Spouses Huguete vs Spouses Embudo, GR No.

49554, July 1, 2003

(Civil Procedure Jurisdiction, Real Action)
Facts: Petitioner spouses filed a complaint for the annulment of deed of sale and
partition of the 50-square meter portion of land against respondent spouses in the
RTC.
Respondent spouses filed a Motion to Dismiss the complaint on the ground of lack of
jurisdiction over the subject matter of the case, arguing that the action is one for
annulment of title and the total assessed value of the subject land was only
P15,000.00 which falls within the exclusive jurisdiction of the MTC, pursuant to Sec
33(3) of BP Blg 129, as amended by RA 7691.
Petitioner spouses filed an Opposition to the Motion to Dismiss alleging that the
subject matter of the action is incapable of pecuniary estimation and, therefore, is
cognizable by the RTC, as provided by Sec 19(1) of BP 129, as amended.
Issue: WON the civil action is one in which the subject matter is incapable of
pecuniary estimation.
Held: No. The argument that the present action is one incapable of pecuniary
estimation considering that it is for annulment of deed of sale and partition is not
well-taken.
What determines the nature of an action as well as which court has jurisdiction over
it are the allegations of the complaint and the character of the relief sought (Caiza
vs CA).
And in Singsong vs Isabela Sawmill, the Supreme Court ruled that:

In determining whether an action is one the subject matter of which is not capable
of pecuniary estimation this Court has adopted the criterion of first ascertaining the
nature of the principal action or remedy sought. If it is primarily for the recovery of
a sum of money, the claim is considered capable of pecuniary estimation, and
whether the jurisdiction is in the municipal courts or in the courts of first instance
would depend on the amount of the claim. However, where the basic issue is
something other than the right to recover a sum of money, where the money claim
is purely incidental to, or a consequence of, the principal relief sought, this Court
has considered such actions as cases where the subject of the litigation may not be
estimated in terms of money, and are cognizable exclusively by courts of first
instance (now Regional Trial Courts).
The principal purpose of the petitioners in filing the complaint was to secure title to
the 50-square meter portion of the property which they purchased from the
respondents. Their cause of action is based on their right as purchaser of the
subject land from respondents. They pray that they be declared owners of the
property sold. Thus, their complaint involved title to real property or any interest
therein. The alleged value of the land which they purchased was P15,000.00, which
was within the jurisdiction of MTC.
The annulment of the deed of sale, were prayed for in the complaint because they
were necessary before the lot may be partitioned and the 50-square meter portion
subject thereof may be conveyed to petitioners.

Russel vs. Vestil, 304 SCRA 738; GR No. 119347, March 17, 1999
(Civil Procedures Jurisdiction; Civil actions in which the subject of the litigation is
incapable of pecuniary estimation)
Facts: Petitioners discovered a public document, which is a declaration of heirs and
deed of confirmation of a previous oral agreement, of partition, affecting the land
executed by and among the respondents whereby respondents divided the property
among themselves to the exclusion of petitioners who are entitled thereto as legal
heirs also.
Petitioners filed a complaint, denominated DECLARATION OF NULLITY AND
PARTITION against defendants with the RTC claiming that the document was false
and perjurious as the private respondents were not the only heirs and that no oral
partition of the property whatsoever had been made between the heirs. The
complaint prayed that the document be declared null and void and an order be
issued to partition the land among all the heirs.
Private respondents filed a Motion to Dismiss the complaint on the ground of lack of
jurisdiction over the nature of the case as the total assessed value of the subject
land is P5,000.00 which under section 33 (3) of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, as
amended by R.A. No. 7691, falls within the exclusive jurisdiction of the MTC.
Petitioners filed an Opposition to the Motion to Dismiss saying that the RTC has
jurisdiction over the case since the action is one which is incapable of pecuniary
estimation within the contemplation of Section 19(l) of B.P. 129, as amended.
Issue: WON the RTC has jurisdiction over the nature of the civil case.
Held: Yes. The complaint filed before the Regional Trial Court is one incapable of
pecuniary estimation and therefore within the jurisdiction of said court.
In Singsong vs. Isabela Sawmill, the Supreme Court ruled that:
In determining whether an action is one the subject matter of which is not capable
of pecuniary estimation this Court has adopted the criterion of first ascertaining the
nature of the principal action or remedy sought. If it is primarily for the recovery of
a sum of money, the claim is considered capable of pecuniary estimation, and
whether jurisdiction is in the municipal courts or in the courts of first instance would
depend on the amount of the claim. However, where the basic issue is something
other than the right to recover a sum of money, where the money claim is purely
incidental to, or a consequence of, the principal relief sought, this Court has
considered such actions as cases where the subject of the litigation may not be
estimated in terms of money, and are cognizable exclusively by courts of first
instance (now Regional Trial Courts).
The main purpose of petitioners in filing the complaint is to declare null and void the
document in question. While the complaint also prays for the partition of the
property, this is just incidental to the main action, which is the declaration of nullity
of the document above-described. It is axiomatic that jurisdiction over the subject

matter of a case is conferred by law and is determined by the allegations in the

complaint and the character of the relief sought, irrespective of whether the plaintiff
is entitled to all or some of the claims asserted therein.

Copioso vs Copioso, 391 SCRA 325; GR No. 149243, October 28, 2002
Posted by Pius Morados on November 28, 2011
(Civil Procedures Jurisdiction; Civil actions in which the subject of the litigation is
incapable of pecuniary estimation)
Facts: Respondents filed with the RTC an action for specific performance of
reconveyance of two parcels of land having an assessed value of P3,770.00.
Respondents alleged that they together with their deceased brother were co-owners
of the subject property having inherited the same from their parents, and that
through fraud and machination the deceased had the property transferred to his
name and that of spouses Doria who subsequently sold the same to third parties.
Thus, they are praying for the reconveyance of the property by virtue of their
being co-owners thereof.
Petitioners moved to dismiss the complaint on that ground that it was the MTC and
not the RTC that had jurisdiction considering that the assessed value of the property
was lower than P20,000.00 (Section 33 [3] of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, as amended
by R.A. No. 7691). Petitioners argue that the complaint for reconveyance cannot be
resolved unless the trial court delves upon the issues of title, possession and
interests of each of the stakeholders over the subject parcels of land.
Respondents claim that the instant complaint for reconveyance is a case of joinder
of causes of action which include the annulment of sale and other instruments of
false conveyance incapable of pecuniary estimation thus within the legal
competence of the RTC ( Section 19(l) of B.P. 129, as amended).
The trial court denied the motion to dismiss holding that since the subject matter of
the action was beyond pecuniary estimation it was properly within its jurisdiction.
Issue: WON denial of the motion to dismiss was correct.
Held: Yes. Although the assessed value of the two parcels of land involved is
P3,770.00, which is within the jurisdiction of the MTC, the action filed by the
respondents is for specific performance of reconveyance, annulment of contracts
and claim for damages, which are incapable of pecuniary estimation and thus
properly within the jurisdiction of the RTC.
If the action affects the title to or possession of real property then it is a real action
and jurisdiction is determined by the assessed value of the property. It is within the
jurisdiction therefore of the Metropolitan Trial Court.

[G.R. No. 139325. April 12, 2005]

MIJARES et.al. vs RANADA
Facts:
Invoking the Alien Tort Act, petitioners Mijares, et al.*, all of whom suffered human
rights violations during the Marcos era, obtained a Final Judgment in their favor
against the Estate of the late Ferdinand Marcos amounting to roughly 1.9 Billion U.S.
Dollars in compensatory and exemplary damages for tortuous violations of
international law in the US District Court of Hawaii. This Final Judgment was affirmed
by the US Court of Appeals.
As a consequence, Petitioners filed a Complaint with the Regional Trial Court of
Makati for the enforcement of the Final Judgment, paying Php 410.00 as docket and
filing fees based on Rule 141, Section 7(b) where the value of the subject matter is
incapable of pecuniary estimation. The Estate of Marcos however, filed a MTD
alleging the non-payment of the correct filing fees. The Regional Trial Court of
Makati dismissed the Complaint stating that the subject matter was capable of
pecuniary estimation as it involved a judgment rendered by a foreign court ordering
the payment of a definite sum of money allowing for the easy determination of the
value of the foreign judgment. As such, the proper filing fee was 472 Million
Philippine pesos, which Petitioners had not paid.
Issue:Whether or not the amount paid by the Petitioners is the proper filing fee?
Ruling
Yes, but on a different basisamount merely corresponds to the same amount
required for other actions not involving property. The Regional Trial Court of
Makati erred in concluding that the filing fee should be computed on the basis of the
total sum claimed or the stated value of the property in litigation. The Petitioners
Complaint was lodged against the Estate of Marcos but it is clearly based on a
judgment, the Final Judgment of the US District Court. However, the Petitioners
erred in stating that the Final Judgment is incapable of pecuniary estimation
because it is so capable. On this point, Petitioners state that this might lead to an
instance wherein a first level court (MTC, MeTC, etc.) would have jurisdiction to
enforce a foreign judgment. Under Batasang Pambansa 129, such courts are not
vested with such jurisdiction. Section 33 of Batasang Pambansa 129 refers to
instances wherein the cause of action or subject matter pertains to an assertion of
rights over property or a sum of money. But here, the subject matter is the foreign
judgment itself. Section 16 of Batasang Pambansa 129 reveals that the complaint
for enforcement of judgment even if capable of pecuniary estimation would fall
under the jurisdiction of the Regional Trial Courts. Thus, the Complaint to enforce

the US District Court judgment is one capable of pecuniary estimations but at the
same time, it is also an action based on judgment against an estate, thus placing it
beyond the ambit of Section 7(a) of Rule 141. What governs the proper computation
of the filing fees over Complaints for the enforcement of foreign judgments is
Section7(b)(3), involving other actions not involving property.

Manchester Development vs Court of Appeals

149 SCRA 562 Remedial Law Civil Procedure Payment of Docket Fees Claimed
Damages must be Stated in the BODY and PRAYER of pleadings
FACTS:
A complaint for specific performance was filed by Manchester Development
Corporation against City Land Development Corporation to compel the latter to
execute a deed of sale in favor Manchester. Manchester also alleged that City Land
forfeited the formers tender of payment for a certain transaction thereby causing
damages to Manchester amounting to P78,750,000.00. This amount was alleged in
the BODY of their Complaint but it was not reiterated in the PRAYER of same
complaint. Manchester paid a docket fee of P410.00 only. Said docket fee is
premised on the allegation of Manchester that their action is primarily for specific
performance hence it is incapable of pecuniary estimation. The court ruled that
there is an under assessment of docket fees hence it ordered Manchester to amend
its complaint. Manchester complied but what it did was to lower the amount of claim
for damages to P10M. Said amount was however again not stated in the PRAYER.
ISSUE: Whether or not the amended complaint should be admitted.
HELD: No. The docket fee, its computation, should be based on the original
complaint. A case is deemed filed only upon payment of the appropriate docket fee
regardless of the actual date of filing in court. Here, since the proper docket fee was
not paid for the original complaint, its as if there is no complaint to speak of. As a
consequence, there is no original complaint duly filed which can be amended. So,
any subsequent proceeding taken in consideration of the amended complaint is
void.
Manchesters defense that this case is primarily an action for specific performance
is not merited. The Supreme Court ruled that based on the allegations and the
prayer of the complaint, this case is an action for damages and for specific
performance. Hence, it is capable of pecuniary estimation.
Further, the amount for damages in the original complaint was already provided in
the body of the complaint. Its omission in the PRAYER clearly constitutes an attempt
to evade the payment of the proper filing fees. To stop the happenstance of similar

irregularities in the future, the Supreme Court ruled that from this case on, all
complaints, petitions, answers and other similar pleadings should specify the
amount of damages being prayed for not only in the body of the pleading but also in
the prayer, and said damages shall be considered in the assessment of the filing
fees in any case. Any pleading that fails to comply with this requirement shall not
bib accepted nor admitted, or shall otherwise be expunged from the record.

Sun Insurance v Asuncion Digest

G.R. Nos. 79937-38 February 13, 1989
Facts:
Petitioner Sun Insurance (or SIOL) files a complaint for the annulment of a decision
on the consignation of fire insurance policy. Subsequently, the Private Respondent
(PR) files a complaint for the refund of premiums and the issuance of a writ of
preliminary attachment in a civil case against SIOL. In addition, PR also claims for
damages, attorneys fees, litigation costs, etc., however, the prayer did not state
the amount of damages sought although from the body of the complaint it can be
inferred to be in amount of P 50 million. Hence, PR originally paid only PhP 210.00 in
docket fees.The complaint underwent a number of amendments to make way for
subsequent re-assessments of the amount of damages sought as well as the
corresponding docket fees. The respondent demonstrated his willingness to abide
by the rules by paying the additional docket fees as required.
Issue: Did the Court acquire jurisdiction over the case even if private
respondent did not pay the correct or sufficient docket fees?
YES.
It was held that it is not simply the filing of the complaint or appropriate initiatory
pleading, but the payment of the prescribed docket fee, that vests a trial court with
jurisdiction over the subject matter or nature of the action. Where the filing of the
initiatory pleading is not accompanied by payment of the docket fee, the court may
allow payment of the fee within a reasonable time but in no case beyond the
applicable prescriptive or reglamentary period. Same rule goes for permissive
counterclaims, third party claims and similar pleadings.
In herein case, obviously, there was the intent on the part of PR to defraud the
government of the docket fee due not only in the filing of the original complaint but
also in the filing of the second amended complaint. However, a more liberal

interpretation of the rules is called for considering that, unlike in Manchester, the
private respondent demonstrated his willingness to abide by the rules by paying the
additional docket fees as required.
Where a trial court acquires jurisdiction in like manner, but subsequently, the
judgment awards a claim not specified in the pleading, or if specified the same has
been left for determination by the court, the additional filing fee shall constitute a
lien on the judgment. It shall be the responsibility of the Clerk of Court or his duly
authorized deputy to enforce said lien and assess and collect the additional fee.

BANK OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS vs. DOMINGO R.

DANDO G.R. No. 177456 September 4, 2009 (Case Digest)
FACTS:
The instant Petition stemmed from a Complaint for Sum of Money and Damages by BPI against Dando
before the RTC.Dando availed of a loan in the amount of P750,000.00 from Far East Bank and Trust
Company (FEBTC), BPI's predecessor in interest. Dando defaulted in the payment and despite repeated
demands, Dando refused and/or failed to pay his just and valid obligation.
After Dando filed with the RTC his Answer with Counterclaim, BPI filed its Motion to Set Case for PreTrial. The RTC issued a Notice of Pre-Trial Conference, which directed the parties to submit their
respective pre-trial briefs at least three days before the scheduled date of pre-trial.
Dando submitted his Pre-trial Brief on time while BPI filed its Pre-trial Breif with the RTC and furnished
Dando with a copy thereof on the very day of the scheduled Pre-Trial Conference. Dando then moved for
the dismmissal of the case on the ground of late filing of the Pre-trial Brief. RTC granted Dandos Motion
to Dismiss.
BPI filed a Motion for Reconsideration with the RTC which reconsidered and set aside it former order.
Dando filed a Motion for Reconsideration
but was denied.
Dando sought recourse from the Court of Appeals by filing a Petition for Certiorari. CA held that BPI's
excuse is too flimsy to justify the reversal of an earlier order dismissing the action. The BPI did not come
forward with the most convincing reason for the relaxation of the rules, or has not shown any persuasive
reason why it should be exempt from abiding by the rules. The RTC decision was ANNULLED and SET
ASIDE by the CA.
Hence, this Petition.
ISSUE:

IS THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, IN ISSUING THE DECISION AND RESOLUTION,

CORRECT WHEN IT STRICTLY APPLIED THE RULES OF PROCEDURE.
RULING:
It is a basic legal construction that where words of command such as shall, must, or ought are
employed, they are generally and ordinarily regarded as mandatory. Thus, where, as in Rule 18, Sections
5 and 6 of the Rules of Court, the word shall is used, a mandatory duty is imposed, which the courts
ought to enforce.
x x x However, it is equally true that litigation is not merely a game of technicalities. Law and
jurisprudence grant to courts the prerogative to relax compliance with procedural rules of even the most
mandatory character, mindful of the duty to reconcile both the need to put an end to litigation speedily and
the parties right to an opportunity to be heard. x x x This is in line with the time-honored principle that
cases should be decided only after giving all parties the chance to argue their causes and defenses.
Technicality and procedural imperfection should, thus, not serve as basis of decisions. In that
way, the ends of justice would be better served. For, indeed, the general objective of procedure is
to facilitate the application of justice to the rival claims of contending parties, bearing always in
mind that procedure is not to hinder but to promote the administration of justice.
In Sanchez v. Court of Appeals, the Court restated the reasons that may provide justification for a
court to suspend a strict adherence to procedural rules, such as: (a) matters of life, liberty, honor
or property; (b) the existence of special or compelling circumstances; (c) the merits of the case;
(d) a cause not entirely attributable to the fault or negligence of the party favored by the
suspension of the rules; (e) a lack of any showing that the review sought is merely frivolous and
dilatory; and (f) the fact that the other party will not be unjustly prejudiced thereby.
x x x The substantive right of BPI to recover a due and demandable obligation cannot be denied or
diminished by a rule of procedure, more so, since Dando admits that he did avail himself of the credit line
extended by FEBTC, the predecessor-in-interest of BPI, and disputes only the amount of his outstanding
liability to BPI. To dismiss the case with prejudice and, thus, bar BPI from recovering the amount it
had lent to Dando would be to unjustly enrich Dando at the expense of BPI.
x x x BPI did not manifest an evident pattern or scheme to delay the disposition of the case or a wanton
failure to observe a mandatory requirement of the Rules. In fact, BPI, for the most part, exhibited
diligence and reasonable dispatch in prosecuting its claim against Dando by immediately moving to set
the case for Pre-Trial Conference after its receipt of Dandos Answer to the Complaint; and in
instantaneously filing a Motion for Reconsideration of the 10 October 2003 Order of the RTC dismissing
the case.
Accordingly, the ends of justice and fairness would be best served if the parties are given the full
opportunity to thresh out the real issues and litigate their claims in a full-blown trial. Besides, Dando
would not be prejudiced should the RTC proceed with the hearing of the case, as he is not stripped of any
affirmative defenses nor deprived of due process of law.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant Petition is GRANTED.