G Holdings vs Namawu

Facts:
G Holdings, Inc. (GHI), is a odomestic corporation primarily engaged in the business of owning
and holding shares of stock of different companies. Private respondent, National Mines and Allied
Workers' Union Local 103 (NAMAWU), was the exclusive bargaining agent of the rank and file
employees of Maricalum Mining Corporation (MMC). MMC was incorporated by the Development
Bank of the Philippines and the Philippine National Bank on account of their foreclosure of the
Marinduque Mining and Industrial Corporations assets. Later, DBP and PNB trasferred it to the
Natonal Governmen for disposition or privatization because it had become a non-performing asset. On
October 2, 1992, pursuant to a Purchase and Sale Agreement executed between GHI and Asset
Privatization Trust (APT), the former bought ninety percent of MMCs shares and financial claims.
These financial claims were converted into three Promissory Notes issued by MMC in favor of GHI
totaling P500M and secured by mortgages over MMCs properties. Upon signing of the Purchase and
Sale Agreemen and satisfaction of downpayment, GHI immediately took possession of the mine site
and its facilities and took full conrol of the management and operation of MMC. Almost four years
thereafter, a labor dispute arose between MMC and NAMAWU with the latter eventually filing with the
NCMB a notice of strike. Labor Secretary Quisimbing declared that the lay-off implemented was
illegal and that MMC committed unfair labor practice. He then ordered the reinstatement of the laid-off
workers with payment of full backwages and benefits, and directed the execution of a new CBA. Then
the Acting Secretary of DOLE, Arturo Brion, on motion of NAMAWU, directed the issuance of a
partial writ of execution (Brion Writ). The writ was not fully satisfied because MMCs resident manager
resisted its enforcement. On motion of NAMAWU, the then DOLE Secretary Sto. Tomas ordered the
issuance of the July 18, 2002 Alias Writ of Execution and Break-Open Order (Sto. Tomas Writ).
Respondent acting sheriffs and the members of the union as well as several armed men implemented
the Sto. Tomas Writ and levied on the properties of MMC. Due to this, the trial court issued ex parte a
TRO effective for 72 hours, and set the hearing on the application for a writ of injunction. NAMAWU's
separate motions for the reconsideration of the injunction order and for the dismissal of the case were
denied. Aggrieved, NAMAWU filed with the CA a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 which was
granted by the appellate Court. Hence, this petition.
Issue:
Whether or not the Court should take judicial notice.
Held:
Yes. Judicial notice must be taken by this Court of its Decision in Maricalum Mining
Corporaton vs. Hon. Arturo D. Brion and Namawu, in which we upheld the right of herein private
respondent, NAMAWU, to its labor claims. Upon the same principle of judicial notice, we
acknowledge our Decision in Republic of the Philippines, through its trustee, the Asset Privatization
Trust vs. G Holdings, Inc., in which GHI was recognized as the rightful purchaser of the shares of
stocks of MMC, and thus, entitled to the delivery of the company notes accompanying the said
purchase. The two cases provide the necessary perspective to determine whether GHI is such a party
with a valid ownership claim over the properties subject of the writ of execution. In Juaban vs. Espina,
we held that in some instances, courts have also taken judicial notice of proceedings in other cases that
are closely connected to the matter in controversy. These cases may be so closely interwoven, or so
clearly interdependent, as to invoke a rule of judicial notice. The two cases that we have taken judicial
notice of are of such character, and our review of the instant case cannot stray from the findings and
conclusions therein.

Spouses Latip vs Chua

Facts:
Rosalie Chua is the owner of Roferxane Building, a commercial building. A contract of lease
was entered by Chua and the Spouses Latip over two cubicles, signed by the former as lessor, and by
the Spouses as lessees. A year after the commencement of the lease and with the Spouses Latip already
occupying the leased cubicles, Rosalie sent the spouses a letter demanding payment of back rentals and
should they fail to do so, to to vacate the leased cubicles. When Spouses Latip did not heed Rosalies
demand, she instituted the aforesaid complaint. According to the Spouses, the lease of two cubicles had
already been paid in full as evidenced by receipts showing payment to Rosalie of the total amount of
P2,570,000.00. The MeTC ruled in favor of Chua and ordered the spouses to vacate the premises and
pay the corresponding rent. However, the RTC reversed the decision n appeal and ruled in favor of
Spouses Latip. RTC did not give credence to the contract of lease, ruling that it was not notarized and,
in all other substantial aspects, incomplete. On a different light, CA reversed the RTC and reinstated the
decision of the MeTC. It ruled that the Contract of lease, albeit lacking the signature of Ferdinand and
not notarized, remained a complete and valid contract. Hence, this petition.
Issue:
Whether or not the Court should take judicial notice.
Held:
As previously adverted to, the CA, in ruling for Rosalie and upholding the ejectment of Spouses
Latip, took judicial notice of the alleged practice of prospective lessees in the Baclaran area to pay
goodwill money to the lessor. Sections 1 and 2 of Rule 129 of the Rules of Court declare when the
taking of judicial notice is mandatory or discretionary on the courts . Generally speaking, matters of
judicial notice have three material requisites: (1) the matter must be one of common and general
knowledge; (2) it must be well and authoritatively settled and not doubtful or uncertain; and (3) it must
be known to be within the limits of the jurisdiction of the court. The principal guide in determining
what facts may be assumed to be judicially known is that of notoriety. Hence, it can be said that judicial
notice is limited to facts evidenced by public records and facts of general notoriety. However, in this
case, the requisite of notoriety is belied by the necessity of attaching documentary evidence, i.e., the
Joint Affidavit of the stallholders, to Rosalies appeal before the CA. In short, the alleged practice still
had to be proven by Rosalie; contravening the title itself of Rule 129 of the Rules of Court What need
not be proved. Apparently, only that particular division of the CA had knowledge of the practice to pay
goodwill money in the Baclaran area. As was held in State Prosecutors, justices and judges alike ought
to be reminded that the power to take judicial notice must be exercised with caution and every
reasonable doubt on the subject should be ample reason for the claim of judicial notice to be promptly
resolved in the negative.

Corinthian

Gardens

vs.

Spouses

Tanjangco

Facts:
Spouses Tanjangco owned Lots 68 and 69 at Corinthian Gardens, which is managed by
Corinthians. Spouses Cuasos owned Lot 65 which is adjacent to the Tanjangco lots. Before the Spouses
Cuasos constructed their house, a relocation survey was necessary. Corinthian referred Engineer
Democrito De Dios. Before, during and after the construction of house, Corinthian conducted ocular
inspections to determine compliance with the approved plans pursuant to Manual of Rules and
Regulations. After the Cuasos constructed their house employing CB Paraz as builder, their perimeter
fence encroached on the Tanjangcos Lot 69. Tanjangcos demanded Cuasos demolish the perimeter
fence but the latter failed and refused, prompting the Tanjangcos to file with the RTC a suit for
Recovery of Possession with Damages. Cuasos filed a 3rd Party Complaint against Corinthian, CB
Paraz and Engr. De Dios. The RTC ruled in favor of the Tanjangcos and stated that the wall encroached
on the land of the Tanjangcos by 87 square meters. It further ruled that the Cuasos were builders in
Good Faith and gave the Tanjangcos option to sell and Cuasos the option to buy the encroaching
portion of the land. After appeal, the CA reversend and set aside the RTC Decision. It held that the
Cuasos were in bad faith and held that Corinthian, CB Paraz and Engr. De Dios are all found negligent.
Issue:
Whether or not Court should take Judicial notice.
Held:
Truly, mere judicial notice is inadequate, because evidence is required for a court to determine
the proper rental value. But contrary to Corinthian's arguments, both the RTC and the CA found that
indeed rent was due the Tanjangcos because they were deprived of possession and use of their property.
This uniform factual finding of the RTC and the CA was based on the evidence presented below.
Moreover, in Spouses Catungal v. Hao, we considered the increase in the award of rentals as reasonable
given the particular circumstances of each case. We noted therein that the respondent denied the
petitioners the benefits, including rightful possession, of their property for almost a decade.

Social Justice Society vs. Atienza

Facts:
The Sangguniang Panlungsod of Manila enacted Ordinance No. 8027. Respondent mayor
approved the ordinance on November 28, 2001. It became effective on December 28, 2001, after its
publication. Sections 1 and 3 of the Ordinance provides that the Pandacan Terminals of the oil
companies such as Caltex, Petron and Shell to cease and desist from operating their business es within
six months from the date of effectivity of the ordinance. However, on June 26, 2002, the City of Manila
and the Department of Energy (DOE) entered into a memorandum of understanding (MOU) with the
oil companies in which they agreed that "the scaling down of the Pandacan Terminals [was] the most
viable and practicable option." Meanwhile, petitioners filed this original action for mandamus on
December 4, 2002 praying that Mayor Atienza be compelled to enforce Ordinance No. 8027 and order
the immediate removal of the terminals of the oil companies.
Issue:
Whether or not the respondent has the mandatory legal duty to enforce Ordinance No. 8027.
Held:
Yes. Assuming that the terms of the MOU were inconsistent with Ordinance No. 8027, the
resolutions which ratified it and made it binding on the City of Manila expressly gave it full force and
effectonly until April 30, 2003. Thus, at present, there is nothing that legally hinders respondent from
enforcing Ordinance No. 8027. Ordinance No. 8027 was enacted right after the Philippines, along with
the rest of the world, witnessed the horror of the September 11, 2001 attack on the Twin Towers of the
World Trade Center in New York City. The objective of the ordinance is to protect the residents of
Manila from the catastrophic devastation that will surely occur in case of a terrorist attack on the
Pandacan Terminals. No reason exists why such a protective measure should be delayed.

Toshiba Information Equipment (Phils.), Inc. vs. Commissioner of Internal Revenue

Facts:
Toshiba is a domestic corporation principally engaged in the business of manufacturing and
exporting of electric machinery, equipment systems, accessories, parts, components, materials and
goods of all kinds, including those relating to office automation and information technology and all
types of computer hardware and software, such as but not limited to HDD-CD-ROM and personal
computer printed circuit board. It is registered with the Philippine Economic Zone Authority (PEZA) as
an Economic Zone (ECOZONE) export enterprise in the Laguna Technopark, Inc. In its VAT returns
for the first and second quarters of 1997, it declared input VAT payments on its domestic purchases in
the aggregate sum of P3,875,139.65 with zero-rated sales. Toshiba subsequently submitted to the BIR
uts amended VAT returns for the first and second quarters of 1997. Toshiba filed with the DOF OneStop Shop two separate applications for tax credit/refund of its unutilized input VAT payments. CIR
contended that that Toshiba was not entitled to the credit/refund of its input VAT payments because as a
PEZA-registered ECOZONE export enterprise, Toshiba was not subject to VAT. The CIR then further
contended that under Section 24 of Republic Act No. 7916, a special law, all businesses and
establishments within the ECOZONE were to remit to the government five percent (5%) of their gross
income earned within the zone, in lieu of all taxes, including VAT. This placed Toshiba within the ambit
of Section 103(q) of the Tax Code of 1977, as amended, which exempted from VAT the transactions
that were exempted under special laws. Following Section 4.103-1(A) of Revenue Regulations No. 795, the VAT-exemption of Toshiba meant that its sale of goods was not subject to output VAT and
Toshiba as seller was not allowed any tax credit on the input VAT it had previously paid. Upon
knowing this, Toshiba filed a motion for reconsideration on the CA decision that Toshiba is a tax
exempt entity and not entitled to refund the VAT payments made in its domestic purchases of goods and
services. It grounded its MR on the failure of the CIR to timely plead and prove before the CTA the
defenses or objections that Toshiba was VAT-exempt under Section 24 of R.A. No. 7916 but it was
denied. Hence, this petition.
Issue:
Whether or not the CA erred when it failed to dismiss outright and gave due course to CIR's
petition notwithstanding CIR's failure to adequately raise in issue during the trial in the CTA the
applicability of Section 24 of R.A. No. 7916 to Toshiba's claim for refund.
Held:
It is axiomatic in pleadings and practice that no new issue in a case can be raised in a pleading
which by due diligence could have been raised in previous pleadings. The Court cannot simply grant
the plea of the CIR that the procedural rules be relaxed based on the general averment of the interest of
substantive justice. It should not be forgotten that the first and fundamental concern of the rules of
procedure is to secure a just determination of every action.
he arguments of the CIR that Toshiba was VAT-exempt and the latters export sales were VATexempt transactions are inconsistent with the explicit admissions of the CIR in the Joint Stipulation of
Facts and Issues (Joint Stipulation) that Toshiba was a registered VAT entity and that it was subject to
zero percent (0%) VAT on its export sales.
The admission having been made in a stipulation of facts at pre-trial by the parties, it must be treated as
a judicial admission. Under Section 4, Rule 129 of the Rules of Court, a judicial admission requires no
proof. The admission may be contradicted only by a showing that it was made through palpable
mistake or that no such admission was made. The Court cannot lightly set aside a judicial admission
especially when the opposing party relied upon the same and accordingly dispensed with further proof
of the fact already admitted. An admission made by a party in the course of the proceedings does not

require proof. There is no basis for believing that to bind the CIR to his judicial admissions in the Joint
Stipulation that Toshiba was a VAT-registered entity and its export sales were zero-rated VAT
transactions would result in falsehood, unfairness and injustice. The judicial admissions of the CIR
are not intrinsically false, wrong, or illegal.

Cuenco vs. Talisay

Facts:
Jesus Cuenco leased from respondents for a period of 2 years the Talisay Tourist Sports
Complex, to be operated as a cockpit. It was further extended to 4 years. Upon expiration of the lease
contract, a public bidding was conducted. The contract was awarded to a new lessee. Thus, petitioner
demanded the return of the amount deposited. However, his 4 demand letters remained unheeded. Thus,
he filed a complaint for sum of money, damages before RTC Cebu City. He maintained that
respondents acted in bad faith in withholding the amount of the deposit without any justifiable reason.
In their Answer, respondents countered that petitioner caused physical damage to the leased premises
and the cost of repair and replacement of materials amounted to more than P500,000.00. The RTC
issued a Pre-trial Order in which respondent admitted that there is no inventory of damages. The
respondents later offered an inventory which was admitted by the said trial court. The RTC ruled
favorably for the petitioner. The CA reversed said decision.
Issue:
Whether or not a judicial admission is conclusive and binding upon a party making the decision.
Held:
Yes. Obviously, it was on Coronado's testimony, as well as on the documentary evidence of an
alleged property inventory conducted on June 4, 1998, that the CA based its conclusion that the amount
of damage sustained by the leased premises while in the possession of petitioner exceeded the amount
of petitioner's deposit. This contradicts the judicial admission made by respondents' counsel which
should have been binding on the respondents. A party may make judicial admissions in (1) the
pleadings, (2) during the trial, by verbal or written manifestations or stipulations, or (3) in other stages
of the judicial proceeding. The stipulation of facts at the pre-trial of a case constitutes judicial
admissions. The veracity of judicial admissions require no further proof and may be controverted only
upon a clear showing that the admissions were made through palpable mistake or that no admissions
were made. Thus, the admissions of parties during the pre-trial, as embodied in the pre-trial order, are
binding and conclusive upon them. Respondents did not deny the admission made by their counsel,
neither did they claim that the same was made through palpable mistake. Respondents did not deny the
admission made by their counsel, neither did they claim that the same was made through palpable
mistake.

People vs. Muit

Facts:
A group composed of Hermani, Morales, Udon, Manuel, Bokbok and Muit succeeded in
kidnapping their intended victim, Engr. Ignacio Ong Jr. Ferraer was the one who was approached to use
his house as a safehouse for the crime. However, he was discharged from the cases because he served
as a state witness. While they were on their way to their rendezvous point with Pancho Jr., they were
intercepted by the police. A gun battle ensued which left all of the kidnappers dead including the
victim, except for Muit. Thereafter, Dequillo and Romeo were arrested and stood trial. During the trial,
the prosecution presented several witnesses. The testimony of these witnesses were corroborated by the
extrajudicial confessions of Pancho Jr. and Dequillo. Dequillo claimed that he was allegedly tortured
when he claimed he did not have knowledge. Pancho Jr. claimed that he was tortured and was forced to
sign an extrajudicial confession. It was claimed that it was only after they signed that Atty. Mallare
came. Muit also executed 2 extra-judicial confessions. He was assisted by 2 different lawyers on both
occasions. The RTC ruled that the accused are guilty and that assuming they did not have those extrajudicial confessions, there was still enough evidence to convict them. The CA affirmed the RTC.
Issue:
Whether or not the RTC erred in giving credence to the extra-judicial confessions of Pancho Jr.
and Dequillo.
Held:
No. The extra judicial confessions of Pancho, Jr., Dequillo, and Muit strengthened the case
against them. There is nothing on record to support appellants claim that they were coerced and
tortured into executing their extra judicial confessions. One of the indicia of voluntarinessin the
execution of appellants extra judicial statements is that each contains many details and facts which the
investigating officers could not have known and could not have supplied, without the knowledge and
information given by appellants. Moreover, the appellants were assisted by their lawyers when they
executed their statements. Atty. Mallare testified that Pancho, Jr. and Dequillo executed their statements
voluntarily and affixed their signatures after he talked with them alone and informed them of their
constitutional rights. The extra judicial confessions of Pancho, Jr., Dequillo, and Muit also strengthened
the prosecutions case against Romeo. The rule that an extra judicial confession is evidence only against
the person making it recognizes various exceptions. One such exception is where several extra judicial
statements had been made by several persons charged with an offense and there could have been no
collusion with reference to said several confessions, the fact that the statements are in all material
respects identical is confirmatory of the confession of the co-defendants and is admissible against other
persons implicated therein. They are also admissible as circumstantial evidence against the person
implicated therein to show the probability of the latters actual participation in the commission of the
crime and may likewise serve as corroborative evidence if it is clear from other facts and circumstances
that other persons had participated in the perpetration of the crime charged and proved. These are
known as interlocking confessions.

People vs. Satorre

Facts:
Gliceria Saraum, the wife of the victim Romero Pantilgan testified that she was awakened by a
gunshot. She got up and went out to the porch where she found her dead husband lying on the ground.
Rufino, a barangay kagawad, testified that appellant's father, Abraham Satorre, informed them that it
was appellant who shot Pantilgan. Cynthia Castanares, the Barangay Captain, brought Herminiano, the
accused, to Castanares' residence where he confessed to the killing of Pantilgan. He informed her that
he killed Pantilgan because the latter struck him with a piece of wood. Castanares later executed an
affidavit and further averred that Herminiano voluntary killed Pantilgan with the use of a handgun
which he wrestled from his possession. The trial court found him guilty of the crime due to the alleged
oral extra-judicial confession given to Brgy. Captain Castanares. However, Herminiano disputes the
admissibility and sufficiency of the testimonial evidence offered to prove the alleged oral extrajudicial
confession.
Issue:
Whether or not the extra-judicial admission is admissible.
Held:
No. The Court acquitted Herminiano on the basis that the voluntariness of the confession cannot
be conclusively established due to the personal circumstances of Herminiano. Rule 130, Section 26 of
the Rules of Court defines an admission as an act, declaration or omission of a party as to a relevant
fact. A confession, on the other hand, under Section 33 of the same Rule is the declaration of an
accused acknowledging his guilt of the offense charged, or of any offense necessarily included therein.
Both may be given in evidence against the person admitting or confessing. On the whole, a confession,
as distinguished from an admission, is a declaration made at any time by a person, voluntarily and
without compulsion or inducement, stating or acknowledging that he had committed or participated in
the commission of a crime. There is no question as to the admissibility of appellants alleged oral
extrajudicial confession.Indeed, as far as admissibility is concerned, Rule 130, Section 33 of the Rules
of Court makes no distinction whether the confession is judicial or extrajudicial. In the case at bar,
appellant was a 19-year old farmer who did not even finish first grade.Granting that he made the
confession in the presence of Barangay Captain Castaares, he may not have realized the full import of
his confession and its consequences. This is not to say that he is not capable of making the confession
out of a desire to tell the truth if prompted by his conscience. What we are saying is that due to the
aforesaid personal circumstances of appellant, the voluntariness of his alleged oral confession may not
be definitively appraised and evaluated. On the whole, it appears that the trial court simply based
appellants conviction on the testimonial evidence of prosecution witnesses that appellant orally owned
up to the killing. We cannot affirm appellants conviction on mere testimonial evidence, considering that
the voluntariness of said confession cannot be conclusively established because of appellants personal
circumstances and the failure of the police to reduce the alleged oral confession into writing.

People vs. Cachuela

Facts:
Ibanez went to Weapons System Corporation (WSC) on board an old car, and told Henessy
Auron, WSCs Secretary and Sales Representative, that he was the one who bought a gun barrel at the
companys gun show in SM Megamall. Ibaez inquired from Henessy about the schedule and the rates
of WSCs firing range and the amount of the membership fee of its gun club. He also asked the days
when there are many people in the firing range, and whether Henessy was WSCs only female
employee. After Henessy arrived at the WSC, she discovered that Zaldy, another employee, was tied
inside which prompted her to call the police. They found the body of Rex Dorimon, a gunsmith, dead.
The NBI received an information that the group of Cachuela was involved in the robbery of WSC and
that they had been looking for prospective buyers of firearms. Due to this, they were able to form an
entrapment team which made the arrest of Cachuela and Ibanez successful. At the NBI Main Office,
Zaldy pointed to the appellants, during a police line-up, as the persons responsible for the robbery at
WSC and for the killing of Rex. Nabilgas also executed a handwritten confession implicating the
appellants and Zaldy in the crime.The prosecution filed an Information for robbery with homicide
before the RTC against the appellants, Nabilgas and Zaldy, docketed as Criminal Case No. 04-0943.
The accused all pleaded not guilty on arraignment. Trial on the merits ensued thereafter. During trial,
Zaldy died.
Issue:
Whether or not the out-of-court identification and the extra-judicial confession are admissible.
Held:
Out-of-court identification is conducted by the police in various ways. It is done thru show-ups
where the suspect alone is brought face-to-face with the witness for identification. It is done thru mug
shots where photographs are shown to the witness to identify the suspect. It is also done thru line-ups
where a witness identifies the suspect from a group of persons lined up for the purpose x x x In
resolving the admissibility of and relying on out-of-court identification of suspects, courts have adopted
the totality of circumstances test where they consider the following factors, viz.: (1) the witness'
opportunity to view the criminal at the time of the crime; (2) the witness' degree of attention at that
time; (3) the accuracy of any prior description, given by the witness; (4) the level of certainty
demonstrated by the witness at the identification; (5) the length of time between the crime and the
identification; and, (6) the suggestiveness of the identification procedure. The absence of an
independent in-court identification by Zaldy additionally justifies our strict treatment and assessment of
Linos testimony.
After a careful examination of the evidence on hand, we hold that Nabilgas extrajudicial
confession is inadmissible in evidence. The Court has consistently held that an extrajudicial confession,
to be admissible, must satisfy the following requirements: "(1) the confession must be voluntary; (2) it
must be made with the assistance of a competent and independent counsel, preferably of the
confessant's choice; (3) it must be express; and (4) it must be in writing." We rule that Nabilgas
confession was not made with the assistance of a competent and independent counsel. The services of
Atty. Melita Go, the lawyer who acted in Nabilgas behalf, were provided by the very same agency
investigating Nabilgas the NBI itself; she was assigned the task despite Nabilgas open declaration to
the agencys investigators that he already had a lawyer in the person of Atty. Donardo Paglinawan.
An exception to the res inter alios acta rule is an admission made by a conspirator under Section
30, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court. This provision states that the act or declaration of a conspirator
relating to the conspiracy, and during its existence, may be given in evidence against the co-conspirator
after the conspiracy is shown by evidence other than such act or declaration. Thus, in order that the

admission of a conspirator may be received against his or her co-conspirators, it is necessary that: (a)
the conspiracy be first proved by evidence other than the admission itself; (b) the admission relates to
the common object; and (c) it has been made while the declarant was engaged in carrying out the
conspiracy.

People vs. Villacorta

Facts:
Accused set fire on a residential house of Angge Arguelles by pouring kerosene on a mattress
placed in a room and ignited it with a lighter, knowing it to be occupied by one or more persons,
thereby causing as a consequence damage to the house and adjacent houses in the amount of more or
less P2,000,000.00, to the damage; that on the occasion, RODOLFO CABRERA, a resident/occupant
of said house sustained burn injuries which were the direct and immediate cause of his death. The
accused pleaded not guilty upon arraignment. The RTC found the accused guilty of the crime.
Prosecution had presented sufficient circumstantial evidence, coupled with the written confession of the
accused-appellant, to sustain her conviction of the crime charged. Admitted the oral and written
confessions of the accused-appellant and found the prosecution witnesses more credible than the
accused-appellant. It was alleged that according to William Lim, the accused forcibly took the pen from
a policeman in order for her to put in writing the actual incident. Rodolfo Lorenzo, a kagawad, said that
she told him Manggugulo ako at manununog. Also, there was the written statement executed by the
accused-appellant admitting responsibility for conflagration. While she admitted the authenticity of her
written confession, she denied on the witness stand that she voluntarily wrote.
Issue:
Whether or not Villacorta is guilty.
Held:
Yes. There are two type of positive identification of a perpetrator of a crime. Positive
identification is the proof of identity and not per se to that of being an eyewitness to the very act of
commission of the crime. Direct Evidence states that witness may identify a suspect or accused in a
criminal case as the perpetrator of the crime as an eyewitness to the very act of the commission of the
crime. While Positive Identification states that although a witness may not have actually seen the very
act of commission of a crime, he may still be able to positively identify a suspect or accused as the
perpetrator of a crime as for instance when the latter is the person or one of the persons last seen with
the victim immediately before and right after the commission of the crime. This forms part of
circumstantial evidence, which, when taken together with other pieces of evidence constituting an
unbroken chain, leads to the only fair and reasonable conclusion, which is that the accused is the author
of the crime to the exclusion of all others. Regarding her extrajudicial confession, the plaintiff-appellee
correctly adverted to the ruling in People v. Andan as to the admissibility of the verbal confession made
by the accused-appellant, which she made not only to Kagawad William Lim but also to Kagawad
Rodolfo Lorenzo while the fire was in progress. Moreover, as correctly held by the CA, even if the
written extra-judicial confession is disregarded, the evidence presented by the prosecution is more than
sufficient to prove the guilt of the accused-appellant beyond reasonable doubt .

People vs. Erguiza

Facts:
AAA, together with her friends, siblings Joy and Ricky Agbuya, went to the mango orchard
located at the back of ZZZ Elementary School to gather fallen mangoes. When they were bound for
home at around 5:00 o'clock in the afternoon, AAAs short pants got hooked on the fence. AAA asked
Joy and Ricky to wait for her but they ran away and left her. While AAA was trying to unhook her short
pants, Larry suddenly grabbed and pulled her. The accused was then successful in raping the victim.
After her family discovered that she was pregnant, it was only then she revealed that she was raped by
accused-appellant. AAA, accompanied her mother and uncle, went to the police headquarters. CCC
(AAA's father), testified that family of accused-appellant went to their house and initially offered
P50,000 and later P150,000; that in January 5, 2000, while they were repairing his house for the
wedding reception Larry left at around 4:00 o'clock p.m. Albina, the mother of the accused-appellant,
testified that Spouses CCC and BBB were asking for P1,000,000.00 which was later reduced to
P250,000.00 and that she made a counter-offer of P5,000.00.
Issue:
Whether or not the accused is guilty.
Held:
No. Offer of compromise allegedly made by Albina is critical to the case at bar in light of law
and jurisprudence that an offer of compromise in a criminal case may be received in evidence as an
implied admission of guilt. However, alleged offer of the parents of appellant to settle the case cannot
be used against appellant as evidence of his guilt. Appellant testified that he did not ask his parents to
settle the case. He was not present when the offer to settle was allegedly made. An offer of compromise
from an unauthorized person cannot amount to an admission of the party himself. For a compromise to
amount to an implied admission of guilt, the accused should have been present or at least authorized the
proposed compromise. Where the accused was not present at the time the offer for monetary
consideration was made, such offer of compromise would not save the day for the prosecution.

Antonio Lejano vs. People

FACTS:
Vizconde and her daughters were slain at their home. Following an intense investigation, the
police arrested a group of suspects, some gave detailed confessions. But the trial court smelled a frameu and ordered them discharged. 4 years later NBI announced that it had solved the crime. It presented
star-witness Jessica M. Alfaro, who claimed that she witnessed the crime. She pointed to accused
Hubert Jeffrey P. Webb, Antonio Tony Boy Lejano, Artemio Dong Ventura, Michael A. Gatchalian,
Hospicio Pyke Fernandez, Peter Estrada, Miguel Ging Rodriguez, and Joey Filart as the culprits. She
also tagged accused police officer, Gerardo Biong, as an accessory after the fact. RTC Paraaque City
tried only seven of the accused since Artemio Ventura and Joey Filart remained at large. Some of the
accused denied any part in the crime and saying they were elsewhere when it took place. Webbs alibi
appeared the strongest since he claimed that he was then across the ocean in USA. He presented the
testimonies of witnesses as well as documentary and object evidence to prove this. In addition, the
defense presented witnesses to show Alfaro's bad reputation for truth and the incredible nature of her
testimony. But impressed by Alfaros detailed narration of the crime and the events surrounding it, the
trial court found a credible witness in her. It noted her categorical, straightforward, spontaneous, and
frank testimony, undamaged by grueling cross-examinations. The trial court remained unfazed by
significant discrepancies between Alfaros April 28 and May 22, 1995 affidavits, accepting her
explanation that she at first wanted to protect her former boyfriend, accused Estrada, and a relative,
accused Gatchalian; that no lawyer assisted her; that she did not trust the investigators who helped her
prepare her first affidavit; and that she felt unsure if she would get the support and security she needed
once she disclosed all about the Vizconde killings. In contrast, the trial court thought little of the denials
and alibis that Webb, Lejano, Rodriguez, and Gatchalian set up for their defense. After four years of
arduous hearings, the trial court rendered judgment, finding all the accused guilty as charged and
imposing on Webb, Lejano, Gatchalian, Fernandez, Estrada, and Rodriguez the penalty of reclusion
perpetua and on Biong, an indeterminate prison term of eleven years, four months, and one day to
twelve years. The trial court also awarded damages to Lauro Vizconde.
Issue:
Whether or not the Court should acquit him outright, given the governments failure to produce
the semen specimen that the NBI found on Carmelas cadaver, thus depriving him of evidence that
would prove his innocence.
Whether or not Alfaros testimony as eyewitness, describing the crime and identifying Webb,
Lejano, Gatchalian, Fernandez, Estrada, Rodriguez, and two others as the persons who committed it, is
entitled to belief
Whether or not Webb presented sufficient evidence to prove his alibi and rebut Alfaros
testimony that he led the others in committing the crime.
Held:
If, on examination, the DNA of the subject specimen does not belong to Webb, then he did not
rape Carmela. It is that simple. Thus, the Court would have been able to determine that Alfaro
committed perjury in saying that he did. Still, Webb is not entitled to acquittal for the failure of the
State to produce the semen specimen at this late stage. When Webb raised the DNA issue, the rule
governing DNA evidence did not yet exist, the country did not yet have the technology for conducting
the test, and no Philippine precedent had as yet recognized its admissibility as evidence. Idea of
keeping the specimen secure even after the trial court rejected the motion for DNA testing did not come
up. Indeed, neither Webb nor his co-accused brought up the matter of preserving the specimen in the
meantime. After the trial court denied Webbs application for DNA testing, he allowed the proceeding to

move on when he could have gone up to CA or SC to challenge alleged arbitrary actions taken against
him and the other accused. They raised the DNA issue before CA but merely as an error committed by
the trial court in rendering its decision in the case. None of the accused filed a motion with the appeals
court to have the DNA test done pending adjudication of their appeal. Considering the accuseds lack of
interest in having such test done, the State cannot be deemed put on reasonable notice that it would be
required to produce the semen specimen at some future time. Webbs documented alibi altogether
impeaches Alfaro's testimony, not only with respect to him, but also with respect to Lejano, Estrada,
Fernandez, Gatchalian, Rodriguez, and Biong. For, if the Court accepts the proposition that Webb was
in the U.S. when the crime took place, Alfaros testimony will not hold together.

Tamargo vs. Awingan

Facts:
Atty. Tamargo and his 8-year-old daughter, Gail Franzielle, were shot and killed at around 5:15
p.m. of AUG 15, 2003 along Nueva Street corner Escolta Street, Binondo. The police had no leads on
the perpetrators of the crime until a certain Reynaldo Geron surfaced and executed an affidavit dated
SEPT 12, 2003. A certain Lucio Columna told him during a drinking spree that Atty. Tamargo was
ordered killed by ANTIPORDA and that he (Columna) was one of those who killed Atty. Tamargo. He
added that he told the Tamargo family what he knew and that the sketch of the suspect closely
resembled Columna. Columna, (whose real name was Manuel, Jr.), admitted his participation as look
out during the shooting and implicated Romulo Awingan (alias Mumoy) as the gunman, Richard
Mecate, Masterminds respondent Licerio Antiporda, Jr. and his son, respondent Lloyd Antiporda.
Former was the ex-mayor and the latter the mayor of Buguey, Cagayan at that time. When the killing
took place, Licerio Antiporda was in detention for a kidnapping case in which Atty. Tamargo was acting
as private prosecutor. During the preliminary investigation, Licerio presented Columnas unsolicited
handwritten letter dated May 3, 2004 to respondent Lloyd, sent from Columnas jail cell in Manila.
Columna disowned the contents of his MARCH 2004 affidavit. He had been tortured until he signed
the extrajudicial confession. Those he implicated had no participation in the killings. Another affidavit
of Columna dated MAY 25, 2004 essentially repeated the statements in his handwritten letter. Due to
the submission of Columnas letter and affidavit, the investigating prosecutor set a clarificatory hearing,
to enable Columna to clarify his contradictory affidavits and his unsolicited letter. OCT 22, 2004,
Columna categorically admitted the authorship and voluntariness of the unsolicited letter. Affirmed
MAY 25, 2004 affidavit and denied that any violence had been employed to obtain or extract the
affidavit from him.
Issue:
Whether or not the CA erred in finding that Judge Daguna had committed grave abuse of
discretion in denying the withdrawal of the Informations for murder against respondents.
Held:
No. Judge Daguna failed to consider that Columnas extrajudicial confession in his March 8,
2004 affidavit was not admissible as evidence against respondents in view of the rule on res inter alios
acta. Rule on res inter alios acta provides that the rights of a party cannot be prejudiced by an act,
declaration, or omission of another. An extrajudicial confession is binding only on the confessant, is not
admissible against his or her co-accused and is considered as hearsay against them. REASON: On a
principle of good faith and mutual convenience, a mans own acts are binding upon himself, and are
evidence against him. So are his conduct and declarations. Yet it would not only be rightly
inconvenient, but also manifestly unjust, that a man should be bound by the acts of mere unauthorized
strangers; and if a party ought not to be bound by the acts of strangers, neither ought their acts or
conduct be used as evidence against him. EXCEPTION: Admission made by a conspirator under
Section 30, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court: Admission by conspirator. The act or declaration of a
conspirator relating to the conspiracy and during its existence, may be given in evidence against the coconspirator after the conspiracy is shown by evidence other than such act or declaration.
Act or declaration of the conspirator relating to the conspiracy and during its existence may be
given in evidence against co-conspirators provided that the conspiracy is shown by independent
evidence aside from the extrajudicial confession.
In order that the admission of a conspirator may be received against his or her co-conspirators, it is
necessary that:
a. Conspiracy be first proved by evidence other than the admission itself

Admission relates to the common object

c. It has been made while the declarant was engaged in carrying out the conspiracy.
Otherwise, it cannot be used against the alleged co-conspirators without violating their
constitutional right to be confronted with the witnesses against them and to cross-examine them.
b.

Boston Bank vs. Manalo

Facts:
Xavierville Estate, Inc. sold to The Overseas Bank of Manila some residential lots in
Xavierville subdivision. Nevertheless, XEI continued selling the residential lots in the subdivision as
agent of OBM. Carlos Manalo, Jr. proposed to XEI, through its President Emerito Ramos, that he will
purchase two lots in the Xavierville subdivision and offered as part of the downpayment the
P34,887.66 Ramos owed him. XEI through Ramos, agreed. In a letter dated August 22, 1972 to Perla
Manalo, Ramos confirmed the reservation of the lots. In the letter he also pegged the price of the lots at
P348,060.00 with a 20% downpayment of the purchase price amounting to P69,612.00 payable as soon
as XEI resumes its selling operations; the corresponding Contract of Conditional Sale would then be
signed on or before the same date. Perla Manalo conformed to the letter agreement. Thereafter, the
spouses constructed a house on the property. The spouses were notified of XEI's resumption of selling
operations. However, they did not pay the balance of the downpayment because XEI failed to prepare a
contract of conditional sale and transmit the same to them. XEI also billed them for unpaid interests
which they also refused to pay. XEI turned over its selling operations to OBM. Subsequently,
Commercial Bank of Manila acquired the Xavierville Estate from OBM. CBM requested Perla Manalo
to stop any on-going construction on the property since CBM was the owner of the lot and she had no
permission for such. Perla informed them that her husband had a contract with OBM, through XEI, to
purchase the property. She failed to produce documents which prompted CBM to file a complaint for
unlawful detainer against the spouses. But later on, CBM moved to withdraw its complaint because of
the issues raised. In the meantime, CBM was renamed the Boston Bank of the Philippines. Then the
spouses filed a complaint for specific performance against the bank before the RTC. The spouses
alleged that they had always been ready and willing to pay the installments on the lots sold to them but
no contract wat forthcoming.
Issue:
Whether or not the terms of the deeds of conditional sale executed by XEI in favor of the other
lot buyers in the subdivision, which contained uniform terms of 120 equal monthly installments,
constitute evidence that XEI also agreed to give the Manalo spouses the same mode and timeline of
payment.
Held:
No. The bare fact that other lot buyers were allowed to pay the balance of the purchase price of
lots purchased by them in 120 or 180 monthly installments does not constitute evidence that XEI also
agreed to give the respondents the same mode and timeline of payment. Under Section 34, Rule 130 of
the Revised Rules of Court, evidence that one did a certain thing at one time is not admissible to prove
that he did the sae or similar thing at another time, although such evidence may be received to prove
habit, usage, pattern of conduct or the intent of the parties. Habit, custom, usage or pattern of conduct
must be proved like any other facts. Respondents failed to allege and prove that, as a matter of business
usage, habit or pattern of conduct, XEI granted all lot buyers the right to pay the balance of the
purchase price in installments of 120 months of fixed amounts with pre-computed interests, and that
XEI and the respondents had intended to adopt such terms of payment relative to the sale of the two
lots in question.

People vs. Rimorin

Facts:
Two persons were kidnapped and brought to a forest area where they were killed.The bodies
were set afire while in a pit then buried in the same spot.A helper of the suspects and the families of the
victims were threatened with retaliation if they reported the incident.Tenyears later, the helper, after
learning that one of the suspects have died, reported the incident and the bodies were then exhumed.
Appellants were convicted of kidnapping with murder.
Issue:
Whether or not it was necessary to present the seized goods to prove the corpus delicti.
Held:
No. Corpus Delicti Established by Other Evidence. Petitioner argues that he cannot be
convicted of smuggling under the Tariff and Customs Code, because respondent failed to present the
seized contraband cigarettes in court. We disagree. Corpus Delicti refers to the fact of the commission
of the crime charged or to the body or substance of the crime. It does not refer to the ransom money in
the crime of kidnapping for ransom or to the body of the person murdered. To prove the corpus delicti,
it is sufficient for the prosecution to be able show that: A certain fact has been proven -- say, a person
has died or a building has been burned and a particular person is criminally responsible for the act.
Since the corpus delicti is the fact of the commission of the crime, this Court has ruled that even a
single witness uncorroborated testimony, if credible, may suffice to prove it and warrant a conviction
therefor. Corpus delicti may even be established by circumstantial evidence. Both the RTC and the CA
ruled that the corpus delicti had been competently established by respondents evidence, which
consisted of the testimonies of credible witnesses and the Custody Receipt issued by the Bureau of
Customs for the confiscated goods.

Lucas vs. Lucas

Facts:
Jesse U. Lucas, filed a Petition to Establish Illegitimate Filiation (with Motion for the
Submission of Parties to DNA Testing) before RTC Valenzuela City. Sometime in 1967, his mother,
Elsie Uy (Elsie), migrated to Manila from Davao and stayed with a certain Ate Belen (Belen) who
worked in a prominent nightspot in Manila. Elsie would oftentimes accompany Belen to work. On one
occasion, Elsie got acquainted with respondent, Jesus S. Lucas, at Belens workplace, and an intimate
relationship developed between the two. Elsie eventually got pregnant and, she gave birth to petitioner,
Jesse U. Lucas. The name of petitioners father was not stated in petitioners certificate of live birth.
However, Elsie later on told petitioner that his father is respondent. Respondent allegedly extended
financial support to Elsie and petitioner for a period of about two years. When the relationship of Elsie
and respondent ended, Elsie refused to accept respondents offer of support and decided to raise
petitioner on her own. While petitioner was growing up, Elsie made several attempts to introduce
petitioner to respondent, but all attempts were in vain. Respondent was not served with a copy of the
petition. Nonetheless, respondent learned of the petition to establish filiation. His counsel therefore
went to the trial court and obtained a copy of the petition. Petitioner filed with the RTC a Very Urgent
Motion to Try and Hear the Case.
There is the danger of allowing an absolute DNA testing to a compulsory recognition test even
if the plaintiff/petitioner failed to establish prima facie proof.
If at anytime, motu proprio and without pre-conditions, the court can indeed order the taking of DNA
test in compulsory recognition cases, then the prominent and well-to-do members of our society will be
easy prey for opportunists and extortionists. Casual sexual indiscretions in their younger years could be
used as a means to harass them.
Issue:
Whether or not a prima facie showing is necessary before a court can issue a DNA testing order.
Held:
Yes. Rule on DNA Evidence provides the prescribed parameters on the requisite elements for
reliability and validity (i.e., the proper procedures, protocols, necessary laboratory reports, etc.), the
possible sources of error, the available objections to the admission of DNA test results as evidence as
well as the probative value of DNA evidence. It seeks to ensure that the evidence gathered, using
various methods of DNA analysis, is utilized effectively and properly, [and] shall not be misused and/or
abused and, more importantly, shall continue to ensure that DNA analysis serves justice and protects,
rather than prejudice the public. SEC 4 of the Rule on DNA Evidence merely provides for conditions
that are aimed to safeguard the accuracy and integrity of the DNA testing. Appropriate court may, at
any time, either motu proprio or on application of any person who has a legal interest in the matter in
litigation, order a DNA testing. The existence of other factors, if any, which the court may consider as
potentially affecting the accuracy or integrity of the DNA testing. This Rule shall not preclude a DNA
testing, without need of a prior court order, at the behest of any party, including law enforcement
agencies, before a suit or proceeding is commenced.
DNA testing order is not a matter of right if, during the hearing, the said conditions are not
established. There must be a show cause hearing wherein the applicant must first present sufficient
evidence to establish a prima facie case or a reasonable possibility of paternity or good cause for the
holding of the test. Court order for blood testing is considered a search, which, under their
Constitutions (as in ours), must be preceded by a finding of probable cause in order to be valid. Hence,
the requirement of a prima facie case, or reasonable possibility, was imposed in civil actions as a
counterpart of a finding of probable cause. The same condition precedent should be applied in our

jurisdiction to protect the putative father from mere harassment suits. Thus, during the hearing on the
motion for DNA testing, the petitioner must present prima facie evidence or establish a reasonable
possibility of paternity.
Issuance of a DNA testing order remains discretionary upon the court. The court may, for
example, consider whether there is absolute necessity for the DNA testing. If there is already
preponderance of evidence to establish paternity and the DNA test result would only be corroborative,
the court may, in its discretion, disallow a DNA testing.

People vs Umanito
Facts:
The accused Rufino Umanito was found by the Regional Trial Court of Bauang, La Union,
Branch 67 guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of rape. On appeal, the Court of Appeals
offered the judgment of the trial court. Umanito appeald the decision of the appellate court to this court.
In its 2007 Resolution, the Court acknowledged the alleged 1989 rape of the private complainant,
AAA, had resulted in her pregnancy and the birth of a child, identified as BBB. In view of that fact,
as well as the defense of alibi raised by Umanito, the Court deemed uncovering of whether or not
Umanity is the father of BBB is a great determinative of the resolution of the appeal. Due to this, the
Court resolved for the very first time, to apply the then recently promulgaed New Rules on DNA
Evidence. The RTC of Bauang, La Union, presided by Judge Ferdinand A. Fe, upon receiving the
Resolution of the Court on 9 November 2007, set the case for hearing to ascertain the feasibility of
DNA testing. After the hearing was conducted, the DNA testing was held. The DNA sample from the
accused was taken at his detention center at the New Bilibid Prisons on 8 February 2008. After the RTC
ordered the NBI to submit the result of the DNA examination, the case was set for hearing on the
admissibility of the result of the DNA testing. At the hearing, the prosecution presented Mary Ann T.
Aranas, a Forensic Chemist of the NBI who testified on the examination she concluded. She declared
that based on the findings, there is a 99.9999% probability of paternity that Rufino Umanito y Millares
is the biological father of BBB. The defense did not interpose any objection, hence the exhibits were
admitted.
Issue:
Whether or not the result of the DNA examination is admissible.
Held:
Yes. The procedure adopted by the DNA section, Forensic Chemistry Division of the NBI in
analyzing the samples was in accordance with the standards used in modern technology. The NBI DNA
Section, Forensic Division is an accredited DNA testing laboratory in the country which maintains a
multimillion DNA analysis equipment for its scientific criminal investigation unit. It is manned by
qualified laboratory chemists and technicians who are experts in the field, like Mary Ann Aranas, the
expert witness in the instant case, who is a licensed chemist, has undergone training on the aspects of
Forensic Chemistry for (2) years before she was hired as forensic chemist of the NBI and has been
continuously attending training seminars, and workshops which are field related and who has handled
more than 200 cases involving DNA extraction or collection or profiling.
Section 6 A.M. No. 06-11-5-SC provides that If the value of the Probability of Paternity is
99.9% or higher, there shall be a disputable presumption of paternity. Disputable presumptions are
satisfactory if uncontradicted but may be contradicted and overcome by other evidence. The disputable
presumption that was established as a result of the DNA testing was not contradicted and overcome by
other evidence considering that the accused did not object to the admission of the results of the DNA
testing.

In re: The Writ of Habeas Corpus for Reynaldo De Villa

Facts:
On February 1, 2001, Reynaldo De Villa was found guilty of the rape of Aileen Mendoza and
was senteced to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua and ordered him to pay the offended party civil
indemnity, moral damages, costs of the suit, and support for Leahlyn Corales Mendoza, the putative
child born of the rape. Three years after the promulgation of the decision, petitioner-relator, June de
Villa who is the son of Reynaldo, alleges that during the trial of the case, he was unaware that there was
a scientific test that could determine once and for all if Reynaldo was the father of the victim's child,
Leahlyn. He was only informed during the pendency of the automatic review of petitioner's case that
DNA testing could resolve the issue of paternity. Thus, petitioner's brief sought the conduct of a blood
type test and DNA test in order to determine the paternity of the child but it was denied on February 21,
2001. De Villa then filed a mition for partial reconsideration of the decision where he once more prayed
that DNA test be conducted however, it was also denied on November 20, 2001. Hence, the decision
became final and executory on January 16, 2002. Undaunted by these, petitioner-relator was able to
somehow get a sample of Leahlyn's saliva which he used together with four more samples from
Reynaldo de Villa's grandchildren for a DNA examination in the DNA Analysis Laboratory at the
Natonal Science Research Institute. After the examination, the DNA Laboratory rendered a preliminary
report on March 21, 2003 which showed that Reynaldo de Villa could not have sired any of the children
whose samples were tested, due to the absence of a match between the pertinent genetic markers in
petitioner's sample and those of any of the other samples, including Leahlyns.
Issue:
Whether or not the petition should prosper.
Held:
No. The issue of Leahlyn Mendoza's paternity is not central to the issue of petitioner's guilt or
innocence. Pregnancy is not an essential element in the crime of rape. Further, the petitioner anchors
his plea on the basis of purportedly newly-discovered evidence, i.e., the DNA test subsequently
conducted, allegedly excluding petitioner from the child purportedly fathered as a result of the rape. A
motion for new trial based on newly-discovered evidence may be granted only if the following
requisites are met: (a) that the evidence was discovered after trial; (b) that said evidence could not have
been discovered and produced at the trial even with the exercise of reasonable diligence; (c) that it is
material, not merely cumulative, corroborative or impeaching; and (d) that the evidence is of such
weight that, if admitted, it would probably change the judgment. It is essential that the offering party
exercised reasonable diligence in seeking to locate the evidence before or during trial but nonetheless
failed to secure it. In this instance, although the DNA evidence was undoubtedly discovered after the
trial, it did not meet the criteria for newly-discovered evidence since the petitioner-relator's claim that
he was unaware of the existence of DNA testing speaks of negligence. Either on the part of the
petitioner or the petitioner's counsel, this negligence is binding upon petitioner. Therefore, the DNA
evidence has failed to conclusively prove to this Court that Reynaldo de Villa should be discharged.

People vs. Vallejo

Facts:
The victim, Daisy Diolola, was sent by her mother, Ma. Nida Diolola, on July 10, 1999 to their
neighbors' house in Pilapil, Rosario, Cavite so that Aimee Vallejo, sister of accused-appellant, could
help Daisy with her lessons. She was then wearing pink short pants and a white sleeveless shirt. An
hour later, Daisy came back with accused-appellant because they were looking for a book. After finding
the book, they left. However, the day went on without Daisy going home which made Ma. Nida Diolola
as well as her brother and sister search for Daisy until the following day, June 11, 1999. As their search
proved fruitless, about 10:00 oclock in the morning, she was then informed that the dead body of her
daughter was found by the river. Daisy was wearing her pink short pants with her sleeveles shirt tied
around her neck. A witness, Jessiemin testified that she saw accused-appellant arrive on the store near
her house wearing only his basketball shorts on and was holding his shirt. She noticed both his shorts
and his shirt were wet. Accused-appellant was then invited by the policement for questioning. The shirt
and shorts which were bloodstained were turned over to the NBI for laboratory examination. The
Mayor and Atty. Lupo Leyva went to the municipal jail where the accused-appellant eventually
confessed of the crime despite having told him his rights. The results of the examinations conducted by
Pet Byron Buan, Forensic Biologist of the NBI, showed accused-appelant belong to the Group O while
the victim belong to Group A. The shirt and shorts worn by accused-appellant were all positive for the
presence of human blood showing the reactions of Group A. The accused-appellant argues that the
prosecution failed to show that all the samples submitted for DNA testing were not contaminated,
considering that these speciments were already soaked in smirchy waters before they were submitted to
the laboratory. The trial court then rendered a decision finding accused-appellant guilty of the offense
charged. Hence this appeal.
Issue:
Whether or not the DNA results are admissible.
Held:
Yes. When a crime is committed, material is collected from the scene of the crime or from the
victim's body for the suspect's DNA. This is the sample. The evidence sample is then matched with the
reference sample taken from the suspect and the victim. The purpose of DNA testing is to ascertain
whether an association exists between the evidence sample and the reference sample. The samples
collected are subjected to various chemical processes to establish their profile. In asessing the probative
value of DNA evidence, therefore, courts should consider among other thing, the following data: how
the samples were collected, how they were handles, the possibility of contamination of the samples, the
procedure followed in analyzing the samples, whether the proper standards and procedures were
followed in conducting the tests, and the qualification of the analyst who conducted the tests.
In the case, the bloodstains taken from the clothing of the victim and of accused-appellant, the
smears taken from the victim as well as the strands of hair and nails from her tested negative for the
presence of human DNA because the specimens were soaked in smirchy water before they were
submitted to the laboratory. However, it is the inadequacy of the specimens submitted for examination,
and not the possibility that the samples had been contaminated, which accounted for the negative
results of their examination. The vaginal swabs taken from the victim, on the other hand, yielded
positive for the presence of human DNA and upon analysis, they showed the DNA profile of accused
appellant. We hold that the totality of the evidence points to no other conclusion than that accusedappellant is guilty of the crime charged. Evidence is weighed not counted. When facts which are
proved are not only consistent with the guilt of the accused but also inconsistent with his innocence,
such evidence, in its weight and probative force, may surpass direct evidence in its effect on the court.

People vs. Enojas

Facts:
City Prosecutor of Las Pias charged ENOJAS GOMEZ, SANTOS, and JALANDONI with
murder before RTC Las Pias PO2 Eduardo Gregorio, Jr. (PO2 Gregorio). He and PO2 Francisco
Pangilinan (PO2 Pangilinan) were patrolling the vicinity of Toyota Alabang and SM Southmall when
they spotted a taxi that was suspiciously parked in front of the Aguila Auto Glass shop near the
intersection of BF Almanza and Alabang-Zapote Roads. The officers approached the taxi and asked the
driver, Enojas, for his documents. The latter complied but, having entertained doubts regarding the
veracity of documents shown them, they asked him to come with them to the police station in their
mobile car for further questioning. Enojas voluntarily went with the police officers and left his taxi
behind. On reaching the 7-11 convenience store on the Zapote-Alabang Road, however, they stopped
and PO2 Pangilinan went down to relieve himself there. As he approached the stores door, however, he
came upon two suspected robbers and shot it out with them. PO2 Pangilinan shot one suspect dead and
hit the other who still managed to escape. PO2 Gregorio came around and fired at an armed man whom
he saw running towards Pilar Village. He saw another man, who came from the Jollibbee outlet, run
towards Alabang-Zapote Road while firing his gun at PO2 Gregorio. The latter returned fire but the
men were able to take a taxi and escape. PO2 Gregorio radioed for help and for an ambulance. On
returning to his mobile car, he realized that accused Enojas, the taxi driver they had with them had fled.
P/Insp. Ferjen Torred (Chief of Investigation Division of the Las Pias Police), he and PO2
Teoson Rosarito (PO2 Rosarito) immediately responded to PO2 Gregorios urgent call. Suspecting that
accused Enojas, the taxi driver who fled, was involved in the attempted robbery, they searched the
abandoned taxi and found a mobile phone that Enojas apparently left behind. P/Ins. Torred instructed
PO3 Joel Cambi (PO3 Cambi) to monitor its incoming messages. Suspect whom PO2 Pangilinan had
killed was someone named Reynaldo Mendoza who was armed with a .38 caliber revolver. The police
found spent 9 mm and M-16 rifle shells at the crime scene. Follow-up operations at nearby provinces
resulted in finding the dead body of one of the suspects, Alex Angeles, at the Metro South Medical
Center.PO3 Cambi and PO2 Rosarito, they monitored the messages in accused Enojas mobile phone
and, posing as Enojas, communicated with the other accused. The police then conducted an entrapment
operation that resulted in the arrest of accused Santos and Jalandoni. Subsequently, the police were also
able to capture accused Enojas and Gomez. The prosecution presented the transcripts of the mobile
phone text messages between Enojas and some of his co-accused.
Issue:
Whether or not the accused are guilty.
Held:
Prosecution failed to present direct evidence that the accused Enojas, Gomez, Santos, or
Jalandoni took part in shooting PO2 Pangilinan dead but could prove their liability by circumstantial
evidence that meets the evidentiary standard of proof beyond reasonable doubt. It has been held that
circumstantial evidence is sufficient for conviction if: There is more than one circumstance, facts from
which the inferences are derived are proven, combination of all the circumstances is such as to produce
a conviction beyond reasonable doubt. Here the totality of the circumstantial evidence the prosecution
presented sufficiently provides basis for the conviction of all the accused. PO2 Gregorio positively
identified accused Enojas as the driver of the taxicab suspiciously parked in front of the Aguila Auto
Glass shop. Subsequent inspection of the taxicab yielded Enojas mobile phone that contained
messages which led to the entrapment and capture of the other accused who were also taxicab drivers.
Enojas fled during the commotion rather than remain in the cab to go to the police station where he was
about to be taken for questioning, tending to show that he had something to hide. He certainly did not

go to the police afterwards to clear up the matter and claim his taxi. PO2 Gregorio positively identified
accused Gomez as one of the men he saw running away from the scene of the shooting. The text
messages identified Kua Justin as one of those who engaged PO2 Pangilinan in the shootout; the
messages also referred to Kua Justin as the one who was hit in such shootout and later died in a
hospital in Bacoor, Cavite. These messages linked the other accused. During the follow-up operations,
the police investigators succeeded in entrapping accused Santos, Jalandoni, Enojas, and Gomez, who
were all named in the text messages. The text messages sent to the phone recovered from the taxi
driven by Enojas clearly made references to the 7-11 shootout and to the wounding of Kua Justin,
one of the gunmen, and his subsequent death. The context of the messages showed that the accused
were members of an organized group of taxicab drivers engaged in illegal activities.
Upon the arrest of the accused, they were found in possession of mobile phones with call numbers that
corresponded to the senders of the messages received on the mobile phone that accused Enojas left in
his taxicab.
As to the admissibility of the text messages, the RTC admitted them in conformity with the
Courts earlier Resolution applying the Rules on Electronic Evidence to criminal actions.
Text messages are to be proved by the testimony of a person who was a party to the same or has
personal knowledge of them. PO3 Cambi, posing as the accused Enojas, exchanged text messages with
the other accused in order to identify and entrap them. As the recipient of those messages sent from and
to the mobile phone in his possession, PO3 Cambi had personal knowledge of such messages and was
competent to testify on them. The killing of PO2 Pangilinanand the investigating police officers had
personal knowledge of facts indicating that the persons they were to arrest had committed it.
The text messages to and from the mobile phone left at the scene by accused Enojas provided strong
leads on the participation and identities of the accused. Indeed, the police caught them in an entrapment
using this knowledge.

Nuez vs. Cruz-Apao

Facts:
Complainant filed an illegal dismissal case against PAGCOR before the Civil Service
Commission (CSC). The CSC ordered complainants reinstatement but a writ of preliminary injunction
and a temporary restraining order was issued by the CA in favor of PAGCOR, thus complainant was
not reinstated to his former job pending adjudication of the case. Desiring an expeditious decision of
his case, Nuez sought the assistance of respondent sometime in July 2004 after learning of the latters
employment with the CA from her sister, Magdalena David. Nuez communicated to the respondent
through telephone conversation and text messages. A week after their first telephone conversation,
respondent allegedly told complainant that a favorable and speedy decision of his case was attainable
but the person who was to draft the decision was in return asking for One Million Pesos
(P1,000,000.00). Complainant expostulated that he did not have that kind of money since he had been
jobless for a long time and August of 2004, he sought the assistance of Imbestigador. The crew of the
TV program accompanied him to PAOCCF-SPG where he lodged a complaint against respondent for
extortion. Thereafter, he communicated with respondent again to verify if the latter was still asking for
the money and to set up a meeting with her. Upon learning that respondents offer of a favorable
decision in exchange for One Million Pesos (P1,000,000.00) was still standing, the plan for the
entrapment operation was formulated by Imbestigador in cooperation with the PAOCC.
On 24 September 2004, complainant and respondent met for the first time in person at the 2nd
Floor of Jollibee, Times Plaza Bldg., the place where the entrapment operation was later conducted.
Respondent was brought to the PNP Crime Laboratory at the WPD where she was tested and found
positive for ultra-violet powder that was previously dusted on the money. She was later detained at the
WPD Headquarters.
As evidence, complainant was able to prove by his testimony in conjunction with the text
messages from respondent duly presented before the Committee that the latter asked for One Million
Pesos (P1,000,000.00) in exchange for a favorable decision of the formers pending case with the CA.
Issue:
Whether or not the text messages may be admitted as evidence.
Held:
The text messages were properly admitted by the Committee since the same are now covered by
Section 1(k), Rule 2 of the Rules on Electronic Evidence which provides:
"Ephemeral electronic communication" refers to telephone conversations, text messages . . . and other
electronic forms of communication the evidence of which is not recorded or retained." Under Section 2,
Rule 11 of the Rules on Electronic Evidence, "Ephemeral electronic communications shall be proven
by the testimony of a person who was a party to the same or who has personal knowledge thereof . . . ."
In this case, complainant who was the recipient of said messages and therefore had personal knowledge
thereof testified on their contents and import. Respondent herself admitted that the cellphone number
reflected in complainants cellphone from which the messages originated was hers. Moreover, any
doubt respondent may have had as to the admissibility of the text messages had been laid to rest when
she and her counsel signed and attested to the veracity of the text messages between her and
complainant. It is also well to remember that in administrative cases, technical rules of procedure and
evidence are not strictly applied. We have no doubt as to the probative value of the text messages as
evidence in determining the guilt or lack thereof of respondent in this case.
Complainants testimony as to the discussion between him and respondent on the latters
demand for One Million Pesos (P1,000,000.00) was corroborated by the testimony of a disinterested
witness, Siringan, the reporter of Imbestigador who was present when the parties met in person.

Siringan was privy to the parties actual conversation since she accompanied complainant on both
meetings held on 24 and 28 of September 2004 at Jollibee.
Respondents evidence was comprised by the testimony of her daughter and sister as well as an
acquaintance who merely testified on how respondent and complainant first met. Respondents own
testimony consisted of bare denials and self-serving claims that she did not remember either the
statements she herself made or the contents of the messages she sent. Respondent had a very selective
memory made apparent when clarificatory questions were propounded by the Committee. When she
was asked if she had sent the text messages contained in complainants cellphone and which reflected
her cellphone number, respondent admitted those that were not incriminating but claimed she did not
remember those that clearly showed she was transacting with complainant.

Ang vs. CA
Facts:
After receiving from the accused Rustan via multimedia message service (MMS) a picture of a
naked woman with her face superimposed on the figure, Complainant filed an action against said
accused for violation of the Anti-Violence Against Women and Their Children Act or Republic Act
(R.A.) 9262. The senders cellphone number, stated in the message, was 0921-8084768, one of the
numbers that Rustan used. Irish surmised that he copied the picture of her face from a shot he took
when they were in Baguio in 2003. The accused said to have boasted that it would be easy for him to
create similarly scandalous pictures of her and threatened to spread the picture he sent through the
internet.
The trial court later found Rustan guilty of the violation of Section 5(h) of R.A. 9262. On
Rustans appeal to the Court of Appeals (CA), the latter rendered a decision affirming the RTC
decision. The CA denied Rustans motion for reconsideration in a resolution dated April 25, 2008.
Thus, Rustan filed the present for review on certiorari.
Issue:
Whether or not the RTC properly admitted in evidence the obscene picture presented in the
case.
Held:
Yes. The Supreme Court affirms the decision of the CA. Rustan claims that the obscene picture
sent to Irish through a text message constitutes an electronic document. Thus, it should be authenticated
by means of an electronic signature, as provided under Section 1, Rule 5 of the Rules on Electronic
Evidence (A.M. 01-7-01-SC).
However, Rustan is raising this objection to the admissibility of the obscene picture for the first
time before the Supreme Court. The objection is too late since he should have objected to the admission
of the picture on such ground at the time it was offered in evidence. He should be deemed to have
already waived such ground for objection.
Moreover, the rules he cites do not apply to the present criminal action. The Rules on Electronic
Evidence applies only to civil actions, quasi-judicial proceedings, and administrative proceedings.
In conclusion, the Court finds that the prosecution has proved each and every element of the
crime charged beyond reasonable doubt.

NAPOCOR vs. Codilla

Facts:
On april 20, 1996, M/V DibenaWinm being operated and owned by the herein private
respondent Bangpai shipping company under its hip agent Wallen shipping Inc., accidentally bumped
the power barge of the herein petitioner, NAPOCOR. The latter filed a complaint for damages on april
26, 1996 before the sala of the herein public respondent judge. During the presentation of evidence, the
petitioner presented as pieces of evidence Xerox copies, to which such was admitted by the court.
Hoever, a motion to strike out the evidence was filed before the court to which the court ordered that
such pieces of evidence be stricken out of the records but has to be attached to the documents for
proper disposition by the appellate in case of appeal before the latter. The petitioner aver that such
documents be admitted for the basic reason that such is within the purview of the electronic evidence.
Issue:
Whether or not the pieces of evidence submitted by the petitioner be regarded within the
purview of the electronic evidence for the court be compelled to admit.
Held:
No, the Supreme Court mentioned the following, Section 1 of Rule 2 of the Rules on Electronic
Evidence as follows:
(h) "Electronic document" refers to information or the representation of information, data, figures,
symbols or other models of written expression, described or however represented, by which a right is
established or an obligation extinguished, or by which a fact may be proved and affirmed, which is
received, recorded, transmitted, stored, processed, retrieved or produced electronically. It includes
digitally signed documents and any printout, readable by sight or other means which accurately reflects
the electronic data message or electronic document. For the purpose of these Rules, the term "electronic
document" may be used interchangeably with "electronic data message".
On the other hand, an "electronic document" refers to information or the representation of
information, data, figures, symbols or other models of written expression, described or however
represented, by which a right is established or an obligation extinguished, or by which a fact may be
proved and affirmed, which is received, recorded, transmitted, stored, processed, retrieved or produced
electronically.It includes digitally signed documents and any printout, readable by sight or other means
which accurately reflects the electronic data message or electronic document.
The rules use the word "information" to define an electronic document received, recorded,
transmitted, stored, processed, retrieved or produced electronically. This would suggest that an
electronic document is relevant only in terms of the information contained therein, similar to any other
document which is presented in evidence as proof of its contents. However, what differentiates an
electronic document from a paper-based document is the manner by which the information is
processed; clearly, the information contained in an electronic document is received, recorded,
transmitted, stored, processed, retrieved or produced electronically.
A perusal of the information contained in the photocopies submitted by petitioner will reveal
that not all of the contents therein, such as the signatures of the persons who purportedly signed the
documents, may be recorded or produced electronically. By no stretch of the imagination can a persons
signature affixed manually be considered as information electronically received, recorded, transmitted,
stored, processed, retrieved or produced. Hence, the argument of petitioner that since these paper
printouts were produced through an electronic process, then these photocopies are electronic
documents as defined in the Rules on Electronic Evidence is obviously an erroneous, if not
preposterous, interpretation of the law. Having thus declared that the offered photocopies are not
tantamount to electronic documents, it is consequential that the same may not be considered as the
functional equivalent of their original as decreed in the law.

Section 2, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court:

"SECTION 2. Original writing must be produced; exceptions. There can be no evidence of a
writing the contents of which is the subject of inquiry, other than the original writing itself, except in
the following cases:
(a) When the original has been lost, destroyed, or cannot be produced in court;
(b) When the original is in the possession of the party against whom the evidence is offered, and the
latter fails to produce it after reasonable notice;
(c) When the original is a record or other document in the custody of a public officer;
(d) When the original has been recorded in an existing record a certified copy of which is made
evidence by law;
(e) When the original consists of numerous accounts or other documents which cannot be examined in
court without great loss of time and the fact sought to be established from them is only the general
result of the whole."
When the original document has been lost or destroyed, or cannot be produced in court, the offeror,
upon proof of its execution or existence and the cause of its unavailability without bad faith on his part,
may prove its contents by a copy, or by a recital of its contents in some authentic document, or by the
testimony of witnesses in the order stated. The offeror of secondary evidence is burdened to prove the
predicates thereof: (a) the loss or destruction of the original without bad faith on the part of the
proponent/offeror which can be shown by circumstantial evidence of routine practices of destruction of
documents; (b) the proponent must prove by a fair preponderance of evidence as to raise a reasonable
inference of the loss or destruction of the original copy; and (c) it must be shown that a diligent and
bona fide but unsuccessful search has been made for the document in the proper place or places.
However, in the case at bar, though petitioner insisted in offering the photocopies as documentary
evidence, it failed to establish that such offer was made in accordance with the exceptions as
enumerated under the abovequoted rule. Accordingly, we find no error in the Order of the court a quo
denying admissibility of the photocopies offered by petitioner as documentary evidence.
Indeed the documents presented by the petitioner as evidence before the court were not within
the purview electronic document or electronic data message. It will be highly unacceptable to regard
an information manually written down to be regarded as electronic message. The petitioner cannot
aver now to submit the original copies of the documents since they were given enough time to submit
such but they refused to do so and insist that the photocopies be admitted instead.
The high court denied such petition.

Jose vs. CA
Facts:
On February 22, 1985, at around six o'clock in the morning, petitioner Manila Central Bus
Lines Corporation's (MCL) bus 203, then driven by petitioner Armando Jose, collided with a red Ford
Escort car driven by John Macarubo on McArthur Highway in Marulas, Valenzuela, Metro Manila. As
a result, the car was severely damaged while its driver, Jose Macarubo and its lone passenger, Rommel
Abraham, were severely injured. Despite surgery, Macarubo failed to recover and died five days later.
His lone passenger, Rommel Abraham survived but he became blind on the left eye. He also sustained a
fracture on the forehead and multiple lacerations on the face which caused him to be hospitalized for a
week.
Rommel Abraham, represented by his father, Felixberto, instituted a civil case against MCL and
Armando Jose in the Regional Trial Court, Branch 172, Valenzuela. The spouses, Jose and Mercedes
Macarubo, parents of the deceased John Macarubo, also filed their own suit for damages against MCL
alone. On the other hand, MCL filed a third-party complaint against Juanita Macarubo, registered
owner of the Ford Escort, on the theory that John Macarubo was negligent and that he was the
"authorized driver" of Juanita Macarubo. The latter in turn filed a counterclaim for damages against
MCL for damage to her car. The cases were consolidated and tried jointly. The trial court rendered
judgment dismissing both civil cases against MCL and ruling favorably on the third-party complaint
against Juanita Macarubo, ordering the latter to pay MCL actual damages and attorney's fees. Rommel
Abraham, the Macarubo spouses, and third-party defendant Juanita Macarubo appealed to the Court of
Appeals which rendered a decision reversing the decision of the trial court. It held (1) that the trial
court erred in disregarding Rommel Abrahams uncontroverted testimony that the collision was due to
the fault of the driver of Bus 203; (2) that the trial court erred in relying on photographs (Exhs. 1-3)
which had been taken an hour after the collision as within that span of time, the positions of the
vehicles could have been changed; (3) that the photographs do not show that the Ford Escort was
overtaking another vehicle when the accident happened and that John Macarubo, its driver, was
negligent; and (4) that MCL failed to make a satisfactory showing that it exercised due diligence in the
selection and supervision of its driver Armando Jose.
Hence, the present petition.
ISSUE:
Whether or not physical evidence prevails over testimonial evidence where the physical
evidence on record ran counter to the testimonial evidence of the witnesses; case at bar and whether or
not evidence not formally offered cannot be considered.
HELD:
Yes, Physical Evidence Prevails over testimonial evidence. The trial court was justified in
relying on the photographs rather than on Rommel Abraham's testimony which was obviously biased
and unsupported by any other evidence. Physical evidence is a mute but an eloquent manifestation of
truth, and it ranks high in our hierarchy of trustworthy evidence. In criminal cases such as murder or
rape where the accused stands to lose his liberty if found guilty, this Court has, in many occasions,
relied principally upon physical evidence in ascertaining the truth. In People v. Vasquez, where the
physical evidence on record ran counter to the testimonial evidence of the prosecution witnesses, we
ruled that the physical evidence should prevail. In this case, the positions of the two vehicles, as shown
in the photographs (Exhs. 1 to 3) taken by MCL line inspector Jesus Custodio about an hour and fifteen
minutes after the collision, disputes Abraham's self-serving testimony that the two vehicles collided
because Bus 203 invaded the lane of the Ford Escort and clearly shows that the case is exactly the
opposite of what he claimed happened. Contrary to Abraham's testimony, the photographs show quite

clearly that Bus 203 was in its proper lane and that it was the Ford Escort which usurped a portion of
the opposite lane. The three photographs show the Ford Escort positioned diagonally on the highway,
with its two front wheels occupying Bus 203's lane. As shown by the photograph marked Exhibit 3, the
portion of MacArthur Highway where the collision took place is marked by a groove which serves as
the center line separating the right from the left lanes. The photograph shows that the left side of Bus
203 is about a few feet from the center line and that the bus is positioned parallel thereto. This negates
the claim that Bus 203 was overtaking another vehicle and, in so doing, encroached on the opposite
lane occupied by the Ford Escort.
Rommel Abraham mentioned in his appellant's brief in the appellate court a sketch of the scene
of the accident allegedly prepared by one Patrolman Kalale, which shows Bus 203 to be occupying the
Ford Escort's lane. However, the records of this case do not show that such a sketch was ever presented
in evidence in the trial court or that Patrolman Kalale was ever presented as a witness to testify on the
sketch allegedly prepared by him. Under Rule 132, 3 of the Rules on Evidence, courts cannot consider
any evidence unless formally offered by a party.

Case Digests on
Evidence

Submitted by:
Laguio, Ysrael P. Jr.
I.D. 2012400107
Submitted to:
Atty. Rico Quicho