BERSAMIN-drafted cases (9 cases)

JUNE 2014
1. G.R. No. 164961

June 30, 2014

HECTOR L. UY, Petitioner,

vs.
VIRGINIA G. FULE; HEIRS OF THE LATE AMADO A. GARCIA, namely:
AIDA C. GARCIA, LOURDES G. SANTAYANA, AMANDO C. GARCIA, JR.,
MANUEL C. GARCIA, CARLOS C. GARCIA, and CRISTINA G. MARALIT;
HEIRS OF THE LATE GLORIA GARCIA ENCARNACION, namely: MARVIC
G. ENCARNACION, IBARRA G. ENCARNACION, MORETO G.
ENCARNACION, JR., and CARINA G. ENCARNACION; HEIRS OF THE
LATE PABLO GARCIA, namely: BERMEDIO GARCIA, CRISTETA GARCIA,
HONORATO GARCIA, VICENTE GARCIA, PABLO GARCIA, JR., and
TERESITA GARCIA; HEIRS OF THE LATE ELISA G. HEMEDES, namely:
ROEL G. HEMEDES, ELISA G. HEMEDES, ROGELIO G. HEMEDES,
ANDORA G. HEMEDES, and FLORA G. HEMEDES, Respondents.
2. G.R. No. 195668

June 25, 2014

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee,

vs.
MA. HARLETA VELASCO y BRIONES, MARICAR B. INOVERO, MARISSA
DIALA, and BERNA M. PAULINO, Accused,
MARICAR B. INOVERO, Accused-Appellant.
3. G.R. No. 157163

June 25, 2014

BANK OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS, Petitioner,

vs.
HON. JUDGE AGAPITO L. HONTANOSAS, JR., REGIONAL TRIAL COURT,
BRANCH 16, CEBU CITY, SILVERIO BORBON, SPOUSES XERXES AND
ERLINDA FACULTAD, AND XM FACULTAD & DEVELOPMENT
CORPORATION, Respondents.
4. G.R. No. 159031

June 23, 2014

NOEL A. LASANAS, Petitioner,

vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.

5. A.C. No. 3452

June 23, 2014

HENRY SAMONTE, Petitioner,

vs.
ATTY. GINES ABELLANA, Respondent.
6. G.R. No. 192432

June 23, 2014

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee,

vs.
LARRY MENDOZA y ESTRADA, Accused-Appellant.
7. G.R. No. 160827

June 18, 2014

NETLINK COMPUTER INCORPORATED, Petitioner,

vs.
ERIC DELMO, Respondent.
8. G.R. No. 162021

June 16, 2014

MEGA MAGAZINE PUBLICATIONS, INC., JERRY TIU, AND SARITA V.

YAP, Petitioners,
vs.
MARGARET A. DEFENSOR, Respondent.
9. A.M. No. RTJ-13-2356
June 9, 2014
[Formerly OCA No. IPI-11-3701-RTJ]
ARGEL D. HERNANDEZ, Complainant,
vs.
JUDGE VICTOR C. GELLA, PRESIDING JUDGE, CLARINCE B. JINTALAN,
LEGAL RESEARCHER, and ROWENA B. JINTALAN, SHERIFF IV, ALL
FROM THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, BRANCH 52, SORSOGON
CITY, Respondents.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. 164961

June 30, 2014

HECTOR L. UY, Petitioner,

vs.
VIRGINIA G. FULE; HEIRS OF THE LATE AMADO A. GARCIA, namely:
AIDA C. GARCIA, LOURDES G. SANTAYANA, AMANDO C. GARCIA, JR.,
MANUEL C. GARCIA, CARLOS C. GARCIA, and CRISTINA G. MARALIT;
HEIRS OF THE LATE GLORIA GARCIA ENCARNACION, namely: MARVIC
G. ENCARNACION, IBARRA G. ENCARNACION, MORETO G.
ENCARNACION, JR., and CARINA G. ENCARNACION; HEIRS OF THE
LATE PABLO GARCIA, namely: BERMEDIO GARCIA, CRISTETA GARCIA,
HONORATO GARCIA, VICENTE GARCIA, PABLO GARCIA, JR., and
TERESITA GARCIA; HEIRS OF THE LATE ELISA G. HEMEDES, namely:
ROEL G. HEMEDES, ELISA G. HEMEDES, ROGELIO G. HEMEDES,
ANDORA G. HEMEDES, and FLORA G. HEMEDES, Respondents.
DECISION
BERSAMIN, J.:
The decisive question here is whether or not the petitioner was a purchaser
in good faith of the property in litis. The standard is that for one to be a
purchaser in good faith in the eyes of the law, he should buy the property of
another without notice that some other person has a right to, or interest in,
such property, and should pay a full and fair price for the same at the time of
such purchase, or before he has notice of the claim or interest of some other
persons in the property.1 He buys the property with the belief that the person
from whom he receives the property was the owner and could convey title to
the property.2 Indeed, a purchaser cannot close his eyes to facts that should
put a reasonable man on his guard and still claim he acted in good faith.3
The Case
Under appeal by petition for review on certiorari is the decision promulgated
on February 17, 2004,4 whereby the Court of Appeals upheld the judgment
rendered in favor of the respondents on June 30, 2000 by the Regional Trial
Court, Branch 32,in Pili, Camarines Sur (RTC).5
Antecedents

The dispute herein involves the parcel of land registered under Transfer
Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 30111 of the Registry of Deeds of Camarines Sur
with an area of 180,150square meters located in San Agustin, Pili, Camarines
Sur that was part of the vast tract of land covered by TCT No. 1128
registered in the name of the late Conrado Garcia. TCT No. 1128 was derived
from Original Certificate of Title (OCT) No. 854 registered on November 23,
1933 in the Registration Book of the Register of Deeds of Camarines Sur
pursuant to Decree No. 517240, No. 854, issued in LRC GLRO Record No.
47802.
Upon the death of Conrado Garcia on November 23, 1972, his heirs entered
into an extrajudicial settlement of his estate, including the vast track of land.
Thereafter, his heirs caused the registration on March 7, 1973 of the vast
track of land under TCT No. RT-8922 (16498), covering Lot 1, PSU-81269 and
Lot 2, PSU-81269.6
In September 1985, the Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR) engaged
Geodetic Engr. Rolando A. Sales (Engr. Sales) to conduct a survey of the
disputed land, referring to it as Lot 562, Cad. 291 (Csd-05-003874). Together
with DAR Technologist Carmen Sorita and DAR Team Leader Julian F. Israel,
Engr. Sales issued a joint certification dated August 30, 1988 to the effect
that the disputed land was an "untitled" property owned by Conrado Garcia.
The joint certification dated August 30, 1988 was buttressed by the
certification issued on January 30, 1989 by the Office of the Register of
Deeds of Camarines Sur to the effect that no title covering Lot 562, Cad. 291
(Csd-05-003874) appeared on record. As a result, the disputed land was
included in the Operation Land Transfer (OLT) program of the DAR pursuant
to Presidential Decree No. 27.
In 1988, the DAR and the Office of the Register of Deeds of Camarines Sur
respectively issued emancipation patents (EPs) and original certificates of
title (OCTs) coveringthe disputed land to the farmersbeneficiaries, namely:
Catalino Alcaide, Mariano Ronda, Ponciano Ermita, Felipe Marcelo, Salvador
Pedimonte, Fabiana Pedimonte and Leonila Pedimonte (farmersbeneficiaries).7
In the interim, farmer-beneficiary Mariano Ronda sold his portion to Chisan
Uy who then registered his title thereto under TCT No. 29948 and TCT No.
29949 of the Registry of Deeds of Camarines Sur. On the other hand, the
heirs of farmer-beneficiary Mariano Ronda (Isabel Ronda, et al.) sold their
land to petitioner Hector Uy for P10 million. The petitioner registered his title
thereto under TCT No. 31436 and TCT No. 31437, both of the Registry of
Deeds of Camarines Sur.
In 1997, TCT No. RT-8922 (16498)was cancelled following the partition of the
property covered therein.1wphi1 Subsequently, TCT No. 30136 and TCT No.

30111 were issued in the names of respondents heirs of the late Conrado
Garcia. TCT No. 30111 covered the disputed land.8
In 1998, the President, acting through the DAR Secretary, issued EPs to the
farmers-beneficiaries pursuant to P.D. No. 27 and P.D. No. 266, to wit:
1. To Catalino Alcaide, OCT No. 8534 and OCT No. 8549, which were
cancelled by TCT No. 29948 and TCT No. 29949 in the name of Chisan
Uy;
2. To Mariano Ronda, OCT No. 9852 and OCT No. 9853, which were
cancelled by TCT No. 301120 and TCT No. 301121; and, in turn, TCT
No. 301120 and TCT No. 301121 were cancelled by TCT No. 31436 and
TCT No. 31437 in the name of petitioner Hector Uy;
3. To Ponciano Ermita, OCT 8539;
4. To Felipe Marcelo, OCT No. 8542;
5. To Salvador Pedimonte, OCT Nos. 8545 and 8546;
6. To Fabiana Pedimonte, OCT No. 9848; and
7. To Leonila Pedimonte, OCT No. 9849.9
On December 21, 1998, the respondents filed a complaint for cancellation of
titles, quieting of title, recovery of possession, and damages against the DAR
Secretary; the Municipal Agrarian Reform Officer of Pili, Camarines Sur; DAR
Technologist Carmen Sorita; DAR Team Leader Julian Israel; Engr. Sales; and
Regional Director Antonio Nuesa of DAR Regional Office No. V (public
defendants) and the farmer-beneficiaries (private defendants) in the Regional
Trial Court (RTC) in Pili, Camarines Sur, alleging that they had been denied
due process; and that the titles of the defendants (who included the
petitioner)in the disputed land constituted clouds on their own title. They
prayed that the private defendants certificates of title, including those of
their purchasers Chisan Uy and the petitioner, be cancelled; that the private
defendants be ordered to surrender the possession of the disputed land to
them; and that in default thereof the private defendants be ordered to pay
the fair market value of the property, with reparation for damages in either
case.10
Ruling of the RTC
On June 30, 2000,11 the RTC resolved in favor of the respondents by finding
that no notice of the inclusion of the disputed land under the operation of
P.D. No. 27 had been given to them. The RTC decreed thusly:

IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING CONSIDERATIONS, judgment is hereby

rendered:
1. Declaring plaintiffs as the owners of the lands covered by TCT No.
30111 and declaring said title as VALID, BINDING AND EFFECTIVE,
against the whole world;
2. Declaring null and void all the proceedings taken by public
defendants in the generation of the certificates of land transfer and
emancipation patents, on the bases of which the OCTs mentioned in
paragraphs 2 and 3 of this decision were issued by the Register of
Deeds of Camarines Sur;
3. Ordering the Register of Deeds of Camarines Sur to cancel all the
OCTs and TCTs mentioned in paragraph 2 and 3 of this decision;
4. Ordering defendants whose titles were cancelled to surrender the
possession of the lands covered by their cancelled titles to the
plaintiffs and condemning them to PERPETUAL SILENCE in so far as TCT
30111 is concerned.
NO COSTS.
SO ORDERED.12
Decision of the CA
Isabel Ronda, et al. (heirs of deceased farmer-beneficiary Mariano S. Ronda),
Catalino Alcaide, Julia Casaysayan, Chisan Uy, and the petitioner appealed to
the CA.
The defendant public officials did not appeal.13 Also not appealing were
defendants farmers-beneficiaries (with their respective OCTs) Spouses
Salvador R. Pedimonte and Herminia Barrientos (OCT Nos. 8545 and 8546);
Spouses Angeles C. Ronda and Consolacion Pedimonte (OCT No. 9851);
Spouses Felipe Marcelo and Isabel Nacario (OCT No. 8542); Leonila S.
Pedimonte (OCT No. 9849); Ponciano Ermita (OCT No. 8539); and Fabiana R.
Pedimonte (OCT No. 9848).14 Accordingly, on September 5, 2003, the Clerk of
Court of the RTC issued the certificate of finality as to them, as well as a writ
of partial execution.
Isabel Ronda, et al. raised the following errors on appeal, namely: (1) that the
court a quo erred in acquiring jurisdiction over the case; and (2) the court a
quo erred in ordering the ejectment of the appellants, heirs of deceased
spouses, Mariano S. Ronda and Fidela Cortez-Ronda.15

On their part, Catalino Alcaide, Julia Casaysayan, and Chisan Uy claimed that
the RTC erred in assuming jurisdiction over the case when in fact it had no
such jurisdiction; in holding that the titles issued to the tenants Spouses
Alcaides and Chisan Uy were void; and in holding that the proceedings taken
by the public defendants in generating the CLTs and EPs were void.16
In his appeal, the petitioner insisted that the RTC gravely erred in holding
that he had not been an innocent purchaser in good faith and for value; and
in declaring void and ordering the cancellation of TCT No. 31436 and TCT No.
31437, among others.17
For their part, the respondents asserted that the disputed land, being
originally registered under OCT No. 854, and later on under TCT No. 1128,
and still later on under TCT No. RT-8922, and now under TCT No. 30111, did
not lose its character as registered land; and that as registered land, the
disputed land should not have been subject of another land registration
proceeding from which the EPs and the certificates of title of the private
defendants could be derived.18
In its decision promulgated on February 17, 2004,19 the CA ruled in favor of
respondents, viz:
WHEREFORE, this appeal is DENIED. The assailed Decisiondated June 30,
2000 of the Regional Trial Court of Pili, Camarines Sur, Branch 32 in Civil
Case No. P-2167 is hereby AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
On the inclusion of the disputed land under the DARs OLT Program (P.D. No.
27), the CA observed:
Significantly, the disputed land was earlier extra-judicially settled by the
plaintiffs-appellees as heirs of the original owner. The disputed land was
already titled to plaintiffs-appellees at the time that public respondent DAR
included it in the operation of PD No. 27. The DARs finding that the same
was an "untitled" property is belied not only by the records but, more so, by
the failure of defendants-appellants to refute plaintiffs-appellees assertion to
the contrary.
Moreover, for a valid application of PD No. 27, the procedures outlined under
PD No. 266 should have been observed, among which is the duty of the
Register of Deeds to notify the registered owner concerning such application
within a reasonable time. However, as found by the Trial Court, no such
notice was served on plaintiffs-appellees, precisely due to the erroneous
premise that the disputed land was "untitled property".

Prescinding from the said wrong premise that the disputed land was an
untitled property, no payment of just compensation was made to the
registered owners. Such failure or absence of payment violates the very law
(PD 27) from which the titles of defendants were purportedly derived. Hence,
the land transfer initiated by the DAR involving the disputed land is not only
irregular but also unlawful for having been undertaken in violation of the law.
Moreover, a land covered by a title which is outstanding cannot be the
subject of an application for registration unless the existing title which has
become indefeasible is first nullified by a proper court proceeding.
Consequently, the Emancipation Patents and the Certificates of Titles issued
as a result of the DARs Operation Land Transfer program over an already
registered land have no legal foundation or basis. Such subsequent titles
must be cancelled because they cast clouds on the earlier existing, valid and
uncancelled title of plaintiffs-appellees. For all intents and purposes, they are
redundant titles that cannot supplant or supersede existing valid titles.20
On whether the petitioner and Chisan Uy had been purchasers in good faith
and for value without any notice of any defect in the title of the seller (i.e.,
the heirs of the farmers-beneficiaries), the CA decreed:
We disagree. Even assuming arguendo that they had no notice of any defect
in their transferors titles, and the lands sold to them should be included in
the DARs Operation Land Transfer(OLT) program, no valid title could have
passed to them because the transfers are void under PD 27. PD 27 explicitly
provides:
xxxx
Title to land acquired pursuant to this Decree or the Land Reform Program of
the Government shall not be transferable except by hereditary succession or
to the Government in accordance with the provisions of this Decree, the
Code of Agrarian Reforms and other existing laws and regulations;
x x x x (Emphasis supplied)
Based on the above-quoted provision, appellant-purchasers Hector and
Chisan Uy are clearly not the qualified transferees of the lands sold to them.
More importantly, the policy of the State in passing PD 27 is to emancipate
the tiller of the soil from his bondage by transferring to him the ownership of
the land he tills. The prohibition against its transfer is for the purpose of
preserving the land for the sole benefit and enjoyment of the farmer and his
family. To sustain the transfer of the lands to appellants-purchasers would
clearly not achieve that purpose. It would, in fact, defeat it.

The titles of appellant-purchasers Hector Uy and Chisan Uy are, therefore,

voided. Ownership of the lands unlawfully transferred to them, remains with
plaintiffs-appellees. However, this is without prejudice to whatever legal
remedies these appellant-purchasers may avail to recover what they had
paid to their transferors.21
In its resolution of August 18, 2004 denying the petitioners motion for
reconsideration, the CA, citing Baltazar v. Court of Appeals,22 correctly
observed:
The property subject of the said Baltazar case was titled in the name of the
private respondent Good Earth Enterprises, Inc. Petitioner therein, Baltazar,
claimed ownership of the property, tracing his rights from an alleged vast
Spanish grant to one "Don Hermogenes Rodriguez, Governor General of
Intramuros, Manila" down to a deed of sale over the subject lots allegedly
executed by one Pedro Asedillo (for whose mother, Baltazar had been a
tenant sharing in the rice harvest from the lots). Baltazar filed a case for
declaration of ownership and reconveyance, and was declared by the court
as the true owner of the property. Consequently, Good Earths title was
cancelled and another one issued in Baltazars name. Baltazar promptly sold
the land to third parties. Good Earth filed a case for annulment of judgment
and reconveyance. Baltazar argued that his vendees are innocent purchasers
for value. The Supreme Court, in upholding Good Earths title, declared:
We might assume for the moment and for purposes of argument only that
Baltazars vendees had successfully proven they were purchasers in good
faith and for value. Even so, as between two persons both of whom are in
good faith and both innocent of any negligence, the law must protect and
prefer the lawful holder of registered title over the transferee of a vendor
bereft of any transmissible rights. Under the foregoing principle derived from
the above case law, Baltazars vendees have no rights as against Good
Earth. Their recourse is against Baltazar himself." (Emphasis supplied.) 23
xxxx
Like Baltazar, Hector and Chisan Uys transferors had no transmissible rights
because their titles were void, having emanated from an erroneous
declaration that the property is untitled, and from an irregular or
procedurally flawed implementation of the agrarian reform law (as there was
no notice to the registered owner that the subject property would be placed
under the Operation Land Transfer program, and there was no payment of
just compensation). Accordingly, Hector and Chisan Uys titles are likewise
void.24
Issues

Hence, the petitioner has appealed, along with Chisan Uy, Catalino Alcaide
and Julia Casaysayan. The petition for review on certiorari of Chisan Uy,
Alcaide and Casaysayan was docketed as G.R. No. 165320, and that of
petitioner Hector Uy as G.R. No. 164961.
On January 21, 2008, the Court promulgated a resolution in G.R. No. 165320,
pertinently stating: x x x It appearing that Atty. Nelson P. Paraiso, counsel for
petitioners in G.R. No. 165320, failed to file reply to the comment on the
petition for review on certiorari as required in the Resolution dated 24 August
2005 within the extended period which expired on 01 December 2006, the
petition is hereby ordered DENIED for failure to comply with said resolution,
which amounts to failure to prosecute.
In any event, petitioner failed to sufficiently show that the Court of Appeals
committed any reversible error in the challenged decision and resolution as
to warrant the exercise of this Courts discretionary appellate jurisdiction.
Besides, the issues raised are factual in nature.25 As such, only the
petitioners appeal remains unresolved. Towards that end, he insists that the
CA erred: (a) in failing to find that he was an innocent purchaser for value
who had the better right than the respondents over the disputed land; and
(b) in failing to find that the law applicable to the dispute was R.A. No. 6657
(approved on June 10, 1988), not P. D. No. 27.26
The petitioner argues that he paid a full and fair price of P10,000,000.00 to
Isabel Ronda, et al. for the lots in dispute, said lots having a base market
value of only P7,717,000.00;27 that all the documents shown to him by the
vendors (Isabel Ronda, et al.) did not indicate any defect in the title or any
claim by the respondents in the lots in dispute; that, accordingly, before he
and the vendors (Isabel Ronda, et al.) entered into the deed of sale, there
was absolutely nothing in the documents that showed any defect in the title
conveyed to him; that, specifically, OCT No. 9852 and OCT No. 9853, which
were on file in the Registry of Deeds, showed that the lots in dispute had
been awarded to a bona fide tenant-beneficiary as part of the land reform
program, that is, OCT No. 9852 and OCT No. 9853 showed that as early as
November 21, 1997: (a) the encumbrance in favor of Land Bank of the
Philippines had been cancelled; (b) the records of the DAR indicated that
Mariano Ronda had been awarded OCT No. 9852 and OCT No. 9853 as the
bona fide tenant-beneficiary; and (c) the extra-judicial settlement revealed to
him that he was then dealing with the children of Mariano Ronda.28
The petitioner concludes that the absence of any irregularities in the
documents presented to him, coupled with the fact that it was Isabel Ronda,
et al., not the respondents, who were then in the possession of the lots in
dispute, clearly evinced to him that he did not have to look beyond the titles
presented to him; that, consequently, he could not have been aware of the
respondents claim over the disputed lots;29 that he should be deemed an

innocent purchaser for value because the only time that he could have been
charged with constructive notice of the respondents claim to the lots in
dispute was after the annotation of their adverse claim on the title of the lot,
which they made five months after the sale to him;30 and that according to
Tenio-Obsequio v. Court of Appeals,31 "the rule of law and justice that should
apply in this case is that as between two innocent persons, one of whom
must suffer the consequences of a breach of trust, the one who made it
possible by his act of confidence must bear the loss. The right of the
innocent purchaser for value must be respected and protected, even if the
seller obtained his title through fraud."32
Anent the applicability of P.D. No. 27,33 the petitioner contends that the RTC
and the CAs reliance on P.D. No. 27 to support their rulings to the effect that
the transfer to him had been void, in that the alienation had not been made
in favor of the Government or by hereditary succession, was misplaced; that
it was Section 2734 of R.A. No. 6657 (Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law),
not P.D. No. 27, that should apply to the controversy;35 that Section 27 of R.A.
No. 6657 amended P.D. No. 27 in view of the former laws repealing clause
(Section 7636); and that, as a result, the perpetual prohibition against transfer
contained in P.D. No. 27 must be deemed inconsistent with and repealed by
Section 27 of R.A. No. 6657, which provides a prohibition for only 10 years.
According to the petitioner, the evidence established that Mariano Ronda had
secured OCT No. 9852 and OCT No. 9853 on July 7, 1998; that the first
transfer of the lots (from Mariano Ronda to Isabela Ronda, et al.) by virtue of
the deed of extra-judicial settlement had been by hereditary succession,
which was not in breach of either P.D. No. 27 or R.A. No. 6657; that the
second transfer of the lots on July 31, 1998, whereby Isabel Ronda, et al. sold
the lots to the petitioner, was beyond the ten-year prohibited period under
Section 27 of R.A. No. 6657 due to said period having expired on July 6,
1988; and that, consequently, the sale from Isabela Ronda, et al. to the
petitioner was outside the ambit of the ten-year prohibited period under
Section 27 of R.A. No. 6657.37
The respondents counter, however, that their action for quieting of title was
premised on the illegal acquisition of their decreed and titled property by the
DAR under its OLT Program as a result of the DARs declaration of their
property as "untitled" and "abandoned"; that their title did not lose its
character as "valid, existing, binding, effective, and uncancelled" since
November 23, 1933,the time when the OCT was issued; and that the DAR
officials, by not appealing the RTCs decision, were implicitly "recognizing,
acknowledging and admitting" the decision.38
The respondents deny the petitioners claim of good faith. They point out
that he did not exercise due diligence in examining the title of the heirs of
Mariano Ronda given that said title had been previously, but wrongfully,

acquired through the OLT Program of the DAR; that the express prohibition
contained in OCT No. 9852 and OCT No. 9853, which the petitioner
unavoidably saw, made it clear that the lots thereby covered "shall not be
transferred except by hereditary succession or to the Government in
accordance with the provisions of Presidential Decree No. 27", thereby
belying the petitioners assertion of being an innocent purchaser for value
and in good faith;39 that the nullity of the DAR proceedings and the void
character of the OCTs issued by DAR did not supersede the valid, existing,
binding and uncancelled title of the respondent.40
Ruling of the Court
We affirm the decision of the CA.
We stated at the start that in determining whether or not a buyer of property
is a purchaser in good faith, he must show that he has bought the property
without notice that some other person had a right to, or interest in, such
property, and he should pay a full and fair price for the same at the time of
his purchase, or before he had notice of the claim or interest of some other
persons in the property.41 He must believe that the person from whom he
receives the property was the owner and could convey title to the
property,42 for he cannot close his eyes to facts that should put a reasonable
man on his guard and still claim he acted in good faith.43
In Bautista v. Silva,44 the Court enunciates the requisites for the buyer to be
considered a purchaser in good faith, viz:
A buyer for value in good faith is one who buys property of another, without
notice that some other person has a right to, or interest in, such property
and pays full and fair price for the same, at the time of such purchase, or
before he has notice of the claim or interest of some other persons in the
property. He buys the property with the well- founded belief that the person
from whom he receives the thing had title to the property and capacity to
convey it.
To prove good faith, a buyer of registered and titled land need only show that
he relied on the face of the title to the property. He need not prove that he
made further inquiry for he is not obliged to explore beyond the four corners
of the title. Such degree of proof of good faith, however, is sufficient only
when the following conditions concur: first, the seller is the registered owner
of the land; second, the latter is in possession thereof; and third, at the time
of the sale, the buyer was not aware of any claim or interest of some other
person in the property, or of any defect or restriction in the title of the seller
or in his capacity to convey title to the property. Absent one or two of the
foregoing conditions, then the law itself puts the buyer on notice and obliges
the latter to exercise a higher degree of diligence by scrutinizing the

certificate of title and examining all factual circumstances in order to

determine the sellers title and capacity to transfer any interest in the
property. Under such circumstance, it was no longer sufficient for said buyer
to merely show that he had relied on the face of the title; he must now also
show that he had exercised reasonable precaution by inquiring beyond the
title. Failure to exercise such degree of precaution makes him a buyer in bad
faith.45
An examination of the deed of sale executed between Isabel Ronda, et al.
and the petitioner respecting the portions covered by TCT No. 31120 and TCT
No. 31121 indicates that the TCTs were issued only on August 17, 1998 but
the deed of sale was executed on July 31, 1998. While it is true, as the
petitioner argues, that succession occurs from the moment of death of the
decedent pursuant to Article 777 of the Civil Code,46 his argument did not
extend to whether or not he was a buyer in good faith, but only to whether or
not, if at all, Isabel Ronda, et al., as the heirs of Mariano Ronda, held the right
to transfer ownership over their predecessors property. The argument did
not also address whether or not the transfer to the petitioner was valid.
Evidently, the petitioner entered into the deed of sale without having been
able to inspect TCT No. 31120 and TCT No. 31121 by virtue of such TCTs
being not yet in existence at that time. If at all, it was OCT No. 9852 and OCT
No. 9853 that were available at the time of the execution of the deed of sale,
and such OCTs were presumably inspected by petitioner before he signed the
deed of sale. It is notable that said OCTs categorically stated that they were
entered pursuant to an emancipation patent of the Ministry of Agrarian
Reform pursuant to the Operation Land Transfer (OLT) Program of the
government. Furthermore, said OCTs plainly recited the following prohibition:
"it shall not be transferred except by hereditary succession or to the
Government in accordance with the provisions of Presidential Decree No. 27,
Code of Agrarian Reforms of the Philippines and other existing laws and
regulations."
The foregoing circumstances negated the third element of good faith cited in
Bautista v. Silva, i.e., that "at the time of sale, the buyer was not aware of
any claim or interest of some other person in the property, or of any defect
or restriction in the title of the seller or in his capacity to convey title to the
property." As we have ruled in Bautista v. Silva,47 the absence of the third
condition put the petitioner on notice and obliged him to exercise a higher
degree of diligence by scrutinizing the certificates of title and examining all
factual circumstances in order to determine the sellers title and capacity to
transfer any interest in the lots. Consequently, it is not sufficient for him to
insist that he relied on the face of the certificates of title, for he must further
show that he exercised reasonable precaution by inquiring beyond the
certificates of title. Failure to exercise such degree of precaution rendered
him a buyer in bad faith. "It is a well-settled rule that a purchaser cannot

close his eyes to facts which should put a reasonable man upon his guard,
and then claim that he acted in good faith under the belief that there was no
defect in the title of the vendor."48
The petitioner was not an innocent purchaser for value; hence, he cannot be
awarded the disputed land.1awp++i1
In view of the result thus reached by us, it becomes superfluous to settle the
issue of which between P.D.No. 27 and Section 27 of R.A. No. 6657 should
control, and whether or not the R.A. No. 6657 has repealed P.D. No. 27. Even
so, the Court has expressly clarified that R.A. No. 6657 did not repeal or
supersede P.D. No. 27, stating in Sigre v. Court of Appeals:49
Finally, the Court need not belabor the fact that R.A. 6657 or the CARP Law
operates distinctly from P.D. 27. R.A. 6657 covers all public and private
agricultural land including other lands of the public domain suitable for
agriculture as provided for in Proclamation No. 131 and Executive Order No.
229; while, P.D. 27 covers rice and corn lands. On this score, E.O. 229, which
provides for the mechanism of the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program,
specifically states: "(P)residential Decree No. 27, as amended, shall continue
to operate with respect to rice and corn lands, covered thereunder. xxx." It
cannot be gainsaid, therefore, that R.A. 6657 did not repeal or supersede, in
any way, P.D. 27. And whatever provisions of P.D. 27 that are not inconsistent
with R.A. 6657 shall be suppletory to the latter, and all rights acquired by the
tenant-farmer under P.D. 27 are retained even with the passage of R.A. 6657.
WHEREFORE, we DENY the petition for review on certiorari; AFFIRM the
decision of the Court of Appeals promulgated on February 1 7, 2004; and
ORDER the petitioner to pay the costs of suit.
SO ORDERED.
LUCAS P. BERSAMIN
Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:
MARIA LOURDES P. A. SERENO
Chief Justice
TERESITA J. LEONARDO-DE
CASTRO
Associate Justice

MARTIN S. VILLARAMA, JR.

Associate Justice

BIENVENIDO L. REYES
Associate Justice

CERTIFICATION
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, I certify that the
conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before
the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court's Division.
MARIA LOURDES P. A. SERENO
Chief Justice

Footnotes
1

Sandoval v. Court of Appeals, G. R. No. 106657, August 1, 1996, 260

SCRA 283, 296-297, citing Agricultural and Home Extension
Development Corporation v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 92310,
September 10, 1992, 213 SCRA 563, 565-566; Santos v. Court of
Appeals, G.R. No. 90380, September 13, 1990, 189 SCRA 550; Fule v.
De Legare,G.R. No. L-17951, February 28, 1963, 7 SCRA 351, 356; De
Santos v. Intermediate Appellate Court, No. L-69591, January 25, 1988,
157 SCRA 295, 301-302.
2

Duran v. Intermediate Appellate Court, G. R. No. L-64159, September

10, 1985, 138 SCRA 489, 494; Arriola v. Gomez de la Serna, 14 Phil.
627 (1909).
3

Embrado v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 51457, June 27, 1994, 233
SCRA 335, 344.
4

Rollo (G.R. No. 164961), pp. 9-22; penned by Associate Justice Noel G.
Tijam, and concurred in by Associate Justice Ruben T. Reyes (later
Presiding Justice, and a Member of the Court, but now retired) and
Associate Justice Edgardo P. Cruz (retired).
5

Id. at 145-152.

Id. at 10-11.

Id. at 11.

Id. at 11-12.

Id. at 12-13.

10

Id.

11

Supra note 5.

12

Id. at 152.

13

Id. at 15-16.

14

Id. at 16.

15

Id. at 14.

16

Id. at 14-15.

17

Id. at 15.

18

Id.

19

Supra note 4, at 21.

20

Id. at 19-20.

21

Id. at 20-21.

22

No. L-78728, December 8, 1988, 168 SCRA 354.

23

Rollo, p. 63.

24

Id. at 64.

25

Rollo (G.R. No. 165320), p. 467.

26

Rollo (G.R. No. 164961), p. 77.

27

Id. at 78-79.

28

Id. at 80-81.

29

Id. at 81.

30

Id. at 84.

31

G.R. No. 107967, March 1, 1994, 230 SCRA 550.

32

Id. at 560.

33

P.D. No. 27 provides:

Title to land acquired pursuant to this Decree or the Land Reform

Program of the Government shall not be transferable except by
hereditary succession or to the Government in accordance with the
provisions of this Decree, the Code of Agrarian Reforms and other
existing laws and regulations.
34

Section 27 of R.A. No. 6657 states:

Section 27. Transferability of Awarded Lands.Lands acquired by

beneficiaries under this Act may not be sold, transferred or conveyed
except through hereditary succession, or to the government, or to the
LBP, or to other qualified beneficiaries for a period of ten (10) years.
Provided, however, that the children or the spouse of the transferor
shall have a right to repurchase the land from the government or LBP
within a period of two (2) years. Due notice of the availability of the
land shall be given by the LBP to the Barangay Agrarian Reform
Committee (BARC) of the barangay where the land is situated. The
Provincial Agrarian Reform Coordinating Committee (PARCCOM), As
herein provided, shall, in turn, be given due notice thereof by the
BARC.
If the land has not yet been fully paid by the beneficiary, the rights to
the land may be transferred or conveyed, with prior approval of the
DAR, to any heir of the beneficiary or to any other beneficiary who, as
a condition for such transfer or conveyance, shall cultivate the land
himself. Failing compliance herewith, the land shall be transferred to
the LBP which shall give due notice of the availability of the land in the
manner specified in the immediately preceding paragraph.
In the event of such transfer to the LBP, the latter shall compensate
the beneficiary in one lump sum for the amounts the latter has already
paid, together with the value of improvements he has made on the
land.
35

Rollo (G.R. No. 164961), pp. 103-104.

36

R.A. No. 6657, Section 76. Repealing Clause. Section 35 of

Republic Act No. 3834, Presidential Decree No. 316, the last two
paragraphs of Section 12 of Presidential Decree No. 946, Presidential
Decree No. 1038, and all other laws, decrees executive orders, rules
and regulations, issuances or parts thereof inconsistent with this Act
are hereby repealed or amended accordingly.
37

Rollo, 105-106.

38

Id. at 182-183.

39

Id. at 205-206.

40

Id. at 194-195.

41

Supra note 1.

42

Supra note 2.

43

Supra note 3.

44

G.R. No. 157434, September 19, 2006, 502 SCRA 334.

45

Id. at 346-348.

46

Rollo (G.R. No. 164961), p. 82.

47

Supra note 44.

48

Lucena v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 77468, August 25, 1999, 313
SCRA 47, 57.
49

G.R. No. 109568 & 113454, August 8, 2002, 387 SCRA 15, 29.

The Lawphil Project - Arellano Law Foundation

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. 195668

June 25, 2014

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee,

vs.
MA. HARLETA VELASCO y BRIONES, MARICAR B. INOVERO, MARISSA
DIALA, and BERNA M. PAULINO, Accused,
MARICAR B. INOVERO, Accused-Appellant.

DECISION
BERSAMIN, J.:
The several accused in illegal recruitment committed in large scale against
whom the State establishes a conspiracy are each equally criminally and
civilly liable. It follows, therefore, that as far as civil liability is concerned
each is solidarily liable to the victims of the illegal recruitment for the
reimbursement of the sums collected from them, regardless of the extent of
the participation of the accused in the illegal recruitment.
The Case
Accused-appellant Maricar B. Inovero seeks the review and reversal of the
decision promulgated on August 26, 2010,1 whereby the Court of Appeals
(CA) affirmed her conviction for illegal recruitment committed in large scale
amounting to economic sabotage under the judgment rendered on January
14, 2008 by the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 133, in Makati City.2
Antecedents
On March 17, 2004, the Office of the City Prosecutor of Makati City filed in
the RTC two informations3 charging Inovero, Ma. Harleta Velasco y Briones,
Marissa Diala and Berna Paulino with illegal recruitment as defined and
penalized under Section 6 of Republic Act No. 8042 (Migrant Workers Act of
1995), and 11 informations4 charging the same accused with estafa as
defined and penalized under Article315, paragraph 2(a) of the Revised Penal
Code. Only Inovero was arrested and prosecuted, the other accused having
remained at large.
Six cases charging estafa (Criminal Case No. 04-1565, Criminal Case No.
1568, Criminal Case No. 1570, Criminal Case No. 1571 and Criminal Case No.
1572 and Criminal Case No. 1573) and one of the two charging illegal
recruitment (Criminal Case No. 04-1563) were provisionally dismissed
because of the failure of the complainants to prosecute.5 The seven cases
were later permanently dismissed after the complainants did not revive them
within two years, as provided in Section 8,6 Rule 117 of the Rules of Court.
Trial on the merits ensued as to the remaining cases (Criminal Case No. 041562, for illegal recruitment; and Criminal Case No. 04-1564; Criminal Case
No. 04-1566; Criminal Case No. 04-1567; Criminal Case No. 1569 and
Criminal Case No. 04-1574, for estafa).7
The CA recounted the transactions between the complainants and the
accused, including Inovero, in the following manner:

Regarding Criminal Case No. 04-1562, the prosecution presented the five (5)
private complainants as witnesses to prove the crime of Illegal Recruitment,
namely: Novesa Baful ("Baful"), Danilo Brizuela ("Brizuela"), Rosanna Aguirre
("Aguirre"), Annaliza Amoyo ("Amoyo"), and Teresa Marbella ("Marbella"), and
Mildred Versoza ("Versoza") from the Philippine Overseas Employment
Administration ("POEA").
Baful testified that on May 20, 2003 she, together with her sister-in-law, went
to Harvel International Talent Management and Promotion ("HARVEL") at Unit
509 Cityland Condominium, Makati City upon learning that recruitment for
caregivers to Japan was on-going there. On said date, she allegedly met
Inovero; Velasco, and Diala, and saw Inovero conducting a briefing on the
applicants. She also testified that Diala, the alleged talent manager, directed
her to submit certain documents, and to pay Two Thousand Five Hundred
Pesos (P2,500.00) as training fee, as well as Thirty Thousand Pesos
(P30,000.00) as placement and processing fees. Diala also advised her to
undergo physical examination.
On June 6, 2003, after complying with the aforesaid requirements and after
paying Diala the amounts of Eighteen Thousand Pesos (P18,000.00) and Ten
Thousand pesos (P10,000.00), Baful was promised deployment within two (2)
to three (3) months. She likewise testified that Inovero briefed her and her
co-applicants on what to wear on the day of their departure. However, she
was never deployed. Finally, she testified that she found out that HARVEL
was not licensed to deploy workers for overseas employment.
Brizuela, another complainant, testified that he went to HARVELs office in
Makati on February 7, 2003 to inquire on the requirements and hiring
procedure for a caregiver in Japan. There, Diala told him the amount required
as processing fee and the documents to be submitted. And when he
submitted on March 7, 2003 the required documents and payments, it was,
this time, Paulino who received them. He claimed that he underwent training
and medical examination; he likewise attended an orientation conducted by
Inovero at which time, he and his batchmates were advised what clothes to
wear on the day of their departure; he was assured of deployment on the
first week of June 2003, however, on the eve of his supposed "pre-departure
orientation seminar," Paulino texted him that the seminar was cancelled
because Inovero, who had the applicants money, did not show up. He
testified that he was not deployed. Neither was his money returned, as
promised.
On cross-examination, Brizuela testified that Inovero was the one who
conducted the orientation, and represented to all the applicants that most of
the time, she was in the Japanese Embassy expediting the applicants visa.

Aguirre, the third complainant to testify, alleged that she went to HARVEL on
May 22, 2003, to apply as caregiver in Japan; there, Diala informed her that
Inovero was oneof the owners of HARVEL and Velasco was its President; she
paid Thirty Five Thousand Pesos (P35,000.00), and submitted her documents,
receipt of which was acknowledged by Diala; despite her undergoing medical
examination and several training seminars, she was however not deployed to
Japan. Worse, she found out that HARVEL was not licensed to recruit workers.
Amoyo, the fourth complainant, testified that she went to HARVELs office on
May 28, 2003 to apply as caregiver in Japan, and Diala required her to submit
certain documents, to undergo training and medical examination, and to pay
Thirty Five Thousand Pesos (P35,000.00) as placement and processing fees.
However, after complying with said requirements, she was never deployed as
promised.
Marbella was the last complainant to testify. She alleged that she applied for
the position of janitress at HARVEL sometime in December 2002; just like the
rest of the complainants, she was required to submit certain documents and
to pay a total amount of Twenty Thousand pesos (P20,000.00) as processing
fee; after paying said fee, Diala and Inovero promised her and the other
applicants that they will be deployed in three (3) months or in June 2003;
however, the promised deployment never materialized; she later found out
that HARVEL was not even licensed to recruit workers.
[Mildred] Versoza, on the other hand, is a Labor and Employment Officer at
the POEA Licensing Branch. She testified that she prepared a Certification
certifying that neither HARVEL nor Inovero was authorized to recruit workers
for overseas employment as per records at their office.
In her defense, Inovero denied the allegations hurled against her. As
summarized in the assailed Decision, she claimed that she is the niece of
accused Velasco, the owner of HARVEL, but denied working there. Explaining
her presence in HARVEL, she alleged that she worked for her uncle, Velascos
husband, as an office assistant, hence, for at least two or three times a week,
she had to go to HARVEL on alleged errands for her uncle. She also testified
that her alleged errands mainly consisted of serving food and refreshments
during orientations at HARVEL. Inovero likewise denied receiving any money
from the complainants, nor issuing receipts therefor.8
Judgment of the RTC
On January 14, 2008, the RTC rendered judgment acquitting Inovero of five
counts of estafabut convicting her in Criminal Case No. 04-1562 of illegal
recruitment committed in large scale as defined and penalized by Section 6
and Section 7 of Republic Act No. 8042 (Migrant Workers and Overseas
Filipinos Act of 1995), disposing thusly:

WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered in the aforestated cases as

follows:
In Criminal Case No. 04-1562, accused Maricar Inovero is found guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of Illegal Recruitment in large scale defined
and penalized under Sections 6 and 7, II, of Republic Act No. 8042 otherwise
known as the Migrant Workers and Overseas Filipinos Act of 1995, and is
hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty of life imprisonment. She is likewise
ordered to pay a fine of Five Hundred Thousand Pesos (P500,000.00).
Criminal Case No. 04-1563 also for illegal recruitment in large scale is hereby
ordered dismissed to its finality for failure of complainants Alvin De Leon,
Roderick Acuna, Agosto Vale and Marina Viernes to revive said case despite
the lapse of two years from its provisional dismissal.
Criminal Cases No. 04-1564, 1566, 1567, 1569, 1571 and 1574 are hereby
ordered DISMISSED for failure of the prosecution to adduce sufficient
evidence to prove all the elements of the said offense.
Criminal Cases Nos. 1565, 1568, 1570, 1572 and 1573 also for estafa [are]
hereby ordered dismissed to its finality for failure of complainants Agosto
Vale, Alvin De Leon, Roselyn Saruyda, Roderick Acuna and Marina Viernes to
revive said cases despite the lapse of two (2) years from its provisional
dismissal.
Considering that the accused is a detention prisoner, she shall be credited in
the service of her sentence with the full time during which she has
undergone preventive imprisonment if she agrees voluntarily to abide by the
same disciplinary rules imposed upon convicted prisoners, otherwise, with
four-fifths thereof.
Meanwhile, considering that the accused Ma. Harleta B. Velasco, Marissa
Diala and Berna Paulino are still at large, let alias warrants of arrest be issued
against them. In the meantime, let the cases filed against them be archived,
which shall be revived upon their apprehension.
SO ORDERED.9
Decision of the CA
Inovero appealed, contending that:
THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN FINDING ACCUSEDAPPELLANT GUILTY
OF THE CRIME CHARGED DESPITE THE PROSECUTIONS FAILURE TO
ESTABLISH [HER] GUILT BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT. 10

On August 26, 2010, the CA affirmed the conviction, viz:

WHEREFORE, the instant appeal is DISMISSED. The January 14, 2008
Decision of the RTC is AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.11
Issue
In this appeal, Inovero insists that the CA erred in affirming her conviction by
the RTC because she had not been an employee of Harvel at any time; that
she could be faulted only for her association with the supposed illegal
recruiters; that in all stages of the complainants recruitment for overseas
employment by Harvel, they had transacted only and directly with Diala; and
that the certification from the POEA to the effect she was not a licensed
recruiter was not a positive proof that she engaged in illegal recruitment.
Ruling of the Court
The appeal lacks merit.
In its assailed decision, the CA affirmed the entire findings of fact of the RTC,
stating:
The essential elements of illegal recruitment committed in large scale are:
(1) that the accused engaged in acts of recruitment and placement of
workers as defined under Article 13(b) of the Labor Code, or in any prohibited
activities under Article 34 of the same Code; (2) that the accused had not
complied with the guidelines issued by the Secretary of Labor and
Employment with respect to the requirement to secure a license or authority
to recruit and deploy workers; and (3) that the accused committed the
unlawful acts against 3 or more persons. In simplest terms, illegal
recruitment is committed by persons who, without authority from the
government, give the impression that they have the power to send workers
abroad for employment purposes. In Our view, despite Inoveros
protestations that she did not commit illegal recruitment, the following
circumstances contrarily convince Us that she was into illegal recruitment.
First, private complainants Baful and Brizuela commonly testified that
Inovero was the one who conducted orientations/briefings on them; informed
them, among others, on how much their salary would be as caregivers in
Japan; and what to wear when they finally will be deployed. Second, when
Diala introduced her (Inovero) to private complainant Amoyo as one of the
owners of HARVEL, Inovero did not bother to correct said representation.
Inoveros silence is clearly an implied acquiescence to said representation.

Third, Inovero, while conducting orientation on private complainant Brizuela,

represented herself as the one expediting the release of applicants working
visa for Japan.
Fourth, in a Certification issued and attested to by POEAs Versoza Inovero
had no license nor authority to recruit for overseas employment.
Based on the foregoing, there is therefore no doubt that the RTC correctly
found that Inovero committed illegal recruitment in large scale by giving
private complainants the impression that she can send them abroad for
employment purposes, despite the fact that she had no license or authority
to do so.12
It is basic that the Court, not being a trier of facts, must of necessity rely on
the findings of fact by the trial court which are conclusive and binding once
affirmed by the CA on intermediate review. The bindingness of the trial
courts factual findings is by virtue of its direct access to the evidence. The
direct access affords the trial court the unique advantage to observe the
witnesses demeanor while testifying, and the personal opportunity to test
the accuracy and reliability of their recollections of past events, both of
which are very decisive in a litigation like this criminal prosecution for the
serious crime of illegal recruitment committed in large scale where the
parties have disagreed on the material facts. The Court leaves its confined
precinct of dealing only with legal issues in order to deal with factual ones
only when the appellant persuasively demonstrates a clear error in the
appreciation of the evidence by both the trial and the appellate courts. This
demonstration was not done herein by the appellant. Hence, the Court
upholds the CAs affirmance of the factual findings by the trial court.
All that Inoveros appeal has offered was her denial of complicity in the illegal
recruitment of the complainants. But the complainants credibly described
and affirmed her specific acts during the commission of the crime of illegal
recruitment. Their positive assertions were far trustworthier than her mere
denial.
Denial, essentially a negation of a fact, does not prevail over an affirmative
assertion of the fact.1wphi1 Thus, courts both trial and appellate have
generally viewed the defense of denial in criminal cases with considerable
caution, if not with outright rejection. Such judicial attitude comes from the
recognition that denial is inherently weak and unreliable by virtue of its being
an excuse too easy and too convenient for the guilty to make. To be worthy
of consideration at all, denial should be substantiated by clear and
convincing evidence. The accused cannot solely rely on her negative and
self-serving negations, for denial carries no weight in law and has no greater
evidentiary value than the testimony of credible witnesses who testify on
affirmative matters.13 It is no different here.

We concur with the RTC and the CA that Inovero was criminally liable for the
illegal recruitment charged against her. Strong and positive evidence
demonstrated beyond reasonable doubt her having conspired with her coaccused in the recruitment of the complainants. The decision of the CA
amply recounted her overt part in the conspiracy. Under the law, there is a
conspiracy when two or more persons come to an agreement concerning the
commission of a felony, and decide to commit it.14
The complainants paid varying sums for placement, training and processing
fees, respectively as follows: (a) Baful P28,500.00; (b) Brizuela
P38,600.00; (c) Aguirre P38,600.00; (d) Amoyo P39,000.00; and (e)
Marbella P20,250.00. However, the RTC and the CA did not adjudicate
Inoveros personal liability for them in their judgments. Their omission needs
to be corrected, notwithstanding that the complainants did not appeal, for
not doing so would be patently unjust and contrary to law. The Court, being
the ultimate reviewing tribunal, has not only the authority but also the duty
to correct at any time a matter of law and justice. It is, indeed, a basic tenet
of our criminal law that every person criminally liable is also civilly
liable.15 Civil liability includes restitution, reparation of the damage caused,
and indemnification for consequential damages.16 To enforce the civil liability,
the Rules of Court has deemed to be instituted with the criminal action the
civil action for the recovery of civil liability arising from the offense charged
unless the offended party waives the civil action, or reserves the right to
institute the civil action separately, or institutes the civil action prior to the
criminal action.17 Considering that the crime of illegal recruitment, when it
involves the transfer of funds from the victims to the accused, is inherently in
fraud of the former, civil liability should include the return of the amounts
paid as placement, training and processing fees.18 Hence, Inovero and her
co-accused were liable to indemnify the complainants for all the sums paid.
That the civil liability should be made part of the judgment by the RTC and
the CA was not disputable. The Court pointed out in Bacolod v. People19 that
it was "imperative that the courts prescribe the proper penalties when
convicting the accused, and determine the civil liability to be imposed on the
accused, unless there has been a reservation of the action to recover civil
liability or a waiver of its recovery," because:
It is not amiss to stress that both the RTC and the CA disregarded their
express mandate under Section 2, Rule 120 of the Rules of Court to have the
judgment, if it was of conviction, state: "(1) the legal qualification of the
offense constituted by the acts committed by the accused and the
aggravating or mitigating circumstances which attended its commission; (2)
the participation of the accused in the offense, whether as principal,
accomplice, or accessory after the fact; (3) the penalty imposed upon the
accused; and (4) the civil liability or damages caused by his wrongful act or
omission to be recovered from the accused by the offended party, if there is

any, unless the enforcement of the civil liability by a separate civil action has
been reserved or waived." Their disregard compels us to act as we now do
lest the Court be unreasonably seen as tolerant of their omission. That the
Spouses Cogtas did not themselves seek the correction of the omission by an
appeal is no hindrance to this action because the Court, as the final
reviewing tribunal, has not only the authority but also the duty to correct at
any time a matter of law and justice.
We also pointedly remind all trial and appellate courts to avoid omitting
reliefs that the parties are properly entitled to by law or in equity under the
established facts. Their judgments will not be worthy of the name unless
they thereby fully determine the rights and obligations of the litigants. It
cannot be otherwise, for only by a full determination of such rights and
obligations would they be true to the judicial office of administering justice
and equity for all. Courts should then be alert and cautious in their rendition
of judgments of conviction in criminal cases. They should prescribe the legal
penalties, which is what the Constitution and the law require and expect
them to do. Their prescription of the wrong penalties will be invalid and
ineffectual for being done without jurisdiction or in manifest grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction. They should also determine and
set the civil liability ex delicto of the accused, in order to do justice to the
complaining victims who are always entitled to them. The Rules of Court
mandates them to do so unless the enforcement of the civil liability by
separate actions has been reserved or waived.20
What was the extent of Inoveros civil liability?
The nature of the obligation of the co-conspirators in the commission of the
crime requires solidarity, and each debtor may be compelled to pay the
entire obligation.21 As a co-conspirator, then, Inoveros civil liability was
similar to that of a joint tortfeasor under the rules of the civil law. Joint
tortfeasors are those who command, instigate, promote, encourage, advise,
countenance, cooperate in, aid or abet the commission of a tort, or who
approve of it after it is done, if done for their benefit.22 They are also referred
to as those who act together in committing wrong or whose acts, if
independent of each other, unite in causing a single injury.23 Under Article
2194 of the Civil Code, joint tortfeasors are solidarily liable for the resulting
damage. In other words, joint tortfeasors are each liable as principals, to the
same extent and in the same manner as if they had performed the wrongful
act themselves. As regards the extent of their respective liabilities, the Court
expressed in Far Eastern Shipping Company v. Court of Appeals:24
x x x. Where several causes producing an injury are concurrent and each is
an efficient cause without which the injury would not have happened, the
injury may be attributed to all or any of the causes and recovery may be had
against any or all of the responsible persons although under the

circumstances of the case, it may appear that one of them was more
culpable, and that the duty owed by them to the injured person was not
same. No actors negligence ceases to be a proximate cause merely because
it does not exceed the negligence of other acts. Each wrongdoer is
responsible for the entire result and is liable as though his acts were the sole
cause of the injury.
There is no contribution between joint tort-feasors whose liability is solidary
since both of them are liable for the total damage. Where the concurrent or
successive negligent acts or omissions of two or more persons, although
acting independently, are in combination the direct and proximate cause of a
single injury to a third person, it is impossible to determine in what
proportion each contributed to the injury and either of them is responsible
for the whole injury. x x x
It would not be an excuse for any of the joint tortfeasors to assert that her
individual participation in the wrong was insignificant as compared to those
of the others.25 Joint tortfeasors are not liable pro rata. The damages cannot
be apportioned among them, except by themselves. They cannot insist upon
an apportionment, for the purpose of each paying an aliquot part. They are
jointly and severally liable for the whole amount.26 Hence, Inoveros liability
towards the victims of their illegal recruitment was solidary, regardless of
whether she actually received the amounts paid or not, and notwithstanding
that her co-accused, having escaped arrest until now, have remained
untried.
Under Article 2211 of the Civil Code, interest as part of the damages may be
adjudicated in criminal proceedings in the discretion of the court. The Court
believes and holds that such liability for interest attached to Inovero as a
measure of fairness to the complainants. Thus, Inovero should pay interest of
6% per annum on the sums paid by the complainants to be reckoned from
the finality of this judgment until full payment.27
WHEREFORE, the Court AFFIRMS the decision promulgated on August 26,
2010, subject to the MODIFICATION that appellant Maricar B. Inovero is
ordered to pay by way of actual damages to each of the complainants the
amounts paid by them for placement, training and processing fees,
respectively as follows:
(a) Noveza Baful - P28,500.00;
(b) Danilo Brizuela - P38,600.00;
(c) Rosanna Aguirre - P38,600.00;
(d) Annaliza Amoyo - P39,000.00; and

(e) Teresa Marbella - P20,250.00.

plus interest on such amounts at the rate of six percent (6%) per annum
from the finality of this judgment until fully paid.
Inovero shall further pay the costs of suit.
SO ORDERED.
LUCAS P. BERSAMIN
Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:
MARIA LOURDES P. A. SERENO
Chief Justice
TERESITA J. LEONARDO-DE
CASTRO
Associate Justice

MARTIN S. VILLARAMA, JR.

Associate Justice

BIENVENIDO L. REYES
Associate Justice
CERTIFICATION
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, I certify that the
conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before
the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court's Division.
MARIA LOURDES P. A. SERENO
Chief Justice

Footnotes
1

Rollo, pp. 2-18.

CA rollo, pp. 40-54.

Id. at 8-11.

Id. at 12-33.

Id. at 48.

Section 8. Provisional dismissal. A case shall not be provisionally

dismissed except with the express consent of the accused and with
notice to the offended party.
The provisional dismissal of offenses punishable by imprisonment
not exceeding six (6) years or a fine of any amount, or both, shall
become permanent one (1) year after issuance of the order
without the case having been revived. With respect to offenses
punishable by imprisonment of more than six (6) years, their
provisional dismissal shall become permanent two (2) years after
issuance of the order without the case having been revived. (n)
7

CA rollo, p. 49.

Id. at 144-148.

Id. at 152-154.

10

Id. at 69.

11

Id. at 156.

12

Id. at 154-156, (the bold underscoring is in the original text).

13

People v. Bensig, G.R. No. 138989, September 17, 2002, 389 SCRA
182, 194.
14

Article 8 of the Revised Penal Code.

15

E.g., Article 100 of the Revised Penal Code stipulates that every
person criminally liable for a felony is also civilly liable. The provision,
although seemingly applicable only to a felony, governs also a nonfelony by virtue of Article 10 of the Revised Penal Code expressly
making the provisions of the Revised Penal Code "supplementary" to
special laws unless such laws provide otherwise.
16

Article 104 of the Revised Penal Code.

17

Section 1, Rule 111 of the Rules of Court(2000).

18

The Civil Code, in its Article 1170, expressly holds to be liable for
damages those who in the performance of their obligations are guilty
of fraud, negligence, or delay, and those who in any manner
contravene the tenor of the obligations; and in its Article 1171,

considers the responsibility arising from fraud to be demandable in all

obligations.
19

G.R. No. 206236, July 15, 2013, 701 SCRA 229 (the bold underscoring
is part of the original text of the decision).
20

Id. at 239-240.

21

The Civil Code states:

Article 1207. The concurrence of two or more creditors or of two
or more debtors in one and the same obligation does not imply
that each one of the former has a right to demand, or that each
one of the latter is bound to render, entire compliance with the
prestation. There is a solidary liability only when the obligation
expressly so states, or when the law or the nature of the
obligation requires solidarity. (1137a) See IV Tolentino,
Commentaries and Jurisprudence on the Civil Code of the
Philippines, 1991 (Reprinting 1999), Central Lawbook Publishing
Co., Inc., Quezon City, p. 220.

22

Malvar v. Kraft Food Phils., Inc., G.R. No. 183952, September 9, 2013;
Chan, Jr. v. Iglesia ni Cristo, Inc., G.R. No. 160283, October 14, 2005,
473 SCRA 177, 186.
23

Blacks Law Dictionary, Fifth Edition, 1979, pp. 752-753, citing Bowen
v. Iowa Nat. Mut. Ins. Co., 270 N.C. 486, 155 S.E. 2d 238, 242.
24

G.R. No. 130068, October 1, 1998, 297 SCRA 30, 84.

25

Lafarge Cement Philippines, Inc. v. Continental Cement Corporation,

G.R. No. 155173, November 23, 2004, 443 SCRA 522, 545.
26

Id.

27

Sison v. People, G.R. No. 187229, February 22, 2012, 666 SCRA 645,
667.
The Lawphil Project - Arellano Law Foundation
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila

FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. 157163

June 25, 2014

BANK OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS, Petitioner,

vs.
HON. JUDGE AGAPITO L. HONTANOSAS, JR., REGIONAL TRIAL COURT,
BRANCH 16, CEBU CITY, SILVERIO BORBON, SPOUSES XERXES AND
ERLINDA FACULTAD, AND XM FACULTAD & DEVELOPMENT
CORPORATION, Respondents.
DECISION
BERSAMIN, J.:
Injunction should not issue except upon a clear showing that the applicant
has a right in esse to be protected, and that the acts sought to be enjoined
are violative of such right. A preliminary injunction should not determine the
merits of a case, or decide controverted facts, for, being a preventive
remedy, it only seeks to prevent threatened wrong, further injury, and
irreparable harm or injustice until the rights of the parties can be settled.
The Case
Under review at the instance of the defendant, now the petitioner herein, is
the decision promulgated on July 9, 2002,1 whereby the Court of Appeals
(CA) upheld the order issuedon July 5, 2001 in Civil Case No. CEB-26468
entitled Spouses Silverio & Zosima Borbon, et al. v. Bank of the Philippine
Islandsby the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 16, in Cebu City, presided by
Hon. Judge Agapito L. Hontanosas, Jr.
Antecedents
On May 22, 2001, respondents Spouses Silverio and Zosima Borbon, Spouses
Xerxes and Erlinda Facultad,and XM Facultad and Development Corporation
commenced Civil Case No. CEB-26468 to seek the declaration of the nullity
of the promissory notes,real estate and chattel mortgages and continuing
surety agreement they had executed in favor of the petitioner. They further
sought damages and attorneys fees, and applied for a temporary restraining
order (TRO) orwrit of preliminary injunction to prevent the petitioner from
foreclosing on the mortgages against their properties.
The complaintalleged that the respondents had obtained a loan from the
petitioner, and had executed promissory notes binding themselves, jointly
and severally, to pay the sum borrowed; that as security for the payment of
the loan, they had constituted real estate mortgages on several parcels of

land in favor of the petitioner; and that they had been made to sign a
continuing surety agreement and a chattel mortgage on their Mitsubishi
Pajero.
It appears that the respondentsobligation to the petitioner had
reached P17,983,191.49, but they had only been able to pay P13 Million
because they had been adversely affected by the economic turmoil in Asia in
1997. The petitioner required them to issue postdated checks to cover the
loan under threat of foreclosing on the mortgages. Thus, the complaint
sought a TRO or a writ of preliminary injunction to stay the threatened
foreclosure.
On June 6, 2001, the petitioner filed its answer with affirmative defenses and
counterclaim, as well as its oppositionto the issuance of the writ of
preliminary injunction, contending that the foreclosure of the mortgages was
within itslegal right to do.2
Also on June 6, 2001 the petitioner filed a motion to dismiss reiterating its
affirmative defenses, to wit:
I) THAT THE COMPLAINT SHOULD BE DISMISSED BECAUSE VENUE IS
IMPROPERLYLAID. (RULE 16, SECITON 1, PARAGRAPH (C);
II) THAT THE COURT HAS NOTACQUIRED JURISDICTION OVER THE
SUBJECT MATTER OFTHE CLAIM BECAUSE THE PROPER LEGAL FEES
HAS NOT BEEN PAID IN ACCORDANCE WITH RULE 14, OF THE RULES OF
COURT AND CIRCULAR NO. 7 OF THE SUPREME COURT, SERIES OF
1988;
III) THAT ZOSIMA BORBONS COMPLAINT SHOULD BE DISMISSED
BECAUSE PLAINTIFF ZOSIMA BORBON HAS NO LEGAL PERSONALITY TO
SUE BEING DECEASED, SPOUSE OF PLAINTIFF SILVERIO BORBON. (RULE
16, SECTION 1(d);
IV) THAT THE ESTATE OF ZOSIMA BORBON BEING AN INDISPENSABLE
PARTY, THE COMPLAINT SHOULD BE AMENDED TO INCLUDE THE
ESTATE OF ZOSIMA BORBON. (RULE 16, SECTION 1(j);
V) THAT THE COMPLAINT OFPLAINTIFF XM FACULTAD AND
DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, SHOULD BE DISMISSED BECAUSE
THERE IS NO BOARD RESOLUTION AUTHORIZING THE FILING OF THIS
CASE. [RULE 16, SECTION 1 (d)];
VI) THAT THE PLEADING ASSERTING THE CLAIM STATES NO CAUSE OF
ACTION.3

On July 5, 2001, the RTC denied the petitioners motion to dismissfor being
unmeritorious,4 but granted the respondents application for preliminary
injunction,5 to wit:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the application for preliminary injunction
is GRANTED. Upon filing by the plaintiffapplicants of a bond in the amount
of P2,000,000 in favor of defendant to the effect that applicants will pay to
adverse party all damages which it may sustain by reason of the injunction,
let a writ of preliminary injunction be issued directing the defendant and its
agents or representatives, to cease and desist from commencing foreclosure
and sale proceedings of the mortgaged properties; from taking possession of
the Mitsubishi Pajero subject of the chattel mortgage; and from using the
questioned post-dated checks as evidence for the filing of complaint against
plaintiffs Facultad for violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22, while the present
case is pending litigation.
This writ of preliminary injunction shall continue until further orders from the
Court.
Notify the parties of this Order.
SO ORDERED.6
The RTC later denied the petitioners motion for reconsideration through its
order7 of August 22, 2001.
Ruling of the CA
Dissatisfied, the petitioner assailed the orders of the RTC by petition for
certiorariin the CA, submitting the lone issue of:
WHETHER OR NOT THE PUBLIC RESPONDENT COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF
DISCRETION WHEN IT ISSUED AN ORDER DENYING THE MOTION TO DISMISS
AND GRANTING THE WRIT OF PRELIMINARY MANDATORY INJUNCTION.
On July 9, 2002, however, the CArendered the adverse decision under
review, to wit:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the assailed order of the Regional Trial
Court (RTC) of Cebu City, Branch 16 dated July 5, 2001 and August 22, 2001
are hereby AFFIRMED. Let the original records of this case be remanded
immediately to the court a quo for further proceedings. SO ORDERED.8
The CA held that the petitioners averment of non-payment of the proper
docket fee by the respondents asthe plaintiffs in Civil Case No. CEB-26468
was not substantiated; that even if the correct docket fee was not in fact

paid, the strict application of the rule thereon could be mitigated in the
interest of justice;9 and that Civil Case No. CEB-26468, being a personal
action, was properly filed in Cebu City where respondent XM Facultad and
Development Corporations principal office was located.10
The CA further held that ZosimaBorbons death rendered respondent Silverio
Borbon, her surviving spouse, the successor to her estate; that although
there was a valid transfer of interest pending the litigation, the dismissal of
the complaintwould not be in order because it was permissible under the
rules to continue the action in the name of the original party;11 and that the
RTC did not commit grave abuse of discretion in issuing the writ of
preliminary injunction because it thereby only applied the pertinent law and
jurisprudence.12
The CA denied the petitioners motion for reconsiderationthrough its
resolution of February 12, 2003.13
Issues
Hence, this appeal, with the petitioner positing as follows:
1. Whether or not Civil Case No. CEB-26468 should be dismissed for (a)
non-payment of the correct amount of docket fee; and (b) improper
venue;14
2. Whether or not the issuance of the writ of preliminary injunction
against the petitioner, its agents and representatives, was in order.
Ruling of the Court
The appeal is partly meritorious.
1. Civil Case No. CEB-26468 was a personal action; hence, venue was
properly laid
The CA and the RTC held that Civil Case No. CEB-26468, being for the
declaration of the nullity of a contract of loan and its accompanying
continuing surety agreement, and the real estate and chattel mortgages,
was a personal action; hence, its filing in Cebu City, the place of business of
one of the plaintiffs, was correct under Section 2, Rule 4 of the Rules of
Court.
The petitioner contends, however, that Civil Case No. CEB-26468 was a real
action that should be commenced and tried in the proper court having
jurisdiction over the area wherein the real property involved, or a portion
thereof, was situated; and thatconsequently the filing and docket fees for the

complaintshould be based on the value of the property as stated in the

certificate of sale attached thereto.
We sustain the lower courts holdings.
The determinants of whether an action is of a real or a personal nature have
been fixed by the Rules of Courtand relevant jurisprudence. According to
Section 1, Rule 4 of the Rules of Court, a real action is one that affects title to
or possession of real property, or an interest therein. Such action is to be
commenced and tried in the proper court having jurisdiction over the area
wherein the real property involved, ora portion thereof, is situated, which
explains why the action is also referred to as a localaction. In contrast, the
Rules of Courtdeclares all other actionsas personal actions.15 Such actions
may include those brought for the recovery of personal property, or for the
enforcement of some contract or recovery of damages for its breach, or for
the recovery of damages for the commission of an injury to the person or
property.16 The venue of a personal action isthe place where the plaintiff or
any of the principal plaintiffs resides,or where the defendant or any of the
principal defendants resides, or in the case of a non-resident defendant
where he may be found, at the election of the plaintiff,17 for which reason the
action is considered a transitory one.
The complaintin Civil Case No. CEB-26468 pertinently alleged as follows: 18
xxxx
3.1 Plaintiffs signed blank pre-printed forms of promissory note no.
501253-000, continuing surety agreement, real estate mortgages,
chattel mortgage which violates the principle of mutuality of contracts.
These contracts are in the nature of contracts of adhesion with
provisions favouring defendant bank and plaintiffs had nothing to do
except to sign the unjust stipulations which should be declared as NULL
AND VOID. These contracts do not reflect the real agreement of the
parties and the stipulations are tilted infavor of defendant bank.
3.2 Moreover, these real estate mortgages, chattel mortgages and
continuing surety agreement are securing specific amounts of
obligation and upon the payment of P13,000,000 to defendant bank,
automatically, these became functus de oficioand should be released
immediately without the encumbrance.
3.3 As the chattel mortgage involving the Mitsubishi Pajero secured
only P600,000.00, upon liquidation of more than P800,000.00 principal
payment, the same became null and void, and defendant bank should
be ordered to cancel the mortgage and to be directed not to take any
appropriate action to take possession.

3.4 In addition, Penbank Checks Nos. 11237 to 11242 with amounts

of P200,000.00 each and BPI Check Nos. 019098 & 019099 with
amounts of P400,000.00 each, issued against the will of plaintiffs
Facultad and without any consideration, should be declared null and
void. Defendant bank should be directed not to deposit the samefor
collection with the drawee bank.
xxxx
3.6 Furthermore, the total obligation of plaintiffs is void and baseless
because it is based on illegal impositions of exorbitant interest and
excessive charges. Interest was converted into principal which in turn
earns interest. These illegal impositions are considered by law and
jurisprudence as null and void. These excessive interest and charges
should be applied to the principal unless there isapplication, defendant
bank is enriching itself at the expense of plaintiffs. x x x x
Based on the aforequoted allegations of the complaintin Civil Case No. CEB26468, the respondents seek the nullification of the promissory notes,
continuing surety agreement, checks and mortgage agreements for being
executed against their will and vitiated by irregularities, not the recovery of
the possession or title to the properties burdened by the mortgages. There
was no allegation that the possession of the properties under the mortgages
had already been transferred to the petitioner in the meantime. Applying the
determinants, Civil Case No. CEB-26468 was unquestionably a personal
action, for, as ruled in Chua v. Total Office Products and Services
(Topros),Inc.:19
Well-settled is the rule that an action to annul a contract of loan and its
accessory real estate mortgageis a personal action. In a personal action, the
plaintiff seeks the recovery of personal property, the enforcement of a
contractor the recovery of damages. In contrast, in a real action, the plaintiff
seeks the recovery of real property, or, as indicated in Section 2 (a), Rule 4 of
the then Rules of Court, a real action is an action affecting title to real
property or for the recovery of possession, or for partition or condemnation
of, or foreclosure of mortgage on, real property.
In the Pascual case, relied upon by petitioner, the contract of sale of the
fishpond was assailed as fictitious for lack of consideration. We held that
there being no contract to begin with, there is nothing to annul. Hence, we
deemed the action for annulment of the said fictitious contract therein as
one constituting a real action for the recovery of the fishpond subject thereof.
We cannot, however, apply the foregoing doctrine to the instant case. Note
that in Pascual, title to and possession of the subject fishpond had already
passed to the vendee. There was, therefore, a need to recover the said

fishpond. But in the instant case, ownership of the parcels of land subject of
the questioned real estatemortgage was never transferred to petitioner, but
remained with TOPROS. Thus, no real action for the recovery of real property
is involved. This being the case, TOPROS action for annulment of the
contracts of loan and real estate mortgage remains a personal action.
xxxx
The Court of Appeals finds that Hernandez v. Rural Bank of Lucena,
Inc.provides the proper precedent in this case. In Hernandez, appellants
contended that the action of the Hernandez spouses for the cancellation of
the mortgage on their lots was a real action affecting title to real property,
which should have been filed in the place where the mortgaged lots were
situated. Rule 4, Section 2 (a), of the then Rules of Court, was applied, to wit:
SEC. 2. Venue in Courts of First Instance. (a) Real actions. Actions
affecting title to, or for recovery of possession, or for partition or
condemnation of, or foreclosure of mortgage on, real property, shall be
commenced and tried in the province where the property or any part thereof
lies.
The Court pointed out in the Hernandezcase that with respect to mortgage,
the rule on real actions only mentions an action for foreclosure of a real
estate mortgage. It does not include an action for the cancellation of a real
estate mortgage. Exclusio unios est inclusio alterius. The latter thus falls
under the catch-all provision on personal actions under paragraph (b) of the
above-cited section, to wit:
SEC. 2 (b) Personal actions. All other actions may be commenced and tried
where the defendant or any of the defendants resides or may be found, or
where the plaintiff or any of the plaintiffs resides, at the election of the
plaintiff.
In the same vein, the action for annulment of a real estate mortgage in the
present case must fall under Section 2 of Rule 4, to wit:
SEC. 2. Venue of personal actions. All other actions may be commenced
and tried where the plaintiff or any of the principal plaintiffs resides, orwhere
the defendant or any of the principal defendants resides, or in the case of a
nonresident defendant where he may be found, at the election of the
plaintiff.
Thus, Pasig City, where the parties reside, is the proper venue of the action
to nullify the subject loan and real estate mortgage contracts. The Court of
Appeals committed no reversible error in upholding the orders of the

Regional Trial Court denying petitioners motion to dismiss the case on the
ground of improper venue.
Being a personal action, therefore, Civil Case No. CEB-26468 was properly
brought in the RTC in Cebu City, where respondent XM Facultad and
Development Corporation, a principal plaintiff, had its address.
Upon the same consideration, the petitioners contention that the filing and
docket fees for the complaintshould be based on the assessed values of the
mortgaged real properties due to Civil Case No. CEB-26468 being a real
action cannot be upheld for lack of factual and legal bases.
2. Respondents were not entitled to the writ of preliminary injunction
In their application for the issuance of the writ of preliminary injunction, the
respondents averred that the nullity of the loan and mortgage agreements
entitled them to the relief of enjoining the petitioner from: (a) foreclosing the
real estateand chattel mortgages; (b)taking possession, by replevin, of the
Mitsubishi Pajero; and (c) depositing the postdated checks; that respondents
Spouses Facultad would suffer injustice and irreparable injury should the
petitioner foreclose the mortgages and file criminal complaints for violation
of Batas Pambansa Blg.22 against them; and that such threatened acts, if
done, would render ineffectual the judgment of the trial court.20 They prayed
that the petitioner be enjoined from doing acts that would disturb their
material possession of the mortgaged properties, manifesting their
willingness to post a bond for the issuance of the writ of preliminary
injunction.21
As mentioned, the RTC issued the writ of preliminary injunction on July 16,
2001 based on the foregoing allegations of the respondents
application,22 and the CA upheld the issuance in its assailed July 9, 2002
decision.23
The petitioner submits that the issuance of the writ of preliminary injunction
constituted a violation of Administrative Circular (AC) No. 07-99 dated June
25, 1999, and thus subjected respondent Judge to administrative
sanction;24that injunction could not issue to enjoin the prosecution of the
criminal offenses because such prosecution was imbued with public
interest;25 and that the petitioner, as the mortgagee, could not be prohibited
from exercising its legal right to foreclose the mortgages because foreclosure
of the mortgages was its proper remedy under the law.26
AC No. 07-99 was issued as a guideline for lower court judges in the issuance
of TROs and writs of preliminary injunctions to prevent the implementation of
infrastructure projects, or the seizure and forfeiture proceedings by the
Bureau of Customs, viz:

ADMINISTRATIVE CIRCULAR NO. 07-99 June 25, 1999

TO: ALL JUDGES OF LOWER COURTS RE: EXERCISE OF UTMOST CAUTION,
PRUDENCE, AND JUDICIOUSNESS IN ISSUANCE OF TEMPORARY RESTRAINING
ORDERS AND WRITS OF PRELIMINARY INJUNCTIONS
Despite well-entrenched jurisprudence and circulars regarding exercise of
judiciousness and care in the issuance of temporary restraining orders (TRO)
or grant of writs ofpreliminary injunction, reports or complaints on abuses
committed by trial judges in connection therewith persist. Some even
intimated thatirregularities, including corruption, might have influenced the
issuance ofthe TRO or the writ of preliminary injunction.
No less than the President of the Philippines has requested this Court to issue
a circular reminding judges to respect P.D. No. 1818, which prohibits the
issuance of TROs in cases involving implementation of government
infrastructure projects. The Office of the President has likewise brought to the
attention of this Court orders of judges releasing imported articles under
seizure and forfeiture proceedings by the Bureau of Customs.
Judges are thus enjoined to observe utmost caution, prudence and
judiciousness in the issuance of TRO and in the grant of writs of preliminary
injunction to avoid any suspicion that its issuance or grant was for
considerations other than the strict merits of the case.
Judges should bear in mind that in Garcia v. Burgos(291 SCRA 546, 571-572
[1998]), this Court explicitly stated:
Sec. 1 of PD 1818 distinctly provides that "[n]o court in the Philippines shall
have jurisdiction to issue any restraining order, preliminary injunction, or
preliminary mandatory injunction in any case, dispute, orcontroversy
involvingan infrastructure project . . . of the government, . . . to prohibit any
person or persons, entity or government official from proceeding with, or
continuing the execution or implementation of any such project . . . or
pursuing any lawful activity necessary for such execution, implementation or
operation." At the risk of being repetitious, we stress that the foregoing
statutory provision expressly deprives courts of jurisdiction to issue
injunctive writs against the implementation or execution of an infrastructure
project.
Their attention is further invited to Circular No. 68-94, issued on 3 November
1994 by the OCA OIC Deputy Court Administrator Reynaldo L. Suarez, on the
subject "Strict Observance of Section 1 of P.D. 1818 Envisioned by Circular
No. 13-93 dated March 5, 1993, and Circular No. 20-92 dated March 24,
1992.

Finally, judges should never forget what the Court categorically declared in
Mison v. Natividad(213 SCRA 734, 742 [1992] that "[b]y express provision of
law, amply supported by well-settled jurisprudence, the Collector of Customs
has exclusive jurisdiction over seizure and forfeiture proceedings, and regular
courts cannot interfere with his exercise thereof or stifleor put it to naught."
The Office of the Court Administrator shall see to it that this circular is
immediately disseminated and shall monitor implementation thereof.
STRICT OBSERVANCE AND COMPLIANCE of this Circular is hereby enjoined.
AC No. 07-99 was irrelevant herein, however, because Civil Case No. CEB26468 did not involve the implementation of infrastructure projects, or the
seizure and forfeiture proceedings by the Bureau of Customs. Consequently,
the petitioners urging that respondent Judge be held administratively liable
for violating AC No. 07-99 was misplaced.
However, the RTCs issuance of the writ of preliminary injunction to enjoin
the petitioner from proceeding withthe foreclosure of the mortgages was
plainly erroneous and unwarranted.
A preliminary injunction is an order granted at any stage of an action prior to
the judgment or final order requiring a party or a court, agency or a person
to refrain from a particular act or acts.27 It is the "strong arm of equity," an
extraordinary peremptory remedy that must be used with extreme caution,
affecting as it does the respective rights of the parties.28 The requirements
for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction or TRO are enumerated in
Section 3, Rule 58 of the Rules of Court, to wit:
Section 3. Grounds for issuance of preliminary injunction. - A preliminary
injunction may be granted when it is established:
(a) That the applicant is entitled to the relief demanded, and the whole
or part of such relief consists in restraining the commission or
continuance of the act or acts complained of, or in requiring the
performance of an act or acts, eitherfor a limited period or perpetually;
(b) That the commission, continuance or non-performance of the act or
acts complained of during the litigation would probably work injustice
to the applicant; or
(c) That a party, court, agency or a person is doing, threatening, or is
attempting to do, or is procuring or suffering to be done, some act or
acts probably in violation of the rights of the applicant respecting the
subject of the action or proceeding, and tending to render the
judgment ineffectual.

In City Government of Butuan v. Consolidated Broadcasting System (CBS),

Inc.,29 the Court restated the nature and concept of a writ of preliminary
injunction, as follows:
A preliminary injunction is an order granted at any stage of an action or
proceeding prior to the judgment orfinal order requiring a party or a court, an
agency, or a person to refrain from a particular act or acts. It may also
require the performance of a particular act or acts, in which case it is known
as a preliminary mandatory injunction. Thus, a prohibitory injunction is one
that commands a party to refrain from doing a particular act, while a
mandatory injunction commands the performance of some positive act to
correct a wrong in the past.
As with all equitable remedies, injunction must be issued only at the instance
of a party who possesses sufficient interest in or title to the right or the
property sought to be protected. It is proper only when the applicant appears
to be entitled to the relief demanded in the complaint, which must aver the
existence of the right and the violation of the right, or whose averments
must in the minimum constitute a prima facieshowing of a right to the final
relief sought. Accordingly, the conditions for the issuance of the injunctive
writ are: (a) that the right to be protected exists prima facie; (b) that the act
sought to be enjoined is violative of that right; and (c) that there is an urgent
and paramount necessity for the writ to prevent serious damage. An
injunction will not issue to protect a right not in esse, or a right which is
merely contingent and may never arise; or to restrain an act which does not
give rise to a cause of action; or to prevent the perpetration of an act
prohibited bystatute. Indeed, a right, to be protected by injunction, means a
right clearly founded on or granted by law or is enforceable as a matter of
law. (Bold emphasis supplied)
Under the circumstances averred in the complaintin Civil Case No. CEB26468, the issuance ofthe writ of preliminary injunction upon the application
of the respondents was improper. They had admittedly constituted the real
estate and chattel mortgages to secure the performance of their loan
obligation to the petitioner, and, as such, they were fully aware of the
consequences on their rights in the properties given as collaterals should the
loan secured be unpaid. The foreclosure of the mortgages would be the
remedy provided by law for the mortgagee to exact payment.30 In fact, they
did not dispute the petitionersallegations that they had not fully paid their
obligation, and that Civil Case No. CEB-26468 was precisely brought by them
in order to stave off the impending foreclosure of the mortgages based on
their claim that they had been compelled to sign pre-printed standard bank
loan forms and mortgage agreements.
It is true that the trial courts are given generous latitude to act on
applications for the injunctive writ for the reason that conflicting claims in an

application for the writ more often than not involve a factual determination
that is not the function of the appellate courts;31 and that the exercise of
sound discretion by the issuing courts in injunctive matters ought not to be
interfered with exceptwhen there is manifest abuse.32 Nonetheless, the
exercise of such discretion must be sound, that is, the issuance of the writ,
though discretionary, should be upon the grounds and in the manner
provided by law.33 Judges should always bear in mind that the writ of
preliminary injunction is issued uponthe satisfaction of two requisite
conditions, namely: (1) the right to be protected exists prima facie; and (2)
the acts sought to be enjoined are violative of that right. According toSaulog
v. Court of Appeals,34 the applicant must have a sufficient interest or right to
be protected, but it is enough that:x x x for the court to act, there must be an existing basis of facts affording a
present right which is directly threatened by an act sought to be enjoined.
And while a clear showing ofthe right claimed is necessary, its existence
need not be conclusively established. In fact, the evidence to be submitted
to justify preliminary injunction at the hearing thereon need not be
conclusive or complete but need only be a "sampling" intended merely to
give the court an idea of the justification for the preliminary injunction
pending the decision of the case on the merits. This should really be so since
our concern here involves only the propriety of the preliminary injunction and
not the merits of the case still pending with the trial court.
Thus, to be entitled to the writ ofpreliminary injunction, the private
respondent needs only to show that it has the ostensible right to the final
relief prayed for in its complaint x x x.
It is also basic that the power to issue a writ of injunction is to be exercised
only where the reason and necessity therefor are clearly established, and
only in cases reasonably free from doubt.35 For, truly, a preliminary injunction
should not determine the merits of a case,36 or decide controverted
facts.37 As a preventive remedy, injunction only seeks to prevent threatened
wrong,38 further injury,39 and irreparable harm40 or injustice41 until the rights
of the parties can be settled.1wphi1 As an ancillary and preventive remedy,
it may be resorted to by a party to protect or preserve his rights during the
pendency of the principal action, and for no other purpose.42 Such relief will
accordingly protect the ability of the court to render a meaningful
decision;43 it will further serve to guard against a change of circumstances
that will hamper orprevent the granting of proper relief after a trial on the
merits.44 Verily, its essential function is to preserve the status quo between
the parties until the merits of the case can be heard.45
Moreover, the applicant must prove that the violation sought to be prevented
would cause an irreparable injustice.46But the respondents failed to establish
the irreparable injury they would suffer should the writ of preliminary

injunction not be issued. Theyprincipally feared the loss of their possession

and ownership of the mortgaged properties, and faced the possibility of a
criminal prosecution for the post-dated checks they issued. But such fear of
potential loss ofpossession and ownership, or facing a criminal prosecution
did not constitute the requisite irreparable injury that could have warranted
the issuance of the writ of injunction. "An injury is considered irreparable,"
according to Philippine National Bank v. Castalloy Technology Corporation, 47
x x x if it is of such constant and frequent recurrence that no fair or
reasonable redress can be had therefor ina court of law, or where there is no
standard by which their amount canbe measured with reasonable accuracy,
that is, it is not susceptible of mathematical computation. The provisional
remedy of preliminary injunction may only be resorted to when there is a
pressing necessity to avoid injurious consequences which cannot be
remedied under any standard of compensation.
The injury being fearedby the herein respondents is not of such nature.
Ultimately, the amount to which the mortgagee-bank shall be entitled will be
determined by the disposition of the trial court in the main issue of the case.
We have explained in Equitable PCI Bank, Inc. v. OJMark Trading, Inc.that all
is not lost for defaulting mortgagors whose properties were foreclosed by
creditors-mortgagees. The respondents will not be deprived outrightly of
their property, given the right of redemption granted to them under the law.
Moreover, in extrajudicial foreclosures, mortgagors have the right toreceive
any surplus in the selling price. Thus, if the mortgagee is retaining more of
the proceeds of the sale than he is entitled to, this fact alone will not affect
the validity of the sale but will give the mortgagor a cause of action to
recover such surplus.
As a general rule, the courts will not issue writs of prohibition or injunction
whether preliminary or final in order to enjoin or restrain any criminal
prosecution.48 But there are extreme cases in which exceptions to the
general rule have been recognized, including: (1) when the injunction is
necessary to afford adequate protection to the constitutional rights of the
accused; (2) when it is necessary for the orderly administration of justice or
to avoid oppression or multiplicity of actions; (3) when there is a prejudicial
question that is sub judice; (4) when the acts of the officer are without or in
excess of authority; (5) when the prosecution is under an invalid law,
ordinance or regulation; (6) when double jeopardy is clearly apparent; (7)
when the court has no jurisdiction over the offense; (8) when it is a case of
persecution rather than prosecution; (9) when the charges are manifestly
false and motivated by the lust for vengeance; and (10) when there is clearly
no prima faciecase against the accused and a motion to quash on that
ground has been denied.49 However, the respondents did not sufficiently
show that Civil Case No. CEB-26468 came under any of the foregoing
exceptions. Hence, the issuance by the RTC of the writ of preliminary

injunction to enjoin the petitioner from instituting criminal complaints for

violation of BP No. 22 against the respondents was unwarranted.
Every court should remember that an injunction should not be granted lightly
or precipitately because it isa limitation upon the freedom of the defendant's
action. It should be granted only when the court is fully satisfied that the law
permits it and the emergency demands it,50 for no power exists whose
exercise is more delicate, which requires greater caution and deliberation, or
is more dangerous in a doubtful case, than the issuance of an injunction.51
In view of the foregoing, the CA grossly erred in not declaring that the RTC
committed grave abuse of discretion in granting the application of the
respondents as the plaintiffs in Civil Case No. CEB-26468. The RTC apparently
disregarded the aforecited well-known norms and guidelines governing the
issuance of the writ of injunction. Thereby, the RTC acted capriciously and
arbitrarily. Grave abuse of discretion means either that the judicial or quasijudicial power was exercised in an arbitrary or despotic manner by reason of
passion or personal hostility, or that the respondent judge, tribunal or board
evaded a positive duty, or virtually refused to perform the duty enjoined or
to act in contemplation of law, such as when such judge, tribunal or board
exercising judicial or quasi-judicial powers acted in a capricious or whimsical
manner as to be equivalent to lack of jurisdiction.52
WHEREFORE, the Court PARTIALLY GRANTS the petition for review on
certiorari; MODIFIES the decision promulgated on July 9, 2002 by annulling
and setting aside the writ of preliminary injunction in Civil Case No. CEB26468 issued by the Regional Trial Court, Branch 16, in Cebu City for being
devoid of factual and legal bases; ORDERS the Regional Trial Court, Branch
16, in Cebu City to proceed with dispatch in Civil Case No. CEB-26468; and
DIRECTS the respondents to pay the costs of suit.
SO ORDERED.
LUCAS P. BERSAMIN
Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:
MARIA LOURDES P. A. SERENO
Chief Justice
TERESITA J. LEONARDO-DE
CASTRO
Associate Justice

MARTIN S. VILLARAMA, JR.

Associate Justice

BIENVENIDO L. REYES
Associate Justice
CERTIFICATION
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, I certify that the
conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before
the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court's Division.
MARIA LOURDES P. A. SERENO
Chief Justice

Footnotes
1

Rollo, pp. 179-187; penned by Associate Justice Eugenio S. Labitoria

(retired), and concurred in by Associate Justice Teodoro P.
Regino(retired) and Associate Justice Juan Q. Enriquez, Jr. (retired).
2

Id. at 152-160.

Id. at 181-182.

Id. at 169-170.

Id. at 171.

Id. at 170.

Id. at 177.

Id. at 186.

Id. at 183.

10

Id. at 184.

11

Id. at 184-185.

12

Id. at 186.

13

Id. at 239.

14

Id. at 24.

15

Section 2, Rule 4 of the Rules of Court.

16

Hernandez v. Development Bank of the Phil., No. L-31095, June 18,

1976, 71 SCRA 290, 292-293.
17

Section 2, Rule 4 of the Rules of Court; see also Orbeta v. Orbeta,

G.R. No. 166837, November 27, 2006, 508 SCRA 265, 268.
18

Rollo, pp. 145-146.

19

G.R. No. 152808, September 30, 2005, 471 SCRA 500, 507-509.

20

Rollo, p. 147.

21

Id.

22

Id. at 171.

23

Id. at 185-186.

24

Id. at 27-30.

25

Id. at 30.

26

Id. at 32.

27

Section 1, Rule 58 of the Rules of Court.

28

China Banking Corporation v. Ciriaco, G.R. No. 170038, July 11, 2012,
676 SCRA 132, 137-138.
29

G.R. No. 157315, December 1,2010, 636 SCRA320, 336-337.

30

China Banking Corporation v. Court of Appeals,G.R. No. 121158,

December 5, 1996, 265 SCRA 327, 343 ("xxx On the face of the clear
admission by private respondents that they were unable to settle their
obligations which were secured by the mortgages, petitioners have a
clear right to foreclose the mortgages which is a remedy provided by
law.)
31

Urbanes Jr. v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 117964, March 28, 2001,
355 SCRA 537, 548.
32

Searth Commodities Corp. v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 64220, March

31, 1992, 207 SCRA 622, 628; S & A Gaisano, Incorporated v. Hidalgo,
G.R. No. 80397, December 10, 1990, 192 SCA 224, 229; Genoblazo v.

Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 79303, June 20, 1989, 174 SCRA 124, 133;
Detective and Protective Bureau, Inc. v. Cloribel, No. L-23428,
November 29, 1968, 26 SCRA 255, 266.
33

Republic Telecommunications Holdings, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, G.R.

No. 135074, January 29, 1999, 302 SCRA 403, 409.
34

G.R. No. 11969, September 18, 1996, 262 SCRA 51, 60.

35

43 CJS Injunctions 15.

36

43 CJS Injunctions 5, citing B. W. Photo Utilities v. Republic Molding

Corporation, C. A. Cal., 280 F. 2d 806; Duckworth v. James, C. A. Va.
267 F. 2d 224; Westinghouse Electric Corporation v. Free Sewing
Machine Co., C. A. Ill, 256 F. 2d 806.
37

43 CJS Injunctions 5, citing Lonergan v. Crucible Steel Co. of

America, 229 N. E. 2d 536, 37 Ill. 2d 599; Compton v. Paul K. Harding
Realty Co., 231 N. E. 2d 267, 87 Ill. App. 2d 219.
38

Doeskin Products, Inc. v. United Paper Co., C. A. Ill., 195 F. 2d 356;

Benson Hotel Corp. v. Woods, C. C. A. Minn., 168 F. 2d 694; Spickerman
v. Sproul, 328 P. 2d 87, 138 Colo. 13; United States v. National
Plastikwear Fashions, D. C. N. Y., 123 F. Supp. 791.
39

Career Placement of White Plains, Inc. v. Vaus, 354 N. Y. S. 2d 764, 77

misc. 2d 788; Toushin v. City of Chicago, 320 N. E. 2d 202, 23 Ill. App.
3d 797; H. K. H. Development Corporation v. Metropolitan Sanitary
District of Greater Chicago, 196 N. E., 2d 494, 47 Ill. App. 46.
40

Exhibitors Poster Exchange, Inc.v. National Screen Service Corp., C.

A. La., 441 F. 2d 560; Marine Cooks & Stewards, AFL v. Panama S. S.
Co., C. A. Wash., 268 F. 2d 935.
41

City of Cleveland v. Division 268 of Amalgamated Association of St.

Elec. Ry. & Motor Coach Emp. Of America, 81 N. E. 2d 310, 84 Ohio
App. 43; Slott v. Plastic Fabricators, Inc., 167 A. 2d 306, 402 Pa. 433.
42

Mabayo Farms, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 140058, August 1,

2002, 386 SCRA 110, 115; China Banking Corporation v. Court of
Appeals, G.R. No. 121158, December 5, 1996, 265 SCRA 327, 343;
Bengzon v. Court of Appeals, No. L-82568, May 31, 1988, 161 SCRA
745, 749; Calo v. Roldan, 76 Phil. 445, 451-452 (1946).
43

Meis v. Sanitas Service Corporation, C. A. Tex., 511 F. 2d 655; Gobel

v. Laing, 231 N. E., 2d 341, 12 Ohio App. 2d 93.

44

United States v. Adlers Creamery, C. C. A. N. Y., 107 F. 2d 987;

American Mercury v. Kiely, C. C. A. N. Y., 19 F. 2d 295.
45

Rava Development Corporation v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 96825,

July 3, 1992, 211 SCRA 144, 154; Avila v. Tapucar, G.R. No. 45947,
August 27, 1991, 201 SCRA 148, 155.
46

Los Baos Rural Bank, Inc. v. Africa, G.R. No. 143994, July 11, 2002,
384 SCRA 535; see also Power Sites and Signs, Inc. v. United Neon,
G.R. No. 163406, November 24, 2009, 605 SCRA 196, 208.
47

G.R. No. 178367, March 19, 2012, 668 SCRA 415, 424-425.

48

Samson v. Guingona, Jr., G.R. No. 123504, December 14, 2000, 348
SCRA 32, 36.
49

Id.

50

Equitable PCI Bank, Inc. v. OJ-Mark Trading, Inc., G.R. No. 165950,
August 11, 20 I 0, 628 SCRA 79, 90; Tanduay Distillers, Inc. v. Ginebra
San Miguel, Inc., G.R. No. 164324, August 14, 2009, 596 SCRA 114,
135-136.
51

Pahila-Garrido v. Tortogo, G.R. No. 156358, August 17, 2011, 655

SCRA 553, 578; Lu v. Lu Ym, Sr., G.R. No. 153690, 157381 and 170889,
August 26, 2008, 563 SCRA 254, 280.
52

Delos Santos v. Metropolitan Bank and Trust Company, G .R. No.

153852, October 24, 2012, 684 SCRA 410.
The Lawphil Project - Arellano Law Foundation
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. 159031

June 23, 2014

NOEL A. LASANAS, Petitioner,

vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.

DECISION
BERSAMIN, J.:
Any person who contracts a second marriage without first having a judicial
declaration of the nullity of his or her first marriage, albeit on its face void
and in existent for lack of a marriage license, is guilty of bigamy as defined
and penalized by Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code.
The Case
The accused seeks the reversal of the decision promulgated on August 29,
2002,1 whereby the Court of Appeals (CA) affirmed his conviction for bigamy
under the judgment rendered on October 30, 2000 in Criminal Case No.
49808 by the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 38, in Iloilo City.
Antecedents
On February 16, 1968,2 Judge Carlos B. Salazar of the Municipal Trial Court of
San Miguel, Iloilo solemnized the marriage of accused Noel Lasanas and
Socorro Patingo3 without the benefit of a marriage license.4 The records show
that Lasanas and Patingo had not executed any affidavit of cohabitation to
excuse the lack of the marriage license.5 On August 27, 1980, Lasanas and
Patingo reaffirmed their marriage vows in a religious ceremony before Fr.
Rodolfo Tamayo at the San Jose Church in Iloilo City.6 They submitted no
marriage license or affidavit of cohabitation for that purpose.7 Both
ceremonies were evidenced by the corresponding marriage certificates.8 In
1982, Lasanas and Patingo separated de facto because of irreconcilable
differences.9
On December 27, 1993, the accused contracted marriage with Josefa Eslaban
in a religious ceremony solemnized by Fr. Ramon Sequito at the Sta. Maria
Church in Iloilo City. Their marriage certificate reflected the civil status of the
accused as single.10
On July 26, 1996, the accused filed a complaint for annulment of marriage
and damages against Socorro in the RTC in Iloilo City,11 which was docketed
as Civil Case No. 23133 and raffled to Branch 39 of the RTC. The complaint
alleged that Socorro had employed deceit, misrepresentations and fraud in
securing his consent to their marriage; and that subsequent marital
breaches, psychological incompatibilities and her infidelity had caused him to
suffer mental anguish, sleepless nights and social humiliation warranting the
award of damages. In support of his complaint, he further alleged, among
others, that:

He was married to the defendant on February 16, 1968 which marriage was
officiated by Hon. Carlos B. Salazar, Municipal Judge of San Miguel, Iloilo.
Machine copy of the Marriage Contract is herewith attached as Exhibit "A"
and made part hereof; which marriage was ratified by a wedding at San Jose
Church, Iloilo City on August 27, 1980 and registered at the office of Iloilo
City Registrar. Machine copy of the Marriage Contract is herewith attached as
Annex "B";
Plaintiff and defendant have no children and have no properties except some
personal belongings;
Plaintiff met the defendant sometime in the middle of 1967 at the house of
Mr. Raul L. Cataloctocan in Burgos Street, Lapaz, Iloilo City wherein the
purpose of their meeting was for the plaintiff to consult and seek treatment
by the defendant because the latter was a "babaylan": Plaintiff was treated
by the defendant and the subsequent treatments were performed by the
defendant at her residence in Barangay, Banga, Mina, Iloilo, the treatment
made being on a continuing basis;
xxxx
On February 16, 1968, defendant asked the plaintiff to come with her to Iloilo
City. They went to Dainty Restaurant at J.M. Basa Street. Plaintiff saw several
persons therein. After eating plaintiff was made to sign the marriage
contract, which was null and void for lack of marriage license and based on a
false affidavit of cohabitation. After their marriage, they went home to
Barangay Bangac, Mina, Iloilo, which marked the start of a married life
rocked with marital differences, quarrels and incompatibilities, without love,
but under the uncontrollable fear of harm that should befall him should he
not follow her;
xxxx
During the period the parties are living together defendant would nag the
plaintiff, fabricate stories against him and displayed her fit of jealousy,
neglect her marital obligations even committed infidelity, which
psychological incompatibilities and marital breaches have forced the
petitioner to live separately from defendant since 1982 up to the present.12
In October 1998, Socorro charged the accused with bigamy in the Office of
the City Prosecutor of Iloilo City.13 After due proceedings, the accused was
formally indicted for bigamy under the information filed on October 20, 1998
in the RTC, viz:
That on or about the 27th day of December, 1993 in the City of Iloilo,
Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Court, said accused, Noel

Lasanas being previously united in a lawful marriage with Socorro Patingo

and without the said marriage having been legally dissolve (sic) or annulled,
did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously contract a second or
subsequent marriage with Josefa Eslaban.
CONTRARY TO LAW.14
The criminal case, docketed as Criminal Case No. 49808, was raffled to
Branch 38 of the RTC in Iloilo City. The accused pleaded not guilty at his
arraignment,15 and trial ensued in due course.
In the meanwhile, on November 24, 1998, the RTC (Branch 39) rendered its
judgment in Civil Case No. 23133 dismissing the accuseds complaint for
annulment of marriage, and declaring the marriage between him and Socorro
valid and legal, as follows:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered dismissing
the complaint filed by the plaintiff Noel Arenga Lasanas against the
defendant, Socorro Patingo, considering that the marriage between them is
valid and legal.
The plaintiff Noel Lasanas is hereby ordered to give monthly support to his
wife, the defendant in this case, Ma. Socorro Patingo in the amount
of P3,000.00 a month, from the time that she filed her answer with
counterclaim on February 3, 1997, pursuant to Article 203 of the Family Code
and every month thereafter. Costs against the plaintiff.
SO ORDERED.16
The accused appealed to the CA.17
Ruling of the RTC
On October 30, 2000, the RTC (Branch 38) rendered its assailed decision in
Criminal Case No. 49808, disposing thusly:
WHEREFORE, finding accused NOEL LASANAS guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of the offense of BIGAMY punishable under Art. 349 of the Revised
Penal Code, judgment is hereby entered ordering him to serve an
indeterminate penalty of imprisonment of two (2) years and four (4) months
of prision correccional, as minimum, to eight (8) years and one (1) day of
prision mayor as maximum.
The accused is entitled to the privileges extended to him under Art. 29 of the
Revised Penal Code.

SO ORDERED.18
Decision of the CA Aggrieved, the accused appealed his conviction to the CA,
insisting that the RTC thereby erred in finding that he had legally married
Socorro despite the absence of the marriage license, affidavit of cohabitation
and affidavit of the solemnizing officer.
The accused contended that because he had not been legally married to
Socorro, the first element of bigamy was not established; that his good faith
and the absence of criminal intent were absolutory in his favor; and that he
had been of the honest belief that there was no need for a judicial
declaration of the nullity of the first marriage before he could contract a
subsequent marriage.19
On August 29, 2002, however, the CA promulgated its challenged decision,
decreeing: WHEREFORE, for lack of merit, the Court DISMISSES the appeal
and AFFIRMS the appealed Decision.
SO ORDERED.20
Issues
Hence, the accused has appealed by petition for review on certiorari.21 He
argues that the RTC and the CA incorrectly applied the provisions of Article
349 of the Revised Penal Code,22 asserting that the civil law rule embodied in
Article 40 of the Family Code requiring a judicial declaration of nullity before
one could contract a subsequent marriage should not apply in this purely
criminal prosecution;23 that even if Article 40 of the Family Code was
applicable, he should still be acquitted because his subsequent marriage was
null and void for being without a recorded judgment of nullity of marriage, as
provided in Article 53 in relation to Article 52 of the Family Code;24 that,
consequently, an essential element of the crime of bigamy, i.e. that the
subsequent marriage be valid, was lacking;25and that his good faith and lack
of criminal intent were sufficient to relieve him of criminal liability. 26
Ruling
The appeal lacks merit.
The law on bigamy is found in Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code, which
provides:
Article 349. Bigamy. The penalty of prision mayor shall be imposed upon
any person who shall contract a second or subsequent marriage before the
former marriage has been legally dissolved, or before the absent spouse has

been declared presumptively dead by means of a judgment rendered in the

proper proceedings.
The elements of the crime of bigamy are as follows: (1) that the offender has
been legally married; (2) that the marriage has not been legally dissolved or,
in case his or her spouse is absent, the absent spouse could not yet be
presumed dead according to the Civil Code; (3) that he or she contracts a
second or subsequent marriage; and (4) that the second or subsequent
marriage has all the essential requisites for validity.27
The CA specifically observed:
This Court concedes that the marriage between accused-appellant Lasanas
and private complainant Patingo was void because of the absence of a
marriage license or of an affidavit of cohabitation. The ratificatory religious
wedding ceremony could not have validated the void marriage. Neither can
the church wedding be treated as a marriage in itself for to do so, all the
essential and formal requisites of a valid marriage should be present. One of
these requisites is a valid marriage license except in those instances when
this requirement may be excused. There having been no marriage license
nor affidavit of cohabitation presented to the priest who presided over the
religious rites, the religious wedding cannot be treated as a valid marriage in
itself.
But then, as the law and jurisprudence say, petitioner should have first
secured a judicial declaration of the nullity of his void marriage to private
complainant Patingo before marrying Josefa Eslaban. Actually, he did just
that but after his marriage to Josefa Eslaban. Consequently, he violated the
law on bigamy.
Accuseds reliance on the cases of People v. Mendoza, 95 Phil. 845 and
People v. Aragon, 100 Phil. 1033 is misplaced because the ruling in these
cases have already been abandoned per Relova v. Landico, supra, and
Wiegel v. Sempio-Diy, 143 SCRA 499. The petitioner also cited Yap v. Court of
Appeals, 145 SCRA 229 which resurrected the Aragon and Mendoza doctrine
but Yaps ruling too had been overtaken by Art. 40 of the Family Code and by
Domingo v. Court of Appeals and Te v. Court of Appeals, supra.
Regarding accused-appellants defense of good faith, the same is unavailing
pursuant to Maozca v. Domagas, 248 SCRA 625.
This Court, therefore concludes that the appealed Decision is correct in all
respect.28
Decision of the CA

Aggrieved, the accused appealed his conviction to the CA, insisting that the
RTC thereby erred in finding that he had legally married Socorro despite the
absence of the marriage license, affidavit of cohabitation and affidavit of the
solemnizing officer.
The accused contended that because he had not been legally married to
Socorro, the first element of bigamy was not established; that his good faith
and the absence of criminal intent were absolutory in his favor; and that he
had been of the honest belief that there was no need for a judicial
declaration of the nullity of the first marriage before he could contract a
subsequent marriage.19
On August 29, 2002, however, the CA promulgated its challenged decision,
decreeing: WHEREFORE, for lack of merit, the Court DISMISSES the appeal
and AFFIRMS the appealed Decision.
SO ORDERED.20
Issues
Hence, the accused has appealed by petition for review on certiorari.21 He
argues that the RTC and the CA incorrectly applied the provisions of Article
349 of the Revised Penal Code,22 asserting that the civil law rule embodied in
Article 40 of the Family Code requiring a judicial declaration of nullity before
one could contract a subsequent marriage should not apply in this purely
criminal prosecution;23 that even if Article 40 of the Family Code was
applicable, he should still be acquitted because his subsequent marriage was
null and void for being without a recorded judgment of nullity of marriage, as
provided in Article 53 in relation to Article 52 of the Family Code;24 that,
consequently, an essential element of the crime of bigamy, i.e. that the
subsequent marriage be valid, was lacking;25and that his good faith and lack
of criminal intent were sufficient to relieve him of criminal liability. 26
Ruling
The appeal lacks merit.
The law on bigamy is found in Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code, which
provides:
Article 349. Bigamy. The penalty of prision mayor shall be imposed upon
any person who shall contract a second or subsequent marriage before the
former marriage has been legally dissolved, or before the absent spouse has
been declared presumptively dead by means of a judgment rendered in the
proper proceedings.

The elements of the crime of bigamy are as follows: (1) that the offender has
been legally married; (2) that the marriage has not been legally dissolved or,
in case his or her spouse is absent, the absent spouse could not yet be
presumed dead according to the Civil Code; (3) that he or she contracts a
second or subsequent marriage; and (4) that the second or subsequent
marriage has all the essential requisites for validity.27
The CA specifically observed:
This Court concedes that the marriage between accused-appellant Lasanas
and private complainant Patingo was void because of the absence of a
marriage license or of an affidavit of cohabitation. The ratificatory religious
wedding ceremony could not have validated the void marriage. Neither can
the church wedding be treated as a marriage in itself for to do so, all the
essential and formal requisites of a valid marriage should be present. One of
these requisites is a valid marriage license except in those instances when
this requirement may be excused. There having been no marriage license
nor affidavit of cohabitation presented to the priest who presided over the
religious rites, the religious wedding cannot be treated as a valid marriage in
itself.
But then, as the law and jurisprudence say, petitioner should have first
secured a judicial declaration of the nullity of his void marriage to private
complainant Patingo before marrying Josefa Eslaban. Actually, he did just
that but after his marriage to Josefa Eslaban. Consequently, he violated the
law on bigamy.
Accuseds reliance on the cases of People v. Mendoza, 95 Phil. 845 and
People v. Aragon, 100 Phil. 1033 is misplaced because the ruling in these
cases have already been abandoned per Relova v. Landico, supra, and
Wiegel v. Sempio-Diy, 143 SCRA 499. The petitioner also cited Yap v. Court of
Appeals, 145 SCRA 229 which resurrected the Aragon and Mendoza doctrine
but Yaps ruling too had been overtaken by Art. 40 of the Family Code and by
Domingo v. Court of Appeals and Te v. Court of Appeals, supra.
Regarding accused-appellants defense of good faith, the same is unavailing
pursuant to Maozca v. Domagas, 248 SCRA 625.
This Court, therefore concludes that the appealed Decision is correct in all
respect.28
Based on the findings of the CA, this case has all the foregoing elements
attendant.
The first and second elements of bigamy were present in view of the absence
of a judicial declaration of nullity of marriage between the accused and

Socorro. The requirement of securing a judicial declaration of nullity of

marriage prior to contracting a subsequent marriage is found in Article 40 of
the Family Code, to wit:
Article 40. The absolute nullity of a previous marriage may be invoked for
purposes of remarriage on the basis solely of a final judgment declaring such
previous marriage void. (n)
The reason for the provision was aptly discussed in Teves v. People: 29
x x x The Family Code has settled once and for all the conflicting
jurisprudence on the matter. A declaration of the absolute nullity of a
marriage is now explicitly required either as a cause of action or a ground for
defense. Where the absolute nullity of a previous marriage is sought to be
invoked for purposes of contracting a second marriage, the sole basis
acceptable in law for said projected marriage to be free from legal infirmity is
a final judgment declaring the previous marriage void.
The Family Law Revision Committee and the Civil Code Revision Committee
which drafted what is now the Family Code of the Philippines took the
position that parties to a marriage should not be allowed to assume that
their marriage is void even if such be the fact but must first secure a judicial
declaration of the nullity of their marriage before they can be allowed to
marry again.
In fact, the requirement for a declaration of absolute nullity of a marriage is
also for the protection of the spouse who, believing that his or her marriage
is illegal and void, marries again. With the judicial declaration of the nullity of
his or her marriage, the person who marries again cannot be charged with
bigamy.
In numerous cases, this Court has consistently held that a judicial declaration
of nullity is required before a valid subsequent marriage can be contracted;
or else, what transpires is a bigamous marriage, reprehensible and immoral.
If petitioners contention would be allowed, a person who commits bigamy
can simply evade prosecution by immediately filing a petition for the
declaration of nullity of his earlier marriage and hope that a favorable
decision is rendered therein before anyone institutes a complaint against
him. We note that in petitioners case the complaint was filed before the first
marriage was declared a nullity. It was only the filing of the Information that
was overtaken by the declaration of nullity of his first marriage. Following
petitioners argument, even assuming that a complaint has been instituted,
such as in this case, the offender can still escape liability provided that a
decision nullifying his earlier marriage precedes the filing of the Information
in court. Such cannot be allowed. To do so would make the crime of bigamy

dependent upon the ability or inability of the Office of the Public Prosecutor
to immediately act on complaints and eventually file Informations in court.
Plainly, petitioners strained reading of the law is against its simple letter.
Pursuant to Teves, the accuseds conviction for bigamy is
affirmed.1wphi1 The crime of bigamy was consummated from the moment
he contracted the second marriage without his marriage to Socorro being
first judicially declared null and void, because at the time of the celebration
of the second marriage, his marriage to Socorro was still deemed valid and
subsisting due to such marriage not being yet declared null and void by a
court of competent jurisdiction.30"What makes a person criminally liable for
bigamy," according to People v. Odtuhan:31
x x x is when he contracts a second or subsequent marriage during the
subsistence of a valid marriage. Parties to the marriage should not be
permitted to judge for themselves its nullity, for the same must be submitted
to the judgment of competent courts and only when the nullity of the
marriage is so declared can it beheld as void, and so long as there is no such
declaration, the presumption is that the marriage exists. Therefore, he who
contracts a second marriage before the judicial declaration of nullity of the
first marriage assumes the risk of being prosecuted for bigamy.
The accuseds defense of acting in good faith deserves scant consideration
especially because the records show that he had filed a complaint for the
annulment of his marriage with Socorro prior to the institution of the criminal
complaint against him but after he had already contracted his second
marriage with Josefa. But even such defense would abandon him because
the RTC (Branch 39) dismissed his complaint for annulment of marriage after
the information for bigamy had already been filed against him, thus
confirming the validity of his marriage to Socorro. Considering that the
accuseds subsequent marriage to Josefa was an undisputed fact, the third
element of bigamy was established. Nonetheless, he submits that his
marriage to Josefa was invalid because of lack of a recorded judgment of
nullity of marriage. Such argument had no worth, however, because it was
he himself who failed to secure a judicial declaration of nullity of his previous
marriage prior to contracting his subsequent marriage. In Tenebro v. Court of
Appeals,32 the Court has explained that "[s]ince a marriage contracted during
the subsistence of a valid marriage is automatically void, the nullity of this
second marriage is not per se an argument for the avoidance of criminal
liability for bigamy.
x x x A plain reading of [Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code], therefore,
would indicate that the provision penalizes the mere act of contracting a
second or subsequent marriage during the subsistence of a valid marriage."33

The Court has further observed in Nollora, Jr. v. People:34 x x x Nollora may
not impugn his [subsequent] marriage to Geraldino in order to extricate
himself from criminal liability; otherwise, we would be opening the doors to
allowing the solemnization of multiple flawed marriage ceremonies. As we
stated in Tenebro v. Court of Appeals:
There is therefore a recognition written into the law itself that such a
marriage, although void ab initio, may still produce legal consequences.
Among these legal consequences is incurring criminal liability for bigamy. To
hold otherwise would render the State's penal laws on bigamy completely
nugatory, and allow individuals to deliberately ensure that each marital
contract be flawed in some manner, and to thus escape the consequences of
contracting multiple marriages, while beguiling throngs of hapless women
with the promise of futurity and commitment.
Under Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code, the penalty for bigamy is
prision mayor. With neither an aggravating nor a mitigating circumstance
attendant in the commission of the crime, the imposable penalty is the
medium period of prision mayor,35 which ranges from eight years and one
day to 10 years. Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the minimum of
the indeterminate sentence should be within the range of prision
correccional, the penalty next lower than that prescribed for the offense,
which is from six months and one day to six years. Accordingly, the
indeterminate sentence of two years and four months of prision correccional,
as minimum, to eight years and one day of prision mayor as maximum, as
imposed by the RTC, was proper.
WHEREFORE, the Court AFFIRMS the decision of the Court of Appeals
promulgated on August 29, 2002; and ORDERS the petitioner to pay the
costs of suit.
SO ORDERED.
LUCAS P. BERSAMIN
Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:
MARIA LOURDES P.A. SERENO
Chief Justice
TERESITA J. LEONARDO-DE
CASTRO
Associate Justice

MARTIN S. VILLARAMA, JR.

Associate Justice

BIENVENIDO L. REYES
Associate Justice
CERTIFICATION
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, I certify that the
conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before
the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court's Division.
MARIA LOURDES P. A. SERENO
Chief Justice

Footnotes
1

Rollo, pp. 17-24; penned by Associate Justice Hilarion L. Aquino

(retired), with Associate Justice Edgardo P. Cruz (retired) and Associate
Justice Regalado E. Maambong (retired/deceased) concurrirtg.
2

Records, p. 6.

Id. at 197.

Rollo, p. 20.

Id.

Records, p. 198.

Rollo, p. 21.

Records, pp. 197-198, 200, 205.

Rollo, p. 21.

10

Records, p. 199.

11

Id. at 6-12.

12

Id. at 6-9.

13

Rollo, p. 21.

14

Records, p. 1.

15

Id. at 38.

16

Id. at 235-236.

17

Id. at 453.

18

Id. at 455.

19

Rollo, pp. 22-23.

20

Id. at 24.

21

Id. at 8-16.

22

Id. at 10.

23

Id. at 11-12.

24

Id. at 13.

25

Id.

26

Id. at 14.

27

Tenebro v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 150758, February 18, 2004, 423
SCRA 272, 279, citing Reyes, L.B., The Revised Penal Code, Book II,
14th Ed., 1998, p. 907.
28

Rollo, pp. 23-24.

29

G.R. No. 188775, August 24, 2011, 656 SCRA 307, 313-314.

30

See Jarillo v. People, G.R. No. 164435, September 29, 2009, 601
SCRA 236, 246.
31

G.R. No. 191566, July 17, 2013, 701 SCRA 506, 515.

32

Supra note 27.

33

Id. at 282.

34

G.R. No. 191425, September 7, 2011, 657 SCRA 330, 348.

35

Article 64(1), Revised Penal Code.

The Lawphil Project - Arellano Law Foundation

Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
FIRST DIVISION
A.C. No. 3452

June 23, 2014

HENRY SAMONTE, Petitioner,

vs.
ATTY. GINES ABELLANA, Respondent.
DECISION
BERSAMIN, J.:
A lawyer who willfully resorts to any falsehood in order to mislead the courts
or his clients on the status of their causes exhibits his unworthiness to
remain a member of the Law Profession. This is because he is always
expected to be honest and forthright in his dealings with them. He thereby
merits the condign sanction of suspension from the practice of law, if not
disbarment.
Antecedents
On February 16, 1990, complainant Henry E. Samonte brought this
administrative complaint against respondent Atty. Gines N. Abellana who had
represented him as the plaintiff in Civil Case No. CEB-6970 entitled Capt.
Henry E. Samonte v. Authographics, Inc., and Nelson Yu of the Regional Trial
Court in Cebu City.1 In the administrative complaint, Samonte enumerated
the serious acts of professional misconduct by Atty. Abellana, to wit:
1. Falsification of documents, when Atty. Abellana made it appear that
he had filed Civil Case No. CEB-6970 on June 10, 1988, conformably
with their agreement, although the complaint was actually filed on June
14, 1988;
2. Dereliction of duty, when Atty. Abellana failed to: (a) file the reply
vis--vis the answer with counterclaim, with his omission having
delayed the pre-trial of the case; (b) inform the trial court beforehand
that Samonte could not be available on a scheduled hearing, thereby
incurring for the plaintiffs side an unexplained absence detrimental to

Samonte as the plaintiff; and (c) submit an exhibit required by the trial
judge, only to eventually submit it three months later;
3. Gross negligence and tardiness in attending the scheduled hearings;
and
4. Dishonesty for not issuing official receipts for every cash payments
made by Samonte for his court appearances and his acceptance of the
case.
To support his administrative complaint, Samonte attached the following
annexes, namely:
1. Comparative photocopies of the cover page of the complaint on file
in the RTC and of the cover page of the complaint Atty. Abellana
furnished him;2
2. A photocopy of the order issued on January 16, 1989, and a
photocopy of the order issued on January 19, 1990 in which the RTC
observed that "[t]he formal offer of plaintiffs exhibits is rather very
late;"3 and
3. The motion to change counsel, in which Samonte stated that Atty.
Abellana had failed to promptly attend court hearings and to do other
legal services required of him as the counsel. In the lower left portion
of the motion, Atty. Abellana noted the motion subject to the
reservation that his attorneys fees should still be paid.4
On March 12, 1990, the Court required Atty. Abellana to comment on the
administrative complaint.
In his comment dated April 6, 1990,5 Atty. Abellana denied the charge of
falsification of documents, clarifying that the actual filing of the complaint
could be made only on June 14, 1988 instead of on June 10, 1988 because
Samonte had not given enough money to cover the filing fees and other
charges totaling P5,027.76; and that Samonte shelled out only P5,000.00,
contrary to their agreement in April 1988 on paying to him P10,000.00 as the
acceptance fee in addition to the filing fees. He asserted that the charge of
dereliction of duty was baseless, because he had filed the reply on December
2, 1988 after receiving the answer with counterclaim of the defendants on
August 2, 1988, attaching as proof the copies of the reply (Annex 8 and
Annex 9 of his comment);6 and that it was the RTC, not him, who had
scheduled the pre-trial on January 16, 1989.7 Anent his nonattendance at the
hearings in Civil Case No. CEB-6970, he explained that although he had
informed the RTC of his having been either stranded in another province, or
having attended the arraignment of another client in another court, the

presiding judge had opted not to await his arrival in the courtroom. He
blamed Samonte for his inability to submit the formal offer of exhibits on
time, pointing out that Samonte had failed to give the duplicate originals of
the documentary exhibits despite his request because of the latters absence
from the country. He countered that it was Samonte who had been dishonest,
because Samonte had given only the filing fees plus at least P2,000.00 in
contravention of their agreement on the amount of P10,000.00 being his
acceptance fees in addition to the filing fees; that the filing fees paid were
covered by receipts issued by the Clerk of Court; that no receipts were issued
for the P200.00/appearance fee conformably with the practice of most
lawyers; and that Samonte had not also demanded any receipts.
Atty. Abellana branded as unethical Samontes submission of a motion to
change counsel,8 stating that the latter did not thereby exhibit the courtesy
of informing him beforehand on the intention of not meeting his obligation to
him as the counsel; that Samonte had been forced to issue to him a check
after the Branch Clerk of Court had told him that his motion to change
counsel would not be acted upon unless it carried Atty. Abellanas conformity
as the counsel; and that he had duly acknowledged the check.9
On May 23, 1990, the Court received Samontes letter dated May 8,
199010 embodying additional charges of falsification of documents,
dereliction of duty and dishonesty based on the reply and the annexes Atty.
Abellana had filed. Samonte noted in the letter that the reply attached to the
comment of Atty. Abellana was not authentic based on the categorical
statement of the Branch Clerk of Court of Branch 5 of the RTC in Cebu City to
the effect that no such reply had been filed in behalf of Samonte; and that
the rubber stamp affixed on the reply supposedly filed by Atty. Abellana in
Samontes behalf was not also the official rubber stamp of Branch
5.11 Samonte denied being the cause of delay in the submission of the formal
offer of exhibits, and reminded that the documentary exhibits concerned had
been shown to the trial court during his testimony, with the opposing party
not even objecting to their authenticity.
Samonte declared that his agreement with Atty. Abellana on the fees for all
his legal services stipulated the equivalent of 20% of the awarded damages;
that the amount demanded was P1.12 Million;12 that he paid Atty. Abellana a
total of P7,027.00 for filing expenses, plus P5,000.00 that he gave as a token
payment for Atty. Abellanas services after discovering the latters
inefficiency and fraudulent practices.
On May 30, 199013 and July 30, 1990,14 the Court referred the administrative
complaint to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for investigation.
Proceedings in the IBP

On November 3, 1994, the IBP notified the parties to appear and present
their evidence at 10:00 am on November 18, 1994.15 However, the parties
sought postponements.16 The hearing was reset several times more for
various reasons, namely: on December 9, 1994 due to the IBP Commissioner
being out of town, but telegrams were sent to the parties on December 6,
1994;17 on April 12, 2002, with the hearing being cancelled;18 and on March
7, 2003, with the hearing being cancelled until further notice.19
On February 7, 2005, the IBP received a motion to quash dated January 7,
2005 from Atty. Abellana,20 seeking the dismissal of the administrative
complaint because of the lack of interest on the part of Samonte. Atty.
Abellana observed therein that Samonte had always sought the
postponement of the hearings.
Reacting to the motion to quash, Samonte requested an early hearing by
motion filed on February 9, 2005,21declaring his interest in pursuing the
administrative complaint against Atty. Abellana.
On March 22, 2005,22 IBP Commissioner Victoria Gonzalez-De Los Reyes set
the mandatory conference on June 22, 2005. In that conference, only
Samonte appeared;23 hence, the IBP just required the parties to submit their
verified position papers within 30 days from notice. Nonetheless, the IBP
scheduled the clarificatory hearing on August 18, 2005.24
Samonte submitted his position paper on August 2, 2005.25 On August 9,
2005, Atty. Abellana requested an extension of his period to submit his own
position paper allegedly to allow him to secure relevant documents from the
trial court.26
On August 18, 2005, the parties appeared for the clarificatory hearing. The
case was thereafter deemed submitted for resolution.
On August 29, 2005, Samonte presented a verified amended position paper,
reiterating his allegations against Atty. Abellana.27
Also on August 29, 2005, Atty. Abellana submitted his verified position paper
dated August 17, 2005,28 in which he represented that although he had been
at times late for the hearings he had nonetheless efficiently discharged his
duties as the counsel for Samonte; that he had not caused any delay in the
case; that it was Samonte who had been unavailable at times because of his
work as an airline pilot; that the complainant had discharged him as his
counsel in order to avoid paying his obligation to him; and that the
complainant filed this disbarment case after he lost his own civil case in the
RTC. He attached all the pleadings he had filed on behalf of the complainant,
except the above-stated replies.

On May 1, 2008,29 the IBP Commission on Bar Discipline found Atty. Abellana
negligent in handling certain aspects of his clients case, like not filing a reply
to the defendants answer with counterclaims in order to deny the new
matters raised in the answer; resorting to falsehood to make it appear that
he had filed the reply; and being considerably late in submitting the formal
offer of exhibits for Samonte, as noted even by the trial judge in the order
dated January 19, 1990. It observed that although the negligence of Atty.
Abellana did not necessarily prejudice his clients case, his lack of honesty
and trustworthiness as an attorney, and his resort to falsehood and deceitful
practices were a different matter;30 noted that he had twice resorted to
falsehood, the first being when he tried to make it appear that the complaint
had been filed on June 10, 1988 despite the court records showing that the
complaint had been actually filed only on June 14, 1988; and the second
being when he had attempted to deceive his client about his having filed the
reply by producing a document bearing a rubber stamp marking distinctively
different from that of the trial courts; that he did not dispute the pieces of
material evidence adduced against him; that he had explained that the
reason for his delay in the filing of the complaint had been the complainants
failure to pay the agreed fees on time; and that he had only stated that he
had filed a reply, without presenting proof of his having actually filed such in
court.
The IBP Commission on Bar Discipline recommended the disbarment of Atty.
Abellana, observing as follows:
x x x Apart from his negligent handling of portions of the civil case, said
respondent has shown a facility for utilizing false and deceitful practices as a
means to cover-up his delay and lack of diligence in pursuing the case of his
client. Taken together as a whole, the respondents acts are nothing short of
deplorable.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, it is respectfully recommended that
respondent Atty. Gines Abellana be disbarred from the practice of law for
resorting to false and/or deceitful practices, and for failure to exercise
honesty and trusthworthiness as befits a member of the bar.(Bold emphasis
supplied)
On June 5, 2008, the IBP Board of Governors, albeit adopting the findings of
the IBP Investigating Commissioner, suspended Atty. Abellana from the
practice of law for one year, to wit:
RESOLVED to ADOPT and APPROVE, as it is hereby unanimously ADOPTED
and APPROVED, with modification, the Report and Recommendation of the
Investigating Commissioner of the above entitled case, herein made part of
this Resolution as Annex "A", and, finding the recommendation fully
supported by the evidence on record and the applicable laws and rules, and

for resorting to falsehood and/or deceitful practices, and for failure to

exercise honesty and trustworthiness as befits member of the Bar, Atty.
Gines N. Abellana is hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of law for one (1)
year.31 (Bold emphasis supplied)
On September 25, 2008, Atty. Abellana moved for reconsideration based on
the following grounds:32
A. That the imposition of sanction for the suspension of the
undersigned from the practice of law for one (1) year is too stiff in
relation to the alleged unethical conduct committed by the respondent;
B. That the findings of the investigating commissioner is not fully
supported with evidence;
C. That the complaint of the complainant is not corroborated by
testimonial evidence so that it is hearsay and self-serving.
In support of his motion, Atty. Abellana rehashed most of his previous
arguments, and stated that the "enumerations of failures are belied by the
existence of Reply to counterclaims, which were attached as Annexes "8" and
"9" of the Position Paper of respondent."33 It is noted, however, that Annex 8
and Annex 9 of Atty. Abellanas position paper were different documents,
namely: Annex 834 (Manifestation and Opposition to Plaintiffs Motion to
Change Counsel); and Annex 935 (Manifestation). Nonetheless, he argued
that both documents were already part of the records of the case, and that
anyway Atty. Geronimo V. Nazareth, the Branch Clerk of Court, did not
execute any affidavit or certification tothe effect that both documents were
inexistent. He reminded that Samonte had only said that both documents
"seemed to be falsified documents" based on the certification of Atty.
Nazareth on the official rubber stamp of the court.
The IBP required Samonte to comment on Atty. Abellanas motion for
reconsideration.36
In his comment dated October 21, 2008,37 Samonte reiterated his allegations
against Atty. Abellana; insisted that Atty. Abellana did not refute the charges
against him; and noted thatthe reply that Atty. Abellana had supposedly filed
in the case was not even annexed either to his position paper and motion for
reconsideration.
On December 16, 2008, Atty. Abellana filed a motion requesting to be
allowed to submit certified true copies of his exhibits, i.e., the pleadings he
had submitted in the RTC.38
On April 2, 2009, Samonte filed a motion for early resolution.39

On September 15, 2009, Atty. Abellana filed a supplemental motion for

reconsideration.40
On June 22, 2013, the IBP Board of Governors denied the motion for
reconsideration of Atty. Abellana.41
Ruling
We adopt and approve the findings of the IBP Board of Governors by virtue of
their being substantiated by the records.
In his dealings with his client and with the courts, every lawyer is expected to
be honest, imbued with integrity, and trustworthy. These expectations,
though high and demanding, are the professional and ethical burdens of
every member of the Philippine Bar, for they have been given full expression
in the Lawyers Oath that every lawyer of this country has taken upon
admission as a bona fide member of the Law Profession, thus:
I, ___________________, do solemnly swear that I will maintain allegiance to the
Republic of the Philippines; I will support its Constitution and obey the laws
as well as the legal orders of the duly constituted authorities therein; I will do
no falsehood, nor consent to the doing of any in court; I will not wittingly or
willingly promote or sue any groundless, false or unlawful suit, nor give aid
nor consent to the same. I will delay no man for money or malice, and will
conduct myself as a lawyer according to the best of my knowledge and
discretion with all good fidelity as well to the courts as to my clients; and I
impose upon myself this voluntary obligation without any mental reservation
or purpose of evasion. So help me God. (Emphasis supplied)
By the Lawyers Oath is every lawyer enjoined not only to obey the laws of
the land but also to refrain from doing any falsehood in or out of court or
from consenting to the doing of any in court, and to conduct himself
according to the best of his knowledge and discretion with all good fidelity as
well to the courts as to his clients. Every lawyer is a servant of the Law, and
has to observe and maintain the rule of law as well as be an exemplar worthy
of emulation by others.42 It is by no means a coincidence, therefore, that
honesty, integrity and trustworthiness are emphatically reiterated by the
Code of Professional Responsibility, to wit:
Rule 10.01 - A lawyer shall not do any falsehood, nor consent to the doing of
any in Court; nor shall he mislead, or allow the Court to be misled by any
artifice.
Rule 11.02 - A lawyer shall punctually appear at court hearings.

Rule 18.04 - A lawyer shall keep the client informed of the status of his case
and shall respond within a reasonable time to clients request for
information.
Atty. Abellana abjectly failed the expectations of honesty, integrity and
trustworthiness in his dealings with Samonte as the client, and with the RTC
as the trial court. He resorted to outright falsification by superimposing "0"
on "4" in order to mislead Samonte into believing that he had already filed
the complaint in court on June 10,1988 as promised, instead of on June 14,
1988, the date when he had actually done so. His explanation that Samonte
was himself the cause of the belated filing on account of his inability to remit
the correct amount of filing fees and his acceptance fees by June 10, 1988,
as agreed upon, did not excuse the falsification, because his falsification was
not rendered less dishonest and less corrupt by whatever reasons for filing at
the later date. He ought to remember that honesty and integrity were of far
greater value for him as a member of the Law Profession than his
transactions with his client.
Atty. Abellanas perfidy towards Samonte did not stop there. He continued
misleading Samonte in explaining his mishandling of the latters civil case.
Worse, he also foisted his dishonesty on the Court no less. To counter
Samontes accusation about his not filing the reply in the civil case, he
knowingly submitted two documents as annexes of his comment during the
investigation by the IBP, and represented said documents to have been part
of the records of the case in the RTC. His intention in doing so was to
enhance his defense against the administrative charge. But the two
documents turned out to be forged and spurious, and his forgery came to be
exposed because the rubber stamp marks the documents bore were not the
official marks of the RTCs, as borne out by the specimens of the official
rubber stamp of Branch 5 of the RTC duly certified by Atty. Geronimo V.
Nazareth, the Branch Clerk of Court.43 He defended his dishonesty by lamely
claiming that "court personnel were authorized to accept filing of pleadings
even without the usual rubber stamp."44 In these acts, he manifested his
great disrespect towards both the Court and his client.
The finding on Atty. Abellanas neglect in the handling of Samontes case was
entirely warranted. He admitted being tardy in attending the hearings of the
civil case. He filed the formal offer of evidence in behalf of his client way
beyond the period to do so, a fact that he could not deny because the RTC
Judge had himself expressly noted the belated filing in the order issued in the
case. Atty. Abellana was fortunate that the RTC Judge exhibited some
tolerance and liberality by still admitting the belated offer of evidence in the
interest of justice.
In the motion for reconsideration that he filed in the IBP Board of Governors,
Atty. Abellana challenged the sufficiency of the proof presented against him

by Samonte, contending that such proof had consisted of merely hearsay

and self-serving evidence.
The contention of Atty. Abellana is bereft of substance. In disciplinary
proceedings against lawyers, clearly preponderant evidence is required to
overcome the presumption of innocence in favor of the respondent lawyers.
Preponderant evidence means that the evidence adduced by one side is, as a
whole, superior to or has greater weight than that of the other.45 In order to
determine if the evidence of one party is greater than that of the other,
Section 1, Rule 133 of the Rules of Court instructs that the court may
consider the following, namely: (a) all the facts and circumstances of the
case; (b) the witnesses manner of testifying, their intelligence, their means
and opportunity of knowing the facts to which they are testifying, the nature
of the facts to which they testify, the probability or improbability of their
testimony; (c) the witnesses interest or want of interest, and also their
personal credibility so far as the same may ultimately appear in the trial; and
(d) the number of witnesses, although it does not mean that preponderance
is necessarily with the greater number.
The complainants evidence preponderantly established the administrative
sins of Atty. Abellana. To start with, Atty. Abellana admitted superimposing
the "0" on "4" but justified himself by claiming that he had done so only
because the complainant had not given to him the correct amount of filing
fees required. Secondly, Atty. Abellana filed a spurious document by making
it appear as one actually filed in court by using a fake rubber stamp. His
misdeed was exposed because the rubber stamp imprint on his document
was different from that of the official rubber stamp of the trial court. He
defended himself by stating that court personnel accepted papers filed in the
court without necessarily using the official rubber stamp of the court. He well
knew, of course, that such statement did not fully justify his misdeed.
Thirdly, Atty. Abellana did not present any proof of his alleged filings, like
certified copies of the papers supposedly filed in court. His omission to prove
his allegation on the filings conceded that he did not really file them. And,
lastly, Atty. Abellana misrepresented the papers he had supposedly filed by
stating that he was attaching them as Annex 8 and Annex 9 of his comment,
but Annex 8 and Annex 9 turned out to be papers different from those he
represented them to be.
Disciplinary proceedings against lawyers are designed to ensure that
whoever is granted the privilege to practice law in this country should remain
faithful to the Lawyers Oath. Only thereby can lawyers preserve their fitness
to remain as members of the Law Profession. Any resort to falsehood or
deception, including adopting artifices to cover up ones misdeeds
committed against clients and the rest of the trusting public, evinces an
unworthiness to continue enjoying the privilege to practice law and

highlights the unfitness to remain a member of the Law Profession. It

deserves for the guilty lawyer stern disciplinary sanctions.
The falsehoods committed by Atty. Abellana, being aimed at misleading his
client and the Court to bolster his unworthy denial of his neglect in the
handling of the client's case, were unmitigated. Still, the Court must not
close its eyes to the fact that Atty. Abellana actually finished presenting his
client's case; and that the latter initiated the termination of Atty. Abellana's
engagement as his counsel only after their relationship had been tainted
with mistrust. Thus, we determine the proper sanction. In Maligaya v.
Doronilla, Jr., 46 the respondent lawyer was suspended for two months from
the practice of law for representing in court that the complainant had agreed
to withdraw the lawsuit when in truth the complainant had made no such
agreement. The respondent admitted the falsity of his representation, but
gave as an excuse his intention to amicably settle the case. In Molina v.
Magat,47 the respondent had invoked double jeopardy in behalf of his client
by stating that the complainant had filed a similar case of slight physical
injuries in another court, but his invocation was false because no other case
had been actually filed. He was suspended from the practice of law for six
months for making the false and untruthful statement in court. For Atty.
Abellana, therefore, suspension from the practice of law for six months with
warning of a more severe sanction upon a repetition suffices.
ACCORDINGLY, the Court AFFIRMS the Resolution dated June 22, 2013 of the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines Board of Governors subject to the
MODIFICATION that Atty. Gines N. Abellana is SUSPENDED FOR SIX (6)
MONTHS FROM THE PRACTICE OF LAW effective upon receipt of this decision,
with the stern warning that any repetition by him of the same or similar acts
will be punished more severely.
Let a copy of this decision be entered in the personal records of Atty. Gines
N. Abellana as a member of the Philippine Bar, and copies furnished to the
Office of the Bar Confidant, the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, and the
Office of the Court Administrator for proper dissemination to all courts in the
country.
SO ORDERED.
LUCAS P. BERSAMIN
Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:
MARIA LOURDES P. A. SERENO
Chief Justice

TERESITA J. LEONARDO-DE
CASTRO
Associate Justice

MARTIN S. VILLARAMA, JR.

Associate Justice

BIENVENIDO L. REYES
Associate Justice

Footnotes
1

Rollo, pp. 4-5.

Id. at 6.

Id. at 7-8.

Id. at 9

Id. at 11-16.

Id. at 29-32.

Id. at 33 (Annex 10).

Id. at 35 (Annex 12).

Id. at 36 (Annex 13 and Annex 13-A).

10

Id. at 44-47.

11

Id. at 52.

12

Id. at 53.

13

Id. at 38.

14

Id. at 57.

15

Id. at 63.

16

Id. at 64 and 66-67.

17

Id. at 70.

18

Id. at 75-76.

19

Id. at 77-78.

20

Id. at 79-81

21

Id. at 86-87.

22

Id. at 91.

23

Id. at 92.

24

Id. at 93.

25

Id. at 94.

26

Id. at 101.

27

Id. at 104-105.

28

Id. at 107-113.

29

Id. at 226-238 (penned by Commissioner Rico A. Limpingco).

30

Id. at 226-238.

31

Id. at 225.

32

Id. at 153-160.

33

Id. at 154.

34

Id. at 129-130.

35

Id. at 131.

36

Id. at 162.

37

Id. at 163-165.

38

Id. at 183.

39

Id. at 189.

40

Id. at 192-196.

41

Id. at 223.

42

De Leon v. Castelo, A.C. No. 8620, January 12, 2011, 639 SCRA 237,
243-244.
43

Supra note 11.

44

Rollo,p. 158.

45

Aba v. De Guzman, Jr., A.C. No. 7649, December 14, 2011, 662 SCRA
361, 372.
46

A.C. 6198, September 15, 2006, 502 SCRA 1, 8-10.

47

A.C. 1900, June 13, 2012, 672 SCRA 1, 6-7.

The Lawphil Project - Arellano Law Foundation

Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. 192432

June 23, 2014

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee,

vs.
LARRY MENDOZA y ESTRADA, Accused-Appellant.
DECISION
BERSAMIN, J.:
The law enforcement agents who conduct buy-bust operations against
persons suspected of drug trafficking in violation of Republic Act No. 9165
(RA No. 9165), otherwise known as the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act
of 2002, should comply with the statutory requirements for preserving the
chain of custody of the seized evidence. Failing this, they are required to
render sufficient reasons for their non-compliance during the trial; otherwise,
the presumption that they have regularly performed their official duties
cannot obtain, and the persons they charge should be acquitted on the
ground of reasonable doubt.

The Case
This appeal seeks the review and reversal of the decision promulgated on
April 26, 2010 in CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No. 03901 entitled People of the Philippines
v. Larry Mendoza y Estrada,1 whereby the Court of Appeals (CA) affirmed the
judgment rendered on February 24, 2009 by the Regional Trial Court (RTC),
Branch 67, in Binangonan, Rizal finding accused Larry Mendoza y Estrada
guilty of a violation of Section 5 and a violation of Section 11, Article II of RA
No. 9165.2
Antecedents
The accusatory portion of the information charging the violation of Section 5
of RA No. 9165 reads:
That on or about the 28th day of August 2007, in the Municipality of
Binangonan, Province of Rizal, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the above-named accused, without having been authorized
by law, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and knowingly sell, deliver and
give away to a poseur buyer (PO1 Arnel D. Diocena), 0.03 gram and 0.01
gram or a total weight of 0.04 gram of white crystalline substance contained
in two (2) heat-sealed transparent plastic sachets, which substance was
found positive to the test for Methylamphetamine hydrochloride alsoknown
as "shabu", a dangerous drug, in consideration of the amountof Php 500.00,
in violation of the above-cited law.
CONTRARY TO LAW.3
The accusatory portion of the information charging the violation of Section
11 of RA No. 9165 alleges:
That, on or about the 28th day of August 2007, in the Municipality of
Binangonan, Province of Rizal, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the above-named accused, not being lawfully authorized to
possess any dangerous drug, did, then and there willfully, unlawfully and
knowingly possess and have in his custody and control 0.01 gram of white
crystalline substance contained in one (1) heat-sealed transparent plastic
sachet, which substance was found positive to the test for
Methylamphetamine hydrochloride also known as "shabu", a dangerous
drug, in violation of the above-cited law.
CONTRARY TO LAW.4
After the accused pleaded not guiltyto both informations,5 the State
presented Sr. Insp. Vivian C. Sumobay, PO1 Arnel D. Diocena and Insp.

Alfredo DG Lim as its witnesses, while the witnesses for the Defense were
the accused himself, Lolita Flores and Analiza Acapin.
The CA summarized the respective versions of the parties in the decision
under review as follows:
Evidence for the Prosecution
As culled from the herein assailed Decision, the prosecution presented the
following witnesses:
"x x x Policemen Arnel Diocenaand Alfredo DG Limtestified that, on
September 29, 2007, they received reports that an alias Larry was selling
shabuat St. Claire Street, Barangay Calumpang, Binangonan, Rizal. They
organized a buy-bust operationwhere Diocena acted as the poseur buyer
while Lim servedas back-up. They proceeded to the target area with their
asset at around 10:45 p.m. There Diocena and the asset waited in the corner
on their motorcycle while Lim and the other cops positioned themselves in
the perimeter. The asset texted Larry and they waited for him to arrive.
Later,Larry arrived and told them, Pasensya na at ngayon lang dumating
ang mga items. Larry then asked them how much they were buying and
Diocena told P500.00 worth. Larry took out two plastic sachets of shabuand
gave it to Diocena who gave him a marked P500 bill (exhibit D). Diocenalit
the left signal light of his motorcycle to signal Lim and the other cops that
the deal was done. They then arrested Larry who turned out to be the
accused. After frisking him, they recovered another sachet of shabufrom him.
Diocena marked the first two LEM-1and LEM-2while the one taken after the
frisk he marked LEM-3(TSN dated April 23 and July 17, 2008, exhibits D, E
and F). These were sent to the police crime lab for forensic testing where
they tested positive for 0.03 (LEM-1), 0.01 (LEM-2) and 0.01 (LEM-3)
grams for Methylamphetamine Hydrochloride or shabu respectively (TSN
dated December 5, 2007, exhibits A,B and C). LEM-1 and LEM-2 were
made the basis of the pushing charge while LEM-3 the one for possession."
Evidence for the Defense
The defense witnesses version of facts, as summarized in the herein
assailed Decision, is as follows:
"x x x On that day, he was minding his own business, eating with his wife
when his friend Rolly Lopez knocked on the door. Rolly was wanted by the
cops (may atraso) and asked Mendoza for help to get them off his
back.Rolly texted somebody and after there was another knock. It was the
police led by one Dennis Gorospewho asked Mendoza for his identity. When
he said yes, Gorospe cuffed him after showing him sachets of shabuwith his
initials. Gorospe was then taken to the police station where he was

interrogated and asked how much protection money he can cough up. When
he refused, he was arrested and drug tested. He claims that he was
supposed to be a regaloto the new police chief. (TSN dated August 27,
October 9, November 26, 2008 and February 18, 2009)6
Ruling of the RTC
On February 24, 2009, the RTC convicted the accused of the crimes
charged,7 disposing:
We thus find accused Larry Mendoza GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of
violating Section 5 of R.A. No. 9165 and sentence him to suffer a penalty of
life imprisonment and topay a fine of P500,000.00. We also find him
GUILTYbeyond reasonable doubt of violating Section 11 of R.A. No. 9165 and
illegally possessing a total of 0.01 grams of Methylamphetamine
Hydrochloride or shabuand accordingly sentence him to suffer an
indeterminate penalty of 12 years and 1 day as minimum to 13 years as
maximum and to pay a fine of P300,000.00
Let the drug samples in this case be forwarded to the Philippine Drug
Enforcement Agency (PDEA) for proper disposition. Furnish PDEA with a copy
of this Decision per OCA Circular No. 70-2007.
SO ORDERED.8
Judgment of the CA
The accused appealed, contendingthat the identity of the corpus delictiand
the fact of illegal sale had notbeen established beyond reasonable doubt;
that PO1 Diocenas testimony on the sale of the illegal drugs and on the buybust operation had not been corroborated; that the Prosecution had patently
failed to show compliance with the requirements of Section 21 of RA No.
9165; and that such failure to show compliance had negated the
presumption of regularity accorded to the apprehending police officers, and
should warrant his acquittal.9
On April 26, 2010, the CA affirmed the conviction of the accused,10 holding
and ruling thusly:
x x x [I]t is worthy of mention that prosecution of cases for violation of the
Dangerous Drugs Act arising from buy-bust operations largely depend on the
credibility of the police officers who conducted them. Unless clear and
convincing evidence is proffered showing that the members of the buy-bust
team were driven by any improper motive or were not properly performing
their duty, their testimonies on the operation deserve full faith and credit.

Here, accused-appellant failed to present any plausible reason or ill-motive

on the part of the police officers to falsely impute to him such a serious and
unfounded charge. We thus are obliged to accord great respect to and treat
with finality the findings of the trial court on the prosecution witnesses
credibility. After all, it is settled doctrine that the trial courts evaluation of
the credibility of a testimony is accorded the highest respect, for the trial
court has the distinct opportunity of directly observing the demeanor of a
witness and, thus, to determine whether he is telling the truth.
Accused-appellants argument that the procedural requirements of Section
21, paragraph 1 of ArticleII of Republic Act No. 9165 with respect to the
custody and disposition of confiscated drugs were not complied with is
equally bereft of merit.
xxxx
Verily, failure of the police officers to strictly comply with the subject
procedure isnot fatal [to] the integrity and the evidentiary value of the
confiscated/seized items having been properly preservedby the
apprehending officer/team. Its non-compliance will not render an accuseds
arrest illegal or items seized/confiscated from him inadmissible. For, what is
of utmost importance is the preservation of the integrity and evidentiary
value of the seized items, as the same would be utilized in the determination
of the guilt or innocence of the accused.
xxxx
It thus behooves Us to believe that all the links in the chain from the
moment it was seized from the accused-appellant, marked in evidence and
submitted to the crime laboratory, up to the time it was offered in evidence
were sufficiently establishedin this case.
We are thus constrained to uphold accused-appellants conviction.
xxxx
WHEREFORE, the instant appeal is DISMISSED. The assailed Decision dated
February 24, 2009 is AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.11
Issue
In this appeal, the accused presentsthe lone issue of whether the CA erred in
finding him guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the violations of Section 5 and
Section 11 of RA No. 9165.

Ruling of the Court

The appeal is meritorious.
1.
The State did not satisfactorilyexplain substantial lapses
committed by the buy-bust team in the chain of custody;
hence, the guilt of the accused for the crime charged
was not established beyond reasonable doubt
The presentation of the dangerous drugs as evidence in court is material if
not indispensable in every prosecution for the illegal sale of dangerous
drugs. As such, the identityof the dangerous drugs should be established
beyond doubt by showing thatthe dangerous drugs offered in court were the
same substances boughtduring the buy-bust operation. This rigorous
requirement, known under RA No. 9165 as the chain of custody, performs the
function of ensuring thatunnecessary doubts concerning the identity of the
evidence are removed.12 As the Court has expounded in People v.
Catalan,13 the dangerous drugs are themselves the corpus delicti; hence:
To discharge its duty of establishing the guilt of the accused beyond
reasonable doubt, therefore, the Prosecution must prove the corpus
delicti.That proof is vital to a judgment of conviction. On the other hand, the
Prosecution does not comply with the indispensable requirement of proving
the violation of Section 5 of Republic Act No. 9165 when the dangerous drugs
are missing but also when there are substantial gaps in the chain of custody
of the seized dangerous drugs that raise doubts about the authenticity of the
evidence presented in court.14
As the means of ensuring the establishment of the chain of custody, Section
21 (1) of RA No. 9165 specifies that:
(1) The apprehending team having initial custody and control of the drugs
shall, immediately after seizure and confiscation, physically inventory and
photograph the same in the presence of the accused or the person/s from
whom such items were confiscated and/or seized, or his/her representative
or counsel, a representative from the media and the Department of Justice
(DOJ), and any elected public official who shall be required to sign the copies
of the inventory and be given a copy thereof.
The following guideline in the Implementing Rules and Regulations (IRR) of
RA No. 9165 complements Section 21 (1) of RA No. 9165, to wit:

(a) The apprehending officer/team having initial custody and control of the
drugs shall, immediately after seizure and confiscation, physically inventory
and photograph the same inthe presence of the accused or the person/s
from whom suchitems were confiscated and/or seized, or his/her
representative orcounsel, a representative from the media and the
Department of Justice (DOJ), and any elected public official who shall be
required to sign the copies of the inventory and be given a copy thereof:
Provided, that the physical inventory and photograph shall be conducted at
the place where the search warrant is served; or at the nearest police station
or at the nearest office of the apprehending officer/team, whichever is
practicable, in case of warrantless seizures; Provided, further, that noncompliance with these requirements under justifiable grounds, as long as the
integrity and the evidentiary value of the seized items are properly
preserved by the apprehending officer/team, shall not render void and invalid
suchseizures of and custody over said items;
Based on the foregoing statutory rules, the manner and timing of the
marking of the seized drugs or related items are crucial in proving the chain
of custody. Certainly, the marking after seizure by the arresting officer, being
the starting point in the custodial link, should be made immediately upon the
seizure, or, if that is not possible, as close to the time and place of the
seizure as practicable under the obtaining circumstances. This stricture is
essential because the succeeding handlers of the contraband would use the
markings as their reference to the seizure. The marking further serves to
separate the marked seized drugs fromall other evidence from the time of
seizure from the accused until the drugs are disposed of upon the
termination of the criminal proceedings. The deliberate taking of these
identifying steps is statutorily aimed at obviating switching, "planting" or
contamination of the evidence.15Indeed, the preservation of the chain of
custody vis--vis the contraband ensures the integrity of the evidence
incriminating the accused, and relates to the element of relevancy as one of
the requisites for the admissibility of the evidence.
An examination of the records reveals that the buy-bust team did not
observe the statutory procedures on preserving the chain of custody.
To start with, the State did not show the presence during the seizure and
confiscation of the contraband, aswell as during the physical inventory and
photographing of the contraband, ofthe representatives from the media or
the Department of Justice, or of any elected public official. Such presence
was precisely necessary to insulatethe apprehension and incrimination
proceedings from any taint of illegitimacy or irregularity. 16
It is notable that PO1 Diocena, although specifically recalling having marked
the confiscated sachets of shabuwith the initials of the accused immediately
after the seizure, did not state, as the following excerpts from his testimony

indicate, if he had madehis marking in the presence of the accused himself

or of his representative, and in the presence of a representative from the
media or the Department of Justice, or any elected public official, to wit:
Q - What did you do with the plasticsachets you bought or the plastic sachets
handed to you and the other plastic sachet Insp. Lim recovered from him?
A - I put markings, Maam.
Q - What markings did you place on the plastic sachets?
A - LEM-1, LEM-2 and LEM-3.
Q - And after marking those specimen, what did you do with them?
A - We brought them to the police station.
Q - What did the police station do with the plastic sachets?
A - Our investigator took pictures and brought them to the PNP Crime
Laboratory.
xxxx
Q - You said that you put markings on the specimen at the target area?
A - Yes, Maam.
Q - You prepared the listing of all the specimen and marked money you
recovered from the accused?
A - No, Maam.
Q - When you returned to the police station that was the only time that you
took pictures of the marked money?
A - Yes, Maam.
Q - To whom did you turn it over?
A - To our investigator, Maam.
Q - What is the name of your investigator?
A - PO1 Dennis Gorospe, Maam.17

Similarly, P/Insp. Lim did not mention in his testimony, the relevant portions
of which are quoted hereunder, that a representative from the media or the
Department of Justice, or any elected public official was present during the
seizure and marking of the sachets of shabu, as follows:
Q - What did you do with the subject sale and the one you recovered from
the accused?
A - I told PO1 Diocena to mark it, the three heat-sealed plastic sachets.
Q - Do you know the markings placed on the plastic sachets?
A - LEM-1, LEM-2 and LEM-3.
Q - And aside from marking the specimen, what did you do with them?
A - I apprised the suspect of his rights, then right after that we went to the
headquarters.
Q - And after you brought the accused and the specimen to the
headquarters, what did you do next with the specimen?
A - We submitted them to the Crime Laboratory for verification.
Q - Who personally brought them to the Crime Laboratory?
A - If I am not mistaken it was also PO1 Diocena and the other men.
xxxx
Q - Where was Officer Diocena when heput markings on the three plastic
sachets you recovered?
A - When I arrested the subject, he alighted from the motorcycle and he
helped me in arresting the accused, it was just then beneath the Meralco
post.
Q - And the markings represent the initials of the accused?
A - I dont know, Maam, LEM, maybe, Maam.
Q - But it was Officer Diocena who put the markings?
A - Yes, Maam.

Q - Was there an inventory or list of the things you recovered from the
accused?
A - Yes, Maam.
Q - Did you ask the accused to sign that inventory?
A - I was not able, Maam.18
The consequences of the failure ofthe arresting lawmen to comply with the
requirements of Section 21(1), supra, were dire as far as the Prosecution was
concerned. Without the insulating presence of the representative from the
media or the Department of Justice, or any elected public official during the
seizure and marking of the sachets of shabu, the evils of switching,
"planting" or contamination of the evidence that had tainted the buy-busts
conducted under the regime of RA No. 6425 (Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972)
again reared their ugly heads as to negate the integrity and credibility of the
seizure and confiscation of the sachets of shabu that were evidence herein of
thecorpus delicti, and thus adversely affected the trustworthiness of the
incrimination of the accused. Indeed, the insulating presence of such
witnesses would have preserved an unbroken chain of custody.
Secondly, the records nowhere indicated, contrary to the claim of P/Insp. Lim,
that the buy-bust team, orany member thereof, had conducted the physical
inventory of the confiscated items. We know this because the States formal
offer of evidence did not include such inventory, to wit:
PROSECUTOR ARAGONES:
Your Honor, we formally offer Exhibit "A", the Chemistry Report No. D-221-07;
Exhibit "B", the request for laboratory examination from the Binangonan
Police Station; and Exhibit "C", the subject specimen. This is to prove that
after request made by the Binangonan Police Station, examined by the
forensic chemical officer, and after examination proved positive to the test
for methamphetamine hydrochloride. These exhibits are offered as part of
the testimony of the forensic chemist. Exhibit "D", the buy bust money,
the P500.00 bill used during the operation; Exhibit "D-1" is the marking
placed by Police Officer Diocena. This is to prove that this is the xerox copy
of the original buy bust money used during the buy bust operation
conducted against the accused. Exhibit "E" is the sworn statement of Police
Officer Diocena. This is to prove all the facts alleged in the information and
as part of the testimony of the said police officer. Exhibit "F" is the sworn
statement of P/Insp. Alfredo Lim to prove all the facts alleged in the
information and as part of the testimony of said witness. That would be all
for our formal offer of evidence.19 Without the inventory having beenmade by

the seizing lawmen, it became doubtful whether any shabu had been seized
from the accused at all.
And, thirdly, although PO1 Diocena asserted that photographs of the
confiscated items and the marked money were taken at the police
station,20 it still behooved him to justify why the photographs of the seized
shabuwas not taken immediately upon the seizure,and at the place of
seizure. The State did not explain this lapse. The pictorial evidence of the
latter kind would have more firmly established the identity of the
seizedshabufor purposes of preserving the chain of custody.
The last paragraph of Section 21(1) of the IRR of RA No. 9165 expressly
provides a saving mechanism tothe effect that not every case of noncompliance with the statutory requirements for the physical inventory and
photograph of the dangerous drugs being made "in the presence of the
accused or the person/s from whom such items were confiscated and/or
seized, or his/her representative or counsel, a representative from the media
and the Department of Justice (DOJ),and any elected public official who shall
be required to sign the copies of the inventory and be given a copy thereof"
would prejudice the States case against the accused. But in order for that
saving mechanism to apply, and thus save the day for the States cause, the
Prosecution must have to recognize first the lapse or lapses, and then
credibly explain them.21
It appears that the application ofthe saving mechanism in this case was not
warranted. The Prosecution did notconcede that the lawmen had not
complied with the requirement for "the presence of the accused or the
person/s from whom such items were confiscated and/or seized, or his/her
representative or counsel, a representative from the media and the
Department of Justice (DOJ), and any elected public official who shall be
required to sign the copies of the inventory and be given a copy thereof."
Also, the Prosecution did not tender any justification why no representatives
from the media or the Department of Justice, or any elected public official
had been present during the seizure and confiscation of the shabu. The
omissions, particularly the failure to justify on the part of the lawmen, were
strange and improbable, particularly because the records indicated that the
lawmen had sufficient time and the opportunity to prepare for the proper
conductof the buy-bust operation against the accused due to such operation
having come in the aftermath of a successful test buy.
Anent the test buy, PO1 Diocena mentioned the same in his sinumpaang
salaysay, thusly:
x x x Na itong sinasabi ng aming asset na alyas "Larry" ay matagal na
naming minamanmanan at sa katunayan ay nagsagawa na kami ng Test Buy
noong Hulyo 10, 2007 at kami ay nakabili sa kanya ng isang pirasong maliit

na plastic na may lamang shabu at amin itong ipinasuri sa RIZAL PNP Crime
Laboratory Office na nagbigay ng positibong resulta sa pinagbabawal na
droga at siya ay di namin kaagad nahuli sapagkat siya ay huminto
pansamantala sa pagbebenta ng iligal na droga. x x x22
Similarly, P/Insp. Lim adverted to the test buy in his own sinumpaang
salaysayas follows:
x x x Sapagkat ako ay bago lamang dito sa himpilan ng Binangonan,
napagalaman ko mula saaking mga kasamahan na itong sinasabi ng aming
asset na alyas "Larry" ay matagal na nilang minamanmanan at sa katunayan
aynagsagawa ng Test Buy noong Hulyo 10, 2007 laban dito kay alyas "Larry"
at ang nabiling pinaghihinalaang shabu ay ipinasuri sa RIZAL PNP Crime
Laboratory Office na nagbigay ng positibong resulta sa pinagbabawal na
droga na kaya lamang hindi nahuhuli itong si alyas "Larry" sa dahilang siya
at huminto pansamantala sa pagbebenta ng iligal na droga.23
P/Insp. Lim reiterated his story on direct examination, viz:
Q - And what report, if any, was madeby that asset aside from there was an
ongoing sale of drugs in Calumpang?
A - That there was an ongoing sale byalias Larry na matagal na nilang
minamatyagan, in fact they havealready testbuy noong mga nakaraang
taon, eh, wala pa ho ako noon.24
In all, the buy-bust team had about 48 days the period intervening between
July 10, 2007, when the test buy was conducted, and August 28, 2007, when
the crimes charged were committed within which to have the media and
the Department of Justice be represented during the buy-bust operation, as
well as to invite an elected public official of the place of operation to witness
the operation. It puzzles the Court, therefore, that the buy-bust team did not
prudently follow the procedures outlined in Section 21(1), supra, despite
their being experienced policemen who knew the significance of the
procedures in the preservation of the chain of custody.
With the chain of custody being demonstrably broken, the accused deserved
to be acquitted of the seriouscharges. Even if we rejected the frame-up
defense of the accused, the unexplained failures and lapses committed by
the buy-bust team could not be fairly ignored. At the very least, they raised a
reasonable doubt on his guilt. "A reasonable doubt of guilt," according
toUnited States v. Youthsey:25
x x x is a doubt growing reasonably out of evidence or the lack of it. It is not
a captious doubt; not a doubt engendered merely by sympathy for the
unfortunate position of the defendant, or a dislike to accept the responsibility

of convicting a fellowman. If, having weighed the evidence on both sides,

you reach the conclusion that the defendant is guilty, to that degree of
certainty as would lead you toact on the faith of it in the most important and
crucial affairs of your life, you may properly convict him. Proof beyond
reasonable doubt is notproof to a mathematical demonstration. It is not proof
beyond the possibility of mistake.
Thus, the accused was entitled to beacquitted and freed, for, as we pointed
out in People v. Belocura:26
x x x in all criminal prosecutions, the Prosecution bears the burden to
establish the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt. In discharging
this burden, the Prosecutions duty is to prove each and every element of the
crime charged in the information to warrant a finding of guilt for that crime
or for any other crime necessarily included therein. The Prosecution must
further prove the participation of the accused in the commission of the
offense. In doing all these, the Prosecution must rely on the strength of its
own evidence, and not anchor its success upon the weakness of the
evidence of the accused. The burden of proof placed on the Prosecution
arises from the presumption of innocence in favor of the accused that no less
thanthe Constitution has guaranteed. Conversely, as to his innocence, the
accused has no burden of proof, that he must then be acquitted and set free
should the Prosecution not overcome the presumption of innocence in his
favor. In other words, the weakness of the defense put up bythe accused is
inconsequential in the proceedings for as long as the Prosecution has not
discharged its burden of proof in establishing the commission of the crime
charged and in identifying the accused as the malefactor responsible for it.
2.
The CA and the RTC erred in relying
on the presumption of regularity in the
performance of duty of the arresting officers
Even if the foregoing conclusion already renders any further discussion of the
applicability of the presumption of regularity in favor of the members of the
buy-bust team superfluous, we need to dwell a bit on the matter if only to
remind the lower courtsnot to give too much primacy to the presumption of
regularity in the performance of official duty at the expense of the higher and
stronger presumption of innocence in favor of the accused in a prosecution
for violation of the Comprehensive Drugs Act of 2002.
We have usually presumed the regularity of performance of their official
duties in favor of the members of buy-bust teams enforcing our laws against

the illegal sale of dangerous drugs. Such presumption is based on three

fundamental reasons, namely: first, innocence, and not wrong-doing, is to be
presumed; second, an official oath will not be violated; and, third, a
republican form of government cannot survive long unless a limit is placed
upon controversies and certain trust and confidence reposed in each
governmental department or agent by every other such department or
agent, at least to the extent of such presumption.27 But the presumption is
rebuttable by affirmative evidence of irregularity or of any failure to perform
a duty.28 Judicial reliance on the presumption despite any hint of irregularity
in the procedures undertaken by the agents of the law will thus be
fundamentally unsound because such hint is itself affirmative proof of
irregularity.
The presumption of regularity of performance of official duty stands only
when no reason exists in the records by which to doubt the regularity of the
performance of official duty. And even in that instance the presumption of
regularity will not be stronger than the presumption of innocence in favor of
the accused. Otherwise, a mere rule of evidence will defeat the
constitutionally enshrined right to be presumed innocent. Trial courts are
instructed to apply this differentiation, and to always bear in mind the
following reminder issued in People v. Catalan:29
x x x We remind the lower courts that the presumption of regularity in the
performance of duty could not prevail over the stronger presumption of
innocence favoring the accused. Otherwise, the constitutional guarantee of
the accused being presumed innocent would be held sut ordinate to a mere
rule of evidence allocating the burden of evidence. Where, like here, the
proof adduced against the accused has not even overcome the presumption
of innocence, the presumption of regularity in the performance of duty could
not be a factor to adjudge the accused guilty of the crime charged.
Moreover, the regularity of the performance of their duty could not be
properly presumed in favor of the policemen because the records were
replete with indicia of their serious lapses. As a rule, a presumed fact like the
regularity of performance by a police officer must be inferred only from an
established basic fact, not plucked out from thin air. To say it differently, it is
the established basic fact that triggers the presumed fact of regular
performance. Where there is any hint of irregularity committed by the police
officers in arresting the accused and thereafter, several of which we have
earlier noted, there can be no presumption of regularity of performance in
their favor.
WHEREFORE, the Court REVERSES and SETS ASIDE the decision promulgated
on April 26, 2010 by the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No. 03901
entitled People of the Philippines v. Larry Mendoza y Estrada; ACQUITS LARRY
MENDOZA y ESTRADA on the ground of reasonable doubt; and ORDERS his

immediate release from detention at the National Penitentiary, unless there

are other lawful causes warranting his continued detention.
The Director of Bureau of Corrections is directed to forthwith implement this
decision and to report to this Court his action hereon within ten (10) days
from receipt.
No pronouncement on costs of suit.
SO ORDERED.
LUCAS P. BERSAMIN
Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:
MARIA LOURDES P. A. SERENO
Chief Justice
TERESITA J. LEONARDO-DE
CASTRO
Associate Justice

MARTIN S. VILLARAMA, JR.

Associate Justice

BIENVENIDO L. REYES
Associate Justice
CERTIFICATION
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, I certify that the
conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before
the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court's Division.
MARIA LOURDES P. A. SERENO
Chief Justice

Footnotes
1

Rollo, pp. 2-18; penned by Associate Justice Vicente S.E. Veloso, with
Associate Justice Francisco P. Acosta and Associate Justice Danton Q.
Bueser concurring.
2

CA Rollo, pp. 14-16.

Original Records, Criminal Case No. 07-496, p. 1.

Original Records, Criminal Case No. 07-497, p. 1.

Supra note 3, at 29.

Rollo, pp. 4-6.

Supra note 2

Id. at 16.

Rollo, pp. 8-9.

10

Supra note 1.

11

Rollo, pp.11-18.

12

Malillin v. People, G.R. No. 172953, April 30, 2008, 553 SCRA 619,
632.
13

G.R. No. 189330, November 28, 2012, 686 SCRA 631.

14

Id. at 642-643.

15

People v. Coreche, G.R. No. 182528, August 14, 2009, 596 SCRA 350,
357.
16

People v. Catalan, supra note 13, at 644.

17

TSN of April 23, 2008, pp. 8-15.

18

TSN of July 17, 2008, pp. 9-17.

19

TSN of July 17, 2008, pp. 19-20.

20

Supra note 17.

21

People v. Denoman, G.R. No. 171732, August 14, 2009, 596 SCRA
257, 270.
22

Original Records, Criminal Case No. 07-496, p. 6.

23

Id. at 9.

24

TSN of July 17, 2008, p. 4.

25

91 Fed. Rep. 864, 868.

26

G.R. No. 173474, August 29, 2012, 679 SCRA 318, 346-347. Citing
Patula v. People, G.R. No. 164457, April 11, 2012, 669 SCRA 135, 150151.
27

People v. De Guzman, G.R. No. 106025, February 9, 1994, 229 SCRA

795, 799.
28

Id.

29

Supra note 13, at 646-647.

The Lawphil Project - Arellano Law Foundation

Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. 160827

June 18, 2014

NETLINK COMPUTER INCORPORATED, Petitioner,

vs.
ERIC DELMO, Respondent.
DECISION
BERSAMIN, J.:
In the absence of a written agreement between the employer and the
employee that sales commissions shall be paid in a foreign currency, the
latter has the right to be paid in such foreign currency once the same has
become an established practice of the former. The rate of exchange at the
time of payment, not the rate of exchange at the time of the sales, controls.
Antecedents
On November 3, 1991, Netlink Computer, Inc. Products and Services (Netlink)
hired Eric S. Delmo (Delmo) as account manager tasked to canvass and
source clients and convince them to purchase the products and services of
Netlink. Delmo worked in the field most of the time. He and his fellow
account managers were not required to accomplish time cards to record their

personal presence in the office of Netlink.1 He was able to generate sales

worth P35,000,000.00, more or less, from which he earned commissions
amounting to P993,558.89 and US$7,588.30. He then requested payment of
his commissions, but Netlink refused and only gave him partial cash
advances chargeable to his commissions. Later on, Netlink began to nitpick
and fault find, like stressing his supposed absences and tardiness. In order to
force him to resign, Netlink issued several memoranda detailing his
supposed infractions of the companys attendance policy. Despite the
memoranda, Delmo continued to generate huge sales for Netlink. 2
On November 28, 1996, Delmo was shocked when he was refused entry into
the company premises by the security guard pursuant to a memorandum to
that effect. His personal belongings were still inside the company premises
and he sought their return to him. This incident prompted Delmo to file a
complaint for illegal dismissal.3
In its answer to Delmos complaint,Netlink countered that there were
guidelines regarding company working time and its utilization and how the
employees time would be recorded. Allegedly, all personnel were required to
use the bundy clock to punch in and out in the morning, and in and out in the
afternoon. Excepted from the rules were the company officers, and the
authorized personnel in the field project assignments. Netlink claimed that it
would be losing on the business transactions closed by Delmo due to the
high costs of equipment, and in fact his biggest client had not yet paid.
Netlink pointed out that Delmo had becomevery lax in his obligations, with
the other account managers eventually having outperformed him. Netlink
asserted that warning, reprimand, and suspension memoranda were given to
employees who violated company rules and regulations, but such actions
were considered as a necessary management tool to instill discipline.4
Ruling of the Labor Arbiter
On September 23, 1998, the Labor Arbiter ruled against Netlink and in favor
of Delmo, to wit:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered declaring complainant as illegally
and unjustly dismissed and respondents are ordered to reinstate complainant
to his former position without loss of seniority rights with full backwages and
other benefits and respondents are hereby ordered to pay complainant as
follows:
P161,000.00 - Backwages, basic pay and allowances from Nov. 1996 to
Sept. 1998
15,000.00 - 13th month pay for 1996 to 1998
993,558.89 - unpaid commissions

P1,169,558.89 - Total
plus - unpaid commissions
US$7,588.30
plus 10% attorneys fees
The reinstatement aspect is immediately executory even pending appeal. In
case reinstatement is no longer feasible, complainant shall be paid
separation pay of one-month pay for every year of service. All other claims
are hereby dismissed.
SO ORDERED.5
Decision of the NLRC
On appeal, the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) modified the
decision of the Labor Arbiter by setting aside the backwages and
reinstatement decreed by the Labor Arbiter due to the existence of valid and
just causes for the termination of Delmos employment, to wit: WHEREFORE,
premises considered, the decision of the Labor Arbiter a quo is hereby SET
ASIDEand a new one ENTERED, ordering the respondents-appellantsto pay
the following:
1. TWO THOUSAND PESOS (P2,000.00) as indemnity for failure to
observe procedural due process;
2. Unpaid commission in the amount of P993,558.89;
3. US$7,588.30 as unpaid commission;
4. P15,000.00 representing the 13th month pay for 1996, 1997, and
1998;
5. 10% attorneys fees of the total amount awarded.
SO ORDERED.6
The NLRC denied the motion for reconsideration, after which Netlink filed a
petition for certiorariin the CA.
Judgment of the CA
On May 9, 2003, the CA promulgated its assailed decision upholding the
NLRCs ruling subject to modifications,7viz:

In the present case, since the payment of the commission is made to depend
on the future and uncertain event which is the payment of the accounts by
the persons who have transacted business with the petitioner, without
payment by the former to the latter, the obligation to pay the commission
has not yet arisen.
The evidence on record shows that the ALCATEL, private respondents
biggest client has not paid fully the amount it owes to the petitioner as of
March 10, 1998. (Rollo, pp. 101, 397, 398) The obligation therefore, on the
part of the petitioner to pay the private respondent for his commission for
the said unpaid account has not yet arisen. Thus it is a grave abuse of
discretion on the part of the public respondent to make petitioner liable to
the private respondent for the payment of the said commission, when it is
clear on the record, as We have discussed above, that the obligation therefor
has not yet arisen.
Perusal of the records, likewise, show that petitioner failed to refute by
evidence that the private respondent is not entitled to the P993, 558.89
commission. Petitioner however claimed that since the amounts out of which
the commission will be taken has not yet been paid fully, petitioner must,
likewise, not be made liable for the said commission. However, public
respondent committed grave abuse of discretion when it disregard the
evidence on record which is not disputed by the private respondent that out
of the total commissions of the private respondent, petitioner has paid the
petitioner in the amount of P216,799.45 in the form of advance payment.
(Rollo, p. 12)
In view of the foregoing discussions, therefore, the advance payment made
by the petitioner in favorof the private respondent in the amount of P216,
799.45 must be deducted to the P993, 558.89 unpaid commission of the
private respondent. The difference amounting to P776, 779.44 must likewise
be deducted to the amount of P4, 066.19 which represents the amount which
the petitioner had admitted as the net commission payable to private
respondent. The difference thereof amounting to P772, 713.25 shall
represent the unpaid commission which shall be payable to the private
respondent by the petitioner upon payment of the accounts out of which
such commission shall be taken.
We, likewise, agree with the petitioner that the private respondent is not
entitled to 13th month pay in the years 1997 and 1998. The order of the
public respondent making the petitioner liable to the private respondent for
the 13th month pay of the latter in the years 1997 and 1998 is contrary to its
findings that there are valid and just cause for the termination of the private
respondent from employment, although private respondent was not given his
right to due process. (Rollo, pp. 32-33) The rule applicable in the present
case is the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Sebuguero vs

National Labor Relations Commission [248 SCRA 532, 547 (1995)] where it
was ruled that "where the dismissal of an employee is in fact for a just and
valid cause and is so proven to be but he is not accorded his right to due
process,i.e., he was not furnished the twin requirements of notice and the
opportunityto be heard, the dismissal shall be upheld but the employer must
be sanctioned for non-compliance with the requirements of or for failureto
observe due process." Hence, petitioner should not be made to pay the 13th
month pay to private respondent whose employment was terminated for
cause but without due process in 1996.
xxxx
Thus, private respondent is entitled only to a 13th month pay computed prorata from January 1996 to November 1996 which as properly computed by
the petitioner amounts to P4, 584.00. (Rollo, p. 11)
With respect to the other arguments of the petitioner, this Court is not
persuaded. Petitioner failed to refute by evidence that private respondent is
not entitled to the commissions payable in US dollars. Neither is there any
reason for us to agree with the petitioner that the computation of these
commissions must be based on the value of [the] Peso in relation to a Dollar
at the time of sale. As properly observed by the Labor Arbiter a quo, viz:
"Likewise the devaluation of the peso cannot be used as a shield against the
complainant because that should have been the lookout of the respondent
company in providing for such a clause that in case of devaluation, the price
agreed upon should be at the exchange rate when the contract of sale had
been consummated. For the lack of foresight and inefficiency of the
respondent company and as regards its contracts or agreements with its
clientele, the complainant should not be made to suffer." (Labor Arbiter
Ricardo Olairez Decision, September 23, 1998, pp. 11-12, Rollo,pp. 328-329)
In this regardtherefore, We uphold the well settled rule that "the findings of
facts of the NLRC, particularly where the NLRC and the Labor Arbiter are in
agreement, are deemed binding and conclusive upon the Court." (Permex,
Inc. vs National Labor Relations Commission, 323 SCRA 121, 126).
xxxx
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the assailed Resolutions are hereby
AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION, ordering the petitioner to pay the private
respondent the following:
1. TWO-THOUSAND PESOS (P2,000.00) as indemnity for failure to
observe procedural due process;
2. P4,066.19 representing the unpaid commissions that have accrued
in favor of the private respondent;

3. P776,779.44 payable to the private respondent upon payment of the

accounts out of which the said amount will be taken;
4. P4,584.00 representing the unpaid 13th month pay of the private
respondent;
5. US$7,588.30 as unpaid commission;
6. 10% attorneys fees of the total amount awarded excluding the
amount contained in the No.3 of this Order.
SO ORDERED.
Issues
Hence, this appeal.
Netlink submits that the CA committed a palpable and reversible error of law
in not holding that the applicable exchange rate for computing the US dollar
commissions of Delmo should be the rates prevailing at the time when the
sales were actually generated, not the rates prevailing at the time of the
payment; and in awarding attorneys fees.
In his comment,8 Delmo counters that because he had earned in US dollars it
was only fair that his commissions be paid in US dollars; that Netlink should
not be allowed to flip-flop after it had paid commissions in US dollar on the
sales generated by its sales agents on US-dollar denominated transactions;
and that attorneys fees were warranted because of the unanimous finding
that there was violation of procedural due process.
In its reply,9 Netlink maintains that the commissions of Delmo should be
based on sales generated, actually paid by and collected from the
customers; that commissions must be paid on the basis of the conversion of
the US dollar to the Philippine peso at the time of sale; and that no cogent
and justifiable reason existed for the award of attorneys fees.
To be considered for resolution are,therefore, the following, namely: (1)
whether or not the payment of the commissions should be in US dollars; and
(2) whether or not the award ofattorneys fees was warranted.
Ruling of the Court
The appeal lacks merit.
As a general rule, all obligations shall be paid in Philippine currency.
However, the contracting parties may stipulate that foreign currencies may

be used for settling obligations. This is pursuant to Republic Act No.

8183,10 which provides as follows:
Section 1. All monetary obligations shall be settled in the Philippine currency
which is legal tender in the Philippines. However, the parties may agree that
the obligation ortransaction shall be settled in any other currency at the time
of payment.
We remarked in C.F. Sharp & Co. v. Northwest Airlines, Inc.11 that the repeal
of Republic Act No. 529 had the effect of removing the prohibition on the
stipulation of currency other than Philippine currency, such that obligations
or transactions could already be paid in the currency agreed upon by the
parties. However, both Republic Act No. 529 and Republic Act No. 8183 did
not stipulate the applicable rate of exchange for the conversion of foreign
currency-incurred obligations to their peso equivalent. It follows, therefore,
that the jurisprudence established under Republic Act No. 529 with regard to
the rate of conversion remains applicable. In C.F. Sharp, the Court cited Asia
World Recruitment,Inc. v. NLRC,12 to the effect that the real value of the
foreign exchange-incurred obligation up to the date of itspayment should be
preserved.
There was no written contract between Netlink and Delmo stipulating that
the latters commissions would be paid in US dollars.1wphi1 The absence of
the contractual stipulation notwithstanding, Netlink was still liable to pay
Delmo in US dollars because the practice of paying its sales agents in US
dollars for their US dollar-denominatedsales had become a company policy.
This was impliedly admitted by Netlink when it did not refute the allegation
that the commissions earned by Delmo and its other sales agents had been
paid in US dollars. Instead of denying the allegation, Netlink only sought a
declaration that the US dollar commissions be paid using the exchange rate
at the time of sale. The principle of non-diminution of benefits, which has
been incorporated in Article 10013 of the Labor Code, forbade Netlink from
unilaterally reducing, diminishing, discontinuing or eliminating the practice.
Verily, the phrase "supplements, or other employee benefits" in Article 100 is
construed to mean the compensation and privileges received by an
employee aside from regular salaries or wages.
With regard to the length of timethe company practice should have been
observed to constitute a voluntary employer practice that cannot be
unilaterally reduced, diminished, discontinued or eliminated by the
employer, we find that jurisprudence has not laid down any rule requiring a
specific mmimum number of years. In Davao Fruits Corporation v. Associated
Labor Unions,14 the company practice lasted for six years. In Davao
Integrated Port Stevedoring Services v. Abarquez,15 the employer, for three
years and nine months, approved the commutation to cash of the unenjoyed
portion of the sick leave with pay benefits of its intermittent workers. In

Tiangco v. Leogardo, Jr.,16 the employer carried on the practice of giving a

fixed monthly emergency allowance from November 1976 to February 1980,
or three years and four months. In Sevilla Trading Company v. Semana, 17 the
employer kept the practice of including non-basic benefits such as paid
leaves for unused sick leave and vacation in the computation of their 13thmonth pay for at least two years.
With the payment of US dollar commissions having ripened into a company
practice, there is no way that the commissions due to Delmo were to be paid
in US dollars or their equivalent in Philippine currency determined at the time
of the sales. To rule otherwise would be to cause an unjust diminution of the
commissions due and owing to Delmo.
Finally, we affirm the following justification of the CA in granting attorney's
fees to Delmo, viz: The award of attorney's fees must, likewise, be upheld in
line of (sic) the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Consolidated
Rural Bank (Cagayan Valley), Inc. vs. National Labor Relations Commission,
301 SCRA 223, 235, where it was held that "in actions for recovery of wages
or where an employee was forced to litigate and thus incur expenses to
protect her rights and interests, even if not so claimed, an award of
attorney's fees equivalent to ten percent (10%) of the total award is legally
and morally justifiable. There is no doubt that in the present case, the private
respondent has incurred expenses for the protection and enforcement of his
right to his commissions.18
WHEREFORE, the Court DENIES the petition for review on certiorari; AFFIRMS
the decision promulgated on May 9, 2003; and ORDERS the petitioner to pay
the costs of suit.
SO ORDERED
LUCAS P. BERSAMIN
Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:
MARIA LOURDES P. A. SERENO
Chief Justice
TERESITA J. LEONARDO-DE
CASTRO
Associate Justice

MARTIN S. VILLARAMA, JR.

Associate Justice

BIENVENIDO L. REYES
Associate Justice

CERTIFICATION
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, I certify that the
conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before
the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court's Division.
MARIA LOURDES P. A. SERENO
Chief Justice

Footnotes
1

Rollo, p. 49.

Id.

Id. at 49-50.

Id. at 50.

Id. at 354.

Id. at 66.

Id. at 48-58; penned by Associate Justice Bennie A Adefuin-De law

Cruz (retired), with the concurrence of Associate Justice Jose L. Sabio,
Jr. (retired/deceased) and Associate Justice Hakim S. Abdulwahid.
8

Id. at 490-492.

Id. at 495-499.

10

An Act Repealing Republic Act Numbered Five Hundred Twenty-Nine,

As Amended, Entitled "An Act To Assure the Uniform Value of Philippine
Coin and Currency."
11

G.R. No. 133498, April 18, 2002, 381 SCRA 314, 319-320.

12

G.R. No. 113363, August 24, 1999, 313 SCRA 1, 17.

13

Article 100. Prohibition against elimination or diminution of benefits.Nothing in this Book shall be construed to eliminate or in any way
diminish supplements, or other employee benefits being enjoyed at the
time of promulgation of this Code.

14

G.R. No. 85073, August 24, 1993, 225 SCRA 562, 567.

15

G.R. No. 102132, March 19, 1993, 220 SCRA 197, 205.

16

No. L-57636, May 16, 1983, 122 SCRA 267, 275-277.

17

G.R. No. 152456, April 28, 2004, 428 SCRA 239, 249.

18

Rollo, p. 57.

The Lawphil Project - Arellano Law Foundation

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. 162021

June 16, 2014

MEGA MAGAZINE PUBLICATIONS, INC., JERRY TIU, AND SARITA V.

YAP, Petitioners,
vs.
MARGARET A. DEFENSOR, Respondent.
DECISION
BERSAMIN, J.:
In labor cases, the rules on the degree of proof are enforced not as
stringently as in other cases in order to better serve the higher ends of
justice. This lenity is intended to afford to the employee every opportunity to
level the playing field.
The Case
Being now assailed is the amended decision promulgated on November 19,
2003,1 whereby the Court of Appeals (CA) reconsidered its original
disposition, and granted the petition for certiorari filed by respondent
Margaret A. Defensor (respondent) by annulling and setting aside the
adverse resolutions dated July 31, 2002 and March 31, 2003 issued by the
National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC).

Antecedents
Petitioner Mega Magazine Publications, Inc. (MMPI) first employed the
respondent as an Associate Publisher in 1996, and later promoted her as a
Group Publisher with a monthly salary of P60,000.00.2
In a memorandum dated February 25, 1999, the respondent proposed to
MMPIs Executive Vice-President Sarita V. Yap (Yap) year-end commissions for
herself and a special incentive plan for the Sales Department.3
The proposed schedule of the respondents commissions would be as follows:
1. MMPI Total revenue at P28-P29 M 0.05% outright commission
2. MMPI Total revenue at P30-P34 M 0.075% outright commission
3. MMPI Total revenue at P35-P38 M 0.1% outright commission
4. MMPI Total revenue at P39-P41 M 0.1% outright commission
5. MMPI Total revenue at P41M up 0.1% outright commission
while the proposed schedule of the special incentive plan would be the
following:
1. MMPI Total revenue at P28-P29 M P5,000 each by year-end
2. MMPI Total revenue at P30-P34 M P7,000 each by year-end
3. MMPI Total revenue at P35-P38 M P8,500 each by year-end
4. MMPI Total revenue at P39-P41 M P10,000 each by year-end
5. MMPI Total revenue at P41M up P10,000 each by year-end Plus
incentive trip abroad
Yap made marginal notes of her counter-proposals on her copy of the
respondents memorandum dated February 25, 1999 itself,4 crossing out
proposed items 1 and 2 from the schedule of the respondents commissions,
and proposing instead that outright commissions be at 0.1% of P35-P38
million in accordance with proposed item 3; and crossing out proposed items
1 and 2 from the schedule of the special incentive plan, and writing "start
here" and "stet" in reference to item 3. Yap also wrote on the memorandum:
"Marge, if everything is ok w/ you, draft something for me to sign "; "You
can also announce that at 5 M net for MMPI [acc to my computation,

achievable if they only meet their month min. quota] we can declare 14th
month pay for entire company."5
The respondent sent another memorandum on April 5, 1999 setting out the
1999 advertisement sales, target and commissions, and proposing that the
schedule of her outright commissions should start at .05% of P34.5 million
total revenue, or P175,000.00;6 and further proposing that the special
incentives be given when total revenues reached P35-P38 million.
On August 31, 1999, the respondent sent Yap a report on sales and sales
targets.7
On October 1999, the respondent tendered her letter of resignation effective
at the end of December 1999.1wphi1 Yap accepted the resignation.8 Before
leaving MMPI, the respondent sent Yap another report on the sales and
advertising targets for 1999.9 On December 8, 1999, Yap responded with a
"formalization" of her approval of the 1999 special incentive scheme
proposed by the respondent through her memorandum dated February 25,
1999,10revising anew the schedule by starting commissions at.05% of P35P38 million gross advertising revenue (including barter), and the proposed
special incentives at P35-P38 million with P8,500.00 bonus.11
The respondent replied to Yap, pointing out that her memorandum dated
April 5, 1999 had been the result of Yaps own comments on the special
incentive scheme she had proposed, and that she had assumed that Yap had
been amenable to the proposal when she did not receive any further reaction
from the latter.12
On May 2000, after the respondent had left the company, she filed a
complaint for payment of bonus and incentive compensation with
damages,13 specifically demanding the payment ofP271,264.68 as sales
commissions, P60,000.00 as 14th month pay, and P8,500.00 as her share in
the incentive scheme for the advertising and sales staff.14
Ruling of the Labor Arbiter
In a decision dated February 5, 2001,15 the Labor Arbiter (LA) dismissed the
respondents complaint, ruling that the respondent had not presented any
evidence showing that MMPI had agreed or committed to the terms proposed
in her memorandum of April 5, 1999; that even assuming that the petitioners
had agreed to her terms, the table she had submitted justifying a gross
revenue of P36,216,624.07 was not an official account by MMPI;16 and that
the petitioners had presented a 1999 statement of income and deficit
prepared by the auditing firm of Punongbayan & Araullo showing MMPIs
gross revenue for 1999 being only P31,947,677.00.17

Decision of the NLRC

The respondent appealed, but the NLRC denied the appeal for its lack of
merit,18 with the NLRC concurring with the LAs ruling that there had been no
agreement between the petitioners and the respondent on the terms and
conditions of the incentives reached.
The respondent filed a motion for reconsideration and a supplement to the
motion for reconsideration.1wphi1 In the supplement, she included a
motion to admit additional evidence (i.e., the affidavit of Lie Tabingo who had
worked as a traffic clerk in the Advertising Department of MMPI and had been
in charge of keeping track of the advertisements placed with MMPI) on the
ground that such evidence had been "unavailable during the hearing as
newly discovered evidence in a motion for new trial".19
The NLRC denied the respondents motions for reconsideration.20
Judgment of the CA
The respondent brought a special civil action for certiorari in the CA.
In its decision promulgated on August 28, 2003,21 the CA dismissed the
respondents petition for certiorari and upheld the resolutions of the NLRC.
On motion for reconsideration by the respondent, however, the CA
promulgated on November 19, 2003 its assailed amended decision granting
the motion for reconsideration and giving due course to the respondents
petition for certiorari; annulling the challenged resolutions of the NLRC; and
remanding the case to the NLRC for the reception of additional evidence. The
CA opined that the NLRC had committed a grave abuse of discretion in
finding that there had been no special incentive scheme approved and
implemented for 1999,22 and in disallowing the respondent from presenting
additional evidence that was crucial in establishing her claim about MMPIs
gross revenue.23 The amended decision disposed as follows:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the motion for reconsideration is hereby
GRANTED. Our Decision of August 28, 2003 is hereby RECONSIDERED AND
SET ASIDE. A new judgment is hereby entered GIVING DUE COURSE to the
petition and GRANTING the writ prayed for. Accordingly, the challenged
Resolutions of the NLRC in NLRC NCR 00-03-61361-00 (CA No. 028358-01)
dated July 31, 2002 and March 31, 2003 are hereby ANNULLED and SET
ASIDE. The case is hereby remanded to the NLRC for reception of additional
evidence on appeal as prayed for by petitioner and for proper proceedings in
accordance with Our disquisitions herein.

The denial of the claim for 14th month pay is sustained for lack of
evidentiary basis.
No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.24
The petitioners and the respondent sought reconsideration of the CAs
amended decision, but the CA denied their motions through the resolution
promulgated on February 4, 2004.25
Issues
Hence, this appeal by petition for review on certiorari, with the petitioners
urging that the CA erred in ruling that
I. RESPONDENT CAN INTRODUCE EVIDENCE THAT IS NOT NEWLYDISCOVERED FOR THE FIRST TIME ON APPEAL.
II. A [REMAND] OF THE CASETO THE NLRC FOR FURTHER RECEPTION
OF EVIDENCE IS JUSTIFIED BY REASON OF DEARTH OF EVIDENCE TO
PROVE THAT TARGET GROSS SALES OR REVENUES WEREACTUALLY
MET AS TO ENTITLE RESPONDENT TO THE INCENTIVE BONUS FOR THE
SUBJECT PERIOD/YEAR.26
The petitioners argue that the circumstances of the case did not warrant the
relaxation of the rules of procedure in order to allow the submission of the
memorandum and the affidavit of Tabingo to the LA and the NLRC. They
contend that the respondent had sought to introduce in the proceedings
before the LA Tabingos memorandum dated December 10, 1999 addressed
to the Accounting Department stating that the "gross revenue from all
publications was P36,022,624.07, while net revenue
was P32,551,890.58";27 that Tabingos affidavit was meant to validate her
memorandum; that such pieces of evidence sought to prove that MMPIs
target gross sales had been met, and would then entitle the respondent to
her claims of commissions and special incentives; that the LA actually
considered but did not give any weight or value to Tabingos memorandum in
resolving the respondents claims; that any affidavit from Tabingo that the
respondent intended to introduce would be merely corroborative of the
evidence already presented, like the table purportedly showing MMPIs gross
revenue for 1999; and that such evidence was already considered by the
NLRC in resolving the appeal.28
The important issue is whether or not the respondent was entitled to the
commissions and the incentive bonus being claimed.

Ruling
The appeal is partly meritorious.
The grant of a bonus or special incentive, being a management prerogative,
is not a demandable and enforceable obligation, except when the bonus or
special incentive is made part of the wage, salary or compensation of the
employee,29 or is promised by the employer and expressly agreed upon by
the parties.30 By its very definition, bonus is a gratuity or act of liberality of
the giver,31 and cannot be considered part of an employees wages if it is
paid only when profits are realized or a certain amount of productivity is
achieved. If the desired goal of production or actual work is not
accomplished, the bonus does not accrue.
Due to the nature of the bonus or special incentive being a gratuity or act of
liberality on the part of the giver, the respondent could not validly insist on
the schedule proposed in her memorandum of April 5, 1999 considering that
the grant of the bonus or special incentive remained a management
prerogative. However, the Court agrees with the CAs ruling that the
petitioners had already exercised the management prerogative to grant the
bonus or special incentive. At no instance did Yap flatly refuse or reject the
respondents request for commissions and the bonus or incentive. This is
plain from the fact that Yap even "bargained" with the respondent on the
schedule of the rates and the revenues on which the bonus or incentive
would be pegged. What remained contested was only the schedule of the
rates and the revenues. In her initial memorandum of February 25, 1999, the
respondent had suggested the following schedule, namely: (a) 0.05%
outright commission on total revenue of P28-P29 million; (b) 0.075% on P30P34 million; (c) 0.1% on P35-P38 million; (d) 0.1% on P39-P41 million pesos;
and (f) 0.1% on P41 million or higher, but Yap had countered by revising the
schedule to start at 0.1% as outright commissions on a total revenue of P35P38 million, and the special incentive bonus to start at revenues of P35-P38
million. Moreover, on December 8, 1999, Yap sent to the respondent a
memorandum entitled Re: Formalization of my handwritten approval of 1999
Incentive scheme dated 25 February 1999. Such actuations and actions by
Yap indicated that, firstly, the petitioners had already acceded to the grant of
the special incentive bonus; and, secondly, the only issue still to be threshed
out was at which point and at what rate the respondents outright
commissions and the special incentive bonus for the sales staff should be
given.
For sure, Yaps memorandum dated December 8, 1999, aside from being the
petitioners categorical admission of the grant of the commissions and the
bonus or incentives, laid down the petitioners own schedule of the
commissions and the bonus or incentives,32 to wit:

Re: Formalization of my handwritten approval of 1999 incentive scheme

dated 25 February 1999
1999 Incentive Scheme for Group Publisher

MMPI Gross Advertising Revenue

(includes barter)

P35-38 M
P39-41 M
P41 M

.05%
.075%
up 1%

Commissionable ad revenue is net of advertising agency commission and

absorbed production costs.1avvphi1 Commission will be paid in bartered
goods and cash in direct proportion to percentage of cash and bartered
goods revenue for the year. This amount will be paid by January 30, 2000 if
the documents (contracts, P.O.s) to support the gross revenue claim are in
order and submitted to Finance.
Group Incentive for Sale and Traffic Team

MMPI Gross Advertising Revenue

P35-38 M
P39-41 M
P41 M up

P8,500.00 each
P10,000.00 each
P10,000.00 each
+ incentive trip abroad

Concerning the remand of the case to the NLRC for reception of additional
evidence at the instance of the respondent, we hold that the CA committed a
reversible error. Although, as a rule, the submission to the NLRC of additional
evidence like documents and affidavits is not prohibited, so that the NLRC
may properly consider such evidence for the first time on appeal,33 the
circumstances of the case did not justify the application of the rule herein.
The additional evidence the respondent has sought to be admitted (i.e.,
Tabingos affidavit executed on October 14, 2002) was already attached to
the pleadings filed in the NLRC, and was part of the records thereat. Its
introduction was apparently aimed to rebut the petitioners claim that its
gross revenue was only P31,947,677.00 and did not reach the minimum P35
million necessary for the grant of the respondents outright commissions and
the special incentive bonus for the sales staff (inclusive of the respondent).
Tabingos affidavit corroborated her memorandum to the Accounting
Department dated December 10, 1999 stating that MMPIs revenue for 1999
was P36,216,624.07.341wphi1
Confronted with the conflicting claims on MMPIs gross revenue realized in
1999, the question is which evidence must be given more weight?

The resolution of the question requires the re-examination and calibration of

evidence.35 Such re-examination and calibration, being of a factual nature,
ordinarily lies beyond the purview of the Courts authority in this appeal. Yet,
because the documents are already before the Court, we hereby treat the
situation as an exception in order to resolve the question promptly and
finally instead of still remanding the case to the CA for the reevaluation and
calibration.
We start by observing that the degree of proof required in labor cases is not
as stringent as in other types of cases.36 This liberal approach affords to the
employee every opportunity to level the playing field in which her employer
is pitted against her. Here, on the one hand, were Tabingos memorandum
and affidavit indicating that MMPIs revenues in 1999
totaled P36,216,624.07, and, on the other, the audit report showing MMPIs
gross revenues amounting to only P31,947,677.00 in the same year. That the
audit report was rendered by the auditing firm of Punongbayan & Araullo did
not make it weightier than Tabingos memorandum and affidavit, for only
substantial evidence that amount of relevant evidence which a reasonable
mind might accept as adequate to justify a conclusion37 was required in
labor adjudication. Moreover, whenever the evidence presented by the
employer and that by the employee are in equipoise, the scales of justice
must tilt in favor of the latter.38For purposes of determining whether or not
the petitioners gross revenue reached the minimum target of P35 million,
therefore, Tabingos memorandum and affidavit sufficed to positively
establish that it did, particularly considering that Tabingos memorandum
was made in the course of the performance of her official tasks as a traffic
clerk of MMPI. In her affidavit, too, Tabingo asserted that her issuance of the
memorandum was pursuant to MMPIs year-end procedures, an assertion
that the petitioners did not refute. In any event, Tabingos categorical
declaration in her affidavit that "[because] of that achievement, as part of
the Sales and Traffic Team of MMPI, in addition to my other bonuses that
year, I received P8,500.00 in gift certificates as my share in the Group
Incentive for the Sales and Traffic Team for gross advertising revenue of P35
to P38 million xxx,"39 aside from the petitioners not refuting it, was
corroborated by the 1999 Advertising Target sent by the respondent to Yap
on December 2, 1999, in which the respondent reported a gross revenue
of P36,216,624.07 as of December 1, 1999.40
Accordingly, the Court concludes that the respondent was entitled to her
0.05% outright commissions and to the special incentive bonus of P8,500.00
based on MMPI having reached the minimum target of P35 million in gross
revenues paid in "bartered goods and cash in direct proportion to percentage
of cash and bartered goods revenue for the year," as provided in Yaps
memorandum of December 8, 1999.41

WHEREFORE, the Court REVERSES AND SETS ASIDE the amended decision
promulgated on November 19, 2003; ENTERS a new decision granting
respondent Margaret A. Defensors claim for outright commissions in the
amount of P 181,083 .12 and special incentive bonus of P8,500.00, or a total
of 1!189,583.12; and DIRECTS petitioner Mega Magazine Publications, Inc. to
pay the costs of suit.
SO ORDERED.
LUCAS P. BERSAMIN
Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:
MARIA LOURDES P. A. SERENO
Chief Justice
TERESITA J. LEONARDO-DE
CASTRO
Associate Justice

JOSE PORTUGAL PEREZ*

Associate Justice

BIENVENIDO L. REYES
Associate Justice
CERTIFICATION
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, I certify that the
conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before
the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court's Division.
MARIA LOURDES P. A. SERENO
Chief Justice

Footnotes
* Vice Associate Justice Martin S. Villarama, Jr., who penned the
decision under review, per the raffle of September 26, 2011.
1

Rollo, pp. 58-74; penned by Associate Justice Martin S. Villarama, Jr.

(now a Member of this Court), with the concurrence of Presiding Justice
Cancio C. Garcia (retired Member of this Court) and Associate Justice
Mario L. Guaria, lll (retired).

Id. at 59.

Id. at 121-122.

Id.

Id.

Id. at 124-125.

Id. at 126-127.

Id. at 132.

Id. at 129.

10

Id. at 108.

11

Id.

12

Id. at 109,131.

13

Id. at 110-116.

14

Id. at 115.

15

Id. at 211-225.

16

Id. at 130.

17

Id. at 275.

18

Id. at 287-305.

19

Id. at 341-342.

20

Id. at 367-376.

21

Id. at 479-487.

22

Id. at 71.

23

Id. at 73.

24

Id. at 74.

25

Id. at 54-56.

26

Id. at 25.

27

Id. at 65.

28

Id. at 31.

29

See Protacio v. Laya Mananghaya & Co., G.R. No. 168654, March 25,
2009, 582 SCRA 417, 429.
30

Lepanto Ceramics, Inc. v. Lepanto Ceramics Employees Association,

G.R. No. 180866, March 2, 2010, 614 SCRA 63, 71.
31

Id.

32

Rollo,p. 108; emphasis supplied.

33

Sasan, Sr. v. National Labor Relations Commission, 4th Division, G.R.

No. 176240, October 17, 2008, 569 SCRA 670, 686-687.
34

Rollo, pp. 343-347.

35

Reyes v. National Labor Relations Commission, G.R. No. 160233,

August 8, 2007, 529 SCRA 487, 494.
36

House of Sara Lee v. Rey, G.R. No. 149013, August 31, 2006, 500
SCRA 419, 435.
37

Javier v. Fly Ace Corporation, G.R. No. 192558, February 15, 2012,
666 SCRA 382, 395.
38

Uy v. Centro Ceramica Corporation, G.R. No. 174631, October 19,

2011, 659 SCRA 604, 618;Mobile Protective & Detective Agency v.
Ompad, G.R. No. 159195, May 9, 2005, 458 SCRA 308, 323.
39

Rollo, p. 341.

40

Id. at 129.

41

Id. at 108.

The Lawphil Project - Arellano Law Foundation

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
FIRST DIVISION
A.M. No. RTJ-13-2356
June 9, 2014
[Formerly OCA No. IPI-11-3701-RTJ]
ARGEL D. HERNANDEZ, Complainant,
vs.
JUDGE VICTOR C. GELLA, PRESIDING JUDGE, CLARINCE B. JINTALAN,
LEGAL RESEARCHER, and ROWENA B. JINTALAN, SHERIFF IV, ALL
FROM THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, BRANCH 52, SORSOGON
CITY, Respondents.
DECISION
BERSAMIN, J.:
We reiterate that an administrative complaint against a judge is not a
substitute for a proper remedy taken in due course to review and undo his
acts or omissions done in the performance of his judicial duties and
functions. For any litigant to insist otherwise is censurable because the,
complaint adversely affects the administration of justice and harms the
reputation of a judicial officer.
Antecedents
In his verified complaint dated July 8, 2011,1 complainant Argel D. Hernandez
charged Judge Victor C. Gella, as the Presiding Judge of Branch 52 of the
Regional Trial Court in Sorsogon City (RTC), with gross ignorance of the law;
and Sheriff IV Rowena B. Jintalan, also of Branch 52, and Legal Researcher
Clarince B. Jintalan with abuse of authority in connection with the
implementation of the writ of execution issued in Case No. 2005-7473, a
proceeding for consolidation of ownership entitled Maria Purisima Borlasa v.
Spouses Jesus Hernandez and Margarita De Vera.
It appears that the property involved in Case No. 2005-7473 was sold at a
public auction in which Maria Purisima Borlasa was declared the winning
bidder; that a final bill of sale was issued to Borlasa on May 30, 2007; that in
2009, Borlasas motion for the issuance of the writ of execution was granted;
that in 2010, Sheriff Jintalan started implementing the writ but was
unsuccessful in doing so because Hernandez consistently found ways to

resist her implementation, including the filing of a petition for certiorari in the
Court of Appeals.
Ultimately, on May 31, 2011, Sheriff Jintalan successfully implemented the
writ of execution and entered the house of Hernandez.
According to Hernandez, the implementation of the writ of execution was
tainted with abuse. He claimed that Sheriff Jintalan and Legal Researcher
Jintalan, together with policemen and goons carrying bolos and mallets, had
arrived at his house; that she ordered the goons to destroy his house despite
being made aware of the pendency of the petition for certiorari in the CA;
that the goons entered his house, and took his familys belongings and
valuables outside the house and loaded them in a truck; that his familys
belongings and valuables were brought to a warehouse of Vicente Bonaobra,
who was the brother and attorney-in- fact of the plaintiff; that his children,
who witnessed the proceedings, were traumatized; and that he had a verbal
argument with Legal Researcher Jintalan, who had owed him some money.2
Hernandez added that such acts of Sheriff Jintalan and Legal Researcher
Jintalan of destroying his house and taking his familys belongings and
valuables were in excess of their authority; and that such excess of authority
would not have happened had Judge Gella not authorized the execution of
the writ of execution notwithstanding the pendency of the petition for
certiorari in the CA.3
The respondents denied the charges.
Judge Gella narrated the background of Case No. 2005-7473 and set forth
the events leading to the filing of the petition for certiorari by Hernandez in
the CA and the enforcement of the writ of execution on May 31, 2011. He
insisted that the RTC had afforded due process to Hernandez; that prior to
the implementation of the writ of execution Sheriff Jintalan had already
accommodated Hernandez by granting him concessions; and that Hernandez
was only a disgruntled litigant who refused to accept and to bow to the
lawful orders and processes of the RTC.4
Legal Researcher Jintalan explained that he had been tasked to assist in the
implementation of the writ by Sheriff Jintalan, who was his wife; that police
assistance became necessary because Hernandez and his uncle had been
resisting the writ of execution, which was a lawful court order, by threatening
Sheriff Jintalan with administrative and criminal cases, and even physical
harm; that although admitting having instructed the hired men to destroy
the chain of the fence and the door lock of the main door of Hernandezs
house, he had done so only to gain entry into and to exit from the property;
that Hernandez and the other occupants of the house had earlier padlocked
the gate and parked a ten-wheeler truck behind the fence to block the entry

of the sheriff; that Hernandez had also used his children as a shield by
having them barricade the door to prevent entry of the sheriffs team; that
Hernandez had taunted the implementing officers into firing at his children;
that no jewelry and money were taken because the members of the sheriffs
team did not go inside Hernandezs bedroom; and that he did not owe any
money to Hernandez.5
On her part, Sheriff Jintalan asserted that she had only performed her
ministerial duty to implement the writ of execution; that cutting the chain of
the fence and breaking the door knob had been necessary to gain entry into
the house; that her team could pull out only a few pieces of furniture and
several sacks of palay because Hernandez had used his children to barricade
the entrance and had dared them to shoot at him and the children; that at
one point Hernandez had poked a gun at her; that they had loaded the
inventoried items in the truck owned by Vicente Bonaobra to be brought to
the latters warehouse only for safekeeping; and that only the assisting
policemen had carried guns during the execution proceedings.6
In its Report dated March 28, 2012,7 the Office of the Court Administrator
(OCA) recommended that:
1. The administrative complaint against Judge Victor C. Gella, Presiding
Judge, Regional Trial Court, Branch 52, Sorsogon City be DISMISSED for
being premature and judicial in nature;
2. The administrative complaint against Rowena B. Jintalan, Sheriff IV,
Regional Trial Court, Branch 52, Sorsogon City be RE-DOCKETED as a
regular administrative matter;
3. Respondent Rowena B. Jintalan be found Guilty of Simple Neglect of
Duty and be SUSPENDED from office for one (1) month and one (1) day
without pay; and
4. The administrative complaint against Clarince B. Jintalan, Legal
Researcher, Regional Trial Court Branch 52, Sorsogon City be
DISMISSED for being unsubstantiated.8
Ruling
We ACCEPT the findings of the OCA because they were supported by the
records, and, accordingly, ADOPT its aforequoted recommendations.
Re: Judge Gella Hernandezs complaint against Judge Gella, being rooted in
the denial of Hernandezs motion for reconsideration (vis--vis the denial of
Hernandezs motion to quash the writ of execution), unquestionably related
to Judge Gellas performance of his judicial office, and is for that reason

outrightly dismissible. We reiterate that an administrative remedy is neither

alternative nor cumulative to any proper judicial review. A litigant like
Hernandez who is aggrieved by an order or judgment of the judge must
pursue his proper available judicial remedies because only a higher court
exercising appellate authority can review and correct any error of judgment
committed in the discharge of the judicial office. As to an order or judgment
tainted by grave abuse of discretion or a jurisdictional defect, only a higher
court invested with supervisory authority can revise the order or judgment. It
is always worth stressing that an administrative remedy cannot be a proper
means to undo or rectify the order or judgment.
The filing of administrative complaints or just the threats of the filing of such
complaints do subvert and undermine the independence of the Judiciary and
its Judges. Thus, the Court does not tolerate unwarranted administrative
charges brought against sitting magistrates in respect of their judicial
actions. Moreover, as the Court pointedly observed in Re: Verified Complaint
of Engr. Oscar L. Ongjoco, Chairman of the Board/CEO of FHGYMN MultiPurpose and Transport Service Cooperative, against Hon. Juan Q. Enriquez,
Jr., Hon. Ramon M. Bato, Jr. and Hon. Florito S. Macalino, Associate Justices,
Court of Appeals,9 to wit:
It is evident to us that Ongjocos objective in filing the administrative
complaint was to take respondent Justices to task for the regular
performance of their sworn duty of upholding the rule of law. He would
thereby lay the groundwork for getting back at them for not favoring his
unworthy cause. Such actuations cannot be tolerated at all, for even a mere
threat of administrative investigation and prosecution made against a judge
to influence or intimidate him in his regular performance of the judicial office
always subverts and undermines the independence of the Judiciary.1wphi1
We seize this occasion, therefore, to stress once again that disciplinary
proceedings and criminal actions brought against any judge in relation to the
performance of his official functions are neither complementary to nor
suppletory of appropriate judicial remedies, nor a substitute for such
remedies. Any party who may feel aggrieved should resort to these
remedies, and exhaust them, instead of resorting to disciplinary proceedings
and criminal actions.10 (Bold emphasis supplied)
The nature of adjudication by a judicial magistrate as a function of
sovereignty invests the magistrate with a great degree of immunity from
administrative and other liabilities. This the Court explained in Re: Verified
Complaint For Disbarment of AMA LAND, INC. (Represented By Joseph B.
Usita) Against Court of Appeals Associate Justices Hon. Danton Q. Bueser,
Hon. Sesinando E. Villon and Hon. Ricardo G. Rosario:11

Indeed, no judicial officer should have to fear or apprehend being held to

account or to answer for performing his judicial functions and office because
such performance is a matter of public duty and responsibility. The office and
duty to render and administer justice are function of sovereignty, and should
not be simply taken for granted. As a recognized commentator on public
offices and public officers has written:
It is a general principle, abundantly sustained by authority and reason, that
no civil action can be sustained against a judicial officer for the recovery of
damages by one claiming to have been injured by the officers judicial action
within his jurisdiction. From the very nature of the case, the officer is called
upon by law to exercise his judgment in the matter, and the law holds his
duty to the individual to be performed when he has exercised it, however
erroneous or disastrous in its consequences it may appear either to the party
or to others.
A number of reasons, any one of them sufficient, have been advanced in
support of this rule. Thus it is said of the judge: "His doing justice as between
particular individuals, when they have a controversy before him, is not the
end and object which were in view when his court was created, and he was
selected to preside over or sit in it. Courts are created on public grounds;
they are to do justice as between suitors, to the end that peace and order
may prevail in the political society, and that rights may be protected and
preserved. The duty is public, and the end to be accomplished is public; the
individual advantage or loss results from the proper and thorough or
improper and imperfect performance of a duty for which his controversy is
only the occasion. The judge performs his duty to the public by doing justice
between individuals, or, if he fails to do justice as between individuals, he
may be called to account by the State in such form and before such tribunal
as the law may have provided. But as the duty neglected is not a duty to the
individual, civil redress, as for an individual injury, is not admissible." (Bold
underscoring is part of the original text)
Re: Legal Researcher Jintalan
The complaint against Legal Researcher Jintalan was similarly bereft of
factual and legal merit. There is no question that Legal Researcher Jintalans
participation in the implementation of the writ of execution was upon the
prior authorization of Judge Gella in order to assist Sheriff Jintalan in her
proceedings to implement the writ of execution. To hold Legal Researcher
Jintalan administratively liable is to unreasonably disregard his having acted
in the execution proceedings upon official authority of the court itself, and
would be a travesty of justice.
Re: Sheriff Jintalan

The OCAs recommendation to hold Sheriff Jintalan administratively liable for

simple neglect of duty is well-taken.
With the implementation of the writ of execution being her purely ministerial
duty, Sheriff Jintalan must perform her duty strictly to the letter. She thus
knew that the levied personal properties of Hernandez must be kept safely in
and under her direct custody, not in and under the custody of any of the
parties.12 Her bringing of such personal properties to the warehouse of
Vicente Bonaobra despite being aware that the latter was the plaintiffs
brother and her attorney-in- fact for purposes of the case signified that she
let herself serve as the "special deputy" of the winning litigant.13 Therein lay
the irregularity. Verily, she did not live up to the standards prescribed by her
office. Her conduct as a court personnel must be beyond reproach and free
from any suspicion that could taint the Judiciary. She should avoid any
impression of impropriety, misdeed or negligence in the performance of
official duties.14
Sheriff Jintalan was thereby guilty of simple neglect of duty the failure to
give proper attention to a task expected of an employee, thus signifying a
disregard of a duty resulting from carelessness or indifference. Simple
neglect of duty is punishable by suspension of one month and one day to six
months.15 Under the established circumstances, the penalty for Sheriff
Jintalan is suspension without pay for one month and one day.
WHEREFORE, the Court DISMISSES the administrative complaints against
Judge Victor C. Gella and Legal Researcher Clarince B. Jintalan of the
Regional Trial Court, Branch 52, in Sorsogon City; and PRONOUNCES Sheriff
Rowena B. Jintalan GUILTY of SIMPLE NEGLECT OF DUTY and, accordingly,
SUSPENDS her from office for one month and one day without pay, with a
stern warning that a repetition of the same or similar act shall be dealt with
more severely.
SO ORDERED.
LUCAS P. BERSAMIN
Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:
MARIA LOURDES P. A. SERENO
Chief Justice
TERESITA J. LEONARDO-DE
CASTRO
Associate Justice

MARTIN S. VILLARAMA, JR.

Associate Justice

BIENVENIDO L. REYES
Associate Justice

Footnotes
1

Rollo, pp. 1-5.

Id. at 2-4.

Id. at 4.

Id. at 166-175.

Id. at 115-118.

Id. at 140-146.

Id. at 239.

Id.

A.M. OCA IPI No. 11-184-CA-J, January 31, 2012, 664 SCRA 465.

10

Id. at 474-475.

11

OCA IPI No. 12-204-CA-J, March 11, 2014.

12

Villanueva-Fabella v. Lee, A.M. No. MTJ-04-1518. January 15, 2004,

419 SCRA 440, 452.
13

Caja v. Nanquil, A.M. No. P-04-1885, September 13, 2004, 438 SCRA
174, 195.
14

Supra note 12, at 454.

15

Id. at 455.

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