n o w open-one
t h e eetabliahment of a protectorate b y t h e
United States, a n d t h e o t h e r a n n e r a t i o n full a n d complete. I t h i n k
the latter coume * *
* ie t b e only o n e t h a t will adequately
eecure t h e interesta of t h e zloited States."
T b i s treaty wa6 w i t h d r a w n from t h e SooaLe b y Preaident CLEYELAWD March 9tb, 1 8 9 3 , a n d Hon. Janm H . BLOCNT
w a s 6ent 86
special commiesioner to the Hawaiian Islandn to aecortain a n d report upon the facta in connection witb t h e revolution. In hie annual
meeaage to Coogreee in December, 1893, Preeident CLEVELAND
mid
the report enbmitted b y Mr. BLOCNT
ebowed t h a t "tho conetitutional
g o v e r n m e n t of H a w a i i had been subverted w i t h the activo aid of

, I.
0

our repreeeotatioe to tbat gevernment, and through tho

intimidation cawed by t b e premnce of a n armed%iaval force of the United

Ellatee, wbicb wae landed for t b a t purpose at tbe instance of our
YioZqter. It tbetefore seemed to him .the only bonorable course
1
for oar pveromeot to pursue was to undo the wrong t h a t had been
done by tboee repreeenting us, and to restore ae far as practicable
t b e etatue eristiog at the time of our forcible intervention. I n a
eubseQnent messsge, December 18,1893,President CLEVELAND
submitted the report of Commiueioner BLOUNT
and stated tbat a n attemp3 bad been mado by Hon. ALBEBTG. WILLIS,who had been
eent he United Statee Minister to Hawaii, to effect t h e restoration of
t b e mooarcby, apon terms providing f p clemency as well as j u s tice to all partiee concerned; had failed because tboee terms had
notproved acceptable lo the Queen. T h e President, therefore.
committed t h e fartlpr consideration of the subject I t o the extended
powers and t b e wide discrotion of the Cangreee.
I n t b e following year &convention was elected which sat i n
Honolnla and formed a new8conetitution for tbe governmeot of the
country, and t h e Republic of Hawaii was formally proclaimed July
4, 1894, (notice the date).
Tbe Preeident is electod for six years. The Legialaturo conaisb
of a Senate and Home of Representatives all elected by popular
vote. The Sdnatorn are elected for a term of six years, and voters
for Senatore must bave real property worth $1,500, or peraonal
property worth $3,000, or a n iocome of not less t h a n $600 per
annum. T b e vote for Representatives is based on man hood suffrage.
T h e judiciary cQheiste of a Supremo Court, five Circuit Courts i n
wbich trialn by jary are coodncted, and District Courts iri every
district. There is ah emcient police force in o r e r y part of the
groap. T b e Ropnblid wae formally recognized by t h e United States
on A a p & 7 , 1894. I
I

T H E Hi1 WAIIAN ISLA>-DS.

TH HAWAIIAN ISLANDS.

204

A royaliet a m s p i h y i n the fall of 1894 resulted in the insurwbicb was promptly suppressed. A
ex-Queeo LILIUOKALANI,
wero arrested
ely-released. The ex-Queen left the

aouotry io 1898 a n

siocereeided.

ed to the United Statas where she ban

lic baa maintained iteelf by its own
plications of an int$rnational chamcJapan, growing ont of a treaty with
status of Japaoeee immigraots.
The
eabmittcd to arbitratioo.

205

On the 16th of June, l S Y 7 , President JLCKINLEYeent to tbe

Senate of t h u United States another treaty of annexation, which is
still urider consideration i n that body.
I n transmitting this treaty he said, .The incorporatiou of t h e
lFawaiian Islrrnds into the body politic ot the Cnited States i n the
necefary and fitting sequel to the cliniu of events which from a
\-cry early period h a s controlled t h e intercourae and prescribed t h e
association of tho United States and the Iiawaiitrn IJlaniis. *
The union is no new echeine. but i t is tlie inevitable conuequence of
the relation steadfastly maintained w i t h tliat mid Pacific ilomai ti for
\
three quarters of a crntury.
This treaty is not aniere renewal ofthat rn+tfe i n lS!b:3, b u t was
initiated and conducted u p o n indepeiident line@. This ircuty reservee to the ~ o n g r e a sof ttie L-niteii States tIie (ietcrminntion of all
questions affecting the form of gorFrninent of the annesed territory.
the citizenship and elective trancliise of its inlitrbitanta. arid the
manner i n which the Iawsof the rriited States are to be extended
to the islands.
Some of the fcaturee of t h i s treaty may be briefly nicnrioned:
..The Republic of Hawaii cedes abpolutely an.! without reserve to
the absolute
the United States all rights of sovereignty,
fee arid ownership ot all public, government. o r crown lands, build*
ings, or edifices, ports, harbors. military eqiiipnients. and all other
public propert? of e r e r y kind arid dewription. Copqress .shsll
enact special laws for the managenient and disposition ot ttiesc
lands; Prwided, That all revenue roni portions not used !or military,
naval, or goveriiincnt purposes. tlilrll&
used for thc beticstit of the
for cductition:rl nnd Attier purin11at)itants of the IIawaiian Islans
poses.
The present govcrnnieiit to reiiiain i n force till
~ o i l y r e s ss ~ i n
provide
~ ~
fur tiic governnieiitBf tlie i h n d s . * *, *
The President Iiaring power to rcniove otliccrs uiid f i l l vacanEics.
5
Exinting treaties :ill to cease :rnd be replaced by tlioac ot
the United States. * * * The liabilitr o f t h o Cnited Swtcti for
the public debt shall i n no case e r c w d I4.000,OoO.
* So
further i m m i g r a t i o n of Chineee except under laws of the I-nitcd
* The President of t h e Ciiited State* to appoint
States.
five commissioners, two from residents of the Hawaiian Islands, to
recommond to Congress such legislation as they ahdn deem necessary
or propcr.
Protest was made by the gcireronisnt of Japan against tho conclusion of tbe treaty on the ground thnt it affectcd Japanese interests and treaty rights i u Hawaii.

* *

*-

* * ,*

It

* * *

* *

* *

* *

In

I cannot ulom, however, without q u o t i n g froiii Mr. TEUBSTONS

i W t h t p u n p h l e t hie

instructive a b o u t t h e characterietim, re
langnagea, military fora n d police,
tation, m a n n e r of life, clothing, a n d t h e
t bee been built up a m o n g tbeee intereetodorful ielande; a n d how l h e American
,even to t h e owiiing of nearly threeed at S50,000,000. hit my p a p e r is

drerdl b0 lOOR.

reaeone i n favor of annexntion, ala0 t w e n t y

objdone that are

-me very ablo argnmente, and
a b l e m a n n e r , b u t apace doca

i
c

TEE E A TVruTd.iV I S L AND9.

TE EAWAIIAN ISLANDS.

206

I
I

(z

TAVOB OP ANNEX4TION OF HAWAII.

BBABONE I

firid. It will p vent the establishment of an alien and posI

-I

1 &aid
7

I.

i
I

-1

eibls boattile m o g b d i o 3 p i t i o n commanding the Paci6c coapt,

and tbe eomrnek of the North Pacidc, a n d de6nitely a n d tinally

to tbe Unitod Statdethe strateplicrrl contrdl of t h e N o r t h

Pbci6c. t h e r e b y p r o k t h g t h e - P a c i 6 c coa& o n d commerce from
\
attaak. , lr
((Thecoeditions are encb t h a t t h e United States must
&owl.
ad
to preeerve t b e results o f ita pmt $)icy 4 n d to provent the
domisqsq in Ha+ of. foreign people.
W d . .It will incmaae, manifold and w o r e to t h e United
&tee the oornmeroe f tb ielsods.
Ip ihcrerree and eecnre to t h e United
FourtA. It ai
of t h e islande.
Sletee the shipping
o Hawaii from intemmtional politice, tntt
n the PaOiac by eliminating an ,otberwibe
a t i o n r l friction.

ANNBXATION 01 HAWAII.

epe~ci6callyk r a n t power

. .

207

Third. I t is nnconatitutional, bectroee t h e inhabitante aru not

homogeneous with t h e peopl\of t h e Uoitecl States.
Fourth.
W h e t h e r tile annexation of a non-homo,Keneoue people
is conatitutiooal 01-not, t h e populotion of Hawaii ie u n 6 t for incur;
poration into, a n d will be daugeroue t o t h e Americrrn politicat
system .
Fifth. L X e d o not w a n t Hawaii am a state, with t w o more .
senntore.
Sirth. ItHawaii ie an outlying territory, a n d in time of w a r it
will be a Bourne of a e a k n e s a to t h e United Statca.
Seventh. I t wtti necessitate heavy expenditures a n d a n a v y in
order to protoct Hawaii in t i m e of war.
Eighth. *Itwill be 8 foreruoner a n d form a precedent for a
policy of unlimited a n n e s a t i o n of t e r r i t o r r .
NintA. I t ie c o n t r a r y to the Monroe Doctrine to acquire t e r ridry beyond t h e boundaries of t h e American continent.
Tenth. A l a r g e portion of t b e Hawaiian votera have been diefranchiacd. So vote haa been t a k e n i o Hawaii upon t h e question
of annexation, a n d i t is un-American t o a n n e x a t e r r i t o r y w i t b o a t
a popnlar vote of i 2 inhabitante.
Blcuenth. A protectorate will secure to the United States all
t h e advantage8 which will accrue o n d c r annexation, without involving t h e c o u n t r y in t h e responeibilities ofownemhip.
Twelfth. < & Iwill
t
be injurious to t h e beet e u g a r i n i n e t r y , as
Hawaiian sugar will compete with beet eugar raised i n t h e United
state@.
Thirteenth. &,Itwill excite t h e jealousy of, a n d create complica1
tions with, foreign governmeota.
Fourteenth.
T h e govocnment of Hawaii consiate of foreign
adventurers, w h o have no a u t h o r i t y or jnrindiction over the country.
F i / t c m h . A n n e x a t i o n will bt, k n e f i c a l to t h e Sngar traet.
Sizttenth.
Under t h o propoeed t r e a t y of annexation t h e United
%tea nmumee t h e Hawaiian public dobt without receiving in return t h e meane or property with which to pay it.
Seventeenth.
T h e r e ie leprosy in Hawaii.
Eighteenth. ( 6 T h e monarchy wan overthrown throngh the agency
of American troopn.
(L

Nineteenth. I t is unlikely t h a t t h e U n i t e d Stales will go to

war with a n y o t h e r coontry. Bot if i t doee, a n d if i t t h e a w a n t s
Hawaii thero ie time onougb to take it.

I
p

.-

It

. TEB EA-WMAN ISLANDS.

808

-A.
.'uThe bnited Statee already baa enough terriiory,
people and pmbleme. We want no moxk of thorn. Let well enough
dona"

-.

.
1

* ?-

1:

..I.

' . I

L,.

.. ,

..

-,

,.i .

,/

-.

TW A S X E X ; \ T I O S OF HAWAII; &ME

O F ITS M I L I T A R Y
ASD ECOSOJIlC ADIAXTAGES.

~~

BT LIEITESALTS. LH. SLOCCM. EIGHTHC A V A I . H Y .

TkS whole question rests mainly on the fact, whether or no this

country is prepared politicnlly, financially and aocinlly
take
up the military and economic responsibililtes of territorial expansion heyond its immediate borders. I believe i t is, and I believe the
apirit of unrest and t h e ceaselcss energy which have given England
ita d l o n i a l possessions, a n d which h a w erer charncterized t h o
Anglo-Saxon race, pe ade tbi8 country now and clamor for oxpansion and more intima e reletions w i t h t h e outer world.
Time was when we were so isolated and 80 nbsorbcd a8 a people
i n developing o u r own immense territory that the afftrirs o f the older
countries were of only p a d o g interest
But now how changed is all this. The Atlantic cables placeiis
within an hourn t a l k of any of the European centers; eight,regular
paseenger lines send weekly steamers acrosu the . i t l n n t i c l i o m New
York alone, the fleetest making the royage i n leas than Rix days; and
six lines of s t e a m e r s sail between the S o r t b American continent and
Cbina, Jmpan and Australia.
This country is now one of the leading food producurs of the
world, and o u r monetary interests abroad are manifold. I n alniost
all industries w e a r e competitors i n the great mnrts of the world.
The tentacles of o u r c o m v c i a l intereats have%o grown that they
are clinging to almost every country the world over. We can no
longer say w e a r e sul3cient unto ourselves, and cnre riot for the
affaire of otliers. A nation i n onr modern day can not stand etill,
ae China did for centuriee; it m u s t progress or recede, and the raetleea force t h a t has conquered the raainese of, and mmde productive
the United Stat-, raising it in balf a century from a fourth class to
a 6re.t clam powor in t h e world, demands other Belds for ita efforta.

*-

ANNE-XATION OF H A WAZ!.

210

T i a f k of it, gentlemen, seventy millions of people and cxccIjt

Alae a, not 8 poeeessiou w o r t h y t h e name outside our own bor-

rp

-.

I.

!, .
I

dew, a n d b o t o n e coaling station-Ponrl

Harbor-of
which w e
have exclueive pee. We are b e l e a p o r e d b y England along our
e n t i r e Atlantic' coaat line, a n d s h e threutene the Pacitic from t h e
north, a n d tbep again w e are humiliated b y h a v i n g to *end o u r large
battle-sbipe to a foreigo p q r t to be dockod.
It is protty bard on the navy for their own Secretary to tell theni
when i n troEble,"to go to Halifax." England elso has tied our
baode in t h e Clayton-Bulwer t r e a t y , under t h e proriNion~of wliich
we can neitbzr acquire territory nor' the control of un?; ciirllil i n
\
Sooth America.
ure ever
h o e r or lator o n r vaet commercial intereste&ich
increasing, will conflict r o d b r i n g us to battle with some of' the .old
world paera. With no trane-iwthmian canal we require two nnvul
forcee, oneon t h e A t l a n t i c a n d 0 0 0 on the Pacitic Ocean.
For t h o protection of these sea-beards, besides t h e regular w a r
veoaels, t h e g o v e r n m e n t is now organizing a n auxiliary fleet ot'
cruisere from the merchant marine, a k d cinim thnt w i r h i d t h r e e
weeke eixty weeels could be p u t into t h e aervice on t h e Atluntic
coset and twenty on t h e Pacific.
W e abeolately need wnie point o t h e r than o u r o w n ports, where
theee'veeeels c a n rende%roua, re6t, a n d resupply. We can not n o w
get i t i o t h e Atlantic, b o t we can i n t h e Pacific. l o fact we arc'
having one, t b e moet valuable between the two Hernispherc?;.
-Eawaii-practimlly
t h r u s t d o w n our throata,and I hope t h a t our
Senatom are built of Rternor etuff thhn to have it a c t au a n emetic.
Under t h e exietinp; conditions of peace a n d Amorican control, w e
are. now deriving eeeentially all the advantages from Hawaii t h a t we'
would were w e in actual poseemion, b u t these conditione arc of very
uncertain tenore, a n d if we d o not a n n e x , England or J a p a n will, for
the Bepoblic c a n n o t eodare, a n d o u r whole weeteru c o u n t r y will bts
at t h e mercy of t h e hostile fleet which eaile from Honolulo'recoale~l
- and m6tted. Ita annexation i s a m a t t e r of vital self-protection for- oe; w e moat poseese to p r e v e n t o t h e r s poeseseinp.
T h i s ie not a new or recent isme for u13to meet. E v e r 8ince the.
t i m e of Presidont PILECI,,
in 1854, the qaeution of e8tabliehing Y protactorate, wbich would q-0 creeuming all reeponeibilitiee without
or of q n e x i n g t h e Sandwich Islaode, has mow
power of' COOCMI,
or leas bepn under adoiodment by the different cabinetn, and eince
that time our a t t i t a d e t o r a r d e t h e w islands bae been o n e of almost
paternal' intenwt, a n d t h e i r civilization, cbrietienication, cornmercc
Bod gemoral deoe1opment:Cre tlio reault of American effort.

-4 .Y..YESd T I O S OF H A n-;I

If.

21 1

It in, i n every elcrnent which enter3 ioto the composition of- I)

motfcrn cirilizcd community. 3 child of -1mericn. :ind is tho o d y
.lmoricun ~(JIOIIJ-beyond our borde * a n d Hoiiolrilli is tlie only
52
Rlreign port the world over where the s t n r s and * t r i p e n w l i v e a)rcr
nioro ships than all otlier dags combinell.
I t would be interesting. perhaps. to go back i n t o the P I I ' ~u~ ~ ~ d
quote ttie exprewicne of nome of' o u r ctiffc.rent 9tntesnrt.n i r i refcarence to 11:iw:iii.
1).431EL 1VTEUSTER. i n I.%?. while .';ecret:rry ( J f s t a l e . i n ail
ofsciul paper, staled: *'The United S t s t e s urc inore interentcd i r i
the fate of the i d a n d a a n d of t h a t govertrnrent t t r c c n any 0Lh.m
nntion can be."
Secretnry of State LEGARE,
i n lS43, i n a tii.*ptrtcli t o niir Minister
,
i n London, s a i d :
* < Y e tt h e r e i s something Y O e n t i r e t y peculiar i n
the relatiom betweel) this little Commonwealth. Mawsii. and o u r w l r e s thet w e might feol justified connistently with o u r principler,
i n interfering by force to p r e v e n t its f i r l l i n g into t h e hands of o n r
of the g r c a t powers o! Europe."
IAnter.irl1 S 5 l S l f r .jVEBTTERRaid to o u r Consul to h w a i i , i n reference to the thrcntencd French invnsion : " I trusr tlie French will
not take poarcssion. but it' they d o they will bc ilislmlged. if in?
advice i R taken. i f tho whole power of t h e g o ~ e r n n i e n t in required
to d o i t . "

Secretsry of Stntc MARCY. in 1854. i n n tiispatch to o u r Minister

i n Honolulu, said: i*Iftrnyforeign connection ie to be formed. t h e jieo-

graphics1 position ot'thewialrrnda indicaky-that it should be with ue."

T h a t g r e a t Anierican, JAMES
G. BLAINE,
while Secretary of State,
anid i n an official dispatch : '(TLiiv government firmly believes that
ttic position of the Hawaiian Islands is t h e ke,y to t h e d r ~ l ~ l i n i oof
n
the AmericnnCPaciGc, a n d demands, etc." Furthclr on i n t h e same
dic~patclib o stated: I ' I t i s too obvious for a r g u m e n t that tho posseesioti
ot' these ixlands b y a g r e a t maritime power would not only be a
dangerous diminution of the j u s t a n d ncceesory fntluence of the
r i i i t e d States i n t h e water8 of t h e Pacific. but in c m e of' international difficulty it would be a positive t h r e a t to interests too large
and i m p o r t a n t to be lightfy rieked."
Mnny of t h e reaeons for annexation I tisre t h u s dar advanced
:ire eentinientol ones, a n d d o n o t touch its value in dollars, its s t r a tegic importance or the delermination of' o u r people t h a t Hawaii
*hall never pass under t h e control of a foreign power. and that t h a t
determination is poeitive a n d almost universal in this c o u n t r y is
beyond peradventure or doubt.

I---

-7

212

-4 NXEX-4 TIOX

A N N E X A T I O N OF H A WAZZ.

And if there were n o other reasons tlian sentimental ones. art

they not almost eutacient? Shall we decline to help our computriotn, a handful of datermined and resolute men, who by their
nerve and energy have eetablished the 6 m t American colony beyonil
seae, nnd a r e crying to their suoerity million brethren, W e caiinot
bold o u t much longer, belp and eave UK
There WM a wide spread feeling ot iodignwion t o w a r d J l r . S E W AnD when he bought Alaska, becauue i t wae clainletl t b i t externality
in oar poeqemions wae unconstitutional and aloo contrary to tlic
Monroe doctrine; but the wisdom of t h a t purchase is no longer
doabted nor ita conatitutionality questioned.
Hawaii is 2,089 miles from Sufi Francisco; but i n these days dir-ace is iiot 80 much o matter of miles HA of hours. California when
annexed wae two monthe i n time from Wsebington ; IFawuii is n o w
ten and one-half dags, and with steamers on the Pacific as deet 113
tboee on the Atlnntic, Chi@time would be lessened to eight days.
W e have territory much further west t h n n t b e Sandwich I e l a n h .
The Aleutian Ielands, r e a c h i w d m o e t to tbe Asiatic: couat, extent1
l,!!,OO miles weet of Alaska, which ia itoelf separated from t h e
United States by a vast foreign territory, and .Midway Island is
approximately 3,000 mlles from our coat: Our geographical center
on the eame degree of Igtitude is about the longitude ot San Francisco.
Hawaii lies, as gcul;will Hee by glancing at the map o n the blnckboard, betwoen 18 a n d 22 degrees north latitude, nod 154 and l t j o
degrees west longitude. It is 2,300 miles from Victoria, 4,210 fronl
t h e Nicaragua Canal, 4,665 from Panama, 5,149 from Callao, S.9lr;
fram Valpraiso, 6,379,totbe etraits of Magellan, all points on the
American coaet; and &om points on the Asiatic coast it is diatnnt;
from Yokohama 3,39q miles, from Hong g o n g 4,917, and fionl
Sydney, Auatralia, abaut 5,100 miles. From which i t will be we11
t h a t i t is nearer to Sa+ Francis_co than to Yokohama by over 1.301
milee, and to Honk Kdng by over 2,800 milen.
This group coootaina eight inhabited island8 and a large nurnber
of uninhabited onee, of a total approximate area of ?,OOO~s,sut~r~~
miles, b i n R nearly ti+ area of N e w Jereey. The islands nre all
bigh and mountainous, rising to a heigbt of 4,000 feet i n Oabu, t8
10,000 in sui, and lq,OOO feet and perpetnal snow io the ieland of
a w a i i . The wbole c p o t r y is vol&nic in origin, tbere being h u n dreds of estioct volca4oe.a and two active ones.
Each ieland ooneietb of one or more mountains seamed with val
ley8 and gorge@,with irolling plains lying between the rnouDtain..
udd generallp fringed with a comparatively level belt of land alon,<
a

OF H A I V J I I .

313

tho sea ehore. .%me portion6 of the coast are protected by reefe of
coral, while others a r e sheer precipices r i s i n g o u t of b l u e w a t e r to a
beight of thousands of feet. T h o woil, vonsisting mostly of decomposed Iavu, is fertile. but h a s to be irrigated i n many place*. Fertilizers are uaed i n large quantities. tlioueanda o f tona per annum
being uaed on the sugar plantatione. The ulimvto i i m i l d a n t i e v e n ,
being of an average weekly maximum of 74 i n wiilter and W o i n
summer. The lowest temperature a t sea lerel i n winter i n ubotlt
i- 56O
and the hottest i n summer about 88.
.it higher elerutions above
the sen almost n n p de*ired tcmpernture can he found.
The country a t all elerutiona and,throughorii the year, is healthy,
the death rate among whites beiiiL+xctapLionally aniall. Nonc of
the lerers and othcr typical diseases of tiwpical countriea are found.
Sotliing i n the climatic conditionn 01 IIawnii has caused the
leprody which exietu there. It wnu brouqht from China about thirty
yeare ago, and has uttncked a liir,ge i1umbc.r of r1:itives. S o casea are
Been a t large s n d all o! the paticntw are most earctully cared tor by
t h o government.
All the Iiawaiian born populatioil of all nirtiooalities tnri road and
1896 was
write English. Tbe uuniber of schoola--kll English-in
187; number of scholnrs over 12,000. The populution \VIIS i n 1896
about 120,000, of which only 3,000 were Americana, nnd of these
we have reason to be prood. There are two nteamsliip companies)
engaged i n the inter-island transportation, ubout titteen stcamere
being employed i n the trade. There : I I W tllrec railroads on the
ialnnde, one about thirty milca long on the irliind of Oahu. another
about thirteen miles long on the island of Xaui, uiid the third about
twenty miles i n length on the Island of Hawaii. The Islands of
Hawaii belong Lo t b e Postal rnion and the three pIinc.ipal islands
hare telephone@to over? accesoible point.
On Oahu is the capital, fionolulu. It niirnberH about 30.000 inhabitnnb. Tbecity is lighted with electric light, there i* a complete
telephone eyetern, and etreet car# run along t h o Irincipal atreete.
There are three eveoiog daily paperspubli8hed io Englieh, one
daily morning paper nnd two weekliea; i n n d d i r i o o to tbeee tbere
are paper8 published i n the Eawaiian, Portugueee, Japanem and
Chinese Jsognages, besides monthly magazines i n varioua tongues.
Mr. LOBEINA. TECEUTON,
ex-Minister from Hawaii, t h u s Riree
succioctly three reasone of public policy to show why we should
nnnex Hawaii : I t will preveot the establiehment of an alien and
possibly hoetile atrangbold i n n poeition commanding ( b e Paci6c
coast and the commerce of the North Pacific, and definitely and

214

'

ANNEXATION OF HAWAII.

finally eecuw to t h e United States t h e etrategical control of the

N o r t h Pacific, thereby eecuring its coast a n d commerce from attack
The conditioos are euc t h a t t h e United States must a c t now to prcBewe t h e reeulta of i past policy a n d provent t h e dominancg i n
Hawaii of a foreign p ple. It will increase m a n y fold and Recure
to t h e United Ytatee he commerce of t h e islands. I t will rernovc
E a w a i i from internatiqnal politics a n d tend to promote pence in the
Pacific by eliminatinglan otherwise certain eource of international
friction."
Mr. TEURSTON
goes on to m y , which w e ull know to be a fact.
t h a t all t h e great powers of Europo have coaling stations within
s t e a m i n g dietance of obr Atlantic coast, b u l t h a t none of them poseaeeee each a station n ar enough to t h e Paci6c coast to be avsiluble
ne a baee of operation againat i t ; t h a t while t h e r e a r e scores of
i d a n d e in tho A t l a n t i c ' t h a t can be usad ne bases for oaval supplies
a n d repaire. there is b r t one spot in the Paci6c from t h e Equator to.
1
Alaska, from J a p a n to t h e American contineut-Hawaii - w h e r e J
coal, bread a n d water c a n be obtained. A s t r o n g argument, surely.
i o eopport of hie firet teason for favoring nnnexation.
It i6 claimed by eome'that Eiawaii being a n outlying territory-.
would be a source af weakneee to us, as Mr. Thurston says.
Whether an o n t l y i o g territory is a source of weakness depends
upon circnrnetancm. When E n g l a n d held territory i n F r a n c e , it
WM a Boorce of weakneee to her, b u t Gibrnltar is a tower o!
etrength ."
S h u t oat from coaling at Hawaii, no man-of-war with ite limited
coal eupply coold croee t h e Pacific a n d r e t u r n if o u r porte were
hoetile.
!
England'e baee at Esquimault, io case of w a r , would prore t h e
hard& n u t for ua to c r a c k i n ' o n r defenee of t h e Pacific coast, as it
ie a b o u t twenty-tioe miles from the main land, heavily fortifiod a n d
a r m e d with t h e largest gune.
We can not expect to keep all theee advantagee without some
aorresponding exporn, a n d fortification will be t h e main item. Is
it to be sopposed t h a t any Enropean power poeeeeeiog territory
which, io t h e h a n d s of an enemy, could threaten ita ports as Hawaii
m i g h t oar P a c i 6 c conat, wool heeitate to fortify i t eo as to make
it impregnable, however c tly anch an operation m i g h t be?
Poaeeaion woald g i v e the r i g h t to d o eo, a n d t h e lureertion of t h a t
right coald not ~ i b l be
y conatroed as a violation of any of the
principlss of international law. We can Becure t h a t possemion
now, bot w h a t the f u t u r e m a y gmnt i6 problematical.

iT
b

'1

215

-4s I hare before 3uid. i t is no longer a quwtion whether IIuwaii

shall be controlled by native Hawaiians. but t)y what foreign nation
it d h d l be controlled. One of o u r holds upou the islands i s given
by t h e reciprocity treaty, but t h a t treaty n~uybe termiritited by
either party upon a year'? notico, and o t h e r nations a r e w a i t i n g
a n d eager to avail themsolves of t h e opportuniry of ousting u.y from
our present advantageous position should it occur.
One a r g u m e n t which is used against s n n e s a t i o n i 3 the coolie
question. This refers to the Japanese cooliea, as tlir Chinese would
be barred by o u r acts of exclusion already exietinp, nnd Article V
of the t r e a t y specitically prohibit* t h e immigration of Chinese to
t h e islands.
The Japanese number about 45.000,and previous to ttieir e x clusion were coming i n a t t h e rate of about 1,OI)O a month. and i n a
short time would h a v e practically been i n control of the iJlands;
but these coolies w e all under (.ontract. and their contract specitica
t h a t they shall return honie a t i t s termination.
I n a n n e x i n g Hawaii as a territory. which t h e treaty submitted
ta t h e Senate a n d almost uuanimously revorntperided by the Cornniittee on Foreign Affair*, wo aesume its n a t i o n a l debt--an omirioue
t h o u g h t when we think of' t h e debt of t h e g r e a t powers-but t h e
national d e b t of Hawaii is only $3,900,000. a n d under t h e t r e a t y all
t h e property owned b y t h e H a w a i i a n governrncnt would be t r a n s ferrvd to t h e Vnitcd States a n d this. cxclusire of customs. rents,
~,
to 87.!X%3.000,leaving
etc.. which largely esceed ~ X ~ J Q I I Wnmounts
a clear n e t profit to the I.-nited States i n property ncquircd. of
approximately 84,OO~J.OOO.
Ita revenues in 1896 exceeded i @ expenses by about 870,000,
and t h a t under a regime t h a t was struggling for ita very existence.
S o m e people fear i t will h u r t our beet mgar industry, but thie
Reems to be groundless, as t h e sugar consuniption of t h e United
States was last y e a r about 2,000.000 tons, and Hawaii produces only,about 200,000 tonu a n n u a l l y , a n d all of ita be8t cane lands a r e
already under cultivation a n d will not a d m i t of further increase.
There ie yet a n o t h e r a n d final reason I shall a d r a n c e for favoring annexation, a n d t h a t is t h a t American control of t h e Nicaragua
Canal would be in hourly j e g p a r d j were a hostile power to control
Hawaii.
E v e r y steamer t h a t would pam t h r o a g h t h e S i c a r a g u a Cunal
en route across t h e Pacific would have to stop at Honolulu to recoal.

ANNEXA TION OF HA WAIL

ANLVI?XATION OF H-4 JlvAII.

I believe t b e day bee gone by when we csn ignore our international privileges a n d obligatione, and tbat tbe compulsion of
epeoba is forcing ua to take a place among the great nations of t h e
'world, and to adopt svery meane of maintaining that position.
And tbe annexation of a a w a i i L believe is to be one of tbem.

The existing treaties of the Hnn-aiinn IalandR w i t h foreign

natione ehall forthwith cease and !etermine, being replnced by such
treaties a e m a p exist, o r as may be-bereafter concluded between t h e
United States and such foreign nagitma. The mnnicipnt legislation
o f t h e Hawaiian Islnnds not enacted for the fulfillment of the treatiae
so e x t i n p i e b e d , and not inconsistont with this treat? nor c o n t r a q to
the Constitution of the United States, nor to any existinp treaty of
the United Statee, ebnll remain i n force until the Congresa of the
United States s h a l l otherwise determine.
U n t i l legielation shall be enacted extending Unitod States customs l a w s a n d r e p l a t i o n e to tbe Hawaiian Islands, the oxistiny
cirstoni relatione of t h e Hawaiian Islands Gith the r'nited States
and other countries shall remain unchanged.

216

TEXT OF TREATY OF ANSEXATION.

ARTICLE 1.

me

Republic of Hawaii hereby cedee, absolutely and without reserve, to the United S t a b e of America all righta of eovereignty, of
whatsoever kind, in and over t h e Hawaiian Islande and their dependencies; and i t is agreed that all the territory of and appertaini o g t o t h e Republic of ,Hawaii is bereby annexed to t h e United
States of America under the name of tho Territory of Hawaii.

ARTICLE I V .

The public debt of tbe Republic of Hawaii. lawfully existing n t

t h e d n t e of tbe exchange of t h e ratificntione o f this treaty, i n c l u d i n g the anfounte due to depositors i n the Hawaiian Postal Savings
Bank, is hereby neaumed by tho gov'ornment of the L-nited States;
but the liabilityof the United Statee i n Lhie regard shall i n no case
excced 84,000,000. do .long, however, 3s the existing government
and the preRent commercial relatione of the Hawaiian Islands a r c
continued, as hereinbefore provided, eaid government eball continue
t o pny t b o interest on said debt.

ARTICLE 11.

T b e Republic of Haw*

ale0 cedee and hereby rranefere to the

United Statecl t h e absolute fee and ownerebip of all public, govern-

ment, or crown lands, public buildinge or edifices, porte, hnrbore,

military eqgipment.8, and all o t h e i public property of every kind
and description, belon@og to tbe government of tbe Hawaiian Islands, togetber witb every rigbt and appurtenance thereunto apperhiaing.
T h e existing laws of t b e United States relative to public lands
' eball not apply to euch laode i n the Hawaiian Islands; b u t t h e
Congrew of the United States shall enact epecial lawe for their
management and d i e p i t i o n ; Rouided, !Chat all revenue from or
p d - a of t h e -me, exwept ae regards socb part tbereof m may be
m m d or ocoupied for t i e civil, military, o r naval purpoeee of the
Unitod Statee, or may bq aseigned for the benefit of t h e inbebitante
of the Hawaiian Islands b r educational and otber public purposes.
ABTICLE 111.

.I

21 i

ARTICLE V.

There shall be no furtber irnmigrntion of Chinese into the

Hawaiian Islands, excepi u p o n sod@ conditione a8 nre now o r may
hereafter be allowed by the lawe of the r n i i e d Statee, nod no Chinese,
by. rea8On of anything herein contained, shall be allowed to enter
the United States from t h e Hawaiian Ielaods.
ARTICLE VI.

. *

The President ehall appoint f i r e cornmisaioners, at I e a R t t w o of

whom e h a l l be residents of tbe Hawaiian Islnnds, who eball, a8 BOO^
aa lgasonably practicable, recommond to Congrew euch legielation
concerning the Territory of Hawaii as t b e j eball deem neceeeary o r
proper.

Until Coagreae sball Provide for the government of eocb ielaods,

aII t b s civil, judicial and P i l i b r y powere exercised by the o5cere
of tbe edating government in mid islands shall be veated io such
pereon or penone, and eball be exercieed i n eacb -manner aa tbe
w e n t of tbe United State8 r b d l direct; a d t h e Preaident shall
b.ro power to remove mid OdBoern and 611 tbe vacancies 80 o c a -

ABTICLE VII.

This treaty shall be ratified by t h e Preeideot of t h e l'nited

States, by and with the advice and consent o f t h e Senate, on the

mooed.

I: '

ANNEXATION OF H A WAZI.

218

one p a r t , a n d by t h e Pieeident of t h e Republic of Hawaii, by nnd.

with t h e advioe and consent ot' t h e Senate, in accordance with t h e
Conetitutioo of t h e eaid Republic. o n t h e other; a n d t h e ratifications
'heroof ehall b e exchanged at Washington as soon as possible.
Mr. BLBBY,
Democratio Congressman f r o m K e n t u c k y , in a recent
interview, s p e a k i u g of t h e natnral beauty of t h e islands a n d t h e
value of t h e i r prodacte, LMJW : $'Itie worth tire long voyage there
to nee one of t h e finest spota o n t h e habitable globe. E v e r y flower
a n d plant t h a t ie familiar in thie c o u n t r y g r o w s in Hawaii with a
luxuriance t h a t chal~engeat h e admiration of the pilgrim from t h e
States. W e cannot begin to match ita wonderful flora. Then t h e
coffee a n d eugar plantatione appeal to t h e eightseers. I saw a coffee
farm of t h i r t y acree whiuh pad 1,000 buuhee to t h e acre, each bush
good for t w o pound6 of coffee. A t eeventeon cents per pound t h e
owner R e t s S340 for every acco in cultiration, w h i c h ie a good deal
better t b a n raising cotton a n d wheat in t h e United States."
The adrninietration and advocatee of annexation are very
anxioue to m u r e theearlieat coneideration of t h e treaty. One point
which t h e Committee on Foreign Relatione will be called upon to
decide is, wbether to proceed to ratifying t b e troaty of annexation
or to a n u e x the ielande by reeolotion. A ratification of t h e t r e a t y
would require a two-thirds majority, while i n the form of a resolution, in oped Senate a n d Home, a majority only would be sufllcient.
Texae was admitted by reeolation d e r t h e Senate had refused
to ratify t h e troa , a n d I believe the eame course will be adopted
in regard to Ha aii, should t h e membere of t h e Foreign Relations
Committee be doubtful of obtaining a two-thirds majority.
Japao'e d a i m agaioet H a w a i i for indemnity for t r e a t y violation
in excluding the Japanese, meme to b%.jnst, and I don't doubt our
government will 80 coneider a n d meet it.

Ip

..4

t '

CL

REPRINTS A N D TRANSLATIONS.

THE C Jf P.1 I G S
a\

G .I ISST W E I - 1I -1I . \V :k I .

I n this a c c o u n t of t h e campaign a g a i n s t Wei-Hai-\Vei, I will u w

information t h a t I received ~-1lilea t Wei.IIai-Kei, from our a r m y

officers who were t h e r e w i t h t h e Japanese sirmr, from t h e J a p a n e w officers who were i o the engsgeincnt. and froin personal
obscrvutions.
3
T h e harbor of Wei-IIui-Wei is very large, a n d will accommodate
a f e e t of almost a n y Rize. It is protected from storms b y t h e
island of Leu K u n g Tau. It is also protected hy a serien of shoals.
PO that t h e w a r e s a r e well broken up befnre t h e y get into the h a r bor. T h e southern part of t h e harbor is not deep enough for large
ships, YO t h a t tho usual auchoruge ie on t h e north side. close to t h e
island of Leu E u n g T a u .
I t waR b u t a s h o r t time ago t h a t the Chinese saw t h e neceseity
of doing a n y t h i n g i n t h e wny of fortifications, b u t when t h e F did
begin t h e y left nothing undone t h a t would help them, except putt i n g i n a large dry dock, a n d t h e rery important item of g e t t i n g
officer* a n d nieo qoalified to os8 t h e guna, a n d w h o had K r i t enough
to fight. I wae told while o n t h e field t h a t t h e fortifications cost
fifty million y e n , o r twenty-five million dollars. Of course t h e
Chinese in authority had to g e t their shiire firwt, and t h a t w a s large,
so t h a t considerable of this did not g e t to t h e fortifictrtions. F o r t s
were placed wherever t h e r e was any pousibility of approaching
from eeaward, a n d I heard one of t h e military erpertn who was
there, say, C'Give me ten tbousand trained soldiers with pleDty of
provisions, and you can h a r e as
nj- AS you please a n d 1 will hold
m y own." H e possibly made It- 00 strong, but it is no exeggeration to eay t h a t t h e fortifications were 86 nearly perfect as man
could build them.
. ..
We lett Sagasnki in Dece&r,
uud whilc there k n e w t h a t t h e
Japnneee were prepariog an expedition agaiiist Wci-Hai.Wei, a n d
as t h e Chinese must have known of i t , it ia surprising t h a t they did
not d o more in the yay of provisioning t h e defenses. \Ve went to
Chefoo, where we remained until J a n u a r y 6th, when we left for
Cbemnlpo, Korea. On t h e "st
of J a n u a r y we were anchorod

**

j.

.
.i.

.',

REPRINTS AND TRANSLATIONS.

220

peacefolly i n t b a t harbor, cloee to t h e Englieh Rquadron. About '3

A. Y. we d g h t e d a m a o - o f + w a rcoming in, which proved to be t h e
Aeolos, a Britieb croieer. S h e notified ne t h a t the J a p a n e e e had
' landodoo t b e S h a i i t u n g prdrmootory. Quiet reigned no longer. Boats
began r o o o i n g from one ehip to anoltier to notify o t h e r men.of-war
i n t b e b a r b o r of t h e i r i o t e o d e d eailing; boa- w e r e hoisted i o ,
eipnals w e r e made fro9 @ h i p to ahip, eteam W ~ Agotten u p , a n d
almoet all men-of-war left a t onctc f o r Cbefoo, as t h a t was t h o

t h e J a p a n e s e bad lauded a t night. so

REPI3Ih-T.Y A..\-I!)

.).>1
--

TR--lAV.5L-4TI9,VS.

T h e J a p a n e s e made no advance durinK t h e next two day*. but 011

F e b r u a r y 2d a scouting p a r t y found t h n t all of t h e we*t.ern forts
had been abandoned a n d t h e i r magazines b l o w n up, b u t n o t n n
a r m e d Cllinsrnau was i n siglit. These magazines w e r e probably
blown u p v n t h e 30th d u r i u g t h o e n g a g e m c r ~ t so
. t h a t t h e Japzbncac
could not dietinguish between t b e firing- and t h e hlowlny: u p of t h e .
magazines. Wei-Hai-Wci w a s d o o m e d . .ill t h e l'orts o n [tie cnnst
were in poweraion of tho J a p a n e s e , a n d t h e Chinere commarlder
probably k n e w t h a t it was unl>- tl question nt' tin>,. bzfi)rc t h e
Jnpariwe x o u l d s t a r v e tlitlm out if t h e y w u l d riot be forc.etl out n n y
otber way.
T h e J a p a n e e e i m m e d i a t e l j pla&ti mortars beIiin(1 t h e 11111.1 an('l
ridges a n d beran d r o p p i n g *hells on t h e flert and I U ] : I I I ~ ii)rth,
- T h e firing was steady. t h e Japanese fleet takiriy part oc.c:c-iorlally.
b u t l e n r i o g a gooil s h a r e of tho work to t h e c t r p t u d f;nrtr.
Oil t h e niyh't of ttic 5 t h of PebruarJ- t h e (.'hinest? jiot R t)lo\v
t h e y did not expect. The..lapaneac torpedo bonis. clc.ren i n nuni.
ber. made an a t t a c k t h a t coet t h e Chirieue thei5 t l a r . s l ~ i p .t h e .&'ring
Yuen." T h e trcimiral wse on her at t h e tinie biit escapt'd. nncl t r a n s .
ferred hi* flag to t h e ..C'hen Tuen." a riciter s h i p of t h r **Ting..' -\
couple of the Japanesu torpedo h u t s w e r e tmIIy qtraincd i n . clenriiig the obstructions t h a t t h e Cliineae b a d p l M ( : W i t h e r e LO prevcrlt
.nuch an n u e c k , a n d one Lorpedo boat W a c lost by r u n n i n g a3hol.c.
but the loss w a s n o t h i n g comparatively. Ttic ncxt n i g h t .is or
torpedo boats i-eoewed t h e a t t a c k not1 thi* time tticy p o t t h e
Yiien." Uie .. K e i Tuen." a t u g . arid a j u n k . t h a t w a ~R u n k by mi*
take. It was very d a r k , a n d w h c n e r c r a t o r p e h boat got cl,~?.e
enough t o a V08eel t h e y did not StOD to inventipnte. T h e Lai
Y u e n war) n good cruiser of s b o u t 2,3110 tdn* and B 3ister rliip of
t h e * * K i n gY u e o " whicb \FW Hunk a t t h e blrttir of Y d u 1tirc.r
W h e n t h e torpedo h i t lier s h e cnpsized almost immcdiutcbly. arid
t w o tiundred feet of her keel iw all t h a t is to he ~ e c 1 1
t d her
T h o **\\'ei Y u e n " wa* n s m a l l veseel useti nti a a c l ~ o o lHtiip, n n d
lier losa did riot a m o u n t to inucll. .\notller low r h r ~ ~ t i i n 6115.
~ - ~ c
tain1.d wns t h r s i n k i n g of t h e .*Chirig Yucn
She W ~ Rlit nnc*hnr
i n t h e h a r b o r a n d r i d i n g end on to onr of ttic J . i p a ~ \ e s cfilrta.
~
By 21
l u c k y shot R shell wns p u t i n t o her a t t h e water l i n e r h n t w e n t
t h r o u g h tier from Rtern to s t e r n , paaRin,g out below th e wnter lirle.
This one 8hell eunk her a8 i t broke t l i r o u y t ~ all t h e water-tip;tit
bulkheads. .Sbe nunk i n about four t i n t i tl half fitbolns, a n d lier
forecastle g u n pointcl Iiorizontallp over t h e water. hut t h e cnrriaKe is
invisible a t tiigb wnter, a n d looks 3s i i i t were o u t there to shoot
ducks.
D u r i n g all thie t i m e we were anchored a t Chefoo. w e could hear
t b e reports of t h e heavy g u n s when i t was c a l m , a ~ l do n t h e riigbts
of t h e torpedo a t t a c k e w e could hear t h e firing plainly.
The m o r n i n g after t h o second a t t a c k . a b u t 9 A. w rpy a t t e n
tioo WELO callcd to a torpedo boat t h a t wad barely viAib% j u q corniog i n eiRht i b r o u g h t h e miet. I wae on d u t y a t t h e time a n d roported it to t h e officer of tlie deck. T h e torpedo boat did not
t

. I

"

on t b e Cbineae

"

a not take tbe Javneee long to occupy t h e deeerted fortg,

and the guns were tben t q r n e d o n t h e i r lute ownere a n d h e a v y
It

shell from t h e m WM m i n e d on the C h i n e m batteriee o n t h e C h a n n e l

Inland and on the C b i n w deot. Bat the Japaneee rcceived e
beovier 6re then the mu(d give, for the batteriee from t h e forte
on t be idand. Len d m g pan and C h a n n e l I e l m d , a n d t h e g u n s
Itom the Chin- deet compenced a furions b o m b a r d m e n t o n t h e .\
reoently captured fbrt~,and did -me Jamagu. b o t could not d r i v e
oat tbe Japoeoe thoogb t h y silenced them for a while.

&.A;

.,.I

i .I..

.:

222

REPRINTS AND T R S N S LATIOLVS.

have any colore flying, a a d from t b e way t h e smoke was 'cominx

was m a k i n g with her bow
a n d ecrew, i t wns ovident s h e was l o u i n g no titnu.
k h n y were
the e u r m i e e s w e made, sowe s a y i n g it was u J a p , olhera muiotaioiog t h a t i t w a s o Cbinafonn, but m*hen a n o t h e r came in sight a
minute or two later u n d o r like circumstances, w e t i l l agreed t h a t i t
wae a Jap chaaiog a Chinese boat. T h a t i t was not a Chinese
torpedo boat after a Jap we all kuew. We were all rniutakco.
however, for 8oon afler we saw n vessel ahowing t h r o u g h tho mist
that w'e k n e w at a g l a n c e u p s tbe'.Toshino,"Japan'd awifteat cruiser.
and ebe wae followed b y t h e I'Taehichido," a n o t h e r swift cruiser.
W h e n w e m w them we kaow t h a t the torpedo boats mere Chiriese.
a n d t h a t tho J a p e were io pursuit. Tliey rounded II point n e a r u s
and soon w e beard dring. O n e boat.eecapod, hut t h e o t h e r was
c a u g h t in the ice a n d s b o t to piecos. K n o w i n g t h a t thoy would be
captured if t b e y remained, t h e y had tried to eacapu with t h e ahoye
opened fire but did no damage.
reeult. T b e Cbioese fort nt Che
It became evident to Admiral
t h a t he must surrender. S o t
that t b e fire wae hurting him 80 much, b u t h i a officer8 w*ete insist.
iog eacb d a y t b n t they muat surrender o r bo killed. D a y b y day
b e urged t h e m to w a i t for reinforcoments, t h a t he knew would riot
come, until t h e y would n o t be beld a n y longer.
O n tho 1 2 t b , tborefore, h e Bent a flag of truce to Admiral Iru.
m a k i n g overturee for t h e eurrender of t h e place. l i e received 1111
aoewer a g r e e i n g to t b e eprreoder a n d also agreeing to parole t i l l
otscere a n d men, if the plare was turned over without further d e .
etrnction. W h e n Admirat Tlno saw h e could do no more for his
@ m - a a n d meu be committed suicide. Tbe g e n e r i l of tho :irniy
did the name, and no one wae left to carry on negotiations. Finnlly
Admiral Lro aeked for some o n e to conclude t h e surrender ot the
place, and after mach pereaaeion tbe "Tauti" w e n t o u t and a r r a n p t i
t b e earrender. All t h e fbrta, one battle ehip, t h r e e cruisern, six
Rnnboata, a n d eleven torpedoboats, were turned over to t h e J a p .
neea. Io r e t n r n t h e oi3cere a n d men were all paroled except n n
American named HOWIE,
who w a s held for b r e a k i n g his parole. Ilc
bad previously been taken off a Pronch vewe a n d then been r e l e w d , OD hie agreeing no( to eervo against
pan d u r i n g t h e w-tip.
He waa at tbe t i m e undtlp contract to serve China, a n d , notnittietandinp; hie pledge to Japan, be proceeded to Wei-Hai-Wei at O I I W
nod begun w o r k with them. Hiu claim waa t h a t J a p a n did not I W lease bie companione,and t h a t thin released him. T h e Japanene
beld bim until t b e closo of t b e w a r then torned him adrift. We
t h o a g h t t h e Japaoeee would execate him, a n d from w b a t wc heard
of tbe cam we thought be bngbt to be ehot. All the foreigners at
Wei-Esi- Wet nay t h a t bo *an a v e r y brave man a n d t b e life of t h e
defeaee. W b e o a n y t b i o k dangeroue wan to be d o n e Howrlr did it,
a d he gave many examplee of beroism-but
he violated h i s oath.
T b i r fighting all took $lace beforo w e reached Woi-'Hni-Wei, b n t
w e arrived before the plhce surrendered. I was attacbed to the
"Baltimore," bot bad peltniwioo to go down a8 a paeclenger on the
"Cbarleaton" to BOO a b u t bad happened.'

from h e r pipee a o d ffom tho foam die

"4

HEPRINTS A N D TRANSLA TIONS.

KEPKI-VT.5 A S L ) TR.4-V.5L-4 TIf)-V.5,

? w e n t to see it amd wan probably the onlr foreigner who did

eee it. It bae t w o Krapp guns. T b e parapeta aro fully forty-tive
fmt ;hick a o d i t WM very nicely p u t up. Tbie mae tho only one of
tbe wqsstern forbs t h a t w m not b l o w n . u p , a n d as I could see no
a i m u n i t i n n , I took it far g r a n t e d t h a t t h e J a p e had taken them
unawares and thnt t h i e fort had n o t b e e n given any ammunition.
The o t h e r for@ contaioed large guns, and all were in good c o n dition, b u t i o each cam t h e magazinua had been blown up, while d i r t .
stone a n d hundreds of fltet clam shell were lying a r o u n d i n iade.
seribable confusion.
It is hard to wy at wborn I felt t h e moet indignant, t h e ChineJe
for deserting such m a g n i t h o t w o i k s witbout a fight, o r t h e
Jayaneeci for continuing Obi8 work of deatroction by blowing u p t h c
guns. Tbep d i d not wish to leave men enough there to man all thth
forteland ae they could not transport t h e large p i n e enail: they tin11
decided to destroy them. T h e y were t r y i n g t o buret them by p u t t i n g i n gun'cottod, b o t beyond twistinK t h e . t i 8 i n g no notiwnblc
damage w m done: T h e y found. however, thht they could easily
destroy t h e carriage eo they used guncotton-+ere a8 well, a n d by
placin8 a charge o n the loadirig platform tbey entirelx disabled tlic
ROO.
They destroyed is thie m a n n e r ull t h e large g u n * on t h e
mainland, twenty.sevea i n number, but those on the island w e r e not
injored, I believe.
The n e x t d a y wae t b e 22d d a y of F e b r u a r y , and we rernaincil
aboard ebip.
It is a costom when veesele of on0 nation celebrate, t h a t tile
weeels i n t h e harbor of o t h e r nations nwiat. Thie celebratioii
oauallp coneibte i n decorating t h e s h i p with flag8,snd t i r i n ~a anlutc
of twenty-one guns at omn with t h e flag of t h e nation celebrating
at the main. T h e r e were about t h i r t y Japancso men-of*-war vr
armed transports, ODO Russian, one Italian a n d one Englishman. so
t b a t when we h a d dreesed ebip it did not look ae though w e were i n
tbe midstof wgr. A t noon, howevor, when ahout thirty-five ren.relo
b e e n firing it sounded somewhat like i t , ahout uevcn hundred a n d
fifty rounds being 6red In a few minutes. I might add that rnariy
Eoglisb commaudera do not like to celebrate the 4th of J u l y nor t b e
22d of F e b r u a r y , BO t h e dag prerioue to either of these dntea they
get up aacbor, put to epa, r e t u r n i n g t h e day followiog. By eo
doing, t h e y do n o t have to fire a d o t e to ue, a n d etill avoid refueinp
ta d o 80, ne tbia wonld a n 6 e trouble. Thie ie particolarly t h e cme
on the 4th of J u l y , b o t i t ie done by Borne cornmaadera on t h e 22d

go,b o t

r p '

c _

of February aleo.
00 the evening of tbe 22d we took a eteam launch a n d w e n t
rroond t b e b.rbor to inspect t h e vessels. T b e Bret veasel w e Tisited
WM the"Cbeo Yuea." the battle ebip. S h e eeemed to be i n good

condition aboot t b e WaterCine, b u t needed docking. Sbe,hnd touobed

eborrly before and had pat a bole in ber bottom, b u t bad had temHer u p p r w o r k s were riddled, while at the battle
Japansee b 4 given all t h e i r atteqtion to t h e t w o
r
/I

.'

.>.>
,,5

battle $ I I ~ * . which altt.iretb?r rect4rcd r % ) j rb u r l , I r r i hits A i l t b e

ahot holee tiad been (.clveryli civt'r a n d h e r a i . l t . wy11- or,e nia.s.1 of
patches S o shell hnd penetrated hvr r l t a l pnrti. t i l ' w e v e r , a n d stir
was Reaworthy
Sonic heavy * h e l l na'l ! l i t her arrnot y r ~ i ltl.jrrptb,
but the protection =a$ f @ u r t e ~ riln v h e - . ; ~ n , iK t . t . - l , t . ! : - ' 1 1 . 1 r l l t t p e r ~ e tratz

The n e x t qhip we T i d i t e d =as t h t l t o r p ! o r i . T:ng Yt1c.11

.I
rntlre c ~ ~ m p l e t twreck
.
c o i i l ~ l not h e in.ay;r:ed
\ V t J c n * t r u c k by
t h e torpedo s h e had g o n e Int8) s h o s i wawr tnt.::lre - i n k i r l K antj at
h i g h tide her upper deck i d flurih w i t h rbe w a f e r \ \ ' h e n *lit> w a s
e u r ~ kt h e Chirebe wemed t o k i j o w t h a t m)oner
I3rt.r a h t . u-,juI,j be
captured. und tu prrTent t h e m raigioy htsr the? i l u t d c n a n i : t l s . ~ Q U I I I
tier zniuke pipe-* a n d ()It*= her up. Hvr dcwt?* :Lrt> ti:iclly torn I I ~
a n d her h a m a a n d frames twiatcd i n t o incv)nc.t.ivat,lcL -Ii:~p..
nn.1
rrpairii a r e o u t u t the queation.
n 1.cillaiwing r c a s e ! ~ .
T h e Japanese captured i n this c a o i p f ~ ~ pthe
T h e ,*('hen Tucn ' hattle ship of 5.01'10 ton:: t h e i'ing Yuan" rtrmcLd
cruiser.;. Tai f u e o " c r u i w r . and ,. Quonp: 1'1 I I K torpdcr cruiser. ,-is
gunhosts a n d eleren torprdo boats. FL+idz.R l c y l n y theat, rta*Je19
t h e ('hineqe lost fnur hy being g u n k , t w o of w-hia.h?hc Japarlcse n.:i
probnblr raise. On ahore t h e J a p a n m e c,aprure,.i t a e l r t z f2r:.u. titry.
one puns of twelve centimeter+ o r o r e r , a large n u m h e r o f tiel$i and
Piegt' pun& tb0u.wnd.y of the fiflwt of' *hell of HI: sizcc. 15tl.iliiO
rounfla of anirnuoition (marked U. 5. Gorernmerlt :inti i n fact
e r e r F t h i n g that toold be used i n carrFi0.K on n u r
T h e dcfenas a t K e i - H a i - W c i wad aettk-x-ery w e a k
T ~ , conly
part of t h e defense t b a t was spirited was o n C b e n n d Idlan4i. l i e r e
there were two eight-inch g o n e mounted on disappearing c.arriag!p9.
two twenty.four centimeter and t n o s i x centimeter p i i n * Innurnerable abell were rained in on t h i a little island and t h e parnpcts'ii-ere
eaten away badly. a n d building8 torn down, but r t i l l t h e fort held its
own. W h e n the Japaneee would p i o r their fire in hearinet. the
g u m on t h e ieland would cease d r i n g for s while, b u t when t h e tire
bad slackeoed a little, t b e dieappearing guns would riac. u p s o d .*end
their cornplirnonte to t h e Jape. F i n a l l r a shell pot i n t o the
kitcben and exploded under t b e cook. When I d w e n h e was saili n g heavenward a n d is pupposed to be moving- through spare n o w .
a~ t h e ebell Bent bim eo higb t b a t t h e attraction of g r a r i b t i o n hlcJ
no influence on him. -4t any raw he baa oot returned. nor ha3 he
sent a meeeage to hie friends.
O t h e r parte of t h e defenne did well for a while. where the (]&ere
were capable, but i n no place was t h e defense so good ae t h i a .
T b e enduranco of the Chinese ie wonderful. While st Cdefoo I
w e n t to t h e boapitala a n d M W many badly wounded who had walked
from Wei-Hai.Wei, between t h i r t y and forty milea, a b e n the tbermometer waa from six to f i k n degreee b e l o w zero. One fellow
had bis sboolder splintered a n d bad started to r u n p b e a a n o t b e r
bollet caogbt him in t h e back. I M.+-tbis bullet extracted. It had
lodged*io bie spiue aod W ~ L Bwedged in 80 tigbtly that i t required
"

$ 4

,--

..$
REPBINTS AND T W 8 L A T I O N S .

227

t h a t t h e y wonld stay looger than CASABIANCA

had stayed 00 the
waa about M much eurpriaed with
bnraiog deck. General STUEQI~
this aouwer SE I had been by his remarks to me, bat instantly a i d
to me: T h a t is all I want of roo now,, 1 stop t h e division right
here a n d will m o d back a regimeot after t h a t picket company.
CHOtheo tnroed to his inspector-gemeral, a n d with a flow of 6 words
took him sharply to trek for failare to relieve thin cket company,
sod immediately sent one of the Michigan regime0 at a smart g a i t
t6 k i o g io Captaio EYLBSB
mmpany. T h e en re division waa
halted, aod i n d o e timo t h e regiment came btick b oging the picket
corn a n y with them. Geoeral STOBQII~
eaid 00 i o g further
me
at t at time, a n d I returned to my regim
The oext morning
while we were on t h e march, Geoeral STUBQU
came over to t h e road
we were m o v i n r on. Staodiob 00 s h e roadside 4e -ked for t h e
Seventh Ohio Cavalry, a n d beiog ioformed t h a t we were approachiog, he awaited our comiog. As I rode u p he came towarch me,
a o d i o a baodsome manner d e e d his hat, a o d eaid, &Goodmorning,
Adjutsot; I hope yoa are well. T h a t w w all, aod t h a t WM enough.
I always had a likiog for Geoenrl STUBOU
from this, our first meetiog, described above, till the d a y he left OR

P
aatn

Lp

CAPTAIN XI&-

KEOGE.

This yooog Irishmun came to UE as a n aid-do camp on t h e ~taff

of General STOPISMAN,
who, for a time commaoded oor division.
A t t b a t time we eonsiderod ourselves veterooe, having served t w o
yean. s o d were a @deal
disposed to r w e n t tho presenw of newWe
did not like the style of Captain Y I LKBCMXI;
~
there
; c-mm.
wan altogether too much style. Ee w a i ~ ~ ahandsome
s
a yoaog mao
ae 1 aver saw, theo I rhoold m y about tweoty-three or tweoty-four
yean of age. He rode a horae like a Centaur. H e had a frwh
Irish complexion like t h e pink side of a ripe peach-more
like the
complexion of a sixteen-year old girl than of a cavalry soldier.
His moiform wae Rpotleas, and fitted him like t h e ekio 00 a momage, if
there had bee0 a n y more of t h e mao, or a n y l e a s of t h e oniform, it
woald have bee0 a mistlt. We were told that he waa from t h e
Popee body gnard. We were n o t cariog much i n thoee d a y e f o r
t b e %pe~or his body guard, aod at all eventa we did not care much
tbr (Lptain KBOOE,and particularly did .not like his style. W e
gave him t h e cold shoulder, and aa be p
d os side remarks
were patwed, each M, 1wooder if his mother cute his hair? What
1anoch.y do yon thiok be patronizes? etc., etc., aod nobody permitted him to drink from their canteen. One day oot loog after
K m joined as, we got iotoan argumeot with t h e eoemys cavalry,
and G o o d particalar diiUcolty io driving them trom a wooded knoll
wbicb c o m m a o d d oor p i t i o n . T w o or three oosocceosful etrorta
had b o o made, bat t h e eoemy coptinoed to hold the p i t i o o .
Soon b p t a i o E#)oHcame gallopiog to our frost with 80 order from
Geneal STONSHIN,
d i m t i o g as to drive t h e eoemy from t h e poeitioo m f e d to. Aftor delivering this order EUK(H
mid t b a t be

BEPRINT8 AND TBAhVJLATIOA!&

228

+ '

bad permimion from General STO~EYANto aak fohtbe command of

the force that wrm to carry o u t tbir order. Abattalioo of fonr
companieo (nearly 300 men) were placed at bin dirpocul. Io column
of cornpoien be rtarted at a briak trot, and getting under fire.
mined bimmlf in his s t i ~ u p sand
, witb cap io band, turned to the
battalion.cried out, *'Hip, E i p , Eurrah. Boys! Bats we go!" and
breaking into a gallop, the battalion witb K ~ well
H io t b e lead,
charged on tbe enemy capturing all whom- f l e e t o w of b o w did
o a t permit tbem to enmcape. The position waa qaickly won, and
K=R ever afterwards WM a mont welcome gaemst at every campire, and every canteen in the regiment waa freely proffered to him.
Many a volunteer of 18614863 riocerely monrned bin deatb wbeo
t h e wires firmbed to ur tbe oe-8 bf tbe dieaster that had occurred
on the Little Bin Horn, wben K m m died with CUSTEB.
9

OBNEBAL A. V. -UTE

When colonel of tbe &mod Ohio Cavalry, Geoeral KAUTZfor a

timo commanded onr brigade. H e waa a moat tborough and conscientiour commander, and had our unbounded respect and cosfidance. One day wbeo we occapied the line of tbe.Cumberland
Boer, near Someraet, Kentucky, we c
d to the southern ride of
. t h e river,.then ocuapied by Geneml P m r r ~of t h e enemy's force.
We gave PKOMY"alpod ran for bir m ney'*and drove bim
mveral mil- back into tbe fantoerr of tbe m uotainr heyoad Montieello. W e tben rerted on oar retoro to tbe north aide of the
to rest
Cumberland Biwr. AI we a p p m b e d t h e river we rto
tbe men and homm. We were nu ' f i d to hear tiring y our rear
guard, and won a m m o g e r browT It t b e information t b a t Pwuy,
iu Ml brae, was giving the rear ~ord
a double-band fall of i g b t
a n d a b o n e mce~. General
tbrew hb oommaod iuto t b e
addle and reinforced tbe rear guard witb hb entire-command. I
went into tbie Q b t immediatdy bebiod General KAVTI,wbo
purbed b b whole force io at once, a n d met PWMM'~
advance in a
denm w o o d r , . p w n u p witb onderbrarb. I n an inatant t b e two
tbrosr were mthin pinto1 rbot of one another, and in anotber inrtaot
were hotly engaged at hardly arm'n length.. Tbere waa imminent
danger of the two forcer b e i o g ' m i d together. One of oar serpanu took a primmer &om t b e otber dde of t b e tree t b e m m n t
9w d a g for a breastwork-the two men of contending forceto
d a g the -me tree br a roteodon. T h e fighting continued till
k k , when both mdee r i t g d r e w h m t h e b l d , it being a d'rann
%bt, and neither ride cl;.iming to bave done more tban bold tbeir
own. .During t b e night detrrila h m eacb ride virited t b b denm
t b e e e u e b i n g prth worked
wooda to recover t b e
a i r wan koowo u the h k y
nodor a
Hill
or the .dlkir at C r p b i n W&O h.
Goooral K A ~in ,
rpmking of tht .msir +r
tbe war, d d it w u tho Ubotteet little
light" ,be bad ever experieooed. One odaaa of the &aood Ohio
C a v w mrhot throogb the body new the l a y . Hi8 aomr8dee
m - e d him ender a tma wbem they expected him to die every

'

'

'

wt,

f
m

minmte. Colonel Sm

WY. P. BANDBBS.

SAND- at t h a t time commanded a Michigan r e ~ m e n t . Gepeml

KAUTZsent the writer of them linea with an order to Colonel
SANDEM
direating him to char* the enemy witb hie regiment. la
deliveriog tbir order to SANDEM
I obeeroed tbat, after sending for
his regiment to come to t h e f m n t (it being a little w a p in tbe
rear be rode bin b o w to a brook near by, tbrowiog bia bridle rein
on t e home'r peck, and while the home wna drinking SUVDBBE
reached into bir pocket and brooght out a pair of kid glovm, whicb
he proceeded to pot on with tho ntmp.t care, palling tbe glove over
each band and preMiog it down over h c b iogor, M tbougb drawing
for mme IKH)UI
ttnction. I WM quite interested in obeerving thin
performance, and wondergd if it WM t b e correct and proper thing
with regnlar army ofEcere to lead cavalry charges witb their bandr
carefi~llyd
d in kid glover. SANDERS
bad previoarly demone t r a b d bin gallantry, and we all knew tbat be wan well rnpplied
witb,"mnd," and w~y8a mldior of capacity, coarage'and the bigbest
merit. I concluded tbat tbe glove epimde wan not indicative of
anything, and t b a t be bad put on t b e glovee uncooscioualy a n d
wliilo preoccupied witb the mattm at hand. Io an engagement witb
t h e e'rremp at Dotton Hill, near Somemet, Kentucky, General
S u r m r e , then a captain' on the rbff of o u r commander, General
Q
A. UILYOBE,
gave- an evidence of bin capacity to mise t h e
opportunity aa offered. Tbir WM a very intereating cavalry Q b t ,
with t h e peculiar featore t b a t t h e o p p i n g for- '*rwapped" poaitione daring tbe Bght, we ocoupying tbeir original poeition a n d
they occopyiog oura Immediately upon t b t cbange takiog place,
G e n d GILMOBB
m o t an order by General (tbeo Captain) S ~ I W I
for olrcrbattalion of our regiment to cbarge t h e eoemyt poeition-9
stating to our commander, General LBAEL
GABBABD,
that a n a l QILMO.~ had given p e r m i d o n for him (SAUDEM) to a&
.*r the .command of the battalion. T b e &mod Battalion of the
&renth Ob* Cavalry wan immediately placed at bin oommaod, a n d
Wibg tbir kttalion he drove t b e enemy quickly from. bin potsition,
and, U n g up the pomit, dieappeared in the near by forat.' We
d d h c u hie fino8 growing more and more d m n t till it died
awas He pumaed %be~ t i v m
until be had ooptnred a large puL
of t h e command, a n d returoeil to M with t p e battle-aCrgr
~
and a

a -

1
REPRINTS AND TRANSLATIONS.

REPRINTS AND TRANSLATIONS.

230

antimely deatb (killed

big drove of prisoners. General SANDERS
wbile opposing LONQSTBEETS
advance apon Knoxville) b e t to the
service an o58oer of the bigbest merit, and who, bad be lived, would
have attaiaed tbe highest, rank M a cavalry commander.

The volunteers wbo bad tbe good fortune to come under the
command of thie brilliaat cavalry leader, are alwaye oatepoken i n
their praiw of bim, and are eqaally prond of saying they belonged
to WILSONScavalry corps; they are prond of their commander and
of tbeir own acbievemeata ander bie masterly direction. We bave
been accused of beinn tender-heard i n oar regard for General
WILBON,and freely admit the tratb of tbis cbargc. I tbiok it will
apply to every eoldier who served .in WIL~ONS
cavalry corpe. We
all had this tender-tiearted alfection for bim. The peason ie plain :
viz : he always led un to victory ; he made au proud of oweelvee, and
we rewarded him witb our ~on6deocoand oar ofection.
The memory of a little d p i d e wbicb introduced me to General
mat recollcction.
WILSONbas always been a
W e bad bee0 resiatiog H o u advance i n t o Tennessee jast prior
to tbe battles of Franklin and Sosbville, in 1864. FOBBEST,
with
hie cav ry corpu, had cmeaed Dack River above Columbia. Our
caralry ivision bad beep holding tho line of Duck River, but wae
then falling back toward Franklin. A lively cavalry engagement
was i n progreae in tbe valley of .Duck River, when a t dark, 1 waa
posted with my company of eixty Spencer carbine8 to cover t h e retreat of our forcee over a rocky ford. I had a strong poeitioo nod
felt myself capable of cbeckinp: tbe enempa advance at this point.
One brigade, commanded by Colonel CAPEON,in falling back became a little too bmty, and i o their efforts to advance to the
rear, ran over my company a t tbe ford. Natprally I wae in p bad
bomor over tbis, and wae4sayiog tlioge to everybody wbo came
within reacb or hearing. I n the meantime oar forcea bad all paeeed
acrose the ford ; the enemy occapied tbe opposite side, aod m y company wne keenly alert, wa-kbini for tbe next pocleible more. -It had
now grown almoet dark. In t h e gloaming of tbat Novemkr evening a single horseman rode up to my poet abd began to ask qaestioas, one quickly after aootber. As stated, I WM in an exceediogly.
bad bamor, damning the brigade wbicb bad just run over my poet,
and WM not in a bamor to carry on an exteaded conversation with
anybody. However, I answered tbe qaeetions, tboagb not in a very
polite Iangaage. Aner a half a ddzen moments of vigorous queations my unknown visiter asked wbo I was. I replied, I a m
Captain Amin of the Seoentb Ohio Cavalry, and dont care a damn
wbo knows it. With tbis my visitor started to depart, wben I
halted him and asked, SWbo are yoa? Tbem are times wbcn we
ace particalar. 1 waa surprised wben tbe answer came, saying my
visitor WUJ General W n m ~ .

231

I explained to the General t i a t % did not think I could give bim

any more informatioo than I bad@von bim, bot if I bad known
wbo be waa the langaag6 woald Mve been more carefully chosen.
:*Ob! tbate all rigbt, Csptcrin, be replied over his eboalder, as be
galloped off io the darkoeee.
At this particnlu moment my oatpost waa tbe most important
on oar front, and the above incident is mentioned to sbow tbat
Geoeral WI-N waa tbeo, M always, on tbe spot in pereon, wbere
b e wold witb bie own eyes me tbe first mqve of tbe eoemy and
me& it promptly.
Tbe *snbseqnentproceedings of WILEONS
cavalry corps, with
ite iotrepid leader, mark, eome of the most brilliant pages of bietory.
~ ~ in tbe two daye battle
Holdiog tbe rigbt of General T E O M Aaryy
of Naebville, it met with continued sacam, doubling HOODS
left
flank back on iteelf, and thereby weakening t h e enemys entire line,
for. if tbere is one thing more than aaotber tbat a soldier d m not
like, it is to bave his gdank tarned. In tbie two days battle a t
Nashville, WILE ON'^ cavalry c o r p fougbt moooted and diemouoted,
an the nature of the groand necessitated,and met with euccem botb
w a p , again demonstratiog tbe tratb of GeneFl WIWNs remark,
that his c o r p WUJ eicient afoot or homebaakc, and coald be
depeoded upon,ia any emergency excapt, poeeibly, ut ma. Tbeir
e5ciency had never been tried in MU wqfizre. I n the pareuit of
H o d s army atter t b e battle of Naabville, tbe cavalry waa bandled
by General WI-N with saperb skill, resulting in tbe captare of
great nambere of rieoners, battle-dags, gaoe and monitions of war.
.
The remoant of &OOD~ army never afterward proved effectire in
preventing t h e triumpbant advance of t b e victor&
Tbe great mid of this cavalry corps, comprising 12,000 wellmounted and well-armed troopere, ripping tbe bowels out of tbe
Confederacy,waa a brilliant eoding of the campaign in tbe west,
andincluded t h e capture of 5 fortided oities, 7,000 prisoners, 22
battle-flap, 280 pieces of artillery, and over 100,000 stands of r m d l
armr, besides rant quantities of otber monitions of war, closing tbe
climax in the capture of J S ~ B S ODAVU,
N
cam rgn with the 6 t t i n ~
t b e resident of tbe Confederacy. At tbie time WILEONB
cavalry
corp fokmed an armed cordon, reacbing from Dalton, i n tbe monnb i n fatness of North Georgia, to Saint Xarks, Florida, on tbe Glrlf
of h x i c o , a dbtmrJcebf about 300 miles. The eotire command WUJ
under tbe control of General WILEON,
with hie cavalry detrchmeata
p t e d at dl c ~ - r o a d sand at every ferry. As a n indication of
the alertom of tbis command at tbis time, it may be mentioned
b
tbat, while t b e capture of Jwr DAVISfell by the fortune of good
.
look to Lieatenant-Colonel B. D.PBITCHABD,
of tbe Foartb Micbigan Cavalry, tbe digbt WUJ ao closely under observation that witbin
a few minutes of tbe actual captore, Liemteoant.Colooe1 ~ U ~ B Y
HA^=, ef tbe First Wisconsin Cavalry, who first diecovered the
had
trail, WUJ on the spot ready to make tbe capture if PIUTCRABD
oot bean luckily a few minotea ahead of him.

r-

~~

?r

232

REPRINTS A X D T R A N S L A TIO-VS.

Tbe 12,000 troopere who were o n d e r General WILson's comrnand

on thia campaign compoeed probably t h e largest body of w e l l a r m e d a n d well-mounted cavalry t h a t ever mored on thia c o n t i n e n t
n. one command. T h e coneurnmate skill and brilliunt *uccee?; with
which General WILSON
handled thie large body of horsemen deniori.
atrated t h e wiedom of o u r great c o m m a n d e r , Generul (:;HAST. i n
eelecting WILSONfor t h i s important command.
A t tbie time General WILSON, w a s about twenty-serenyyears of
age, a n d t h e 12,000 cavalrymen who s w u n g into their aaildlcs at t h e
eonnd of hie bugle to follow hie battle-flag were mostly * * youngsters."
from t w e n t y to twenty-five y e a r s of age, though d l sent3ooed v e ~ c r a n *
of tbree or more yearn' eorvice.
c
r

PROFESSIOSAL NOTES

General WILSON
was born a t Shawneetown, Illinois, grudutiteil
from Weet P o i n t i n the Gret yoar of " o u r -Tar," proving t t i n t lie wn*
born at t h e r i g h t tim? to enable 6im to win h i a major-general's
double star within t h d e yeare from leuvinc t h e cadet sct~oolroom
T h e troopere who followed hie lead wero, like himself, -*youngsters,"
who had t h r o w n w i d e their nchool book8 or law bocik8, o r dropped
t h e plow or barrow about t b e 'time their commander had dropped
hie ecbool books, a n d were mostly from Ohio, Iniliana, K e n t u c k > - ,
Michigan, Jllinois, Wieconsin, Minnesotci, Iowa, a n d o t h e r \Vc*terri
States.
No commander e v e r lield a command in "our w a r ' I l?til-l-ti5 I
w h o bad in a g r e a t e r degree t h e love, confidencc kind fnilti of' hi*
command t h a n WILSON'U12,000 cavalrymen freely gnre to their
leader. A aoldier dearly loves n commander who leads to v i c t o r y . in
loving him t h e y honor thsmeelves.
THEOI)OKB F. A L I . E S ,
h l c Coplain
>D?

co. D.Sriwnfh Ohio

I
I

I*dunlccr C o t d r y .

Btmd Cdoncl, Lkikd Statrs

ylvd~~ri!~v8.

1
I

RlSG WdT

T t i : ~poht 1 3 nl9o hollox and mmde in M rirnilar as?. h u t mu-t t ) t a

a b o u t nine feet high. T h e a r m a b u t four feet long a h i c h v x t e n ~ l ~ 1
out over t h e track, is made o f a piece of half-inch water o r ~'114plpe.
and

IS

hent

downward a t t h e outward Pxtremity a*

4h1)wii i n

our

PROFESSIONAL NOTES.

236

time M an ordinary steel eboe under the eame conditions. It an.

swem the purpoee of the rubber pad and a t tbe same time is a protection a g a i n s t d i p p i n g on slippery pavernente, tbe weight of t h e
boree f o r c i q t h e rubber through the slota in the eboe each time t h e
foot strikee tbe pavement, wbicb is a better protection againet elipping t b a n calke or any other known device. Rubber pads a8 useti
with common ehoae a r e iojurioue, for the reaeon that they corer t h c
bottom of t h e hoof, excluding the air, whicb ie contrwy to nature
The Gibbe Sboe covere no more eurftlce on the hoof tbsn the ordinary
ateel eboe and leaves t h e hoof as near i t s natural a t a t e ae one rho11
with common shoee. It may be readilyshaped to t h e foot cold, anal

ie made i n eizes to correepood with the regular steel shoes. rsnd h c iug forged from epecially eelected steel, can be either widened or
narrowed and ebaped to adapt it to t h e foot of a n y horse.
, The pad rubber boreeeboe coneiste of a dotted forged steel frarnc
on which ie 6rmly vulcanited a cushion of rubber wbicb p m s e ~
through the slob, 6lle a channel on the underside. awelliog out at
t h e inside of tbe heele to form two d i d rubber pads.
Tbe rubber cnsbiooed horeeeboe ia quite a new t h i u g , at lefbbt a6
far a8 one is concerned. Tbe horeee of the tire department i n many
of the large citiee are being tried with tbeeo ehoea, and it is wid
they are proving natiafactorp. The differonce i n tbq,motion of a
b o w o n pavement ehod with the rubber cuebioned shoe ie r e r y
noticeable. There i e little or no noiee, and apparently no concuesion. Tbe ad. trbilicy of the eboe to roagb roads and trails aw yet
b o e n o t b e e n t ed.

rB

I.

Fig. 2

T
-f

to it). A rifle or carbine ie then inwrted i n the split and aimed at

the water'a edge on t h e oppoeite side It i a i m p r u n t that t h e
piwe be held 80 firmly i n the split tbat the poaition of the piece will
not be easily dieturbed r t b r i t is tbos aim-ed.
The atake is t h e n rerolved ontil the ])ne of e i g h t intersecte the
watBr'e edge on the near side, care being taken to keep t h e stake
vertical. Mark t h e i n t e r s e c t i o n , z . and m e m u r e t b e $distancec: = IIJ

I----

41

If the-stream is wide and the currcnt rapid. revolve :tIso t o :

zr;add to z r arid txke hnlf t h e s u m .
Ofcouree any atick with's atroiglit etlqe niup t)c u.ic,t iri.tt':l.l ~ t '
the ride.
meamre

PIOVRE

2.

.i

RepreRenta an instrumont for m i l k i n g such rne:isiirerncnt~ I t i.

easilj- c a r r i e b n d cirii be niirllc nt u ~ i yp w t . I t C O I I .
eiate of the upright 6 g , shoiit o n e i n c h i n tiiumc.tt.r arid fiv,. : r r l r l
one-half feet long, i n t w o Rrction.9 b f and . i q . 'rho .upptQrw,:tiori
revolvee on tho lowor by mennu of a d o w e l t'mtcnv(l i n l o tile 1,)wt.r
eection, and is clamped and iinclnmlicd t o the do\vcl by :I r h i i I i i I ,
ecrew a t f .
The aighting arm, a b, i n n straight cdgc iricti tt1ic.k. iricti
wide and 3ti inchea long, and is tirstcnccl to tile uI)riplit by n -crew
at 6 eo that t h e arm w i l l hnvc n. vcrticnl niigiil:ir r n n t i o r l 113 , I /, t z i .
n i e arm,has a smnll fiat-headed tack a t cucli e n d , r i n r i d b . tor u w
in eighting; c d ie a l i g h t brace fastened t o the urin :rt (.by :r 3 c r t ~ \ v
and to the upright by a clamp Rprinp w h i c h hold3 t t i c ~ i r i i ii n 1 1 0 - i .
emall, l i g h t ,

tion when eiyhted; g

a,

is

a p l u m b bob funtenccl t o t l i c
thc lower section

By IooseninR the thumb wrcw

iipri:l1t

:It h

the iilll.i:Iit

can be removed, the upper section i r r i t i arm <*on t t l c

c t;)Itit..l t o
p t h c r and all tied i n u compact buridlc w i t h tlie plllnil) bolt r i r l r i , :
\ V I L I , I . ~ M w. n)K.-Y.rtt.
Firs1 Licutrnnnl. h ~ ~ i - t (/. 'iI I I

,rir!j

The device here repreeented was gotten up by Genernl J A M E S

RUBE LINCOLN,
of the Iowa Nationnl Guard, a n d apptwi'* t o be
an inexpeonivo nod handy tombination of the pluno h b l e :lnd the

.
I

PROFESSIONAL ,VOTES.

240

and inquired, ')Why not?" I called bis attention to the cottotiwoods chore, and told b i m I bad taken t h e responsibiliLy of *avinK
the men and horsed. The dear old man bad learned to swear i n
t h e old army before tbe w a r and WBR a past master, and when 1 1 t h
got through I ealuted and set the men hustling the wagon3 u t i loaded and h i t c h i n g up the teams, and he 'rode off. M A C K E N Z I E ,
who WM mated on hie horse some diacance off, overseeing every.
t h i n g that tvae happening, then rode over to me and ayked Inc
what I wae oing to do. I told bim to KO aRer cottonwood*. I l e
asked me if did not sue thoee cloee by. and told me that an oficer
abould urn cornmoo eentw, nod eave hie men a n d horses i n e v e r wsy poaei ble.
Youm truly,
C. L HAYMOSD

BOOK NOTICES A N D EXCHASGES.

.\* t h i - nuriihrr o f t h e J I > I . R S A Lcontain3 t h e prize

Z * - Y ~ .arid

many other excellent articles. t h e &retary h a * had a large

number printed and c a n supply any call t h a t may be m a d e !ar extra
ca)pies, Lieutrnunt Dicknian c article *)n '. Patrollirip c'ovzrw [ t i e
hutjjt8c.t very thoroughly. and will hc. of undoutlte 1 v a l u e t n all
~ ~ t f i c eof
r s the Iiile
The map to be used i n working o u t t i i v rsriQu3
problt>ms. m o i i r t t d on I loth. can be obtained frorn r h t a .?&retary

IIIW

'

tor t ( ~ n(.t'nt.-.

....

S<j J 1 E FOREIGS COJi.\IEST OS THE \V( I R K S c')F I.IF:I'T E S . \ S T I 11. S.'(R(iEST. SEC'(IS1.) ( ' 3\'.tI.l<T I'. 5
A I< 11T

Thirikiriy that the readem l o f t t i t . J ( I ~ - R S . ~ miah:

I.
he :[itcrt3+tetji n
foreicn c o m m e n t s on t h e ni04t e x c e l l t ? n t awl n o w 3tantiaril
wtIrk3 of 1.it.iitt.nant Parpent, some of t h e m art' hvw presented for
*
1,y
thchir perusal. I t is r e r y pratitrinK to know t l i i t b ~ . ~ ktFri:trn
t h e oficers of o u r army are 30 w e l l received stIroa4j. s n , i sit ur1,
formly g i v e n t h a t c r e d i t t o w h i c h t h e i r m e r . ( e n t i t i c s t t i c r n
the

FIWT C A M P A I C 3 S
have been reeding Lieutenant Sargent'8 tmk on ?r'spo:et>n'I
first Italian campaign all the morning. and was m u c h tnterrstetl
I
hope i t mny be rtudied clmely br n11 our vounp: office,, for i t 1 6
ewily un~lrratiml arid tell9 it* o w n *tory "-f,crd
F d s e l q . Cornmander.in.C'htef o f Btitiah ..lrmy. in ,: l c r t n to the publi.rhers
~ . 4 P c l L E O Y ROSAPARTE'S

.. I

* * Ihope you will let me erpreaa to >-oo how much I aflrnire your
work on the Bret campaign ofSspoleon. I do not agree i n nI1 your
views. but the J k e t c b ie mo8t able and interesting. * * Yo11 beat
ua easily i n milltar? hiatorp, poseibly becaaw you have latelv had
a great war; at least. within forty pear~."-Williarn O ' C h n o r
M0rri.9. *iuthor of .4,\hpdel:.n Warrior, Ruler.' in 11 letter t o the mrhor.

242

BOOK NOTICES A N D ESC'HANGKS.

"NO000, whether be be civilian o r soldier. can, after t h e perusal

of t h i s small volome, fail to realize v i v i d l y tho ntupeodvue geniui
of Nopoleon Bonaparta aa manifeeted e v e n i n t h e earliest gear:, of'
his service i n the 6eld.
Vnluable ae ia t h i e book aa n trealiw
OD etrategy, it8 worth in this respect ie f i r eurpaseed by i t s value M.
II life-like portrayal of Sapoleon. not nnly tho htratcyist i ~ r 1 1tactti.
1
cian but the general 6 heanen born." -The T i m e s , L o n d o n .

* *

t a i l volume that i R well worthy to bo ranked w i t h IAort!\ V V I ~ I .

leg's IDecline and Fall of Sapoleon ' ia *Sapoleon h;napttrtc'*
Firnt Campaign.' N*e do not know where to find a tirrner c j i ' twttcr
picture of the Itnlian camp'nign than i n Lieutcriaiit Scrrgt~iit'.cY I ~ I ume."-Army and Navy W z e f t e , L o n d o n .

"Tho captious critic might be diapored, on rending the t i i l c

page, to inveigh againet D commentary o n tlie greaterlt c o m r n a n ~ l c r
of modern timee by a cavalry twbalterii; but the modeat, uriprt~t-ritioua style and thorough krwwladgu of the N u b j e c t IIIY m o r e t l i a r i
suflcient to diaarm any uuch hoetile reviwver."- Folrtnterr .+r!.i,*r.
Gmette, London.

' & T Othe mind which nppreciatee t h e real criteria of rnilirsry

Renine, Napoleoo'e first campnipn i n Italy ia the m o a t ciiyri~.c-irig
arid instroctive etudp that ia offered by the whole of' h i s tprilliant
career, and for this reawn the volume now beforo U R w i l l bc niirnily
welcomed by Lhe more studious clava of readers, although i t iii:iy
perhaps not receive the careful attention which it undoubteiily ( I t . .
mrves from that large eection of t h o public., w h i c h hna beconic - u r .
feited with t h e too generoos output of Nnpoleonic liternturc ': *
Neither French nor Enplieh writers-can ever nttnin to M * e r e r e l y
impartial and judicial spirit i n their diaeertatioriu upon n man WIIIJ
bad no dire o n iotlneoce i n embittering thc relatione between t h e
two p e o p l ~ . American critics, however, arc fur more eiic~es~f'ul
in
passing a fair and candid judgmeiit, becniiee t i l e c a r e o n ttiirc ?iub
jeot better able to write without prepoereanion or prejudice. aril1
Lieutenant .Sargent bas, i n our opinion, furnished tin cxceeciingly
admirable little history, digtinguiehed alike for the clear arrtingemente of ite facta, and the judicioudrieae of i t a comments. * *
The sothor bas a ready knack ot' enshrining t h e leenone to be d e doced f r o m t h i e campaiga i o very clear 1angI;age. a n d the cririchma which follow opon the description of each battle are modelH of
perspicuity."-TThc
Broad A t r o u , London.

TEE CAMPAIGN
or MAUBNW.
4'Lieotentmt Sargent, B cavalry omcer i n the Vnited Stirte.c
army, haw junt poblished b l i t t l e volume describing and coinnienting o n the c a m p a i p of Y ~ t i g o Bonaparte's
,
Brnt military triumpli
aAer he bad risen to the First Consulate. With the aid of three
excellent skelch m a p t'he author Kivcn a graphic nntl concise RIJI~I.
mary of the plane and strategy on both eidew, nnd makra it en-y

'

244

BOOK NOTICES AND EXCHANQES.

245

BOOh' 3-0T I C E.q -4 S D E X ('ifA .VG E.<.

\

WAB GAME.By Captain Eben Swift, Fifth Cavalry.

Eudaoo-Kimberly Pobliebing Co.,Kaneae City, Bo.
T b e value of t b e W a r bame i o m m e form as ari adjooct to t h e
theoretical s t u d y of military tactics a n d etrategy, bas long been
r e u o g n i s d in t h e a r m i e s of moet of t b e European nations, and hns
bad many advocates in oar o w n country.
T w o different American authora have prepared very complete
a n d elaborato eyeteme, bot in each case t h e succeta of t h e g n m e h a d
depended to a great o x t e n t opon t h e familiarity of its director w i t b
t b e complex rulen a n d tablen required b y t h e eyetem. T h o cost of
t h e neceeeary books a n d material hae also served, in a rneaRure, t o
p r e v e n t ite general popularity.
After eomo years o f experience as director of w a r gnmes nt the
United Ytatee I n f a n t r y a d Cavnlry School, Captain Ebeu Swift,
FiAh Cavalry, became convinced of t h e desirability of a l e u c o m plex a p t e m for t h e pooernl use of Ammican ettfdeots, and after
d o e consideration, decided upon t h e treatiee of General I. von Vertly
d u Vernoie, which he has translated a n d arrangod.
T h e reeult of Captain Swift'e lsbora ie a little manual called ..A
Simplified
Gnme," n b i c b h M been ieaued witb t h e neceanery
mape a n d mat rial by Hudson, Kimberly & Co. of Kanhas City.
T h e outfit cansieta of a book containing general instructions au
to t h e m a n n e r of conducting an exercieo, a problem carel'ully
worked o u t from t h e statement of "general a n d special conditionn"
to t b e finieh, criticiem tbemon, a n d , in t h e appendices, an illustra.
tion of t h e eratern of note keeping neceesary i n t h e course of the
.eolUtiOD.
T h e accompanying maps are tbree i n number: o large one on a
wale of twelvo incbee to t b e mile of a section of coontry, showing a
p a t variety of topographical festuree; two mnps of t h e w m o
terrain on a emall scale for t h e aeo of t h e otscere engaged upon the
problem, in e t a d p i n g t h e general situation as presented, before begioninR operatione upon t b e large map. T h e r e are also t w o boxea
cootaioing celluloid blocke, reprerenting various tactical unit8 from
t h e troop, battery a n d half battalion, down to a single patrol or
scoot; aleo a representation of a line of skirmishers a n d a pair ot'
pincers for oee i n picking u p a n d moving the blockrt
The sacceeeive eteps io t h e eolutioo of t h e problem a r e so corn.
pletaly explained, w i t b all t b e neceeeary computations, etc., as to be
readily followed. By c b a n g i n g conditione ae to time, place, etrenKtb
and relative c o m p i t i o n of oppoeiog forces, a great n u m b e r of
probleme, on t b e m a p fhrnished, are possible, and where t b e playor@
hare WXJMto cootoured m a p a b i c b may be enlarged to suituble
malo by any of t b e eimple metbode, a great variety may be gireo
to tbe character of tbe field d operations.
T h e reasooable price of tbie w o r k , a o d tbe simplicity of tbe
eyetam, commend it to the om oT-'poet lyceome a n d National
Goad organizations, w h e r e both pledurn a n d profit could certainly
be derived from itn om.
H.A. G .
A

8IMPLlPIED

T H EG E X E R A L ' IJ ~ C - B L E
h ;STORY
O F T H E . ~ R Y YO F r i i E P I ~ Y A ~ .
By Captain Charles Biog. C- S -1. II:u3trate.1 b y J Steeple
Unvis. J. B. Lippincott Cornpanj-, Pbiladelpbia
The plot of the *tory is laid d u r i n g t l i e IVar t o ( the Rebellion, a n d
deals with ecenca and incidence i n t h e battle$ anni ninneurers of t h e
.\rmy of t h e Potornac. T h e book i?; not I(.) be read for the plot. 8s
this merely forniFhes a n e x c u w for t)Uautifu( d??;(.riptlongof actual
nccarrenceo. T h e word pictures a r e fa?;cinatiricy. anmi i n many i n stances exciting to a degree. A g h i n there, i 3 m w h of practical
utility i n many parta of t h e novel.
T h e Southern family and ita act:on- tow:trii wFnun,.ied Iiriconcrs
is given a prominent plucc. a4 it i . i the c i i p p w e d rcfuge of a 8 p y .
t h e foundation of ttie ytory. Vi3ual ~ t g r i s l i r , gi.i allude4i to i n -uc,h
R w a y that rine w h o has not been i n 3(.tua! wdrfare i a n comprehend
ju.it about wbnt nyc may be matlc of it t i o t h for ct.oaj t l r j d c v i l . The
tieecription of a battery coniing in!<> 111 1 i 1 1 1 i . alter firbt dewribiriy
the gmunll over whicb i t i $ ti~npaw, ii realistic a n t i i n t e ? w t i o g indeed.
But i t ie i n t h e *tory or' P i ' . k e t ? ' c ~ ~ t i a r g cait. t l ~ ct'iattle o f Gettv3hurq t h a t K i n g f i n d + a t h e m e wortby Q' t i l a grzetent e f f o r t . 3011 cut'.
ficirnt to draw fnrrh h i $ most eloqutbnt a n ' i Iwautiful p ~ e of
m lie*c.i.iprion. Hac- h a r e eaaayed this t 3 . k Kirir: hji.4 s c c ~ i r i i p ~ i ~ hi tt .l d
1;ranii anel Rublime ae wn3 the charge oi t t , e Fltjaer o r t h r 5 ) u t t i .

86

'I

e.1.n

r5rmy." t h e r.:irrntivc ir n*.,nv

~!JL?

h r t t h i n g this a u t h o r ha? ever sri::en

reirii to be sl)prec&atc.d.

Lc.>i +O

sri,i

1-

prctmhly

T t c ,ic-cription

ttie

~riunit

be

Old Foulweattier. t h e hard tlrinkinp. tiarqi rucar:n:. tdard rigfin<.

and hard tigtitinK major of d r s p ) n > 8.0ri;e- i n fi-Nr n o 1 i t t . c ccn$urc
i n t b c *tory. He wng a nece+dit\- i n t h e uld iJaj--. s r i d might have
twen hundleii mort' kindly.
Hia t F p r t i m a t o r n I , i e t t ~ I > -diaappearvd
from tlie a r m y . b u t be tilled a placv '11 bi. t i n i c a n . i filled i! t.at1.i(a c t o r i I y
Cnpt K i n g often spoilR nn orherniae gooif ( i t . - ( ript:on b>- r e ci t i n g
t h e fall name of t h e principal a t t h e mort e r c i t i n z p n t . I t m a k e a
his o t h e r w i s e plea*ing a n d rimple 3 t y : e a p p r 3.c'rneahat atilteal.

ItEPoBT OF TEE d D J I - T A S T (;t>ERAL.

SEC7IrC:T.

.\SSI-AL

' I F T f I L .T.\TC

<IF CIIS-

T h e J O ~ R N AiaLi n receipt of t h e annual report o f the Adjutant

(;enern1 of t h e State of Connecticut, which is a carefnlly gotten up
r o l u m e of about 300 pages. It sbows t h a t the Connecticut S a t i o n a l
Guard is well abreast of the timee in discipline. drill and inetructioo.
I n addition to t h e report of t h e Adjotant General himuelf it contain8
reports from t h e beads of t h e various Staff Departments. T h e
r e p o r 9 o f t b e I o ~ p e c t o r sa r c e r i d e n t l v made without fe,ar or favor,
and give praise a n d censure with perfect impartiality where t h e y
nre deserved. I t npeaks r e r j w e l l h r t h e diecipline of n command
w h e r e theae r e p o r t i are bo made, a n d indicatee t h a t pcrronal l i k e s
a n d dirlikes h a v e no bearing on rbe Pubjcct T h e report o f the

246 '

BOOK NOTICES !AND EXCHANQES.

Uoited Stat- a r m y o 5 c e r attached to tbe Governor'e Rtad iJ also

appended.
T h e report of the Brigade Signal Ofecer ehows that a most corn
mendable amount of attention baa been paid to t b i e important wervice. It ehowa t h a t a number of etatione were cetablishcd at verioua
points 00 and. near tho Connecticut coaet, and that, communication
wao kept up for a diehnce of forty-six and one-half miles altogether.
The eigoal corpe ie e l m the bicycle corpe, that ie, i t uee8 thc bicycle
aa a meane of traveling wherever practicnble.
It WM the privilege of the writer to attend tile encampment of
tbe-bri@e at Xiantic, Coonecticut, August 16-21, 1897, and he is
pleaaed to be able to add hie email tribute to the courtewy, discipline and edicieocy of t h e eotiro command. Both otscers and a n lieted men aeemed to realize. t h a t they were not there for piviiic
purpoees, but to learn aa iiiuch ae poscliblu, i n 80 short a t i m e , of t h e
a r t and ecjence o war.
T h e thank8 of the JOURNAL
are due to General Iiaren for eendi n g the report, and aim a map ehawing the location ot the different
companiee and rogimentcl conetituting the brigade, -with. metrrI* of
concontration. AIM to Major G i d d i n p , Hrigads Signal Officer, tbr
n very correct contoured map of t h e country i n t h e vicinity of t h e
State camp ~ r o u n d e ,ruade by him under the order* ot' the A d j u t a n t
General, and which will %e ueed i n I'uture cnnipe. "hid map is w e l l
drawn and evidently correct, a n d will be of great aclsi*~ance i n
devieiog probleme for future field oxercirrea.
A. G . It.

___-___

By S. J. Hunter. J . S.
Parka, Topeka, Kan.
Io response to numeroue inquiries u p o n the aubject Prof. S. J .
Hunter, of tb8 Department of Entomology io t h e Cnivemity of
Kannne, Lawrence. baa just published P full trcatine upon & d e Insect'n Injorioue to Orcbarde." H e bars g i v e n special attention tberein
to tbe Sao Jose wale, tbe moat perniciooe enemy to f r u i t treee. The
rogeny of a siogle female in one maeon amounts to over three
gillioo iodividuala, and when t h e m ecales a r e once well epread over
an ombard, tbe only remedy is to bnra t h e treee. To diwueaione,
and illostrationq are added the lawe enacted i n the sererrl Statea,
thirteen io all, relating to tbe extermination of the peat. T h i e publicatidn C ~ Dbe procored by sending addroes to the author.
Wbile tbe ecale ie not yet reported i n Eanaae, i t is highly i m portant tbat t h e fruit m i w m of thie locality examine t h e i r orchard*
now while trees are bare s o d assure fhemaelven of iU absence upon
their premises.
SCALE INMXXS I N J U m O U 8 TO OUCEAEDd.

ACCUMCT
II#
HISTORY.By John Speer. J. S. Parka, Topeka, Kan.
PamphleL form.

Tmab of the importance of aocoracy io bietorical

aod citeo many illostratiooe from the

etutsmeote.

early hiabry of Kanwe.

JocasAL. O F T H E ! < O Y A L CSITLDS c R v i c E ~ Y $ T I T [ . T I ( I ? Iwtitnber

1*!)7, January. Februarc, M a r c h . 1494.

1. Thc French Fitat.Clau Armoreci Cruiwr P o t h n s u . " 2 T h4.

e
Future of Lhe Torpedo. 3 . The Prychologc of the Battlefield.
The Fourth Arm. 5 . Scholmeieter the Spy. 6. Java Campaign of
1811. 7 . The S e a French Firet C I M ~BattJeehip, ..Charleu Ynrtel."
S. Sbilob: or the Battle of Pittabure Landing. 9. 1)iscuwion on
the m i t a r y Price Eysaye, lS97. 10. The Old Royal Army of

248

'

1' 4 >!

BOOK NOTICES AND EXCHANGES.

France. 11. Soldiering io the West Indiea i n the D a p of Queen

Aune. 12. The Japanese First.Clase Battlesbip, 4'Yoskima." 18.
Tbe Great Siege of Afalta 14. The Federal Defense of Australia.
15. Tbe Fortitlcation of Our Dmkyarde. 16. Souvenirs Militaries;
General Yontundon. 17. Lines of Concentration of the German
&miToward t h e French Ftootier. 18. Broadside -Subrnorped
Torpedo Tubes. 19. Major General Robert Cranfurd. 20. The
Army Reorganiurtioo. 21. Tbe Training of tbe Mercantile Marine.
22. T h e DefensiveStrengtb of Russia. 23. Supplement: The Health
of tbe Britiab Troop io India, and other Foreigu Statiuna. 24,
3
Legidation for tbe Health of the Troops i n India.
'

P B o C E r D I N G i OP THE

ROYALABTILLEBYINSTITCTION. December,

1897; Janoary, Febroary, March, 1898.

1. Notes on Artillery, Dictated by Napoleon a t St. IIulena to
Baron Gourgand. 2. The Artillery ot Japan. 3. Artillery Uuder
fbe Stuart Kings. '4. The Yaizsr Affair.
5. Tbe Service8 of

Lieutenant-Colonel Francie Downman. 6. BritiAh Gunnera at t b e

Siege and Battle of Narvo io 1700. 7. A Few Plain Remarka on
tbe Poaitioue and Work of the Artillery io the Field. R M i l i t i a
Field Artillery. 9. Yetbode of Bringing Guns I n t o Action. 10.
Tbe Servicee of Lieatenant-Colonel Francie Downman. 11. Re.
oroiting. 12. Salmon Fishing i o Eastern Canada. 13. Memoir of
.Goners1 W. H. Aekwitb. 14. Wirelese Telegraphy and ita Military
Possibilitiee. 16. A Syetem of Comparing Geographical Diwttrnccs.
16. Ootpssta fopCoaet Defenee.

Rrvnr DL CavrLnarr. December, 1897; Jannary, February, 189s.

1. The Influence of Armamoot on Organization and Tactics: Reforms Necesesry. 2. Tbe I n f i n t r y Cycliet: Support of tbe
3. &om Bantmo to Ploswitc. 4. Notes on the Training o
Cavalry Eorse. 6. Apropoe of the Tandem Jdouuted. ti. The Cavalry in tbe Maneovers of 1897. 7. An Inspector-General of C'avAlry under the Directory end the Conenlate. 8. h'otea 011 the Trtli n .
i n g o f the Cavalry Horae. 9. T h e German Maneurern of 1897. 10.
The Lancer. 11. T h e Impoeeibility of the Union of the Stud and
the h m o n n t . 12. Armament and Tactics: Lance and Saber. 13.
T h e I n f i n t r y Cyclist: Sopport of the Cavalry. 14. The Controlling
Idea of the Employment of Cavalry. 15. Pieces from tho Archives.

9-y;;

JOIJMALOF THI MILITARYSIEVICIJ

INSTITUTION. J a n u a r y , March,
1898.
1. Oor Volunteer Army. 2. The American Soldier. 3 . Otlcero on the Retired List. 4. Military Departments i o Schools.
6. Non-Commiaeioned OtEcera. 6. Hmtp Intrenchments. i.The
N e w Carbine. 8. Inetrpction io Firet Aid. 9. The Late.Revolutron in Cotombia. 10. Sowing Without Reaping. 1 1 . A Service

S o b o d for Heavy Artillery.

A N N U A L YEETlSG

Pursuant to notice previously given the annual meeting ot t h e

Amciation W I L ~ held O D January 17, 1898, in Sherman Hall, Fort
Leavenworth, Baneas.
The annual election reeolted in the choice of the following ~ F f i
core for tbo year 1898:
Preeident -Major

General WESLEYMEBUITT.

Vice-Pmideot -Mnjor J. A. AUOUH,Fourth Cavalry.

Elective membereof theExecntive Council-Captain J. H K E K R .
Sixth Cavalry; Captain W. D. Braca, Third Cavalry, Captain -1 C;
RAYMOND,
Eighth Cavalry; Firat Lieatenant J . T. D I C K Y A X , Third
Cavalry; First Lieutenant A. L. MILLE,FirNt Cavalry
T h e coneideration of the new Candtutiou wae tben taken up.
and upon motion the words "not on tbe active list," Article I\*,
&&ion 4, were ordered-etricke out. A rote waMthen taken upon
the'propoeed Constitution
hue amended, and resulted i n i t 8 atioptioo by a nearly unanimous rote.*

UR

After listening to the report of the Secretary and Treasurer.

which waa approved, the meeting adjourned
E. L. PHILLIPS,
'
&vnd LieulcM?~Sirlh Cardry,
Secrrfary.
*Thr, naw BnWtatlon hado. boon prInt8d and lurnLhed to tbe mcmbsn
La p w t h l l y the -e
form Y dopcsd,It la doomed ann- rn

clatlom

(be J O U U A L

of (ha lompr!nt 11 In

b@ rcdlll obwnd. bowrcr. by d d r a d a g the &re(.-

I
I

.I

'

THE UNITED STATES CAVALRY.

PIRST CAPALRY-COWSEL A B R A H A M K. A R V O M .
Quarcarmuur. 6.H. -YALL,
A d j n W W. 8. Banr.
H C A D ~ U A FORT
~ ~ *= U T , KANSAS.
Woap--C.nd K,Fort lUl87. f i n . : A and I. Fon H u r b n m ~ r i x . ;k and E. Fort clll. (.I
T.: 8 . n d D, ?on Reno. 0. T.: Cand 0. n t3herid.n. I l l .

CAVALRY OF T H E SATIOSAL G U A R D .

-7

88mND CA P A L R Y - - C o W S U GEORGE G . A C N T r .
LYimr
Qurnermuur. H. A. SARUIYT
HCAWUA-.
?om W I X O A ~ N.
~ , M.
---1CMd
X, Port WlOPCa. N. Y.9 A. C, D. f . G and E. F o RIley.
~
K.0.: B and I .
Fort
Cob.
_- _-_-._
T E l R D CA VALRY-COWNCL 8. E. Y. YOQSG.
Adjotnoh T. B B r v l g
Qnartermuter. J. W. I ~ C A R D .

.-

AdJoWs E B

w.

PO-

RUOgUlrmO.

LYRAS ALLIN,

Vf.

l h a ~ 0 - A .E. D, 8,l a o d X, Jellhmn Bumcka, Mo.; C. E. F m n d G, Fort Ethan Allen, V i .

.4!Mka. Anmna. ConS+,rr-The following h a w n o m o u n t < * !triope

necticut, Delaaare, Dlstnct of Columbia. FI,in#lo. Idaho. Indiana. I i ) a q
K a w . Kentucky. Louie1.n.. Maine. Harriand. M I c hlyan. Mtnneaou, MISBoun, Srvmla. Sorth Carolina, .%utb Dakotil, West Virylnia, Vermont, W p

minp

POVRTB C A ~ A L R Y - ~ ~ XC CH ALR L C ~E. COMPTOS.

Aqllt80L. C.

Qrurterrnutmr 0. A. C A U Z ~ O X

-Am.

H C A D Q O A FOR
~ ~ . WALLI WAUA. WAIH.
--A
and Q, Fort Wall. W d L . W u b . : 2. Vancouver Barnet& Wuh.; P', Bole Bar.
M b , I d . b O ; 8. C , I M d X.PruldloofS!an F n n c l r o . C . l . ; D m n d E,Fort Y e l l o a Mno, Wro.
PJP'fB C ~ V A L R Y - - C ~ W N KL
L A. CARPENTER.
' A d j ~ U O hJ. Y. Jmxrm.
Quartermuur. J. T. A A I X F ~ ~
HSADQOA-

--C,

Z. Q m d X. Fort 9.m Boaaton. tex.; E. Fort Y c I o l a b , T e x . : H a n d I. Fort

Cluk TaL; F,Fort Bmro, Tex.: D . Port Rlnggold. Tex.; A. Fon B l l r . Ter.

FORT GRAW. A . M L A .

aDQI7A-

C. B a n d F. Fort OmnC Arb.; Iand X. Port Hureb&.

a NN. Y.: t3-d a
.Fort Apache. AN.

Ads.: A and D. Fort

#16BfB C A V A L R Y - C o w s u J. Y. BACON.
Adjntanb Y. P. Ikms.

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8. D.
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HKADQOA-

Aqot.nt.

FORT MEADE,

NIWTE C A V A L R ~ - C O ~ DAVID
~ ~ . PERRY.
Quartanouter. 1. E. GARDSEL

w. a wmo.

H..DqUlpm*

FOB? ROBINSON. NCB.

l h v ~ s - A .C. B. 0. E rod a
.?oon Boblmn. Neb.: B and f , Fort Dn Chane. C U h 1 D

.od & Fort W m b W o , W q

T

~ cAv+r-Coma=
E

A~tju(.Dt,M. E BAMOX.
-DpUA&.

OW v. BENBY.
QMrlermnlar.

? O R m N R n o I N C , UONT.

L. HABDCXLL.

T+mo~m--C. 0, P
. 0, H. I u d x, itort Mnpibolna. MonL: A and r, ?art Keogh, &ant.:
m p Y a r l R Yoat.

a.

'

FIRST CAVALRY SQCADBOS-YAJ

J A U T~ B r a

ABKAlOBAS.

J. B Yomn.

? O n 8 A U H O c n O N . TCXAa

SIXTH CA~ALRI'--C~LOOSU BAYUEL 5. SCMNER

AdjotUIt, B L. H O m
Qurrtermuur. J . A . H A R ~ A ? ~
HUWUA-,
F o n YTCR.VA.
--A,
r. 0 - d 8.FOfI Ymr, Vr; B, c.f and 9,Fort Leavenworth. Ran.. D and I.
Fort Boblmon. Neb.
I E P K N T R C A P A L R Y - - C ~ W X K L EDWIN V . YUYNER
Adjotant, W. A. Houoooc.
Quarlermuur. W. H. HART.

--E.

A L A B A Y A.

"be Adjotants of Begiments will please notify the

of Tmo .

the Rsgimentd 8t.d. and in atatin-

Edidof changes in
f

T m p 'A:'

h n o k Y d o r Y . C . Horvs. Troop " 8 . ' J a c k a n v l l l s . C . p u l n 3

Muribhaw
~

CALIFOSR
XA.
A:'
p

B ' Sacramento. CapWn

E d l n u Capuln Ylcbael J Burke. Troop' D." L a A r y r l r . U p W n

S n F~m.ocuco.Chprrln Yarius B u r n e t t , Troop

J o h n C o o t e : Trmp'C."
Charla H . H o r h d .

COLOBADO.

26-2

CAVALRY OF T H E NATIONrlL GC-ARD.

War, Jr.

NORTH DAKOTA.