Chapter 3

Socio-cultural dynamics of Vietnam

Vietnamese culture at the organisational level
3.1 Introduction
The purpose of this chapter is to provide as much of an understanding of the
Vietnamese culture at the organisational level as is possible. However, it has been stated
that organisational culture does not form and develop independently of the national
culture, and the national and industry characteristics in which the organisations operate
(Webster & Sundaram 1999). Repeatedly, past research shows that national culture is
not something apart from organisations, but determines their very essence (Maher 1994;
Rhody & Tang 1995). Indeed, a study, which surveyed over a thousand managers from
US and Japanese firms, showed that corporate cultural values reflect those of the
national culture (Yeh 1995). Therefore, this chapter starts with an investigation of
Vietnams national characteristics and general cultural traits. The chapter seeks to
explore the countrys significant and unique socio-cultural factors their manifestation
in todays Vietnam with a brief presentation of their origins, the historical and/or social
circumstances that brought them into being and changes over time. A brief description
of Vietnams major historical events and the political, social and economic situation and
its development is presented to provide readers with a background understanding of the
traditional values and cultural traits of the Vietnamese people. The main areas of
investigation include:

major historical events of Vietnam

thought and religion

family and gender

young generation

political overview

economic overview

renovation (Doi moi) and the Open-door policy

socio-cultural changes following Renovation and Open-door policy

Each of these areas was studied with reference to and emphasis on how they might
affect the formation of and changes to Vietnamese traditional cultural values and the
recent socio-cultural dynamics of Vietnam. To some extent, the investigation provides a
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picture of the culture of the Vietnamese people and nation in a broad view. The chapter
does not attempt to present a comprehensive picture of the countrys society and
culture. It only seeks to cover the most significant and representative events, traits and
features that are deemed likely to exert an impact on the countrys IT implementation.
The investigation is followed by a brief discussion of some of the negative sides of the
culture, the current cultural policies and the Vietnamese perspective on culture and
technology. The second part of this chapter presents a closer view of the Vietnamese
culture at the organisational level. The materials used in this chapter came both from
secondary sources and the authors knowledge and understanding of her fellow
countrymen, her own motherland and home country, Vietnam.

3.2 Exploring the Vietnamese culture in light of the major historical

events and background to the current situation of the country
Major historical events
Vietnam boasts an age-long and special culture that is closely attached to the formation,
history and development of the country. Historically, some researchers have claimed
that the most important feature of Vietnams heritage is its struggles against foreign
aggression (Engholm 1995, p. 13). In fact, Vietnam has found itself entangled in wars
against foreign powers more often than any other country in the region. Wars not only
depleted resources but also deprived the country of many economic achievements.
While the Asian Miracles were concentrating on economic development in the 1960s
and 1970s, for example, Vietnam was still embroiled in one of the more tragic wars of
the twentieth century (Engholm 1995). On the positive side, this history of war has
helped shape the Vietnamese character. Long years of fighting against foreign intruders
have served to unify the country, fostering a sense of nationalism and pride.
One of the notable events of the countrys early history is the Era of Chinese
domination, which lasted for almost 1000 years. As a result, the Viet people and culture
were subject to constant Chinese influence and significant attempts of assimilation.
The Chinese bureaucrats and their indigenous collaborators would implant much of
Chinese high culture, including legalist bureaucratic techniques and Confucian ethics,
art, literature, and language (McLeod & Nguyen 2001, p. 16). Some Viet even
welcomed the chance to assimilate to what they considered to be a superior culture.
Even for the Vietnamese elite, however, admiration for Chinese culture did never
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include any desire for Chinese political control. Remarkably, the southern Viet (todays
Vietnamese) retained historical memory of the ancient Van Lang (ancient Vietnam)
independence and preserved Lac Viets cultural patterns beneath multiple layers of
Chinese culture. These continuities contributed to the repeated rebellions against
Chinese domination. Finally, in 939 AD, the Chinese were driven out of Vietnam,
opening a new era of Vietnamese independent monarchies. The Vietnamese dynasties
guarded their independence zealously, but did not abandon Chinese culture. They
applied the lessons of the Chinese regimes and began the process of bureaucratic
centralisation, implementing civil service examinations based on Chinese texts about
Taoism, Buddhism, and Confucianism. Confucian studies were linked to bureaucratic
appointment. Most dynasties adopted Chinese-style bureaucratic government,
Confucianism

and

political

thought.

Legalist

concepts

guided

bureaucratic

reorganisation to help the emperor control and tax his people. Confucianism justified
imperial authority by linking it to a Heavenly Mandate. Culturally, the overriding
influence of China has strongly shaped the countrys social, cultural and political
values. Confucian thought has long been a predominant feature of Vietnamese society
and continues to manifest itself today in many aspects of daily life, especially in human
relations and politics (Engholm 1995). Some of these values and features include:
family-orientation
Chinese Confucian model adapted to Vietnam Confucian morality and ethics,
integrity and uprightness
village culture, collective discipline (collectivism) versus (above) individualism
Mandarin system of governance from China
Under the monarchy, before the colonial conquest, Vietnams elite accepted Confucian
conceptions of society as comprising four ranked social classes: scholars (si), peasants
(nong), artisans (cong), and merchants (thuong). In theory, these ranks reflect each
classs contribution to society. Scholars provided ethical leadership and held office in
the monarchs service and, therefore, ranked highest. Second came peasants since their
labour provided necessary resources. Artisans ranked third as they made useful and
beautiful objects. Merchants were lowest because they were considered parasitic
elements who profited from exchanging goods produced by others. Of course, at its
pinnacle were the emperors and their relatives, who held positions by hereditary right or
marriage (McLeod & Nguyen 2001). This schema, which represented the Confucian
scholars worldview, to some extent, helped explain the organisation of social orders
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and the functioning of the governing mechanism. It also explained the society views on
certain values. For example, for centuries, the merchant class was considered petty,
undignified, low-class and even subject to contempt. The policy that facilitated
agriculture and restrained trade prevailed under most autocratic dynasties.
Confucianism not only paid little attention to benefits but also disregarded material
interests. On the other hand, education and scholarly pursuits have always been given
great emphasis and importance. In literature, while rich landlords were often depicted as
showy, crude, vulgar and ignorant people, the scholars were the picture of knowledge,
pureness, nobility and refinement.
The traditional Vietnamese character was formed from the agricultural society, which
was characterised by the village community with many of its primitive vestiges
retained. Farmers thoughts penetrated deeply into the Vietnamese agricultural society
and had many positive aspects that made up the typical features of the traditional
Vietnamese. Farmers were the central force in wars of resistance and uprisings against
foreign invaders. The village was the basic administrative and social unit of the society.
The village affairs were run by notables and the state rarely interfered. The state did not
deal with individuals and family were not directly taxed; the state kept records of how
many lived in each village and presented the notables with demands. The notables
assigned obligations to each family and collected the proceeds on the states behalf; the
state intervened only if villages failed to meet obligations (McLeod & Nguyen 2001).
Villages did enjoy some degree of self-government, which explained the autonomous
nature of the village culture. The very popular proverb in Vietnam says, The ruling of
the King has to yield to village custom (Phep vu thua le lang). The village culture
highly valued emotional ties and attachment to relatives and community as well as help
extended to each other especially to the less fortunate members. In this way, it fostered
the sense of collectivism.
Dynastic struggles led to civil wars during the sixteenth, seventeenth and eighteenth
centuries when the powerless Kings of Le dynasty nominally reigned while the Nguyen
and Trinh Lords fought, each claiming to be Les servant. A de facto partition resulted,
with the Trinh to the north of the eighteenth parallel and the Nguyen to the south.
During this period, Vietnam gained control over the Mekong delta and the first
Christian missions arrived. It was not until 1802 that the present Vietnam was united

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under a single ruler, Nguyen Anh, whose court was located at the central coastal city of
Hue (DFAT 2003).
Despite the continuation of the Nguyen dynasty, Vietnam saw increasing French
intervention from the 1850s. Spurred by Hue Court's persecution of French Christian
missionaries and their Vietnamese converts and by a desire not to loose South East
Asian markets to the British, France annexed the Cochin-China region (southern part of
Vietnam), their possession of which was recognised by Hue in a treaty in 1874. A treaty
of protection over Vietnam followed in 1883. By 1901, Vietnam, Cambodia and Laos
had fallen collectively under a central French administration, forming the French
Indochina (DFAT 2003). French colonial rule, for the most part, was politically
repressive and economically exploitative. The French developed a colonial bureaucracy
to replace traditional forms of authority. Two of the most radical changes that the
French instigated in Vietnam were the introduction of selective industrialisation and the
transformation of the traditional subsistence economy into a colonial economy based on
commodity and rice production, and export. With an immediate aim of increased
revenue from more efficient forms of taxation, commodity production, and export, the
French failed to foresee the growth of new social classes: most noticeably, a small but
increasingly volatile industrial proletariat, and an urban bourgeoisie. The new forms of
production led to an end of communal ownership of land and, for many, complete
separation from land ownership. The quest for a more efficient bureaucracy necessitated
some form of educational system. The French saw that the standardisation of language
and script (the use of Romanised script quoc ngu) would help achieve this, but they did
not foresee the extent to which these would serve equally well as instruments of
resistance and instruments for the development of nationalistic or patriotic ideas and
sentiments. Apart from changes which developed out of the introduction of French
administration, the Vietnamese also made many contributions to change. These were
facilitated in part by the Vietnamese tradition of receptivity to foreign influences and
foreign ideas. As presented earlier, China had traditionally been a source of influence;
Vietnam had accepted Chinas Confucian legal, administrative and moral codes. As the
French entered Vietnam, the Vietnamese were experiencing a structural breakdown, in
which traditional Confucian forms of authority and administration were being
questioned, and rejected. The French ideas of individualism, liberty, and equality began
to lure many Vietnamese scholars away from the concept of an ordered, king-centred
worldview, and the concept of a fate decreed by Heaven was replaced with the concept
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of a destiny shaped by the individual, and by the people as a whole. By this time,
Confucianism was fading and the Western culture started to penetrate into the country.
The period up to the end of French domination was marked by a cultural mix brought
about by two opposite trends i.e. of Europeanization and anti- Europeanization,
presenting the fight between patriotic culture and colonialist culture.
The French colonial system created a common feeling of injustice throughout the
country. Increasing taxes, combined with decreasing income (the French taxed family
heads heavily, directly and in cash) led to conditions of famine and served to foster
widespread opposition to the French. The search for a more satisfactory destiny for
Vietnam began, rooted in the poor economic conditions and political injustice that
prevailed under colonial rule. The first modern nationalist organisations in Vietnam
were formed by members of the urban middle class. This small group arose after 1900
and comprised clerks, journalists and lower-level administrators. Being Frencheducated, they admired the French conceptions of liberty, equality, and fraternity, and
were outraged by the difference between legal equality and democratic freedom in
France and the discrimination and repression in Vietnam. By 1930, the Vietnamese
Nationalist Party (Viet nam Quoc dan Dang) had staged the first significant armed
uprising against the French, but its virtual destruction in the ensuing French repression
left leadership of the anti-colonial movement in the hands of those more adept at
underground organisation and survival the communist party. Founded in 1930 by Ho
Chi Minh, the Communist Party of Indochina (CPI) was dedicated to overthrowing
colonialism and building socialism in Indochina. It was the ancestor of todays
Vietnams Communist Party (CPV). Marxist-Leninism, in the form developed and
introduced into Vietnam by Ho Chi Minh, was essential to the development of a new
Vietnamese mentality.
Despite the Japanese advance into Vietnam in 1941, a Vichy French administration
maintained authority until early 1945, when it was deposed by the Japanese, and a proJapanese government was appointed by Emperor Bao Dai. Following the Japanese
surrender, the Vietminh Independent League headed by Ho Chi Minh took control of a
number of northern provinces. After the abdication of Bao Dai, Ho Chi Minh declared
independence and the founding of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam on 2nd
September 1945. The relations between Viet Minh and the French completely broke
down by late 1946, leading to a 9-year war of resistance against the French, which
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ended with the French defeat at Dien Bien Phu in 1954. A cease-fire agreement at
Geneva in the same year provided for provisional division of the country at
approximately the 17th parallel. Vietnam was to be administered in the north from Hanoi
by the government of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam (DRV) and in the south
from Saigon by the government of the State of Vietnam, which had been founded by the
French under Bao Dai in 1949. The agreement also provided for the possibility in 1956
of national elections that would bring about the unification of the two zones of Vietnam.
The French, weakened and disillusioned after the defeat at Dien Bien Phu, were
prepared to implement the Geneva Accords. The United States, wanting to continue the
fight for a non-communist Indochina, knew that Ho Chi Minh, a hero due to his antiJapanese and anti-French leadership, would win a free election. The US pressed France
to leave Vietnam in 1955, a year before the elections were to occur; and used Bao Dai
and State of Vietnam to erect an anti-communist state in Saigon and controlling the
southern territory. The US provided economic aid to Bao Dai, encouraging him to
accept Ngo Dinh Diem an anti-French and anti-communist nationalist as prime
minister. Diem later overthrew Bao Dai to become President of the Republic of
Vietnam (RVN) (McLeod & Nguyen 2001). The following decade saw economic and
social restructuring in the north under the Vietnams Workers Party (formerly the CPI)
and the dominance of Ngo Dinh Diem in the south.
The Communist Party, leading the DRV, sought to reunify Vietnam under its authority.
Its attempts to destroy, and US efforts to save, the ruling of RVN constituted the second
Indochina war (referred to by Vietnamese as the anti-American resistance war and by
American as the Vietnam war) from 1960 to 1975. The United States stepped up its
military support of RVN and, at the height of US involvement, sent almost half a
million US troops to the South Vietnam. In 1964, the United States began to launch a
series of devastating air strikes on the North, which continued on and off through
January 1973 when peace talks were finally concluded. Two years later, the North
surprised the South with a massive offensive, which brought down Saigon on April 30th
1975. Saigon was renamed Ho Chi Minh city. Formal reunification of the country took
place in 1976 with the foundation of the Socialist Republic of Vietnam (SRV). In the
same year the Hanoi-based Vietnam Workers Party (Dang Lao dong Viet nam)
renamed itself Dang Cong san Viet nam, or Communist Party of Vietnam (CPV).

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In the late 1970s, relations with China soured over border disputes, the plight of
southern Vietnams Chinese, Chinas support to for the hostile Pol Pot regime in
Cambodia, and Vietnams orientation towards the USSR. Following the Vietnamese
involvement in Cambodia in late 1978, tension with China increased leading to fullscale conflict in February and March 1979. Sporadic clashes continued throughout the
1980s. Although the USSR-China rapprochement in the late 1980s and the withdrawal
of Vietnamese troops from Cambodia in 1989 helped ease conflict, tension between
Vietnam and China over competing claims in the South China Sea continued to the
present. Changing global circumstances and desperate economic conditions within the
country during the late 1980s forced Vietnam to make its first steps towards political
and economic Doi moi (renovation). In 1994, the United States lifted its economic
embargo against Vietnam, imposed after Vietnams involvement in Cambodia. In 1995,
Vietnam became the seventh member of ASEAN. In the same year, the United States
and Vietnam established full diplomatic relations, the two countries signing an
agreement to normalise trading relations in July 2000 (DFAT 2003).
For nearly 2000 years, the Vietnamese have been driving aggressors out of their
territory. Having successfully kept three foreign powers (Chinese, French, and
American) from controlling their country, pride, patriotism and nationalism are strong
components of the countrys psyche. These attitudes have been perpetuated by a
socialist education, which focused on the nationalist struggle, the victories of the
Vietnamese people, and the correctness of the ideology Vietnam adopted. One might
wonder, with a bitter history of wars against foreign powers, would Vietnamese people
show some degree of hostility or discrimination against foreigners, especially French
and Americans? Surprisingly, that is not the case. For the most part, the Vietnamese are
pragmatic people who do not feel the need to dwell on the past, and prefer to focus on
the betterment of their economic and social condition for the future. You will not face
recrimination or outward ill feeling because you are French or Americans (Engholm
1995). The Vietnamese perceive the anti-American war as only one of many of their
triumphs over foreign invaders. All they ever wanted was for their country to be free of
occupying forces and united. The focus now is more on economic development. The
Vietnamese people want to be friend and equal partner with other countries. They have
moved beyond the war and want to develop. In fact, the Vietnamese have shown to be
very friendly and hospitable towards foreigners. In business and trade, Western
partners, especially Americans, are enthusiastically welcome. The Vietnamese business
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circle does admire their high level of economic development, high technology and the
highly developed level of business, organisational and management skills. Most
Vietnamese today are quite open to foreign ideas and willing to learn from them. The
application of foreign skills and knowledge into Vietnam, however, is selective. In the
same way as with culture, the Vietnamese always try to adapt and localise foreign
components into their own practice.
Nationalism has perhaps been the most important source of the countrys unity. It has its
roots long before the arrival of the French and will likely continue into the future.
However, Vietnam no longer has an invader to provide fuel for nationalist sentiment.
More than likely, this sentiment will eventually manifest itself in the form of economic
competition with other developing countries in the region. Years of wars have also
made the Vietnamese a resilient, determined, and hardworking people. While some of
the work ethic (for example, being hardworking) was negated by the lack of incentives
under socialism before 1986, the Vietnamese are rebounding and are busy as ever.
Vietnams historical record indicates that the people can prevail even when the odds are
decidedly stacked against them (Engholm 1995).
It should be noted the Vietnamese culture is not entirely homogeneous throughout the
whole country. Differences in historical background between the North and the South of
Vietnam inevitably led to some cultural and political differences (not to mention the
minor ethnic culture). While some people might dismiss these as prejudice and
exaggerations, they hold a certain degree of merit. For example, the saying goes: The
South is richer, yet the North is more educated and The South is entrepreneurial, the
North is governmental. Understandably, people from the North are far more supportive
or tolerant of the Communist Party than those in the South. The North has a long
established and refined culture while the South has less years of tradition. People in the
South are generally more open to new ideas and willing to take risks. Of course, this
tendency can be traced back to the capitalist roots of the South and the strong influence
of the US prior to 1975. Most of the Southerners did not experience the war directly.
Northerners suffered years of bombing while the South did not. The South has always
been able to feed itself; the North has suffered hardships and periods of famine due to
the consequences of the wars and less favourable weather condition. As a result,
Northerners are distinguished for their thrift or their ability to save money relative to
those in the south. Southerners are said to flaunt their wealth by wasting money on
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unnecessary, extravagant goods, or at least to spend their money quickly on consumer

goods. To some extent, this tendency is reflected in the more cautious approach to
business by people in the North, and the faster pace of business dealings by people in
the South. Northern Vietnamese are characterised as more politically sensitive,
hardworking, contriving-oriented and risk avoiding. Southern Vietnamese consider
Northerners to be more regimented, stubborn, and cold. In contrast, Northern
Vietnamese often complain about the flashy, arrogant, informal behaviour of
Southerners. While Southerners may be outwardly more friendly, that does not
necessarily mean they are more trustworthy. Northerners can be more reserved and
blunt, but at least it is easier to understand their position. However, most of these are
sweeping generalisations and certainly cannot be applied across the board.
The structure of the Vietnamese cultural system is a multi-layered phenomenon
intertwining the native culture (Lac Viets culture) with the feudal culture influenced
strongly by East Asian Confucianism. In more contemporary times, there were added
the influences of the French, Socialist, and American systems. It has hence become a
melting pot of many civilisations and traditions. The cultural influences, which are
perceived as different, varying and even opposed and yet do not eliminate each other,
have become unified, co-existing, and creating for the Vietnamese a diversified and
multi-patterned culture. In the history of Vietnam, no room has existed for any
monopolising cultural institution. From a different point of view, however, there exists a
unified cultural identity and a spirit of belonging to the Vietnamese community. This
identity has been formed and consolidated throughout the long processes of historical
development in the work of both building and defending Vietnam. For the Vietnamese,
the longstanding and enduring task has been to preserve and maintain the cultural spirit
and traditional skills by creating resistance against imposition and assimilation which
serves as the foundation of national pride. In its openness to the external world, the
Vietnamese culture contains the ability to adapt, integrate and change the foreign
influences into inner ones. There is always seen the phenomenon of refracting,
restructuring and Vietnamising the cultural factors from other countries. This is why the
Vietnamese culture has always had the ability to adapt to situations and integrate into
new environments without losing cultural identity. Once these factors has been
internalised, the Vietnamese culture has the ability to mix and combine different and
even opposite factors in an equilibrium of counter weights. Throughout its history, the
identity of the Vietnamese traditional culture has formulated and consolidated national
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unity, sped up the historical process, and rounded basic traditions (patriotic nationalism,
the community spirit of the family-village-nation, the righteous way of life and
harmonisation with nature and with society, and with the psyche as seen in the virtues
of determination, diligence, religious tolerance and pragmatism). Of course, the
dialectical development has sometimes deformed these traditions in a negative manner,
but in general the Vietnamese have had high respect for the core of these exalted
traditions (Nguyen 1995).

Thought and religion

Vietnam is often described as a Buddhist or Confucian country. In addition to Animism
(the belief that spirits inhabit nature), which was common throughout Asia, most major
religions, including Buddhism, Taoism, Confucianism, Christianity, Hinduism, and
Islam have penetrated and are still followed in Vietnam. Historically, the spiritual and
cultural environment of Vietnam has always been characterised by acceptance and
harmony: the native culture linking with the various layers of external East Asian
Confucianist culture and Western culture the smaller tradition intermingling with the
bigger tradition. The Vietnamese people have grown to be appreciative of a peaceful
co-existence, being of multi-faiths and not too preoccupied with financial matters.
Traditionally, there has been a tolerant co-existence between the ideology of the
Confucian state with those of other religions (Buddhism, Taoism, Christianity) as
well as other less official folk beliefs. The Viet rarely accepted beliefs or practices
wholly as presented to them. They adopted and adapted foreign traditions, blending
them with indigenous beliefs and with each other (McLeod & Nguyen 2001). Almost
80% Vietnamese consider themselves Buddhists. Every Vietnamese family, however,
will also venerate their ancestors, and most homes have a family altar where prayers are
made and incense burned. As mentioned earlier, Confucianism entered Vietnam during
Chinese domination as the doctrine of state, imposed by Chinese officials. During the
early independence era, from the tenth until the founding of the Later Ly Dynasty in the
fifteenth century, Confucian scholars, associated with Chinas occupation, were reduced
to competing for influence with Buddhist monks; and Buddhism played a vital role in
Viet society and government, sometimes serving as the state religion. Buddhist monks
were literate and qualified for state service at a time when the loyalty of Confucian
scholars was suspected in light of the support that some had given to Chinese
occupation regimes. Buddhist monks also seemed less threatening to rulers, for their
severing of family ties and commitment to celibacy suggested that they would not covet
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the throne (McLeod & Nguyen 2001, p. 50). It was not until the Later Ly Dynasty in
the 1400s that Viet rulers adopted Confucianism as state ideology and initiated a
Chinese-style bureaucracy and legal codes. While the Vietnamese aristocracy clung to
Chinese Confucianism, the common people still embraced Buddhism, adapting it to fit
their own indigenous religions and worldview. At the state level, the use of Confucian
examinations for selection of officials encouraged men to master the Confucian
doctrines, and for the next 400 years, elite thought was more heavily influenced by
them. Reinforced by the state, Confucianism gradually reached the masses, and family
life was influenced by its ideas about male domination, ancestor worship, and filial
piety. Confucianism, bureaucratic procedure, and the influence of scholar-officials came
to a peak just before the country began to face Western imperialism.
Catholicism acquired a substantial following during French colonial rule and is the
second largest practiced religion in Vietnam. Under the colonial regime, many
Vietnamese priests resented subordination to missionaries, accusing Vietnamese
Catholics of following a foreign religion and supporting colonialism (McLeod &
Nguyen 2001).
By the 1920s and 1930s, Confucianisms influence had faded, and many Vietnamese
opposed to colonialism found Marxism an attractive alternative. Marxism-Leninism
served as a political religion, providing a historical explanation of Vietnams crisis and
promising liberation through revolutionary action. However, even today many
Communist Party members retain some attributes of the old Confucian scholars: a
paternalistic attitude toward the people based on a sense of mission as carriers of a
superior doctrine. The Vietnamese seem to still operate more on Confucian ideals,
putting emphasis on the virtues and character of individuals. Confucianism per se,
however, never again exercised its former influence on the Vietnamese public life,
despite the efforts of a number of scholars to restore it. Its residual effect can be seen in
the continuing importance placed on the family and education.

Family
The family in Vietnam nowadays seemingly straddles multiple worlds: tradition and
modernity; capitalism and socialism, commented McLeod and Nguyen (2001, p. 135).
From North to South, from countryside to cities, the changes that resulted from decades
of wars, the return of peace, and the opening of the country under Doi moi (Renovation)
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have affected the very foundation of Vietnamese society, the family. The Vietnamese
family nowadays is a reflection of the past with its deeply held values that encompassed
thousands of years of existence, and yet concurrently the Vietnamese family of the
twenty-first century has been shaped by profoundly different conditions that have
influenced the society for the last fifty years. Traditionally, the Vietnamese were
defined first and foremost by their families. The Vietnamese family (before the colonial
time) was shaped by three fundamental values and customs: filial piety (hieu), moral
debt or gratitude (on), and merit (duc). Filial piety, the most heavily stressed value,
encompassed the duties and obligations of children towards their parents. It bound the
son or daughter in an unbreakable parental relationship because of the moral debt or
gratitude that he or she owed and that could never be fully repaid. Throughout
childhood, Vietnamese children were taught the moral lessons of filial piety, obedience
and proper social behaviour through songs, saying and stories. The child also learned
from a very young age that the prosperity, wealth and happiness that he or she currently
enjoyed were the result of the merit accumulated by the ancestors through successive
generations of ethical observance and good deeds (phuoc loc ong ba de lai). Such merit
was considered to be an inheritance as solid and worthy as land or a house, and the adult
child was expected in turn to contribute to the amassing of such merit to be bestowed on
the following generations. Conversely, ones poverty, misery and unhappiness were
considered to be the result of some past evil deeds committed by some ancestors, and
thus it was ones duty to make amends to prevent ones own child from experiencing
suffering and misery in the future. Filial piety, moral debt or gratitude, merit
accumulation (tich duc), and their obligations were projected beyond the parents and
ancestors to ones relatives, friends, superiors, village, ruler, state, and people. Hence,
the pre-colonial Vietnamese paid enormous attention to such values as loyalty, respect,
and gratitude towards all these entities. A married couple lived with the husbands
father, mother and unmarried siblings. It was expected that the eldest son would care for
his parents in their old age. The patriarchal character of the Vietnamese family was
reflected in the fact that it was the eldest son in the family who had the duty to
perpetuate the practice of ancestor worship (tho cung ong ba). Privacy was not highly
valued, and aunts, nieces, grandparents and grandchildren could be found sharing the
same house. Seldom did the son moved away to a land distant from his ancestral home.
He was defined by and attached to his birthplace, land, and village, which had been
those of his ancestors. Were this to happen, he would become that most unfortunate,
rootless person, without a hearth, without a tomb to call his own (McLeod & Nguyen
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2001, p. 138). Many of these values and customs are still upheld in the Vietnamese
family today, although not in its original strict and absolute forms.
The family life in todays Vietnam
Some of the traits that characterised the traditional Vietnamese family started
undergoing change during the French colonial time when Western values began to seep
into Vietnamese society, starting from the top down. However, these changes
predominantly affected the urban population, especially the educated upper class, which
had more opportunities to be in contact with Western civilization. Inspired by the ideas
of liberty and individualism, this group of young educated Vietnamese fought to break
through the Confucian-style strict and rigid family ties and rules.
Decades of wars, the opening of the country, the demands of a fast-paced market
economy following the Renovation, and the ever increasing intrusion of globalisation
have affected the Vietnamese family greatly, stretching its traditional fabric to the limit
while leaving some core values intact. The multi-generational and the patriarchal
aspects of the traditional Vietnamese family are less prevalent nowadays, particularly in
the cities. The nuclear, two-generation family has been increasingly prevalent.
However, the government two-child policy a national effort to stem the population
explosion has encountered strong resistance as the result of the traditional patriarchal
influence (the need to have a male heir) as well as the desire by young couples to
perpetuate their own images and achieve their ambition through their children. The
customs and values that once defined the Vietnamese family such as ancestor
worship, filial piety, obedience, loyalty, the primacy of the ancestral home, and the
extended patrilineal and patrilocal family have suffered from the intrusion of the
modern industrial world (McLeod & Nguyen 2001). It seems that the ties that used to
bind all the members of this entity together have become somewhat looser, with the
priority given to the more immediate members (parents and children, husband and wife,
and grandparents) while ancestors recedes further into the past in terms of familial
memory. Although parental authority remains strong, it is expressed less in decrees than
in advice and discussion with the children. Respect for parents, concern for the care of
aging parents as well as the related notion of family honour remain at the core of the
Vietnamese value system. The manifestations of family life and ties might be more
flexible and expectations might have diminished, however, great value is still placed on
the family. A survey study jointly conducted by the University of California-Irvine and
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the Hanoi Institute for Human Studies of 20 provinces and cities in Vietnam in 2001
revealed that: 99 per cent (of those surveyed) think mothers and fathers should be
respected regardless of their qualities, while 97 per cent state that one of my main goal
in life has been to make my parents proud (Do 2001).

The young generation

The term young generation in Vietnam often refers to those under 30 years of age who
were born after the early 70s and have grown up mostly during the time of peace. Most
of them know nothing of the previous years of armed struggles, sacrifice, commitment
and tragedy except via the accounts of elders. Many of them, however, still retain vivid
memories of severe economic deprivation during the late 70s and the 80s when their
parents often found it difficult to feed and clothe their families. Since about 1990, the
young generation has encountered the full weight of the market economy and the opendoor policy, which influence the way they view the surrounding world, interact with
parents, teachers, colleagues or friends, and make day-to-day or longer-term choices in
life (Marr 1996). Since Doi moi, the government and Party have been very careful in
nurturing the young generation in the right direction by insisting on core values such
as patriotism, heroism, self-sacrifice, respect for elders, frugality and hard work, and
attempting to control the flow of information that floods the country, particularly
through the Internet. However, these efforts have not been able to slow the Vietnamese
youth in its race to embrace the outside world with all of its positive as well as negative
traits. Young people have quickly absorb Western ideas not only about market economy
and the Western way of doing business but also about self as an individual rather than
as an appendage of a larger entity; about love, marriage, sex and about latest fads in
music and fashion (McLeod & Nguyen 2001). They have aspirations and tastes that are
similar to those of youth the world over, very different from those of their parents
generation, a generation of war. The Marxist-Leninist ideology and normative system,
which dominated Vietnam until the mid 80s, are now ignored or even ridiculed by
many young people. An implied substitute has been the get rich quick mentality a
burning desire to make money by applying available savings, energy, social connections
and relevant experience to a wide variety of entrepreneurial initiatives (Marr 1996).
Their main concern is job and career-related. This is expressed in terms of global
market awareness, which guides their choices of career often business and/or
computer-related and English-based. They are keen to gain new knowledge, skills, and
favour styles and technologies from the West. Being exposed to and dazzled by the
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new, they have a desire to replicate and catch up. For many young people, it is
important to possess a driving will to accomplish. They are working hard towards a
better future, making sure they have adequate education and training to prepare
themselves for the ferocious competition for higher-paid and more prestigious jobs.
Most of the youth nowadays would refuse to follow their parents path of war-time
sacrifice and hardship and instead seek the most elusive attainment of happiness and,
particularly value the rapid accumulation of material wealth manifested in the
acquisition of consumer goods (especially the modern and Western-brand ones) such as
mobile phones, sleek motorbikes, large-screen televisions, washing machines, houses or
apartments (McLeod & Nguyen 2001). Although sometimes being accused by older
generations as being too pragmatic and being loose on the traditional values and virtues,
they are often seen as the most progressive force of the population whose will,
dynamism, initiatives and innovativeness will make a great contribution to the success
of Doi moi and ultimately, to the development of the country.

Political overview
Vietnam is a one-party communist state. In its political structure, Vietnam has been
profoundly influenced by the policies and mechanism of its big brothers: China and
USSR. Its bureaucracy is inherited from the Soviet ministerial system. Its economy is
centrally governed by central and local arms of those ministries. The Communist Party
is charged with moral and political indoctrination and social education. Political power
lies with the Communist Party of Vietnam (CPV) headed by the Party Secretary
General. Since it is the only party in the country, the word Party in Vietnam is now
always written with the capital P and means the Communist Party of Vietnam. Its peak
organ, the fifteen-member Politburo, holds authority over the implementation of social,
economic, labour, defence, security and foreign policy. The Politburo is elected by the
Partys Central Committee. The Secretariat consisting of some Politburo and some
Central Committee members provide day-to-day policy advice and policy
implementation. The National Assembly, which was lately granted an increase in its
power and independence, is designated as the highest representative body of the people
and the only body with the legislative powers. However, the CPV remains the dominant
political force with the entire bureaucracy and the armed forces being subordinate to the
authority of the Party. The Vietnams Communist party has been reaffirming its stance
against the formation of a multiparty system and will not allow the dilution of the
Partys leadership in the style of the Soviet program Perestroika, which it views as a
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huge mistake. The Party, however, admitted that bureaucracy, abusive power and
corruption have surfaced among not a small section of officials in the Party and State
apparatus (Engholm 1995, p. 36).
During the late 1970s and early 1980s, Vietnam implemented centralised economic
planning, nationalisation of industry and agricultural collectivisation. This model has
been tried in the northern Democratic republic of Vietnam in the 1950s and 1960s and
failed to meet the growing populations needs, but Soviet bloc aid had allowed the Party
to not realise that failure or learn its lessons. From 1978, the same program was
implemented in the South. Industry was nationalised and run by the State Planning
Commission, which determined the production of each sector and each plant. It
coordinated the exchanges among units to ensure that raw materials were available and
that products had buyers. State-appointed managers were told what to make, where to
buy raw materials and at what price, to whom to sell, and how much to charge. To
succeed, managers had to meet quotas; if a factory ran a deficit, the state would make it
up. Since managers did not face market competition, they were not motivated to
maintain quality. Substandard products were accepted by quality inspectors for bribes.
Industrial products were too old-fashioned or shoddy for sale in global markets,
constraining exports. The USSR provided two billion dollars annually, but most of this
went into large-scale projects, many of which were troubled by mismanagement and
corruption. Agricultural collectivization met with similar results. Farmers were told
what and how much to produce; state bought rice at fixed rates for distribution at
subsidised prices. This was in line with the socialist goal that the state should provide
for all, but the systems failed to provide for the people both in the North and the South.
As the farmers could keep only 20 per cent of the harvest with the rest going to the
state, they have little incentive to produce beyond their subsistence needs. Increments in
production generated by producers diligence or creativity could be obtained by the
state by manipulating quotas and pricing. Unable to keep pace with a growing
population, the state had to import rice from other Asian countries, but was unable to
ensure decent nutrition. Queues formed at state stores to buy scarce rations.
Malnutrition became chronic (McLeod & Nguyen 2001).
In 1986, at a time of economic crisis following years of economic stagnation resulting
from the effects of wars and unsuccessful economic programs, the Communist Party
embarked upon a program of limited market-based economic reforms (also referred to
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as Doi moi or Renovation. These reforms were aimed at a shift towards market
economy with socialist orientation. Under Doi moi, the private sector was permitted to
exist in a limited capacity. There was also some decentralisation of economic planning
as well as a greater acceptance of market forces as the determinant of prices and
production. Foreign investment was encouraged and agriculture deregulated to allow
individual family farms. Vietnamese living standards rose appreciably, particularly in
urban areas. Growth, however, started to slow down in the late 1990s and further reform
is needed to stimulate the economy (DFAT 2003).
Decision making in Vietnam is shared by national and provincial government and
agencies, slowing down the political process and encouraging a cautious approach to
major policy issues, including those affecting business and trade. Vietnams
bureaucratic centralism model of decision-making implies that policies will be
formulated and decided upon at the central level, and implemented accordingly at the
provincial level. In practice, the direction of authority between the central and
provincial government bodies might not be so evident. As the provincial authorities are
delegated to implement policies in accordance with the localities special
characteristics, implementation style usually differ by province and locality. Policies
implemented by provinces may only approximate the States original policy and in
many cases will diverge significantly. In many cases, the State would sanction local
adaptation of centrally promulgated policies, in other cases, the policies themselves
might be so general as to necessitate provincial engineering. Depending upon the
province, local authorities can wield a substantial amount of power and establish
policies independent of the central government as long as they do not radically defy the
principles of existing laws. Doi moi has only contributed to the autonomy of provinces
by further decentralising the decision making process and cutting off local authorities
from central subsidies (Engholm 1995).
Since the end of 1997, there have been a number of instances where members of the
Party and the general population have been prepared to express dissent. The Party has
responded by introducing measures to address the concerns of the general population
(e.g. pursuing administrative reform within the Party and extending benefits of
economic reforms to the rural areas) and by projecting itself as the protector of
Vietnamese culture. The August 1999 Central Committee Plenum reflected these
themes, acknowledging that ineffective organisation and a cumbersome political
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structure, particularly in state administrative management, has been responsible for

reducing the efficiency of the (Party) leadership and management. The Party also
launch a campaign of criticism and self-criticism in May 1999, designed to purify
itself and to stem internal corruption and mismanagement (DFAT 2003, p. 5). As a
result, a number of high-ranking officials were dismissed, disciplined or removed from
position.
In general, the CPV has managed to achieve a significant amount of economic reform
while still maintaining power and political stability. Part of the reason for this is that
most Vietnamese people are better of today than they were 15 years ago. However, few
are yet at the point where they have the luxury to be politically active. For right now, it
appears to most Vietnamese that the pursuit of wealth is more important than political
change. Once the Vietnamese have attained a certain level of comfort, it is possible that
political issues will be at the forefront of social activity. Another factor inhibiting
Vietnamese political action is the historical acceptance of institutions and respect for
leaders. However, respect is something that must be deserved it is not automatically
obtained. Therefore, if the government leaders continue to steer the economy correctly,
criticise their own shortcomings and take measures against corruption, the Vietnamese
people will have little incentive to engage in politics more than economics. This does
not mean that the Vietnamese are not politically aware or politically sensitive.
Vietnamese people to have definite opinions about their government and politics, but
they may not be anxious to share them. Most people in Vietnam will not speak openly
about politics. After the fall of Saigon, the government implemented a Soviet-style
informant system wherein people were forced to reveal secrets about the political
activities of their neighbours. Walls have ears is a popular saying cited by the people.
People watch their backs if they feel they are saying something a little too critical.
Suspicion and reserve of strangers and outsiders are a big factor in human relations in
Vietnam. Fear of informants and submerged resentments are the root cause of another
core personality trait of the Vietnamese businessperson unwillingness to trust those
outside his or her family. The informant society that permeated everyday life for much
of the 1950s, 1960s, 1970s and even the 1980s has left a profound impact on the
Vietnamese. As a result, political discussions rarely take place on the street. Instead,
such discussions are often heard among friends and family members in the home. When
the Vietnamese do discuss politics, they can be critical. Since the introduction of Doi
moi, people are more outspoken. In fact, from 1987 to 1989, media control was
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loosened and the press was encouraged by the government to be the voice of the masses
in exposing complaints about corruption and bureaucracy. However, faced with the
rapidity with which the press and the public had taken to criticism of the government,
the Party imposed new censorship regulations and shut down several newspapers and
magazines in 1989. From 1991, the CPV moved to increase its control over the media
and pressed for guided information to avoid the negative effects of pessimistic articles
on society. Political pressure commented Engholm (1995, p. 43) like many things
in Vietnam, is not making a linear progression downwards; rather, it oscillates between
light and heavy depending on the security of the government and the CPV.

Economic overview
As presented earlier, in the years following the reunification of Vietnam, the
government of the new Socialist Republic of Vietnam implemented on the South the
Soviet-style, central planned economic policy that had been the model in the North
since 1954. Its failure, marked by a period of serious economic crisis, forced the
Vietnamese leaders to abandon it and reorient their way towards a policy of economic
reforms. Reform efforts were initiated as early as 1979. However, the half-hearted
reform measures pursued throughout the first half of the 1980s were clearly
unsuccessful in containing inflation and reducing serious fiscal imbalances. In response
to the deteriorating economic situation, a fundamental change in the government
economic policy was ultimately reflected in the resolutions adopted by the Sixth Party
Congress meeting in December 1986 when the policy of Renovation (Doi moi) was
officially introduced. The reform measures focused on the following policy areas:
Call for the economic and financial independence of state-owned enterprises,
reduction of state subsidies and privatisation of state enterprises which have
suffered serious and chronic financial losses
Price liberalisation moving the entire economic system from centrally
determined prices towards market determined prices
Ownership diversification encouraging the private sector, providing for a
partnership between the state, cooperative and private sectors of the country.
Economy being opened to commercial relations with foreigners encouraging
foreign investment in several forms
Strengthening of both agricultural incentives and institutional support for
agriculture in a significant reversal of the past trend of support for industry
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 Fundamental reform of the financial system separating central banking functions

from those of the newly created commercial banks; implementing adjustments in
official exchange rates and some liberalisation of foreign exchange regulations (St
John 1993)
Reform efforts were further stepped up in 1989 with the introduction of an extensive
reform package, abolishing most subsidies and price controls, lifting most trade
restrictions, and restructuring the banking sector (The Economist Intelligence Unit
1999). New reform measures introduced were very impressive as they were both
comprehensive and well coordinated. A major setback in this period was the collapse of
the Soviet Union. During the 1980s, the Soviet Union was Vietnam's largest single
trading partner as well as its largest creditor and aid donor. As the Soviet Union began
to crumble, its economic relationship with Vietnam deteriorated and its support slowly
faded (Englund 1988). The collapse of the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe meant the
loss not only of political allies and economic aid for Vietnam, but also its largest
market. In addition, the return of tens of thousands of contract workers from the Soviet
Union and Eastern Europe only made the prevailing unemployment situation worse. By
1991, Vietnamese leaders were convinced that Vietnam could no longer count on
political, let alone economic, support from the Soviet Union and that the vigorous
pursuit of economic renovation was the best survival course for the Communist Party of
Vietnam (Williams 1991 and Wain 1991). From the early 1990s, the economic reforms
initiated in 1986 and expanded after 1989 were having an increasing positive impact on
the Vietnamese economy. High economic growth and development was achieved with
real GDP growth averaging 8% annually from 1990 to 1997. Vietnam's inflation rate,
which stood at an annual rate of over 300% in 1987, fell steeply to less than 4% in
1997. During this same period, there was a three-fold increase in investment and a fivefold increase in domestic savings. Agriculture production doubled, transforming
Vietnam from a net food importer to the world's second largest exporter of rice (Bureau
of East Asian and Pacific Affairs 1998). Economic reforms also resulted in a significant
increase in foreign trade, which represented about 80% of GDP in 1997-1998, and
foreign direct investment inflows, equivalent to about 15% of GDP in 2003. Growth,
however, slowed in the late 1990s (GDP growth at 4.8% in 1999) due to the combined
effects of declining foreign and domestic investment resulting from the regional
economic crisis of 1997 and the loss in the momentum of growth as the impact of the
first generations of reforms were fading (DFAT 2003). Structural reforms have slowed
during the past few years and investors have expressed increasing concern about the
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ambivalence of policy reforms and lack of transparency. Some researchers argued that
Vietnams key problems are internal (Pierre 2002). According to the Australian Trade
Commission (Austrade 2004), apart from a strong protection for domestic firms,
especially state owned enterprises (SOEs), the main deterrents to trade and investment
in Vietnam include the lack of comprehensive and transparent legal system; restricted
land usage rights; complex taxation and foreign investment laws; continued corruption
in infrastructure projects; and poor state of financial system. It is suggested that
potential benefits of Doi moi changes are close to being exhausted and further reform is
needed to stimulate the economy (DFAT December 2003). The growth rate has picked
up (6.8% GDP growth in 2001, estimated 7% in 2002, and 7.1% in 2003) but this is
mostly due to high earnings from crude oil exports (roughly 48% of state revenue in
2002) (Austrade 2004). In an effort to improve the investment climate, the Vietnamese
government is speeding up its privatisation program and revising its investment laws.
150 of 5,600 state owned enterprises were privatised or equitised in 2002. The target is
to reduce the number of SOEs to about 2,000 by the year 2005 (Austrade 2004).
As a long-term objective of the Open-door policy accompanied with Doi moi, Vietnam
is committed to global economic integration through participation in APEC, the
ASEAN Free Trade Area and WTO accession negotiations. Since joining ASEAN in
1995, Vietnam has seen its exports to ASEAN countries grow an average 23-25% per
annum. ASEAN-initiated foreign direct investment (FDI) accounts for almost 30% of
total FDI. The US-Vietnam Bilateral Trade Agreement, ratified in December 2001, is
considered by many to be the first step towards WTO accession. The participation in
ASEAN Free Trade Arena also means that Vietnam will have to reduce many of its
tariffs to less than 5% by the year 2006. Membership of the WTO will require a more
level playing field and more transparency in the economy (DFAT December 2003).
The overall systematic economic reform, according to the international communitys
opinion, has been limited by both Vietnams communist ideology and a section of a
bureaucracy which views reform as a threat to the status quo. Economic reforms have
stalled in some parts of the country because powerful political and bureaucratic interests
feel their access to government largesse threatened, and because the Party fear losing its
support should it proceed all the way with liberalisation (Bureau of East Asian and
Pacific Affairs 1998). On the other hand, the Vietnamese people display an admirable
blend of a stoic acceptance of life as it is and a steadfast faith that there are always good
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prospects (St John 1993, p. 304). This mind-set will serve them well as the country
continues its transition from a command economy to a market-oriented system. In
addition, the survival of a nationalistic and clear-minded intelligentsia capable of
forming the basis for a technocracy to support sound government decision making
presents a positive factor for the countrys development (Fforde 1993, p. 48). The more
prestigious newspapers (e.g. the Vietnam Economic Times) have often shown that the
analytical independence of this group has been retained. And the Vietnamese culture
has always highly regarded the patriotic intellectual by showing them respect and/or
placing them in positions of certain level of influence and power (Fforde 1993).
Another positive factor is the countrys human resources. Its young and disciplined
population grew up in a culture that gives priority to education (Vietnam has a 92%
literacy rate) and possesses a strong work ethic (Pierre 2000). The increasing number of
Vietnamese with a Western education will also help make a difference, although it
should be noted that quite a few of them tend to leave government service when they
return from overseas. Despite continuing difference between North and South, the
Vietnamese people are united in their nationalism and committed to the ideology of
modernisation (Geib 1999).

Socio-cultural changes following Doi moi (Renovation) and the Open-door

policy
While attempting to describe the most prominent socio-cultural traits of Vietnam and
Vietnamese people, the author frequently faced with a quandary: between the longstanding traditional traits and the traits brought about by the recent surging of the social
dynamism which ones should be described as typical and representative for the
Vietnamese character? They are sometimes contradicting, and, in some cases, even
opposite extremes. On the one hand, the author cannot dismiss those traditional values
and socio-cultural traits that have prevailed for decades or centuries as not
representative or typical of the Vietnamese people. In fact, the majority of these still
exist among a considerable section of the population. However, since Doi moi, together
with rapid and, sometimes, radical economic and political changes, peoples behaviour,
mentality and values (especially of those living in urban areas where they are most
likely to be affected by Doi moi outcomes) have shown amazing signs of changes,
adaptation and dynamism. If one is to study the Vietnamese social/cultural phenomena,
one might come to experience doubts: whether the old values still hold? The following
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section will give a brief discussion of some social and cultural changes in Vietnam
following 18 years of Doi moi.
It is widely agreed that Renovation and the Open door policy have brought about
profound changes to Vietnam in many different fields: economy, politics, science and
technology, culture and society. Nowadays, many foreigners who have been to Vietnam
can clearly see the social changes as compared to before 1986: the tempo of life is more
active, the exchanging and receiving of information is more open-hearted and broadminded, the urban life reflects the rise of private economic sectors: private shops and
consumer goods everywhere, the signboards of the limited and joint-venture companies
are bold and dazzling. One can even see the names of private schools from elementary
to higher education in the daily and weekly newspapers. New buildings have
mushroomed, some constructed by the state, but most by the private sector. There is
also a boom in the land and real estate values in most urban areas. On a deeper level,
socio-psychological changes of the Vietnamese people, with the experience of the
market mechanism in the last 18 years, have been profound, sensitive and also
observable to varying degrees in a mixture of positiveness and negativeness.
Traditionally, the basis of the Vietnamese society was characterised by the way of life
of the small peasants, communal spirit and village democracy. Following Doi moi, with
the introduction of the market economy, each person seems to be released from the
constraints of traditional communal ties and hurries to compete for a suitable position,
creating a surge in individual dynamism. Historically, a strong communal spirit was an
inherent and salient attitude in the mind of Vietnamese who lived in a long lasting
agricultural society. This dominant attribute has always in a strong force in the nation,
and the individual consciousness did not develop, the individual was diluted into the
community. In the period of central planning and subsidies before Doi moi, this salient
attitude continued to be brought into play and it maintained the egalitarianism which
was basic to the village democracy. Individuals had few chances to affirm themselves.
Consequently, with the coming of the market mechanism, in the competition for
livelihood and development, individual liberation began to take advantage of new
opportunities. The bustling economic activities are both push and pull forces for the
potential development of each person. In the old days of centralised planned economy
and state subsidy, 'individual fortune-making, and above-average standard of living
were hardly acceptable and seemingly immoral and inadmissible by common sense'
(Nguyen 1996, p. 72). Most people were poor and accepted to be poor as every one else.
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The 'poor but honest' type of person was highly regarded. In today's Vietnam, the
psychology to make fortune, to overcome poverty and the fear of being poor, inferior
and slighted loom large. From the attitude of giving their mind to food and clothes, now
the people have thought of the accumulation in precaution against 'rainy days', old age
and mishap. From the worry of how to accumulate enough food and clothes, now the
people want to have delicious food and beautiful clothes, their household appliances
must be modern, their houses must be bigger. In the time of the market economy, the
man's longing for much wealth has spouted: having land to build houses, purchasing
gold, jewels and expensive living facilities both for use and for savings. This is a
prominent special psychological character in the period of market economy, a need of
all individuals. One of the positive influences of the new mentality and attitude of the
Vietnamese people is the manifestation of dynamism and creativeness in economic
activities and the heightening of the responsibility of the individuals and groups before
consumers for the quality of their products. The market mechanism only admits
dynamic and innovative people who are aware of the demands of the market and the
consumers in order to produce adequate quantity of products with high quality and
attractiveness, using the guideline of 'many, rapid, good and cheap' and applying
science, technology and entrepreneurship management. The mechanism of Doi moi
have indeed aroused, revived and heightened the initiative and innovative role of many
managers, executives, direct producers and every worker.
The market mechanism of Doi moi has pushed the birth and self-assertion of a
generation of Vietnamese businessmen and entrepreneurs (especially the young ones),
who are determined and able to make fortune with their genius and resources of the
country, who are ready to associate and compete with foreign businesses in a move to
gain a share in the world market. Today, business and trading activities hope for a
change of value criteria in culture. Whereas in the old days people used to regard
private commerce as anti-value, businessmen and persons making wealth legitimately
are now regarded as a specimen of personality to be cited and learned from (Do 1996).
It should be noted that the change in the concept of values varies according to age
groups and strata of people. Old and new values concurrently exist. Some values that
are very sacred to aged persons and are adored and respected by them might be not
highly priced or attractive to the young generation. Collectivism, which was formerly a
powerful value (still regarded highly by older people), is now less referred to than
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individual values, such as individual benefits, individual rights and interests. There is, in
fact, a re-adjustment and re-evaluation of the relationship between the collective, the
community and the individual. To the young generation, career, job and productivity
amount to money and benefits, and hence create values that are real and tangible. In the
market economy, anything that is illusory and abstract receives less concern than the
values that are near at hand and visible. Young people are quick in adapting to the new
mechanism and the new pace of life. Although some of them may show the extremist
thinking and short-sightings, in general, the Youth dynamism contributed much to the
high tempo of social life. In relation to that social dynamism, the ability of Youth, in
general, and the appearance of young entrepreneurs, in particular, deserve special
attention. Some of these young entrepreneurs may have little experience and basically
no training in market-based business principles, however, by means of their youthful
energy, they have made noteworthy advances. They are the ones who will be important
force for the new stage of development.
As legitimate fortune-making is recognised as a universal value (Nguyen 1996), the
status of government administrative officials in society and the value of various types of
work and career also change significantly. Before Doi moi, when the private sectors
officially did not exist, people used to dream of getting a foothold in the government
staff (lifetime employment guaranteed unless serious fault committed), something
regarded as a real value, a top criterion to assert the status of a person in society.
Nowadays, the youngsters look for stable and high-income jobs no matter if in or out of
the government organisations. Jobs in certain areas such as commerce, business,
telecommunications, airlines, import-export and jobs in joint-ventures with foreign
partners or foreign-owned companies are becoming increasingly more preferred.
Furthermore, not a small number of people with high expertise and high level of
education voluntarily quit their jobs done for years in the state sector for work of their
own choice or even for settlement in foreign countries to make a fortune, to secure
wealth for themselves and their families.
The 'Open-door policy' under Doi moi has broken the closed-door mentality, stimulating
foreign-oriented psychology, intensifying the possibility of joint-venture and
association, absorbing foreign investment, management skills and technology for
economic purposes, bringing wealth to the individual, the family and the country,
relieving Vietnam of poverty and backwardness. At the government level, policies are
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formulated to promote international cooperation and global integration. Companies and

organisations strive for closer association and cooperation with foreign countries and
overseas Vietnamese. The foreign-oriented attitude is demonstrated in everyday life
the preference for and the increasing use of foreign made consumer goods, foreign
fashion, foreign languages, foreign music, arts, movies and lifestyles
The market mechanism has also stimulated the potentialities of the country and its
people. Resources, ranging from land and manpower to the management competence
of the Vietnamese, have been awakened and brought into full play. The atmosphere of
social psychology in every unit and locality of the entire country has become more
animated, bustling and enthusiastic. Stagnation, monotony and hardening have been
gradually overcome. The living power, tempo, style, standard and condition of each
person and various social strata have been improved and raised step by step (Tran
1997).
From a different perspective, it should be noted that the market mechanism under Doi
moi has also exerted some negative influences on the country's social and cultural scene.
Competitions under the pressure of the market and the rush to make money have
resulted in accelerated social stratification the increasing differentiation between the
rich and the poor (Tuong 1997). One cannot fail to note the group of people who fell
into more destitute conditions. Those were vulnerable persons who had no capacity to
protect themselves when facing sudden accidents, who were disable and/or lacked
necessary skills or means for earning a living, who were previously subsidised by the
agricultural cooperatives or state factories and enterprises. Obviously, a fact, which
must be accepted, is that social stratification (versus the traditional long-lasting social
egalitarianism) created the motivation for production and economic growth. The market
mechanism picks and chooses very quickly the talents, which can be fit to it. Under this
process of screening, ideally, each person can or must be placed in the jobs and social
positions that correspond to their capability. In order not to be eliminated each
individual has to persevere and compete. The competition promotes the strive to
improve one's prospects by gaining new knowledge, new skills, obtaining necessary
qualifications. People rush to business, business management, IT, and English language
classes. An overseas education is a dream of many young people.

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The shift to the market economy also causes a number of values to be deformed or overinflated. For instance, everybody recognises the value of money earned in a legitimate
way, yet, desirous of making wealth easily and quickly, not a few people have sought
every means to earn money unlawfully and even rashly in disregard of morality. The
social psychology has changed from that of paying little attention to money to a
psychology of esteeming the money and even money devotion. The market mechanism
has roused the psychology of pursuing maximum profits at all costs in disregard of law,
morals, kind-heartedness and reasons. The thirst for super profits tends to increase
smuggling, tax evasion, production and circulation of fake, imitation and substandard
goods and other tricks in business activities, harming the interests of other people,
provided that more profits are secured for the individual and his group.
As mentioned earlier, in the current transitional period in Vietnam, old and new values
concurrently exist, influencing people's perception and behaviour in different ways.
Some Western researchers argued that these Asian values nowadays are based on
double standards. For example, those claiming to believe in filial piety are in fact
accused of being worried by young people not supporting their parents; those claiming
the West is materialistic are accused of being engaged in enriching themselves (Milner
1999). The author believes that these phenomena, in fact, are manifestations of the
different degrees of change in the concept of values among different age groups and
strata of people. In other words, these types of phenomena reflect the different values
held by older and younger generations, rural and urban population, and traditionaloriented and modern-oriented people. In the struggle between the old and the new,
some academics have taken on a critical attitude towards the traditional values and
psychology. Phan and Vu (1994, p. 217), for example, stated:
The communal spirit has led to negating individual psychology, levelling personality to
egalitarianism, localism, and factionalism. Sentimentalism has led to irrationalism, illogicality,
lacking in objectivity and legal spirit. The high assessment of the spiritual value and slight of
material factor has led to idealism and voluntarism. Patriotism and communal love has led to the
tendency of digging in, clinging to villages and native places, and no courage to strive for
discovery. Empiricism has led to low development of reasoning thought, honouring the thinking of
'making oneself a situation thanks to one's seniority', conservativeness, short-sightedness,
stagnation, vainglory, arbitrariness, demanding, and paternalism. Abstract horoscopic thought has
given rise to the habit of talking instead of working, empty arguments, inferiority of organisation
and real action, liability to personality cult, dogmatism and superstition. Diligence, endurance
have led to inferiority of technical thought, lack of dynamism, and slow renovation.

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For a number of Western researchers, some of the Confucian-based values, which once
were attributed as a factor of the economic tigers' successes, now seem to have gone
wrong. The attachment to the family becomes nepotism. The importance of personal
relationships rather than formal legality becomes cronyism. Consensus becomes wheelgreasing and corrupt politics. Conservatism and respect for authority become rigidity
and an inability to innovate. Much-vaunted educational achievements become rotelearning and a refusal to question those in authority (Milner 1999).
In the context of aggravated social evils and increasing influence of Western values, the
Vietnamese government has been placing greater emphasis on preserving its national
culture and identity. The goal has been set to develop a 'modern culture imprinted with
national identity' (Communist Party General Secretary Le Kha Phieu July 7, 1998).
The General Secretary said that the process of building a culture with a Vietnamese
identity is actually the process of building and developing human resources. Le also
stated that such a culture 'should allow open exchange with other cultures, absorbing
what is essential in other cultures, adapting selectively the quintessence of mankind's
cultures to create a harmonious combination of modernity, national and international
traditions'. The ten year development program for culture, submitted by the Ministry of
Culture and Information and approved by the Prime Minister in 2003, also aims to 'build
a healthy cultural environment while maintaining and promoting cultural heritage and
creating new cultural values' (United Nations Vietnam December 2003, p. 8). Some
cultural values and traits to be promoted in the process of industrialisation and
modernisation under Doi moi include: the thirst for knowledge, industrial work-style
and modern thinking, activeness, dynamism and innovativeness in production and
business, learning from advanced, developed industrial countries, overcoming backward
habits and negative aspects in the psychology of the Vietnamese petty producer,
upholding long-standing traditions such as heroism, bravery, eagerness, optimism,
diligence, thriftiness and compatriotic feelings. It is also necessary to build and
consolidate new ways of life and habits in production and business. More emphasis has
to be placed on labour discipline, industrial process, civilised way of life, simplification
of administrative procedure, observance of laws and regulations. For this reason,
persistence, control, emulation, commendation and reward, severe and proper
punishment must be attached to the implementation of the above tasks (Tran 1997).

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Vietnamese culture and technology: a changing perspective

Vietnam has been considered to be one of the backward countries in terms of science
and technology (Le 1995). One could blame various wars inflicting devastation to the
country for this situation and of course there are economic factors which provide
equally powerful explanations or 'excuses'. However, it is more revealing to examine
how Vietnamese culture accommodates science and technology. Traditionally, the
Vietnamese believe that there are three worlds: the physical world which is concrete and
soul-less; the human world which involves people immediately around an individual as
well as those in a much wider community; and the spiritual world which seems to be
remote but also very close to the human mind. The Vietnamese people have particularly
had a strong traditional respect for human and spiritual values. They found it less
attractive to explore the physical world than the spiritual one, as they believed the inner
strength of an individual can bring peace, harmony and happiness to life (a belief that
was strongly influenced by the prevailing Buddhism), whereas knowledge of the
physical world does not necessarily lead to the achievement of happiness and
sometimes it could even lead to the destruction of civilisation. This spiritual world can
interfere strongly with any attempts to explore the physical world in which science and
technology owe their existence. Under the influence of Confucianism, the Vietnamese
mind was 'more easily attracted to social philosophy than to physics and chemistry' (Le
1995, p. 6). Different from the West, which emphasised the significance of intellectual
development, the Vietnamese traditional Confucian-style education emphasised the
human world in terms of the moral obligation of individuals to the community at large
(Le 1995). It is, therefore, understandable why science and technology were not
promoted in the Vietnamese society in the old days.
Since Doi moi, in the context of a highly competitive world, the role of science and
technology has been increasingly seen as decisive for the country to fulfil its
industrialisation and modernisation targets. At the organisational level, it is becoming
more and more obvious that technology is an important factor in determining an
organisation's survival, development and competitiveness. While seeing the importance
of technologies, most managers still do not fully understand their capabilities.
Moreover, in the eyes of Westerners, Vietnam has a somewhat 'fraught' approach to
technology acquisition (Engholm 1995, p. 173). Vietnam undervalues intellectual
know-how, and this is reflected in its technology transfer regulations, which restricts its
overall value in an investment contract. Engholm (1995, p. 173) stated that the
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Vietnamese want state-of-the art technology, but do not want to pay for it. This
mentality might have underpinnings in the country's historical experience with
innovations. Vietnam has an agricultural culture in which technological innovations
traditionally took place in the open and were immediately made communal property. To
imitate another's innovation was the highest compliment, while the selling of
proprietary was unknown (Engholm 1995). In the actual implementation of technology,
this attitude is often reflected in the reluctance of managers to go to any great length as
far as the recognition of financial resources required for the project is concerned.

3.3 Vietnamese culture at the organisational level

The concepts of organisational behaviour and organisational culture are new and
unknown to most Vietnamese including academics and researchers. Books and papers
written by foreign authors on Vietnamese business practice and guides to working with
Vietnamese in Vietnam often attribute Vietnams unique traits to the countrys culture
in general, without making reference to the concept of organisational culture.
Vietnamese organisational culture could be considered a new and unexplored land and
there have hardly been any researches or studies on this topic. In fact, an extensive
search by the author of both domestic and foreign databases and libraries did not return
a single research that was entirely dedicated to this subject. The materials and
information used in this section were drawn from different researches on various related
topics. A significant part of the discussion was presented from the authors experience,
understanding and knowledge of the Vietnamese organisations, having been a
researcher, and having herself worked in the system. It could be stated that the
uniqueness of the Vietnamese organisational culture originated from the countrys
distinctive characteristics. The Vietnamese organisational behaviour, to a large extent, is
a reflection of the countrys culture at all different levels, demonstrating the national,
community, village, family and individual values, customs and practices.
As presented earlier, prior to 1986, Vietnam followed a centrally planned economy in
which the Central State Planning Committee determined both financial and human
resource allocation and utilization in the country. This state organ developed strategies
and plans for the whole national economy. It should be noted that by this time the
private sector did not officially exist. The whole system was organised in many
bureaucratic layers based either on geographical area and locations (e.g., national,
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provincial, district, village) or industries and functions (such as Ministry of Heavy

Industry, Ministry of Education and Training (MOET)). Each organisation belonged
somewhere in the Vietnamese system: for example, trading companies belonged to the
Ministry of Trade, academic institutions to MOET or Ministry of Science, Technology
and Environment. Each higher level organisation acted as an umbrella or patron
organisation for the lower level ones by means of not only direction and dictation but
also care and protection. None of the state owned companies and organisations stood by
itself or had an independent status. In a downward direction, the government plans and
strategies were implemented in each state-owned enterprise and performance targets
were distributed to each production unit following the strict bureaucratic and
hierarchical management system. With regards to the production and business
operations, the Government dictated the enterprises on what to produce, how much to
produce, where to buy the raw materials and where to sell the products and at what
price. Similarly, human resources policies and planning in each organisation were
determined by the government (more specifically, by the patron organisation often one
level up the system). This patron organisation (co quan chu quan) appointed the
management positions in its subordinate (truc thuoc) organisations, determined how
many permanent employees (bien che) an organisation was allowed to have in each
department or function, and allocated a payroll fund (qui tien luong) figure for each
financial year. Under such a system, managers in the state enterprises used to strictly
comply with orders coming down from the higher level organisations, having very little
room to exercise their own leadership, management competencies and styles. This
system had a direct impact on determining the prevailing culture in most organisations.
Some of the features of Vietnamese organisations before the Renovation period can be
briefly described as follows:

Mechanistic control devices: punch clocks, periodic observation, quantity

control and some quality control (in manufacturing and production units)

Unclear responsibility/authority definition

Low degree of decentralisation/delegation

Paternalistic autocratic leadership style

Medium level of trust and confidence in subordinates, people were treated as

men of the system

Personnel policy often not stated, not transparent or regulated within an

organisation
106

Top-down communication pattern

Training often not effective or relevant

Both monetary (bonus) and psychological (certificate of merit or award)

motivation

Employee morale not always high

Low absenteeism

Low productivity (Truong & Nguyen 2000)

Participation and initiatives not encouraged

Emphasis on uniformity and respect for order and hierarchy

Informal and casual interrelationship among fellow workers

Lifetime employment and low wages

It could be stated that the Vietnamese general social and cultural practices and values
have been extensively brought into and vividly demonstrated in the workplace
environment at both personal and organisational levels. One of the prominent features
of the command economy the old state employment allocation system, which ordered
personnel to take up specific jobs at specific locations, had a significant impact on how
the organisations were formed and operated. At the government level, the State
Planning Committee coordinated the demand and supply of personnel between the
personnel supplier, namely the Ministry of Education and Training, which was in
charge of colleges, universities, vocational training schools and the general schooling
system, and the personnel receivers which were organisations, companies, enterprises of
other ministries and functions. Since the private sectors did not officially exist, until
1986, most 'proper jobs' were in the government organisations. In the centrally planned
mechanism, the typical system can be described as follows: an education either at a
college, university or a vocational training school would lead to job appointment in
government companies or organisations. Upon the completion of tertiary education, the
graduates were ordered (or waited to be ordered) to take up jobs in specific
organisations at specific locations. The government acted as an overseeing umbrella
organisation any job changes, either from one organisation to another or from one
location to another, were considered 'internal transfers' and had to be ordered or
approved by the government at different levels. School leavers normally had to look for
and apply for jobs themselves. This was one of the reasons why everyone regarded
tertiary education as a must for a guaranteed future. The term bien che, which means a
107

permanent job in a government organisation, also means the permanent employment

status, with which one can stay in the organisation for life unless he/she makes an
exceptionally serious mistake. Pay rise and promotion were determined either by length
of service and seniority or by recommendations or orders from higher levels of
government where, very often, the connections factor had a role to play. On the one
hand, these practices did not offer much motivation for workers to be hardworking or
innovative. In fact, before Doi moi, underemployment was widely prevalent in many
state-owned organisations. Workers, who were paid for a 48 hour work week, might be
working only a few hours a week because of insufficient work or ineffective
management. Worker productivity and efficiency in the state sector could be said to be
very low (Gates 1995, p. 27). On the other hand, this mechanism, coupled with the low
wages, seemed to offer some explanations as to how such a system was prone to
nepotism, favouritism, and corruption. If one had some powerful connections, a decent
job at a lucrative organisation, located right in the capital or in some big city would be
waiting for him/her upon the completion of tertiary studies. Connections and money
were even more important in cases when one did not have a tertiary education. Until
early 90s, one could never find an advertisement for any jobs in any newspaper. Even
now, the number of jobs publicly advertised is very limited mostly low-level jobs,
jobs in the private sector or with foreign companies and organisations. Since Doi moi,
jobs in the private sector and in foreign-invested enterprises have become more
attractive in the eyes of many people especially the younger generation, mainly due to a
popular perception that they offer better salaries and better chance of self-enhancement;
e.g. learning the new working style and way of doing business. Thus, managers of state
owned organisations constantly have to fight brain drain as their staff leave for higherpaid positions (Engholm 1995). State organisations sometimes use legal and extra-legal
measures to discourage their best workers from seeking employment elsewhere,
including labour regulations, commitment agreement, and transfers from one state job to
another (Gates 1995). Due to the official hassles that a state worker might have to
experience should he or she wish to change companies and, considering the risk of loss
of perks, trained labour in the state sector does not seem to take up to other growth
opportunities as readily as it should (Engholm 1995). More emphasis has been placed
on productivity and efficiency in state organisations since the introduction of Doi moi
policies of economic and financial independence of state-owned enterprises and
reduction of state subsidies. Although still enjoying certain entitlements and privileges,
the state owned enterprises now have to really compete in the free market to survive.
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The government decision to either dissolve or privatise (equitise) those state owned
enterprises that have suffered losses for a long period of time also provides state
organisations with a further push towards efficiency and financial viability. The policies
have seen certain degree of improvement in state owned organisations in terms of
management style and market-oriented business approach.
Another prominent feature of Vietnam is that its society is comprised of an
interconnected network of personal relationships, all of which carry obligation on both
sides. These mutual obligations are the underpinnings of social order in Vietnam, so
they are taken very seriously (Smith, Esmond & Pham 1996). In fact, with regard to the
Vietnamese business culture, a Western author even made a somewhat bold statement
that Relationships are everything in Vietnam (Gillin in Engholm 1995, p. 211). In
social life, the personal relationships can be just friendships which are pure, and noneconomical or materialistic. In the business setting, these relationships are often referred
to as calculative relationships since they are mutual and economically-oriented
between two parties. In the organisational life, this characteristic of the Vietnamese
culture is demonstrated by the popular phenomenon of ekip, crudely translated as
click or gang. Within an organisation, if one managed to get himself in the right
ekip, one might be at ease that his career would be on the right and speedy path.
Organisational politics personal relationships: who knows who and who belongs to
which ekip was an important factor of organisational life. This phenomenon was
associated with the practice of informal communications networks. Each ekip formed its
own information and communication channels. Being in the right ekip could guarantee
ones chances of economic gains and/or career advancement. There were ekip in
power and shadow ekip. The power and success of an ekip depended not only on the
power and success of the ekip members but also, to a large extent, on who in the higherups or other relevant bodies that the members knew and associated with. This
phenomenon, in many cases, resulted in a popular problem of inadequate and
insufficient experience and qualifications in the workplace. Many managers lacked the
required understanding, knowledge and management skills. In many cases, the criteria
for selection and appointment of people in management positions were not based on
qualifications and experience. During the post-war periods, the practice of rewards and
compensations for war achievements widely prevailed. Very often, appointments to
managerial positions (ranging from low-level supervisor to the general director level)
were a form of political reward and compensation for past loyalty to the Party. The level
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of hierarchy to be appointed was measured and determined by either the number of war
medals, years being a Party member, or years being exiled or confined in the
imperialist prisons (nha tu de quoc). In fact, according to some prominent Party
leaders, imperialist prisons were great school for learning communism. The number of
years being imprisonment by the enemies was often highlighted in a leaders biography
as a noble achievement and qualification. The motto of ex-soldiers now engaged in
economic activities was upheld for a long time. These practices resulted in an armylike management style and culture in many organisations. The political arrangement in
a state organisation was similar to that of the countrys political system. The two most
powerful figures in an organisation were the general director and the secretary of the
organisations Communist Party unit. The few people who were more competent in
business operations and management often held the deputy or assistant positions. The
technical and professional people belonged to the technical or some specialised
departments and often not involved in management. Since Doi moi, there have been
changes in recruitment and employment policies in most organisations. Apart from
permanent employment, contractual employment has been introduced and become
increasingly popular. Although Party membership is still an implicit criterion for
management positions in most state organisations, Party units are almost non-existent in
private or joint-venture entities. Qualifications and experience have been given more
weight in selection and promotion. The emergence of a new generation of younger
business managers, many of whom are well-educated and overseas trained, who are
seen as more assertive, initiative and dynamic, has been a noteworthy and positive
impact of Doi moi.
The Vietnamese village culture has also exerted some influence on the organisational
practices. In the modern society, the popular folklore proverb The Emperors rule stops
at the village gate (Phep vua thua le lang) is translated into the fact that (business)
units within the same organisation are highly and, sometimes, dangerously autonomous.
As a result, there is very limited sharing of information, data and systems between units.
Different units or departments often have separate and independent systems and
databases. Organisational communication is largely by word of mouth, taking place at
the numerous meetings and face-to-face contacts. Informal communication in the form
of little chats in the corridor, lunch or coffee out together or riding-home-together trips
on motorbikes and bikes (most Vietnamese go to work by motorbikes and bicycles)
accounts for a significant part of information circulation in the organisational life. This
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practice seems to go hand in hand with the ekip system with a universal understanding
that information is power and, therefore, important news is passed on among the ekip
members accordingly. The meetings and face-to-face contacts are, in fact, the core of
the Vietnamese social interactions. Memos, reports (except formal compulsory reports
to the higher authority organisation; e.g. quarterly and annual reports) and paper trails
are not abundant. Vietnamese also tend to be indirect in their way of communication.
They often use proverbs and parables that tell seemingly irrelevant anecdotes,
describing context while spiralling subtly towards the issue at hand. The indirectness is
a question of tact not of sincerity (Borton 2000). Directness is only used among people
you are close to and know well. When it comes to communication, Vietnam is
considered to have a high-context culture where the situation, place, attitude, nonverbal behaviour, and gestures are sometimes more important than words spoken in a
meeting (Smith, Esmond & Pham 1996). Many Vietnamese find non face-to-face
interactions disconcerting. As a result, it is more difficult for them to develop and
maintain relationships via long-distance technology such as phone, fax, and Internet.
Although email has been increasingly widely used in Vietnam as a quick and effective
means of communication most Vietnamese are still more comfortable with face-to-face
interaction than with email as far as building relationships are concerned.
As mentioned earlier in section 3.2, family values are still predominant in the
Vietnamese society. In the organisational setting, this feature is visible in the way many
Vietnamese business managers show holistic concerns for the workers including their
family. They are not only concerned with their employees at work but also are
interested and sometimes involved in the family life of their employees and usually try
to provide social support when necessary. Many organisations have an unwritten policy
of giving priority to recruiting employees children to work in the company. It is also a
practice that funds are created to help employees in difficulty to overcome their
financial problems (Truong & Nguyen 2000). By different ways and means, this
paternalistic orientation continues to show in many Vietnamese organisations.
It is often said that Vietnam, like some other Asian countries, practices consensus
decision making. In the Westerners view, this practice might seem cumbersome
(Borton 2000) as it seems to take forever to reach a decision. In many cases, decision
making might take longer due to the Vietnamese peoples cautious approach to business
and/or the lack of commercial knowledge and financial tools to analyse and assess a
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business proposal or plan. In an organisational setting, however, it should be noted that

consensus decision making meant consensus among the leaders, managers and people in
authority only. The lower-level management and employees often do not have any
influence or involvement in the decision making process. In fact, most information is
often kept among the top management circle and the employees only get to know
certain news when it is necessary for the organisation to have their participation in the
implementation. A notable feature of the old system is the practice of information
hoarding in both inward and outward ways. One the one hand, for a long period of
closed-door and isolation, books, documents and literature from outside the country
were rare to be seen in Vietnam (except some limited general and pro-socialist materials
from the socialist bloc). Materials from the West and the capitalist countries were
considered to be anti-revolutionary and reactionary. As a result, the censorship system
used to be very active. In the early days of the introduction of Internet and email into
Vietnam, there used to be a section of the Ministry of Interior Affairs in charge of
reading emails to make sure that undesirable information would not be permeated into
the country. Since the number of emails has grown well out of hand, it is no longer
possible to check every email but it is believed that emails and information from
selected (often highly sensitive) sources and websites are still under constant
censorship. On the other hand, it is a popular practice in Vietnam that information
(especially that of negative and sensitive nature) should not be disclosed to outsiders of
a particular unit, group or organisation. This also holds true at the national level. For a
long period of time, ordinary people were in the dark about most of what was really
happening. Until a large campaign of free speech and free press in the early days of
Doi moi, many scandals were securely hidden. In the days of the criticise and selfError! Not a valid link. campaign initiated by the Party, many people were feeling both

astounded and indignant at discovering new facts almost every day in the newspapers
and on the mass media. The practice of cover-up, in a way, served as a security
measure since it helped minimised the chance of people developing undesirable,
reactionary or subversive attitude towards the government. Either at the national or at
organisational level, the purpose of the non disclosure practice was two-fold: (a) not to
stain the image or undermine the performance and capability of the authority in the eyes
of the other people (especially when the information is likely to provoke those feelings)
and, (b) to protect special favours and privileges of a group of people.

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In the words of Hofstede (1980), the Vietnamese culture can be described as high power
distance, high collectivism, moderate uncertainty avoidance and high context
(Swierczek 1994 in Truong & Nguyen 2000, p. 61). The high power distance
characteristic is presented in the daily life of Vietnamese as well as in the workplace. In
both settings, the Vietnamese follows a strict system of order and hierarchy. In the
family, sons and daughters have to obey parents orders. In organisations, there is a
clear superior-subordinate relationship. Titles, status and formality are very important in
the Vietnamese society. Respect is paramount and is shown according to ones age,
seniority and rank of authority. The seniors and the ones in authority are not to be
contradicted or publicly criticised. Command respect is equally important. A
respectable person (especially leader, manager) should be polite, calm and command
respect without being domineering or patronising. In business dealings, one should
never show emotion and try not to show any evidence of impatience. Losing ones
temper or becoming angry causes one to lose face and is considered a demonstration of
immaturity. In the Vietnamese perception, age carries experience and wisdom and being
respectful and solicitous to the elderly is a core virtue. The other side of this respect for
age is a difficulty in taking young people seriously, especially when it comes to having
business expertise or making important decisions. Although this attitude seems to have
slightly shifted as Vietnam has been exposed to the relative youth of many foreign
business executives (Smith, Esmond & Pham 1996) and due to the increasing number of
young Vietnamese being educated in modern business and management principles in
Western countries, it should be recognised as an important characteristic of the
Vietnamese culture. Collectivism a long-standing feature of the Vietnamese culture is
characterised by tight social frameworks and self-functioning communities. People in a
particular group are expected to look after their members, protect them, and provide
them security in return for their loyalty. Vietnamese people place great importance on
fitting in harmoniously and avoiding conflicts and direct confrontation. In Vietnam, the
ultimate goal of all personal interactions is harmony, not discord. Consequently, a direct
refusal or negative answer is considered impolite and crude. Rather than openly
disagreeing, the Vietnamese will often say It is a bit complicated, Let us consider
further or maybe when they really mean probably not. From a Vietnamese
perspective, this is not considered to be untruthful; it is simply the means for
maintaining a harmonious relationship. Further implications of this Vietnamese cultural
feature is demonstrated when it comes to criticism and censure. Vietnamese consider
face an individuals public image extremely important. Any open public criticism
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or unfavourable remarks can result in a loss of face and cause severe embarrassment.
For this reason, criticism is best handled privately and, if possible, in an indirect way.
Similarly, praising and rewarding an individual, out of the group context, might be
embarrassing and likely to be counter-productive. Public rewards are best given to
groups, not individuals (Smith, Esmond & Pham 1996). Until very recently, collective
responsibility has been a popular practice at almost all levels and, therefore, successes
or failures are to be attributed to groups. Asserting individual capabilities and
contributions is considered to be boasting and arrogant and would often create
resentment among co-workers. Although this cultural characteristic may change over
time (since the introduction of Western business principles, the motto of dare to think,
initiate and act and dare to take accountability (dam nghi, dam lam, dam chiu trach
nhiem) has been admiringly upheld), it remains prudent to criticise or to offer individual
rewards in private. Vietnamese culture displays a moderate degree of uncertainty
avoidance. People in society as well as in organisations often feel threatened by
ambiguous situations and try to avoid these situations by aiming for greater job stability,
establishing more formal rules and rejecting deviant ideas and behaviour. Although
Vietnamese are quick to adapt they take a considered approach to fundamental change.
Change takes time to be absorbed. Following each major change there is always a slow
and almost stagnant period for adjustments, assessment or just for a chance to catch a
breath (Borton 2000, p. 29) before more radical changes can take place.
Ownership diversification and the opening of the economy to foreign investments two
of the major changes under Doi moi have resulted in the formation and development
of new economic sectors (private, joint-venture, and foreign owned) in addition to the
long existing state sector. This has brought about significant changes and diversity to
the face and the content of the Vietnamese organisation. Differences in management
styles and organisational cultures between the sectors are understandable given the
differences in their length of existence, control system and mechanism, business
approach and direct influences of owners. A recent research by Truong and Nguyen
(2000) indicated that the bureaucratic style was most widely used in the state enterprises
where the old central planning and ministry patronage/subsidy system had been the rule
of the day. The familial style ranked second among the state sector organisations,
showing the patriarchal influence in the Vietnamese tradition culture on business.
Managers in the state sector tended to adopt a paternalistic approach in their
management, by keeping close supervision over their subordinates, giving a great deal
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of direction to ensure the work was done properly and, at the same time, providing less
freedom and delegation to their subordinates in deciding their courses of action and
seldom consulting for opinions before making decisions. In the private sector, where
most organisations were more recently established and often of smaller size, the familial
style was found to be especially popular. Many of these enterprises were developed
from family workshops or family stores. Members of the private companies often had a
close relationship, as they were often relatives or friends of the owners. The managers
sometimes preferred to build their companies as a big family. Paternalistic leadership
style was also widely adopted; however, more attention to the interests of subordinates
was shown by the private sector managers. At the same time, more concern seemed to
be centred on productivity of workers as much closer supervision was exercised by
managers in this sector compared to the state and joint-venture sectors. In jointventures, where managers and employees were found to be generally younger,
participative style prevailed. Most of the Vietnamese in these organisations were keen
to learn from their foreign business partners on how to manage business in a market
economy. They were more willing to encourage horizontal coordination and
cooperation, build open communication system, stimulate teamwork and allow some
degree of employee participation in the decision-making process. Bureaucratic style was
surprisingly found to be also widely used in joint-ventures. This might be due to the fact
that most Vietnamese partners of joint-ventures were state owned enterprises, which
still retained their inherent organisational characters and management styles even after
joining a foreign partner in a business venture. The study also revealed that only around
half of the managers surveyed across all sectors agreed that entrepreneurial style would
be the most appropriate in their situation. In terms of decision-making practice, the
common characteristic of most Vietnamese organisations in all sectors is that
management usually did not promote employees participation in the process. On the
positive side, many managers tried new methods of management and technologies, such
as upgrading the computerisation and communication systems, to enhance effectiveness
in

decision-making.

The

decision-making

mechanism

in

most

Vietnamese

organisations, however, could be said to be typically top-down. According to the study,

Vietnamese managers seemed to begin to appreciate the importance of open
communication in the market economy. Two-way communication was introduced in
some companies, which allowed employees grievances to reach the top management.
However, interdepartmental relations did not seem to be going very well and conflicts
of interests between departments were found to exist in the organisations under study.
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The control mechanism in most Vietnamese organisations was found to be based on

means of close supervision. It is widely believed that managers should not trust their
subordinates and should closely control their work. However, the concept of control on
both ends, that is, on the process and on the final outcomes, has been increasingly
emphasized. In conclusion, the study stated that all organisations, be they state-owned,
private or joint-venture, should
come up with a more people-centred management style and practice, using human resource
development as a channel to create a critical mass of competent and motivated workforce. Such a
change in attitude and behaviour should encompass restructuring of key components of an
organisation such as its structure, people and culture (Truong & Nguyen 2000, p. 75).

Most of the features of the pre-Doi moi organisations are still present, although in
different degrees, in todays organisations, especially those belonging to the state sector.
It is not surprising that some of these traits might be demonstrated in many jointventures and private sectors organisations as well. A state-owned organisation often
constitutes one of a joint-ventures partners. Except for the younger generation (under
30 years of age), most of the private businesses owners and workers had worked in the
government system for a long time before starting up or joining a private sector entity.
In addition, Vietnam is a country in transition and a prominent characteristic of
transitional societies is the presence of the old and the new in every aspect of life.
This holds true with regards to the values and practices prevalent in Vietnamese
organisations where many traditional, socialist and capitalist values are
concurrently active. On an individual level, it should be noted that not all Vietnamese
are alike. Some are more Western while others are more traditional (Borton 2000). The
transition to the market-based and open-door principles has brought about different
reactions and adjustments by different individuals and generations. Most of the young
people quickly embrace the new business principles, new way of life and show certain
degree of foreign-oriented attitudes. The older generations seem to approach change in
different manners. Some see the advantages and immediate benefits of the new and, in
contrast, realised the disadvantages and the negative aspects of the old regime and thus,
reacted somehow in an extreme manner by upholding almost all the new and
condemning all the old. Some others, also realising the benefits of the new but at the
same time believing that the old system has got its own advantages, take up a more
cautious approach by using almost a dual-standard system of applying either or both
the old and the new selectively, depending either on the areas under consideration or
on the contemporaneous circumstances. One section of the older generations shows a
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reluctance to change and seem to be deeply rooted in the old. These people tend to
associate the new with the emerging social evils and the negative impacts of Doi moi
on the countrys socio-cultural life. All these factors contribute to the diversity and the
blending combination of the Vietnamese organisations cultural characteristics.

3.4 Conclusion
An amalgam of influences undoubtedly shapes the culture exhibited by organisations. In
the case of Vietnamese organisations, there has the fusion of the pre-Doi moi and postDoi moi cultural and other developments that has left its imprint on organisational
culture. Hence, pre-Doi moi, although Vietnamese culture was strongly influenced by
traditional Chinese civilization, the struggle for political independence from China
instilled a strong sense of national identity in the Vietnamese people. Nearly 100 years
of French rule (1858-1954) introduced important European elements, but the
Vietnamese still attach great importance to the family and continue to observe rites
honouring their ancestors, indicating the persistence of tradition. It can be said that there
were three main layers of culture overlapping each other during the history of Vietnam:
the local culture, the culture that mixed with those of China and other countries in the
region, and the culture that interacted with the Western and the Socialist cultural
systems. In the current renovation of Vietnam (post-Doi moi), traditional culture still
plays a very important role. Today, Vietnam is witnessing a great synthesis and
integration of the various cultures present in the Vietnamese society: tradition with
modernity, Oriental values with Western values, preservation of national culture with
international integration. By its impact on the organisational culture, the national culture
influences the development process by facilitating or hindering the adjustments,
regulating the differences between the institutional structure (the ideology and the
realities of socio-economic life) and the public psyche, coordinating growth and
development, balancing technology with the humanities and bridging economic renewal
with political renovation. Hence, organisational culture has been and will continue to be
moulded by national (as well as international) influences. Aspects of these elements will
be used to underpin the conceptual framework and develop the research design in
Chapter 5, explain/interpret the findings related to organisational culture in Vietnam in
Chapter 6 and inform the recommendations in Chapter 7.

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