EN BANC

[G.R. No. 139465. January 18, 2000]

SECRETARY OF JUSTICE, petitioner, vs. HON. RALPH C.
LANTION, Presiding Judge, Regional Trial Court of
Manila, Branch 25, and MARK B.
JIMENEZ, respondents. Esmso
DECISION
MELO, J.:
The individual citizen is but a speck of particle or molecule vis--vis
the vast and overwhelming powers of government. His only
guarantee against oppression and tyranny are his fundamental
liberties under the Bill of Rights which shield him in times of need.
The Court is now called to decide whether to uphold a citizens basic
due process rights, or the governments ironclad duties under a
treaty. The bugle sounds and this Court must once again act as the
faithful guardian of the fundamental writ.
The petition at our doorstep is cast against the following factual
backdrop:
On January 13, 1977, then President Ferdinand E. Marcos issued
Presidential Decree No. 1069 "Prescribing the Procedure for the
Extradition of Persons Who Have Committed Crimes in a Foreign
Country". The Decree is founded on: the doctrine of incorporation
under the Constitution; the mutual concern for the suppression of
crime both in the state where it was committed and the state where
the criminal may have escaped; the extradition treaty with the
Republic of Indonesia and the intention of the Philippines to enter
into similar treaties with other interested countries; and the need for
rules to guide the executive department and the courts in the proper
implementation of said treaties.
On November 13, 1994, then Secretary of Justice Franklin M. Drilon,
representing the Government of the Republic of the Philippines,
signed in Manila the "Extradition Treaty Between the Government of
the Republic of the Philippines and the Government of the United
States of America" (hereinafter referred to as the RP-US Extradition
Treaty). The Senate, by way of Resolution No. 11, expressed its
concurrence in the ratification of said treaty. It also expressed its
concurrence in the Diplomatic Notes correcting Paragraph (5)(a),
Article 7 thereof (on the admissibility of the documents
accompanying an extradition request upon certification by the
principal diplomatic or consular officer of the requested state
resident in the Requesting State). Kycalr
On June 18, 1999, the Department of Justice received from the
Department of Foreign Affairs U. S. Note Verbale No. 0522
containing a request for the extradition of private respondent Mark
Jimenez to the United States. Attached to the Note Verbale were the
Grand Jury Indictment, the warrant of arrest issued by the U.S.
District Court, Southern District of Florida, and other supporting
documents for said extradition. Based on the papers submitted,
private respondent appears to be charged in the United States with
violation of the following provisions of the United States Code (USC):

A)......18 USC 371 (Conspiracy to commit offense

or to defraud the United States; two [2] counts;
Maximum Penalty 5 years on each count);
B)......26 USC 7201 (Attempt to evade or defeat
tax; four [4] counts; Maximum Penalty 5 years on
each count);
C)......18 USC 1343 (Fraud by wire, radio, or
television; two [2] counts; Maximum Penalty 5
years on each count);
D)......18 USC 1001 (False statement or entries; six
[6] counts; Maximum Penalty 5 years on each
count);
E)......2 USC 441f (Election contributions in name
of another; thirty-three [33] counts; Maximum
Penalty less than one year).
(p. 14, Rollo.)
On the same day, petitioner issued Department Order No. 249
designating and authorizing a panel of attorneys to take charge of
and to handle the case pursuant to Section 5(1) of Presidential
Decree No. 1069. Accordingly, the panel began with the "technical
evaluation and assessment" of the extradition request and the
documents in support thereof. The panel found that the "official
English translation of some documents in Spanish were not attached
to the request and that there are some other matters that needed to
be addressed" (p. 15, Rollo). Calrky
Pending evaluation of the aforestated extradition documents, private
respondent, through counsel, wrote a letter dated July 1, 1999
addressed to petitioner requesting copies of the official extradition
request from the U. S. Government, as well as all documents and
papers submitted therewith; and that he be given ample time to
comment on the request after he shall have received copies of the
requested papers. Private respondent also requested that the
proceedings on the matter be held in abeyance in the meantime.
Later, private respondent requested that preliminarily, he be given at
least a copy of, or access to, the request of the United States
Government, and after receiving a copy of the Diplomatic Note, a
period of time to amplify on his request.
In response to private respondents July 1, 1999 letter, petitioner, in a
reply-letter dated July 13, 1999 (but received by private respondent
only on August 4, 1999), denied the foregoing requests for the
following reasons:
1. We find it premature to furnish you with copies
of the extradition request and supporting
documents from the United States Government,
pending evaluation by this Department of the
sufficiency of the extradition documents
submitted in accordance with the provisions of
the extradition treaty and our extradition law.
Article 7 of the Extradition Treaty between the
Philippines and the United States enumerates the
documentary requirements and establishes the

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procedures under which the documents

submitted shall be received and admitted as
evidence. Evidentiary requirements under our
domestic law are also set forth in Section 4 of P.D.
No. 1069.
Evaluation by this Department of the
aforementioned documents is not a preliminary
investigation nor akin to preliminary investigation
of criminal cases. We merely determine whether
the procedures and requirements under the
relevant law and treaty have been complied with
by the Requesting Government. The
constitutionally guaranteed rights of the accused
in all criminal prosecutions are therefore not
available.
It is only after the filing of the petition for
extradition when the person sought to be
extradited will be furnished by the court with
copies of the petition, request and extradition
documents and this Department will not pose any
objection to a request for ample time to evaluate
said documents. Mesm
2. The formal request for extradition of the United
States contains grand jury information and
documents obtained through grand jury process
covered by strict secrecy rules under United
States law. The United States had to secure orders
from the concerned District Courts authorizing
the United States to disclose certain grand jury
information to Philippine government and law
enforcement personnel for the purpose of
extradition of Mr. Jimenez. Any further disclosure
of the said information is not authorized by the
United States District Courts. In this particular
extradition request the United States Government
requested the Philippine Government to prevent
unauthorized disclosure of the subject
information. This Departments denial of your
request is consistent with Article 7 of the RP-US
Extradition Treaty which provides that the
Philippine Government must represent the
interests of the United States in any proceedings
arising out of a request for extradition. The
Department of Justice under P.D. No. 1069 is the
counsel of the foreign governments in all
extradition requests.
3. This Department is not in a position to hold in
abeyance proceedings in connection with an
extradition request. Article 26 of the Vienna
Convention on the Law of Treaties, to which we
are a party provides that "[E]very treaty in force is
binding upon the parties to it and must be
performed by them in good faith". Extradition is a
tool of criminal law enforcement and to be
effective, requests for extradition or surrender of
accused or convicted persons must be processed
expeditiously.

(pp. 77-78, Rollo.)

Such was the state of affairs when, on August 6, 1999, private
respondent filed with the Regional Trial Court of the National Capital
Judicial Region a petition against the Secretary of Justice, the
Secretary of Foreign Affairs, and the Director of the National Bureau
of Investigation, for mandamus (to compel herein petitioner to
furnish private respondent the extradition documents, to give him
access thereto, and to afford him an opportunity to comment on, or
oppose, the extradition request, and thereafter to evaluate the
request impartially, fairly and objectively); certiorari (to set aside
herein petitioners letter dated July 13, 1999); and prohibition (to
restrain petitioner from considering the extradition request and from
filing an extradition petition in court; and to enjoin the Secretary of
Foreign Affairs and the Director of the NBI from performing any act
directed to the extradition of private respondent to the United
States), with an application for the issuance of a temporary
restraining order and a writ of preliminary injunction (pp. 104-105,
Rollo). Scslx
The aforementioned petition was docketed as Civil Case No. 9994684 and thereafter raffled to Branch 25 of said regional trial court
stationed in Manila which is presided over by the Honorable Ralph C.
Lantion.
After due notice to the parties, the case was heard on August 9,
1999. Petitioner, who appeared in his own behalf, moved that he be
given ample time to file a memorandum, but the same was denied.
On August 10, 1999, respondent judge issued an order dated the
previous day, disposing:
WHEREFORE, this Court hereby Orders the
respondents, namely: the Secretary of Justice, the
Secretary of Foreign Affairs and the Director of
the National Bureau of Investigation, their agents
and/or representatives to maintain the status quo
by refraining from committing the acts
complained of; from conducting further
proceedings in connection with the request of the
United States Government for the extradition of
the petitioner; from filing the corresponding
Petition with a Regional Trial court; and from
performing any act directed to the extradition of
the petitioner to the United States, for a period of
twenty (20) days from service on respondents of
this Order, pursuant to Section 5, Rule 58 of the
1997 Rules of Court.
The hearing as to whether or not this Court shall
issue the preliminary injunction, as agreed upon
by the counsels for the parties herein, is set on
August 17, 1999 at 9:00 oclock in the morning.
The respondents are, likewise, ordered to file their
written comment and/or opposition to the
issuance of a Preliminary Injunction on or before
said date.
SO ORDERED.
(pp. 110-111, Rollo.)

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Forthwith, petitioner initiated the instant proceedings, arguing that:

PUBLIC RESPONDENT ACTED WITHOUT OR IN
EXCESS OF JURISDICTION OR WITH GRAVE
ABUSE OF DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK
OR EXCESS OF JURISDICTION IN ISSUING THE
TEMPORARY RESTRAINING ORDER
BECAUSE: Slxs c
I.
BY ORDERING HEREIN PETITIONER TO REFRAIN
FROM COMMITTING THE ACTS COMPLAINED
OF, I. E., TO DESIST FROM REFUSING PRIVATE
RESPONDENT ACCESS TO THE OFFICIAL
EXTRADITION REQUEST AND DOCUMENTS AND
FROM DENYING PRIVATE RESPONDENT AN
OPPORTUNITY TO FILE A COMMENT ON, OR
OPPOSITION TO, THE REQUEST, THE MAIN
PRAYER FOR A WRIT OF MANDAMUS IN THE
PETITION FOR MANDAMUS, CERTIORARI AND
PROHIBITION WAS, IN EFFECT, GRANTED SO AS
TO CONSTITUTE AN ADJUDICATION ON THE
MERITS OF THE MANDAMUS ISSUES;
II.
PETITIONER WAS UNQUALIFIEDLY PREVENTED
FROM PERFORMING LEGAL DUTIES UNDER THE
EXTRADITION TREATY AND THE PHILIPPINE
EXTRADITION LAW;
III.
THE PETITION FOR (MANDAMUS), CERTIORARI
AND PROHIBITION IS, ON ITS FACE, FORMALLY
AND SUBSTANTIALLY DEFICIENT; AND
IV.
PRIVATE RESPONDENT HAS NO RIGHT IN
ESSE THAT NEEDS PROTECTION AND
ENFORCEMENT, AND WILL NOT SUFFER ANY
IRREPARABLE INJURY.
(pp. 19-20, Rollo.)
On August 17, 1999, the Court required private respondent to file his
comment. Also issued, as prayed for, was a temporary restraining
order (TRO) providing: slx mis
NOW, THEREFORE, effective immediately and
continuing until further orders from this Court,
You, Respondent Judge Ralph C. Lantion, your
agents, representatives or any person or persons
acting in your place or stead are hereby
ORDERED to CEASE and DESIST from enforcing
the assailed order dated August 9, 1999 issued by
public respondent in Civil Case No. 99-94684.

GIVEN by the Honorable HILARIO G. DAVIDE, JR.,

Chief Justice, Supreme Court of the Philippines,
this 17th day of August 1999.
(pp. 120-121, Rollo.)
The case was heard on oral argument on August 31, 1999, after
which the parties, as directed, filed their respective memoranda.
From the pleadings of the opposing parties, both procedural and
substantive issues are patent. However, a review of these issues as
well as the extensive arguments of both parties, compel us to
delineate the focal point raised by the pleadings: During the
evaluation stage of the extradition proceedings, is private
respondent entitled to the two basic due process rights of notice and
hearing? An affirmative answer would necessarily render the
proceedings at the trial court, moot and academic (the issues of
which are substantially the same as those before us now), while a
negative resolution would call for the immediate lifting of the TRO
issued by this Court dated August 24, 1999, thus allowing petitioner
to fast-track the process leading to the filing of the extradition
petition with the proper regional trial court. Corollarily, in the event
that private respondent is adjudged entitled to basic due process
rights at the evaluation stage of the extradition proceedings, would
this entitlement constitute a breach of the legal commitments and
obligations of the Philippine Government under the RP-US
Extradition Treaty? And assuming that the result would indeed be a
breach, is there any conflict between private respondents basic due
process rights and the provisions of the RP-US Extradition Treaty?
The issues having transcendental importance, the Court has elected
to go directly into the substantive merits of the case, brushing aside
peripheral procedural matters which concern the proceedings in Civil
Case No. 99-94684, particularly the propriety of the filing of the
petition therein, and of the issuance of the TRO of August 17, 1999
by the trial court. Missdaa
To be sure, the issues call for a review of the extradition procedure.
The RP-US Extradition Treaty which was executed only on November
13, 1994, ushered into force the implementing provisions of
Presidential Decree No. 1069, also called as the Philippine Extradition
Law. Section 2(a) thereof defines extradition as "the removal of an
accused from the Philippines with the object of placing him at the
disposal of foreign authorities to enable the requesting state or
government to hold him in connection with any criminal
investigation directed against him or the execution of a penalty
imposed on him under the penal or criminal law of the requesting
state or government." The portions of the Decree relevant to the
instant case which involves a charged and not convicted individual,
are abstracted as follows:
The Extradition Request
The request is made by the Foreign Diplomat of the Requesting
State, addressed to the Secretary of Foreign Affairs, and shall be
accompanied by:
1. The original or an authentic copy of the criminal charge and the
warrant of arrest issued by the authority of the Requesting State
having jurisdiction over the matter, or some other instruments
having equivalent legal force;

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2. A recital of the acts for which extradition is requested, with the

fullest particulars as to the name and identity of the accused, his
whereabouts in the Philippines, if known, the acts or omissions
complained of, and the time and place of the commission of these
acts; Sda adsc
3. The text of the applicable law or a statement of the contents of
said law, and the designation or description of the offense by the
law, sufficient for evaluation of the request; and
4. Such other documents or information in support of the request.
(Section 4, Presidential Decree No. 1069.)
Section 5 of the Presidential Decree, which sets forth the duty of the
Secretary of Foreign Affairs, pertinently provides:
. . . (1) Unless it appears to the Secretary of
Foreign Affairs that the request fails to meet the
requirements of this law and the relevant treaty
or convention, he shall forward the request
together with the related documents to the
Secretary of Justice, who shall immediately
designate and authorize an attorney in his office
to take charge of the case.
The above provision shows only too clearly that the executive
authority given the task of evaluating the sufficiency of the request
and the supporting documents is the Secretary of Foreign Affairs.
What then is the coverage of this task?
In accordance with Paragraphs 2 and 3, Article 7 of the RP-US
Extradition Treaty, the executive authority must ascertain whether or
not the request is supported by:
1. Documents, statements, or other types of information which
describe the identity and probable location of the person sought;
2. A statement of the facts of the offense and the procedural history
of the case;
3. A statement of the provisions of the law describing the essential
elements of the offense for which extradition is requested;
4. A statement of the provisions of law describing the punishment
for the offense; Rtc spped
5. A statement of the provisions of the law describing any time limit
on the prosecution or the execution of punishment for the offense;
6. Documents, statements, or other types of information specified in
paragraph 3 or paragraph 4 of said Article, as applicable.
(Paragraph 2, Article 7, Presidential Decree No. 1069.)
7. Such evidence as, according to the law of the Requested State,
would provide probable cause for his arrest and committal for trial if
the offense had been committed there;

8. A copy of the warrant or order of arrest issued by a judge or other

competent authority; and
9. A copy of the charging document.
(Paragraph 3, ibid.)
The executive authority (Secretary of Foreign Affairs) must also see
to it that the accompanying documents received in support of the
request had been certified by the principal diplomatic or consular
officer of the Requested State resident in the Requesting State
(Embassy Note No. 052 from U. S. Embassy; Embassy Note No.
951309 from the Department of Foreign Affairs).
In this light, Paragraph 3, Article 3 of the Treaty provides that
"[e]xtradition shall not be granted if the executive authority of the
Requested State determines that the request is politically motivated,
or that the offense is a military offense which is not punishable under
non-military penal legislation."
The Extradition Petition
Upon a finding made by the Secretary of Foreign Affairs that the
extradition request and its supporting documents are sufficient and
complete in form and substance, he shall deliver the same to the
Secretary of Justice, who shall immediately designate and authorize
an attorney in his office to take charge of the case (Paragraph [1],
Section 5, P. D. No. 1069). The lawyer designated shall then file a
written petition with the proper regional trial court of the province or
city, with a prayer that the court take the extradition request under
consideration (Paragraph [2], ibid.). Korte
The presiding judge of the regional trial court, upon receipt of the
petition for extradition, shall, as soon as practicable, issue an order
summoning the prospective extraditee to appear and to answer the
petition on the day and hour fixed in the order. The judge may issue
a warrant of arrest if it appears that the immediate arrest and
temporary detention of the accused will best serve the ends of
justice (Paragraph [1], Section 6, ibid.), particularly to prevent the
flight of the prospective extraditee.
The Extradition Hearing
The Extradition Law does not specifically indicate whether the
extradition proceeding is criminal, civil, or a special proceeding.
Nevertheless, Paragraph [1], Section 9 thereof provides that in the
hearing of the extradition petition, the provisions of the Rules of
Court, insofar as practicable and not inconsistent with the summary
nature of the proceedings, shall apply. During the hearing, Section 8
of the Decree provides that the attorney having charge of the case
may, upon application by the Requesting State, represent the latter
throughout the proceedings.
Upon conclusion of the hearing, the court shall render a decision
granting the extradition and giving the reasons therefor upon a
showing of the existence of a prima facie case, or dismiss the petition
(Section 10, ibid.). Said decision is appealable to the Court of
Appeals, whose decision shall be final and immediately executory
(Section 12, ibid.). The provisions of the Rules of Court governing
appeal in criminal cases in the Court of Appeals shall apply in the

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aforementioned appeal, except for the required 15-day period to file

brief (Section 13, ibid.).

if it were to evaluate the extradition request, it would not allow

private respondent to participate in the process of evaluation.

The trial court determines whether or not the offense mentioned in

the petition is extraditable based on the application of the dual
criminality rule and other conditions mentioned in Article 2 of the
RP-US Extradition Treaty. The trial court also determines whether or
not the offense for which extradition is requested is a political one
(Paragraph [1], Article 3, RP-US Extradition Treaty).

Plainly then, the record cannot support the presumption of regularity

that the Department of Foreign Affairs thoroughly reviewed the
extradition request and supporting documents and that it arrived at
a well-founded judgment that the request and its annexed
documents satisfy the requirements of law. The Secretary of Justice,
eminent as he is in the field of law, could not privately review the
papers all by himself. He had to officially constitute a panel of
attorneys. How then could the DFA Secretary or his undersecretary,
in less than one day, make the more authoritative determination?

With the foregoing abstract of the extradition proceedings as

backdrop, the following query presents itself: What is the nature of
the role of the Department of Justice at the evaluation stage of the
extradition proceedings? Sclaw
A strict observance of the Extradition Law indicates that the only
duty of the Secretary of Justice is to file the extradition petition after
the request and all the supporting papers are forwarded to him by
the Secretary of Foreign Affairs. It is the latter official who is
authorized to evaluate the extradition papers, to assure their
sufficiency, and under Paragraph [3], Article 3 of the Treaty, to
determine whether or not the request is politically motivated, or that
the offense is a military offense which is not punishable under nonmilitary penal legislation. Ipso facto, as expressly provided in
Paragraph [1], Section 5 of the Extradition Law, the Secretary of
Justice has the ministerial duty of filing the extradition papers.
However, looking at the factual milieu of the case before us, it would
appear that there was failure to abide by the provisions of
Presidential Decree No. 1069. For while it is true that the extradition
request was delivered to the Department of Foreign Affairs on June
17, 1999, the following day or less than 24 hours later, the
Department of Justice received the request, apparently without the
Department of Foreign Affairs discharging its duty of thoroughly
evaluating the same and its accompanying documents. The
statement of an assistant secretary at the Department of Foreign
Affairs that his Department, in this regard, is merely acting as a post
office, for which reason he simply forwarded the request to the
Department of Justice, indicates the magnitude of the error of the
Department of Foreign Affairs in taking lightly its responsibilities.
Thereafter, the Department of Justice took it upon itself to determine
the completeness of the documents and to evaluate the same to find
out whether they comply with the requirements laid down in the
Extradition Law and the RP-US Extradition Treaty. Petitioner
ratiocinates in this connection that although the Department of
Justice had no obligation to evaluate the extradition documents, the
Department also had to go over them so as to be able to prepare an
extradition petition (tsn, August 31, 1999, pp. 24-25). Notably, it was
also at this stage where private respondent insisted on the following:
(1) the right to be furnished the request and the supporting papers;
(2) the right to be heard which consists in having a reasonable
period of time to oppose the request, and to present evidence in
support of the opposition; and (3) that the evaluation proceedings
be held in abeyance pending the filing of private respondent's
opposition to the request. Kyle
The two Departments seem to have misread the scope of their duties
and authority, one abdicating its powers and the other enlarging its
commission. The Department of Foreign Affairs, moreover, has,
through the Solicitor General, filed a manifestation that it is adopting
the instant petition as its own, indirectly conveying the message that

The evaluation process, just like the extradition proceedings proper,

belongs to a class by itself. It is sui generis. It is not a criminal
investigation, but it is also erroneous to say that it is purely an
exercise of ministerial functions. At such stage, the executive
authority has the power: (a) to make a technical assessment of the
completeness and sufficiency of the extradition papers; (b) to
outrightly deny the request if on its face and on the face of the
supporting documents the crimes indicated are not extraditable; and
(c) to make a determination whether or not the request is politically
motivated, or that the offense is a military one which is not
punishable under non-military penal legislation (tsn, August 31,
1999, pp. 28-29; Article 2 & and Paragraph [3], Article 3, RP-US
Extradition Treaty). Hence, said process may be characterized as an
investigative or inquisitorial process in contrast to a proceeding
conducted in the exercise of an administrative bodys quasi-judicial
power. Ex sm
In administrative law, a quasi-judicial proceeding involves: (a) taking
and evaluation of evidence; (b) determining facts based upon the
evidence presented; and (c) rendering an order or decision
supported by the facts proved (De Leon, Administrative Law: Text and
Cases, 1993 ed., p. 198, citing Morgan vs. United States, 304 U.S. 1).
Inquisitorial power, which is also known as examining or
investigatory power, is one of the determinative powers of an
administrative body which better enables it to exercise its quasijudicial authority (Cruz, Phil. Administrative Law, 1996 ed., p. 26). This
power allows the administrative body to inspect the records and
premises, and investigate the activities, of persons or entities coming
under its jurisdiction (Ibid., p. 27), or to require disclosure of
information by means of accounts, records, reports, testimony of
witnesses, production of documents, or otherwise (De Leon, op.
cit., p. 64).
The power of investigation consists in gathering, organizing, and
analyzing evidence, which is a useful aid or tool in an administrative
agencys performance of its rule-making or quasi-judicial functions.
Notably, investigation is indispensable to prosecution.
In Ruperto v. Torres (100 Phil. 1098 [1957], unreported), the Court
had occasion to rule on the functions of an investigatory body with
the sole power of investigation. It does not exercise judicial functions
and its power is limited to investigating the facts and making
findings in respect thereto. The Court laid down the test of
determining whether an administrative body is exercising judicial
functions or merely investigatory functions: Adjudication signifies the
exercise of power and authority to adjudicate upon the rights and
obligations of the parties before it. Hence, if the only purpose for
investigation is to evaluate evidence submitted before it based on
the facts and circumstances presented to it, and if the agency is not

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authorized to make a final pronouncement affecting the parties, then

there is an absence of judicial discretion and judgment. Mse sm
The above description in Ruperto applies to an administrative body
authorized to evaluate extradition documents. The body has no
power to adjudicate in regard to the rights and obligations of both
the Requesting State and the prospective extraditee. Its only power
is to determine whether the papers comply with the requirements of
the law and the treaty and, therefore, sufficient to be the basis of an
extradition petition. Such finding is thus merely initial and not final.
The body has no power to determine whether or not the extradition
should be effected. That is the role of the court. The bodys power is
limited to an initial finding of whether or not the extradition petition
can be filed in court.
It is to be noted, however, that in contrast to ordinary investigations,
the evaluation procedure is characterized by certain peculiarities.
Primarily, it sets into motion the wheels of the extradition process.
Ultimately, it may result in the deprivation of liberty of the
prospective extraditee. This deprivation can be effected at two
stages: First, the provisional arrest of the prospective extraditee
pending the submission of the request. This is so because the Treaty
provides that in case of urgency, a contracting party may request the
provisional arrest of the person sought pending presentation of the
request (Paragraph [1], Article 9, RP-US Extradition Treaty), but he
shall be automatically discharged after 60 days if no request is
submitted (Paragraph 4). Presidential Decree No. 1069 provides for a
shorter period of 20 days after which the arrested person could be
discharged (Section 20[d]). Logically, although the Extradition Law is
silent on this respect, the provisions only mean that once a request is
forwarded to the Requested State, the prospective extraditee may be
continuously detained, or if not, subsequently rearrested (Paragraph
[5], Article 9, RP-US Extradition Treaty), for he will only be discharged
if no request is submitted. Practically, the purpose of this detention is
to prevent his possible flight from the Requested State. Second, the
temporary arrest of the prospective extraditee during the pendency
of the extradition petition in court (Section 6, Presidential Decree No.
1069).
Clearly, there is an impending threat to a prospective extraditees
liberty as early as during the evaluation stage. It is not only an
imagined threat to his liberty, but a very imminent one. Sc lex
Because of these possible consequences, we conclude that the
evaluation process is akin to an administrative agency conducting an
investigative proceeding, the consequences of which are essentially
criminal since such technical assessment sets off or commences the
procedure for, and ultimately, the deprivation of liberty of a
prospective extraditee. As described by petitioner himself, this is a
"tool" for criminal law enforcement (p. 78, Rollo). In essence,
therefore, the evaluation process partakes of the nature of a criminal
investigation. In a number of cases, we had occasion to make
available to a respondent in an administrative case or investigation
certain constitutional rights that are ordinarily available only in
criminal prosecutions. Further, as pointed out by Mr. Justice
Mendoza during the oral arguments, there are rights formerly
available only at the trial stage that had been advanced to an earlier
stage in the proceedings, such as the right to counsel and the right
against self-incrimination (tsn, August 31, 1999, p. 135;Escobedo vs.
Illinois, 378 U.S. 478; Gideon vs. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335; Miranda vs.
Arizona, 384 U.S. 436).

In Pascual v. Board of Medical Examiners (28 SCRA 344 [1969]), we

held that the right against self-incrimination under Section 17, Article
III of the 1987 Constitution which is ordinarily available only in
criminal prosecutions, extends to administrative proceedings which
possess a criminal or penal aspect, such as an administrative
investigation of a licensed physician who is charged with immorality,
which could result in his loss of the privilege to practice medicine if
found guilty. The Court, citing the earlier case of Cabal vs.
Kapunan (6 SCRA 1059 [1962]), pointed out that the revocation of
ones license as a medical practitioner, is an even greater deprivation
than forfeiture of property.
Cabal vs. Kapunan (supra) involved an administrative charge of
unexplained wealth against a respondent which was filed under
Republic Act No. 1379, or the Anti-Graft Law. Again, we therein ruled
that since the investigation may result in forfeiture of property, the
administrative proceedings are deemed criminal or penal, and such
forfeiture partakes the nature of a penalty. There is also the earlier
case of Almeda, Sr. vs. Perez (5 SCRA 970 [1962]), where the Court,
citing American jurisprudence, laid down the test to determine
whether a proceeding is civil or criminal: If the proceeding is under a
statute such that if an indictment is presented the forfeiture can be
included in the criminal case, such proceeding is criminal in nature,
although it may be civil in form; and where it must be gathered from
the statute that the action is meant to be criminal in its nature, it
cannot be considered as civil. If, however, the proceeding does not
involve the conviction of the wrongdoer for the offense charged, the
proceeding is civil in nature. x law
The cases mentioned above refer to an impending threat of
deprivation of ones property or property right. No less is this true,
but even more so in the case before us, involving as it does the
possible deprivation of liberty, which, based on the hierarchy of
constitutionally protected rights, is placed second only to life itself
and enjoys precedence over property, for while forfeited property
can be returned or replaced, the time spent in incarceration is
irretrievable and beyond recompense.
By comparison, a favorable action in an extradition request exposes a
person to eventual extradition to a foreign country, thus saliently
exhibiting the criminal or penal aspect of the process. In this sense,
the evaluation procedure is akin to a preliminary investigation since
both procedures may have the same result the arrest and
imprisonment of the respondent or the person charged. Similar to
the evaluation stage of extradition proceedings, a preliminary
investigation, which may result in the filing of an information against
the respondent, can possibly lead to his arrest, and to the
deprivation of his liberty.
Petitioners reliance on Wright vs. Court of Appeals (235 SCRA 241
[1992]) (p. 8, Petitioners Memorandum) that the extradition treaty is
neither a piece of criminal legislation nor a criminal procedural
statute is not well-taken. Wright is not authority for petitioners
conclusion that his preliminary processing is not akin to a preliminary
investigation. The characterization of a treaty in Wright was in
reference to the applicability of the prohibition against an ex post
facto law. It had nothing to do with the denial of the right to notice,
information, and hearing.
As early as 1884, the United States Supreme Court ruled that "any
legal proceeding enforced by public authority, whether sanctioned
by age or custom, or newly devised in the discretion of the legislative

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power, in furtherance of the general public good, which regards and

preserves these principles of liberty and justice, must be held to be
due process of law" (Hurtado vs. California, 110 U.S. 516).
Compliance with due process requirements cannot be deemed noncompliance with treaty commitments.
The United States and the Philippines share a mutual concern about
the suppression and punishment of crime in their respective
jurisdictions. At the same time, both States accord common due
process protection to their respective citizens. Sc
The due process clauses in the American and Philippine
Constitutions are not only worded in exactly identical language and
terminology, but more importantly, they are alike in what their
respective Supreme Courts have expounded as the spirit with which
the provisions are informed and impressed, the elasticity in their
interpretation, their dynamic and resilient character which make
them capable of meeting every modern problem, and their having
been designed from earliest time to the present to meet the
exigencies of an undefined and expanding future. The requirements
of due process are interpreted in both the United States and the
Philippines as not denying to the law the capacity for progress and
improvement. Toward this effect and in order to avoid the confines
of a legal straitjacket, the courts instead prefer to have the meaning
of the due process clause "gradually ascertained by the process of
inclusion and exclusion in the course of the decisions of cases as
they arise" (Twining vs. New Jersey, 211 U.S. 78). Capsulized, it refers
to "the embodiment of the sporting idea of fair play" (Ermita-Malate
Hotel and Motel Owners Association vs. City Mayor of Manila, 20
SCRA 849 [1967]). It relates to certain immutable principles of justice
which inhere in the very idea of free government (Holden vs. Hardy,
169 U.S. 366).
Due process is comprised of two components substantive due
process which requires the intrinsic validity of the law in interfering
with the rights of the person to his life, liberty, or property, and
procedural due process which consists of the two basic rights of
notice and hearing, as well as the guarantee of being heard by an
impartial and competent tribunal (Cruz, Constitutional Law, 1993 Ed.,
pp. 102-106).
True to the mandate of the due process clause, the basic rights of
notice and hearing pervade not only in criminal and civil
proceedings, but in administrative proceedings as well. Nonobservance of these rights will invalidate the proceedings. Individuals
are entitled to be notified of any pending case affecting their
interests, and upon notice, they may claim the right to appear
therein and present their side and to refute the position of the
opposing parties (Cruz, Phil. Administrative Law, 1996 ed., p. 64).
In a preliminary investigation which is an administrative investigatory
proceeding, Section 3, Rule 112 of the Rules of Court guarantees the
respondents basic due process rights, granting him the right to be
furnished a copy of the complaint, the affidavits, and other
supporting documents, and the right to submit counter-affidavits
and other supporting documents within ten days from receipt
thereof. Moreover, the respondent shall have the right to examine all
other evidence submitted by the complainant. Scmis
These twin rights may, however, be considered dispensable in certain
instances, such as:

1. In proceedings where there is an urgent need for immediate

action, like the summary abatement of a nuisance per se (Article 704,
Civil Code), the preventive suspension of a public servant facing
administrative charges (Section 63, Local Government Code, B. P. Blg.
337), the padlocking of filthy restaurants or theaters showing
obscene movies or like establishments which are immediate threats
to public health and decency, and the cancellation of a passport of a
person sought for criminal prosecution;
2. Where there is tentativeness of administrative action, that is,
where the respondent is not precluded from enjoying the right to
notice and hearing at a later time without prejudice to the person
affected, such as the summary distraint and levy of the property of a
delinquent taxpayer, and the replacement of a temporary
appointee; and
3. Where the twin rights have previously been offered but the right
to exercise them had not been claimed.
Applying the above principles to the case at bar, the query may be
asked: Does the evaluation stage of the extradition proceedings fall
under any of the described situations mentioned above?
Let us take a brief look at the nature of American extradition
proceedings which are quite noteworthy considering that the subject
treaty involves the U.S. Government. Mis sc
American jurisprudence distinguishes between interstate rendition or
extradition which is based on the Extradition Clause in the U.S.
Constitution (Art. IV, 2 cl 2), and international extradition
proceedings. In interstate rendition or extradition, the governor of
the asylum state has the duty to deliver the fugitive to the
demanding state. The Extradition Clause and the implementing
statute are given a liberal construction to carry out their manifest
purpose, which is to effect the return as swiftly as possible of persons
for trial to the state in which they have been charged with crime
(31A Am Jur 2d 754-755). In order to achieve extradition of an
alleged fugitive, the requisition papers or the demand must be in
proper form, and all the elements or jurisdictional facts essential to
the extradition must appear on the face of the papers, such as the
allegation that the person demanded was in the demanding state at
the time the offense charged was committed, and that the person
demanded is charged with the commission of the crime or that
prosecution has been begun in the demanding state before some
court or magistrate (35 C.J.S. 406-407). The extradition documents
are then filed with the governor of the asylum state, and must
contain such papers and documents prescribed by statute, which
essentially include a copy of the instrument charging the person
demanded with a crime, such as an indictment or an affidavit made
before a magistrate. Statutory requirements with respect to said
charging instrument or papers are mandatory since said papers are
necessary in order to confer jurisdiction on the governor of the
asylum state to effect the extradition (35 C.J.S. 408-410). A statutory
provision requiring duplicate copies of the indictment,
information, affidavit, or judgment of conviction or sentence and
other instruments accompanying the demand or requisitions be
furnished and delivered to the fugitive or his attorney is
directory. However, the right being such a basic one has been
held to be a right mandatory on demand (Ibid., p. 410, citing Ex
parte Moore, 256 S.W. 2d 103, 158 Tex. Cr. 407 and Ex parte Tucker,
Cr., 324, S.W.2d 853). Mis spped

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In international proceedings, extradition treaties generally provide

for the presentation to the executive authority of the Requested
State of a requisition or demand for the return of the alleged
offender, and the designation of the particular officer having
authority to act in behalf of the demanding nation (31A Am Jur 2d
815).
In petitioners memorandum filed on September 15, 1999, he
attached thereto a letter dated September 13, 1999 from the
Criminal Division of the U.S. Department of Justice, summarizing the
U.S. extradition procedures and principles, which are basically
governed by a combination of treaties (with special reference to the
RP-US Extradition Treaty), federal statutes, and judicial decisions, to
wit:
1. All requests for extradition are transmitted through the diplomatic
channel. In urgent cases, requests for the provisional arrest of an
individual may be made directly by the Philippine Department of
Justice to the U.S. Department of Justice, and vice-versa. In the event
of a provisional arrest, a formal request for extradition is transmitted
subsequently through the diplomatic channel.
2. The Department of State forwards the incoming Philippine
extradition request to the Department of Justice. Before doing so,
the Department of State prepares a declaration confirming that a
formal request has been made, that the treaty is in full force and
effect, that under Article 17 thereof the parties provide reciprocal
legal representation in extradition proceedings, that the offenses are
covered as extraditable offenses under Article 2 thereof, and that the
documents have been authenticated in accordance with the federal
statute that ensures admissibility at any subsequent extradition
hearing.
3. A judge or magistrate judge is authorized to issue a warrant for
the arrest of the prospective extraditee (18 U.S.C. 3184). Said judge
or magistrate is authorized to hold a hearing to consider the
evidence offered in support of the extradition request (Ibid.)
4. At the hearing, the court must determine whether the person
arrested is extraditable to the foreign country. The court must also
determine that (a) it has jurisdiction over the defendant and
jurisdiction to conduct the hearing; (b) the defendant is being sought
for offenses for which the applicable treaty permits extradition; and
(c) there is probable cause to believe that the defendant is the
person sought and that he committed the offenses charged
(Ibid.) Spped
5. The judge or magistrate judge is vested with jurisdiction to certify
extraditability after having received a "complaint made under oath,
charging any person found within his jurisdiction" with having
committed any of the crimes provided for by the governing treaty in
the country requesting extradition (Ibid.) [In this regard, it is noted
that a long line of American decisions pronounce that international
extradition proceedings partake of the character of a preliminary
examination before a committing magistrate, rather than a trial of
the guilt or innocence of the alleged fugitive (31A Am Jur 2d 826).]
6. If the court decides that the elements necessary for extradition are
present, it incorporates its determinations in factual findings and
conclusions of law and certifies the persons extraditability. The court
then forwards this certification of extraditability to the Department of
State for disposition by the Secretary of State. The ultimate decision

whether to surrender an individual rests with the Secretary of State

(18 U.S.C. 3186).
7. The subject of an extradition request may not litigate questions
concerning the motives of the requesting government in seeking his
extradition. However, a person facing extradition may present
whatever information he deems relevant to the Secretary of State,
who makes the final determination whether to surrender an
individual to the foreign government concerned.
From the foregoing, it may be observed that in the United States,
extradition begins and ends with one entity the Department of State
which has the power to evaluate the request and the extradition
documents in the beginning, and, in the person of the Secretary of
State, the power to act or not to act on the courts determination of
extraditability. In the Philippine setting, it is the Department of
Foreign Affairs which should make the initial evaluation of the
request, and having satisfied itself on the points earlier mentioned
(see pp. 10-12), then forwards the request to the Department of
Justice for the preparation and filing of the petition for extradition.
Sadly, however, the Department of Foreign Affairs, in the instant
case, perfunctorily turned over the request to the Department of
Justice which has taken over the task of evaluating the request as
well as thereafter, if so warranted, preparing, filing, and prosecuting
the petition for extradition. Jo spped
Private respondent asks what prejudice will be caused to the U.S.
Government should the person sought to be extradited be given due
process rights by the Philippines in the evaluation stage. He
emphasizes that petitioners primary concern is the possible delay in
the evaluation process.
We agree with private respondents citation of an American Supreme
Court ruling:
The establishment of prompt efficacious
procedures to achieve legitimate state ends is a
proper state interest worthy of cognizance in
constitutional adjudication. But the Constitution
recognizes higher values than speed and
efficiency. Indeed, one might fairly say of the Bill
of Rights in general, and the Due Process Clause,
in particular, that they were designed to protect
the fragile values of a vulnerable citizenry from
the overbearing concern for efficiency and
efficacy that may characterize praiseworthy
government officials no less, and perhaps more,
than mediocre ones.
(Stanley vs. Illinois, 404 U.S. 645, 656)
The United States, no doubt, shares the same
interest as the Philippine Government that no
right that of liberty secured not only by the Bills
of Rights of the Philippines Constitution but of
the United States as well, is sacrificed at the altar
of expediency.
(pp. 40-41, Private Respondents
Memorandum.) Spped jo

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In the Philippine context, this Courts ruling is invoked:

One of the basic principles of the democratic
system is that where the rights of the individual
are concerned, the end does not justify the
means. It is not enough that there be a valid
objective; it is also necessary that the means
employed to pursue it be in keeping with the
Constitution. Mere expediency will not excuse
constitutional shortcuts. There is no question that
not even the strongest moral conviction or the
most urgent public need, subject only to a few
notable exceptions, will excuse the bypassing of
an individuals rights. It is no exaggeration to say
that a person invoking a right guaranteed under
Article III of the Constitution is a majority of one
even as against the rest of the nation who would
deny him that right (Association of Small
Landowners in the Philippines, Inc. vs. Secretary of
Agrarian Reform, 175 SCRA 343, 375-376 [1989]).
There can be no dispute over petitioners argument that extradition is
a tool of criminal law enforcement. To be effective, requests for
extradition or the surrender of accused or convicted persons must be
processed expeditiously. Nevertheless, accelerated or fast-tracked
proceedings and adherence to fair procedures are, however, not
always incompatible. They do not always clash in discord. Summary
does not mean precipitous haste. It does not carry a disregard of the
basic principles inherent in "ordered liberty." Miso
Is there really an urgent need for immediate action at the evaluation
stage? At that point, there is no extraditee yet in the strict sense of
the word. Extradition may or may not occur. In interstate extradition,
the governor of the asylum state may not, in the absence of
mandatory statute, be compelled to act favorably (37 C.J.S. 387) since
after a close evaluation of the extradition papers, he may hold that
federal and statutory requirements, which are significantly
jurisdictional, have not been met (31 Am Jur 2d 819). Similarly, under
an extradition treaty, the executive authority of the requested state
has the power to deny the behest from the requesting state.
Accordingly, if after a careful examination of the extradition
documents the Secretary of Foreign Affairs finds that the request
fails to meet the requirements of the law and the treaty, he shall not
forward the request to the Department of Justice for the filing of the
extradition petition since non-compliance with the aforesaid
requirements will not vest our government with jurisdiction to effect
the extradition.
In this light, it should be observed that the Department of Justice
exerted notable efforts in assuring compliance with the requirements
of the law and the treaty since it even informed the U.S. Government
of certain problems in the extradition papers (such as those that are
in Spanish and without the official English translation, and those that
are not properly authenticated). In fact, petitioner even admits that
consultation meetings are still supposed to take place between the
lawyers in his Department and those from the U.S. Justice
Department. With the meticulous nature of the evaluation, which
cannot just be completed in an abbreviated period of time due to its
intricacies, how then can we say that it is a proceeding that urgently
necessitates immediate and prompt action where notice and hearing
can be dispensed with?

Worthy of inquiry is the issue of whether or not there is tentativeness

of administrative action. Is private respondent precluded from
enjoying the right to notice and hearing at a later time without
prejudice to him? Here lies the peculiarity and deviant characteristic
of the evaluation procedure. On one hand, there is yet no extraditee,
but ironically on the other, it results in an administrative
determination which, if adverse to the person involved, may cause
his immediate incarceration. The grant of the request shall lead to
the filing of the extradition petition in court. The "accused" (as
Section 2[c] of Presidential Decree No. 1069 calls him), faces the
threat of arrest, not only after the extradition petition is filed in court,
but even during the evaluation proceeding itself by virtue of the
provisional arrest allowed under the treaty and the implementing
law. The prejudice to the "accused" is thus blatant and manifest.
Plainly, the notice and hearing requirements of administrative due
process cannot be dispensed with and shelved aside.
Apart from the due process clause of the Constitution, private
respondent likewise invokes Section 7 of Article III which
reads: Nex old
Sec. 7. The right of the people to information on
matters of public concern shall be recognized.
Access to official records, and to documents and
papers pertaining to official acts, transactions, or
decisions, as well as to government research data
used as basis for policy development, shall be
afforded the citizen, subject to such limitations as
may be provided by law.
The above provision guarantees political rights which are available to
citizens of the Philippines, namely: (1) the right to information on
matters of public concern, and (2) the corollary right of access to
official records and documents. The general right guaranteed by said
provision is the right to information on matters of public concern. In
its implementation, the right of access to official records is likewise
conferred. These cognate or related rights are "subject to limitations
as may be provided by law" (Bernas, The 1987 Phil. Constitution A
Reviewer-Primer, 1997 ed., p. 104) and rely on the premise that
ultimately it is an informed and critical public opinion which alone
can protect the values of democratic government (Ibid.).
Petitioner argues that the matters covered by private respondents
letter-request dated July 1, 1999 do not fall under the guarantee of
the foregoing provision since the matters contained in the
documents requested are not of public concern. On the other hand,
private respondent argues that the distinction between matters
vested with public interest and matters which are of purely private
interest only becomes material when a third person, who is not
directly affected by the matters requested, invokes the right to
information. However, if the person invoking the right is the one
directly affected thereby, his right to information becomes absolute.
The concept of matters of public concern escapes exact definition.
Strictly speaking, every act of a public officer in the conduct of the
governmental process is a matter of public concern (Bernas, The
1987 Constitution of the Republic of the Philippines, 1996 ed., p.
336). This concept embraces a broad spectrum of subjects which the
public may want to know, either because these directly affect their
lives or simply because such matters arouse the interest of an
ordinary citizen (Legaspi v. Civil Service Commission, 150 SCRA 530

PIL 3rd SET FT

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[1987]). Hence, the real party in interest is the people and any citizen
has "standing".Mani kx

applicable in the domestic sphere (Salonga & Yap, Public

International Law, 1992 ed., p. 12).

When the individual himself is involved in official government action

because said action has a direct bearing on his life, and may either
cause him some kind of deprivation or injury, he actually invokes the
basic right to be notified under Section 1 of the Bill of Rights and not
exactly the right to information on matters of public concern. As to
an accused in a criminal proceeding, he invokes Section 14,
particularly the right to be informed of the nature and cause of the
accusation against him.

The doctrine of incorporation is applied whenever municipal

tribunals (or local courts) are confronted with situations in which
there appears to be a conflict between a rule of international law and
the provisions of the constitution or statute of the local state. Efforts
should first be exerted to harmonize them, so as to give effect to
both since it is to be presumed that municipal law was enacted with
proper regard for the generally accepted principles of international
law in observance of the Incorporation Clause in the above-cited
constitutional provision (Cruz, Philippine Political Law, 1996 ed., p.
55). In a situation, however, where the conflict is irreconcilable and a
choice has to be made between a rule of international law and
municipal law, jurisprudence dictates that municipal law should be
upheld by the municipal courts (Ichong vs. Hernandez, 101 Phil. 1155
[1957]; Gonzales vs. Hechanova, 9 SCRA 230 [1963]; In re: Garcia, 2
SCRA 984 [1961]) for the reason that such courts are organs of
municipal law and are accordingly bound by it in all circumstances
(Salonga & Yap, op. cit., p. 13). The fact that international law has
been made part of the law of the land does not pertain to or imply
the primacy of international law over national or municipal law in the
municipal sphere. The doctrine of incorporation, as applied in most
countries, decrees that rules of international law are given equal
standing with, but are not superior to, national legislative
enactments. Accordingly, the principle lex posterior derogat
priori takes effect a treaty may repeal a statute and a statute may
repeal a treaty. In states where the constitution is the highest law of
the land, such as the Republic of the Philippines, both statutes and
treaties may be invalidated if they are in conflict with the constitution
(Ibid.). Manikan

The right to information is implemented by the right of access to

information within the control of the government (Bernas, The 1987
Constitution of the Republic of the Philippines, 1996 ed., p. 337).
Such information may be contained in official records, and in
documents and papers pertaining to official acts, transactions, or
decisions.
In the case at bar, the papers requested by private respondent
pertain to official government action from the U. S. Government. No
official action from our country has yet been taken. Moreover, the
papers have some relation to matters of foreign relations with the U.
S. Government. Consequently, if a third party invokes this
constitutional provision, stating that the extradition papers are
matters of public concern since they may result in the extradition of
a Filipino, we are afraid that the balance must be tilted, at such
particular time, in favor of the interests necessary for the proper
functioning of the government. During the evaluation procedure, no
official governmental action of our own government has as yet been
done; hence the invocation of the right is premature. Later, and in
contrast, records of the extradition hearing would already fall under
matters of public concern, because our government by then shall
have already made an official decision to grant the extradition
request. The extradition of a fellow Filipino would be forthcoming.
We now pass upon the final issue pertinent to the subject matter of
the instant controversy: Would private respondents entitlement to
notice and hearing during the evaluation stage of the proceedings
constitute a breach of the legal duties of the Philippine Government
under the RP-Extradition Treaty? Assuming the answer is in the
affirmative, is there really a conflict between the treaty and the due
process clause in the Constitution?
First and foremost, let us categorically say that this is not the proper
time to pass upon the constitutionality of the provisions of the RPUS Extradition Treaty nor the Extradition Law implementing the
same. We limit ourselves only to the effect of the grant of the basic
rights of notice and hearing to private respondent on foreign
relations. Maniks
The rule of pacta sunt servanda, one of the oldest and most
fundamental maxims of international law, requires the parties to a
treaty to keep their agreement therein in good faith. The observance
of our country's legal duties under a treaty is also compelled by
Section 2, Article II of the Constitution which provides that "[t]he
Philippines renounces war as an instrument of national policy, adopts
the generally accepted principles of international law as part of the
law of the land, and adheres to the policy of peace, equality, justice,
freedom, cooperation and amity with all nations." Under the doctrine
of incorporation, rules of international law form part of the law of the
land and no further legislative action is needed to make such rules

In the case at bar, is there really a conflict between international law

and municipal or national law? En contrario, these two components
of the law of the land are not pitted against each other. There is no
occasion to choose which of the two should be upheld. Instead, we
see a void in the provisions of the RP-US Extradition Treaty, as
implemented by Presidential Decree No. 1069, as regards the basic
due process rights of a prospective extraditee at the evaluation stage
of extradition proceedings. From the procedures earlier abstracted,
after the filing of the extradition petition and during the judicial
determination of the propriety of extradition, the rights of notice and
hearing are clearly granted to the prospective extraditee. However,
prior thereto, the law is silent as to these rights. Reference to the U.S.
extradition procedures also manifests this silence.
Petitioner interprets this silence as unavailability of these rights.
Consequently, he describes the evaluation procedure as an "ex
parte technical assessment" of the sufficiency of the extradition
request and the supporting documents.
We disagree.
In the absence of a law or principle of law, we must apply the rules of
fair play. An application of the basic twin due process rights of notice
and hearing will not go against the treaty or the implementing law.
Neither the Treaty nor the Extradition Law precludes these rights
from a prospective extraditee. Similarly, American jurisprudence and
procedures on extradition pose no proscription. In fact, in interstate
extradition proceedings as explained above, the prospective
extraditee may even request for copies of the extradition documents

PIL 3rd SET FT

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from the governor of the asylum state, and if he does, his right to be
supplied the same becomes a demandable right (35 C.J.S. 410).
Petitioner contends that the United States requested the Philippine
Government to prevent unauthorized disclosure of confidential
information. Hence, the secrecy surrounding the action of the
Department of Justice Panel of Attorneys. The confidentiality
argument is, however, overturned by petitioners revelation that
everything it refuses to make available at this stage would be
obtainable during trial. The Department of Justice states that the U.S.
District Court concerned has authorized the disclosure of certain
grand jury information. If the information is truly confidential, the veil
of secrecy cannot be lifted at any stage of the extradition
proceedings. Not even during trial. Oldmis o
A libertarian approach is thus called for under the premises.
One will search in vain the RP-US Extradition Treaty, the Extradition
Law, as well as American jurisprudence and procedures on
extradition, for any prohibition against the conferment of the two
basic due process rights of notice and hearing during the evaluation
stage of the extradition proceedings. We have to consider similar
situations in jurisprudence for an application by analogy.
Earlier, we stated that there are similarities between the evaluation
process and a preliminary investigation since both procedures may
result in the arrest of the respondent or the prospective extraditee. In
the evaluation process, a provisional arrest is even allowed by the
Treaty and the Extradition Law (Article 9, RP-US Extradition Treaty;
Sec. 20, Presidential Decree No. 1069). Following petitioners theory,
because there is no provision of its availability, does this imply that
for a period of time, the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus is
suspended, despite Section 15, Article III of the Constitution which
states that "[t]he privilege of the writ of habeas corpus shall not be
suspended except in cases of invasion or rebellion when the public
safety requires it"? Petitioners theory would also infer that bail is not
available during the arrest of the prospective extraditee when the
extradition petition has already been filed in court since Presidential
Decree No. 1069 does not provide therefor, notwithstanding Section
13, Article III of the Constitution which provides that "[a]ll persons,
except those charged with offenses punishable by reclusion
perpetua when evidence of guilt is strong, shall, before conviction, be
bailable by sufficient sureties, or be released on recognizance as may
be provided by law. The right to bail shall not be impaired even
when the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus is suspended " Can
petitioner validly argue that since these contraventions are by virtue
of a treaty and hence affecting foreign relations, the aforestated
guarantees in the Bill of Rights could thus be subservient
thereto? Ncm
The basic principles of administrative law instruct us that "the
essence of due process in administrative proceedings is an
opportunity to explain ones side or an opportunity to seek
reconsideration of the actions or ruling complained of (Mirano vs.
NLRC, 270 SCRA 96 [1997]; Padilla vs. NLRC, 273 SCRA 457
[1997]; PLDT vs. NLRC, 276 SCRA 1 [1997]; Helpmate, Inc. vs. NLRC,
276 SCRA 315 [1997]; Aquinas School vs. Magnaye, 278 SCRA 602
[1997]; Jamer vs. NLRC, 278 SCRA 632 [1997]). In essence, procedural
due process refers to the method or manner by which the law is
enforced (Corona vs. United Harbor Pilots Association of the Phils.,
283 SCRA 31 [1997]). This Court will not tolerate the least disregard
of constitutional guarantees in the enforcement of a law or treaty.

Petitioners fears that the Requesting State may have valid objections
to the Requested States non-performance of its commitments under
the Extradition Treaty are insubstantial and should not be given
paramount consideration.
How then do we implement the RP-US Extradition Treaty? Do we
limit ourselves to the four corners of Presidential Decree No. 1069?
Of analogous application are the rulings in Government Service
Insurance System vs. Court of Appeals (201 SCRA 661 [1991]) and Go
vs. National Police Commission (271 SCRA 447 [1997]) where we
ruled that in summary proceedings under Presidential Decree No.
807 (Providing for the Organization of the Civil Service Commission
in Accordance with Provisions of the Constitution, Prescribing its
Powers and Functions and for Other Purposes), and Presidential
Decree No. 971 (Providing Legal Assistance for Members of the
Integrated National Police who may be charged for ServiceConnected Offenses and Improving the Disciplinary System in the
Integrated National Police, Appropriating Funds Therefor and for
other purposes), as amended by Presidential Decree No. 1707,
although summary dismissals may be effected without the necessity
of a formal investigation, the minimum requirements of due process
still operate. As held in GSIS vs. Court of Appeals:
... [I]t is clear to us that what the opening
sentence of Section 40 is saying is that an
employee may be removed or dismissed even
without formal investigation, in certain instances.
It is equally clear to us that an employee must be
informed of the charges preferred against him,
and that the normal way by which the employee
is so informed is by furnishing him with a copy of
the charges against him. This is a basic procedural
requirement that a statute cannot dispense with
and still remain consistent with the constitutional
provision on due process. The second minimum
requirement is that the employee charged with
some misfeasance or malfeasance must have a
reasonable opportunity to present his side of the
matter, that is to say, his defenses against the
charges levelled against him and to present
evidence in support of his defenses. Ncmmis
(at p. 671)
Said summary dismissal proceedings are also non-litigious in nature,
yet we upheld the due process rights of the respondent.
In the case at bar, private respondent does not only face a clear and
present danger of loss of property or employment, but of liberty
itself, which may eventually lead to his forcible banishment to a
foreign land. The convergence of petitioners favorable action on the
extradition request and the deprivation of private respondents
liberty is easily comprehensible.
We have ruled time and again that this Courts equity jurisdiction,
which is aptly described as "justice outside legality," may be availed
of only in the absence of, and never against, statutory law or judicial
pronouncements (Smith Bell & Co., Inc. vs. Court of Appeals, 267
SCRA 530 [1997]; David-Chan vs. Court of Appeals, 268 SCRA 677
[1997]). The constitutional issue in the case at bar does not even call
for "justice outside legality," since private respondents due process

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rights, although not guaranteed by statute or by treaty, are

protected by constitutional guarantees. We would not be true to the
organic law of the land if we choose strict construction over
guarantees against the deprivation of liberty. That would not be in
keeping with the principles of democracy on which our Constitution
is premised.
Verily, as one traverses treacherous waters of conflicting and
opposing currents of liberty and government authority, he must ever
hold the oar of freedom in the stronger arm, lest an errant and
wayward course be laid.
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing premises, the instant petition
is hereby DISMISSED for lack of merit. Petitioner is ordered to furnish
private respondent copies of the extradition request and its
supporting papers, and to grant him a reasonable period within
which to file his comment with supporting evidence. The incidents in
Civil Case No. 99-94684 having been rendered moot and academic
by this decision, the same is hereby ordered dismissed.

The second challenged Order, on the other hand, directed the

issuance of a warrant, but at the same time granted bail to
Jimenez. The dispositive portion of the Order reads as follows:
WHEREFORE, in the light of the foregoing, the [Court] finds probable
cause against respondent Mark Jimenez. Accordingly let a Warrant
for the arrest of the respondent be issued. Consequently and taking
into consideration Section 9, Rule 114 of the Revised Rules of
Criminal Procedure, this Court fixes the reasonable amount of bail for
respondents temporary liberty at ONE MILLION PESOS (Php
1,000,000.00), the same to be paid in cash.
Furthermore respondent is directed to immediately surrender to this
Court his passport and the Bureau of Immigration and Deportation is
likewise directed to include the name of the respondent in its Hold
Departure List.[4]
Essentially, the Petition prays for the lifting of the bail Order,
the cancellation of the bond, and the taking of Jimenez into legal
custody.

SO ORDERED.
The Facts

EN BANC
[G.R. No. 148571. September 24, 2002]
GOVERNMENT OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
represented by the Philippine Department of
Justice, petitioner, vs. Hon. GUILLERMO G.
PURGANAN, Morales, and Presiding Judge,
Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 42; and
MARK B. JIMENEZ a.k.a. MARIO BATACAN
CRESPO, respondents.
DECISION
PANGANIBAN, J.:
In extradition proceedings, are prospective extraditees entitled
to notice and hearing before warrants for their arrest can be
issued? Equally important, are they entitled to the right to bail and
provisional liberty while the extradition proceedings are pending? In
general, the answer to these two novel questions is
No. The explanation of
and
the reasons for,
as
well
as
the exceptions to, this rule are laid out in this Decision.

The Case

Before us is a Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules

of Court, seeking to void and set aside the Orders dated May 23,
2001[1] and July 3, 2001[2] issued by the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of
Manila, Branch 42.[3] The first assailed Order set for hearing
petitioners application for the issuance of a warrant for the arrest of
Respondent Mark B. Jimenez.

This Petition is really a sequel to

entitled Secretary of Justice v. Ralph C. Lantion.[5]

GR

No.

139465

Pursuant to the existing RP-US Extradition Treaty,[6] the United

States Government, through diplomatic channels, sent to the
Philippine Government Note Verbale No. 0522 dated June 16, 1999,
supplemented by Note Nos. 0597, 0720 and 0809 and accompanied
by duly authenticated documents requesting the extradition of Mark
B. Jimenez, also known as Mario Batacan Crespo. Upon receipt of the
Notes and documents, the secretary of foreign affairs (SFA)
transmitted them to the secretary of justice (SOJ) for appropriate
action, pursuant to Section 5 of Presidential Decree (PD) No. 1069,
also known as the Extradition Law.
Upon learning of the request for his extradition, Jimenez
sought and was granted a Temporary Restraining Order (TRO) by the
RTC of Manila, Branch 25.[7] The TRO prohibited the Department of
Justice (DOJ) from filing with the RTC a petition for his
extradition. The validity of the TRO was, however, assailed by the SOJ
in a Petition before this Court in the said GR No. 139465. Initially, the
Court -- by a vote of 9-6 -- dismissed the Petition. The SOJ was
ordered to furnish private respondent copies of the extradition
request and its supporting papers and to grant the latter a
reasonable period within which to file a comment and supporting
evidence.[8]
Acting on the Motion for Reconsideration filed by the SOJ, this
Court issued its October 17, 2000 Resolution.[9] By an identical vote
of 9-6 -- after three justices changed their votes -- it reconsidered
and reversed its earlier Decision. It held that private respondent was
bereft of the right to notice and hearing during the evaluation stage
of the extradition process. This Resolution has become final and
executory.
Finding no more legal obstacle, the Government of the United
States of America, represented by the Philippine DOJ, filed with the
RTC on May 18, 2001, the appropriate Petition for Extradition which
was docketed as Extradition Case No. 01192061. The Petition

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alleged, inter alia, that Jimenez was the subject of an arrest warrant
issued by the United States District Court for the Southern District of
Florida on April 15, 1999. The warrant had been issued in connection
with the following charges in Indictment No. 99-00281 CR-SEITZ: (1)
conspiracy to defraud the United States and to commit certain
offenses in violation of Title 18 US Code Section 371; (2) tax evasion,
in violation of Title 26 US Code Section 7201; (3) wire fraud, in
violation of Title 18 US Code Sections 1343 and 2; (4) false
statements, in violation of Title 18 US Code Sections 1001 and 2; and
(5) illegal campaign contributions, in violation of Title 2 US Code
Sections 441b, 441f and 437g(d) and Title 18 US Code Section 2. In
order to prevent the flight of Jimenez, the Petition prayed for the
issuance of an order for his immediate arrest pursuant to Section 6
of PD No. 1069.
Before the RTC could act on the Petition, Respondent Jimenez
filed before it an Urgent Manifestation/Ex-Parte Motion,[10] which
prayed that petitioners application for an arrest warrant be set for
hearing.
In its assailed May 23, 2001 Order, the RTC granted the Motion
of Jimenez and set the case for hearing on June 5, 2001. In that
hearing, petitioner manifested its reservations on the procedure
adopted by the trial court allowing the accused in an extradition case
to be heard prior to the issuance of a warrant of arrest.
After the hearing, the court a quo required the parties to
submit their respective memoranda. In his Memorandum, Jimenez
sought an alternative prayer: that in case a warrant should issue, he
be allowed to post bail in the amount of P100,000.
The alternative prayer of Jimenez was also set for hearing on
June 15, 2001. Thereafter, the court below issued its questioned July
3, 2001 Order, directing the issuance of a warrant for his arrest and
fixing bail for his temporary liberty at one million pesos in
cash.[11] After he had surrendered his passport and posted the
required cash bond, Jimenez was granted provisional liberty via the
challenged Order dated July 4, 2001.[12]
Hence, this Petition.[13]

Issues

Petitioner presents the following issues for the consideration of

this Court:

1. An extradition court has no power to authorize bail, in the absence

of any law that provides for such power.
2. Section 13, Article III (right to bail clause) of the 1987 Philippine
Constitution and Section 4, Rule 114 (Bail) of the Rules of Court, as
amended, which [were] relied upon, cannot be used as bases for
allowing bail in extradition proceedings.
3. The presumption is against bail in extradition proceedings or
proceedings leading to extradition.
4. On the assumption that bail is available in extradition proceedings
or proceedings leading to extradition, bail is not a matter of right but
only of discretion upon clear showing by the applicant of the
existence of special circumstances.
5. Assuming that bail is a matter of discretion in extradition
proceedings, the public respondent received no evidence of special
circumstances which may justify release on bail.
6. The risk that Jimenez will flee is high, and no special circumstance
exists that will engender a well-founded belief that he will not flee.
7. The conditions attached to the grant of bail are ineffectual and do
not ensure compliance by the Philippines with its obligations under
the RP-US Extradition Treaty.
8. The Court of Appeals Resolution promulgated on May 10, 2001 in
the case entitled Eduardo T. Rodriguez et al. vs. The Hon. Presiding
Judge, RTC, Branch 17, Manila, CA-G.R. SP No. 64589, relied upon by
the public respondent in granting bail, had been recalled before the
issuance of the subject bail orders.[14]
In sum, the substantive questions that this Court will address
are: (1) whether Jimenez is entitled to notice and hearing before a
warrant for his arrest can be issued, and (2) whether he is entitled to
bail and to provisional liberty while the extradition proceedings are
pending. Preliminarily, we shall take up the alleged prematurity of
the Petition for Certiorari arising from petitioners failure to file a
Motion for Reconsideration in the RTC and to seek relief in the Court
of Appeals (CA), instead of in this Court.[15] We shall also preliminarily
discuss five extradition postulates that will guide us in disposing of
the substantive issues.

I.
The Courts Ruling
The public respondent acted without or in excess of jurisdiction or
with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction in adopting a procedure of first hearing a potential
extraditee before issuing an arrest warrant under Section 6 of PD No.
1069.
II.
The public respondent acted without or in excess of jurisdiction or
with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction in granting the prayer for bail and in allowing Jimenez to
go on provisional liberty because:

The Petition is meritorious.

Preliminary Matters

Alleged Prematurity of Present Petition

Petitioner submits the following justifications for not filing a
Motion for Reconsideration in the Extradition Court: (1) the issues
were fully considered by such court after requiring the parties to
submit their respective memoranda and position papers on the
matter and thus, the filing of a reconsideration motion would serve

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no useful purpose; (2) the assailed orders are a patent nullity, absent
factual and legal basis therefor; and (3) the need for relief is
extremely urgent, as the passage of sufficient time would give
Jimenez ample opportunity to escape and avoid extradition; and (4)
the issues raised are purely of law.[16]
For resorting directly to this Court instead of the CA, petitioner
submits the following reasons: (1) even if the petition is lodged with
the Court of Appeals and such appellate court takes cognizance of
the issues and decides them, the parties would still bring the matter
to this Honorable Court to have the issues resolved once and for all
[and] to have a binding precedent that all lower courts ought to
follow; (2) the Honorable Court of Appeals had in one case[17] ruled
on the issue by disallowing bail but the court below refused to
recognize the decision as a judicial guide and all other courts might
likewise adopt the same attitude of refusal; and (3) there are pending
issues on bail both in the extradition courts and the Court of
Appeals, which, unless guided by the decision that this Honorable
Court will render in this case, would resolve to grant bail in favor of
the potential extraditees and would give them opportunity to flee
and thus, cause adverse effect on the ability of the Philippines to
comply with its obligations under existing extradition treaties.[18]
As a general rule, a petition for certiorari before a higher court
will not prosper unless the inferior court has been given, through a
motion for reconsideration, a chance to correct the errors imputed to
it. This rule, though, has certain exceptions: (1) when the issue raised
is purely of law, (2) when public interest is involved, or (3) in case of
urgency.[19] As a fourth exception, the Court has also ruled that the
filing of a motion for reconsideration before availment of the remedy
of certiorari is not a sine qua non, when the questions raised are the
same as those that have already been squarely argued and
exhaustively passed upon by the lower court.[20] Aside from being of
this nature, the issues in the present case also involve pure questions
of law that are of public interest. Hence, a motion for reconsideration
may be dispensed with.
Likewise, this Court has allowed a direct invocation of its
original jurisdiction to issue writs of certiorari when there are special
and important reasons therefor.[21] In Fortich v. Corona[22]we stated:
[T]he Supreme Court has the full discretionary power to take
cognizance of the petition filed directly [before] it if compelling
reasons, or the nature and importance of the issues raised,
warrant. This has been the judicial policy to be observed and which
has been reiterated in subsequent cases, namely: Uy vs. Contreras, et.
al., Torres vs. Arranz, Bercero vs. De Guzman, and, Advincula vs.
Legaspi, et. al. As we have further stated in Cuaresma:
x x x. A direct invocation of the Supreme Courts original jurisdiction
to issue these writs should be allowed only when there are special
and important reasons therefor, clearly and specifically set out in the
petition. This is established policy. x x x.
Pursuant to said judicial policy, we resolve to take primary
jurisdiction over the present petition in the interest of speedy justice
and to avoid future litigations so as to promptly put an end to the
present controversy which, as correctly observed by petitioners, has
sparked national interest because of the magnitude of the problem
created by the issuance of the assailed resolution. Moreover, x x x
requiring the petitioners to file their petition first with the Court of
Appeals would only result in a waste of time and money.

That the Court has the power to set aside its own rules in the higher
interests of justice is well-entrenched in our jurisprudence. We
reiterate what we said in Piczon vs. Court of Appeals:[23]
Be it remembered that rules of procedure are but mere tools
designed to facilitate the attainment of justice. Their strict and rigid
application, which would result in technicalities that tend to frustrate
rather than promote substantial justice, must always be
avoided. Time and again, this Court has suspended its own rules and
excepted a particular case from their operation whenever the higher
interests of justice so require. In the instant petition, we forego a
lengthy disquisition of the proper procedure that should have been
taken by the parties involved and proceed directly to the merits of
the case.
In a number of other exceptional cases,[24] we held as follows:
This Court has original jurisdiction, concurrent with that of Regional
Trial Courts and the Court of Appeals, over petitions for certiorari,
prohibition, mandamus, quo warranto and habeas corpus, and we
entertain direct resort to us in cases where special and important
reasons or exceptional and compelling circumstances justify the
same.
In the interest of justice and to settle once and for all the
important issue of bail in extradition proceedings, we deem it best to
take cognizance of the present case. Such proceedings constitute a
matter of first impression over which there is, as yet, no local
jurisprudence to guide lower courts.
Five Postulates of Extradition
The substantive issues raised in this case require an
interpretation or construction of the treaty and the law on
extradition. A cardinal rule in the interpretation of a treaty or a law is
to ascertain and give effect to its intent.[25] Since PD 1069 is intended
as a guide for the implementation of extradition treaties to which the
Philippines is a signatory,[26] understanding certain postulates of
extradition will aid us in properly deciding the issues raised here.
1. Extradition Is a Major Instrument for the Suppression of
Crime.
First, extradition treaties are entered into for the purpose of
suppressing crime[27] by facilitating the arrest and the custodial
transfer[28] of a fugitive[29] from one state to the other.
With the advent of easier and faster means of international
travel, the flight of affluent criminals from one country to another for
the purpose of committing crime and evading prosecution has
become more frequent. Accordingly, governments are adjusting their
methods of dealing with criminals and crimes that transcend
international boundaries.
Today, a majority of nations in the world community have
come to look upon extradition as the major effective instrument of
international co-operation in the suppression of crime.[30] It is the only
regular system that has been devised to return fugitives to the
jurisdiction of a court competent to try them in accordance with
municipal and international law.[31]
An important practical effect x x x of the recognition of the principle
that criminals should be restored to a jurisdiction competent to try
and punish them is that the number of criminals seeking refuge

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abroad will be reduced. For to the extent that efficient means of

detection and the threat of punishment play a significant role in the
deterrence of crime within the territorial limits of a State, so the
existence of effective extradition arrangements and the consequent
certainty of return to the locus delicti commissi play a corresponding
role in the deterrence of flight abroad in order to escape the
consequence of crime. x x x. From an absence of extradition
arrangements flight abroad by the ingenious criminal receives direct
encouragement and thus indirectly does the commission of crime
itself.[32]
In Secretary v. Lantion[33] we explained:
The Philippines also has a national interest to help in suppressing
crimes and one way to do it is to facilitate the extradition of persons
covered by treaties duly entered [into] by our government. More and
more, crimes are becoming the concern of one world. Laws involving
crimes and crime prevention are undergoing universalization. One
manifest purpose of this trend towards globalization is to deny easy
refuge to a criminal whose activities threaten the peace and progress
of civilized countries. It is to the great interest of the Philippines to
be part of this irreversible movement in light of its vulnerability to
crimes, especially transnational crimes.
Indeed, in this era of globalization, easier and faster
international travel, and an expanding ring of international crimes
and criminals, we cannot afford to be an isolationist state. We need
to cooperate with other states in order to improve our chances of
suppressing crime in our own country.
2. The Requesting State Will Accord Due Process to
the Accused
Second, an extradition treaty presupposes that both parties
thereto have examined, and that both accept and trust, each others
legal system and judicial process.[34] More pointedly, our duly
authorized representatives signature on an extradition treaty
signifies our confidence in the capacity and the willingness of the
other state to protect the basic rights of the person sought to be
extradited.[35] That signature signifies our full faith that the accused
will be given, upon extradition to the requesting state, all relevant
and basic rights in the criminal proceedings that will take place
therein; otherwise, the treaty would not have been signed, or would
have been directly attacked for its unconstitutionality.
3. The Proceedings Are Sui Generis
Third, as pointed out in Secretary of Justice v.
Lantion,[36] extradition proceedings are not criminal in nature. In
criminal proceedings, the constitutional rights of the accused are at
fore; in extradition which is sui generis -- in a class by itself -- they
are not.
An extradition [proceeding] is sui generis. It is not a criminal
proceeding which will call into operation all the rights of an accused
as guaranteed by the Bill of Rights. To begin with, the process of
extradition does not involve the determination of the guilt or
innocence of an accused. His guilt or innocence will be adjudged in
the court of the state where he will be extradited. Hence, as a rule,
constitutional rights that are only relevant to determine the guilt or
innocence of an accused cannot be invoked by an extraditee x x x.
xxxxxxxxx

There are other differences between an extradition proceeding and a

criminal proceeding. An extradition proceeding is summary in nature
while criminal proceedings involve a full-blown trial. In
contradistinction to a criminal proceeding, the rules of evidence in
an extradition proceeding allow admission of evidence under less
stringent standards. In terms of the quantum of evidence to be
satisfied, a criminal case requires proof beyond reasonable doubt for
conviction while a fugitive may be ordered extradited upon showing
of the existence of a prima facie case. Finally, unlike in a criminal case
where judgment becomes executory upon being rendered final, in an
extradition proceeding, our courts may adjudge an individual
extraditable but the President has the final discretion to extradite
him. The United States adheres to a similar practice whereby the
Secretary of State exercises wide discretion in balancing the equities
of the case and the demands of the nations foreign relations before
making the ultimate decision to extradite.
Given the foregoing, it is evident that the extradition court is
not called upon to ascertain the guilt or the innocence of the person
sought to be extradited.[37] Such determination during the extradition
proceedings will only result in needless duplication and
delay. Extradition is merely a measure of international judicial
assistance through which a person charged with or convicted of a
crime is restored to a jurisdiction with the best claim to try that
person. It is not part of the function of the assisting authorities to
enter into questions that are the prerogative of that
jurisdiction.[38] The ultimate purpose of extradition proceedings in
court is only to determine whether the extradition request complies
with the Extradition Treaty, and whether the person sought is
extraditable.[39]
4. Compliance Shall Be in Good Faith.
Fourth, our executive branch of government voluntarily entered
into the Extradition Treaty, and our legislative branch ratified
it. Hence, the Treaty carries the presumption that its implementation
will serve the national interest.
Fulfilling our obligations under the Extradition Treaty promotes
comity[40]with the requesting state. On the other hand, failure to
fulfill our obligations thereunder paints a bad image of our country
before the world community. Such failure would discourage other
states from entering into treaties with us, particularly an extradition
treaty that hinges on reciprocity.[41]
Verily, we are bound by pacta sunt servanda to comply in good
faith with our obligations under the Treaty.[42] This principle requires
that we deliver the accused to the requesting country if the
conditions precedent to extradition, as set forth in the Treaty, are
satisfied. In other words, [t]he demanding government, when it has
done all that the treaty and the law require it to do, is entitled to the
delivery of the accused on the issue of the proper warrant, and the
other government is under obligation to make the
surrender.[43] Accordingly, the Philippines must be ready and in a
position to deliver the accused, should it be found proper.
5. There Is an Underlying Risk of Flight
Fifth, persons to be extradited are presumed to be flight
risks. This prima facie presumption finds reinforcement in the
experience[44] of the executive branch: nothing short of confinement
can ensure that the accused will not flee the jurisdiction of the
requested state in order to thwart their extradition to the requesting
state.

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The present extradition case further validates the premise that

persons sought to be extradited have a propensity to flee. Indeed,
extradition hearings would not even begin, if only the accused were
willing to submit to trial in the requesting country.[45] Prior acts of
herein respondent -- (1) leaving the requesting state right before the
conclusion of his indictment proceedings there; and (2) remaining in
the requested state despite learning that the requesting state is
seeking his return and that the crimes he is charged with are bailable
-- eloquently speak of his aversion to the processes in the requesting
state, as well as his predisposition to avoid them at all cost. These
circumstances point to an ever-present, underlying high risk of
flight. He has demonstrated that he has the capacity and the will to
flee. Having fled once, what is there to stop him, given sufficient
opportunity, from fleeing a second time?

First Substantive Issue:

Is Respondent Entitled to Notice and Hearing
Before the Issuance of a Warrant of Arrest?

Petitioner contends that the procedure adopted by the RTC -informing the accused, a fugitive from justice, that an Extradition
Petition has been filed against him, and that petitioner is seeking his
arrest -- gives him notice to escape and to avoid
extradition. Moreover, petitioner pleads that such procedure may set
a dangerous precedent, in that those sought to be extradited -including terrorists, mass murderers and war criminals -- may invoke
it in future extradition cases.
On the other hand, Respondent Jimenez argues that he should
not be hurriedly and arbitrarily deprived of his constitutional right to
liberty without due process. He further asserts that there is as yet no
specific law or rule setting forth the procedure prior to the issuance
of a warrant of arrest, after the petition for extradition has been filed
in court; ergo, the formulation of that procedure is within the
discretion of the presiding judge.
Both parties cite Section 6 of PD 1069 in support of their
arguments. It states:
SEC. 6. Issuance of Summons; Temporary Arrest; Hearing, Service of
Notices.- (1) Immediately upon receipt of the petition, the presiding
judge of the court shall, as soon as practicable, summon the accused
to appear and to answer the petition on the day and hour fixed in
the order. [H]e may issue a warrant for the immediate arrest of
the accused which may be served any where within the
Philippines if it appears to the presiding judge that the
immediate arrest and temporary detention of the accused will
best serve the ends of justice. Upon receipt of the answer, or
should the accused after having received the summons fail to answer
within the time fixed, the presiding judge shall hear the case or set
another date for the hearing thereof.
(2) The order and notice as well as a copy of the warrant of arrest, if
issued, shall be promptly served each upon the accused and the
attorney having charge of the case. (Emphasis ours)
Does this provision sanction RTC Judge Purganans act of
immediately setting for hearing the issuance of a warrant of arrest?
We rule in the negative.
1. On the Basis of the Extradition Law

It is significant to note that Section 6 of PD 1069, our

Extradition Law, uses the word immediate to qualify the arrest of the
accused. This qualification would be rendered nugatory by setting
for hearing the issuance of the arrest warrant. Hearing entails
sending notices to the opposing parties,[46] receiving facts and
arguments[47] from them,[48] and giving them time to prepare and
present such facts and arguments. Arrest subsequent to a hearing
can no longer be considered immediate. The law could not have
intended the word as a mere superfluity but, on the whole, as a
means of imparting a sense of urgency and swiftness in the
determination of whether a warrant of arrest should be issued.
By using the phrase if it appears, the law further conveys that
accuracy is not as important as speed at such early stage. The trial
court is not expected to make an exhaustive determination to ferret
out the true and actual situation, immediately upon the filing of the
petition. From the knowledge and the material then available to it,
the court is expected merely to get a good first impression -a prima facie finding -- sufficient to make a speedy initial
determination as regards the arrest and detention of the accused.
Attached to the Petition for Extradition, with a Certificate of
Authentication among others, were the following: (1) Annex H, the
Affidavit executed on May 26, 1999 by Mr. Michael E. Savage -- trial
attorney in the Campaign Financing Task Force of the Criminal
Division of the US Department of Justice; (2) Annexes H to G,
evidentiary Appendices of various exhibits that constituted evidence
of the crimes charged in the Indictment, with Exhibits 1 to 120 (duly
authenticated exhibits that constituted evidence of the crimes
charged in the Indictment); (3) Annex BB, the Exhibit I Appendix of
Witness [excerpts] Statements Referenced in the Affidavit of Angela
Byers and enclosed Statements in two volumes; (4) Annex GG, the
Exhibit J Table of Contents for Supplemental Evidentiary Appendix
with enclosed Exhibits 121 to 132; and (5) Annex MM, the Exhibit L
Appendix of Witness [excerpts] Statements Referenced in the
Affidavit of Betty Steward and enclosed Statements in two
volumes.[49]
It is evident that respondent judge could have already gotten
an impression from these records adequate for him to make an initial
determination of whether the accused was someone who should
immediately be arrested in order to best serve the ends of justice. He
could have determined whether such facts and circumstances existed
as would lead a reasonably discreet and prudent person to believe
that the extradition request was prima facie meritorious. In point of
fact, he actually concluded from these supporting documents that
probable cause did exist.In the second questioned Order, he stated:
In the instant petition, the documents sent by the US Government in
support of [its] request for extradition of herein respondent are
enough to convince the Court of the existence of probable cause to
proceed with the hearing against the extraditee.[50]
We stress that the prima facie existence of probable cause for
hearing the petition and, a priori, for issuing an arrest warrant was
already evident from the Petition itself and its supporting
documents. Hence, after having already determined therefrom that
a prima facie finding did exist, respondent judge gravely abused his
discretion when he set the matter for hearing upon motion of
Jimenez.[51]
Moreover, the law specifies that the court sets a hearing upon
receipt of the answer or upon failure of the accused to answer after
receiving the summons. In connection with the matter of immediate

PIL 3rd SET FT

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arrest, however, the word hearing is notably absent from the

provision. Evidently, had the holding of a hearing at that stage been
intended, the law could have easily so provided. It also bears
emphasizing at this point that extradition proceedings are
summary[52]in nature. Hence, the silence of the Law and the Treaty
leans to the more reasonable interpretation that there is no intention
to punctuate with a hearing every little step in the entire
proceedings.
It is taken for granted that the contracting parties intend something
reasonable and something not inconsistent with generally
recognized principles of International Law, nor with previous treaty
obligations towards third States. If, therefore, the meaning of a treaty
is ambiguous, the reasonable meaning is to be preferred to the
unreasonable, the more reasonable to the less reasonable x x x .[53]
Verily, as argued by petitioner, sending to persons sought to
be extradited a notice of the request for their arrest and setting it for
hearing at some future date would give them ample opportunity to
prepare and execute an escape. Neither the Treaty nor the Law could
have intended that consequence, for the very purpose of both would
have been defeated by the escape of the accused from the
requested state.
2. On the Basis of the Constitution
Even Section 2 of Article III of our Constitution, which is
invoked by Jimenez, does not require a notice or a hearing before
the issuance of a warrant of arrest. It provides:
Sec. 2. The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses,
papers, and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures of
whatever nature and for any purpose shall be inviolable, and no
search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable
cause to be determined personally by the judge after examination
under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he
may produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched
and the persons or things to be seized.
To determine probable cause for the issuance of arrest
warrants, the Constitution itself requires only the examination -under oath or affirmation -- of complainants and the witnesses they
may produce. There is no requirement to notify and hear
the accused before the issuance of warrants of arrest.
In Ho v. People[54] and in all the cases cited therein, never was a
judge required to go to the extent of conducting a hearing just for
the purpose of personally determining probable cause for the
issuance of a warrant of arrest. All we required was that the judge
must have sufficient supporting documents upon which to make his
independent judgment, or at the very least, upon which to verify the
findings of the prosecutor as to the existence of probable cause.[55]
In Webb v. De Leon,[56] the Court categorically stated that a
judge was not supposed to conduct a hearing before issuing a
warrant of arrest:
Again, we stress that before issuing warrants of arrest, judges merely
determine personally the probability, not the certainty of guilt of an
accused. In doing so, judges do not conduct a de novo hearing to
determine the existence of probable cause. They just personally review
the initial determination of the prosecutor finding a probable cause
to see if it is supported by substantial evidence.

At most, in cases of clear insufficiency of evidence on record,

judges
merely
further
examine complainants and their witnesses.[57] In the present case,
validating the act of respondent judge and instituting the practice of
hearing the accused and his witnesses at this early stage would be
discordant with the rationale for the entire system. If the accused
were allowed to be heard and necessarily to present evidence during
the prima facie determination for the issuance of a warrant of arrest,
what would stop him from presenting his entire plethora of defenses
at this stage -- if he so desires -- in his effort to negate a prima facie
finding? Such a procedure could convert the determination of a
prima facie case into a full-blown trial of the entire proceedings and
possibly make trial of the main case superfluous. This scenario is also
anathema to the summary nature of extraditions.
That the case under consideration is an extradition and not a
criminal action is not sufficient to justify the adoption of a set of
procedures more protective of the accused. If a different procedure
were called for at all, a more restrictive one -- not the opposite -would be justified in view of respondents demonstrated
predisposition to flee.
Since this is a matter of first impression, we deem it wise to
restate the proper procedure:
Upon receipt of a petition for extradition and its supporting
documents, the judge must study them and make, as soon as
possible, a prima facie finding whether (a) they are sufficient in form
and substance, (b) they show compliance with the Extradition Treaty
and Law, and (c) the person sought is extraditable. At his discretion,
the judge may require the submission of further documentation or
may personally examine the affiants and witnesses of the
petitioner. If, in spite of this study and examination, no prima facie
finding[58] is possible, the petition may be dismissed at the discretion
of the judge.
On the other hand, if the presence of a prima facie case is
determined, then the magistrate must immediately issue a warrant
for the arrest of the extraditee, who is at the same time summoned
to answer the petition and to appear at scheduled summary
hearings. Prior to the issuance of the warrant, the judge must not
inform or notify the potential extraditee of the pendency of the
petition, lest the latter be given the opportunity to escape and
frustrate the proceedings. In our opinion, the foregoing procedure
will best serve the ends of justice in extradition cases.

Second Substantive Issue:

Is Respondent Entitled to Bail?

Article III, Section 13 of the Constitution, is worded as follows:

Art. III, Sec. 13. All persons, except those charged with offenses
punishable by reclusion perpetua when evidence of guilt is strong,
shall, before conviction, be bailable by sufficient sureties, or be
released on recognizance as may be provided by law. The right to
bail shall not be impaired even when the privilege of the writ of
habeas corpus is suspended. Excessive bail shall not be required.
Respondent Mark B. Jimenez maintains that this constitutional
provision secures the right to bail of all persons, including those
sought to be extradited. Supposedly, the only exceptions are the
ones charged with offenses punishable with reclusion perpetua, when

PIL 3rd SET FT

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evidence of guilt is strong. He also alleges the relevance to the

present case of Section 4[59] of Rule 114 of the Rules of Court which,
insofar as practicable and consistent with the summary nature of
extradition proceedings, shall also apply according to Section 9 of
PD 1069.
On the other hand, petitioner claims that there is no provision
in the Philippine Constitution granting the right to bail to a person
who is the subject of an extradition request and arrest warrant.
Extradition Different from Ordinary Criminal Proceedings
We agree with petitioner. As suggested by the use of the word
conviction, the constitutional provision on bail quoted above, as well
as Section 4 of Rule 114 of the Rules of Court, applies only when a
person has been arrested and detained for violation of Philippine
criminal laws. It does not apply to extradition proceedings, because
extradition courts do not render judgments of conviction or
acquittal.
Moreover, the constitutional right to bail flows from the
presumption of innocence in favor of every accused who should not
be subjected to the loss of freedom as thereafter he would be
entitled to acquittal, unless his guilt be proved beyond reasonable
doubt.[60] It follows that the constitutional provision on bail will not
apply to a case like extradition, where the presumption of innocence
is not at issue.
The provision in the Constitution stating that the right to bail
shall not be impaired even when the privilege of the writ of habeas
corpus is suspended does not detract from the rule that the
constitutional right to bail is available only in criminal proceedings. It
must be noted that the suspension of the privilege of the writ of
habeas corpus finds application only to persons judicially charged for
rebellion or offenses inherent in or directly connected with
invasion.[61] Hence, the second sentence in the constitutional
provision on bail merely emphasizes the right to bail in criminal
proceedings for the aforementioned offenses. It cannot be taken to
mean that the right is available even in extradition proceedings that
are not criminal in nature.
That the offenses for which Jimenez is sought to be extradited
are bailable in the United States is not an argument to grant him one
in the present case. To stress, extradition proceedings are separate
and distinct from the trial for the offenses for which he is
charged. He should apply for bail before the courts trying the
criminal cases against him, not before the extradition court.
No Violation of Due Process
Respondent Jimenez cites the foreign case Paretti[62] in arguing
that, constitutionally, [n]o one shall be deprived of x x x liberty x x x
without due process of law.
Contrary to his contention, his detention prior to the
conclusion of the extradition proceedings does not amount to a
violation of his right to due process. We iterate the familiar doctrine
that the essence of due process is the opportunity to be
heard[63] but, at the same time, point out that the doctrine does not
always call for a prior opportunity to be heard.[64] Where the
circumstances -- such as those present in an extradition case -- call
for it, a subsequent opportunity to be heard is enough.[65] In the
present case, respondent will be given full opportunity to be heard
subsequently, when the extradition court hears the Petition for
Extradition. Hence, there is no violation of his right to due process
and fundamental fairness.

Contrary to the contention of Jimenez, we find no arbitrariness,

either, in the immediate deprivation of his liberty prior to his being
heard. That his arrest and detention will not be arbitrary is
sufficiently ensured by (1) the DOJs filing in court the Petition with its
supporting documents after a determination that the extradition
request meets the requirements of the law and the relevant treaty;
(2) the extradition judges independent prima facie determination
that his arrest will best serve the ends of justice before the issuance
of a warrant for his arrest; and (3) his opportunity, once he is under
the courts custody, to apply for bail as an exception to the no-initialbail rule.
It is also worth noting that before the US government
requested the extradition of respondent, proceedings had already
been conducted in that country. But because he left the jurisdiction
of the requesting state before those proceedings could be
completed, it was hindered from continuing with the due processes
prescribed under its laws. His invocation of due process now has
thus become hollow. He already had that opportunity in the
requesting state; yet, instead of taking it, he ran away.
In this light, would it be proper and just for the government to
increase the risk of violating its treaty obligations in order to accord
Respondent Jimenez his personal liberty in the span of time that it
takes to resolve the Petition for Extradition? His supposed immediate
deprivation of liberty without the due process that he had previously
shunned pales against the governments interest in fulfilling its
Extradition Treaty obligations and in cooperating with the world
community in the suppression of crime. Indeed, [c]onstitutional
liberties do not exist in a vacuum; the due process rights accorded to
individuals must be carefully balanced against exigent and palpable
government interests.[66]
Too, we cannot allow our country to be a haven for fugitives,
cowards and weaklings who, instead of facing the consequences of
their actions, choose to run and hide. Hence, it would not be good
policy to increase the risk of violating our treaty obligations if,
through overprotection or excessively liberal treatment, persons
sought to be extradited are able to evade arrest or escape from our
custody. In the absence of any provision -- in the Constitution, the
law or the treaty -- expressly guaranteeing the right to bail in
extradition proceedings, adopting the practice of not granting them
bail, as a general rule, would be a step towards deterring fugitives
from coming to the Philippines to hide from or evade their
prosecutors.
The denial of bail as a matter of course in extradition cases falls
into place with and gives life to Article 14[67] of the Treaty, since this
practice would encourage the accused to voluntarily surrender to the
requesting state to cut short their detention here. Likewise, their
detention pending the resolution of extradition proceedings would
fall into place with the emphasis of the Extradition Law on the
summary nature of extradition cases and the need for their speedy
disposition.

Exceptions to the No Bail Rule

The rule, we repeat, is that bail is not a matter of right in

extradition cases. However, the judiciary has the constitutional duty
to curb grave abuse of discretion[68] and tyranny, as well as the
power to promulgate rules to protect and enforce constitutional
rights.[69] Furthermore, we believe that the right to due process is

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broad enough to include the grant of basic fairness to

extraditees. Indeed, the right to due process extends to the life,
liberty or property of every person. It is dynamic and resilient,
adaptable to every situation calling for its application.[70]
Accordingly and to best serve the ends of justice, we believe
and so hold that, after a potential extraditee has been arrested or
placed under the custody of the law, bail may be applied for and
granted as an exception, only upon a clear and convincing showing
(1) that, once granted bail, the applicant will not be a flight risk or a
danger to the community; and (2) that there exist special,
humanitarian and compelling circumstances[71] including, as a matter
of reciprocity, those cited by the highest court in the requesting state
when it grants provisional liberty in extradition cases therein.
Since this exception has no express or specific statutory basis,
and since it is derived essentially from general principles of justice
and fairness, the applicant bears the burden of proving the above
two-tiered requirement with clarity, precision and emphatic
forcefulness. The Court realizes that extradition is basically an
executive, not a judicial, responsibility arising from the presidential
power to conduct foreign relations. In its barest concept, it partakes
of the nature of police assistance amongst states, which is not
normally a judicial prerogative.Hence, any intrusion by the courts
into the exercise of this power should be characterized by caution, so
that the vital international and bilateral interests of our country will
not be unreasonably impeded or compromised. In short, while this
Court is ever protective of the sporting idea of fair play, it also
recognizes the limits of its own prerogatives and the need to fulfill
international obligations.
Along this line, Jimenez contends that there are special
circumstances that are compelling enough for the Court to grant his
request for provisional release on bail. We have carefully examined
these circumstances and shall now discuss them.
1. Alleged Disenfranchisement
While his extradition was pending, Respondent Jimenez was
elected as a member of the House of Representatives. On that basis,
he claims that his detention will disenfranchise his Manila district of
600,000 residents. We are not persuaded. In People v. Jalosjos,[72] the
Court has already debunked the disenfranchisement argument when
it ruled thus:
When the voters of his district elected the accused-appellant to
Congress, they did so with full awareness of the limitations on his
freedom of action. They did so with the knowledge that he could
achieve only such legislative results which he could accomplish
within the confines of prison. To give a more drastic illustration, if
voters elect a person with full knowledge that he is suffering from a
terminal illness, they do so knowing that at any time, he may no
longer serve his full term in office.
In the ultimate analysis, the issue before us boils down to a question
of constitutional equal protection.
The Constitution guarantees: x x x nor shall any person be denied the
equal protection of laws. This simply means that all persons similarly
situated shall be treated alike both in rights enjoyed and
responsibilities imposed. The organs of government may not show
any undue favoritism or hostility to any person. Neither partiality nor
prejudice shall be displayed.

Does being an elective official result in a substantial distinction that

allows different treatment? Is being a Congressman a substantial
differentiation which removes the accused-appellant as a prisoner
from the same class as all persons validly confined under law?
The performance of legitimate and even essential duties by public
officers has never been an excuse to free a person validly [from]
prison. The duties imposed by the mandate of the people are
multifarious.The accused-appellant asserts that the duty to legislate
ranks highest in the hierarchy of government. The accused-appellant
is only one of 250 members of the House of Representatives, not to
mention the 24 members of the Senate, charged with the duties of
legislation. Congress continues to function well in the physical
absence of one or a few of its members. Depending on the exigency
of Government that has to be addressed, the President or the
Supreme Court can also be deemed the highest for that particular
duty. The importance of a function depends on the need for its
exercise. The duty of a mother to nurse her infant is most compelling
under the law of nature. A doctor with unique skills has the duty to
save the lives of those with a particular affliction. An elective
governor has to serve provincial constituents. A police officer must
maintain peace and order. Never has the call of a particular duty
lifted a prisoner into a different classification from those others who
are validly restrained by law.
A strict scrutiny of classifications is essential lest[,] wittingly or
otherwise, insidious discriminations are made in favor of or against
groups or types of individuals.
The Court cannot validate badges of inequality. The necessities
imposed by public welfare may justify exercise of government
authority to regulate even if thereby certain groups may plausibly
assert that their interests are disregarded.
We, therefore, find that election to the position of Congressman is
not a reasonable classification in criminal law enforcement. The
functions and duties of the office are not substantial distinctions
which lift him from the class of prisoners interrupted in their freedom
and restricted in liberty of movement. Lawful arrest and confinement
are germane to the purposes of the law and apply to all those
belonging to the same class.[73]
It must be noted that even before private respondent ran for
and won a congressional seat in Manila, it was already of public
knowledge that the United States was requesting his
extradition. Hence, his constituents were or should have been
prepared for the consequences of the extradition case against their
representative, including his detention pending the final resolution
of the case. Premises considered and in line with Jalosjos, we are
constrained to rule against his claim that his election to public office
is by itself a compelling reason to grant him bail.
2. Anticipated Delay
Respondent Jimenez further contends that because the
extradition proceedings are lengthy, it would be unfair to confine
him during the pendency of the case. Again we are not
convinced. We must emphasize that extradition cases are summary
in nature. They are resorted to merely to determine whether the
extradition petition and its annexes conform to the Extradition
Treaty, not to determine guilt or innocence. Neither is it, as a rule,
intended to address issues relevant to the constitutional rights
available to the accused in a criminal action.

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We are not overruling the possibility that petitioner may, in

bad faith, unduly delay the proceedings. This is quite another matter
that is not at issue here. Thus, any further discussion of this point
would be merely anticipatory and academic.
However, if the delay is due to maneuverings of respondent,
with all the more reason would the grant of bail not be
justified. Giving premium to delay by considering it as a special
circumstance for the grant of bail would be tantamount to giving
him the power to grant bail to himself. It would also encourage him
to stretch out and unreasonably delay the extradition proceedings
even more. This we cannot allow.
3. Not a Flight Risk?
Jimenez further claims that he is not a flight risk. To support
this claim, he stresses that he learned of the extradition request in
June 1999; yet, he has not fled the country. True, he has not actually
fled during the preliminary stages of the request for his
extradition. Yet, this fact cannot be taken to mean that he will not
flee as the process moves forward to its conclusion, as he hears the
footsteps of the requesting government inching closer and
closer. That he has not yet fled from the Philippines cannot be taken
to mean that he will stand his ground and still be within reach of our
government if and when it matters; that is, upon the resolution of the
Petition for Extradition.
In any event, it is settled that bail may be applied for and
granted by the trial court at anytime after the applicant has been
taken into custody and prior to judgment, even after bail has been
previously denied. In the present case, the extradition court may
continue hearing evidence on the application for bail, which may be
granted in accordance with the guidelines in this Decision.

Brief Refutation of Dissents

The proposal to remand this case to the extradition court, we

believe, is totally unnecessary; in fact, it is a cop-out. The parties -- in
particular, Respondent Jimenez -- have been given more than
sufficient opportunity both by the trial court and this Court to
discuss fully and exhaustively private respondents claim to bail. As
already stated, the RTC set for hearing not only petitioners
application for an arrest warrant, but also private respondents prayer
for temporary liberty. Thereafter required by the RTC were
memoranda on the arrest, then position papers on the application
for bail, both of which were separately filed by the parties.
This Court has meticulously pored over the Petition, the
Comment, the Reply, the lengthy Memoranda and the Position
Papers of both parties. Additionally, it has patiently heard them in
Oral Arguments, a procedure not normally observed in the great
majority of cases in this Tribunal. Moreover, after the Memos had
been submitted, the parties -- particularly the potential extraditee -have bombarded this Court with additional pleadings -- entitled
Manifestations by both parties and Counter-Manifestation by private
respondent -- in which the main topic was Mr. Jimenezs plea for bail.
A remand would mean that this long, tedious process would be
repeated in its entirety. The trial court would again hear factual and
evidentiary matters. Be it noted, however, that, in all his voluminous
pleadings and verbal propositions, private respondent has not asked
for a remand. Evidently, even he realizes that there is absolutely no
need to rehear factual matters.Indeed, the inadequacy lies not in

the factual presentation of Mr. Jimenez. Rather, it lies in

his legal arguments. Remanding the case will not solve this utter lack
of persuasion and strength in his legal reasoning.
In short, this Court -- as shown by this Decision and the
spirited Concurring, Separate and Dissenting Opinions written by the
learned justices themselves -- has exhaustively deliberated and
carefully passed upon all relevant questions in this case. Thus, a
remand will not serve any useful purpose; it will only further delay
these already very delayed proceedings,[74] which our Extradition Law
requires to be summary in character. What we need now is prudent
and deliberate speed, not unnecessary and convoluted delay. What is
needed is a firm decision on the merits, not a circuitous cop-out.
Then, there is also the suggestion that this Court is allegedly
disregarding basic freedoms when a case is one of extradition. We
believe that this charge is not only baseless, but also unfair. Suffice it
to say that, in its length and breath, this Decision has taken special
cognizance of the rights to due process and fundamental fairness of
potential extraditees.

Summation

As we draw to a close, it is now time to summarize and stress

these ten points:
1. The ultimate purpose of extradition proceedings is to
determine whether the request expressed in the petition, supported
by its annexes and the evidence that may be adduced during the
hearing of the petition, complies with the Extradition Treaty and Law;
and whether the person sought is extraditable. The proceedings are
intended merely to assist the requesting state in bringing the
accused -- or the fugitive who has illegally escaped -- back to its
territory, so that the criminal process may proceed therein.
2. By entering into an extradition treaty, the Philippines is
deemed to have reposed its trust in the reliability or soundness of
the legal and judicial system of its treaty partner, as well as in the
ability and the willingness of the latter to grant basic rights to the
accused in the pending criminal case therein.
3. By nature then, extradition proceedings are not equivalent to
a
criminal
case
in
which
guilt
or
innocence
is
determined. Consequently, an extradition case is not one in which
the constitutional rights of the accused are necessarily available. It is
more akin, if at all, to a courts request to police authorities for the
arrest of the accused who is at large or has escaped detention or
jumped bail. Having once escaped the jurisdiction of the requesting
state, the reasonable prima facie presumption is that the person
would escape again if given the opportunity.
4. Immediately upon receipt of the petition for extradition and
its supporting documents, the judge shall make a prima facie finding
whether the petition is sufficient in form and substance, whether it
complies with the Extradition Treaty and Law, and whether the
person sought is extraditable. The magistrate has discretion to
require the petitioner to submit further documentation, or to
personally examine the affiants or witnesses. If convinced that a
prima facie case exists, the judge immediately issues a warrant for
the arrest of the potential extraditee and summons him or her to
answer and to appear at scheduled hearings on the petition.

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5. After being taken into custody, potential extraditees may

apply for bail. Since the applicants have a history of absconding, they
have the burden of showing that (a) there is no flight risk and no
danger to the community; and (b) there exist special, humanitarian
or compelling circumstances. The grounds used by the highest court
in the requesting state for the grant of bail therein may be
considered, under the principle of reciprocity as a special
circumstance. In extradition cases, bail is not a matter of right; it is
subject to judicial discretion in the context of the peculiar facts of
each case.
6. Potential extraditees are entitled to the rights to due process
and to fundamental fairness. Due process does not always call for
a prior opportunity to be heard. A subsequentopportunity is sufficient
due to the flight risk involved. Indeed, available during the hearings
on the petition and the answer is the full chance to be heard and to
enjoy fundamental fairness that is compatible with the summary
nature of extradition.
7. This Court will always remain a protector of human rights, a
bastion of liberty, a bulwark of democracy and the conscience of
society. But it is also well aware of the limitations of its authority and
of the need for respect for the prerogatives of the other co-equal
and co-independent organs of government.
8. We realize that extradition is essentially an executive, not a
judicial, responsibility arising out of the presidential power to
conduct foreign relations and to implement treaties. Thus, the
Executive Department of government has broad discretion in its duty
and power of implementation.
9. On the other hand, courts merely perform oversight
functions and exercise review authority to prevent or excise grave
abuse and tyranny. They should not allow contortions, delays and
over-due process every little step of the way, lest
these summary extradition proceedings become not only inutile but
also sources of international embarrassment due to our inability to
comply in good faith with a treaty partners simple request to return
a fugitive. Worse, our country should not be converted into a
dubious haven where fugitives and escapees can unreasonably delay,
mummify, mock, frustrate, checkmate and defeat the quest for
bilateral justice and international cooperation.
10. At bottom, extradition proceedings should be
conducted with all deliberate speed to determine compliance
with the Extradition Treaty and Law; and, while safeguarding
basic
individual
rights,
to
avoid
the
legalistic contortions, delays and technicalities that may negate t
hat purpose.
WHEREFORE, the Petition is GRANTED. The assailed RTC Order
dated May 23, 2001 is hereby declared NULL and VOID, while the
challenged Order dated July 3, 2001 is SET ASIDE insofar as it
granted bail to Respondent Mark Jimenez. The bail bond posted by
private respondent is CANCELLED. The Regional Trial Court of Manila
is directed to conduct the extradition proceedings before it, with all
deliberate speed pursuant to the spirit and the letter of our
Extradition Treaty with the United States as well as our Extradition
Law. No costs.
SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 153675

April 19, 2007

GOVERNMENT OF HONG KONG SPECIAL

ADMINISTRATIVE REGION, represented by the
Philippine Department of Justice, Petitioner,
vs.
HON. FELIXBERTO T. OLALIA, JR. and JUAN ANTONIO
MUOZ, Respondents.
DECISION
SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, J.:
For our resolution is the instant Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65
of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended, seeking to nullify
the two Orders of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 8, Manila
(presided by respondent Judge Felixberto T. Olalia, Jr.) issued in Civil
Case No. 99-95773. These are: (1) the Order dated December 20,
2001 allowing Juan Antonio Muoz, private respondent, to post bail;
and (2) the Order dated April 10, 2002 denying the motion to vacate
the said Order of December 20, 2001 filed by the Government of
Hong Kong Special Administrative Region, represented by the
Philippine Department of Justice (DOJ), petitioner. The petition
alleges that both Orders were issued by respondent judge with grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction as
there is no provision in the Constitution granting bail to a potential
extraditee.
The facts are:
On January 30, 1995, the Republic of the Philippines and the then
British Crown Colony of Hong Kong signed an "Agreement for the
Surrender of Accused and Convicted Persons." It took effect on June
20, 1997.
On July 1, 1997, Hong Kong reverted back to the Peoples Republic
of China and became the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region.
Private respondent Muoz was charged before the Hong Kong Court
with three (3) counts of the offense of "accepting an advantage as
agent," in violation of Section 9 (1) (a) of the Prevention of Bribery
Ordinance, Cap. 201 of Hong Kong. He also faces seven (7) counts of
the offense of conspiracy to defraud, penalized by the common law
of Hong Kong. On August 23, 1997 and October 25, 1999, warrants
of arrest were issued against him. If convicted, he faces a jail term of
seven (7) to fourteen (14) years for each charge.
On September 13, 1999, the DOJ received from the Hong Kong
Department of Justice a request for the provisional arrest of private
respondent. The DOJ then forwarded the request to the National
Bureau of Investigation (NBI) which, in turn, filed with the RTC of
Manila, Branch 19 an application for the provisional arrest of private
respondent.
On September 23, 1999, the RTC, Branch 19, Manila issued an Order
of Arrest against private respondent. That same day, the NBI agents
arrested and detained him.

EN BANC

PIL 3rd SET FT

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On October 14, 1999, private respondent filed with the Court of

Appeals a petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus with
application for preliminary mandatory injunction and/or writ
of habeas corpus questioning the validity of the Order of Arrest.

the assets of accused, real and personal, be filed with this

Court soonest, with the condition that if the accused flees
from his undertaking, said assets be forfeited in favor of
the government and that the corresponding
lien/annotation be noted therein accordingly.

On November 9, 1999, the Court of Appeals rendered its Decision

declaring the Order of Arrest void.

SO ORDERED.

On November 12, 1999, the DOJ filed with this Court a petition for
review on certiorari, docketed as G.R. No. 140520, praying that the
Decision of the Court of Appeals be reversed.

On December 21, 2001, petitioner filed an urgent motion to vacate

the above Order, but it was denied by respondent judge in his Order
dated April 10, 2002.

On December 18, 2000, this Court rendered a Decision granting the

petition of the DOJ and sustaining the validity of the Order of Arrest
against private respondent. The Decision became final and executory
on April 10, 2001.

Hence, the instant petition. Petitioner alleged that the trial court
committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction in admitting private respondent to bail; that there is
nothing in the Constitution or statutory law providing that a
potential extraditee has a right to bail, the right being limited solely
to criminal proceedings.

Meanwhile, as early as November 22, 1999, petitioner Hong Kong

Special Administrative Region filed with the RTC of Manila a petition
for the extradition of private respondent, docketed as Civil Case No.
99-95733, raffled off to Branch 10, presided by Judge Ricardo
Bernardo, Jr. For his part, private respondent filed, in the same
case,- a petition for bail which was opposed by petitioner.
After hearing, or on October 8, 2001, Judge Bernardo, Jr. issued an
Order denying the petition for bail, holding that there is no
Philippine law granting bail in extradition cases and that private
respondent is a high "flight risk."
On October 22, 2001, Judge Bernardo, Jr. inhibited himself from
further hearing Civil Case No. 99-95733. It was then raffled off to
Branch 8 presided by respondent judge.
On October 30, 2001, private respondent filed a motion for
reconsideration of the Order denying his application for bail. This
was granted by respondent judge in an Order dated December 20,
2001 allowing private respondent to post bail, thus:
In conclusion, this Court will not contribute to accuseds further
erosion of civil liberties. The petition for bail is granted subject to the
following conditions:
1. Bail is set at Php750,000.00 in cash with the condition
that accused hereby undertakes that he will appear and
answer the issues raised in these proceedings and will at all
times hold himself amenable to orders and processes of
this Court, will further appear for judgment. If accused fails
in this undertaking, the cash bond will be forfeited in favor
of the government;
2. Accused must surrender his valid passport to this Court;
3. The Department of Justice is given immediate notice and
discretion of filing its own motion for hold departure order
before this Court even in extradition proceeding; and
4. Accused is required to report to the government
prosecutors handling this case or if they so desire to the
nearest office, at any time and day of the week; and if they
further desire, manifest before this Court to require that all

In his comment on the petition, private respondent maintained that

the right to bail guaranteed under the Bill of Rights extends to a
prospective extraditee; and that extradition is a harsh process
resulting in a prolonged deprivation of ones liberty.
Section 13, Article III of the Constitution provides that the right to
bail shall not be impaired, thus:
Sec. 13. All persons, except those charged with offenses punishable
by reclusion perpetua when evidence of guilt is strong, shall, before
conviction, be bailable by sufficient sureties, or be released on
recognizance as may be provided by law. The right to bail shall not
be impaired even when the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus is
suspended. Excessive bail shall not be required.
Jurisprudence on extradition is but in its infancy in this jurisdiction.
Nonetheless, this is not the first time that this Court has an occasion
to resolve the question of whether a prospective extraditee may be
granted bail.
In Government of United States of America v. Hon. Guillermo G.
Purganan, Presiding Judge, RTC of Manila, Branch 42, and Mark B.
Jimenez, a.k.a. Mario Batacan Crespo,1 this Court, speaking through
then Associate Justice Artemio V. Panganiban, later Chief Justice,
held that the constitutional provision on bail does not apply to
extradition proceedings. It is "available only in criminal proceedings,"
thus:
x x x. As suggested by the use of the word "conviction," the
constitutional provision on bail quoted above, as well as Section 4,
Rule 114 of the Rules of Court, applies only when a person has been
arrested and detained for violation of Philippine criminal laws. It
does not apply to extradition proceedings because extradition courts
do not render judgments of conviction or acquittal.
Moreover, the constitutional right to bail "flows from the
presumption of innocence in favor of every accused who should not
be subjected to the loss of freedom as thereafter he would be
entitled to acquittal, unless his guilt be proved beyond reasonable
doubt" (De la Camara v. Enage, 41 SCRA 1, 6, September 17, 1971,
per Fernando, J., later CJ). It follows that the constitutional provision

PIL 3rd SET FT

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on bail will not apply to a case like extradition, where the

presumption of innocence is not at issue.
The provision in the Constitution stating that the "right to bail shall
not be impaired even when the privilege of the writ of habeas
corpus is suspended" does not detract from the rule that the
constitutional right to bail is available only in criminal proceedings. It
must be noted that the suspension of the privilege of the writ
of habeas corpus finds application "only to persons judicially charged
for rebellion or offenses inherent in or directly connected with
invasion" (Sec. 18, Art. VIII, Constitution). Hence, the second sentence
in the constitutional provision on bail merely emphasizes the right to
bail in criminal proceedings for the aforementioned offenses. It
cannot be taken to mean that the right is available even in
extradition proceedings that are not criminal in nature.
At first glance, the above ruling applies squarely to private
respondents case. However, this Court cannot ignore the following
trends in international law: (1) the growing importance of the
individual person in public international law who, in the 20th century,
has gradually attained global recognition; (2) the higher value now
being given to human rights in the international sphere; (3) the
corresponding duty of countries to observe these universal human
rights in fulfilling their treaty obligations; and (4) the duty of this
Court to balance the rights of the individual under our fundamental
law, on one hand, and the law on extradition, on the other.
The modern trend in public international law is the primacy
placed on the worth of the individual person and the sanctity of
human rights. Slowly, the recognition that the individual person
may properly be a subject of international law is now taking root.
The vulnerable doctrine that the subjects of international law are
limited only to states was dramatically eroded towards the second
half of the past century. For one, the Nuremberg and Tokyo trials
after World War II resulted in the unprecedented spectacle of
individual defendants for acts characterized as violations of the laws
of war, crimes against peace, and crimes against humanity. Recently,
under the Nuremberg principle, Serbian leaders have been
persecuted for war crimes and crimes against humanity committed in
the former Yugoslavia. These significant events show that the
individual person is now a valid subject of international law.
On a more positive note, also after World War II, both international
organizations and states gave recognition and importance to human
rights. Thus, on December 10, 1948, the United Nations General
Assembly adopted the Universal Declaration of Human Rights in
which the right to life, liberty and all the other fundamental rights of
every person were proclaimed. While not a treaty, the principles
contained in the said Declaration are now recognized as
customarily binding upon the members of the international
community. Thus, in Mejoff v. Director of Prisons,2 this Court, in
granting bail to a prospective deportee, held that under the
Constitution,3 the principles set forth in that Declaration are part of
the law of the land. In 1966, the UN General Assembly also adopted
the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights which the
Philippines signed and ratified. Fundamental among the rights
enshrined therein are the rights of every person to life, liberty, and
due process.
The Philippines, along with the other members of the family of
nations, committed to uphold the fundamental human rights as well
as value the worth and dignity of every person. This commitment is

enshrined in Section II, Article II of our Constitution which provides:

"The State values the dignity of every human person and guarantees
full respect for human rights." The Philippines, therefore, has the
responsibility of protecting and promoting the right of every person
to liberty and due process, ensuring that those detained or arrested
can participate in the proceedings before a court, to enable it to
decide without delay on the legality of the detention and order their
release if justified. In other words, the Philippine authorities are
under obligation to make available to every person under detention
such remedies which safeguard their fundamental right to liberty.
These remedies include the right to be admitted to bail. While this
Court in Purganan limited the exercise of the right to bail to criminal
proceedings, however, in light of the various international treaties
giving recognition and protection to human rights, particularly the
right to life and liberty, a reexamination of this Courts ruling
in Purganan is in order.
First, we note that the exercise of the States power to
deprive an individual of his liberty is not necessarily limited
to criminal proceedings. Respondents in administrative
proceedings, such as deportation and quarantine,4 have
likewise been detained.
Second, to limit bail to criminal proceedings would be to
close our eyes to our jurisprudential history. Philippine
jurisprudence has not limited the exercise of the right to
bail to criminal proceedings only. This Court has admitted
to bail persons who are not involved in criminal
proceedings. In fact, bail has been allowed in this
jurisdiction to persons in detention during the pendency of
administrative proceedings, taking into cognizance the
obligation of the Philippines under international
conventions to uphold human rights.
The 1909 case of US v. Go-Sioco5 is illustrative. In this case, a Chinese
facing deportation for failure to secure the necessary certificate of
registration was granted bail pending his appeal. After noting that
the prospective deportee had committed no crime, the Court opined
that "To refuse him bail is to treat him as a person who has
committed the most serious crime known to law;" and that while
deportation is not a criminal proceeding, some of the machinery
used "is the machinery of criminal law." Thus, the provisions relating
to bail was applied to deportation proceedings.
In Mejoff v. Director of Prisons6 and Chirskoff v. Commission of
Immigration,7 this Court ruled that foreign nationals against whom
no formal criminal charges have been filed may be released on bail
pending the finality of an order of deportation. As previously stated,
the Court in Mejoff relied upon the Universal declaration of Human
Rights in sustaining the detainees right to bail.
If bail can be granted in deportation cases, we see no justification
why it should not also be allowed in extradition cases. Likewise,
considering that the Universal Declaration of Human Rights applies
to deportation cases, there is no reason why it cannot be invoked in
extradition cases. After all, both are administrative proceedings
where the innocence or guilt of the person detained is not in issue.
Clearly, the right of a prospective extraditee to apply for bail in this
jurisdiction must be viewed in the light of the various treaty
obligations of the Philippines concerning respect for the promotion
and protection of human rights. Under these treaties, the

PIL 3rd SET FT

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presumption lies in favor of human liberty. Thus, the Philippines

should see to it that the right to liberty of every individual is not
impaired.
Section 2(a) of Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 1069 (The Philippine
Extradition Law) defines "extradition" as "the removal of an accused
from the Philippines with the object of placing him at the disposal of
foreign authorities to enable the requesting state or government to
hold him in connection with any criminal investigation directed
against him or the execution of a penalty imposed on him under the
penal or criminal law of the requesting state or government."

The applicable standard of due process, however, should not be the

same as that in criminal proceedings. In the latter, the standard of
due process is premised on the presumption of innocence of the
accused. As Purganan correctly points out, it is from this major
premise that the ancillary presumption in favor of admitting to bail
arises. Bearing in mind the purpose of extradition proceedings, the
premise behind the issuance of the arrest warrant and the
"temporary detention" is the possibility of flight of the potential
extraditee. This is based on the assumption that such extraditee is a
fugitive from justice.15 Given the foregoing, the prospective
extraditee thus bears the onus probandi of showing that he or she is
not a flight risk and should be granted bail.

Extradition has thus been characterized as the right of a foreign

power, created by treaty, to demand the surrender of one accused or
convicted of a crime within its territorial jurisdiction, and the
correlative duty of the other state to surrender him to the
demanding state.8 It is not a criminal proceeding.9 Even if the
potential extraditee is a criminal, an extradition proceeding is not by
its nature criminal, for it is not punishment for a crime, even though
such punishment may follow extradition.10 It is sui generis, tracing its
existence wholly to treaty obligations between different nations.11 It
is not a trial to determine the guilt or innocence of the potential
extraditee.12 Nor is it a full-blown civil action, but one that is merely
administrative in character.13 Its object is to prevent the escape of a
person accused or convicted of a crime and to secure his return to
the state from which he fled, for the purpose of trial or punishment.14

The time-honored principle of pacta sunt servanda demands that the

Philippines honor its obligations under the Extradition Treaty it
entered into with the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region.
Failure to comply with these obligations is a setback in our foreign
relations and defeats the purpose of extradition. However, it does
not necessarily mean that in keeping with its treaty obligations, the
Philippines should diminish a potential extraditees rights to life,
liberty, and due process. More so, where these rights are guaranteed,
not only by our Constitution, but also by international conventions,
to which the Philippines is a party. We should not, therefore, deprive
an extraditee of his right to apply for bail, provided that a certain
standard for the grant is satisfactorily met.

But while extradition is not a criminal proceeding, it is characterized

by the following: (a) it entails a deprivation of liberty on the part of
the potential extraditee and (b) the means employed to attain the
purpose of extradition is also "the machinery of criminal
law." This is shown by Section 6 of P.D. No. 1069 (The Philippine
Extradition Law) which mandates the "immediate arrest and
temporary detention of the accused" if such "will best serve the
interest of justice." We further note that Section 20 allows the
requesting state "in case of urgency" to ask for the "provisional
arrest of the accused, pending receipt of the request for
extradition;" and that release from provisional arrest "shall not
prejudice re-arrest and extradition of the accused if a request for
extradition is received subsequently."

An extradition proceeding being sui generis, the standard of proof

required in granting or denying bail can neither be the proof beyond
reasonable doubt in criminal cases nor the standard of proof of
preponderance of evidence in civil cases. While administrative in
character, the standard of substantial evidence used in administrative
cases cannot likewise apply given the object of extradition law which
is to prevent the prospective extraditee from fleeing our jurisdiction.
In his Separate Opinion in Purganan, then Associate Justice, now
Chief Justice Reynato S. Puno, proposed that a new standard which
he termed "clear and convincing evidence" should be used in
granting bail in extradition cases. According to him, this standard
should be lower than proof beyond reasonable doubt but higher
than preponderance of evidence. The potential extraditee must
prove by "clear and convincing evidence" that he is not a flight risk
and will abide with all the orders and processes of the extradition
court.

Obviously, an extradition proceeding, while ostensibly administrative,

bears all earmarks of a criminal process. A potential extraditee may
be subjected to arrest, to a prolonged restraint of liberty, and
forced to transfer to the demanding state following the
proceedings. "Temporary detention" may be a necessary step in the
process of extradition, but the length of time of the detention should
be reasonable.

In this case, there is no showing that private respondent presented

evidence to show that he is not a flight risk. Consequently, this case
should be remanded to the trial court to determine whether private
respondent may be granted bail on the basis of "clear and
convincing evidence."

Records show that private respondent was arrested on September

23, 1999, and remained incarcerated until December 20, 2001, when
the trial court ordered his admission to bail. In other words, he had
been detained for over two (2) years without having been
convicted of any crime. By any standard, such an extended period
of detention is a serious deprivation of his fundamental right to
liberty. In fact, it was this prolonged deprivation of liberty which
prompted the extradition court to grant him bail.

WHEREFORE, we DISMISS the petition. This case is REMANDED to

the trial court to determine whether private respondent is entitled to
bail on the basis of "clear and convincing evidence." If not, the trial
court should order the cancellation of his bail bond and his
immediate detention; and thereafter, conduct the extradition
proceedings with dispatch.

While our extradition law does not provide for the grant of bail to an
extraditee, however, there is no provision prohibiting him or her
from filing a motion for bail, a right to due process under the
Constitution.

SECOND DIVISION

SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 85750 September 28, 1990

PIL 3rd SET FT

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INTERNATIONAL CATHOLIC IMMIGRATION

COMMISSION, petitioner
vs
HON. PURA CALLEJA IN HER CAPACITY AS DIRECTOR
OF THE BUREAU OF LABOR RELATIONS AND TRADE
UNIONS OF THE PHILIPPINES AND ALLIED SERVICES
(TUPAS) WFTU respondents.

non-profit agency involved in international humanitarian and

voluntary work. It is duly registered with the United Nations
Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC) and enjoys Consultative
Status, Category II. As an international organization rendering
voluntary and humanitarian services in the Philippines, its activities
are parallel to those of the International Committee for Migration
(ICM) and the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC)
[DOLE Records of BLR Case No. A-2-62-87, ICMC v. Calleja, Vol. 1].

G.R. No. 89331 September 28, 1990

On 14 July 1986, Trade Unions of the Philippines and Allied Services

(TUPAS) filed with the then Ministry of Labor and Employment a
Petition for Certification Election among the rank and file members
employed by ICMC The latter opposed the petition on the ground
that it is an international organization registered with the United
Nations and, hence, enjoys diplomatic immunity.

KAPISANAN NG MANGGAGAWA AT TAC SA IRRIORGANIZED LABOR ASSOCIATION IN LINE

INDUSTRIES AND AGRICULTURE, petitioner,
vs
SECRETARY OF LABOR AND EMPLOYMENT AND
INTERNATIONAL RICE RESEARCH INSTITUTE,
INC., respondents.
Araullo, Zambrano, Gruba, Chua Law Firm for petitioner in 85750.
Dominguez, Armamento, Cabana & Associates for petitioner in G.R.
No. 89331.
Jimenez & Associates for IRRI.
Alfredo L. Bentulan for private respondent in 85750.

MELENCIO-HERRERA, J.:
Consolidated on 11 December 1989, these two cases involve the
validity of the claim of immunity by the International Catholic
Migration Commission (ICMC) and the International Rice Research
Institute, Inc. (IRRI) from the application of Philippine labor laws.
I
Facts and Issues
A. G.R. No. 85750 the International Catholic Migration
Commission (ICMC) Case.
As an aftermath of the Vietnam War, the plight of Vietnamese
refugees fleeing from South Vietnam's communist rule confronted
the international community.
In response to this crisis, on 23 February 1981, an Agreement was
forged between the Philippine Government and the United Nations
High Commissioner for Refugees whereby an operating center for
processing Indo-Chinese refugees for eventual resettlement to other
countries was to be established in Bataan (Annex "A", Rollo, pp. 2232).
ICMC was one of those accredited by the Philippine Government to
operate the refugee processing center in Morong, Bataan. It was
incorporated in New York, USA, at the request of the Holy See, as a

On 5 February 1987, Med-Arbiter Anastacio L. Bactin sustained ICMC

and dismissed the petition for lack of jurisdiction.
On appeal by TUPAS, Director Pura Calleja of the Bureau of Labor
Relations (BLR), reversed the Med-Arbiter's Decision and ordered the
immediate conduct of a certification election. At that time, ICMC's
request for recognition as a specialized agency was still pending with
the Department of Foreign Affairs (DEFORAF).
Subsequently, however, on 15 July 1988, the Philippine Government,
through the DEFORAF, granted ICMC the status of a specialized
agency with corresponding diplomatic privileges and immunities, as
evidenced by a Memorandum of Agreement between the
Government and ICMC (Annex "E", Petition, Rollo, pp. 41-43), infra.
ICMC then sought the immediate dismissal of the TUPAS Petition for
Certification Election invoking the immunity expressly granted but
the same was denied by respondent BLR Director who, again,
ordered the immediate conduct of a pre-election conference. ICMC's
two Motions for Reconsideration were denied despite an opinion
rendered by DEFORAF on 17 October 1988 that said BLR Order
violated ICMC's diplomatic immunity.
Thus, on 24 November 1988, ICMC filed the present Petition for
Certiorari with Preliminary Injunction assailing the BLR Order.
On 28 November 1988, the Court issued a Temporary Restraining
Order enjoining the holding of the certification election.
On 10 January 1989, the DEFORAF, through its Legal Adviser, retired
Justice Jorge C. Coquia of the Court of Appeals, filed a Motion for
Intervention alleging that, as the highest executive department with
the competence and authority to act on matters involving diplomatic
immunity and privileges, and tasked with the conduct of Philippine
diplomatic and consular relations with foreign governments and UN
organizations, it has a legal interest in the outcome of this case.
Over the opposition of the Solicitor General, the Court allowed
DEFORAF intervention.
On 12 July 1989, the Second Division gave due course to the ICMC
Petition and required the submittal of memoranda by the parties,
which has been complied with.

PIL 3rd SET FT

Page 25 of 33

As initially stated, the issue is whether or not the grant of diplomatic

privileges and immunites to ICMC extends to immunity from the
application of Philippine labor laws.
ICMC sustains the affirmative of the proposition citing (1) its
Memorandum of Agreement with the Philippine Government giving
it the status of a specialized agency, (infra); (2) the Convention on
the Privileges and Immunities of Specialized Agencies, adopted by
the UN General Assembly on 21 November 1947 and concurred in
by the Philippine Senate through Resolution No. 91 on 17 May 1949
(the Philippine Instrument of Ratification was signed by the President
on 30 August 1949 and deposited with the UN on 20 March
1950) infra; and (3) Article II, Section 2 of the 1987 Constitution,
which declares that the Philippines adopts the generally accepted
principles of international law as part of the law of the land.
Intervenor DEFORAF upholds ICMC'S claim of diplomatic immunity
and seeks an affirmance of the DEFORAF determination that the BLR
Order for a certification election among the ICMC employees is
violative of the diplomatic immunity of said organization.
Respondent BLR Director, on the other hand, with whom the Solicitor
General agrees, cites State policy and Philippine labor laws to justify
its assailed Order, particularly, Article II, Section 18 and Article III,
Section 8 of the 1987 Constitution, infra; and Articles 243 and 246 of
the Labor Code, as amended, ibid. In addition, she contends that a
certification election is not a litigation but a mere investigation of a
non-adversary, fact-finding character. It is not a suit against ICMC its
property, funds or assets, but is the sole concern of the workers
themselves.
B. G.R. No. 89331 (The International Rice Research Institute [IRRI]
Case).
Before a Decision could be rendered in the ICMC Case, the Third
Division, on 11 December 1989, resolved to consolidate G.R. No.
89331 pending before it with G.R. No. 85750, the lower-numbered
case pending with the Second Division, upon manifestation by the
Solicitor General that both cases involve similar issues.
The facts disclose that on 9 December 1959, the Philippine
Government and the Ford and Rockefeller Foundations signed a
Memorandum of Understanding establishing the International Rice
Research Institute (IRRI) at Los Baos, Laguna. It was intended to be
an autonomous, philanthropic, tax-free, non-profit, non-stock
organization designed to carry out the principal objective of
conducting "basic research on the rice plant, on all phases of rice
production, management, distribution and utilization with a view to
attaining nutritive and economic advantage or benefit for the people
of Asia and other major rice-growing areas through improvement in
quality and quantity of rice."
Initially, IRRI was organized and registered with the Securities and
Exchange Commission as a private corporation subject to all laws
and regulations. However, by virtue of Pres. Decree No. 1620,
promulgated on 19 April 1979, IRRI was granted the status,
prerogatives, privileges and immunities of an international
organization.
The Organized Labor Association in Line Industries and Agriculture
(OLALIA), is a legitimate labor organization with an existing local

union, the Kapisanan ng Manggagawa at TAC sa IRRI (Kapisanan, for

short) in respondent IRRI.
On 20 April 1987, the Kapisanan filed a Petition for Direct
Certification Election with Region IV, Regional Office of the
Department of Labor and Employment (DOLE).
IRRI opposed the petition invoking Pres. Decree No. 1620 conferring
upon it the status of an international organization and granting it
immunity from all civil, criminal and administrative proceedings
under Philippine laws.
On 7 July 1987, Med-Arbiter Leonardo M. Garcia, upheld the
opposition on the basis of Pres. Decree No. 1620 and dismissed the
Petition for Direct Certification.
On appeal, the BLR Director, who is the public respondent in the
ICMC Case, set aside the Med-Arbiter's Order and authorized the
calling of a certification election among the rank-and-file employees
of IRRI. Said Director relied on Article 243 of the Labor Code, as
amended, infra and Article XIII, Section 3 of the 1987
Constitution, 1and held that "the immunities and privileges granted
to IRRI do not include exemption from coverage of our Labor Laws."
Reconsideration sought by IRRI was denied.
On appeal, the Secretary of Labor, in a Resolution of 5 July 1989, set
aside the BLR Director's Order, dismissed the Petition for
Certification Election, and held that the grant of specialized agency
status by the Philippine Government to the IRRI bars DOLE from
assuming and exercising jurisdiction over IRRI Said Resolution reads
in part as follows:
Presidential Decree No. 1620 which grants to the
IRRI the status, prerogatives, privileges and
immunities of an international organization is
clear and explicit. It provides in categorical terms
that:
Art. 3 The Institute shall enjoy immunity from
any penal, civil and administrative proceedings,
except insofar as immunity has been expressly
waived by the Director-General of the Institution
or his authorized representative.
Verily, unless and until the Institute expressly
waives its immunity, no summons, subpoena,
orders, decisions or proceedings ordered by any
court or administrative or quasi-judicial agency
are enforceable as against the Institute. In the
case at bar there was no such waiver made by the
Director-General of the Institute. Indeed, the
Institute, at the very first opportunity already
vehemently questioned the jurisdiction of this
Department by filing an ex-parte motion to
dismiss the case.
Hence, the present Petition for Certiorari filed by Kapisanan alleging
grave abuse of discretion by respondent Secretary of Labor in
upholding IRRI's diplomatic immunity.

PIL 3rd SET FT

Page 26 of 33

The Third Division, to which the case was originally assigned,

required the respondents to comment on the petition. In a
Manifestation filed on 4 August 1990, the Secretary of Labor
declared that it was "not adopting as his own" the decision of the BLR
Director in the ICMC Case as well as the Comment of the Solicitor
General sustaining said Director. The last pleading was filed by IRRI
on 14 August 1990.
Instead of a Comment, the Solicitor General filed a Manifestation and
Motion praying that he be excused from filing a comment "it
appearing that in the earlier case of International Catholic Migration
Commission v. Hon. Pura Calleja, G.R. No. 85750. the Office of the
Solicitor General had sustained the stand of Director Calleja on the
very same issue now before it, which position has been superseded
by respondent Secretary of Labor in G.R. No. 89331," the present
case. The Court acceded to the Solicitor General's prayer.
The Court is now asked to rule upon whether or not the Secretary of
Labor committed grave abuse of discretion in dismissing the Petition
for Certification Election filed by Kapisanan.
Kapisanan contends that Article 3 of Pres. Decree No. 1620 granting
IRRI the status, privileges, prerogatives and immunities of an
international organization, invoked by the Secretary of Labor, is
unconstitutional in so far as it deprives the Filipino workers of their
fundamental and constitutional right to form trade unions for the
purpose of collective bargaining as enshrined in the 1987
Constitution.
A procedural issue is also raised. Kapisanan faults respondent
Secretary of Labor for entertaining IRRI'S appeal from the Order of
the Director of the Bureau of Labor Relations directing the holding of
a certification election. Kapisanan contends that pursuant to Sections
7, 8, 9 and 10 of Rule V 2 of the Omnibus Rules Implementing the
Labor Code, the Order of the BLR Director had become final and
unappeable and that, therefore, the Secretary of Labor had no more
jurisdiction over the said appeal.
On the other hand, in entertaining the appeal, the Secretary of Labor
relied on Section 25 of Rep. Act. No. 6715, which took effect on 21
March 1989, providing for the direct filing of appeal from the MedArbiter to the Office of the Secretary of Labor and Employment
instead of to the Director of the Bureau of Labor Relations in cases
involving certification election orders.

Art. III, Section 4. The specialized agencies, their

property and assets, wherever located and by
whomsoever held, shall enjoy immunity from
every form of legal process except insofar as in
any particular case they have expressly waived
their immunity. It is, however, understood that no
waiver of immunity shall extend to any measure
of execution.
Sec. 5. The premises of the specialized
agencies shall be inviolable. The property and
assets of the specialized agencies, wherever
located and by whomsoever held shall be
immune from search, requisition, confiscation,
expropriation and any other form of interference,
whether by executive, administrative, judicial or
legislative action. (Emphasis supplied).
IRRI is similarly situated, Pres. Decree No. 1620, Article 3, is explicit in
its grant of immunity, thus:
Art. 3. Immunity from Legal Process. The
Institute shall enjoy immunity from any penal,
civil and administrative proceedings, except
insofar as that immunity has been expressly
waived by the Director-General of the Institute or
his authorized representatives.
Thus it is that the DEFORAF, through its Legal Adviser, sustained
ICMC'S invocation of immunity when in a Memorandum, dated 17
October 1988, it expressed the view that "the Order of the Director
of the Bureau of Labor Relations dated 21 September 1988 for the
conduct of Certification Election within ICMC violates the diplomatic
immunity of the organization." Similarly, in respect of IRRI, the
DEFORAF speaking through The Acting Secretary of Foreign Affairs,
Jose D. Ingles, in a letter, dated 17 June 1987, to the Secretary of
Labor, maintained that "IRRI enjoys immunity from the jurisdiction of
DOLE in this particular instance."
The foregoing opinions constitute a categorical recognition by the
Executive Branch of the Government that ICMC and IRRI enjoy
immunities accorded to international organizations, which
determination has been held to be a political question conclusive
upon the Courts in order not to embarrass a political department of
Government.

III
Findings in Both Cases.
There can be no question that diplomatic immunity has, in fact, been
granted ICMC and IRRI.
Article II of the Memorandum of Agreement between the Philippine
Government and ICMC provides that ICMC shall have a status
"similar to that of a specialized agency." Article III, Sections 4 and 5
of the Convention on the Privileges and Immunities of Specialized
Agencies, adopted by the UN General Assembly on 21 November
1947 and concurred in by the Philippine Senate through Resolution
No. 19 on 17 May 1949, explicitly provides:

It is a recognized principle of international law

and under our system of separation of powers
that diplomatic immunity is essentially a political
question and courts should refuse to look beyond
a determination by the executive branch of the
government, and where the plea of diplomatic
immunity is recognized and affirmed by the
executive branch of the government as in the
case at bar, it is then the duty of the courts to
accept the claim of immunity upon appropriate
suggestion by the principal law officer of the
government . . . or other officer acting under his
direction. Hence, in adherence to the settled
principle that courts may not so exercise their
jurisdiction . . . as to embarrass the executive arm
of the government in conducting foreign

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relations, it is accepted doctrine that in such cases

the judicial department of (this) government
follows the action of the political branch and will
not embarrass the latter by assuming an
antagonistic jurisdiction. 3
A brief look into the nature of international organizations and
specialized agencies is in order. The term "international organization"
is generally used to describe an organization set up by agreement
between two or more states. 4 Under contemporary international law,
such organizations are endowed with some degree of international
legal personality 5 such that they are capable of exercising specific
rights, duties and powers. 6 They are organized mainly as a means
for conducting general international business in which the member
states have an interest. 7 The United Nations, for instance, is an
international organization dedicated to the propagation of world
peace.
"Specialized agencies" are international organizations having
functions in particular fields. The term appears in Articles 57 8 and
63 9 of the Charter of the United Nations:
The Charter, while it invests the United Nations
with the general task of promoting progress and
international cooperation in economic, social,
health, cultural, educational and related matters,
contemplates that these tasks will be mainly
fulfilled not by organs of the United Nations itself
but by autonomous international organizations
established by inter-governmental agreements
outside the United Nations. There are now many
such international agencies having functions in
many different fields, e.g. in posts,
telecommunications, railways, canals, rivers, sea
transport, civil aviation, meteorology, atomic
energy, finance, trade, education and culture,
health and refugees. Some are virtually worldwide in their membership, some are regional or
otherwise limited in their membership. The
Charter provides that those agencies which have
"wide international responsibilities" are to be
brought into relationship with the United Nations
by agreements entered into between them and
the Economic and Social Council, are then to be
known as "specialized agencies." 10
The rapid growth of international organizations under contemporary
international law has paved the way for the development of the
concept of international immunities.
It is now usual for the constitutions of
international organizations to contain provisions
conferring certain immunities on the
organizations themselves, representatives of their
member states and persons acting on behalf of
the organizations. A series of conventions,
agreements and protocols defining the
immunities of various international organizations
in relation to their members generally are now
widely in force; . . . 11

There are basically three propositions underlying the grant of

international immunities to international organizations. These
principles, contained in the ILO Memorandum are stated thus: 1)
international institutions should have a status which protects them
against control or interference by any one government in the
performance of functions for the effective discharge of which they
are responsible to democratically constituted international bodies in
which all the nations concerned are represented; 2) no country
should derive any national financial advantage by levying fiscal
charges on common international funds; and 3) the international
organization should, as a collectivity of States members, be accorded
the facilities for the conduct of its official business customarily
extended to each other by its individual member States. 12 The
theory behind all three propositions is said to be essentially
institutional in character. "It is not concerned with the status, dignity
or privileges of individuals, but with the elements of functional
independence necessary to free international institutions from
national control and to enable them to discharge their
responsibilities impartially on behalf of all their
members. 13 The raison d'etre for these immunities is the assurance
of unimpeded performance of their functions by the agencies
concerned.
The grant of immunity from local jurisdiction to ICMC and IRRI is
clearly necessitated by their international character and respective
purposes. The objective is to avoid the danger of partiality and
interference by the host country in their internal workings. The
exercise of jurisdiction by the Department of Labor in these instances
would defeat the very purpose of immunity, which is to shield the
affairs of international organizations, in accordance with international
practice, from political pressure or control by the host country to the
prejudice of member States of the organization, and to ensure the
unhampered performance of their functions.
ICMC's and IRRI's immunity from local jurisdiction by no means
deprives labor of its basic rights, which are guaranteed by Article II,
Section 18, 14 Article III, Section 8, 15 and Article XIII, Section 3 (supra),
of the 1987 Constitution; and implemented by Articles 243 and 246
of the Labor Code, 16 relied on by the BLR Director and by Kapisanan.
For, ICMC employees are not without recourse whenever there are
disputes to be settled. Section 31 of the Convention on the Privileges
and Immunities of the Specialized Agencies of the United
Nations 17 provides that "each specialized agency shall make
provision for appropriate modes of settlement of: (a) disputes arising
out of contracts or other disputes of private character to which the
specialized agency is a party." Moreover, pursuant to Article IV of the
Memorandum of Agreement between ICMC the the Philippine
Government, whenever there is any abuse of privilege by ICMC, the
Government is free to withdraw the privileges and immunities
accorded. Thus:
Art. IV. Cooperation with Government Authorities.
1. The Commission shall cooperate at all times
with the appropriate authorities of the
Government to ensure the observance of
Philippine laws, rules and regulations, facilitate
the proper administration of justice and prevent
the occurrences of any abuse of the privileges
and immunities granted its officials and alien
employees in Article III of this Agreement to the
Commission.

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2. In the event that the Government determines

that there has been an abuse of the privileges
and immunities granted under this Agreement,
consultations shall be held between the
Government and the Commission to determine
whether any such abuse has occurred and, if so,
the Government shall withdraw the privileges and
immunities granted the Commission and its
officials.
Neither are the employees of IRRI without remedy in case of dispute
with management as, in fact, there had been organized a forum for
better management-employee relationship as evidenced by the
formation of the Council of IRRI Employees and Management (CIEM)
wherein "both management and employees were and still are
represented for purposes of maintaining mutual and beneficial
cooperation between IRRI and its employees." The existence of this
Union factually and tellingly belies the argument that Pres. Decree
No. 1620, which grants to IRRI the status, privileges and immunities
of an international organization, deprives its employees of the right
to self-organization.
The immunity granted being "from every form of legal process
except in so far as in any particular case they have expressly waived
their immunity," it is inaccurate to state that a certification election is
beyond the scope of that immunity for the reason that it is not a suit
against ICMC. A certification election cannot be viewed as an
independent or isolated process. It could tugger off a series of
events in the collective bargaining process together with related
incidents and/or concerted activities, which could inevitably involve
ICMC in the "legal process," which includes "any penal, civil and
administrative proceedings." The eventuality of Court litigation is
neither remote and from which international organizations are
precisely shielded to safeguard them from the disruption of their
functions. Clauses on jurisdictional immunity are said to be standard
provisions in the constitutions of international Organizations. "The
immunity covers the organization concerned, its property and its
assets. It is equally applicable to proceedings in personam and
proceedings in rem." 18
We take note of a Manifestation, dated 28 September 1989, in the
ICMC Case (p. 161, Rollo), wherein TUPAS calls attention to the case
entitled "International Catholic Migration Commission v. NLRC, et als.,
(G.R. No. 72222, 30 January 1989, 169 SCRA 606), and claims that,
having taken cognizance of that dispute (on the issue of payment of
salary for the unexpired portion of a six-month probationary
employment), the Court is now estopped from passing upon the
question of DOLE jurisdiction petition over ICMC.
We find no merit to said submission. Not only did the facts of said
controversy occur between 1983-1985, or before the grant to ICMC
on 15 July 1988 of the status of a specialized agency with
corresponding immunities, but also because ICMC in that case did
not invoke its immunity and, therefore, may be deemed to have
waived it, assuming that during that period (1983-1985) it was tacitly
recognized as enjoying such immunity.
Anent the procedural issue raised in the IRRI Case, suffice it to state
that the Decision of the BLR Director, dated 15 February 1989, had
not become final because of a Motion for Reconsideration filed by
IRRI Said Motion was acted upon only on 30 March 1989 when Rep.
Act No. 6715, which provides for direct appeals from the Orders of

the Med-Arbiter to the Secretary of Labor in certification election

cases either from the order or the results of the election itself, was
already in effect, specifically since 21 March 1989. Hence, no grave
abuse of discretion may be imputed to respondent Secretary of
Labor in his assumption of appellate jurisdiction, contrary to
Kapisanan's allegations. The pertinent portion of that law provides:
Art. 259. Any party to an election may appeal
the order or results of the election as determined
by the Med-Arbiter directly to the Secretary of
Labor and Employment on the ground that the
rules and regulations or parts thereof established
by the Secretary of Labor and Employment for
the conduct of the election have been violated.
Such appeal shall be decided within 15 calendar
days (Emphasis supplied).
En passant, the Court is gratified to note that the heretofore
antagonistic positions assumed by two departments of the executive
branch of government have been rectified and the resultant
embarrassment to the Philippine Government in the eyes of the
international community now, hopefully, effaced.
WHEREFORE, in G.R. No. 85750 (the ICMC Case), the Petition is
GRANTED, the Order of the Bureau of Labor Relations for
certification election is SET ASIDE, and the Temporary Restraining
Order earlier issued is made PERMANENT.
In G.R. No. 89331 (the IRRI Case), the Petition is Dismissed, no grave
abuse of discretion having been committed by the Secretary of Labor
and Employment in dismissing the Petition for Certification Election.
No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.

EN BANC
G.R. No. L-35131 November 29, 1972
THE WORLD HEALTH ORGANIZATION and DR.
LEONCE VERSTUYFT, petitioners,
vs.
HON. BENJAMIN H. AQUINO, as Presiding Judge of
Branch VIII, Court of First Instance of Rizal, MAJOR
WILFREDO CRUZ, MAJOR ANTONIO G. RELLEVE, and
CAPTAIN PEDRO S. NAVARRO of the Constabulary
Offshore Action Center (COSAC), respondents.
Sycip, Salazar, Luna, Manalo and Feliciano for petitioners.
Emilio L. Baldia for respondents.

TEEHANKEE, J.:p

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An original action for certiorari and prohibition to set aside

respondent judge's refusal to quash a search warrant issued by him
at the instance of respondents COSAC (Constabulary Offshore Action
Center) officers for the search and seizure of the personal effects of
petitioner official of the WHO (World Health Organization)
notwithstanding his being entitled to diplomatic immunity, as duly
recognized by the executive branch of the Philippine Government
and to prohibit respondent judge from further proceedings in the
matter.
Upon filing of the petition, the Court issued on June 6, 1972 a
restraining order enjoining respondents from executing the search
warrant in question.
Respondents COSAC officers filed their answer joining issue against
petitioners and seeking to justify their act of applying for and
securing from respondent judge the warrant for the search and
seizure of ten crates consigned to petitioner Verstuyft and stored at
the Eternit Corporation warehouse on the ground that they "contain
large quantities of highly dutiable goods" beyond the official needs
of said petitioner "and the only lawful way to reach these articles and
effects for purposes of taxation is through a search warrant." 1
The Court thereafter called for the parties' memoranda in lieu of oral
argument, which were filed on August 3, 1972 by respondents and
on August 21, 1972 by petitioners, and the case was thereafter
deemed submitted for decision.
It is undisputed in the record that petitioner Dr. Leonce Verstuyft,
who was assigned on December 6, 1971 by the WHO from his last
station in Taipei to the Regional Office in Manila as Acting Assistant
Director of Health Services, is entitled to diplomatic immunity,
pursuant to the Host Agreement executed on July 22, 1951 between
the Philippine Government and the World Health Organization.
Such diplomatic immunity carries with it, among other diplomatic
privileges and immunities, personal inviolability, inviolability of the
official's properties, exemption from local jurisdiction, and exemption
from taxation and customs duties.
When petitioner Verstuyft's personal effects contained in twelve (12)
crates entered the Philippines as unaccompanied baggage on
January 10, 1972, they were accordingly allowed free entry from
duties and taxes. The crates were directly stored at the Eternit
Corporation's warehouse at Mandaluyong, Rizal, "pending his
relocation into permanent quarters upon the offer of Mr. Berg, Vice
President of Eternit who was once a patient of Dr. Verstuyft in the
Congo." 2
Nevertheless, as above stated, respondent judge issued on March 3,
1972 upon application on the same date of respondents COSAC
officers search warrant No. 72-138 for alleged violation of Republic
Act 4712 amending section 3601 of the Tariff and Customs
Code 3 directing the search and seizure of the dutiable items in said
crates.
Upon protest of March 6, 1972 of Dr. Francisco Dy, WHO Regional
Director for the Western Pacific with station in Manila, Secretary of
Foreign Affairs Carlos P. Romulo, personally wired on the same date
respondent Judge advising that "Dr. Verstuyft is entitled to immunity
from search in respect of his personal baggage as accorded to

members of diplomatic missions" pursuant to the Host Agreement

and requesting suspension of the search warrant order "pending
clarification of the matter from the ASAC."
Respondent judge set the Foreign Secretary's request for hearing
and heard the same on March 16, 1972, but notwithstanding the
official plea of diplomatic immunity interposed by a duly authorized
representative of the Department of Foreign Affairs who furnished
the respondent judge with a list of the articles brought in by
petitioner Verstuyft, respondent judge issued his order of the same
date maintaining the effectivity of the search warrant issued by him,
unless restrained by a higher court. 4
Petitioner Verstuyft's special appearance on March 24, 1972 for the
limited purpose of pleading his diplomatic immunity and motion to
quash search warrant of April 12, 1972 failed to move respondent
judge.
At the hearing thereof held on May 8, 1972, the Office of the
Solicitor General appeared and filed an extended comment stating
the official position of the executive branch of the Philippine
Government that petitioner Verstuyft is entitled to diplomatic
immunity, he did not abuse his diplomatic immunity, 5 and that court
proceedings in the receiving or host State are not the proper remedy
in the case of abuse of diplomatic immunity. 6
The Solicitor General accordingly joined petitioner Verstuyft's prayer
for the quashal of the search warrant. Respondent judge
nevertheless summarily denied quashal of the search warrant per his
order of May 9, 1972 "for the same reasons already stated in (his)
aforesaid order of March 16, 1972" disregarding Foreign Secretary
Romulo's plea of diplomatic immunity on behalf of Dr. Verstuyft.
Hence, the petition at bar. Petitioner Verstuyft has in this Court been
joined by the World Health Organization (WHO) itself in full assertion
of petitioner Verstuyft's being entitled "to all privileges and
immunities, exemptions and facilities accorded to diplomatic envoys
in accordance with international law" under section 24 of the Host
Agreement.
The writs of certiorari and prohibition should issue as prayed for.
1. The executive branch of the Philippine Government
has expressly recognized that petitioner Verstuyft is entitled to
diplomatic immunity, pursuant to the provisions of the Host
Agreement. The Department of Foreign Affairs formally advised
respondent judge of the Philippine Government's official position
that accordingly "Dr. Verstuyft cannot be the subject of a Philippine
court summons without violating an obligation in international law
of the Philippine Government" and asked for the quashal of the
search warrant, since his personal effects and baggages after having
been allowed free entry from all customs duties and taxes, may not
be baselessly claimed to have been "unlawfully imported" in
violation of the tariff and customs code as claimed by respondents
COSAC officers. The Solicitor-General, as principal law officer of the
Government, 7 likewise expressly affirmed said petitioner's right to
diplomatic immunity and asked for the quashal of the search
warrant.
It is a recognized principle of international law and under our system
of separation of powers that diplomatic immunity is essentially a

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political question and courts should refuse to look beyond a

determination by the executive branch of the government, 8 and
where the plea of diplomatic immunity is recognized and affirmed by
the executive branch of the government as in the case at bar, it is
then the duty of the courts to accept the claim of immunity upon
appropriate suggestion by the principal law officer of the
government, the Solicitor General in this case, or other officer acting
under his direction. 9 Hence, in adherence to the settled principle
that courts may not so exercise their jurisdiction by seizure and
detention of property, as to embarrass the executive arm of the
government in conducting foreign relations, it is accepted doctrine
that "in such cases the judicial department of (this) government
follows the action of the political branch and will not embarrass the
latter by assuming an antagonistic jurisdiction." 10

embarrassment of said department heads, if not of the Philippine

Government itself vis a vis the petitioners. 15

2. The unfortunate fact that respondent judge chose to rely on the

suspicion of respondents COSAC officers "that the other remaining
crates unopened contain contraband items" 11 rather than on the
categorical assurance of the Solicitor-General that petitioner
Verstuyft did not abuse his diplomatic immunity, 12 which was based
in turn on the official positions taken by the highest executive
officials with competence and authority to act on the matter, namely,
the Secretaries of Foreign Affairs and of Finance, could not justify
respondent judge's denial of the quashal of the search warrant.

The Court, therefore, holds that respondent judge acted without

jurisdiction and with grave abuse of discretion in not ordering the
quashal of the search warrant issued by him in disregard of the
diplomatic immunity of petitioner Verstuyft.

As already stated above, and brought to respondent court's

attention, 13 the Philippine Government is bound by the procedure
laid down in Article VII of the Convention on the Privileges and
Immunities of the Specialized Agencies of the United Nations 14 for
consultations between the Host State and the United Nations agency
concerned to determine, in the first instance the fact of occurrence
of the abuse alleged, and if so, to ensure that no repetition occurs
and for other recourses. This is a treaty commitment voluntarily
assumed by the Philippine Government and as such, has the force
and effect of law.
Hence, even assuming arguendo as against the categorical assurance
of the executive branch of government that respondent judge had
some ground to prefer respondents COSAC officers' suspicion that
there had been an abuse of diplomatic immunity, the continuation of
the search warrant proceedings before him was not the proper
remedy. He should, nevertheless, in deference to the exclusive
competence and jurisdiction of the executive branch of government
to act on the matter, have acceded to the quashal of the search
warrant, and forwarded his findings or grounds to believe that there
had been such abuse of diplomatic immunity to the Department of
Foreign Affairs for it to deal with, in accordance with the
aforementioned Convention, if so warranted.
3. Finally, the Court has noted with concern the apparent lack of
coordination between the various departments involved in the
subject-matter of the case at bar, which made it possible for a small
unit, the COSAC, to which respondents officers belong, seemingly to
disregard and go against the authoritative determination and
pronouncements of both the Secretaries of Foreign Affairs and of
Finance that petitioner Verstuyft is entitled to diplomatic immunity,
as confirmed by the Solicitor-General as the principal law officer of
the Government. Such executive determination properly
implemented should have normally constrained respondents officers
themselves to obtain the quashal of the search warrant secured by
them rather than oppose such quashal up to this Court, to the

The seriousness of the matter is underscored when the provisions of

Republic Act 75 enacted since October 21, 1946 to safeguard the
jurisdictional immunity of diplomatic officials in the Philippines are
taken into account. Said Act declares as null and void writs or
processes sued out or prosecuted whereby inter alia the person of
an ambassador or public minister is arrested or imprisoned or his
goods or chattels are seized or attached and makes it a penal
offense for "every person by whom the same is obtained or
prosecuted, whether as party or as attorney, and every officer
concerned in executing it" to obtain or enforce such writ or
process. 16

ACCORDINGLY, the writs of certiorari and prohibition prayed for are

hereby granted, and the temporary restraining order heretofore
issued against execution or enforcement of the questioned search
warrant, which is hereby declared null and void, is hereby made
permanent. The respondent court is hereby commanded to desist
from further proceedings in the matter. No costs, none having been
prayed for.
The clerk of court is hereby directed to furnish a copy of this decision
to the Secretary of Justice for such action as he may find appropriate
with regard to the matters mentioned in paragraph 3 hereof. So
ordered.

SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. L-24294 May 3, 1974
DONALD BAER, Commander U.S. Naval Base, Subic
Bay, Olongapo, Zambales, petitioner,
vs.
HON. TITO V. TIZON, as Presiding Judge of the Court
of First Instance of Bataan, and EDGARDO
GENER, respondents.
Sycip, Salazar, Luna Manalo & Feliciano for petitioner.
A. E. Dacanay for private respondent.
Office of the Solicitor General Camilo D. Quiason as amicus
curiae.

FERNANDO, J.:p
There is nothing novel about the question raised in this certiorari
proceeding against the then Judge Tito V. Tizon, filed by petitioner
Donald Baer, then Commander of the United States Naval Base,
Subic Bay, Olongapo, Zambales, seeking to nullify the orders of

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respondent Judge denying his motion to dismiss a complaint filed

against him by the private respondent, Edgardo Gener, on the
ground of sovereign immunity of a foreign power, his contention
being that it was in effect a suit against the United States, which had
not given its consent. The answer given is supplied by a number of
cases coming from this Tribunal starting from a 1945
decision, Raquiza v. Bradford 1 to Johnson v. Turner, 2 promulgated in
1954. The doctrine of immunity from suit is of undoubted
applicability in this jurisdiction. It cannot be otherwise, for under the
1935 Constitution, as now, it is expressly made clear that the
Philippines "adopts the generally accepted principles of international
law as part of the law of the Nation." 3 As will subsequently be
shown, there was a failure on the part of the lower court to accord
deference and respect to such a basic doctrine, a failure
compounded by its refusal to take note of the absence of any legal
right on the part of petitioner. Hence, certiorari is the proper remedy.
The facts are not in dispute. On November 17, 1964, respondent
Edgardo Gener, as plaintiff, filed a complaint for injunction with the
Court of First Instance of Bataan against petitioner, Donald Baer,
Commander of the United States Naval Base in Olongapo. It was
docketed as Civil Case No. 2984 of the Court of First Instance of
Bataan. He alleged that he was engaged in the business of logging in
an area situated in Barrio Mabayo, Municipality of Morong, Bataan
and that the American Naval Base authorities stopped his logging
operations. He prayed for a writ of preliminary injunction restraining
petitioner from interfering with his logging operations. A restraining
order was issued by respondent Judge on November 23,
1964. 4 Counsel for petitioner, upon instructions of the American
Ambassador to the Philippines, entered their appearance for the
purpose of contesting the jurisdiction of respondent Judge on the
ground that the suit was one against a foreign sovereign without its
consent. 5 Then, on December 12, 1964, petitioner filed a motion to
dismiss, wherein such ground was reiterated. It was therein pointed
out that he is the chief or head of an agency or instrumentality of the
United States of America, with the subject matter of the action being
official acts done by him for and in behalf of the United States of
America. It was added that in directing the cessation of logging
operations by respondent Gener within the Naval Base, petitioner
was entirely within the scope of his authority and official duty, the
maintenance of the security of the Naval Base and of the installations
therein being the first concern and most important duty of the
Commander of the Base. 6 There was, on December 14, 1964, an
opposition and reply to petitioner's motion to dismiss by respondent
Gener, relying on the principle that "a private citizen claiming title
and right of possession of certain property may, to recover
possession of said property, sue as individuals, officers and agents of
the Government, who are said to be illegally withholding the same
from him, though in doing so, said officers and agents claim that
they are acting for the Government." That was his basis for
sustaining the jurisdiction of respondent Judge. 7 Petitioner,
thereafter, on January 12, 1965, made a written offer of documentary
evidence, including certified copies of telegrams of the Forestry
Director to Forestry personnel in Balanga, Bataan dated January 8,
and January 11, 1965, directing immediate investigation of illegal
timber cutting in Bataan and calling attention to the fact that the
records of the office show no new renewal of timber license or
temporary extension permits. 8 The above notwithstanding,
respondent Judge, on January 12, 1965, issued an order granting
respondent Gener's application for the issuance of a writ of
preliminary injunction and denying petitioner's motion to dismiss the
opposition to the application for a writ of preliminary injunction. 9

A motion for reconsideration having proved futile, this petition for

certiorari was filed with this Court. The prayer was for the
nullification and setting aside of the writ of preliminary injunction
issued by respondent Judge in the aforesaid Civil Case No. 2984 of
the Court of First Instance of Bataan. A resolution of March 17, 1965
was issued by this Court requiring respondents to file an answer and
upon petitioner's posting a bond of P5,000.00 enjoining them from
enforcing such writ of preliminary injunction. The answer was duly
forthcoming. It sought to meet the judicial question raised by the
legal proposition that a private citizen claiming title and right of
possession of a certain property may, to recover the same, sue as
individuals officers and agents of the government alleged to be
illegally withholding such property even if there is an assertion on
their part that they are acting for the government. Support for such a
view is found in the American Supreme Court decisions of United
States v. Lee 10and Land v. Dollar. 11 Thus the issue is squarely joined
whether or not the doctrine of immunity from suit without consent is
applicable. Thereafter, extensive memoranda were filed both by
petitioner and respondents. In addition, there was a manifestation
and memorandum of the Republic of the Philippines as amicus
curiae where, after a citation of American Supreme Court decisions
going back to Schooner Exchange v. M'faddon, 12 an 1812 decision,
to United States v. Belmont,13 decided in 1937, the plea was made
that the petition for certiorari be granted..
A careful study of the crucial issue posed in this dispute yields the
conclusion, as already announced, that petitioner should prevail.
1. The invocation of the doctrine of immunity from suit of a foreign
state without its consent is appropriate. More specifically, insofar as
alien armed forces is concerned, the starting point is Raquiza v.
Bradford, a 1945 decision.14 In dismissing a habeas corpus petition
for the release of petitioners confined by American army authorities,
Justice Hilado, speaking for the Court, cited from Coleman v.
Tennessee, 15 where it was explicitly declared: "It is well settled that a
foreign army, permitted to march through a friendly country or to be
stationed in it, by permission of its government or sovereign, is
exempt from the civil and criminal jurisdiction of the place." 16 Two
years later, in Tubb and Tedrow v. Griess,17 this Court relied on the
ruling in Raquiza v. Bradford and cited in support thereof excerpts
from the works of the following authoritative writers: Vattel,
Wheaton, Hall, Lawrence, Oppenhein, Westlake, Hyde, and McNair
and Lauterpacht. 18Accuracy demands the clarification that after the
conclusion of the Philippine-American Military Bases Agreement, the
treaty provisions should control on such matter, the assumption
being that there was a manifestation of the submission to
jurisdiction on the part of the foreign power whenever
appropriate. 19 More to the point is Syquia v. Almeda Lopez, 20 where
plaintiffs as lessors sued the Commanding General of the United
States Army in the Philippines, seeking the restoration to them of the
apartment buildings they owned leased to United States armed
forces stationed in the Manila area. A motion to dismiss on the
ground of non-suability was filed and upheld by respondent Judge.
The matter was taken to this Court in a mandamus proceeding. It
failed. It was the ruling that respondent Judge acted correctly
considering that the "action must be considered as one against the
U.S. Government." 21 The opinion of Justice Montemayor continued:
"It is clear that the courts of the Philippines including the Municipal
Court of Manila have no jurisdiction over the present case for
unlawful detainer. The question of lack of jurisdiction was raised and
interposed at the very beginning of the action. The U.S. Government
has not given its consent to the filing of this suit which is essentially
against her, though not in name. Moreover, this is not only a case of

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a citizen filing a suit against his own Government without the latter's
consent but it is of a citizen filing an action against a foreign
government without said government's consent, which renders more
obvious the lack of jurisdiction of the courts of his country. The
principles of law behind this rule are so elementary and of such
general acceptance that we deem it unnecessary to cite authorities in
support thereof." 22 Then came Marvel Building Corporation v.
Philippine War Damage Commission, 23 where respondent, a United
States agency established to compensate damages suffered by the
Philippines during World War II was held as falling within the above
doctrine as the suit against it "would eventually be a charge against
or financial liability of the United States Government because ..., the
Commission has no funds of its own for the purpose of paying
money judgments." 24 The Syquia ruling was again explicitly relied
upon in Marquez Lim v. Nelson, 25 involving a complaint for the
recovery of a motor launch, plus damages, the special defense
interposed being "that the vessel belonged to the United States
Government, that the defendants merely acted as agents of said
Government, and that the United States Government is therefore the
real party in interest." 26 So it was in Philippine Alien Property
Administration v. Castelo, 27 where it was held that a suit against the
Alien Property Custodian and the Attorney General of the United
States involving vested property under the Trading with the Enemy
Act is in substance a suit against the United States. To the same
effect is Parreno v. McGranery, 28 as the following excerpt from the
opinion of Justice Tuason clearly shows: "It is a widely accepted
principle of international law, which is made a part of the law of the
land (Article II, Section 3 of the Constitution), that a foreign state
may not be brought to suit before the courts of another state or its
own courts without its consent." 29 Finally, there is Johnson v.
Turner, 30 an appeal by the defendant, then Commanding General,
Philippine Command (Air Force, with office at Clark Field) from a
decision ordering the return to plaintiff of the confiscated military
payment certificates known as scrip money. In reversing the lower
court decision, this Tribunal, through Justice Montemayor, relied
on Syquia v. Almeda Lopez, 31 explaining why it could not be
sustained.
The solidity of the stand of petitioner is therefore evident. What was
sought by private respondent and what was granted by respondent
Judge amounted to an interference with the performance of the
duties of petitioner in the base area in accordance with the powers
possessed by him under the Philippine-American Military Bases
Agreement. This point was made clear in these words: "Assuming, for
purposes of argument, that the Philippine Government, through the
Bureau of Forestry, possesses the "authority to issue a Timber
License to cut logs" inside a military base, the Bases Agreement
subjects the exercise of rights under a timber license issued by the
Philippine Government to the exercise by the United States of its
rights, power and authority of control within the bases; and the
findings of the Mutual Defense Board, an agency of both the
Philippine and United States Governments, that "continued logging
operation by Mr. Gener within the boundaries of the U.S. Naval Base
would not be consistent with the security and operation of the Base,"
is conclusive upon the respondent Judge. .. The doctrine of state
immunity is not limited to cases which would result in a pecuniary
charge against the sovereign or would require the doing of an
affirmative act by it. Prevention of a sovereign from doing an
affirmative act pertaining directly and immediately to the most
important public function of any government - the defense of the
state is equally as untenable as requiring it to do an affirmative
act." 32 That such an appraisal is not opposed to the interpretation of
the relevant treaty provision by our government is made clear in the

aforesaid manifestation and memorandum as amicus curiae, wherein

it joined petitioner for the grant of the remedy prayed for.
2. There should be no misinterpretation of the scope of the decision
reached by this Court. Petitioner, as the Commander of the United
States Naval Base in Olongapo, does not possess diplomatic
immunity. He may therefore be proceeded against in his personal
capacity, or when the action taken by him cannot be imputed to the
government which he represents. Thus, after the Military Bases
Agreement, in Miquiabas v. Commanding General 33 and Dizon v. The
Commanding General of the Philippine-Ryukus Command, 34 both of
them being habeas corpus petitions, there was no question as to the
submission to jurisdiction of the respondents. As a matter of fact,
in Miquiabas v. Commanding General, 35 the immediate release of the
petitioner was ordered, it being apparent that the general court
martial appointed by respondent Commanding General was without
jurisdiction to try petitioner. Thereafter, in the cited cases of Syquia,
Marquez Lim, and Johnson, the parties proceeded against were
American army commanding officers stationed in the Philippines.
The insuperable obstacle to the jurisdiction of respondent Judge is
that a foreign sovereign without its consent is haled into court in
connection with acts performed by it pursuant to treaty provisions
and thus impressed with a governmental character.
3. The infirmity of the actuation of respondent Judge becomes even
more glaring when it is considered that private respondent had
ceased to have any right of entering within the base area. This is
made clear in the petition in these words: "In 1962, respondent
Gener was issued by the Bureau of Forestry an ordinary timber
license to cut logs in Barrio Mabayo, Morong, Bataan. The license
was renewed on July 10, 1963. In 1963, he commenced logging
operation inside the United States Naval Base, Subic Bay, but in
November 1963 he was apprehended and stopped by the Base
authorities from logging inside the Base. The renewal of his license
expired on July 30, 1964, and to date his license has not been
renewed by the Bureau of Forestry. .. In July 1964, the Mutual
Defense Board, a joint Philippines-United States agency established
pursuant to an exchange of diplomatic notes between the Secretary
of Foreign Affairs and the United States Ambassador to provide
"direct liaison and consultation between appropriate Philippine and
United States authorities on military matters of mutual concern,'
advised the Secretary of Foreign Affairs in writing that: "The enclosed
map shows that the area in which Mr. Gener was logging definitely
falls within the boundaries of the base. This map also depicts certain
contiguous and overlapping areas whose functional usage would be
interfered with by the logging operations.'" 36 Nowhere in the answer
of respondents, nor in their memorandum, was this point met. It
remained unrefuted.
WHEREFORE, the writ of certiorari prayed for is granted, nullifying
and setting aside the writ of preliminary injunction issued by
respondent Judge in Civil Case No. 2984 of the Court of First
Instance of Bataan. The injunction issued by this Court on March 18,
1965 enjoining the enforcement of the aforesaid writ of preliminary
injunction of respondent Judge is hereby made permanent. Costs
against private respondent Edgardo Gener.
Zaldivar, Antonio, Fernandez and Aquino, JJ., concur.

PIL 3rd SET FT

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