CHANGE OF NAME; CORRECTION/CANCELLATION OF ENTRIES

ELEOSIDA vs. CIVIL REGISTRAR OF QC

FACTS: On January 30, 1997, petitioner Ma. Lourdes Eleosida filed a petition before the Regional Trial Court
of Quezon City seeking to correct the following entries in the birth certificate of her son, Charles Christian: first,
the surname "Borbon" should be changed to "Eleosida;" second, the date of the parents' wedding should
be left blank; and third, the informant's name should be "Ma. Lourdes B. Eleosida," instead of "Ma.
Lourdes E. Borbon." In support of her petition, petitioner alleged that she gave birth to her son out of wedlock
on May 24, 1992; that she and the boy's father, Carlos Borbon, were never married; and that the child is
therefore illegitimate and should follow the mother's surname. The petition impleaded the Local Registrar of
Quezon City and Carlos Villena Borbon as respondents. On April 23, 1997, the trial court issued a notice of
hearing. On June 26, 1997, the trial court issued another order setting the date for the presentation of evidence
on July 23, 1997.
RTC Ruling: On August 25, 1997, the trial court motu proprio dismissed the petition for lack of merit. It ruled:
It is an established jurisprudence that, only CLERICAL ERRORS OF A HARMLESS AND INNOCUOUS
NATURE like: misspelled name, occupation of the parents, etc., may be the subject of a judicial order
(contemplated under Article 412 of the New Civil Code), authorizing changes or corrections and: NOT as may
affect the CIVIL STATUS, NATIONALITY OR CITIZENSHIP OF THE PERSONS INVOLVED.
ISSUE: Whether corrections of entries in the certificate of live birth pursuant to Article 412 of the Civil Code,
in relation to Rule 108 of the Rules of Court may be allowed even if the errors to be corrected are substantial
and not merely clerical errors of a harmless and innocuous nature
HELD: Yes, Rule 108 of the Revised Rules of Court provides the procedure for cancellation or correction of
entries in the civil registry. The proceedings under said rule may either be summary or adversary in
nature. If the correction sought to be made in the civil register is clerical, then the procedure to be adopted is
summary. If the rectification affects the civil status, citizenship or nationality of a party, it is deemed
substantial, and the procedure to be adopted is adversary. This is our ruling in Republic vs. Valencia where
we held that even substantial errors in a civil registry may be corrected and the true facts established under Rule
108 provided the parties aggrieved by the error avail themselves of the appropriate adversary proceeding. An
appropriate adversary suit or proceeding is one where the trial court has conducted proceedings where
all relevant facts have been fully and properly developed, where opposing counsel have been given
opportunity to demolish the opposite party's case, and where the evidence has been thoroughly weighed
and considered. The Court further laid down the procedural requirements to make the proceedings under Rule
108 adversary, thus:
The pertinent sections of Rule 108 provide:
SEC. 3. Parties.--When cancellation or correction of an entry in the civil register is sought, the civil registrar
and all persons who have or claim any interest which would be affected thereby shall be made parties to the
proceeding.
SEC. 4. Notice and publication.-- Upon the filing of the petition, the court shall, by an order, fix the time and
place for the hearing of the same, and cause reasonable notice thereof to be given to the persons named in the
petition. The court shall also cause the order to be published once in a week for three (3) consecutive weeks in a
newspaper of general circulation in the province.
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SEC. 5. Opposition.--The civil registrar and any person having or claiming any interest under the entry whose
cancellation or correction is sought may, within fifteen (15) days from notice, file his opposition thereto.
Thus, the persons who must be made parties to a proceeding concerning the cancellation or correction of an
entry in the civil register are--(1) the civil registrar, and (2) all persons who have or claim any interest
which would be affected thereby. Upon the filing of the petition, it becomes the duty of the court to--(1) issue
an order fixing the time and place for the hearing of the petition, and (2) cause the order for hearing to be
published once a week for three (3) consecutive weeks in a newspaper of general circulation in the province.
The following are likewise entitled to oppose the petition:--(1) the civil registrar, and (2) any person having or
claiming any interest under the entry whose cancellation or correction is sought.
It is true in the case at bar that the changes sought to be made by petitioner are not merely clerical or harmless
errors but substantial ones as they would affect the status of the marriage between petitioner and Carlos Borbon,
as well as the legitimacy of their son, Charles Christian. Changes of such nature, however, are now allowed
under Rule 108 in accordance with our ruling in Republic vs. Valencia provided that the appropriate procedural
requirements are complied with.
IN VIEW WHEREOF, the petition is GRANTED and the Order dated August 25, 1997 of the RTC of Quezon
City, Branch 89, subject of the petition at bar is set aside. The case is REMANDED to the court a quo for
further proceedings
REPUBLIC vs. KHO
FACTS: On February 12, 2001, Carlito and his siblings Michael, Mercy Nona and Heddy Moira filed before the
RTC of Butuan City a verified petition for correction of entries in the civil registry of Butuan City to effect
changes in their respective birth certificates. Carlito also asked the court in behalf of his minor children, Kevin
and Kelly, to order the correction of some entries in their birth certificates.
In the case of Carlito, he requested the correction in his birth certificate of the citizenship of his mother to
"Filipino" instead of "Chinese," as well as the deletion of the word "married" opposite the phrase "Date of
marriage of parents" because his parents, Juan Kho and Epifania Inchoco (Epifania), were allegedly not legally
married. The same request to delete the "married" status of their parents from their respective birth
certificates was made by Carlitos siblings Michael, Mercy Nona, and Heddy Moira. With respect to the birth
certificates of Carlitos children, he prayed that the date of his and his wifes marriage be corrected from
April 27, 1989 to January 21, 2000, the date appearing in their marriage certificate.
On April 23, 2001, Carlito et al. filed an Amended Petition in which it was additionally prayed that Carlitos
second name of "John" be deleted from his record of birth; and that the name and citizen ship of Carlitos
father in his (Carlitos) marriage certificate be corrected from "John Kho" to "Juan Kho" and "Filipino" to
"Chinese," respectively.
On September 14, 2001, the OSG entered its appearance with an authorization to the city prosecutor of Butuan
City to appear in the case and render assistance to it (the OSG).
On January 31, 2002, respondents presented documentary evidence showing compliance with the jurisdictional
requirements of the petition and testimonial evidence consisting of the testimonies of Carlito and his mother,
Epifania. During the same hearing, an additional correction in the birth certificates of Carlitos children was
requested to the effect that the first name of their mother be rectified from "Maribel" to "Marivel."

RTC Ruling: The trial court directed the local civil registrar of Butuan City to correct the entries in the record of
birth of Carlito, as follows: (1) change the citizenship of his mother from "Chinese" to "Filipino"; (2) delete
"John" from his name; and (3) delete the word "married" opposite the date of marriage of his parents. The last
correction was ordered to be effected likewise in the birth certificates of respondents Michael, Mercy Nona, and
Heddy Moira. As well as the prayer for the correction in the birth certificates of Carlitos minor children are
granted. Further, the trial court granted the correction prayed for in Carlitos marriage certificate.
Petitioner, Republic of the Philippines, appealed the RTC Decision to the CA, faulting the trial court in granting
the petition for correction of entries in the subject documents despite the failure of respondents to implead the
minors mother, Marivel, as an indispensable party and to offer sufficient evidence to warrant the corrections
with regard to the questioned "married" status of Carlito and his siblings parents, and the latters citizenship.
CA Ruling; By the assailed Decision of October 27, 2005, the CA denied petitioners appeal and affirmed the
decision of the trial court.
ISSUE: Whether the failure to implead Marivel and Carlitos parents rendered the trial short of the required
adversary proceeding and the trial courts judgment void.
HELD: No.
A similar issue was earlier raised in Barco v. Court of Appeals. That case stemmed from a petition for
correction of entries in the birth certificate of a minor, June Salvacion Maravilla, to reflect the name of her real
father (Armando Gustilo) and to correspondingly change her surname. The petition was granted by the trial
court.
Barco, whose minor daughter was allegedly fathered also by Gustilo, however, sought to annul the trial courts
decision, claiming that she should have been made a party to the petition for correction. Failure to implead her
deprived the RTC of jurisdiction, she contended.
In dismissing Barcos petition, this Court held that the publication of the order of hearing under Section 4 of
Rule 108 cured the failure to implead an indispensable party. The essential requisite for allowing substantial
corrections of entries in the civil registry is that the true facts be established in an appropriate adversarial
proceeding. This is embodied in Section 3, Rule 108 of the Rules of Court, which states:
Section 3. Parties. When cancellation or correction of an entry in the civil register is sought, the civil registrar
and all persons who have or claim any interest which would be affected thereby shall be made parties to the
proceeding.
xxxx
Undoubtedly, Barco is among the parties referred to in Section 3 of Rule 108. Her interest was affected by the
petition for correction, as any judicial determination that June was the daughter of
Armando would affect her wards share in the estate of her father.
x x x.
Yet, even though Barco was not impleaded in the petition, the Court of Appeals correctly pointed out that the
defect was cured by compliance with Section 4, Rule 108, which requires notice by publication
x x x. x x x x
The purpose precisely of Section 4, Rule 108 is to bind the whole world to the subsequent judgment on the
petition. The sweep of the decision would cover even parties who should have been impleaded under Section 3,
Rule 108, but were inadvertently left out.
xxxxxxx
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Verily, a petition for correction is an action in rem, an action against a thing and not against a person. The
decision on the petition binds not only the parties thereto but the whole world. An in rem proceeding is
validated essentially through publication. Publication is notice to the whole world that the proceeding has or its
object to bar indefinitely all who might be minded to make an objection of any sort against the right sought to
be established. It is the publication of such notice that brings in the whole world as a party in the case and vests
the court with jurisdiction to hear and decide it .
Given the above ruling, it becomes unnecessary to rule on whether Marivel or respondents parents should have
been impleaded as parties to the proceeding. It may not be amiss to mention, however, that during the hearing
on January 31, 2002, the city prosecutor who was acting as representative of the OSG did not raise any
objection to the non-inclusion of Marivel and Carlitos parents as parties to the proceeding.
Parenthetically, it seems highly improbable that Marivel was unaware of the proceedings to correct the entries
in her childrens birth certificates, especially since the notices, orders and decision of the trial court were all sent
to the residence she shared with Carlito and the children.
It is also well to remember that the role of the court in hearing a petition to correct certain entries in the civil
registry is to ascertain the truth about the facts recorded therein. With respect to the date of marriage of Carlito
and Marivel, their certificate of marriage shows that indeed they were married on January 21, 2000, not on April
27, 1989. Explaining the error, Carlito declared that the date "April 27, 1989" was supplied by his helper,
adding that he was not married to Marivel at the time his sons were born because his previous marriage was
annulled only in 1999.Given the evidence presented by respondents, the CA observed that the minors were
illegitimate at birth, hence, the correction would bring about no change at all in the nature of their filiation.
With respect to Carlitos mother, it bears noting that she declared at the witness stand that she was not married
to Juan Kho who died in 1959. Again, that testimony was not challenged by the city prosecutor. The
documentary evidence supporting the deletion from Carlitos and his siblings birth certificates of the entry
"Married" opposite the date of marriage of their parents, moreover, consisted of a certification issued on
November 24, 1973 by St. Joseph (Butuan City) Parish priest Eugene van Vught stating that Juan Kho and
Epifania had been living together as common law couple since 1935 but have never contracted marriage legally.
A certification from the office of the city registrar, which was appended to respondents Amended Petition,
likewise stated that it has no record of marriage between Juan Kho and Epifania. Under the circumstances, the
deletion of the word "Married" opposite the "date of marriage of parents" is warranted. With respect to the
correction in Carlitos birth certificate of his name from "Carlito John" to "Carlito," the same was properly
granted under Rule 108 of the Rules of Court. As correctly pointed out by the CA, the cancellation or correction
of entries involving changes of name falls under letter "o" of the following provision of Section 2 of Rule 108:
Section 2. Entries subject to cancellation or correction. Upon good and valid grounds, the following
entries in the civil register may be cancelled or corrected: (a) births; (b) marriages; (c) deaths; (d) legal
separation; (e) judgments of annulment of marriage; (f) judgments declaring marriages void from the beginning;
(g) legitimations; (h) adoptions; (i) acknowledgments of natural children; (j) naturalization; (k) election, loss or
recovery of citizenship; (l) civil interdiction; (m) judicial determination of filiation; (n) voluntary emancipation
of a minor; and (o)changes of name.
Hence, while the jurisdictional requirements of Rule 103 (which governs petitions for change of name) were not
complied with, observance of the provisions of Rule 108 suffices to effect the correction sought for.
More importantly, Carlitos official transcript of record from the Urious College in Butuan City, certificate of
eligibility from the Civil Service Commission, and voter registration record satisfactorily show that he has been
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known by his first name only. No prejudice is thus likely to arise from the dropping of the second name. The
correction of the mothers citizenship from Chinese to Filipino as appearing in Carlitos birth record was also
proper. Of note is the fact that during the cross examination by the city prosecutor of Epifania, he did not deem
fit to question her citizenship. Such failure to oppose the correction prayed for, which certainly was not
respondents fault, does not in any way change the adversarial nature of the proceedings. Also significant to note
is that the birth certificates of Carlitos siblings uniformly stated the citizenship of Epifania as "Filipino."
To disallow the correction in Carlitos birth record of his mothers citizenship would perpetuate an
inconsistency in the natal circumstances of the siblings who are unquestionably born of the same mother and
father. Outside the ambit of substantial corrections, of course, is the correction of the name of Carlitos wife
from "Maribel" to "Marivel." The mistake is clearly clerical or typographical, which is not only visible to
the eyes, but is also obvious to the understanding considering that the name reflected in the marriage certificate
of Carlito and his wife is "Marivel." Apropos is Yu v. Republic which held that changing the appellants
Christian name of "Sincio" to "Sencio" amounts merely to the righting of a clerical error. The change of name
from Beatriz Labayo/Beatriz Labayu to Emperatriz Labayo was also held to be a mere innocuous alteration,
which can be granted through a summary proceeding.
The same ruling holds true with respect to the correction in Carlitos marriage certificate of his fathers name
from "John Kho" to "Juan Kho." Except in said marriage certificate, the name "Juan Kho" was uniformly
entered in the birth certificates of Carlito and of his siblings.
WHEREFORE, the Petition is DENIED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals is AFFIRMED.
PETTION FOR CHANGE OF NAME OF JULIAN LIM CARULASAN WANG

The registered name of a legitimate, legitimated and recognized illegitimate child contains a given name, a
middle name and a surname.
Before a person can be authorized to change his name given him either in his certificate of birth or civil
registry, he must show proper or reasonable cause, or any compelling reason which may justify such
change. Otherwise, the request should be denied.
That the continued use of a middle name would cause confusion and difficulty does not constitute proper
and reasonable cause to drop it from one's registered complete name.

FACTS: Julian was born in Cebu City on February 20, 1998 to parents Anna Lisa Wang and Sing-Foe Wang
who were then not yet married to each other. When his parents subsequently got married on September 22,
1998, they executed a deed of legitimation of their son so that the childs name was changed from Julian Lin
Carulasan to Julian Lin Carulasan Wang.
Since the couple planned to live in Singapore where Julian will study together with a sister who was born in
Singapore, Anna Lisa decided to file a petition in the Regional Trial Court seeking to drop his middle name
and have his registered name in the Civil Registry changed from Julian Lin Carulasan Wang to Julian Lin
Wang. The reason given for the change of name sought in the petition is that Julian may be discriminated
against when he studies in Singapore because of his middle name since in Singapore middle names or the
maiden surname of the mother is not carried in a person's name.
After trial, the RTC denied the petition because the reason given did not fall within the grounds recognized by
law. The RTC ruled that since the State has an interest in the name of a person it cannot just be changed to suit
the convenience of the bearer of the name. The RTC said that legitimate children have the right to bear the
surnames of the father and the mother, and there is no reason why this right should be taken from Julio
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considering that he was still a minor. When he reaches majority age he could then decide whether to change his
name by dropping his middle name, added the RTC.
ISSUE: Whether the RTC was correct in denying the petition?
HELD: Yes. Middle names serve to identify the maternal lineage or filiation of a person as well as further
distinguish him from others who may have the same given name and surname as he has. When an illegitimate
child is legitimated by subsequent marriage of his parents or acknowledged by the father in a public instrument
or private handwritten instrument, he then bears both his mother's surname as his middle name and his father's
surname as his surname, reflecting his status as a legitimated child or an acknowledged natural child. The
registered name of a legitimate, legitimated and recognized illegitimate child thus contains a given name, a
middle name and a surname.
The State has an interest in the names borne by individuals and entities for purposes of identification,
and that a change of name is a privilege and not a right, so that before a person can be authorized to change
his name given him either in his certificate of birth or civil registry, he must show proper or reasonable cause,
or any compelling reason which may justify such change. Otherwise, the request should be denied.
To justify a request for change of name, petitioner must show not only some proper or compelling reason
therefore but also that he will be prejudiced by the use of his true and official name. Among the grounds for
change of name which have been held valid are: (a) when the name is ridiculous, dishonorable or extremely
difficult to write or pronounce; (b) when the change results as a legal consequence, as in legitimation; (c)
when the change will avoid confusion; (d) when one has continuously used and been known since childhood
by a Filipino name, and was unaware of alien parentage; (e) a sincere desire to adopt a Filipino name to
erase signs of former alienage, all in good faith and without prejudicing anybody; and (f) when the surname
causes embarrassment and there is no showing that the desired change of name was for a fraudulent purpose
or that the change of name would prejudice public interest.
In the case at bar, the only reason advanced by petitioner for the dropping his middle name is convenience.
However, how such change of name would make his integration into Singaporean society easier and convenient
is not clearly established. That the continued use of his middle name would cause confusion and difficulty does
not constitute proper and reasonable cause to drop it from his registered complete name.
In addition, petitioner is only a minor. Considering the nebulous foundation on which his petition for change of
name is based, it is best that the matter of change of his name be left to his judgment and discretion when he
reaches the age of majority. As he is of tender age, he may not yet understand and appreciate the value of the
change of his name and granting of the same at this point may just prejudice him in his rights under our laws.
BRAZA vs. CIVIL REGISTRAR OF NEGROS OCCIDENTAL
Validity of marriages as well as legitimacy and filiation can be questioned only in a direct action seasonably
filed by the proper party, and not through collateral attack such as a petition for correction of entry under Rule
108
FACTS: Ma. Cristina married Pablo in 1978. Out of their union, Pablo Josef, Janelle Ann, and Gian Carlo were
born. When Pablo died in 2002, and his remains were repatriated to the Philippines, Lucille began introducing
Patrick as a son of Pablo. Ma. Cristinas investigation revealed that Patricks Certificate of Live Birth indicated
he was acknowledged by the late Pablo as his child, and a notation in said Certificate of Live birth states that he
was subsequently legitimated by virtue of the marriage between Pablo and Lucille on April 22, 1998. She was
also able to get a copy of the Certificate of Marriage between Pablo and Lucille. Hence, Ma. Cristina filed an
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action under Rule 108 to (1) correct the entries in the birth certificate of Patrick with respect to his
alleged legitimation; (2) the acknowledgment by Pablo; (3) the use of the last name Braza; (4) a
directive for Patricks guardians to submit him to DNA testing; (5) the declaration of nullity of his
legitimation, as well as the marriage between Pablo and Lucille, averring that Patrick could not have
been legitimated because the marriage of Pablo and Lucille was bigamous, hence void. On motion to
dismiss by Patrick, the trial court granted the motion and dismissed the case without prejudice, holding that in a
petition for correction of entry, the trial court, which had no Family Court, had no jurisdiction to annul the
marriage between Pablo and Lucille; impugn the legitimacy of Patrick; and subject him to DNA testing. Thus,
her case should be ventilated in an ordinary action. Her motion for reconsidertion denied, she filed a petition for
review on certiorari with the Supreme Court, arguing that the court may pass upon the issue of validity of
marriage and questions on legitimacy even in petitions for corrections of entries, and correct substantial errors
therein, citing the cases of Carino vs Carino, Lee vs. Court of Appeals, and Republic vs. Kho.
HELD: The petition fails. In a special proceeding for correction of entry under Rule 108 (Cancellation or
Correction of Entries in the Original Registry), the trial court has no jurisdiction to nullify marriages and rule on
legitimacy and filiation.
Rule 108 of the Rules of Court vis a vis Article 412 of the Civil Code charts the procedure by which an entry in
the civil registry may be cancelled or corrected. The proceeding contemplated therein may generally be used
only to correct clerical, spelling, typographical and other innocuous errors in the civil registry. A clerical error
is one which is visible to the eyes or obvious to the understanding; an error made by a clerk or a transcriber; a
mistake in copying or writing, or a harmless change such as a correction of name that is clearly misspelled or of
a misstatement of the occupation of the parent. Substantial or contentious alterations may be allowed only in
adversarial proceedings, in which all interested parties are impleaded and due process is properly observed.
The allegations of the petition filed before the trial court clearly show that petitioners seek to nullify the
marriage between Pablo and Lucille on the ground that it is bigamous and impugn Patricks filiation in
connection with which they ask the court to order Patrick to be subjected to a DNA test.
Petitioners insist, however, that the main cause of action is for the correction of Patricks birth records and that
the rest of the prayers are merely incidental thereto.
Petitioners position does not lie. Their cause of action is actually to seek the declaration of Pablo and Lucilles
marriage as void for being bigamous and impugn Patricks legitimacy, which causes of action are governed not
by Rule 108 but by A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC which took effect on March 15, 2003, and Art. 171[7] of the Family
Code, respectively, hence, the petition should be filed in a Family Court as expressly provided in said Code.
It is well to emphasize that, doctrinally, validity of marriages as well as legitimacy and filiation can be
questioned only in a direct action seasonably filed by the proper party, and not through collateral attack
such as the petition filed before the court a quo.
Petitioners reliance on the cases they cited is misplaced.
Cario v. Cario was an action filed by a second wife against the first wife for the return of one-half of the
death benefits received by the first after the death of the husband. Since the second wife contracted marriage
with the husband while the latters marriage to the first wife was still subsisting, the Court ruled on the validity
of the two marriages, it being essential to the determination of who is rightfully entitled to the death benefits.
In Lee v. Court of Appeals, the Court held that contrary to the contention that the petitions filed by the therein
petitioners before the lower courts were actions to impugn legitimacy, the prayer was not to declare that the
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petitioners are illegitimate children of Keh Shiok Cheng as stated in their records of birth but to establish that
they are not the latters children, hence, there was nothing to impugn as there was no blood relation at all
between the petitioners and Keh Shiok Cheng. That is why the Court ordered the cancellation of the name of
Keh Shiok Cheng as the petitioners mother and the substitution thereof with Tiu Chuan who is their
biological mother. Thus, the collateral attack was allowed and the petition deemed as adversarial proceeding
contemplated under Rule 108.
In Republic v. Kho, it was the petitioners themselves who sought the correction of the entries in their respective
birth records to reflect that they were illegitimate and that their citizenship is Filipino, not Chinese, because
their parents were never legally married. Again, considering that the changes sought to be made were substantial
and not merely innocuous, the Court, finding the proceedings under Rule 108 to be adversarial in nature, upheld
the lower courts grant of the petition.
It is thus clear that the facts in the above-cited cases are vastly different from those obtaining in the present case.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED.
REPUBLIC vs. SILVERIO
FACTS: Rommel Jacinto Dantes Silverio having undergone a sex reassignment surgery, sought to have (1)
his first name changed from Rommel to Mely, and (2) his sex from male to female. Trial court granted
his petition. CA, however, upon appeal filed by the Republic of the Philippines thru the OSG, reversed the trial
court decision, holding that there is no law allowing the change of entries of either name or sex in the birth
certificate by reason of sex alteration.
ISSUE: Whether or not Rommel's first name and sex be changed on the ground of sex reassignment.
RULING: No. There is no law authorizes the change of entry as of sex and first name through the
intervention of sex reassignment surgery. Article 376 of the Civil Code as amended by RA 9048 (Clerical
Error Law), together with Article 412 of the same Code, change of name or sex in the birth certificate is allowed
by the courts so long as clerical or typographical errors are involved.
Changes sought by Silverio will have serious legal and public policy consequences. To grant this petition
filed by Silverio will greatly alter the laws on marriage and family relations. Second, there will be major
changes in statutes that underscore the public policy in relation to women.
REPUBLIC vs. CAGANDAHAN
FACTS: Respondent Jennifer Cagandahan filed a Petition for Correction of Entries in Birth Certificate before
the RTC of Siniloan, Laguna. She asserted that she was registered as a female in the Certificate of Live Birth but
while growing up, she developed secondary male characteristics and was diagnosed to have Congenital
Adrenal Hyperplasia (CAH), which is a condition where persons thus afflicted possess both male and female
characteristics. Tests revealed that her ovarian structures had minimized, she has stopped growing and she has
no breast or menstrual development; she has become a male person. In her petition with the RTC to have her
birth certificate be corrected such that (1) her gender be changed from female to male and (2) her first name
be changed from Jennifer to Jeff, her physician testified on her condition by presenting a medical
certificate to back her alleged condition. The RTC granted her petition, recognizing her proven medical
condition. Thus (OSG) filed this petition seeking areversal of the above mentioned ruling based on (1)
violations on Rule 108 of the Rules of Court regarding (a) Cagandahans failure to implead the local civil
registrar in her petition with the RTC and (b) her plea to have her gender changed in the birth certificate (OSG
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believes her condition does not make her male; and (2) a violation on Rule 103 of the Rules of Court, in which
Cagandahan failed to state that respondent is a bona fide resident of the province where the petition was filed
for at least three (3) years prior to the date of such filing. The court dismissed the two procedural issues on
Rules 108 and 103, and decided on the substantive merit regarding the change of gender in Cagandahans
records due to her medical condition.
ISSUE: WON the trial court erred in ordering the correction of entries in the birth certificate of respondent to
change her name and gender, on the ground of her medical condition known as CAH.
HELD: The Republics petition is denied.
No. The respondents condition, CAH, is one of many conditions involving intersexuality, which apply to
human beings who cannot be classified as either male or female. Here, the rule of determining a persons gender
at birth cannot apply because the sexual development in cases of intersex persons makes the gender
classification at birth inconclusive. Instead, it is at maturity that the gender of such persons, like
respondent, is fixed. Thus, the Court is of the view that where the person is biologically or naturally intersex,
the determining factor in his gender classification would be what the individual, like respondent, having reached
the age of majority, with good reason thinks of his/her sex. In the case of respondent, his having ordered his life
to that of a male is backed by preponderant biological bases. Unlike in the case of individuals who underwent
sexual reassignment, respondent here has simply let nature take its course and has not taken unnatural steps to
arrest or interfere with what he was born with. In the absence of a law on such an unusual matter, the Court will
not dictate on respondent concerning a matter so innately private as ones sexuality and lifestyle preferences,
much less on whether or not to undergo medical treatment to reverse the male tendency due to CAH.
REPUBLIC vs. UY
When a petition for cancellation or correction of an entry in the civil register involves substantial and
controversial alterations, including those on citizenship, legitimacy of paternity or filiation, or legitimacy of
marriage, a strict compliance with the requirements of rule 108 of the rules of court is mandated
FACTS: Dr. Norma Lugsanay Uy filed a petition for correction of entries in her birth certificate, alleging therein
that she was born on February 8, 1952, the illegitimate daughter of Sy Ton and Sotera Lugsanay, and her name
was registered as Anita Sy, though she had always been known as Norma S. Lugsanay. Considering that
her parents were never married, she had to follow the surname of her mother; she is a Filipino citizen, not
Chinese; and all her siblings were Filipinos and bore the surname Lugsanay. All her school records and
professional records also indicate her surname as Lugsanay. Thus she prayed that corrections be made in her
Certificate of Live Birth to indicate (1) her first name as Norma, her middle name as SY; her last name
as Lugsanay, and (2) her citizenship as Filipino. She impleaded in the petition as respondent the Local
Civil Registrar of Gingoog City. After finding the petition sufficient in form and substance, the RTC set the
case for hearing and ordered Norma to cause the publication of the Order in a newspaper of general publication
in the City of Gingoog and the Province of Misamis Oriental once a week for three consecutive weeks.
Petitioner complied with the requirements. After trial, the RTC granted her petition, effecting the correction of
entries in her birth certificate as prayed for. It ruled that her petition would neither prejudice the government
nor any third party. It also held that the names Norma Sy Lugsanay and Anita Sy refer to one and the same
person, especially since the Local Civil Registrar of Gingoog City has effected the correction. Considering that
respondent has continuously used and has been known since childhood as Norma Sy Lugsanay and as a
Filipino citizen, the RTC granted the petition to avoid confusion. The CA affirmed in toto the RTC decision,
holding that respondents failure to implead other indispensable parties was cured upon the publication of the
Order setting the case for hearing in a newspaper of general circulation for three (3) consecutive weeks and by
serving a copy of the notice to the Local Civil Registrar, the OSG and the City Prosecutors Office. At any rate,
9

there was no collateral attack on her filiation as her parents were not legally married and her sibling were all
Filipino citizens. The Office of the Solicitor General this filed a petition for review on certiorari with the
Supreme Court to assail the CA ruling.
ISSUE: Whether or not Norma successfully complied with the jurisdictional requirements of the petition for
failing to implead indispensable parties.
HELD: No, cancellation or correction of entries in the civil registry is governed by Rule 108 of the Rules of
Court, to wit:
SEC. 1. Who may file petition. Any person interested in any act, event, order or decree concerning the civil
status of persons which has been recorded in the civil register, may file a verified petition for the cancellation or
correction of any entry relating thereto, with the Regional Trial Court of the province where the corresponding
civil registry is located.
SEC. 2. Entries subject to cancellation or correction. Upon good and valid grounds, the following entries
in the civil register may be cancelled or corrected: (a) births; (b) marriages; (c) deaths; (d) legal separations; (e)
judgments of annulments of marriage; (f) judgments declaring marriages void from the beginning; (g)
legitimations; (h) adoptions; (i) acknowledgments of natural children; (j) naturalization; (k) election, loss or
recovery of citizenship; (l) civil interdiction; (m) judicial determination of filiation; (n) voluntary emancipation
of a minor; and (o) changes of name.
SEC. 3. Parties. When cancellation or correction of an entry in the civil register is sought, the civil registrar
and all persons who have or claim any interest which would be affected thereby shall be made parties to the
proceeding.
SEC. 4. Notice and Publication. Upon the filing of the petition, the court shall, by an order, fix the time and
place for the hearing of the same, and cause reasonable notice thereof to be given to the persons named in the
petition. The court shall also cause the order to be published once a week for three (3) consecutive weeks in a
newspaper of general circulation in the province.
SEC. 5. Opposition. The civil registrar and any person having or claiming any interest under the entry whose
cancellation or correction is sought may, within fifteen (15) days from notice of the petition, or from the last
date of publication of such notice, file his opposition thereto.
SEC. 6. Expediting proceedings. The court in which the proceeding is brought may make orders expediting
the proceedings, and may also grant preliminary injunction for the preservation of the rights of the parties
pending such proceedings.
SEC. 7. Order. After hearing, the court may either dismiss the petition or issue an order granting the
cancellation or correction prayed for. In either case, a certified copy of the judgment shall be served upon the
civil registrar concerned who shall annotate the same in his record1.
In this case, respondent sought the correction of entries in her birth certificate, particularly those pertaining to
her first name, surname and citizenship. She sought the correction allegedly to reflect the name which she has
been known for since childhood, including her legal documents such as passport and school and professional
records. She likewise relied on the birth certificates of her full blood siblings who bear the surname Lugsanay
instead of Sy and citizenship of Filipino instead of Chinese. The changes, however, are obviously not
mere clerical as they touch on respondents filiation and citizenship. In changing her surname from Sy
(which is the surname of her father) to Lugsanay (which is the surname of her mother), she, in effect, changes
10

her status from legitimate to illegitimate; and in changing her citizenship from Chinese to Filipino, the same
affects her rights and obligations in this country. Clearly, the changes are substantial.
It has been settled in a number of cases starting with Republic v. Valencia that even substantial errors in a civil
registry may be corrected and the true facts established provided the parties aggrieved by the error avail
themselves of the appropriate adversary proceeding. The pronouncement of the Court in that case is
illuminating:
It is undoubtedly true that if the subject matter of a petition is not for the correction of clerical errors of a
harmless and innocuous nature, but one involving nationality or citizenship, which is indisputably substantial as
well as controverted, affirmative relief cannot be granted in a proceeding summary in nature. However, it is also
true that a right in law may be enforced and a wrong may be remedied as long as the appropriate remedy is
used. This Court adheres to the principle that even substantial errors in a civil registry may be corrected and the
true facts established provided the parties aggrieved by the error avail themselves of the appropriate adversary
proceeding. x x x
What is meant by appropriate adversary proceeding? Blacks Law Dictionary defines adversary
proceeding as follows:
One having opposing parties; contested, as distinguished from an ex parte application, one of which the party
seeking relief has given legal warning to the other party, and afforded the latter an opportunity to contest it.
Excludes an adoption proceeding.
In sustaining the RTC decision, the CA relied on the Courts conclusion in Republic v. Kho, Alba v. Court of
Appeals, and Barco v. Court of Appeals that the failure to implead indispensable parties was cured by the
publication of the notice of hearing pursuant to the provisions of Rule 108 of the Rules of Court. In Republic v.
Kho petitioner therein appealed the RTC decision granting the petition for correction of entries despite
respondents failure to implead the minors mother as an indispensable party. The Court, however, did not
strictly apply the provisions of Rule 108, because it opined that it was highly improbable that the mother was
unaware of the proceedings to correct the entries in her childrens birth certificates especially since the notices,
orders and decision of the trial court were all sent to the residence she shared with them
In Alba v. Court of Appeals, the Court found nothing wrong with the trial courts decision granting the petition
for correction of entries filed by respondent although the proceedings was not actually known by petitioner. In
that case, petitioners mother and guardian was impleaded in the petition for correction of entries, and notices
were sent to her address appearing in the subject birth certificate. However, the notice was returned unserved,
because apparently she no longer lived there. Thus, when she allegedly learned of the granting of the petition,
she sought the annulment of judgment which the Court denied. Considering that the petition for correction of
entries is a proceeding in rem, the Court held that acquisition of jurisdiction over the person of the petitioner is,
therefore, not required and the absence of personal service was cured by the trial courts compliance with Rule
108 which requires notice by publication.
In Barco v. Court of Appeals the Court addressed the question of whether the court acquired jurisdiction over
petitioner and all other indispensable parties to the petition for correction of entries despite the failure to
implead them in said case. While recognizing that petitioner was indeed an indispensable party, the failure to
implead her was cured by compliance with Section 4 of Rule 108 which requires notice by publication. In so
ruling, the Court pointed out that the petitioner in a petition for correction cannot be presumed to be aware of all
the parties whose interests may be affected by the granting of a petition. It emphasized that the petitioner therein
exerted earnest effort to comply with the provisions of Rule 108. Thus, the publication of the notice of hearing
was considered to have cured the failure to implead indispensable parties.
11

In this case, it was only the Local Civil Registrar of Gingoog City who was impleaded as respondent in the
petition below. This, notwithstanding, the RTC granted her petition and allowed the correction sought by
respondent, which decision was affirmed in toto by the CA.
We do not agree with the RTC and the CA.
This is not the first time that the Court is confronted with the issue involved in this case. Aside from Kho, Alba
and Barco, the Court has addressed the same in Republic v. Coseteng-Magpayo, Ceruila v. Delantar, and
Labayo-Rowe v. Republic.
In Republic v. Coseteng-Magpayo claiming that his parents were never legally married, respondent therein filed
a petition to change his name from Julian Edward Emerson Coseteng Magpayo, the name appearing in his
birth certificate to Julian Edward Emerson Marquez Lim Coseteng. The notice setting the petition for hearing
was published and there being no opposition thereto, the trial court issued an order of general default and
eventually granted respondents petition deleting the entry on the date and place of marriage of parties;
correcting his surname from Magpayo to Coseteng; deleting the entry Coseteng for middle name; and
deleting the entry Fulvio Miranda Magpayo, Jr. in the space for his father. The Republic of the Philippines,
through the OSG, assailed the RTC decision on the grounds that the corrections made on respondents birth
certificate had the effect of changing the civil status from legitimate to illegitimate and must only be effected
through an appropriate adversary proceeding. The Court nullified the RTC decision for respondents failure to
comply strictly with the procedure laid down in Rule 108 of the Rules of Court. Aside from the wrong remedy
availed of by respondent as he filed a petition for Change of Name under Rule 103 of the Rules of Court,
assuming that he filed a petition under Rule 108 which is the appropriate remedy, the petition still failed
because of improper venue and failure to implead the Civil Registrar of Makati City and all affected parties as
respondents in the case.
In Ceruila v. Delantar the Ceruilas filed a petition for the cancellation and annulment of the birth certificate of
respondent on the ground that the same was made as an instrument of the crime of simulation of birth and,
therefore, invalid and spurious, and it falsified all material entries therein. The RTC issued an order setting the
case for hearing with a directive that the same be published and that any person who is interested in the petition
may interpose his comment or opposition on or before the scheduled hearing. Summons was likewise sent to the
Civil Register of Manila. After which, the trial court granted the petition and nullified respondents birth
certificate. Few months after, respondent filed a petition for the annulment of judgment claiming that she and
her guardian were not notified of the petition and the trial courts decision, hence, the latter was issued without
jurisdiction and in violation of her right to due process. The Court annulled the trial courts decision for failure
to comply with the requirements of Rule 108, especially the non-impleading of respondent herself whose birth
certificate was nullified.
In Labayo-Rowe v. Republic petitioner filed a petition for the correction of entries in the birth certificates of her
children, specifically to change her name from Beatriz V. Labayu/Beatriz Labayo to Emperatriz Labayo, her
civil status from married to single, and the date and place of marriage from 1953-Bulan to No
marriage. The Court modified the trial courts decision by nullifying the portion thereof which directs the
change of petitioners civil status as well as the filiation of her child, because it was the OSG only that was
made respondent and the proceedings taken was summary in nature which is short of what is required in cases
where substantial alterations are sought.
Respondents birth certificate shows that her full name is Anita Sy, that she is a Chinese citizen and a legitimate
child of Sy Ton and Sotera Lugsanay. In filing the petition, however, she seeks the correction of her first name
and surname, her status from legitimate to illegitimate and her citizenship from Chinese to Filipino.
12

Thus, respondent should have impleaded and notified not only the Local Civil Registrar but also her
parents and siblings as the persons who have interest and are affected by the changes or corrections
respondent wanted to make.
The fact that the notice of hearing was published in a newspaper of general circulation and notice thereof was
served upon the State will not change the nature of the proceedings taken. A reading of Sections 4 and 5, Rule
108 of the Rules of Court shows that the Rules mandate two sets of notices to different potential oppositors: one
given to the persons named in the petition and another given to other persons who are not named in the petition
but nonetheless may be considered interested or affected parties. Summons must, therefore, be served not for
the purpose of vesting the courts with jurisdiction but to comply with the requirements of fair play and due
process to afford the person concerned the opportunity to protect his interest if he so chooses.
While there may be cases where the Court held that the failure to implead and notify the affected or interested
parties may be cured by the publication of the notice of hearing, earnest efforts were made by petitioners in
bringing to court all possible interested parties. Such failure was likewise excused where the interested parties
themselves initiated the corrections proceedings; when there is no actual or presumptive awareness of the
existence of the interested parties; or when a party is inadvertently left out.
It is clear from the foregoing discussion that when a petition for cancellation or correction of an entry in the
civil register involves substantial and controversial alterations, including those on citizenship, legitimacy of
paternity or filiation, or legitimacy of marriage, a strict compliance with the requirements of Rule 108 of the
Rules of Court is mandated If the entries in the civil register could be corrected or changed through mere
summary proceedings and not through appropriate action wherein all parties who may be affected by the entries
are notified or represented, the door to fraud or other mischief would be set open, the consequence of which
might be detrimental and far reaching
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is hereby GRANTED. The Court of Appeals Decision dated
February 18, 2011 and Resolution dated July 27, 20011 in CA-G.R. CV No. 00238-MIN, are SET ASIDE.
Consequently, the June 28, 2004 Order of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 27, Gingoog City, in Spl. Proc. No.
230-2004 granting the Petition for Correction of Entry of Certificate of Live Birth filed by respondent Dr.
Norma S. Lugsanay Uy, is NULLIFIED.
MINORU FUJIKI vs. MARINAY
FACTS: Fujiki married Maria Paz in 2004. However, his parents objected to his marriage with Maria Paz so he
was not able to bring Maria Paz to Japan when he returned. In 2008, Maria Paz married another Japanese,
Maekara, who was able to bring him to Japan. There, Fujiki and Maria Paz met again. When she recounted her
ordeal to Fujiki, he helped her secure a judgment from the Family Court in Japan which declared the marriage
between Maria Paz and Maekara void on the ground of bigamy. Fjuki then filed a petition in the Regional Trial
Court of Quezon City praying that: (1) the Japanese judgment be recognised; (2) the marriage between
Maria Paz and Maekara be declared void for being bigamous; and (3) the Local Civil Registrar be
directed to annotate the Family Court judgment on the marriage certificate of Maria Paz and Maekara.
The Regional Trial Court dismissed the petition of Fujiki. It ruled that based on the provisions of Sec. 2 on the
Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and Annulment of Voidable Marriages (A.M. No.
02-11-10-SC, only the husband or the wife may file the petition, hence Fujiki is not the proper party to file the
petition.
Fujiki moved to reconsider. According to him, the Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages
and Annulment of Voidable Marriages (A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC) is not applicable to this case, this being a
13

petition for recognition of foreign judgment. The rule applies only to void or voidable marriages. Rule 108 is
the applicable rule.
The RTC denied his motion for reconsideration. Among others, it justified its ruling by holding that Fujiki is a
stranger to the marriage between Maria Paz and Maekara. A Rule 108 proceeding is not the proper remedy to
nullify a marriage as ruled in the case of Braza vs City Civil Registrar of Himamaylan City, Negros Occidental.
According to the RTC, the nullity of marriage can only be attacked in a direct action, not thru a collateral attack
such as petition for correction of entry.
Fujiki appealed to the Supreme Court on pure question of law. He raised the following issues:
(1) Whether the Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and Annulment of Voidable
Marriages (A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC) is applicable.
(2) Whether a husband or wife of a prior marriage can file a petition to recognize a foreign judgment nullifying
the subsequent marriage between his or her spouse and a foreign citizen on the ground of bigamy.
(3) Whether the Regional Trial Court can recognize the foreign judgment in a proceeding for cancellation or
correction of entries in the Civil Registry under Rule 108 of the Rules of Court.
The Office of the Solicitor General sided with the petitioner.
HELD: The Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and Annulment of Voidable Marriages
(A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC) does not apply in a petition to recognize a foreign judgment relating to the status
of a marriage where one of the parties is a citizen of a foreign country. Moreover, in Juliano-Llave v.
Republic, this Court held that the rule in A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC that only the husband or wife can file a
declaration of nullity or annulment of marriage does not apply if the reason behind the petition is bigamy.
xxx
To hold that A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC applies to a petition for recognition of foreign judgment would mean that
the trial court and the parties should follow its provisions, including the form and contents of the petition, the
service of summons, the investigation of the public prosecutor, the setting of pre-trial,the trial and the judgment
of the trial court. This is absurd because it will litigate the case anew. It will defeat the purpose of recognizing
foreign judgments, which is to limit repetitive litigation on claims and issues. The interpretation of the RTC is
tantamount to relitigating the case on the merits. In Mijares v. Raada, this Court explained that [i]f every
judgment of a foreign court were reviewable on the merits, the plaintiff would be forced back on his/her original
cause of action, rendering immaterial the previously concluded litigation.
A foreign judgment relating to the status of a marriage affects the civil status, condition and legal capacity of its
parties. However, the effect of a foreign judgment is not automatic. To extend the effect of a foreign judgment
in the Philippines, Philippine courts must determine if the foreign judgment is consistent with domestic
public policy and other mandatory laws. Article 15 of the Civil Code provides that [l]aws relating to family
rights and duties, or to the status, condition and legal capacity of persons are binding upon citizens of the
Philippines, even though living abroad. This is the rule of lex nationalii in private international law. Thus, the
Philippine State may require, for effectivity in the Philippines, recognition by Philippine courts of a foreign
judgment affecting its citizen, over whom it exercises personal jurisdiction relating to the status, condition and
legal capacity of such citizen.
A petition to recognize a foreign judgment declaring a marriage void does not require relitigation under a
Philippine court of the case as if it were a new petition for declaration of nullity of marriage. Philippine courts
cannot presume to know the foreign laws under which the foreign judgment was rendered. They cannot
substitute their judgment on the status, condition and legal capacity of the foreign citizen who is under the
14

jurisdiction of another state. Thus, Philippine courts can only recognize the foreign judgment as a fact according
to the rules of evidence.
Section 48(b), Rule 39 of the Rules of Court provides that a foreign judgment or final order against a person
creates a presumptive evidence of a right as between the parties and their successors in interest by a
subsequent title. Moreover, Section 48 of the Rules of Court states that the judgment or final order may
be repelled by evidence of a want of jurisdiction, want of notice to the party, collusion, fraud, or clear
mistake of law or fact. Thus, Philippine courts exercise limited review on foreign judgments. Courts are not
allowed to delve into the merits of a foreign judgment. Once a foreign judgment is admitted and proven in a
Philippine court, it can only be repelled on grounds external to its merits, i.e., want of jurisdiction, want of
notice to the party, collusion, fraud, or clear mistake of law or fact. The rule on limited review embodies the
policy of efficiency and the protection of party expectations, as well as respecting the jurisdiction of other
states.
Since 1922 in Adong v. Cheong Seng Gee, Philippine courts have recognized foreign divorce decrees between a
Filipino and a foreign citizen if they are successfully proven under the rules of evidence. Divorce involves the
dissolution of a marriage, but the recognition of a foreign divorce decree does not involve the extended
procedure under A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC or the rules of ordinary trial. While the Philippines does not have a
divorce law, Philippine courts may, however, recognize a foreign divorce decree under the second paragraph of
Article 26 of the Family Code, to capacitate a Filipino citizen to remarry when his or her foreign spouse
obtained a divorce decree abroad.
There is therefore no reason to disallow Fujiki to simply prove as a fact the Japanese Family Court judgment
nullifying the marriage between Marinay and Maekara on the ground of bigamy. While the Philippines has no
divorce law, the Japanese Family Court judgment is fully consistent with Philippine public policy, as bigamous
marriages are declared void from the beginning under Article 35(4) of the Family Code. Bigamy is a crime
under Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code. Thus, Fujiki can prove the existence of the Japanese Family
Court judgment in accordance with Rule 132, Sections 24 and 25, in relation to Rule 39, Section 48(b) of
the Rules of Court.
xxx
Section 2(a) of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC does not preclude a spouse of a subsisting marriage to question the
validity of a subsequent marriage on the ground of bigamy. On the contrary, when Section 2(a) states that [a]
petition for declaration of absolute nullity of void marriage may be filed solely by the husband or the wifeit
refers to the husband or the wife of the subsisting marriage. Under Article 35(4) of the Family Code, bigamous
marriages are void from the beginning. Thus, the parties in a bigamous marriage are neither the husband nor the
wife under the law. The husband or the wife of the prior subsisting marriage is the one who has the personality
to file a petition for declaration of absolute nullity of void marriage under Section 2(a) of A.M. No. 02-11-10SC.
Article 35(4) of the Family Code, which declares bigamous marriages void from the beginning, is the civil
aspect of Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code, which penalizes bigamy. Bigamy is a public crime. Thus,
anyone can initiate prosecution for bigamy because any citizen has an interest in the prosecution and prevention
of crimes. If anyone can file a criminal action which leads to the declaration of nullity of a bigamous marriage,
there is more reason to confer personality to sue on the husband or the wife of a subsisting marriage. The prior
spouse does not only share in the public interest of prosecuting and preventing crimes, he is also personally
interested in the purely civil aspect of protecting his marriage.
When the right of the spouse to protect his marriage is violated, the spouse is clearly an injured party and is
therefore interested in the judgment of the suit. Juliano-Llave ruled that the prior spouse is clearly the
15

aggrieved party as the bigamous marriage not only threatens the financial and the property ownership aspect of
the prior marriage but most of all, it causes an emotional burden to the prior spouse. Being a real party in
interest, the prior spouse is entitled to sue in order to declare a bigamous marriage void. For this purpose, he can
petition a court to recognize a foreign judgment nullifying the bigamous marriage and judicially declare as a
fact that such judgment is effective in the Philippines. Once established, there should be no more impediment to
cancel the entry of the bigamous marriage in the civil registry.
xxx
Under the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code, Philippine courts are empowered to correct a
situation where the Filipino spouse is still tied to the marriage while the foreign spouse is free to marry.
Moreover, notwithstanding Article 26 of the Family Code, Philippine courts already have jurisdiction to extend
the effect of a foreign judgment in the Philippines to the extent that the foreign judgment does not contravene
domestic public policy. A critical difference between the case of a foreign divorce decree and a foreign
judgment nullifying a bigamous marriage is that bigamy, as a ground for the nullity of marriage, is fully
consistent with Philippine public policy as expressed in Article 35(4) of the Family Code and Article 349 of the
Revised Penal Code. The Filipino spouse has the option to undergo full trial by filing a petition for declaration
of nullity of marriage under A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC, but this is not the only remedy available to him or her.
Philippine courts have jurisdiction to recognize a foreign judgment nullifying a bigamous marriage, without
prejudice to a criminal prosecution for bigamy.
In the recognition of foreign judgments, Philippine courts are incompetent to substitute their judgment on how a
case was decided under foreign law. They cannot decide on the family rights and duties, or on the status,
condition and legal capacity of the foreign citizen who is a party to the foreign judgment. Thus, Philippine
courts are limited to the question of whether to extend the effect of a foreign judgment in the Philippines. In a
foreign judgment relating to the status of a marriage involving a citizen of a foreign country, Philippine courts
only decide whether to extend its effect to the Filipino party, under the rule of lex nationalii expressed in Article
15 of the Civil Code.
For this purpose, Philippine courts will only determine (1) whether the foreign judgment is inconsistent
with an overriding public policy in the Philippines; and (2) whether any alleging party is able to prove an
extrinsic ground to repel the foreign judgment, i.e. want of jurisdiction, want of notice to the party,
collusion, fraud, or clear mistake of law or fact. If there is neither inconsistency with public policy nor
adequate proof to repel the judgment, Philippine courts should, by default, recognize the foreign judgment as
part of the comity of nations. Section 48(b), Rule 39 of the Rules of Court states that the foreign judgment is
already presumptive evidence of a right between the parties. Upon recognition of the foreign judgment, this
right becomes conclusive and the judgment serves as the basis for the correction or cancellation of entry in the
civil registry. The recognition of the foreign judgment nullifying a bigamous marriage is a subsequent event that
establishes a new status, right and fact that needs to be reflected in the civil registry. Otherwise, there will be an
inconsistency between the recognition of the effectivity of the foreign judgment and the public records in the
Philippines.
PEOPLE vs. MERLINDA OLAYBAR
FACTS: Respondent requested from the National Statistics Office (NSO) a Certificate of No Marriage
(CENOMAR) as one of the requirements for her marriage with her boyfriend of five years. Upon receipt
thereof, she discovered that she was already married to a certain Ye Son Sune, a Korean National. She
denied having contracted said marriage and claimed that she did not know the alleged husband; She, thus, filed
a Petition for Cancellation of Entries in the Marriage Contract, especially the entries in the wife portion thereof.

16

During trial, she completely denied having known the supposed husband, but she revealed that she recognized
the named witnesses to the marriage as she had met them while she was working as a receptionist in Tadels
Pension House. She believed that her name was used by a certain Johnny Singh, who owned a travel agency,
whom she gave her personal circumstances in order for her to obtain a passport. A document examiner testified
that the signature appearing in the marriage contract was forged.
The RTC held in favor of the petitioner, Merlinda L. Olaybar.
Petitioner, however, moved for the reconsideration of the assailed Decision on the grounds that: (1) there was no
clerical spelling, typographical and other innocuous errors in the marriage contract for it to fall within the
provisions of Rule 108 of the Rules of Court; and (2) granting the cancellation of all the entries in the wife
portion of the alleged marriage contract is, in effect, declaring the marriage void ab initio.
Contrary to petitioners stand, the RTC held that it had jurisdiction to take cognizance of cases for correction of
entries even on substantial errors under Rule 108 of the Rules of Court being the appropriate adversary
proceeding required. Considering that respondents identity was used by an unknown person to contract
marriage with a Korean national, it would not be feasible for respondent to institute an action for declaration of
nullity of marriage since it is not one of the void marriages under Articles 35 and 36 of the Family Code.
ISSUE: Whether or not the cancellation of entries in the marriage contract which, in effect, nullifies the
marriage may be undertaken in a Rule 108 proceeding.
HELD: The petition for review was denied.
Rule 108 of the Rules of Court provides the procedure for cancellation or correction of entries in the civil
registry. The proceedings may either be summary or adversary. If the correction is clerical, then the procedure to
be adopted is summary. If the rectification affects the civil status, citizenship or nationality of a party, it is
deemed substantial, and the procedure to be adopted is adversary.
Since the promulgation of Republic v. Valencia 225 Phil. 408 the Court has repeatedly ruled that "even
substantial errors in a civil registry may be corrected through a petition filed under Rule 108, with the true facts
established and the parties aggrieved by the error availing themselves of the appropriate adversarial
proceeding." An appropriate adversary suit or proceeding is one where the trial court has conducted
proceedings where all relevant facts have been fully and properly developed, where opposing counsel
have been given opportunity to demolish the opposite partys case, and where the evidence has been
thoroughly weighed and considered.
It is true that in special proceedings, formal pleadings and a hearing may be dispensed with, and the remedy [is]
granted upon mere application or motion. However, a special proceeding is not always summary. The procedure
laid down in Rule 108 is not a summary proceeding per se. It requires publication of the petition; it mandates
the inclusion as parties of all persons who may claim interest which would be affected by the cancellation or
correction; it also requires the civil registrar and any person in interest to file their opposition, if any; and it
states that although the court may make orders expediting the proceedings, it is after hearing that the court shall
either dismiss the petition or issue an order granting the same. Thus, as long as the procedural requirements in
Rule 108 are followed, it is the appropriate adversary proceeding to effect substantial corrections and changes in
entries of the civil register.Lee v. CA 419 Phil. 392
To be sure, a petition for correction or cancellation of an entry in the civil registry cannot substitute for an action
to invalidate a marriage. A direct action is necessary to prevent circumvention of the substantive and procedural
safeguards of marriage under the Family Code, A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC and other related laws. Among these
17

safeguards are the requirement of proving the limited grounds for the dissolution of marriage, support pendente
lite of the spouses and children, the liquidation, partition and distribution of the properties of the spouses and
the investigation of the public prosecutor to determine collusion. A direct action for declaration of nullity or
annulment of marriage is also necessary to prevent circumvention of the jurisdiction of the Family Courts under
the Family Courts Act of 1997 (Republic Act No. 8369), as a petition for cancellation or correction of entries in
the civil registry may be filed in the Regional Trial Court where the corresponding civil registry is located. In
other words, a Filipino citizen cannot dissolve his marriage by the mere expedient of changing his entry of
marriage in the civil registry. Minoru Fujiki v. Maria Paz Galela Marinay, Shinichi Maekara, Local Civil
Registrar of Quezon City, and the Administrator and Civil Registrar General of the National Statistics Office
G.R.No. 196049, June 26, 2013.
While we maintain that Rule 108 cannot be availed of to determine the validity of marriage, we cannot nullify
the proceedings before the trial court where all the parties had been given the opportunity to contest the
allegations of respondent; the procedures were followed, and all the evidence of the parties had already been
admitted and examined. Respondent indeed sought, not the nullification of marriage as there was no
marriage to speak of, but the correction of the record of such marriage to reflect the truth as set forth by
the evidence. Otherwise stated, in allowing the correction of the subject certificate of marriage by cancelling
the wife portion thereof, the trial court did not, in any way, declare the marriage void as there was no
marriage to speak of.
The petition is denied for lack of merit.

18