1. Cangco vs. Manila Railroad Co.

FACTS: On January 20, 1915, Cangco was riding the train of Manila Railroad Co
(MRC). He was an employee of the latter and he was given a pass so that he
could ride the train for free. When he was nearing his destination at about 7pm,
he arose from his seat even though the train was not at full stop. When he was
about to alight from the train (which was still slightly moving) he accidentally
stepped on a sack of watermelons which he failed to notice due to the fact that it
was dim. This caused him to lose his balance at the door and he fell and his arm
was crushed by the train and he suffered other serious injuries. He was dragged
a few meters more as the train slowed down.
It was established that the employees of MRC were negligent in piling the sacks
of watermelons. MRC raised as a defense the fact that Cangco was also
negligent as he failed to exercise diligence in alighting from the train as he did
not wait for it to stop.
ISSUE: Whether or not Manila Railroad Co is liable for damages.
HELD: Yes. Alighting from a moving train while it is slowing down is a common
practice and a lot of people are doing so every day without suffering injury.
Cangco has the vigor and agility of young manhood, and it was by no means so
risky for him to get off while the train was yet moving as the same act would have
been in an aged or feeble person. He was also ignorant of the fact that sacks of
watermelons were there as there were no appropriate warnings and the place
was dimly lit.
The Court also elucidated on the distinction between the liability of employers
under Article 2180 and their liability for breach of contract [of carriage]:

2. Del Prado vs. Manila Electric Co.

FACTS: Teodorico Florenciano, Meralcos motorman, was driving the companys
street car along Hidalgo Street. Plaintiff Ignacio Del Prado ran across the street
to catch the car. The motorman eased up but did not put the car into complete
stop. Plaintiff was able to get hold of the rail and step his left foot when the car
accelerated. As a result, plaintiff slipped off and fell to the ground. His foot was
crushed by the wheel of the car. He filed a complaint for culpa contractual.
ISSUES:
(1) Whether the motorman was negligent
(2) Whether Meralco is liable for breach of contract of carriage
(3) Whether there was contributory negligence on the part of the plaintiff
HELD:
(1) We may observe at the outset that there is no obligation on the part of a street
railway company to stop its cars to let on intending passengers at other points
than those appointed for stoppage. Nevertheless, although the motorman of this
car was not bound to stop to let the plaintiff on, it was his duty to do no act that
would have the effect of increasing the plaintiff's peril while he was attempting to

board the car. The premature acceleration of the car was, in our opinion, a
breach of this duty.
(2) The relation between a carrier of passengers for hire and its patrons is of a
contractual nature; and a failure on the part of the carrier to use due care in
carrying its passengers safely is a breach of duty (culpa contractual).
Furthermore, the duty that the carrier of passengers owes to its patrons extends
to persons boarding the cars as well as to those alighting therefrom.
Where liability arises from a mere tort (culpa aquiliana), not involving a breach of
positive obligation, an employer, or master, may exculpate himself by proving that
he had exercised due diligence to prevent the damage; whereas this defense is
not available if the liability of the master arises from a breach of contractual duty
(culpa contractual). In the case before us the company pleaded as a special
defense that it had used all the diligence of a good father of a family to prevent
the damage suffered by the plaintiff; and to establish this contention the company
introduced testimony showing that due care had been used in training and
instructing the motorman in charge of this car in his art. But this proof is irrelevant
in view of the fact that the liability involved was derived from a breach of
obligation.
(3) It is obvious that the plaintiff's negligence in attempting to board the moving
car was not the proximate cause of the injury. The direct and proximate cause of
the injury was the act of appellant's motorman in putting on the power
prematurely. Again, the situation before us is one where the negligent act of the
company's servant succeeded the negligent act of the plaintiff, and the
negligence of the company must be considered the proximate cause of the injury.
The rule here applicable seems to be analogous to, if not identical with that which
is sometimes referred to as the doctrine of "the last clear chance." In accordance
with this doctrine, the contributory negligence of the party injured will not defeat
the action if it be shown that the defendant might, by the exercise of reasonable
care and prudence, have avoided the consequences of the negligence of the
injured party. The negligence of the plaintiff was, however, contributory to the
accident and must be considered as a mitigating circumstance.

3. M.H. Rakes vs Atlantic Gulf and Pacific Company

FACTS: M.H. Rakes was a black man working as a laborer for Atlantic Gulf in the
early 1900s. One day, they were working in the companys yard and they were
transporting heavy rails using two cars (karitons?); each car carrying the opposite
ends of the rails. The cars were pulled by rope from the front and other workers
are pushing the cars from behind. There were no side guards installed on the
sides of the cars but the rails were secured by ropes. The track where the cars
move were also weakened by a previous typhoon. It was alleged that Atlantics
foreman was notified of said damage in the tracks but the same were left
unrepaired. While the cars were being moved and when it reached the
depressed portion of the track, and while Rakes was beside one of the cars, the
ropes gave in and the rails slipped thereby crushing his leg and causing it to be
amputated. Rakes sued Atlantic Gulf and he won; he was awarded 5,000 pesos
for damages ($2,500).
Atlantic assailed the decision of the lower court alleging that they specifically
ordered their workers to be walking only before or after the cars and not on the

side of the cars because the cars have no side guards to protect them in case
the rails would slip. Atlantic also alleged that Rakes should be suing the foreman
as it was him who neglected to have the tracks repaired; that Rakes himself was
negligent for having known of the depression on the track yet he continued to
work.
ISSUE: Whether or not Atlantic is civilly liable.
HELD: Yes. Rakes as per the evidence could not have known of the damage in
the track as it was another employee who swore he notified the foreman about
said damage. Further, his lack of caution in continuing to work is not of a gross
nature as to constitute negligence on his part. On the other hand though, Rakes
contributory negligence can be inferred from the fact that he was on the side of
the cars when in fact there were orders from the company barring workers from
standing near the side of the cars. His disobedient to this order does not bar his
recovery of damages though; the Supreme Court instead reduced the award of
damages from 5,000 pesos to 2,500 pesos.
In this case, the SC also elucidated the two kinds of culpa which are:

Culpa as substantive and independent, which on account of its origin

arises in an obligation between two persons not formerly bound by any
other obligation; may be also considered as a real source of an
independent obligation (extra-contractual or culpa aquiliana).
Culpa as an incident in the performance of an obligation which cannot be
presumed to exist without the other, and which increases the liability
arising from the already existing obligation (contractual or culpa
contractual).

4. Antonio Vasquez vs. Francisco De Borja

FACTS: In January 1932, Francisco De Borja entered into a contract of sale with
the NVSD (Natividad-Vasquez Sabani Development Co., Inc.). The subject of the
sale was 4,000 cavans of rice valued at Php2.10 per cavan. On behalf of the
company, the contract was executed by Antonio Vasquez as the companys
acting president. NVSD. only delivered 2,488 cavans and failed and refused
despite demand to deliver the rest hence De Borja incurred damages (apparently,
NVSD was insolvent). He then sue Vasquez for payment of damages.
ISSUE: Whether or not Vasquez is liable for damages.
HELD: No. Vasquez is not party to the contract as it was NVSD which De Borja
contracted with. It is well known that a corporation is an artificial being invested
by law with a personality of its own, separate and distinct from that of its
stockholders and from that of its officers who manage and run its affairs. The
mere fact that its personality is owing to a legal fiction and that it necessarily has
to act thru its agents, does not make the latter personally liable on a contract duly
entered into, or for an act lawfully performed, by them for an in its behalf.
The fact that the corporation, acting thru Vazquez as its manager,
negligence in the fulfillment of the contract did not make Vazquez
even subsidiarily liable for such negligence. Since it was the
contract, its non fulfillment, whether due to negligence or fault or
cause, made the corporation and not its agent liable.

was guilty of
principally or
corporations
to any other

JUSTICE PARAS Dissenting :

Vasquez as president of NVSD is liable for damages. Vasquez, as acting
president and manager of NVSD, and with full knowledge of the then insolvent
status of his company, agreed to sell to De Borja 4,000 cavans of palay. Further,
NVSD was soon thereafter dissolved.

5. Air France vs. Rafael Carrascoso

FACTS: In March 1958, Rafael Carrascoso and several other Filipinos were
tourists en route to Rome from Manila. Carrascoso was issued a first class round
trip ticket by Air France. But during a stop-over in Bangkok, he was asked by the
plane manager of Air France to vacate his seat because a white man allegedly
has a better right than him. Carrascoso protested but when things got heated
and upon advise of other Filipinos on board, Carrascoso gave up his seat and
was transferred to the planes tourist class.
After their tourist trip when Carrascoso was already in the Philippines, he sued
Air France for damages for the embarrassment he suffered during his trip. In
court, Carrascoso testified, among others, that he when he was forced to take the
tourist class, he went to the planes pantry where he was approached by a plane
purser who told him that he noted in the planes journal the following:
xxx First-class passenger was forced to go to the tourist class against his will,
and that the captain refused to intervene xxx
The said testimony was admitted in favor of Carrascoso. The trial court
eventually awarded damages in favor of Carrascoso. This was affirmed by the
Court of Appeals.
Air France is assailing the decision of the trial court and the CA. It avers that the
issuance of a first class ticket to Carrascoso was not an assurance that he will be
seated in first class because allegedly in truth and in fact, that was not the true
intent between the parties.
Air France also questioned the admissibility of Carrascosos testimony regarding
the note made by the purser because the said note was never presented in court.
ISSUE 1: Whether or not Air France is liable for damages and on what basis.
ISSUE 2: Whether or not the testimony of Carrasoso regarding the note which
was not presented in court is admissible in evidence.
HELD 1: Yes. It appears that Air Frances liability is based on culpa-contractual
and on culpa aquiliana.
Culpa Contractual
There exists a contract of carriage between Air France and Carrascoso. There
was a contract to furnish Carrasocoso a first class passage; Second, That said
contract was breached when Air France failed to furnish first class transportation
at Bangkok; and Third, that there was bad faith when Air Frances employee

compelled Carrascoso to leave his first class accommodation berth after he was
already, seated and to take a seat in the tourist class, by reason of which he
suffered inconvenience, embarrassments and humiliations, thereby causing him
mental anguish, serious anxiety, wounded feelings and social humiliation,
resulting in moral damages.
The Supreme Court did not give credence to Air Frances claim that the issuance
of a first class ticket to a passenger is not an assurance that he will be given a
first class seat. Such claim is simply incredible.
Culpa Aquiliana
Here, the SC ruled, even though there is a contract of carriage between Air
France and Carrascoso, there is also a tortuous act based on culpa aquiliana.
Passengers do not contract merely for transportation. They have a right to be
treated by the carriers employees with kindness, respect, courtesy and due
consideration. They are entitled to be protected against personal misconduct,
injurious language, indignities and abuses from such employees. So it is, that
any rule or discourteous conduct on the part of employees towards a passenger
gives the latter an action for damages against the carrier. Air Frances contract
with Carrascoso is one attended with public duty. The stress of Carrascosos
action is placed upon his wrongful expulsion. This is a violation of public duty by
the Air France a case of quasi-delict. Damages are proper.
HELD: 2: Yes. The testimony of Carrascoso must be admitted based on res
gestae. The subject of inquiry is not the entry, but the ouster incident. Testimony
on the entry does not come within the proscription of the best evidence rule.
Such testimony is admissible. Besides, when the dialogue between Carrascoso
and the purser happened, the impact of the startling occurrence was still fresh
and continued to be felt. The excitement had not as yet died down. Statements
then, in this environment, are admissible as part of the res gestae. The utterance
of the purser regarding his entry in the notebook was spontaneous, and related
to the circumstances of the ouster incident. Its trustworthiness has been
guaranteed. It thus escapes the operation of the hearsay rule. It forms part of the
res gestae.

6. Singson vs. Bank of Philippine Islands

FACTS: Singson, was one of the defendants in a civil case, in which judgment
had been rendered sentencing him and his co-defendants therein Lobregat and
Villa-Abrille & Co., to pay a sum of money to the plaintiff therein. Said judgment
became final and executory as only against Ville-Abrille for its failure to file an
appeal. A writ of garnishment was subsequently served upon BPI in which the
Singsons had a current account insofar as Villa-Abrilles credits against the
Bank were concerned.
Upon receipt of the said Writ of Garnishment, a clerk of the bank, upon reading
the name of the Singson in the title of the Writ of Garnishment as a party
defendants, without further reading the body and informing himself that said
garnishment was merely intended for the deposits of defendant Villa-Abrille &
Co., et al, prepared a letter informing Singson of the garnishment of his deposits
by the plaintiff in that case.

Subsequently, two checks issued by the plaintiff Julian C. Singson, one in favor
of B. M. Glass Service and another in favor of the Lega Corporation, were
dishonored by the bank. B. M. Glass Service then wrote to Singson that the
check was not honored by BPI because his account therein had already been
garnished and that they are now constrained to close his credit account with
them.
Singson wrote to BPI, claiming that his name was not included in the Writ of
Execution and Notice of Garnishment, which was served upon the bank. The
defendants lost no time to rectify the mistake that had been inadvertently
committed. Thus this action for damages.
ISSUE: WON the existence of a contract between the parties bars a plaintiffs
claim for damages based on torts?
HELD: NO. The existence of a contract between the parties does not bar the
commission of a tort by the one against the order and the consequent recovery of
damages therefore. Indeed, this view has been, in effect, reiterated in a
comparatively recent case. Thus, in Air France vs. Carrascoso, involving an
airplane passenger who, despite his first-class ticket, had been illegally ousted
from his first-class accommodation and compelled to take a seat in the tourist
compartment, was held entitled to recover damages from the air-carrier, upon the
ground of tort on the latters part, for, although the relation between a passenger
and a carrier is contractual both in origin and nature the act that breaks the
contract may also be a tort.
In view, however, of the facts obtaining in the case at bar, and considering,
particularly, the circumstance, that the wrong done to the plaintiff was remedied
as soon as the President of the bank realized the mistake he and his subordinate
employee had committed, the Court finds that an award of nominal damages
the amount of which need not be proven in the sum of P1,000, in addition to
attorneys fees in the sum of P500, would suffice to vindicate plaintiffs rights.
7. Radio Communications of the Philippines Inc. vs. Court of Appeals
FACTS: Loreto Dionela received a telegram via the Radio Communications of
the Philippines, Inc. (RCPI). However, at the end of the telegram were the
following:
SA IYO WALANG PAKINABANG DUMATING KA DIYAN WALA KANG PADALA
DITO KAHIT BULBUL MO
The said portion of the telegram was not intended for Loreto. Loreto sued RCPI
for damages based on Article 19 and 20 of the Civil Code which provides:
ART. 19.- Every person must, in the exercise of his rights and in the performance
of his duties, act with justice, give everyone his due, and observe honesty and
good faith.
ART. 20.-Every person who, contrary to law, wilfully or negligently causes
damage to another, shall indemnify the latter for the same.
In its defense, RCPI averred that there was no intention to malign Loreto and that
the attached message was an insider joke between RCPI employees which was

not meant to be attached. RCPI also disclaimed liability as it insisted it should be

held liable for the libelous acts of its employees.
Loreto however averred that the said message was read by his employees and it
affected greatly his business reputation. The trial court ruled in favor of Loreto.
The Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court.
ISSUE: Whether or not the Court of Appeals erred in holding that the liability of
RCPI is predicated under Article 19 and 20 of the Civil Code.
HELD: No. The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the appellate court. The
cause of action of private respondent is based on Articles 19 and 20 of the new
Civil Code as well as respondents breach of contract thru negligence of its own
employees. RCPI is not being sued for its subsidiary liability.
RCPI was negligent as it failed to take the necessary or precautionary steps to
avoid the occurrence of the humiliating incident now complained of. The
company had not imposed any safeguard against such eventualities and this void
in its operating procedure does not speak well of its concern for their clienteles
interests. Negligence here is very patent. This negligence is imputable to
appellant and not to its employees. RCPI should be held liable for the acts of its
employees. As a corporation, RCPI acts and conducts its business through its
employees. It cannot now disclaim liability for the acts of its employees. To hold
that the RCPI is not liable directly for the acts of its employees in the pursuit of its
business is to deprive the general public availing of the services of RCPI of an
effective and adequate remedy.