Xvietnam War White House CIA Foia 05lbjvol1

FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES
1964, Volume I
Vietnam
Department of State
Washington, DC
Editor in Chief
John P. Glennon
Editors
Edward C. Keefer
Charles S. Sampson
United States Government Printing Office

Washington
1992
DEPARTMENT OF STATE PUBLICATION 9934
Office of the Historian
Bureau of Public Affairs
Contents
Preface
List of Sources
List of Abbreviations
List of Persons
Vietnam, Volume I
Section I.
Section II.
Section III.
Section IV.
Section V.
Section VI.
Section VII.
Section VIII.
Section IX.
Section X.
Section XI.
Section XII.
Section XIII.
The Khanh coup, January 1-31

U.S. assessment of the Khanh government, February 1-March 4
The McNamara-Taylor Mission to Vietnam and the McNamara report,
March 4-April 3
The Rusk Mission to Vietnam, April 17-19, and planning for pressures
against the North, April 4-May
The second McNamara-Taylor Mission to Vietnam and planning
discussions, May 8-26
The second Rusk visit to Saigon; the Honolulu meeting; the de GaulleBall conversation; Seaborn's discussions in Hanoi, May 26-June 25
Taylor's first month as Ambassador; the increase in U.S. Advisory
Forces in Vietnam, June 25-July 31
U.S. reaction to events in the Gulf of Tonkin, August 1-10
Changes in the government of South Vietnam, August 11-September 5
Ambassador Taylor's visit to Washington, September 6-10
U.S. efforts to strengthen the Government of South Vietnam, September
11-October 31
Proceedings of the NSC Working Group on Vietnam, November 1December 7
U.S. response to the governmental crisis in South Vietnam, December
8-31

1964-1968, Volume I
Vietnam, 1964
Department of State
Washington, DC
Preface
The Foreign Relations of the United States series presents the official documentary
historical record of major United States foreign policy decisions and significant
diplomatic activity of the United States Government, including the reports and
intelligence that contributed to the formulation of policies and the documentation of
supporting and alternative views to the policy positions ultimately adopted.
The Historian of the Department of State is responsible for the preparation of the Foreign
Relations series. The editing of the series in the Office of the Historian, Bureau of Public
Affairs, is guided by principles of historical objectivity and accuracy. Documents are not
altered or deletions made without indicating where changes have been made. Every effort
is made to identify lacunae in the record and to explain why they have occurred. Certain
omissions may be necessary to protect national security or to condense the record and
avoid needless repetition. The published record, however, omits no facts that were of
major importance in reaching a decision, and nothing has been excluded for the purpose
of concealing or glossing over a defect in policy.
At the time of the compilation of this volume in 1984, the Department was guided in the
preparation of the Foreign Relations series by official regulations first promulgated by
Secretary of State Frank B. Kellogg on March 26, 1925. A new statutory charter for the
preparation of the Foreign Relations series was established by Title IV of Public Law
102-138, the Foreign Relations Authorization Act, Fiscal Years 1992 and 1993, which
was signed by the President on October 28, 1991. That new charter requires that the
Foreign Relations series "shall be a thorough, accurate, and reliable documentary record
of major United States foreign policy decisions and significant United States diplomatic
activity." The new charter also requires that the Foreign Relations series be published
"not more than 30 years after the events recorded."
Structure and Scope of the Foreign Relations of the United States Series
This volume is the first in a comprehensive subseries that will document the most
important issues in the foreign policy of President Lyndon B. Johnson's administration.
The subseries covers the years 1964 through 1968, although the editors may in a few
cases include documents from 1963 or 1969 to round out and make more understandable
the documentation regarding particular topics.
Continuing the longstanding tradition of the Foreign Relations series and in compliance
with the legislation of October 28, 1991, the editors have planned a comprehensive
subseries of volumes to record the most important issues in the foreign affairs of the
United States during the Johnson administration. The diplomacy of U.S. involvement in
the civil war in Vietnam during the decade of the 1960s was a matter of overwhelming
importance in the conduct of foreign affairs and is a primary topic documented in the
Foreign Relations volumes covering the years 1964 through 1968. Volumes I through VII
in the subseries for 1964-1968 are devoted to U.S. policy toward Vietnam. These volumes
focus on that nation alone and do not record activities throughout the remainder of
Indochina except as they may relate immediately to the conduct of the war in Vietnam.
The record of U.S. relations with and policies toward Laos and Cambodia is the subject of
a separate volume in the Foreign Relations series.
In preparing the volumes of Foreign Relations regarding U.S. involvement in Vietnam,
the editors have given the highest priority to the inclusion of documents on:
1. The formulation of U.S. national goals regarding policy toward Vietnam.
2. The international diplomatic background of the conflict.
3. The search by the United States for international support for its war aims.
4. U.S. relations with the Republic of Vietnam.
5. Major political-military decisions regarding U.S. involvement in Vietnam and strategies
to be followed, including military assistance to the Republic of Vietnam.
6. The search for a peaceful end of the war, including direct and indirect contacts with the
Democratic Republic of Vietnam and with various Communist powers.
7. Economic assistance and social reform programs for Vietnam.
The record of military operations in Vietnam, operational intelligence activities, the
conduct (as opposed to the policy considerations) of covert actions, the broad range of
Foreign Service activities and the administration of overseas posts, and routine or
ceremonial diplomatic exchanges are outside the terms of reference of the Foreign
Relations volumes. Important military and intelligence activities bearing upon the
diplomatic context of U.S. involvement in Vietnam are, however, covered in the many
high-level papers and discussions that are included in the volumes of the series.
Sources for the Foreign Relations Series
The longstanding 1925 charter of the Foreign Relations series and the law of October 28,
1991, on the series require that the published record reflect all major foreign policy
decisions and activities and include necessary documentation from all government
agencies and entities involved in foreign policy formulation, execution, or support. The
historical records of the Presidents and their national security advisers together with the
still larger body of documentation in the Department of State are the principal sources of
the Foreign Relations series. The National Archives and Records Administration,
including the Presidential libraries which it administers, is the main repository and
coordinating authority for historical government documentation.
The official documentary record on U.S. foreign affairs available for preparing the
published Foreign Relations volumes must on occasion be supplemented by information

from private collections of papers of historical significance and from interviews with U.S.
officials who were involved in the events documented. This was particularly true in
research for the volumes documenting U.S. involvement in the Vietnam war. Interviews
by Department historians are conducted in accordance with professional scholarly
practices and existing government procedures regarding their preparation and
preservation. Oral histories, where already available, are also reviewed and used.
In the case of the volumes documenting U.S. involvement in the Vietnam war, the editors
reviewed the documents included in the 12-volume study prepared by the Department of
Defense, United States-Vietnam Relations, 1945-1967, printed for the use of the
Committee on Armed Forces of the U.S. House of Representatives (Washington: U.S.
Government Printing Office, 1971), the so-called "Pentagon Papers." Particular
documents from this version of the "Pentagon Papers" are included in Foreign Relations
volumes, in their most authentic version, when their inclusion is vital to understanding the
published record. Not all of the diplomatic documentation in the "Pentagon Papers" will,
however, be reprinted or even accounted for in the Foreign Relations series.
Particular sources used in preparing the volume presented here are described in detail in
the List of Sources.
Principles of Selection for Foreign Relations, 1964-1968, Volume I
On the basis of preliminary research and review of already-published documentation,
including the 1971 "Pentagon Papers," the editors developed the following five areas of
focus for the research and selection of documents for inclusion in this volume: 1)
discussion and formulation of policy in Washington; 2) missions of high-level Johnson
administration officials to South Vietnam and their recommendations; 3) planning for
military operations against North Vietnam and the actual implementation of U.S. military
operations in Vietnam; 4) the relationship among the U.S. Government, the Khanh
government, and opposition elements in South Vietnam; 5) the implementation of policy
in South Vietnam.
Discussion and formulation of policy in Washington: President Lyndon B. Johnson made
the important policy decisions on Vietnam. He received advice from the Washington
foreign affairs community, either orally at meetings or in documents. The records of these
meetings with the President and advice provided to him in writing are the primary focus
of this volume. The editors are confident that they have had complete access to all the
Presidential written records bearing on important decisions relating to Vietnam.
The most important repository for records on the formulation of U.S. policy toward
Vietnam in 1964 is the Lyndon B. Johnson Presidential Library. The records of the
Department of State, to which the editors also had complete access, include a large
segment of Presidential and National Security Council documentation, but the Johnson
Library remains the single most comprehensive source. Department of Defense records
located at the Washington National Records Center, especially the files and papers of
Secretary of Defense Robert S. McNamara, are also an important source.
Missions of high-level Johnson administration officials to South Vietnam: Secretary of
State Dean Rusk, Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara, and Chairman of the Joint
Chiefs of Staff Maxwell Taylor each made two fact-finding visits to Vietnam in 1964. The
recommendations resulting from these missions provided President Johnson with a means
of focusing on the problems in Vietnam. They also forced the competing elements in the
government in Washington to negotiate their different policy alternatives. The approval of
recommendations of these missions by the President and his national security advisers
provided guidelines for government-wide policy. Records at the Johnson Library,
McNamara's files, Taylor's papers at the National Defense University, and records in the
Department of State provided the principal sources for these missions and their results.
U.S. military involvement in Vietnam: The editors sought to include documentation that
illustrates the relationship between military planning and strategy and the conduct of
relations with the Republic of Vietnam and other countries. The editors have concentrated
on policy discussions of the feasibility and desirability of covert or overt action against
North Vietnam. Overt military action superseded policy deliberation and planning with
the U.S. response to the incidents in the Gulf of Tonkin in August 1964. The documents
presented on the Gulf of Tonkin episode do not resolve the question of whether the second
North Vietnamese attack actually took place, but they do indicate that the Johnson
administration at the time believed that the attack had occurred. Subsequent U.S. military
action was based on that presumption. The Johnson Library, files of the Secretary of
Defense and the Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs at the
Washington National Records Center, and the decentralized files of the Department of
State's Vietnam Working Group are the principal sources for this topic.
The relationship among the U.S. Government, the Khanh government, and opposition
elements in South Vietnam: In 1964, the United States supported the Republic of Vietnam,
but never felt totally at ease with General Nguyen Khanh who took power in late January
1964. The extensive reports of U.S. Embassy relations with the Khanh regime come
primarily from the central files of the Department of State. In addition, the editors have
included a considerable number of telegraphic reports from the Embassy in Saigon on
relations with dissident and opposition Vietnamese. The Central Intelligence Agency
records on these contacts were obtained from the Johnson Library and Department of
State files.
Policy implementation in Vietnam: The editors have also selected documentation that
covers the implementation of policy established by the President and a small range of
lesser policy decisions that did not reach the President or were resolved in the Department
of State or other agencies of the foreign affairs community. The files of the Department of
State, the Johnson Library, and the United States Information Agency are the primary
documentary sources for these decisions.
For this volume, which was prepared in 1984, the editors have not attempted to document
particular U.S. intelligence operations or any significant contribution that U.S.
intelligence made to the formulation of foreign policy. The editors closely reviewed the
intelligence documentation, including records originated by the Central Intelligence
Agency, included in the Johnson Library. That research was accomplished with the full
cooperation and assistance of the CIA. It resulted in the inclusion in this volume of some
key intelligence analyses that contributed to major political and diplomatic actions.
Completion of the declassification of this volume and the final steps of its preparation for
publication coincided with the development of procedures since early 1991 by the Central
Intelligence Agency in cooperation with the Department of State that have expanded
access by Department historians to high-level intelligence documents from among those
records still in the custody of the Central Intelligence Agency. The Department of State
chose not to postpone the publication of this volume to ascertain how such access might
affect the scope of available documentation and the changes that might be made in the
contents of this particular volume. The Department of State, however, is making good use
of these new procedures, which have been arranged by the CIA's History Staff, for the
compilation of future volumes in the Foreign Relations series.
The editors of the volume are confident that the documents printed here provide a
comprehensive and accurate foreign affairs record of U.S. policy toward and involvement
in Vietnam during 1964. The declassification review process for the documents originally
selected for this volume, outlined in more detail below, resulted in withholding from
publication only 2.5 percent of the original manuscript.
The editors wish to acknowledge the assistance of officials at the National Archives and
Records Administration's Lyndon B. Johnson Library, in particular David Humphrey.
Susan Lemke at the National Defense University and Sandra Meagher at the Department
of Defense deserve special thanks, as do former government officials who consented to
interviews for this volume.
Editorial Methodology
The documents are presented chronologically according to Washington time. Incoming
telegrams from U.S. missions are placed according to time of receipt in the Department of
State, and memoranda of conversations are placed according to the time and date of the
conversation. President Johnson maintained regular contact with both Ambassadors Henry
Cabot Lodge and Maxwell Taylor in messages sent to and received from Saigon as
telegrams. These are printed as messages to and from the President, and information about
the telegrams is included in the first footnote.
Editorial treatment of documents published in the Foreign Relations series follows Office
style guidelines, supplemented by guidance from the Editor in Chief and the chief
technical editor. The source text is reproduced as exactly as possible, including marginalia
or other notations, which are described in the footnotes. Obvious typographical errors are
corrected, but other mistakes and omissions in the source text are corrected by bracketed
insertions: a correction is set in italic type; an omission in roman type. Bracketed
insertions are also used to indicate text that has been omitted because it deals with an
unrelated subject (in roman type) or because it remained classified after the
declassification review process (in italic type). The amount of material not declassified
has been noted by indicating the number of lines or pages of source text that were omitted.
The amount of material omitted because it was not related to the subject, however, has not
been accounted for. All ellipses and brackets that appear in the source text are so
identified by footnotes.
The first footnote to each document indicates the document's source, original
classification, distribution, and drafting information. The source footnote also provides the
background of important documents and policies and indicates whether the President
and/or his major policy advisers read it. Every effort has been made to determine if a
document has been previously published, and this information has been included in the
source footnote.
Editorial notes and additional annotation summarize pertinent material not printed in this
volume, indicate the location of additional documentary sources, provide references to
important related documents printed in other volumes, describe key events, and
summarize and provide citations to public statements that supplement and elucidate the
printed documents. Information derived from memoirs and other first-hand accounts have
been used when applicable to supplement or explicate the official record.
Declassification Review Procedures
Declassification review of the documents selected for publication was conducted by the
Division of Historical Documents Review, Bureau of Diplomatic Security, Department of
State. The review was made in accordance with the Freedom of Information Act, the
Privacy Act, the criteria established in Executive Order 12356, and the act of October
28,1991, regarding:
1) military plans, weapons, or operations;
2) the vulnerabilities or capabilities of systems, installations, projects, or plans relating to
the national security;
3) foreign government information;
4) intelligence activities (including special activities), or intelligence sources or methods;
5) foreign relations or foreign activities of the United States;
6) scientific, technological, or economic matters relating to national security;
7) U.S. Government programs for safeguarding nuclear materials or facilities;
8) cryptology; and
9) a confidential source.
Declassification decisions entailed concurrence of the appropriate geographic and
functional bureaus in the Department of State, other concerned agencies of the U.S.
Government, and appropriate foreign governments regarding documents of those
governments. The principle guiding declassification review is to release all information,
subject only to the current requirements of national security and law.
Edward C. Keefer and Charles S. Sampson compiled and edited the volume under former
Editor in Chief John P. Glennon. General Editor Glenn W. LaFantasie supervised the final
steps in the editorial and publication process. Suzanne E. Coffman and Jeffrey A. Soukup
prepared the lists of names and abbreviations. Rita M. Baker and Althea W. Robinson
performed the technical editing. Barbara A. Bacon of the Publishing Services Division
(Natalie H. Lee, Chief) oversaw production of the volume. Max Franke prepared the
index.
William Z. Slany
The Historian
Bureau of Public Affairs
January 1992

1964-1968, Volume I
Vietnam, 1964
Department of State
Washington, DC
List of Sources
Unpublished Sources
Department of State
1. Subject-Numeric Indexed Central Files. In February 1963, the Department changed its
decimal central files to a subject-numeric central file system. The subject-numeric system
was divided into broad categories: Administration, Consular, Culture and Information,
Economic, Political and Defense, Science, and Social. Within each of these divisions were
subcategories. For example, Political and Defense contained four subtopics: POL
(politics), DEF (defense), CSM (communism), and INT (intelligence). Numerical
subdivisions further defined them.
The following were the most important files used in this volume:
POL 1 FR-VIET S, general policy, France-South Vietnam
POL 1 US-VIET, general policy, U.S.-Vietnam
POL 1 US-VIET S, general policy, U.S.-South Vietnam
POL 1 VIET N-VIET S, general policy, North Vietnam-South Vietnam
POL 1-1 VIET S, development and coordination of future policies
POL 7 US (LODGE), visits of Ambassador Lodge
POL 8 CAMB, neutralism and non-alignment of Cambodia
POL 13 VIET S, non-party blocs
POL 13-2 VIET S, students and youth groups
POL 15 VIET S, government
POL 15-1 VIET S, head of government/Executive branch
POL 15-1 US/JOHNSON, Executive branch, President Johnson
POL 15-4 VIET S, administration of government

POL 16 CHICOM, recognition of the People's Republic of China
POL 16 VIET S, recognition
POL 27 LAOS, military operations, Laos
POL 17 CHINA-VIET S, diplomatic representation, China-South Vietnam
POL 17-5 US-VIET S, diplomatic representation, changes in status, U.S.-South Vietnam
POL 23 VIET S, internal security and counterinsurgency
POL 23-7 VIET S, infiltration and subversion
POL 23-8 VIET S, demonstrations, protests and riots
POL 23-9 VIET S, rebellions and coups
POL 27 VIET S, military operations
POL 27-3 LAOS-VIET N, use of force in Laos against North Vietnam
POL 27-14 VIET S, truce, cease-fire, and armistice
POL 32 CAMBODIA-VIET S, boundaries, Cambodia-South Vietnam
POL 33-6 US-VIET N, waters and boundaries, high seas
POL CAN-US, U.S.-Canadian relations
POL FR-US, U.S.-French relations
POL FR-VIET S, general policy, France-South Vietnam
POL US-VIET S, general policy, U.S.-South Vietnam
DEF 1 ASIA SE, plans and policy, Southeast Asia
DEF 1 US-VIET S, plans and policy, U.S.-South Vietnam
DEF 6-3 VIET S, air force, South Vietnam
DEF 9-3 VIET S, morale and discipline, South Vietnam
DEF 19 PHIL-VIET S, military assistance, Philippines-South Vietnam
DEF 19 US-VIET S, military assistance, U.S.-South Vietnam
DEF 19-9 US-VIET S, advisory assistance and training, U.S.-South Vietnam

SOC 10 VIET S, disaster relief, South Vietnam
SOC 12 VIET S, religion, South Vietnam
AID (US) 8 VIET S, grants and technical assistance, U.S. aid to South Vietnam
AID (US) VIET S, general policy and technical assistance, U.S. aid to South Vietnam
E 12 VIET S, land reform, South Vietnam
INCO-RICE 14 VIET S, rice prices, South Vietnam
INF 8 US-VIET S, U.S. psychological operations, South Vietnam
ORG 7 VIET S, field trips to South Vietnam
SEATO 3 PHIL (MA), SEATO meeting, Manila
2. Lot Files. Documents from the central files have been supplemented by materials from
decentralized office files, the lot files of the Department of State. A list of the major lot
files used or consulted follows:
Ball Files: Lot 74 D 272
Files of Under Secretary of State George Ball, 1961-1967.
Bundy Files: Lot 85 D 240
Files of William P. Bundy for the 1960s, first as Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense
for International Security Affairs and then Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern
Affairs after 1964 (cited as Bundy Files/WPB Special Papers without Lot File number).
Conference Files: Lot 66 D 110
Collection of documentation on International conferences abroad attended by the
President, the Secretary of State, and other U.S. officials, May 1961-December 1964.
Har-Van Files
Files created for Ambassador W. Averell Harriman and Cyrus Vance, Delegates to the
Paris Peace Conference in 1968. Background documents beginning in the early 1960s.
The file contains texts of documents found nowhere else.
INR Files: Lot 81 D 343
Consolidated files of the Bureau of Intelligence and Research.
Presidential Correspondence: Lot 66 D 204
Exchanges of correspondence between the President and heads of foreign governments,
1953-1964, maintained by the Executive Secretariat.
Presidential Correspondence: Lot 77 D 163
Correspondence between Presidents Kennedy and Johnson and the Chairman of the Soviet
Union, Prime Minister of Great Britain, and President of France, 1961-1964.
Presidential Memoranda of Conversation: Lot 66 D 149
Cleared memoranda of Presidential conversations with foreign visitors, 1956-1964,
maintained by the Executive Secretariat.
Presidential Reading File: Lot 74 D 164
Department of State material included in the President's evening reading items. 19641973; also Secretary-President luncheon meetings, 1964-1969.
Rusk Files: Lot 72 D 192
Files of Secretary of State Dean Rusk, 1961-1969, including texts of speeches,
miscellaneous correspondence files, White House correspondence, chronological files,
and memoranda of telephone conversations.
Saigon Embassy Files: Lot 68 F 8
Top Secret subject files of the Embassy in Saigon, 1964.
Secretary's Memoranda of Conversation: Lot 65 D 330
Memoranda of conversation of the Secretary and Under Secretary of State, 1961-1964.
Secretary's Staff Meetings: Lot 66 D 147
Minutes of the Secretary of State staff meetings, 1961-1964.
S/P Files: Lot 70 D 199
Files of the Policy Planning Council for the yeas 1963-1964.
S/P Files: Lot 71 D 273
Files of Ernest K. Lindley, member of the Policy Planning Staff, 1961-1968.
Special Group for Counterinsurgency Files: Lot 68 D 451
Memoranda and minutes of the meetings of the Special Group, Counterinsurgency, 19611966, and "eyes only" material for 1964.
S/S-NSC Files: Lot 70 D 265
Master set of papers pertaining to National Security Council meetings, including policy
papers, position papers, and administrative documents for the years 1961-1966,
S/S-NSC Files: Lot 72 D 316
Master file of National Security Action Memoranda (NSAMs) for the years 1961-1968,
Vietnam Negotiating Files: Lot 69 D 412
Files of negotiations for a possible peace in Vietnam, including the efforts of countries,
international organizations and individuals, 1961-1967.
Vietnam Working Group Files: Lot 72 D 219
Top Secret files of the Interagency Vietnam Working Group, 1963-1967.
Massachusetts Historical Society. Boston, Massachusetts

Lodge Papers
Personal papers of Henry Cabot Lodge, Jr., 1928-1968.
Washington National Records Center, Suitland, Maryland
Record Group 84, Records of the Foreign Service Posts of the United States
Saigon Embassy Files: FRC 68 A 1814
Classified and unclassified files of the Embassy in Saigon for 1964 (formerly Lot 67 F
26).
Saigon Embassy's Coordinator Files: FRC 68 A 5612
Classified sensitive captioned files of the coordinator, Embassy in Saigon, 1964-1965
(formerly Lot 68 F 32).
Record Group 306, Records of the United States Information Agency
USIA Psychological Operations Files: FRC 68 A 4933
Vietnam Working Group files, 1962-1964 (formerly Lot 67 D 444).
Record Group 319, Records of the Army Staff
Headquarters, Department of the Army
Microfilm files of incoming and outgoing messages, 1945 ff.
Record Group 330, Records of the Office of the Secretary of Defense
McNamara Files: FRC 71 A 3470
Files of Secretary of Defense Robert S. McNamara for the years 1961-1968.
OASD/ISA Files: FRC 68 A 306
Secret and lower-classified general files of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for
International Security Affairs, 1964.
Top Secret files of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs,
1964.
Miscellaneous Top Secret and sensitive files of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for
International Security Affairs, 1961-1964.
Official Records of the Secretary of Defense, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense, and
the Special Assistant, 1964.
National Defense University, Fort McNair, Washington, D.C.
Taylor Papers
Papers of General Maxwell D. Taylor, Chief of Staff of the Army, 1955-1959; Military
Adviser to the President, 1961-1962; and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff 19621964.
John F. Kennedy Library, Boston, Massachusetts
Thompson Papers
Files of the Special Assistant to the Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs, 1960-1966.
Lyndon B. Johnson Library, Austin, Texas
Papers of President Lyndon B. Johnson, National Security File
Agency File (cited as Agencies File)
Aides Files
Heads of State Correspondence
Intelligence File
Memos to the President
National Intelligence Estimate File
NSC Meetings
Vietnam Country File
Papers of President Lyndon B. Johnson, Special Files
Meeting Notes File
President's Daily Diary
Papers of President Lyndon B. Johnson, White House Central Files
Confidential Files
Rusk Appointment Book
Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Washington, D.C.
Harriman Papers
Special files of W. Averell Harriman, Public Service, Kennedy and Johnson
administrations
U.S. Army Center for Military History, Washington, D.C.
Westmoreland Papers
Records of General William C. Westmoreland, Commander, Military Assistance
Command Vietnam, 1964-1968.
Published Sources
Documentary Collections, Congressional Documents, and Periodicals
The Declassified Documents Quarterly Catalog and microfiche. Woodbridge, CT:

Research Publications (formerly Washington: Carrollton Press), 1974 and onwards.
Joint Chiefs of Staff Historical Division. History of the JCS: The War in Vietnam, 19601968.
The Pentagon Papers: The Department of Defense History of United States
Decisionmaking on Vietnam [The Senator Gravel Edition]. 4 vols. Boston: Beacon Press,
1971.
U.S. Department of State. Aggression From the North. Washington: U.S. Government
Printing Office, 1965.
____. American Foreign Policy: Basic Documents, 1950-1955. Washington: U.S.
Government Printing Office, 1957.
____. American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1961, 1963, and 1964. Washington:
U.S. Government Printing Office.
____. Department of State Bulletin, 1964. Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office.
U.S. National Archives and Records Administration. Public Papers of the Presidents of
the United States: Lyndon B. Johnson, 1963-1964. Washington: U.S. Government
Printing Office, 1964.
Memoirs
Note: The Department of State takes no responsibility for the accuracy of these memoirs
nor endorses their interpretation of the events.
Ball, George. The Past Has Another Pattern: Memoirs. New York, 1982.
Colby, William, and Forbath, Peter. Honorable Men: My Life in the CIA. New York,
1978.
Hilsman, Roger. To Move a Nation. Garden City, NY, 1967.
Johnson, Lyndon Baines. The Vantage Point: Perspectives of the Presidency, 1963-69.
New York: Holt, Reinhardt and Winston, 1971.
Johnson, U. Alexis with Jeff Olivarius. The Right Hand of Power. Englewood Cliffs, NJ,
1984.
Nguyen Cao Ky. Twenty Years and Twenty Days. New York, 1976.
Nitze, Paul. From Hiroshima to Glasnost: At the Center of a Decision, A Memoir. New
York, 1989.
Rusk, Dean as told to Richard Rusk. As I Saw It. New York, 1990.
Sullivan, William. Obbligato, 1939-1979: Notes on a Foreign Service Career. New York,
1984.
Taylor, Maxwell D. Swords and Plowshares: A Memoir. New York, 1972.

1964-1968, Volume I
Vietnam, 1964
Department of State
Washington, DC
List of Abbreviations
AA, anti-aircraft
AAA, anti-aircraft artillery
ABG, air base group
AC&W, aircraft control and warning
AFC, Armed Forces Council
AFP, Agence France Presse (French Press Agency)
AID, Agency for International Development
ALO, Air Liaison Officer
AP, Associated Press
ARVN, Army of the Republic of Vietnam
ASAP, as soon as possible
ASW, anti-submarine warfare
AWOL, absent without leave
Bks, barracks
BLT, battalion landing team
Bn/Dist Adv, Battalion District Advisers
BNA, Office of British Commonwealth and Northern European Affairs, Bureau of
European Affairs, Department of State
BOQ Bachelor Officers Quarters
BTL, Battalion
CAP, Combat Air Patrol
CARE, Cooperative for American Relief Everywhere
CAS, controlled American source
ChiCom, Chinese Communists
CIA, Central Intelligence Agency
CIDG, Citizens' Irregular Defense Group
CINCPACFLT, Commander in Chief, Pacific Fleet
CINCRVNAF, Commander in Chief, Republic of Vietnam Air Force
CINCUSARPAC, Commander in Chief, U.S. Army Pacific
CINCVAF, Commander in Chief. Vietnamese Armed Forces
CIP, counterinsurgency program
CJCS, Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff
CVN, Central Vietnam
COM7FLT. Commander Seventh Fleet
COMUSMACV, Commander, United States Military Assistance Command, Vietnam
CONUS, continental United States
CP, command post
CP, Communist Party
CPR, Chinese People's Republic
C/S, Chief of Staff
CTV, Confederation Travailleurs du Vietnam (Vietnamese Confederation of Labor)
CT, Country Team
CVA, attack aircraft carrier
CVTC, Confederation of Vietnamese Trade Congresses
DCI, Director of Central Intelligence

DCM, Deputy Chief of Mission
DepPriMin, Deputy Prime Minister
Deptel, Department of State telegram
DIA, Defense Intelligence Agency
DMZ, demilitarized zone
DOD, Department of Defense
DRV, Democratic Republic of Vietnam
DTG, date-time group
EDT, Eastern Daylight Time
KG, escort group
EmbOff, Embassy officer
Embtel, Embassy telegram
EST, Eastern Standard Time
EUR, Bureau of European Affairs, Department of State
ExCom, Executive Committee
Exdis, Executive distribution only
FAC, Forward Air Controllers FBI, Federal Bureau of Investigation
FE, Bureau of Far Eastern Affairs, Department of State
FE/SEA, Office of Southeast Asian Affairs, Bureau of Far Eastern Affairs, Department of
State
FonOff, Foreign Office
FSO, Foreign Service officer
GCI, Ground Controlled Interception
GNZ, Government of New Zealand
GOA, Government of Australia

GRC, Government of the Republic of China
GVN, Government of Vietnam
HMG, Her Majesty's Government
HNC, High National Council
ICC, International Control Commission
INR, Bureau of Intelligence and Research, Department of State
IO, Bureau of International Organizations Affairs, Department of State
ISA, Office of International Security Affairs, Department of Defense
J-1, Personnel, JCS
J-2, Intelligence, JCS
J-3, Operations, JCS
J-4, Logistics, JCS
JCS, Joint Chiefs of Staff
JCSM, Joint Chiefs of Staff Memorandum
JGS, Joint General Staff
Limdis, limited distribution restriction on telegrams
LOC, lines of communication
MAAG, Military Assistance Advisory Group
MAC J00, series indicator for telegrams from MACV
MACV, Military Assistance Command, Vietnam
MAP, Military Assistance Program
MAROPS, Maritime Operations
MEB, Marine Expeditionary Brigade
MEDICO, Medical International Cooperation
MEF, Marine Evacuation Force Emergency

MiG, Soviet-built fighter aircraft
MinDef, Minister of Defense
MLF, multilateral force
MOH, Ministry of Health
MRC, Military Revolutionary Council
NATO, North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NCO, non-commissioned officer
NFLSVN, National Front for the Liberation of South Vietnam
NLF, National Liberation Front
NM, nautical miles
NMCC, National Military Communications Center
Nodis, no distribution
Noforn, no foreign dissemination
NOTAL, telegram code, "not all," indicating that corresponding reference telegram was
not sent to all addressees
NSA, National Security Agency
NSAM, National Security Action Memorandum
NSCWG, National Security Council Working Group
NVN, North Vietnam
OASD/ISA, Office of Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs
ODMA, Office of the Director for Military Assistance
OPLAN, Operations Plan
OSD, Office of the Secretary of Defense
OSS, Office of Strategic Services
PA, Bureau of Public Affairs, Department of State

PACAF, Pacific Air Forces (USAF)
PACOM, Pacific Command
PAVN, People's Army of Vietnam
PDJ, Plaine des Jarres
PL, Pathet Lao
PL, Public Law
PM, Prime Minister
PNG, persona non grata
P/ON, Office of News, Bureau of Public Affairs
POL, petroleum, oil, lubricants
POLAD, Political Adviser
PRC, People's Republic of China
PRC, People's Revolutionary Council
PriMin, Prime Minister
psyops, psychological operations
PT, patrol
RCI, Office of Current Intelligence Indications, Bureau of Intelligence and Re search,
Department of State
reftel, reference telegram
RFE, Office of Research and Analysis for Far East, Bureau of Intelligence and Re search,
Department of State
RG, Record Group
RKG, Royal Khmer government
RLAF, Royal Laotian Air Force
RLG, Royal Laotian government
RTG, Royal Thai Government

RVN, Republic of Vietnam
RVNAF, Republic of Vietnam Armed Forces
SACSA, Special Assistant for Counterinsurgency and Special Activities, JCS
SAM, surface-to-air missile
SAR, search and rescue
SC, Security Council
SDC, Self Defense Corps
SEA, Southeast Asia
SEATO, Southeast Asian Treaty Organization
SecDef, Secretary of Defense
septel, separate telegram
SKZ, Chinese recoilless rifle
SLF, Special Landing Force
SNIE, Special National Intelligence Estimate
S/P, Policy Planning Council, Department of State
SPECAT, special category, military telegram
S/S, Executive Secretariat, Department of State
S/VN, Secretary of State's Special Assistant for Vietnamese Affairs
SVN, South Vietnam
TACS, Tactical Air Control System
tel, telegram
TG, Thai Government
UK, United Kingdom
UN, United Nations
UNESCO, United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization

UNSC, United Nations Security Council
UPI, United Press International
USAF, United States Air Force
USG, United States Government
USIA, United States Information Agency
USIS, United States Information Service
USOM, United States Operations Mission
USNS, United States Naval Ship
USS, United States Ship
USSF, United States Special Forces
VC, Viet Cong
VM, Viet Minh
VNAF, Vietnamese Air Force
VNN, Vietnamese Navy
VNQDD, Viet Nam Quoc Dan Dung (National Party of Vietnam)
VOA, Voice of America
WESTPAC, Western Pacific
ZI, Zone of Interior

1964-1968, Volume I
Vietnam, 1964
Department of State
Washington, DC
List of Persons
Note: The identification of persons in this list is limited to circumstances and positions
relevant to the events documented in the volume. All titles and positions are American
unless otherwise indicated.
Alphand, Herve, French Ambassador to the United States
Anthis, Brigadier General Rollen H., USAF, Commander U.S. 2d Air Force advanced air
echelon headquarters in Saigon; Chief, Air Force Section, Military Assistance Advisory
Group, Vietnam
Asbjornson, Mildred, secretary to Secretary of State Rusk
Ball, George W., Under Secretary of State
Bell, David E., Administrator, Agency for International Development
Blouin, Rear Admiral F. J., USN, Director, Far East Region, Office of the Assistant
Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs
Bohlen, Charles E., Ambassador to France
Breckon, M. Lyall, Office of Southeast Asian Affairs, Bureau of Far Eastern Affairs,
Department of State, until March 1, 1964; thereafter Office of the Secretary of State's
Special Assistant for Vietnamese Affairs
Brent, Joseph L., Director, United States Operations Mission in Vietnam
Brubeck, William H., Secretary of State's Special Assistant and Executive Secretary of the
Department of State until July 20, 1964
Bundy, McGeorge, President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs
Bundy, William P., Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs until
March 10, 1964; Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs after March 16, 1964
Butler, Richard A., British Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs
Caccia, Sir Harold A., Permanent Under Secretary, British Foreign Office; later, Head of
Diplomatic Service
Carter, Lieutenant General Marshall S., Deputy Director, Central Intelligence Agency
Cater, S. Douglass, President's Special Assistant
Chadbourn, Philip H., Counselor of the Embassy in Vientiane
Chu, see Nguyen Xuan Chu
Cleveland, James H., Assistant Secretary of State for International Organization Affairs
Cline, Ray S., Deputy Director, Central Intelligence Agency
Coffin, Frank M., Deputy Administrator for Operations, Agency for International
Development
Colby, William E., Chief, Far East Division, Central Intelligence Agency
Coote, Wendell B., Deputy Director for Far Eastern Affairs, Office of Eastern and
Southern African Affairs, Bureau of African Affairs, Department of State, until August
16, 1964 Cooper, Chester, Member of the National Security Council Staff, on detail from
the Central Intelligence Agency
Couve de Murville, Maurice, French Foreign Minister
Cox, Gordon E., Canadian Commissioner, International Supervision and Control
Commission, until April 1964
De Gaulle, Charles, President of France
De Silva, Peter, Chief of Central Intelligence Agency Station in Saigon
Defferre, Gaston, Socialist candidate for President of France
Denney, George C., Jr., Deputy Director, Bureau of Intelligence and Research,
Department of State
Dillon, C. Douglas, Secretary of the Treasury
Do Mau, Brigadier General, ARVN, Vietnamese Vice Prime Minister for Cultural and
Social Affairs, February 4-November 4, 1964
D'Orlandi, Giovanni, Italian Ambassador to the Republic of Vietnam
Douglas-Home, Sir Alec, British Prime Minister until October 1964
Dunn John M., Special Assistant to the Director, United States Operations Mission in
Saigon
Duong Van Duc, Brigadier General, ARVN, Commander of IV Corps and leader of
abortive coup of September 13, 1964
Duong Van Minh ("Big Minh"), Lieutenant General, ARVN, Chairman of the Military
Revolutionary Council until January 30, 1964; Chief of State of the Republic of Vietnam,
February 8-October 26, 1964
Engle, F. Byron, Director, Office of Public Safety, Agency for International Development
Felt, Admiral Harry D., Commander in Chief, Pacific, until February 1964
Fischel, Wesley, Professor of Political Science, Michigan State University
Flott, Frederick W., First Secretary and Special Assistant to the Ambassador, Embassy in
Saigon
Forrestal, Michael V., member of the National Security Council Staff until July 1964;
thereafter Secretary of State's Special Assistant for Vietnam Affairs
Fredericks, J. Wayne, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State, Bureau of African Affairs
Fulbright, J. William, Senator (D-AR), Chairman, Senate Foreign Relations Committee
Furness, George A., Jr., Office of Research and Analysis for Far East, Bureau of
Intelligence and Research, Department of State, from April 1964
Gard, Richard A., political officer in the Consulate at Hong Kong, February 2-April 3,
1964; thereafter Consul at Hong Kong
Gilpatric, Roswell L., Deputy Secretary of Defense until January 1, 1964
Goldwater, Barry, Senator (R-AZ), Republican Presidential candidate, 1964
Goodpaster, Lieutenant General Andrew J., USA, Assistant to the Chairman, Joint Chiefs
of Staff
Gore, Sir David Ormeby, then Lord Harlech, British Ambassador to the United States
Green, Marshall, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs
Gromyko, Andrei A., Soviet Foreign Minister
Halleck, Charles A., Congressman (R-IN), House Minority Leader
Harkins, General Paul D., USA, Commander, Military Assistance Command, Vietnam
until June 20, 1964
Harriman, W. Averell, Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs

Helble, John J., Consul at Hue
Helms, Richard R., Deputy Director for Plans, Central Intelligence Agency
Hoan, see Nguyen Ton Hoan
Ho Chi Minh, President of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam
Hughes, Thomas L., Director, Bureau of Intelligence and Research, Department of State
Humphrey, Hubert H., Senator (D-MN) and Vice President-designate
Jenkins, Walter, Administrative Assistant to the President
Johnson, Lyndon Baines, President of the United States
Johnson, Robert H., member of the Policy Planning Council, Department of State
Johnson, U. Alexis, Deputy Under Secretary for Political Affairs until July 1, 1964;
thereafter Deputy Ambassador to Vietnam
Kaysen, Carl Deputy Special Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs
Kennedy, John F., President of the United States, January 20, 1961-November 22, 1963
Kennedy, Robert F., Attorney General of the United States
Kent, Sherman, Chairman, Board of National Estimates, Central Intelligence Agency
Khanh, see Nguyen Khanh
Khrushchev, Nikita S., Soviet Premier until mid-October; thereafter, Chairman of the
USSR Council of Ministers
Killen, James S., Director, United States Operations Mission in Saigon
Kim, see Le Van Kim
Koren, Henry L.T., Director, Office of Southeast Asian Affairs, Bureau of Far Eastern
Affairs, Department of State, until April 7, 1964; thereafter Deputy Director for
Coordination, Bureau of Intelligence and Research, Department of State
Krulak, Major General Victor H., USMC, Special Assistant for Counterinsurgency and
Special Activities to the Joint Chiefs of Staff
Ky, see Nguyen Cao Ky
Lam Van Phat, Brigadier General, ARVN, leader of the abortive coup of September 16,
1964
LeMay, General Curtis E., USAF, Chief of Staff of the Air Force
Le Van Kim, Major General, ARVN, Secretary General and Foreign Affairs member of
the Executive Committee of the Military Revolutionary Council until January 30, 1964
Lippmann, Walter, newspaper columnist
Lodge, Henry Cabot, Jr., Ambassador to Vietnam until June 28, 1964
Macapagal, Diosdado, President of the Philippines
MacDonald, Admiral David L., USN, Chief of Naval Operations
Macmillan, Harold S., British Prime Minister until October 1963
Maechling, Charles, Jr., Special Assistant to the Under Secretary of State for Political
Affairs
Manhll, Melvin L., Counselor for Political Affairs in the Embassy in Saigon
Manning, Robert J., Assistant Secretary of State for Public Affairs until July 31, 1964
Mansfield, Michael J., Senator (D-MT), Senate Majority Leader
Mao Tse-tung, Chairman, Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party
Martin, Graham A., Ambassador to Thailand
Martin, Paul J., Canadian Minister of External Affairs
McCafterty, Arthur, member, National Security Council staff
McCone, John A., Director of Central Intelligence
McCormack, John W., Congressman (D-MA), Speaker of the House
McNamara, Robert S., Secretary of Defense
McNaughton, John T., Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs
after March 1964
Mendenhall, Joseph A., Deputy Director of the Office of Southeast Asian Affairs, Bureau
of Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs, Department of State, until April 12, 1964
Minh, see Duong Van Minh
Moore, Major General Joseph H., USAF, Commander, 2d Air Division after January 31,
1964
Morgan, Thomas E., Congressman (D-PA), Chairman of the House Foreign Affairs
Committee
Moyers, Bill D., Deputy Director of the Peace Corps; thereafter Special Assistant to the
President
Murrow, Edward R., Director, United States Information Agency, through January 1964
Nes, David G., Deputy Chief of Mission in Saigon until July 1964
Ngo Dinh Can, brother of Ngo Dinh Diem, convicted of murder, extortion, and misuse of
power and executed on May 9, 1964
Nguyen Cao Ky, Colonel and then Air Commander, VNAF, Commander of the Republic
of Vietnam Air Force; member and spokesman of the Armed Forces Council after
December 18, 1964
Nguyen Khanh, Major General, ARVN, Commander of I Corps; leader of coup of January
30, 1964; Prime Minister of the Republic of Vietnam, February 4-October 30, 1964;
thereafter Commander in Chief of Republic of Vietnam Armed Forces; Chairman of the
Armed Forces Council after December 18, 1964
Nguyen Luu Vien, General, ARVN, Vietnamese Minister of the Interior after November 4
and member of the Armed Forces Council after December 18, 1964
Nguyen Ngo Tho, Vietnamese Prime Minister and Minister of Economy and Finance until
January 30, 1964
Nguyen Ton Hoan, Vietnamese Vice Premier for Civil Pacification Affairs, February 4November 4, 1964
Nguyen Van Thieu, Brigadier General, ARVN, Chief of Staff of the Joint General Staff
and Commander of the ARVN after February 4, 1964
Nguyen Xuan Chu, Chairman of the Vietnamese High National Council, October 30November 5, 1964
Nguyen Xuan Oanh, Vietnamese Minister of Finance and Vice Minister for Economy,
February 4-November 4, 1964
Oanh, see Nguyen Xuan Oanh
O'Brien, Lawrence F., Special Assistant to the President
Pearson, Lester B., Canadian Prime Minister
Pham Huy Quat, Vietnamese Minister of Foreign Affairs, February 4-November 4, 1964
Pham Khac Rau, Counselor and Charge d'Affaires ad interim, Vietnamese Embassy in
Washington
Pham Khac Suu, Chairman of the Vietnamese High National Council, September 26,
1964; Chief of Staff of the Republic of Vietnam after October 26, 1964
Pham Van Dong, Prime Minister of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam
Poats, Rutherford M., Assistant Administrator for the Far East, Agency for International
Development
Procter, Carolyn J., Personal Assistant to Secretary of State Rusk after January 15, 1964
Pye, Lucian, Professor of political Science, Massachusetts Institute of Technology
Read, Benjamin H., Secretary of State's Special Assistant and Executive Secretary of the
Department of State
Reedy, George E., Press Secretary to the President
Rosenthal, James D., consular Officer at the Consulate at Hue
Rostow, Walt W., Counselor and Chairman of the Policy Planning Council, Department
of State
Rowan, Carl T., Director, United States Information Agency, January 21, 1964
Rusk, Dean, Secretary of State
Russell, Richard, Senator (D-GA), member, Senate Armed Services Committee
Sarit Thanarat, Field Marshal, Thailand Prime Minister until December 8, 1963
Seaborn, J. Blair, Canadian Commissioner, International Supervision and Control
Commission, April 1964
Sharp, Vice Admiral Ulysses S.G., Jr., USN, Commander, Pacific Fleet (CINCPACFLT),
April 26, 1964; Commander, Pacific Command (PACOM), April 30, 1964
Shenstone, Michael, First Secretary of the Canadian Embassy in Washington
Shriver, Sargent, Director, Peace Corps
Sihanouk, Prince Norodom, Chief of State of Cambodia
Silver, Solomon, Assistant Program Director with the Agency for International
Development in Saigon; after November 8, 1964, Director, Office of Development
Planning, Bureau of Far East Affairs

Smart, General Jacob E., USAF, Commander, Pacific Air Forces
Smith, Bromley, Executive Secretary, National Security Council
Smith, Colonel William Y., USA, member, National Security Council staff
Solbert, Peter, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs
Stevenson, Adlai E., Representative to the United Nations
Stilwell, Major General Richard G., USA, Commander, U.S. Army Support Command,
Military Assistance Command, Vietnam, March 1, 1964
Stoneman, Walter G., Director, Office of Vietnam Affairs, Agency for International
Development, through winter 1964; Deputy Assistant Administrator, Bureau of Far East
Affairs, April 26, 1964
Sukarno, President of Indonesia
Sullivan, William H., Secretary of State's Special Assistant for Vietnamese Affairs and
head of the interagency Vietnam Coordinating Committee until July 1964; Ambassador to
Laos, November 25, 1964
Suu, see Pham Khac Suu
Sylvester, Arthur, Assistant Secretary of Defense for Public Affairs, March 1964
Tam Chau, Buddhist leader
Taylor, General Maxwell D., USA, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff until June 30
1964; thereafter Ambassador to Vietnam
Thant, U, Secretary-General of the United Nations
Thieu, see Nguyen Van Thieu
Tho, see Nguyen Ngo Tho
Thompson, Llewelyn E., Ambassador at Large; Acting Deputy Under Secretary for
Political Affairs, April 29, 1964
Thompson, Robert G. K., RAF Retired, Chief of the British Advisory Mission to the
Republic of Vietnam
Thomson, James C., Secretary of State's Special Assistant for Far Eastern Affairs;
thereafter member, National Security Council staff
Throckmorton, Lieutenant General John L., USA, Deputy Commander, Military

Assistance Command, Vietnam, August 2, 1964
Ton That Dinh, Major General, ARVN, Vietnamese Minister of Interior until January 30,
1964
Tran Thien Khiem, Lieutenant General, ARVN, Vietnamese Minister of National
Defense, February 4-September 30, 1964
Tran Van Don, General, ARVN, Commander in Chief of the Vietnamese Armed Forces
and Minister of National Defense, until January 30,1964
Tran Van Huong, Vietnamese Prime Minister after November 4,1964
Tran Quoc Buu, President of the Confederation of Vietnamese Trade Congresses
Trimble, William C., Director, Office of West African Affairs, Bureau of African Affairs,
Department of State; former Ambassador to Cambodia (1959-1962)
Tri Quang, Buddhist leader and official of General Buddhist Association
Trueheart, William C., Counselor and Consul General at the Embassy in Saigon until May
10, 1964; thereafter Director, Office of Southeast Asian Affairs, Bureau of Far Eastern
Affairs, Department of State
Tyler, William, Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs
Unger, Leonard, Ambassador to Laos until December 1, 1964
Valeo, Francis R., Secretary for the Majority, U.S. Senate
Valenti, Jack, Special Consultant to the President
Vance, Cyrus R., Secretary of the Army until January 28, 1964; thereafter Deputy
Secretary of Defense
Vien, see Nguyen Luu Vien
Vinson, Carl, Congressman (D-GA), Chairman of the House Armed Services Committee
Vo Nuyen Giap, Vice Premier for Defense, Democratic Republic of Vietnam
Waters, General John K., USA, Commander, U.S. Army, Pacific
Westmoreland, General William C., USA, Deputy Commander of the Military Assistance
Command, Vietnam, January 27-June 19, 1964; thereafter Commander
Wheeler, General Earl G., USA, Chief of Staff of the Army until July 1, 1964; thereafter
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff
Wilson, Donald M., Deputy Director, United States Information Agency

Wilson, James Harold, British Prime Minister from October 16, 1964
Wilson, Colonel Jasper, USA, adviser, Senior Military Assistance Advisory Group, I
Corps
Yost, Charles W., former Ambassador to Laos (1954-1956); Deputy Representative to the
United Nations Security Council from February 13, 1961
Zorthian, Barry, Public Affairs officer in the Embassy in Saigon through June 2, 1964;
thereafter Counselor for Public Affairs

1964-1968, Volume I
Vietnam, 1964
Department of State
Washington, DC
Vietnam/1/
I. The Khanh Coup, January 1-31
1. Message From the Ambassador in Vietnam (Lodge) to the President/2/
Saigon, January 1, 1964.
/1/For documentation on U.S. relations with Vietnam during 1961-1963, see Foreign
Relations, 1961-1963, volumes I-IV
/2/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Heads of State Correspondence,
General Minh Corres. Secret; Eyes Only. Sent over CIA channels from Saigon. The
source text bears neither a telegram number nor time of transmission. Relayed to the
President at his ranch in Texas on receipt at the White House. McGeorge Bundy sent
copies to Rusk and McNamara.
Ref CAP 63663./3/ Many thanks for your public letter to General Minh which I presented
personally this morning at an appointment which I have reported to the State
Department./4/
/3/Foreign Relations, 1961-1963, vol. IV, p. 744.
/4/See Foreign Relations, 1961-1963, vol. IV, pp. 745-747.
Thank you too for your best wishes and warm encouragement to me personally for the
new year, which I heartily reciprocate. I also particularly appreciate your kind words
about my agreeing to serve in Saigon.
I agree that there is much to be done here. It is true that a trend has been arrested which,
had it continued a few months longer would have led inevitably to disaster. We are also
now just beginning to see the full extent of the dry rot and lassitude in the Government of
Viet-Nam and the extent to which we were given inaccurate information. It is also true
that praise is due to President Kennedy for his decision to make changes in U.S. policy
and personnel without which the trend of last summer and autumn would have rocketed
on to certain catastrophe. I am free to say this because, although I agreed with them, I did
not make the policies; I carried them out.
All of this merely underscores the fact that we have a difficult job ahead. But I do not
think that we are being unduly optimistic when I say that we are getting on to the right
track.
Let me assure you that I shall spare no effort to provide the kind of leadership which you
describe. I also believe that I am in a good position to support and advise the Minh
government.
I am happy to read your dismissal of the suggestions that because we belong to different
parties, there may be some political tension between us. To me, knowing you, your
intelligence, and your broad patriotic outlook so well, and also knowing myself, such a
suggestion is fantastic. You are everlastingly right that we are involved in this problem
together and I am glad to see it that way.
You can indeed rely on me: to leave no stone unturned; always to keep you thoroughly
informed; to make all recommendations to you which I think will lead to victory; and to
carry out all your instructions with complete energy and loyalty.
With my warmest and very respectful regards,
Faithfully yours,
Lodge/5/
/5/The telegram bears this typed signature.
2. Memorandum From Senator Mike Mansfield to the President/1/

Washington, January 6, 1964.
SUBJECT
Viet Namese Situation
/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Vietnam Country File, Vol. 11,
Memos and Misc. No classification marking. Attached to the source text is a note from
McGeorge Bundy to Rusk and McNamara, January 6, which reads as follows:
"The President received the enclosed papers this morning from Senator Mansfield, and
asks if each of you would write a personal memorandum of refutation which he can
review and then use with Senator Mansfield if he wishes, not later than Wednesday
morning."
This memo is responsive to your telephone request during Christmas week to Frank
Valeo./2/ I have discussed the request with him and would respectfully refer you to my
memo of December 7th, a copy of which is enclosed./3/
/2/No record of this telephone conversation has been found.
/3/Foreign Relations, 1961-1963, vol. IV, pp. 691-692.

As you remarked to him on the telephone, we do not want another China in Viet Nam. I
would respectfully add to this observation: Neither do we want another Korea. It would
seem that a key (but often overlooked) factor in both situations was a tendency to bite off
more than we were prepared in the end to chew. We tended to talk ourselves out on a limb
with overstatements of our purpose and commitment only to discover in the end that there
were not sufficient American interests to support with blood and treasure a desperate final
plunge. Then, the questions followed invariably: "Who got us into this mess?" "Who lost
China?" etc.
We are close to the point of no return in Viet Nam. A way to avoid another Korea and,
perhaps, another China may be found in the general policy approach suggested in the
memo of December 7th. If so, there ought to be less official talk of our responsibility in
Viet Nam and more emphasis on the responsibilities of the Vietnamese themselves and a
great deal of thought on the possibilities for a peaceful solution through the efforts of
other nations as well as our own.
3. Telegram From the President to the Ambassador in Vietnam (Lodge)/1/

Washington, January 7, 1964--1:40 p.m.
/1/ Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Vietnam Country File, Vol. I,
Pres./Rusk/Lodge Messages. Top Secret; Eyes Only. Sent to Saigon over CIA channels.
CAP 63633. Personal for Ambassador Lodge from the President. At my instruction, John
McCone has searched the rolls of Agency officers to find the ablest senior executive in the
whole outfit for assignment as the new chief of station. I told him that the operation in
Vietnam is an absolutely number one priority. He has nominated, and I have approved the
appointment of [less than 1 line of source text not declassified]. I shall see De Silva when
he is back here, and I will say to him what I now say to you, that it is of the first
importance that there be the most complete understanding and cooperation between you
and him. He will understand that you are the head of the Country Team, and his reputation
in a series of previous appointments of this sort is that of absolutely outstanding
cooperation with the Ambassador. I am concerned not only to sustain effective
cooperation, but to avoid any mutterings in the press. I look to you all to ensure the
complete absence of any backbiting and the establishment and maintenance of a
relationship of genuine trust and understanding at all levels. I cannot overemphasize the
importance which I personally attach to correcting the situation which has existed in
Saigon in the past, and which I saw myself when I was out there./2/
/2/ For documentation on Vice President Johnson's trip to Vietnam, May 11-13, 1961, see
Foreign Relations, 1961-1963, vol. I, pp.135 ff.
4. Memorandum From the President's Special Assistant for National Security

Affairs (Bundy) to the President/1/

/1/ Source: Johnson Library, National Security file, Memos to the President, Vol. I,
McGeorge Bundy. Top Secret; Sensitive. A note on the source text in Bundy's hand reads:
"Read by the P[resident] Jan. 13."
Defense and CIA have together prepared a plan for covert operations against North
Vietnam/2/ which has been reviewed by Rusk, McNamara, McCone and myself, and we
are united in recommending that you approve it. In essence, the proposed program would
involve the following:
/2/The joint draft plan, the basis for Operations Plan (OPLAN) 34A-64, January 3, was
outlined in a 3-page covering memorandum to the President to be signed by McCone,
McNamara, and Rusk. The program of operations had as its premise that North Vietnam
directed and supported the Viet Cong in South Vietnam through a radio network and
through infiltration of cadres, weapons, and materiel from Laos and Cambodia. To
demonstrate to North Vietnam the risk it ran in supporting the insurgency in the South, an
interdepartmental committee under Krulak recommended a 4-month program of covert
operations against North Vietnam beginning on February 1. The program was designed
primarily to convince the North Vietnamese that it was in their economic self-interest to
desist from aggression in South Vietnam. Attached to the covering memorandum were a
3-page annotated target list and a map. (Ibid.)
1. Expansion of intelligence collection by U-2 and by communications/electronics
intelligence missions.
2. Expansion of psychological operations by leaflet drops and phantom covert operations
and increased black and white radio broadcasts from South Vietnam.
3. Intensified sabotage operations in North Vietnam by Vietnamese personnel.
Sabotage and propaganda operations in North Vietnam in the last year and a half have
been most disappointing. The operators now believe that substantial improvements can be
achieved, and the policy officers are all in favor of trying.
Specific views are as follows: McNamara is highly enthusiastic. McCone thinks you
should understand that no great results are likely from this kind of effort. Rusk is
favorable; while he believes 98% of the problem is in South Vietnam and not in crossborder operations, he thinks that an increase in such operations will help to persuade
Hanoi that we have no intention of quitting, and may help also to put muscle behind our
argument that the trouble comes from the north and that when that trouble stops, our
presence in South Vietnam can become unnecessary.
I myself recommend that you approve this general program for detailed development of
operational plans in the field, these plans in turn to be reviewed as usual within the
Government by the Special Group which monitors all covert programs. You may recall
that this group consists of McCone, Gilpatric, Alexis Johnson and myself.
McG. B.
5. Letter From the Director of Central Intelligence (McCone) to the Secretary of

State/1/
/1/ Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 VIET S. Secret. A copy was sent
to McGeorge Bundy. Rusk's initials appear on the source text.
Dear Dean: It was apparent when Secretary McNamara and I visited Saigon in
December/2/ that information furnished to us from MACV and the Embassy concerning
the current Viet Cong activities in a number of provinces and the relative position of the
SVN Government vs. the Viet Cong Forces was incorrect, due to the fact that the field
officers of the MAAG and USOM had been grossly misinformed by the province and
district chiefs. It was reported to us, and I believe correctly, that the province and district
chiefs felt obliged to "create statistics" which would meet the approbation of the Central
Government.
/2/McCone was in Vietnam, December 18-20, and McNamara December 19-20, 1963. For
their reports to the President, see Foreign Relations, 1961-1963, vol. IV, pp. 721-738.
I believe it is quite probable that the same practice might be repeated by the new province
and district chiefs appointed by the MRC. Furthermore, it is obviously quite difficult for
the United States civilian and military personnel to overtly audit the reporting in detail by
on-site visits to all areas, villages and hamlets.
I therefore propose developing a new covert method of checking on information on the
progress of the war and the counterinsurgency efforts. The details of this plan are outlined
in the attached memorandum./3/
3 [Footnote (7 lines of text) not declassified]
I should like to discuss this plan at today's meeting./4/ Obviously its implementation and
success is contingent upon the support of both State and Defense, and the issuance of
appropriate orders to the Ambassador and MACV. I also believe the plan should be
reviewed with higher authority in the interest of securing his endorsement.
/4/ There was an NSC meeting on January 7, 4:10-5 p.m., which McCone and Rusk
attended, but Vietnam was not on the agenda. Johnson Library, President's Daily Diary)
The reference is more likely to an Executive branch oversight meeting on covert
operations of which no record has been found.
Sincerely,
John
6. Message From the President to the Ambassador in Vietnam (Lodge)/1/

/1/ Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 23 VIET S. Secret; Priority; Exdis.
This message was sent by the White House to the Department of State for transmission. It
was cleared by Ball and sent as telegram 1031 to Saigon, which is the source text.
I have read with great interest your 1257,/2/ and I want you to know at once that any
program which you recommend in this area will have my very strong support in principle.
From all that I have heard, I could not be more in agreement that political energy is at the
center of the government's problem in South Vietnam. I cannot spare Larry O'Brien, but I
can and will get you just about anyone else. I am asking all agencies here to prepare a
coordinated and constructive response showing what we can do to help you in executing
this idea, but I want you to know immediately of my personal support.
/2/ In telegram 1257, January 6, Lodge stated: "The war cannot be won without there
being the rough equivalent of a nation-wide precinct organization so that ultimately every
family in Vietnam will be known to precinct worker and the government will become
favorably known to every family." Lodge suggested that this was something on which
President Johnson's own personal advice would be "precious," and also asked if the
services "of such a top flight political organizer as Lawrence O'Brien" could be made
available. (Ibid.)
Lyndon B. Johnson/3/
/3/ Telegram 1031 bears this typed signature.
7. Memorandum From Michael V. Forrestal of the National Security Council Staff

to the President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy)/1/
/1/ Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Vietnam Country File, Vol. II,
Memos and Misc. Secret.
SUBJECT
Reporting on the Situation in South Vietnam
I looked at John McCone's letter of January 7 to Dean Rusk./2/ I see nothing wrong with
attempting to improve the reporting system out of Saigon. As you are well aware, the
great difficulties we had to live through last August and September resulted largely from a
nearly complete breakdown of the Government's ability to get accurate assessments of the
situation in the Vietnamese country-side. The more we learn about the situation today, the
more obvious it becomes that the excessively mechanical system of statistical reporting
which had been devised in Washington and applied in Saigon was giving us a grotesquely
inaccurate picture. Once again it is the old problem of having people who are responsible
for operations also responsible for evaluating the results.
/2/Document 5.
John McCone has made a great effort, aided and abetted by Lodge, to get his people out of
all except a few operations in South Vietnam. He has been trying to put them back into
the intelligence business, and I think we should encourage him to do so.
Bob McNamara is now equally aware of the reporting failure, and sincerely desires to do
something about it. I have the impression, however, that the military system of reporting
will not be responsive to the problem; and unless McNamara can create a separate
reporting staff outside the chain of command, he won't get very far. McNamara faces
considerable difficulty in accepting the thought that CIA should take on a separate
reporting function. His problem is that to do so is an implied criticism of the Saigon
command and its uniformed counterpart in Washington. If John is discreet enough and if
his efforts are very low key, McNamara's problem will be reduced. One way of doing this
is not to send large numbers of new CIA people into the field, but to utilize the civilians
we already have there from whom the most accurate reporting has come in the past. The
Agency's function could be coordination and evaluation./3/
/3/A revised plan for a covert spot-check on counterinsurgency reporting, reflecting in
part these concerns, was sent by McCone to Rusk and Bundy on January 9. (Department
of State, Central Files, POL 23 VIET S)
I think John's efforts should be encouraged along these lines, something which I will do at
subterranean levels if you agree.
Mike

/1/ Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Vietnam Country File, Vol. II,
Memos and Misc. Confidential.
SUBJECT
Comments on Senator Mansfield's memorandum on Vietnam/2/
/2/Document 2.
On Monday/3/ you asked for short comments by Rusk, McNamara, and myself on Senator
Mansfield's memorandum on Vietnam. These comments are attached--Rusk at Tab A,
McNamara at Tab B, and Bundy at Tab C. The Mansfield memorandum itself is at Tab D.
I have two small additional comments, as an ex-historian:
/3/ January 6; see footnote 1, Document 2.
The political damage to Truman and Acheson from the fall of China arose because most
Americans came to believe that we could and should have done more than we did to
prevent it. This is exactly what would happen now if we should seem to be the first to quit
in Saigon.
Mansfield's analogy with Korea neglects the fact that a very solid anti-Communist base
existed in South Korea when the armistice was worked out in 1953. Moreover, the U.S.
presence has continued. There is literally no comparison between this solution and
proposals for "neutralization" and U.S. withdrawal in the present situation in South
Vietnam. When we are stronger, then we can face negotiation.
Perhaps you can trade with Mike Mansfield: his support for the war effort against our
support, which is real, for new and energetic political, social, and economic programs in
South Vietnam.
McG. B.
Tab A
Memorandum From the Secretary of State to the President/4/
/4/ Confidential. Also published in Declassified Documents, 1982, 002001.
SUBJECT
Viet-Nam
I am attaching an unclassified statement on our policy toward Viet-Nam which bears upon
Senator Mansfield's two memoranda to you./5/
/5/ See Document 2 and footnote 3 thereto.
In addition, the following points should be made:
(a) It has been made repeatedly clear to Moscow by me personally that U.S. military
activities in Southeast Asia would cease if Hanoi would leave its neighbors alone. Similar
messages have been sent, through a variety of channels, to Hanoi. We have made it clear
that we are not interested in U.S. military bases or a military position in Southeast Asia./6/
/6/ Reference is to Rusk's answers to questions asked at a news conference on November
8, 1963; see American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1963, p. 880.
(b) Peiping and Hanoi are defying the Geneva Accords on Southeast Asia, both those of
1954 and the more recent Geneva Accord on Laos./7/ There is little reason to suppose,
therefore, that a diplomatic effort to obtain still another Accord of that type would cause
Peiping and Hanoi to leave their neighbors alone.
/7/For text of the Agreement on the Cessation of Hostilities in Vietnam, July 20, 1954, see
Foreign Relations, 1952-1954, vol. XVI, pp. 1505-1520. For the Declaration and Protocol
on the Neutrality of Laos, July 23 1962, see 14 UST 1104.
(c) The proposal for the "neutralization" of South Viet-Nam is a phony. I have proposed
to Gromyko, and he has rejected, the idea that there be a neutralization of both parts of
Viet-Nam, North and South. He said that North Viet-Nam is a part of the "socialist camp"
and that that cannot be changed./8/ What the communists mean by "neutralization" of
South Viet-Nam is a regime which would have no support from the West and would be an
easy prey to a communist takeover.
/8/Apparent reference to a Rusk-Gromyko-Home discussion at the United Nations on
September 28, 1963. When Rusk related this conversation to Couve de Murville on
October 7,1963, he recalled that "on Vietnam, there was a complete
impasse." (Department of State, Secretary's Memoranda of Conversation: Lot 65 D 330)
(d) I have discussed Viet-Nam with President deGaulle and he has no interest in the kind
of "neutralization" which the communists talk about. His attitude toward the eventual
settlement of Viet-Nam is very close to our own.
(e) The argument is made that there could be no long-term settlement of Southeast Asia
without the agreement of Peiping. But this depends upon what Peiping will agree to.
There has been no evidence thus far that Peiping would agree to genuinely independent
neighbors in Southeast Asia. If any such possibility opens up, we would move promptly;
our own moves in that direction have been repeatedly rebuffed. We are now studying
whether Mr. Khrushchev's most recent message on "territorial disputes" can offer any
fresh opening./9/
/9/ Reference is to a letter, December 31, 1963, from Chairman Khrushchev to President
Johnson on the subject of peaceful settlement of territorial disputes; see American Foreign
Policy: Current Documents, 1963, pp. 938-940.
Dean Rusk
Attachment to Tab A
U.S. POLICY ON VIET-NAM
When President Kennedy announced, in December 1961, that the United States would
increase our assistance to help the Republic of Vietnam preserve its independence, he
made clear that this assistance had a limited objective. As he told the Vietnamese at that
time "If the Communist authorities in North Vietnam will stop their campaign to destroy
the Republic of Vietnam, the measures we are taking to assist your defense efforts will no
longer be necessary."/10/
/10/ Letter from President Kennedy to President Diem, December 14, 1961; American
Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1961, pp. 1056-1057.
On many subsequent occasions, this government has reiterated its desire to see genuinely
established in the former Indo Chinese states that truce which was negotiated in Geneva in
1954, but which the North Vietnamese have arrogantly abrogated ever since. We have
stipulated that our intention in Southeast Asia is not to establish a position of Western
strength, but to see there a community of independent states, with the confidence that they
can develop free from the constant terror of subversive warfare. We believe this goal is
very much the same as Senator Mansfield has described as "a Southeast Asia less
dependent on our aid-resources and support, less under our control, not cut off from China
but still not overwhelmed by China."
Our basic objectives, therefore, coincide with those suggested by Senator Mansfield. But
we differ sharply with him on the means by which these objectives can be achieved. We
do not believe that North Vietnam's terrorism can be called off by "an astute diplomatic
offensive" at this time. While diplomacy may eventually play a role, we believe this will
happen only after the North Vietnamese become convinced that they cannot succeed in
destroying the Republic of Vietnam by guerrilla warfare. "Political and social acts of
popular benefit" are an essential part in preserving the Republic against destruction. But
these acts can only become possible if military successes against the marauders make
feasible an unfettered exchange of confidence between the people in the villages and the
government in Saigon. We believe the fight against the Viet Cong can be won without
major and direct United States involvement provided the new South Vietnamese
Government takes the proper political, economic and social actions to win the support of
the rural people and uses its armed forces effectively.
We further believe that only such a victory will give the people of Vietnam and of all
Southeast Asia the confidence they need to establish that community of states which both
we and Senator Mansfield desire. As General Duong Van Minh, Chairman of the Military
Revolutionary Council in South Vietnam recently stated, neutralism cannot be considered
until South Vietnam is strong. And peace will not prevail in Southeast Asia until
aggression is frustrated.
Any "truce" which might be "won now in Vietnam" would be bought at a price which I
am convinced would eventually prove far more costly to us than the peace which we hope
to see established there by the action of the new South Vietnamese Government. I am also
convinced that the overwhelming majority of the American people agree with me.
Tab B
Memorandum From the Secretary of Defense (McNamara) to the President/11/
/11/Secret.
SUBJECT
Comment on Memoranda by Senator Mansfield
I recommend the following points in your conversation with Senator Mansfield.
1. We should certainly stress that the war is essentially a Vietnamese responsibility, and
this we have repeatedly done, particularly in our announced policy on U.S. troop
withdrawal./12/ At the same time we cannot disengage U.S. prestige to any significant
degree. U.S. news reports are bound to place a heavy U.S. cast on the action. Moreover,
the whole history of our support of South Vietnam going back to 1954 makes it inevitable
that the U.S. is deeply involved, and this would have been true even if we had not made
the decision to intervene on a substantial scale in the fall of 1961.
2. The security situation is serious, but we can still win, even on present ground rules. The
government has experienced extreme turmoil incident to the coup d'etat. Almost every
key official from the head of State to the village mayor has been changed, as well as most
of the military leaders. Order, cohesion and direction are only now beginning to appear. In
the past few days there have been early evidences of strength and resolution. The military
command structure has been further streamlined, more combat forces have been
concentrated in the critical provinces and there is direct response to our urging to
consolidate and strengthen strategic hamlets on a systematic basis. In any case, the current
dry season in the Delta is the critical time, and the next four months will disclose whether
the new government can establish its presence in terms of a cohesive base of popular
confidence. During that period anything other than exhibitions of resolution and
encouragement on our part could do serious hurt to the Vietnamese cause.
3. Senator Mansfield's suggestion about dividing South Vietnam by present areas of
control is impractical. The GVN exercises some degree of control throughout the country.
The same is true with the Viet Cong. In much of the country the people are more
committed to peace and security than to any political organization, and there could be no
negotiated division which would be a meaningful reflection of political control. More
basically, although the present government has popular support--probably more than any
predecessor--it could not survive a partition. Any deal either to divide the present territory
of South Vietnam or to "neutralize" South Vietnam would inevitably mean a new
government in Saigon that would in short order become Communist-dominated. By
hypothesis, any such "division" or "neutralization" would involve complete U.S.
withdrawal, and the situation would then collapse.
4. The consequences of a Communist-dominated South Vietnam are extremely serious
both for the rest of Southeast Asia and for the U.S. position in the rest of Asia and indeed
in other key areas of the world.
a. In Southeast Asia, Laos would almost certainly come under North Vietnamese
domination, Cambodia might exhibit a facade of neutrality but would in fact accept
Communist Chinese domination Thailand would become very shaky, and Malaysia,
already beset by Indonesia, the same; even Burma would see the developments as a clear
sign that the whole of the area now had to accommodate completely to Communism (with
serious consequences for the security of India as well).
Basically, a truly "neutral" Southeast Asia is very unlikely to emerge from such a
sequence of events, even if the U.S. itself tried to hold a firm position in Thailand, if
Malaysia too tried to stand firm and even if such remote and uninvolved powers as France
backed the concept of "neutrality."
b. In the eyes of the rest of Asia and of key areas threatened by Communism in other areas
as well, South Vietnam is both a test of U.S. firmness and specifically a test of U.S.
capacity to deal with "wars of national liberation." Within Asia, there is evidence--for
example, from Japan--that U.S. disengagement and the acceptance of Communist
domination would have a serious effect on confidence. More broadly, there can be little
doubt that any country threatened in the future by Communist subversion would have
reason to doubt whether we would really see the thing through. This would apply even in
such theoretically remote areas as Latin America.
5. Thus, the stakes in preserving an anti-Communist South Vietnam are so high that, in
our judgment, we must go on bending every effort to win. In the final analysis, Senator
Mansfield is challenging what he regards as the gross imbalance between the extent of our
involvement in Southeast Asia and our narrow self-interests in the area. My assessment of
our important security interests is that they unquestionably call for holding the line against
further Communist gains. And, I am confident that the American people are by and large
in favor of a policy of firmness and strength in such situations.
Robert S. McNamara
Tab C
Memorandum From the President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs
(Bundy) to the President/13/
/13/ Secret. Also published in Declassified Documents, 1978, 128B.
SUBJECT
Senator Mansfield's Views on South Vietnam
1. To neutralize South Vietnam today, or even for the United States Government to seem
to move in that direction, would mean the following:
a. A rapid collapse of anti-Communist forces in South Vietnam, and a unification of the
whole country on Communist terms.
b. Neutrality in Thailand, and increased influence for Hanoi and Peking.
c. Collapse of the anti-Communist position in Laos.
d. Heavy pressure on Malaya and Malaysia.
e. A shift toward neutrality in Japan and the Philippines.
f. Blows to U. S. prestige in South Korea and Taiwan which would require compensating
increases in American commitment there--or else further retreat.
2. We may have to move in these painful directions, but we should do so only when there
is a much stronger demonstration that our present course cannot work. If we neutralize, it
should not be because we have quit but because others have. Today a move in this
direction would be regarded as betrayal by the new regime in Saigon and by all antiCommunist Vietnamese. There are enough of them to lose us an election.
3. The right course is to continue to strengthen our struggle against the Communist terror
(which is exactly what it is). For this we need new and stronger leadership in the U.S.
effort. In particular, we need a wholly rejuvenated military command and a rapidly
stepped-up political effort of the sort which Lodge has at last recommended./14/
/14/ Apparent reference to Lodge's presentation of 11 points to the Government of
Vietnam on January 1; see Foreign Relations, 1961-1963, vol. IV, pp. 745-747.
4. I take it from his memorandum that Senator Mansfield would agree with this
recommendation but would add that we should engage in diplomatic feelers with the
French and should show more sympathy to the Cambodians. I disagree about the French
because such feelers would inevitably stir talk of neutralization at the wrong time. I agree
about soothing the Cambodians and believe that we have been heavy-han~ded in this area
in recent weeks.
McG. B.
9. Memorandum From the Chairman of the Policy Planning Council (Rostow) to the
Secretary of State/1/
/1/ Source: Department of State, S/P Files: Lot 70 D 199, Southeast Asia. Secret. Copies
were also sent to Ball, Harriman, and U. Alexis Johnson. Rusk's initials appear on the
source text. Also published in Declassified Documents, 1977, 147C.
SUBJECT
Southeast Asia and China
Three forces are converging which might well produce the greatest setback to US interests
on the world scene in many years.
1. The rise in South Vietnam of a popular mood, spreading into the bureaucracy and the
armed forces, that neither the South Vietnam government nor the US has a viable concept
for winning the war and that a neutralized South Vietnam is the only way out.
2. A spread of neutralist thought and feeling in Thailand as well as Cambodia; and the
growing judgment in Indonesia that we shall fail in South Vietnam and that the National
Liberation Front, supported by Hanoi, will win.
3. De Gaulle's campaign both to encourage neutralist feeling in Southeast Asia and to
bring about the Chinese Communist entrance into the UN.

Many of these despairing neutralist elements were also present in the wake of
Dienbienphu and the outcome of the Geneva Conference of 1954. They were reversed by
vigorous US diplomatic action, including the negotiation of the Manila Pact, the creation
of SEATO and a strengthening of the position in South Vietnam itself.
It may be that actions now taken within South Vietnam itself, military and political, can
retrieve the present situation or hold it short of a definitive crisis through the calendar year
1964; but from such evidence as is available to me, this appears doubtful. I return,
therefore, to the concept of a direct political-military showdown with Hanoi over the
question of its direct operation of the war in South Vietnam including infiltration of men
and supplies./2/
/2/Rostow was referring to memoranda which he sent Rusk on November 28, 1962, and
November 1, 1963. In these memoranda, both of which Rusk saw, Rostow argued that the
United States should confront Hanoi with the choice of ceasing to direct and support the
war in the South or accepting retaliatory military damage in the North. Neither is printed.
If we succeed in forcing Hanoi to respect the provisions of the Geneva Accords of 1962
this would have profound psychological and political effects throughout Asia; and we
might then be able to deal with the gathering forces designed to put Communist China
into the UN from a position of poise. But until it is demonstrated that the game of "Wars
of National Liberation" is not viable and that the borders of China and North Vietnam are
firm, the acceptance of Communist China within the world community and in the UN
could be a major disaster. The present combination of circumstances, if not reversed,
would signal to those on the spot that we have granted Chinese Communist hegemony in
Southeast Asia.
10. Telegram From the Embassy in Vietnam to the Department of State/1/

Saigon, January 10, 1964--6 p.m.
/1/ Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 23 VIET. Secret; Limdis. A note on
another copy of this telegram reads as follows: "MAC: This is worth your looking at.
Lodge may be a little fuzzy, but there is at least a sense of give and take. Mike
Forrestal." (Johnson Library, National Security File, Vietnam Country File, Vol. II,
Cables)
1290. A two-hour meeting with Generals Minh, Don, Kim, PriMin Tho, Ministers Quang
and Lam, parts of which are being reported in separate telegrams./2/ I had prepared some
questions in French so that we could all concentrate conversation on the same subject. I
read these questions aloud as follows:/3/
/2/ Reference is to telegrams 1287 and 1288 from Saigon, both January 10, 5 p.m. In
telegram 1287, Lodge reported that after the 2-hour meeting with the Generals, General
Kim told him that the 11 points which Lodge had made to Minh on January I (see footnote
14, Document 8) were already being implemented by the government with the exception
of point 8, early revitalization of the amnesty program, which was still under study.
(Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 VIET S) In telegram 1288, Lodge reported
that Generals Kim and Minh spoke of "the extreme undesirability" of U.S. advisers going
into the districts and villages because they would seem "more imperialistic than the
French" and their presence would substantiate Viet Cong charges that the government was
a U.S. "lackey." Minh was also unimpressed with Vietnamese who worked directly for the
United States, since they were viewed by the people in the same way "as the Vietnamese
who worked for the Japanese during the war." Generals Minh and Don complained of
special U.S. support for the Cao Dai and Hoa Hao who they believed were trying to play
the United States off against South Vietnam. Finally the Generals asked the United States
to stop supporting financially a Vietnamese student group which they maintained was
involved in anti-French demonstrations. (Ibid., POL 23 VIET S)
/3/The paper from which Lodge read is in the Massachusetts Historical Society, Lodge II
Papers, Box 123, Vietnam.
"I. Aim:"
"Is this the aim? That: in the seven key provinces the government's writ runs day and
night; the ordinary person can sleep throughout the night without fear; government
officials need only minimum police protection; and that the seven provinces become a
'show case' end as secure as Saigon is now."
"II. How to achieve it?"
"What orders have been issued by the central government to reach above objective? For
example, is the Long An Province Chief getting one set of orders? And is he getting
enough people to help him? Is there a pacification directive? If a pacification directive is
in existence, what are its provisions as regards:"
A. Political
B. Military
"III. What is being done under A (Political)?"
"1. How is it that the VC guerrillas put up such a tough and relentless fight without
helicopters? Obviously because they believe in something; the Communists have
conveyed to these men clear picture of a program which they think will make life better.
We have not. They are also well organized politically; we are not."
"2. What, therefore, are we doing to enunciate a political program in terms people can
understand, which will at a very minimum remove age-old inequities and the grievances
which these have caused and which will also make honest promises of constructive
improvement for the future--a doctrine which can be applied meticulously from the
grassroots up, in which deeds will be matching words and which can be communicated
effectively and repeatedly to the people?"
"3. Will there be an active national information program, using the extensive
communications apparatus now available to contrast your program with that of
Communism?"
"4. Such a program must go hand in hand with the military security measures considered
under B because when the military achieve security, the people will then be in a position
to make a choice. Now they are in no position to choose anything because they are
terrified and can only think of survival. What then are we doing to see to it that when they
are in a position to make a choice, they choose our side rather than the other? For it is
when they choose our side that they will have destroyed the infrastructure of the VC--and
we are much more interested in destroying the infrastructure, the very base of the VC,
than we are in killing individual VC."
"5. Should not such a program assure them:"
of our interest in their security,
improve their facilities for education,
reform the system of land ownership (so as to at least be competitive with VC)
abolish favoritism,
eliminate exorbitant taxation and forced labor (where labor is not for manifest benefit of
people performing it),
improve health,
protect people from extortionists?
"6. In your speech to the Council of Notables/4/ you spoke in general terms of a domestic
program. Why not amplify this, with specific illustrations named in paragraph 5?"
/4/A summary of and extract from the speech, which the Embassy characterized as
commendable "for its anti-Communist and anti-neutralist tone and for its sincere tribute to
democratic values," is in telegram 1246 from Saigon, January 2. (Department of State,
Central Files. POL 15 VIET S)
"6. [7.] We are advised that the GVN has increased troop strength in Long An but that the
VC have simply shifted from military to political tactics and are defeating us politically.
This is the old Mao Tse-tung maxim "fight, fight, talk, talk". We are, therefore, as yet
essentially no better off in Long An than we were. We are at present overwhelmingly
outclassed politically because there is literally no Vietnamese corps of junior
governmental/political workers to carry out directives of the GVN. Province Chief,
although excellent, cannot possibly cover all the strategic hamlets. At present of 219
strategic hamlets in the province the government controls 20, and 40 have been
completely abandoned."
"8. Can war be won without there being the rough equivalent of a nation-wide precinct
organization so that ultimately every family in Vietnam will be known to a precinct
worker? In the case of Long An this means eventually three teams of eight men each for
each of six districts--a total of 144 men. I understand that this would cover the entire
population of the province. These men must be competent, enthusiastic, and well trained.
Eventually and ideally they should be local men, but this is not possible in Long An at
present. The men that are sent in should look for promising local men and turn
responsibility over to them."
"9. Must not these men sleep in the hamlets? That is the first and most important
commandment, for this makes clear as nothing else can that the government is truly
interested in the security of the people. Then, in addition to [garble] for local talent, these
men should systematically maintain contact with each hamlet, counter the Viet Cong
propaganda, and explain the new MRC and its program for the country. This means MRC
must have a program which is truly competitive with Communism. On such a program
item no. 1 must be security which will never be believable unless MRC workers sleep in
the hamlet."
"10. Can you not recruit an elite group here in Saigon to work in Long An, said men to be
withdrawn as soon as they have built a local corps, for the purpose of training others for
other provinces? Should not an intensive program of schooling be started to build up a
corps like this for all of the other 42 provinces in Vietnam?"
"11. Should not these men actively promote General Minh's program for the nation? They
certainly should not be sent into the provinces unless there is something for them to do.
They could be kept busy initially, carrying out the local program which is now going on,
involving cement, well drilling, insecticides, pesticides, roofing and building of schools."
"12. The above is not the old civic action program. This old program was for propaganda,
whereas what we here suggest is for performance. The old program aimed to keep a
certain group in power whereas this program aims to give Vietnam a political organization
which can compete with the political organization of the Viet Cong."
1. When I finished reading, PriMin Tho said that there was much in the paper which was
good, but that there were some things that could not be done now. On the matter of taxes
and rents, they were planning to cancel all the repayments due from farmers to owners
over the next 12 years, which would amount to 500 million piastres.
2. General Minh said that they had already reduced taxes from 40 per cent to 20 per cent
on houses and on farms used for habitation.
3. When I commented that I was following events in Vietnam very closely, and had not
heard of this, General Don replied "That is why we have changed the Information
Minister".
4. General Minh continued that they were suppressing the taxes paid by Vietnamese
students abroad. This would entail a 75 million piastre loss.
5. They agreed on the importance of public support for the government and felt that public
support for them was improving. General Kim said that during last Sunday's/5/ clear and
hold operations in Long An by the airborne battalion, information was given to them by
peasants on the location of 50 fresh VC corpses. They had actual photographs of the
corpses which they showed me and which evidently were not decomposed at all.
/5/January 5.
6. General Minh felt they were getting really well organized on the elimination of the key
VC in each village. General Kim said this kind of thing was much better done locally, and
not by bringing in people from Saigon.
7. General Minh felt that, referring to my number III, para 1, the Vietnamese people were
really not actuated much by having a clear picture of a program. If, he said, I were to go
into California and divide it all up into 3-acre lots and give it away, the people to whom I
gave it would be pleased, but this was not a question of ideology so much as a question of
banditry.
8. I agreed that there was a lot of banditry in it, but that ideology was also involved. He
agreed and said that he had made a declaration of a domestic program in his speech of Jan
2.
9. When I applauded his speech, but pointed out that it was largely generalities, he said
that he as the Chief of State had to deal in generalities and that it was up to Tho to give the
details.
10. When I said that a Chief of State would make more of an impression if he dealt in
things that were concrete, he finally agreed and said that on February 13, he was making a
statement on amnesty and for giving land owners the purchase price for their 3 hectares
which they had bought under the Diem regime.
11. On the question of building a sort of political machine, he pointed out that they were
creating a "Council of Notables" in each village which, in all but 10 percent of the villages
in Vietnam, would consist of local people. They would be the ones to expound the
program, know the people, and to serve as a link between the people and the government.
12. General Kim, with obvious agreement from the rest, spoke of the great helpfulness of
USIS, notably in the tracts which they made available to province officials. But he did
hope that all USIS activities would be done "hand in hand" with the province people, and
General Kim volunteered to give advice to USIS personnel himself. He commented that
the Long An Province Chief had decided not to use the atrocity photographs which USIS
had provided during the Diem regime.
13. I then raised the question of intensifying the Chieu Hoi program./6/ General Kim said
that it had some definite value but that too much could never be expected from it. The
people who "fight against us" are, broadly speaking, in 3 categories--(1) the hard-core
Communists whom no Chieu Hoi program can reach; (2) the nationalists who are against
French, Japanese, and American "imperialism", many of whom are already under
Communist influence; (3) those who joined the VC because they were pursued by the
Diem police because of the Buddhist troubles, or something similar.
/6/The Vietnamese Government's amnesty program which aimed at resuming Viet Cong
to government control. See Foreign Relations, 1961-1963, vol. III, p. 229.
Note: The VC Chief who kept the American, Krause, a prisoner for 5-1/2 months, had
become a VC because the Diem police had killed his father, beaten his mother to death,
and had made it clear he had no future whatever if he stayed in Saigon. End of note.
14. General Kim said it was obvious that only limited results could be obtained from the
Chieu Hoi program and nothing whatever with regard to categories 1 and 2. The important
thing, he said, with evident agreement by all present, was to "keep what we have" and
make it impossible for the VC to recruit any more.
15. On the matter of night operations, he said these were going on and that the Long An
Province Chief had reported that in November there were 30 night operations and in
December more than 200.
16. Many were not used to fighting at night and Kim was looking for new tactics and
planned to consult General Harkins and General York. For example, carbines were not
much use at night, and perhaps shotguns would be better.
17. On the matter of rewards to encourage night fighting, it was largely a question of
money with which to buy information. In Long An there was 20,000 piastres a month
allotted for this purpose, which was not very much. He would like to see money taken
away from "useless projects" so that they could do more of this.
18. I said I hoped he would give me a list of "useless projects", because no one would like
to suppress them more than I would.
19. In response to another question of mine, he said that firm and constant pressure was
being exercised by the government, that now they had a real wartime general staff, a real
command situation and not a peacetime style of organization such as they had before.
They are prepared to "cut off a man's head" for unsatisfactory performance and had
already done so. In fact, he cited a case of a Colonel Dao who had had two SDC executed
for looting.
20. He gave me the new list of the 7 provinces in which they were concentrating their
efforts and asked whether this was satisfactory to us: Long An, Binh Duong, Hau Nghia,
Dinh Tuong, Hien Hoa, Tay Ninh and Kien Tuong.
Comment: In their own way, these men are obviously trying to put out a program and
create a sort of political organization to serve as a link between them and the people. They
are obviously not as concerned with ideology as I am. Their Council of Notables in each
village is obviously not what I had in mind. I still think my emphasis is about right, but I
also recognize that they know this country much better than I do. These men are
obviously intelligent, very hard working, and are giving this whole effort everything
they've got. Believe we should work with these Councils of Notables as the best thing
available.
Lodge
11. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Vietnam/1/

/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 VIET S. Secret; Priority. Drafted
by Mendenhall; cleared by McGeorge Bundy, Hilsman, Poats (in draft and substance),
William Bundy, and Krulak (both in draft); and approved by Harriman. Repeated to
CINCPAC.
1055. CINCPAC for POLAD. Saigon pass COMUSMACV for Harkins. Joint
State/Defense/Aid Message. In elaboration of brain trust concept suggested by General
Minh and accepted by President Johnson (our 1000),/2/ it is our view here that high-level
advisors may be essential key to instilling ingredient most sorely lacking in GVN:
efficiency and urgency of action. Minh's invitation to establish brain trust and readiness to
accept US advice and cooperation which it connotes should be seized upon as avenue to
increase guidance of new government along proper lines in effective conduct of war.
What we have in mind is advisors working directly with Vietnamese officials on day-today implementation of agreed policy lines. They would, of course, be completely
responsible to you for policy guidance and would in no sense supplant your policy role
with top GVN officials nor would they infringe direct and comprehensive military
advisory role of COMUSMACV. On contrary they would be continuously implementing
policy Country Team urges on GVN and would in effect be extension your arm into key
sectors GVN by maintaining closest possible liaison between Country Team and key
GVN officials. We believe that this new link should reinforce, not compete with,
influence of Country Team members. We recognize such advisors must operate behind
the scenes and that their persistent prodding must be done with great tact. We believe this
can be done and it is essential to do it to reverse war trend.
Specifically, we think it would be useful to begin by assigning three senior experienced
full-time advisors (plus necessary assistants) to work with top levels of GVN. One would
be senior FSO working with General Minh and Premier Tho on broad program
implementation; second would be ranking AID official working with GVN
counterinsurgency and economic officials, especially those dealing with rural programs;
and third would be high ranking military officer provided by COMUSMACV to represent
him in working with Minister of Defense and Joint General Staff particularly on
coordination military policy with other related programs. (In economic area this would not
supplant joint committee work in which Kaysen and Silver involved.) Other advisors
might be added later depending on experience we gain in these operations.
We envisage these advisors as team subordinate individually to their respective Country
Team principal but working closely with each other and advisors who are already
assigned within, for example, Joint General Staff, as well as with high-level Vietnamese
officials whom they are advising. Primary task this team will be to advise and assist GVN
in coordinating policies and programs related to war effort, in issuance implementing
instructions and funding for policies and programs to lower echelons, and in following up
to help insure action is taken at lower echelons. They would necessarily require full
support of Embassy, USOM, and MACV. We would not expect them to prepare policy or
technical proposals; we would expect them to contribute to proposals developed by the
Country Team elements and to help gain effective Vietnamese implementation. Examples
include coordination of plans for military clear-and-hold operations with follow-up
program for protection villagers, assistance in preparation of directives for this follow-up
program (whether it be strategic hamlet program or some modification of that program),
amnesty program and Minh's domestic Peace Corps proposal. These advisors will, in
other words, assist top-level GVN officials and Country Team members by helping to
serve as coordinators and expediters of actions to implement policies decided upon by
GVN officials.
We contemplate that American assistants to these officers be Vietnamese language
officers (like Helble and Rosenthal) to maximum extent possible to achieve optimum
efficiency. Both advisors and assistants should have office space in GVN buildings close
to officials they advise.
We know that extent of direct US involvement envisaged in concept set forth here may be
somewhat greater than General Minh had in mind in suggesting the brain trust idea. If we
can put forth right people, however, we think it likely that he and other generals will
welcome this further evidence of our determination to do everything possible to help
them. We think advantages from our point of view quite clear. Unless you or Harkins find
difficulties with concept, you are authorized to discuss it with General Minh at early
opportunity./3/
/3/ In telegram 1304 from Saigon, January 14, Lodge commented in response that the
Vietnamese Government was loath to follow up on the brain trust idea and refused to treat
it as a businesslike proposal. Lodge doubted whether the government "would like the idea
of high-powered Americans on an "opposite number" basis in adjacent offices to them all
through the government" Lodge thought such a scheme had a "colonial" touch. Instead, he
recommended advice in a purely advisory, friendly basis through existing channels. Lodge
maintained that American advisers would sap the determination of the Vietnamese to act
responsibly on their own. (Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 VIET S)
You should ask General Minh whether he likes this suggestion or whether he has different
ideas. Also what individuals GVN would like to have for these advisory portions. We
believe it desirable that American advisory personnel working in close contact with
Vietnamese officials as set forth above should be known to and held in high regard by
GVN. If this not possible, they must at very least have strongest endorsement of
Washington.
With regard to senior political, military and economic advisors, we would expect them to
be at level of FSO or FSR 1 or 2 and Brigadier General and assigned permanently.
Re your 1257 further message will be forthcoming./4/
/4/ In telegram 1052 to Saigon, January 10, the Department "heartily endorsed" the
Embassy proposal in telegram 1257 from Saigon of setting up a domestic Vietnamese
peace corps organization drawn from the youth and students of Saigon (see footnote 2,
Document 6). This organization could aid in getting the government's message across to
the hamlets and villages of South Vietnam. Equally important, the Department contended,
was the creation of trained resident village and hamlet leaders to carry on the work
between visits of the Vietnamese peace corps. The Department also considered that Long
An would make an excellent "showcase" for such a program and suggested consideration
of a radio contact/airborne troop carrier system to defend Long An's villages and hamlets
from Viet Cong attack. (Ibid., POL 23 VIET S)
Rusk
12. Memorandum for the Record of the Meeting of the Special Group for
Counterinsurgency/1/
Washington, January 16, 1964, 2 p.m.
/1/Source: Department of State, Special Group Counterinsurgency Files: Lot 68 D 451,
Minutes of Meetings. Secret. Drafted by James W. Dingeman who is not listed among the
participants.
PRESENT
Governor Harriman, General Taylor, Mr. Coffin vice Mr. Bell, Mr. Wilson vice Mr.
Murrow, Mr. Solbert vice Mr. Gilpatric, Mr. Karamessines vice Mr. McCone, Mr.
Brubeck vice Mr. Forrestal
Ambassador Trimble, Mr. Fredericks and Mr. Coote were present for Item No. 1.
Mr. Poats was present for Items 1 and 3.
Mr. Koren and Mr. Mendenhall were present for Items 2 and 3.
Mr. Margolies and Mr. Engle were present for Item No. 4.
Mr. Maechling was present for the meeting.
1. Counterinsurgency Intelligence Summary
Mr. Karamessines, in commenting on the major items in the intelligence memorandum,
stated that in Viet-Nam, the Viet Cong appear to be shifting to terrorism and harassment
while they continue to prepare for renewed offensive actions. A recent report indicates
that the Communists plan to bring reinforcements into the central section of Viet-Nam.
[Here follows discussion of matters unrelated to Vietnam.]
2. Status Report on Counterinsurgency Projects in Viet-Nam
Mr. Koren stated that the Vietnamese Generals are aware of the need for programs to
solve socio-economic problems, but they lack the sense of urgency that we attach to these
problems. Recent favorable developments are: the reorganization of the military command
structure; the recognition of the need for concentrated efforts in the southern provinces,
particularly in Long An; the development of a new pacification plan; and continued
efforts to rally the religious sects to support the Government. In their foreign relations, the
Vietnamese have made significant bilateral efforts to resolve their differences with
Cambodia; however, due to the nature of these issues, no quick resolution is anticipated.
On the negative side: The Government has not yet made a clear statement of policy on the
strategic hamlet program, and the continued delay in establishing specific authorities,
responsibilities, and command channels has caused a backlog of supporting US funds and
commodities. It is understood that General Minh plans to announce the Government's
policy on the strategic hamlet and Amnesty Programs on Tet (Vietnamese New Year-February 13).
Mr. Koren said that the Vietnamese plan to use "Council of Notables" at the district and
village level to encourage support for the Government, does not seem adequate to achieve
desired results. He believes that some sort of domestic peace corps is required to get
young people out to work in the country to foster closer identification and allegiance to
the Government. In addition, this type of program might serve to quell restlessness
existing in student groups.
General Taylor commented that no problem exists in placing US military advisors down
to the necessary levels in the Vietnamese military establishment and that no US military
advisors have been in contact with religious sect forces. He recommended, and the
Chairman agreed, that General Harkins should be invited to be present when military
matters are being discussed between the Ambassador and the Generals.
Mr. Mendenhall commented that two problems related to the strategic hamlet program
have not been resolved: whether the people will be forcibly resettled into the hamlets, and
what subsequent controls will be placed on them.
General Taylor stated that the strategic hamlet concept is sound and what is needed now is
better execution of this program. He believes that there should be specific individuals,
both in the Vietnamese Government and the Country Team, responsible for this program.
Mr. Mendenhall agreed to check into this matter.
The Group, in noting the status report, agreed that the responsibilities of the Group for
execution of programs in Viet-Nam would be discussed at a subsequent meeting./2/
/2/At the Counterinsurgency Group meeting, February 20, Harriman stated that the
Sullivan Coordinating Committee on Vietnam, established by authority of NSAM 280,
February 14 (Document 46) had assumed primary responsibility for South Vietnam.
Thereafter, the CI group would keep Vietnam within its cognizance and would assist the
Sullivan Committee when required. (Department of State, Special Group
Counterinsurgency Files: Lot 68 D 451, Minutes of Meetings)
James W. Dingeman
Executive Secretary
13. Telegram From the Central Intelligence Agency Station in Saigon to the
Agency/1/

Sent by the CIA to the Department of State Exclusive for Hilsman, to the Pentagon
Exclusive for Krulak, and to the White House for McGeorge Bundy. Rusk's initials appear
on the source text. No time of transmission is on the source text.
CAS Saigon 3902. Ref [document number not declassified]./2/ Following are Ambassador
Lodge's comments on ref.
/2/ This joint State/Defense/CIA telegram, January 16, personal for Lodge, Harkins and
the CIA Station Chief, outlined the manner in which the President created an
interdepartmental committee representing the Departments of Defense and State and the
CIA to select from the comprehensive 12-month plan for increased pressure against North
Vietnam "those operations which are most feasible, and which promise the greatest return
for the least risk." In this telegram, the three agencies stated that the President had
approved execution of the plan commencing February 1, and they asked for comments
from Lodge, Harkins, and the Station Chief. (Ibid.)
1. Your [document number not declassified]. Herewith my comments as requested your
paragraph 4.
2. I welcome exerting increased pressure on North Vietnam with the double aims of
bringing about a cease-fire by VC and Pathet Lao and the neutralizing of North Vietnam,
turning it into an oriental Yugoslavia. I do not think it profitable to try to overthrow Ho
Chi Minh, as his successor would undoubtedly be tougher than he is.
3. We should have it clearly understood that GVN intensifies its efforts as our operations
start in accordance with a definite commitment approved by MACV.
4. Reur paragraph 7,/3/ I propose to bring GVN into planning process by personally
explaining to General Minh the purpose and general types planned operations. In this
connection General Minh likely to ask U.S. estimate of actions North Vietnam (NVN)
might take in retaliation. I intend to ask General Minh for GVN estimate of possible NVN
retaliatory actions in any event, but would appreciate estimate of interdepartmental
committee having in mind possible actions against American employees and dependents.
/3/Paragraph 7 of the telegram suggested that the covert use of Vietnam's best military
forces and their military resources required that the Vietnamese Government be brought
into the planning on a "secure" and "most discreet basis."
5. Assume that actual operations will be accompanied by supporting political actions
designed to leave no doubt in minds of NVN leaders (and their Chinese mentors and
Soviet associates if any) that these operations are merely first phase and examples of type
of treatment NVN can expect if they persist in their support of indirect aggression in SEA.
In this regard, we hope that our pressure program could be carried out in a manner which
would: (a) permit Ho Chi Minh to give ground without losing face; and (b) not give
appearance of a direct challenge to the entire Communist bloc. Our strong preference
therefore is to maintain the maximum possible deniability on part of ourselves and GVN
(paragraph 3 reftel)./4/
/4/Paragraph 3 of the telegram noted that the actions contemplated could be plausibly
denied by the United States and that deniability by the Vietnamese Government, while
more difficult, should be attempted. In some cases Vietnamese acknowledgment of
complicity might be appropriate and the message requested the recipients' views.
6. In general we believe the sooner the NVN leaders realize they are dealing with the U.S.
(albeit from discreet sources) the better. Further, NVN would tend to lose less face in
giving ground to U.S. rather than to SVN.
7. As a related subject, we wonder whether it is not possible to inject a carrot along with
the stick at some later stage in the pressure program. The carrots might be withdrawal of
some U.S. military personnel (assuming we are going to do it in any case) and some SVN
rice to assuage NVN's obvious agricultural difficulties. Depending on progress of events,
we may be able to gain some advantage from anticipated U.S. action (i.e., withdrawal of
some U.S. military personnel), which otherwise would not be matched by any
corresponding actions on part of NVN.
[Numbered paragraph 8 (2-1/2 lines of source text) not declassified]
9. General Harkins concurs.
14. Telegram From the Ambassador in Vietnam (Lodge) to the Secretary of State/1/
/1/Source: Department of State, Vietnam Working Group Files: Lot 72 D 219, TIGER
Basic File. Top Secret. Repeated to JCS and CINCPAC for POLAD. Sent over CIA
channels.
[document number not declassified]. 1. Accompanied by DCM, Gen Harkins [less than 1
1ine of source text not declassified] I spent two hours with Generals Minh and Kim, Prime
Minister Tho and For Min Lam late yesterday on plan for expanding operations against
North Vietnam [document number not declassified]./2/ Discussion of recent French
actions and of Laotian matters in separate telegrams./3/
/2/Reference is to the telegram described in footnotes 2-4, Document 13.
/3/See Document 15; the message on Laotian matters has not been found.
2. I opened discussion with following statement:
"The United States Government has drafted a plan, which has been approved at the
highest levels, for expanded operations against North Viet Nam. The first phase would
begin February 1. We desire your agreement and that you should carry it out. The
execution of the whole plan would take 12 months."
"As an example of what is contemplated, there would be clandestine, aggressive and
daring attacks, principally in the nature of sabotage, against the port of Haiphong; and
destruction of petroleum reserves and of naval installations."

"The goal is to convince the rulers of North Vietnam that if they continue their war-like
actions in South Vietnam, there will be reactions from our side which will be more and
more expensive and destructive for them. After operations at an accelerated rate, the word
would be gotten to the chiefs of North Vietnam that they ought to cease fire and that this
could be done without loss of face. They should know that South Vietnam, with the tacit
approval of the United States, intends to increase the rate and the extent of operations
against North Vietnam, thus causing immense destruction on the economic and military
installations of North Vietnam, if that becomes necessary."
"The operations are in three phases of increasing intensity. President Johnson, assuming
the agreement of the Government of Vietnam, has approved the commencement of the
first phase on February 1 for four months, under the direction of MAC/V."/4/
/4/On January 22, Hilsman, who was en route to Australia and New Zealand, sent the
following message from Honolulu over other-agency channels:
"Suggest it be made clear in subsequent conversations our view that phase 2 and 3
operations not intended to be launched until after we begin make headway in Delta and it
becomes increasingly clear to all concerned that Vietcong are losing any chance of
gaining loyalty of SVN population. In the first place, phase 2 and 3 operations prior to
beginnings of headway in Delta would likely be interpreted by North Vietnamese as act of
desperation and therefore would not be effective in bringing change in their policies. In
the second place, phase 2 and 3 actions launched prematurely would greatly increase
pressure from Western allies and certain segments of U.S. opinion for international
conference since U.S. involvement with North is principal fear of neutralist sentiment.
Purpose of phase 1 operations is to maintain threat in interim period until we begin to
make progress in Delta and to lay groundwork for launching phase 2 and 3 operations at a
time when they most likely to result in Viet-Nam backdown." (Department of State,
Vietnam Working Group Files, TIGER Basic File)
"We consider that you have great assets here and that the personnel of the Vietnamese
special branch which has been so well trained can serve as a foundation on which a more
extensive organization can be built. Perhaps you will want MAC/V to make a contact with
the special branch of your Special Forces High Command. It goes without saying that we
are at your disposal."
3. Reaction Gen Minh and others was thoughtful and constructive and consisted
exhaustive canvass various eventualities and problems which could result implementation
first phase. Most important questions raised and our responses were:
a. As past experience with intelligence and propaganda operations in North had been
largely failure, did this plan offer anything new which promised greater chance success?
We said risk to personnel remained high but possible achievements particularly in
sabotage operations far greater. Lessons had been learned from past, and targets this plan
now quite different and more far reaching.
b. What was our real motive? In seeking "cease fire" was there not possibility this in
reality only disguised step toward neutrality conference? Gen Kim here raised AFP story-
handling of which subject separate telegram through State channels./5/ I countered this
extreme sensitivity any idea "cease fire" by assuring Minh that what we all wanted here
was unilateral "cease fire" by Viet Cong on orders from Hanoi resulting from our
increasing pressure against North Vietnam. Once VC had stopped fighting GVN and U.S.
would decide what to do next.
/5/ Reference is to telegram 1337 from Saigon, January 19, in which Lodge informed
Harriman of a call he received from Foreign Minister Lam, who complained about an
Agence France Presse article of January 18 entitled "The Asian Policy of France." The
article suggested France planned to use its recognition of China to bring about a
settlement in Indochina, equated U.S. actions in South Vietnam with those of North
Vietnam and the Viet Cong, and called for a cease-fire in South Vietnam. Lam thought the
article was "obviously inspired by the Elysee or Quai d'Orsay" and expressed grave
concern over it. (Ibid.. Central Files. POL 27 VIET S)
c. What would be UN and world reaction? I pointed out operations envisaged would be
clandestine and implication GVN and U.S. would be publicly denied, though of course Ho
Chi Minh would be left in no doubt as to what was happening and why. Should GVN
and/or U.S. eventually become publicly involved our actions would be portrayed as selfdefense against North Vietnamese aggression. I believed this could be effectively done.
d. Reactions of North Vietnam and ChiComs. Here Gen Minh and others cited following
as possible eventualities for which provision should be made in course detailed prior
planning each operation contemplated.
1. Greatly intensified Viet Cong activity, particularly in sabotage of installations in South.
We agreed RVNAF could meet this threat. I said our reaction could also be stepped up
operations in North.
2. If economy, especially agriculture, in North as fragile as reported Hanoi might resort to
directed mass flight South hungry refugees including many subversives and combatants.
Minh said trained division could easily be hidden in million refugees. How could GVN
hope to cope with this? They could not prevent such a march; they could not put people
into camps; they would be overwhelmed. We agreed contingency plan meet this
possibility should be developed.
3. Two North Vietnamese divisions presently in north Laos might be moved south to
"protect refugees". Gen Harkins pointed to impossible logistical problems involved and
expressed view RVNAF could adequately meet any overt invasion this quarter.
4. How could RVNAF effectively meet air attacks launched from North Vietnam or China
and what would U.S. be prepared do in this eventuality? Minh suggested hostile aircraft
could be jets flown by Chinese and carrying either North Vietnamese markings or no
markings. I said entirely new war would result.
5. Gen Minh asked whether U.S. public prepared support USAF retaliation against North
Vietnam and possible Chinese targets. Would U.S. retaliate at all?
e. Would actions contemplated involve men and materials which could more effectively
be employed against Viet Cong or against Cambodia? Very fast boats were badly needed
in war in South Vietnam. We replied that only 200-400 men would be involved and
equipment contemplated not of type needed against Viet Cong.
f. Tho said they would prefer act against Cambodia than North Vietnam. Minh agreed this
preferable from military but not psychological standpoint. [less than 1 line of source text
not declassified] explained equipment designed for operations against North Vietnam not
equally appropriate for use against Viet Cong.
g. On own initiative Minh suggested any activities against North should be paralleled by
some form of intensified effort against Viet Cong. We agreed.
h. In conclusion Gen Minh stressed he was not trying to pick plan to pieces but merely
wished canvass all possible eventualities so as to be ready to meet them. He felt plan fully
deserved penetrating and constructive study and would assign Gens Don, Kim, and Chieu
to proceed forthwith. Finally he emphasized fact we presenting such plan at this time
demonstrated continued U.S. determination vigorously pursue war in Vietnam.
4. Gen Don has just contacted Gen Harkins and suggested that he [less than 1 1ine of
source text not declassified] meet with Gen Kim on 23 January to discuss military details
this plan.
5. Would appreciate joint State-DOD-CAS comments all points raised and in particular on
4. d and e./6/
/6/In telegram [document number not declassified] to the Station in Saigon, January 22,
the CIA made the following observations on these concerns as expressed by the
Vietnamese:
"1. The tenor of thoughtful MRC questions, particularly in paragraph 4d of reference,
suggests that their first reaction to your presentation was one of apprehension that the U.S.
might be headed for a major enlargement of the war, both geographically and physically,
and that the GVN might somehow be left holding the bag. This may have derived from
their focusing on the statements quoted in paragraph 2 of reference regarding accelerated
rate of operations, three phases of increasing intensity and the prospects of immense
destruction."
"2. In any case, it is suggested that through the medium of the working meeting noted in
paragraph 4, which will get down to the actual details, you will be able to put the matter in
perspective. It will then be plain that we have approval at this time for only a modest
program, and not one which, in itself, will result in immense destruction or which should
entail the broad questions raised by the Generals. While planning for broader actions
should proceed, we have no approvals beyond the specific actions listed in [document
number not declassified]."
"3. A summary of the Board of National Estimates evaluation of the approved program is
being transmitted to you separately. It addresses the general matter of DRV and
international reaction. While it does not discuss, in detail, the specific contingencies raised
in paragraph 4d, it estimates that there will not be a strong reaction to the approved
actions." (Ibid.)
For the Board of National Estimates summary, see Document 16. The document referred
to at the end of paragraph 2 is the one described in footnotes 2-4, Document 13.
6. Gen Harkins has read and concurs in this message.

/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 VIET S. Secret; Exdis.
1352. Deptels 1083 and 1092./2/ This relates to meeting with Minh, Kim, Tho and Lam
attended by DCM, Gen. Harkins, [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] and
myself on Monday, Jan. 20,/3/ insofar as it pertains to recent French actions.
/2/ In telegram 1083 to Saigon, January 18, Harriman informed Lodge that intelligence
reports, which Lodge would have seen, suggested that "one element French negotiations
with ChiComs was latter's agreement accept neutralization Southeast Asia." Harriman
informed Lodge that he had spoken bluntly to the French Ambassador in Washington
about the French acceptance of a connection between recognition of the People's Republic
of China and the promotion of neutralism in Southeast Asia. Harriman stated that in spite
of his private language, "public expression will be to play a restrained key." He instructed
Lodge to inform the MRC that the United States still supported the Republic of China,
and to state explicitly that the French diplomatic moves would not alter U.S. commitments
in Vietnam. (Ibid., UN 6 CHICOM) In telegram 1092 to Saigon, January 19, Harriman
told Lodge that the contents of telegram 1083 to Saigon should give him "necessary
ammunition to talk with General Minh et al." (Ibid., POL 27 VIET S)
/3/See Document 14.
1. I had sensed at lunch on USS Providence that Tho and Kim were disturbed. On
returning to office, was told that Info Min, Gen Do Mau, was going to be at the afternoon
meeting, which made it evident that they thought I had asked for the meeting in order to
discuss the AFP article./4/ I felt this would put us in the position of building up the
French. I therefore telephoned Tho and stated topic of our meeting was military and secret
and had nothing to do with anything in Do Mau's department. I also decided not even to
mention De Gaulle or France at the meeting but to leave it to the Vietnamese to do so if
they wanted to.
/4/ See footnote 5, Document 14.
2. I believe Harriman and Rusk decision, as revealed in Deptels, to make it crystal clear in
private that we are totally opposed to the French line and totally uninfluenced by it, and in
public to "play it cool", is absolutely right. If we here in Vietnam do not in any way
enlarge the importance of the French action (which we could easily do), it will fizzle out
very fast.
3. During the discussion, [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] Gen Kim
brought up AFP story (of which he had an elaborately annotated copy) and solemnly
spoke of the dangers inherent in the seeking of a "cease fire". I brushed it aside by saying
that De Gaulle had no real chips to play in SEA--neither men, nor arms, nor money of any
significance, and that if one wanted to play in this poker game, one had to buy a seat at the
table. Quoting our English proverb that "sticks and stones can break my bones, but words
will hurt me never", I characterized De Gaulle's pronouncements on SEA and AFP expose
of French policy as "baragouinage", which could neither affect US policy nor the
fundamentals of the SEA situation. They grinned with pleasure when I said that the
French were indulging in a favorite national pastime of "garglingwords" and that, of
course, US policy was unchanged.
4. Generals Minh and Kim appeared greatly reassured and relieved that we did not take
the French maneuvers too seriously. They stressed that regardless of the points of detail
[document number not declassified],/5/ the big fact of the day which emerged [document
number not declassified] was the US determination to win the war. In fact, as we were
leaving, Minh said he hoped I understood that GVN had "not been overly impressed with
AFP story."/6/
/5/Reference is to the telegram described in footnotes 2-4, Document 13.
/6/In telegram 1105 to Saigon, January 21, the Department informed the Embassy that the
"line" which Lodge took was "just right." The United States was "180 degrees opposed"
to the recommendations in the Agence France Presse article. It believed that the war could
be won and considered the "French approach as avenue of disaster which could lead to
Communist control of all Viet-Nam and Southeast Asia." The Department instructed the
Embassy to try to dissuade the Vietnamese from breaking diplomatic relations with
France over recognition of the People's Republic of China, should they be so inclined,
because it "would blow up French action beyond its real significance" and would
complicate U.S. efforts to convince the Republic of China to "also play matter
cooly." (Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 VIET S)
Lodge
16. Telegram From the Central Intelligence Agency to the Station in Saigon/1/
/1/ Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 VIET S. Top Secret. Also sent to
the Department of State Eyes Only for Hilsman, to the Office of the Secretary of Defense
Eyes Only for McNamara, to the JCS Eyes Only for Krulak, and to the White House Eyes
Only for McGeorge Bundy. Repeated to Honolulu Eyes Only for Felt. Rusk initialed the
source text.
[document number not declassified]. Ref CAS Washington [document number not
declassified]./2/ Summary of Board of National Estimates study on probable reactions to
various courses of action with respect to North Vietnam:/3/
/2/See footnote 2-4, Document 13.
/3/Reference is to a memorandum from the Office of National Estimates to McCone,

January 2. (Library of Congress, Harriman Papers, Vietnam 1964)
A. Communist reactions to most of these operations would be slight.
B. Communist reactions would be sharper in cases of operations against Haiphong and
railroads near borders of China. Reactions would be felt primarily in South Vietnam and
Laos, but would not be so extreme as to change character of hostilities in those countries.
C. Operations would not be likely to lead to appreciably increased Chinese Communist
involvement in area. Neither would operations lead Soviets to believe that United States
had made significant change in its policies.
D. Proposed sabotage operations, taken by themselves, even if all were successful, would
not convince the DRV leadership that their continued direction and support of insurgent
activities in South Vietnam and Laos should cease.
E. It is possible, however, that North Vietnamese Government might see these operations
as representing significant increase in vigor of U.S. policy, potentially dangerous to them.
If so, they would probably wish to halt new developments at early date and would
therefore try to arouse international pressures for conference to settle problem of Vietnam
before it expanded into more general conflict in Far East. In such case U.S. could
probably expect little political support from its major allies.
F. Principal determinant of DRV prosecution of war will not be damage suffered from
such small scale operations, but course of war in South and degree of risk Hanoi believes
will be involved in its prosecution.
17. Editorial Note

On January 22, 1964, the Joint Chiefs of Staff sent Secretary of Defense McNamara a
memorandum recommending that the United States put aside many of the "self-imposed
restrictions" in South Vietnam and undertake bolder action. The Joint Chiefs stated that
success or failure in Vietnam was crucial to the U.S. position in all Southeast Asia. They
recommended the following specific actions:
"a. Assign to the US military commander responsibilities for the total US program in
Vietnam."
"b. Induce the Government of Vietnam to turn over to the United States military
commander, temporarily, the actual tactical direction of the war."
"c. Charge the United States military commander with complete responsibility for conduct
of the program against North Vietnam."
"d. Overfly Laos and Cambodia to whatever extent is necessary for acquisition of
operational intelligence."
"e. Induce the Government of Vietnam to conduct overt ground operations in Laos of
sufficient scope to impede the flow of personnel and material southward."
"f. Arm, equip, advise, and support the Government of Vietnam in its conduct of aerial
bombing of critical targets in North Vietnam and in mining the sea approaches to that
country."
"g. Advise and support the Government of Vietnam in its conduct of large-scale
commando raids against critical targets in North Vietnam"
"h. Conduct aerial bombing of key North Vietnam targets, [1-1/2 lines of source text not
declassified]."
"i. Commit additional US forces, as necessary, in support of the combat action within
South Vietnam."
"j. Commit US forces as necessary in direct actions against North Vietnam." (Washington
National Records Center, RG 330, OASD/ISA Files: FRC 69 A 926,092 Vietnam)
McNamara sent a copy of this memorandum to Rusk on January 28. The full text of the
memorandum is printed in Pentagon Papers: Gravel Edition, volume III, pages 496-499.
Agency/1/
/1/Source: Department of State, HarVan Files, Vietnam Coup Two, January 30,1964
Secret. The source text, which bears no time of transmission from Saigon, is a copy sent
by the CIA to the Department of State for Hilsman. Also sent to JCS for Krulak and to the
Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence for the Defense Intelligence Agency. A later
White House copy is published in part in Declassified Documents, 1975, 58C.
[document number not declassified]. 1. Maj Gen Nguyen Khanh on 28 Jan told Col Jasper
Wilson, senior MAAG advisor for I Corps, that he had info indicating that another coup
would be attempted possibly as early as Friday 31 Jan. Coup, which would be of Palace
variety involving little or no bloodshed, would be mounted by pro-French, pro-neutralist
Generals with Mai Huu Xuan playing leading role. Once coup successfully carried out,
perpetrators would immediately call for neutralization of SVN. Plotters in touch with Gen
Nguyen Van Hinh./2/
/2/Chief of Staff of the Army of the Republic of Vietnam, 1953-1954.
2. Khanh appeared deeply concerned, stating that if plot not immediately crushed, it stood
fair chance of success. Although officers at field grade level generally opposed to
neutralism, Khanh fears neutralist platform might strike responsive chord among junior
officers, who might help sustain Palace coup. Khanh personally coming Saigon today or
tomorrow.
3. In conversation with Wilson, Khanh did not indicate sources of his information or
reasons for his obvious concern. [1-1/2 lines of source text not declassified]
a. [4 lines of source text not declassified] Interesting to note that during conversations
Xuan told Ly that he intended to report meeting to Big Minh. Ly subsequently informed
by intermediary that Minh anxious to talk to him./3/
/3/At this point, Mendenhall wrote the following note in the margin of the source text:
"Yes, but see," and then drew an arrow to paragraph 4 below.
b. Lt Col Tran Dinh Lam, most recent returnee from Paris, is alleged by col who met him
at airport to have been empowered, presumably by the French, to spend substantial sum
(two billion piastres) to achieve neutralization of SVN. Lam reported by this source to
have been brought back to SVN at request Gens Tran Van Don and Le Van Kim./4/
/4/Mendenhall at this point wrote in the margin the following comment: "Cf. [?] attitude
expressed by Generals to Lodge of adamant opposition to neutralism. JM"
c. Earlier this month American observer noted number of military trucks bringing
ammunition and weapons into Xuan's police HQS at Camp Du Mare.
d. Maj Gen Le Van Nghiem has stated both to American observers and Vietnamese
sources on number of occasions. that Gens Kim, Don, Nguyen Van Vy, and Duong Van
Duc are pro-French and privately in favor of neutralization.
4. Worth noting in connection with assessment of Xuan's capability to pull [off] coup is
recently instituted policy of MRC to thin out military units in Saigon area. However, there
still significant ARVN security forces Saigon area.
5. Difficult to evaluate these various reports and indications, including Khanh's claims.
They may merely reflect, in cases of Nghiem/5/ and Khanh/6/ in particular,
disgruntlement over failure to achieve more prominent positions in MRC. Nevertheless,
noticeable rise in uneasiness, rumor-mongering and political maneuvering detectable in
past few days. Restiveness finding its focus in continued dissatisfaction with Premier Tho,
concern and confusion over question of neutralism and De Gaulle's China initiative, and
expectation of further changes in composition military high command and provisional
govt. Will continue to watch situation closely and report developments. In the recent past
Khanh has also identified Big Minh, Don and Kim as pro-French and pro-neutralist. It is
possible that he feels this alleged tendency on their part is becoming so pronounced that
he and his like-minded military associates must act to prevent a neutral solution.
/5/At this point in the margin of the source text, Mendenhall wrote the following
comment: "Nghiem is central Vietnamese and this is obviously gov't in which southern
Vietnamese predominate. Thus Nghiem's comments to be taken with several grains of
sand. JM"
/6/Mendenhall wrote the following comment in the margin at this point: "Personally very
ambitious. Thus has his own axe to grind in this situation. JM"
6. Amb Lodge and General Harkins advised.

/1/Source: Department of State, HarVan Files, Vietnam Coup Two, January 30, 1964.
Secret: Nodis. Received at 8:03 a.m.
1431. For the Secretary of State from Lodge.
1. Believe that it would be healthy to tell General De Gaulle that we have many reports
from particularly responsible sources about French neutralist plot, French money, and
French agents, and request him to cease these activities./2/ Even though he would
undoubtedly not comply with our request, it is well for him to know that we know what is
going on, and that we suspect a secret agreement between him and the ChiComs. We
should give him a sense of pressure. It is good tactics to start making a list of the things
which he is doing which are against our vital interests. We can decide what use to make of
the list later on. In a situation of this kind, we simply must start somewhere and then
watch for the breaks. What is being rumored is too responsibly vouched for to be ignored.
/2/In telegram 1413 from Saigon, January 28, Lodge made a similar suggestion as
follows:
"Department might consider telling Gen. De Gaulle that U.S. has secret information
indicating that there are persons purporting to be under the strong influence of the French
Government who are working directly against U.S. vital interests in Viet-Nam, and
requesting him to call off his dogs." (Ibid., POL 27 VIET 5)
The Department responded in telegram 1138 to Saigon, January 28, 7:22 p.m., as follows:
"1. Our relations with de Gaulle at this time are such that approach to him would be
fruitless."
"2. We believe it would be worthwhile to sound out General Khanh on sources and
reliability his information and also whether he had informed General Minh".
"3. Would appreciate Country Team assessment significance these reports and what action
you are taking in Saigon." (Ibid.)
2. As to General Khanh he is profoundly disturbed by his expectation of a strong move
towards neutralism by the Government of Vietnam which he thinks will take place either
tomorrow or Friday. He thinks if it is not vigorously crushed, it might succeed because of
war weariness among the Vietnamese, including the Junior ARVN Officers. His other
views are:
a. French inspiration in all of this he believes to be very strong. When pressed at my
suggestion by Colonel Jasper Wilson, I Corps MAAG Adviser, he identified Generals
Don, Kim and Xuan as talking publicly against neutralism, but as actually dealing with
the French. He said that Kim and Don are former French OSS Officers, that they are still
French Nationals, that they are "rabidly pro-French", and added that General Dinh would
go along for the money.
b. Khanh considers General Dinh [Minh?] to be an "honest patriot", but he is "isolated".
But even he has sent money to France at Christmas time and has bought a home in France.
c. General Khanh, therefore, says "we want to be in a position of strength". When he says
"We", he says he means himself, General Khiem of the III Corps, General Tri of the II
Corps, 90 percent of the Army and 70 percent of the existing Civil Government.
d. He wants U.S. assurance that we are opposed to neutralism. In reply to this, Colonel
Wilson pointed to my statement in the press which General Khanh said was totally
satisfactory to him.
e. Then he wants U.S. assurance that we will get his family, who are now in Da Nang, out
of the country, if required. I said that I could not give asylum anywhere but in the
Embassy in Saigon, but that I would provide a plane in Da Nang provided General
Khanh's family could get to the plane.
f. He wants to use Colonel Wilson as his exclusive contact with us and has asked Wilson
to stay in Saigon and, if possible, to obtain two [garble--radios?] so that he and Witson
might maintain radio contact because of the insecurity of the telephone system. [3 lines of
source text not declassified]
3. I believe all the above should be closely held on a "need to know" basis, and am
limiting knowledge of this to Harkins and De Silva. My assessment is that General Khanh
is considered to be the most capable general in Vietnam, that he controls the I and II
Corps, which is the most orderly part of Vietnam, and that in addition to being a capable
soldier, he has the reputation of being politically perspicacious.
While I have no great faith in Xuan, I continue to believe that Generals Don and Kim are
patriotic Vietnamese. Therefore, what General Khanh says about them goes against my
own deepest instincts. But, General Khanh's reputation for perspicacity gives me pause,
even though I hardly know General Khanh at all.
4. The allegations which he makes against General Don, specifically, are contrary to what
I have understood to be the case. For example, I was told that General Don was the first
Vietnamese in the French Army who publicly gave up the French Army and burned up his
insignia. [2 lines of source text not declassified]
5. Khanh is contacting Wilson again later today, so there may be more to report.
6. I am not reporting anything to the GVN as yet.
7. General Harkins has seen this message and agrees.
Lodge
20. Memorandum From the Deputy Director of the Bureau of Intelligence and
Research (Denney) to the Acting Secretary of State/1/
/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Vietnam Country File, Vol. II, Memos
and Misc. Secret; Noforn. Rusk was en route from Japan. (Ibid., Rusk Appointment Book)
SUBJECT
The Coup in Saigon
According to our latest information the situation in Saigon is as follows:
A coup has taken place under the leadership of General Khanh, Commander of I Corps,
which has the support of the generals in command of the other three corps areas (Generals
Tri, II Corps; Khiem, III Corps; and Co, IV Corps) as well as other important officers.
The coup is clearly directed at removing Premier Tho./2/ It appears that changes are also
intended in the Military Revolutionary Council, the chairman and leading members of
which, Generals Minh, Kim, and Dinh, are in custody. Minh will reportedly be offered a
figurehead position if he agrees to align himself with Khanh's group.
/2/Lodge reported to the Department in telegram 1432 from Saigon, January 30, 3:15 a.m.
Saigon time, that Khanh had informed him through Wilson that a coup would take place
at 4 a.m. and that "Tho must go." The telegram was received at the Department at 2:32
p.m. on June 29 and relayed to the White House at 2:40 p.m. (Department of State,
Central Files, POL 15 VIET S)
We have no reports of bloodshed or armed resistance./3/ Such troop movements as have
been reported appear to be in support of the coup.
/3/At 6:25 a.m., when the coup was in progress and General Minh's and Kim's houses
surrounded by rebel troops, Lodge instructed Wilson to tell Khanh and Khiem that he
strongly advised that all possible efforts be made to avoid bloodshed. (Telegram 1437
from Saigon, January 30; ibid.; published in Declassified Documents, 1975, 213C)
General Khanh has expressed a desire to see the Ambassador later today (it is now
Thursday, Saigon time)./4/ Khanh was reportedly to go on the air to announce the new
government at 7 a.m. Saigon time but we have no indication that he actually did so./5/ A
late bulletin from Saigon states that Khanh and his group tentatively plan to institute
military government with Khanh as Prime Minister and Khiem as Commander-in-Chief of
the Armed Forces./6/
/4/January 30; reported in telegram 1437 from Saigon.
/5/At 4:45 p.m. on January 30, Radio Saigon broadcast a resolution in the name of the
Military Revolutionary Council dissolving the Executive Committee set up after the
November 1, 1963, coup and naming General Khanh as the Council's new chairman.
(Telegram 1446 from Saigon, January 30; Department of State, HarVan Files, Vietnam
Coup Two, January 30, 1964)
/6/Reported in telegram 1442 from Saigon, January 30, 9:14 a.m. Also reported in this
telegram, which was received at the Department at 8:56 a.m., January 29, was a
conversation between Khanh and Wilson in which Khanh stated that he began planning
for the coup 5 days earlier because he feared the corps commanders were to be arrested by
pro-French neutralist elements. Because of his political inexperience, Khanh promised to
rely heavily for political assistance" on Lodge. (Ibid., Central Files, POL 27 VIET S)
We have had some recent indications of coup plotting in Saigon, but none of the available
material gives us a clear picture of the motives and intentions of Khanh's group. One or
more of the following considerations were probably involved in the decision to stage a
coup.
1. Growing concern with Minh-Tho leadership. There has been growing concern that
Minh and his collaborators have moved too slowly in restoring the momentum of the
counterinsurgency effort. Tho has been a particular target of criticism, many Vietnamese
feeling that he is too identified with the former Diem regime, that he has appointed
personal followers to key posts, and that generally he is incapable of providing dynamic
and efficient civilian leadership. Minh, however, has resisted pressure to remove him.
2. Personal ambitions. A number of generals, particularly Khanh and Khiem, feel that they
were not assigned sufficiently important positions since the ouster of the Diem regime.
Khanh, for example, was in effect head of the armed forces under the Diem regime, and
Khiem was Chief of Staff of the Joint General Staff for several months last year.
3. Concern over possible pro-neutralist or pro-French tendencies. Although General Minh
and the other leading members of the MRC have shown no evidence of neutralist
sentiments, during the past several weeks their French background has been commented
upon with concern by Generals Khiem and Khanh, as well as by other military officers.
Two arrests made during the coup, those of General Xuan and Colonel Lam, indicate a
possible effort to counter neutralist activities. General Xuan, head of the National Police,
was earlier reported to be planning a pro-neutralist, pro-French coup;/7/ Colonel Lam has
just returned from France and is suspected by some Vietnamese of being a French agent.
/7/See Document 18.

/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 VIET S. Secret; Flash; Limdis.
Drafted by Marshall Green; cleared by Forrestal, Mendenhall, and Rusk, who resumed to
the Department of State at 6:25 p.m.; and approved by Harriman.
1149. For Ambassador. We have so little info on motivations and other factors involved in
current crisis that we leave to your judgment how to handle. Meantime we trust you will
make very clear through your actions that we had nothing to do with coup. If you consider
it advisable and possible there would seem to us to be merit in preserving Minh as head of
Government since he appears to have best potentialities for rallying support of people.
Ball
to the President/1/
/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Vietnam Country File, Vol. III,
Memos. Secret. A handwritten "L" on the source text indicates that the President saw this
memorandum.
SUBJECT
Vietnam
As of 11 a.m. the situation is as follows:
1. General Nguyen Khanh is in control. He has taken the leaders of the Military
Committee, Generals Minh, Don, Kim and some of their associates into custody. There
has been no bloodshed.
2. Both Lodge and Harkins report that the reason for the coup was Khanh's fear that the
old government was dickering with the French in an effort to bring about the
neutralization of South Vietnam./2/ We have no hard evidence that this was so.
/2/Lodge made this observation in telegram 1443 from Saigon, January 30, 8:30 p.m.,
received at 7:34 a.m. (Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 VIET S) The White
House copy of this telegram is published in Declassified Documents, 1975, 214A. Harkins
reported Khanh's motivation as such in telegrams MAC 321 and 325, both January 30,
12:30 and 2:05 p.m., respectively, received at the Department of State at 2:07 a.m. and
9:16 a.m., January 30. Johnson Library, National Security File, Vietnam Country File,
Vol. 111 Cables, and Department of State, HarVan Files, Vietnam Coup Two, January 30,
1964. both of Harkins messages are in Declassified Documents, 1975, 156C and 156D.)
3. Both Lodge and Harkins think that Khanh is a tough, able military leader. Harkins says
that with proper help and support, he may prove to be stronger than the present set-up of
Committee government./3/ Khanh apparently does not intend to make wholesale changes
in the lower echelons of government. This is good, if true.
/3/ Harkins made this prediction in MAC 321. He also characterized Khanh as "the
strongest character in the military" and expressed surprise that given his outsider position
and open disagreement with the MRC he had survived to stage a coup.
4. The Viet Cong appear to have been caught by surprise and have as yet not been willing
or able to take advantage of the situation.
Mike
23. Memorandum From the Acting Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern
Affairs (Green) to the Secretary of State/1/
/1/ Source: Library of Congress, Harriman Papers, Vietnam 1964. Secret. Drafted by
Mendenhall. Copies were sent to Forrestal, Ball, and Harriman. Hilsman was in Australia.
SUBJECT
The New Vietnamese Coup
Situation. Major General Nguyen Khanh has seized complete control in a bloodless coup.
In a public statement carried over Saigon Radio Khanh stated that the coup is directed
against the inefficiency of the "administrative organ" of the displaced government and
against a "number of people" who are neutralists paving the way for a Communist victory.
Khanh has made no public charges against the French but his denunciation of
"colonialists" obviously refers to the French./2/
/2/Reported in telegram 1446 from Saigon, January 30. (Department of State, Central
Files, POL 23-8 VIET S)
Khanh told Ambassador Lodge (7 hours after coup) that he has tried to persuade General
Minh to remain as chief of state, but will not accede to Minh's conditions that all generals
arrested be released. He expressed determination to get on with the war, and promised a
prompt public announcement to province chiefs and the army to carry on. He raised
questions with Lodge about U.S. recognition (we preparing reply)./3/
/3/The Khanh-Lodge conversation of 11 a.m., January 30, is reported in telegram 1443
from Saigon, January 30, 8:30 p.m. (Ibid., POL 27 VIET S) Specifically, Khanh asked
what would be established diplomatic practice concerning recognition if Vietnam changed
presidents and also whether the United States would recognize the new government. In
telegram 1154 to Saigon, January 30, the Department informed Lodge that from a legal
standpoint the United States had the option of extending formal recognition or handling
the matter as a continuation of normal relations. In a number of recent cases, the United
States had continued relations after coupe, which was the preferred course in Vietnam. If
Lodge agreed, the Department suggested telling Khanh to inform the United States
officially that there had been a change in the chairmanship and composition of the MRC
and to make no reference to the matter of recognition. (Ibid., POL 16 VIET S)
A subsequent Saigon Radio broadcast names Gen. Khanh as Chairman of the Military
Revolutionary Council, and drops Minh, Don, Kim, Xuan, and Dinh from Council
membership./4/
/4/No record of this broadcast has been found.
Lodge comments that Gen. Khanh is cool, clear-headed, realistic planner; has good
record; is tough, ruthless, farsighted./5/
/5/This assessment is taken from telegram 1443 from Saigon.

Assessment. Khanh's main reason for seizure of power is undoubtedly his personal
ambition. His allegations about efficiency and neutralism on the part of elements of the
displaced government are a cloak for his own desire for power.
He is unquestionably pro-U.S and may carry on the war more efficiently and energetically
than the preceding government. But there will probably be a new period of confusion
during Khanh's settling-in. Part of the aura of mistrust which surrounded the Diem regime
may return because Khanh will probably feel the necessity of protecting his rear with
security forces in Saigon. This means fewer troops available for use against the Viet
Cong.
Khanh does not have the qualities of popular appeal which "Big" Minh has, and was
beginning to use. Conceivably, as a young, attractive figure, he might develop a style of
his own for winning the people. In the domestic political picture he seems to have two
options: either to restore many of the Can Lao like Thuan, Tuyen, etc., to positions in the
government, or to push for "total revolution" against ex-Diem elements as many students,
Buddhists, and others in Saigon have been demanding. We suspect he will choose the
latter path.
Public Posture. Our public position is going to be difficult because this is a second coup
within three months in war-torn Viet-Nam. We believe we should use publicly the two
elements which Khanh has used in his public statement: improved efficiency and antineutralism. These two points should evoke a somewhat favorable response in the U.S. in
view of recent press stories on how badly the war has been going, and in the light of the
recent French actions in the Far East.

/1/ Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 VIET S. Secret; Limdis. Repeated
to CINCPAC. Received at 2:07 p.m. and passed to the White House, Office of the
Secretary of Defense, CIA, and JCS. The White House copy is published in Declassified
Documents, 1975, 214E.
1451. CINCPAC for POLAD. 1. Called on Gen Khanh and gave him gist of the pertinent
parts of your 1154./2/ He is instructing FonMin Lam to work out a text of the note with
DCM along lines your last part./3/ At 4 pm press conference will announce there has been
a change in the chairmanship and composition of the Military Revolutionary Council, and
that the Council continues to respect Vietnam's international obligations./4/ He also plans
to invite all the diplomats to a reception tomorrow, Saturday afternoon.
/2/See footnote 3, Document 23.
/3/Text of the Vietnamese note, January 31, and the Embassy's reply, January 31,
acknowledging it, are in telegram 1460 from Saigon. (Department of State, Central Files,
POL 16 VIET S) The U.S. note is printed in Department of State Bulletin, February 17,
1964, p. 239.
/4/A summary of the press conference, held at 5:31 p.m., January 31, is in telegram 1452
from Saigon, January 31. (Department of State, Central Files, POL 23-9 VIET S)
2. With this out of the way, I told him that the purpose of my call was to make him
understand clearly that he would rise or fall, as far as American opinion was concerned,
on the results which he obtained in the effort against Viet Cong. Nothing could be more
fatal as far as US confidence was concerned than another 6 weeks interregnum, or a
period of any length devoted to fumbling around and to so-called "reorganization". It was
utterly vital that the commanders and the province chiefs in the field understand that all
existing orders are still in force and are confirmed, and that he actually gave vigorous
impetus, including a few kicks in the rear end where necessary, to see that the whole
effort against the Viet Cong went ahead in all phases--military, political, psychological,
economic and social; that what I hoped for was not rhetoric, but concrete results in Long
An, Dinh Tuong, Kien Tuang and other provinces where the situation is so critical. I
wanted news of specific hamlets which had been cleared, I hoped for reports showing that
corrupt district officials who had been extorting and oppressing the people were being
removed.
3. Gen Khanh agreed emphatically with all of this and repeated what he said to me
yesterday--that competent people were to be kept on the job.
4. I said I was glad to hear this because unless he conveyed a strong, hard focused picture
of a thoroughly aggressive and capable leader, there was going to be tremendous
disappointment not only in the US, but throughout free world.
5. He said that he would announce in his press conference that he was determined to get
on with the war effort in the above way.
6. He then said he wanted to ask my advice. He was thinking of forming a "govt of
national union" of all responsible parties, 5 or 6 in number, and what did I think? I said I
did not know the details of Vietnam well enough to give him specific advice, but that
certainly one good rule of politics in any country was to include rather than to exclude,
and to give all elements in the community a sense of participation. I asked him whether, in
addition to the 5 or 6 major political parties, he was planning to include persons who
adhered to the Catholic religion and whether he had considered the Buddhists, the Hoa
Haos, and the Cao Dais. He said that he would.
7. He then said he would like to ask my advice on whom he should name as PriMin--who
did I think was the best man? PriMin Tho was leaving and he had to find someone else. I
said I did not feel I knew the personalities in Vietnam well enough to give him a
worthwhile answer, as I had not yet been here seven months, but that I would consult
people who knew this country much better than I did, and that if I had a valuable
suggestion, I would let him know.
8. He then said that "within 7 to 10 days" he would be obliged to take some very "clear
positions" regarding France and wanted to know whether we would help if this action
were to lead to blockage of funds, elimination of French financial aid, or other retaliatory
measures.
9. I asked him just what he meant by "clear positions". If he meant total rupture, that was
one thing. If he meant merely rupture of diplomatic relations, with consuls still present,
that was something else. I asked him whether he was seriously contemplating expelling all
of the 450 French schoolteachers and all of the French doctors? Did he seriously
contemplate closing down the Grall Hospital which had given a million cholera shots free
in the last 10 days--because if he did, he was taking on a very big proposition indeed, and
one which would cause a great deal of suffering. It was not realistic to think that all these
services which had been built up over a long period of time could suddenly be replaced.
The US certainly had no ambition to substitute English for French in this country, and
perhaps it would be possible to recruit French-speaking teachers in Quebec, Belgium and
Switzerland, but that this would be a long process and it seemed to me a very imprudent
thing to do without careful study.
10. He seemed impressed. He obviously feels strongly the need of some very vigorous
gesture against France, in order to justify his seizure of power and in order to prevent it
from looking like a naked power grab. Perhaps the outcome will be breaking diplomatic
relations, but leaving consuls.
11. Question: Is there anything I can tell him in reply to his question on helping Vietnam
against possible French retaliation to a breach of relations? (see Embtel 1416)/5/
/5/In telegram 1416, January 29, the Embassy warned that deterioration of FrenchVietnamese relations could result in the withdrawal or departure of the French technical
and managerial community in Vietnam as well as the withdrawal of French aid. The
Embassy concluded that while a break in relations between France and Vietnam would
not eliminate much of the French private investment in Vietnam, the United States would
find it costly to replace even a portion of the official French commitment. (Ibid., POL FRVIET S)
Lodge
25. Telegram From the Secretary of State and the Secretary of Defense (McNamara)
to the Ambassador in Vietnam (Lodge) and the Commander, Military Assistance
Command, Vietnam (Harkins)/1/
/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 VIET S. Secret. Sent over CIA
channels. The source text is a copy the CIA sent the Department of State Exclusive for
Rusk. Also sent to the Office of the Secretary of Defense Exclusive for McNamara. In an
undated memorandum which bears a handwritten note indicating that it was taken from
the President's bedroom on February 1, Moyers made the following recommendations to
the President:
"(1) After the last coup in Vietnam, the Communists waited about ten days before
launching an aggressive attack which caught Vietnamese and Americans off-guard."
"(2) They will probably try it again now."

"(3) Therefore, Rusk and McNamara should be instructed to inform Lodge and Harkins to
take the initiative now--to get the Vietnamese moving against the Viet Cong--to launch an
offensive before the Communists launch one."
"(4) This could then be leaked, if desirable, in an effort to show that you are determined to
push the war at a faster pace." (Johnson Library, White House Central Files, Confidential
File, CO 312 Vietnam)
At 9:59 a.m., January 31, McNamara telephoned Rusk concerning the need for such
initiative in Saigon. The transcript of the call reads as follows:
"M said re South Vietnam, President asked what to do. M said his only suggestion was to
step up South Vietnamese operations; if that seemed good, he would have a cable
developed on it and would get his people to work with Sec's people. Sec said it was a very
good idea. M will get the cable drafted and get it over for clearance." (Department of
State, Rusk Files: Lot 72 D 192, Telephone Conversations)
[document number not declassified]. Joint State/Defense message.
For Amb Lodge and Gen Harkins. After the coup in November, South Vietnamese
military operations were neglected. A period of uncertainty ensued and the Viet Cong
took advantage of the confusion in government and the weakness in administration of
both political and military affairs. Serious setbacks to the counterinsurgency program
resulted, particularly in the Delta. We fear similar results from yesterday's coup.
Therefore, you and General Harkins are instructed to state to Khanh that there must be no
opportunity for the Viet Cong to benefit from the events of the past few days--it is
essential that he and his government demonstrate to the people of South Vietnam, the
people of the United States and the people of the world their unity and strength. To do so,
the tempo of South Vietnamese military operations must be stepped up immediately and
visibly so. The President would like to be able to announce tomorrow (Saturday am) that
he has been informed by General Khanh that General Khanh has instructed the corps
commanders to step up the pace of military operations immediately and has directed
certain specific operations./2/
/2/On the afternoon of February 1, President Johnson read the text of a personal letter to
General Khanh at a press conference. The letter reads:
"I am glad to know that we see eye to eye on the necessity of stepping up the pace of
military operations against the VietCong. I particularly appreciate your warm and
immediate response to my message as conveyed by Ambassador Lodge and General
Harkins. We shall continue to be available to help you carry the war to the enemy and to
increase the confidence of the Vietnamese people in their Government." (Telegram 1168
to Saigon, February 1, 4:41 p.m.; ibid., Central Files, POL 27 VIET S)
According to telegram 1464 from Saigon, February 1, 10 a.m., Lodge had received
assurances from Khanh the previous day that he would get on with the struggle against the
Viet Cong. This apparently constitutes Khanh's "warm and immediate response" to the
President's message. (Ibid.)
26. Telegram From the Ambassador in Vietnam (Lodge) to the Secretary of State/1/
/1/Source: Department of State, Vietnam Working Group Files; Lot 72 D 219, TIGER
Basic File. Secret, Nodis. Sent over CIA channels. The source text, which bears no time
of transmission from Saigon, is a copy sent by the CIA at 3:25 p.m. to the Department of
State for Hilsman. Also sent to the JCS for Krulak and the White House for McGeorge
Bundy.
[document number not declassified]. 1. At meeting with General Khanh today I told him
that he would soon be briefed on a program of intensified activity in North Vietnam,
which I said should be accompanied by intensified activity against the Viet Cong in South
Vietnam.
2. He already knew of this in a general way and said that he was disturbed at the thought
that General Don still had the briefing papers on the subject. He feared that these papers
would get into hands of neutralists and then into the hands of Communists, and he was
trying to recover the documents.
3. It seems to me that if General Don is as General Khanh thinks he is, we must assume
that copies have already been made and are already in the hands of those who ought not to
have them.
Lodge
27. Editorial Note

Replying to a question at a press conference on the French decision to recognize the
People's Republic of China, French President Charles de Gaulle reviewed the reasons for
France's action. De Gaulle then raised the relationship between China and Southeast Asia
as follows:
"In fact, there is in Asia no political reality, notably with regard to Cambodia, Laos,
Vietnam, or to India, Pakistan, Afghanistan, Burma, or to Korea or Soviet Russia or
Japan, etc., which does not concern or affect China. There is, in particular, neither a war
nor a peace imaginable on this continent without China's being implicated in it. Thus it
would be absolutely impossible to envision, without China, a possible neutrality
agreement relating to the Southeast Asian States, in which States for so many reasons, we
French feel a very particular and cordial interest--a neutrality which, by definition, must
be accepted by all, guaranteed on the international level, and which would exclude both
armed agitations supported by any one among them in one or another of the States, and
the various forms of external intervention; a neutrality that, indeed, seems, at the present
time, to be the only situation compatible with the peaceful existence and progress of the
peoples concerned."
For a larger extract of De Gaulle's answer, see American Foreign Policy: Current
Documents, 1964, pages 873-875.

1964-1968, Volume I
Vietnam, 1964
Department of State
Washington, DC
II. U.S. Assessment of the Khanh Government, February 1 - March 4

Washington, February 1,1964--1:53 p.m.
/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 VIET S. Secret; Priority; Limdis.
Drafted on January 31 by Mendenhall; cleared by Koren, Green, and in draft with Poats
and Blouin; and approved by Harriman.
1165. CINCPAC for POLAD. Saigon pass COMUSMACV for Harkins. Priority Actions
Vis-a-vis New GVN.
We are sure you agree it important to move in rapidly to furnish advice to General Khanh
in order to reduce to minimum loss of momentum resulting from change in government
and prevent Viet Cong from capitalizing on change. In addition message on military
operations sent other channel,/2/ we consider following as high priority matters to urge on
Khanh which we know you consider encompassed in general approach to Khanh outlined
Para 2, your 1451:/3/
/2/Document 25.
/3/Document 24.
1. He should retain all those civilian ministers whom he and Country Team consider
capable. This plus your earlier urging of retention of provincial and district chiefs should
provide maximum continuity.
2. He should make prompt announcement of government's intention to maintain and
continue Strategic Hamlet program. Announcement should make it clear to both local
officials and populace importance government attaches to this program as central element
in counterinsurgency concept and should be designed prevent Viet Cong from again
making kind of inroads against Strategic Hamlets which they achieved after November
coup.
Also important for Khanh to designate single vigorous, energetic administrator for this
program and see that this administrator gets out directives soonest on all important aspects
of this program-security, economic and social, political, population and resources control,
etc.-to provincial and district officials.
3. Khanh should see to it that immediate steps are taken to assure that farmer will get as
good price for rice during current harvest as last year. Separate cable being forwarded on
this./4/
/4/In telegram 1167 to Saigon, February 1, the Department suggested that the Embassy
encourage the Khanh government to maintain the guaranteed price of rice. While this
would mean a rise in the price of rice to consumers in the cities, it would help the new
government win support of the peasants in the countryside. (Department of State, Central
Files, INCO-RICE 14 VIET S)
4. He should also be urged carry on and expand previous government's efforts to use land
reform in manner attract peasant support. Septel on this also will be sent./5/
/5/ Telegram 1171 to Saigon, February 3, in which the Department noted that the present
land tenure system, in which many tenants not having paid rent or taxes for 20 years and
squatters taking over land, created "major disincentives" to peasant support of the
government. Return of government control might bring return of demands on the peasants
for rent, taxes, or displacement by owners. The Embassy was instructed to encourage the
government to promote land reform which would negate these "disincentives." (Ibid., E
12 VIET S)
5. He should revitalize amnesty program. Imminent approach of lunar new year holiday
should provide good occasion for such announcement.
6. He should pay particular attention to desirability attracting support all religious groups
including continuation previous government's special efforts directed at Hoa Hao and Cao
Dai.
7. He should treat deposed members of preceding government humanely in order preserve
his international image.
You may have additional thoughts on high priority items to press on Khanh. Would
welcome your views./6/
/6/In telegram 1473 from Saigon, February 3, Lodge responded that he "had already made
the points which needed to be made immediately," and at the first opportunity, he would
work on paragraphs 2, 3, 4, 6, and 7. (Ibid., POL 27 VIET S)
Rusk

Washington, February 1, 1964--1:54 p.m.
Drafted on January 31 by Mendenhall; cleared by Koren, Green, the substance of
paragraph 1 by Blouin, and the substance of paragraph 2 by Stoneman; and approved by
Harriman. Repeated to CINCPAC. The White House copy is published in Declassified
Documents, 1975, 215D.

1166. CINCPAC for POLAD. Saigon pass COMUSMACV for Harkins. Your 1451./2/
/2/ Document 24.
1. New Prime Minister. We inclined toward view that it better unite Chairmanship MRC
and Premiership in Khanh as single individual to promote maximum efficiency in conduct
of government.
If this done, Khanh should appoint separate personalities as Minister Defense and Chief
Joint General Staff to insure that each of these important positions is receiving full-time
attention by capable individuals.
If you or Khanh believes Khanh should not hold Premiership, you might suggest
possibility of Tran Quoc Buu, President CVTC, as personality with political savvy and
ability to attract popular support to government.
2. French Presence in Viet-Nam. Should be made absolutely clear to Khanh that we are
not in position replace French economic, financial, medical, or cultural role in Viet-Nam.
Suggest you give Khanh summary your 1416/3/ to drive home full impact of what
involved. In view current attitudes on aid in U.S. we are hard-pressed to furnish assistance
now required for support of counterinsurgency program in all its aspects.
Khanh should therefore be strongly counseled to avoid any actions which would
jeopardize French presence in fields indicated./4/ While we realize he has political
problem, he should meet it by means which will not lead to strong French retaliation. This
might consist of continued refusal agree to French Ambassador or reduction in size
French diplomatic establishment.
/4/ In telegram 1473 from Saigon, February 3, Lodge "entirely agreed that we are in no
position to replace French economic, financial, medical or cultural role in Vietnam and
have made this very clear." (Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 VIET S)
Rusk

Saigon, February 1, 1964--3 p.m.
/1/ Source: Department of State, POL 15 VIET S. Secret; Priority; Limdis. Repeated to
CINCPAC. Passed to the White House, JCS, Office of the Secretary of Defense, and CIA.
1467. CINCPAC for POLAD. Herewith my preliminary assessment of the new
government in Viet Nam. It is very much subject to change as we move along.

1. General Khanh's coup was obviously extremely disconcerting at first blush. We felt we
were beginning to make real progress here with the Minh government-in the conduct of
the effort against the Viet Cong; and in making General Minh into a popular figure. To
overthrow a government which was progressing fairly satisfactorily seemed like a violent
and disorderly procedure. In a country in which there are so few able men, it seemed a
waste no longer to have the services of Minh, Don, and Kim. One wondered whether the
coup was anything more than a crude, if skillful, power grab.
2. On second thought, however, one realized that Generals Don and Kim had never at any
time foresworn the possibility of a neutral solution at what might seem to them to be the
proper time. They had clearly been working, and working effectively, to strengthen the
effort against the Viet Cong. But none of us had ever discussed what the next step would
be after the Government of Viet Nam had reached a position of strength. Perhaps they did
favor the French neutrality solution at that time. We had all concentrated exclusively on
winning. Then I remembered an evening at which I had tended to belittle the effect in Viet
Nam of what the French were doing and had said that it took more than mere words to
stop a program on which the USA and GVN agreed. On looking back on it, I remember a
stony look on General Don's face and total silence when he should have said something.
Finally, Ambassador D'Orlandi of Italy, who is one of the shrewdest men here, has
thought ever since November that the Minh government was actively in support of
General de Gaulle's ideas and would turn overtly neutralist at proper time. He had said
this to me several times and had made much of the fact that both Don and Kim were still
French citizens, had been aides to Marshal de Lattre when he was here, and had actively
worked in the French Secret Service in the past. Therefore Khanh's opinion of the French
intentions for neutralization coup might be correct.
3. Also the forward steps of history are often not made by one man or group of men. In
U.S., for instance, the men who manage a successful campaign for the party nominations
are often not the same as those who manage the election campaigns and they, in turn, are
not the same as those who occupy the big posts after the election is won. Similarly, the
group that ended the Diem regime and cleaned out much of its dry rot has rendered a
service and now a new man has the job of winning the war.
4. Finally, in this country it rarely occurs to anyone that an election is an efficient or
appropriate way to get anything important accomplished. The traditional way of doing
important things here is by well planned, well thought out use of force. What General
Khanh has done does not appear to have shocked the Vietnamese. From the Vietnamese
who I see every day, that is, my cook, no. 1 boy, and driver, I hear expressions of
admiration for the smoothness of the technique. However, numerous Vietnamese have
expressed the opinion to members of my staff that it was a pity that General Minh was
removed because he is a "good man".
5. The real question is, therefore: Is Khanh able? Will he really supply some drive in
connection with the effort against the Viet Cong? The evidence to date is that he is able,
that he has got a lot of drive, and that he is not tolerating any delay. General
Westmoreland was in Can Tho yesterday morning and reports that none of the officers
there feels any lack of a definite policy or definite directive from on top.
1. [6.] If Khanh is able, his advent to power may give this country one-man command in
place of a junta. This may be good. We have everything we need in Viet Nam. The US
has provided military advice, training, equipment; economic and social help; and political
advice. The Government of Viet Nam has put relatively large number of good men into
important positions and has evolved civil and military procedures which appear to be
workable. Therefore, our side knows how to do it; we have the means with which to do it;
we simply need to do it. This requires a tough and ruthless commander. Perhaps Khanh is
it.
Lodge
31. Editorial Note

At a press conference on February 1, 1966, beginning at 3 p.m., President Johnson read to
the news correspondents the text of his message to General Khanh expressing satisfaction
on their agreement for the need to increase military activity against the Viet Cong (see
footnote 2, Document 25). President Johnson then answered questions, two of which were
related to Vietnam. Asked if he ruled out the possibility of neutralization of Vietnam as
President de Gaulle had suggested (see Document 27), Johnson replied:
"If we could have neutralization of both North Viet-Nam and South Viet-Nam, I am sure
that would be considered sympathetically. But I see no indication of that at the moment. I
think that if we could expect the Viet Cong to let their neighbors live in peace, we could
take a much different attitude. But as long as these raids are continuing and people are
attempting to envelop South Viet-Nam, I think that the present course we are conducting
is the only answer to that course, and I think that the operations should be stepped up
there. I see no sentiment favoring neutralization of South Viet-Nam alone, and I think the
course that we are following is the most advisable one for freedom at this point."
Asked later if President de Gaulle's proposal for neutralizing Southeast Asia interfered
with or made U.S. efforts in Vietnam more difficult, Johnson replied affirmatively, and
continued:
"We think the course of action that we are following in Southeast Asia is the only course
for us to follow, and the most advisable at this time. We plan to pursue it diligently and,
we hope, successfully on a stepped-up basis."
Toward the end of the press conference, President Johnson was asked to elaborate on his
statement that he would sympathize with neutralization of both North and South Vietnam
and how this idea differed from President de Gaulle's plan for neutralization of Indochina.
Johnson responded:
"You will have to ask General de Gaulle about the details of his proposal. But as I
understand it, the neutralization talk has applied only to South Viet-Nam and not to the
whole of that area of the world. I think that the only thing we need to do to have complete
peace in that area of the world now is to stop the invasion of South Viet-Nam by some of
its neighbors and supporters." (Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States:
Lyndon B. Johnson, 1963-64, Book I, pages 257-260)
32. Memoranda of Telephone Conversations Between the Assistant Secretary of

State for Public Affairs (Manning) and the Secretary of State/1/
Washington, February 1, 1964
/1/Source: Department of State, Rusk Papers: Lot 72 D 192, Telephone Conversations. No
classification marking. Transcribed by Mildred Asbjornson.
TELEPHONE CALL FROM MR. MANNING, 3:45 p.m.
Mr. Manning called from the White House and said he was under a handicap since he did
not yet have a copy of the Pres's press conference transcript but the Pres had said on the
neutralization of Vietnam, we were sympathetic to neutralization of both North and South.
Manning said this didn't pose too much of a problem. Pres had said we were opposed to
De Gaulle's idea of neutralization. The Sec said the two didn't quite fit. Manning said the
French press were dictating stories and tearing this apart. The Sec suggested Manning call
Harriman. Manning said he would call Sec back when he got hold of a transcript.
TELEPHONE CALL TO MR. MANNING (at the WH), 4:25 p.m.
The Sec said he had been watching TV on the Pres's press conference on the question of
neutralization of Vietnam and also on what De Gaulle had said. Mr. Moyers got on the
phone and asked the Sec if he would dictate to him a clarification of what the Pres had
said on these two things.
Sec said:
"It was obvious from what he said that the President was concerned about the
interpretation put on President De Gaulle's discussion of neutralization in Southeast Asia
itself. Out there it was taken to mean some sort of neutralization of South Vietnam which
will simply expose that country to continued penetration from the north. Since President
De Gaulle has not made any detailed proposals, it is easy to see how this interpretation
could cause such deep concern in South Vietnam."
The Sec said he would not put this clarification in the Pres's mouth but as background
clarification from Salinger's office. Moyers asked if they couldn't say that the Pres and the
Sec had discussed this matter of interpretation only today. The Sec said they could add to
above-"The President had discussed just today with the SecState the depth of concern of
the anxiety in South Vietnam."
TELEPHONE CALL FROM MR. MANNING (from WH), 4:55 p.m.
Mr. Manning said we were not completely finished with the clarification. He said in the
middle of the two questions in the Pres's press conference a newsman had asked if De
Gaulle's proposal interfered with our objectives and the Pres had said: yes. The Pres said
that De Gaulle was entitled to his opinion and we had expressed ours. We thought our
course was the only wise one and we planned to pursue it on a stepped up basis. Manning
said that De Gaulle, in talking about Southeast Asia, was referring to what was formerly
Indochina. The Sec said that, just [as] in the classroom, the Pres did not completely [and]
accurately understand just what De Gaulle was talking about. We ought to deflect the
whole business to what the people in Southeast Asia think De Gaulle is talking about.
Manning said we should make ourselves clear that what the Pres was rejecting was the
neutralization of South Vietnam. That was what South Vietnam was concerned about./2/
As far as De Gaulle was concerned, let him come up with details.
/2/ In telegram 1170 to Saigon, February 1, 7:15 p.m., the Department sent to the
Embassy the following information on the President's statements on neutralization:
"There may be attempts to distort the meaning of what the President said at press
conference this afternoon regarding the de Gaulle neutralization proposal. In order head
off conflicting interpretations, you should make absolutely clear in response to any
inquiries, or direct statement by you if need be, that President firmly opposed to de Gaulle
proposal for neutralization, that this has been and continues to be the position consistently
taken by the US Government. It would be incorrect to read any change in policy into the
President's remarks. This borne out by letter which Present sent General Khanh this
afternoon." (Ibid., Central Files, POL 27 VIET S)
Washington, February 4, 1964.
/1/ Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Vietnam Country File, Vol. 11,
Memos and Misc. Secret and Personal. Published in part in Declassified Documents,
1975, 175B.
SUBJECT
South Vietnam
Herewith my overnight thoughts for your lunch today:/2/
/2/ Reference is to a luncheon meeting at the White House at 1:04 p.m. among the
President, Secretaries Rusk and McNamara, and McGeorge Bundy. The meeting ended at
2:45 p.m. Johnson Library, President's Daily Diary) No record of the meeting has been
found, but see Document 34 and Document 35.
1. If Lodge must remain, the military commander must be changed. The President might
publicly load Lodge with full responsibility for the whole U.S. effort in South Vietnam,
giving him as deputy the ablest, most modern-minded 3-star general we can find. General
Westmoreland might fill the bill. He doesn't have to have an extra star, if he is acting as
Lodge's deputy.
2. Here in Washington we should get a Manager for South Vietnam. He should be in the
Department of Defense at a level which would permit him to deal with the Under
Secretaries and the Assistant Secretaries of State and the Aid Agency Administrator. He
should be McNamara's man. He should concern himself with operations in South Vietnam
and on policy matters he should report to McNamara, Rusk and Harriman. I have in mind
someone like Vance, your brother Bill, or possibly Solbert.
3. We should set up immediately a group of about 10 people who would meet together for
approximately two weeks, completely free from all other responsibilities, preferably not in
Washington but possibly in Honolulu or some reasonably secluded place, to think of
specific things which we should do to improve our effort inside South Vietnam. Since we
really do not have all of the best people for this job in Washington, we should draw from
the following sources: one or two of the best people from MACV; one or two from
USOM in Saigon; one or two from the Embassy in Saigon and/or State; one from the
CIA; one each from Krulak's shop and ISA; and possibly one from the academic world
like Fishel or Lucian Pye./3/ Solbert could be the Chairman of such a group; and we
should be ruthless in providing him the time and resources of the best people, regardless
of their duties or rank.
/3/ Wesley R. Fishel, Professor of Political Science at Michigan State University, and
Lucian W. Pye, Professor of Political Science at Massachusetts Institute of Technology.
4. There should be another group assembled entirely from Washington which should be
working at the same time on diplomatic and military plans for U.S. initiatives in the SEA
area as a whole, principally outside South Vietnam. Believe it or not, I would not be
averse to having Walt Rostow handling this one, provided he had tough representation
from all the schools of thought.
Michael V. Forrestal/4/
/4/ Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.
/1/ Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Aides Files, McGeorge Bundy,
Luncheons with the President, Vol. 1 [Part 2]. Secret. Bundy wrote the following note on
the source text: "P[resident] used all this in lunch with results not yet clear. McGB"
SUBJECT
Your luncheon with Secretaries Rusk and McNamara
You said yesterday that you wanted to talk about South Vietnam and about Africa at this
lunch.
1. On South Vietnam
There are two kinds of questions here:
a. What stronger courses of action can we take?

The gut question here is whether and how we can bring pressure on North Vietnam. The
working levels of the government are now inclined to argue that we can, but we do not yet
have a plan.
Such a plan would need a closely interlocked military and diplomatic program so as to lay
the widest possible basis of support for an action which will make almost all our allies
nervous except perhaps Nationalist China, the Philippines, South Vietnam, and Thailand.
b. To get any plan and to give it a better chance of success we need improvement in our
organization here and in the field.
In the field
If Lodge must stay then the transfer from Harkins to Westmoreland should be speeded up,
and we need to have an intense back-and-forth communication from Washington to Lodge
himself.
At home
We must end the deep-seated lack of confidence which exists between senior people at
Defense and the Hilsman office.
My own judgment is that government needs a senior officer, accepted as first-rate by all
concerned, who will make South Vietnam and related problems his only business. My
nominee would be Mike Forrestal, but I would be glad to have him wear a Defense hat or
State hat if that would help. I emphasize the role of Defense because that is where the
resources are, and McNamara is the man with the heaviest personal commitment.
[Here follow recommendations on item 2, Africa.]
McG. B./2/
/2/ Printed from a copy that bears these typed initials.
35. Memorandum From the Acting Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern
Affairs (Green) to the Secretary of State/1/
/1/ Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 VIET S. Top Secret. Drafted by
Mendenhall. A note on the source text indicates Rusk saw this memorandum.
SUBJECT
Viet-Nam
In addition to Deptels 1165 and 1166 to Saigon (attached),/2/ we believe you should be
aware of the following in connection with the lunch which you are having with the
President and Secretary McNamara on Viet-Nam:
/2/ Documents 28 and 29.
1. Khanh's reaction to the President's letter--Khanh has expressed pleasure at receiving the
letter President Johnson sent on Saturday. He has issued a press release with the text of
the letter and the comment that the U.S. and Vietnamese Governments have an absolute
identical point of view on intensifying the war against the Communists (Saigon's telegram
1481, February 4)./3/
/3/ Not printed. (Department of State, Central Files, POL 15-1 US/Johnson)
2. Diemist Revival?--We have a few inconclusive signs that Khanh's coup signifies a
Diemist revival. This would lead to political instability because of the strong opposition of
the students, Buddhists and intellectuals to a return of the Diemists. There has already
been a student demonstration in support of "complete revolution" (and at least partly in
support of General Minh-Saigon's telegram 1482, February 4)./4/
/4/ Not printed. (Ibid., POL 23-8 VIET S)
3. Low-level American Advisers--The displaced junta did not give us a final answer on
our proposal of assigning American advisers at District level and in other lower level
capacities than they now function. We believe this proposal should be taken up with
Khanh and at least pushed on an experimental basis. We are inclined to think that the
increase in efficiency would outweigh the risk of successful Viet Cong capitalization on
American presence at a low level. An experimental approach should prove the validity of
our belief. We propose to move a cable to Saigon along these lines.
4. North Viet-Nam--In the present context resulting from France's recognition of
Communist China we believe that it is desirable for the U.S. to search for some means of
action for recovering the psychological initiative. We are therefore cooperating with
Defense and CIA in a new review of possible actions against North Viet-Nam.
5. Laos--We believe that it would be useful and important to supply Prince Souvanna
Phouma with existing evidence of Viet Cong use of the Laos corridor for infiltration into
Viet-Nam, and taking steps to see that this is done. Such information should be politically
useful to Souvanna in dealing with the DRV and also build political support for
intelligence collection operations in southern Laos.
6. Reporting--Secretary McNamara may raise the question of reporting from the U.S.
agencies in Saigon. This question is now being actively worked on by the
Interdepartmental Working Group on VietNam and we expect to send instructions to
Saigon shortly. We are reviewing the substance, mode of presentation and frequency of
assessment reporting-both overall and by province--as well as the personnel and sources
of material for reporting. Defense has urged the dispatch of a State-DOD-CIA team to
Saigon to improve reporting, but we have resisted this suggestion on the ground that the
first task is for Washington to define what it considers the weaknesses in the reporting. If
this can be done it ought to be possible to get a satisfactory response from Saigon without
sending still another team out there.
36. Letter From the Secretary of State to the Secretary of Defense (McNamara)/1/
/1/ Source: Washington National Records Center, RG 330, OASD/ISA Files: FRC 69 A
926, 092 Vietnam. Top Secret; Exdis. According to the Department of State copy of this
letter, Mendenhall was the drafter. (Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 VIET S)
Dear Bob: I have read with a great deal of interest the Joint Chiefs of Staff Memorandum
of January 22, 1964, on Viet-Nam and Southeast Asia, which you forwarded with your
letter of January 28, 1964./2/
/2/ See Document 17.
I share the view of the Joint Chiefs of Staff that in Viet-Nam we must demonstrate to both
the Communist and the non-Communist worlds that the "wars of national liberation"
formula now being pushed so actively by the Communists will not succeed. The Joint
Chiefs have, in my view, correctly remarked that the focus of the counterinsurgency battle
lies in South Viet-Nam itself, and the war must be fought and won primarily in the minds
of the Vietnamese people. This means that this war, like other guerrilla wars, is essentially
political--an important fact to bear in mind in determining command and control
arrangements in Viet-Nam.
I also agree with the Joint Chiefs that we must follow an integrated U. S. approach in
Southeast Asia to achieve our policy objectives. We must determine what the effects will
be on the other countries in the area of any major action we take in or with respect to a
given country. We must also determine with respect to any proposed action what we can
realistically expect to achieve with that action, and balance that against the political and
military risks attendant upon that action before reaching a decision.
I have noted the list of possible actions which the Joint Chiefs may wish to consider
recommending from a military standpoint as the situation develops. The Department of
State will, of course, always be prepared to consider promptly, in the light of the factors
mentioned above, any courses of action which the Joint Chiefs and the Department of
Defense propose.
With warm regards,
Sincerely,
Dean

/1/ Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Vietnam Country File, Vol. III,
Memos and Misc. Top Secret.
South Vietnam
General Khanh has discussed with Lodge the composition of his Government (Saigon's
1510)./2/ It looks pretty good. General Minh as Chief of State will be a big help both in
South Vietnam and internationally. As the cable points out, it will leave General Khanh
somewhat more free to attend to the substantive problems of winning the war.
/2/ Dated February 7. (Department of State, Central Files, POL 15 VIET S) The White
House copy is published in Declassified Documents, 1975, 215C. Lodge had an earlier
discussion with Khanh on February 5 during which he expressed concern for Khanh's
safety and asked what precautions Khanh was taking against possible coupe. Khanh
dismissed the threat, and assured Lodge that he planned to move quickly and vigorously
in prosecuting the war. (Telegram 1493 from Saigon, February 5; Department of State,
Central Files, POL 23 VIET S. The White House copy of telegram 1493 is published in
Declassified Documents, 1975, 215A.)
The Vice Prime Minister in charge of Pacification, Mr. Hoan is a Dai Viet leader. Carl
and I met him here once in Washington, and we were not particularly impressed. I gather
he will be in charge of the civilian side of the struggle. He has, however, I believe, a fairly
large Nationalist following.
Other hopeful signs are Oanh (Carl's friend) as Minister of Finance, Mau (Diem's old
Foreign Minister) back in the same job,/3/ and National Defense under Khiem. The
Government as a whole seems to include almost every geographic and non-Communist
political faction. I am asking State and the Agency to do a more thorough evaluation.
/3/ Tran Ngoc Oanh was Minister of Public Works and Vu Van Mau did not have a
Cabinet post in the Diem government.
[Here follows a summary of developments in Laos.]
On top of this,/4/ we have intelligence strongly suggesting that a high level meeting
between the North Vietnamese and the Chinese is taking place in a town called Mengtzu
near the North Vietnamese border. There has also been a significant movement of Chinese
interceptor and bomber aircraft into this area.
/4/ Reference is to the worsening situation in Laos and the possibility of a Pathet Lao
military offensive.
These indications plus the situation in South Vietnam suggest to me that any
organizational changes that we make here in Washington should occur quickly, so that we
have a strong team to deal with the trouble which I sense will be developing in the months
of March and April.
Mike
38. Report From the Executive Director-Comptroller of Central Intelligence

(Kirkpatrick) and the Station Chief in Saigon (de Silva) to the Director of Central
Intelligence (McCone)/1/
Saigon, February 10, 1964.
/1/ Source: Washington National Records Center, RG 330, OSD Files: FRC 330-75.
Alternate Proposals. Secret. The source text is a copy of the report that the CIA sent
McNamara on February 10 under cover of a memorandum explaining that this analysis
was not being formally disseminated because it was a reply to a personal request from
McCone.
1. With regard to the conduct of the war, we must judge that the situation at this moment
must be characterized as one in which the population at large appears apathetic, without
enthusiasm either for the GVN or the VC sides but responsive to the latter because it fears
the VC. The most important single factor continues to be whether or not the rural
population will be willing to defend itself against the VC and to support GVN actions
against the VC. In this sector, there now seems to be less conviction and resolution, and a
more widespread inclination to avoid the problems of opposing the VC, and to play both
sides in hopes somehow of getting along peacefully and without personal commitment.
2. Obviously this gradual abrading of the popular will to resistance, if such is indeed
taking place as it appears to be to us here in Saigon, is of the most fundamental
importance, and constitutes a trend which must be altered and reversed. What is needed in
this regard and very soon are a series of GVN successes in the military sphere which
would go [far] toward implanting and nourishing a popular attitude that the GVN has the
means of bringing security and a sense of ease to the rural population, and is clearly
determined to do so on an everbroadening front throughout the countryside. Only within
some such atmosphere of hopefulness can the will and the resolve to oppose the VC be
strengthened, and it must be if this war is to be won.
3. The new regime will enjoy stability in direct proportion to the degree it galvanizes and
energizes the government apparatus and in particular the Vietnamese military
establishment in terms of an aggressive and successful prosecution of the fight. If the
present regime should give an impression of uncertainty, apathy, or irresoluteness, it
would appear logical to assume that its days as a government would inevitably be
numbered, and it would also seem logical that its successor would be a regime destined to
lend itself to solutions to end the fighting on conditions which we would find highly
undesirable. In short, the present regime can be a stable one if it takes the initiative and
forces it on a government structure and a population waiting to be led and hopefully still
willing to be led in an anti-VC cause. If the regime falters and appears to be failing in this
regard, there are undoubtedly elements in Vietnam who will be willing to make their
move and seek other solutions.
4. Mr. Kirkpatrick's personal comment is as follows: I agree with the above but must note
that even armed with your pessimistic comments following your last visit I have been
shocked by the number of our (CIA) people and of the military, even those whose job is
always to say we are winning, who feel that the tide is against us. Admittedly this is based
on a limited number of discussions here and in Danang in three days. There are ominous
indications that the VC are able to mount larger operations than in the past using bigger
arms, including anti-aircraft. Vietnamese Government reactions are still slow, defensive
and reminiscent of French tactics here a decade ago. There are still really no fundamental
internal security measures of any effectiveness such as identity cards, block wardens,
travel controls, etc. Extensive use by the VC of the waterways leaves the GVN
handcuffed. It is evident that a major factor in VC victories is their superior intelligence
based on nationwide penetrations and intimidation at all levels. This also is a factor in
their military victories where internal agents turn guns on defenders. Finally, with the
Laos and Cambodia borders open, this entire pacification effort is like trying to mop the
floor before turning off the faucet.
39. Memorandum From the President's Special Assist3nt for National Security
/1/ Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Memos to the President, Vol. 1.
Confidential.
SUBJECT
Notes for your meeting with Senator Mansfield today at 6:00/2/
/2/ The meeting took place from 6:35 p.m. to 7:15 p.m., February 10. (Johnson Library,
President's Daily Diary) No record of the meeting has been found.
1. Vietnam
On Vietnam he continues to believe in the de Gaulle approach, and we don't, though
public finger-pointing at de Gaulle is not your line. I suggest you should say to him that
for the present any weakening of our support of anti-Communist forces in South Vietnam
would give the signal for a wholesale collapse of anti-Communism all over Southeast
Asia. Khanh's government may be our last best chance, and we simply cannot afford to be
the ones who seem to pull the plug on him. For this reason you might wish to urge
Mansfield himself not to express his own doubts in public, at least for a while. His
Vietnamese memoranda are at Tab A./3/
/3/ Document 2 and Foreign Relations, 1961-1963, vol. IV, pp. 691-692.
You are acting promptly to reorganize the Washington end of our South Vietnamese
operations and depending on the success of your conversation with Sullivan, you may
wish to tell Mansfield in confidence of your plans. The draft NSAM is attached at Tab
B./4/
/4/ Not attached; for the approved NSAM, see Document 46.
[Here follow items 2-4 which are unrelated to Vietnam.]
McG. B.
40. Editorial Note

On February 11, 1966, McGeorge Bundy issued National Security Action Memorandum
No. 284, "Official Visits to South Vietnam," which directed that official visits by highranking military and civilian personnel to South Vietnam be coordinated with the
Department of State through the Chairman of the Committee on Policy and Operations in
Vietnam. NSAM 284 superseded NSAM 217, January 25, 1963, printed in Foreign
Relations, 1961-1963, volume III, page 63.
On January 10, 1964, Roger Hilsman had recommended to the Executive Secretary of the
Department of State, Benjamin Read, that NSAM 217 be reissued. Hilsman's
memorandum to Read reads in part as follows:
"As you know, there has been a constant flow of high-level visitors to South Viet-Nam
during the past couple months. I feel quite strongly that we must be careful not to
overload this circuit. After all our purpose in Viet-Nam is to get on with the war. To the
extent we divert the Generals as well as our own people from this task, we are not helping
matters. It is clear that the Generals themselves feel we have been too importunate in the
matter of visitors, and I am sure that Ambassador Lodge shares this view."
Hilsman asked that the Assistant Secretary of State be given responsibility for
coordinating visits to South Vietnam. Read complied, because the draft of NSAM 284
which he sent Bundy indicated Hilsman as the coordinator. (Department of State, Central
Files, POL 23-10 VIET S) The NSAM as issued, however, gave the responsibility to
William Sullivan, the newly-designated Chairman of the Vietnam Committee. For
Sullivan's responsibilities, see Document 46.
41. Memorandum of a Conversation, White House/1/

Washington, February 12, 1964, 4:30 p.m.
/1/ Source: Department of State, President's Memoranda of Conversation: Lot 66 D 149,
Jan-March, 1964. Secret. Drafted by Willis C. Armstrong. Approved by the Executive
Secretary on February 27 and by the White House on February 24. The source text is
labeled Part II of a six-topic meeting.
British Prime Minister Sir Alec Douglas Home was in Washington for an official visit,
February 12-14.
SUBJECT
Southeast Asia
PARTICIPANTS
British Side
Sir Alec Douglas-Home, Prime Minister of the United Kingdom
R.A. Butler, Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs
Sir Harold Caccia, Permanent Under Secretary, the Foreign Office
Sir David Ormsby Gore, British Ambassador
Sir Timothy Thigh, Principal Private Secretary to the Prime Minister
Sir Burke Trend, Secretary to the Cabinet
U.S. Side
The President
The Secretary of State
Governor Harriman, Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs
David K.E. Bruce, Ambassador to Great Britain
McGeorge Bundy, Special Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs
William R. Tyler, Assistant Secretary, EUR
Richard I. Philips, Director, P/ON
Willis C. Armstrong, Director, BNA
The President suggested that the Secretary of State comment on the situation in Southeast
Asia, and the Secretary remarked that good progress had already been made by
representatives of the two governments in a common approach to Southeast Asian
problems. He explained the talks of February 10 and 11,/2/ and went on to say that
agreement had been reached to have some language in the communique to cover our
understanding on Southeast Asia, particularly on Viet Nam and Malaysia./3/ Mr. Butler
made the point that Britain supported US efforts in Viet Nam and was quite prepared to
say so in the communique, whereas Britain was anxious to have a comparable reference to
Malaysia in the same paragraph./4/
/2/ These meetings concerned planning for the Indonesia-Malaysia crisis.
/2/ These meetings concerned planning for the Ind/3/This understanding was reached at a
discussion between U.S. and U.K. of officials headed by Butler and Rusk, February 12,
dealing with Southeast Asian problems in general. (Memorandum of a meeting at the
White House, February 12, 3 p.m.; Department of State, Conference Files: Lot 66 D 110,
CF 2369)
/4/ The joint communique, February 13, is printed in Department of State Bulletin, pp.
336-337. It did contain references to British support for U.S. policy in Vietnam and U.S.
support for British policy in Malaysia.
The Secretary reported further that there had been agreement to have a good thorough
NATO discussion next week, with the US talking about South Viet Nam and Laos and
with the UK speaking of Malaysia and Cambodia. He also noted the intention of the
British to consider with the French what they mean by neutrality in Southeast Asia. Mr.
Butler referred to the message from Couve de Murville explaining that neutrality for
Cambodia was separable and separate from any efforts with respect to Viet Nam. The
Secretary emphasized further that a review with Mr. Butler in an earlier conversation had
indicated that in general the US and UK were approaching Southeast Asian problems very
much in the same way, should keep in close touch with each other, and should move
forward along various lines to be mutually helpful./5/
/5/ In a private conversation, February 12, from 11 a.m. to approximately noon, Home
gave Johnson similar assurances although he stated that Great Britain "must help quietly
because of its peacekeeping role under the agreements of 1954." (Memorandum for the
record by Bundy, February 13; Johnson Library, National Security File, Memos to the
President, Vol. 1)
The Prime Minister said to the President that he thought that the visit of Attorney General
Kennedy had been extremely helpful in the harmonization of views on Indonesia and
Malaysia./6/ He again referred to British support for US efforts in South Vietnam. The
President said this was helpful, because there were always questions in the US as to the
extent to which our allies were also committed to support such efforts. The Secretary
commented that the object of the NATO discussion on Southeast Asia was to alert all the
allies to the problems caused there by Communist forces and to identify their interests.
The Prime Minister added that the message from Couve de Murville had indicated a
willingness to make a public statement on Cambodia's neutrality, separating it from any
question of South Viet Nam.
/6/ Attorney General Robert F. Kennedy undertook a 13-day mission to the Far East,
January 15-27, in which he represented President Johnson in talks with the leaders of
Indonesia, the Philippines, and Malaysia concerning the dispute over Malaysia. Kennedy
also conferred with officials in Japan, Korea, Thailand, and the United Kingdom. For an
account of the mission, see Department of State Bulletin, February 17, 1964, pp. 239-243.
The Prime Minister wondered whether the situation in South Viet Nam was worse, or
whether it was holding. The Secretary of State said the situation was worse, since there
had been a real increase in the capability of the Vietcong. He noted that the resources,
human and material, exist, but pointed out that the local Vietnamese have not been
sufficiently vigorous. He said we must see what more can be done to help the Vietnamese
to do the job, and that the next several weeks of the dry season are critical.
[4 lines of source text not declassified] The President remarked that it was very hard to get
a clear picture of the facts in the Vietnamese situation.
Mr. Bundy said that this meeting of our two countries and others with other allies could
help a good deal. De Gaulle expresses himself, but does not make any contribution
otherwise. The change of government in Viet Nam and the press release of General de
Gaulle/7/ had both tended to damage confidence, and meetings such as the present one
could help restore it. The Secretary remarked that the UK and US were both using the
olive branch and arrows in Southeast Asia, but that de Gaulle was using only the olive
branch, and his efforts did not improve the situation. The Prime Minister remarked that
"none of these fellows" in Southeast Asia fight very well. The Secretary of State said that
the South Vietnamese had really done quite well, all things considered. The Prime
Minister said he was not happy about the Malays as fighters, or the Thais. He said that
Britain was fortunate to still have some Gurkhas in the area.
42. Paper Prepared in the Defense Intelligence Agency/1/

306, 350.05 Southeast Asia. Secret. Attached to a memorandum of transmittal, February
12, from Director of the Defense Intelligence Agency Carroll to Secretary of Defense
McNamara. SNIE 50-64, "The Situation in Southeast Asia," is not printed. Johnson
Library, National Security File, National Intelligence Estimate File, 14.3 NVN)
BRIEF
SNIE 50-64, Short-Term Prospects in Southeast Asia
This Special National Intelligence Estimate was approved by the United States
Intelligence Board on 12 February 1964. Significant judgments of this estimate are as
follows:
Certain signs of new North Vietnamese and Chinese Communist military activities,
together with an upsurge of Viet Cong activity in South Vietnam, recent Viet Cong
successes there, and recent Communist advances in Laos, raise the question whether the
situations in South Vietnam and Laos may be on the verge of collapse. After carefully
reviewing the evidence, we believe:
That the situation in South Vietnam is very serious, and prospects uncertain. Even with
US assistance approximately as it now is, we believe, unless there is a marked
improvement in the effectiveness of the South Vietnamese government and armed forces,
that the South Vietnamese have at best an even chance of withstanding the insurgency
threat during the next few weeks or months.
That if present trends in Laos are not checked, there will be continued erosion of nonCommunist military and political positions there. The Laos situation may deteriorate
rapidly, and it could take a turn which would further improve the Viet Cong position in
South Vietnam.
That dramatic new Chinese Communist intervention in Vietnam or Laos is unlikely. North
Vietnam, however, is stepping up its support of the Pathet Lao, and may do so for the Viet
Cong-perhaps with some increase of Chinese Communist material assistance. The
Communist hope in South Vietnam would be to gain sufficient quick victories before
General Khanh's new government could bring its full military potential to bear, to
undermine the South Vietnamese will to resist, and to induce the US to consider a
negotiated settlement its only feasible option.
That developments elsewhere in Southeast Asia, save in Cambodia, have thus far had little
impact on those in Vietnam and Laos. However, the outcome of the present war in South
Vietnam will have a serious effect on the future willingness of governments in Southeast
Asia to adopt anti-Communist, rather than neutralist, stances.
43. Memorandum From the Chairman of the Policy Planning Council (Rostow) to
the Secretary of State/1/
/1/ Source: Department of State, S/P Files: Lot 70 D 199, Southeast Asia. Top Secret; For
the Secretary Only. Rusk's initials appear on the source text.
SUBJECT
Southeast Asia
The essential points to be made by the President to a conference of Congressional leaders,
in asking for a Resolution, are these. They would require coordinated elaboration (as at
President Truman's famous conference on Greece and Turkey in 1947)/2/ among yourself,
Secretary McNamara, and General Taylor.
/2/ Apparent reference to a meeting with congressional leaders, February 27, 1947,
described in Harry S. Truman, Memoirs, vol. II (Garden City, NY, 1956), p. 103.
1. Southeast Asia is a critical area to the United States and to our world position. The loss
of Viet Nam would endanger Southeast Asia. Thailand would no longer rely on U.S.
backing. Laos, Cambodia, and probably Burma would go to the Communists. Taiwan's
morale would crumble. The Philippines, Korea, and Japan would be insecure. Sukamo
would be confirmed in his semi-pro-Communist stance. Malaya would be endangered.
The Indian subcontinent would be outflanked. The Middle East and East Africa would be
substantially opened up. The credibility of our European stance under the Johnson
Administration would be put in question; for our commitments to South Viet Nam are no
less explicit than our commitments to Berlin.
2. South Viet Nam is in danger. The internal position in South Viet Nam created by the
systematic operations conducted from North Viet Nam is precarious. From outside: the
1962 Geneva Accord and the 1954 Accord are not being respected. North Vietnamese
troops are still in Laos; North Vietnamese arms and men are being introduced into South
Viet Nam; the war is run by a general staff in the north via a complex communications
network; the morale in South Viet Nam (and Southeast Asia) has been weakened by the
failure of the West to stop this violation of the 1962 Agreement.
3. Although difficult tasks would still be faced in South Viet Nam and Laos if North
Vietnamese compliance with the 1962 Agreement was enforced, we see no possibility of
achieving short-run or long-run stability in the area until it is enforced. This is not a new
judgment. General Taylor reported to President Kennedy on November 3, 1961: "While
we feel that the program recommended represents those measures which should be taken
in our present knowledge of the situation in Southeast Asia, I would not suggest that it is
the final word. Future needs beyond this program will depend upon the kind of settlement
we obtain in Laos and the manner in which Hanoi decides to adjust its conduct to that
settlement. If the Hanoi decision is to continue the irregular war declared on South
Vietnam in 1959 with continued infiltration and covert support of guerrilla bands in the
territory of our ally, we will then have to decide whether to accept as legitimate the
continued guidance, training, and support of a guerrilla war across an international
boundary, while the attacked react only inside their borders. Can we admit the
establishment of the common law that the party attacked and his friends are denied the
right to strike the source of aggression, after the fact of external aggression is clearly
established? It is our view that our government should undertake with the Vietnamese the
measures outlined herein, but should then consider the broader question beyond."/3/
/3/ Foreign Relations, 1961-1963, vol. I, p. 477.
4. We have given the 1962 Agreement a chance to work. The time has now come for the
United States to use every means at its command, diplomatic and military, to enforce
compliance.
5. We believe there is a fair chance that compliance can be enforced without substantial
military engagement if there is a united expression of determination by the Executive and
Congressional branches of the Government, backed by our people, for these reasons:
a. Ho has an industrial complex to protect: he is no longer a guerrilla fighter with nothing
to lose.
b. Ho does not wish the Chinese in Hanoi.
c. The Chinese Communists are militarily and economically weak but committed to split
from Moscow and anxious to come out in the world.
d. Mao's doctrine has always been: "When the enemy advances, withdraw; when the
enemy falters, attack."
e. Moscow has ample reasons not to engage its forces in Southeast Asia or elsewhere if
U.S. is determined and united.
In short, if our objective is compliance with the 1954 and 1962 Agreements--and not the
invasion of North Viet Nam or China--we may be able to achieve it without major
military operations, but only if we are united, determined, and prepared for any level of
escalation.
6. If we do not take this action now, we not only endanger Southeast Asia, but we
encourage the Communists everywhere (including the Caribbean) to believe that it is
accepted by the West as legal to conduct wars of "National Liberation" across borders,
with resistance possible only from within; and that if guerrilla war successfully takes hold,
the West surrenders. Obviously, at some stage, we would react; but then we will have to
do so with greater violence from a profoundly weakened Western position.
7. Therefore, we are asking Congressional and national support to draw the line in the dust
at the borders of South Viet Nam. The essentials of a Congressional Resolution are:
a. To call attention to the continued violation of the 1954 and 1962 Accords;
b. To reaffirm the United States commitment to Southeast Asia under the Manila Pact;
c. To reaffirm the United States commitment, made by three Presidents, to the continued
independence of the people of South Viet Nam;
d. To call on the President to use all the means at our command to enforce compliance
with the 1954 and 1962 Accords.
8. At the time of presentation to the Congress of the case for a Congressional Resolution,
we shall be publishing evidence of the violation of the Geneva Accords.
9. In the wake of a Congressional Resolution, we shall:
--Move additional forces into the area;
--Take a series of diplomatic moves to inform both our Allies and the various Communist
regimes of our intention to impose measured, limited sanctions on North Viet Nam, if
necessary, to enforce compliance.
10. There will be considerable confusion in the Free World, which will fear a
confrontation; and this will be heightened by the Communists, de Gaulle, Lippmann, etc.
The chances of not having to drop bombs in the North will depend substantially on
whether the Executive Branch and the Congress remain united and resolute. Let us put all
other considerations aside and stay together.
11. If we can make this proposition stick in Southeast Asia, our job with Castro will be
greatly eased and the long-run prospects for a peaceful world under law enhanced.
/1/ Source: Department of State, S/P Files: Lot 70 D 199, Vietnam. Secret. Rusk's initials
appear on the source text.
SUBJECT
Contingency Planning for Southeast Asia
Governor Harriman, Alexis Johnson, Roger Hilsman, Bill Sullivan and I will be meeting
with you at 4:30 p.m. today./2/
/2/ The meeting began at 4:40 p.m. and lasted until almost 5:30. Robert Johnson also
attended. Johnson Library, Rusk Appointment Book) No record of the meeting has been
found.
The purpose of our meeting will be to report to you the results of our individual review of
the attached report on Southeast Asia prepared by the Policy Planning Council. A
summary of the concept and key issues examined in this report are at Tab A. I recommend
you thumb through the table of contents (Tab B)/3/ which will give you an idea of the
scope of the paper.
/3/ Not attached to the source text. A copy of the table of contents and the draft report is in
Department of State, S/P Files: Lot 70 D 199, Vietnam.
I recommend that you give your approval to the following proposals:
1. That the Tuesday Planning Group at its next meeting take on the job of serving as a
steering group to provide general guidance and direction to the preparation of a
contingency plan for the imposition of measured sanctions against North Viet-Nam. As
you know, Governor Harriman and Alex Johnson are regular members of that group. For
these purposes we would add others as required, including immediately senior
representatives of FE and USIA.
2. That the Planning Group establish a working group under State Department
chairmanship to prepare the necessary studies and plans.
The objective of the next planning stage is not to produce a recommended policy. It is to
produce a complete politico-military scenario which we can lay before senior officers of
the Government so that they may judge whether and under what circumstances a forward
policy of the kind examined here might prove wise and viable.
[Here follows discussion unrelated to Vietnam.]
Tab A
SUMMARY OF CONCEPT AND KEY ISSUES
I. The Concept
The paper is not a plan, but an exposition of issues that would need to be examined in
preparing a plan. It examines a concept designed to cause North Vietnam (the DRV) (a) to
cease its illegal infiltration of men and arms into South Vietnam, its direction of the war in
South Vietnam and its supporting activities in Laos; and (b) to withdraw its troops or
cadres from both countries and to comply fully with the 1954 and 1962 Geneva Accords.
The concept is based upon the assumption that the imposition of graduated political,
military and, possibly, economic sanctions on the DRV could cause it to call off the war
principally because of its fear that it would otherwise risk loss of its politically important
industrial development; because of its fear of being driven into the arms of Communist
China; and because of Moscow's, Peiping's and Hanoi's concern about escalation.
II. Key Issues
1. The question of how to define operational objectives that will command wide support at
home and abroad; provide a reasonably clear-cut basis for measuring Communist
performance and not provide undue opportunities for Communist delaying tactics and
political warfare; and therefore provide the basis for determining when U.S. pressures
should be continued, when halted. As a related matter, how important and how feasible
are inspection arrangements or other means of insuring continued DRV compliance?
2. The question of the degree of the U.S. commitment. We must be prepared to withstand,
if necessary, possibly great international political pressures which might force us to desist
before we have achieved our objective. We must consider how far we are prepared to go
in meeting Communist military responses. We must consider the actions that we would
take in the event of either success or failure.
3. Against the background of the past, how do we develop a convincing case against the
DRV that will command, at a minimum, broad domestic U.S. support and some
international support and at the maximum, broad international support?
4. How might the crisis be terminated? Are there acceptable turning off points? Under
what circumstances would we be prepared to go to an international conference and for
what purpose?
5. We must consider how far we are prepared to go in providing additional commitments
of support to South Vietnam, Thailand and, perhaps, the Philippines, and whether, even
with such commitments, they will give us their initial and their continued support.
6. We face broad tactical choices: whether we should move quickly or slowly in posing
and carrying out our threat to the DRV; whether we should begin on the covert or the
overt level and how and when we should move from one level of action to the other.
7. We need to reexamine organization for making and implementing policy in the context
of an intense and possibly protracted politico-military crisis to insure responsiveness to
top-level control without neglect of expert advice and local problems.
to the Secretary of Defense (McNamara)/1/
/1/ Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Aides Files, McGeorge Bundy,
Luncheons with the President, Vol. 1, [Part 2]. Secret and Personal. Published in part in
Declassified Documents, 1977, 109B.
SUBJECT
South Vietnam
I wanted to give you some thoughts for your forthcoming trip to Saigon./2/ I agree that the
next four or five months will be critical in the sense that if a favorable political and
military trend does not develop in that period, we will slowly lose our position in Vietnam
and the rest of Southeast Asia. Thus we have a very short time within which to make the
changes in our own organization in the field to produce a coherent effort from the
American side.
/2/ The McNamara mission visited South Vietnam March 8-12.
I have the impression that since last November 1st our own efforts in support of what we
used to call the Strategic Hamlet Program have deteriorated badly. I refer to that
collection of activities which included the Montagnard program, hamlet militia training,
CIDG training, police training, pig and fertilizer programs, etc.; in short, all of the mixed
civil and military counterinsurgency programs which about a year ago seemed to be
working well.
The two coups obviously have affected the GVN's efforts, but I am also worried lest our
own organization has deteriorated. We have lost [less than 1 line of source text not
declassified] a rather large and extraordinarily successful effort with the Montagnards on
the Central Plateau. Recent reports suggest to me that what we once thought was a solid
program is beginning to fall apart in that region. A [less than 1 line of source text not
declassified] memorandum/3/ I have recently read implies that most of the young
Vietnamese and tribal dialect speaking Americans who worked in the hill country have
been pulled off.
/3/ Not found.
I don't know what has happened to Trueheart's rural rehabilitation committee, which
coordinated the AID efforts with the military, especially in the Delta. I assume it must be
functioning under Nes; but we haven't had any word about it.
I suspect that Army Special forces, [1-1/2 lines of source text not declassified] have
tended to pull their resources away from the populated regions of the High Plateau in an
effort to increase their activities along the Laotian border. This may have left the VC
behind to attack what we once thought were strong Montagnard hamlets in their rear.
These are only impressions that I have gathered from reading the current reporting, which,
as you know too well, is voluminous but uninformative. I have four specific suggestions
for you to consider while you are in Saigon:
1. Minister for Rural Operations. We should have one manager in Saigon with the
responsibility and authority to run that part of the war which lies between Lodge's
diplomatic discourses with the highest level of the GVN on the one hand, and Harkins'
military responsibility to advise and direct ARVN and conventional U.S. military efforts
on the other. He should have the rank of Minister and be responsible to Lodge and
Harkins. Nes should become Lodge's Minister for Political Affairs and should perform the
traditional functions of DCM in an ordinary Embassy. The Minister for Operations should
be a civilian preferably with some military background, someone like Hank Byroade.
Such a person would have direct authority over the following parts of the existing U.S.
agencies in Saigon:
(a) The USOM rural rehabilitation organization (i.e., including the USOM representatives
in the various provinces).
(b) All USIS psywar-type operations (leaflet printing, films, etc.).
(c) Those Army Special Forces units who are engaged in training Vietnamese irregulars
who do not leave their home regions (hamlet militia, SDC, and other local paramilitary
organizations as distinguished from regular ARVN units).
(d) Any vestiges remaining of [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] paramilitary
functions.
He should have a call upon MACV, USOM, the Embassy and [less than 1 line of source
text not declassified] for support where necessary.
2. You might inquire whether the organization of the ARVN itself is well suited to the
territorial war. Is the division a useful unit on which to base U.S. and GVN planning and
support? Would more decentralization of tactical command, say to the province or district
level, tend to tailor military operations more closely to local intelligence and other
conditions? I have no expertise at all in such matters; but I should imagine that General
Stilwell and Bob Thompson may have some useful thoughts. If you are impressed with
Thompson, would it make any sense to associate him more closely with our own effortsi.e., as an informal member of our country team?
3. Wouldn't it be worthwhile discussing with Khanh the possibility of his instructing
ARVN subordinate commanders to take their military advisors more seriously? Could this
be done on a "burden of proof" basis? If an ARVN unit commander refused to follow U.S.
advice and then failed, he would have the burden of showing affirmatively that his
decision was the correct one. Conversely, if he followed the advice and failed, he would
be given the benefit of any doubt.
4. The necessity for U.S. liaison with Khanh and his government is greater than ever
before. We had no knowledge of this coup; and unless we pull up our socks, we will not
ever have the opportunity of dissuading others from starting a new one. The French can be
counted upon to stir up trouble. [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] Lodge has
to be persuaded that such people do not represent a threat to his authority, if he chooses to
give them guidance.
Mike
46. National Security Action Memorandum No. 280/1/

/1/ Source: Department of State, S/S-NSC Files: Lot 72 D 316, NSAM 280. Secret.
MEMORANDUM TO
The Secretary of Defense
The Director of Central Intelligence
The Administrator. AID
I have today determined that it is essential to establish in Washington a small committee
for the management of U.S. policy and operations in South Vietnam. After consultation
with the Secretary of State, I have designated Mr. William Sullivan of the Department of
State to serve as Chairman of this committee, under the direct supervision of the Secretary
of State.
I now request that the Secretary of Defense, the Director of Central Intelligence, and the
Administrator of the Agency for International Development nominate to me individuals
from their departments and agencies to serve as members of Mr. Sullivan's committee.
The officers so nominated will be expected to give an absolute priority to their obligations
as members of this committee and as agents for the execution of approved decisions. On
this basis, I have already designated Mr. Michael Forrestal to serve as the White House
representative on this committee.
Major questions of policy and operations will be subject to my approval in consultation
with heads of departments and agencies as appropriate. In the execution of approved
policy, it is my desire that Mr. Sullivan's committee shall move energetically, and that
department appeal from Mr. Sullivan's decisions shall be kept to a minimum. He is being
appointed because he commands the confidence not only of myself and of the Secretary of
State, but also of senior officials of all agencies concerned.
It is my hope and expectation that the establishment of this committee will permit an
energetic, unified and skillful prosecution of the only war we face at present./2/
/2/ On February 15, at 11:33 a.m., Rusk called McGeorge Bundy. The transcript of their
conversation relating to the establishment of the Vietnam Committee reads as follows:
"Re the Viet-Nam task force, Sec. said he put a burr under their tail; told them that their
mission is as broad as the problem, top priority, that we have got to win this war. B.
thought it important to have the other track explored; Sec. said we were moving full speed
on this as an adjunct to the task force." (Ibid., Rusk Files: Lot 72 D 192, Telephone
Conversations)
Lyndon B. Johnson
/1/ Source: Department of State, S/P Files: Lot 70 D 199, Vietnam. Secret. Copies were
sent to Harriman, Sullivan, U. Alexis Johnson, and Hilsman. Rusk's initials appear on the
source text.
SUBJECT
Ho and Mao
The question of Hanoi-Peking relations was raised briefly yesterday./2/ I should like to
add a word.
/2/ Apparently at the 4:40 p.m. meeting on February 14; see footnote 2, Document 44.
I have assumed for some time that, in terms of Bloc relations and policy towards South
Viet-Nam, Ho and Mao were coming closer together, although not without some debate in
the Communist Party in Hanoi of which there is considerable evidence.
I assume further that Ho and Mao are now operating very closely and, indeed, engaged in
a plan to warn us of escalation should we move north. Some additional aircraft have been
moved to Hainan and into South China, I believe.
Moreover, in my view, no plan to inflict even limited damage on the North should
proceed without our taking the fullest possible preparations to face any degree of
escalation within enemy capabilities. The likelihood of escalation will be inversely
proportional to their judgment of our determination and available and relevant military
strength.
But this is a quite different matter from the important point made in the paper./3/ For
centuries all Vietnamese have had as an objective of policy to keep an arms-length
relation to China. The Vietnamese Communist Party has maintained control over its own
army, secret police, and party apparatus. It maintains that critical degree of independence
now.
I do not for one moment believe--nor is there any evidence--that the North Vietnamese are
prepared to forego that kind of independence, whatever their present relations with
Peking.
A substantial war in North Viet-Nam would require the Chinese Communists to introduce
into Hanoi aircraft and, perhaps, troops. No Vietnamese would view this event without a
certain apprehension that the consequence might be the permanent reduction in their
status from junior partner to Chinese province.
I continue to believe, therefore, that this deep reservation in Hanoi about relations with
China will be one among other constraints on their conduct in the face of the policy we
have been discussing; although, to repeat, we should not count on anything but a
determination and a capacity to make their present course of action, in violation of solemn
Accords, unprofitable as opposed to any other course of action they might adopt.
48. Memorandum From the Deputy Director of the Bureau of Intelligence and
Research (Denney) to the Secretary of State/1/
RFE-11
/1/ Source: Department of State, S/P Files: Lot 71 D 273, Vietnam. Secret.
SUBJECT
Hanoi Foresees Victory in South Vietnam--But Only After Long Guerrilla War
In view of increasing speculation concerning the designs of North Vietnam in the South,
we have analyzed a spate of recent statements from Hanoi which provide an unusually
revealing picture of Hanoi's calculations.
Abstract
A series of authoritative North Vietnamese articles, released on February 10 and 11,
reaffirm Hanoi's belief that protracted political and military struggle without open North
Vietnamese intervention will be ultimately successful against a militarily superior army.
Nevertheless, Hanoi again evinces concern about how Viet Cong morale will hold up in
the long run and even reveals the existence of considerable Northern disenchantment
about the war in the South. The fullest exposition of these views is an article in the
January issue of the elite journal Hoc Tap, by Lt. General Nguyen Van Vinh who, as head
of the "reunification" committees of both the party's central committee and the National
Assembly, probably has a major role in the formulation of Viet Cong policy.
Vinh argues at length against the contention that the conflict carries serious risk of
escalation, a view apparently advanced by Moscow and perhaps echoed by some North
Vietnamese leaders. In so doing, he warns the United States for the first time that an
attack on North Vietnam would involve conflict with Communist China, but he is notably
less explicit about the Soviet response. Hanoi appears genuinely concerned that the United
States may be considering action against the North. This in part may explain not only
these articles but also the recent flurry of related political and even military activity.
General Vinh predicts that the United States will remain involved in South Vietnam "for
some years" until forced to withdraw in the face of heavier and heavier defeats. He is less
precise about the consequences should the United States vastly increase its role, hinting
this might necessitate increased North Vietnamese participation (as in Laos). The article
implicitly rules out an international political settlement as a feasible course of action, at
least under prevailing conditions. Another statement released the same day categorically
rejects French President de Gaulle's suggestion (although it was attributed to President
Johnson) that North Vietnam might be neutralized.
[Here follows the text of the 6-page paper.]

/1/ Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 23-9 VIET S. Secret; Exdis. The
source text bears no time of transmission. Received at 10:01 a.m. A note on the White
House copy of this telegram indicates that the President read it. Johnson Library, National
Security File, Vietnam Country File, Vol. IV) Also published in Declassified Documents,
1975, 216A.
1574. For Harriman and Hilsman. I have just seen JCS 4893 to MACV/2/ calling for a
plan for "an immediate concentrated counterinsurgency offensive in Long An Province to
restore effective GVN control." This is the most discouraging instruction I have seen since
joining our Vietnamese effort two months ago. It reveals an almost total lack of
comprehension of the character of the Vietnamese problem and of the present situation
here.
/2/ Dated February 14, this cable transmitted the JCS belief that a counterinsurgency
offensive in Long An Province would be a symbol of "revitalized war effort." The JCS
requested development of a comprehensive plan in coordination with the Country Team
for "earliest possible accomplishment this purpose." Johnson Library, National Security
File. Vietnam Country File. Vol. IV. Memos and Misc.)
It assumes that:
1. An indigenous Communist insurgency enjoying full external Communist support can
be defeated by such an "offensive" in a measurable period of time.
2. The GVN has adequate political cohesion and leadership, centralized control, and local
administrative talent and organization to launch a "concentrated counter-insurgency
offensive in Long An" or anywhere else.
3. The U.S. Mission here has sufficient influence and control over the GVN to persuade it
to do so.
None of these assumptions are true in Viet-Nam today.
I have suggested to MACV that its reply which will to extent possible receive Country
Team coordination include frank statement re utter impossibility of launching "an
immediate concentrated counter-insurgency offensive" or of achieving quick success even
were such action possible. It is my hope that our reply can convey a more realistic
appreciation of our task than instruction which engendered it.
Doubtless Ambassador Lodge will have more to say on "quick victory" approach upon his
return. In my opinion we face a long hard pull with final success probably dependent
more on developments external to Viet Nam than on our counter-insurgency efforts here.
On these U.S. Mission is and will continue to exert maximum effort.
Nes
50. Memorandum From the Deputy Director for Plans, Central Intelligence Agency
(Helms), to the Secretary of State/1/
/1/ Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Vietnam Country File, Vol. IV,
Memos and Misc. Secret. Signed by Colby for Helms. Also sent to McNamara, McGeorge
Bundy, Taylor, Hilsman, Forrestal, Anthis, Sullivan, Carroll, and others. Also published
in Declassified Documents, 1974, 246D. Bundy wrote the following note on the source
text: "President read Feb. 18 and so called meeting of Feb. 20 on SVN. McGB." For the
results of the meeting, see Document 54.
According to a covering note, this was the third report of a group of CIA officers who
went to Vietnam to cross-check covertly intelligence information provided by the
Vietnamese. The first report, February 14, concluded that while the Vietnamese had been
reporting honestly to their American counterparts since November 1, 1963, failings in
quantity, quality, and training of Vietnamese personnel and lack of professionalism
among Vietnamese sources made their intelligence product difficult to evaluate. A general
impression gained by the CIA group was that the momentum of the strategic hamlet
program had slowed practically to a halt. Commenting specifically on Binh Long and
Phuoc Thanh Provinces, the report concluded that security had badly deteriorated there.
The second report, February 14, concentrated on I Corps and concluded that optimism
regarding the security of the area was mistaken and based on superficial developments.
(Both in Johnson Library, National Security File, Vietnam Country File, Vol. IV, Memos
and Misc.) The accord report is published in Declassified Documents, 1975, 246C.
A. Tide of insurgency in all four corps areas appears to be going against GVN. In many
provinces team finds VC-controlled areas to comprise better than 50 or 60 per cent of total
area. Some provinces (Phaoc Thanh, Binh Duong and An Xuyen) report VC-controlled
areas as high as 80 per cent. In Tay Ninh Province American and Vietnamese officials
agree VC can attack and enter any village of their choosing, including provincial capital.
B. National level direction of all programs appears to be weak to non-existent. This
includes ARVN operations, strategic hamlet program. Chieu Hoi program, civic action
program, national police program, hamlet militia program, etc. What ARVN operations
are being conducted appear to be corps-controlled and corps concepts of action appear to
vary even to the point that different divisions with the same corps have a different
approach to problems.
C. Until 1 Nov coup, strategic hamlet program, while full of faults weaknesses, etc., had
certain momentum and full national direction. Since coup, program has been viewed more
realistically and many of illusions held jointly by US and Vietnamese have been shattered.
Program at present at virtual standstill, as provincial officials, lacking direction at national
level, grope for local and varying new approaches to pacification problem. Illustrative of
results of current re-evaluation of strategic hamlet program is case of Hau Nghia, where
province chief states that of 52 hamlets previously reported as completed, only eight are
now considered viable. Province chief estimates that 75 per cent of Hau Nghia VCcontrolled.
D. There is no evidence of any particular GVN appeal to youth or students and as matter
of fact GVN propaganda mechanism in toto is largely moribund. Dissemination and
production of propaganda appear to be centered entirely in Saigon and is so poorly
operative in many provincial areas that VC were first to inform populace of 30 January
coup. There are no newspapers produced outside of Saigon although VC by contrast do
produce some regular periodicals which appear to be well read by local populace. (CAS
working with GVN in this entire field.)
E. Several province chiefs encountered proved to be of high caliber. However, due to
frequent personnel changes, present incumbents apprehensive over their tenure and
reluctant to exercise initiative. Particularly in newly created provinces, there is lack of
qualified subordinate personnel.
F. Hamlet militia appear effective mainly in non-critical areas. In critical areas as a rule
hamlet militia have been disarmed by province chiefs, overrun by VC, or members have
on their own initiative fumed in their arms and resigned. Therefore, in these areas hamlet
militia not significant factor in war, brunt of which being increasingly borne by selfdefense corps.
G. Quality and quantity of VC arms appear to be rapidly increasing. Presence of Russiandesigned carbines, Czech sub machine guns, Chinese SKZ recoilless weapons and 7.92
heavy machine guns and increased use of heavy mortars by VC elements have been noted
in all corps areas. These better weapons being distributed down to VC guerrilla units and
presence of homemade and French weapons in hands of VC decreasing. In one recent case
VC left behind in an overrun district headquarters in Quang Tri French weapons which
they had brought with them. Progress in rearming VC units probably uneven, but in IV
Corps it believed process virtually complete. In number of areas in IV Corps both
American and Vietnamese sources assert that friendly forces now both outgunned and
outmanned by enemy. (This info has been scattered in various MAC/V statistical reports,
but to our knowledge has never been brought home in a clear, explicit, qualitative
statement.)
H. Presence of improved weapons in hands of VC suggests significant degree of
infiltration of new equipment into South Vietnam.
51. Memorandum From the Joint Chiefs of Staff to the Secretary of Defense
(McNamara)/1/
JCSM-136-64
926, 092 Vietnam. Top Secret; Sensitive.
SUBJECT
Vietnam and Southeast Asia
1. Reference is made to the memorandum by the Joint Chiefs of Staff, dated 22 January
1964,/2/ subject as above, which expressed the view that a loss of South Vietnam to the
communists would presage a loss of the remainder of the United States position in
Southeast Asia. It sets forth a number of actions which the United States should be
prepared to take in order to ensure victory. Since submission of that memorandum,
mindful of the need to revitalize the counterinsurgency campaign in South Vietnam,
which has been interrupted and slowed by the confusion resulting from recent changes in
government, the Joint Chiefs of Staff have reviewed the situation in South Vietnam with
the view of determining additional actions which can be recommended for

implementation immediately.
2. The Government of Vietnam has developed, with the close collaboration of the US
Military Assistance Command, a new National Pacification Plan/3/ which provides for the
orderly pacification of the insurgency in accordance with a realistic phasing schedule.
From a military planning viewpoint, this program should correct many of the past
deficiencies of the effort, and it provides for consolidation of secure areas and expansion
of them (the "spreading oil drop"). US military assets in Vietnam will fully support this
plan. What is now required is implementation of additional actions which will insure an
integrated political, socio-economic, and psychological offensive to support more fully
the military effort. Accordingly, the Joint Chiefs of Staff recommend that the Country
Team be directed to implement the following actions at the earliest practicable time:
/3/On February 18, the Khanh government approved the National Pacification Plan which
set forth a combined military, political, and economic offensive against the Viet Cong in
two stages. Phase I envisioned a coordinated military and civilian effort to clear territory
of the Viet Cong, moving successively from secure and highly populated areas into
insecure and less densely populated ones. The concept became known as "spreading the
oil drop." In Phase II, Vietnamese military forces would destroy the Viet Cong in their
secret military bases and end the insurgency. The first priority of Phase I was the
provinces surrounding Saigon and extending south into the Delta with an estimated
completion date of July 1, 1965. The next priority was the remainder of the Delta and
certain critical provinces north of Saigon, with a completion date of January 1, 1966. All
of Corps I and II, with the exception of VC strongholds reserved for Phase II, were to be
pacified by January 1, 1965. JCS Historical Division, The History of the Joint Chiefs of
Staff. The War in Vietnam. 1960-1968, Part 1, chapter 8, pp. 23-24)
a. Induce the GVN (General Khanh) military to accept US advisors at all levels
considered necessary by COMUSMACV. (This is particularly applicable in the critical
provinces where the advisory effort should be expanded and should reach down to the
subsector level.)
b. Intensify the use of herbicides for crop destruction against identified Viet Cong areas as
recommended by the GVN.
c. Improve border control measures:
(1) Direct border surveillance elements to establish intelligence nets without regard to the
existing geographic borders.
(2) Exploit smugglers and the Cao Dai, Hoa Hao, and other border minority groups.
(3) Establish denied areas where a "shoot on sight" policy will be followed.
d. Direct the US civilian agencies involved in Vietnam to assist the GVN in producing a
civilian counterpart package plan to the GVN National Pacification Plan. (Any area in
Vietnam can be temporarily cleared of Viet Cong, but it is the GVN civil administration
which must win the people and stabilize the area in concert with the military. This plan
should support and revitalize the Vietnamese "New Life Hamlet Program.")
e. Provide US civilian advisors to all necessary echelons and GVN agencies to provide
civil administration "know-how" until a GVN corps of administrators can be trained.
f. Encourage early and effective action to implement a realistic land reform program.
g. Support the GVN in a policy of tax forgiveness for low income population in areas
where the GVN determines that a critical state of insurgency exists. (In some areas the
Viet Cong and GVN both levy taxes on the peasant population. Relief of the GVN tax
would provide a small monetary relief but, more important, would have psychological
value.)
h. Assist the GVN in developing a National Psychological Operations Plan and
conducting psychological operations to insure an intensive nationwide coordinated
propaganda campaign to establish the GVN and Khanh's "images," create a "cause" which
can serve as a rallying point for the youth/students of Vietnam, and develop the long term
national objectives of a free Vietnam.
i. Intensify efforts to gain the support of US news media representatives in Vietnam by
exploring with them measures that can be taken to improve this situation.
j. Arrange US sponsored trips to Vietnam by groups of prominent journalists and editors.
k. Inform all GVN military and civilian officials through various means, to include their
US advisors and counterparts, that the United States (a) considers it imperative that the
present government be stabilized, (b) would oppose another coup, and (c) that the United
States is prepared to offer all possible assistance in forming a stable government which
will eliminate the necessity for another coup. In this instance, all US intelligence agencies
and advisors must be alert to and report cases of dissension and plotting in order to
prevent such actions.
3. The Joint Chiefs of Staff recognize that the implementation of the foregoing measures
will not be sufficient to exercise a decisive effect on the campaign against the Viet Cong.
They are continuing study of the actions suggested in the memorandum of 22 January
1964, as well as other proposals which require further study, and will recommend to you
progressively the execution of such actions considered militarily required. Among the
subjects to be studied as a matter of urgency are the following:
a. Intensified operations against North Vietnam to include air bombings of selected
targets.
b. Removal of restrictions for air and ground cross-border operations.
c. Intelligence and reporting.
d. US organizational changes.
e. Increased US Navy participation in shore and river patrol activities.
f. Introduction of jet aircraft into the Vietnamese Air Force and the US Air Commando
unit.
g. DOD-CIA relationship changes.
h. Reduction of test and evaluation activities.
For the Joint Chiefs of Staff:
Maxwell D. Taylor/4/
Chairman
Joint Chiefs of Staff
/4/ Printed from a copy that bears this stamped signature.
52. Letter From the Deputy Chief of Mission in Vietnam (Nes) to the Assistant
Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs (Hilsman)/1/
/1/ Source: Department of State, William Bundy Files, WPB Special Papers. Secret;
Official-Informal. Hilsman sent a copy of this letter to Forrestal for his information with
the following handwritten note: "Another old Burma hand you have to deal with!! R.H."
On March 5, Green sent this copy to the newly-designated Assistant Secretary of State for
Ear Eastern Affairs, William Bundy, stating that the letter with its enclosure "presents
views you will be interested in."
Dear Roger: I am sending along to you for what it is worth my personal views on Where
We Stand in Viet-Nam conveyed to Ambassador Lodge in the enclosed Memorandum.
They vary in several important respects from those held by many high ranking American
officials far more experienced with the Vietnamese scene than I. In defense of the
judgments I have reached, I can only say that I approached VietNam with little previous
knowledge but with an open mind and no vested interest in past counterinsurgency
policies or operations.
My most disillusioning experience has been with the MACV-MAAG operation which
seems to be tailored largely toward providing the U.S. military establishment, within the
framework of World War II Conventional Doctrine, organization and weapons, a fertile
field for the utilization and promotion of its senior officers rather than as an instrument to
deal with guerrilla war. I have an idea that were you and I, with our Burma experience, to
take over from the nineteen General officers we have out here, we might put some realism
into the military side of our operations against the VC.
I will have a great deal more to say about our Vietnamese adventure as time goes on but
you may rest assured that I will say it only through channels, i.e., to you and to
Ambassador Lodge.
Sincerely yours,
David
[Enclosure]
Memorandum From the Deputy Chief of Mission of the Embassy (Nes) to the
Ambassador in Vietnam (Lodge)/2/
/2/ Secret.
SUBJECT
Where We Stand in Viet-Nam
The following are my personal views and with particular reference to the French
assessment of the SEA situation as conveyed in Deptel 1232, Paris Embtel 3907 to Dept.,
and as seen by the British, Paris Embtel 3873 to Dept./3/
/3/ These telegrams, February 13, 13, and 14, respectively, described the rationale of the
French for their campaign for neutralism of Vietnam and Southeast Asia. (Department of
State, Central Files, POL 16 CHICOM, POL 16 CHICOM, and POL VIET S,
respectively)
1. Although I have only been directly associated with this area for some two months, my
reading of developments over the past year and recent experiences here lead me to fear
that General De Gaulle may be right in his belief that we are faced with the choice
between accepting the possible collapse of our counter-insurgency efforts here or the
escalation of the conflict toward a direct military confrontation of the DRV and China by
the U.S.
2. Nothing that I have seen or heard thus far in Saigon leads me to believe that against the
background of recent Vietnamese history our counter-insurgency efforts can win through
so long as the Viet Cong is backed politically and psychologically and to a lesser extent
militarily by Hanoi and Peking.
3. The peasants who form the mass of the South Vietnamese population are exhausted and
sick of 20 years of civil conflict. During this entire period they have never and are not
now receiving either political leadership or orderly and just administration from the
central authorities of the GVN. They have enjoyed little if any social or economic
betterment.
4. On the other hand, the Viet Cong represents a grass roots movement which is
disciplined, ideologically dedicated, easily identifiable with the desires of the peasantry
and of course ruthless. The fact that the VC has the full backing of China is perhaps its
most powerful asset in presenting itself as the inevitable winner.
5. I do not see in the present military regime or any conceivable successor much hope in
providing the real political and social leadership or the just and effective country-wide
administration so essential to the success of our counter-insurgency program.
I think we would be naive in the extreme to believe that any number or quality of
American advisors can succeed in changing within a reasonable period of time the
attitudes and patterns of thinking of senior Vietnamese military and political officialdom.
6. In developing a large conventional World War II Vietnamese military establishment
organized into four Corps and 9-10 divisions with other equally sizable supporting units,
we may, in fact, have a Frankenstein on our hands which on the one hand serves little
purpose in dealing effectively with the Viet Cong and on the other provides a perfect
framework for spawning successive coups and so perpetuating the current political
malaise.
7. Against this pessimistic appraisal, I do believe that were the VC to be totally deprived
of all outside support, both material and psychological, we would be graced with the most
important factor of all in a counter-insurgency effort-namely time. I would estimate very
roughly that so deprived, and assuring continued and massive U.S. support for any and all
anti-communist regimes which might emerge in Saigon, we might see the VC movement
wither away in 5-10 years time.
8. At the same time, if General De Gaulle could be persuaded to change his view re our
willingness to escalate our conflict with the Communists throughout SEA, I think his
sponsorship of neutralization of South Viet-Nam might also be modified.
9. Finally, should our readiness and willingness to escalate toward a direct confrontation
of Hanoi and Peking become obvious by our overt actions throughout the area, I think the
tendencies toward neutralism here would rapidly disappear also.
10. In brief, it seems to me that De Gaulle has correctly analyzed the SEA situation if his
assumption is correct that we will do no more than continue our present counterinsurgency efforts in South VietNam--these being concentrated on a large team of
American military and civilian advisers working through whatever anti-communist regime
exists in Saigon and in massive economic and military aid programs extended through
such a regime. After two years of the most strenuous efforts by the U.S. along these lines,
De Gaulle quite correctly feels that we have achieved little more than a precarious
stalemate which in the next weeks, should further coups occur, could disintegrate very
rapidly. This is also the conclusion of SNIE 50-64./4/
11. Should this in fact happen, we will be faced either with turning the SEA ball game
over to De Gaulle in the hope that his policy can salvage something from the wreckage or
of rapidly escalating our efforts toward a final military showdown with China.
Recommendations:
1. That we seize every opportunity to warn Washington that escalation may be the only
alternative to inevitable neutralization, i.e., the loss of the U.S. political and military
position in SEA.
2. That we recommend that De Gaulle be informed in the frankest terms that we will not
leave SEA and that we are ready to face a conflict with China to preserve our position
here.
3. That we urge the acceleration and expansion of OPS Plan 34A-64./5/

/1/ Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 VIET S. Secret; Exdis.
Transmitted as telegram 1583 from Saigon to the Department of State, where it was
received at 7:21 a.m. and passed to the White House at 8:30 a.m. Telegram 1583 is the
source text.
1. In reply to your 1256,/2/ I believe persistent and patient execution of current civil and
military plans will bring victory-provided external pressures would be about as they were
when I got here last summer. These pressures come from Communist China, North VietNam, Laos, Cambodia and France, and I believe they have been increasing, although I
cannot prove it. Effective steps to lessen, and perhaps eliminate, these pressures would be
most helpful.
/2/ In telegram 1256, February 18, from the President to Ambassador Lodge, Johnson
reminded Lodge that it had been 2 weeks since he delivered the President's personal
message to Khanh (see footnote 2, Document 25). The President asked for a report for his
own guidance on any further steps the United States should take to be of assistance and, in
particular, any additional military or economic assistance Lodge might need to carry out
existing or recommended policies. (Ibid., POL 23-9 VIET S)
2. Believe that within Viet-Nam, U.S. is giving enough economic and military assistance
with one exception: an increase of funds to pay for the increase in the pay of the Army
and of paramilitary forces./3/
/3/ In telegram CAP 64047 from the White House, February 20, Johnson responded that
the request for increase in pay would be addressed immediately. (Ibid., POL 27 VIET S)
Lodge/4/
54. Memorandum for the Record of a Meeting, White House/1/

Washington, February 20, 1964, 12:17 p.m.
/1/ Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Vietnam Country File, Vol. IV,
Memos and Misc. Secret. Drafted by Forrestal. Copies of this memorandum were sent to
Rusk, McNamara, Taylor, McCone, Bell, and Sullivan.
Prepared for this meeting, which lasted 1 hour, was an agenda, annotated by McGeorge
Bundy, which reads as follows:
"1. Situation Briefing (5 minutes); 2. Intelligence and Reporting, (A) Cooper Activities,
(B) French Activities; 3. Operations, (A) Response to Lodge Message, (B) Policy on
Dependents [Bundy wrote at this point "P[resident] prefers"], (C) Other Matters; 4.
Diplomatic Problems, (A) Cambodia, (B) Laos, (C) Others; 5. North Viet-Nam, (A)
Intelligence [Bundy wrote "increase efforts"], (B) Propaganda [Bundy wrote "increase"],
(C) Operations; 6. Planning, (A) Johnson Subcommittee [Bundy wrote "Speed up"], (B)
Question of Time Phase." (Ibid.)
SUBJECT
South Vietnam
The President met today with the Secretaries of State and Defense, the Chairman of the
Joint Chiefs of Staff, Under Secretary Ball, Director McCone, and the members of Mr.
William Sullivan's committee on policy and operations in South Vietnam.
After an intelligence briefing on the current situation and a full discussion of the work of
the committee, the President directed the following actions:
1. Any requests for assistance or other Washington action from Ambassador Lodge should
be given prompt and sympathetic response. Such staff work as may be required to back up
such requests in Washington should be given the highest priority, so that decisions can be
reached quickly.
2. Contingency planning for pressures against North Vietnam should be speeded up.
Particular attention should be given to shaping such pressures so as to produce the
maximum credible deterrent effect on Hanoi.
3. For the time being, American dependents in Vietnam should be encouraged to accept
voluntary repatriation. Early next month, the Secretary of Defense will consult with
Ambassador Lodge on whether dependents should be evacuated and will make
appropriate recommendations to the President and the Secretary of State upon his return.
4. The Department of State will explore in a positive manner the possibilities opened up
by the recent proposals of Prince Sihanouk for a conference in Phnom Penh on the
problem of Cambodian neutrality./2/
/2/ See American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1964, p. 847, footnote 7.
M V Forrestal

Transmitted as telegram 1594 from Saigon which is the source text. A note on the White
House copy of this telegram indicates that the President saw it. (Johnson Library, National
Security File, Vietnam Country File, Vol. IV, Cables)
This is in further reply to your 1256./2/
1. I believe various pressures can and should be applied to North Viet Nam to cause them
to cease and desist from their murderous intrusion into South Viet Nam. I have made
detailed recommendations in a memo dated October 30, 1963,/3/ of which Under
Secretary Harriman has a copy, and to which I believe I referred briefly to you when you
received me on November 24./4/
/3/ Foreign Relations, 1961-1963, vol. IV, pp. 656-659. Sullivan sent a copy of Lodge's
paper of October 30, 1963, to McNamara on February 24, 1964. (Memorandum from
Sullivan to McNamara, February 24; Department of State, Bundy Files, WPB Special
Papers, I of II, 1963)
/4/ See Foreign Relations, 1961-1963, vol. IV, p. 635-637.
2. In light of recent terrorism against Americans in Saigon,/5/ I believe North Viet Nam
should be told secretly that every terrorist act against Americans in South Viet Nam will
provoke swift retaliation against North Viet Nam.
/5/ Thus far in February, there had been 15 terrorist attacks against Americans, including
bombings of a U.S. theater and a softball game in which 5 Americans were killed and
over 50, including official dependents, were wounded.
3. On the basis of knowledge available to me, I do not think this will bring on nuclear war
with ChiComs or with anyone. It simply puts U.S. and South Viet Nam on a par with
ChiComs and North Viet Nam in the struggle against the Viet Cong. At present, we let
them have a sanctuary from which they operate against us, whereas we not only have no
sanctuary, but do not operate against them in any significant way.
4. If the above recommendation is adopted, we should consider announcing just before
undertaking it that we are evacuating all U.S. dependents. Our announcement should
make it crystal clear that this step is being taken because we are cleaning the decks for
action and intend to make things tougher for the V.C. Evacuation should not appear to be
a frightened response due to Viet Cong terrorism.
5. Believe the South Vietnamese expect us to be brave and that there are big advantages to
be gained by not disappointing them.
6. My present policy regarding American dependents is that any American who wishes to
leave Viet Nam and return to the U.S. be allowed to do so. I reckon that only a few will
want to go but that those who are unhappy here should not be required to stay.
7. In regards U.S. children in Saigon, I am in close touch with parents' organization whose
present attitude is not to close school. They have question under constant review. General
Khanh told me this morning he hopes to move school very soon to a more secure location.
8. In answering your telegrams, I am most anxious to keep you fully informed, and at the
same time, not give you too much to read. If you wish my wires to be different in length
and format, please advise.
Lodge/6/

Transmitted as telegram 1281 to Saigon, which is the source text. McGeorge Bundy sent a
draft of this telegram and the text of Lodge's message, supra, to Palm Springs, California,
where the President was vacationing. The text of Bundy's covering cable to the President
reads as follows:
"Next two following messages are an incoming from Lodge on enlarging our effort in
North Vietnam and a draft response for the President. I send these now because of the
President's desire to be very quick and effective in responses to Lodge's messages. The
draft answer is being cleared with Rusk and McNamara, and we can get it out as soon as
we have the President's own comments."
"The memorandum to Harriman which Lodge refers to [see footnote 3, supra] is sensible
but tentative in form, and does not show strong advocacy of anything different from what
we have been doing. My own notes on the President's November meeting with Lodge
show nothing significant on North Vietnam. We therefore believe that the draft answer is
fully responsive, and we assess the incoming message as sincere and reasonable, as far as
it goes." (Telegram CAP 64050, February 21; Johnson Library, National Security File,
Vietnam Country File, Vol. IV)
I appreciated your 1594/2/ which corresponds to much of my own thinking. Secretaries
Rusk and McNamara, with my approval have already begun preparing specific plans for
pressure against NVN, both in the diplomatic and military fields. Secretary McNamara
will be visiting you early in March to review with you that subject and other aspects of the
counter-insurgency campaign. Then or very soon thereafter we should make definite
decisions.
/2/ Document 55.
I agree that any announcement of the evacuation of dependents must be made in such a
way as to show we are getting tougher, not softer, and Bob McNamara will take this up
with you also. In the meantime, the policy you have suggested in your paragraph 6 is just
what I have already instructed the Departments to implement.

I value these direct exchanges with you on top policy matters. We should keep them up./3/
/3/ Telegram 1281 does not bear President Johnson's signature.
57. Memorandum From the Secretary of Defense (McNamara) to the Chairman of

Joint Chiefs of Staff (Taylor)/1/
4023, Vietnam 092. Top Secret. Attached to the source text was a covering memorandum
from William Bundy to McNamara, February 21, which reads as follows:
"The attached memorandum, prepared in response to your request, will obtain JCS views
on a number of critical questions affecting our actions in Vietnam. The answers will also
be helpful to the work of the Sullivan Committee. We have coordinated this request with
the Joint Staff."
SUBJECT
Vietnam
As you are aware, one of the alternatives which is now being reviewed with respect to the
situation in Vietnam is a carefully planned program designed to exert increasing military
pressures upon the government of North Vietnam, with a view to inducing that
government to terminate its support and encouragement of the insurrection in South
Vietnam and curtail Pathet Lao activities in Laos. The military pressures which might be
applied extend from relatively minor covert activities, which you are already examining,
to open GVN or U.S. air or sea non-nuclear attacks upon the DRV.
There are a number of military uncertainties which must be resolved, to the extent
possible, before political decisions affecting such military actions can be taken.
Accordingly, I should like to have your views upon the following matters:
1. The overall capabilities of the DRV and of the Chinese Communists for military action,
with specific reference to:
(a) The types and magnitudes of actions which are possible, taking into account current
Communist logistic capabilities.
(b) The geographic areas within which such actions might be undertaken.
(c) The time period within which the enemy forces could be brought to bear.
(d) The enemy capability for concurrent reactions, as for example, reactions both in
Southeast Asia and in Korea and/or Taiwan off-shore islands.

2. What military actions against North Vietnam, employing air and naval power, but not
ground forces beyond the scale of smallscale raids, might be:
(a) undertaken by the GVN and within the plausible range of GVN capabilities
(b) assertedly undertaken by the GVN, even if outside the plausible range of GVN
capabilities;
(c) undertaken by the U.S. without public acknowledgment;
(d) undertaken by the U.S. along with, or after, a public declaration by the U.S. of an
intent to exert military pressure upon the DRV with a view to forcing a termination of the
insurrection in the South?
What targets would be most effective to attack from the standpoint of:
(a) specific effect on DRV capability against Laos, South Vietnam, and Thailand;
(b) interdiction of main communication routes between the DRV and Communist China,
plus interdiction of sea communications into North Vietnam;
(c) more generalized target patterns designed to inflict damage on key installation in the
DRV but to minimize the effect on the civilian population as a whole?
While the assessment of the impact of possible courses of action on DRV continued
support of operations in South Vietnam and Laos is in large part an intelligence question
that should be addressed by intelligence authorities as well, I would appreciate the views
of the JCS as to the courses of action under one or more of the above headings that would
in your judgment be most likely to bring about cessation of DRV support for operations in
South Vietnam and Laos and at the same time be least likely to lead to stepped-up conflict
and adverse reactions in third countries.
3. Assuming that, in response to the attacks upon the DRV, the DRV and/or the Chicoms
undertake large scale troop movements over the border into one or more of:
(a) South Vietnam
(b) Laos
(c) Thailand or Burma
(d) South Korea
(e) Taiwan
What U.S. effort, air, sea, and land, would be required to contain such an invasion? If
intelligence indicated that such a movement were contemplated by the enemy, what
actions against North Vietnam and mainland China would be likely to deter such a
response?
In each of these circumstances, or any likely combination of them, to what extent could
the U.S. effectively counter such actions through air and naval responses only (without the
use of ground forces other than those presently deployed) utilizing each of the following
means:
(a) conventional ordnance only:
(b) conventional ordnance plus classified non-nuclear munitions. The degree of increased
effectiveness to be expected from the latter should be specified along with the
considerations for and against employment.
[Subparagraphs (c) and (d) (5-1/2 lines of source text) not declassified]
4. Assuming that the Chicom reaction included air action from mainland bases (either
against SVN or other air bases, or supporting aircraft carriers) to what extent could this air
threat be countered by:
(a) actions against enemy aircraft only, without attacks upon mainland bases, or
(b) selective attacks upon the Chinese bases and air defenses utilizing:
(i) Conventional ordnance (plus classified munitions if significantly more effective)
[Subparagraph (ii) (1-1/2 lines of source text) not declassified]
[Subparagraph (c) (2 lines of source text) not declassified]
5. What modifications must be made in existing contingency plans in order to provide for
U.S. reactions which would depend primarily upon air activities rather than the
intervention of substantial U.S. ground forces?
In view of the broad scope of these questions, I believe that the JCS will wish to create a
special planning unit that can devote itself exclusively to these problems on a continuing
basis. I appreciate that a detailed response may require a longer time, but believe that we
must have your preliminary judgment on these questions for consideration prior to our
anticipated departure for South Vietnam about 4 March. Accordingly, I would appreciate
it if a preliminary response could be available for discussion with me not later than
Monday, March 2. Our review at that time will almost certainly uncover additional
questions and refinements that would form the basis for the next phase of the examination.
Robert S. McNamara
58. Telegram From the Commander, Military Assistance Command, Vietnam

(Harking) to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (Taylor)/1/
Saigon, February 21, 1964--4:15 p.m.

/1/ Source: Washington National Records Center, RG 330, McNamara Files: FRC 71 A
3470, South Vietnam. Top Secret; Eyes Only. The JCS sent copies of this cable to
McNamara, Gilpatric, Anthis, and William Bundy.
MAC 665. Subj: CAS third appraisal./2/ Ref JCS 734, DTG 182258Z Feb./3/
/2/ Document 50.
/3/ In this telegram, the Joint Chiefs requested Harkins' views on the third appraisal.
(National Archives and Records Administration. RG 213. ICS Files)
1. Except for the spectacular and eye catching lead sentence, I have no quarrel with most
of the statements contained in the CAS survey team appraisal. Where the statements are
clean-cut, the supporting information was usually provided by my field personnel and
reflected in reports already sent to Washington by this headquarters. Where the statements
are sweeping, they are based on opinion or an unfortunate penchant for generalizing from
the specific. My detailed comments follow and are geared to the specific paragraphs of the
CAS message.
A. Area vs. People. Since August there has been a steady, gradual erosion of GVN control
of territory, this erosion has become progressively worse and more noticeable subsequent
to 1 Nov 63. In 23 RVN provinces the VC dominate in over 50 percent of the area. Report
is in error where it states Binh Duong is 80 percent VC controlled; degree of control by
VC is 45 percent. However, Phnoc Tuy in which the area is over 80 percent controlled by
the VC is not mentioned in the report. All this has been reported by MACV. It is still
considered here that GVN control is complete or predominant over 70 percent of the
people in the rural area, while VC control is complete or predominant over 18 Percent.
There is another 3 percent over which neither GVN nor VC have dominance. Then there
are also the 1,687,000 in the major cities which are definitely under GVN control.
B. National level direction of most, but not all, programs has been weak since 1
November. It is difficult to have direction without an effective government. Khanh,
however, is meeting now with [regarding?] a national pacification plan today or by
Monday. The effectiveness of military operations may be low but they do proceed
according to the national plan and are certainly not without direction. It is logical for the
corps to do the derivative planning within assigned areas and to direct and control the
operations of its major subordinate units. The divisions within a given corps face different
problems in terms of terrain, enemy and population. As regards military civic actions, the
program began to get excellent backing in early January to include directives to the field
and addresses by top members of the MRC. In a sharp departure from prior practices,
twenty million plasters were allocated to the corps for military civic actions. Officials
charged with administering the Chieu Hoi program are convinced it will become
functional again under General Khanh's leadership.
C. E. F. Concur with contents. In this connection; see US Mission monthly status reports
for December and January respectively; Section V and Annex X thereto of US Mission
quarterly evaluation for period ending [end?] of December, and pare 6E, MACV headway
reports since 8 January./4/
/4/ None found.

D. The experienced Embassy official assigned to monitor and support youth activities
states it is not entirely accurate to say that GVN is inactive in their appeal to youth since
active programs are carried on by USIS and USOM with the active cooperation of
appropriate ministries of GVN. It is true there are no programs carried on to the vast
extent of the Cong Hoa or Combatant Youth under the Diem regime. As a matter of fact,
GVN propaganda mechanisms are quite active. The statement that "no newspapers are
produced outside of Saigon" is not only ill-advised, but false. For example, 183 village
district newspapers are operating (of the 200 programmed by USOM). The average
circulation per newspaper is 450 three times weekly. These are widely read as
demonstrated by requests received last week from Kien Giang, Kian Hoa, and Chaong
Thzen for additional paper supplies to increase circulation. Kien Quoc, a provincial
newspaper, is produced in four different editions weekly for the key provinces of Quang
Ngai, Tay Ninh, Binh Duong and Long An with a provincial circulation of 35,000 each.
Periodicals are numerous; for the population alone, USIS produces Huong Que (Rural
Life-125,000 copies monthly) and Gioi Tu Do (Free World-150,000 copies monthly)
aimed at the student population.
G. The statement "presence of Russian-designed carbines" is misleading. It is true that
originally the carbine was Russian-designed--20 years ago. However, the weapon in
question is ChiCom PE 53 carbine, which is obsolete in the Chinese Communist army. No
knowledge here of Czech submachine guns. Reference is probably to ChiCom 7.62 mm
modified K-50 submachine guns. ARVN has a habit of calling this weapon Czech. No
information available in this headquarters regarding VC abandonment of weapons during
the incident in Quang Tri; it is very unlikely this happened, since VC are not that fat in
weapons. The friendly forces are not outmanned & outgunned by the enemy in IV Corps,
although certain VC elements in this area such as the 96th and 306th Battalions are
considered well trained, aggressive and competent units and they have given good
accounts of themselves in several instances. The VC through massing of forces can
achieve temporary numerical superiority in areas of their choosing but overall they cannot
approximate the RVN strength in either manpower or materiel. The heaviest weapon of
the VC is the 81 mm mortar. The VC [have] no 105 or 155 howitzers, no APC's or
armored cars, no support aircraft and no heavy river craft.
H. Concur.
2. As a general comment this message appears to be a combination of rehashing old
information previously reported, plus the reporting of unevaluated individual observations
not necessarily in consonance with an overall analysis of the situation in a division tactical
area. I am concerned over the disregard of the terms of reference for this group that is
demonstrated by the scope of this report. JCS message 362-64 [?] January 1964,/5/
indicates that the role of this group is to "assist in developing techniques to improve [less
than 1 1ine of source text not declassified] intelligence collection." This example of
unilateral reporting on matters outside their quarter and competency, without the benefit
of the advice of this headquarters and other interested agencies can only be detrimental to
the achievement of a joint, inter-agency intelligence effort and more important, is likely to
introduce misleading, if not incorrect, information into the national decision making
process.
/5/ Not printed. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 218, JCS Files)
We have nothing to hide but do have updated info on many of the problems covered by
the [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] team report, and feel that such reports
should be coordinated before being dispatched.

Transmitted as telegram 1606 from Saigon, which is the source text. Passed to the White
House on receipt at the Department of State.
This is in further reply to your 1256./2/
1. In my 1583/3/ I mentioned the external threats to Viet-Nam and the steps which should
be taken internally. In my 1594/4/ I referred in detail to steps which should be taken with
regard to North Viet-Nam. In this telegram, I suggest steps to be taken with regard to
France.
/3/ Document 53.
/4/Document 55
2. Because French is by all odds the Western language which the largest number of
Vietnamese possess the best and because they have many personal relationships with
individual French people, General de Gaulle's declaration on neutralism is having a
demoralizing effect on the will to win of both senior and junior officers, and of the
politically conscious population generally which is quite out of proportion to French
power here which is actually quite skimpy. It starts a line of thought which runs: "It was
Laos last year; this year it will be Cambodia; and next year it will be us." Obviously such
thinking does not make for bravery and for hard fighting. To this psychological campaign
is added the activity of French agents; Gen. Khanh's statement to me which is yet to be
verified that these agents have conspired with the Viet Cong terrorists during the last
week; and reports that some of the explosives which have been found near the theater and
the stadium in which Americans were wounded and killed were of French origin. All of
this can have a potentially very dangerous effect on Franco-American relations, and they
create a totally false and dangerous emphasis here in Viet-Nam. I firmly believe that
conditions are fundamentally much worse in North Viet-Nam than they are here. Yet, due
in large part to de Gaulle's public utterances and the work of French agents, this
community is concentrated on itself and its own fears instead of taking the initiative
against an enemy which is having a very hard time in many ways.
3. I suggest, therefore, that General de Gaulle be told that all men of good will obviously
desire the end of the Viet Cong war and the creation of a Vietnamese state which is not a
satellite, which is free and independent and which is strong enough to be neutral if it
wants to be. There is no disagreement about the goal, but simply as to how we are to
achieve it. The following questions therefore arise:
a. How can so called "neutralization" be attained if the aggressor is determined not to be
neutralized, as is obviously the case as regards North Viet-Nam?
b. South Viet-Nam is experiencing a change of government after a period of deterioration
with an inevitable temporarily adverse effect on the war effort. Obviously, the word
"negotiation" makes no sense when one side is much weaker than the other. Under these
circumstances, there is no negotiation; there is simply an ultimatum and a capitulation. If
France had gone to a "neutralizing" conference in 1943, for example, it would merely
have confirmed the occupation by the German army. VC activity is not as devastating as
was German occupation, but the comparison is applicable. How then can South Viet-Nam
go respectably to an international conference when she is weak on the battlefield, and
when to go to an international conference under those conditions is to go to inevitable
defeat?
c. How can one avoid the conclusion that a chief of state who talks about neutrality at
such a time is lessening the will to win of the Viet-Nam army and would thus bring VietNam to a conference weaker than she is already?
d. In view of the fact General de Gaulle must be aware of the above, why does he speak of
neutralism at the worst possible time from the standpoint of a truly just solution thus
directly helping the Communists and why does he speak publicly of something which
should not be public at all, but which should be the subject of a very secret declaration to
North Viet-Nam, accompanied by effective pressures of many different kinds?
4. I suggest this one question be then put to him: "Believing you to be a man of good will
who would not intentionally work to destroy the RVN or the vital interests of U.S., I,
President Johnson, ask you to make a public statement making it clear that your remarks
about neutralism were not meant to apply to the present time."
Lodge/5/
/5/Telegram 1606 bears this typed signature.
60. Telegram From the Executive Secretary of the National Security Council (Smith)
to the President, at Palm Springs, California/1/
/1/ Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 VIET S. Secret; Exdis. Also sent
to Rusk in Palm Springs. The source text is the copy Smith sent to the Department of
State as White House telegram CAP 64056, February 22. No time of transmission appears
on the original message, but CAP 64056 was received in the Department of State at 1:49
p.m.
There follows another pair of messages from and to Lodge. The first is a long and
important proposal for dealing with the French./2/ The second is an interim answer/3/
which we will send as soon as the President approves.
/2/Document 59.
/3/ See below.
This is the trickiest area yet opened in this dialog, and I am working with Sullivan and
Tyler to prepare alternatives for President and Secretary on their return. Meanwhile, they
will probably wish to discuss the matter together. (Message from Lodge)
(Draft answer to Lodge from the President follows.)
"Your 1606 has been relayed to me in California. Dean Rusk and I will talk about it here.
Let me say at once that we entirely agree with the purpose of your recommendation and
that the problem is simply to find the right ways and means of getting the French to
understand the damage done by their current position. Ambassador Bohlen has tried
repeatedly on this, but I agree with you that we must leave no stone unturned in this
effort."/4/
/4/The reply as it was approved in slightly different form reads as follows:
"Your 1606 has been relayed to me in California. Let me say at once that Secretary Rusk
and Ambassador Bohlen have probed the French repeatedly to impress upon them futility
and danger of empty talk of neutralization of South Viet Nam. We will keep at the French
end of it and wish to be informed of any evidence local French activity cutting across our
efforts."
"We must expend every effort and mobilize every resource to get Viet Nam strong enough
to be independent and feared by any aggressor. We believe that your leadership can make
this the driving zeal of every American working with the Vietnamese and that a dedicated
and united effort on the American side can inspire them and impress Hanoi with the
danger of pursuing its present course." (Telegram CAP 64058, February 22; Department
of State, Central Files, PER-Taylor, Maxwell)
61. Memorandum From the Secretary of State's Special Assistant for Vietnam
(Sullivan) to the Secretary of State/1/
/1/ Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 VIET N. Secret; Sensitive. Copies
were sent to U. Alexis Johnson and Rostow.
Mr. Read has asked for my comments on Walt Rostow's paper entitled, "Habana and
Hanoi."/2/ You will appreciate that I have no competence to make any observations on the
Venezuela-Cuba situation and will therefore address my remarks exclusively to the
corollary problem which we face in Viet Nam.
/2/ Rostow's paper, February 22, dealt primarily with potential U.S. responses to the
discovery of Cuban weapons in Venezuela. Rostow suggested that after reconnaissance
and a leaflet drop by U.S. aircraft, Venezuelan military aircraft attack a Cuban target as a
reprisal. Rostow then drew a parallel with Vietnam as follows:
"The same principle might be applied in North Viet Nam; that is, if our first overt acts of
violence in the north were against targets directly related to North Viet Nam aggression
against the south (for example, the Vinh radio station), we could share in the warning
leaflet drop, ride high-cover and deal with any escalation, while the South Viet Nam air
force would actually attack the chosen target or targets. Once again, this would dramatize
the principle at work; be consistent with the notion that our objective is to help the South
Vietnamese defend their independence, and that we were merely protectors of that
principle, in conformance with the 1954 treaty; and make it somewhat easier for Mao to
keep out of the act; although, once again, we cannot go into this without being prepared
for escalation."
Rostow also thought that military action against Cuba might "carry enough conviction in
Hanoi and elsewhere that the mere massing of our forces in Southeast Asia would, against
that background, be a credible demonstration that we were prepared to act against the
north." (Ibid., S/P Files: Lot 70 D 199, Vietnam)
First, as I know Mr. Rostow agrees, action against North Viet Nam can never be a
substitute for the hard, grubby job of routing out the Viet Cong in the areas where they
have established themselves in the South. Despite the fact that they have control,
direction, and a certain amount of supply from the North, the Viet Cong, especially in the
Delta areas, have a sustaining strength of their own. Therefore, any action which might be
taken against the North must be designed to bring the problem in the South within
manageable dimensions and not in the vain hope that it can be eliminated purely by
pressure on Hanoi.
Secondly, it seems to me that we have to give explicit and active attention to the Soviets.
If we propose any moves in North Viet Nam, we should at the same time consider how we
can neutralize Soviet reaction. I feel, without having gone into this in detail, that such
neutralization might require a fairly broad "peace offensive" erected against the Soviets
on matters nearest to the heart, such as Germany, trade, credits, etc. In other words, if we
are going to produce a reaction from the North Vietnamese and the Chinese, we should at
the same time be actively dangling before the Soviets some reasons for them to look the
other way.
Therefore it would seem to me hardly propitious for us to consider simultaneous action in
North Viet Nam and in Cuba, no matter how thoroughly we attempt to dissemble either
event as being of indigenous origin. Soviet prestige is very actively engaged in Cuba, not
only in its confrontation with the U.S. but also in its conflict with the Chinese. Therefore
any prospects we might have of deflecting Soviet attention from a more active policy in
North Viet Nam would, in my opinion, be seriously compromised by engaging the Soviets
simultaneously in the Caribbean.
I believe that if we decide upon more active measures with respect to both Hanoi and
Habana, we should undertake them in separate sequence. and with very carefully tailored
parallel steps in other directions.
W. H. Sullivan
62. Editorial Note

At a news conference on February 29, 1966, President Johnson announced that William P.
Bundy was replacing Roger Hilsman as Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern
Affairs. The President also answered questions on Vietnam. For the complete transcript of
the news conference, see Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Lyndon B.
Johnson, 1963-64, Book I, pages 322-329. Bundy became Assistant Secretary-designate
on March 10 and was approved by the Senate on March 16.

Drafted by McGeorge Bundy and Rusk and cleared and initialed by Rusk. Attached to a
copy of this telegram at the Johnson Library is a note from Read to Bundy indicating that
this telegram "is the substance of what the Secretary and the President agreed to at lunch
today." (Johnson Library, National Security File, Vietnam Country File, Vol. IV)
340. For Ambassador from Secretary. Re your 1601./2/ As result your telegram, we
requested Ambassador Bohlen to submit his advice as to what we might usefully say to
DeGaulle and urged that every effort be made to comply with your request.
/2/This reference is in error and should be to either telegram 1606, Document 59 or to
telegram 1613 from Saigon, February 24, in which Lodge reported information from a
"very authoritative source that GVN intends to break off relations with France because
they think France is going to recognize Hanoi and break with GVN, and they want to beat
them to it." In telegram 1613, Lodge again suggested that de Gaulle be convinced to issue
a brief public statement saying that his earlier calls for neutralism in Southeast Asia did
not apply to the present time. A de Gaulle statement of this kind would, in Lodge's
opinion, prevent the potential break in relations between South Vietnam and France and
discourage neutralist tendencies in South Vietnam which were sapping the war effort.
(Department of State, Central Files, POL FR-VIET S)
Telegram 1601 from Saigon, February 20, reported on a ceremonial call by Lodge, Felt,
and Harkins on General Minh. (Ibid., POL 15-1 VIET S; published in Declassified
Documents, 1975, 216B.
Bohlen has now replied,/3/ stating that in his view the most effective approach in Paris at
present is through Couve de Murville, and we are now instructing him to conduct such an
approach along the lines you suggest, especially to see whether a public statement
clarifying French policy in Viet-Nam is possible. If this approach does not succeed,
Bohlen suggests that he should come back here for consultation. President is authorizing
Bohlen to approach Couve as he recommends, and depending on Couve's response we
will consider further aspects of Bohlen's proposal.

/3/ In telegram 4061 from Paris, February 26. In addition to recommending an approach
through Couve de Murville, Bohlen stated that going through de Gaulle would only
produce vague and ambiguous statements and would convince de Gaulle that he had
forced the United States to throw itself on his mercy. Bohlen also said that de Gaulle did
not have an operational or general plan for a neutralized Vietnam and might even be
considering temporary Communist control of all Vietnam from which a Yugoslavia-like
Vietnam would emerge. (Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 VIET S)
Herve Alphand requested to see me today and affirmed (a) France is not engaged in
conspiracy in Southeast Asia against US effort, (b) France remains solidly anti-communist
and this applies to Southeast Asia, (c) France does not wish to see military effort in South
Viet-Nam fail, (d) There is no understanding between Paris and Peiping regarding
Southeast Asia, (e) France wishes to keep in closest consultation with US on Southeast
Asian matters./4/
/4/The memorandum of conversation of this meeting, February 28, 3:30 p.m., is ibid.,
Secretary's Memoranda of Conversation: Lot 65 D 330.
Clearly we must evaluate this in light of further discussions with French, and implications
of some of their recent actions and statements.
Let me repeat that we share your sense of urgency about improving French public
position.
Rusk
64. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in the United
Kingdom/1/
Washington, March 1, 1964--6:30 p.m.
/1/ Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 VIET S. Secret; Priority; Limit
Distribution. Drafted and approved by Rusk and cleared with Tyler, Green, and Sullivan.
5534. Please pass following message from Secretary to Foreign Secretary:
"Thank you very much for your message of February 29 about South Viet-Nam."/2/
/2/ The message asked for clarification of press stories that the United States was
contemplating some form of offensive policy toward North Vietnam and asked for "some
advance inkling" of U.S. plans and intentions so that the British Government could
concert with the United States on a line to take in public. (Ibid.)
"Let me say at once that we will keep in closest touch with you about further
developments in that area. The Viet Cong have obviously attempted to take maximum
advantage of changes of government in Saigon and the dislocations which these changes
inevitably produce. Whether this increased effort on their part can be sustained over any
period of time is not yet clear but there is no doubt that there is a deterioration of morale
and effectiveness on the South Viet-Nam side. McNamara's visit will attempt to sort out
just where the problems are and what might be done to deal with them."
"As we see it there are three broad alternatives before us in South Viet-Nam. We could
withdraw and leave Southeast Asia to the communists. We could continue on our present
course and do everything possible to assist the South Viet-Namese to win their own war.
We could escalate the war by positive and direct military pressures on Hanoi. I can assure
you that the second course is the one we greatly prefer. We cannot adopt the first course,
with its calamitous results for the entire free world, and the third course is obviously one
which would be turned to with the greatest reluctance."
"We are not convinced that the second course has exhausted its possibilities. We shall do
everything we can to make it succeed. Unfortunately, there is not the sense of solidarity in
the free world which would give this course the greatest chance of success. The
recognition of Peiping by Paris clearly signals to Peiping that their course of militancy
pays dividends. The talk of neutralization is phony, given the fact that there is not the
slightest indication that North Viet-Nam is interested in breaking away from the
communist camp. If neutralization simply means that the US abandons its support of
South VietNam, then neutralization is a formula for a communist takeover of Southeast
Asia. We have repeatedly said to the other side that if they want to get American forces
out of Southeast Asia the way to do it is to leave their neighbors alone."
"I should like to put to you the dividends of concentrating very hard on Laos at this point.
If the Geneva Accords of 1962 were to be fully implemented, the situation in South VietNam would be drastically improved. In Laos we have a firm and flat commitment from
the Soviet Union as well as solemn commitments from Hanoi and Peiping. Surely on this
even Paris can act with complete solidarity with you and us and other free world
countries. The Viet Minh presence in Laos and the free use of Laos as an avenue of
infiltration into South VietNam are unacceptable violations of the Accords of 1962.
Perhaps you could stimulate Paris to give forceful and public support to those Accords
and to make it quite clear that all of us in the free world are determined on performance. I
feel that we in Washington are in a position to insist upon this because, as you will recall,
we went a long way to meet Paris in working out the Accords of 1962 and in accepting
and supporting Souvanna Phouma as the Prime Minister. I can tell you that we are much
concerned about attitudes expressed by Ambassador Millet who seems to think that
General Phouma is the problem and that Souvanna Phouma ought to make his peace at
any price with the Pathet Lao. This I suppose is consistent with the view expressed to us
since 1961 by Paris that France will not commit a single soldier to Southeast Asia."
"In any event, the purpose of this message is to let you know that we shall certainly keep
in touch before any new or important decisions are made about courses of action in
Southeast Asia other than those on which we are now embarked."
Rusk
(McNamara)/1/
JCSM-168-64
Washington, March 2, 1964.
926, 092 Vietnam. Top Secret; Sensitive.
SUBJECT
Removal of Restrictions for Air and Ground Cross-Border Operations
1. By JCSM-136-64, dated 18 February 1964, subject: "Vietnam and Southeast Asia
(U),"/2/ the Joint Chiefs of Staff forwarded recommendations for certain steps to be taken
immediately to revitalize the counterinsurgency campaign in South Vietnam. That
memorandum advised that other actions were also under study, among which was the
subject removal of existing restrictions related to ground and air cross-border operations.
This memorandum contains the views and recommendations of the Joint Chiefs of Staff
on that subject.
/2/ Document 51.
2. While our available hard intelligence does not reveal the exact dimensions of the
infiltration of men and materials into South Vietnam from the North, and the true extent to
which the Viet Cong and their North Vietnamese supporters are utilizing sanctuaries in
Laos and Cambodia, there is mounting evidence that these are of such proportions as to
constitute an increasingly important factor in the war. Modern weapons of Chinese
communist origin, including recoilless rifles and quadruple-mounted heavy machine guns,
are appearing in the hands of the Viet Cong in South Vietnam in increasing numbers,
partially offsetting the tactical advantage we have derived heretofore from the use of air
mobility and armored personnel carriers. Viet Cong military capabilities are growing
significantly in terms of well trained, well armed, and well directed hard core units,
indicating the extent and effectiveness of the support being provided by Hanoi in terms of
arms, equipment, trained cadre, and operational direction. There is evidence that small
Viet Cong units have used Cambodia as a sanctuary for a considerable period of time.
Additionally, there has occurred recently an incident wherein a battalion-sized Viet Cong
unit, several hundred strong, after making a devastating attack, withdrew into their
inviolable sanctuary in Cambodia. All our experience in counterinsurgency indicates that
when the insurgents enjoy the advantage of such sanctuaries and support across
international borders, their elimination will be a most difficult, if not impossible, task.
3. In the face of the serious menace to our ultimate victory represented by the above, we
continue to operate under the limitations of self-imposed restrictions. These restrictions
are outlined in Appendix A hereto./3/ Their effect is to deny to ourselves and our South
Vietnamese Allies the essential means to satisfy urgent military requirements for
interdiction of infiltration routes, pursuit, and destruction of enemy forces who take refuge
in their sanctuaries across the borders.
/3/ Not printed.
4. The Joint Chiefs of Staff believe that the time has come to lift the restrictions which
limit the effectiveness of our military operations. Certain military operations across the
borders of Laos and Cambodia are considered essential to successful prosecution of war.
Specifically, the Joint Chiefs of Staff recommend that authority be sought for the conduct
of operations as described in Appendix B hereto/4/ which have been proposed by the
Commander in Chief, Pacific. An analysis of the military benefits to be gained versus the
possible risks involved is also contained in Appendix B.
/4/ In Appendix B, not printed, the JCS recommended that the South Vietnamese adopt a
policy of hot pursuit of hostile Viet Cong forces into the Demilitarized Zone, Cambodia,
and Laos, and that U.S. advisers be allowed to accompany them; also that the 2d U.S. Air
Division be allowed hot pursuit on the same basis. In addition, the JCS recommended
low-level reconnaissance of Laos and Cambodia by U.S. aircraft, encouragement of overt
operations by South Vietnam against the Viet Cong in Laos (with U.S. advisers and
cooperation with friendly Lao forces), and covert ground operations into Cambodia.
5. Since the actions considered here represent only one segment of the Joint Chiefs of
Staff recommendations in relation to revitalizing the Vietnamese campaign, it is suggested
that this paper be held and considered in connection with the other papers bearing on the
Vietnamese campaign.
Chairman
/5/ Printed from a copy that bears this stamped signature.
(McNamara)/1/
JCSM-174-64
/1/ Source: Washington National Records Center, RG 330, McNamara Files: FRC 71 A
3470, Military Plans Against NVN, March 1964. Top Secret; Sensitive.
SUBJECT
Vietnam
1. This memorandum responds to your memorandum, dated 21 February 1964, subject as
above./2/ For purposes of clarity, each question in your memorandum has been repeated
and underlined,/3/ followed by the answer thereto. The response to the separate portions
of your memorandum follow:

/2/ Document 57.
/3/ Printed here in italic type.
a. The over-all capabilities of the DRV and of the Chinese Communists for military action,
with specific reference to:
(1) The types and magnitudes of actions which are possible, taking into account current
Communist logistic capabilities.
(2) The geographic areas within which such actions might be undertaken.
(3) The time period within which the enemy forces could be brought to bear.
(4) The enemy capability for concurrent reactions, as for example, reactions both in
Southeast Asia and in Korea and/or Taiwan offshore islands.
Answer: Over-all capabilities of the DRV and ChiCom follow:
(a) It is currently estimated that 13 ChiCom infantry divisions, less heavy artillery and
armor, plus nine DRV divisions could be logistically supported during the dry season
(November-May) in initial moves against Southeast Asian countries. (b) It is currently
estimated that the ChiCom Air Force, by redeploying and operating from airfields in
South China, Hainan, and North Vietnam, could make available about 400 jet fighters and
125 jet light bombers for operations in Southeast Asia.
(c) The ChiCom naval capabilities include harassing tactics by PT boats, mining
operations, and possibly some submarine activity (four to six maintained on station).
(d) With regard to logistic support of DRV/ChiCom aggression in Southeast Asia, the
onset of the wet season will bring about a considerable reduction in the capability to
support large-scale offensive operations. Further study will be necessary to determine
specifics.
(e) The ChiComs have the capability to launch limited ground and/or air attacks
concurrently in widely separated areas such as Southeast Asia, South Korea, and Taiwan.
However, logistic limitations severely restrict their ability to sustain a major land, sea, and
air campaign in more than one area. By concentrating their efforts in any geographic area,
they could mount a major campaign comprising land, sea, and air forces as indicated in
Appendix C. /4/
/4/ Not printed.
b. What military actions against North Vietnam, employing air and naval power, but not
ground forces beyond the scale of small-scale raids, might be:
(1) undertaken by the GVN and within the plausible range of GVN capabilities;
(2) assertedly undertaken by the GVN, even if outside the plausible range of GVN
capabilities;
(3) undertaken by the US without public acknowledgment;
(4) undertaken by the US along with, or after, a public declaration by the US of an intent
to exert military pressure upon the DRV with a view to forcing a termination of the
insurrection in the South?
Answer: Military pressures can be applied to North Vietnam in the form of air strikes,
amphibious raids, sabotage operations, and a naval blockade. The Republic of Vietnam
Armed Forces (RVNAF) have a very limited capability to conduct air strikes, amphibious
raids, and sabotage operations in North Vietnam. By the utilization of nonattributable air
support, e.g., Farmgate-type operations, the VNAF air effort could be intensified and
expanded for conducting air strikes against LOCs, military installations, and industrial
targets. With respect to Farmgate, augmentation with the B-57 jet aircraft, as
recommended by the Joint Chiefs of Staff, will greatly enhance its capability. The
introduction of US air and naval elements, even though not openly acknowledged, would
permit further selective destruction of the above targets. Openly announcing US intentions
would provide more freedom of action for using military force in achieving clearly stated
limited objectives. More detailed information is contained in Appendix A. 4 Additionally,
a scenario (Appendix B) 4 has been developed which outlines those actions necessary to
the accomplishment of a program of increasing pressures against North Vietnam.
c. What targets would be most effective to attack from the standpoint of:
(1) specific effect on DRV capability against Laos, South Vietnam, and Thailand;
(2) interdiction of main communications routes between the DRV and Communist China,
plus interdiction of sea communications into North Vietnam;
(3) more generalized target patterns designed to inflict damage on key installations in the
DRV but to minimize the effect on the civilian population as a whole?
Answer: Targets, the destruction of or damage to which would have the most effect on
DRV operations against Laos, South Vietnam, and Thailand, include airfields, POL
storage facilities, bridges, and military installations. Interdiction attack in Laos and North
Vietnam would assist in reducing support to the Pathet Lao and the Viet Minh/Viet Cong.
In addition, sustained interdiction attacks of specified railroad facilities, roads, and water
routes would disrupt ChiCom support of the DRV. The destruction of selected industrial
facilities and power plants will further reduce DRY's war-supporting capability. Targets
have been selected in terms of key installations, minimizing destruction to the population
as a whole. The treatment of target systems is contained in Appendix A. Annex to
Appendix A lists representative targets by category and order of attack within category.
d. Assuming that, in response to the attacks upon the DRV, the DRV and/or the ChiComs
undertake large-scale troop movements over the border into one or more of:
(1) South Vietnam
(2) Laos
(3) Thailand or Burma
(4) South Korea
(5) Taiwan
What US effort, air, sea, and land, would be required to contain such an invasion? If
intelligence indicated that such a movement were contemplated by the enemy, what
actions against North Vietnam and mainland China would be likely to deter such a
response?/5/
/5/ At this point, McNamara wrote the following note in the margin: "air strikes at 1)
ChiCom airfields 2) lines of supply. Why not assume massive use of US air both B47's &
sea based & land based in SVN."
Answer: The ChiComs/DRV would be unable to undertake large-scale military actions in
more than one area at a time due to logistic limitations and availability of forces, although
military pressures might be exerted in several areas. US forces required to counter
aggression in each of the areas listed in your memorandum are set forth in Appendix D./6/
In addition, certain actions (such as making clear to the DRV and the ChiComs our
limited objectives, alerting and deploying US forces, U.S. Assessment of the Khanh
Government 115 and increasing reconnaissance programs in pertinent areas) may deter
such responses on the part of the DRV and ChiComs. These actions are treated further in
Appendix D.
/6/ Not printed.
e. In each of the circumstances in subparagraph d above, or any likely combination of
them, to what extent could the US effectively counter such actions through air and naval
responses only (without the use of ground forces other than those presently deployed)
under several alternatives as to weapons employed?
Answer:
(a) In the broad application of land and sea based air power, nonnuclear attacks may not
cause the ChiCom/DRV to cease aggression; however, nuclear attacks would have a far
greater probability of causing them to desist. Sea power would be most effective in the
form of a blockade, but would require imposition for a considerable time before it would
have a marked effect on ChiCom/DRV aggressive operations. Other naval actions such as
an amphibious feint could be used to supplement the effect of the blockade. Use of
classified conventional munitions in an air and naval response would tend to increase the
effectiveness of such response on a sortie-by-sortie basis. However, there is relatively
little advantage to the use of classified munitions against hard targets. An expanded
treatment is contained in Appendix D.
(b) The Joint Chiefs of Staff emphasize that in initiating actions against the DRV there
must be a readiness and willingness on the part of the United States to follow through
with appropriate contingency plans to counter DRV/ChiCom reaction as required. Also
listed in Appendix D are certain related military measures which should be accomplished
to improve the US military readiness posture to execute contingency plans. The most
important of these is the deployment of US air strike and air defense units to Thailand and
South Vietnam as necessary. An attack carrier strike force is available to move within
striking distance of North Vietnam.
f. Assuming that ChiCom reaction included air action from mainland bases (either
against SVN or other air bases, or supporting aircraft carriers), to what extent could this
air threat be countered by: actions against enemy aircraft only or selective attacks
against Chinese bases and air defenses utilizing conventional or alternatively low yield
nuclear weapons employed to minimize both collateral damage and fallout?
Answer: With respect to air defense, the air defense capabilities in Southeast Asia,
Taiwan, Japan, and Korea are inadequate to cope with saturation attacks. Accordingly,
enemy air should not be permitted to operate from sanctuaries, but should be attacked at
the sources. However, occasional air attacks on Saigon and similar key localities must be
anticipated. Additional study is required to provide specific data requested in your
memorandum.
g. What modifications must be made in existing contingency plans in order to provide for
US reactions which depend primarily upon air activities rather than the intervention of
substantial US ground forces?
Answer:
(a) CINCPAC operation plans provide for the application of military power against the
DRV and ChiComs. These are:
i. Plan 33--provides for overt employment of US forces in retaliatory attacks against
North Vietnam.
ii. Plan 34-A--provides for RVNAF military operations in North Vietnam.
iii. Plan 99--provides for overt employment of US forces in military operations designed
to stabilize the situation in Laos and South Vietnam.
iv. Plan 94--provides for overt operations employing US forces in air strikes against a
ChiCom nuclear production facility.
v. Plan 32--provides for the over-all defense of Southeast Asia./7/
/7/ Regarding OPLAN 34A, see footnote 2, Document 4. The text of OPLAN 99-64 is in
the Johnson Library, National Security File, Vietnam Country File, Southeast Asia, Vol.
11, Memos (B), 5/64-6/64. OPLAN 32-64 is ibid., Memos (A), 5/64-6/64. Texts of
OPLAN 32-64 and OPLAN 94-64 are in the National Archives and Records
Administration. RG 218, JCS Files.
(b) While CINCPAC has numerous plans which call for substantial US air effort in
conjunction with the intervention of US ground forces, there are no specific plans based
solely on air and naval responses which apply to all of the situations contained in this
paper. The Joint Chiefs of Staff will direct the preparation of such plans as required.
h. The view of the Joint Chiefs of Staff as to the courses of action that would most likely
bring about cessation of DRV support for operations in South Vietnam and Laos.
Answer:
(a) US intentions and resolve to extend the war as necessary should be made clear
immediately by overt military actions against the DRV.
(b) Military actions should be part of a coordinated diplomatic, military, and
psychological program directed at deterring the enemy and preparing the world for
extension of the war.
(c) We should prepare military actions, one in the form of a sudden blow for shock effect,
another in the form of ascending order of severity with increasing US participation; the
purpose of both being to bring about cessation of DRV support of the insurgency.
(d) Initial military preparations should provide for:
i. Overt demonstrations of US intentions through US low level aerial reconnaissance over
Laos and North Vietnam.
ii. Expansion of RVN activities including Farmgate aircraft, into North Vietnam by:
(Outlined in Appendix A.)
1. Air strikes
2. Amphibious raids
3. Sabotage
4. Harassment of shipping and fishing activities.
(e) Preparation should be initiated by the US and GVN for:
i. Increasing the intensity of efforts against the DRV by:
1. Armed reconnaissance along the principal supply routes from DRV to Laos.
2. Destruction of:
(i) Highway bridges along the principal supply routes from DRV to Laos.
(ii) Military targets in DRV and Laos which directly support the insurgency.
(iii) Airfields in DRV which are used for aerial resupply to Laos.
(iv) POL installations and major LOC facilities between China and DRV in North
Vietnam.
(v) Industrial base targets in the Hanoi/Haiphong area.
3. Mine laying in selected areas.

4. Conducting cross-border operations.
5. Undertaking a maritime blockade of DRV
2. An assessment of enemy reactions to the military actions listed above indicates that the
Chinese communists view Laos and South Vietnam as DRV problems. It is unlikely that
the ChiComs would introduce organized ground units in significant numbers into the
DRV, Laos, or Cambodia except as part of an over-all campaign against all of Southeast
Asia. They might offer the DRV fighter aircraft, AAA units, and volunteers. They would
assume an increased readiness posture and ChiCom aircraft might be committed to the
defense of North Vietnam. The Soviets would probably be highly concerned over possible
expansion of the conflict. To the extent that Moscow believed the Hanoi and Peiping
regimes in jeopardy, Sino-Soviet differences would tend to submerge. It is believed that
Moscow would initiate no action which, in the Soviet judgment, would increase the
likelihood of nuclear war. The appraisal of possible enemy reaction is contained in
Appendix C.
3. The foregoing discussion provides the preliminary judgments of the Joint Chiefs of
Staff as you have requested; however, they desire to reaffirm the view expressed by
memorandum to you, dated 22 January 1964,/8/ concerning the overriding importance to
the security interests of the United States of preventing the loss of RVN. The North
Vietnamese direction and support of the insurgency in the RVN is one of the controlling
factors in the continuation of the war. Accordingly, intensified operations are warranted
and essential at this time to convince both the DRV and ChiCom leadership of our
resolution to prevail.
4. It is recognized that the program of intensified operations contemplated herein involves
a change in US policy. Nevertheless, the Joint Chiefs of Staff recommend that those
actions described in paragraph 1h above be approved as a basis for discussion and
planning with US and GVN officials in your forthcoming visit to Southeast Asia./9/ In
making this recommendation, the Joint Chiefs of Staff recognize that even if success
attends our efforts to cause the DRV to desist from aiding the Viet Cong, the latter can by
their own efforts sustain the insurgency for an indeterminate period at a reduced level.
/9/ At this point, McNamara wrote in the margin: "OK, fuller use of massive U.S. air
power in lieu of US gd forces."
Maxwell D. Taylor
Chairman
67.Memorandum Prepared in the Department of Defense/1/

/1/ Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Vietnam Country File, Vol. V. No
classification marking. In a covering memorandum, McNamara informed the President
that this was the 2-page South Vietnam summary which he had requested.
SUMMARY STATEMENT ON SOUTH VIETNAM
1. The Problem
In Southeast Asia today the Free World is facing an attempt by the Communists of North
Vietnam to subvert and overthrow the non-Communist government of South Vietnam.
North Vietnam has been providing direction, control, and trained cadres for the 25,000
Viet Cong guerrillas and the 60,000 to 80,000 irregulars engaged in harassment,
systematic terror, and armed attacks on the people of South Vietnam.
I
Our purpose in South Vietnam is to help the Vietnamese maintain their independence. We
are providing the training and the logistic support which they cannot provide themselves.
We will continue to provide that support as long as it is required. As our training missions
are completed, certain of our troops can be withdrawn. In December 1000 men came
home. This group included, for example, two military police units whose airport guard
duty had been taken over by Vietnamese trained for that purpose.
3. The Current Situation
In the past four months, there have been three governments in South Vietnam. Each of
them has appointed its own cabinet members, its own provincial governors, and its own
senior military leaders. The Viet Cong have taken advantage of the confusion resulting
from these changes by raising the level and intensity of their attacks. They have been
using larger forces and more powerful weapons.
This increased activity has had a good deal of success. Strategic hamlets formerly under
government protection have been lost to the Viet Cong; roads formerly open to free
movement have been closed. On the other hand, Viet Cong fatalities have been high. The
unfavorable rate of 3 or 4 Viet Cong killed for every Vietnamese has continued. Although
15,000 to 20,000 Viet Cong have been killed during the past 12 months, their strength has
remained approximately level through receipt of cadres from North Vietnam and recruits
from South Vietnam.
4. Alternative Courses of Action
At least four alternatives are open to us today:
A. We can withdraw from South Vietnam. Without our support the government will be
unable to counter the aid from the North for the Viet Cong. Vietnam will collapse, and the
ripple effect will be felt throughout Southeast Asia, endangering the independent
governments of Thailand and Malaysia, and extending as far as India on the west,
Indonesia on the south, and the Philippines on the east.
B. We can seek a formula that will "neutralize" South Vietnam. But any such formula will
only lead in the end to the same result as withdrawing support. We all know the
communists' attitude that "What's mine is mine and what's yours is negotiable." True
neutralization would have to extend to North Vietnam as well, and this possibility has
been specifically rejected by the North Vietnamese and Chinese Communist governments.
C. We can send the Marines and other U.S. ground forces against the sources of the
aggression. But if we do, our men may well be bogged down in a long war against
numerically superior North Vietnamese and ChiCom forces.
D. We can continue our present policy of providing training and logistical support for the
South Vietnam forces. This policy has not failed. We propose to continue it.
Secretary McNamara's trip to South Vietnam will provide us with an opportunity to
appraise the future prospects for this policy, and the further alternatives that may be
available to us.
68. Memorandum Prepared by the Director of Central Intelligence (McCone)/1/

/1/ Source: Department of State, Bundy Files, WPB Special Papers. Secret. There was no
designated recipient of this memorandum indicated on the source text, but a handwritten
note by William Bundy reads: "McCone Draft. Bundy Working."
MEMORANDUM ON VIETNAM
Following my trip to Saigon in late December, 1963, I concluded that while the problems
of accomplishing the U.S. objectives in South Vietnam are not insurmountable they are
indeed formidable and there were more reasons to be pessimistic about obtaining our
objectives than there were reasons to be optimistic./2/
/2/ See Foreign Relations, 1961-1963, vol. IV, pp. 735-738.
Since then Khanh's coup has removed Generals Don, Kim, Xuan and Dinh. This has
precipitated a decided change in the situation, necessitating a reassessment of the outlook.
In making such a reassessment the following areas must be considered:
1. The South Vietnamese Political Situation.
a. General Khanh has demonstrated that he is an able military leader. He is young (36
years old), relatively inexperienced. He was a lieutenant in 1954 and void of any political
experience. He is unknown to the people and hence there is no evidence of strong popular
support or great confidence in his leadership on the part of the people. We note
considerable gossip among the people with whom the Station is in contact indicating lack
of confidence in Khanh and his government.
b. General Khanh has appointed General Big Minh as Chief of State and three Vice Prime
Ministers. General Minh is little more than a figurehead if that and has indicated some
residual unhappiness at having been displaced by Khanh. Of the three Vice Prime
Ministers, Nguyen Ton Hoan is a leader of the Dai Viet Party with a strong political
motivation, but has been out of the country since 1954 until January of this year. Nguyen
Xuan Oanh is a technician in economics and finance. He has spent most of the past 18
years out of his country and returned only this year. Do Mau is a general, formerly Chief
of the Military Security Services and attache in Paris, but has little background in the
cultural and social affairs he is supposed to supervise.
c. In addition he has appointed a slate of ministers. These have been drawn from various
political and religious groups and with some attention to their geographic origin in an
attempt to include most currents of opinion. Due to the lack of experience of the ministers,
however, and their varying backgrounds, we cannot expect the cabinet to be especially
strong. In addition some able men were not selected because of prior associations with
Diem-Nhu, Minh-Don or the French and some others have not wished to serve because of
the uncertainty as to the future of this government. We are already receiving reports of
planning for new coupe, especially from the political circles of the Dai Viet party. We
conclude that the prospects for a strong government are not bright.
d. In the provinces and districts there is both confusion and lack of direction. Some chiefs
appointed by Minh have been removed, others do not know their future. Most are
awaiting guidance from the new government in Saigon. Therefore, there is no strong
political direction at the level of province and district chiefs.
e. As a result of what appears to be a weak and ineffective central government and a
confused situation at the level of provinces and districts, many essential programs such as
the strategic hamlet program and various civic action programs have come to a virtual
halt. This is giving the VC an opportunity to fill this vacuum with their own political and
military action with the result that many areas have been lost to the government and there
is a growing feeling that the VC may be the wave of the future.
All of the above leads to the conclusion that the situation is worse now than it was in
December and therefore I am more pessimistic of the future of the American cause in
South Vietnam than my December report reflects.
2. South Vietnam Military Organization
a. The organization still exists in the proportions built up by Diem-Nhu and taken over by
Minh-Don. However, there is some evidence that morale is low because of constant
changes in leadership at the senior and intermediate levels. This situation might change as
the new commanders assume control.
The situation is particularly bad within the Security Forces in Saigon. There have been
three different commanders of the Saigon Police and Security Forces in the last few
months. We are receiving reports of increased VC activities in Saigon itself. Lack of
morale in the military and lack of confidence in Khanh's leadership is causing a new
round of coup plotting and also rumors of plans to assassinate Khanh. Either might
happen. Khanh is being warned of these plans and plots and is said to be taking
precautions. However, his success is dependent upon his mastering the role of leader of
the country and being accepted as such by officers at all levels, as well as by the civilian,
political and private leadership.
From the above I conclude that the military situation, bad in December, has worsened and
the problem of reversing the trend is formidable. A continuation of the present nature of
GVN and U.S. military and political actions does not appear to me to be enough to reverse
current trends toward defeat.
4.[sic] Viet Cong Activities
Militarily the Viet Cong situation has improved in the last 90 days. They have organized 5
additional battalions, their communication network has been improved, and there are
indications that they are organizing units into regiments. Captured equipment gives
evidence that VC's now have heavier equipment then they possessed a year ago,
bazookas, mortars, anti-aircraft, etc. Much of such heavier equipment is of Chinese
Communist origin but does not reflect any sudden great increase of direct Chinese
Communist support or presence as much of it could come from DRV inventories. Of the
smaller arms, the largest amounts are American made (most captured but some older
items infiltrated). The VC's also use some equipment which originated in Communist
China, Czechoslovakia and the Soviet Union. The VC's appear to have substantial
supplies of arms, perhaps not the most modern, although they still probably have a serious
logistic, maintenance and ammunition problem.
VC leadership seems to be sound; their political action and terrorism are effective, as
evidenced by their ability to persuade whole areas to abandon the strategic hamlet
program and turn in their arms as a price for pacification.
There is a continuing flow of evidence that VC operations are being directed from North
Vietnam, leadership is being supplied from the north as well as war materiel and trained
cadres. However it is evident that a very substantial part of the VC organization, strength
and support is indigenous to South Vietnam.
I can only conclude from my observations that both militarily and politically the VC are
gaining at the moment.
5. United States Operations
1. The military operations conducted by MACV follow the pattern of equipping, training
and advising the RVN to get out and fight the war. The Korean situation was different;
American forces fought and inspired the Koreans to do likewise. In Vietnam we have had
limited experience with this technique but it seems to have been favorable among the
Special Forces. There are many causes for Vietnamese reluctance to rush out and fight
stemming from the long history, some doubt as to the eventual outcome, many early
abuses and the lack of any strong appeal from the GVN. Whether American participation
can overcome this or may intensify xenophobic feelings about the Whiteman's war is not
clear. It is clear that the present course is not successful.
The various units which were trained for the purpose of defending their own strategic
hamlets should be used in this way, that is, as a defensive organization and not as
offensive units. They are neither trained nor capable of offensive operations. The concept
of the civilian defense units should be expanded, along the "oil stain" principle of the
Pacification Plans.
Intelligence has been spotty. There has been submersion of bad news and an
overstatement of good news. For the past year we have been misinformed about
conditions in Vietnam. The entire intelligence apparatus is undergoing review and
reorganization. It is essential that this be completed promptly and that there be a very
close liaison between the J-2 organization, dealing with enemy capabilities, and the J-3,
dealing with RVN capabilities and plans.
I conclude that our military operations in South Vietnam have not been as successful as
we assumed up to last December. I think the whole concept has to be reviewed. It is the
only time in our history that we have put such a large force into a country for the purpose
of telling others to go out and fight. It is conceivable that we have unwittingly lifted the
responsibility for the success of the battle from the shoulders of the South Vietnamese
onto our own shoulders without accepting combat responsibility. In other words we may
have gone beyond a MAAG operation, but have not selected the best way to carry out a
combat operation in Vietnamese circumstances.
6. New Courses of Action
In view of the fragile political situation and the deteriorating military situation, one asks
the question, "What should we do?" The courses of action are these:
1. Immediately develop a program which will remove us from South Vietnam by
negotiating a neutralist "solution". In doing so we must recognize that such a negotiation
would lead to South Vietnam falling to the Communists. With this, we could expect
others in Southeast Asia to follow "The Domino Theory". Laos would probably fall
quickly. Burma and Cambodia would certainly move closer to Peiping and we would need
considerable treasure, effort and luck to keep Thailand from slipping away through
accommodation or Communist subversion. On the other hand, this might be inevitable if
the situation in South Vietnam should be even now beyond the point of no return. The
evidence to date, gloomy as it is, does not bear out this prospect as one cannot say that
Khanh and company with new and better U.S. support of various kinds cannot develop
enough dynamism to hold the Viet Cong to give the GVN and the U.S. time and
opportunity to begin turning the tide. We should also recognize that DRV resources and
strength are limited and that while they will undoubtedly continue their outside instigation
and steady support of the Viet Cong, this prospect is not one of a sudden escalation of
their effort.
2. We can continue as we are now doing, restricting ourselves to actions of the same type
we have been engaged in. This to me does not seem to be productive. 15,000 or 16,000
Americans have been engaged now for two years training and directing the South
Vietnamese. Likewise the South Vietnamese are supplied with all of the arms and
ammunition they can use; therefore an increasing quantity of materiel, except in certain
special items, would not be productive. Nonetheless, present trends are down and will
probably remain so if no great changes occur in either GVN performance or U.S.
techniques.
3. We could greatly increase the U.S. military and political commitment in Vietnam and
surrounding areas and take a far greater

direct role in the operations. This would be accomplished by a series of actions to step up
the dynamism and effectiveness of Khanh's government and its programs. This would
require a very direct input into the political posture of the Khanh government and its
machinery at the national level and a great increase in our counterinsurgency advice and
support at the local levels. As an element of this program we might add the placing of
U.S. combat forces in South Vietnam to secure the Saigon base and strengthen Khanh's
government against possible coupe. These moves might have some negative effects in
terms of highlighting the issue of white-faced intervention but the overall result would
appear to be more positive than negative.
4. We could carry out dramatic operations against North Vietnam, theoretically nonattributable but actually well identified as coming from South Vietnam with U.S. support.
The consequences of this type of action must be examined but, more important, we must
make a judgment as to whether action of this type would accomplish the U.S. objectives
in South Vietnam. It seems obvious to me that unless the Khanh government is
strengthened in South Vietnam, then carrying the action into North Vietnam would not
guarantee victory. It might stop the North Vietnamese supply for a short time. It would
not stop the Viet Cong military or political action. It would not guarantee victory. If, on
the other hand, the Khanh government can be strengthened, then actions against North
Vietnam would be warranted although the cost and risk to the United States would be
great. There would be danger that the war would escalate, either through large scale DRV
operations into South Vietnam or Laos, Chinese Communist support in these areas, threats
of Chinese Communist air strikes against Saigon or U.S. naval forces, or Soviet naval
convoying of shipping into the DRV. We should of course be prepared for such
contingencies in undertaking any course of extreme pressures against North Vietnam,
although I incline to the view that the Communist powers would not in fact feel that such
extreme reactions were either necessary or worth the risks involved. I do not think that
any extreme U.S. pressures against the DRV would materially affect Sino-Soviet
relations.
I am inclined to believe that if the political climate in South Vietnam is proper, then it is
worth taking these risks, as the loss of the game in South Vietnam would have too serious
consequences to be acceptable. On the other hand, if the Khanh government remains
fragile, if the people remain disinterested, and disaffected, and we are continually
confronted with coup plotting and the consequent hazards, if the resentment of American
presence increases, then it appears to me that carrying the war to North Vietnam would
not win the war in South Vietnam and would cause the United States such serious
problems in every corner of the world that we should not sanction such an effort.
5. There are steps that can be taken to strengthen the Khanh government. Some of these
are:
a. The strategic hamlet program must be revitalized and attacked as the top priority. Plans
exist for the implementation of this program according to the "oil stain" concept. The
regular forces must establish as their primary duty the reinforcement of the strategic
hamlet program according to these plans and the clearing and holding of additional areas.
The irregular forces must be supported, trained, advised and inspired by a considerable
increase in U.S. Special Forces and AID support, possibly organized as a separate
Peoples' Defense Authority.

b. A concentrated program of political action and agitation at the grass roots level must be
established using supplied teams to conduct
such agitation, organization and motivation efforts in conjunction with the strategic
hamlet program. Additional information and civic action efforts must be conducted in
support of these teams.
c. Assistance should be obtained from the Chinese Nationalist Government in a discreet
but major scale manner. Detailed recommendations on this point have been submitted
separately./3/
/3/ Apparently a reference to an undated and unattributed memorandum received in ISA
on March 25 on possible Chinese Nationalist aid to the South Vietnamese in South
Vietnam, North Vietnam, and the South China Sea. (Washington National Records
Center, RG 330, OASD/ISA Files: FRC 68 306, 092 Vietnam) When reviewing his papers
after he left office, William Bundy noted on the source text that this idea was "a bug with
McCone."
d. An unofficial political advisor should be appointed to General Khanh to assist him in
his early efforts as Chief of Government. Personnel having experience along these lines
with Macapagal, Sarit, and others are available within CIA. In addition to the advisor to
General Khanh appropriate advisors should be selected for other key political leaders.
e. Operations should be conducted against Viet Cong personnel and facilities across the
Lao and Cambodia borders. In order to conduct such operations reconnaissance both by
air and ground will be necessary. These operations should be conducted on a nonadmitted (not necessarily deniable) basis.
f. The posture of U.S. personnel in Vietnam must be one of aggressive leadership
although they might claim only an "advisory" mission. Thus the maximum use should be
made of U.S. channels, organization and appeal to the lower ranking Vietnamese, even at
the cost of some noses out of joint at the higher ranks. Our personnel must share the
dangers of the Vietnamese peasants and fighting men and take full responsibility for
stirring them into maximum action against the Viet Cong in their own protection and for
no other purpose. Building overall loyalty to the Saigon government should be a
secondary matter, to be sought after security is obtained, not as means thereto.
g. In our diplomatic approaches in Southeast Asia, we must establish the strengthening of
the Khanh regime and the morale of the Vietnamese people as our primary objective. All
steps in Cambodia, Laos, Thailand and Taiwan must be taken in this context. It will be
particularly important to forcefully demonstrate our rejection of the neutralist solution
advocated by the French. This may give us problems in Cambodia and Laos, but these
would be both more manageable and of lesser gravity than a growth of defeatism their
alternatives might inspire in Vietnam.
h. Consideration should be given to the dispatch of a U.S. battle group to the Saigon area.
The ostensible mission of this group would be to insure the security of the Saigon area as
the base for operations against the Viet Cong. Its real purpose would be the support of the
Khanh government against possible neutralist coupe. There are solid arguments pro and
con on the use of combat troops in this manner. General Khanh's own approval would
have to be obtained and his judgment might be best on the subject.
5.[sic] With these steps we should be able to strengthen the Khanh government enough to
permit us to decide whether continuance along that line alone will be adequate to defeat
the Viet Cong or whether these steps must be supplemented by operations against North
Vietnam. In the absence of these steps, operations against North Vietnam would in any
case not likely be worth the cost. With these steps we might be able to win without
attacking North Vietnam but we at least would have sufficient basis to make such
activities profitable.
6. The next few weeks or so are probably critical. We may find that Khanh and South
Vietnam simply don't have it, or just don't want to be rescued by the U.S. But, if we find
instead that there is still some stretch in the situation, then victory may yet come in time.
It would be long in coming, in the best of circumstances, but we should never forget that
the DRV and Chinese Communists have their own weaknesses, which could grow in time,
and that if the peasant in South Vietnam could be assured of his physical security for
some sustained period he would no longer actively support the Viet Cong. His support
would be accelerated if he could be convinced that in addition to security he could look
forward to social, economic and political betterment through loyalty to the GVN.
69. Memorandum From the Secretary of State to the President/1/

/1/ Source: Department of State, President's Reading File: Lot 74 D 164. Secret; No
Distribution.
SUGGESTED ITEMS FOR EVENING READING
1. French Policy in Viet-Nam--Chip Bohlen met today with Couve in Paris and was told
that France has had no military or operational policy in Viet-Nam for the past 9 years and,
therefore, is not working against U.S. interests./2/ Couve made a personal suggestion, that
a "political objective", such as ultimate mutual withdrawal of U.S. and Viet Cong forces,
would promote our military aims./3/ He was not suggesting a conference, although
admitting that we might have to deal with the Chinese Communists. Couve did not
respond to Bohlen's mention of a French statement on Viet-Nam but agreed that French
official silence would be desirable.
/2/ As reported in telegrams 4165 and 4173 from Paris, both March 4. (Ibid., Central
Files, POL 27 VIET S)
/3/ When the Embassy in Saigon learned of this suggestion by Couve de Murville, it
cabled the Department of State that such a proposal revealed a "very fundamental French
misunderstanding of the true nature of the Viet Cong." In telegram 1713, March 9, the
Embassy explained that the Viet Cong were "indigenous communists" many of whom
derived from the Viet Minh cadres who remained in the south after 1954. They had to be
eliminated or won over; they could not be induced to withdraw in 1964 any more
effectively than they had been in 1954. The Embassy asked that this fact be stressed to the
French Government and added that, should South Vietnam learn that the United States
was "toying with such an idea," the effect in Vietnam would be "unfortunate." (Ibid.) The
White House copy is published in Declassified Documents, 1976, 211E.
[Here follow items 2-7 which were unrelated to Vietnam.]
Dean Rusk/4/
/4/ Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.

1964-1968, Volume I
Vietnam, 1964
Department of State
Washington, DC
III. The McNamara-Taylor Mission To Vietnam and the McNamara

Report, March 4-April 3
70. Memorandum of a Conversation Between the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the
President, Washington, March 4, 1964/1/
/1/Source: National Defense University, Taylor Papers, T-36-71. Top Secret. Drafted by
Taylor.
[Here follows discussion unrelated to Vietnam.]
4. He then opened the subject of our coming trip to Saigon and asked what course I was
inclined to recommend at this moment. I told him that, in general, I felt our program
should consist of two main parts; one, an intensive continuation of the counterinsurgency
campaign within South Vietnam and, second, a progressive program of selective air and
naval attacks against North Vietnam using means beyond those employed in the past. The
other Chiefs expressed themselves generally in accord. They also were of the opinion that
it was unlikely that the ChiComs would intervene in strength. However, once embarked
on the program the US must carry it to success, cost what may.
5. The President accepted the need for punishing Hanoi without debate, but pointed to
some other practical difficulties, particularly the political ones with which he was faced. It
is quite apparent that he does not want to lose South Vietnam before next November nor
does he want to get the country into war.
6. The President is impressed with the danger of another coup. He feels we must make
General Khanh "our boy" and proclaim the fact to all and sundry. He wants to see Khanh
in the newspapers with McNamara and Taylor holding up his arms.
7. He directed a check made on all requests from Harkins for help since November to see
if any have been rejected or significantly curtailed. He anticipates queries from Congress
on this score.
8. He asked that we initiate a State/DOD/CIA/COMUSMACV examination of the realism
of Senator Mansfield's plan for a neutralization of North and South Vietnam. He
expressed indignation over the Saigon article by Keyes Beech dated 22 February
(attached)/2/ which revealed US military thinking on an expansion of the war. He directed
me to talk to Harkins about it./3/
/2/Not attached.
/3/A handwritten note on the margin reads: "Done, MDT, 13 March '64."
Chairman
/4/Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.
71. Summary Record of the 523d Meeting of the National Security Council, White
House, Washington, March 5, 1964, 4:30 p.m./1/
/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, NSC Meetings, Vol. 1, Tab 4. Secret.
Drafted by Bromley Smith. An attached attendance list indicates that 23 persons attended
the Vietnam portion of the meeting.
1. Secretary McNamara's Trip to South Vietnam
Secretary McNamara gave an oral summary of what he intends to accomplish by visiting
South Vietnam. In a report which he will make upon his return, he will comment on the
current strength of the Khanh government, the outlook for the future, and on alternative
courses of action which might be taken to improve the situation in Vietnam. He said he
would be prepared to make both an oral and a written report.
Mr. Bundy commented that the President was not being asked to make decisions prior to
the return of Secretary McNamara.
Secretary Rusk said he was taking a sober view, even a pessimistic view of developments
in South Vietnam. Listing the points of weakness in the situation in Vietnam was a way
for us to concentrate on courses of action to overcome these weaknesses. Our attention
should be concentrated on what we can do to improve the course we are now on.
The President asked whether it was true that all recommendations made by Ambassador
Lodge had been dealt with without exception--promptly and generally favorably.
Secretary McNamara replied affirmatively, as did Director Bell and Director McCone.
Secretary Rusk said the only exception was the proposal which Ambassador Lodge had
made with respect to how to handle de Gaulle's support of the neutralization of Vietnam.
[Here follows item 2 which was unrelated to Vietnam.]
Bromley Smith/2/
72. Letter From the President to the Secretary of Defense (McNamara)/1/

/1/Source: Washington National Records Center, RG 330, McNamara Files: FRC 71 A
1470. Presidential Instructions. No classification marking.
Dear Mr. Secretary: I am giving you this personal letter instead of any more formal
instruction, as you leave on your important mission to Saigon, but I shall be grateful if
you will share it with the senior officers who are going with you.
I will not ask you now to prepare a formal report, but I do hope that you and your
colleagues will work together to bring back the most careful possible assessment of the
situation and of the best possible courses of action for improving it. Some of these
possibilities have been discussed in a preliminary way here in recent days, but what we
now need is an assessment of all the possibilities and needs on the spot.
I particularly want your opinions and recommendations to be framed in the light of your
discussions with Ambassador Lodge and his colleagues, and with the leaders of the
Vietnamese Government. I look to you, as its senior officer, to coordinate the work of this
mission.
Sincerely,
Lyndon B. Johnson
73. Letter From the President to the Secretary of Defense (McNamara)/1/

Washington, March 5, 1964
3470, Presidential Instructions. Secret.
Dear Bob: One of the most important things you can do for me in South Vietnam is to talk
privately on my behalf with Cabot Lodge. I have the highest regard for him as a patriot
and a public servant, and I want him to know at first-hand of my determination that we in
Washington must do everything we can to back him up as the top American in Vietnam.
He is an old friend of mine from the Senate, and the simplest way of emphasizing my high
opinion of him to you is to say that I recommended him for your job after the election of
1952.
When we had our first meeting with Ambassador Lodge, on November 24,2 I told him
that I counted on him to take full charge of our effort there and to press our views as
strongly as possible on the Government. I also told him that we would back him up in
every part of the country team. We have made all the personnel changes which he has
requested, and which it was quite proper for him to request in his effort to discharge his
responsibilities. You should make it clear that we mean to continue to be responsive to his
needs, and that just as we count on him to insist on first-class performance out there, we
have taken fairly energetic steps of our own to ensure that the team in Washington
working on Vietnam is as good as we can make it.

I have asked the Ambassador to make sure that we know of any new recommendations
and proposals which he or his colleagues may wish to press with us, and on his only
specific proposal relating to our own support of the struggle in Vietnam-the support for
the military pay raise-I believe we have responded promptly./3/ We are also doing all that
we can through Ambassador Bohlen, and here in Washington with Ambassador Alphand,
to get across to the French the importance of their own posture in Vietnam, and while
Bohlen does not. think we can get the public statements that Ambassador Lodge wants,
we have pressed him to do everything that he can in this direction.
/3/See footnote 2, Document 53. On March 9, Forrestal prepared for McGeorge Bundy a
memorandum assessing "the extent to which we have responded to Lodge's requests."
After reviewing the cable traffic since January 1, Forrestal concluded that there were only
two major policy requests from Lodge which were still unresolved: the proposed
statement from de Gaulle clarifying his call for neutralism of Vietnam, and Lodge's
tentative requests for bringing pressure on North Vietnam. Forrestal explained that the
need for considerable planning and policy decisions at the highest level were responsible
for these requests going partially unanswered. Johnson Library, National Security File,
Vietnam Country File, Vol. V, Memos; published in Declassified Documents, 1978,
128C)
McGeorge Bundy passed a copy of Forrestal's memorandum to the President on March 11
stating that further action should await McNamara's return and "that I think we are in
slightly better shape on both issues than Forrestal makes out." (Johnson Library, National
Security File, Memos to the President, McGeorge Bundy, Vol. II)
As I read the messages from Ambassador Lodge, these are the specific areas in which he
has asked for our support, but I want you to be sure to tell him that we will rely on him
and his associates to keep us fully and currently apprised of their needs as they see them.
We may not always be able to achieve what they ask, but we will always try, within the
limits of our resources and capacities.
Sincerely,
Lyndon B. Johnson
74. Memorandum From the Secretary of Defense (McNamara) to the Members of

the McNamara-Taylor Mission to Vietnam/1/
/1/Source: Department of State, Bundy Files, WPB Special Papers. Confidential.
Addressed to Bell, McCone, McNaughton, William Bundy, Sullivan, and Sylvester who,
with the addition of McNamara and Taylor, made up the mission to South Vietnam. They
arrived in Saigon on March 8 and returned to Washington on March 12.
SUBJECT
McNamara-Taylor Mission to South Vietnam

The purpose of our mission is to appraise the current strength of the SVN government; to
review the political and military trends of the past four months; to estimate the outlook for
the future, assuming no change in current US policies; and to evaluate alternative courses
of action in the event it appears current policies will not lead to attainment of our
objective.
I do not propose to submit a final written report to the President immediately following
our return. Instead, I shall prepare a draft memorandum from which another report will be
made. I hope it will be possible for the senior members of the party to concur in all
significant points in the draft memorandum; in the event we cannot agree, the dissenting
views will be expressed fully as footnotes to the report.
While in SVN, I believe we should minimize both formal and informal contacts with the
press. Please review your plans for any such discussions with Arthur Sylvester before they
take place and inform him of the substance of the discussions after the event.
I do not believe it should be necessary for individual members of the party, while in SVN,
to send interim reports to their Departments or Agencies in Washington. If at any time
you believe such a report is required, please furnish me a copy of the proposed message.
Robert S. McNamara
75. Memorandum for the Record by Brigadier General W.W. Stromberg of the
Army General Staff/1/
Saigon, March 8, 1964.
/1/Source: National Defense University, Taylor Papers, T-233-69. Top Secret; US Eyes
Only. Stromberg sent a copy of this memorandum to Lodge, Taylor, McNamara, and
Harkins.
This morning, Sunday, 8 March 1964, I paid a call on General Duong van Minh. A single
soldier stood guard behind the closed gate. I saw no other security except possibly three
civilian occupants of a white jeep across the street. One of these assisted me in gaining
entrance by speaking in Vietnamese to the soldier guard who spoke neither English nor
French. At his residence in Saigon, I presented General Minh with a box of orchids and
the red canary which was the personal gift of General Wheeler. When I explained to him
that the gifts were a token of the high esteem with which he is held in the Pentagon as a
soldier and patriot, he was visibly touched. Tam, his son was in the house as was General
Kim's son whose name I did not catch. Mrs. Minh joined us for a brief period. She
appeared nervous and sad. I attempted to carry out our discussion in English as I had
assumed General Minh had continued his English lessons since I had last seen him in
1961, but he quickly reverted to French.
Initially, we covered events leading up to the overthrow of the Diem government. He said
he regretted terribly to have been obliged to organize the coup as he had the greatest
admiration for the President. As the internal situation deteriorated and he saw that Diem
was losing the support of the people to ever greater degrees, General Minh said he
constantly attempted to influence the President to make the necessary reforms and to rid
himself of the influence of his family and other evil people who surrounded him. Finally,
when he-saw that Diem would never listen, he decided to overthrow him before the Viet
Cong did so. General Minh said he prepared the coup during a period of two years. For all
but three months of this period, General Kim was his only confidante. They constantly
discussed possible situations, personalities, forces and the risks involved. Three months
before the coup went in, General Minh sent Kim to General Don to cut the latter in. (Kim
is married to Don's sister Gabrielle.) Don agreed to the coup. One month before the coup,
General Minh asked General Dinh, whose III Corps was essential to success, to his home.
This was the critical moment. There was some talking around the point on the part of both
but finally, General Dinh suddenly said "Big Brother, our country is in danger, tell me
what to do." General Minh gave him his instructions. Finally, every key General and
agency was brought into the coup except for General Cao's IV Corps and the Navy.
General Cao was not brought in as he was pet of Diem's. The Corps Deputy was in on it.
Dinh's III Corps was between Cao and Saigon; and besides, plans had been made to
control or destroy two essential ferries between III and IV Corps areas. General Khanh,
then CG, II Corps was in on the coup but told Minh he would remain at Pleiku. This way
Minh said Khanh could stand back and go either way depending on how the coup worked
out. General Khiem played an important role. General Minh did not cut the Navy in as
they were too unreliable. He charged General Xuan, CG of the Quang Trung Training
Center outside Saigon to take care of the Navy whose headquarters was taken with 40
men. Xuan was also given the job of taking care of the Saigon police; a cause of worry to
Minh. During the last month's preparation for the coup, Minh was able to reconcile Dinh
and Kim.
(After the abortive coup of 11 November 1960, Kim, then Commandant of the Military
Academy at Dalat, had been arrested by Dinh.) In any case before the 1 November 1963
coup, Kim forgave Dinh in order that the larger interests of their country could be served.
The final consideration that encouraged all of them to go ahead with [was] the knowledge
of the disenchantment of the United States with Diem's government and that the
revolutionary government would probably be quickly recognized and supported. General
Minh said it was regrettable that his junta had been overthrown because if people could
have been patient, he felt they would have pulled the country back on the road to victory.
He said that the situation had been deteriorating for so long and with such increasing
acceleration, that the situation was bound to continue to deteriorate for a period under his
junta before the effect of their measures could be felt. He said it was like a dive bomber
plunging at a target. Even after the pilot pulls back on the stick, there is a period when the
plane continues in its original speed and direction. He said one of the main objectives of
the junta was to win back the support of the people. One of the important considerations
here, for example, was to cease promptly attacks on inhabited areas where the Viet Cong
were reportedly holed up. General Minh said that ground and air attacks in such situations
which resulted in casualties among the civilians had been causing the government to lose
the support of the people. Minh said that the relatives and friends of the victims became
embittered. Minh said that, therefore, his junta attempted to get rid of the internal Viet
Cong organization in the villages. Once the Viet Cong lost their "guides" who prepared
their entry into the villages, the Viet Cong would be afraid to enter. He said maybe
Americans could not understand how the Viet Cong could be driven out of the villages but
that I could be assured the Vietnamese understood how this could be done. Minh said
once the Viet Cong was separated from the villages, they could be isolated and destroyed.
In the meantime, the infliction of casualties on innocent people would have ceased and
chances of winning back their support would be increased. He also said that the junta had
been attempting to find effective province and district chiefs who were natives of the area.
Minh said this was essential as it carried along with it a built in information system on [of]
old family ties and friendships. He said the junta had been making real progress in this
program and cited these successful operations in point. One was the district of Cho Cao
where the villagers gave information on the Viet Cong inside the village, disappeared
from the village before the attack and enabled friendly forces to gain a victory without
harming the civilian population. Minh said General Don was on the spot to verify
personally the operation The next operation, the success of which was due to information
provided by the people was the destruction of a Viet Cong depot on the Canal
Commerciale in the Plaine des Joncs. Don was there also to verify personally. The last
operation Minh mentioned was the successful ambush set by a friendly battalion of the
21st Division. The Viet Cong were caught in a canal at Chuong Thien in the IV Tactical
Zone. It was the first time in the history of the war that friendly forces had been able to set
up an ambush of battalion size. It was made possible by the information furnished by the
local people. He said of course the measures which make the people want to give
information take a long time to implement. Unfortunately, Khanh and the others were
young and impatient.
Minh said the junta knew about the 30 January coup one hour before it went off. The
other members called Minh and wanted to take immediate action. Minh, however, said
they should do nothing and see what would happen as to set Vietnamese against
Vietnamese would only play into the Viet Cong hands. Minh said he is absolutely positive
that the charges of neutralist and plotting with the French are completely false. He said
that although he did not know Kim well before 1959, he had observed him closely ever
since. In fact, he had put him to some severe tests of his determination and loyalty and
Kim has passed them all. He said that because of his concern over de Gaulle's philosophy
of neutralism, he had convoked key French bankers and other businessmen of Saigon
whom he knew to his office to inform them how empty and dangerous such a philosophy
was. He said these were all official visits. Kim and Don always participated in these
meetings. Kim was always the most adamant in denouncing de Gaulle's views to the point
where Minh had to remonstrate with Kim about his violent reaction. Minh then stated that
he had watched all the other members of the junta closely and worked with them during
their three months in power and that all of them were staunch patriots and only desire to
defeat the Viet Cong.
Minh said so long as these Generals remain under arrest/2/ the Army will be cut by
schisms and the war effort will not be pushed vigorously. He said since the coup many
officers have talked to him about the situation in a way they would talk to no other officer.
They are bitter and frustrated about it. Minh says he calms them down by telling them to
following his example and wait for them to be freed which he is sure will be done. He
tells them that he, Minh, loves these Generals as much or more than they do. Minh says
the problem stems from the fact that all of these officers have a host of loyal supporters.
Don was CG, I Corps for five years and the population in I Corps area and the officers
who served there admire and support Don. The same applies to Dinh, who served as CG
of II Corps for two years and then for two years as CG, III Corps. As for Kim, an
intellectual, Minh said, he had been running the schools. Kim has a group of supporters
among senior officers dating from Kim's duty as Commandant of the C & GS School.
There is also a large group of young officer supporters dating from the time he was
Commandant of the Military Academy. Xuan has his supporters stemming from young
officers and NCO's who served under him during his long tenure at the Quang Trung
Training Center.
/2/Generals Tran Van Don, Le Van Kim, Ton That Dinh, and Mai Huu Xuan were
arrested during the January 30 coup.
Minh said that besides the bad morale problem caused by their unjust imprisonment the
Army needs badly the experience of these officers. He sited as an example the
impossibility of the young and inexperienced Khiem attempting to serve as both Minister
of Defense and Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces. He mentioned General Duc,
recently promoted to CG of IV Corps being both incompetent and crazy. Minh admitted
he arranged for Duc to return from France after the 1 November coup but now regretted it.
He thought Duc, who had been carrying out a campaign against the Diem regime from
outside the country, would be a useful patriotic officer. Minh arranged for doctors care for
Duc's crazy tendencies as he believes it comes from some physical ailment. Moreover,
Duc proved to be irritable and constantly unhappy about everything. Minh said he
believes Khanh gave him the IV Corps job [to] pacify him. As for Khanh, Minh feels that
through inexperience, he is trying to develop a climate for politics too fast and that this
could be dangerous for the country. However, Khanh believes this makes a good image in
the eyes of the rest of the world. Minh said after all there was no party system under
Diem. Minh mentioned Khanh's willingness to let the Dai Viet operate, a party formed
around 1943 to oppose the Japanese occupation. He cited General Thieu, Chief of Staff of
the Joint General Staff and a Catholic, who is a member of the Dai Viet. He says Thieu's
brother is Minister of Youth, as I understand it, and is also in the Dai Viet. Minh said the
Vice-President also of the Dai Viet, Nguyen Ton Hoan, did not accept that post to remain
there indefinitely. He covets the Presidency. Khanh seems happy to have the Dai Viets
(Catholics) and the Buddhists in a sort of friendly opposition. In the meantime, try as he
may, it will be difficult for Khanh to regain the support of the people. He is putting more
and more of the old Diem crowd back in power. He is using the same Diem experts to
organize his visit to the countryside and "spontaneous" demonstrations. These tactics, as
for Diem, only promote counter-propaganda. Counter-propaganda against the Americans
will probably result from "spontaneous" demonstrations such as the one organized for Mr.
McNamara this morning at the airport.
However, Minh said the number one problem now was to reunify the Army and carry the
war vigorously to the Viet Cong. He said we can worry about Khanh's political fortunes
later. He said the four generals must be freed and reintegrated into the Army or the war
will not be carried through vigorously because so many officers throughout the Army will
not have their hearts in it.
Minh said Khanh must call these officers in, state there has been a misunderstanding,
offer his apologies and reintegrate them into the Army.
At this point, I told General Minh that if Khanh refused, and if he or any other group was
thinking of a coup, it would be disastrous for both our countries and only the Viet Cong
would benefit. Besides, I told him, another coup would just further deteriorate the morale
of the Army and destroy the faith of the people. I told him that my superiors in
Washington were counting on him to put the interests of his country and his people above
his own and to lend his enormous prestige and popularity to support the government,
restore the morale of the Army, and prosecute vigorously the war against the Viet Cong.
He thought for a long time and replied he would do everything in his power to support
Khanh. However, he said he would like Ambassador Lodge, who enjoys tremendous
prestige with the Vietnamese people, Mr. McNamara, and General Taylor to force Khanh
to reintegrate the four generals back into the Army. He said the Americans have the power
to do it and that it was absolutely essential in order to get the war going again. He said
that the reintegration process must be handled carefully. If Khanh told them directly
Khanh would be dead of old age before they would accept. If Minh can talk to them (he
was unable to see them up to this point) he can influence them to accept, as it is a question
of prestige and honor. Minh is ready to give his personal guarantee that the four will bury
the hatchet in the interest of the country. Minh will also handle their assignments
personally, with the concurrence of Khanh, in order to avoid an embarrassing assignment
situation as between these older, more experienced officers and the new crop of generals.
Then as concerns the Army, Minh said he would do everything possible so as to reunify
the Army for the government. He said there was only one man in all of Vietnam who had
the possibility of doing it and that was he, Minh. He stated he wanted to emphasize the
word possibility.
I asked General Minh if he couldn't see any other alternative to the problem of the four
generals, such as, for example, freedom and retirement with full benefits. He reacted
promptly and vigorously and stated that it wouldn't work and that the only solution for the
good of the country was reintegration. He said such a solution would not repair the
schisms at all, that the deception of the officer corps would remain.
W. W. Stromberg/3/
76. Memorandum Prepared by the Ambassador to France (Bohlen)/1/

/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Vietnam Country File, Vol. V.
Confidential. Also published in Declassified Documents, 1976, 211H. Bohlen was in
Washington for consultations. A note on the source text indicates that the President saw
this memorandum and a covering note. The President met with Bohlen from 6:02 to 6:27
p.m. on March 12. Johnson Library, President's Daily Diary) No record of this meeting
has been found.
Ambassador Lodge had asked some time ago that we endeavor to obtain from General de
Gaulle some clarifying statement in regard to French policy towards Viet-Nam. The
Ambassador's request, as I recall it, was based, at least in part, upon a desire to restrain the
Viet-Namese from breaking with France on the assumption that France was about to
recognize Viet Minh. It was also dictated by the bad effect France's unclear position was
having on Viet-Namese morale.
We gave this request of Ambassador Lodge the most careful consideration in Paris and
came to the conclusion that any approach to General de Gaulle on this subject would be
fruitless. We also noted and so reported to Saigon that there seemed to be no possibility of
any French recognition of Hanoi. I feel very definitely that a request of General de Gaulle
to clarify a statement which he had purposely left ambiguous would not only not produce
the result desired, but also might offer the General an opportunity to restate his very
generalized view of Viet-Nam; namely, that neutralization and unification, and similar
vague terms were the only possible bases for a solution there. Furthermore, it would tend,
I believe, to convince him that the United States was urgently in need of some French help
in the Viet-Namese situation. We should always remember that de Gaulle has stated on a
number of occasions directly to American officials, to President Kennedy in May of 1961,
and to me, his belief that we could not succeed in the course that we are pursuing. It is
also not clear exactly what type of clarification we desired. For all of these reasons, I
thought at the time, and still do, that any approach to de Gaulle merely for clarification of
French policy would be a very serious mistake and would most certainly not yield the
result desired.
However, if, as I have reported from Paris, we are able, following Secretary McNamara's
visit to devise a course of action in Viet-Nam with a clear political objective, I believe
then it would be worthwhile my going to see General de Gaulle to explain this policy and
its objective to him and to request the cooperation of France in its achievement. This, of
course, is dependent upon our ability to work out some form of coherent policy which I
could take to de Gaulle.
On the other hand, if there are considerations of which I am not aware which would make
it important, even with the certainty of a refusal, to have made an effort with de Gaulle. I
am of course entirely prepared to do it.
C. E. Bohlen

Saigon, March 13, 1964--1:11 p.m.
/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 VIET S. Secret; Limdis. Repeated
to CINCPAC. Taylor described this meeting in Swords and Plowshares, pp. 309-310.
1740. CINCPAC for POLAD. In a conversation yesterday with Secretary McNamara,
General Taylor and I on the US side and Generals Khanh and Khiem on the GVN side,
General Khanh agreed that actions designed to exert increased pressure on NVN could be
a helpful assist to his effort but would be no substitute for successful actions in SVN
against the VC. General Khanh said that his "base" in SVN was not strong enough as yet
for overt operations against NVN; however. he would like to "redouble" covert operations
right away.
Lodge

Saigon, March 13, 1964--1:30 p.m.
/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 23 VIET S. Secret; Priority. Repeated
to CINCPAC.
1744. CINCPAC for POLAD. Following based on uncleared memorandum of
conversation of final meeting between Secretary McNamara and party with General
Khanh and GVN representatives on March 12.
General Khanh opened discussion by referring to preliminary discussions with Secretary
McNamara during trip to Hue on March 11 concerning a proposed National Service Act
for SVN. Khanh said his government prepared embark upon program to mobilize all
human and material resources to fight VC. As envisaged by General Khanh proposed
National Service Act would have two major components: military service and civil
defense. Breakdown as follows:
Military service comprised of: RVNAF (3 years service; actual strength: 227,000;
planned: 251,683). Civil Guard (3-1/2 years; actual: 90,032; planned: 119,636). SDC &
hamlet militia (4 years; actual: 257,960; planned: 422,874). Civil defense comprised of
civil service corps, cadre corps, National Youth, and political-administration corps.
Khanh noted military service component self-evident and, response McNamara's question,
confirmed that civil defense component included civil administration corps for work in
countryside. Khanh emphasized that in civil defense sector all civilians would be
included; for example, in Saigon might be possible assign trained youth to perform some
of static police functions while police were pursuing more important police duties. This
segment also included civic action teams for hamlets and villages.
Khanh emphasized figures were planning figures only and designed give idea of number
of military and civilians required and indicate financial implications of plan. Eventual
numbers would be flexible in that they would depend on such factors as population in a
particular area, whether area was actually in danger of VC attack, and strength of VC in
particular area, etc.
McNamara stated that US, and he assumed GVN, would wish to study strength figures
carefully; however, his first impression was that figure of 422,874 SDC and hamlet militia
appeared unduly large and would be difficult to support. Khanh responded that in actual
practice total numbers may not reach this level. In fact, number may not exceed 300,000
SDC and hamlet militia actually deployed against VC. Here again figures were flexible
and would have be refined depending on actual situation in various areas.
General Taylor noted ascending length of service for Civil Guard (3-1/2 years) and the
SDC/hamlet militia (4 years) over RVNAF (3 years) and inquired whether it was because
the former groups would be operating close to home. Khanh affirmed this, noting soldiers
in ARVN have to move often and take their families with them. Now difficult recruit CG
and SDC forces for deployment like ARVN troops. Therefore Khanh felt since they stay
close to home they could be expected serve a slightly longer period of service.
Khanh then asked General Thieu to explain breakdown under civil defense sector of
proposed National Service Act. Thieu stated that all men from age 18 through 40 would
be required to participate in the national pacification effort. Most of them, such as those in
civil service corps and cadre corps (those now in countryside) would serve in same
positions they now occupy. Others, such as national youth group up to age 40, would be
required serve in city and countryside and would be organized into small groups to assist
ARVN and Civil Guard. Category of political-administration corps would consist of
cadres planned for assignment to villages and hamlets. General Thieu estimated that
125,000 such cadre would be required. In first instance, GVN will ask for volunteers; if
insufficient volunteers come forward, the necessary cadres will be drafted. Time spent in
political-administration corps would count against military service. McNamara stated
general approach appeared excellent but he questioned whether GVN would need 125,000
cadre. McNamara pointed out this number added to total figures for Civil Guard, SDC and
hamlet militia, constituted an extremely large figure. If assumed there are approximately 6
million men of draft age in SVN, ratio of estimated figures to total draft-eligible
population appeared disproportionate. While genera] concept was excellent it would be
desirable to look most closely at planning figures.
Khanh replied that he intended make maximum effort in first instance in 8 critical
provinces surrounding Saigon, noting that in certain hamlets now de facto situation exists
where people must defend themselves. However, a National Service Act would have a
very good effect in Saigon and the other urban areas.
McNamara inquired whether upon his return to Washington he could tell President
Johnson that General Khanh's government was prepared embark on a program of national
mobilization of human and material resources and whether President Johnson in turn
could inform the American people that General Khanh has put SVN on the national
mobilization basis. Khanh replied in the affirmative and asked for agreement in principle
from us to his proceeding with concept as outlined. McNamara indicated that he viewed
concept favorably and asked Ambassador Lodge for his views.
Ambassador stated that he favored general concept but thought that detailed figures
should be looked into carefully. Ambassador also believed that emphasis should be placed
first on 8 critical provinces surrounding Saigon. General Khanh expressed his thanks for
agreement in principle.
General Harkins noted that a mobilization law was in fact in existence but that few people
knew about it. He pointed out that ARVN, CG and SDC were not up to their authorized
military strengths. Khanh said that he realized this but believed it still desirable to have a
new law setting forth a national service or mobilization program. Harkins stated that
MACV and other elements of US Mission would like to work closely with Khanh and his
chief aides in developing such a law. Khanh replied this well understood. McNamara said
it was agreed on American side that general concept was a wise one and that we should
proceed on this basis.
Khanh then inquired whether it was desirable to raise CG to same relative status as ARVN
as regards salary, pensions, survivors benefits, etc. He estimated that total cost would be
in neighborhood of one billion plasters. McNamara thought this was highly desirable.
General Taylor inquired whether this would involve any change in role or mission of Civil
Guard. Khanh replied in negative stating that it was merely question putting Civil Guard
on comparable basis with ARVN as concerns benefits he had mentioned. McNamara

observed that he felt all agreed in principle on this.
McNamara inquired how long Khanh estimated it would take to recruit and train
administrative cadre for 8 critical provinces near Saigon. Khanh estimated approximately
one month, in any event he believed cadres could be in place by end of April. Khanh said
GVN would aim for volunteers for this effort and it was not necessary to await
promulgation of National Service Act.
In response Taylor's question as to how long Khanh anticipated it would take to draft and
promulgate National Service Law, Khanh observed that GVN was a fairly compact
organization at present and that law could be ready for his signature in very short time.
Taylor pointed to necessity give due regard to democratic forms in developing and
announcing a National Service Act. Khanh agreed and said that at same time a major
effort was being made to pacify the countryside, he intended to push for concurrent
development of democratic institutions and forms. McNamara suggested that when Khanh
ready announce a National Service Act that he also re-emphasize related actions already
taken and those planned for the future, such as those for expansion of national economy,
for increased educational opportunities in hamlets, for increased production of rice, for
marketing of fish, and so forth. McNamara believed a well publicized announcement of
this nature would find ready response among people and would materially assist Khanh to
obtain and hold support of Vietnamese people. Ambassador Lodge agreed and added that,
despite statement of General de Gaulle to the effect that we could not win a military war
in SVN, Americans were well aware that war here is an inter-related one having political,
economic, social and psychological aspects. Memcon being pouched./2/
/2/Not found.
Lodge
/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, McGeorge Bundy, Memos to the
President, Vol. 11. No classification marking.
You may or may not want these for night reading, but you should have them available:
At Tab A is McNamara's full draft report/2/ of which you got a brief this morning./3/
/2/Not attached, but see Document 84.
/3/The President met briefly and individually with McNamara and then McGeorge Bundy
between 8:50 and 10 a.m. on March 13. Later in the day from 12:15 to 1:23 p.m., he met
with McNamara, Rusk, Taylor, McCone, and McGeorge Bundy as a group. Apparently
the President was briefed on the draft McNamara report on one, some, or all of these
occasions. Johnson Library, President's Daily Diary)

At Tab B is his draft White House statement/4/ which both Dean Rusk and I think needs a
lot of revision.
/4/Not attached. Reference is to a draft version of a White House statement of March 17,
printed in Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Lyndon B. Johnson, 196364, vol. 1, pp. 387-388. An undated text of the proposed White House statement and a
copy with handwritten revisions by McGeorge Bundy are in the Johnson Library, National
Security File, Vietnam Country File, Vol. V.
At Tab C is a fascinating document prepared for possible publication in Foreign Affairs
by Ambassador Lodge./5/
/5/Not attached, but a draft of the article is attached to a letter from Lodge to Harriman
March 3; ibid.
For the TV show on Vietnam,/6/ I myself would quietly but firmly spell out the following
themes:
/6/For the transcript of the President's television and radio interview conducted by
representatives of the major broadcast services, March 15, see Public Papers of the
Presidents of the United States: Lyndon B. Johnson, 1963-64, Book I, pp. 361-375.
1. Neutralization of the whole area has been repeatedly denounced by the Communists
and is therefore not practicable now.
2. The right of people to choose their own course is exactly what we are supporting, and if
foreign interference and subversion should end, the need for our help will end.
3. While the danger of the threat continues, American support will be firm and strong.
4. Secretary McNamara and a first-rate team have made a most careful study which has
led to constructive suggestions that are now being reviewed within the Government.
5. We are strong, calm and determined, in a situation which has danger but also hope.
6. The Ambassador is our top man in the field, and you are proud of the U.S. unity which
has been developed both here and in Vietnam in the first hundred days.
McG.B.
80. Memorandum From the Deputy Director for Intelligence (Cline) to the Director
of Central Intelligence (McCone)/1/
/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Vietnam Country File, Vol. XXX,
CIA. Secret.
SUBJECT
Recommended Actions for South Vietnam
1. In my memorandum to the DCI, 30 October 1963,/2/ just before the "Big" Minh coup
in Saigon, I argued against U.S. support for coup plotting on the grounds that: "If a coup
succeeds it will result in the kind of dislocation and confusion characteristic of post-coup
South Korea and the Dominican Republic." This phenomenon is exactly what we have
been witnessing in South Vietnam in the last four months. My arguments, which went for
naught, in favor of bolstering the shaky Diem regime are even more compelling toward
support of the Khanh regime. It is probably our last chance to halt the spiral of confusion
of purpose and defeatism that may destroy our position in Southeast Asia.
/2/Not found.
2. The simple question raised in the McNamara report/3/ is whether, with ample U.S.
support of counterinsurgency efforts in South Vietnam, the recent trend toward Viet Cong
victory can be reversed, and substantial, sustained progress made toward stabilization. I
believe the odds are 6 to 5 against this favorable trend setting in within the next 3 to 4
months, as concluded by McNamara, so long as North Vietnamese political, military and
logistic support are freely available to the Viet Cong. Furthermore, I think the loss of
virtually all U.S. prestige and influence in Southeast Asia is likely if a favorable trend
does not set in in South Vietnam soon. Consequently, it seems to me too great a gamble
for the United States to rely solely on the measures recommended for South Vietnam
during the next 3 to 4 months. Instead, I recommend that the measures recommended by
McNamara be supplemented as soon as operationally feasible by adopting steps 1 through
3 of "Possible Later Actions" plus all four actions suggested in your footnote to the
conclusion (p. 14) of the report. Personally, I would also recommend the "rejected" course
of action of furnishing a U.S. combat unit (perhaps a battalion landing team) to insure the
security of U.S. personnel and-implicitly-the Khanh regime's control of the Saigon area.
/3/Document 84.
Ray S. Cline/4/
/4/At the bottom of the source text, Cline added a postscript on Cambodia, but
acknowledged that it went "beyond the scope of the measures intended to save South
Vietnam."
/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, McGeorge Bundy, Memos to the
President, Vol. II. No classification marking. Although there is no indication on the source
text, this memorandum was presumably prepared in anticipation of the interview with the
President by broadcast media representatives on March 15. See footnote 6, Document 79.
BROAD QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS ON VIETNAM
1. Why is South Vietnam important to us?
First, it is a key element in Southeast Asia. Southeast Asia in turn is an area whose size
and importance are plain to see-almost 250 million people and a land and sea area
stretching from China to Australia, and from the Philippines to India. Second, we have a
commitment there in honor and in national interest. Ten years ago President Eisenhower
rightly decided to support the new government of South Vietnam and we have continued
that support ever since in good times and in bad. Indeed the language of that first
commitment reminds me very much of the language we still use (Eisenhower letter to
Diem attached at Tab A )/2/ It speaks of our assistance against subversion and aggression.
It speaks of the need for effective performance and reform in Vietnam. It speaks of the
need to respond to the aspirations of the people of Vietnam themselves.
/2/Letter dated October 25, 1954; Foreign Relations, 1952-1954, vol. XIII, Part 2, pp.
2166-2167.
In recent months the danger and difficulty in Vietnam have increased, but this is no time
to quit, and it is no time for discouragement.
2. What are the prospects now?
I am working right this week end with Secretary Rusk, Secretary McNamara and General
Taylor on this problem, and I can tell you that while there have been troubles and
difficulties in recent months out there, we are going to keep right on with our basic
present program and purpose. I am proud of the improvement in the coordination of the
American effort both here and in Saigon, and we expect to take further measures to
strengthen our support for the free people of South Vietnam.
I am particularly encouraged by reports from the Ambassador and from Secretary
McNamara on the quality of the present leadership of South Vietnam. I have had an
encouraging personal message from General Khanh, and we are very hopeful that his
government will be able to take the strong and effective measures which are needed on
every front out there.
I am sure the Vietnamese people will respond to this kind of leadership because it is quite
foreign to the traditions of the area to give in to pressures which are directed from Peking.
(Some deliberate connection of the Communists with China may be helpful in Saigon.)
3. Can this be ended by 1965?
1965 has never been anything more for us than a target for the completion of certain
specific forms of technical training and assistance. A struggle of this kind needs patience
and determination. We and our friends in Vietnam entirely agree that as time goes on the
responsibility for effective work in all fields should be carried more and more by the
Vietnamese themselves. No one who is working effectively against Communism need be
worried about American determination and persistence. We mean to keep at it out there.
McG. B./3/
3/Printed from a copy that bears these typed initials.
(McNamara)/1/
/1/Source: Washington National Records Center, OASD/ISA Files: FRC 69 A 7425,
Vietnam 381. Top Secret. A note on the source text indicates that McNamara saw this
memorandum on April 2.
JCSM-222-64
SUBJECT
Draft Memorandum for the President, Subject: "South Vietnam"/2/
/2/Reference is to a March 13 draft of Document 84.
The Joint Chiefs of Staff have reviewed the subject memorandum and concur with the
recommendations subject to the following comments:/3/
/3/Within the JCS, Commandant of the Marine Corps General Greene and Chief of Staff
of the Air Force General LeMay were critical of McNamara's draft report. Greene wrote
that the 12 recommendations "offer little more than a continuation of present programs of
action in Vietnam," and reiterated the view that if the United States was to stay and win in
Vietnam, then that objective should be pursued with the full concentrated power of the
United States. Greene stated, "half measures won't win in South Vietnam."
General LeMay agreed with McNamara's recommendations to support and stabilize the
Khanh government, but took exception with the view that the "military tools of the
GVN/US effort" were sound and adequate. LeMay felt that to do the job in Vietnam, the
Viet Cong had to be attacked in their Cambodian sanctuaries and North Vietnam's supply
and reinforcement lines through Laos could not be left unmolested. General Greene's
comments are in JCS 2343/346-1, March 17, and General LeMay's are in CSAFM-263-64
to JCS, March 14; both in National Archives and Records Administration, RG 218, JCS
Files, JMF 9155.3/3100 (13 Mar 64), as quoted in Historical Division, Joint Secretariat,
JCS, The Joint Chiefs of Staff and the War in Vietnam, 1960-1968, Part 1, Chapter 9, pp.
18 and 19)
a. The Joint Chiefs of Staff do not believe that the recommended program in itself will be
sufficient to turn the tide against the Viet Cong in South Vietnam without positive action
being taken against the Hanoi Government at an early date. They have in mind the
conduct of the kind of program designed to bring about cessation of DRV support for
operations in South Vietnam and Laos outlined in JCSM-174-64, subject: "Vietnam,"
dated 2 March 1964./4/ Such a program would not only deter the aggressive actions of the
DRV but would be a source of encouragement to South Vietnam which should
significantly facilitate the counterinsurgency program in that country. To increase our

readiness for such actions, the US Government should establish at once the political and
military bases in the United States and South Vietnam for offensive actions against the
North and across the Laotian and Cambodian borders, including measures for the control
of contraband traffic on the Mekong.
/4/Document 66.
b. In view of the current attitude of the Sihanouk Government in Cambodia, the Joint
Chiefs of Staff recommend authorizing now hot pursuit into that country.
c. With regard to the reaction times contained in recommendation 12 of the subject
memorandum, the Joint Chiefs of Staff consider that the time of reaction for border
control and retaliatory actions against North Vietnam should be reduced to 24 hours and
the time for the initiation of the program of "graduated overt military pressures" reduced
to 72 hours. These times are considered feasible as soon as an aerial mining capability has
been established in the VNAF.
Maxwell D. Taylor
Chairman
/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security Files, Memos to the President, McGeorge
Bundy, Vol. II. Secret.
SUBJECT
Vietnam
This memorandum is designed to help to clarify the issues that are likely to be before you
at 10 A.M. Monday./2/ As I see it, the problem of our next steps with respect to Vietnam
falls into four parts:
/2/From 10:12 to approximately 11:15 a.m. on March 16, the President met with
McNamara, Ball, Taylor, and McGeorge Bundy in an informal meeting to discuss the
McNamara report. No record of the meeting has been found. For the approved report, see
Document 84.
1. Action in South Vietnam itself.
2. Action relating to Cambodia and Laos.
3. Action against North Vietnam.
4. Relations with France.
Following are my comments on each item.

1. Action in South Vietnam itself.
I think we have agreement all around on Item 1, which remains the most important of the
lot. Bob McNamara assured me today that his twelve recommendations fully cover
everything Lodge is asking for within South Vietnam, and then some. He further assures
me that Lodge himself spoke of six crucial needs for action in Vietnam, and that all six
are more than covered within his recommendations.
2. Action relating to Cambodia and Laos.
The McNamara report is so drafted as to leave you leeway in these two areas. It would
authorize hot pursuit and ground operations over the Laotian line, but it is noncommittal
about operations across the Cambodian border. McCone and Lodge would like to go
further, especially with respect to Cambodia, and I find that Dean Rusk is also strongly
inclined to move in this direction if the right combination of political and practical steps
can be devised. I think there is room here for you to move in a direction which is at once
useful to South Vietnam and effective as a response to the Ambassador's own desires. We
will not have final plans on this tomorrow morning, but I think the field is a productive
one and that a good resolution can be found. I think it is particularly desirable that we
should have Lodge work on the practical process of this matter with Khanh directly.
3. Action against North Vietnam.
On this one we have agreement between McNamara and Khanh, at least for the present,
that overt action against North Vietnam is undesirable. There is also agreement that the
covert program should be intensified. As a practical matter, McNamara believes that this
program will not amount to very much, and I agree with him, but I believe it essential that
we authorize Lodge to strengthen it in any way that he can work out with Khanh. The one
specific Lodge request which is still outstanding in this area is his proposal of late
February that we warn the North Vietnamese of direct retaliation in response to any
terrorist attack on Americans. McNamara tells me that the concern over the lives of
Americans had been greatly reduced by the time of his visit last week, and that therefore
this is not now a live issue. But at the end of the current deliberations, you will wish to go
back to Lodge again.
4. Relations with France.
It is now agreed that Bohlen should go to work directly with General de Gaulle, as soon as
possible after the General's return from Mexico. This will not be for about another ten
days. The Department will be drafting a detailed instruction to Bohlen this week, and
Dean Rusk's current intent is to let Ambassador Lodge and Ambassador Bohlen both
comment on this instruction before it is made final. This seems to us the best we can do to
keep all parties in line.
There are other questions which need to be discussed tomorrow morning, like the shape of
the White House statement to follow the more formal meeting on Tuesday. For internal
Pentagon reasons, McNamara is very eager to put out a substantial account of the current
situation in terms which are acceptable to his military colleagues. I myself doubt that this
should be done at the White House level, and we will have alternative statements for your
consideration in the morning.
McG.B.
84. Memorandum From the Secretary of Defense (McNamara) to the President/1/

/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Vietnam Country File, Vol. V. Secret.
Also printed in Pentagon Papers: Gravel Edition, vol. III, pp. 499-510 and published in
Declassified Documents, 1978, 148A. On March 16, Bromley Smith sent a slightly
revised version of this memorandum to the National Security Council for consideration at
a March 17 meeting. (Johnson Library, National Security File, Vietnam Country File, Vol.
V)
A March 2 preliminary draft of this memorandum was prepared by William Bundy over
the weekend of February 29-March 1, designed, in Bundy's words, as an "overall vehicle
for thought and also designed by Secretary McNamara to serve as a possible framework
for his report upon his return." Bundy's covering memorandum and the draft are ibid., Vol
IV. They are published in Declassified Documents, 1975, 157A. On March 4, an
abbreviated version of the draft was sent to those officials attending the March 5 NSC
meeting (see Document 71). This March 4 draft is in Department of State, Bundy Files,
WPB Special Papers. An undated White House copy of the abbreviated March 4 draft,
received for filing on March 6, is published in Declassified Documents, 1977, 146D.
Two additional drafts of the full memorandum, March 5 and March 13, are in the Johnson
Library, National Security File, Vietnam Country File, Vol. V. Important differences
between these drafts and the final memorandum as submitted to the President are noted in
footnotes below.
SUBJECT
South Vietnam
This report addresses two questions:/2/
/2/The introduction highlighting the two questions to be addressed appeared in the March
13 draft. In previous drafts, the report was introduced as an analysis of problems in
Vietnam, possible courses of action, and pro and cons of a program of military action
against North Vietnam.
1. What is the present situation in Vietnam? (What is the trend of the counterinsurgency
program, how stable is the Khanh government, and what is the effectiveness of our
current policy of assisting the South Vietnamese Government by economic aid, military
training and logistical support?)
2. How can we improve that situation? (What are the plans and prospects of the Khanh
government and what more should they be doing, and what more should the U.S. be doing
under present or revised policy, in South Vietnam or against North Vietnam?)

To answer the questions, the report will review: I. U.S. Objectives in South Vietnam; II.
Present U.S. Policy in South Vietnam; III. The Present Situation; IV. Alternative Present
Courses of Action; V. Possible Later Actions; VI. Other Actions Considered But
Rejected; and VII. Recommendations.
I. U.S. Objectives in South Vietnam
We seek an independent non-Communist South Vietnam. We do not require that it serve
as a Western base or as a member of a Western Alliance. South Vietnam must be free,
however, to accept outside assistance as required to maintain its security. This assistance
should be able to take the form not only of economic and social measures but also police
and military help to root out and control insurgent elements.
Unless we can achieve this objective in South Vietnam, almost all of Southeast Asia will
probably fall under Communist dominance (all of Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia),
accommodate to Communism so as to remove effective U.S. and anti-Communist
influence (Burma), or fall under the domination of forces not now explicitly Communist
but likely then to become so (Indonesia taking over Malaysia). Thailand might hold for a
period with our help, but would be under grave pressure. Even the Philippines would
become shaky, and the threat to India to the west, Australia and New Zealand to the south,
and Taiwan, Korea, and Japan to the north and east would be greatly increased.
All of these consequences would probably have been true even if the U.S. had not since
1954, and especially since 1961, become so heavily engaged in South Vietnam. However,
that fact accentuates the impact of a Communist South Vietnam not only in Asia, but in
the rest of the world, where the South Vietnam conflict is regarded as a test case of U.S.
capacity to help a nation meet a Communist "war of liberation."
Thus, purely in terms of foreign policy, the stakes are high. They are increased by
domestic factors.
II. Present U.S. Policy in South Vietnam
We are now trying to help South Vietnam defeat the Viet Cong, supported from the North,
by means short of the unqualified use of U.S. combat forces.3 We are not acting against
North Vietnam except by a very modest "covert" program operated by South Vietnamese
(and a few Chinese Nationalists)-a program so limited that it is unlikely to have any
significant effect. In Laos, we are still working largely within the framework of the 1962
Geneva Accords. In Cambodia we are still seeking to keep Sihanouk from abandoning
whatever neutrality he may still have and fulfilling his threat of reaching an
accommodation with Hanoi and Peking. As a consequence of these policies, we and the
GVN have had to condone the extensive use of Cambodian and Laotian territory by the
Viet Cong, both as a sanctuary and as infiltration routes.
3 The adjective "unqualified" referring to use of combat troops first appeared in the
March 13 draft. The last two sentences of section 11 were also added to the March 13
draft.
III. The Present Situation in South Vietnam

The key elements in the present situation are as follows:
A. The military tools and concepts of the GVN/US effort are generally sound and
adequate.4 Substantially more can be done in the effective employment of military forces
and in the economic and civic action areas. These improvements may require some
selective increases in the U.S. presence, but it does not appear likely that major equipment
replacement and additions in U.S. personnel are indicated under current policy.
4 Mr. McCone emphasizes that the GVN/US program can never be considered completely
satisfactory so long as it permits the Viet Cong a sanctuary in Cambodia and a continuing
uninterrupted and unmolested source of supply and reinforcement from NVN through
Laos. [Footnote in the source text that first appeared in the March 13 draft.]
B. The U.S. policy of reducing existing personnel where South Vietnamese are in a
position to assume the functions is still sound. Its application will not lead to any major
reductions in the near future, but adherence to this policy as such has a sound effect in
portraying to the U.S. and the world that we continue to regard the war as a conflict the
South Vietnamese must win and take ultimate responsibility for. Substantial reductions in
the numbers of U.S. military training personnel should be possible before the end of 1965.
However, the U.S. should continue to reiterate that it will provide all the assistance and
advice required to do the job regardless of how long it takes.
C. The situation has unquestionably been growing worse, at least since September:
1. In terms of government control of the countryside, about 40% of the territory is under
Viet Cong control or predominant influence./5/ In 22 of the 43 provinces, the Viet Cong
control 50% or more of the land area, including 80% of Phuoc Tuy; 90% of Binh Duong;
75% of Hau Nghia; 90% of Long An; 90% of Kien Tuong; 90% of Dinh Tuong; 90% of
Kien Hoar and 85% of An Xuyen.
/5/In the March 5 draft the figure was 30 percent.
2. Large groups of the population are now showing signs of apathy and indifference, and
there are some signs of frustration/6/ within the U.S. contingent:
/6/In the March 5 draft "declining morale" was used rather than "frustration."
a. The ARVN and paramilitary desertion rates, and particularly the latter, are high and
increasing.
b. Draft dodging is high while the Viet Cong are recruiting energetically and effectively.
c. The morale of the hamlet militia and of the Self Defense Corps, on which the security
of the hamlets depends, is poor and falling.
3. In the last 90 days the weakening of the government's position has been particularly
noticeable. For example:
a. In Quang Nam province, in the I Corps, the militia in 17 hamlets turned in their
weapons.
b. In Binh Duong province (III Corps) the hamlet militia were disarmed because of
suspected disloyalty.
c. In Binh Dinh province, in the II Corps, 75 hamlets were severely damaged by the Viet
Cong (in contrast, during the twelve months ending June 30, 1963, attacks on strategic
hamlets were few and none was overrun).
d. In Quang Ngai province, at the northern edge of the II Corps, there were 413 strategic
hamlets under government control a year ago. Of that number, 335 have been damaged to
varying degrees or fallen into disrepair, and only 275 remain under government control.
e. Security throughout the IV Corps has deteriorated badly. The Viet Cong control
virtually all facets of peasant life in the southernmost provinces and the government
troops there are reduced to defending the administrative centers. Except in An Giang
province (dominated by the Hoa Hao religious sect) armed escort is required for almost all
movement in both the southern and northern areas of the IV Corps.
4. The political control structure extending from Saigon down into the hamlets
disappeared following the November coup. Of the 41 incumbent province chiefs on
November 1, 35 have been replaced (nine provinces had three province chiefs in three
months; one province had four). Scores of lesser officials were replaced. Almost all major
military commands have changed hands twice since the November coup. The faith of the
peasants has been shaken by the disruptions in experienced leadership and the loss of
physical security. In many areas, power vacuums have developed causing confusion
among the people and a rising rate of rural disorders.
5. North Vietnamese support, always significant, has been increasing:
a. Communications between Hanoi and the Viet Cong (see classified annex)./7/
/7/Not found.
b. Since July 1, 1963, the following items of equipment, not previously encountered in
South Vietnam, have been captured from the Viet Cong:
ChiCom 75 mm, recoilless rifles.
ChiCom heavy machine guns. U.S. .50 caliber heavy machine guns on Chicom mounts.
In addition, it is clear that the Viet Cong are using Chinese 90 mm rocket launchers and
mortars.
c. The Viet Cong are importing large quantities of munitions and chemicals for the
production of explosives: Approximately 50,000 pounds of explosive-producing
chemicals destined for the Viet Cong have been intercepted in the 12 months ending
March 1964. On December 24, five tons of ammunition, of which one and one-half tons
were 75 mm recoilless rifle ammunition, was captured at the Dinh Tuong Viet Cong
arsenal. Ninety percent was of ChiCom manufacture.

D. The greatest weakness in the present situation is the uncertain viability of the Khanh
government. Khanh himself is a very able man within his experience, but he does not yet
have wide political appeal and his control of the Army itself is uncertain (he has the
serious problem of the jailed generals)./8/ After two coupe, as was mentioned above, there
has been a sharp drop in morale and organization, and Khanh has not yet been able to
build these up satisfactorily. There is a constant threat of assassination or of another coup,
which would drop morale and organization nearly to zero./9/ Whether or not French
nationals are actively encouraging such a coup, de Gaulle's position and the continuing
pessimism and anti-Americanism of the French community in South Vietnam provide
constant fuel to neutralist sentiment and the coup possibility. If a coup is set underway,
the odds of our detecting and preventing it in the tactical sense are not high./10/
/8/The observation in the parenthesis was added to the March 13 draft.
/9/Mr. McCone does not believe the dangers of another coup (except as a result of a
possible assassination) at this time are as serious as he believes this paragraph implies.
[Footnote in the source text that first appeared in the March 13 draft.1
/10/In the March 5 draft, a section IV, "The Situation in North Vietnam and Communist
China," followed this paragraph. The section concluded that "the Viet Cong operation has
been a North Vietnamese show from the beginning and almost certainly remains so," and
maintained that Hanoi did not need help from China nor did it want it. While leaning
toward Peking rather than Moscow, North Vietnam wanted to win the war in the south
"by itself." The section highlighted North Vietnam's vulnerabilities: agriculture, a weak
industrial base, and dependence on outside sources for POL. The conclusion was that the
North Vietnamese feared U.S. action and "serious pressure could affect Hanoi's
determination or at least lead them to throttle back." The assessment concluded that the
Soviet Union was presently unwilling to help North Vietnam and that China, despite its
encouragement, was unwilling to commit itself to offering significant help.
E. On the positive side, we have found many reasons for encouragement in the
performance of the Khanh government to date. Although its top layer is thin,/11/ it is
highly responsive to U.S. advice, and with a good grasp of the basic elements of rooting
out the Viet Cong. Opposition groups are fragmentary, and Khanh has brought in at least
token representation from many key groups hitherto left out. He is keenly aware of the
danger of assassination or coup and is taking resourceful steps to minimize these risks. All
told, these evidences of energy, comprehension, and decision add up to a sufficiently
strong chance of Khanh's really taking hold in the next few months for us to devote all
possible energy and resources to his support.
/11/In the March 13 draft, at this point was the phrase "it is more able than under any
previous regime," with a footnote in the source text that reads as follows:
"Mr. McCone, while encouraged by Khanh's evident ability, does not believe that we have
had enough experience with the members of Khanh's government to be able to make this
judgment."
IV. Alternative Present Courses of Action
A. Negotiate on the Basis of "Neutralization"

While de Gaulle has not been clear on what he means by this and is probably deliberately
keeping it vague as he did in working toward an Algerian settlement-he clearly means not
only a South Vietnam that would not be a Western base or part of an alliance structure
(both of which we could accept) but also withdrawal of all external military assistance and
specifically total U.S. withdrawal. To negotiate on this basis-indeed without specifically
rejecting it would simply mean a Communist take-over in South Vietnam. Only the U.S.
presence after 1954 held the South together under far more favorable circumstances, and
enabled Diem to refuse to go through with the 1954 provision calling for nationwide
"free" elections in 1956. Even talking about a U.S. withdrawal would undermine any
chance of keeping a non-Communist government in South Vietnam, and the rug would
probably be pulled before the negotiations had gone far.12
12 The March 5 draft contained an extensive discussion of "just what kind of a solution
we might be prepared to accept at some point through the path of negotiation." This
section suggested refining thinking on possible acceptable points to be included in future
negotiations. Essentially, the 1954 Geneva Accords would provide the framework of the
U.S. position with the following exceptions: 1) Removal of restrictions on external
military assistance; 2) Establishment of an effective guarantee of South Vietnam's borders
with a police mechanism more effective than the ICC; 3) An equivalent guarantee of
Cambodia's borders and a rewriting of the 1962 Laos accords; and 4) Removal of the
1954 provision for "free elections" in all of Vietnam. The discussion held that
neutralization of North Vietnam was unattainable, but could be considered for tactical
reasons. It concluded that "the guts of what we are after is that North Vietnam should
renew its understanding not to interfere in the South, and that this undertaking should be
subject to really effective control this time."
B. Initiate GVN and U.S. Military Actions Against North Vietnam/13/
/13/From this point, the March 5 draft differs both organizationally and substantively from
the March 13 draft and final memorandum. The reorganization reflects the results of the
McNamara Mission. Hereafter only differences between the March 13 draft and the final
resort will be noted.
We have given serious thought to all the implications and ways of carrying out direct
military action against North Vietnam in order to supplement the counterinsurgency
program in South Vietnam. (The analysis of overt U.S. action is attached as Annex
A.)/14/ In summary, the actions break down into three categories:
/14/Not found.
1. Border Control Actions. For example:
a. An expansion of current authority for Laotian overflights to permit low-level
reconnaissance by aircraft when such flights are required to supplement the currently
approved U-2 flights.
b. Vietnamese cross-border ground penetrations into Laos, without the presence of U.S.
advisors or re-supply by U.S. aircraft.
c. Expansion of the patrols into Laos to include use of U.S. advisors and re-supply by U.S.
aircraft.
d. Hot pursuit of VC forces moving across the Cambodian border and destruction of VC
bases on the Vietnam/Cambodian line.
e. Air and ground strikes against selected targets in Laos by South Vietnam forces.
2. Retaliatory Actions. For example:
a. Overt high and/or low level reconnaissance flights by U.S. or Farmgate aircraft over
North Vietnam to assist in locating and identifying the sources of external aid to the Viet
Cong.
b. Retaliatory bombing strikes and commando raids on a tit-for-tat basis by the GVN
against NVN targets (communication centers, training camps, infiltration routes, etc.).
c. Aerial mining by the GVN aircraft (possibly with U.S. assistance) of the major NVN
ports.
3. Graduated Overt Military Pressure by GVN and U.S. Forces.
This program would go beyond reacting on a tit-for-tat basis. It would include air attacks
against military and possibly industrial targets. The program would utilize the combined
resources of the GVN Air Force and the U.S. Farmgate Squadron, with the latter
reinforced by three squadrons of B-57s presently in Japan. Before this program could be
implemented it would be necessary to provide some additional air defense for South
Vietnam and to ready U.S. forces in the Pacific for possible escalation.
The analysis of the more serious of these military actions (from 2(b) upward) revealed the
extremely delicate nature of such operations, both from the military and political
standpoints. There would be the problem of marshalling the case to justify such action, the
problem of Communist escalation, and the problem of dealing with the pressures for
premature or "stacked" negotiations. We would have to calculate the effect of such
military actions against a specified political objective. That objective, while being cast in
terms of eliminating North Vietnamese control and direction of the insurgency, would in
practical terms be directed toward collapsing the morale and the self-assurance of the Viet
Cong cadres now operating in South Vietnam and bolstering the morale of the Khanh
regime. We could not, of course, be sure that our objective could be achieved by any
means within the practical range of our options. Moreover, and perhaps most importantly,
unless and until the Khanh government has established its position and preferably is
making significant progress in the South, an overt extension of operations into the North
carries the risk of being mounted from an extremely weak base which might at any
moment collapse and leave the posture of political confrontation worsened rather than
improved.
The other side of the argument is that the young Khanh government needs the
reinforcement of some significant successes against the North and without them the incountry program, even with the expansion discussed in Section C below, may not be
sufficient to stem the tide.
On balance, except to the extent suggested in Section V below, I recommend against

initiation at this time of overt GVN and/or U.S. military actions against North Vietnam.
C. Initiate Measures to Improve the Situation in South Vietnam
There were and are sound reasons for the limits imposed by present policy-the South
Vietnamese must win their own fight; U.S. intervention on a larger scale, and/or GVN
actions against the North, would disturb key allies and other nations; etc. In any case, it is
vital that we continue to take every reasonable measure to assure success in South
Vietnam. The policy choice is not an "either/or" between this course of action and
possible pressures against the North; the former is essential without regard to our decision
with respect to the latter. The latter can, at best, only reinforce the former.
The following are the actions we believe can be taken in order to improve the situation
both in the immediate future and over a longer term period. To emphasize that a new
phase has begun, the measures to be taken by the Khanh government should be described
by some term such as "South Vietnam's Program for National Mobilization."
Basic U.S. Posture
1. The U.S. at all levels must continue to make it emphatically clear that we are prepared
to furnish assistance and support for as long as it takes to bring the insurgency under
control.
2. The U.S. at all levels should continue to make it clear that we fully support the Khanh
government and are totally opposed to any further coupe. The ambassador should instruct
all elements, including the military advisors, to report intelligence information of possible
coups promptly, with the decision to be made by the ambassador whether to report such
information to Khanh. However, we must recognize that our chances would not be great
of detecting and preventing a coup that had major military backing.
3. We should support fully the Pacification Plan now announced by Khanh (described in
Annex B),/15/ and particularly the basic theory now fully accepted both on the
Vietnamese and U.S. sides-of concentrating on the more secure areas and working out
from these through military operations to provide security, followed by necessary civil
and economic actions to make the presence of the government felt and to provide
economic improvements. This so-called "oil spot" theory is excellent, and its acceptance
is a major step forward. However, it is necessary to push hard to get specific instructions
out to the provinces, so that there is real unity of effort at all levels. A related matter is to
stabilize the assignment of province chiefs and senior commanders and clarify their
responsibilities and relationships.
/15/Not found, but see footnote 3, Document 51.
Many of the actions described in succeeding paragraphs fit right into the framework of the
Plan as announced by Khanh. Wherever possible, we should tie our urging of such actions
to Khanh's own formulation of them, so that he will be carrying out a Vietnamese plan
and not one imposed by the U.S.
Civil and Military Mobilization
4. To put the whole nation on a war footing--to obtain the manpower for these efforts
described below and to remedy present inequities and inadequacies in the use of
manpower--a new National Mobilization Plan (to include a National Service Law) should
be urgently developed by the Country Team in collaboration with the Khanh government.
The present structure of decrees, dating from the Diem government, is haphazard and
produces substantial injustices. The new Program for National Mobilization would both
greatly increase the effectiveness of the war effort and be a strong visible sign of the
government's determination and will. Full attention should be given to the way it is
presented so that it appears as a remedy for past injustices; and not as a repressive or
totalitarian act.
5. The strength of the Armed Forces (regular plus paramilitary) must be increased by at
least 50,000 men. About 15,000 of these are required to fill the regular Armed Forces
(ARVN) to their present authorized strength. Another 5,000 would fill the existing
paramilitary forces to authorized strengths. The balance of 30,000 men is required to
increase the strength of the paramilitary forces, in whatever form these may be organized
(see paragraph 7 below). (All of the foregoing strength figures are illustrative and subject
to review, which review I have directed General Harkins to make in consultation with
General Khanh.)
6. A Civil Administrative Corps is urgently required to work in the provincial capitals, the
district towns, the villages, and the hamlets. "Hamlet civic action teams" of five men each
are now beginning to be trained, on a small scale, to go into hamlets after they have been
cleared, start the rehabilitation process, and train hamlet leaders to carry on. School
teachers and health technicians are now assigned to some hamlets, many more are needed,
and those on the job need to be retrained to higher competence. Many other types of
technicians (e.g., agricultural workers) are needed, in varying numbers. Taking into
account the fact that many hamlets are not now secure, and that adequate training is
required, the initial goal during 1964 should be at least 7,500 additional persons; the
ultimate target, at least 40,000 men for the 8,000 hamlets, in 2500 villages and 43
provinces. The administrators would come largely from the areas in which they serve and
would be paid by the national government. The U.S. should work with the GVN urgently
to devise the necessary recruiting plans, training facilities, financing methods, and
organizational arrangements, and should furnish training personnel at once, under the
auspices of the AID Mission. Further, maximum effort should be made to make use of the
available trained personnel by assignment to provincial and village administration where
needed.
Improved Military Forces
7. The paramilitary forces are now understrength and lacking in effectiveness. They must
be improved and reorganized.
Specifically:
a. What remains of the present hamlet militia (and related forces of a part-time nature for
hamlet defense) should be consolidated with the Self Defense Corps into a single force
compensated by the national government.
b. Pay and collateral benefits must be substantially improved at once. A reasonable course
of action would be to raise the pay scale of the Civil Guard approximately to that of the
regular Armed Forces, and to raise the pay scale of a reorganized Self Defense Corps
approximately to the present level of the Civil Guard. In addition, measures should be
taken to improve the housing and allowances of the families of both forces, so that they
can live decently in areas near where the forces are operating.
c. Strength should be maintained and expanded by conscription, effectively enforced, and
by more centrally directed recruitment policies.
d. Additional U.S. personnel should be assigned to the training of all these paramilitary
forces.
e. The National Police require special consideration. Their strength in the provinces
should be substantially increased and consideration should be given to including them as
part of an overall "Popular Defense Force". In expanding and improving the police, the
AID Mission should make special arrangements to draw on the advice of the present
British training mission under Brigadier Thompson because of its experience in Malaya.
(Mr. Bell has instructed Mr. Brent, the USOM Chief, to accomplish this.)
8. An offensive Guerrilla force should be created to operate along the border and in areas
where VC control is dominant. Such a force could be organized around present Ranger
Companies and ARVN Special Forces and provided with special training and advice by
U.S. Special Forces. The force should carry the fight to the VC on their own basis in
advance of clear-and-hold operations on the conventional pattern.
Additional Military Equipment for the GVN
9. The Vietnamese Air Force should be strengthened at once by the substitution of 25 A1H aircraft for the present 25 T-28s. The A-1H aircraft has a much greater bomb load and
slightly better speed.16
16 Concurrently, the effectiveness of the USAF's Farmgate operation will be increased by
assignment of A-1E aircraft in replacement of B-26s and T-28s. Furthermore, in another
important area, we are strengthening the U.S. intelligence and reporting system. [Footnote
in the source text.]
10. Although there are no major equipment deficiencies in other forces, we should act at
once to replace the present M-114 armored personnel carriers by 63 M-113s and to
provide additional river boats. Additional lesser deficiencies should also be met at an
estimated cost of approximately $10 million.
Economic Actions
11. The approved, but unannounced, Fertilizer Program should be particularly stressed
and expanded and publicly announced. Its target of 85,000 tons for the present planting
season (April-June) should probably be doubled for the next season and trebled the
following season, both to provide immediate and direct benefits to peasants in secure
areas and to improve the rice crops and export earnings. Estimates are that an additional
ton of fertilizer costing around $70 can, if properly applied, produce additional yield of an
equivalent two tons of rice, which might be sold for $110 per ton. Thus, the potential
export improvement alone could be on the order of $20 million from this year's 85,000 ton
input.
US and GVN Costs of the Above Actions
The above actions will involve a limited increase in U.S. personnel and in direct Defense
Department costs. More significantly, they involve significant increase in Military
Assistance Program costs and in the budget of the GVN itself, with the latter requiring
additional US economic aid. The estimates of additional annual costs are as follows:
Action
GVN Budget Costs
5-6 billion piastres

a. Raise military and
paramilitary numbers and
pay scales
Cost to U.S.
$30-40 million/17/
b. Enlarge civil
administrative cadre
250 million piastres (1st $1,500,000 (first year)

year)
c. Furnish additional
military equipment
$20 million (one time)
/17/Increases in GVN budget expenditures do not automatically require equal increases in

U.S. economic aid. As a rough approximation, subject to later refinement, an increase of
5-6 billion piastres of GVN budget expenditures might require an increase of $30-40
million worth of imports financed through U.S. economic aid. Some of the imports
undoubtedly could be obtained under P.L. 480. [Footnote in the source text.]
Conclusion
If the Khanh government can stay in power and the above actions can be carried out
rapidly, it is my judgment that the situation in South Vietnam can be significantly
improved in the next four to six months./18/ The present deterioration may continue for a
part of this period, but I believe it can be levelled out and some improvement will become
visible during the period. I therefore believe that this course of action should be urgently
pursued while we prepare such additional actions as may be necessary for success.
/18/In the March 13 draft, the time frame for improvement was "the next three to four
months" and an extensive crossed-out footnote reads as follows:
"Mr. McCone believes that the situation in South Vietnam is so serious that it calls for
more immediate and positive action than I have proposed. His reasons are: '(1) General
Minh is discontented and his attitude will be a drag on Khanh's efforts to activate the
military and civilian establishments. (2) Khanh's three Vice Premiers cannot give him the
solid help that he needs because two of them, Hoan (an important political figure in Dai
Viet Party) and Oanh (a capable economist and professor) have been out of the country
for ten years or more and are therefore out of touch, and General Mau is known to be an
affable but not a strong figure. General Khiem (Minister of Defense) is not particularly
impressive. Parenthetically, it is reported to me that Generals Khiem, Mau and Thieu
(Khanh's Chief of Staff) are the trio who conceived the January 30th coup. (3) I have
received so many reports that the ARVN, from field grade officers down, lack the
motivation and will and/or techniques to confront the enemy that I cannot but accept this
as probable truth. This is also present among the middle and lower level civil officials. (4)
The morale of the people in the hamlets and villages and countryside is reported as very
low. (5) The irregular forces, i.e., Civil Guard and Self Defense Corps, are ineffective and
the Hamlet Militia have virtually disintegrated. (6) The Viet Cong situation is improving
militarily, organizationally, and in their political power over the people of the
countryside.'"
"He concurs in the actions outlined in the previous pages and in Sections V and V11
below, but states that they are 'too little too late.' In addition he would: (1) Have General
Khanh meet immediately with Sihanouk for the purpose of developing a joint South
Vietnam-Cambodia program to clear the Cambodian border. And, if there is no successful
meeting, General Khanh with U.S. assistance would stop all traffic on the Mekong River
into and from Cambodia, and would implement immediately 'border control' item (b) on
page 5 above (i.e., Vietnamese patrols, with appropriate U.S. aerial resupply, into Laotian
territory). (3) Have Khanh negotiate with Chiang Kai-shek for the movement of two or
possibly three divisions into the southern tip of the Delta in order to give impetus and
support to the hard-pressed ARVN effort in that area. (4) Implement immediately
'retaliatory' item (a) on page 6 above (i.e., overt U.S. air reconnaissance over North
Vietnam). He recommends that the overflights be over populous areas for psychological
in addition to intelligence purposes."
V. Possible Later Actions
If the Khanh government takes hold vigorously-inspiring confidence, whether or not
noteworthy progress has been made-or if we get hard information of significantly steppedup VC arms supply from the North, we may wish to mount new and significant pressures
against North Vietnam. We should start preparations for such a capability now. (See
Annex C for an analysis of the situation in North Vietnam and Communist China.)/19/
Specifically, we should develop a capability to initiate within 72 hours the "Border
Control"/20/ and "Retaliatory Actions" referred to on pages 5 and 6, and we should
achieve a capability to initiate with 30 days' notice the program of "Graduated Overt
Military Pressure." The reasoning behind this program of preparations for initiating action
against North Vietnam is rooted in the fact that, even with progress in the pacification
plan, the Vietnamese Government and the population in the South will still have to face
the prospect of a very lengthy campaign based on a war-weary nation and operating
against Viet Cong cadres who retain a great measure of motivation and assurance.
/19/Not found
/20/Authority should be granted immediately for covert Vietnamese operations into Laos,
for the purposes of border control and of "hot pursuit" into Laos. Decision on "hot
pursuit" into Cambodia should await further study of our relations with that country.
[Footnote in the source text.]
In this connection, General Khanh stated that his primary concern is to establish a firm
base in the South. He favors continuation of covert activities against North Vietnam, but
until such time as "rear area security" has been established, he does not wish to engage in
overt operations against the North.
In order to accelerate the realization of pacification and particularly in order to denigrate
the morale of the Viet Cong forces, it may be necessary at some time in the future to put
demonstrable retaliatory pressure on the North. Such a course of action might proceed
according to the scenario outlined in Annex D.
VI. Other Actions Considered But Rejected
We have considered the following actions, but rejected them for the time being except to
the extent indicated below:
1. Return of Dependents. We recommend that the present policy be continued of
permitting dependents to return home on a voluntary basis, but not ordering them to do so.
The security situation in Saigon appears to have improved significantly, and ordering
dependents home would now, in the universal judgment of our senior people in Saigon,
have a serious impact on South Vietnamese morale. It would also raise a serious question
whether tours of duty for AID personnel would not have to be shortened. Thus, unless
there are further serious incidents, or unless we were taking more drastic measures
generally we believe compulsory return should not be undertaken.
2. Furnishing a U.S. Combat Unit to Secure the Saigon Area. It is the universal judgment
of our senior people in Saigon, with which we concur, that this action would now have
serious adverse psychological consequences and should not be undertaken.
3. U.S. Taking Over Command. It has been suggested that the U.S. move from its present
advisory role to a role that would amount in practice to effective command. Again, the
judgment of all senior people in Saigon, with which we concur, is that the possible
military advantages of such action would be far outweighed by its adverse psychological
impact. It would cut across the whole basic picture of the Vietnamese winning their own
war and lay us wide open to hostile propaganda both within South Vietnam and outside.
Moreover, the present responsiveness of the GVN to our advice-although it has not yet
reduced military reaction time-makes it less urgent. At the same time, MACV is steadily
taking actions to bring U.S. and GVN operating staffs closer together at all levels,
including joint operating rooms at key command levels.
VII. Recommendations/21/
/21/The March 13 draft contains a crossed-out footnote that reads as follows:
"Mr. McCone believes that these recommendations, in which he concurs without
reservation, are inadequate to meet the `very serious situation confronting us in Vietnam
and recommends the additional actions stated in the footnote to the Conclusions to
Section IV of this Report for the reasons there stated.'"
I recommend that you instruct the appropriate agencies of the U.S. Government:
1. To make it clear that we are prepared to furnish assistance and support to South
Vietnam for as long as it takes to bring the insurgency under control.
2. To make it clear that we fully support the Khanh government and are opposed to any
further coupe.
3. To support a Program for National Mobilization (including a national service law) to
put South Vietnam on a war footing.
4. To assist the Vietnamese to increase the armed forces (regular plus paramilitary) by at
least 50,000 men.
5. To assist the Vietnamese to create a greatly enlarged Civil Administrative Corps for
work at province, district and hamlet levels.
6. To assist the Vietnamese to improve and reorganize the paramilitary forces and to
increase their compensation.
7. To assist the Vietnamese to create an offensive guerrilla force.
8. To provide the Vietnamese Air Force 25 A-1H aircraft in exchange for the present T28s.
9. To provide the Vietnamese Army additional M-113 armored personnel carriers
(withdrawing the M-114s there), additional river boats, and approximately $5-10 million
of other additional material.
10. To announce publicly the Fertilizer Program and to expand it with a view within two
years to trebling/22/ the amount of fertilizer made available.
/22/In the March 13 draft, the amount of fertilizer to be made available reads "doubled."
11. To authorize continued high-level U.S. overflights of South Vietnam's borders and to
authorize "hot pursuit" and South Vietnamese ground operations over the Laotian line for
the purpose of border control. More ambitious operations into Laos involving units
beyond battalion size should be authorized only with the approval of Souvanna Phouma.
Operations across the Cambodian border should depend on the state of relations with
Cambodia.
12. To prepare immediately to be in a position on 72 hours' notice to initiate the full range
of Laotian and Cambodian "Border Control" actions (beyond those authorized in
paragraph 11 above) and the "Retaliatory Actions" against North Vietnam, and to be in a
position on 30 days' notice to initiate the program of "Graduated Overt Military Pressure"
Robert S. McNamara

/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 VIET S. Top Secret; Priority;
Exdis. Drafted in the White House and approved by Rusk. Transmitted as telegram 1454
to Saigon, which is the source text.
1. I have now personally reviewed your cables 1754 through 1757/2/ and have considered
them with Secretaries of State and Defense. I am delighted to find that we have a very
high measure of agreement.
/2/In these telegrams from Saigon, March 15, Lodge commented on the March 13 draft of
the McNamara report. Lodge thought that the situation in South Vietnam had been
growing worse since May, not September, 1963. He took exception to the view that U.S.
officials in Vietnam were any more "frustrated" than was normal "in the tropics dealing
with orientals," and noted that CIA "old hands" reported some improvement in the lower
Delta. Lodge thought that most former province chiefs were incompetent, did not consider
the jailed Generals a threat to Khanh's control of the army, and blamed the poor showing
of South Vietnam in reacting to the Viet Cong's challenge on the Diem government's
policies and legacy. As for McCone's views, Lodge doubted that a meeting between
Sihanouk and Khanh would accomplish much, and he considered stopping traffic on the
Mekong bound for Cambodia and hot pursuit of Viet Cong into Cambodia as justifiable
because Cambodia was no longer a "bona fide neutral." Lodge opposed the idea of
Chinese Nationalist troops in Vietnam, although he thought they and the South Koreans
might serve as advisers. He opposed recommendation 12 of the McNamara report,
recommended his idea of a "diplomatic carrot-and-stick approach backed by covert
military means" in dealing with North Vietnam, and reserved judgment on overt U.S.
military action against the North. (All ibid., POL 27 VIET S, except telegram 1756 which
is POL 32 CAMBODIA-VIET S)
2. Your comments on various sections of McNamara report/3/ make good sense to all of
us, and report has been revised to meet most of your points. Revised version as approved
today in National Security Council follows by air.
/3/Supra.
3. We have also shortened and amended the White House statement/4/ to reconcile it with
your comments. Different people seem to view the past differently, but there is no point in
letting such differences worry us as we go forward.
4. Specifically with respect to the comments in your 1757 your whole-hearted support of
first eleven recommendations covers our most important efforts which are still in South
Vietnam. On your additional comments, I have reached the following conclusions:
(1) I think additional actions against Laos and Cambodia should be intensively examined.
We have agreed that cross-border ground penetrations should be initiated into Laos along
any lines which can be worked out by Khanh and Phoumi with Souvanna's endorsement,
and I will authorize low-level reconnaissance there wherever the present high-level flights
indicate that such reconnaissance may be needed.
The questions of further U.S. participation and of air and ground strikes against Laos raise
tough diplomatic issues and I have asked Rusk and McNamara to concert a further
recommendation. My first thought is that it is important to seek support from Souvanna
Phouma and to build a stronger case before we take action which might have only limited
military effect and could trigger wider Communist action in Laos.
On Cambodia we find ourselves hard put to keep abreast of the rapid changes Sihanouk
introduces into the scene./5/ Our impression is that bilateral GVN-RKG talks may now be
in progress and State has sent you some thoughts on those prospects./6/ However, in the
event of further deterioration, I would expect to authorize hot pursuit.
/5/Sihanouk rejected a proposal for a quadripartite conference on Cambodia, rejected
bilateral talks with South Vietnam on frontier differences, and sent a mission to Hanoi to
discuss South Vietnamese border matters.
/6/Apparent reference to telegram 1452 to Saigon, March 17. (Department of State,
Central Files, POL 8 CAMB)
On overt high- or low-level reconnaissance over North Vietnam, we are not ready to make
a decision now. I have asked that political and diplomatic preparations be made to lay a
basis for such reconnaissance if it seems necessary or desirable after a few weeks, for
military or political reasons, or both.
(2) As I read your comments on John McCone's points, the main items are those discussed
above on Laos and Cambodia. We agree that Mekong traffic is a trump card, and State has
already sent you a message on this question./7/
/7/Not further identified.
We agree that large-scale Chinese Nationalist incursion would be a mistake, but high
quality advisers are different matter and we will send further thoughts on that.
(3) I have ordered a review of your paper of October 30./8/ My own inclination is to favor
such pressures, short of overt military action.
/8/Foreign Relations, 1961-1963, vol. v, pp. 656-659.
(4) Like you, I reserve judgment on such overt U.S. measures against North Vietnam.
Question of direct retaliation for attacks on Americans is more complex. As I understand
it from McNamara mission, these attacks are not an immediate present threat, but you are
authorized to prepare contingency recommendation for specific tit-for-tat actions in the
event attacks on Americans are renewed.
Your cable does not mention it, but Bob McNamara has reported your concern about the
effectiveness of our representations to the French. I have discussed this matter with
Bohlen and we now plan that he will raise these matters with General de Gaulle
personally when latter returns from Caribbean. Department is drafting instructions and
will circulate them for your comment before they are final./9/ Meanwhile we may wish to
consider whether at some point it would be fruitful for you to go to Paris yourself to
explain the realities of the situation to the General. In the light of your wartime connection
with France, this possibility seems to me to have real merit./10/

/10/Telegram 1454 does not bear President Johnson's signature.
86. Summary Record of the 524th Meeting of the National Security Council,
Washington, March 17, 1964, Noon/1/
/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, NSC Meetings, Vol. 1, U.S. Policy
Toward Vietnam. Secret. Drafted by Bromley Smith. A full attendance list for this
meeting is ibid.
REPORT OF SECRETARY MCNAMARA'S TRIP TO VIETNAM
In response to a request from the President, Mr. McCone reported that there was nothing
new out of Vietnam this morning worthy of mention. Secretary Rusk said that we had
preliminary information about what might become an important new development, i.e.,
that Sihanouk of Cambodia is turning away from North Vietnam and is prepared to work
out an understanding with South Vietnam.
Secretary Rusk presented the recommendations on pages 17 and 18 of Secretary
McNamara's report on Vietnam (attached)./2/ He said that no one could guarantee that the
proposed program would ensure success, but that if the situation in South Vietnam
continued to deteriorate, the proposed recommendations provided for readying forces
which could be used if it were decided later to take the war to North Vietnam.
/2/Document 84
Secretary McNamara said he had no additional comments to make but asked General
Taylor to present the military actions discussed in the report. General Taylor began by
commenting that highlevel overflights of North Vietnam are now possible, but if we
required low-level reconnaissance, we will have to use U.S. planes overtly. General
Taylor then covered the sections of the report, including border control actions, retaliatory
actions, and the graduated overt military pressure program. He said that the kinds of
military actions he described would produce strong reactions in Cambodia and in North
Vietnam including, as a final act, asking the Chinese Communists to come to their
support. Risk of escalation would be greatest if we undertook the overt military pressure
program, and before doing so, we would want to improve the readiness of U.S. naval
forces in the Pacific.
General Taylor said the Chiefs support the McNamara report. They favor readying forces
now which would be required if it were decided later to take further military action than
that recommended in the report. The Chiefs also want to examine the possibility of
reducing from 72 to 24 hours the prior notice required to undertake actions against North
Vietnam.
Secretary McNamara said that each Department and Agency concurs with the
recommendations which fall in its area of responsibility. Ambassador Lodge agrees with
all the recommendations except for his views on the need for overt reconnaissance of
Cambodia. Mr. McGeorge Bundy pointed out that Ambassador Lodge's recommendation
on Cambodian reconnaissance has been overtaken by events. No decision on this matter
can be taken until we have further information about the conversations which are taking
place between Khanh and the Cambodians.
The President said it was his understanding that Ambassador Lodge approved all the
recommendations in the report except the one which has been overtaken by events and
which he can be told lies in the area of unfinished business. The President then asked
Secretary McNamara to summarize all twelve of his recommendations.
Secretary McNamara said as to cost, the program proposed would involve an expenditure
of between $50 million and $60 million by the South Vietnamese, but that the actual cost
to us would be approximately $30 million. Some of the cost will be covered by PL 480
funds and the remainder will come from reallocation of funds to meet the new plans. No
supplemental budget request will be necessary.
Secretary McNamara covered very briefly all twelve recommendations. He agreed that the
Joint Chiefs of Staff should study the proposal to reduce the 72-hour notice proposal
contained in Recommendation 12. He agreed that this time should be reduced if it is
possible to do so without resulting in the maldeployment of our forces in the Pacific.
The President asked Secretary McNamara if his program would reverse the current trend
in South Vietnam. Secretary McNamara replied that if we carry out energetically the
proposals he has made, Khanh can stem the tide in South Vietnam, and within four to six
months, improve the situation there.
The President summarized the alternatives to the recommended course of action, i.e.,
putting in more U.S. forces, pulling out of the area, or neutralizing the area. He said the
course we are following is the only realistic alternative. It will have the maximum
effectiveness with the minimum loss.
General Taylor said the Chiefs believed the proposed program was acceptable, but it may
not be sufficient to save the situation in Vietnam. He commented that the Chiefs' interest
in military action against North Vietnam was based on their belief that action against
North Vietnam might be necessary to make effective the program recommended by
Secretary McNamara.
Secretary McNamara commented that Khanh had told him that he opposed taking the war
to North Vietnam now because he felt that the South Vietnamese need a more secure base
in the South before undertaking expanded military action.
The President said the McNamara proposals did not foreclose action later if the situation
did not improve as we expected. He asked whether anyone present had any objections.
Hearing none, he said the recommendations were approved.
The President, accompanied by Secretaries Rusk and McNamara, USIA Director Rowan,
and Mr. McGeorge Bundy, went to his office where a draft press statement was revised
and later issued. (Copy attached)/3/
/3/The final statement is printed in Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States:
Lyndon B. Johnson, 1963-64, pp. 387-388. Attached to a Department of State copy of the
McNamara report of March 16 was a draft of this statement with handwritten revisions.
(Department of State, S/S-NSC Files: Lot 70 D 265, NSC Meetings, 3/17/64)
Bromley Smith/4/

/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, NSAMs. Secret
TO
The Secretary of the Treasury
The Attorney General
The Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff
The Director, United States Information Agency
The Director, Bureau of the Budget
The Administrator, Agency for International Development
SUBJECT
Implementation of South Vietnam Programs
1. The report of Secretary McNamara dated March 16, 1964 was considered and approved
by the President in a meeting of the National Security Council on March 17. All agencies
concerned are directed to proceed energetically with the execution of the
recommendations of that report.
2. The President, in consultation with the Secretary of State and the Secretary of Defense,
has designated the Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs to coordinate the
execution of the recommendations in the report.
McGeorge Bundy
88. Memorandum of a Telephone Conversation Between the Secretary of State and

the Director of the United States Information Agency (Rowan), Washington, March
17, 1964, 5:15 p.m./1/
/1/Source: Department of State, Rusk Files: Lot 72 D 192, Telephone Conversations. No
classification marking. Transcribed by Carolyn J. Proctor of Secretary Rusk's staff.
TELEPHONE CALL FROM MR. ROWAN

R said in terms of our broadcast into North Vietnam, we are confused as to whether we
should play up North Vietnam as tool of Chinese or that they are caught between Moscow
and Peking. Sec said he would think the theme should be their leaders are leading them
into an unnecessary and fratricidal struggle with their brothers and this is eating up their
own resources and threatening them with unnecessary dangers. Sec said he would think R
should draw the line between Hanoi leadership and their own people; and then the
Chinese business; Sec said not to get into the Moscow-Peking aspect.
/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Vietnam Country File, Vol. V. Secret.
SUBJECT
Vietnam
I have read Bill Smith's two memoranda on Vietnam/2/ with great interest. These support
in appropriate cautious language some of the things which I have been hearing myself. It
may be worthwhile for all of us if I commit to paper some additional evidence in support
of Bill Smith's worries.
/2/In March 17 memoranda to Bundy, William Y. Smith of the NSC Staff reported
"undercurrents" of pessimism within the Department of Defense over the situation in
South Vietnam. The belief was that there was no alternative to Khnah, yet he did not have
the ability to rally the army. Furthermore, Smith reported that some feared that the
Johnson administration was not taking forthright action because of the upcoming
Presidential campaign. In his second memorandum, Smith drew an analogy between the
missile gap issue in the 1960 campaign and Vietnam in 1964. Smith suggested that the
Johnson administration should avoid the mistakes made by Eisenhower in 1960 by
briefing opposition candidates on Vietnam and by making sure that the administration
spoke with one voice. (Ibid.)
Before Sullivan left for Saigon, he attended a meeting of the JCS with Secretary
McNamara and General Taylor. Sullivan reported to me that he was impressed by the
vehemence of opinion in the JCS for strong overt U.S. action against the North. Admiral
McDonald was particularly outspoken, but the other Chiefs appeared to support his views.
General Anthis (who is Krulak's successor) told me after a rather wet working dinner at
Ray Cline's office that he felt if we couldn't "make the high jumps in South Vietnam, then
we should pole-vault into the North".
After the mission's return from Saigon, Sullivan tells me that McNamara's report was very
strenuously criticized by some officers in MACV and some of his own team. Yesterday a
correspondent from Time Magazine (Cook) told me he was convinced that the decision
not to attack the North was made because President Johnson did not wish to face a
domestic political crisis before the election. He said that his Pentagon sources were
convinced that the correct decision in Vietnam was avoided for this reason. I told him this
was hogwash and could not come from responsible officials and certainly not anyone who
was associated with the top-level team representing all interested agencies who
accompanied the Secretary.
So I agree with Bill Smith that there may be a problem developing here, but I don't think
it is quite like the missile gap issue in 1960. The difficulty then apparently was that the
Eisenhower Administration felt it could not safely disclose enough of the facts to permit a
reasonable explanation of the Government's position. I don't think quite the same problem
exists with respect to our policies in Southeast Asia today. The question of whether or not
overt U.S. forces should be used against the North depends upon an assessment of factors
which are, in most instances, currently discussed in the press. Against the history of the
Bay of Pigs and the October Cuban crisis, the advantage in political debate, I think, lies
with the Administration. Prudence and caution are really more popular stances, I believe,
than loud demands for war. The thing to avoid is too flat an impression that we have
stopped thinking about all the possibilities.
I agree with Bill Smith that responsible officials in the Government should be encouraged
to speak quite frankly about our current estimates of the position in South Vietnam and
the rationale supporting McNamara's recommendations. In speaking about the North, it
should be emphasized that the situation is constantly being reviewed by Defense and State
to see if further actions need be taken.
Actually, I am somewhat more worried by those who argue for a bugout in Southeast Asia
than I am by the adherents of Rostow.
Mike
/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Vietnam Country File, Vol. V. No
classification marking.
Attached are two parting memoranda from Roger Hilsman to Dean Rusk which are worth
your attention when you have a chance to read them. With exceptions, I think they are a
good and clear assessment of the basic view of the matter which this Government has had
right along. Roger is a better analyst than administrator, and this is the sort of thing he has
done best. His specific proposal that we put some troops in Thailand is more attractive to
State Department and White House staff than to the Pentagon, because its object is
political and not military. I think you may hear more of this proposal in coming weeks.
McG. B.
Attachment
Letter From the Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs (Hilsman) to the
/2/Secret. The letter was not attached to the covering memorandum from Bundy to the
President. Hilsman sent copies of this letter and the attached memorandum to McNamara,
McCone, Harriman, William and McGeorge Bundy, and Forrestal.
Dear Mr. Secretary: As I leave Government service and the post of Assistant Secretary of
State for Far Eastern Affairs, I thought it might be useful for me to set down my thoughts
on the persistent and stubborn problem of Southeast Asia, which has plagued us for the
past decade.
Although our ability to control the course of events in Southeast Asia is inherently
limited, I think the root of our present troubles there--in South Viet-Nam, Laos,
Cambodia, and even Thailand--lies primarily in the gnawing doubts of both the Southeast
Asians and the Communists as to our ultimate intentions in the region.
Since the fall of Dienbienphu, all Asians have wondered about our determination to fight
in Southeast Asia, should fighting become necessary. Given the facts of life in a nuclear
world, they are not impressed with the totality of our power even though the strategic
balance tips heavily in our favor. Both free and Communist Asians scrutinize our actions
and words for signs of U.S. determination to use appropriate force, tailored to the
essentially limited political objectives we seek in this part of the world-that is, free and
independent nations rather than bastions of anti-Communism. But of such determination
they seem to feel they have seen few signs. The alacrity with which the Communists fell
into line after we introduced troops into Thailand following the fall of Nam Tha illustrates
the effectiveness of such moves as well as the fact that the Communists continue to worry
that we might well fight if they push us too hard.
It seems to me that these doubts about our ultimate intentions are fundamental and
recurrent wherever you look in Southeast Asia. We all say that Sihanouk is misbehaving
because he feels that we are losing in South Viet-Nam. But even Sihanouk understands
the extent of American power, and what he means by his statement that Communism is
the wave of the future is most probably that he feels the United States is not prepared to
do what is necessary to preserve Southeast Asia as a whole. Generosity, maturity, and
restraint have not worked with Sihanouk. But so far it must seem to him that we are acting
from weakness, and he might respond quite differently if he thought we were acting from
strength.
In Laos, the Communists have pursued a two-track policy. They scratch away at the
neutralist and conservative positions with one hand, pausing on each occasion to assess
our reaction. With the other hand, they continue to toy with talks about a Government of
National Union and implementation of the Geneva Accords. Quite clearly, they are
keeping both lines open-ready to go ahead with implementing the Geneva Accords if and
when they finally become convinced that we are both able and determined to permit them
no other honorable alternative, and ready to nibble our position away completely if we
appear indecisive.
The Thais, with infinite patience, are merely waiting. Although their indecision shows
occasionally in reminiscences about their past successes in balancing off the rivalries of
Great Powers, most Thais are prepared to be stubborn: they will match what they think is
vigor with vigor and what they think is indecisiveness with indecisiveness.
The South Vietnamese are equally concerned. DeGaulle, Lippmann, and Mansfield have
set the neutralist hares running with self-fulfilling prophecies that dishearten those who
wish to fight and encourage coup-plotting among both the true neutralists and the simple
opportunists. But what gives these lofty, unrealistic thoughts of a peaceful neutralist Asia
their credibility is, again, fundamental doubts about our ultimate intentions.
A corollary to the preceding analysis is that we have so far failed as a Government to
mesh fully the many different instrumentalities of foreign policy and thus to obtain full
benefit from mutually reinforcing actions. This is true throughout Southeast Asia, but
especially in South Viet-Nam. It applies to all instrumentalities of foreign policy equally,
but it can best be summed up by Clausewitz's dictum that war is politics pursued by other
means. We must learn better how to tailor our military might, aid, etc., to political
purposes and, most important, to orchestrate military power more neatly with diplomacy
and politics.
If we can successfully convince our friends and allies as well as the Communists and
those, such as de Gaulle and Sihanouk, who tend to serve the Communists' purposes, that
we are determined to take whatever measures are necessary in Southeast Asia to protect
those who oppose the Communists and to maintain our power and influence in the area,
we will have established an atmosphere in which our problems in Laos, Viet-Nam and
Cambodia may be amenable to solution. In such an atmosphere, the Communist side must
inevitably be more cautious as it contemplates the possibility that we might escalate
hostility to a level unacceptable to them. It is not necessary that they be certain of what we
will do; but we must give them reason to assume that we are prepared to go as far as
necessary to defeat their plans and achieve our objectives.
I believe, therefore, that we must urgently begin to strengthen our overall military posture
in Southeast Asia in ways which will make it clear that we are single-mindedly improving
our capability to take whatever military steps may be necessary to halt Communist
aggression in the area. Because Thailand, a loyal friend and ally, is the keystone of our
position in Southeast Asia, we should begin by introducing substantial U.S. ground and
air forces into that country in order (1) to imply clearly that we are prepared to introduce
U.S. ground forces into Laos if necessary, and (2) to guarantee that, whatever else
happens, Thailand itself will not be left to the mercy of Communist aggression. This step,
in which some of our SEATO allies should be willing to join, must be accompanied by a
diplomatic offensive designed (1) to reassure our friends as to our determination, and (2)
to warn the Communist side that they are indeed playing a "deeply dangerous game."
I scarcely need add that I do not envisage this U.S. buildup of a military presence in
Thailand as susceptible to dismantlement in the short term. No matter what we do, our
problems in Southeast Asia are not going to vanish overnight and we must be prepared to
maintain a strong military posture in the area quite indefinitely. (I believe the Thais will
gratefully accept and fully cooperate with such a determined U.S. approach to the mutual
threat; as I say, all that really bothers them is doubt as to our intention to remain in the
area.)
At the same time, we should keep clear in our own minds an important distinction
between means and objectives in Southeast Asia. A strong military posture in Thailand is
an instrument, not an objective. Its purpose will be served once Thailand and its neighbors
have the wherewithal to maintain their own freedom and independence whether through
new collective security arrangements or a gradual receding of the Communist threat.
Meanwhile, the strengthening of our position in Thailand, together with our flat assertions
of determination to take whatever steps the situation in the area requires and our clear
commitment to a victory in the guerrilla war in South Viet-Nam, would, in my view,
make all of the problems we face in the area more susceptible to effective treatment.
By way of conclusion, I would say that we have not yet lost the struggle for Southeast
Asia, and I see no reason for despair. But I believe we must focus on the essentials of the
problems confronting us and pursue an integrated and coordinated policy toward the area
as a whole if we are to come out on top. We must take action that will make it clear to
friend and foe alike that we mean to fulfill our responsibilities in Southeast Asia.
I am attaching a separate summary of my views on the situation we face in South VietNam.
Sincerely,
Roger Hilsman
Attachment
Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs
(Hilsman) to the Secretary of State/3/
Washington, March 14, 1964
/3/Secret.
SUBJECT
South Viet-Nam
In my judgment, the strategic concept that was developed for South Viet-Nam remains
basically sound. If we can ever manage to have it implemented fully and with vigor, the
result will be victory.
The concept is based on the assumption that villagers in Southeast Asia are fumed inward
on themselves and have little or no sense of identification with either the national
government or Communist ideology--that the villagers are isolated physically, politically
and psychologically. In such circumstances, it is not at all difficult to develop a guerrilla
movement. In Burma during World War II, about 150 Americans created a guerrilla force
of 30,000, and did it with white faces. It is hardly surprising that the Viet Cong could do
equally well or better in South Viet-Nam.
A corollary to this assumption is that the villagers' greatest desire is security and that, if
the villagers are given security, some simple progress towards a better life, and--most
important of all--a sense that the government cares about them and their future, they will
respond with loyalty.
The recent USIA survey of Long An/4/ gives some evidence of the validity of this
assumption. 1,250 families were interviewed in Long An, which is among the worst of the
Delta provinces. The results were as follows: In insecure villages, 75 percent of the people
expressed an attitude towards the Viet Cong and the government that was essentially "a
plague on both their houses", and 25 percent of the people were silent. In relatively secure
villages--those which could be penetrated by large Viet Cong groups but not by small
patrols--50 percent of the people took a "plague on both their houses" point of view, and
50 percent were mildly pro-government. In very secure villages, which had also received
some benefits, such as a school or a well, the people were 100 percent pro-government
and expressed a determination to fight the Viet Cong.
On the basis of such an apparently valid assumption, the strategic concept calls for
primary emphasis on giving security to the villagers. The tactics are the so-called oil-blot
approach, starting with a secure area and extending it slowly, making sure no Viet Cong
pockets are left behind, and using police units to winkle out the Viet Cong agents in each
particular village.
This calls for the use of military forces in a different way from that of orthodox,
conventional war. Rather than chasing Viet Cong, the military must put primary emphasis
on clear-and-hold operations and on rapid reinforcement of villages under attack. It is also
important, of course, to keep the Viet Cong regular units off balance by conventional
offensive operations, but these should be secondary to the major task of extending
security.
All this requires careful coordination of military operations, police efforts and rural
development towards the primary objectives: the extension of security over the heavilypopulated regions of the Delta, the cutting off of Viet Cong sources of supplies and
especially recruits, and their dispersion into the jungles and mountains where they can be
worn down by attrition, starvation and more conventional military means.
At the heart of the strategic concept are two basic principles:
The first is that of the oil blot. In the past, the GVN sought to blanket the whole country
with so-called strategic hamlets which in many cases involved nothing more than wireenclosed villages doused with political propaganda, with the Viet Cong agents left in
place. The result was to blanket the Delta with little Dienbienphus--indefensible,
inadequately armed hamlets far from reinforcements, that lacked both government
benefits and police facilities to winkle out Communist sympathizers, with Viet Cong
pockets left behind. In effect these were storage places of arms for the Viet Cong which
could be seized at any time. After November 1st, the military began to demobilize some
of these vulnerable villages and outposts, and a race developed between the government
and the Viet Cong. The race may have ended in a tie, but the result is that the Viet Cong
now have much better weapons and greater stocks of ammunition than they ever had
before.
The second basic principle is that the way to fight a guerrilla is to adopt the tactics of the
guerrilla--night ambushes, small patrols, and so on. In spite of all our pressures, this has
never been done in Viet-Nam. Instead, the emphasis has been on large operations, artillery
and air bombardments, and the use of cumbersome battalion-sized units which telegraph
their movements to the Viet Cong.
As to the question of operations against North Viet-Nam, I would suggest that such
operations may at a certain stage be a useful supplement to an effective counterinsurgency
program, but that they would not be an effective substitute for such a program.
My own preference would be to continue the covert, or at least deniable, operations along
the general lines we have been following for some months with the objective, since these
are only pinpricks, not of forcing North Viet-Nam to its knees but of keeping the threat of
eventual destruction alive in Hanoi's mind. Then after we had made sufficient progress in
the Delta so that all concerned began to realize that the Viet Cong were losing the support
of the population, and that their ability to continue the war depended solely on North
Vietnamese support, I think we should indicate as much privately to the North
Vietnamese and follow this by selected attacks on their infiltration bases and training
camps.
In my judgment, significant action against North Viet-Nam that is taken before we have
demonstrated success in our counterinsurgency program will be interpreted by the
Communists as an act of desperation, and will, therefore, not be effective in persuading
the North Vietnamese to cease and desist. What is worse, I think that premature action
will so alarm our friends and allies and a significant segment of domestic opinion that the
pressures for neutralization will become formidable.
In sum, I believe that we can win in Viet-Nam with a number of provisos.
The first proviso is that we do not over-militarize the war--that we concentrate not on
killing Viet Cong and the conventional means of warfare, but on an effective program for
extending the areas of security gradually, systematically, and thoroughly. This will require
better teamwork in Saigon than we have had in the past and considerably more emphasis
on clear-and-hold operations and on police work than we ourselves have given to the
Vietnamese.
The problems of getting effective teamwork is troublesome. Ideally, what we need is what
the British had in Malaya--a Gerald Templer/5/ who has absolute authority to hire and fire
anyone in any agency or department and through whom all reporting and all orders are
transmitted.
/5/General Sir Gerald W.R. Templer, British Commander in Chief, Eastern Command,
1950-1951, and High Commissioner for the Federation of Malaya, 1952-1954.
My second proviso is that there be political stability in Saigon. The talk of neutralization
is clearly very dangerous. It tends to be in the nature of a self-fulfilling prophecy-talk

about neutralization disheartens those who must fully and vigorously implement the
strategic concept and encourages those who are plotting for a neutralist coup.
I think we can counter such dangers most effectively by the proposals in my letter to you
of March 14 dealing with the whole of Southeast Asia; if necessary, however, we might
also station a Marine battalion in Saigon. Publicly, we could explain this as a move to
protect American dependents; privately, we could pass the word in Viet-Nam that we
wanted no more coups./6/
/6/McGeorge Bundy wrote the following marginal note: "No one in Saigon agrees."
To reiterate, I think that we have made the necessary and fundamental policy decisions on
the over-all strategic concept. What remains is to implement this concept vigorously and
with effective coordination.

Saigon, March 19, 1964--3 p.m.
/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 VIET S. Top Secret; Exdis.
House on receipt in the Department of State.
1. Thank you for your 1454./2/ I will carry out the program with maximum energy.
/2/Document 85.
2. It seems appropriate to comment further on two matters: first, the proposal to put
pressure on North Vietnam, as referred to in your pare 4, subparagraph 3, so that they will
cease their aggression; and, second, the imaginative and interesting suggestion, which
deserves careful analysis, that I see General de Gaulle.
3. As regards pressure on NVN, I submit the following:
4. US problem in any underdeveloped country is how to apply our power. The
Communists, confident that we will not use our missiles, are trying to take over the people
in the underdeveloped countries right under our noses. It is as though we had a
tremendous warship capable of dominating the seas, but were facing a problem in the
middle of the desert. In such a situation our power seems useless.
5. Last autumn the US did face the problem of how to apply our power in South Vietnam.
President Kennedy, very properly I thought, wanted to bring about some fundamental
changes in the behavior of the GVN. But we seemed to be up against a blank wall. There
seemed to be no way we could use our great power which would not either damage the
war effort or bring on an economic panic with widespread unemployment and starvation.
6. Yet, finally, much thought and study in Washington and in the Embassy discovered
ways to apply US power. We hammered away at one place and then at another and, after
awhile, there was a crack in the blank wall. The beginning of a change in Diem's attitude
was becoming apparent when the Nov 1 coup came. A description of these methods is in
my 949, Nov 6./3/
/3/Foreign Relations, 1961-1963, vol. V, pp. 575-578.
7. Now we face the problem of how to apply our power to NVN, and we seem also to be
up against a blank wall. Yet we seem to be quite sure of two things: (a) one single
saturation raid on NVN could destroy the fruits of eight years' fighting against the French
and of ten years backbreaking labor since 1954; and (b) while there would be some sort of
ChiCom reaction, the above raid would not bring on nuclear war or a real world war.
8. If NVN thought that the US had the will to use just what we have out here in Southeast
Asia (the 7th Fleet, US Air Force units, etc.), they would see that they cannot afford a Viet
Cong victory in SVN. The price would be too high.
9. The problem is how to persuade NVN, and a corollary is how to apply our power in
relatively limited doses so as to give them a sample of how really dangerous we are. Some
overt reconnaissance flights might be useful as an initial step.
10. What we can do to them should also be linked to what we can do for them-in terms of
rice and removing whatever US personnel we intend to remove anyway.
11. I recommend that the same kind of intensive study be now given to the above in
Washington that was given last fall to applying sanctions to Diem. I am confident that
good results would be obtained and that some things which look pretty strong today
would start falling apart.
12. As regards de Gaulle, I look forward to chance to comment, which you mentioned in
your last paragraph, on instructions to Ambassador Bohlen. Paris seems honestly to
believe that 1964 is 1954, which leads them into still other dangerous errors.
13. As regards my going to Paris to explain realities to the General, the following can be
said in favor:
14. A life-time of association with the French, the wartime connection of which you
spoke, and more recent contacts in 1960 and in 1961, at which time I located the
headquarters of the Atlantic Institute in Paris, above all, the fact that I would be visiting
him as your representative should bring about a change in attitude, if anything can.
15. On the negative side is the reaction in the GVN. Prolonged reflection convinces me
that GVN, from General Khanh on down, would be filled with apprehension and that,
given their mentality, nothing could convince them that I was not going to Paris to sell
them down the river. As US representative, I am extremely prominent here, and a trip by
me to Paris to see de Gaulle, at this time, would be a body blow to morale and would,
with one hand, destroy what we are trying to do with the passage of time.
Lodge/4/

/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 VIET S. Top Secret; Exdis. The
message was drafted in the White House and approved by Rusk. Transmitted as telegram
1484 to Saigon, which is the source text.
1. We have studied your 1776/2/ and I am asking State to have Bill Bundy make sure that
you get our latest planning documents on ways of applying pressure and power against the
North. I understand that some of this was discussed with you by McNamara mission in
Saigon, but as plans are refined it would be helpful to have your detailed comments. As
we agreed in our previous messages to each other, judgment is reserved for the present on
overt military action in view of the consensus from Saigon conversations of McNamara
mission with General Khanh and you on judgment that movement against the North at the
present would be premature. We here share General Khanh's judgment that the immediate
and essential task is to strengthen the southern base. For this reason our planning for
action against the North is on a contingency basis at present, and immediate problem in
this area is to develop the strongest possible military and political base for possible later
action. There is additional international reason for avoiding immediate overt action in that
we expect a showdown between the Chinese and Soviet Communist parties soon and
action against the North will be more practicable after than before a showdown. But if at
any time you feel that more immediate action is urgent, I count on you to let me know
specifically the reasons for such action, together with your recommendations for its size
and shape.
/2/Supra.
2. On dealing with de Gaulle, I continue to think it may be valuable for you to go to Paris
after Bohlen has made his first try. (State is sending you draft instruction to Bohlen, which
I have not yet reviewed, for your comment.)/3/ It ought to be possible to explain in Saigon
that your mission is precisely for the purpose of knocking down the idea of neutralization
wherever it rears its ugly head, and on this point I think that nothing is more important
than to stop neutralist talk wherever we can by whatever means we can. I have made this
point myself to Mansfield and Lippmann and I expect to use every public opportunity to
restate our position firmly. You may want to convey our concern on this point to General
Khanh and get his ideas on the best possible joint program to stop such talk in Saigon, in
Washington, and in Paris. I imagine that you have kept General Khanh abreast of our
efforts in Paris. After we see the results of the Bohlen approach you might wish to sound
him out on Paris visit by you./4/
/3/Telegram 1487 to Saigon, March 20. (Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 VIET
S). For the instructions sent to Paris, see Document 96.

Saigon, March 23, 1964--1 p.m.
/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 VIET-S. Top Secret; Exdis.
Your 1484./2/
/2/Document 92.
I will of course be glad to comment on whatever you send me regarding pressure on the
North.
2. I continue to agree that overt U.S. action should be withheld until after Viet-Nam and
U.S. covert steps have been tried-and tried as part of an essentially diplomatic pressure
move. I do not think that such a move, including the Viet-Nam and U.S. covert activities
involved, is premature. If such an effort could be successfully carried out, it would
obviously greatly discourage the VC and help General Khanh strengthen his southern
base. In fact it might very much hasten the end of the war here. I have noted with interest
your expectation of a showdown between the Chinese and Soviet Communist Parties and
agree that this is a major element to be considered in any such diplomatic effort.
3. U.S. Mission (Country Team) will hear a report, pursuant to instruction in your
1454,/3/ paragraph 4, subparagraph 4 on "tit for tat" methods at the regular meeting this
week./4/
/3/Document 85.
/4/According to telegram 1828 from Saigon, from Lodge to the President, March 25, a
committee of CIA and military representatives from the Embassy reached the preliminary
conclusion that for a program of "tit-for-tat" overt military actions against North Vietnam,
aerial bombardment and aerial mine-laying were the preferred methods of counteraction.
(Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 VIET S)
4. As regards de Gaulle, I will of course be glad to carry out your instructions to the best
of my ability, should you decide you want me to go. I am commenting on proposed
instruction to Ambassador Bohlen in separate telegram./5/ I like your reasoning regarding
knocking down the idea of neutralism and will discuss with General Khanh.
/5/Document 94.
Lodge/6/

Saigon, March 23, 1964--4 p.m
/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 VIET S. Secret; Nodis.
1806. For the Secretary from Lodge. Regarding your priority 1487,/2/ I recommend that
the fourth unnumbered paragraph in instruction to Bohlen make it clear that what we want
from de Gaulle is a statement that he does not favor his "neutralization" at the present
time. We are not asking him to drop his idea for all eternity. What we want is a statement
saying that he does not think it applies now.
/2/See footnote 3, Document 92. The fourth unnumbered paragraph reads as follows:
"What we actually want from de Gaulle is a public statement, prior to SEATO meeting,
that the idea of 'neutralization' does not relate to the attitudes or policies of the
Government of Vietnam or its friends in the face of the current communist aggression."
Perhaps the following line of argument may be helpful to Ambassador Bohlen for his own
information and use as he deems opportune. It seeks to refute some of the misconceptions
which have been put out in Paris, and also seeks to deal with the circumstances which are
particularly vivid in Saigon. The argument runs as follows:
1. France and the U.S. are headed for a collision as regards VietNam. This is not due to a
fundamental difference of interests but to a misunderstanding, which it is the business of
diplomacy to straighten out. As one who rejoices in French strength, I am worried that so
many highly placed Vietnamese sincerely believe that General de Gaulle wishes the
destruction of the Republic of Viet-Nam; that French agents are trying to incite the
assassination of the Chief of State; and that French agents have worked with the Viet
Cong in the recent terrorism against Americans. I have on every occasion made it clear
that I think these rumors are fantastic and impossible to substantiate and have often tried
to persuade the Chief of State not to break off relations with France. But much more than
my efforts is needed.
2. Also on February 20 the VC, in an official communication, said it "approves
particularly President de Gaulle's proposal to establish a regime of neutrality in South
Viet-Nam".
3. For these reasons, a statement by General de Gaulle himself to the effect that his idea of
"neutralism" was not meant to apply at the present time would have a very constructive
effect.
4. Beyond the helpful effect which it would have, it is also clearly justified by the
situation in Viet-Nam and for the following reasons:
a. The situation here is not hopeless at all. 1964 is not 1954. Vietnamese military are
definitely on the track for the first time since the deterioration began in April of '63. The
brave are being rewarded; the cowards are being relieved. In order to enable the GVN to
hold an area once it has been cleared, the U.S. is helping strengthen the militia and create
a corps of civil administrators. A National Service Law will soon be in effect.
b. Also, contrary to what is often said in Europe, the Americans and Vietnamese are not
seeking an exclusively military solution of the problem. Indeed we agree that an
exclusively military solution of the problem would be impossible. Hand in hand with the
attempt of the military to bring about order is a social revolution in which the U.S. is
taking an active part and which also aims to bring education, health, economic well-being,
land ownership, to the ordinary people. The U.S. agrees emphatically that this struggle
cannot be won exclusively by military methods.
5. It should be emphasized that the U.S. is not, as is being said in Europe, trying to do
with "16,000 men what France did not do with 200,000 men". The U.S. effort is totally
different; it has entirely distinct aims; it is not nearly as extensive and has not nearly as
ambitious a goal as did the French aims in the early 1950's.
6. The statement often made in Europe that "while the U.S. has its strategic interests in
Viet-Nam, the French have their cultural and economic interests" is profoundly
misleading. Actually, the strategic interest in the American-Vietnamese effort in VietNam is directly to the advantage of the French doctor, the French schoolteacher, and the
French businessman in Viet-Nam, just as their presence here helps Viet-Nam and thus
helps U.S. interests here. American and French interests should not be put in contradistinction with each other as they are mutually consistent.
7. The Communists realize that the American-Vietnamese effort is actually getting off the
ground, which is why they are intensifying their neutralist talk. In the language of the Viet
Cong, "neutralism" is the same thing as Communist victory. We realize that it is a
coincidence, but it is a most unfortunate coincidence that General de Gaulle's phrase
"neutralism" is the identical phrase used by the Communists.
8. France has an influence in Viet-Nam way beyond what it contributes in the way of
men, weapons and money. This is because French is still the Western language which is
possessed by the largest number of Vietnamese (although the younger generation is trying
hard to get away from French and to learn English). But at the present, the so-called
people who count in Viet-Nam read French newspapers; in particular, they read the
background news stories which the Agence France Presse gets from the Quai d'Orsay.
Some are impressed by it and others are infuriated by it, and altogether no good purpose is
served. If what is desired is the eventual neutralization of Indo-China or of Viet-Nam, the
way not to do it is to create the furor which these statements out of Paris create. General
de Gaulle is thus a very influential figure in Viet-Nam and, unwittingly, in a way which is
defeating his own stated purpose.
9. A de Gaulle statement stating that he did not favor "neutralism" now would go far to
correct the present bad situation, and at the same time, to promote a good result.
10. Such a statement not only does not foreclose a unified and neutral Indo-China at some
future date; it would actually greatly facilitate such a result.
11. If a neutral Indo-China, or even a neutral Viet-Nam, were attempted at the present
time, it would be foredoomed to failure. Since South Viet-Nam is not strong enough to
bargain on an equal basis with North Viet-Nam, the holding of the conference would end
the will to win in South Viet-Nam, and the net result would be to turn South Viet-Nam
over to the North. By no stretch of the imagination can this be considered neutralism.
12. If so-called "neutralism" had been applied to France at any time between 1940 and
1944, the German Army would have remained in occupation in France. In fact, the initial
German occupation before the collapse of the Vichy government was virtually the same
kind of neutralism with regard to France which some appear to advocate today with
regard to Viet-Nam. Those of us who have always wanted a strong France and are glad
that France is strong today would have opposed "neutralism" for a France occupied by an
hostile army in the '40's, just as we oppose "neutralism" for a Viet-Nam, which, though
not occupied in the same sense, is under hostile attack in the '60's. And, one might add,
just as we oppose "neutralism" for Berlin./3/
/3/In telegram 1510 to Saigon, March 24, Rusk thanked Lodge for his suggestions, which
were being repeated verbatim to Ambassador Bohlen. He also noted: "The President has
incorporated your suggested phrasing into paragraph four of his instructions to Bohlen
and those instructions are being sent to Paris today." Department of State. Central Files,
POL 27 VIET S)
Lodge
(Sullivan) to the Special Assistant in the Bureau of Far Eastern Affairs
(Thompson)/1/
/1/Source: Kennedy Library, Thomson Papers, Southeast Asia, Vietnam, McNamara's
Speech, 3/26/64. Confidential. Rusk took this memorandum to a luncheon meeting with
the President, McGeorge Bundy, and McNamara at the White House on March 24, where
the McNamara speech was approved substantially as originally drafted. No record of the
luncheon meeting has been found. (Memorandum from Read to Rusk; Department of
State, President's Reading File: Lot 74 D 164)
SUBJECT
Comments on Proposed McNamara Speech/2/
/2/The speech was given on March 26 at the James Forrestal Memorial Awards Dinner of
the National Security Industrial Association in Washington. For text. see Department of
State Bulletin, April 13, 1964, pp. 562-570.
I think the general tone and thrust of this speech is excellent but I detect one truly major
problem toward the end of it. In the section "A Program to Meet Our Objectives" there is
a listing of the options which President Johnson had before him prior to the McNamara
visit. The manner in which the second option--"A Big War"--is treated leaves our reaction
to this speech [option?] deliberately inconclusive.
I know that this is a useful device in maintaining a certain degree of uncertainty in the
North. It is also valuable for dealing with the LeMays and the Rostows. However, that is
not the audience which this particular speech is intended to address.
The basic purpose of the speech is to obtain broad support and particularly to state
objectives which will be endorsed by the Mansfields and the Lippmanns. More pointedly,
it is intended to separate the Mansfields from the Morses.
A second objective is to set forward our policy with precision in a way which will induce
General de Gaulle similarly to define French policy. Indeed, we are telling de Gaulle that
the McNamara speech will make our policy "precise".
Therefore, deliberately to leave an area of imprecision in order to attain a commendable
objective with respect to the North would be defeating the major purposes and the major
addresses of the speech.
I would, therefore, recommend that the entire section concerning options be rewritten so
that the only course of action which is described and discarded is the "neutralization"
course. The speech could then remain silent on the question of the "Big War"./2/
/2/At this point, Sullivan added the following handwritten note: "I have discussed this
with McNaughton, who says that McNamara does want to retain the `options.' However
these particular arguments have not been presented to him. WHS"
There are attached also certain suggestions by Joe Mendenhall for revision of the sections
on pages four and five in the interest of clear historical accuracy./3/
/3/Attached but not printed.
96. Message From the President to the Ambassador in France (Bohlen)/1/

/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 VIET S. Secret; Immediate; Exdis.
The message was drafted in the White House; discussed and revised at a 1 p.m. luncheon
meeting among the President, Rusk, McNamara, and McGeorge Bundy; and approved by
Rusk. Transmitted as telegram 4793 to Paris, which is the source text. Also published in
Declassified Documents, 1978, 296A. A draft with McGeorge Bundy's handwritten
revisions is in the Johnson Library, National Security File, Vietnam Country File, Vol. VI,
Cables and Memos.
As agreed [in] recent consultations Washington, you should seek early appointment with
de Gaulle for frank discussion Vietnam. You should indicate that you will have message
from me for the General, draft text of which appended this instruction.
In presenting this message, you should stress our determination to assure that communistdirected aggression will not succeed in overthrowing independent states in Southeast Asia
and our willingness take necessary measures to implement that determination.
You should point out that in Vietnam, we have come to this determination after having
thoroughly examined and rejected arguments for disengagement or for political
negotiation starting from current circumstances. You should draw upon March 17 White
House statement/2/ following National Security Council action on McNamara report/3/ to

describe nature our current commitment and action which we pursuing jointly with Khanh
Government.
/3/Document 84.
What we actually want from de Gaulle is a public statement, prior to SEATO meeting,/4/
that the idea of "neutralization" does not apply to the attitudes or policies of the
Government of Vietnam or its friends in the face of the current communist aggression. We
want him to state that he does not favor "neutralization" of this sort at the present time.
We are not asking him to drop his idea for all eternity. What we want is a statement that
he does not think it applies now. French spokesmen like Couve and Baumel have
repeatedly said in private that a US pullout now would be disastrous and that we must
keep up our end in South Viet-Nam. What we need is some parallel expression from the
General./5/
/4/The ninth Ministerial Meeting of the SEATO Council, Manila, April 13-15.
/5/The last sentence of this paragraph was added to the draft by McGeorge Bundy: see
footnote 1 above.
We leave to your discretion whatever action you feel appropriate to develop the forum or
the manner in which such a statement might be delivered. You will have noted from other
messages that the Vietnamese Foreign Minister expects to be in Paris in the near future;
and it might be opportune for the statement to appear in the form of a joint FrenchVietnamese communique on that occasion.
You may use whatever argument or persuasion you deem most effective in the
presentation of this demarche. But you should make it clear that we expect France, as an
ally, to adopt an attitude of cooperation rather than obstruction in this critical area of
United States interest. I would welcome any comments or suggestions you may have on
the text of my message to de Gaulle and will consider them urgently with Secretary Rusk.
Secretary Rusk has sent an advance copy of this instruction to Ambassador Lodge, who
made constructive suggestions which have been incorporated into the message as you
have received it. The full text of his cable presenting additional argumentation for your
demarche is being repeated to Paris./6/
/6/Document 94. On March 23, Lodge informed the President that he had told Khanh
about the proposed demarche to de Gaulle and that Khanh was "extremely positive" about
the idea of having a public statement by de Gaulle on record. (Telegram 1811 from
Saigon; Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 VIET S) After a night's reflection,
Lodge informed the President that such a de Gaulle statement could pave the way for a
new Vietnamese-French relationship and allow Khanh to drop his plan to break
diplomatic relations with Paris. (Telegram 1817 from Saigon, March 24; ibid.)
Message to de Gaulle
The most immediate and the most complex problem of foreign policy which faces the
United States today is centered in Southeast Asia. The type of subversive aggression
which is being conducted against independent states and innocent populations in that part
of the world poses a dangerous threat to the prospects for the stable evolution of
developing nations everywhere. The Republic of Vietnam is, at the present time, the
principal target of this aggression. As you know, it is the policy of my Government to
furnish assistance and support to the Republic of Vietnam for as long as it is required to
bring this aggression and terrorism under control.
Our objective in the pursuit of this policy is to assist in the establishment, throughout
Southeast Asia, of independent states, secure from their neighbors, and each with an
opportunity to determine its own policies, both foreign and domestic.
It is understandable, in the larger perspectives of history, and, given the political and
economic circumstances, that these states might eventually choose an international
posture which could be described as neutral. In this sense, neutralization might be held out
as a long term objective to which these states could aspire.
However, all our reports from the area show that current public discussion of this
objective has left a twofold impression: First, that the present victims of aggression should
adopt an attitude of neutrality towards it; and second, that these same victims should be
required not to accept external assistance to meet that aggression. It seems clear to us that
these two courses would amount to a prescription for disaster.
Ambassador Lodge has informed me that in Vietnam today, there is a widespread
impression that France endorses such courses. This impression has stirred up a sharp
reaction among many elements in Vietnam, a reaction which has been moderated only by
our own diplomatic efforts. At the same time in private conversations leading
representatives of France have made it clear that France does not believe US help can
safely be ended now, and that France does not believe in letting the Communists take over
South Viet-Nam./7/
/7/The last sentence of the paragraph was added by McGeorge Bundy.
I believe it is important that all erroneous public impressions concerning the policies of
nations which have an interest in the future of Southeast Asia be eliminated so that the
problems of that area can be seen and dealt with as lucidly as possible. I have directed that
the policy of the United States be set forth with precision; and senior members of my
Government will do this in the course of the next few days.
It would be most helpful to our common cause if the real policy of France could also be
clarified publicly in the minds of those who may feel disturbed by implications which
have been read into its most recent expression. It would be particularly useful if such
clarification should be made prior to the Manila meeting of the SEATO Council.
With these thoughts in mind, I have asked Ambassador Bohlen to discuss these matters
with you and to report your views./8/
97. Message From the Ambassador in France (Bohlen) to the President/1/

Paris, March 25, 1964--5 p.m.
Transmitted as telegram 4486 from Paris, which is the source text. Passed to the White
We were informed this morning/2/ by the Quai d'Orsay at about same time that Deptel
4793/3/ arrived that Khanh had taken up with French Charge a demand for a statement
from de Gaulle about French position on neutrality (Embtel 4481)./4/ Since Khanh seems
to have jumped the gun on us and in effect asked for what I was trying to obtain I wonder
if we should not wait a day or so and assess French reaction before my seeking an
interview with de Gaulle. However, on assumption that I will go through with this
interview I would like to submit for your consideration the following suggestions in
regard to the text of your message to de Gaulle. I assume this was designed to be
presented in writing and we can of course add suitable salutation and closing.
/2/March 23.
/3/Document 96
/4/Khanh made this demand to Perruche on March 23, suggesting that the statement
should make clear that even if future neutrality were desirable for Vietnam, the current
struggle against the Viet Cong was the correct course. Should France do this, Khanh
suggested that Vietnam could then remove economic restrictions on French imports and
name a new Ambassador to Paris. Khanh added that the need for such a statement was
both important and urgent; he had to have an answer by April 1. (Department of State,
Central Files, POL 1 FR-VIET S)
I would suggest dropping paragraph four which as written seems to be our interpretation
of French position. It is somewhat strong and I fear might produce an unnecessarily
adverse reaction from de Gaulle. I would also eliminate last sentence of paragraph five
since I think it extremely unwise to even hint to de Gaulle that "leading representatives of
France" making statements about French policy which de Gaulle himself has initiated and
which might lead him to the view that his position was being undercut by these
"representatives".
In place therefore of paragraphs four and five I would substitute the following:
"The difficulty is that the term neutralization is being understood by certain people in
Vietnam as having immediate application and not as a long-term objective. These people
consider that any advocacy of neutrality at the present time really is a pseudonym for
eventual Communist take-over. This impression has stirred up sharp reaction among many
elements in Vietnam, a reaction which we have done our best to moderate through our
own diplomatic efforts".
The Quai also informed us of a conversation that you had with Alphand (I assume during
Defferre's visit). I would appreciate anything that you could let us have on this
conversation./5/
/5/From 4:43 to 4:50 p.m., March 24, the President met with Gaston Defferre, Mayor of
Marseilles. (Johnson Library, President's Daily Diary) No record of this meeting has been
found.
I shall not request an interview with de Gaulle until I hear further from you./6/
/6/Rusk called William Bundy on March 25 at 2:33 p.m., to discuss this cable. The
transcript of their telephone conversation reads in part as follows:
"The Sec asked him if he had seen Bohlen's message and Bundy said he had. Sec said it
was bad that Khanh went roaring in. Bundy said we should have warned Bohlen Bundy
said we were in an awful box, and said he was inclined to agree that Bohlen should put off
his call to De Gaulle for a day or two. Sec said it would be very unwise to go roaring in.
Sec said perhaps he had better in effect say that he had been informed about Khanh's
action and that we think it would be very unwise for Khanh to go on down this road. We
have been urging maximum restraint on him in this matter. We were concerned by the
known fact that neutralization would create problems in Vietnam and go on from there.
Sec said we should do something as a consequence of what Khanh has said rather than a
parallel move. Bundy asked if we should let the French know we were coming, so to
speak, and Sec said no but to go because Khanh did this and try to get the thing in order.
Sec said it was a rough one and that this rather guarantees that we would fail with De
Gaulle. Sec thought maybe we should wait a couple of days. Bundy said we were not
under specific gun and Monday they agreed would be OK." (Department of State, Rusk
Files: Lot 72 D 192, Telephone Conversations)
Bohlen/7/
98. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in France/1/

Drafted in the White House, cleared by William Bundy and Rusk, and approved by
Sullivan. Repeated to Saigon.
4818. For Ambassador.
1. The President has reviewed your 4486/2/ and agrees with you that you should wait a
day or so to assess French reaction before seeking interview with de Gaulle. He
nevertheless believes that you should seek this interview without fail within the 'next
week, adjusting your presentation to the situation as it then appears, and making the
strongest possible argument to the General for a public clarification of the position of
France.
/2/Document 97.
2. The President does not wish any formal message from himself to be presented at this
time, in the light of Khanh's threatening dmarche. Instead you should draw on the draft
message in our 4793/3/ as appropriate, making clear that these are Presidential views as
well as those of the USG in general. You should present these views as an expansion upon
the brief remarks which the President made informally to Alphand.
/3/Document 96.
3. We do not fully share your argument that General should go uninformed of what his
Foreign Minister and others are saying officially to us, and believe it should be helpful to
say that the policy of France as stated to us in diplomatic channels has only to be clarified
publicly in order to become much more helpful to the common cause on the scene.
4. President's short meeting with Alphand took place on request of latter before Defferre
meeting./4/ On South East Asia, exchange was very brief. President said that as he
understood it, France did not wish American forces pulled out and did not believe in this
kind of neutralism which would lead to takeover of south by Communists. If this were
indeed French position, President said, it would be helpful to have it publicly clarified.
Alphand said he would report this view and contrive to indicate some personal sympathy
with it without actually committing himself.
/4/See footnote 5, Document 97. No record of the Alphand-Johnson meeting has been
found.
Rusk
99. Memorandum for the Record of the White House Daily Staff Meeting,
Washington, March 30, 1964, 8 a.m./1/
/1/Source: National Defense University, Taylor Papers. T-217-69. Secret: Eyes Only.
Drafted by William Y. Smith.
1. Mr. Bundy presided throughout the meeting.
2. Vietnam. The entire meeting was spent in a long discussion of our problems in
Vietnam. Forrestal had sent Bundy the latest Sit Rep on Vietnam, with the comment that
he was not sure our military operations in the field were in consonance with our political
objectives./2/ Bundy said he had found the Forrestal memorandum very interesting, and
asked why the military seemed to have the impression that napalm solves everything, and
why they spent so much time chasing the enemy. In fact, he said, the enemy was not as
readily identifiable as those operations made him sound. He asked if I had followed these
matters closely, and I replied I had not, with respect to day to day operations.
/2/It was the weekly report from USMACV dated 23 May. [Footnote in the source text in
Smith's hand. Forrestal's covering memorandum has not been found.]
Bundy then asked Cooper what he thought, and he responded that he was very concerned
because we only had two or three months left to really get things moving, and it did not
look like the field operations were going as they should. I then interjected that I could see
some disadvantages and difficulties in using napalm and in chasing the enemy, but
wondered what alternatives the other people really had in mind.
My question lead to two different kinds of responses, one from Forrestal and Bundy, and
the second from Cooper. Forrestal referred to a book by a Frenchman, Modern Warfare,
by Roger Trinquier,/3/ which he said was a report on the French experiences in Southeast
Asia and Algeria. According to Forrestal, you can see from this book that we are making
the same mistakes the French did, and are forgetting to profit by their lessons. The only
specific concerning Vietnam he mentioned was that unless something changes, when the
rainy season sets in, RVN morale will drop so far that the army may not be able to be
salvaged. Cooper, on the other hand, said that we needed some "dramatic victories" to
bolster the Vietnamese people. After the meeting I asked Cooper how he could reconcile
dramatic victories with no identifiable enemy. He said he was not quite sure, but that we
should be able to make raids on political and military command posts and bring back
some Viet Cong alive. He thought the military could think of other possibilities. Both
Cooper's and Forrestal's comments had one thing in common: neither was sure that the
present military staffs in Saigon were capable of moving fast enough to solve these
problems.
/3/Roger Trinquier, Modern Warfare: A French View of Counterinsurgency (New York:
Praeger, 1964).
Bundy again commented that the basic problem was that the military thought of the war in
Vietnam too much in terms of regular conventional warfare with an identifiable enemy
and specific military objectives. In fact the problem was quite different. The result of this
type of military thinking was that all the Chiefs except General Taylor wanted to go north.
He asked that Forrestal recast his comments in his weekend memorandum,/4/ raising
questions on the course of operations in Vietnam in terms that Bundy could send to
Secretary McNamara. Bundy would tell McNamara that these questions had been raised,
and Bundy felt they should be discussed with the President. Forrestal replied that the
instances he cited did not really make a strong enough case since McNamara could cite
some other "Krulak statistics" to show the other side. Bundy said then that he and Cooper
should get together to draft such a memorandum. After the meeting I talked with Cooper
and Forrestal, at Forrestal's suggestion, to see what assistance I can be in these
conversations. Forrestal said that his basic point was that the operations the military
consider important, such as the search and clear, are not the type of actions that will be
most effective in achieving US objectives. He realizes that this is more an attitude of mind
than anything else, but believes that it should be dealt with somehow. He is clearly
groping, in a constructive way.
/4/Apparent reference to the covering memorandum by Forrestal; see footnote 2 above.
The military weren't the only ones in trouble this morning. The new AID man in Saigon is
not considered the best possible choice. Forrestal thinks Bell's approach is to treat the
Vietnam situation as any other bureaucratic problem. In reality, however, special
treatment is called for. Bell wants to send a man named Van Dyke to Saigon, a good,
capable, conservative administrator. The White House evidently is pushing Amory.
Komer suggested another alternative, a Jim Killen. Bundy will see if the issue is still
open.
The upshot of this discussion was that there may soon be some White House initiative to
look more closely into the types of military operations being conducted in Vietnam. More
important, however, to me it demonstrated the frustration of certain elements of the
civilian side of the government over progress in Vietnam. If the military are frustrated and
want to go north, the civilians are equally frustrated and want to do something more-they
didn't know what-in the south. The basic point is that everyone is increasingly frustrated,
and this is not good.
[Here follows discussion of subjects unrelated to Vietnam.]
7. Vietnam War Game./5/ I asked Bundy if the Vietnam war game next week would help
deal with any of the problems with which he was concerned. He said it would not, since it
properly would be dealing with higher levels of escalation. Having had no other comment
from him, I take this as his concurrence of the scenario I gave him Friday./6/
/5/Reference is to a political-military game, code-named Sigma 1-64, sponsored by the
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and organized by the Joint Wargames Agency of the
JCS. The game took place from April 6 to 9 and had as participants most of the senior
officials in the Johnson administration. The focus was the insurgency in South Vietnam
and ways to combat it. The report of the war game is in the Johnson Library, National
Security File, Agencies' File, JCS War Games. William Sullivan, in Obbligato, pp. 178182, describes this war game in detail, but misdates it as occurring in the spring of 1963,
not 1964.
/6/March 27. The scenario for Sigma 1-64 is not printed. (Ibid.)
WYC
/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Luncheons with the President,
McGeorge Bundy, Vol. I, Part 2. Secret.
SUBJECT
South Vietnam
Apropos of our discussion this morning,/2/ my thinking is as follows:
/2/See Document 99.
Although we have paid a lot of attention to the personnel and organization of the new
government in Saigon, we have done very little to improve our own organization there. It
is a full five months since the November 1st coup and two months since General Khanh's
coup. Most of the experts seem to be agreed that this dry season is critical in reversing the
declining trend in the war we have been observing during the past year. Unfortunately, we
have now let more than half that season go by without having shaken ourselves down in
Saigon.
The warning indicators are still flashing. The MACV report/3/ which I have shown you
over the week-end does not by itself prove that we have a military staff in Saigon
inadequate for the job. All one can say (and this only at the risk of violent reaction from
the uniformed side of the Pentagon) is that such a report which places such emphasis on
military activities so similar to those which failed the French, suggests a lack of
understanding of what the war is about.
It is extremely difficult, and probably irresponsible for civilians to second-guess military
field commanders; and it is even more difficult for them to propose new tactics. Beyond
recommending that Roger Trinquier's book/4/ be made required reading, there is not much
we can do from here. So, what it comes down to is that we simply must get out to Saigon
our most imaginative military commanders and civilian administrators. This we simply
have not done.
Both Bill Bundy and Bill Sullivan spoke to McNamara about this problem in Honolulu on
their way to Saigon. The best Bob could offer was that he would consider relieving
General Harkins no sooner than April 15 and not later than June 30. I spoke to Bob myself
before the Forrestal Award Dinner, and he then told me that he plans to move Harkins
when Lodge leaves. Bob thinks that Lodge will inevitably succumb to temptation in the
month of June, resign, and return here for the convention. His reasons for not wanting to
move Harkins now are:
a. We can't afford a change in the American organization until the Khanh Government is
settled down.
b. Khanh and Harkins get along very well.
c. General Westmoreland has not been there long enough yet to be able to take over.
Sullivan believes, and I agree with him, that these three reasons merely cover Bob's
fundamental problem, which is that Max Taylor and the Chiefs will not agree to a change
at this time. Sullivan is also somewhat concerned about Westmoreland. He thinks he is an
able, flexible officer, but extremely ambitious and anxious to take over the complete
direction of the war from the Ambassador. Sullivan is worried that unless Westmoreland
gets into the habit of working for a powerful figure, he will tend to dominate any new
ambassador we send out, if and when Lodge returns. For this reason Sullivan thinks it is
important that there be an overlap and that any new ambassador be a particularly powerful
figure.
Our record on the civilian side is not any better. You know the problems we have had
finding an AID Director. On top of that, there is still no civilian in Saigon who is acting as
Chief of Staff for the war in the countryside. The original theory was that Dave Nes, the
DCM, would do this. But I am still doubtful whether he can do this job at all, and
certainly not within the time we have left. Dave has not had experience in an insurgency
situation and, like most senior Foreign Service Officers, is bound to devote more of his
time to the diplomatic and housekeeping problems of the Embassy and the vast American
community in Saigon. For some months I have felt that another man at Nes's level was
required-a man who would be Lodee's Chief of Staff for coordinating all U.S. activities,
military and civilian, in support of the war in the field. The ideal I have in mind is
someone like Desmond Fitzgerald, and there are probably some other people like him in
the CIA and perhaps in the DOD. I attach a memorandum I wrote to Bob McNamara
before he went out on his trip, a copy of which I have sent to John McCone; but so far I
have gotten absolutely nowhere with it./5/
5/Not found
I had a long talk with Dave Bell about his new Mission Director, during the course of
which he exposed his own theory that since the AID Agency did not actually have full
responsibility for the effort against the Viet Cong, he did not see how an AID official
could take over the whole job. I had been trying to convince him of the importance of
getting a man like [1-1/2 lines of source text not declassified]. I think that Dave may be
right; but the result as of the moment is that there is no one in the AID Mission in Saigon,
and no prospects for finding anyone who can even do a first-class job in running the AID
part of the Strategic Hamlet Program.
Finally we must face the likelihood that Lodge might leave and start looking for a new
ambassador. This is going to be an immensely difficult job, since we need a man with
somewhat inconsistent qualities. He has to be prestigious enough to retain civilian control
of the total U.S. effort, and at the same time he has to know enough about the theory of
counterinsurgency at least to be able to encourage the useful actions of the military and
discourage the self-defeating ones. What I really would like to see the President do would
be to appoint you and Bob as a committee of two to produce the top level personnel and
effect the changes in Saigon. You could both call on the two departments, the Agency and
the AID people, for nominations and suggestions; but somehow there must be a place
where the brutal decisions are taken and made to stick.
Chet Cooper is completely right. This is a Greek tragedy, and the curtain is slowly
descending.
MVF
101. Memorandum From the Director, Far East Region, Office of the Assistant
Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs (Blouin) to the Assistant
Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs (McNaughton)/1/
I-35397/64
/1/Source: Washington National Records Center, RG 330, OASD/ISA Files: FRC 68 A
4023, 092 Vietnam. Top Secret.

SUBJECT
Status of Actions Approved in NSAM No. 288/2/
/2/Document 87.
This is a summary of actions taken to implement the approved recommendations of the
McNamara report./3/
/3/Document 84.
1. To make it clear that we are prepared to furnish assistance and support to South
Vietnam for as long as it takes to bring the insurgency under control.
The White House statement of 17 March 64/4/ included the statement that "It will remain
the policy of the United States to furnish assistance and support to South Vietnam for as
long as it is required to bring Communist aggression and terrorism under control." Same
point was made in Secretary McNamara's 26 Mar 64 speech./5/
/5/See Document 95.
2. To make it clear that we fully support the Khanh government and are opposed to any
further coupe.
All Saigon agencies advised 18 Mar 64 that procedures should be established to bring
coup plotting to the attention of the Ambassador for his evaluation and decision as to
action (Deptel 1463)./6/ [7-1/2 lines of source text not declassified]
/6/Not printed. (Department of State, Central Files, POL 7 US/MCNAMARA)
3. To support a Program for National Mobilization (including a national service law) to
put South Vietnam on a war footing.
Embassy, Saigon was requested 20 Mar 64 (Deptel 1490)/7/ to report the current status of
GVN plans and CT views with regard to adoption of a National Service Act. Embassy
reported 25 Mar 64 (Embtel 1829)/8/ that as of that time GVN seems to favor institution
of a civil defense organization to supplement present regular and paramilitary forces,
rather than implementation of a national mobilization plan. An interagency committee,
chaired by J-1, MACV, will continue to study the problem. The GVN has been notified
that the US wishes to have an opportunity to comment on any proposed plan at an early
stage of development.
/7/Not printed. (Ibid., POL 23 VIET S)
/8/Not printed. (Ibid., POL 7 US/MCNAMARA)
4. To assist the Vietnamese to increase the armed forces (regular plus paramilitary) by at
least 50,000 men.
Embassy advised 23 Mar 64 (Deptel 1505)/9/ among other things that General Khanh's
concept for employment of forces must be refined before any firm determination is made
as to the breakdown of the "at least 50,000 men" increase; that it is essential that an early
determination be made as to the responsibility of the military and paramilitary (including
police); that it is essential that RVNAF carry the war to the guerrillas in their base areas.
Embassy was advised to refine the concept for implementing recommendations 4, 6, and 7
and to submit requirements for forces (including US personnel), MAP, and AID funding.
/9/Not printed. (Ibid.)
General Harkins reported 25 Mar 64/10/ that MACV, in conjunction with all other
interested agencies in Saigon, was progressing well with required planning. Mission
approval for the program is to be sought soon and presentation to the GVN made as soon
thereafter as possible. Mr. Brent is exploring financial aspects with Vice Prime Minister
Oanh.
5. To assist the Vietnamese to create a greatly enlarged Civil Administrative Corps for
work at province, district and hamlet levels.
On 21 Mar 64 (Embtel [Deptel] 1492)/11/ the Embassy was requested to submit estimates
of US and GVN personnel requirements; cost; and training schedules. Embassy was asked
whether Michigan State or third country personnel would be useful.
/11/Not printed. (Department of State, Central Files, POL 23 VIET S)
There has been no response from Saigon and no further action generated in
Washington./12/
/12/First session of special civil administration training course for district chiefs from four
provinces began 30 Mar 64. The course will be repeated once a month until all of the 237
district chiefs have a chance to attend. [Footnote in the source text.]
6. To assist the Vietnamese to improve and reorganize the paramilitary forces and to
increase their compensation.
See summary under Recommendation #4 above.
7. To assist the Vietnamese to create an offensive guerrilla force.
See summary under Recommendation #4 above.
8. To provide the Vietnamese Air Force 25 A-1H aircraft in exchange for the present T28s.
On 22 March 64, CINCPAC advised the JCS that he has approved a plan for delivery of
16 A-1H's (from units in the Pacific) in Vietnam on or about 1 May and 9 from the USS
Midway by 15 May./13/ These aircraft constituting the third VNAF squadron will be
located at Bien Hoa. A Navy unit of 4 support officers, 8 instructor pilots, and 150 men
will arrive on or about 1 May. Its mission is to train the VN pilots and maintenance people
until they can assume full responsibility (estimated three-six months). ODMA is handling
funding.
/13/CINCPAC telegram 220026Z, March 22. Johnson Library, National Security File,
Vietnam Country File, Vol. VI)
9. To provide the Vietnamese Army additional M-113 armored personnel carriers
(withdrawing the M-114s there), additional river boats, and approximately $5-10 million
of other additional material.
COMUSMACV has requested shipment of 63 M-113's in three increments with the first
increment to arrive in Vietnam on or about 15 Apr 64 and the last before 1 June 64./14/
This schedule was approved by the Department of the Army on 26 Mar 64. The
disposition of the M-114's that are being withdrawn is being worked out by the
Department of the Army. ODMA will determine the price and funding data for the
exchange as soon as the final disposition is decided. There is no resultant delay.
On 22 March 1964, CINCPAC listed his additional FY 64 requirements for Vietnam./15/
They are 30 M-113's, 84 cupolas for M-113's, TACS, 54 AN/ARC-55 and 93 AN/ARC45 radios, 17 loudspeaker systems, 5 30-ton cranes, transportation for CG, conversion of
an LSM to a hospital ship and 500 backpack sprays. Total cost of this list is $2.65 million.
CINCPAC was advised by ODMA on 25 March 1964 that these additional requirements
were approved for funding and was requested to provide programming data. CINCPAC
also proposed additional items that would increase the FY 65 MAP from $150.8 to $174.6
million. ODMA will respond to this request later.
/15/CINCPAC telegram 22002Z, March 22. (Johnson Library, National Security File,
Vietnam Country File, Vol. VI)
10. To announce publicly the Fertilizer Program and to expand it with a view within two
years to trebling the amount of fertilizer made available.
The Embassy was requested 25 Mar 64 (Deptel 1523)/16/ to draft a public announcement
for the Ambassador's and GVN concurrence, after which appropriate announcement is to
be made in Saigon. Embassy was advised that the release should probably be deferred
until week of 30 Mar to permit resolution of fertilizer procurement problems. USOM has
advised AID that commercial suppliers in Vietnam can meet the requirement.
/16/Not printed. (Department of State, Central Files, AID (US) VIET S)
11. To authorize continued high-level U.S. overflights of South Vietnam's borders and to
authorize "hot pursuit" and South Vietnamese ground operations over the Laotian line for
the purpose of border control. More ambitious operations into Laos involving units
beyond battalion size should be authorized only with the approval of Souvanna Phouma.
Operations across the Cambodian border should depend on the state of relations with
Cambodia.
A draft telegram of guidelines to Saigon was considered by DOD 30 March 64. Its main
provisions are to authorize the following:
(1) Establishment of covert five-man GVN military liaison team with Laotian forces at
Savannakhet.
(2) Authorization of hot pursuit.
(3) Authorization of intelligence collection operations and commando and sabotage raids
by VN forces in the region south of Tchepone.
(4) Operations of not to exceed battalion size for relief and support of friendly Lao forces
in border regions.
(5) Limited covert encadrement of FAR units in territory adjacent Lao Vol Bn 33.
(6) Resupply opns. (See Vientiane #1067)/17/
/17/Paragraph (6) was handwritten. In telegram 1067, March 30, the Embassy in
Vientiane recommended against approaching Souvanna Phouma on the question of
resupply of covert South Vietnamese troops in Laos because of his fundamental
opposition to Laos becoming involved in "someone else's war." (Ibid., POL 27 VIET S)
12. To prepare immediately to be in a position on 72 hours notice to initiate the full range
of Laotian and Cambodian "Border Control" actions (beyond those authorized in
paragraph 11 above) and the "Retaliatory Actions" against North Vietnam, and to be in a
position on 30 days' notice to initiate the program of "Graduated Overt Military Pressure"
The JCS recommended 30 Mar 64 (JCSM-272-64)/18/ that authority be granted to deploy
48 B-57's and 1081 personnel from Japan to Clark Air Force Base, beginning 1 Apr 64
and at the rate of 4 aircraft every three days. If necessary, movement can be completed in
4 days.
/18/Not printed. (Washington National Records Center, RG 330, OASD/ISA Files: FRC
69 A 926, 452.1 Vietnam)
On 30 Mar 64 the JCS approved dispatch of planning guidance to CINCPAC that requests
submission of an outline plan to the JCS by 8 May emphasizing the application of air and
naval power against the DRV and Communist China. The objective of the operations
would be to cause cessation of any large scale aggression undertaken by the CHICOM's,
possibly assisted by the DRV, in response to US/GVN military pressures against the
DRV. A series of other planning messages have been sent by the JCS to CINCPAC. The
JCS were requested on 25 Mar to brief selected representatives of the Department of State
as early as possible on the concepts of our plans for phased actions.
On 26 March Mr. Forrestal sent Mr. Rowen a memorandum entitled, "Political Scenario
in support of pressures on the North."/19/ Mr. Rowen has added material to this
memorandum and prepared a new script on 28 March./20/ Copies have been sent to Mr.
Sullivan and Mr. Forrestal.
/19/Apparent reference to the first draft of Document 102.
F. J. Blouin
Rear Admiral, USN
/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Vietnam Country File, Vol. VI,
Cables and Memos. Top Secret. This covering memorandum is also published in
Declassified Documents, 1984, 002725.
SUBJECT
Political Scenario in Support of Pressures on the North
I attach the latest version of my political scenario for pressures on the North./2/ Bill
Sullivan and Henry Rowen from McNaughton's office participated. I discussed it at
luncheon today with Sullivan, McNaughton and Bill Bundy. We agreed it could go to
General Taylor as a draft with no official standing. This means it will probably be taken
up at the JCS meeting tomorrow.
/2/On March 30, Forrestal sent McGeorge Bundy a copy of what he described as "a very
rough draft of a political scenario for pressures against North Vietnam." Forrestal stated
that he did the original "off the top of my head" and that Henry Rowen of ISA had
"tinkered with it, but not brutally enough." The March 28 draft scenario and the covering
memorandum from Forrestal to Bundy are in the Johnson Library, National Security File,
Vietnam Country File, Vol. VI, Cables and Memos.
This draft does two major violences to JCS thinking. Instead of proceeding immediately
to direct U.S. involvement (which some of the Chiefs favor) it introduces a second phase
of overt SVN action with U.S. covert support. All us civilians are agreed that this is the
stage we should really plan for, keeping the possibility of direct U.S. action as a
contingency reserved against the possibility of major escalation.
The other probable shortfall from the JCS point of view is the memorandum's failure to
concentrate on intensified border operations against Laos and Cambodia and U.S. lowlevel reconnaissance over these two countries, plus North Vietnam. Again the civilians are
agreed that these actions would only attract a strong international protest against the U.S.,
without providing us with significant leverage against the North.
Finally, I am worried that too much preoccupation with a military-political scenario will
detract from our regular efforts in South Vietnam, which, as you and I know, need
considerable improvement. More specifically, it is hard to imagine a more dangerous
course than embarking upon the attached scenario without having made the changes in
"policy and personnel" in our own organization in Saigon.
Please let me know urgently if any of the steps I am taking seem impolitic to you.
Mike
[Attachment]
POLITICAL SCENARIO IN SUPPORT OF PRESSURES ON THE
NORTH (THIRD DRAFT)/3/
/3/Top Secret.
This paper does not describe in detail the nature or order of specific military actions which
are being devised by JCS. It is assumed, however, that there are three major categories of
such actions, with perhaps some overlap between the categories:
a. Covert SVN action against the North (with US covert support).
b. Overt SVN action against the North (with US covert support) including:
Aerial mining
VNAF attacks on selected DRV targets possibly including Farmgate
c. Overt joint SVN and US action including:
Warning and preparatory actions
US aerial reconnaissance activities
Sizeable build up of US forces
Naval displays and large scale overflights
Destructive activities
Naval control measures ("selective" or total blockade, possibly including mining
operations)
Naval bombardment
Air attacks on selected DRV targets.
What follows are some suggestions for political moves to set the stage and to develop
support both at home and abroad for each category of action.
I. Political steps during the period from the present to the time when US and GVN decide
on overt SVN actions against the North.
We are in this period now, and it is assumed that actions in Category (a) will be continued
and augmented. During this period it is necessary for both the GVN and the US to make
clear in each country and to the world the nature of the underlying facts and rationale
which support the GVN's efforts against the VC and our support of these efforts. There
should be produced by speeches, articles, interviews and other methods, a consistent
historical picture of SVN since World War II, a general description of North Vietnamese
involvement in events since 1959 and a more detailed description of the desired state of
affairs in Southeast Asia after control of the insurgency from North. Secretary
McNamara's speech on March 26/4/ is an excellent start on such a program. Among the
specific steps which should be prepared to follow McNamara's speech are:
/4/See Document 95.
1. An article by Ambassador Lodge should appear within the next two weeks (a draft has
already been prepared by Lodge, commented on here, and is being resumed to him for
final revision)./5/
/5/The major substantive revision of the draft Lodge article suggested by William Bundy
and Rusk in telegram 1543 to Saigon, March 27, was their desire that Lodge identify
North Vietnam as the "primary aggressor" against South Vietnam rather than emphasizing
China's role. (Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 VIET S)
2. Another speech by General Khanh on war aims. In such a speech General Khanh
should describe the specific programs and measures which his government intends to
pursue in order to bring a better life to the villages of Vietnam. General Khanh has already
made a strong start in his speech of March 9th./6/ Subsequent speeches laying out specific
programs in support of these aims should also be made by General Khanh and other
members of his government. The Department of State should prepare a brochure of
significant excerpts from General Khanh's speeches for informal dissemination to
interested experts in this country.
/6/A summary and analysis of the speech are in telegrams 1711 and 1729 from Saigon,
March 8 and 11. (Ibid.)
3. Material for friendly Senators and Congressmen should be prepared on the subject of
neutralism, US objectives in Southeast Asia as a whole, new programs and reforms
undertaken by the GVN, and a general description of NVN direction and control of the
VC.
4. In addition to the above, a modest program aimed at increasing public awareness of the
US interest and involvement in Vietnam should be carried out. Additional material along
the lines of the recently issued AID poster/7/ should be developed and distributed. Public
service advertisements in magazines, newspapers and radio/television should be
encouraged.
5. Another diplomatic exchange with the British, and one with our principal allies to make
sure that they understand our view of the war in South Vietnam and the importance of
North Vietnamese involvement. We did something like this recently when Lord Home
and Butler were in Washington,/8/ and Bohlen is currently probing the French on the
subject of "neutralization." Another effort should be made three or four weeks from now,
perhaps by sending an emissary to London and Paris to report on progress made in SVN.
At that time North Atlantic Council should also be given a presentation of the US view
/8/Reference is to the official visit of February 12-14; see Document 41.
II. Steps to be taken after decision to begin actions in Category (b): (i.e. Overt actions by
SVN against the North).
Although the decision to initiate these actions will have to be taken at the highest level of
the US Government, it must be remembered that political initiatives should surface in
Saigon and not in Washington, so as to maintain the credibility of the sovereignty of the
GVN. The nature of some operations that might be carried out in this phase (e.g.,
Farmgate) will make it difficult to deny US involvement. Some specific and political
moves are listed below:
1. McNamara should make another trip to Saigon. His object should be to secure General
Khanh's agreement to begin overt SVN action against the North. Publicly, his trip will be
explained as the next in a logical series but particular emphasis will be placed on his onthe-spot review of the problems posed by increasing evidence of North Vietnamese
involvement. McNamara reports to the President on his return.
2. McNamara carries with him to Saigon some suggestions for another major speech by
General Khanh. This speech gives details on NVN activity against the South and contains
a demand that Hanoi cease. The speech also describes the future of Indo-China if Hanoi
would cooperate. It foresees a period of two independent but separate Vietnams, gradually
increasing peaceful contacts with each other followed by eventual reunification on a
satisfactory basis.
3. President consults with limited number of Congressional leaders and discloses that the
US has been asked by General Khanh to help the GVN bring pressures on the North for
the purpose of convincing Hanoi to cease its insurgency in the South. He [1 line of source
text not declassified] informs them that USG intends to give SVN covert support in these
operations.
4. Speech by General Khanh.
5. Shortly thereafter, public release of Jorden White Paper/9/ detailing NVN involvement.
/9/Published by the Department of State in February 1965, as Aggression From the North:
The Record of North Vietnam's Campaign To Conquer South Vietnam.
[Numbered paragraph 6 (1-1/2 lines of source text) not declassified]
7. Offer reassurances to SVN and Thailand (and possibly Laos) of US protection and
assistance in the event of NVN retaliation by air or by stepped-up insurgency. Request
permission of Philippines and Thailand to stage and deploy US forces to those countries.
8. US commences unannounced air defense capability for Saigon and takes first overt
military movements to prepare for possible escalation (such as fleet movement to provide
whatever cover JCS deems necessary for air operations against North). Some care should
be taken, however, to avoid public appearance that US is involved in GVN action.
9. GVN begins training Vietnamese pilots for B-57's.
10. US evacuates dependents from Saigon.
11. GVN takes first action against North (probably Farmgate harbor minings of important
ports).
12. Immediately thereafter Khanh makes second speech calling on North to cease
insurgency and making public the military action which has been taken.
13. US uses third country, i.e., Canada, UK or France to transmit message to Hanoi that
while US deplores need for these actions, it understands their necessity and supports them
in principle. US also indicates particular interest in that part of Khanh's speech offering
food to the North and wonders if negotiations between North and South might be useful.
Some communication to ChiComs might also be appropriate. No approach should be
made to USSR at this time.
14. President consults broader group of Congressional leaders and describes the gravity of
situation, making full disclosure [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] evidence
of NVN involvement with VC, and emphasizes need to support Khanh in his initiative.
President does not ask for action by Congress. He also gives background briefing, [less
than 1 line of source text not declassified] to selected group of public opinion leaders
(editors, publishers and columnists). He might also consider briefing Republican
candidate.
15. On the assumption that no change occurs in NVN attitude and behavior, Khanh makes
speech immediately after appropriate VC incident, i.e., cutting of rail line, killing of US
personnel or destruction of POL dump; announces need to inflict appropriate type of
damage on NVN. Khanh deplores necessity for taking such action and situation which
makes it necessary for SVN to send military force to North, instead of food and medicine.
16. First targeted attack occurs as promptly as possible. Use of Farmgate aircraft may lead
to public disclosure of US participation, either through loss of the aircraft by way of
enemy anti-aircraft capability or materiel failure or through disclosures made by
correspondents in SVN. Means of minimizing this possibility through improvements in
SVN capabilities or through use of sheepdipped US pilots should be investigated.
17. Other overt SVN actions against North are taken accompanied by a series of SVN
announcements and a call by Khanh for a GVN-DRV meeting at Hue and cessation of VC
attacks. Propagandize North, by radio and leaflet, warning of the consequences and [of]
continued aggression. Khanh stresses that these are not reprisals against civilians. Stresses
GVN carrying out "just actions" in reply to "acts of terror."
Farmgate-type actions should probably continue until some evidence of a favorable North
Vietnamese reaction appears. We should consider at some stage precisely what we would
expect them to do and inform them of this decision. We should probably not consider
moving to the next phase of overt US pressures unless the ChiComs intervene or the DRV
begins a full-scale assault on the South. It is important that all the possibilities of SVN
overt pressures covertly supported by us be played out to the full.
III. US decides on direct US action against NVN.
The move from the previous categories of action to this one can be made either suddenly
or slowly, depending upon the array of military actions from which we choose. In other
words, we could proceed slowly and logically from covert to overt support of SVN
sponsored actions or we might decide to move quickly and dramatically if international
pressures had reached a dangerous point or if we wish to lend support to four-power
conference in Geneva. The specific political steps listed below could be adjusted to either
course.
1. If we have not already done so the establishment of EXCOM arrangements at this point
is essential.
2. The Department of State brings SEATO allies up to date on [less than 1 line of source
text not declassified] evidence of VC involvement. Though formal SEATO action will not
be possible because of the probable positions of France and the UK, the US case might be
based in part upon the US SEATO commitment. The North Atlantic Council should be
informed.
3. Second conference between President and legislative leaders in which the President
discloses full details [less than 1 line of source text not declassified], reviews histories of
attacks against US installations and personnel in SVN and states arguments for necessity
for retaliation directly against the North, and asks Congressional support and possibly a
Congressional resolution.
4. Public speech by President setting forth US policy and explaining necessity for direct
action against North. US direct action takes place in accordance with JCS plan and
simultaneous deployment of US forces to offset possible escalation.
5. Assurances given to SVN, Laos and Thailand on US protection, already evident
through US military deployment, against possible DRV and ChiCom retaliation.
6. Convey to North our demands which need to be satisfied in order to stop our action,
expanding on points in Presidential speech. Make clear limited intentions and
determinations. State actions we want taken by North and fact that compliance will have
to be visible to us. Possibly identify some specific VC units we want to see comply with
our demands.
7. As a supplement to what was said in the President's speech, state privately to the
Soviets and ChiComs our objectives and warn the Soviets and ChiComs against support
of the North either directly or by way of arms and logistics (SAM, interceptors, trucks,
POL).
8. Conference begins in Geneva and US action continues unless visible cessation of NVN
action in South occurs. Note: The possibility should be considered of making the.initial
US action strong, so as to permit some time to pass before second action is needed. If, as
it should be, our measure of compliance is a reduction in the insurgency, rather than DRV
promises, it is possible that military pressures might have to be continued over a period of
several months and perhaps even longer. We will have to be prepared to deal with the
international pressures which might build up during this period.
The following are some of the questions with which we must be prepared to deal at a
conference and upon which we must prepare a position:
Our overt goal.
Geneva Accords brought up to date?
Better ICC?
Cessation of logistic support?
Reduction of VC insurgency?
The problem of dealing with the VC.
Will there be an amnesty
Will we insist that the GVN be free to hunt down the holdouts?
Provisions for reimposing military pressures.
US military presence in GVN?
Controls on indigenous forces?
GVN-DRV diplomatic and other contacts.
North-South trade?
Treatment of Laos and Cambodia.
9. Conference reaches acceptable settlement or US actions continue and increase.
Washington, April 1, 1964.
Cables and Memos. Top Secret.
SUBJECT
Presidential Luncheon on Thursday, April 2/2/
/2/The luncheon meeting took place from 12:35 to 2:54 p.m., April 2. (Ibid.. President's
Daily Diary) No record of the meeting has been found.
Here is a list of matters which I think you can profitably raise at the luncheon tomorrow.
1. Replacement for Ambassador Lodge brought about by his possible resignation after the
Oregon primary.
2. Reassignment of General Harkins and reorganization of MACV. (I have submitted a
memorandum to you on this subject.)/3/
/3/Document 100.
3. Follow-up action with respect to Chantrea (I have submitted a memorandum to you.)/4/
/4/The Chantrea incident occurred on March 19 when South Vietnamese troops
accompanied by two American advisers entered Cambodia in hot pursuit of people fleeing
and believed to be Viet Cong. The Vietnamese Air Force directed napalm and
machinegun fire on the village of Chantrea and a U.S. helicopter penetrated Cambodia.
MACV reported that U.S. personnel did not fire on the fleeing civilians nor did they direct
Vietnamese fire, but they were deficient in determining their geographical position.
(Memorandum from Forrestal to the President, March 21; Johnson Library, White House
Confidential File, CO 312 Vietnam) In a memorandum to McGeorge Bundy, April 1,
Forrestal suggested ways to assure that this type of incident did not happen again. (Ibid.,
National Security File, Vietnam Country File, Vol. VI, Cables and Memos)
4. Discussion of tactical problem of clear-and-sweep plus air strikes, versus clear-andhold operations. (I would only raise this in an elliptical fashion if the chance occurs during
the discussion of Harkins or Chantrea.)
5. Cross border operations between Laos and Cambodia. Although the JCS raised this
question this afternoon, they were surprisingly mild. General Taylor, however, was not
present, and he may suggest early action. Sihanouk having just made another turn-about,
and Souvanna being in one of his periodical states of jelly--this is not the time to press
against either of these countries. This is particularly true if we have any hope of laying a
political base for direct pressure against the North. It is going to be difficult enough to lay
such a base without also having to face the screams of the rest of the world that we are
beating on two small and supposedly neutral countries.
6. Political scenario and military planning for pressures against the North. General Taylor
has the political scenario which I developed/5/ and he may have read it. The Joint Chiefs
got an oral description this afternoon and seemed receptive. However, they will only be
getting the actual copies tonight. Judging from Goodpaster's comments, Taylor seems
wedded to the idea of moving from reconnaissance and cross border operations against
Laos and Cambodia, and low-level reconnaissance over all contiguous countries through
retaliatory actions by both US and SVN forces to full scale air strikes against the North.
But we really do not know what his position actually is. The next step in this planning
should be to have the JCS designate one or two senior officers to fill in the military part of
the scenario.
/5/See attachment, Document 102.
Mike
Cables and Memos. Top Secret. Also published in Declassified Documents, 1984,
002725.
SUBJECT
Laos/Vietnam--Cross Border Operations
I enclose a draft telegram to Saigon and Vientiane, which it is proposed be sent today to
the field./2/
/2/Attached but not printed was a draft of telegram 1630 to Saigon, also sent to Vientiane
as telegram 836, April 7. In substance the draft and the cable as sent were similar and they
provided proposed guidelines for the types of operations in Laos by South Vietnamese
forces for which the United States was prepared to provide financial and materiel support.
The principal difference between the draft and cable was that the latter had an
introduction that indicated that the guidelines were tentative and subject to comment by
Ambassador Unger in Laos. (Department of State. Central Files. POL 27 VIET S)
To send this telegram without Averell's approval is just asking for trouble in my book.
Sullivan tells me that he believes that the Governor would not object to the substance; but
he admits that he has never shown anything quite like this cable to Averell. I am going to
urge as strongly as I can that they not dispatch this cable until Averell's return on
Friday./3/
/3/April 3.
On the substance, I think this is an ill-conceived plan, which could well cut the ground out
from Unger in Vientiane. Souvanna has been increasingly nervous about his relations with
Phoumi and has been making real gestures in the direction of leaving Vientiane with the
neutral faction and returning to the Plain of Jars. He is also about to leave for Peiping and
Hanoi. The possibility that an overenthusiastic MACV might order a raid into Laos
without Unger's knowing about it could, in my opinion, really upset the applecart.
Sullivan thinks that the concept of "hot pursuit" and the fact that the border regions are
generally uninhabited will, in effect, result in there being no action taken under these
instructions. How he can think this so soon after the Chantrea incident puzzles me. I think
at the very least we must give Unger a veto on the planned operations, subject to being
overridden here in Washington./4/ We can keep our fingers crossed on the "hot pursuit"
activities.
/4/In telegrams 1116 and 1119 from Vientiane, April 10 and 11, Unger responded to
telegram 836 to Vientiane and the guidelines for cross-border operations in Laos by
stating that such activities would jeopardize the U.S. policy of Lao neutrality and would
be opposed by Souvanna Phouma. In most areas of Laos, the presence of South
Vietnamese troops would destroy existing U.S.-Lao cooperation in combating North
Vietnamese presence in Laos. (Both Department of State. Central Files. POL 27 VIET S)
I am going to talk to your brother about this to get his reaction. I know that the workinglevel of the State Department feels more concerned about this than I do.
Mike
105. Message From the Ambassador in France (Bohlen) to the President/1/

Paris, April 2, 1964--8 p.m.
/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Memos to the President, McGeorge
Bundy, Vol. III. Secret; Immediate; Nodis. Transmitted as telegram 4615 from Paris,
which is the source text. Passed to the White House on receipt in the Department of State.
The Department of State also summarized this telegram as an item for the President's
evening reading, April 2. (Department of State, S/S Files: Lot 64 D 164, President's
Evening Reading File. 1964)
I spent approximately forty-five minutes this afternoon endeavoring to persuade General
de Gaulle to make a statement which would clarify French policy on neutrality as a longterm policy and policy applicable in the actual situation of warfare in Vietnam. De Gaulle
told me frankly that he did not think he could make any such statement since he believed
in the policy of neutrality even under present conditions. The most I could get him to do
was to say that if "he returned" to the subject he would state that France was against
anything that would lead to the Communist takeover but he said he would probably add
that this was the reason why they favored the policy of neutrality.
I began the conversation by outlining in detail your message (Deptel 4793)/2/ I then
outlined the four possible courses of action which the US could follow: 1) withdrawal,
which we had rejected; 2) enlargement of the war, which we did not seek; 3) a
continuance of the present course of action and to assist the Government of Vietnam; and
4) we had even considered the policy of neutrality but had rejected it because of total
inapplicability to warfare such as existed in Vietnam.
/2/Document 96.
I mentioned that in effect current US policy was that of number 3, to continue our
assistance to the Vietnamese Government with certain variations dictated by
circumstances emphasizing that this assistance would involve political as well as military
factors. I also told him that in the opinion of Secretary McNamara General Khanh had
made an excellent impression upon the Americans there. He seemed to be intelligent,
able, energetic, and with a clear understanding of the necessities of the situation.
I then asked General de Gaulle if he had any comments to make in regard to what I had
told him. General de Gaulle said that France did not agree with the US in its analysis of
the situation in that it did not consider that there was any real government in Vietnam. He
pointed out that Diem, who had had a real government, had lost the support of his people
and had been "eliminated". He was succeeded by someone whose name he could not
remember (presumably Big Minh), and now they had "this Khanh". He said the war in
essence was the same one that the French had been fighting since the end of World War
II; that the Vietnamese had no taste for this war and that the anti-Communist forces in
Vietnam were not up to the task.
I interrupted him to tell him this was quite contrary to our analysis of the situation. We
felt it was quite different, one was a colonial war which came out as colonial wars always
do and the other was a war against aggression directed and maintained from without. I
said that I assumed that France did not wish to see the Communists take over Vietnam nor
for this reason did they wish to see the US withdraw under present circumstances. De
Gaulle agreed with these two statements and said they were correct. I then said that I
thought France could assist the Vietnamese Government in this difficult task if it were
possible to find a formulation of words which, without denying the validity of an eventual
policy of neutrality, could state that neutrality is obviously not applicable under present
conditions and that the first task in Vietnam is military stabilization.
De Gaulle at this point asked what would be our policy if and when a military
stabilization--which he doubted--was achieved. I told him that then we could certainly
have no objection to a consideration of neutrality if the military situation was stabilized to
the point where the government really controlled its own territory and if it was the desire
of the government. I pointed out that the US had in effect agreed to the neutralization of
Laos and Cambodia but not Vietnam where circumstances were entirely different.
De Gaulle then said it was his considered judgment that the US could not possibly
succeed in the course that we were on. He felt we would merely repeat the experience the
French had earlier; that the Vietnamese had no stomach for the war; that in his opinion the
quicker we came out for neutralization in Vietnam, possibly through the mechanism of a
Geneva-type conference including the Chinese, the better it would be. He said it was
conceivable that the situation might not get much worse but saw no prospect of it getting
better. He said it was either this neutralization as an announced policy or a willingness of
the US to really carry the war to the North and if necessary against China.
I interrupted to ask him if the French would be in favor of our extending the war. He said
no, that France would not wish to see this but at least it was a clear and definite policy.
De Gaulle then in a rather reminiscent mood mentioned that the US and France had never
coordinated their policies towards Southeast Asia, referring to the period during the war
when we seemed to be working against France in Indochina. I told him that while this
may have had some truth towards the end of the war it was not true since I was in the
Embassy here (1949-1951) when we shifted over to full assistance to the French in order
to help them win the war. I also reminded him that at one point in 1954 we had given
serious consideration to the atomic bomb in order to help relieve the situation in Dien
Bien Phu. I took advantage of the opening and said that if we could get now some moral
assistance from the French Government we would be satisfied and repeated arguments in
favor of clarifying statement in regard to neutrality as a long-term and not an immediate
policy. De Gaulle countered by saying in effect he considered that the neutrality policy
offered the only way out to the US other than to engage in a major hostility against North
Vietnam and China.
He said that he felt that any military stabilization would only come about with Chinese
consent and that with Chinese consent there could be genuine neutrality. He also
mentioned that once China had decided in favor of neutrality he felt some time in the
future the two parts of Vietnam would then come together.

I countered this by telling him our experience with Communists had shown that neutrality
was a policy which the Communists would adopt only if they were avoiding something
worse, mentioning in this connection the case of Laos.
I asked de Gaulle what form of pressure or inducement could be used on the Chinese for
them to accept neutrality when according to his statement they were on the winning side.
De Gaulle shrugged his shoulders and said this would have to be seen, mentioning
parenthetically that this was one of the reasons why they had recognized China when they
did in order to be in a position to ascertain Chinese views.
With further reference to his statement that we had never concerted our policies in this
area I told him that I was sure the US would be more than anxious to concert with France
in the present situation in Southeast Asia and if he could find it possible to make the
declaration that I had referred to this would rapidly lead to a close consultation in regard
to Vietnam. De Gaulle said flatly it was too late for any such concerting and repeated his
view that the sooner the US went for neutralization in Vietnam the better off they would
be.
He then said that the most he could do at the present time would be that if he reverted to
the subject to say that France was against the Communization of Vietnam and it was for
this reason that they were in favor of neutralization.
Since it was apparent that no further argumentation would be of any avail with de Gaulle I
terminated the conversation with the statement that there would be a considerable degree
of disappointment in Washington over his position on this matter and that I feared a good
opportunity had been lost to really work closely together with France on a specific
situation.
Comment:
I think that the above narrative speaks for itself. De Gaulle was courteous and affable
throughout and did not appear to be irritated by my rather frank and direct comments, but
showed no sign whatsoever of changing his attitude. It seems to me that what this adds up
to is his firm belief that the course we are on, i.e., supporting the Vietnamese
Government, is one that will only end in failure and that the best policy for the US was to
opt for an immediate policy of neutralization. The only other alternative he could see
would be one in which the US would enlarge the war by an attack on North Vietnam and
probably China.
It was not clear to me to what extent De Gaulle was operating on genuine conviction or
whether past failure and humiliation in Vietnam played a large part in determining his
current attitude.
I shall merely tell press that I had not seen General de Gaulle since January and was just
having a "tour d'horizon".
I will send a further analytical message and a few more minor details tomorrow./3/
/3/Document 106.
Bohlen/4/
106. Telegram From the Embassy in France to the Department of State/1/

Paris, April 3, 1964--noon.
4621. For Secretary from Ambassador. The following are some sidelights of the
conversation with de Gaulle which I did not consider of sufficient importance to put into
the main telegram to the President (Embtel 4615)./2/ One very noticeable feature was his
obvious contemptuous dislike of the Vietnamese and their government. At one point after
he had complained about the attitude towards France of successive Vietnamese
governments, beginning with Diem and with particular reference to the Khanh
government, I told him that I thought the statement that we were seeking would be a great
step in the direction of improved Franco-Vietnamese relations, mentioning in this
connection that while we had known about Khanh's dmarche to the French Charg in
Saigon/3/ we had not suggested it.
/2/Document 105.
De Gaulle in answer said flatly that the attitude of any Vietnamese Government towards
France was a matter of complete and utter indifference. He also throughout the
conversation made disparaging references to the fighting ability, morale and general
character of the Vietnamese people. Some time ago Pinay in private conversation with me
had mentioned that while he was in the government he too had been struck by de Gaulle's
basic dislike of Vietnam and his unwillingness to hear any rational analysis of the
situation there.
De Gaulle a number of times during the conversation referred to the fact that the request I
was making did not render France's task more easy. When I inquired as to exactly what he
meant he made a vague reference to his previous statements at his press conferences about
France's views on the situation in the Orient. I surmise that what he had in mind is the
general plan he had for the recognition of Communist China.
One thing that can be said in regard to this conversation is that it indeed "clarified" French
policy in regard to Vietnam. De Gaulle was explicit in his statement that he felt that
neutralization was the only course which the U.S. could follow and "the sooner the better"
unless we were prepared to carry military operations to the North against Vietminh and
against China.
You will recall that Couve de Murville made a similar statement to me about a month ago
(Embtel 3968)/4/ in regard to the possibility of extension of hostilities. I did not gather
however from de Gaulle that he really seriously was recommending this course of action
but merely that it was pointed out as clear and definite policy, presumably, to contrast
with the uncertainties of our present course.
/4/Dated February 25. (Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 VIET S)
I can assure you that I used every argument that I could think of but avoided any threats or
implied threats as to the future effect on relations with the U.S. since I was convinced that
these would merely complicate matters without producing the slightest change in de
Gaulle's attitude.
My impression was that de Gaulle will probably say nothing on the subject of Vietnam for
some time to come while he watches to see whether we are able with the Vietnamese to
bring about an improvement in the situation or whether as he anticipates we will be
headed towards a bigger crisis later on. I would certainly recommend against any further
approach to de Gaulle on this subject and that we make every effort to keep the actual
contents of this talk confidential.
I don't quite know how this problem will be handled in Saigon since Lodge apparently
had already informed Khanh of my proposed talk. I would suggest that a sanitized version
of this conversation be transmitted to Khanh but I feel that anything like a full account of
de Gaulle's views should not be given to Vietnam.
You will undoubtedly wish to discuss this matter further with Couve de Murville in
Manila/5/ but I would think with the realization in the back of your mind that Couve has
no authority to make de Gaulle's policy.
/5/See Document 113.
Bohlen
Washington, April 3, 1964, 2 p.m./1/
/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, NSC Meetings, Vol. 1. Top Secret.
Drafted by Bromley Smith.
The President opened the meeting with the Congressional Leaders by saying that his
purpose was to bring them up to date on recent developments. Various Council members
would report on current situations. He first called on Secretary Rusk for a summary of
developments in Brazil.
[Here follow Rusk's briefing on Brazil and subsequent discussion.]
The President then turned to a discussion of our policy toward Vietnam. He referred to his
meeting with Ambassador Lodge/2/ in which he told the Ambassador that he was to carry
out a unified policy. The President mentioned that he had made personnel changes in
USIA and CIA which the Ambassador suggested. He said there were alternative policies
for Vietnam but that the Administration had chosen one following a National Security
Council discussion of Secretary McNamara's report/3/ which he made upon his return
from his fourth trip to Vietnam. The President said he wanted the Congressional Leaders
to know the policy of the Administration. He was not asking those present to commit
themselves on the policy. His purpose was to be certain that those present knew exactly
what we are trying to do in Vietnam. He then called on Secretary McNamara.
/2/See Foreign Relations, 1961-1963, vol. iv, pp. 635-637.
/3/Document 84.
Secretary McNamara apologized for the absence of General Taylor who he said was
indisposed and obliged to remain at his quarters. He then described how the situation in
Vietnam had grown worse, especially since last September. The Viet Cong controls 40%
of the territory but a lesser percentage of the total population. The people of Vietnam were
becoming apathetic toward the war. This had the effect in the military of increasing the
desertion rate. Many fortified hamlets had been overrun or disbanded-some civil guards
had turned in the weapons with which they were supposed to defend these hamlets. The
security in many areas was less than it had been. The political structure in the hamlets and
villages had almost disappeared. Frequent changes of hamlet leaders and village chieftains
had produced a vacuum into which the Viet Cong had moved. The changes of local
leaders caused by the changes of the central government in Saigon had contributed to
local disorganization in village and provincial governmental life. In addition, the Viet
Cong was receiving larger weapons primarily from Communist China.
Secretary McNamara then summarized the various policy alternatives for Vietnam:
a. We could withdraw entirely and allow the area to be taken by the Communists.
b. We could agree to a neutralization of the area which, in effect, would mean permitting
it to fall into Communist hands.
c. We could broaden the military campaign by taking the war to other areas, such as North
Vietnam. This alternative we had seriously considered.
d. We could make the present program of assistance more effective. This is the course we
have chosen to follow.
Secretary McNamara then spelled out the military action categories which were contained
in his report but which were not recommended to the President for approval. He said that
General Khanh did not favor broadening the military action at present because he felt that
first priority should be given to solving the problems of security in South Vietnam.
Secretary McNamara summarized the various parts of the current expanded program. He
said that the Joint Chiefs of Staff supported the program adopted, but the Chiefs felt that
to be successful in South Vietnam the war would have to be taken to North Vietnam. He
said that the twelfth recommendation in the report called for preparations so that we
would be in a position to broaden the war if the adopted program did not succeed in
solidifying the situation in South Vietnam.
Senator Dirksen asked whether General Harkins were going to be retained in Saigon.
Secretary McNamara said under normal procedures General Harkins will retire on July
31st. He had performed magnificently. It may be that he would be called back to
Washington in the next few months prior to the date of his retirement. The President said
that the best officer in the U.S. military forces for this assignment had been sent as
General Harkins' deputy in anticipation of his taking command. He said this officer is
General Westmoreland.
Senator Saltonstall asked whether, under the new McNamara program, U.S. soldiers
would be participating in the fighting or whether they remained as advisers to the South
Vietnamese. Secretary McNamara replied that they would continue their present role of
advising.
[Here follows discussion of Panama.]
Senator Morse said that the Panamanian agreement was a great agreement and he
congratulated the President and the Secretary of State. He said, however, he felt obliged to
say that he disagrees entirely with the program for South Vietnam. He said that the only
way to solve the Vietnam problem was by using SEATO and the UN to achieve a
peaceful settlement.
The President said that there was no effort to compromise Senator Morse's position or
involve him in the Administration plan for Vietnam. Senator Morse replied that he
understood, however, that Premier Khanh had called him a traitor. President Johnson
replied that "no one in this room has called you a traitor."
Senator Dirksen said he wondered whether SEATO was viable. Senator Mansfield replied
that in his view SEATO was a paper tiger, adding that the President's policy toward
Vietnam was the only one we could follow.
The President said we had recently attempted to find out what de Gaulle was trying to
accomplish in Southeast Asia. On the basis of Ambassador Bohlen's talk with de Gaulle
we had learned that the French have no plan or program./4/ The President concluded by
saying that we have now adopted an expanded program for South Vietnam and we will
push it as hard as we can.
/4/See Documents 105 and 106.
Senator Dirksen asked whether the press reports coming out of Saigon were accurate.
Secretary McNamara replied by saying that there were a host of wars going in Vietnam.
Each dispatch is right but covers only one facet of the problem. Therefore, it is not an
accurate description of the whole problem. We tried to get as full a picture of the situation
as we could and traveled widely in the area. The picture we did get was quite different
from that appearing in the press.
[Here follows discussion of Panama and Africa.]
Senator Humphrey stated that the President's statement on Panama was excellent. He said
our forbearance and patience had paid off. With respect to Vietnam, he asked what would
be the extra cost of the new program. Secretary McNamara replied that this was very
difficult to estimate but he doubted that it would exceed $50 million additional.
Senator Humphrey asked where we expect to get the Vietnamese to carry out the new
program. Mr. Bell replied that numbers of Vietnamese were going back to Saigon from
exile. In addition, the program called for greatly expanded training of Vietnamese civil
administrators. He doubted that there was a problem of obtaining people to take the civil
training courses.
The President, noting that Secretary Rusk had to leave the meeting to keep an earlier
appointment, asked Under Secretary Ball to report on his recent activities.
[Here follows discussion of subjects unrelated to Vietnam.]
Bromley Smith/5/

1964-1968, Volume I
Vietnam, 1964
Department of State
Washington, DC
IV. The Rusk Mission To Vietnam, April 17-19, and Planning for
Pressures Against the North, April 4-May 7
108. Letter From the Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs (Bundy) to
the Ambassador in Vietnam (Lodge)/1/
/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Vietnam Country File, Vol. VII,
Dear Cabot: I have delayed in carrying out the job assigned to me in the President's 1484
to you of March 20th,/2/ because the planning documents and our whole thinking have
been evolving so that it did not seem useful until now to go into the situation more deeply
with you.
/2/Document 92.
As you know, we carried with us to Saigon a so-called "Annex A" which was an analysis
of the implications of direct US military action against North Viet-Nam./3/ You saw that
analysis at the time and gave your comments to Bob McNamara and John McNaughton.
The latter subsequently revised it into the form which I now enclose as Tab B./4/
/3/Apparent reference to papers cited in footnote 4, Document 93.
/4/Not found.
For the first ten days after our return, we were so preoccupied with the various actions
under the first 11 recommendations of the report that we did not again focus on the issue,
except that the JCS in this period went forward with their examination of the implications
of putting in readiness the various categories of action described in the final McNamaraTaylor report at pages 6 and 7./5/ The original criterion provided that the Border Control
Actions, going beyond those approved by the President at present, should be placed on a
72-hour basis, that the same should be done for the Retaliatory Actions, and that the
actions falling within "graduated overt military pressure by GVN and US forces" should
be placed on a 30-day readiness basis.
/5/Document 84.
In their examination, the JCS worked to the categories as stated in the report, but pointed
out, quite rightly, that they needed further political guidance.
Accordingly, we in the Department, with great help from Mike Forrestal in the White
House, turned our attention to re-thinking the political scenario. The result is the attached
Tab A,/6/ which has now been talked over informally with the JCS and will be the subject
of further refining and inserting appropriate military actions within its framework. (It
should be noted that this scenario, in Part III, goes beyond Recommendation 12 and deals
with the kind of actions discussed in Tab B.)
/6/Not attached, but apparent reference to the attachment to Document 102.
Three conclusions stick out from the re-analysis and I think are now accepted here:
1. There would be serious domestic problems in moving directly to overt US military
action, and, even more basically, if we are to focus the objective where it belongs, on
North Viet-Nam, it seems to us vital that the initial acknowledged actions be carried out
extensively by the GVN itself. Hence, the new scenario would call for a progression of
actions that would put the GVN and Khanh right in the forefront for a period before we
ourselves considered moving to overt US action.
2. The categories used in the McNamara-Taylor report seem to us more and more not to
fit the most likely time sequence. In particular, we believe that actions against Cambodia
and Laos are dependent heavily on the political position in these countries at the time, and
that, in general, it seems more likely that we would wish to hold off in hitting Cambodia
until we had gone ahead hard against North Viet-Nam itself. Serious as the Cambodian
role is, if we start to take strong military action, even in the form of hot pursuit, we will
perhaps be making Cambodia wholly hostile and ready to help the VC, and we would
certainly be stirring up an international hornets nest that would obscure the real objective
and focus of our effort against North Viet-Nam.
Laos is a somewhat different case. If we are to carry actions against Laos to the point
where North Vietnamese forces would move back in, we must be prepared to deal with all
the implications of upsetting the "settlement" in Laos (however precarious and
unsatisfactory it is). At the very least, we should be ready at that point either with forces
stationed in Thailand or to do that at once. [sic] Moreover, for a whole host of reasons,
opening up a Laos theater is the least appetizing way to go about it until we have made a
real attempt in North Viet-Nam. Trouble in Laos can only be dealt with with ground
forces effectively, and I am sure you know that this would not be an easy move to take
from a domestic standpoint nor would it be too good from a strictly military view.
In short, there appear to be reasons not to open up other theaters until we have made clear
that North Viet-Nam is the main theater and have got really started on it. Obviously, we
must deal in due course--once we really mean business--with the activities of North VietNam in both Laos and Cambodia. But our feeling is that this would probably come later
rather than sooner, and we are writing an annex to the next revision of Tab A that will
cover the problem in that sense.
We have also considered the part to be played by retaliatory actions of a tit-for-tat variety.
As you will see, these are woven into the present scenario, but we do not necessarily
envisage them as a separate and prior category of action. Part of the reason is that they are
hard to fit and to present as fitting specific actions by the Viet Cong; one can hit an oil
dump in response to an attack on an oil dump, but attempts to retaliate against the far
more subtle and damaging Viet Cong assassinations, for example, may be hard to
rationalize. But, more basically, tit-for-tat actions, presented as such, do not seem to us by
themselves to convey the picture of concerted and steadily rising pressures that reflect
complete US determination to finish the job.
I state this to you frankly, knowing that you and Paul Harkins are looking at this category
of action, and I do not exclude the possibility of there being individual cases where our
general conclusion will yield to the attractiveness of a specific proposed operation. We
will examine them too in an annex.
3. The result of the above would be to require some sorting of military and political
actions and perhaps to change appreciably the readiness times applicable to each category.
The Border Control and Retaliatory Actions may not need as short a fuse as 72 hours, but
conversely the initiation of actions under the old category of graduated military pressure
should probably have a shorter fuse than 30 days.
The re-sorting of the actions is now in process within the JCS, and will be reflected in the
revised and enlarged scenario we are now preparing. It will require the careful selection of
actions which would make a strong impact right from the outset and might be applied
thereafter either in the form of a single large action--if and when we move to the US overt
phase--or through successive, progressively more serious groups of targets. The JCS
considered this informally the other day, and feel that it should be no serious problem to
arrange the sequence of actions so that it could be handled in either way.
As to the problem of readiness times on the military side, the overt GVN actions are
mostly ready now, since we contemplate extensive and perhaps even exclusive use of the
Farmgate unit on the air side; even the insertion of B-57s, to be flown with a Vietnamese
who would in fact be only a passenger, would take very little time. Thus, the whole
question of readiness times is more apparent than real, except for actions to respond to
possible escalation although of course we will fit this in and see if there are bugs that do
need to be ironed out.
Thus, we are now working to amplify the political scenario and dovetail it with the
military actions that would be taken at each stage. Secondly, we are working on an annex
that would frame the possible timing and type of action in Cambodia and Laos. Thirdly,
we will do an analysis of retaliatory actions. And fourthly, once these three jobs are done,
we propose to refine our estimates and judgments of North Vietnamese and Chinese
Communist reaction, through a comprehensive National Intelligence Estimate. Lastly, this
Estimate in turn will give us a better fix on how likely the more drastic forms of North
Vietnamese and Chinese Communist action really appear to be, so that we can properly
advise the President, at the right time, just what the real risks of escalation are and what it
would take to deal with them from a military standpoint.
This, then, is the status of our planning. I am pouching this rather detailed explanation so
that you, in consultation with Paul Harkins and his senior people as you see fit, can see
how our minds are working and give us your own comment back. I am hoping that this
will reach you by about April 10, and, if you saw fit, I myself will be in Manila from the
12th through the 15th,7 and would welcome a discussion with whomever you might
choose to send. I could make several hours available for this purpose more or less at their
convenience, and we could settle time and place by cables between Manila and Saigon if
this does not reach you before our departure the morning of the 10th. In order to make the
consultation not too conspicuous, I would suggest that the Saigon representation be small
and arrive in a discreet manner.
7 As a member of the U.S. Delegation to the Ninth Ministerial Council Meeting of
SEATO.
I need hardly add that all of this planning is on a contingency basis and does not reflect
any policy decisions yet taken by the President.
I have some other thoughts that relate back to your memorandum of October 30th to
Averell Harriman,8 and I will write you a separate letter on this.9 However, you will see
that we have at least put in the motif of the carrot-and-stick, in the form of possible food
offers. As to our negotiating position with respect to some reduction of the US presence
eventually, this would take further thought, and my own inclination is that we should not
raise it at an early point.
/8/Foreign Relations, 1961-1963, vol. iv, pp. 656-659.
/9/Not found.
Forgive the length of this, but the subject is complex and we will doubtless need further
exchanges to see if we are all thinking at least in the same general lines.
With warm regards to you and to Emily,
Yours ever,
William P. Bundy/10/
P.S. I have gone over this letter with General Goodpaster (General Taylor's Assistant),
with John McNaughton, and with Bill Sullivan and Mike Forrestal. However, it would not
make much sense at this point to try to write you any firm views on behalf of the
Department, Secretary McNamara, or the JCS. All of us tend to agree with much of the
substance contained in the attached Tab A, but it has not been examined in detail and does
not reflect a firm "Washington position." On the contrary, we very much need your
thinking at this point in particular.
W.P.B./11/
/11/Printed from a copy that bears these typed initials.
109. Memorandum From the Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern
Affairs (Green) to the Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs (Bundy)/1/

/1/Source: Department of State, Bundy Files, Special Papers. Secret.
SUBJECT
Ambassador Lodge's plan to Pressure North Viet-Nam /2/
/2/See Foreign Relations, 1961-1963, vol. iv, pp. 656-659.
1. Lodge's plan runs counter to realities, such as:
(a) Our estimate of the objectives and tactics of the various Communist groups involved;
(b) Hanoi's outspoken denunciation of any neutralization of North Viet-Nam;
(c) Hanoi's repeated denial of support for the Viet Cong who are depicted as an internal
liberation force. (Even if, incredibly, Hanoi accepted neutralization, the VC would
continue to operate with Hanoi's support.)
2. Any US overtures at this time would be regarded by North Viet-Nam as a sign that we
were becoming war weary and frustrated, and this would convince Hanoi all the more that
its tactics were wearing us down and succeeding.
3. While neutralization of North Viet-Nam might conceivably have attractions to the
USSR, the latter well knows that the ChiComs and the other Asian Communists would
never accept this "solution".
Incidentally, the idea that old man Ho could be bought off with any offers of rice grants is
ridiculous.
In turning Lodge down on his suggestion, it might be conceded to him that, when it
becomes possible to withdraw US troops, we should, as he suggests, consider means for
extracting maximum benefit and concessions from the NVN.
Bundy, Vol. 3. Confidential.
SUBJECT
Mission for Secretary of State
I talked to my brother about the specific mission which you have in mind for the Secretary
of State,/2/ and he reports the following. This has been discussed in the Department, with
Ball and Manning in favor, with the Far Eastern experts evenly balanced, and with the
Secretary so far not deciding to do it.
Bill himself thinks that the considerations are quite evenly balanced. On the one hand, we
have had so much high level visiting at Saigon that there is always something to be said
for not putting another top level mission in. Moreover, the Secretary has a very strenuous
schedule already with the SEATO meeting/3/ and a visit to Taiwan.
/3/April 13-15.
On the other hand, there is some feeling in the Department that our posture is too
McNamara-warlike and that it would be helpful to the Department and to the Secretary for
him to spend a day with the Ambassador and with Khanh.
Bill agrees with me that the balance of considerations is tilted quite positively if the
picture of this trip is that you have asked the Secretary to make it. We have to be careful
not to undercut Bob in this, but I think we can manage that side with an announcement
something like the following for George Reedy either tonight or tomorrow:
"The President had a good discussion with the Secretary on Thursday afternoon of the
issues which will come up at the SEATO meeting in Manila./4/ The President also
requested Secretary Rusk to extend his visit to the Far East to include a visit to Saigon as
a followup to the recent visit of Secretary McNamara. The President's desire is to take the
occasion of the Secretary's visit to the SEATO meeting to ensure continued effective
consultation with General Khanh and Ambassador Lodge."
/4/On April 9, Rusk conferred with the President from 6:30 to 7 p.m. No record of that
meeting has been found. Johnson Library, President's Daily Diary)
McG.B./5/

Washington, April 9, 1964--8:37 p.m.
/1/Source: Department of State. Central Files. ORG 7 S. Secret; Immediate; Nodis.
Drafted and initialed by Rusk.
1653. President and I have decided that it would be important for me to extend my visit to
the Far East with a two or possibly three day visit to Saigon. This would give me a full
opportunity to bring you and General Khanh up-to-date on our discussions at SEATO in
which South Viet-Nam will play a most important role. Further, it will give you and me a
chance to go over the situation in great detail, to give me some personal feel of a country
which I have not visited as Secretary of State, and another opportunity for us to
reemphasize our support for our common effort there. I could arrive in Saigon in the early
afternoon of Friday, April 17. I hope this will not cause you or General Khanh undue
inconvenience about existing schedule commitments.
Would much appreciate your suggestions as to how to make best use of time./2/ President
is asking General Wheeler to proceed direct to Saigon to be there when I arrive. I do not
plan to swamp you with entire SEATO delegation most of which I would leave in Manila.
Names of few who would accompany me to Saigon will be forwarded later. Putting aside
personal considerations I am of a somewhat divided mind as to whether to bring Mrs.
Rusk since your and my time will presumably be filled with business. I would greatly
appreciate your personal and frank advice on this. Please reply to Acting Secretary with
Nodis relay to Manila for me. Warm personal regards.
/2/In telegram 1953 from Saigon, repeated to Manila for the Secretary, April 10, Lodge
suggested Rusk should plan to have a long talk with Khanh and Quat, and he might
consider a trip to the countryside to see how the pacification program was working. (Ibid.)
Rusk
to the President/1/
Washington. April 10, 1964.
/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Vietnam Country Series, Vol. VII,
Cables and Memos. Top Secret. McGeorge Bundy initialed the memorandum, and an "L"
on the source text indicates that the President saw it.
VIETNAM
I have reviewed the status of our record with Ambassador Lodge. There are two principal
matters between him and Washington which are still open.
U.S.-French-South Vietnam Relations
After learning the results of Bohlen's talk with De Gaulle last week,/2/ Lodge has said that
he feels he can no longer advise Khanh to keep the French Embassy in Saigon./3/
Secretary Rusk has asked Lodge to try to stall Khanh's break with France until after the
Secretary has had another go at Couve de Murville at the SEATO meeti~ng in Manila./4/
/3/Reported in telegrams 1916 and 1930 from Saigon, April 7 and 8. (Both in Department
of State, Central Files, POL 27 VIET S) Both are published in Declassified Documents,
1978, 296C and 296D.
/4/In telegram 1620 to Saigon, April 7. (Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 VIET
S)
Planning for Military Pressures against the North

Bill Bundy has written Lodge (copy of letter attached)/5/ explaining the status of our
political and military planning and sending him a copy of a draft political scenario to lay
the groundwork for action against the North.
/5/Document 108.
Although the Saigon Embassy has expressed interest in mounting cross-border operations
into Laos, it is by no means clear that this is Lodge's idea; nevertheless the matter is being
studied both at State and in Defense. Some such operations will no doubt be part of the
military plans for pressures against the North.
Follow-up
The Secretary and Bill Bundy, accompanied by General Wheeler, will go to Saigon from
the SEATO meeting in Manila to discuss all of the above matters with Lodge. He will
have received Bundy's letter by then and will transmit his comments through the
Secretary. The Secretary and Bundy will also be able to discuss with Lodge the French
position on Vietnam, which they will have picked up in Manila. Upon their return to
Washington they should be in a position to make recommendations to you.
All the other matters raised by Lodge have been or are in the process of resolution in Bill
Sullivan's committee. Lodge's cables continue to get unusually prompt and responsive
attention within the Department.
Mike
113. Memorandum of a Conversation, U.S. Embassy Chancery, Manila, April 12,

1964, 5:45 p.m./1/
US/M C-2
/1/Source: Department of State, Secretary's Memoranda of Conversation: Lot 65 D 330.
Secret. Drafted by Salans and approved by Rusk on April 16. The source text is labeled
"Part II of II." Rusk and Couve de Murville were in Manila as the heads of their
respective delegations to the Ninth Ministerial Council Meeting of SEATO, April 13-15.
PARTICIPANTS
United States
William P. Bundy, Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs
Carl F. Salans, Assistant Legal Adviser for Far Eastern Affairs
France
Maurice Couve de Murville, Minister of Foreign Affairs
Jacques de Beaumarchais, Director of the Minister's Cabinet
Robert Gillet, Assistant Director of Political Affairs

SUBJECT
Viet-Nam
The Secretary asked Couve what his thoughts were about South Viet-Nam.
Couve said he hadn't changed his mind since his last discussions with the Secretary in the
autumn./2/ The problem in Viet-Nam, as he saw it, was not military but rather a complete
political vacuum in Saigon. The Vietnamese people do not want to fight. Couve stated
that French reports are that apart from the cities Vietnamese territory is out of the control
of the Vietnamese government. The Diem government, although unpopular, was at least a
government. Now there is nothing at all.
/2/Couve de Murville and Rusk discussed Southeast Asia and Vietnam in October 1963.
(Ibid.)
The Secretary asked what France meant by "neutrality" for Viet-Nam.
Couve replied, "Quite simply, the Geneva Agreements of 1954." Those accords, he said,
provided for the division of Viet-Nam with a commitment by both sides not to accept
military aid from outside (sic)/3/ and not to enter into military alliances--which is really
neutrality. The Accords provided for independence, nonalignment and reunification. But,
Couve admitted, reunification would not be possible with a Communist regime in the
North which is not independent.
/3/As on the source text.
Couve said, if you tell me military victory, I will say that is fine. But if the war is not
extended to the North and if U.S. forces do not participate, there is not likely to be
military victory in Viet-Nam. The South Vietnamese people are out of the game. All you
have is a professional army supported from outside. Couve stated that the situation is
exactly the same as the French experienced in Viet-Nam in 1954 and again in Algeria. In
1962 in Algeria, when the French gave Algeria its independence, the French had complete
physical control of the country, "but in spite of that we lost the battle. You can't win
without the people."
The Secretary asked whether there were large numbers of Vietnamese and Algerians
fighting with the French in those situations. Couve said yes--200,000 Vietnamese and
large numbers of Algerians.
Couve continued. There is the game in Viet-Nam, he said, and the game in the
international field, with China. North Viet-Nam depends greatly on China. China is an
expansionist, imperialist country, and Southeast Asia has always been a target of China's
expansionism. All Southeast Asian countries are terrified at the thought of Chinese
expansion. Is there any possibility of China's considering it in its own interests to reach an
accommodation with the West, i.e., the United States? He thought there was, that in order
to concentrate on internal development and to reduce the threat to it, China would
renounce its expansionist drive in Southeast Asia on the understanding that Southeast
Asia would not be hostile. The Hanoi government would have to follow suit.
The Secretary asked, would North Viet-Nam agree to be nonaligned? Couve admitted it
would be difficult to conceive of that at the present time. But, he said, it would be enough
if North Viet-Nam would agree to let South Viet-Nam alone. National cohesion in
VietNam, Couve added, depends on the Vietnamese alone. The Vietnamese don't like the
Chinese and it is not in their interest to be aligned with China.
The Secretary questioned whether the formula described by Couve would appeal to the
Chinese any more than in the past. Couve said, "you omit the fact that you are there." The
Chinese are terrified by that. The Secretary said, we were not there in force in 1957.
That's not fair, Couve rejoined. Since 1954 the United States supported the Diem
government. The Chinese felt that South Viet-Nam was an American sphere of influence.
The Secretary pointed out that our increased presence in Viet-Nam came only after 1959
when Hanoi announced that it was after the South. Mr. Bundy indicated that before that,
our presence in Viet-Nam was within the scope of the 1954 Geneva Accords. For
example, we had no more than 500-600 military personnel, the number the French had in
1954. Couve replied that for China 500 French military personnel in South Viet-Nam is
one thing, but 500 American personnel is another.
Couve said France was trying to find the best means calculated to keep South Viet-Nam
from falling to the Communists. The Secretary asked, "Is it the heart of French policy not
to have a Communist regime in South Viet-Nam?" Couve answered, "Of course. I have
said it many times." The Secretary asked, then wouldn't it help for France to throw its
support behind those who are trying to stop a Communist takeover? No, said Couve,
because we don't think you can win. The South Vietnamese think that French policy is to
get the United States out of Viet-Nam and to have the Communists take over, the
Secretary added.
The Secretary said we thought there was a chance for a settlement in Laos, but we haven't
seen it. Couve attributed this fact to the deterioration of the Vietnamese affair. In any
case, Couve said, Laos is no longer a "crisis" and Laos is not finally divided. There is still
a possibility of unification under some kind of government.
The Secretary said that when Couve speaks of the Laos agreement not having worked
because of Viet-Nam, it meant to the Secretary that the Viet Minh want to continue to use
Laos to push people into South Viet-Nam. That is one reason, Couve admitted. Another is
that the Pathet Lao and Phoumi had no intention of implementing the Geneva
Agreements. Both thought there was still something to gain. Phoumi hoped to be master
of South Laos-to have a divided country.
Couve asked the Secretary how he saw things for the SEATO Conference. The Secretary
said he thought there would be full discussion in the private meetings of Laos, Viet-Nam
and Malaysia. He thought it important for SEATO to express interest in there being no
further expansion of Communism in Southeast Asia. South Viet-Nam, after all, was one
of the SEATO Protocol States. The Secretary did not think SEATO would be called upon
to get into the Malaysia question.
The Secretary said he hoped he and Couve would have a further talk. Couve said perhaps
something could be arranged on Wednesday afternoon./4/
/4/April 15. No record of a conversation has been found.
114. Memorandum of a Conversation, U.S. Embassy Chancery, Manila, April 12,

1964/1/
/1/Source: Department of State, Bundy Files, WFB Chron. Secret. Drafted by Bundy on
April 13.
PARTICIPANTS
The Secretary
Mr. Bundy
Foreign Minister Quat, South Viet-Nam
Following the conclusion of Dr. Quat's discussion of his plans at the Conference,/2/ he
asked to stay on alone with the Secretary and myself.
/2/At 3:30 p.m. on April 12, Quat, accompanied by Nguyen Duy Lien, the Vietnamese
Observer at the SEATO Council Meeting, and Do Lenh Tuan, the Vietnamese Charge in
Manila, met with Rusk, William Bundy, and Max V. Krebs, Political Counselor at the
Embassy in Manila. Rusk stressed to Quat that he should use the Council meeting to talk
with each of the SEATO foreign ministers and describe the situation in Vietnam, the
threat from the North, and how South Vietnam was countering it. Rusk thought it
important that Quat give the impression that South Vietnam was confident of its ability to
cope successfully with the situation. Quat stated that such was his intention, and the two
foreign ministers discussed the best means of doing so. (Memorandum of conversation,
April 12, US/MC/1; ibid., Secretary's Memoranda of Conversation: Lot 65 D 330)
Dr. Quat said he wanted to describe the real situation in Saigon, which he had talked
about with Ambassador Lodge recently.
He said that the essential problem was that all groups should pull together to assure
victory. In particular, he was deeply concerned that there was not full military-civilian
cooperation. He said that Khanh knows the situation uniquely among the generals, but that
some of his advisors were not so wise. He said there was presently a tendency for Khanh
to draw in on himself, and likened this to an accordion which had been fully extended but
was now sharply contracted.
He made clear that what he meant was that there was a tendency toward increasing
military domination and military powers. This he thought might increase effectiveness in
the military sense, but that the result would be ephemeral without better political
understanding.
Dr. Quat said that the resignation of Interior Minister Ky/3/ was an "eclatement" of
feeling between the military and the civilians; the implication was that he was friendly to
Ky's position.
/3/Ha Thuc Ky.
Dr. Quat said that he himself was playing the part of an unofficial intermediary between
the military and the civilians, and that in his talks with the military leaders, one or two of
them had expressed what Dr. Quat regarded as dangerous ideas. Specifically, it was being
suggested that if the press did not behave in a disciplined fashion, it should be suppressed.
Secondly, it was being suggested that there should be anti-intellectual demonstrations,
apparently by military forces ("sorties dans la rue").
Dr. Quat thought there were two possible solutions. One would be a "real marriage"
between the two groups, so that not only would there be a plan (which he conceded there
was at present) but it would be carried out in unison on both the military and civilian
sides.
Alternatively, Dr. Quat thought there might be a sharing of responsibilities. For example,
the MRC might be taken out of political life and lay down the basic guidelines of action
for the so-called "points" of the plan, and there might be a civilian government set up
under the MRC in order to carry out the plan. If the civilian government then did not do
its job, it might be changed.
Comment: Throughout the conversation, Dr. Quat spoke in a low, intense manner,
apparently reflecting deep feeling. He was obviously trying to get across the picture that
all was not well with Khanh's handling of the civilian side, and that he himself, despite his
asserted position of intermediary, was among those who were sharply unhappy with the
way things were going. He did not refer specifically, except in the one instance, to the
position of the intellectuals, but I should judge that this, too, is very much on his mind. (I
note Khanh's attack on the intellectuals as useless in his statement yesterday.)
I am not sure how seriously to take Quat's expression. He himself has always been
something of an intellectual, and recollection is that he expressed similar misgivings early
in the Khanh regime. Nonetheless, his description does tally sufficiently with other
evidences of military-civilian friction so that we should take it as not wholly unfounded.
William P. Bundy/4/
115. Telegram From the Delegation at the SEATO Ministerial Council Meeting to
the Department of State/1/
Manila, April 15, 1964--7 p.m.
/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, SEATO 3 PHIL (MA). Secret; Immediate;
Exdis. Repeated to Saigon, Paris, London, and Vientiane. Passed to the White House on
receipt in the Department of State.
Secto 49. For Acting Secretary from Secretary.
1. As expected, communiqu presented main issue. Text key paragraphs concerning VietNam and Laos being transmitted septel./2/ As you will see, all members except French
finally supported strong paragraphs on Viet-Nam, with French submitting separate

paragraph expressing their sympathy for Viet-Nam effort but saying they did not think it
wise to join in declaration made by others.
/2/For full text of the communiqu, see American Foreign Policy: Current Documents,
1964, pp. 835-839.
2. Believe this result best we could have achieved in circumstances and at least heartening
evidence of solidarity other SEATO members. Couve had resisted stoutly all efforts
produce more forthcoming French statement of support during restricted session
yesterday,/3/ and had simply gone on repeating that since French believed effort in VietNam doomed to failure they considered political solution must be explored. Incidentally,
in discussing escalation possibility in restricted session, Couve said that if French were
consulted they would probably be "rather against" extending the war to the North, which
in his view would have to include hostilities with China. This seems to clarify French
thinking this point and to negate Alphand's contrary interpretation. At same time, Couve
said there certainly was no assurance Chinese Communists in fact would accept a neutral
Viet-Nam (even with US forces withdrawn, which he had made clear in private
conversation was what French envisaged). Comment on this position seems superfluous,
but at least we are a shade clearer where French stand and they are at least willing to
express their sympathy for Vietnamese effort.
/3/Rusk's assessment of this restricted session was transmitted in Secto 26 from Manila,
April 14. (Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 VIET S)
3. As to impact on French-Vietnamese relations, Quat seemed both satisfied with strength
of declarations by other members and even somewhat pleased that French had finally
ended up with some affirmative [statement?] however mild. Couve and Quat have also
had two conversations here,/4/of which second was reported by Quat to be cordial and
Quat considers door now open for French to initiate discussions that could include
economic issues as well as restoration of Ambassadors. I will want to discuss this more
fully in Saigon to assess what our next move and position with Khanh should be.
/4/An account of Quat's discussions with Couve de Murville as recounted to William
Bundy by Quat is in Secto 68 from Saigon, April 19. (Ibid., POL FR-VIET S)
4. As communique shows, all others remained solid throughout although Pakistanis said
little and Lopez/5/ made abortive effort find common ground between our strong position
and that of French. Thanat, as expected, particularly firm. Essentially French were
isolated in restricted session but were not publicly pilloried except by Thanat in opening
public session, which Couve did resent. Otherwise, he probably content with result and
had no latitude to go further. In this morning's session on communique he quickly
suggested solution along lines ultimately reached.
/5/Salvador P. Lopez, Secretary of Foreign Affairs of the Philippines.
5. What French future in SEATO is or should be is a matter we should consider on my
return, but there no indication here French plan withdrawal. On contrary, given probable
rigidity de Gaulle's instructions, Couve seemed to be going to some length to avoid
confrontation.
6. As to greater individual contributions to Viet-Nam, I have obtained no specific

promises of material significance but believe communique and atmosphere here have
prepared way for us to keep pressure on.
7. In Laos discussion, French proposed text that would have blamed "factions" impartially
but yielded to final text which refers "particularly" to Communist violations.
8. Other communiqu issues revolved around Pakistani effort to invoke SEATO support
as between member states and non-member states, meaning of course India, and brief
British effort express concern on Malaysia. We stayed out of Pakistani fight, partly in
order to avoid disturbing Pakistanis and possibly upsetting their support for Vietnamese
paragraphs. Believe result innocuous.
9. In sum, meeting closed on fairly high note, considering adamant French position.
Rusk
Affairs (Bundy) to the Secretary of State, at Taipei/1/
/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Intelligence File, Vietnam, Rusk/
Lodge, Wm. Bundy Correspondence. Top Secret; Eyes Only; Personal; No Other
Distribution. There is no indication on the source text how this memorandum was
transmitted to Rusk in Taipei, which he visited after the SEATO Council Meeting.
The President has asked me to emphasize again the importance which he attaches to your
conversation with Ambassador Lodge and the opportunity which this conversation gives
for the most candid discussion of our policy toward the struggle in South Vietnam. The
President sets the highest possible importance on maintaining the effective understanding
with Ambassador Lodge which has been established ever since November, and he thinks
it of the greatest importance that this cooperation should be sustained, especially in the
light of the possibility that others may try to inject partisan politics into the matter.
The President therefore reiterates his hope that you and Bill will examine closely with the
Ambassador any recommendations which he may have which in any sense go beyond
current policy positions of the USG. The President will wish to give the most sympathetic
and careful study to any specific recommendation which the Ambassador makes, and will
go to very considerable lengths to assure full harmony. It does remain possible, of course,
that there may be some particular recommendation from the Ambassador which the
Administration will not be able to accept, but in any such case the President will himself
review with the Ambassador the reasons for the Administration's decision and will do his
best on his side to work the matter out amicably with the Ambassador.
In this connection President is asking Ambassador to take up with you the possibility
presented in his Secret 8 of April 16 to the President./2/ We need to develop before
decision here a more complete picture of proposed "tit for tat" operations, as well as
implications of any warning to Ho.

/2/Reference is to telegram 8 from Lodge to the President, April 16, which reads as
follows:
"1. Through [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] we have had report from
source judged by the police to be reliable of a VC plan bomb American community
school. We can get no information as to date." [1 line of source text not declassified]
"2. Such a terroristic act would completely justify 'tit for tat' retaliation NVN. There could
be no target more precious and more deserving of retaliation."
"3. It also points to desirability of notifying Ho as a preventative measure that any
terroristic act against Americans will bring instant retaliation. This, however, should not
be done in a way to destroy our existing sources of information." (Department of State,
Central Files, POL 27 VIET S) In telegram 1710 to Saigon, April 16, 7:14 p.m., the
President informed Lodge that he was "authorized to take whatever action you and
General Harkins see fit to meet the threat to the school." (Ibid.)
In summary, the President hopes that any specific new recommendations will be
pinpointed, and that you will convey to the Ambassador the President's strong desire to
have a fully agreed common policy between Washington and Saigon. The President
continues to recognize the distinguished service which the Ambassador is giving in this
most difficult post.
New Subject: While the President has repeatedly insisted that no one in the
Administration should appear to be pressing the Ambassador to give up his present post
because of any domestic political involvements, George Ball and I both believe that it
would be entirely appropriate for you as Secretary to ask the Ambassador to share with
you his own present thinking on any possible early change in his assignment. The
nomination of any possible replacement will be your responsibility and will be a matter of
great importance, and in the present situation in South Vietnam any significant gap
between Ambassador's return and the assignment of his successor would be most
undesirable.
SUBJECT
Vietnam Planning
Herewith a brief status report on the progress of planning for pressures against the North.
The political scenario which I developed with Bill Sullivan's help/2/ has been turned over
to John McNaughton for further refinement before it is presented to the JCS. Sullivan and
I have tried to press John to get something simple into the hands of the JCS as rapidly as
possible. We are afraid that they are going off on two politically unproductive tracks.
First, they may be spending most of their time planning for cross border raids and aircraft
incursions into Laos and Cambodia; and second, they may be ginning up a variety of "titfor-tat" actions against the North. Planning on both of these tracks has been largely
stimulated, I think, by General LeMay./3/ In order to get the Chiefs something more
politically useful to work on, we are pressing McNaughton and McNamara to get
something like our paper officially into their mill before we are faced with a mass of
ineffective and politically explosive planning.
/2/See the attachment to Document 102.
/3/An example of such planning is JCSM-298-64, April 14, in which General LeMay and
General Greene advised Secretary McNamara that they were "convinced that operations
in Vietnam should be extended and expanded immediately." They recommended a plan
for a series of overt and covert actions against North Vietnam and across the Lao and
Cambodian borders in order to force the North to cease its support for the insurgency in
the South. The other members of the Joint Chiefs dissented on the grounds that the plan
was premature. (Washington National Records Center, RG 330, OASD/ISA Files: FRC
69 A 926, 092 Vietnam)
Since a majority of the Joint Chiefs dissented, McNamara took no action on JCSM-29864. (Memorandum from the Administrative Secretary, OSD, to the Secretary of the JCS,
May 5, enclosure to JCS 2343/345-4, May 7, as quoted in Historical Division, Joint
Secretariat, JCS, The Joint Chiefs of Staff and the War in Vietnam, 1960-1968, Part 1,
Chapter 9, p. 22)
I think that there is some fear at the Pentagon, among the more reasonable military as well
as the civilians, that since the President will never authorize anything like the actions
proposed in the political scenario, it is better to concentrate on the cross border and "titfor-tat" approach. In short, they suspect us of putting up a straw man. There may also be
an underlying worry that what we have proposed might get the U.S. involved in an
unmanageable, large-scale war.
As matters stand now, John McNaughton has agreed to prepare a simple memo for the
Chiefs based upon our scenario but adding some elements of cross border operations and
"tit-for-tat" actions as one of several tactics we might use. McNaughton, Sullivan and I
will discuss this with Bob McNamara on Saturday afternoon,/4/at which time we will
press him to put it to the Chiefs officially, so that we stop the growing criticism that no
formal political proposal has been made to them.
/4/April 18; no record of a meeting has been found.
What would be helpful now is a very delicate hint from the President that he has not
excluded actions directed against the North before the election. I realize how dangerous
this could be if any such hint got out of control; and consequently I have perhaps been
overcautious in not repeating any of our conversation with the President several weeks
ago, except in a very oblique way to Bill Sullivan.
We should have a chat about this and other aspects of Vietnam when you get a minute.
Mike
118. Memorandum of a Conversation Between Secretary of State Rusk and Prime

Minister Khanh, Saigon, April 18, 1964/1/
/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 1 US-VIET S. Top Secret; Exdis.
Drafted by William Bundy.
SUBJECT
Discussion of action against the North. All other topics were fully covered in the reporting
cable. (Secto 71 from Saigon 4/19/64)/2/
/2/Document 119.
PARTICIPANTS
Secretary Rusk
Ambassador Lodge
General Wheeler/3/
Mr. Bundy
General Khanh
Dr. Quat
/3/General Wheeler was in Vietnam, April 15-20, to represent the Department of Defense
during Rusk's visit and to assess air operations in South Vietnam. Wheeler's report, April
22, is in Washington National Records Center, RG 330, McNamara Files: FR(3 71 A
3470. South Vietnam.
Khanh initiated this topic. He said he agreed with the idea of carrying the war to North
Vietnam, and that there were a lot of possibilities of action such as commando raids, etc.
We could not stay on the defensive but must move to the enemy.
The Secretary responded that there were two important considerations. First, the base here
must be made firmer, as Khanh himself had indicated to Secretary McNamara in March.
Secondly, the Sino-Soviet situation was not yet clear. Khrushchev appeared to think a real
break could be prevented.
Moreover, the Secretary said, the United States had to study the implications carefully.
The United States would never get into another Korea with large conventional forces, and
enlargement of the war might mean a high level of military action in which we would
have to consider using nuclear weapons. Because of these problems, we should do
absolutely all we could to improve the situation here before we started actions against the
North.
The Secretary further noted that some of our Asian allies had expressed opposition to the
use of nuclear weapons.
Khanh responded that as far as he was concerned we could use anything we wanted
against China. As long as Communist China remained "you will never have security."
Communist China was Vietnam's hereditary enemy, and the issue must be resolved.
The Secretary said others in Asia felt the same way. He went on that there were a number
of actions that might be taken that would not be likely to lead to general war. These we
needed to discuss between our two governments.

Saigon, April 29, 1964--6 p.m.
/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 1 US-VIET S. Secret; Priority;
Limdis. Passed to the White House on receipt in the Department of State at 5:48 a.m.
Secto 71. Department repeat parts to other posts as needed. From Secretary for Acting
Secretary. Following were highlights my talk with Khanh, supplemented as necessary by
my earlier shorter talk with Quat.
1. I stressed our complete commitment to GVN and that this based on national interest.
Khanh responded that struggle vital both for area and principle and that he annoyed when
"some" did not understand. (I took up this cue in dinner toast, pointing out two Senators
disagreed, but 98 supported US policy and both parties did.) Khanh went on to say that
this new kind of war in which aggression could not be neatly proved but in which special
laws applied and should not hang on exact words. Really total Communist war, with Mao
following Stalin policy of biting off small nations. First Central Europe, now Southeast
Asia, later Africa.
2. I strongly urged importance decentralizing authority and giving local officials initiative,
asking whether he satisfied with present province chiefs. Khanh responded no magic
formula and could not change old habits of society and especially officials quickly, but
that he moving to bring all groups in, to provide firm and determined leadership, and to
give officials responsibility. He said much talk of dictatorship, but this not at all his way
and that he doing all possible to get lower levels to act on own.
3. Khanh encouraged by Manila result. I responded Quat had been most helpful to GVN
cause and that this showed importance GVN getting out and selling own case, including
naming key Ambassadors who might be men who for political reasons could not be used
at home. (I did not refer directly to Kim and Don, but he clearly got point.) Khanh said he
recognized this weak point, hard to find people, but that he would "handle this
month" (meaning Kim and Don, for what this may be worth in light previous statements
similar nature).
4. GVN-French relations. I said French attitude 80 percent motivated by de Gaulle's wish
to be independent of U.S., that French had no more real power or interest in Asia and that
it best to ignore them. If French individuals misbehaved, then get rid of them. Cooperation
of French community in VN important, and since it seemed to support GVN effort should
be made to make this clear. Khanh concurred that French here anti-de Gaulle, but went on
to say that he deeply concerned that document obtained by secret means from French
Embassy had shown French had specific plans to supersede us in information area. I said
such document hard to interpret and that French might think badly of some U.S.
information efforts in their former African areas on same lines. Khanh said he would look
further into this. Note: In earlier Quat talk he had reviewed his Manila talks with Couve
along lines reported separately. Quat had concluded that situation not grave and that now
up to French to take initiative if they wanted to discuss restoration of Ambassadors and
commercial problems. He said he recommending to Khanh they play it cool, and my
deduction from tone of Khanh talk is that he agrees unless specific stronger evidence turns
up of French activity against GVN. Khanh did say he on watch for such evidence and that
lines ran into other countries. I did not draw him out or offer our intelligence help but
obviously we should watch very closely in such places as Paris and Phnom Penh as well
as here.
5. Cambodia. Khanh said France dictates Sihanouk attitudes, not necessarily through
Ambassador but through French advisors. Sihanouk believes Commies will win and hence
threatens to negotiate with Hanoi. He said he particularly concerned latest Sihanouk talk
of dealing with both Hanoi and with National Liberation Front which of course just name
for Viet Cong. If Sihanouk did this, "I will no longer be obliged to respect the frontier".
He went on to cite latest Cambodian border incidents, saying that supporting fire had
come from Cambodian side of border. He thought Sihanouk might be stirring up such
incidents and then planning to use them to justify dealing with NLF as party really
controlling border, and repeated that if he did so he, Khanh, would be compelled to
counter-attack into Cambodia. He considered the situation grave.
6. I responded that Couve had assured me that the French would press Sihanouk to work
out his problems by bilateral dealings with both Thailand and South Vietnam, and that we
ourselves would support such efforts strongly. I urged he hold off till after Sihanouk's
visit to France. Khanh did not seem wholly persuaded and said that they had just sent a
forthcoming note to Sihanouk, but that the latter had responded badly (presumably
meaning the threat about the NLF). Note: I conclude we will have to watch this one very
closely and consider whether there are ways to get Sihanouk to withdraw at least his NLF
threat.
7. SEATO action. Khanh said the Manila communiqu/2/ seemed to indicate the SEATO
countries were ready to move to action and asked whether the GVN should make a formal
appeal to SEATO. I said that SEATO still had the rule of unanimity on military actions
although the nations in fact acted under the principle of the Rusk-Thanat communiqu/3/
that their obligations continued even though SEATO as such did not note the action. (He
at once grasped this point and showed, as throughout, great acuteness.) Thus, I said the
thing was to find out what more individual nations were prepared to do, not as SEATO
but under their SEATO obligations. We fully supported getting more help from such
nations both for its military help and its political significance in showing GVN had many
supporters. I referred specifically to the past Philippine offer of Rangers which I
understood had been turned down by Diem, and urged that it be revived. I also mentioned
Thanat's suggestion about training Thai Rangers for use in Laos. Khanh asked if the use of
military forces from other nations would raise international complications, and I said I
thought not. (In retrospect, it occurs to me he may have had ChiNats in mind here, but I
doubt if ChiNat armed forces apart from specialists are now a live issue here in light
Gimo's comments in Taipei/4/ and also fact General Khiem told me specifically at dinner
last night that he had approached Gimo about possibility ChiNat military units and been
fumed down flat )
/2/See American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1964, pp. 835-839.
/3/For text of the joint statement issued at Washington by Rusk and Thai Foreign Minister
Thanat Khoman on March 6, 1962, see ibid., 1962, pp. 1091-1093.
/4/In a discussion in Taipei, President Chiang Kai-shek told Rusk that the best way for the
Republic of China to aid South Vietnam was by airdropping 5,000 to 10,000 Chinese
Nationalist guerrillas into China's southwestern province to encourage and promote an
anti-Communist revolution and disrupt Chinese Communist supply lines to their allies in
Vietnam, Laos, Cambodia, and Burma. Chiang wanted the United States to provide the
planes for the airdrop. (Memorandum of conversation between Rusk and Chiang Kaishek, April 16; Department of State, Secretary's Memoranda of Conversation: Lot 65 D
330)
8. Laos. Khanh said the Lao asking him to help in South Laos. He said that the southern
corner of Laos was of special concern to them, showing on the map how the trails run
from south Laos down into Cambodia and east to Ban Me Thnot. He had guerrilla forces
who could move into this area to work with the FAR, and of course the Viet Cong
pipeline ran through this area. (He seemed to focus much more on this area than on the
Tchepone area.)
9. I responded that the GVN should focus on its own interests not on the struggle between
the various groups in Laos. The important thing was to get intelligence on what the Viet
Cong were doing. I then said that since the three factions were meeting and also we
ourselves were pressing the Soviets for help, they should wait a few days and Ambassador
Lodge should then talk further with the GVN. Khanh said that Moscow was far and
Peking near, and he doubted if the Soviets could do much.
10. Action against North Vietnam. Khanh raised this topic. I will report fully on my
return./5/
11. Relations with GRC and ROK. Khanh asked what we thought of the idea of their
forming a common front with these two, which would not be a military alliance but a
"common moral front" to show solidarity. I said we would favor regular consultations to
show sympathy, and also forms of aid short of combat forces, but that we did not
encourage an alliance and believed particularly that the issue of Southeast Asia should not
get mixed with the enormous issue of the basic Chinese conflict.
12. Overall. Conversation friendly throughout. He was carefully prepared, knew what he
wanted to get across, and responded quickly to my points. A most impressive man.
Rusk
120. Memorandum of a Conversation, U.S. Embassy, Saigon, April 19, 1964, 10

a.m./1/
/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Vietnam Country Series, Vol. IX,
Memos. Top Secret. Drafted by John M. Dunn, Special Assistant to the Director of
USOM in Saigon.
SUBJECT
Discussion of Mr. Bundy's letter of April 4, 1964, to the Ambassador/2/
/2/Document 108.
PARTICIPANTS
The Secretary
Mr. Bundy
Ambassador Lodge
General Wheeler
General Harkins
Mr. Solbert
Mr. Nes
Mr. de Silva
Mr. Manfull
Mr. Dunn
Ambassador opened discussion with summary of Mr. Bundy's letter of April 4. He
indicated that the letter and the attached scenario and rationale were impressive and
interesting. He summarized the letter as follows:
Actions fall into three categories.
Category A. In essence this is what is being done now and what is projected already under
OP Plan 34-A./3/ It is very questionable whether these actions influence events to any
important extent. There may be a training benefit which might be useful if more farreaching actions are adopted later. Essentially, all actions under Category A are and
should be covert South Viet-Nam measures with covert U.S. support.
Category B. The distinction between Categories A and B primarily is that South VietNam actions become overt with U.S. covert support continuing. These actions would
include both aerial mining of selected harbors and sea routes and VNAF attacks on
selected DRV targets, possibly including the use of Farmgate aircraft.
Category C. Actions would involve joint overt SVN and U.S. participation. Would consist
of (a) warning and preparatory actions, to include intensified U.S. aerial reconnaissance
activities, sizable area build-up of naval power, and large-scale overflights of North
VietNam; and (b) destructive activities, to include naval control measures (involving
either selective or total blockade of North Viet-Nam through use of patrols, mines, and
other measures), naval bombardment of selected DRV targets, and air attacks on selected
DRV targets.
Both GVN and U.S. would prior to taking any destructive action make clear to its own
people and to the world the rationale which supports such efforts against the North.
Lodge questioned wisdom both of massive publicity and of massive destructive actions
before a well planned and well executed diplomatic attempt had been made (with military
and economic backing) to persuade NVN to call off the V.C.
Hanoi should be told, in a way not to involve loss of face, of a carrot-stick program, aim
of which would be cessation of V.C. terrorism. One element would be fear, to be
produced by bombing some target. The pot could also be sweetened for Hanoi by adding
the possibility of food imports (perhaps from Western nations other than the U.S.) and by
some U.S. personnel withdrawal which we had decided to do anyway (none other).
To make such a statement to Hanoi the right kind of interlocutor was important. There is a
fairly long list of names which Lodge had rejected for various reasons. These were UAR,
Yugoslavs, Poles and United Kingdom. [8-1/2 lines of source text not declassified]
Lodge felt it was very difficult to predict the Viet Cong reaction to large-scale measures
against the North-particularly measures involving overt U.S. participation. It is possible
that the VC might react violently here. We are not at all sure that we know their full
capability-how much they hold in reserve. Almost certainly, targets in the South such as
dams and oil refineries, power transmission lines, generators, etc. would immediately be
taken under attack. There is also a possibility that the PAVN, perhaps followed by the
Chinese Communist Army, would cross the border in open invasion of South VietNam.
U.S. could not match Chinese millions of men. If so, would the defense of the South
necessarily involve U.S. use of nuclear weapons?
For us to make such a statement to Hanoi through an interlocutor is neither a negotiation
nor a dialogue. It is more nearly an ultimatum.
Certainly no Geneva-type conference should be considered unless and until we grow
much stronger here than we are now.
General Discussion Followed
The Secretary raised the question as to what the attitude in South Viet-Nam would be
toward another Geneva Conference for Laos. Lodge indicated that it would be bad, that a
proposal for such a conference inevitably would have a bad reaction here. Consternation
reigns even when the New York Times, for example, speculates on the possibility of a
Geneva Conference. This is because the Vietnamese feel the subject of Viet-Nam
necessarily will come up in any Geneva Conference. Embassy representatives indicated,
however, that there is a difference, which can be drawn distinctly, between a conference
called on Laos to settle specific points which arise on an urgent basis and one called for
the general purpose of considering the situation in Southeast Asia or the Protocol States.
Mr. Bundy commented generally on the rationale of his paper. The paper represents an
effort to pull together a political scenario which would at least represent a useful
beginning. The basic premise is that we must first state our objective-getting Hanoi and
Peking out of South Viet-Nam. While the paper does not make explicit the possibility of
American troop withdrawal from the South, some change in our military posture here
would result if Northern and Chinese involvement is discontinued. Implicit in our whole
stand is the fact that the U.S. military presence here would be very different if the war
became a case simply of counter-insurgency. It is, in any case, very difficult to play the
card of promised troop withdrawal, since we don't know yet how many and what types of
military men are needed here. We may, in fact, require American troop increases in South
Viet-Nam. We can and will, of course, provide economic aid of some type from the West
if North Viet-Nam cooperates. Rice imports, for example, could be scheduled in a manner
similar to the wheat now going into Communist China.
Lodge indicated that it would be very hard indeed for Ho Chi Minh to provide a salable
package for his own people and for other Communist nations unless we can do something
that Hanoi can point to, even though it would not be a real concession on our part.
The Secretary indicated that he was not too concerned about the possibility that any
withdrawal from the South on the part of North Viet-Nam and the Chinese might be
temporary. He indicated that, in his opinion, we can rebuild our strength here faster than
they can if this becomes necessary. He stated his concern that the extent of infiltration and
other provision of support from the North be proven to the satisfaction of our own public,
of our allies, and of the neutralists. Mr. Bundy stated that Mr. William Jorden's draft paper
on this subject is coming along nicely,/4/ that he feels unit strengths can be projected from
individual POW reports, and that aerial reconnaissance has been and will continue to be
particularly useful. [2 lines of source text not declassified]
General Harkins stated that the VNAF now has two prisoners definitely identified as
coming from the North Vietnamese 325th Division. The prisoners are now on their way
up for interrogation at the National Center. Important evidence should result.
A discussion of the efficacy of aerial photography flights ensued: Mr. de Silva indicated
that his understanding was that present U-2 flights had produced no evidence of
infiltration. It was decided that for low-level reconnaissance U.S. planes would be
preferable, but that their use even over Laos raises many political problems. Ambassador
Unger, for example, feels strongly that any air reconnaissance involving U.S. aircraft
should not be performed below 10,000 feet. It was agreed that the psychological value of
U.S. low-level reconnaissance could be great and should be considered when weighing
such a program.
The Secretary then raised the possibility of a U.S. naval presence at Tourane or Cam Ranh
Bay. He also suggested the possibility of nibbling on North Viet-Nam shipping above the
Demarcation Line. He asked about the possibility that the junk fleet might pick up some
North Vietnamese small vessels above the parallel and whether air cover would have to be
provided for such an operation. General Wheeler did not feel that aerial attack was a
problem, but that the Swatow-class gunboats would make it impossible for junks to
operate in that area. He feels that the Nastys will be more than a match for the Swatow
boats when they become operational and should be used for such purposes. General
Harkins indicated that even the very limited naval operations undertaken to date have had
considerable impact on the North. There is, for example, considerable evidence of
increased defensive measures already having been taken all along the coast.
[1 paragraph (3-1/2 lines of source text) not declassified]

The availability of other Asian troops to fight here then was discussed. The Secretary
stated that we are not going to take on the masses of Red China with our limited
manpower in a conventional war. While China's Chiang Kai-shek is adamantly opposed to
America's use of nuclear weapons in Asia, the Chinats do not offer the kind of
conventional forces that would be useful here or probably even on mainland China.
Ninety per cent of the enlisted men now are Formosans and not particularly well
motivated to fight outside Formosa (or perhaps the off-shore islands) where they may be
reasonably expected to give a good account of themselves. The use of individuals from
Taiwan as cadre and advisers, and of some special units such as UDT and the like is, of
course, a different matter.
[4-1/2 lines of source text not declassified] General Wheeler agreed that the Chinese
solders are used to getting along with a great deal less than we are and that it would be
very difficult to interdict from the air [less than 1 1ine of source text not declassified]. Mr.
de Silva suggested that the principal question which must be considered before
undertaking such a program is whether the Chinese feel themselves capable of taking on
the U.S. at this time. The Secretary indicated that he felt this was primarily a question of
Chinese-Soviet relations. If the Chinese do not feel they can count on Soviet support, it is
highly questionable whether they would want to face our power. He feels that a great deal
can be done with the Chinese based on the fact that their trend in trade relationships has
shifted over the past few years from the Red Bloc to the West in greater measure. The
Australians and Canadians, for example, could bring great pressure on Red China by
withholding wheat and other grains. If we go much further with the plans under
discussion, we must consider approaching our allies along these lines.
The Ambassador indicated that he was very dubious about what might happen to the Viet
Cong here in SVN if we took out the industrial targets in the Haiphong-Hanoi complexes.
They have ample weapons and a base from which to recruit and supply themselves with
food and other necessities. It is entirely possible that we would have forfeited the
"hostage" which we hold in the North which provides a certain amount of security to
some of our more sophisticated and complex installations here without markedly affecting
the fight against the Viet Cong, at least in the short run. The basic problem was still the
creation of a proper political atmosphere. He stated that he found the idea of a naval
presence in Tourane and Cam Ranh Bay very attractive. This would provide feasible
evidence of American strength for both the South Vietnamese and the North. The
Secretary stated-that he would couple such a presence with intensified civic action
projects to be launched in the immediate area to give the Vietnamese people an added
stake in the American presence.
The Secretary raised the point of our intelligence operation and its apparent inadequacies
here in the South. He finds it difficult to understand how VC forces of the strength of two
battalions can literally "spring from the ground" and launch a coordinated attack without
prior detection. Mr. de Silva stated that a great deal more can be done if present
restrictions on the Cambodian and Laotian side of the border are removed. General
Harkins feels that the key point is to obtain intelligence from the people who at the
present time simply won't provide information in certain areas either because they are
terrorized or committed to the VC. These are the very areas in which, because of the
geography and vegetation, the VC can move readily and stealthily. For example, in the
lower Camau Peninsula, they can use the canals virtually without fear of detection.
The Secretary indicated that we should go ahead with our plans to use a Canadian as
intermediary and begin the groundwork now to obtain such a man and station him here.
Bundy, Vol. 3. No classification marking.
You decided yesterday to call Mike Pearson and to say to him that Dean Rusk will be
bringing an important personal message 2 from you when he goes up to the Ministerial
discussions on U.S.-Canada relations next week. You may or may not want to indicate to
Pearson that this message deals with our view that the very best possible Canadian should
be assigned to the ICC team in Vietnam with the specific mission of conveying to Hanoi
both warnings about its present course and hints of possible rewards in return for a
change.
2 The message has not been found, but see Document 134.
McG. B.
122. Memorandum From the Director of the United States Information Agency
(Rowan) to the President/1/
/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Vietnam Country Series. Vol. VII.
Cables and Memos. Secret.
SUBJECT
Information-Psychological Warfare Program in South Viet-Nam
During the recent trip to Saigon with Secretary Rusk, I came to the conclusion that the
weakest part of the war operation, both on our part and that of the Government of South
Viet-Nam, is in the field of information and psychological warfare. According to a report
by the Military Advisory Commission as well as information gathered by USIS, this is
true on both a nationwide basis and a province-by-province basis.
It is my judgment that the Viet-Namese people will never give sufficient support to the
war effort until certain glaring gaps are closed in the information-psychological campaign.
In view of the importance of public opinion in Viet-Nam, in this country and in the world
at large, I believe that top priority should be given to a large scale United States program
to improve the GVN ability to win the support of the people and to tell its story abroad.
Two steps are urgently required:
1. We must place informational-psychological advisors into every major area, just as we
have placed military and economic development advisors throughout the GVN
organization.
2. We must begin a crash program to train promising South VietNamese personnel in
radio, motion picture, publishing and other techniques crucial to any program of
psychological warfare. This is essential because it is unanimously agreed that the GVN is
sorely lacking in personnel with the motivation and training to do the job required.
I found Prime Minister Khanh and Minister of Information Pham Thai extremely
forthcoming in talks about a new information program, and both expressed eagerness to
have United States assistance-a sharp improvement over the attitude of the Diem
government. This Agency already has submitted to the GVN a detailed proposal of steps
needed to improve its psychological warfare performance. The GVN has promised to
respond with a detailed proposal of areas in which it wishes our immediate assistance.
While in Saigon, I also held sessions with the representatives of CIA, MACV, USOM, the
Embassy political section and my USIS staff. We agreed on steps now underway, or soon
to be gotten underway, which require no action from Washington. (For example, a small
group of key Americans and a few top Viet-Namese officials Monday held the first
meeting of a joint psychological operations committee which had been set up some time
earlier but had never gotten together.)/2/
/2/No record of the meeting on Monday, April 20, has been found.
If the proposed program is to succeed, it will require a modest outlay of U.S. funds and
some increase in personnel from USIA and perhaps other U.S. agencies. I recommend
also that we explore the possibility of third country contributions to the information
program. U.S. expenditures in the information-psychological field are now quite small,
relatively speaking. In fact, I was informed that the program is a failure in several
provinces because of the lack of small bits of money to pay for such things as the running
of a projector, or paper on which to print leaflets.
I emphasize strongly my belief that the information effort will fail, no matter what
resources we pour into it, unless it has the clear direction of a single individual capable of
formulating the program required and of guiding it to success. For many reasons, I believe
that the control should be civilian and that Barry Zorthian, the Country Public Affairs
Officer and one of the most capable men in this entire agency, should be given this
responsibility.
I further recommend that a top USIA officer be included as an official part of any
subsequent missions from Washington to study the development of the Viet-Namese
operation. Likewise, if Mr. Zorthian is to have a chance at success, USIA must be
represented on all committees in Washington which are mapping plans to carry us to
victory in VietNam.
In a few days I shall submit for consideration by you, the Secretary of State and the
Secretary of Defense a detailed plan to meet the objectives spelled out above./3/
/3/Apparent reference to a memorandum from Rowan to Sullivan, April 28. (Washington
National Records Center, RG 306, USIA Psychological Operations Files: FRC 68 A 4933,
INFO-PSYCH Operations, 1964)
Carl

to CINCPAC.
2033. CINCPAC for POLAD.
1. General Minh, on the occasion of Secretary Rusk's call,/2/ exclaimed to me that he
never saw me anymore. When I said that I would gladly come whenever he would see me,
he said he did not wish to summon me, but hoped he could see me nonetheless.
Accordingly, I called on him late Monday afternoon/3/ at his home.
/2/Apparent reference to a courtesy call on Minh by Rusk when he was in Saigon, April 1
7-19.
/3/April 20.
2. He says the Buddhists are turning against Khanh. The newspaper Tin Sang, which he
suspects is backed and managed by the Buddhist clergy, has openly attacked him in two
editions in a row on the ground that Khanh is appointing "bad Diemists".
3. Khanh is making the same errors as Diem. He puts people at the head of key posts
because he trusts them rather than because they are capable people.
4. The man who is now chief of military security, Col. Phuoc, was a key member of Nhu's
secret service and had arrested many Buddhist professors and students.
5. Khanh badly needs to win more confidence than he has. Minh had gone to the movies
incognito the other night, and when Khanh's picture came on the screen, he could discern
the discontent. He felt Khanh was unpopular throughout the country. When I asked him
what he meant by unpopular in a country where there is really no public as we know it, he
meant the businessmen, intellectuals, and the professional classes in the big towns.
6. Khanh sees Minh as a rival. When I asked why Minh didn't go around the country
making public appearances and shaking hands, Minh said: "I withdraw voluntarily
because I don't think he wants me to be active."
7. I said that if he made a public appearance somewhere, I would be delighted to go with
him, and that I intended to say to General Khanh that it was a pity that General Minh was
not out making public appearances. The job of getting the Vietnamese Government before
the people was bigger than any one man.
8. Minh said that Khanh had made the fallacious declaration that General Minh is not
Chief of State because of not being elected and that he is only "carrying out the duties of
Chief of State".
9. Minh had a low opinion of Khanh's advisers. He said there were 17 advisers talked of
in the press, but he only knew of 2. One was Tuoc, Khanh's brother-in-law whom Minh
described as a "bandit". The other was Hong, the Secretary to the Presidency who is a
dishonest lawyer.
10. Vice Prime Minister Hoan is insisting on government employees joining the Dai Viet
Party.
11. Khanh promised elections too soon before the people were ready for them.
12. There should be no public spectacle about Ngo Dinh Can. The national interest does
not require his death./4/ The whole matter could be indefinitely postponed. There are
1,600,000 Catholics in the country who could easily become upset.
/4/Ngo Dinh Can, the brother of the late President of South Vietnam Ngo Dinh Diem, was
the unofficial governor of Central Vietnam during the Diem years, although he held no
government position. In the coup of November 1, 1963, Can unsuccessfully sought refuge
in the U.S. Consulate in Hue, and was taken into custody by coup forces. Lodge received
assurances from Minh that Can's physical safety would be assured and he would receive a
fair trial; see Foreign Relations, 1961-1963, vol. iv, pp. 427 ff. Can was found guilty of
murder, extortion, and misuse of power by a revolutionary tribunal on April 22, 1964, and
was sentenced to death.
13. Apparently irrelevantly, he then said it is not yet time to put outside people in the
saddle. By this he meant the Vietnamese of real merit who are in Europe and in the United
States, and who should at some time be brought back.
14. When I asked what I could do about all of what he had said, he said that I could do
nothing, that it was all an internal matter.
Comment: I really do not take any of this very seriously in a country where the people are
so firmly committed to the ideal of every man for himself and devil take the hindmost. I
cannot imagine any head of government who would get anything less than this in the way
of criticism.
I do intend, however, to continue to try to get Minh out on the stump because I am sure it
would help the effort against the Viet Cong.
Lodge
Washington, April 22, 1964, 4:45 p.m./1/
/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, NSC Meetings, Vol. 1, Tab 9. Top
Secret
Secretary Rusk chaired the meeting in the absence of the President and reported on his
recent trip.
a. The SEATO meeting in Manila--French Foreign Minister Couve de Murville made
clear in bilateral conversations that the French have no specific plan for the neutralization
of Southeast Asia. The French are convinced that our policy in Vietnam will not succeed
but they don't want South Vietnam to fall into the Communist camp. The French think we
must either enlarge the war, which they oppose, or negotiate a settlement. Therefore,
French policy aims at keeping flexibility so that it can promote negotiations at the earliest
possible moment. Couve did not veto the SEATO communiqu but merely added his
disagreement with the conclusion reached by all the others with respect to the importance
of defeating the Communists in Vietnam.
b. Discussion with General Chiang Kai-shek--The most interesting point was Chiang's
passionate statement that nuclear war in Asia would be wrong. Chiang does not think that
the U.S. will put only conventional forces on the Mainland and that, therefore, his military
capability is limited to that under his control in Formosa. However, Chiang thinks that
disorders on the Mainland would break out when he invades, thus, making it possible for
his forces to defeat the Communists. U.S. military advisors in Formosa are not certain
how Chiang's army would react if it were ordered to invade the Mainland because 90% of
his army now consists of Formosans.
c. South Vietnam--Most of the recommendations he has made on South Vietnam are
being worked on.
(1) Khanh is a very impressive person who realizes fully that his problem is not just
military.
(2) We need to get more flags flying in South Vietnam. We need to help persuade other
countries to provide assistance to Vietnam, not only for the value of assistance, but also
because of its importance to Vietnamese morale.
(3) The Vietnamese need to fill diplomatic posts in several major capitals so that their
point of view can be put across to other countries.
(4) The relationship between Khanh and Big Minh is not entirely satisfactory.
Ambassador Lodge is trying to bring these two men closer together. If some of Minh's
followers are taken care of and put in jobs abroad or in Vietnam, it is possible that Minh
will actively support Khanh
(5) Khanh needs to seek a broader civilian base for his government. A non-governmental
organization has been formed to try to produce greater unity among the civilians.
(6) Psychological warfare in Vietnam is very spotty. Mr. Rowan studied this problem and
has made some recommendations as to what should be done./2/
/2/Document 122.
(Mr. Rowan, in response to the Secretary's request, commented that the critical
information need is to train South Vietnamese. The Vietnamese information service is
very weak in the provinces. Limited physical facilities exist but maintenance is very poor.
A great improvement can be made with the expenditure of a very small amount of money.
The USIA in Vietnam is now working on a joint basis with the Vietnamese and it is hoped
that progress will result from the joint effort.)
(7) Limitation of funds-we may not be doing some things that we ought to be doing in
Vietnam because we still think we must limit expenditures. As compared to the cost of a
war or our withdrawal, the amount of money we are spending in Vietnam is small.
Ambassador Lodge says he has enough U.S. funds but this may not be so. We should look
again at our programs and examine all ideas without thinking whether or not they can be
done without increasing our expenditures.
(8) The Defense Department is studying several new military recommendations made by
the group.
(9) We are anxious to get a new Canadian member on the International Control
Commission. This Commissioner would be visiting Hanoi and seeing Ho Chi Minh every
few weeks. [1-1/2 lines of source text not declassified]
Secretary Rusk asked Assistant Secretary William Bundy to comment. Mr. Bundy said
that we are now getting good reporting in both the political and military fields. Newspaper
reporters have been misleading us. Unrest within the South Vietnam government has been
exaggerated. The security situation is much better than as reported in the press. In the
most recent large engagement. the Vietnamese stood and fought very well.
General Wheeler said he agreed. He called attention to a page one story in the New York
Times which was quite misleading in that it left the impression that the Viet Cong had
achieved a major victory over the Vietnamese. Viet Cong losses in this battle were
sizable. A1though the week has been bloody, it has been pretty successful for the
Vietnamese. Among the military advisers there is a growing sense of accomplishment
even though the war is hotting up. The Viet Cong forces are tending now to stand and
fight harder but the Vietnamese are also fighting much better. We should be encouraged
by the progress which was being made.
Secretary McNamara said he was impressed by two things, one, our restriction on funds,
and two, our restriction on people. As to funds, he thought we were unduly conservative.
We are keeping the Vietnamese under too much financial pressure by insisting that they
pay for certain projects, They are not doing things they should be doing because they do
not have sufficient funds. This is especially true in the difficult areas where we should be
building the infrastructure, such as schools and roads, because the Vietnamese cannot do
so. As to the restrictions on people, we do not have enough U.S. civilian advisers to show
the Vietnamese how to do some of the things they should be doing.
Secretary Rusk said that because of the critical security problems in many areas, we have
been concentrating on military activity. The result is that we tend to take for granted the
provinces which have been pacified. We should be building up the pacified provinces and
exploiting our opportunity to carry on activities helpful to the people, such as providing
doctors and schools, etc.
Secretary McNamara said that to accomplish its task AID had one-fourth of the people
that the military had to accomplish its objective. We may be wasting some people and
some money in Vietnam, but this is unimportant because of the critical nature of the task.
The country team is too restrictive. AID is doing a great job and the AID people are true
heroes, but there are too few AID people.
Director Bell acknowledged that neither money nor people should stand in the way of our
achieving our objectives in Vietnam. However, AID officials in the provinces are not
asking for more U.S. citizens, but they want people from third countries, especially
Filipinos. AID is trying to get in third country people and is currently engaged in
recruiting many of them. However, Ambassador Lodge has limited the number of people
that AID could send.
Secretary McNamara acknowledged that Lodge had done this and it was an attitude of
mind of his. Despite this, we need many more people in Vietnam.
Assistant Secretary Bundy interjected to say that Lodge had recently changed his mind on
this point.
Director Bell said that he had instructed American officials to ask for what they need. He
added, however, that the Vietnamese must do the job. What we need is more Vietnamese
who exercise leadership rather than more Americans. We must keep the heat on the
Vietnamese to do the job themselves.
Secretary McNamara said we can't find enough Vietnamese. He said we need a great deal
more training by USIA. We need an increased program for the civil administration school.
Director Bell said that in addition to numbers we need Vietnamese leaders and
administrators. Secretary McNamara said there appeared to be a new mood in Saigon
which would result in Vietnamese being used more extensively.
Secretary McNamara said we were right on the margin in Vietnam and that he could not
guarantee that we would still be there six months or twelve months from now. Therefore,
we should pour in resources now even if some of them are wasted because of the terrific
cost that would be involved if we had to use U.S. forces. He said the Defense Department,
with its $50 million budget, must somehow be used effectively in Vietnam.
Mr. Rowan commented that there was a joint U.S.-Vietnamese plan which called for a
field service center. Nothing had been done because more people were required to
organize this center. USIA is now sending people to help the Vietnamese organize radio
programs aimed at North Vietnam.
Mr. Rowan said he had had long discussions with U.S. correspondents in Saigon. He
asked why they did not write affirmative stories and why their leads could not be on Viet
Cong losses rather than on Vietnamese losses. He said the correspondents complained that
they were not being helped; for example, that military information officers are not even in
their offices on weekends. Mr. Rowan added that the USIA chief there could not be very
helpful because he had been told by Ambassador Lodge that he should have no contacts
with the press since the Ambassador would handle all such contacts, as he had always
done in his long government experience.
Secretary McNamara said that we were just now getting organized to aim black
broadcasts into North Vietnam. White broadcasts were not yet being made. He expressed
irritation at the length of time that it took to get these broadcasts organized primarily
because of a lack of radio programmers and Vietnamese technicians.
Director Bell said that up until recently he had been unable to use former Peace Corps
Volunteers in Vietnam. He had just succeeded in reaching agreement that former Peace
Corps Volunteers could be recruited by AID and used throughout the world, including
Vietnam.
Secretary McNamara said we need up to 200 more civilians in Vietnam now. He was
prepared to take out one military person for each civilian added. He has made military
personnel available to AID, allowing them to work in civilian clothes. In his view, only
one-fourth of the civilians needed by AID in the provinces are now there.
Secretary Rusk called attention to the importance of providing basic health services for
the Vietnamese. He cited simplified methods being used successfully by AID and
suggested that military health officers and doctors be allowed to work with the
Vietnamese.
Mr. Sullivan commented that we are asking our allies, especially the Filipinos, to make
available civilians for service in Vietnam.
Secretary McNamara said he wished to cite another illustration, namely, the Vietnamese
coastal railroad. If we spend enough money we can get this railroad running even though
the Viet Cong continues to sabotage it. We are pouring money into Korea which is not
now critical and we are not spending enough in Vietnam.
Secretary Rusk agreed that we need a rapid expansion of our programs and should not
consider a money limitation.
Mr. McGeorge Bundy suggested that a telegram containing the new proposals be sent to
Ambassador Lodge./3/ So far, we have asked for his approval on all matters and have
been successful in persuading him to go along with Washington proposals. We should
continue our method of persuasion.
/3/Apparent reference to Document 129.
Secretary Rusk noted that if we go in with new expanded programs we might prompt the
French, as well as Sihanouk, to change their attitude of pessimism.
General Wheeler said he wished to comment that in his view more military personnel
would be required in Vietnam shortly. More air forces will probably be required as well.
We will have to train more people and this is difficult to do.
The President joined the meeting. Secretary Rusk suggested that Assistant Secretary
Bundy report on his trip to Laos.
[Here follow William Bundy's briefing on Laos and discussion of cutbacks in nuclear
production.]

2045. Called on General Khanh at 9 am Friday.
1. I expressed concern about his health, having seen a story in the papers and also having
reports from other quarters that he had been ill. He made a very full disclosure, treating
me like a friend and uncle. He had been having indigestion, difficulty in sleeping. I gave
him the best advice I could and told him that he had to learn to live with his responsibility
and not think he could be in a perpetual state of crisis all the time. I urged him to
eliminate all unnecessary activity, including superfluous American visitors, if any.
2. I said that as regards the VC victory in Long An on April 8,/2/ it was evident to me that
the VC had penetrated the GVN forces, and I suggested using a polygraph to find out who
the traitors were. I also said it was apparent that in Long An there was a failure of
leadership. He did not disagree and said that to remedy this would involve changing the
province chief once again, and there had been too many changes already. He thought well
of the province chief, but also said that he was not in good health, that there was
something "in his insides which didn't work". In other words, he admitted that the man
was not doing his job.
/2/On April 8, the Viet Cong launched a company-sized attack on a training center in
Long An Province. Apparently aided by agents from within the garrison, the Viet Cong
killed 28 government defenders, wounded 36, and captured 112 weapons and 5 radios.
("The situation in South Vietnam," Weekly Report, April 15; Johnson Library, National
Security File, Vietnam Country File, Vol. VII)
3. I then said that I felt he could get a great deal more value out of General Minh than he
was getting, by having Minh get out on the stump, shake hands and show himself around
the country. Khanh agreed and said that if Minh did not do this, it was because Minh did
not want to. I said that Minh had told me that he, Minh, feared that Khanh did not want
him to be conspicuous. Khanh said this was not true. I said: Can I say to General Minh
that you would like to have him go around, and he said: Yes, and I will tell him so myself.
4. I then brought up the case of Ngo Dinh Can and said that I hoped he would be given
executive clemency and that he not be executed, and that he be allowed to wither away
and die in peace./3/ Khanh agreed but said that this was one case in which Minh had a
very great deal of real power. If he did nothing, Can would under the law die in five days,
although there was a possibility of extending this because of Can's involvement in other
litigation. Nonetheless, it was up to Minh to act affirmatively to give Can clemency. He
hoped I would speak to Minh about this, which I agreed to do.
5. Khanh was mobilizing all of the different religious groups in Viet-Nam, the Hoa Haos,
the Cao Dais, etc., and the Buddhist leaders, in favor of clemency. It was going well with
everyone except Tri Quang, who wants vengeance. He hoped I would see Tri Quang in
view of the great favor which the US Embassy had done him, and tell him it was not good
for Buddhism and not good for Viet-Nam for Can to be executed. I agreed to do this.
6. I then said that I thought Minh would be in much better humor if the cases of Generals
Don and Kim could be disposed of. Khanh said I was misinformed, that the only person in
whom Minh had a strong friendly interest was Tho. Actually, General Don disliked
General Minh intensely. Khanh knew this to be the case as he saw Don frequently.
7. He said the case of the four Generals would be dealt with before the end of April. He
was going to convene a "court of honor" and oblige all of them to justify themselves. The
"court" would be composed of the commanders of troops and other officers and would
number about ten. The four imprisoned Generals would be called upon to admit their
misdeeds and volunteer to make amends. They would then be freed and given work to do
either at home or abroad.
8. This would inevitably mean that General Don would have to explain why he signed a
travel order for a man named Huan, a member of the Council of Notables, to travel to
France to contact a large number of French persons interested in "neutralism". General
Don would have to state that General Minh had ordered him to do this, and this would
inevitably bring Minh himself before the court. Minh would have to justify the money that
he obtained with which to buy "villas" in France and would have to account for his action
in sending Huan to France. It would inevitably come out that Minh was a long time friend
of Tran Van Huu, the Vietnamese leader who lives in France, is General de Gaulle's
trump card, and who talks with the Viet Cong, etc. Khanh said he very much feared this
would be the end of General Minh.
9. I was flabbergasted by this revelation and said that it was, first of all, important for
Minh to act on Can's clemency first, and then when the "court of honor" convened, to
dispose of Don, Kim, Xuan and Dinh first. It was also vital that at no time would it appear
that Khanh was taking any initiative against Minh at all. Khanh agreed and said that this
would not come from any initiative of his, that he, Khanh, had gone out of his way to be
nice to Minh and to bring him into the government, but that this would inevitably flow
from the statements which the other Generals would make.
Comment: A. I will, of course, see Minh/4/ and Tri Quang/5/ as soon as possible in the
interest of Can.
/5/On April 25, Lodge made a special trip to Hue to talk to Tri Quang about clemency for
Can. Lodge noted that Can might become a symbol of persecution of Christians in
Vietnam. Lodge thought that an appeal by the Buddhist clergy for compassion in Can's
case would have a beneficial "world-wide impression." Lodge's report of their meeting in
telegram 2055 from Saigon, April 25, reads in part as follows:
"[Tri Quang stated] that I should realize that the Khanh government was unpopular,
particularly with Buddhists. If Can were not executed it would be accepted as evidence
that the old Diem crowd including particularly Catholic leaders and clergy, with all its
money and weapons, were still in control. This would injure the struggle i.against the
Communists which was still not going well because the people did not believe in the
government's sincerity for freedom. Clemency for Can would weaken the faith in the
United States, because many would think clemency was due to US influence. If it were
known that I had come to see him to intercede for Can, my popularity in Vietnam would
be seriously injured."
"He agreed to think over what I said and stressed that he was not asking for Can's death.
(But he did not warm up to the idea of life imprisonment as an alternative. Evidently in
this country you either get it or you don't.)" (Department of State, Central Files, POL 15
VIET S)
B. Obviously, the case of the four Generals has been hanging over us ever since Khanh
came to power, and once their cases are disposed of, I hope that Khanh can devote himself
to the pacification effort. It is at first blush very regrettable indeed that the proceedings
involving the Generals should tear down "Big" Minh. We will have to follow the facts
closely.
C. Khanh said there was much evidence that Kim was "up to his neck" in intrigues with
the French.
D. Perhaps we are on the edge of getting some solid information about the French
operations against the RVN of which so much has been said. Secretary's statement to
Khanh about this eventuality comes to mind./6/ The sending of Huan looks as though it
might be the clincher.
Lodge

2046. 1. At 10:45 am I called on Minh, pursuant to Khanh's request, and told him how
serious it would be if Ngo Dinh Can became a martyr and gave the GVN the reputation
throughout the Christian world to be anti-Christian. This was not a remote contingency. I
reminded him of the uproar in the United States last year when it appeared that the GVN
was anti-Buddhist. If there could be a reaction like this in a country where there were no
Buddhists, he could imagine what the reaction would be in a country which was
predominantly Christian. A situation would arise in which it was politically well nigh
impossible for the US Govt to support the GVN if it wanted to. I therefore requested him
in clear-cut language to give executive clemency to Ngo Dinh Can.
2. After a long silence, he said in a very emotional tone as though on the verge of tears:
"The Ngo Dinh family has paid enough. The coup of November 1 was not made for
hatred of anybody, but for the good of the country. I still very much regret the death of
Diem. It was Nhu who was bad. Can is a pathetic specimen, insufficiently educated. It
was the regime which made him bad. He would not have acted as he did if he had not
been the President's brother."
3. "Khanh should not have formed revolutionary tribunal. By its very terms, it was
inevitable that it should sentence Can to death. When I was running things, I temporized
and tried to give time for the people to calm down. Now the people are super-excited. I
am in an extremely difficult position. I must answer yes or no in writing. Khanh sets a
five-day limit on me."
4. I interrupted to say that I understood this was the law, which Khanh had told me was
the case, to which Minh replied: "Yes, but Khanh makes the law. Why does he set a fiveday limit? He always tries to put me in a difficult position. I must find a solution for Can.
I will be hated and denounced from one end of the country to the other if I give him
clemency."
5. I then suggested that Minh take the position that Can's presence was essential for
possible testimony and evidence in further litigation.
6. Minh said: "That's it, I will reprieve him on the ground that he is going to be needed in
other litigation in the future." He distinguished between this procedure and clemency. He
added: "I had a long talk with my family last night. We agreed that I should be prepared to
sacrifice all my popularity, which is what I do if I give clemency to Can. I know I will be
denounced."
7. He then said: "I want to ask you a question about a money matter. Did Conein ever give
General Don money for the November coup?"
8. I said: "Definitely not. Had he done such a thing, I would certainly have known it."
9. Minh continued: "I am surrounded by traps. I may be accused of taking money to give
clemency to Can. It is said already that Can's friends are very rich, and that many are at
large. It will be said that they are bribing me to prevent Can's execution."
10. "I am also very unhappy that General Khanh said that when I was in power, I had only
prepared a three-page indictment which would only have given Can five days of
punishment."
11. "What we need in this country is to have good feeling between Catholics and
Buddhists. That is what I have always tried to get for national unity."
12. I then said that I knew that General Khanh would be glad to have Minh go out on the
stump and make tours in the country, and that Minh was in error in thinking that Khanh
did not want him to do so.
13. Minh changed his ground. He said everything [sic] he had friends who were also
friends of Generals Don and Kim, and they ask him "why have you done nothing for our
mutual friends?" "They accuse me of disloyalty. It is so disagreeable that I do not want to
make any trips in the country."
Comment: A. From all this I get the impression that he will not allow Can to be executed.
I am sure I have pushed him as far as I can today. I would bet that he would prevent Can
from being executed. But he has not yet really signed on the dotted line in a way so that
he cannot wiggle out of it.
B. Clearly Khanh is rigging matters so that Minh will bear all obligation for not executing
Can./2/
/2/Can was executed on May 9.
Lodge
(Sullivan) and the Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs (Bundy) to the
/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 VIET S. Secret. Drafted by
Sullivan. A note on the source text indicates that Secretary Rusk saw the memorandum.
SUBJECT
Actions on Your Recommendations Affecting Viet Nam/2/
/2/For Rusk's recommendations, see Document 124.
This is an interim report on the actions which we are taking to implement the
recommendations which you have made concerning Viet Nam. For the sake of easy
reference, we will run down the list in accordance with the numbered sequence you have
laid out in your own summary of those recommendations.
A. Actions presenting no substantial policy problems:
1. Increase in Sources of External Assistance.
The Department of Defense has been directed to send a message through military
channels to MACV instructing the latter to indicate the types of assistance that can best be
integrated into the current US military efforts. MACV has been directed to discuss the
problem with the Ambassador before answering. As far as other types of assistance are
concerned, AID/Washington has been asked to compile a list of desirable economic and
technical projects which could be provided from national resources other than the US. We
had already undertaken efforts for increased medical assistance and have suggested to
USOM in Saigon that they send a representative to Manila to investigate the Filipino
potential.
2. GVN Diplomatic and Foreign Information Activity.
Lodge has spoken once again to General Khanh on this subject and has been once again
assured that Khanh will give it urgent attention.
3. Enlistment of General Minh.
Lodge has talked with both Khanh and Minh about getting Minh more actively involved
in support of the current government. Lodge seems to be fully convinced of the need for
this and has pursued it with imagination and vigor.
4. Support from Civilian Groups.
We have sent our Regional Buddhist Advisor, Mr. Gard, from Hong Kong to Saigon to
assist in obtaining Buddhist support for the regime. We are bringing Mr. Buu, head of the
Trade Union Movement, here to the United States and we hope to be able to provide him
with certain material incentives such as fertilizer to be distributed through his rural
organizations. We have assigned two officers from the Embassy to conduct regular
contact with the local French community in order to develop ways in which they can be
better enlisted behind the Government.
5. Psychological Warfare.
Carl Rowan has agreed with our suggestions that we send Ambassador Lodge a copy of
his memorandum to the President/3/ on the deficiencies in the Psychological Warfare
effort. Carl is also preparing a more detailed recommendation on this matter. In the
meantime, we have used MAP funds from the Department of Defense to purchase a new
50 kw. transmitter to be located in Viet Nam for Voice of America broadcasts to the
North. The negotiator for this installation left for Saigon yesterday. We sent his
instructions to the Post last evening.
/3/Document 122.
6. Expulsion of Undesirable Characters.
This is one on which we are having to move cautiously. However, there are at least two
members of the USOM whom we are going to have removed in the near future. One has
been a constant source of bellyaches to the press and has been an irritant inside US
Mission operations. There is also a Defense Department team in Saigon now investigating
certain reports concerning problems in one element of our military establishment.
7. Promotions for US Civilians.
We have begun discussions with the personnel people to determine the procedures for
carrying out these on-the-spot promotions.

8. Money.
The draft Presidential telegram which you cleared has now also been cleared by Secretary
McNamara, Dave Bell and Carl Rowan./4/ It has been sent to the White House this
evening.
9. Special Services.
The Defense Department is looking into the possibility of providing additional services to
its more remote units in Viet Nam. In the meantime, USIA is investigating the availability
of current American entertainment films to be shipped in on a regular basis for Lodge to
use at his own discretion within the American community.
B. Actions presenting policy problems:
1. Provincial Programs.
This matter is touched upon in some detail in the draft telegram from the President. If
Lodge answers in a positive vein the message which you sent on the subject of the
Pacification Committee, we can follow up further in that series. This will require
continued attention by State and AID.
2. U.S. Naval Presence.
The Pentagon has been in touch with CINCPAC, and Admiral Felt, who has been here in
Washington for the last two days, has been consulted. The Department of Defense
members of the Coordinating Committee will have a memorandum in a few days giving
the JCS views on what could be done with respect to a naval presence without
handicapping the general readiness posture in the area.
3. Junk Operations North of the Demarcation Line.
This, too, is being discussed in the Pentagon and a similar memorandum will be prepared.
There is some reluctance to undertake operations which would pit Swatow boats against
Nasty crafts. The Swatows are more heavily armed.
4. Improved Intelligence in Laos and Cambodia.
Alex Johnson will discuss this whole matter in the Special Group 5412.
5. Canadian Contacts with Hanoi.
In coordination with EUR, we are preparing for you a talking paper/5/ to be used with
Mike Pearson when you meet with him on April 30./6/
/5/Not found.
6. Economic Interdiction of North Viet Nam.
We have prepared for your signature a letter to the Secretary of Treasury asking that
foreign assets control be applied against North Viet Nam./7/ We will undertake more
extensive discussions within the Department to determine how best to have the same sort
of action undertaken by other friendly countries. We have already approached the
Japanese with a brief message and have spoken to the British concerning their shipping.
Our intelligence estimates indicate that the problem is a very limited one, with most ships
of the Free World arriving at North Vietnamese ports in ballast. Cargo carried out of
North Viet Nam consists almost entirely of anthracite coal.
/7/The draft letter as approved by McGeorge Bundy is in the Johnson Library, National
Security File, Vietnam Country File, Vol. VII, Cables and Memos.
SUBJECT
Vietnam
The attached memorandum from Bill Sullivan results from my request for a status report
on our responses to Lodge's suggestions.
Bill's memorandum is somewhat cryptic, because the actions which Lodge has suggested
have been incorporated into a political-military scenario, which is now in the hands of the
Joint Chiefs. I sent you yesterday the latest version of the political half of the scenario./2/
/2/Reference is to an April 20 draft of a three-part political/military scenario with the
narrative portion also summarized in tabular form. (Ibid.) For an earlier draft, see the
attachment to Document 102.
I would suggest that the President see the narrative part (not the charts) of the scenario
and consider whether it isn't time for you and him (and perhaps Rusk and McNamara) to
discuss future moves in Vietnam at one of your lunches. The point to keep in mind is that
almost any of the actions suggested by Lodge, but not yet implemented, could start a
chain of escalation for which we are not yet prepared.
Mike
Attachment
Memorandum by the Secretary of State's Special Assistant for Vietnam (Sullivan)/3/
/3/Top Secret.
There are three categories of action in which Ambassador Lodge has made certain
recommendations which we have not as yet fulfilled. These are (a) cross border probes
into the Laos corridor; (b) hot pursuit into Cambodia; and (c) tit-for-tat raids on North
Vietnamese targets in the event of terror against Americans.
All of these recommendations have involved certain contingencies. For example, the titfor-tat suggestion was first made as part of a political-military scenario which involved
covert diplomatic contacts with the North Vietnamese, offers of food and partial
withdrawal of US forces, etc., etc. The Cambodian hot pursuit suggestion was in the
context of further action by Sihanouk detrimental to the legal status of the Saigon
Government. The operations into Laos were recommended if we considered current
intelligence operations unsatisfactory.
Therefore, although we have not responded positively to these proposals from Lodge, it
should be understood that the proposals themselves were in one measure or another
designed to be part of a larger schematic view of our political and military posture in
Southeast
Asia as a whole. On the other hand all of Lodge's recommendations have in one form or
another been incorporated into a planning document which has been roughed out on the
political side here in Washington and is currently under study in the Joint Chiefs of Staff
to examine its military consequences. Therefore. we have given positive consideration to
these recommendations.
The basic question of course is whether the planning document can be considered a "live"
plan directed toward ultimate accomplishment in the forseeable future, or whether it is a
contingency arrangement which will always remain on the shelf. If it is the former, we can
categorically state that we are acting on all of Lodge's recommendations. If it is the latter,
that statement would need considerable qualification.
W. H. Sullivan

Washington, April 28, 1964--7:02 p.m.
/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, AID (US) VIET S. Secret; Priority; Exdis.
Transmitted as telegram 1791 to Saigon, which is the source text. According to a draft of
telegram 1791, the message was drafted by Sullivan and revised by McGeorge Bundy.
Johnson Library, National Security File, Vietnam Country Series, Vol. VII, Cables and
Memos)
McGeorge Bundy sent a copy of this draft telegram to the President under cover of a
memorandum, April 26, which reads as follows:
"This is a draft dispatch from you to Lodge which argues out a general proposition that
people should not be timid in asking for what they need. It has been cleared in substance
with Rusk, McNamara, and Bell, although this draft is a revision of a State Department
original. The one point of substance on which there may not be full agreement is that
Sarge Shriver hates to have his Peace Corps graduates tapped for unpeaceful missions.
None of the rest of us agrees with him, and I think you are safe in going ahead." (Ibid.)
Dean Rusk has reported fully to me and to the National Security Council on the
encouraging impressions which he has brought back from his recent visit to Viet Nam. He
made a number of recommendations which he had already discussed in general terms with
you, and as soon as they have been studied and reviewed by appropriate departments here
in Washington, we will be sending you separate messages on them.
Meanwhile I would like to raise with you one general question that has come out of our
most recent discussions here. Dean Rusk has reported that he gets a strong impression
both here and in Viet Nam that our plans and recommendations are often inhibited by a
feeling that resources available for this struggle are closely limited, so that there is no
room for bold new efforts. Bob McNamara has reported a similar concern. So I have told
them both what I want to repeat to you and to all members of the country team--that in our
effort to help the Vietnamese to help themselves, we must not let any arbitrary limits on
budget, or manpower, or procedures stand in our way. We can do extraordinary things
within the limit of our current appropriations and we can, if necessary, seek emergency
appropriations if they are needed for success in Viet Nam. We all recognize that a prompt
and clear success in Viet Nam would be worth a very large amount to us; and we should
not shrink from using the necessary funds to obtain the result.
Both Dean Rusk and Bob McNamara, for example, wonder whether we have committed
enough Americans to assist on a crash basis in the development of civil administrative
services in those areas of Viet Nam which have already been partially pacified and where
the "holding" process must now be pressed forward vigorously. There is a danger that the
Vietnamese Government, because of a shortage or an absence of its own resources, may
rest on its oars once an area has been militarily cleared and fail to carry through the civil
efforts needed to win the population in that area. We know that Vietnamese resources for
such leadership are woefully short, but relative to their needs, our own resources are large.
I have authorized Dave Bell to recruit as many highly motivated young men as he may
need to help train the Vietnamese to provide civil services in these cleared areas. Our
civilian staffing in the Provinces still seems too thin in many areas. I understand that our
military often have 10 to 20 times as many field personnel assigned to provincial
pacification work (excluding tactical advisors and support personnel) as does USOM--yet
the largest job in cleared areas is surely civil. I have suggested to Bell that young people
emerging from two years' service in the Peace Corps would represent an ideal source of
experienced and motivated assistants for this work, and I have asked Sargent Shriver to
cooperate in supporting such recruiting if it proves necessary.
Carl Rowan has given me a carefully prepared report/2/ on deficiencies which he found in
the informational-psychological operations of both the Vietnamese Government and our
Mission. He has strongly endorsed proposals originating within the country team to train
Vietnamese for these operations and to provide more US guidance, both in Saigon and in
the provinces. These proposals will involve a small increase in USIA personnel, and
perhaps from other agencies, as well as a modest outlay of US funds. Rowan is in the
process of detailing a plan to improve the overall psychological effort, so we should soon
have specific ideas on which to act.
/2/Document 122.
I have been informed of your energetic and highly commendable efforts to maintain the
size of your Mission at the minimum necessary. I thoroughly endorse your views in this
regard and think particularly that frugality and economy of manpower should be applied
above all with respect to the headquarters and home office staffs in Saigon, which are
reported to have shown the usual tendency to mushroom. I hope, however, that you share
our feeling that we should take a different attitude out in the countryside because it is so
important that we get the job done there where the war is actually being fought. I know
that one of your concerns is to keep the American presence in Viet Nam from becoming
excessive, but we all believe here that the need for effective leadership on the civilian side
out in the country is overriding, and for this reason Bob McNamara has agreed that if you
think it necessary any civilian increases on this side can be matched by reductions of up to
two or three hundred military personnel, so that we could say flatly that there was no net
increase but merely a shift of effort towards the arts of peace.
All in all the guidance I would like to give to your entire Mission is not to let your
thinking be limited by possible budgetary or personnel restraints upon the resources at
your disposal to execute our policy. As far as I am concerned you must have whatever you
need to help the Vietnamese do the job, and I assure you that I will act at once to
eliminate obstacles or restraints wherever they may appear./3/
to the President/1/
Bundy, Vol. 111. Secret.
LAOS CROSS BORDER OPERATIONS
There will be raised with you this afternoon at the NSC meeting 2 the question of
authorizing military operations from South Vietnam across the border into Laos for the
purpose of gathering intelligence on the Ho Chi Minh Trail. The issues are as follows:
1. Recent high level photographic surveillance has revealed a new truckable road between
Route 12 and the area of Tchepone in central Laos, together with some apparent supply
bases. There is a feeling in the JCS that we should take direct ground and air action
against these targets if intelligence proves them out.
2. Ambassador Unger discussed this problem with Assistant Secretary Bundy in
Saigon./3/ He is very much opposed to any kind of cross border operation into Laos which
would be internationally visible, particularly at a time when Souvanna Phouma's position
in Vientiane is not secure.
/3/Reported in a memorandum by William Bundy, April 29. (Washington National
Records Center, RG 330, OASD/ISA Files: FRC 68 A 4023, 092 Laos)
3. The Department of State will suggest a compromise designed to reduce the risk of
causing trouble in Laos. They would permit small-scale, carefully controlled intelligence
sorties into Laos organized in such a way as to avoid, to the maximum extent possible,
creating an international hue and cry. State will probably recommend against direct
involvement of U.S. personnel, except for emergency air transport to the intelligence
teams. They will also recommend low level reconnaissance by U.S. aircraft. You may
wish to ask what Ambassador Lodge's position is on this question, since it is not clear
from the cables.
Mike
Washington, April 29, 1964, 5 p.m./1/
/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, NSC Meetings, Tab 1. Secret. Drafted
by Bromley Smith.
U.S. POLICY TOWARD LAOS
Director McCone introduced Mr. Ray Cline who read a paper/2/ on the intelligence now
available which indicates greatly increased use of Laos for infiltration of men and
materials from North to South Vietnam.
/2/Not found.
Mr. Cline reported that there had been an expansion of Pathet Lao forces in Laos. In
addition, the North Vietnamese appear to be strengthening the Pathet Lao forces. There
are no regular Chinese forces in Laos as far as we know. The Pathet Lao alone have only a
50-50 chance of overrunning all other non-Communist forces in Laos. However, if the
Pathet Lao forces were joined by pro-Communist forces and Communist forces from
Vietnam, they could overrun all Laos quickly without warning. The Communists appear
to be moving to clear out rightist forces which are now in Communist controlled areas in
Laos.
Mr. Cline read the Watch Committee conclusions (copy attached)./2/
The President was shown numerous aerial photographs which revealed major
improvements in road networks, the effect of which is to improve Hanoi's ability to back
up forces in Laos or in South Vietnam.
Under Secretary Harriman told the President we are attempting to get the International
Control Commission to send inspectors to the Plaine des Jarres in the hope that their
presence would halt the fighting which apparently is now going on there. The situation in
Laos is not clear but we are making an effort to force Siho,/3/ one of the rebel generals, to
support continuation of Souvanna's coalition government. Governor Harriman stated a
requirement for low-level reconnaissance in Laos and favored sending non-U.S. patrols
into Laos to try to find out the size of the military buildup.
/3/General Siho Lamphouthacoul.
The President asked whether Ambassador Lodge favored these proposals. Secretary
McNamara said that Lodge did favor the suggestions but actually they would have little
effect in South Vietnam. He added that Ambassador Unger opposed the proposals when
asked about them some days ago.
Mr. McCone said the photographic intelligence shown the President was so new that there
had been little time to analyze it. He said that neither the Secretary of Defense nor the
Joint Chiefs had seen the pictures and asked for more time for the intelligence community
to analyze the new information.
Under Secretary Harriman said the situation was urgent and he asked for authority to
explore ways of finding out what was actually going on. Mr. Colby acknowledged that the
pictures of the staging area in North Vietnam indicated a buildup but we do not know
whether the additional forces are headed for South Vietnam or Laos. Secretary McNamara
thought that it was essential for us to obtain additional information on the military
buildup.
The President asked that the proposals be presented to Ambassador Unger again in the
light of current developments so that he could give his best estimate of the political effect
in Laos if the reconnaissance actions were taken. Mr. McCone was asked to present the
new evidence to his evaluators and return with an intelligence community view. Further
discussion of the subject was scheduled for Friday.
Bromley Smith/4/
/4 Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.

/1/Department of State, Central Files, DEF 19-9 US-VIET S. Secret; Priority; Exdis.
1. Your 1791/2/ with its proposal for (A) Americans to "assist on a crash basis in the
development of civil administrative services" in "partially pacified" areas and (B) its
proposal for "more US guidance" on information-psychological operations is of major
significance.
2. It involves, first, finding out GVN general reaction and, secondly, deciding best
recommendations to you.
3. By noteworthy coincidence, General Khanh today asked me to provide one American
expert each in the fields of finance-economics; foreign affairs; and press relations who
would be assigned to him personally and would have their offices "in a convenient villa",
perhaps the one in which General Khanh lives. He also made this statement: "We
Vietnamese want the Americans to be responsible with us (he stressed the words "with
us") and not merely be advisers." He freely recognized that the trained personnel which is
utterly indispensable if he is actually to run the government simply does not exist.
4. As the Department knows, I have opposed our seeking to fasten American personnel
onto the GVN because of obvious colonialist overtones, because it would cause
resentment, because it would mean a lessening of effort by the GVN and a placing of the
blame for everything that went wrong on us. As the impotence of the bureaucracy has
become increasingly evident, I have been hoping that General Khanh would ask us for
help. Now it has happened, and it has been caused by the conviction of urgent necessity. It
is a real breakthrough, and I welcome it. Believe we have right people here to take care of
Gen. Khanh's request. Experience acquired in Viet-Nam most useful, if not indispensable.
5. With all of this as the background, I told him of your proposal for civil administrators
on a crash basis in the partially pacified areas. His quick reply was: "Yes--if you will
accept the losses". He stressed that in districts and villages there was risk of getting shot
and that "Americans seemed to get very upset" when anyone was killed in that way. As
regards your proposal in the psychological field, he said: "I think so" but wanted more
time.
6. My own recommendations are as follows: There should be an individual civil
administration adviser to join the other three advisers mentioned in paragraph 3; action on
my proposal for four civil-political advisers, one for each corps area, now under
consideration in AID, should be expedited; there should be a few people well qualified in
civil administration who could be available for assignment in the critical provinces, as the
corps area advisers recommend; and we should continue the effort in training the
Vietnamese. But I do not think that we should dump a large number of persons on a crash
basis. There is no use in having several hundred persons out here as not enough areas are
being cleared fast enough to give them things to do. As it is, I suspect that we have too
many military personnel in a number of places. The situation calls for a qualitative, rifleshot, precision approach rather than a quantitative buckshot saturation approach.
7. As regards psychological operations we are moving ahead on basis of plans Rowan
presented to you. Glad we can call on you for more help, but feel we are progressing now.
8. In view of the above trail-blazing development, I believe it will be extremely useful if
you could send a member of your staff for conference with me, possibly Forrestal.
Lodge/3/
133. Letter From the Ambassador in Vietnam (Lodge) to the Secretary of State/1/
Saigon, April 30, 1964.
/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Intelligence File, Rusk/Lodge/ Wm
Bundy Correspondence. Confidential, Nodis.
Dear Dean: The following is in furtherance of the conversation which we had in my office
recently on the subject of the post of U.S. Ambassador to Viet-Nam:/2/
/2/No record of this conversation has been found, but see Document 116.
1. Everything that I have read, reamed and observed brings me to the conclusion that the
wisest thing which has been said about VietNam was Bedell Smith's statement in 1954
that "Any second rate general should be able to win in Indo-China if there were a proper
political atmosphere".
2. The creation of this atmosphere is still the essential aim and everything else that we do
must contribute to it. The AID program does so through its economic and social program.
MAC/V does so by helping to bring about order, so that people can sleep at night. The
USIS in a very obvious and utterly essential sense contributes by helping saturate the
minds of the people, giving them the idea, based on practical achievement, that it is to the
government-and not the communists-that people must look to bring about the much
needed social revolution. The Embassy leads and coordinates the entire effort.
3. We have given much more time, attention and money to the military than to the civil.
Had we developed the civil side as much as we have the military, we would be well on
our way to a solution, because once the people really like the government, the Viet Cong's
days are numbered, and the military job is well nigh done.
4. For the future, therefore, the United States must organize itself to help to create this
"proper political atmosphere". The Ambassador as the leader of the U.S. effort should,
therefore, be a man to whom civil-political factors are very real indeed, possibly from
actual experience. He should also have a well known record of achievement. It is not in
the interest of the military for the Ambassador at this stage to be a military man. The
military's best interests are served by having the civil-political side energetically and
expertly developed.
5. The Ambassador, contrary to the understanding in very high quarters, has not got
authority over all military activities of the U.S. Government in Viet-Nam. Two papers
govern. A.) One is the President's letter of May 29, 1961,/3/ which puts the Military
Assistance Advisory Group under the Ambassador, but specifically excludes "United
States military forces operating in the field where such forces are under the command of
the United States area military commander". When MAAG and MAC/V were
consolidated, all U.S. military ceased to be members of the country team. B.) In addition
is a memorandum/4/ of which I do not possess the date, but which embodies the terms of
reference signed by the President and agreed to by Secretary McNamara and Secretary
Rusk, and given to General Harkins personally, paragraph 2 of which says:
/3/See Foreign Relations, 1961-1963, vol. I, p. 655, footnote 5.
/4/See ibid., vol. II, pp. 111-112.
"Commander, United States Military Assistance Command will:"
"(a) have direct responsibility for all United States military policy, operations, and
assistance in that country and the authority to discuss both the United States and
Vietnamese military operations directly with the President of Viet-Nam and the leaders of
the Government of Viet-Nam."
This clearly means that the military commander has direct access to the chief of state and
that the Ambassador does not control all U. S. access to the chief of state and therefore
has no way of assuring that all Americans speak with one voice.
Is this special status truly to the advantage of the military? Does it contribute to creating
the "proper political atmosphere"?
With warm regards,
As ever yours,
Cabot L.

Washington, May 1, 1964--8:34 p.m.
/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 VIET S. Secret; Priority; Exdis.
Drafted by Sullivan and initialed by Rusk. Repeated to Ottawa. McGeorge Bundy sent the
President a copy of this telegram under cover of a brief memorandum on which the
President wrote: "OK, LBJ." Johnson Library, National Security File, Memos to the
President, McGeorge Bundy, Vol. 4)
1821. For the Ambassador from the Secretary. I flew up to Ottawa yesterday to talk with
Mike Pearson and Martin concerning the Canadian presence in Hanoi. I found our
Canadian friends in close concert with the thoughts you and I discussed in Saigon and
they assure me that they are most willing to cooperate with us.
Their new ICC Commissioner will be J. Blair Seaborn, an expert in communist affairs,
who has recently returned from an assignment as Counselor of the Canadian Embassy in
Moscow. The exchange with Cox in Saigon has been scheduled to take place some time
this summer, but they agreed to attempt to step this up by a few weeks.
They readily agreed that Seaborn should plan to spend much more time in Hanoi than
have his predecessors in this assignment. They also accept as part of his mission an effort
to establish ready access to and close contact with senior authorities in Hanoi, beginning
with Ho Chi Minh. We discussed several points which we would like Seaborn to
undertake for us. I am having talking papers prepared here in the Department and will
send an officer to Ottawa in the near future for further development of this matter directly
with Seaborn.
Following are some of the matters which we roughed out in Ottawa and which I will have
further developed here. I would appreciate your comments on these points together with
any additional suggestions for talking points which we can give to the Canadians:
1. Seaborn should start out by checking as closely as he can what is on Ho Chi Minh's
mind. We want to know whether he considers himself over-extended and exposed, or
whether he feels confident that his Chinese allies will back him to the hilt. We want to
know whether his current zeal is being forced upon him by pro-Chinese elements in his
own camp, or whether he is impelled by his own ambitions.
2. Seaborn should get across to Ho and his colleagues the full measure of US
determination to see this thing through. He should draw upon examples in other parts of
the world to convince them that if it becomes necessary to enlarge the military action, this
is the most probable course that the US would follow.
3. Seaborn should spread the word that he is puzzled by Hanoi's intentions. The North
Vietnamese should understand that the US wants no military bases or other footholds in
South Viet Nam or Laos. If Hanoi would leave its neighbors alone, the US presence in the
area would diminish sharply.
4. The North Vietnamese should understand that there are many examples in which the
Free World has demonstrated its willingness to live in peace with communist neighbors
and to permit the establishment of normal economic relations between these two different
systems. We recognize North Viet Nam's need for trade, and especially food, and consider
that such needs could be fulfilled if peaceful conditions were to prevail./2/
/2/In telegram 2110 from Saigon, May 4, Lodge stated that he approved these points, but
added the following suggestions:
"1. Under your pare 1, it is not clear exactly how Seaborn would get the information. He
should also, I think, try to find out how interested Ho is in playing an independent role of
any kind."
"2. In your pare 2, I would add this for Seaborn to tell Ho: if the United States has to
choose between enlarging the war and withdrawing, we will enlarge. We intend to stay.
We expect to win; we will retaliate for every terroristic act against us."
"3. Under pare 3, I would have Seaborn make this point: it is in North Vietnam's best
interest to have as few Americans here as possible, and their behavior has great influence
on this particular question. Why do they not behave in such a way as to achieve the end
which they state is their end?"
"4. Under pare 4, Seaborn should try to enlist the Poles with us and with North Vietnam,
so as to detach them from China." (Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 VIET S)
Pearson also agreed to instruct Seaborn and his people in general to work more actively
on trying to break the Poles off from constant and active espousal of North Vietnamese
aggression. He felt, however, that the Poles are playing something of a middle role in
Sino-Soviet matters these days and doubted that there would be much profit in this.
Rusk

Saigon, May 2, 1964--7 p.m.
/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, DEF 1 US-VIET S. Top Secret; Limdis.
Repeated to CINCPAC. Also published in Declassified Documents, 1984, 001242.
2101. 1. Herewith my comment, as requested, on your 1815./2/
/2/In telegram 1815, May 1, the Departments of State and Defense informed Lodge that
the desirability of maintaining a U.S. naval presence in or near South Vietnam had been
reviewed. The conclusion was "that such a presence intermittently introduced into that
area, would give increased evidence of US determination, would provide warning signal
to North Vietnamese, and, because of its ambiguous nature, would offer certain
operational positions we might find useful at a later date." (Department of State, Central
Files, DEF 1 US-VIET S)
2. It does not seem to me that proposed action/3/ would add much psychologically to what
we have now, and evidently that is the purpose. Those who are interested in such things
assume that 7th Fleet is always just over the horizon and that Marines from Okinawa are
not far away. Doubt whether suggested air operations would achieve much
psychologically. Actual recon flights over NVN would be needed to do that.
/3/In telegram 1815, the Departments of State and Defense also proposed moving Task
Force 77.4 (carrier Kitty Hawk and 3 destroyers) into a 200-mile circular operating area,
where it would conduct air operations offshore and over South Vietnam. Subsequent
operations could be carried out by Task Group 77.6 (carrier Midway and escorts). It
would also be possible to conduct small amphibious training exercises in South Vietnam
with or without South Vietnamese participation. The Joint Chiefs of Staff first proposed
these operations in JCSM-356-64 to Secretary McNamara on April 25. (Washington
National Records Center, RG 330, OASD/ISA Files: FRC 68 A 4023, Vietnam 092)
3. I suggest consideration of establishing what the layman would call a "U.S. naval base"
at Cam Ranh Bay. There need not-should not-be an expensive shore installation. But the
flag should fly, the U.S. presence there should be known and a generous and deep
beachhead should be provided.

4. I think, but am not sure, that land area around Cam Ranh Bay is not heavily populated,
and I plan to look at it on the ground next week. I understand it is the driest land in all
SEA.
5. A generous expanse of empty land should make the base readily defensible on the
ground. Outside of the beachhead USG might have a "show place" model community for
Vietnamese.
6. I understand General Khanh would approve.
7. Establishment of such a base would do the following:
A. Establish a U.S. presence in a way which is defensible without depending on Viet-Nam
and without political complications or involvement of dependents.
B. It would enable us to derive maximum benefit from Navy, Air power [Force], and
Marines. Obviously, in the interior of Viet-Nam the Army plays the dominant role, and it
is full of strong and subtle complications and tied to many factors outside military control,
yet having a strong effect on military operations.
C. But a U.S. Naval presence at Cam Ranh Bay would be purely U.S. and purely militarynot dependent on Viet-Nam, and without hampering influence of civilians. Practically no
construction would be involved, therefore, with little effect on the gold flow.
D. Possession of this base could be a useful trump card at a diplomatic conference when,
as, and if one should ever be held. It would be something we could readily withdraw if the
price were right.
Lodge

/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 VIET S. Top Secret; Exdis. Passed
to the White House and the Office of the Secretary of Defense for McNamara on receipt
in the Department of State. Also published in part in Declassified Documents, 1984.
001244.
2108. For the Secretary, McNamara, Harriman, and Bundy from Lodge.
1. Just as I was leaving the house this morning, I received the unusual message to call on
General Khanh at 10:00 AM. When I came in, he said he had asked me to call partly
because "I always feel better after I talk with you" and partly to put to me the following
question:
2. Should he make a declaration that he was putting the country on a war footing?
3. This would involve many things at home and abroad. At home it would involve getting
rid of the so-called "politicians" and having a government which would frankly be a
government of technicians. It would involve, as had been the case under Lincoln in our
Civil War, the suspension of certain civil rights. There would be a curfew; Saigon would
cease to be a city of pleasure; evacuation plans would be made which would be capable of
being carried out in three to four months to evacuate all of the two million people in
Saigon. Under these plans the government with the diplomatic corps would leave Saigon,
and American dependents would be evacuated.
4. Announcement would be made to Hanoi that any further interference in South
Vietnam's internal affairs would lead to reprisals, and he specifically asked if the United
States would be prepared to undertake tit-for-tat bombing each time there was an
interference in the internal affairs of South Vietnam.
5. Cambodia would be told: We have done what we could to have good relations with
you, but we will not respect anything you negotiate either with Hanoi or with the Viet
Cong.
6. A declaration of a state of war obviously would have to be accompanied by actions to
prevent the French subversive activities here which he was sure were going on. For one
thing, there was no doubt at all as to their activities in Cambodia. Their purpose obviously
was to get the United States out of the whole of Southeast Asia. Colonel Lan, General Vy,
and Huan, the former manager of the Caravelle, had made declarations under the
polygraph in response to questions both direct and indirect which established beyond
doubt that Generals Kim and Xuan were [garble--paid to?] make the neutralist coup.
There was a letter which Van Tam, the well-known French cat's paw, had written to Big
Minh but which was apparently "lost". He envisioned breaking diplomatic relations with
France but keeping the Consul.
7. He asked me what my personal reaction was. I said, speaking purely personally and
directing my remarks to the internal changes, that, given the state of the country, winning
the war must come first. After the war was won, there would be plenty of time to go ahead
with democratic forms.
8. He said that he could not enthuse about just "making the agony endure", that it was
fundamental common sense and logic to try to move ahead and get a real victory,
otherwise, it was inexcusable to take 2,000 casualties and lose five airplanes, as they had
done, simply in order to stand still.
9. Before making a declaration that he was putting the country onto a war footing, he
would tell the people and the world why war had to be waged. He would say that at the
time of the November first coup the GVN had "lost control" of some seven million
people. In the last three months, the GVN had "gained control" over two million people,
leaving five million who were still not under GVN control. Each week, in addition to the
regular military operations, the GVN was gaining control over more and more people.
Last week they gained control over 60,000. It was indispensable to regain control over the
whole country, and this was why the war had to [garble--waged?].
10. I asked him the specific question whether he thought there was any possibility at all of
a Communist victory similar to that which had been won at Dien Bien Phu in 1954, that
is, a key battle somewhere which would have a totally demoralizing effect and cause
capitulation to the Communists.
11. Speaking again to him personally, I said that I thought anyone contemplating steps of
this kind would have to figure out where it all might lead and what reprisals the enemy
might take. It was one thing for the US and the GVN to bomb North Vietnam but how
would they retaliate? If we blew up their gasoline refinery, we should expect them to blow
up ours. If we destroyed their power dam, they would destroy our power dam. Was it
certain at this time in such an exchange we would come out ahead?
12. Then I said that if NVN undertook to invade SVN with its army, that would raise a
host of new questions of very acute interest to the United States. The possibility of the
Chinese Army itself coming in had to be considered. He asked whether the United States
would be prepared to follow through with all the consequences which might very well
involve China. Ultimately, NVN would have to be liberated from China.
If the Chinese Army came in, said I, the question arose as to whether this army could be
prevented from functioning by bombing its supply lines and this in time raised the
question in my mind as to whether the supply lines could be effectively interdicted with
conventional bombing or whether nuclear weapons would be necessary. I did not have the
answers to these questions, but obviously they were ones that any sensible person would
ask. He agreed.
13. I said these were very large questions involving the highest level in the US
Government, that I did not pretend to have the answers, that I personally had been brought
up on the idea, so often voiced by General MacArthur, that in Asia the United States
could have great influence with its air power and its navy and in working in support of
Asiatic armies but that it was out of the question for the United States to commit a large
land army to the mainland of Asia. For example, I did not visualize the United States ever
putting an army into Asia comparable to the army it had put into Europe during World
War II.
14. He appreciated this; but he hoped that we would consider the big things which could
be done with an "army corps" of US Special Forces. He thought that any "army corps" of
Special Forces numbering 10,000 men could do in Asia what an army group had done in
Europe. He said one American can make soldiers out of ten Orientals. If an army group in
Europe could cover a hundred miles, he thought an army corps of Special Forces could
cover the whole Cambodian-Laotian frontier.
15. He thought it was illogical, wasteful, wrong to go on incurring casualties "just in order
to make the agony endure". He felt that the show of determination which he was outlining
would make the Viet Cong change and that it would not be necessary to go to the ultimate
limit, but he wanted to be honest and candid and have us face up to these ultimate limits.
16. I asked whether he wanted to continue with the present plan of concentrating the effort
in the provinces around Saigon, and he said by all means but that much more than that
ought to be done in order to develop a real show of determination and an offensive spirit.
Comment: This man obviously wants to get on with the job and not sit here indefinitely
taking casualties. Who can blame him?
His desire to declare a state of war, leaving out specific details such as the plans for
evacuating Saigon, seems wholly in line with our desire to get out of a "business as usual"
mentality.
He is clearly facing up to all the hard questions and wants us to do it too.
Lodge
137. Memorandum for the Secretary of State/1/

Washington, May 4, 1964.
/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Vietnam Country File, Vol. VIII. Top
Secret. There is no indication on the source text who sent this memorandum to Rusk, but
it was apparently from William Bundy. A copy of the memorandum is in Department of
State, Bundy Files, Special Papers.
SUBJECT
Lodge's Conversation with Khanh Re Mobilization and Pressure on the North/2/
It is suggested that you raise the report of Lodge's conversation with Khanh during the
luncheon session with the President and Secretary McNamara./3/ Khanh has touched upon
several points which are difficult to answer by telegram and it would seem that the best
means of bringing this conversation into focus would be to have McNamara prepared to
discuss it with Lodge upon his arrival in Saigon May 12. Therefore, if your luncheon
discussion produces a consensus we could send Lodge a brief message from you stating
that McNamara will raise the matter with him.
/3/At the luncheon meeting on May 5, beginning at 12:55 p.m., Rusk, McNamara,
McGeorge Bundy, Taylor, and McCone discussed seven foreign policy items of which
Khanh's suggestion of a war footing for South Vietnam was the first. Johnson Library,
President's Daily Diary, and memorandum to Rusk, May 5; Department of State,
President's Reading File, Lot 74 D 164) No record of the meeting has been found.
Khanh's motivations in raising these points are not entirely clear. However, coming
through his talk there is a quite clear sense of his conviction that he must move soon to
take action against the North. He has swung around to this position more forcibly in the
course of the past months and this conversation is by far the most positive exposition of
that conviction.
Secondly, there may be some sense of pique that we are pushing him too actively to
declare national mobilization and to put the country on a war footing. Khanh seems to be
telling Lodge that mobilization of the type which has been suggested to him would make
sense only if there were to be action against the North; and in time that action would make
sense only if the United States would fully support it.
Thirdly, and perhaps most disturbingly, there is a certain sense of despair and perhaps
some trace of panic in Khanh's presentation. His plea for an attack on the North, and
particularly his request for the intervention of American ground forces are inconsistent
with his statements that the current activity of the GVN is reclaiming population which
had previously been lost to the Communists.
Khanh therefore seems badly in need of some type of reassurance. This could take one of
several forms:
a. We could encourage him by saying that we will support him in action against the North,
and agree to initiate joint planning with him.
b. We could assure him that we will support action in the North, but stipulate a specific
date before which we would not consider such action politically feasible.
c. We could suggest a phased mobilization program which would move somewhat more
gradually toward the more Spartan measures which Khanh has outlined, making it clear
that these would be moving toward a basis for more vigorous action to the North, but at
the same time making it clear that an improvement on the ground in the South was an
essential element to progression through these various phases.
/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Vietnam Country Series, Vol. VIII.
Top Secret.
SUBJECT
Vietnam
I attach a memorandum I just had from State/2/ on Lodge's recent cable report of his
conversation with Khanh (Saigon 2108)./3/ I agree that probably both Lodge and Khanh
are somewhat shaken by events of the last few days./4/ At your lunch today,/5/ however,
you might want to make the following points:
/2/Document 137.
/3/Document 136.
/4/Apparent reference to the explosion during the early morning of May 2 which damaged
USNS Card, a converted aircraft carrier used for aircraft and cargo transport; a terrorist
attack wounding 8 U.S. military personnel also on May 2; and the generally increased
tempo of Viet Cong attacks over the last 3 weeks. (Weekly Report of the Intelligence and
Reporting Subcommittee of the Inter-Agency Vietnam Coordinating Committee, May 7;

Johnson Library, National Security File, Vietnam Country File, Vol V111, Memos)
There may well be a need to put Vietnam in general, and Saigon in particular, on a "war
footing" and try to create throughout the country the impression that the GVN and the
U.S. are determined to press the war against the Viet Cong to as rapid a conclusion as
possible. There is no doubt that people in Vietnam are getting tired and probably we need
to give them some hope that they will not indefinitely have to endure the casualties that
are inflicted upon them by the guerrillas.
Mobilizing the country is fine, especially if the mobilization effort is designed to put the
cities more on a wartime footing and give to the countryside a sense immediately of hope.
One idea that has occurred to me is that in connection with a mobilization speech, Khanh
should announce a very specific program to bring quickly and efficiently to the peasants
in those areas which are relatively free of the VC as many of the aspects of the better life
as we and the GVN can contrive. The point is to emphasize as dramatically as we can the
difference between life in a government cleared area and life in a VC dominated area. At
the same time we should encourage Khanh to bring the capital city more into the war,
perhaps by introducing there some of the spirit of sacrifice which is continuously being
demanded of the peasants.
Mike
/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Vietnam Country Series, Vol. XIII.
Secret. Also published in Declassified Documents, 1979, 107B.
SUBJECT
Vietnam
This is to remind you that I have delayed execution of the Secretary of State's suggestion
that aircraft from the carrier "Kittyhawk" overfly a region of South Vietnam around the
city of Hue and the area between that city and the 17th Parallel. The Secretary proposed
that this be done in connection with the move of the carrier and its escorting vessels to a
point off Hue which would enable its aircraft to patrol a circle which would extend from
the South Vietnam coast to a point approximately 30 miles off Hainan Island.
You may wish to raise this at the meeting tomorrow/2/ in the event that no one else does.
Lodge does not think that this sort of action will accomplish much, and it is technically a
violation of the 54 Geneva Accords, which generally provide that no outside power will
introduce military forces into North or South Vietnam. I don't see any particular objection
to our planes overflying international waters, even so close to Hainan Island, although
again I worry about the kind of signal this represents to Peiping.

/2/Reference is to a meeting of the NSC Executive Committee on May 6 in the Cabinet
Room of the White House. Vietnam was one of four topics on the agenda. The meeting
lasted from 5:45 to 6:21 p.m. Johnson Library, President's Daily Diary; and agenda, May
6; ibid., National Security File, Vietnam Country File, Vol. V111)
A related subject is the proposal which emanates from Lodge and is concurred in by the
Secretary of State (Saigon's 2101)/3/ that we construct a naval installation in Cam Ranh
Bay, about midway up the coast of South Vietnam. Lodge's arguments are set forth in the
attached cable. I think this is an idiotic notion.
/3/Document 135.
Such a base would serve no useful military purpose and would only provide another
tempting focus for Viet Cong attacks against U.S. installations. It would have to be
defended, and I am very much afraid that we might be forced out of there before we could
give it up gracefully.
I probed the Sullivan Committee this afternoon on the proposition, and no one is in favor
of it. I also understand that the JCS doesn't particularly like the idea. You don't have to do
anything about it until it comes to the President's attention, and I will make sure that in
one way or another it does.
Mike

/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 VIET S. Top Secret; Flash; Nodis.
Drafted by Sullivan, cleared by McGeorge Bundy, and approved by Rusk. This cable was
apparently discussed at the luncheon meeting at the White House on May 5. A draft with
revisions by Bundy and comments by Forrestal is in the Johnson Library, National
Security File, Vietnam Country File, Vol. V111, Memos. At 7:28 p.m. on May 5,
McGeorge Bundy called Rusk and made the following suggestions:
"B. said the end of the first paragraph of this draft cable to Lodge he thought ran the risk
of emphasizing to Lodge that Yes indeed we want to go in the North. Both agreed to
soften the line a bit and take out the last sentence of the first pare. B. and Sec. discussed
further changes and Sec. told B. that his brother and Sullivan were with him and would
get it out." (Department of State, Rusk Papers: Lot 72 D 192, Telephone Conversations)
The last sentence of paragraph 1 in the draft referred to above reads: "Is he [Khanh]
attempting to have us commit the US to support action against North Viet Nam before he
will move upon a mobilization program?"
1838. For the Ambassador from the Secretary. Your 2108/2/ has been considered
carefully at the highest level. It raises extremely grave issues and we feel that our
reactions must be developed with care. We will be meeting with the President again
tomorrow afternoon/3/ on this matter prior to departure of McNamara (who will be taking
up these issues with you) and would like to have your answers to the following questions
before Noon, Washington time, May 6 if possible:
/2/Document 136.
1. What is your assessment of Khanh's motivations? He obviously entered on this train of
thought after considering the problem of issuing a mobilization declaration. Do you detect
any pique because we have been urging him to place the country on a more austere war
footing? Do you feel that he believes such a mobilization program would make sense only
as a prelude to military action against North Viet Nam?
2. We detect a trace of despair in Khanh's remarks. Has he reached the conclusion that he
cannot successfully win the war in the South unless he undertakes military action against
the North? There is, of course, a distinct inconsistency between his statements about
"making the agony endure" and his claim to be systematically regaining control over the
entire population.
3. When Khanh discussed action against the North with McNamara,/4/ he spoke of the
need to consolidate his base in the South before he acted. When he talked with me
recently/5/ he spoke about the political nature of counterinsurgency and the need to
undertake a long slow struggle. Do you feel that he has changed his view on these matters
and that he wants to move now regardless of the progress in the South? Experience in
Greece, Malaya and Korea demonstrates the need for a sound structure of support before
active advances can be made, and this would seem to mean genuine progress in South
Viet Nam itself before action against the North.
/4/See Document 77.
4. Khanh's description of the mobilization program, and especially the talk of evacuation
plans for all 2 million people in Saigon seem to take on exaggerated proportions. Is this
merely his way of telling us that he does not have the administrative machinery capable of
carrying out any mobilization which he should declare?
5. Were his remarks concerning warnings to Hanoi and to Cambodia, as well as the
actions to be taken against the French all part and parcel of mobilization, as he envisages
it? Or would this merely indicate the course of events which he would expect to ensue if
air strikes were mounted against North Viet Nam? Of course, if Khanh has convincing
evidence against French nationals, he should move now to have them expelled rather than
having to wait for a mobilization program. Similarly, with respect to Cambodia, it would
be logical for Khanh to react if Sihanouk actually carries out his threats; but for the
present we are inclined to regard them as needling gestures which the Vietnamese have
very sensibly ignored to date.
6. Do his remarks concerning "an army corps" of US special forces represent, in your
opinion, a genuine desire on his part to have US or other foreign combat forces introduced
into Viet Nam? Or, was he merely illustrating the contingent use of such forces in the
event of Chicom or DRV conventional intervention?
7. Finally, do you consider that there is any sort of limited mobilization program, within
the capacity of the GVN to administer, which Khanh could put into effect with good
results as a step toward the elimination of a "business as usual" mentality without
necessarily moving to the more spartan extremes which he has suggested?
We are earnestly attempting to gauge our view of the issues raised in your cable both on
the basis of Khanh's needs as well as your own assessment of his state of mind. It
becomes most important to us to know whether this conversation represented an
accumulation of frustrations which Khanh sees in facing up to all the hard questions or
whether it is a forced effort to determine the ultimate US intentions if he asks us to assist
him in carrying the war to North Viet Nam in the near future. Obviously, Khanh's attitude
has a bearing on the Canadian matter, but I am confident we should not discuss this with
him at this time.
Rusk

/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 VIET S. Top Secret; Flash; Nodis.
2125. For the Secretary from Lodge. Your Flash 1838./2/ Herewith my best answers to
your questions:
/2/Document 140.
1. Your para 1--I believe Khanh is thinking much as any professional soldier would think
whose whole training is to get a victory as expeditiously as possible. I do not detect any
pique. I think he honestly is trying to answer the questions in his own mind how far he
should go in putting the country on a war footing. Obviously, there are many variants in
doing this, and he was in a sense thinking out loud with me.
2. Your para 2--I don't think he has reached the conclusion that he cannot win the war in
the South without military action against the North. And, you are, of course, right that
there is an inconsistency between his statements about "making the agony endure" and his
claim that he has regained control over two million people, which he repeated to me again
last night. This last is a very interesting point for many reasons, including public relations.
I understand MACJ J-2 will try to plot these two million on the map. Also last week's
60,000.
3. Your para 3--I don't think he wants to move regardless of progress in the South. He is
too intelligent for that.
4. Your para 4--I agree that a plan to evacuate two million people from Saigon seems
utterly fantastic. Moreover, I think Saigon has value as a showcase of what life in a nonCommunist state can be. In the whole "clear-and-hold" concept, Saigon is the biggest
example of "hold", and I would hate to see the people leave it. Of course, if it were to be
bombed, a regular civil defense evacuation plan would have to be considered. I do not
think he wants to evacuate Saigon, but he wants us all to think through what is involved in
possible Communist retaliation on Saigon. He also thinks there should be a civil defense
plan and that the public should know that there is such a plan. It might sober them.
5. Your para 5--I believe that the answer to your question is "yes". I told him many times
and again last night that he should try and get convincing evidence against French
nationals. Many things could be done by him and by us that are not now possible if he had
such evidence.
6. Your para 6--I wouldn't say he was asking for an army corps of US Special Forces now.
We were discussing the possible consequences of action against the North, both from
North Vietnam and Communist China, and this led him to ask me what we could do.
When I expressed great lack of enthusiasm for a large US ground force in Asia, he
brought out the idea of an "army corps" of Special Forces.
7. Your para 7 is a puzzler. I have not been able to figure out a way to get rid of "business
as usual" thinking without doing at least some of the things which he wants to do.
8. I don't think Khanh is becoming pessimistic, but he is realizing what a hard job he has,
which is why he has asked us for advisers. I agree we should not discuss the Canadian
matter now.
Lodge
142. Telegram From the Commander in Chief, Pacific (Felt) to the Chairman of the
Joint Chiefs of Staff (Taylor)/1/
Honolulu, May 6, 1964--9:45 p.m.
/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 VIET S. Top Secret; Specat;
Exclusive. Repeated to CINCPACFLT, CINCUSARPAC, and PACAF. The source text is
a copy the JCS sent for information to the Department of State Specat-Exclusive for Rusk.
070745Z. Exclusive for Gen Taylor, Gen Waters, Gen Smart, Adm Sharp. War in
Vietnam. A. Saigon 2108 to State./2/
/2/Document 136.
1. Following are comments on ref A as requested by CJCS:
A. Khanh's remarks to Amb Lodge reveal a temporary (I hope) breakdown under
pressures which have been applied by both Communists and the U.S. Small countries
under tremendous pressure are unable to take the same long view of tensions which we
can take. Things look different to those who are pressed to perk up to a long dirty war
when they have been fighting one for 20 years. Their impatience sometimes approaches
that of Americans--though not expressed in the same way.
B. It is not desirable to go to a full-scale war footing unless there is assurance that the
GVN can carry out effectively the necessary controls. It is premature to entertain seriously
thoughts of declaring war on NVN. There should not be undue haste to escalate to a
different type of war footing in SVN divorced from the problems of Laos and Cambodia.
C. Policy for the Protocol States will not stay compartmented before escalating in NVN
directly. We should move up the ladder via a series of steps in Laos as we are
commencing to do.
D. However, I suggest that Khanh should redeclare a state of emergency, reaffirming if he
will the declaration made by Diem in October 1961. Khanh would then have a proper
umbrella for civil control actions similar to those taken in Malaya such as curfews,
registration, search, and control of movement.
E. Evacuation of Saigon is desperation talk and should be ignored as a passing mood.
F. Khanh knows it but it needs to be repeated. Real victory comes when the people are
convinced that his government can protect them and give them social improvement and
justice. Confidence of a population is not gained quickly in one glorious battle or assault.
It comes from a series of events governed by Vietnamese themselves. It swells and floods
if earned by a Govt of RVN. It does not grow from white troop invasion of their land.
Khanh needs another pep talk, encouraging him to carry on with implementing good plans
and programs, bolstered as suggested above by issuing a govt edict that the country is in a
state of emergency.

/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 VIET S. Secret; Exdis. Transmitted
as telegram 2144 from Saigon, which is the source text. Passed to the White House on
receipt in the Department of State. Also published in Declassified Documents, 1984,
002655.
1. I have been asking myself whether another Dien Bien Phu is possible in South Vietnam
today; that is a really big defeat in 1964 which would end the struggle and bring
Communist victory, as Dien Bien Phu did in 1954.
2. I do not anticipate a concentration of GVN troops comparable to the concentration of
French troops in 1954 and therefore do not expect a wholesale defeat of the GVN army.
3. But I do think a massive Communist success is possible which could end the war as a
Communist victory if the US were not to react promptly. I think it may be possible for
North Vietnam to seize the northern provinces. The Viet Cong have a very strong hold on
Quang Ngai now. In this regard, see General Westmoreland's statement at Mission
meeting--Embtel 2142./2/ If there were no US reaction to such an event, there is no doubt
that morale would drop to the bottom in Saigon.
/2/At the regular weekly Mission meeting on May 7, Westmoreland raised "the possibility
that General Giap, whom he described as a master strategist whose stock in trade is
deception, might secretly build up a formidable Viet Minh force just north of the DMZ,
perhaps in Laos along Highway 9. Then, if another coup were to occur or the Geneva
Accords were to collapse, such a force could move quickly to seize the northern
provinces, including the city of Hue which is a cultural and religious center of great
importance, and perhaps the entire I Corps area. The GVN would then be confronted with
a very serious situation, since such an overt move would certainly be complemented by
the more than adequate guerrilla force available in the South." (Telegram 2142 from
Saigon, May 7; Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 VIET S)
4. I assume that if this were a clear-cut invasion by the North Vietnam army in uniform
with flags flying that the US would react immediately.
5. But we must expect that NVN is crafty enough to fuzz the whole operation so that in
Washington it will not look clear-cut. Whether a lot of men dressed as farmers will swarm
in through the forests and suddenly appear and how it would be done, I do not know. A
plausible effort might be made by "agrarian reformers" to invite us to leave. It is under
such circumstances as these that a foothold at Cam Ranh Bay--see my tel 2101/3/--could
be valuable.
/3/Document 135.
6. The above unpleasant possibility is something you should have in mind because it may
create a situation in which quick action by the US Government could actually make all the
difference between either holding or losing South Vietnam./4/
/4/Because President Johnson was away from Washington on May 7, McGeorge Bundy
sent the following response to Lodge in White House telegram CAP 64139, May 7:
"The President will see your 2144 promptly, but in his absence I can assure you that he
will share your view that any NVN attempt to achieve rapid control of important SVN
territory would present most serious contingency for U.S. President knows you and your
advisors will keep Washington fully informed if hard evidence of any buildup aimed at
northern provinces is developed. In meantime I am sure you and McNamara and Taylor
will discuss contingency planning already undertaken here and any other we should be
doing in the light of this possible new threat." (Department of State, Central Files, POL 27
VIET S)
Lodge/5/
144. Letter From the Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Vietnam (Lodge)/1/

/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Intelligence File, Vietnam,
Rusk/Lodge/William Bundy Correspondence. Confidential. At 6:35 p.m. on May 7, Rusk
called McGeorge Bundy about this letter. The transcript of the telephone conversation
reads in part: "Sec said he had signed letter to Lodge today re no questions his being top
but he should deal with Harkins personally and not expect him to report to DCM;
McNamara agrees but has problems about saying that in a directive." (Department of
State, Rusk Files: Lot 72 D 192, Telephone Conversations)
On May 11, McGeorge Bundy wrote William Bundy the following memorandum: "I quite
agree that the whole business between Lodge and Harkins is childish, and I have given the
President only the most general account of it telling him that we think it best for him not
to be involved, and that Lodge himself has addressed his communication to the Secretary
and not to the President." (Ibid., Bundy Files, Ambassador's Private Correspondence)
Dear Cabot: I have your letter of April 23 enclosing in turn a letter from General Harkins
and raising the issue of his directive and its relation to your own memorandum of April
21./2/
/2/The documents referred to in this paragraph are ibid., WPB Chron File. They relate to
the ongoing controversy between Harkins and Lodge over Lodge's insistence that all
agency heads in Saigon, including Harkins as head of MACV, check with the Deputy
Chief of Mission of the Embassy, David Nes, before meeting with Khanh.
As we see it here, General Harkins' authority to discuss military matters with the top
Vietnamese officials, including in present circumstances both the "Chief of
State" (presumably General Minh) and the Prime Minister, is not in conflict with your
over-all supervisory authority, and under the latter you are entitled to receive advance
notice of all such contacts, to know what will be discussed, and to provide policy
guidance as required for over-all reasons.
At the same time, I wonder if you would not consider amending your memorandum, at
least in practice, to provide that General Harkins will consult personally with you about
his visits to General Khanh, and would not be subject to clearance with your DCM. I think
you can understand that General Harkins would have some sensitivity about appearing to
report to the DCM in an area where both his directive and the continuing necessities of the
situation have required him to have top-level contacts over a long period. I do not think
the same difficulty would exist for your other agency heads, but General Harkins' position
does seem to us special to this extent.
As a practical matter, we would hope that your consultations with General Harkins would
in any event be so frequent that the question of calls by him on General Khanh would
simply fall into place alongside the other important business that you and he should be
transacting on a continuing basis. Such an informal relationship is surely easier and more
effective than written communication in almost all cases.
With warm regards,
Sincerely,
Dean
145. Talking Paper Prepared for the Secretary of Defense (McNamara) by the
Secretary of State's Special Assistant for Vietnam (Sullivan)/1/
/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Vietnam Country File, Vol. VIII. Top
Secret; Nodis. There is no indication on the source text that Sullivan was the drafter, but
there is on an earlier draft. (Ibid.)
SUBJECT
General Khanh's Conversation with Lodge
In the conversation which Lodge reported in his telegram No. 2108,/2/ Khanh touched
upon but did not fully explore a great many matters of fundamental significance affecting
the future of US policy in Viet Nam. Because of the growing intimacy of US relations
with the Vietnamese Government, it seems advisable that Secretary McNamara and
Ambassador Lodge should take advantage of the Secretary's forthcoming visit to Saigon
to explore these matters in greater depth. The nature of our relationship with the Diem
Government over the years has never permitted a full and frank exchange of USVietnamese views.
/2/Document 136.
The Secretary and the Ambassador should try to find out why Khanh made the statements
which Lodge has repeated. Does Khanh believe his current program will not succeed and
does he believe that he is merely "prolonging the agony by this program. Although the
issue which precipitated Khanh's discourse was the question of a mobilization declaration,
it is clear from Lodge's report of the conversation and from his subsequent reply to our
questions that Khanh is searching for some basic understandings with the US about the
immediate and long-run future of his Country. He wants and needs to know more
explicitly about the nature of our commitment."
"In their public posture, the Vietnamese must naturally continue to assume the position
that they ultimately wish the reunification of their Country. We, ourselves, can lend moral
support to this ultimate objective. However, we must make clear to the Vietnamese and
they must fully accept the fact that we do not intend to provide military support nor
undertake the military objective of rolling back" Communist control in North Viet Nam.
Our purpose is to force the North Vietnamese to cease their ambitions to extend their
control both in South Viet Nam and in Laos. Complementary to that, our purpose is to
provide enough strength in both South Viet Nam and in Laos that those countries will not
offer temptations to the North Vietnamese as opportunities for subversion.
Once this is understood, Khanh should be assured that our commitment has no artificial
limits. We are prepared to provide whatever assistance is needed in whatever form is
considered most effective to assure the attainment of our objective. This commitment does
not rule out the use of US force either directly or in association with South Vietnamese
force against North Viet Nam. Our purpose in employing that force, however, should be
understood by General Khanh in the context of its contribution to his ultimate success in
gaining control over the population of South Viet Nam and eliminating the Viet Cong
menace. In that sense, as Secretary McNamara has previously said publicly, such actions
must be supplementary to and not a substitute for successful counterinsurgency in the
South.
It, therefore, becomes important for us and for Khanh to gauge the ability of the South
Vietnamese Government to move successfully in extending its protection to increasingly
large portions of the population in South Viet Nam. We believe the program which Khanh
has laid out in the "oil stain" pacification plan is sound. We believe that the actions he has
taken in seeking to reorganize his military and paramilitary establishment for the
execution of that plan are correct. We believe that the effort to decentralize authority
down to the Corps and Province level represents steps forward which we have been long
urging upon previous Vietnamese Governments. In brief, we believe that Khanh has made
a good beginning and that shortcomings in the execution of his plan derive from the
weakness of human and material resources rather than from its concept.
Fortunately, the provision of temporary human and material resources to assist Khanh and
his Government are well within our capabilities. We have made available military
advisors and military support units. We can make available additional civilian elements
both as advisors and as practitioners who can act in support of Khanh's Government.
Khanh has recently indicated his acceptance of the fact that the US advisory and
assistance effort is fully integrated into his Government's efforts and that the relationship
should be an intimate one. We do not wish to seek command and would not accept
command of either the military or civilian components of his Government even if he
attempted to thrust it upon us. However, our personnel are willing and ready to become an
integral part of his organization and to work as closely with his people as he wishes them
to.
We recognize that the immediate question of mobilization and the problem of converting
Viet Nam to a more active war footing pose serious questions for Khanh. We know that
he does not have the administrative machinery to establish total mobilization in the sense
of our own war time experience without at the same time hampering greatly his ability to
conduct counterinsurgency operations in the countryside. We realize that, within the
framework of Vietnamese experience, the countryside is already mobilized. The question
of the war footing therefore becomes largely a matter of bringing the impression of the
conflict more dramatically to the urban centers of population, and particularly Saigon.
We wonder whether such measures require many of the proposals which Khanh
discussed. We would want the Secretary particularly to examine the need to eliminate the
politicians from the Government, and whether there is any requirement at this stage to
curtail civil rights beyond the current arrangements. We would want to know if there is
any justification to consider the evacuation of American dependents, the diplomatic corps,
and to plan for the evacuation of the total population of Saigon.
On the other hand, we believe there are many things which could be done. National
service requirements for people in the city whose talents are not being currently used in
the counterinsurgency program would be drawn upon. This is particularly true in the
civilian sector where engineers, health workers, teachers, and general administrators could
be recruited for work in the countryside. The pattern of the economic burden and the
economic benefits would be consciously shifted. American assistance could be
consciously and conscientiously headed toward the improvement of welfare in the country
rather than the embellishment of luxury in the city. Taxation and other measures reflecting
a contribution to the war could be brought to bear on the urban population so that the
sense of "business as usual" would be dissipated.
As for the stance which Khanh should take toward Hanoi, it does not seem necessary at
this time for him to begin threatening specific retaliatory military action against their
interference in South Viet Nam. What is more important at this stage is that Khanh and his
Government systematically and aggressively demonstrate to the world that the subversion
in the South is directed from Hanoi. Tao much of the world's population, including that of
the US, has the impression that this is a "civil war" and a spontaneous uprising in the
South. Khanh and his ministers must make it indelibly clear that the action is directed and
controlled from the North. Khanh must send out capable ambassadors to the important
capitals of the world to convince governments of this fact. He should realize that his own
propaganda position throughout the world is weak and that the US alone cannot
compensate for this weakness.
While he should tolerate no nonsense from Cambodia, he should recognize that his
primary problem is with North Viet Nam and that the Viet Cong, who infest the
Cambodian border reaches, are there because of the weakness of the Cambodian
Government. Sihanouk is a nuisance but Khanh should not waste his energies or divert his
attention by skirmishing either diplomatically or militarily. The real menace is in Hanoi
and Khanh must constantly make that clear.
Similarly, Khanh must not be diverted by the annoyances that originate in Paris.
Aggravating as these are to all of us, they do not represent a substantive menace. The
French have no territory and no military power in Asia. They can only create annoyances,
not policy. On the other hand, Khanh should keep a close surveyance [surveillance] upon
French activities and should not hesitate to expel any French Nationals who are
participating in actions contrary to interests of Viet Nam. Before contemplating the
rupture of diplomatic relations with France, however, Khanh should estimate clearly what
the consequences would be and whether the satisfaction he would receive from this step
would be worth the difficulties he would experience.
Khanh's claims to have brought two million people under his Government's control in the
past three months and his need to bring only five million more under his control seem
overly optimistic to us. On the other hand, this does indicate that he has fastened on the
right objective in his military and political efforts-the control and protection of Viet Nam's
population. We should use a discussion of these claims to work out with Khanh a manner
in which a careful plotting of the progress of the counterinsurgency can be calculated. We
should be able to do it graphically as the British did in Malaya so that we and the world
will know that the Government is progressing in its fight against the Viet Cong rather than
vice versa. A conviction of this progress would be the greatest morale factor that can be
introduced in South Viet Nam and the greatest incentive for those who are sitting on the
fence to join up in the war effort.
As far as the question of US ground forces in Viet Nam is concerned, Khanh should
understand that we do not consider manpower is the limiting factor in the success of
Vietnamese efforts. US ground forces deployed along the border of Viet Nam as he has
suggested, would hardly make any contribution to the type of counterinsurgency in which
he is engaged. In fact, such a deployment of forces would make the US look ridiculously
impotent because we could expect that a continuing rate of incidents would take place
behind those forces and in spite of their presence. He should be made to understand that
we have the highest respect for the fighting quality of the Vietnamese soldier and that his
need is for organization, leadership and executive control not for personal courage.
Insofar as the US can supply or inspire those qualities we stand willing to do so. The basic
and enduring strength, however, must be implanted in the Vietnamese military and
civilian hierarchy.

1964-1968, Volume I
Vietnam, 1964
Department of State
Washington, DC
V. The Second McNamara-Taylor Mission To Vietnam And Planning

Discussions, May 8-26
146. Editorial Note

After meeting in Bonn with the leaders of the Federal Republic of Germany, May 9-11,
Secretary of Defense McNamara and two aides traveled to Saigon for brief consultations
and an assessment of the situation. General Taylor, William Sullivan, and Michael
Forrestal flew from Washington and arrived in Saigon on May 11. McNamara arrived on
May 12 and the group, with the exception of Forrestal, returned on May 13. According to
Taylor, President Johnson was "impatient" with the lack of visible progress in the war
against the Viet Cong and in implementation of plans to strengthen the South Vietnamese
Government. There was also a general feeling in Washington that Khanh had rather too
abruptly changed directions on the question of taking the war to North Vietnam.
Therefore, McNamara, Taylor, Sullivan, and Forrestal were to take a second look at the
situation. (Swords and Plowshares, pages 311-312)
147. Memorandum of a Meeting, Saigon, May 11, 1964, 11 a.m./1/

926, 333 Vietnam. Top Secret; Sensitive. The source text is Enclosure A to an undated
memorandum from McNamara to the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Director of DIA.
SUBJECT
Conference with Ambassador Lodge Prior to SecDef Arrival (111100 May 1964)
PRESENT
Ambassador Lodge
General Taylor
General Harkins
Mr. Sullivan
During the discussions, the following points we reopened:
a. The Ambassador is not particularly afraid of a military coup to oust General Khanh. He
does regard the Buddhists as a possible source of danger to the government. In particular,
he thinks that Tri Quang, the Buddhist leader, is a potential trouble maker. Having
overthrown one government, he may feel like trying again against Khanh. He has
indicated to the Ambassador that he does not regard Khanh as a "good Buddhist"-meaning, presumably, that he is a Buddhist who does not follow Tri Quang's direction.
b. From a discussion of a possible coup, the Ambassador expressed the view that we
should be giving serious consideration to our course of action if Khanh were ousted or
assassinated. He suggested the possible need of a US presence to take over and run the
government. In such a case, he thought a naval base at Cam Ranh Bay might be used as a
US headquarters external to Saigon. He apparently feels that in a situation of civil turmoil,
the US facilities in Saigon would not be available.
c. In discussing the famous interview with General Khanh,/2/ he explained Khanh's frame
of mind as one of frustration at recent heavy losses and the inability to bring the VC to
bay. He is not happy in contemplating a long drawn out guerrilla war offering no decisive
victory. Hence, he looks to the North as a battlefield offering more attractive targets.
148. Memorandum of a Conversation Between the Ambassador in Vietnam (Lodge)

and the Secretary of State's Special Assistant for Vietnam (Sullivan), Saigon, May
11, 1964/1/
/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Vietnam Country Series, Vol. IX,
Memos. Top Secret. Drafted by Sullivan on May 14. Copies were sent to Rusk, Ball,
McGeorge Bundy, McNamara. McCone, and William Bundy.
SUBJECT
Additional Pressures on North Viet Nam
After the initial call which General Taylor and I, accompanied by General Harkins, made
on the Ambassador,/2/ I stayed behind at the Ambassador's invitation for further
discussions. After reviewing a number of immediate issues, we turned to a review of the
Ambassador's thinking with respect to additional pressures on North Viet Nam.
The Ambassador opened the discussion by referring to the cables which had been
exchanged between himself and Secretary Rusk concerning the Canadian interlocutor./3/ I
said that because I would be traveling to Canada to discuss this matter with the Canadians,
it became important that I have a clear and precise idea of the Ambassador's views.
The Ambassador began by indicating his belief that there should be a steady escalation of
the clandestine operations now being conducted under Plan 34-A./4/ At an appropriate
point, he believed these operations should include air strikes. He was not certain what
targets should be involved in the air strikes but did mention such things as railway
bridges.
I asked whether he expected these air strikes to be carried out by Vietnamese or by
Americans. He said that he considered it a matter of indifference whether the pilots were
American or Vietnamese so long as they were proficient and capable of pinpoint
accuracy. I then asked who would accept the credit for these actions. He said that he
believed that they should be disavowed entirely by both the Vietnamese and the
Americans. He would envisage them as taking place "in the dark of the night" and that no
one would admit responsibility for them.
He said he thought that they should be carried out with unmarked planes and that one
arrangement we might consider would be a volunteer squadron such as the Flying Tigers.
However, he was emphatic in his statement that neither we nor the Vietnamese should
admit responsibility for the actions.
I asked him how he viewed the Canadian intercession in this respect. The Ambassador
said that he would expect the Canadians to tell the North Vietnamese that they could
continue to expect this sort of action so long as they harassed South Viet Nam. They could
particularly expect retaliation whenever they committed an especially grievous offense in
South Viet Nam. In making these statements, the Canadians would be talking entirely in
confidence and would not assign responsibility for the retaliatory acts either to the South
Vietnamese or to the Americans.
When I expressed some doubt that this position of disavowability could be maintained,
the Ambassador insisted that maintenance of such an attitude was something the United
States needed to learn and to practice. He said that in the United Nations he had practiced
the policy of "no comment" for several years on certain key issues. It was valuable to keep
our mouths shut. He himself had relearned this lesson recently. He had said absolutely
nothing in the last few months and had received surprising political support in the New
Hampshire and Massachusetts primaries.
I then gave the Ambassador a copy of the scenario which had been presented to the Joint
Chiefs of Staff as a military planning document for action against North Viet Nam./5/ I
told him that I would not leave the paper in Saigon but hoped he had a chance to read it
and return it to me before I left. Within a half hour the Ambassador sent for me again, said
he had read the planning document and was entirely opposed to the approach which it was
taking. He said that it was in effect a repetition of the program which had been contained
in Bill Bundy's letter./6/ He said he had made clear to Secretary Rusk and Bill Bundy
when they were here that he did not concur in that approach. He particularly objected to
the idea of the Government of Viet Nam or anyone else accepting responsibility for the
actions against the North. He reiterated the need for disavowable actions which would not
be acknowledged. He showed me a copy of Mike Dunn's record of conversation with
Rusk and Bundy to demonstrate that he had opposed this position in the past./7/
/5/Apparent reference to a later, April 20, draft of the attachment to Document 102. The
April 20 draft is in Washington National Records Center, RG 330, OASD/ISA Files: FRC
68 A 4023, Vietnam 092.
/6/Document 108.
/7/Document 120.
I then asked for further clarification on the manner in which he wanted this entire matter
discussed with the Canadians. He referred to his telegram on this subject and pointed to
the sentence which stressed the need for advising the North Vietnamese that there would
be retaliatory action against the North on a tit-for-tat basis./8/ I asked whether he wished
this made clear to the Canadians when I saw them in Ottawa. He said as far as he was
concerned that was the main point of the arrangement with the Canadians.
In discussing this point further, he said it might be useful to let a few of these occur in the
North before the Canadian actually delivered his statement to the North Vietnamese
authorities. I asked what, therefore, he contemplated as a time frame. He said as far as he
was concerned, we should be able to do this some time this summer. He was not sure what
the military requirements for protection against DRV retaliation would be, but he saw no
reason why these measures shouldn't be initiated as soon as we felt competent to mount
the initial actions.
I said that my discussions with Secretary Rusk and Bill Bundy did not indicate to me that
there was a meeting of the minds on this whole approach. The Ambassador expressed
some surprise at this and said that he felt he had made himself explicitly clear in the
conversations which had been held in Saigon. I therefore closed the conversation with the
assurance that I had a clear picture of his views and would take them back to Washington
for further discussion with the Secretary.
Later that evening after dinner, the Ambassador again reverted to the need for military
measures. He said that General Khanh was under great strain and that perhaps only by the
introduction of action along these lines could Khanh rally the support of the population
which he needed to be successful in the South. I said that Secretary McNamara would be
prepared to discuss this whole question of General Khanh's attitude as reported in recent
cables when he arrived. The Ambassador felt it would be useful for the Secretary to get a
first-hand view of this from Khanh and that he thought this would clarify the way in
which both he and Khanh viewed the problem. I did not pursue this line any further at that
session.
149. Memorandum of a Meeting, Saigon, May 11, 1964/1/

926, Vietnam 333. Top Secret; Sensitive. The source text is Enclosure B to an undated
memorandum from McNamara to the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Director of DIA.
SUBJECT
Conference with COMUSMACV and Staff Prior to Arrival of SecDef (11 May)
1. Saigon to State 2108./2/ At a recent Embassy meeting which General Westmoreland
reported on,/3/ it was the consensus that subject conversation reflects Khanh's basic
dissatisfaction with the present level of the war effort (i.e., the Pacification Program in
RVN). He was unhappy with the humdrum, nasty nature of the affair and would prefer to
have some glamorous, dramatic victory.
/2/Document 134.
2. The nation-wide Pacification Program will not be in full gear before 1 September 1964.
The preparations to expand capabilities against North Vietnam will all be ready by 1
September except the round-out of the Second A1E squadron for the Air Commandos.
The capabilities created will include those for air strikes by VNAF and Farmgate aircraft
against North Vietnamese targets, aerial mining (ready by 1 June), and parachute saboteur
drops [less than 1 line of source text not declassified]. Also, the Nasty boats will be
capable of interfering with fishing activities and can engage small craft of the North
Vietnamese Navy. The C-123 will be capable of various forms of air activities outlined in
the 34A program.
3. General Taylor stated it was his impression that the 34A program in relation to
CINCPAC 37-64/4/ should be reviewed. Many of the 34A actions such as air attack on
POL facilities are not plausibly deniable by the South Vietnamese government and should
be taken out of the 34A program if it is to remain covert in the sense of being plausibly
deniable.
/4/CINCPAC OPLAN 37-64, "Military Action To Stabilize the Situation in the Republic
of Vietnam," March 30. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 218, ICS
Files)
4. General Taylor then asked the opinion of the assembled group as to the time required to
establish sufficient control in the South to warrant a consideration of operations against
the North beyond the scope of covert sabotage operations. General Harkins expressed the
view that by 1 January 1965, acceptable control will have been established everywhere
except in the Delta which will require the entire calendar year of 1965. General
Westmoreland is far more conservative. He says that it will take a year from now to
establish acceptable control north of Saigon and two to three additional years to clear up
the Delta.
5. No one in the conference showed enthusiasm for taking action under OPLAN 37-64.
The most they were willing to consider was an escalating application of 34A. The thought
seemed to be to get things going favorably in the Pacification Program and then add blows
against the North to accelerate the trend against the enemy. General Harkins feels that it
would be dangerously easy to divert the South Vietnamese from the main job of internal
pacification by the attractiveness of a venture directed against the North. According to
General Westmoreland, when ARVN Generals use the expression "march North", nine
out of ten of them mean full scale attack.
6. J-2 MACV made the points that the VC are growing in sophistication, better weapons
(including antiaircraft), and that battalions in the Delta are tied up by the Number One
problem, to ferret out the covert VC (Fifth Column) in the villages, etc., in RVN.
7. Need for a third squadron of A1Es. General Taylor expressed the view that it was
premature to expect approval for the third squadron of A1Es. He stated that we should
proceed with the organization of the two approved squadrons and meanwhile, develop
data for the need for the third squadron.
8. Progress in setting up a reporting system on combat effectiveness and morale of
RVNAF based on use of US advisers. It was established that MACV had not understood
the requirement to develop a US adviser reporting system on the effectiveness of the
RVNAF. General Harkins expressed some concern lest it involve critical reporting by
advisers upon their opposite numbers and that the substance of such reports might get
back to the Vietnamese. General Taylor reiterated the purpose of the report and told
General Harkins it was the responsibility of his headquarters to work out a system to
accomplish it. He stated further that it was his feeling that every person in uniform should
be an eye for MACV to report on such matters through military channels. 9. Causes of the
Vietnamese manpower shortages. Explanation of working of the conscription system.
Desertion problem.
a. The GVN policy is to have at least 80 per cent volunteers and not more than 20 per cent
conscriptees in combat divisions. The stated military reason for failing to recruit and
induct sufficient numbers during 1964 was budgetary. Additionally, the various military
and paramilitary organizations and the VC compete for recruits. The paramilitary is more
popular now because recruits can remain at home. General Harkins has repeatedly pressed
to bring units up to strength. Some drain-off of manpower is caused by excessive
overhead at headquarters and maintenance of security at excessive [levels at?] rear area
bases. Advisers are constantly pressing for elimination of these excesses. During the visit,
remedial action was in process by virtue of an order issued by General Khiem, CINCVAF
as follows:
(1) Retains conscripts due for discharge in June, July, and August. Releases them in
October and November.
(2) All conscript training can be done at Quang Trung and National Training Centers.
(3) A study should be made to reduce manning levels of Central Agencies (High
Command Headquarters), Corps area logistic centers and combat support units. It is
expected that people from the above will begin shifting to combat units by 1 June. As a
part of the MACV proposed augmentation, RVNAF rifle companies will now have a 25man replacement company.
b. The training establishment has been used at about 30 per cent of capacity for the past
three months. The efforts of the GVN to bring the RVNAF up to strength should be
reflected by an influx of conscriptees into training centers. A general conclusion reached
is that there is no short term correction of the Vietnamese manpower problem because of
the ineffectiveness of the conscription machinery. Also there is some hesitation to use
conscripts generally for fear of introducing VC sympathizers into the Vietnamese Armed
Forces.
c. Factors affecting the desertion rate are:
(1) Statistics reflect AWOLs which occurred 30-60 days before the date of the statistics.
(Therefore, rates now are in part reflection of the Tet Holiday.)

(2) Lack of ordinary leave.
(3) Heavy casualties coupled with understrength in the units.
(4) Although there is little effort to round up deserters, some are found when looking for
VC.
(5) Very little punishment is meted out to deserters.
10. Cross Border Operations. With regard to cross border operations into Laos, General
Harkins and his people are satisfied with the limited approval which they have just
received for two areas of patrolling. They stated that even though the operations are
limited, their approval justified the establishment of a joint mechanism for planning and
preparation. An estimated two to four weeks will be required before implementation.
(General Taylor cautioned that sufficient time should be taken for preparation to ensure
success.) They are generally against harassment and sabotage measures using Hard Nose,
fearing that the main contribution of intelligence from these patrols would be jeopardized.
11. Westmoreland-Moore/5/ Committee on air support. No Ad Hoc committee has been
set up. However, General Harkins stated he would be glad to have them restudy the air
support situation. Concerning recent improvements, General Moore described the
progress made on the quick response net to be established in the 7th Division, III Corps:
/5/Major General Joseph H. Moore, Commander, 2d Air Division and component U.S. Air
Force Commander in Vietnam.
a. Eight (8) VNAF ALOs trained.
b. Seven (7) VNAF ALOs started training.
c. Hardware (i.e., communications) for net is on hand.
d. US ALOs are in position.
e. Hardware for all Corps is on order.
12. Introduction of B-57s into RVN. In discussing the possible use of B-57s in RVN,
General Taylor expressed the opinion that they would never be admitted unless required
for use under OPLAN 37-64. General Moore pointed out the awkwardness of requiring
Vietnamese in all planes involved in Farmgate operations. General Taylor replied that this
presence has been a prerequisite for conduct of Farmgate operations and probably would
remain so.
13. Low-level reconnaissance over Laos and Cambodia. Although all parties present favor
low-level reconnaissance into Laos just as soon as possible, General Taylor stated that it
was not permitted for the present in deference to Ambassador Unger's wishes to withhold
it until the situation jells in Laos. It was revealed that reaction would be almost immediate
if authorized. Possible areas are Route 9, Kontum, and along the DMZ. Results are used to
improve target folders for future plans. Readout on U-2 photography is about 48 hours
and pictures are produced the following day. Reaction time is such that missions could
react to Hard Nose intelligence.
14. Length of tour of US advisers. General Harkins feels that length of tours of US
advisers is about right. Normally, advisers are with battalions roughly six months, then go
to training centers. Some sector advisers represent the only continuity because of the great
number of changes which have been made in province and district chiefs.
15. Austere naval base at Cam Ranh Bay. There is limited enthusiasm over the concept of
an austere naval base in Cam Ranh Bay. It was agreed that a survey should be made to
determine the nature of the problem. The Cam Ranh Bay locale is presently a secure area.
16. Policy on foreign military observers visiting RVN. There was a discussion of visits of
foreign military observers to RVN arising out of the Argentine request. Several patterns
were considered for permitting such visits. MACV was requested to recommend a policy.
17. There was a brief discussion of Secretary Rusk's proposals made following his visit to
RVN. There was general agreement with his ideas except with regard to anti-junk
operations north of the 17th parallel. It was felt that little would be gained by hit and run
actions whereas a considerable increase in GVN naval strength would be required to
permit sustained naval operations.
150. Memorandum of a Meeting, Saigon, May 11, 1964, 5 p.m./1/

/1/Source: National Defense University, Taylor Papers. Top Secret; Sensitive. The source
text is Enclosure C to an undated memorandum from McNamara to the Joint Chiefs of
Staff and the Director of DIA.
PRESENT
General Minh
Ambassador Lodge
General Taylor
1. General Minh feels we have been losing ground since January. The reason is that the
government has lost the confidence of the people. General Khanh has brought back into
the Army bad officers who had been dismissed by the Junta. What is needed is a popular
leader.
2. General Taylor pointed out that it was difficult to be popular in time of civil war, that
there were times when Lincoln's popularity was very low in the United States during our
civil war. He insisted, however, that something had to be done to attract the people to the
side of the government.
3. Speaking of neutralists, Minh said that Diem used to see communists everywhere; now
Khanh sees neutralists everywhere. The fact is that many friends are neutralists and antiAmerican. However, their political influence is not important.
4. The Buddhists do have a political importance. They have been infiltrated to some
extent by communists. Tri Quang may become dangerous.
5. General Minh sees no present likelihood of a coup but he is quite sure that victory is not
in sight.
151. Memorandum of a Meeting, Saigon, May 12, 1964/1/

926, Vietnam 333. Top Secret; Sensitive. The source text Enclosure D to an undated
memorandu~m from McNamara to the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Director of DIA.
PRESENT
Country Team
Ambassador Lodge
General Harkins
Mr. Nes
Lt. General Westmoreland
Mr. Manfull
Mr. Brent
Mr. de Silva
Mr. Dunn
Visitors
Secretary McNamara
General Taylor
Mr. Sylvester
Mr. McNaughton
Mr. Sullivan
Mr. Forrestal
Lt. Col. Berry
1. Appraisal of Khanh's progress or lack thereof in strengthening government:
a. Central Government: Administrative mechanism of government has not [been] and is
not functioning smoothly. Greatest psychological weakness in SVN is attitude of "every
man for himself". Khanh centralizes authority in himself to detriment of efficiency of
government operation. Lodge is encouraged by Khanh's request for American advisors to
assist his government. Given time, inter-governmental relationships may work out, but
prospects are not good.
b. Provincial Government: Remains weak. Uncertainty as to Corps Commanders'
responsibility handicaps administration. Khanh's 23 new province chiefs and 80 new
district chiefs on the whole have improved quality of administration.
c. Central Pacification Committee: Lacks number and quality inspection personnel to be
effective.
It is of major importance to seize one place (Long An, for instance), conduct intensive
economic-political campaign, and publicize success.
2. Khanh's support by various groups, particularly Buddhists.
Buddhists are fragmented. Tri Quang is "nearest thing to a political animal" Lodge has
seen in RVN. He is ambitious, anti-Christian, full of hatreds, and agitating against Khanh.
Because of Buddhist agitation, particularly that led by Tri Quang, Catholics are about to
withdraw from Army all Catholic chaplains. Country Team does maintain close contact
with Tri Quang. Some communist infiltration of Buddhists exists. Labor unions have, in
general, avoided communist infiltration. Students generally support Khanh. Intellectuals
oppose Khanh, as they have opposed everything else.
3. Extent to which increased U.S. aid can strengthen GVN counterinsurgency program.
a. Existing U.S. program "is about right size". Skill, energy, leadership is what is needed.
b. Lodge is anxious to have a civil advisor added to each Corps Area. Qualifications:
fluent in French, about 45 years old, 2-4 year tour, bring family, live in capital of Corps
Area, have assigned air and ground transportation, be under Ambassador.
c. U.S. should not increase number of American families in RVN.
4. Creation of Administrative Civil Corps.
a. GVN is underdeveloped government. Much progress has been made. USOM fears
putting too much pressure on government or it might shatter.
b. USOM is short 25% of authorized strength (about 1/2 for expanding rural affairs staff).
c. Mr. McNamara was greatly disturbed over this shortage and suggested consideration of
use of active duty military personnel, Foreign Service officers or Peace Corps people to
fill this shortage. Sec/Def requested Mr. Forrestal to look into this problem, collect facts,
and make recommendations upon his return to Washington.
d. National Institute of Administration is short of faculty members for two reasons: (1)
Seven instructors are assigned elsewhere in government; and (2) an inadequate budget.
e. Current plans call for training of 7,000 hamlet cadre personnel for three weeks and 235
district officers by end of 1964.
f. USOM stated that the most important thing to do is to develop a plan for organization
and operation of GVN.
g. Sec/Def directed Mr. Forrestal to follow this item and to check on usefulness of
Michigan State work bearing on this.

Saigon, May 14, 1964--7 p.m.
2203. For Rusk and McNamara from Lodge.
1. Herewith report McNamara-Khanh conversation,/2/ attended also by Lodge, Taylor and
Harkins.
/2/Held on May 13.
2. General Khanh began by reviewing the recent course of the war. He noted that over the
past three months, the GVN had reestablished its control over some 3,000,000 Vietnamese
citizens. He said that while there was obviously much that still had to be done, he was
satisfied with the rate of progress. He said that an obvious problem was the danger that
Communists would reinfiltrate into or otherwise reassert their control over the areas that
had been made secure. The GVN was taking appropriate measures to assure that this did
not happen.
3. General Khanh then said that his biggest problems and most time-consuming
preoccupations were political. He protested that he was unskilled in political matters and
wanted to lean heavily on Ambassador Lodge. He said that in addition to the normal
political problems of a post-revolutionary situation, he had to cope with serious religious
problems. It happened that almost any political question included a religious question.
There were two major areas of religious conflict: that raging between the Catholics and
the Buddhists, and that raging within the Buddhist movement. He said there were
Catholics who dismissed all Buddhists as Communists, and Buddhists who made similar
allegations about the Catholics. While the two religious groups were fighting, the GVN
was in the middle and was receiving the blows each camp aimed at its adversaries. The
Catholics accused him of being pro-Buddhist and the Buddhists accused him of being proCatholic.
4. The worst thing about this religious problem was that feelings were beginning to run so
high that the religious dissension could spread to the army and completely shatter its
unity. The importance of the religious problem could not be exaggerated. He felt that the
best way to cope with it was to get authoritative spokesmen for the moderate tendencies in
each religious group together, and let them work out the agreements and reconciliations
that were in the manifest interest of both.
5. The real troublemaker in all this was Thich Tri Quang. General Khanh said he
discussed the problem at length with the Ambassador, and hoped that the Ambassador
would use his influence on Tri Quang to get him to adopt a more moderate position. The
Ambassador remarked that he had tried this, that he was nevertheless prepared to try
again, and would make another effort to influence Tri Quang to take a more conciliatory
attitude towards the Catholics. The Ambassador added that Embassy officers frequently
saw Tri Quang, and that perhaps they could influence him. General Khanh said this latter
approach might be the better one; he felt that Tri Quang might respond better if
approached at a working level, because if the Ambassador sought him out too often, there
was a danger that this fact would go to Tri Quang's head and make him more difficult than
ever.
6. In addition to the religious problem, there was also the problem of the press. General
Khanh remarked that more often than not the main purpose of a newspaper in Vietnam
was to support specific financial or commercial interests, and that the press tended to be
defamatory. Further, it got involved in the intrigues of those whom he called "parlor
politicians"--those Saigonese who had had no contact with the war whatsoever, who knew
nothing of the sacrifices that it entailed for the rural populations who lived in the midst of
it, who had never struck a blow for freedom but who nonetheless set themselves up as the
champion of freedom, often in opposition to the government and to the detriment of the
war effort and whose sole interest was power and preferment for themselves.
7. All things considered, General Khanh was not displeased with what had been
accomplished in recent months. There was no escaping the fact that the mobilization,
induction and training of recruits and the mounting of operations had all suffered and been
set back as a result of the two coups of last fall and winter. There had been no effective
government in Vietnam since last May, but GVN was extending its authority, and there
was good reason to believe that it would do so at a more rapid rate in the future--the
progress of consolidation would not only be an oil spot, it would also snowball.
8. General Khanh said he was a soldier and not a politician, and that he wished he could
spend more of his time on mounting military operations, on assisting the pacification
program, and in thinking a bit about longer-term strategy and the international relations of
his country, rather than spending so much time on internal political squabbles. He said
these squabbles were like stomach troubles: they caused him considerable discomfort and
served no useful purpose.
9. He had to think of the security of his regime. He said the Americans, and especially the
Secretary and the Ambassador, had gone all-out in support of him. He wanted to be
worthy of this American commitment and make it prove to be worthwhile. To do this he
had to protect his regime from any divisive tendencies or attempted coupe. That he was
doing, and he felt his prospects of success in that particular effort were good.
10. After he had completed this general expose of his thoughts and hopes, Khanh asked if
his guests had any questions. The Secretary suggested that General Khanh go on and
outline any specific points he had in mind. The Secretary said that he had noted in one of
the Ambassador's reports (Embtel 2108 of May 4, 1964)/3/ that Khanh had said he did not
want to prolong "the agony" and wanted to push on with a more vigorous prosecution of
the war. The Secretary said he would like to hear Khanh's thoughts in this connection.
/3/Document 136.
11. Khanh said that when he spoke of not wanting "to make the agony endure", he did not
want to give the impression that he would lose patience in a long, grinding struggle of the
sort that doubtlessly lay ahead in this kind of a war. But he did think the process could be
speeded up by something like the following: the proclamation that South Vietnam was on
a war footing and was being attacked from the North; that if this attack did not stop within
a specified period of time, which could be six weeks, a month, or two weeks, South
Vietnam would strike back and carry out attacks on the North comparable to those the
North had been carrying against the South. These countermeasures would be comparable
in degree and importance and extent, although not necessarily identical in form, "whereas
the North attacks us with guerrillas that squirm through the jungle, we would attack them
with 'guerrillas' of our own, only ours would fly in at tree-top level and blow up key
installations or mine the port of Haiphong."
12. The Secretary asked General Khanh if he thought it would be wise to undertake such
operations now. Khanh replied that before starting such operations, we had to think about
what the enemy reaction would probably be. It could well be that the North would attack
in strength, perhaps even with Chinese Communist assistance or direct participation. This
would rapidly become America's problem, so it would have to be for the Americans to
decide on timing or whether attacks against the North were to be undertaken at all. Having
said this, he said, he would like to note that the NFLSVN and the VC were but the arms or
legs of the enemy monster; its head was in Hanoi--"and maybe further North;" and to
destroy it properly and quickly, a blow at the head was needed. The purpose of putting the
country formally on a war footing would be to set the stage, to set a proper frame of
reference, for the ultimate extension of the war that would follow.
13. General Taylor asked how General Khanh thought he could best attack the North.
Khanh replied by air or by sea but not by land. It was noted that some small-scale
infiltration operations had been tried or were in progress, but it was generally agreed that
these had not been successful and were unlikely to make any decisively significant
contribution to the war effort. When the question of the material capabilities of the
Vietnamese Armed Forces to mount such attacks came up, Khanh replied that they either
were ready or could quickly be brought to a point of readiness. This was not the problem.
The problem was to be certain that the GVN would continue to enjoy full American
support in connection with a strong attack by the North in reaction to what the GVN had
done. Khanh noted that there were always unknowns that must be taken into account. He
recalled the parts played by comparable "unknownsv in the French war in Indochina-the
decisive role played by a Viet Minh division that had been grouped and held secretly just
over the Chinese border for a sudden and decisive intervention in the fighting in the
Tonkin. The French had known nothing about it. He would point out the risks and the
prospects for gain, but the Americans would have to make the basic decisions.
14. General Taylor recalled that at their last (March) meeting,/4/ General Khanh had said
he would prefer to hold off on attacking the North until he had established a better and
sounder base in the South. General Taylor asked if we now had a stable base. Khanh
indicated that there was much more to be done in this area, but that it was almost
impossible to describe the problem or his approaches to it in absolute terms. He said that
the very fact that the base in the South was not yet satisfactorily solid might be a reason to
strike against the North at once, rather than wait for the weakness to be corrected, because
it could be, in a certain international conjuncture and set of circumstances, that the best
cure for weakness in the South would be an attack on the North. He saw some merit in
drawing clear lines of battle and thereby engaging men's hearts and their all-out efforts.
That would be the advantage of proclaiming a war footing: it would increase people's
awareness of the war and of the fact that they had to take a position and play their part. It
could be that an attack on the North would galvanize opinion in the South and speed up
the successful prosecution of the war considerably.
/4/See Document 77.

15. Furthermore, General Khanh said, we had to be mindful of the diplomatic and
international consequences of our acts or possible courses of action. For example, there
was the problem of the French. When Secretary Rusk had spoken with him a few weeks
ago, the Secretary had urged him not to break relations with France. When Khanh asserted
that he knew that certain Frenchmen were involved in subversion, Secretary Rusk had
said to expel them selectively and for cause, but not to break off diplomatic relations with
France. This Khanh had done yesterday: three Frenchmen had been expelled on security
grounds. This was just the beginning. He was going to expel any Frenchman who spread
neutralist doctrine or otherwise threatened the security of the government, the state, or the
war effort. Khanh said this with considerable force and pride, in the manner of a man who
felt he was getting underway and enjoyed the feeling of motion and concrete achievement,
and looked forward to more of the same.
16. General Khanh then asked the Secretary for his views. The Secretary recalled their
conversations of last March and the increases in levels of forces upon which they had then
agreed. Notably, there was to be a 72,000 man increase in the ARVN and another 72,000
increase in the paramilitary forces, to replace casualties, separations and to raise the level
of forces to something like 238,000 for the ARVN and 98,000 each for the Civil Guard
and the SDC. The Secretary noted that the figures for what had actually been
accomplished in these areas in April and May did not suggest that we were on schedule.
The Secretary emphasized that he was making the observation only to introduce his main
point that the USG was willing to help in any way it could to get this program back on
schedule. If more money or materiel was needed, it would be made available whenever a
real need could be demonstrated.
17. The Secretary then produced a chart showing what should have been accomplished
over the past few months and what had actually been achieved. The Secretary and Khanh
went over these figures carefully. After this study of detailed specifics was completed,
Khanh asked the Secretary what general observation he would like to make on the war
effort to date.
18. The Secretary noted the limitations of his vantage point as compared to that of
General Khanh, but gave a clear and concrete listing of important points. First of all, he
said, he would emphasize strength levels.
Second, he said, the Vietnamese Air Force needed more fighter-type aircraft. These could
be delivered over here within three or four months. The Secretary indicated which aircraft
types should be substituted for which types currently in use.
Thirdly, the Secretary said, there was the matter of the budget. This was very important.
Delays in the granting of budgetary approval seemed to be holding up progress of the
pacification effort. The Secretary emphasized that the GVN could count on the USG to
supply any funds that were clearly needed, and to cover any shortfall that had been
occasioned by worthwhile activity.
The GVN must emphasize, particularly in the provinces, that it is a crime not to disburse
funds one is supposed to disburse. Khanh said he had recently gotten this message across
to a large group of province chiefs at Cap Saint Jacques; he was going to talk to the
remainder of the province chiefs within a week or so. He said jocularly that he was going
to tell them that he would cut off the head of anyone who put money into his own pockets,
but would also cut off the head of anyone who sat on money he was supposed to disburse.
All present expressed satisfaction at Khanh's having accepted this important point of
speeding up disbursements and removing obstacles to adequate funding of key projects.
Khanh explained that many of the GVN's difficulties in this area stemmed from their
heritage of French budgetary practice and its particularly formidable system of controls.
19. At Khanh's request the Secretary offered more detailed points of advice. He said once
again that he could not emphasize too strongly the importance of raising forces to the
agreed levels. He felt still more effort should be made in the strategic provinces. There
was also the problem of replacing incompetents. The Secretary said that in every relevant
report, he had heard that the commander of the 5th Division was incompetent. He must be
replaced quickly. The same applied to the province chief of Hau Nghia Province.
20. General Khanh said he agreed regarding the incompetence of these two individuals.
They would soon be replaced. The case of the commander of the 5th Division presented
something of an internal problem, but it would be arranged.
21. The Secretary then noted that the GVN was failing to receive much support that it
might get from third-country nations interested in its struggle simply because it was
inadequately represented abroad. The GVN must send out many more able Ambassadors.
Ambassador Lodge remarked that he knew of several Vietnamese available in Saigon who
would make excellent Ambassadors. The Secretary pointed out that the GVN could do
much good for its cause by being properly represented at the UN, in a number of African
and South American countries, and in Europe, especially in the Federal Republic of
Germany.
22. General Khanh replied that he had this problem very much in mind. He said that an
Ambassador, unlike a province chief, cannot be assigned quickly and then withdrawn if he
does not work out well. A very careful selection must be made in the first place. There
were, to be sure, many able men available, but there were also many problems.
Ambassadors had to be representatives-nationally, socially and politically. They had to be
worthy of the trust imposed in them. There were many otherwise suitable men who had
family problems that complicated their cases; the wives of some were unsuitable for a
diplomatic assignment. He was moving as fast as he could on this.
23. Finally, the Secretary said there must be a more effective administration of the
pacification program. Those running it must be pushed to higher levels of effectiveness,
and any obstacles in their paths must be removed. General Khanh said he hoped in the
near future to be able to spend much more time on military and pacification matters, if
only this political "stomach trouble" that took so much of his time could be quieted.
24. General Taylor, in a very serious and deliberate manner, said there was one problem
of which he wished to remind General Khanh: the matter of proper supervision of
communications security, this was extremely important. The fate of a nation could hang
on communications security practices, and General Khanh would have to insist on higher
standards. Khanh acknowledged this.
25. Ambassador Lodge said he had a problem too: he had just learned that Major Dang-
Sy/5/ was soon to be brought to trial in Hue and on a date (May 21) that was
psychologically extremely dangerous. This trial could only exacerbate the religious strife
of which General Khanh had earlier complained. Khanh said the date was May 18 and
assured the Ambassador that Major Sy would not be executed. Khanh said, with some
determination and inflexibility in his voice, that Sy would be tried. But he added with
equal firmness and as a firm and personal commitment to the Ambassador, that he would
not be executed. The Ambassador warned him that with religious feeling running as high
as it was, any mishandling of the Sy trial could even start a religious war. Khanh
acknowledged the Ambassador's points. He objected, however, that he had recently
received a letter from Monseigneur Binh, the Bishop of Saigon, which was little less than
an ultimatum. Khanh repeated again that Tri Quang was stirring up trouble, this time in
connection with the Sy case. The Ambassador acknowledged that he did not envy the
position in which Khanh found himself, but emphasized again that nothing must be
[done?] even to justify the impression the GVN was in the slightest degree anti-Catholic.
/5/Major Dang-Sy was Deputy Chief of Thua Thien Province and the official responsible
for the government attacks on Buddhist demonstrators in Hue on May 8, 1963. Dang-Sy
was relieved of his duties soon after the incident. After the overthrow of the Diem
government in November 1963, he was arrested.
26. The meeting, which had been frank and friendly throughout, ended on a particularly
warm and friendly note, with Khanh expressing his obviously sincere thanks for the
Secretary's and the Ambassador's statements of all-out USG support for him and for his
government.
Lodge
Saigon, May 14, 1964--5 p.m.
2205. Literally eyes only to Rusk and McNamara from Lodge. From a very reliable
source I reamed after McNamara departure that "Big" Minh stated on Wednesday/2/
afternoon that he was planning a coup to overthrow Khanh. This should be very closely
held because knowledge of it might create the very developments we wish to discourage.
Khanh is infinitely the best bet in this country./3/
/2/May 13.
/3/On May 15, Lodge sent the following update to Rusk and McNamara in telegram 2213
from Saigon:
"Since my 2205, I have learnt that 'Big Minh' is moving at a very slow speed and letting
things come to him, and that there is no high pressure plot to get anything done quickly.
What is chiefly significant is the state of mind. My present intention is that it would do
more harm than good for me to tell Khanh that I am aware of this. Undoubtedly, he is
thoroughly aware of it and has been for a long time. I will exercise my best
judgment." (Department of State, Central Files, POL 15 VIET S)
Lodge
154. Notes Prepared by the Secretary of Defense (McNamara)/1/

4370, South Vietnam-Statements and Supporting Papers. Secret. According to the
President's Daily Diary of May 14, Johnson met with McNamara, Taylor, McGeorge and
William Bundy, Bell, and Colby from 10:40 a.m. to noon. Sullivan was not listed as a
participant at the meeting. Johnson Library, President's Daily Diary)
RMcN's NOTES FOR REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT
SUBJECT
South Vietnam
Summarized below are my comments and conclusions based upon the discussions which
General Taylor and I held in South Vietnam May 12 and 13.
1. The Situation
a. Since last September the number of villages under Government control has declined by
200, approximately 12%. Most of this decline occurred between September and January,
but the decline continued at a lesser rate through March. The adverse trend appears to
have leveled off in April.
b. Khanh states that today the Government controls 8 million people out of a total
population of 14 million.
c. The Viet Cong continue to hold the initiative. The rate of harassing incidents, with its
adverse effects on public morale, continues to rise. The fighting strength of the Viet Cong
has risen and they are now able occasionally to stand and fight rather than to retire and
dissolve in the face of Government pressure. However, they are not yet capable of seizing
an area and holding it for an extended period of time against determined Government
attack.
d. The Government's operations are improving in effectiveness:
"Holding" and "oil spot" operations are under way in several parts of the country.
Khanh has a clear and effective concept of the pacification program.
However:
Frequent changes of leadership continue (there have been six Province Chiefs in Long An
in recent weeks).
Incompetent leadership exists in many critical areas, e.g., the 5th Division and Hai Nghia
Province.
Resources are not concentrated in the areas of highest priority (for example, the crescent
of provinces around Saigon including Long An, Binh Duong, and Hai Nghia, has fewer
troops and less competent leadership in relation to the Communist threat than do less
critical areas).
Operational plans for applying the "holding" and "oil spot" concepts to all provinces or to
all major parts of each important province (Long An) have not yet been developed.
Desertion rates remain high and the strength of both regular and pare-military forces is
inadequate and falling.
The administrative processes of the Government, particularly as they relate to the war
effort and especially its budgetary aspects, are ineffective (the budget for January has not
yet been approved and province chiefs are reluctant to assume responsibility for spending
for such purposes as increases in pay, additions to strength, the rural pacification
program).
The Government remains fragmented by dissension and distrust (e.g., the Foreign
Minister reported to Manfull on May 13 that Khanh had possible Communist or neutralist
connections).
A religious crisis is brewing both among the Buddhists and between the Buddhists and the
Catholics, and the latter may spread to the Army (note the "ultimatum" letters to Khanh
from both the Buddhists and the Catholics and the Bishop's proposal to remove Catholic
chaplains from the Army).
Tri Quang, the leader of the Buddhists in the central part of the country, is an ambitious,
dangerous, unpredictable, powerful, political force antagonistic to Khanh's Government.
e. MACV estimates:
1) The Pacification Program will not be in full swing until September.
2) Governmental control over the Central and Northern areas will not be achieved before
mid-1965 and possibly as late as the end of 1965 (per Westmoreland and Stilwell).
3) Governmental control over the Delta will not be achieved in less than two to three
years (per Westmoreland and Stilwell).
4) Governmental preparations for operations against the North will not be completed
before September or October.
2. Actions which we have recommended to strengthen the Government's Program.
a. The strength of the regular and paramilitary forces must be increased substantially by
the end of the year. MACV was asked to prepare a detailed plan to accomplish this, to
obtain Khanh's approval of the plan, and to monitor its implementation. The plan,
prepared while we were in Saigon, proposed the recruitment of 147,000 men between
April 1 and December 31, 1964. I asked Khanh to approve this plan--he did.
b. South Vietnam's financial budget must be approved immediately and the province
chiefs must be instructed to implement it at once. Khanh agreed to issue the necessary
instructions.
c. Financial limitations or the fear of such limitations must not be allowed to stand in the
way of the action required to expedite the Pacification Program. Mike Forrestal will stay
in Saigon until he negotiates with Oanh a plan for providing whatever budgetary support
is required to offset the bad psychological effect of what the South Vietnamese view as
our restrictive financial policies. (Oanh has requested an additional $56 million for the
CIP plus $20 million to be added to the foreign exchange reserve.)
d. Detailed plans for the extensive application of the "oil spot" concept must be developed
for all provinces and resources provided and allocated in accordance with these plans.
MACV will assume the responsibility for this action.
e. Certain additional training or logistical support is required for the Vietnamese forces.
We will endeavor to increase by 100% the number of Vietnamese fighter pilots within 90100 days. We will increase the number of fighter aircraft by approximately 3.3% by the
first of October and provide by that date additional pilots for such aircraft. We will
approve MACV's request for additional financial and material assistance totalling
approximately $7 million (this list of items to be submitted in response to my request that
they tell us of any additional assistance which they required). A detailed training program
for the 7,000 additional civilian administrators to be used for pacification cadres must be
developed and expedited. The USOM Chief will follow this program.
3. Khanh's views. (For a more complete exposition of his comments, see the report of my
interview with him.)/2/
/2/Document 152.
a. As stated earlier, Khanh believes that today the Government controls approximately 8
million of the population. He believes his plans for application of the "oil spot" concept
will gradually extend the Government's control over the remainder of the population, but
he points out this will require a long time.
b. He states that his major problem today is not military, but rather political and religious
in character. Irresponsible elements of the urban population, who have not been exposed
to the dangers and pressures of the war, press for political reforms which are inappropriate
under the present circumstances. Religious crises involving controversy among the
Buddhists and between the Buddhists and Catholics are mounting rapidly. He fears they
will spread to the Army. In these areas Khanh stated he is "a fish out of water" and he
seeks our advice.
c. Because the war will last a long time, Khanh believes that at some point a strike against
the North will be desirable. He will probably not be ready for such a strike before the end
of the year, although it may be forced upon him earlier by political and psychological
factors. The strikes against the North can be carried out by South Vietnamese forces, but
the decision to undertake such action must be that of the United States because if the
North Vietnamese and Chinese Communists respond by attacking South Vietnam, Khanh
must depend on U.S. forces for the protection of his country. In any event, Khanh states
strikes against the North are not required now and he is not yet ready to carry them out.
d. Khanh accepted my statements of the requirement for:
1) A plan to increase the military and paramilitary strength of the GVN forces.
2) The early approval and effective provincial application of the financial budget.
3) The early assignment of ambassadors to key nations throughout the world.
4) The concentration of resources in the strategic heartland.
5) The removal of incompetent leaders in both the military and political organizations.
e. Following Khanh's acceptance of my statements of the action he should take to increase
the effectiveness of the counterinsurgency program, I emphasized again that the U.S.
would support fully whatever financial expenditures were required for projects which
contributed to the effectiveness of the counterinsurgency program.
4. Lodge's proposals for strikes against the North.
a. Lodge wishes to carry out air strikes against the North [4 lines of source text not
declassified]. The objective of Lodge's program would be not only to cut off the supply of
men and equipment from the North, but also to destroy the morale of the North
Vietnamese and to raise the morale of the South Vietnamese.
b. Not only is this the program which Lodge believes should be followed, but, according
to Bill Sullivan, Lodge believes his record shows he has consistently recommended it. His
memorandum of record of the conversation with Messrs. Bundy and Rusk indicates to
him that he proposed such a plan to them./3/ He considers that since his memorandum of
last October to Averell Harriman he has consistently advocated this proposal.
c. Lodge believes he has made clear his opposition to Bill Bundy's proposal for
establishing a political base and time schedule for action against the North. Dunn's notes
of the conversations with Bundy and Rusk refer to Lodge's arguments against Bundy's
proposal.
d. The time schedule which Lodge apparently would follow is based on the Canadians'
arrival in Saigon in June. Lodge believes the necessary training will be completed and
plans to protect Saigon implemented by the end of the summer, at which time the
political-military program could start.
e. Almost certainly Lodge has discussed such a plan with Khanh, hoping to lead him to
accept it.
5. Administration of the Country Team.

[Paragraphs a and b (8 lines of source text) not declassified]
c. Harkins and Lodge do not communicate effectively with each other. Neither Harkins
nor Nes saw Lodge's cable reporting on his conversations with Khanh, /4/ nor did they see
his "Dienbienphu" cable./5/ [1 line of source text not declassified]
/4/Document 136.
/5/Document 143.
[Paragraph d (2 lines of source text) not declassified]
e. The morale in the Embassy is poor because the able people on the staff see no effective
direction of the counterinsurgency program within the Country Team.
6. Miscellaneous comments.
a. Lodge believes that if Khanh disappears, the U.S. should be prepared to run the
country, possibly from Cam Ranh Bay.
b. With respect to coup possibilities, DeSilva states that although Khanh is not very
popular, this is a normal condition for a leader of such a country and coup prospects, in
his opinion, are lowest since January 30 of this year.
RMcN

/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 VIET S. Top Secret; Immediate;
Nodis. Sent as telegram 1942 to Saigon, which is the source text. The message was
drafted in the White House and, according to a May 14 note from McGeorge to William
Bundy, it was approved by the President and McNamara. Johnson Library, National
Security File, Vietnam Country File, Vol. IX)
McNamara and Sullivan have reported fully this morning regarding their conversations
with you and your colleagues./2/ I was particularly struck by Sullivan's report of his
conversation with you in which you indicated your concept of a strategy for moving
against the North./3/ While you had discussed this matter with Dean Rusk and Bundy
earlier, they had not understood that you were proposing that a sequence of actions be
initiated in the near future.

I consider it vital that you and I at all times fully and clearly understand each other's
minds and would therefore greatly appreciate it if you would send me urgently your
precise present recommendations with respect to the North including the Canadian aspect,
the timing, and the degree of visible U.S. participation at each stage. With respect to the
Canadians, I feel it important to know whether you contemplate their being informed of
the full range of the actions you propose and being advised at this time of the precise
nature of the messages you would wish them to convey to the North Vietnamese.
Bob McNamara also reports that in his discussion of-these matters General Khanh
indicated his own present belief that action of this sort will become necessary later but
that he will not be ready for such action before the end of the year.
Khanh also emphasized that any action of this kind must require a U.S. decision and a
U.S. promise of protection against any reprisal. I would appreciate your estimate both as
to the prospect of reprisal and of the need for advance protection./4/
156. Summary Record of the 532d Meeting of the National Security Council,
Washington, May 15, 1964, Noon/1/
Secret. Drafted by Bromley Smith. A list of attendees is ibid,. Memos to the President.
McGeorge Bundy, Vol. 4.
The agenda of the meeting, which included presentations on U.S. assistance to Indonesia
and U.S. policy toward Panama, was cancelled. The bipartisan Congressional leaders had
been invited by the President to attend the Council session to hear reports by Secretaries
Rusk and McNamara.
[Here follows Rusk's brief summary of the NATO meeting he attended with specific
reference to France and Cyprus.]
3. United Nations--A report on what we are doing in South Vietnam accompanied by a
plea to the NATO members to assist in the effort against the Viet Cong. About half a
dozen States may register their presence in South Vietnam. It is important that more flags
appear in South Vietnam. The contribution which additional states will make helps the
war effort but also has a beneficial effect on the morale of the South Vietnamese
government. The resistance among NATO members to assisting in Vietnam is an echo of
the past and recalls colonial disputes in which European nations believe we worked
against them.
[Here follow discussion by Rusk of the U.S. position on overflights of Cuba as presented
at the NATO meeting and his brief summary of NATO discussions concerning tripartite
talks on German reunification.]
Secretary McNamara then summarized the report he had prepared following his most
recent visit to South Vietnam.
1. The situation in South Vietnam has worsened since his last visit. The number of people
under Viet Cong control' and the amount of Vietnamese territory they control is
increasing. The Viet Cong holds the initiative in the military action. The Khanh
government is fragmented and a religious crisis is brewing. South Vietnamese efforts
involve clear and hold exercises, the oil spot program, and pacification programs. Khanh
controls eight out of fourteen million South Vietnamese. His major problem is not
military but civilian and religious. He does not feel that he should strike north before his
security situation in the south is improved, possibly by this Fall. No strike to the north is
required now, but there may be a psychological requirement to hit North Vietnam at a
later time. He feels that because the reaction of the Communists to an attack on North
Vietnam is unknown, he must have a U.S. guarantee of protection, i.e., the introduction of
U.S. forces, before such an attack is initiated.
In response to the President's question, General Taylor said that if we attack North
Vietnam, there would be a strong reaction by the Viet Cong in the south. It is difficult to
estimate what the North Vietnamese and the Chinese Communists would do. The Chinese
Communists could intervene but probably would not. The larger the U.S. attack, the
greater chance of Communist reaction. The level of the attack would be the determining
factor on the Communist reaction.
The President pointed out that Khanh's support of any attack on North Vietnam would be
essential.
Secretary McNamara said that the most important thing to do now is to back Khanh
solidly. He suggested that we could help Khanh in the following ways:
1. Increase the South Vietnamese force level.
2. Help get his budget approved and implemented.
3. Provide financial support to ensure the stability of the South Vietnamese economy.
More foreign aid in 1965 will be needed, as well as additional military equipment.
4. Train Vietnamese pilots in order to provide crews for the increased number of U.S.
planes which we should send to Vietnam.
In answer to a question, Secretary McNamara said that U.S. military personnel would be
training Vietnamese and would not be in combat. However, U.S. men are exposed to fire
on the ground and in the air during their training time. He referred to Jungle Jim, an Air
Force program to train a Vietnamese force for counterguerrilla activity. As to U.S. planes
given to the Vietnamese earlier, he said there was a sound case for sending the T-28s.
Propeller-driven planes are more appropriate to Vietnam than jets. The size of the airfields
is small. The T-28s had been used to provide air cover for helicopters. U.S. experts agree
that the T-28s are the best type of plane for the Vietnamese war. Fatalities were low,
considering the large number of sorties flown.
Secretary McNamara said, in summary, that we would be obliged to increase our previous
level of economic and military assistance. In answer to Senator Dirksen's question,

Director Bell said total U.S. assistance amounted to about $500 million a year.
Senator Dirksen recalled Secretary McNamara's earlier report to the Congressional
group/2/ and asked whether the Vietnamese had been able to enlist or conscript the
additional soldiers called for under their program. Secretary McNamara said the present
goal is 75,000 more men by the end of the year. In fact, 150,000 recruits are needed but it
is unlikely that this number will be obtained.
In answer to a question by Senator Dirksen as to the effect of our increased assistance on
the economy of South Vietnam, both Secretary McNamara and Mr. Bell agreed that the
effect would be little. This year's rice crop is expected to be good.
In answer to Senator Dirksen's question about the Cambodian border incident,/3/
Secretary McNamara said it was very difficult to determine the specific facts. Apparently
there were two different incidents involving the crossing of the border by South
Vietnamese. Secretary Rusk added that the Viet Cong felt free to move across the border
into Cambodia. He added that we may try to use the Cambodian appeal to the UN to get
UN observers on the Cambodia/ South Vietnam border. Director McCone noted that both
sides have crossed and recrossed the border. These crossings are not deep and are in areas
where the border is not clearly identified.
/3/Reference is to a South Vietnamese armed incursion of Cambodia on May 7 and 8 in
pursuit of the Viet Cong. (Memorandum from Samuel E. Belk to McGeorge Bundy, May
15; Johnson Library, National Security File, Vietnam Country File, Vol. IX)
The President summarized the McNamara report by saying that the situation in South
Vietnam was deteriorating and caused us to be extremely alarmed. The religious situation
is explosive. A great effort will be necessary to turn the tide back to our side.
Senator Saltonstall asked whether U.S. soldiers will be engaged in fighting under the new
program. He also asked whether U.S. planes were being adequately maintained, adding
that many people had expressed their concern to him on this point.
Secretary McNamara replied that U.S. soldiers are not engaged in combat except in the
course of their training Vietnamese. The number of our fighter pilots in South Vietnam
has not been greatly increased. The bulk of the air effort is by South Vietnamese forces
and does not involve exposing our men.
Congressman Jensen asked whether our allies are helping us. He wanted to know why the
U.S. is carrying so much of the load and why our allies can not be forced to contribute
more.
Secretary Rusk replied that we are carrying almost all of the load but are getting some
assistance from Germany, France, the U.K. and Australia. The U.K., however, is involved
in Borneo and in Malaysia. Some twenty nations have been asked to help us in South
Vietnam.
Congressman Jensen made clear that he thought we are merely puttering around instead of
launching a campaign against the Red Chinese. He is convinced that we have to deal with
the Red Chinese. He is unhappy because he believes our allies really do not give a damn
about Communist aggression in Southeast Asia.
Secretary McNamara repeated his view that effective action must be taken in South
Vietnam. Attacks on North Vietnam may become necessary, but our purpose would be to
make possible the carrying out of present programs in South Vietnam. The Viet Cong is
being hurt in South Vietnam now. We are trying to get our allies to help, but many of
them have severe limitations. However, the Australian effort is much too small. Because
their entire defense budget is so low, the Australians would be able to put only a token
force in South Vietnam.
Secretary Rusk pointed out that Prime Minister Menzies can now increase his defense
budget because, in a recent election, he gained sufficient additional political support to
make this action possible.
Congresswoman Bolton asked when we began training South Vietnamese pilots.
Secretary McNamara replied in January 1962. He added that in two and one-fourth years
twenty-eight U.S. lives have been lost, but that Vietnamese sorties had increased eight
times. He cited additional facts to refute criticism that the Vietnamese are not fighting and
that U.S. soldiers are actually carrying on the war.
When Secretary McNamara finished, Mrs. Bolton requested that his information be made
public. She said she is getting a tremendous amount of mail criticizing our actions in
South Vietnam. Secretary McNamara said we are making the information he had
summarized available to the public and he had given some of it during his testimony
before Congressional committees.
In response to a question from Senator Dirksen as to the location of the Seventh Fleet,
Secretary McNamara said elements of the Fleet are off the coast of South Vietnam, within
forty-eight hours steaming time of Saigon.
In response to a question by Senator Dirksen as to whether Communist China is
increasing the number of weapons shipped to South Vietnam, Secretary McNamara
replied that there had been no increase in weapon shipments above the March level.
Senator Dirksen asked for a description of the routes of supply from North Vietnam to
South Vietnam. Secretary McNamara described several of the routes, adding that 90-95%
of Viet Cong forces are recruited in South Vietnam. Only cadres are sent from North
Vietnam.
Speaker McCormack said that the Administration was doing everything it could to get
help from our allies. He pointed out that if South Vietnam goes, all of Southeast Asia will
fall to the Communists. It is in our national interest to keep Southeast Asia nonCommunist.
Congressman Jensen agreed that the U.S. has an interest in Southeast Asia but firmly
restated his view that so do others who are not now helping us. He asked about the
position of Thailand.
Secretary Rusk replied that Thailand is focusing on the problem in Laos and has moved
some of its forces to northeast Thailand. This helps the situation in South Vietnam. In
addition, the Thais are worried about the activity of Sihanouk. The South Vietnamese do
not want Thai forces in their territory. The Thais are giving us good political support, but
we have not pressed them to send military forces to South Vietnam.
Secretary Rusk called attention to the fact that the Vietnamese problem is ten years old.
We have been committed to help Vietnam remain independent since 1954. In 1959, U.S.
aid to Vietnam was increased when it became clear that Hanoi was intensifying its efforts
to overthrow the South Vietnamese government.
The President said that a request for a supplemental appropriation to pay for increased
economic and military assistance to South Vietnam would come from the Bureau of the
Budget to the National Security Council and then be sent to Congress. The amount
required was more than could be covered by the contingency fund. The specific amount
was not yet known. The President requested that information on this point not be made
public
Senator Saltonstall asked what could be said. The President replied that we would say that
Congressional leaders had been asked to attend the National Security Council meeting to
hear a briefing by Secretaries Rusk and McNamara. It was clear that more U.S. funds
would be required for the Vietnamese program, but no details should be given out because
they were still considered confidential.
In response to a question, Secretary McNamara said that Ambassador Lodge and General
Harkins were in full agreement that more U.S. effort was needed in South Vietnam.
The President concluded the meeting by commenting that even with increased U.S. aid the
prospect in South Vietnam is not bright.
Bromley Smith/4/

Saigon, May 15, 1964--4 p.m.
/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 VIET S. Top Secret; Nodis.
Transmitted as telegram 2212 from Saigon, which is the source text. Also published in
Declassified Documents, 1982, 002002.
This is in reply to your 1942./2/
/2/Document 155.
1. My views on this subject were last submitted in my memorandum of October 30 to
Harriman/3/ and later various aspects were covered in the following wires from me to
you: my 1583 of February 19,/4/ my 1594 of February 20,/5/ my 1757 of March 16,/6/ my
1454 of March 18,/6/ my 1776 of March 19,/7/ my 08 of April 16,/8/ and my 1803 of
March 23./9/
/4/Document 53.
/5/Document 55.
/7/Document 91.
/8/See footnote 2, Document 116
/9/Document 93.
2. I think the Canadian interlocutor on his first trip to Hanoi should state that the
Americans are utterly determined to win the struggle in South Viet Nam and will do
whatever is necessary to win it. He should also point out that the North Vietnamese have
it in their power to behave in such a way as to bring about the eventual withdrawal of U.S.
military personnel, and so as to get food and economic aid for themselves, but that if they
persist in their present gross and murderous intrusion into South Viet Nam, they will
unquestionably be punished.
3. If prior to the Canadian's trip to Hanoi there has been a terroristic act of the proper
magnitude, then I suggest that a specific target in North Viet Nam be considered as a
prelude to his arrival. The Vietnamese Air Force must be made capable of doing this, and
they should undertake this type of action.
4. I much prefer a selective use of Vietnamese air power to an overt U.S. effort perhaps
involving the total annihilation of all that has been built in North Viet Nam since 1954~
because this would surely bring in the Chinese Communists, and might well bring in the
Russians. Moreover, if you lay the whole country waste, it is quite likely that you will
induce a mood of fatalism in the Viet Cong. Also, there will be nobody left in North Viet
Nam on whom to put pressure. Furthermore, South Viet Nam's infrastructure might well
be destroyed. What we are interested in here is not destroying Ho Chi Minh (as his
successor would probably be worse than he is), but getting him to change behavior. That
is what President Kennedy was trying to do in October with Diem and with considerable
success.
5. I believe the Canadian interlocutor idea offers the opportunity of using military power
in a sharp focus to achieve specific political objectives, and we can increase or decrease
the dose as we judge the traffic will bear and depending on our own readiness.
6. This is a procedure the intensity of which we can constantly control and bring up to the
point to which we think the Communist reaction would cease to be manageable. It should
be covert and undertaken by the Vietnamese, but, of course, we must be clear in our own
minds that we are ready and able to take care of whatever reaction there may be.
7. It is easy for us on the one hand to ignore our superiority as we did at the time of Berlin
in 1948 (when we still had sole possession of the atomic bomb). It is also a relatively
simple concept to go all out and destroy North Viet Nam. What is complicated, but really
effective, is to bring our power to bear in a precise way so as to get specific results.
8. Another advantage of this procedure is that when, as and if the time ever came that our
military activities against the North became overt, we would be in a strong moral position
both with regard to U.S. public opinion, the U.S. Congress, and the U.N. I say this
because we would then have a record to show that we had given Ho Chi Minh fair
warning to stop his murderous interference in the internal affairs of Viet Nam. Not only
would we have given him fair warning, but we would have given him honest and valuable
inducements in the way of some withdrawal of American personnel and in the way of
economic aid, notably food. I think it is indispensable to lay this kind of basis on which
we can then reasonably expect to get the support of Congress, public opinion, the United
Nations.
9. The capacity to provide adequate protection against NVN reaction is a matter for the
best military judgment available. I favor starting this procedure as soon as the Canadian
can get going and as fast as military adequacy permits. Canadian should be a really big
man.
Lodge/10/
158. Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs
(Bundy) to the Secretary of State/1/
/1/Source: Department of State, Bundy Files, WPB Chron. Confidential.
At yesterday's meeting/2/ Secretary McNamara and Sullivan reported that Lodge was now
urging that we undertake the Canadian gambit in the full sense as soon as the man gets out
there (June 15 is now estimated), and that the initial threat-carrot approach be followed by
covert air strikes against targets in North Vietnam. Lodge claims that it is the position that
he took in his discussions with you in Saigon.
As you know, we have asked Lodge to make this specific. But just on the point of what he
said to you during your visit, I have checked the notes taken by Lodge's own man./3/ They
make clear that Lodge proposed the Canadian gambit but did not have in mind, at that
time, that it would be undertaken before the new Canadian man arrived, which then
looked like July. As to the question of initial air strikes being wholly "covert", the record
contains absolutely nothing to support Lodge's contention that he made this point during
the discussion. Our own scenario, which he should have read but (according to Nes) had
not (!) made it quite clear that our script thought that the initial air strikes would have to
be acknowledged by the GVN. Thus, it was an obvious point for Lodge to seize on if he
disagreed with it, but the record is perfectly clear that he did not do so.
This only for use if the President appears to believe that you and I did not take Lodge in
correctly. As often, he was simply fairly woolly.
I have now made a master file of all our exchanges with Lodge on this subject, and will do
an analysis of this very soon so that we know just what kind of things he really said.
W.P.B.
159. Memorandum Prepared by the Directorate of Intelligence, Central Intelligence

Agency/1/
[document number not declassified]
/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Vietnam Country File, Vol. IX.
Secret. A covering memorandum from McCone, May 16, brought this memorandum to
President Johnson's attention. (Ibid., SEA Special Intelligence Material, Vol. I) Also
published in Declassified Documents, 1976, 21C.
At 1:03 p.m., May 16, McCone called Rusk to discuss this memorandum:
"M said he thought the situation in Viet-Nam was much more serious than Bob's report;
we are trying to deal with it isolated from Cambodia, Laos and M thought the situation
there was really serious. M said that was why he produced the paper this morning, the
May 15 appraisal; he thought the Sec should read it; the Sec said he had not seen it. M
said we are hanging on a thread of two people--Khanh and Phoumi. M said also the great
emphasis was on the military and none on his building a government, which he did not
have. Sec said he was working this week end on a long message from him to Lodge;
probably President, McNamara and M would see before it went out." (Department of
State, Rusk Papers: Lot 72 D 172, Telephone Conversations)
For McNamara's report, see Document 154
SUMMARY
The over-all situation in South Vietnam remains extremely fragile. Although there has
been some improvement in GVN/ARVN performance, sustained Viet Cong pressure
continues to erode GVN authority throughout the country, undercut US/GVN programs
and depress South Vietnamese morale. We do not see any signs that these trends are yet
"bottoming out." During the next several months there will be increasing danger that an
assassination of Khanh, a successful coup, a grave military reverse, or a succession of
serious military setbacks could have a critical psychological impact in South Vietnam. In
any case, if the tide of deterioration has not been arrested by the end of the year, the antiCommunist position in South Vietnam is likely to become untenable.

/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, AID (US) 8 VIET S. Secret; Immediate;
Limdis. Drafted by Stoneman, cleared in substance by Bell and in draft by Poats and
Blouin, and approved by Sullivan.
1968. Joint State/AID/DOD message. Pass Forrestal for info. Rpt to CINCPAC for info.
Subject: Vietnam Supplemental Appropriation Request.
Decision made today to proceed on Monday with supplemental appropriation request
$125 million for increase in FY 1965 U.S. foreign assistance to Vietnam, $70 million
economic and $55 million military. Septel gives verbatim text presently proposed draft of
message./2/
/2/Telegram 1967 to Saigon, May 16. (Ibid., DEF 19-7 US-VIET S) The May 1&
message to Congress is printed in American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1964,
pp. 970-972.
Based information available here, supplemented by Secretary McNamara's observations
during this week's Saigon visit, the $70 million economic aid will be divided $50 million
additional for commercial import program and $20 million additional for counterinsurgency program. This additive to Congressional Presentation figures of $95 million
CIP and $35 million C.I.
This action being taken in order to assure availability of funding for increased needs now
foreseen and to remove any possible psychological or political impediment to all-out
GVN budgetary, administrative and military efforts. This is to be used for real needs as
they actually arise within the illustrative context of the current supplemental presentation
and as additional reassurance in negotiating with GVN for maximum effort on its part.
For instance, we envisage announcement of our additional support will enable Country
Team to obtain effective GVN commitments to following, inter alia:
(a) Immediate, decisive GVN action to provide all plaster financing needed for civil
counter-insurgency and increased military effort;
(b) Greatly simplified and streamlined budgetary and administrative procedures;
(c) Further curtailment of luxury imports;
(d) Sharing of import-financing costs through drawdown of GVN reserves by $25 to $30
million in FY 64 from the Jan 1, 1964 level of $ 179 million:
(e) RAND/USOM/GVN study on appropriate economic mobilization measures will be

carried on vigorously and results applied to maximum extent feasible.
(f) Better utilization of military manpower and equipment.
In short, U.S. is providing under most extraordinary procedures virtually everything by
way of external resources for which GVN has indicated need and it is now calling on
GVN to exert maximum effort on its part along lines already jointly agreed as necessary.
Rusk
(McNamara)/1/
JCSM-426-64
926, 092 North Vietnam. Top Secret; Sensitive. A summary version is printed in
Pentagon Papers: Gravel Edition, vol. III, pp. 511-512.
SUBJECT
North Vietnam Operations
1. The first phase of operations against North Vietnam, under OPLAN 34A,/2/ terminates
on 31 May 1964. In reviewing the military commanders' proposal for a four month
continuation of operations, commencing June 1964, the Joint Chiefs of Staff have
appraised the achievements, and limitations, of the first three months of the program now
being conducted under cognizance of the Department of Defense.
2. The over-all objective of the program is primarily to help convince the North
Vietnamese leadership that it is in its own self-interest to desist from its aggressive
policies. Ancillary objectives are:
a. To gain more information regarding the enemy, and
b. To intensify the current psychological warfare, deception and resistance operations in
order to weaken Hanoi's control of the population and to involve the regime in costly
countermeasures.
3. The indices of the progress of the war in South Vietnam for the past three months
indicate a slow beginning in an over-all program designed to deter the Democratic
Republic of Vietnam (DRY) aggression against the Republic of Vietnam (RVN). There
are, however, indications that attempts at infiltration and certain psychological activities,
together with widespread press and radio speculation over the extension of the war, have
had an effect on the DRV. Its reactions tend to substantiate the premise that Hanoi is
expending substantial resources in defensive measures.
4. The Joint Chiefs of Staff conclude from their appraisal of the program that:
a. A general lack of program direction by the Government of Vietnam (GVN) was caused
by the 30 January coup.
b. The program was initiated before the special materiel and personnel required for such a
program were assembled in adequate numbers. Some of the assets inherited at the outset
of the program were not operationally effective.
c. Overflights of Laos, while presently severely restricted, are essential in order to take
advantage of en route weather conditions, avoid DRV radar and antiaircraft defenses,
reduce time over DRV territory, permit planning flexibility, and enhance the security of
drop zones and aircraft.
d. Other factors which have limited operations are bad weather, inadequate combat
intelligence, motivational problems, and the time required for [to?] ready major items of
equipment.
5. With due regard for the difficulties encountered in commencing this program, the Joint
Chiefs of Staff conclude that the potential of this total program remains high. They
advocate continuing the program for the Phase II period of June, July, August, and
September at a rate commensurate with the growing operational capabilities of
COMUSMACV and GVN armed forces. The next four months will bring a substantial
increase in the military resources which can be brought to bear in the form of improved
electronic intelligence, trained RVN, military sabotage teams, increased C-123 airlift,
including crews, Nasty type PT craft, and operating experience for all echelons. The
recently developed capability of the VNAF to conduct aerial mine-laying should be
exploited during this period. In addition to aerial mining, the Joint Chiefs of Staff consider
that the VNAF has the capability to conduct air strikes successfully now and their
recommendations concerning this type of operation during the Phase II period will be
provided in the near future.
6. In summary, the Joint Chiefs of Staff recommend that:
a. RVN operations against North Vietnam be continued during the Phase II period
commencing 1 June 1964 and intensified as operational capabilities are achieved and
demonstrated.
b. Aerial mining against Swatow bases utilizing unmarked aircraft and non-US crews be
authorized during this period.
c. The restrictions on overflights of Laos in support of this program be removed for
unmarked aircraft with non-US crews.
d. Intelligence collection efforts, reconnaissance, and psychological operations be
conducted at an increased tempo to include ground intelligence collection probes into the
DMZ, the infiltration of intelligence teams into North Vietnam via Laos, and the
development of intelligence networks and resistance cadres in tribal areas.

e. Joint planning, training, and organizing be conducted to provide for an intensified
Phase III commencing 1 October 1964.
f. The recommendations contained herein, together with the proposed list of actions for
June, July, August, and September contained in the Appendix hereto,/3/ be the basis of the
Department of Defense position and presented for decision as a matter of priority.
/3/Not printed.
Chairman
/4/Printed from a copy that bears this stamped signature.

/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, AID (US) 8 VIET S. Confidential; Priority.
Drafted by Sullivan, cleared in draft by Stoneman, and initialed by Rusk.
2022. For the Ambassador from the Secretary. As you and I agreed during my recent visit
to Saigon, it is extremely important that the material effort we are investing in Viet Nam
should have a visible impact upon the rural areas of the country where the Viet Cong
terror strikes hardest. In discussions here in the United States and with our friends abroad,
I am increasingly impressed with the general feeling that we have done little or nothing to
improve the lot of the rural population. While I know that this feeling is inaccurate, I still
wonder whether we are doing all we can, given the vast scope of our resources, to be sure
that the peasant is receiving his share of the aid we are supplying or are prepared to
supply.
It seems to me that some of the most useful evidences of concern for the peasant would be
farm tools, seeds, pesticides, fertilizer, etc. which would ease his labor and increase his
productivity and income; medical supplies and services which would meet his health
needs; hamlet schools where none existed before to educate his children; and radio sets,
which would place him in contact with Saigon and increase his appreciation of what the
GVN is doing for him. All of these items are within the scope of materials being supplied
by our AID Mission and I am informed that, with the exception of some lag in the
arrangements with the GVN for the handling of radio sets, there are generally plentiful
supplies either on hand in Viet Nam or in the pipeline.
However, the obvious bureaucratic inadequacies of the Vietnamese administrative
apparatus--especially plaster releases, staffing and transportation bottlenecks--cause us to
have great doubts that many of these benefits are actually reaching the hamlets and the
villages.
I hope you will personally look into this matter, have your USOM team give you a full
report on the status of their programs in these and related fields, and satisfy yourself that
we are doing all we can to achieve the intended results. It may be that in addition to forcefeeding these materials into the Vietnamese distribution channels at Saigon, we will need
more Americans at the rural end of the distribution system extracting the commodities
themselves and placing them in the hands of Vietnamese officials to present to the
peasants as benefits from the Khanh Government.
It is reported to me that Trang Quoc Buu, the Vietnamese Labor Leader now in
Washington, feels that Americans are needed in the countryside to handle this sort of
problem. I know that this raises the risk of casualties, especially to civilians who are not
supposedly intended to take combat risks. On the other hand I can think of no other way
to be sure that what we are trying to do is actually accomplished.
I would appreciate your comments on this or any alternative proposals which will help
ensure that our aid to the rural population is truly reaching its destination./2/
/2/In telegram 2330 from Saigon, May 29, Lodge reported that USOM felt that its rural
programs were benefiting the peasant population, but there could be improvements in the
logistical system. He reminded Rusk that USOM had requested 80 additional American
positions and additional third-country nationals. In its 1965 request, USOM would stress
the kinds of basic farming tools, health services, local schools, and radio communication
which Rusk suggested. The Mission would continue to press the South Vietnamese to
improve bureaucratic procedures. Lodge then stated that too many Americans in Vietnam
would diminish the Vietnamese consciousness of their responsibility for the war and the
need to make their government effective, and concluded that the best thing for the
Vietnamese peasant was security, followed by social justice, efficient administration, and
economic vitality unencumbered by inefficient government bureaucracy. (Ibid.)
Rusk
163. Memorandum From William Y. Smith of the National Security Council Staff to
the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (Taylor)/1/
/1/Source: National Defense University, Taylor Papers, T-248-87. Top Secret. Drafted by
Smith.
SUBJECT
Briefing for Mr. Bundy on Southeast Asia Plans
1. From 0930 to 1045 today Mr. McGeorge Bundy received briefings on OPLAN 34A,/2/
and OPLANs 37/3/ and 99/4/ by Capt Bowell (SACSA) and Col Kidd J-3). Capt
Eggeman of SACSA accompanied Capt Bowell.

/4/OPLAN 99, as described in this memorandum, was similar to OPLAN 37, except that
U.S. Forces would be involved overtly rather than covertly.
2. Capt Bowell described the origin and the scope of operations envisaged in OPLAN
34A. Mr. Bundy seemed particularly interested in the capabilities of the VNAF to carry
out the more difficult operations called for in the plan. He was assured this was primarily
a problem of training and could be handled. Bundy also was interested in the aerial minelaying operations and the desirability of such operations.
3. Col Kidd then described the three categories of operations of OPLAN 37. He identified
some of the more important targets that would be attacked in the various categories; he
also covered the US forces that would be alerted when Category 1, 2, and 3 operations
began. He noted that the 12 day reaction time for category 3 operations stemmed in large
measure from the desirability of getting US forces moving into position so that they could
both help deter escalation and be prepared to meet it, should it occur.
4. In the discussion of the target systems in OPLAN 37, Mr. Bundy, when POL bulk
storage was mentioned as one option, asked about the strategic importance of oil and oil
storage. He asked if we had any method of measuring the effects of destroying the DRV
bulk storage facilities. With respect to possible attacks on rail lines, he asked if our
intelligence could provide us with any indications of the degree of reliance the DRV
placed on railways as opposed to seaways and truck movements. Finally, he asked about
the difficulty of amphibious (maritime) operations. It was agreed they would be more
difficult to mount but it was also pointed out that even if they were not completely
successful, they did force the DRV to divert resources they might otherwise apply against
the GVN.
5. Emphasizing the need to minimize any adverse political consequences, Mr. Bundy
asked if we could warn the North Vietnamese populace of impending attacks. He had in
mind possible leaflet drops to warn civilians that the area in which they were might be
attacked. Col Kidd informed him that he felt certain that such warnings could be made.
There then followed a brief discussion of our ability to produce the leaflets, and Capt
Bowell assured Mr. Bundy that the problem could be handled.
6. Mr. Bundy also showed interest in the degree of public notice attendant to the various
categories of actions in OPLAN 37. He said he believed that a major factor in the 1962
Cuba crisis had been the major movements of US forces in Southeast US. Moscow knew
something was coming. He wanted to know if any such visible signs would accompany
the alerting actions in OPLAN 37, or if they would not, was the plan flexible enough to
permit them to do so. He was told that some of the alerting steps would surely attract
public notice and others could be made to.
7. After completing the discussion of OPLAN 37, Col Kidd briefly explained that OPLAN
99 was very similar in that the same types of actions would be undertaken against the
same target systems, but that US forces would be overtly involved rather than covertly as
in the case ;of OPLAN 37. 8. Mr. Bundy seemed very well satisfied with the briefing, and
commented that he certainly had learned a lot from the discussion. Recommendation: I
recommend that General Burchinal, by a copy of this memorandum, be asked to look into
the principal matters raised by Mr. Bundy. Specifically, these questions should be looked
into:
Can we develop any yardstick concerning the importance of POL and POL storage
facilities to the DRV?
What degree of reliance does the DRV place on rail versus sea or truck lines of
communication?
What capabilities exist to warn populations in selected target areas that an attack may
soon be forthcoming? Is it a good idea to provide advance warning in some cases?
Which measures alerting US forces in OPLAN 37 will become public notice? What steps
could be taken if it were desired to increase the public awareness of US alerting and
movement actions?
W.Y. Smith/5/

Washington, May 21, 1964--3 p.m.
/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 VIET S. Secret; Immediate; Nodis.
2027. Eyes only for the Ambassador from the Secretary.
1. Situation in Southeast Asia is clearly moving toward basic decisions both in the free
world and in the communist world.
The present activity with regard to Cambodia, Laos and Vietnam illustrates that the
central issue of pressures from the Communist North will have to be faced not just by us
but by other allies.
2. You are aware of recent steps with regard to bombing operations in Laos and
reconnaissance which step up the pace. The Geneva Accords of 1962 are very specific and
have been grossly violated by the continued presence of Viet Minh in Laos and the
persistent use of Laos for infiltration of South Vietnam. We intend to press very hard for
the full and complete implementation of those accords on the basis of an international and
legal position which is very strong indeed.
3. At a time when we and other governments are facing decisions on further military
action in Southeast Asia, including the possibility of actions against North Vietnam, the
fragility of the present situation in South Vietnam is very much on our minds.
On the basis of my talks with congressional leaders and committees and a sensing of
public concern about Southeast Asia, I am convinced that the American people will do
what has to be done if there is something to support. The prospect that we might strike the
North, with all of the attendant risks, only to lose the South is most uninviting.
4. We need your judgment as to what more can be done to achieve the reality and
appearance [of] greater solidarity in South Vietnam and to improve the actual
administration performance of the government itself in grappling with the awesome
problems.
5. When I was in Saigon, we talked about whether the nongovernmental community could
be stimulated to demonstrate solidarity with the fight against the Viet Cong. Recent
reports of new religious crises, rumblings among senior officials of government, delays in
administration action to get on with the most elementary tasks of government are all
disconcerting. From this end we are prepared to furnish men, material, funds on whatever
scale is required to defeat the Viet Cong. But I feel the need to assure the President that
everything humanly possible is being done both in Washington and by the government of
Vietnam to provide a solid base of determination from which far-reaching decisions could
proceed. I would greatly appreciate, therefore, your comments on such questions as the
following, plus any others along the same lines which might occur to you.
(A) Is there any way in which we can shake the main body of leadership by the scruff of
the neck and insist that they put aside all bickering and lesser differences in order to
concentrate upon the defeat of the Viet Cong?
(B) Can we find some way to get the leaders of the religious communities to declare a
moratorium on their differences until the anti-religious Communist threat has been thrown
back?
(C) How can we provide personnel experienced and trained in military government to
work along side Vietnamese counterparts in order to galvanize the machinery of
government?
(D) Can we find some way by which General Khanh can convince larger segments of the
people that they have a stake in the success of his leadership against the Viet Cong?
(E) Can we devise further incentives to enlist the full cooperation of ordinary people both
in the cities and in the countryside to pursue the struggle as one in which they are
personally involved?
6. Everyone here in Washington is deeply impressed by the magnitude and difficulty of
the problems faced by General Khanh, yourself and General Harkins but, in the face of the
prospect of a deepening crisis and the possible necessity for asking the American people
to accept larger sacrifices and grave risks, we want to be sure nothing is left undone which
could be done to strengthen the position of South Vietnam itself.
I find it hard to believe, for example, that General Khanh and General Minh cannot find a
basis to work together as patriotic Vietnamese even though it may require General Khanh
to take some chances on working with some of those he displaced when he assumed
power. I do not understand why so much delay in strengthening the puny diplomatic effort
of Vietnam abroad. I can't see why we are just now able to approve a January budget. I
can't see why materials in warehouses and pipelines cannot be moved promptly to the
countryside to achieve the purpose for which such materials are being supplied. Surely
administration can go on a war footing and French techniques of triple entry bureaucracy
can be set aside in order to get prompt action. Having served in India, Burma and China
during World War II I have had considerable personal experience with how deliberate all
deliberate speed can be in that part of the world, but somehow we must change the pace at
which these people move and I suspect that this can only be done with a pervasive
intrusion of Americans into their affairs. I would deeply appreciate it if you would give
me your best judgment as to how we on the American side can further stimulate
Vietnamese solidarity and effort. In other words, what more can we do to make it quite
clear to the American people that if a great deal more is required of them there is
something solid to support and that what we may ask of them has point and the prospect
of success.
Rusk

Saigon, May 22, 1964--1 p.m.
2284. Eyes only for the Secretary from Lodge. Your 2027./2/
/2/Document 164.
1. There is no doubt that the situation here is fragile and unstable. The religious crisis, the
rumblings among senior officials, and the delays in administrative action continue. See
my 2282 3 for friction between General Khanh and General Minh.
3 Telegram 2282, May 22, contained a long report of a conversation between Lodge and
Khanh on Thursday, May 21, which ranged over many topics. One was the upcoming trial
of Generals Don, Kim, and Dinh. Lodge suggested that they be found not guilty and
released on the grounds that they had been misled by General Xuan. Khanh stated he had
solid information that Generals Kim and Xuan planned to transform South Vietnam into a
pro-French neutralist state and that the trial would expose Chief of State Minh's role.
According to Khanh, Minh was already considering resignation. (Department of State,
2. This unhappy country emerged from colonialism ten years ago and has been trying to
get along since then with help from us that is, in all truth, advisory and not at all colonial.
The question clearly arises as to whether this "advisory" phase is not about to be played
out and whether the United States will not have to move into a position of actual control.
This time has clearly not arrived yet, but it may be approaching. Whether it means that we
will have a High Commissioner or a Commissioner General, or a man who really gives
the orders under the title of Ambassador, will have to be determined in the light of
circumstances as they develop. It appears to me now that such a relationship can only
succeed if we are invited in.

3. Replies to your specific questions are as follows:
A. As you will see from my talk with Khanh on Thursday afternoon, I have made this
point very clear to him. I will, of course, be glad to talk to Hoan, Oanh and Do Mau, and
impress them with the importance of concentrating on the defeat of Viet Cong. I also
stressed again yesterday the importance of increasing GVN diplomatic activity.
B. Monsignor de Nittis has just called here Friday morning and is tremendously upset
because the trial of Dang-Sy is, at [after?] all, going to be held in Hue, and he fears
violent actions against the Catholics. I am going to talk to Khanh about this, but this
shows what chance there is of getting the "religious communities to declare a
moratorium". Everything is going the other way. I intend to tell Buddhist leaders Saturday
night that they must do their part to avoid religious strife. Any more of these barbaric
public trials can destroy the country.
C. We have at the present time literally hundreds of Americans, each of whom
individually has many contacts with their Vietnamese counterparts. I started in some
months ago making a list and am pouching it to you now. The question of going further
than we are now going by installing American personnel involves the whole question of
whether we shall shift from a basis of being advisory to that of being actually in control.
We could probably use military government personnel in provinces and districts. Have we
not got many in the U.S. who did military government in World War II?
It does not seem to me that it can possibly work for us to compel them to install American
advisors throughout the government in a control capacity against their will. The result
would be absolutely certain xenophobia, a stoppage of effort by the Vietnamese, a placing
of full responsibility by [on] us for everything that went wrong. To bring about a system
where the Americans run the show, we must be asked to do it. You can find many
Vietnamese around town who will tell you frankly that they would like the Americans to
run the country for ten years and get it through this difficult period, and then turn it back
to the Vietnamese. But we have not reached the point where any Vietnamese in a position
of responsibility will say this.
D. With a good deal of prodding by me, General Khanh is making radio speeches, and
they go over quite well. This is a new departure for Viet-Nam, and it is promising; but you
cannot expect any "crash" results from it. It must, at best, be gradual.
E. This is your most promising question. At this moment, I personally cannot think of
"further incentives", but I do not doubt that some could be found.
I believe that greater security at night is the one thing which would be most appreciated
by people throughout this country, and that if the able-bodied men could join with the
military forces to patrol the villages and hamlets at night, you would get an increased
degree of security which would be much appreciated and which would, at the same time,
discourage the Viet Cong. Also this would tend to lessen the emphasis on military
activities such as napalm bombing which, whatever their military merit may be, hit
women and children and do not make votes for our side.
I am also interested in promising land to veterans as we did in the Civil War.

4. Finally, I wonder whether the Americans should not give up "business as usual"
atmosphere in Saigon, with its lavish cocktail parties and black tie dinners. If we lived in
tents and drank out of lister bags, GVN might step up the pace. As it is, we keep numbers
of them up at night going to our parties. This raises the question of evacuating dependents,
which should not be done suddenly, but we can at least start policy of not bringing out any
more. Also, the luxury items at our commissary (which are not available to Vietnamese)
do not give a sense of urgency.
Lodge

/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 VIET S. Top Secret: Priority;
Nodis. Drafted by William Bundy, cleared by Sullivan, and approved by Rusk.
2049. Literally eyes only for Ambassador from Secretary.
1. Many thanks for your thoughtful 2284./2/ We are continuing to review carefully just
what more we may be able to do within South Vietnam and also the question of possible
action against the North.
/2/Document 165.
2. In connection with the latter, we have of course cranked in your proposal for use of a
Canadian intermediary and have been examining your other proposal that substantial
initial attacks be carried out without acknowledgment by either the GVN or ourselves. On
the Canadian matter, in light of present Canadian attitudes we tend to see real difficulty in
approaching Canadians at this time with any message as specific as you suggest, i.e., that
Hanoi be told by the Canadians "that they will be punished." But we are keeping this in
mind and will see whether we can go further when we consult them next week than the
more general type of message stated in my 1821./3/ As you can see, the more specific
message might lead us into a very difficult dialogue with the Canadians as to just what our
plans really were. c
/3/Document 134.
/4/In telegram 2318 from Saigon, May 26, Lodge provided Rusk with the following
additional thoughts:
"1. Upon reflection let me add that the scheme which I propose involves the use of
Vietnamese planes and pilots. Also, the Canadian interlocutor does not need to tell North
Viet Nam that the bomb is about to come. What I propose, if a proper opportunity offers,
is that the bomb does come just prior to his arrival in Hanoi. There is no question
whatsoever of consulting the Canadian."
"2.1 am coming to the conclusion that we cannot reasonably and prudently expect a much
better performance out of the GVN than that which we are now getting unless something
new of this kind is brought into the picture. I am, of course pressing vigorously on all
facets of our program and good breaks may occur." (Department of State, Central Files,
POL 27 VIET S)
3. On the other question, whether initial substantial attacks could be left without
acknowledgment, it is our present view here that this would simply not be feasible. Even
if Hanoi itself did not publicize them, there are enough ICC and other observers in North
Vietnam who might pick them up and there is also the major possibility of leakage at the
South Vietnam end. Thus, publicity seems almost inevitable to us here for any attack that
did significant damage. Once such publicity occurred, I think you can see that the finger
would point straight at us and that the President would then be put in perhaps a far more
difficult position toward the American public and the Congress.
4. Thus, we are using a GVN- or US-acknowledged enterprise as part of our main
planning track at the present time, although we do recognize that something a little
stronger than the present OPLAN 34-A might be carried on on the basis you propose.
5. One final note. We have had some press inquiries here based on a report from some
source that you were planning a speech in the United States on June 22. Both for press
guidance and for wider reasons, would you let us know if you do have any thoughts in this
direction? As I have indicated above, we may be entering a considerably more intensive
phase in the whole area.
Rusk
/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Memos to the President, Vol. IV. Top
Secret. Also published in Declassified Documents, 1979, 473A.
SUBJECT
Planning Actions on Southeast Asia
A small, tightly knit group meeting at my call has now had two long sessions in working
forward the two basic plans which you asked for Wednesday afternoon./2/ Today's
session had the benefit of the full-scale participation of both Bob McNamara and George
Ball.
/2/May 20.
1. A group under William Sullivan is now preparing a basic statement of a three to six
month program for major stiffening of our effort in South Vietnam, essentially by
marrying Americans to Vietnamese at every level, both civilian and military. (The direct
military aspect of this stiffening is being studied by General Goodpaster and members of
the Joint Staff.) The object of this exercise is to provide what Khanh has repeatedly asked
for: the tall American at every point of stress and strain. This cannot be done overnight,
but for the first time there is agreement that we must prepare a means to do it. The
persuasion of Lodge and his relation to such an effort are tricky problems to which outline
answers are being prepared.
2. An integrated political-military plan for graduated action against North Vietnam is
being prepared under John McNaughton at Defense. The theory of this plan is that we
should strike to hurt but not to destroy, and strike for the purpose of changing the North
Vietnamese decision on intervention in the south. This is easier said than done, but
McNamara has confidence that we have the military means as long as we have the
political will.
3. An estimate of enemy reactions to both of these plans is being prepared on a crash basis
by a task force of the intelligence community under Chester Cooper. This task force will
examine in particular such sensitive questions as whether the Chinese or the Soviets
would intervene and the equally edgy question whether the North Vietnamese reply to air
strikes might be an irresistible increase of action against the shaky regime in South
Vietnam. (Bob McNamara thinks this is not likely, but others are more worried.)
4. A small group under George Ball is drafting alternative forms of a Congressional
resolution so as to give you a full range of choice with respect to the way in which you
would seek Congressional validation of wider action. The preliminary consensus is that
such a resolution is essential before we act against North Vietnam, but that it should be
sufficiently general in form not to commit you to any particular action ahead of time. Our
hope is that you might be able to persuade Dick Russell to accept a three-day truce in
Civil Rights on straight patriotic grounds.
5. I am meeting this afternoon with Douglass Cater to make sure that he understands this
whole situation and to ask him to begin drafting a speech or statement which would
precede any new action on any of the above fronts.
6. Drafts of all of these plans and papers are to be submitted to my office in time for
duplication and distribution the first thing Sunday morning./3/ The working group plans
to meet on Sunday morning and will be ready to report to you in a preliminary way at any
time after lunch. My suggestion is that you might wish to have such a consideration in the
latter part of Sunday afternoon.
/3/May 24.
McG. B./4/

/1/Source: Department of State, Vietnam Negotiating Files: Lot 69 D 412, Vietnam
Negotiations, Seaborn. Top Secret.
SUBJECT
Consultations with the Canadians
The Canadian Embassy has, with some insistence, scheduled my visit to Ottawa for
Thursday May 28. I, therefore, plan to depart in the afternoon of May 27 and return in the
morning of May 29. I will be accompanied by Mr. Chester Cooper of CIA.
Attached is a draft talking paper which builds upon your original cables to Lodge
concerning the terms of reference for the Canadian interlocutor. While it does not accept
Lodge's suggestions concerning "punishment of North Viet Nam" it does expound upon
the massive military power of the United States available in the area and the vulnerability
of North Viet Nam should that power be brought into play.
I would be most appreciative if I could have your approval or revision of this paper prior
to May 27. Mr. Ball and Mr. Bundy have already reviewed and approved it./2/
/2/No revisions have been found.
Attachment/3/
/3/Top Secret. Drafted by Sullivan on May 22.
SUBJECT
Talking Paper for Canadians
It is our hope that Commissioner Seaborn, upon assuming his new duties in Viet Nam,
will place much greater stress than heretofore upon the nature and frequency of Canadian
contacts in Hanoi. Since Seaborn has had considerable experience in Communist
countries, he should know the means to establish useful arrangements in Hanoi which will
bring him into touch with significant officials of the North Vietnamese Regime. He
should make it clear to these officials that he is a political personality who can be dealt
with and is not merely an observer who functions as a customs inspector.
In the course of his initial rounds in Hanoi Seaborn should express considerable interest in
attempting to understand the North Vietnamese motivations for their policy in South Viet
Nam. He should perhaps begin by giving all North Vietnamese officials who so desire an
adequate opportunity to express not only their policies but their various complaints and
the rationale for the course of action they are pursuing.
In the course of these discussions, Seaborn should attempt to determine what the state of
mind is among the various high functionaries in Hanoi. He should specifically be alert to:
a. Differences in attitude with respect to the Sino-Soviet split;
b. Frustration or war weariness with the slowness of the effort in the South;
c. Indications of the North Vietnamese desire for trade or other contacts with Western
nations;
d. Evidences of cliques or factions within the Party and Governmental apparatus; and
e. Evidences of differing points of view between the political cadres and the military
group.
Seaborn should additionally seek to develop the best information concerning the
prevalence and the importance of the Chinese Communist presence in North Viet Nam.
While it may not be possible for him to develop direct contacts with the Chinese
Communist representation there he should learn as much as he can about the nature of that
representation and particularly its relationship to other official representatives in Hanoi.
Drawing upon his Moscow experience [he] ought to be able to establish contact with the
Soviet Ambassador in Hanoi and draw him out on his evaluation of both domestic and
international issues affecting the North Vietnamese regime.
In addition to these efforts, Seaborn should also establish himself as the authority upon
United States motivations and policies. He should use every convincing evidence,
including his discussions with United States officials in Saigon, to present to the North
Vietnamese the full measure of the United States commitment to South Viet Nam. He
should make clear that the United States views the problem in South Viet Nam as
something which affects its policies and its stature throughout the entire world. Because
the United States holds this view he should make it resoundingly clear that we do intend
to see the problem through in Viet Nam and not withdraw ignominiously. He should
carefully and deliberately stipulate that, if it becomes necessary for the United States to
choose an alternative to the course it is now pursuing, that alternative would be in the
direction of enlarging the military action and escalating direct pressure against North Viet
Nam. He should draw on examples of United States actions in other parts of the world and
in other circumstances to underline this statement.
At the same time, he should make clear the limitations of United States ambitions in
Southeast Asia. He should specifically state that the United States seeks no military bases
or other permanent installations in that area. Our purpose instead is to assure that the
South Vietnamese are able to live independently free from external aggression. He should
point out that we know that the aggression against South Viet Nam is directed and
controlled from Hanoi. He should state that we hold Hanoi directly responsible for the
guerrilla action in South Viet Nam.
He should state that the United States evaluation of North Vietnamese intentions suggests
that Ho Chi Minh and the Viet Minh truly hope to succeed to the territorial control
exercised by France in its colonial regime over the Indo-Chinese states. He should
therefore emphasize that the United States holds North Viet Nam responsible, in the
execution of this ambition, for the evidences of Communist subversion and terror
throughout all the Indo-Chinese states. He should specify that we have convincing
evidence of North Vietnamese presence in Laos and participation in the aggressive actions
against Souvanna Phouma's Government. He should also stress that we are aware of
flagrant North Vietnamese violations of Laotian territories in the course of infiltrating
personnel and material into South Viet Nam. He can if he chooses use Wilfred Burchette's
public journalistic accounts of his use of the Ho Chi Minh trail complex in his clandestine
trips into South Viet Nam. Finally he should stress the fact of our awareness that Viet
Cong units under North Vietnamese control regularly and frequently violate Cambodian
territory and constitute an irritating factor in the Cambodian-Vietnamese border region.
He should underline the nature and the purpose of United States commitments in
Southeast Asia. In doing this he should stress that our conviction is that Laos, Cambodia,
and South Viet Nam have every right to be maintained free from the application of
communist subversion. He should state that we believe these countries do not have the
means within their own resources to resist this type of aggression but that the United
States is determined to provide those means. He should point out that this is a matter of
far greater significance to the United States than the parochial concerns of Southeast Asia.
The United States, like the Chinese, understands the "three continent" approach that is
inherent in the application of the Chinese doctrine of insurgency. Therefore, the position
of the United States in Latin America and Africa, as well as the rest of Asia, is affected by
the outcome of events in Southeast Asia. Consequently the United States does not view
the Communist territorial nibblings in the scope of their immediate effect. The United
States has long since become sophisticated in the doctrine of communist insurgency and
indeed has developed a doctrine of counterinsurgency which it fully intends to apply to
this area.
Seaborn can draw, however, upon many other examples of United States policy in other
parts of the world to convince the North Vietnamese that we do generally accept the
practice of peaceful coexistence and that we do tolerate "national Communism" as a
fixture which it is not our purpose to subvert. The example of Tito, and our response to
some of the recent stirrings in the East European Bloc may be used for this purpose. He
could even go further to demonstrate that our policy encompasses the occasional
provision of economic assistance, particularly food stuffs. He should cite the PL-480
agreements with Yugoslavia and specifically with Poland.
This sort of statement should be coupled with the frank acknowledgment that both official
and public patience with North Vietnamese aggression is growing extremely thin. He
should point out the bipartisan nature of this impatience in the United States and should
stipulate that the existence of an election campaign in this country cannot be taken as the
existence of a policy vacuum into which communist aggression can move at will.
Hopefully, prior to Seaborn's initial approaches with the North Vietnamese, tangible
manifestations of this fact will have been made in the Congress and should be drawn upon
to underline this point.
Insofar as Seaborn considers that it might be educational, he could review some of the
military strength of the United States immediately available to the area of Southeast Asia
and could graphically suggest the overwhelming ratio of forces which might be thrown
against North Viet Nam if the United States crossed the Rubicon and decided upon a
military punishment to North Vietnamese intervention. At the same time he might wish to
indicate the well-known vulnerabilities of the North Vietnamese to American military
power and the incapacity of the Chinese Communists to assist in resistance to this military
power. In whatever manner he deemed most effective, Seaborn could paint a picture of
the absolute havoc that would result in North Viet Nam if United States military power
were brought to bear or indeed if North Viet Nam became a battlefield between United
States and Chinese Communist military forces.
Again he could contrast this circumstance with the prospects that North Viet Nam could
have for developing its own existence using not only resources indigenously available to it
but also resources which could be introduced into a development of North Viet Nam both
by foreign trade and by some degree of external technical assistance, perhaps even
including assistance from international organizations and agencies.
In addition to these activities, which would be directed primarily toward North
Vietnamese officials, Seaborn could apply his Eastern European experience to the
cultivation of indirect influences, particularly with the Soviets and the Poles. In tracing
some of the same general outlines suggested for his discussions with the North
Vietnamese, Seaborn could elaborate with the Soviet and Polish representatives in an
effort not only to have them use their influence upon North Vietnamese but also to modify
their current actions with respect to the Geneva Agreements. Specifically, he should seek
to convince the Pole that it is in Poland's interest to disassociate itself from the reckless
and irresponsible aggressive actions of the North Vietnamese. If the Pole can be
convinced to vote even occasionally (perhaps not significantly) with the Indian and
Canadian Commissioners on minor investigatory actions against North Vietnamese or
Viet Cong violations, this would be progress.
In sum, the purpose of Seaborn's mission in the North would be as an interlocutor with
both active and passive functions. On the active side he should establish his credentials
with the North Vietnamese and incidently with the East Europeans as an authoritative
channel of communication with the United States. On the passive side he should function
as a channel which could bring back either observances or direct communications
concerning the North Vietnamese attitude toward extrication from or escalation of
military activities. In each of his functions Seaborn should assume the posture that the
decision as to the future course of events in Southeast Asia rests squarely with Hanoi and
that the United States is looking to Hanoi for the signal which will determine the nature of
events to ensue in Southeast Asia.
169. Draft Congressional Resolution Prepared in the Department of State/1/

/1/Source: Department of State, S/S-NSC Files: Lot 70 D 265, NSC Meeting, May 5,
1964. Top Secret. According to a note on an agenda for the meeting on May 24 (see
Document 172), this and other papers prepared for the meeting were "all working papers,
no official standing." (Executive Committee Meeting on Southeast Asia, May 24; Johnson
Library, National Security File, Aides File, McGeorge Bundy, Meetings on SEA, Vol. 1)
DRAFT RESOLUTION ON SOUTHEAST ASIA
Whereas the signatories of the Geneva Accords of 1954, including the Soviet Union, the
Communist regime in China, and Viet Nam agreed to respect the independence and
territorial integrity of South Viet Nam, Laos and Cambodia; and the United States,
although not a signatory of the Accords, declared that it would view any renewal of
aggression in violation of the Accords with grave concern and as seriously threatening
international peace and security;/2/
/2/See Foreign Relations, 1952-1954, vol. XVI, pp. 1500-1501.

Whereas the Communist regime in North Viet Nam, with the aid and support of the
Communist regime in China, has systematically flouted its obligations under these
Accords and has engaged in aggression against the independence and territorial integrity
of South Viet Nam by carrying out a systematic plan for the subversion of the
Government of South Viet Nam, by furnishing direction, training, personnel and arms for
the conduct of guerrilla warfare within South Viet Nam, and by the ruthless use of terror
against the peaceful population of that country;
Whereas in the face of this Communist aggression and subversion the Government and
people of South Viet Nam have bravely undertaken the defense of their independence and
territorial integrity, and at the request of that Government the United States has, in
accordance with its Declaration of 1954, provided military advice, economic aid and
military equipment;
Whereas in the Geneva Agreements of 1962 the United States, the Soviet Union, the
Communist regime in China, North Viet Nam and others solemnly undertook to respect
the sovereignty, independence, neutrality, unity and territorial integrity of the Kingdom of
Laos;
Whereas in violation of these undertakings the Communist regime in North Viet Nam,
with the aid and support of the Communist regime in China, has engaged in aggression
against the independence, unity and territorial integrity of Laos by maintaining forces on
Laotian territory, by the use of that territory for the infiltration of arms and equipment into
South Viet Nam, and by providing direction, men and equipment for persistent armed
attacks against the Government of National Unification of the Kingdom of Laos;
Whereas in the face of this Communist aggression the Government of National
Unification and the non-Communist elements in Laos have striven to maintain the
conditions of unity, independence and neutrality envisioned for their country in the
Geneva Agreements of 1962;
Whereas the United States has no territorial, military or political ambitions in Southeast
Asia, but desires only that the people of South Viet Nam, Laos and Cambodia should be
left in peace by their neighbors to work out their own destinies in their own way, and,
therefore, its objective is that the status established for these countries in the Geneva
Accords of 1954 and the Geneva Agreements of 1962 should be restored with effective
means of enforcement;
Whereas it is essential that the world fully understand that the American people are united
in their determination to take all steps that may be necessary to assist the peoples of South
Viet Nam and Laos to maintain their independence and political integrity;
Now, therefore, be it resolved by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United
States of America in Congress assembled:
That the United States regards the preservation of the independence and integrity of the
nations of South Viet Nam and Laos as vital to its national interest and to world peace;
Sec. 2. To this end, if the President determines the necessity thereof, the United States is
prepared, upon the request of the Government of South Viet Nam or the Government of
Laos, to use all measures, including the commitment of armed forces to assist that
government in the defense of its independence and territorial integrity against aggression
or subversion supported, controlled or directed from any Communist country.
Sec. 3. (a) The President is hereby authorized to use for assistance under this joint
resolution not to exceed $___ during the fiscal year 1964, and not to exceed $___ during
the fiscal year 1965, from any appropriations made available for carrying out the
provisions of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961,/3/ as amended, in accordance with the
provisions of that Act, except as otherwise provided in this joint resolution. This
authorization is in addition to other existing authorizations with respect to the use of such
appropriations.
/3/Public Law 87-195, approved September 4, 1961; 75 Stat. 424.
(b) Obligations incurred in carrying out the provisions of this joint resolution may be paid
either out of appropriations for military assistance or appropriations for other than military
assistance, except that appropriations made available for Titles I, III, and VI of Chapter 2,
Part I, of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, as amended, shall not be available for
payment of such obligations.
(c) Notwithstanding any other provision of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, as
amended, when the President determines it to be important to the security of the United
States and in furtherance of the purposes of this joint resolution, he may authorize the use
of up to $___ of funds available under subsection (a) in each of the fiscal years 1964 and
1965 under the authority of section 614(a) of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, as
amended, and is authorized to use up to $___ of such funds in each such year pursuant to
his certification that it is inadvisable to specify the nature of the use of such funds, which
certification shall be deemed to be a sufficient voucher for such amounts.
(d) Upon determination by the head of any agency making personnel available under
authority of section 627 of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, as amended, or otherwise
under that Act, for purposes of assistance under this joint resolution, any officer or
employee so made available may be provided compensation and allowances at rates other
than those provided by the Foreign Service Act of 1946,/4/ as amended, the Career
Compensation Act of 1949,/5/ as amended, and the Overseas Differentials and
Allowances Act/6/ to the extent necessary to carry out the purposes of this joint
resolution. The President shall prescribe regulations under which such rates of
compensation and allowances may be provided. In addition, the President may utilize
such provisions of the Foreign Service Act of 1946, as amended, as he deems appropriate
to apply to personnel of any agency carrying out functions under this joint resolution.
/4/Public Law 724, approved August 3,1946; 60 Stat. 999.
/5/Public Law 351, approved October 12, 1949; 63 Stat. 802.
/6/Public Law 86-707. approved September 6, 1960; 74 Stat. 792.
170. Draft Memorandum for the President Prepared by the Secretary of State's
Special Assistant for Vietnam (Sullivan)/1/
/1/Source: Department of State, S/S-NSC Files: Lot 70 D 265, NSC Meeting, May 24,
1964. Top Secret.
SUBJECT
United States Role in Viet-Nam
1. Problem: The Vietnamese Government is not operating efficiently enough to reverse
the adverse trend in the war with the Viet Cong. The Khanh Government has good
intentions; it has announced good general plans and broad programs; but these plans are
not being translated into effective action against the Viet Cong on either the military or
the civil side. It has, therefore, become urgently necessary to find a means to infuse the
efficiency into the governmental system that it now lacks.
2. General Concept: American personnel, who have hitherto served only as advisors,
should be integrated into the Vietnamese chain of command, both military and civil. They
should become direct operational components of the Vietnamese Governmental structure.
For cosmetic purposes American personnel would not assume titles which would show
command functions, but would rather be listed as "assistants" to the Vietnamese principals
at the various levels of government.
3. Extent of American Integration: Americans should be integrated at all levels of the
Vietnamese Government. General Khanh and General Tran Thien Khiem would continue
to be superior in rank to any Americans integrated into the Vietnamese hierarchy, and
Ambassador Lodge would continue to serve as the President's principal representative and
over-all policy advisor to General Khanh.
Americans would be integrated into the Central Government to insure that decisions are
taken, orders are issued and funds, supplies and personnel are made available for their
implementation, and execution actually takes place. At the regional level Americans, both
military and civilian, would also be introduced into the corps and divisional apparatus,
particularly to insure that military and civil activities are coordinated. Americans would
likewise be brought into the government machinery at province and district level to insure
that the counterinsurgency programs are actually executed at the level at which the people
live.
Aside from the command aspect which Americans would assume, the principal other new
element in this concept would be the introduction of American civilians at the district
level. Their purpose would be to insure that programs are put into effect at the village and
hamlet level to gain the support of the people.
Charts are attached 2 showing a recommended pattern of integration for Americans at the
various levels of the Vietnamese Government.
/2/Not found.
4. Sources of American Personnel: The great bulk of the Americans required for
integration into the Vietnamese Government structure would come from those already
serving in the Embassy, MACV, USOM, USIA [less than 1 line of source text not
declassified]. Lt. General Westmoreland, Deputy Commander, USMACV, would be the
senior American integrated into the Vietnamese structure. David Nes, now Deputy Chief
of Mission at the Embassy, would be the next senior man. Both should be introduced into
the Vietnamese structure just below the levels of Generals Khanh and Khiem. In practice
we believe that, in view of the good working relationship between these two Americans,
Westmoreland would concentrate on security affairs and Nes on civil affairs.
As shown on the attached charts, other senior Americans, such as George Tanham, the
Deputy Director of USOM for Counterinsurgency, Sol Silver, the Assistant Director of
USOM for Programming and Economic Planning, Major General Richard Stilwell, Chief
of Staff of MACV, and Barry Zorthian, Public Affairs Officer, would also be integrated.
Most other officials of the American agencies in Viet-Nam would likewise be integrated
at appropriate levels.
Additional recruitment of Americans would be required for civil functions. The total
number would be about 950, broken down as follows:
Civil
Functions
Civilians
Military
Personnel
Corps
40
--
Divisions
10
--
Provinces
200
200
Districts
250
250
Total
500
450
The main recruitment problem concerns Americans to perform civil functions at the
district level. We envisage an average of two Americans per district for this purpose
(augmented by Filipinos and Chinese Nationalists). Not all of the Americans would be
required immediately as they should be phased into the picture as clear-and-hold
operations are progressively mounted from district to district. Civilians can be recruited
either through (a) a Presidential appeal for volunteers from the Foreign Service, AID,
CIA, USIA and Peace Corps or (b) Department of State assignment of a specific number
of career officers to this function. As shown in the table above, one-half of the number
required could come from military officers assigned by the Department of Defense to civil
affairs duties.
Personnel at the district level would confront a maximum risk and casualties would be
virtually certain. Since the U.S. should take any feasible measure to assure their security,
it is important that Vietnamese units of the Civil Guard and Self-Defense Corps, which
operate at this level, be encadred with an adequate number of American military
personnel to insure that they will operate effectively.
Throughout the integration process we should be highly selective regarding the Americans
chosen for these positions. Success will to a large extent depend upon their ability to get
along with Vietnamese officials.
5. Residual American Setup in Viet-Nam: Each American agency would retain a modest
traditional establishment in Viet-Nam. These establishments would be responsible (as at
present) for U.S. policy recommendations and implementation, for over-all programming
of U.S. input, for logistical and financial support, for reporting (which would be
specifically excluded from the functions of the Americans integrated into the Vietnamese
structure other than that required by their operational duties) and for the administrative
support of the integrated Americans.
Charts showing the new organization of the American agencies are attached./3/
/3/Not found.
6. Integration of Third Countries: We should also seek to obtain the agreement of both the
Vietnamese Government and of third countries with advisors in Viet-Nam for the
integration of the latter into the Vietnamese structure. We propose that Mr. R.G.K.
Thompson, Chief of the British Advisory Mission, be integrated with General
Westmoreland and Mr. Nes at the top level. Other British, Australian and any additional
third-country advisors who are or become available would also be integrated at
appropriate levels.
7. Changes in the Vietnamese Structure: We should proceed with integration without
waiting for any changes in the Vietnamese structure. If acceptable to General Khanh, we
should, however, seek the following minimal changes (which the attached charts reflect):
a) Designation of General Khiem as "Deputy Premier" (in addition to his function as
Minister of Defense) to place him above General Westmoreland and Mr. Nes.
b) Elimination of General Do Mau as a Vice Premier by placing the Ministries for which
he is responsible under the Vice Premier for Pacification where they more appropriately
belong. In view of reports of Do Mau's intrigues against General Khanh the latter will
probably gladly sacrifice him. However, in order to remove him from availability to
intrigue, he should be given a significant post abroad.
c) We considered replacing Nguyen Ton Hoan as Vice Premier of Pacification, in view of
his inactivity and political maneuvering, but decided it would cause fewer political
problems to keep him. He is surrounded by Americans who can easily work around him,
if necessary.
d) We would move the Ministry of Defense out from under the Vice Premier of
Pacification, leaving the latter to deal with civil pacification matters only.
e) We would place the Directorate of New Rural Life under Colonel Lac directly under
the Vice Premier for Pacification where it seems to belong.
f) We would move the Self-Defense Corps and Hamlet Militia (Popular Forces) from the
Ministry of Interior to the Ministry of Defense where they would become a component of
the ground forces thus enabling coordinated use of all ground forces available. (This is
reportedly already in process.)
g) Civilian officials would be assigned at the corps level to effect coordination of military
and civil activities and better support of the lagging civil activities.
While not reflected in the attached charts, we believe there would be merit to elimination
of divisions from the Vietnamese military structure and placing all authority for
pacification, military and civilian, in the hands of the province chiefs under the control of
the corps commanders. Retention of responsibility for military activities in the divisions
perpetuates the division of authority which has plagued counterinsurgency operations to
date.
171. Draft Memorandum for the President Prepared by the Department of

Defense/1/
/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Vietnam Country File, Vol. X,
Memos. Top Secret. No drafting information appears on the source text. Attachment A,
"Possible SEATO Nation Contributions," and Attachment B, "Major Forces Deployed and
Alerted on D-12," are not printed.
SUBJECT
Scenario for Strikes on North Vietnam
There are two alternatives for the United States in Vietnam--to try to improve the situation
in the South without strikes on the North, or to try to improve the situation in the South
with strikes on the North. Recent moves to extend Pathet Lao control over Laos and to
intensify Viet Cong pressures in South Vietnam--as well as our belief that additional
efforts regarding the Cambodian border, in Laos, and within South Vietnam will not by
themselves prevent further deterioration there--caused us to consider strikes on the North
in some detail.
The scenario below, in summary, provides simultaneously for military pressures on and
political contacts with North Vietnam. (The military attacks would probably be by South
Vietnamese, not Farmgate or U.S. aircraft initially, and would continue despite political
communications, until there was clear evidence that North Vietnam had stopped its
subversion of the South; the parties to the communications might soon include South
Vietnam, North Vietnam, the U.S. and Communist China.) The military actions would
start only after appropriate assurances were obtained of Congressional support for such
actions.
SCENARIO
1. Stall off any "conference" on Vietnam until D-Day.
Mid-June
2. Intermediary (Canadian?) tell North Vietnam in general terms that U.S. does not want
to destroy the North Vietnam regime (and indeed is willing "to provide a carrot"), but is
determined to protect South Vietnam from North Vietnam.
D-19
3. Get Khanh's agreement to start overt South Vietnamese air attacks against targets in the
North (see D-Day item 14 below), and inform him of U.S. guarantee to protect South
Vietnam in the event of North Vietnamese and/or Chinese retaliation.
D-19
4. Squeeze Khanh to take certain steps (re imprisoned generals, re trial of Major Sy, re
internal bickering) which we have been trying to get him to take and which would
improve the image of his regime in U.S. Use as leverage the difficulties anticipated in
gaining backing of Congress and American public for actions against the North.
Concurrently: An effort should be in process to strengthen the posture in South Vietnam.
Integration of U.S. advisors into the military and civilian elements critical to pacification,
down at least to the district level, might be undertaken. And encadrement or expanded
training of the Civil Guard and Self-Defense Corps by U.S. military personnel might be
done.
D-18
5. President spell out plans (probably in specific terms) to Congressional leadership and
lay groundwork for appropriate expression (probably in general terms) by Congress of its
support.
D-17
6. Groundwork of item 5 followed by implementing steps, such as Presidential speech or
message to Congress, to obtain appropriate Congressional expression of support.
D-17
7. Consult with Thailand and the Philippines to get permission for U.S. deployments. Ask
them, plus U.K., Australia, New Zealand and Pakistan, for their open political support for
the undertaking and for their participation in the re-enforcing action to be undertaken in
anticipation of North Vietnamese and/or Chinese retaliation. (See Attachment A, on page
8, for suggested participation.) Talk to certain NATO allies. Start moves in the UN.
D-17
8. Release an expanded "Jorden Report," including recent photography and evidence of
the communications nets, giving full documentation of North Vietnamese supply and
direction of the Viet Cong.
D-17
9. Start moving U.S. dependents.

D-16
10. Direct CINCPAC to take all preparatory actions necessary to ready the forces listed in
Attachment B (at pages 9-12), making the necessary movements and completing the
necessary plans on the assumption that strikes will be made on D-Day. This will include
moving the B-57s to Saigon in augmention of Farmgate and may involve the initiation of
low-level reconnaissance of North Vietnam if not previously begun.
D-10
11. Khanh makes speech demanding that North Vietnam stop aggression, threatening
unspecified military action if he [it?] does not. (He could refer to a "carrot.")
D-3
12. President informs U.S. public (and thereby North Vietnam) that action may come,
referring to Khanh speech (item 11 above) and declaring support for South Vietnam.
D-1
13. Khanh announces that all efforts have failed and that attacks are imminent. (Again he
refers to limited goal and possibly to "carrot.")
D-Day
14. Launch first strikes. Initially, mine their ports and strike North Vietnam's transport and
related ability (bridges, trains) to move south; then against targets which have maximum
psychological effect on the North's willingness to stop insurgency. These latter targets
would comprise those related to North Vietnam's military power (e.g., POL storage,
selected airfields, barracks/training areas, bridges, railroad yards, port facilities,
communications) and those comprising their industrial assets. Initially, the strikes would
be by South Vietnamese aircraft; they could then be expanded by adding Farmgate, or
U.S. aircraft, or any combination of the three.
D-Day
15. Call for conference on Vietnam. State the limited objective: Not to overthrow the
North Vietnam regime nor to destroy the country, but to stop DRV-directed Viet Cong
terrorism and resistance to pacification efforts in the South. Essential that it be made clear
that attacks on the North will continue (i.e., no cease-fire) until (a) terrorism, armed
attacks, and armed resistance to pacification efforts in the South stop, and (b)
communications on the networks out of the North are conducted entirely in uncoded form.
Responses to the above actions are estimated to be as follows:
To South Vietnamese Air Strikes-North Vietnam: Has limited capability to deal with very low-level bombing even by A-1H
aircraft. Would stir world opinion. Would request Chicom air defense. Would probably
increase ground strength in Laos (including in the Panhandle), and if the strikes began to
hurt, would probably stimulate increased Viet Cong activity in South Vietnam.
Chinese: Would probably supply North Vietnam jet air defense and buttress their antiaircraft capability. Would possibly (but not likely) undertake troop deployments along the
South China border and, on a limited basis, into North Laos.
Soviets: Would probably do nothing more than make strenuous diplomatic efforts,
including a probably successful effort to convene a UN meeting on Southeast Asia.
To Farmgate (B-57) Air Strikes-North Vietnam: Same as above.
Chinese: Same as above except might attempt retaliatory air attacks against the South and
somewhat more likely to undertake troop movements (above). Would make diplomaticpropaganda efforts to attribute attacks to U.S. and to label U.S. as aggressor.
Soviets: Same as above.
To Overt U.S. Air Strikes-North Vietnam: Same as above except might be fearful enough to be willing to reduce its
support of VC (perhaps also of PL), but would probably be prevented by Chinese.
Chinese: Would attempt to provide North Vietnam with air defense, but would hesitate to
commit its limited air power against U.S. high-performance aircraft. Might attempt
retaliatory air attacks against the South. Would probably move troops to South China
border, and, on limited basis, into North Laos, and perhaps Burma and Thailand. Might
engage in harassing actions elsewhere (e.g., off-shore islands). Not likely to send ground
forces into South Vietnam unless North Vietnam is invaded by ground forces or China is
bombed.
Soviets: Would intensify diplomatic efforts. Possibly take limited "threatening" military
action and engage in harassing actions elsewhere (e.g., Berlin, Cuba).
Chinese/North Vietnamese Capabilities (if no interdiction):
In the wet season (May-November) they could initially deploy and logistically support in
Southeast Asia, less Burma, about 9 infantry division-equivalents--some 95,000 troops.
This force would probably be armor and artillery deficient. In the dry season, some
250,000 troops could be initially deployed, with more armor and artillery. The wet season
forces are capable of starting their movement within one or two days; all could be across
borders within 10 or so days. Wet season movement against light opposition would be at a
rate of 6-8 miles per day (dry season movement at about 12 or so miles per day). The
Chinese could simultaneously deploy up to 7 infantry division-equivalents into Burma.
The North Vietnamese have no significant air force but have substantial AA capability
(radar-controlled 57mm, 85mm and new 100mm guns), particularly against mediumheight aircraft. The Chinese could deploy about 400 MIG-15, -17 or -19 jet fighters and
about 150 jet light bombers, plus a few piston light bombers. The Chinese-North
Vietnamese naval capability is limited, their major threat being Chinese PT boats and
submarines (reportedly some 40 PT boats and 4-6 submarines).
16. The possible enemy military reactions described above are arranged below in
ascending order of magnitude (and, probably, in descending order of probability). With
respect to each such reaction, the possible U.S. military responses are considered:
a. Greatly expanded insurgency in South Vietnam (possibly with sizable infiltration by the
North Vietnamese army).
(1) Redouble efforts with existing South Vietnamese forces augmented by U.S. ground
forces prepositioned in South Vietnam or on board ship nearby.
(2) Intensify operations against North Vietnam; tell them that increased actions are in
response to increased insurgency.
b. Drive toward Mekong by Pathet Lao with substantial North Vietnamese augmentation.
(1) Neither FAR/Neutral, Thai, nor prepositioned U.S. brigade in Thailand could deal
effectively with this threat. Meeting the challenge on the ground might require an
additional two or more brigades plus additional tactical air.
(2) Intensified operations against North Vietnam
c. Chinese "Farmgate-like" attacks on South Vietnam.
(1) Defend with prepositioned U.S. interceptor capability.
(2) Destroy on the ground their aircraft based in North Vietnam.
d. Overt Chinese Air Strikes.
(1) Same as c(1) above.
(2) Attack bases in China. May be necessary to augment U.S. air capability to gain air
supremacy.
e. Overt North Vietnamese Invasion of South Vietnam and Laos accompanied by Chinese
occupation of North Laos.
Step up air attacks, and provide the following forces (implementing OPLAN 32,/2/ Phase
III) in addition to the D-Day forces:
/2/CINCPAC OPLAN 32-64, November 6, 1963, "Defense of Mainland Southeast
Asia." (Department of State, Bundy Files, Working Paper, Nov. 64, Vol. IV, JCS)
(a) Ground--
3 divisions
1 reduced division
1 division in reserve
1 airborne brigade
1 mechanized brigade
(b) Air--10 tactical fighter squadrons to Southeast Asia and Western Pacific
(Note: All of this force could be deployed by 45 days from "go.")
f. Chinese/North Vietnamese invasion of Southeast Asia with up to 24 divisions (some
250,000 troops).
(1) Provide the following forces (implementing OPLAN 32, Phase IV) in addition to the
D-Day forces:
(a) Ground--
4 divisions
1 reduced division
2 divisions in reserve
(b) Air--13 tactical fighter squadrons to Southeast Asia and Western Pacific
(c) Naval--1 attack carrier group
(Note: All of this force could be deployed by 60 days from "go.")
(2) Alternatively, or additionally, deploy additional air and naval forces to the Western
Pacific for the purpose of attacking mainland China with the objective of causing the
Chinese to stop their aggression.
[Paragraph (3) (less than 1 line of source text) not declassified]
172. Summary Record of the National Security Council Executive Committee

Meeting, Washington, May 24, 1964, 11 a.m./1/
/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Aides File, McGeorge Bundy,
Meetings on SEA, Vol. 1. Top Secret. Drafted by Bromley Smith.
PRESENT
Secretary Rusk, Secretary McNamara, Director McCone, General Taylor, Under Secretary
Ball, Director Bell, Assistant Secretary Manning, Assistant Secretary Bundy, Assistant
Secretary McNaughton, General Goodpaster, Special Assistant Sullivan, Mr. Chester
Cooper, Mr. William Colby, Mr. McGeorge Bundy, Mr. Douglass Cater, Mr. Bromley
Smith
Secretary Rusk opened the meeting by stating his general view toward the entire
Southeast Asia problem. He reviewed current efforts to seal the Cambodian border and to
uphold the government in Laos.
Referring to the proposal for a Congressional resolution,/2/ Secretary Rusk said it is most
important that we not put the President in a precarious position. For example, General
Khanh's position is somewhat difficult for us to defend until he takes certain actions to
damp down religious controversy and internal bickering in South Vietnam. We must
remember that while the South Vietnamese are not fighting for the U.S., they must create
an image of being willing and able to fight for themselves.
With reference to the proposal to assume larger responsibility of Vietnamese conduct of
the war,/3/ Secretary Rusk expressed his doubts that we should try to persuade Khanh to
accept a plan involving U.S. officers giving direct orders to Vietnamese officers. He
preferred a parallel command arrangement. He feared that if we got too deeply into
operations of the Vietnamese military, we would be open to accusations of colonialism.
We would be giving Khanh's enemies a chance to move against him in South Vietnam.
/3/Document 170.
Secretary McNamara said the first issue which should be presented to the President is
whether we believe that additional U.S. efforts within South Vietnam will or will not
prevent further deterioration in South Vietnam.
Secretary Rusk developed his belief that we should straighten out the Laotian situation,
possibly by moving against North Vietnam, and if we succeed in this, we would then
straighten out South Vietnam. Secretary McNamara commented that we had not studied
the scenario for Laos. Does it provide another road to the north? If so, it required study by
the group. Mr. William Bundy was assigned the task of preparing a Laotian scenario
which emphasizes the link between the Laotian problem and the South Vietnamese
problem.
Secretary Rusk referred to four preconditions which must be met before we agree to a
Laotian conference. Copies of Vientiane telegram 1407 were circulated (copy
attached)./4/ This cable contains a summary of Souvanna's press conference.
/4/Dated May 24, not attached. (Department of State, Central Files, POL 15-1 Laos)
Secretary McNamara asked how we would get the Pathet Lao to withdraw from Laos.
How could we force this? Secretary Rusk replied we could put pressure on Hanoi and
Peking on the basis of the Geneva Accords of 1962. If we were not successful in getting a
conference on our terms, we might attack East Laos and North Vietnam. This action thus
becomes our path to the north.
General Taylor said we can go into North Vietnam only for both reasons, i.e., Laos and
South Vietnam. Secretary McNamara said that if we went via the Laotian routes, the time
schedule might be as short as fifteen to thirty days.

Secretary Rusk repeated his view that Laos is one chapter and South Vietnam is another
and separate chapter. Mr. McGeorge Bundy commented that we could not separate the
political and military chapters on Laos and South Vietnam. We will have to crank in any
Laos scenario.
Secretary Rusk said we might accomplish our purpose in phases. The first phase would be
diplomatic activity in an effort to get a conference based on our preconditions. If we get a
conference on our terms, we will have achieved our objective. Phase two would involve
the situation if there were no conference. The question immediately arises as to whether
we should use force to get a conference. In phase two U.S. pressure would be exerted first
to restore the Plaine des Jarres in Laos to the neutralists, force the removal of Pathet Lao
forces from Laos, and then deal with North Vietnam. He mentioned that consideration
was being given to a plan which would provide for a UN Security Council resolution
authorizing a four-power commission, including teams to inspect the
Cambodian/Vietnamese border.
Director McCone expressed his view that if we go into North Vietnam we should go in
hard and not limit our action to pinpricks. General Taylor commented that a surprise
attack from the air could be very effective, but thereafter attacks would be less effective
and losses would go up.
Secretary McNamara pointed out that we had three kinds of military force: A South
Vietnamese air force comprising some fifty fighter bombers; a much larger force
consisting of South Vietnamese air forces plus Farmgate; and U.S. air power.
Secretary Rusk expressed his view that we should hit light at first so that North
Vietnamese prestige was not involved. Ho Chi Minh could back out of the situation if his
prestige was not deeply engaged. The Secretary referred again to the importance of
getting the maximum out of General Khanh, such as actions which would induce full
Vietnamese support of the Khanh government before we go to Congress asking U.S.
support of the South Vietnamese government. Secretary McNamara's response was to ask
what specifically do we do. Can General Khanh do what we ask him to do in the light of
his restricted political power? Secretary Rusk said we do not go to war for a government
which is more interested in quarreling than in fighting the Viet Cong.
Mr. Sullivan summarized his proposal to send many more U.S. advisers to Vietnam so
that General Khanh can carry out some of the actions he is prepared to take. Many things
that the South Vietnamese government wants to do are not being done merely because
there are not enough Vietnamese officials who know what to do.
Director McCone said the proposal to send more U.S. advisers might produce a reverse
reaction, i.e., there were so many Americans that the Vietnamese would take the position
that they had no responsibility.
Secretary McNamara referred to another major issue, i.e., can U.S. air stop a Chinese
Communist movement into Laos and Vietnam? Our inability to halt such a movement
from the air means that we will need to be prepared to put U.S. forces on the ground in
Southeast Asia. He said our objective was to find the best way to deter the North
Vietnamese from attacking South Vietnam, and, if the Chinese Communists attack in
response to U.S. actions, the best way to defeat them.
Secretary Rusk said we should consider moving a U.S. division in Korea to Southeast
Asia, at which time we would make public a declaration that any attack on South Korea
would be met by the use of nuclear weapons.
Mr. McGeorge Bundy said we need an operational plan on targets in North Vietnam.
General Taylor said the Chiefs and CINCPAC were at work on such a plan which
involved dividing targets into three categories.
Secretary Rusk said he favored cutting down on dependents in South Vietnam beginning
now. They should be returning in small groups so that they would not be a problem to
deal with on D-Day. Secretary McNamara said he thought this would give a wrong signal
to the South Vietnamese, i.e., that we were preparing to withdraw. All agreed that the
dependents should come out on the day the President makes a speech outlining our plans.
Mr. McGeorge Bundy said the President was interested in seeing what could be done if
we decide to intensify covert actions now being undertaken. It was agreed that there is
little more which can be down in this area.
There was a lengthy discussion of what was called interlarding our political encadrement
as explained in the paper listed as Tab 3./5/ After Mr. Sullivan explained the concept, both
Secretary McNamara and Director McCone pointed out that even if this plan were put into
effect, it would have little effect in South Vietnam in the near future.
/5/Document 170.
General Taylor said his reaction to the plan was to call it the "third coup." As he saw it, it
followed a chief of staff concept. He said Khanh would have to want it badly or he would
not accept it. He felt it raised the question as to whose war, ours or South Vietnam's. He
thought it would have a bad effect on Vietnamese conduct of the war. He doubted that
sufficient U.S. personnel could be found to implement it.
Secretary McNamara said that if he were President he would want to ask his advisers this
question: "Do I want to use military force in Southeast Asia in the next two or three
months?" This decision is not affected by whether or not we decide to attempt interlarding
of U.S. forces. However, the President now appears to look at interlarding as an
alternative or a substitute for the use of force.
Secretary Rusk said that a better situation in Saigon is a supporting requirement to a
decision to go north. Congressional and world opinion must be given this reassurance.
Secretary McNamara said the proposed actions in South Vietnam were not a substitute for
the use of force. The attempt to take over more of the direction of the war in South
Vietnam was extremely complex. We lacked sufficient U.S. personnel. General Khanh
could be removed suddenly as head of the government by assassination or by coup. We
must concentrate on the most crucial points and acknowledge that the measures to support
South Vietnam are restricted. They will not substitute for the use of force against North
Vietnam. We do not have a solution and these proposals will not save us.
General Taylor said we should try the interlarding concept on a pilot province basis.
Secretary McNamara said that where our proposals are being carried out now, the
situation is still going to hell. We are continuing to lose. Nothing we are now doing will
win.
General Taylor replied that it was too early to say that Khanh was losing. To reach the
conclusion that he is not going to win out is unwise. We should give him four or five
months before we decide that the actions he is taking will not be successful.
Mr. Sullivan commented that all we are doing now ends up with Viet Cong assassinations
which remove promising provincial leaders as soon as they begin to act effectively.
Secretary McNamara added that the leadership in the provinces is worse now than before
because most present province leaders lack governmental experience.
Mr. Sullivan said General Khanh can't implement his program, which is acceptable to us,
because he lacks the personnel resources to carry it out.
Secretary Rusk said that, if necessary, the U.S. is prepared to take military action against
North Vietnam and Communist China to keep Laos and South Vietnam from being
overrun by the Communists. Thus, we are obliged to do everything we can to strengthen
South Vietnam because the alternative is the use of force.
Secretary McNamara said the probability is that further weakening will occur in South
Vietnam. The question is whether we should hit North Vietnam now or whether we can
wait. South Vietnam is weaker now than it was in January, but we can ride through for a
few additional weeks, even with further weakening. Thus, we do not have to act now, but
we may have to use military force later.
Secretary Rusk said we must act for reasons arising out of the situation in Southeast Asia
and not for reasons arising out of the situation in the U.S. He hoped that we could get
better reporting out of South Vietnam where all is not doom and gloom. We must get
better information here and in Vietnam in order to present a brighter picture of the actual
situation in Vietnam. We badly need actions in the information field.
General Taylor commented that we need a government-wide information program. He
urged that senior officials here and U.S. officers returning from Vietnam be used in this
program.
Secretary Rusk said we must counter public reports that the President is not acting
because of the upcoming elections. He thought that a major speech by the President was
required soon. It would not need to contain much new, but he and other officials must say
the same thing over and over again. He pointed out that while he had said nothing new in
his last speech, the press had called attention to one idea as if it were new when in fact he
had been saying it for months.
General Taylor commented that the South Vietnam government isn't going to lose rapidly
or win rapidly. Secretary McNamara restated his view that the situation in the provinces is
much worse, the number of desertions has risen, and recruitment in South Vietnamese
units is not adequate. He asked whether anything that we did could improve the situation
as long as Viet Cong harassment continues. His personal view was that it was very
doubtful whether we could affect the deteriorating situation in South Vietnam unless the
Viet Cong could be stopped. If the Communist activity could be halted, what we are now
doing in Vietnam would definitely improve the situation. General Taylor said the military
would prefer to wait until fall before military action was taken. Better equipment would
be available in the field and the administration of our military effort would be further
along. However, prompt military action could be taken and it would serve as a shot in the
arm for General Khanh and possibly be useful in dealing with the situation in Laos.
Secretary McNamara expressed doubt that we could get at the North Vietnamese situation
via the Laos route, as suggested by Secretary Rusk.
Bromley Smith/6/
173. Draft Memorandum From the President's Special Assistant for National
Security Affairs (Bundy) to the President/1/
/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Aides File, McGeorge Bundy,
Luncheon with the President, Vol. I, Part 1. Top Secret Sensitive. Also published in
Declassified Documents, 2979, 473B. Bundy sent this draft memorandum to Johnson
under a covering memorandum with the explanation that it was his effort to put in one
document both Rusk's and McNamara's thinking. He concluded: "There are several holes
in this discussion, most notably on action in South Vietnam and on precise U. S.
objectives, but there is more thinking on these topics than this particular paper
shows." (Johnson Library, National Security File, Special Meetings on SE Asia, Vol. I)
SUBJECT
Basic Recommendation and Projected Course of Action on Southeast Asia
I. Basic Recommendation
1. It is recommended that you make a Presidential decision that the U.S. will use selected
and carefully graduated military force against North Vietnam, under the following
conditions: (1) after appropriate diplomatic and political warning and preparation, and (2)
unless such warning and preparation-in combination with other efforts-should produce a
sufficient improvement of non-Communist prospects in South Vietnam and in Laos to
make military action against North Vietnam unnecessary.
2. This basic Presidential decision is recommended on these premises:
(1) that the U.S. cannot tolerate the loss of Southeast Asia to Communism;
(2) that without a decision to resort to military action if necessary the present prospect is
not hopeful, in South Vietnam or in Laos;
(3) that a decision to use force if necessary, backed by resolute and extensive deployment,
and conveyed by every possible means to our adversaries, gives the best present chance of
avoiding the actual use of such force.
3. It is further recommended that our clear purpose in this decision should be to use all our
influence to bring about a major reduction or elimination of North Vietnamese
interference in Laos and in South Vietnam, and not to unroll a scenario aimed at the use of
force as an end in itself. We will have further recommendations on the ways of stating
U.S. objectives.
4. It is further recommended that in the execution of this decision all separate elements of
the problem (political, diplomatic, economic, and military) and all separate geographical
elements of it (in Laos, in South Vietnam, in Cambodia, and in North Vietnam itself)
should be treated as parts of a single problem: the protection of Southeast Asia from
further Communist encroachment.
5. It is the hope and best estimate of most of your advisers that a decision of this kind can
be executed without bringing a major military reply from Red China, and still less from
the Soviet Union. It is also the prevailing estimate that selective and carefully prepared
military action against North Vietnam will not trigger acts of terror and military
operations by the Viet Cong which would engulf the Khanh regime. Nevertheless, it is
recognized that in making this decision we must accept two risks: (1) the risk of escalation
toward major land war or the use of nuclear weapons; (2) the risk of a reply in South
Vietnam itself which would lose that country to neutralism and so eventually to
Communism.
II. An outline of the proposed sequence of actions
It is our current estimate that the actions which follow should be taken in the order in
which they are listed. Especially in the later stages it might well be important to modify
the sequence in the light of the development of events. In each major stage, moreover,
there would be a number of connected actions. Finally, it must be remembered that the
enemy has choices, too, and that this sequence might therefore be truncated or drastically
modified by the actions of others.
(1) A Presidential decision as outlined in I. above.
(2) The establishment of communication with Hanoi (through the Canadians) and with
other adversaries of major importance [less than 1 1ine of source text not declassified].
The purpose of these communications would be to make very clear both the seriousness of
U.S. will and the limited character of U.S. objectives. We intend that Communism shall
not take over Southeast Asia, but we do not intend or desire the destruction of the Hanoi
regime. If terror and subversion end, major improvement in relations is possible. It is only
if they do not end that trouble is coming.
(3) A Honolulu conference and discussions with Thailand.
This meeting, which might occur early next week, would be directed to the establishment
of full understanding with Ambassador Lodge and MACV, and to possible intense
consultations with Ambassador Unger and Ambassador Martin from Thailand. At the
same time, or just after, we would communicate our basic determination and our opening
strategy to the governments of Thailand, Laos and South Vietnam. This Honolulu meeting
would imply major decisions also to intensify our efforts in South Vietnam (along lines to
be presented in a separate paper).
(4) Action at the UN.
This would probably take a double form:
(a) in the broadest terms, we would present the problem of Communist aggression in
Southeast Asia, together with much hitherto secret evidence proving Hanoi's
responsibility;
(b) in parliamentary terms, we would probably ask [for] a resolution confined to the
Pathet Lao aggression in Laos. It is the current estimate of our UN experts that on a wider
resolution involving South Vietnam we might not have the necessary seven votes for
affirmative action. The one thing we do not want is to take our basic political case to the
UN and fail to muster a majority.
The basic object of this exercise would be a double one:
(a) to give worldwide publicity to the basic problem through the voice of Stevenson, and
(b) to make it perfectly plain if we move to further action that we had done our best at the
UN.
(5) A formal announcement by us and our friends that the requirements of the UN
resolution (whether or not it was vetoed) are not being met.
The purpose of this step is to clarify again that we have tried the UN and that it is not our
fault that there has been an inadequate response.
(6) Consultation of SEATO allies.
We believe this should take place both by a meeting of the SEATO Council in Bangkok
and by more intense consultations in the capitals of the more energetic members of
SEATO, notably Australia, New Zealand, Great Britain, The Philippines, and Thailand.
We do not expect Pak or French support. The object would be to obtain basic agreement
on the next steps toward action and commitment of forces at as high a level as possible.
(7) The first deployments toward Southeast Asia of U.S. and, hopefully, allied forces.
It is our recommendation that these deployments be on a very large scale, from the
beginning, so as to maximize their deterrent impact and their menace. We repeat our view
that a pound of threat is worth an ounce of action--as long as we are not bluffing.
(8) A Congressional Resolution.
We agree that no such resolution should be sought until Civil Rights is off the Senate
calendar, and we believe that the preceding stages can be conducted in such a way as to
leave a free choice on the timing of such a resolution. Some of us recommend that we aim
at presenting and passing the resolution between the passage of Civil Rights and the
convening of the Republican Convention. Others believe that delay may be to our
advantage and that we could as well handle the matter later in the summer, in spite of
domestic politics.
(9) A further and expanded deployment of military force toward the theater.
The object of this continuing deployment, after the passage of the resolution, is to give
still more time for threat to do the work of action.
(10) Initial strike against the north.
This would be very carefully designed to have more deterrent than destructive impact, as
far as possible. This action would be accompanied by the simultaneous withdrawal of
U.S. dependents from South Vietnam and by active diplomatic offensives in the Security
Council, or in a Geneva Conference, or both, aimed at restoring the peace throughout the
area. This peacekeeping theme will have been at the center of the whole enterprise from
the beginning.
McG. B./2/
174. Special National Intelligence Estimate/1/

SNIE 50-2-64
Memos. Top Secret; Limited Distribution; Controlled Dissem. According to a note on the
cover sheet, the CIA, the intelligence organizations of the Departments of State and
Defense, and NSA participated in the preparation of this estimate. This estimate was
submitted by the Director of Central Intelligence and concurred in by the U.S. Intelligence
Board, with the Directors of INR, DIA, and NSA concurring and the representative of the
AEC and the Assistant Director of the FBI abstaining on the grounds that the subject was
outside their jurisdiction. Also published in Declassified Documents, 1978, 30A.
PROBABLE CONSEQUENCES OF CERTAIN US ACTIONS WITH
RESPECT TO VIETNAM AND LAOS
The Problem
To estimate the consequences of certain US and US-sponsored actions against North
Vietnam and Communist-held Laos, the objectives of which would be to induce the DRV
to bring about a major reduction of Viet Cong insurrectionary activity in South Vietnam
and to respect the 1962 Geneva agreement on Laos.

Assumptions/2/
/2/These assumptions have been given to the intelligence community for the purpose of
this estimate and are not meant to represent the full range of options open to the US. The
intelligence community is not asked to assess the consequences either (1) of undertaking
other broad courses, or (2) of not undertaking the general course discussed in this
estimate. [Footnote in the source text.]
I. The actions to be taken, primarily air and naval, would begin with GVN (US-assisted)
operations against the DRV and Communist-held Laos, and might subsequently involve
overt US military actions. They would be on a graduated scale of intensity, ranging from
reconnaissance, threats, cross-border operations, and limited strikes on logistical targets
supporting DRV efforts in South Vietnam and Laos, to strike (if necessary) on a growing
number of military and economic targets in the DRV. In the absence of all-out attacks by
the DRV or Communist China, the measures foreseen would not involve attacks on
population centers or resort to nuclear weapons.
II. That these actions would be accompanied by these US moves:
A. Through various channels, conveying the limited nature of US intentions to Hanoi,
Peiping, and Moscow.
B. Stationing initially some 5,000 US combat troops and certain additional air elements in
northeastern Thailand, with a possible increase at a later stage.
C. Giving the enemy tangible evidence of US seriousness of purpose by readying and
deploying strong US strike units--naval, air, and ground assault--to the Western Pacific
and the South China Sea.
D. Providing increased military support, including air defenses, to South Vietnam.
Further, stiffening over-all GVN military and administrative capabilities by the infusion
of substantial additional US personnel.
E. Acting diplomatically to avert a new Geneva conference, at least until it was judged
that the above actions had improved the bargaining position of the US and its associates.
Conclusions
A. DRV reactions to US preparatory and low-scale actions-force deployments, serious
threats, or GVN/Farmgate attacks on outlying targets in Communist-held Laos or in the
DRV-would probably be to rouse world opinion against the US, hoping that a new
Geneva conference or UN action would result and bring a cessation of attacks. We think
that the DRV, while taking various precautionary measures, would order the VC and PL
to refrain from dramatic new attacks, and might reduce the level of the insurrections for
the moment. Communist China and the USSR would both support this course. The
Communists would probably indicate that the outcome of a conference should be to
stabilize the situation in South Vietnam and Laos. Their intention, however, would be to
preserve Communist gains and assets in these two countries and to resume the
insurrectionary campaigns at a later date.

B. If these initial responses did not succeed, and attacks on North Vietnam continued, it is
likely that the Communists would intensify their political action efforts against the US
course. Hanoi might intermittently step up the tempo of the insurrections in South
Vietnam and Laos, while still seeking a negotiated settlement. If these tactics, too, failed,
the scale of attacks broadened, and North Vietnam began to suffer considerable
destruction, the DRV leaders would have to ask themselves whether the tactics they were
pursuing were worth the destruction of their country. We are unable to set any meaningful
odds for the course DRV leaders would adopt at this juncture, though we incline to the
view that they would lower their terms for a negotiated outcome; they would do so in the
interests of preserving their regime and in the expectation of being able to renew the
insurrections in South Vietnam and Laos at a later date. There would nevertheless be a
significant danger that they would fight, believing that the US would still not be willing to
undertake a major ground war, or that if it was, it could ultimately be defeated by the
methods which were successful against the French.
C. Communist China almost certainly would not wish to become involved in hostilities
with US forces. It would accordingly proceed with caution, and though it would make
various threatening gestures, would not risk any major ground action unless US forces
attacked Chinese territory or US ground forces moved deep into the DRV. We believe that
the USSR would refrain from military actions in the area, and would not provoke a major
crisis with the US elsewhere. Its primary concern would be to exert its influence in a
manner to insure a negotiated settlement.
D. Clear-cut achievement of the US objectives as stated in the Problem would signify not
that the Communist threat in Southeast Asia was removed, but simply that time had been
gained for further constructive action to deal with the threat. The US commitment would
in itself improve anti-Communist morale and improve the chances for such action. On the
other hand, to the degree that the consequences of the US action were ambiguous or
unsuccessful, there would almost certainly be a strong tendency for morale and discipline
in South Vietnam and Laos to deteriorate rapidly-perhaps more rapidly than if the US had
not begun its intensified effort. The deterioration would be felt generally through nonCommunist Asia.
[Here follows the "Discussion" section.]

Saigon, May 26, 1964--3 p.m.
/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 15-1 VIET S. Top Secret. Sent to the
Office of the Secretary of Defense on receipt in the Department of State.
2314. Eyes only for Rusk and McNamara from Lodge.
1. Recalling my conversation of last Thursday,/2/ I asked General Khanh today, Monday,
what actual evidence the GVN has against General Kim and General Xuan.
/2/May 21; see footnote 3, Document 165.

2. General Khanh said that one of the key figures in the whole French neutralist
conspiracy is Tran Dinh Lam, who is a French citizen and French officer, who arrived in
Saigon quite unexpectedly, and whose arrival attracted a good deal of attention. Khanh
says that they have the following information:
a. General Kim, in his capacity as Secretary General of the Military Revolutionary
Committee and as the member of the Military Revolutionary Committee for Foreign
Affairs, gave the order to bring Lam back from France.
b. Kim was involved in the coup of November 11, 1960, a coup the promoters of which
"were closely tied with the French" and they were backing Kim as the new "chief of
government."
3. These facts have just come to light as a result of the analysis which General Khiem is
making of the captured Diem documents. The information in the documents is absolutely
definite, said Khanh, and there can be no doubt about it.
4. Therefore, the outlook is that General Don will probably fare quite well, that Generals
Kim and Xuan will not, and that it is a tossup on General Dinh. The trial will be in Dalat
this week. The implications for General Minh may be far-reaching.
Lodge
176. Letter From the Ambassador in Vietnam (Lodge) to the Secretary of State/1/
Saigon, May 26, 1964.
/1/Source: Department of State, Rusk Files: Lot 72 D 192. Correspondence--L. Top
Secret.
Dear Dean: This is for you, the President, Bob McNamara, and whoever else you think
needs to know. It is definitely not a subject which should get into the cable traffic.
General Khanh told me on May 25 that when Diem was shot he had in his hand a brief
case containing one million dollars U.S. currency "in the largest denominations". He said
that General Minh took possession of the brief case and has never yet surrendered it. He
added that General Minh at the same time had taken possession of forty kilograms of gold
bars.
I advised General Khanh not to make this public lest it shake public confidence here in all
generals. He hopes that General Minh will make his exit quietly.
As ever yours,
Cabot L.
/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Vietnam Country File, Vol X. Secret.
During and since my visit to South Viet-Nam,/2/ USIA has given the highest priority to
altering its program so as to meet the urgent needs of Southeast Asia. In this connection, I
have:
/2/Rowan accompanied Rusk to South Vietnam, April 17-19.
1. Increased the USIA staff in Viet-Nam by adding ten new positions.
2. Assigned three officers to Viet-Nam on temporary duty to assist in radio program
production and other information activities.
3. Authorized the direct transfer of personnel from any post in the world to fill needs in
South Viet-Nam.
4. Facilitated an agreement with the Defense Department to train an additional 42 Army
officers who will serve as psychological warfare and civil affairs advisors at the province
level. This will permit a vitally-needed expansion of the psychological warfare program in
the countryside.
5. Recommended to AID (and secured its agreement) that a $278,000 "petty cash" fund be
set up to insure that the information program in the provinces is not hampered because of
lack of funds to cover such items as paper, ink or spare parts.
6. Increased Voice of America broadcasting into North Viet-Nam and made arrangements
for a broad expansion of VOA broadcasts in Vietnamese in early July.
7. Secured the agreement of the Government of Viet-Nam to the installation of a portable
50 kilowatt transmitter to be located near Hue for broadcasting into North Viet-Nam (this
is a joint USIA-Defense project, with Defense providing most of the money).
8. Arranged to fly, with the help of the Defense Department, three 50 kilowatt short-wave
transmitters from Liberia to the Philippines so as to increase our Southeast Asia coverage
by fifty per cent.
9. Agreed to provide a USIA officer as an engineering advisor to Radio Viet-Nam.
10. Asked the Australian Government to provide a program advisor for Radio Viet-Nam.
11. Placed on duty a USIA officer to advise the Government of Viet-Nam on motion
picture production and have agreed to provide a production specialist for the GVN
printing plant.
12. Agreed to provide a USIA officer who will serve as personal press relations advisor to
Premier Khanh (this officer; who previously gave award-winning service in Viet-Nam,
has been pulled out of France and is now enroute to Saigon).
13. Submitted a comprehensive country-wide information program for approval of the
Government of Viet-Nam (this has been approved in principle and the GVN is now being
pressed to implement the program with speed).
14. Set up in Washington a special research unit to produce materials on Viet-Nam for use
by VOA and other facilities.
Following are more details on the actions listed above:
VOA PROGRAMMING TO VIET-NAM
On May 3 we introduced a new half-hour of prime evening time broadcasting to VietNam. This raised to three hours per day our program designed to influence listeners in the
North. By mid-July, VOA will broadcast a solid evening block of five and one-half hours,
from 7:00 pm until 12:30 am Saigon time, plus one-half hour each morning.
To sustain this expanded schedule VOA is recruiting 12 new Vietnamese employees for
work in Washington, has stationed an American officer in Saigon to develop new program
materials on the scene, and is increasing use of Vietnamese students and other Vietnamese
nationals in the United States. These additional resources will provide us with a great deal
more material on North Viet-Nam than we have been able to get in the past.
USIA and the Army are cooperating in the crash construction of a 50 kilowatt mediumwave transmitter in Hue. Components are being flown from Liberia and the United States.
The transmitter should be relaying VOA by July 18 and should give competitive coverage
of North Viet-Nam unless the Communists resort to jamming.
In addition, the three 50 kilowatt short-wave transmitters to be flown from Liberia to the
Philippines next month are expected to be operational by July 18. The Philippines is an
ideal distance from Viet-Nam for short-wave coverage. These three transmitters will
provide a good signal for a full program day.
I discussed with you our need for a megawatt medium-wave transmitter in the area in
order for us to compete with Peking and Hanoi. I want to emphasize, however, that this
facility is not of immediate importance because 18 to 24 months would be required for its
construction. We have rushed, therefore, to install the kind of facilities that can have some
immediate influence on the situation.
COORDINATION OF INFORMATION OPERATIONS WITHIN THE
U.S. MISSION IN SAIGON
General lack of coordination has been, in my view, our gravest problem in terms of the
information-psychological program. You are aware, I believe, that in accepting Barry
Zorthian as the Public Affairs Officer last January, Ambassador Lodge specified in a
telegram to Ed Murrow that Zorthian "will not have responsibility for press relations
(newspaper, magazines, television, radio) as I do this work myself."/3/ In addition the
military had its own information program. The general result was that no one could be
sure who was responsible for what, which is why I asked in my earlier memorandum to
you/4/ that Zorthian be given over-all responsibility in this area.
/3/Telegram 1285 from Saigon, January 10. (Department of State, Central Files, POL 27
VIET S)
/4/Document 122.
There has been considerable progress in recent weeks. Zorthian has been made Chairman
of a mission-wide Psychological Operations Committee and a Joint Field Service Center
has been created to merge the resources of all U.S. agencies for the psychological effort.
I emphasize, however, that Zorthian and the USIA staff are still not in a position where
they have any clear responsibility for dealing with the American press. I do not say this to
suggest that giving them such responsibility would end the spate of critical articles written
by American newsmen. Many, such as those by Jim Lucas in the Washington Daily News,
are the products of reporters who go out into the field, gain the confidence of our soldiers
and then pick up bits of information which they turn into stories that are not at all helpful
to our over-all mission. These are reporters who will be influenced little, if at all, by
government press officers. I do believe, however, that Zorthian and other USIA officers
ought to be free to make whatever effort they can to inform and give guidance to
American newsmen.
One aspect of the reports by American newsmen that has bothered me was their tendency
to emphasize American mistakes and acts that could be called "brutal" and to give little
coverage to Viet Cong atrocities. USIA has recommended that a special Army
photographic team be sent to South Viet-Nam to cover combat actions and to make
available to American and other newsmen the kind of photographs that put across the
stories we want told. The military have agreed to do whatever is necessary.
COOPERATION WITH VIET-NAM GOVERNMENT
Our ability to move on the Country-wide Information Plan depends largely on the extent
to which we can budge the GVN to go along.
The GVN has set up a counterpart to the U.S. Mission's Psychological Operations
Committee, and a joint committee representing the two governments began meeting
immediately after my departure from Saigon.
This represents a significant step in view of the fact that no national information plan
existed under previous GVN regimes and we could get no cooperation in producing one.
My officers report that the current government is moving much more slowly than we like,
but we are prodding them in Saigon, and I have indicated to Zorthian my willingness to
write the Minister of Information from this end to urge greater speed on his part.
SUMMARY
USIA has given its highest priority to South Viet-Nam. In terms of its own program and
that of the Government of South Viet-Nam, we are moving as rapidly in Viet-Nam as is
possible and sparing no facility or personnel in our efforts to see that the rest of the world
knows what is at stake in Viet-Nam and Southeast Asia.
Carl
/1/Source: Kennedy Library, Thomson Papers, Southeast Asia-Vietnam, 1964 General,
3/64-5/64. Top Secret. A covering note from Forrestal to Bundy reads as follows:
"Herewith the main thoughts I brought back. I've not sent this to anyone and will rely on
your judgment as to who should see it." Forrestal also sent Harriman a copy of this
memorandum and appendix on June 1. McGeorge Bundy apparently sent this
memorandum to the President under cover of a memorandum of May 27. Bundy wrote:
"Here is an important memorandum from Mike Forrestal which may help you as you
think about the basic problem in Southeast Asia." Johnson Library, National Security File,
Aides File, McGeorge Bundy--Memos to the President, Vol. 4) A signed copy of
Forrestal's memorandum, but not the appendix, which Forrestal sent to McNamara, Ball,
McNaughton, William Bundy, and Sullivan is in Department of State, Bundy Files,
Special Papers.
SOUTH VIETNAM
Here in brief are the major impressions I developed during my two-week stay with
Ambassador Lodge in Saigon.
Progress of the War
I cannot answer the question of whether we are winning or losing. The situation varies
from place to place. If I were forced to sum it up, I would say that there has been a slight
improvement overall in the last month, but that the trend has definitely not yet fumed in
our favor. Politically, the most damaging aspect of the military situation is the fact that
Saigon is still in the center of a doughnut of Viet Cong controlled territory. Little or no
progress has been made in clearing and holding these critical provinces surrounding
Saigon. The impact of this on the psychology of everyone living in the capital (including
the U.S. press) is very depressing.
Efforts of the Government of Vietnam
On the debit side of the ledger, General Khanh has not been able to attract the loyalty of
the politicians in Saigon. Without a dramatic change in the military situation (either a
success or something like an action against the North) he may never be able to. The war
has gone on so long without a decisive turn one way or the other that people in Saigon
have adjusted to it as a way of life. Consequently, political bickering among factions in
the French fashion continues. The longer this continues, the weaker the central
government becomes.
There is a definite possibility of a religious war between Catholics and Buddhists. It is
going to take all the pressure we can bring to bear on both sides to keep it from crippling
the war effort. Lodge is doing his most effective work on this problem and may be able to
squeak through the next few critical weeks without a religious crisis.
Vietnamese bureaucracy is still having the greatest difficulty in cranking itself up to
fighting the war in the countryside; this is partly because of the shortage of trained people
and partly because there just isn't the necessary sense of urgency.
On the credit side of the ledger, Khanh has gotten the services of as good a group of
civilian ministers and sub-ministers as Vietnam has ever had. This is particularly true in
budget, economics and finance. Most of them are younger people who have been trained
in the West. They are by no means perfect, but they are head and shoulders above the
average.
The psychological boost of the President's message to Congress requesting a supplemental
appropriation was great. We were able to follow it up quickly with negotiations on
assistance for fiscal '65. As a result there is now a feeling in some of the ministries in
Saigon to get out and spend whatever amount of money is necessary to get goods and
services out to the provinces. It will take a much greater U.S. effort, however, to make the
civil service outside of Saigon function with any effect at the grass roots.
U.S. Efforts in Vietnam
Our own team in Saigon is badly coordinated, and some parts of it are in a shambles. The
Embassy is functioning well in dealing with immediate political problems, such as the
religious crisis, and damping down of coup plots and rumors. However, Ambassador
Lodge has not yet developed an instrument for managing the total U.S. effort. He is not
particularly interested in performing this function himself, and he has nobody on his staff
who seems to be able to do it.
The military command (MACV) has been vastly improved by the recent reorganization;
and such coordination between U.S. agencies as there is takes place because of the efforts
of General Westmoreland. He accomplishes this by taking the Deputy AID Director and
the USIS Chief with him on his trips to the provinces and using these occasions to discuss
and coordinate specific actions under the pacification program. I doubt that General
Westmoreland can keep this up for very long in view of his other responsibilities; and in
any event it tends to leave the Embassy out of the picture and increase the danger of
having another split in our own ranks.
The AID Mission is in a very bad state. There is no leadership, morale is low, and
consequently there is bickering between Mission personnel. I would give first priority to
effecting the changes in AID personnel in Saigon which have already been agreed here in
Washington.
Suggestions
I have brought back two very strong personal opinions:

First, the United States must take a fairly dramatic step soon against the North, not only to
respond to Hanoi's actions in Laos and increased Viet Cong activity in Vietnam, but also
to develop a sense of urgency in GVN civil and military personnel. A bit of a shock is
needed. There is a risk that the structure in Saigon is already so weak that it might not be
able to withstand a strong reaction from Hanoi; but I am convinced that the structure will
get weaker, rather than stronger, if we do nothing.
The second area in which we must act very quickly is the strengthening of our own
organization in Vietnam and getting it much more deeply into the battle in the provinces
than it now is.
We must find a civilian U.S. official who can compensate for Ambassador Lodge's lack of
managerial talent. He has got to be a man whom the Ambassador trusts and of sufficient
stature to be able to work easily with General Westmoreland, CIA, and the AID Director.
We must speed up the additions to and changes in the personnel of the AID Mission,
which we have already agreed to here in Washington.
Finally, I think we have to increase significantly our penetration of the Vietnamese civil
and military bureaucracy at the corps and province levels, despite the political risks
involved. It doesn't make much difference whether we do so formally or not; but the effect
must be that Americans interpose themselves much more directly in the chain of
command between Saigon and the villages. Eventually this may mean an increase both in
the American military and civilian presence in the countryside; but the first priority is to
get those men that we already have in the field more intimately involved with the
pacification program. There are many devices for doing this, such as the joint provincial
committees, which are already being used. Both the Americans and the Vietnamese I
talked to in Saigon seemed to agree that there will be less opposition to this kind of
encadrement than one might expect. Putting our people into the ministries in Saigon is a
more difficult and politically more touchy problem and may not be as necessary. It would
probably be more effective to stimulate our own officials to be more energetic in
following up actions with their Vietnamese counterparts.
We have to get the Vietnamese to concentrate more on the war and less on their individual
political ambitions. This could be done, I think, by being far more vigorous than we have
been in following up specific questions with them. It would also be a great help if we
engaged them in a real effort against the North.
Attachment
APPENDIX TO MEMORANDUM ON SOUTH VIETNAM
AMBASSADOR LODGE
Ambassador Lodge has devoted most of his attention and efforts to maintaining an uneasy
balance among the constantly shifting political factions in Saigon. His acute sense of
politics has served him well in this respect, and he has achieved a useful kind of standing
with the Vietnamese. They are a little frightened of him. His somewhat distant attitude has
enabled him to avoid getting embroiled in local maneuverings and has added considerably
to the weight of the advice he gives.
Unfortunately, the Ambassador has had neither the interest nor the time to concentrate on
getting his own American community organized. This is partly because management is
not one of his talents and partly because he has not found anyone on his own staff to
whom he will delegate his fundamental authority to lead the American effort. I think he
would give a rather free hand in this respect to a clearly competent official who made a
real effort to gain his confidence.
Although Ambassador Lodge has virtually no effective communication with General
Harkins, he is developing confidence in General Westmoreland despite the unfortunate
episode of Nixon and the helicopters./4/ General Westmoreland has gone out of his way to
emphasize the essentially political nature of the war and has convinced Ambassador
Lodge that he is receptive to political guidance.
/4/Former Vice President Nixon stopped in Vietnam in April during his 24-day trip to the
Far East. Westmoreland escorted Nixon to the village of Phu My near Saigon, apparently
by unauthorized use of helicopters.
Lodge is acutely aware of and quite frank about his strange political position as
Ambassador. He senses a tendency towards record-making in his correspondence with
Washington. He volunteered that he would under no circumstances make a public issue of
any differences with the Administration on policy in Vietnam. While he felt that the
President had a right to his advice, he also felt that the President had the right not to take it
without fear of creating a political issue. The vehemence and sincerity with which Lodge
discussed this subject has led me to conclude he would not kick over the traces under any
circumstances we can now foresee.
Although I tried to sound him out on his personal plans, both before and after Oregon, I
could not get a clear picture of his intentions. He said that he wanted to serve the U.S. in
the most useful way he could, but he did not intend to spend the rest of his life in Saigon.
On several occasions he made it clear he wanted to continue to serve the Government in
some capacity, either in Washington or abroad.
I would hazard a guess that Lodge will stay in Saigon for the immediate future, unless he
concludes that his presence in the United States in July might make the difference
between Goldwater's succeeding or failing in capturing the nomination. He seems
convinced that a Goldwater victory would destroy the Republican Party. I do not think,
however, that he has any real hopes of getting the nomination himself or that he would
make the effort to do so.
Washington. May 26, 1964.
/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Aides File, McGeorge Bundy, Memos
to the President, Vol. 4. Top Secret.
SUBJECT
Talking Points at 4:30 Meeting with Republican Senators/2/
/2/President Johnson, Rusk, McNamara, McCone, and McGeorge Bundy met from 4:35 to
5:23 p.m. on May 26 with the following Senators: Everett Dirkson, Thomas Kuchel,
Leverett Saltonstall, Milton Young, Karl E. Mundt, J. Glenn Beall, Frank Carlson, and
John J. Williams. No record of the meeting has been found.
1. I have asked for this meeting in order to talk straight with you about the situation in
Southeast Asia and to have a chance to exchange thoughts about some very serious
possibilities that may lie ahead of us.
2. I will ask Secretary Rusk to describe briefly the immediate diplomatic crisis over Laos
and Cambodia and to comment generally on the political situation in South Vietnam.
3. I will then ask Secretary McNamara to report on his own most recent visit to South
Vietnam. Some of you may have heard this report, but its essentials have been brought up
to date and confirmed by Mr. Michael Forrestal who returned yesterday, and it is worth
hearing in outline.
4. I will then ask Director McCone to give a brief estimate of the forecast which the
intelligence community now gives of possible further weakening in the situation in Laos
and South Vietnam in coming months.
5. I hope that we can then have a general discussion.
6. Finally, I would emphasize in opening the meeting that while in one sense these are
small scale problems involving small scale countries.
--and while each country and even each province has a separate set of tricky questions
(even the names of the actors are hard to remember and pronounce)
--and while the whole struggle in Laos has a comic opera aspect
--nevertheless what is at stake overall is whether the Communists will take over Southeast
Asia--by a process of subversion and terror and general nibbling.
7. It is in this large framework--the U.S. national interest and the future of Southeast Asia-that I hope we will all be thinking as the discussion goes on.
McG. B.

Drafted by Sullivan, cleared by William Bundy, and initialed by Rusk.
2086. For the Ambassador from the Secretary. Ref: Embtels 2284,/2/ 2314,/3/ 2319,/4/
and others. Your tireless efforts to bring about constructive attitudes among the bickering
elements in Viet Nam are greatly appreciated here. It would seem that your work with
Oanh, the Buddhist hierarchy, and the responsible Catholic leaders is already producing
dividends.
/2/Document 165.
/3/Document 175.
/4/In telegram 2319, May 26, Lodge reported that Khanh had accepted his suggestion that
he talk to the three Vice Prime Ministers to explain to them "what is the proper role of a
cabinet minister and their relationship with General Khanh." Lodge told Khanh that he
had already had a "heart-to-heart" talk with Oanh and informed him that cabinet ministers
should not try to be "political personages in their own right." (Department of State,
However, we remain worried about two specific elements of discord which could be
potentially troublesome. The first concerns the trial of the generals. It is still not clear to
us here that the evidence which Khanh expects to introduce against General Kim and
which might implicate General Minh is convincing and authentic. The very fact that much
of it is being drawn from Diem documents would seem to make it difficult to sustain
publicly. If you feel that there is no alternative to a trial in Dalat this week, you should
urge Khanh to have it speedily and quietly completed and "elegant" disposition of the
generals put into effect immediately. From our point of view, however, it would be a
disaster if one of the results of this trial were to be a deposition of General Minh./5/
/5/As reported in telegram 2332 from Saigon, May 28, Lodge made these suggestions to
Khanh who stated that he hoped the Generals would admit their errors and then they could
be pardoned and allowed to return to private lives. Although Khanh was surprised by
Lodge's suggestion that it was not the right time to depose Minh as Head of State, Khanh
said he understood and would act accordingly. (Ibid., POL 27 VIET S)
Subsequent message coming tonight/6/ explaining we here in Washington believe that
fuse is shortening with respect to North Viet Nam, both because of events in South Viet
Nam and because of events in Laos. We believe it imperative therefore, that the maximum
facade of national unity be maintained in Saigon at this time, to avoid the appearance of
political debacle just at the moment when we are making major decisions of national and
international significance.
/6/Apparent reference to the message Document 181.

The other area which concerns us immediately is the activity of Vice Prime Minister Hoan
and to a lesser extent, Minister of Information Pham Thai. We trust you will move in on
them just as you have with Jack Oanh and just as effectively. The Dai Viet preoccupation
with politics as usual could produce the worst sort of dilettante confusion in these days of
crisis.
Rusk

1964-1968, Volume I
Vietnam, 1964
Department of State
Washington, DC
VI. The Second Rusk Visit To Saigon; The Honolulu Meeting; The De
Gaulle-Ball Conversation; Seaborn's Discussions in Hanoi, May 26 - June
25
Nodis; Eyes Only. Drafted by McGeorge Bundy and initialed and approved by Rusk.
Transmitted as telegram 2087 to Saigon, which is the source text.
I have been giving the most intense consideration to the whole battle for Southeast Asia,
and I have now instructed Dean Rusk, Bob McNamara, Max Taylor, and John McCone to
join Felt in Honolulu for a meeting with you and a very small group of your most senior
associates in Southeast Asia to review for my final approval a series of plans for effective
action.
I am sending you this message at once to give you private advance notice because I hope
this meeting can occur very soon-perhaps on Monday./2/ Dean Rusk will be sending
tomorrow a separate cable on the subjects proposed for the meeting,/3/ and Bob
McNamara will put a plane at your disposal for the trip.
/2/June 1.
/3/In telegram 2095 to Saigon, May 27. (Department of State, Central Files, DEF 1 ASIA
SE)
In the light of my message to General Harkins asking him to return on June 24/4/ and in
the light of the undesirability of having our two senior military officers away from Saigon
at the same time, I suggest that you bring General Westmoreland to this meeting and leave
General Harkins in charge of the war.
/4/Not found.
Finally, I have received from Forrestal a direct account of your belief that there is need for
change and improvement in the civilian side of the country team./5/ We have reached a
similar conclusion here, and indeed we believe that it is essential for you to have a topranking officer who is wholly acceptable to you as chief of staff for country team
operations. My own impression is that this should be either a newly appointed civilian of
wide governmental experience and high standing, or General Westmoreland himself, and I
am asking Rusk and McNamara to discuss this problem with you privately and in detail.
You can be sure that we will leave no step untaken to insure effective support for your
over-all command./6/
/5/Document 178.
182. Memorandum for the Record of a Conversation Between President Johnson
and Prime Minister Pearson, Hilton Hotel, New York, May 28, 1964, 6:15-6:45
p.m./1/
/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL CAN-US. Top Secret; Exdis. Drafted
by McGeorge Bundy on May 30. The President was in New York for a Democratic Party
fundraising dinner and gala.
The President and the Prime Minister began by talking briefly and lightly about
immediate problems of politics in their two countries. The President gave the Prime
Minister greetings from Senator Magnuson,/2/ and the Prime Minister commented wryly
on the problems of lumber and fish. The Prime Minister explained the great political
difficulty and importance of changing the national flag of Canada, and the President
remarked that he had as many troubles as he wanted, too.
/2/Senator Warren G. Magnuson of Washington.
The conversation then turned to Southeast Asia. The Prime Minister opened by saying
that in his brief conversation with McGeorge Bundy/3/ he had agreed on the importance
of sending Mr. Seaborn to Vietnam as soon as possible, and he made it clear that he
thought this could be arranged in the coming week. He spoke warmly of Mr. Seaborn's
qualifications, and made clear his entire readiness to have a Canadian officer play this
important role of reporting accurately the purposes of the United States Government and
the meaning of any actions in which it might be involved.
/3/No record of this conversation has been found.
The President thanked the Prime Minister and gave a general summary of his view of U.S.
policy in Southeast Asia. The U.S. was not interested in starting wars, but in keeping
peace. The U.S. had no desire to threaten any government in the area, and wanted nothing
more than the restoration of peace in countries which were now under attack from outside.
The U.S. was not going to be pushed out, but the Prime Minister could be absolutely sure
that the President intended to follow a policy of peace.
The Prime Minister expressed his satisfaction in this general exposition and said he fully
understood the very difficult and important problems which the U.S. faced in Southeast
Asia. He agreed that the U.S. could not simply pull out and that it must continue its
support for governments which were not always very good at supporting themselves,
difficult as this task might be. The Prime Minister said that, on the other hand, he did
think it would be dangerous to move in directions which had recently been mentioned by
Senator Goldwater,/4/ and that any drastic escalation would give great problems both in
Canada and internationally. The Prime Minister said that it would be a different matter if
action could be carefully limited and directed in the interdiction of supply lines from
North to South.
/4/Senator Barry M. Goldwater in his campaign for the Republican presidential
nomination suggested on May 24 that "low yield atomic weapons" be used as defoliants
along South Vietnam's borders and that the United States employ a conventional bombing
campaign to attack roads, railroads, and bridges used in supplying the insurgency in South
Vietnam.
The President firmly interjected that the Prime Minister could be absolutely sure that the
present Administration had no interest at all in the kind of thing which Senator Goldwater
had mentioned. The President himself was a man of peace, and his Administration was
going to be an Administration of peace. If it did become necessary, against the President's
own hopes and desires, to act against the North, the President's intention was that such
action should be carefully limited.
The Prime Minister expressed his satisfaction at the President's comment and said that he
thought it would be very important to have targets carefully defined and sharply
delimited. It would be one thing to attack a bridge or an oil tank, but quite another to
shower bombs on a village full of women and children.
The President expressed his clear agreement.
The President and the Prime Minister then talked briefly about more general aspects of the
problem. The President indicated the next immediate courses of action were to be the
subject of the Honolulu meeting, and thanked the Prime Minister again for his cooperation
in the matter of Mr. Seaborn's special assignment./5/ The conversation then became
informal and social, and the President introduced the Prime Minister to members of his
family and others guests in the Presidential suite.
/5/While Pearson and Johnson were meeting in New York, Sullivan met with Canadian
Foreign Minister Martin and Seaborn in Ottawa. Sullivan found Canadian officials to be
of a similar mind to Pearson, and noted: "While Foreign Minister Martin seemed a little
nervous about the prospect of 'expanding the war', External Affairs officials readily
assented to the use of Seaborn as an interlocutor. It was stipulated that he need not agree
with or associate his Government with the substance of some of the messages he would be
asked to transmit. The only thing required was faithful transmission of the messages."
"Seaborn, who struck Sullivan as an alert, intelligent and steady officer, readily agreed to
these conditions and has made immediate plans for an accelerated departure." (Telegram
2133 to Saigon, May 30; Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 VIET S)
The Prime Minister later informed me that at a moment when I was out of the room, he
had mentioned to the President the important meeting of Commonwealth Prime Ministers
in London in July, and had said that he would be glad to know of any special U.S. views
which it might be helpful for Canada to know about at the time of such a meeting. He told
me that the President had expressed interest, and I undertook to make sure that we would
be in a position to offer such close consultation before the Prime Minister's meeting.
McG.B./6/
to the President/1/
Memos. Top Secret. In White House telegram CAP 64144, May 29, McGeorge Bundy
sent the text of this memorandum to the Johnson Ranch in Texas. Bundy described the
memorandum as "the most sensitive account I have yet seen of the probable balance of
forces in South Vietnam." (Ibid., Southeast Asia, Vol II, Memos CB)
SOUTH VIETNAM
Mac Bundy tells me that you are interested in the time factor in the struggle in South
Vietnam: Is it working with us or against us, and if against us, how fast?
I cannot speak with any assurance about the military situation. I think that in spots there
are signs of improvement, and in some areas there are signs that the Government's efforts
to reach people are beginning to show progress. But these are isolated indications and, in
my judgment, are not widespread enough to indicate a trend for the better.
I can speak more confidently about the political atmosphere in Saigon. The feeling there is
that the Government's military and political position continues to erode. There is doubt
that the war will ever be ended the way it is now being fought; and this produces a
tendency towards factionalism, bickering, and probably some coup plotting in political
and military circles.
I don't think that there is in the near future a danger of military collapse; but there is an
increasing danger of political accident or upheaval, unless there is some dramatic change
in the atmosphere in which the struggle is being waged. What I think is needed fairly soon
(i.e. within the next month or 6 weeks) is action by the United States in some part of
Southeast Asia which gets across forcefully to the Vietnamese a sense that we believe
Communist insurgency can be contained and that we will do whatever is required to
insure this.
MVF
184. Summary Record of a Meeting, Department of State, Washington, May 30,

1964, 10:30 a.m./1/
/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 VIET S. Top Secret. Drafted by
Benjamin Read, Executive Secretary, on May 30. The source text indicates that Ball
served as chairman of the meeting. There are several handwritten editorial changes in the
source text, presumably by Read.
SUBJECT
Viet-Nam and Honolulu Meeting
PARTICIPANTS
State: Messrs. Ball, Harriman, Green, Sullivan, Trueheart and Read
Defense: Secretary McNamara and Mr. McNaughton
AID: Mr. Stoneman
CIA: Mr. Colby, Mr. Cooper, Gen. Carter
White House: Mr. Bundy and Mr. Forrestal
Mr. Ball distributed the agenda (attached)/2/ with five points on questions relating to VietNam.
/2/Not found.
Agenda Item I
Mr. Ball asked for comment on his assessment that the general situation in Viet-Nam was
deteriorating.
Secretary McNamara agreed with this assessment. He said he agreed with UK
representative Thompson who was in Washington this week, who said that his assessment
was that nothing much was happening and that there was lots of talk but little action. He
said that Thompson had stated that he did not know whether we were beyond the point of
no return, and that if the present deterioration continues the situation would disintegrate in
anywhere from three to four months to nine months from now. If the situation is to be
retrieved Thompson favored getting rid of the Dai Viet. Secretary McNamara said these
conclusions were approximately the same as his own.
Mr. Sullivan stated Thompson had made the point to him that the US must cross the line
between its advisory role and action or operational role for at least the top ten officials in
the country. Thompson thought we weren't getting more than 10 cents on our dollar of
material input.
Agenda Item II
Mr. Ball asked why interlarding was not doing the job. Why weren't oil spot procedures
working out?
Secretary McNamara said that it was complex administrative problems and that the main
difficulty was the lack of competent political and military personnel.
Mr. Forrestal said it was the question of trying to improve morale in South Vietnam that
was critical in his opinion. Mr. Sullivan stated that many people in the south were now
hedging their bets on the future with the thought that the US would cut its losses and pull
out. He said in addition there was a premium on inefficiency because efficient
administrators were prime subjects of assassination. Mr. McNamara asked the Agency
representatives to prepare a paper on the attacks on division and district chiefs to see if
there was corroboration for the view that the efficient leaders were the principal targets
for assassination.
Mr. Stoneman stated that Secretary Rusk felt that we should try a pilot program in
provinces where the deterioration was not advanced.
Secretary McNamara said we are already trying to do too many things and that AID was
short 80 persons already. We should concentrate on the provinces in the south and west of
Saigon where the situation was critical and not start other new programs.
Mr. Ball stated that one of the purposes of the Honolulu meeting should be to assure that
there are no arbitrary limits on personnel.
Mr. Colby stated that the Agency has received indications of reservations at both low and
high levels in the Vietnamese government to our encadrement proposal forwarded to
Lodge three or four days ago. Mr. Colby's view is that the most important thing is to
integrate civil and military functions under a single commander.
Mr. Ball expressed reservation to any proposal which would have the effect of putting
Western representatives out front with all the argument of neo-colonialism which could be
brought to bear against us.
Agenda Item III
Secretary McNamara said he thought we should have somebody looking at the problem of
"surrender terms" if we took the war to the North; or, more accurately, the problem of
when we should stop if such a venture is undertaken.
Mr. McNaughton said that a study was underway on this point and the Agency also
indicated it had some studies underway on related problems.
Honolulu Meeting
Secretary McNamara said that he thought the Honolulu talks should proceed on two or
three planes.
First, on the military questions two military sub-groups should get to work to examine the
J-3 and J-4 problems, and contingency war plans.
Second, an information panel should be set up, chaired by Carl Rowan or Bob Manning,
to examine four different information problems: (1) North Vietnam (2) South Vietnam (3)
US and (4) European allies, i.e., the problems of information originating in the south
beamed towards the north, information beamed into the south and what we are putting out
in the US for domestic and overseas consumption.
Third, Gaud and Sullivan should chair a panel examining the pilot province program and
this team would have aid, military and political considerations to take into account.
At the policy-making level the two Secretaries and Ambassador Lodge should examine
the problems of getting Khanh's backing and cooperation for our program and the choice
of international forums. The Secretary said we would put the detailed agenda together on
the airplane.
Gov. Harriman said he thought we needed more work done on the question of what
"carrots" we could offer to North Vietnam. It was generally agreed that this did not need
more attention
Secretary McNamara said he saw the purposes of the Honolulu meeting as follows: (1) to
exchange views with Lodge and Westmoreland on our assessments and estimates of the
situation in South Vietnam; (2) to map out more effective actions against the Viet Cong;
and (3) to consider tentative courses of action in case the situation in the south continues
to deteriorate and to try to achieve accord on our contingency plans against the North.
Mr. Cleveland stated that we would have a huge job of convincing the rest of the world of
our assumption that if we can't win in Indo-China, we can at least prevent Peking and
Hanoi from doing so.
Secretary McNamara stated that that is what the President, Secretary Rusk and he had
been worrying about for the last week or more.
185. Letter From the Under Secretary of State (Ball) to the Secretary of State/1/
/1/Source: Department of State, Ball Files: Lot 74 D 272, Manila Folder. Top Secret.
Dear Dean: Wednesday afternoon/2/ the President asked me to participate in a discussion
with Walter Lippmann. The others involved were Bob McNamara and McGeorge Bundy.
The President sat in on part of the discussion and after Lippmann had left, he talked
further to the three of us for almost an hour.
/2/May 27.
Lippmann made his usual argument for neutralization--admitting, when I pressed him, (a)
that his proposed course of action was based on the assumption that all of Southeast Asia
was destined inevitably to become a zone of Chinese Communist control; (b) that we
could not halt Chinese expansionism in this area; and (c) that our best hope was to seek by
political means to slow that expansionism down and make it less brutal.
The exchange with Lippmann was rather animated but it did serve to bring out the
differences in the assumptions on which we were proceeding. I do not think that the
President bought Lippmann's ultimate thesis. He was, however, quite clearly impressed by
Lippmann's contention that the United States was presenting itself in a bad light to the
world by refusing to negotiate and entertaining the possibility of enlarged military action.
After Walter's departure, the President returned to the question that has been
preoccupying him. (He said that he had not slept more than a few hours the night before.)
How could he maintain his posture as a man of peace in the face of the Southeast Asian
crisis? How could he carry a united country with him if we were to embark on a course of
action that might escalate under conditions where the rest of the world would regard us as
wrong-headed?
While no precise instructions emerged from our discussion, I was persuaded that the
President will not act hastily and that he is by no means tied on to a scenario of the kind
that was being considered when you left. This impression has been confirmed by casual
remarks he has made since the Lippmann conversation.
Before talking with the President, I had already begun to ask some hard questions which it
seemed to me had been treated too cavalierly. When I first moved back into the
Vietnamese situation a fortnight ago, I had the feeling that plans were going forward too
precipitously and that there was an inarticulate wish to sweep the difficult issues under the
bed. It seemed to me that much of our planning was proceeding on the assumption that,
since we were in danger of losing by pursuing the present course, we should promptly
undertake a more decisive plan of action even though (a) no one could be sure that the
new plan of action would have the desired effect and (b) the risks of a major catastrophe
might be vastly enlarged.
Against the background of the President's wise caution, Alex and I have, by an insistent
challenge of the basic premises, considerably slowed down the headlong crystallization of
a plan for enlarging the war. The new mood of diminished certainty will necessarily alter
the purposes of the Honolulu meeting. Instead of concentrating on detailed arrangements
necessary to carry out a specific plan of action, the meeting should, I think, be devoted
primarily to an examination of the assumptions and implications of alternative courses of
action in order to bring about a greater common understanding between Saigon and
Washington and lay the basis for plans consistent with the hard realities. Since Alex
returned Thursday/3/ morning, he and I have worked closely together in trying to point up
some of the problems and focus on available alternatives. With the Honolulu meeting in
mind, we have drawn up a list of questions that you might wish to inject into the
discussion.
/3/May 28.
I realize that these questions may appear negative and defeatist. I am disturbed, however,
by the fact that we are not facing up to the basic requirements for achieving the maximum
effectiveness in our present management of the war. Both Alex and I find it personally
difficult to advocate a course of action that could result in the loss of many American
lives, the further disruption of Western solidarity, and grave dangers of escalation-at a
time when we feel unprepared to do all that we know to be possible to reverse the
downward trend (if it exists) in South Viet-Nam.
I cannot, in other words, reconcile myself to the-fateful step of action against the North
until we are satisfied in our hearts that we have taken every possible step to achieve full
effectiveness in our own efforts in the South. I need not specify the kinds of steps needed.
You and I have frequently talked about them.

We appreciated your prompt response on our thoughts with respect to the Polish proposal
for Laos./4/ They have been passed on to the President but we have not yet heard from
him. (He is at the Ranch over this long week-end.) If and when he approves in principle,
our first step should probably be for Unger to have a thorough discussion with Souvanna.
Unless Souvanna comes along, we will obviously have no package.
/4/On May 27, the Polish Embassy in Vientiane proposed immediate consultations in
Switzerland among high-level representatives of the 1954 Geneva Cochairmen (the
United Kingdom and the Soviet Union), the ICC member nations, and the three political
factions in Laos. (Circular telegram 2209, May 27; Department of State, Central Files,
POL 27 LAOS)
Yours ever,
George
P.S. With the President's approval, I am asking Paris today to set up a meeting for me with
de Gaulle on Friday, June 5. I will be seeing the British on Monday (June 8), at their
request, to talk about a number of things, including Cyprus. It seems to us that since Bill
Bundy has just been to London and I am going there, our failure to talk to Paris would be
a subject for wide comment. You might give some thought to the line I should take with
the General, and we can go over it on Thursday when you return./5/
/5/Ball wrote the following note at the end of the postscript: "You might wish to tell
Lodge about this since he has been concerned about the effect in Saigon of any
conversations in Paris."
Enclosure
FUNDAMENTAL ISSUES
1. Are we proposing action against the North because we are reasonably confident it will,
in fact, work, or merely because we are becoming reasonably confident that the present
course of action will not work and we are not able to think of anything else to do?
2. What will be the effect on the SVN of action against the North?
Here we should measure the temporary boost to morale that may be given the GVN
leadership against the dangers of a panic of the SVN population--particularly in Saigon-that may result from (a) counter-threats by Hanoi, Peiping, and perhaps Moscow and (b)
increased terrorism in the cities (bombing of cafes, public buildings, assassinations, etc.).
3. What do we seek to achieve by bombing the North?
If we hope to achieve merely an interruption or impairment of the North's ability to direct
insurgency through the radio net, or to assist insurgency through men and supplies, then
we must ask ourselves whether the Viet Cong may not now have self-sufficient tactical
centers in the South adequate to enable the carrying-on of their campaign with only
marginally diminished effectiveness.

If on the other hand, we intend by attacking the North to force North Viet-Nam to direct
the cessation of insurgency in the South, how feasible is this? The history of the Viet
Cong has been that of carrying on underground when necessary. Even after the partition
they did not give up a plan that has now been in existence for more than two decades and
that has a fundamental ideological underpinning. Is it not probable that--even though the
DRV announced that they were ceasing their encouragement and assistance to the Viet
Cong in the South--they would covertly direct the Viet Cong to continue insurgency
without their direct help?
This question can be formulated in another way. Do we yet have in South Viet-Nam a
sufficiently strong political base in the GVN to deal with the indigenous disaffection that
would continue even if the North were in fact to order a cessation of insurgency? The
argument may well be made that--even granting the strength of indigenous disaffection-the cessation of encouragement and direction from the North would reduce the insurgency
to manageable form. Is this demonstrable?
4. What kinds of assurances will the USG be required to give the FGVN in order to assure
their tranquillity?
Presumably this would mean more than the provision of antiaircraft and other air defense
apparatus. It would mean the assurance that if there were a land effort against SVN we
would have the forces immediately available to defend the country. This raises a number
of issues: (a) It implies an open-ended commitment of the US to defend SVN with our
own troops. This must be considered in the light of the deep aversion of many Americans
to the commitment of US ground forces to the Asian mainland.
(b) From the SVN point of view, the appearance of substantial American troops might
either have the effect of raising the old colonial bogey or of persuading the SVN that the
US would do the fighting and they need do nothing.
(c) From the point of view of many other friendly nations, such a US action would be
regarded as America's inability to learn from past experience. While we might minimize
by strenuous information and diplomatic activities, we could not count on having many, if
any, of our friends with us very far down the road. In any event, we should have an
extended period of psychological and political preparation and an opportunity to measure
its results before final decisions are reached.
5. Why are we contemplating an air action against the North in the face of a recently
played war game that demonstrated the ineffectiveness of such a tactic. (Alex
participated--along with Mac Bundy, Max Taylor and many others.)/6/ The answers I
have been given are not wholly satisfactory. They are merely that the war game was
crudely played and that the time span for action (60 days) was too brief. Yet, it did reveal
some of the serious disadvantages of the proposed course and those lessons have not been
critically applied to the plans now being proposed.
6. Would not the proposed course of action lead directly to what we have been seeking to
avoid--a conference in which our bargaining position is poor? Either on our own initiative
or through the actions of others, we would be faced with a Security Council action almost
as soon as the first air strike was completed. The first efforts of the Security Council
would be to obtain a ceasefire. If we vetoed such a resolution, we would almost certainly
be faced with a call for a General Assembly.
Under these circumstances, we could well find ourselves in a position not wholly
dissimilar from that of Britain and France at Suez. World opinion would be against us and
opposition would be heightened by the racial implications of a white attack upon the
Asian people. Our friends could not be counted on to stay with us far down this track. It
seems unlikely that we could hold out very long against some form of conference either in
New York or Geneva--in which the neutralization of Southeast Asia would be very
appealing to most of the participants. While we might have gained some slight advantage
by the demonstration of American will and capability, we would have lost greatly in the
moral approbation of most UN members.
186. Telegram From the Secretary of State to the Department of State/1/

Honolulu, June 1, 1964--5 p.m.
/1/Source: Department of State Central Files, PSL 27 VIET S. Top Secret; Immediate;
Exdis. Repeated to Saigon. Passed to the White House on receipt in the Department of
State. Rusk, accompanied by William Bundy, was in New Delhi, India, May 28-30. He
flew to Saigon and Bangkok on May 31 and then on to Honolulu on June 1.
McGeorge Bundy sent a copy of this telegram to the President on June 2. His transmittal
memorandum reads in part as follows:
"You may also be interested in the Secretary's summary of the things the U.S. had to bear
in mind at the end of Section 3 and the beginning of Section 4. The Secretary's emphasis
here, as in other conversations in Asia, is more military and strategic than diplomatic and
political. In particular, he does not address the question of international justification for
action, an omission noted in the closing comment of the cable (which was probably
drafted by my brother Bill." Johnson Library, National Security File, Memos to the
President, McGeorge Bundy, Vol. 5)
Secto 37. Highlights of General Khanh conversation with Secretary, May 31.
(Ambassador Lodge participating, and Mr. Bundy and Mr. Flott present.)
1. Solidarity Within South Vietnam.
After amenities Secretary Rusk transmitted greetings of President Johnson to General
Khanh and said President spends much time and thought on problems of SVN and SEA in
general. Secretary remarked President had recently been consulting on SEA problems
with Senators both parties with Secretary present./2/ Senators are increasingly concerned
about pressures being applied on SEA by Peking and Hanoi. Forthcoming Honolulu
conference will consider these problems and many others.

Secretary stated one of main problems President faces is justifying to American people
whatever course of action may be necessary or indicated as matter of internal solidarity of
SVN. Secretary noted that if struggle escalates, only US will have the forces to cope with
it.
This basic reality means President has heavy responsibility of making vital decisions and
leading American public opinion to accept them. Difficult to do this if SVN appears
hopelessly divided and rent by internal quarrels.
A principal purpose of the US in area is to bring about a free, secure, peaceful SVN. This
can be done only if Vietnam people display internal solidarity. So it follows that the
greater is the solidarity of Vietnamese people, the greater will be the propensity of US and
other free world countries to aid it in struggle against aggressors and to escalate if
necessary.
Secretary said he was not thinking in terms of displaying solidarity so as to convince Paris
that struggle could be won, but rather was thinking in terms of sustaining the faith in the
possibilities of ultimate success of our Vietnamese effort among those nations we hoped
"would be in the foxholes with us" if escalation became necessary and if enemy forces
reacted in strength, for example, UK, Australia, New Zealand. Solidarity and unity of
purpose in SVN was keystone of whole effort. Was General Khanh doing all he could to
bring about such national unity?
Khanh replied affirmatively, saying he fully aware of importance of unity. His recent
handling of the case of the arrested Generals showed this./3/ His clemency showed he was
primarily interested in protecting unity of army. But there were many problems.
Underlying structure and heritage of country was such that only army could lead nation in
unity. Only army had the requisite organization, cadres, discipline, and sense of purpose.
Nascent political parties and other groupings did not. The intellectuals would never be
able to adopt a common point of view unless it was imposed by a dictatorship-by a party
as the Communists did, or a "family dictatorship" such as Diem's. This situation was made
worse because of disproportion between measure of political and civil liberties granted in
wartime situation on one hand and lack of background and sense of responsibility of
recipients on other hand. A direct consequence of this disproportion has inevitably some
measure of disunity. He was aware he had perhaps given more freedom than really
prudent handling of situation would have dictated, but he had to be mindful oftproclaimed democratic goals of the Vietnamese revolution. All in all, this disunity would
not be fatal because Army itself was united, and no potentially disruptive force could hope
to oppose army and overthrow GVN. (N.B. No reference to religious problems, sects, or
labor under this heading.)
/3/The General Officers of the Military Revolutionary Committee met in Dalat May 27-28
to consider the cases of Generals Tran Van Don, Mai Huu Xuan, Le Van Kim, Ton That
Dinh, and Nguyen Van Vy, all of whom had been under arrest since the Khanh coup of
January 30. The MRC found the Generals' actions prior to the coup to be lacking in
revolutionary spirit, thoughtless, demoralizing to the people and the troops under their
command, and irresponsible. The Generals received official reprimands and were
prohibited from serving on the MRC or holding a command for a fixed period. (Telegram
2359 from Saigon, May 31; Department of State, Central Files, POL 15 VIET S)
Khanh said that he and Minh and other members National [Military] Revolutionary
Council had literally worked 27 hours without interruption in Dalat on Friday discussing
case of Generals among themselves and with detainees. There were many different views
on how situation should be handled. Nobody was entirely satisfied with Khanh's decision.
After it was all over, he asked for a secret vote of confidence in himself personally. He
received 15 favorable votes with 15 senior officers voting. This showed army was united.
2. Need for Action Outside South Vietnam.
Khanh dwelt at length on this, laying out some fairly precise ideas about the kind of action
that might be taken. Basically, he said that despite the pacification plan and some
individual successes he and his government were "on the defensive" against the Viet
Cong. He said pretty flatly that they could not win unless action was taken outside South
Vietnam, and that this needed a firm US decision for such action.
Specifically, Khanh said that he thought both Hanoi and Peiping now assumed that some
wider action was going to be taken in the near future. He thought that this was the reason
Hanoi had moved to clean out the Plaine des Jarres and weaken Kong Le and Vang Pao,
that Hanoi had a historic concern for the overland threat from the Plaine des Jarres
through Sam Neua province and up to Hanoi.
He then said that the "immediate" response should be to clean out the Communists in
eastern Laos, who were the same kind of threat to him, and that we should not get bogged
down in negotiations but act.
He said that they did not know really what the Communists had in eastern Laos (circling
especially the area south of Tchepone), but that there was a strong chance of major units
being there which would at some point-perhaps in the event of attack on the North-move
across the border and give the Communists enough strength to cut through to Quang Ngai
and divide the country in two, joining up with the forces concentrated around the Do Xa
area.
Khanh also said that the real enemy was Peiping, and that they were the power behind
Hanoi and the Viet Cong. He said that attacks against North Vietnam should be selective
and designed to minimize the chances of a drastic Communist response. (No reference
was made to who should carry out these attacks or who should clean out eastern Laos,
though there was some implication that he thought South Vietnamese forces, with air,
could deal with the latter.)
Secretary then noted we could never predict enemy reaction with certainty. How would
SVN people react if NVN and China responded by attacking SVN? Khanh replied this
would have even more favorable effect on SVN national unity and faith in victory, and
would mobilize usual patriotic reactions in face of more clearcut external threat.
Secretary asked if Khanh believed Viet Cong was fully committed in present operation, or
if he felt it had reserves.
Khanh replied VC forces in SVN were fully committed and no significant reserves existed
in country. When questioned, however, he admitted that VC could do more in the way of
terrorism (importance of which he belittled) and that it may have significant reserves in
southern Laos or Cambodia about which we knew nothing. Our intelligence from these
areas was poor, and we could be in for unpleasant surprises. Noted that if VC could
assemble one division in Laos just north of fifteenth parallel, it could attack towards sea at
Quang Ngai and perhaps cut SVN in two and isolate important Da Nang area and its
installations.
Khanh recalled French experience with Vietminh reserves about 1950 at Cao Bang and
Long Son.
Further to strategy, Khanh said Vietminh had made possible their seizure of Red River
Delta by attacking toward Luang Prabang and more or less forcing French into Dien Bien
Phu commitment and subsequent defeat. This defeat need not have been fatal but French
morale cracked. All this suggests following: best way to react to current Communist
encroachments in Laos would be SVN attack in southern Laos, just south of Tchepone,
and perhaps in Cambodia as well.
Secretary asked whether such actions outside SVN as cutting of Laos corridor would
seriously damage VC materially and break their will to resist.
Khanh replied with considerable assurance as follows: Re Central Vietnam and high
plateau, cutting Laotian corridor would cut off deliveries of munitions and cadres and
seriously affect VC, both materially and morale-wise. Re Delta, material effect would be
minimal because external aid for VC in Delta and west and northwest of Saigon comes
from Cambodia often by sea along Gulf of Siam. Not by chance are most ChiCom and
Soviet-origin arms captured in these areas. Nonetheless, cutting of Laotian corridor would
lower morale of VC in south in that it would show US determination and indicate Hanoi
unable any longer to support VC.
3. Timing of Action Against the North and Necessary Prior Action Within South Vietnam.
Khanh asked if Secretary and Ambassador believed he should proclaim state of war
existed during next few days and now that Generals' case was settled. Both advised him to
wait at least until after Honolulu conference and in no case ever to take action on such
matter without consulting. He agreed, and remarked that if he proclaimed state of war,
NVN would know this was preparatory to some form of escalation and he would never act
unilaterally and thereby run risk of tipping America's hand. Although the matter was not
specifically mentioned, Khanh appeared to accept as entirely natural that he would not
necessarily know in advance when and if US decided to strike outside SVN.
During military discussions Khanh mentioned that during recent Do Xa operation,/4/
GVN had come upon proof of ChiCom involvement in that area and nearer to coast.
Proofs of Chinese involvement were in fact more conclusive there than in Delta.
/4/The "Weekly Report, The Situation in South Vietnam," June 3, reported that this
month-long operation against the Viet Cong Do Xa base ended on May 27. Although no
major engagement with VC forces resulted, the operation achieved one of its objectives:
the destruction of VC structure and food supplies. The report concluded that while losses
of men, materiel, and structures would not have a permanent effect on VC capabilities, the
operation represented a considerable setback. Johnson Library, National Security File,

Vietnam Country File, Vol. XI, Memos)
Secretary asked Khanh if something could not be done to penetrate highest levels of NVN
government and know what they were saying and how they were reacting to situation.
Khanh replied one promising possibility was NVN Under Secretary of State of
Agriculture. Not sure of his exact post. GVN hoped he would go abroad on official
mission to some such place in Soviet bloc as Hungary, where it would be easy (sic) for
GVN to contact him. Added that it was of course much easier to penetrate NFLSVN, and
GVN knew what its leaders were thinking, both the real Communist members and the
non-Communist window-dressing members. Re NVN, Khanh added that Americans and
British more likely to be informed than GVN. Comment: Unstated implication was that
only significant possibility of coverage would be by [less than 1 line of source text not
declassified] or by use of third country national agents.
In course of discussion of possible enemy reactions to escalation, Khanh remarked NVN
had commenced civil defense precautions and South had not. Secretary noted that
although North presented no significant air power threat, it was nevertheless impossible to
state with absolute certainty that North would be unable to deliver a single bomb on
Saigon before their air power was totally destroyed. Secretary noted Japanese had created
panic by dropping one single fifty-pound bomb in Calcutta during World War II. One
million people tried to cross a single bridge in purposeful flight. How would Saigonese
react? Khanh replied: Probably just as Indians did. Noted Saigonese not experienced in
matter of air warfare. He seemed inclined to go into matter of civil defense in more timeconsuming detail than Americans present wished. Secretary and Bundy headed off this
digression by remarking that only valid and credible civil defense was overwhelming
offensive capability, and our air force was indeed overwhelmingly superior.
Further to Hanoi reactions, Secretary remarked we purposely giving Sino-Soviet bloc
many indicators we are about to react to recent aggressions. Hanoi well aware we
overflying NVN, and that whereas earlier only 7 T-28's in Laos, now are 28. Additional
indicators being planted with Poles, Czechs, Soviets, etc. Some question as to how enemy
camp will react at various points in conversation. Khanh was obviously seeking some
more definite statement of specific American intentions in immediate future. Secretary
told him he could say nothing on this because he simply did not know. The Honolulu
meeting would produce some firm recommendations to the President and some plans, but
ultimately only President could decide. His decision would be influenced by consideration
of all implications of escalation: on our forces, on our allies, and perhaps even on
mankind itself if nuclear warfare should result. Only US had the means to cope with
problems escalation would pose. and only President could make the ultimate decisions.
Nevertheless, Secretary said he wished to emphasize the following:
a. Since 1945 US had taken 165,000 casualties in defense of free world against
Communist encroachments, and most of these casualties were in Asia.
b. US would never again get involved in a land war in Asia limited to conventional forces.
Our population was 190,000,000. Mainland China had at least 700,000,000. We would
not allow ourselves to be bled white fighting them with conventional weapons.
c. This meant that if escalation brought about major Chinese attack, it would also involve
use of nuclear arms. Many free world leaders would oppose this. Chiang Kai-shek had
told him fervently he did, and so did U Thant. Many Asians seemed to see an element of
racial discrimination in use of nuclear arms; something we would do to Asians but not to
Westerners. Khanh replied he certainly had no quarrel with American use of nuclear arms,
noted that decisive use of atomic bombs on Japan had in ending war saved not only
American but also Japanese lives. One must use the force one had; if Chinese used masses
of humanity, we would use superior fire power.
d. Regardless what decisions were reached at Honolulu, their implementation would
require positioning of our forces. This would take time. Khanh must remember we had
other responsibilities in Asia and must be able react anywhere we had forces or
commitments. Not by chance was this conference being held at Honolulu; the combined
headquarters of all American forces in Pacific was there.
e. A further complicating factor in all this was Sino-Soviet split. We would not want to
heal it by our actions.
f. In summary, US took problems of SEA very seriously, but we have to keep control of
events and keep events from getting control over us. The responsibility of the President
himself in all this was enormous, and only he could make the final decisions, and that
only after the conversations in Honolulu and consultations in Washington.
4. SVN Diplomatic Representation.
Secretary then asked Khanh what he was doing about appointing Ambassadors and
generally increasing effectiveness of GVN representation abroad. Khanh acknowledged
some action from him was long over due and said Ambassador had frequently reminded
him of this. Khanh had put off action on naming Ambassadors until Generals' case was
settled. Now Foreign Minister Quat was out of country. When he returned, Khanh would
take action. Secretary and Ambassador reemphasized importance of GVN achieving
effective representation abroad and making most of opportunities to get aid from friendly
third countries.
5. Further Disposition of Released Generals.
On closing, Khanh asked if any more questions. Ambassador said he would like to know
what Khanh thought the Generals, both Minh and detainees, said among themselves after
he left them in the room in Dalat after announcing his disposition of their case. Reply:
Minh probably said, "Look, fellows, I am sorry about this decision but I did all I could for
you." Don probably said, "You, Minh, are a stinker. You looked out for yourself and left
us to take the rap. Of all of us, only you came out of it all right." Khanh said both Kim and
Mai Hu Xuan had really feared that they would be shot, and cried from joy on hearing of
disposition their case. Khanh indicated that he fully aware he had not made friends of the
Generals he released. Acknowledged they might still like to conspire against him but
commented that after the vote of confidence he got from the other officers, it would be
clear to all that any attempt at conspiracy foredoomed to failure. (Khanh did not comment
on what jobs, if any, the Generals would be given or where they would be located.)
As can be seen, the Secretary let Khanh develop his ideas fairly fully and do most of the
talking. Khanh talked firmly and effectively, and responded well to the Secretary's several
points. He showed clearly that he was aware of the gravity of the decisions (though he did
seem a touch cavalier about the political problems of hitting eastern Laos at once), and did
not seem to want a firm US answer the day after tomorrow. But it seemed clear that he did
want it pretty soon, and was now convinced he could not win in South Vietnam without
hitting other areas including the North. He was careful to point out that the pacification
campaign was making gains and would continue do so. Still, it was essentially defensive.
On the timing, the Secretary said that any action would be preceded in any event by some
period of time for force deployments (he did not refer to diplomatic steps re Laos, the UN
side, the US Congressional problem, or other types of factors). Khanh understood this,
and also accepted the Secretary's point that we would need to consult very closely with
Khanh himself, try to bring the British and Australians aboard (the Secretary referred only
to these two possible active participants), and generally synchronize and work out the
whole plan with great care.
Rusk
187. Summary Record of a Meeting, Honolulu, June 1, 1964, 8:30 a.m.-12:30 p.m./1/
/1/Source: Department of State, S/S-NSC Files: Lot 72 D 316, NSAMs. Top Secret.
Prepared by CINCPAC. An attached list of partidpants is not printed. In all, 55 persons
attended the conference. After this plenary session, a group of approximately 15
principals met in restricted discussions (see Documents 188 and 189). The rest of the
participants formed four working groups, each to discuss one of the following issues:
Program for wider actions; Matters pertaining to South Vietnam; Logistical support
problems; and Psychological and informational actions. Summary reports of these
working groups, prepared by CINCPAC, are not printed.
I. OPENING PLENARY SESSION TO REVIEW THE SITUATION IN
SOUTHEAST ASIA
Secretary Rusk opened the meeting by stating that the purpose this morning was to assess
the situation in Southeast Asia as it exists today. He was seeking information as to where
we stand and what are the problem areas which would have a bearing on future policy
decisions.
A. South Vietnam
1. General review of the political situation. Ambassador Lodge opened the discussion
with an over-all review of the situation in South Vietnam. He characterized it as being still
generally unsatisfactory. He does not think that General Khanh has actually extended
government control over an additional two million more Vietnamese as he recently
claimed. Long An and Hai Nghia are two particularly bad provinces. While the intensity
of GVN activity has stepped up, the VC have also increased the level of their operations
with the result that such gains as GVN has achieved have been offset by the VC.
Within Saigon the police are as effective as they have ever been in maintaining internal
security, yet more Americans are being killed there all the time. This is due, of course to a
greater level of VC activity in the capital City.
When discussing Vietnam it must be remembered that we are not talking about a unified
country in any sense of the word. Internal divisions are manifold. It is a country where
many discordant elements live together. Catholics, Buddhists, Hoa Hao, Cao Dai,
Montagnards, etc. It is characterized by a general lack of patriotism and public spirit. In a
sense, it is a case of every man for himself with the Devil taking the hindmost. With this
as a background, we have to remember that what America is trying to do is to pull this
undeveloped country into the 20th Century as fast as we can.
Although we were able to get through Buddha's birthday on May 26 without serious
incidents, the possibility of religious trouble is always present. Credit for getting over this
anniversary was due primarily to General Khanh's patience and hard work with both
Catholic and Buddhist leaders, as well as extensive activity by the Embassy.
All in all, it would not be prudent for us to think that the situation in South Vietnam can
be expected to improve in the near future without our introducing something new and
significant into the equation.
General Khanh has managed to halt the general deterioration of political stability in the
country which began with the 8 May 1963 Buddhist disorders in Hue. He has injected
new pep into the army. He travels around the country making a major effort to give the
general population a psychological "shot in the arm" and raise their morale. He is trying to
build up the strength and esprit of the Civil Guard and the SDC. He is giving command
emphasis to the problem of improving the over-all psychological attitude of the people
and is making some headway in this regard. He appears to have emerged successfully
from the religious crisis stemming from discrimination against the Buddhists, which he
inherited from the Diem regime, and recently seems to have gotten himself "off the hook"
on the crisis of the four generals, although here he has exchanged one political problem
for another political problem of a different character. He has released the generals from
prison and has constituted them into a special staff to work together in Dalat. Of course
these four are under surveillance 24 hours a day, but at least they are not under lock and
key. In general, Ambassador Lodge's assessment of Khanh was that he is an able man,
who like his country has high potential.
In assessing the release of the generals, Ambassador Lodge felt that they were well under
control at present, that they had no possibility of organizing a coup in the near future, that
their popularity in the Army seemed to be exaggerated, and that in any event, General
Khanh had a sufficient following within the RVNAF to keep him in power.
Secretary Rusk asked if there seemed to be any widespread feeling in South Vietnam in
support of the Communist aims; was there any general revolutionary movement among
the population with direct loyalty to Hanoi? Ambassador Lodge said he did not think so.
A number of Vietnamese consider Ho Chi Minh a great leader, but any support for the VC
in the country-side is a direct result of their terrorism campaign which is extremely
effective. As soon as some "counterterrorism measures" can be initiated by the GVN, we
can expect to see this popular support for the VC change. By counter-terrorism measures,
Ambassador Lodge explained that he did not mean indiscriminate saturation bombing of
North Vietnam. That would have a bad effect on public opinion in the South. However, he
is convinced that the South Vietnamese would welcome a selective bombing campaign
against military targets in the North. This would bolster morale and give the population in
the South a feeling of unity and a sense of accomplishing something in the war.
Secretary Rusk asked if there were any private groups or popular movements in the GVN
that could be persuaded to come out publicly in support for the government program and
if there were, what would be the best way to get them to speak out? Ambassador Lodge
said that the strongest anti-Communist group in South Vietnam is the Catholics. In his
judgment this would have to be the core around which a really effective anti-Communist
political force would be built. The Hoa Hao and Cao Dai are also influential groups
totaling from two to three million people. At present they support General Khanh. The
Buddhists, while they have never denounced the VC publicly, still have been able to
prevent the VC from seriously infiltrating their ranks. Both the Buddhist and Catholic
leadership are cautious about taking a public position against the VC for fear that their
priests and bonzes in the villages might become targets for VC terrorist attacks. There is
also Mr. Buu's labor union, as well as numbers of rice farmers and rubber plantation
workers. The latter two labor groups can be expected to follow the lead of Mr. Buu and
his union. As far as "political parties" in South Vietnam are concerned, there are only two
of any importance, the Dai Viet and the VNQDD. Both of these are relatively small
groups most of whom are personal friends. Some have returned only recently from exile
in France. Neither are political parties in the U.S. sense of the word. They have no appeal
to the masses or any real mass base.
Secretary Rusk asked if United States had any inventory of trained Vietnamese personnel
living outside of Vietnam. Ambassador Lodge stated that General Khanh knew of some
that he would like to bring back, however past experience with this type of intelligentsia
has not been overly successful. The problem is that when they return to Vietnam they
generally feel they have not been given high enough positions to warrant their remaining.
GVN has asked UNESCO to survey this personnel problem and it is hoped that a specific
placement program for this type of trained Vietnamese can be developed. Mr. Colby
pointed out that there were a couple of hundred thousand Vietnamese living in France as
French citizens. However, very few of these are particularly interested in returning to
South Vietnam and we cannot expect to find many recruits among them. In fact
Ambassador Lodge pointed out that more and more of the educated Vietnamese are
leaving the country to seek their future elsewhere.
Mr. McCone asked if there was not some political approach that might be made to the
Vietnamese leadership which would cause them to put aside their differences for the
duration of the war and work together in a unified way against the VC. Ambassador
Lodge said there was more national spirit today than there was five years ago. He was of
the opinion that if we bombed Tchepone or attacked the Swatow boats and the
Vietnamese people knew about it, this would tend to stimulate their morale, unify their
efforts and reduce the quarreling among themselves as it would focus their attention on a
common enemy and enable Khanh to make more effective his appeal to put the whole
country on a war footing.
Ambassador Lodge stated that the Papal Delegate in SVN and Archbishop Binh of Saigon
were both good men. On the Buddhist side he said that the Venerable Tam Chau is a good
man, and that Tri Quang is a natural politician and a very important man in the country.
Ambassador Lodge has tried to impress upon Tri Quang the importance of sharing a more
active responsibility for the fate of his country. He has told Tri Quang that he could be a
world figure if he was prepared to step forward and assume a greater responsibility for
events.
Secretary Rusk asked if there was any major personality or leader on the Vietnamese
scene. Ambassador Lodge said that he did not see any. Aside from General Khanh
himself, there is always "Big" Minh, but in Lodge's judgment the latter fills the bill of a
natural leader even less today than he did in the early days of the war. The most
prominent figure, Deputy Prime Minister Hoan, does not have any substantial personal
following either.
Secretary Rusk asked if there would be any merit in the suggestion that the Office of the
Chief of State might be made more important and used in some way to create a greater
sense of Buddhist and Catholic unity. Ambassador Lodge has already explained to Khanh
that the art of politics was the art of inclusion, not exclusion of divergent views. Khanh
has made a real effort to include both Catholic and Buddhist and other elements in high
positions in government today. In fact he has done about as much as he can to bring
together all points of view. The Ambassador's feeling was that it would be better to leave
things as they are for the time being and not try to inject a new emphasis on the Chief of
State role or reorganize the government. It seemed preferable to leave the Ministers where
they were and to work around them if necessary.
Secretary Rusk asked if General Khanh himself felt the situation had deteriorated since he
took office. Ambassador Lodge said no. Khanh thinks that what has happened is that both
sides have stepped-up the intensity of their activities. This applies not only to in-country
VC activities, but external factors also.
Secretary McNamara expressed concern that things were going badly in South Vietnam,
citing desertion rate increases as a case in point. He was of the opinion that this
unfavorable trend of events will not be reversed unless something new is injected into the
situation to cause a change.
Secretary Rusk asked whether the general administrative ineffectiveness of the
government was due to defective administrative procedures or poorly trained
administrative personnel. Ambassador Lodge thought the fault lay in the antiquated
administrative procedures, most of which were inherited from the French Civil Service
System, rather than personnel. Mr. Manfull added that since the November coup,
bureaucrats have been reluctant to assume responsibility for fear of another sudden
change of administration. Moreover Vietnamese administrative personnel work on a
different and much more leisurely time frame than we are accustomed to in the United
States. As far as the administration in the country-side is concerned, there is the perennial
problem of lack of trained personnel to work at the district, village and hamlet levels. We
cannot look forward to any quick improvement in this area.
2. Military and security situation: General Westmoreland presented a brief overview of
the military situation in Vietnam under the subheadings of Control, Personnel
Management, Resource Management and Operational Effectiveness. Control is important
as both the goal and the measurement of success. Government control of rural population
continued to decline during the first quarter of calendar year 1964. It fell from 79% on 31
December 1963 to 75% on 31 March 1964. But the rate of decline slowed and the trend in
April started to rise slowly, yes--but this indicates that while the situation is grim, the
prospects are not.
Hamlets of New Rural Life (formerly called Strategic Hamlets) as a program and
reflection of Government control made gains in areas open to US impact where money
and material could help. However, in the more significant aspects of control, i.e., mutual
trust (in the government by the people and in the people by those in authority) there was a
failure to meet objectives and an actual decline. This is best shown in the decline in the
percent of MAP supported hamlet militia programmed to be armed which have actively
been armed, and in the percent of completed hamlets having their authorized number of
armed hamlet militia squads. No doubt the VC understood and exploited this situation
because, although the trend line in VC attacks declined, the VC initiated incident line
continued its upward course.
The brief analysis of selected indicators of control shows the need for long duration
pacification operations to establish firm separation of the population from the VC and
restore the confidence of the people in the ability and desire of the government to protect
them from the VC.
A major problem facing MACV is that of personnel management in the Vietnamese
Armed Forces. The review and analysis of the last quarter of year 1963 touched upon the
demoralization of the middle level of management in the Vietnamese Armed Forces
following the loss and replacement of military and civil leaders after the 1 November
coup. Their discontentment when neither progress nor leadership materialized and the
apathy when General Khanh took over on 30 January appeared to have reached the
ordinary soldier in the first quarter of calendar year 1964 and the desertion rate rose in an
alarming fashion. There are some indications of slight improvement. Volunteers in Aprilalmost a thousand-exceeded the entire total for the first quarter 1964 and the increase in
desertion rate slowed in April but the trend line continues to rise and points up the
demoralization of the Armed Forces. The combat unit level is where the strength declines
more rapidly than elsewhere because combat losses compound the desertion problem and
could rob us of the means to execute a sound and comprehensive national pacification
plan. This is the number one problem for joint GVN/US action.
Resource Management is one aspect of the military situation in Vietnam which is
improving and improving at a steady rate. Forces are being allocated to weigh the critical
provinces and major pacification efforts. General reserve forces have been released in
greater numbers to Corps and the Corps have used them well. The 3rd Regiment was
moved out of I Corps and used in the highly successful Ara Solour operation in III Corps.
It is now engaged in supporting 7th Division pacification operations in Dinh Tuong
Province. Two A1H fighter squadrons are coming into operational use with the third one
scheduled to be flying before the end of the calendar year. Another step forward is the
reorganization of the paramilitary forces. Decrees signed on 7 and 12 May redesignate the
Civil Guard as Regional Force and the Self Defense Corps and Hamlet Militia as the
Popular Force. The headquarters of both these forces are under the Ministry of Defense
and command arrangements are provided for down to the subsector level.
As to operational effectiveness, massive US effort to accelerate the tempo of military
operations has been successful in spite of the dislocations caused by two changes in
government. Although there was a slight downward trend in air support caused by the
training necessary for the activation of the third A1H squadron, the number of small unit
operations tripled in the first quarter of this year and battalion size operations doubled.
Battalion operations with contact rose to 58% also but small unit operations with contact
declined and remains at about 2%.
Here we note a paradox. The number of GVN operations of all types rose dramatically
above the rate of increase of VC initiated incidents, but there was no corresponding
increase of population or area under Government control. In fact, Government control
continued to decline. This establishes the fact that there is no direct relationship of []
between operating tempo and extension of control. Further, the failure to show an increase
in the effectiveness of operations in terms of contact in small unit actions highlights the
problem. If no contact indicates a VC disability incurred by increased presence of
Government forces, why was there no corresponding increase in area and population
under Government control?
The strength decline in the Armed Forces and high desertion rates in both the regular and
paramilitary forces also need to be considered. Canvassing alternatives and integrating
professional observations of the advisory effort, it is concluded that operations must be
aimed at retention and extension of control and this means more clear and hold operations
and fewer "safaris" with large formations which start from a secure area, sweep through a
contested area, then return to a secure area-and with no lasting contribution to
pacification. All things considered, there must be more attention to pacification oriented
tasks together with carefully selected morale building attacks against the VC when the
weight of good intelligence, planning and firepower are on the side of GVN forces. In
short, the philosophy and concepts of the Chien Thang National Pacification Plan need to
be translated into operational techniques.
One clear fact arises from this analysis. The GVN responded to the massive US advisory
pressure to increase the tempo of operations. Therefore, there is good reason to believe
that the GVN will respond to a massive, continuing US advisory program aimed at
pacification-oriented operations which result in control. This will be the prime objective
and the major theme for US advisory efforts in the months ahead.
In summary, General Westmoreland expressed the view that the entire military situation
in Vietnam today is tenuous, but far from hopeless. We have developed a means for
translating the good philosophy of the Chien Thang Plan into itemized requirements
which wild guide planning and measure the progress of our efforts towards national
pacification.
In response to a question by General Taylor, General Westmoreland indicated that the
chain of command for pacification operations ran from General Khanh to General Khiem
(the Secretary of Defense) to the Corps, the Divisions and then to the Provinces or Sectors
Secretary McNamara asked if there was a clear understanding on pacification matters as
to the chain of command and responsibilities of the division commanders and the province
chiefs. The discussion revealed that this matter had been clarified by General Khanh who
had decided that the Division Commander would be in the chain.
General Westmoreland indicated that he had considered a possible elimination or
reorientation of the III Corps headquarters with the 5th and 7th Divisions functioning as
independent divisions for operations in the critical provinces in the heart of the country.
He would give highest priority to pacification operations in the key areas immediately
surrounding the capital and would defer any major effort in the IV Corps area until later.
Secretary McNamara said he would like to go back to General Westmoreland's summary.
For the sake of discussion, he thought we should consider the military situation worse
than tenuous. It was approaching the hopeless category. Desertion rates are higher than
ever, the GVN was falling behind in recruiting to meet any of the force goals agreed upon
at our mid-March meeting. Morale in the armed forces is generally very poor and not
getting any better. The GVN has yet to deploy adequate forces into the key provinces to
meet the critical VC situation there. The three facts that seem to be unmistakably clear
are: (1) An average of 17,000 new recruits per month are needed, but at present the rate is
running around 1,000. (2) There is no evidence of any increase in either area or population
under government control. (3) The administration of the overall pacification effort is very
ineffective. As of today the GVN has only about 10-12 clear and hold operations
underway in the whole country and the gist of the reports on all of these operations is that
they are making little if any progress.
General Westmoreland stated that MACV had urged General Khanh to initiate an
intensive recruiting campaign. Nevertheless, during the month of May the percentage
recruited as compared to the goals indicated shortages of anywhere from 50 to 80%. There
have been at least two instances where a group of draftees have elected to join the VC
rather than the government. One of the propaganda themes of the VC is that Vietnamese
who join their ranks will be able to remain at their homes and will not be sent to other
parts of the country as is the case if they join the government. The fact of the matter is that
the government is in serious competition with the VC for recruits.
General Westmoreland pointed out that it is easier to recruit for the Civil Guard and the
SDC than it is for the regular Army as these units are not required to move from their
home area. His idea is that an attempt should be made to recruit for the regular Army from
the Civil Guard and SDC, taking personnel from those units who have indicated a desire
to follow a military career. Regular troops could then be deployed around the country
where needed. Regional and Popular Forces would be deployed as near where they were
recruited as possible, with the mission of securing cleared areas.
Secretary Rusk noted that morale is generally considered to be a function of leadership.
He asked for a report on measures being taken by General Khanh to improve the low
morale. General Westmoreland cited General Khanh's use of a more liberal promotion
policy, better pay, and prompt recognition of valor by awarding medals to deserving
soldiers. He went on to say that MACV studies indicated dependent housing is one of the
key factors affecting Vietnamese Armed Forces morale and that MACV hoped to be able
to submit specific recommendations on this problem within two weeks. Secretary Rusk
said that if this would improve morale we should get on with it as soon as possible. He
wondered, for example, if there would be any advantage in announcing some approval in
principle of this idea within a week. General Westmoreland pointed out that any
construction in Vietnam involved a lot of red tape and it would probably take at least six
months to get anything going under the Vietnamese system. For that reason, MACV is
even exploring the possibility of using U.S. prefabricated housing to cut down this time
lag. Secretary Rusk said that this was something we should push through the planning
stage as fast as possible so as to produce some tangible results quickly.
In response to a question from General Taylor as to whether the Vietnamese officers and
soldiers are willing to fight, Ambassador Lodge provided the Secretary with a paper on
this subject which had been prepared in Saigon./2/
/2/Not found. In telegram 2336 from Saigon, May 28, Lodge asked the Department of
State to inform McNamara that he had asked MACV to prepare a "definitive essay with
detailed examples, facts and 6gures to support our claim that the Vietnamese are brave,
effective fighters willing to sacrifice their lives in defense of their country." Lodge hoped
to bring it with him to Honolulu. (Ibid., Central Files, POL 27 VIET S)
General Westmoreland distributed a "spread sheet" which indicated MACV's concept as
to how to translate the Chien Thang National Plan, which was soundly conceived, into
specific actions. The chart includes three phases-Phase I, Clearing; Phase II, Securing;
Phase III, Developing. Secretary Rusk asked what the difference was between a pacified
area and a cleared area. General Westmoreland explained that a pacified area was one in
which the VC infrastructure had been completely eliminated whereas a cleared area was
one which had been swept clear of VC regular or guerrilla forces.
[Here follow sections entitled "South Vietnam, Economic situation and USOM status,
Psychological factors and programs;" "Laos, The military situation, Political situation;"
and "Thailand, Political situation and attitudes, Military appraisal."]
D. North Vietnam.
1. The military situation: CINCPAC J2 presented a briefing on the North Vietnamese
Armed Forces which currently include some 225,000 fighting troops.
Secretary McNamara asked if the North Vietnamese had any mode of transport for their
divisions. The answer was that their divisions are not motorized in the U.S. sense and
generally moved from one location to another by foot. Each division has some 150 2-1/2
ton trucks to move their supplies.
As to the general disposition of the PAVN deployments, the current order of battle
indicates they are neither disposed for offense or defense but rather are deployed
administratively as are U.S. forces in continental USA. The majority of their divisions are
located in the Red River delta. Their Air Force consists of some 76 aircraft, forty of which
are light transport. None are fighters or jets. There are five jet-capable airfields in North
Vietnam. Ambassador Lodge observed that the current deployments of PAVN units
seemed to be designed more to help the government maintain its control over the people
than anything else.
General Taylor inquired as to the status of North Vietnamese air defense. He was told that
it was relatively ineffective against high-flying jet aircraft but would be effective against
helicopters and prop-aircraft. Although NVN AC&W system was overlapped by the
Communist Chinese air defense system, there is no evidence to date that a combined
North Vietnamese-Chinese Communist air defense control center has been established. It
was pointed out that the AC&W and AAA were centered in the Hanoi-Haiphong
industrial area.
With respect to possible air operations against North Vietnam, General Smart stated that
our aircraft could probably go in and hit targets without any losses in an initial attack.
Secretary McNamara emphasized that whatever air defenses the North Vietnamese may
have, they are only effective where their guns are positioned. No missiles (SAM) are
known to be located in NVN. They simply do not have the air defense resources to
provide air defense for all their key targets. Consequently, it should certainly be possible
to plan an air attack on targets in North Vietnam which would avoid running into their
defended areas. Secretary McNamara asked that one of the working groups specifically
examine the proposed target system in North Vietnam from the point of view of the North
Vietnamese air defense capability.
Admiral Felt reminded everyone present that the North Vietnamese army did defeat the
French and this fact has certainly not been forgotten by the Thais and the Lao. As far as
these two countries are concerned, the Viet Minh soldier seems to be "one hundred feet
tall".
Secretary Rusk inquired whether there were any reports of ChiCom displacements of air
units towards the South of China. He was told that no such reports had been received,
however, the fact that the North Vietnamese possessed five jet-capable fields lends a
ready potential for deployment of Chinese Communist jet aircraft to North Vietnam at
some future date. Secretary Rusk brought the morning meeting to an end at 12:30 p.m. by
reminding those present that there would be no statements made to the press today. Some
form of communiqu would be issued at the end of the meeting and this would be a
problem for Mr. Rowan's working group to consider.
188. Summary Record of a Meeting, Honolulu, June 1, 1964, 2:15-6:15 p.m./1/

3470, Southeast Asian Strategy. Top Secret. The source text does not indicate who drafted
this account of the meeting.
MEETING OF PRINCIPALS
Secretary Rusk
Ambassador Lodge
Secretary McNamara
Ambassador Martin
General Taylor
Admiral Felt
Asst Sec State Bundy
Admiral Sharp
Asst Sec Def McNaughton
Lt General Westmoreland
Mr. Forrestal
Mr. Chadbourn/2/
Mr. Sullivan
/2/Philip H. Chadbourn, Counselor of the Embassy in Vientiane.
1. Assessment of Situation in SVN.
SecDef asked re situation in SVN: Is it deteriorating per evidence; weak planning at grass
roots; shifting administrators.
SecState said he did not believe it was deteriorating rapidly; not going downward as bad
as a year ago.
Lodge said if there is nothing new, SVN will probably jog along as is. Potential there to
do better. External things could have effect. Khanh has done a lot; improved things in last
4 months.
SecDef said that GVN controls less, lower fighting will, fewer men to fight. This though
better than would have been without Khanh.
SecState asked if there has been a downward trend since January.
Westmoreland said there is instability at SDC level because of coupe. Desertion rate is
final, delayed, manifestation of coup impact. Recruiting was stopped administratively. He
is not optimistic; but not pessimistic. Things have leveled off and there has been a slight
rise. Generals are finally getting the concept of pacification, and we are keeping them at
it. Some successful operations recently. Khanh is doing fairly well at getting good
commanders. Hopefully, the desertion rate will be reduced. Psywar is moving in right
direction. Plans now getting down to where we can get moving. Need a "victory" badly:
e.g., battlefield; pacification; hitting panhandle, etc. Can't pacify SVN completely as long
as the panhandle is open. If no "victory" but Khanh is in power, we'll move forward bit by
bit-by first of year should see substantial progress. Not spectacular. Should at least double
existing oil spots. We should see a leveling off and slight rise by the end of year.
Lodge anticipated some improvement if Khanh lives; jogging along. Hitting the North
would be a shot in the arm. It would weaken the VC and lift the GVN. We should be in
considerably better shape if Khanh remains in for a year. SecState reminded that we
shouldn't get ourselves hung on Khanh's survival. If Khanh gone, USA must start again.
SecDef said we need plan to apply if Khanh gone. He is not happy with Kim.
Lodge said maybe we'll have no government at all.
SecDef summarized that the opinion at the table is that there is no great pressure for
drastic action at this time; SVN is not deteriorating rapidly.
McCone said that while deterioration may not be fast, a dramatic victory for the VC could
be very negative; and what of the deteriorating morale of people themselves.
Westmoreland said that instability has just filtered down. Also, of course, there is war
weariness.
Taylor reported that Buu said morale surprisingly good.
Sullivan said that Bob Thompson agreed.
Westmoreland added that the VC have their morale problems too.
2. Measures which might be taken in SVN.

Lodge said we should organize the police in the chosen bad provinces to kill off terrorism.
McCone remarked that Castro did it effectively in Cuba.
Westmoreland said that the Civil Defense Corps may have been designed with this task.
SecState pointed out that Saigon has something like this.
Felt repeated his offer of Civil Affairs military people who can help on this.
SecDef suggested that we consider this as one of recommendations, along with other
actions, in the chosen provinces. He asked what else?
Westmoreland said, first we must designate the critical critical provinces and get GVN to
accept the concept. Then we must infuse resources and cadres of GVN and US advisors,
and create a task force to monitor, on a day-by-day basis, the operation. He suggested 8
provinces in "Phase I"; 1 in "Phase II"; and 1 in "Phase III."/3/ He omitted Kien Hoa
because it would be too much of an undertaking; not of sufficient strategic importance.
/3/References are to the phases in the Chien Thang or National Pacification Plan; see
Document 187.
Felt dissented re Kien Hoa.
Westmoreland would move in troops, probably borrowed from Corps II. He would not
abandon the lower half of Corps IV. It is politically unacceptable.
Taylor suggested that if we can't do 8 provinces, do fewer. Also, he is bothered by the
absence of centralized control of the program.
Westmoreland said that General Hon will take over the 5th Division (he worked with
Cushman). Saigon will jump over Corps III and work directly with 5th and 7th Divisions.
There would be an interdepartmental (US/GVN) task force. We would make Colonel
Depuy the US representative. The task force would meet in Colonel Lake's office
(Ministry of Rural Life).
Lodge said that, when the point is raised, Khanh acts interested in it, but never does
anything.
Westmoreland said that the troops would be under the command of the province chief
(who must be good and have US advisors). Although the province chief would be under
the division commander, troops couldn't be removed by the division commander. There
would be a team of 25 people (1/2 US, 1/2 VN) in a province. Extend down to district. If
we say four districts per province, with 6 US and 6 VN per district, require 35-40 US
military per province and 5 USOM. They would be a training team to work with
counterparts at province and district level from 2-6 months--as long as needed. This over
and above existing military and USOM there. Could call them a "Pacification Task
Force." They would pair off with GVN representatives. The division commander will hold
back small reserve (companies); also there is a reserve in Saigon (battalions) to be called
on. So no need to divert the province chief's pacification forces. He reminded that sons of
most families in bad areas are in the VC. Find only old folks, women and kids there. What
happens if youth can't come home? This is a problem that takes time.
SecDef said we should concentrate on the 8 provinces. Take the 500 men out of existing
assets. We can't do this in less than 90 days-6 months if we recruit. Shouldn't wait. So we
must drain off elsewhere in SVN to get going immediately. Can get military all right. As
for USOM, we can transfer people from military to temporary duty with USOM for the
time being.
Westmoreland said that the reorganization will free up some men.
SecDef asked if the first thing the team does is to lay out, with district chief, the
pacification plan step by step in the district, and the allocation of resources (forces, cadres,
etc.) and timing.
Westmoreland said that we are trying it out now in Go Cong.
SecDef asked if Westmoreland needed more men to provide "stiffening" for the GVN
paramilitary.
Westmoreland said that that was already included. Also we should increase from one
officer and one noncom to 2 plus 2 per battalion. We need 30 officers and 30 men per
division-or, in 8 provinces, about 75 men. They would be battalion advisors. This is for
the regular Army. For the CG and SDC, the 40 men per province already mentioned can
take care of it.
Taylor asked if we need 4 men per district to do unit training of paramilitary and to plan
operations.
Westmoreland said that his 6 + 6 at district level absorbs Taylor's 4.
Lodge said that then we must consolidate by police, to get the population [under?] control.
SecDef asked what about curfews, identification, etc., in critical provinces.
Westmoreland said that we have tried a blockade of the Mekong (with limited success).
Some curfews-left to local decision. Results have been disappointing.
SecState said that, re police, he was for on-the-job training.
Westmoreland said that we need 4 weeks at least to be sure the man is reliable. Also,
though highly desirable to integrate police forces into the Phase I operations, there are not
enough police now to do it until maybe Phase III.
SecDef said we should agree that the functions, by military (or paramilitary) will be in
Phase I. He asked if we need anything else. Piasters? Information Program? We can
supply radios in 2 or 3 weeks if we must. He said we should leave this with Bill Gaud. We
could pay for the radios from MAP and deliver them by air.
SecState said maybe we should ask the Japanese to give the radios.
SecDef asked what about the "economic leg" of the 3-legged stool: Medicines, materials
for schools, etc. He said we need a package.
SecState said we should use it as bait for pacification.
Westmoreland said we better pay for civil servants too.
SecState commented that it's hard to escalate from business-as-usual to war-with-China
just to jog folks a little.
Lodge suggested better population control, perhaps a curfew fo~r all (not just US),
declaration of some kind by Khanh, a night-shift war, promises of land to vets,
promotions (rank to go with command). Re Americans, there is some business as usual.
Re parties, we do want continued US-VN association. Could remove dependents.
SecDef said there are three things we could do: Stop inflow of dependents; encourage
them to go home; order them home.
Lodge said he was now encouraging kids to go home for the summer (at own expense).
SecDef guessed that more would get out if we paid their transportation home and their
tuition.
Westmoreland said that there are now 113 MACV authorized with families (cut by 40
recently). No dependents means a 1-year tour. But also, families sometimes pay their own
way; 103 such cases now.
SecDef said this could be stopped.
SecState asked what resources we had, to make use of national emergency, to set aside
peacetime regulations-e.g., accounting for the property, etc. Would let us tell agencies to
get things done. We should get our lawyers at it.
Westmoreland said he could save people by streamlining certain procedures, but not save
much time that way.
Lodge said he wants to stop the flow of dependents. Chadbourn remarked that it would be
discriminatory. He said it would lift morale, but show a lack of confidence in the
outcome.
Taylor said it would not lift military morale.
SecDef asked what about sending dependents to the Philippines. We could pay
transportation and allow visits.
SecDef asked if further "encadrement" in the other provinces is wise. He distinguishes (1)
for training, (2) for planning and (3) for stiffening.
Westmoreland said we are getting advisory experience in 13 districts now. Have 150 or so
relevant districts (239 districts, 40 capitals of which are province capitals, and 40 of which
are not usefully accessible). With 2 officers and 2 men in each, would assist in training
paramilitary and supervising them. Problems are (1) interpreter shortage, (2) would
probably triple U.S. casualties. On the plus side: The men (1) would be good as "agents"
for MACV, (2) would be catalysts for action for MACV, and (3) could help in training
and operations. Query as to net value. It would not divert many GVNs to protect the
Americans. They would have to stay 6-9 months to do the job. He prefers to work on the 8
"damn critical" provinces. He can scrape up enough interpreters. (The GVN portion of 6plus-6 Task Force would speak English).
SecState asked about possible use of third country assistance. He said it is important that
we get these people out there soon, that they be distributed around country, and that their
participation be coordinated with GVN before request and before arrival.
Gaud said that third countries could help with police.
SecDef said, re facilities to match up with third country medical, manpower contributions,
we will provide the facilities.
SecDef then asked about the proposal to make the government one of "technicians"?
Lodge said it is better to work around the politicians like FDR did; the politicians are not
getting in way; they have symbolic value; there should be no "purge".
McCone asked if we can recruit able South Vietnamese in SVN and outside.
Lodge said Khanh doesn't trust them and for good reasons.
Lodge remarked that Khanh may send Big Minh to USA as ambassador.
SecState, re "civil encadrement", defined it as "an adviser in the next office".
Lodge said he would favor this only if invited in urgently by Khanh.
Forrestal asked what about "joint operations committees".
Lodge said he did this in the piaster settlement--an ad hoc thing. But if the idea were
institutionalized, it would go against the GVN grain and look like "colonialism".
Gaud asked if it couldn't be done for the very critical provinces. and then expanded to the
entire pacification program.
Westmoreland pointed out that, in the Directorate of Rural Life, there is such a thing. The
principle, on ad hoc basis, is not so bad. Also, he favors fewer direct contacts by so many
people with Khanh and more formal contacts when contacts are made.
SecState said that the Ambassador should coordinate all contacts with Khanh.
SecDef asked about the idea of co-location of headquarters.
Westmoreland said that the pacification effort should be integrated as he had described.
He added that, now, we have a number of officers permanently at JGS and JOC
combined. He opposed advisory representation at the company level, but he favored a
beefing up of the battalion team. He would change if from 2 officers and 4 man to 2 plus
3. This would mean 377 more people. (This includes 29 officers--one with each artillery
battalion, where we now have no officers.)
SecDef suggested that we address the information program and the offensive guerrilla
force tomorrow.
SecState added intelligence operations across the border.
Westmoreland reported that we now have 4 6-man VN ranger paratrooper teams in
training. They are for intelligence (looking) only. They will be dropped on 6/15 into the
trees. They are to operate North and South of Rt. 9 (unaccompanied by Americans). On
7/15, double it to 8x6; on 8/15, 16x60. They are to stay there 30 days, be air supplied and
removed by helicopter.
Taylor said that Westmoreland should look at what he would do if the limits were lifted.
Adjourned at 1815 until 0830, 2 June 1964.
189. Summary Record of Meetings, Honolulu, June 2, 1964, 8:30-11:50 a.m. and
2:15-4 p.m./1/
3470, Southeast Asian Strategy. Top Secret. The source text does not indicate who drafted
this record of the meeting.
PRINCIPALS' MEETING
Secretary Rusk
Secretary McNamara
General Taylor
Mr. McCone
Mr. Rowan
Mr. W. Bundy
Mr. McNaughton
Mr. Gaud
Mr. Forrestal
Mr. Sullivan
Ambassador Lodge
Ambassador Martin
Admiral Felt
Admiral Sharp
LtGen Westmoreland
Mr. Chadbourn
McCone summarized his assessment of the situation in SVN. He sees the downward spiral
as continuing; he views the internal dissension and business-as-usual as making value of
"encadrement" doubtful; he saw a dramatic VC victory as demoralizing. He sees erosion
of the will to resist. He does not see the situation as "unrecoupable" but grim.
Felt remarked that if we pulled troops out of Corps II it would leave Quang Ngai exposed.
A dramatic VC attack could "fix the clock".
[Here follow discussion primarily on Laos.]
Rowan gave Information Report. He said there was a good deal of unanimity. He
addressed the press in particular and psychology in general. The press will continue to
write pessimistically. Defeats will be defeats and lassitude will be lassitude. But we can
improve our propaganda. It must be part and parcel of every step we take.
(1) Improve morale of South Vietnamese. Doubt that victory can be won without more
support of SVN people. Since there is no inspired leadership, the job is to make Khanh
and his government look inspired. E.g.:
(a) Fireside chats on a regular basis (tape 3 or 4, 10 minutes long, with synchronized
sound to interlock with film from field). We have film capacity. Khanh can't do it all
himself. To extent feasible, might bring in other governmental leaders. Some of this going
on now.
(b) Radios for rural areas. Ask Japan for 100,000 (as cheap as $1 each). Gaud says 10,000
are there; 25,000 are on the way, 65,000 no problem. McCone said let's have 200,000
then.
(c) With every military unit in field with US advisers, one should have no responsibility
other than propaganda. He should be alert to VC atrocities and mistakes. He could
interview bereaved widows; he could take pictures. Now have 42 US military in training
for this role. Westmoreland says in Binh Duong there is an experiment with "Go teams"one for this sort of thing. Felt says we never see any of this Rowan says they will be alert
to heroism for newspapers and radios. This has overlapping effect (e.g., on US newsmen).
Re the 42 military men, they won't be out of school until November!
(d) Courage is contagious. Recently, series of stories of heroism compiled. This should be
continuous and for immediate exploitation. Maybe cash gift or piece of land.
(e) Mission should press for land reform in Delta.
(f) CIA has 200 Agitation-Propaganda teams doing word-of-mouth propaganda.
(g) Explore role US youth might play in firing up SVN youth. Lodge is apprehensive
since the idea seems not to be directed. Quality of people is important.
(h) Also try to find US and third country exchange professors. Lodge agrees. Add 7 field
service advisers, for the provinces.
(j) Press the Minister of Info to call in their people for training.
(k) Try to write a song for SVN.
(l) Find a good story-teller in GVN units.
(2) Propaganda directed to North. Many of the above ideas will apply. Begin in-service
training program. USIA will take over White programming in Hue in September. Lodge
said Reds use guitar-playing story-telling types to good effect. Could use US singer who
memorized bit. Westmoreland said ARVN does a good deal of this. Lodge asked if we are
advising VN to keep people's minds full. Rowan said Minister of Info promised to do it.
We are pressing.
(Rusk and McNamara returned at 1105)
(3) Program aimed at US and rest of the world. Must restore credibility of US. Military
representatives said they had to lie too often. We have caused US newsmen to lie. We
must make a new start to cure suspicion and cynicism. Recommend: (a) Fresh info
directive (e.g., re Napalm, helicopters, jets, defoliants, Farmgate) giving discretion to
Lodge and MACV. SecDef said should wipe off old directive, replace with new position;
query if state publicly everything we are doing; against lying to press, but not against
certain restrictions. Felt said "jets" should not be on the list; no question there; training
operations.
Rowan continued: (b) More cohesive press program. Non U.S. newsmen don't get full
briefings. Non-resident US newsmen, more of which will be visiting, should be treated
properly. Favor a "communications czar"-a civilian-heading up all of it. SecDef said could
have a policy czar in embassy and operations in MACV. Westmoreland queried how it
would work. Rowan said he envisioned a czar who would receive, say, visitors and make
all contacts. Westmoreland asked if this merely raises the level of the press attache. Lodge
said it could free military from this kind of worry. MACV publicity is "defensive" and
"reactive". We have lousy news stories. No one at MACV looking at it from "positive"
viewpoint. SecDef said he would like a propaganda chief operating under Lodge. Sees
that press gets to the right things to tell the story. It can't be done from the US; must be
done in SVN. Lodge says they are straightened out vis-a-vis the embassy, but not in
MACV.
Rowan continued: The man's status must be up. Colonel Baker hasn't enough weight.
Can't ensure space on helicopters. (c) Bad stories are reports of gripe stories. But can
minimize military sounding off. (d) PA officers are substandard--some with no
experience, some resistance in D.C. Rule in USIA will be pick good men. Felt asked if we
could get reservists to do it. SecDef queries if they would volunteer. He said we have
enough PA officers in DOD; we can get them out there.
Lodge says any "czar" must be in on military discussions to see the angles. Westmoreland
said the problem is how to keep the man in on everything. SecDef said the question is not
lack of knowledge, but lack of proper orientation. Decided Westy should review
competency of men and replace the incompetent. Felt said there had been transportation
availability. Westmoreland said the whole thing has to be managed by MACV. Rowan
said the "czar" could be high-ranking military. Westmoreland suggested Lt. Col. Breaulet.
Rowan said the rank was too low.
Taylor asked about the problem in USA. SecDef said we need a "czar" there too, and it
should be on our agenda in Washington. Manning distinguished the case needed
internationally (Jordan-type case) and in US (SVN will to fight, etc.).
SecDef said that if create a "czar" in Saigon, need (1) positive approach and (2) quick
response on bad stories. Though 63% of US not "concerned," one half of remainder think
will do a bad job (obsolete equipment, lack of will to fight, ruthless GVN, inefficient
government, graft). Recommend that Zorthian's job be enlarged to handle this job.
McCone said we should not short-change the job inside SVN. SecDef agreed, but
suggested larger staff. Rowan said that is partly why he picked Art Hanes (?) to be
Zorthian's deputy. SecDef said we should agree to leave it in Lodge's hands to request
what he needs.
McCone asked about radio broadcasting capability in SVN; which he considers more
important than broadcasting to the North. He thinks we should do more with transmitters.
Zorthian said the problems are programs and receivers.
(1150 adjourned for lunch) Resumed 6/2/64--1415
Rusk asked whether there is a Joint Pacification Committee in Saigon. Westmoreland said
that at the province level we have advisers. At division level we have GVN and U.S. staffs
and a USOM adviser to the general. At Corps level, advisers. Get to Colonel Lak's
Directorate of New Rural Life. MACV and USOM participate by officers physically
located there. Report to General Kim, executive agent for Pacification. Have Committee
on U.S. side: J-3, Zorthian, Manfull, Brent, Nes. It is formally "unilateral". Lodge said
they shy away from the GVN-U.S. groups which meet regularly-institutionalized. SecDef
says that he hopes there will be special meetings, almost regularly, for the very critical
Provinces Program. Westmoreland said he had this in mind.
SecDef raised the question of a successor to Khanh if he were assassinated. Doubtful
about Khiem. Lodge says it has been regularized. If all get assassinated, we probably
would have to work with the most promising Colonel near Saigon. Westmoreland said his
impression of Khiem is not bad; he cannot find a better one than Khiem. McCone said the
contingency plan would depend on how Khanh disappeared from the scene. Lodge said
we should think some about how we can exist in SVN if the government is hostile. Taylor
said we couldn't stay if armed forces are on the other side.
[Here follows a brief discussion on Thailand.]
Re the requirement of a joint resolution, SecDef said we would have to make major
deployments, make guarantees, anticipate escalation, and call up some reserves. The
political foundation is required.
Taylor said Chicoms could move air forces into NVN; VC could step up activity. These
are not too troublesome. But NVN may use [move?] its 5 divisions into SVN and Laos,
and Chinese could come in. They have their troubles, and we could be [have] 25-75%
interdiction effectiveness. In dry season, with 50% reduction factor, they could maintain
13 divisions. Even in wet season, about half of that. To hold along Mekong, take
someone's 5-7 divisions Saigon-Burma. We could punish heavily by air. Query how long
it would take to force them to desist. SecDef said this is why it is important to have solid
political base. We must be prepared to respond to this even before selective strikes begun.
McCone says that the probabilities are such that it would be reckless to make any move
against the North without the preparation: and, the preparations increase the probabilities.
Felt says they are capable of deploying 18 divisions against SEA. First, we hold with 5
U.S. divisions into SEA; then offensive by amphibious operation into North Vietnam.
SecDef said that this is a possible, not probable reaction. If we have controlled, selective
strikes, probably there won't be attacks against SVN. But they are possible, so must be
prepared. [3 lines of source text not declassified]
SecState referred to Cuba II. We did not expect USSR to strike with nuclears, but risk so
great that it had to be taken into account and faced. He then referred to Korea. MacArthur
thought 2 divisions enough, then 4, then 7. He recommended crossing 38th parallel on
ground China would not come in. China did come in and maintained 500,000 men despite
our air superiority. In Laos, we may isolate U.S.S.R.; but re SVN, U.S.S.R. as better as
China [sic]. Soviet might intrude via Berlin or elsewhere. We do what must be done, but
this is a major decision requiring full national support. Other side won't roll over and play
dead. In 1953-54, France-U.K.-U.S. agreed when threat. If agreed to partition of VN, why
not Laos, etc.? So President must face all this. And the nuclear part of it. Not impossible.
Taylor said if McCone's and SecDef's pessimistic view is right, we can err by inaction too.
SecState agreed.
McCone suggested the resolution itself would be a deterrent. E.g., the Middle East
resolution gotten long before needed. Lodge asked what the resolution might say. Sullivan
read from draft ("to use all measures on request"). They come from Middle East
resolutions. Lodge suggested that it be extended to "the independent nations of SEA".
Lodge said VC could make Saigon uninhabitable, shooting from the nearby areas they
control.
Chadbourn said Unger wants to know how far he can go talking to Lao. (1) Re extension
of "our war" into Panhandle. Probably Souvanna less sensitive about that now. SecState
said some things we may have to do without talking to Lao. Object of exercise is to make
NVN desist. SecDef said if PL moved on, we might strike NVN. Rusk said it would be
hard to get U.S. or Allies to support Siho/2/ if Souvanna backs out. A lot depends on
Souvanna's attitude.
/2/General Siho Lamphouthacoul, head of paramilitary police in Laos, attempted
unsuccessfully on April 19 to overthrow the government of Souvanna Phouma.
Taylor remarked that the time factor is important. SecState said he saw nothing quickly
unless PL move on. Will take some time to handle physical and political base. Taylor said
it would be 8/64 before 3 squadrons of A1's in (6 squadrons by 2/15); B-57's in any time;
Khanh says he needs a "firm base"-by end of the year; some trouble with U.S. 5-7
divisions (e.g. calling up some reserves and shipping requiring perhaps 2 months).
Westmoreland would like to build up manpower, get pacification base, squeeze 12
battalions out for the Laos border, and rainy season. Taylor recommends being ready by
middle of November. SecDef said we envision a resolution with perhaps a long wait. A
month of preparation, public and private, required for a resolution. In meantime, we must
head off hardening of opposition to our policy in SVN. SecState said large group strongly
opposes U.S. boys in Asia.
[Here follows a brief discussion on Laos.]
(Meetings terminated at 1600.)

Saigon, June 2, 1964--3 p.m.
/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 23-9 VIET S. Secret; Immediate;
Exdis. Also sent to CIA. the Office of the Secretary of Defense. the White House, JCS,
and CINCPAC.
2377. CINCPAC for Ambassador Lodge and De Silva.
1. During the past several days we have had chance to sit down [less than 1 1ine of source
text not declassified] and review the situation emerging from the 28 May Dalat disposition
of charges against Major Generals Tran Van Don, Ton That Dinh, Le Van Kim, Mai Huu
Xuan, and Brigadier General Nguyen Van Vy.
2. Considerable uneasiness exists both because original charges of pro-neutralism were
neither proffered nor sustained and because the Generals now that they are free and
together have a far greater capability to engage in anti-regime coup plotting. A key factor
is the attitude of Major General Duong Van (Big) Minh. [less than 1 line of source text
not declassified] who conversed with Minh immediately after the court of honor
terminated, states Minh was definitely unhappy with those proceedings and said as much
in aside to him. Minh also stated that he would be remaining in Dalat with the newly
released Generals through 2 June, returning to Saigon 3 June, at which time he desired to
see [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] again. Generals Don and Kim
likewise, but in a friendly fashion, urged caution on the part of [less than 1 line of source
text not declassified] but did not explain the reason for such caution. The circumstances
were such that discussion was impossible.
3. Again, [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] General Kim, probably the most
perceptive of the Vietnamese Generals, had emerged from his detention somewhat aged
and strained. By contrast, General Dinh appears more physically and mentally fit than
ever before. There were no perceptible, remarkable changes in the other detainees.
4. The ex-detainees, although stripped of command, have been given the function of
creating among themselves a special planning staff. Among them are some of the best
minds and tacticians that the Vietnamese Army has known. Kim is politically and
administratively astute. Dinh, while tending to flamboyance, has in the past shown tactical
skill. Don still has some following in both military and civilian circles, particularly I
Corps, although aspirant General Nguyen Chanh Thi, Deputy I Corps Commander, was
the only member of the MRC to demand the continued detention of the Generals. Xuan is
clever and well-connected, with undoubted lines both into the French and VC camps. Vy,
who suffered a heart attack following the events in Dalat and is now in the Grall Hospital,
is a long-time friend and supporter of Khanh and can be dismissed from the role of
probable coup plotters.
5. It is probably true Khanh has these officers under careful surveillance. The quantity of
the surveillance, as proven by past experience, may not be entirely adequate, particularly
given the fact that the families of the Generals have been brought to Dalat and have used
the interval between 30 January and the present to test and probe former loyalties and to
secure means of clandestine communication.
6. Although it is not explicit in any statement or action of the ex-detainee Generals, they
must know the Dalat affair is but the first of many steps designed for them by Khanh. If
they believe this, and if they have any aspirations towards gaining power, and we must
assume they have, then they probably conclude they must act quickly. We believe that the
profundity of the crisis which could attend a power grab on the part of these individuals is
such that urgent and strong measures should be agreed upon to halt them before they
move.
7. In this light it is recommended that we be authorized to have [less than 1 line of source
text not declassified] inform Minh, Kim and the others that they would not have American
support before, during or after any new coup attempt and to emphasize that such rash
actions on their part would lead only to American disengagement and a probable
Communization of SVN. We believe we can make this point effectively with them in such
a fashion that they would believe it. We must state this position, however, as upon the
highest authority in Washington and without conditions./2/
/2/Ball recommended that this authority should be granted by Rusk in Honolulu in
consultation with Lodge. (Tosec 68, June 2; ibid.) Rusk and Lodge sent Nes the
authorization in Secto 40. June 2. (Ibid.)
8. [less than 1 1ine of source text not declassified] will be contacting Minh again at his
request on Wednesday morning./3/ He plans merely to listen and elicit further details of
Minh's mood and thinking. Because of time factors it may become urgent, however, that
we have within our arsenal, for immediate use, the authority to take the position outlined
above.
/3/June 3.
9. We are of course alert to reactions to the Dalat affair and are carefully probing military
attitudes particularly. A Mission assessment of reaction among various power groups will
be transmitted next day or two. So far, we have no evidence to indicate strong military
reaction for or against the Dalat decisions.
10. As a contingency, however, the use of the statement of position noted above could be
effective in giving military opinion one way or the other on the matter or another coup. If
we wait until we are faced with a move by the Generals (and that moment may quickly or
never come) we might lose by a few hours the possibility of forestalling such actions. In
the interest of time we recommend that we be suitably empowered to approach the
Generals as outlined above if and when this is clearly essential. We would not, however,
unless so instructed plan the approach prior to Amb Lodge's return from Honolulu end
this week.
11. Charge has shown General Harkins this message and he concurs.
Nes
191. Memorandum From the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (Taylor) to the
Secretary of Defense (McNamara)/1/
CM-1450-64
Washington, June 2, 1964.
7425, Vietnam 381. Top Secret. A note on the source text indicates that McNaughton saw
this memorandum.
SUBJECT
Transmittal of JCSM-471-64. "Objectives and Courses of Action-Southeast Asia"
1. On 30 May 1964, the Joint Chiefs of Staff considered the subject paper and directed the
Joint Staff to recast certain parts to make it acceptable to all Chiefs. The recasting was
done but because of the desire to get it to you before your departure for Honolulu on 31
May, it was dispatched by the office of the Director, Joint Staff before being seen by all
the Chiefs in its modified form. When I saw it on 31 May prior to leaving with you for
Honolulu, I found that it did not entirely conform to my views and directed its withdrawal
from your office pending further consideration by the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Nevertheless,
because of its pertinence to the impending discussions in Honolulu, I made it available to
you and Assistant Secretary McNaughton as a paper still under consideration and not
approved in its existing form.
2. The Joint Chiefs of Staff met on this paper on June 1 and made several changes in
language which they have cabled to Honolulu. They requested that the paper be modified
and transmitted to you. To meet their request, I am attaching it in modified form to this
memorandum. It should now be considered an agreed JCS paper less the views of the
Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, which I will submit later./2/
/2/Document 199.
Maxwell D. Taylor
Chairman

Attachment
Memorandum From the Joint Chiefs of Staff to the Secretary of Defense
(McNamara)/3/
/3/Top Secret; Sensitive.
JCSM-471-64
SUBJECT
Objectives and Courses of Action--Southeast Asia
1. Over the past few months and particularly in recent weeks, the Joint Chiefs of Staff
have given considerable attention and thought to our national purpose in Southeast Asia.
In this context they are concerned because of what they consider to be a lack of definition,
even a confusion in respect to objectives and courses of action related to each objective.
2. The Joint Chiefs of Staff consider that it is their first obligation to define a militarily
valid objective for Southeast Asia and then advocate a desirable military course of action
to achieve that objective. Based on military considerations, the Joint Chiefs of Staff
consider that the United States should seek through military actions to accomplish
destruction of the North Vietnamese will and capabilities as necessary to compel the
Democratic Government of Vietnam (DRY) to cease providing support to the
insurgencies in South Vietnam and Laos. Only a course of action geared to this objective
can assure that the North Vietnamese support of the subversive efforts in Laos and South
Vietnam will terminate. The Joint Staff currently is developing a new plan of action
against North Vietnam designed to achieve this objective. This plan will be completed as
a matter of urgency.
3. The Joint Chiefs of Staff are concerned that the military validity of the objective stated
above may not be recognized. They note that some current thinking appears to dismiss
this objective in favor of a lesser objective, on visualizing limited military action which,
hopefully, would cause the North Vietnamese to decide to terminate their subversive
support of activity in Laos and South Vietnam. This lesser objective is thus not geared to
destruction of capability but rather to an enforced changing of policy and its
implementation which, if achieved, may well be temporary in nature. The Joint Chiefs of
Staff consider that this lesser objective just described is militarily an inadequate objective
for the present situation, but would agree as an initial measure to pursue a course of action
to achieve this lesser objective.
4. In the event that US action is to be related to achievement of the lesser objective, it is
incumbent upon the Joint Chiefs of Staff to furnish their views as to the implementing
military actions. Assuming national authority chooses to pursue the lesser objective, resort
to a broad range and evolutionary development of miscellaneous activity can perpetuate
the inadequacy of present response and the impact on the North Vietnamese could be
delayed and even diffused and uncertain. Reluctance now to take positive action will
almost inevitably increase the price and gravity of such action when it is finally taken.
This situation exists because, in spite of more than two years of effort to convince a
determined enemy of our determination that he will not prevail, he has clearly increased
his effort and achieved improvement in his relative situation. Thus, even within the lesser
second objective, the time for continuing a monologue of "messages" that repeat the
substance or maintain the intensity of our past effort seems to us to be well past. If we
mean to send a "message" to convey the determination which must be part of our national
purpose if we really intend to prevail in this situation, we must recognize the requirement
to convey directly, sharply, even abruptly, that the situation has indeed changed insofar as
the United States is concerned. It appears that the way to convey that "message" now is
along the following lines:
a. Select carefully a limited number of target complexes-perhaps two-in North Vietnam.
b. In selecting these target complexes, screen carefully to assure that those chosen are in
fact directly and significantly associated with support of the effort in Laos and North
Vietnam; that they represent completely valid military objectives; that they are susceptible
to reasonable quick and precise destruction by air attack; that their destruction can be
achieved with minimum impact on civilian populations. (Appended hereto are summary
data on the target complexes selected in keeping with these criteria.)/4/
/4/Not printed.
c. Once the targets are chosen, appropriate planning action should be initiated to establish
readiness for implementation.
d. In relation to establishing readiness for this action, we must, of course, establish a
related readiness for implementing the course of action related to the first objective
discussed above since readiness for escalation must be clearly established as a matter of
military prudence and clearly demonstrated to achieve the full impact of the initial effort.
5. In summary, the Joint Chiefs of Staff conclude that:
a. There is no basis to be hopeful about the situation in Southeast Asia until and unless
North Vietnam is forced to stop supporting the insurgent activities in Laos and South
Vietnam.
b. The best way to achieve this objective is through destruction of the North Vietnamese
will and capabilities as necessary to compel the DRV to cease providing such support.
c. If there should be a national decision that the United States will resort to lesser
measures to cause the North Vietnamese to make a decision to terminate their subversive
activities, then we should not waste critical time and more resources in another protracted
series of "messages," but rather we should take positive, prompt, and meaningful military
action to underscore our meaning that after more than two years of tolerating this North
Vietnamese support we are now determined that it will stop.
d. Just as it is essential to convey a meaningful "message" to the North Vietnamese, it is
obviously also important that we convey to our Allies the will and determination of the
United States in this matter. In this connection, your attention is invited to the recent
comment of the US Ambassador to Thailand, who, in discussing current attitudes of our

important Thai Allies, made this significant statement (reference U.S. Embtel Bangkok to
Department of State 2014, DTG 241345Z May 64):/5/
/5/Dated May 24. (Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 LAOS)
"It should be clearly evident from recent reporting that events propelling Thai toward
massive re-examination value their commitment to West. At this moment they still believe
we would honor our undertakings but rapid pace recent events and mini mum U.S.
responses are almost visibly eroding confidence manifested last October, when I first
arrived."
a. In any national level discussions of action against North Vietnam, you seek precise
delineations of both objectives and their supporting courses of action.
b. In defining objectives, it be recognized that the Joint Chiefs of Staff consider that
termination of North Vietnamese support efforts in both South Vietnam and Laos can be
assured only through destruction of North Vietnamese will and capabilities as necessary
to compel the DRV to cease providing such support; based on military considerations, the
Joint Chiefs of Staff advocate acceptance of this objective and the initiation now of
measures designed to increase readiness for its achievement.
c. If is be determined that a lesser objective is to be adopted, the military implementation
thereof be geared to demonstrating an early sharp change in US outlook and
determination, generally as discussed in paragraph 4, above; that necessary supporting
actions be incorporated in an appropriate scenario, without however diffusing or delaying
in any way the impact of the deliberate signal of change.
J.W. Davis
Rear Admiral, USN
Deputy Director, Joint Staff
/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File. Memos to the President. McGeorge
Bundy, Vol. 5. Top Secret
SUBJECT
The Honolulu Team Returns
1. I have now talked with Dean Rusk, Mike Forrestal, and my brother Bill, and I am on
my way to see Bob McNamara, to whom I have talked briefly on the phone. The first
reading is that no one is recommending any major decision today or, indeed, in the next
few days.
2. Lodge and Westmoreland are marginally more optimistic than McNamara, McCone,
Forrestal, and Bill Bundy, and they have moved Dean Rusk a little toward their view.
Lodge thinks that we can "jog along" for some undefined period, and Westmoreland
would probably be happy with a relatively low-key decision to take military action
(imperfectly defined) in Southern Laos.
3. Rusk and McNamara, with different emphases, are also inclined to push military action
ahead of them, at least for several weeks, and possibly for quite a lot longer. Lodge
remains in favor of selective bombing of the North, but he has a much better
understanding than before of the necessity for facing a large amount of noise and the
possibility of serious escalation.
4. The plan for selective addition of American advisers, military and civil, in critical
provinces is moving ahead and has general support. At the same time, you need to know
that Lodge, and to a much less extent Westmoreland, are very wary of major U.S.
"encadrement" or "interlarding" and are accepting this plan more because Washington
urges it than because of deep belief in it.
5. Rusk reports that Lodge is very eager to have his Political Officer, Manfull, as Deputy
Chief of Mission, and shows no desire for any more ambitious reinforcement. The
Secretary obviously did not press the question with him, and reports his own conviction
that since Lodge will probably be leaving in a few months, it is not worthwhile to make an
issue of this. Forrestal and, I think, McNamara strongly disagree with this way of handling
it, but I do not yet have any idea as to how you can get past the combined reluctance of
Rusk and Lodge.
6. The one major new agreement growing out of Honolulu is that we need to centralize
authority for public information on Vietnam, both in Saigon and in Washington.
Moreover, there is agreement on the names of the men to do this job: Zorthian of USIA in
Saigon, and Bob Manning back here. Manning may need some White House standing in
order to control Sylvester and his goons, and I am sure it will be in our interest to give it
to him.
7. The political and diplomatic course of action with respect to Laos is probably still the
most immediate possible trigger of larger decisions. For the moment, we are doing quite
well in our negotiations with and on behalf of Souvanna, and our relatively affirmative
position on the Polish proposal has been helpful, but it is agreed that we need to discuss
possible further actions with respect to Laos, both among ourselves and with the Thais,
the British, and the French.
8. Finally, I believe George Ball will bring a draft of a talking paper for his meeting with
de Gaulle./2/
9. Unless I learn something more before the meeting, my personal recommendation is that
the public statement after the meeting should be quite simply that you have received the
report, that there will be further discussions in the coming days, and that no startling new
statement need be expected in the immediate future.
McG.B./3/
193. Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs
(Bundy) to the Secretary of State/1/
/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Vietnam Country File, Southeast Asia,
Vol. II, Memos (A). Secret. According to a June 3 covering note to McNamara, Bundy
sent copies of "his personal notes" of the Honolulu conference to McNamara, Taylor, and
McCone with the qualification that they did not necessarily reflect the views of Rusk who
approved the distribution. (Washington National Records Center, RG 330, OASD/ISA
Files: FRC 69 A 7425, Vietnam 381)
A note on the top of the source text in McGeorge Bundy's hand reads: "Hitting the North
is required."
SUBJECT
Highlights of Honolulu Conference
For your possible use in your discussion with the President this evening,/2/ I am setting
down what I thought were the highlights of the Honolulu Conference. (I must say that the
big pluses of the conference seemed to me to be the opportunity for a real strategic
discussion with Lodge present, and the work done in the information area. I thought the
military planning presentation by CINCPAC was not adequate and served largely to
highlight some of the difficult issues we still have. Westmoreland's plan for the critical
provinces was a superb piece of work on short notice, but still needs refinement and
thought, as well as careful recruiting, before it can be real good. In general, I think the
conference showed the ill effects of short notice and lack of opportunity for you and
Secretary McNamara to go over jointly just what you wanted to cover and how, before we
left Washington.)
/2/President Johnson met with McGeorge and William Bundy, Rusk, McNamara, Taylor,
and McCone from 6 to 8 p.m. on June 3 at the White House. (Johnson Library, President's
Daily Diary) No record of this meeting has been found.
I. Situation in South Vietnam.
The situation is "tenuous but not hopeless" (Westmoreland). Lodge and Westmoreland
were a shade more optimistic than McNamara and McCone (and myself), and
Westmoreland thinks there could be significant improvement by the end of the year if
Khanh stays in power, and that a few victories are badly needed and would be a big help.
Lodge thinks the situation can continue to "jog along", but also thinks that some external
action would be a big lift to South Vietnamese morale. Both Lodge and Westmoreland
concede the built-in perils of something happening to Khanh or the effects of defeats
rather than victories. Basically, the crucial indicators of morale, both military and civilian,
are very hard to read; some say the peasant is holding out reasonably well, but such
factors as the military desertion rate are clearly serious in their implications. (McNamara
would probably add the difficulty of obtaining the needed manpower, but Westmoreland's
latest information on this, received during the conference, showed some improvement for
May, and I do not believe myself that a difference of 20,000 or even 50,000 in total
manpower strengths will make all that much difference.)
II. Effect of Measures to Improve the Situation within South Vietnam.
A. There is much we can still do.
1. Westmoreland put forward a selective plan for moderate increases in US personnel,
both civilian and military (on the order of 500), for eight critical provinces. This plan,
which requires completion in Saigon, does offer some hope and should be worked on
urgently. Both Lodge and Westmoreland reject any major over-all plan for "inter-larding"
or "encadrement" in the sense of US personnel moving directly into a decision-making
role; such a plan they consider to be both unwise and presently unacceptable by Khanh
and the Vietnamese.
2. Information activities can be greatly improved, and the decisions to put "czar" powers
into the hands of Zorthian should help the US press problem over time (overcoming a
long-standing Lodge bar to Zorthian doing this job). Vietnamese information and psywar
activities are also capable of slow improvement, and a number of useful ideas were
developed by a group headed by Carl Rowan.
3. The US Mission is as well coordinated as possible given Lodge's basic nature, except
that there is need for a key change in the DCM in favor of a truly executive man.
Relations with the GVN are harmonious and they are responsive to US advice; the tactic
of intermittent high-level meetings between the US and GVN on specific policy problems
is off to a good start, and Lodge and others believe this method will be more effective and
palatable than a more systematic high-level, day-to-day relationship involving putting
significant numbers of US personnel directly into the GVN structure.
4. There can be some useful clearing of the decks and a more business-like atmosphere in
Saigon, through reductions in social activities and progressive cut-down of dependents at
least on the military side. (The timing of possible removal of dependents also was not
discussed, and is apparently still thought to be wise only in the context of a decision for
wider action.)
B. However, none of these measures for improvement can really affect the dubious
prognosis for the next 3-6 months. The best we can hope for is a slight gain by the end of
the year, and it is worth noting that--despite all we may be able to do in improving press
reporting--there will probably continue to be a press bias toward reporting the
unfavorable. Thus, so far as the US public view is concerned, we may well appear to be
getting nowhere even though we might ourselves consider that the trend was at least
slightly upward. Obviously, if improvement is not in fact achieved, the public impression
could be one of really sharp deterioration because of the same press bias.
III. Military Plans and Intelligence Estimates re Wider Actions.
The meeting revealed serious unresolved questions in this area, some of a military nature
and some requiring political guidance and more refined assumptions. Examples are:
1. To what degree should we seek to conduct military operations in Laos, especially the
likely effect of force requirements for any significant operations against the Panhandle
Corridor?
2. To what degree should there be a major build-up of forces prior to taking wider action?
This requires a careful balancing of the military advantages of such a build-up (which
would clearly be prudent in the event of sharp retaliation) as against the possibility that
major measures would, in the intelligence view, tend to make the Vietnamese
Communists and Hanoi think our objectives are beyond what they are, and thus drive
them to the very drastic action the build-up would be designed to meet.
3. In planning of possible air strikes against North Vietnam we need still more refined
targeting and a clearer definition of just what should be hit and how thoroughly, and
above all, for what objective as between massive destruction and effect on Hanoi's will.
To most of us, the latter seems the proper guideline, but it has not yet been cranked
properly into the military plan.
4. In general, the military timing factors would point to some delay in taking action. The
additional Vietnamese aircraft will not be available until mid-July although B-57's could
be provided at any time on a Farmgate basis. The logistic and personnel factors to prepare
for a possible maximum commitment of 5-7 divisions, as well as the shipping
requirements, can be handled properly only in a period of about two months. The
Vietnamese manpower should be built up as much as possible, with Westmoreland
preferring to have a reserve of 12 battalions that he could use along the Laos border. The
rainy season precludes major offensive action in the Panhandle area of Laos until
November. And finally, we would like to have Khanh's base stronger than it is.
On the other hand, some of the timing factors cut the other way. The rainy season does
reduce Communist capability to move ground forces south. Moreover, we are obviously
uncertain whether Khanh's base will in fact improve in the next few months.
In general, it was General Taylor's conclusion that all the military timing factors related to
optimum military operations, and that they could be disregarded, although we would have
some sacrifice to capability and prudent preparation.
5. The intelligence estimate on Communist reaction has already run into the variable of a
major military build-up, and a new assessment should be made in the light of a more
refined planning scenario. The latter should be urgently prepared under the guidance of
the Executive Committee.
IV. Over-all Conclusions.
The somewhat less pessimistic estimate of the situation in Vietnam means that we can
afford-and as indicated above would clearly benefit from-taking perhaps two more weeks
to refine our plans and estimates. Although the Laos situation is somewhat shaky, we
believe that we can hold it in line at least for this period by a combination of careful
diplomacy and perhaps a few added gestures of force.
Crucial actions for the immediate period appear to be the following:
1. An urgent US information effort to make the basic points now arising in the budding
"great debate." This debate will probably grow in volume, and we must get at the basic
doubts of the value of Southeast Asia and the importance of our stake there that are
besetting and confusing both key members of the Congress and the public. 3
3 McGeorge Bundy wrote the following note at this point: "U.S. information how high."
2. Diplomatically:
A. We should get started at once with the Thai, laying out at least the general possibility
of wider action and initiating joint planning, which in itself should have a very helpful
effect on their attitude.
B. We must continue to work closely and urgently with the British. They hold a large
share of the key to successful diplomacy and standing firm concerning Laos, and they
almost certainly have serious doubts about the basic question of wider action, on which
they have now been fully informed.
C. We should also cut in the Australians and perhaps the New Zealanders, probably to the
full extent that we have done with the British.
D. We have a dilemma with the Philippines, in that we cannot leave them out of the
planning activity wholly, but equally cannot trust them with any clear picture of our
possible intentions. We need careful instructions on this.
E. We must make another determined effort to get the French not to cut dead across our
possible lines of action. This is the purpose of the Ball Mission.
3. We need an intensive and coordinated information and intelligence effort both for the
sake of refining our plans and for preparing materials to use for eventual support of wider
action if decided upon. (There is an immediate need for intelligence and information
support in the Laos diplomatic arena.)
4. To hold the line in Laos and stand firm on withdrawal as a precondition for a
conference, we need careful handling of the present consultations and the Polish proposal
and, to hold Souvanna Phouma in line, we probably need at least generalized indications
of continuing military firmness. Deployment of forces to Thailand should not, and indeed
cannot, be envisaged at least until we have gone further with the Thai, but we should
consider some added element of military action such as overflights of North Vietnam in
the course of our present admitted reconnaissance operations in Laos.
5. We have an immediate problem of handling the high degree of operations flowing from
the conference itself. We want to avoid a boiling up of opinion, but at the same time our
posture must continue to appear firm, above all to Hanoi and Peking. This will take
careful guidance and consideration of high-level statements and speeches in the next two
weeks.
194. Editorial Note

At the request of Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs Averell Harriman, the
Central Intelligence Agency prepared a memorandum entitled "Possible Carrots for
Hanoi" and submitted it to Harriman on June 4. The memorandum stated that "carrots"
should be considered as complementary and supplemental to the ongoing examination of
punitive action against North Vietnam meant to compel the North Vietnamese to call a
halt to insurgencies in Laos and South Vietnam.
The CIA memorandum concluded that there were "doctrinal differences" in the upper
echelons of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam's leadership, but these differences were
related primarily to tactics, and not to long-term goals. While Defense Minister Vo
Nguyen Giap and President Ho Chi Minh might be more "nationalist" than pro-Chinese
Chairman of the Standing Committee of the National Assembly, Troong Chin, all North
Vietnamese leaders were dedicated to reunification of North and South Vietnam on their
terms. The memorandum therefore concluded that "Hanoi is probably under little present
compunction to settle for half a loaf, even temporarily."
The memorandum then assessed possible concessions to Hanoi in political, economic, and
international fields. These potential concessions, however, would have little effect
because North Vietnam always subordinated economic and popular needs to political and
military ambition. The memorandum concluded as follows:
"In sum, though the idea of canvassing our imaginations to develop positive inducements
capable of giving the DRV some reason to stop its insurgent activities in Laos and South
Vietnam is worthwhile we think it unlikely that any such inducements can be evolved
which could both (a) be really tempting to the DRV and (b) not be counterproductive for
the US. We feel that this would probably remain the case whether such inducements were
publicly offered and negotiated or privately conveyed and discussed through some
discreet, privileged channel." (Library of Congress, Harriman Papers, Southeast Asia,
1964)
195. Memorandum of a Conversation, White House, Washington, June 4, 1964, 1

p.m./1/
/1/Source: Department of State, President's Memoranda of Conversation: Lot 66 D 149.
Confidential. Drafted by Sullivan on June 5. The time of the meeting is taken from the
President's Daily Diary. Johnson Library)
Quat was in the United States to attend the sessions of the United Nations. On June 3, he
met with Secretary Rusk who urged Quat to try to eliminate political quarrels in Saigon,
defuse religious differences, and encourage Vietnamese politicians to drop their business-
as-usual attitude. Quat promised to take this message home and to try to improve South
Vietnam's diplomatic representation and its information policies and programs.
(Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 VIET S) A subsequent discussion of
Vietnamese information policies and program is in a memorandum of conversation
between Quat and Rowan. June 5. (Washington National Records Center, RG 306, USIA
Psychological Operations Files: FRC 68 A 4933, INFO-PSYCH Operations, 1964) Quat
also met with Senator Humphrey on June 5; see footnote 4, Document 208.
SUBJECT
Visit of Foreign Minister Quat with The President
PARTICIPANTS
The Presiden
Michael V. Forrestal--National Security Council
William H. Sullivan, Department of State
Phan Huy Quat--Foreign Minister, Republic of Viet Nam
Pham Khac Rau--Counselor, Embassy of Viet Nam
The Foreign Minister opened the conversation by stating that he had taken advantage of
his presence in New York to come to Washington in order to express to the President and
the Government of the United States the gratitude of his people for American assistance.
He went on to state that the seriousness of the situation in Viet Nam is not because the
Government of Viet Nam misuses American assistance. It is rather because of the nature
of the communist attack and the nature of the institutions which the Government of Viet
Nam has inherited.
The Minister said that he personally felt the current serious situation can be remedied.
Until now, the main emphasis has been on military means. He did not contest the need for
a stronger military effort but he felt that this alone would not suffice to solve the problem.
There is needed a better administrative organization especially in the villages in order to
have a communion between the people and the government.
The Minister said that US agencies have understood this problem and have attempted to
improve the situation. However, the Vietnamese themselves have failed in coordinating
their own efforts as well as combining their work with US assistance. The new
government intends to proceed both to establish internal coordination on the Vietnamese
side and better coordination between United States and Vietnamese officials.
As a personal suggestion, the Minister thought it might be worthwhile to have a joint USVietnamese team in directing the pacification effort in Viet Nam. He believed that
Vietnamese officials should have "no complexes" about attempting this sort of intimate
American association with their efforts.
The President thanked the Foreign Minister for his views and said that the United States
would explore the Minister's proposal in our own government. He suggested that the
Minister and the Prime Minister discuss the matter with Ambassador Lodge and General
Westmoreland. In order for such a proposal to function effectively, it would need the
complete support and understanding of the US representatives on the scene.
The President then said that he had two points he wished to raise with the Foreign
Minister. First, he wished to stress how important it was that the Government of Viet Nam
approach every possible third government to provide assistance. In order to do this
effectively, the Vietnamese Government needed to appoint competent ambassadors to
those governments. The President said he would like to receive some indication of the
countries which the Vietnamese Government approaches and learn the nature of their
reactions to these approaches.
Secondly, the President stressed his feeling that it was important to have unity in dealing
with the problem of communism. It was important to have unity of the non-communist
countries, but equally important to have a unified government in Saigon. He thought this
was not the time for petty politics and urged that all non-communist leaders in the country
settle their differences and unite for their own salvation.
The Foreign Minister expressed appreciation to the President for this advice on both
points and said he would report it faithfully to his government when he returned to
Saigon.
196. Memorandum From the President to the Under Secretary of State (Ball)/1/
Washington, June 4 1964.
/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL FR-US. Top Secret. The unsigned
White House copy of this memorandum is published in Declassified Documents, 1978,
315A.
SUBJECT
Guidelines for your Talk with General de Gaulle
There are four main points which I would like you to get across to the General:
1. The United States is in Southeast Asia because of a commitment to help in keeping
peace and preserving the independence of countries which are important to elf of us. We
have absolutely no interest in domination, and still less in extending our military
influence.
2. Increasing threats from North Viet-Nam and Communist China, combined with doubts
of our strength and the strength of those who depend on us, could easily lead to a situation
in which, against all my own desire and intent, the United States Government would have
to prove its determination by military action.
3. It surely is not in the interest of France or of the United States that doubts between our
two Governments, and even division of purpose, should contribute to a result of this sort,
which could profoundly affect the peace of the world.
4. In the event that the United States should find itself forced to act in defense of peace
and independence, in Southeast Asia, I am confident that I could place reliance upon the
firmness of General de Gaulle as a friend and ally, as America properly did in the Cuba
crisis of '62, and if by any chance I am wrong on this point, it is a matter of great
importance that we should know it now.
You should emphasize above everything else my own determination to follow a peaceful
course if it is at all possible, but at the same time you should leave no doubt of the
determination of the United States to meet its commitments in Southeast Asia.
In making these positions clear you are authorized to draw upon the long memorandum of
talking points which has been prepared for this purpose,/2/ but I hope that you will not
weary General de Gaulle with an account of our virtues which he must have heard before,
and I also hope that you will not be so specific about our contingency planning as to tempt
him to any indiscretions with those whom he now seeks to cultivate. I would not wish him
to have any excuse to tell them that we have no intention of hurting them significantly.
/2/Not found.
Finally, I hope you will make it clear to General de Gaulle that I myself am deeply
interested in any new blueprint that would assure the guaranteed independence of the
nations of Southeast Asia. Our minds are open to further clarification, and anything that
General de Gaulle can tell you that would give more concreteness to his thinking on this
point would be most helpful. Our interest in this subject is genuine, and we would be
quick to give our support to any plan that seemed to give us any real hope of maintaining
effective, guaranteed independence.
Lyndon B. Johnson
Vol. 11, Memos (A). Secret. Rowan sent this memorandum to the President with a
covering memorandum explaining the issue was discussed at Honolulu. Rowan believed
the steps proposed were "of great importance" and hoped that the President would find
time to read the report. It is uncertain whether the President did so. McGeorge Bundy
received the original and Forrestal got a copy.
IMPROVEMENT OF INFORMATIONAL-PSYCHOLOGICAL
PROGRAM IN SOUTH VIET-NAM
Sixteen officers representing State, Defense, CIA and USIA, all with long experience in
the fields of public information and psychological warfare, met for several hours in
Honolulu and discussed thoroughly problems relating to South Viet-Nam. There was a
remarkable degree of unanimity with regard to the steps that ought to be taken in order to
effect the following:
1. Improve the morale of the people of South Viet-Nam so as to inspire them to pursue
more zealously the war against the Viet Cong.

2. Carry our story to the peoples of North Viet-Nam so as to warn them sufficiently of the
risks imposed upon them by the Hanoi regime's continued aggressions.
3. Better inform the American people and our allies in Europe and elsewhere so as to
maintain their support for necessary efforts to keep Southeast Asia from falling under
Communist domination.
The Committee felt that in passing along its recommendations, I should make two points
of over-riding importance.
First--The situation in South Viet-Nam, as described in briefing sessions in Honolulu, is
gloomy and quite unsatisfactory on many counts. American newsmen know this (indeed,
they contend that they were reporting this when American officials were pretending that
things were proceeding satisfactorily) and there is every reason to expect that they will
continue to write it. Further, there is no conceivable information program that will make
defeats look like victories, or GVN lassitude appear to be fiery enthusiasm. No single
thing will do more to provide a positive information-psychological outlook than a few
sparkling victories for our side.
Second--There are ways, however, in which a more effective public affairs program can
be built, even in the present situation. But it will require, from the topmost level in
Washington and Saigon, to the lowest level in the villages and hamlets, a fuller
appreciation of the role of propaganda than has heretofore been exhibited. It will require a
fuller understanding on the part of our top policy makers that the informationpsychological program is not a tangential operation, but must be a planned, built-in part of
every program drawn up to meet the crisis in Southeast Asia.
The Committee felt that if the problem is approached with awareness of the two points
made above, the following steps will do much to enhance the free world position in
Southeast Asia.
How to Improve the Situation in South Viet-Nam
1. Top policy makers pointed out that dynamic or "inspired" leadership has been the key
to the solidarity of several Asian nations since World War II. Ambassador Lodge pointed
out, however, that no such leadership seems to be available in South Viet-Nam. The
Committee expressed the view, then, that nothing is more important than to exert every
effort to make the present leadership appear to be inspired leadership. The group
recommends that Ambassador Lodge continue to press Premier Khanh vigorously to make
fire-side chats on a regular basis. The Committee visualizes the chats as being no longer
than ten minutes, and as dealing with such things as the Government's health program or
other socio-economic programs designed to improve the well-being of the peoples of
South Viet-Nam.
Because Premier Khanh is obviously busy, it is hoped that he would tape three or four
chats at a single sitting. These would be recorded sync-sound so as to make them usable
not only as radio broadcasts, but in films where the Premier could then be shown doing
the commentary.
The significance of the latter point can be seen in the fact that Vietnamese audiences at
USIS film showings last year totalled an estimated 28 million. As the information
program is expanded in the provinces, the potential use of these filmed chats will be even
greater.
The Committee urged that these chats emphasize what the Government is doing for the
people, and not what Khanh the individual is doing. Thus, as the political situation
permits, the Committee urged that other leading Vietnamese be brought into this program.
2. Steps must be taken to insure that the people in villages and hamlets hear the talks
referred to in Recommendation 1, and that they are reachable through other radio
programs. Thus the Committee urged that immediate steps be taken to alter a situation
where the great majority of radio receivers are concentrated in Saigon. It urged that
USOM move speedily to secure and distribute the 100,000 transistors already allocated to
South Viet-Nam and that the State Department request that the Japanese Government
contribute another 100,000 transistor radios.
3. In order to facilitate meaningful programming both for radio and the press, every
military unit in the field where there is a substantial number of American advisors should
have one American whose sole concern is information and propaganda. There are two
vitally important functions that this individual would pursue:
a. Watch alertly for Viet Cong atrocities and mistakes, the public exploitation of which
would win support for the GVN-US effort both in Viet-Nam and in the rest of the free
world. For example, if the Viet Cong murdered a Vietnamese who was teaching school or
helping people to grow more food, this American would, with the assistance of a GVN
counterpart, tape-record the widow's story of the atrocity with the idea of using it on press
and radio so as to arouse contempt for the Viet Cong.
b. Watch for acts of heroism on the part of the GVN soldiers and report it immediately for
possible usage in the program referred to in Recommendation 4.
(There are now 42 military men in training for this kind of role in the provinces of South
Viet-Nam. It is estimated that their training program will end in November. The
Committee urged that steps be taken to condense their training and get them into the field
much sooner. It was agreed that USIA would add 7 individuals to its South Viet-Nam
staff for service as advisors in the field.)
4. The Committee believes that courage is contagious, and that there would be a double
benefit if the American military command would order the continuous collection of
stories of heroism by GVN soldiers or units, and insure that these stories are immediately
exploited by the newspapers and radio stations of South Viet-Nam. The Committee urged,
also, that the American Mission explore with the GVN the possibility of an award of cash
or, even better, a plot of land, to GVN soldiers showing extraordinary courage in battle.
This kind of program will, first of all, inspire courage on the part of other GVN soldiers
and will refute in the most effective way reports now emanating from Viet-Nam that
people of that country are unwilling to fight their own battle.
5. The U.S. Mission should press for a start to the long-promised land reform program in
the Delta area.

6. The Committee hailed the CIA program under which more than 200 small propaganda
(agitprop) teams have been formed in the villages, largely to spread by word of mouth the
GVN story. The Committee urged full support for additional teams, many of which are
being formed voluntarily, or at the urging of village chiefs.
7. It was recommended that USIA and the State Department explore the role that U.S.
youth might play in firing up South Vietnamese youth to greater activity on behalf of their
Government. It was recommended also that a more vigorous effort be made in the United
States to recruit American (and possibly Canadian and other third nation) professors for
Vietnamese institutions.
8. The Committee felt other more "sophisticated" propaganda steps can be taken in the
near future. For example, it was noted that in every war, the American sense of unity has
been enhanced by such popular songs as "Remember the Alamo," "Remember Pearl
Harbor," etc. It was recommended that an effort be made to find a Vietnamese who can
write a GVN version of "God Bless America."
Propaganda Directed to the North
It was the Committee's belief that many of the efforts listed above would be meaningful
assets in the propaganda program directed at North Viet-Nam. For example, the
Committee expressed the belief that radio programs and other efforts showing Khanh as a
popular, inspired leader, or detailing the success of a socio-economic program in the
South, would also be good for the Northern audience. The Committee recommended also
that steps be taken to provide more Vietnamese radio talent. It was noted that [less than 1
line of source text not declassified] the U.S. needs to launch a much larger in-service
training program. USIA pledged the use of VOA facilities and/or personnel in such a
program.
It was recommended that USIA provide personnel to advise and guide a portion of the
radio programming on Radio Hue, also known as "The Voice of Freedom." USIA agreed
to assign such personnel when needed.
Information to the United States and the Rest of the World
The Committee felt that this category was of vital importance and offered more
difficulties and perhaps less opportunity for governmental influence than the two areas
listed above. The Committee made several recommendations, however, based on an
utterly frank appraisal of the present situation.
1. The U.S. Government must take steps to restore some measure of credibility with
American correspondents covering the war in Viet-Nam. Information specialists on the
scene reported that, to a man, American newsmen feel that the U.S. Government,
particularly the military people, have lied to them on several occasions. Belief was
expressed that much of the reporting coming out of Viet-Nam is tinged with hostility born
of this belief.
The Committee recommends, therefore, that the Government issue a new information
directive that would wipe out the several directives now on the books which some military
information people interpret as requiring them to lie under certain circumstances. The
Committee expressed the belief that Lt. Col. Baker, present head of the Military
Information Unit, has been so discredited because of previous requirements to lie, that he
no longer is useful in his present position.
2. The Committee felt that to solve the aforementioned problem and to meet the equally
great need to provide cohesion to our press program in Viet-Nam, a single individual
ought to be given across-the-board authority-under the direction of the Ambassador. The
Committee recommended that this individual be one with the confidence of Lt. General
Westmoreland and Ambassador Lodge, and that he be included in all meetings and
briefings so as to be fully informed of what is taking place on both the military and
civilian side.
This individual's role would be to advise the Ambassador and the MACV Commander as
to which newsmen to see and as to the points they ought to make; he would direct efforts
to refute immediately misinformation in press reports from Viet-Nam; he would direct the
development of a program designed to get the positive side of the story to Americans and
other newsmen. In doing so, he would have the authority to call upon all the resources of
the Embassy, the Military, USOM and USIA. It was anticipated that this overall press
advisor would be given personnel from all the agencies involved to the extent necessary to
do the job effectively. (The principals in Honolulu agreed that Barry Zorthian, the chief
Public Affairs Officer, should have this responsibility and a telegram to the field spelling
out his new responsibilities is being prepared./2/
/2/Document 203.
3. It was recommended that steps be taken to assure the immediate availability of
transportation for newsmen. Military members of the Committee pointed out that Col.
Baker "is bumming rides every day," and never can be sure of his ability to get newsmen
to a development where reporting is in the national interest. The Committee recommended
that aircraft be specifically and permanently set aside for use by the press whenever
decided by the overall Press Counselor.
4. The Committee, and most vocally the Military members, felt that high priority should
be given to the improvement of the quality of Military public information officers. It was
asserted that most of those sent to Viet-Nam lack experience or the general ability to do
the kind of job required under the present circumstances. It was pointed out that several
qualified information officers have resigned rather than go to Viet-Nam, but the view was
expressed that there are adequate information people of the highest competence in the
Military, and that all that is required is a vigorous effort to get them into this area where
they are almost desperately needed.
5. It was recommended that the Military launch a more vigorous internal education
program. It was pointed out that virtually all of the damaging articles written by
correspondents like Jim Lucas were really almost direct quotes from gripe sessions by
Military men which are overheard by correspondents. It is the Committee's belief that
even a modest educational campaign will reduce the incidents where soldiers "sound off"
to the press in such a way that the press reports themselves make the soldiers' task more
difficult.
The Committee made the overall observation that every effort must be made to push the
Viet-Nam Government to move from general agreement on an informationalpsychological program to putting it into effect. It was recommended that the Director of
USIA develop further a helpful relationship with the Minister of Information and that
Ambassador Lodge continue to press the GVN, in general, as to the importance of the
information-psychological program in the execution of the war.

/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 VIET S. Top Secret; Nodis
Received at 4:18 a.m.
2412. Literally eyes only for Rusk and McNamara from Lodge.
1. It would help here, and possibly in Laos and Thailand, if there were some screams from
North Viet-Nam that they had been hit. They are really looking much too tall, particularly
considering the military potential of both sides, which is so heavily in our favor. They are
able to enjoy the great advantage of total silence which makes them look still bigger,
whereas the U.S. looks as though we are talking a great deal without doing very much.
2. There must be a number of different ways to make them scream. Could rocket carrying
planes, flying along the North Viet-Nam-Laos border, let something go on the pretext that
they had been fired on and were firing back? Could something be done some night in
North Viet-Nam, possibly using personnel and equipment which would be Vietnamese
[less than 1 line of source text not declassified]; can Tchepone not be hit immediately?
3. We want a scream from them that they had been hit by something coming from our
side. I would not object if they blamed us. They could prove nothing. We could either be
totally silent, or challenge them to provide proof, or say we are looking into it.
4. In a situation such as is described above you don't have to escalate if you don't want to.
Surely this kind of limited carefully modulated action does not require approval of
Congress-especially when it is against North Vietnamese targets which are thoroughly
illegal.
5. Not only would screams from the North have a very tonic effect and strengthen morale
here; it is also vital to frighten Ho. Do not believe our 34A operations bother him much, if
at all. If he is sufficiently frightened and could do so without losing face, he might cease
his intrusion, save many lives and avoid the much greater cost to him and to us involved
in the procedures discussed in Honolulu. [less than 1 line of source text not declassified]
should, above all, be able to hold out the prospect of the cessation of punishment and not
just a shipment of rice and a verbal assurance that the Americans are really very angry.
6. In this part of the world and in this kind of situation, silence and action often the best
ways to achieve results.
Lodge
199. Memorandum From the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (Taylor) to the
Secretary of Defense (McNamara)/1/
CM-1451-64
7425, Vietnam 381. Top Secret.
SUBJECT
Comments of the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, on JCSM-471-64, "Objectives and
courses of Action--Southeast Asia"/2/
1. This memorandum transmits the views of the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff upon the
subject paper in which the Joint Chiefs of Staff (less the Chairman) express their views on
two possible alternatives for air strikes against North Vietnam. The first would have the
objective of seeking "through military actions to accomplish destruction of the North
Vietnamese will and capabilities as necessary to compel the Democratic Government of
Vietnam (DRY) to cease providing support to the insurgencies in South Vietnam and
Laos". They favor adopting this course of action. They note, however, as a possible lesser
alternative the employment of "limited military action which, hopefully, would cause the
North Vietnamese to decide to terminate their subversive support of activity in Laos and
South Vietnam". If the latter alternative is adopted, they recommend two target complexes
in the Appendix of JCSM-471-64 (Vinh and Dien Bien Phu) as appropriate for initial
attack.
2. As I understand the distinction between the two alternatives, the first calls for a
concurrent attack upon North Vietnamese will and capabilities in order to induce the
North Vietnamese to cease their attacks upon their neighbors and in addition, by
destroying in large part their military capabilities, to assure that they cannot resume these
attacks. The second alternative places more emphasis on changing the will of the enemy
and less emphasis on the destruction of capabilities although the attacks considered upon
Vinh and Dien Bien Phu require hundreds of sorties and thus are not of inconsiderable
weight.
3. I do not feel these two alternatives as stated are an accurate or complete expression of
our choices. It appears to me that there are three patterns from among which we may
choose to initiate the attack on North Vietnam. In descending order of weight, they are the
following:
a. A massive air attack on all significant military targets in North Vietnam for the purpose
of destroying them and thereby making the enemy incapable of continuing to assist the
Viet Cong and the Pathet Lao.
b. A lesser attack on some significant part of the military target system in North Vietnam
for the dual purpose of convincing the enemy that it is to his interest to desist from aiding
the Viet Cong and the Pathet Lao, and, if possible, of obtaining his cooperation in calling
off the insurgents in South Vietnam and Laos.
c. Demonstrative strikes against limited military targets to show US readiness and intent
to pass to alternatives 3b or 3a above. These demonstrative strikes would have the same
dual purpose as in alternative 3b.
4. The forces required to execute these strike alternatives would vary from a maximum
effort by VNAF, Farmgate and US aircraft for alternative 3a to VNAF alone (perhaps
stiffened by Farmgate) for alternative 3c. Similarly, the time for executing the attacks
would vary from several weeks in the case of alternative 3a to one or two days for
alternative 3c.
5. I would not recommend alternative 3a at the outset because it is probably unnecessarily
destructive for the purpose of changing the will of the adversary; it limits any possibility
of cooperation from Hanoi in calling off the insurgents; and represents such a challenge to
the Communist Bloc as to raise considerably the risks of escalation. I would prefer
alternative 3b, reserving judgment on the precise target system chosen for the initial attack
pending further photography and analysis. However, I feel that it is highly probable that
political considerations will incline our responsible civilian officials to opt for alternative
3c and, hence, feel that the Joint Chiefs of Staff should recognize this possibility and
develop a plan for possible implementation.
6. In summary, I recommend that JCSM-471-64 be noted and used as appropriate in
considerations of a strike program based upon the implementation of alternative 3b, and
that the Joint Chiefs of Staff be asked to develop a strike plan based upon a decision to
follow alternative 3c.
Maxwell D. Taylor
Chairman
200. Letter From the Ambassador in Vietnam (Lodge) to the President/1/

/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Vietnam Country File, Vol. XI. Top
Secret. Also published in Declassified Documents, 1984, 001490.
Saigon, June 5, 1964.
Dear Mr. President: This is intended to be helpful advice in connection with the matter of
a Congressional resolution regarding Southeast Asia. I would, of course, be very happy to
have you show this letter to Dean Rusk and Bob McNamara if you perceive no objection.
First, I am not yet persuaded that such a resolution is in fact required. The argument that
developments in Southeast Asia could theoretically involve calling out the reserves and
that, therefore, a resolution is necessary does not seem valid when you consider that we
did all of these things--and many more--in Korea without a Congressional resolution. But
you are far closer to the situation in Congress and to public opinion than I am and can
judge this much better than I can.
Clearly a very strong, if not impregnable, argument can be made for the proposition that
Southeast Asia is of vital concern to the United States. Indeed if this were all that were
involved in the debate on the resolution, there would be nothing to worry about.
I do worry about committing seven divisions of the U.S. Army to the mainland of
Southeast Asia, as is contemplated. This goes against the belief that has been held by
many Americans, including myself, for a long time. The climate and other conditions in
this area are of incomparable difficulty for Americans.
Also the testimony which I have heard did not show that our seven divisions would
constitute but a small proportion of the total army, just large enough to get us the
command, as the small British army at Waterloo was large enough to get the command for
Wellington. On the contrary, I understand that a single Thai division and a few extremely
mediocre Laotian battalions are all that can be expected to be in the line in addition to the
Vietnamese--and the Vietnamese are fully committed now.
It is apparently not planned to bring in Chinese Nationalists, even though this would
definitely be an action against Chinese Communists in which their presence would be
appropriate. Nor is it planned to use ROK troops who, according to recent telegrams,
would probably come if their expenses were paid--which they should be.
This, therefore, would be neither an encapsulated action, as it were, with a good
possibility of clearly limited results and a quick departure, nor is it a large campaign in
which the U.S. provides a small proportion of troops in order to get the command. On the
contrary, it is a largely U.S. venture of unlimited possibilities which could put us onto a
slope along which we slide into a bottomless pit.
I still have faith that naval and air power, with clearly limited and very specific actions on
the ground, can give us what we need. If the Chinese communists attack on the ground in
a place of their own choosing, I cannot see why we must oblige them and why we cannot
retaliate in a place and in a way of our own choosing. It is dangerous for us to put the
manpower of a nation of 190 million against the manpower of a nation of 900 million and
thus put us on the short end of the stick. We should instead put our overall military power
in confrontation with their military power and thus put us on the long end of the stick.
Based on past experience, I assume that there are vigorous differences of opinion in the
Pentagon on this whole question. I suggest, therefore, that this is a matter of sufficient
importance for you to get the most eloquent protagonists of the various schools of thought
into the room with you so that there may be a forthright discussion among them in the
hope that thus you can get at truths which will satisfy you.
All of the above is but another manifestation of the problem which we constantly face as
the world's most powerful nation, to wit, how to apply our power. We cannot--and must
not--be on the horns of the dilemma of either doing nothing or doing something
imprudent. It is, for example, obviously, a simple, though disastrous, matter to sit still and
do nothing and let Southeast Asia go down the drain. It is equally simple, and also
disastrous, to trigger off World War III. We should, while mindful of what is possible,
concentrate on what is probable.
We must be able to apply our power in sharp focus, in carefully tailored ways to gain
specific objectives. This is complicated and difficult but not impossible. President
Kennedy did it last October when he used U.S. power to bring about a change of behavior
in the government of Viet-Nam.
There ought to be a way to apply American power to North VietNam and in addition use
the threat of our tremendous superiority in overall military power to keep the Chinese
communists at bay.
As President you carry a very great load under the best of circumstances. It is not right to
ask all-embracing commitments of you when all that you want to accomplish is something
which, though utterly necessary, is precise and limited.
With respectful regards,
Very sincerely yours,
Cabot L.
201. Paper Prepared for the President by the Secretary of Defense (McNamara),
Washington, June 5, 1964/1/
/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security Files, Vietnam Country File, Vol. XI,
Memos. Secret. Published in part in Declassified Documents, 1978, 62C. A title page
indicates that this memorandum was for the President's use at a meeting at 6 p.m. on June
5. The President met with Rusk, McGeorge Bundy, and McNamara from 6:52 to 7:43
p.m., June 5. Johnson Library, President's Daily Diary) No record of this meeting has
been found.
SOUTH VIETNAM ACTION PROGRAM
I. Strengthen the situation within SVN by:
A. Expanding the U.S. and Vietnamese activities in the 8 Critical Provinces.
1. Move in additional Vietnamese troops.
2. Assign control over all troops in each of the provinces to the province chiefs.
3. Develop detailed hamlet by hamlet "oil spot" and "clear and hold" operational plans for
each of the approximately 40 districts.
4. Introduce a system of population control (curfews; identification papers; intelligence
network; etc.)
5. Increase the provincial police force.

6. Expand the information program (introduce approximately 40,000 radios; install
transmitters at provincial capitals; provide taped programs; etc.).
7. Develop a special economic aid program for each province (distribution of medicines;
school construction materials; etc.).
8. Add additional U.S. personnel (initially from within SVN):
a. 320 military provincial and district advisers.
b. 40 USOM provincial and district advisers.
c. 74 battalion advisers (2 for each of 37 bns).
[Total] 434
9. Transfer military personnel to fill existing and future USOM shortages where necessary
(110 to 180 men).
10. Establish joint US-GVN teams to monitor the program at both the national and
provincial levels./2/
/2/These first 10 steps were sent to Saigon in telegram 2184, June 5, 8:01 p.m., as actions
to be taken to expand U.S. and Vietnamese activities in the 8 "super critical
provinces." (Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 VIET S) Telegram 2184 is
published in Declassified Documents, 1977, 147E.
B. Intensifying the information program within the country.
1. Distribute between 100,000 and 200,000 radio receivers.
2. Increase the quantity and quality of in-country radio programs including "fireside"
chats, etc.
C. Strengthen the administration of the Country Team.
D. Actions not taken:
1. Lodge opposed:
a. A shift from a government of politicians to a government of technicians.
b. A shift in the U.S. role from one of "advice" to one of "direction".
c. Removal of dependents unless accompanied by military moves.
d. "Interlacing" [Interlarding?] of U.S. personnel within the national and provincial
governments.
II. Near-term Forecast.
A. The actions referred to above will have little or no effect within the next 3 to 6 months.
B. At best, during that period, the situation will jog along about as it is (assuming Khanh
is not assassinated)-it may continue to deteriorate slowly.
C. Because visible improvement is unlikely, we can expect increasing criticism of U.S.
policy and U.S. operations by the public and by our allies.
III. U.S. Information Program.
To offset the expected criticism and to develop the "peace offense" theme (with members
of Congress; the press; the public; foreign diplomats; etc.).
IV. Congressional Resolution.
About mid-July consider requesting a Congressional Resolution supporting U.S. policy in
Southeast Asia.
V. Strike against North Vietnam.
A. Continue to prepare political and military plans for such operations, recognizing that
all efforts to achieve our objectives by peaceful means must be exhausted before military
action is undertaken. It is unlikely that a strike against the north would be desirable at any
time within the next 3 to 6 months, although this estimate may be affected by events in
Laos.
B. Carry on a dialogue with the DRV through the Canadians.
C. Initiate joint military planning with the Thais.
VI. Military pressures short of combat operations.
A. Periodically review a list of military moves designed to demonstrate the U.S. intention
to prevent further communist advances in Southeast Asia and determine whether any of
such moves are timely (see list attached).
R McN
Attachment
Illustrative Military Moves Designed to Demonstrate the U.S. Intention to Prevent
Further Communist Advances in Laos and South Vietnam/3/
/3/Confidential.
1. Continue high and low-level reconnaissance over Laos.

2. Continue high-level reconnaissance over DRV (20 flights per month).
3. Introduce GVN recon. teams into Laos (with or without U.S. advisors)--4 approx. 6/15;
16 by 8/15.
4. Authorize hot-pursuit into Cambodia.
5. Initiate selective low-level recon. into DRV along supply lines feeding the Laotian
corridor.
6. Re-introduce a MAAG into Laos (shift from Thailand).
7. Re-introduce White Star teams into Laos--(15 teams in 20 days).
8. Introduce GVN harassing forces into Laotian corridor (with or without U.S. advisors-60 days.
9. Send 500 additional military advisors to SVN to expand the counter-insurgency
program (announce immediately; complete in 120 days).
10. Expand T-28 operations in Laos, then use of U.S. military pilots.
11. Accompany U.S. recon. flights over Laos with fighter escort.
12. Authorize VNAF air strikes against DRV activities in Laotian corridor.
13. U.S. Force movements:
a. 1 or 2 B-57 squadrons into SVN--24 hours.
b. 1 interceptor squadron into SVN--24 hours.
c. 1 or 2 fighter squadrons into Thailand--24 hours.
d. 1 Army Brigade (5150 men) into Thailand (5 to 12 days).
e. 1 Marine Brigade and Air Group (5700 men and 40 aircraft) into SVN on exercise or
assignment (8 days).
f. 1 Army Brigade to Philippines from Hawaii (5 to 12 days).
g. 1 Army Brigade to Okinawa from Hawaii (5 to 12 days).
h. Reassign carrier task force from Pacific Coast to South China Sea (2 weeks).
i. 10 fighter squadrons CONUS to Philippines or WestPac (2 to 10 days).
j. 1 Marine Division and Air Wing (22,900 men) CONUS to Okinawa (40 days).
k. 1 Infantry Division (11,500 men) CONUS to Hawaii (45 days).
[Here follow a paper entitled "Memorandum for Discussion on Friday, June 5, 6 p.m.,
Laos," and a paper entitled "Memorandum for Discussion on Friday, June 5, 6 p.m.,
Outline Information Program," which summarized Document 197.]
202. Telegram From the Under Secretary of State (Ball) to the Department of
State/1/
Paris, June 6, 1964--1 a.m.
Repeated priority to Saigon. Received at 10:30 p.m., June 5, and sent to the White House.
Secun 3. For President and Secretary from Ball. Following is a memorandum of
conversation between General de Gaulle and Under Secretary Ball at Elysee Palace June
5. Also present were Amb Bohlen, Burin des Roziers and Roger Vos (interpreting).
After replying to General de Gaulle's inquiry in regard to his trip, Mr. Ball handed the
General the President's letter/2/ and stated that President Johnson appreciated de Gaulle's
courtesy in seeing him. De Gaulle then read the letter in English and made only one
comment, repeating the phrase in the letter that referred to Mr. Ball as "my close and
trusted associate."
/2/Dated June 6. (Ibid., Presidential Correspondence: Lot 66 D 204, de Gaulle-President
Johnson, 1964)
De Gaulle said that he found the letter gratifying and was obviously pleased with it. He
said he would, of course, reply directly to the President. He then turned to Mr. Ball and
said: "I am ready to listen."
Ball said that President Johnson had asked him to explain our views on the situation in
Southeast Asia and to solicit de Gaulle's comments and advice. He had had a useful and
long conversation with M. Couve de Murville this morning/3/ during which they had
discovered a considerable area of agreement. The differences between them, he thought,
dealt more with methods and procedures rather than with objectives. He said that they had
found themselves in agreement on the following points:
/3/Reported in Secun 1, June 5, 10:05 p.m. (Ibid., Central Files, POL 27 VIET S)
1. That a Communist takeover in Southeast Asia would be a catastrophe for the whole free
world.
2. That the central problem was that of South Vietnam and that Laos and Cambodia were
by-products of the South Vietnamese problem;
3. That Hanoi has organized and directs the subversive operations in South Vietnam and
that Ho Chi Minh and his colleagues are in a position to intensify or reduce subversive
activities in SVN if they so wish.
He said he and the Foreign Minister had been in general agreement in regard to the need
to create an independent Vietnam which would be capable of resisting the Communist
subversion.
The US had no economic or commercial interests in the area, no wish to establish military
bases here, and no ambition to dictate to the Asians. Since 1954 the US had been giving
economic and military assistance to Vietnam. There were only 15,000 American military
in Vietnam. They were there as advisers. Until about May 1961 we had thought that
progress was being made in dealing with insurgency in SVN. Then the religious disputes
began. The Diem govt had progressively lost control of the country and, as General de
Gaulle knew, there had been two coups which had threatened governmental stability.
General Khanh, present head of the govt, seemed to us to have qualities of leadership even
though inexperienced. But the situation was clearly fragile and the govt weak.
Our objectives in South Vietnam are clear. We seek the creation of an independent viable
govt. We see two possible ways to achieve this: One, to continue to help the Vietnamese
Govt to develop sufficient strength to deal with the insurgency problem; or two. to bring
sufficient military pressure to bear on the North in order to convince Ho Chi Minh and
Peking that aggression was too costly. We were now at the point where, if there was no
improvement in the situation and the problem of insurgency was not resolved within a
reasonable time, we would be required to bring increasing military pressure on Hanoi in
order to change the Communists' course of action. This was not an effort on which the US
would embark lightly. We are fully aware that action against the North would bring the
danger of Chinese involvement. We were prepared to take such action only if it was the
sole means of preventing a takeover by the Communists. We hoped it will not be
necessary. Ho Chi Minh and his colleagues could prevent such an eventuality and we
hope that he understands the firmness of the US intention.
Our ultimate objective was a political solution that would insure the independence of
South Vietnam. We do not believe this could be achieved unless US power were present
to assist the Vietnamese Govt at least until it had attained full competence and control of
its own territories. Even after that it was essential that the Western govts remain in a
position to come to the assistance of the Vietnamese Govt, if this was asked for.
We did not feel we could rely only on the guarantees of the powers concerned. We had no
trust in Hanoi or Peking in his regard. It was therefore essential that the South Vietnamese
have the right to call for help from whatever outside source it wished.
We agree with what we understand to be General de Gaulle's idea-that stabilization in the
area requires the agreement and acquiescence of Peking. But we do not see the present
situation presenting the balance of force which would make this possible.
There are certain elements of the problem that seem to be a matter of disagreement
between the US and France. One results from a different appreciation of the phasing of
the Communist revolution in China. We see that the Chinese revolution is in a phase
reminiscent of the primitive Soviet Communism of 1917 which was both bellicose and
expansionist. We do not think that Peking would accept any arrangement that would limit
or prevent the spread of Communism in Southeast Asia or that it would abide by any such
arrangement if made.
In our experience agreements with the Communists only succeed when there were
countervailing powers that produced a kind of equilibrium. Examples were Austria and
Finland. But if there is no countervailing force in the area the Communists will continue
their subversive efforts. They will profit by the advantage that accrues to those who
engage in covert and dishonest operations as compared with the open and aboveboard
operations of their adversaries. He said we would have to insist on some countervailing
force in the area.
Mr. Ball said that he had attempted to give General de Gaulle an outline of our views and
would be most appreciative of the General's comments.
General de Gaulle said he had listened with great attention to what Mr. Ball had said.
There was little surprising in it since he had suspected for some time the difficulties of the
situation. The US has taken on itself alone the responsibilities which the French had borne
in the past.
He said he agreed that South Vietnam was the main problem, with Laos and Cambodia as
accessory problems. He referred to our hope that we can bring about a suppression of the
insurgency by supplying Vietnam with arms, credits, military advice, etc. I take note, said
General de Gaulle, of your hope but I cannot agree with it. I do not believe that you can
win in this situation even though you have more aircraft, cannons, and arms of various
kinds.
The problem was primarily a political and psychological problem. He was not referring
merely to General Khanh but to the people. To them the US was a very big foreign power.
"I do not mean that all of the Vietnamese are against you but they regard the US as a
foreign power and a very powerful foreign power."
The more the US becomes involved in the actual conduct of military operations the more
the Vietnamese will turn against us, as will others, in Southeast Asia./4/
/4/Written comments appear on the source text in different hands, none of which is
attributable. At this point is written: "French experience."
He said he understood the immense difficulties which the US faced. The US has the
possibility and the means of going to war. We could destroy Hanoi, Canton and even
Peking. We could link Chiang Kai-shek on the Chinese Mainland and even American
troops if we desired. But what would happen when the war began? What would be its
consequences? He could not say.
In 1900, at the time of the Boxer Rebellion, it had been very easy. The only problem was
that of frightening the Empress. Now continents were involved.
War was, of course, a possibility which the US could envisage. General MacArthur had
thought it was a good idea. However, he said, the French would never resume war in Asia.
He had told this to President Kennedy. The French consider that Southeast Asia is a
"rotten" territory in which to fight. Even if the US were involved France would not get
into a war in Asia, as an ally or otherwise.
If the US did not make war we still appeared to think that by reinforcing the existing
situation we could strengthen the Vietnamese and win the current struggle. He did not
agree with this. The United States might maintain the struggle in this manner for an
extended period of time, but we could not bring the affair to an e~nd. Once we realized
this, i.e., that we could not put an end to the situation, we might come to the conclusion
that we would have to make peace. This would mean peace with China and others in the
area.
He said he noticed that we thought that China was like Russia in 1917--intransigent,
warlike, and expansive. He did not know whether this was true or not. Personally he
doubted it. He thought it possible that China would see the advantage to itself, at least for
a few years, in a passive posture. He did not mean that this would last forever but it might
for a few years. China needs rest, it needs help, it needs commerce and technical
assistance from other countries. The Russians had been in a different position. Russia had
had an intelligentsia, an army, and agriculture. China has none of these things. In any
event, the French thought that we should try to see what China was up to./5/ He then
asked for Mr. Ball's comments.
/5/At this point is the marginal comment: "Wow!"
Mr. Ball said if we were now to undertake diplomatic efforts with Peking or Hanoi this
would threaten the collapse of the existing resistance in South Vietnam. General de Gaulle
had said--and he agreed--that the problem was more political and psychological than
military. Our task was to help the South Vietnamese create a govt in which the people
would have confidence, and to which they would feel allegiance. But if we began, or
attempted to begin, negotiations of the type that General de Gaulle was speaking about.
the result might be a general failure of the will to resist.
Either we must increase the Vietnamese will to resist or we must reduce the subversive
efforts of the North. To negotiate before either of these objectives was achieved would
destroy the only basis on which we can hope to build in the future. Moreover we said
[had?] no reason to believe that an agreement made with the Communists would be
carried out. We remembered the agreement of 1962 for the neutralization of Laos, and the
attitude of Hanoi and Peking toward it.
De Gaulle said that if a diplomatic operation were undertaken by the US alone, it would,
of course, not succeed. What he had in mind was a vast diplomatic operation which would
include the participation of France, India, China, Japan, and other countries. This would
provide the Vietnamese people--and he was not speaking of General Khanh--with a sense
of support and assurance for the future. He doubted that even Ho Chi Minh could continue
to kill South Vietnamese while taking part in a conference. World opinion would make it
impossible./6/
/6/At this point is the marginal comment: "Nonsense."
He repeated, however, such a diplomatic effort could not be done by the Americans. A
large conference had been attempted in 1954 and although the talks had taken a very long
time he felt that this in itself was not a bad thing. If a world conference of the type he was
thinking of could be put into operation it would change the state of mind of the
Vietnamese people and produce a detente. This would render it very difficult for Ho Chi
Minh to keep on with his activities. If such a diplomatic operation were undertaken a
resulting detente would bring about a new political situation. This, however, was not
possible under conditions of civil war./7/
/7/At this point is the marginal comment: "How fuzzy can one be!"
Mr. Ball said the situation in South Vietnam presented problems of exceptional difficulty.
If we were dealing with conventional warfare--with regular armies drawn up in opposing
formations--it would be possible to agree to a cease-fire and police it. But in South
Vietnam there were scattered groups of guerrillas. Many only came out at night. It would
be extremely difficult to police any cease-fire. Moreover, it was not realistic to assume
that the insurgents would be willing to lose momentum and thus would be willing to
accept a cease-fire. Ho Chi Minh would probably argue with contrived innocence that he
had no connection with what was going on in Vietnam. At the same time he would
covertly maintain the subversive action. There was enormous danger that a conference
would play into the hands of the Communists who would exploit it covertly and
dishonestly. Thereafter it might well be impossible to infuse any vitality into a
Vietnamese Govt. We would be reluctant to take such a risk.
De Gaulle replied: "All policy involves risks. If it is a policy that does not involve risks
there is no choice of policy." He thought a conference of Europeans, Asians and US
would produce a very powerful impact on the Vietnamese people and succeed in changing
the whole situation, at least for a certain period of time. The present situation, he said,
would not result in anything. France has had experience which proved it.
De Gaulle then remarked first he had had the opportunity of seeing Mr. Anderson,/8/ who
had been sent by the President, and now he had been very glad to see Mr. Ball. Keeping
contact was very useful.
/8/Robert B. Anderson, former Secretary of the Treasury in the Eisenhower
administration, undertook a number of unofficial and semi-official diplomatic missions
for President Johnson. Anderson met de Gaulle on June 1 at the French President's
invitation. De Gaulle wanted to establish a personal line of communication to Johnson via
letter or telephone, and gave Anderson his private telephone number for the President's
use. A report of the conversation between de Gaulle and Anderson is in a memorandum
from McGeorge Bundy to Johnson, June 1. Johnson Library, National Security File,
McGeorge Bundy, Memos to the President, Vol. 5)
He then added--as an afterthought--that he understood the extreme difficulties in which
the US finds itself. Everyone who had been involved in the Southeast Asian situation had
had the experience that those on the spot--the military and particularly the press--became
caught up by the general excitement and created an atmosphere that was not agreeable.
There was a tendency to blame others for difficulties incurred. France had done this in the
past. Now the United States tended to blame France. He would like to ask how could
France take any action when it had been eliminated from the scene and had no power for
action? He could assure Mr. Ball that France was not seeking to hamper the US. We ought
to stop this criticism.

Mr. Ball said that whatever rumors the US press might print as to the culpability of French
policy, the Johnson administration does not hold such views. "You, Mr. President, are
held in the highest esteem by everyone in the administration, beginning with the President
himself."
Mr. Ball then thanked General de Gaulle for receiving him and said he would report
faithfully to President Johnson. He was sure that President Johnson would study General
de Gaulle's comments very carefully because of his respect for General de Gaulle and for
the French nation. He believed it important that we keep in close touch on these and other
matters.
Mr. Ball said he wished to emphasize in conclusion that President Johnson was, above all,
a man of peace. If the United States was forced to actions involving war in regard to
Southeast Asia it was only because we had learned by the experience of the last three
decades that aggression must be checked at an early stage. Otherwise the costs become
progressively higher.
Comment: Both Amb Bohlen and I had the impression that General de Gaulle is merely
waiting for events to come his way. He is confident that they will. He is certain no
improvements will result from present efforts. He probably envisages that some time in
the not too distant future we will begin to consider seriously his suggestion of a
conference. He quite likely assumes that we will then ask the French to take soundings
with the Chinese and the North Vietnamese./9/
/9/In telegram 2424 from Saigon, June 6, commenting on this meeting, Lodge noted that
de Gaulle had returned to his recurrent theme that the United States sought a military
solution in South Vietnam when the problem could not be solved militarily. Lodge wanted
the following points to be made to de Gaulle: 1) U.S. objectives in South Vietnam were
political and not military; 2) military action was designed to reinforce political objectives
by providing security; and 3) the Khanh government was the best that South Vietnam
could expect under the current circumstances. (Department of State, Central Files, POL 27
VIET S)
Ball

Washington, June 6, 1964--1:13 p.m.
/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, INF 8 US-VIET S. Confidential. Drafted by
Rowan and Sullivan and cleared by Forrestal and McNamara. Repeated to CINCPAC
2192. Saigon pass COMUSMACV. Joint State/Defense/AID/USIA message. The
President has approved the decision to place one man in overall control of dealing with
the American and foreign press in Saigon and of prosecuting a vigorous program to assure
that the true story of our efforts is reported in the United States and elsewhere. The
appropriate agencies here have spelled out that decision in the following details:
1. Barry Zorthian, presently the Country Public Affairs Officer, will assume the
responsibilities of over-all press counselor. He will retain the title of Country Public
Affairs Officer with jurisdiction over the total information effort. He will delegate such of
his responsibilities as he considers necessary to his deputy in order that there be no lapse
in the execution of all our information programs.
2. It will be most important that Mr. Zorthian be kept fully informed on all significant
activities and plans, both political and military, so that he can, under the guidance of the
Ambassador, undertake advance planning of informational and psychological activities.
3. Mr. Zorthian will service both the Ambassador and COMUSMACV in their contacts
with American and foreign correspondents. They can look to him for advice concerning
the desirability of seeing certain correspondents, concerning the substance of information
in which those correspondents are interested, and concerning the reliability of those
correspondents in handling sensitive information.
4. It will be Mr. Zorthian's responsibility to conduct a continuing effort to publicize such
information as will refute and counteract erroneous and misleading reports now emanating
from Viet Nam. It is expected that the agencies concerned will contribute sufficient
personnel to assist him in the conduct of such a program.
5. It will be Mr. Zorthian's responsibility to help newsmen cover the positive side of the
news in order that the American and world public may get a more balanced picture of
GVN operations. In order to do this, it is expected that the US military commands will
make readily available appropriate transportation for this purpose. There is much
misinformation in the world press about ARVN willingness to fight, about the ratio of
their combat losses to the enemy, and about their so-called brutality. On the other hand,
there is very little reporting of Viet Cong terror, especially against civilians, Viet Cong
defections, and Viet Cong military losses.
6. Under the Ambassador's direction and in consultation with other country team
members, it will be Mr. Zorthian's responsibility for developing further aspects of the
informational program in the Psychological Operations Committee which he chairs. It is
expected that all agencies will make available to the Committee such resources as are
required to do an effective job.
It is our hope and expectation that, with this concentration of authority, effective pressure
can be brought upon the GVN to secure active cooperation on their part so that their
efforts are invigorated and they carry their share of the burden. This work must be done
not only in Viet Nam in order to have the desired effect upon the population of South Viet
Nam; it must also be done internationally through official Vietnamese missions abroad.
The story of Viet Nam is of critical significance to every nation and every person in the
Free World. We and the Vietnamese must do our utmost to see that it is well and
accurately told.
Rusk
Bundy, Vol. 5. No classification marking. A note on the source text indicates Bundy
dictated, but did not read, this memorandum.
SUBJECT
Possible Successor to Lodge
Partly because I think you ought to have a person right from the center of the present
management, and partly because these are the people I know, my own nominations for
Lodge's successor are the following. I do not put these men in any particular order
because they are good at different things.
1. Sargent Shriver--I think this is more important than poverty, and the right man harder
to find. Shriver has energy, skill, a peaceful imagination and determination. He would
have great standing in Vietnam and his reputation here is excellent. I do not think he
speaks French and he has less experience in international politics and military matters
than my other nominees. Nevertheless, I recommend him strongly.
2. Ros Gilpatric--I think Gilpatric has standing, style and judgment. I doubt just a little
whether he has the energy and the political insight to take the call to the provinces and the
case to the people. It would be hard to pry him loose from the Kravath firm, but I think he
would come at your call.
3. Bob McNamara--You know everything I can tell you about him. My one reservation is
that he has been trying to think of ways of dealing with this problem for so long that he
has gone a little stale. Also, in a curious way, he has rather mechanized the problem so
that he misses some of its real political flavor.
4. Robert F. Kennedy--I come back to this suggestion, although I know you have thought
it wild in the past, for two reasons: the first is that the Attorney General has tremendous
appeal to younger people and to non-Americans all around the world. He would give a
picture of idealism and peace-seeking which our case will badly need, especially if we
have to move to stronger measures. I have heard it said that he would take this challenge
with some relish, but I have never talked to him about it myself.
5. William Gaud--Among the people at the next level down in the Administration, he has
the right combination of qualities to a greater degree than anyone else I know: Energy,
loyalty, skill, understanding of different kinds of action, and the trust of all services. He
looks disarmingly young, but in fact he is a man of 56 with wide and deep experience in
Southeast Asia, in the war, in the Pentagon, and in the jungle of New York law, and in
AID.
6. Myself--I am no judge of my own skills, and it is certainly true that I have never run an
embassy or a war. On the other hand, I think I do understand the issues. I know I care
about them. I speak French and I have a heavy dose of the ways of thinking of all
branches of the U.S. team in South Vietnam.

McG.B./2/
205. Memorandum by the President/1/

/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Vietnam Country File, Vol. XI,
Memos. No classification marking.
MEMORANDUM FOR
The Director, AID
The Director. USIA
It has come to my attention that in a number of instances departments and agencies have
had difficulty in getting needed consent from individuals who are recommended for
service in South Vietnam./2/
/2/In an earlier draft of this memorandum a sentence at the end of this paragraph reads as
follows: "I am informed that in at least one case a nominated individual resigned rather
than accept such an appointment."
This country has no more important job right now than to get the very best men in every
field for more effective service to our embattled friends in South Vietnam. If in any case
direct word from me can be helpful, I expect to be called on. I would want no U.S. officer
to be in doubt of the value of service in South Vietnam and of the importance which I
personally attach to it.
Lyndon B. Johnson
206 Editorial Note

On June 6 and 7, two U S. reconnaissance aircraft were shot down over Laos. On June 8,
the President met with McNamara, Harriman (acting for Rusk), Wheeler, William Bundy,
Manning, U. Alexis Johnson, Sullivan, McNaughton, Carter, Cooper, Colby, and Forrestal
to discuss the situation. Bromley Smith was the notetaker. The meeting began at 3 p.m.
without the President. Harriman, Johnson, and William Bundy arrived a few minutes late
because they had been conferring by telephone with Rusk who was vacationing in
Newport, Rhode Island. Harriman stated that Rusk favored a retaliatory airstrike against
Pathet Lao antiaircraft guns in Laos; he continued:
"Mr. Harriman said the purpose of the strike would be to convey a message to Hanoi.
Unless we take some action to convince Hanoi that we are serious, negotiations with Ho
Chi Minh will not be productive. Secretary McNamara agreed."
The discussion then turned to the details of the reconnaissance mission and the mechanics
of a possible retaliatory strike, particularly a 24-hour postponement:
"Secretary McNamara said: 'Suppose we decide not to make the strike? What would we
do if we cancelled it?' Mr. Sullivan pointed out that Canadian International Control
Commission (ICC) representative Seaborn would be in Hanoi on June 15. The message he
is to convey would not be appropriate if we had not acted in some way in response to the
shootdown of our reconnaissance planes. He, in effect, would be going to Hanoi with a
broken stick."
"There was discussion of low-level reconnaissance of North Vietnam as a possible
alternative. The general view was that such reconnaissance would not be safe."
"General Wheeler recommended strongly that the air attack be authorized. He opposed
any delay and said that we had no other plan to respond to the shoot-down."
"Secretary McNamara said we do not have to recommend the air attack but that no other
action we can take to convey a message to Hanoi is comparable to an air attack. The
possibility of some of our planes being shot down was a real one but the possibility that
there would be a catastrophe was one chance in a million. The risk of not doing anything
is greater than doing what is proposed. We must put additional pressure on Hanoi now."
"In response to a suggestion that Laos and South Vietnam are separate issues, Alexis
Johnson said the relationship between the problems in the two countries is exemplified by
two chess boards, some plays being made on both boards."
"Secretary McNamara said he and Deputy Secretary Vance had talked to several Senators
during the day, including Senators Saltonstall and Russell. They had encountered less
opposition than they had anticipated."
The President joined the meeting at 3:45 p.m. and the group reiterated the discussion. The
President was dubious about the strike and wondered if its results would offset criticism
that the United States was violating the 1962 Geneva Accords on Laos. Harriman and
McNamara argued that unless the United States reacted quickly North Vietnam might
conclude that the United States talked tough but acted weakly. The President was
skeptical, but he approved the strike with grave reservations. (Memorandum of
conversation by Bromley Smith, June 8; Johnson Library, National Security File, Aides
File, McGeorge Bundy, Meetings on Southeast Asia, Vol. I)
On June 9, eight F-100 aircraft attacked a Pathet Lao antiaircraft installation at Xieng
Khoung.
207. Memorandum From the Ambassador in Vietnam (Lodge) to the Secretary of

State/1/
Saigon, June 8, 1964.

/1/Source: Department of State, Rusk Files: Lot 72 D 192, Correspondence--L. No
classification marking. Lodge sent this memorandum to Rusk under a cover of a brief
letter, June 8, which explained that the memorandum represented "some of the thoughts
which I said I would send you regarding the job of the U.S. Ambassador to South
Vietnam."
SUBJECT
U.S. Ambassador to South Vietnam
1. The problem here is clearly essentially political, with the military as an utterly
indispensable aid, but as an aid nonetheless. Under these circumstances, Washington
would look to the Ambassador for inventive and creative proposals such as could only
come from the man on the spot. For this reason, the Ambassador should be an inventive
and creative thinker in the political-governmental-diplomatic field.
2. He would also have to meet other issues. One is the creation of a proper political
atmosphere here which, as the late General Bedell Smith indicated in 1954, is the
indispensable pre-requisite to military victory. This means educating the Vietnamese in
political ways at least as intensively as we have done militarily.
3. This in turn means leading and coordinating all American activities here. First and
foremost is the military effort to achieve security. Then he must lead and coordinate the
economic and social effort of USOM, the psychological programs of USIS and the work
of CIA.
4. He should synthesize the American views in Saigon so that they focus on the same
question at the same time and thus present Washington with clearcut suggestions.
Washington will thus not be drowned in uncoordinated papers coming at different times
on different topics, and in which the issue is never joined. This would deprive no one in
Saigon of his own channel to his own agency in Washington. President Kennedy required
this synthesis of me in the month before the coup. The time may come when President
Johnson may need the same service.
5. We may be sure that our Communist antagonist handles his political-militaryeconomic-social-propaganda and subversive activities as one program, and that for one
country--if not for one region--there is one Communist boss.
6. In addition to having a head for all of this it is most useful for the Ambassador to speak
French. If this is not possible, there should be a first class interpreter--who understands
the issues.
7. The Ambassador should also consider himself expendable. He should not consider his
"next post" and should not have one.
8. Also it helps to be a "personage" who has already made somewhat of a name for
himself.
9. Undoubtedly it is impossible to meet all these requirements.
208. Memorandum From Senator Hubert H. Humphrey to the President/1/

Vol III, Memos (A). Secret.
SUBJECT
Southeast Asia
PREFACE
At your request I have attempted in this memorandum to give you my personal view as to
the course we should follow in Southeast Asia. As a result of confidential discussions
with Vietnamese officials and with Americans who have served recently in Vietnam and
who know the military and political situation in Vietnam intimately, I feel that there is a
clear and positive alternative to either pulling out of Southeast Asia, or of launching what
is essentially a Korea-type conventional war in the area.
Attached to this memorandum is a detailed proposal "Concept for Victory in Vietnam",/2/
which I strongly urge that you personally read. It was prepared by a small group of men/3/
who have impressed me with their brilliance, their patriotism, and their tough and
sophisticated approach to the task of winning a U.S. victory in Vietnam. They are all
veterans of campaigns where we gave the Communists memorable lickings. They have
written about what they themselves would be prepared to go out and do.
/2/Not attached, but a copy is in the Hoover Institution, Lansdale Papers, Saigon Liaison
Office, "Concept for Victory in Vietnam."
/3/Edward G. Lansdale, Rufus Phillips, and Charles T.R. Bohannan.
I shall also hope to have attached by the time this memorandum is delivered a third
memorandum, prepared at my request by a high Vietnamese official, covering the subject
of his conversation with me last week./4/
/4/Not found. Humphrey met with Foreign Minister Quat on June 5. Rusk telephoned
Humphrey on Friday, June 5, at 5:09 p.m., to hear about his conversation. The
transcription of the call reads as follows:
"See said President had asked him to call H to hear his interesting remarks on his meeting
with Quat. He said he was preparing a detailed memo and would have that Monday. H
said in summary that Quat said he wanted to talk to H not as Foreign Minister but as
private individual; he was not speaking publicly and could not; US had respected
Vietnamese sovereignty but now if something not done so that US takes over a good deal
more, we are not going to have any sovereignty; Vietnam does not have administrators;
we need not an adviser but a brother; someone who is not afraid to criticize; Quat paid
tribute to AID people; there were not yet any policy goals which aroused Vietnamese
people; this could not be said publicly; Quat said he thought the military situation could
be stabilized. H asked for a detailed memo, unsigned, that he could have to be very careful
with, give it only to Sec or to President. He said since then he had called in Fraleigh of
AID and Gen Lansdale whom he found interesting. H said the impact of the total
conversation with Quat was that military can help stabilize but cannot win in that way;
said Quat told him interesting facts re infighting in his own administration. Sec said he
was looking forward to getting the material. H said he would get it to Sec Monday
morning."
"H said he told President last night that we have no one for spokesman up here; H wanted
to know more; many of us are just confused; H said he thought we had to lay down some
fundamentals and see what we can do. Sec said he needed more time with the
Committee."
"H said further on the Quat talk, he gathered there is good enough formal relationship
with the Embassy but there is a lack of people who really understand the area; he said he
was not certain of Quat's meaning in this regard." (Department of State, Rusk Files: Lot
72 D 192, Telephone Conversations)
I. Situation
A. General Situation
1. The military/political situation is no more hopeless than it was in 1954, but it is
extremely critical.
2. The restoration of security in South Vietnam and the neighboring states is not
something that can wholly be accomplished in a short period (probably requiring a
commitment of 8 to 10 years before the total job is finally done). Hearteningly, however,
marked progress can be shown in a year.
3. Neither the Vietnamese, the Viet-Cong, the Chinese Communists, nor people of
Southeast Asia are now convinced that we are there to stay until there is a free and
independent Southeast Asia.
4. The area must be considered integrally, for what happens in South Vietnam will
inevitably affect Cambodia, Thailand, and further east. If South Vietnam is lost,
Cambodia, Thailand and Burma will follow.
B. Military Situation
1. The Viet-Cong are allowed virtual control of most of South Vietnam at night.
Vietnamese forces and U.S. forces generally hole-up at night behind barbed wire and
concrete and the countryside is, in effect, controlled by the V.C. There is little effective
counter-action by Vietnamese armed forces. The security situation is extremely bad. The
Mekong Delta is mostly under control of a Viet-Cong Government with taxation powers,
virtually independent logistically, although support also comes in by ship to Cambodia
and then down the canals. Experienced observers believe that cutting off all outside
support to the Viet-Cong would not materially affect the outcome of the war. (See the
accompanying report on pacification in Long An Province for details of Vietnamese and
U.S. ineffectiveness.)/5/
/5/Not attached. Apparent reference to a supplement to the "Weekly Report: The Situation
in South Vietnam," May 8, entitled "Situation in Long An Province." Johnson Library.
National Security File. Vietnam Country File, Vol. IX, Memos)
2. The strategic hamlet program has essentially failed to provide security for the peasants,
partly because of the lack of back-up security. At first 18 or 20 armed villagers could
either kill or repel the two or three Viet-Cong intruders at night. Then when the Viet-Cong
organized their larger-scaled 40-or-50-men attacks with automatic weapons (followed by
ambushes of relief columns from the larger military centers) the effect was to lose the
confidence of the villagers in the hamlets that they could be backed up and secured. Now
one current practice apparently is to fire off artillery in the direction of a hamlet being
attacked, which often indiscriminately kills friendly villagers. The use of aircraft and
artillery has too often been a "substitute" for effective night and day ground action.
3. Relatively little intelligence about the whereabouts of Viet-Cong guerrillas can be
obtained from a population which is both intimidated by the Viet-Cong and which has
nothing but dislike or even hatred for the Vietnamese regular forces. It appears within the
capability of the Viet-Cong to mount two or three dramatic strokes for psychological
effect within the next weeks or months--such as the occupation for 24 hours of a
provincial capital.
4. The Vietnamese Army suffers from having a large number of its people who have been
in combat too long and are playing it safe; their principal mission is to stay alive. There
has been an extraordinarily low proportion of Vietnamese officer casualties compared to
enlisted casualties. The attitude of officers toward men is too often a master-servant
relationship, and there seems to be a lack of trust between officers and men. Officers are
unwilling, and not encouraged, to assume responsibility. The attitude of both officers and
men toward the civilian population is bad, on the whole. There is real estrangement
between the people and the Army. Such incidents as Vietnamese soldiers driving U.S.
furnished trucks down through the streets of villages and killing children and livestock,
without stopping, plus the relatively indiscriminate use of heavy weapons and napalm are
not calculated to win the support of the people.
5. While there is an overwhelming number of U.S. personnel in Vietnam, too many are in
Saigon. The prevailing attitude of the U.S. commanders has been to press the war against
the Viet-Cong and if anyone gets in the way that is too bad-"war is hell", etc. The result
has been a concentration on heavier weapons, with nearly zero attention to civic action,
nearly zero attention to winning the people of Vietnam to the side of the Vietnamese
Government and the Vietnamese Army. Air Force flyers, for example, have too often
followed a policy of shooting anything that moves-on the theory that only the Viet-Cong
will be running away from a strafing airplane.
C. Political/Psychological Situation
1. In general the Vietnamese people are not so much anti-government as indifferent to the
Government, and the general attitude is "a plague on both houses." They are weary of
twenty or more years of war. Clearly there is little commitment and motivation, nor belief
in a government program for the people, although there is a considerable reservoir of
idealistic young people who could be organized into a national movement.
2. The Vietnamese Government appears uncertain as to how to proceed, with the U.S.
advisers overconscious of the national sovereignty of the Vietnamese, with relatively little
rapport with the Vietnamese leaders, and neither the understanding nor ability to insist
upon political/psychological emphasis in the war. The Vietnamese leadership is divided
and mistrustful of each other.
3. The Vietnamese Government has promulgated no goals for the people that are believed,
and has begun no action programs that would give the people something to be for.
Although there is a fair-sized budget for "civic action" by the Vietnamese Army, it has not
been spent with any effective results in the countryside.
4. There is no consistent or effective program of troop indoctrination-in sharp contrast to
the very heavy and steady indoctrination employed by the Viet-Cong forces.
D. American AID personnel, particularly those in rural development work of increasing
agricultural production and food distribution, are working with a small team of 40 some
people in the rural areas, and are not hindered by the Viet-Cong. The people have
confidence in these men, who are by and large young and idealistic and are recognized as
such by the Vietnamese people. They have been making rather dramatic advances in
agricultural production and other improvements wherever they are working. However, the
Vietnamese Army and Government, who should get the credit, obtain lit~tle benefit from
the work of these Americans. Too often such Vietnamese do not participate in meaningful
ways in the activities of the rural development people.
II. What Should Be Done
A. There should be a U.S. decision to stay, stabilize, and help the Vietnamese build. To
pull out now or to permit a "neutralist" solution at this time when the security situation is
so difficult will be to signal to the people of Southeast Asia that we have lost confidence
in them and that the game is lost.
B. There should be a U.S. determination and an announcement of our primary goal-not of
creating an anti-Communist bastion in Southeast Asia, but the creation of an independent
and free Southeast Asia.
C. The Vietnamese must be skillfully and firmly guided, but it is they (not us) who must
win their war.
D. The two most urgent fundamental needs in Vietnam are: stabilizing the Vietnamese
leadership and giving some hope to which the Vietnamese people can rally. Vietnamese
civilian leaders appear to have an effective plan for stabilizing leadership which should be
supported. A political base is needed to support all other actions toward gaining victory.
The winning of the people's minds and hearts is imperative. No amount of additional
military involvement can be successful without accomplishing this task.
E. Political Goals
1. The Government of Vietnam should announce a sweeping program of economic and
social reform and progress, and the identification of its own role as a caretaker. Looking
toward more self-government and democratic rule, a practical program for establishing a
new Constitution, for eventual national elections, and a return to civilian government must
be set forth.
2. There should be widespread propaganda and information disseminated about specific
political and economic goals-such as land reform, increasing agricultural production by x
percentage in one or two years, the construction of new schools in every hamlet, etc.
3. The VN Army must undergo a thorough and detailed indoctrination to change its
attitude and practices toward the civilian population, to ensure that their primary mission
is understood to be to protect the people of South Vietnam and their secondary mission to
help them.
4. Vietnamese civilian administrators and village teams must be recruited on a volunteer
basis, not bureaucrats sent out unwillingly from the capital. Young people who are willing
to work with the peasants in the villages and on the farms should be given encouragement
and incentives to do so.
F. Military Program
1. Since SEATO has shown itself to be apparently an impractical instrument for defending
Southeast Asia from Communist subversive insurgency, SEATO either should be changed
drastically or a substitute organization created to permit some multi-lateral military action
in Southeast Asia. One practical alternative would be the creation of the kind of
international volunteer group which was once created in the Philippines, which would
accept volunteers for service and act, nominally, perhaps, under contract with the
Vietnamese Government as advisers and technicians.
2. Training and combat in night fighting must be instituted and the concept of close
infantry combat substituted for the present reliance upon heavy weapons, especially
napalm, bombs, and heavy artillery, except under specialized circumstances. Experienced
counter-guerrilla forces from other nations, especially in Southeast Asia, ought to be
invited in-such as the Filipinos with Huk campaign experience.
3. A possible dramatic stroke to demonstrate the U.S. intention to stay and help defend the
Southeast Asian people would be a multilateral military cordon established across the area
from Thailand eastward, and westward from the South Vietnamese coast immediately
below the 17th parallel-joining across Laos. While this would have only a relatively small
role in drying up the logistic support for the Viet-Cong guerrillas, it would have a
tremendous dramatic impact throughout Southeast Asia. Perhaps SEATO could undertake
this task.
III. Methods
A. The key would appear to be not to increase the number of U.S. personnel committed in
Vietnam, but to restructure the command and control organization. This could be done by
sending in a seasoned team of men who have demonstrated their ability to defeat Asian
insurgents who fight by Mao Tse-tung's doctrines of guerrilla warfare. The team that went
into the Philippines to help Magsaysay defeat the Huks was effectively only three men.
The team that went into Vietnam in 1954 to help Diem stabilize the country was
effectively only ten men. To emphasize the relative non-importance of additional numbers
of people, the rural development program in South Vietnam, which is one of the great
successes, is being run by only about 40 dedicated and motivated men.
B. Basic changes in the U.S. advisory effort in Vietnam are required:
1. Advisers must be motivated and convinced that the way to win in Southeast Asia is to
win the minds and hearts of the people and they must want to do so. The present emphasis
is on killing the Viet Cong and God help anything that stands in the way. Advisers who
become personally committed must be encouraged to extend their tours, or return after
leave.
2. Key advisers, having the confidence of the key Vietnamese leaders, and the backing of
the U.S. Government, must be positioned to coordinate the U.S. and Vietnamese efforts,
exercising when necessary strong, firm guidance, practically effective control, in both
military and civilian areas. Clearly the present U.S. advisory leadership is both oversensitive about Vietnamese "sovereignty", and too little sensitive to the feelings and needs
of the Vietnamese people.
3. Effective support must be given to U.S. advisors at lower echelons, so that the advised,
if they disregard their advice, know that their actions will be promptly and effectively
brought to the attention of Vietnamese and U.S. advisors at as high an echelon as might be
necessary. Major errors must be rectified, or their perpetrators suitably dealt with, even at
risk of infringements on sovereignty.
C. The Vietnamese Government should be moved and effectively assisted to make the
necessary public announcements regarding political and economic goals, to develop an
active program of civil action and indoctrination of the troops, and to engage in an
intensive program of training and combat in night fighting.
D. To deal with North Vietnam, a committee on national liberation should be formed in
South Vietnam with announcements that the eventual goal is the unification of a free and
independent Vietnam. This would regain some of the psychological initiative that the
North Vietnamese now have. The committee could use the new SOKW VOA transmitter
(with a changed frequency) which is now in Vietnam.
E. Direct U.S. military action against North Vietnam, U.S. assumption of command roles,
or the participation in combat of U.S. troop units are unnecessary and undesirable.
IV. Proposal
That a team be immediately selected by the President from among those men who have
had experience in inspiring and guiding counter-guerrilla forces in Asia, who are known
to and have the confidence of the Vietnamese leaders, who are motivated to win the
political and psychological war, as well as the military war, in Vietnam, and who have a
similar direct authority stemming from the President of the United States that Gerald
Templer had in Malaysia and that Edward Lansdale had in Vietnam in 1954.
At least two key individuals ought to be called in by. the President personally to discuss
the possibility of organizing such a team: Major General Edward G. Lansdale, presently
serving in the White House on Food for Peace; and Rufus Phillips, presently head of his
own engineering company in the Washington area, who, up until 6 months ago, was the
director of rural affairs for AID in South Vietnam. Both Lansdale and Phillips served in
the pacification program in South Vietnam in 1954 and 1955--Lansdale as the key adviser
to Diem, and Phillips in the field as an airborne officer. Both are highly motivated, highly
trained, decisive and imaginative people. Lansdale, whose biographical sheet is
attached,/6/ was the key American figure in Magsaysay's defeat of the Huk forces in the
Philippines, the key figure in the development of counter-insurgency work in the Defense
Department, as well as being the key adviser to Diem in the first two years of his reign.
He was an adviser to President Kennedy on South Vietnam and is known to McNamara,
the Joint Chiefs, and Lodge. It is strongly suggested that the President ask Lansdale to
discuss this whole matter with him.
/6/Not found.
209. Memorandum From the Board of National Estimates to the Director of Central
Intelligence (McCone)/1/
Vol. III, Memos (B). Secret. A June 11 covering memorandum from McCone to
McGeorge Bundy reads as follows:
"Attached is a memorandum from Dr. Sherman Kent on the 'doming effect' in the Far East
resulting from loss of South Vietnam and Laos."
"You will recall the President made inquiry concerning this subject last Saturday. I call
your specific attention to numbered paragraph 9, the final paragraph in the memorandum."
On another copy of this memorandum, Forrestal wrote the following note: "Mac: This is
obvious but good. Might help answer one of the Pres's questions."
SUBJECT
Would the Loss of South Vietnam and Laos Precipitate a "Domino Effect" in the Far
East?
1. The "domino effect" appears to mean that when one nation falls to communism the
impact is such as to weaken the resistance of other countries and facilitate, if not cause,
their fall to communism. Most literally taken, it would imply the successive and speedy
collapse of neighboring countries, as a row of dominoes falls when the first is toppled--we
presume that this degree of literalness is not essential to the concept. Most specifically it
means that the loss of South Vietnam and Laos would lead almost inevitably to the
communization of other states in the area, and perhaps beyond the area.
2. We do not believe that the loss of South Vietnam and Laos would be followed by the
rapid, successive communization of the other states of the Far East. Instead of a shock
wave passing from one nation to the next, there would be a simultaneous, direct effect on
all Far Eastern countries. With the possible exception of Cambodia, it is likely that no
nation in the area would quickly succumb to communism as a result of the fall of Laos
and South Vietnam. Furthermore, a continuation of the spread of communism in the area
would not be inexorable and any spread which did occur would take time--time in which
the total situation might change in any of a number of ways unfavorable to the Communist
cause.
3. The loss of South Vietnam and Laos to the Communists/2/ would be profoundly
damaging to the US position in the Far East, most especially because the US has
committed itself persistently, emphatically, and publicly to preventing Communist
takeover of the two countries. Failure here would be damaging to US prestige, and would
seriously debase the credibility of US will and capability to contain the spread of
communism elsewhere in the area. Our enemies would be encouraged and there would be
an increased tendency among other states to move toward a greater degree of
accommodation with the Communists. However, the extent to which individual countries
would move away from the US towards the Communists would be significantly affected
by the substance and manner of US policy in the period following the loss of Laos and
South Vietnam.
/2/This memorandum assumes a clear-cut Communist victory in these countries, i.e., a
withdrawal of US forces and virtual elimination of US presence in Indochina, either
preceded or soon followed by the establishment of Communist regimes in Laos and South
Vietnam. The results of a fuzzier, piecemeal victory, such as one staged through a
"neutralist" phase, would probably be similar, though somewhat less sharp and severe.
[Footnote in the source text.]
4. Southeast Asia. In the remaining piece of Indochina, Sihanouk would probably
accelerate his movement toward accommodation with the Communists, in anticipation of
a Communist victory he considers inevitable. Thailand would almost certainly shift
toward a neutralist position, hoping thus to forestall any vigorous Communist move
against the regime for as long as possible. Cooperation with the US would be reduced.
Already, Thai leaders have made clear their worries about the firmness of US
commitments in the area and their doubts about the wisdom of ready responsiveness to
Washington's immediate policy desires. Burma would be less affected, having already
virtually severed its ties with the US. Ne Win would see the ouster of the US from
Indochina as confirming the wisdom of the isolationist, somewhat pro-Peiping course he
has already embarked upon.
5. London, Canberra, and Kuala Lumpur have been counting ultimately upon US support
for Malaysia against Indonesian aggression. They would be badly disconcerted by a US
failure in Indochina, and would almost certainly seek some clear US commitment to help
them defend Malaysia. Indonesia, for its part, would be emboldened in its efforts to crush
Malaysia.
6. US Western Pacific Bases. US military strength in the Far East is based on the chain of
islands from the Philippines to Japan, not on the Asian mainland. As long as the US can
effectively operate from these bases, it will probably still be able to deter Peiping and
Hanoi from overt military aggression. Furthermore, the protection of these island
countries from Communist subversion efforts is a different problem from that of
protecting countries on the mainland. In the Philippines, there would be some impetus to
the tendency of ultranationalists, such as former Foreign Minister Lopez, to press for
reduced cooperation with the US and a softening of the Philippines' anti-Peiping stand.
They would also seek restrictions on US bases similar to those presently enforced in
Japan. We do not think this would affect Philippine government policy, at least as long as
the present administration is in power in Manila.
7. On Taiwan, Chiang Kai-shek and his followers would be greatly disheartened, but they
would not be likely to seek an accommodation with the Communists. As in the case of the
Philippines, the Nationalist Chinese leaders appreciate the efficacy of US sea and air
power, and their nation has proved among the least vulnerable in the Far East to
Communist infiltration and subversion.
8. In Japan, the loss of South Vietnam and Laos would almost certainly produce some
increase of neutralist sentiment. There would be more questioning of the desirability of
remaining committed to the US side and continuing to be made a prime Communist target
by the presence of US bases. The mutual defense treaty and the US bases in Japan and
Okinawa would come under even greater attack than at present. At a minimum, political
pressures for further restrictions on the use of these bases would be greatly intensified,
and the government would probably make a few concessions to these pressures. We do
not believe that there would be major changes in Japanese policy.
9. Communist Asia. Aside from the immediate joy in the DRV over achievement of its
national goals, the chief effect would be upon Communist China, both in boosting its
already remarkable self-confidence and in raising its prestige as a leader of World
Communism. Peiping has already begun to advertise South Vietnam as proof of its thesis
that the underdeveloped world is ripe for revolution, that the ~US is a paper tiger, and that
local insurgency can be carried through to victory without undue risk of precipitating a
major international war. The outcome in South Vietnam and Laos would conspicuously
support the aggressive tactical contentions of Peiping as contrasted with the more cautious
position of the USSR. To some degree this will tend to encourage and strengthen the more
activist revolutionary movements in various parts of the underdeveloped world.
For the Board of National Estimates:
Sherman Kent
Chairman
210. Summary Record of a Meeting, White House, Washington, June 10, 1964, 5:30
p.m./1/
/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Aides Files, McGeorge Bundy,
Meetings on Southeast Asia, Vol. 1. Top Secret; Sensitive. Drafted by Smith. The source
text indicates the President did not attend.
PRESENT
Secretary Rusk (later), Secretary McNamara, Secretary Dillon, Attorney General, Under
Secretary Harriman, Director McCone, Director Bell, Director Rowan, Mr. Rostow,
Assistant Secretary Bundy, Assistant Secretary Manning, Assistant Secretary
McNaughton, General Goodpaster, Deputy Under Secretary Johnson, Special Assistant

Sullivan, Mr. Chester Cooper, Mr. William Colby, Mr. McGeorge Bundy, Mr. Douglass
Cater, Mr. Bromley Smith
[Here follows discussion of the situation in Laos.]
The group then turned to consider item three of the agenda, i.e., next steps in South
Vietnam./2/ Mr. Sullivan reported on the existing situation. The most important element
in the South Vietnam picture is the will and determination of the Khanh government and
the South Vietnamese people. Their morale would be deeply affected by the position we
take in Laos. If we stand firm they will be encouraged to adopt our new suggestions with
respect to adding U.S. advisory personnel to the Vietnamese civil and military structure.
They must, however, have a clear idea of what we plan to do in the future. If we go to a
Geneva conference without gaining our preconditions, there will be crisis of confidence in
South Vietnam. If we ask and obtain a Congressional resolution in support of our
Southeast Asia policy, the Vietnamese will be greatly encouraged. The Manning
information operation here and the Zorthian USIA operation in Saigon are efforts in the
right direction. We will need to indoctrinate our own people so that they are not
conveying to the Vietnamese that we are Gung Ho for a military victory, but, rather, are in
South Vietnam for the long term. Our training people can convince the South Vietnamese
that we are sticking with them. With the takeover of the military command by General
Westmoreland, we can shift from trying to kill every Viet-Cong, to protecting the
Vietnamese population. The country team in Saigon has taken three provinces in which
pilot projects will be initiated. These three are among the eight provinces recommended
by the Honolulu meeting. The Vietnamese Foreign Minister Quat is returning to South
Vietnam and, hopefully, will speed up the dispatch abroad of South Vietnamese
ambassadors. In addition, the South Vietnamese government has wired [hired?] a U.S.
public relations firm to assist it in drawing public attention to its accomplishments. He
concluded by repeating that if the Vietnamese can be convinced we are sticking with them
and not withdrawing, they will agree to our plans for greater participation in the
government structure of South Vietnam.
/2/Items 1 and 2 on the attached agenda were: "The immediate situation [in Laos]: Report
by Mr. William Bundy;" and "Laos--alternative steps: Presentation by Mr. Forrestal."
Secretary Rusk asked why the South Vietnamese doubt that we are sticking with them.
Mr. Sullivan responded that they are upset by the statements which Senator Morse makes
almost daily, by Agence France Presse reports from Saigon, by whispering which
constantly goes on in Saigon involving neutralization proposals, and by the diplomatic
activity which we are engaged in involving the problem of Laos.
Secretary McNamara said there is no question but that we face a morale problem in South
Vietnam. Many South Vietnamese doubt that we will take actions necessary to save the
situation. We must be prepared to take what actions are necessary to maintain morale
which has weakened in the last two or three weeks.
Mr. Sullivan said that events in Laos have weakened morale in South Vietnam. He
referred to certain evidence that the South Vietnamese think we lack firmness in our
policy toward the Laos situation.
Mr. William Bundy disagreed. He suggested that we wait until we had further evidence of
the effect of our actions in Laos on the state of morale in Saigon. The air strike in Laos
has helped morale in South Vietnam. Secretary McNamara agreed that as a result of our
air strike in Laos morale in South Vietnam has improved in the last two days.
Mr. Cooper asked how we could realistically change South Vietnamese morale. The
situation in Laos might have affected morale in South Vietnam, but we cannot say flatly
that it was the result of our actions in Laos. It may have been the result of the improved
situation in Laos.
Mr. Sullivan said it was necessary to reassure the South Vietnamese every day. Secretary
Rusk agreed and said that this necessity applied to several other countries, even including
Germany. We cannot build our policy on the constant need to reassure nervous friendly
countries.
Secretary McNamara said he concluded, following the Honolulu meeting, that the
situation in South Vietnam was weakening. He acknowledged that Ambassador Lodge
thought things were getting better there. However, Secretary McNamara felt that the U.S.
would not have to take any major action in South Vietnam in the next two or three
months. We should review the situation and the actions we are taking every two weeks.
Mr. Sullivan agreed that we did not have a short fuze on the South Vietnamese situation.
He noted that the Viet Cong had eased up on their attack on South Vietnam military bases
and are concentrating their propaganda on trying to erode South Vietnamese support of
General Khanh's government, to weaken U.S. support of that government, and to bring
U.S. domestic public opinion pressure on the U.S. Government to reduce its support of
General Khanh.
Secretary Rusk suggested we might initiate an operations checklist which might have as
many as one hundred items on it. This checklist would be reviewed every few days.
Pluses and minuses would be placed after each item on the list. Items would include such
subjects as the countries giving aid to South Vietnam, the appointment of South
Vietnamese ambassadors, the religious question, and pay and housing for troops. These
detailed actions are the essence of our program rather than big diplomatic moves. The
checklist would be a stimulus to continued action on the many small proposals.
Mr. Cooper said the weekly combined report now being prepared on South Vietnam
meets part of the Secretary's suggestion.
Mr. McGeorge Bundy suggested that Mr. Sullivan's group was the proper group to draw
up a list of current problems with comment as to progress being made on each. Mr.
Rowan volunteered to prepare a study on South Vietnam morale, based on press reports
from Saigon.
Secretary Rusk felt it would be helpful to the President to know that we are reviewing
South Vietnam actions comprehensively and in detail.
Director McCone expressed some concern over the prospect that we might be confronted
in South Vietnam with a sudden Communist thrust. There is some evidence to indicate
that the Communists may be holding back their forces and building up for a new attack.
The Watch Committee is closely following this subject. There has been a period of
relative quiet for the past two weeks in Vietnam, during which there have been no large
enemy military actions. Conceivably, the Viet Cong may be assembling resources for a
major blow at the Khanh government. Mr. Alexis Johnson said that the Viet Cong may be
turning away from military actions to attacks on the morale of the South Vietnamese, as
had been pointed out earlier by Mr. Sullivan.
Secretary Rusk asked that the closest watch be kept on the deployment of the Communist
Chinese air forces. He emphasized the extreme importance of any movement of these air
forces.
Mr. Sullivan summarized the views of Mr. Burdett, an English correspondent who had
spent considerable time in Communist areas in the Far East. Mr. Burdett's view is that the
Viet Cong is not seeking a military victory in Vietnam but is trying to turn South Vietnam
into another Laos by creating political confusion for the Khanh government and spreading
confusion throughout the countryside.
The group then turned to consideration of a draft Congressional resolution/3/ which was
summarized by Mr. William Bundy. The draft resolution tries to convey a firm posture
but also emphasizes the peace motive and the readiness to negotiate, plus the willingness
to use SEATO and the UN. The objective is to enlist the support of as many Senators as
possible, minus Senator Morse. Paragraph two of the draft resolution is modeled on the
Near East resolution rather than on the Offshore Island resolution or the Cuban
revolution./4/ The whereases are important in the effort to gain maximum support. Section
three of the draft is considered by the lawyers to be very important but it could be dropped
as not being absolutely necessary.
/3/See Document 169 and attachment 3 to Document 214.
/4/For text of the Middle East resolution, March 9, 1957, see American Foreign Policy:
Current Documents, 1957, pp. 829-831. The Formosa or Offshore Islands resolution,
January 29, 1955, is ibid.: Basic Documents, 1950-1955, pp. 2486-2487. The resolution
on Cuba, October 2, 1962, is ibid.: Current Documents, 1962, pp. 389-390.
The group then turned to Mr. McGeorge Bundy's paper, "Alternative Public Positions for
U.S. on Southeast Asia for the Period July 1-November 15."/5/ Mr. Bundy said the only
time to seek the Congressional resolution on Southeast Asia would be at the end of the
Civil Rights debate, which may occur within ten days or two weeks. However, if there
were a crash situation in Southeast Asia. a resolution could be dealt with at any time.
/5/Document 211.
Secretary Rusk said the ideal situation would be a short resolution adopted unanimously
by Congress. It would be disastrous if Congress refused to vote a resolution proposed by
the Administration or if the resolution was basically weakened during the course of
Congressional debate. We should ask for a resolution only when the circumstances are
such as to require action, and, thereby, force Congressional action. There will be a
rallying around the President the moment it is clear to reasonable people that U.S. action
is necessary.
Secretary McNamara said we would not be in a position to ask for a Congressional
resolution before July 1.

The Attorney General foresaw great difficulties in obtaining approval of a Congressional
resolution if the Administration's course of action was not crystal clear. He felt the
difficulties on the Hill would be great if events are not pushing us to prompt action. It
would be much simpler to obtain approval of a resolution if U.S. actions are forcing the
pace. Heavy ground work with Congressmen will be necessary.
Mr. McGeorge Bundy said the Congressional ground work would be difficult if we are
not committed to seek a resolution. Secretary McNamara doubted that we could go to
Congress before July 1. Secretary Rusk said there was no basis for a resolution in the
existing situation or on decisions which the Administration has so far taken.
Secretary McNamara said a Congressional resolution before September was unlikely
unless the enemy acts suddenly in the area, which is also unlikely. Our actions proposed
to date are not such as to require a resolution.
Mr. McGeorge Bundy asked that the group not dismiss the proposal to seek Congressional
resolution without taking into account the great benefit such a resolution would have in
conveying our firmness of purpose in Southeast Asia.
Secretary Rusk said we can get a resolution passed only with great difficulty unless the
President has already taken basic decisions as to what we would do in Southeast Asia.
Success in obtaining the Cuba resolution and then support we obtained from NATO
countries followed the announcement of our decision to act. Before we reach a higher
climax resulting in firm U.S. decisions, our Congressional problem will be considerable.
Mr. McGeorge Bundy agreed to beef up the last page of his paper which deals with how
we can meet the situation in Laos prior to a Congressional resolution or without seeking
one.
Secretary McNamara suggested that a press campaign should be launched which would be
of such a nature as to avoid building up public pressure for drastic action. Mr. Manning
said perhaps the public information program should be aimed at continuing the present
disinterest in the Laos and South Vietnam situations. This is a different objective than
trying to sell a Congressional resolution.
Secretary Rusk said the Congressmen he had met recently were reacting as if they were
unconcerned and not as if there were a crisis. Secretary McNamara pointed out, however,
that there was dissatisfaction in Congress with what we are now doing. Mr. Manning said
one very thin sample of public opinion consisted of letters being sent to the State
Department. About one-third of the letters received dealt with Southeast Asia. Most of
these were "soft" in the sense of inquiring as to what we are doing in Southeast Asia, but
were not as "soft" as they had been earlier.
Secretary McNamara suggested that in the event of a dramatic event in Southeast Asia we
would go promptly for a Congressional resolution, but we would not plan on one and that
our public information program would not be aimed at getting support for a resolution.
Mr. McGeorge Bundy called attention to the problem of how far we could go in
influencing the situation in Southeast Asia without taking actions which could be initiated
only with a Congressional resolution. Secretary McNamara replied that the thirteen
actions he had recommended could be taken without a Congressional resolution and that
these actions go quite far. Mr. McGeorge Bundy agreed that even air defense actions in
Southeast Asia would be possible without a Congressional resolution.
Secretary Dillon said the arguments for a Congressional resolution could be reversed. If
we get a resolution and then do not act promptly, there could follow a crisis of morale.
Mr. Alexis Johnson asked whether, if the Pathet Lao attacked, we had sufficient authority
to hit back. Mr. McGeorge Bundy felt that under the NATO [SEATO?] Treaty such a
response would be possible. Director McCone said that putting U.S. troops on the ground
in Southeast Asia would require a Congressional resolution. He reminded the group that
the idea of a resolution arose when we were discussing how to deal with a Communist
reaction to an attack by us on North Vietnamese targets.
Secretary Rusk requested that the paper on the Congressional resolution be rewritten to
reflect the views expressed during the meeting.
211. Draft Memorandum by the President's Special Assistant for National Security
Affairs (Bundy)/1/
/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Southeast Asia, Vol. 111. Top Secret.
SUBJECT
Alternative public positions for U.S. on Southeast Asia for the period July 1-November 15
It is agreed that the U.S. will wish to make its position on Southeast Asia as clear and
strong as possible in the next five months. The immediate watershed decision is whether
or not the Administration should seek a Congressional resolution giving general authority
for action which the President may judge necessary to defend the peace and security of the
area. It is agreed that if such a resolution is sought, it should be general in tone. It is also
agreed that the best available time for such a move is immediately after the Civil Rights
bill clears the Senate floor. Finally, it is agreed that no such resolution should be sought
unless careful Congressional soundings indicate rapid passage by a very substantial
majority. The question that remains is whether on these assumptions such a resolution is
or is not desirable, and the argument which follows is designed to explore the
consequences of having and not having such a resolution.
A. Scenario for a Congressional resolution/2/
/2/For drafts of the proposed resolution, see Document 169 and attachment 3 to Document
214.
The first necessity, if we are to have a resolution, is to prepare the case in favor. This
requires that the Administration be ready to give answers to a whole series of disagreeable
questions. Some of the more significant questions and possible answers follow:
1. Q. Does this resolution imply a blank check for the President to go to war over
Southeast Asia?
A. The resolution will indeed permit selective use of force, but hostilities on a larger scale
are not envisaged, and in any case any large escalation would require a call-up of
Reserves and thus a further appeal to the Congress. More broadly, there is no intent to
usurp the powers of the Congress, but rather a need for confirmation of the powers of the
President as Commander in Chief in an election year. The basic precedents are the
Formosa Resolution, the Middle East Resolution, and, in a sense, the Vandenberg
Resolution./3/
/3/Regarding the Formosa and Middle East resolutions, see footnote 4, Document 210.
The Vandenberg resolution, June 11, 1948, is printed in Foreign Relations, 1948, vol. III,
pp. 135-136.
2. Q. What kinds of force, if any, are possible under this authorization?
A. No force will be used if the President can avoid it. If the continued aggression of others
should require a limited response, that response will be carefully aimed at installations
and activities which directly support covert aggression against the free people of Laos and
South Vietnam. There is no intent or desire to enlarge the action beyond what is
absolutely required, and specifically, there is no intent to overthrow existing governments
in North Vietnam or in Red China, however much we dislike those regimes.
3. Q. What change in the situation requires such a resolution now?
A.1. This answer should include a candid account of the existing situation and hazard and
the growing dangers both in Laos and in South Vietnam.
A.2. This part of the answer should refer to the need for international awareness that the
U.S. is not immobilized by a political campaign.
4. Q. Isn't the situation in Southeast Asia one which really requires action (a) by the
people on the spot, or (b) by allies. or (c) by the U.S. through other than military means?
A. All of these other kinds of action are needed, and all will be sought to the limit of U.S.
ability. Specifically:
(a) The resolution is designed to give encouragement to those on the spot in their own
effort at self-help.
(b) We will seek as much help as possible from allies, but in realistic terms we must
recognize that our most reliable friends have their own commitments on other fronts.
(c) The political, economic, and social efforts of the U.S. in Southeast Asia, in support of
the free governments there, are being intensified to the limit of our wit and resources.
5. Q. Does Southeast Asia matter all that much?
A. Yes--because of the rights of the people there, because our own commitment, because
of the far-reaching effect of a failure, and because we can win if we stay with it.
A strong campaign in defense of this resolution will require a substantial increase in the
commitment of U.S. prestige and power to success in Southeast Asia. The resolution
would need to be preceded by a Presidential message. Such a message should not come as
a bolt from the blue; it should itself be preceded by a clear indication of the increasing
firmness of the Administration's position, and the reasons for that firmness. Such
indications could be given only by public statements of high officials or by such devices
as a White Paper.
In sum, a Congressional resolution would require a major public campaign by the
Administration. A very important element in such a campaign would be early and
outspoken support by leading members of Congress.
This is not a small undertaking, and it would have heavy implications.
The great advantages of an early Congressional resolution are international. It would give
additional freedom to the Administration in choosing courses of action; still more
important, it would give a signal of this new freedom of action and firmness of purpose in
a number of important capitals, the most important of which are in Southeast Asia, on
both sides of the line.
B. Without a Congressional Resolution
If we do not seek a Congressional Resolution, the international disadvantages are obvious,
in that we may seem to have a relative lack of freedom of action and will not have built
the major new base of commitment and of authority which in the best of cases such a
resolution, with its attendant debate, might provide. On the other hand, if we do not have a
resolution, we do not have the risks of a contest at home, nor do we pin ourselves to a
level of concern and public notice which might be embarrassing if in fact we do not find it
wise to take drastic action in the months immediately ahead. Thus we need to consider
how much our course of action may be limited if we do not seek a Congressional
Resolution.
First, it should be recognized that there are alternative forms of bipartisan support for
action: consultation with Eisenhower and the Republican candidate; discussion with
bipartisan leadership of Congress; direct Presidential appeal to the people; ample, if not
always encouraging, precedent for Presidential action, as in Korea.
Second, there is a wide range of actions which are plainly permissible without a
resolution. These include direct military action by South Vietnamese forces, and very
substantial deployments of U.S. air, sea and ground forces. Within the framework of
SEATO, and in defense of the agreements of 1962, we can plausibly move troops even
into Vietnam, Thailand and Laos itself if the appropriate governments request it. Short of
direct U.S. military action against North Vietnam, we could almost surely maintain
adequate freedom of action even without a Congressional Resolution.
Third, the only time we can get a resolution, in the absence of acute emergency, is within
the next three weeks. A strong case can be made that we do not now need to commit
ourselves so heavily, and that if the situation changes drastically, we could readily
respond by emergency session, certainly in November, and conceivably in September too.
On balance, it appears that we need a Congressional Resolution if and only if we decide
that a substantial increase of national attention and international tension is a necessary part
of the defense of Southeast Asia in the coming summer.
Bundy, Vol. 5. Top Secret. An "L" on the source text indicates that the President saw this
memorandum, and a handwritten note reads: "returned by Pres. 6/12/64."
SUBJECT
Our current work on Southeast Asia
1. We spent the day in two rather indecisive meetings,/2/ but I think in fact a good deal
was learned, and some underbrush cleared away.
/2/See Document 210. The reference to the second meeting is unclear.
2. Lodge's answer/3/ makes it clear that the basic next step in policy toward South
Vietnam is the selection of his successor. I continue to believe unrepentantly that this is
the most important single job you have to fill before the election, and that there is no one
whom you should not take if you think he has the qualifications. You know my list,/4/ and
I promise you there is not a name that I would remove from that list on any theory that the
individual is more valuable to you where he is.
/4/Document 204.
3. Moreover, I have not heard any additional names that strike me as good enough. It is
perhaps immodest to speak this way about a list in which I have included myself, but I am
trying to be honest.
4. Until we get a new Ambassador, we cannot really mount a sound program for crash
action--political, social, and economic--in South Vietnam. Nevertheless, planning can
begin and under your spur we have begun an intensive study of new and additional steps
that could be taken on the basic theory that Americans can and should do more. This
theory is shared by the men making the study.
5. On the situation in Laos, we have made a first cut at a diplomatic timetable which
would be slower and less explosive than the one we started on three weeks ago. This
paper is at Tab A,/5/ and it is the one which triggered a strong objection from the
Secretary of State. He insists that our real objective is to force strict compliance with the
'62 Accords. Most of us think that while we should press for such compliance, we should
not expect it and should be ready to settle for less. The Memorandum at Tab A states the
survival of Souvanna as the real objective, and I think it is right.
/5/Not attached, but apparent reference to a draft memorandum from William Bundy to
the President, June 8, entitled "Diplomatic Action Concerning Southeast Asia." Johnson
Library, National Security File, Vietnam Country File, Southeast Asia, Vol. II, Memos
(A).
6. The other subject on which we made progress today was whether or not to go for a
Congressional resolution soon. The memo which we used for discussion on this subject is
at Tab B,6 and the summary conclusion of the discussion was that we do not now
recommend an attempt to get an early resolution. We think the risks outweigh the
advantages, unless and until we have a firm decision to take more drastic action than we
currently plan.
/6/Document 211.
7. Finally, it was agreed that we will not be ready for a general meeting with you
tomorrow, but that it will be very important to have Dean Rusk, Bob McNamara, and me
to meet with you briefly at the 12:45 hour which is now scheduled by Jack Valenti./7/
/7/This off-the-record meeting did not take place until 4:45 p.m. on June 11. It lasted until
5:45, although Rusk left at 5:13 p.m. (Johnson Library, President's Daily Dairy) No record
of this meeting has been found.
8. If for any reason this program is not satisfactory, you can reach me anytime tonight or
early in the morning.
McG.B./8/

Saigon, June 12, 1964-3 p.m.
2459. Eyes only for Rusk from Lodge. Comment: I suggest that the distribution of what
follows be limited to those knowing about proposal for Congressional resolution on
Vietnam. End comment.
1. I became worried about likelihood that General Khanh would announce his reorganization of the Government of Vietnam just at the worst possible time from the
standpoint of Congress and that this might have a very serious effect on passage of a
resolution, assuming that it is planned to have one.
2. I therefore called on him this morning and recalled what he already knew, that
preparatory work was going on in Washington affecting Vietnam about which I could not
give him any details, but I did want to say that these activities in Washington must not be
upset by news of more changes in Vietnam which would give a further impression of
instability. I therefore asked him what was his timing on his proposed re-organization of
the government?
3. He said first that he felt he was considerably affected by what was being done in
Washington and felt he had the right to be kept informed, and that he would assure me
here and now that his reorganization would not be done at a time which would be
embarrassing to Washington. In other words, his re-organization would take place after
we had done what we needed to do in the US. He asked whether I thought 30 days from
the present date would be enough time, and I said that offhand I thought it was.
4. I then asked whether he would give me plenty of notice ahead of time and a list of all
principal personnel involved, and he said that he would. He also said that he would make
proper public relations preparation, i.e., communiques, speeches, etc.
5. I then told him of Hoan's suggestion to me reported in Saigon 2338 2 that the village
administrative councils be given the right to vote "no confidence" in the village
administrator, this procedure to be used only in flagrant cases of corruption, torturing, etc.
I had wondered whether this might not be a useful gesture provided it was undertaken on
the stipulation that a two-thirds vote would be needed and that the central government in
Saigon could dissolve the village council at will.
/2/Dated May 28. (Ibid., POL 27 VIET S)
6. Khanh said that this had been considered at length and that there was no doubt that in
the present state of development of the Vietnamese people, it could lead only to anarchy
and disorder and would be a made-to-order opportunity for the Viet Cong to make trouble
and bring about paralysis in local government which was paralyzed enough already.
Village councils could make written complaints, which was enough. He said that when the
matter had come up at the Council of Ministers, that out of 15 present, only 2 had voted
for it--Hoan and one other.
Comment: I am disposed to accept Khanh's view of this idea. End comment.
7. I then told him of the oral message which I had received from Hoan on Wednesday,/3/
to wit, that Hoan threatens to leave the government if General Khanh re-organizes it. I
told Khanh that suspecting a trap, upon receiving this message, I had sent back word that I
did not know what Hoan was talking about.
/3/June 10.
8. The message also expressed a desire on Hoan's part to have an informal talk with me,
not in official circumstances. I have sent back word that I understood he was going to be
at the Australian Embassy tonight, Friday night, in honor of the Australian Foreign
Minister, and that we would have a chance to talk there. I told Khanh that I intended to
tell Hoan that this is an extremely bad time for him to leave the government.
9. On a totally different subject, I pointed out to Khanh that in our Civil War, Abraham
Lincoln had made very effective use of a promise to veterans of the Union Army to be
given land in the West and wondered whether something similar could not be done in
Vietnam. Khanh said yes, the idea had great merit, particularly as regards lands in the
high plateau which the French authorities in the colonial days had always described to the
Vietnamese in very frightening terms so as to keep them out. Khanh felt the idea
definitely had great merit.
10. As I was leaving, he said: "You will be pleased to hear that I am following your
advice and am working on General Minh. He is coming in to see me here at 11 o'clock. I
hope you will agree that I am a good pupil."/4/
/4/In telegram 2258 to Saigon, June 12, Rusk told Lodge that he received telegram 2459
just after he drafted one to Lodge expressing concern about sweeping changes in the
Khanh government. Rusk stated that the line Lodge took was "precisely what I had in
mind." While Rusk realized that Khanh's government was "less than ideal," and that
Khanh needed men he could trust to share his responsibilities, a sweeping reshuffle would
give the impression of "confusion, internal bickering and misdirection." (Department of
State. Central Files. POL 15-4 VIET S)
Lodge
Affairs (Bundy) to the Secretary of State and the Secretary of Defense
(McNamara)/1/
4023, 092 Vietnam. Unclassified with Secret and Top Secret Attachments. Attachment 5,
a "Question Index" of 14 questions about a possible Congressional resolution, is not
printed. The questions as well as draft answers are published in Declassified Documents,
1979, 90B. The answers were not part of the original attachment.
There will be a meeting in the conference room of the Secretary of State at 6:00 p.m.
today/2/ to consider the attached papers.
/2/The meeting took place in the Department of State and lasted from 6 p.m. to
approximately 7:20 p.m. Rusk, Ball, Sullivan, Rostow, Cleveland, and Manning attended
for the Department of State. McNamara, Vance, McNaughton, Taylor, and Goodpaster
represented the Department of Defense and JCS. Bell and Gaud attended for AID,
McCone and Colby for CIA, Wilson for USIA, and McGeorge Bundy and Cater
represented the White House. (Johnson Library, Rusk Appointment Book) No record of
this meeting has been found.
The principal question for discussion will be to assess the desirability of recommending to
the President that a Congressional resolution on Southeast Asia should be sought
promptly.
A second question is what the optimum recommendation for action should be if in fact a
Congressional resolution is not recommended. A short supplementary paper on this point
will be available later in the day./3/
/3/Document 215.
McGeorge Bundy
[Here follows an index of attached papers.]
Attachment 1
Draft Memorandum by the Secretary of State's Special Assistant for Vietnam
(Sullivan)/4/
/4/Secret. The source text indicates erroneously that this paper was drafted on July 13; it
should have been June 13.
MEMORANDUM ON SITUATION IN SOUTH VIET NAM
I. United States Programs for South Viet Nam:
As of last March we recommended a series of actions to be taken which would give the
Vietnamese more ability to carry out General Khanh's Pacification Program. The main
thrust of these recommendations was to increase and improve the organization of paramilitary forces, which would be better paid, better equipped, and better trained than in the
past. These forces, recruited locally and inspired with the purpose of protecting their own
families, would be a key element in the "holding" phase of the pacification "clear and
hold" programs.
At the same time, we recommended that the Vietnamese Air Force be re-equipped. T-28's
and B-26's were to be phased out by A-1H's and A-1E's. The size of the air force was to
be expanded and the number of pilots capable of flying the new aircraft were to be
expanded in order to provide a better pilot to plane ratio. This program is well advanced;
new aircraft are arriving in Viet Nam; pilots are being upgraded; and the training program
is moving ahead.
After the Honolulu meeting,/5/ we recommended sharpening the focus of this effort by the
selection of eight critical provinces in the vicinity of Saigon where there would be a
greater infusion of American personnel and the execution of "clear and hold" pacification
programs. Americans would be introduced as advisors to the para-military forces, and
together with Vietnamese counterparts as a joint team, would go into these provinces
actually to perform some of the executive and administrative functions necessary to the
execution of the "clear and hold" programs. Similarly, in Saigon, a joint US Vietnamese
group would be established to supervise this effort.
/5/June 1-2; see Documents 188 and 189
In the economic and social fields, we have expanded the American effort significantly.
Because the increase in pay, allowances and dependents benefits for the military forces
have strained the Vietnamese budget, we have increased our own financial contributions
both in terms of direct grants and in terms of expanded imports. Against this increase we
have negotiated with the Vietnamese for more flexible budgetary and financial systems
within their own government structure. We have authorized the addition of nearly 200
American civilians to the AID Mission. We are doubling the number of AID provincial
representatives throughout the country, expanding the administrative training program,
and have hired a new highly qualified team to direct the rural affairs program.
We have doubled the amount of fertilizer being provided the Vietnamese farmers and
hope that the subsequent increase in rice production will result in expanded Vietnamese
rice exports and consequent foreign exchange earnings. This year's crop has been better
than earlier predictions suggested and it now appears that as much as 150,000 tons of rice
may be exported. We have encouraged land reform and General Khanh has taken several
measures which should have an attraction to the Vietnamese farmers. We are continuing
to press for better marketing arrangements. better agricultural methods. and more attention
to rural needs.
We have pressed friendly countries to show their solidarity with South Viet Nam by
making tangible contributions to the Vietnamese Government. We have had favorable
responses from Australia, New Zealand, China, the Philippines, and Korea. We expect
actions by Germany, Japan, Italy, the United Kingdom and Thailand. The Vietnamese
Government and our own mission in Saigon have established a coordinated mechanism to
solicit and accept these contributions.
We have persuaded the American medical profession to take more interest in the medical
needs of Viet Nam. A team of American physicians, under the sponsorship of MEDICO
and CARE, are now in Saigon working out a program for the introduction of American
volunteer physicians on a rotating basis in Viet Nam. This is a technique which MEDICO
has used successfully in Algeria and which we believe can be applied in Viet Nam. It will
require a recruiting campaign during the summer months here in the US.
The Vietnamese information effort, both internally and throughout the world has been far
from satisfactory. We have quadrupled our own U.S. advisory staff in the field of
psychological operations and are attempting to improve the quality of Vietnamese
propaganda directed toward the population of South Viet Nam. We have constructed new
radio stations; we are providing 100,000 radio sets; we are asking the Japanese to provide
an additional 100,000 and we are working directly with the Vietnamese Information
Service in programming the content of their broadcasts and their written propaganda. We
have established an American press officer with General Khanh to act as his personal
press advisor. We have pressed the Vietnamese to increase their embassy establishments
abroad and particularly to augment their information staffs. We have encouraged them
here in their plan to contract with an American public relations firm.
II. Additional Measures Being Contemplated:
We have examined for some time the question of how we can make the US effort more
directly effective in Viet Nam. Most U.S. officials who have served there firmly believe
that there is needed a closer integration of US personnel within the Vietnamese structure.
This concept, however, raises a number of problems, especially problems of national

sensitivity. We have under review proposals which would address this idea in various
forms. Among them are the "encadrement" of US personnel into the provincial
administrative structure and into the pare-military forces; the establishment of a "catalyst
team" of specially chosen individuals who would operate as shadow advisors to key
personnel in the Vietnamese government; the collocation of US and Vietnamese military
headquarters so that US and Vietnamese officials are working in and out of the same
building; the establishment of "joint operations centers" in which there would be
binational participation in the direction of various programs.
Another possibility which we are exploring is the reestablishment of direct US
participation in the Montagnard guerrilla operations. These Montagnard forces were
originally trained and assisted by US personnel but have subsequently been turned over to
Vietnamese special forces control. Because of ancient antipathy between the Montagnards
and the ethnic Vietnamese, there are indications that this program has faltered. [less than
1 line of source text not declassified] DOD are examining the possibility of reconstituting
the program with more direct American participation.
We have reviewed several times the question of removing US dependents from Viet Nam.
Ambassador Lodge, at the Honolulu meeting, recommended against such action unless we
were willing to accompany it by a fairly dramatic operational commitment against North
Viet Nam. An alternative proposal which has recently been raised is the construction of a
US housing compound, on the outskirts of Saigon, where American families could live in
a more secure but isolated area and where they would be less exposed to the possibility of
Viet Cong terror tactics.
We are continuing to study the possibility of introducing a US naval presence more or less
permanently based out of Viet Nam. A CINCPAC team is inspecting Cam Ranh Bay as a
possible location for such a naval station, and as an area where the US fleet plus Marine
forces could conduct amphibious training operations. We have similarly located B-57
aircraft in the Philippines which could be introduced into Viet Nam if we wish to increase
the capability of jet bomber potential from South Viet Nam. We are examining the
requirements for a US air defense contribution to protect South Vietnamese cities in the
event there is a more direct air threat from the North.
III. Problem Areas:
In attempting to accomplish many of these programs, we have encountered resistance both
from the Vietnamese and from our own US Mission. Ambassador Lodge has been most
reluctant to increase a civilian staff, especially in the rural areas. He fears that this will
augment American casualties and undermine American support for the effort in Viet Nam.
He also fears that the increased introduction of Americans would give a colonial
coloration to our presence there and would cause the Vietnamese to depend more and
more on our execution of their programs. The Vietnamese have resisted for a number of
reasons. They, too, worry about American civilians in the provinces whom they are
unable to protect. They have some fear of appearing to be American puppets by excessive
American presence in civilian ministries. Finally, there is some indication that they are
reluctant to associate themselves too closely with the Americans there until they feel more
confident of ultimate American intentions.
At the current moment, there is great doubt and confusion in Viet Nam about US
determination. The daily speeches of Senator Morse, the columns of Walter Lippmann,
the New York Times editorials, the AFP distortions of George Ball's meetings with
General de Gaulle, the diplomatic negotiations with respect to Laos, and the absence of
any clear signal concerning US intentions in Southeast Asia have worried the Vietnamese.
As a leading Saigon newspaper said on June 12: "We must be vigilant and we must be
ready to meet any eventuality so as to avoid the possible shameful sacrifice and dishonor
to our country as in the past."
Given this sort of atmosphere in South Viet Nam, it is very difficult to persuade the
Vietnamese to commit themselves to sharp military confrontations with the communists if
they suspect that something in the way of a negotiated deal is being concocted behind
their backs. Consequently, many of the actions which we are pressing on the South
Vietnamese are flagging because of this uncertainty. Recruitment for the army and the
pare-military forces, expansion of the civil service, and a willingness to accept more
Americans in the administrative measures are all affected by this attitude.
Both Ambassador Lodge and General Westmoreland, at the Honolulu Conference,
expressed the opinion that the situation in South Viet Nam would "jog along" at the
current stalemated pace unless some dramatic "victory" could be introduced to put new
steel and confidence into Vietnamese leadership. General Westmoreland defined "victory"
as a determination to take some new vigorous military commitment, such as air strikes
against Viet Cong installations in the Laos corridor. Ambassador Lodge defined "victory"
as a willingness to make punitive air strikes against North Viet Nam. The significant fact
about both the Ambassador's and the General's suggestions was that they looked toward
some American decision to undertake a commitment which the Vietnamese would
interpret as a willingness to raise the military ante and eschew negotiations begun from a
position of weakness.
While it is almost impossible to establish measurements of Vietnamese morale, we are
able to say that there is not at the current moment a single galvanized national purpose,
expressed in the government leadership and energizing all elements of the country with a
simple sense of confidence. The internal divisions of South Viet Nam are historical and,
under the stress of years of war, have persisted rather than disappeared. General Khanh
inherited an internal political and religious situation which was badly divided and he
contributed to further division by his action against the four generals who had run the
November coup. He has moved with some success over the last few months to paper over
these various divisions and has achieved a measure of external unity.
However, he has still not been able to crystalize a spirit of leadership or to develop a
leadership team in South Viet Nam. Leadership and control of their own destinies is
something which has been alien to the Vietnamese for so long that it becomes difficult for
many in the country to view their status in anything other than in a client relationship to
the great powers. There is a general impression, to some degree enhanced by their heavy
dependence upon the US, that South Viet Nam's role in working out its own destiny is
essentially passive, and not the primary determinant.
IV. Vietnamese Capabilities:
If we assume that the first step that has to be taken is the inspiration of confidence and a
spirit of leadership, we still have to examine whether such an inspired leadership would
find capable resources to command. In general, our assessment on this point remains
affirmative. The Vietnamese army is well trained and well equipped. The Vietnamese
soldier, when properly led, has proved himself in battle time and again. The resistance and
tenacity of the peasant in the face of constant harassment over twenty years is nothing
short of remarkable. The native intelligence and industriousness of the Vietnamese people
are extremely high.
There are, however, some major shortcomings. The highly sophisticated nature of the Viet
Cong guerrilla warfare requires a sophisticated response. General Khanh has developed a
pacification plan which, to all observers, is essentially sound. This plan requires
extensive, articulated actions on a military, political, and economic scale. The Vietnamese
government doesn't possess the executive and administrative apparatus to put this plan
effectively into action. This is partly because the French left them with only a shadow of
administrative apparatus, partly because the Viet Cong have deliberately assassinated
government officials, and partly because of the absence of clear direction and leadership
from Saigon.
The military situation in South Viet Nam is far from perilous. While the Viet Cong retain
an effective capacity for continuous harassment on a nation-wide scale, they are not yet
militarily capable of winning a stand-up, open battle with government forces.
Consequently, they cannot militarily seize and hold any significant areas in South Viet
Nam. Government forces, which can be mustered in superior numbers and fire power
against any Viet Cong concentration, can move into and clear any position which the Viet
Cong attempt to establish.
On the other hand, by their system of harassment, terror, and secret cellular organizations,
the Viet Cong deny security to major elements of the Vietnamese population. Their
constant effort is to extend this sense of insecurity further and further into those territories
where Vietnamese Government control exists. The sort of pacification campaign which is
required of the government to reverse this effort and to extend the areas of security
guaranteed to the South Vietnamese population is extremely complex. The task of
organizing the extensive executive machinery necessary to accomplish victory is an
enterprise in which there must be a direct and continuing US involvement.
If we can obtain a breakthrough in the mutual commitment of the US and Viet Nam to a
confident sense of victory, we believe that we can introduce this sort of executive
involvement into the Vietnamese structure. Moreover, we believe that the Vietnamese
structure itself, in such an event, would be more effective and more responsive to such
involvement. There is no one who can define with precision just how that breakthrough
can be established. It could come from the external actions of the US, internal leadership
in Viet Nam, or from an act of irreversible commitment by the US.
V. Conclusions:
The general conclusion from this analysis is that we can anticipate no sharp upturns in the
Vietnamese willingness or ability to press for the extermination of the insurgency if the
current situation continues. Indeed, if they continue to worry about American will and
determination, we could expect further political fragmentation and increasing disabilities.
On the other hand, we cannot guarantee that a dramatic "victory" or active commitment
by the US would produce the sharp infusion of spirit which both the Ambassador and
General Westmoreland predict.
It is clear, however, that unless some improvement in spirit and leadership can be
introduced, we will have great difficulty in introducing more effective American
assistance or in obtaining more effective Vietnamese utilization of that assistance. There
is no immediate sharp crisis in South Viet Nam at the current moment. However, there are
the rumbling undertones of crises which, as they emerge, will more likely appear in the
form of a crisis of confidence rather than a military debacle. Communist propaganda and
communist tactics over the last few months have accentuated the campaign against the
will and determination of the Vietnamese as well as the will and determination of the
Americans. This is currently the most critical factor to which we now have to address
ourselves.
Attachment 2
Draft Memorandum Prepared by the Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern
Affairs (Bundy)/6/
/6/Secret. The source text indicates this is a "second draft."
MEMORANDUM ON THE SOUTHEAST ASIA SITUATION
Now that we have worked through the immediate problem of the shooting down of our
aircraft over Laos and have Souvanna Phouma's clear understanding that reconnaissance
flights may continue over the Plaine des Jarres and "South Laos" and with escort as
necessary, we should now draw back and examine the total picture as it may develop in
the next three to four months and what our central plan should be.
1. We do not expect at the present time to move in the near future to military action
against North Viet-Nam. At the same time, a significant change in the local situation,
largely beyond our control, might compel us to reconsider this position. Such a significant
change might come in the form of:
a. A re-estimate of the South Viet-Nam situation more gloomy than the one that was
reached at Honolulu and indicating that we cannot expect some signs of improvement
over the summer and may indeed be facing significant and visible deterioration.
b. Major continued Communist attacks in Laos, threatening the extinction of Kong Le's
forces, Luang Prabang, or the areas along the Mekong (including Saravane and Atopeu).
c. Creation of a separate Communist government in Laos and a de facto partition of the
country. This might be less compelling toward wide action against the north, but such
action would certainly have to be weighed.
2. The principal present elements in the situation are that:
a. We have entered a negotiating track on Laos that we hope will lead to the convening of
the Polish consultations in the next 3-4 weeks and their continuation over a period of time
with Souvanna, the British and the Canadians at least holding firm that Communist
withdrawal remains a precondition of any 14-nation "Geneva Conference." At this
moment. the Soviets and British have not yet agreed on the form of invitation to the
Polish consultations, and it is still possible that the whole project will hit a serious snag
before it can even be convened. However, we must assume that it will in fact get under
way; if it does not, we then would have an immediate sharp acceleration of the whole
problem.
b. By our public statements and the crisis atmosphere of the last two weeks, including the
Honolulu conference, we have created an impression in the area that we are very firm
indeed but have also left the area and the US public in some uncertainty as to just what
firmness in fact means.
c. By the shooting incidents in connection with our reconnaissance operations in Laos, as
well as the continuing T-28 operations, we have set up a fairly good picture of military
firmness in the area, and specifically in Laos, and we can maintain this to some degree by
continuing escorted reconnaissance operations on precise plans to be worked out.
d. Through our speeches and our military actions we have undoubtedly gotten some kind
of signal through to Hanoi, and this will be reinforced by the message being conveyed by
the Canadian ICC representative to Hanoi on June 15. Hanoi has been conspicuously
silent about our air activities over Laos, and there is recent Hanoi broadcasting indicating
that alert measures have been intensified. Nonetheless, we are faced with two grave
problems in keeping our signal clear to Hanoi:
(1) Hanoi tends to believe that our stronger gestures come in fits and starts and that by
toning down its own actions for a time it can lull us (for example, the President's
speech/7/ and the speculations of early March, plus our initiation of extensive
reconnaissance at that time over North Viet-Nam, undoubtedly gave them pause for a
short time, but by early May this signal seemed quite clearly to have worn off).
/7/Apparent reference to the White House statement on Vietnam, March 17: for text, see
American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1964, pp. 962-963.
(2) The Communist stereotype generally is that we simply do not move hard in an election
year, and some of our European friends constantly lend support to this thesis. A related
point is that Hanoi has throughout used salami tactics, seeking to avoid any single action
strong enough to cause us to react hard and fast.
3. Our ideal objectives in relation to Laos are:
a. To use the Vietnamese consultations to compile strong evidence of the Communist
military aggressions of May.
b. To use the Polish consultations to build up a clear picture that the Communists have
been far more in the wrong in the political sphere and that Souvanna's position must now
be strengthened and affirmed, to get the ICC functioning more clearly, and to put
maximum pressure on the Communist side to withdraw substantially from the areas
occupied in May.
c. If we get a Communist withdrawal, to use the Geneva Conference to place maximum

pressure on the Communist side on the basic violations that have been in existence right
along--the presence of North Vietnamese forces in Laos and the use of the Laos corridor
by the North Vietnamese to support the war in South Viet-Nam.
In short, our ideal objective in Laos remains a full and effective implementation of the
1962 Geneva Accords. We do not seek a unified non-Communist Laos because this is
simply not capable of achievement without a complete war on the ground. But on the
contrary we do strongly prefer a Geneva Accords to a de facto partition that would
remove third-country interest in the Laos situation and tend to ratify the Communist
position in the corridor areas--which sooner or later must be dealt with if we are to obtain
security in Viet-Nam.
4. In practice, we doubt very much if we can fully accomplish these objectives through
any combination of negotiating and military firmness that we can devise. For the
Communists to give up their gains of May and to accept fully Souvanna's political
position would be for them to accept a very major breakdown. The Soviets and Poles may
well go with us on a great deal of tidying up of the internal political situation, on which
they appear to be supporting Souvanna's position. Moreover, the Polish consultations
could well produce major improvement in the performance of the ICC. These two points
in themselves would be significant gains and well worth the Polish consultations in
themselves.
However, the Soviets and Poles, and Indians too, probably cannot be expected to go along
at all on any agreed demand that the Communists withdraw militarily. It is just possible
that the Communist side might permit some reestablishment of the neutralists in the Plaine
des Jarres, but it seems considerably more likely that the parallelogram of forces would
produce a Soviet-Polish-Indian position that would drop or drastically weaken the
withdrawal point and demand an early 14nation conference. The British and Canadians
would be hard to hold in line at this point, and Souvanna himself would be under
considerable diplomatic pressure to go along, although on the other hand he would be
under great right-wing pressure within Laos not to do so.
The net of this is that we would face a serious dilemma at the time that the Polish
consultations approached an impasse on the withdrawal issue. Thus, in the absence of any
of the developments named in paragraph 1 above, we would like to see the Polish
consultations continue over a considerable period, at least into September, and hopefully
even beyond.
We must recognize, however, that stringing out the Polish consultations to these lengths
will not be easy, nor can we guarantee to achieve this. Pressures to slide off toward
Geneva may build up well before this time, and our resistance to these would then
confront us with a situation of considerably heightened tensions that could in itself change
our timetable. But in any event-however long the Polish negotiations can be strung out-we
have the problem of continuing to demonstrate firmness.
5. This practical chain of events raises serious problems about our additional courses of
action. If we weaken on our ideal objectives, we would clearly go far to demoralize
Khanh and the politically sensitive people in South Viet-Nam, and even the continuation
of negotiations would tend over time to cause growing concern that we are moving toward
negotiated solutions for both Laos and South Viet-Nam. Whatever success we may
achieve in the Polish consultations also depends on a steady strong signal that we are
willing to use force if necessary.
The central problem then is what we can do in addition to maintain and demonstrate our
firmness to Souvanna and to people in Laos and South Viet-Nam and, above all, to Hanoi.
The range of possible actions includes the following:
a. Additional military action in the area. We had been thinking last week that the desired
added element of firmness could be obtained by starting reconnaissance over North VietNam and escorting it if necessary. However, we would not now think of conducting such
missions unescorted, and the use of escort missions, as the Laos experience has now
shown, would almost certainly get us into a degree of shooting in North Viet-Nam that
would in itself sharply raise the tension level and tend to force our hand.
Another military action we should consider would be to conduct not only continued
reconnaissance operations over Laos, but a carefully calculated series of "reconnaissance"
strike operations such as that of June 9. The Communist side has clearly found it difficult
to respond to these or to make heavy propaganda play of them, partly because it is
unwilling to let the ICC inspect any Communist areas. On the other hand, these attacks do
tend to worry and weaken the Indians and to some extent the British, and it does not
appear easy to find such clearly isolated targets, without civilian damage, as was selected
on June 9. If we started to hit Lao civilians, even in the vicinity of military installations,
Souvanna might throw another fit. We also have the problem of further US aircraft losses
if we do this; even though the US public has not reacted drastically to the losses of last
weekend, a repetition of these could well create serious problems, particularly if the
Communists in Laos lie low on the ground. This course of action seems at first glance the
most promising we might follow, but it does need further study.
One further military action could be taken, namely permitting the Vietnamese Air Force
to attack targets in the corridor area of Laos. This would have a very helpful tonic effect
on Vietnamese morale and would perhaps somewhat cut down Communist capacity to use
the corridor. It would convey a modest signal to Hanoi, but not as much of a one as an
action conducted by the US.
b. We have a wide range of possible troop deployments to the Western Pacific and
perhaps to Thailand. Some of these, such as additional carriers to the area, probably do
have a useful signaling value. Others, such as the move of additional ground and air units,
may have some short-term value, but they have the weaknesses that this signal tends to
peter out, that these are moves we would prefer to make in the context of an even stronger
over-all policy, and that they may create uncertainty and doubt in the US as to just where
we are headed. As to deployments to Thailand, it is doubtful that the Thai will accept
these in the absence of some change in the situation on the ground, and this move
particularly--having been taken once before--conveys a very limited and indeed a
somewhat defensive signal.
c. To hold the political situation within Laos and to strengthen Souvanna, there are a
number of actions we can and should take in any event--to route our assistance directly
through Souvanna rather than through the Right Wing, etc. However, these measures will
not have any wider signal value to the north.
6. In sum, there are military moves that we can take that would contribute to a continuing
impression of firmness as we try to keep the Laos negotiations moving and to preserve our
options concerning Viet-Nam. But it is at least doubtful that any combination of the
moves listed above would in fact do the trick. Moreover, it must be emphasized that the
Polish consultations may well not play out to the extent we desire, and that the moment
we face pressures to slide off to Geneva and resist these, we might have to consider still
further military measures or at least be able to make a convincing threat of such measures.
Finally, we must never lose sight of the fact that the situation in South Viet-Nam--without
necessarily any dramatic event--could deteriorate to the point where we had to consider at
least beginning stronger actions to the north in order to put greater pressure on Hanoi and
lift morale in South Viet-Nam.
7. For all of these reasons there is a very strong argument for a continuing demonstration
of US firmness and for complete flexibility in the hands of the Executive in the coming
political months. The action that most commends itself for this purpose is an immediate
Congressional Resolution, subject to the following conditions:
a. A formula must be devised, in consultation with the Congressional leadership, that
would ensure rapid passage without extended and divisive debate. The draft resolution
must support any action required but must at the same time place maximum stress on our
peaceful objectives and our willingness to accept eventual negotiated solutions, so that we
might hope to have the full support of the school of thought headed by Senator Mansfield
and Senator Aiken and leave ourselves with die-hard opposition only from Senator Morse
and his very few cohorts.
b. Timing must be considered. Because of proximity on either side to the Republican
convention, July appears very difficult. Early August is likewise difficult because the
Congress will probably be rushing to complete other measures and adjourn before the
Democratic convention. We thus conclude that the only feasible time for presentation
would be shortly following the conclusion of the Civil Rights debate, i.e., during the week
of June 22. In addition to being virtually inevitable from a political standpoint, this timing
does fit very well with the probable date of the convening of the Polish consultations and
with the time when our existing and planned signals to Hanoi may begin to taper off.
It may be argued that a Congressional Resolution under present circumstances faces the
serious difficulty that there is no drastic change in the situation to point to. The opposing
argument is that we might well not have such a drastic change even later in the summer
and yet conclude--either because of the Polish consultations or because of the South VietNam situation--that we had to act.
c. The line of argument to be followed in presenting the resolution requires careful
thought. A separate memorandum deals with the suggested theme of presentation and with
basic questions that would be raised and the line of answer that would be followed./8/
From this theme, and these questions and answers, appropriate Presidential messages,
testimony by Secretaries Rusk and McNamara, special presentations to the Congress (e.g.,
of the evidence concerning North Vietnamese involvement), and other necessary elements
would be drawn.
/8/Attachment 4 below.
8. Conclusion
It is recommended that the President urgently review with the Congressional leadership a
resolution along the lines covered in the accompanying folder.
Attachment 3
Draft Congressional Resolution/9/
/9/Secret. Also published in Declassified Documents, 1979 89D.
WHEREAS,
The aim of the United States in Southeast Asia is to achieve and preserve peace and
security in the area;
The United States has no territorial, military or political ambitions in Southeast Asia, but
desires only that the peoples of Southeast Asia should be left in peace by their neighbors
to work out their own destinies in their own way;
The peace and security of Southeast Asia are seriously threatened by a systematic and
deliberate campaign of Communist aggression and subversion against the nations and
peoples of that area;
In particular the Communist regime in North Viet-Nam, with the aid and support of the
Communist regime in China, has flouted its obligations under the Geneva Accords of
1954 and has engaged in aggression against the independence and territorial integrity of
the Republic of Viet-Nam by carrying out a systematic plan for the subversion of the
Government of the Republic of Viet-Nam, by furnishing direction, training, personnel and
arms for the conduct of guerrilla warfare within the Republic of Viet-Nam and by the
ruthless use of terror against the peaceful population of that country;
In violation of its undertakings in the Geneva Agreements of 1962 the Communist regime
in North Viet-Nam, with the aid and support of the Communist regime in China, has
engaged in aggression against the independence and territorial integrity of Laos by
maintaining forces on Laotian territory, by the use of that territory for the infiltration of
arms and equipment into the Republic of Viet-Nam, and by providing direction, men and
equipment for persistent armed attacks against the Government of National Union of the
Kingdom of Laos;
The United States is a party to the Southeast Asia Collective Defense Treaty for the
preservation of peace and security in Southeast Asia and for collective defense against
Communist aggression and subversion and by a Protocol to that Treaty the nations of
Laos and the Republic of Viet-Nam are unanimously designated as within the protective
scope of the Treaty;/10/
/10/For text of the treaty and protocol, September 8, 1954, see 6 UST 81.
The loss of any of the free nations of Southeast Asia to Communism would upset the
world balance of power and pose a direct threat to the security of the United States;
The United States stands prepared to seek through the United Nations or otherwise a
peaceful settlement in Southeast Asia which would effectively ensure that the peoples and
nations of that area would live in freedom and independence;
It is essential that the world fully understand that the American people are united in their
determination to take all steps that may be necessary to assist the nations of Southeast
Asia to maintain their independence and political integrity;
States of America in Congress assembled:
Sec. 1. That the maintenance of international peace and security in Southeast Asia and the
preservation of the political independence and territorial integrity of the non-Communist
nations of the area, including the Republic of Viet-Nam and Laos, is required by the
national interest of the United States:
Alternative Drafts of Section 2
Alternative Based on the Middle East Resolution of 1955 [1957]:
Sec. 2. To this end, if the President determines the necessity thereof, the United States is
prepared, upon request from any nation in Southeast Asia, to take, consistent with the
Charter of the United Nations, all measures including the use of armed forces to assist that
nation in the defense of its political independence and territorial integrity against
aggression or subversion supported, controlled or directed from any Communist country.
Any such measures shall be reported to the Security Council of the United Nations.
Alternative Based on the Cuba Resolution of 1962:
Sec. 2. That the United States is determined to prevent by whatever means may be
necessary, including the use of arms, the Communist regime in North Viet-Nam, with the
aid and support of the Communist regime in China, from extending, by force or threat of
force, its aggressive or subversive activities against any non-Communist nation in
Southeast Asia.
Alternative Drafts of Section 3
First Alternative:
Sec. 3. This Resolution shall expire when the President shall determine that the peace and
security of Southeast Asia is reasonably assured by international conditions created by
action of the United Nations or otherwise, and shall so report to the Congress.
Second Alternative:
Sec. 3. This Resolution shall expire on January 8 (7), 1965 [date of convening of the next
Congress]./11/
/11/Brackets in the source text.

Attachment 4
Paper Prepared by the Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs
(Bundy)/12/
/12/Secret.
BASIC THEMES IN PRESENTING THE RESOLUTION
We confront a serious and continuing crisis in Southeast Asia in which our objective is to
preserve and restore the peace through getting North Vietnam and Communist China to let
their neighbors alone. We have no wider objective.
The basic decision that the Congress is asked to support is that the US should employ all
necessary measures to prevent the spread of Communist influence in Southeast Asia.
In the coming months, we shall be seeking to achieve our ends by a combination of
assistance to the Government of South Vietnam and negotiation in respect to Laos. At any
time, developments in either South Vietnam or Laos may force us to consider limited
forms of military action so as to make progress in South Vietnam and to keep Laos
negotiations moving forward.
The situation is unlike any past crisis in which the Congress has enacted similar
Congressional Resolutions. It is more serious and imminent than the situation that
accompanied the Middle East Resolution of 1955 [1957], but at the same time less
immediately critical than the Cuba situation at the time of the Congressional Resolution of
October 1962. But the essential basis of seeking Congressional support in the form of a
Resolution is the same-that there is a continuing crisis and that the hand of the Executive
must be strengthened and given all flexibility by an emphatic statement of Congressional
support.
The fact that this is an election year makes such an affirmation of extra importance. Over
the next six months, we shall be engaged in continuing political debate and in certain
fixed political events, notably the Conventions, that will affect the availability of the
Congress. Moreover, the crisis is of such a nature that a need for action may well arise
without the type of dramatic event that would inevitably call for convening the Congress.
In this situation, the Communist side must be convinced that America means business. We
believe that our actions to date have had considerable impact in this direction. But in the
absence of a Congressional declaration of support there is a serious danger that the
Communist side would assume that the US is unlikely to act firmly during election year.
Any real or assumed irresolution on the part of the United States may well encourage
further aggressive acts or refusal to accept reasonable negotiating proposals, and thus
make necessary more serious US military measures.
We must also give the nations of the area clear evidence of our determination. A
Congressional Resolution should raise their morale and make less likely any deterioration
of their internal situations that would make US military action more necessary or drastic
than otherwise.
The nation's vital interest in Asia will not be enhanced by speculation on possible actions
in Southeast Asia. Successful action in the area demands a flexible and carefully
controlled strategy.
Even during the election period, the President will consult regularly with Congressional
leadership. He has no desire for a blank check, but neither does he wish to ignore the
realities ahead during an election period.
215. Memorandum Prepared for a Meeting at the Department of State/1/

/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Southeast Asia, Vol. 111, Memos (B).
Top Secret. No drafter is indicated on the source text, but according to the William P.
Bundy manuscript, Chapter 13, p. 25, McGeorge Bundy drafted this memorandum.
(Department of State, Bundy Files, William P. Bundy Manuscript) This is the paper
prepared for the meeting described in footnote 2, Document 214.
SUBJECT
Elements of a Southeast Asian Policy that does not include a Congressional Resolution
The following outline is a sketch of the actions that would remain open to us in varying
combinations in the event that we do not now decide on major military operations against
North Vietnam and do not now decide to seek a Congressional Resolution. No effort has
been made to design a precise scenario. Indeed, if a decision is made not to seek a
resolution, what we should have instead is reasonably broad planning authority within
which operating officers would be encouraged to work with a relatively free sense that
specific recommendations which did not violate general guidelines could expect a
sympathetic hearing over the next months.
1. Possible military actions.
a. Reconnaissance, reconnaissance-strike, and T-28 operations in all parts of Laos.
b. Small-scale reconnaissance strike operations, after appropriate provocation, in North
Vietnam (initially VNAF?).
c. VNAF strike operations in Laotian corridors.
d. Limited air and sea deployments toward Southeast Asia, and still more limited ground
troop movements. (Major ground force deployments seem more questionable, without a
decision "to go north" in some form.)
The most interesting of these operations are those involving reconnaissance-strikes and
VNAF attacks in the corridors. It is suggested that a detailed and precise roster of such
attacks should be prepared, together with estimates of the situations to which they would
be a good response, and the ways in which their tactical conduct could reinforce their
political purpose
2. Political actions.
a. Internationally--a continued and increased effort to maximize support for our
diplomatic track in Laos and our political effort in South Vietnam. Higher authority
particularly desires a maximum effort with our allies to increase their real and visible
presence in support of Saigon.
b. Laos--an intensive effort to sustain Souvanna and to restrain the right wing from any
rash act against the French. Possible increase of direct support and assistance to Kong Le
in appropriate ways.
c. South Vietnam--rapid development of the critical province program and the information
program, strengthening of country team, and shift of U.S. role from advice toward
direction; emphatic and continued discouragement of all coup plots; energetic public
support for Khanh Government.
d. In the U.S.--continued reaffirmation and expanded explanation of the above lines of
action, with opposition to both aggressive adventure and withdrawal, and a clear open
door to selected action of the sort included in paragraph 1.
This outline does not preclude a shift to a higher level of action if actions of the other side
should justify or require it. It does assume that in the absence of such drastic action,
defense of U.S. interests is possible, within these limits, over the next six months.
/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Vietnam Country File, Vol. XII,
Memos. Top Secret.
SUBJECT
Reassurance in South Viet Nam
In the course of the meeting June 15/2/ on this subject, I was asked to put forward
suggestions for the sort of action which the United States might take in order to reassure
South Viet Nam concerning the degree of our commitment there. The following proposal,
which is fashioned to meet the most prevalent suggestions both from the Vietnamese and
from our own U.S. representation in Saigon, represents the sort of step which might meet
the problem.
/2/See footnote 2, Document 214
1. As a first step, we should send somewhat inconspicuous representatives (I would

nominate Forrestal and myself) to talk privately with General Khanh about the problem.
We should pick him up on his discussions with Ambassador Lodge about "prolonging the
agony" and on his discussions with you and Secretary McNamara about taking action
against North Viet Nam. We should tell him that the United States is prepared to consider
shortening the "agony" by reaching a political agreement which would result in the
termination of guerrilla insurgency in South Viet Nam.
2. We should make clear to him our realization that negotiations toward such an
agreement would essentially involve only four representatives-Communist China, the
United States, North Viet Nam and South Viet Nam. However, we should indicate our
willingness, if Khanh agrees, to slide into such negotiations through the diplomatic
machinery which is being rigged around the Laos question, and should particularly
indicate that this might involve participation in a Fourteen Nation Conference.
3. In discussing such negotiations, we should emphasize that we consider our current
bargaining position totally inadequate. We could therefore seriously contemplate such
discussions only if we had better bargaining counters which would serve as some measure
of a match for the position now enjoyed by the communists. Specifically, this would
require that North Viet Nam be undergoing some punitive action which could be posed as
an equivalent to the "agony" being suffered by the South Vietnamese in the hands of the
Viet Cong.
4. Given the relative circumstances [of] South and North, such a punitive equivalent
would appear available only in the form of limited air strikes against North Viet Nam.
This is the sort of action which General Khanh has on several occasions proposed and we
should indicate that we are now ready to discuss with him the form which such action
would take. Ideally, we believe that the action should be initiated by South Vietnamese
aircraft with South Vietnamese crews. The U.S. would be willing to assist in the
development of these strikes by the provision of pre-strike reconnaissance, target
planning, and post-strike observation of results. More importantly still, we would be
willing to provide air defense for South Viet Nam and political support as insurance
against North Vietnamese ground retaliation.
5. It would be our suggestion that such air action against North Viet Nam be openly
announced and acknowledged by General Khanh, that the United States would openly
condone and support such actions, and that we would immediately enter into diplomatic
negotiations at about the same time the air action began. The essential understanding
would be that the air action would continue during the diplomatic negotiations just so long
as the guerrilla action continues in South Viet Nam. A "cease fire" would involve
cessation of both the air action and the guerrilla action simultaneously.
6. If General Khanh accepts this sort of arrangement, we should insist on having further
understandings with him. A central point on which we should reach agreement would
concern the South Vietnamese attitude toward eventual unification of Viet Nam and
consequently the nature of the "carrot" which we would eventually be willing to offer an
independent North Viet Nam. Similarly, we need understanding from him concerning his
immediate acquiescence in the rapid infusion of American assistance in his pacification
program and in the general acceleration of South Vietnamese activities in their own
provincial programs. We need it clearly understood that the improvement of Vietnamese
governmental processes and bureaucracy are essential to making it possible for the United
States to consider a political agreement which would leave South Viet Nam independently
able to manage the improvement of its people's welfare once the insurgency is brought
under control.
7. Finally, it should be understood that, especially as a counter to the points outlined in the
preceding paragraphs, Khanh may insist upon more active U.S. association with the air
action. In that instance, we should be prepared if necessary to concede the inclusion of
Farmgate strikes and perhaps, as an outside limit, the deployment of B-57 aircraft into
South Viet Nam to be manned by U.S. "volunteers."
The foregoing package of proposals would certainly give Khanh the sort of reassurance
that he personally has sought over the past few weeks. It also would lay out for him a
program of preparations that would consume at least eight weeks before negotiations and
actions could be brought into train. The uncontrolled factor which could impel more rapid
acceleration of this schedule is, of course, the situation in Laos. Either military actions by
the communists, or more likely diplomatic actions by the several busybodies which are
now concerning themselves with this problem, could move the time schedule for decision
on these matters into the latter days of next month.
217. Memorandum From the Secretary of the Treasury (Dillon) to the Secretary of
State/1/
/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL FR-US. Top Secret; Exdis. Also sent
to McNamara and McGeorge Bundy.
On Monday, June 15, French Finance Minister, Valery Giscard d'Estaing, gave a luncheon
for the other Ministers and Central Bank Governors attending the financial meeting in
Paris. I found myself seated on his right. Toward the end of the meal the French Finance
Minister turned to me and asked how we viewed the current situation in Indochina.
I told him the situation was extremely serious, that we had reached a decision that we
would not retreat any further, and, if necessary, would resist further military measures by
force. I told him it would be perfectly possible for us to mount very substantial air attacks
on North Vietnamese objectives from aircraft carriers. Should we be forced to any such
action, I said we would make very clear that we had no idea of doing anything except
persuading the North Vietnamese to stop their adventures in neighboring countries. We
would make clear that we were not interested in upsetting the government of North
Vietnam, or of taking any part of North Vietnam. I said I doubted if there would be any
need for large scale ground action, in view of the weight of air power that could be
brought to bear. I said the facts of this situation were the exact opposite of that in Korea
when, in the face of Chinese warnings, we crossed the 38th parallel and moved up to the
Chinese border. In this case we were taking the position that the Communist Chinese took
during the Korean episode, namely, trying to make clear that we had reached the limit of
our patience and that no further Communist advances would be permitted. Whether or not
the situation escalated had now become a question for the Communists to decide.
Giscard d'Estaing then asked me if I had been at the Honolulu meeting. I told him I had
not. He then inquired whether I was a member of, and present at National Security
Council meetings. I told him I was a regular attendant at such meetings. The conversation
ended on this note. I have no doubt that he will report our conversation promptly to de
Gaulle. I would hope that this might result in an additional signal to the Communists to go
easy.
Giscard d'Estaing also commented that the French felt the present military government in
South Vietnam could not, on its own, handle the situation there over the long run. I told
him we were very conscious of the need for better civil organization at the regional level.
We planned to make a major effort to increase the effectiveness and efficiency of civilian
provincial governments but this type of work naturally would take some time before
results could be seen.
Douglas Dillon
218. Telegram From the Ambassador in Vietnam (Lodge) to the Department of

State/1/
Saigon, June 18, 1964--10:28 a.m.
/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Vietnam Country File, Lodge
Resignation and Taylor Appointment. Top Secret; No Distribution. [1 line of text not
declassified] Received at 11:39 p.m., June 17.
[document number not declassified] Literally eyes only to Secretary Rusk from
Ambassador Lodge.
1. The following brand new and totally unexpected dilemma has just arisen:
2. I am reliably informed that my presence in the U.S. as a private citizen can make a
great difference in deciding whether or not the leadership of one of our two major parties
falls into hands which in foreign affairs would be imprudent and impulsive and
unsatisfactory for other reasons in domestic affairs. I remember well your saying here
how vital it is that both major parties nominate men who could be trusted with the atomic
bomb.
3. I feel therefore that at this juncture the highest duty for me is to go home and take part
in the important struggle now being waged for Gov. Scranton.
4. I say this in full realization of the importance of my duty in Viet-Nam and of all that is
at stake here.
5. I should be in U.S. as soon as possible consistent with smooth transition here and
obviously must be there as a private citizen.
6. Perhaps you can send Alexis Johnson here who could handle this job magnificently I
am sure.
7. Realize how difficult this is for you and will, of course, always keep faith with you.
Note: Delivery requested at beginning of business day./2/
/2/In message [document number not declassified], June 18, Rusk expressed his regret at
Lodge's decision to leave, but stated that he understood the "personal considerations and
decisions involved." Rusk thought that the President would try to meet Lodge's wishes as
quickly as possible and asked for a letter of resignation to the President suitable for
publication. (Ibid.) Lodge sent his letter of resignation to the President via Rusk in
[document number not declassified], June 19. (Ibid.) Lodge's letter and the President's
letter accepting the resignation are printed in Department of State Bulletin July 13, 1964,
pp. 46-47.

/1/Source: Department of State, S/S-NSC Files: Lot 72 D 316, NSAM 308. Secret. Also
published in Declassified Documents, 1984, 001493.
MEMORANDUM TO
The Director, U.S. Information Agency
The Administrator, Agency for International Development
Domestic understanding and support are essential to the success of United States
operations in Southeast Asia. The national interest requires full understanding of our
policy and purpose in this area. I am not satisfied with the performance of the several
departments in this area; we require stronger arrangements.
I have therefore designated Mr. Robert J. Manning, Assistant Secretary of State for Public
Affairs, to generate and to coordinate a broad program to bring to the American people a
complete and accurate picture of the United States involvement in Southeast Asia, and to
show why this involvement is essential.
Mr. Manning is instructed to draw as necessary upon the resources of all government
agencies in obtaining and disseminating the facts needed by the American people. He will
call as necessary upon the senior policy and information officers of your agency. I request
that you take the steps necessary to ensure that he receives their unstinting cooperation on
a priority basis. I have instructed Mr. Manning to inform me if he encounters any delays
or obstructions.
Lyndon B. Johnson
220. Editorial Note

At a press conference on June 23, 1964, President Johnson released a statement explaining
the resignation of Ambassador Lodge and announcing the appointment of General
Maxwell D. Taylor as the new Ambassador to the Republic of Vietnam. In addition, the
President announced that U. Alexis Johnson would hold the new position of Deputy
Ambassador to Vietnam. The President's statement is printed as part of his press
conference of June 23 in Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Lyndon B.
Johnson; 1963-64, Book I, pages 802-808.
Taylor, in Swords and Plowshares, pages 313-314, recounts how, why, and on what
conditions he accepted the appointment. U. Alexis Johnson, in The Right Hand of Power,
pages 402-403, provides similar information on his appointment.
221. Memorandum From the President's Assistant (Cater) to the President/1/

Vol. 111, Memos (A). No classification marking.
Pursuant to your urging this morning that we consider all the things we need to be doing
in Viet Nam and Laos,/2/ I would like to raise the following questions which need to be
asked of the appropriate experts. Some have been raised in the past but laid aside because
conditions were not so urgent. Certainly, they deserve to be examined before General
Taylor and Alexis Johnson depart for Saigon.
/2/Apparent reference to the statement on Vietnam at the President's press conference at
11:04 a.m.; see Document 220.
1. What new projects of real or symbolic value can we sponsor to affirm (a) our
determination not to retreat from this area, (b) our overriding interest in building peace
rather than waging war?
The Mekong River Development Plan certainly falls into this category. We have already
contributed financially to five tributary dams under construction there. It might be highly
appropriate to select an additional project, either in Laos or South Viet Nam and publicly
call on the Soviets to join us in building it.
AID might be called on to provide a list of the economic and social projects that have
been put on the shelf which would constitute an impact program for the area.
2. What reform measures--land, tax, credit system, etc.--could we persuade General
Khanh to pursue vigorously as signal of a new deal in Viet Nam? An indication of
Presidential interest might give the necessary push to reforms which have been long
postponed.
3. What is the current status of the Pentagon's effort to apply all the skill of modern
weaponry to the problem of waging guerrilla warfare? Have we utilized every conceivable
device for detection of Viet Cong fighters?
4. Senator Humphrey has sent you a report/3/ which contained a number of action
proposals by Major General Edward Lansdale. My understanding is that he was extremely
effective in waging anti-guerrilla warfare in the Philippines. The question arises whether
he and his team might accompany General Taylor to Viet Nam.
/3/Document 208.
I suggest the above questions as ones you may wish to put at the next meeting of your
Secretaries. Alternatively, I would be happy to forward them to the appropriate working
groups, including the Sullivan Committee and John McNaughton in the Pentagon.
Hold for your own use?
Forward to appropriate officials?/4/
/4/President Johnson checked this option and wrote the following note: "Doug, This good-carefully comb Humphrey for all ideas and then forward to appr. officials. L".

2567. Herewith my comment on Seaborn's first report./2/
/2/The report [8 pages of source text] was not declassified. (Johnson Library, National
Security File, Vietnam Country File)
1. It seems to me that it is very mildly encouraging. Pham Van Dong's non-polemic tone,
the way in which he read Pearson's letter and welcomed the opening up of the Channel,
and the tone of obvious concern are in contrast with the kind of rough stuff of which
Communists are capable.
2. Seaborn's report did not mention the fact that Pham Van Dong brought up the matter of
a commando raid over the frontier from Laos. Dong made it clear that it not like this at all.
3. I would like to see Seaborn go back before the middle of August.
4. If we can give them a very neat bloody nose by knocking out a machine tool factory or
a bridge or something of the kind without killing non-combatants, it might be worth
doing. If so, it should be keyed to some Viet Cong outrage here.
Lodge
(Sullivan) to the President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs
(Bundy)/1/
/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File. Vietnam Country File. Vol. XII,
Memos. Confidential.
SUBJECT
Third Country Assistance in South Viet Nam
You asked me yesterday what action the White House could take to assist in obtaining
concrete offers of support from third countries for the effort in South Viet Nam. There are
three specific categories of action which I would propose:
1. The President should make absolutely clear to General Taylor, and through General
Taylor to the U.S. Mission in Saigon, the political requirement for this third country
assistance. There is ample indication that our own mission, specifically the military
element, looks upon third country assistance with very little zeal. This is partly because of
their experience in allied commands, such as Korea, in which the care and feeding of
these third country elements has always proved far more trouble than it is worth. It is also
been reflected in the fact that such an organization as the British Advisory Mission, which
is composed of skilled counterinsurgency and police officers, has sat for nearly three
years in Viet Nam with only limited relationships with the United States command. It may
therefore be necessary for the President to put in writing an indication of the importance
which he attaches to these third country contributions and the necessity that the U.S.
Mission bend over backwards to accommodate them.
2. I will draft today a circular telegram to various ambassadors in posts which have lagged
in the production of voluntary contributions. This telegram will be as from the President
and will pin upon the ambassadors personally the responsibility for obtaining these
contributions. I will send it over to you for your clearances during the course of the
day./2/
/2/The telegram was not sent for reasons explained in a memorandum from Forrestal to
McGeorge Bundy, June 26:
"Bill Sullivan and I have agreed to hold up getting the President to sign off on a tough
cable to some of our embassies abroad until we have received an answer to our request to
Saigon for a list of the categories of people and units which would be useful to the war
effort."
"This list was expected today, but has not yet come in, and we have queried the field
again. We felt that it would not be satisfactory to have the President write a general
message to the ambassadors without having a concrete idea of what it was he was asking
them to do." (Ibid.)
A draft of the circular telegram, June 25, with extensive revisions by McGeorge Bundy
and a marginal note that it was "not used" is ibid., Vol. XIII.
3. As a last resort, we may require that the President actually address appeals to foreign
chiefs of state or chiefs of government. For example, in Canada our representations have
lain on the Minister of External Affairs' desk for over a month. It may require a letter or a
telephone call to the Prime Minister if our ambassador is unable to deliver.
William H. Sullivan/3/
224. Memorandum From the Secretary of Defense (McNamara) to the President/1/

/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Vietnam Country File, Vol. XIII. Top
Secret. A note on the source text indicates that the original memorandum went to
Forrestal.
SUBJECT
Authorization of Combined US/GVN Planning and Training for Cross-border Operations
from South Vietnam into Laos
NSAM 288 of 17 March 1964/2/ authorized, among other things, South Vietnamese
ground operations into Laos for border control purposes (Recommendation 11) and also
directed preparation of a full range of Laotian border control actions (Recommendation
12).
/2/Document 87.
Unilateral U.S. planning has been completed for both covert and overt cross-border
operations into Laos and for a full range of Laotian border control actions. The essential
US/GVN negotiations, planning and training to attain the desired state of readiness for
these operations have not been initiated, except for limited covert intelligence collection
patrols authorized into Laos.
In view of the present situation in Laos and South Vietnam, it is recommended that you
now authorize such negotiations with the GVN and such combined US/GVN planning and
training as is necessary to achieve a state of readiness to conduct cross-border operations
from South Vietnam into Laos in the event a decision is made to initiate such actions. This
would not involve any commitment to carry out such operations.
Enclosure
Memorandum From the Joint Chiefs of Staff to the Secretary of Defense
(McNamara)/3/
JCSM-541-64
/3/Top Secret.
SUBJECT
US/GVN Combined Planning (U)
1. Reference is made to NSAM 288, dated 17 March 1964, in which the President directed
the following actions:
a. Recommendation 11. To authorize continued high-level US overflights of South
Vietnam's borders and to authorize "hot pursuit" and South Vietnamese ground operations
over the Laotian line for the purpose of border control. More ambitious operations into
Laos involving units beyond battalion size should be authorized only with the approval of
Souvanna Phouma. Operations across the Cambodian border should depend on the state of
relations with Cambodia.
b. Recommendation 12. To prepare immediately to be in a position on 72 hours' notice to
initiate the full range of Laotian and Cambodian "Border Control" actions (beyond those
authorized in Recommendation 11, above) and the "Retaliatory Actions" against North
Vietnam and to be in a position on 30 days' notice to initiate the program of "Graduated
Overt Military Pressure" against North Vietnam.
2. In order to comply with the NSAM the following US military operations plans have
been prepared:/4/
/4/A second enclosure, a memorandum from the Deputy Director of the Joint Staff to the
Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs, June 25, DJSM-106964, contained brief summaries of the three operations plans. It is not printed.
a. COMUSMACV OPLAN 98-64, Covert Cross-Border Operations into Laos. (To
implement Recommendation 11)
b. COMUSMACV OPLAN 98A-64, Overt Cross-Border Operations into Laos. (To
implement Recommendation 11)
c. CINCPAC OPLAN 37-64, Military Actions to Stabilize the Situation in RVN. (To
implement Recommendation 12, but includes also the operations visualized in
Recommendation 11)
3. The Joint Chiefs of Staff are concerned over the general lack of progress in
implementing these recommendations. Their status is as follows:
a. Recommendation 11. Although this recommendation authorizes "hot pursuit" and
ground operations into Laos under varying circumstances, agreement has been reached
with the Department of State only for limited covert intelligence collection patrols. The
full range of operations authorized has not been discussed with the GVN, nor has
combined planning and training for these operations been initiated. The views of the Joint
Chiefs of Staff on this matter are contained in CM-1332-64, dated 23 April 1964.
b. Recommendation 12. Unilateral US planning has been completed; however, the
essential US/GVN negotiations, planning, and training necessary to attain the desired state
of readiness for US/GVN operations have not been initiated.
4. In view of the present situation in Laos and South Vietnam, it would appear prudent
that we reduce the lead time required for the military operations envisaged in these
operations plans by obtaining authorization for noncommitting negotiations with the GVN
to the extent necessary to permit the combined US/GVN planning and training which is
required to attain a state of readiness for US/GVN operations. Such authority need not
include authority to launch operations at this time. As a collateral benefit, it should be
noted that such negotiations, planning, and training could be used to convince Hanoi
further of US resolve to take such action as necessary to defend the US position in
Southeast Asia.
5. The Joint Chiefs of Staff recommend that you sign the attached draft memorandum to
the Secretary of State/5/ which recommends that authority be granted for such preliminary
negotiations and combined US/GVN planning and training as is required to attain the
proper degree of readiness to conduct operations in the event a decision is made to initiate
US/GVN military operations.
/5/Not printed; the draft memorandum basically reiterated the arguments presented above.
Maxwell D. Taylor
Chairman
Bundy, Vol. 5. Secret.
SUBJECT
Your 6 PM Meeting with Taylor, Johnson et al/2/
/2/This off-the-record meeting took place at the White House from 6:20 to 6:50 p.m. on
June 25, with the following in attendance: the President, McNamara, Taylor, U. Alexis
Johnson, Bell, William Bundy, Forrestal, Rowan, McGeorge Bundy, McCone, and
Sullivan. (Ibid., President's Daily Diary)
The main purpose of this meeting is to meet with Alexis Johnson before he leaves. His
plane goes from Andrews at 10:30 AM tomorrow. The subjects are three: (1) Ambassador
Taylor's basic directive; (2) Staff; (3) Your reassertion of basic policy.
(1) Ambassador Taylor's basic directive.
Attached at Tab A is a letter/3/ which is worth reading aloud before you sign it. What it
does is to give Max full control over everything in South Vietnam. This is something the
military never let the Ambassador have before, and now that we have a man whom the
military cannot refuse, it is time to establish the principle. This letter represents Taylor's
own desire and has been checked with State but not with McNamara.
/3/For the letter as sent, see Document 228.
(2) Staff.
Taylor and Johnson have been working on this very hard in the last 24 hours and can give
their own report. The two key questions are: head man for AID and a new DCM.
(3) Basic policy.
If I understand your feelings correctly, the following is a possible outline of what you
might want to say.
1. You want the strongest possible U.S. effort to move ahead within South Vietnam.
Large-scale moves "to the North" are not the present answer, though we will be ready to
consider new decisions at any time, as we did in the case of reconnaissance over Laos.
2. We all know that two things are needed:
(a) an effective government in South Vietnam;
(b) an absolutely first-rate team.
We are now getting an absolutely first-rate U.S. team, for the first time since the situation
became acute.
The first task of this U.S. team is to strengthen the effectiveness of Khanh and his
colleagues, at every level, and by every means.
3. We have had plenty of plans and proposals; what we now need is execution. (This is
what Taylor and Johnson want to hear.)
4. But there is still need for all the good ideas we can get. We count on initiative at every
level. We shall send out our ideas for comment, and we shall expect energetic demands
for support from the field. (This is what they are less eager about but need to hear from
you. Today is not the day for a catalogue of new proposals.)
5. You particularly want the new team to get life and energy into Vietnamese efforts to
bring other flags in. And the U.S. team too must show imagination and hospitality in
making such allies feel welcome and useful. (Max Taylor is bearish on this and needs a
spur.)
6. You also particularly want to carry out an information and propaganda effort twice as
big as what Eisenhower has asked for
7. But an ounce of real progress is worth a pint of propaganda and a peck of threats.
8. Washington will back you up.
9. The spirit of Taylor and Johnson, who said "Yes" at once. will be the spirit of the whole
U. S. effort.
McG.B./4/

1964-1968, Volume I
Vietnam, 1964
Department of State
Washington, DC
VII. Taylor's First Month as Ambassador; the Increase in U.S. Advisory

Forces in Vietnam, June 25-July 31
226. Memorandum From the Secretary of State to the President/1/
/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, DEF 19 US-VIET S. Secret. Drafted by
Leonard C. Meeker and Carl F. Salans of L, cleared by Norb Schlie of the Department of
Justice and by William Bundy. Also published in Declassified Documents, 1983, 002145.
SUBJECT
Legal Basis for Sending American Forces to Viet-Nam
The enclosed memorandum/2/ is submitted in response to your request of June 22 for a
consideration of the legal basis for sending American forces to Viet-Nam./3/ The
conclusions of the memorandum may be summarized as follows:
/2/Not printed here; published ibid.
/3/Apparently the request was oral. (Memorandum from Meeker to Rusk, June 26;
Department of State, Central Files, DEF 19 US-VIET S)
1. The sending of American military personnel to serve in an advisory, non-combatant
role rests on specific authority contained in the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 and on a
Mutual Defense Assistance Agreement with Viet-Nam.
2. The assignment of United States military personnel to duty in Viet-Nam involving
participation in combat rests on the constitutional powers of the President as Commanderin-Chief of the armed forces, as Chief Executive, and in precedents in history for the use
of these powers to send American forces abroad, including various situations involving
their participation in hostilities. In the case of Viet-Nam, the President's action is
additionally supported by the fact that South Viet-Nam has been designated to receive
protection under Article IV of the Southeast Asia Collective Defense Treaty; both the
Treaty and the Protocol covering Viet-Nam received the advice and consent of the Senate.
Dean Rusk/4/
227. Memorandum of a Conversation, Department of State, Washington, July 1,

1964, 7:15 p.m./1/
Secret. Drafted by Imhof and approved by Rusk. Copies were sent to William and
McGeorge Bundy.
SUBJECT
Southeast Asia: The Polish Proposals; Discussion of the French Position; Cambodia
PARTICIPANTS
The Secretary
Mr. Johannes V. Imhof, French Desk, WE
Ambassador Alphand, French Embassy
M. Roger Duzer, Counselor, French Embassy
Ambassador Alphand, at his request, called on the Secretary at 7:15 p.m. on July 1. One
of the subjects discussed was Southeast Asia.
[Here follows discussion of Laos.]
Discussion of the French Position
The Secretary said he wished to discuss frankly the French position on Southeast Asia and
the points which troubled us. As we saw it, the French position was based on the
following points: 1) there should be no Communist takeover in Southeast Asia; 2) the
problem cannot be resolved by military means; 3) there was no solid political structure in
South Vietnam and it was unlikely that it would be possible to create such a solid
structure; 4) there should be a political solution and France should reserve herself for an
initiative in this direction; 5) a political solution required strong U.S. military presence in
the area. Ambassador Alphand did not dispute any of these points.
The Secretary continued that we had three problems with regard to this position. One was
fundamental, the two others were of a psychological nature. The fundamental problem
was that we did not |understand what was meant by a "political solution." We realized, of
course, that the war could not be won by military means alone, but, in our opinion, a
political solution for the area had been reached through the 1954 and 1962 accords. We
could not see any new solution which would not be much worse for the interests of the
West.
Ambassador Alphand agreed that the 1962 agreement on Laos was an acceptable political
solution. All that was required were the reconstitution of the three political tendencies and
perhaps stronger controls. As to Vietnam, the only new element to be added to the 1954
accords was the concept of neutrality. The Secretary asked whether neutrality would apply
to both North and South Vietnam. Ambassador Alphand said that it should, but suggested
that it should be applied to South Vietnam first and that it should be gradually extended to
the North.
The Secretary said that if the other side would leave South Vietnam alone, U.S. forces
would be withdrawn. The only reason for U.S. military presence was the continued
interference by Hanoi in South Vietnam. Ambassador Alphand agreed that U.S. military
presence in South Vietnam was a result of the military activities of the other side. On the
other hand, the U.S. had exerted a dominant political influence in South Vietnam
immediately after the French withdrawal in 1954. The French had warned against this
because they had been concerned about the reactions of the other side. The Secretary
repeated that we had no desire to control South Vietnam and that our presence there
would end as soon as the other side stopped its interference.
Ambassador Alphand said that the U.S. and France had a different evaluation of the
situation in Communist China. The French felt that the Chinese were beset by their
domestic problems. The Chinese were also in difficulties with the Soviets. The only sure
way to solve the problem in Southeast Asia was a settlement guaranteed by the United
States and China. The Secretary said that we had such an agreement with regard to Laos;
it had not worked. Ambassador Alphand said that Laos had only been a partial settlement
which had not worked because of the continued war in Vietnam.
The Secretary said he wanted to mention the two other points in the French position which
gave us difficulties. He noted French skepticism about the possibility of creating a viable
political structure in South Vietnam. Yet, the French could be of great help in creating
such a viable structure by using their influence. Ambassador Alphand asked what France
could do. Should it give advice to the Vietnamese politicians? The Secretary said that
France should state openly that it is opposed to a Communist takeover of the area and that
it was prepared to cooperate with South Vietnam to this end. Ambassador Alphand felt
that France had already made it clear that she was opposed to a Communist takeover.
The Secretary said that the other point concerned U.S. military presence in the area, the
need for which France appeared to recognize. On this, we could use some moral support.
Standing aside and equating U.S. with Communist presence was definitely not helpful.
Ambassador Alphand said that he recognized the difficulties. He alluded to France's own
experience in Indochina until 1954. He recognized that France had received material
support from the United States. Nevertheless, the war had cost France $8.5 billion and she
had to fight the war alone. The Secretary said that it had always been his view that the
West had made mistakes with regard to Indochina in the 1953-54 period.
Ambassador Alphand said that it was his personal opinion that a choice would have to be
made sooner or later with. regard to the Vietnamese problem. The Secretary reiterated that
if Peking and Hanoi would leave Southeast Asia alone, there would be no need for U.S.
presence in the area. As long as this was not the case, the U.S. would remain. He said that
if the French were to tell this to the Chinese, this would be an accurate statement of U.S.
policy. Ambassador Alphand said that it was necessary to talk to the Chinese. The
Secretary said that we have indeed talked to the Chinese. Perhaps we have talked more
seriously with the Chinese than any other Western nation that has diplomatic relations
with Communist China. The absence of such relations between the U.S. and China was no
obstacle to serious talks. We have not ignored China but we haven't liked what we have
heard in these talks. We want a decision from the Chinese that they, as well as North
Vietnam, will cease their interference in South Vietnam and Laos.
The Secretary said that there were indications that an important meeting is currently going
on in Hanoi. He could also tell Ambassador Alphand in confidence that we had closely
watched the situation on the southern border of China and that there had been no Chinese
troop movements to the South. Ambassador Alphand suggested that perhaps a political
solution with regard to Laos was in the offing. The Secretary said that we wanted to return
to the 1962 accords.
The Secretary said that he wanted to be brutally frank. It appeared to him that there were
people in Paris--he did not know who they were--who seemed to interpret U.S. actions on
the world scene as an attempt to replace and to diminish French influence. Nothing could
be further from the truth. Ambassador Alphand interjected that he could assure the
Secretary that neither he, nor Couve, nor, he thought, General de Gaulle held this view.
The Secretary said that, on the contrary, we would be delighted to see an extension of
French influence in Southeast Asia, in Africa and in other parts of the world. There have
been reports that the French wish to extend their influence in the Congo. Nothing would
please us more. Ambassador Alphand said that since the last war the U.S., as the dominant
power, had been thrust into a position where it had to exert its influence. He said this had
been a good thing and had helped to ensure peace. On the other hand, it had led to a deep
involvement of the United States in certain areas, such as Southeast Asia. He referred to
our initial support of Diem and alluded to CIA activities in Vietnam.
The Secretary said that seen from Europe, Southeast Asia seemed very far away. We, on
the other hand, were an Atlantic as well as a Pacific power and the security of Asia was as
important to us as the security of Europe. To us, the defense of South Vietnam has the
same significance as the defense of Berlin. Ambassador Alphand disputed this. He felt the
situations were not comparable. The stakes in Europe were enormous. The loss of Berlin
would shake the foundations of Western security. On the other hand, if we were to lose
South Vietnam we would not be losing much.
The Secretary said that if we were to pull out of South Vietnam our guarantees with
regard to Berlin would lose their credibility. It was all part of the same struggle, to prevent
an extension of Communist influence. Ambassador Alphand said that an agreement on
Vietnam with guarantees would not have the effect of lessening Western confidence in
U.S. guarantees. The Secretary pointed out that we already have such an agreement on
South Vietnam. Ambassador Alphand said that we had not signed the agreement. The
Secretary said that we had nevertheless accepted it.
The Secretary said that the reason why we have allies is that we believe in the right of
nations to independence. We have 42 allies. Nevertheless, we are not troubled by the
concept of non-alignment and neutralism as long as it is genuine.
Ambassador Alphand wondered what could be done in practical terms. He said that with
regard to Southeast Asia, we appear to have a difference of opinion and we were going
along different paths. The Secretary asked precisely what was the difference of opinion.
Ambassador Alphand said France believed there should be a negotiated agreement. The
Secretary said that we already have the 1954 and 1962 agreements. Ambassador Alphand
suggested that perhaps all that was needed was the 1954 agreement with new guarantees
and new controls. The Secretary asked why France did not say so publicly and offer her
cooperation to South Vietnam. He said that Saigon did not know what France meant by a
"political solution". Did it mean the inclusion of the Vietcong in the government?
Ambassador Alphand admitted that he did not know. He reviewed General de Gaulle's
approach to the Algerian problem: de Gaulle had a policy--a negotiated settlement. The
details, the means to get there, varied depending on day-to-day developments.
The Secretary said that it was distressing that France used the term "neutralization"
without giving it any concrete contents. Used in this manner, the concept becomes
negative and creates the impression that France does not really care about the security of
the area. The terms "neutralization" and "political solution" without concrete contents are
merely words, not a policy. Ambassador Alphand felt that these words nevertheless
expressed a policy, a direction. He felt that a choice would have to be made, and although
he did not wish to exaggerate the importance of the coming elections, he felt that the
choice would be reached more easily once the elections are over. The Secretary assured
Ambassador Alphand that the elections played no role in this. The President had made this
quite clear. He had heard the President say "I don't have to be re-elected President, but I
have to be President while I am President". Moreover, no U.S. President, before or after
the elections, would pull out of Southeast Asia as long as the other side interferes. On the
other hand, we would pull out tomorrow if the other side would leave Southeast Asia
alone. The Secretary said that his brief trip to Vietnam had convinced him that the
country, if it were left in peace, would not only be viable but could be an example to this
entire part of the world, thanks to a large extent to what the French had done there in the
past. Ambassador Alphand agreed. He observed that the French, while in the area, had
always found it necessary to have an agreement with the Chinese.
The Secretary said the question was how to get Chinese assent to a solution. He said
Soviet assent in Europe had been accomplished through our defensive arrangements. Only
when the Soviets became convinced that they would face a major risk in stirring up
trouble in Europe did they assent to actual conditions. Obviously, this lesson must be
applied in Asia with regard to the Chinese. Ambassador Alphand agreed that Moscow had
come to know the risks involved. He was not sure that this applied to China. He did not
think the Chinese realized that local actions in Southeast Asia--infiltrations in South
Vietnam and Laos--could eventually create the risk of a destruction of China. The
Secretary said that the French should make the Chinese aware of the risks. Ambassador
Alphand said he thought that this had already been done; on the other hand, the U.S. had
not as yet made a statement to this effect.
The Secretary said that the appearance of a division of the West with regard to Southeast
Asia had a definite bearing on the problem and made a solution more difficult. He said the
French should tell the North Vietnamese that they must leave South Vietnam alone and
that France will oppose them if they continued their interference. Ambassador Alphand
asked precisely what the Secretary would wish the French to convey to the Chinese. The
Secretary said France should tell the Chinese (1) that if the Chinese and North Vietnamese
leave Southeast Asia alone, France will use its influence to see to it that these countries
will not present any threat to China; and (2) that if the Chinese do not leave Southeast
Asia alone, France will oppose them. The Secretary asked Ambassador Alphand to put
these two points to the French Foreign Minister. He said that it seemed to him that a
genuinely non-aligned Southeast Asia was also in the interest of France. A non-aligned
Southeast Asia would in all likelihood turn toward Paris.
[Here follows discussion of Cambodia.]
228. Letter From the President to the Ambassador to Vietnam (Taylor)/1/

Washington, July 2, 1964.
/1/Source: National Defense University, Taylor Papers, T-161-69. Confidential. Taylor
was appointed Ambassador to Vietnam on July 1, arrived in Saigon on July 7, and
presented his credentials on July 14. The White House copy of this letter is published in
Declassified Documents, 1976, 219C.
Dear Ambassador Taylor: As you take charge of the American effort in South Vietnam, I
want you to have this formal expression not only of my confidence, but of my desire that
you have and exercise full responsibility for the effort of the United States Government in
South Vietnam. In general terms this authority is parallel to that set forth in President
Kennedy's letter of May 29,1961 to all American Ambassadors; specifically, I wish it
clearly understood that this overall responsibility includes the whole military effort in
South Vietnam and authorizes the degree of command and control that you consider
appropriate.
I recognize that in the conduct of the day-to-day business of the Military Assistance
Command, Vietnam, you will wish to work out arrangements which do not burden you or
impede the exercise of your overall direction.
At your convenience, I should be glad to know of the arrangements which you propose for
meeting the terms of this instruction, so that appropriate supporting action can be taken in
the Defense Department and elsewhere as necessary.
This letter rescinds all conflicting instructions to U.S. officers in Vietnam.
Sincerely,
Lyndon B. Johnson

Saigon, July 8, 1964-7 p.m.
/1/Source: Department of State. Central Files. POL 1 US-VIET S. Secret; Limdis.
Repeated to CINCPAC.
56. CINCPAC for POLAD. I called on General Khanh this morning and we had cordial
one hour conversation. He expressed satisfaction with new American personnel, saying
that Vietnamese morale rose on news of appointments and VC morale fell. Said this might
explain recent wave of VC attacks. I replied that President was prepared to commit all
resources needed to assure Vietnamese independence. President wished to make clear that
Viet-Nam was number one problem and would enjoy top priority.
Returning to recent VC attacks, Khanh said VC seems to attack sporadically and it was
important for us not to be shaken by spectacular VC successes over a short span of time.
He noted that French had lost only 13,000 men at Dien Bien Phu and had force of 400,000
left. But French morale had been shattered by this one blow and war was lost. Said we
must avoid reactions like this.
Khanh said he could promise me "the frank cooperation of a soldier". He would be
seeking man-to-man advice. If he could not meet some request of ours, he would tell us
frankly why he could not do so. I thanked him for this and said I would deal with him in
same way. Khanh said he was not a political expert but that he believed that one military
principle that really applies to politics is flexibility. He would be flexible and would
reconsider any decision if this seemed warranted by new facts, by our desires or by
evolving situation.
I then made point that I believed one of our principal common problems was meshing of
our efforts. We had to make certain that the efforts of the two national teams, the
Vietnamese and the American, geared. I told him of my decision of yesterday to set up a
Mission Council with myself as chairman and drew parallel of council concept to
functioning of NSC. Identified members of Mission Council and how it was intended that
they would operate. I noted in passing my overall responsibility for American military
activities, citing this as evidence of attainment of complete unity of effort on the U.S. side.
I offered to show him at our next meeting how Mission Council and its several
committees would work. We could then study possibilities of a closer working relation
between counterparts. Khanh asked for an organization chart so he could set up an
analogous council.
Khanh recalled that as he had told Ambassador Johnson, when he commanded I Corps, he
believed that Americans should not be merely advisors but should actually participate in
making and implementing of plans. We should do this in Saigon as well, between GVN
ministries and offices and their American counterparts. Zorthian was already working this
way with Information Minister Thai, and results were already impressive. He added that if
this cooperation were to be too open or too generally known, "it would be criticized by
people too willing to criticize". I acknowledged this danger and observed that in some
areas we would need closer and more frequent contact than in others; in some cases we
night need even daily contact.
I agreed to supply him our organization chart, for whatever applicability it might have,
and asked how often he thought we should meet. He suggested once every other week at
least at outset. I suggested we set a definite regular day towards which we could plan. We
agreed that our first meeting should take place on Friday, July 17./2/ He prefers meeting at
Joint General Staff building as more discreet and efficient.
/2/A memorandum of the conversation at this meeting was transmitted as an enclosure to
airgram A-48 from Saigon, July 20. (Ibid.)
Khanh then invited me to join him for part of his trip to Danang area July 11 and 12 for
two days of Vietnamese Air Force Day celebrations. I will try to spend at least one day
with him in the field over the weekend. I told him that I would like to accompany him
from time to time on his field trips. Khanh remarked Minh was making field trips now,
and I expressed pleasure at learning this. Khanh said he was glad too and that Minh's trips
were definitely useful. Neither of us discussed Minh's situation any further.
I recalled that last time we spoke (mid-May) religious problem was acute, and remarked
that it seemed perhaps less acute now. He agreed that religious situation had improved but
said it was still delicate. I asked him which side was the aggressor. Without hesitating he
replied the Catholics, and remarked that they were better organized than the Buddhists. I
asked what was issue-were they seeking to recover privileges they thought they had lost.
He said yes, that in past they had had such special privileges as wood cutting rights, direct
delivery of relief goods, etc. This was illegal, and when normal and legal processes were
restored Catholics alleged discrimination. I observed that it appeared no religious
oppression as such had taken place. He agreed. I asked if the incidents between Buddhists
and Catholics might be described as local and vary from place to place. He replied yes,
commenting that if two citizens get in a fight and one is Catholic and one Buddhist, it is
regarded as a religious incident.
I asked if the top leaders of the religious communities had become more reasonable.
When he said yes, I asked about Thich Tri Quang. He replied that Thich Tri Quang
reasonable when he was in Saigon but less so when in Hue. He noted there was also the
matter of differences in temperament of people and regional differences. Whereas Saigon
tended to be calm and non-vindictive, in Hue every problem seemed to take more extreme
form.
Next I asked how recruiting was going. He said better but not as well as he would like. I
told him General Westmoreland had described to me the new plan to work out from
Saigon in force. I thought the plan looked reasonable but remarked that we must anticipate
need for greater forces to hold "cleared" area as we advanced. This was particularly true in
this area because paramilitary forces existed to relieve ARVN. Further, if we brought
ARVN reinforcements to this critical area, we would be stripping other areas of their
defense forces. I made clear that I did not raise this point as an objective [objection] to
their plan, but rather as a reminder of mounting manpower requirements.
Khanh said that when regular army units left an area, his forces would be replaced with
regional forces. He noted that recent changes in pay and other matters had made service in
regional forces much more attractive and therefore improved recruitment levels in
regional forces. He also noted Vietnamese soldiers prefer to serve near their homes, and
this factor also improved recruitment figures of regional forces, usually to detriment of
regular army recruitments. He said that as an area was cleared, first the regulars and then
the regional forces would withdraw, leaving local forces. He said we must include in our
recruitment plans measures to reinforce local and regional forces up to ~the levels
necessary for them to meet their new responsibilities as regulars pull out.
In general comment on all this Khanh noted that the base of the VC action is the local
hard-core group, and added that only the inhabitants of the same region could cope with
these local VC elements.
I asked Khanh about the desertion rate, whether the figures were correct and if there were
not many AWOL being listed as deserters. He said this problem was very complex and
stemmed largely from deep-seated desire of Vietnamese to stay near their birthplaces.
This desire had plagued population resettlement efforts just as it now influenced desertion
rate. Many desertions are for short time; over the holidays desertion rate was particularly
high, but most such deserters returned to their units after holidays. The number of
deserters who actually go over to the enemy with their weapons is small.
I asked Khanh for more information on his policy towards desert~ers, and expressed
concern over fact that according to statistics we are losing in desertions as many men as
we acquire in recruitments. I asked if this impression were correct. He said it was a
complicated question; when one service becomes more attractive than another, men desert
from latter to join former. This practice made all the more common because forces keep
minimal and unsatisfactory personnel records. I remarked that General Sternberg, MACV
G-1, had been studying this whole problem and hoped Khanh's G-1 would work closely
with him. He replied they already working together, and added that the problem lay inside
ARVN. He said he must put some more effective officer in charge of all personnel affairs.
I remarked that the more I studied the situation here, the more I was impressed by the
importance of the personnel problem, in all its ramifications.
I next reminded Khanh of President Johnson's interest in the earliest possible appointment
of a more extensive Vietnamese representation abroad, and particularly of effective
Ambassadors. He replied much as he had on other occasions. He said Ambassadors go out
for several years, and once at their posts they cannot be changed like regimental
commanders or province chiefs. There was also the problem of suitable wives. He said he
could of course please President Johnson by appointing many Ambassadors tomorrow,
but they would not be good appointments and it would be better to wait. Better no
Ambassador than a poor one. He added that he had to tie these appointments in with his
efforts to solve certain internal problems.
I acknowledged the truth of all this but said that Viet-Nam was losing much by not having
enough Ambassadors to represent its interests effectively abroad. He replied that it was
better to leave representation at charg d'affaires level rather than have a bad Ambassador.
Khanh then gave example of totally unsatisfactory proposed nomination made to him by
Foreign Minister Quat: Dang Van Sung, "a Dai Viet, of course", to be Ambassador to
Laos. Khanh said Sung began to publish a newspaper that attacked government. Khanh
said he called him in and asked why he wrote such irresponsible nonsense, to which Sung
allegedly replied "so he could sell newspapers." Khanh observed that if such a person
became Ambassador, he would be able to sell other things.
Another case was Catholic leader of Central Viet-Nam Tran Van Ly. Khanh wanted to
send him to Rome as Ambassador, but said that after interviewing him he concluded Ly
wanted to be Prime Minister.
On taking leave of Khanh I emphasized once more importance of unity. Khanh replied
that this difficult of achievement because Vietnamese suffer from French political heritage
that makes them individualistic and disunited. I reminded him of the saying about
necessity to hang together or hang separately.
Taylor

Washington, July 8, 1964--9:09 p.m.
/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27-14 VIET S. Top Secret; Priority;
Exdis. Drafted by Mendenhall, cleared by William Bundy, and initialed and approved by
Ball. Repeated to Ottawa.
69. Shenstone/2/ of Canadian Embassy Washington has given us copy July 5 cable from
Seaborn/3/ stating it now seems likely ICC will meet in Hanoi about July 14. Seaborn will
try see Ho and Giap whom he would ask for comments or reply to message conveyed to
Pham Van Dong.
/2/Michael Shenstone, First Secretary of the Canadian Embassy.
/3/Not printed. (Department of State, Central Files, POL 27-14 VIET S)
Seaborn asked whether any specific further points for him to convey to DRV. We told
Canadian Embassy here July 8 that Sullivan/4/ will be in direct touch with Seaborn in
Saigon and will let him know whether we have anything further to convey at this stage.
/4/William H. Sullivan went to Vietnam temporarily to assist Taylor and Johnson on the
understanding he would become Ambassador to Laos in a few months. Events in Vietnam
kept him there for 5 months. (William H. Sullivan, Obbligato, pp. 196-197) Forrestal
replaced Sullivan as the Special Assistant for Vietnam.
On behalf Seaborn Canadian Embassy here requested our comments on Pham Van Dong's
position re status and role of National Liberation Front. We told Canadians there is
nothing new or surprising about this position as it is generally consistent with DRV public
attitude on this question. We drew Canadians' attention however to fact that speeches and
resolution of Third Congress of Lao Dong Party in September 1960 placed great stress on
"peaceful national reunification" as major aim of "national united front" to be set up in
South Viet-Nam. Thus Pham Van Dong was substantially less than candid when he told
Seaborn that "neutrality" was not necessarily first step only.
We also told Canadian DRV should be in no doubt we regard National Liberation Front as
puppet and agent of Hanoi, and we hope Canadians will keep this firmly before DRV
leaders.
Seaborn stated that he proposes to tell DRV leaders that appointment of Taylor-Johnson
team is evidence of seriousness of US purpose but not of bellicosity. He proposes to say
there is no change in basic US approach already given to Pham Van Dong. We have
confirmed to Canadians that this is correct interpretation and proper line to pursue with
Hanoi.
Shenstone at July 8 meeting also told us Ottawa feels on basis statement at recent National
Assembly meeting in Hanoi of DRV position on South Viet-Nam struggle that DRV is
putting forth maximum position. Ottawa suggested therefore it might not serve our
interest to appear too eager to get DRV response to message conveyed to Pham Van
Dong. While we see nothing new in DRV position, we told Shenstone we agree with
Ottawa's view about not appearing too eager. We therefore concur with Seaborn that if
ICC meeting in Hanoi does not come off in July he should put off new trip to Hanoi until
August. (Latest word from Seaborn is that July 16 is earliest ICC commissioners could
leave for Hanoi and apparent Polish lack of enthusiasm may delay date further.) We also
told Shenstone we believe that if Seaborn's request to call on Ho and Giap on next visit to
Hanoi not readily granted he should not press to see them./5/
/5/In telegram 74 from Saigon, July 11, Taylor agreed with this line and reported that
Sullivan would discuss the matter in detail with Seaborn in Saigon after July 13. Taylor
reported that Sullivan would offer Seaborn the following advice:
"Unless ICC fixes date for early meeting Hanoi, Sullivan will counsel against appearing
too eager and will advise August trip rather than July. Will also advise against Seaborn
`asking' for comments or reply to message conveyed Pham Van Dong. In our view, ball
now in Hanoi's court and their views should be volunteered rather than solicited. Finally,
we will reiterate views re puppet nature Liberation Front." (Department of State, Central
Files, POL 27-14 VIET S)
In telegram 81 from Saigon, July 13, Taylor reported that Seaborn told Sullivan that the
trip to Hanoi was postponed until August. (Ibid.)
Ball
/1/Source: Johnson Library, White House Central Files, Confidential File, CO 312 Viet
Nam. No classification marking.
SUBJECT
Rural Opinion in Viet-Nam
USIS conducted a study in April and May, 1964, to determine psychological attitudes in
the rural Vietnamese province of Binh Hoa. Despite the fact that Binh Hoa is not typical
of all rural Vietnamese provinces, findings proved surprisingly consistent with less
detailed but significant data taken previously from other areas, and are probably indicative
of rural thinking throughout much of the country.
The following summary of findings from the study may interest you.
1. Villagers prefer the central government over the Viet Cong. Viet Cong influence was
significant in only two of the fifteen villages surveyed. Only in the face of threats did
villagers tend to support the VC. Left alone, they looked to the central government for any
real help.
2. There is confidence in the Khanh government, but it can only be maintained by
fulfilling villagers' desires. Khanh has achieved a considerable measure of respect by
meeting certain village demands such as relaxation of taxes and elimination of forced
indoctrination sessions. Even among Catholics who felt that Diem gave them preferential
treatment, the old regime is no longer mourned.
3. The most common aspiration is for government credit and material aid. Financial and
technical help is everywhere sought and needed for construction of public works such as
hospitals, schools, and irrigation projects and for private assistance in agricultural
developments.
4. Success of the strategic hamlet program is dependent upon several factors.
a. Adequate and well-behaved security forces.
b. Prompt payment of resettlement costs.
c. Free elections.
d. Honest, energetic, and socially-responsible government officials and district chiefs.
5. The presence of U.S. advisors is not resented. Generally, people "do not care whether
U.S. officers act as advisors or commanders as long as they help in winning the war."
Despite some unfavorable comparisons with the French who "got closer to the people,"
U.S. advisors are judged as "better disciplined."
6. Villagers' uncertainties about their prospects can be reduced by still further
improvement of the Vietnamese Information Service. Common complaints were that
publications do not reach the people, movie showings are too infrequent, and Vietnamese
information officers do not exert themselves enough. Thus, uncertainties about the
government can result from lack of information about so uncomplicated a subject as
"People wonder what happened to the savings they have poured into the Agricultural
Credit Service fund for the last years."
The overwhelming need is for reassurances of physical security.
For your more detailed information, a fuller report is attached./2/
/2/Not printed.
Carl

Saigon, July 14, 1964--midnight.
/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27-14 VIET S. Top Secret; Exdis.
98. Re Embtel 81./2/ Sullivan met July 13 with Seaborn to discuss Seaborn's views re next
encounter with North Vietnamese. According currently anticipated schedule, Seaborn
does not expect visit Hanoi until first part of August. At that time, on basis previous
conversation with Pham Van Dong, he expects have interview with Ho Chi Minh.
However, despite his suggestions to Pham Van Dong, he has very little hope of seeing
General Giap.
/2/See footnote 5. Document 230.
In general, Seaborn accepts idea that ball is now in Hanoi court and he will not solicit
reaction to his previous approach to Pham Van Dong. His latest cable from Ottawa, which
reflects conversations in Washington, suggests that he should refer to his previous
conversations only indirectly in his next visit.
As for subject matter which he will wish to initiate in his discussion in Hanoi, Seaborn
wishes to obtain from us the line we would like to pursue with respect to the National
Liberation Front. He wishes to have, by pouch or cable: (A) [garble--latest?] intelligence
information we have developed on the Front to demonstrate its DRV control, and which
we would be willing to share with him, (B) talking points which we would wish him to
use with respect to the Front, and (C) any information which we would like to develop on
the Front, and which might emerge from discussions on this subject in Hanoi.
In dinner conversation after private meeting, Seaborn and Sullivan were joined by
Canadian Brigadier recently returned from Hanoi, who reported considerable continuing
anti-air raid precautions being taken in city and camouflage work being done on POL tank
farm just outside city. This info being repeated in more detail by separate messages/3/ in
order not compromise privacy this series of cables.
/3/Not found.
Taylor

Saigon, July 15, 1964--4 p.m.
/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, DEF 19 US-VIET S. Secret; Limdis.
Repeated to JCS and CINCPAC. McGeorge Bundy sent a copy of this cable to the
President on July 16, under cover of a memorandum that reads as follows:
"This is a cable which I think Bob McNamara mentioned to you yesterday. The critical
paragraph is the last one. I see some advantage in a careful build-up, carefully explained
from every point of view, but we obviously cannot make decisions until we get more
detailed accounts. Bob and I would expect this matter to be ready for discussion and
decision sometime next week, but not before." Johnson Library, National Security File,
Vietnam Country File, Vol. XIV, Memos)
108. Dept pass to Director AID. For Secretary Rusk and Secretary McNamara.
I have just cleared a cable/2/ which should reach you shortly which raises the estimate of
Viet Cong strength in South Vietnam to 23,000-34,000. This is not a sudden or dramatic
increase but rather the acceptance of the existence of units suspected for two or three
years for which confirmatory evidence has become available only in the last few months.
/2/Telegram 107 from Saigon, July 15. (Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 VIET
S)
This increased estimate of enemy strength and recent upward trend in VC activity in the
North should not occasion overconcern. We have been coping with this strength for some
time without being accurately aware of its dimensions. As to the heightened tempo of
operations in the North, there is considerable reason to believe that VC command thinks
we are about to shift larger forces to Saigon area than modest transfer actually planned
and that these are holding attacks to pin forces in North. However, taken in combination,
both events are a reminder of the growing magnitude of our problems and the need to
raise the level of the GVN/US effort.
With this need in mind, we are expediting the formulation of additional requirements to
support our plans during the ensuing months. This morning I went over the military
personnel requirements which Westmoreland is developing for the execution of the
pacification plan for the area around Saigon (dubbed Pica I) and for subsequent operations
up to about July, 1965. It appears likely that US military strength should increase to
around 21,000 in the next six months to meet projected needs. This matter is being studied
closely and will result shortly in a recommendation from General Westmoreland
supported by detailed justification. I will comment at that time. USOM requirements are
more complex and difficult to define but are taking form and will be forwarded by about
August 1.
Taylor
to CINCPAC, the Department of Defense, and CIA.
115. CINCPAC for POLAD. This is a Mission message.
A. The countrywide rate of Viet Cong activity while not as high as that experienced in the
peak weeks of the February-April period, has increased over the June weekly average.
The period 5-13 July has seen several major actions which have produced fairly heavy
losses on both sides.
B. Following is furnished in effort to place major military events of the past several days
in perspective, point up certain strengths and weaknesses on the part of the RVNAF, and
provide some indication of probable course of the war in weeks to come.
1. The spate of press reports regarding PAVN units in battalion size operating in the I
Corps area cannot be confirmed. The introduction of regular PAVN forces into the area is
regarded as unlikely. Report of initial interrogation of prisoners recently captured
indicates that infiltration of drafted native-born North Vietnamese trained in various
PAVN divisions has probably increased in the past few months. The extent of this
infiltration is not yet clear but there is no evidence that PAVN battalions are moving into
this area.
2. Referring to the major specific VC-initiated actions during the past two weeks, the
following operational comments supplement the various spot reports, wirenotes, and
sitreps which cover these actions. They are intended to provide an insight into current
activities and to assist in the assessment of the significance of these activities.
A. Actions against Special Forces (Pled Krong and Narn Dong):
(1) Attacks took place at camps which for a considerable period previously had been
relatively free from VC harassment. VC controls in area had been of a transitory nature.
Friendly patrols normally ranged to 10km or more before any contact was made. Camps
had been established to recruit indigenous personnel away from VC.
(2) Because of lack of previous activity, security apparently was somewhat lax. However,
Nam Dong was successful in repelling an attack of over BN size.
(3) Local intelligence sources were apparently poor since large VC forces were able to
assemble undetected in vicinity.
(4) At least one camp appears to have been infiltrated by VC.
(5) Reaction forces were not effective since arrival was after VC withdrawal.
(6) Apparently VC planning, coordination, and execution were based on detailed
knowledge of camps' activities and reaction capability of available reinforcements.
B. Vinh Cheo outpost (11-12 July):
(1) VC apparently used attack on outpost as bait for reaction. A large VC force, estimated
at two battalions, was employed in the entire operation which was obviously wellplanned.
(2) The VC were disposed in a strong defensive position blocking each column advancing
toward the outpost.
(3) Sector reacted quickly but had difficulty in maintaining control in part because
reaction forces were dispatched at night.
(4) The reaction forces initially were five Hoa Hao companies. Two of the units were
organized in April, the other three in June. None had unit training. They had very little
experience. Leadership was weak. The deputy province chief was the strongest leader.
However, he was seriously wounded early in the operation.
(5) March security apparently was poor on the moves.
(6) Terrain was difficult. For the most part area consisted of rice paddies under three feet
of water. This handicapped reaction forces and was advantageous to VC ambush.
C. Binh Long ambush (13 July):
(1) VC again used two separate forces. At this time, it is difficult to determine whether
one was used to lure a reaction force into an ambush or whether the initial encounter was
accidental.
(2) The convoy ambush appeared to have been well-planned and executed. Some VC
were reported to have been disguised as Rangers. lO9mm shells were electrically
detonated in the road. The ambush was well-timed and coordinated.
(3) Security and march discipline was lax. Vehicles were bunched and the command
element was in the first three vehicles.
(4) Reaction to the ambush was poor. Two Ranger companies in the immediate vicinity
did not react. This may have been due to fact that battalion commander was lost in
ambush. Coordination was lacking. Two other companies were helilifted to Chon Thanh
but were not committed.
(5) Binh Long has significance for the VC as a "corridor" province through which some of
their lines of communication are known to run between their national headquarters
(COSVN) and the northern provinces and between war zones C and D. While recent VC
activity in the province confined itself mainly to interference with traffic on the few
highways in that area, ARVN forces have been ambushed there before, and the most
recent VC reaction signals their determination to keep ARVN forces out of that area.
C. In summary the following observations are offered as possible explanation of VC
activity during last two weeks:
1. Possibly in response to publicity during last few months on hardening US attitude
toward war, some reports indicate VC issued instructions during the latter part of June 64
to step up the tempo and intensity of their activities during following three months to
include the conduct of a series of attacks on forward RVN military bases. Several reports
referred to VC instructions for increased activities during July to commemorate the
signing of the Geneva Accords on 20 July 1954. There were other reports associating
increased activity with arrival of Ambassador Taylor. The Viet Cong clandestine
broadcasting station last week announced an increase in VC activity, while exhorting their
followers to intensify their efforts.
2. Another possible explanation for increased VC activity is that the VC are putting on the
pressure in I, II and IV Corps to prevent or discourage GVN reinforcement in the
provinces around Saigon. They are no doubt aware of plans to intensify pacification in the
Binh Duong, Hau Nghia, Long An, Gia Dinh area.
3. The VC seem to make announcements of increased activity only when their reserve
strength is ready to accomplish or at least attempt what their propaganda predicts. The VC
have sufficient reserves to raise the tempo and intensity of their effort. This is particularly
true of VC Military Region 5, comprising the provinces of I Corps and most of the
provinces of II Corps, where main force units are known to exist, but are rarely
committed. In I Corps tactical zone, recent infiltration of North Vietnamese mentioned
above, have added new but relatively inexperienced reinforcements. We have low-level
reports of recent infiltration further South via Attopeu province of Laos but these have not
been substantiated thus far.
4. Significant recent VC attacks do not depart from patterns established over the past year.
The attacks on the CIDG campaign Kontum and Thua Thien were undoubtedly the result
of long preparation. CIDG camps because of their very nature are high priority targets for
the VC. This was demonstrated by the repeated VC efforts against the Chau Lang camp
and the devastating attack on the Kiep Hoa camp in November 63.
5. The attack on Vinh Cheo outpost apparently was a continuation of the same tactics
which the VC had attempted to use earlier in Phuoc Thanh province when they inflicted
heavy casualties on a 2company Ranger relief force attempting to intervene after a 5pronged VC action against minor targets.
6. The upsurge of VC activity in the two northern provinces of I Corps during the past
several days has not fallen into a discernible pattern but it seems reasonable to credit it in
part to a carefully designed VC plan to counter First Division offensive operations into
territory that VC consider their base area, negate successful GVN pacification efforts in
the coastal regions of the two provinces, and cause the withdrawal of GVN elements
working on road projects in the piedmont areas of the two provinces. If these were in fact
their goals, they have succeeded to a considerable degree. Some of the increased activity
may have been designed to delay or prevent strong ARVN reaction to the attack on the
Nam Dong post on 6 July. Finally, stepped up activity in the North probably had a
strategic objective, discouragement of GVN intentions to concentrate more troops in the
South. In past few days VC activity in I Corps seems to have returned to pattern of weeks
prior to 5 July with emphasis continuing to be on the harassment, terroristic and sabotage
type of activity. Route 1 is open for traffic. However, Route 9 remains closed west of Ca
Lu due to a destroyed bridge.
D. However, in general, high level of activity must be anticipated in response to apparent
policy decisions on conducting a special campaign during July. Priority targets are likely
to be: district towns, isolated posts, and ARVN units entering VC base areas. However,
main thrust of VC campaign is expected to emphasize terrorism, harassment and efforts
against routes and lines of communications with particular effort in those areas where
pacification operations show evidence of progress.
E. Deptel 130/2/ just received. We share concerns expressed reftel and agree there are
many unknowns in situation. Are making urgent review and will submit Mission views
and recommendations in few days.
/2/In this joint State-Defense-CIA message, July 14, the three agencies expressed concern
about the military situation in the northern provinces and suggested that the Mission in
Saigon consider the feasibility of additional air and ground reconnaissance and
intelligence collection to obtain hard evidence on the Viet Cong situation there. (Ibid.)
Taylor
/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Vietnam Country File, Vol. XIII,
Memos. No classification marking.
Here are three interesting dispatches from Max Taylor.
The first explains where the bad UPI story out of Saigon came from./2/
/2/In telegram 109 from Saigon, July 15, Taylor reported that General Stilwell held a
background briefing with local correspondents in Saigon to eliminate speculation of a
North Vietnamese invasion of South Vietnam. Reporters had received this impression
from Khanh and other South Vietnamese officials. (Department of State, Central Files,
POL 27 VIET S) On July 14, UPI wrote a story based on the Stilwell background briefing
emphasizing that the North Vietnamese had stepped up their infiltration of regulars into
the South. The President was not pleased with this result, according to telegram 131 to
Saigon, July 14. (Ibid.)
The second gives the view of the experienced Chinese Nationalist Ambassador on the
general situation./3/
/3/Ambassador Yuen Tse-kien's view was guardedly optimistic as reported in telegram
112 from Saigon, July 15. (Ibid., POL 17 CHINA-VIET S; also published in Declassified
Documents, 1976, 297A)
The third gives perhaps in more detail than you want an account of the effort which has
been made to get the Saigon Government to do something serious about help from other
countries./4/ I concur in the last paragraph which says that they are doing all they can.
/4/Telegram 99 from Saigon, July 14. (Department of State, Central Files, AID VIET S)
There is just no comparison between the reporting we get from the Taylor-Johnson team
and what we used to get from Ambassador Lodge. These are good examples.
McG.B.

/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, DEF 19 US-VIET S. Secret; Priority.
Repeated to CINCPAC, the White House, Department of Defense, and JCS.
125. CINCPAC for POLAD. Ref: (A) Embtel 108./2/ (B) MACJ-31 6180 DTG 161045
Jul 64./3/
/2/Document 233.
/3/Dated July 16. (Washington National Records Center, RG 319, HQDA Message
Center. Reel 11854)

1. In separate messages COMUSMACV is recommending force increases of about 2,000
personnel. Added to earlier recommendations still pending approval of CINCPAC and/or
JCS and shortages not yet filled, the total increase over current strength on board would
rise by approximately 4,200 military personnel over the next nine months bringing the
total in country to nearly 22,000.
2. I have reviewed these increases, both pending and recommended, in the light of plans
to intensify pacification in certain priority areas and to improve operations throughout the
country.
3. Without being able or wishing to comment on line items, I give general over-all support
to General Westmoreland's recommendations for the following reasons:
a. A substantial improvement in effectiveness of reaction is required at BN level because
of an increasing requirement for quicker response in counterambush operations and
because the quality and aggressiveness of the VC seem to be rising.
b. In order to improve and accelerate the pacification program a major extension of
advisory effort at district level is essential. It is proposed to position advisory teams at all
districts in the priority provinces and in the most important districts in other provinces.
c. In addition to the administrative increases which automatically follow the deployment
of another 900 advisors to widely dispersed field positions there is a corresponding need
for increased airlift and helicopters.
d. Conversion of the Special Forces command to Special Forces group on PCS at full
strength minus certain aviation and ~Q elements, will improve and reinforce operations on
the border, in the highlands, against the war zones and support special operations. It
should be possible to carry on an effective offensive counterguerrilla program--something
we have done only to a limited degree in the past.
4. In the absence of presently unforeseen contingencies, the increases presently being
sought added to those in process of approval should meet the US military personnel
requirement for pacification operations for approximately the next twelve months. I urge
prompt processing and action on these recommendations./4/
/4/The Department of State, in telegram 205 to Saigon, July 21, replied as follows:
"Highest Authority has approved in principle, subject to further review of details, the
requested increase in authorized military strength to approximately 22,000. It has not yet
been decided whether or how this augmentation should be announced. Steps should be
taken to insure that there is no intentional or accidental release of information on this
subject from Saigon until authorized." (Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 VIET
S)
Taylor
237. Memorandum of a Conversation, Secretary of State Rusk's Office, Department

of State, Washington, July 20, 1964, 12:15 p.m./1/
/1/Source: Department of State, Secretary's Memoranda of Conversations: Lot 65 D 330.
Secret. Drafted by Imhof and approved by Rusk on August 10. Copies were sent to FE,
EUR, WE, the White House, and the Embassy in Paris.
SUBJECT
Southeast Asia
PARTICIPANTS
The Secretary
Mr. Imhof, WE
Ambassador Alphand, French Embassy
Minister de Leusse, French Embassy
M. Roger Duzer, Counselor, French Embassy
Ambassador Alphand said that he now had a message from Couve de Murville in
response to a number of points which the Secretary had raised with Alphand on July 1./2/
Ambassador Alphand explained that the delay had been caused by Couve's extremely
busy schedule--he had been in Germany, in Sweden and he had chaired the WEU meeting
in Paris. Ambassador Alphand then proceeded to read from penciled notes.
Ambassador Alphand said he could assure the Secretary the French Government was fully
aware that the U.S. had no territorial ambitions in Southeast Asia. The Secretary said that
not only do we have no territorial ambitions, we also have no ambition to regard
Southeast Asia as our special sphere of influence.
Ambassador Alphand said that the French Government knows that U.S. actions in the area
are not in any sense directed against France. To be sure, there had on occasions been some
activities by certain U.S. services but the French Government knew that U.S. policy was
not directed against France. By the same token, the French Government hoped that no one
in the United States Government would consider that French policies were directed in any
sense against U.S. interests.
Ambassador Alphand said that the fact remained that while we had similar objectives,
there were serious differences with regard to Southeast Asia about the ways and means to
get there. The French Government believed that the best way to stabilize the area was to
make certain that there was no outside intervention, neither from the Chinese nor from the
U.S.
Ambassador Alphand said that he recalled the Secretary's statement on July 1 that we
would quickly be back in the area militarily in case the stability of the area were
threatened. Ambassador Alphand said that it seemed that this statement indicated that we
did regard Southeast Asia as our special sphere of influence. The Secretary said that this
interpretation was not correct. We have a commitment to ensure the freedom and the
security of the area. We felt the countries had a right to expect outside help in case their
security was threatened. Ambassador Alphand asked who would decide whether there was
a renewal of aggression. He noted that in the case of the Austrian State Treaty, there was
no provision for a unilateral decision that an aggression had occurred. The Secretary said
that we considered the current situation in Southeast Asia as an aggression. If Hungary
were to put armed bands into Austria, we would have to do something about it.
Ambassador Alphand reverted to the question who would define whether an aggression
had occurred. The Secretary pointed out that we have jointly registered our interest in the
security of Southeast Asia in SEATO.
Ambassador Alphand, again reading from his notes, said that France agreed that the
Chinese Communist regime had many bad qualities; on the other hand, the Chinese
regime was aware of U.S. power and concerned about U.S. bases on the Asian mainland.
The Secretary asked whether China understood why we were there. Ambassador Alphand
said he felt certain that China did understand. The U.S. had said so directly. He assumed
that we had also made the Chinese aware of our position in our direct discussions with
them. He said in this situation the French Ambassador in Peiping could add little. Our
statements would count far more heavily with the Chinese than anything the French might
say.
Ambassador Alphand then came to what appears to have been the gist of his instructions.
He said that there should be an understanding between France and the U.S. not only on
objectives in Southeast Asia but also on the means to get there. Without such an
understanding, French possibilities to be of help would be limited. As the French saw it,
we had various options. We could extend the war. In this case, France could not play a
useful role. We could look for a negotiated settlement. In this case, France could be of
help. Ambassador Alphand referred in this connection to General de Gaulle's recent
statement to Mr. Ball/3/ that a vast negotiation, including China, the USSR, the UK,
France and the U.S., would in itself help to stabilize the situation in Southeast Asia by
slowing down Communist military actions. A French dmarche to Peiping would be
useful only at a later stage when an understanding had been reached on the course which
we would adopt. An earlier dmarche would simply jeopardize the usefulness of a later
French intervention.
The Secretary asked whether Peiping knew that France disapproved of Chinese and North
Vietnamese actions in Southeast Asia. Ambassador Alphand said Peiping was aware that
France was opposed to outside intervention in the area and that it wants an agreement with
international guarantees. Ambassador Alphand said that Chen Yi had given a bad speech
on the occasion of Bastille Day, a speech which had not pleased the French at all.
Nevertheless, Ambassador Alphand thought that there was no doubt in Chinese
Government circles about French disapproval of outside interference in the area.
The Secretary asked Ambassador Alphand whether the French Government had given any
indications as to the kind of agreement they expected to come out of such a conference.
Ambassador Alphand said that he had nothing specific from Paris on this point but that
the hope was that the Chinese will keep out of the area if the U.S. withdraws from Laos
and Vietnam. The Secretary said that if that was what the Chinese desired, they could
have it tomorrow if they themselves stopped interfering in the area. Ambassador Alphand
said that the Chinese required guarantees. It was desirable that others also participated in
extending these guarantees. The Secretary said that we had such an agreement in Laos and
it had not worked. Ambassador Alphand said he had repeatedly discussed some of our
earlier actions in Laos with the Secretary's predecessors. The Secretary said he was
specifically referring to the situation after the 1962 agreement. We had taken 600 men out
of Laos. The other side had not adhered to the agreement. Ambassador Alphand suggested
that the situation in Laos had disintegrated because of the war in Vietnam. He said it was
necessary to solve the problem of the entire area. An attempt to solve Laos alone would be
fruitless. The Secretary said that on the contrary, a solution of the Laotian problem could
facilitate a solution in Vietnam, relieve pressures on Sihanouk, and lead to a stabilization
of the situation in Southeast Asia. The Secretary noted that the agreement on Laos was
self-contained and not dependent on the situation in South Vietnam. Ambassador Alphand
said that the Secretary was right juridically; he believed, however, that a solution had to
be found for the problem of the entire area. The Secretary said it seemed to him the
question was not so much a new agreement but performance on existing agreements.
Ambassador Alphand recalled the Secretary's remark to him on July 1 that while the
Soviets had come to realize that aggression would involve the most serious risks for them,
the Chinese apparently had not as yet come to realize this. Ambassador Alphand said once
a negotiated settlement had been reached, it ought to be possible to make the Chinese
understand that any infraction of the agreement would create the most serious risks for
them. The U.S. could bring into play its overwhelming power in Southeast Asia. The
threat of a nuclear war would have a most sobering and deterrent effect on the Chinese.
The Secretary said that the Asians, including even Chiang Kai-shek, were strongly
opposed to the employment of nuclear weapons in Asia. He wondered to what extent the
Chinese Communists really felt themselves threatened. For instance, did they really think
that they are facing a threat from South Vietnam? Ambassador Alphand said he did not
know, but he thought that the Chinese were aware of the power position of the United
States.
Ambassador Alphand said that under present circumstances, his government believed that
it was better to await a later time for a French dmarche in Peiping.
The Secretary asked whether the French Government supported Souvanna Phouma.
Ambassador Alphand said that the French Government considered him the Prime Minister
of Laos but hoped that he would not allow himself to be integrated among the Right.
There should be three factions in Laos. The Secretary said that he did not wish to go into
this in detail at this time but that the three factions were not necessarily a permanent
ingredient of the accord on Laos.

/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 VIET S. Secret; Exdis. Drafted by
Forrestal, cleared by William Bundy, and initialed and approved by Rusk. Also published
in Declassified Documents, 1979, 91A.
192. For the Ambassador from the Secretary. Realize you fully aware importance keeping
General Khanh as far as possible on same track as ourselves regarding possible action
against North. Khanh's speech of yesterday plus editorial in Bui Diem's paper suggests to
us that GVN may be attempting stimulate pressure for U.S. involvement in such action./2/
/2/Telegram 201 from Saigon, July 24, summarized Khanh's speech of July 19 as a call
for liberation of North Vietnam. This telegram also included a summary of press coverage
of Khanh's "Day of Shame" rally marking the tenth anniversary of the 1954 Geneva
Accords and calling for a "March to the North." (Department of State, Central Files, POL
1 VIET N-VIET S)
You may wish to reiterate to Khanh importance of maintaining parallel position. Talk of
this sort tends to distract GVN from first job of getting on with pacification. It also
confuses our signals to the North and the rest of the world. If it should become necessary
to take such action in response to significant escalation by Hanoi, we would want to be in
position of responding to new aggression rather than appear to be carrying out previously
planned and publicized offensive.
Rusk
239. Memorandum From the Secretary of State 1s Special Assistant for Vietnam
(Forrestal) to the President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs
(Bundy)/1/
/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Vietnam Country File, Vol. XIV,
Memos. Secret
I attach a preliminary summary made here of the anticipated deployments of the
additional military personnel requested by General Taylor for Vietnam.
The picture is still incomplete, but I think you should note that approximately 1,600 U.S.
officers and enlisted men will be assigned to the field, either with battalions or in district
headquarters. This will probably mean that American servicemen will accompany more
Vietnamese units into combat, increasing their exposure at the battalion level by some
40%.
The presence of approximately five U.S. servicemen in each of the critical 45 districts will
also have an appreciable effect on exposure, since their job would presumably be to
accompany district military forces into combat with the Viet Cong.
I think the issue we have to think about is whether it is better simply to let casualties
increase over the next few months or whether we should anticipate the possibilities of
such casualties by announcing in general terms that we are increasing our advisory
presence in the field.
My own inclination is still to do the latter, not by talking about specific numbers, but
rather by indicating informally to the press that our civilian and military advisory effort is
going to be increased as the situation demands and that the result of this will probably be
more exposure of U.S. personnel.

Mike
Attachment/2/
/2/Secret.
SUBJECT
Additional Support for RVN
1. The request for additional military support from Ambassador Taylor can be broken
down into three main categories. These are: advisors and special forces in the field,
logistic and combat support personnel, and items of equipment. A general breakdown of
the above categories derived from incomplete information follows:
A. Advisory Personnel in the Field (approximately 1600)
Army
Bn/Dist Adv--700 personnel
Spec Forces--592 personnel
Battalion advisors will be increased from 3 per battalion to 5. A district advisory
detachment will be assigned to each of 45 districts in the 8 critical provinces. The
breakdown will average 5 US personnel per district. The duties of the personnel at district
level and the exact number in each specific district has not been determined. The increase
in the Special Forces contingent in Viet Nam will include a group headquarters. The
Special Forces increase will allow for extension of the program on the border, increased
guerrilla type operations and will provide for full A detachments at all Special Forces
camps instead of 1/2 A detachments which are now in many Special Forces camps.
Navy
Navy Adv Group--73 personnel
This increase will provide US Navy advisors with [to] greater number of Vietnamese
naval craft
Marine Corps
Navy Adv Group--8 personnel
This increase will provide additional Marine advisors to Marine battalions in essentially
the same number as additional Army advisors provided to Army battalions.
Air Force
ALO/FAC--149 personnel
This increase provides Air liaison officers and forward air controllers.
B. Support Personnel (approximately 2100)
The additional personnel fall into three categories: additions to MACV staff, additions to
logistic support activities and additions to combat support activities. The bulk of the
personnel will be provided to fly and maintain the aircraft of one Air Force C-123
squadron (16 aircraft), one Army Caribou company (16 aircraft) and 2 Army UH-1B
helicopter companies (total 50 aircraft). The majority of these personnel will probably
wind up in the Saigon-Tan Son Nhut area.
C. Items of Equipment
Major items of equipment required will be 16 USAF C-123 aircraft, and 106 Army
aircraft to include 77 UH-1B and 16 CV-2B (Caribou) aircraft, 336 one-quarter ton trucks,
478 radios and medical equipment for a ten-bed field hospital.
2. In summary, the number of US advisors is nearly doubled at the lower echelon and the
number of locations of US advisors at the end of communications and supply lines is
nearly doubled. The increase of personnel at the lower level coupled with the increase in
helicopter units will undoubtedly create a situation in which a great many more
Americans will be exposed to hostile fire than are at present.
MVF
/1/Source: Department of State, S/P Files: Lot 70 D 199, Vietnam. Secret. A note on the
source text indicates that Rusk saw the memorandum. Copies were also sent to Harriman,
William Bundy, Hughes, and Llewellyn Thompson.
SUBJECT
Information Memorandum: Dialogue on Southeast Asia/2/
/2/Reference is to an attached CIA memorandum, OCI No. 2073/64, July 13, entitled
"Dialogue on Southeast Asia," which concluded that China and North Vietnam were
undoubtedly receiving U.S. messages that the United States considered the situation in
Laos and South Vietnam very grave and that it held North Vietnam responsible for the
deterioration. The paper also concluded that neither the Chinese nor North Vietnamese
believed the United States meant what it said.
1. I thought you might be interested in a brief report on the discussion of Communist
views of U.S. intentions in Southeast Asia which took place July 16 in the Thursday inter-
agency Planning Group.

2. A substantial--but by no means unanimous--consensus seemed to be that the North
Vietnamese believed we were seriously considering the possibility of eventual retaliation
against Hanoi, but were not moved by this belief to abate the present level of violence in
South Vietnam, and probably would not be so moved until some--but not necessarily all-of the following:
(a) The US made concrete military preparations thus indicating that attack was a nearterm possibility.
(b) Those preparations extended to the contingency of ground, as well as air, attack on
North Vietnam, since the Communists might be prepared to endure considerable bombing
in order to get South Vietnam.
(c) The US gave clear evidence that it was not going to be diverted, at the last moment, by
French and other pressures for neutralization, since the Communists may set some store
on these pressures as a likely brake on any US military action that may develop.
(d) We indicated what specific actions the Communists would have to cease, if they were
to dissuade us from attacking North Vietnam.
3. It was agreed that ChiCom and North Vietnamese perceptions might diverge, but there
was no agreement as to the implications of this divergence.
4. This is by no means a complete report of the discussion, but I thought these highlights
might be of interest.
We have checked this memo for accuracy with the INR representative who was present at
the meeting. The FE representative who was there is now on leave.

/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 1 VIET N-VIET S. Secret; Flash;
Limdis. Repeated to CINCPAC. Passed to the White House on receipt in the Department
of State. Also published in Declassified Documents, 1979, 91B.
235. Saigon pass COMUSMACV. Refs: Saigon's 196, 203/2/ and related CAS
messages./3/
/2/These telegrams from Saigon, July 24, described rumors in the capital that Khanh's
position as Prime Minister was becoming "shaky." (Department of State, Central Files,
DEF 6-3 VIET S and POL 15-1, respectively)
/3/Apparent reference to CIA telegrams TDCS DB-315/00231-64 to DB-315/ 00236-64,
all July 24. Johnson Library, National Security File, Vietnam Country File, Vol. XIV;
published in Declassified Documents, 1977, 94F-95D)

Referenced messages have suggested to us following possible explanations for reported
attitude Khanh and other members MRC:
1. Khanh may simply be expressing frustration felt by himself and other military, in view
of recent military difficulties and consequent feeling war cannot be successfully
prosecuted under present concept This mood may be transitory and could be assuaged by
reaffirmation of our conviction that pacification program can be successful and must be
vigorously pushed, which will be fortified by impending announcement of increase in
U.S. military and civilian advisory assistance.
2. Khanh may be reacting against pressures from the neutralist-minded by pushing openly
for strong action against the North. His retreat from this tactic may have led some of the
military to doubt our continued support of Khanh personally. If you feel that there is
indeed slightest doubt about our continued support for Khanh as Prime Minister, you
should make every effort to remove these doubts.
3. Recent developments suggest we should watch closely as possible neutralist thinking in
Vietnamese circles and specifically watch for any indications of DRV contacts with
former junta generals, GVN officials or leading Vietnamese exiles. To avoid generating
misinterpretation our interest it might be best alert British to pass us promptly whatever
their assets can learn of any such developments.
Rusk

/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, DEF 9-3 VIET S. Secret; Priority; Limdis.
Drafted by Forrestal and cleared with William Bundy and McNaughton. Published in part
in Declassified Documents, 1979, 91D.
213. CINCPAC for POLAD. Embtels 180, 184, 185, 186,/2/ 201;/3/ Deptel 235./4/ As our
previous reports on the "march to the North" theme (in Vietnamese this phrase actually
means "to the North" and does not have same connotation of movement on ground) have
indicated Khanh appears to have launched deliberate campaign to associate US with
policy of increased military pressure on North Viet-Nam. This decision was taken with
full knowledge that GVN campaign would cause embarrassment to US. In our view
following interrelated factors are involved in GVN attitude:
/2/In these telegrams, all July 23, the Embassy reported that Khanh and other South
Vietnamese officials were losing confidence in the pacification effort in South Vietnam
and sought to solve the problem of the Viet Cong insurgency by attacking North Vietnam.
Also reported was information which indicated Khanh hoped to use his "March to the
North" campaign to incite the United States to take military action against the North.
(Department of State, Central Files, all POL 15-1 VIET S, except 186 from Saigon, which
is in DEF 9-3 VIET S)

/4/Document 241.
1) In Khanh's mind need for some dramatic move to raise morale and if possible to bring
war effort in SVN to more decisive phase has existed for some time. In May Khanh
outlined his rationale to Ambassador Lodge (Embtel 2108)/5/ in which he cited growing
war weariness on part of Vietnamese people, slow pace of pacification efforts, continued
high casualties sustained in indecisive military actions against Viet Cong, etc. He also
raised at that time question as to whether he should make a declaration that state of war
exists in SVN in order strengthen his hand in taking necessary measures to more
effectively prosecute the war. Khanh also stressed with Secretary Rusk on May 31 that
extension of war (for example to Laos or North Viet-Nam) would have effect of
producing great national unity, would tend eliminate or postpone internal political
quarrels, and would give morale boost to Vietnamese people. Although Khanh appeared
recognize serious implications of escalation, it seems clear Khanh has remained
personally convinced that something new must be injected in the situation. However,
intervening events (such as Honolulu conference, departure of Ambassador Lodge, arrival
of new US team in Saigon) have tended to push these thoughts into background. It is also
possible that during his frequent meetings at Dalat his Generals have pressed him to take
more dramatic action (General Kim frequently espoused similar ideas prior to Khanh's
takeover).
/5/Document 136.
2. While Khanh tends to lump many of above factors under general rubric of "war
weariness" we are inclined to believe that war weariness applies more to leaders in Saigon
than to population at large. Rather it is lack of demonstrable concrete progress and
achievement and little prospect of things getting better in short term which present
naggings doubts. This is particularly so when Khanh sees few people solidly behind him
for long pull. These problems weigh heavily on Khanh and his young military colleagues
who would probably like to sweep them away with bold military gesture against source of
the frustration in North.
3. Khanh is concerned over morale and divisions within military, particularly since he is
convinced that military is only real solid instrument in SVN capable of exercising power
and directing affairs of state at present time. There are numerous recent reports that Khanh
is unable to exert full control over Generals. He told me yesterday that he is currently
under pressure from two groups of Generals and as man in middle is being pulled in two
directions. Further he can foresee a division existing among general officers permeating
down through officer ranks with its potential adverse effects on morale. Further, he is
undoubtedly aware, even if only in general terms, of various moves afoot to unseat him
and replace him with one or another combination of Generals (FVS 10550, 10551,
10552)./6/ To close these rifts, he may be tempted to try old gambit of turning on a
foreign enemy.
4. On civilian side he has been unable to achieve. any real unity of purpose and action
among his official family. He is surely conscious of daily sniping at quality of his
performance by his Ministers with three Vice Premiers leading pack. While he can take
considerable pride in manner with which he has managed numerous problems on civilian
front, particularly religious, labor, student activities, he probably realizes that resolution of
these problems was based in large measure on forbearance of groups concerned.
5. Politicians whom he considers in any case as contributing little to national effort, are
able to exploit any divisions of loyalty within military ranks by playing one group off
against another. Press situation permits irresponsible criticism of government with
politicians able to make full and often misguided use of press freedom.
6. Recent spate of Viet Cong attacks of battalion and company strength with continued
heavy government casualties, difficulty of recruiting sufficient personnel to bring regular
forces to authorized strength, undiminished Viet Cong activity and capability must also be
disturbing factors. While Khanh is probably convinced that with US support and
assistance to GVN Viet Cong cannot take over substantial part of country, prospect for
future is still one of painfully slow advances through long years ahead.
7. Developments on international scene have also influenced GVN attitudes. Goldwater's
nomination has led many (Embtel 201) to believe that now was opportune moment to
apply pressure on US to expand area of conflict. Sino-Soviet split, split between US and
French policy toward SEA and de Gaulle's most recent anti-US stance and heavy pressure
for neutral solution, US Presidential elections probably all contribute to conclusion on part
Khanh and his colleagues that now is opportune time to launch campaign.
8. Influenced by these factors Khanh may have any of three courses of action in mind:
a. He may talk "march North" merely to whip up such public enthusiasm as is possible.
Conceivably, this might aid recruiting and facilitate putting country more nearly on war
footing. He could continue to explain his action privately to us as being necessary to
public morale
b. He can talk "march North" but really have in mind getting us committed to program of
reprisal bombing. Such a limited program could be first step to further escalation against
Hanoi.
c. He could talk "march North" and literally mean to initiate military actions to reunify
country as soon as he felt he has us inextricably involved beyond point of possible
detachment.
If Khanh has been reasonably sincere in his statements to me his present objective would
appear to be b. above. He knows full well he cannot "march North" on ground with his
present resources. He does have air capability to put on fairly good show against NVN if
US wild keep ChiCom air out of picture. This is course I believe he wants to follow
although thus far he has never indicated exactly when he wants to initiate this new line
BN action.
In sum, Khanh, after nearly six months in office, seems to have reached conclusion that
frustrating and ineffective instruments of government at his command are not adequate to
master Viet Cong by counterinsurgency means alone. He and his colleagues seem to have
decided that they can bring about cessation of Viet Cong harassment only by bringing
direct pressure to bear on North. If they are unsuccessful in getting US more directly
involved, it is difficult to judge at this stage how strong pressures would become within
GVN to seek a negotiated solution. However, there are signs that this possibility cannot be
excluded [document number not declassified] (General Lam and aide departed Saigon on
July 23 with a ticket to Hong Kong, ultimate destination unknown. [less than 1 line of
We are unable to judge how far Khanh and his associates have thought this "march North"
through in terms of ultimate consequences, and in terms of solution other than
unconditional surrender by Hanoi; but we must assume that they have discussed this in
their own councils. Our recommendation on how to approach this knotty problem with
Khanh follows by septel./7/
/7/Document 243.
Taylor

/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 1 VIET N-VIET S. Top Secret; Flash;
Exdis. Repeated to CINCPAC. Received at 8:10 a.m. and passed to the White House.
Also printed in Pentagon Papers: Gravel Edition, vol. 111, pp. 512-513.
214. The GVN public campaign for "marching North" (reported Embtel 201)/2/ may take
several courses. In the face of U.S. coolness and absence of evidence of real grass roots
support outside certain military quarters, it may die down for a while although it is hardly
likely to disappear completely. On the other hand, the proponents of a "quick solution"
may be able to keep it alive indefinitely as an active issue, in which case it is likely to
foment an increasing amount of dissatisfaction with the U.S. (assuming that we continue
to give it no support) to the serious detriment of our working relations with the GVN and
hence of the ultimate chances of success of the in-country pacification program. In such a
case, Vietnamese leaders in and out of government, unable to find a vent to their
frustration in "marching North" may seek other panaceas in various forms of negotiation
formulas. General Khanh may find in the situation an excuse or a requirement to resign.
Finally, this "march North" fever can get out of hand in an act of rashness-one maverick
pilot taking off for Hanoi with a load of bombs-which could touch off an extension of
hostilities at a time and in a form most disadvantageous to U.S. interests.
Faced with these unattractive possibilities, we propose a course of action designed to do
several things.
We would try to avoid head-on collision with the GVN which unqualified U.S. opposition
to the "march North" campaign would entail. We would do this by expressing a
willingness to engage in joint contingency planning for various forms of extended action
against NVN. Such planning would not only provide an outlet for the martial head of
steam now dangerously compressed but would force the Generals to look at the hard facts
of life which lie behind the neon lights of the "march North" slogans. This planning would
also gain time badly needed to stabilize this government and could provide a useful basis
for military action if adjudged in our interest at some future time. Finally, it would also
afford us an opportunity, for the first time, to have a frank discussion with GVN leaders
concerning the political objectives which they would envisage as the purposes inherent in
military action against the DRV. We do not really know whether they feel that Viet-Nam
can indeed be unified by military action, or whether such action is intended only to
introduce a pressure which would be equivalent to Viet Cong terror in order to induce
DRV to desist from aiding VC and to improve bargaining opportunities for a political
negotiation with Hanoi.
It would be important, however, in initiating such a line of action that we make a clear
record that we are not assuming any commitment to implement such plans. Therefore, I
would recommend that I be authorized to give General Khanh the following written
statement:
"The United States Government has noted recent public statements by various leaders of
the Republic of Viet-Nam proposing military action against the sources of aggression in
North Viet-Nam. The reasons which have prompted these statements are clear and the
impatience of the people of the Republic of Viet-Nam in the face of continuing subversive
warfare from the North is understandable.
"In considering ways and means to bring the Viet Cong insurgency under control,
authorities in Washington have given serious study over a considerable period to the
question of bringing military pressure to bear on the leaders of North Viet-Nam. It has
been their conclusion that this is a complex problem involving judgments and decisions in
both the political and military fields which neither the United States nor Viet-Nam could
take independently. The current activity of the United States Government consists in the
provision of massive assistance to your government in the extension of its [garble]
approved pacification programs in South Viet-Nam. The question of extending this
assistance by the United States Government to a program of action outside the territorial
limits of South Viet-Nam has not been seriously discussed up to now, but it is my belief
that the time has come for giving the matter a thorough analysis.
"In the view of the United States Government, the best method of producing such an
analysis would be in the form of a joint contingency planning study, undertaken by
appropriate representatives of our two governments, without advance commitments by
either side as to subsequent actions. If the Government of the Republic of Viet-Nam
agrees, the Government of the United States has authorized me to appoint representatives
who would be able to meet, under conditions of maximum discretion and security, with
representatives of the Republic of Viet-Nam to undertake such discussions."
It is my opinion that such discussions, if initiated with responsible Vietnamese officials,
would not only develop some of the fundamental political thinking which is currently
motivating the Vietnamese leadership, but would also reveal the need for the completion
of a number of preliminary actions which should be taken before serious consideration

can be given to expanding the war. Such actions should include the absorption of the new
A1H aircraft by November 1, the filling of the ranks of understrength ARVN units, air
defense measures for urban centers and the establishment of a greater degree of control
over the VC than now exists in order to secure the rear and flanks of fighting forces.
It would be most helpful if approval for the above statement can be received to permit its
use at my next meeting with Khanh scheduled for 1600, 27 July (Saigon time).
Taylor

/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 VIET S. Secret; Priority, Exdis.
Drafted by William Bundy and cleared by Forrestal and Harriman.
245. As part of the problem of making clear our full support for Khanh, we have been
concerned that he may have the feeling that USG in past has been pressuring him to
maintain Minh's position and go easy with Dalat generals. While we have always felt that
Minh's position could be useful in enlisting public support, we believe this aspect may
now be secondary to crucial need reinforce Khanh's position in every possible way.
Accordingly, you may in your discretion sound Khanh out whether he wishes us
dissociate ourselves further from Minh and whether he needs our support in taking tough
line against Dalat or other generals.
Rusk

/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 VIET S. Secret; Flash; Exdis.
Drafted by William Bundy and cleared by Forrestal, Manning, McGeorge Bundy, and
Ball. Also published in Declassified Documents, 1979, 91C.
253. State-Defense message. Ref: Embtels 213, 214,/2/ 215./3/
/2/Documents 242 and 243.
/3/In telegram 215, July 25, Taylor requested permission to allow Khanh to make a formal
announcement that the United States was increasing its troop levels in Vietnam. Taylor
would follow the announcement with a background press briefing. (Department of State,
1. Analysis your 213 most helpful and persuasive. We note particularly your judgment
that sense of frustration and desire for some action particularly strong among generals but
perhaps not widespread in people as a whole.
2. Proposal your 215 for announcement personnel increase fully approved. Please let us
know soonest what you propose to say in backgrounder so that we can keep
backgrounding here fully in tune. As stated our 235,/4/ we do not propose announcement
here.
/4/Document 241.
3. Re proposal your 214, our objective should be to provide channel for frustrations of
Khanh and generals without committing USG to action and with minimum risk of
disruptive leaks that might add to picture of US/GVN disagreement, cause wrong signal to
Hanoi and Peking, and above all impair our freedom of action and public policy posture.
We have impression that Khanh's meetings in Dalat will have been concerned with the
pressures he is under from Khiem on the one hand and with reference to Minh's position
on the other. Thus, you should first draw him out on results Dalat meetings and on his
present position and state of mind. If this part of conversation confirms analysis your 213
and 214 that major pressures and frustrations do exist and that it essential to Khanh's
position and our relationship with him to go forward, you are authorized to make
following points:
a. USG has of course made careful study of problems involved in action against DRV and
believes it would be useful pursue this subject in more concrete manner in small and
select joint group.
b. Vital that such discussions be conducted so that they do not leak in any way. Military
security alone dictates this, but you should also emphasize to Khanh that leaks can only
lead to same problems of clarifying statements and apparent disunity that we have already
had in last week, and that these will if anything make it more difficult USG pursue
additional courses of action if and when these become necessary.
c. Accordingly, Khanh for such discussions should bring in only very few most needed
and trusted GVN officers chosen personally by him for their loyalty and security.
d. While we do not believe you should table any written statement or terms of reference as
proposed your 214, you should make these points orally and particularly underscore that
USG assuming no commitment to carry out such plans.
4. FYI: We concur completely that resulting discussions should highlight need for
completing preliminary actions, which may take some time to accomplish. You should be
prepared to stress particularly such concrete items as the need for additional A1H aircraft
and trained pilots, and Khanh himself may suggest importance air defense measures.
However, arguments of under-strength ARVN units and need for greater degree of control
over VC may encounter response that these aspects are not going to get any better. Hence
importance of stress on military essentials for attack itself. End FYI.
5. JCS considering urgently what additional external measures might be taken, short of
attack on DRV itself, that would provide maximum military benefit with minimum risks
of escalation or international complications. Request your judgment as to actions you

would recommend under this heading. If you think it useful, you could tell Khanh
Monday/5/ that you have asked your government to consider such actions and that these
could be discussed in same group. Khanh's reaction might produce some suggestion this
area that would help to meet basic problem of channel for frustrations.
/5/July 27.
6. We remain deeply concerned that even with these restrictions and caveats Khanh's
position and attitudes of key generals now such that he or they will feel strong temptation
publicize existence such planning exercise perhaps in some tendentious form and with
implication USG committed at least in some degree. Our line here in such case would be
that USG has not changed policy but has repeatedly made it clear that wider action not
excluded. Hence natural that US and GVN should be giving careful study this subject, and
such contingency discussions have been underway long period.
Rusk

/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, AID (US) VIET S. Secret; Priority; Limdis.
Drafted by Forrestal, Poats, and Montgomery and cleared by William Bundy. Also
published in Declassified Documents, 1978, 297A.
254. Joint State-AID message. At highest level meeting today,/2/ concern was expressed
that despite many desirable AID contributions to economic and social progress in rural
areas, the pacification effort is not offering the Vietnamese peasant a sharply contrasting
alternative between life under the VC and a clearly better deal with the GVN. It was
proposed that US undertake with GVN a dramatic and intensive social and economic
effort on a single project or area which would highlight as quickly and effectively as
possible the opportunity for progress after pacification. This objective also could be
furthered through more discriminating provision of benefits of present nationwide AID
programs, with denial of benefits to disloyal or VC-dominated villages.
/2/The following persons met with the President at the White House from 11:34 a.m. to
12:29 p.m. on July 25: McGeorge Bundy, McNamara, William Bundy, Forrestal,
Wheeler, McNaughton, Colby, and Harriman. The meeting was off the record. Johnson
Library, President's Daily Diary) At this meeting, Wheeler was asked to prepare a list of
possible military courses of action designed to support the counterinsurgency program in
South Vietnam and relieve the current frustration of South Vietnamese leaders.
Highest authority has asked for Country Team's most imaginative thoughts on what might
be done toward this objective. US would be prepared to make an all-out effort to produce
rapid and visible impact on popular psychology.
Possibilities which initially occur to us for CT consideration include:
A. Area projects such as irrigation works and related agricultural production and
processing development in the Phan Rang valley. Understand Japanese completing
feasibility study of irrigation system using runoff from Da Nhim dam which might irrigate
20,000 hectares. This water presently going to waste, it would seem. Suggest
consideration of creation of joint GVN-US body functioning somewhat like JCRR in
Taiwan for overall accelerated development of area. Joint body would have assured
commitment of US and GVN funds and special authorities to establish or improve
cooperatives, assure equitable land distribution, draw on GVN and AID agricultural and
industrial development assistance. Suggest this area may be small enough to serve as
manageable model and large enough to have important demonstration effect. It is
relatively pacified and defensible. Success there could lead to similar area projects
elsewhere on chronically dry central coast.
B. Nationwide programs:
1. The intensive village water wells and cisterns program now being launched, might be
announced with numerical targets and with emphasis on provision of potable water to
cleared and loyal villages and hamlets. Plans for future CI fertilizer distributions restricted
to a discriminatory award and punishment approach might be announced.
2. Full scale windmill irrigation program, based upon recent experiments, might be
announced, as grant assistance to established or new cooperatives and confined to secured
hamlets.
3. While recognizing complexities of the problem, we continue to believe a bolder GVN
approach to land reform and rural debt-waiver would strike a telling blow at VC,
particularly if restricted to cleared and cooperative villages. If payments to land owners
and creditors could be made in form of equity shares in productive enterprise rather than
cash, benefits would be multiplied. Imaginative CT action in this field welcome.
Emphasize foregoing are informal ideas to add to CT's consideration. Further suggestions
may be offered later.
Rusk
247. Research Memorandum From the Director of the Bureau of Intelligence and
Research (Hughes) to the Secretary of State/1/
INR-27
/1/Source: Department of State, INR Files: Lot 81 D 343, Vietnam, INR Studies, 19641965. Secret.
SUBJECT
DeGaulle's Proposals For Indochina and Likely Reactions Thereto
Although little official response has so far emerged to President Charles deGaulle's
proposal for an international conference to neutralize the Indo-China peninsula, the recent
actions of relevant governments support the following speculation concerning their likely
reaction.
Abstract
DeGaulle's July 23rd press conference went beyond his earlier proposals for international
neutralization of the Indo-China peninsula chiefly in detail./2/ Noteworthy was his
proposal that four powers, France, Communist China, the Soviet Union, and the United
States, agree "no longer to be committed there." In addition to his earlier rationale,
deGaulle may have been prompted to this move by a sense of increased risk that hostilities
would escalate, on the one hand, and a feeling of greater Communist receptivity to his
proposals, on the other hand. Asian Communist reaction is likely to be more favorable
than to his January statements, as indicated by statements from representatives of Hanoi
and the Viet Cong. Peiping's attitude remains ambiguous but the regime appears to have
taken some steps, especially in the diplomatic sphere, to anticipate this proposal. Soviet
reaction is likely to be favorable, if only to keep the proposal alive. Pakistan's increasing
support for Communist China's position on Southeast Asia may foreshadow explicit
support for deGaulle's policy, thereby effectively shattering the SEATO front. In Saigon,
the official reaction will certainly be negative but the proposal will further promote
destabilizing factors and undermine morale.
/2/For text of de Gaulle's statement at the press conference, see American Foreign Policy:
Current Documents, 1964, pp. 977-978.
[Here follows the text of the five-page paper.]
248. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Laos/1/

Exdis. Drafted by McNaughton, cleared in draft with Wheeler and William Bundy, and
initialed and approved by Forrestal. Repeated to Saigon. Also printed in Pentagon
Papers: Gravel Edition, vol. 111, p. 514.
89. Vientiane for Ambassador Unger. Saigon for Ambassador Taylor for information
only. No other distribution whatsoever.
1. Primarily for reasons of morale in South Viet-Nam and to divert GVN attention from
proposal to strike North Viet-Nam, we are considering proposing to Ambassador Taylor
that he discuss with Khanh air attacks on VC supply lines in the Laotian Panhandle. For
meeting of Secretaries, request by 0600 our time Monday your views on such operations,
your estimate of reaction of Souvanna and other Lao leaders, and your advice as to best
way to obtain Souvanna's acquiescence.
2. Our preliminary views as to possible air attacks are as follows:
a. The military objective would be to interdict and destroy facilities supporting infiltration
into SVN. (It is possible that the political objective might be achieved by fewer targets
and/or sorties than indicated below.)
b. Initial targets, which would be programmed for moderate to severe damage, would
probably be Muong Phine army barracks (12 sorties), Ban Thay military camp and 4 AAA
gun emplacements (18 sorties), Ban Na Nhom military camp (12 sorties), Tchepone army
barracks (68 sorties), Muong Nong military area (10 sorties), and Ban Trim barracks and
supply area (34 sorties). Also considering Mu Gia border control point just inside North
Viet-Nam (14 sorties). At same time, attacks of opportunity would be carried out on lines
of communication by armed reconnaissance.
c. Aircraft would be either A1H with only GVN pilots, or A1H plus A1E with American
instructors also aboard in case of AIEs. Our present thinking does not include use of Lao
T-28s.
d. Armament would be napalm unless politically unacceptable, in which case armament
would be less effective conventional bombs, rockets and 20 mm.
e. Estimate that attacks could begin in early August and could, without serious
degradation of air support for pacification in SVN, be carried out at rate of 20 sorties a
day. Our proposal, however, may be that strikes be conducted on intermittent basis at a
slower rate than indicated depending on political requirements.
f. Estimated aircraft losses at less than two per cent in early stages, meaning that some
planes will probably be downed in Laos during attacks on initial targets.
g. We may recommend certain readiness measures in Laos and Thailand to cope with
possible communist reaction or escalation (e.g., PL moves on Panhandle towns or even
toward Mekong).
h. It is assumed that attacks would promptly become known and responsibility would be
acknowledged by GVN, that if US instructors are on board, US would acknowledge this
fact; that operation would be justified on grounds of infiltration of personnel and supplies
through corridor in violation of Geneva Accords; and that we would publicize relevant
evidence from photography and POW interrogation. We would hope Souvanna would
publicly support such a rationale but at minimum would do or say nothing to undermine
it.
3. As you know, joint US-GVN planning is underway not only for air attacks but also for
ground operations up to battalion size in Panhandle. We may be querying you shortly for
your reactions regarding such ground operations.
Rusk

Saigon, July 27, 1964--10 a.m.
/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 VIET S. Top Secret; Flash.
Repeated to CINCPAC, the White House, and McNamara. McGeorge Bundy sent a copy
of this cable to the President under cover of a memorandum, July 27, which reads as
follows:
"We have just received this report of Max Taylor's interview today with Khanh.
Underneath is the outgoing which went to him after our Saturday meeting. The tickers are
beginning to carry Khanh's announcement of U.S. reinforcement, and for the moment
Khanh's positron seems somewhat strengthened. Nevertheless, the first paragraph of
Taylor's message shows that the underlying problem of Khanh's mood persists." (Johnson
Library, National Security File, Vietnam Country File. Vol. XIV; regarding the Saturday
meeting, see Document 246)
Bundy added the following handwritten end note: "We will discuss this general problem
again on Tuesday at lunch."
232. Deptel 253./2/ Alex Johnson and I called on Khanh at Dalat at 1500, 27 July and
discussed alone with him a wide range of topics. We were uncertain in what mood we
would find him as we had reliable information that the previous day he had been
grumbling about the uncertainties of US policy and his unwillingness to adjust himself to
a puppet role.
/2/Document 245.
On arriving we asked him about his day and a half of conferences which he was having
with his senior Generals. The question elicited no immediate response other than that
numerous subjects had been discussed. Some of the subjects came out in the subsequent
discussion reported elsewhere in this message.
I opened the matter of a press release by him covering the US military personnel increase.
He saw at once the advantage of his putting out such a release and accepted our text with
one modification. He preferred to change reference to "advisors at the district level" to
"advisors throughout the provinces" saying that the mention of the district suggested an
undesirably deep US advisor penetration of the government structure. It was agreed that
we would take the statement back to Saigon where we would be met by one of Khanh's
officers who would arrange for the immediate release. He understands the necessity to
avoid public statements of ultimate end strengths and agrees to conform to our request for
secrecy on this subject.
There was a short discussion of press leaks generated by the quick appearance in the press
on July 23 of our joint conference arising from General Ky's statement on penetrations of
North Viet-Nam./3/ Mr. Johnson told him that a Saigon US pressman had said that the
leak was from the Vietnamese side. We agreed that, whoever the culprit, the incident is a
reminder that there are unfriendly elements here and elsewhere anxious to drive a wedge
between our two governments in general and between Khanh and Taylor in particular. We
all agreed to be watchful in the future. Khanh made a note to investigate leak.
/3/On July 23, Ky told news reporters that South Vietnamese planes had airdropped
combat troops into North Vietnam for sabotage operations. (Telegram 172 from Saigon,
July 22; Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 VIET S)
Khanh said press stories on alleged US correspondence with Peking through Ayub had
been raised at Cabinet meeting. We replied that this is just type thing that hostile elements
will use to create suspicion and distrust between us. Facts were exactly opposite from
those in press stories. Facts were that we had asked certain countries having relations with
Peking, particularly SEATO countries, to make clear to Peking (and where possible to
Hanoi) that our commitment to SVN was firm, they should not make mistake of thinking
we [would?] abandon SVN under any circumstances and it would be dangerous for
Peking and Hanoi to make any assumption to contrary. Ayub had apparently made same
representations to Peking and had a reply./4/ This was far different from us entering into
negotiations with Peking thru Pakistan. We had not and would not negotiate over SVN
behind back GVN. It was essential Khanh be absolutely clear on this. We would expect
the same from him. He expressed understanding and said we must appreciate Vietnamese
sensitivities on this after their experience with French. He mentioned there were even
rumors that because of Johnson's previous background of negotiation with ChiComs, he
had somehow been sent here to negotiate. Johnson replied that his previous experience of
negotiating with ChiComs was just reason that he personally had no desire repeat
experience.
/4/The representations made by Mohammed Ayub Khan, President of Pakistan, to the
People's Republic of China in May concerned primarily the withdrawal of Pathet Lao
troops from the Plain of Jars.
We then invited Khanh to speak frankly about his views on US policy toward Vietnamwas he as unhappy about it as reported? He answered indirectly by explaining his views
about the need for pressure on the North. He again spoke strongly about national
warweariness and the need to bring hostilities to a prompt end. Once more it came out
clearly that he is thinking about reprisal tit-for-tat bombing rather than a movement North
with land forces or massive bombing to effect total destruction of Hanoi and all its works.
He wants to do this reprisal bombing to encourage his people and to hasten Ho Chi Minh
to conclude that the support of the VC should end. He recognizes that at some time he will
need the cooperation of Ho Chi Minh to end the Viet Cong activities in the South.
This discussion opened the way for me to comment along the lines of Deptel 253. I
observed that we have never had joint discussions up to now as to the forms of action that
might be considered against the Laos Panhandle and NVN and the problems which might
arise therefrom. The keen interest he is displaying in the subject suggests that it may be
timely now to start a joint study or studies of possible initiatives which might be
considered.
He did not jump at the proposal which plainly caught him unprepared but was pleased to
receive it and asked to think it over for a few days. I stressed the need for any such
planning to be kept within a very small group and he agreed at once. He mentioned
himself, Khiem and Thieu (plus possibly a civilian) as the probable participants, at least at
the outset. It was left that he would indicate to me when he wants to resume the
discussion.
Among miscellaneous matters touched on were the following:
a) Our intention to have a MACV J-2 background briefing to acquaint press with latest
estimate of increased VC strength.
b) My intention to visit IV Corps on July 29.

c) The recent outbreak of indiscipline in the Special Forces camp at Nha Trang and need
to change the commanding officer.
At the end, Khanh again raised question of reorganization of government a la de GaullePompidou. He had no answer as to who could be civilian Pompidou. We replied that
organization was secondary to personalities and most of what he had in mind could be
accomplished in present organizational structure by giving more responsibility to vice
ministers. Question was his having ministers in whom he had confidence.
We also said changes that seemed to be far-reaching could have demoralizing effect
domestically and disturbing effect abroad. He agreed but did not seem to abandon idea.
From discussion it appeared some way of disposing of Minh may be principal motivating
force as well as Khanh's desire avoid present burden of detail and responsibility.
Khanh also said they would shortly be ready with a decree declaring a national "state of
emergency". This would give them greater power to deal with a number of problems such
as press, travel, etc. We urged there be good explanation and rationale to foreign and
domestic press at time of issuance to avoid charges of dictatorship, etc. He agreed and
said would consult with us before taking action. During course of discussion he said he
had given up project of declaring "state of war" (see Embtel 184)/5/ as he recognized
could not have this without "declaring war against someone".
When we went to leave, Khanh seemed to be in very good spirits saying that his morale
had received a lift from our discussion.
Taylor
250. Telegram From the Embassy in Laos to the Department of State/1/

Vientiane, July 27, 1964--5 p.m.
/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 VIET S. Top Secret; Flash; Exdis.
Repeated to Saigon. Passed to the White House, Department of Defense, and CIA on
receipt in the Department of State. Also printed in Pentagon Papers: Gravel Edition, vol.
111, pp. 515-517.
170. Deptel 89./2/ Saigon for Ambassador Taylor. No other distribution whatsoever. Air
attacks on Viet Cong supply lines in Laotian Panhandle, while helping morale South
Vietnam and diverting government there from its proposals to strike North Vietnam,
would have only marginal effect on problem of infiltration via Laos and would greatly
complicate Laotian situation which already threatens get out of hand as result Soviet
threat withdraw from co-chairman role.
/2/Document 248.
When various cross-border actions proposed earlier, also including air strikes, I pointed
out fundamental attitude of Souvanna, which generally shared by Lao, that use of
corridor, even though involving Lao territory, not primarily their problem, and anyway
they have their hands full trying to protect heart of their country for defense of which
corridor not essential. Our creating new military as well as international political conflict
over corridor will be regarded by them as another instance Laos being involuntarily
involved in struggle among big powers on matter outside Laos' own prime interests. There
is also Souvanna's view (no doubt nurtured by French) that GVN is fighting a hopeless
war.
Souvanna Phouma and other Lao leaders want help in immediate present to assure they
can continue in secure possession of present territory of free Laos. If any new military
initiatives are contemplated with attendant risk of escalation they would wish above all
that they be directed at retaking Plaine des Jarres. More immediately they want maximum
effort be made to cut Route 7 and they also wish be assured of fullest support for Muong
Soui if again actively threatened, to say nothing of protection of routes toward Mekong if
Muong Soui falls.
Likely reaction to proposals for air attacks in corridor would be: Why complicate our
problem and risk creating dangerous military threat in central and southern areas where it
does not now exist; why does not US apply its power to source of problem and bomb
Hanoi or move effectively in some other way against North Vietnam? North Vietnam is
cause of trouble and ought to be target; moreover we are not bound by international
agreements there as we are in Laos. Department will recall this line of thinking has been
pressed by King and Souvanna Phouma and is undoubtedly view even more strongly held
by right-wing leaders.
In this connection, wish point out with respect pare g reftel that there are virtually no
uncommitted Lao resources to deal with whatever PL/VM reaction may be. Energies and
staff capacity as well as troops and planes are tied down in Operation Triangle and
literally only reserve in country is two DNC pare battalions which for political reasons
unlikely leave Vientiane. Therefore "preparedness measures in Laos" would have to be
taken by US.
Thus if we proceed with projected action Panhandle we must be prepared also to meet any
responsible Lao request for help in defending what they regard as heart of their country. If
we hesitate under such circumstances Souvanna's occasional dissatisfaction with what he
has regarded as foot dragging by us will be greatly accentuated and arguments on our part
that certain actions should be avoided because of international complications or risks of
escalation will not carry much weight. Nothing could illustrate point better than question
napalm, which being proposed for use in corridor operation at same time I am obliged
turn down request from Souvanna to use it in area he considers vital for defense his
country.
In view foregoing I believe proposed action would probably bring to an end possibility
our preserving even facade of government national union under Souvanna and Geneva
Accords, keeping open possible road back to peaceful solution and avoiding resumption
full-scale civil war. There certainly has been no sign from Pathet Lao, DRV or ChiComs
of any change in their attitude to encourage us to believe they are ready to start living by
Geneva Accords and end their interference in Laos. Nevertheless it has been our hope that
our recent assumption of stiffer political posture and careful application of stronger
military measures would at least bring nibbling to an end. However, as result initiatives in
corridor we may find ourselves turned entirely away from guiding principles of last two
years under which we have accepted uneasy equilibrium of de facto division of Laos as
best we could get for present and better than resumption large-scale fighting. Following
strikes in Panhandle we might even find ourselves being pressed hard into a major
military effort aimed at pushing North Vietnamese out of Panhandle (when it becomes
clear air attacks do not halt infiltration) and eventually entirely out of Laos and
reestablishing authority of RLG throughout country.
I realize proposed action envisages employment primarily GVN personnel but from
international point of view we must be prepared accept full responsibility. Action will also
solidly link questions Laos and South Vietnam which at earlier date we appeared to be
intent on keeping separate as possible, at least in context any international discussion.
From here it is difficult to see what all international repercussions of projected Panhandle
action might be but I can foresee serious complications with British and Canadians, on
whom we depend for cochairman and ICC help. They may well ask us to demonstrate that
the installations to be hit have some important connection with infiltration problem and
that strikes will appreciably improve situation South Vietnam. On other hand they will be
most apprehensive about dangers of escalation as well as major complications in handling
international aspects of problem as illustrated by Soviet note just received.
Souvanna's acquiescence in proposed action [may?] not be enough. If we proceed he will
undoubtedly be besieged by press and posture of PriMin of Laos can hardly be
acquiescence in other countries' taking action on his territory. If we are to make effort to
bring him along, his position would have to be fortified in advance by buildup of public
evidence of use of corridor and its aggravation of problem in SVN. Public indications that
corridor problem really much less than represented (for example see July 26 Wireless File
story by Robert Brunn, C S Monitor) must also be overcome. Against this background we
might try sell Souvanna on line that action against corridor is fundamental to resolving
what is basic cause of Laos' present plight, namely war in South Vietnam. In other words,
block corridor so that GVN can again resume full authority over its territory at which
point DRV can make no further use of corridor. Unless Souvanna can be persuaded action
in Panhandle really serves his cause more than it endangers it, his support will be very
hard to secure. Even if support is squeezed out (perhaps only as result of right wing
pressure), his remaining on the job becomes problematical.
Specific comments follow:
(1) Delete Muong Phine from target list pare 2b because of probable presence there of C46 survivors.
(2) Foregoing reservations do not apply to Mu Gia control point or other points inside
North Vietnam.
(3) Attacks of opportunity on convoys (if related to recce flights) and responsive strikes to
ground fire would be less objectionable than proposed action, and this would be even truer
of T-28 strikes.
In summary, I believe it would be exceptionally difficult to persuade Souvanna Phouma to

approve stepped up military actions in Panhandle without triggering virtually irresistible
pressures for similar escalation in this part of Laos, involving increased commitments here
of sort we have thus for shied away from. Perhaps we can successfully withstand these
pressures, but more likely outcome, in my judgment, would be heightened political
instability and a situation in which we might well lose Souvanna and the international
recognition his government commands, ending up with albatross around our neck in form
of rightist regime lacking in international support and able to survive internal and external
pressures only with our outright military support.
Unger

Exdis. Repeated to Vientiane.
236. Ref: A) Deptel 89 to Vientiane rptd Saigon 261./2/ B) Vientiane 170 to Dept rptd
Saigon 106./3/
/2/Document 248.
/2/Document 248. /3/Document 250.
1. We are grateful here for positive action under consideration to assist in building GVN
morale and thereby divert local attention from proposals to strike NVN. While matter is
still in discussion phase I would like to advance the following comments from point of
view Saigon.
2. In the first place I do not feel any great urgency to get action started against Panhandle
targets by early August. It is likely that Khanh will reopen shortly the question of joint
contingency planning and upon becoming engaged therein will remain satisfied at least
for a time. In the course of this joint planning, we would give consideration to an attack of
Panhandle targets along lines proposed in ref (A) or as discussed in pare 3 below. If
indeed we decide to execute such a plan, it is highly preferable from point of view Saigon
that it should be a product of our joint planning activities.
3. Noting some of the cogent objections raised by Ambassador Unger, I would suggest
considering as a variant to plan in ref (A) the attack on Panhandle targets as an outgrowth
of US armed reconnaissance in Laos. In course of flying reconnaissance missions of
Plaine des Jarres and of other locations of interest to Souvanna Phouma there would be
ample opportunity and excuse to destroy targets such as those contained in ref (A) on
basis they represent threats to our recce missions. Timing could be related as desired
either to requirements of Laotian situation and/or to those of SVN.
4. In conclusion I recommend that no decision be taken on this matter at this time but that
I be authorized to develop a joint plan for the attack of Panhandle targets following
initiation of joint planning with Khanh. As matter of priority on the US side, we should
now examine the proposed target list to see whether it is the most suitable for intended
purpose and consider the relative advantages of concept of operations outlined in ref (A),
of that suggested in pare 3 above, or of some other concept. Once the preferred one is
determined it would be used in our planning with Khanh.
Taylor
252. Memorandum From the Joint Chiefs of Staff to the Secretary of Defense/1/
JCSM-639-64
7425, Vietnam 381. Top Secret. Notes on the source text indicate that Vance and
McNamara saw this memorandum. A copy in the Johnson Library, National Security File,
NSC Meetings, Vol. 11, Tab 9, indicates that McGeorge Bundy saw it.
SUBJECT
Actions Relevant to South Vietnam
1. The Joint Chiefs of Staff have considered, as requested, those military actions which
will:
a. Contribute militarily to the success of the counterinsurgency effort in the Republic of
Vietnam (RVN);
b. Reduce the frustration and defeatism of the RVN leaders by undertaking punitive
measures against the enemy outside the borders of the RVN;
c. Entail minimum risk of escalatory measures by the enemy; and d. Require minimum
US participation in a combat role.
2. Of the many courses of actions examined, only three fall within the established
parameters. These are air strikes against the infiltration routes through Laos into the RVN,
cross-border ground operations against the infiltration effort, and selected air missions
using non-US unmarked aircraft against prime military targets in the Democratic Republic
of Vietnam (DRV).
3. As to the first, the Joint Chiefs of Staff believe that air strikes, to include armed
reconnaissance missions, against communist installations and traffic in the Panhandle of
Laos would reduce, but not stop, the flow of support to the Viet Cong and would also
signal sharply to Hanoi and Peking that they must pay a higher price to continue the
subversion effort. While such strikes could be mounted with the Vietnamese Air Force
alone, the Joint Chiefs of Staff are of the opinion that, to obtain a desirable level of effort
and ensure effective US direction of this sensitive operation in both planning and
execution, Farmgate should also be employed. For details see Appendix A hereto./2/
/2/None of the appendices is printed.
4. As to the second, reconnaissance and punitive cross-border ground operations into Laos
could locate, harass, and, in some cases, destroy communist installations and troop
formations. Even moderate success would increase the already sizable problems of the
communists in supplying men and material to the Viet Cong and, additionally, would
signal Hanoi and Peking. For any worthwhile effort of this kind to be mounted, the Joint
Chiefs of Staff believe that US advisors must accompany RVN units. For details see
Appendix B hereto.
5. As to the third, over the past several months, a modest, covert, psychological and
punitive campaign has been directed against the DRV. However, as yet no air strikes have
been mounted. Air missions by unmarked aircraft to mine selected harbors and rivers and
to strike prime military targets in DRV could punish the enemy and signal sharply Hanoi
and Peking. Non-US air crews would perform these missions. For details see Appendix C
hereto.
6. The actions set forth above are not likely to trigger a communist response escalating the
conflict in Southeast Asia beyond present levels; therefore, the Joint Chiefs of Staff do not
recommend moving US combat units into or contiguous to the RVN at this time.
Moreover, the introduction of US combat forces which would sit idle could well have a
psychological impact on both friends and enemies the reverse of that desired.
7. In summary, the Joint Chiefs of Staff consider that implementation of the limited
actions set forth above could prove militarily and psychologically beneficial to the war
effort in the RVN, provided they do not siphon off needed resources and distract the
attention of the RVN leaders from the counterinsurgency effort. In making this judgment,
the Joint Chiefs of Staff advise that these actions would not significantly affect communist
support of Viet Cong operations in South Vietnam and might have counterproductive
results in Laos from a political point of view.
8. The Joint Chiefs of Staff recommend that Ambassador Taylor and General
Westmoreland be queried as to the feasibility and desirability of undertaking the
foregoing measures.
Earle G. Wheeler
Chairman
253. Memorandum From the Director of Central Intelligence (McCone) to the

President/1/
/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Vietnam Country File, Vol. XIV,
CIA. Top Secret; Sensitive.

SUBJECT
Probable Communist Reactions to Certain US or US-Sponsored Courses of Action in
Vietnam and Laos
PROPOSED COURSES OF ACTION/2/
/2/These descriptions of proposed courses of action are abbreviated summaries of the
courses spelled out in the JCS Memorandum devoted to this subject. [Footnote in the
source text. The JCS memorandum is Document 252.]
Category 1. Air raids upon key supply centers along the Viet Cong supply and infiltration
corridor in the Laos Panhandle, these raids to be conducted by the VNAF, possibly using
napalm and possibly augmented by Farmgate.
Category 2. Ground force cross-border raids on the same targets by GVN units up to
battalion in size and perhaps accompanied by US advisors.
Category 3. Limited air strikes against specific military and transportation targets in North
Vietnam by unmarked planes flown exclusively by non-US aircrews.
1. In response to the first or second categories of action, local Communist military forces
in the areas of actual attack would react vigorously, but we believe that none of the
Communist powers involved would respond with major military moves designed to
change the nature of the conflict. Rather than risk escalation, which must appear to them
unnecessary and potentially disastrous to long-term achievement of their objectives, they
would be more likely to rely on a continuing war of attrition and on intensive propaganda
and political maneuvering aimed at isolating the US and building up pressure for an
international conference to "neutralize" South Vietnam. In any event, the intensity of
Communist response to Category 1 and 2 actions would depend to some extent upon the
scale and manner in which such actions were executed.
2. Air strikes on North Vietnam itself (Category 3) would evoke sharper Communist
reactions than air strikes confined to targets in Laos, but even in this case fear of
escalation would probably restrain the Communists from a major military response.
Though we think it unlikely, they might attempt isolated air raids on Saigon and other
South Vietnamese cities hoping quickly to shatter South Vietnamese morale.
3. There are various local military or semi-military actions, short of major change in the
character of the conflict, which should be considered among possible Communist
responses:
(a) Improvement of local air defenses (probably with additional AA equipment from
North Vietnam and China), dispersal of supplies and troop concentrations, and movement
discipline designed to hamper effective air attack. Such measures would be likely.
(b) Intensification of Viet Cong ambushes and attacks, accompanied perhaps by the more
or less covert introduction into South Vietnam of some additional personnel from North
Vietnam. This response also would be likely.
(c) Sabotage attacks on airfields in South Vietnam to damage their communications

facilities, POL depots, etc., and if possible to cripple planes on the ground. We believe
such attacks likely.
(d) A widespread campaign of terrorism against Americans, including civilians and
dependents, in South Vietnam. We think the chances of such a campaign would be less
than even.
(e) Communist forces now in Laos could attempt to seize one or more of the Mekong
towns. We believe such an attempt would be unlikely.
(f) Fighter aircraft would be introduced into North Vietnam. We think this unlikely if
US/GVN air strikes are confined to targets in Laos (Category 1). However, if attacks are
initiated against North Vietnam itself (Category 3), chances of the Communists
introducing some defensive air capability in North Vietnam would increase appreciably,
mounting as the scope and intensity of the attacks increased.
4. The influence of the USSR on the Communist camp in the Indochina situation is
limited, and it wants to avoid too direct involvement. Moscow would certainly want to
show itself no less strong than the Chinese in opposition to the US-sponsored moves. It
would almost certainly consider that an intense international campaign against the US
could damage US interests considerably, to Soviet world-wide gain, and would not
necessarily jeopardize Soviet dtente tactics on issues of US-Soviet relations other than
Vietnam. Accordingly, the Soviets would give Hanoi vigorous political and propaganda
support, and would probably place themselves in the forefront of those calling for an
international conference--and might accompany this by leading A move in the UN to
condemn the US.
John A. McCone
254. Memorandum From the Secretary of State 1s Special Assistant for Vietnam
(Forrestal) to the Secretary of State/1/
/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 VIET S. Top Secret; Exdis. The
source text bears Rusk's initials. A copy was sent to William Bundy.
SUBJECT
Vietnam
I thought you might like a paragraph or two on the status of our planning effort with the
Vietnamese and possible actions outside South Vietnam.
As you remember, Ambassador Taylor told us on Monday that he was not in a great rush
to initiate any of the proposed actions in the Laos Panhandle, but that he would wish to
begin an orderly process of planning both for such actions and actions against the North
with General Khanh and a small group of Khanh's trusted colleagues./2/

We have authorized him to commence such planning, but it is not expected to begin until
next week. In the meantime, the Joint Chiefs have responded to the President's request for
actions which would involve the minimum of escalation with the maximum of political
effect. In a memorandum (JCSM 639-64)/3/ the Chiefs have listed a number of possible
air actions against infiltration targets in the Panhandle and in North Vietnam. They have
also proposed armed reconnaissance across the Laos border in units up to battalion
strength, accompanied by U.S. advisors. A copy of this memorandum has been sent to
Ambassador Taylor for his personal use in preparing for the planning exercise.
/3/Document 252.
The Chiefs' memorandum represents, in my opinion, a very significant step forward, since
it gives their tentative approval to the very limited kinds of actions which we may want to
use in the event Hanoi steps things up, or in the event we need a low key military
accompaniment to our diplomatic activities concerning Laos.

1964-1968, Volume I
Vietnam, 1964
Department of State
Washington, DC
VIII. U.S. Reaction To Events in the Gulf of Tonkin, August 1-10

255. Editorial Note
At 3:40 a.m. EDT (3:40 p.m. Saigon time), August 2, the destroyer Maddox, on patrol in
the Gulf of Tonkin, reported that it was "being approached by high speed craft with
apparent intention of torpedo attack. Intend open fire in necessary self defense." (Message
020740Z to Commander Seventh Fleet; Department of State, Vietnam Working Group
Files: Lot 72 D 219, DeSoto Patrols, August) Twenty-seven minutes later, the Maddox
reported that it was being attacked by three North Vietnamese patrol craft and had opened
fire. (Message 020807Z to Commander Seventh Fleet; ibid.) In the ensuing engagement,
the Maddox and aircraft from the U.S.S. Ticonderoga damaged two of the patrol craft
which retreated to the North, and left one dead in the water. Reports on the incident
reached Washington shortly after 4 a.m.

Saigon, August 2, 1964--9 p.m.
/1/Source: Department of State, Vietnam Working Group Files: Lot 72 D 219, DeSoto
Patrols, August. Confidential; Flash. Repeated to CINCPAC. Received at 8:46 a.m.
281. CINCPAC for POLAD. Ref Maddox incident, most important that we be authorized
to give facts to GVN before Hanoi breaks story and falsified version is disseminated.
Request official version to be used and, when determined, what action USG expects to
take. Please indicate how much of this latter information can be passed to GVN.
As you are aware, operational radio traffic relating to this incident was in clear.
Taylor
257. Memorandum From the Duty Officer in the White House Situation Room to the
President/1/
Washington, August 2, 1964.
/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Vietnam Country File, Operation
Pierce Arrow. No classification marking. Printed in part in Johnson, Vantage Point, p.
112. The President recalled that this memorandum was sent to him in his bedroom. Since
his Daily Diary shows breakfast at 9 a.m., he must have received it before that time.
Mr. President:
1. Early this morning the USS Maddox was attacked by three DRV PT boats while on
patrol approximately 30 miles off the North Vietnamese coast in the Gulf of Tonkin.
2. The Captain of the Maddox returned the fire with 5-inch guns and requested air support
from the carrier Ticonderoga on station nearby in connection with reconnaissance flights
in that area.
3. Ticonderoga jets arrived shortly and made strafing attacks on the PT boats resulting in
one enemy boat dead in the water, two others damaged and turned tail for home.
4. The Maddox reports no personnel or material damages.
5. Messrs. Rusk and McNamara have been informed of the incident and present plans are
to release a press statement later today either from Washington or Saigon./2/
/2/For text of the statement, released at 10:15 a.m., see Goulden, Truth, p. 23.
6. Additional details on the Maddox encounter will be available later today.
258. Editorial Note

At 11:30 a.m. on August 2, the President met at the White House with Secretary Rusk,
Under Secretary Ball, Deputy Secretary of Defense Vance, General Wheeler, and
intelligence experts to discuss the Tonkin Gulf incident. Johnson Library, Johnson Daily
Diary) The meeting lasted approximately 45 minutes and the President wrote that they
studied the latest reports and considered a U.S. response. After concluding that a local
North Vietnamese shore commander or a shore station had taken the initiative, the
participants decided not to retaliate. They did, however, agree to dispatch a protest note to
North Vietnam and to order a continuation of the patrol. (Johnson, Vantage Point, page
113) No other record of this meeting has been found. The meeting is described as taking
place "c. 10:30" in Rusk's appointment book.
259. Telegram From the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (Wheeler) to the
Commander in Chief, Pacific (Sharp)/1/
Washington, August 2, 1964--12:25 p.m.
/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Vietnam Country File, Maddox
Incident. Secret; Immediate. Repeated to MACV, Saigon, the White House, CIA, the
Department of Defense, and the Department of State, among others.

7680. This is a DeSoto Patrol message. Reference: A. CINCPACFLT DTG 021104Z
(NOTAL). B. ADMINO CINCPAC DTG 021255Z (NOTAL)./2/
/2/Reference A stated that it was in the best interest of the United States to assert the
freedom of the seas and resume Gulf of Tonkin patrols at the earliest. (Department of
State, Vietnam Working Group Files: Lot 72 D 219, DeSoto Patrols, August; printed in
Goulden, Truth, p. 137) Reference B concurred in these proposals. (Washington National
Records Center. RG 219, HQDA Message Center, Reel 11885)
1. You are authorized to continue the DeSoto patrol in the Gulf of Tonkin area in
conformance with routes and times specified in reference A, subject to the following:
a. Closest approach to the NVN mainland coastline will be 11 miles, repeat 11 miles.
b. Air patrol CAP will be provided during daylight hours, however, CAP will be
maintained to the seaward of the two destroyers so as to preclude any possibility of
overflight of NVN.
c. Be extremely watchful for any possible action including possible submarine activity
either against the DeSoto patrol or the Ticonderoga task force.
d. Avoid close approaches to NVN coast during period when maritime activities related to
OPLAN 34A are underway.

/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 33-6 US-VIET N. Confidential; Flash.
Drafted by William McAfee (INR) and cleared with Green, Hughes, and the Department
of Defense.
328. Embtel 281./2/ Maddox was engaged in fleet patrol similar to patrols conducted
routine basis various parts of world. Ships engaged such activities operate in international
waters. For instance ship engaged in patrol along coast Communist China normally
remains 15 NM from coast in view Chicom claim 12 mile limit. Observing claimed limits
does not indicate recognition of claim. Firing by DRV patrol craft took place in
international waters over 20 NM from coast of North Vietnam. Similar destroyer patrol
was conducted February-March in Gulf of Tonkin by destroyer Craig. All of foregoing
may be passed to GVN.
/2/Document 256.
FYI. Maddox was on DeSoto Patrol and had been authorized approach 8 NM coast of
North Vietnam or 4 NM to certain North Vietnamese islands. Destroyer Craig in FebMarch was authorized approach to 4 NM coast of N VN. Maddox will resume patrol
observing an 11 mile limit. In case DRV Department has no record of specific distance
claimed by them so approach closer than 12 NM authorized. Just prior to incident Maddox
may have approached to about 11 NM of coast. Assume you have seen press release
issued Honolulu this morning./3/ End FYI.
Rusk
261. Telegram From the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of-Staff (Wheeler) to the
/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Vietnam Country File, Maddox
Incident. Secret; Flash. Repeated to Saigon, MACV, the White House, the Department of
State, CIA, and the Department of Defense, among others.
7681. This is a DeSoto Patrol Message. Reference: JCS 7680 DTG 021725Z Aug 64 2 In
event US vessels are attacked in international waters (11 miles offshore or more), you will
seek to destroy the attacking forces, however, pursuit into hostile waters or air space is not
authorized.
/2/Document 259.
Saigon, August 3, 1964--11 a.m.
Patrols, August. Secret; Immediate; Limdis. Also sent to the White House, CIA, and the
Department of Defense. Received at 12:15 a.m.
282. Deptel 328 and Embtel 281./2/ Deptel does not address itself to primary question
raised Embtel namely what will be U.S. Govt reaction to this attack? Dept [Emb] will
appreciate that info. Unprovoked attack against U.S. destroyer in international waters by
three illegal North Vietnamese torpedo boats will be received dramatically in current
atmosphere Saigon. It is not adequate to local minds (nor indeed to ours) to state that
attack was repelled and that patrol will continue.
/2/Documents 260 and 256, respectively.
This reaction, if it constitutes totality of U.S. Govt intentions, will make it appear that we
are prepared to accept regular Swatow harassment in international waters as normal
concomitant our normal naval patrolling activities. Such an attitude would immediately be
construed in Saigon as indication that U.S. flinches from direct confrontation with North
Vietnamese, especially since we apparently did not press home total destruction those
vessels which attacked Maddox.
To meet this situation, recommend prompt consideration of following actions:

a. Announce that Swatows will henceforth be attacked whenever found in international
waters and maintain air and/or naval forces in readiness to do so.
b. Direct regular air surveillance of Swatows overflying DRV air space as required.
c. Mine approaches to Swatow harbors.
d. Create a torpedo capability in GVN Navy for use against appropriate targets, such as
Haiphong dredges.
These are quick thoughts without opportunity for consultation with experts. However, we
are impressed with need for prompt reaction and timely private communication of
intentions to GVN.
Request urgent consideration these matters and advice soonest re statements which we
may make privately to GVN.
Taylor

/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 15-1 VIET S. Secret, Priority Exdis.
Repeated to CINCPAC, the White House, ICS, and the Secretary of Defense.
286. As a part of his swing through four provinces July 31-August 1, Khanh asked me to
accompany him on the latter day. In the morning we visited Binh Tuy, a relatively small
province of about 60,000 situated on the coast--east of Saigon. There is essentially no
pacification problem there but the province illustrates the needs of an economically
backward area after elimination of VC.
Khanh received a thorough briefing on the local situation from an intelligent-looking
province chief, then visited a nearby fishing village which turned out in force to greet us.
Khanh addressed the villagers with apparently good effect, then made a token presentation
of gifts to a few chosen elders, taken from a large pile of gift packages laid out in the
square, consisting in the main of frying gear, pots and pans.
Khanh and his party then helicoptered from Binh Tuy to Cap St. Jacques where they gave
a barbecue for the foreign press at the end of the day. I joined him an hour in advance of
the reception to talk business. First, I reported to him matter contained in Embtel 240./2/
He took the news calmly and said that if allegation against Hoach were true he would be
"eliminated."
/2/Telegram 240, July 28, reported that Minister of State Le Van Hoach had on his own
authority been in touch with the Viet Cong concerning a cease-fire. Taylor speculated on
the reasons for such an approach and included the possibility that Khanh might be behind
it. (Ibid., POL 27 VIET S)
In course of subsequent conversation Khanh asked me (for at least the third time since my
arrival) whether US was solidly behind him. I assured him such was the case and
intimated some surprise at need for repeating assurance. His reply indicted that he is
considering some move against Minh and wanted to determine how USG would react. I
took this opportunity to follow guidance contained in Deptel 245,/3/ saying that we
Americans had been happy to see Minh brought into government and had hoped that his
presence would contribute to creating the national unity so badly needed. It was not Minh
the individual who attracted us but Minh the popular symbol with possible utility in the
unstable political situation. If, as Khanh insisted, Minh was not a help but a hindrance to
unity, we had no further interest in him. However, I asked Khanh whether in fact he had
ever asked Minh to do specific things which the latter had declined to do.
/3/Document 244.
Khanh said indeed he had. He cited failure to respond to invitation to Cabinet meetings.
Also, as Head of State Minh has certain duties which go back to time of Bao Dai and
include signing of State papers. In this Minh had been tardy particularly in the recent
submission of papers to UN bearing on designation of official GVN spokesman. Khanh is
plainly fed up and may be expected to take some action against Minh shortly.
I asked Khanh whether he had given further thought to the joint planning exercise
discussed in Embtel 219./4/ He said he had but then indicated that he had more in mind
the declaration of a "state of urgency" (condition d'urgence) than military planning related
to NVN. When I mentioned latter he replied that we could talk about it later in Saigon but
showed no interest in pursuing subject. In course of entire day, he did not mention "march
North" issue or any related matter.
/4/Dated July 26, telegram 219 from Saigon requested the best available portfolio of
political/military planning papers for a joint contingency planning exercise with the
Vietnamese. (Department of State, Central Files, POL 1 US-VIET S)
Press reception and barbecue were well attended by foreign correspondents. Purpose was
purely social-Khanh made no statement to press.
Taylor
264. Telegram From the Embassy in Vietnam to the Agency for International
Development/1/
/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, AID (US) VIET S. Secret; Priority; Limit
Distribution. Received at 11:12 a.m.
Toaid 555. Joint Emb/USOM message. Ref: Deptel 254./2/
/2/Document 246.
1. We have under intensive examination the questions cited in reftel. Action is anticipated
in certain functional areas soonest with others subject to initial review and/or planning.
2. We believe urban areas should share with rural communities in allocation of efforts to
bolster confidence in GVN and its program. To that end Saigon-Cholon becomes critical
target with its large share of nation's population and total economic activity. At same time
current unemployment represents fertile area for VC agitation and action.
3. USOM is therefore initiating action looking towards formulation of comprehensive
development program for Saigon-Cholon which could be carried out on time-phased basis
over period of years. Initial effort would probably involve slum clearance and extensive
housing program. Target date of August 20 set for development of ideas as to how
program could be carried forward.
4. USOM also plans move ahead immediately on work necessary to put fifteen hospital
suites in operating condition soonest. OICC will supervise project with MOH doing work.
Project financing being worked out simultaneously. Concurrent action by GVN in
reorganizing MOH and establishing budget required. Close coordination now exists
between USOM, Public Health and MOH in all aspects of project. Hope actual work on
suites plus water and power supply can be undertaken within 30-45 days, with first suite
ready to accommodate next arriving surgical team late fall. Every effort will be made to
accomplish this task at earlier time if possible.
5. Re sites for concentrated effort in Kral area or areas, USOM now determining most
feasible location for such activity. Findings will be reviewed for strategic or other
considerations. When this completed will develop plans with GVN for implementation.
Expect plans crystallized in 30-45 days.
6. Greater exercise of selectivity in determining locale of effort to distinguish between
GVN-controlled and other areas foremost in our thinking. This makes urban effort doubly
attractive. At same time, well drilling and other more far-flung activities being reviewed
to examine possibility and feasibility of concentration along lines you outline.
7. We share feeling that formulation and scrupulous conduct of politically attractive and
economically feasible land policy has great value to overall effort. This problem being
studied and discussions with GVN will be undertaken soon.
8. Ever-present problem in all above matters is need to bring GVN along with our
thinking. GVN must in all cases be implementing body with assistance from us. To this
problem, major US effort being directed.
9. Outside framework of above matters, we are also considering some one-shot operations
involving supply problems that would underscore in appealing way US support for
Vietnamese people and their problems. More on this later if preliminary review indicates
favorable prospects such action.
Taylor
265. Editorial Note

On August 3 at 11:30 a.m., President Johnson called an impromptu press conference at the
White House and read the following statement:
"I have instructed the Navy:
"1. to continue the patrols in the Gulf of Tonkin off the coast of North Viet-Nam,
"2. to double the force by adding an additional destroyer to the one already on patrol
"3. to provide a combat air patrol over the destroyers, and
"4. to issue orders to the commanders of the combat aircraft and the two destroyers, (a) to
attack any force which attacks them in international waters, and (b) to attack with the
objective not only of driving off the force but of destroying it." (Department of State
Bulletin, August 24, 1964, page 259)
266. Memorandum From the Chairman of the Vietnam Coordinating Committee

(Forrestal) to the Secretary of State/1/
/1/Source: Department of State, Vietnam Working Group files: Lot 72 D 219, Maddox
Incident. Top Secret. The source text bears the handwritten notation: "Secretary Saw."
SUBJECT
Possible Actions Following Maddox Incident
We met this morning with Pete Solbert (McNaughton is away on vacation) and his
civilian and military staff people./2/ The following information may be of use to you in
connection with any meeting the President may have this afternoon.
/2/No record of this meeting has been found.
I. Present Rules of Marine Reconnaissance
At the present moment destroyer patrols are authorized to close within 15 miles of the
Chicom coastline, 11 miles of the DRV coastline, and 4 miles from DRV offshore islands.
We have only made four destroyer patrols since December 1962, and the distances off the
coast have varied depending upon the purpose of the reconnaissance, i.e. [less than 1 line
of source text not declassified], Junk Surveillance, etc. Another patrol is scheduled for the
period August 3-7.
You probably know that the action against the Maddox took place within the same 60-
hour period as an OPLAN 34A harassing action by SVN forces against two islands off the
DRV coast, Hon Me and Hon Nieu. It seems likely that the North Vietnamese and perhaps
the Chicoms have assumed that the destroyer was part of this operation, although it was
attacked some 30 miles away from the nearest island. It is also possible that Hanoi
deliberately ordered the attack in retaliation for the harassment of the islands. This
suggests to me that we should in the future assure coordination between OPLAN 34A
activities, which are controlled in the Pentagon by SACSA, and the destroyer patrols,
which are controlled by J-3. Other OPLAN 34A actions are scheduled for August 3-5.
II. Rules of Engagement
At the moment, rules of engagement for both marine and air units are to respond to any
attack and pursue the attacking forces with the objective of destroying them up to a point
11 miles from the DRV coastline. Our units are permitted to fire beyond this point and in
the case of destroyers, this means they could reach the shoreline with their guns.
III. Additional Thoughts
The 11-mile limitation referred to above reflects the fact that NVN probably claims that
her territorial waters extend 12 miles off her coast. We do not admit this claim, and the
theory is to show this by penetrating it to the extent of one mile. I agree that there is some
logic to this position as far as regular patrols are concerned; but I wonder if we should not
authorize our people to engage in hot pursuit of NVN attacking forces, both on the sea and
in the air, to a distance of three miles from the DRV coast. Another question which has
not been thoroughly discussed is what happens if in the course of hot pursuit of an
attacking enemy ship or aircraft, our forces are fired upon by landbased aircraft or coastal
artillery. Do we engage in suppressive or retaliatory activity against the DRV mainland? I
believe that we probably should, but we do not have to make this decision now.
I raised the question this morning whether any sort of aerial reconnaissance over the DRV
would have any military value in connection with the protection of our coastal patrols.
The answer appears to be "no", because the risk of a shootdown is considerably greater
than the reconnaissance results we could expect to achieve. But this is a point you might
wish to raise.
I think we might at least wish to discuss other actions against the DRV associated with
their patrol boat activity. I have in mind the aerial mining of the harbor or harbors from
which these boats emerge. I understand that this probably could be done effectively by the
VNAF, who have been trained in this technique. Another possibility, of course, is an
unidentified airstrike against one or more of these harbors. A recent JCS paper includes
several such harbors as a possible VNAF target./3/
/3/Presumably the 91 Target List submitted to the Secretary of Defense as an appendix to
JCSM-460-64, May 30. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 218, JCS
Files)
Finally, you have our draft cable to Saigon asking Ambassador Taylor to hand our protest
to the ICC for transmission to Hanoi./4/ The issue here is whether to use the ICC for this
purpose, since to do so might only stimulate Hanoi to react by demanding an investigation
of our destroyer activities in the Gulf of Tonkin.
/4/A copy of this draft, which is substantially the same as Document 270, is in the
Johnson Library, National Security File, Maddox Incident.
We have considered going through the British, Canadians, Indians or French-all of whom
have representation of some sort in Hanoi. We have concluded in the interests of speed
that the ICC is the best means for the formal transmission of our protest. We are not
asking the ICC to investigate, merely to transmit.
267. Editorial Note

On August 3, Secretary McNamara called Secretary Rusk at 11:05 a.m. to say that the
President thought it would be wise for them to brief Congressional leaders concerning the
Maddox incident. McNamara had already made arrangements for the Secretaries to brief
the Senate Armed Services and Foreign Relations Committees at 3 p.m. and the Speaker
of the House and selected Congressmen at 4. (Department of State, Rusk Files: Lot 72 D
192, Telephone Conversations) No records of the briefings have been found.
268. Memorandum From the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for

International Security Affairs (Solbert) to the Secretary of Defense (McNamara)/1/
/1/Source: Washington National Records Center, RG 330, OSD/ISA Files: FRC 69 A
7425, Vietnam 381. Top Secret; Sensitive. Received in the Office of the Secretary of
Defense at 4:49 p.m. The source text bears the stamp "Sec Def has seen."
SUBJECT
Meeting this Afternoon at the White House concerning aftermath of Maddox Incident
1. Proposed Meeting. I understand from Mike Forrestal that a meeting this afternoon at
the White House may involve review of Ambassador Taylor's cables on the Maddox
incident (Tab A),/2/ including our present ship [less than 1 line of source text not
declassified] reconnaissance instructions, rules of engagement and possible additional
actions in response to the Maddox engagement.
/2/Tab A contained copies of Documents 256, 260, and 262.
2. President's News Release. Attached (Tab B)/3/ is a news ticker on the President's
statement made this morning.
/3/Tab B consisted of the text of the statement in Document 265.
3. Present Rules for [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] Reconnaissance. We
understand that these rules vary for each mission. The Maddox was operating under the
limitations that it not go nearer than 15 nautical miles to ChiCom territory (not near
islands), 8 miles from DRV mainland and 4 miles from DRV offshore islands. Present
orders (issued yesterday--Tab C)/4/ require the Maddox on the balance of its mission to
keep 20 miles from the ChiCom mainland, 11 miles from DRV mainland and 4 miles
from DRV offshore islands. A question may be raised as to the frequency with which
these [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] missions should be run in the future:
chart of mission at Tab D./5/
/4/Tab C contained copies of Documents 259 and 261 and a copy of message 030553Z
from the Commander of the Seventh Fleet to the Ticonderoga stating that, if another
attack took place, it was mandatory to make a maximum effort to achieve the complete
destruction of the attacking units.
/5/Not printed.
4. Rules of Engagement. The current rules of engagement provide that ships on patrol will
fire back if attacked and will destroy the attacking craft. In attempting to destroy an
attacking craft, our ships may not go closer than 11 miles from the DRV mainland. It may
be desirable to reduce this limit, though the 5" guns of most destroyers can reach up to
and perhaps beyond the coastline from the 11-mile limit (Com7Flt orders permit firing
"over-the-line"). Our aircraft should not go much beyond this limit if they are to avoid
DRV overflights.
5. Further Actions. The meeting may also consider other actions in response to the
Maddox incident. Some suggestions are (a) aerial mining of DRV naval bases or harbors
(now under JCS review for 34A); and (b) other 34A missions directed against these bases
(probably not feasible with current 34A craft). Ambassador Taylor has also suggested
aerial surveillance of Swatows, including DRV overflights as required, destruction of
Swatows on the high seas, and creation of GVN torpedo capability. Surveillance flights
over the DRV, over and above present flights, would not appear to produce substantial
military information and involve risk of escalation, as does the destruction of Swatows at
sea. The creation of GVN torpedo carrying capability is being investigated but appears
slight.
Peter Solbert
269. Editorial Note

At 6:35 p.m. on August 3, the President met in the Cabinet Room of the White House
with Rusk, McNamara, Wheeler, and McGeorge Bundy to discuss Vietnam. (Johnson
Library, Johnson Daily Diary) No record of the meeting, which lasted until 7:15 p.m., has
been found. A telephone conversation between Bundy and Rusk at 2:45 p.m.. however,
previewed the meeting:
"B called to see if Sec had message re the 6:15. Sec did. Sec said he presumed it was on
the Gulf of Tonkin and B said yes. B supposed we would review the rules of engagement.
B said we need a draft reply to Max; since we were not asking any staff, could Sec bring
whatever he wanted himself. B said he thought this would all pass over. Sec said Khanh is
kicking up, saying we should retaliate." (Department of State, Rusk Files: Lot 72 D 192,
Telephone Conversations)
The meeting was delayed until 6:35 p.m. because of a reception for American foreign
language newspaper editors.

/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 VIET S. Limited Official Use;
Flash. Drafted by Corcoran (S/VN); cleared with Green, Forrestal, Harriman, Trueheart,
Blouin, McGeorge Bundy, Ball, and others; and initialed by Rusk. The text of the protest
is printed in Department of State Bulletin, August 24, 1964, p. 258.
335. Please hand the following to the ICC with the request that this protest be passed to
the Hanoi regime:
"The United States Government takes an extremely serious view of the unprovoked attack
made by Communist North Vietnamese torpedo boats on an American naval vessel, the
USS Maddox, operating on the high seas in the Gulf of Tonkin on August 2.
United States ships have traditionally operated freely on the high seas, in accordance with
the rights guaranteed by international law to vessels of all nations. They will continue to
do so and will take whatever measures are appropriate for their defense.
The United States Government expects that the authorities of the regime in North VietNam will be under no misapprehension as to the grave consequences which would
inevitably result from any further unprovoked offensive military action against United
States forces."
Text will be released in Washington at noon press briefing August 4./2/
/2/Department spokesman Robert McCloskey read the statement to news correspondents
on August 4.
Rusk

/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 33-6 US-VIET N. Top Secret;
Immediate; Nodis. Drafted by Forrestal and initialed by Rusk.
336. From the Secretary to the Ambassador. Ref Embtel 282./2/ We have been very
sensitive here to the considerations you raise reftel. We would hope that part of the
problem has been met by President's public statement today,/3/ which you have already
received. We have asked JCS to insure that you receive copies of the implementing orders
to the appropriate commanders through military channels.
/2/Document 262.
Suggestions made in b, c and d reftel are currently being considered in context OPLAN
34A. Significant additions have been made to list of targets for marine operations and
these will be transmitted to you shortly.
We believe that present OPLAN 34A activities are beginning to rattle Hanoi, and Maddox
incident is directly related to their effort to resist these activities. We have no intention
yielding to pressure.
In your discretion you may pass these thoughts along to Gen. Khanh. You may also
reiterate to him, but only if you believe it appropriate, our concern that actions against the
North be limited for the present to the OPLAN 34A type. We do not believe that SVN is
yet in a position to mount larger actions so long as the security situation in the near
vicinity of Saigon remains precarious. We are impressed with the fact that a battalionsized attack could have occurred within 4 miles of Saigon without any advance warning.
We would welcome your further comments on Saigon reaction to today's announcement,
as well as your continuing assessment of the political temperature there.
Rusk
272. Editorial Note

At 7:40 a.m. EDT (7:40 p.m., Saigon time), August 4, the destroyer Maddox, on patrol in
the Gulf of Tonkin, reported that an attack from unidentified vessels appeared imminent.
The National Military Communications Center in the Department of Defense received the
report at 9:30 a.m. in message 041240Z. (Department of State, Vietnam Working Group
Files: Lot 72 D 219, DeSoto Patrols August) The following entries are taken from a Top
Secret chronology of the events of August 4-5 prepared on August 28 and submitted by
McGeorge Bundy to President Johnson on September 4:
"8:13 AM: First word of a possible attack on the Maddox is received at the Pentagon by
the DIA Indications Center over the phone [less than 1 line of source text not
declassified]. While on the phone, a copy of the [less than 1 line of source text not
declassified] field unit message arrives and copies are delivered sometime about 9:00 a.m.
to the Secretary of Defense McNamara, and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff
Wheeler. The message states that there are 'imminent plans of DRV naval action possibly
against DeSoto mission' gathered from [less than 1 line of source text not declassified].
"8:36 AM (8:36 PM, August 4, Saigon time): The Maddox establishes its first radar
contacts with two unidentified surface vessels and three unidentified aircraft. U.S. fighter
aircraft are then launched from the USS Ticonderoga to provide the Maddox and the
Turner Joy with protection against possible attacks from the unidentified vessels and
aircraft, in accordance with the President's previously issued directives. At this time, the
Ticonderoga is located approximately 100 nautical miles East North East of Da Nang.
(NMCC receives this report at about 10:30 AM.)
"9:08 AM (9:08 PM, August 4, Saigon time): The Maddox reports that the unidentified
aircraft have disappeared from its radar screen but that the surface vessels are still
remaining at a distance. U.S. aircraft from the Ticonderoga arrive and commence
defensive patrol over the Maddox and the C. Turner Joy. (NMCC receives this report at
11:04 AM.)
"9:12 AM: McNamara calls the President and tells him about the [less than 1 line of
source text not declassified]/DIA intelligence warning he has just received that the
Maddox is on the alert again, with the presence of hostile ships reported." Johnson
Library, National Security File, Vietnam Country File, Gulf of Tonkin Misc. 1964)
The message received in the National Military Communications Center at 10:30 a.m. is
041336Z. (Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 VIET S) The message received at
11:04 a.m. is 041408Z. (Ibid., Vietnam Working Group Files: Lot 72 D 719, DeSoto
Patrols August) The 9:12 a.m. telephone call from McNamara to the President is
described in Johnson, Vantage Point, page 114.
273. Editorial Note

At 9:25 a.m., August 4, Secretary of Defense McNamara, Deputy Secretary of Defense
Vance, and Lieutenant General David A. Burchinal, Director of the Joint Staff of the JCS,
met at the Pentagon. The following account of the meeting is taken from the August 28
Top Secret chronology of the events of August 4-5 submitted to the President by
McGeorge Bundy on September 4:
"McNamara, Deputy Secretary Vance, General Burchinal, Colonel Jones, and Admiral
Mustin of the Joint Staff meet at the Pentagon beginning at 9:25 AM as reports of the
attack on the destroyers come in. As the situation grows more intense, possible levels and
time of retaliation are discussed, and target folders are examined. High on the list are the
PT boats and bases and supporting POL installations, but other targets such as airfields,
industrial complexes and bridges are also scrutinized. Captain Miller of the Navy, a mine
expert, is also asked to join the meeting and the possibility of mining one or more of the
North Vietnamese important Ports is discussed. Here it is pointed out that the mines
would have to be brought to the carriers from Subic Bay, the Philippines. McNamara
orders that mines be brought to the carriers as soon as possible. Burchinal informs
McNamara that a retaliatory attack can take place at first light. McNamara, during this
time, calls the President, informs him that a retaliatory attack is being planned, and tells
the President that he will call Secretary Rusk and Presidential Assistant Bundy to join him
in preparing a number of options to be presented to the President as soon as possible.*
"During these discussions, McNamara develops four options for a sharp limited blow and
one option for continuous pressure against the North Vietnamese. The four options for the
sharp limited blow are:
"1. Air strikes against PT boats and their bases.

"2. Air strikes against petroleum installations.
"3. Air strikes on bridges.
"4. Air strikes on prestige targets, such as a steel plant.
"The option for continuing pressure against the North Vietnamese is to mine important
ports along their coastline.
"McNamara, about 11:00 AM, summons Rusk, Bundy, and the JCS and they arrive
shortly thereafter." Johnson Library, National Security File, Vietnam Country File, Gulf
of Tonkin Misc. 1964)
The asterisk footnote reads: "McNamara made three calls to the President during this
period at 9:43, 10:53, and 11:06 AM." For an account of the 9:43 a.m. call, see U.S.
Senate, Committee on Foreign Relations, The U.S. Government and the Vietnam War,
Executive and Legislative Roles and Relationships, Part 11, 1961-1964 (Washington: U.S.
Government Printing Office, 1974), page 289. Regarding the 11 a.m. call, see Document
275.

the Secretary of Defense (McNamara), Washington, August 4, 1964, 9:55 a.m./1/
classification marking. Transcribed by Carolyn J. Proctor.
TELEPHONE CALL TO SECRETARY McNAMARA
Sec wanted to be sure there would be as much force as needed. M said Wheeler had called
the commandant of CINCPAC and they will put the whole 7th Fleet out there if
necessary. M said the President agreed with out position; he was very much concerned
about what additional retaliatory steps we should take. Sec said one thing is to go after the
boats. M said he would be inclined to do more than that, pick out a target of our own and
go after that. M said he would have something for discussion at lunch.

the Secretary of Defense (McNamara), Washington, August 4, 1964, 11:10 a.m./1/
classification marking. Transcribed by Proctor.
TELEPHONE CALL FROM SECRETARY McNAMARA
M said there was a cable [at] 9:36/2/ our time reporting 3 unidentified boats and 3
unidentified aircraft approaching the destroyers; they had just had a phone call from Sharp
that the destroyer reported under torpedo attack. M had told the President we were
working out retaliatory measures. M asked if Sec could come over as they had all the
charts etc. Sec said he would be there in about 10 minutes.

/2/Presumably message 041336Z. (Ibid., Central Files, POL 27 VIET S) See Document
272.
276. Editorial Note

At 11:40 a.m., Secretary of Defense McNamara, Secretary of State Rusk, McGeorge
Bundy, Acting Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs Marshall Green
(William Bundy was on vacation in Massachusetts, where Rusk called him to return to
Washington), and the Joint Chiefs of Staff met at the Pentagon. The following entries are
taken from the August 28 chronology:
"11 :40 AM: Bundy arrives at JCS meeting. McNamara briefs Bundy. McNamara
describes the five options listed on page 5 above. McNamara informs the group that he
has issued orders to have mines moved from Subic Bay into Da Nang. There is a
discussion of retaliatory measures. McNamara and Bundy discuss the advantages and
disadvantages of a sharp limited blow such as air strikes and/or the continuing pressure of
mining the North Vietnamese coast. McNamara tells LeMay that the JCS should work up
recommendations for immediate action, then recommended actions for 24, 48 and 60
hours ahead, with special emphasis on reinforcements, such as the movement of B-57s
into South Vietnam and fighter-interceptors into the Philippines.
"12:04 PM: McNamara, Rusk, Bundy, Green (State Dept.) and Vance move to
McNamara's office, while the JCS continue meeting in McNamara's dining room. At this
meeting the options are essentially refined to three:
"1. Sharp limited strikes against such target as PT boats, PT bases, oil depots, etc.
"2. Continuing pressure, i.e., mining the Vietnam coast.
"3. A combination of both.
"12:20 PM: McNamara, Rusk, Bundy and Green depart for White House. Vance goes into
McNamara's dining room to ask JCS if it would make any difference whether the
retaliatory strikes were conducted at first light. JCS tell Vance that the time of attack
would make no difference from a military standpoint but that fewer people would be at
the PT boat bases and supporting installations at first light.
"12:25 PM: Vance departs for the White House. The JCS continue meeting until 1:49 PM.
During their meeting, at JCS direction, Burchinal calls McNamara at White House to
recommend the sharp limited response option." Johnson Library, National Security File,
Vietnam Country File, Gulf of Tonkin Misc. 1964)
Regarding the five options described by Secretary McNamara, see Document 273.
At 12:40 p.m., according to the chronology, McNamara, Rusk, Bundy, and Green arrived
at the White House where they joined the National Security Council which was discussing
the Cyprus situation. McNamara briefed the NSC and the President on the available
details of the attack on the Maddox and the C. Turner Joy. Bromley Smith's notes of the
537th meeting of the National Security Council read in part as follows:
"Secretary McNamara: North Vietnamese PT boats have attacked the DeSoto Patrol
consisting of two U.S. destroyers, the Maddox and the C. Turner Joy, approximately 65
miles off North Vietnam in the Gulf of Tonkin. Presently we believe 9 or 10 torpedoes
were fired at the Patrol. Two of the PT boats were reportedly sunk and three to six were
fired on. So far, we have no casualties. Nearby U.S. aircraft carriers are providing
continuous air cover.
"Secretary Rusk: Secretary McNamara and I and the Chiefs of Staff are preparing
recommendations but these are not yet ready.
"Mac Bundy: In addition to these recommendations we should have an estimate of the
reaction to various courses of action we might take."
Later in the meeting, the discussion again turned to the incidents in the Gulf of Tonkin:
"The President: Turning again to the attack in the Gulf of Tonkin, he asked that nothing
be made public for the time being.
"Secretary Dillon: There is a limit on the number of times we can be attacked by the
North Vietnamese without hitting their naval bases." (Johnson Library, National Security
File, NSC Meetings, Vol. 3, Tab 19, 8/4/64)
Following the NSC meeting, Rusk, McNamara, McCone, Bundy, and Vance joined the
President for lunch from 1:04 to 2:50 p.m. The August 28 chronology reads:
"The President agrees that a firm, swift retaliatory strike must be carried out. Here, a
general consensus is formed on the approach finally taken in the JCS message to
CINCPAC, developed later that afternoon, ordering the strikes into execution against the
PT boats located at bases Port Wallut, Hon Gay, Phuc Loi and Quang Khe and Loc Chao
estuary and the oil depot at Vinh. (See the 5:19 PM entry below.) The mining option, as
well as an attack on Haiphong, is rejected. The President asks how long it would take to
execute the strike. McNamara estimates from the advice he has received that a strike
could be launched at about 7:00 PM (7:00 AM, Saigon time). The President suggests that
McNamara call the JCS to confirm the time, but McNamara says he wants to work it out
carefully with the JCS on his return to the Pentagon."
At 3 p.m. at the Pentagon, the Joint Chiefs of Staff began meeting; they were joined by
McNamara and Vance who informed the Chiefs that "the President wants the strikes to
take place at 7:00 PM Washington time, if possible, and at the following targets: PT boats
and bases at Quang Khe, Phoc Loi, Port Wallut, Hon Gay and Loc Chao, and the oil
complex at Vinh. The JCS agree with this proposal." (August 28 chronology)
The drafting of the strike execute message continued throughout the afternoon of August
4 amid some confusion about the actual course of events in the Gulf of Tonkin. At 1:27
p.m., the Maddox reported that "a review of the action makes many reported contacts and
torpedoes fired 'appear doubtful'. 'Freak weather effects' on radar, and 'over-eager'
sonarmen may have accounted for many reports. 'No visual sightings' have been reported
by the Maddox, and the Commander suggests that a 'complete evaluation' be undertaken
before any further action. (NMCC receives this report about 1-1/2 to 2 hours
later.)" (August 28 chronology, the report was in message 041727Z; Department of State,
"4:47 PM: McNamara, Vance and the JCS meet to marshal the evidence to overcome lack
of a clear and convincing showing that an attack on the destroyers had in fact occurred.
They conclude that an attack had taken place. In this regard five factors are considered:
"1. The Turner Joy was illuminated when fired on by automatic weapons.
"2. One of the destroyers observed cockpit lights.
"3. A PGM 142 shot at two U.S. aircraft.
"4. A North Vietnamese announcement that two of its boats were 'sacrificed.' [less than 1
line of source text not declassified]
"5. Sharp's determination that there was indeed an attack.
"Burchinal, at Wheeler's request, tells McNamara that the 7:00 PM strike time will not be
met because the carriers are operating on a time which makes 8:00 PM Washington time
7:00 AM carrier time.
"5:19 PM: JCS strike execute message is retransmitted Flash precedence as JCS 7720 to
CINCPAC. It states that by 7:00 PM EDT (0700 local time) a one-time maximum effort
attack against Port Wallut (later cancelled because of weather), Hon Gay, Phuc Loi,
Quang Khe, Loc Chao and Vinh, and an armed reconnaissance against PT boats beyond
the three mile limit should be conducted. The message cautions that if the weather
precludes meeting the above time of attack, the commander is to 'proceed soonest' and to
notify the JCS as soon as possible. (CINCPAC receives this message at 5:52 PM (11:52
AM, August 4, CINCPAC time).)" (August 28 chronology)
JCS 7720 to CINCPAC is in the Johnson Library, National Security File, Vietnam
Country File, Gulf of Tonkin, [less than 1 line of text not declassified].
277. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Thailand/1/

/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 33-6 US-VIET N. Secret; Flash;
Nodis. Drafted by Trueheart, cleared with Ball, and initialed by William Bundy. Repeated
to CINCPAC.
171. In view further attacks today on US Destroyer Maddox President has decided air
strike should be carried out at once against torpedo boat bases and a fuel installation in
North Viet-Nam. You should be prepared on receipt further message repeat on receipt
further message, to notify Thanom and call emergency SEATO meeting to announce
action and reasons therefor.
Slug reply Nodis-Pierce Arrow.
Rusk
278. Summary Notes of the 538th Meeting of the National Security Council,
Washington, August 4, 1964, 6:15-6:40 p.m./1/
Secret; Sensitive; For the President Only. Drafted by Bromley Smith.
Gulf of Tonkin Attack
Secretary McNamara: The North Vietnamese PT boats have continued their attacks on the
two U.S. destroyers in international waters in the Gulf of Tonkin. No enemy aircraft was
involved. Our efforts to learn the exact situation and protect the Patrol have been
complicated by a very low ceiling. One of the two destroyers was fired on by automatic
weapons and was lit up by search lights.
Secretary Rusk: An immediate and direct reaction by us is necessary. The unprovoked
attack on the high seas is an act of war for all practical purposes. We have been trying to
get a signal to Hanoi and Peking. Our response to this attack may be that signal. We are
informing NATO, SEATO, and the UN. As an indication of Hanoi's intentions, this
second attack was a more serious decision for the North Vietnamese than the decision to
make the first attack.
Secretary McNamara: We have agreed to air strikes on two bases in the north of North
Vietnam and two base complexes in the south of North Vietnam. A fifth target has been
deleted because it is close to Communist China. In addition, any North Vietnamese PT
boats and Swatows found off Vietnam outside the three-mile limit will be attacked as part
of an armed reconnaissance program. (The execute order as actually set is attached-JCS
7720.)/2/
CIA Director McCone: The proposed U.S. reprisals will result in a sharp North
Vietnamese military reaction, but such actions would not represent a deliberate decision to
provoke or accept a major escalation of the Vietnamese war. (The text of Mr. McCone's
estimate of probable North Vietnamese and Chinese Communist reactions to our reprisal
is attached.)/3/
/3/Not found.
The President: Do they want a war by attacking our ships in the middle of the Gulf of
Tonkin?
Director McCone: No. The North Vietnamese are reacting defensively to our attacks on
their off-shore islands. They are responding out of pride and on the basis of defense
considerations. The attack is a signal to us that the North Vietnamese have the will and
determination to continue the war. They are raising the ante.
The President: Are we going to react to their shooting at our ships over 40 miles from
their shores? If yes, we should do more than merely return the fire of the attacking ships.
If this is so, then the question involves no more than the number of North Vietnamese
targets to be attacked.
Secretary McNamara: Our intelligence officers report that a Chinese Communist air
regiment is moving to North Vietnam.
USIA Director Rowan: Do we know for a fact that the North Vietnamese provocation
took place? Can we nail down exactly what happened? We must be prepared to be
accused of fabricating the incident.
Secretary McNamara: We will know definitely in the morning. As of now, only highly
classified information nails down the incident. This information we cannot use and must
rely on other reports we will be receiving.
Secretary Rusk: We should ask the Congressional leaders whether we should seek a
Congressional resolution. (The draft resolution read by Secretary Rusk is attached.) This
short and clear draft is similar to the Mid-East resolution.
Secretary McNamara: In addition to the air strikes, we plan to send major U.S.
reinforcements into the area. These include ships, men and planes. (A detailed listing of
these forces is attached.)/4/
/4/Not printed.
A draft statement for the President was revised./5/ It is to be made public by the President
as soon as the U.S. attack planes are over target.
Bromley Smith
Attachment
DRAFT JOINT RESOLUTION ON SOUTHEAST ASIA/6/
/6/Top Secret. There is no indication on the source text of the drafter.
Whereas warships of the Communist regime in North Viet-Nam have committed a series
of unprovoked armed attacks in international waters against naval units of the United
States;
Whereas these attacks are a part of a continuous, deliberate and systematic campaign of
aggression and subversion carried on against free nations, and particularly against the
peoples of Southeast Asia, by the Communist regime in North Viet-Nam;

Whereas such Communist aggression and subversion constitutes a serious threat to
international peace and security and is inconsistent with the purposes and principles of the
United Nations;
Whereas the Communist regime in North Viet-Nam has flouted its obligations under the
Geneva Accords of 1954 and has engaged in aggression against the independence and
territorial integrity of the Republic of Viet-Nam by carrying out a systematic plan for the
subversion of the Government of the Republic of Viet-Nam, by furnishing direction,
training, personnel and arms for the conduct of guerrilla warfare within the Republic of
Viet-Nam and by the ruthless use of terror against the peaceful population of that country;
Whereas in violation of its undertakings in the Geneva Agreements of 1962 the
Communist regime in North Viet-Nam has engaged in aggression against the
independence and territorial integrity of Laos by maintaining forces on Laotian territory,
by the use of that territory for the infiltration of arms and equipment into the Republic of
Viet-Nam, and by providing direction, men and equipment for persistent armed attacks
against the Government of National Union of the Kingdom of Laos;
Whereas at the request of the Government of the Republic of Viet-Nam, the United States
is assisting the people of that country to maintain their independence and political
integrity with no territorial, military or political ambitions of its own, but solely to assure
that the peoples of Southeast Asia will be left in peace by their neighbors to work out their
destinies in their own way,
States of America in Congress Assembled:
That the United States will not tolerate unprovoked and illegal armed attacks on its forces,
that it will take such measures as may be necessary to prevent such attacks and otherwise
to protect its forces and that the maintenance of international peace and security in
Southeast Asia, including the preservation of the political independence and territorial
integrity of the nations of Southeast Asia, is required by the national interest of the United
States;
Sec. 2. To this end, the Congress supports the determination of the President, as
Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces of the United States:
(a) to respond instantly with the use of appropriate force to repel any unprovoked attack
against the armed forces of the United States and to take such other steps as may be
necessary to protect these forces and
(b) upon request from any nation in Southeast Asia, to take, consistently with the Charter
of the United Nations, all measures including the use of armed force to assist that nation
in the defense of its political independence and territorial integrity against aggression or
subversion.

Patrols, Aug. Top Secret; Flash; Exdis; Pierce Arrow. Drafted by Forrestal and cleared by
William Bundy.
341. For the Ambassador. In view of two Maddox incidents and certain responses which
are now being developed here, you should see Khanh as soon as possible to be sure he has
accurate account of NVN actions against our two destroyers. You should tell him that
President will shortly be announcing U.S. responsive measures against NVN including
actions against NVN naval craft wherever they may be found on the high seas, U.S. air
strikes against four torpedo boat bases on NVN coast, air cover for these operations which
will engage any unfriendly aircraft. These actions are expected to take place
approximately 1830 Washington time.
You should enjoin Khanh to keep this information strictly secret. We expect to have a
Presidential message out to you in the next few hours. We will also insure that you are
informed through military channels of results of U.S. action which you may also pass on
to Khanh in your discretion.
Our position is that this deliberate and unprovoked attack on U.S. vessels in international
waters cannot go unanswered. On the other hand, we have limited our response to the
offending boats and supporting facilities in order to avoid forcing escalation.
We want to keep Khanh as fully informed as possible, consistent with operational
security. In meantime you should forcefully advise Khanh to take no independent action
external to SVN and avoid public statements during this critical period. You may wish,
however, to suggest to him precautionary and alerting measures against possible NVN
retaliation. We leave these to your judgment.
When these actions have become public, they may help you in your efforts convince
military and politicians that drastic changes in GVN leadership must not be considered at
this time.
Slug all future messages this subject "Pierce Arrow."
Rusk
280. Notes of the Leadership Meeting, White House, Washington, August 4, 1964,
6:45 p.m./1/
/1/Source: Johnson Library, Meeting Notes File, August 4, 1964. No classification
marking. Drafted by Walter Jenkins of the President's Staff. Attached to the source text
were two notes dated August 24 and 25 concerning its drafting. One of these reads: "Put
that on my desk--I'll need it every day. LBJ:JRJ 8/27/67." In addition to the participants,
Senator Kuchel and Representatives Vinson and Morgan were present. A 3-1/2-page
summary of the meeting is ibid.

President: I want to counsel with you. It is dangerous to have the leaders come here. The
reporters see they are coming and they go back and report all over the Hill. Some of our
boys are floating around in the water. The facts we would like to present to you are to be
held in the closest confidence and are to be kept in this room until announced.
Halleck: I did not tell a damn person.
President: I know no one did, but it is on both tickers anyway. We have to be very careful.
Please don't discuss what goes on in this room. I have asked Secretary McNamara to brief
you and it would be unjustifiable to refer to it at all.
McNamara: The first indication we had of another attack on the destroyers, the Maddox
and Turner Joy, was received at 7:30 A.M. today.
President: I asked the Secretary of State to give us a report on the political situation.
Rusk: For months and months we have been trying to get to them a signal, etc. This was a
serious decision to attack our vessels on the high seas. It was planned to take place forty
to sixty miles away from port on the high seas. We should not look on anything as
accidental and they look for us to come back in a relevant fashion. At the source of the
trouble we would run the great risk that they would misinterpret what the positions are in
South East Asia. We must make it quite clear that we are resolved not to overlook the
threat that is posed to our forces. We would propose to call for the Security Council and
also report to our Allies.
President: The Security Council of the United Nations.
Rusk: We would make it clear as we can that we are not going to run out of South East
Asia, but that we have no national ambitions nor either in a war to the north. They made
the choice themselves. They will have some doubts there if it comes to choice, but if we
go back in a limited fashion, there would still be a showing that we want to limit the
escalation. We have not had time to consult our Allies.
President: I would like to ask Mr. McCone to give us his estimate of enemy action--what
their responses would be.
Russell: Mr. McCone, I notice you did not mention the submarine. Does anybody know
what kind of anti-submarine warfare there is in that area?
McCone: We discussed that today. Our forces there have ample forces to take care of it.
We expect to move close to the China Seas.
McNamara: They can be there before any submarines can. The carriers can take of
themselves.
President: We do not seriously anticipate that.
Russell: It would more likely be through the air.
Rusk: They can disguise their air power by pretending they are Viet Namese.
Russell: The submarine can come nearer disguising itself.
Hickenlooper. Do I understand the reasoning behind your analysis on one phase is that if
we do not do something here then the Communist forces will be in a position to deal from
strength in any proposed settlement? If we do react, it may put us in a position to deal
from strength.
Russell: That is part of the problem. It is possible we would be giving up the right to sail
through the Gulf. If we did that, psychologically our prestige possibly would be seriously
affected in Hanoi and other places. They might come to the wrong conclusion about what
we are willing to do, which would be much more serious.
Hickenlooper: They attacked and we will deal from here on out and we are trying to
counteract.
Rusk: We are trying to get across two points: (1) leave your neighbors alone and (2) If
you don't, we will have to get busy.
Hickenlooper: May I ask if there is a comparison between Cuba and this? Cuba was a
bold and dangerous operation as far as Washington is concerned. No one knows what
would have happened had we not reacted. Is it possible this follows the same route? If we
don't react, what kind of position does it put us in with the North Viet Namese?
Rusk: What the Russians learned in Cuba could have an influence on the entire world.
Speaker: There is no question but what it is an act of war-an attack on American vessels.
Deliberate from our angle. In the lives of Nations you must take calculated risks. If we
don't take some action, what would flow from it? Inaction may be more important than
action.
Bolton: Ammunition available to the ship was not powerful enough to do the job.
McNamara: We have the most modern ammunition available anywhere.
Saltonstall: The Secretary said they are going to protest to the Security Council tomorrow.
Rusk: I will get the notes for you on this issue.
Saltonstall: If you ask for action and did not get. it, wouldn't you be in a weak position?
Rusk: Our preliminary thought is that we are in a stronger position to make it if we do not
ask the Security Council.
Aiken: Get Mr. McCone to give us a report on the Chinese.
McNamara: I do not think they will join in any physical reaction and I do not think that
there will be any other reaction.
Halleck: Could they think that they could withdraw from the Bay to ease tension?
President: Maybe you would want to consider that General Taylor follow the instrument.
The Joint Chiefs of Staff have gone over it all. General Wheeler is here. I would like for
him to report on the recommendations of General Taylor in Viet Nam. (General Wheeler
then explained the recommendations.)
Rusk: We do expect to be in contact with the co-chairmen of the 1954 settlement. We
want to get the main hand in disengagement and try to keep it under control.
Russell: Are you sure you have enough stuff to do this job? We don't want to do it half
way.
McNamara: We have two carriers and definitely enough power to do the job. We do
propose to use bombers.
Russell: You will have to make more than one strike. How many sorties do we have
planned?
McNamara: We have issued orders for only a single night's action. These orders are
already in being.
Russell: Is it daytime over there?
McNamara: Our attacks will be in daylight hours.
Russell: I hope you will keep going until they get the last one of them. We had a
Formosan type resolution in the Middle East. It was taken before the positive action--or
subsequent to the positive action.
President: I think they were taken before this debate was critical of Korea. Felt they would
come and see the seriousness of the situation. If I recall, ____/2/ speech would have said
he had supported it.
Halleck: That is tantamount to a declaration of war.
Speaker: I think the fleet was pretty well in preparation. All plans were made.
Hickenlooper: It seems to me there should be no desire to have a confrontation. There
should be no doubt as to whether the President should have the right to order the Armed
Forces into action. Should not have to quarrel for weeks as to whether he had the authority
or not. It is my own personal feeling that it is up to the President to prepare the kind and
type of resolution he believes would be proper. It is up to Congress to say whether they
will pass it or not. I have no doubt in my mind that concrete action would be taken.
President: I had that feeling but felt I wanted the advice of each of you and wanted to
consult with you. We felt we should move with the action recommended by the Joint
Chiefs, but I wanted to get the Congressional concurrence. I think it would be very
damaging to ask for it and not get it.

(Rusk then discussed Laos and Cambodia)
Russell: Does that include Burma?
Rusk: We considered specifying certain countries but felt we could not do this without
getting into problems.
Saltonstall: The only comment I have is this: How far does it go and where does it go
from there.
President: We thought there were two decisions to make after we were attacked yesterday
and today and nine torpedoes were shot at our destroyers 40 miles on the high seas. We
had to answer that attack. There are four bases. There have been many discussions and
recommendations by people in the country that we go into the northern area and not allow
them to murder us from bases of safety. These boats came from these bases and have been
shooting at American ships. I think I know what the reaction would be if we tucked our
tails. I thought I should get the Security Council and get the Leadership and after the
orders are executed I would plan to make a statement something like this. (The President
then read the proposed statement.)/3/
/3/Not found. For text of the statement as delivered at 11:36 p.m., see Document 286.
Saltonstall: Three times in that little statement you use the word "limited." Why not use
the word "determined" and let the limitations speak for themselves. If you will use the
"limited" maybe we won't go any further. Turned for the time being.
President: That is why we use it. We want them to know we are not going to take it lying
down, but we are not going to destroy their cities. We hope we can prepare them for the
course we will follow.
Saltonstall: I agree with what you are doing. If you put it in, someone will pick it up.
Bolton: I would do it. Keep them a little bit in the dark on what we are doing.
Rusk: I think there is some advantage in not leaving it in but that we are using this as a
pretext for a larger war. With the time factors involved I have not had a chance to discuss
this with all the governments that will have to be consulted. We can cut down the
emphasis.
Hickenlooper: I agree that the word limited should not be used three times. I wonder if the
connotation is that we are limited at this time.
President: We say our response for the moment will be limited. I suppose if you look at
the paragraph phrase it could include Burma, but we don't consider Burma would be
involved.
Humphrey: Better get a little task force to put the fine points to it.
Saltonstall: Just ask the Secretary to show me that paragraph again. Doesn't ask any other
Nations to join us at all. We would have to go alone. Other Nations could say-go to it.
Rusk: We can't tie ourselves to what they could do.
Halleck: We thought you ought to consider the words and phrases.
President: We will probably make some changes in it. Maybe we will say "desirable"
action. I don't ask you to draft the message or any bill we want. We have taken the
resolutions you have had in the past. I don't think any resolution is necessary, but I think it
is a lot better to have it in the light of what we did in Korea.
Speaker: I think Congress has a responsibility and should show a united front to the
world.
Halleck: The President knows there is no partisanship among us. Are we getting fouled up
here on something we could put off? There was never any hesitation when we had the
deal about Cuba. I was the first to speak up and say-Mr. President, count me in.
President: I would hope we could pretty well work out a resolution which is good with a
minimum of doctoring. I wanted to see if you felt it was the wise thing to do.
Hickenlooper: I think the resolution is appropriate and proper, but I doubt you should
mention the resolution in your remarks this evening.
President: I did not plan to mention it tonight.
Fulbright: Are they expected to urge these provocations?
Rusk: Maybe you have seen some of the broadcasts. They are highly inaccurate. They
have not talked about what did happen but what did not happen. Actions of that sort are a
low level minimum we have to take seriously.
Fulbright: What bases do you plan to destroy--Haiphong?
McNamara: No, we will not destroy any in the Haiphong area.
Aiken: You spoke of airplanes. Do you conclude they are airplanes? Viet Nam has no
combat aircraft. Communist China will move combat aircraft in shortly.
Russell: There are some Chinese here [there?]--perhaps in the nearby area.
McCone: There are four bases in North Viet Nam.
Russell: Aren't there some in ____/4/ Island?
McNamara: Two of them.
Mansfield: When the call came I looked at the ticker and I suppose you want us to be
frank. I don't know how much good it will do. I would point out as far as the Island of
Kinon is concerned, it is fortified. There is a sharp question between this and Cuba,
Russia, and the United States. In this instance, Russia is remote. China is not involved
directly. May be getting all involved with a minor third rate state. Then what is to come in
response, if not Korea for China? The Communists won't be faced down. A lot of lives to
mow them down.
President: Do you give me a formula?
Mansfield: Two, make them isolated acts of terror. Three, the United Nations, four, call
on 54 countries to consider it a matter of urgency.
Rusk: Principal problem, however, is that China has not committed itself. It would be
wonderful if she could get them to pull away. Cuba is quite different in a number of
respects. If we concentrate in a limited fashion on the source of the attack, it gives the
other side a chance to pull away.
Mansfield: In North Viet Nam there are jet airfields. In addition, have you considered
actions that might happen in Formosa.
Russell: What purpose do we have for drawing China into this? I am sure you will give
some thought to it. If we have to fight them, we will whip them. But I would like to know
[if?] you have come to some assumption.
Rusk: Some Chinese were planning to come in in any event. The general reaction to
mounting pressures and to impress the seriousness of their whole attitude.
Fulbright: The point the Secretary has made is that the provocation is important. It could
go on for several days. I think you ought to leave it in for the moment.
Dirksen: If I had it to do I would put our references to the word "limited" in deep freeze. It
connotes we would be like sitting ducks. We should make it clear we would meet every
enemy threat. I have one other observation--at 3 P.M., three of the most responsible
reporters say we got word out of the Pentagon. They could tell me six particular shots
were involved. They knew much more about it than I did. Maybe there is some
whispering going on.
McNamara: I heard the same story and have some idea of where it came from. I am sure
you understand what we told you last night/5/ has to be kept [secret?] because the North
Viet Namese could use the boats and their defenses could be alerted.
/5/Regarding the briefings by Rusk and McNamara on August 3, see Document 269.
Halleck: If we are going to have it, it has to be overwhelming. (He indicated a desire to
hear from the Speaker and the Majority Leader.)
President: I have told you what I want from you.
Fulbright: I will support it.
Mansfield: It will go before the Foreign Affairs Committee.

Saltonstall: I hope you make the United Nations a little more effective.
Russell: I share that hope.
Halleck: I think it will pass overwhelmingly as far as I am concerned. I have made my
position here clear in all cases.
Aiken: By the time you send it up there won't be anything for us to do but support you.
281. Circular Telegram From the Department of State to Certain Diplomatic

Missions/1/
/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 VIET S. Confidential; Immediate;
Exdis; Pierce Arrow. Drafted by Green and Robert Creel (EUR) and initialed by William
Tyler, Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs. Sent to Bonn, Brussels, The
Hague, Luxembourg, Paris (for the Embassy and USRO), and Rome and repeated to the
other NATO capitals and Madrid. Similar messages were sent to 14 other capitals at 11:01
p.m. (Circular telegrams 222 and 223; ibid.) and at 11:02 individual messages were sent to
New Delhi and Karachi. (Telegrams 266 and 136; ibid.) At 9:12 and 10:32, the U.S.
representatives to NATO and SEATO were instructed to call sessions of their
organizations to report on the U.S. position (Topol 198 and telegram 175 to Bangkok;
ibid.)
218. For the Ambassador or Charge. The following personal message from the President
to the Head of Government in your country should be delivered as soon as possible to the
FonMin or senior available official:
Begin Verbatim Text:
I am asking my Ambassador to convey to you a statement I am making in Washington
tonight/2/ with regard to deliberate attacks which have been made by Communist North
Viet-Namese torpedo boats on American vessels operating on the high seas.
As I am sure that you will agree, these attacks could not go unanswered. The response we
are making is, however, limited and fitting. I hope that it will make clear to the North
Viet-Namese regime the dangerous character of the course they are following in Southeast
Asia. End Verbatim Text.
Text of Presidential message as well as Pentagon announcement/3/ being sent to you
Septel and via USIS wireless file, respectively, and should accompany this personal
message. Slug future messages this subject "Pierce Arrow".
/3/Presumably reference is to News Release 570-64, a brief announcement describing the

attack on August 4. (Washington National Records Center. RG 330, Pentagon Papers
Files: FRC 75-0062, News Releases)
Rusk
282. Message From President Johnson to Prime Minister Macmillan/1/

/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 33-6 US-VIET N. Top Secret;
Immediate; Nodis; Pierce Arrow. Transmitted to the Embassy in London in telegram 861,
August 4, 9:41 p.m. with the explanation that the message had been sent to the Prime
Minister by a separate channel. Telegram 861 is the source text.
I tried to reach you earlier by phone to inform you of a serious development concerning
North Vietnam. Two of our destroyers, the Maddox (which had already been subjected to
attack on August 2) and the C. Turner Joy were today attacked on the high seas some 65
miles from the North Vietnamese coast by a number of PT boats which launched a
number of torpedoes. Fortunately neither of our ships suffered any damage. They engaged
the attack craft vigorously and, according to still unconfirmed reports, three were sunk. In
view of this further unprovoked attack against U.S. war ships on the high seas by the
North Vietnamese Naval Forces, I gave orders that air strikes should be immediately
carried out on the four PT bases and the accompanying POL installations. Two of these
bases are located in the Southern part of the coastline and the two others in the Northern
area.
I have called the leadership of the Congress to meet with me at 6:45 this evening, our
time. We will make a report to a special meeting of the North Atlantic Council at 3 p.m.
European time tomorrow, Wednesday. I am also considering whether to send a personal
message to Chairman Khrushchev in order to inform him of this further attack and of the
reasons why I am determined to take all measures necessary to prevent such attacks and to
protect our forces. At the same time, I would assure him that our objective remains the
maintenance of international peace and security in Southeast Asia.
I will of course continue to keep you informed of developments as promptly as possible
and attach the greatest importance to our keeping in closest touch with each other.
Sincerely,
Lyndon B. Johnson/2/
283. Message From President Johnson to Prime Minister Khanh/1/

/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 VIET S. Secret; Flash; Exdis;
Pierce Arrow. Transmitted to the Embassy in Saigon in telegram 342, 9:47 p.m., for
delivery to Khanh with President Johnson's statement (see Document 286). Telegram 342
is the source text.
I am asking Ambassador Taylor to convey to you personally a statement I am making in
Washington tonight concerning the deliberate attacks which have been made by
Communist North Vietnamese torpedo boats on American vessels operating on the high
seas. The measures I have ordered are intended to make it unmistakably clear to the
Communist leaders in Hanoi that the United States defends its rights and that our
commitment to assist your country in preserving her freedom and independence cannot be
shaken.
The Hanoi regime has embarked upon an adventure which can have the gravest
consequences for world peace, and I believe that you and I have responsibilities which
extend beyond our own borders. For this reason our response to North Vietnamese
provocation has been, for the present, limited in the hope that the Hanoi regime will
recognize the dangers which flow from increasing violence in Southeast Asia.
It is of the utmost importance therefore that our two countries continue to plan and act in
the closest consultation during the very critical days ahead. Ambassador Taylor will
always be prepared to communicate your thoughts to me, and I will keep in close touch
with you through him./2/
284. Telegram From the Commander in Chief, Pacific (Sharp) to the Chairman of
the Joint Chiefs of Staff (Wheeler)/1/
Honolulu, August 4, 1964--9:53 a.m.
/1/Source: Washington National Records Center, RG 319, HQDA Message Center, Reel
11885. Secret; Priority. According to another copy, this telegram was repeated by the JCS
to the White House, CIA, NSA, and the Department of State at 8:47 p.m. and was
received in the Department of State at 10:26 p.m. (Department of State, Central Files,
POL 27 VIET S)
032353Z. DeSoto Patrol rules of engagement. A. JCS 7680 DTG 021725Z. B. JCS 7681
DTG 022349Z. C. OPNAVINST 03300.8. D. JCS 2084/80. E. SM-1431-62./2/
/2/JCS telegrams 7680 and 7681 are printed as Documents 259 and 261; the other three
documents have not been found.
1. A United States ship has been attacked on the high seas off North Vietnam. The
Maddox quite properly repulsed the attackers and one of the attacking boats was
destroyed. Now, our friends and enemies alike will await what additional moves the
United States will take.

2. Refs A and B appear to be a retreat at a time when aggressive measures are necessary.
Ref A now prohibits an approach by DeSoto Patrol closer than eleven miles to the North
Vietnam mainland coastline. Ref B prohibits hot pursuit into hostile waters and refers to
international waters parenthetically as eleven miles offshore. Does this mean that hot
pursuit must stop eleven miles offshore? If so, we are drastically reducing the time and
space available to our ships and aircraft for destroying the attackers.
3. Although the terms hostile waters and hostile airspace are used in the rules of
engagement contained in refs C through E, no clear definition of the terms is set forth and
it must be assumed that they are synonymous with territorial waters and territorial
airspace of the offending country.
4. In the event of unprovoked attack, our forces should be authorized to take aggressive
action to destroy the attackers. This action has traditionally included hot pursuit into the
territorial waters and airspace of the hostile country. If we are to be prohibited from
pursuing into territorial waters and airspace, we should be allowed to pursue to the threemile limit where territorial waters commence, in accordance with standard U.S. policy.
5. Recommend that:
a. The terms territorial waters and airspace be used in lieu of hostile waters and airspace.
b. DeSoto Patrol be permitted to approach within eight miles of NVN coastline, thus
keeping five miles clear of territorial waters.
c. Hot pursuit into territorial waters and airspace of the hostile country be authorized.
d. If hot pursuit into territorial waters is not authorized, then authorize pursuit to the threemile limit.
285. Memorandum of a Telephone Conversation Between the Secretary of State in

Washington and the Representative at the United Nations (Stevenson) in New York,
August 4, 1964, 10:40 p.m./1/
TELEPHONE CALL FROM AMB. STEVENSON, USUN
S said the earliest possible would be noon; Yost is notifying U Thant. Sec said President
will make his statement at 11:15; there were some changes in the text. Sec said the key
thing and we must make it very clear up there tomorrow is that this is limited action
appropriate to the nature of the intolerable kind of attack; we do not want a big war, in no
sense is this destroyer a pretext to make a big thing out of a little one. S asked if this were
self-defense under Article 51/2/ Sec said he thought so; we cannot have our vessels
operating in danger of being torpedoed; we are not going into any general assault, just
after these boats. They discussed whether U Thant visit should be postponed;/3/ they did
not think so but it was possible. Sec said he did not think a resolution would be introduced
tomorrow; this was basically a reporting situation. S asked in the event they ask for North
Viet Nam to be seated, should we ask for South Viet Nam. Sec said yes, but he doubted
they would. S asked if we had any info about the boats. Sec said they were built in
Chinese yards, but have been in North Viet Nam for some time and for all practical
purposes are North Vietnamese. Sec said we should concentrate on the fact that they are
North Vietnamese, so that we do not force the Chinese into it.
/2/Article 51 of the U.N. Charter provides that nothing in the Charter impairs the right of
self-defense, if an armed attack occurs against a member, until the Security Council has
taken measures to maintain international peace and security.
/3/U Thant was scheduled to visit Washington on August 6.
286. Editorial Note

At 11:20 p.m., Admiral Sharp telephoned Secretary McNamara to confirm that that the
Ticonderoga "got her planes off at 0243" or 10:43 p.m., Washington time, and 10:43 a.m.,
Saigon time. Sharp indicated that it would take the aircraft almost 2 hours to reach their
targets. After discussing the matter with General Wheeler, McNamara called President
Johnson to inform him. (August 28 chronology; Johnson Library, National Security File,
Vietnam Country File, Gulf of Tonkin Misc. 1964)
At 11:36 p.m. on August 4, President Johnson addressed the nation from the White House
over radio and television. He summarized the events since the attack on the Maddox on
August 2 and informed the nation that "air action is now in execution against gunboats
and certain supporting facilities in North Viet-Nam which have been used in these hostile
operations." The President told the nation:
"In the larger sense this new act of aggression, aimed directly at our own forces, again
brings home to all of us in the United States the importance of the struggle for peace and
security in Southeast Asia. Aggression by terror against the peaceful villagers of South
Viet-Nam has now been joined by open aggression on the high seas against the United
States of America.
"The determination of all Americans to carry out our full commitment to the people and to
the government of South Vietnam will be redoubled by this outrage. Yet our response, for
the present, will be limited and fitting. We Americans know, although others appear to
forget, the risks of spreading conflict. We still seek no wider war."
He concluded his statement with an acknowledgement of his "solemn" responsibility in
ordering the military action, but he considered that "firmness in the right is indispensable
today for peace; that firmness will always be measured.'' The President's statement is
printed in Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Lyndon B. Johnson, 196364, Book II, pages 927-928, and Department of State Bulletin, August 24, 1964, page 259.

Saigon, August 5, 1964--noon.
/1/Source: Department of State, Saigon Embassy Files: Lot 68 F 8. Top Secret; Flash;
Exdis; Pierce Arrow. Received at 11:58 p.m., August 4. Drafted by Taylor. Also sent to
the Department of Defense and repeated to CINCPAC, CIA, and the White House.
303. Deptel 341./2/ In company with Alex Johnson and Westmoreland I saw Khanh at
0930 Saigon time and gave him information and advice contained in reftel. Khanh was
delighted with news and asked permission to tell Cabinet which was meeting at 1000. As
execution of attacks had not been confirmed, I authorized communication of information
less indication of targets.
/2/Document 279.
At same time, I urged Khanh and he agreed to stress to Cabinet seriousness of situation
and need to close ranks and achieve greater unity.
There followed considerable discussion of precautionary measures to take in SVN in view
of possible hostile reaction. Khanh was inclined to put out something to public warning
people (of Saigon in particular) of danger of air attack. We persuaded him not to do so,
pointing out danger of panic and got his agreement to say nothing publicly now. Later,
following President's statement not yet received here, he will want to make some
statement explaining situation and urging national unity.
It was agreed that an alert should go out through military channels warning of possible
VC reaction and air action against targets in I and II Corps, particularly the air field at
DaNang and the 34A marine base. Westmoreland is meeting with DefMin Khiem to work
out detailed alert plan./3/
/3/Westmoreland transmitted a report on his meeting with Khiem at 11:30 a.m. in MAC
JOO 7425 from Saigon, August 5. Johnson Library, National Security File. Vietnam
Country File, Vol. XIV, Memos)
General Khanh stated that his air force would like to participate in this action against
NVN. I told him that I understood his desire to join forces but that now was not the time.
He should keep his military guard up and await outcome of events in progress.
Khanh mentioned that in case of air attacks on Saigon he was prepared to move to
emergency CPs which he had prepared at Cap St. Jacques, Dalat and Nha Trang. In view
of fact that something might happen to him, he suggested giving me a paper asking US
intervention and take over of command if he disappeared. I acknowledged this might be a
desirable thing but let matter drop. (I would appreciate advice on attitude to take on this
point.) Khanh also indicated that he still regards Khiem as his successor.
Westmoreland informed Khanh that he was seeing General Minh shortly for purpose of
introducing General Throckmorton and got Khanh's agreement to tell Minh the same
things which Khanh was about to tell Cabinet regarding events in Tonkin Gulf.
I informed Khanh on leaving that US would increase the number of F-102s presently in
SVN and he expressed thanks while reminding us that US has the only means for air
defense of his country.
Taylor
288. Telegram From the Department of State to the Mission at the United Nations/1/
Washington, August 5, 1964--1:30 a.m.
/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 VIET S. Confidential. Drafted by
Cleveland.
282. For Ambassador Stevenson. Subject: Security Council meeting on torpedo boat
incidents. Following is general guidance and suggestions for SC meeting Wednesday
morning. Additional memo on legal aspects in septel./2/
/2/Not found.
1. We are coming to the SC to report a threat to the peace, and to report the action we
have felt necessary to take as a responsible member of the world community. Although an
attack on a U.S. destroyer in international waters is clearly an armed attack on our nation
within the meaning of Article 51, our case for UN concern rests more broadly on Charter
doctrine that all governments have responsibility to refrain from aggression and armed
attack. We are not angry, but sorrowful. It is not (as one TV commentator tonight called
it) "a drastic retaliatory action", but rather a single action designed to make unmistakably
clear that U.S cannot be diverted by military action from its obligation to help its friends
establish and protect their independence.
2. We hope you can encourage other friendly members of SC to make appropriate
statements of support. It seems to us that there are five clear votes (US, UK, GRC, Brazil
and Bolivia) against any unsatisfactory proposition, but that seven votes are probably
lacking for condemnatory res. French, who as usual are swing vote, may take occasion to
plug for Geneva Conference; desire to heat up atmosphere in order to get a Geneva
Conference may indeed be one of Hanoi and Peking motivations in this affair.
3. In the event North Vietnamese ask to be heard, suggest you not oppose but try to
arrange so that they are heard under Rule 39 (under which SC "may invite.../3/ persons,
whom it considers competent for the purpose, to supply it with information or to give
other assistance in examining matters within its competence"). In these circumstances,
believe Government of South Viet-Nam should also be invited to appear, not under Rule
39 but as government of non-member state concerned.
/3/Ellipsis in the source text.
4. As in Cambodian border case, every occasion should be taken to emphasize (a) general
context of Geneva Agreements violated by communists and (b) our desire for enforceable
peace and assured independence as only motive our military assistance to SVN and our
military activity in the area.

5. We do not see any need for seeking formal action of SC and would be satisfied to have
SC conclude with no resolution. However, following is suggested draft resolution for
possible tactical use in event hostile resolution proposed by Soviets or some other SC
member. It is too early to make any definitive judgment as to whether, in absence of
hostile resolution, it would be politically desirable to put forward such a resolution, since
this would depend in part on amount of support we could get from other Council members
as well as what counter-measures, if any, other side may take in response to our
retaliation.
We recognize that resolution put forward by others would undoubtedly include
evenhanded appeal to both sides to refrain from any action which might exacerbate
situation. For this reason, we have included in suggested resolution paragraph along these
lines which would be acceptable to us and avoids fixing blame on United States.
Text of resolution follows:
"The Security Council
Noting that the North Vietnamese have launched unprovoked attacks on American naval
vessels in international waters,
Having considered the complaint of the United States,
Noting further the measures taken by the United States,
Concerned that the continuation of the present situation could lead to a serious threat to
peace in the area,
Condemns the attacks by the North Vietnamese on U.S. ships;
Calls on the Hanoi regime to respect the freedom of use of the high seas in accordance
with the rights guaranteed by international law to vessels of all nations, and to cease and
desist from any further hostile and provocative acts;
Calls on all concerned to refrain from any actions which might further exacerbate the
situation."
Rusk

/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 VIET S. Secret Immediate; Exdis;
Pierce Arrow. Also sent to the Department of Defense and repeated to CINCPAC, CIA,
and the White House. Received at 6:09 a.m.

310. Delivered President's letter and public statement/2/ to Khanh at 1600 local 5 August.
He was pleased to receive letter and expressed complete agreement with it. He
understands that it is confidential and not to be released. I took opportunity to stress
importance of getting on with our joint military planning which is being initiated today by
General Westmoreland and DefMin Khiem.
I gave him in general terms our US plans for reinforcing SEA area of which the
introduction into SVN of 2 squadrons of B-57's and 1 squadron of F-102's was a part. He
responded that his country was open to US forces at any time and no permission for
introduction need be sought, particularly if time presses.
I cited danger at time like this to neglect the counter VC campaign and urged him to keep
pressure behind the operations in progress. He stated that he had already issued
instructions to this effect.
He has decided to make Cap St. Jacques his alternate command post. Westmoreland is
looking the facilities over today, particularly the signal communications.
We decided to postpone the GVN National Security Council-US Mission Council meeting
scheduled for tomorrow, 6 August.
Still no news here on results of Seventh Fleet strikes. Khanh most interested (as am I).
Taylor
290. Memorandum for the Record of the White House Staff Meeting, Washington,
August 5, 1964, 8 a.m./1/
/1/Source: National Defense University, Taylor Papers, T-202-69. Secret; Eyes Only.
Drafted by William Y. Smith.
1. Mr. Bundy presided.
2. Southeast Asia. Much of today's session was spent discussing various aspects of the
Southeast Asia situation, and the entire waterfront was covered. Before getting into
specifics, I should state that the general tone of the remarks, especially Bundy's, was that
thus far everything the US had done was well in hand. As to possible future
developments, there was uncertainty, the feeling being that both friendly and unfriendly
reactions would become better known during the day.
Bundy began by saying that it is difficult to understand the DRV motives in attacking US
warships. He said there obviously was some relation between the recent covert attacks on
DRV maritime bases, but how much was not clear. Further, he recognized the DRV might
have feared stepped-up US actions against them and decided to act. Still it was difficult to
conceive what kind of image they had of the US to think we could stand for such attacks.
Later in the meeting I came back to the point of DRV intentions by asking what steps we
were taking to find out what Hanoi was thinking. I recalled that at one point we were
trying to cultivate the Canadians to perform this chore. Bundy responded that things were
being done but he chose not to mention them specifically. He added that one problem was
that even after an outsider talked with Hanoi, it was difficult to determine what the DRV
had in mind.
Wilson of USIA asked what evidence we could offer publicly that the attacks had taken
place. Bundy replied that Rowan had stressed last night/2/ the importance of making the
evidence public, and he was right. On the first attack, the evidence wou1d be pretty good.
On the second one the amount of evidence we have today is less than we had yesterday.
This resulted primarily from correlating bits and pieces of information eliminating double
counting and mistaken signals. This much seemed certain: There was an attack. How
many PT boats were involved, how many torpedoes were fired, etc.--all this was still
somewhat uncertain. This matter may be of some importance since Hanoi has denied
making the second attack.
/2/At the NSC meeting at 6:15 p.m., August 4; see Document 278.
Douglass Cater, sitting in at his first staff meeting, raised a question about the
Congressional resolution on SE Asia. He said he had not thought it through completely,
but the logic behind the resolution troubled him somewhat, and he also questioned use of
the Middle East precedent--that turning out a not too successful venture. The logic that
troubled him was how an attack on US forces specifically justified a resolution in favor of
maintenance of freedom in SE Asia. Bundy, in reply, jokingly told him perhaps the matter
should not be thought through too far. For his own part, he welcomed the recent events as
justification for a resolution the Administration had wanted for some time.
Other points of interest mentioned:
Bromley Smith thought it prudent to emphasize that our attacks were reprisals. Thus he
thought that restrikes or follow-on air attacks should not continue over an extended period
of days. He asked who would approve restrikes. After the meeting I confirmed what
Bundy thought: that authority for restrikes would come from Washington, at least from
McNamara and probably from the White House. In the same vein, Bromley Smith also
thought we should emphasize that "iron" bombs are being used, not nuclear ones. No one
thought this a problem: this word is out already.
Someone asked what would happen if the ChiComs brought their air power on the DRV.
Bundy cautiously said that our people thought we could handle them. He then looked at
me and said, "General LeMay doesn't think in terms of the enemy, does he? He assumes
they won't be there." I made some response to the effect that General LeMay assumes
some of his people will take care of the enemy for him; he doesn't have to worry too much
about that. All this was said in good humor, and the matter dropped.
Referring to the President's meeting with the Congressional "leadership" yesterday,/3/
Bundy commented that "leadership" was a funny word in this case, in that there was little
Congressmen could do in the way of leading in a situation in which the President's role
was so primary.
3 See Document 280.
[Here follow brief discussions on Cuba, war games, and Daniel Ellsberg.]
6. President's speech. The President originally was to speak of the dangers of nuclear war
at Syracuse today He first, among others, decided today was the wrong day; so a new
subject was chosen. SE Asia will be covered, to some extent, at least.
W.Y.S./4/
291. Record of the Secretary of State's Staff Meeting, Washington, August 5, 1965,
9:15 a.m./1/
/1/Source: Department of State, Secretary's Staff Meetings: Lot 66 D 147. Secret. Drafted
by Richard T. Davies, Deputy Executive Secretary.
Governor Harriman presided./2/
/2/Secretary Rusk was at a breakfast with Senators Fulbright and Saltonstall and
Representatives Morgan and Arends to discuss the Congressional resolution. Johnson
Library, Rusk Appointment Book)
1. INR (Mr. Hughes)
After reviewing the results of the U.S. strike in the Gulf of Tonkin, Mr. Hughes said that,
while there was no official reaction from the CPR, diplomats in Peiping reported the CPR
was taking a very grave view of the development. The U.S. strike would vastly increase
chances of a direct Sino-U.S. confrontation in their view. There was continuing CPR
silence on the original incident of August 3.
Japanese reaction was moderate and the Japanese were looking forward to the Security
Council meeting.
DRV domestic radio has broadcast a statement attacking U.S. sabotage and subversive
actions as well as an alleged U.S. air attack on a North Vietnamese village. The Maddox
was alleged to have infringed DRV territorial waters on August 2, 3 and 4, and Hanoi
radio claimed two U.S. planes have been shot down and three others damaged.
The British reaction was relatively favorable.
There was no official French reaction yet.
Governor Harriman said that, while South Vietnamese vessels have operated in DRV
waters, participants in the meeting should tell their embassies in Washington that no U.S.
vessels have done so.
Mr. Hughes said that Soviet comment so far was quite moderate.
[Here follows discussion of unrelated subjects.]
2. FE (Mr. Green)
It looks as though the Tonkin Gulf action was very effective: about one-half the Swatows
and PT boats were destroyed or badly damaged and the oil dump in Vinh has undergone
90 percent destruction. Various redeployments of U.S. forces are going on. The SEATO
meeting was satisfactory. 3 The Japanese reaction has been surprisingly positive.
3 A brief report on the special SEATO Council meeting on August 5, which indicated that
most of the Council representatives had privately expressed their satisfaction with the
U.S. actions, was transmitted in telegram 141 from Bangkok, August 5. (Department of
State, Central Files, POL 27 VIET S)
292. Editorial Note

At 11:30 a.m. on August 5, President Johnson spoke at the dedication ceremonies for a
new journalism building at Syracuse University. After reviewing the attacks in the Gulf of
Tonkin, he told of the U.S. reprisals and the referral of the question to the United Nations.
He then reviewed U.S. policy in Vietnam since 1954 and the aggression of North Vietnam
toward its neighbors.
Later in the day, the President sent a special message to Congress asking for a resolution
"expressing the unity and determination of the United States in supporting freedom and in
protecting the peace in Southeast Asia."
Both the address and the message to Congress are printed in Public Papers of the
Presidents of the United States: Lyndon B. Johnson, 1963-64, Book II, pages 928-932,
and Department of State Bulletin, August 24, 1964, pages 260-263.

the Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs (Bundy), Washington,
August 5, 1964, 2:22 p.m./1/
classification marking. Transcribed by June M. Robinson of the Operations Staff.
TELEPHONE CALL FROM MR. WM. BUNDY
[Here follows discussion of an unrelated subject.]

B. asked about the resolution--Sec. said Mac Bundy and Ball were now going over the
final touches--it was a good resolution and only minor changes were made on the Hill.
There is also a short statement which Sec. just went over with the Pres. Sec. said there
will be Hearings in the morning--House and Senate. Sec. would like B. and his boys
together with McNaughton to put together a ten minute statement to start off and it should
among other things analyze the resolution--Sec. said start off with the purpose of the
resolution--the purpose of our policy in Southeast Asia and the importance of maximum
unity and making unity clear and end up a little bit on the same note.
294. Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for International

Organization Affairs (Cleveland) to the Secretary of State/1/
/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 VIET S/UN. Confidential. Drafted
and initialed by Cleveland and sent to Rusk through S/S.
SUBJECT
Security Council Session on Tonkin Gulf Incident and its Implications--Action
Memorandum
The first session of the Security Council dealing with the North Vietnamese attack on our
vessels and our response could hardly have gone better today./2/ After a procedural hassle
in which the Deputy Soviet Representative, Morozov, made a pro forma protest at holding
the session today without an opportunity to get instructions from Moscow, Ambassador
Stevenson delivered the statement essentially as you approved it in the wee hours this
morning./3/
/2/Discussion of the events in the Gulf of Tonkin before the U.N. Security Council began
at 3 p.m. on Wednesday August 5 and continued at the same hour on August 7. For
records of the discussions at these sessions, see U.N. docs. S/PV.1140 and 1141.
Ambassador Stevenson's statement is printed in Department of State Bulletin, August 24,
1964, pp. 272-274.
/3/A draft of this statement, which is essentially the same as U.N. doc. S/PV.1140, is in
Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 VIET S.
Despite his allegation of unpreparedness, Morozov replied to Stevenson immediately at
some length and introduced a resolution requesting the DRV be heard. While fairly long,
the Soviet statement seemed largely improvised and based on press accounts. By normal
Soviet standards, Morozov's statement was moderate. He pleaded lack of factual
information about the incidents. He said, in general terms, that the Soviet Government
expects the United States to put an immediate end to military activities against the DRV,
adding that if this were not done, the United States "shall bear heavy responsibilities for
the consequences." One almost had the impression that he was not defending a fellow
Communist regime, or at least not his kind of Communist regime.
The only other speakers delving into the substance of the issue were the UK and China,
who fully supported our action as justifiable self-defense within the UN Charter.
The French Representative professed inability to speak on substance at this point and
merely supported hearing of [from?] the DRV. However, like several other Council
members, he believed this could and should be arranged without a formal resolution such
as the Soviets had requested.
Pursuant to your guidance,/4/ Ambassador Stevenson intervened a second time to say that
the U.S. did not object to someone from Hanoi explaining their aggressive acts to the
Council, but he pointed out that since these attacks were an extension of the war against
South Viet Nam, a representative of the Republic of Viet Nam should also be invited.
The session concluded when the Council President, Nielsen of Norway, found a
consensus in favor of scheduling no meeting for tomorrow and permitting the day to be
used for consultations both on the manner in which North and South Viet Nam would be
invited, and on the date of the next meeting.
In the absence of further hostilities or serious Communist threats the Security Council
deliberation will resume, probably on Friday, in less of a crisis atmosphere and with a
possibility that the sessions will be extended over a long period. We now need to consider
with you where we want to go in the UN forum from here on in. The debate will
inevitably broaden--particularly when and if representatives from Hanoi and Saigon
appear. Now that we have discharged our reporting responsibility, we must reflect in
longer range terms what if any UN action we can usefully seek to help cope with the
vexing problems facing us in Southeast Asia. I very much hope that Ambassador
Stevenson's presence here tomorrow will provide an opportunity for us to review this
question with you.
Late Bulletin: In a corridor conversation after the Council meeting, the Soviets have
displayed uncertainty as to whether DRV would accept the invitation to appear in New
York, even if it is tendered. Apparently, this feature of the Soviet role today was also
improvised.
295. Letter From Chairman Khrushchev to President Johnson/1/

Moscow, August 5, 1964.
/1/Source: Department of State, Presidential Correspondence: Lot 77 D 163. No
classification marking. The Russian text of the signed original, which was handed to
Ambassador Kohler at 9 p.m. on August 5 is ibid. Presumably this translation was made
in the Embassy in Moscow.
Dear Mr. President: I deem it necessary to personally inform you about the concern that
we feel in connection with the events unfolding in the Gulf of Tonkin.
From the very outset I want to mention that we know about these events solely from those
statements which have been made these days in Washington, from the published orders to
the American armed forces, from the reports of the news agencies and also from the
statement, just published, by the spokesman of the High Command of the Vietnamese
People's Army concerning the incident on August 2 in the Gulf of Tonkin./2/ We do not
have other information as yet. One thing is indisputable, however, the situation there has
sharply deteriorated and military conflicts are taking place near the coast of the
Democratic Republic of Vietnam and the Chinese People's Republic, in which warships of
the U.S. Navy are participating as well as military planes--based on American aircraft
carriers. Also obvious is the seriousness of these developments--indeed, it is impossible to
rule out that they may mushroom into such proportions and turn in such a way that it will
be difficult to say where they will stop.
/2/Not found.
We do not know exactly now just what has happened there. But even irrespective of this
the fact remains that the warships of the U.S. Navy have entered the Gulf which cuts
deeply into the territories of the DRV and the CPR, and that it is from these ships that fire
was opened and aircraft are being launched which according to the latest reports, are
making strikes against objectives on the territory of the DRV. Suffice it to look at the map
to convince oneself that except the DRV and the CPR there are no other states the
territories of which adjoin the Gulf of Tonkin and that, consequently, the very fact of
introduction of American warships in that Gulf under any circumstances cannot be viewed
in any other way but as a military demonstration, as a challenge to the states whose shores
are washed by that Gulf.
With all frankness I must say that if these actions of American warships and air forces
pursue the aim of strengthening somehow the position of the corrupt and rotten South
Vietnamese regime which exists--and this is no secret to anyone--only because of the
foreign support, then such actions will not achieve the given aim. But to increase the
danger of a serious military conflict--they can.
A question arises before me: have not clouds been deliberately darkened around the
developments in the Gulf of Tonkin? Is not the influence felt here by those quarters and
persons who do not conceal their desire to inflame the passions, to pour oil on the flame
and whose militant frame of mind one should regard with great caution and restraint? But
if this influence is indeed real and if it has an ear, then another, more serious question
arises--where the present developments can lead to?
It would be unnecessary to speak in detail now about the enormous responsibility which
our two powers bear, you personally as President of the United States and I as Chairman
of the U.S.S.R. Council of Ministers, in keeping the peace, in ensuring that dangerous
events whichever area of the globe they begin with, would not become first elements in
the chain of ever more critical and maybe irreversible events. I believe that you should
agree with this. And if this is so, then at this moment it is most important to draw from
this necessary practical conclusions and proceeding from this lofty responsibility to look
at the circumstances around the developments in the Gulf of Tonkin with maximum
objectivity and to again and again weigh possible consequences.
I would not like here to give play to feelings although this, in all appearance, is justified
by the situation. Because of lack of reliable information I confine myself to expressing

those thoughts which follow from the main and undeniable fact, namely, that the warships
and air forces of the United States have taken military action in the Gulf of Tonkin area.
I want to emphasize that no one has asked the Soviet Government to address you in
connection with the developments near the coast of the DRV and the CPR. If there
appears a threat to peace, I am deeply convinced that we should not wait for requests or
appeals from anybody but must act so as to remove that threat without delay.
I would like to hope that on your part there will be shown necessary composure and
restraint in order to remove the military tension and stop defiant actions of the American
armed forces in the Gulf of Tonkin area which may lead to an appropriate response from
the other side.
Sincerely,
N. Khrushchev/3/
296. Memorandum From the Director of the Policy Planning Council (Rostow) to the
/1/Source: Department of State, S/P Files: Lot 70 D 199, Vietnam. Secret. Initialed by
Rostow and sent to Rusk through S/S. The source text bears the handwritten notation
"Secretary Saw." Also published in Declassified Documents, 1979, 92C.
SUBJECT
Speculation on the Background and Possible Implications of the Tonkin Gulf Incidents
1. The Setting. The North Viet Nam PT-boat attacks occurred against a background
marked, in recent weeks, by divergent tendencies as seen from Hanoi:
a. Their military and political prospects in South Viet Nam have substantially improved,
and this fact was appreciated and reflected, for example, in General Giap's speech of July
26.
b. On the other hand, the U.S. commitment to the defense of Southeast Asia and support
of peripheral offensive actions increased both in Laos and in Viet Nam. The covert moves
against North Viet Nam and the discussion of the possibility of more direct action against
North Viet Nam have been, evidently, taken seriously despite the evident desire of
President Johnson to limit the terrain of conflict. They may have reckoned that this danger
would rise in the months ahead, notably after our election.
It is out of this mixed setting of simultaneously enlarged hopes and fears, with perhaps a
sense that time might not be their friend, that they took a course extremely difficult to
explain by attacking directly units of the Seventh Fleet.

2. Alternative Theories. The following four major hypotheses might explain the action.
a. The least likely, that the attacks on the Seventh Fleet were an
effort to seek a response which could be used as a provocation for a previously planned
massive military assault on Laos and South Viet Nam either by the overt use of ground
forces across frontiers or by forces previously secreted in those areas.
b. More likely, Hanoi may have concluded, on the basis of its assessment of SVN politics,
that a U.S. failure to react sharply to these attacks might have persuaded the Khanh
government that further reliance on the U.S. was unprofitable and that Saigon should seek
the best terms it could find with Hanoi. The incident may have been linked in its timing to
such a planned or hoped for cave-in by the GVN.
c. The attacks could be a device for so raising the international noise level and anxiety
about war in Southeast Asia as to force the U.S. into a conference in which the issue of
the violation of the 1954 and 1962 Accords would be obscured; that is, they could have
regarded the move as a device to place us in a position of negotiating under conditions
where it would be extremely difficult for us to continue to increase direct pressure on the
North, while they continued their military and political campaign in the South, hoping, as
in 1954, for a Dienbienphu during the conference. U.S. acceptance of a conference on
such terms would be assessed in Hanoi as a damaging, if not mortal, blow to GVN
morale.
d. The attacks may have been intended as a limited reaction to covert intrusions into the
North, and the raised level of our support in SVN and Laos, probably designed to make us
back off or to deter us from conducting further operations of this type or from continuing
to expand our commitment in the area.
3. Comment on the Hypotheses. We know of no evidence to justify the view that a
massive ground force attack by the Communists in Southeast Asia is planned. However, a
heightening of all forms of intelligence collection on Communist troop dispositions and
movements in Southeast Asia does appear justified. The hope that the U.S. might respond
so passively as to trigger a cave-in or coup inside Saigon is a more tenable hypothesis;
although the political evidence available from South Viet Nam does not make a
connection clear. What is clear, however, is that a failure to react vigorously by the U.S.
might, in fact, have had the result of inducing Khanh to throw in his hand. One likely
strand in their action was a felt need to make a show of force in the face of our increasing
involvement in the area. So far as a conference is concerned, what is clear is that a direct
U.S.-Hanoi confrontation may prove a more effective way of forcing us to the conference
table, in their view, than a focusing of attention on the state of the 1954 and 1962
Accords, taken by themselves.
In short, we cannot give a straight, confident answer to the question: Why did they do it?
The most likely elements appear a desire to make a show of force against us; a desire to
force us to the conference table on unfavorable terms; and the hope that we would so
behave as to weaken the political base in Saigon.
4. The Next Stage. On the whole, it is likely that they did not count on a response as
substantial as that now under way. From their point of view, the U.S. strike will appear a
rather massive countermove, however limited it may be judged by us. It will create a new
situation. Specifically, we would agree in general with the memorandum of August 4 to
you from Tom Hughes,/2/ suggesting that they would feel impelled to increase their
actions in South Viet Nam and, perhaps, in Laos; that they would seek to bring us to the
conference table on unfavorable terms; and that the Chinese Communists might make
some move of limited support in air defense, at least.
/2/Published ibid., 92A.
As a contingency matter, however, we should be prepared for the possibility that Hanoi
will feel itself so cornered or humiliated as to feel impelled to engage their ground forces,
which constitute their major unused asset, more overtly and substantially in Laos or, even,
in South Viet Nam than the Hughes memorandum suggests. This might be more likely if
Hanoi interpreted the military deployments we will now be making in the Pacific for
deterrent purposes as the prelude to massive attack. Lacking lucid communication from
us, they may undertake what they would regard as preemptive action on the ground.
5. Policy Consequences. The Tonkin Gulf incidents, taken as a whole, are likely to have a
momentum of their own which we should seek to direct for our own purposes.
Specifically, they will tend to shift the vision of the problem out of the context of a
struggle for control over Southeast Asia by local Communists, with the U.S. as marginal
defenders of the area, to one of direct U.S. confrontation with the Asian Communists. As
we suggested to George Ball and Harlan Cleveland last night,/3/ this requires of us, in our
Security Council presentation, to ensure that the Tonkin Gulf incidents do not become the
exclusive focus for discussion but are kept in the larger perspective of purposeful
Communist violation of the 1954 and 1962 Accords. It also would make advisable that we
strictly discipline our public reporting on the air strike against North Viet Nam to portray
the action as an essentially limited retaliatory move, minimizing the details of military
reporting, ancillary damage, etc.
/3/The only record of a meeting at which Rusk, Ball, Rostow, and Cleveland were present
on August 4 is an entry in the Secretary's appointment book for 5:30 p.m. (Johnson
Library)
The fundamental issue raised by these incidents, however, is the following: (a) if a limited
Communist response permits, should we seek to treat these incidents as closed by our
action, while we carry forward substantially our present policy on Southeast Asia; or (b)
should we take the occasion of these incidents and the perhaps transient unity they bring
about in U.S. public opinion and the Congress, to move on to force Hanoi to cease its
aggression and to return, essentially, to compliance with the 1954 and 1962 Accords.
I believe it is to this fundamental choice that you and the President may wish to address
yourselves as the hour-by-hour events of the occasion unfold. Public opinion at home and
abroad will require prompt decision and continuing leadership if the Tonkin Gulf
incidents are not to result in confusing debate which could gravely weaken our position in
Southeast Asia and elsewhere. Although the Communist response to our retaliatory strike
may determine the choice for us, we should seek to guide the forces set in motion by the
Communist attacks on our fleet, to the maximum extent possible.
In any case, as we go forward from these incidents and try, by whatever route the
President chooses, to move towards a settlement which would restore the 1954 and 1962
Accords, we shall have to shift focus quite rapidly from the Tonkin Gulf incidents
themselves to the basic problem of indirect Communist aggression in Laos and South Viet
Nam
297. Editorial Note

At 9 a.m. on August 6, Rusk, McNamara, and General Wheeler appeared before a joint
session of the Senate Foreign Relations and Armed Services Committees to testify on the
August 2 and 4 events in the Gulf of Tonkin, and in support of the joint Congressional
resolution. For texts of their statements and related discussion, see Southeast Asia
Resolution: Joint Hearing before the Committee on Foreign Relations and the Committee
on Armed Services, United States Senate, Eighty-Eighth Congress, Second Session
(Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1966). Some of the deleted sections in
this hearing are included in Goulden, Truth. The statements are also printed in Department
of State Bulletin, August 24, 1964, pages 263-268.
Later that morning, Rusk, McNamara, and Wheeler also appeared before the House
Foreign Affairs Committee. Rusk and McNamara repeated the statements they had made
in the Senate, but no record of the rest of the discussion has been found.
298. Memorandum of a Conversation, White House, Washington, August 6, 1964/1/

/1/Source: Department of State, President's Memoranda of Conversation: Lot 66 D 149.
Confidential. Drafted by Cleveland and approved in the White House on August 17. U
Thant held a similar conversation with Rusk at 1:15 p.m. during a working luncheon at the
Department of State. (Ibid., Secretary's Memoranda of Conversation: Lot 65 D 330)
SUBJECT
U Thant on Southeast Asia
PARTICIPANTS
The President
Secretary General U Thant
Under Secretary of UN Dr. Ralph Bunche
Ambassador Adlai E. Stevenson
Special Assistant to the President McGeorge Bundy
Assistant Secretary of State Harlan Cleveland
Ambassador Angier Biddle Duke
The President and the Secretary General had been together alone for about twenty
minutes. The other members of the party joined them in the President's office a little after
12:00 Noon. The Secretary General said they had been discussing Southeast Asia and
asked about the recent reports of an impending coup in Saigon. Mr. Bundy said there had
been about 200 of these rumors over the past couple of years; that obviously the situation
was somewhat unstable in view of the previous coups and the fact that "many of the
opposition had not been purged and still were in a position to maneuver for power."
The Secretary General then spoke of Ho Chi Minh. He said that when he and then Prime
Minister U Nu of Burma visited Hanoi and Peking in 1954, their assessment was that Ho
Chi Minh was deeply influenced by French culture and traditions, that he was not a
Communist or even a pro-Communist--at that time. While conceding that this assessment
was more than nine years old, he thought it might be worth pursuing a private probe with
Ho. The best channel for such a probe, he thought, would be the Pakistani,/2/ who had
indicated to him some interest in such a role. He said Burma and Cambodia were also
natural possible channels, but under present conditions Cambodia was not sufficiently
reliable, and that as far as Burma was concerned, he had discussed the matter with
General Ne Win on his (U Thant) recent visit to Rangoon and found Ne Win negative on
the subject. Ne Win, said the Secretary General, "does not want to be involved in any
foreign implications" for the time being.
/2/Reference is to Mohammed Ayub Khan, President of Pakistan
Mr. Bundy said that some signal had been sent through the Pakistani to Peking. On Hanoi,
we have made some effort to get through but it seems to be a blank wall.
The Secretary General said that he thought Ho was probably pro-Moscow rather than proPeking now--and added that this was also true of the leadership of the Indonesian
Communists and Burmese Communists. Many of the rank and file leaders in Burma,
however, were oriented toward Peking. But in Burma, he said with emphasis, the
backbone of the Communist Party has been broken.
Continuing on Southeast Asia, the Secretary General referred to talk of a UN role. If there
were a consensus, including North Viet-Nam but not necessarily Peking, he felt the UN
could come in to take some responsibility for administering the agreed arrangements.
The President asked Mr. Bundy whether Ayub had not let it be known he was acting as an
intermediary between us and the Chinese Communists. Mr. Bundy said that apparently
there was a leak in Paris but was not clear that Ayub was personally involved. The
President thought that maybe they had blown up the Secretary of State 1s suggestion,
adding that if they were going to take credit for being a channel perhaps they are not the
best channel.
Mr. Bundy added that in any event it doesn't look to us as though the North Vietnamese
are ready for political discussion.
The Secretary General reverted to his previous experience in Burma with the Chinese
Communists. In 1947, he said, the Chinese Communists told the Burmese Government
that they would not subvert the Burmese Government, and not aid the Burmese
Communists, if Burma did not have any "Western bases". "They even gave us the names
of political refugees seeking asylum in Communist China," U Thant said. For 17 years, he
added, the Chinese Communists have not helped the Burmese Communists inside Burma.
He had checked on this during his recent visit to Rangoon, he said, and reamed that there
had been "no single instance of material aid". But the other side of the Chinese position
was a threat: if Burma did the way Pakistan, the Philippines, Laos and other countries
were doing and accepted "foreign installations" in their country, the Chinese Communists
would have to "destroy" them.
Even in Laos, the Secretary General said, while it was "definitely established" that North
Viet-Nam has taken a hand in helping the Pathet-Lao, he was not sure about the role of
the Chinese Communists.
The Secretary General then repeated that the Pakistanis had hinted that they are available
for soundings in Peking and said he had reported this to Ambassador Stevenson.
Mr. Bundy said it was somewhat hard to use the Pakistanis because of the relationship
with India. Mr. Bundy added that if what the Secretary General was saying, in effect, was
that the Chinese Communists thought that the problem of Southeast Asia was getting the
Americans out, on this at least we could agree with them, since nothing was clearer than
our desire to leave Southeast Asia under proper conditions.
The President reinforced this in the following words: "We are ready to get out tomorrow
if they (the Communists) will behave."
The Secretary General, again reverting to earlier history, said there had been a chance in
1954 to implement the Geneva Accords. Of course, there had been damaging flaws in the
Geneva Accords, notably the troika concept of peacekeeping machinery established under
those Accords. (Mr. Bundy interjected that the idea of early elections was also a flaw, and
the Secretary General agreed.)
The Secretary General said he had talked to John Foster Dulles at the time about possible
arrangements for internationally-sponsored neutrality of Southeast Asian countries, but
"he didn't believe in neutrality". The Secretary General said he still felt that some
internationally-guaranteed neutrality was the best answer for Southeast Asia, and repeated
that it was not too late to probe Ho Chi Minh's private feelings.
At this point in the discussion, Mrs. Johnson, who had joined the group a few minutes
before, took the Secretary General out into the Rose Garden for the scheduled walk
around the garden.

the Director of Central Intelligence (McCone), Washington, August 6, 1964, 1:10
p.m./1/
TELEPHONE CALL FROM MR. McCONE
Sec said his secure phone was not buttoned up and he would have to talk to M on this one.
M said he had gone into the question of the use of some of the sensitive information to
prove the night attack and disprove Hanoi's allegation that it did not take place; it just
cannot be used; we will have to have eyewitness accounts and things of that kind.

Saigon, August 7, 1964--noon.
/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 VIET S. Top Secret; Exdis. Also
sent to the Department of Defense and the White House. According to another copy, this
telegram was drafted by Sullivan and signed for Taylor by Johnson. (Ibid., Saigon
Embassy Files: Lot 68 F 8)
332. For Rusk from Taylor. DOD for McNamara, White House for Bundy. As you are
aware, we have suspended actions under Operations Plan 34-A in order to avoid
confusing signals associated with recent events in the Gulf of Tonkin. The JCS has now
asked CINCPAC to recommend a date for the resumption of these actions. From a
military point of view, maritime operations could be resumed about Aug 10. Air
operations, which depend upon the moon phase, could be scheduled to begin Aug 17.
From this perspective, I cannot judge the total political consequences which might result
from resumption of these actions at an early date. In general, I would expect that, unless
the DRV obtains jet fighters in the near future, air operations, which are principally
resupply drops and propaganda leaflets drops could be resumed with the moon phase on
Aug 17. However the maritime operations, which include two or three bombardments
from ship to shore, as well as junk captures, could adversely interfere with action
underway in the Security Council and elsewhere. I therefore hesitate to concur in any
recommendation by MACV to CINCPAC that these maritime operations recommence as
early as Aug 10 without knowing Washington's planning in the larger political arena.
On the other hand, it is my conviction that we must resume these operations and continue
their pressure on North Vietnam as soon as possible, leaving no impression that we or the
South Vietnamese have been deterred from our operations because of the Tonkin Gulf
incidents. I would therefore appreciate your collective guidance in the light of the
circumstances which you can perceive from the Washington perspective. Since the boats
employed in the maritime operations have been dispersed and should be reassembled at
their main base as soon as possible, I would appreciate an early response./2/
/2/The Embassy in Saigon was informed later on August 7 that further OPLAN 34A
operations should be held off pending review of the situation in Washington. (Telegram
379; ibid., Central Files. POL 27 VIET S)
Taylor
301. Editorial Note

At 1 p.m. on August 7, former Ambassador Henry Cabot Lodge met with President
Johnson and agreed to undertake a trip to Europe as the personal representative of the
President and Secretary of State "to acquaint our allies with conditions in Viet-Nam and
seek their support." (Johnson Library, President's Daily Diary, and Department of State,
Rusk Papers: Lot 72 D 192, Telephone Conversations) Preparations for the trip began
immediately, and on August 12 the Department of State sent a circular telegram to the
missions that Lodge would visit describing it as follows:
"Major purpose of his trip, although this will not be indicated publicly, will be to enlist
support for increased economic and technical assistance from third-countries to
Government of South Vietnam, notably as regards getting more third-country personnel
out into the field. For public consumption it will be stated that purpose Amb Lodge's trip
is to explain to leaders of various foreign governments in Europe the current situation and
US policies in Vietnam." (Ibid., Central Files, POL 7 US/Lodge)
Lodge left Washington on August 16 and during the next 2-1/2 weeks addressed the North
Atlantic Council and discussed Vietnam with government officials in France, Belgium,
the Netherlands, Denmark, the Federal Republic of Germany, Italy, Spain, and the United
Kingdom before returning to Washington on September 2. Lodge's reports on the
individual discussions are ibid., and in Johnson Library, National Security File, Vietnam
Country File, Vol. XVI, Cables. A discussion of the forthcoming trip by the Vietnam
Coordinating Committee on August 12 is in the Washington National Records Center, RG
330, OSD/ISA Files: FRC 68 A 306, Box 41, Country Files.
302. Letter From President Johnson to Chairman Khrushchev/1/

/1/Source: Department of State, Presidential Correspondence: Lot 77 D 163. No
classification marking. Also published in Declassified Documents, 1978, 315B.
Dear Mr. Chairman: I share the concern expressed in your message of August fifth/2/
concerning the incidents in the Gulf of Tonkin.
/2/Document 295.
I also fully share your view of the heavy responsibility which we both bear for keeping
the peace and for preventing incidents anywhere in the world from starting a chain of
dangerous and irreversible developments. It was for this reason that we took only the
minimum defensive action in response to the first attack upon the American destroyer in
the Gulf of Tonkin. I think you can understand that the second deliberate attack--on which
there is complete and incontrovertible evidence--could not be allowed to pass without
reply. Our action was carefully measured to fit the circumstances, and we have no wish at
all to see this matter go further. We have, of course, made appropriate deployments in the
area as we are uncertain of the purpose of these flagrant attacks on our ships on the high
seas. We do not know, for example, whether they were instigated by Peiping or made by
the North Vietnamese in an effort to draw Peiping into the area. I have made it clear,
publicly, that we ourselves do not wish an escalation of this situation.
Our position with respect to South Vietnam has been made clear on many occasions. I
repeat that we seek no military base or special position in this area and that our sole
purpose is to enable the nations there to maintain their independence without outside
intervention. Our complete withdrawal from Laos following the agreement of 1962, about
which I have already communicated with you,/3/ is convincing evidence of the sincerity
of our purpose. Anything you can do to restrain either the North Vietnamese or Peiping
from further reckless action in this area will be most helpful to peace. My country will
always be prompt and firm in its positive reply to acts of aggression, and our power is
equal to any such test. But the mission of that power is peace.
/3/Reference is to the President's August 1 letter. (Telegram 316 to Moscow, August 1;
Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 LAOS)
Sincerely,/4/
/4/Printed from an unsigned copy.

(Westmoreland) to the Commander in Chief, Pacific (Sharp)/1/
Saigon, August 8, 1964--3:15 p.m.
11888. Top Secret. Repeated to the Embassy in Saigon and to the JCS.
MAC JOO 7565. Joint planning discussions with GVN. 1. At 1100Z August [7?], selected
members of MACV staff and I met with Generals Khanh, Khiem and Thieu, C/S JGS, and
Col Thang, J3 JGS. Meeting at my initiative to set stage for effective combined planning
with GVN High Command.
2. The meeting was opened with a short briefing for Gen Khanh on the current status of
U.S. air defense measures and capabilities in the RVN and their tie in with the overall SE
Asia system. Khanh and group interested and asked several pertinent questions. I then
gave Khanh a summary of damage done to the DRV by recent naval operations.
3. I then reviewed the threat including air, sea, infiltration and sabotage, ground attack by
VC in concert with overt outside Communist incursions. Also emphasized the
psychological threat to RVNAF forces of their becoming defensive minded in their
counterinsurgency campaign, stressing need for balance between security and mobile
offensive operations against the VC. Vulnerabilities were specified to include airfields,
Saigon port channel and POL storage. Khanh and group agreed and outlined some of the
security measures already ordered.
4. Then took up the topic of need for combined planning. Acknowledged that we had both
been doing much unilateral planning but it now seemed wise to get together. I noted that
combined planning for increased crossborder operations into Laos was underway but
should be accelerated. We must be informed and prepared for probable increased
infiltration and movement of PAVN forces through Laos. Khanh agreed. I then
emphasized that we must immediately plan for defense against overt aggression,
particularly in the northern part of RVN.
5. I told him I thought any offensive operations outside the RVN should primarily rely on
air to punish the DRV and interdict routes of communication and infiltration to the South
while the RVNAF put offensive pressure on VC forces within the RVN to discourage or
defeat them. I then outlined a concept of categorizing targets for contingency air
operations. Category I targets directly support the VC insurgency within RVN. This
category has two sub groups--those in Laos and those in the DRV. Category II includes all
important military targets in the DRV. Category III includes non-military targets which if
destroyed, would extinguish the will and capability of the DRV to launch and support
aggression against the RVN. I stated I felt that we would be able to provide specific
targeting materials when the time came for detailed planning.
6. Up to this point Gen Khanh had made only occasional comments. Gen Khanh then
stated the DRV has already committed aggression against his country and was increasing
it. I replied that I appreciated his point of view but that my government would deal on a
timely basis with specific provocative acts by the DRV.
7. I then returned to combined planning, which I considered particularly urgent. There
would be two simultaneous missions. One would be to continue pacification, while the
other would be operations against the external threat. Command arrangements then came
into the discussion. I suggested that we defer this subject to a later meeting but did
mention that our Korean experience might be helpful in developing a concept. Khanh was
agreeable to postponing further discussion on this subject.
8. Gen Khanh then asked how the US defines "overt aggression". He said he was
convinced that we would not see PAVN units coming into the RVN with "ID cards and in
uniform." They would come in as VC reinforcements, absorbing PAVN units into VC
battalions or regiments, but all under the guise of VC. He was concerned that the PAVN
would build up forces in places like the Attopeu area without our knowing it until they
initiated an attack inside RVN. Gen Khanh further stated that he felt that Communist
forces will increase pressure on Saigon with numerous units infiltrated from Cambodia
through the Tay Ninh/Binh Duong/Hau Nghia area. He was certain that with French and
Cambodian connivance the Communists could build up and concentrate large forces just
across the border without our knowing about it. He identified a large French rubber
plantation in Cambodia north of Tay Ninh province as one place he feared. I stated that it
would be necessary to carefully review intelligence in order to determine the extent of
aggression.
9. I then asked about the reported alternate CP at Vung Tau, stating we had done some
preparatory planning plus installing some badly needed commo gear and that we could be
operating in 24 hours. Gen Khiem and Gen Khanh then explained that Vung Tau was to
be the alternate national command post. It would become a "second Saigon" if Saigon
became untenable. They agreed that Nha Trang would be the best location for a
combined, field command post for military operations.
10. Discussion then turned to civil defense at which time Gen Khanh outlined the decree
of national emergency which he was to issue later in the day. His philosophy is to prepare
the nation psychologically for more trying times. He made the interesting comment that
for too long the people in the cities have been living in peacetime conditions while in the
country there is war everywhere. The decree also would provide the legal basis for many
measures that cannot be taken in peacetime associated with a ban on strikes and mass
meetings, resource and population control, arrest and detention of VC and other security
and anti-sabotage actions, etc. He also assured us that the plan to pacify the Saigon area
and to conduct a large and sustained RVNAF offensive operation in Binh Duong will be
aggressively executed as scheduled.
11. The meeting concluded with agreement to have a JGS-MACV planning team get
together immediately to start on specifics.
12. Comment: The meeting was a constructive one, both sides airing in general terms their
views of the problems and agreeing to get together immediately at the staff level to start
solving them.
304. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Canada/1/

Exdis. Drafted by William Bundy and cleared in draft with McNamara, Ball, and
McGeorge Bundy. Also sent to Saigon. The message and a McNaughton draft of it, dated
August 7, are printed in Pentagon Papers: Gravel Edition, vol. III, pp. 519-522.
169. Following message was handed directly to Canadian Embassy here for transmittal to
Seaborn by fastest channel. This is for your information only.
"Canadians are urgently asked to have Seaborn during August 10 visit make following
points (as having been conveyed to him by US Government since August 6):
A. Re Tonkin Gulf actions, which almost certainly will come up:
1. The DRV has stated that Hon Ngu and Hon Me islands were attacked on July 30. It
should be noted that the USS Maddox was, all of that day and into the afternoon of the
next day, over 100 miles south of those islands, in international waters near the 17th
parallel, and that the DRV attack on the Maddox took place on August 2, more than two
days later. Neither the Maddox nor any other destroyer was in any way associated with
any attack on the DRV islands.
2. Regarding the August 4 attack by the DRV on the two US destroyers, the Americans
were and are at a complete loss to understand the DRV motive. They had decided to
absorb the August 2 attack on the grounds that it very well might have been the result of
some DRV mistake or miscalculation. The August 4 attack, however--from the
determined nature of the attack as indicated by the radar, sonar, and eyewitness evidence
both from the ships and from their protecting aircraft--was, in the American eyes,
obviously deliberate and planned and ordered in advance. In addition, premeditation was
shown by the evidence that the DRV craft were waiting in ambush for the destroyers. The
attack did not seem to be in response to any action by the South Vietnamese, nor did it
make sense as a tactic to further any diplomatic objective. Since the attack took place at
least 60 miles from nearest land, there could have been no question about territorial
waters. About the only reasonable hypothesis was that North Viet-Nam was intent either
upon making it appear that the United States was a 'paper tiger' or upon provoking the
United States.
3. The American response was directed solely to patrol craft and installations acting in
direct support of them. As President Johnson stated: 'our response for the present will be
limited and fitting.'/2/
4. In view of uncertainty aroused by the deliberate and unprovoked DRV attacks this
character, US has necessarily carried out precautionary deployments of additional air
power to SVN and Thailand.
B. Re basic American position:
5. Mr. Seaborn should again stress that US policy is simply that North Viet-Nam should
contain itself and its ambitions within the territory allocated to its administration by the
1954 Geneva Agreements. He should stress that US policy in South Viet-Nam is to
preserve the integrity of that State 1s territory against guerrilla subversion.
6. He should reiterate that the US does not seek military bases in the area and that the US
is not seeking to overthrow the Communist regime in Hanoi.
7. He should repeat that the US is fully aware of the degree to which Hanoi controls and
directs the guerrilla action in South Viet-Nam and that the US holds Hanoi directly
responsible for that action. He should similarly indicate US awareness of North
Vietnamese control over the Pathet Lao movement in Laos and the degree of North
Vietnamese involvement in that country. He should specifically indicate US awareness of
North Vietnamese violations of Laotian territory along the infiltration route into South
Viet-Nam.
8. Mr. Seaborn can again refer to the many examples of US policy in tolerance of peaceful
coexistence with Communist regimes, such as Yugoslavia, Poland, etc. He can hint at the
economic and other benefits which have accrued to those countries because their policy of
Communism has confined itself to the development of their own national territories and
has not sought to expand into other areas.
9 Mr. Seaborn should conclude with the following new points:
a. That the events of the past few days should add credibility to the statement made last
time, that 'US public and official patience with the North Vietnamese aggression is
growing extremely thin.'/3/
/3/Regarding Seaborn's approach to North Vietnam in June, see Document 222.
b. That the US Congressional Resolution/4/ was passed with near unanimity, strongly reaffirming the unity and determination of the US Government and people not only with
respect to any further attacks on US military forces but more broadly to continue to
oppose firmly, by all necessary means, DRV efforts to subvert and conquer South VietNam and Laos.

c. That the US has come to the view that the DRV role in South Viet-Nam and Laos is
critical. If the DRV persists in its present course, it can expect to continue to suffer the
consequences.
d. That the DRV knows what it must do if the peace is to be restored.
e. That the US has ways and means of measuring the DRY's participation in, and direction
and control of, the war in South Viet-Nam and in Laos and will be carefully watching the
DRY's response to what Mr. Seaborn is telling them."/5/
/5/Seaborn met with Prime Minister Pham Van Dong on August 12 at Hanoi and
conveyed the U.S. message with the exception of final points d and e. Seaborn reported
that the Prime Minister became "very angry," and warned that the United States was
escalating the war. Seaborn concluded that despite the meeting he was still little wiser as
to the motivations for the attacks on August 2 and 4. (Candel 419, August 15; Johnson
Library. National Security File, Vietnam Country File, Vol. 15, Cables)
Rusk

/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 33-6 US-VIET N. Secret; Priority;
Limdis. Repeated to Bangkok, Vientiane, and CINCPAC. Also printed in Pentagon
Papers: Gravel Edition, vol. 111, pp. 522-524.
363. Ref: Deptel 378./2/ From our vantage point we can see positive disadvantages to our
position in SEA in pursuing course of action outlined reftel.
/2/Telegram 378, August 7, discussed the preconditions for a possible conference on Laos
and asked for the reactions of the South Vietnamese Government. (Department of State,
Central Files, POL 27 LAOS)
1. In first place rush to conference table would serve to confirm to ChiComs that US
retaliation for destroyer attacks was transient phenomenon and that firm ChiCom response
in form of commitment to defend NVN has given US "paper tiger" second thoughts.
Moreover, much of beneficial effects elsewhere resulting from our strong reaction to
events in Gulf of Tonkin would be swiftly dissipated.
2. In Viet-Nam sudden backdown from previous strongly held US position on PDJ
withdrawal prior to conf on Laos would have potentially disastrous effect. Morale and
will to fight, particularly willingness to push ahead with arduous pacification task and to
enforce stem measures of Khanh's new emergency decree, would be undermined by what
would look like evidence that US seeking to take advantage of any slight improvement in
non-Communist position as excuse for extricating itself from Indochina via conf route.
This would give strength to probable pro-Gaullist contention that GVN should think about
following Laotian example by seeking negotiated solution before advantage of
temporarily strengthened anti-Communist position recedes.
3. General let-down in Viet-Nam which would result from softening of our stand in Laos
just after we had made great show of firmness vis-a-vis Communists would undoubtedly
erode Khanh's personal position. with prospects of increased political instability and coup
plotting,
4. It should be remembered that our retaliatory action in Gulf of Tonkin is in effect an
isolated US-DRY incident. Although this has relation, as Amb Stevenson has pointed out,
to larger problem of DRV aggression by subversion in Viet-Nam and Laos, we have not
yet come to grips in a forceful way with DRV over the issue of this larger and much more
complex problem. Instead, we are engaged, both in Viet-Nam and Laos, in proxy actions
against proxy agents of DRV. If, as both Khanh and Souvanna hope, we are to parlay the
consequences of our recent clash with the DRV into actions which specifically direct
themselves against DRV violations of the 1954 and 1962 Agreements, we must avoid
becoming involved in political engagements which will tie our hands and inhibit our
action. For example, any effort to undertake credible joint planning operations with GVN
re interdictory air strikes upon infiltration network in southern DRV and especially in
Panhandle would be completely undercut if we were engaged in conf discussing the Laos
territory in question.
5. Similarly, it would seem to us that Souvanna's willingness to hold fast on preconditions or [for?] substantive negotiations bears direct relationship to his assessment of
US willingness to meet the problem where it originates-in North Vietnam itself. This fact
shines clearly through his recent brief letter to Pres Johnson./3/ Moreover, it would be
folly to assume that Khanh, who is now in fairly euphoric state as result of our Gulf of
Tonkin action, would do anything other than slump into deepest funk if we sought to
persuade him to send GVN del to conf. Emb prediction is that he would resign rather than
send del.
6. Intensified pressures for Geneva-type conf cited in reftel would appear to us to be
coming almost entirely from those who are opposed to US policy objectives in SEA
(except possibly UK which seems prepared jump on bandwagon). Under circumstances,
we see very little hope that results of such conference would be advantageous to us.
Moreover, prospects of limiting it to consideration of only Laotian problem appear at this
time juncture to be dimmer than ever. Even though prior agreement reached to limit conf,
we do not see how in actual practice we could limit discussion solely to Laos if others
insist on raising other issues. To best our knowledge, we never "withdrew" from room
when DRV attempted raise extraneous issues during 1961-1962 conf. Instead, we insisted
to chair on point of order and had DRV ruled out of order. Prospect of informal corridor
discussions with PL, DRV and ChiComs is just what GVN would fear most and may well
increase pressures on GVN to undertake negotiated solution so as to avoid their fear of
being faced with "fait accompli" by US.
7. Rather than searching for "safety valve" to dissipate current "generalized pressures"
SEA, it seems to us we should be looking for means which will channel those pressures
against DRV; seems to us "safety valve", if needed (for example by Soviets), exists in
current UNSC discussion. We should continue to focus attention in all forums on
Communist aggressive actions as root cause of tension in SEA and reinforce our current
stance. In the final analysis, this stance would be more valid deterrent to escalation by
PL/VM than attempt seek accommodation within context Laos problem alone.
While not specifically within our province, we would point out that PL/VM appear to
have capability of retaking territory regained by RLG in Operation Triangle at any time of
their choosing and that therefore "territorial swap" envisaged in Deptel may be highly
illusory. Moreover, any territorial deal which seems to confirm permanent PL/VM control
over corridor as an arrangement acceptable to US would be anathema to GVN and
indicate our willingness accept infiltration network as tolerable condition on GVN
frontiers. Such situation would in their and US Mission opinions vitiate against any hope
of successful pacification of GVN territory.
Taylor

Received at 10:07 a.m. and passed to the White House, the Department of Defense, and
CIA later that day. A summary of the telegram is printed in Pentagon Papers: Gravel
Edition, vol. III, pp. 530-533.
377. For the President. For the Secretary of State. This is a US Mission report. The
following situation report based on a combination of June and July data is submitted in
compliance with Deptels 108 and 270./2/ Because of the disruptive effect of the two coups
on the operations of the GVN and the invalidation of much of the database used to
measure progress in the earlier months (e.g., the status of fortified hamlet program), it is
virtually impossible to measure the present situation against that existing far enough in the
past to provide a meaningful comparison. It is hoped that the present report will serve as a
baseline from which to measure progress in future months.
/2/Neither printed.
This is the first situation report in which estimates of such factors as army and public
morale, combat effectiveness of military units, US advisor-GVN counterpart
relationships, and effectiveness of GVN officials have been based largely on a countrywide canvass of the views of the responsible US advisors and observers. By repeating this
procedure on a monthly schedule, we hope to develop a more reliable basis for reporting
on these important factors which in the past have had no yardstick for measurement.
In this first sampling of advisor opinion, we have been surprised by its optimism which,
generally speaking, has exceeded that of most senior US officials in Saigon. It will require
some time to determine where the right lies--it may be only another illustration that the
front line morale is usually better than that of the command post.
Where possible, we have indicated where we hope to be in our programs at year end.
There is little scientific in these projections which merely indicate goals which, if
vigorously pursued in a reasonably stable political environment, appear feasible of
attainment.
Introduction
The Communist strategy in the their continuing effort to take over South Vietnam has
been clearly defined by North Vietnamese leaders both in the Hanoi regime and in the
puppet National Liberation Front. It is not their purpose to attempt to defeat the superior
Republic of Vietnam military forces in the field or to seize and conquer territory by
military means. Instead, it is their announced intention to harass, erode and terrorize the
population and its leadership into a state of such demoralization that a political settlement
favorable to the Communists will ensue. They propose to achieve this political objective
by stages, passing first through "neutralism", using the liberation front machinery, and the
technique of a coalition government. It is against this goal that we should measure USGVN progress.
Faced with this kind of challenge, the Khanh government is called upon to execute an
extremely complex body of programs involving not only military actions, but also social,
economic, psychological and, above all, administrative measures of a highly sophisticated
nature. The ability of the GVN to rise to this level of performance is the prime
determinant of the unfolding situation in South Vietnam. For this reason, and in spite of
the difficulty in discussing the situation in neat categories, we present our evaluation in
the following order: political-economic, military, overall.
As indicated above, the most important and most intractable internal problem of South
Vietnam in meeting the Viet Cong threat is the political structure at the national level. The
best thing that can be said about the present Khanh government is that it has lasted six
months and has about a 50-50 chance of lasting out the year although probably not
without some changed faces in the Cabinet. Although opposed by Minh and resisted less
openly by Dai Viet sympathizers among the military, Prime Minister Khanh seems for the
time being to have the necessary military support to remain in power. However, it is an
ineffective government beset by inexperienced ministers who are also jealous and
suspicious of each other. Khanh does not have confidence or trust in most of them and has
not been able to weld them into a group with a common loyalty and purpose. However,
there is no one in sight who could do better than Khanh in the face of the many difficulties
which would face any head of government.
On the side of positive achievement, Khanh seems to have allayed the friction between
Buddhists and Catholics at least for the moment, has won the cooperation of the Hoa Hao
and Cao Dai, and has responded to our suggestions for improved relations between the
GVN and US Mission.
The attitude of the people toward the Khanh government, mostly confused and apathetic
since its inception, is only slightly more favorable than a few months ago. Despite
considerable efforts, Khanh has not succeeded in building any substantial body of active
popular support in Saigon. In the countryside, US Embassy provincial reporters indicate
that support exists for the GVN in direct proportion to the degree of security established
by government forces. There are grounds to conclude that no sophisticated psychological
approach is required at this stage to attract the country people to the Khanh government-the assurance of a reasonably secure life is about all that is necessary.
The intriguing inside his government and the absence of dramatic military or political
successes react upon Khanh who is inclined to be moody and occasionally subject to fits
of despondency. Seeing the slow course of the counterinsurgency campaign and frustrated
by the weakness of his government, Khanh has turned to the "march North" theme to
unify the home front and to offset the war-weariness which he asserts is oppressing his
people and his armed forces. US observers, in assessing the symptoms of war-weariness
and of the bad military morale which Khanh reports, are inclined to feel that the
symptoms of defeatism are more in the minds of the inexperienced and untried leadership
than in the people and the army.
Khanh's state of mind will be an important factor in the future conduct of the war and in
his relations with the representatives of US policy. He and many of his colleagues are
finding it very difficult to face up to the long hrs of slow, hard slugging which is all they
see ahead under the present rule of operational conduct. While they received a dramatic
lift from our August 5 action against North Vietnam, its very success may whet their
desire for positive action against the North particularly if the situation tends to subside
again into the doldrums of continued Viet Cong incidents and indecisive bloodshed. In the
coming months, we may expect to face mounting pressures from the GVN to win the war
by direct attack on Hanoi which, if resisted, will create frictions and irritations which
could lead local politicians to serious consideration of a negotiated solution or local
soldiers to a military adventure without US consent.
The economic problems of SVN have thus far appeared to be of second order importance.
Prices are stable and inflation is under control. Industrial investment continues to be
insignificant although there has been some recent rise. Industrial production, though
small, has risen steadily from 140 percent of the 1962 level on April 1 to 143 percent on
July 31 and is projected at 150 percent at the end of the year, a 30 percent rise over 1963.
Exports are off this year so that any rise in capital goods imports would, if not covered by
US assistance, lead to a major balance-of-payments problem. For a variety of factors, one
of which is uncertainty as to the government's attitude toward the Chinese community, the
black market rate of the plaster has dropped to 135-40 to the dollar (legal rate: 72
plasters). A more penetrating scrutiny, however, may indicate certain basic weaknesses in
the economic policy and operation of the GVN. The tax structure, import policy and the
present multiple exchange rate system may be acting as drags both on the competence and
effectiveness of governmental administration and the proper use of total resources in the
prosecution of the war against Communist aggression. USOM is examining these
problems in depth and will submit its findings for Mission Council consideration.
Both political and economic factors play an important part in the counter VC pacification
program. As the armed forces clear the identified VC forces from an area, it is essential to
follow up quickly with representatives of the civilian ministries of the government
representing police, education, public works, interior, information, rural affairs, health and
finance. It is the task of the United States Operations Mission (USOM) and the United
States Information Service (USIS) to energize these forces of government and to mesh
their contribution in the provinces with the military pacification effort. This task is
proving to be a most difficult one primarily because of the inefficiency of the ministries,
their ineptitude in planning and their general lack of spirit of team play. To step up the
job, USOM has strengthened its provincial representation from 45 in March to 64 in July
but the number of Americans is still insufficient. A year end objective has been
established of two Americans in all provinces, often reinforced with a third public safety
officer. USIS has 16 American personnel in the field and expects to remain at about that
strength.
On the government side, provincial and district administration is in the hands of
inexperienced junior officers operating under the policy and fiscal supervision of remote,
poorly-staffed civilian ministries in Saigon. In spite of this unpromising background, US
observers reported in July that in about three-fourths of the provinces the GVN provincial
and district officials were performing effectively; also that in general they were working
well with their US counterparts. This situation is indicative of progress since the
governmental upheavals at the time of the coup, but there is still much to be done to bring
the civil capabilities of the government abreast of its military.
As a major vehicle for achieving the improvements which we seek, the US Mission,
working jointly with the GVN, has developed a significant pacification plan (which has
been given the name Hoptac) building outward from the "oilspot" urban center of SaigonCholon. Not only is this area of paramount strategic importance both politically and
militarily, but, in its broadest extension, it contains 40 percent of the nation's population,
almost all of its limited industry, and its centers of social and political power. In grappling
with tangible problems of this plan, we hope to induce the Vietnamese (a) to work
together better as a functioning government, (b) to build both their urban areas and the
outlying rural areas towards a sounder administrative, social and economic reality, and (c)
finally to achieve some pragmatic military successes which will bolster their morale,
engage the energies of their best qualified people, and drive the Viet Cong effectively
away from the nation's heartland.
The US Mission has recognized in its information and psychological programs the need to
present the Khanh government in its most favorable light at home and abroad, particularly
in the United States. We are obtaining a more balanced and wider media coverage by
improving facilities for the press by inviting foreign media representatives to Vietnam and
by helping the Khanh government to improve its press relations. Our own effectiveness
both in the press and psychological fields has been increased by placing coordination
responsibility for all US assets in the Director, USIS.
We are always impressed with the need to improve our intelligence on the enemy. The
level of competence among Vietnamese personnel, both military and civilian, leaves much
to be desired. In both categories, we have underway extensive programs for improvement
particularly in the area of war interrogation where we expect to triple the Vietnamese
capability by the end of the year.
Military Evaluation
The military aspects of the counterinsurgency campaign in SVN are showing signs of
slow improvement since the period of deterioration which followed the two coups in
November 1963 and January 1964. The personnel strength of the armed forces of SVN as
well as of the paramilitary forces (regional forces and popular forces) is slowly rising and
by January 1965 should reach about 98 percent of the target year and [end?] strength of
446,000. The desertion rate of the army has currently dropped to about 5.72 percent or
half of the rate of last March. In spite of unofficial reports of bad morale, only one unit in
the Army, an infantry regiment on a static security mission, is considered by the
responsible US advisors to have unsatisfactory morale.
The reequipping of the VNAF with the A1H aircraft is on schedule so that three
squadrons will be combat ready by 30 September 1964 and a fourth by 1 December 1964.
The pilot training program directed at attaining a two-pilot-to-one-aircraft ratio should
reach that goal by year end.
In the view of US advisors, more than 90 percent of the battalions of the army are at least
marginally effective. Two out of thirty regiments, one out of 101 battalions (infantry,
marine, airborne), three out of twenty Ranger battalions and one out of 20 engineer
battalions are rated as not combat effective. The principal defects throughout the army are
low present-for-duty strengths and weak leadership at the level of junior officers and
NCO's.
In general, it is believed that the weaknesses in the military forces have been identified
and are receiving corrective treatment. The recently authorized increase in US advisor
strength should assure increased progress throughout the rest of the year in improving the
performance of the military forces of all categories.
Against this improvement on the side of the GVN, one must take into account the
accepted estimate in main and local force VC strength of at between 28-34,000, in
contrast with 23-27,000 estimated accepted prior to July 1964. In terms of equipment and
training, the VC are better armed and led today than ever in the past. Infiltration continues
both from Laos and Cambodia and there is no indication that the VC are having difficulty
in replacing their losses in men and equipment. However, there is no reason to believe that
in the coming months they will wish to risk their past gains in an overt military
confrontation with GVN forces although they keep a sizable unused force in the Central
Highlands with considerable offensive capability. Finally, they have unused dirty tricks in
their bag such as the mining of the Saigon River, sabotage of POL stocks and terrorist
attacks on civilian communities and US dependents.
Overall Forecast
In early July, the percentages of the rural and combined rural and urban populations under
governmental control, VC control and contested were as follows:
Rural
Rural and Urban
GVN control
33 percent
40 percent
VC control
20 percent
18 percent
Contested
47 percent
42 percent
By year end, assuming no further political upheavals, the following percentages should be
attainable:
Rural
Rural and Urban
GVN control
40 percent
47 percent
VC control
16 percent
14 percent
Contested
44 percent
39 percent
This change in percentages, if achieved, will represent modest progress toward stabilizing
the in-country situation. It will not represent a dramatic advance toward cutting down the
VC to size, stopping infiltration or justifying a forecast of final success. It is not likely to
be enough to induce General Khanh to give up his campaign in favor of attacking NVN or
to convince Hanoi to give up the contest in South Vietnam.
In the light of the foregoing considerations, it is felt that the US efforts should focus on
the following actions during the coming months:
a. Do everything possible to bolster the Khanh government.
b. Improve the in-country pacification campaign against the VC by concentrating efforts
on strategically important areas such as the provinces around Saigon (the Hoptac plan).
c. Undertake "show-window" social and economic projects in secure urban and rural
areas.
d. Be prepared to implement contingency plans against North Vietnam with optimum
readiness by January 1, 1965.
e. Keep the US public informed of what we are doing and why.
Taylor
307. Memorandum for the Record of a Meeting, Cabinet Room, White House,
Washington, August 10, 1964, 12:35 p.m./1/
Meetings on Southeast Asia, Vol. 1. Top Secret. Drafted by McGeorge Bundy.
PRESENT
The President, Secretaries Rusk, McNamara, Ball, Vance, Messrs. McCone, Wheeler,
Reedy, McG. Bundy
For second item: William Bundy, John McNaughton
[Here follows item 1, "Cyprus."]
2. Southeast Asia
Mr. McCone began with a brief report on the intelligence situation. He mentioned the
report of a U-2 pilot over North Vietnam to the effect that missile bursts had been sighted
and indicated his own inclination to discount the pilot's report. He reported existing
intelligence on air and ground movements and mentioned the possibility that we might
now face increased Communist air activity over Laos or intensified infiltration.
It was also reported that there might be a meeting of the three Laotian factions in Paris in
August.
The Secretary of State 1ndicated his own view that we should hold up on such actions as
34-A, DeSoto patrol, or any other additions to our current course at least until we see what
the other side does. He emphasized, as he has repeatedly before and since, the importance
from his point of view of keeping the responsibility for escalation on the other side.
The Secretary of Defense indicated that our side was well prepared for a response to any
likely form of escalation.
The President expressed his basic satisfaction with what had been accomplished in the last
week. He said the reaction from Congress was good, and also from the people, judging by
the polls. He said this response was quite a tribute to the Secretaries of State and Defense.
He warned, however, that if we should fail in the second challenge, or if we should do
nothing further, we could find ourselves even worse off than before this last set of events.
The President did not wish to escalate just because the public liked what happened last
week. We would have to pick our own ground; nonetheless, instead of letting the other
side have the ball, we should be prepared to take it. He asked for prompt study and
recommendations as to ways this might be done with maximum results and minimum
danger. He did not believe that the existing situation would last very long.
McG.B.
308. Editorial Note

On August 10, President Johnson signed into law Joint Resolution 1145, "To Promote the
Maintenance of International Peace and Security in Southeast Asia" as Public Law 88408. (78 Stat. 384) The Joint Resolution had passed the Senate (88-2) and the House of
Representatives (416-0) on August 7. For text of President Johnson's remarks at the
signing, see Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Lyndon B. Johnson,
1963-64, Book II, pages 946-947, and Department of State Bulletin, August 31, 1964,
pages 302-303.
The resolution expressed Congressional approval and support of the "determination of the
President, as Commander in Chief, to take all necessary measures to repel any armed
attack against the forces of the United States and to prevent further aggression." It is
printed ibid., August 24, 1964, page 268. For an earlier draft of the resolution, see the
attachment to Document 278.

1964-1968, Volume I
Vietnam, 1964
Department of State
Washington, DC
IX. Changes in the Government of South Vietnam, August 11-September 5

309. Memorandum for the Record by the Commanding General, U.S. Army
Mobility Command (Sibley)/1/
Saigon, August 14, 1964.
/1/Source: Department of State, Saigon Embassy Files: Lot 68 F 8. Top Secret. Sibley had
been Deputy Chief of the U.S. Military Assistance Advisory Group in Vietnam in 1961.
On Tuesday afternoon, 11 August 1964, during a briefing at Tan Son Nhut by General
Oden and the Support Command staff, I received a message at about 1500 hours that
Khanh wanted to see me at 1545 in his office. His aide took me into his office
immediately on my arrival and told me that a couple of correspondents and several others
who had appointments were being asked to wait. I met with Khanh from 1540 hours until
1620 hours in his office with Major Kwasigroch present. The entire conversation was in
French, of which Major Kwasigroch only picked up a few words. Khanh walked across
the room and embraced me when I entered, asked about Ellie, my wife, and said, "We
have missed you very much here, Sib." I congratulated him for his having become Prime
Minister of his country and he said:
"I could not stand by and see my country fall to the communists. After the November
coup, there was much relaxation, wining and dining, and little serious prosecution of the
war effort. The intelligence organization which I had helped President Diem build up over
six years was completely destroyed and many of the hard-core Viet Cong whom we had
collected so painstakingly over the years were released by opening a Pandora's box. These
two things that are apparatus for learning when and where the VC were going to strike
combined with the return of their hard-core leadership just released are primarily
responsible for the intensification of their efforts over the last 6 months." (My
observation: Evidently, the incident rate has increased from an average of some 50 a week
when I was here in 1961 to some 500 odd per week currently.)
I asked him what would be the results of the recent U.S. attack on the North Vietnamese
bases. He said that the men in the streets of Hanoi reacted to this attack with smiles on
their faces. I asked him how he knew this. He said that while his infiltration effort into the
north left much to be desired, he was getting enough intelligence to know it and, if I didn't
believe him, he told me to ask our own CIA. He said this confirmed his impression that
the North Vietnamese people were disenchanted with the hardships and provision under
the communist regime and would welcome the unification of North and South Vietnams
under his (Khanh's) leadership. He said that he would thus become a kind of Tito. He
repeated this several times and I believe that he meant to identify himself with Tito as a
national leader, a champion of the people, who would thus be unified as a Vietnamese
nation out from under the shadow, as he put it, of "our traditional enemy, the Chinese."
He said that the North Vietnamese, including their leaders, are afraid of the Chinese and
are resisting their overtures to "help". He said Ho Chi Minh is still there but he is too old
to come to the office and that the real power is held by several of his principal lieutenants,
two of whom are Moscow oriented communists rather than Peking sympathizers. He said:
"Sib, we are not expert in guerrilla warfare in spite of our ranger training center at Duc
My and our efforts with your Special Forces. This is a new kind of war in which neither
we nor the great powers like you have much experience in spite of our recent efforts to
learn. On the contrary, these people in the north are true experts in guerrilla warfare,
sabotage, assassination, political subversion, coup d'etat, and all the paraphernalia which
has become classic doctrine to them since the time of Marx and Lenin. This is a war
against our people and as long as we continue to try to fight their kind of war, they can
succeed with only a small force of about 20,000 against the mobilization of our entire
manpower to keep this going on forever. Therefore, we must open the war up. We must
turn to the kind of conventional military operations which we understand and not continue
to try to fight their kind of war which is new to us. If we do this, our people will rally to
our cause because they will know that they are fighting for their country and the enemy
will be identified to them."
"Our penetrations in the north are primarily for intelligence not for sabotage and, while
we have achieved some success, we still have much work to do."
I asked him whether we could expect a Chinese retaliation for our strike on the North
Vietnamese bases. He said:
"No, not the kind of retaliation you would expect. They only have Mig 15's and 16's
which are Korean vintage aircraft far less capable than the American planes and I have
learned that the Russians have recently cut off the supply of spare parts to the Chicom."
I challenged him on this one and he said that this was his intelligence. He said the Chicom
lack the military capability to intervene militarily in North Vietnam today and that such
intervention would be opposed by the North Vietnamese because of their fear of the
Chinese.
He said, "This is my personal view of free-world strategy and, while I have not studied it
out in detail, I will tell you what I think:
"For centuries, the great powers--the British, the French, and the Russian empire under the
Tzars--have had a traditional enemy, the Chinese. This has been our traditional enemy
over the centuries as well. Today the Chinese have massive manpower. We, that is the
great powers, have massive firepower. The Chicoms are trying desperately to build their
firepower. When they do, it is impossible for me to imagine how we could live with a
totalitarian and aggressive regime such as this. It would then be too late for the free world.
They would go on the offensive immediately."
"You know they are working hard to develop an atomic capability. When they are able to
make their first test explosion, although it will not be significant firepower-wise, the
psychological effect will rock all Asia. They will become immediately more aggressive.
We can't live with such a situation."
"Now the South Chinese are tired of the communist regime. I mean those in Canton and
the south Chinese provinces. They would welcome Chiang Kai-shek tomorrow and he has
the capability of cutting China in two from East to West and liberating the South Chinese.
We should first insure that the Moscow-Peking split is effective and then Chiang should
split China in two. The South Chinese would be happy and would welcome him.
Moreover, he has the military capability of doing this today with perhaps some support
from the United States."
Khanh again referred to the Viet Minh and the Vietnamese as seeing in him, Khanh, a
nationalist leader such as Tito, but I didn't interpret this as implying a Tito in the
communist sense but rather in the sense of a strong national leader under whom his people
could be reunited.
He said that he appreciated the strong support that McNamara is giving him and that he is
delighted to have Ambassador Taylor here with his splendid people like General
Westmoreland, who he considers the cream of the crop. He reiterated that if we continue
the "people's war" there may be no end to it, that we must open up the war, "il faut ouvrir
la guerre", unify the people in support of the national effort, identify the VC as the
people's enemy and go to conventional military operations which we understand and in
which we have experience.
I told him I was so pleased to hear that he had just pinned a fourth star on General Khiem
at Vung Tau and that I felt he had made an excellent choice in a loyal and very capable
officer. He said,"we must have a stronger military organization, Sib, and it must be
headed by officers of appropriate rank." I gathered that he had in mind some additional
promotions in the near future. He said, "I will not promote myself as I am now up to my
neck in this political game." He said, of course with his characteristic modesty, that he felt
himself to be uniquely qualified for leadership of his country because of his experience in
the political field as President Diem's Chief of Staff as well as his military background. I
observed that Diem had kept the military promotions down and had consistently resisted
all efforts to achieve unbroken military chains of command in the armed forces because
Diem, fearing another coup, interrupted the military chain with political appointments at
province chief and higher levels who reported back to him through Nhu. I asked if Khanh
still felt he had to counterbalance the military with a civilian organization. He replied that
he felt the answer was to have a strong military organization with an uncompromised
military chain of command and with leaders who were loyal and whom he could trust.
I recalled that he had kept the correspondents and a number of others waiting for nearly
three-fourths of an hour and he said that it had been worth it to have a heart to heart chat
with an old friend. I asked to take his picture in front of the stuffed tiger in his office and
he said, "Why don't we have our picture taken together, Sib?" Major Kwasigroch took a
couple of pictures of us. In parting, he sent his warm regards to Ellie and asked me to
bring her over with me the next time I came.
In leaving the palace, I asked his aide about Generals Don, Dinh, and Xuan, whom I had
known very well. The aide replied that he was sure that General Khanh would be
delighted to have me call on them in Dalat if I had time during my trip and that they
would be delighted to see me. He said that of course they were not in prison, that I would
understand that they had to be under surveillance for the time being.
I told the aide that I supposed the industrialist, Mr. Buu, whose steamship line and other
businesses had been confiscated, would be released from the hospital before long as
Vietnam needed strong businessmen of this type. The aide nodded and said he would
mention it to Khanh who knew Mr. Buu very well.
I left the office at 1625 hours and drove back to MACV Headquarters where I reported the
substance of the above to General Westmoreland and, at his suggestion, to Ambassador
Taylor later that evening.
Alden K. Sibley
Major General, USA

Repeated to CINCPAC, the White House, CIA, and the Department of Defense.
According to another copy, this telegram was drafted and initialed for Taylor by Johnson.
(Ibid., Saigon Embassy Files: Lot 68 F 8)
387. Am disappointed to note from JCS 7828 to CINCPAC/2/ that proposal for further
patrol in Gulf of Tonkin not approved at this time. As noted Embtel 364,/3/ we feel that it
is important to continue these patrols at frequent intervals.
/2/Telegram JCS 7828 is presumably an incorrect reference. Telegram JCS 7827, August
10, informed Sharp that a DeSoto patrol into the Gulf of Tonkin August 12-17 was not
approved, but would be considered at a later date. (National Archives and Records
Administration, RG 218, JCS Files)
/3/Telegram 364, August 9, reported that OPLAN 34A actions would be suspended until
further notice, but that the destroyer patrols would be continued. (Department of State,
Although we know in past such patrols have only been on widely spaced periodic basis,
are concerned that both DRV/ChiCom as well as GVN will interpret present action as
retreat in face deployment of MIGs to DRV. From standpoint Communists, this may
encourage them to resume attacks when patrols begin again at later date. From standpoint
GVN and public attitudes here, it will tend to hasten and accentuate drop in morale which
received major lift from August 5 action.
Insofar as "normal requirements" are concerned, it seems to us presence of MIGs in DRV
has raised previously existing requirements for patrols, including necessity closely
following by [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] development of GCI
capabilities in DRV.
Taylor

Limdis. Drafted by Forrestal and cleared in substance with William Bundy. Repeated to
CINCPAC.
405. Ref Embtel 388./2/ Agree your conclusion removal Quat and Oanh from GVN. Our
main concern here is effect reorganization on U.S. opinion. Quat only recently visited
Washington/3/ and made rather good impression. Oanh is, of course, well known in both
domestic and international economic community, and his removal bound to have some
adverse effect on confidence in management GVN economic problems. Realize risks in
U.S. intervening too directly in support of individuals, but nevertheless you may wish
draw on these points when you see Khanh as well as emphasize need for type of public
explanation which best maintains impression of stability.
/2/Telegram 388, August 11, received in the Department of State at 8:01 a.m., transmitted
a lengthy report on a proposed governmental reorganization. Among the contemplated
changes was the removal of Oanh and Quat, both of whom were regarded favorably by
the Embassy in Saigon. (Ibid.)
Rusk

Repeated to CINCPAC. Although the source text is a Department of State telegram form,
the internal structure and references in the telegram (see footnote 2 below) show that it is
the text as repeated to CINCPAC.
393. Ref. A. Embtel 189. Ref. B. Embtel 171./2/ Spent an hour with Khanh this morning
devoted largely to a discussion of pending changes in government organization and
personnel. I introduced the subject by mentioning Thao's visit yesterday to Alex Johnson
(Embtel 189) and expressing an interest in his plans if they were ready for discussion.
/2/Telegram 189 to CINCPAC is the same as telegram 388 from Saigon; see footnote 2,
Document 311. Telegram 171 to CINCPAC (355 from Saigon, August 8) reported
Khanh's plans for a provisional government and constitution. (Department of State,

He indicated some annoyance that Thao has raised these matters before he had had an
opportunity to do so but then plunged into a discussion of his intentions using notes which
he had prepared for the occasion.
A provisional constitution is being drafted, a copy of which will be furnished us on
Friday. It will provide for a government generally as reported in Embtel 171, consisting of
independent legislative, executive and judicial branches with the MRC remaining as the
capstone over the entire structure. The legislative assembly will be composed of 60
appointed military officers (all or most retired), 60 members elected by provincial
councils, and 30 appointed from politicians, notables and confessional representatives.
Out of the 150 members of the assembly, Khanh reckons there will be about 60 antigovernment members to form a loyal opposition. The legislative branch will not have sole
lawmaking authority since the executive will have the concurrent power to issue decrees
in time of war or emergency.
The executive will be headed by a president (Khanh) and a vice-president (Khiem) in
charge of military affairs. No mention was made of the appointment of Vu Van Mau (see
Embtel 189) to a similar position for political affairs, but this may still be in the cards. The
present ministries will be aligned as departments under the presidency. Khanh is planning
some changes among present ministerial incumbents to obtain greater unity and
competence but was not inclined to discuss personalities. Nonetheless, I took opportunity
to put in plug for Quat along line of Deptel 388. He replied that he would probably keep
Quat although he was too much of a partisan Dai Viet for Khanh's liking.
Khanh's only remark on the judiciary was that it would be independent as in US.
Khanh hopes to announce these governmental changes by the end of the week. He still has
the problem of Minh and the four Dalat Generals./3/ He intends to offer Minh an
ambassadorship; if he declines, then Khanh wants us to take him off his hands by a
military or civil school assignment. In any case, he expects Minh to leave the country
amicably-otherwise he will release information to public highly damaging to Minh. I
urged importance of handling this matter quietly and without a public scandal and he
promised to do his best.
/3/Generals Dinh, Don, Le Van Kim, and Xuan.
Khanh had hoped to salvage Don from the other Dalat Generals but this solution is
proving unacceptable to certain unspecified military colleagues of Khanh's. Hence places
for all four must be found abroad either in Embassies, US schools.
Asked about changes in the military high command, Khanh indicted intention to replace
General Xuan commanding I Corps for unsatisfactory performance of duty (possibly
outcome of Hue incident reported in Embtel 378)/4/ and General Tri commanding II
Corps. Tri is needed to provide Khiem with an operational planner to work with
Westmoreland's staff.
/4/Apparently an incorrect reference since telegram 378, August 11, refers to two
incidents in the central provinces. (Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 VIET S)
I gave Khanh two general comments, the first being concern over renewed instability
which will result from these sweeping changes. Khanh recognized point but insists that
the country could never progress under present government. I am afraid that he may think
personality problems will [fade?] away if he changes the organizational framework.
The second point made was to emphasize the need to explain adequately these changes in
advance as a realignment made necessary by the state of emergency. Khanh made note of
this point which we will reopen with him on Friday when the Mission Council meets with
the National Security Council at Cap St. Jacques. Following that meeting Khanh wants to
discuss with us the text of the provisional constitution which we will presumably have
seen by that time.
Taylor
Meetings on Southeast Asia, Vol. 1. Top Secret.
The attached memorandum will be the main topic of discussion at the meeting scheduled
for noon tomorrow, Friday. In the main, the paper speaks for itself, but you should know
of a couple of important issues which it does not state directly.
The most important section of the paper begins on page 7 and deals with possible limited
pressures forward in the direction you indicated in the Monday meeting. Within this
section, on page 8, there is a discussion of cross-border operations into the Panhandle, and
you should know that General Taylor and many others would now like to move toward
U.S. air operations against the infiltration routes. Bob McNamara is strongly opposed. I
think you may want to hear argument on both sides on this issue. Max Taylor's cable
giving his view is attached at Tab A./2/
On page 9 there is a discussion of the DeSoto patrol. There is difference of opinion on
when this patrol should go back. Most of us here in Washington think it can wait ten days
to two weeks (as the memo says on page 1). Max Taylor would like it to go almost right
now, on grounds of signal to the Communists and encouragement to our friends. On this
one also you may wish to hear argument.
More broadly, it occurs to me that this meeting may be a good time for you to emphasize
again the priority we put on Saigon. At Tab B is a very private letter from Mike Forrestal
to John McNaughton2 which shows that the Army is using rather routine assignment and
reassignment methods there. A bit of questioning from you to Wheeler might do a lot of
good on this point.

Finally, I will give you a one-sheet wrap-up on this before the noon meeting.
McG.B.
Attachment
Memorandum by the Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs (Bundy)/3/
/3/Top Secret. The source text bears the typed note: "Third Draft." The original draft of
this memorandum has not been found, but a second draft, which is the same in format but
missing some of the subsections, is printed in Pentagon Papers: Gravel Edition, vol. III,
pp. 524-529. A memorandum from Robert Johnson to William Bundy, dated August 12,
with comments on the second draft is in Department of State, S/P Files: Lot 70 D 199 R.
Johnson Chron.
NEXT COURSES OF ACTION IN SOUTHEAST ASIA
I. Introduction
The next ten days to two weeks should be a short holding phase in which we would avoid
actions that would in any way take the onus off the Communist side for escalation.
We will send the DeSoto patrol back, will hold up on new 34A operations (continuing
only essential re-supply of air-dropped missions, plus relatively safe leaflet drops), but
will continue intensive reconnaissance of the DRV and the Panhandle (PDJ if necessary).
Within Laos, the attempt to secure Phou Kout would continue (napalm may be used in
discretion of Ambassador Unger), as would T-28 operations and consolidation of Triangle
gains, but no further military action would be done or indicated. In view of possible
Communist moves in Laos, road watch and other intelligence efforts should be intensified
accepting some greater risks.
We are not yet sure what the Communist side may do in this period. They have introduced
aircraft into North Vietnam, and may well send in at least token ground forces. VC
activity could step up markedly at any moment. Although the volume of Chicom
propaganda and demonstrations is ominous, it does not yet clearly suggest any further
moves; if they were made, we would act accordingly. This paper assumes the Communist
side does not go beyond the above.
II. Essential Elements in the Situation
A. South Vietnam is not going well. The mission's monthly report (Saigon 377)/4/
expresses hope of significant gains by the end of the year. But it also says Khanh's
chances of staying in power are only 50-50, that the leadership (though not so much the
people or the army) has symptoms of defeatism and hates the prospect of slugging it out
within the country, that there will be mounting pressures for wider action "which, if
resisted, will create frictions and irritations which could lead local politicians to serious
consideration of a negotiated solution or local soldiers to a military adventure without US

consent."
/4/Document 306.
In other words, even if the situation in our own view does go a bit better, we have a major
problem of maintaining morale. Our actions of last week lifted that morale temporarily,
but also aroused expectations, and morale could easily sag back again if the VC have
successes and we do nothing further.
B. Laos, on the other hand, has shown real military progress--so much so that a
Communist retaliatory move is a real possibility. If Phou Kout can be secured, present
military areas of control are if anything better for Souvanna than the line of last April. T28 operations have been a major factor, and really hurt PL morale. Souvanna's internal
position is also stronger, though the right-wing generals and colonels could make fools of
themselves again at any time.
C. Laos negotiations may start to move in the near future whatever we do. Souvanna has
accepted a tripartite meeting in Paris, and suggested August 24th. With his gains in hand,
he has already indicated he is likely not to insist on his previous precondition of
Communist withdrawal from the PDJ before agreeing to a 14-nation conference. The
USSR (at least publicly), India, and France--and the UK and Canada only slightly less so-are pressing for a conference or at least clear motion toward one. Souphanouvong's
silence and other indicators suggest the Communist side may still not accept an early
tripartite meeting or push for a conference, but we must recognize that, if they do accept a
tripartite, it will be a real step toward an eventual conference. We can and will urge
Souvanna to go slow, but our control will be limited.
D. Hanoi and Peiping, as of now, are certainly not persuaded that they must abandon their
efforts in South Vietnam and Laos. The US response to North Vietnamese naval attacks
has undoubtedly convinced the Communist side we will act strongly where US force units
are directly involved-as they have previously seen in our handling of Laos reconnaissance.
But in other respects the Communist side may not be so persuaded we are prepared to take
stronger actions, either in response to infiltration into SVN or to VC activity. The
Communists probably believe that we might counter air action in Laos quite firmly, but
that we would not wish to be drawn into around action there.
III. Essential Elements of US Policy
A. South Vietnam is still the main theater. Morale and momentum there must be
maintained. This means:
1. There is advantage in devising the best possible means of action that for minimum risks
get maximum results in terms of SVN morale and pressure on DRV.
2. We must continue to oppose any Vietnam conference, and must play the prospect of a
Laos conference very carefully. We must particularly avoid any impression of rushing to a
Laos conference, and must show a posture of general firmness into which an eventual
Laos conference might fit without serious loss.
3. We particularly need to keep our hands free for at least limited measures against the
Laos infiltration areas.
B. It is in our interest to stabilize the Laos situation as between Government forces and the
Communist side, and to reduce chances of a Communist escalating move on this front. (If
such a move comes, we must meet it firmly, of course. We should also be stepping up
Thai support to deter and prevent any Communist nibbles.) However, Souvanna should
not give up his strong cards, particularly T-28 operations, without getting a full price for
them. Moreover, we must seek to reduce as much as possible the inhibiting effect of any
Laos talks on actions against the Panhandle.
C. Basically, a solution in both South Vietnam and Laos will require a combination of
military pressure and some form of communication under which Hanoi (and Peiping)
eventually accept the idea of getting out. Negotiation without continued military action
will not achieve our objectives in the foreseeable future. But military pressure could be
accompanied by attempts to communicate with Hanoi and perhaps Peiping-through thirdcountry channels, through side conversations around Laos negotiations of any sortprovided always that we make it clear both to the Communists and to South Vietnam that
military pressure will continue until we have achieved our objectives. After, but only
after, we have established a clear pattern of pressure hurting the DRV and leaving no
doubts in South Vietnam of our resolve, we could even accept a conference broadened to
include the Vietnam issue. (The UN now looks to be out as a communication forum,
though this could conceivably change.)
IV. Timing and Sequence of Actions
A. Limited Pressures (late August tentatively through December)
There are a number of limited actions we could take that would tend to maintain our
initiative and the morale of the GVN and Khanh, but that would not involve major risks of
escalation. Such actions could be such as to foreshadow stronger measures to come,
though they would not in themselves go far to change Hanoi's basic actions.
1. 34 A Operations could be overtly acknowledged and justified by the GVN. Marine
operations could be strongly defended on the basis of continued DRV sea infiltration, and
successes could be publicized. Leaflet operations could also be admitted and defended,
again on the grounds of meeting DRV efforts in the South, and their impunity (we hope)
would tend to have its own morale value in both Vietnams. Airdrop operations are more
doubtful; their justification is good but less clear than other operations, and successes
have been few. With the others admitted, they could be left to speak for themselves-and of
course security would forbid any mention of specific operations before they succeeded.
2. Joint US/GVN planning already covers possible actions against DRV and the
Panhandle. It can be used in itself to maintain the morale of the GVN leadership, as well
as to control and inhibit any unilateral GVN moves. With 34A surfaced, it could be put
right into the same planning framework. We would not ourselves publicize this planning,
but it could be leaked (as it probably would anyway) with desirable effects in Hanoi and
elsewhere.
3. Stepped-up training of Vietnamese on jet aircraft should now be undertaken in any
event in light of the presence of MIG's in North Vietnam. The JCS are preparing a plan,
and the existence of this training could be publicized both for its morale effect in the GVN
and as a signal to Hanoi of possible future action.
4. Cross-border operations into the Panhandle could be conducted on a limited scale. To
be successful, ground operations would have to be so large in scale as to be beyond what
GVN can spare, and we should not at this time consider major US or Thai ground action
from the Thai side. But for air operations there are at least a few worthwhile targets in
infiltration areas, and these could be hit by GVN air. US reconnaissance missions in the
Panhandle would of course continue in any event; suppressive missions might be
considered at some point, but not until after the GVN has acted in this area. (Our
Panhandle reconnaissance does not have the justification of a request from Souvanna, as
our PDJ operations do.) Probably we should avoid publicity on air operations so as not to
embarrass Souvanna; the Communist side might squawk, but in the past they have been
silent on this area.
5. DeSoto patrols could be reintroduced at some point. Both for present purposes and to
maintain the credibility of our account of the events of last week, they must be clearly
dissociated from 34A operations both in fact and in physical appearance. In terms of
course patterns, we should probably avoid penetrations of 11 miles or so and stay at least
20 miles off; whatever the importance of asserting our view of territorial waters, it is less
than the international drawbacks of appearing to provoke attack unduly. The 20-mile
distance would not appreciably change the chances of a North Vietnamese reaction, while
it would deprive them of a propaganda argument (since a great many other countries also
assert a 12-mile territorial waters limit.)
6. Specific tit-for-tat actions of opportunity could be undertaken for any special VC or
DRV activity. As Saigon 377 points out, the VC have "unused dirty tricks" such as mining
(or attacks) in the Saigon River, sabotage of major POL stocks, and terrorist attacks on US
dependents. The first two, at least, would lend themselves to prompt and precise reprisal,
e.g., by mining the Haiphong channel and attacking the Haiphong POL storage.
7. US Dependents. This has two aspects. If there were substantial terrorism against our
dependents, we should consider some specific reprisal against the DRV; however, this has
disadvantages in that it might appear that we were reacting only when US nationals were
hit, and ignoring the regular pattern of terrorism against South Vietnamese. The second
aspect, whether or not there are terrorist attacks, is the possible withdrawal of our
dependents. If the situation should reach another intense point, withdrawal might be
useful in itself as a signal to Hanoi that we were really getting ready for business.
8. The sequence and mix of US and GVN actions needs careful thought. At this point, we
should emphasize both the GVN role in actions and rationales directly relating actions to
what is being done to the GVN. Overt 34A actions should be the first moves, and the
GVN would go first in air attacks against the Panhandle. But there are advantages in other
respects to actions related to US forces. If we lost an aircraft in the Panhandle, we could
act hard and fast, and of course similarly for any attack on the DeSoto patrols. Probably
the sequence should be played somewhat by ear, with the aim of producing a slightly
increased tempo but one that does not commit us prematurely to even stronger actions.
Summary. The above actions are in general limited and controllable. However, if we
accept--as of course we must--the necessity of prompt retaliation especially for attacks on

our own forces, they could amount to at least a pretty high noise level that might stimulate
some pressures for a conference. New DRV air and AA capability may also produce
incidents.
These actions are not in themselves a truly coherent program of strong enough pressure
either to bring Hanoi around or to sustain a pressure posture into some kind of discussion.
Hence, we should continue absolutely opposed to any conference.
B. More Serious Pressures
All the above actions would be foreshadowing systematic military action against the
DRV, and we might at some point conclude such action was required either because of
incidents arising from the above actions or because of deterioration in the SVN situation,
particularly if there were to be clear evidence of greatly increased infiltration from the
north. However, in the absence of such major new developments, we should be thinking
of a contingency date for planning purposes, as suggested by Ambassador Taylor, of 1
January 1965.
Our present thinking is that systematic action against the DRV might start by progressive
attacks keyed to the rationale of infiltration routes and facilities, followed by other
selected military-related targets. However, the mix is now hard to foresee and would
obviously depend heavily on specific incidents and desired signal strength at any one
time.
C. Handling Laos Negotiations
1. We would wish to slow down any progress toward a conference and to hold Souvanna
to the firmest possible position. Unger's suggestion of tripartite administration for the PDJ
is one possibility that would be both advantageous and a useful delaying gambit.
Insistence on full recognition of Souvanna's position is another point on which he should
insist, and there would also be play in the hand on the question of free ICC operations. As
to a cease-fire, we would certainly not want this to be agreed to at the tripartite stage,
since it would remove Souvanna's powerful T-28 lever. But since Souvanna has always
made a cease-fire one of his preconditions, we must reckon that the other side might insist
on it before a conference was convened-which we would hope would not be for at least 23 months in any case.
2. If, despite our best efforts, Souvanna on his own, or in response to third-country
pressures, started to move rapidly toward a conference, we would have a very difficult
problem. If the timing of a Laos conference, in relation to the degree of pressures we had
then set in motion against the DRV, was such that our attending or accepting the
conference would have major morale drawbacks in South Vietnam, we might well have to
refuse to attend ourselves and to accept the disadvantages of having no direct
participation. In the last analysis, GVN morale would have to be the deciding factor.

to the President, Vol. VI. No classification marking.
RE
12 o'clock meeting on Southeast Asia
The immediate Southeast Asia situation has not changed since last night. If you have had
time to read the paper,/2/ you can say so and reduce discussion by turning attention to
specific questions. John McCone would like to open with a few minutes of intelligence
briefing and I think this is helpful. The only significant new piece of intelligence is that
we have some new [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] photography of
Chinese nuclear facilities which raises a question as to whether they are not coming quite
near an explosion. The pictures have not yet been analyzed and no direct estimate is
available today, but McCone may mention this new evidence on a most important
problem.
/2/Attachment to Bundy's memorandum, Document 313.
You will want to ask Rusk for a brief discussion. The specific questions which I suggest
are these:
1. You assume we plan to put these matters succinctly to CINCPAC and to Max Taylor
for comment.
2. You understand there is difference of opinion about means of attacking the infiltration
routes and especially on the question of U.S. aircraft. You would like to hear argument on
this point.
3. Is there any consensus on the timing of the next DeSoto patrol and on its combat
instructions.
4. You may wish to repeat to others what you have said to me about following upon
Goldwater's assertion that you gave an admonition to commanders to use any weapons,
including nuclear weapons. I have been pressing this with many newspaper men and find
a surprising reaction--which is that everyone knows Barry is this kind of fool and there is
not much news in it any more! My own conclusion is that if you wish to put more light on
this folly, you may have to do it yourself in a press conference, and I am working on
possible language.
5. You may wish to ask Wheeler if the Army is using all its best--and also its most
experienced--men in South Vietnam.
The general result of this meeting should be agreement on further study and refinement of
a program in which we are free to take appropriate initiatives, together with an instruction
to consult further in the Pacific. McNamara will be away all next week, and if the
situation does not change sharply, we will probably not wish to make big decisions until
his return on Monday, the 24th./3/
/3/The off-the-record meeting took place in the Cabinet Room of the White House from
12:31 to 1:14 and was attended by the President, Secretaries Rusk and McNamara,
McGeorge and William Bundy, Ball, Vance, McNaughton, McCone, Wheeler, and Ray
Cline. Johnson Library, President's Daily Diary) No record of the meeting has been found.
McG.B./4/
315. Telegram From the Commander in Chief, Pacific (Sharp) to the Commander,
Military Assistance Command, Vietnam (Westmoreland)/1/
Honolulu, August 14, 1964--5:51 p.m.
11885. Secret; Limdis.
150351Z. Personal for Gen Westmoreland from Sharp. Security of US resources in SVN.
1. I know you share my concern over the vulnerability to possible VC attack of heavy
concentrations of recently deployed US aircraft on airfields such as Bien Hoa, Tan Son
Nhut and Danang. I am particularly concerned about the possibility of mortar attacks from
locations difficult to secure. VC reaction to Pierce Arrow operation may well single out
these and other vital US resources for reprisal, from which they would derive tremendous
psychological advantage. This would be in addition to the substantial loss we would
sustain from successful attacks of any type.
2. I am sure that you will impress upon RVN necessity for all possible security
measures./2/
/2/On August 16, Westmoreland replied that the possibility of attacks on the airfields was
"fully recognized." After describing the actions taken unilaterally and with the
Vietnamese, Westmoreland concluded:
"I believe we have explored all defense possibilities and have organized our resources to
the best to meet the potential threat. This matter will continue to be given my personal
attention." (MAC JOO 8214; ibid., Reel 11888)
(McNamara)/1/
JCSM-701-64

7425, Vietnam 381. Secret.
SUBJECT
Next Courses of Action in Southeast Asia
1. With reference to the draft policy paper, subject as above, dated 13 August 1964,/2/ the
Joint Chiefs of Staff are in general accord with the policy and courses of action contained
in the paper provided that more serious pressures, comparable to those referred to in
subparagraph IV B of the paper, be implemented as necessary along with the limited
pressures outlined in subparagraph IV A. This will provide for military courses of action,
to include attack of targets in the Democratic Republic of Vietnam (DRV), as necessary,
with the objective of destroying the DRV will and capabilities to continue support of
insurgent forces in Laos and the Republic of Vietnam.
/2/Attachment to Document 313.
2. The Joint Chiefs of Staff believe that the recent sharp and immediate military action
taken by the United States against the DRV, more clearly than any United States action in
some time, conveyed to both friend and enemy the measure of US resolution in Southeast
Asia. The sudden advantage gained by this military action must be retained. The actions
proposed in the draft paper, as modified by paragraph 1 above, if promptly pursued,
should sustain the US advantage gained and, at the same time, maintain the higher morale
and momentum generated in the Republic of Vietnam as a result of recent US military
operations.
3. The next military courses of action in Southeast Asia are now being analyzed as a
matter of urgency by the Joint Chiefs of Staff. The referenced draft paper will be
considered in the development of these military courses of action. Upon completion of
this analysis, appropriate recommendations will be forwarded for your consideration
before implementing actions are taken on the Bundy memorandum.
Earle G. Wheeler
Chairman
/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 VIET S. Secret; Immediate;
Limdis. Also sent to CIA, the Department of Defense, and the White House and repeated
to CINCPAC.
415. CINCPAC for POLAD. After August 14 meeting of GVN SC and U.S. Mission
Council, I stayed for picnic lunch, accompanied by Sullivan and Manfull (Johnson has
been laid up with flu). After lunch, Khanh took us aside and produced a rough English
translation of his new constitution. Full text, with notes, transmitted by septel./2/ We
found it brusque in language and suggested to Khanh that in present form it would raise
criticism in U.S. and in world press. We stressed to him that internal problems of
acceptance in Vietnam were his own affair, and we could only offer observations on the
objective issue of international reactions.
/2/Telegram 416 from Saigon, August 15, 12:10 p.m. (Ibid.)
Khanh heard out these observations with apparent understanding and then suggested that
we should perhaps meet with the commission which had drafted this document in order to
discuss our observations with them. I proposed that Sullivan and Manfull should remain
in Cap St. Jacques for this purpose while I returned for commitments in Saigon.
Sullivan and Manfull were then taken to province chief's residence while call went out to
various villas in Cap St. Jaques to assemble the constitutional commission. When mission
arrived at residence, it proved to be headed by one-time P.M. Tran Chanh Thanh, and to
be composed of Tran Le Quang, plus five prominent jurists, one of whom had recently
been Chief Justice of Constitutional Court under Diem regime.
During two and one-half hour frank exchange and after full explanation, accompanied by
occasional jocular commentary from judicial experts, Sullivan and Manfull made fol
points:/3/
/3/For another account of this meeting, see Sullivan, Obbligato, pp. 205-208.
(1) Preamble did not make clear provisional nature of new "charter".
(2) Preamble should stipulate that MRC felt compelled to assume authority because of
threat to republic, but that this authority should be relinquished as conditions permitted.
(3) Chapter II, concerning "bill of rights" was unnecessarily abrupt. Rights should be
spelled out in detail, even if charter specified that they must necessarily be curtailed
temporarily because of emergency. Comparison was drawn between twenty articles
concerning rights of citizens in old Diem constitution, and only two articles in new charter
devoted to this subject.
(4) Several articles, notably those affecting Council of Govt and High Council of
Magistrates, were cryptically obscure in their meaning.
(5) Whole document would be considered as unduly permanent formalization of military
takeover. Therefore most careful preparation needed in public relations field if this to be
done smoothly.
In general, constitutional commission accepted all these observations in good spirit. They
undertook to convene forthwith and examine means by which any or all of them could be
put into effect. Sullivan and Manfull then withdrew, and, by prior arrangement with
Khanh, returned to latter's villa for final consultation with him prior their return to Saigon.
At Khanh's villa, meeting of top level Military Revolutionary Council reps was in session
when Sullivan and Manfull arrived. Khanh withdrew from meeting, listened to recital of
observations listed above, and expressed general agreement that these matters should be
dealt with. However, he laid great emphasis upon urgency with which action had to be
taken. He had, he said, "five days at the outside" and "at the inside", maybe only a couple
of days. He therefore wanted all the help he could obtain soonest.
He said he and his colleagues would draft a proclamation which they would deliver to
Embassy August 15 for our comments and that he would appreciate any advice we could
give on public relations handling of this enterprise. He doubted there was time to get
professional legal advice from Washington and also questioned whether it would be really
useful in these "special circumstances". With this, he returned, very solemnly, to the room
where his MRC colleagues, equally solemn, were busily scratching on foolscap,
presumably drafting their proclamation.
Comment: We conclude that Khanh and his military colleagues have decided that this sort
of change is indispensable. It is of course still not determined what Gen Minh's attitude
will be. We have considered possibility of seeking legal aid from Washington to review
this charter, but feel this would not be useful because this document departs so widely
from U.S. experience and because time is so short. We have therefore decided that our
best efforts would be devoted to (1) making wording of document less brusque and
therefore more palatable both in Vietnam and abroad and (2) assisting in proclamation and
other measures of public relations nature explaining necessity for this sort of change.
Whether we like it or not, this is the constitutional form which the MRC fully intends to
impose, and we see no alternative but to make best of it./4/
/4/The new constitution, sometimes called the Vung Tau Charter, was promulgated on
August 16.
Taylor
Exdis. Repeated to the White House, the Department of Defense, and CINCPAC.
According to another copy, this telegram was drafted and initialed by Taylor. (Ibid.,
Saigon Embassy Files: Lot 68 F 8)
457. There is need for guidance to COMUSMACV in the execution of joint military
planning now underway with RVNAF. This planning will involve three contingency
areas: (1) cross-border operations into Laos, (2) DRV ground attack against northern
provinces of SVN, (3) air attack of targets in DRV by VNAF and/or US air forces. I
should like to comment by category with regard to some of the emerging problems.
A. Cross-border operations into Laos
This kind of operation has already been undertaken with limited success in the form of the
Leaping Lena parachute drops. This pattern has the advantage of making reasonably sure
that a reconnaissance team arrives at destination and does not turn back at some point
before getting there. I do not think that we should be discouraged by poor initial results
but should proceed to reestablish the capability for Leaping Lena operations which is
currently virtually nil as the result of disaffection of trainees at Nha Trang.
In expanding cross-border operations, consideration is now being given to a concept

involving the establishment of three "bridgeheads" of considerable dimension in Laos as
described in MACV 8213 to CINCPAC1CS DTG 160943Z./2/
/2/An abbreviated text of this telegram is printed in the Pentagon Papers: Gravel Edition,
vol. III, pp. 539-540.
As I understand the proposal, it seems to me to be subject to several objections. It is
overly ambitious in relation to the forces which could properly be made available without
detriment to the pacification effort which should always remain the bread-and-butter
preoccupation of RVNAF. Since such diverted forces, in my judgment, should not exceed
at this time about 2-3 battalion equivalents additional to present border forces the crossborder operations are likely to be relatively ineffective in stopping infiltration. To achieve
any effectiveness, I would agree with the joint planners that US advisors should
accompany the ground forces.
It is proposed to provide VNAF air support for these ground operations on approval of
CINCRVNAF and COMUSMACV. Such air operations would raise some of the
questions posed by Ambassador Unger in Vientiane's 160 [170]/3/ to Department and
would cause concern in my mind over loss of US control of air actions outside of SVN,
which could have great political and military significance to US interests. US Mission is
presently studying pros and cons of using US air against Panhandle targets as described in
Embtel 236 4 rather than VNAF and results of this study will bear on our position with
regard to use of air in cross-border operations.
/3/Document 250.
/4/Document 251.
Notwithstanding these adverse comments, I am in favor joint cross-border planning not
because of its probable effectiveness but because us [it?] will have value in letting off
some of the steam building up in local military.
B. Defense against DRV ground/air attack
COMUSMACV has described in following terms the most probable (in view of JCS)
offensive ground reaction of DRV in case of military escalation:
"Entire units of PACV could be infiltrated on an intensive scale probably with unit
designations changed and in VC uniforms but otherwise maintaining unit integrity. This
infiltration could take place across the demilitarized zone and through the Laotian
Panhandle. Forces equivalent to division strength could be thus infiltered and marshalled
in Quang Nam or Thua Thien and could make a sudden and violent descent upon Da
Nang and Hue or both, with little or no warning. An attack at Da Nang could be highly
destructive and would represent a direct blow against a major US air base."
In view of this threat, COMUSMACV recommends holding a BLT on call to land at Da
Nang within 6 hours and the remainder of MEF to follow as soon as possible. In addition,
he wishes a US brigade available on call to move to the defense of Tan Son Nhut and
Bien Hoa if needed and to provide a general reserve. He also recommends deployment to
SVN ASAP logistic, communication and anti-aircraft missile units, the latter for the air
defense of Saigon complex, Da Nang and Nha Trang.
In summary, COMUSMACV feels that a DRV ground action in I Corps is sufficiently
probable to require a BLT to remain indefinitely afloat off Da Nang (with the remainder
of MEF on alert presumably at home stations on Okinawa), to keep a brigade available for
quick deployment to Tan Son Nhut and Bien Hoa, and to deploy now the logistic and
communications elements necessary to support the additional combat forces and the air
defense elements necessary in anticipation of hostile air attacks on Saigon, Da Nang and
Nha Trang.
There is considerable logic behind the ascribed capability of DRV to create a serious
ground situation in I Corps if PAVN units are added to the VC. However, if the form of
the attack were the infiltration mode described above, a concurrent air attack on Saigon,
Da Nang and Nha Trang seems incompatible with the covert character of the ground
action. Nevertheless it is quite clear that an air threat against these crowded bases always
exists in any circumstance.
The question comes down to the point of deciding whether or not the DRV actions in the
Gulf of Tonkin have so changed our evaluation of the capabilities and possible intentions
of Hanoi as to warrant preparation against a ground attack in I Corps and the consequent
threat to Da Nang by positioning the Marines, alerting the army forces and taking now the
air defense/logistic measures mentioned above (including increasing military forces
permanently in SVN).
Another question arising in joint planning concerns command relationships in case US
ground forces are brought into SVN. This question could become an area of futile debate
if not brought under early control and should be avoided if possible. If something must be
said, COMUSMACV could comment that the Korean pattern of allied command
relationship, with appropriate modifications, would probably be favored by US but this
matter need not be decided now.
C. Air attack of targets in DRV
Joint planning will soon give consideration to the air attack of targets in DRV either under
the tit-for-tat concept of Category II CINCPAC OPLAN 37-64 or the mounting pressure
concept of Category III, same plan. Here we are brought face to face with certain new
factors which bear on the OPLAN 37-64 concept.
It is well to remind ourselves that this CINCPAC plan was drawn up with the idea of
applying military pressure in DRV through overt actions of GVN with US participation
limited to reconnaissance beyond capability of VNAF and to Farmgate activities to which
would be added the contribution of the B-57's. Since this early concept, several new
factors have come into play. The DRV attack in the Gulf of Tonkin has required a US
posture of readiness reflected in CINCPAC Fragorder 062335Z 5 which calls on US air
forces alone to attack NVN targets. The crash requirement for a plan ready for immediate
implementation caused the movement of the B-57's to SVN as US, not Farmgate, aircraft.
Finally, the appearance of MIG 15/17's at Phuc Yen Airfield, Hanoi, has set definite limits
upon what the VNAF propeller planes can do in contributing to OPLAN 37-64.
5 This cable transmitted the fragmentation operations order summarized below

These new factors call for a quick review of OPLAN 37-64 to decide what role the US
wishes VNAF (without and with Farmgate) to play in any air action against NVN.
Emphasize quick review because COMUSMACV needs guidance today as to how to
conduct his planning discussions. For example, he will need to know whether VNAF can
hope to get jets (particularly the B-57's) and, if so, when and how many. All of these
questions do not need to be answered now but we do need to decide in general what role
the GVN should be encouraged to play in out-of-country air operations. It will not do to
say the role is zero as now implied in CINCPAC Fragorder. This government must be
given a significant military role to play which will stimulate enthusiasm without diverting
attention from the in-country pacification plan. This is going to be a hard balance to strike.
In conclusion, I recommend approving following joint planning guidance for use by
COMUSMACV with GVN:
A. Cross-border operations
(1) Only one area of ground operations to be undertaken at outset, preferably the one
offering greatest promise of success.
(2) Not more than two battalion equivalents to be committed at any one time (beyond
present border forces).
(3) Plans for air actions in Laos to make provision for use of either VNAF/Farmgate or
US air without prejudice to final decision.
(4) All air operations in Laos to be on approval by COMUSMACV (who will obtain
necessary US clearances).
B. Defense against DRV ground/air attack
(1) No planning for landing US ground forces in SVN beyond Marines at Danang to
protect airfield in case of clear threat. CINCPAC to have logistic support responsibility
for the Marines.
(2) No indication of any intention to increase permanent US garrison beyond possible
introduction of Hawk units if [unknown amount of source text missing].
(3) Discussion of command relationship to be avoided as long as possible. If necessary,
use Korean pattern as basis for planning without commitment.
C. Air attack of targets in DRV
(1) Include B-57's in Farmgate for planning purposes.
(2) Joint planners to examine MIG threat and decide what targets could be safely given to
propeller aircraft under current conditions.
(3) Eventually assure appropriate participation of VNAF in light of foregoing

examination.
This message, while bearing on some of the matters contained in Deptel 439,/6/ was
prepared before its receipt and does not constitute an answer to it.
The foregoing has been discussed in detail with Westmoreland who concurs with the
above recommended guidance for joint planning with GVN. He reaffirms his position on
military posture as described in MACV 8149 DTG 150123Z./7/
/7/This telegram reviewed the military situation in South Vietnam and proposed various
troop deployments to improve it. (Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 VIET S)
Taylor

/1/Source: Department of State, Saigon Embassy Files: Lot 68 F 8. Top Secret;
Immediate; Limdis. Drafted by Taylor. Repeated to CIA, the Department of Defense, the
White House, Vientiane, and CINCPAC. Also printed in Pentagon Papers: Gravel
Edition, vol. III, pp.545-548.
465. Deptel 439./2/ This is a US Mission message. In preparing our reply, we have found
it simpler to produce a new paper which undertakes to state the problem in South Viet
Nam as we see it in two possible forms and then to provide a course of action responding
to each statement of the problem.
/2/The text of Bundy's draft memorandum (attached to Document 313), without the last
three paragraphs, was transmitted to Saigon in telegram 439, August 14. (Department of
State, Central Files, POL 27 VIET S; also printed in Pentagon Papers: Gravel Edition,
vol. III, pp. 533-537) The draft memorandum was also sent to Vientiane and CINCPAC
for comments. Both replied on August 17. The Embassy in Vientiane expressed doubts
about how much action in the Panhandle Souvanna could or would accept and felt that
Laos was a holding action until the situation in Vietnam could be resolved. (Telegram 310
from Vientiane; Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 VIET S) CINCPAC stressed
the need for increased military pressure, stated that no conference on Southeast Asia
should be held before the insurgency was overcome, and commented point by point on the
items in the memorandum. (Telegram 170530Z; Washington National Records Center,
RG 319, HQDA Message Center, Reel 11885) Both replies are printed in Pentagon
Papers: Gravel Edition, vol III, pp.541-545.
Underlying our analysis is the apparent assumption of Deptel 439 (which we believe is
correct) that the present in-country pacification plan is not enough in itself to maintain
national morale or to offer reasonable hope of eventual success. Something must be added
in the coming months.

Statement of the Problem--A. The course which US policy in South Viet Nam should take
during the coming months can be expressed in terms of four objectives. The first and most
important objective is to gain time for the Khanh Government to develop a certain
stability and to give some firm evidence of viability. Since any of the courses of action
considered in this cable carry a considerable measure of risk to the US, we should be slow
to get too deeply involved in them until we have a better feel of the quality of our ally. In
particular, if we can avoid it, we should not get involved militarily with North Viet Nam
and possibly with Red China if our base in South Viet Nam is insecure and Khanh's army
is tied down everywhere by the VC insurgency. Hence, it is to our interest to gain
sufficient time not only to allow Khanh to prove that he can govern, but also to free
Saigon from the VC threat which presently rings it and assure that sufficient GVN ground
forces will be available to provide a reasonable measure of defense against any DRV
ground reaction which may develop in the execution of our program and thus avoid the
possible requirement for a major US ground force commitment.
A second objective in this period is the maintenance of morale in South Viet Nam,
particularly within the Khanh Government. This should not be difficult in the case of the
government if we can give Khanh assurance of our readiness to bring added pressure on
Hanoi if he provides evidence of ability to do his part. Thirdly, while gaining time for
Khanh, we must be able to hold the DRV in check and restrain a further buildup of Viet
Cong strength by way of infiltration from the North. Finally, throughout this period, we
should be developing a posture of maximum readiness for a deliberate escalation of
pressure against North Viet Nam, using January 1, 1965 as a target D-Day. We must
always recognize, however, that events may force us to advance D-Day to a considerably
earlier date.
Course of Action--A. If we accept the validity of the foregoing statement of the problem,
we then need to design a course of action which will achieve the four objectives
enumerated above. Such a course of action would consist of three parts: the first, a series
of actions directed at the Khanh Government; the second, actions directed at the Hanoi
Government; and third, following a pause of some duration, initiation of an orchestrated
air attack against North Viet Nam.
In approaching the Khanh Government, we should express our willingness to Khanh to
engage in planning and eventually to exert increased pressure on North Viet Nam,
providing certain conditions are met in advance. In the first place before we would agree
to go all out against the DRV, he must stabilize his government and make some progress
in cleaning up his operational backyard. Specifically, he must execute the initial phases of
the Hop Tac plan successfully to the extent of pushing the Viet Cong from the doors of
Saigon. The overall pacification program, including Hop Tac, should progress sufficiently
to allow earmarking at least three division equivalents for the defense in I Corps if the
DRV steps up military operations in that area.
Finally, we should reach some fundamental understandings with Khanh and his
government concerning war aims. We must make clear that we will engage in action
against North Viet Nam only for the purpose of assuring the security and independence of
South Viet Nam within the territory assigned by the 1954 agreements; that we will not
join in a crusade to unify the North and South; that we will not even seek to overthrow the
Hanoi regime provided the latter will cease its efforts to take over the South by subversive
warfare.
With these understandings reached, we would be ready to set in motion the following:
(1) Resume at once 34A (with emphasis on Marine operations) and DeSoto patrols. These
could start without awaiting outcome of discussions with Khanh.
(2) Resume U-2 overflights over all NVN.
(3) Initiate air and ground strikes in Laos against infiltration targets as soon as joint plans
now being worked out with the Khanh Government are ready. Such plans will have to be
related to the situation in Laos. It appears to us that Souvanna Phouma should be informed
at an appropriate time of the full scope of our plans and one would hope to obtain his
acquiescence in the anti-infiltration actions in Laos. In any case we should always seek to
preserve our freedom of action in the Laotian corridor.
By means of these actions, Hanoi will get the word that the operational ground rules with
respect to the DRV are changing. We should perhaps consider message to DRV that
shooting down of U-2 would result in reprisals. We should now lay public base for
justifying such flights and have plans for prompt execution in contingency of shoot down.
One might be inclined to consider including at this stage tit-for-tat bombing operations in
our plans to compensate for VC depredations in SVN. However, the initiation of air
attacks from SVN against NVN is likely to release a new order of military reaction from
both sides, the outcome of which is impossible to predict. Thus, we do not visualize
initiating this form of reprisal as a desirable tactic in the current plan but would reserve
the capability as an emergency response if needed.
Before proceeding beyond this point, we should raise the level of precautionary military
readiness (if not already done) by taking such visible measures as introducing US Hawk
units to Danang and Saigon, landing a Marine force at Danang for defense of the airfield
and beefing up MACV's support base. By this time (assumed to be late fall) we should
have some reading on Khanh's performance.
Assuming that his performance has been satisfactory and that Hanoi has failed to respond
favorably, it will be time to embark on the final phase of Course of Action A, a carefully
orchestrated bombing attack on NVN, directed primarily at infiltration and other military
targets. At some point prior thereto, it may be desirable to open direct communications
with Hanoi if this has not been done before. With all preparations made, political and
military, the bombing program would begin, using US reconnaissance planes,
VNAF/Farmgate aircraft against those targets which could be attacked safely in spite of
the presence of the MIG's, and additional US combat aircraft if necessary for the effective
execution of the bombing programs.
Pros and Cons of Course of Action--A. If successful, Course of Action A will accomplish
the objectives set forth at the outset as essential to the support of US policy in South Viet
Nam. It will press the Khanh Government into doing its homework in pacification and
will limit the diversion of interest to the out-of-country venture. It gives adequate time for
careful preparation estimated at several months, while doing sufficient at once to maintain
internal morale. It also provides ample warning to Hanoi and Peking to allow them to
adjust their conduct before becoming over-committed.
On the other hand, Course of Action A relies heavily upon the durability of the Khanh
Government. It assumes that there is little danger of its collapse without notice or of its
possible replacement by a weaker or more unreliable successor. Also, because of the
drawn-out nature of the program, it is exposed to the danger of international political
pressure to enter into negotiations before NVN is really hurting from the pressure directed
against it.
Statement of the Problem--B. It may well be that the problem of US policy in SVN is
more urgent than that depicted in the foregoing statement. It is far from clear at the
present moment that the Khanh Government can last until January 1, 1965, although the
application of Course of Action A should have the effect of strengthening the government
internally and of silencing domestic squabbling. If we assume, however, that we do not
have the time available which is implicit in Course of Action A (several months), we
would have to restate the problem in the following terms. Our objective should be action
at once which will hold the government together and will avoid the possible consequences
of a collapse of national morale. To accomplish these purposes, we would have to open
the campaign against the DRV without delay, seeking to force Hanoi as rapidly as
possible to desist from aiding the VC and to convince the DRV that it must cooperate in
calling off the VC insurgency.
Course of Action--B. To meet this statement of the problem, we need an accelerated
course of action, seeking to obtain results faster than under Course of Action A. Such an
accelerated program would include the following actions:
Again we must inform Khanh of our intentions, this time expressing a willingness to
begin military pressures against Hanoi at once, providing that he will undertake to
perform as in Course of Action A. However, US action would not await evidence of
performance.
Again we may wish to communicate directly on this subject with Hanoi or await the effect
of our military actions. The scenario of the ensuing events would be essentially the same
as under course A but the execution would await only the readiness of plans to execute,
relying almost exclusively on US military means.
Pros and Cons of Course of Action--B. This course of action asks virtually nothing from
the Khanh Government, primarily because it is assumed that little can be expected from it.
It avoids the consequences of the sudden collapse of the Khanh Government and gets
underway with minimum delay the punitive actions against Hanoi. Thus it lessens the
chance of an interruption of the program by an international demand for negotiation by
presenting a fait accompli to international critics. However, it increases the likelihood of
US involvement in ground action, since Khanh will have almost no available ground
forces which can be released from pacification employment to mobile resistance of DRV
attacks.
Conclusion: It is concluded that Course of Action A offers the greater promise of
achievement of US policy objectives in SVN during the coming months. However, we
should always bear in mind the fragility of the Khanh Government and be prepared to
shift quickly to Course of Action B if the situation requires. In either case, we must be
militarily ready for any response which may be initiated by North Viet Nam or by
Communist China.
Miscellaneous: As indicated above, we believe that 34A operations should resume at once
at maximum tempo, still on a covert basis. Similarly, DeSoto patrols should begin at once,
operating outside 12-mile limit. We concur that a number of VNAF pilots should be
trained on B-57's between now and first of year. There should be no change now with
regard to policy on evacuation of US dependents.
Recommendation: It is recommended that USG adopt Course of Action A while
maintaining readiness to shift to Course of Action B.
Taylor
320. Memorandum of a Conversation Between the Desk Officer of the Vietnam

Working Group (Furness) and the Vietnamese Charge (Rau), Washington, August
21, 1964/1/
/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 VIET S. Secret. Drafted by Furness
on August 25.
SUBJECT
Conversation on Political Situation in Viet-Nam
Mr. Rau asked me for lunch on August 21 and discussed various aspects of the political
situation in Viet-Nam and a few other subjects.
Political Situation in Viet-Nam
We first discussed the recent elevation of General Khanh to the presidency of Viet-Nam.
Rau indicated that he had gained the impression from conversations with other State
Department officers that Khanh had actually consulted with the Embassy as to whether or
not he should take the office of President. I indicated to Rau that it was my understanding
that while Khanh had told Ambassador Taylor and others that he was planning to
reorganize the government and might assume the office of Chief of State himself, I did
not believe that he had ever told us that he was planning to take the office of President. I
told him that Khanh had shown us his first draft of the new provisional constitution and
that we had been able to make changes in it. Rau indicated that he believed that Khanh's
taking of the office of President created resentment among Vietnamese. Rau felt Khanh's
future depends on how effectively he operates in the future and only if he is able to win
the cooperation of other political figures in Viet-Nam. Rau indicated that as far as he
knew, the Vietnamese see no great distinction in the fact that Khanh calls himself "ChuTich" instead of "Tong-Thong" and that they were immediately reminded of the Diem
regime when Khanh assumed the office of President.
Rau said he has received very little information from the Foreign Office (he says he gets
monthly reports about two months late); I indicated that we would do our best to keep him
informed of new developments. He asked if we had any information as to the composition

of the new cabinet; I told him we did not know who was to be appointed to the new
cabinet but that we did have an idea as to how it would be organized. I described the
cabinet structure and Rau remarked that it was very much like the organization under
Diem. I told Rau I understood that Khanh was considering appointing former Foreign
Minister Vu Van Mau, now Ambassador to London, as Vice President and that this office
would be, in effect, the executive of the government. I asked Rau whether he thought Mau
would be a good appointee for this position. Rau said he thought Mau might do a good job
but wondered if he would be willing to accept the position. Rau said Mau might feel he
would not be given sufficient authority by President Khanh, given the experience of the
previous Deputy Prime Ministers under Khanh. I asked Rau what other civilian might
make a good Vice President if Mau did not accept, but Rau made no suggestion. Rau said
he knew very little about Lt. General Tran Thien Khiem, except that he was apparently
one of the few thoroughly "clean" senior officers. In response to a question, Rau said he
believed Khiem had been given his extra star "to keep him happy", but made no further
comment. Rau described Do Mau as an intriguer and a danger.
Action Against North Viet-Nam
Rau indicated that he had learned through a friend who had just returned from Saigon that
the Vietnamese populace had been greatly encouraged by the U.S. strike against North
Vietnamese PT boat bases, but that our failure to follow-up on this action has caused a letdown. He said the lack of any response by the North Vietnamese and Chinese indicated
we could have done considerably more. I said that I believed that our ordering the strikes
was a new departure in our policy and that we had made it clear that our response was
limited and related to the fact that the U.S. destroyers had been attacked by the North
Vietnamese patrol craft and not related directly to the war in South Viet-Nam. Rau stated,
however, that he believed it would be extremely difficult to win in South Viet-Nam
without bringing the attack to North Viet-Nam. I said that while this question was
continually being studied, Assistant Secretary Bundy and others had indicated we should
concentrate on trying to win in South Viet-Nam but had not excluded the possibility of
taking action against the North if Hanoi's actions made this necessary. I said that I
believed that we should try to make our counter-insurgency operations in the South more
effective, and only if we found that this strategy failed, should we try further attacks
against the North. I also pointed out the danger of escalation leading to land war with
China and possibly nuclear war. Rau seemed disappointed and I had the impression that
he believes there is not time left to concentrate only in operations in the South.
Activities of the Front
Rau said that he had learned that a film on the Liberation Front had been seized by
Customs on the East Coast but that another copy of the film was circulating on the West
Coast. Rau said he would like to view the film, and hopes we will impede its circulation. I
said that I would attempt to find out about it. He also said that many Vietnamese who had
left North Viet-Nam in the 1930's, now living in the United States and in Paris, Cambodia
and Thailand and elsewhere, looked to Ho Chi Minh for allegiance, though they were not
Communists and that the Front would probably find a fertile field among these
individuals. He gave me the name of a former ship's cook who came to the United States
in 1953 or 1954, who falls into this category and who is circulating Front literature from
California. Rau said that about 100 people had left his own village in North Viet-Nam to
go South in the 1930's and that many of them look to Ho as the leader of the country even
though they are living in the South.
I mentioned to Rau that we thought that the Front might try to capture prominent
politicians living in exile and use them to try to attract allegiance of non-Communist
Vietnamese. He thought that Tran Van Huu, Phan Van Giao and Nguyen Van Xuan were
all has-beens and would not have much appeal. General Nguyen Van Hinh would
probably not be interested as he has a high-ranking job in the French Armed Forces (Chief
of Staff). Rau said we should watch particularly Nguyen Ngoc Bich and Nguyen Huu
Chau.
Miscellaneous
Rau asked if we could provide him a copy of a report prepared by Professor Milton Sachs
in 1949 entitled Political Alignments of Vietnamese Nationalists as well as any other
information on current political parties in Viet-Nam. I said I would try to find the above
report and see if I could work anything up on the political parties.
Comment
I have subsequently learned that Political Alignments of Vietnamese Nationalists is
misleading and inaccurate and not for distribution outside the Department. I plan to
inform Mr. Rau that it is out of print, but that I will try to find him information on current
political groupings.

Saigon, August 22, 1964p.m.
to CINCPAC.
520. CINCPAC for POLAD. Embassy contact close to both Tri Quang and Nguyen Ton
Hoan came to Embassy yesterday to report on recent conversations these personalities.
Claimed he was acting as emissary for both. In conveying substance his conversation with
Tri Quang, source reviewed line of reasoning being pushed by Buddhists that Gen Khanh
is in fact captive of other Generals at present time. Source believes Tri Quang sincere in
his belief that apparatus exists within government inimical to Buddhist interest-this group
led by Generals Khiem and Thieu and comprised of ex-Can Lao members, Catholics, and
certain key Dai Viets. According to source Tri Quang believes Catholics in fact control
Dai Viet party. Tri Quang mentioned following personalities as members Can LaoCatholic-Dai Viet combine: Generals Khiem, Thieu, Lam, Phat (Interior), Cao (Khanh's
Chef de Cabinet), Dzu (ex-Commander Second Division), Col. Ben (Chief of Police), Col.
Phuoc (Chief MSS), Col. Huyen (Information), Xuong (Head Popular Forces) and Dr.
Truong (Minister of Health). Tri Quang feels Buddhists must neutralize or destroy this
organization.
According to source Tri Quang has informed Gen. Khanh through intermediaries that
Gen. Khanh has choice to throw in his lot with above group or with the "Buddhists and
the people". Tri Quang believes that with Buddhist support Khanh would be able to
neutralize or eliminate the Khiem/Thieu faction. However, if Khanh does not opt for
Buddhists, Tri Quang intends launch campaign of passive resistance. Tri Quang would not
resort to demonstrations or to violence but would call on Buddhist faithful not to
cooperate with government. Non-cooperation campaign on part of Buddhist faithful
would proceed in three phases: 1) in general population; 2) in civil service and
bureaucracy; and 3) in army. No timing was indicated by Tri Quang as to when he
expected reply from Khanh to Buddhist demands, nor did he indicate nature his specific
demands.
According to source, Hoan shares view that Khanh merely frontman for Khiem and Thieu.
Hoan informed source that Khiem and Thieu were real leaders of, and had Dai Viet
support for, January coup and at last moment decided push Khanh forward as "leader".
Hoan claims Khanh has sought destroy Dai Viet organization since that time and this is
why Hoan has consistently opposed Khanh since his return to SVN. Hoan fears that
Khanh, with Buddhist support, will seek consolidate his personal position, neutralize
Khiem/Thieu group and destroy Dai Viet party at the same time. Hoan believes Khiem
content to have Khanh serve as lightning rod and pick up pieces after Khanh is brought
down.
Source claimed Hoan had commissioned him to try arrange meeting with Tri Quang
soonest to explain basic Dai Viet position as not anti-Buddhist nor pro-Catholic. Source
says Hoan would be prepared accept position President of National Assembly if offered.
However, if major confrontation between Buddhist leadership and Hoan's faction of Dai
Viets should ensue, Hoan would likely leave country.
In subsequent meeting last night with EmbOff, Tri Quang confirmed all above points
attributed to him, although denying source had been commissioned as his emissary. Tri
Quang unwilling indicate precisely what he is after beyond destruction of above "cabal"
of Can Lao-Catholics-Dai Viets. Tri Quang added that he was not personally against
Khanh per se nor was he personally in favor of General "Big" Minh, whom he still
considers to be of little capacity.
Today, Thich Tam Chau's liaison officer with Embassy invited Political Counselor and
EmbOffs to joint meeting tonight at An Quang Pagoda with Tam Chau, Tri Quang, and
Thien Minh. Will probe intentions and at same time attempt steer Buddhists towards less
negative pursuits and towards more positive support of Khanh, making it clear we do not
intend to act as intermediary between him and Khanh./2/
/2/Taylor reported that at the meeting on August 22 Tri Quang presented the official
Buddhist position essentially along the lines described here. The Embassy officials
stressed the unfortunate effect continued divisive actions had in the United States and
emphasized the duty of the Buddhists to deal directly with their government. (Telegram
528, August 23; ibid.)
Taylor

/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, SOC 12 VIET S. Secret; Immediate;
to CINCPAC. Received at 10:42 a.m.
541. CINCPAC for POLAD. Accompanied by Alex Johnson and Manfull, I called on
Khanh at Vung Tau this afternoon to impress on him our view of seriousness of situation
arising from the student-Buddhist demonstrations/2/ and to encourage him to take certain
actions. The outcome was agreement to the following actions which conform generally to
our recommendations:
/2/On August 23 and 24, students and Buddhists in Hue, Da Nang, and Saigon
demonstrated against the Khanh government and the August 16 constitution. At the
Secretary of State's Staff Meeting on August 24, Hughes stated that they were "quite
serious and have definite anti-American undertones." (Ibid., Secretary's Staff Meetings:
Lot 66 D 147) In a memorandum to the President on the same date, Ball characterized
them as "near-riots," but not as serious as the ones against Diem the year before. (Ibid.,
President's Reading File: Lot 74 D 164)
1. He will endeavor to announce his government on Thursday/3/ following Vu Van Mau's
return on Wednesday. He hopes that Vu Van Mau will accept the vice presidency; if he
declines, the announcement of the government may be delayed.
/3/August 27.
2. He will meet the Buddhist leadership to hear their complaints and seek enlist their help
in forming government. They will be told the time schedule Khanh is working on to
preclude drawn out discussions. Khanh has invited and offered his plane to Tam Chau.
Thien Minh and Tri Quang to meet with him this evening at Vung Tau for this purpose.
While he had an agreement with them "in principle", he would prefer to have them
actually present at Vung Tau before making any announcement of the meeting. However,
if they fail to show, he will announce that he has made the offer.
3. Khanh will announce this evening steps he is prepared to take to meet certain student
demands, such as limiting press censorship (freedom of press, etc.) and relaxing curfew
hours.
4. Khanh will issue orders to police to prevent further violations of law by the students but
he intends to proceed with utmost caution to avoid a physical clash with the students
which might produce unwanted martyrs.
5. GVN will proceed urgently with mobilization decrees under which Khanh could draft
into military service a selected number of students. However, these decrees will not be
issued until after new government is installed.
6. Khanh will return to Saigon tomorrow afternoon and remain in Saigon until current
situation abates. Khanh reluctant return Saigon because he claims he unable work with
constant incursions on his time. However, in view public and press comment, he would
return tomorrow afternoon following his meeting with members of MRC at Vung Tau.
For our part, we undertook to explain to Washington that the situation here, while serious,
is not falling apart and to pass the word to Buddhists that we have no sympathy for their
divisive machinations.
Full report on above and other items discussed follow by septels./4/
/4/The full report was transmitted in telegram 545 from Saigon, August 25. (Department
of State, Central Files, POL 15 VIET S)
Taylor

/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 VIET S. Secret; Immediate.
Drafted by Forrestal and cleared with William Bundy and McNaughton. Repeated to
CINCPAC and Munich.
507. CINCPAC for POLAD. Munich pass Ambassador Lodge. Although probably too
early make accurate assessment significance past two days events, following is our current
thinking which we are using on background basis in answer official and press inquiries:
1. This is end academic year lyces and universities when students, under pressure
examinations; are not attending classes. As in past they tend to let off steam in
demonstrations at this time. So far size and scope demonstrations do not equal those of
last year.
2. Buddhists still wrangling over assault on pagodas last August and have picked
anniversary date to revive old fears oppressive government actions, but their activities are
still more restrained and under control than was case last year.
3. Although certain elements among both students and Buddhists have made anti-Khanh
and anti-U.S. statements, this does not appear to be widespread. GVN has not reacted
violently to demonstrations, and appears to be undertaking discussions with leaders
student and Buddhist factions.
We note that you are indirectly in touch Tri Quang, Chau, and Hoan; and are no doubt
making point violent activities could lead to complete breakdown resistance aggression
from North, and thus make it extremely difficult U.S. maintain its stepped up efforts bring
pacification program to early conclusion. Report Embtel 541/2/ that Khanh plans early
announcement members new government including Vu Van Mau seems excellent step.
You might consider suggesting early establishment National Assembly, where prominent
Buddhist personalities could let off steam in debate rather than on streets.
/2/Document 322.
In view of attacks by students on Catholic villagers in Da Nang area, would it be possible
to cast any police action there in terms of protecting innocent peasants?
We have no plans for USG statement on merits dispute, but we stand ready to give quick
and favorable consideration any suggestion you may make as situation develops.
Finally, we unable determine here whether these political disturbances could in any way
reflect Hanoi or VC campaign mounted as reaction Tonkin Gulf incident. Would
appreciate your comments.
Rusk

/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Vietnam Country File, Cables, Vol.
XVI. Secret; Priority; Limdis. Repeated to CINCPAC. Received at 7:38 p.m., August 24.
542. Khanh requested that Johnson, Manfull and I meet with him at 1 am this morning to
inform us of his meeting with Buddhist del. Khanh said he was unable to meet with
Buddhist del at Vung Tau and returned to Saigon. The Buddhist del, composed of Tam
Chau, Thinh Minh, and Tri Quang, filed with him written prepared statement of their
demands substance of which follows:
1. The Aug 16 charter to be annulled or at the minimum its application immediately
suspended.
2. The charter to be replaced by provisional constitution drafted by "juridical authorities."
3. The MRC to elect the pres (under new provisional constitution) and then MRC to
disband itself, the pres to form provisional govt from "patriotic and capable elements".
4. The pres to appoint committee to draft permanent constitution and electoral law to go
into effect by Nov 1, 1965.
5. The pres to call for national religious council that would include all religious groups.
6. Council for press censorship to be formed of MinInfo and reps of the press.
7. All those guilty of crimes to be severely punished.
8. All Can Lao elements to be dismissed "even if wearing Dai Viet labels".
Buddhist statement concluded by statement that if above demands not met Buddhists
would embark on campaign of passive resistance "without collaborating with any other
group". In presenting statement, Buddhists asked Khanh to make proclamation accepting
their demands which Buddhist leaders could refer to at demonstration At central market
scheduled for 0800 Aug 25.
Khanh stated that he had informed Buddhists that he could not give them immediate
answer. Subsequently he discussed matter with General Khiem. According to Khanh,
Khiem said it was Khanh's decision but suggested Khanh discuss problem with
Americans, and if Americans agreed that Khanh should go along with Buddhist demands,
then Khiem would support him. Khanh said he specifically requested Buddhists not
publish their written statement. Khanh appeared disposed to accept Buddhist demands.
Khanh then requested my views as to how he should proceed. In response I stressed we
were in no position give him any advice in any official capacity, but as interested third
party could give him my tentative personal views. It was his responsibility to decide his
course of action. On this basis I said I thought a mistake to give in to pressure from
minority group on an issue of this importance, particularly to an ultimatum with short
deadline. To do so may only create further demands. I suggested he inform Buddhist
leadership that he would consider their demands carefully along with ideas and
suggestions from other minority groups. I added that he could assure Buddhists that he
was willing to sit down with them and attempt reconcile points of view over next few
days but final decision must also accommodate legitimate aspirations and concerns of
other groups. I said it appeared to me useful for him to emphasize throughout that charter
was provisional in nature, was subject to modification or amendment with experience and
not final definitive constitution. He should stress that in time of war it is essential that
govt be formed quickly.
I informed Khanh that I intended to return Tam Chau's call on Aug 25 and, without ref to
current conversation, inform Chau that US was against shortsighted actions by any group
which promoted disunity and divisions within the country.
Khanh emphasized throughout his fear of religious war or failing this extreme
development, an extended conflict between Buddhist and Catholic groups which would
inevitably sap the morale of armed forces. He also seemed attracted by possibility of
eliminating the MRC from the picture. In reply to question, he said there would not be any
ambiguity in identifying "Can Lao" elements, they being well known.
In conclusion Khanh said that he agreed with informal comments we had made and that
he had in fact drafted his own proclamation along following lines, prior to seeing
Buddhists, which was designed to assuage certain concerns of both students and
Buddhists:
1. He is now in process of consulting religious groups and politicians form govt of
capable honest men.
2. He intends to ease restrictions on censorship and to modify existing curfew (note: to
meet student demands).
3. He is willing to modify provisional charter as necessary (note: Khanh made point that
this was to "modify" but not to "suspend" provisional charter as demanded by Buddhists).
4. Crimes including terrorism will be quickly punished by military court (note: Khanh
considers this another nod to the Buddhists).
5. Recent incidents and demonstrations have destroyed public and private property and
have killed innocent people. These activities must cease.
6. Only VC and neutralists profit from activities which create disunity and divisive forces
among the people.
7. Current critical situation does not permit people to engage in activities which aid the
VC and he appeals to patriotism of Vietnamese to rally behind govt.
In sum Khanh believed that such proclamation would meet certain concerns of students
and some of the legitimate concerns of the Buddhists. However it was still clear that he
found certain attractions in the Buddhist demands.
Taylor

/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 15-1 VIET S. Secret; Flash; Limdis.
Also sent to CIA, the Department of Defense, and the White House and repeated to
CINCPAC. Received at 9:18 a.m.
555. CINCPAC for POLAD. Following the meeting of the MRC on 25 August, the
following proclamation was made:
"The MRC meeting on the morning of 25 August 1964 at the office of the ARVN
Commander in Chief has resolved the following:
1. To revoke constitution of 16 August 1964.
2. To call an urgent meeting of the MRC to elect a new Chief of State.
3. Following the election of a new Chief of State, the MRC will be dissolved and will
return the powers of leadership to the armed forces of the Republic of Vietnam in order to
oppose Communism, neutralism, colonialism and every form of treacherous dictatorship.
4. The new Chief of State will be entrusted with the responsibility of calling a national
assembly in order to develop the national structure in going along with the aspirations of
all the people in a position which will oppose Communism, neutralism, colonialism and
each form of treacherous dictatorship and reconstruct the nation in democratic freedom.
5. In the meantime, the work of managing the nation will be carried out by the present
government.
Saigon, 25 August 1964

Steering Committee of the MRC"
I called on Khanh at 4:00 pm to obtain his interpretation of recent events to include the
meaning of the very general language of the foregoing proclamation. He gave me the
following information.
The new Chief of State will be elected by the MRC at a meeting in Saigon, 10:00 am, 26
August. All Generals, including the four Dalat Generals, have been invited to attend.
Khanh asked me if I would pass the word to Minh that his presence would be appreciated
in the interest of national unity. I agreed to do so.
Khanh explained that with the dissolution of the MRC there will be no political body
above the president who will appoint the members of the executive, the key figures of the
judiciary and the members of the national assembly. Although the exact composition of
the assembly is still under study, Khanh is thinking in terms of 300 members representing
the various political and religious groupings. He feels that it will take at least a couple of
weeks to get the assembly going whereas he expects to round out the executive by the end
of this week.
With regard to the executive, he intends to have a civilian vice president and Vu Van Mau
is still the front running candidate. The heads of executive departments will be largely
civilian; in fact, Khanh (who seems to have no doubt that he will be elected president a
second time) intends to have only the Department of Defense headed by a military
incumbent.
Khanh stressed that all of this arrangement was provisional and that, within a year, he
hopes to have drawn up a permanent constitution and be in a position to hold general
elections for a permanent assembly. For the next few days, the government will continue
to function as at present.
We then discussed some of the factors which have been in the background of recent
developments.
Khanh says that he had no particular trouble getting the Generals of the MRC to agree
with this sweeping concession to Buddhist demand which results in the dissolution of the
Council. (This easy acquiescence is hard to believe.) He anticipates some trouble with the
Dai Viets but feels it will be manageable. He is particularly incensed against Deputy
Premier Hoan who, in the midst of yesterday's events, published a letter critical of Khanh.
The master mind behind these incidents has been Buddhist leader, Tri Quang. His control
of the student rioters was proved by the quickness with which order was restored in
Saigon today after Khanh agreed to his demands. Tri Quang and his Buddhist colleagues
have promised to endorse Khanh's actions and to come out publicly for the first time
against Communism.
Now the question is whether the Buddhists will keep their word and Khanh is clearly
anxious. Khanh asked if I or other Embassy representatives could see Tri Quang and urge
upon him the essentiality of living up to his part of the bargain. He described Tri Quang as
a "type special", more of a politician than a bonze for whose power he, Khanh was
obvious respect.
I pressed Khanh hard on the question of whether this was going to be a Buddhist
government or a national government, whether he would be Buddhist president or a
national president. He fought back hard on both points insisting that he knew the
importance of a national government and the impossibility of winning the war without
broad national support.
I asked him whether he feared a Catholic reaction at this time and I received a negative
reply. He would like to discuss his plans with the Catholic leaders but unfortunately
Archbishop Binh is out of town and the new Papal Delegate, Palmas, has not yet
presented his credentials. I expressed the view that in spite of these circumstances he
should explain his position to the Catholics at an early date.
In closing, I asked Khanh how I should interpret these events to Washington where they
were being watched with deep concern. He replied that today's decision marked the
withdrawal of the army from politics. Any other alternative would have resulted in the use
of armed force against fellow citizens, a solution which he, Khanh found was intolerable.
If the Buddhists make good on their word, the counterinsurgency program can proceed
apace. If they do not, Khanh sees no military solution to bring the war against the Viet
Cong to a successful conclusion.
Taylor
Agency/1/
Saigon, August 25, 1964.
/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Vietnam Country File, Cables, Vol.
XVI. Secret. Neither the time of transmission nor receipt is legible on the source text. The
CIA sent copies to the White House for Thomson at 10:39 a.m., to the Department of
State for Forrestal, and to DIA for Carroll. The source text is the White House copy.
The following is dated August 25 for your background use.
1. Ambassador Taylor had long meeting with General Khanh afternoon 25 August which
is being reported in considerable detail in Embtel 555 to Department of State./2/ After you
have read that telegram, you will note that Khanh, even if his most optimistic views
obtain, has in effect put his government completely in the hands of Tri Quang, and by so
doing has similarly bound over to Tri Quang's safekeeping our own government's equity,
commitment, and policy in this country.
/2/Document 325.
2. The alternatives to Khanh's continuing in normal power would seem to be, at this point:
a. The reappearance of Big Minh again as a figurehead nominally leading a government
acceptable to Tri Quang.

b. Rejection of the Buddhist demands by a new junta headed by Khiem, with further
domestic convulsions to follow.
c. Some other kind of impasse with results difficult to anticipate.
In any event, a new and dangerous period has begun, and the effects of the current
upheavals have not yet shown themselves in terms of popular or military morale, but the
prognosis of [on?] this side is not optimistic.
327. Summary Notes of the 541st Meeting of the National Security Council,
Washington, August 25, 1964, 12:35 p.m./1/
/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, NSC Meetings, Vol. 3, Tab 23 Top
Secret; Sensitive; For the President Only. Drafted by Bromley Smith.
[Here follows discussion of Cyprus.]
William Bundy: As to South Vietnam, Prime Minister Khanh has suspended the
constitution and the Buddhists have made their demands on the government. The Military
Council will meet tonight to elect a new President. A new National Assembly is to be
called. President Khanh has told Ambassador Taylor that he expects to be reelected. These
developments are the result of some kind of a bargain between President Khanh and the
Buddhists. Two major uncertainties are apparent:
A. Will the Buddhists carry out their part of the bargain and come out against the
Communists?
B. Does President Khanh have sufficient military support to be reelected? The generals
may not sit still for a downgrading of the Military Council.
Some very tough decisions will have to be made soon, but none right now. After the
election of the new Assembly, we will have to support whoever comes out on top. It is a
messed up situation.
Secretary Rusk: We should not call off Ambassador Taylor's planned trip to Washington.
We have a strong team in the field and we don't know when would be a better time for
him to come.
Bromley Smith

Repeated to the Department of Defense, CIA, the White House, and CINCPAC for
POLAD. Received at 12:16 a.m.
559. After events Aug 25,/2/ and despite fact that MRC publicly endorsed Khanh's
capitulations to Buddhist demands, it became soon clear that major elements of MRC
were happy [unhappy] with outcome and wished upset results. Those officers centered
around Khiem and Thieu immediately began politicking during evening and night of Aug
25 with primary purpose of ousting Khanh from presidency. Khanh, in meantime, had
gone to Vung Tau in order "get some sleep" and presumably to withdraw himself from
central arena of bargaining.
/2/Taylor's diary describes the events of August 25 as a "rump meeting" of the Military
Revolutionary Committee "with only the corps commanders and Chiefs of Staff
present." (National Defense University, Taylor Papers, T-272-69, Box 55)
In early evening Aug 25, Khiem and Thieu sought out Big Minh, gave him a somewhat
biased account of day's events and apparently left Minh with impression that he, Minh,
would be a strong candidate in Aug 26 MRC elections for president. Other pro-Khiem
elements of MRC, especially Lam, were busy making contact with MRC members,
reportedly sounding them out on voting possibilities. I had sent Westmoreland to see
Khiem and sent Stilwell to see Thieu during evening to sound out their state of mind.
During night, Lam had insistently sought info from his MACV adviser, wishing to know
US Govt opinion of possible change from Khanh to some other General as President. I
had also sent a note to Big Minh encouraging him to attend MRC meeting and cast his
vote there.
On morning Aug 26, I received word that Minh wished see me at 9:00 am (elections were
scheduled for 10:00 am). I also had received reports re politicking activities during night
of Aug 25. I therefore decided upon and took following actions.
(1) I went to see Minh (detailed report by septel)/3/ and told him US wanted no change in
govt. Our candidate was Khanh.
/3/Telegram 561 from Saigon, August 26, noon. (Department of State, Central Files, POL
27 VIET S)
(2) I sent De Silva to see Khiem to convey same message to him./4/
/4/A report on De Silva's meeting with Khiem was transmitted in telegram 564 from
Saigon, August 26, 4 p.m. (Ibid., POL 15-1 VIET S) Following receipt of telegrams 561
and 564, the Department of State cabled Saigon that it fully concurred in the line taken
with the Generals. The Mission was instructed to continue its efforts along these lines as
long as deemed appropriate. (Telegram 521, August 26; ibid.)
(3) I sent Gen Lam's MACV adviser to see Lam and tell him we had no alternate
candidate to Khanh.
(4) After these events (at about 9:40) I telephoned Khanh, reported my conversation with
Minh, assured him of our support, and wished him good luck in elections.
It was my conviction, in taking these actions, that US could not possibly afford confusion
that would result from loss of Khanh, that internal maneuvers had to be stopped
somewhere, and that Khanh is indeed the best bet we have in current circumstances. I am
now awaiting report on results of election./5/
/5/At the end of the day, Taylor and Johnson met with Khanh, who reviewed the MRC
sessions. Khanh reported that the going had been hard and that the Dai Viet were not
above attempting a coup. A variety of organizational changes were discussed, but nothing
settled. Khanh also reported that he had received a letter from Tri Quang pledging his
support. (Telegram 572 from Saigon, August 27, 12:30 a.m.; ibid., POL 15 VIET S) Tri
Quang had informed the U.S. Embassy about the letter at noon. (Telegram 570 from
Saigon, August 26, 9 p.m.; ibid., POL 27 VIET S)
Taylor
329. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Spain/1/

/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 7 US (LODGE). Secret; Immediate;
Limdis. Drafted by Breckon, cleared with William Bundy, and initialed by Forrestal.
188. For Ambassador Lodge. Concur in line you have taken in private and public
conversations that present unrest in South Viet Nam cannot deter us from primary goal of
resisting Communist aggression and achieving stability in that country. Buddhist and
student demonstrations which have forced Khanh to abrogate August 16 Constitution
spring from continuing religious tension which is one of numerous critical problems GVN
must meet in order to preserve its independence.
We do not intend to make any public statement here today on the subject of whom we
favor in the current crisis. We are taking line that it not appropriate for US Government to
comment while Military Revolutionary Council still in session. We are pointing out that
Khanh is still head of GVN, and as we have stated many times in past, we continue to
support GVN.
FYI: Ambassador Taylor has made clear to Generals Minh and Khiem that we strongly
favor General Khanh's continuance as head of GVN. August 26 meeting of MRC was
inconclusive, and next MRC meeting scheduled to begin 0100Z August 27. End FYI.
We shall continue to pass you most important messages from Saigon on situation.
Rusk

/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 13-2 VIET S. Secret; Priority; Limdis.
Bangkok, Vientiane, Phnom Penh, Manila, Tokyo, London, Paris, Rome, and CINCPAC.
577. Rome for Lodge. CINCPAC for POLAD. Deptel 507/2/ While we cannot be sure
that we have all the facts nor that the so-called facts we have are fully reliable, we are
inclined to view the events since about August 21 up to noon today in the following light:
/2/Document 323
The government which Khanh put together after the coup of January 30, 1964 achieved a
tenuous equilibrium which fundamentally satisfied no single activist element in Vietnam
politics, but which did not dissatisfy any significant political group enough to cause the
outbreak of intractable opposition. At the same time, the government itself proved to be
little more than a collection of individual personalities and ambitions which proved unable
to work effectively together or to address themselves consistently to problems of national
interest.
Khanh from the start seems to have lacked confidence in most of the politicians in his
cabinet (as well as they in each other) and to have refrained from assigning them other
than token responsibility. His incompatibility with his cabinet deepened and he came to
rely to an ever growing degree upon the instrument of the armed forces, and especially on
General Khiem (who had apparently played an important role in bringing Khanh to
power), to accomplish whatever efforts the government was able to muster in the
campaign against the Viet Cong. Even in this quarter, however, he had less than complete
confidence and received less than wholehearted support. And, rightly or wrongly, he came
to feel that General Minh was to some extent responsible for his military and political
problems. He therefore concentrated a great measure of his attention, in the past several
weeks, upon the problem of getting rid of General Minh in a manner which would not
disrupt the army. Also, he developed general feeling that pacification programs were too
slow and achieved at high cost in lives, and sensed, or thought he sensed a general malaise
demanding dramatic developments on solutions. In casting about Khanh hit on the "march
to the North" theme and with the August US attack on DRV he seized the favorable
climate thus created to attempt emergency solution to perennial problems as well as
opportunity he felt this gave him to remove Minh.
The scheme he hit upon to eliminate Minh along with certain unwelcome ministers was
the creation of a provisional constitution which simply pulled Minh's position out from
under him. As early as May Khanh had begun to toy with this project, talking in terms of
a "de Gaulle-Pompidou" system as well as straight presidential system. He had talked to
various politicians such as Tran Van Do regarding the form it should take. It is quite
certain that it was discussed in great detail with Khiem, who was Khanh's greatest
assurance of maintaining army unity. Khiem's own role in this development is somewhat
obscure and there are some indications that he found the scheme ill-advised, particularly
the elimination of Minh. However, disregarding our advice Khanh failed to lay either the
necessary political or public groundwork and when the new charter emerged under forced
draft over a weekend and its authors became identified, it was recognized by many that
former Can Lao elements (such figures as Tran Chan Thanh, Tran Le Quang and General
Cao) had had a major role in drafting it. It also seemed probable that many of these Can
Lao figures hoped to play a key role in the new government to be established under the
new charter. Moreover, after it emerged in its final version from the MRC, it was evident
MRC had put more of a strait jacket around Khanh, limiting the independence of MRC he
had sought through his own first draft. Thus, though the charter in no way changed
fundamental relationship of MRC asserting supreme power, with Khanh as leader of
government, the charter did provide focal point and catalyst in bringing discontented
elements to surface.
Khanh, therefore, in his concentration on the problem of Minh, had conjured up a whole
new set of problems while attempting to solve an immediate one.
The Buddhists and students, who have been feeling their political oats since their
successes against Diem, felt they had suffered a set back in the January 30 coup that put
Khanh in power and now saw further setbacks in prospect. Goaded by the militant Tri
Quang, they saw the specter of Diemism in the combination of the predominantly
Catholic MRC and the old Can Lao. It should be emphasized it was only a specter as at no
time had there been any evidence of a government policy of mistreatment of Buddhists.
The students, nettled by such petty annoyances as an 11:00 pm curfew and censorship of
the press, and fearing the prospect of a much more effective National Service Law, saw
the end of some of their teahouse leisure and were amenable to leadership of Tri Quang
and Buddhists. (There is considerable evidence of concert between Buddhists and students
although all the points of contact are not yet established.)
The Dai Viet, troubled by Khanh's effort to upset the post-January governmental
equilibrium were probably uncertain regarding his real motives and interpreted the charter
of August 16 as possibly directed against them.
All three of these groups, plus dissident out-politicians began to agitate. Just how much
and how deeply the Viet Cong were able to influence these events is difficult to say; but it
can be taken for granted that they have been very bush [?] indeed.
Khanh, faced with these circumstances, found himself at the vortex of a perplexing
mixture of forces. The two most extreme elements he had to deal with were the
Buddhist/student militants, personified by Tri Quang, and the Can Lao-Catholic military
not entirely logically personified by General Khiem. In between were a whole array, such
as Hoan and the Dai Viet, General Xung and Thi of I Corps, and the Catholic clergy.
Although we pointed out to him the dangers in appearing to capitulate to the ultimatum of
a demagogic Tri Quang who represented only one element in the country, he seemed
willing to let the Buddhists and students display their strength, perhaps in an effort to
convince Khiem and the other Generals that the MRC did not control all of the levers of
power. In his first meetings with the MRC he seems, at least superficially, to have been
able to play this factor. As he told us, he faced those members of the MRC who were
assembled Aug 25 with the choice of "shooting their own youngsters" or making
concessions to satisfy the forces led by Tri Quang. Given this decision, and knowing that
Khanh spoke with the tremendous asset of continued tangible US support, the MRC
(really a rump version) nominally accepted an arrangement which was essentially a
capitulation to Tri Quang's demands.
At this stage, however, a "backlash" set in. When the full MRC (which is predominantly
Catholic and pro-Dai Viet) assembled in Saigon Aug 26, there was considerable
grumbling about the decision on dissolution taken by the rump session on August 25.
Many of the senior Generals, who had participated in the decision Aug 25 reversed
themselves and sought not only to renege on the decision re dissolution but also to oust
Khanh. The groupings within the MRC who came to this persuasion were not clearly
identified. Some obviously were associated with Minh, others (perhaps the majority) were
closer to Khiem and the Catholics.
As matters now stand, the Catholic crowds have taken to the street. Whether Khanh will
be able to cope with this confusion and emerge as the continuing symbol of authority is
questionable. His greatest single asset--perhaps as of the moment at least equal to all those
possessed by his potential rivals for power--is the continued, tangible support of the US
for him personally.
Therefore, he remains very much a significant element of force in the power struggle. The
other significant individual who has emerged is Tri Quang. He appears to be the most
effective and potentially dangerous politician in Vietnam and having achieved this new
victory cannot be expected now to retire into the shade of Bo Tree. There are some
indications that he may have ambitions extending beyond Vietnam with talk of his desire
to lead a neutralist Buddhist grouping in SEA that would also have room for Moslem
Malaya and Indonesia.
We obviously have to learn much more about him and must see what we can do to
influence him.
The Generals who make up the MRC, because of the bickering among themselves, have
along with Khanh obviously lost prestige and [sic] in their demonstrated unwillingness or
inability effectively to use their power to maintain public order and keep the government
functioning. Their confrontations within the MRC will undoubtedly reinforce divisive
tendencies among the military and tend further to polarize factions which previously
existed but were dormant. Who among them will emerge as the dominant figure is unclear
at this writing.
Taylor
(McNamara)/1/
TCSM-746-64
926, 381 Southeast Asia. Top Secret; Sensitive. Also printed in Pentagon Papers: Gravel
Edition, vol III, pp. 550-552.
SUBJECT
Recommended Courses of Action--Southeast Asia
1. In their memorandum to you dated 14 August 1964,/2/ the Joint Chiefs of Staff advised
that they were analyzing the next military courses of action in Southeast Asia and that
appropriate recommendations would be forwarded for your consideration before
implementing actions are taken on the Bundy memorandum dated 13 August 1964./3/
They also reiterated the views of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, less the Chairman, of 2 June
1964/4/ that military courses of action should include attack of targets in the Democratic
Republic of Vietnam (DRY) with the objective of destroying, as necessary, the DRV will
and capabilities to continue support of insurgent forces in the Republic of Vietnam (RVN)
and Laos.
/2/Document 316.
/3/Attachment to Document 313.
/4/Document 191.
2. In analyzing courses of action, the Joint Chiefs of Staff have considered the views of
CINCPAC and Ambassadors Taylor and Unger. The Joint Chiefs of Staff also noted the
DIA assessment dated 7 August 1964/5/ of Asian communist capabilities and 15 probable
courses of action following the 5 August retaliatory attack on North Vietnam and the
current US buildup in the Western Pacific. This assessment indicates that the most likely
course of action would be stepped up actions in RVN and Laos with attendant increased
flow of men and supplies.
/5/Not found.
3. The Joint Chiefs of Staff have considered Ambassador Taylor's statement of objectives
and courses of action./6/ In recognition of recent events in SVN, however, they consider
that his proposed course of action B is more in accord with the current situation and
consider that such an accelerated program of actions with respect to the DRV is essential
to prevent a complete collapse of the US position in Southeast Asia. Additionally, they do
not agree that we should be slow to get deeply involved until we have a better feel for the
quality of our ally. The United States is already deeply involved. The Joint Chiefs of Staff
consider that only significantly stronger military pressures on the DRV are likely to
provide the relief and psychological boost necessary for attainment of the requisite
governmental stability and viability.
4. Recent US military actions in Laos and against the DRV have demonstrated our resolve
more clearly than any other US actions in some time. These actions showed both force
and restraint. Failure to resume and maintain a program of pressure through military
actions could be misinterpreted to mean we have had second thoughts about Pierce Arrow
and the events leading thereto, and could signal a lack of resolve. Accordingly, while
maintaining a posture of increased readiness in the Western Pacific, the Joint Chiefs of
Staff believe that the US program should have as concurrent objectives: (1) improvements
in South Vietnam, including emphasis on the Pacification Program and the Hop Tac plan
to clear Saigon and its surroundings; (2) interdiction of the relatively unmolested VC lines
of communication (LOC) through Laos by operations in the Panhandle and of the LOC
through Cambodia by strict control of the waterways leading therefrom; (3) denial of Viet
Cong (VC) sanctuaries in the Cambodia-South Vietnam border area through the conduct
of "hot pursuit" operations into Cambodia, as required; (4) increased pressure on North
Vietnam through military actions. As part of the program for increased pressures, the
OPLAN 34A operations and the DeSoto patrols in the Gulf of Tonkin should be resumed,
the former on an intensified but still covert basis.
5. The Joint Chiefs of Staff believe, however, that more direct and forceful actions than
these will, in all probability, be required. In anticipation of a pattern of further successful
VC and Pathet Lao (PL) actions in RVN and Laos, and in order to increase pressure on
the DRV, the US program should also provide for prompt and calculated responses to
such VC/PL actions in the form of air strikes and other operations against appropriate
military targets in the DRV.
6. The Joint Chiefs of Staff recognize that defining what might constitute appropriate
counteroperations in advance is a most difficult task. We should therefore maintain our
prompt readiness to execute a range of selected responses, tailored to the developing
circumstances and reflecting the principles in the Gulf of Tonkin actions, that such
counteroperations will result in clear military disadvantage to the DRV. These responses,
therefore, must be greater than the provocation in degree, and not necessarily limited to
response in kind against similar targets. Air strikes in response might be purely VNAF;
VNAF with US escort to provide protection from possible employment of MIGs; VNAF
with US support in the offensive as well as the defensive role; or entirely US. The precise
combination should be determined by the effect we wish to produce and the assets
available. Targets for attack by air or other forces may be selected from appropriate plans
including the Target Study for North Vietnam consisting of 94 targets, recently forwarded
to you by the Joint Chiefs of Staff./7/
/7/The 94-target study list was Appendix A to ICSM-729-64, dated August 24, which
identified the most significant targets in North Vietnam in five categories: 1) airfields, 2)
lines of communications, 3) military installations, 4) industrial installations, and 5) routes
of armed reconnaissance. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 218, ICS
Files)
7. While a US program as discussed above will not necessarily provide decisive end
results, the Joint Chiefs of Staff advocate its adoption and implementation at once.
Anything less could be interpreted as a lack of resolve on the part of the United States.
The military course of action which offers the best chance of success remains the
destruction of the DRV will and capabilities as necessary to compel the DRV to cease
providing support to the insurgencies in South Vietnam and Laos.
8. Attached as Appendices to this memorandum/8/ are discussions of the following:
/8/None printed.
a. Operations in the Laos Panhandle--Appendix A.
b. OPLAN 34A operations--Appendix B.
c. Other possible actions against North Vietnam-Aerial mining against the DRV and
resumption of the DeSoto patrol in the Gulf of Tonkin--Appendix C.
d. Other actions in RVN-Strict control of waterborne traffic on the Mekong and Bassac
rivers and direct action against Viet Cong leadership--Appendix D.
a. The following military actions receive priority (not necessarily in the order listed):
(1) Continuation of the Pacification Program in RVN with emphasis on the Hop Tac
program to establish the security of Saigon and its surroundings;
(2) Continuation of the present forward deployment of US combat units;
(3) Resumption and intensification of OPLAN 34A operations with emphasis on maritime
operations and with initiation of air operations against selected targets when practicable.
OPLAN 34A operations should remain covert for the time being.
(4) Resumption of DeSoto patrols in the Gulf of Tonkin;
(5) Operations against the VC LOC, including staging base areas and infiltration routes in
the Laos Panhandle by:
(a) The RLAF;
(b) GVN and Thai forces in cross-border operations with US support as required;
(c) US armed aerial reconnaissance, attacking infiltration installations.
(6) Retaliatory actions by GVN/US forces against appropriate targets in the DRV in
response to stepped up Viet Cong/Pathet Lao actions should such occur.
(7) Institution of "hot pursuit" operations into Cambodia.
b. The following related actions be taken:
(1) Institution of strict controls on the Mekong and Bassac rivers;
(2) Direct action against the Viet Cong leadership in RVN.
c. Since the above actions will probably not in themselves accomplish our objectives of
compelling the DRV to respond favorably, we should be prepared to:
(1) Commence deployment of remaining Category III OPLAN 37-64/9/ forces;
/9/CINCPAC OPLAN 37-64, "Military Actions To Stabilize the Situation in RVN," dated
March 30, 1964. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 218, JCS Files) See
also footnote 4, Document 149.
(2) Commence a US air strike program against targets in North Vietnam in accordance
with current planning.
10. In light of recent developments in South Vietnam and the evaluations furnished by
COMUSMACV, the Joint Chiefs of Staff conclude that accelerated and forceful action
with respect to North Vietnam is essential to prevent a complete collapse of the US
position in Southeast Asia. They consider that a decision as to specific actions and the
timing of these actions is urgent and recommend that conversations with Ambassador
Taylor focus on this issue with a view to its early resolution.
Curtis E. Le May/10/
Acting Chairman

/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 15-1 VIET S. Secret; Flash; Limdis.
Also sent to the Department of Defense, CIA, and the White House and repeated to
CINCPAC and Rome.
598. CINCPAC for POLAD. Rome for Lodge. This cable summarizes the outcome of
discussions Alex Johnson and I held morning and afternoon 28 August with Generals
Khanh, Minh and others re current governmental crisis. A more detailed report will
follow./2/
/2/Telegram 606 from Saigon, August 28, 11 p.m. (Ibid., POL 15 VIET S)
General Khanh has publicly announced that he has submitted his resignation as head of
government to the MRC (now abolished) but that he has received no reply. He will shortly
announce that his resignation (which he now says was based on reasons of health) has
been rejected (presumably by his colleagues of the military triumvirate), that Khanh will
remain as Prime Minister but that he has been authorized a short period of rest and
recuperation during which time Nguyen Xuan Oanh will sign papers in his name.
However, it will be made clear that this is a continuation of the Khanh government which
does not lapse during his short leave of absence.
Khanh indicates that he really does not expect to be away any appreciable time although
he looks badly in need of rest. I must say he will have little time for leisure if he stays on
intended schedule.
The next step will be the formation of a new organ called tentatively the Committee of
National Unity (CNU). As presently conceived, it would consist of representatives of the
religious groups, the parties (if any representatives can be found after Khanh's public
denunciation of the Dai Viets) and Notables, with General Minh as Chairman representing
the military. Just what role of the CNU would be is still under discussion. Among the
powers which are being considered for attribution are those of approval of change from a
ministerial to a presidential form of executive, approval of the President, recall of the

President, advice to President and approval of certain of his acts, and establishment of the
national assembly. Khanh wants at least two things from CNU-a semblance of national
endorsement for his assumption of presidency and a dignified slot for Minh.
It is far from clear that Minh will be satisfied with this deal although Khanh had intimated
that he expects no trouble. In our morning session, there seemed to be two problems: (1)
to get Minh to give public support to Khanh and (2) to get Khanh to withdraw his
resignation. We thought we had agreement on both counts before lunch although we
suspected that Minh might impose the condition of his being retained as Chief of State.
After lunch, Khanh led us to believe that the chairmanship of the CNU would satisfy
Minh but when Johnson and I listened to some of the discussion among the officers
conferring on the matter (Khanh, Minh, Khiem, Thieu, Co) we got clear impression that
Minh is still resisting. If this point becomes a real stumbling block, I propose to urge
Khanh to accept Minh as Chief of State for this period of provisional government.
Khanh hopes to get CNU going in a couple of days and realign his government on
presidential lines in a couple of weeks. We think this very optimistic.
It is premature to consider any of the foregoing as final until officially announced by
government here.
Taylor

Limdis. Also sent to the Department of Defense, CIA, and the White House and repeated
to CINCPAC for POLAD. Received at 10:38 a.m. According to another copy, this
telegram was drafted by Taylor. (Ibid., Saigon Embassy Files: Lot 68 F 8)
684. When Alex Johnson and I called on General Khanh in Dalat this morning (August
31), we found him suffering from hemorrhoids, high blood pressure, and an obsession
over the preponderant strength of the Dai Viet. As his doctor was prescribing for the first
two ailments, we addressed ourselves to the third.
Khanh seems to have come to Dalat from the meetings in Saigon impressed with the lust
for power of the Dai Viet and their determination to attain their objectives. In spite of the
unanimous vote of the Generals at the meeting on August 27th urging Khanh to remain as
head of government, he has no illusion over the long-term loyalties of the Dai Viet
Generals. After his public denunciation of the party, he is sure they are out to get him.
He went over the usual list of those whom he considered to be Dai Viet and the available
troop strength. He points out that much of this strength is in the Saigon area and hence it
would be easy for them to stage a coup in the city. He has in mind in particular the Saigon
Police of Colonel Ben, the Armor of Colonel Nghia, and the 7th Division of Colonel Ton.
Khanh is also aware of a possible coup from a group of unspecified young Generals and
Colonels. He says that he is in contact with this group who are generally anti-Dai Viet. He
apparently considers that they are basically for him but he states that he is urging them not
to make any move since, from a national point of view, a new coup would be disastrous.
Meanwhile, mulling over such thoughts as these, Khanh has been doing nothing in Dalat
other than receive medical treatment and enjoy the sunshine. He seems oblivious to the
need for getting his government going again and for taking those preparatory measures
necessary to offset any possible move by the Dai Viet.
In the subsequent discussion, Johnson and I took as our primary objective an effort to
bestir Khanh to activity. First, we went over the list of his enemies and compared them to
the strength which he claims for his cause. On the political side, he agreed that he had the
support of the Buddhists, Catholics and the sects. He considers that he has the large
majority of the Generals, to include all of the Corps Commanders, particularly the
strategically located III Corps Commander in Saigon. Even a fragment of the Dai Viet
favors him. Thus, by any method of evaluation, his potential strength well outweighs that
of his Dai Viet enemies, although the latter have some advantages in the location of their
troops.
Hence, we saw no reason for him to hide out in Dalat when so much work remains to be
done in Saigon. We emphasized the evidence of lack of government activity in Saigon and
the confusion of the public and the press. He fought back feebly saying that Khiem and/or
Minh and perhaps FonMin Quat were working on the composition of the proposed
Council of National Unity. We told him that we had seen no sign of such activity.
We also emphasized the bad effect of the Oanh interview which indicated that Oanh was
really the head of the government for the next two months and that he, Khanh, was
practically a mental case./2/ He laughed this off as best he could but got the point that he
needed to show himself at an early date in Saigon.
/2/The interview has not been further identified.
At this point he asked us what we recommended that he do. While admitting that as
foreigners we could never be sure of our judgment, particularly with regard to timing, we
made the following points: I urged him to return to Saigon quickly, at least for one day,
there to convene his Cabinet, issue orders and be visibly active in directing the
government. At the same time he might consider some statement to or appearance before
the press.
Thereafter, if he felt he had to return to Dalat to continue his medical treatment, he might
bring the triumvirate back with him and hold meetings with prospective members of the
Council of National Unity in Dalat. I suggested that he consider including among these
labor [garble--leader?] Buu who has impressed us all favorably.
Next, we talked to him about the need for preparing his fences against a possible coup.
Why not call to Dalat the principal non-Dai Viet Generals and be sure they are ready to
act if the Dai Viet move? Once all preparations are made to defend against a coup, Khanh
should consider calling in General Khiem and ordering the replacement of the Dai Viet
Generals whom he considers a threat to his government.
We assured him that further inactivity would be fatal, that his actions were being watched
closely in Vietnam, in Washington and other capitals abroad to see whether he could
really govern this country. If he can give such evidence, the US is still behind him. If we
ever become convinced that he cannot lead his country to victory, he can no longer count
upon us.
Khanh inquired as to whether we had a substitute government if his failed. I assured him
that we had no favorite and were not looking for a substitute at this time. He asked for the
third or fourth time my opinion of General Minh. I repeated what I have usually said,
namely that I have always been friendly with Minh but that I considered that he lacked
leadership and was unwilling to work at any hard task. However, I would be inclined to
let him remain in the Khanh government as Chief of State providing that his role as a
dignified figurehead was clearly understood and agreed in advance.
I mentioned that in my meeting with Minh on Aug 28/3/ he had admitted to an ambition
to be either Chief of State or to head the army replacing General Khiem. Khanh does not
like either alternative, stating that if he ever became head of a permanent government he
would insist upon occupying concurrently the presidency and the Ministry of Defense. He
reminded us that this is the way Diem had run things during his long presidency.
/3/No record of a meeting between Taylor and Minh on August 28 has been found, nor
does Taylor's diary have an entry for one. (National Defense University, Taylor Papers, T274-69) Regarding Taylor's meeting with Minh on August 26, see Document 328.
We ended on the note with which we had began--the need for activity, decisiveness and a
display of initiative. All we got from Khanh was the statement that he would reflect on
our suggestions. He says that he hopes to reappear in Saigon within a few days and to get
things in order there by the end of the week.
Taylor

Drafted by William Bundy and cleared in draft with Forrestal and in substance with Rusk,
McNamara, and McGeorge Bundy. Repeated to CINCPAC.
567. Following points raised at high level meeting today/2/ for your comment:
/2/According to Rusk's appointment book, the meeting took place at 5 p.m., but no record
of it has been found.
1. Urgent necessity is to get Khanh back into action and rehabilitate his prestige if
possible. Embtel 684/3/ took exactly right line. We now wonder whether if Khanh
remains reluctant it would be useful for you to have Presidential letter along lines
following draft:
/3/Document 333.
"Dear Mr. Prime Minister:
I want you to know that I have been following closely the political problems that have
arisen in the past week. I appreciate fully the difficulties you have faced, and I admire the
restraint with which they have been handled.
Ambassador Taylor tells me you are taking a rest from the strain of recent days and
indeed of the past six months. I hope that you will recover rapidly, as it seems to me
urgently necessary to have your presence in Saigon just as soon as you possibly can,
demonstrably leading your country in its fight against the Viet Cong and meeting the
criticism being heard in some quarters that your government and the resolve and unity of
your people have been weakened by recent events. You may be assured that, with such
leadership, the US will continue to give its full support to your government.
I am also well aware of your continuing concern that your government be able to plan and
consider with us possible stronger actions against the source of the Viet Cong insurgency.
This activity too requires your firm presence and leadership.
With all best wishes,
Sincerely yours,"
Request your comment and re-draft if desired. Consider especially whether inclusion last
paragraph desirable. It would preclude release of letter, and this may be desirable./4/
/4/On September 1, Taylor replied that he wanted to defer a decision on delivering the
letter until he saw whether Khanh would return to Saigon and until he got a report on the
meetings Khanh held at Dalat. (Telegram 697 from Saigon; Department of State, Central
2. We gather from your reports no evidence province chain of command seriously
affected as yet. Can Oanh be persuaded to put out firm directives that would assist in
preventing deterioration, or might GVN consider devolving special responsibilities
temporarily onto four corps commanders so that they jack up province chiefs? Realize key
to problem, if there is one, may be basic doubt who is in charge, but above are samples of
things that might help.
3. View general uncertainty, a clear GVN success in one or more key province, especially
in area near Saigon, would now be particularly helpful. Realize you and MACV have
given this continuing consideration, and do not mean to suggest occasion warrants undue
risk through troop movements.
Rusk

to the President. Secret. Also published in Declassified Documents, 1979, 107C.
Welcome back!/2/
/2/The President had been in Texas to celebrate his 56th birthday.
Our only really serious international problem is South Vietnam, but that could hardly be
more serious. The immediate situation is that we just do not know whether Khanh still has
it in him to resume full control. Taylor and Johnson saw him today/3/ and urged him once
more to do so, and he indicated that he probably would go back to Saigon later this week
and see what he could do. We here all agree that we ought to stay with him solidly, so that
if he falls it will in no sense be our doing. A draft letter of encouragement from you to
him is being considered by Max Taylor overnight,/4/ and we should have his advice on
whether to use it in the morning. Meanwhile, Taylor's return home has been rescheduled
tentatively for September 7, and if things have not improved by then, our current
inclination is to have Alexis Johnson come instead and keep Max on the job out there.
The larger question is whether there is any course of action that can improve the chances
in this weakening situation. A number of contingency plans for limited escalation are in
preparation. They involve three kinds of activities--naval harassments, air interdiction in
the Laos panhandle, and possible U.S. fleet movements resuming a presence on the high
seas in the Gulf of Tonkin. The object of any of these would be more to heighten morale
and to show our strength of purpose than to accomplish anything very specific in a
military sense--unless and until we move toward a naval quarantine.
One other possibility which we are discussing is the increase of a U.S. military presence
in South Vietnam, perhaps by a naval base, or perhaps by landing a limited number of
Marines to guard specific installations. Bob McNamara is very strongly against the latter
course, for reasons that are not clear to me, and you may wish to question him on it if we
have a luncheon meeting tomorrow.
A still more drastic possibility which no one is discussing is the use of substantial U.S.
armed forces in operations against the Viet Cong. I myself believe that before we let this
country go we should have a hard look at this grim alternative, and I do not at all think
that it is a repetition of Korea. It seems to me at least possible that a couple of brigade-size
units put in to do specific jobs about six weeks from now might be good medicine
everywhere.
McG.B.
Saigon, September 2, 1964--9 p.m.

/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 VIET S. Secret; Limdis. Also sent
to CIA, the Department of Defense, and the White House and repeated to Bangkok,
Vientiane, Phnom Penh, Paris, London, Manila, Tokyo, and CINCPAC. Also published in
Declassified Documents. 1979, 94D.
698. CINCPAC for POLAD. Embtel 577/2/ Although political situation Vietnam is far
from stabilized, we think it useful to make an interim assessment of events which have
taken place during past few days subsequent to developments reported and analyzed in
reftel.
/2/Document 330.
First, it should be emphasized that Khanh has been largely frustrated in the attempt at
governmental changes which he began immediately after the Gulf of Tonkin incident. It
was his purpose to use the galvanizing force of those incidents to narrow the base of his
government, give him more flexibility and make his politico/military efforts more
effective. He has succeeded only in the partial elimination of General Minh, the
dissolution of the MRC, and the disaffection of the Dai Viets. His tactical failure in
pursuing his major objectives was due to the fact that he moved neither with lightning
rapidity nor with deliberate consultative thoroughness. Instead he fell directly between
stools, moving too slowly for a coup de theatre, and too rapidly for a politically negotiated
deal. By the time he had issued his August 16 charter, he had apparently achieved his
primary objective of getting rid of General Minh, but he had so seriously entangled
himself in the MRC and had produced such sharp confrontations with the Buddhists and
Dai Viets that his problems became greater than he could cope with. His efforts to cope
with it led to further confusion because of his deals with the Buddhists and the frictions
which these generated within the MRC.
The results of all the recent maneuverings, the street fighting, and the internal bickering
among Generals and politicians have led, through a spasm of volatile excitement, to a
sense of political exhaustion and sullen irritation on all sides. The Khanh/Minh/Khiem
triumvirate which was created with the dissolution of the MRC does not represent a
resolution of existing internal tensions among GVN leadership, but merely a moratorium
which essentially leaves the basic issues unsettled.
However, everything is not precisely as it was on August 15. Essentially, the Buddhists
and the Catholics have retained about the same measure of strength and influence within
the tenuous equilibrium that they had at that time. Further, the unwillingness of either
religious group to accept certain political or military personalities in a ~revamped
government has remained unchanged or has hardened. But many other forces have been
altered. The following is a listing of the 59 most significant changes:
1. Khanh: By the inept manner in which Khanh handled his effort to centralize his control,
and by the lack of firmness which he demonstrated in discussions with the Buddhists and
particularly the premature dissolution of MRC, his reputation as strongman has been
seriously tarnished. Although he has always entertained strong suspicions of those who
share leadership responsibilities with him, his sense of uneasiness and distrust of all of his
colleagues has now reached almost paranoiac proportions. He himself is acutely aware of
this, feels depressed and deflated, and there is great question whether he will ever be able
to recapture the cocky confidence which has heretofore marked his career and to fully
exert control over the political forces now unleashed. He particularly feels concern over
and doubts about his ability to deal with the Dai Viets, yet if he acts soon, he may be able
to recapture some of his strength for it has become increasingly evident that all the
maneuvering has not brought forth any other figure around whom a reasonable consensus
could be achieved.
2. Hoan and the Dai Viets: The Dai Viets have considered their participation in Khanh's
government primarily as an opportunity to K9enhance their own political status, to
dispense patronage, and enforce their political organization for eventual elections. When
they realized that Khanh sought to eliminate them in large measure from the government
he attempted to create, they at first chose to turn this effort aside by remaining within the
government in positions of lesser authority and continuing to work from within. However,
at a critical juncture in the recent crisis, Hoan, contrary to all the cabalistic rules of
Vietnamese politics, took his opposition outside the conference room and made his case
publicly against Khanh.
Khanh had little choice but to reply in the same forum. Therefore, to all practical
purposes, the split between Khanh and the Dai Viets (unless the party overwhelmingly
repudiates Hoan as its leader) now seems complete and irreparable. Therefore association
between Khanh and the Dai Viets in any future Cabinet seems unlikely.
3. The military: This split between Khanh and the Dai Viets will, of course, have serious
repercussions among some senior military officers. A few of the top and more effective
Generals are acknowledged Dai Viets. Some of them are now sharply disaffected with
Khanh and can be expected either to leave Khanh or begin to plot to mount a coup against
him.
Another factor has rather clearly emerged, however, from the MRC discussions. This was
the fact that no single element in the MRC commanded enough authority to impose its
domination upon the other factions. When the senior officers became aware of this fact
and when it became clear that their continued bickering would only lead to deepening
confusion and further bloodshed in the streets, they effected the Khanh/Minh/Khiem
triumvirate formula. But as each member of the triumvirate has privately admitted, this is
mere window dressing and not intended to solve anything.
What currently exists, therefore, with Khanh reposing at Dalat, is a serious vacuum in
GVN leadership. "Jack Owen"/3/ is the personification and incarnation of this vacuum.
He has no strength to back him up and no support from any known quarter except
possibly from Dai Viets should they decide to use him as a frontman. His occupancy of
Khanh's office in the Presidency and the motions through which he is going pretending to
act as Prime Minister cannot be taken seriously. The circumstances, therefore, lead [lend?]
themselves dangerously to the ambitions of any person reckless and courageous enough to
undertake a coup.
/3/Nguyen Xuan Oanh.
Greatest danger for the development of such a coup comes from the southern faction of
the Dai Viets which could obtain substantial military support centered around General
Thieu and Col. Ton. Another group consists of a clique of Colonels who center largely
around Colonel Pham Ngoc Thao. This latter group, it will be recalled, came very close to
precipitating a coup shortly after this time last year and might have succeeded if their
plans had not alarmed and been overtaken by the group who eventually succeeded in the
downfall of Diem on November 1. Again, it would be questionable this year whether
Generals Khiem and Thieu and others of that stripe would permit Thao and his shabby
Colonels to run a coup. In the current power vacuum both these groups can be expected to
continue to plot with the possibility of either triggering off a coup in order to have a
preemptive position.
Therefore, in the current circumstances it is obvious that the best solution we could
anticipate would be the return of Khanh to a position of responsibility and authority. If
this happens, as we are attempting to make it happen, Khanh is likely to be a chastened
but less forceful young man than he was before August 16. On the other hand, at present
he seems our only opportunity for anything resembling stability in the pursuit of
pacification of Vietnam. We should not delude ourselves that we can put together any
combination of personalities which will add up to a really effective government in the
foreseeable future, given the political immaturity of the military and civilian leaders and
the Vietnamese body politic. What is critically lacking here is any tradition of team play
and any experience in making governmental institutions and evolutionary processes work.
Without this "glue" we must expect to "rock" along indefinitely without a strong
executive and play with the breaks./4/
/4/On September 1, the CIA reached similar conclusions as expressed in a memorandum
entitled "The Situation in South Vietnam." Johnson Library, National Security File,
Vietnam Country File, Memos, Vol. XVII) A field report of the same date presented a
similar estimate. (TDCS 315/00595, September 1; ibid.)
Taylor

/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 15-1 VIET S. Secret; Flash; Exdis.
CINCPAC. Received at 12:08 p.m.
714. Deptel 567./2/ Our info is that Khanh is usefully employing his time in Dalat taking
actions which are necessary prerequisites to his return to Saigon and full assumption of
govt direction. The three principal problems with which he is grappling are (a) security
against a coup (with Dai Viets as principal suspects), (b) establishing some limits upon
voracious Buddhist demands, and (c) the constant problem of "Big" Minh. In general, he
seems to be proceeding along lines which Alex Johnson and I commended to him the
other day. (See Embtel 684)/3/ He has called in and obtained pledges of allegiance from
all his principal Generals./4/ He met this afternoon with Tam Chau in Dalat in [and] has
asked Khiem to speak to Big Minh and attempt to remove the latter from active
opposition.
/2/Document 334.
/3/Document 333.
/4/Westmoreland transmitted a brief account of this meeting, based on U.S. advisers'
reports, in MAC JOO 9139, September 2. (Washington National Records Center, RG 319,
HQDA Message Center, Reel 11925) At Taylor's suggestion, Westmoreland had also
visited Khanh at Dalat on September 1 to encourage him. (MAC JOO 9095, September 1;
Johnson Library, National Security File, Vietnam Country File. Vol. XVII. Cables)
For these reasons and because we have several reports indicating that he plans to return to
Saigon Sept 3, I do not consider it necessary or advisable at this stage to employ the
President's letter./5/ Delivery of the letter would require another conspicuous trip by me to
Dalat enhancing the impression already current here that we are dragging a reluctant
Khanh back to his responsibilities against his own will. Also we like to withhold weight
of a Presidential message for a verified emergency.
/5/Transmitted in Document 334.
However, there is always the possibility that Khanh may lose his nerve or that something
could go awry in his preparatory actions. Consequently I believe it important that I have at
my disposal an authorized text of a Presidential letter which I could use tomorrow or later
at my discretion if the situation warrants.
We have reviewed carefully the text which you proposed in reftel. We believe the first
two paragraphs are an excellent presentation of the US position in seeking Khanh's early
return to leadership. We are doubtful that the third paragraph, which refers to joint
planning, would be desirable to include at this time.
We would propose substituting for the third paragraph, if you agree: "I am impressed with
the importance of the period between now and Oct 27 in determining the future of your
country. From here, the problem appears to fall into two parts. The first is the need to
establish means which will develop a national consensus concerning the form of a future
and enduring governmental structure for the Republic of Vietnam. The second is the
requirement to restore national morale and confidence by exhibiting tangible success
against the Viet Cong. For the latter purpose, I would think that the vigorous prosecution
of the pacification drive which has now begun in the area around Saigon would offer a
readily available means for achieving this much needed success."
I will take a reading tomorrow morning, Saigon time, concerning Khanh's plans. If it
appears desirable for me to use the President's letter, tomorrow I would plan to fly up to
Dalat mid-morning, since the weather closes in at this season later in the afternoon. It
would be my hope to have the authorized text of the President's letter, as amended by the
foregoing suggestion, available to me at that time if that contingency arises./6/
/6/At 8:20 p.m., the Department of State transmitted the text of a new letter combining the
first two paragraphs of the first draft (with only minor changes) and the third paragraph as
quoted here. (Telegram 584 to Saigon; Department of State, Central Files, POL 15-1
VIET S) On September 5, Taylor reported that since Khanh had returned to Saigon of his
own volition, the letter had not been used. (Telegram 757 from Saigon; ibid.)
Taylor

to CINCPAC.
739. CINCPAC for POLAD. Alex Johnson and I called on General Khanh this morning to
review with him the recent course of events in Dalat. Khanh had lost the bright look
which he had when we last saw him in Dalat on Monday/2/ and seemed in face as tired as
when he took off for his Dalat vacation. He had also lost his goatee, shaved, he explained
vaguely, to mark end of a phase. He reported that in Dalat he had been seeing a constant
stream of visitors, military and civilian, most of whom had come to urge his return to
Saigon and assumption of full governmental powers. He confirmed that he had received
written statements of fealty from all his principal Generals and that the Buddhists had
pledged their support. Now he feels that he has a "carte blanche" to proceed with his plan
for the reorganization of the government.
/2/August 31; see Document 333.
We asked him whether he had authorized Vice Premier Oanh's statement in Hue on
September 3 (see Embtel 730)./3/ He looked surprised and said he had no knowledge of it.
When we showed him the text, he said he definitely had not authorized it and that it was
entirely premature.
/3/Dated September 3, telegram 730 reported on a visit to Hue by Minh and Oanh during
which the latter stated that two decisions had been made: 1) the Military Revolutionary
Committee had repealed the August 16 charter, and 2) a committee would be formed in
the near future representing the whole country to choose the new Prime Minister and
President. Once the committee was formed, the triumvirate would be dissolved.
In the ensuing discussion, Khanh outlined his governmental plans in the following terms:
From now until about November 1st, the triumvirate of Khanh, Minh and Khiem will
remain in existence. This morning, Khanh expects to offer Minh his old attributes of Chief
of State less the title itself. Thus, he will be the front man in the interim government,
receiving the credentials of Ambassadors and performing other ceremonial functions.
Hopefully, he will do some useful work in the triumvirate in making preparations for the
provisional government following November 1. Khanh will keep Oanh as his principal
assistant in charge of civil affairs (although he is in a slow burn over Oanh's intimation to
the press on August 29 that Khanh was "fou" and over the indiscretion yesterday at Hue).
Khanh, himself, will keep a personal eye on military activities and will guide the
reorganization of the government.
In the latter field, the first requirement is putting together the National Front Committee
(referred to in previous cable/4/ as the Committee for National Unity (CNU)) to be
composed only of civilians with broad, national credentials. Concurrently with the
formation of this committee, there will be appointed a small committee of legal experts to
draw up a plan for the provisional government which will go into effect after November
1st. Khanh expects this government to resemble structurally the one which he had hoped
to establish by the charter of August 16, i.e., a presidential system with separation of
power between the three branches. The CNU will approve this governmental structure as
well as the individual who will head the executive branch. Khanh is obviously not sure
whether this will be he or some civilian. We gathered that he would be quite happy to bow
out if he could do so gracefully.
/4/Document 332
Khanh expects to make a number of changes in his current interim government, generally
in the direction of giving it a civilian aspect. All of its present military members, including
Generals Khiem and Thieu, have submitted their resignations. He has not yet decided
whether he can afford to accept them all, particularly that of Khiem, who is very useful to
him in spite of his alleged Dai Viet association. I suggested he might consider keeping a
few of his most useful military officials in a civilian status. He apparently intends to
accept Thieu's resignation at once. His Dai Viet enemy and late colleague, Dr. Hoan, he is
asking to leave the country by Sunday. He hopes Vu Van Mau will return shortly and will
accept a prominent position in the government.
Khanh announced his intention to make the following military changes: General Duc,
presently commanding IV Corps, to replace General Thieu (whether as Deputy Defense
Minister, as Chief of Staff, or as both was not clear); General Go, former Deputy
Commander of IV Corps, to assume that command; General Tri, Commanding III Corps,
to be replaced by General not yet selected, because of intense hostility of the Buddhists;
General Xung, Commanding I Corps, who has requested transfer.
General Khanh emphasized that General Tam, III Corps, who is responsible for the
execution of Plan Hop Tac, remains in place. He confirmed his intention to transfer the
7th Division to the IV Corps and move the 25th Division south to the III Corps.
Always concerned about the ripple effect of government changes, we asked about Khanh's
intentions to change officials in the provinces. He assured us that he had no such
intention. Furthermore. Hop Tac would go forward as planned.
General Khanh explained the disturbances in Hue and elsewhere as symptoms of a current
anti-militarism complex which he feels bound to conciliate. He is determined to get the
army out of government and out of politics. When I expressed concern over possible
weakness, unreliability or trend toward neutralism on the part of an all-civilian
government, he assured me that the army would always be vigilant and ready to intervene
before any serious damage could result. He is deeply impressed with the essentiality of
Buddhist support. He believes the principal bonzes are with him now and he hopes to
retain their cooperation. They have agreed to appoint lay representatives to the Committee
of National Unity although, because of their religious status, they will not participate in
person
Khanh hopes to formalize and expand the present inter-faith committee for handling
religious issues. This committee will represent Buddhists, Catholics, Cao Dai and Hoa
Hao and will work in contact with but outside the government.
When we asked about the Dalat Generals, Khanh said that, according to his
understanding, each had telegraphed the appropriate US university with regard to
matriculation. He indicated that he might have second thoughts on General Don and retain
him for possible use in a military assignment. He then asked for six additional spaces in
US civilian schools for other Colonels and Generals. The individuals he has in mind
apparently include certain officers to whom he wishes to give advance schooling in
preparation for diplomatic assignments abroad. In other cases, he may have in mind
simply getting dangerous characters out of the country for awhile. We promised to see
what we could do about meeting this new request.
We stressed the importance of careful public information preparations prior to making the
governmental changes in offing and offered all US resources to assist. He seemed
impressed with the consequences of neglecting such preparations in mid-August and may
do better this time. He is transferring the unreliable Lt. Col. Thao from his present press
assignment in Khanh's office to the Psychological Warfare Branch.
Asked about his evaluation of the short-term future, Khanh indicated the expectation of
the continuance of the present uneasy tranquillity but foresees much wrangling over the
governmental questions which will arise in coming weeks. We are of the same opinion
and doubt he can keep his present schedule based upon a new provisional government
approved by the Committee of National Unity by November 1st.
Taylor

1964-1968, Volume I
Vietnam, 1964
Department of State
Washington, DC
X. Ambassador Taylor's Visit to Washington, September 6-10

/1/Source: National Defense University, Taylor Papers, T-161-69. Top Secret; Immediate;
Nodis. Drafted by Taylor.
768. For the Secretary. The following is a review of the situation in South Vietnam,
concurred in by the U.S. Mission Council, as it appears at the time of my departure for
Washington./2/ I would hope to use it as a basic document in our coming discussions.
You will note that I have left the distribution to your decision.
/2/At the end of August, Taylor requested a return to Washington for consultations, but
the governmental crisis in South Vietnam had precluded it. On September 4, Taylor and
Johnson reviewed the local situation and concluded that the time was as favorable then as
could be foreseen for the Ambassador to return. (Telegram 744 from Saigon, September
4; Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 VIET S) The trip was announced at 6 p.m.,
Saigon time, on September 5.
While we must be disappointed by the political turmoil of recent days, we cannot consider
it totally unexpected. The very nature of the social, political and ethnic confusion in this
country makes governmental turbulence of this type a factor which we will always have
with us.
What has emerged from these recent events is a definition within fairly broad limits of the
degree to which perfectability in government can be pushed. It should be remembered that
the recent fracas started when Khanh sought to make his broad and cumbersome
government more tractable and more effective. His motives were of the best even though
his methods were clumsy. But now, after this recent experience at government
improvement, we must accept the fact that an effective government, much beyond the
capacity of that which has existed over the past several months, is unlikely to survive. We
now have a better feel for the quality of our ally and for what we can expect from him in
terms of ability to govern. Only the emergence of an exceptional leader could improve the
situation and no George Washington is in sight.
Consequently we can and must anticipate for the future an instrument of government
which will have definite limits of performance. At the very worst, it will continue to seek
a broadened consensus involving and attempting to encompass all or most of the minority
elements with political aspirations until it approaches a sort of popular front. This
amalgam, if it takes form, may be expected in due course to become susceptible to an
accommodation with the Liberation Front, which might eventually lead to a collapse of all
political energy behind the pacification effort.
At best, the emerging governmental structure might be capable of maintaining a holding
operation against the Viet Cong. This level of effort could, with good luck and strenuous
American efforts, be expanded to produce certain limited pacification successes, for
example, in the territory covered by the Hoc Tap plan. But the willingness and ability of
such a government to exert itself or to attempt to execute an all-out National Pacification
Plan would be marginal. It would probably be incapable of galvanizing the people to the
heightened level of unity and sacrifice necessary to carry forward the counterinsurgency
program to final success. Instead, it would look increasingly to the United States to take
the major responsibility for prying the Viet Cong and the North Vietnamese off the backs
of the South Vietnamese population. The politicians in Saigon and Hue feel today that the
political hassle is their appropriate arena; the conflict with the VC belongs to the
Americans.
We may, therefore, expect to find ourselves faced with a choice of (a) passively watching
the development of a popular front, knowing that this may in due course require the U.S.
to leave Vietnam in failure; or (b) actively assuming increased responsibility for the
outcome following a time-schedule consistent with our estimate of the limited viability of
any South Vietnamese government.
An examination of our total world responsibilities and the significance of Vietnam in
relationship to them clearly rules out the option of accepting course (a). If we leave
Vietnam with our tail between our legs, the consequences of this defeat in the rest of Asia,
Africa and Latin America would be disastrous. We therefore would seem to have little
choice left except to accept course (b).
Our previous views on the right course of action to follow in South Vietnam are set forth
in Embtel 465./3/ The discussion in this present cable amounts to a recognition that
Course of Action A of Embtel 465 no longer corresponds with the realities of the
situation. Recent events have revealed the weakness of our ally and have convinced us of
the improbability of attaining the level of governmental performance desired under
Course A before embarking on a campaign of pressure against the DRV. We are forced
back on Course of Action B with certain revised views on timing.
/3/Document 319.
In the cold light of recently acquired facts, we need two to three months to get any sort of
government going which has any chance of being able to maintain order in the cities and
to continue the pacification effort of past levels. There is no present urge to march north
among our Vietnamese friends; the leadership is exhausted and frustrated following the
recent disorders and are not anxious to take on any new problems or obligations. Hence
there is no need to hasten our plans to satisfy an impatience to close with the enemy.
There is, however, the problem of morale, both civil and military. Both would respond
favorably to a visibly sincere effort to improve government and to the successful
execution of Hop Tac. Hence these courses of action must be emphasized in our present
program which we will continue to prosecute in this period with maximum vigor. At the
same time, the DRV needs to be put on notice of our continued vigilance and
determination by means of a resumption of 34-A operations and DeSoto patrols and by
modest crossborder operations into Laos.
Thus, our objective up to about December 1 should be to get going some kind of
government worthy of the name while shoring up morale and holding enemy activities in
check. Throughout the period, we should have the capability of executing on short notice
attacks on Laotian infiltration targets and Category II and III operations under CINCPAC
37-64. We should be ready to exploit any opportunities presented by the Communists
(such as the Gulf of Tonkin attacks) to initiate military pressures on DRV under favorable
conditions of world opinion.
At the end of the period and provided the objective for the period ~had been attained, we
would then be ready to begin escalating pressures on the DRV for the purpose of holding
the GVN together, of raising morale and of creating conditions required for a negotiated
termination of hostilities on favorable terms. Before initiating these pressures, US and
allied military forces would be positioned to meet possible Chicom/DRV reaction.
Escalating actions would then begin, taking the form of any desired combination of
attacks on Lao infiltration routes and/or on targets of appropriate categories in DRV. In
Laos, the air forces used could be Lao, VNAF or US; in the DRV, the air effort would be
largely US with VNAF operating out of range of the MIG's. The attacks should be
orchestrated in such a way as to produce a mounting pressure on the will of the Hanoi
high command designed to convince the latter to desist from further aid to the VC and
Vietminh and to agree to cooperate in calling off the insurgencies in South Vietnam and
Laos.
During this period, we can expect the GVN to do little more than assure the ground
defense of the national territory, participate to a limited degree in the air action and to act
as the recognized government of SVN. Even if Hanoi should comply with our wishes,
there would still remain in SVN many serious political, economic and social problems
which would test the ability of the best of governments. To cope with them, any GVN
which we can foresee now will require US help for a long time. Thus, even with the
acceptance of our recommendations herein and their successful implementation, we see
no quick and sure way to discharge our obligations honorably in this part of the world.
This forecast is fairly grim but the alternatives are more repugnant. We feel that we
should take the offensive generally along the lines recommended herein and play for the
international breaks.
Taylor
340. Memorandum From the Commander, Military Assistance Command, Vietnam

(Westmoreland) to the Ambassador in Vietnam (Taylor)/1/
MACJO2
Saigon, September 6, 1964.
/1/Source: Department of State, Saigon Embassy Files: Lot 68 F 8. Top Secret.

SUBJECT
Assessment of the Military Situation
1. In preparation for your trip to Washington, I thought it might be useful to give you my
assessment of the military situation. In subsequent paragraphs I outline in some detail the
rather substantial progress which we have already made and, more importantly, the great
potential for additional progress. I also describe military problem areas. These, as you
know, are many; but all are susceptible to solution assuming that political stability can be
achieved, and that the Armed Forces, particularly the Army, remains intact and unified in
its purpose. Under the present circumstances, however, the continued solidarity of the
Armed Forces is in doubt. As all else depends on holding the Armed Forces together, I
address this matter first.
The Key Military Issue:
2. It seems to me there are certain conditions which must be met in order to preserve the
structure and effectiveness of the RVNAF:
a. The officers of the RVNAF must be protected against purge, solely by reason of
religious or political affiliation. The Commander in Chief, the officers of the Joint General
Staff and the Commanders down the line, must be given some assurance that their careers
and reputations will not be sacrificed for political expediency to the ambitions or interests
of political or religious blocs.
b. The officers' corps must be assured that its members will not be punished or expelled
from the Armed Forces if they faithfully execute the orders of constituted authority in
connection with the maintenance of law and order. They must be assured that their
superiors will not accede to the arbitrary demands of pressure groups whose interest it is
to destroy the discipline of the Armed Forces and to render ineffective the forces of law
and order.
3. If I interpret correctly the events of the past two weeks, neither of these minimum
conditions have been met. To the contrary, actions best calculated to destroy the morale,
the unity, the pride and confidence of the Armed Forces have transpired in a manner
which leads me to believe that a relative free hand has been given to those who aim to
destroy the Armed Forces. The demands of the Buddhists for the resignation of the
Commander in Chief, the Chief of Staff, Commander of II Corps, the Prefect of Saigon
and the Director of National Police, to name a few, appear to be blows directed at the
heart of the security forces which stand between the Viet Cong and victory. I cannot
believe that it is in the interests of the nation to accede to these demands. To the contrary,
I am persuaded that acceptance is a formula for political and military disaster. While
aware that the insurgency cannot be overcome by military means alone, I am equally
aware that without a strong military foundation no program will ever achieve victory. I am
concerned that the Government of Vietnam has already moved some distance down the
wrong road in dealing with its Armed Forces. I do not know whether the Armed Forces
will collapse or whether, finding the present course intolerable, they will make a desperate
move to regain power. Neither course is compatible with the objective we seek.
4. What follows is highly sensitive to the assumption that the provisional government can
and will take extraordinary steps to restore morale and rekindle a unity of purpose within
the Armed Forces.
Favorable Trends:
5. There is room for some optimism about the ability of the RVNAF to execute the
military portions of the pacification program. Over the last few months there have been
measurable increases in military means and improvements in operational methods; and
more are in sight. Thus, the prospect is for a continuing rise in combat strength and
tactical proficiency. To be sure, the VC are making gains in these same areas. However,
we estimate that the rate of improvement of overall US/GVN military effectiveness will
be much more rapid than that of the VC--barring, of course, great escalation of DRV
support. There follow certain specifics on which this estimate is based.
6. Manpower and Morale:
a. The strength of the Armed Forces has been steadily increasing since May. The
Divisions of III and IV Corps have just received a large, and badly needed, infusion of
replacements. There are currently some 10,000 regulars in the National Training Centers
and [are] reportedly doing well. In the revitalized volunteer program, results have been
close to target. Intakes of conscriptees have only been 50% of program--but that program
was overly ambitious. It is estimated that the 31 December goals will be achieved in early
1965.
b. From January forward, the High Command has developed and implemented a series of
policies and programs aimed at improving the morale of the fighting forces. The most
important are:
(1) Significant pay raises for the Regular and Regional Forces; and reasonable added
emoluments for the Popular Forces.
(2) A new awards and decorations program featuring additional medals, decentralization,
on-the-spot action, and good publicity of presentations.
(3) Establishment of a centralized promotion board for officers and senior NCO's; and
decentralization of promotions below grades E8 to Corps and Division Commanders.
(4) Greatly expanded dependent housing construction program (including some housing
for Regional Forces dependents).
7. Strengthening of U.S. Advisory Effort:
a. Additional advisors are being introduced at the level of infantry and artillery battalions
and armored troops. Also, additional advisors are being placed with the VNAF and VNN.
These increases should serve to enhance substantially the overall military effectiveness of
the RVNAF.
b. [paragraph (5 lines of source text) not declassified]
c. One C-123 squadron and one Caribou Company are also scheduled for deployment in
order to provide more effective support for the larger advisory effort throughout the
country.
8. Development of a Pacification Focus:
a. The Hop Toc Plan (Intensification of Pacification in the Saigon Area) has been
accepted and is being implemented by the GVN. The Commander of III Corps has been
designated as the coordinating authority and he is being assisted and supported by
representatives of various civilian ministries. Emphasis has been given to the role of
police; and their quality and numbers are being increased. Hop Toc has served as a
vehicle for bringing about better coordination among the elements of the U.S. Mission in
support of integrated pacification operations.
b. The GVN has ordered certain important troop redispositions which give substance to
the priority accorded the Saigon area by the national plan. The 25th Infantry Division is
being moved from II Corps into the provinces of Long An and Hau Nghia. This move
should increase not only the troop density in this high priority area, but also improve
management and direction of the pacification campaign.
c. Two additional 18 tube 105mm Howitzer Battalions have been organized and
positioned with divisions supporting the pacification of priority areas.
9. Augmentation of Air Capabilities:
a. The VNAF will shortly have 4 fully combat ready A-1H squadrons (and has the
capability to build up a total of 6 by 1 December 1965). In addition, by the end of
December, the 2 Farmgate A-1E Squadrons will be at full operational strength with a total
of 50 aircraft. (Present holding is 30.) All 4 VNAF H-34 squadrons will be trained and
operational by the end of the year. The efficiency of the VNAF pilots is improving,
particularly in night operations. The air-ground operations system is being steadily
improved by better communications, improved training, and the provision of air liaison
and control teams at regimental level. Finally, procedures, designed to maximize
capabilities, have been developed for mutual cooperation and support between USAF,
VNAF, and Army aviation.
b. Two additional transport helicopter companies will arrive in country by 1 December
and they will enhance materially the mobility of ARVN and its capability to react to VC
attacks.
c. Detailed procedures for quick reaction forces and counter-ambush tactics utilizing
aircraft are being developed on a sound and practical basis.
10. U.S. Special Forces are being substantially increased by additional "A" teams; and
supervision will be strengthened by the introduction of additional "B" and "C" teams. The
present CIDG (Strike Force) strength of approximately 19,000 is programmed to increase
steadily until the goal of 30,000 is reached in July 1965. This buildup should lead to
greater success in disrupting infiltration routes across the borders and within SVN. In
addition, these forces will figure importantly in operations against VC base areas.
11. Increased Effectiveness of Naval Forces:

a. Recent acquisition of 2 PCEs and early arrival of 4 PGMs will add considerably to the
capability of the Sea Forces.
b. Thanks to expedited deliveries of 15 LCM8s, by end December the lift capability of the
River Forces will have increased by 50% (from 6 to 9 Infantry Battalions). The balance
(primarily patrol craft) of the additional River Assault Group, making a total of seven in
country, will be on hand by July 1965.
c. The first keels of the additional 90 motorized junks will be laid next month. Beginning
January, these junks will take their place in the coastal force at the rate of ten per month.
12. Intelligence agencies are exchanging information to a much greater degree and
effecting better coordination at all levels down to and including province (sector). In this
connection, all sectors have now established operations and intelligence centers; and most
are functioning with some success.
13. The RVNAF logistic system is being partially reorganized to improve the logistic
support of the paramilitary forces. The Administrative and Direct Support Logistic (A&L)
Companies, until now integrated into the Regional Forces for their immediate support and
that of the Popular Forces, are being incorporated directly into the ARVN logistic system,
increased in strength, and extended to the subsector level by addition of logistic contact
teams.
14. Communications are being further developed and are becoming more reliable. An
alternate tropo scatter route is opening between Saigon and Pleiku. Southern Aid
microwave circuits are now carrying military traffic. Advisors are equipped with mobile
communications for field use and for greater flexibility of air-ground operations.
15. Finally, there are perceptible improvements in operational techniques and tactics
throughout the fighting forces. For instance, I am encouraged by the better integration of
the capabilities of the combined ground arms; by the increasing number of joint ground
and naval operations; and by the effectiveness of night operations conducted by certain
units. We are beginning to develop sound plans for disruption of War Zones C and D, by
both ground and air operations. In this connection, our work with IR, and successful
exploitation of this technique, convinces us that it represents a real potential for detecting
and hitting the VC in terrain which heretofore has provided him sanctuary.
Problem Areas:
16. There are many problem areas under constant study and surveillance by my
headquarters and subordinate elements. The major ones include:
a. Deficiencies in leadership training and development, particularly of junior officers and
noncommissioned officers. Because this is of central importance, it is given special
emphasis at all advisory levels, and particularly at the National Training Centers.
b. Development of capabilities for conscription and recruitment of manpower to meet the
requirements of approved plans and programs.
c. Development of a viable paramilitary concept and force structure responsive to security

and political requirements. The problems here are equitable division of responsibility
between the national government and the local community; the preconditions for
community commitment to local defense, and insuring that the two efforts are mutually
reinforcing.
d. The determination of an optimum deployment and utilization of U.S. Special Forces. A
comprehensive study and analysis of this problem is underway which will undoubtedly
lead to the redeployment of a number of Special Forces detachments into the areas where
they may be expected to be more productive in attacks against VC bases and in the
interdiction of actual VC routes, both into and within the country. We are also studying
the problem of the legal status of the CIDG forces. We are not yet sure of the impact of
giving the CIDG Strike Companies a legal status similar to the Regional Forces.
e. Orientation and training of military units for their pacification tasks. A principal
requirement is preparation of selected units for participation in various aspects of
population and resources control operations. Another is the entire area of peasant/soldier
relationships.
f. Tactical deficiencies. This runs the entire gamut. We continue to work to improve the
rapidity and effectiveness of reaction forces; to develop methods of detecting and
punishing VC ambushes; to make ARVN conscious of the essentiality of thorough ground
reconnaissance and patrolling; to exploit and increase means of acquiring combat
intelligence.
g. Continued efforts to improve coordination and integration of effort between the
agencies of the U.S. Mission in support of pacification.
h. Lack of authority to disrupt the VC infiltration routes and facilities in the Laotian
corridor.
Status of Contingency Planning:
17. MACV planning for Special, Contingency, and Emergency actions by the U.S. and its
Allies reflects more realism than at any previous time. This applies equally to Component
and Supporting Commands.
a. Special OPlans 37 and 34A have been partially implemented. Planning for further
operations is well ahead of anticipated authority to execute. CINCPAC is integrating all
his Special Plans (33, 34, 99) for actions in SEAsia into OPlan 37 by 1 November. 34A,
37, and DeSoto actions are either limited or held in abeyance. Unilateral MACV and U.S.
component planning is so well advanced that minimum reaction time to execute external
combined air operations with RVNAF will be required. Combined US/RVN planning for
limited surface operations in Laos has been authorized and is in process.
b. Contingency Plans for counterinsurgency (32 Ph II) and for countering DRV/ChiCom
aggression (32 Ph III/IV) have been brought up to date by U.S. Component and ZI
Commands. Counterpart SEATO plans are comparably up to date. U.S. unilateral plans
will be more realistic when bilateral planning with the Thais is completed and when
similar planning is effected wit-in the GVN.
c. The U.S. Emergency Evacuation and Security Plans (60-64, 61-62) have been
thoroughly reviewed, refined, and steps taken to expedite and facilitate execution as may
be directed.
d. Preliminary combined planning with GVN against DRV aggression resulted in tentative
working level agreement on the nature of the threat and a concept of operations. It also
surfaced a potentially serious problem in US/RVN command relationships. Continued
combined planning with GVN was deferred as the.estimate of possible DRV reaction to
the U.S. Golf of Tonkin actions failed to materialize.
W. C. Westmoreland/2/
General, United States Army

SNIE 53-64
Washington, September 8, 1964.
/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Vietnam Country File, Memos, Vol.
XVII. Secret. Submitted by the Director of Central Intelligence and concurred in by the
U.S. Intelligence Board. Also published in Declassified Documents, 2978, 31A.
CHANCES FOR A STABLE GOVERNMENT IN SOUTH VIETNAM
The Problem
To assess the chances for the emergence of a stable non-Communist regime in South
Vietnam.
Conclusion
At present the odds are against the emergence of a stable government capable of
effectively prosecuting the war in South Vietnam. Yet the situation is not hopeless: if a
viable regime evolves from the present confusion it may even gain strength from the
release of long-pent pressures and the sobering effect of the current crisis. Of the men on
the scene, General Khanh probably has the best chance of mustering sufficient support to
restore a reasonably stable and workable government.
Discussion
1. The downfall of the Diem regime released powerful political forces previously
suppressed or underground. Religious groups, principally the Buddhists, the students,
labor, and the diverse array of intellectuals and politicians both at home and in exile
moved quickly to voice their aspirations and make themselves felt. These cross currents
were reflected within the military establishment, particularly among the senior officers.
The struggle among these various forces can be expected to continue until an acceptable
balance is struck, one group proves strong enough to dominate the others, or the fabric of
central government is torn apart.
2. The convulsions of recent weeks have surfaced and exacerbated these deep-seated
divisions and strains. They have intensified reciprocal suspicions between the military
leadership and segments of the populace, at least in urban areas, increased disunity within
the military establishment itself, and produced serious discord, including religious strife,
among the civilians. The present situation is far more serious than that of November 1963,
for the Viet Cong are now stronger, and in 1963 popular enthusiasm over Diem's ouster
gave his immediate successors a degree of general support and period of grace the present
shaky government does not have. Furthermore, the events of the past nine months have
inevitably increased sentiments of war weariness and frustration, and probably caused
"neutralism" (i.e., an end to the constant struggle) to appear increasingly attractive to
many. Also, the factors inherent in the US/GVN relationship have caused some rise in
anti-American feeling, which probably will grow.
3. The situation is fragile and vulnerable to attack or exploitation from all sides. It affords
obvious opportunities to any person or group reckless or ambitious enough to undertake a
coup. There are indications of such plotting by at least two groups: disgruntled Dai Viets
allied with officers who presently command key military units, and another group
influenced by Colonel Pham Ngoc Thao. Among the civilian population some Buddhist
and Catholic leaders appear to be trying to avoid new violence, but the spectre of religious
strife has not been laid to rest. Recent Buddhist demands have alarmed the Catholics and
militants of either persuasion may provoke fresh crises. While some civilian politicians
wish to play a constructive role, most remain more concerned with personal power and
prestige than national unity. The students seem to be calming down, but this volatile
group remains vulnerable to manipulation from various quarters, including the Viet Cong
and, perhaps, the French.
4. The present governmental arrangements are likely to undergo several changes during
the next few weeks. The shaky solution evolved amid riot and discord--a sixty-day
caretaker government headed by an ostensible triumvirate of rival generals--was patently
a stopgap. Some other arrangements will be tried-perhaps in connection with the proposed
National Congress. Beyond the immediate crisis over governmental arrangements,
however, there is the question of whether any stable regime can emerge, capable of
effectively prosecuting the war. On present evidence, chances of this outcome must be
rated as less than even.
5. The situation in South Vietnam is so fluid and complex, however, that those
developments which appear most likely will not necessarily occur--as, indeed, they have
not on many occasions in both ancient and recent Vietnamese history. There is a chance,
even if it be slight, that the experiences of the last week or so may ultimately prove
salutary, that the situation had to get worse before it could get better. In the political chaos
and conflict, some longstanding pressures have been released, some smoldering
grievances and quarrels have been aired and possibly ameliorated, and the dangers
implicit in continued drift have been made more real. It is not impossible that adroit
leadership could turn these conditions to advantage in convincing influential figures of the
need for national unity under available leaders, imperfect as they may be.
6. The real relationships of the persons and groups involved in the present situation are
obscure./2/ It is not clear how much power General Khanh actually retains or what role he
will play in forthcoming weeks. In some respects, recent events have damaged him
politically. At least some of his military colleagues are obviously unhappy at what they
regard as his weakness in the face of Buddhist and student disorder. On the other hand, his
manifest reluctance to use force against protesting civilians may lay to rest longstanding
civilian suspicions that he is a neo-Diemist anxious to reverse the verdict of November
1963 and restore a Can Lao dictatorship. His courageous willingness to stand alone and
unarmed amidst demonstrating crowds won him personal respect.
/2/See Annex. [Footnote in the source text. The annex is not printed.]
7. In the context of present realities Khanh probably has a better chance than any other
obvious figure of providing the leadership around which a stable government could be
built. His success in this venture, however, is far from assured. Even if he himself shows
the necessary astuteness and willingness to tackle the task his success will depend to a
great degree on the willingness of other influential figures (e.g., General Khiem, General
Minh, and Tri Quang) to lend him support or, at a minimum, to refrain from working
actively for his downfall. General Minh in particular probably retains enough prestige so
that a government which did not have his participation, or at least his approval, would
have considerably lessened chances of survival.
8. There are, of course, several possibilities other than a government in which Khanh
plays the paramount role. Some new figure may arise or some already prominent
personality may prove to have hidden talents or unsuspected support. However, at the
moment every likely alternative candidate has individual drawbacks or enough known
opposition to cast serious doubt on his ability to provide unifying leadership. Several
groups or figures seem strong enough to exercise what amounts to a de facto veto in the
business of creating a government. Although it is possible that some individual or faction
may succeed in overthrowing the present government, none--other than Khanh--presently
seems capable of holding power.
9. The longer the present unstable situation lasts, the more difficult it will be to form a
government which can preserve even the appearance of unity and determination. In such
circumstances, neutralist sentiment would almost certainly increase, together with the
danger that a loosely organized coalition would emerge which could take advantage of
frustration and war weariness to seek a neutralist solution. In the prolonged absence of
firm central direction from Saigon, the morale and effectiveness of individual unit
commanders in the field will decline, and there is even the danger that some might make
their own accommodations with the Communist enemy. There is also a chance that some
province or region will secede, and there are already rumors of separatist tendencies in
Hue.
10. On the other hand, except for tensions in Hue, there is as yet little sign of the
imminence of such dire developments. Furthermore, in weighing the situation in South
Vietnam it is important not to focus exclusive attention on events in urban areas. During
the past month, the war in the provinces has been carrying on, the army shows no signs of
slackening its efforts and, indeed, has recently scored two major successes. Local officials
have probably adopted the traditional Vietnamese wait and see attitude rather than taking
actions which might jeopardize their own position. Prolonged discord in the cities will
inevitably affect the rural pacification effort, but so far the limited momentum which the
counterinsurgency effort had in the provinces has not diminished.
11. The Viet Cong obviously are not indifferent to South Vietnam's current troubles.
Hanoi and Viet Cong propaganda emphasizes that the Communists expect victory to come
primarily from South Vietnamese political failures and instability. There is no evidence
that the Viet Cong triggered the recent actions which led to urban upheaval, but the
Communists have almost certainly been actively encouraging discord and violence
(eleven of those arrested as directly responsible for the worst of recent disorders in Saigon
were claimed by the police to be known VC agents). Militarily, recent weeks have been
marked by an actual decline in VC attacks, though this "lull" is probably a normal phase
and there are signs that the VC may now be preparing to step up their activity. Judging
from past experience, it will take some time for the VC to ready themselves to take full
advantage of recent developments. Also, the Communists may wish to avoid the risk of
increasing the obvious VC threat to a point where it might unify anti-Communists
presently engaged in internecine political strife.
12. Some of the recent agitation against Khanh's government has had anti-American
undertones. In some circles there is a belief that the US prodded Khanh into attempting to
eliminate Minh as chief of state and into resuming the kind of tight controls formerly
exercised by Diem. Minh himself is manifestly resentful of what he regards as US
undercutting of his position (though Khanh too has been uneasy about what he considers
US endeavors on Minh's behalf). There has been a growing anti-American feeling among
some Catholics who blame the US for Diem's overthrow and resent what they consider
US favoritism of the Buddhist cause. In some military quarters (e.g., General Khiem) and
probably in some civilian circles as well there is resentment at what is inevitably viewed
as US "meddling" in internal Vietnamese affairs.
13. Communist--and possibly also French--agents have encouraged and exploited anti-US
sentiments. The idea is also being circulated that South Vietnam is really a battlefield on
which two alien powers, the US and Communist China, are waging war by proxy. It is
likely that anti-American sentiment will grow.
/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Vietnam Country File, Vol. XVII,
Memos. Secret. Also printed in Pentagon Papers: Gravel Edition, vol. III, pp. 561-562,
and Pentagon Papers: New York Times Edition, pp. 357-359.
SUBJECT
Courses of action for South Vietnam
The attached memorandum (Tab A) records briefly the consensus which has been worked
out with Max Taylor in recent days./2/ This course of action is the best we can design for
the central purpose of thickening the thin fabric of the Khanh government in the next two
months. Everyone regards this as the first priority task, and the American actions are all
framed with this as their primary purpose. Our consensus now runs against any plan to
force substantial escalation before October, at the earliest. My own guess is that unless
there is a very marked change in Saigon, we will still be cautious a month from now,
although Bob McNamara is a little more aggressive than the rest of us.
/2/The meetings took place September 7 at noon and September 8 at 11:05 a.m. Rusk,
McNamara, McGeorge and William Bundy, Manning, Taylor, and Wheeler attended both,
while McCone was present at the second. Johnson Library, Rusk Appointment Book) The
first meeting is described in United States-Vietnam Relations, 1945-1967, Book IV, pp.
25-27; and Taylor summarized both meetings briefly in Swords and Plowshares, pp. 320321. In his diary, Taylor also notes that there was general agreement on the
recommendations in telegram 768 (Document 339), but "there was a rather sharp debate
over the timeliness of provoking North Vietnamese action." (National Defense University,
Taylor Papers, T-272-69)
This paper does not discuss long-range actions, but you should know that in the longer
perspective nearly all of us are agreed that substantially increased pressure against North
Vietnam will be necessary if we are not to face the prospect of a gradual but increasingly
inevitable break-up of our side in South Vietnam.
I also attach at Tab B a Special National Intelligence Estimate which was approved
today./3/
/3/Document 341.
McG. B.
Tab A
COURSES OF ACTION FOR SOUTH VIETNAM/4/
/4/Secret. Drafted by William Bundy. Also printed in Pentagon Papers: Gravel Edition,
vol. III, pp. 561-562. For an earlier draft, also dated September 8, see ibid., pp. 560-561.
In anticipation of Taylor's return and in response to the deteriorating situation in Saigon,
McNaughton and William Bundy had begun drafting papers on Vietnam on September 2.
McNaughton's first and second drafts, dated September 2 and 3, of a seven-point "Plan of
Action for South Vietnam" are in the Johnson Library, National Security File, Vietnam
Country File, Vol. XVII, Memos. The second draft is also printed in Pentagon Papers:
Gravel Edition, vol. III, pp. 556-559.
Bundy's paper, "Possible Courses of Action for South Viet-Nam," initially drafted on
September 3 and revised on September 5, was similar to McNaughton's but had only five
sections: Analysis of the Present Situation, Actions To Be Taken in Any Event, Major
Additional Action We Might Consider Within South Viet-Nam, Major Additional
Courses of Action Outside South Viet-Nam, and Summary and Conclusions. (Johnson
Library, National Security File, Vietnam Country File, Vol. XVII, Memos) Both papers
were pessimistic about the situation in Vietnam and presented a range of possible U.S.
actions to improve it. The text printed here represents the consolidation and revision of the
Bundy and McNaughton drafts in light of the discussions on September 7 and 8.
The Situation
1. Khanh will probably stay in control and may make some headway in the next 2-3
months in strengthening the government (GVN). The best we can expect is that he and the
GVN will be able to maintain order, keep the pacification program ticking over (but not
progressing markedly), and give the appearance of a valid government.
2. Khanh and the GVN leaders are temporarily too exhausted to be thinking much about
moves against the North. However, they do need to be reassured that the US continues to
mean business, and as Khanh goes along in his government efforts, he will probably want
more visible US effort, and some GVN role in external actions.
3. The GVN over the next 2-3 months will be too weak for us to take any major deliberate
risks of escalation that would involve a major role for, or threat to, South Vietnam,
However, escalation arising from and directed against US action would tend to lift GVN
morale at least temporarily.
4. The Communist side will probably avoid provocative action against the US, and it is
uncertain how much they will step up VC activity. They do need to be shown that we and
the GVN are not simply sitting back after the Gulf of Tonkin.
Courses of Action
We recommend in any event:
1. US naval patrols in the Gulf of Tonkin should be resumed immediately (about
September 12). They should operate initially beyond the 12-mile limit and be clearly
dissociated from 34A maritime operations. The patrols would comprise 2-3 destroyers and
would have air cover from carriers; the destroyers would have their own ASW capability.
2. 34A operations by the GVN should be resumed immediately thereafter (next week).
The maritime operations are by far the most important. North Vietnam is likely to
publicize them, and at this point we should have the GVN ready to admit that they are
taking place and to justify and legitimize them on the basis of the facts on VC infiltration
by sea. 34A air drop and leaflet operations should also be resumed but are secondary in
importance. We should not consider air strikes under 34A for the present.
3. Limited GVN air and ground operations into the corridor areas of Laos should be
undertaken in the near future, together with Lao air strikes as soon as we can get
Souvanna's permission. These operations will have only limited effect, however.
4. We should be prepared to respond on a tit-for-tat basis against the DRV in the event of
any attack on US units or any special DRV/VC action against SVN. The response for an
attack on US units should be along the lines of the Gulf of Tonkin attacks, against specific
and related targets. The response to special action against SVN should likewise be aimed
at specific and comparable targets.
The main further question is the extent to which we should add elements to the above
actions that would tend deliberately to provoke a DRV reaction, and consequent
retaliation by us. Examples of actions to be considered would be running US naval patrols
increasingly close to the North Vietnamese coast and/or associating them with 34A
operations. We believe such deliberately provocative elements should not be added in the
immediate future while the GVN is still struggling to its feet. By early October, however,
we may recommend such actions depending on GVN progress and Communist reaction in
the meantime, especially to US naval patrols.
The aim of the above actions, external to South Vietnam, would be to assist morale in
SVN and show the Communists we still mean business, while at the same time seeking to
keep the risks low and under our control at each stage.
Further actions within South Vietnam are not covered in this memorandum. We believe
that there are a number of immediate impact actions we can take, such as pay raises for
the police and civil administrators and spot projects in the cities and selected rural areas.
These actions would be within current policy and will be refined for decision during
Ambassador Taylor's visit. We are also considering minor changes in the US air role
within South Vietnam, but these would not involve decisions until November.
343. Memorandum of a Meeting, White House, Washington, September 9, 1964, 11

a.m./1/
/1/Source: Johnson Library, Meeting Notes File. Secret. Drafted by McGeorge Bundy.
The meeting took place in the Cabinet Room. For the President's account of this meeting,
see Vantage Point, p. 120. Also published in Declassified Documents, 1978, 129B.
PRESENT WERE
The President, Secretary Rusk (after the first half-hour), Secretary McNamara, Mr.
McCone, General Wheeler, Ambassador Taylor, William Bundy, John McNaughton,
Robert Manning, and McGeorge Bundy
The meeting began with the President's review of a memorandum, "Courses of Action for
South Vietnam," dated September 8, 1964 (attached)./2/ Initial attention was concentrated
on the four specific recommendations in this paper. The Secretary of Defense reported
that these recommendations, with minor adjustments, had the approval of the Joint
Chiefs,/3/ but he reported also that there was an important division among the Chiefs, in
that the Chief of Staff of the Air Force and the Commandant of the Marine Corps believed
that it was now necessary in addition to execute extensive U.S. air strikes against North
Vietnam. General Wheeler explained that these two officers now felt that the situation
would continue to deteriorate unless such drastic action was taken now. He said that he
and the other two colleagues were persuaded by the argument of Ambassador Taylor--the
man on the spot--that it was important not to overstrain the currently weakened GVN by
drastic action in the immediate future. General Taylor repeated that this was indeed his
view, but he emphasized that he also believed that in the long run the current in-country
program would not be sufficient. He had held this view for many months, but it had been
reinforced by recent events in the field.
/2/Not attached to the source text, but see Tab A, supra.

/3/For text of the JCS views, CM-124-64, September 9, see Pentagon Papers: Gravel
Edition, vol. III, p. 564. A copy of CM-124-64 is also in the Johnson Library, National
Security File, Vietnam Country File, DeSoto Patrol.
The President pressed General Taylor as to the reasons for his current unreadiness to
recommend larger action. Under this questioning General Taylor made it clear that he and
General Westmoreland were in agreement on this question of timing. The President
indicated that he had gained the impression in an earlier talk with Ambassador Taylor that
the Government now might in fact be somewhat strengthened by recent events, in that
General Khanh had eliminated some people who were good riddance./4/ Ambassador
Taylor agreed that this was a real possibility, at the more optimistic end of the spectrum,
and that perhaps also General Khanh would now have more true support in the country as
a whole. But he could not be sure of this, and on balance he thought the government was
in a more uncertain condition than before.
/4/According to Taylor's diary, he had seen the President at the end of the preceding day
and explained the situation in Saigon. (National Defense University, Taylor Papers, T272-69) No record of this meeting has been found.
The President asked whether the U.S. had given any encouragement to General Khanh in
his August 16 effort to concentrate power in his own hands, and the Ambassador replied
in the negative. We had tried to encourage Khanh to include a bill of rights and to lay a
careful groundwork for any actions he might take. He had accepted the first point, but had
not had time to carry out the second before his plans were overtaken by protest.
The President asked Director McCone for his opinion and the Director replied that in the
judgment of his Agency the four recommended actions were appropriate, and that a
sustained air attack at present would be dangerous because of the weakness of the GVN.
Such an attack might also trigger major increases in Chinese Communist participation.
The Agency remained very gravely concerned by the internal situation in South Vietnam,
which the Director estimated a shade more pessimistically than Ambassador Taylor.
The President asked the Ambassador whether we could stop internal feuding. The
Ambassador replied that it was very difficult with a group of men who turned off their
hearing aids in the face of appeals to the public weal. These people simply did not have
the sense of responsibility for the public interest to which we were accustomed, and
regularly estimated matters in terms of their own personal gains and losses. The President
then asked the Secretary of State for his judgment. Mr. Rusk said that a major decision to
go North could be taken at any time--"at 5-minutes' notice." He did not recommend such
decision now. He thought we should take the four recommended actions and play for the
breaks. The split in the Communist bloc was deepening and would probably be sharpened
by the forthcoming December meeting./5/ As that split grew more severe, there might be
real inhibitions upon adventures by Peking and Hanoi in Southeast Asia.
/5/Reference is to the International Conference of Communist Parties to be held on
December 15.
The President asked what could be done to strengthen the Government in South Vietnam.
Ambassador Taylor replied that this was very difficult, but that one thing he would try to
do would be to discourage Khanh from excluding all military men. I said that this was the
common judgment of all of us, and that the Government needed what talent it could get
whether military or civilian.
The President said that in his judgment the proper answer to those advocating immediate
and extensive action against the North was that we should not do this until our side could
defend itself in the streets of Saigon. We obviously wanted to strengthen the GVN. We
believed it could be strengthened. But what specifically were we going to do in this
direction?
Ambassador Taylor replied that we needed to move on in meshing our team with the
GVN. This had been well started before the unrest of August. The problem was not in
planning but in execution, and in the quality of the individuals in the GVN. Nevertheless
we should continue to seek better individuals and continue to strengthen our cooperative
effort with them.
The President accepted this as a first purpose and then asked whether we needed
additional equipment as well. Ambassador Taylor said that while the additional U.S.
advisers would be helpful, there was currently no equipment need beyond that which was
being supplied.
Secretary McNamara emphasized the importance of politico-economic action in the urban
areas, along the lines of the recent Rand report,/6/ to lower the level of student and
Buddhist pressure and increase the political base of support for the GVN. Mr. McCone
endorsed this judgment. He further expressed his opinion that Hanoi and Peking now
believed that they were doing very well and that they were not having second thoughts
about their basic policy (an implied disagreement with the Secretary of State). The
Agency was also disturbed by the prospect that internal movement toward negotiations
might be increasing, and that there was some sign also of anti-American feeling in South
Vietnam. It could happen that the President would find that the purposes originally set
forth in Eisenhower's 1954 letter/7/ were no longer supported by the people of Vietnam
themselves.
/6/"U.S. Economic Assistance in Vietnam: A Proposed Reorientation," R-430-AID, July
1964, was prepared by the Rand Corporation for the Agency for International
Development. A copy is in the Johnson Library, National Security File, Vietnam Country
File, Rand Report.
/7/Foreign Relations, 1952-1954, vol. XIII, Part 2, pp. 1239-1241.
Secretary Rusk asked Ambassador Taylor if it could be said that the key leaders had
looked at the dangers of recent weeks and might be sobered toward responsibility.
Ambassador Taylor said there were some such factors at work. The recent events had
proven that for the present, at least, General Khanh is indispensable, and on paper, at
least, he now had a broader backing than before.
The President asked what would happen if our proposed efforts did not strengthen the
government and if instead it got weaker and weaker. Ambassador Taylor replied that as
long as the armed forces are solid, the real power is secure. It was vital to be sure of the
armed forces. And he believed that these forces would be reliable as long as they had
confidence that we were with them.
The President asked who might come in if Khanh went out. He said that he hoped that it
would not be "Mac's friend Mr. Oanh of Harvard," and was pleased to hear that this
assumption was right. Ambassador Taylor indicated that it might be such a man as Quat,
or General Khiem, or perhaps Vu Van Maul But he emphasized that this was a very
uncertain game of prediction.
Ambassador Taylor further recommended that we should make every effort to execute the
sound Hop-Tac plan. This plan for clearance around Saigon would make ministers work,
but work was good for the ministers.
The President asked whether the situation was better or worse than when Ambassador
Taylor went out. Ambassador Taylor said he thought it was somewhat worse, but made it
clear in response to a further question that this weakening was political, not military.
Ambassador Taylor also emphasized his belief that sooner or later we would indeed have
to act more forcefully against the North. He simply did not think now was the best time.
The President asked if anyone doubted whether it was worth all this effort. Ambassador
Taylor replied that we could not afford to let Hanoi win, in terms of our overall position in
the area and in the world. General Wheeler supported him most forcefully, reporting the
unanimous view of the Joint Chiefs that if we should lose in South Vietnam, we would
lose Southeast Asia. Country after country on the periphery would give way and look
toward Communist China as the rising power of the area. Mr. McCone expressed his
concurrence and so did the Secretary of State, with considerable force.
The President indicated that the reason for waiting, then, must be simply that with a weak
and wobbly situation it would be unwise to attack until we could stabilize our base.
Secretary McNamara added that the price of waiting was low, and the promise of gain
substantial. Ambassador Taylor pointed out that General Khanh himself wants two
months simply to organize his own government. The Secretary of State asked what the
situation was in the countryside. Ambassador Taylor replied it was not too bad. He had
constantly asked Khanh if he was keeping things quiet in the provinces and had regularly
been assured of Khanh's concern on just this point.
The President asked Ambassador Taylor to compare Khanh and Diem in the people's
affections. The Ambassador replied the people did not care for either one.
The Secretary of State asked if television could be used to give Khanh more contact with
the people. Ambassador Taylor said the matter needed further study.
Secretary McNamara asked if it were clear that money was no object, and returned to the
importance of carrying out the kind of program recommended in the Rand report.
Ambassador Taylor replied that recommendations from Saigon were likely to be more
conservative than the Rand report. Mr. Killen felt that our program had been too much a
U.S. program, and too little a matter of real intent and planning by GVN officials. Mr.
Killen felt that to make a government you had to make it do its own work.
Secretary Rusk said he very much hoped money would not be regarded as the ceiling, and
felt that it would be worth any amount to win. He adduced the example of the costs of the
anti-Communist struggle in Greece, which worked out at $50,000 a guerrilla. Secretary
McNamara repeated that the Rand report said we had been penny-pinching and that we
should make sure that our people in the field understood that these were not normal
circumstances and that normal attitudes would not be helpful. Ambassador Taylor replied
that the country team would ask for any money it needed. The President emphasized his
own continuing conviction that it was necessary not to spare the horses. He pointed out
that this had been his constant view and that he wondered what the Rand report was
talking about. Secretary McNamara and I said in reply that the report was talking of the
attitudes of second- and third-level officials in the field, and not about the efforts of
people in Washington to get everybody to do whatever would be helpful.
The President reemphasized his own position and asked Ambassador Taylor directly if he
felt pinched. The Ambassador replied "no."
The President said that what disheartened him was that we had our best team out there for
60 days and had lost ground. Ambassador Taylor replied that the President might have a
wrong impression. The Ambassador believed that in the field we were indeed doing
better--that General Westmoreland, if present, would report real strengthening of the
pacification effort, that tactics and performance were improving--that at least in half the
provinces the over-all program was going well. The Ambassador believed that progress
was being made at the grass roots, and that our current problem was political.
The President asked Mr. McCone why things were quiet on the enemy side after the Gulf
of Tonkin. Mr. McCone replied that the enemy was waiting and watching and probably
felt that the current political unrest was working in his interest.
The President asked if anyone present had a different view from the basic
recommendation of the attached paper. No differing view was expressed. Secretary
McNamara said that we could try other things later on. Secretary Rusk concurred. General
Wheeler said that of course a clear-cut incident might require appropriate action at any
time, and there was general agreement with this thought.
The President then turned to what would be said, and Mr. Manning made brief
suggestions emphasizing our concern for security and stability in South Vietnam, as well
as for the pacification effort. The President discussed briefly the plan for a meeting with
the Leadership,/8/ saying that we should take every occasion we could to bring them in
normally in these matters. Mr. Bundy pointed out the problem of Congressional
delegations going to South Vietnam, and the President and Ambassador Taylor agreed
that it would be useful for Ambassador Taylor to point out that one reason for his regular
return to this country was to avoid the advantage given to enemies of the GVN
government by U.S. types coming out all the time. We would emphasize to the Leadership
our hope that Congress would let the government get stabilized, and that at this delicate
moment when the government is fragile we should have only one spokesman on the
scene--the Ambassador.
/8/At 3 p.m., the participants in this meeting, with the exception of Manning,
McNaughton, and William Bundy, met with congressional leaders and reviewed the
situation in Vietnam. (Johnson Library, Johnson Diary and Rusk Appointment Book) In
his diary, Taylor noted: "To my surprise, there was no heckling." (National Defense
University, Taylor Papers, T-272-69) No other record of this meeting has been found.
During the afternoon of September 10, Taylor also appeared before the Senate Foreign
Relations Committee to brief the members on the situation in Vietnam. (National
Archives and Records Administration, RG 46, Records of the U.S. Senate; scheduled for
publication in the 1964 volume of Executive Sessions of the Senate Foreign Relations
Committee)
The President then approved the four courses in the attached memorandum, reemphasized
that money was no object, and asked General Wheeler to explain to his colleagues in the
JCS that we would be ready to do more, when we had a base. The President did not wish
to enter the patient in a 10-round bout, when he was in no shape to hold out for one round.
We should get him ready to face 3 or 4 rounds at least.
There was a brief discussion of a draft letter to General Khanh,/9/ and the President
directed that a revision be prepared for his consideration.
/9/A copy of this draft and a revised draft, dated September 10, are in the Johnson Library,
National Security File, Heads of State Correspondence. A copy of the 2-paragraph letter
as signed by the President on September 10 is ibid.
McG.B./10/
344. Memorandum From the Director of the Operations Mission in Vietnam (Killen)
to the Ambassador in Vietnam (Taylor)/1/
Saigon, September 9, 1964.
/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Vietnam Country File, Rand Report.
Secret.
SUBJECT
Proposed Economic Program of Next GVN
1. The Forrestal-Oanh talks in the spring of this year/2/ envisaged a sharply increased
level of expenditure by the GVN during CY 1964 and 1965 for the military, counterinsurgency, and developmental purposes. This increased level of spending would be
financed by overdrafts at the Bank of Vietnam. It was agreed that excessive inflationary
pressures which might be engendered thereby should be ameliorated by increases, as
required by import demand, in AID-financed import levels. This policy would be pursued
so long as the current emergency situation prevailed.
/2/Forrestal transmitted a summary of his discussions with Oanh in telegram 2252 from
Saigon, May 19. (Department of State, Central Files, DEF 19 US-VIET S) A summary of
the results of the talks and a memorandum of understanding are in telegrams 2296 and
2297 from Saigon, May 27. (Ibid., AID(US)VIET S)
2. The Rand Report,/3/ submitted pursuant to an extended on-the-ground examination of
the current politico/economic problems in Vietnam and the effectiveness of U.S.
economic assistance in dealing with them, called attention to a number of needed

revisions in the character of U.S. aid and made recommendations relating thereto.
3. During the past months, since the Forrestal-Oanh talks, expenditures for the cited
purposes, while above the level of the previous year, have failed to meet the projected
levels due to a number of factors endemic to the GVN administration. The failure of the
GVN counter-insurgency effort to achieve the hoped-for success in the intervening period,
plus the weakened structure of the GVN itself, heighten both the need for and the urgency
of a renewed effort to make government more effective and to engender in the
Vietnamese people a greater sense of confidence in the capacity of the GVN to be
responsive to their economic and social needs.
4. The U.S. Government is prepared to vigorously support the efforts of the GVN to these
ends. The USG is prepared to collaborate fully with the GVN in the formulation and
financing of programs and activities which will readily contribute to these ends. At the
same time, in order for these ends to be effectively served, such programs and/or activities
must clearly appear as GVN-originated efforts, rather than as the product of U.S.
conception and sponsorship. Further, the successful implementation of such programs
requires a reasonable (but wholly possible) self-help effort of the GVN in certain current
problems of budget management and economic policy, both of which impinge heavily on
the opportunity to effectively marshal indigenous resources so essential to an accelerated
input of U.S. resources.
5. The achievement of the interdependent U.S. security and political objectives in
Vietnam requires vigorous and successful action by the GVN on both the "pacification"
and socio/economic development fronts in both rural and urban areas. Actions are
currently underway to greatly strengthen the U.S. support for pacification--in military,
pare-military, and civilian activities. On-going programs in rural areas are directed
towards both pacification and developmental targets, each of which seeks to associate the
rural community with the GVN in action and attitude. Much less has been undertaken in
urban areas with their greater potential for adverse political and social activities which
thwart the ability and the determination of any GVN to carry out its normal and essential
functions of government. (An exception to this generalization is the already initiated
action to have the Doxiades Associates of Athens, Greece, and Washington, D.C. develop
by the end of calendar 1964 an urban development plan for the Saigon metropolitan area
which envisages a fully comprehensive and multi-year action plan for that community.)
6. Given the widespread unemployment and underemployment in both urban and rural
areas, a major economic and political objective would be the creation of jobs, more jobs,
and still more jobs. This underscores the importance of developing indigenous sources for
materiel, e.g., cement, roofing, nails, lumber, glass, and all other goods for which basic
raw material needs can be met from within-country sources. To have these materials
provided from offshore sources would dissipate a major, if not the major, benefit that
should accrue from the total effort. It is recognized that some time would be required to
tool up for expanded internal production and during the interim recourse would
necessarily be made to imports. But for the longer-term and maximum political benefit,
local resources must be exploited soonest. This underscores again the importance of the
second group of GVN actions mentioned in paragraph 7.
7. The USOM/VN therefore proposes to initiate with the GVN, during the immediate
future, a series of talks looking towards agreement on a substantially expanded
socio/economic action program which aims to induce a greater sense of popular
confidence in both the GVN and the future of the country. An accompanying objective
will be to obtain maximum possible public participation in both the planning and
implementation of all components of such a program. It would envisage prompt action by
the GVN on three main fronts: first, the construction of new and widely-desired social and
economic facilities, e.g., low-cost housing, schools, public services, and industrial
facilities; second, the removal or correction of present deterrents to popular support for,
and confidence in, the GVN, e.g., excessively low government salaries; the failure of the
GVN to pay promptly for goods or services provided by the private sector; the failure to
make funds available promptly through Bank of Vietnam overdrafts, in the first instance,
and through normal funding approval procedures, in the second; the excessive "control"
actions which thwart private investment (this is particularly important where a critical
need for the expanded production of building materials impedes the envisaged
construction program); and the failure to utilize existing facilities in the Vietnamese
private sector for functions critical to the war effort. Under this program the U.S. would
provide maximum financial and technical support in any and all ways which would make
effective contributions to success. The third area of GVN action would represent positive
steps (in addition to those cited above) to induce greater popular support for this total
approach, e.g., greater decentralization of authority to village and hamlet officials to
utilize land taxes for paid public works or other useful purposes; the possible
establishment of a system of student scholarships for both intermediate and university
level studies; possible grants-in-aid to various politically influential groups for
educational or other approved purposes; and other similarly motivated activities.
8. All these activities would be so carried out as to seek to the maximum degree a clear
distinction between the benefits afforded people in GVN controlled (or nearly controlled)
areas and those available (or not available) to people in areas where GVN control is not
pervasive.
9. It is desirable, indeed almost imperative, that understandings on these matters be
reached with the GVN soonest. The USOM proposes to utilize, in addition to its own
staff, such other personnel in the joint USOM/GVN formulation of this program as may
be available and competent to assist. Once the elements of agreement are reached, the
general content of the program should be announced in a suitable context by the GVN as
its own decision, plan and product. The U.S. role should be played in the softest key
possible. The timing of the announcement should be determined against the background
of political developments in Vietnam so as to maximize the popular support for and the
political appeal of the program itself and its GVN sponsorship. Of particular importance
in timing is the political decision as to whether we wish the current interim government to
get the credit-or whatever successor government emerges.
James S. Killen/4/

/1/Source: Department of State, S/S-NSC Files: Lot 72 D 316, NSAM 314. Top Secret.
Also printed in Pentagon Papers: Gravel Edition, vol. III, pp. 565-566. The differences
between the numbered paragraphs of NSAM 314 and the "Courses of Action for South
Vietnam" (Tab A to Document 342) reflect the views of the TCS as indicated in CM-12464, September 9. See footnote 3, Document 343.
TO
The President has now reviewed the situation in South Vietnam with Ambassador Taylor
and with other advisers and has approved the following actions:
1. U.S. naval patrols in the Gulf of Tonkin will be resumed promptly after Ambassador
Taylor's return. They will operate initially well beyond the 12-mile limit and be clearly
dissociated from 34A maritime operations. The patrols will comprise two to three
destroyers and would have air cover from carriers; the destroyers will have their own
ASW capability.
2. 34A operations by the GVN will be resumed after completion of a first DeSoto patrol.
The maritime operations are by far the most important. North Vietnam has already
publicized them, and is likely to publicize them even more, and at this point we should
have the GVN ready to admit that they are taking place and to justify and legitimize them
on the basis of the facts of VC infiltration by sea. 34A air drop and leaflet operations
should also be resumed but are secondary in importance. We should not consider air
strikes under 34A for the present.
3. We should promptly discuss with the Government of Laos plans for limited GVN air
and ground operations into the corridor areas of Laos, together with Lao air strikes and
possible use of U.S. armed aerial reconnaissance. On the basis of these discussions a
decision on action will be taken, but it should be recognized that these operations will in
any case have only limited effect.
4. We should be prepared to respond as appropriate against the DRV in the event of any
attack on U.S. units or any special DRV/VC action against SVN.
5. The results of these decisions will be kept under constant review, and recommendations
for changes or modifications or additions will be promptly considered.
6. The President reemphasizes the importance of economic and political actions having
immediate impact in South Vietnam, such as pay raises for civilian personnel and spot
projects in the cities and selected rural areas. The President emphasizes again that no
activity of this kind should be delayed in any way by any feeling that our resources for
these purposes are restricted. We can find the money which is needed for all worthwhile
projects in this field. He expects that Ambassador Taylor and the country team will take
most prompt and energetic action in this field.
7. These decisions are governed by a prevailing judgment that the first order of business at
present is to take actions which will help to strengthen the fabric of the Government of
South Vietnam; to the extent that the situation permits, such action should precede larger
decisions. If such larger decisions are required at any time by a change in the situation,
they will be taken.
McGeorge Bundy

1964-1968, Volume I
Vietnam, 1964
Department of State
Washington, DC
XI. U.S. Efforts To Strengthen the Government of South Vietnam,

September 11-October 31
Exdis. Repeated to Bangkok, Vientiane, CINCPAC, and the Department of Defense. Also
printed in Pentagon Papers: Gravel Edition, vol. 111, pp. 566-568.
913. Deptel 622./2/ Following is a summary, coordinated with Vientiane and Bangkok, of
the conclusions of the meeting of the three posts held at Saigon September 11 to review
air and limited ground operations for the Lao corridor:
/2/Telegram 622, September 9, reported the decisions reached at the September 9 meeting
in Washington on limited air and ground operations in Laos (see Documents 343 and 345)
and asked that the meeting at Saigon on September 11 clarify their scope and timing.
(Department of State. Central Files, POL 27 VIET S)
1. Air operations in corridor. This involves attack of 22 targets for which folders available
at Vientiane and Saigon. If objective is primarily military, i.e., to inflict maximum
damage to targets, to prevent VN/PL dispersal and protective measures, and impede rapid
VN/PL riposte, it was agreed that a series of sharp, heavy attacks must be made in a
relatively short timespan, which would involve substantial US and/or VNAF/Farmgate
attacks. If objective primarily psychological, military disadvantages of attacks over longer
time frame would be acceptable and chief reliance could be placed on RLAF T-23s with
some Yankee team strikes against harder targets, e.g., five bridges. Estimated sortie
requirements for this second option 188 T-28 sorties and 80 USAF sorties. Time required
12 days. Vientiane representatives believe Souvanna would probably go along with
second option but would probably wish to have such attacks spread out over considerable
period of time. Also felt Souvanna would prefer VNAF not conduct air strikes in corridor.
It was general consensus that best division of targeting for immediate future would be
RLAF/Yankee team mix.
Vientiane is very reluctant to see VNAF participation such strikes and would hope that by
keeping GVN informed of actions being taken by RLAF and US in corridor,
psychological needs of GVN could reasonably be met. Saigon will seek to do this. But if
there are compelling reasons for covert VNAF participation Vientiane would be given
prior info on necessity, timing and place of such strikes.

Alternatively, it was agreed that, if possible, joint Lao, Thai, and US participation in a
common effort against a common enemy would be desirable but, recognizing that, even if
possible, arrangements for such an effort would take some time to achieve. If such
negotiations are conducted, however, RLAF/Yankee team strikes should not be precluded.
Vientiane has since stated it does not consider that it would be desirable to seek to
formalize such four country participation in corridor operations as to do so would raise
question of degree of Souvanna Phouma's knowledge and involvement which Vientiane
feels would jeopardize success of operations.
2. Ground operations.
a. Although it was agreed that northern route 9 area offered most profitable targets,
conference proceeded on assumption that Vientiane would find operations astride route 9
politically unacceptable at this time. However, Vientiane's 448 to Dept,/3/ dispatched after
return of conferees, now indicates that "shallow penetration raids (20 kilometers)...in rte 9
area.../4/ by company-sized units" would be acceptable and would not require clearance
by the RLG.
/3/Telegram 448 from Vientiane, September 13, reported that after hearing a report on the
September 11 meeting the Embassy in Vientiane was persuaded that it was possible to
move ahead with limited air and ground operations in the corridor. (Ibid.)
/4/Ellipses in the source text.
b. Conference also agreed that central and southern areas offered targets and terrain
consistent with capabilities of current assets.
c. Saigon concept is that operations astride rte 9 would be initiated by 8-man intelligence
and reconnaissance teams infiltrated overland or by air. Exploitation of targets developed
by these teams would be by Airborne Ranger companies (80-100 men), committed by
parachute, helicopter or overland. Operations in other two areas would be conducted by
reconnaissance and combat patrols of up to company size. In southernmost area
operations would be characterized by limited but ever expanding overland ground probes;
in central area combination of overland and air launch methods probably required. In each
area operations would be limited to 20 kilometers penetration and not to exceed two
companies at any one time. In addition to Airborne Ranger companies, assets include
CIDG strike companies and ARVN Rangers.
d. Air supply for these operations can in normal foreseeable circumstances be handled
exclusively within VNAF assets. This would include not only air drop and air exfiltration
requirements but also air strike support and SAR operations in the event of emergency.
Farmgate and/or overt US support would be called upon only in the event of unforeseen
contingency which would exceed available VNAF capability. No problem was foreseen in
use of US jumpmasters/observers. Saigon group stated that under these operating rules,
operations could be initiated within fifteen days of decision to execute.
e. It was the view of Saigon group that authority for US advisors to accompany units is a
prerequisite to successful operations. Without this US participation probability of success
is judged so low that the advisability of conducting cross-border operations would be

questionable. Vientiane representatives were strongly opposed to presence US advisors
because of difficulty with current SAR operations in Laos and political importance of US
maintaining credible stance of adhering to provisions Geneva Accords.
f. Embassy Vientiane had earlier indicated that they would insist on advanced clearance of
cross-border operations. All representatives agreed that this requirement would be met by
Vientiane having opportunity to comment on all plans submitted to Washington for
approval. Once approval to execute is received, Vientiane would be kept informed of dayto-day operations as information addressee on operational traffic between
Saigon/Washington/CINCPAC.
3. Public stance. It was the unanimous opinion of the group that it would be preferable to
have no publicity with regard to operational details, and that no comment should be made
in response to questions or accusations other than our unawareness of any such matters.
Additionally, it was agreed that Souvanna should not be informed of any of these
GVN/US actions. Use of RLAF would, of course, have to be cleared by him.
4. In summary, recommend we proceed as follows:
a. Yankee team escort strike hard targets (5 bridges), RLAF remainder of 22-target list.
Accordingly, Vientiane should be instructed make approach to RLG on initiation T-28
strikes (paragraph 2, Vientiane's 448 to Department).
b. Authorize ground operations in all three areas, with timing and mode of employment of
available assets as determined appropriate by COMUSMACV and CINCRVNAF, subject
to provision of pare 2(19) [sic] relative depth of penetration and size of forces to be
committed; pare 2(d) relative air support; and pare 2(f) relative coordination with
Vientiane.
c. All actions, ground and air, to be initiated as rapidly as operationally feasible.
d. No publicity and no public acknowledgment of any operational matters, ground or air.
e. In order to give some four nation "flavor" to operations, authorize Bangkok to approach
TG for authority to use Korat as base for some of US aircraft participating in foregoing
Yankee team operations.
5. Request earliest Washington decision as to use of US advisors, recognizing Saigon's
serious reservations as to chances of success if their use is denied and Vientiane's concern
over adverse political impact of capture by PL/VM of US military personnel in Laos.
Note for Bangkok and Vientiane. Foregoing has been modified from original draft sent
you in light your comments and Vientiane's 448 to Dept.
Taylor
347. Editorial Note
Before dawn on September 13, military units led by former Minister of the Interior
General Lam Van Phat and the Commander of the IV Corps, General Duong Van Duc,
began to occupy strategic points in Saigon. At 10:35 a.m., U. Alexis Johnson reported that
a "major military power play" was in progress. (MACJ-312 9613; Washington National
Records Center, RG 319, HQDA Message Center, Reel 11925) At 10:49 a.m., Johnson
reported that he had ordered all Americans off the streets, that he was at the MACV
command center with Westmoreland, and that Phat was announcing that he had executed
a bloodless coup. (MACJ-312 9615; ibid.)
At 12:45 a.m. (11:45 p.m. Washington time), September 12, Rusk, Ball, and William
Bundy began a teletype conference with Johnson to assess the situation. Johnson reported
that Khanh, who was at Dalat, had asked if MACV could help with a counter plan and
whether the United States would send Marines ashore if requested. Everyone in
Washington and Saigon agreed that negative answers should be given to these questions.
By the end of the conference, over 2 hours later, Johnson agreed to send Sullivan and
General Stilwell to Dalat to find out what Khanh was doing, while he saw General "Big"
Minh to see where he stood on the coup. At no time during the conference was
recognition of Phat and Duc considered. (Telecon 13/0445Z; Johnson Library, National
Security File, Vietnam Country File, Vol. XVII, Memos) For other accounts of these
events, see Johnson, Right Hand of Power, pages 414-415; Sullivan, Obbligato, pages
199-202; and Ky, Twenty Years, pages 49-50.

/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 VIET S. Secret; Flash. Repeated to
CIA, the Department of Defense, the White House, and CINCPAC. The time of
transmission is presumably midnight, September 12/13, because the cable was received at
12:52 p.m., September 13.
836. CINCPAC for POLAD. I have just spent one and one-half hours with Phat and
another hour and one-half with "Big" Minh. Khanh has just called from airport and asked
urgently to see me now so following is briefest possible summary.
Phat very confused with vague ideas of big committee of 100 or so with an executive
committee to run govt in place of PriMin for four month period end of which general
elections would be held. Claims support from most military elements except I Corps,
admits that Ky, Air Force, is sitting on fence. I was tough with him, made it clear thought
his ideas were harebrained, and we were still supporting Khanh as PriMin of recognized
govt. Talked hard about necessity avoiding clashes between ARVN forces, leaving areas
in 4th uncovered for VC, etc., etc. He promised that he would do all possible avoid
clashes and would not initiate any attacks.
Minh was in low sprite but made it emphatically clear that as much as he disliked Khanh,
he felt Khanh was not at fault for much of what had happened. He thought Duc, Phat and
company were mad in what they were attempting to do, had no support from population
or anyone else, expected they would get no support and it was important US make clear it
was not supporting. Said he had and would continue to do all he could to discourage them.
We both agreed that finding way out was, however, extremely difficult with Duc, Phat
and [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] on one hand rightly fearing Khanh's
vengeance if they now backed down and other hand Khanh could not appear to be soft in
disciplining army. We both agreed that we would work toward restoration status quo,
although he felt best solution would be for both Khanh and Duc/Phat to leave country.
More detailed accounts follow septel./2/
/2/Telegram 840, September 14, 2 a.m., reported on the interview with Phat; telegram
841, September 14, 3 a.m., reported on the meeting with Minh. (Ibid.) The latter is
published in Declassified Documents, 1979, 94F.
Johnson

Washington, September 13, 1964--2:36 p.m.
Drafted by William Bundy and cleared in substance by Rusk and the White House.
Repeated to CIA, the Department of Defense, the White House, and CINCPAC.
According to a memorandum from McGeorge Bundy to the President, September 14, this
telegram was approved at a 1 p.m. meeting at the White House attended by the President,
Rusk, McNamara, McCone, Wheeler, and McGeorge Bundy. (Johnson Library, National
Security File, Aides File, McGeorge Bundy, Memos to the President) Also published in
Declassified Documents, 1979, 94E.
654. For Ambassador from Secretary.
1. Believe strongest private representations to all key personalities should be made ASAP
as USG attitude toward events of last few hours in Saigon:
(a) it is imperative that there not be internecine war within South Vietnamese armed
forces, whose energies and resources are needed for victory over a common enemy, the
Viet Cong;
(b) the picture of petty bickering among Vietnamese leaders has created an appalling
impression abroad and causes friends of South Vietnamese freedom all over the world to
wonder how serious South Vietnamese are about their freedom and security and what
there is for others to support; Communist capitals are already expressing their glee over
most recent news from Saigon;
(c) the US has not provided massive assistance to South Vietnam, in military equipment,
economic resources and personnel, in order to subsidize continuing quarrels among South
Vietnamese leaders. The use of US equipment and resources to pursue quarrels is an
outrageous abuse of such assistance and raises the gravest issues for the USG and people;
(d) The US has pledged its full commitment to the security and independence of South
Viet Nam in the face of the massed manpower of Hanoi and Peiping. It is we who stand
between the free peoples of Southeast Asia and that potential tide sweeping down from
the north. But what can be the purpose of this commitment and the massive US force in
position to meet it if South Vietnamese leaders themselves cannot declare a moratorium
on personal rivalries and secondary differences about the details of government until such
time as their country is secure;
(e) South Vietnamese leaders need not look among themselves for enemies; they all have
a common enemy in the Viet Cong. Remind them of Viet Cong plans for their liquidation
and of Benjamin Franklin's remark that if they do not hang together they will surely hang
separately;
(f) we believe that tactical units should return to their assigned areas and that General
Minh should be permitted to continue with his task of constituting a council of
representatives of major groups which can get to work on the constitution of a
government which, with the support and participation of all major element can lead the
country to victory. In this preparatory state we believe the Triumvirate with Prime
Minister Khanh, General Minh and General Khiem should continue to direct affairs in
order to avoid confusion and a reduction of effort against the Viet Cong.
(g) emphasize that Vietnamese leaders must not take the US for granted. We have tried to
exercise the greatest patience because of difficulties which have been bravely faced by the
Vietnamese people/2/ but patience and understanding are being drained away by disputes
which seem to us to be intolerable in the face of our common dangers and tasks. The
American people are already beginning to ask what are we supporting and why when they
hear of these repeated internal differences among comrades in arms.
/2/For Rusk's comments along these lines during his new conference on September 14, see
American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1964, pp. 996-999.
2. In line with above you should make it emphatically clear, wherever useful, that we do
not believe a Phat/Duc Government can effectively govern the country or command the
necessary popular support to carry forward the effort against the VC. US support for the
GVN is based on the triumvirate and its efforts to bring about a broadly based and
effective government satisfactorily reflecting the interests and concerns of all groups
3. Since Catholic sentiment may be crucial to resolution present crisis, you should exert
all possible efforts ascertain degree of responsible Catholic sense of grievance and how it
can be met so that government and program would have endorsement and support of key
Catholic leaders such as Apostolic Delegate and Archbishop.
4. Above drafted before receiving your 836./3/ Your line was right and you should draw
on above to continue stressing it.
/3/Document 348.
Rusk

/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 VIET S. Secret; Flash. Repeated to
the White House, the Department of Defense, CIA, and CINCPAC for POLAD. Received
at 5:26 p.m. Also published in Declassified Documents, 1971, 94F. The Department of
State file copy is apparently in error in giving the time of transmission as 2 a.m.
838. I have just had one hour meeting with Khanh who out at General Ky's headquarters
Tan Son Nhut (porch was thronged with foreign and Vietnamese newsmen), surrounded
by Ky, Thieu, Kang (Marine Corps) and Colonel Thao. Also Ranger captain who had
defected from Duc.
I told Khanh of my conversations with Phat and Minh and at my urging he immediately
dispatched messenger to ask Minh to meet him. Told him felt Minh could and was ready
to play useful intermediary role.
Khanh said that he planned to go slow with any military moves against dissidents and
rather seek defections. He was encouraged by defection of Ranger captain in less than an
hour of his arrival. Khanh agreed every effort must be made to avoid clashes between
Vietnamese forces. Also agreed important to give face-saving way for Duc and company
to retreat without feeling under compulsion to fight. Said would permit them and families
leave country without reprisals and if negotiations appeared useful would offer permit
dissidents have some representation on Supreme National Council or otherwise give
tangible satisfaction. He said originally this morning through intermediary he had made
three demands which he did not find insurmountable:
1) Colonel Thao must be dismissed,
2) The four Dalat Generals could not resume active duty, and
3) There must be a strong central government.
However, this overtaken by violent Phat radio broadcast attacking Khanh personally.
Khanh asked and I agreed recommend to Washington:
1) We make statement disapproving of coup effort,
2) Indicating our support continues to be given to triumvirate and the govt of General
Khanh,
3) (This and 4) added at my suggestion) Continue to feel that program for formation
national council provisional.
4) We deplore bloodshed between GVN forces.
I strongly recommend release of such statement/2/ and its play over VOA as it now seems
clear Duc and company have little political viability. Even if outcome is fall of Khanh,
Duc and company are not likely to be ones running country. I also gave full and fair
warning to Phat this was our position.
/2/A statement along these lines, transmitted to Saigon in telegram 657, September 13 at
7:11 p.m., was released to the press at 6:45 p.m. Washington time. (Department of State,
Johnson

(Westmoreland) to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (Wheeler)/1/
Saigon, undated.
11925. Secret; Flash. Passed by the ICS to the Office of the Secretary of Defense, the
White House, and the Department of State. Also passed by other means to the Embassy in
Saigon. Received in the National Military Communications Center at 3:30 p.m.,
September 13. No time or date of transmission appears on the source text.
MACV 26.
1. General Duc just called and stated that he had understood that an individual whose
name was unfamiliar to me wanted to speak to him. I told him that I did not know the
individual or his whereabouts but I would talk with him. I asked if he had seen Colonel
Nemethy recently and he replied in the negative. He said he was now at JGS Headquarters
and had a few things to talk to General Khanh about tomorrow. I asked him the status of
the situation. He was very vague in his reply. Then, in no uncertain terms, I informed him
that MACV, the U.S. Mission, and the U.S. Government did not support in any way his
move. I advised that he get his troops moved out of town immediately. He said he
understood and thanked me. He seemed to be a shaky and insecure young man.

Saigon, September 14, 1964--8:45 p.m.
/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 15-1 VIET S. Secret; Immediate;
Exdis. Also sent to CIA, the Department of Defense, and the White House and repeated to
CINCPAC. Also published in Declassified Documents 1979, 95B. Taylor arrived back in
Saigon at 7 a.m. on September 14.
857. CINCPAC for POLAD. Alex Johnson and I went to Vung Tau today at Khanh's
invitation to hear his account of the events of the last 24 hours. We sent word ahead that
we would also like to see General Minh whom we knew to be there. Somewhat to our
surprise, we found the two of them ready to receive us as a team, the first time such a
thing has happened in my experience.
Asked to interpret the meaning of the recent coup, Khanh, with Minh in agreement,
explained it as primarily a power play by two ambitious officers, Duc and Phat. Although
Colonel Ton, the Dai Viet commander of the Seventh Division was involved with them,
Khanh does not consider that it was either pro-Dai Viet or pro-Catholic.
The coup failed primarily because it got no popular support. Phat's broadcast was badly
received by the public with whom Phat enjoys no popularity. Many junior officers in the
troop units which came to Saigon did not know what the purpose was. Their troops
became demoralized by the radio broadcasts directed at them by government sources and
by indications of public indifference. Realizing that they were involved in a losing
operation, the troops withdrew in the course of 14 September leaving the leaders to save
such face as they could.
Duc tried to salvage his face in the course of the press conference reported in Embtel
848./2/ Khanh says that Ky and Duc met together to discuss the situation prior to the press
conference which was originally planned to be exclusively Ky's. However, as the
conference with Duc terminated at the time for the initiation of the press conference, Duc
became involved and took advantage of the occasion to try to salvage his prestige. The
result was the confused series of statements by Ky, Duc and Thi reported in the cited
Embtel.
/2/Telegram 848, September 14, 4:40 p.m., reported on a press conference at 7:45 a.m. on
September 14 at which Duc explained the reasons for the attempted coup, and Ky and Thi
made individual statements on their actions. Taylor described the proceedings as "unreal"
and leaving "many important questions unanswered." (Department of State. Central Files.
POL 27 VIET S)
We asked Khanh what warning he had of the coup. Apparently some rumors had been
floating about for several days including a rather specific one which reached Khanh on the
evening of 12 September. He did not become aware of the troop movements toward
Saigon until early the following morning and was surprised by the involvement of Duc
and Phat.
He got definite word of the coup at the Dalat airfield where he was about to bring back the
five Generals to Saigon in his plane. He explained that he was bringing them down just to
see how they would be received, as a trial balloon to their possible assignment later to
active military posts. Both Khanh and Minh agreed that the government needed their
talent and described their attitude as one of cooperation and willingness to serve in any
military or civilian capacity.
I asked about reports that dissatisfaction with slow promotion among junior and middle
grade officers was a factor in the coup. Khanh and Minh did not directly agree that it was
but conceded a need for an overhaul of the promotion system in the military services.
We asked what happens now. Khanh indicated that they intended to review the past events
in cold blood and determine what to do with the errant senior officers--Duc, Phat, and
Ton. He indicated that in all probability they would be required to leave the country. I
expressed my view of the seriousness of their offenses and the need to impose appropriate
punishment.
We then changed the subject and I reported on my trip to Washington. I transmitted

President Johnson's letter to General Khanh/3/ with the comment that it had been signed
prior to the events of 13 September; otherwise there would probably have been some
changes in the Presidential text.
I mentioned my discussions with the President, his advisors and reps of the Congress,
stressing the difficulty in Washington of understanding the confused political events of
August. I reported the general consensus on all sides that by far the greatest problem
facing South Vietnam was the formation of the provisional government as envisaged in
General Khanh's announced plans. However, it had also been agreed that as a reminder to
Hanoi of our continued vitality, we would resume the DeSoto patrols almost at once and
follow them by 34-A actions which General Westmoreland would soon be discussing with
the appropriate Vietnamese officers.
I then turned to a discussion of the seriousness of the events of 13 Sept and their impact
upon US Governmental and public opinion, following in general the thoughts contained in
Deptel 654./4/ I solemnly pointed out it seemed to us Americans tragic that politics had
been allowed to split the armed forces which heretofore had been regarded as the solid
bulwark of legitimate government. After the disorders of August, yesterday's coup would
raise even more serious doubts in the US as to the reliability of the Vietnamese ally and
would shake public confidence in our combined ability to achieve ultimate success. Under
such circumstances, it would be a mistake to count indefinitely on unlimited US support
in the light of the clear evidence of repeated internal differences among senior officers of
the armed forces.
/4/Document 349.
Khanh and Minh in chastened tones replied that no one could be sadder than they over
recent events. They believed, however, that a lesson had been drawn by all participants
and observers which would help in the future and that meanwhile they are resolved to
push ahead with their announced program for consulting the Supreme National Council
and the subsequent provisional government.
I asked whether I could help in emphasizing to senior officers and officials the risks they
were running of losing US and international support by in-house feuding and bickering.
Khanh suggested that I might pass the word through Gen Westmoreland's MACV
channels to the senior Generals and that Embassy representatives might talk to the
Buddhists, Catholics and certain unspecified politicians. I promised to undertake these
contacts with the help of appropriate US representatives.
When the meeting broke up, Khanh took off by helicopter for Saigon to hold a press
conference and to attend a cabinet meeting. He intends to return to Vung Tau thereafter.
As a parting shot, I reminded him that things always seemed to go better when he stays in
Saigon.
Taylor

Exdis. Repeated to the Department of Defense and CINCPAC.
870. CINCPAC for POLAD. This message discusses the problems of politico-military
coordination which are expected to arise in Southeast Asia as the decisions of NSAM
314/2/ are implemented during the coming months. The recent ad hoc conference in
Saigon on September 11/3/ showed clearly that some of these problems are with us now.
What appears necessary is to anticipate future requirements by formalizing a coordination
procedure which can be quickly invoked as and when needed.
/2/Document 345.
The political agencies involved in current and projected military activities are the
Embassies in Bangkok, Vientiane and Saigon. The military agencies are MACV and the
Seventh Fleet (both subordinate to CINCPAC) and the armed forces (particularly the air
force) of SVN, Laos and Thailand. The overall problem is how to mount quickly effective
military operations in Laos and NVN by military forces of one or more of four nations on
satisfactory political terms. Obviously this will take some doing.
While the determination of the coordination machinery is a joint State-DOD
responsibility, I venture to suggest as a possible solution the creation on a Noforn basis of
a politico-military Southeast Asia coordination committee reporting to State/DOD with
seat at Saigon. The political component would consist of the DCM's of the Embassies of
Bangkok, Vientiane and Saigon under chairmanship of Alex Johnson. (This would not
exclude attendance of Ambassadors if desired.) The military component would consist of
COMUSMACV-T (chairman), a senior representative of CINCPAC/Seventh Fleet, a
senior military representative from Bangkok, and a military representative from
Vientiane. CIA or other agency representation would be arranged as required. The
coordination committee would meet on call of any of the three posts or Washington, as
required, either as a single body or by components. The US Ambassador Saigon could be
charged with providing administrative and logistical support
This is one way to accomplish the needed coordination. There may be other and better
ways. As it appears important to get early agreement on some way, it is recommended that
the matter be taken up by State-DOD as a matter of urgency.
I am sending Sullivan to Bangkok and Vientiane to furnish background on this matter to
Ambassadors Martin and Unger who will undoubtedly wish to comment to Washington.
Taylor
/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 23-9 VIET S. Top Secret, Immediate;
Exdis. Also sent to CIA, Department of Defense, and the White House and repeated to
CINCPAC for POLAD. According to another copy, this telegram was drafted by Taylor.
(Ibid., Saigon Embassy Files: Lot 68 F 8)
876. I called on Gen Khanh at the Joint Gen Staff compound this morning Sept 16, to find
out his plans with regard to the officers involved in the September 13 coup. In the course
of that coup, he had indicated to Alex Johnson that he intended no reprisals against the
guilty officers and would be satisfied if they left the country. Today he is having after
thoughts based upon the reaction against the coup leaders in the army and within the
population. Also he had had time to reflect upon the serious implications of growing
indiscipline within the armed forces.
Hence Khanh's present intention is to hold a formal inquiry to determine the culprits and
the extent of their involvement. Thereafter he will decide upon the course of action to
follow.
I pointed out the need to avoid a drawn-out public trial which could create new divisions
and dissensions and exacerbate relationships within the armed forces and between the
minorities. There seemed to be every advantage in taking quick administrative action
without going through the procedure of court martial since it was possible without trial to
dismiss and exile the guilty officers.
Khanh conceded that speed was important and that the punishment I indicated might be
sufficient. However, he felt that it was impossible to handle lightly so important a matter.
In particular, the junior and middle grade officers of the army are most critical of the
conduct of their superiors and they would resent any whitewashing of the guilty. Also,
Khanh said that he is being charged with having engineered the coup to strengthen his
own position. He could not afford to let this charge stand and felt obliged to follow
normal investigative procedures in order to nullify the accusation.
We discussed the practical problem of getting Gen Phat and Col Ton to Saigon. They are
presently holed up in My Tho, the headquarters of Ton's Seventh Division. They have
thus far declined to come to Saigon on the grounds that their lives would be in jeopardy.
After some discussion, it was agreed that we would offer these two officers and the Chief
of Staff of the Seventh Division a ride to Saigon in a U.S. helicopter accompanied by a
U.S. advisor. Khanh would telephone assurance that the officers were in no personal
danger but that their conduct would be investigated in due course. At the time of writing
this cable, it is not yet clear whether these officers have agreed to come to Saigon on these
terms.
I mentioned that recent events had had an adverse effect upon the execution of
pacification Operation Hop Tac. Things were bogging down and required the personal
attention of both of us. We agreed to hold a joint NSC/U.S. Mission Council meeting at
9:30 am Friday with Hop Tac the principal subject on the agenda.
Khanh mentioned that he intended to stay in Saigon for the next day or two and I took the
opportunity to stress once more the need for his spending much more time in the capital
than during recent weeks, as he moves about every night to avoid sleeping in the same
place. We agreed that Gen Vien, the new Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces, would be
the point where we can ascertain Khanh's whereabouts any time. Recently we have had
serious difficulty in getting to him on short notice. Khanh was in the dumps today, deeply
unhappy over the abortive coup which had disappointed him in the character of some of
his close military associates. He complained of his isolation and of the many enemies
around him. He took off in particular against Deputy Prime Minister Oanh (Jack Owen)
because of his double dealings and libelous press statements. I defended Owen halfheartedly pointing out his value as an economist and technician. Khanh talks of changing
all the disloyal ministers, but I get no impression he has specific replacements available.
As we broke up, he said that his only consolation was that only 41 days more remained in
his present tenure of office. I tried to cheer him up but this was one of his black days./2/
/2/On September 17, Taylor invited several Vietnamese ministers including Quat, Oanh,
and Mau to the residence where he conveyed the points in telegram 654 (Document 349).
The session lasted for 1 hour and 45 minutes, and Taylor concluded "disunity and lack of
common sense of unity and of purpose" were all too evident among the ministers.
(Telegram 887 from Saigon, September 18; Department of State, Central Files, POL 27
VIET S)
Taylor

Also sent to CIA. the Department of Defense. and the White House and repeated to
CINCPAC.
903. CINCPAC for POLAD. US Mission Council met for two hours with Vietnamese
National Security Council morning Sept 18. Atmosphere of discussions was more frank
and more concrete than previous such meetings and Khanh obviously felt much more
comfortable with his current cabinet team than he had in earlier days when Hoan, Khiem
and Phat were members of the group. He touched upon several internal Vietnamese
problems with more bluntness than he has done on previous occasions.
Meeting addressed two fundamental agenda points. First was formality of assigning
specific tasks to joint US-GVN staff committees which had been created prior to hiatus
which developed over past month. These talks had been worked out in specific detail at
staff level and it is expected committees will begin functioning on these matters
immediately.
Second major agenda point, which consumed bulk of meeting, concerned problems
associated with execution of Hop Tac plan. In this discussion, we ventilated and in some
measure resolved four significant points:
(a) First item was structural organization for direction of Hop Tac undertaking. Khanh
himself will initially head pacification task force in his capacity as MinDef and will meet
at least weekly with similar US group headed by Westmoreland. I urged Khanh that he
appoint deputy for Hop Tac who will be able to give it time and attention it requires. He
agreed. Civilian reps of VN ministries and US agencies will sit in this body.
(b) Associated with this question is problem of field organization for Hop Tac. Currently
III Corps exercises field command responsibility but does not control Gia Dinh Province
or Rung Sac special zone. Khanh will study possibility integrating these two areas under
III Corps but said quite frankly that issue involved defense of capital military zone and
capacity for dissatisfied elements to execute coup against capital if area immediately
surrounding Saigon all placed in hands single authority.
(c) Third matter of significance discussed concerned legal authority for civil and military
police to arrest suspected Viet Cong, Viet Cong sympathizers and Viet Cong agents who
have committed no ostensible breach of law. It was agreed that authority for such arrests
currently exists under Diem regime law but that need remains for clarifying directives to
police and provincial authorities stipulating manner in which these decrees can be
executed. US advisors will work with GVN authorities in developing this clarification.
(d) Finally emphasis was laid upon need for civilian ministers and ministerial authorities
to accord first priority, both personnel and resources, to Hop Tac requirements. Newly
appointed Inter Min Vien has been assigned general responsibility for pacification
matters, relieving erstwhile Vice PriMin Hoan (whom Khanh described as attempting to
use pacification cadres to execute nationwide coup). Vien, who has privately discussed
Hop Tac with Alex Johnson and myself, seems excellent choice for job since he appears
to recognize urgency of Hop Tac operation and to be relatively able man.
In general, I [garble--came from?] meeting with satisfactory resumption of bilateral effort
which we have attempted infuse into these national security level sessions. It brought into
relief the many areas where preparatory work needs to be done before the Hop Tac
operation can be considered truly underway. In recognition of this fact, we agree to set
October 1 as the date for the formal initiation of Hop Tac and to utilize remainder of
September to bring up to date the preparatory measures which have slipped during the
recent political turmoil. It is our belief that appropriate pressure forcing GVN to grapple
with pragmatic issues involved in Hop Tac may not only raise level administrative
competence on their part but, if they are successful, could induce that measure of
confidence in their own abilities which is now so conspicuously lacking in both Saigon
and the provinces.
Taylor
356. Memorandum for the Record by the President's Special Assistant for National
Security Affairs (Bundy)/1/
to the President. Top Secret. Also published in Declassified Documents, 1978, 129C.
SUBJECT
The Gulf of Tonkin Incident, September 18
Our first information on this episode came at about 9:15 Friday morning, Washington
time./2/ Subsequent messages during the morning made it clear that the episode was not
comparable to those of August, in that the reporting was more cautious and the evidence
of actual hostile attack thin to non-existent.
/2/At 7:43 p.m. Saigon time on Friday, September 18, the destroyers Morton and Edwards
on a DeSoto patrol in the Gulf of Tonkin reported surface radar contacts. During the next
2 hours, the ships fired on closing targets and by 9:37 p.m. had ceased fire. Although the
targets were observed on radar, they were not sighted visually. (Amplifying report on
DeSoto sitrep, 181327Z; Johnson Library, Vietnam Country File, DeSoto Patrol)
At noon on Friday we reviewed in Bob McNamara's office the possibilities for additional
reply. The initial proposal of the Joint Chiefs was that we should attack the major POL
installations in the Hanoi/Haiphong area, that in order to conduct these attacks we must
first attack and neutralize the MIGs in the same area. Dean Rusk opposed so large an
action right from the beginning, urging instead that if the episode proved to be confirmed
attack on our forces, we should execute a strike but at a lower level of force. Bob
McNamara elicited from General LeMay the information that strikes in the southern part
of North Vietnam would not require neutralizing attacks on the MIGs. McNamara then
instructed the Joint Staff to work on three alternative orders: (1) to attack the air and oil
installation in the north in and around Hanoi; (2) to attack selected targets in the south;
and (3) to continue patrolling, perhaps closer to the 12-mile line or even inside it.
At about 2:30 we met with the President in the Mansion-Secretary McNamara, General
Wheeler, Mr. McNaughton, Tommy Thompson and myself. (Dean Rusk had a luncheon
meeting which he could not break.) The President proved very skeptical about the
evidence to date, and he was deeply annoyed that leaks apparently from the Pentagon
were producing pressure for a public statement before we knew what we wanted to say.
He pressed his own skeptical views and made it clear that he was not interested in rapid
escalation on so frail evidence and with a very fragile government in South Vietnam. He
authorized a brief interim statement as drafted by McNamara/3/ during the meeting, and
he authorized preparatory orders for the strike against southern targets not defended by
MIGs.
/3/For text of McNamara's statement as released on September 19, see American Foreign
Policy: Current Documents, 1964, pp. 999-1000.
Through the afternoon, further reports made it more and more clear that there was no
proof of a premeditated torpedo boat attack. The opinion hardened against any further
immediate military reply. The President continued skeptical. He resisted any suggestion of
a further statement. The preparatory orders were cancelled. By Friday evening, at the top
of the Government, it was believed that the matter should be ended, and that we should
take overnight to see what else could be learned-especially from air and sea search by
daylight.
By Saturday morning it was clear that the search had proven negative. Summary reports
from CINCPAC and others somewhat hardened the evidence that vessels had been in the
area, but the general conclusion was that these vessels had not attempted an aggressive
attack. In these circumstances, the President reviewed and authorized a statement by
Secretary McNamara (attached at Tab A),/4/ and himself agreed to conduct a
backgrounder with the White House press (attached at Tab B)./5/
/4/No tabs were attached to the source text. The text of the statement was transmitted to
Saigon in telegram 701, September 19, 2:59 p.m. (Department of State, Central Files,
POL 27 VIET S)
/5/For text of the President's statement at his press conference on September 21, see
Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Lyndon B. Johnson. 1963-64. Book
II. pp. 1098-1099.
In this meeting in the Cabinet Room between 11 and 1, the following were present: The
President, Rusk, Ball, McNamara, Thompson, McNaughton, Vance, Wheeler, Rowan,
Carter, Reedy, B. Smith, McG. Bundy. In this meeting the President continued to make
clear his very grave doubt that there had been any hostile vessels, let alone an intent to
attack. McNamara summarized the evidence, adducing not only the continuous radar
contacts, both search and fire control, but two seamen's eyewitness reports, a pilot's report
of sighting wakes from covering aircraft, and an intercept which appeared to indicate
DRV report that DRV ships were under attack. The President found only the intercept
persuasive (and it is significant that even this evidence was countered by a later analytical
report).
The President pressed his doubts with General Carter, who asserted his own belief that it
was possible that there were vessels. Secretary Rusk put the probability at 99%. Secretary
Rusk also pressed on the President the importance of not seeming to doubt our naval
officers on the spot. These officers were convinced that they had been facing the enemy,
and an expression of doubt from Washington would be damaging. The President replied
somewhat sharply that he was not planning to make a radio broadcast on the matter but
that he did think it important to find out exactly what happened. He also repeated his
irritation at having his hand forced by an AP report obtained from some junior military
officer.
Secretary McNamara raised with the President the question of renewing de Soto patrols at
an early date. George Ball raised sharply the question whether an early resumption of
these patrols was wise. He pointed out that before the August patrol there had been a lapse
of six months in these patrols, and that their military value was limited. He believed that if
we should now lose a destroyer in such patrols there would be a very grave questioning
both here and abroad as to the justification for our having taken such risks for a limited
return. The President again found consideration [considerable] force in this argument.
The President asked General Wheeler to explain the military value of de Soto patrols.
General Wheeler said that the patrols were desirable but not essential. They obtained
electronic evidence on the defensive dispositions of the North Vietnamese. Much of this
information could be obtained by aerial patrols, but surface patrol was a useful
supplement. More important to General Wheeler was the general proposition that we
should not allow ourselves to be denied free movement on the high seas. Secretary Rusk
supported this argument strongly by saying that the "bandits" in North Vietnam needed to
know that we were in the area and had no intention of being driven out. The President said
he found force in these arguments and was himself quite ready to continue the patrols,
with all their dangers, provided there were solid and persuasive reasons for doing so. He
pointed out that at some time in the future a brutal prosecutor like Tom Dewey might be
asking how we got into these troubles, and he wanted to be sure that the answers would be
good. He reminded the group of the Pearl Harbor hearings, and said that he did not wish
to have his people playing tennis or riding horseback when they should be available for
crucial decisions. The President then instructed Secretary McNamara and General
Wheeler to prepare a general argument showing the justification for further de Soto
patrols, and including both military arguments and political arguments like those of
Secretary Rusk. He asked that Secretary Ball serve as critic of the argument thus
developed so that he could make a judgment on the matter.
The President also directed that full contingency planning be developed so that if anything
should happen to the de Soto patrol, the Government would be ready for immediate and
appropriate reply. The President wanted to be quite sure that we had a full and proper
response ready that would make the enemy "swallow his teeth," if he tried to start
anything.
The President further directed the preparation of a message to General Taylor asking for
his weekly assessment of the military situation in South Vietnam. The President pointed
out that nothing would be more useful in the next six weeks than a real success on the
ground, for both domestic and international reasons. (This cable was later prepared and
reviewed and approved by the President, and is attached at Tab C.)/6/
/6/Telegram 702 to Saigon, September 19, 5:20 p.m. (Department of State, Central Files,
POL 27 VIET S)
The President's summary view of this episode, as reported to me in a telephone
conversation Sunday noon, is that it is still very unclear that there were any hostile vessels
there, that it was highly destructive to have leaks before we were ready to determine what
we wished to do about the matter, that we must control our tongues and arrange for tighter
discipline at every level. (I told the President that I myself had not been as alert as I
should have been to the need for discreetness, and it turned out that he had heard me tell
Jack Valenti at a time when he did not think I needed to. The President obviously has the
problem of privacy in his own immediate decision-making very much on his mind. But
his main concern in this episode is with looseness in military channels, and he indicated
that he had been aiming his comment mainly at Secretary McNamara for action in DOD.)
McG. B./7/
/7/Printed from a copy that bears these typed initials
S/P-213-64
/1/Source: Department of State, S/P Files: Lot 70 D 199, Southeast Asia. Top Secret. The
source text, which was initialed by Rostow, bears the handwritten notation "S[ecretary]
saw 9/28/64." Copies were sent to William Bundy, Forrestal, Hughes, and Thompson.
SUBJECT
Some Ambiguities in Southeast Asia and in Our Policy Towards That Region
Leaving open the question of whether we retaliate immediately against North Viet Nam in
response to the Tonkin Gulf engagement of September 18,1 should like to suggest certain
ambiguities in the situation as it has developed since the earlier Tonkin Gulf incidents,
which may have implications for diplomatic action. They have operational urgency, given
the character of the retaliatory targets now planned in response to a Tonkin Gulf attack.
1. The military and political dispositions of Hanoi and Peiping. Evidently Hanoi and
Peiping retain a capability to launch major conventional aggression in Southeast Asia.
This capability has not yet been brought into play. Although recent Communist
dispositions do not rule out such initiation of massive hostilities, that does not appear to
be the current intent in Hanoi and Peiping. Since the earlier Tonkin Gulf incidents, Hanoi
has positioned itself on a relatively high degree of air defense and ground force alert. It
has accompanied these movements with policy statements which are designed to project a
commitment to fight rather than abandon the war in South Viet Nam. Without initiating
new military action against us or presenting us with any palpable escalation, they are
pressing the war forward via infiltration and their command channels, with high hopes of
producing a political situation in South Viet Nam which would take them far along the
road to victory and, hopefully, deny us a credible base for action against the North. They
do not rule out that we will, under desperate political circumstances in South Viet Nam,
initiate military action against North Viet Nam and are evidently looking for Chinese
Communist support, as well as trying to build a case before world public opinion, should
our action come at a time when it appears to be an effort to retrieve a defeat virtually
accomplished by a mixture of their prior military and political action. They are conscious
that the timing of the U.S. election plays some role in our policy; but I doubt whether they
are clear what effect it will have on our policy, both before or after November 3./2/
/2/The date of the U.S. Presidential election.
2. Meanwhile, the Chinese Communists have made a series of military moves which
suggest that they, too, envisage the possibility of substantial military action in the
relatively near future. These moves, however, are geared in their political pronouncements
to some version of the Korean circumstance; that is, a commitment to defend North Viet
Nam from being occupied and destroyed as a Communist political unit by the United
States. They have kept a certain distance from Hanoi's commitment to pursue the war in
the South. As the Chicom reaction in support of Hanoi's air defense after the first Tonkin
Gulf incidents suggest, Peiping has available a spectrum of moves in support of North
Viet Nam short of engaging U.S. or allied forces. Nevertheless, there is a certain
potentially important ambiguity between Hanoi's declaratory commitment to continue the
war to the South and Peiping's declaratory commitment to defend North Viet Nam from
attack by the U.S.
3. This ambiguity suggests that, should we move to systematic military pressure on the
North, it will be important to make lucid the following three messages:
a. That we are prepared to take serious military action against North Viet Nam if it
continues to support the war in the South; but that our objective is not the destruction of
the regime in Hanoi but the enforcement of compliance to the 1954 and 1962 Accords.
b. This message must be conveyed to Peiping as well as Hanoi so that Peiping is clear that
the analogy to Korea is inexact; namely, that if it engages its forces against the U.S. or our
allies, it will be doing so not to protect the integrity of a Communist North Viet Nam but
to protect the right of North Viet Nam to conduct aggression against Laos and South Viet
Nam.
c. Should the Chinese Communists engage themselves in hostilities for this purpose, that
the mainland of China would be subject to attack.
4. The problem of ambiguity is heightened by the character of the targets presently
planned for retaliatory action in case of a further attack on our ships in the Tonkin Gulf.
These targets relate not merely to the North Vietnamese challenge to our naval forces on
the high seas but to their illegal conduct of the war in South Viet Nam. This is, of course,
a critically important switch in rationale. I believe that switch is fully justified; but it
requires that we be prepared not only with public opinion at home and in the Free World
(including opinion in Taipei, Seoul, and Saigon) but in communications with the
Communists, to make clear our limited purposes and our unlimited commitment to them.
5. The virtue of our actions in the Cuba missile-crisis and the earlier Tonkin Gulf crisis
was the close link between purpose, rationale, and military action. A shift in rationale and
apparent purpose, unclarified and lacking a palpable military and political base for prompt
follow-through, could give us the worst of both worlds: a situation where we were judged
by the Communists to have unlimited purposes (including a possible desire to bring down
the regime in Hanoi) and a limited commitment to pursue them.
6. Specifically, I question whether a tit-for-tat approach is wise in punishing Hanoi for its
illegal conduct of war in the South. A tit-for-tat approach was highly appropriate in the
first Tonkin Gulf incidents because we were reacting to a specific, limited challenge to the
U.S. on the high seas. The books could be closed after our retaliation, at least until that
challenge was renewed. With respect to the conduct by Hanoi of the war against South
Viet Nam, aggression proceeds systematically every day. What is required with respect to
Hanoi and Peiping, therefore, is not a tit-for-tat action of limited scope and duration.
Measured against the prospects for victory in the South-now so hopefully measured-such
limited retaliation is a relatively trivial cost to Hanoi.
7. What is required in Hanoi and Peiping is the conviction that we have decided to go
ahead with a regular and systematic imposition of costs on the North on a scale and with a
continuity sufficient to raise the question in Hanoi as to whether the war in the South is
worth pursuing; a conviction in Peiping that our objectives are limited but deadly serious,
and that Peiping's engagement against us (or our allies) in order to permit Hanoi to
continue the war against the South could involve major costs on the mainland; and a
conviction in both capitals that we are prepared to deal with any degree of escalation they
may mount.
8. The character of the retaliatory targets, therefore, places on us a requirement to shift our
military dispositions and communications in such a way as to remove ambiguities which
could be dangerous. Specifically, what is likely to maximize the chance of a settlement on

our terms with respect to Viet Nam and Laos, is not the damage we may do in a tit-for-tat
sequence of exchanges but a mixture of deadly serious communications and deadly
serious military preparations which would obviously display two characteristics:
a. A capacity to impose on North Viet Nam damage on a scale sufficient to put in question
the advantages of pursuing the war in the South;
b. A capacity to put in question in Peiping the wisdom of placing mainland China in
mortal jeopardy in order that Hanoi might extend its power in the direction of Saigon and
Vientiane.
9. In short, the situation built up between the Tonkin Gulf incidents and the character of
the retaliatory targets now chosen leads us towards a new track, directly related to Hanoi's
aggression and Peiping's relation to it. This new track requires military signals,
communications with the enemy, and diplomacy of a quite different kind than that
required in the earlier Tonkin Gulf incidents. In its first phase, the essence of the track is
not the damage we do but the scale and character of our military dispositions and our
diplomatic communications.

Saigon, September 24, 1964--11 a.m.
/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 VIET S. Confidential; Priority.
Repeated to Hue and CINCPAC.
937. CINCPAC for POLAD. Supplementing reports of current Rhade uprising in Darlac
Province transmitted military channels,/2/ following is presentation of political aspects
and background.
/2/Late in the evening of September 19 and early morning of September 20, Montagnards
seized control of four CIDG camps in Darlac Province killing several Vietnamese soldiers
and taking both U.S. and Vietnamese Special Forces troops hostage. Following extended
negotiations in which the United States indicated that it would not support the
Montagnards, the four camps and the hostages were freed on September 27 and 28. Most
of the reporting on the uprising was done over MACV channels beginning on September
20. These cables are in the Washington National Records Center, HQDA Message Center.
Reel 11925.
There has been longstanding friction between Montagnards and Vietnamese, springing
largely from Montagnard resentment that Vietnamese have treated them as inferiors.
During French era, French protected and isolated Montagnard highland areas from
Vietnamese. However, with French withdrawal, Diem regime opened up highland areas to
Vietnamese settlement through northern refugee centers and land development centers to
relieve population pressures in central lowlands. These measures intensified MontagnardVietnamese friction as two peoples came into close contact. Montagnards saw Vietnamese
taking over their lands, and local Vietnamese officialdom tended to ride roughshod over
"inferior peoples". In 1957-58 Montagnard autonomy movement developed, culminating

in Montagnard revolt and jailing of rebel leaders in 1958.
With advent of special US military assist4nce to GVN in late 1961-62, GVN agreed to
[less than 1 1ine of source text not declassified] US Special Forces programs to mobilize
Montagnard manpower into CIDG units, and USSF teams were placed in CIDG strike
force camps, thereby injecting noticeable US presence into highland areas. Despite Diem
regime's accord with this program, Diem and Nhu were suspicious of US activities with
Montagnards, fearing that US presence and aid programs would serve even further to
alienate Montagnards from Vietnamese. In this connection, US advisers with Montagnard
forces were and are under strict policy guidance to do everything possible to foster
improved Montagnard-Vietnamese relations and to prevent transfer of Montagnard
allegiance to US.
Following Khanh's takeover last January 30, Montagnard rebel leaders in jail were
released and Montagnards were appointed to positions of authority in provincial
administrations in several cases. Countering this increased Montagnard participation in
local government, there has been greater Vietnamese command and control in CIDG
camps. Nevertheless, certain Montagnard leaders continued to promote idea of greater
autonomy for their people. Within context of political turmoil and civil disorders over past
two months, resulting in serious weakening of Khanh's authority and in his capitulation to
Buddhist demands, Rhade leaders probably felt moment was ripe to make own bid for
greater autonomy. In effect, purpose of current Montagnard revolt is to achieve: (1)
improved GVN attitude toward Montagnards; (2) appointment of Montagnard leaders to
responsible positions in GVN both at local and national levels; (3) enlarged
socioeconomic programs for Montagnards; and (4) substantial if not complete autonomy.
GVN authorities in II Corps held two meetings with Montagnard representatives, in May
and August, to discuss Montagnard aims. Montagnards, however, apparently not satisfied
with GVN efforts on their behalf following these meetings and Rhade moved to direct
action.
Degree of VC or other external instigation or exploitation of Montagnard rebellion
difficult to assess at this time. There is circumstantial evidence (e.g., references to
"imperialist Americans" in rebel tracts) suggesting VC inspiration and exploitation of
rebellion.
Taylor

Saigon, September 24, 1964--11 a.m.
Repeated to CINCPAC. A copy of this telegram was sent to the President under cover of a
memorandum from McGeorge Bundy, September 24. (Johnson Library, National Security
File, Aides File, McGeorge Bundy, Memos to the President)
938. CINCPAC for POLAD. For the Secretary. Re Deptel 707/2/ As background to the
following answers to your questions it must be noted that effectiveness of present GVN is
continuing downward trend. Ministers and their subordinates are very conscious of the
"lame duck" character of GVN, and other elements such as labor and Montagnards, who
hitherto had been quiet, have been encouraged by success of Buddhists and students to
push their demands. Having established a pattern of weakness and willingness to make
temporizing concessions, Khanh has had little choice but to give in. Although both labor
and Montagnards have had legitimate complaints which should have been met, by doing
so now Khanh contributes further to atmosphere of weakness that increasingly surrounds
him.
/2/Telegram 707, September 21, asked for Taylor's analysis of the structure of the
Vietnamese Government and posed six specific questions on the situation in Saigon.
(Department of State, Central Files, POL 1 US-VIET S)
Following are answers to your specific questions:
1) Insofar as power is being exercised in Saigon, it is being exercised by Khanh in his
combined role of Prime Minister, Minister of Defense and Commander-in-Chief Armed
Forces. All decisions are made by him (or they are not made) and no one else in
government has emerged as a strong figure. If anyone were to seek to do so they could be
certain of exciting Khanh's already overwrought suspicions. Quat in FonOff remains
relatively bright spot within his limited sphere of activity and is playing a generally
constructive role. Vien, new Minister of Interior, shows some promise. He has been
assigned general responsibility for the non-military aspects of pacification matters but has
not yet had time to demonstrate ability to perform. Khanh still leaves technical financial
matters in hands of Oanh and USOM work on budget planning and financial matters goes
forward quite well. In summary, over next several weeks Khanh is still man with whom
we have to deal, although with MinDef and CINC burdens now added, he is even more
overwhelmed by the burdens of the job and able to apply even less attention to individual
problems.
2) Although as noted above, Oanh is still continuing to function, he badly tarnished his
image with Khanh by the alacrity with which he responded to Duc's call for a meeting of
the cabinet on September 13. However, there are no signs of his immediate dismissal and
it is likely he will stay on during this interregnum. We should be clear that there are no
signs he can play any major political role now or in the future.
Although now apparently "cleared" by Khanh of any complicity in the September 13 coup
attempt, Khiem has no present role in the government beyond the nominal one as a
member of the triumvirate and relations between him and Khanh are strained. It is
impossible now to foresee what his role may be in a post November 1 government, but as
long as he is in the country he will be an important and influential but inscrutable figure.
3) Effects thus far are minimal.
4) As noted above, labor had some justified complaints. Although a general strike was an
extreme reaction and another example of national indiscipline in a time of crisis, its effect
may be beneficial in preventing employers from taking excessive advantage of present
situation and in some degree reestablishing Buu's leadership which had been slipping./3/
We do not at this time foresee labor putting forth major additional or extreme demands.
Having made their point by the general strike they should for the time being be in a
position to obtain reasonable settlements of reasonable grievances.
/3/On September 21, the Vietnamese Confederation of Labor (CTV) called a 48-hour
general strike.
5) I do not foresee further serious difficulty with Buddhists, etc. during this interregnum
while National Council is at work on new government provided Tri Quang and other
leaders of pressure groups feel satisfied with trend of Council's work. In period after
November 1 everything will depend on whether present constituent [constitutional]
machinery will be able to produce something in way of a government around which there
can be a reasonable degree of national consensus. On balance renewed difficulty with
some of the groups mentioned at some point seems likely.
Khanh's position has in a negative way been strengthened by fact that even though he has
shown increasing weakness and inability to deal effectively with problems of the country,
no one else has thus far emerged around whom there is any greater consensus. However,
he has steadily lost stature as a political figure and personal zest in doing his job. He has
survived only be making virtually unending concessions to every pressure group that has
presented itself. There is general recognition that such a process cannot continue
indefinitely and still have anything left deserving the name of a government. We are now
close to that stage. As part of this problem, we must reckon with the distinct possibility of
a renewed lunge against Khanh from the military before the formation of the provisional
government, should they judge that Khanh is proving too compliant regarding Tri Quang
and the neutralist objectives many in the military feel Tri Quang represents. After the
formation of the provisional government, there is no present assurance that Khanh will
remain head of government. Either he may not be chosen for the position at the end of the
procedure for setting up the provisional government or, offered the position, he may
decline.
6) Recent developments have demonstrated a faster rate of deterioration of governmental
process than I would have predicted. Also I had not anticipated the reemergence of the
Montagnard problem at this time. In combination, these recent events cast considerable
doubt on the ability of the caretaker government to carry through its program as planned
for establishing a provisional government. However, our only hope for an orderly
transition to effective government lies in hewing to this course of action and we are
putting the full mission effort behind it
Taylor

/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 23-9 VIET S. Secret: Limdis.
Repeated to Hue and CINCPAC.
943. CINCPAC for POLAD. Previous Emb assessments have recorded Khanh's
preoccupation for some time with problem of consolidating his control over govt and
military. Coup attempt of Sept 13 reflects deep dissatisfaction among certain elements of
army with Khanh's performance and trend of events since mid-August. Massive Buddhiststudent reactions to promulgation of Vung Tau Charter and Khanh's elevation to
Presidency, and specific Buddhist-student objective of cleansing GVN of "Catholic-Can
Lao-Dai Viet conspiracy" in military ranks must have persuaded Khanh that no action on
his part which was opposed by Buddhists could succeed, and that as long as military
elements to which Buddhists objected were in power, he would be caught in vice between
these two forces. He therefore apparently made conscious decision to throw his lot in with
Buddhists, thereby taking calculated risk that opposing forces would not be strong enough
to do him in. He also probably felt that if he failed to ally himself with Buddhist elements.
latter would consider him part of anti-Buddhist conspiracy.
Course of events since mid-August had convinced those elements in military, including
those officers with Dai Viet and Catholic ties (who opposed and distrusted Khanh's
actions) that only drastic action could install regime to their liking. Following Khanh's
announcement on Sept 4 that Generals holding governmental positions would be removed
and resumed to solely military functions, rumors and reports of coup plotting mounted.
There seems to be little doubt that key Dai Viet officers (General Thieu and Colonel Ton)
were in fact engaged in such plotting, as was separate group of younger officers under
Colonel Pham Ngoc Thao's guiding hand. When nothing materialized after some two
weeks of rumors and reports, it was generally assumed that danger of coup had passed.
When coup attempt came on Sept 13, it failed because of inadequate prior planning and
coordination, of lack of support from within military and from populace, and because of
clear and unequivocal US support for Khanh govt. General Duong Van Duc, IV Corps
commander and prime mover of coup attempt, had obtained support of Dai Viet Colonel
Ton, commander of 7th Division, but little other support. General Lam Van Phat,
MinInterior, who had been relieved from his governmental position two days before,
reportedly got on bandwagon through Colonel Ton's good offices but had little prior
contact with Duc.
Duc/Phat team was uncoordinated and, despite exaggerated claims, never obtained
support necessary to bring coup to successful conclusion. In fact there is considerable
evidence to indicate that Duc (coup's father) never really intended to overthrow Khanh but
merely to put pressure on him in order to redress balance overweighted in Buddhists'
favor. Phat, however, went too far by announcing over radio that Khanh was traitor and
was to be arrested. Other Generals--Khiem, Thieu, and others who were perhaps unhappy
enough with Khanh to associate themselves with Duc's efforts, may have hesitated to get
involved with Phat's objective of overthrowing Khanh and run likely risk of inciting
Buddhists to violence. Furthermore, these Generals undoubtedly knew plan was ill
prepared, and they probably had little faith in ability of unstable Duc and mercurial Phat
to succeed. In any case, they could sit on fence and jump either way before it was too late.
Another group of Generals emerged to position of prominence during the coup attempt
and thereafter-the younger Generals, all of whom had been promoted since November 1
and who only served to gain if coup failed. Kingpin in this group was VNAF commander
Nguyen Cao Ky, who was probably loyal to Khanh throughout and opposed to further
coupe, but who could not have afforded to stick with Khanh if coup looked like it would
succeed. Other key figure in this group was 1st Division Commander Nguyen Chanh Thi,
who was already so closely identified with Buddhist cause in Hue and with allied People's
Revolutionary Council that he could not afford to see coup succeed. "Young Turks"
realized that Duc and Phat were not succeeding and could not obtain necessary support if
they remained united, so they remained loyal to Khanh, but at same time indicated their
willingness to negotiate with Duc (not extremist Phat). When curtain rang down on Sept
14, Young Turks were thus in position of having saved Khanh from downfall but at same
time of being able press demands on Khanh which he could not refuse. Most urgent of
these demands was removal or neutralization of "old-line" Generals and their supporters.
Perhaps more important for future, events of Sept 13-14 appeared to have fairly well
eliminated Dalat Generals from army and therefore as divisive factor, and to have
measurably reduced influence of those Generals who have been Buddhist target.
It worth recording that many Vietnamese are giving currency to theory that coup attempt
was phony, that Khanh planned and inspired it as means for discrediting and neutralizing
old-line Generals and to undermine the charge that he was captive of Buddhists. Fact that
there was no bloodshed, and that Duc appeared with Ky in press conf on Sept 14 appear to
add substance to this theory, but there is still no conclusive proof of it and there are
several factors which tend to disprove it.
Failure of recent coup attempt created situation in which Buddhist leadership, "Young
Turks" in military, and central Vietnam political movement coalesced for moment on
objective of supporting Khanh against old-line Generals. Durability of any Vietnamese
political alliance is congenitally tenuous, and there is no reason to believe current alliance
will be anything but transitory phenomenon. In fact, of "Young Turks" only General Thi
seems to be solidly in Buddhist-PRC camp, and Thi's opportunism casts doubt even on
this constant over longer term.
Most immediate implication of these developments for GVN and for US is fact that
present triumph of Buddhists, Young Turks and PRC has only intensified deep bitterness
and resentment within Catholic circles and among remaining old-line military officers to
point where they could be easily triggered into backlash of violence against those they
blame for current state of affairs-Buddhists and their allies, General Khanh himself, or us.
These emotions, incidentally, are spreading even to some Buddhists-primarily to
educated, professional classes who suspect motives of Buddhist leadership. This situation
is compounded by Buddhist readiness to demonstrate their ability to call their faithful into
streets should occasion demand. Final component which could bring situation to flash
point on any pretext is demonstrated reticence of General Khanh to enforce law and order.
Thus all elements are present for major disorders which could degenerate into anarchy and
chaos if not controlled.
Longer-term, but very real, implication for us is motivation of Buddhist and PRC
leadership which now, with help of Young Turks on Sept 13-14, have ascendant political
position. At very least, war against VC is for them secondary issue at present. Although
PRC leadership repeatedly has publicly professed its devotion to "anti-Communist, antineutralist, anti-colonialist" struggle and their recognition of need for US help, Buddhist
leadership has only been willing make similar profession in private to US officials,
consistently arguing that it cannot take such position publicly. Actions both groups have
strong xenophobic quality which shows some signs already of anti-Americanism. Also,
political and social turbulence of last month has undoubtedly been exploited by VC,
although to undetermined degree.
Big question for us is whether Buddhist and PRC leadership is actually guided, inspired,
or infiltrated by Communist elements, or whether it is purely nationalist drive for govt
more responsive to will of people. In addition those desperate elements described above,
growing number of Vietnamese who approved of and supported Buddhist struggle against
Diem regime year ago as legitimate opposition to dictatorial regime are beginning to
express concern that Buddhist leadership, students, and PRC are infiltrated or at least
being unwillingly manipulated by VC agitators. We have no hard evidence to support
accusations that there are Communist members among Buddhists, students or PRC
leaders. However, all returns are not in, and such possibility cannot be dismissed out of
hand.
Taylor
361. Paper Prepared in the Department of Defense/1/

Washington, undated.
/1/Source: Department of State, NSC Files: Lot 70 D 265, NSC Mtg 9/25/64. Top Secret.
Drafted by McNaughton. Another draft of this paper, which is the same except for minor
wording changes, is in the Johnson Library, National Security File, Vietnam Country File,
Vol. XV111, Memos. Attached to the source text is a note to the Office of the Secretary of
State stating that the paper was intended for a meeting with Rusk, McNamara, Ball, and
others at 11 a.m., September 25. Also attached to the source text is a memorandum from
Forrestal to McNaughton, September 24, which reviewed the same points, and a 2-page
draft telegram to Vientiane instructing that the cross-border strikes be carried out as soon
as possible.
POINTS FOR DISCUSSION 9/25/64
A. Estimate of the situation. The situation is deteriorating rapidly in South Vietnam, and
the trend is not likely to change. (See Saigon 938:/2/ "Recent developments have
demonstrated a faster rate of deterioration of governmental processes than I would have
predicted. .../3/ These recent events cast considerable doubt on the ability of the caretaker
government to carry through its program as planned for establishing a provisional
government.")
/2/Document 359.
B. Areas for US action. The United States can improve the situation in South Vietnam
over what it would otherwise be (a) by efforts within that country designed to strengthen
the government and to enhance pacification, and (b) by efforts outside South Vietnam
designed to influence favorably North Vietnam's behavior.
C. Actions inside South Vietnam. We have no suggestions as to new efforts which should
be made within South Vietnam to strengthen the government and to enhance pacification.
Ambassador Taylor appears to be pursuing the optimum course-bolstering Khanh and
helping to achieve a permanent government by October 27. A plan should be prepared,

however-perhaps involving extension of the 60-day mandate or, on expiration of the
mandate, US "negotiations" with South Vietnamese leaders-which will apply if it
becomes apparent that Khanh will be unable to put together a government before the 60day mandate of the "triumvirate" expires.
D. Actions outside South Vietnam
1. The guiding principle. The situation in Southeast Asia can be improved over what it
would otherwise be if pressure is brought to bear on North Vietnam to induce her to be
satisfied with a lesser degree of direction of and assistance to the VC in South Vietnam, or
at least to induce her to become amenable to a more satisfactory arrangement should
negotiations take place. In order to achieve these ends, North Vietnam must be made to
suffer and be persuaded that US interest in a proper solution is deadly serious, that US
presence in support of that end is ominous and enduring, and that she is likely to suffer
even more. The pressure must be a kind which is at least acceptable to the American
people and to our allies immediately involved.
2. The recommended actions.
a. MAROPS. We should resume MAROPS immediately (the 13-day "resumption
schedule"--involving two probes, a junk capture, two bombardments, a bridge destruction
and two more bombardments--are on 12-hour readiness); and the first step toward
legitimating the operations as a counter-infiltration "Coastal Security Service' (per Saigon
911),/4/ should be approved.
/4/Telegram 911, September 19, discussed various aspects of making public maritime
operations (MAROPS). (Department of State, Saigon Embassy Files: Lot 68 F 8)
b. DeSoto Patrols. If MAROPS are postponed, deSoto patrols should resume
immediately. If MAROPS are resumed, a three-day deSoto patrol should follow the 13day MAROPS schedule with a gap of no less than two nor more than three days. The
deSoto patrol should run not later than October 10. We should not announce the patrol in
advance, but we should in the US lay the groundwork for a possible incident by
backgrounding key people regarding the intelligence importance of the missions and the
right of our ships to be there (and perhaps even the "pressure" objective?). We should of
course be prepared, if an incident occurs, to retaliate appropriately.
c. Cross-border operations. We should begin a several-months' program of cross-border
operations. We should, by October 10, start ARVN ground operations in the Panhandle.
The operations would be limited to the 20-kilometer-deep "middle area" (Dak Prou), US
advisers should be permitted to accompany the troops, and any air support should be
solely logistical (no combat air support) and by US aircraft. Authority should be given to
plan for, but not to execute, operations in the other two areas (Lao Bao and Dak To). We
should start air strikes immediately against infiltration targets, using Lao T-28s at the
beginning (with occasional AA suppression by Yankee Team) and Yankee Team
suppressive strikes (with possible VNAF participation if it can be arranged) following
later.
3. Communication with Hanoi. We should seek a method to communicate with Hanoi as
our program of pressures becomes effective.

/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 15 VIET S. Top Secret; Exdis. Drafted
in S/VN, cleared by AID, CIA, DOD/ISA, JCS, USIA, and FE/SEA; and approved by
Forrestal. Repeated to CINCPAC.
731. Saigon pass COMUSMACV. Joint State-Defense-AID-USIA-CIA message. Ref:
Saigon's 714, 887 and 920; joint State-Defense msg 2184./2/
/2/Telegram 714 is printed as Document 337. Regarding telegram 887, see footnote 2,
Document 354. Telegram 920, September 22, reported that Taylor would begin weekly
reports on the situation in Vietnam. (National Defense University, Taylor Papers, T-16169) Message 2184, June 5, reported the decisions reached on pacification at the June 2
Honolulu conference. (Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 VIET S)
1. The following is transmitted only as a reflection of thoughts held here that might assist
give impetus pacification program; but your comments would be appreciated.
2. Agree that two major problems now face GVN. One, to arrive at a firm stable
government, and second, to pacify the countryside. Appears to us that actions necessary to
arrive at a firm stable government must be taken primarily within Saigon. On the other
hand, under current conditions it may be necessary to accomplish initial pacification in
provinces with minimum GVN assistance from Saigon. Past experience shows that
aggressive action by commanders in the field and Province Chiefs can bring at least
temporary security to given areas with only general GVN guidance from Saigon. In light
current situation US/GVN action program contained reftel 2184 more important than ever
as basis for a centrally directed and coordinated US effort in support of decentralized
GVN effort until firm stable GVN government a reality.
3. In reviewing current situation and attempting to arrive steps which can be taken keep
pacification going in provinces, certain actions within bounds current pacification concept
(Chien Thang and Hop Tac) appear worthy of consideration and might assist those
commanders and Province Chiefs capable and willing to further pacification.
a. Decentralize control pacification to Corps and Province Chiefs to maximum extent
possible and give Corps Commander fresh mandate which furnishes him greater
responsibility and authority in pacification.
b. Decentralize programs and functions to Corps and lower levels to maximum extent
possible. Programs and functions such as psyops, funding, provision of PL 480 supplies
and training of Regional Forces are examples.
c. Assign US political action advisor to Corps Advisory Staff for both military and
civilian political agitation, organization and motivation.
d. Through US channels (e.g. USOM, MACV, CAS), provide direct support to local
leaders who show leadership and willingness to develop oil spots.
4. Recognize that decentralization will pose problems, will not improve situation some
areas and may be greatly resisted by GVN. Certainly we would have to maintain
appearance dealing with Saigon ministries. On other hand, a certain amount of de facto
decentralization may provide means for aggressive and capable leaders to improve
security situation in their areas and keep pacification moving.
Rusk
363. Telegram From the President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs
/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Vietnam Country File, Vol. XVIII.
Top Secret; Eyes Only. A note on the source text reads: "For delivery to the President at
the LBJ Ranch tonight."
CAP 64237. 1. In 2-hour meeting this morning,/2/ we received additional political and
military steps available to us in effort to shore up government in Saigon. Dean Rusk is
asking Max Taylor urgently for any additional advice as to what we can do to help on the
political side./3/
/2/See footnote 1, Document 361. No record of this meeting has been found.
2. On military side, we are consulting with Souvanna about possible Laotian air action
with some U.S. fighter support in Laotian corridor./4/ We are also preparing plans for
your later approval on possible use of South Vietnamese rangers with U.S. advisers
against infiltration corridors. We have also prepared a schedule of possible marine
operations by South Vietnamese torpedo boats in the coming weeks. All these actions are
subject to your review and final decision next week.
/4/Telegram 275 to Vientiane, September 25, 8:11 a.m. (Department of State, Central
3. The only action for which we now request immediate approval is a first naval patrol by
South Vietnamese PT boats going 60 miles north of the boundary line, but never closer
than 12 nautical miles to shore. This would be a probe of North Vietnamese naval reaction
and, if uneventful, would be followed, with your later approval, by a second probe to the
3-mile limit. Neither probe will involve any U.S. forces or personnel. Respectfully request
you call me "yes" or "no" on first probe at your convenience before Saturday noon./5/
/5/Although no reply from the President has been found, he apparently approved, since
JCS 9112 to CINCPAC, Saturday, September 26, 4:20 p.m., authorized these probes.
(Ibid., Vietnam Working Group Files: Lot 72 D 219, Tiger Operations)

Forrestal and cleared with William Bundy.
736. Personal for the Ambassador from the Secretary. We have been following closely the
excellent reporting from your Mission which boiled down to the conclusion in your 938/2/
that the deterioration of governmental processes is proceeding faster than we anticipated. I
have asked my colleagues here to scratch their heads and think of more ways of pulling
the body politic together.
/2/Document 359.
One thought that has occurred is the possibility of drafting a declaration of national unity
to be signed by all prominent Vietnamese civil and military leaders. The purpose would
be to get unanimous written agreement to a list of political objectives toward which all
could pledge themselves to work. Something like this was done, I think, in the Philippines
and Korea and I am asking our people here to send you the precedents.
In a separate cable we are also raising the question whether Vu Van Mau's return from
London would be helpful./3/ In this connection, I wonder whether you have been able to
identify any civilian or group of civilians who might provide civilian political leadership,
a sort of individual or collective Pompidou.
/3/This telegram has not been identified.
I am also concerned about the contingency that Khanh may fall away completely. Is there
any other leader or group of leaders that you can identify?
Finally, I wonder if you could spare Bill Sullivan for a two-day trip to Washington to give
us a better feel for this extremely fluid situation. (I suggest Sullivan because he could
probably come in and out of Washington without creating a public fuss.) I don't want to
press this on you if his presence is more urgently required in Saigon. Bob McNamara has
said he will arrange the most rapid air transport for Sullivan if you could spare him.
We are very much aware of the extraordinary demands the situation is making upon you
and your colleagues, and I need hardly tell you again that the President and the Executive
Branch are concerned primarily about finding additional ways in which we can help.
Rusk

Exdis. According to another copy, this telegram was drafted by Taylor. (Ibid., Saigon
972. For the Secretary. Ref: Embtel 938 and Deptel 736./2/ This is a US Mission message.
/2/Document 359 and Document 364.
In continuation of the discussion contained in reftels and to furnish additional basis for
your talks with Bill Sullivan, this cable resumes consideration of our basic problem, how
to assure adequate political leadership (a) in this interim period to about November 1 and
(b) in provisional govt thereafter while maintaining throughout an effective military
posture toward VC.
Fundamental to this consideration is how we are to view Khanh who, up to now, has
enjoyed our confidence and has received our unqualified public and private support. In
recent times we have bailed him out at least twice: first, in late August when, except from
our repeated assertion of US support, his Generals were apparently ready to oust him
because of his concessions to the Buddhists; second, at the time of the September 13
abortive coup when word of encouragement from us to the coup leaders would have
tipped scales. The question now is whether he is worth saving again either for the long or
short
Before answering the question, it is probably worthwhile to review Khanh's assets and
liabilities as the pressures of recent events have allowed us to see them more clearly. He
continues to demonstrate alert intelligence, quickness to see point and agility in moving
(sometimes too quickly) to a conclusion. His native cockiness has been reduced to
manageable proportions by the tribulations of the past month which have been sobering
and edifying experience. He continues to display diligence, working endless hours often
to his physical detriment.
Khanh has chosen to identify himself politically with loose coalition, represented on one
flank by Tri Quang, and the Buddhist support which he can command, and on the other
flank by the clearly anti-Communist, "Young Turk" officers who saved his skin [in] the
September 13 affair. These two disparate elements supported Khanh at the time of the
September 13 coup and continue to support him temporarily, but for motives which are
essentially unrelated except for their common opposition to the Can Lao-Dai Viet-Diemist
remnant groups.
To gain the support of these two elements, particularly Tri Quang, Khanh has paid
considerable price--how great is presently difficult to determine--in alienating important
groups of Vietnamese Army officers. But whatever this loss, he still has the apparent
support of majority of officer corps for at least two reasons, (1) evidence of his continued
support by US and (2) the absence of strong rival.
So much for Khanh's assets. He has formidable list of offsetting liabilities. First and
foremost, in the last two months he has given most discouraging demonstration of lack of
fundamental qualities of leadership. He has yielded to pressure groups and, in particular,
has lost precious face in giving way publicly to the Buddhists. His extended absences
from Saigon suggest fear for his personal safety.
After his ill-considered and hasty effort to impose the Vung Tau Charter of August 16, he
has demonstrated lack of decisive force in dealing with the genie which he released from
bottle on that occasion. In particular he seems to have had no sense of clear direction after
authoritarian lines of Vung Tau Charter were effectively repudiated.
He is pathologically suspicious of his oldest associates whom he thereby repels and
alienates. His suspicions are now turned in uncomfortable measure against Americans
who are his last refuge. We have pretty clear indications that he is surreptitiously
condoning "leaks" to the press alleging that US was behind the Sept 13 coup, the general
strike of the CTV/3/ and the Montagnard revolt.
If he has won some political support, it has been at the expense of incurring the hostility
of the Dai Viets, the Can Lao and of some part of the Catholics which [while?] losing the
esteem of an important element of the officer corps. These are his tangible losses--more
important is the overall loss of confidence in him of much of the thinking Vietnamese
public, of important elements of the armed forces and of Khanh in himself. He is alone,
unhappy, afflicted by suspicions and anxious to find some way out of his job.
Mission also has tended to lose confidence in Khanh's ability to handle the current
situation and his ability to prevail in the long run. It now seems doubtful that he can pull
through until the inauguration of the provisional govt.
What then should be our course of action in this interim period? I would recommend that
we try to stay with Khanh. But if he seems clearly to be going down (and we doubt that he
can survive another coup attempt), we should do what we can to maintain an organization
with which we can work, preferably with Minh in charge. Minh has been behaving quite
well of late and is personally identified with the formation of the High National Council.
He is no world-beater as we all know but we need time to see what will come out of the
deliberations of the Council.
It would seem that three things might happen in this interim period. First, the Council may
succeed in discharging its mission, even if later than the present schedule, and an
undistinguished but acceptable civilian govt may emerge which can get on with the war,
cooperative adequately with us and justify our giving renewed consideration to military
pressures against the North. In this case, we should be filled with pious gratitude and
render the govt full support.
Next, the Council may bog down amid bickerings, political maneuvers and renewed
pressures from minorities. We should do everything in our power to avoid or restore
[resolve?] such situation which could dissolve into anarchy. Alternatively, it could result
in backlash which would lead to complete military takeover by armed forces who will
hardly stand aside long before such spectacle and in reversion to a dictatorship fully as
grim as that of Diem.
In course of such events, the radicals of Hue, the Montagnards in the highland and the VC
everywhere all offer potentialities for further troubles but, by the working of the law of
averages, they are not all likely to realize their total possibilities.
I am afraid that the foregoing, like most recent cables from Saigon, does not present
pleasant outlook. Yet we on the ground are far from ready to concede defeat. As
previously reported (Embtel 938) we must hang on, keep up the war and play for political
breaks. If we can get reasonably good provisional govt before the end of the year we are
back in business. I suspect Khanh will not survive as head of govt but if he can be retained
as MinDef and Commander-in-Chief, he may be able give effective military leadership to
pacification effort. There remains the ever present problem of finding civilian head of
govt. Vien, the new MinInterior, Quat or Vu Van Mau might turn the trick but we will
never know until we try them. To permit experimenting, there would be some advantage
if the Council comes up with PriMin rather than President as head of govt.
In summary, we recommend for the present:
a. Continuing to press for satisfactory governmental solution by way of the Council.
b. Being prepared to drop Khanh if he gets into irreparable trouble.
c. Viewing Minh as a short term substitute for Khanh.
d. Continuing to fight the war and play for the breaks.
e. Continuing to prepare to take the offensive against North Vietnam in accordance with
the time schedule outlined in Embtel 465./4/
/4/Document 319.
I would appreciate your making this cable available to the President in partial discharge of
my obligation under Deptel 707/5/ to provide him each week with a personal evaluation
of the situation. 6
/6/On September 28, the Central Intelligence Agency completed a paper entitled
"Deterioration in South Vietnam," which concluded:
"The deluge of adversity being reported out of South Vietnam raises the question whether
we may be on the verge of some sudden calamity. We believe that certain of this reporting
is overly despairing and does not take sufficient heed of offsetting considerations.
Nevertheless, the signs of deterioration are so many and so clear, in our view, that the
odds now favor a continuing decay of South Vietnamese will and effectiveness in coming
weeks, sufficient to imperil the political base for present US policy and objectives in
South Vietnam."
A copy of the paper was transmitted to McGeorge Bundy on September 28. (Johnson
Library, National Security File, Vietnam Country File, Vol. XV111, Memos. This paper
served as the basis for SNIE 53-2-64, Document 368.
Taylor
366. Message From the Ambassador in Vietnam (Taylor) to the President/1/

Nodis. Transmitted as telegram 1000 from Saigon, which is the source text. According to
another copy of telegram 1000, it was drafted by Taylor. (Ibid., Saigon Embassy Files:
Lot 68 F 8)
Deptel 702./2/ This is my first try at responding to your request for a weekly assessment
of the progress of the pacification program in South Viet-Nam. I am assuming that
pacification is meant in the broadest sense which embraces virtually all actions of the
Vietnamese Government, the Vietnamese Armed Forces and the U.S. Mission except a
limited number of long term projects which by their nature do not bear directly on the
outcome of the struggle against the Viet Cong. Although most of the actions falling under
pacification are a blend of many elements, for simplicity in reporting, I shall usually
group my comments under the headings military, political, economic and psychological.
Military--The military activities of the week were characterized by an increase in the
tempo of major Vietnamese ground operations and a drop off in the intensity of Viet Cong
activity. Friendly air activity was conducted at what may be considered a normal rate but
three aircraft were shot down and two crashes occurred in the course of combat
operations.
For the first time, we are trying to get some feel for the quality of the thousands of
friendly ground operations occurring in a week by requiring U.S. advisors to comment on
the success or lack of success of those operations which they have personally observed.
During the past week U.S. advisors observed 241 such operations and rated 181 of them
as successful in the sense that the observers considered they accomplished their intended
mission. Ninety-nine of these involved contact with the Viet Cong and of these 99, the
advisors considered that 72 were successful.
The most important activity of the Vietnamese Armed Forces during the week was not
directed at the Viet Cong but at the rebellion of certain Rhade CIDG strike forces in
Darlac and Quang Duc Provinces. As reported in cable traffic elsewhere, this rebellion
was put down without bloodshed on September 27 and for the moment we have the
impression that this immediate problem is behind us.
In spite of the many evidences of political weakness in the Vietnamese Government, there
is still little indication of loss of military effectiveness of the units of the armed forces.
During the week, U.S. advisors rated two regiments and four battalions as being combat
ineffective but gave passing marks to the remainder of the ground forces. However, the
ineffectiveness of the national and provincial governments was reflected in a sharp drop in
the recruiting and conscription rate. It looks as if the September total of volunteers will
approximate 1,700 in contrast to a 4,000 average of the previous three months. The
conscription for September will remain about 1,600 in contrast to 4,400 in August. The
conscription goal for this month had been set at 10,440. Because of its importance, the
manpower situation has been placed on the agenda to be discussed by the U.S. Mission
with the National Security Council at its meeting next week.
Political--In addition to the Montagnard rebellion, the past week witnessed other new and
serious challenges to the Khanh government. These included a large labor strike and
demonstration in Saigon and serious civil disturbances in Binh Dinh Province where the
military and political situation is clearly deteriorating. By week's end, only the rebellion
had been satisfactorily settled and, additionally, the formation of local people's salvation
councils continued to spread out from Hue down the central lowlands coast, reaching
Phan Thiet by week's end. These developments reinforced the growing impression that
General Khanh has largely [let?] governmental authority and responsibility for
maintaining law and order pass by default to any interest group which will press its
demands. Another disturbing aspect of this further disintegration of governmental
authority has been the inclination of Khanh and his senior advisors to underestimate the
seriousness of the challenges and therefore the urgent need for sound solutions. A third
disturbing aspect of these developments is the clear evidence that Khanh is encouraging
the Montagnard rebellion and even of being behind the September 13 coup attempt.
An encouraging note of the past week was the formation and public presentation of the
High National Council, charged with forming the new provincial [provisional]
government, which was accompanied by a constructive speech by General Minh as
chairman of the Provisional Leadership Committee (Triumvirate). Following its public
debut, the Council immediately elected its officers and established an agenda for its first
substantive session of September 28.
In implementation of paragraph 6 of NSAM-314,/3/ the United States Operations Mission
(USOM) is developing plans covering a wide range of potential GVN-sponsored work
projects designed to create quick employment in urban areas. Likewise the director, Mr.
Killen, has been exploring with the GVN the prospects for and financial implications of a
25 percent across-the-board salary increase for civil servants, with a special adjustment
for low-paid school teachers. We feel these short-term stimuli should be applied as soon
as ready to keep life in the interim government; proposals of long-range will be held back
for use in encouraging the provisional government which we hope will emerge from the
current deliberations of the High National Council.
/3/Document 345.
Psychological--One sees on all sides increasing signs of discouragement caused by the
lack of effective government and strong leadership, and by the continuing civil
disturbances. The morale of civil servants in Saigon and in the provinces is being
adversely affected in the present situation and government operations at both levels are
being increasingly marked by indecision and indifference. There is a growing tendency to
blame the U.S. for the troubles of South Viet-Nam, a phenomenon which is likely to
increase as troubles continue and the Viet Cong exploit them./4/
/4/On October 1, McGeorge Bundy sent a copy of telegram 1000 to the President under
cover of a short memorandum in which he stated:
"There is not much comfort here, and Bill Sullivan, who is in town this week, confirms
the particularly serious point made at the end of Max's telegram to you--namely that there
are increasing signs that the Vietnamese are blaming us for their troubles." (Johnson
Library, National Security File, Aides File, McGeorge Bundy, Memos to the President)
No record of Sullivan's discussions in Washington has been found.
For the broader and deeper treatment of the current situation, I should like to invite your
attention to Embtel 972./5/
/5/Document 365.
Taylor/6/
367. Memorandum From the Secretary of State's Special Assistant (Forrestal) to the
President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy)/1/
/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Vietnam Country File, Vol. XV111,
Memos. Secret and Personal.
I have been a little disturbed at the recent spate of gloomy reports from Embassy Saigon,
particularly their prognosis for General Khanh. While I don't dispute the essential
accuracy of the reporting, I am worried about the effect it is going to have in the
intelligence community here in Washington. There is a SNIE in preparation/2/ which, in
my judgment, gives an unbalanced picture of the situation. I am going to try to defer
formalization of the draft SNIE until Bill Sullivan has had a chance to confer on it.
/2/Reference is to a September 30 draft of SNIE 53-2-64. (Department of State, Ball
Papers: Lot 74 D 272, Vietnam Intelligence Estimates) See Document 368.
I had a talk with Lou Conein this morning. As you may know, he has been sent home
from Saigon at the request of Max Taylor. He tells me that personal relations between
Max and General Khanh are definitely not good and really have not been since early
August. He cites a number of conversations he has had with both of them; but I will not
bore you with the details. In any event, I want to check this out with Bill Sullivan. The
difficulty seems to be essentially one of personality more than anything else. Differences
in age and rank seem to have made easy communication between the two men difficult,
and I would doubt there is much we can do to correct the situation at the moment.
Under these circumstances, however, I think it is important that we be very careful in our
public characterization of the political situation in Saigon--particularly we should avoid
doing or saying anything which could impel Khanh to decide to drop out of the picture
before the end of October, at which time I figure he may have decided to go anyway. I
should like a chance to discuss this with you further when you get a minute.
In order to restore some balance, at least for you, I attach a briefing paper/3/ done by Tom
Corcoran over here, which we have used in briefing other Assistant Secretaries of the
Department. Although it may be a touch optimistic, I think it sets a better tone.
/3/Not printed.
On the subject of actions outside Vietnam, I hope you will look at the JCS memorandum
835-64./4/ This is a remarkable step forward under the circumstances, and I am willing to
subscribe to the whole thing, subject only to the assurance that the timing of the execution
is kept firmly in the White House and State control. The memorandum is of course
addressed to Bob McNamara, and he will, I hope, promptly bring the proposals up to the
highest levels for decision. As you know, we've only gone out to the field on the Laos air
action. We need a decision on the ground action.
/4/Dated September 30, ICSM 835-64 provided the plans for implementation of air and
ground operations into the Laos corridor specified in NSAM 314 (Document 345).
(Department of State, Vietnam Working Group Files: Lot 72 D 219, Prairie Fire, 19641967)

SNIE 53-2-64
Washington, October 1, 1964.
/1/Source: Department of State, INR-NIE Files. Secret; Controlled Dissemination;
Limited Distribution. Prepared by the Director of Central Intelligence and concurred in by
the Directors of INR, DIA, and NSA. Also published in Declassified Documents, 1976,
229C.
THE SITUATION IN SOUTH VIETNAM
The Problem
To examine the situation as it has developed since early September, and to assess its
implications for the US.
Conclusions
A. Since our estimate of 8 September 1964/2/ the situation in South Vietnam has
continued to deteriorate. A coup by disgruntled South Vietnam military figures could
occur at any time. In any case, we believe that the conditions favor a further decay of
GVN will and effectiveness. The likely pattern of this decay will be increasing defeatism,
paralysis of leadership, friction with Americans, exploration of possible lines of political
accommodation with the other side, and a general petering out of the war effort. It is
possible that the civilian government promised for the end of October could improve
GVN esprit and effectiveness, but on the basis of present indications, this is unlikely.
/2/SNIE 53-64, "Chances for a Stable Government in South Vietnam," dated 8 September
1964, Secret. [Footnote in the source text. SNIE 53-64 is printed as Document 341.]
B. We do not believe that the Viet Cong will make any early effort to seize power by
force of arms; indeed, we doubt that they have the capability for such a takeover. They
will continue to exploit and encourage the trend toward anarchy, looking for the
emergence of a neutralist coalition government which they can dominate.
Discussion
The GVN
1. Continued Political Deterioration. Political conditions in South Vietnam have
continued to deteriorate since our estimate of early September. Despite efforts by Prime
Minister Nguyen Khanh to stabilize the situation, he has been faced with an attempted
coup, rioting and demonstrations in the northern provinces, a massive labor strike in
Saigon, and an armed revolt by Montagnard elements among the Special Forces. Khanh's
authority, already weakened by the Buddhist-student crisis in August, has been further
diminished, and the degree of his support within the military establishment is increasingly
in question. Most of the non-Communist power elements appear to be marking time,
pending their assessment of the civilian government which Khanh has promised will be
formed by the end of October.
2. The Picture in Saigon. South Vietnam is almost leaderless at the present time. General
Khanh has retained his position by making concessions to various interest groups-political, religious, students, military, and labor--which have pressed their demands upon
him. In turn, these groups still seem bent on pursuing self interest and factional quarrels
almost to the point of anarchy. A lack of sense of purpose and an absence of direction
from above have seriously affected morale and created passiveness and apathy within the
civil law enforcement agencies. Government ministries in Saigon are close to a standstill,
with only the most routine operations going on. Cabinet ministers, as well as second-level
bureaucrats, freely express their pessimism, and even though US and GVN officials are
again meeting on pacification and other joint planning, these meetings are not being
followed by action from the Vietnamese side.
3. GVN Military Morale and Effectiveness. The continuing disarray of the Saigon
government, power struggles within the military leadership, and the activities of selfseeking politicians and religious leaders have adversely affected morale within the
military establishment. However, the existing level of effectiveness of combat operations
does not seem to have been seriously affected as yet. Nevertheless, continuing political
instability would almost certainly aggravate such long-standing deficiencies in the
Vietnamese military effort as inadequate motivation, initiative, and aggressiveness. A
continuing lack of firm direction, and further squabbling among senior officers in
particular, could depress the morale of the troops and junior officers to the critical point.
Although the GVN armed forces have long had a high rate of desertion by individuals,
there have been no important unit desertions or defections. If military morale continues to
decline, however, desertion and defections within both the military and paramilitary
services may occur on a larger scale, perhaps even by organized units.
4. Signs of Defeatism in GVN Leadership. High-ranking ARVN officers have confessed to
US officers deep discouragement at the lack of leadership and direction. The J-3 of the
Joint General Staff has indicated that he feels little reason even to discuss further
pacification planning; various high-ranking field commanders have expressed similar
pessimism; and General Khanh himself has shown signs of being overwhelmed by his
responsibilities.
5. The Situation in the Countryside. The near paralysis of government initiative in Saigon
appears to be spreading rapidly to outlying areas. Although the southern areas still appear
relatively unaffected by the crises of the past several weeks, governmental authority has
declined seriously in the northern coastal provinces where provincial and police officials
are apparently receiving little guidance from Saigon. In such urban centers as Hue,
Danang, Qui Nhon, and Nha Trang, Vietnamese commanders have repeatedly failed to
intervene in civil disturbances and rioting on the grounds they lacked precise orders; in
some instances, actual authority has passed by default to extremist "vigilante" groups,
such as the "People's Salvation (or Revolutionary) Council" (PRC). The nature of the
provincial bureaucracy is such that it can rock along for considerable time, carrying out
existing programs despite political deterioration in Saigon. Nevertheless, continued
confusion and inaction in Saigon, or another coup, could rapidly produce a critical
deterioration in government in the countryside. A slippage in morale and in programs
among provincial administrations, at least in the central provinces, has already begun.
6. The People's Revolutionary Council (PRC). The PRC has established local councils in
many coastal cities and may seek to form a chapter in Saigon, where two PRC leaders
have recently been named to the new 17-man High National Council. The aims of the
PRC are not clear, but the local councils seem vulnerable to Viet Cong penetration, and
the fact that they have assumed government powers in some provincial cities tends to
undermine Saigon's control and to damage the morale of civil servants.
7. The Montagnard Problem. The Rhade revolt of 20 September and the continuing
possibility of further and more general uprisings by the Montagnards pose an immediate
and very serious problem for the GVN. The Montagnards have a violent dislike for and
distrust of the lowland Vietnamese, and have sought autonomy for years. The Vietnamese
on their part look down on the Montagnards; until recently, the GVN has usually acted in
a manner which has widened rather then lessened the breach between the two. The
problem has been further compounded by constant and rather intensive Viet Cong
political and psychological agitation among the Montagnards, playing on their aspirations
and their dislike of the ethnic Vietnamese. Resentment over the killing of some 70
Vietnamese by tribesmen during their revolt will make it extremely difficult for the GVN
to offer settlement terms acceptable to the Montagnards. Thus, there will probably be
continuing disorders in the Highland areas, diminishing cooperation with the GVN, and
increasing Viet Cong influence.
8. Offsetting Considerations. Although the signs of deterioration are many and clear, there
are offsetting considerations that reduce the likelihood of sudden collapse and afford some
very slim hope that the trend can be arrested. The Vietnamese people have a long record
of resilience in the face of adversity; the ability of the peasants and even of urban
elements to continue normal patterns of life despite political disorder makes for some
degree of basic stability. The routine functions of government still work fairly normally;
business does go on; and the streets are not places of constant terror. Discouragement over
the absence of leadership and the progress of the war has not yet led to calls for ending the
fighting. Few if any of the many groups now seeking to enlarge their powers regard an
accommodation with the Communists as consistent with their interests. Finally, the
military instrumentalities of pacification still exist and retain significant capabilities.
9. Tensions in US-GVN Relations. In the last month or so, there has been a disturbing
increase in anti-American sentiment at various levels of Vietnamese society. Recent
demonstrations in Hue, Da Nang, Qui Nhon, and Nha Trang have had definite antiAmerican overtones. These were probably attributable in part to Viet Cong agitation and
incitement, but in some measure they seem also to have reflected a genuine irritation at
the Americans for various reasons having no direct connection with Viet Cong activity.
For its part, the Buddhist leadership, whether anti-Communist or not, is imbued with
intense nationalism which has at times manifested itself in opposition to US policies and
actions. Suspicion of US motives and concern over US involvement in internal policy is
growing among the top echelons of the GVN, and, most importantly, on the part of Khanh
himself.
10. GVN Contacts with the Communists. The principal GVN leaders have not to our
knowledge been in recent contact with the Communists, but there has been at least one
instance of informal contact between a lesser governmental official and members of the
"National Liberation Front," which is a creation of Hanoi. Moreover, there are numerous
potential channels of communication between the present GVN leadership and the DRV
authorities, and these could very likely be used without US knowledge.
11. Coup Possibilities. Although no definite coup plans are known to be afoot at the
moment, we believe that further coup attempts are likely, given the ambitions,
discouragement, and bitterness prevalent among certain key South Vietnamese military
and civilian figures--and the comparative ease of mounting a coup attempt in the present
deteriorating scene.
12. Alternatives to Present GVN Leadership. Present plans call for the establishment of a
new, broadly-based, and predominantly civilian government by the end of October. Such
a government might do better than the present one, but the odds are against its having the
cohesion and effectiveness necessary to arrest the current decline. No visible alternative
seems any more promising. Indeed, we cannot presently see any likely source of real
leadership; no Magsaysay has yet appeared. None of the military personalities and
factions seems capable of commanding a sufficiently broad spectrum of support. Of
nonmilitary figures, the Buddhist leader Tri Quang is the strongest political personality
and has demonstrated talents for leadership and organization. But he apparently desires to
avoid such responsibility, and a Tri Quang government would face strong opposition from
militant Catholics, some of the military, and certain other groups. Not least, it would be a
difficult government for the US to work with, and some of its major policies would almost
certainly not be consonant with US interests.
The Viet Cong
13. Viet Cong Policy. There are numerous signs that Viet Cong agents have played a role
in helping sustain the level of civil disorder which has recently prevailed in the cities of
South Vietnam; they have also affected the tone and direction taken by some recent
protest demonstrations. Their hand was evident in the recent riots in the capital of Binh
Dinh Province, and they may have already penetrated the PRC. Viet Cong propaganda
throughout September has increasingly called upon the people to take advantage of the
government's confusion by pressing on all fronts. This capitalizing on unrest is an old
policy; what is new is the rich opportunity presented by the collapsing of GVN authority.
The Viet Cong have apparently decided that heightened efforts on their part will reduce
the country to near anarchy and the government to impotence, bringing an early victory in
the form of a negotiated truce and a "neutralist" government dominated by their National
Liberation Front. Although these heightened efforts may include some battalion-sized, or
larger attacks, we do not believe that the Viet Cong are trying to force a military decision
at this stage. Rather, they will continue stressing small-scale terrorist activity aimed at
furthering the breakdown of administration and the decline of faith in the government.
14. Viet Cong Capabilities in the Cities. Viet Cong strength in the cities has almost
certainly increased substantially in recent months We base this conclusion on our general
reading of the present situation rather than on specific knowledge of current Viet Cong
assets. In the closing days of the Diem regime, Vietnamese police and security agencies
had a fairly good reading on the nature and extent of the Viet Cong apparatus in the
capital area, and it did not constitute a serious threat at that time. Immediately following
the November 1963 coup, however, Colonel Tran Ba Thanh became Deputy Director of
National Police. There are strong grounds for believing that Tranh may be a Communist
agent; in any event he released some key Viet Cong prisoners, destroyed Viet Cong
dossiers in police archives, and placed at least one known Viet Cong agent in a key
position within the police structure. Although Thanh was ousted when Khanh seized
power, the Saigon police and security services have not recovered their anti-Communist
capabilities. The fact that Communist agitation still remains under careful cover, however,
suggests that the Viet Cong intend still to husband these assets and not risk them in a
premature takeover attempt.
369. Minutes of a Meeting, White House, Washington, October 5, 1964, 4:15 p.m./1/
to the President. Top Secret; Sensitive. Drafted by Bundy on October 6.
PRESENT WERE
The President, Secretary of State, Secretary of Defense, McGeorge Bundy and, for the last
two items, John McCone
1. It was agreed that no decision would be taken at present on sending the Secretary of
State to South Vietnam. The Secretary argued that at present such a visit would be
misunderstood, lead to criticism, and have no positive results. It might be wise to
reconsider the question later. Specifically, the Secretary suggested that after the British
election/2/ it might be useful for him to go to the UK and then come home by way of the
Far East.
/2/October 15.
2. It was agreed that we would not at present respond affirmatively to Souvanna Phouma's
request for interdiction operations along Route 7. We should point out to him that such
operations now would put the onus of escalation upon us. We should not, however,
foreclose the possibility of a different decision in the event of renewed hostile activity by
the Pathet Lao and the Viet Minh.
3. The President approved the next scheduled marine operation under the 34-A program, a
patrol proceeding to a distance of three miles from the North Vietnamese coast line.
4. The President agreed to a program of Laotian bombing in the communications corridors
of Southern Laos, using the T-28 force now available. The Secretary of Defense pointed
out that there was implied in this program a limited use of U.S. fighters, at some stage, for
suppressive strikes, but Presidential approval for this part of the program was neither
asked nor given.
5. The Secretary of State proposed the formation of a national committee for the Alliance
for Progress, and the President agreed.
McG. B./3/
370. Editorial Note

On October 5, Under Secretary Ball sent copies of a lengthy memorandum on Vietnam to
Secretaries Rusk and McNamara and McGeorge Bundy. The memorandum posited four
options for U.S. policy:
1. Continue the present course of action;
2. Take over the war;
3. Mount an air offensive against the North;
4. Work for a political settlement.
For text of the memorandum, see Atlantic Monthly, July 1972, pages 36-49; for Ball's
recollection of the drafting and discussion of the memorandum, see The Past Has Another
Pattern, pages 380-384. According to William Bundy, Ball was tasked by the President to
prepare the memorandum at a meeting on October 3 (Bundy Files, Bundy Manuscript,
page 17-9), but no record of a meeting on that day appears in either Johnson's Daily Diary
or Rusk's Appointment Book. (Johnson Library)
Later in the month, following discussions with John McNaughton and Michael Forrestal,
William Bundy drafted his own memorandum on Vietnam. Circulated to Rusk,
McNamara, Ball, and McGeorge Bundy under cover of an October 19 memorandum, this
42-page paper did not attempt to meet all Ball's arguments, but in Bundy's words
contained "all the apparent heresies" he could think of. (Department of State, Bundy Files,
October 1964) After surveying the situation in Vietnam and the likely developments
under the existing U.S. policy, the paper presented the following five options:
A. Continue present policies indefinitely;
B. Maintain systematic military pressures against North Vietnam;
C. Continue present programs, but wink at intra-Vietnam negotiations;

D. Continue present programs, but take a negotiating initiative;
E. Continue present programs, but add actions to convey a believable threat of force, then
negotiate.
Discussion of these papers did not occur in a formal sense until November 7, when they
became part of the work of the NSC Working Group. See Document 403.

Saigon, October 6, 1964--9:30 a.m.
CINCPAC. According to another copy, this telegram was drafted by Taylor. (Ibid., Saigon
Embassy files: Lot 68 F 8)
1035. Deptel 731/2/ Reftel raises the cogent question of how to get a maximum of
pacification effort in South Viet-Nam with a minimum contribution from the central
government in Saigon. This cable acknowledges the existence of this problem, comments
on the proposals of reftel, and indicates the actions which the U.S. Mission considers
feasible and desirable to implement at this time.
/2/Document 362.
It is true that the pacification activities in the provinces have thus far shown a surprising
degree of independence of the political turmoil in Saigon. This independence has been in
large measure because of the already decentralized nature of the pacification program and
of the leadership occasionally displayed by certain military and provincial officials. The
question raised by reftel is whether we should increase this decentralization and
encourage greater initiative on part of local commanders to press forward in clearing and
holding action to bring at least temporary security to broader areas.
With regard to increased decentralization, as indicated above there is already a high
degree of decentralization particularly in most aspects of the PL-480 and psyops
programs. With respect to the training of regional forces, this matter is progressing
satisfactorily under present arrangements and hence no change seems required. It is
doubtful that much further decentralization is feasible except by way of improved
supervision at regional level which is discussed below.
We do not necessarily agree that, in principle, it is desirable to encourage uncontrolled
initiative wherever found throughout the provinces. The shotgun application of resources
in the past has been one of the defects of the pacification program. In instituting the Hop
Tac plan, we resolved to concentrate our resources in the Saigon area and accept relatively
little progress elsewhere for the time being. This establishment of priority does not, of
course, rule out exploiting to the maximum the resources available elsewhere. However,
we do think it essential to meet Hop Tac requirements fully and accept shortages as
necessary in other parts of the country.
Monthly provincial reporting is now giving us a better feel of the progress of pacification
throughout the provinces. For the month of August, our observers considered that
pacification was not going satisfactorily in fourteen provinces in comparison to seven in
July. This retrogression may be due to a number of reasons such as (a) political events in
Saigon (b) refined reporting methods and (c) the concentration of effort being given the
Hop Tac provinces. We are now about to propose to Khanh that he strengthen the regional
level (currently coextensive with Corps) by providing each with Ministerial
representatives who can be used for troubleshooting in the provinces where pacification is
lagging.
Another observation is that in the long run Saigon must play an important role in the
country-wide pacification. The overall problem is to establish justified requirements for
Ministerial resources at the provincial level and then see that the Ministries meet these
requirements on time. The Ministerial pipelines must be stocked and made to flow at a
proper rate in order to meet pacification needs. This machinery is working very poorly
now but it must be our objective to improve it, and get it to perform if we are to be
successful in the end. During this caretaker government of Prime Minister Khanh, we
should do nothing to retard the subsequent development of the governmental machinery in
Saigon, after the installation of the follow-on government. Thus we do not favor the
suggestion of providing U.S. aid directly to the provinces beyond present procedures.
In conclusion, the U.S. Mission is unanimous in recommending the following program:
a) Give full support to Hop Tac plan, assuring it the necessary priorities to give it every
chance to succeed.
b) Continue to refine U.S. provincial reporting in order to determine areas requiring
remedial attention. When Hop Tac priorities permit, concentrate on selected weak areas.
c) Take up with Khanh the need to provide Ministerial representation at regional level
capable of forming troubleshooting inspection visits to lagging provinces.
d) Continue at the National Security Council level to develop simplified pacification
budgeting procedures without involving regional (Corps) headquarters.
Taylor

Washington, October 8, 1964--8:18 p.m.
Limdis. Drafted by Forrestal, cleared with William and McGeorge Bundy, and approved
by Secretary Rusk. Repeated to CINCPAC for POLAD. An undated draft of this cable
with different wording is in the Johnson Library, National Security File, Vietnam Country
File, Vol. XXV111, Cables.
795. For the Ambassador from the Secretary. Ref: Embtels 983, 1036, and 1054./2/
/2/Telegram 983, September 29, transmitted preliminary views on what the Embassy
would like to see emerge from the sessions of the High National Council. Telegram 1036,
October 6, transmitted the text of a statement that the Embassy would give if asked
whether the United States insisted on having Khanh continue as Head of Government.
Telegram 1054, October 7, reported the trends in the High National Council on the form
that the new Vietnamese Government might take. (All in Department of State, Central
1. We concur that we must do our best to avoid any public espousal of charters or people,
although we will undoubtedly be charged in any event with considerable responsibility for
the selection of the form and personnel of any new government. More basically, we
believe we cannot privately disclaim any preference for individuals or form of
government because of our intense interest in seeing a new government having sound
organization, able members and broad basis of popular support. We also want to avoid
any private impression that we are dumping Khanh and that as far as we are concerned
everything is up for grabs. Some US guidance also seems a necessary precaution, given
the backgrounds of the Council members, some of whom look like neutralists on basis
past records and a few of whom seem to have had past Communist associations.
2. As seen from here, evolving political situation in Saigon contains at least two major
problems for US. Embtel 1054 strongly suggests HNC is leaning toward parliamentary
form of government with all the weaknesses which were so apparent in the French Fourth
Republic. The second problem, highlighted in Embtel 983, is to avoid a sharp split
between the only real power in the country, the military, and the civilian HNC. This split
could occur not only over the form of the new government, but also over its personnel. It
seems to us, therefore, that the US must exercise privately all the influence it can bring to
bear to obtain as stable a form of government as possible and one whose personnel will be
acceptable not only to the HNC but also to the military. We realize, of course, that any US
initiative on these matters may leak and we leave completely to your discretion the
manner in which you decide to exercise influence along the lines suggested.
3. We concur with the six points outlined in Embtel 983. In an effort to stimulate further
thinking on additional stabilizing devices under a parliamentary system, we offer the
following thoughts on Embtel 1054, which you may use in your discretion in private
conversations. All are directed at primary US interest in creation of strong, effective
central government whose mandate will run at least until orderly machinery for a change
is functioning
A. HNC should take courageous and firm action in designating Chief of State who could
nominate Prime Minister subject to HNC approval. Prime Minister should select cabinet.
Important point, however, would be that Chief of State, Prime Minister and cabinet would
not be subject to change until after provisional Assembly completely formed, either by
designation or direct or indirect elections. HNC could, as suggested 1054, perform
legislative functions of Assembly in interim.
B. Power of Assembly to change government should be limited to a vote of no confidence

by highest acceptable majority (ideally three-fourths) and result in the dissolution of the
Assembly and new elections. Perhaps government could be given minimum period of
office (one year) during which vote of no confidence could not be taken. As balance to
this position, maximum term of both government and Assembly might be limited to fixed
period (four to seven years).
C. Although individual Ministers should not be subjec4 removal by Assembly except in
connection vote of no confidence against government, they might be subject to censure by
two-thirds vote of Assembly, giving Prime Minister choice dismissing them or making
public defense before Assembly.
4. On question of personnel in new government, two criteria have to be met. The Prime
Minister and Cabinet should be as decisive and disinterested people as can be found. They
must also, however, be acceptable to the major power groups, of which the military is
probably the most important. For this reason we concur your view Embtel 983 that
arrangement with Minh as titular Chief of State with civilian Prime Minister and Khanh as
Deputy Prime Minister or Defense Minister offers best possible combination. We should
vigorously oppose suggestion of multiple Chief of State reported in Embtel 1054. We
foresee, however, that military or Khanh may demand a higher role, particularly if form of
government looks weak. Possible fallback positions, therefore, might be the creation of a
dual Premiership, i.e., a civilian Prime Minister in charge of civilian affairs and Khanh as
coequal in charge of military affairs and pacification or even a civilianized Khanh as
Prime Minister. We tend to see Khanh as best hope at moment for bridge between military
and civilian power groups. This would seem to follow from Khanh's apparent ability to
get along with military Young Turks, Buddhists and possibly other elements, such as Hue
University faculty group, as well as from his military qualifications. Therefore, we believe
that in private discussions with HNC members and with Khanh himself, we should make
point we have high regard for his military abilities and believe he could play major role in
any new government. We should not, how ever, leave impression that Khanh is
inevocably [irrevocably?] our chosen instrument.
5. We agree that if HNC cannot reach agreement on the personnel and form of a stable
government by deadline of October 27th, we should strongly urge all factions, both in and
outside HNC, to agree to extension. Perhaps form of government could be announced first
with designation personnel and investiture coming later. This might fit with formula
proposed in Para B Embtel 1054.
6. We are not clear whether statement contained Embtel 1036 intended for publication.
We see some danger in public statement which leaves impression that we are completely
disinterested in the political shape of the new government since this could contribute to
thought that we do not intend to remain to work with it. Privately, we would expect to be
more specific as suggested above. If a public statement becomes clearly necessary,
something along following lines might indicate appropriate US concern.
"The United States Government supports the efforts of the High National Council and the
Government leadership to form an essentially civilian government capable of pursuing
successfully the pacification campaign against the Viet Cong. We have no specific
preference as to the form of government or as to individuals who will hold key positions.
However, it is clear such a government must have the cooperation of all the patriotic non-
Communist elements in the country. We believe all leaders of Vietnamese political life
are in agreement on this point."
7. Finally, there is a delicate problem, during this transition period, in our relations with
General Khanh and his military supporters. The present truth is that they hold such power
as exists in South Vietnam. Their acceptance of new governmental arrangements is a
prerequisite to any successful constitution of a new government. Our problem is that we
must not abandon one horse before there is another horse which can run the course. I
would suggest, therefore, that you have full and frank discussions with General Khanh
about how he sees the development of the situation so that what we ourselves do is
consonant with the consensus among military and civilian leadership which it is now our
highest purpose to build. If the Council's effort fails, we shall continue to have to live with
and support Khanh. As indicated above we think that a successful High National Council
effort should include Khanh in a responsible position, at the very minimum as Minister of
Defense. But the important thing is that during this period we not find ourselves in a
position where there is no one with whom we can work.
With warm personal regards,
Rusk

Saigon, October 9, 1964--10 a.m.
to CINCPAC.
1064. CINCPAC for POLAD. I saw Khanh today, October 8, primarily to sound him out
with regard to his views of the activities of the High National Council. He claims to be
pretty much in the dark and reported having visited Minh yesterday to see if the latter
could provide him with information. He seems to have got as li~ttle from Minh as I did on
October 6 (Embtel 1049)./2/
/2/Telegram 1049, October 7, reported that Minh had little information on the events
inside the Council. He had also asked if the United States was still backing Khanh. (Ibid.)
I asked Khanh how he expected to detach himself from the government on October 27 as
he has often expressed hope to do. He agreed it is quite clear that the High National
Council cannot form a National Assembly by that time which can, in turn, select a new
head of state and/or head of government. Khanh feels, however, that at least by
implication the Council has power to name these officials on a provisional basis pending
convocation of the National Assembly. He gave no indication that he expected to be
extended beyond October 27 although there are many rumors of his growing reluctance to
step down. With me, he has always stressed his anticipation of a return to a happy military
life.
Khanh made a vague reference to the danger of neutralism growing out of the Council. I
asked whether he had misgivings about any of the members. In reply, he expressed
uncertainty about the intentions of Dr. Quyen and [less than 1 line of source text not
declassified] who represent the National Salvation Movement of Hue. He is unhappy
because Minh invited them to membership on the Council in the first place and thus gave
tacit recognition to their movement as a legitimate political activity.
I took up the matter mentioned in Embtel 1035/3/ of placing Ministerial representatives as
troubleshooters at regional (Corps) levels of [for] pacification. Khanh said that he had
given this some thought but preferred to take no action now for two reasons. First, he
wishes to acquire experience through the operation of the III Corps Headquarters which
has Ministerial representatives for the Hop Tac operation. Next, he pointed out that the
new government may wish to replace the Corps commanders in their non-military
functions by civilian governmental delegates. I asked whether he expected the province
chiefs also to be replaced by civilians but he replied this would be impossible because of
the need to centralize military and civil operations at the province level to prevent
fragmentation of the pacification effort at the grass roots. I agreed.
/3/Document 371.
Taylor

Saigon, October 9, 1964--7 p.m.
Exdis. Repeated to Bangkok, Vientiane, and CINCPAC. According to another copy, this
telegram was drafted by Johnson. (Ibid., Saigon Embassy Files: Lot 68 F 8) Also printed
in Pentagon Papers: Gravel Edition, vol. III, pp. 578-579.
1068. Deptel 783/2/ Organizing session was held October 8 and terms of reference agreed
ad referendum to Ambassadors Unger and Martin. Agreed text will be transmitted
Department./3/
/2/Telegram 783, October 7, approved an organizational meeting to coordinate militarypolitical recommendations affecting Vietnam. (Department of State, Central Files, POL
27 VIET S; printed in Pentagon Papers: Gravel Edition, vol. III, pp. 757-758)
/3/Transmitted in telegram 1080 from Saigon, October 10. (Johnson Library, National
Security File, Vietnam Country File, Vol. XX, Cables; printed in Pentagon Papers:
Gravel Edition, vol. III, pp. 759-760)
Group also discussed all operations of common interest mentioned in Saigon's 1017/4/
with particular emphasis on rules of engagement for US aircraft three countries and SAR
operations, particularly problems of SAR for OPLAN 34A crews that may be downed in
Laos. [5 lines of source text not declassified]
/4/Telegram 1017, October 2, discussed cross-border operations from South Vietnam into
Laos and from Laos into North Vietnam. (Department of State, Central Files, POL 27
VIET S)
Very useful discussion of problem of SAR for OPLAN 34A crews clarified situation for
Vientiane which will undertake definitive comments on Saigon's 1030/5/ to Dept as basis
for Washington decision.
/5/Telegram 1030, October 3, posed several questions on how search and rescue
operations in Laos should be conducted. (Ibid.. Vietnam Working Group Files: Lot 72 D
219, Tiger Operations)
There was also discussion on sharpening existing coordination and responsiveness of all
intelligence assets to Viet Cong movements through Lao corridor. Specifically, a military
targeting sub-committee was formed to extend and improve the target list and reaction
time.
In view of stand down on ground cross border operations and good possibility that ARVN
will be unable to afford detachment any significant ground combat capability for corridor
in foreseeable future, air strikes are sole remaining dependable alternative.
Fixed targets (the 22 Target List), will soon be destroyed if the RLAF performs as
advertised and authorization received for Yankee Team strikes. Thus, the group discussed
at length problem of acquisition additional targets in corridor and particularly problem of
quick air reaction to targets of opportunity developed by ground observers. Saigon and
Vientiane will further examine their assets and possibilities in this regard. [1-1/2 lines of
There was also unanimous agreement that US participation in air operations in corridor is
essential if such operations are to have desired military and psychological impact,
particularly since initiative for operations came from US. US failure to participate would
diminish US influence over these operations (whether we wish to expand or to limit them)
and their continuation could well be jeopardized if Lao are expected to do job unassisted.
Although Vientiane believes Lao prepared to go ahead with strikes against first twelve
targets authorized Deptel 785 to Saigon,/6/ their initial enthusiasm may not survive loss of
a few aircraft.
/6/Dated October 7. (Johnson Library, National Security File, Vietnam Country File, Vol.
XIX, Cables and Memos; printed in Pentagon Papers: Gravel Edition, vol. III, pp. 576577)
Also, If Lao do not hit those four targets for which US strikes were requested and are
discouraged from strikes on Mu Gia Pass, the five most important targets in the corridor
will go unscathed. These omissions will grossly diminish the military benefits of these
bombings. The group thus hoped that Washington would reconsider present ban on RLAF
attack on Mu Gia Pass and approve soonest Yankee Team strike on other targets.
It was noted that Washington is still considering the Lao recommendations that the US
provide cap over RLAF strike aircraft. The present rules of engagement for US aircraft
currently permit US attack on Communist bloc aircraft attacking Laotian aircraft over
Laos. Provision of a cap would hence be a relatively minor extension of existing
authority. Since the Lao have requested such cap, it would have psychological value and
group recommends early Washington approval. Vientiane anticipates RLAF would
initiate operations October 14. Affirmative decision re cap prior to that date would be
most helpful.
Vientiane does not expect RLG will initiate any publicity on strikes but will probably
acknowledge RLAF operations in response to queries. Saigon and Bangkok will privately
inform Khanh and Thanom prior to initiation operations. Vientiane will undertake keep
Souvanna currently informed.
It is tentatively proposed that next meeting be held November 5.
Taylor

/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 15 VIET S. Confidential; Limdis.
1089. CINCPAC for POLAD. Ref: Embtel 1054./2/ Since dispatch reftel, we have
continued our consultations with High National Council (HNC) members and others.
Johnson had lengthy conversation with HNC Secretary General Tran Van Van Thursday
evening./3/ At outset Johnson stressed importance US attaches successful work HNC and
necessity for HNC come up with realistic and workable formula for new government.
Tran Van Van said that trend thinking in HNC now pointed more firmly to single chief of
state (no troika or joint chief of state body). Also general view that General Minh is most
realistic candidate for this position. Van said Chief of State would then select Prime
Minister as head of government, who would present his program to HNC. With approval
of his program by HNC, Prime Minister would select and install his government;
however, HNC would retain power to remove Prime Minister or individual Ministers after
consultation with Prime Minister on the basis of large majority vote (2/3 or 3/4).
/3/October 8.
Van indicated that Council generally agreed that election of Assembly (whether direct or
indirect or mixture of both) was necessary but impossible accomplish this task by October
27 deadline. Van expressed his personal view that if the Council were honest it would
merely state in the draft charter that the National Congress would be elected. Elections
could be set from four to six months hence and a new Chief of State could be elected at
the same time. Johnson questioned necessity of electing new Chief of State 1f the
government installed by end of this month were functioning effectively. Van did not argue
the point, merely observing that popular election of Chief of State had some merit in
getting more popular support for government. Van said HNC would perform legislative
functions pending installation of National Congress and alluded to Council's "controlling"
government. Johnson cautioned any tendency install parliamentary form of government
which not adapted to situation in South Vietnam or for HNC attempt "control" too closely
actions of Executive.
Van said Council unanimous in its view that Prime Minister must be civilian and
indicated that "Council believed" Khanh did not qualify even if he resigned from military.
Van then spelled out formula for creating National Security Council to be composed of
Chief of State (Minh), President of the HNC (personality to be determined), Prime
Minister (Pham Khac Suu), and Commander in Chief of the Armed Forces (General
Khanh). Johnson questioned whether it would be desirable to have President of High
National Council as the interim legislative body formally a member of proposed National
Security Council, which is clearly an instrument of the Executive branch. Here again this
would be direct intervention of legislative into an Executive function. Van did not respond
to this point. Johnson continued with great stress on necessity for military to be actively
engaged in the government, committed to carrying out solution developed by HNC,
thereafter for closest possible cooperation to exist between the military and the civilian
sides of the government. Van agreed but expressed great concern that Khanh would try to
perpetuate himself in office. Van doubted that Khanh would be willing to assume a
subordinate position and would maneuver for his retention as Prime Minister, using as a
primary tactic support from Tri Quang and the Buddhists. Van appealed for direct US
intercession with Khanh to convince him that he must step aside in the interests of the
country. Van believed that Council was powerless to block a move by Khanh and only US
pressure could keep him in line. In response to Van's direct question as to whether US
would intercede in this sense with Khanh, Johnson responded along the line of Embtel
1036./4/
In parting Manfull asked Van if he were serious in proposing Pham Khac Suu as Prime
Minister. Van laughed and said "not really" but Suu would be good "elected Chief of
State". (This may reflect Tran Van Van's personal ambitions to be Prime Minister or
President of the HNC should Suu assume another position.)
Johnson and Sullivan met Pham Dang Lam, former Foreign Minister and currently
Secretary-General of General Minh's office, Friday noon. Lam recognized need for
forming government by October 27, end of two-month period, but was worried about two
obstacles: 1) HNC's terms of reference provided that Assembly should select Chief of
State, but would take two or three months to form Assembly; and 2) Minh would be
"embarrassed" if HNC chose him as Chief of State and not Khanh as Prime Minister
because Minh chose HNC members and would be accused of plotting against Khanh. Lam
spoke of forming temporary government (as opposed to provisional government) for two
or three months until Assembly formed; Assembly then would choose permanent Chief of
State and Prime Minister. Johnson pointed out that formation new government with
probable two or three month life or prolongation present lame-duck government would
only prolong present deteriorating situation. He said two or three week extension of
Khanh government beyond October 27 deadline at request of HNC seemed manageable,
but US felt strongly that present period of uncertainty should be ended as quickly as
possible and that government should be formed which could get back to prosecution of
war. Johnson suggested that HNC might agree now on government providing for
Assembly, when formed, to be able to remove Chief of State or Prime Minister by twothirds or three-fourths vote if replacement agreed upon at same time. Such formula,
Johnson pointed out, by giving Assembly right to remove government would give
Assembly voice in matter but would avoid situation in which government again "up for
grabs" when Assembly formed. (Implicit during this discussion was Lam's assumption
that Minh logical choice as Chief of State.)
Lam also raised question of Khanh continuing as Prime Minister and probed US attitude.
Johnson followed line in Embtel 1036. Lam expressed great concern as to whether Khanh
would resign on October 27 and asked what US could do to get him to resign. Johnson
stressed that there were two aspects to question: 1) Whether Khanh would resign, and 2)
whether there was someone to take his place. He pointed out would be irresponsible for
Khanh to resign without replacement on hand; and that it was HNC's job to provide that
replacement if they wanted change of government. Lam appeared recognize that Khanh
must have place in new government but expressed great skepticism he would accept
subordinate position such as MinDef, DepPriMin.
Johnson suggested that if HNC wanted to learn Khanh's intentions, or to have Khanh in
government, it would be up to HNC and in fact essential it invite him in for consultation.
Johnson strongly urged that HNC sit down with Minh and Khanh to work out what
happens on October 27, reiterating that initiative up to HNC in this regard. Lam seemed to
agree in principle, but expressed doubt that such consultation would work out in practice.
He said, "Perhaps you Americans will have to help." Johnson's response to this was
unenthusiastic.
Friday evening, Johnson and Sullivan met with Pham Khac Suu, HNC Chairman, and
Tran Van Van, HNC Secretary-General. During conversation it was clear Suu was only
shadow of his former self and capable of playing no more than figurehead role in his
country's future. He spoke very little, expressed no ideas more complex than platitudes,
but occasionally confirmed Tran Van Van's statements. Tran Van Van predicted HNC
would vote and promulgate provisional charter next Monday or Tuesday (12th or 13th).
Van referred to their concern with respect to Khanh, indicating once again that HNC
considering establishment of National Security Council (Chief of State, Prime Minister,
Chief of JGS, and President of HNC) to find place for Khanh. National Security Council
would also permit close liaison between civilian government and military forces which
Van recognized as vital.
Johnson and Sullivan urged that HNC take initiative to consult with Khanh and Minh on
finding governmental solution before October 27. They also stressed necessity for civilian
government maintaining closest possible relations with military, and for HNC to develop
well-planned information program for selling its decision to people.
In talk with EmbOff October 9, Father [less than 1 line of source text not declassified]
indicated that he, along with other religious leaders, had been called to Vung Tau by
PriMin Khanh October 6. Purpose of trip was attempt Khanh's part enlist religious support
for post-October 27 governmental line-up with Pham Khac Suu as Chief of State, Khanh
(without uniform) as PriMin. [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] said that his
group had no really strong opposition to such a line-up, but for moment he had refrained
from registering full support. [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] is neither
staunchly pro nor violently con-Khanh. On basis his performance week of August 23,
[less than 1 line of source text not declassified] considers him weak, but on other hand he
feels certain Khanh not anti-Catholic. When EmbOff declared that selection Chief of State
and Prime Minister was internal matter, [less than 1 line of source text not declassified]
protested that US should play more dominant role in formation new Vietnamese
Government, added that Vietnamese had had such limited experience in self-government,
firm guidance was needed. "US should have been more firm with all our leaders including
Diem."
Taylor

to Vientiane, Bangkok, Hue, and CINCPAC.
1108. CINCPAC for POLAD. We held a working reception for High National Council
yesterday evening. Following members of Council attended: Pham Khac Suu, Ngo Gia
Hy, Nguyen Dinh Luyen, Le Van Thu, Nguyen Van Luc, Tran Quang Vinh, Tran Van
Van, Ho Van Nhut, Le Khac Quyen, Nguyen Van Huyen, Tran Van Que, and Mai Tho
Truyen. Atmosphere throughout was warm, relaxed but serious and responsive in our
general discussions.
After initial greetings and private conversations, I made short statement to the group on
the historical significance task assigned to the Council, the importance US attaches to
successful completion of the Council's work, and the difficulty of reconciling in a realistic
manner the current surge for greater democracy in midst of war. I stressed inter alia: 1) the
necessity for strong, stable government suited to a wartime situation; 2) the importance of
assuring that the government would endure for a considerable period of time and not have
its life span limited either by specific provisions of Provisional Charter or through caprice
of the National Assembly when installed; 3) necessity for close cooperation between
civilians and the military; 4) fact that US has no preconceived notions as to the particular
forms of government or personalities; and 5) our constant availability for consultation
should the Council wish to obtain authoritative statement of US views. After brief
response from Pham Khac Suu, Council members invited our questions concerning status
their work. In ensuing discussion, which was open and much more frank than anticipated,
following general impressions drawn from remarks those present:
1) There is considerable area of agreement on the form of government preferred by the
Council; namely a single Chief of State who would be designated by the Council; Chief of
State with some form of Council approval would appoint a Prime Minister having broad
executive powers. Prime Minister designate would then present himself and his program
to the Council and after receiving Council endorsement would form his government.
Council (and later National Assembly perhaps with Council acting as Senate) would
retain power to change government through vote of no confidence but only by substantial
majority (2/3 or 3/4) and in conjunction with parallel vote on government which would
replace out-going government. (Council members refer to this as Bonn formula.)
2) General agreement exists that new National Assembly cannot be installed by October
27 deadline and should be deferred for 3-4 months beyond that date. Assembly would
basically be an elected one but precise method of elections not yet determined.
3) Council had given considerable thought to incorporating safeguard in draft charter so
that stability and tenure of provisional government could be maintained and government
(and work of the Council) could not be overturned by whim of new Assembly once it is
installed.
4) While Council members carefully skirted issue of personalities, they were obviously
concerned as to General Khanh's intentions. Many interpreted Khanh's letter (Embtel
1092)/2/ as ultimatum and evidence Khanh maneuvering to stay in power regardless of
work of Council. All appeared to agree that close cooperation between civilians and
military absolutely essential for governmental stability and on need for early consultation
with the military concerning Council's provisional charter. (Suu and Van indicated
privately that they would attempt to have separate discussions with Minh and Khanh
today.)
/2/Telegram 1092, October 11, transmitted a translation of Khanh's letter to Minh and the
High National Council asking to be replaced as Prime Minister so he could return to the
military. (Ibid.)
5) Council seemed to be shooting for a deadline of October 20 to complete their work and
to have some elements of new government actually installed by October 27 deadline. (In
individual conversations some members indicated Council could complete draft of charter
by tomorrow if all went well.)
In general the group was more impressive, dedicated, and cohesive in their views than we
had anticipated. While it remains to be seen whether this sense of purpose can be
maintained in their forthcoming discussions with the military on the composition of the
government, they appeared to be approaching their task with a real sense of responsibility
and urgency. We will follow up on results their meetings with Minh and Khanh. Telegram
follows/3/ on views expressed by Council members in individual discussions./4/
/3/Telegram 1122 from Saigon, October 13. (Ibid.)
/4/In his diary for October 11, Taylor noted: "The outstanding impression was the fear of
the Council members of the military and in particular of General Khanh." (National
Defense University, Taylor Papers, T-272-69)
Taylor

to CINCPAC. Also published in Declassified Documents, 1979, 96C.
1109. CINCPAC for POLAD. On October 12, Alex Johnson and I took up a number of
questions with General Khanh on a visit to his headquarters at Cap St. Jacques. After
disposing of a number of secondary matters reported in other cables,/2/ we opened a
discussion of the new govt.
/2/telegram 1102 from Saigon, October 12, reported on the brief discussion of air
operations in the Lao corridor. (Department of State, Saigon Embassy Files: Lot 68 F 8)
No other cables on the discussion with Khanh have been found.
I reported to him our meeting with the Council at my residence on Oct 11 (see Embtel
1108)./3/ He showed a lively interest in the matter saying that he was still out of touch
with the Council, and asked how the work was proceeding.
/3/Document 376.
I summarized the general nature of our discussion with the Council members and stressed
their uneasiness over the attitude of the military. I reported that his recent letter to them
guaranteeing the support of the army for a govt which received "the approval of all the
people" had caused them some concern./4/ Did this suggest the military leaders were
about to pounce upon the dissatisfaction of some minority as a reason to oppose a govt
which the Council might propose? Because of their obvious apprehensions, I thought they
were greatly in need of a heart-to-heart talk with Generals Khanh and Minh.
General Khanh answered at once that his position was perfectly clear. He had no personal
ambition for any public office and would take any assignment which he was offered. He
agreed to the need of a frank discussion with the Council and indicated that, while up to
now they had not conferred with him, he had an appointment with them on the morning of
Oct 13. He will first meet with General Minh and will then join the Council.
Khanh expressed surprise that they intended to publish a charter this week. Recalling his
unfortunate experience in surfacing the Vung Tau Charter against our advice without
laying adequate political and public groundwork, he expressed hope Council would not
repeat same mistake. He said he thus far had no idea of what they intended to come up
with in way of charter.
There followed the discussion of governmental formulas under consideration. I told
Khanh that apparently the Council had in mind a govt with a Chief of State and a Prime
Minister. He replied that he would definitely oppose any parliamentary system which
would be subject to the instability of the French Fourth Republic. Alex Johnson pointed
out that it was possible to have a parliamentary system with built-in restraints such as the
German system which would not have the disadvantages that General Khanh seemed to
fear. We ended by agreeing that there are a number of formulas which might satisfy either
a Presidential system, a system on the French "De Gaulle-Pompidou" pattern or one on

the German pattern.
I then made the point that agreement would probably not be difficult on the matter of the
governmental formula. The hard debate would center about the personalities to occupy the
principal posts in the new provisional govt. Khanh asked if the members of the Council
had shown any desire to discuss personalities, and I replied in the negative. He then asked
what Alex Johnson and I thought.
I took the opportunity by the forelock and replied it seemed to me to be a problem of
properly relating three key individuals-General Khanh, General Minh and a presently
unidentified civilian who could qualify as Prime Minister. Operating on the premise that it
is preferable to have a civilian Prime Minister, then it becomes a question of how best to
use the talents of Khanh and Minh. There are at least two ways to do so. The first is to
leave Minh as Chief of State generally with his present functions and make Khanh the
chief military figure of the govt, perhaps as both Minister of Defense and Commander-inChief. The second solution would reverse the roles although in this case the position of
Minister of Defense might go to Minh and the position of Commander-in-Chief to some
other General. I said I would favor the first solution unless indeed the overall formula for
the govt followed the De Gaulle pattern, in which case I would prefer General Khanh as
the Chief of State.
General Khanh did not hesitate to say that he preferred the first solution in which he could
be the military leader and leave Minh in his present role as Chief of State. He explained
his preference by saying that the army would never accept Minh again as their military
leader. They know too much about him and no longer respect him. He, Khanh, would be
very happy to fulfill a purely military role which would allow him to unify the army once
more. He feels deeply the need of purifying the army after the experience of the Sept 13
coup and feels that he is the man to do it. He repeated his conviction that the army must
be got out of politics and kept out of politics. No military man should enter the govt
unless he has first resigned his commission.
General Khanh went on to say that, of course, his willingness to serve in the govt would
depend on its composition. He would have to know who would be the civilian Prime
Minister and decide whether he is a man under whom he would be willing to serve. Also,
he would have to know the program of the govt, professing that this was more important
than the personality of the Prime Minister. We pointed out that he would probably have to
be content with a statement of principles at outset as it would take time to elaborate a
program.
In the course of the discussion, we raised the matter of assuring the duration of the
leadership chosen at the outset by the High National Council. Johnson and I emphasized
the points which we made with the Council, namely that it would be most unfortunate if
the leadership chosen now were changed a few months later by the new National
Assembly. Khanh got the point and seemed to agree entirely.
In summary, we found Khanh in one of his best moods, seeming to talk frankly and
without reservations. If he is out to sabotage any govt in which he is not the chief, he
dissembled very ably. He has promised to inform us by Wednesday the outcome of his
discussions with Minh and the Council.
Taylor
378. Memorandum From the Chairman of the Vietnam Coordinating Committee

(Forrestal) to the President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs
(Bundy)/1/
/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Vietnam Country File, Memos, Vol.
XIX. Secret. Also sent to William Bundy, McNaughton, and Colby. Also published in
Declassified Documents, 1979, 107D.
SUBJECT
General Khanh
At the risk of getting out on a limb, I thought I would put on paper some personal
thoughts about General Khanh and his place on the Saigon political scene. Some reporting
from the field has suggested that General Khanh demonstrated indecision during the
August and September difficulties, that he never has been much of a politician, that he has
shown inability to mobilize significant popular support, and that he is pretty well finished.
The implication of such an assessment would be that we must search for alternate
leadership in Vietnam.
I am not at all sure that such an assessment and conclusion are justified. On the contrary, I
think it may very well be that General Khanh is turning into one of the shrewder modern
Vietnamese political figures. Sufficient time has now passed since the events in August,
beginning with the ill-fated promulgation of the Vung Tau Charter to suggest that Khanh
may be playing a deeper and longer term political game more successfully than we have
suspected. Consider what his refusal to act during the public disturbances in August has
accomplished. There is evidence that Tri Quang, the militant Buddhist leader, has become
more and more moderate and apparently concerned over the adverse political reaction in
the coastal cities to the rioting, which he himself probably encouraged. There is beginning
to be evidence that Thich Tam Chau is making capital out of publicly espousing a
moderate line in the Buddhist community and may be regaining control over the Buddhist
organization (particularly insofar as the students and newspapers in Saigon are
concerned).
Dr. Quyen is in Saigon on the High National Council. In the meantime, the People's
National Salvation Committees which he spawned from Hue and other northern cities
show signs of falling apart. In some of the central provinces officials are cracking down
on the unruly elements which showed their heads last August, apparently in response to
orders from Khanh
Finally, the coup attempt of September 13th was such a comic failure that one begins to
suspect whether the Can Lao/Dai Viet "remnants" didn't fall into a carefully prepared trap.
In any event, the vestiges of influence they had left, including General Khiem, have been
removed.
It is possible to argue that all this has happened without any action on Khanh's part and
merely confirms his inability to make decisions. This proposition does not strike me as
being the most likely explanation. We know that when Khanh was Commander of the
Second Corps, he was considered to be among the most decisive of corps commanders, as
well as the most politically effective. We have recently learned that Khanh was not the
prime mover of the January coup from which he emerged as Prime Minister. On the
contrary, the leader now appears to have been General Khiem. This may account for the
apparent lack of effective action by Khanh during the period when he was supposed to be
in charge of the government. In fact, he may not have been, certainly not of the civilian
side.
At present Khanh may be continuing his waiting game in an effort to create a political
situation which will enable him to return to power in answer to a draft, under conditions
where he owes as little as possible to any single supporter, including the U.S.
He has done an effective job of telling Ambassador Taylor he has no ambitions to remain
as Prime Minister. He has already acted in such a way as to make some of the members of
the High National Council suspect that his public demonstrations of his intent to resign on
October 27th are merely designed to encourage a popular demand (which Khanh himself
might stimulate) for his return to power.
In short, I don't think Khanh is going to pull a Coolidge. He might well return as the
country's principal leader with Vu Van Mau, who is now said to be his closest political
advisor, as a civilian front.
The main question in my mind is where this leaves General Minh, and I suspect that this
is the main question in Khanh's mind as well.
Whether or not this analysis turns out to be correct' I think there is enough in it to suggest
that we should not get too fixed on the proposition that the man we once embraced as the
most effective leader in Vietnam is going to opt for early retirement from political life.

Limdis. Repeated to CIA, the Department of Defense, the White House, and CINCPAC.
According to another copy, this telegram was drafted by Taylor. (Ibid., Saigon Embassy
Files: Lot 68 F 8)
1137. CINCPAC for POLAD. Today (October 14) I called on Minh in the morning and
Khanh in the afternoon to hear their accounts of meeting with the High National Council
yesterday.
Minh reported that the visit went off amicably and that he was able to assure members of
his complete support.
Minh explained that the new charter may not be ready today but should be very shortly.
His version of the probable course of future events is as follows:
The charter will be announced with the explanation that the triumvirate remains
responsible for the general conduct of the government until convocation of the National
Assembly. During this interval, the Council will serve as the legislative branch of the new
government but the problem remains how to constitute the executive for this interim
period.
Since the triumvirate remains in existence, in Minh's mind there is no question but that he
will remain as Chief of State. As a way to constitute a cabinet and choose an interim
Prime Minister, he visualizes a small team ("equipe") of leaders getting together, forming
a trial government with an aspirant Prime Minister and producing a governmental
program. This team would then present itself with its program to the triumvirate (less
Khiem) and the Council and ask for acceptance as the interim government. If approved, it
would be in business; otherwise some other team would have to try.
I then tried to draw him out on the subject of personalities. According to Minh's
statements, it is quite clear there is such a team in formation now, probably headed by the
Prefect of Saigon, Tran Van Huong, who under this plan would hope to become Prime
Minister. The other members whom Minh regards as being on the team are not clear.
Minh referred to them as being some from the Council and some on the outside. I
gathered that Vu Van Mau may be on the list as Prime Minister and Nguyen Luu Vien,
the present Minister of the Interior, will have some key position.
As to the role for him and Khanh to play, Minh agrees that the ideal solution would be for
him to remain as Chief of State and Khanh to be the principal military figure of the
government. He expressed some doubts however that Khanh would accept this relatively
subordinate role.
I asked Minh upon leaving whether he expected an orderly transition from the present
government on October 27. He hesitated a moment and then said that he anticipated no
disturbance. As previously reported, we hear rumors that pro-Khanh government
demonstrations are possible.
In the afternoon, I went to see Khanh to compare his story of events with Minh's. He said
that he, too, had had a pleasant meeting with the Council and felt that he had assuaged
their fears of military intervention.
He added that the Council had urged him to remain in the government as Chief of State or
Chief of Government. He refused to entertain the proposition saying he could not send his
Generals "back to the barracks" and exclude them from political activities if he did not do
likewise.
We then went over his understanding of what the Council was about to do and it differs
considerably from other interpretations. He understands that the High National Council
after promulgating its charter (presumably today) will name the Chief of State who will be
of the Gaullist type with extensive powers. The Chief of State will choose an aspirant
Prime Minister who will put together a cabinet and a program for presentation to the
Council acting as substitute for the National Assembly. The Council will accept or reject
the government and its program; in the latter case, someone else will have to try again.
Khanh verified that the Council will act as the legislative branch until the convocation of
the National Assembly some months later. Apparently safeguards to assure stability are in
the plan and the new National Assembly will accept the existing government unless it can
be overturned by a two-thirds vote. The Chief of State 1s independent of the government
and is not subject to removal by the Assembly except for some extreme offense such as
treason. He, on the other hand, can dissolve the National Assembly if the latter overturns
the government too frequently.
The Chief of State also presides over the cabinet and, according to Khanh, is the real
source of policy direction, in fact, a De Gaulle.
I tried to find out whether Khanh knew anything about Minh's "team" headed by the
Prefect of Saigon. He would only concede that he had heard the Prefect mentioned as a
possible candidate for Prime Minister.
Khanh confessed to surprise as I did at this new concept of the government. He said that
his only suggestion to the Council had been to give a more "honorable" position to the
army by having it depend directly from the Chief of State. Thus, he would remove the
Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces from the control of the Prime Minister and the
Minister of Defense, the latter becoming strictly an executive and administrative official.
I told Khanh that such a government would be criticized as establishing a dictatorship as
rigid as that of the rejected Vung Tau Charter. Khanh conceded that point but seemed to
enjoy the idea. Asked about personalities in key positions, he would only say that he does
not intend to accept the position of Chief of State, but would be happy to be Commanderin-Chief. I am not at all so sure of his sincerity because from an early date he has shown
an interest in the De Gaulle-Pompidou formula, with Khanh in the role of De Gaulle.
I am afraid that the foregoing cable presents a confusing melange of views on the
formation of the government. We should receive a copy of the charter shortly which I
hope will be explicit enough to clarify what is intended. Although we have stressed the
importance of breaking news of the charter to the public after adequate public relation
preparations, I am afraid this one is likely to appear with as little preparation as the illfated Vung Tau Charter.
Taylor

Repeated to Bangkok, Vientiane, and CINCPAC.
1148. CINCPAC for POLAD. Confrontation which has been developing between Khanh
plus Young Turk officers on the one hand and Minh plus High National Council on the
other hand, has sharpened considerably in past few days.

Although sparring for position has been characterized by usual Vietnamese indirection
and obscurities, picture we have pieced together from numerous contacts appears as
follows:
1) The HNC has completed a draft charter and has sent copies to Khanh and Minh. Khanh
has confidentially sent Ambassador Taylor a photocopy of what he claims to be charter he
has received from HNC. According this document, Chief of State given extraordinary
powers to considerable detriment of Prime Minister. Moreover, Chief of State assumes
title of Supreme Commander of Armed Forces and appoints all senior military officers.
2) Khanh met with HNC Oct 15, told them their charter "unacceptable" to armed forces
and demanded revisions. Although he seems to have offered them several options, his
primary suggestion reportedly is based on Republic of China pattern which gives special
"position of honor" to armed forces. Khanh has told Ambassador Taylor that he feels
armed forces should in effect be a "fourth branch" of government, coordinated with
executive, legislative and judicial. This proposal confirmed by sources in HNC.
3) Tran Van Van, and others among our contacts in HNC (who are unaware we have
received photocopy of charter from Khanh) insist that draft charter gives only titular
authority to Chief of State, reserving basic power, on Bonn government model, to Prime
Minister.
They accuse Khanh of threatening them with coup d'etat by armed forces and insist he is
reneging on previous intentions withdraw armed forces from politics. While they
recognize the problems presented by personalities in current positions of power, they have
not been willing to meet these problems head on. Further, appears that group within HNC,
Suu, Van, Thu, Nhut, also interested in seeing final arrangements emerge which would
permit their group to install Prime Minister and government compatible with their ideas
and amenable their direction. They view Khanh as main obstacle in their path and Minh as
their principal ally at the moment.
4) Minh attended part of Khanh's session with HNC Oct 15 but said nothing until Khanh
departed. After Khanh's departure, Minh in effect counseled HNC to ignore Khanh's
suggestions and proceed on basis current draft. One feature of that draft would be to
continue triumvirate in capacity Chief of State until Assembly convenes and selects
permanent Chief of State, which obviously unworkable.
5) HNC met in rump session evening Oct 15 to consider Khanh proposals. Since Khanh
going Pleiku for session on Montagnard affairs Oct 16 and 17, they have scheduled next
meeting with him for Sunday, Oct 18.
6) Although Khanh and Minh have had several private bilateral meetings, there is no
sense of understanding between them. Khanh is still trying to get Minh out of public
office and Minh is trying to get Khanh back to a purely military command position
subordinate to government. Johnson and Sullivan met with Vu Van Mau and Pham Dang
Lam October 15 to urge them make more active efforts reconciliation between two
Generals. It was clear from this meeting that even these two old friends had not been
actively in contact in this effort.
7) Some rather vague moves are afoot to propose all-civilian slate as way out of current
impasse. Various names are being mentioned for both Chief of State and Prime Minister
roles. Among these are Pham Khac Suu for Chief of State (impossible if Chief of State
anything but ceremonial), Ho Van Nhut, Nguyen Luu Vien, and Tran Van Huong (Prefect
of Saigon) for Prime Minister. All these gropings [groupings?] seem, even by their
sponsors, to be considered unrealistic unless and until Khanh and Minh reach some modus
vivendi.
Our action to date, pressed upon all personalities we have met, has concentrated upon
obtaining general agreement that draft charter should not be published at this time, that
remaining twelve days before October 27 should be spent in effort reconcile differences
among principal factions and personalities, and that if necessary even more time should be
taken.
We are also strongly pressing point that we wish to be consulted, want no surprises, and
we expect current protagonists to reconcile their differences in a mature fashion.
Taylor

to CINCPAC.
1150. CINCPAC for POLAD. This morning (October 16) before the opening of the
combined session of the NSC and the U.S. Mission Council, I talked to Khanh briefly
with regard to his meeting with the High National Council yesterday. He confirmed what
we had heard through other sources.
He has informed the High National Council that the draft charter in its present form is not
satisfactory to the armed forces and, if promulgated, is likely to generate a coup. Khanh
considers that under the charter the Chief of State is vastly more powerful. than the Prime
Minister and does not resemble the position presently held by Minh; because of its
primacy the post must be filled by a civilian. In fact, all military officers presently in the
government must "return to the barracks". Furthermore, the armed forces cannot be
submerged as planned under the charter but must be given the special status reported in
Embtel 1137/2/ whereby they depend directly from the Chief of State and are independent
of the rest of the government.
/2/Document 379.
Khanh was particularly eloquent in attacking the provision of the charter whereby the old
triumvirate would assume the powers of the Chief of State until the latter can be selected
by a National Assembly. This provision would mean that a divided, discordant committee
would attempt to direct the government for a period of months while elections were being
held and arrangements completed for the National Assembly.

I asked Khanh how we can end the apparent impasse. Would he still be satisfied with the
formula which he had apparently accepted in a recent conversation with me at Cap St.
Jacques; namely, that Minh would remain as nominal Chief of State and he, Khanh, would
assume the offices of Minister of Defense and Commander-in-Chief while a strong
civilian with full powers would run the government as Prime Minister? Khanh said that
this formula was still acceptable to him.
Following the meeting of the NSC/Mission Council, I went to see Minh and found him
plunged in gloom. He described Khanh as having behaved very badly the previous day in
threatening the Council with a military coup if he does not have his way. He verified the
nature of Khanh's demands essentially as Khanh had described them, but argues strongly
that Khanh is wrong in his evaluation of the importance of the powers attributed in charter
to Chief of State. In his view, under the charter, the Chief of State would "reign and not
govern". He also insists that under the terms of the decision of the Military Revolutionary
Council of September 8 the triumvirate is obliged to remain in place until "the national
institutions set forth in the provisional charter have been set up."
I asked Minh the same question as I had Khanh, namely, would he accept the formula of a
strong civilian Prime Minister with him as nominal Chief of State and Khanh the number
one military officer? Minh said he would but did not believe that Khanh would go along.
Minh described the Council as being discouraged and disgusted. He suggested that we
Americans should contact key members and encourage them. We are trying to set up an
appointment with the four recognized leaders for a meeting tomorrow, October 17./3/ We
will sound out their willingness to adjust the charter to the governmental formula
described above, provided Minh and Khanh will really line up for it.
/3/At the meeting on the afternoon of October 17, Taylor stressed to the four leaders the
need for accommodating Khanh, emphasizing in particular the powers of the Chief of
State, the elimination of the triumvirate, the personalities in the new government, and the
length of their tenure. Taylor described the session as useful, but noted that he would have
to maintain pressure on the Council to fulfill its mandate. (Telegram 1175 from Saigon;
Department of State, Central Files, POL 15 VIET S)
Taylor

(Westmoreland) to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (Wheeler)/1/
Saigon, October 17, 1964--3:20 p.m.
/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 VIET S. Top Secret; Eyes Only.
Also sent to Goodpaster and repeated to CINCPAC for Admiral Sharp.
MAC 5532. 1. Your JCS 4804-64, DTG 161746Z Oct,/2/ received Saigon during visit of
CINCPAC. This reply jointly drafted following exchange of views.
/2/This cable asked for Westmoreland's views on whether "some dramatic military action"
would assist in creating a stable government and whether a stable government was a
prerequisite or merely desirable for launching overt military action against North
Vietnam. (Ibid.)
2. We agreed with the JCS that "present programs will not of themselves suffice to reverse
the unfavorable trend in South Vietnam." On the other hand an expanded U.S. military
effort will not alone reverse the trend.
3. Unless there are reasonable prospects of a fairly effective government in South
Vietnam in the immediate offing, then no amount of offensive action by the U.S. either in
or outside South Vietnam has any chance by itself of reversing the deterioration now
underway. On the other hand VNAF, Farmgate, and U.S. air strikes against infiltration
associated targets in the Panhandle of Laos and in DRV are in order under any
circumstances. Also to keep the general atmosphere clear on the fact of U.S. military
dominance in the area, the DeSoto patrol should be continued with full preparation for
retaliation. At least the prospect of a reasonably effective government in South Vietnam is
prerequisite to mounting major overt U.S. military action against the DRV except in
retaliation for attack on U.S. forces.
4. Time is running out; however, the situation is not yet desperate and in our opinion we
can and must wait at least until December before we will know with any certainty whether
a government will emerge from the current effort. Although we do not expect that all
problems will be solved by December, we do believe that it will be clear to us on the
ground whether or not some sound beginnings have been made which offer reasonable
prospects of further development and eventual success.
5. If a government seems to be pulling itself together then stepped up U.S. military action
would give impetus to this favorable trend and should be undertaken.
6. This matter has been discussed with Ambassador Taylor who generally concurs with
this reply. His detailed views are contained in his message of 16 October to the
President,/3/ info you.
/3/Presumably this is JPS 303, 161030Z; see Document 388.

Saigon, October 17, 1964--8:30 p.m.
/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 VIET S. Secret; Exdis. Transmitted
as telegram 1174 from Saigon, which is the source text.
Knowing your intense interest in seeing more flags in SVN, I am sure you will want to
know that free-world aid personnel in Viet-Nam, in addition to Americans, has now
reached the one thousand mark, representing 11 countries. Much material aid has also
been received, but I believe this tangible presence of third-country teams complies with
your desire to have this aid "as large and visible as possible in terms of men on the scene".
Third-country personnel are serving all over Viet-Nam, from outposts in southern Delta to
Hue in the north. Many, and particularly the Australians, are accepting the same hazards
as the Americans, serving as advisors in combat with units down to company level.
The work of our Embassies abroad and the special missions of Ambassador Lodge/2/ have
played a key role in this favorable development. We have reason to hope, from their
reports, that we may expect a continuing augmentation of this aid. Details concerning
these contributions are being reported routinely and the Embassy is sending to the
Department of State a report which will give a breakdown of each contributing nation's
efforts./3/
/2/Regarding Lodge's trip to Europe in August, see Document 301.
/3/Not found.
We have attempted to assure that this free-world commitment has been given maximum
publicity here and abroad, and we believe the third country presence in SVN is becoming
well known and gaining recognition. I am having our information people work with their
Vietnamese colleagues to give appropriate publicity to the fact that we have passed the
thousand mark.
Taylor/4/

Washington, October 18, 1964--3:47 p.m.
Exdis. Drafted by Forrestal, cleared in substance with McNamara, and initialed by Rusk.
859. From Secretary for Ambassador. Bob McNamara and I have following reactions to
political moves you have reported during last week.
A struggle seems to be developing between Minh and HNC on one hand and Khanh and
Young Turk military on the other. Between these two groups it seems to us our best
interests are served if Khanh comes out on top. We have little confidence that Minh can
serve as effective chief executive especially in light of weakness his support and strength
of his Young Turk opposition. Problem, therefore, is how to get government with Khanh
in a leading role, ideally as chief executive unless some strong civilian shows up who is
not now apparent. At least Khanh should remain as leader Army with co-equal position to
civilians in a government whose mandate will run for at least 18 months.
It seems important to make effort find acceptable civilian leadership which can work with
Khanh and military. Our only thought from this end is that Vu Van Mau might form
center of such civilian leadership. He might serve as chief of civilian side of government
with Khanh as chief of military side. Whether or not this is in realm of possible, we
believe it should be made clear that US does not support Minh as powerful chief
executive.
This is consensus here and we would much appreciate your comment./2/
/2/On October 19, Taylor replied that he had reached the same conclusions. He was
optimistic that U.S. officials had convinced the Council to reduce the powers of the Chief
of State, leaving real power to be exercised by the Prime Minister and the Commander in
Chief of the Armed Forces, and speculated that an acceptable arrangement could be
worked out if a satisfactory civilian Prime Minister could be found and if he and Khanh
could then work out a role for the armed forces. Taylor did not think Vu Van Mau would
"pan out," but felt former Foreign Minister Quat might be possible. (Telegram 1183 from
Saigon; ibid.)
Rusk

to CINCPAC.
1199. CINCPAC for POLAD. After a series of consultations today with General Khanh,
Generals Minh and Thu, I have the impression that the business of putting together a new
government has reached the following point:
Khanh, Minh and the Secretariat of the High National Council, Suu, Chu, Luc, Van and
Huyen, had a reasonably satisfactory meeting of minds yesterday. Khanh concedes that
they have deflated the powers of the Chief of State to a point acceptable to him. He did
not give the impression, however, of having studied in detail the provisions of the charter
as it now stands and had some difficulty showing in chart form the relationships of the
principal elements. He claims not to have seen the charter with its latest modifications.
One outcome of yesterday's meeting was the signing of a document by Minh and Khanh
authorizing the dissolution of the triumvirate and the passage of its powers to the High
National Council. This document is now in the hands of the Council.
Minh, supported by Thu, gave me a somewhat different version of the state of affairs.
They consider they are now on the home stretch and even hope to promulgate the charter
today. In their minds, there is no doubt as to the relationship of the principal elements of
the new government. There is the Chief of State with nominal powers whom they may
prefer to call the President; a civilian Prime Minister with a normal cabinet including a
civilian Minister of the Armed Forces; a Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces
subordinated to the Minister of Defense. Off to one side is the National Security Council
presided over by the Chief of State as President with the Prime Minister as Vice President
and the Minister of the Armed Forces and the Commander-in-Chief as additional
members. This council will have only the power to make recommendations either to the
National Assembly for such matters as a declaration of war or a state of emergency or to
the government on matters of defense policy.
According to Minh and Thu, these provisions essentially as described above were in the
draft charter shown to Khanh yesterday and to which he agreed. They conceded some last
minute changes are being made but consider them insignificant.
Nonetheless, based on Khanh's statement that he had not yet seen the final papers, I urged
them to have one more go-round with Khanh before publishing the charter. This they are
strangely reluctant to do, probably because of the disagreeable tone of most of their
conferences with Khanh. They charge him bitterly with being unwilling to work on a team
and even with frequent violations of his word. They would not have him in the
government if they could find some way to get rid of him.
We then got around to talking about personalities in the government.
I pointed out they had the double problem of finding two civilians who could work with
Khanh, one a Prime Minister and the other a Minister of the Armed Forces. They said that
Khanh was plugging for his uncle, Minister of Interior Nguyen Luu Vien, as Minister of
the Armed Forces and asked what I thought of him. I replied that my impressions based
upon limited observation had been favorable but the fact that he is Khanh's uncle will
cause some criticism.
I then pressed them for their plan for filling the position of Prime Minister. To my
surprise, they said that Khanh, Minh and the Council representatives had reached an
informal agreement on a name last night, but they were not at liberty to communicate it to
me yet. They assured me the person involved is highly respected and should satisfy all
parties.
I stressed the need for careful public and press preparations for announcing the new
charter and later the key figures of the government. Unfortunately, as is so often the case,
they are now in an enormous hurry to promulgate the charter/2/ and satisfy those who
have been pressing for evidence of progress. They did not promise to have a full scale
press conference and a thorough public explanation of the contents of the charter.
/2/The text of the Provisional Charter, which as Taylor feared was promulgated later
during the day on October 20, was transmitted in telegram 1204 from Saigon, October 20.
(Johnson Library, National Security File, Vietnam Country File, Vol. XX, Cables)
The foregoing would seem to mean that we may be getting somewhere in the formation of
a new government generally along lines satisfactory to us. I still have my fingers crossed
about Khanh. He was too non-committal this morning to give me the feeling that
everything is really settled in his mind.
Taylor

to Bangkok, Vientiane, and CINCPAC for POLAD.
1219. Embtel 1210; Deptel 880./2/ I called on Khanh today to find out his feeling about
the charter and related matters. I led off with the same point as with Minh yesterday
(Embtel 1210), to effect that we Americans had no candidates for the key positions in the
govt but we did not wish to be surprised. Effective USG/GVN cooperation was
indispensable to our common success and we did not wish to be presented with the fait
accompli of a governmental slate containing key individuals with whom we would not
work. Khanh agreed and stated that certainly the key positions should be discussed with
us in advance.
/2/Telegram 1210 from Saigon, October 21, reported a conversation between Minh and
Taylor on that day during which Taylor stated that the United States had no preferred
candidates, but did not want to be surprised by the new leadership, and Minh related that
the Dalat Generals had resumed to Saigon with new assignments. (Ibid.) Telegram 880 to
Saigon, of the same date, asked for clarification of Khanh's role in the new government
and for specific recommendations on the position the United States should take with
regard to it. (Ibid.)
I asked Khanh if he is satisfied with the charter. He stated that he had not studied it in
detail and really had no qualified opinion. He repeated his complaint that he had never
been consulted officially and never saw the final draft. He did concede that the meeting
had taken place with Minh and Council representatives reported in Embtel 1199,/3/ but
does not consider this constituted official consultation. When I asked him specifically
about his views of the powers of the Chief of State and the position of the armed forces
under the charter, he admitted he was satisfied on both counts. He also believes that the
National Security Council arrangement is a good one although he would have preferred to
have included the Minister of Interior in this membership. I gathered from his responses
that he would not oppose the charter but probably would not display much public
enthusiasm for it. However, he has agreed to take part in the press conference tomorrow at
which the charter will be explained to the public.
/3/Document 385.
We then discussed some of the leading candidates for the key positions in the govt. Khanh
says that he favors Minh as Chief of State providing that he will retire from the army. Suu
is a second possibility although, since Minh controls the majority of the Council, Minh
should have no difficulty being selected provided he puts aside his uniform. One of the
reasons that Khanh favors Minh, I gather, is that the assignment of Minh would occasion
considerable embarrassment if he returned with his seniority to active duty in the army.
Khanh gave me every reason to believe that he is entirely satisfied for the moment to
assume the position of Commander-in-Chief. He considers that he could not be Minister
of Defense since he is a former President and head of state and by tradition barred from
accepting any cabinet post. This is an odd position for him to take since if persisted in, it
would appear to exclude Khanh from any future governmental post other than Chief of
State.
I asked Khanh if he thought they could find a Minister of Defense with whom he could
work harmoniously in his new assignment as Commander-in-Chief. He seemed
unconcerned on this score and mentioned General Don as one individual who, in a civilian
role, could fill the job.
With regard to the choice of Prime Minister and to other actions of the High National
Council. Khanh gives the impression of assuming a laissez faire attitude. He agrees that
the principal candidates appear to be Saigon Mayor Huong and his uncle, Minister of
Interior Vien. He considers Huong a good man but of uncertain health. Uncle Vien would,
of course, be a satisfactory choice to Khanh, but he tried to impress me with his
detachment from these high personnel matters.
I urged on him need for taking a more active role in helping to get the strongest possible
governmental line-up. The most promising slate appeared to me to be Minh as Chief of
State, Vien as PriMin and Khanh as Commander-in-Chief. Khanh did not disagree with
slate but showed no apparent feeling of responsibility to do anything about getting it
adopted.
I then asked about the Dalat Generals whose new assignments were published in the
morning papers. Khanh conceded that they were back in town, in fact working for him in
the General Staff Hqs. where we were meeting. He verified their assignments as reported
in Embtel 1210 but added that the announced assignments were largely "theoretical", that
in reality they were doing special studies for him at this time. [6-1/2 lines of source text
not declassified]
[2 paragraphs (11-1/2 lines of source text) not declassified]
Incidentally, the morning paper also carried the news of the promotion of the Young
Turks--Ky, Cang, Khanh, Thi. Presumably these promotions are to placate the Turks for
the return of the Dalat Generals.
Taylor

/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 15-1 VIET S. Secret; Priority; Limdis.
1259. I called on Pham Khac Suu at my request at 9:30 this evening accompanied by
Johnson and Manfull. Tran Van Van also present at my request.
I told them very bluntly and with some deliberate anger that we could not countenance the
Council's action of last evening in which important decisions taken without advising US
in advance./2/ This despite our previous understanding that US did not want to be
surprised by actions taken by Council. Suu immediately replied he would resign tomorrow
if we wished. I dismissed this but told Suu directly that he could not count on support of
the US unless he and the Council presented to us well in advance, and we were satisfied
with, their nominations for Prime Minister, Minister of Defense, other key Ministers, and
CINC Armed Forces.
/2/At that time, the High National Council had chosen Suu rather than Minh as Chief of
State.
In response to my questions Suu said he "was consulting" Council re Prime Minister
candidates. He said his current preference was for Ho Van Nhut.
Both he and Van professed ignorance concerning what now being discussed among
Generals at Vung Tau (which probably accurate). In response to further question he said
he would be satisfied with Khanh as Commander in Chief.
With respect to Minh, Suu merely turned to Van in response to my question as to what
they had in mind as a position for him. Van replied that they were thinking of creating a
new position of "Supreme Counsellor" to the Chief of State for Minh. While admitting
this not previewed in charter Van opined that Chief of State possessed power to create this
position.
I underlined essentiality of US aid and support to SVN and necessity our being currently
informed if we are to work effectively together. While we could overlook failure to
consult in past, we could not accept it for the future.
I specifically requested that Suu and Van convey the full sense and flavor of my remarks
to the full Council so that the Council was aware of the seriousness of the situation as we
viewed it.
Suu throughout stressed importance he attached to US aid and support.
In parting Johnson reiterated to Van importance conveying full sense of dmarche to
Council.
It clear even in this brief exchange that Suu not on top of situation and being coached by
[garble--Tran Van Van?]. He turned repeatedly to Van for prompting or direct replies to
questions.
Taylor
(McNamara)/1/
JCSM-902-64
/1/Source: Department of State, Bundy Files. Working Papers. Nov 1964, Vol. IV, JCS.
Top Secret; Sensitive.
SUBJECT
Courses of Action, Southeast Asia
1. In view of the recent estimate of the deteriorating situation in South Vietnam, the Joint
Chiefs of Staff believe that strong military actions are required now in order to prevent the
collapse of the US position in Southeast Asia. The agreed judgments expressed by the
intelligence community in SNIE 53-2-64/2/ have implications which are particularly
grave when note is taken that such judgments in the past have consistently been
characterized by restraint and moderation. The promulgation of this judgment by the
intelligence community requires prompt and responsive recognition by the Joint Chiefs of
Staff.
/2/Document 368.
2. Ambassador Taylor, by message JPS 303, DTG 161030Z October 1964,/3/ advised the
President concerning the worsening situation in Southeast Asia. He has drawn attention to
the increased rate of infiltration into South Vietnam and stated that with the advent of the
dry season this problem will assume a magnitude and urgency that will require immediate
attention.
/3/Not found.
3. The Joint Chiefs of Staff recognize that the lack of stability in the central government,
the low state of morale of the leadership, and the poorly trained civil service in the
Republic of Vietnam (RVN) militate against early success and that the solutions,
primarily political, to these problems are also critical to the eventual termination of the
insurgency.
4. The struggle in South Vietnam is a combination of political and military action and
there is an interaction between the two that permits a political success to be exploited
militarily and vice versa. Accordingly, a program of military and supporting political
actions with respect to the RVN has been developed on the basis that US withdrawal from
the RVN or Southeast Asia is not an acceptable course of action. This program envisages
the requirement now for accelerated and forceful actions both inside and outside of the
RVN to support a strategy of:
a. Depriving the Viet Cong (VC) of out of country assistance by applying continuously
increasing military pressures on the Democratic Republic of Vietnam (DRY) to the extent
necessary to cause the DRV to cease support and direction of the insurgency.
b. Depriving the VC of assistance within the RVN by expanding the counterinsurgency
effort--military, economic and political--within the RVN.
c. Continuing to seek a viable effective government in the RVN based on the broadest
possible consensus.
d. Maintaining a military readiness posture in Southeast Asia that:
(1) Demonstrates the US will and capability to escalate the action if required.
(2) Deters a major communist aggression in the area.
5. The proposed courses of action now recommended in support of the above strategy
include both new actions and certain actions previously recommended by the Joint Chiefs
of Staff. The recommended courses of action are appended as follows:
a. Actions within the RVN, Appendix A.
b. Actions outside the RVN, Appendix B.
6. The military actions in Appendices A and B are arranged in a general ascending order
of severity. The military course of action which would contribute most to defeating
insurgencies in Southeast Asia remains the destruction of the DRV will and capabilities as
necessary to compel the DRV to cease providing support to those insurgencies.
Consequently, the Joint Chiefs of Staff believe that the first six courses of action in
Appendix A and the first eight courses of action in Appendix B should be implemented
concurrently, now. While many of the remaining actions can also be taken concurrently,
the lists are arranged so that any of the actions may be selected, implemented, and
controlled, as required, to produce the desired effect while analyzing and estimating the
communist reaction. The Joint Chiefs of Staff advocate adoption of the program of
military and political courses of action as a means of applying increased pressures at all
available points. In the event our objectives are achieved during the course of the
program, it could, of course, be curtailed or terminated; however, the entire program of
courses of action may be required in an effort to destroy the DRV will and capability to
support the insurgency in the RVN and in Laos.
7. The Joint Chiefs of Staff, having noted the latest Special National Intelligence
Estimate, SNIE 10-3-64, dated 9 October 1964,/4/ believe that there is not a high risk of
introduction of Chinese communist ground force combat units unless major US/RVN
ground units had moved to occupy areas of the DRV or communist. held territory of
Northern Laos, or possibly, the Chinese communists had committed their air and had
subsequently suffered attacks on their bases. Further, the Joint Chiefs of Staff believe that
because of the present favorable balance of power it is within the capability of US force to
deal with large-scale aggression.
/4/A copy of this paper, entitled "Probable Communist Reactions to Certain Possible
US/GVN Courses of Action," is in Department of State. Ball Files: Lot 74 D 272 Vietnam
Intelligence Estimates.
8. In summary:
a. The Joint Chiefs of Staff request authority to implement now the first six courses of
action in Appendix A and the first eight courses of action in Appendix B. Further, the
Joint Chiefs of Staff recommend that courses of action 7 in Appendix A and 11 through
16 in Appendix B be implemented as required to achieve US objectives in Southeast Asia.
b. The Chief of Staff, US Army, and the Chief of Naval Operations request authority to
implement, as an extension of increasing pressures on the DRV, courses of action 9 and
10 of Appendix B, after appropriate implementation of the first eight courses of action.
c. The Chief of Staff, US Air Force, and the Commandant of the Marine Corps believe the
judgment reflected in SNIE 53-2-64 forces the conclusion that, if indeed, time has not run
out, it is fast doing so. Unless we move now to alter the present evolution of events, there
is great likelihood of a VC victory. They see no useful alternative to initiating action
against the DRV now through a planned and selective program of air strikes. Accordingly,
they recommend that courses of action 9 and 10 (as revised) in Appendix B be
implemented now, and that course of action 10 be revised to read:
"Selective air strikes against DRV to include air strikes on infiltration routes."
They believe that the initial effort should be focused on targets of military significance
and should be mounted in response to the next significant VC action in South Vietnam
(SVN). In this regard, they consider that a battalion size VC attack in SVN or an act of
VC terrorism against US personnel should be construed as significant. Additionally,
Ambassador Taylor has reported infiltration by northern born conscripts, and that the
Government of Vietnam (GVN) claims they come in organized units. He states "By any
objective standard their presence in SVN constitutes an invasion by hostile forces into the
territory of an ally of the US." Action to verify this GVN claim should be undertaken as a
matter of priority. If verified, it is considered a significant incident within the above
context.
9. The Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, supports the requests and recommendations
contained in subparagraphs 8 a and 8 b, above.
10. In view of the grave implications outlined above, the Joint Chiefs of Staff request that
these views be provided to the President at the earliest feasible time./5/
/5/In a memorandum to Wheeler, October 29, McNamara noted that he was sending a
copy of JCSM-902-64 to Taylor for comments. (Washington National Records Center,
RG 330, OASD/ISA Files: FRC 69 A 926, Box 1) Taylor was advised along these lines in
DEF 1342, October 29. (Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 VIET S; printed in
Pentagon Papers: Gravel Edition, vol. 111, p. 586)
Earle G. Wheeler/6/
Chairman
Appendix A
ACTIONS WITHIN RVN
Action
Forces
1. Influence the RVN to apply RVNAF and

increasing pressure on the VC. civil
authorities
Continue the pacification
Comments
Province Chiefs and military
commanders who exhibit strong
initiative in accomplishing pacification
program with emphasis on the

Hop Tac program to establish
the security of Saigon and its
surroundings.
2. Initiating a vigorous civil
affairs effort in RVN.
tasks should be given support even

though their areas may lie outside the
Hop Tac region.
US/RVNAF
3. Tighter control of personnel RVNAR and

civil
and materiel to include:
authorities
a. Identification, search,
seizure and detention
procedures to include direct
action against the VC
leadership in RVN.
b. Establishment of areas and
check points for control of
population movement.
c. Systematic search of all
vehicles and hand-carried
containers at the above
mentioned check points to
insure that no contraband is
carried therein.
To establish and maintain the authority

and the effectiveness of the
government in Saigon throughout the
territory south of the 1 7th parallel by
increasing the ARVN civil affairs
effort at lower levels. US Medical
Civic Action Program should be
continued at present level. Subsector
advisory teams should be used during
clearing operations to increase
emphasis on proper employment of
civil affairs teams. USOM planned
augmentation of public safety (i.e.,
police) advisory effort at province
level should be expedited. This
improved capability should be used to
improve the effectiveness of ARVN
Civil Affairs Teams which should
include police representatives where
feasible, to initiate population
identification and movement control,
to survey indigenous capabilities, and
supervise security and police
operations.
d. Establishment of strict
curfew in selected areas with a
clear-cut understanding of
substantial penalties for
violations.
4. Encourage the RVN to
Civil
recruit from the local PF
authorities
individuals who will volunteer
to serve as uniformed district
and village policemen. The
police organization should be
structured as a local force
responsive to orders from the
District Chief.
5. Support, as required, the
US/RVNAF
operations being developed to and civil
eliminate the supply to the VC authorities
through Mekong-Bassac
Rivers and associated
waterways.
No additional US personnel required.
6. Employ US fixed wing

aircraft to accomplish air
strikes within the RVN.
Day and night operations are required.
US
7. Deploy forces to implement US

appropriate CINCPAC
OPLANs.
To assist actively in fighting the

insurgency in RVN or to defeat
communist aggression as necessary.
Appendix B
ACTIONS OUTSIDE THE RVN
Action
Forces
1. Resume DeSoto Patrols.
US
2. Intensify 34A operations

with emphasis on MAROPs
and initiate air operations
against selected targets.
RVNAF
3. Maintain forward
deployments of US combat
units in Southeast Asia.
US
Comments
4. Permit RVN forces to

pursue and destroy VC
forces which cross into
Cambodia.
US/RVNAF
To prevent the use of "safe

haven" areas in Cambodia by the
VC.
5. Appropriate retaliatory
actions to DRV/VC
initiations.
US/RVNAF
NSAM 314 states that we should

be prepared to respond as
appropriate against the DRV/VC
in event of any attack on US units
or any special DRV/VC action
against South Vietnam.
CINCPAC is ready to retaliate.
6. Low-level reconnaissance US
probes of the DRV.
To gather intelligence and to

demonstrate US resolve in the
area.
7. Resume and expand cross US/Farmgate/RVNAF Air strikes and armed route
border operations to
reconnaissance and raid type of
interdict the flow of
joint operations, including
communist personnel and
airborne, as a show of force and
materiel moving through the
to demonstrate capabilities for
Laos Panhandle area.
destruction of supplies, equipment
and military installations in the
Laos Panhandle.
8. Attack LOC in DRV in
conjunction with air strike
operations on nearby targets
in RVN and Laos.
US/Farmgate/VNAF
9. Deploy concurrently with

or prior to initiating US air
strikes against the DRV,
necessary additional US
forces within the concept of
OPLAN 37-64.
1 Army Bde to
Thailand;
To destroy border targets such as

Mu Gia Pass.
1 MEB
(RLT/MAG) to
Danang;
2 F-100 Sqdns
to Thailand
10. Air strikes against

infiltration associated
targets in the DRV.
US/Farmgate/VNAF
11. Aerial mining of DRV

ports:
US/VNAF
a. Haiphong approaches
(three (3) fields)
Notify, through diplomatic

channels, other countries to stay
clear of mined ports.
Haiphong, as the single principal
port, handles 85% of all important
DRV imports and 70% of all

exports. Ocean-going ships
number an average of 40 per
month. Stopping or appreciably
reducing import shipping would
cut seriously into the DRV
economy and would force
diversion of traffic to alternate
transportation routes.
b. Cam Pha (one (1) field),
Hon Gay (three (3) fields)
Reduction of export shipping by

mining Cam Pha and Hon Gay
would produce a long-range
deteriorating effect on the DRV
economy and would restrict the
free use of alternate ports
following the mining of
Haiphong.
12. Naval
quarantine/blockade of the
DRV (also applies to
Cambodia).
US/RVNAF
13. Attack, with increasing

severity, targets in DRV.
US/VNAF
To further increase pressure on

the DRV to attempt to cause the
DRV to make a political decision
to cease support of the
insurgencies in Laos and the
RVN.
14. All-out air attack on the

DRV.
US
Strike the 94 targets contained in

JCSM 729-64 with the objective
of destroying the will and
capability of the DRV to support
insurgencies in SEA.
15. Amphibious/airborne
operations on the coastal
areas in DRV.
US/RVNAF
Either in conjunction with item 14

or as an additional pressure to
achieve the US objective, conduct
amphibious/airborne operations to
seize one or more lodgements in
the littoral of DRV. The
lodgement(s) to be of sufficient
magnitude to pose a plausible
threat to the DRV and yet limited
in area to optimize the capability
of the employed force to defend
against infiltration and attacks by
numerically larger ground forces.
These lodgements to be held until
the US objective is achieved or

the magnitude of overall military
operations is significantly
increased.
16. Commit US and allied
ground forces into
Southeast Asia as required.
US/Allied

Saigon, October 28, 1964-9 a.m.
/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 VIET S. Secret; Priority; Nodis.
Transmitted as telegram 1292 from Saigon, which is the source text.
Embtel 1205./2/ Two months ago today Khanh undertook the commitment to give up his
position as Prime Minister and to install a civilian government on a pattern to be designed
by the High National Council. He made good on his promise yesterday by submitting his
resignation and that of the cabinet to the newly designated Chief of State, Pham Khac
Suu.
/2/Telegram 1205, October 20, transmitted Taylor's report to the President for the
previous week. (Ibid.)
The box score of progress in moving toward civilian government includes the
promulgation of a reasonably satisfactory charter which has received generally favorable
acceptance, the selection of Suu as Chief of State, and the conversion of the High National
Council into the legislative element of the government pending the organization of a
National Assembly. We are not too happy over the choice of Suu who was slipped in
ahead of Minh at the last minute by pressure on the High National Council by a delegation
composed of Buddhist, Catholic, Hoa Hao, and Cao Dai leaders. Suu is a respected man
of high principles, but old beyond his years and clearly lacking in physical stamina.
However, he may be in for only a short time, as he has stated his unwillingness to
continue unless given a popular mandate at the time of the formation of the National
Assembly. In any case, after making the initial appointments of the Prime Minister and
Chief of State, he will have a nominal role so that I do not view his selection as cause for
great concern.
I have had two meetings thus far with Suu, the first/3/ to convey our displeasure at not
being consulted by the Council with regard to the final choice of Chief of State and our
expectation to be consulted in the future before final agreement on a government slate. I
have taken the position that we are not pushing individual candidates but that we have a
thoroughly legitimate right to insist upon a strong and stable government which can
utilize U.S. aid with maximum effect.
This morning, Suu showed that he got the point by calling me in to discuss the possible
composition of the government./4/ He seemed quite receptive to all my comments and
again indicated his intention to consult frequently with us. The danger we saw several
days ago of a clash between Khanh and the armed forces on the one hand and the High
National Council on the other seems allayed for the time being. Khanh now appears
sincere in his intention to return to the armed forces and to assist in their purification from
past political contamination. He called in 40 Generals last Saturday and, I hear, gave a
ringing plea for unity within the armed forces./5/ He appears quite ready to cooperate with
Suu in the formation of the new government. However, he and the armed forces will
henceforth be on the side lines watching intently the performance of the new civilian
government. If it appears to falter, the Generals may be expected to make a new grasp for
political power.
/4/The second meeting with Suu took place during the morning of October 27. Taylor
transmitted his account of it in telegram 1278 from Saigon, October 27. (Department of
State, Central Files, POL 15-1 VIET S)
5 Taylor transmitted Khanh's account to him of this October 24 meeting in telegram 1277
from Saigon, October 27. (Ibid., POL 15 VIET S) A similar account was transmitted in
TDCS 314/84655-64 from Saigon, October 25. Johnson Library, National Security File,
Vietnam Country File, Vol. XX, Cables; published in Declassified Documents, 1976,
23A)
Military activity this week was at about normal levels, offering nothing special to report.
The quality of South Vietnamese military actions was quite good; out of 77 contacts with
the VC observed by U.S. advisors, the latter rated 68 as having been successful.
The pacification program around Saigon, Hop Tac, is still moving very slowly. Inadequate
military and police forces remain an obstacle which we hope to overcome progressively.
All indications are that a long, hard process of mobilization and organization lies ahead.
Our hopes for the future rest heavily upon the new government which is being formed. In
reviewing the disappointments of recent months, we should not forget that there has never
been a stable government, and at times, no government at all in South Viet-Nam since
Diem was overthrown last November. Without a government to work with, we have been
seriously hampered in carrying out the military and economic programs which we have
promoted. No one can really say how far we would be today if we had had a reasonably
effective government in Saigon during the past year. Such a government will not appear
over-night, but we all hope that the modest advance toward restoring government which
has been made in the last two months will develop into an effective organization with
which we can mesh our U.S. efforts.
Taylor/6/

to CINCPAC.
1351. CINCPAC for POLAD. Embtel 1340./2/ I called on Khanh this morning (October
31) prior to the reception of the Diplomatic Corps by Chief of State Suu. I had with me
the provisional slate of Ministers reported in reftel.
/2/Telegram 1340, October 30, transmitted a list of the officials whom Huong wished to
include in his cabinet. (Ibid., POL 15-1 VIET S) Taylor commented that the Ministerial
candidates possessed a reputation for honesty and competence.
General Khanh, who had spent the last two days in Dalat, was unaware of the discussions
which PriMin-designate Huong has been conducting with possible Ministers. Hence, he
was interested in seeing the tentative slate which I showed him. He said that he did not
know about half of the Ministerial candidates but that he was satisfied with the key men,
Huong, Vien, Hach and Than. Without stressing the point, he indicated that he would
have preferred Quat to Tran Van Do as Minister of Foreign Affairs.
I expressed some concern about having Huong as Minister of National Defense in
addition to PriMin. This does not bother Khanh who says that he will see that Huong gets
plenty of help (no doubt about that) in conducting the work of the Ministry of National
Defense. He anticipates the need of a Dep Minister to reinforce Huong in this area.
I explained my feeling of a need for a War Cabinet consisting of the Heads of National
Defense, Interior, FonAffs, Public Works, Information and Rural Affairs, preferably
chaired by Dep PriMin Vien. Khanh also favors such an arrangement and promised to
push it. He also assured me that the weekly NSC/US Mission Council meetings will be
continued. In general, he expects that Huong will work with the Americans about as he
has.
I took the opportunity to mention the need which Gen Westmoreland feels to meet on a
regular basis with Khanh about once a week. Khanh who is aware of the accumulation of
important military matters which has built up over the past weeks readily agreed. At one
point, I expressed surprise over General Ky's recent visit to Suu during which the press
reports that Ky promised his support to the new govt. I asked if Ky considers himself the
spokesman for the so-called Young Turks and in a position to offer or withhold support
for the govt. Khanh replied rather lamely that the army had fallen into such bad habits in
the last year that it would be difficult to get the Generals quickly out of the habit of
making pronouncements and dabbling in politics. He recognizes that it is one of his
principal jobs to get them to mend their ways.
In summary, I would say that Khanh and the senior officers whom he represents accept
the proposed govt but with little real enthusiasm. I think that they can be counted upon to
give it a reasonable try but may grow quickly impatient if it proves to be ineffective.
Taylor
391. Memorandum From the Commander, Military Assistance Command, Vietnam

(Westmoreland) to the Ambassador in Vietnam (Taylor)/1/
Saigon, October 31, 1964.
/1/Source: Washington National Records Center, RG 84, Saigon Embassy Coordinator's
Files: FRC 68 A 5612, Council Meetings. Top Secret.
SUBJECT
U.S. Posture Toward the Emerging GVN
1. Over the last two weeks, considerable thought has been given to an effective modus
operandi between the new GVN and the U.S. Mission. I firmly believe, U.S. policy
permitting, that we should be tougher and more exacting about GVN performance. Unless
we have a new and more hard-headed approach, success will probably be elusive. The
point is that the Vietnamese officialdom are convinced that the U.S. is irrevocably
committed, for political and strategic reasons, to a policy of assisting the GVN; and that,
consequently, massive aid will continue to be forthcoming without quid pro quo. As a
result, the GVN takes U.S. assistance and U.S. representatives for granted-as is
demonstrated by repeated failure to consult with us prior to making political and military
decisions of major impact on governmental operations and pacification. This behavior
might be acceptable if the VN were operating effectively or, at the very minimum, gave
evidence of a real desire to do what was required to win the war. The fact is, however, that
the conduct of the government is characterized by inefficiency, corruption, disinterest and
lack of motivation. The GVN is not winning the war; and thus, the U.S. would appear to
have no other alternative than to lay things on the line.
2. It would therefore seem in order to enunciate to GVN leadership that U.S. support at
current or expanded levels is contingent upon demonstrated GVN performance and/or
specific reforms, plus assurance that the U.S. Mission will be consulted on all significant
matters. For such a policy to succeed there must be disciplined acceptance thereof within
the entire U.S. official community, in Washington and South Vietnam; there must be no
further mention of "blank checks"; and there must be Washington agreement to relinquish
greater control and manipulation of programs to the U.S. Mission. The remainder of the
paper assumes that there is agreement on these basic propositions.
3. Lists of criteria to be met and/or deficiencies to be corrected by the new GVN are easy
to prepare. The four basics you propose/2/ are fundamental; but they are so broadly stated
as to be difficult to measure without further definition. We had refined these criteria, from
a military standpoint, in Inclosure #1 (which bears a resemblance to my earlier
submission, Inclosure #1a)./3/
/3/None of the enclosures is printed.
4. To focus further in on the military sphere, we have compiled, at Inclosure #2, a list of
specific deficiencies which, collectively, constitute the reasons why the pacification
campaign is not advancing. While all deficiencies are not of equal importance, the extent
of the list points up the obvious fact that dramatic improvement is not likely to be
forthcoming immediately. By the same token, it is not likely that the new government will
be able to meet the four basic criteria except over a period of time and then only in degree.
Stated otherwise, the measurement of GVN performance will probably have to be based
more on evaluation of its intent, attitude and effort than on the attainment of specific
benchmarks.
5. Whatever the basis for assessment of GVN performance, the U.S. Mission should be in
a position to exert leverage to call forth the kind of effort, attitude or action considered
necessary. We probably have more sanctions available within the Mission as a whole than
we realize. There are conspicuously effective sanctions available to USOM. While none
are dramatic individually, there are quite a few available to my command. In the course of
normal business with the GVN, at all levels, there are many occasions when it could be
made clear that conditions attach to something the GVN might need or want from us. For
example, the Commander, 2d Air Division, is in position to inform his counterpart that
VNAF A1H squadrons must meet certain performance standards before he could support
a jet replacement program. Our Corps and Division Advisors are in a position to insure
that Army Aviation support is withheld from operations which are ill conceived,
inefficiently organized or launched without adequate intelligence. Other advisors could be
empowered to make clear that requests for increases in personnel or equipment would not
be forwarded, with favorable recommendation, to Saigon unless and until administrative
overhead were cut to an acceptable figure. As an illustrative type sanction, in the military
area, see Inclosure #3. While the level at which application of sanctions should be
authorized needs careful consideration, the real point is that many echelons within the
U.S. Mission could combine to implement a new look in U.S. assistance-an evident
tightening of the screws, an establishment of preconditions for assistance.
6. As the foregoing makes clear, we should be cautious about raising the level of U.S.
commitments until the new GVN has demon" strafed reasonable stability, determination
and the ability. These qualities are not likely to be discernible for several weeks.
Nonetheless, the following are preliminary thoughts on the suggested categories of
widened aid which have direct military implications:
a. Support for a Larger Military/Paramilitary/Police Structure (see Inclosure #4).
If there is a demonstrable requirement for more security forces, we must be prepared to
support same.
b. Route 9 Development Project.
The staff has done a preliminary study of this grandiose concept. It is feasible from a
construction standpoint but will require employment of a U.S. Corps, in addition to what
our Asian allies can provide.
c. Token Jet Interceptor Force for VNAF.
You are up-to-date on our views as a result of the most recent briefing on this subject.
d. Joint Planning for External Operations (see Inclosure #5).
e. Improvement to the City and Port of Saigon.

The recommendations contained in the report of the Joint Strategic Construction
Committee are believed to be the best approach to adopt.
W. C. Westmoreland
General, United States Army
392. Intelligence Study Prepared by Headquarters, Military Assistance Command,

Vietnam/1/
Saigon, October 31, 1964.
/1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 218, JCS Files.
Confidential. A covering memorandum, dated October 31; a table of contents; and
Sections II-VII, which give specifics on statistics, infiltration groups, sources,
personalities, designations, and a map of the infiltration routes are not printed.
INFILTRATION STUDY
VIET CONG FORCES
REPUBLIC OF VIETNAM
Section I--General
1. Purpose
This study has been prepared to allow assessment of the extent of infiltration of personnel
into the Republic of Vietnam (RVN) by the Democratic Republic of Vietnam (DRY) and
to provide reference data for further research into the development of Viet Cong (VC)
order of battle. It replaces the USMACV Infiltration Study, published on 20 Apr 64/2/
which may be destroyed.
/2/Not found
2. Scope
a. The data presented here were extracted, in the main, from interrogation of prisoner of
war (IPW) reports of 187 VC who were captured or who defected in the RVN during the
past five years. Of these 187 prisoners, 164 are actual infiltrators and have provided
information on their own, and in many cases, several other infiltration groups. Prisoner
information is considered to be generally valid and it constitutes the primary definitive
source material upon which to base an assessment of VC infiltration. Captured documents
have provided a limited amount of information concerning infiltration. Exceptionally, a
large group of documents captured in the vicinity of Ca Lu, Quang Tri Province, in June
1960, provided the first substantial evidence of infiltration. These documents consisted of
records of rations issued over an eight-month period to VC personnel infiltrating their way
further South.
b. This study is comprised primarily of identifier data. These are:
(1) Designations of infiltration groups, designations of the units to which the infiltration
groups were assigned, designations of the units of the People's Army of Vietnam (PAVN)
which provided the personnel for infiltration. Researchers are advised that the PAVN unit
(s) listed may not have been the only contributor(s) for a specific infiltration group. The
PW, in some cases, knows only the unit in which he previously served. Further, reported
PAVN units are listed whether or not they agree with current PAVN order of battle
holdings.
(2) Time and place of pre-infiltration training.
(3) Time of infiltration.
(4) Infiltration route.
(5) Subsequent moves and assignments in the RVN.
(6) Key personalities.
(7) Source of information.
3. Background
a. In 1955, following the Geneva Agreements of 1954 which ended the French Indo-China
War, Vietnam was partitioned at the 17th parallel. In accordance with those agreements,
the opposing sides were required to relocate their military forces--to return them, so to
speak, to their own side of the imaginary fence.
b. Although, according to French sources, the DRV did relocate some 100,000 persons,
including some 40,000 military personnel of ethnic South and Central Vietnamese and
Montagnard origin, it later become evident that, even while signing the agreements, the
representatives and the government of the DRV had at no time considered abiding by the
agreements. Several thousand political agitators and activists and at least three
experienced rifle battalions were left in the south with orders to remain dormant.
c. In 1956, the US-backed president of the RVN--Ngo Dinh Diem--blocked the
referendum called for by the Geneva Agreements which was to decide the form of
government that would rule over a reunited Vietnam.
d. The Communists, who saw their hopes for a legal takeover of the whole country vanish
by this maneuver, ordered their dormant "stay behinds" to commence propaganda
activities to put pressure on the new and inexperienced government of the RVN. It is
possible that the DRV even hoped to overthrow the government without having to resort
to military activity.
e. In 1957, the renascent Communist propaganda teams started to back up their arguments
with weapons and instituted a program of proselytizing RVN armed forces officers and
men to the VC cause. During this same period the standard Communist tactic of
infiltrating and subverting legal political parties in the RVN was undoubtedly going on.
f. In 1958 and 1959, the now "armed mission teams", having achieved a degree of popular
support in the rural areas through pressure, argument, terror and subversion, began, here
and there, to organize guerrilla groups drawing on the local populace for personnel and
instructing them in the manufacture and use of primitive weapons. The guerrilla teams, in
turn, expanded the local campaigns of propaganda, terrorism and harassment to lend
weight to the VC argument for national unity. The guerrilla teams were also tasked with
the mission of reestablishing the former Viet Kinh (now called Viet Cong) secret bases
located in almost inaccessible mountainous and jungle-covered areas in the RVN.
g. In 1959, several units were sent from the DRV into Laos to clear areas in Southern
Laos, contiguous to the Vietnamese border, of various Laotian military elements. This
was followed by the sending of elements of the 70th Transportation Group, PAVN, to
establish relay stations connecting Southern DRV with the northern area of the RVN. To
date this unit, directly subordinate to Hanoi, remains in control of the infiltration of both
men and material from the DRV, through Laos, to the tri-border area of Laos, Thua Thien
and Quang Nam Provinces in the RVN. Starting with some 400 men in 1959, it presently
consists of some 2,000 men and porters responsible for about 20
"Communication/Liaison/Transport" stations along what the VC call the Main Corridor.
h. By February 1960 the Communists' preliminary steps for a "War of Liberation" had
been achieved and the stage was set for the infiltration of retrained veterans of the French
Indo-China War and for increasing the ranks of the "stay behind" political activists--group
1, consisting of 400 men, departed the Xuan Mai Training Center near Hanoi on 20 Feb
60, destined for the newly established VC base area called Do Xa in the jungle covered
fastness of Western Quang Ngai Province. This group eventually become the 70th
Battalion which today continues to operate in Quang Tin Province. Group 1 was but the
first of many similar groups that have followed the same jungle paths to the south to form
or be integrated into various military, political, economic or agricultural units which
comprise the covert apparatus--what the French termed the "parallel hierarchy"--which
aims to gain control of the RVN.
i. In September 1960, the 3rd Congress of the Lao Dong (Workers' or Communist) Party
of the DRV openly announced the objective of "Liberating South Vietnam through a
peoples revolutionary struggle."
j. In late 1960, the DRV announced the formation of the National Front for the Liberation
of South Vietnam (NFLSVN), an organ accurately described by its title of front-ostensibly to group all national, professional, political, student, and other groups to lead
them toward the new era of liberty and freedom--Communist style. DRV Defense
Minister Vo Nguyen Giap called for the "building of revolutionary armed forces" in the
RVN to implement the policy of "people's war--people's army".
k. Early in 1961, Hanoi announced the creation of the National Army for South Vietnam.
Over 4,500 men already had been infiltrated into the RVN to form the nucleus of this
army.
1. In 1961, the Viet Cong activated the Central Office, South Vietnam (COSVN) in Tay
Ninh Province, RVN. COSVN is the supreme organ of the Lao Dong Party in the RVN
and directs all VC activities in the RVN.
m. To date the DRV has continued to infiltrate military, political, propaganda, security,
proselytizing, economic, financial and educational specialists into the RVN. Probably
having exhausted the pool of veterans of the French Indo-China War, in 1964 the DRV
started sending in young draftees of ethnic North Vietnamese origin. Information derived
from IPW reports and documents indicate that over 34,000 men have thus far been
infiltrated into the RVN. It is undoubtable that not all information concerning all
infiltration groups and total numbers of men involved has or ever will become available to
intelligence agencies. Depending on the year involved available information is estimated
to be anywhere from 10% to 66% incomplete and averages about 30% for the period
under consideration. Therefore the total could be as much as 45,000 for the period 1959 to
date.
4. Formation and Training of Infiltration Groups
a. Through 1963, all the known military infiltrators consisted of veterans of the French
Indo-China War who had served in the area now governed by the RVN. Many of these
men, upon "regrouping" to the DRV, were conditionally discharged to work on various
communal farm sites and in industry. Others were retained in active military units.
b. When the DRV infiltration program got into full swing in 1961, two major preinfiltration centers were established near Hanoi--Xuan Mai and Son Tay, the home
stations of the 338th and 330th Divisions (Brigades) respectively. Other centers were
established at Gia Lam, Ha Dong, Vinh, Nghi Van, Hoa Binh, Vinh Linh, Xuan Than and
in Hanoi. Other elements were responsible for conducting pre-infiltration training--such as
the 304th, 325th, 350th and 380th Divisions and the 120th Independent Regiment.
c. A typical pre-1964 military infiltration group consists of men drawn from active duty
units and/or re-called to active duty from the farms and work sites. They were directed to
one of the training centers and formed into training groups. Toward the end of the normal
three-month training cycle (shorter for political, economic and administrative specialists,
longer for weapons specialists), the men were grouped into packets or units consisting
primarily of former comrades in arms or of men from the same region in the RVN. The
training cycle normally ends with a celebration attended by high ranking DRV military
and civilian officials.
d. Normally, no furlough is permitted following pre-infiltration training and the
infiltrators are forbidden to divulge the fact that they are destined to the RVN.
e. The group entrucks at its training center and travels via Route 1 to the vicinity to the
Demilitarized Zone at the 17th parallel. Thence, in the majority of cases, further
movement is by foot via Laos and the Main Corridor to the south.
f. Frequently, PWs report being members of the element conducting their pre-infiltration
training. In some cases, this is true; in many cases, the man may have been a member of
the unit during the French Indo-China War; but in the majority of cases, the man has had
no active military duty for a number of years and has "adopted" the training unit's
designation as his own. This is particularly true of the draftees infiltrated in 1964,
inasmuch as their only connection with PAVN has been as a training unit which, in their
ignorance, they mistake for a regular army unit.
g. To date, there is no evidence that regular PAVN units have infiltrated the RVN. In all
cases, men from a number of units are mixed with recalled veterans to form packets or
draftees are formed into unit or replacement packets which will be cadred by veterans of
the French Indo-China War either before infiltration or after arrival in the RVN.
5. Control of Infiltration
a. An agency known as the Unification Commissariat in the DRV, subordinate to the
Central Committee of the Lao Dong Party, is reported by PWs to be directing the
infiltration effort. A specific interest, supervision, and participation by the PAVN Joint
General Staff and the Ministry of Defense is apparent.
b. The link between the DRV and northern RVN appears to remain under DRV control. A
number of PWs have stated that this control extends from Quang Binh Province (DRV),
through Laos to the tri-border area of Laos/Thua Thien and Quang Nam Provinces in the
RVN. This stretch of the Main Corridor is organized and operated by the 70th
Transportation Group, mentioned above. It is probable that none of the relay stations are
located within RVN territory until the route reaches Southern Thua Thien or Northern
Quang Nam Provinces.
c. From Quang Nam Province to the south, responsibility for the infiltration corridor
comes under the jurisdiction of COSVN, with Headquarters Military Region 5 (MR 5)
exercising primary control in the northern half of the country through its
Transportation/Communication/Liaison Section. The functions of this section are as
follows:
(1) To maintain operational control of the infiltration of both personnel and supplies via
the Main Corridor which generally follows the international border of the RVN with Laos
and Cambodia and via the so-called Ho Chi Minh Trail which parallels the Main Corridor
some 100 kilometers to the east and runs along a series of ridges to the vicinity of War
Zone D in Phnoc Thanh Province.
(2) To study measures and prepare plans for the control of communications (travel) in
accordance with the situation existing in each province.
(3) To establish new routes and/or close old routes in accordance with the tactical
situation and the terrain.
(4) To develop procedures for issuing movement papers, to include a system of code
signs, so as to minimize the chance of their being counterfeited.
(5) To keep abreast of the status of personnel and supplies that are due in from the north.
(6) To be familiar with passwords and cover designations of agencies and provinces of
other Military Regions so as to avoid mistakes in the shipment of materials.
d. This control by MR 5 concerns only the Main Corridor and the Ho Chi Minh Trail, the
two major North-South routes leading from the DRV. Other North-South routes and EastWest feeder routes are the responsibility of the various provinces; however, the systems of
control and relay stations are similar if not duplicated.
6. Organization of the Main Corridor
a. Since the beginning of 1963 the Main Corridor has been used exclusively by all
infiltration groups and it is conceivable that the Ho Chi Minh Trail has been abandoned in
whole or in part.
b. The Main Corridor handles two different types of movements--personnel and material
(including correspondence), and is organized to handle each by different methods.
c. Infiltration of Personnel.
(1) The system to handle personnel requires relatively few men. In essence, the system
comprises a series of liaison or relay stations each manned by three to seven men. The
stations are a day's march apart, anywhere from 6 or 7 to 20 to 22 kilometers depending
on the terrain and tactical situation.
(2) The major duties of these stations are to guide the infiltration groups from north to
south. To maximize security, the guides are kept ignorant of the location of the two
adjacent stations. The guides meet the incoming group about half-way between stations
around mid-day. They verify the credentials of the group and then lead it to the vicinity of
their station.
(3) Current security regulations stipulate that:
(a) The infiltration group will bivouac no nearer than 300 meters to the relay station and
preferably 1000 meters away.
(b) Only the leader of the group, if anyone, is allowed to enter the station area proper.
There the credentials are checked again and the rations (rice) are drawn for the group.
(c) The members of the group are allowed to move about within a limited area to obtain
firewood and drinking water.
(d) No noise is permitted and cooking fires are allowed only after sunset.
(e) During movement members will not make noise, contact local inhabitants, or walk in
disorderly groups.
(f) Passive anti-aircraft defense calls for infiltrators to "freeze" if low-flying aircraft fly
over head.
(4) Road crossings are conducted by special teams.
(a) The group stops about 100 meters from the road--no smoking or talking is permitted.
(b) The members cross the road on special cloths rayed on the road to prevent foot prints.
(c) The group re-assembles 100 meters beyond the road and continues movement.
(5) River and bridge crossings are similar to road crossings.
(6) The guide conducts the group about half-way to the next station where a new guide
will be waiting.
d. Infiltration of material (including correspondence).
(1) The system to handle the movement of material requires a relatively large number of
personnel, particularly coolies--about 400 to 600 men for every ten stations.
(2) The number of transport stations is approximately double that of the relay stations and
they are located about one half-day's march apart. This allows the coolies to haul the
material to the next station and return to their home station within a working day.
(3) Material and correspondence is picked up or delivered at main stations along the Main
Corridor by coolies under the control of the province within whose boundaries is located
the recipient or sender. The Main Corridor teams are then responsible for movement
between Main Stations.
f. [sic] Identified Transport Units (Military Region 5).
(1) The 72nd Transport Group infiltrated to the Quang Nam/Quang Tin area in Jan 63 to
augment a previously existing but unsuspected transport organization operating in that
area.
(2) The Binh Son Group consists of approximately 1000 men responsible for 10 transport
stations in Quang Nam.
(3) The Nam Son Group consists of approximately 700 men responsible for 9 transport
stations in Quang Tin.
(4) The Tay Son Group consists of a probable, but unconfirmed 1000-1200 men
responsible for an unknown number of transport stations in Kontum.
(5) Four elements identified as CO 2, CO 7, CO 8 and CO 9 are responsible for
transportation in Pleiku Province.
7. Transport Elements South of Military Region 5
a. A 270th Company, which possibly is a transport security unit, is confirmed in the
Quang Duc/Phnoc Long area.
b. A 280th Company, which also possibly is a transport security unit, is confirmed in the
Phuoc Long/Phuoc Thanh area.
8. Summary of Infiltration
a. During the period 1959-1960 some 4500 infiltrators have been reported coming into the
RVN. Available information fails to reveal the destination of the majority or the type of
personnel involved. The first infiltrated major military unit (Group t) came in during early
1960 and is still active as a unit under the designation 70th Battalion subordinate to the
Quang Tin Provincial Commissariat in Military Region 5. Commencing in 1959 and
through 1960 the 70th Transportation Group organized and established the Main Corridor
in Laos linking the DRV with the RVN. Probably the bulk of the infiltrators were destined
to augment the nucleus of administrative, propaganda and logistical elements who had
remained in the RVN after the French Indo-China War.
b. During 1961, some 5400 men are reported as having come in to the RVN. The bulk of
these (5300) were retrained military personnel of South Vietnamese origin and were
destined primarily for the northern half of the RVN (Military Regions 5, 6 and 7). Most of
these groups went into the formation of main force battalions and regimental support
companies.
c. During 1962, some 13,000 men are reported as having infiltrated. As in 1961, the
overwhelming majority of these men were retrained veterans of the French Indo-China
War of South Vietnamese origin. Almost 9,000 of these men were equally divided
between Military Regions 5 and 7; almost 2,000 were sent to Military Region 8; over
1,000 went to Military Region 6. As in 1961, most of these men were used to form main
force battalions and a few companies.
d. During 1963, the numbers of infiltrators dropped substantially--to about 6,200 as
compared to 1962. Of these, almost 4,600 went to Military Region 5 and were used
primarily to form combat support elements for existing rifle battalions--both main force
and local. Of the total, some 580 were reported in civilian groups which included various
specialists to augment the VC financial and economic effort following the cessation of
such support by the DRV in June 1963. It became evident that the DRV was reaching the
end of its available pool of veterans of the French Indo-China War--many of the PWs
were, and reported other infiltrators to be, in their late 30s and early 40s.
e. During 1964, to date, about 75% of reported Infiltrators have consisted of young
draftees of native North Vietnamese origin. As in previous years, of the 4,700 men
reported to have infiltrated by August, over 400 have been destined to Military Region 5
to form new main force battalions to replace experienced main force battalions which
have been transferred to local (provincial) control.
f. Over the period 1959 to date, reported infiltrators number slightly over 34,000 men. Of
these, some 31,500 have been military personnel. Almost 50% of these (16,000) were
destined for Military Region 5; approximately 20% (6,100) for Military Region 7; and the
remainder were assigned to Military Regions 6, 8 and 9 in that order. The destination and
assignment of over 7,000 men remains unknown.
9. Estimate of Transport/Communications/Liaison System
a. Although only portions of the system have been reliably reported and identified, the
systems of relay and transport stations can be fairly well visualized as far South as Tay
Ninh Province to consist of over 100 stations employing up to 6,000 men for the transport
and protection of goods and the guiding of infiltration groups.
b. South of Tay Ninh Province, available information permits only a guess that the system
extends as far as the tip of the Ca Mau Peninsula and the U Minh War Zone. If such is the
case, the total system could well number in the vicinity of 10,000 men.
10. Conclusions
a. The indicated infiltration of over 34,000 men since 1959 demonstrates the existence of
a well-planned and coordinated effort on the part of the DRV to subject the RVN to covert
military invasion.
b. The existence of a well organized and functioning transport/infiltration system, the full
extent of which is only beginning to be realized, will lead to a new estimate of VC
logistical capabilities.
c. Although the amount of material being infiltrated remains an unknown factor, the
system is limited only by the amount of goods available and the men to carry them. The
Battle of Dien Bien Phu demonstrated that the VC are capable of man packing even heavy
artillery pieces through unprepared jungle-covered mountainous terrain. This permits the
estimate that the present organized system is well-capable of logistically supporting the
VC main and local forces in heavy weapons and in ammunition.
d. It is estimated that the DRV will continue to support the VC through the infiltration of
cadre, political and financial specialists and in surplus man power.
e. There is no evidence to date to indicate that regular PAVN units have infiltrated into the
RVN.

1964-1968, Volume I
Vietnam, 1964
Department of State
Washington, DC
XII. Proceedings of the NSC Working Group on Vietnam, November 1December 7

Saigon, November 1, 1964--10:30 a.m.
/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 VIET S. Top Secret; Flash; Limdis.
Repeated to CIA, JCS, the Secretary of Defense, the White House, and CINCPAC.
Files: Lot 68 F 8) Received at 10:07 p.m., October 31.
1357. VC attack on Bien Hoa/2/ is a deliberate act of escalation and a change of the
ground rules under which they have operated up to now. It should be met promptly by an
appropriate act of reprisal against DRV target, preferably an airfield. Since both US and
GVN have been victims of this attack and since ultimate objective should be convince
Hanoi to cease aid to VC (and not merely to lay off US), the retaliatory action should be
made by a combined US/VNAF effort. Immediate objective would be to reduce
probability of similar attacks on other crowded US facilities such as Danang and Tan Son
Nhut and to offset the depressive effect of this action on the new government to which
this attack is an affront on its national day.
/2/Shortly after midnight, October 31, Bien Hoa airfield came under a mortar attack which
killed 4 U.S. servicemen, wounded 30, and destroyed or damaged 27 aircraft.
We are considering targets to recommend. Phuc Yen is clearly the most attractive but we
are looking at lesser alternatives. Attack should be launched preferably within 24 hours, at
latest within 48 hours.
I request authority to contact Huong and Khanh to get agreement on principle of
combined reprisal.
See no need now for further statement in Washington beyond MACV No. 1, 1 Nov to
NMCC./3/ Also we should not move dependents at this time or take any overt action
which might suggest this intention.
/3/This cable transmitted the text of a brief statement given by Westmoreland on the
attack at Bien Hoa. (Washington National Records Center, RG 319. HQDA Message
Center, Reel 12011)
Taylor

Saigon, November 1, 1964--4 p.m.
Repeated to CIA, JCS, the Secretary of Defense, the White House, and CINCPAC.
According to another copy, this telegram was drafted by Johnson and Taylor. (Ibid.,
Saigon Embassy Files: Lot 68 F 8) Received at 3:23 a.m., November 1.
1360. Embtel 1357, Deptel 976./2/ Following is Embassy/MACV message:
/2/Telegram 1357 is supra; telegram 976, October 31, reported that the whole situation
and Taylor's recommendations would be considered at a meeting at the highest level at
noon on November 1. (Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 VIET S)
1. We believe following principles should be applied in our retaliatory action:
A. Tit should be as close to tat as possible.
B. Action should be mounted from SVN.
C. GVN should participate with U.S.
2. Tit for tat principle clearly indicates Phuc Yen airfield outside of Hanoi. However,
presence of MIG's and heavy flak defense does not permit VNAF participation. Unless
Phuc Yen is hit at the same time or before any other target in NVN, any aircraft now on
Phuc Yen will in all probability be dispersed to several fields complicating the problem of
subsequently locating and destroying them. Next most suitable and productive target is
Vit Thu Lu barracks (target 36)/3/ followed by other two targets in same general area-Chap Le barracks (target 39) and Xom Bang ammunition depot (target 64). Advantage of
these targets is that they are individually within VNAF capabilities with or without U.S.
participation. According to our intelligence, Vit Thu Lu appears to be especially and
closely related to infiltration.
/3/Reference is to item 36 on the 94-target study list, August 24; see footnote 7, Document
331.
3. Thus the combination of maximum effect would be U.S. strike against Phuc Yen (70
sorties) with simultaneous U.S./VNAF strikes against Vit Thu Lu (about 40 sorties) and
targets 39 (about 45 sorties) and 64 (about 50 sorties). If attack on Phuc Yen is not
approved at this time, I recommend U.S./VNAF strike on Vit Thu Lu and would like to
see targets 39 and 64 included.
4. If a favorable decision on striking Phuc Yen is reached at your noon meeting November
1, attack can be made at first light November 3 Saigon time. Vit Thu Lu and targets 39
and 64 require 24 hours between decision and strike to permit adequate VNAF pilot
briefing. Foregoing assumes all U.S. strikes to be made by Second Air Division.
5. I strongly urge that any strikes approved be viewed as the inauguration of a new policy
of tit for tat reprisals in retaliation for major Viet Cong depredations. I recommend that,
immediately following completion of strikes, U.S. and GVN jointly announce that such
retaliation will henceforth be the rule, making our statement broad enough to cover major
acts of sabotage, terrorism, destruction of industrial facilities, and the interruption of
arterial rail and highway communications.
Taylor
Washington, November 1, 1964--4:19 p.m.
7425, 381 Vietnam. Top Secret; Immediate; Limdis. Repeated to COMUSMACV,
Saigon, CIA, the White House, and the Department of State. Also printed in Pentagon
Papers: Gravel Edition, vol. III, p. 587.
1451. Personal for Admiral Sharp, General Westmoreland and Ambassador Taylor from
CJCS.
1. Highest level meeting to discuss courses of action related to Bien Hoa attack tentatively
scheduled for 1300 hours Washington time 2 November.
2. At preliminary meeting same subject this date,/2/ concern was expressed that proposed
US retaliatory/punitive actions could trigger North Vietnamese/ChiCom air and ground
retaliatory acts. Highest authority desires to consider in conjunction with US military
actions, increased security measures and precautionary moves of US air and ground units
to protect US dependents, units and installations against North Vietnamese/ChiCom
retaliation.
/2/The meeting took place at the White House at approximately 12:30 p.m. with the
President, Rusk, McNamara, McGeorge and William Bundy, and Ball in attendance.
(Johnson Library, Johnson Daily Diary and Rusk Appointment Book) No record of the
meeting has been found.
3. JCS are considering the following in connection with proposed US punitive actions
against the DRV:/3/
/3/On November 1, presumably before the meeting at the White House, the loins Chiefs of
Staff made oral recommendations to McNamara concerning the response to Bien Hoa.
They felt that Taylor's "tit-for-tat" was unduly restrictive and limited U.S. initiative, nor
did they espouse joint action with South Vietnam. They proposed instead a series of
specific actions to be taken in the next 3 days which included air strikes, landing of U.S.
forces, and evacuation of dependents. These recommendations were formalized in JCSM933-64, November 4. (Washington National Records Center, RG 330, OSD/ISA Files:
FRC 69 A 7425, 381 Vietnam)
a. Outshipment of US dependents prior to or simultaneous with initiation of US air strikes.

b. Movement of SLF afloat to Da Nang airbase and two Army or Marine battalions by air
to Saigon area to provide local security to US personnel and installations.
c. Movement one Marine Hawk battalion from 29 Palms, California to SVN.
d. Movement of [or?] augmentation land-based and carrier-based air required to optimize
execution of course of action IA CINCPAC Frag Order 3./4/
/4/Transmitted in CINCPAC telegram 280210Z, October 28, CINCPAC Frag Order No.
3, "Punitive and Crippling Reprisal Actions on Targets in North Vietnam," provided a list
of responses in the event that the DeSoto patrol was attacked. Option IA listed airfields,
POL, and port facilities to be attacked on the first day. (Department of State, Vietnam
Working Group Files: Lot 72 D 219, DeSoto September)
4. In addition to above, JCS are considering military utility of employing US aircraft in
South Vietnam in country to augment VNAF and Farmgate.
e. Forward movement from CONUS or within PACOM of around, sea, and air units to
WESTPAC and alert of additional units in CONUS as might be required to implement
appropriate portions of CINCPAC OPLAN 32-64 and/or CINCPAC OPLAN 39-65./5/
/5/Copies of CINCPAC Operations Plan 32-64, November 6, 1963, entitled "Defense of
Mainland Southeast Asia," and CINCPAC Operations Plan 39-65, September 5, which
dealt with responses to Chinese aggression, were attached to Document 411.
5. Request comments of addressees ASAP./6/
/6/Sharp replied in telegram 020400Z, November 2, concurring in items 3c-e and 4,
noting that the action in item 3b had been started, and deferring comment on 3a to
COMUSMACV and the Embassy in Saigon. Johnson Library, National Security File,
Vietnam Country File, Vol XXI, Cables)

Exdis. Drafted by William Bundy and cleared with Rusk, McNamara, and McGeorge
Bundy. Repeated to CINCPAC and the Department of Defense.
978. Saigon for MACV. State-Defense Message.
1. We have weighed carefully your recommendations Embtels 1357 and 1360,/2/ and
supporting messages MACV 010359Z and CINCPAC 010501Z./3/ There is no doubt here
that this event adds considerably to cumulative factors pointing toward much harder
policy in near future. At same time, we would find it hard to portray attack as major act of
escalation in itself, since it differs only in degree and extent of damage from such
previous incidents as Card sinking/4/ and recurrent attacks on US personnel and
equipment playing military roles. We have also been reluctant give any appearance
reacting only when US personnel affected.
/3/The former strongly endorsed Taylor's recommendation, and the latter stressed that
early action must be taken in retaliation for Bien Hoa and transmitted a list of targets
which should be attacked. (Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 VIET S)
/4/The Card, which was being used as a helicopter and aircraft ferry, was sunk in Saigon
harbor on May 2.
2. In addition above reasons arguing against one-shot retaliatory treatment, all of us here,
including JCS, are negative on a tit-for-tat policy as basis for real action against the North.
Not only is it hard to define such a policy, but all our studies and war games have
indicated that in the end it conveys a weak signal to Hanoi and also has maximum
disadvantages in wider international sphere.
3. Accordingly we come back to basic point that attack does bring measurably nearer
point of decision on systematic wider actions against North. We here are seeking convey
to press and public that we take incident seriously but that it must be seen in wider
context.
4. At same time we recognize morale and other factors arguing for some early action. In
this connection we now need your reading of how upset GVN and key leaders are by
attack. As possible early actions that would have right signal level to North, keep up
morale, and with gains outweighing disadvantages. we are considering and need your
comment on following:
a. Releasing US aircraft as such for action against VC. This has disadvantages assuming
explicit US combat role for first time and over time involving us in civilian attacks
through error that could be adverse psychologically. On other hand, it could add
materially your capabilities.
b. Sending in security battalions for Bien Hoa, Da Nang, and Nha Trang, or as you and
MACV might recommend. This could have desirable appearance securing decks for
action. On other hand we not clear how much it would really add to security or whether
GVN would welcome and cooperate. Obviously it tends add to our casualties and general
exposure.
5. Beyond such action, we need your recommendations, in conjunction with MACV, of
preliminary or preparatory actions to secure SVN base and protection US personnel that
would be required in conjunction with possible decision for wider action. This involves
such factors as air defense key installations (especially Da Nang) against possible air
strikes, handling of VC reactions of any character throughout SVN, and of course ground
deployments to deter action in North. As you know planning has always included these
factors, but we need your current judgment in light changes in overall situation and
growing VC capabilities as to all measures we should now include in our planning. JCS
covering same point in separate cable to MACV./5/

/5/Document 395.
6. There will be further high level meetings tomorrow and we would appreciate interim
reply on above points for use that meeting.
Rusk

/1/Source: Department of State, Bundy Files, 1964 Files. Top Secret; Immediate; Nodis.
Drafted by William Bundy and approved by Rusk.
979. Literally eyes only Ambassador from Secretary. I want to assure you that reactions
reported our longer telegram/2/ reflect most careful possible weighing your arguments for
immediate retaliation. In this one case we are inevitably affected by election timing.
Quick retaliation could easily be attacked as election device here, and this would play
back to Hanoi and greatly weaken intended signal. More basically, we believe such action
would in practice commit us to some form of tit-for-tat policy that could only be effective
if leading rapidly to more systematic campaign of military pressures on north with all
implications we have always seen in this course of action. Such a decision is not one to be
lightly taken nor is it wise or perhaps even proper for administration to take it in closing
two days of campaign while awaiting firm mandate from people.
/2/Document 396.
I want to leave you in no doubt that highest levels feel we are reaching point where policy
hardening must be acutely considered. We had been pointing to your return about midNovember to look at whole problem and possible decisions, and this attack may accelerate
timing particularly if there should be additional VC moves. At same time, desirability of
getting GVN fully appointed and firmly established continues to point to original
schedule. We will need to keep in close touch on this and will welcome your views at any
time.
Rusk

Embassy Files: Lot 68 F 8) Received at 6:07 a.m.

1368. CINCPAC for POLAD. Deptel 978./2/ From Saigon end of line, the Bien Hoa
attack looks quite different from the view set forth in reftel. It was unique as an attack
directed specifically against US units and equipment under circumstances unrelated to the
day-to-day operations in which our forces take their losses incidental to the discharge of
the advisory functions within GVN units. It resembled more the Bay of Tonkin incidents
with the exception (1) that the enemy were the VC (whom we hold to be the agents of the
NVN) rather than the NVN themselves; (2) the event took place on land rather than on
sea; and (3) US forces sustained losses and the enemy escaped unscathed. Finally, it
demonstrated a new tactic, the employment of surprise attack by massed mortar fire, with
such success that the US B-57 capability in this country was knocked out in about 15
minutes. Hence, we cannot view it as a VC aggression which is merely an improved
version of similar past conduct. It is clear that Hanoi also views this as something special
and expects something from us.
/2/Document 396.
So much for the Saigon point of view.
I gather that, seen from Washington, the problem is to (1) keep up local morale; (2) get
some signal to Hanoi, and (3) review preliminary and preparatory military actions. On the
first point, with Saigon leaders beset by the problems of forming a government and with a
double holiday with few newspapers published, public reaction has been minimal. Khanh
took off for Dalat yesterday after making a press release which understates the actual
damage suffered at Bien Hoa. Had he been particularly exercised, he would have
contacted me on the subject--which he did not. For the moment, I believe no action needs
to be considered purely for impact on local morale. However, if there is no US reaction.
our prestige is going to sag both with friend and enemy.
With regard to a signal to the North, I could make no suggestion without knowing what
thought we wish to convey at this time. I see no overall advantage either for morale or
signalling purposes in releasing US aircraft for action against VC. We are missing few, if
any, lucrative targets now with our present VNAF/Farmgate force and, by December, the
number of operationally available VNAF aircraft will be roughly double the present
number by virtue of completion of training of the last of the four A1H squadrons.
Meanwhile, the disadvantages cited in pare 4a reftel always with us.
To place US battalions at such places as Bien Hoa, Da Nang and Nha Trang is likely to
convey message that US intends to continue to limit its actions to SVN and to defensive
measures--a note I hope we will not strike. I am not sure what effect the presence of such
US units would have on SVN. I am sure that our troops would regard static security
mission as pretty inglorious business. On balance, I would recommend against this
measure under the circumstances presently in mind. My opinion might be different if we
were embarked on an escalating program of pressures against DRV.
My views on preliminary and preparatory military actions are contained in pare 6 MAC
12962/3/ which is just being dispatched.
/3/Apparently an incorrect reference since MAC 12962 contains only two numbered
paragraphs. (Johnson Library, National Security File, Vietnam Country File, Vol. XXI)
Taylor
Washington, November 2, 1964--7 p.m.
/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Vietnam Country File, Vol. XXI,
Cables. Top Secret; Immediate; Limdis. Drafted by Wheeler. Repeated to the White
House and the Department of State.
1470. 1. At high level meeting today/2/ considering possible US courses of action in
Southeast Asia, thought was expressed that appropriate response to Bien Hoa attack is in
order but such response need not be immediate. However, another similar VC attack
would require immediate action by US forces possibly on the order of 1B of CINCPAC
Frag Order 3./3/ Request that you ensure readiness of your forces to mount such an
operation expeditiously.
/2/The meeting took place at 1 p.m. at the White House and was attended by the President,
Rusk, McNamara, McGeorge and William Bundy, and Ball. (Ibid., Johnson Daily Diary
and Rusk Appointment Book) For another brief account, see infra.
/3/See footnote 4, Document 395. Action 1B provided a secondary list of barracks, ports,
and supply depots in North Vietnam for first day strikes.
2. FYI. Concern was voiced as to adequacy of security measures around air bases and
other sensitive US installations. CJCS asserted that COMUSMACV has undertaken with
South Vietnamese military authorities upgrading of security to extent practicable.
3. Possibility of reducing congestion on South Vietnamese airfields by relocating certain
units to airfields in Thailand was discussed informally. The view was expressed that
removal of part of US air elements to Thailand might occasion reactions unfavorable to us
in both North Vietnam and South Vietnam. Request your comment.

/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Vietnam Country File, Vol. XXI,
Cables. Top Secret; Immediate; Exdis. Drafted by William Bundy, cleared by McGeorge
Bundy, and approved by Ball. Repeated to CINCPAC.
988. Saigon for MACV.
1. High-level meeting today reaffirmed general positions stated Deptel 978/2/ Initiated
intensive planning operation here looking to earliest possible preparation for later decision
of comprehensive scenario for wider action taking account of current circumstances and
interim actions required avoid any impression USG determination changing. JCS, CIA,
Defense and State will be calling for additional inputs as required. Aim is to have analysis
of alternatives and relevant scenarios ready soonest.
/2/Document 396.
2. While we still inclined against immediate response related solely Bien Hoa attack, we
consider possibilities substantial that Hanoi may be embarking on series provocative
actions to test our intentions in what they believe may be period USG uncertainty.
Assume you are taking all possible measures particularly for security US airfields and
other installations. If other incidents occur we would expect immediately to reopen
question of quick related response.
Rusk
401. Telegram From the Embassy in Vietnam to the Office of the Secretary of
Defense/1/
Exdis. Repeated to the Secretary of State, the White House, and CINCPAC. According to
another copy, this telegram was drafted by Taylor. (Ibid., Saigon Embassy Files: Lot 68 F
8) Also printed in Pentagon Papers: Gravel Edition, vol. III, pp. 590-591
251. CINCPAC for POLAD. Ref. DEF 1342./2/ In compliance with request of DOD, I
submit the following personal comments to JCSM 902-64 dated October 27, 1964./3/
SNIE-53-2-64/4/ is not available in Saigon and hence has not influenced my views. I
assume that a political/psychological scenario is being prepared to support the military
actions considered in the JCS study.
/3/Document 388.
/4/Document 368.
As indicated in Embtel 465/5/ and elsewhere, I am in complete agreement with the thesis
that the deteriorating situation in SVN requires the application of measured military
pressures on DRV to induce that government to cease to provide support to VC and to use
its authority to cause VC to cease or at least to moderate their depredations. The evidence
of increased infiltration cited in Embtel 1135/6/ is one cogent reason for prompt and
effective action. The Bien Hoa incident of November 1, 1964 poses an even more
pressing requirement for action under the retaliatory principle confirmed in NSAM314./7/
/5/Document 319.
/6/Telegram 1135, October 14, reported that MACV J-2 had evaluated evidence which
estimated infiltration at 5,000 men for the first half of 1964. (Department of State, Central
/7/Document 345.
Embtel 1357/8/ contains the response to the Bien Hoa action which Embassy-MACV
recommended. In effect, this recommendation is for retaliation bombing attacks on
selected DRV targets by combined US/ VNAF air forces and for a policy statement that
we will act similarly in like cases in the future. If this recommendation is not accepted, I
would favor intensifying 34-A operations and initiating air operations against selected
targets as an interim substitute for more positive measures.
/8/Document 393.
With regard to the JCS recommendations for the first five courses of action of Appendix
A, they are all being implemented now but implementation has been weak in direct
proportion to the ineffectiveness of the local government. This situation is not likely to
change for the better in time to effect the situation in the short term. The new government
in its likely composition appears to have potentialities for improvement but it will be
composed largely of men without governmental experience who will have to learn their
trade on the job. It will take three to four months under favorable circumstances to get it
functioning well.
Item 6 is new and I would have trouble in justifying it. It amounts to a departure for no
clear gain from the principle that the Vietnamese fight their own war in SVN. Added air
strength in-country is not going to have a significant effect on the outcome of the
counterinsurgency campaign.
Under Appendix B, I see no advantage in resuming DeSoto patrols except for essential
intelligence purposes. If we are seeking an excuse for action, it is to our interest to strike
Hanoi for its malefactions in SVN and not for actions in the Bay of Tonkin against the US
Navy. We need to tie our actions to Hanoi support of the VC, not to the defense of purely
US interests. Hence, the excuse for our actions should ideally grow out of events in SVN
and Laos. Such events are available for our exploitation now in the form of infiltration
activities in Laotian corridor and the DRV, the Bien Hoa incident and the increasing
sabotage by the VC of the Saigon-Danang RY. With these provocations already at our
disposal, there is no need to seek others in the Tonkin Gulf where the second incident
developed in such a way as to reduce our ability to use subsequent episodes as a credible
basis for action.
Similarly, I see nothing but disadvantage in further stirring up the Cambodian border by
implementing hot pursuit. We don't often catch the fleeing VC in the heart of SVN; I see
little likelihood of doing better in Cambodia. Sihanouk does not have much in the way of
ground forces but a few counter-incursions from his side could be very awkward in
requiring the diversion of further ARVN to cover the frontier. We are presently short of
trained SVN manpower and need to conserve it for essential purposes. The present
unfriendly frontier is much preferable to one actively hostile.
With regard to low level reconnaissance probes, they are not needed as signals of
intention if, as I hope, we launch forth on a bombing program, overt or covert, against the
North. In the latter case, low level recce should be flown only to meet bona fide
intelligence needs.
Actions 7, 8, and 10 I tend to view as a package for concurrent implementation. In the
aggregate, these actions constitute an attack on a coherent target system all of which may
need to be progressively destroyed if infiltration is to be checked. It is another road to
reach Hanoi which should be traveled in parallel with the one which arrives by way of
reprisal bombing. At some point, both would probably merge into a single pressure vector
on the DRV.
As a final word, it is well to remind ourselves that "too much" in this matter of coercing
Hanoi may be as bad as "too little". At some point, we will need a relatively cooperative
leadership in Hanoi willing to wind up the VC insurgency on terms satisfactory to us and
our SVN allies. What we don't want is an expanded war in SEA and an unresolved
guerrilla problem in SVN.
Taylor
Honolulu, November 3, 1964--5:53 p.m.
/1/Source, Washington National Records Center, RG 319, HQDA Message Center, Reel
12009. Top Secret; Limdis. Repeated to COMUSMACV, four other Pacific commands,
and readdressed to the White House and Department of State on November 4.
040353Z. A. JCS 001470 DTG 022200Z, B. State 978 to Saigon./2/
/2/Documents 399 and 396, respectively.
1. A basic consideration in formulating a reply to RSS [refs] is an evaluation of the
significance of the Viet Cong attack on Bien Hoa. I question the evaluation expressed in
pare 1 of Ref B. The VC have had the capability to strike at Bien Hoa for some time. They
have the capability to make a similar attack on Danang and probably Tan Son Nhut. There
are other major U.S. targets in South Vietnam which are at least as vulnerable to attack as
Bien Hoa. For example, the Starcomm facility near Saigon is extremely vulnerable to
mortar attack and its loss would disrupt our communications in Southeast Asia. Viet Cong
have not attacked a major U.S. installation prior to this because they were fearful of U.S.
retaliation. There is ample evidence to indicate that they expected retaliation for the Bien
Hoa attack. This attack then was a major decision in HQ but on the course where the
insurgency should follow. [sic] I believe, therefore, that the VC now realize that they have
been able to launch a successful and very damaging attack on U.S. forces without
retaliation. We must assume then that they will be encouraged to mount attacks on other
installations in the near future. The VC may delay attacking other installations until the
furor from the last attack has died down, but we must be prepared for further attack.
2. COMUSMACV will do all within his power to make air bases and other sensitive U.S.
installations secure. However, they are inherently vulnerable, most of them being situated
in the midst of populated areas. They can only be secure when there is rigid population
control, a measure which must be carried out by the RVN and will take considerable time.
Therefore, regardless of the measures we take toward improving security, the bases are
vulnerable in the immediate future.
3. Since the air bases in Vietnam are congested, clearly insecure and without dispersal
facilities of any kind, we should not expose any more airplanes and American personnel
on these bases than are necessary for the immediate mission. Aircraft can be moved
readily in and out of RVN as requirements dictate.
4. While it is highly desirable that all forces be iQ place before option 1B is executed, we
can initiate a strike with less forces. For example, with one CVA on station off RVN plus
the USAF forces now in place in RVN, we can execute option 1B of CINCPAC Frag
Order No. 3 but with a considerably less damage level than specified. Within 18 hours all
air forces required could be in place. There are several intermediate positions we can
assume such as prepositioning F-105s from Kadena to Clark. This reduces air force
reaction time to 4 hours after signal is received. If Thai based U.S. forces could be used,
this again would improve our capability by 18 F-105s and 10 F-lOOs. The second CVA
could be in place in 48 hours. Before any option, other than 1B, is executed, all forces
should be in place.
[Numbered paragraph 5 (4 lines of source text) not declassified]
6. At present, there are two CVAs stationed off South Vietnam and a third one will arrive
in the area on 6 November. It is not desirable to maintain this posture for very long unless
we intend to launch heavy air strikes.
7. Lesser actions than option 1B of CINCPAC Frag C)rder No. 3 can be mounted at any
time. For example, target no. 36, Vit Thu Lu bks; Target no. 33, Dong Hoi bks; target no.
24, Chanh Hoa bks or target no. 39, Chap Le bks could be attacked effectively with
continued strikes from the forces normally in place, with or without assistance from
VNAF and Farmgate.
8. If we are not to make a retaliatory attack stronger than option 1B of CINCPAC Frag
Order No. 3 in the near future, we should:
a. Release Bonhomme Richard to return to waters off Japan.
b. Reduce the requirements to one CVA off South Vietnam with a second stationed in the
South China Sea, so as to reinforce within 48 hours.
c. Not further augment Air Force forces in South Vietnam.
d. Release Marine battalions at Okinawa to their normal state of readiness.
403. Editorial Note
Following the meeting with the President on November 2 (see Documents 399 and 400),
William Bundy was asked to chair a working group to review U.S. policy on Vietnam.
Sometimes called the NSC Working Group and at other times the Executive Committee or
Excom, the group comprised officers at the Assistant Secretary level including Vice
Admiral Lloyd M. Mustin, Senior Operations Officer of the JCS;
Harold Ford, Senior China-Asia Officer at CIA; John T. McNaughton, Assistant Secretary
of Defense for International Security Affairs; and McGeorge Bundy from the White
House. The first meeting took place on November 3 and, based on the discussion, William
Bundy drafted a Project Outline.
This outline presented nine topics for which various members of the working group were
responsible. Section I, "Situation in South Vietnam," was to be prepared by the
intelligence community, while Sections II and III, "U.S. Objectives and Stakes in South
Vietnam" and "Southeast Asia and the Broad Options," were to be prepared by William
Bundy assisted by CIA and JCS papers already drafted on these topics. Under Section III,
Bundy presented three options:
"A. Continue on present lines.
"B. Present policies plus a systematic program of military pressures against the north,
meshing at some point with negotiation, but with pressure actions to be continued until we
achieve our central present objectives.
"C. Present policies plus additional forceful measures and military moves, followed by
negotiations in which we would seek to maintain a believable threat of still further
military pressures but would not actually carry out such pressures to any marked degree
during the negotiations."
Section IV, "Alternative Forms of Negotiation," was to be drafted by the Policy Planning
Staff at the Department of State assisted by the Bureau of International Organization
Affairs. Section V analyzed Option A and was put aside in the beginning. The JCS and
Department of Defense were tasked with drafting an analysis of Option B (Section VI),
while Section VII, an analysis of Option C, was deferred until the papers for Sections VI
and VII were ready. Section VIII, "Immediate Actions in the Period Prior to Decision,"
was to be done by the Bureau of Far Eastern Affairs at the Department of State with the
implication that it might not be included in whatever paper was finally devised. Section
IX would present the conclusions and recommendations and would be done at the very
end. For full text of the Project Outline, see Pentagon Papers: Gravel Edition, volume III,
pages 588-590.
On the following day, November 3, Bundy revised the Project Outline, providing details
for some of the sections, adding a new Section VIII, "Actions in Reference to Laos,
Cambodia, and Thailand," which he would prepare, and renumbering Sections VIII and
IX of the first Project Outline as IX and X in the revised draft. (Department of State,
Bundy Files, Working Papers, November 1964, Vol. I; published in Declassified
Documents, 1983, 002148)
In the following two weeks, the working group met frequently to consider the various
drafts of individual sections and to comment on proposals raised by the participating
agencies. At a meeting on November 7 at 11 a.m., it discussed the preliminary drafts and

Ball's October 5 memorandum (see Document 370). By November 17, Bundy had
completed a 100-page draft which considered all aspects of the Project Outline and a 20page summary of this larger draft. Further consideration of these documents is presented
in the documentation that follows.

Repeated to Kuala Lumpur, Phnom Penh, Vientiane, Bangkok, London, Paris, and
CINCPAC for POLAD. Received at 10:53 a.m.
1414. Following is offered as preliminary assessment of new government in context
general political situation, in full recognition its policies and programs as yet only broadly
outlined in PriMin Huong's presentation before High National Council.
Promulgation of provisional charter and election of Pham Khac Suu as Chief of State and
Tran Van Huong as PriMin represent major stage in political evolution which was sparked
by popular reaction to Khanh's promulgation of Vung Tau charter in mid-August and
followed by dramatic deterioration in governmental authority in late August and
September. We hope it also represents beginning, albeit slow and painful, of mending of
SVN's battered body politic.
Looking back over month it is indeed remarkable that decisions taken by MRC in late
August to return power to civilian govt have in large measure been adhered to so far. That
they have is attributable in part to negative factors: 1) widespread fear of recurrence of
August mob violence; 2) temptation of Khanh and military leaders generally to let civilian
govt make mess of running country to show Vietnamese people that only military are
capable of directing country at this grave juncture; and 3) growing concern at rapid
deterioration in security situation. Embassy also actively encouraged support for this first
effort in recent Vietnamese history to arrive at a consensus on a govt by an orderly
process of consultation among reasonably representative groups.
However, more positive and commendable factors can also be found: civilians whom
military charged with drafting provisional charter and selecting Chief of State and PriMin
accepted their heavy responsibilities and, despite frequent waverings and evidence of
timidity, performed creditably under strong diverse pressures. Moreover, despite Khanh's
temptation, and indeed efforts, to discredit High National Council, in end he correctly
read danger signals which these tactics produced and decided wisest course of action for
present was to return to military and wait for more auspicious opportunity to retake
power. Finally, religious leaders and "out" politicians, also reluctant to see recurrence of
demonstrations and violence, were willing to give High National Council a chance,
despite its lack of broad popular base.
Thus, on first anniversary of Diem regime's demise, political prospects are at least faintly
encouraging. However, it is premature to judge whether present situation is only breather
in political turbulence or whether in fact workable political solution has been found.
Following factors contribute to present clouded crystal ball:
1) Pham Khac Suu is widely respected and well regarded among Southerners as longstanding revolutionary against French and antiDiem oppositionist. However, both general
popular acceptance of him as Chief of State and his effectiveness in that position likely to
be tempered by fact his years of prison have left him with little dynamism and in ill
health.
2) Tran Van Huong, while not enjoying the great reputation Suu does, is also respected as
honest, hardworking man. Like Suu, however, he is not well man (has heart condition),
and same reservations apply to him that apply to Suu in this regard. Encouraging indicator
is Suu's claim that Huong appointment was subject to wide consultation among major
groups (religious, military, political) and that Huong is acceptable to all.
3) Team that Huong has collected around him is made up of men with reputations for
honesty and competence. They are in large part, however, not political figures but men
with professional or civil service experience, and are likely to be criticized soon by "out"
politicians as technicians without stature (like Minh-Tho govt). Many politicians and
qualified technicians were reluctant to accept positions in new govt which they believed
would have only short life span. Another reservation is new govt's predominantly
Southern complexion--whether Northern refugees and center populace will sit still for this
for long remains to be seen (criticism in this view [vein] already being heard).
4) Power balance in military establishment is confused at present. Buddhist-led violence
in August and unsuccessful Sept 13 coup attempt provided Khanh with opportunity to rid
himself and army of virtually [all] remaining potential competitive leadership factions,
and brought to fore new military leadership group ("Young Turks") which since mid-Sept
have been generally loyal to him. However, High National Council's ninth-inning switch
to Pham Khac Suu left General Minh with no place to go except back to army and into
competition with Khanh. (Minh had been mentioned most likely candidate for Chief of
State in the early maneuvering within the High National Council.) This combined with
Khanh's earlier surprise move in reintegrating Dalat Generals back into army, may have
created potential sources of friction within military. There are already reports that Young
Turks resent return of Dalat Generals. Problem of Minh is at least temporarily postponed
by his decision to take a trip abroad.
5) In drafting provisional charter and electing Chief of State, High National Council
members have shown themselves vulnerable to pressures from many quarters and
suffering in many cases from personal political ambition and rivalries. Whether these
centrifugal tendencies can be controlled and HNC can continue momentum toward
selection of national assembly remains to be seen. Close personal relations between
several members of HNC and Suu and Huong are favorable factors.
6) Buddhists are in somewhat precarious state. Split between Tri Quang and Tam Chau
factions has waxed and waned during month, but at month's end both factions opposed
Khanh's retention of premiership. Since beginning of Nov, however, there have been
growing number of reports that Buddhists displeased that Huong selected instead of Nhut.
Most gratifying Buddhist development has been firm anti-Communist statements made
publicly both by Tam Chau and Tri Quang, although there were undoubtedly internal
tactical considerations which played part in issuance such statements.

7) Working relationship between Suu and Huong also a question mark. High National
Council has made clear in public statements that intent was to create symbolic, ceremonial
Chief of State, leave PriMin as action officer of govt. Provisional charter is unfortunately
not quite so clear and leaves Chief of State with major powers which if wielded by an
ambitious man, might bring him into conflict with PriMin. Essential, therefore, in the
interests of smooth governmental operation that both Suu and Huong on same wave
length.
Taylor

to CIA, the Department of Defense, the White House, Vientiane, Bangkok, and
CINCPAC. Received at 2:06 p.m.
1416. CINCPAC for POLAD. I saw Huong at 1700 today at his request. First DepPriMin
Vien also present. Huong had nothing pressing to discuss and our conversation was in the
nature of a progress report on his part. Huong said that his govt was now fully inslalled,
he personally had assumed duties of MinDefense this morning. While he had not had
benefit of a thorough briefing on military situation from General Khanh and the military,
they had covered high spots this morning. Huong hopes to have detailed military briefing
when Khanh returns in a few days from his two-day trip to Camau.
With some prompting from me, Huong referred to reports of Buddhist dissatisfaction with
his govt and to rumors that students might demonstrate tomorrow. Huong dismissed
Buddhist complaints as being their traditional maneuver to attempt to obtain Buddhist
ministers who could serve as their "eyes and ears" inside the govt. He anticipated
continued pressure from certain Buddhist factions but did not appear deeply concerned.
With regard to the students, he indicated that he had already issued orders that the police
and the military are to maintain law and order. He showed a quiet determination not to
knuckle under to pressure from these quarters.
Huong said that Council of Ministers had met today to discuss short-term objectives and
programs--those which could be completed by end of year. Vien said that each Ministry
had been charged with preparing a statement of short-term and long-term objectives for
discussion by the Council of Ministers next Wednesday, Nov 11. I mentioned that we
were going through a similar exercise on US side.
Vien said govt would be in a position to discuss these objectives and programs with us the
following Friday. Huong commented that goals should be realistic and people fully aware
of what the govt intends to do and what will be accomplished. Huong commented that his
govt was composed of men who were honest and dedicated to the good of country and
would form a good team. While he did not underestimate size of the task, he believed that
with US assistance substantial progress could be made.

Huong discounted importance of resignation of Chu,/2/ Vice President of the High
National Council, noting that Chu had personally requested him to accept resignation
from position on two occasions and had warmly supported his investiture by the High
National Council. He characterized Chu's action and those of Quat and Tran Van Do as
last minute efforts for their own partisan political reasons to embarrass him in the
formation of a govt. In this connection I noted heavy burden placed upon High National
Council in months ahead and fact that the effective membership of this body had been
reduced to about a dozen people. I inquired whether it would be feasible to increase
membership of the Council in order spread the burden and render it more representative.
Vien replied that enabling decrees establishing the Council made no provision for
increasing its size. nor even for replacing individuals who resign or were incapacitated.
However, it was clear that Huong and Vien saw merit in suggestion and will give it
further consideration. They also picked up quickly suggestion that a new Chef de Cabinet
be found to replace Pham Dang Lam in the of fice of Chief of State Suu.
/2/Chu resigned on November 5; Quat and Do chose not to serve at about the same time.
Comment: It was evident that Huong and Vien share mutual confidence and trust (almost
alien commodities here) and should work well in tandem. Huong is down-to-earth, to the
point, and determined (at least at this stage) to steer his own course and not give in to the
various pressure groups.
Taylor

Exdis. Repeated to CIA, the Department of Defense, JCS, Bangkok, Vientiane, and
CINCPAC.
1415. SEACORD met Saigon November 5 and discussed agenda items transmitted to
Dept in Saigon's 1290 to Dept info CINCPAC 708./2/ In addition to representatives from
Bangkok, Vientiane and Saigon, the meeting was attended by representatives of
CINCPAC.
/2/Dated October 27. (Ibid., Saigon Embassy Files: Lot 68 F 8)
[1 paragraph (6 lines of source text) not declassified]
Group reviewed accomplishments of T-28 operations in corridor and post-strike
photography has shown serious damage has been done to many installations. It was
agreed that this was a generally commendable performance as far as it went, although it
appears from post-strike photography that damage on several targets was slight. MACV
and Vientiane will exchange info on target photography holdings to resolve current
differences in assessments and to obviate those that might arise in the future. Additional
T-28's now scheduled for Vientiane will allow photo reconnaissance planes to accompany
strike aircraft and eliminate major source of differences.
Group also supports Vientiane's need for more T-28 strike aircraft to meet additional
requirements now being refined. Requirements for additional aircraft include armed recce.
It is anticipated that the RLAF is capable of generating 200 sorties in the Panhandle
during the month of November to strike interdiction targets to the degree that close
support requirements permit.
From a list of 39 targets in the Laos corridor (22 USMACV recommended targets; 17
USAIRA Vientiane targets), the RLAF attacked 13 of the USMACV targets during the
period 14 October-2 November. Three additional interdiction targets not on the target list
were also attacked at RLAF initiative. Post-strike damage assessment indicates re-strike
against 10 of these targets is necessary to achieve the desired 80-90 [%] damage. These
re-strikes and initial attacks against 8 other targets on the combined list are currently
planned by the RLAF during November and will fully utilize RLAF capability.
AmEmbassy Vientiane reports that the RLAF has additional potential corridor targets
under study.
Cross border operations: unilateral planning for cross border operations both on the US
and GVN side has continued in order to minimize the time lag when operations are
approved by Washington for implementation. By cable MAJ3 10906 DTG 090015Z/3/
MACV advised that a reevaluation of a starting date would be made when significant
changes occurred in the political and military situations inside Vietnam. The cable also
advised that it was unlikely that we could contemplate any significant cross border
operations prior to January 1, 1965. However, under present conditions it is now
estimated that cross border operations under concept set forth in Saigon telegram 913/4/
could begin between 1 December and 1 January in central area if authorization is received
15 days prior to execution. When authority is given to execute cross border operations, the
group is still of the unanimous opinion it would be preferable to have no publicity with
regard to operational details and no comment made in response to questions and
accusations.
/3/Not found.
/4/Document 346.
In addition to renewing recommendation for approval Yankee team strikes against fixed
targets, group also discussed additional action that could be taken against increasing scale
of VC infiltration through corridor. In this connection group discussed desirability
increased US air participation in striking both fixed targets and targets of opportunity in
Laos Panhandle. It was recognized that such increased US activity in Laos would raise
political problems re US relations with Laos and US posture toward Geneva accords.
Various formulae were discussed that might reduce such problems. For example, it was
felt consideration could be given to modifying rules of engagement for US aircraft
providing CAP and escort for RLAF to permit such aircraft to provide frequent or routine
escort for T-28 missions. This would involve additional authorization for US aircraft to
retaliate against hostile ground action. Vientiane and Bangkok may wish to submit further
views in this regard.

There was considerable discussion of the Route 9 improvement concept and general
agreement that it deserved further consideration by all three posts with the view of
additional discussion at the next meeting. Saigon will transmit by septel,/5/ summary of
concepts discussed and suggestions to provide a basis for discussion at the next meeting.
/5/Telegram 1434 from Saigon, November 8. (Department of State, Central Files, POL 27
VIET S)
Based on a proposal by General Westmoreland, the group considered the requirement for
a military coordinating committee. In view of the political-military composition of the
SEACORD committee and in light of experience to date, it was determined that there is
no need for a military committee. Experience has indicated that ad hoc military staff backup to SEACORD deliberations will suffice. Accordingly proposed terms of reference of
the military committee/6/ will be withdrawn. The group requests that the matter of a
military coordinating committee will be dropped from further consideration.
/6/Transmitted in COMUSMACV telegram 191420Z, October 19. (Washington National
Records Center, RG 319, HQDA Message Center, Reel 11966)
In summary, recommendations are as follows:
[Numbered paragraph 1 (2-1/2 lines of source text) not declassified] 2. T-28 operations in
corridor.
a. MACV and Vientiane exchange info on target photography holdings to resolve current
differences in target assessments and to obviate those that might arise in future. Action
Saigon and Vientiane.
b. Support Vientiane's need for more T-28 strike aircraft to meet additional requirements,
including armed recce. Action Washington.
3. Cross border operations can now begin between 1 Dec-1 Jan in central area 15 days
after Washington authorization. Action Washington.
4. Yankee Team strikes.
a. Renewed recommendation for approval of Yankee Team strikes against fixed targets.
Action Washington.
b. Desirability increased US air participation in striking both fixed targets and targets of
opportunity in Laos Panhandle. This would involve additional authorization for US
aircraft to retaliate against hostile ground action. Action Vientiane and Washington.
It was agreed that the next meeting will be held December 2-3.
Taylor

Nodis. Drafted by Bundy and Forrestal and cleared in substance with Rusk.
1034. For Ambassador from Secretary. Our working group is intensively preparing
alternatives for action. The present high-level tendency, not yet discussed at highest
levels, is to adopt an immediate program, extending for 4-6 weeks, of a clearly tougher
public and private stance accompanied by somewhat expanded actions within present
policy, including reprisals against any repetition of spectacular VC action in the south
along the lines of the Bien Hoa attack. Concurrently, we would propose to decide very
soon that, if such an immediate program does not produce a change in Hanoi behavior, we
would initiate in January a program of slowly graduated military actions against the North
in conjunction with negotiating moves in which we would seek throughout to keep alive a
clear threat of additional action if the Communist side does not modify its position./2/
Such a course of action would be less drastic than the programs sometimes suggested in
the past of full and relentless attacks on the ninety-four targets and inflexible insistence
that we would negotiate only on a basis of full acceptance of our maximum objectives.
/2/The Working Group met at 11 a.m. on November 7 to consider among other things a
McNaughton paper, "Action for South Vietnam," 3d draft (ibid., Bundy Files, Working
Papers, Nov 1964, Vol. I; printed in Pentagon Papers: Gravel Edition, vol. III, pp. 601604) and a William Bundy paper, "Immediate Actions Over the Next Few Weeks," both
dated November 7. The position elaborated here is a summary of Bundy's paper. No
record of the Working Group's meeting has been found, but it is referred to in a covering
note to the McNaughton draft and in Rusk's Appointment Book.
The above is for your personal information. We would particularly welcome your own
planning thoughts for possible use.
As to timing, we hope to have useful papers to send to you urgently about the middle of
this week. Thereafter, we are tentatively thinking in terms of you and Admiral Sharp
returning here about November 19 for consultation, during which we expect to arrive at a
government decision firmly laying out the immediate program and deciding on our longrange course of action.
A key element in either the immediate program or the long-range course of action will be
the nature of our discussions with the GVN. Sullivan has impressed on us the seriousness
of SVN doubts as to US intentions, and this may suggest your taking up whole question
with Huong, Khanh, or others even before you return and we reach final decisions. More
basically, we believe no course of action can succeed unless we are able to stiffen the
GVN to set its house in order and take every possible measure for political stability and to
push forward the pacification program. This point too might be made in the immediate
future by you, to be followed by even more specific and firm discussions after the
decision is taken. We would particularly appreciate your comments on these two points.
Rusk

/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 1-1 VIET S. Top Secret; Priority;
Limdis. Also sent to CIA, Department of Defense, and the White House and repeated to
1440. CINCPAC for POLAD. This is a U.S. Mission cable. Ref. A-337, October 30,
1964./2/ It is apparent that the next few months will be critical to the success of the new
government and to our efforts to bring about some degree of stabilization in the internal
political situation of SVN. The members of this government are generally inexperienced
in public life and have never worked together as a team. It is the consensus of the Mission
Council that under favorable circumstances it will require three to four months to get this
government to function with any degree of effectiveness. By that time an assembly may
have been formed and unless its performance has been acceptable in SVN eyes the
government will face the hazard of removal.
/2/This airgram transmitted a paper entitled "Action Program for Vietnam," which
proposed political, economic and social, military, and psychological programs which the
United States might undertake with the new South Vietnamese Government. (Ibid.,
Central Files, POL 1-1 VIET S)
To avoid waste of effort in uncoordinated activity, it is essential for the government to
establish a series of short-term objectives which are reasonably attainable and which, if
attained, will provide a point of departure from which we can later undertake more
ambitious projects, military and civilian, inside and outside SVN. Such subsequent
projects would include combined and increased military political-economic pressure on
DRV, intensification of the in-country anti-VC effort, expansion of force goals for
military and police forces, and the initiation of medium-term economic, social and
psychological programs.
For planning purposes, we are taking February 1, 1965 as the target date for the short-term
objectives (Annex 1). However, we are in doubt as to the feasibility of even approaching
these objectives without finding some means in the immediate future for sustaining
morale and encouraging a despondent country grown tired of the strains of the
counterinsurgency struggle. We have only one reasonably certain way to provide this
stimulant--by military actions (we are thinking primarily of air strikes) against the DRV
which will do damage to the sources of VC strength along the infiltration routes and to a
limited degree in NVN itself. For maximum morale effect, the existence and results of
these actions need to be known, at least in part, in SVN. Furthermore, some U.S.
participation is required to impart sense of U.S. willingness in future to share in necessary
action to stop DRV support and direction of VC. (This also important as corresponding
signal to Hanoi.) It is a delicate matter, however, to execute such operations because of
the danger of premature escalation at a time when the new government is inadequate to
provide leadership to the country and to use its resources to contain the probable VCDRV reaction which might result from any significant air campaign against DRV.
Our partial solution to this dilemma is to introduce into the short term military program an
expansion of 34-A operations to include limited air strikes against North, an
intensification of the actions against infiltration targets in the Laotian corridor, and
reprisal strikes for major VC depredations as required. There are presently only 10
qualified VNAF pilots available for such covert air strikes so that their scope would
necessarily be limited. Our thought is that the Laotian Air Force should continue to play
the leading part in air attacks in the corridor but we would get agreement for increased
U.S. participation from Souvanna in order to indicate the U.S. commitment needed to
encourage the GVN, as well as perhaps the RLG. (Some thoughts on this were contained
in Embtel 1415/3/ reporting on last SEACORD meeting.)
/3/Document 406.
Since the new Cabinet is already at work on short-term objectives, I propose to make
suggestions at once to Huong and Vien, along the lines of Annex 1, for inclusion in their
programs. I would like authority as soon as possible to discuss the short-term military
program (expanded 34-A, attacks in corridor, reprisal air strikes) with Huong, Vien and
Khanh to obtain their reaction. Depending on their response, it may be desirable to
indicate the broadened pressure program against the North which we are willing to
consider after the government has made adequate progress. Throughout this scenario, it
must be recognized that the GVN may well not make what could be considered even
reasonable progress, and that we may be forced even between now and February 1 to
make the hard choice as to whether we should undertake the broadened pressure program
against the DRV in the face of a deteriorating situation in SVN
Annex 1
Program Objectives To Be Reached by February 1, 1965
I. Governmental
1. Establish effective articulation of GVN/US agencies for optimum cooperation; action in
this field to include establishment of a war cabinet to meet weekly with the U.S. Mission
Council; the organization of a Ministerial Council of Economic and Financial Affairs to
mesh with USOM organization; joint programming at ministerial levels in the military,
economic, social, administrative and information fields.
2. Review governmental organization with a view to streamlining. Consideration to be
given to a reduction or regrouping of Ministries and to the establishment of a Bureau of
the Budget reporting to the Prime Minister.
3. Develop and initiate a national information plan as a means of improving
communication between the GVN and its people.
II. Military
1. Bring the armed forces to authorized strength.
2. Review performances of key commanders, replacing the incompetent and stabilizing
the remainder.
3. Bring all units to full combat effectiveness.

III. Police
1. Fill up the police to targeted strength.
2. Clarify the police mission and elevate its prestige.
3. Give the police a strong commander.
4. Clarify police powers of arrest, detention, and interrogation.
IV. Pacification
1. Complete the first phase of Hop Tac and be ready to pass into the second phase.
2. Review performance of province chiefs, replacing the incompetent and stabilizing the
remainder.
3. Review the vital functions of corps commanders.
4. Carry out a sanitary clean-up of Saigon.
5. Initiate a program for the improvement of the port of Saigon and the Saizon River
channel.
6. Institute measures to effect population and resources control with emphasis on Hop Tac
area.
Taylor

Nodis. According to another copy, this telegram was drafted by Taylor. (Ibid., Saigon
1445. For the Secretary from Ambassador Taylor. Ref: A. Deptel 1034. B. Embtel
1440./2/ Reference A was received just before dispatch of Reference B which, I believe,
goes far toward meeting your request for our planning thoughts for use in the
development of your papers. As I read Reference A, you would appear to be considering
something like the short-term military program of Reference B for the period roughly
from end November until January. At that time, we would move into an overt series of
graduated military actions combined with political pressures-generally speaking, the
"subsequent projects' mentioned in the second paragraph of Reference B.

We have had a great deal of discussion here as to the minimum level of government
required to justify mounting military pressures against the North. I would describe that
minimum government as one capable of maintaining law and order in the urban areas, of
securing vital military bases from VC attacks, and gearing its efforts with those of the
USG. As Reference B indicates, we do not expect such a government for three to four
months-perhaps not then if the current attempts to chip away at the Huong government
continue. Question: Do we withhold all action against the DRV (except those of the
morale sustaining type) until we get this minimum government? What if we never get it?
My own answer would be that it is highly desirable to have this kind of minimum
government before accepting the risks inherent in any escalation program. However, if the
government falters and gives good reason to believe that it will never attain the desired
level of performance, I would favor going against the North anyway. The purpose of such
an attack would be to give pulmotor treatment for a government in extremis and to make
sure that the DRV does not get off unscathed in any final settlement.
In the final paragraph of Reference A, it is suggested that I might take up this question of
direct action against the DRV with Huong, Khanh and others before I return and before
the USG reaches final decision. I do not see how I could do this except in the most general
terms until we know ourselves what we intend to do. I have already suggested vaguely to
Khanh and Huong that we could give consideration to various new courses of action once
a reliable government is established.
With regard to stiffening the GVN to set its household in order and to press for political
stability and the proper execution of the pacification program, I know of no words of
eloquence or of persuasion which have not been tried in the past. At the moment the
problem is not so much with the government, which means well, as with major outside
groups such as some Buddhists, Catholics and politicians who refuse to give it support
and are trying to tear it down before it even has a chance. Quat's refusal to serve in the
government is symptomatic of this attitude. We have gone so far as to suggest that this
government may represent the last chance for a common victory. I point to articles in the
American press showing clearly that the American people are becoming impatient with
the politicking in Saigon with enemy at the gates of the city. My Vietnamese listeners
never argue back but sadly acquiesce in the validity of such judgments. Unfortunately,
they do not know how to remedy the situation, except at some damage to what they feel
are their personal interests, and for all too many Vietnamese this is unthinkable.
Nevertheless we cannot abandon this enterprise. In spite of their inability yet to find a way
of governing themselves, there is still much on which to build in the way of an
individually capable and courageous people who do not want to be run by the North.
There is also a surprising amount of vitality and resiliency in the country as a whole
which remain generally unaffected by the political turmoil in Saigon. Thus we must hang
on, doing our best in the hope that out of this welter some real leadership will eventually
emerge, and play for the breaks. Taking the initiative against the North is one way to force
the breaks.
In summary, the approach which I would like to make now to the GVN is that contained
in the final paragraph of Reference B. We shall be very much interested in receiving your
draft papers when they are ready.

Taylor

Saigon, November 14, 1964--10 a.m.
/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, SOC 10 VIET S. Top Secret; Immediate;
Exdis. Repeated to CINCPAC. According to another copy, this telegram was drafted by
Taylor. (Ibid., Saigon Embassy Files: Lot 68 F 8) Also published in Declassified
Documents, 1983, 000533.
1502. CINCPAC for POLAD. Ref: Deptel 1065; Embtel 1490./2/ As indicated in Embtel
1490, floods in central provinces constitute a serious disaster but, to the eye, are not
comparable to the 1961 flood in the Mekong Delta. I saw latter at its height and
recommended that US logistic units with combat support be brought into SVN for flood
relief operations. This recommendation was not accepted and proved to be unnecessary as
the flood waters drained rapidly and the area was restored within a few months by GVN
with USOM assistance. This experience leads me to doubt necessity for additional US
logistic or combat forces by reason of the present floods. Such units would make no direct
contribution to alleviate conditions of human misery which can best be made by local
relief organizations backed by US supplies and transport. They could, however, expedite
the restoration of the many washed out highway bridges, particularly along Route 1, and
could also be of assistance in reopening the railroad although the latter has suffered more
from VC sabotage than from the flood.
/2/Telegram 1065, November 12, asked for Taylor's comments on the political
implications of introducing U.S. military engineering and logistic forces to help alleviate
conditions in the flooded central provinces. (Department of State, Saigon Embassy Files:
Lot 68 F 8; published in Declassified Documents, 1983, 001257) Telegram 1490,
November 13, reported that Taylor had taken Huong on an aerial reconnaissance of the
flooded provinces and noted that relief organizations seemed to be coping well with the
problem. (Department of State, Central Files, SOC 10 VIET S)
The question is whether this accelerated repair of communications is worth the
introduction of additional US logistic forces which in all probability would require US
combat troops in some numbers to provide close protection. Apart from expediting the
restoration of communications, our willingness to bring in a new form of military support
would undoubtedly be a source of encouragement for the Government and people of
SVN. On the other hand, it could also suggest that the US is prepared to take over more of
the responsibilities of GVN, and hence temper local initiative. As US troops are certain to
be the target of VC harassment, we can expect increased casualties resulting from this
further increase of the US presence which in numbers already threatens to exceed the
ceiling estimates of a few months ago.
Weighing these pros and cons in the light of present knowledge, I would advise against
these additional US forces. I would, however, recommend using this situation as a means
of trying to obtain third country military engineer aid largely for bridge repair on the lines
of communications damaged by the flood. An Asian third country contribution for this
purpose has all of the advantages and none of the disadvantages cited above. Among the
countries which might be approached are the Philippines, Korea, Australia and Taiwan,
where the retired services engineering administration is reportedly a highly skilled
servicemen's organization capable of the technical work we have in mind. Given about
two more days to survey the bridgebuilding requirement, we will be able to indicate the
size and type of help which might be sought from third country sources.
We would appreciate knowing the Department's reaction to this suggestion./3/
/3/The Department of State responded later in the day that its reaction to the suggestion of
third country assistance was favorable, and urged Taylor to encourage the South
Vietnamese Government to issue a call to which third countries might respond. (Telegram
1085 to Saigon; ibid.; published in Declassified Documents, Z988, 001259)
Taylor
(McNamara)/1/
JCSM-955-64
Washington, November 14, 1964.
/1/Source: Department of State, Bundy Files, Working Papers, Nov 1964, Vol. IV JCS.
Top Secret.
SUBJECT
Courses of Action in Southeast Asia
1. This memorandum has been prepared as a result of the meeting in the White House on
2 November 1964/2/ on this subject at which an examination in detail was requested of
the possible Democratic Republic of Vietnam (DRV)/Communist China (CHICOM)
military reactions to US air strikes against North Vietnam. The examination is contained
in six Appendices/3/ to this memorandum which include an analysis of the threat and
possible enemy reactions, our response to such reactions, and the preparatory measures
which we should undertake prior to mounting an attack so that we could defer a CHICOM
response or, failing that, respond in a timely effective fashion to any enemy initiative.
This memorandum summarizes the examination in the Appendices. The underlying
objective remains that of causing the DRV to cease supporting and directing the
insurgencies in RVN and Laos.
/3/None printed. Included among the six appendices (lettered A-F) were CINCPAC
Operations Plan 32-64, "Defense of Mainland Southeast Asia" (Annex A to Appendix C),
and CINCPAC Operations Plan 39-65, which dealt with responses to Chinese aggression
(Annex B to Appendix C).

2. On 4 November 1964, the Joint Chiefs of Staff by memorandum, JCSM-933-64,/4/
formalized their recommendations made orally to you on 1 November 1964 in relation to
the mortar attack on US forces at Bien Hoa Airfield, South Vietnam, which occurred on 1
November 1964. The specific actions recommended at that time are repeated here.
Although these actions were recommended for the attack on Bien Hoa, they comprise an
option equally applicable and available for immediate implementation in the event of
other serious provocations in Southeast Asia.
"a. Within 24-36 hours, Pacific Command (PACOM) forces take initial US military
actions as follows:
"(1) Conduct air strikes in Laos against target #3 (Tchepone Barracks, Northwest), #4
(Tchepone Military Area), #19 (Ban Thay Military Area), #8 (Nape Highway Bridge), and
the Ban Ken Bridge on Route 7.
"(2) Conduct low-level air reconnaissance of infiltration routes and of targets in North
Vietnam south of Latitude 19 degrees.
"b. Prior to air attacks on DRV, land the Marine Special Landing Force at Da Nanz and
airlift Army or Marine units from Okinawa to the Saigon/Tan Son Nhut/Bien Hoa area, to
provide increased security for US personnel and installations.
"c. Use aircraft engaged in airlift (subparagraph b, above) to assist in evacuation of US
dependents from Saigon, to commence concurrently with the daylight air strikes against
the DRV (subparagraph d, below).
"d. Assemble and prepare necessary forces so that
"(1) Within 60 to 72 hours, 30 B-52s from Guam conduct a night strike on DRV target #6
(Phuc Yen Airfield).
"(2) Commencing at first light on the day following (1) above, PACOM air and naval
forces conduct air strikes against DRV targets #6 (Phuc Yen Airfield) (daylight follow-up
on the above night strike), #3 (Hanoi Gia Lam Airfield), #8 (Haiphong Cat Bi Airfield),
#48 (Haiphong POL), and #49 (Hanoi POL).
"(3) Concurrently with subparagraph (2) above, the VNAF will strike DRV target #36
(Vit Thu Lu Barracks).
"(4) Combat Air Patrols (CAP), flak suppressive fire, strike photographic reconnaissance,
and Search and Rescue (SAR) operations are conducted as appropriate.
"(5) The above actions are followed by:
"(a) Armed reconnaissance on infiltration routes in Laos.
"(b) Air strikes against infiltration routes and targets in DRV.

"(c) Progressive PACOM and SAC strikes against the targets listed in the 94 Target
Study./5/
"e. Thai bases be used as necessary in connection with the foregoing, with authority to be
obtained through appropriate channels."
3. In addition to the deployments and actions above, there are additional actions which
should be taken at the time of decision to improve capabilities to conduct the program of
air strikes against the DRV. These actions include the deployment from the CONUS to the
Southeast Asia area of two additional USAF tactical fighter squadrons and additional
tactical reconnaissance and tanker capability, as well as bringing the attack carriers in the
area to a total of three. (Appendix A hereto treats the actions in more detail.) No
significant logistic or transportation deficiencies are anticipated in carrying out the attacks
against the targets listed in the 94 Target Study.
4. An analysis of the enemy threat and possible enemy courses of action is contained in
Appendix B. The Joint Chiefs of Staff believe that the DRV and the CHICOMs will make
every effort through propaganda and diplomatic moves to halt US attacks directed against
North Vietnam. Although the DRV will take all actions to defend itself, the DRV and
CHICOMs would be unlikely to expand the conflict. The Joint Chiefs of Staff believe that
Communist China would be very reluctant to become directly involved in the fighting in
Southeast Asia lest this be taken by the United States as a cause for major retaliation
against the Chinese mainland. However, as the severity of US attacks against the DRV
increases, the CHICOMs would feel an increased compulsion to take some dramatic
action to counter the impact of the US pressures. This CHICOM response may take the
form of the deployment of ground forces into northern Laos, ostensibly at the invitation of
the Pathet Lao, or some similar action short of direct confrontation with US forces. It is
the view of the Joint Chiefs of Staff that the Chinese Communists probably would not
openly engage US forces unless they felt it was necessary to prevent collapse of the
communist regime in North Vietnam. Therefore, there would not be high risk of the
introduction of large-scale Chinese ground/air force combat units unless major US/GVN
ground units had moved to occupy areas of the DRV or communist-held territory in
northern Laos, or unless the Chinese had committed their air or naval power and had
subsequently suffered attacks on CHICOM air force bases in China. Nevertheless, there is
always a chance that Peiping might intervene either for reasons that seem irrational to us
or because they miscalculated the objectives of US moves and US resolve to remain in the
area. The probability that the CHICOMs would engage US aircraft over North Vietnam
would increase in proportion to the number and severity of the attacks and the closeness
with which they approached the CHICOM border. Direct CHICOM military intervention
would call for US military operations against mainland China.
5. An analysis of nine possible enemy courses of action and appropriate US/allied
responses thereto including objectives, forces, deployments, and timing where feasible is
contained in Appendix C. The salient conclusion which can be drawn from this analysis is
that the United States and its allies can deal adequately with any course of action the DRV
and/or CHICOMs decide to pursue.
6. Appendix D contains preparatory actions for the deployment of forces, proposed

preliminary logistic authorizations, and the alerting of forces necessary to deal with largescale communist aggression.
7. A study of the logistic capability to support US/allied military undertakings in response
to enemy reactions is contained in Appendix E. Bottlenecks and shortfalls of logistics and
personnel are identified in Appendix F. There are no significant logistic, transportation, or
personnel problems short of those required to deal with the upper scale of action within
the DRV/CHICOM capability. When approaching full implementation of CINCPAC
OPLAN 32-64, Phase IV, and to a lesser extent in Phase III thereof and in CINCPAC
OPLAN 39-65, deficiencies begin to occur. These require some mobilization consisting
primarily of Air Force reserve transportation units and Army reserve combat service
support units and the extension of terms of active duty service. However, it is improbable
that the DRV or Communist China will adopt a course of action requiring full
implementation of plans of this magnitude, and in view of the vast preponderance of overall US strength, risks involved are considered to be more acceptable than the alternatives
of continuing the present course or withdrawal from Southeast Asia.
8. The Joint Chiefs of Staff recommend that:
a. The views of the Joint Chiefs of Staff herein be reflected by the Secretary of Defense in
the joint State-Defense report being prepared on this subject.
b. That the views of the Joint Chiefs of Staff be forwarded to the President./6/
/6/On November 17, McNamara sent a memorandum to Wheeler stating that he had noted
these views and that they would be presented to the President when the Working Group's
report was presented. (Washington National Records Center, RG 330, OSD/ ISA Files:
FRC 68 A 4023, 381 Southeast Asia)
Earle G. Wheeler/7/
Chairman
the Secretary of Defense (McNamara)/1/
/1/Source: Washington National Records Center, RG 330, OSD/ISA (Admin) Files: FRC
69 A 7425, Vietnam 381. Top Secret; Personal. Also printed in Pentagon Papers: Gravel
Edition, vol. III, pp. 632-633. Rostow sent a similar, but more extensive memorandum to
Rusk on November 23. For text, see ibid., pp. 645-647.
SUBJECT
Military Dispositions and Political Signals

Following on our conversation of last night/2/ I am concerned that too much thought is
being given to the actual damage we do in the North, not enough thought to the signal we
wish to send.
/2/No record of this conversation has been found.
The signal consists of three parts:
a) damage to the North is now to be inflicted because they are violating the 1954 and 1962
Accords;
b) we are ready and able to go much further than our initial act of damage
c) we are ready and able to meet any level of escalation they might mount in response, if
they are so minded.
Four points follow.
1. I am convinced that we should not go forward into the next stage without a US ground
force commitment of some kind:
a. The withdrawal of those ground forces could be a critically important part of our
diplomatic bargaining position. Ground forces can sit during a conference more easily
than we can maintain a series of mounting air and naval pressures.
b. We must make clear that counter escalation by the Communists will run directly into
US strength on the ground; and, therefore, the possibility of radically extending their
position on the ground, at the cost of air and naval damage alone, is ruled out.
c. There is a marginal possibility that in attacking the airfield they were thinking two
moves ahead; namely, they may be planning a preemptive ground force response to an
expected US retaliation for the Bien Hoa attack.
2. The first critical military action against North Vietnam should be designed merely to
install the principle that they will, from the present forward, be vulnerable to retaliatory
attack in the north for continued violations of the 1954 and 1962 Accords. In other words,
we would signal a shift from the principle involved in the Tonkin Gulf response. This
means that the initial use of force in the north should be as limited and as unsanguinary as
possible. It is the installation of the principle that we are initially interested in, not tit for
tat.
3. But our force dispositions to accompany an initial retaliatory move against the north
should send three further signals lucidly:
a. that we are putting in place a capacity subsequently to step up direct [air?] and naval
pressure on the north, if that should be required;
b. that we are prepared to face down any form of escalation North Vietnam might mount
on the ground; and

c. that we are putting forces into place to exact retaliation directly against Communist
China, if Peiping should join in an escalatory response from Hanoi. The latter could take
the form of increased aircraft on Formosa plus, perhaps, a carrier force sitting off China as
distinguished from the force in the South China Sea.
4. The launching of this track, almost certainly, will require the President to explain to our
own people and to the world our intentions and objectives. This will also be perhaps the
most persuasive form of communication with Ho and Mao. In addition, I am inclined to
think the most direct communication we can mount (perhaps via Vientiane and Warsaw)
is desirable, as opposed to the use of cut-outs. They should feel they now confront an LBJ
who has made up his mind. Contrary to an anxiety expressed at an earlier stage, I believe
it quite possible to communicate the limits as well as the seriousness of our intentions
without raising seriously the fear in Hanoi that we intend at our initiative to land
immediately in the Red River Delta, in China, or seek any other objective than the reinstallation of the 1954 and 1962 Accords.

Nodis. Transmitted as telegram 1536 from Saigon, which is the source text. According to
another copy of telegram 1536, it was drafted by Taylor. (Ibid., Saigon Embassy Files:
Lot 68 F 8) Received at 6:21 p.m.
Embtel 1466./2/ Huong's government has survived its second week and, although still
under attack by special interest groups, maintains its precarious position, and the fact that
it is kept alive lends it slightly more authority. By his refusal to be pressured into changes
in his recently announced Cabinet and his use of troops in Saigon over the weekend to
restrain student demonstrations, Huong has continued to demonstrate his determination to
maintain law and order and not to succumb to minority pressures. Thus far, the factions
opposed to some of Huong's Cabinet do not appear able or perhaps willing to force the
issue. In the press, in spite of some attacks on the Cabinet, there are numerous moderate
voices urging that the Huong government be given a chance.
/2/Telegram 1466, November 11, transmitted Taylor's previous weekly report to the
President. (Ibid., Central Files, POL 27 VIET S)
We continue to receive expressions of fear by responsible GVN officials that General
Khanh is maneuvering to maintain a position independent of the government and may
even be encouraging some of the anti-Huong forces. I have seen no hard evidence of its
truth, but in view of Khanh's past behavior, it is not surprising that the suspicion is about.
Aside from the continuing political crisis, the government's energies were heavily
engaged in dealing with the typhoon disaster in Central Vietnam. Although it now appears
the early reports, as is usual in such situations, were very much exaggerated, there is no
doubt that at least six provinces in Central Vietnam have suffered severely. The Prime
Minister and I surveyed the stricken areas by air on Friday/3/ and were briefed in Danang
on the damage and relief efforts. I must say that the Vietnamese response to this challenge
has been most encouraging and has produced examples of community spirit which
contrast sharply with the lack of national unity which we have been seeing in Saigon. All
US agencies are very much involved in assisting the flood relief and I say that their
conduct has been exemplary.
/3/November 13.
On the military and pacification fronts, again there is little to report this week. The floods
held down both friendly and enemy activity in the I and II Corps areas. We have reason to
hope that the floods may have been relatively more disastrous to the Viet Cong and their
exposed supplies than to our side.
Elsewhere Viet Cong casualties were high totaling 255 killed in action during the week.
There may be some significance in the increase in incidents in the tier of provinces just
south of those affected by the flood where in the past the level of Viet Cong activity has
always been quite low. Throughout this area, the Viet Cong appear bent on driving a
wedge to separate economically the Northern provinces from those of the South.
Early in the flood crisis, I was queried from Washington with regard to the need for
additional US logistical troops and the combat forces to protect them./4/ I was not inclined
to favor such action at that time and now as the estimates of the flood damage diminish, I
am quite certain they are not needed. If, as may be possible, outside engineering
assistance is eventually needed to help in reconstructing bridges and other engineering
works destroyed by the flood, I would hope to receive that aid from third country sources.
Taylor/5/

/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 17-5 US-VIET S. Top Secret;
Immediate; Nodis. Drafted by Forrestal, cleared with William Bundy and the White
House, and initialed by Rusk.
1113. For the Ambassador from the Secretary. Re Deptel 1074./2/ It has now been
decided that you should plan arrive Washington the 26th in order to start intensive, top
level meetings on Friday, the 27th./3/ Meeting with President is tentatively scheduled for
December 1st. Our thought is that you should arrive early enough on the 26th in order to
have as much rest as possible. You may, however, prefer the day of rest in Hawaii, but
you can make that decision later.
/2/Telegram 1074 to Saigon, November 11, suggested that, subject to his and the
President's approval, Taylor return to Washington on November 21. (Ibid.) Since the
President's schedule did not coincide with this plan, his return was delayed.
/3/This decision was taken at a meeting of the Working Group held at 11:30 a.m. at the
Department of State and attended by Rusk, McNamara, Wheeler, McCone, William
Bundy, McNaughton, and Forrestal. At this same meeting, a 100-page report by the
Working Group and a 20-page summary by Bundy were distributed. (Department of State,
Bundy Files, Manuscript, ch. 18, p. 10) Regarding the report, see Document 403.
Forrestal will be leaving evening Wednesday, November 18th directly for Saigon. You
can, on the basis of his report to you, decide on makeup of small group to accompany you.
We will make following announcement at noon press briefing here tomorrow unless you
see objection:
"Ambassador Taylor is scheduled to return to Washington for consultations with the
President, the Secretaries of State and Defense, and other government officials, beginning
Friday, November 27th. Ambassador Taylor will be here for five or six days."
You may wish to confirm this announcement in Saigon Thursday morning your time./4/
/4/On November 18, Taylor cabled that he had no objection to the press release (Telegram
1537 from Saigon; Department of State, Central Files, POL 17-5 US-VIET S)
We are looking forward to seeing you.
Regards.
Rusk

to CINCPAC. Received at 10:10 a.m.
1550. CINCPAC for POLAD. Yesterday, November 17, I sent Prime Minister Huong a
letter proposing methods for integrating U.S. Mission efforts with his new government
(text of letter being dispatched by airgram)./2/ I called today to find out his reaction to the
letter and to discuss other related matters.
/2/Not found.
His first words were to express regret over the bombing incident at the Tan Son Nhut
restaurant at noon today which caused 18 U.S. casualties. He then added words of thanks
for the quick response of the USS Princeton in bringing relief supplies from Hong Kong.
With regard to the letter and its proposals, he indicated that he was discussing the matter
with Deputy Prime Minister Vien and some of the Cabinet this evening. He said at first
reading he found nothing in it to cause disagreement.
He then launched into a discussion of his governmental troubles, particularly those arising
from the continuing criticism of minority groups. He classified these groups as generally
inconsequential in size and number but later admitted to growing concern over the
Buddhist opposition. He feels sure that Tam Chau and many of the leaders of the Buddhist
association have neutralist or even Communist backing. He further feels there is some
understanding between General Khanh and the Buddhists, mentioning reports that Khanh
has said that the Huong government will fall if it alienates the Buddhists.
We then discussed Khanh's attitude. I told him that Khanh had repeatedly indicated to me
his sincere desire for the success of the Huong government and his intention to support it.
Huong added that Khanh's expressed attitude toward him had also been thus but
nonetheless he was afraid that Khanh was indulging in maneuvers with the Buddhists. I
suggested that he try to pull Khanh more into the inner councils of his government and see
whether such treatment might not get him into the family. Huong concedes that the army
has responded readily to his requests for reinforcements to deal with the student disorders
over last weekend.
We discussed the High National Council with which Huong is completely out of patience
primarily because of the investigation committee it has set up to examine the composition
of his Cabinet. He recognizes this action as a device for keeping alive the criticism of
some of his Cabinet members.
Huong recognizes the critical importance of the manner [matter?] setting up the national
assembly and feels that it should be the prime concern of the High National Council. The
latter, as we know, is divided between those who insist on elections and those who would
be satisfied with some method of nominating assembly members. Huong is dead against
elections as a general method, feeling that they are impossible in some areas and
dangerous in others. The primary danger which he sees is the infiltration of neutralists and
Communists in the course of the elective process.
I told Huong confidentially of my departure date for Washington and restated my need for
an immediate discussion with him and some of his ministers with regard to their
programs. Washington, I indicated. would have many questions with regard to his hopes
and aspirations and I would need his assistance in preparing the answers. He agreed to a
meeting probably on Friday/3/ with his principal ministers and I added the suggestion that
an additional meeting with him, Vien and Khanh might also be necessary for a discussion
of particularly sensitive topics.
/3/November 20.
At the close of our meeting, I invited him and his Cabinet to a reception on December 7 at
my residence to meet with senior American officials of the Mission. He seemed happy to
accept.
Taylor
416. Memorandum From the Under Secretary of State's Special Assistant (Ehrlich)
to the Under Secretary of State (Ball)/1/
/1/Source: Department of State, Ball Files: Lot 74 D 272, Courses of Action in Southeast
Asia, Book One. Top Secret.
SUBJECT
Viet-Nam
Mr. Bundy has circulated the attached papers concerning "courses of action in Southeast
Asia" to Secretary Rusk, Secretary McNamara, Mr. McCone, and General Wheeler./2/ A
meeting with Secretary Rusk, Secretary McNamara, you, and McGeorge and William
Bundy to review these papers is scheduled for next Tuesday. 3 After further meetings next
Thursday and Friday, a meeting with the President is scheduled for December 1.
/2/No papers were attached to the source text. Regarding the paper Bundy circulated at the
November 17 Working Group meeting, see Document 403.
/3/November 24.
I think that the approach taken in these papers will cause you serious concern. Three
"broad options" are considered. First, to "continue present policies of maximum assistance
with SVN and limited external actions in Laos and by the GVN coherently against North
Viet-Nam;" and, possibly, specific individual reprisal actions. "Basic to this option is the
continued rejection of negotiation in the hope that the situation will improve." Second,
"present policies plus a systematic program of military pressures against the north,
meshing at some point with negotiation, but with pressure actions to be continued until we
achieve our central present objectives." Third, "present policies plus additional forceful
measures and military moves, followed by negotiations in which we would seek to
maintain a believable threat of still further military pressures but would not actually carry
out such pressures to any marked degree during the negotiations."
These papers conclude with a proposed recommendation to the President that we follow
"a program of immediate actions within the next few weeks" and that, "if the Communist
side does not respond favorably" to these actions, we adopt the third alternative early next
year. The "basic ingredients" of the "immediate actions during the next few weeks" would
be: (1) "talking tough;" (2) "vigorous actions within our current policy" including: (a) a
strong 34-A MAROPS schedule; (b) continued strong air activity in the Panhandle area of
Laos, including at least a few United States armed reconnaissance strikes; (c) continued
strong air activity in central Laos; (d) perhaps a DeSoto patrol early in December; and (e)
"consider explicit use of US air in South Viet-Nam if a lucrative target appears;" (3)
reprisals in the event of future serious incidents; (4) "consultations with the GVN to
improve its performance;" and (5) "miscellaneous actions clearly foreshadowing stronger
actions."
Nowhere in these papers is there a consideration of your proposal for negotiations within
the near future and without increased military action (although with the threat of such
action). In fact, the first option (to continue present policies) specifically excludes
negotiations. Furthermore, although the outline of the papers calls for a separate section
concerning "alternative forms of negotiation" no draft of this section was prepared./4/
Rather, "various working papers on negotiations... /5/ have been woven into" the other
sections.
/4/The paper Bundy circulated on November 17 stated that no paper on Section IV,
"Alternative Forms of Negotiation," was included since information on negotiations had
been included in Sections V-VII. However, S/P had drafted a paper specifically for
Section IV on November 4 and revised it on November 6. Copies of these drafts are in
Department of State, S/P Files: Lot 70 D 199, Vietnam.
I think there are a number of significant gaps in reasoning and questions unanswered
throughout these papers. As we have discussed, the third option is full of dangers-I do not
believe that they have received sufficient consideration in these papers. Most serious,
however, is the lack of any real analysis of a negotiating track. In my judgment, at the
very least, a paper on this track should be prepared as a fourth option.
I am particularly concerned because policy proposals like these seem quickly to develop a
bureaucratic life of their own unless immediate action is taken.
As the attached memorandum from Ben Read states, a noon meeting with the President
will be held tomorrow to discuss the schedule outlined in Ben's memorandum as well as
other items including Congo policy. As to the schedule, both you and the Secretary will
be away on December 1, the proposed date for a meeting with the President to decide
which option to adopt. For obvious reasons, I think that the proposed date of the meeting
should be changed.
TE
417. Memorandum for the Record of a Meeting, White House, Washington,

November 19, 1964, 12:30 p.m./1/
/1/Source: Kennedy Library, Thomson Papers, Southeast Asia--Vietnam, 1964 General.
Top Secret. Drafted by Thomson on November 24. According to an agenda and list of
participants, in addition to those mentioned in this memorandum, Humphrey, McCone,
Vance, Ball, and Bromley Smith were present at the meeting. (Johnson Library National
Security File, Aides File, McGeorge Bundy, Misc Mtgs, Vol. 1)
SUBJECT
Vietnam Item, Meeting with the President, 12:30 p.m. Thursday, November 19, 1964
The Secretary of State reported on the work in process regarding South Vietnam and the
timing of the President's consideration of this problem. He noted that Ambassador Taylor
would be returning to Washington on the 27th.
Mr. Rusk explained that the working group was preparing a full examination of the South
Vietnam situation, including its internal and external ramifications: the role of the Viet
Cong, of North Vietnam, Communist China, the Soviet Union, and other nations. The
working group had examined U.S. objectives and stakes in Vietnam and Southeast Asia,
as well as the various contingencies that might arise. The planners had focused on three
broad alternatives: first, a negotiated settlement on any basis obtainable; second, a sharp
increase of military pressure on North Vietnam which might perhaps lead at some future
date to negotiation; and third, an "in between" alternative of increased pressure on North
Vietnam but simultaneous efforts to keep open the channels of communication in case the
other side was interested in a settlement. These alternatives would be accompanied by
attempts to deal with adjacent problems: to diminish Prince Sihanouk's "fever" and to
improve our position in Laos.
Mr. Rusk stated that we are faced with serious and grave decisions. A first essential is to
receive first-hand from Maxwell Taylor his view of the situation in South Vietnam and his
judgment as to what we must require of the South Vietnamese themselves. Following
such consultations with Taylor, we would plan to submit our recommendations for a
thorough review and decision by the President by December 1st.
The President asked for a re-statement of the three alternatives. Mr. William Bundy
outlined them as follows:
Option A: to continue as at present, but to add to our current efforts reprisals against the
Viet Cong and North Vietnam for any further "spectaculars" of the Bien Hoa variety;
Option B: to apply a "hard/fast squeeze", i.e. a systematic program of attacks of increasing
intensity against North Vietnam during which negotiations would not be our immediate
goal but would not be ruled out:
Option C: to apply a slow, controlled squeeze on North Vietnam in order to bring about
negotiations, increasing gradually our present level of operations against the North.
Mr. Bundy noted that this third option was a complex and sophisticated alternative that
would require a high degree of control.
Mr. McGeorge Bundy noted that the Government might profit from the President's
guidance at this juncture in one respect. At the working levels the focus of attention was
increasingly on Option C. Unless the President indicated otherwise, the present thrust
towards C would undoubtedly continue.
Mr. McNamara added that although all the planners were indeed leaning toward Option C,
work was also well advanced on Option B.
Mr. McGeorge Bundy commented that work had not advanced on the "devil's advocate"
exercise, the preparation of a persuasive case for negotiation and withdrawal under
present conditions.
Mr. Rusk and Mr. William Bundy responded that the "devil's advocate" exercise had
made some progress under Mr. Ball. It was noted, however, that Mr. Ball had been
preoccupied with other assignments.
Mr. Rusk assured the President that we would not permit irresistible momentum to
develop in favor of any one option to the exclusion of the others.
Mr. McGeorge Bundy added that while we were inviting Ambassador Taylor to
participate in the discussions next week, we were not for the present including the various
military figures of our Pacific Command.
The President expressed the hope that no firm decisions would be made without
participation by the military; he could not face the Congressional leadership on this kind
of subject unless he had fully consulted with the relevant military people.
Mr. McNamara assured the President that the military were already deeply involved in the
planning, that the JCS had been working for weeks on this problem, and that General
Wheeler would be present at all the discussions with Ambassador Taylor. The JCS was
now preparing written comments on the present working group drafts.
Mr. Rusk said that books and papers on Vietnam planning would be sent to Texas during
the President's absence from Washington.
James C. Thomson, Jr./3/
418. Paper Prepared by the National Security Council Working Group/1/

/1/Source: Department of State, Bundy Files, Master Files, Late Nov 1964. Top Secret.
Drafted by William Bundy and McNaughton. Also printed in Pentagon Papers: Gravel
Edition, vol. 111, pp. 656-666. The first draft of this summary, prepared on November 17
by Bundy (not found), was revised following the November 19 meeting (see supra) and
dated November 21. No copy of the full text of the November 21 draft has been found, but
the text printed here is the same as that draft except for changes on seven pages, made on
November 26. (Memorandum from Bundy to the NSC Working Group; ibid., Working
Papers, Nov 1964, Vol. 1) These changes are indicated in footnotes below and were made
as a result of the discussion at the Working Group meeting on November 24 (see
Document 424).
Summary
COURSES OF ACTION IN SOUTHEAST ASIA
I. Intelligence Assessment: The Situation in South Vietnam
A. South Vietnam. The political situation remains critical and extremely fragile. The
security situation in the countryside has continued to deteriorate.
It is possible that the new government in Saigon can improve South Vietnamese esprit and
effectiveness, though on the basis of current indications this appears unlikely. It is also
possible that GVN determination and authority could virtually give way suddenly in the
near future, though the chances seem better than even that.the new GVN can hang on for
this period and thus afford a platform upon which its armed forces, with US assistance,
can prosecute the war and attempt to turn the tide. Even under the best of circumstances,
however, reversal of present military trends will be extremely difficult.
B. The VC and the North Vietnamese Role. The basic elements of Communist strength in
South Vietnam remain indigenous, but the North Vietnamese (DRY) contribution is
substantial and may now be growing. There appears to be a rising rate of infiltration.
We believe any orders from Hanoi would in large measure be obeyed by Communist
forces in South Vietnam. US ability to compel the DRV to end or reduce the VC
insurrection rests essentially upon the effect of US sanctions on the will of the DRV
leadership, and to a lesser extent on the effect of such sanction on DRV capabilities. USinflicted destruction in North Vietnam and Laos would reduce the elements of DRV
support and damage DRV/VC morale. It might give the GVN a breathing spell and chance
to improve. However, it would almost certainly not destroy DRV capabilities to continue,
although at a lessened level.
If the DRV did in fact remove wholly its direction and support to the VC, the South
Vietnamese could in time probably reduce the VC threat to manageable proportions. But
if any DRV "removal" were superficial only, the South Vietnamese probably could not
develop the capability to establish and maintain a workable and free government in South
Vietnam./2/
/2/According to Bundy's memorandum to the Working Group, Section 1, which
comprised pages 1-2 of the summary, was revised following the November 24 meeting.
II. US Objectives and Stakes in South Vietnam and Southeast Asia
A. US Objectives and the Present Basis of US Action. Behind our policy in South
Vietnam and Laos have been three factors, all closely related to our over-all policy of
resisting Communist expansion:
1. The general principle of helping countries that try to defend their own freedom against
Communist subversion and attack.
2. The specific consequences of Communist control of South Vietnam and Laos on the
security of other nations in Asia.
3. The implications worldwide of South Vietnam, and, to a lesser extent, Laos as test
cases of Communist "wars of national liberation."
Essentially, the loss of South Vietnam to Communist control, in any form, would be a
major blow to our basic policies. US prestige is heavily committed to the maintenance of
a non-Communist South Vietnam, and only less heavily so to a neutralized Laos.
Yet we must face the facts that (a) there is some chance that South Vietnam might come
apart under us whatever' course of action we pursue; (b) strong military action necessarily
involves some risks of an enlarged and even conceivably major conflict in Asia. These
problems force us to weigh in our analysis the drawbacks and possibilities of success of
various options, including the drawbacks of accepting only the fall-back objectives set
forth below.
B. Possible Alternate US Objectives. Our fall-back objectives in South Vietnam would be:
1. To hold the situation together as long as possible, so that we have time to strengthen
other areas of Asia.
2. To take forceful enough measures in the situation so that we emerge from it, even in the
worst case, with our standing as the principal helper against Communist expansion as
little impaired as possible.
3. To make clear to the world, and to nations in Asia particularly, that failure in South
Vietnam, if it comes, was due to special local factors--such as a bad colonial heritage and
a lack of will to defend itself--that do not apply to other nations
C. Consequences of Communist Control of South Vietnam.
1. In Southeast Asia. The so-called "domino" theory is over-simplified. It might apply if,
but only if, Communist China entered Southeast Asia in force and/or the US was forced
out of South Vietnam in circumstances of military defeat. Nonetheless, Communist
control of South Vietnam would almost immediately make Laos extremely hard to hold,
have Cambodia bending sharply to the Communist side, place great pressure on Thailand
(a country which has an historic tendency to make "peace" with the side that seems to be
winning), and embolden Indonesia to increase its pressure on Malaysia. We could do
more in Thailand and with the British in Malaysia to reinforce the defense of these
countries, but the initial shock wave would be great.
2. In Asia Generally. The effects in Asia generally would depend heavily on the
circumstances in which South Vietnam was lost and on whether the loss did in fact greatly
weaken or lead to the early loss of other areas in Southeast Asia. Nationalist China
(shaken already by the Chicom nuclear explosion and the UN membership crisis), South
Korea, and the Philippines would need maximum reassurance. While Japan's faith in our
military posture and determination might not be shaken, the growing feeling that
Communist China must somehow be lived with might well be accentuated. India and Iran
appear to be the Asian problem cases outside the Far East. A US defeat could lead to
serious repercussions in these countries. There is a great deal we could still do to reassure
these countries, but the picture of a defense line clearly breached could have serious
effects and could easily, over time, tend to unravel the whole Pacific and South Asian
defense structures.
3. In the World at Large. Within NATO (except for Greece and Turkey to some degree),
the loss of South Vietnam probably would not shake the faith and resolve to face the
threat of Communist aggression or confidence in us for major help. This is so provided we
carried out any military actions in Southeast Asia without taking forces from NATO and
without generating a wave of "isolationism" in the US. In other areas of the world, either
the nature of the Communist threat or the degree of US commitment or both are so
radically different than in Southeast Asia that it is difficult to assess the impact. The
question would be whether the US was in fact able to go on with its present policies.
4. Summary. There are enough "ifs" in the above analysis so that it cannot be concluded
that the loss of South Vietnam would soon have the totally crippling effect in Southeast
Asia and Asia generally that the loss of Berlin would have in Europe; but it could be that
bad, driving us to the progressive loss of other areas or to taking a stand at some point
where there would almost certainly be major conflict and perhaps the great risk of nuclear
war./3/
/3/The Joint Staff believes that early loss of Southeast Asia and the progressive unraveling
of the wider defense structures would be almost inevitable results of the loss of South
Vietnam in any circumstances. [Footnote in the source text.]
D. Attitudes of Other Nations Regarding US Actions.
1. Major US Allies. We must maintain, particularly to our key NATO allies, the picture of
a nation that is strong and at the same time wise in the exercise of its power. As for
France, we are damned either way we go. Both Britain and, to a lesser extent, Germany
sympathize in principle with our whole policy of seeking to restrain Communist Chinese
expansion, and the British recognize their own specific parallel stake in the closely related
problem of Malaysia. All European countries could be affected in their view of the US
and their willingness to accept continued US leadership by the way we handle Southeast
Asia. Despite the fact that their Far East "experts" tend to believe that Western influence
in Asia is on the wane in any case, our key European allies probably would now [not?]
understand our applying an additional measure of force to avoid letting the ship sink; but
they could become seriously concerned if we get ourselves involved in a major conflict
that degraded our ability to defend Europe and produced anything less than an early and
completely satisfactory outcome.
2. "Nonaligned" Nations. In these countries, the issue is our continued ability to exert
influence on these countries, to keep the peace in and among them, and to keep the
waverers from wavering clear over to Communist answers. The "nonaligned" nations,
with the possible exception of India, would by and large be opposed to any stronger action
we might take. Indeed, they cannot be expected to support any course of action we follow
in South Vietnam arid Laos. A program of systematic attacks against the DRV would find
many of these nations supporting a condemnatory resolution in the UN. But, as we saw in
the Cuban missile crisis, the nonaligned and Afro-Asian nations will accept and even
admire and be grateful for actions that achieve the result we want in a strong and wise
way.
3. Summary. As for likely foreign reactions to our three possible courses of action in Part
III below, it appears that Option A (continue present course indefinitely) would cause no
adverse reactions but if it failed it would leave a considerable after-taste of US failure and
ineptitude; Option B (fast unyielding pressure) would run major risks of sharply expressed
condemnation, which would be erased only if the course of action succeeded quite clearly
and in a reasonable time; Option C (progressive pressure-and-talk) would probably be inbetween in both respects.
III. The Broad Options
There are three broad options available to us:

A. Option A would be to continue present policies indefinitely: Maximum assistance
within South Vietnam, limited external actions in Laos and by the GVN covertly against
North Vietnam, specific individual reprisal actions not only against such incidents as the
Gulf of Tonkin attack but also against any recurrence of VC "spectaculars" such as Bien
Hoa. Basic to this option is the continued rejection of negotiations.
B. Option B would add to present actions a systematic program of military pressures
against the north, with increasing pressure actions to be continued at a fairly rapid pace
and without interruption until we achieve our present stated objectives. The actions would
mesh at some point with negotiation, but we would approach any discussions or
negotiations with absolutely inflexible insistence on our present objectives.
C. Option C would add to present actions an orchestration of (1) communications with
Hanoi and/or Peiping, and (2) additional graduated military moves against infiltration
targets, first in Laos and then in the DRV, and then against other targets in North
Vietnam. The military scenario should give the impression of a steady deliberate
approach, and should be designed to give the US the option at any time to proceed or not,
to escalate or not, and to quicken the pace or not. These decisions would be made from
time to time in view of all relevant factors. The negotiating part of this course of action
would have to be played largely by ear, but in essence we would be indicating from the
outset a willingness to negotiate in an affirmative sense, accepting the possibility that we
might not achieve our full objectives.
IV (old V). Analysis of Option A
Option A is a continuation of present policies, with the additional element of deciding to
have reprisal action not only against another Gulf of Tonkin incident, but against any
repetition of a spectacular attack by the VC within South Vietnam, particularly but not
solely an attack involving US forces or installations.
As far as they go, Option A actions are in fact common to all three Options, and would be
pursued with equal force under Option B or Option C. It is basic that the situation in the
south be improved by all possible means whatever else we do.
A. Actions within South Vietnam. There is a great deal that can be done to improve GVN
performance and to strengthen the whole pacification program. We must continue to seek
additional third-country contributions (though these will probably remain limited). We are
working to improve the key police program, military tactics, the air effort, the economic
program including a stronger emphasis on the cities, etc. We continue to reject the
introduction of US combat forces or a US taking over of command-but short of such
changes in policy we are working as hard as we can on all major avenues for
improvement.
The point is that the effectiveness of all such measures depends on having an increasingly
effective GVN, with sustained government and popular morale. We do not yet have this,
though we have hopes that the present government will settle down and become effective
over a period of 2-4 months. The issue is whether this can happen if we do no more than
Option A over this period.
B. Actions Outside South Vietnam. We would in any event continue and intensify the
various covert forms of action against North Vietnam, and the various Lao and US actions
in Laos, adding GVN air and ground action in Laos on a limited scale. We would also
conduct reprisals as indicated above.
C. Prognosis.
The above actions will not physically affect the DRV scale of infiltration, nor do we
believe they would affect Hanoi's determination and will. They might, however, keep the
DRV from engaging in further spectaculars, and thus keep the scale of the conflict in the
south within some limits.
The question is whether the GVN could start to make real and visible headway on these
terms, with no indication on the US side that we were prepared to go further. We think
that reprisal actions would tend to lift GVN morale and performance for a time, but their
lifting effect would decline with each successive case. For a period of time, perhaps some
months, this Option might keep the GVN afloat and even get it moving slowly toward
effectiveness. Most of us doubt that it can do more than that.
D. Negotiating Avenues.
We ourselves would be rejecting negotiation, as at present, at the outset.
But this still leaves the chance that the GVN itself, or individual South Vietnamese in
potentially powerful positions, might at any time start discussions with Hanoi or the
Liberation Front. If the situation continued to deteriorate, the chances of this taking place
would increase. If it did, Hanoi might not insist on early US withdrawal, but the way
would be paved for a Vietnamese "deal" that would end up with the US being withdrawn
and a coalition government with Communist representation installed in Saigon. The odds
would be heavy that over time such a government--as in Poland in 1946-47--would be
taken over by the Communist element, and eventually merged with the north into a
unified Communist Vietnam.
We might stand aside in such a process, which would at least avoid our name going onto
the deal. Alternatively, if the situation was deteriorating beyond repair, we might seek to
cover a retreat by accepting negotiations, most likely through a Geneva conference, that
could improve the above deal by adding elements of international supervision that might
stretch out the process of Communist control and buy time.
E. Pros and Cons of Option A.
There is clearly a case for Option A as a means of buying a short period of time. We
would have gone the last mile in restraint, and in putting the show up to the Vietnamese.
We would be giving the Sino-Soviet relationship time to clarify--which we think would be
a reaffirmed deep split. And we could hope for some improved GVN performance before
we did more. But the odds are against the latter, and on balance it seems more likely we
would later have to decide whether to take Options B or C under even worse
circumstances.
As an indefinite course of action, Option A appears to offer little hope of getting Hanoi
out or an independent South Vietnam re-established. Its sole advantages would be that (a)
defeat would be clearly due to GVN failure, and we ourselves would be less implicated
than if we tried Option B or Option C, and failed; (b) the most likely result would be a
Vietnamese-negotiated deal, under which an eventually unified Communist Vietnam
would reassert its traditional hostility to Communist China and limit its own ambitions to
Laos and Cambodia. In such a case, whether the rot spread to Thailand would be hard to
judge; it seems likely that the Thai would conclude we simply could not be counted on,
and would accommodate somehow to Communist China even without any marked
military move by Communist China.
V (old VI). Analysis of Option B
A. Rationale and Preparatory Actions.
The basic headings of preparatory action are the same as for Option C.
B. Opening Military Actions.
The opening military actions under Option B would be major air attacks on key targets in
the DRV, starting with the major Phuc Yen airfield.
C. Early Negotiating Actions.
Even though we would be taking a totally inflexible position on negotiating, we would
have to deal with channels of communication, the UN, and perhaps--despite our strong
opposition--a re-convened Geneva Conference of some sort.
D. Probable Communist Responses.
The possible Communist responses again fall under three headings, but with different
orders of likelihood than under Option C.
1. It is still considered unlikely that Hanoi would really yield, at least in the early stages.
2. The chances are significantly greater than under Option C that Hanoi might retaliate at
least by limited air/4/ attacks in South Vietnam, possibly an offensive in Laos,
conceivably a ground offensive into South Vietnam, and--least likely but necessarily to be
considered--ChiCom ground action into Laos primarily.
/4/According to Bundy's memorandum to the Working Group, Section V up to this point,
which comprised page 17 of the November 21 draft, was revised following the November
24 meeting.
3. The most likely general course of action would still be for Hanoi to hold firm, doing its
utmost to stimulate condemnation of our actions, but possibly trying to pretend that it had
reduced its activity in the south.
E. In the Event of the Third Type of Communist Response, Likely Developments and
Problems.
1. Within SVN, the initial reaction to attacks on the DRV would probably be one of
elation, and there would probably be a spurt of more effective GVN performance.
However, as in Option C, there would be offsetting factors that would come into play, and
still leave us with a continuing danger that the situation would resume its present
deteriorating course. The Vietnamese people are clearly war-weary. Probably they would
hold fairly firm under Option B, perhaps firmer than under Option C once the latter
became entwined with real negotiations. But there is the lesser chance that things would
weaken.
Either for this reason, or because Hanoi was not caving--the latter in almost any event--we
would be driven to up the ante militarily.
2. Our further increases in military pressure would then be the same generally as under
Option. C, but applied considerably more rapidly and roughly. And at this point, the odds
would necessarily start to increase that Hanoi, no longer able to temporize, would either
start to yield by some real actions to cut down, or would move itself to a more drastic
military response.
3. Our position internationally could become very difficult at this point. We must face the
fact that we would incur a really serious barrage of criticism including the dominant
public opinion in some of our key allies such as the UK. Our influence might not be
drastically affected on such issues as MLF and NATO, where the issues are less affected
by popular opinion, but the effect could be much more serious on such opinion-related
issues as the Kennedy Round, African views on Communist China, etc., etc.
F. Likely Developments and Problems if the Communist Side Engaged in Major
Retaliation at Some Point.
Right from the outset, this course of action would entail some chance of a Communist
military response against the south. Furthermore, as we move to the stage of "further
increases of military pressure", the chance of the more severe types of response would
increase. These, and the required responses, are covered in the Military Annex./5/
/5/Not found.
G. Possible Over-all Outcomes.
1. At best, conceivably in the early stages, but much more likely only after we had
engaged in the further military pressures covered under E above, Hanoi might decide that
the pain it was incurring was greater than the gains of continuing its present strategy in
South Vietnam. They might be ready to sit down and work out a settlement in some form
that would give us a restoration of the 1954 agreements, hopefully supplemented by more
effective international machinery and guarantees to maintain such a settlement.
2. At worst, South Vietnam might come apart while we were pursuing the course of
action. In such a case, we would be in the position of having got into an almost
irreversible sequence of military actions, but finding ourselves fighting on behalf of a
country that no longer wished to continue the struggle itself.
3. Between these two outcomes, there is much less chance than under Option C that the
struggle would continue indecisively for a considerable period. We could find ourselves
drawn into a situation where such military actions as an amphibious landing in the DRV-proposed as one of our further actions--moved us very far toward continuing occupation
of DRV soil. Alternatively, the volume of international noise and desire for a peaceful
settlement could reach the point where, in the interest of our world-wide objectives, we
would have to consider accepting a negotiation on terms that would be relatively but not
necessarily wholly favorable to the attainment of our full objectives.
H. Pros and Cons of Option B.
Pros.
1. Option B probably stands a greater chance than either of the other two of attaining our
objectives vis-a-vis Hanoi and a settlement in South Vietnam.
2. Our display of real muscle in action would undoubtedly have a salutary effect on the
morale of the rest of non-Communist Asia.
3. The course of military events vis-a-vis Communist China might give us a defensible
case to destroy the Chinese Communist nuclear production capability.
Cons.
1. This course of action has considerably higher risks of major military conflict with
Hanoi and possibly Communist China.
2. If we found ourselves thus committed to a major military effort, the results could be
extremely adverse to our position in other areas, and perhaps to American resolve to
maintain present world-wide policies, unless we achieved a clearly satisfactory outcome
in a fairly short time.
VI (old VII). Analysis of Option C
A. Rationale and Preparatory Actions. The rationale of Option C is explained in pare III.
C. above. The stated basis for our action would be that documented DRV illegal
infiltration of armed and trained insurgents, and over-all DRV direction and control of VC
insurgency, had now reached an intolerable level and that it was now necessary to hit at
the infiltration from the DRV and to bring pressure on Hanoi to cease this infiltration and
direction. The immediate preparatory actions (consistent with all three options) are set out
in Part VII (old IX) below. Under this Option C, the following preparatory action should
be taken:
1. A firm Presidential statement setting forth our rationale.
2. Information actions, surfacing usable information on DRV infiltration and direction.
3. Consultation with leaders of Congress (no new Resolution needed).
4. Talks with the GVN explaining our plan, providing for GVN participation, and
insisting that the GVN "shape up."

5. Appropriate consultation and talks with allies and neutrals--especially the UK,
Australia, New Zealand, Thailand, the Philippines and Laos.
B. Early Military Actions. There would be advantages if Option C could be initiated
following either another "Bien Hoa" or at least strong additional evidence of major
infiltration. Absent these "pegs," the actions, in addition to any reprisal actions required
from time to time, would be these:
1. Intensification of GVN sea harassment, one or more US destroyer patrols, Lao strikes
on infiltration targets in Laos, high-level recce of the DRV, and shallow GVN ground
actions in Laos.
2. US air strikes on infiltration targets in Laos, including Route 7.
3. US/VNAF low-level reconnaissance in southern DRV.
4. US/VNAF air strikes against infiltration targets in southern DRV (after removal of US
dependents and taking security measures in SVN).
In addition to such actions, there is at issue whether we should at an early stage make a
significant ground deployment to the northern part of South Vietnam, either in the form of
a US combat force (perhaps a division) or a SEATO-members force including at least
token contingents from Australia, New Zealand, the UK, Thailand, and the Philippines.
Such 6 a force is not a military requirement-at least until or unless the DRV threatened a
ground move to the south-but there is a strong political argument that it would
demonstrate resolve and also give us a major bargaining counter in negotiations.
5 According to Bundy's memorandum to the Working Group, the text from this point to
the reference to footnote 7 below, which comprised pages 25-26, was revised following
the November 24 meeting.
C. Early Negotiating Actions.
1. UN. We would have to defend our position in the Security Council in any case. We
would hope that this could be a brief proceeding and we believe that the reactions would
be such as to make it crystal clear that the UN could not act usefully. (The latter point
would be useful to meet critics in the US.)
2. We would resist any formal Geneva conference on Vietnam, since the mere convening
of such a conference would have serious morale effects.
3. We would use all available channels to Hanoi and Peiping to make clear our objectives
and our determination.
4. At the same time, we would watch and listen closely for reactions from Hanoi and
Peiping. If these showed any signs of weakening in their positions, we would then try to
follow up as quietly as possible to see what they had in mind. At this stage we would be
insisting on three fundamentals: (a) that the DRV cease its assistance to and direction of
the VC; (b) that an independent and secure GVN be reestablished; and (c) that there be
adequate international supervising and verification machinery. (These fundamentals
would not be fully spelled out; in practice they leave room for minor concessions at later
stages.)
D. Probable Communist Responses to Initial Military Actions. There are three possible
Communist responses to the above initial military actions:
1. Yield visibly (quite unlikely).
2. Retaliate militarily--e.g., by air attacks against South Vietnam or by an offensive in
Laos (initially unlikely).
3. Hold firm while stimulating condemnation of US by world opinion, and, if in
negotiations, take a tough position (most likely).
E. If Hanoi Holds Firm. The initial reaction in South Vietnam to attacks on the DRV
would probably be one of elation and might cause a spurt of more effective performance.
We would try to capitalize on any improvement in the GVN situation by pressing harder
for acceptance of our initial negotiating position, continuing (not needing to step up) our
military pressures and trying to establish a "common law" justification for attacks on
infiltration and other limited targets in the DRV. But the/7/ elation in South Vietnam
would probably wane if the war dragged on, and deteriorating trends would probably
resume./8/ In this case, we would have to decide whether to intensify our military actions,
modify our negotiating positions, or both. A second phase in our military pressure would
here include (5) extension of the target system in the DRV to include additional targets on
the "94 target list," (6) aerial mining of DRV ports, and (7) a naval quarantine of the
DRV. Any visible modification of our negotiating position at this point would create a
major problem, in that key nations on both sides would suspect that we were getting ready
for a way out. Hence, any such modifying moves would have to be synchronized with
military actions. (Simultaneously, we should strengthen and reassure the nations of the
area, possibly involving major additional deployments there.)
/7/See footnote 6 above.
/8/The Joint Staff believes there is less chance that deterioration would resume and more
chance that a lasting upward trend in SVN could come about. [Footnote in the source
text.]
Meanwhile, even if the Communists did not attack South Vietnam, they might take steps
to reduce our initial advantage by improving air defenses in North Vietnam, deploying
Chinese ground forces southward, and hardening their propaganda (thus hardening their
public commitment).
F. If the Communist Side Engaged in Major Military Retaliation. We reckon major
Communist retaliation to be unlikely in the early stages, although a sharp US/GVN
reprisal or a Communist misreading of our intent could change this estimate. In the second
phase of military actions, there would be a progressively increasing chance of major
Communist military response.
The more serious Communist responses are (1) stepped-up VC activities in South
Vietnam, (2) air attacks on South Vietnam, (3) DRV ground offensive in South Vietnam
or Laos, and (4) Chicom ground offensive in Southeast Asia. The US plans and
capabilities to counter these Communist responses are contained in the Military Annex to
this memorandum.
G. Possible Over-all Outcomes. The variable factors are too great to permit a confident
evaluation of how the Option C course of action would come out. At best: To avoid heavy
risk and punishment, the DRV might feign compliance and settle for an opportunity to
subvert the South another day. That is, a respite might be gained. At worst: South
Vietnam might come apart while we were pursuing the course of action. In between: We
might be faced with no improvement in the internal South Vietnam situation and with the
difficult decision whether to escalate on up to major conflict with China.
H. Pros and Cons of Option C. Option C is more controllable and less risky of major
military action than Option B. Being a "stretched out" course of action, however, it is
likely to generate criticism in some quarters. It is more likely than Option A to achieve at
least part of our objectives, and, even if it ended in the loss of South Vietnam, our having
taken stronger measures would still leave us a good deal better off than under Option A
with respect to the confidence and willingness to stand firm of the nations in the next line
of defense in Asia.
VII (old IX). Immediate Actions Over the Next Few Weeks/9/
/9/According to Bundy's memorandum to the Working Group, Section VII (old IX),
which comprised pages 30-31 of the November 21 draft, was revised following the
November 24 meeting.
To bolster South Vietnamese morale and to convey a firm signal to Hanoi and Peiping, we
need in any event a program of immediate actions during the coming weeks. The
following program could be conducted for a period of four weeks or might be extended to
eight weeks or longer as desired:
A. A strong White House or Presidential statement following the meeting with
Ambassador Taylor, with the disclosure of the evidence of increased DRV infiltration to
be included or to follow promptly.
B. An order stopping the sending of further dependents to Vietnam.
C. Stepped-up air operations in Laos against infiltration targets particularly.
D. Increased high-level reconnaissance of the DRV.
E. Starting low-level reconnaissance of the DRV.
F. A small number of strikes just across the DRV border against the infiltration routes.
G. A destroyer patrol in the Tonkin Gulf and also (but separately) intensified GVN
maritime operations along present lines.
H. Major air deployments to the Philippines and at sea, in position to hit North Vietnam.
I. At any time, reprisal air strikes against the DRV might be undertaken for a spectacular
DRV or VC action whether against US personnel or not. Reprisals would be linked to
DRV activity, and the scale of the reprisal action would be determined on a flexible basis
in accordance with the magnitude of the hostile action.
In conjunction with the above sequence of actions, we would consult with the GVN to
"shape-up" in every possible way, through intensifying all present programs, putting
military forces on a totally wartime operations basis, tightening security in Saigon and
elsewhere, etc.
Congress and our major allies would have to be consulted at an early stage. Our basic
rationale would be that the increasing DRV infiltration required this degree of action.
None of these actions are inconsistent in theory with a decision to stick with Option A at
least for the next few months. Nonetheless, to the degree they foreshadow stronger action,
they would tend to have diminishing effect on GVN performance unless taken
concurrently with at least an internal US Government decision that we were ready to
move to Option C early in 1965 unless the situation changed.
Honolulu, November 22, 1964--7:25 p.m.
12009. Top Secret.
230515Z. Next courses of action, Southeast Asia. A. Your 001931 DTG 170045Z./2/ B.
Your 002052 T-3 DTG 191603Z./3/
/2/Dated November 16, this cable informed Sharp that "a controlled program of
systematically increased military pressure against the DRV" was under consideration and
asked for Sharp's views on what U.S. forces might be deployed to Southeast Asia prior to
initiating such a program. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 218, ICS
Files)
/3/Dated November 19, this cable repeated the request for Sharp's views on U.S. force
deployments. (Ibid.)
1. My response to Refs A and B is being prepared and will be forwarded shortly.
2. While the new government of the RVN has just been organized, there is cause for hope
that it may attain some stability and effectiveness. The RVNAF are barely countering and
certainly not reducing the Viet Cong insurgency. If the government survives and achieves
some unity amongst the various factions, the effectiveness of the armed forces should
increase but increased U.S. action is required to provide the necessary momentum for the
counter-insurgency.
3. We still have not made it clear to Hanoi and Peiping that the cost of pursuing their
current objectives will become prohibitive. Our action after the Gulf of Tonkin incident
caused apprehension in North Vietnam but to date our shooting activities have been those
of response only and after the Bien Hoa attack there was no reaction. Thus the pattern is
one which may cause the DRV to believe that they can continue their present aggression
or even raise the level of action with impunity.
4. What is needed is a campaign of systematically and gradually increased measured
military pressures against the DRV conducted in conjunction with a coordinated
diplomatic and psychological program.
This campaign would aim to convince the Communists that destruction will continue to
occur until they cease supporting the insurgency. It offers least provocation to the Chinese
Communists and therefore the least risk of ChiCom intervention as the result of a
calculation that it is incompatible with their national security. It would be conducted in a
manner which would permit the U.S. to observe its effects concurrently in four areas as
the campaign progresses: infiltration, NVN, Communist China, and the political situation
in South Vietnam. It would not irrevocably commit the U.S. to pursue escalation to any
particular level. It would, however, permit us to make ultimate decisions on how far and
in what direction to go in Southeast Asia as we observed effects during the escalation.
5. The required military actions in this campaign call for initial air strikes on infiltration
routes, moving to infiltration-associated targets and then expanding to other important
targets. Geographically, the air strikes would commence in the Panhandle of Laos, move
into the southern part of NVN and gradually move northward. The pattern would be
systematic with progressive attacks of ever-increasing intensity and severity. However,
sufficient time would be allowed between strikes to determine DRV and ChiCom
reaction. These actions, which are geared to specific objectives, should be initiated in a
pre-planned sequence with the follow-on action commencing when it has been determined
that those actions currently underway are not attaining the objective.
A. Step 1. VNAF alone or assisted by Farmgate conduct air attacks on infiltration routes
and targets in Laos.
(1) Because of limited U.S. participation the effectiveness of this action will depend
on the number of aircraft which can be taken away from pacification operations.
Pacification operations would probably suffer so we should not stay at this level too
long.
B. Step 2. U.S. forces conduct air attacks on infiltration targets in Laos and then in NVN.
(1) These strikes would be an effective method of getting the message through to
the DRV. The graduated nature of the attacks will cause maximum apprehension
while at the same time making DRV decision to retaliate and ChiCom decision to
intervene more difficult.
C. Step 3. In event our objectives are not attained in Step 2) U.S. forces conduct major air
attacks on DRV.
(1) This should convince the DRV to cease aiding Viet Cong and Pathet Lao. It
might also cause him to recall his insurgents. (2) It would not be necessary to strike
Phuc Yen until such time as planes based there start to interfere with our operations.
6. Those actions listed above which are directed at Laos are primarily concerned with air
strikes on Panhandle infiltration routes and targets. I would leave the situation in the PDJ
alone at this time realizing that if the Communists step up their military activities, certain
specific U.S. actions can be taken to counter them.
7. The provocation for such a controlled series of attacks has been established. There is,
moreover, reason to believe that the military activity in the Panhandle and along the route
to NVN is becoming more significant. It is time to reverse this trend. Accordingly I
recommend the initiation of the campaign outlined above.
(McNamara)/1/
JCSM-982-64
/1/Source: Department of State, Ball Files: Lot 74 D 272, Vietnam. Top Secret; Sensitive.
SUBJECT
Courses of Action in Southeast Asia
1. This memorandum responds to the memorandum of 17 November 1964 from the
Assistant Secretary of State, Far Eastern Affairs, requesting review of the drafts on this
subject prepared by the National Security Council (NSC) Working Group./2/ Because of
the preliminary and tentative nature of these drafts, this memorandum addresses only
those matters which are considered to comprise the fundamentals of the present problem.
2. The Joint Chiefs of Staff consider Southeast Asia to be an area of major strategic
importance to the United States, the loss of which would lead to grave political and
military consequences in the entire Western Pacific, and to serious political consequences
world-wide. These considerations are amplified in Appendix A./3/ In the present situation
the Joint Chiefs of Staff consider that there are three basic issues relative to our courses of
action in Southeast Asia as follows:
/3/Neither Appendix A nor any of the other four appendices is printed.
a. What are our objectives?
b. What are the courses of action open to us?
c. What are the probable consequences of these courses of action?
These issues are examined in the following paragraphs.

3. The Joint Chiefs of Staff understand established national policies include as objectives
in Southeast Asia a stable and independent noncommunist government in the Republic of
South Vietnam (RVN)/4/ and a stabilized situation in Laos which conforms to the Geneva
Accords of 1962./5/ They consider these objectives to be valid and essential to
maintaining the US security position world-wide. They further consider that the best
probability of success in attaining these ends will be afforded by achieving the
prerequisite objective of causing the cessation of North Vietnamese (DRY) support and
direction of the insurgencies in RVN and Laos. Early implementation of political and
military actions designed to achieve these objectives, in addition to continued aggressive
programs in SVN, offers the greatest assurance of success.
/4/NSAM 288 of 17 March 1964. [Footnote in the source text. NSAM 288 is printed as
Document 87.]
/5/NSAM 249 of 25 June 1963. [Footnote in the source text. NSAM 249 is in Department
of State, NSC Files: Lot 72 D 316, NSAM 249.]
4. The alternatives open to the United States in Southeast Asia are summarized in the five
courses of action listed below, keyed as indicated to the courses of action set forth in the
NSC Working Group (NSCWG) paper:
a. Course A' (This course of action is implicit in the content of the NSCWG paper but is
not clearly identified as a separate and distinct option.): Terminate commitments in RVN
and Laos, and withdraw under conditions which impair as little as possible our standing in
the eyes of the world.
b. Course A (Corresponds to the NSCWG Course of Action A.): Continue actions within
our present policies, including feasible improvements within the boundaries of those
policies.
c. Course C (Corresponds to the NSCWG Course of Action C.): Undertake a program of
graduated military and political initiatives to apply additional pressures against the DRV,
without necessarily determining in advance to what degree we will commit ourselves to
achieve our objectives, or at what point we might stop to negotiate, or what our
negotiation objectives might be.
d. Course C' (This is a variant and logical extension of the NSCWG Course of Action C,
although not specifically identified as such in the NSCWG paper.): Undertake a controlled
program of graduated military pressures, systematically applied against the DRV, in
coordination with appropriate political pressures. This course is distinguished from
Course C by the advance decision to continue military pressures, if necessary, to the full
limits of what military actions can contribute toward US national objectives. The military
program for this course of action is the program set forth in JCSM-96-64, dated 18
November 1964./6/
/6/A copy of this 2-page memorandum with 17 annexes is ibid., Bundy Files, Working
Papers, Nov 1964, Vol. IV, JCS; the memorandum is printed in Pentagon Papers: Gravel
Edition, vol. III, pp. 639-640.
e. Course B (This Course of Action should be used in lieu of the NSCWG Course of
Action B, which is not a valid formulation of any authoritative views known to the Joint
Chiefs of Staff.): Undertake a controlled program of intense military pressures against the
DRV, swiftly yet deliberately applied, designed to have major military and psychological
impact from the outset, and accompanied by appropriate political pressures. The program
would be undertaken on the basis that it would be carried through, if necessary, to the full
limits of what military actions can contribute toward US national objectives; it would be
designed, however, for suspension short of those limits if objectives were earlier achieved.
The military program for this course of action is the program recommended in JCSM-95564, dated 14 November 1964./7/
/7/Document 411.
5. The probable consequences of the foregoing courses of action, with respect both to
accomplishment of our objectives and to other potential reactions, are summarized below,
with additional particulars set forth in Appendix B.
a. Course A': Abandons our objectives, sacrifices the military advantages attainable from
a firm position on the mainland of Southeast Asia, and initiates progressive deterioration
in our military position throughout the Western Pacific and in our political position
worldwide.
b. Course A: Puts some added demands on the DRV, but not commensurate with those
imposed by the DRV on RVN. Thus it offers no identifiable probability of accomplishing
our objectives, nor of alleviating the critical situation in RVN. The present possibility of
internal collapse in RVN could lead to accelerated take-over by the communists, and
entails substantial risks to US personnel and equipment in country during the attendant
disorders.
c. Course C: Is inconclusive as to accomplishment of over-all objectives, because it is
undertaken without a clear determination to see things through in full. Its uncertain pace
could permit and encourage enemy build-ups to counter our own. Thus it would raise the
risks and costs to us of each separate military undertaking, would invite further
escalations on the part of the enemy, and would make miscalculation regarding the
resolve and determination of the United States more likely. At any specific level of
intensity, this course of action appears likely to entail the highest military risks of those
considered, and to foster progressively increasing adverse political pressures in many
quarters.
d. Course C': Offers a probability of achieving our objective through progressively
reducing the DRV support to the insurgencies. Its systematic force build-up would add
further deterrence to possible CHICOM intervention, and should make miscalculation of
US resolve less likely. Should escalation occur, it can be dealt with adequately and on
terms more favorable than those applicable in Course C above. From a strictly military
point of view this course of action involves probable higher military costs and casualties
than Course B, for example, through failure to eliminate DRV air and DRV facilities
available to CHICOM air at the outset. The determination signaled by this course should
enlist substantial US public and world support, while giving pause to the opposition.
e. Course B: Offers the best probability of achieving our objectives at the least risk,
casualties, and cost, and with the least probability of enemy miscalculation. In addition to
its military advantages and its reduced probability of escalation, this course of action
offers greater psychological impact and presents to all concerned a clear and unequivocal
picture of US determination and US objectives. The possibility of intervention by the
CHICOMs is judged to be less likely than in Course C'. There should be no problems
beyond those in Courses C or C' in dealing with any world opinion which might oppose
this course of action.
6. The Joint Chiefs of Staff reject Course A' because it abandons the objectives. They
reject Course A because it does not offer a reasonable probability of achieving the
objectives. They do not recommend Course C, because it is inconclusive as to attainment
of our objectives, yet entails potentially high risks and costs.
7. Course C' is not recommended as the preferred course of action. However, should a
controlled program of systematically increased pressures be directed, the Joint Chiefs of
Staff recommend the program of actions contained in JCSM-967-64.
8. The Joint Chiefs of Staff recommend that:
a. Course B, as defined in this paper and which offers the best probability of attaining the
stated objectives, be implemented at this time.
b. The substance of this memorandum be reflected in appropriate revision of the NSC
Working Group drafts of a study of US courses of action in Southeast Asia.
Earle G. Wheeler/8/
Chairman

Transmitted as telegram 1630 from Saigon, which is the source text.
Embtel 1536./2/ The Huong government is still in business but has made little progress
since my last report. The harassing attacks of minority groups continue the political unrest
in Saigon. Troops and police have shown considerable restraint in dealing with
demonstrators and have behaved reasonably well in consonance with the orders issued.
Reports of deaths and injuries to demonstrators have been greatly exaggerated--we know
of no fatalities. Huong complained to me that politically subsidized newspapers were
reporting casualties in advance of demonstrations. Chief of State Suu is turning out to be a

soft spot in the government structure. He has undercut Huong's position by sending a
letter to the High National Council urging it to convoke a national assembly as soon as
possible (by implication to put Huong out of business). He has also shown himself
vulnerable to pressures from many quarters and to be unduly concerned for his own
popular image. It is a great pity that the Chief of State is not a man of some strength to
bolster Huong and his Cabinet.
We had a good military week with Viet Cong activity low and government
counterinsurgency activity both high and effective. There were several very good
operations conducted by the Vietnamese Army. The losses inflicted in VC during week
amounted to 425 killed in action and 146 prisoners.
Clean-up in the flood area in Central Viet-Nam continues to make progress. As predicted,
we are finding that the losses will be less than originally reported. Fortunately, there have
been no epidemics.
The big question remains the ability of the Huong government to ride out the present
rough weather. The typhoon disaster diverted some attention from the government but
now the Buddhist leadership is returning to the attack, chastising the government for its
"repression of innocent people who only sought to present their just aspirations". Huong
continues to insist that his government will survive.
Taylor/3/
422. Letter From the Deputy Ambassador in Vietnam (Johnson) to the Secretary of
State/1/
Saigon, November 24, 1964.
/1/Source: Department of State, Rusk Files: Lot 72 D 192, Correspondence--J. No
classification marking. The source text is handwritten.
Dear Dean: I am giving below my replies to your queries as I understand them./2/
/2/Rusk's letter has not been found.
1. You can feel confident that our reporting from here is as accurate as we can make it.
Our political section and provincial reporters call the shots as they see them with no one
attempting to edit them back.
With respect to Max and myself as far as senior officials and developments are concerned,
Max's glasses were initially inclined to be a little more rosy than perhaps my too black
glasses. We always talked it out--and still do for that matter--Max could just not be more
thoughtful in this regard. At present there are no significant differences in our view of the
situation although if there is a shade I still tend toward the pessimistic. Understandably
Max tends to look at the statistics on military operations somewhat more than I, who tend
perhaps to look too much at moods.
2. Westmoreland and Zorthian are absolutely first class. Killen is sound for the most part
but he prejudices his case by his manner and Max and I find him somewhat more difficult
to work with than we hoped. He still thinks "the military" are also an "enemy" that must
be dealt with in a firm manner.
3. Can this be won? I perhaps should give the answer I give newspapermen--it must be
won. Given the weaknesses here it cannot be won just in SVN. In some way the DRV
must be gotten off their backs. This will not guarantee anything here but without it, it is
not possible.
I am in full agreement with the plan Max is bringing back./3/ The only question is timing-I am inclined to start somewhat earlier than would Max, while Westmoreland is inclined
to start somewhat later. Westmoreland thinks that in the next few months we can turn
things up a little on the military side. While this might be true, I do not think it is
generally true.
/3/Presumably this is the program presented in Document 426.
Incidentally I was very disappointed in the quality of what Mike brought out. It did not
give me the feeling that the two sides of the river had really worked it out together.
Without beating the drum for my old shop, I think Jeff Kitchen could help on this type of
thing. Max is carrying with him my own concept of our approach./4/
/4/Johnson's plan has not been further identified.
I am deeply conscious of the risk but--as with Cuba--the risks of doing nothing are much
greater. At the minimum we must stick with it and play for the breaks. The other side
must also be having their problems.
Sincerely
Alex
423. Memorandum From the Chairman of the National Security Council Working
Group (Bundy) to the Secretary of State/1/
/1/Source: Department of State, Bundy Files, Working Papers, Nov 1964, Vol. 1. Top
Secret. Also sent to McNamara, McCone, Wheeler, Ball, and McGeorge Bundy. Also
printed in Pentagon Papers: Gravel Edition, vol. III, pp. 646-650. McGeorge Bundy's
copy of this memorandum bears his handwritten notes reflecting the discussion of these
issues at the meeting at 5 p.m. on November 24. (Johnson Library, National Security File,
Vietnam Country File, Courses of Action in SEA) For a record of the meeting, see
Document 424.
SUBJECT
Issues Raised by Papers on Southeast Asia
Although the official comments are not all in at this writing, I think it will be useful for
your meeting this afternoon to have a list of the issues that appear to one mind to warrant
priority discussion. Some are explicitly disagreed, others have been lurking and should be
surfaced in my judgment.
1. Basic Issues as Between the Options
A. Is it true that the South Vietnam situation would deteriorate further under Option A
even with reprisals, but stands a significant chance of improving under Option B or
Option C?
Comment: Advocates of A maximize the chances of decay even under B and C, advocates
of B and C think the lift from greater action could really take hold and move us forward in
South Vietnam, whereas A is doomed. All concede there is some chance that the GVN
would come apart under any Option.
B. Is the negotiating outcome under Option A (with or without US negotiating
participation) likely to be clearly worse than under Option C?
Comment: Advocates of A doubt that it would be.
C. What are the best estimates of the risks of major conflict under Option B and Option
C? If, as the intelligence paper states,/2/ they are about the same as between Option B and
Option C at its highest, is there enough chance that C would succeed before it reached this
point to make a real difference on the risk factor?
/2/A copy of this paper, "Probable Communist Reactions to US Options B and C" (TS#
185782-a), November 19, is in Department of State, Bundy Files, Working Papers, Nov
1964, Vol. 1.
D. Is it true, as the draft paper states,/3/ that Option B has the best chance of attaining our
full objectives?
/3/Document 418.
E. As to our stakes in SEA, is the paper valid as written, or should it be revised in the
direction of the Joint Staff comments/4/ that loss of SVN would be necessarily
catastrophic? Is the analysis of the attitudes of non-Asian key allies right, and what weight
should we give to this?
/4/Document 420.
Comment: The point of the Joint Staff comments really is that greater risks of major
conflict are worth accepting in view of their view of the stakes. The Joint Staff view
would also implicitly assign less weight to key non-Asian allies, and still less to the nonaligned countries.
F. Can Option C be carried out in practice under the klieg lights of a democracy, in view
of its requirement that we maintain a credible threat of major action while at the same
time seeking to negotiate, even if quietly?
Comment: this is a key point raised by advocates of A. The parallel to Korea in 1951-53 is
forbidding. Even advocates of C concede the difficulties.
G. Are we safe in assuming that SVN can only come apart for morale reasons, and not in
a military sense as well?
Comment: The intelligence estimate is not confident on VC "burst capabilities." The
President's repeated concern on protecting the south has not really been met in these
papers, but we have all felt that the purely military aspects of the VC could be contained.
This is a first question to ask of Ambassador Taylor.
II. Issues Relating to the Immediate Courses of Action (Section VII)
A. Is our reprisal planning in proper shape to produce varied options on demand? Does it
provide adequately for GVN participation?
Comment: CINCPAC Frag Order No. 3 is the current basis of planning. It provides for
optional clusters of targets, but no one option calls for less than about 175 strikes, under
very high damage criteria. Such a high order of action could throw off all calculations
based on the theory of "squeeze" under Option C and even under Option B. As to GVN
participation, the latest plans do crank this in, at some sacrifice of destructiveness.
B. What do we mean to take as a basis for reprisal?
Comment: We all agree that another Bien Hoa would call for reprisal, but it would help to
refine our thinking somewhat further. Incidents not solely directed at the US would be
desirable for political reasons. What kind might these be?
C. What sort of high-level statement is needed if we adopt the immediate program?
Comment: Should it be generalized, with the infiltration evidence speaking for itself
separately, or should it make express use of the infiltration evidence? Is the latter wholly
ready for surfacing? Is the new Jorden Report?/5/
/5/The first Jorden Report was released on December 8, 1961; see Foreign Relations,
1961-1963, vol. I, pp. 725-726. In the fall of 1964, a new report on infiltration was being
considered. Sometimes called the new Jorden Report, it was published on February 27,
1965, under the title Aggression From the North (Department of State Publication 7839).
III. Issues Concerning the Execution of Option A
A. Can this Option really be extended to include continued (non-reprisal) actions against
the DRV even at a low scale?
Comment: The longer draft/6/ had so extended it. Most of us think this is a mistake in
definition, in that any continued actions against the DRV create international and other
pressures and are an effect the early stages of Option C.
/6/Presumably Bundy is referring to the 100-page draft paper.
B. Could or should ground forces be put into northern SVN even under this Option?
Comment: Advocates of A urge this as a bargaining counter. Most of us think that, apart
from lacking any military necessity in the absence of attacks on the DRV, it would appear
as a bluff and not help any negotiation.
C. Assuming the situation does deteriorate under this Option, should we let Vietnamese
negotiations develop, or ourselves seek a forum?
Comment: This is a less urgent issue, and perhaps cannot be answered now.
IV. Issues Concerning the Execution of Option B
A. Should we hit major targets, especially airfields, at once, or only after and if the DRV
has hurt us from them?
Comment: Even under this Option, many of us feel the actions should be progressive,
with the prospect of more to come at least as important psychologically as present
damage. We all accept the will of the DRV as the real target.
B. Is ground invasion of the DRV (at Vinh per present plans) a military necessity or
advantage that outweighs the increased risks the Chicoms would then come in force?
(This applies to C as well as B.)
Comment: The intelligence estimate (p. 9 of "Probable Communist Reactions," dated 19
November) highlights this as significantly raising the odds. It would also tend to change
our objectives in the eyes of the world. Is it worth it?
C. At what stage, if ever, might nuclear weapons be required, and on what scale? What
would be the implications of such use?
Comment: This is clearly a sensitive issue. The President may want a more precise answer
than appears in the papers.
V. Issues Concerning the Execution of Option C
A. Should ground forces be introduced into northern SVN at the early stages?
Comment: The pros and cons of this are argued in Section VII of the long draft.
B. Is our early targeting properly thought through?
Comment: This is partly the question of whether to hit Phuc Yen early. But also some
individual comment has highlighted the possible utility of focusing at length on low-key
targets, not so much for the sake of damage as to show how helpless the DRV is, cause it
to strain its security apparatus, and ask for help from the Chicoms in ways the Chicoms
may not be able to give effectively. Also to keep our losses low. Such an undramatic
"water drip" technique would, in the opinion of many Chicom experts, both hit DRV will
harder than more dramatic attacks and strain the key DRV-Chicom relationships more.
Put differently, this school of thought argues that dramatic acts, with probably higher US
losses, would tend to knit the DRV people and the DRV and Chicoms; US losses are also
a key factor in DRV morale, as their propaganda has shown for months. If we were acting
with impunity, this would have a major effect, and the falseness of their propaganda
would become a major weakness in their hold over their people.
C. How do we handle any early negotiations?
Comment: This is the least satisfactory part of the present script. To keep up our show of
determination and at the same time listen for nibbles is a tough job in any case. We need
to consider use of third countries at the outset perhaps more.
D. Do we even listen to nibbles till we have established a clear "common law" pattern of
attacks?
Comment: The point is not made as clear as it should be. I think not.
VI. Action Issues Applicable to any Decisions
A. White House statement.
B. High-level speech.
C. Congressional consultation, including whether Ambassador Taylor should testify if
Committees ask.
D. Key Allies--UK, Australia, New Zealand, Thailand, Philippines. Individually or would
we now form a group as in Korea? (I am inclined against a formal group, with or without
publicity--the interests are too diverse.) SEATO?
E. US Government machinery. Do we not need a designated ExCom now, with a
subordinate working group?
William P. Bundy/7/
424. Memorandum of the Meeting of the Executive Committee, Washington,

November 24, 1964, 5 p.m./1/
Secret. Drafted by William Bundy on November 25. Also published in Declassified
Documents, 1983, 000555. Bundy's handwritten notes on the meeting show that items I C
and E, IV C, and V A provoked the most discussion. (Department of State, Bundy Files
Master Papers, Late Nov 1964)
PRESENT
Secretary Rusk
Secretary McNamara
Mr. McCone
General Wheeler
Mr. Ball
Mr. McGeorge Bundy
Mr. William Bundy
SUBJECT
Issues Raised by Papers on Southeast Asia
This memorandum records the consensus or majority view of key issues discussed at this
meeting, pending discussion with Ambassador Taylor.
Basic Issues
1. There was a consensus that, if the DRV did withdraw its effort, the security situation in
the south could be handled in time if the government could maintain itself. However, the
struggle would still be long
2. There was a consensus that the South Vietnam situation would deteriorate further under
Option A even with reprisals, but that there was a significant chance that the actions
proposed under Option B or Option C would improve GVN performance and make
possible an improvement in the security situation.
3. There was a consensus that any negotiating outcome under Option A (with or without
US negotiating participation) was likely to be clearly worse than under Option C or
Option B.
4. There was a divided view as to whether Option B was in fact (as the draft paper/2/
states) significantly more likely to lead to major escalation than Option C. Mr. McCone
undertook to review this question.
/2/Document 418.
5. There was a consensus that it was not true, as the draft paper states, that Option B, in
the light of all factors, has the best chance of attaining our full objectives. (Draft paper,
page 21, pare H. 1.)
6. There was a consensus that the loss of South Vietnam would be somewhat more serious
that stated in Section II of the draft paper, and it would be at least in the direction of the
Joint Staff view as stated in the footnote to page 7 of the draft.
7. There was a consensus that the requirement of Option C--maintaining military pressure
and a credible threat of major action while at the same time being prepared to negotiate--
could in practice be carried out. The difficulties and domestic pressures were noted, but it
was felt that continuing military actions could handle such pressures and also pressures
for premature negotiations or concessions.
8. There was a consensus that the danger of military defeat in the south, or serious
damage, was not serious under the various options provided that adequate security
measures were taken.
Immediate Courses of Action
(Section VII of draft)
9. It was reported that our reprisal planning provided proper latitude for any gradation of
action that might be required either in the immediate courses of action or under the
options.
10. It was agreed that we needed further work to define the types of incident we would
use as a basis for reprisal. DoD is doing the initial work on this, and we will consult with
Ambassador Taylor.
11. It was agreed that the Saigon intelligence study,/3/ indicating substantial increases in
infiltration both this year and in past years, required careful review and briefing in
Washington. We must not be open to the charge of framing evidence to suit our policy,
and senior Cabinet officers must be in a position to explain strongly why our earlier and
lower estimates have now been found wrong. CIA is taking the lead on this.
/3/Document 392.
Execution of Option B
12. It was agreed that the early hitting of major targets was central to this option.
13. It was agreed that the question of an ultimate limited ground invasion of the DRV--not
yet formally proposed by the JCS--should be further examined to produce an assessment
of its risks and gains. For the time being, this should be treated as a "detachable" element
in the military sequence.
Execution of Option C
14. The question of whether ground forces should be introduced into South Vietnam at an
early stage was discussed without any consensus emerging. The arguments for and against
this element (pp. 24-25 of the draft) were reviewed, and there was some sentiment for
introduction of such forces into northern South Vietnam as a preemptive action. The
introduction of forces for security purposes was also discussed, with a somewhat more
negative initial reaction but with agreement that this should be reviewed with Ambassador
Taylor.
15. There was a consensus that, under Option C, our early military actions against the
DRV should be determined, but low in scale, but that some higher-damage actions should
be included under the reprisal heading.
Procedure
16. It was agreed that, subject to the approval of the President, the group at this meeting
should constitute an Executive Committee for continuing action on this matter.

/1/Source: Department of State, Saigon Embassy Files: Lot 68 F 8. Top Secret; Limdis.
Drafted by Taylor on November 24. Repeated to CINCPAC.
1629. CINCPAC for POLAD. Last Friday/2/ following our meeting with the Internal
[National?] Security Council, I mentioned to Prime Minister Huong that I would like to
have a meeting with him, Deputy Prime Minister Vien and General Khanh to discuss
questions which might arise during my visit to Washington. I told him I would like to
bring Ambassador Johnson and General Westmoreland with me to such a meeting.
/2/November 20.
The meeting took place the morning of November 24 between 1030 and 1230. I explained
that while I did not know the agenda of the coming discussions in Washington, I could
well anticipate being asked a number of difficult questions. It would be very useful to me
if they would indicate their judgment as to the appropriate answers.
For example, an early question will undoubtedly bear on the life expectancy of the Huong
government. We Americans were all pulling for Huong and his cabinet and were watching
with concern the harassing tactics of his detractors. Under the circumstances, could we
look upon the Huong government as one likely to be with us for a considerable time?
Huong replied in terms which he had used before in discussing the political situation. He
recognizes that there are a number of small groups who are working in the interest of
certain politicians to topple his government but he considers the groups do not represent
any substantial segment of the population. He is particularly aware of the union of some
of the Buddhist groups with such men as General Do Mau, Phan Huy Quat and Tran Van
Do. Other ringleaders are politicians who have been disappointed in not being included in
the cabinet. Huong considers them annoying in aggregate but not basically dangerous.
He is more concerned about the attitude of the High National Council and Chief of State
Suu. The High National Council has been very unhelpful, particularly in its action in
appointing an investigating committee to look into the background of cabinet members.
Chief of State Suu, Huong says, is so kind hearted that he does not recognize the
wickedness of men about him and is thus pliable to pressures. He has recently urged
Huong not to go too hard on demonstrations who [which] might include innocent people.
In spite of all adverse factors, Huong is confident that he and his ministers can hang on.
I then asked Khanh to comment upon the internal condition in the Army. Was he
concerned about malcontents there? Khanh replied that, having been in politics for a year,
certain members of the Army were finding it hard to break old habits but generally they
were becoming better behaved. He pointed out that the officer corps was nonhomogeneous in the sense that it came from many sources and included individuals of
widely differing backgrounds. Hence it was not surprising to find numerous small groups
of malcontents but there is nothing like a political faction. He did recognize, however, that
some Dai Viet were still about but are presently lying low.
The next subject we discussed was the estimate of degree of deterioration which has taken
place in the provinces in recent months and the danger of a sudden collapse. All three
rejected strongly the latter possibility. They concede that the situation has worsened in
some provinces but they expect no dramatic toboggan. Khanh remarked that the
provincial front would hold and the Saigon front would hold, and so all that remained for
concern was the "Washington front."
I then asked whether they had any suggestions as to ways of improving the pacification
program and turning the trend upward. Huong remarked that the real remedy was for the
government to demonstrate will and capability to serve the public interest and to assure
that U.S. aid reaches the people at the grassroots. Khanh discussed the probable need for
more manpower both in the military services and in the police. In spite of slowness in
reaching presently authorized strength levels, he is confident that even greater strengths
could be attained. Both he and the Prime Minister commented that evidence of U.S.
support would be an encouragement to the people and would facilitate recruiting. Huong
also mentioned the need for a stronger radio station in Saigon comparable to that of
Hanoi. Khanh had previously raised the matter with the U.S. Mission at a meeting with
the old NSC.
The next subject discussed was the question of carrying the war into Laos or North VietNam. I noted that General Khanh had raised the slogan "March North" some months
before but that I had never understood what he exactly had in mind. Khanh explained that
he never meant by "March North" a movement on the ground into North Viet-Nam. He
never had any idea of occupying North Viet-Nam. He did have in mind reprisal bombing
in compensation for Viet-Cong depredations in the South. He later added that continued
infiltration probably offered a broader justification for action against the North than
spectacular Viet-Cong attacks.
I advanced some of the usual arguments against this course of action pointing out that air
attacks in Laos, while they might limit infiltration, would certainly not stop it. Attacks on
the DRV would probably result in some hostile reaction in the form of a ground attack
into the northern provinces of South Viet-Nam, of air attacks on northern centers or of
heightened Viet-Cong terrorism. In the background, there would always be the possibility
of ChiCom intervention in some form. I asked if the government was prepared to take
these risks for the possible advantages which might accrue from offensive actions against
Hanoi.
All three officials stoutly insisted that they would run the risk unhesitatingly. Vien
stressed the stimulating effect upon the South Vietnamese people of seeing the enemy pay
for his misdeeds and the favorable effect on the campaign against the Viet-Cong. Khanh
rejected my suggestion that the Armed Forces might tend to neglect the anti-Viet-Cong
campaign if they thought an easy formula for success could be found in air attacks.
Although I pointed out that the destruction of North Viet-Nam would not necessarily
conclude the guerrilla warfare in the South, both Khanh and Vien argued strongly that the
discouraged Viet-Cong would soon fall apart if Hanoi were out of the picture.
Johnson asked whether attacks on compatriots in the North would not result in sharp
criticism of the GVN and of the U.S. They conceded that there would be some complaints
but thought they would not be significant.
At end, I summarized my understanding of their views as follows; and they agreed to its
accuracy:
a. Huong believes his government can survive in spite of current attacks.
b. There has been deterioration in the situation during the last few months but there is no
danger of a sudden debacle:
c. The in-country situation can be improved if the government shows that it is the servant
of the people. Improvement will probably also require an increase in military and police
manpower.
d. Military action against DRV is essential and worth the risks which it may entail. 3
3 At 4 p.m. on November 25, Johnson, at his request, met with Suu to discuss the situation
in Saigon. Johnson stressed the need to support Huong, particularly in connection with
Taylor's return to Washington. Johnson concluded his report on the meeting: "Suu
obviously got the message." (Telegram 1635; ibid., Central Files, POL 15 VIET S;
published in Declassified Documents, 1983, 001266)
Taylor
426. Paper Prepared by the Ambassador in Vietnam (Taylor)/1/

Saigon, undated./2/
/1/Source: National Defense University, Taylor Papers, T-157-69. Top Secret. The source
text is initialed by Taylor and bears his notation: "Papers used in Washington during Dec
64 trip." Printed also in Pentagon Papers: Gravel Edition, vol. III, pp. 666-673 and
published in Declassified Documents, 1983, 000557.
/2/Although the source text is undated, William Bundy notes that Taylor, who arrived in
Washington on November 26, brought the paper with him. (Department of State, Bundy
Files, Bundy Manuscript, ch. 19, p.5)
SUBJECT
The Current Situation in South Viet-Nam--November, 1964
After a year of changing and ineffective government, the counterinsurgency program
country-wide is bogged down and will require heroic treatment to assure revival. Even in
the Saigon area, in spite of the planning and the special treatment accorded the Hop Tac
plan, this area also is lagging. The northern provinces of South Viet-Nam which a year
ago were considered almost free of Viet-Cong are now in deep trouble. In the Quang
Ngai-Binh Dinh area, the gains of the Viet-Cong have been so serious that once more we
are threatened with a partition of the country by a Viet-Cong salient driven to the sea. The
pressure on this area has been accompanied by continuous sabotage of the railroad and of
Highway 1 which in combination threaten an economic strangulation of the northern
provinces.
This deterioration of the pacification program has taken place in spite of the very heavy
losses inflicted almost daily on the Viet-Cong and the increase in strength and
professional competence of the Armed Forces of South Viet-Nam. Not only have the
Viet-Cong apparently made good their losses, but of late, have demonstrated three new or
newly expanded tactics: the use of stand-off mortar fire against important targets, as in the
attack on the Bien Hoa airfield; economic strangulation of limited areas; finally, the
stepped-up infiltration of DRV military personnel moving from the north. These new or
improved tactics employed against the background of general deterioration offer a serious
threat to the pacification program in general and to the safety of important bases and
installations in particular.
Perhaps more serious than the downward trend in the pacification situation, because it is
the prime cause, is the continued weakness of the central government. Although the
Huong government has been installed after executing faithfully and successfully the
program laid out by the Khanh government for its own replacement, the chances for the
long life and effective performance of the new line-up appear small. Indeed, in view of the
factionalism existing in Saigon and elsewhere throughout the country, it is impossible to
foresee a stable and effective government under any name in anything like the near future.
Nonetheless, we do draw some encouragement from the character and seriousness of
purpose of Prime Minister Huong and his cabinet and the apparent intention of General
Khanh to keep the Army out of politics, at least for the time being.
As our programs plod along or mark time, we sense the mounting feeling of war
weariness and hopelessness which pervade South Viet-Nam, particularly in the urban
areas. Although the provinces for the most part appear steadfast, undoubtedly there is
chronic discouragement there as well as in the cities. Although the military leaders have
not talked recently with much conviction about the need for "marching North," assuredly
many of them are convinced that some new and drastic action must be taken to reverse the
present trends and to offer hope of ending the insurgency in some finite time.
The causes for the present unsatisfactory situation are not hard to find. It stems from two
primary causes, both already mentioned above, the continued ineffectiveness of the
central government, and the other, the increasing strength and effectiveness of the VietCong and their ability to replace losses.
While, in view of the historical record of South Viet-Nam, it is not surprising to have
these governmental difficulties, this chronic weakness is a critical liability to future plans.
Without an effective central government with which to mesh the U.S. effort, the latter is a
spinning wheel unable to transmit impulsion to the machinery of the GVN. While the
most critical governmental weaknesses are in Saigon, they are duplicated to a degree in
the provinces. It is most difficult to find adequate provincial chiefs and supporting
administrative personnel to carry forward the complex programs which are required in the
field for successful pacification. It is true that when one regards the limited background of
the provincial chiefs and their associates, one should perhaps be surprised by the results
which they have accomplished, but unfortunately, these results are generally not adequate
for the complex task at hand or for the time schedule which we would like to establish.
As the past history of this country shows, there seems to be a national attribute which
makes for factionalism and limits the development of a truly national spirit. Whether this
tendency is innate or a development growing out of the conditions of political suppression
under which successive generations have lived is hard to determine. But it is an
inescapable fact that there is no national tendency toward team play or mutual loyalty to
be found among many of the leaders and political groups within South Viet-Nam. Given
time, many of these conditions will undoubtedly change for the better, but we are
unfortunately pressed for time and unhappily perceive no short-term solution for the
establishment of stable and sound government.
The ability of the Viet-Cong continuously to rebuild their units and to make good their
losses is one of the mysteries of this guerrilla war. We are aware of the recruiting methods
by which local boys are induced or compelled to join the Viet-Cong ranks and have some
general appreciation of the amount of infiltration of personnel from the outside. Yet
taking both of these sources into account, we still find no plausible explanation of the
continued strength of the Viet-Cong if our data on Viet-Cong losses are even
approximately correct. Not only do the Viet-Cong units have the recuperative powers of
the phoenix, but they have an amazing ability to maintain morale. Only in rare cases have
we found evidences of bad morale among Viet-Cong prisoners or recorded in captured
Viet-Cong documents.
Undoubtedly one cause for the growing strength of the Viet-Cong is the increased
direction and support of their campaign by the government of North Viet-Nam. This
direction and support take the form of endless radioed orders and instructions, and the
continuous dispatch to South Viet-Nam of trained cadre and military equipment over
infiltration routes by land and by water. While in the aggregate, this contribution to the
guerrilla campaign over the years must represent a serious drain on the resources of the
DRV, that government shows no sign of relaxing its support of the Viet-Cong. In fact, the
evidence points to an increased contribution over the last year, a plausible development,
since one would expect the DRV to press hard to exploit the obvious internal weaknesses
in the south.
If, as the evidence shows, we are playing a losing game in South Viet-Nam, it is high time
we change and find a better way. To change the situation, it is quite clear that we need to
do three things: first, establish an adequate government in SVN; second, improve the
conduct of the counterinsurgency campaign; and, finally, persuade or force the DRV to
stop its aid to the Viet-Cong and to use its directive powers to make the Viet-Cong desist
from their efforts to overthrow the government of South Viet-Nam.
With regard to the first objective, it is hard to decide what is the minimum government
which is necessary to permit reasonable hope for the success of our efforts. We would
certainly like to have a government which is capable of maintaining law and order, of
making and executing timely decisions, of carrying out approved programs, and generally
of leading its people and gearing its efforts effectively with those of the United States.
As indicated above, however, it seems highly unlikely that we will see such a government
of South Viet-Nam in the time frame available to us to reverse the downward trend of
events. It seems quite probable that we will be obliged to settle for something
considerably less.
However, it is hard to visualize our being willing to make added outlays of resources and
to run increasing political risks without an allied government which, at least, can speak for
and to its people, can maintain law and order in the principal cities, can provide local
protection for the vital military bases and installations, can raise and support Armed
Forces, and can gear its efforts to those of the United States. Anything less than this
would hardly be a government at all, and under such circumstances, the United States
Government might do better to carry forward the war on a purely unilateral basis.
The objective of an improved counterinsurgency program will depend for its feasibility
upon the capacity of the South Vietnamese government. We cannot do much better than
what we are doing at present until the government improves. However, we need to have
our plans and means organized on the assumption that some improvement will occur and
will permit intensified efforts toward the pacification of the country.
In any case, we feel sure that even after establishing some reasonably satisfactory
government and effecting some improvement in the counterinsurgency program, we will
not succeed in the end unless we drive the DRV out of its reinforcing role and obtain its
cooperation in bringing an end to the Viet-Cong insurgency.
To attain these three objectives, we must consider what are the possible courses of action
which are open to us. To improve the government we will, of course, continue to aid,
advise and encourage it much as we are doing at the present time. We will try to restrain,
insofar as we can, the minority groups bent upon its overthrow. We will indicate clearly
the desire of the United States Government to see an end to the succession of weak and
transitory governments and we will throw all of our influence on the side of stabilizing
programs both for organizations and for personnel.
As these efforts in themselves will probably be inadequate, we should also consider ways
and means to raise the morale and restore the confidence both of the government and of
the South Vietnamese people. One way to accomplish this lift of morale would be to
increase the covert operations against North Viet-Nam by sea and air and the counterinfiltration attacks within the Laotian corridor. While the former would be covert in the
sense of being disavowed, nonetheless the knowledge of their occurrence could be made
known in such a way as to give the morale lift which is desired. Additionally, we could
engage in reprisal bombings, to repay outrageous acts of the Viet-Cong in South VietNam, such as the attack on Bien Hoa.
All these actions, however, may not be sufficient to hold the present government upright.
If it fails, we are going to be in deep trouble, with limited resources for subsequent
actions. It is true that we could try again with another civilian government but the odds
against it would be even higher than those which have confronted the Huong government.
We might try in a second civilian government to take over operational control by U.S.
officials if indeed the GVN would agree to this change. However, there are more
objections to this form of U.S. intervention than there are arguments in favor of it.
Another alternative would be to invite back a military dictatorship on the model of that
headed of late by General Khanh. However, Khanh did very poorly when he was on the
spot and we have little reason to believe that a successor military government could be
more effective. Finally, we always have the option of withdrawing, leaving the internal
situation to the Vietnamese, and limiting our contribution to military action directed at
North Viet-Nam. Such action, while assuring that North Viet-Nam would pay a price for
its misdeeds in the South, would probably not save South Viet-Nam from eventual loss to
the Viet-Cong.
There is little to say about the ways and means of intensifying the in-country
counterinsurgency program except to recognise again that this program depends entirely
upon the government. If we can solve the governmental problem, we can improve the incountry program.
In bringing military pressure to bear on North Viet-Nam, there are a number of variations
which are possible. At the bottom of the ladder of escalation, we have the initiation of
intensified covert operations, anti-infiltration attacks in Laos, and reprisal bombings
mentioned above as a means for stiffening South Vietnamese morale. From this level of
operations, we could begin to escalate progressively by attacking appropriate targets in
North Viet-Nam. If we justified our action primarily upon the need to reduce infiltration,
it would be natural to direct these attacks on infiltration-related targets such as staging
areas, training facilities, communications centers and the like. The tempo and weight of
the attacks could be varied according to the effects sought. In its final forms, this kind of
attack could extend to the destruction of all important fixed targets in North Viet-Nam and
to the interdiction of movement on all lines of communication.
Before making a final decision on any of the courses of action, it will be necessary to have
a heart-to-heart talk with Prime Minister Huong and General Khanh to find out their
reaction to the alternatives which we are considering. They will be taking on risks as great
or greater than ours so that they have a right to a serious hearing. We should make every
effort to get them to ask our help in expanding the war. If they decline, we shall have to
rethink the whole situation. If, as is likely, they urge us with enthusiasm, we should take
advantage of the opportunity to nail down certain important points such as:
a. The GVN undertakes (1) to maintain the strength of its military and police forces; (2) to
replace incompetent military commanders and province chiefs and to leave the competent
ones in place for an indefinite period; (3) to suppress disorders and demonstrations; (4) to
establish effective resources control; and (5) to obtain U.S. concurrence for all military
operations outside of South Viet-Nam.
b. The U.S. undertakes responsibility for the air and maritime defense of South Viet-Nam.
c. The GVN undertakes responsibility for the land defense of South Viet-Nam to include
the protection of all U.S. nationals and installations.
d. The GVN accepts the U.S. statement (to be prepared) of war aims and circumstances
for negotiations.
Shortly after initiating an escalation program it will be important to communicate with the
DRV and the ChiComs to establish certain essential points in the minds of their leaders.
The first is that under no circumstances will the United States let the DRV go unscathed
and reap the benefits of its nefarious actions in South Viet-Nam without paying a heavy
price. Furthermore, we will not accept any statement from the DRV to the effect that it is
not responsible for the Viet-Cong insurgency and that it cannot control the Viet-Cong
actions. We know better and will act accordingly. However, the enemy should know that
the United States objectives are limited. We are not seeking to unify North and South
Viet-Nam; we are seeking no permanent military presence in Southeast Asia. But on the
other hand, we do insist that the DRV let its neighbors, South Viet-Nam and Laos, strictly
alone.
Furthermore, we are not trying to change the nature of the government in Hanoi. If the
North Vietnamese prefer a Communist government, that is their choice to make. If the
DRV remain aloof from the ChiComs in a Tito-like state, we would not be averse to
aiding such a government provided it conducted itself decently with its neighbors.
But with all, we are tired of standing by and seeing the unabashed efforts of the DRV to
absorb South Viet-Nam into the Communist orbit against its will. We know that Hanoi is
responsible and that we are going to punish it until it desists from this behavior.
Just how and when such a communication should be transmitted should be a subject of
careful study. But, some such transmission is required to assure that the Communists in
the North know exactly what is taking place and will continue to take place.
We can be reasonably sure that the DRV, and Viet-Cong, will not take such offensive
actions on our part without a reaction. Already the Viet-Cong, assisted from Hanoi, are
doing many things to hamper and harass the central and local governments of South VietNam, to encourage minorities to resist Saigon and to foster the spirit of neutralism and
defeatism everywhere. They are quite capable of intensifying such actions, of raising the
level of harassments of people and officials, of mounting mortar attacks on the model of
Bien Hoa, and of continuing to try to effect the economic strangulation of many areas
within South Viet-Nam.
There are several courses of action which they could adopt which are presently not on
their program. They can call for international intervention to force us to desist from our
pressures. They can engage in limited air and ground attacks in South Viet-Nam using
formed units of the armies of North Viet-Nam and perhaps volunteers from Red China. It
is quite likely that they will invite some ChiCom military forces into the DRV if only to
reinforce its air defense. Furthermore, they have some limited seaborne capability for
raids against the South Vietnamese coast.
If their counter actions failed and our pressures became unbearable, the DRV might feign
submission and undertake to lie low for a time. They would probably, however, insist that
they do not have the capability of compelling the Viet-Cong to lay down their arms and
become law-abiding citizens. Any temporary reduction of their support of the Viet-Cong
could, of course, be resumed at any time after the United States had been cajoled into
leaving the scene of actions.
In view of the foregoing considerations, we reach the point where a decision must be
taken as to what course or courses of action we should undertake to change the tide which
is running against us. It seems perfectly clear that we must work to the maximum to make
something out of the present Huong government or any successor thereto. While doing so,
we must be thinking constantly of what we would do if our efforts are unsuccessful and
the government collapses. Concurrently, we should stay on the present in-country
program, intensifying it as possible in proportion to the current capabilities of the
government. To bolster the local morale and restrain the Viet-Cong during this period, we
should step up the 34-A operations, engage in bombing attacks and armed recce in the
Laotian corridor and undertake reprisal bombing as required. It will be important that
United States forces take part in the Laotian operations in order to demonstrate to South
Viet-Nam our willingness to share in the risks of attacking the North.
If this course of action is inadequate, and the government falls, then we must start over
again or try a new approach. At this moment, it is premature to say exactly what these
new measures should be. In any case, we should be prepared for emergency military
action against the North if only to shore up a collapsing situation.
If, on the other hand as we hope, the government maintains and proves itself, then we
should be prepared to embark on a methodical program of mounting air attacks in order to
accomplish our pressure objectives vis--vis the DRV and at the same time do our best to
improve in-country pacification program. We will leave negotiation initiatives to Hanoi.
Throughout this period, our guard must be up in the Western Pacific, ready for any
reaction by the DRV or of Red China. Annex I suggests the train of events which we
might set in motion.
Whatever the course of events, we should adhere to three principles:
a. Do not enter into negotiations until the DRV is hurting.
b. Never let the DRV gain a victory in South Viet-Nam without having paid a
disproportionate price.
c. Keep the GVN in the forefront of the combat and the negotiations.
Annex I/4/
/4/Top Secret.
SUGGESTED SCENARIO FOR CONTROLLED ESCALATION
(The following suggests a sequence of events without at this time attempting to establish
precise time intervals. It assumes that 34-A operations and corridor strikes including
armed reconnaissance in Laos have been continuing for some period prior to initiating
scenario. It also assumes that background briefing on infiltration has been given in both
Saigon and Washington.)
1. Definitive discussions with GVN to obtain firm GVN request for joint action against
DRV and to reach agreement on the framework of demands to be made on the DRV as
well as on general negotiating procedures. (See 15 below)
2. Initiate discussions with Thai Government.

3. Initiate discussions with other selected friendly governments.
4. Quietly initiate necessary preparatory military moves that have thus far not been taken.
(Preparatory military moves should have included or include stationing of Hawk battalion
and F-105s at Danang, a MEB afloat of Danang and the alerting of the 173rd ABG).
5. Initiate discussions with RLG.
6. Cease travel to Vietnam of additional dependents, but take no action to evacuate
dependents already in Vietnam pending further developments.
7. An appropriate intermediary tells Hanoi nothing has been heard from the U.S.; he is
concerned over the situation; and does Hanoi have anything to pass on to the U.S.?
8. Yankee Team strikes Route seven targets in Laos.
9. RLAF attack on DRV side of Mua Gia Pass with U.S. air CAP.
10. A single VNAF air strike against an infiltration target in DRV just north of DMZ.
11. A significant MAROP supported by U.S. air cover.
12. GVN-US air strike on infiltration target just north of DMZ.
13. Continue limited military actions in the foregoing categories sequentially with not
more than a few days gap between each, while being prepared promptly to make higher
level responses to attacks from MIGs or V-C spectaculars in SVN.
14. Throughout the foregoing, in absence of public statements by DRV, initiate no public
statement or publicity by ourselves or GVN. If DRV does make public statements, confine
ourselves and GVN to statements that GVN is exercising right of self-defense and we are
assisting.
15. In light of developments, disclose to selected allies, and possibly USSR, US/GVN
terms for cessation of attacks as follows: (It will be important to assure that one of these
channels undertakes accurately and fully to communicate these terms to both Hanoi and
Peking)
A. Demands
1. DRV return to strict observance of 1954 Accords with respect SVN--that is, stop
infiltration and bring about a cessation of VC armed insurgency. (Query--should demand
include DRV observance of 1962 Accords with respect to Laos and how should such
demand be framed so as to give ICC Laos effective role in monitoring infiltration through
Laos?)
B. In return:
1. U.S. will return to 1954 Accords with respect to military personnel in GVN and GVN
would be willing to enter into trade talks looking toward normalization of economic
relations between DRV and GVN.
2. Subject to faithful compliance by DRV with 1954 Accords, U.S. and GVN would give
assurances that they would not use force or support the use of force by any other party to
upset the Accords with respect to the DRV.
3. Within the framework of the 1954 Accords, the GVN would permit VC desiring to do
so to return to the DRV without their arms or would grant amnesty to those peacefully
laying down their arms and desiring to remain in SVN.
C. If and when Hanoi indicates its acceptance of foregoing conditions, careful
consideration must be given to immediate subsequent procedures which will avoid
dangers of: (a) becoming involved in a cease fire vis--vis the DRV and/or the VC
accompanied by strung-out negotiations; (b) making conditions so stringent as to be
unworkable from practical point of view. Probably best procedure would be to have the
GVN and DRV meet in the DMZ under ICC auspices with US observers to reach
agreement on mechanics of carrying out understanding while action against the VC and
DRV continues, at least in principle.
427. Editorial Note

Following his meeting with the President on August 6 (see Document 298), U Thant
contacted Ho Chi Minh about the possibility of direct talks with the United States. By
early September, he had received a positive response, but the record is unclear whether he
transmitted it to Ambassador Stevenson at that time, or because of the Presidential
campaign, not until November. On November 23, 24, and 26, Stevenson and Secretary of
State Rusk discussed the question and Rusk concluded that U Thant should keep the
matter in his hands for the time being. Because U Thant was ill for much of December,
further talks did not take place until January 1965.
Records of the three conversations between Stevenson and Rusk are in Department of
State, Rusk Files: Lot 72 D 192, Telephone Conversations. A 4-page undated paper,
entitled "Key Points of Developments Relating to U Thant's 'Rangoon' Initiative," with an
attached 9-page chronology, is ibid., Ball Papers: Lot 74 D 272, Vietnam U Thant. For
another account of these discussions, see Walter Johnson (ed.), The Papers of Adlai
Stevenson, volume VIII, pages 661-666.
428. Memorandum of the Meeting of the Executive Committee, Washington,

November 27, 1964, 11:30 a.m./1/
Secret. Drafted by William Bundy. Also printed in Pentagon Papers: Gravel Edition, vol.
111, pp. 674-676. Bundy's handwritten notes on this meeting are in Department of State,
Bundy Files, Master Papers, Late Nov 1964. He also describes it in some detail in his
manuscript, Chapter 19, pp. 5-8. (Ibid.) Taylor notes that the meeting began at 9:30 a.m.
(National Defense University, Taylor Papers, T-272-69), but this is inconsistent with
Rusk's Appointment Book and Bundy's Manuscript which give 11:30 and late morning,
respectively, as the time of the meeting.
PRESENT
Secretary Rusk
Secretary McNamara
Ambassador Taylor
Mr. McCone
General Wheeler
Mr. Ball
Mr. McGeorge Bundy
Mr. William Bundy
Mr. McNaughton
Mr. Forrestal
1. The question was raised of what message to the GVN would make them perform better.
Ambassador Taylor thought that he must have a strong message but that any threat of
"withdrawal unless" would be quite a "gamble". It was noted that it was still possible to
stress that we could not help as we would like unless the GVN did shape up.
2. There was discussion of whether we could carry on "unilateral" military actions if the
GVN collapsed or told us to get out. The consensus was that it was hard to visualize
continuing in these circumstances, but that the choice must certainly be avoided if at all
possible.
3. Ambassador Taylor noted that "neutralism" as it existed in Saigon appeared to mean
throwing the internal political situation open and thus inviting Communist participation.
There was discussion of neutralism in the sense of withdrawal of external assistance, and
the opinion was expressed that external assistance would remain essential unless the VC
was defeated and that neutralism either in the sense of no more external assistance or in
the sense of a free political system could not be maintained unless this was done.
4. Ambassador Taylor, upon being asked about the problem of administrative
cumbersomeness, said that some progress had been made and that this problem could be
handled if the GVN itself got going. He expressed the general view that newspaper reports
exaggerated the weakness of the present government, that Huong had many fine qualities,
and that he, Vien, and Khanh could mesh into a reasonably effective team if they could
handle sniping from the Buddhists and students. The Ambassador noted that there was no
prospect of a widely based Assembly for some months, but that such an Assembly, if it
came, could be serious in causing general static and possibly leading to some Communist
representation. In answer to a question, Ambassador Taylor said that General Khanh was
performing quite effectively, was out in the field except for weekends, and had made
many military command changes of which General Westmoreland approved. Khanh had
said that he would make no more changes.
5. Ambassador Taylor noted that General Westmoreland had prepared a report of the
military situation, which he would distribute to the group./2/ Westmoreland was generally
more optimistic than he, Taylor, and saw many signs and possibilities of improvement on
the military side. Westmoreland would be inclined to wait six months to have a firmer
base for stronger actions. However, the Ambassador said that he himself did not believe
that we could count on the situation holding together that long, and that we must do
something sooner than this. Secretary McNamara noted his disagreement with General
Westmoreland's view. The view was expressed that the political situation was not likely to
become stronger but that nonetheless the US was justified in taking measures along the
lines of Option C. Ambassador Taylor noted that stronger action would definitely have a
favorable effect on GVN and South Vietnamese performance and morale, but he was not
sure this would be enough really to improve the situation. Others in the group agreed with
this evaluation, and the view was expressed that the strengthening effect of Option C
could at least buy time, possibly measured in years.
/2/Westmoreland's memorandum to Taylor, November 24, on the military situation in
South Vietnam is published in Declassified Documents, 1977, 278E.
It was urged that over the next two months we adopt a program of Option A plus the first
stages of Option C. The likelihood of improvement in the government seemed so doubtful
that to get what improvement we could it was thought that we should move into some
parts of C soon.
6. Ambassador Taylor gave details of the kind of message he would propose giving to the
GVN. (This will be incorporated into the draft scenario for discussion at the next
meeting.)
7. There was discussion of the infiltration evidence, and it was agreed that State and
Defense should check statements made by Secretary Rusk, Secretary McNamara and
General Wheeler on this subject, so that these could be related to the previous MACV and
other estimates and a full explanation developed of how these earlier estimates had been
made and why they had been wrong in the light of fuller evidence.
8. Ambassador Taylor stressed the importance of police forces and said that he would
recommend holding the Popular Forces at the present level but stressing additional police.
He noted that the police had better pay and perquisites than the armed forces and thought
that this was right.
Ambassador Taylor raised a series of questions which he did not think had been
adequately covered in the papers. (This list will be circulated separately.)/3/
/3/Document 429.
9. It was agreed that we needed a more precise and fully spelled out scenario of what
would be proposed if a decision were taken to adopt a general program along the lines of
Section VII of the Draft Summary/4/ (Immediate Actions), with or without a decision to
move into the full Option C program at some time thereafter. Mr. William Bundy
undertook a produce a draft scenario/5/ along these lines for discussion at the next
meeting of the group, which was scheduled for 11:00 a.m. on Saturday, November 28.
/4/Document 418.
/5/Not printed here. (Department of State, Bundy Files, Working Papers, Nov 1964, Vol.
1: printed in Pentagon Papers: Gravel Edition, vol. III. pp. 676-677)

429. Paper Prepared by the Ambassador to Vietnam (Taylor)/1/
/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Vietnam Country File, Vol. XXIII,
Memos. Secret. Attached to a note from the Executive Secretariat of the Department of
State, dated November 27, which stated that the questions were circulated for
consideration by the members of the Executive Committee.
Questions Requiring Answers
1. What is the situation which is assumed to exist at the time of the initiation of either
Course B or Course C? What is going on?
2. What is the minimum acceptable government which must be in being prior to initiating
Course C?
3. Under Course B or C, what role does the armed forces of South Viet-Nam play?
4. Similarly, what role does the GVN play in negotiations and public statements?
5. What is the span of time contemplated for Courses B and C?
6. When and how do we communicate with Hanoi? What is said and by whom?
7. What do we communicate to the Government of Viet-Nam with regard to our intention?
When? By whom?
8. In this discussion with the GVN, what do we ask from them and what do we offer to
add to what we are doing for them?
9. What is to be said to the Congress and the U.S. public? When and by whom?
10. What, when and how do we communicate our intentions to friendly nations?
11. What do we do if the Huong government collapses some place along the B or C track?
12. What are the circumstances justifying retaliation bombing and how do we assure a
quick and effective response? Who does it; U.S., GVN or both?
13. In any SVN scenario, how do we fit in an incident affecting only U.S. interests such as
the Bay of Tonkin?/2/
/2/On November 2, following meetings of Executive Committee and with the President,
Taylor added the six following questions to the list:
"14. What kind of official reply is desired from GVN in response to Ambassador's
presentation?
"15. What kind of public statement from GVN? "16. What say to S[uu?]?
"17. When start military action under Phase 1? How? "18. When present the infiltration
data?
"19. What tell third countries about our plans? When in relation to start of Phase
1?" (National Defense University, Taylor Papers. T-272-69)
430. Memorandum From the Deputy Director of the Central Intelligence Agency
(Cline) to the Director of Central Intelligence (McCone)/1/
/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File. Vietnam Country File. Vol. XXII.
Memos. Top Secret.
SUBJECT
Vietnam
1. Out of the fog of medieval scholasticism surrounding many months of discussion of
Vietnam, a few simple propositions seem to me to emerge as true. Most of the other subtle
distinctions and arguments I have heard do not seem to me to affect the US course of
action.
2. The political and military situation in SVN is bad. It may deteriorate rapidly at any
time. Enlightened and imaginative efforts to stabilize SVN and defeat the VC by actions
in SVN should be made whatever course of action the US adopts. The odds are these
efforts will not succeed in reversing the unfavorable trend in SVN certainly not for a very
long time, during which the US position and the stability of SVN would remain liable to
sudden collapse.
3. In this unfavorable position, the US can take military action against NVN designed to
achieve the limited objectives of causing the cessation of NVN support (cadres and
supplies) and direction of VC insurgency in SVN. Even if successful, this action would
not in and of itself insure achievement of the US basic strategic objective of maintaining a
stable and effective non-Communist SVN, which is a valid and essential requirement of
US policy in Southeast Asia and worldwide. It probably would buy time to try to improve
the security situation in SVN, to gradually contain and eventually destroy the VC as an
effective insurgent force, and to establish a stable, friendly government.
4. The way achievement of this limited objective of cutting off support and direction from
NVN would operate on the situation in SVN would be: (a) reducing VC strength and
military capability; (b) damaging VC morale by making the prospect of early victory
remote; and (c) greatly increasing SVN morale by demonstrating US commitment to our
basic strategic objective in Southeast Asia and eliminating the infiltration problem which
makes counterinsurgency efforts seem hopeless.
5. The first phase in any military course of action aimed at causing the cessation of NVN
support and direction of the VC insurgency ought to center on US air interdiction of
infiltration lines of communication and US air strikes against infiltration associated
facilities in Laos and inside NVN near the borders of Laos and the DMZ.
6. The likelihood of extreme NVN or Chicom military reactions against such US military
action would be small. There would be an intensive world-wide Communist political and
propaganda campaign against the US. NVN would certainly try to defend its territory and
forces, and there is likely to be a vigorous NVN effort at reprisals against US/SVN forces
and facilities within reach.
7. There is a chance, though less than an even chance, that NVN would calculate that
more damaging US attacks would follow. In that case, NVN might effect a cessation or a
marked reduction of insurgent activity in SVN and its support and direction thereof,
hoping to negotiate with the US terms that would not call for inspection and control
arrangements adequate to prevent resumption of its support and direction at a later date.
This would be a gain for the US provided the US insisted on adequate inspection and
control and did not commit itself not to make further air strikes if NVN support and
direction of the VC insurgency in fact continued. It would be a helpful psychological
factor working toward a reversal of the unfavorable trend in SVN, and it might be the
decisive one in achieving such a reversal.
8. There is, of course, a chance, though small, that NVN would react extremely with a
frontal military assault or that the Chicoms would intervene directly on a large scale with
air units and/or ground combat units. The US would have to be prepared to deal with these
eventualities, but should not be deterred from military action by the risk. If, in fact, on
grounds that seem irrational and reckless to us, NVN with Chicom support responds in
this way, there would in fact be no way to avoid a direct military conflict between the US
and NVN short of acquiescence in Communist domination of SVN and the abandonment
of US objectives in Southeast Asia which we have agreed are valid and essential.
9. If NVN temporizes and makes no move toward cessation of its support and direction of
VC insurgency in the face of the first phase US military actions described above, as is
most likely, the US should proceed, after a pause, to a second phase which would extend
air attacks to infiltration associated targets deeper within NVN, and in deliberate sequence
to a third phase involving blockade ("quarantine") of NVN. It is impossible to estimate
with confidence the situation that would exist in these successive phases in either NVN or
SVN, and therefore impossible to estimate with confidence the relative likelihood of the
various possible Communist reactions that might occur. The range of possibilities would
be the same, however, and the consequences the same
10. Generally, it is clear that the chances would increase at each step of increased pressure
on NVN that NVN would opt to negotiate a cessation of support and direction of the VC
insurgency on the most favorable terms they could achieve. At each step the US
bargaining position would improve. At each step the chances of extreme NVN and
Chicom reaction would increase. Even at the extreme range of US military actions aimed
at bringing pressure on NVN, however, provided they do not progress to the point of
occupation of NVN territory by substantial numbers of US ground forces, the Chicoms
will be reluctant to become directly involved in a military conflict with the US and the
chances are therefore better than even that they would not introduce large-scale ground
combat units into Vietnam or Laos. As a consequence, the chances are also better than
even that NVN would not itself directly invade SVN or Laos but would instead intensify
its efforts to negotiate on the best terms possible.
Ray S. Cline
431. Editorial Note

The Executive Committee resumed its meetings at 11 a.m. on November 28, continuing
consideration of the summary (Document 418), Taylor's report (Document 426), and a
new paper drafted by William Bundy, "Scenario for Immediate Action," dated November
28. (Department of State, Bundy Files, Working Papers, Nov 1964, Vol. I; printed in
Pentagon Papers: Gravel Edition, volume III, pages 676-677) Brief accounts of this
meeting are in the National Defense University, Taylor Papers, T-272-69, and Bundy's
handwritten notes are in Department of State, Bundy Files, Master Papers, Late Nov 1964.
Following the meeting, McGeorge Bundy transmitted to the Texas White House the
summary, Taylor's report, and a book of the draft papers on courses of action in South
Vietnam. (Johnson Library, National Security File, Vietnam Country File, Courses of
Action in SEA)
On November 29, the Executive Committee continued its discussion, and William Bundy
drew up a memorandum which presented its conclusions in the form of a draft National
Security Action Memorandum on Southeast Asia, a draft White House statement, and a
draft statement for Taylor to make to the Government of South Vietnam. (Kennedy
Library, Thomson Papers, Southeast Asia Vietnam, General 1964; printed in part in
Pentagon Papers: Gravel Edition, volume III, pages 677-683) At 1:30 p.m. on November
30, the Executive Committee held its final review of the papers under consideration since
November 3, which resulted in a draft position paper on Southeast Asia and a draft
instruction from the President to Ambassador Taylor. Copies of these drafts are in
Department of State, Bundy Files, Action Papers, both showing revisions made at the
meeting with the President on December 1 (see Document 432). Bundy's brief
handwritten notes on the meeting on November 30 are in Department of State, Bundy
Files, Master Papers, Late Nov 1964.
432. Notes on a Meeting, White House, Washington, December 1, 1964, 11:30 a.m./1/
/1/Source: Johnson Library, Meeting Notes File, 12-1-64. Top Secret. The source text is
handwritten notes taken by McNaughton. A similar but shorter set of handwritten notes,
taken by William Bundy, is in Department of State, Bundy Files, Master Papers, Late Nov
1964. The meeting is also described in Bundy's manuscript, Chap. 19, pp. 13-17. (Ibid.)
The President had met with Rusk, McNamara, and William Bundy at 10:30 a.m. Johnson
Library, President's Daily Diary)
PRESENT
President, Humphrey, M. Bundy, Taylor, Rusk, W. Bundy, McNamara, Wheeler,
McNaughton, McCone
T: Pacification bogging down. VC activity in north SVN. Govt instability. DRV

infiltration up. Two problems: weak govt & VC strength. Won't collapse immediately, but
losing game. Papers suggest acting to boost GVN & weaken VC. (Talked from attachment
J.)/2/
/2/Not further identified. Presumably this is Document 426.
Pres: How many groups have to talk to?
T: 1. Military (Khanh & senior generals--Ky + 2 or 3); 2. Catholics (Archbish + Quinn +
few); 3. Buddhists (2: Tam Chao; Tri Quang); 4. Labor (Buu, but splits).
Pres: Where are the Coms? In Buddhists?
T: Reds using Bs./3/
/3/Buddhists.
Pres: French?
T: No monkey wrenches.
T (continuing): 5. HNC. Pain in the neck.
Pres: How did Diem do it?
T: Tight ship. No cement in the people. All factions enjoying taking part. Never worked
together. Need army behind govt & courageous man. Huong is courageous. Better off
today than 1 or 2 mos ago.
Pres: Most essential is a stable govt. Looks like Huong on newspaper in mid Atl & if
moves, gets wet & sinks. Need to pull all groups together--put on concrete. We did in US
post-assassination. Basic to anything is stability. ("You know my views of Diem. Don't
want another Diem") How bring these people together--if it takes all 50 [states?] &
Rockefeller money. They do it or else. No point hitting North if South not together. What
can we do? We thought Khanh pretty good, but gone. Ditto Huong.
T: We've warned them before.
Pres: Why not say "This is it!"? Not send Johnson City boys out to die if they acting as
they are.
T: Maybe emphasize that our offer is for Huong govt.
Pres: Must face problem of how to keep problem from looking worse here than it is. What
resources have we? Pope? Cld he straighten it out with Catholics.
McC: Talked to Pope & Sec State.
Pres: Anything to do with Buddhists? Econ? Social?

T: Minds of 3 or 4 people; CIA sees no way to work on them. Don't want to exile them.
Know them.
Pres: Can't we get the ambitious politicians into the act?
T: More than 100 in the cabinet. 14 (too big) now. Pretty good. Vien (Kin's uncle) may be
white hope. He is close to Huong. He skid succeed Huong.
Pres: Let's get thinker to work on A B C D's to Buddhists. Now, Army?
T: Done pretty well. [Khanh] will go back, as indicated.
Pres: Have we oversold them on our necessity of being power in the Pacific. "Are they
drunk on Alsop".
T: Politics tend to think VC is US problem. If Huong govt falls: 1. Another civilian govt,
2. US take over operational control, 3. Mil dictatorship, 4. Shrink our role (retreat). Mil
wants increased strength.
M:/4/ 2-4 squ/5/ effective strength.
/4/McNamara.
/5/Presumably squadrons.
Pres: Easy to get in or out. Hard to be patient. Anything more we can do to VN, making
them good Rangers. Jet plane can't interdict VC. Better guerrillas?
T: This is what we're doing in SVN. 80-1OOg VC (34,000 hardcore & 60-80 regl/6/ &
part-time). Armed forces 550,000 (200,000 real).
/6/regulars.
Pres: How [can] 34,000 lick 200,000?
T: Ratio in other areas 10:1 to 20:1 for guerrilla situations. Means 20 b[illion] piastres;
$175 m[illion].
Wh: Excellent program (guerrilla).
Pres: But failed. If dollars [are needed], give 'em. Not want to send widow woman to slap
Jack Dempsey. DRV will bomb Saigon once. Then we are off to the races. Maybe we've
given them best training, so all [we] can do is more people. Day of reckoning is coming.
Want to be sure we've done everything we can. Got to be some things still to do. What?
We cld have kept Diem.
T: We need one. Maybe Huong & Vien together may be a Diem. May be progressing. But
progress will be slow. Also we must get Hanoi out of the business.
Pres: But hadn't we better shape up before we do anything. Also dependents should be
out.
M: There are 4000.
T: Can do on short notice. Do it when needed.
Pres: I have looked at summary of our efforts re strong desire re 3rd country help--more
than chaplain & nurse. If [government?] fails, we want them in with us. UK can't [because
of] Malaysia, Germany has Berlin, Australians a "shirt tail frill". If as serious as [we]
believe, need new approach & get big numbers from them.
R: Will review this. UK can do more. May use Hubert.
Pres: Why not use Chinats. Want promptly [to] fire any leaker.
R: Combat Chinats wd merge SVN problem with whole Chinese problem. Chiang wld
exploit contrary to our interests.
McC: Can do much more.
Pres: Can we tell them they can't exploit. Wh will ask to hit North.
R: Chiang may be reluctant to make troops available.
M: 1000 Phil, Aust. & UK not make much cliff militarily, but much politically.
R: Canadians on ICC & carrying burden elsewhere (Cyprus). Hit Wilson, Germans.
M: Germans--unpopular domestically, opposed to image.
T: Don't need combat troops unless go North.
[2 paragraphs (2 lines of source text) not declassified]
Pres: List from T in a week of Utopian need. A. Under present conditions & B. anticipated
conditions. Give thot to who shld make request respectfully, diplomatically & get job
done. Then R, H3/7/ or self go get 'em. Anything out of India? Tell Bowles so. Pakistan?
/7/Vice President Humphrey.
Can see forces at work with $4 b[illion] a yr, & they not doing anything. Referred to poll.
Purpose of this mtg: 1. To pull stable govt together. Bell put in anything he can. Rice.
Fertilizer. Before Wh saddles up, try anything. 2. After T's report in wk or 10 days, pitch
at 3d countries. 3. Try to get better press. Hesitant to sock neighbor if fever 104. Want to
get well first. We've never been in position to attack. Easy to sock. Easy to follow Morse.
They'll be back in January. We want to be prepared to answer the questions. If need be,
create a new Diem, so then [we] tell Wh to slap, we can slap back.
T: Doubt that Hanoi will slap back.
Pres: Didn't MacArthur say the same.
T: All measures mentioned [are] needed. But not enuf. 2-3 mos can keep this govt going.
Fumbling. Not much time to put new factor in except lift from hurting enemy.
Pres: Papers generally satisfactory. Never reluctant to stand up. But must do damndest in
SVN. As many allies in as possible. Plan to get dependents out. "Plans you've got now, all
right."
M: Language changes in.
McC: Don't expect first 30 days or transition to produce much. Reprisals important; could
escalate fast.
Pres: "Policy decision that there will be reprisals but decide exactly what at the time."
Wh: Gave JCS view re hard knock.
Pres: Interrupted to ask if RSM shared view that it's downhill slide in SVN no matter what
we do in country.
M: Yes.
Pres: "I agree with that (start under our own volition), but better if allies with us,
dependents out, done all we can." "Want conditions as favorable as we can get them."
M: Cited Westy on need for base first.
Pres: We are undertaking some of this in our plan, but want to give T one last chance,
McC (Pope), R (Allies). "If more of the same, then I'll be talking to you, General."
Pres: Not bad.
R: Do it pre airport.
Pres: T touch base with Hill. Come here to say goodbye & then see press here. "R out 2;
RSM ditto; T in 2; Lodge." Going to do this [from] time to time. Stick to statement & not
go into ifs. No speculate. Other decisions time to time & tell when. Not[hing] to be gain
[ed] from spelling ifs. Stick to announcement. More effective. Sorry built up to war.
Press at 1:30
Pres left at 1:43.
M: Re infiltration, let's not release them now.

Pres: & shoot at sunrise if leak.
Reedy: (1) Did Max recommend stikes (2) Did Max recommend mil activity (3) Decisions
on new moves (see statement)/8/ (4) Further meetings w T (Yes). Wh H statement.
/8/For text of the statement issued on December 1, see American Foreign Policy: Current
Documents, 1964, pp. 1001-1002.
Pres: Shld talk to Hill.
R: Ful, Hick, Salt,/9/ Russell.
/9/Fulbright, Hickenlooper, and Saltonstall.
Pres: Yes, small mtg so not want it spread, Eyes & Ears only. Give good & bad; cld hope
inside, with 3d nations; ask for suggestions. RSM & R decide re House. Mahon if here.
Ford maybe
Reedy: Backgrder bad. Either press conf or not.
433. Paper Prepared by the Executive Committee/1/

Washington, December 2, 1964.
to the President. Top Secret. Also published in Declassified Documents, 1978, 130B. The
Executive Committee met at 4:30 p.m. on December 2 to revise the previous draft of this
paper (see Document 431) in light of the discussion with the President on December 1. It
was approved by the President on December 3 (see Document 434) and formally
transmitted to Rusk, McNamara, and McCone as Tab 1 to Document 440.
POSITION PAPER ON SOUTHEAST ASIA
I. Concept
A. US objectives in South Vietnam (SVN) are unchanged. They are to:
1. Get Hanoi and North Vietnam (DRY) support and direction removed from South
Vietnam, and, to the extent possible, obtain DRV cooperation in ending Viet Cong (VC)
operations in SVN.
2. Re-establish an independent and secure South Vietnam with appropriate international
safeguards, including the freedom to accept US and other external assistance as required.
3. Maintain the security of other non-Communist nations in Southeast Asia including
specifically the maintenance and observance of the Geneva Accords of 1962 in Laos.
B. We will continue to press the South Vietnamese Government (GVN) in every possible
way to make the government itself more effective and to push forward with the
pacification program. We will also press upon leaders and members of all groups in that
country the overriding need for national unity.
C. We will join at once with the South Vietnamese and Lao Governments in a determined
action program aimed at DRV activities in both countries and designed to help GVN
morale and to increase the costs and strain on Hanoi, foreshadowing still greater pressures
to come. Under this program the first phase actions within the next thirty days will be
intensified forms of action already under way, plus possibly U.S. air protection of Lao
aircraft making strikes in the Corridor, US armed air reconnaissance and air strikes
against infiltration routes in Laos, and GVN and possibly US air strikes against the DRV
as reprisal against any major or spectacular Viet Cong action in the south, whether against
US personnel and installations or not. We would be prepared to stop the flow of
dependents to Vietnam at the same time as US strikes in Laos were conducted.
D. Beyond the thirty-day period, first phase actions may be continued without change.
Alternatively, additional military measures may be taken, including deployment of a large
number of US aircraft to the area, low-level reconnaissance of infiltration targets in the
DRV near the borders, and the possible initiation of strikes a short distance across the
border against the infiltration routes from the DRV. At this time, we would be prepared to
remove US dependents. In the alternative case these actions would become a transitional
phase.
E. Thereafter, if the GVN improves its effectiveness to an acceptable degree and Hanoi
does not yield on acceptable terms, the US is prepared--at a time to be determined--to
enter into a second phase program, in support of the GVN and RLG, of graduated military
pressures directed systematically against the DRV. Such a program would consist
principally of progressively more serious air strikes, of a weight and tempo adjusted to the
situation as it develops (possibly running from two to six months) and of appropriate US
deployments to handle any contingency. Targets in the DRV would start with infiltration
targets south of the 19th parallel and work up to targets north of that point. This could
eventually lead to such measures as air strikes on all major military-related targets, aerial
mining of DRV ports, and a US naval blockade of the DRV. The whole sequence of
military actions would be designed to give the impression of a steady, deliberate
approach, and to give the US the option at any time (subject to enemy reaction) to proceed
or not, to escalate or not, and to quicken the pace or not. Concurrently, the US would be
alert to any sign of yielding by Hanoi, and would be prepared to explore negotiated
solutions that attain US objectives in an acceptable manner.
Tabs D-H/2/ to this paper contain a more detailed presentation of the precise actions
contemplated under this concept. Tab D gives the actions proposed in the first,
transitional, and second stages. Tab E spells out illustrative occasions that might be used
for reprisals and reprisal targets. Tab F deals with possible major Communist actions and
the US/allied counter moves that would then be indicated. Tab G is the Communist order
of battle in Southeast Asia, and Tab H is the US order of battle and reinforcement
capabilities.
/2/Not attached to the source text. Copies of these tabs, drafted by McNaughton on
November 30, are in the Johnson Library, National Security File, Aides File, McGeorge
Bundy, Memos to the President.
II. Thirty-Day Action Program
A. A White House statement will be issued following the meeting with Ambassador
Taylor, with the text as in Tab A, attached./3/
/3/Not found. For the comments Taylor made to the press following his meeting with the
President on December 3, see The New York Times, December 4, 1964, p. 18.
B. Ambassador Taylor will consult with the GVN promptly on his return, making a
general presentation and pressing for the adoption of specific measures in accordance with
the instructions in Tab B, attached./4/
/4/Not attached, but printed as Document 435.
C. Laos and Thailand
The US Ambassadors in these countries will inform the government in general terms of
the concept we propose to follow and of specific actions requiring their concurrence or
participation. In the case of Laos, we will obtain RLG approval of an intensified program
of US armed reconnaissance and air strikes both in the Panhandle area of Laos and along
the key infiltration routes in central Laos. These actions will not be publicized except to
the degree approved by the RLG. It is important, however, for purposes of morale in
SVN, that their existence be generally known.
Thailand will be asked to support our program fully, to intensify its own efforts in the
north and northeast, and to give further support to operations in Laos, such as additional
pilots and possibly artillery teams.
D. Key Allies
We will consult immediately with the UK, Australia, New Zealand, and the Philippines.
1. UK. The President will explain the concept and proposed actions fully to Prime
Minister Wilson, seeking full British support.
2. Australia and New Zealand will be told the concept and will be pressed not only for
support but for additional contributions in South Vietnam. We will also discuss the
possibility of small military unit contributions if and when E of the concept is carried out.
3. The Philippines will not be told the concept but -will be pressed for additional
contributions along the lines of the program for approximately 1800 men already
submitted to President Macapagal./5/
/5/On October 3, the JCS had suggested to the Secretary of Defense the outlines of a
proposed Philippine contribution. Following discussions at Manila, October 28-29, the
two countries agreed on a tri-service Philippine contribution of 1,800 men. A report on the
discussions was transmitted in telegram 806 from Manila, October 30. (Department of
State, Central Files, DEF 19 PHIL-VIET S)
E. We will press generally and strongly for more third country aid, stressing the gravity of
the situation and our deepening concern. A summary of existing third country aid is in
Tab C, attached./6/
/6/Not attached to the source text. A copy of this 3-page summary is in the Johnson
Library, National Security File, Vietnam Country File, Vol. IV, SE Asia Cables.
F. Communist Countries
1. We will convey to Hanoi our unchanged determination and objectives, and that we
have a growing concern at the DRV role, to see if there is any sign of change in Hanoi's
position.
2. We will make no special approaches to Communist China in this period.
3. We will convey our determination and grave concern to the Soviets, not in the
expectation of any change in their position but in effect to warn them to stay out, and with
some hope they will pass on the message to Hanoi and Peiping.
G. Other Countries
1. We will convey our grave concern to key interested governments such as Canada,
India, and France, but avoid spelling out the concept.
2. In the event of a reprisal action, we will explain and defend our action in the UN as at
the time of the Gulf of Tonkin incident. We do not plan to raise the issue otherwise in the
UN. (The Lao Government may stress the DRV infiltration in Laos in its speech, and we
should support this and spread the information.)
H. Intensified Military Actions (See Tab D)
1. GVN maritime operations (MAROPS) will be intensified.
2. Lao air operations will be intensified, especially in the corridor areas and close to the
DRV border. US air cover and flak suppression may be supplied where needed.
3. US high-level reconnaissance over the DRV will be stepped up.
4. US armed air reconnaissance and air strikes will be carried out in Laos, first against the
corridor area and within a short time against Route 7 and other infiltration routes. (These
actions will be subject to RLG concurrence and publicized only to the degree agreed with
Souvanna.)
I. Reprisal Actions (See Tab E)
For any VC provocation similar to the following, a reprisal will be undertaken, preferably
within 24 hours, against one or more selected targets in the DRV. GVN forces will be
used to the maximum extent, supplemented as necessary by US forces. The exact reprisal
will be decided at the time, in accordance with a quick-reaction procedure which will be
worked out.
The following may be appropriate occasions for reprisals, but we should be alert for any
appropriate occasion:
1. Attacks on airfields.
2. Attack on Saigon.
3. Attacks on provincial or district capitals.
4. Major attacks on US citizens.
5. Attacks on major POL facilities.
6. Attacks on bridges and railroad lines after the presently damaged facilities have been
restored and warning given.
7. Other "spectaculars" such as earlier attack on a US transport carrier at a pier in Saigon.
In these or similar cases, the reprisal action would be linked as directly as possible to
DRV infiltration, so that we have a common thread of justification. VC attacks on
transportation facilities, in addition to being related to DRV infiltration, would provide the
occasion for attacks on DRV communications on a parallel basis.
A flexible list of reprisal targets has been prepared running from infiltration targets in the
southern part of the DRV up to airfields. ports, and naval bases also located south of the
19th parallel./7/
/7/Presumably the 94-target list.
J. US/GVN joint planning will be initiated immediately both for reprisal actions and for
possible later air strikes across the border into the DRV.
K. Dependents. We would be prepared to stop the flow of dependents concurrently with
the initiation of intensified US air operations in Laos under paragraph H.4. above.
L. Deferred Actions (see Tab D)
The following actions will not be taken within the thirty-day period, but will be
considered for adoption in the transitional phase of the program:
1. Major air deployments to the area.
2. Furnishing US air cover for GVN MAROPS.
3. Resuming destroyer patrols in the Gulf of Tonkin. If attacked, these would be an

alternative basis for reprisals, and should be considered primarily in this light.
4. US low-level reconnaissance into the DRV.
5. GVN/Lao air strikes across the border; initially against the infiltration routes and
installations and then against targets south of the 19th parallel.
6. Evacuation of US dependents. We would be prepared to carry this out concurrently
with 4 and 5 above.
434. Editorial Note

On December 3, the Executive Committee met at 9:30 a.m. to review a checklist of
questions for the final session with the President. At this meeting, Taylor was told that his
weekly reports were valuable and should be continued, that he was to report on the
activities of the minority groups in Saigon, and that he should note any success in aligning
them with the government. (National Defense University, Taylor Papers, T-272-69)
Following the meeting, the Executive Committee met with the President at 12:30, where
Taylor's instructions (Document 435) and the position paper (Document 433) were
approved. Taylor noted that the President again stressed the importance of third country
aid. (National Defense University, Taylor Papers, T-272-69) Taylor then met for an hour
with members of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee before discussing Vietnam for
45 minutes with representatives of the House Foreign Affairs Committee. (Ibid.) No other
records of these meetings have been found.
435. Instructions From the President to the Ambassador to Vietnam (Taylor)/1/

to the President. Top Secret. The instructions were approved by the President on
December 3 (see Document 434) and formally transmitted to Rusk, McNamara, and
McCone as Tab 2 to Document 440.
I have now approved the following instructions for your personal guidance on your return
to South Vietnam. I hereby authorize and request that from these instructions you prepare
a full statement of the present position of the United States Government for appropriate
use with the senior officials of the Government of Vietnam. I recognize that for written
presentation you may wish to recast in somewhat less specific form the detailed
improvements which we seek in the conduct of affairs by the Government of South
Vietnam, but I expect you to communicate the essence of these instructions in whatever
way you find most effective.
During the recent review in Washington of the situation in SVN, it was clearly established
that the unsatisfactory progress being made in the pacification of the Viet Cong was the
result of two primary causes from which many secondary causes stemmed: first, the
governmental instability in Saigon, and the second, the continued reinforcement and
direction of the VC by the North Vietnamese Government. To change the downward trend
of events, it will be necessary to deal adequately with both of these factors.
It is clear, however, that these factors are not of equal importance. There must be a stable,
effective government to conduct a successful campaign against the Viet Cong even if the
aid of North Vietnam for the VC should end. While the elimination of North Vietnamese
intervention will raise morale on our side and make it easier for the government to
function, it will not in itself end the war against the Viet Cong. It is rather an important
contributory factor to the creation of conditions favoring a successful campaign against
the Viet Cong within South Vietnam. Since action against North Vietnam is contributory,
not central, we should not incur the risks which are inherent in such an expansion of
hostilities until there is a government in Saigon capable of handling the serious problems
involved in such an expansion and of exploiting the favorable effects which may be
anticipated from an end of support and direction by North Vietnam.
It is this consideration which has borne heavily on the recent deliberations in Washington
and has conditioned the conclusions reached. There have been many expressions of
admiration for the courage being shown by the Huong government, which has the
complete support of the USG in its resistance to the minority pressure groups which are
attempting to drag it down. However, the difficulties which it is facing raise inevitable
questions as to its capacity and readiness to discharge the responsibilities which it would
incur if some of the new measures under consideration were taken.
There are certain minimum criteria of performance in South Vietnam which must be met
before new measures against North Vietnam would be either justified or practicable. At a
minimum, the government should be able to speak for and to its people who will need
guidance and leadership throughout the coming critical period. It should be capable of
maintaining law and order in its principal centers of population, make plans for the
conduct of operations and assure their effective execution by military and police forces
completely responsive to its authority. It must have the means to cope with the enemy
reactions which must be expected to result from any change in the pattern of our
operations.
I particularly request that you and your colleagues in the American country team develop
and execute a concerted effort to bring home to all groups in South Vietnam the
paramount importance of national unity against the Communist enemy at this critical time.
It is a matter of the greatest difficulty for the United States Government to require great
sacrifice of American citizens when reports from Saigon repeatedly give evidence of
heedless self-interest and shortsightedness among nearly all major groups in South
Vietnam. I know of your own great interest and concern for this problem and you can be
assured that in your efforts to deal with it you will have the energetic support of the
government in Washington.
While effectiveness is largely a subjective judgment, progress in certain specific areas
such as those listed below provides some tangible measure. The U.S. Mission should urge
upon the GVN particular effort in these fields, not only because of their intrinsic
importance to successful pacification, but also because of the indication of governmental
effectiveness which progress, or the lack thereof, will provide:

1. Improve the use of manpower for military and pacification purposes.
2. Bring the armed forces and police to authorized strength and maximize their
effectiveness.
3. Replace incompetent officials and commanders. Freeze the competent in place for
extended periods of service.
4. Clarify and strengthen the police powers of arrest, detention and interrogation of VC
suspects.
5. Clarify and strengthen the authority of provincial chiefs.
6. Make demonstrable progress in the Hop Tac operation around Saigon.
7. Broaden and intensify the civic action program using both military and civilian
resources to produce tangible evidence of the desire of the government to help the hamlets
and villages.
8. Carry out a sanitary clean-up of Saigon.
Throughout, it will be essential that the GVN and the USG cooperate closely and
effectively as loyal allies dedicated to the attainment of the same objectives. These
objectives in the broadest terms are to cause the DRV to respect the rights of its neighbors
and to terminate the Viet Cong insurgency.
While progress is being made toward these goals by a government of growing
effectiveness, the USG is willing to strike harder at the infiltration routes in Laos and at
sea. In conjunction with the RLG, it is prepared to add U.S. air power as needed to restrict
the use of Laotian territory as an infiltration route into South Vietnam. At sea, it favors an
intensified continuation of the MAROPS which have proved their usefulness in harassing
the enemy. In combination, these operations in Laos and at sea constitute the first phase of
military pressures to reduce infiltration and to warn the DRV of the risks it is running.
While these intensified operations are going on, the armed forces of the GVN and the
USG must be ready to execute prompt reprisals for any unusual hostile action. The U.S.
Mission is authorized to work out with the GVN appropriate plans and procedures to this
end.
As a second phase, the United States is also prepared to consider a program of direct
military pressure on the DRV, to be executed after the GVN has shown itself firmly in
control. The actions undertaken in the first phase should provide encouragement and enlist
popular support for the government and thus facilitate its task. The time provided by this
phase would be used to advantage in the military, political, and economic efforts outlined
earlier, as well as in preparing for the next phase--direct pressure on North Vietnam.
This second phase, in general terms, would constitute a series of air attacks on the DRV
progressively mounting in scope and intensity for the purpose of convincing the leaders of
DRV that it is to their interest to cease to aid the Viet Cong and to respect the
independence and security of South Vietnam, properly assured by appropriate
international safeguards.
The participants in the attacks of the second phase, as we now plan it, would be the air
forces of the U.S., South Vietnam, and Laos. The U.S. would participate (as at present) in
support of the Vietnamese Air Force and at the request of the Government of Vietnam.
We would expect to work out joint plans, and before their execution we would agree on
our purposes, our public position, and the manner of conducting operations against North
Vietnam. The U.S. Mission is authorized to initiate such planning now with the
Government of Vietnam with the understanding that the USG does not commit itself now
to any form of execution of such plans. You are authorized to make it clear, as
appropriate, that the execution of such plans would be preceded by deterrent deployments
by the U.S. as well as security precautions by the Government of South Vietnam against
possible escalation of hostilities.
You are also authorized to explain that we propose to discuss with our major allies both
our present plans of action against the infiltration routes and our preparations for possible
later action against North Vietnam. In particular, we propose to seek the military and
political cooperation of the governments of Thailand, the Philippines, Australia, New
Zealand, and the United Kingdom.
Finally, I request that you give your personal and continuing attention to our effort to
multiply the effective participation of other allies in our effort in South Vietnam. I have
already requested your assessment of the maximum usable contribution both in present
circumstances and in the event of increased efforts along the lines for which planning is
authorized in this instruction. This assessment will be the basis of a major further effort by
this Government.
I shall be glad to have your prompt report of the reaction of the Government of Vietnam
to the policy outlined in these instructions.

Washington, December 3, 1964--6:51 p.m.
/1/Source: Department of State, Vietnam Negotiating Files: Lot 69 D 412, Seaborn. Top
Secret; Immediate; Exdis. Drafted by Forrestal and cleared with William Bundy and
McNaughton. Also sent to Ottawa. Also printed in George C. Herring, ed., The Secret
Diplomacy of the Vietnam War: The Negotiating Volumes of the Pentagon Papers
(Austin: University of Texas Press, 1983), p. 37.
1210. The following message has been handed directly to Canadian Embassy here for
transmittal to Seaborn through fastest channel. This is for your information only.
"Canadians are asked to have Seaborn take following position during his next visit to
Hanoi which, we understand, is currently scheduled for December 7th or 10th (Embtel
1618)./2/
/2/On November 9, Seaborn informed Johnson that he planned to go to Hanoi on

November 23. (Telegram 1438 from Saigon, November 9; ibid., Central Files, POL 27
VIET S) Eight days later, the Department asked if Seaborn could postpone his trip until at
least December 7. (Telegram 1112 to Saigon, November 17; ibid., POL 27-14 VIET S)
Seaborn agreed and suggested that he deliver no message, but ask if North Vietnam had
any message for him to deliver to the United States. (Telegram 1618, November 24; ibid.,
Saigon Embassy Files: Lot 68 F 8)
The United States has nothing to add to the points made by Seaborn on his last visit to
Hanoi in August./3/ All the recent indications from Washington, however, point to a
continued and increasing determination on the part of the US to assist the South
Vietnamese in their struggle. Although he has no specific message on this trip, Seaborn
has noted from its public statements increased US concern at DRV role in direct support
of Viet Cong, and this together with reported high-level meetings Washington makes him
feel that time is ripe for any new message Hanoi may wish to convey.
Seaborn should convey attitude of real personal concern over the growing possibility of
direct confrontation between GVN and DRV."
FYI: Purpose of this approach is to probe for any new DRV reactions.
Harriman
437. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in the United
Kingdom/1/
Exdis. Drafted by William Bundy and initialed by Ball. Also sent to Canberra and
Wellington.
3669. A. In talks with Peck and Stewart (UK) on December 3 and with Waller and
Laking/2/ jointly on December 4, Bundy explained general decisions made here during
Taylor's discussions along following lines:
/2/John K. Waller, Australian Ambassador, and George R. Laking, New Zealand
Ambassador.
1. We deeply concerned about fragility internal GVN situation. Huong himself has guts
and his areas of inexperience are partially supplied by Deputy PM Vien and on military
side by Khanh, who appears be cooperating reasonably well although not as fully as we
would wish. Thus, GVN as whole does have some promise settling down and slowly
improving its performance if it can deal with major Buddhist threat now building up. On
security side, armed forces have held together well and such factors as recruitment
showing improvement. Nonetheless, situation is still slowly deteriorating although little
likelihood really major VC military successes at least in next two months or so.
2. USG believes this fragile situation makes any dramatic action unwise for this reason
alone but that it does require some additional elements that would tend to lift SVN morale
and would also convey slightly stronger signal to Hanoi. USG therefore proposes
immediate program including two new elements: (a) intensified US "armed
reconnaissance" strikes against infiltration routes in Laos, (b) reprisals against any
dramatic VC action in south such as Bien Hoa attack, preferably with reprisal occasion
involving GVN and not solely US elements. Reprisal targets would be carefully selected,
probably infiltration installations, between 17th and 19th parallels. Actions in Laos would
necessarily require Souvanna's concurrence.
3. Time table for above calls for Taylor consultations with GVN on his return to obtain
agreement series GVN actions in return for above program and additional US
undertakings, support forces increases, economic measures, etc. (These will be worked
out in Saigon and announced there.) Sullivan will thereafter talk to Souvanna about 10
December and Martin will concurrently brief Thai rather fully. Laos air actions would be
initiated about 15 December if RLG has concurred.
4. Para 2 program now worked out only for initial 30-day period. May then be continued
or we may at some time move onward into program of gradually increased pressures
through air attacks on DRV with GVN forces playing major role at least at outset. This
second phase not yet decided but clearly preferred to any alternative of more sharp and
dramatic military action. Crucial determinants will be whether GVN settles down and
whether Hanoi shows any signs of responding to Para 2 program designed to impress
them with our determination and to foreshadow possible future actions.
B. Following this briefing, Bundy went on to say prospect possible more serious decisions
made it more than ever vital have increased third country contributions. Suggested UK
increase numbers of police advisors, Australia consider 200-man augmentation combat
advisors, and GNZ likewise seek to increase its contribution markedly. Indicated
President had deep personal concern this aspect, would discuss this with Wilson, and
would send personal messages to Menzies and Holyoake early next week./3/
/3/Copies of the letters to Menzies and Holyoake, dated December 12, are in the Johnson
Library, National Security File, Vietnam Country File, Vol. XXIII, Memos.
C. In response to presentation:
1. Peck and Stewart indicated personal support these decisions and expressed belief HMG
would support all points and would be relieved we not contemplating early drastic action.
At same time, they noted that if military action did increase, HMG at some point would be
under great pressure take some lead in seeking a reconvened Geneva Conference or other
visible negotiating avenue. We said we would be alert for all indications Hanoi and
Peiping changes of position but we are opposed any visible negotiations at least for some
time to come and in absence clear indications they could produce our objective of
independent and secure SVN. British also raised question of possible ChiCom reaction
and tended agree our judgment major response unlikely unless actions carried so far as to
appear to threaten existence of DRV or China herself.
2. Waller and Laking likewise raised question re negotiations and Commie reactions.
They further asked about scale Lao operations to which we responded exact program
being worked out and would in any case depend on RLG acceptance.
D. To Waller and Laking only we mentioned that planning for possible second phase had
considered possibility introducing division-size ground forces into northern SVN to preempt any ground reaction by DRV. We said such a force would be much more effective if
it included at least small units from GOA and GNZ. They responded that Malaysia
commitments increasingly onerous but that they would pass suggestion on for comment.
E. Above is for information Ambassador Powell/4/ and Charges only at this time.
Ambassador Bruce/5/ is being briefed here. You will be further instructed, but may
discuss above with senior officials if they raise with you. We stressed vital importance
avoiding press leaks that go beyond formal statements here or possibly later in Saigon.
/4/Herbert B. Powell, Ambassador to New Zealand.
/5/David K.E. Bruce, Ambassador to the United Kingdom.
Ball
to the President. Secret.
SUBJECT
The British and Vietnam
1. I think you should know that the British will find it very, very difficult indeed to
increase their commitment in Vietnam right now. That does not necessarily mean that we
should not hit them hard while Wilson is here, but I think it does mean that we cannot
expect a definite and affirmative answer.
2. There is no political base whatever in England, in any party, for an increased British
commitment in Vietnam now. For 10 years we have accepted a situation in which the
British give political support, but avoid any major commitment on the ground of their
other interests and their position as Co-Chairman of the Geneva Agreements of 1954. The
most that Wilson could possibly do at this stage would be a slight enlargement of the
Thompson advisory mission and of their police training effort, with perhaps a green light
to a few bold British officers to get themselves in the line of fire as our men do. All this he
would have to do quietly. There is no workable basis for a public change in British policy
at a time when there is no public change in ours. You might press him to go from the
current level of 7 Britishers to about a hundred, but we would be lucky to get 50 in this
first phase.
3. When and if we open a second phase and need to land a mixed force of U.S. and other
troops, we might conceivably get a small British contingent along with larger ones from
Australia and New Zealand. Our own commitment would have gone up and there would
be a better case for asking the British to join in. On the other hand, Tommy Thompson
points out that if the British Co-Chairman send troops in, that might be the trigger, or at
least the excuse, for the Soviet Co-Chairman to help Hanoi.
4. The reciprocal price of this would be stronger support on our side for Malaysia and
perhaps closer participation in naval and air deployments designed to cool off Sukarno.
This kind of bargain in this part of the world makes a good deal of sense, and Rusk and
McNamara will be ready to go forward with the British in detailed discussions on this
basis.
5. The point of this memorandum is simply to make sure that you know how very hard it
will be for Wilson to do as much for us in South Vietnam as we need him to. It is hard to
treat a thing as our problem for 10 years and then try to get other people to take on a share
of it, just because it is getting worse (though we choose not to say so).
McG.B./2/

Saigon, December 7, 1964--9 p.m.
Exdis. Repeated to Bangkok. According to another copy, this telegram was drafted by
Johnson and cleared with Taylor. (Ibid., Saigon Embassy Files: Lot 68 F 8) Received at
9:18 a.m
1746. Bangkok eyes only for Ambassador. Together with Westmoreland and Alex
Johnson I met today with Prime Minister Huong, Deputy PriMin Vien and General
Khanh. I gave them a paper translated into French/2/ following very closely the lines of
my instructions/3/ emphasizing necessity discretion and secrecy.
/2/A copy of this paper was transmitted as enclosure 1 to airgram A-468 from Saigon,
December 15. (Ibid.)
/3/Document 435.
All three read the paper soberly and carefully and we subsequently had extended
discussion in which two main points of concern on their part emerged. First, while
accepting the listed concrete specifics of indications of governmental effectiveness,
concern as to what we really meant and whether they would be able to meet the broad
conditions precedent to undertaking Phase 2, concentrating particularly on "a stable
effective government capable of conducting successfully the campaign against the Viet
Cong" and "a government in Saigon able to speak for and to its people." The second
concern related to failure of the paper to say anything with respect to Cambodia and the
help to the Viet Cong that comes through Cambodia.
With respect to the first point, I detected an undercurrent of disappointment on the part of
the Prime Minister that he felt that the paper implied that he had not been carrying on
government in a capable manner. He pointed out that the army and the police have been
responsive to his direction and that "what we have done up to now proves we have
control." I pointed out that we were by no means criticizing, in fact we were very
impressed with his conduct of the govt up to now but that we were expecting to have a
period during which the govt would be able to demonstrate its ability to continue such
control and that the Buddhist agitation was giving an impression, false to be sure, that a
large segment of the population was against the govt The PriMin asked what proof he
must present to demonstrate that the Buddhist Institute does not represent the
overwhelming majority of Buddhists in Vietnam.
In regard to the second point, both the PriMin and Khanh spoke at some length
concerning the provocative attitude of Cambodia and help for VC coming through
Cambodia. I pointed out that the whole program was directed towards Hanoi which was
the key and if this was dealt with the problem of Cambodian support to the VC would take
care of itself.
In conclusion the PriMin agreed that while reserving on details for later discussion they
generally approved our proposals. It was agreed that the same group would meet again at
8:00 Wednesday/4/ morning for further discussion and at that time I plan to table what we
are prepared to offer the GVN to help strengthen the govt.
/4/December 9.
Meanwhile I perceive no objection to going ahead with proposed discussions with other
allies.
Taylor
440. Memorandum From the President to the Secretary of State, the Secretary of
Defense (McNamara), and the Director of Central Intelligence (McCone)/1/
to the President. Top Secret. Also published in Declassified Documents, 1978, 1 30B.
I have approved the attached paper (Tab 1)/2/ on policy toward Southeast Asia as
guidance for our work in this field in coming months, subject to such amendment and
further development as I may approve from time to time. I have also approved the
attached instructions (Tab 2)/3/ to Ambassador Taylor for his use on his return to South
Vietnam. Taken together, these documents state my present position.
/2/Document 433.
/3/Document 435.
I consider it a matter of the highest importance that the substance of this position should
not become public except as I specifically direct.
In discussions of relevant parts of these matters with foreign governments, I expect that
every effort will be made to impress upon our foreign friends the importance of discretion,
but I recognize that we cannot control what foreign governments say.
In the case of American officials the matter is different. The officers to whom this
memorandum is directed are requested to take personal responsibility for the supervision
of the execution of this policy and for insuring that knowledge of all parts of it within the
Executive Branch is confined as narrowly as possible to those who have an immediate
working need to know.
Lyndon B. Johnson

1964-1968, Volume I
Vietnam, 1964
Department of State
Washington, DC
XIII. U.S. Response to the Governmental Crisis In South Vietnam,

December 8-31
441. Memorandum of a Conversation, White House, Washington, December 8, 1964,
4 p.m./1/
/1/Source: Department of State, Presidential Memoranda of Conversation: Lot 66 D 199.
Secret. No drafting or clearance information appears on the source text which is dated
December 10.
PARTICIPANTS
The President
The Under Secretary of State
Ambassador David K. E. Bruce
McGeorge Bundy
William R. Tyler
Richard E. Neustadt
The British Prime Minister
The Foreign Secretary
The Defense Secretary
Lord Harlech
Sir Burke Trend
Sir Harold Caccia
The discussions then turned to the subject of Vietnam and the President asked the
Secretary of State to describe the problem there.
The Secretary explained that the principal consideration now was to turn Peking and
Hanoi around before they had a firm commitment to go South. On the South Vietnam
side, the purpose was to get the South Vietnamese to win the war in their own country.
The major problem was establishing political unity in the cities and dealing with
infiltration from the outside.
The U.S. Government had tried to send political signals to Peking and Hanoi, pointing out
that if they left their neighbors alone they would have no problem with the U.S.; if they
pushed on, there would be trouble. In addition, military actions were being taken--armed
reconnaissance in Laos, the Gulf of Tonkin, and the redeployment of units of the West
Pacific fleet--to give them additional signals.
The Secretary went on to say that the U.S. was appealing to a number of countries for
assistance, both for its practical effect as well as for the political impact, to demonstrate to
Saigon and Hanoi the degree of free world solidarity. It was the U.S. Government's hope
that the UK would put people into the countryside. Engineers, technicians and military
were needed. The UK's Mr. Thompson had good ideas, too. Showing the flag was
important. In Hanoi, Saigon and here in the U.S., people were interested in what others
were doing and how much help the allies were giving.
Responding to this, Gordon Walker said the U.S. problem in Vietnam and the British in
Malaysia were essentially the same. Only the opponents were different. The British had a
major commitment, albeit with smaller forces. They could not put troops on the ground in
Vietnam for they had a battle of their own to fight. But the British wanted to help the U.S.
in ways that could be publicized-training Vietnamese troops in jungle warfare, providing
medics, putting police in Saigon. And publicizing these actions would in fact step up the
British commitment.
On the policy of signals, the British wanted to help the U.S. in Vietnam and hoped the
U.S. would help British in Malaysia. However, Gordon Walker stressed the importance of
keeping retaliatory action related to things retaliated against. Disproportionate retaliation
would put the British in a difficult position especially since they are co-chairman of the
14-Nation conference. They would not call the conference without U.S. consent and did
not want to be forced into a conference against the U.S. will.
Concluding, Gordon Walker said it was important that the British be consulted about
further steps contemplated in Vietnam so that they could support U.S. efforts effectively.
(The Prime Minister told the President he expected to be questioned extensively about the
war in Vietnam during the parliamentary debate.)
Secretary Rusk thought from a tactical standpoint it was important that all participants
understand the degree to which the earlier agreements had been violated. This was
intolerable and the U.S. was not prepared to go to a conference which took up where the
1962 conference began. In this connection, he pointed out that Laos was important
because it was the place where signals could be exchanged with the other side. He also
explained that efforts were being made to clear the atmosphere with Cambodia. But as cochairman he urged the British to press the Soviets to join them in getting compliance with
the 1962 agreements and to stop playing a neutral game in the aggression against South
Vietnam.
In reply, the Foreign Secretary said the dossier of the violations would be most helpful to
him. He also assured the Secretary he would not agree to a conference without U.S.
consent.
At this point the communiqu was brought in, checked by both sides and approved by the
President and the Prime Minister./2/
/2/For text, see American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1964, pp. 615-616.

Exdis. According to another copy, this telegram was drafted by Johnson and cleared with
Taylor. (Ibid., Saigon Embassy Files: Lot 68 F 8) Received at 6:04 a.m.
1763. Embassy telegram 1746./2/ Westmoreland, Alex Johnson and I again met this
morning with PriMin Huong, DepPriMin Vien and General Khanh to follow up on our
meeting of Dec 7. I gave them paper translated into French entitled "Actions Designed To
Strengthen the Govt of Vietnam"/3/ pointing out GVN problem is one of better
performance vis--vis its own people and foreign govts, greater appeal to its own people
by convincing them of its interest in them, and the development of national and
international confidence in GVN. Paper listed eight areas "in which progress beyond
present levels would not only have intrinsic importance in pacification area but would be
a measure of the effectiveness of the govt":
/2/Document 439.
/3/A copy of this paper was transmitted as enclosure 2 to airgram A-468 from Saigon,
December 15. (Department of State, Saigon Embassy Files: Lot 68 F 8)
1. Attainment of authorized strength for military, paramilitary and police forces and better
use of manpower.
2. Establishment of new and higher force goals for military, pare" military and police
forces.
3. Better performance by civilian and military officials, including replacement of
incompetent and retention of competent.
4. Improvement of budgetary operations, particularly expenditures in provinces.
5. Clarification and strengthening of province chief powers
6. Clarification and strengthening of police powers.
7. More vigor in Hop Tac operation.
8. After considerable time when stability is achieved, reviewing cases of political
prisoners from previous regimes.
Recognizing that much work was already being done in the foregoing fields, the paper
singled out the following nine specific points for which clear responsibility needed to be
assigned:
1. Establishment of new 1965 force goals for military, paramilitary and police forces.
2. Clarification of roles of popular forces, police and civil defense.
3. Improved budgetary formulation and implementation to insure efficient governmental
operations while guarding against inflation.
4. Clarification and strengthening powers of province chiefs and exercise of those powers.
5. An improved and increased effort in the information field to include consideration of a
high-powered radio transmitter for Saigon.
6. An extended rural development program in the provinces to include civil and military
resources.
7. Additional forms of economic assistance for industrial urban and rural development.
8. Improvement of certain highway bridges and port facilities.
9. Renewed efforts to attract third country assistance.
I also offered to assist in any way govt desired with approaches to minority leaders. Paper
closed with statement that foregoing represented an expansion of expenditures, and
budget deficit for CY 1965 may be larger than for CY 1964, thus there was compelling
need to manage financial and fiscal affairs of govt so as to hold down threat of inflation.
Paper was generally well-received and agreed specific joint action responsibilities
assigned to be confirmed by paper which I will make available to them tomorrow./4/
/4/A copy of this paper was transmitted as enclosure 3 to airgram A-468.
PriMin said that review of cases of political prisoners was "a very delicate" matter
indicating that he did not want to commit himself at this time on this point. In response to
statement in paper that it was important that the military continue to express public
confidence in the govt, Khanh opined that this was "no problem" pointing to Dec 2
communiqu./5/ He said that statement had been delayed until then because he did not
want it to be just his personal statement but signed by all the military chiefs.
/5/A copy of the communiqu, issued following a meeting at Dalat on December 2 of the
corps and division Generals with Khanh, was transmitted in telegram 1732 from Saigon,
December 4. (Department of State, Central Files, POL 15 VIET S) Taylor reported on the
meeting in telegram 1770, December 10 (ibid., DEF 2 VIET S), as did Westmoreland in
MAC J2 15711, December 4. (Washington National Records Center, RG 319, HQDA
Message Center, Reel 12056)
In response to statement in the paper that while not giving an impression of submitting to
pressure, the govt might consider honorable ways of conciliating most important minority
groups, PriMin said that he felt that he had overwhelming support "in the
South" (apparent implication was that Northern politicians and elements such as Tam
Chau were primary opponents) and that it was clear they commanded very little support.
However, PriMin reaffirmed his willingness to make orderly changes in a few Ministers if
and when this seemed desirable.
In discussion third country assistance, I emphasized importance it also had from USG
domestic point of view. In reply to PriMin's question, I said that we did not desire to
"internationalize" war such as Korean pattern and agreed with Vien's observation that the
question really involved making third country, free world support concretely evident in
Vietnam. Khanh suggested a "third country aid headquarters building" in front of which
all the third country flags could be flying but recognized problem of those who did not
want to seem to be involved in military activities.
In response to statement in paper on importance of filling diplomatic posts abroad, the
PriMin said that he had already discussed this with FonMin and received in silence
Khanh's offer of more unemployed Generals for diplomatic posts.
With respect to powers of province chiefs, Khanh insisted that they in fact already had
ample powers to be "little presidents" but it was a matter of training and willingness to
exercise their powers. He and Vien agreed to work together on this.
While expressing appreciation for the offer of a stronger radio, Khanh asked that we also
urgently study the question of television, at least on a limited and experimental basis in
the Saigon area. He said that in underdeveloped countries such as Vietnam the visual
image was especially important and could be a powerful instrument in communication for
the govt as well as for education. He said he had heard that under an arrangement with the
Japanese, Hanoi was to have television by 1966 and that it was expected Cambodia would
also shortly have it. I said we were studying the matter and would be prepared to discuss it
further with them.
On my offer to be of assistance in dealing with minority elements, both the PriMin and
Khanh expressed strong reservations about either Johnson or myself seeing them and
urged that even lower level con facts be very carefully managed because of propensity of
such elements to misuse and circulate false interpretations of such meetings. However, the
PriMin enthusiastically endorsed my proposed meeting with key newspaper editors.
All in all it was, I feel, a good meeting and successful in obtaining a reasonably common
approach by PriMin, Vien and Khanh looking toward dealing with some of GVN's more
concrete problems.
Taylor
443. Memorandum of a Conversation, Soviet Embassy, Washington, December 9,

1964, 1 p.m./1/
Secret; Exdis. Drafted by Akalovsky on December 16 and approved in the Executive
Secretariat on December 30. Gromyko was in the United States to attend the 19th session
of the U.N. General Assembly, which began December 1.

SUBJECT
South East Asia
PARTICIPANTS
U.S.
The Secretary
Ambassador Thompson
Ambassador Kohler
Mr. Tyler
Mr. Akalovsky
U.S.S.R.
Foreign Minister Gromyko
Deputy Foreign Minister Semenov
Ambassador Dobrynin
Mr. Smirnovsky, Chief, American Section, Foreign Ministry
Mr. Sukhodrev
In response to the Secretary's remark that he wished to discuss the situation in South East
Asia, Mr. Gromyko said he had also wanted to discuss this matter. Mr. Gromyko said he
wished to ask what intentions the U.S. had in that area. As the Soviet Union had stated on
a number of earlier occasions, it believed that the U.S. had made a great mistake by
getting involved in South Vietnam, because there were no U.S. interests involved in that
area. But the U.S. had its troops in South Vietnam and was now increasing them. This was
not in accord with the U.S.-expressed desire to reduce tensions in the area. Consequently,
the question arose as to what the real U.S. intentions were. The Soviet Union had no
troops or experts in the area and had taken no action similar to the actions taken by the
U.S.
The Secretary observed that on the basis of Mr. Gromyko's remarks, it appeared that there
was no problem between the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. in South East Asia. Unfortunately,
Hanoi and Peiping were very active in that area. Our position was very simple: if Peiping
and Hanoi left their neighbors alone, there would be no U.S. troops in that area. We had
no interests and we sought no bases there, and all we were doing was because of Hanoi
and Peiping. The Secretary hoped that there was no difference between our two countries
as to the facts of the situation. In 1959, Hanoi had made the decision to go after South
Vietnam, and that decision had been made public in 1960. North Vietnam was sending
men and supplies to South Vietnam. Hanoi was in control of daily operations, and we
knew that command lines went from the Viet Cong to Hanoi. There were constant
infiltrations, which particularly increased in 1964. Infiltrators came through Laos. which
was a direct contravention of the 1962 accords. There were more and more men in South
Vietnam who had been trained in the North Vietnamese forces, and they were North
Vietnamese rather than some South Vietnamese who might have undergone training in
North Vietnam. Perhaps some people on the Soviet side said that this was a war of
liberation, but we regarded the situation as pure aggression. The Secretary repeated that if
Hanoi and Peiping left their neighbors alone, we would not be there; otherwise, he
stressed, we were in a serious situation. He hoped the Soviet Union would in no way
encourage Hanoi and Peiping and would use its influence to restrain them. Again, he
could only say that if Hanoi and Peiping left the area alone, we would come home;
otherwise, there would be a real scrap.
Mr. Gromyko said he wished to point out that the U.S. had prevented elections from
taking place in Vietnam as provided for under the 1954 agreement. Thus, the U.S. had
blocked the chance for unification. The U.S. had sent troops to South Vietnam and now it
could see what had developed. He also wished to point out that U.S. troops had been sent
not in response to any action by Hanoi and Peiping; rather, they had been there from the
very beginning.
The Secretary asked what period Mr. Gromyko was talking about.
Mr. Gromyko replied he had in mind the entire period after the 1954 Geneva agreement.
He said the U.S. was trying to tell the Vietnamese how to resolve their problems. The
Soviet Union knew that the U.S. sympathies were with South Vietnam; on the other hand,
the Soviet Union was in sympathy with North Vietnam. Yet the difference was that the
U.S. had troops in South Vietnam whereas the Soviet Union had no troops in North
Vietnam. If the Soviet Union were to match the U.S., it would have troops in North
Vietnam.
The Secretary said that as far as the 1954-55 period was concerned, it had become very
clear that no free elections were possible in North Vietnam. In that period, Hanoi had
asked the Soviet Union for help, and the Soviet Union gave it. South Vietnam had asked
for assistance from the U.S., and we met their request. At that time, we had had no troops,
but only assistance missions in South Vietnam. In any event, it was clear that no free
elections could have been possible. The Secretary noted that neither South Vietnam nor
the U.S. had signed the 1954 agreement, although we had accepted it and had said that a
violation of the agreement would have serious consequences. But even if, for the sake of
argument, one accepted the view that one of the clauses of the agreement had been
violated, that was no justification for military action and aggression. He did not know the
extent of the Soviet responsibility with respect to Hanoi, but he wished to point out that
even though there had been no Soviet troops in Greece or Korea, there was no doubt about
Soviet involvement in those situations. The Secretary reiterated once again that the only
problem in South East Asia was that Hanoi and Peiping did not wish to leave their
neighbors alone.
[Here follows discussion on Laos.]
He [Rusk] then said he wished to point out that as far as U.S. troops in South Vietnam
were concerned, we had fewer troops in South Vietnam than North Vietnam had. He
suggested that Mr. Gromyko and he should not tease each other. We knew perfectly well
who those personnel were, what routes they followed, etc. The situation was one of pure
and cold aggression.
Mr. Gromyko suggested the U.S. was committing aggression against North Vietnam.
The Secretary said there seemed to be ideological differences on this point between our
two sides. Were we aggressors because we helped others defend themselves?

Mr. Gromyko inquired who had asked the U.S. for help. There had been several
governments in South Vietnam, they changed all the time, and none of them had popular
support.
The Secretary noted we had been told that policies would continue even if personalities
change.
Mr. Gromyko commented the methods of change in South Vietnam were rather curious.
In any event, the Soviet Government regarded the U.S. policy in South Vietnam as
contrary to the interests of peace. He reiterated that elections should have been held in
Vietnam. Although he did not know what their outcome would have been, the fact was
that the 1954 agreement had been violated.
The Secretary asked Mr. Gromyko whether he seriously believed that free elections were
possible in North Vietnam.
Mr. Gromyko replied in the affirmative. He said the election procedure was set forth in
the 1954 agreement and had been developed with U.S. participation. What he thought had
happened was that the U.S. had probably decided that the North Vietnamese would obtain
a majority. This was the only explanation of the U.S. refusal to accept elections. Thus, the
U.S. had one policy regarding elections in Germany, and another policy regarding
elections in Vietnam.
The Secretary asked whether this was not true in the case of the Soviet Union.
Mr. Gromyko said no, adding that the U.S. had troops in South Vietnam whereas the
Soviet Union had no troops in North Vietnam.
The Secretary said we were not against peaceful discussion of the South Vietnamese
problem. However, North Vietnam should stop its activities and leave South Vietnam
alone.
Mr. Gromyko again asked by whom the U.S. had been invited to South Vietnam. Was it
by the man who had been overthrown and since forgotten?
The Secretary said we had been invited by all the governments which had served in South
Vietnam.
Mr. Gromyko interjected that none of those governments had been supported by the
people.
The Secretary wondered why Hanoi did not want to leave South Vietnam and Laos alone.
Mr. Gromyko suggested that this question be asked of the North Vietnamese Government
at the conference. He observed that the Secretary's remarks did not open good prospects
for the future.
The Secretary said Mr. Gromyko's remarks implied that Hanoi would continue its
activities.
Mr. Gromyko contended the Soviet Union had no information regarding the presence of
any North Vietnamese troops in South Vietnam. Any information about infiltrators or
guerrillas from North Vietnam was strictly a U.S. responsibility. He said perhaps South
Vietnam and Laos were sending infiltrators in the other direction.
444. Memorandum From Chester L. Cooper of the National Security Council Staff
Memos. Secret.
SUBJECT
Stability of South Vietnam's Government, Report No. 1
This is my initial report covering one of the two matters of current interest to the President
regarding Vietnam--the problem of the government's stability. A report on third country
participation will be submitted tomorrow./2/ Unless unusual developments dictate more
frequent reporting, or unless instructed otherwise, I plan to prepare these reports on an
every-other-day basis. Subsequent memoranda obviously will tend to be more brief than
these initial efforts.
/2/A copy of this memorandum is ibid. On December 14, Cooper and McGeorge Bundy
sent to the President the second memorandum in this series. For text, see Declassified
Documents, 1979, 221C.
1. Premier Tran Van Huong's five-week old government appears momentarily
strengthened by his own exertions and by the firm support of US officials and VN military
leaders. Nevertheless, a concerted Buddhist effort to overthrow Huong still seems likely.
The Buddhists have been moving cautiously, however, and ten days of quiet in Saigon
have permitted an easing of martial law restrictions. Huong's firmness against recent
demonstrators, largely schoolboys and hoodlums, has been publicly endorsed by the High
National Council and key Catholic leaders and privately by responsible labor leaders.
Huong's administrative performance is still spotty, partly through unfamiliarity, but he
seems willing to learn. Privately, he has said he is willing eventually to change some of
his less able or more controversial ministers, but he will not do this while under fire.
2. External threats to the stability of the government arise from the activities of the
Cambodians and the Viet Cong. There have been some hints that Cambodia will
recognize the National Front for the Liberation of South Vietnam as the legitimate
government (this in turn would probably result in the Government of Vietnam's
recognizing the dissident Cambodian Khmer Serei movement and closing the Mekong
River to Cambodian shipping). The Viet Cong have been stepping up their political
agitation and have been sending cadres into Saigon to stimulate and intensify antigovernment demonstrations.
3. Buddhist leaders have been holding strategy talks in Saigon and gearing up their
followers for possible anti-government action. Their foremost strategist, monk Tri Quang,
says they have set up a "Struggle Committee" and plan to apply quiet pressure on Chief of
State Suu and the US to get Huong replaced constitutionally. Today, however, the
Buddhist leadership issued a communiqu announcing opposition to the government and
refusal to cooperate with the present cabinet. Huong [Tri Quang?] privately threatens to
stage hunger strikes by monks and mass demonstrations if necessary; these, he says,
would prove decisive. The Buddhists imply that they are reluctant to oppose the US and
they probably fear army reprisals; they have set no firm deadlines and say there may yet
be time for a "quiet solution." What Buddhist leaders really want is still unclear-perhaps
even to themselves. And though we continue to watch and investigate, we have no
evidence to tie them to the Viet Cong or even to indicate that they sympathize with Viet
Cong aims.
4. Ambassador Taylor has been meeting with Chief of State Suu; Huong, and his cabinet;
the High National Council; military leaders; and the local press. He has made it clear that,
while it is US policy to help South Vietnam, an expanded US commitment cannot be
justified to the US government and public unless Vietnamese groups unite behind their
legitimate government. Other Embassy officers are discreetly getting this message to the
Buddhists and other political oppositionists. Taylor, in addition, has provided Huong and
his top lieutenants (including Khanh) a list of measures designed to strengthen the
government's image domestically and abroad./3/ These suggestions seem to have been
well received.
5. Complementing the efforts of the Ambassador to urge unity on the disparate elements
of the Vietnamese official community, the CIA Station in Saigon is covertly putting
pressure on elements close to Tri Quang to moderate Buddhist opposition to the
government. Buddhists in the United States and abroad are being urged to bring their
influence to bear, and the possibility of getting the Dalai Lama's brother to visit Saigon
with this message is being explored. Covert efforts to generate support for Huong are also
being made among the Saigon students, in senior military circles, and among old guard
politicians./4/
/4/At the bottom of the source text, the President wrote: "Mac, I like this."
CLC

Forrestal and cleared in draft with William Bundy and the first sentence cleared in
substance with McGeorge Bundy. Repeated to CINCPAC for POLAD.
1266. For the Ambassador from the Acting Secretary. Meeting today again underscored
great concern of highest authority for fullest possible Country Team efforts bring various
political groups into support for GVN./2/ Would be helpful if your next status report
could cover attitudes of key groups and summarize various U.S. contacts and types of
effort with each, indicating how effort coordinated by you or Deputy Ambassador. For
this purpose key groups would appear to include Buddhists, military, Catholics, students,
sects, and perhaps such groups as Montagnards, indigenous press, civil servants, as you
believe these important.
/2/Also discussed at the meeting, which was held at the Department of State at 10 a.m.
and was attended by William (Chairman) and McGeorge Bundy, Ball, Forrestal, Cooper,
McCone, Vance, McNaughton, and Admirals Mustin and McDonald, were air operations
in Laos, deployment of Hawk missiles to Vietnam, infiltration, third country briefings,
and OPLAN 34A. (Telegram 1265 to Saigon, December 12; ibid., POL 27 VIET S, and
JCS 2339/164, December 12; National Archives and Records Administration, RG 218.
ICS Files)
In our discussions, the problem of immediate priority was obviously relations between
Buddhists and GVN and Buddhists and U.S. which seemed to be developing into major
confrontations. We are particularly concerned that communications between Buddhists
and GVN/U.S. are deteriorating. We thought some of the following ideas on the method
and substance of communications with the Buddhists which were developed here were
worth passing on to you.
A. Attempt to get across to Buddhist leaders a sense that, (1) unlike summer 1963, their
cause does not now have wide-spread popular support outside Viet-Nam and;
(2) A direct confrontation with the Government at this time could, in our judgment, render
it virtually impossible for us to undertake some of the measures which we think would be
useful in dealing with the VC threat directed and supported from the North. These
thoughts might be conveyed by:
a. A direct approach to Buddhist leaders by Emboffs at appropriate level.
b. Play-back of appropriate U.S. press commentary by VOA.
c. Public statements here in Washington.
B. Letter from Ambassador Lodge to Tri Quang. Embassy views on what might be said
obviously better than our own. Such letter might, however, include thought that essence of
democratic government which Buddhists say they want is building of orderly methods of
taking political action without causing chaos and collapse of entire structure of
government, If this idea seems worthwhile, we will be happy to approach Lodge with
Embassy draft.
C. In order provide Buddhists with a possible attractive stake in enterprise, we might
devise methods of funneling material aid through Buddhist leadership so that they may
become involved in supporting their adherents at village and hamlet level in conjunction
with pacification effort. Perhaps active Buddhist social welfare organizations could be
created, both in Viet-Nam and possibly also in U.S., which could act as brokers between
American official and unofficial aid programs and Buddhist laymen in Viet-Nam in same
way as Catholic and Protestant missionaries work to support their followers in provinces.
Possibly Catholic or Protestant advisor, American or Vietnamese, could be found to help
the Buddhists set up program and deal with necessary paper work.
D. GVN might seek prominent Buddhist interlocutor who could formulate Buddhist
grievances in responsible and respectable manner so that GVN could at appropriate time
promptly and publicly give satisfaction in order to cut some ground out from under hardline Buddhist leaders.
[1 paragraph (4 lines of source text) not declassified]
We would appreciate your comments on these ideas plus any others you may have of your
own. We are trying to. develop further specific thoughts on actions which might be taken
with other groups listed in Para 1 of this message.
Ball

Memos. Secret; Limdis. Repeated to CINCPAC. Attached to the source text was a
memorandum from McGeorge Bundy to the President, dated December 15, which stated:
"We don't get an awful lot of good news from Saigon, and this one is of real interest." The
President had written across the memorandum: "I'd like to see this accelerated."
1817. FYI. During the late spring and summer of this year, an experiment was launched in
Quang Ngai Province in which the Quang Ngai representatives of [less than 1 line of
source text not declassified] played important and complementary roles. The common
purpose was to try a new blend of psywar, civic action, and intelligence factors in order to
get at and root out the Viet Cong apparatus which was rapidly digging itself into the
provinces immediately around Quang Ngai City. This original need was first recognized
by a Vietnamese official, the Quang Ngai police chief, with American involvement
originating at his request. This initial experiment had as its product a team of forty
specially trained and specially armed persons, operating directly under control of Quang
Ngai Province Chief and, under him, District Chief of the district surrounding Quang Ngai
City. The original purpose, as stated above, seems to have been successful to the degree
that the local population in area of the team's operation has been changed in attitude from
one which was fearful of and responsive to the local Viet Cong, to an attitude which
practical experience has demonstrated has made that district difficult and even dangerous
for Viet Cong to operate in. Thus success of this experiment, in terms of its objectives,
seems to be considerable.
In addition to original team, five additional similar teams have subsequently been created
and committed to identical work within Quang Ngai Province. [6-1/2 lines of source text
not declassified]
I feel this kind of activity may have significant impact on problem of rural pacification at
the household, village, and district level. [8-1/2 lines of source text not declassified]
Minister of Interior Vien, under whose purview province chiefs fall, is totally in support
and is eager to endorse this program in whatever province it may be introduced. As initial
[less than 1 line of source text not declassified] survey of six provinces in the North, just
completed, indicates understanding and receptivity on the part of the province chiefs
concerned. Further expansion will take place as rapidly as possible. We have still to [1-1/2
lines of source text not declassified] avoid raising some of the difficulties encountered in
the CIDG program.
Taylor

/1/Source: National Defense University, Taylor Papers, T-161-69. Secret; Priority; Nodis.
Drafted by Taylor and transmitted as telegram 1826 from Saigon, which is the source text.
Embtel 1764./2/ Since returning from Washington, my primary preoccupation has been to
meet with the politically important groups in Saigon in compliance with your instructions
to make crystal-clear the attitude of the USG toward the minority efforts to overthrow the
Huang cabinet and to undertake to offset these efforts. I have stressed our firm intention to
continue to support the struggle of SVN but the essentiality of a durable government in
order to permit that support to be effective. Among those with whom I have spoken are
Chief of State Suu, Huong and his senior advisers, the members of his cabinet, most of the
members of the High National Council, the key Generals, and many of the local editors.
Key members of the Embassy staff have also been spreading the word to all their contacts.
Although there has been little discussion of the views presented in these meetings and no
attempt to rebut them, my impression is that these comments have had an effect and are
receiving wide currency in Vietnamese circles.
/2/Telegram 1764 from Saigon, December 9, transmitted Taylor's report to the President
on the activities in Vietnam while Taylor was in Washington. (Ibid.)
During the week, the opposition of the Buddhist Institute leadership to the government
and to Huong personally took the form of public letters to Chief of State Suu and to me,/3/
castigating Huong and claiming Suu and I bear responsibility for the government. Three
Institute leaders carried on a hunger strike against the government, among them Tri
Quang who has taken full charge of the anti-GVN campaign. I have deliberately avoided
direct contact with the Institute leaders preferring to work through Embassy officers who
are regularly in touch with them. The immediate problem appears to establish
communication between them and a spokesman for Huong who personally has no desire
to talk to the bonzes, much less to compromise with them.
/3/Translations of these letters were transmitted in telegram 1790 from Saigon, December
11. (Department of State, Central Files, SOC 12)
The relatively restrained character of the Buddhist campaign thus far suggests that the
Institute leadership is well aware of their lack of a broad base of support even among most
other Buddhists and lack of a truly religious issue to use against the government. They
appear to be trying to provoke the government to take actions against them which will
give them an issue and an appeal to popular sympathy. Needless to say, the Mission is
giving this entire matter of the Buddhist opposition its priority attention.
General Khanh is the cause of some uneasiness again, not primarily because of any antigovernmental inclination but because of the restlessness of many of the Generals under
his leadership. While he continues to be the most able of the lot, he often displays a
fundamental lack of principle which eventually erodes the confidence in him of most of
his associates. So far as I can see, he is having little luck in unifying the Armed Forces
and eliminating the factions, the primary task he set for himself upon quitting the
government.
There is little newsworthy to report in the other areas of our activity. Except for a rather
large action at An Lao in Binh Dinh Province on December 7, military operations have
been relatively routine. Pacification progress around Saigon seems to be picking up but
probably will not reach all year end target objectives.
We had another series of heavy rains which have caused some flooding north of Saigon
and south of the area devastated by typhoons last month. Relief action is in progress and
the situation appears to be in hand.
In response to your expressed interest in the attitudes of minority groups toward the
Huong government, I am sending to State today a comprehensive summary of attitudes of
the principal minority elements toward the government as we presently appraise them./4/
/4/Infra.
Taylor/5/

Saigon, December 16, 1964, 8 p.m.
/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 23-9 VIET S. Secret; Limdis.
1836. For the Acting Secretary from Taylor. CINCPAC for POLAD. Pursuant to your
request/2/ following is summary of attitudes and our contacts with key groups:
/2/Document 445.
1. Buddhists: Despite slight opening for possible compromise indicated in conversation

yesterday with Tri Quang (Embtel 1833),/3/ our assessment is that Buddhist Institute
leadership still remains intent on confrontation with GVN and at this point will not be
greatly swayed by efforts at direct persuasion by us.
/3/Telegram 1833, December 16, described a 3-hour conversation between Manfull and
Tri Quang which gave the impression that the Buddhist leaders were determined to seek
Huong's overthrow despite some slight indications that a settlement short of that might be
worked out. (Johnson Library, National Security File, Vietnam Country File, Vol. XXIII.
Cables)
Extent to which they willing to go in reaching compromise will undoubtedly depend far
more on their assessment of local strength and support they are able to find (or
manufacture) for such confrontation than on our views. Other major factor is their
estimate Huong's ability to resist their demands and their necessity to "save face" if
Huong's resistance is successful. Therefore, most useful role for us at moment is
maintenance our firm position of support for Huong while at same time continuing quiet
contact with Buddhist Institute leaders to ensure they understand fully US position and to
explore and possibly facilitate establishment of dialogue between them and GVN.
Some elements of direct US action with Buddhist Institute leadership as envisaged reftel
already being undertaken, while certain other suggestions would seem to have only
limited or even no positive effect at this time. With regard to specific lettered paragraphs
your message:
A.(a) EmbOffs have been maintaining constant contact with Buddhist leaders Tri Quang
and to lesser extent with Tam Chau and Mai Tho Trayen. EmbOffs also see various
secondary members Buddhist Institute leadership and other Buddhist elements frequently.
Gard currently in Saigon and will be assisting us in this effort while he is here. Believe
contacts to date have given Buddhist Institute leadership clear idea of US attitude to
extent they willing listen to it. It is clear that they have decided to proceed with campaign
of pressure on government in full knowledge it contrary to US position.
A.(b) Buddhist Institute leadership, like other Vietnamese, believes VOA is voice of USG
and while they will interpret playbacks as USG pressure against them, believe it useful to
keep before them evidence that foreign observers, particularly local correspondents, view
Buddhist Institute campaign of opposition as being without justifiable foundation and a
negative exercise.
A.(c) Believe that for the present, official statements from Washington directed
specifically at Buddhist Institute leaders would likely prove counterproductive. They
directly aware of US position. However, they will probably interpret public statements as
attacks on them before Vietnamese public opinion, and this would work against our
efforts to keep channels of communications open. At same time, statements from
Washington on need for political stability and orderly processes of government, such as
that proposed for President's press conference,/4/ will continue to be useful.
/4/The proposed statement had been sent in telegram 1255 to Saigon, December 11.
(Ibid.)
B. Believe letter from Lodge might prove useful, but would prefer to hold this one in
reserve for time being. At moment, Buddhist Institute leadership still seems intent on
confrontation and we doubt that they can be dissuaded until situation develops in manner
which will either indicate to them they are playing a losing hand or pave way for
reasonable "face saving" compromise that they can accept without achieving their major
goal, i.e., ouster of Huong.
C. Believe this too might be useful in future. But at present juncture this would be
interpreted either as sign of US weakness or as effort to buy them off. US posture of quiet
strength more desirable at present and stakes for which Buddhist Institute leadership now
playing are for effective control of GVN so that material US aid would at present look
like very poor consolation prize. We have discussed this very subject on numerous
occasions with Buddhist Institute leadership but in each case they have failed to follow
through because of their lack of organization and experience. This continues to be one of
our principal aims but Buddhist response to date has been most disappointing. Even
concerted direct welfare effort by American wives has fallen on sterile ground.
D. As noted above, we believe essential Buddhist Institute aim at present is incompatible
with retention of Huong government and little room for maneuver exists. At same time
Embassy is quietly canvassing Buddhist opinion in effort to determine extent to which Tri
Quang and Tam Chau and followers might be isolated within movement. Mai Tho Truyen
has given indication to Political Counselor and Gard, for example, of his dissatisfaction
with current Buddhist policy as expressed by bonzes. Theravada leaders have stated that
Theravada groups dissociating selves with UBA campaign, which they view as political.
Other prominent lay Buddhists expressed similar sentiment. However, there does not
appear to be a lay leader on scene who is now capable or willing serve as focus for this
discontent and to return direction of Buddhist Institute's political activity to lay leaders.
E. Embassy is currently examining this question with Gard.
In short, we believe that if correct posture pursued by Huong (combination of obvious
fairness and strength) and mistakes by his government can be avoided so as to deny
genuinely exploitable issue to Buddhists, and if continuing support can be assured him
from Suu, HNC, and the military, we believe essential weakness of Buddhist Institute's
position will become increasingly evident and way may then become open to getting
Buddhist leaders off hook (should that then appear desirable). At present, therefore, we
plan to stand strongly behind Huong and advise him of our views.
However, at moment we do not believe Buddhist leadership can be dissuaded from
pursuing confrontation until they have more fully grasped unfavorable conjunction (from
their viewpoint) of political variables or until face saving device found to get them off
hook.
Specific suggestions we have envisaged making to Huong include following:
1. That Huong maintain non-provocative course combined with strength and focus public
attention on the positive GVN programs.
2. That he consider taking additional steps which, without being labeled as such, will be
interpreted by the Buddhist hierarchy as nods in their direction; for example:
a) Huong might consider appointing additional members of his cabinet such as a Minister
of Defense and a Minister Without Portfolio (for liaison with the HNC and religious and
private groups) who would be acceptable to the Buddhists. This can be done without the
charge that he is changing his government under pressure.
b) Huong might create a citizens' committee for flood relief and appeal again for support
of religious and private groups in the flood relief area thus providing the opportunity for
the GVN to work cooperatively with the Buddhist hierarchy at the Saigon level.
c) Huong might seek to clarify in a future public statement the impression alleged by the
Buddhists that he had lumped the Buddhist hierarchy, out-politicians and the VC as
sharply the same motives in their opposition to his government [sic].
Longer range steps which the GVN might take are as follows:
1. Arrange for the Dalai Lama, his brother, or other Buddhist leaders from other countries
to visit Vietnam to educate Vietnamese bonzes on the perils of Communism and their
civil responsibilities.
2. Consider changes in his current Cabinet at the proper time, replacing those Ministers
who have not performed well or whose past history is demonstrably open to question.
Measures which the US Mission might take in addition to maintaining close contact with
the Buddhist hierarchy are:
1. Maintain pressure on them.
2. Continue with a program directed primarily toward Buddhists recently approved by the
Mission Council. These measures are designed to foster desired Buddhist views and
activities in the following fields among others: (a) Buddhists against Communists,
especially Viet Cong; (b) Buddhist responsibility toward political authority and stability
for GVN; (c) Buddhist contributions toward social stability, especially through education
and social welfare; (d) Buddhist contacts with foreign countries in ways best for GVNUSG interests. Gard is especially working on the implementation of measures (b), (c), and
(d) stated above, both in SVN and elsewhere in Asia.
3. Continue our work with students to keep them in classroom.
Summary attitudes of other key groups follow:
2. "Out" politicians: Political spectrum of "out" politicians ranges from active
oppositionists who desire Huong's downfall to other wing--represented largely by
Southerners--which actively supports him. Main body of politicians, such as Sung's
Northern Dai Viets, Hoan's Southern Dai Viets, Hiep's Southern VNQDD, who together
probably constitute most important mass of politicians in Vietnam, today are essentially
opposed to efforts to overturn Huong government by force. Though not personally
devoted to Huong or his Cabinet, they nevertheless would view his removal under
pressure as blow to efforts to establish orderly political processes in Vietnam, and
possibly first step on way toward another military takeover. In total political spectrum
there are also numerous irresponsible politicians (such as Hoang Co Thuy, who was
involved in exploiting Buddhist memorial services in early November) who see

opposition to Huong simply as means to further their own ambitions. Although they have
potential for trouble-making, they have little following.
Political Counselor and other Embassy officers are in frequent touch with all these
political figures.
4. [sic] Civil servants: Primacy of concern for furtherance of their careers renders civil
servants circumspect at all times with regard to taking conspicuous positions for or against
any incumbent government, and also renders them timid in taking initiatives during
periods of instability. They also tend to approve developments which might lead to strong
stable government, and Huong's early display of strength has found favor for that reason.
Prime Minister Huong has also won approval of many civil servants for his record of
integrity and his willingness to accept humble circumstances. In many ways, Huong
resembles ideal Confucian government official. On other hand, his reputation for honesty
also causes concern among individuals who are uncertain what this reputation might mean
in terms of stringent insistence on efficiency and honesty. As known Southern regionalist
Huong finds his strongest support among those bureaucrats who come from South, with
rather less warmth than those of Center and North.
Embassy Political Section has numerous close contacts among upper and middle level of
permanent civil service. Other elements of Mission, and notably USOM, have close
working relations with Vietnamese bureaucrats at all levels.
5. Press: Since imposition of martial law, press censorship has been enforced. Ten papers
have been temporarily suspended and several others have voluntarily folded. These harsh
measures have been privately applauded by more responsible journalists who have
watched Saigon's journalistic world become more and more chaotic in past year to point
where some fifty dailies were being published. Rumors were rife that more volatile papers
were infiltrated by crypto-VCs or their sympathizers.
Undoubtedly many journalists oppose Huong, but their opposition will be permanent or
temporary depending upon amount of success he enjoys. If he proves capable of
governing and then succeeds in issuing some sort of reasonable press statute, ranks of
journalistic opposition might be thinned to point of inconsequence. At same time, many
editors and journalists have ties with political and other groups, and their attitudes toward
Huong government will be affected to large extent by actions and attitudes of these larger
groups.
Embassy maintains frequent contacts with journalists through Political Section, USIS
[less than 1 1ine of source text not declassified]. Ambassador has had two receptions for
selected editors and publishers to discuss political situation and expects to have others in
future.
6. Cao Dai: Leaders of Tay Ninh or founding sect of Cao Daiism have expressed full if
unenthusiastic support for Huong government. This support is due in part to realization
that Huong was choice of Suu, devout Cao Dai coreligionist, and High National Council,
whose Deputy Chairman is Cao Dai Archbishop Vinh. There is respectiveness [sic] long
known to many Cao Dai leaders, but also concern that he may not provide strong
leadership and that security conditions, especially in Tay Ninh, may deteriorate.
Nevertheless, Cao Hoai Sang, administrative head of ecclesiastical hierarchy, has issued
formal statement backing Huong. Prime Mission contacts include Vinh, Sang, other
church hierarchy, and provincial officials, especially Brig Gen. Le Van Tat in Tay Ninh.
7. Hoa Hao: Hoa Hao seem to be hopelessly split rather than incohesive organization, and
no overall "Hoe Hao attitude" is discernible. In general, major factions and leaders of sect
support Huong and GVN. Chairman of sect's central committee (i.e., religious
organization), Luong Trong Tuong, is member of High National Council and reportedly
voted in favor of Huong's investiture. Just after late November disorders, Tuong issued
statement in favor of Huong and GVN. One Hoa Hao party politician, Phan Ba Cam, has
expressed opposition to Huong, but Cam does not enjoy wide prestige in sect itself.
Factionalized politically as Hoa Hao are, it would be difficult to envisage any effective
political opposition to GVN on their part unless GVN tried to curtail greatly local semiautonomy many Hoa Hao groups now enjoy in lower Delta.
Mission contacts include major Hoa Hao leaders such as province chiefs of An Giang,
Chau Doc, and Kien Phong, various district chiefs and lesser officials in these and other
provinces, and some Hoa Hao politicians in Saigon, including Truong on HNC.
8. Chinese: Chinese press and leaders of economic elite and Chinese congregations, who
view urban unrest as extension of threat which Viet Cong pose to Chinese commercial
and social interests, have given full moral support to Huong government. Most of them
see activities of Vietnamese Buddhist leadership as disruptive influence in already
unstable political situation, and, accustomed themselves to order of contemplative monks,
tend to brand leading Vietnamese bonzes as "un-Buddhist." Broad mass of working class
Chinese, on other hand, probably are fully engrossed in day-to-day struggle for basic
necessities and are little concerned about future of government, Buddhist leaders or Viet
Cong.
Contacts: Number of Embassy and USOM officers have social and business contacts with
Chinese commercial, financial, and educational leaders. There are two Chinese language
officers in Economic Section, one who speaks Mandarin, and another, Sino-American,
who speaks Cantonese.
One political officer is member of Chinese branch of Rotary Club in Cholon, and another,
who speaks Mandarin Chinese, maintains social contact with leaders of two of five
congregations and with Deputy Chief of Federation of Congregations, as well as with
Chinese Embassy officers. Political Section also monitors five of 12 Chinese daily
newspapers.
9. Montagnards: Political changes which have occurred in SVN during past year and half
have had little impact on attitudes and allegiances of Montagnard people, who have never
had feeling of loyalty and attachment to Vietnamese Government. In fact, average
Montagnard in both cities and hamlets would like to rid Highlands of Vietnamese settlers
and government. At same time, however, vast majority of Montagnards also dislike Viet
Cong and seldom provide them willing support. Montagnard rebellion which occurred in
September and subsequent Pleiku conference in October did not basically change
relationships between Vietnamese and Montagnards but they pose both new dangers and
opportunities for GVN program in Highlands. Sincere fulfillment of promises made by
General Khanh at conference would undoubtedly do much to win more enthusiastic
response from at least some of Montagnards. (Implementation of some of these programs

by new Huong government have occurred too recently to gauge Montagnard reaction.)
Rebel organization behind Rhade revolt still commands allegiances of CIDG in several
Special Forces camps and consequently still poses serious threat to GVN. Demands of this
rebel organization are tantamount to request for complete autonomy for Montagnards, and
it is clear government's promised program will not satisfy this group. There have been
some indications that this group will stage another demonstration and/or revolt sometime
in late December if its demands are not met.
US Mission is cooperating with GVN in initiation and development of programs aimed at
improving economic and social conditions of Montagnards. Mission has urged GVN at
various levels to show due urgency in implementation of its programs for Montagnards.
At same time, United States is making it clear, as it has in past, to Montagnard CIDG that
US stands with Vietnamese Government and will assist it in suppressing rebellious acts
which would only benefit Viet Cong in long run.
MACV, USOM and Embassy officers maintain regular contact with Montagnard civil and
military leaders.
10. Labor: Attitude of great majority of labor leaders and rank-and-file can best be best be
described as ambivalent, passively loyal and apathetic. While organized labor's hostility to
Communist ideology as such has remained fairly active, its interest in promises of more
radical approach to such problems has been increasing rather than decreasing. This is
partly attributable to frustration caused by fact that post-Diem governments have not
carried out any of revolutionary reforms which fall of Diem made appear imminent.
Moreover, as insurgency continues and fatigue of general population increases, labor
seems to have begun to doubt in ultimate victory against Viet Cong.
Thus, under slogan of "apolitical activities" workers have tended to withdraw from public
life, seemingly waiting for outcome of military effort.
American presence in Vietnam is perhaps most important factor holding organized labor
from jumping on other side of the fence. Labor members realize that without American
help economy of country would have suffered and standards of living would not be what
they are today.
Embassy Labor Attach has frequent contacts with labor leaders, management
representatives, and with senior Ministry of Labor officials.
11. Students: At base of student discontent is disappointment that revolution has not
produced leadership with dynamism and charisma. Most students who think about it are
uneasy about some of Ministers, but most are unwilling to take violent action--in fact,
there is some indication that some student leaders believe Buddhist movement has been
discredited and are trying to detach themselves.
There seems to have been some increase in regional feelings, with Southerners in general
tending toward at least mild support of government. Ones who do not support government
feel, apparently sincerely, that urgency of situation does not permit men whose past
records have been ineffectual (some Cabinet members) to remain in office. In short run
main danger, however, seems to stem from fact that students can be easily used by outside
forces, such as Buddhists or politicians. In fact, these outsiders are probably more
effective in drumming up student support, especially among high school students, than
main student groups themselves. In this context students' capacity for troublemaking
should not be underestimated.
Most students do not feel they have been properly "called" to service by country: they are
in large measure ashamed of appeal of their government and its ineffectiveness. In this
sense, there will probably be certain favorable reaction to government which shows itself
to be strong, and especially one which shows itself anxious to draw on student
participation. However, actual strong measures taken against students on streets have
drawn unfavorable reaction and have made good propaganda against government.
Students also strongly object to military government and Gen Khanh in particular.
Between them various elements of Mission have contact with virtually all surfaced
student leaders, and there are frequent exchanges of views with many of them. Beyond
this, such multi-agency programs as English teaching and USOM and AID work with
student economic projects bring US representatives into contact with students at many
levels. The Mission Youth Committee meets once per month under direction of cultural
affairs officer.
12. Summary of military attitudes toward Huong government: Since transfer of power
from military to civilian government, VN military has taken public position of full support
for such transfer and of somewhat ambiguous support for Huong government. Following
December 2 Generals' meeting at Dalat communiqu was issued (Embtel 1732),/5/ signed
by Gen Khanh and highest ranking military officers which promised "to support without
reservation civilian government working for people" without specifically mentioning
Huong government. Position of Gen Khanh himself, both publicly and privately has been
something less than forthright and has led to fears in many circles that he is harboring
ambitions to take over government again. These fears are based on such Khanh statements
as that carried in local press on November 30 that "troubled political situation in Saigon
should not drag on" and remarks to Political Counselor (Embtel 1752)/6/ that he would
stay out of politics "until time is ripe". Misgivings concerning Khanh also based on his
precipitate action before relinquishing post of Prime Minister to grant sizeable across-theboard pay increases to military and civilian personnel, to reinstate Dalat Generals, and to
make last minute promotion or transfer of number of Generals.
/6/Telegram 1752, December 8, reported on a reception Taylor had given for senior
Vietnamese officials and Khanh at which the Ambassador briefed them on his trip to
Washington. (Johnson Library, National Security File, Vietnam Country File, Vol. XXIII,
Cables)
Finally, under Huong government Khanh has attempted, with some degree of success, to
transfer authority from civilian show [side?] of government to RVNAF High Command or
to himself. Khanh has obtained authority to appoint most general officers, to make
promotions up to rank of Colonel, and for expanded mobilization authority for the High
Command. He is currently attempting to obtain greater promotion and budgetary
authority. Khanh's moves have been countered by recent action of "Young Turks" who
ostensibly called Dalat meeting in order to obtain active expression of support for Huong
government and inaugurate certain reforms in military services. In fact there is evidence
that "Young Turks", rather than seeking more support for Huong, are trying to curb
Khanh's personal power and even that some (notably I Corps Commander Gen Thi) may
have ambitions of replacing Khanh as Commander in Chief.
There is also some indication that Sub-Brigadier Generals who were last to review
[receive?] their promotions under Khanh may be rallying around him as counter-balance
to "Young Turks".
In terms of practical support, military has put its full weight behind Huong's thus far
successful efforts to curb demonstrations and maintain government's authority. This was
demonstrated by actions of troops assigned to handle demonstrations, obtaining of
authorization to draft demonstrators, and by forthright expressions of determination to
preserve law and order on part of Saigon Commander, General Dong.
There are two dangers against which we must remain alert: First an outright military
attempt to seize power, and second greater erosion of governmental control over military
from civilian to military hands. We have made number of attempts to influence latter.
Ambassador interceded directly with Huong and Khanh (Embtels 1452 and 1460)/7/ to
obtain modifications of proposed reorganization of armed forces which would have
confused chain of command and given Chief of State stronger position than that intended
in charter. He has impressed on Khanh and other Generals, most recently following his
return from Washington, the necessity for full support for Huong (Embtel 1760)./8/ In
addition Gen Westmoreland and his staff are monitoring closely current military
organizational efforts and attempting to prevent any being adopted which are unsound and
would erode Huong government's authority. We will continue our efforts along these
lines.
/7/Telegram 1452, November 10, transmitted a report on a meeting with Huong on
November 9 to discuss the reorganization of the armed forces. Telegram 1460, also
November 10, reported on a similar meeting with Khanh on November 10. (Both in
Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 VIET S)
/8/Telegram 1760, December 9, transmitted a report on a dinner that Westmoreland had
given for Vietnamese military officers at which Taylor reported on his trip to Washington.
(Johnson Library, National Security File, Vietnam Country File, Vol. XXIII, Cables)
Taylor
449. Letter From the President to Senator Mike Mansfield/1/

/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Names File, Mansfield. No
classification marking. Drafted by the President and McGeorge Bundy. Senator Mansfield
was the Senate Majority Leader.
DEAR MIKE: I want to thank you for your memorandum of December 9,/2/ which I read
with care. I asked Mac Bundy to comment on it, and in particular to see which of your
policy suggestions we could fit into our current program. He has written me a
memorandum of comments, which I enclose as of possible interest.
/2/The memorandum [4 pages of source text] was not declassified. (Ibid.)
I think we have the same basic view of this problem and the same sense of its difficulties.
The one suggestion in your memorandum which I myself would take direct issue with is
that we are "overcommitted" there. Given the size of the stake, it seems to me that we are
doing only what we have to do. That we could always do it better is clear, and it is in that
spirit that I greatly welcome your memorandum on the subject.
Sincerely,
LBJ
Enclosure
Memorandum From the President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs
Bundy. Secret.
SUBJECT
Senator Mansfield's Memorandum of December 9
1. Senator Mansfield's memorandum is characteristically thoughtful. There is a difference
in emphasis between him and us, but certainly no difference in fundamental purpose. I
think he agrees with us that the most important task is to try to help in getting a more
effective and better supported government in Saigon; of course this is a point that you
have hammered on in every meeting in recent months. And we certainly agree with him
"that American and Western interests are best served by the frugal use of American
resources to forestall Chinese political and military domination of the area and to keep
open an opportunity for the development of native institutions of national independence,
regional cooperation and popularly responsible government." What seems frugal to us
may seem too much to him, but this is not a difference in principle.
2. Senator Mansfield's memorandum makes seven policy suggestions and I comment on
them in order:
(1) We think it would be a mistake to make a commitment against any U.S. action of any
kind beyond the borders of South Vietnam. On the other hand, you have repeatedly said
that we seek no wider war and intend no reckless action. I myself do not see the grounds
for the flatness of the Senator's recommendation, given the facts of infiltration and of
North Vietnamese control over the Communists in the South.
(2) There is a lot of force in the Senator's recommendation that we avoid entanglement on
the Cambodian border. But Communist infiltration across this border is a fact, and it is
hard to see how we can impose the stringent restrictions on the Vietnamese which the
Senator suggests. As a practical matter, we do agree that there are other areas of higher
priority, and this position is being urged on the Vietnamese authorities by the country
team. We do not fully share the memorandum's very high judgment of Sihanouk, but we
agree that it is important to negotiate differences if possible. I myself would suppose that
negotiation implied some give on both sides, and we do not find much give in Sihanouk's
current position.
(3) We agree on the importance of supporting Souvanna Phouma; this has been our
position for two years. We do not quite agree that the initiative in these relations should be
"his totally" because that seems to us not a good way of conducting relations which
involve U.S. commitments and responsibilities. Souvanna himself has given repeated
indications of his satisfaction with our current policy in Laos. Souvanna, indeed, is
considerably more favorable to U.S. action outside South Vietnam than the Senator's
memorandum, so that if we followed all his advice we could not follow all of Senator
Mansfield's.
(4) We do not currently share the view that we should stand aside entirely from those who
are trying to increase their contacts with Hanoi. We do recognize the advantages of
detaching Hanoi from China, but at the moment we have also the quite tangible problem
of what Hanoi is doing in South Vietnam. This seems to us to argue against a present
policy of Free World friendliness to North Vietnam.
(5) We agree with the general purpose of this recommendation, but it is not clear to us that
peaceful unification of all Vietnam is the best slogan for a government which has all it can
do to deal with its own immediate problems. Nevertheless, this suggestion is worth further
consideration and it is being reviewed with the State Department.
(6) No matter what course is taken, it seems likely to us that we face years of involvement
in South Vietnam, though not necessarily "a vast increase in the commitment." The
Administration has regularly insisted that this problem is not one which will be solved
tomorrow, but it may well be important to make this point still more clear to the American
people. In general, the Administration's policy seems to correspond to the view of most
thoughtful Americans: We do not want a big war out there, and neither do we intend to
back out on a 10-year-long commitment.
(7) Right now we do not see how we can have useful exploratory talks with the Chinese,
in the light of the extraordinary virulence of their public and private comments about the
U.S. It takes two to conduct a conversation, and everything we currently know about
Peking suggests that there is no interest there in a serious conversation on any terms that
are remotely acceptable to us. Recent reports from leaders of the British Labour Party,
who have been in touch with the Chinese and who might be expected to sympathize with
suggestion No. 7, only confirm our current pessimistic assessment of this possibility.
McGeorge Bundy/4/

Washington, December 19, 1964-6:10 p.m.
Exdis; Ivory. Drafted by William Bundy; cleared in draft with McGeorge Bundy,
McNaughton, and Forrestal; and initialed by Harriman. Repeated to Bangkok, Vientiane,
and CINCPAC.
1312. High-level meeting today/2/ reviewed Ops program for next two weeks which will
be covered by septels through military channels./3/ Agreed to continue information policy
of no comment in event of Hanoi charges, with any aircraft loss being handled from
Washington according to circumstances. Reviewed third-country aid situation as covered
septels.
/2/In addition to Operations Plan 34A and infiltration, the meeting, which was held at the
Department of State at 10 a.m. and was attended by William (Chairman) and McGeorge
Bundy, Ball, Forrestal, Vance, McNaughton, Cooper, Rowan, McCone, Mustin, and
others, discussed Laos and third country aid including the formation of an international
force. (JCS 2339/166, December 19; National Archives and Records Administration, RG
218, JCS Files)
/3/These telegrams have not been further identified.
Main discussion centered on question of surfacing infiltration evidence. Our feeling is that
press both here and in Saigon now accepts increased infiltration as fact but that formal
GVN/US release could be misinterpreted and become vehicle undesirable speculation.
Accordingly, we believe we should handle this in two ways:
a. General background briefings both here and in Saigon should continue to indicate
infiltration has increased without getting into specifics.
b. If Saigon continues to be pressed for more precise information, but in response to such
pressure rather than on our initiative, Saigon could have one or more deep background
sessions with American press to indicate general nature and thrust of information now
available. Such backgrounders should draw on Cooper presentation as revised/4/
emphasizing 1964 increase rather than revision estimates for earlier years, and should
avoid specific numbers game except as tentative orders of magnitude and should stress
that picture constantly being adjusted to reflect latest information some of which
necessarily subject considerations military security. In other words, we would be seeking
to get general picture into survey stories such as Grose article of November 1/5/ rather
than as spot news commanding wide attention. FYI: We would anticipate senior officials
here will testify to Congress this subject perhaps in late January and would then give as
specific figures as possible stressing that they are estimates and in response to
Congressional inquiry. End FYI.
/4/On December 4, Cooper had sent to William Bundy a memorandum attaching a
summary statement and detailed discussion of Viet Cong infiltration, a list of questions
and answers that could be used in connection with its release, an explanation of past low
estimates, and a list of supporting evidence. On December 9, Bundy attached Cooper's
presentation to memoranda to Rusk, McNamara, McCone, McNaughton, Ball, and

McGeorge Bundy. Cooper's and Bundy's memoranda are in Department of State, Central
Files, POL 27 VIET S. The attached four documents have not been found.
/5/For text, see The New York Times, November 2, 1964, p. 1
Saigon 1866/6/ received after meeting concluded. In view above decision on formal
infiltration briefing, we accept your judgment resumption your periodic background
meetings now desirable. It remains important, however, to avoid sensitive areas and even
generalized discussion of plans related to infiltration problem. We believe line should be
that we obviously concerned this problem but that any discussion specific actions not
useful. Our impression here is that knowledgeable press now simply assumes we are
doing more but fully accepts that we are not talking about it. Naturally you could use your
own discretion in discussions GVN political situation and on plans for action within SVN.
/6/Telegram 1866, December 19, reported that relations with the press in Vietnam had
improved in recent months, but failure to provide information on infiltration either in
briefings or at backgrounders would jeopardize the situation. (Department of State,
Re Vientiane 904 and Bangkok 798/7/ both posts should take cue from Saigon on
information given to RTG and RLG. Saigon should inform in advance when and if
background sessions scheduled to permit simultaneous oral handling in other posts but
avoiding transmission written document.
/7/In these telegrams, December 16 and 19, respectively, the Embassies reported that they
had received Cooper's report on infiltration and wanted to present copies of it to local
officials. (Ibid., POL 27-3 LAOS-VIET N and POL 23-7 VIET S)
Ball

Limdis. Repeated to CIA, the Department of Defense, the White House, London, Paris,
Vientiane, Bangkok, Phnom Penh, and CINCPAC. Received at 9:20 a.m.
1870. CINCPAC for POLAD. Embtel 1869./2/ Alex Johnson and I immediately saw
Huong this morning while General Throckmorton and General Moore went to JGS to
persuade military group to hold up on press conference scheduled for 0900./3/
/2/Telegram 1869, December 20, 2 p.m., reported that a newly-formed Military Council
had met late on December 19 and decided to dissolve the High National Council. Huang
and Suu were informed about 2 a.m. on December 20, but Khanh, who had agreed to
inform Taylor, failed to do so. (113id.)
/3/Reports on this meeting were transmitted in MACV 005, 200520Z, and 008, 200750Z.
(Washington National Records Center, RG 319, HQDA Message Center, Reel 12056)
Briefly Prime Minister had no information beyond that he had been given when Khanh
and the ten Young Turks called on him at 2:00 a.m. this morning to inform him of the
action that had been taken and to ask that he remain as Prime Minister. He said that he
was not asked to nor did he concur in dissolution of High National Council (although he
told us he agreed that there were some problems with its composition) and told military
delegation he would only remain if military did not constitute itself as a "state within a
state," if the authority of the state were respected by all, and if those arrested who were
not Communists would be released in due course. He said the military group had told him
that Chief of State had accepted what they had done but the officers asked that if Chief of
State did resign Huong also take over Suu's position in addition to remaining PM. Huong
indicated his belief that although Chief of State was very weak and "soft" it was
preferable that he remain but that if he did leave, Huong would be willing to accept the
position if the military would truly support civilian government. He asked for our advice
as to what he should do and that we should make clear to the military our view on
the proper role of the military with respect to a civilian government. In reply to my
questions he said he was not really sure who controlled the military, he felt the "Young
Turks" were loyal to him but he had a question about Khanh and agreed that Khanh was
perhaps not in real control.
I said that I was not able to give him any advice until I had talked to the military group
and had a better idea of what had happened. I would do this and get in touch with him
later in the day. Meanwhile I observed that he seemed to have preserved his freedom of
action and therefore was in a strong position to impose the conditions under which he
would be willing to remain as Prime Minister. I also thought it important the government
get out some statement later today.
Immediately upon our return from seeing Huong we met at the Embassy with Ky
(VNAF), Thieu (IV Corps), Thi (I Corps), and Cang also accompanied by General
Throckmorton, General Moore and General Rowland./4/
/4/The meeting took place from 12:09 to 1:25, and the Embassy transmitted a summary of
it as an enclosure to airgram A-493, December 24. (Department of State, Central Files,
POL 27 VIET S; published in Declassified Documents, 1978, 433D) For other
descriptions of this meeting, see Taylor, Swords and Plowshares, pp. 330-331; Ky,
Twenty Years, pp. 53-55; and Johnson, Right Hand of Power, pp. 418-419.
Recalling my conversations with them immediately following my return from Washington
on the importance of government stability I very forcefully expressed my disappointment
in the action they had taken, made it clear they had jeopardized US support in everything
they had been seeking and asked for their explanations.
Ky acting as spokesman gave long involved explanation revolving around point that
action had been designed to remove disruptive elements in High National Council and
allegedly strengthen unity. Only concrete point of complaint was the HNC had intervened
in matter of officer retirements which designed to promote unity in armed forces. Took
position that having taken action military now withdraw and return power to civilians,
giving to Suu the legislative powers formerly exercised by HNC and especially the task of
preparing for assembly elections. In response to my questions they alleged that Military
Council was advisory only to General Khanh as C in C and that decisions were in fact
taken by General Khanh.
I pointed out that they had in fact usurped power which had been transferred to HNC and
government last August 27 and all the world would interpret action simply as military
coup. They had destroyed charter and whole basis for orderly development of government
started last August 27 and which had so greatly encouraged US and rest of world. If
Huong and Suu remained in office under these conditions it would make a mockery of
civilian government, it being obvious they remaining only at sufferance of military and at
best were military puppets subject to removal any time military displeased with them.
Having now taken this action they had to accept responsibility and could not just wash
their hands to [of] the affair and say it was up to the civilians to straighten it out. I
strongly urged that they seek some way of walking [taking] back their statement of the
dissolution of the High National Council and cancel press conference scheduled for this
afternoon or if they unwilling to do this at least retain flexibility of action and not slam
doors. If they did not make claim of having dissolved HNC perhaps some way might be
worked out salvage the mess into which they have gotten themselves.
They seemed somewhat impressed and left to see Khanh.
I asked them to make an appointment for me with Khanh for 3 p.m. with whom they were
lunching. Khanh called later and alleged inability to see me at that time because of press
conference which he said had to take place. Thus I have not seen Khanh on this subject up
to present moment.
Taylor

Limdis. Repeated to CIA, the Department of Defense, the White House, London, Paris,
Vientiane, Bangkok, Phnom Penh, and CINCPAC. Received at 9:19 a.m.
1874. CINCPAC for POLAD. Embtel 1870./2/ Alex Johnson and I have just again seen
Prime Minister Huong./3/ Deputy Prime Minister Vien was also with him. He said no one
from the military had contacted him since the 2:00 a.m. call on him last night reported
reftel. However, Huong had seen Chief of State Suu and they had decided that it was
important for both of them to remain with the Chief of State taking over the legislative
functions of the High National Council and the government taking on preparations for the
formation of the assembly. They would thus stay on provided that there were a solemn
undertaking by the military, confirmed by secret vote of each General, not again to
"interfere in civilian affairs".
/2/Supra.
/3/The meeting took place at 4:30 p.m.

I outlined my conversation with the four Generals (reftel), pointing out that in spite of my
urgings on them, as well as on Khanh, they had nevertheless just held a press conference
(Embtel 1871)/4/ at which, also in spite of my urgings, they had formally announced by a
"Military Council Decree No. 1" the dissolution of the HNC. I said that it seemed to me
the Prime Minister had only two choices, either to accept the action of the military or to
denounce it. If he accepted the completely illegal action of the Military Council, situation
would clearly be one of military dictatorship with only a civilian facade. Obviously his
government would have no power and would be operating only in the shadow of the
military. This would present us with an entirely new situation and I could not predict the
attitude of my government. However, it could certainly jeopardize the possibility of our
continued support, including everything I had discussed following my recent return from
Washington. It was impossible for me to see how govt could accept the validity of a
"decree" by the Military Council. (It was evident that up to this time neither he nor Vien
had focused on the fact that the Military Council had issued what purported to be a decree
and finally were impressed by the problem this presented.)
/4/Telegram 1871, December 20, 5 p.m., transmitted the text of Military Council Decree
No. 1. (Department of State, Central Files, POL 15 VIET S) The text of the proclamation
read at the press conference was transmitted in telegram 1872 from Saigon. (Ibid.)
I said that it seemed to me that he was in a strong position to exact conditions from the
military, and that as a price for remaining in office he should do so. I suggested that these
conditions should be:
1. That he not accept the legality of the Military Council decree purporting to dissolve the
HNC; in rejecting it, he might use some face-saving words about the favorable intentions
of the Generals.
2. That he agree in consultation with Suu, Vinh (Vice President of HNC) and Huyen
(HNC member who seems to be respected by the military) to revamp the membership of
the HNC (or an analogous committee under a different name).
3. That military immediately release to the custody of the government all prisoners they
had taken; and
4. That there be a specific undertaking by the military to support his government,
including a willingness to participate in it and share responsibility by accepting a Cabinet
post, such as Ministry of Defense.
Huong and Vien agreed to these conditions, expressed intention of immediately seeing
Khanh and then having a Cabinet meeting later this evening. They will promptly inform
us of results. I told them they could say bluntly to Khanh and the military that we have
lost confidence in either a true military dictatorship or a military dictatorship behind the
facade of a civilian government and under such circumstances there was real doubt USG
could continue support SVN.
Will report further developments soonest./5/
/5/At 10:06 a.m. on December 20, the Department of State transmitted a flash telegram
drafted by William Bundy which reads: "Entirely agree with line you are taking. We are
following closely." (Telegram 1313 to Saigon; ibid.)
Taylor

Saigon, December 20, 1964-11 p.m.
Repeated to the Department of Defense, CIA, the White House, and JCS. Received at
2:43 p.m.
1877. For Secretary Rusk. DOD for McNamara. White House for Bundy. CIA for
McCone. JCS for Wheeler. At the end of an active day, it may be well to record a few
personal impressions of the events which began in the middle of the night of 19-20
December and which are still in progress. It is fairly clear that the Generals had been
developing for some time a growing antipathy for certain members of the HNC because
they were considered hostile to the interests of the armed forces or because they were
partisans of Big Minh or for both reasons. Apparently it was the opposition of the HNC to
the retirement proposal (Embtels 1857 and 1858)/2/ which would have ousted Minh from
active service which brought matter to a head. There seems to have been some
unexplained feeling of urgency that action had to be taken last night "to avoid a mutiny in
the armed forces" as one of the Young Turks described the situation to us. In the
background, there was also the impatience with civilian politicians which is constantly on
the lips of the military.
/2/Telegram 1857, December 19, reported on a conversation between Taylor and Huong
on the draft administrative retirement order. Telegram 1858, also December 19, described
a conversation with Suu on the retirement proposal. (Ibid., POL 1 VIET S)
The action taken against the HNC and the round-up of some of its members along with
certain offending politicians seem to have received the approval of all (or a vast majority)
of the Council of the Armed Forces which. in turn. includes most of the influential
Generals. However, its authors did not look much beyond the pleasure of striking at their
civilian adversaries and certainly gave no serious consideration to the consequences which
they are now beginning to perceive with some dismay. Apparently they had hoped to
break the political crockery and then retire to the more congenial task of fighting the VC.
How to continue the work of the HNC in forming the national assembly without a HNC
was considered only to the extent of hoping to pass the responsibility to Chief of State
Suu who, everyone knows, is utterly incapable of discharging this responsibility even with
extensive staff assistance. One may suspect that the Generals are trying to build up Suu's
powers because of the ease of manipulating him.
Suu certainly not capable of resisting the military; Huong is capable only with strong US
encouragement. At the outset of our meeting this evening (Embtel 1874),/3/ he was quite
prepared to accept the fait accompli presented by the Generals and stay in office pro bono
publico until Alex Johnson and I pointed out some of the implications. It was Armed
Forces Council Decree No. 1 announcing the dissolution of the HNC which Huong only
saw as we arrived which convinced him of the need of some kind of understanding with
the military before agreeing to remain in office.
/3/Supra.
Another outstanding point in the situation is that the Generals have felt no reluctance in
acting without consultation with US representatives and in disregarding our advice on
important matters once we became aware of developments. I specifically asked Khanh to
put off a press conference if possible or, if one were held, to avoid reference to the
dissolution of the HNC. Nevertheless, the conference was held and Armed Forces Council
Decree No. 1 was issued. Perhaps most serious of all is the deliberate disregard of the
message which I brought from Washington and personally transmitted to most of these
Generals that continued and increased US aid for SVN depended upon governmental
stability and evidence of national unity. We are not yet clear as to whether Khanh has lost
control of the "Young Turks" or is using them to his own ends.
As I see it at this moment, we are faced with four possibilities:
a. Huong, despite our advice, may agree to continue in office without obtaining adequate
concessions from the Generals. In this case, he will be the prisoner of the Generals and
thus his government unable to speak with any authority or to cooperate effectively with us
in the prosecution of the war. Every governmental official will be looking over his
shoulder to see if the military headsman is watching him.
b. Huang may attempt to impose conditions on the military for his remaining in office, fail
and resign. Suu may then persuade some civilian politicians to form a new government
but it would be even more impotent than Huong under the situation of subparagraph a.
above.
c. Huong may resign and the military may move in and reestablish a military dictatorship
such as existed up to last August. If Khanh were the head, the government would have
little chance of improving on Khanh's former sorry performance. Under another General,
we might hope for better things--depending on the General. After flaunting US advice in
the present circumstances, any military government is likely to give us even greater
problems--if the Generals get away with it this time.
d. Huong may make his conditions stick with the Generals. This will be good news and
the ensuing government will be worth a serious try.
As the tenor of the foregoing analysis indicates, I can see good only in the last possibility
and will do everything possible to realize it. If any of the other developments occur, we
will have to give serious consideration to some shock treatment to restore a sense of
responsibility to the leadership of this unhappy land.
Taylor
454. Memorandum of a Conversation Between the Ambassador in Vietnam (Taylor)

and the Commander in Chief of the Vietnamese Armed Forces (Khanh), Saigon,
December 21, 1964, 10:30 a.m./1/
/1/Source: National Defense University, Taylor Papers, T-272-69. Secret. U. Alexis
Johnson, the only other participant, presumably prepared this record. The source text
indicates the meeting took place at Khanh's office at the JGS. For other accounts of the
meeting, see Taylor, Swords and Plowshares, p. 331, and Johnson, Right Hand of Power,
p. 418.
SUBJECT
December 20 Armed Forces Council Action against High National Council
(Following is a more complete account than that contained in Embassy telegram 1881/2/
of the foregoing conversation based on notes made at the time by Mr. Johnson. It was
from these same notes that the conversation was recounted to Prime Minister Huong
immediately following the meeting with General Khanh.)/3/
/2/Telegram 1881, December 21, transmitted a summary of this conversation.
/3/Taylor reported on his conversation with Huong, which immediately followed that with
Khanh, in telegram 1880 from Saigon, December 21. Among other things, Taylor told
him that he had received word from Washington agreeing entirely with the position that
he had taken with both men. (Ibid.)
We met General Khanh in his office at the JGS at 10:30 a.m., December 21. He was
alone. The conversation was entirely in French. As usual, General Khanh had a large pad
with him and, on occasion, took notes during the conversation. General Khanh was very
self-possessed and the atmosphere throughout was very calm, matter of fact and
straightforward.
Ambassador Taylor opened the conversation by asking who was responsible for the action
of December 20, recalling that the previous day the four Generals had stated that the
Armed Forces Council was only advisory to Khanh and that the final responsibility was
his./4/
/4/Regarding Taylor's meeting with the Generals, see Document 451.
General Khanh replied that it was "a decision of the Army", a decision by all of the
Armed Forces Council including himself--"It is not my Army". He said that it was not
only his decision but that of everyone else. However, "I am responsible--je suis
responsable." He said that as Commander-in-Chief he must listen when the great majority
of the officers express their opinion. The decision was taken to "limit the deterioration of
the situation". Under the Charter, the High National Council had only two missions--that
is, to act as the legislative branch during the interim and to provide for the formation of a
National Assembly. It had exceeded its authority.
Ambassador Taylor asked what was the authority for taking action against the High
National Council. General Khanh replied, "Those fellows in the Council are not good-ces
yens ne vent pas bons", citing Quyen as a Communist. General Khanh then referred to the
proposed retirement of the nine generals and other officers and said that "Mirth's people"
in the High National Council had opposed this. This was an "unconstitutional" act by the
High National Council. Now that the matter has been taken care of, "We will return to our
position". Suu had been given the responsibility for the legislative functions of the High
National Council and, if necessary, Suu could form a Committee of Lawyers (Conseiller
des Juristes) to assist him. However, there was little in fact to be done as the laws for the
election of the National Assembly were already completed.
Ambassador Taylor then asked whether this meant the re-entry of the Army into politics
to which General Khanh replied that, "It would remain in its role--reste dans son role".
Ambassador Taylor then inquired as to whether the Armed Forces Council replaces the
High National Council to which General Khanh replied that the Armed Forces Council
was not the MRC. After taking this "sole" decision, it returns to its military role.
Ambassador Taylor inquired as to whether General Khanh thought the Government could,
in fact, govern after the events of December 20. The Ambassador recalled his
conversations following his return from his last trip to Washington on the importance of
stability in the government and having a loyal ally with whom we could work with
confidence. He did not feel that the act of December 20 was consistent with this. In effect,
there would be a civilian facade with the military shadow hanging over them. It would be
difficult, if not impossible, for us to cooperate with such a setup. General Khanh replied
that loyalty was a reciprocal matter and that Vietnam was not a vassal of the United
States.
Ambassador Taylor said that he could not but say that he had lost confidence in General
Khanh. General Khanh replied that the Ambassador should keep to his place as
Ambassador and, as Ambassador, it was really not appropriate for him to be dealing in
this way with the Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces on a political matter nor was
it appropriate for him to have summoned some of his Generals to the Embassy yesterday.
Ambassador Taylor replied that General Khanh had faced him with a fait accompli
without even the courtesy of informing him until long after it was all over. General Khanh
replied that he had not wanted to disturb the Ambassador during the middle of the night
and had informed "Colonel Miller", asking that he inform the Ambassador. The
Ambassador said that informing "Colonel Miller" was not informing him. General Khanh
finally appeared to admit that he should have taken better steps earlier to inform the
Ambassador.
General Khanh then said, "I am ready to quit." He asked the Ambassador whether he
thought this would be helpful in the situation to which the Ambassador replied in the
affirmative. He indicated that he was thinking of possibly taking command of a Corps or
retiring from the Army and becoming a civilian. What would the Ambassador think of
that? The Ambassador replied that this was entirely a matter between General Khanh and
his government, but that he saw no objection if, as a civilian living in the country, Khanh
was loyally supporting the government. The Ambassador said that he had previously
heard that General Khanh was thinking of taking a trip abroad--did he have any thought of
this--to which General Khanh replied in the negative. General Khanh then referred to
Diem saying the U.S. had not been very "loyal" to him. The Ambassador replied that
some Americans may have perhaps done things that they had no authority to do.
General Khanh then indicated that he was attracted by the thought of leaving the country
and asked what our views would be if "his generals" did not agree, or the Prime Minister
would not accept his resignation. The Ambassador said these were entirely matters
between him and his government.
General Khanh asked how long he had to reach a decision to which the Ambassador
replied that he was certainly not setting any time limits and felt that General Khanh should
give serious consideration to a prompt resolution of the problem that had been created. As
we left, he again referred to the possibility of leaving the country and said that he would
get in touch with the Ambassador./5/
/5/Following the meeting, Taylor reported that Khanh was prepared to step down and
asked for funds to allow him to travel. (Telegram 1890 from Saigon, December 22;
Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 VIET S) The Department of State agreed that
Taylor should accept Khanh's offer (telegram 1321 to Saigon, December 22; ibid.), but its
telegram informing Taylor crossed with another Taylor message stating that General
Khanh was reconsidering his offer to step down. (Telegram 1897 from Saigon, December
22; ibid.)

Drafted by William Bundy, cleared with Westmoreland and McNaughton, and initialed by
Rusk. Repeated to CINCPAC.
1319. State/Defense Message. Continue to believe line you are following entirely sound.
We have talked over situation with Westmoreland and throw out following possible ideas
for bringing military back into line and at same time making gestures that would ensure
their support for Huong both basically and against possible Buddhist threat. We naturally
continue to rely on your discretion whether or how any of these ideas should be applied.
1. Appears important that Huong himself get credit for dismissing Khanh and
Westmoreland thinks such action would probably have favorable reception among most
senior officers particularly Young Turks.
2. Perhaps even before announcing such action Huong might consult with members
Armed Forces Council collectively or individually and indicate that he seeking their
advice on appointment of successor, making clear that decision must be his and that
officer appointed must necessarily have full powers as commander-in-chief.
(Westmoreland believes Council members accept necessity basic unity of command and
avoidance any semblance committee decision as opposed to advisory function to
commander-in-chief.)
3. Hopefully such discussion might produce consensus on candidate. As we understand it,
Ky has indicated to Westmoreland his own preference stick with Air Force and has told
Westmoreland natural leader might be Thieu. However, latter is Catholic and Dai Viet,
and appointment might give Buddhists issue. Our judgment is that Thi less stable than Ky
himself, and Westmoreland suggests Dong or Co as possible dark horses, who have
avoided involvement in politics. Criteria would appear to be most complete possible
acceptance by senior officers but also not giving Buddhists any easy issue. We gather Ky
not popular with Buddhists but suppose that would be equally true of any general
prepared to act firmly in support of Huong Government.
4. Huong might express willingness, after new commander-in-chief appointed to discuss
disposition of senior officers and to assure proper system for promotions and
appointments throughout armed forces. He might offer handle question of senior officers
by review of individual cases and possibly by retiring some to accept appropriate senior
civilian government positions for which they qualified.
5. Above possible actions would all be aimed at strengthening Huong's personal position,
which seems cardinal objective, while at same time meeting all reasonable desires senior
generals.
In effect above steps would be aimed at compensating Armed Forces Council for
rescinding decree about HNC. Questions of replacing some HNC members and of their
release are separate but might of course become integral parts of total package.
Rusk

Exdis. Drafted by Forrestal and William Bundy, cleared with McNaughton, and initialed
by Rusk. Repeated to CINCPAC.
1320. In support of your efforts to persuade military at least partially undo damage
Saturday's/2/ actions, we have also been considering possible leverage we might apply in
the event you concluded it was necessary.
/2/December 19.
If dispute continues unresolved, most obvious action might be withholding approval any
pending US assistance actions and letting this become known. You are in best position
evaluate whether these would impress generals or conversely hurt Huong's position. In
addition, following steps aimed more specifically at military have occurred to us:
1. Suspend Operation Barrel Roll. We not clear whether this would have significant effect
on attitude of generals, and whether they are aware of our operations and value them at
least psychologically. We also concerned suspension might give wrong signal to Hanoi.
On other hand, publicity or aircraft loss under present circumstances might have adverse
effects both here and in Saigon. Since next operation not scheduled until 24 December
would appreciate your comments for further review this possibility. Obviously, any action
in this connection should not be discussed with generals since this might imply
commitment to resume or increase if they behave.
2. Instruct all or selected corps and division advisors make known [to] their counterpart
our dissatisfaction with blow by military at structure civilian government, perhaps
suspending for the time being further contacts with their counterparts.
3. Stand down temporarily Farmgate.
4. Suspend logistical airlift where critical supply shortages do not exist.
On balance, we inclined believe none except possibly first and second steps would
produce desired results. Obviously any would hamper over-all war effort, especially if
continued for very long.
We have also considered and rejected possibility of cutting essential POL and direct
military supplies. Similarly, we do not favor suspension or interruption CPI, since it
would primarily affect civilian confidence in Huong Government.
We are prepared consider any other suggestions which Mission may have on means of
bringing home to Armed Forces Council necessity of restoring reality of civilian
government.
Rusk

/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 VIET S. Confidential; Priority.
Repeated to CIA, the Department of Defense, the White House and CINCPAC. Received
at 7:43 a.m.
1895. CINCPAC for POLAD. FYI. Following is text of a statement which is being made
available to MACV advisors and other Mission personnel to use as background for
discussions of recent events in Saigon and USG position. MACV advisors down to
division level are being encouraged to initiate discussions in their discretion. Sector
advisors will use it to respond to discussions initiated by their counterparts. Zorthian is
using text as basis for background statement at this evening's press conference:
The United States Govt appreciates the motives which led to the actions that were taken
by the Armed Forces Council last Sunday but feels that the consequences were not fully
appreciated. The armed forces gained much credit and stature, not only in Vietnam but
throughout the world, by their statesmanlike decision of last August to provide for an
orderly transfer of power to a civilian govt and an orderly method of establishing that govt
and its institutions. While progress in establishing that govt and preparing the way for a
national assembly had not been perfect nor satisfactory to everyone, the record was very
creditable and unique in the history of Vietnam. All of the friends of Vietnam were much
encouraged and, as the Ambassador of the United States has publicly stated, the United
States was prepared to move forward with additional help for Vietnam, including help in
dealing with the problem of infiltration from the North.
Although it is realized that this was probably not the intent, the action that was taken last
Sunday was immediately and understandably interpreted by all the world as another
military coup, setting back all that had been accomplished since last August and again
demonstrating the political instability of Vietnam and raising serious question as to the
reliability of Vietnam as an ally. It is inescapable conclusion that if a group of military
officers could issue decisions abolishing one of the three fundamental organs of the
governmental structure, that is, the High National Council, and carry out military arrests
of- citizens, that group of military officers has clearly set themselves above and beyond
the structure of government in Vietnam.
Even though those officers might profess that they would not do the same thing again, the
fact is that there would be nothing to prevent their similarly seeking to change the Prime
Minister or the Chief of State. Thus, even though the armed forces have expressed their
support of the Prime Minister and the Chief of State, these civilian officials would have
no real power, nor would they be able to speak authoritatively for Vietnam. They and
other govts with which they are dealing would always be conscious of the fact that they
are holding office only at the sufferance of the military and are subject to removal at any
time by them. Thus in fact two govts would be set up, a civilian govt acting simply as a
facade with no real authority with a "government" of military officers hovering over them
at all times. There would thus be the image of a puppet govt under the domination of
military leaders who had no real responsibility but who actually exercised the power.
As far as the United States is concerned, this would present a most difficult situation for
the United States Government which would not know where to find the authoritative
voice of Vietnam. The United States would not be able to rely on the commitments of the
civilian government and thus would not have an effective government with which it could
deal on the host of matters of common interest. The United States reps in Vietnam are
naturally concerned over the situation which has arisen and are seeking ways to assist in
finding an honorable solution.
Taylor

/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 23-9 VIET S. Confidential; Flash;
Limdis. Repeated to CIA, the Department of Defense, the White House, and CINCPAC.
Received at 10:14 a.m.
1900. Embtel 1896./2/ From reftel and subsequent tels it is evident Khanh has thrown
down gauntlet.
/2/Telegram 1396, December 22, 3 p.m., transmitted the text of a statement which Khanh
had read over Radio Vietnam at 7 p.m. and had circulated in Vietnamese, French, and
English. The statement gave his reasons for the dissolution of the High National Council
and included the following phrases:
"We make sacrifices for the country's independence and the Vietnamese people's liberty,
but not to carry out the policy of any foreign country."
"All of us are determined to fulfill our duty as the sons of our time. Better to live poor but
proud as free citizens of an independent country rather than in ease and shame as slaves of
the foreigners and Communists." (Ibid., POL 27 VIET S)
In order immediately dissuade him from any illusion that he can turn this into personal
vendetta between myself or Embassy and himself, strongly urge that Dept issue formal
statement, if possible at noon briefing, drawn heavily from background statement
contained Embtel 1895./3/ Hope such statement could also be given heavy play by VOA.
/3/Supra.
Taylor

/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Vietnam Country File, Vol. XXIV,
Cables. Secret; Flash; Exdis. Drafted by Forrestal. Repeated to the Department of
Defense, CIA, and the White House. Rusk's Appointment Book shows that he met with
William Bundy and Forrestal at 11:22 a.m. and 12:40 p.m., and with Forrestal alone at
1:10 p.m., presumably to discuss the drafting of this telegram. (Ibid.)
1324. From Secretary for Ambassador. Your 1900/2/ received too late for us to arrange
for statement at noon briefing, particularly since President and SecDef are in Texas, and I
feel that on a matter of this importance there must be full consultation.
/2/Supra.
I expect, however, that by the end of the day we will be able to send you by flash telegram
a draft of a statement which we could put out here and which could be carried by VOA
during the day in Saigon./3/
I badly need your advice on several points which I feel have to be considered in charting
our future course.
1. What is your best judgment as to the support Khanh can mobilize among his military
colleagues? Westmoreland and Ambassador Khiem have indicated that Khanh's position
is weak, but under the existing circumstances, we need to be as sure as we can of degree
of significant military support he may have been able to muster.
2. Who are the most likely candidates to replace Khanh and what do we expect would be
their relationship with political groups in Vietnam, with the Huong Government and with
ourselves?
3. We must attempt downplay personality issue between USG and Khanh which risks
coalescing anti-US sentiment Should we not measure all our steps in terms of encouraging
unity among the Vietnamese, stating that this is the main objective of U.S. policy. That
unity can best be achieved by a process of consultation among the important political
groups, including the military, so as to restore effective government commanding broad
support where no one group dictates to the others.
I should like to emphasize, as I see it, that political unity within the South Vietnamese
leadership is the utterly fundamental object of our policy and a basic condition for any
prospect of success in South Vietnam. Every step, whether concerning the future of a
particular South Vietnamese personality or otherwise, should be measured by its effect
upon strengthening or weakening unity. There are several circumstances which could face
us with the elementary decision as to our role in South Vietnam. But, because of the farreaching consequences of any such decision, we must do our best to create circumstances
in which that issue does not arise. I wish to compliment you on the vigor with which you
have pursued this issue of unity since your return from Washington. I would much
appreciate any further thoughts you have on the relation between this present crisis and
the issue of unity.
I shall be available this afternoon and evening, and you may wish to arrange a telecon in
the early morning your time for further discussion.
Rusk
460. Telegram from the Embassy in Vietnam to the Department of State/1/

/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 15 VIET S. Secret; Flash; Exdis.
Repeated to CIA, the Department of Defense, and the White House. Received at 6:01 a.m.
1915. For Secretary from Ambassador. Deptel 1324./2/ This cable responds to questions 1
and 2 of reftel. Since his collapse before the Buddhist pressures last August, Khanh's
standing with his military colleagues has been low. On several occasions, they would have
dropped him except for the understanding that he had U.S. support.
/2/Supra.
His position now is somewhat different. Insofar as the current issues are concerned he
seems to have the full support of the 20 Generals of the Council of the Armed Forces who
include the "Young Turks" and the corps commanders who accept responsibility with him
for the illegal acts of December 20. Since they are all out on the same limb, that
uncomfortable position imposes considerable unity in the ranks. Khanh is smart and will
try to hold them in line by using anti-American themes and reminding them how offended
they have been by U.S. disapproval of their actions. However, in the long run, he will
probably fail to retain their support because of the normal tendency to bickering and
disunity within any VN group and because of his personal unpopularity with most of the
Generals.
As to likely candidates to replace Khanh, I can only mention a few who seem to us the
best qualified. General Nguyen Huu Co, now commanding II Corps, seems to be an able
soldier who commands the respect of the Vietnamese and Americans close to him. So far
as we can see, he has thus far stayed clear of politics. General Pham Van Dong has
handled himself very well in his sensitive assignment as CG, Capital Military District, and
has the confidence of Prime Minister Huong. Although one of the oldest and most senior
officers in length of service, he works closely with the Young Turks. General Nguyen
Van Thieu, commanding IV Corps, is usually included in our list of possible candidates.
He has had wide experience including that of Chief of Staff, Armed Forces and I know
General Westmoreland thinks well of his military ability. However, he has two political
strikes on him--he is a Catholic and a Dai Viet, hence a target for the Buddhists.
I am not putting Big Minh on the list. Even if he were not lazy and generally incompetent,
he is too controversial a figure in the officer corps to consider for Commander-in-Chief.
With regard to their relationships to the political groups, Dong is not liked by the
turbulent elements of the Buddhists or of the students because of his execution of the
orders of Huong to put down demonstrations. Thieu would have the disadvantages cited
above. I do not know of any political counts against Co.
Of the three, I believe that Huong knows only Dong and likes him. I have no reason to
believe that Co and Dong could not work well with the Huong government. However,
Thieu, having many of Khanh's characteristics, would have much greater difficulty.
As to desirability from U.S. point of view, General Throckmorton, speaking for MACV,
would rate the three in this order: Co, Dong, Thieu. If General Westmoreland is still
available, I suggest you get his personal opinion.
Before signing off, I must point out that, while Khanh is definitely dispensable, no officer
in the RVNAF stands out like a light as his possible successor. Any choice will involve
some risk as we will never fully know his capability and limitations until we try him. In
any event, the choice will by no means be entirely with us.
Taylor

/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 VIET S. Secret; Priority; Nodis.
Transmitted as telegram 1916 from Saigon, which is the source text. According to another
copy, the telegram was drafted by Taylor. (National Defense University, Taylor Papers,
T-157-69) Telegram 1916 was received in the Department of State at 8:33 a.m.
Embtel 1826./2/ As you have seen from our recent cables, we are in the midst of another
first-class governmental crisis in Saigon. The infighting is going on on three fronts: the
govt versus the Generals, the Generals versus the US Ambassador and the Buddhists
versus the govt.
/2/Document 447.
On the first front, negotiations are now in progress between PriMin Huong and General
Khanh to find way to patch up the situation precipitated by the acts of the Generals on
December 20 in undertaking to abolish the High National Council and in arresting some
22 officials and politicians. We are urging Huong to drive a hard bargain with the
military, insisting at a minimum on refusing to recognize the validity of the abolition of
the High National Council, on the release of the political prisoners to the govt and on a
public declaration of support by the Generals for Huong govt and statement of their
willingness to cooperate with and participate in it if requested. At the moment Khanh is
insisting on acceptance of the abolition of the High National Council and is acting as if he
intended to hold the prisoners hostage until the govt gives in. I am doing my best to keep
Huong bucked up but it is hard to put starch into him because he believes the Buddhist
threat is his foremost problem and thus feels he cannot afford to alienate the military at
this time. I have assured him that he has an important trump in his ability to threaten
resignation if his conditions are not met. I have the feeling that General Khanh and the
other Generals are most anxious to keep him in office and have no satisfactory
replacement for him.
With regard to the Generals versus the Ambassador, the former are acting greatly
offended by my disapproval of their recent actions privately expressed to four of their
number/3/ and resent our efforts to strengthen the Huong govt against their pressures. One
unfortunate effect of our action in opposing the Generals has been to drive them closer to
Khanh who senses the opportunity to solidify his military position by pursuing an antiTaylor, anti-US line. Although it is to neither of our interests to conduct public quarrel, I
am afraid that Khanh intends to make publicly offensive statements which it will be hard
to ignore. Once the immediate heat has subsided and the Generals have reverted to a more
reasonable mood, I shall try to restore normal relations with them.
The Buddhist front has been relatively quiet. Indeed, we have received intimations they
are deliberately laying off the govt while it is being threatened by the military. Although
Huong has always suspected some collusion between Khanh and the Buddhists, our
contacts among the latter indicate nothing but dislike for him. However, the Buddhist
issue is still with us and may flare up again at any time.
In summary, we still do not know the outcome of the political events of the weekend. We
are telling Huong that he has only two choices which are acceptable: (1) To stay in office
after imposing hard conditions on the Generals or (2) to resign and force the military to
take responsibility for their actions. I am afraid he may be tempted to temporize and carry
on with the challenge of the military unanswered; but if he does so, it will be only to
postpone the showdown and will leave us with a cowed government which cannot make
decisions with any assurance of being allowed to carry them out. Particularly since such
situation would further aggrandize Khanh, who is already pretty insufferable, it would be
very difficult for us to work with such a lineup.
Taylor/4/

Repeated to CIA, the Department of Defense, the White House, and CINCPAC. Received
at 9:19 a.m.
1919. This afternoon I called on Vice Premier Vien and Chief of State Suu in that order to
discuss with them their meeting this morning with Khanh (see Embtel 1914)./2/ Vien's
account of the meeting was essentially the same as one given me by Huong with one
important exception. He anticipates that the events of the next few days will take the
following form: after three or four days Khanh, he hopes, will release the prisoners taken
over the weekend, after which the government will then reassemble the available
members of the HNC and set them to work again at their old stand in Gia Long Palace.
Thus, without any announcement, they will nullify in effect the attempt of the Generals to
abolish the HNC. At the same time, the government will announce its intention of
overhauling the membership of the Council.
/2/Telegram 1914, December 23, 6 p.m., reported that Huong had invited Taylor and
Johnson to his office to report on a meeting with Khanh held earlier in the day. Huong
indicated that the meeting had "gone very badly" but that Khanh would accept the four
conditions for Huong and Suu remaining in office (see Document 452), except for the
restoration of the High National Council. (Department of State, Central Files, POL 15
VIET S)
I told Vien that this was all very well except for the possibility that Khanh may hold the
prisoners as hostage until he gets agreement with the government to validate the actions of
the Generals. Vien agrees as to this possibility but sees no way of getting around it.
I urged that the government demand the release of the prisoners at once and if Khanh
demurs to denounce the insubordination of the Generals to the public. I doubt very much
that the Generals would enjoy being placed in this position.
Vien mentioned that the Generals were meeting again today and that he had indications
they were planning an offensive against the American Ambassador. I told him that I was
aware of these maneuvers and regretted them primarily because of the effect they would
have on U.S. relations.
After a half hour's conversation with Vien, I moved to Gia Long and talked with Chief of
State Suu. I indicated my admiration for the fortitude with which he and Huong were
facing the military challenge and assured him of U.S. support. I pointed out that to accept
dissolution of HNC by military would be to accept military intervention in the affairs of
his government, a situation which would call into question validity of the government
itself. I emphasized that it would be impossible to have two governments, one presenting
the facade, the other holding the power, and that U.S. cooperation with such a duality
would be difficult if not impossible. Finally, I reviewed the four-point position I have
been urging Huong to take with Khanh (Embtel 1874) and gave him substance of
Department's statement (Deptel 1328)./3/
/3/Telegram 1328 to Saigon, December 22, 5:33 p.m., transmitted the text of the
following statement which was being issued by the Spokesman of the Department of
State:
"Ambassador Taylor has been acting throughout with the full support of the US
Government. As we have repeatedly made clear, a duly constituted government exercising
full power on the basis of national unity, and without improper interference from any
group, is the essential condition for the successful prosecution of the effort to defeat the
Viet Cong, and is the basis of US support for that effort. This is the position Ambassador
Taylor has been expressing to Vietnamese leaders." (Ibid.)
Suu seemed to be in relatively good shape and spirits (in contrast to Huong this morning)
although as usual he was not very voluble. He expressed regret for military action and
termed it illegal. He referred to meeting earlier today with Huong, Vien and Khanh and
indicated they were seeking solution to present impasse. Suu indicated Khanh still does
not accept government position and, in effect, is using HNC prisoners as "hostages"
against retirement of senior Generals and government's acceptance of dissolution of HNC.
I suggested government could declare that it does not accept dissolution of HNC which it
regards as continuing in existence and repeated my suggestion to Vien that, if prisoners
were not released to government, the government should publicly demand their release. I
observed that Suu and Huang, perhaps, had more power than they realized, noting that
military officers would be sensitive to public charges of insubordination. Suu expressed
concern that such a position would directly confront the military. I suggested that Suu and
Huong might consider discussing the retirement issue with Khanh in the context of the
four-point position I had recommended to Huong.
In closing, I stressed again to Suu that (1) it was impossible to live with military officers
in whom one had lost confidence and (2) the impasse should not be allowed to drag on.
Taylor

Drafted by Forrestal, cleared with William Bundy and McNaughton, and initialed by
Rusk. Repeated to CIA, the Department of Defense, the White House, and CINCPAC.
1339. Transcript Secretary's press conference/2/ being relayed in wireless file. The
following represents our reflections on today's traffic, and we pass them on only for
purposes of consultation.
/2/For the transcript of Rusk's press conference, held at 11 a.m., see Department of State
Bulletin, January 11, 1965, pp. 34-39. The Secretary stressed the need for Vietnamese
unity.
Our inclination now is to avoid further statements until situation becomes more clear. We
are particularly attempting avoid contributing to personality clash between USG and
Khanh, although we realize he may indeed be committed to anti-American campaign. We
also hope that if Khanh eventually goes, it appears as much as possible to be the result of
decision of his colleagues and not ours.
We wonder whether it is wise to put too much pressure on Suu and Huong in effort to
secure early reversal of Armed Forces Council's action in disbanding HNC or publicly to
repudiate offending generals. It seems to us it is important attempt isolate Khanh, perhaps
by working on Young Turks and other generals. Realize this may take time, but we are
not sure that Huong and Suu are up to taking on military establishment by themselves.
We agree completely that rash action of military must be reversed, but we would imagine
that such reversal will have to be result of apparent compromise, perhaps by getting
Young Turks to agree that changes in membership of Council might be undertaken by
Suu.
Your assessment in Embtel 1915/3/ of potential candidates for Commander-in-Chief
agrees with ours.
/3/Document 460

Repeated to the Department of Defense and the White House.
1346. For the Ambassador from the Secretary. Following telegram/2/ gives you our latest
reaction to separate channel message on PNG possibility./3/ In further reference to
Saigon's 1930/4/ believe effort should be made to defuse issue of personalities and keep in
front the issue that effective unity among Vietnamese leaders is essential to success of
SVN effort. Personality issue as used by Khanh is false issue and we should attempt to
keep in front the basic issue of unity and an effective government whatever the formula
South Vietnamese leaders find to bring it about.
/2/Infra.
/3/Presumably reference is to cable 240442Z which described a meeting of South

Vietnamese officers on December 23 at which they decided to propose that Taylor be
declared persona non grata. (Declassified Documents, 1979,132A)
/4/Telegram 1930, December 24, 11 p.m., reported that Taylor had met with U.S. press
representatives that day and briefed them for background only on the situation in Saigon.
(Department of State, Central Files, POL 23-9)
Rusk

Drafted by William Bundy and cleared with McGeorge Bundy and Secretary Rusk.
Repeated to CIA, the Department of Defense, the White House, and CINCPAC. Also
published in Declassified Documents, 1979, 206F.
1347. Delivery to Ambassador or Deputy Ambassador in discretion of duty officer. With
reference to Ky conversation with Embassy officer reported separate channel,/2/ our first
reactions are as follows:
/2/Presumably the cable described in footnote 3, supra.
1. If Huong should in fact be presented with demand to declare you PNG, you should at
earliest opportunity advise him that you have been acting with full support of USG and
that any acceptance of such demand or hesitation in rejecting it would make it virtually
impossible for USG to continue support GVN effort. You should point out that existence
of demand bound to become known to many including US press and that atmosphere
alone would become terribly bad if he hesitated even for tactical reasons. If required you
may inform him you are giving this advice on direct orders of President.
2. If Huong nonetheless insists he must proceed with PNG action, you should tell him this
is matter of gravest importance on which two governments should be in fullest
consultation. You should stress that no such step should be discussed publicly by him and
should say that in order understand what GVN has in mind you must pose following
questions:
a. Does GVN desire to break relations between USG and GVN? If so, how do Huang and
military leaders estimate their capability if they repudiate US support? Do they have in
mind that they can win without US presence and help, or do they have in mind accepting
consequences of weakening of effort?
b. If GVN does not desire to break relationship, how does GVN think American people
could possibly be brought to support continued US effort in SVN in face PNG action
trusted ambassador who has complete confidence and indeed affection American
people?/3/
/3/At this point in the source text, the following paragraph was deleted before
transmission:
"c. If Huong still persists, you should as last resort insist that if there is any implication of
deadline in demand for PNG action, Huong must insist such deadline be removed to
permit fullest consultation."
At 12:10 p.m., December 24, Rusk had talked with McGeorge Bundy who told him that
the President agreed to paragraphs 2a and 2b, but did not want 2c sent to Taylor.
(Department of State, Rusk Files: Lot 72 D 192, Telephone Conversations)
3. At same time we detect in Ky's account of Khanh's position the continuing possibility
bulk of generals including Young Turks can still be brought around to reasonable solution
that would include restoration of HNC, possibly reconstituted, on the one hand, and on the
other hand willingness by Huong to work out problem of senior generals on some basis.
In process of working this out we would hope and expect Huong and military would in
end unite on dumping Khanh as their own decision.
4. To move toward such solution, Huong himself could offer to meet with military council
and could use all available contacts to generals other than Khanh to soften their attitudes
and get dispute off anti-US and anti-Taylor aspect and on to necessity reasonable solution
in interests national unity. Once PNG issue disposed of firmly, urgency would be reduced,
and Huong could afford a little time to bring all hands around and emerge with personal
credit for decisions and solution, which clearly vital if he is to remain.
5. At same time, suggest you use all available MACV counterpart contacts to generals.
Line stated your 1895/4/ is good starting point to extent not already used, and should be
extended to explaining in quiet way that of course USG could never accept PNG demand
but that other issues can be worked out among Vietnamese and this must be done.
Westmoreland's frequent past contacts with Ky may be particularly useful for this sort of
approach and his absence last weekend may be special asset. Seems to us that for you
personally to participate in any talks with generals would at this moment be unwise for
many reasons above all necessity that solution come from Huong.
/4/Document 457.
6. We not clear here whether Ky and other generals aware of policy line you conveyed on
your return from Washington. If not, this might now be used with them to offset any
impression of negativism on our part as reflected in Ky's remarks. They could also be told
that if government were in stable condition such VC actions as bombing of BOQ/5/
(which we should assume to be VC in absence other indications) could have been
considered as "unusual actions" within meaning your instructions/6/ and appropriate
action taken, but that this impossible under current conditions or in face any pressures to
revise carefully considered USG policies. Under present conditions American public
might even doubt VC responsibility. Same point would apply to any possible future
decision to initiate second phase. In other words, without offering anything beyond terms
of your instructions you could use these to their fullest to bring them around. Even
listening to any grievances in this broad policy area should be constructive, although of
course stress should be placed on essential stability and national unity. We recognize risk
discussions this area might be taken as implied commitment to take decisions for which
we are not ready, but believe this outweighed by necessity have frank discussions.
/5/At 6 p.m. on December 24, a bomb exploded in the Brink Hotel in Saigon, which was
being used as a bachelor officers' quarters by the United States, killing 2 and injuring 50.
/6/Document 435.
7. We have not even crossed bridges of what to do if Huong should accept PNG demand
or if generals continue implacable on issue of HNC or its equivalent or against any
reasonable solution. Obviously this would pose gravest possible questions.
8. As to possible disclosure by generals of contents your talks with Khanh and four
generals, we have reviewed record these talks. Believe line we should take both here and
in Saigon, preferably on background basis, is that you stressed that action of military
undermined basis civilian duly constituted government, however unintentionally, and
must be corrected if government to meet South Vietnamese desires and need for national
unity. If claim is made that you insulted Khanh, response should be that action and
manner in which it was taken necessarily raised question of confidence and necessary
frank relationships with those responsible, unless and until it corrected, but that issue is
one of principle and of objectives of Vietnamese themselves, not personalities.
9. You should of course avoid such actions as background briefing on increased
infiltration until situation clarifies. We are proceeding with Barrel Roll mission tonight.
10. Since above drafted, we have received your 1928 and also MACV 240448Z./7/
Former correctly handles problem in pare 8 above but could be amplified later as required.
Latter raises question whether tactics proposed pares 3-6 above as likely to succeed as we
had supposed, but we still believe this is line we must follow. Naturally, MACV contacts
could shoot down idea of Big Minh's return and also indicate that Dalat generals could be
handled. Key question is whether military would stick to position they entitled intervene
whenever they do not like what government does, and believe you have been following
best line to counter this.
/7/Telegram 1928, December 24, received in the Department of State at 9:14 a.m.,
reported on Zorthian's briefing of the foreign press in Saigon that day, during which he
stated that Taylor had not asked, requested, or ordered Khanh to give up his post or take a
trip. (Ibid., Central Files, POL 15 VIET S) Telegram 240448Z, also December 24,
received in the Department of Defense at 4:48 a.m., reported that MACV contacts with
Vietnamese officers showed they did not regard the illegality of their actions as important,
that the army was the final authority in Vietnam, that there was no alternative to Khanh,
and that the four Generals who talked to Taylor on December 20 (see Document 451)
were still smarting from that encounter. (Washington National Records Center, RG 319,
HQDA Message Center, Reel 12056)
Rusk
466. Memorandum From Edward G. Lansdale to the President's Special Assistant

for National Security Affairs (Bundy)/1/

/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Vietnam Country File, Vol. XXIV,
Memos. Personal. At this time, Lansdale was a Consultant to the White House on Food
for Peace.
SUBJECT
Vietnam
Have you considered that Dean Rusk's press statement yesterday/2/ about the Vietnamese
might be rather sound advice if applied to Americans, as well? I pass this notion along to
you as a little Christmas remembrance.
Rusk said: "What is important is unity, the setting aside of personal rivalries or lesser
issues in the interest of maintaining the strength and the unity of the country. Unity would
be worth many, many divisions."
Aside from my own case, since I don't want to have anyone mistake national interest for
self interest, isn't it about time that some of the fine do-ers among the Americans were
permitted to return to Vietnam and lend their skilled help to resolving a critical situation,
waiving "personal rivalries and lesser issues"? A Lou Conein liaisoning with a Khanh at
this moment would be worth at least one of the "many, many divisions." There are others,
known to you, such as Rufe Phillips and John Vann who have rare rapport with the
Vietnamese and whose help has been denied by fellow Americans.
It would be a wonderful and appropriate gift to the nation this Christmas season if you
could cause "good-will" among Americans making the decisions about Vietnam and open
the way past personal feelings so that some of these priceless working Americans can go
to work in Vietnam again, meaningfully.
Ed

Repeated to CIA, the Department of Defense, the White House, and CINCPAC.
Files: Lot 68 F 8) Received at 8:46 a.m.
1939. CINCPAC for POLAD. Deptel 1347; Embtel 1929; Embtel 1940./2/ The action of
General Khanh in forwarding to Huong the complaint of Generals against US Amb makes
what was initially personal vendetta of a few thin-skinned Generals major issue between
our two govts. In consultation with Alex Johnson, Westmoreland and Throckmorton, I
have decided to take action along the following lines:
/2/Telegram 1347 is printed as Document 465. Telegram 1929 from Saigon, December
24, reported that Johnson had lunch with Vien who stated that Khanh refused to release
the arrested members of the High National Council unless they were kept under house
arrest and refused to reinstate the Council. (Department of State, Central Files, POL 23-9
VIET S) Telegram 1940 from Saigon, December 25, 9 p.m., reported that Huong had
received a communication from Khanh reciting Taylor's "misdeeds" and asking Huong to
investigate them and take appropriate action. (Johnson Library, National Security File,
Vietnam Country File, Vol. XXIV, Cables) The text of the communication is published in
Declassified Documents, 1978, 433E.
To set record straight and to smooth military feathers as much as possible, I have asked
Throckmorton to see individually four Young Turk Generals with whom I met last
Sunday/3/ (Throckmorton was present) to see what aspects of this meeting are now
grievance. Some of reports we get indicate possible language misunderstanding. (For
example, it is alleged I implied regret that General Westmoreland "wasted money" to give
them dinner since they had not supported US policy.)/4/ Throckmorton is also to kill the
canard that I ever asked Khanh to resign and leave country so that "Big" Minh could be
installed in his place. I have authorized him to say that I am willing to meet with any one
or all four to clear up any misunderstanding but there is no misunderstanding involved in
my disapproval of coup and my concern over consequences.
/3/See Document 451
Foregoing action may do some good but real difficulty lies in pressures Khanh is putting
on Huong. As reported in Embtel 1929, he is refusing to give on HNC issue and is in fact
hardening his position by limiting his agreement on liberation of political prisoners taken
by army last Sunday. (Only HNC prisoners to be released and they must be kept in house
arrest.) Beyond this hard-nose attitude he has now filed his complaints against me in way
which places painful dilemma before Huong. One cannot avoid impression that Khanh
wants to force Huong to withdraw in order to get back into power on popular slogan such
as "freedom from US vassalage."
I have not seen text of Khanh's paper/5/ but will try to get copy from Huong at our next
meeting (I am seeking an appointment tomorrow). Rather than utilizing at outset authority
contained in Deptel 1347 to press him for immediate rejection, if demand is about as we
think it is, I am inclined to recommend to Huong following course of action. He and I
would agree to form an ad hoc committee consisting of rep of PriMin (hopefully Vien),
rep of General Khanh and rep of US Emb (I would nominate Alex Johnson) to look into
complaints of Generals. This course of action would have advantage of relieving PriMin
of immediate requirement to choose between offending Generals or us, of gaining time to
allow tempers to drop, moderating indignation by requiring formulation of its causes, and
offering possibility that issue might be finessed in end as result of correctable
misunderstandings. The principal disadvantage is creation of impression putting US Amb
on trial and distorted reports which are likely reach public. I am not prepared to
recommend this course until I see text of Generals' bill of particulars but would like to get
Dept's tentative reactions ASAP.
/5/The communication mentioned in footnote 2 above.
A few comments on Deptel 1347 follow as postscript to foregoing.

Word is already about town, indeed about country, of feud between Generals and Amb.
You have noted US adviser reports that Khanh has already carried war to field and is
getting petitions signed among officers of divisions demanding withdrawal of Amb
(Embtel 1934)./6/ The Emb is preparing so-called white paper enumerating events relating
to coup for possible use in rebuttal of Khanh's allegations. Our advisers in field are being
kept informed in order to spike rumors and distortions of fact.
/6/Dated December 25, 1 p.m. (Department of State, Central Files, POL 23-9 VIET S)
With regard to questions 2a and b, quick answer is that responsible leaders of GVN do not
desire to break relations with us and know they cannot win without us. However, they
cannot control Generals who for moment seem completely irresponsible. In this
recklessness they are undoubtedly urged on by Khanh who needs anti-US campaign to
stay alive. Generals who control situation could not care less about internal US problem of
retaining popular support for SVN. That is not their department.
With regard to suggestions in pare 4, Huong take on Armed Forces Council personally,
unfortunate fact is that Huong has neither moral nor physical stamina to undertake such an
assignment. He knows few of Generals personally and is very diffident in their presence.
His physical condition is matter of constant concern.
As to pare 6, Ky and other Generals are thoroughly aware of US policy line. It was in
conveying that line at now famous Westmoreland dinner on December 8 that I laid
groundwork for my falling-out with Generals. As for proper response to bombing of BOQ
under current circumstances, I shall make that subject of septel./7/
/7/Infra.
Taylor

Exdis; Ivory. Repeated to CIA, the Department of Defense, the White House, and
Embassy Files: Lot 68 F 8) Received at 9:27 a.m.
1941. CINCPAC for POLAD. The bombing of the Brink BOQ offers us opportunity to
initiate reprisal bombing if we so desire. It was major terrorist attack directed squarely at
US personnel and fact that there were only two fatalities among some 66 casualties was
providential.
If we retaliate by bombing attack on an appropriate target in DRV, probably barracks,
there are clear gains to be anticipated. Hanoi will get word that, despite our present
tribulations, there is still bite in tiger they call paper, and US stock in this part of world
will take sharp rise. Some of our local squabbles will probably disappear in enthusiasm
which our action would generate.
Other side of argument is, first, present absence of clear proof that bombing is work of
VC. A common sense view would seem to be that it is regarded as VC act unless contrary
evidence is forthcoming. An investigation is in progress and we should know outcome in
another 24 hours. We are closely watching Liberation Radio and Radio Hanoi to see
whether they give us any help by claiming credit for VC.
Another question arises as to the timeliness of initiating reprisals in view of our sorry
relations with RVNAF. I would get around this point by excluding Vietnamese from
participation and by using SEA based US aircraft for strike. We can tell our military
opposite numbers that it is kind of operation we would have liked to conduct jointly but
could not in present state of our relations.
I am withholding recommendation to execute reprisal attack pending outcome of
investigation of source of Brink bombing. This cable is sent in hope of conditioning
addressees for favorable action on such recommendation if made./2/
/2/On December 26, Admiral Sharp sent a similar telegram to the JCS, but concluded with
the specific recommendation that the Vit Thu Lu barracks in North Vietnam be attacked
as soon as possible. The attack, he said, should also be accompanied by a statement
relating it to the Brink Hotel bombing. (Telegram 262150Z; Johnson Library, National
Security File, Vietnam Country File, Vol. XXV, Cables)
Taylor

/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 23-9 VIET S. Top Secret; Immediate;
Exdis. Drafted by William Bundy and cleared with Rusk, Vance, and McGeorge Bundy.
Repeated to the Office of the Secretary of Defense, the White House, and CINCPAC.
1355. State-Defense message. Embtels 1939, 1940, and 1941, and two messages by
separate channel./2/
/2/Telegrams 1939 and 1941 are printed as Documents 467 and 468. Regarding telegram
1940, see footnote 2, Document 467. One of the two messages was CIA telegram
2503225Z which reflected the moderation shown by Khanh and summarized in telegram
1355. (Declassified Documents, 1979, 312B) The other message has not been identified.
1. If document by generals is along lines reported by Ky in separate channel and does not
include deadline element, press conference, or PNG request stated or inescapably implied,
believe that proposal for ad hoc deputies group in your 1939 makes excellent sense. You
have properly flagged point that this might be distorted to appear group had you
personally on trial, but believe this negated by fact that reps would all be deputies. We do
feel that terms of reference should be discussion all possible sources of misunderstanding
and not merely "complaints of generals." We also feel that idea of such group should not
appear to be something Washington has put you up to, thus implying lack of confidence in
you, but that you could personally present it as reasonable action with some real hope that
Khanh and Ky, in moods reflected separate channel messages, would not take advantage.
We believe our statements here have made amply clear our full support for you, but we
can add more if you wish. Obviously such notions as sending out Washington mediator
are nonsense.
2. If PNG or other extreme points do appear in document, or are being publicized by
generals as what they really after, then you authorized go as far as you like along lines
Deptel 1347/3/ both to Huong and Vien and through other contacts with Khanh and
generals. We must shoot this down hard but also get issue away from personalities on
both sides and on to finding reasonable solution.
/3/Document 465.
3. If ad hoc group does meet, most important steps toward solution appear to be
restoration HNC or establishment some equivalent group as act of GVN, preferably Suu.
Real importance such group is not so much constitutional legitimacy (which blurred in
any event) but rather to serve as forum for sentiment and instrument of unity. These
elements may call for substantial reconstitution and possible enlargement. Generals must
also make clear in some form they accept government in full control. Rather than seeking
adamantly to get generals to accept as doctrine that they never have right to intervene,
believe we should focus on point that military role must be related to national unity and
cannot be exercised as it was in this instance, to undermine power of government.
Maximum flattery for past role of military in creating HNC structure may be useful to
preserve face here. Beyond these points we can afford to be very flexible, and of course
solution should appear to be Vietnamese and should be stated in strongest terms of
national unity and resolve.
4. We note and accept your other comments on Deptel 1347. As for your "white paper" on
recent events, we believe you should have record fully organized but that we should not
be considering publication except in most extreme circumstances. Believe backgrounds
have made point that Khanh himself talked to you about his leaving.
5. As to your 1941 on using BOQ bombing as occasion for reprisal, we recognize this
might give lift and needed distraction in Saigon and would also be useful signal to Hanoi
to lay off any more such incidents. On other hand, Hanoi would hardly read into it any
strong or continuing signal in view of overall confusion in Saigon, and Hanoi might well
share what would certainly be strong reaction in US opinion and internationally that we
were trying to shoot our way out of an internal political crisis. Under present
circumstances of Saigon disunity, it would be hard for American people to understand
action to extend war. Moreover, unless evidence crystal clear, there might be some
suspicion at least internationally that BOQ bombing was not in fact done by VC. For these
reasons, we are not convinced reprisal action desirable as of now, but we are prepared to
make quick decision if you make recommendation with different assessment of above
factors or with other factors not covered above. FYI. In event of reprisal we believe target
should be Vit Thu Lu barracks short distance across border, using US aircraft. End FYI.
Rusk

/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL US-VIET S. Top Secret; Immediate;
Exdis. Repeated to CIA, the Department of Defense, the White House, and CINCPAC.
According to another copy, this telegram was drafted by Taylor and cleared with Johnson.
(Ibid., Saigon Embassy Files: Lot 68 F 8) Received at 9:21 a.m.
1952. CINCPAC for POLAD. Embtel 1949./2/ Alex Johnson and I called upon PriMin
Huong at 1045 immediately after Johnson's visit to Vien, reported in Embtel 1949. PriMin
looked tired and said that he had not slept for two nights for worrying about situation with
Generals.
/2/Telegram 1949, December 26, 2 p.m., reported that Johnson had seen Vien at 10 a.m.
that day, and that Vien had described the dinner that Huong had given for the Generals
along lines similar to that reported in telegram 1952. (Johnson Library, National Security
File, Vietnam Country File, Vol. XXV, Cables)
He then gave his version of dinner which he held last night with Khanh and eleven other
Generals which coincides with Vien's story to Johnson. He felt that little had been
accomplished and progress was hung up on issue of honor which Generals are raising
over my inconsiderate treatment of General Khanh. Huong apparently tried to talk
Generals into reasonable frame of mind, arguing that matter of "amour propre" should not
be inflated into serious affair between govts. He says that he gave Generals some straight
talk on subject of absence of legal status of Armed Forces Council and on need to release
HNC prisoners at once before he could talk about other issues such as future status of
HNC. He showed concern over danger of publicity arising from these internal troubles.
I told him that, unfortunately, publicity was inevitable since General Khanh had scattered
news of our divergencies widely throughout armed forces. Also press was picking up
rumors about Saigon which they were reporting with varying degrees of accuracy.
Since neither Huong nor Generals seemed to have any idea of where to turn, I surfaced
proposal of an ad hoc deputies group mentioned in Embtel 1939 3 and approved by Deptel
1355. 4 Huong jumped at idea with visible eagerness and said he would discuss it shortly
with Suu and Vien.
/3/Document 467.
/4/Supra.
We then fell to discussing Khanh's motives and aspirations, Huong describing latter as
being far from clear. He does not think Khanh really wants to take over govt but prefers to
manipulate it from wings for time being. But supposing Khanh does move in and take
over, he asked, what guarantee can I have of US support? I said that I personally doubted
the USG would feel that it could cooperate with military govt headed by Khanh and asked
whether this was kind of assurance he would like to have. He replied that he was asking
nothing at this time but would discuss matter later with Suu and Vien.
While Huong takes liberation of HNC prisoners most seriously, he apparently is making
no issue of other prisoners taken by army in last Sunday's round-up. He smilingly said that
army claimed that it was helping him by locking up some of politicians and student
agitators who had been bedeviling his govt. But it was to be noted, he pointed out, there
was not member of Buddhist Institute among prisoners, another allusion to his suspicion
of some kind of alliance between Khanh and Buddhists.
Reverting to possible request from Huong for some guarantee of protection against
military coup, I suggest consideration be given to authorizing me to communicate
following to Huong if he requests some assurance (I should also be able to pass orally to
other selected individuals, including Generals): "The United States Government would
find it impossible to cooperate with any govt headed or controlled by General Khanh."
You will note in Embtel 1949 that Vien seems to be thinking of broader guarantee to
cover any military coup. I do not think we should rule out possibility of having to support
military govt (not headed by Khanh) if civilian govt fails. Although this matter of some
additional US assurance is not presently before us, I feel reasonably sure that it will arise
shortly and would appreciate any preliminary comment from Dept.
Taylor

/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL US-VIET S. Top Secret; Immediate;
Exdis. Drafted by Forrestal, cleared with McGeorge and William Bundy, and initialed by
Rusk. Reported to CIA, the Department of Defense, the White House, and CINCPAC.
1357. Ref: Embtels 1949, 1952, 1955./2/ In light Huong's apparent acceptance your
proposal for deputies' meeting and Throckmorton's somewhat encouraging report of his
conversation with officers in Embtel 1955, believe we should allow these processes of
conciliation to go forward for next few days. Specifically you should discourage Huong
and Vien from making declaration against generals in terms Embtel 1949 at this time.
/2/Telegram 1952 is supra. Regarding telegram 1949, see footnote 2 thereto. Telegram
1955, December 26, 7 p.m., reported that Throckmorton had called separately on Ky,
Cang, and Thieu on December 25 to correct any misunderstandings they might have had
from the December 20 meeting and to make certain they understood the consequences of
Khanh's communication to Huong (see footnote 2, Document 467). The telegram
concluded that the meetings appeared to have helped open the road for further dialog.
(Johnson Library, National Security File, Vietnam Country File, Vol. XXV, Cables) A
copy of Throckmorton's memorandum to Taylor, December 26, reporting on the meetings,
is ibid., Westmoreland Papers, History Backup.
We agree with you that we should not rule out possibility having support military
government if civilians fail. We also believe we should continue our efforts remove
personality issue which Khanh appears to be turning to his own purposes. Therefore we
doubt that US assurances should now take form of declaration against Khanh.
At present time our best bet seems be preservation of Suu, Huong, Vien team while we
work younger generals back to some form of cooperation with civilians.
We are of course prepared to give rapid response if issue of new assurances becomes
critical.
Rusk

Exdis. Repeated to CIA, the Department of Defense, the White House, and CINCPAC.
1975. For Secretary Rusk. DOD for McNamara. CIA for McCone. White House for
Bundy. CINCPAC for Sharp. Embtels 1941, 1962 1956, 1964, 1970 and CINCPAC
262150Z. 2 Although we will probably never have evidence which will stand up in court
of VC complicity in the Brink bombing, no one in this part of the world has slightest
doubt of VC guilt. This conviction is reinforced by the broadcasts of SVN National
Liberation Front Radio which rejoice over this act of terrorism, praise the perpetrators and
anticipate with pleasure similar acts in the future.
/2/Telegram 1941 is printed as Document 468. Regarding 262150Z, see footnote 2
thereto. Telegrams 1962 and 1956, December 26; 1964, December 27; and 1970,
December 28, all reported National Liberation Front broadcasts on the bombing of the
Brink Hotel. (Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 VIET S)
As Embtel 1970 indicates, the National Liberation Front is clearly claiming the credit for
Brink affair so that the question of whether they can be proved responsible becomes
academic. They say that they did it and we should treat them accordingly.
The US Mission Council has just reviewed all aspects of this matter and joins me in a
unanimous recommendation that a reprisal bombing attack be executed ASAP on Vit Thu
Lu military barracks accompanied by statement relating this action to Brink bombing. The
attack should be primarily a US operation but General Westmoreland would like to
include some VNAF./3/ I do not feel strongly on latter point. As US relations with
RVNAF seem to be improving at the moment and since there were 43 Vietnamese
casualties in the Brink bombing, I am prepared to recede from the view expressed in
Embtel 1941 and accept inclusion of VNAF.
/3/On December 28, the Joint Chiefs of Staff also supported this proposal in a
memorandum to McNamara. (JCSM-1076-64; Washington National Records Center, RG
330, OSD/ISA(Admin) Files: FRC 69 A 7425, Vietnam 381)

Taylor
Commander, Military Assistance Command, Vietnam (Westmoreland)/1/
Washington, December 28, 1964-16:43 p.m.
/1/Source: Johnson Library, Westmoreland Papers, Message File, 1964. Secret. Also sent
to CINCPAC for Sharp.
JCS 5458. 1. Retaliation attack on target 36/2/ as recommended by Ambassador Taylor
and CINCPAC discussed at high level meeting presided over by Secretary Rusk at 1130
hours EST./3/ There is some disagreement as to mounting attack in view of time elapsed
since Brink incident and political situation in Saigon. Decision reached to discuss matter
with highest authority by telephone today and in person at Ranch by Secretary Rusk and
McGeorge Bundy tomorrow.
/2/The Vit Thu Lu Barracks.
/3/According to Rusk's Appointment Book, Wheeler, Vance, Solbert, William and
McGeorge Bundy, Forrestal, Greenfield, and Read attended the meeting. No record of the
meeting has been found. (Johnson Library)
2. In view of foregoing, no decision can be anticipated prior to approximately 1400 hours
EST 29 December.
3. For CINCPAC: During discussion it was agreed that weight of effort will be held to
forty strike sorties and that no napalm will be used. Also agreed that participation by
approximately 12 VNAF sorties would be desirable, if practicable. Request that you be
prepared to mount attack in accordance with foregoing guidelines; however, VNAF pilots
should not be briefed prior to receipt of Washington authorization to strike target 36.
4. For COMUSMACV: Please inform Ambassador Taylor of content this message.
474. Paper Prepared by the President's Special Assistant for National Security
Affairs (Bundy)/1/
to the President. Top Secret. The source text bears the handwritten notation: "This
package went w/Mr. B to Texas 12/29/64." Also published in Declassified Documents,
1979, 108A.
PROS AND CONS OF A REPRISAL RAID AGAINST NORTH VIETNAMESE

BARRACKS AT VIT THU LU (TARGET 36)
I. Considerations against the operation
1. Six days will have elapsed since the Christmas Eve raid and the reprisal element will be
blurred.
2. The political confusion in Saigon will give this signal a very mixed meaning both to
Vietnamese and to the world.
3. A confusing response which may lead to escalation by the other side is not in our
interest at this time.
4. It seems unwise to escalate merely because security control in a U.S. BOQ is bad.
5. The central problem is and remains the establishment of political stability in South
Vietnam, and a major decision of this sort should await progress toward stability. At the
least it should not be taken while the situation is more unstable then ever.
II. Considerations in favor of the operation
1. Target 36 is a military barracks, and the fact that this is a reprisal will be evident to
Hanoi and to others. Six days of delay in this reprisal is not significant, since the close
parallel of one barracks against another will be apparent to all.
2. The delay was justified by the need to pinpoint Viet Cong responsibility, which is now
clear, on the basis of Hanoi radio broadcasts.
3. We decided in December that we would execute reprisals from now on, and this
decision was not tied, as other possibilities were, to increased political stability in Saigon.
We have communicated this decision to those Allies who are closest to us on Vietnam-the Lao, the Thai, the British, the Australians, the Canadians, and the New Zealanders.
We have said the same thing to the senior military and civilian officials of Saigon. They
are now waiting to see whether we mean what we say.
4. The operation is rated as a very low risk by General Wheeler, and because its character
as a reprisal will be clear, it should not lead to escalation (but see separate intelligence
estimate)./2/
5. Seaborn's report from Hanoi/3/ suggests that the Communists very much need a
reminder of our will and determination.
/3/[Footnote (4 lines of text) not declassified]
6. While a reprisal will not produce political stability in Saigon, it does seem likely that
specific, firm action now will be somewhat helpful in assisting us to continue to make
progress in resolving the impasse of last week.
7. A firm reprisal will do wonders for the morale of U.S. personnel in South Vietnam.
8. The theory of our policy of reprisal is that it can help to prevent gradual Viet Cong
escalation in South Vietnam. This theory seems as sound now as it was when we decided
to follow it.
9. Ambassador Taylor and his entire country team are unanimous, and they are the people
on the spot. One more consideration against:
It was Winston Churchill who said that you should never trust the judgment of the man on
the spot.
Or, to put it another way, it is easy for advisers to be brave, but it i5 the President who
must live with the decision.

Exdis; Ivory. Drafted by William Bundy, cleared with Bromley Smith, and initialed by
Ball. Repeated to CIA, the Department of Defense, the White House, CINCPAC,
Bangkok, and Vientiane.
1365. Highest levels today/2/ reached negative decision on proposal your 1975/3/ for
reprisal action for BOQ bombing. We will be sending fuller statement of reasoning and
considerations affecting future actions, after Secretary's return from Texas tonight.
/2/Secretary Rusk left Washington at 9 a.m. for the Texas White House to discuss
Vietnam and other topics with the President and McGeorge Bundy. (Johnson Library,
Rusk Appointment Book) No record of the meeting has been found.
/3/Document 472.
Rusk

Repeated to CIA, the Department of Defense, the White House, and CINCPAC for
POLAD. Received at 12:20 p.m. and transmitted to the Texas White House as CAP
64378.
1999. Following is Alex Johnson's report of his two and one-half hour meeting this
afternoon with Oanh, General Thieu and Admiral Cang:
We had what I feel was quite a satisfactory session, at least as an opener, but with the
crunch issue left open by how military are going to establish that they will not again
irresponsibly intervene in governmental affairs. PriMin Huong informally spoke to us
briefly at the beginning on importance he attached to our work in restoring effective
relations between our two countries, etc. Oanh did a surprisingly good job as chairman.
In opening both Oanh and Thieu made it immediately clear that they considered working
out a solution to governmental question arising from Dec 20 Armed Forces Council
actions an integral part of the job and I accepted this. We discussed questions in order of:
(A) our Dec 20 meeting with four Generals; (B) our Dec 21 meeting with Khanh; and (C)
governmental question.
While it took some pulling and hauling, I finally got Thieu and Cang to state what was
bothering them with respect to Dec 20 meeting by pleading that we had only heard rumors
and indirect reports and I wanted facts directly from them. They raised only the issues of
the "wasted dinner", "do you speak English" and Amb Taylor's general manner at
beginning of Dec 20 meeting. I patiently went into the "wasted dinner" issue at great
length, it being evident that both of them had interpreted, or chose to interpret, the remark
as indicating the Amb's regret at the waste of money on the Westmoreland dinner. I of
course explained this furthest from Amb's mind, he intended no such offensive
connotation. He was simply stating evident fact that what he had said there was evidently
not understood or accepted. Thus what he had said was "wasted". I explained that
question with respect to speaking English had simply been straightforward query as to
what language they preferred.
With respect to manner I said that both Amb Taylor and myself were understandably
upset and felt ourselves offended at action they had taken and we made no apologies for
this. I then recounted at considerable length Amb Taylor's deep personal involvement in
and responsibility for our policy with respect to Vietnam, going back to 1961 and
reviewing events since his arrival here. I explained in general terms the great efforts he
had made [during] his last trip to Washington, the policy decisions that were reached
there, the subsequent discussions on his return, including those with Vien, Huong and
Khanh, the reasons in the background for his meeting with the Generals at Gen
Westmoreland's dinner, his sense that progress was being made and moving toward the
goals he had been seeking for Vietnam only to be awakened early Sunday morning and
told that during the night their actions had dashed all of these hopes without even the
courtesy of informing the Amb until hours after everything was done, etc., etc. Thus he
had deep reason for both personal and official offense at their actions. He had talked to
them man to man and I felt no apology was necessary or required from his side. In fact as
both men recalled I was so concerned that the very sympathetic and understanding attitude
he had taken later in the conversation would be misinterpreted by them as not indicating
the real depth of our concern that I had intervened to make certain that they understood
the fundamental issue involved. I also recalled my own pleading with them not to "close
doors" if they nevertheless went ahead with a press conference but leave open the
question of the dissolution of the institution of the High National Council.
They listened carefully and sympathetically and acquiesced in Oanh's observation that
they should pass on my remarks as they considered them appropriate to other members of
the Armed Forces Council and unless we heard otherwise from them the matter would be
considered closed.
On the Amb-Khanh issue, they recounted Khanh's report of the conversation along lines
that we had previously heard, that is, Amb first questioning Khanh on who was
responsible for the coup, that is, Khanh or the Armed Forces Council, and Khanh's
accepting responsibility as C-in-C. They then quoted Khanh as reporting that Amb Taylor
had said, "In this case you must leave your post of C-in-C and leave the country", this
allegedly confirmed by a telephone conversation between the two the following day. This
was "gross interference in internal affairs, etc., etc." I replied that, "They faced me with a
very deep dilemma." As they knew, I was the only other person present at the
conversation. While the substance of the first part relating to responsibility was generally
correct, I could firmly and emphatically say that the last part relating to Amb Taylor's
alleged statement was not correct. In response to their obviously eager questions as to
what was actually said, I replied that I did not feel I should say because this would put me
in a position of calling Khanh a liar, or he, in turn, calling me a liar and this would only
exaggerate the situation. I told them that I had taken careful notes and we had gone
directly from General Khanh's office to that of the PriMin and had recounted conversation
to PriMin in detail from my notes (Oanh interjected that yes, he knew, because he was in
next room when we were meeting with PriMin). However, could categorically say to them
that Amb Taylor at no time had ever made any demand of any kind on Khanh and that if
he was understood to have done so it was a misunderstanding. I then passed over a copy
of Dec 24 Beverly Deepe interview with Khanh, as well as her interview with him last
August, and a Stars and Stripes article directly quoting Gen Ky as stating that Amb Taylor
had said that he was a General while Khanh was still a cadet./2/ I said as long as we were
clearing the air I thought we should clear the air all about and, although these direct
quotes were deeply and personally offensive for him, Amb Taylor has refrained from
replying or engaging in public vendetta.
/2/Presumably a reference to the article in Pacific Stars and Stripes, December 25, 1964,
pp. 1-2; the other references have not been identified.
I also noted the portion of Dec 24 Beverly Deepe article reporting that Gen Khanh and the
Generals were going to undertake an anti-American campaign. I feel that all this served to
clear the air somewhat and to shock Thieu and Cang. It resulted in a vigorous exchange in
Vietnamese between the three, apparently over who was going to beard Khanh with all
this, the conclusion being that this prickly job was left to Oanh.
As a footnote to this portion: Thieu and Cang said that "they had heard that Amb Taylor
was going to Vung Tau to see Khanh this evening. I said that I was sure that Amb Taylor
"did not know this" and this, in turn resulted in considerable Vietnamese exchange
between Cang and Thieu (in fact, as reported through CAS channels, there was an
apparent feeler from Khanh today on a meeting with Amb Taylor and/or myself to which
no reply thus far has been made).
On governmental issue, I went to great pains at length to explain the whole rationale of
our position, the problem presented for us in our cooperation with Vietnam (particularly
in seeking to move ahead with greater support, in face of the "two govt" situation
resulting from the Dec 20 act of AFC). I explained that we were not taking a legalistic
view but rather a practical view, using as an illustration our call on PriMin on the morning
of Dec 20 when PriMin knew only what he had been told by some military officers at
0200 that morning and when he had obviously been put in a position where he could not
speak for Vietnam and had no control over military forces. A situation in which this could
recur was not tolerable for USG. We were not seeking to dictate what Vietnam should do
and did not allege that there was any single answer although all we had been able to think
of was a reversal of the dissolution of the HNC either by the AFC or by the military
acquiescing in a statement by the govt not recognizing the legality of the Dec 20 action. I
deliberately took a hard line on this in not further introducing the possibility of other
compromises, as at this phase I felt it best to let them wrestle further with the problem
they have created.
Discussion of this was amicable, straightforward and if they did not do so before, I believe
that at least Cang and Thieu now appreciate the problem in terms of our ability to work
with them. I emphasized that the two essentials from our standpoint were "stability", that
is, a govt that is not arbitrarily going to be upset and "effectiveness", that is, a govt that
could speak authoritatively to us on behalf of all the country, including the armed forces,
and which was able to carry out its commitments including those involving the armed
forces.
There was some discussion at Thieu and Cang's initiative of the proper role of the Armed
Forces Council vis--vis the military, they explaining its creation as an effort to prevent
coups by various elements within the armed forces in an effort to keep the armed forces
united. I praised them for this effort and discussed with them in light of our own
experience the difference between various advisory groups and committees and
attempting to run the armed forces by committee.
No firm date was set for the next meeting, it being left that Cang will get in touch with me
after he has seen Khanh. I made it clear that I was available at all times.
Taylor
477. Telegram From the President to the Ambassador in Vietnam (Taylor)/1/

Washington, December 30, 1964--11:15 a.m.
/1/Source: National Defense University, Taylor Papers, T-157-69. Top Secret; Immediate;
Nodis. Drafted in Texas and sent to Washington for transmission to Taylor during the
morning of December 30. Sixteen corrections were phoned to Bromley Smith for
inclusion, all but two of which were of one or two words. The two of substance were the
addition of "if not by air...target 36" in paragraph 3 and "and I want you to
know...overseas" in paragraph 8. A list of the corrections and a marked-up draft are in the
Johnson Library, National Security File, Vietnam Country File, Pres/Taylor Nodis Clores
and Codeword Messages.
CAP 64375. For Amb Taylor only at opening of business day from the President of the
United States.
1. I talked at length with Dean Rusk and Mac Bundy about your recommendation of
reprisal for the Brink bombing./2/ While I fully recognize the force of your feeling, which
was strongly supported by a number of good men here, I myself concurred with Dean
Rusk and Bob McNamara, who for overlapping reasons felt that we should not now make
an air reprisal in North Vietnam. In reaching this decision, we were guided by a number
of considerations peculiar to this episode. First and foremost, of course, is the continuing
political turmoil in Saigon. If we ourselves were uncertain for several days about the
source of the Brink's bombing, we cannot expect the world to be less uncertain. I know
that "the Liberation Front" has claimed the credit, but we all know that radio claims are
not the most persuasive evidence of what has actually happened. This uncertainty is just
one sign of the general confusion in South Vietnam which makes me feel strongly that we
are not now in a position which justifies a policy of immediate reprisal.
/2/The meeting referred to in footnote 2, Document 475.
2. What I want to do in this message is to share my own thinking with you and to ask for
your full comment so that we can lay a basis of understanding that will give us a base-line
not only for prompt reprisals but for other actions, mainly within South Vietnam, which
can help to turn the tide.
3. I continue to feel very strongly that we ought not to be widening the battle until we get
our dependents out of South Vietnam. I know that you have not agreed with this view in
the past, and I recognize that there are some agencies which may face recruiting
difficulties if dependents are removed, but no argument I have yet heard overrides the fact
that we are facing a war in Saigon and we are considering actions which may bring strong
communist reaction, if not by air, at least by a concentrated VC effort against Americans;
this last is estimated by intelligence community as the very likely enemy reaction to a
reprisal like air attack on target 36. In this situation I simply do not understand why it is
helpful to have women and children in the battle zone, and my own readiness to authorize
larger actions will be very much greater if we can remove the dependents and get
ourselves into real fighting trim. Neither this nor any other part of this message is
intended as an order, but I do wish you to understand the strength of my feeling and the
fact that I have not been persuaded by arguments I have heard on the other side.
4. I also have real doubts about ordering reprisals in cases in which our own security
seems, at first glance, to have been very weak. I notice in your last talk with Huong that
he seems to have the same worry. I do not want to be drawn into a large-scale military
action against North Vietnam simply because our own people are careless or imprudent.
This too may be an unfair way of stating the matter, but I have not yet been told in any
convincing way why aircraft cannot be protected from mortar attacks and officers quarters
from large bombs.
5. I am still worried, too, by our lack of progress in communicating sensitively and
persuasively with the various groups in South Vietnam. I recognize the very great
problems which we face in dealing with groups which are immature and often
irresponsible. But I still do not feel that we are making the all-out effort of political
persuasion which is called for.
In particular, I wonder whether we are making full use of the kind of Americans who have
shown a knack for this kind of communication in the past. I do not want to pick out any
particular individual because I do not know these men at first hand. But I do think that we
ought to be ready to make full use of the specialized skills of men who are skillful with
Vietnamese, even if they are not always the easiest men to handle in a country team. In
this, again, I recognize that you must have the final responsibility for the selection and
management of your country team, and I am giving no order but only raising a question
which is increasingly insistent in my own mind.
To put it another way, I continue to believe that we should have the most sensitive,
persistent, and attentive Americans that we can find in touch with Vietnamese of every
kind and quality, and reinforced by Englishmen, and Buddhists, and labor leaders and
agricultural experts, and other free men of every kind and type, who may have skills to
contribute in a contest on all fronts. I just do not think we should leave any stone
unturned, and I do not have the feeling that we have yet done everything that we can in
these areas.
6. Every time I get a military recommendation it seems to me that it calls for large-scale
bombing. I have never felt that this war will be won from the air, and it seems to me that
what is much more needed and would be more effective is a larger and stronger use of
Rangers and Special Forces and Marines, or other appropriate military strength on the
ground and on the scene. I am ready to look with great favor on that kind of increased
American effort, directed at the guerrillas and aimed to stiffen the aggressiveness of
Vietnamese military units up and down the line. Any recommendation that you or General
Westmoreland make in this sense will have immediate attention from me, although I
know that it may involve the acceptance of larger American sacrifice. We have been
building our strength to fight this kind of war ever since 1961, and I myself am ready to
substantially increase the number of Americans in Vietnam if it is necessary to provide
this kind of fighting force against the Viet Cong.
7. I am not saying that all this has to be done before there can be any reprisals. Indeed, as I
say, I am not giving any orders at all in this message. But I am inclined to offer this
suggestion:
I would like to see you move more strongly in four directions:
(1) The removal of dependents.
(2) The stiffening of our own security arrangements to protect our own people and forces.
(3) A much wider and more varied attempt to get good political relations with all
Vietnamese groups.
(4) An intensified US stiffening on-the-ground by Rangers and Special Forces or other
appropriate elements.
If you can give me either progress or persuasive arguments on these matters, I would look
with favor on the execution of immediate and automatic reprisal against targets like No.
36 in the event of further attacks. I myself believe that such reprisals should have a
Vietnamese component whenever possible, but I hope that the necessary consultation for
such a component can be kept down to a very few hours so that we could react with a
speed which will show beyond any question what caused our action.
8. Let me repeat once more that this whole message is intended to show you the state of
my thinking and to ask for your frankest comments and responses. I know that you are the
man on the spot and I know what a very heavy load you are carrying. I am grateful for it
and I want you to know in turn that you have my complete confidence in the biggest and
hardest job that we have overseas. But in this tough situation in which the final
responsibility is mine and the stakes are very high indeed, I have wanted you to have this
full and frank statement of the way I see it.

/1/Source: Department of State, Saigon Embassy Files: Lot 68 F 8. Top Secret; Priority;
Exdis. Drafted by Taylor and Johnson. Repeated to CIA for McCone, to the Department
of Defense for McNamara, to the White House for Bundy, and to CINCPAC for Admiral
Sharp.
2010. Alex Johnson and I send the following reflections on the politico-military situation
as it appears at the moment. General Westmoreland concurs.
As we contemplate the possible course of future political events in SVN, it is apparent
that we may be faced with any one of the following possible outcomes arising from the
current situation:
a. The generals may acquiesce in the demands of the government and undertake to restore
the status quo ante December 20, 1964 coup. This outcome seems very unlikely without a
break between Khanh and the generals with the consequent departure of Khanh from the
scene. Given Khanh's present mood, such a break could be accompanied by some
violence between individuals or elements of the Armed Forces.
b. The government and the generals may reach a compromise on the issues at stake. These
issues are the future status of the High National Council, the disposition of the prisoners
taken by the Armed Forces in the course of their coup, acceptance by the military of
responsibility for and participation in the Huong government, and the vendetta of the
generals with Ambassador Taylor. For each one of these issues, there are several possible
compromises. With regard to the High National Council, one might be to change its name
and retain its present functions. Or another might be to retain its name but change its
membership. With regard to the prisoners, the Armed Forces might release all to the
government or only the prisoners who are members of the High National Council (Prime
Minister Huong does not seem to be much interested in the fate of the others). The release
to the government might be unconditional or be based upon acceptance of some
commitment by the government that the prisoners be kept out of political activity. The
issue of military support and participation in the Huong government could in part be met
by an announcement by the generals of specific support to the Huong government and of
willingness to accept certain positions in the cabinet and in the HNC (or its successor). At
a minimum, the position of Minister of Defense should go to a military man or a civilian
representing the Armed Forces, and one or more other posts might be considered
depending upon the merits of the military candidates. As to the ambassadorial issue, it
appears less and less likely that the generals will seriously press for the recall of
Ambassador Taylor, but Khanh might remain adamant on the point. Thus someone might
suggest that both the Ambassador and General Khanh withdraw in order to clear the
atmosphere. The most likely proposal is that both individuals remain in place and try to
live together, at least for the time being.
c. A third possible development could be the resignation of Huong, a victim of the current
pressures directed at him, to be followed by a new civil government (possibly containing
military representation). The auguries for such a government would not be favorable since
Huong would presumably have been defeated by the generals and forced from his post. It
is very doubtful that any strong civilian could be persuaded to be Prime Minister under
such circumstances.
d. A fourth situation resembling the preceding would be the case of the resignation by
Huong, followed by a military government. It would make considerable difference to the
USG whether this military government were headed by Khanh or some more acceptable
officer.
e. A final possible development is a straight military coup which, as in the foregoing case,
might be headed by Khanh or someone else.
Now let us take up each one of these possible situations and consider what the U.S.
attitude should be towards it if it occurs.
In the case of a capitulation by the generals, we have nothing to do but rejoice and
anticipate increased strength and performance on the part of the Huong government.
In the case of a compromise, much will depend on the form the compromise takes and we
should reserve final judgment until we see its full dimensions. If the overall outcome is a
stronger civilian government, then we have cause for much the same rejoicing as in the
former case. If, however, the result is a weaker Huong government, virtually a straw
government under military domination incapable of controlling its Armed Forces, then we
are in for real trouble. Although there will be a strong temptation to try to rock along in
this unhappy situation, there can be no real hope for ultimate success through U.S.
cooperation with such a line up. The question will be whether the line up seems
indefinitely fixed or whether it may be subject to early change. Even in the latter case, the
thought of further change is a discouraging one. Much would also depend on whether
Khanh remained or whether he left sooner or later. Given their experience with the
consequences of their December 20 action, with Khanh out of the picture, the other
generals are not likely soon to repeat the experiment.
Our attitude toward a military government following a resignation by Huong will
necessarily depend upon the character and apparent promise of the new government.
While we will regret conceding the failure of civilian government and accepting a return
of the military, we cannot for that reason alone refuse to cooperate with it, although the
long term prognosis for Viet-Nam under a strictly military government is not good. If the
latter were headed by Khanh, I would feel that it would be impossible for us to do
business with it. Khanh has too many strikes against him and is too clearly unreliable for
us to try to get into bed with him once more.
The foregoing consideration leads me to conclude that since it is unlikely that the generals
will cede on all points, the U.S. effort should be toward effecting the best possible
compromise, hoping that there-from will come a stronger civilian government than the
present one. We should encourage a cabinet reshuffle to include the inclusion of some
military representation without thereby creating the impression of military domination. If
possible, we should get Khanh out of his present post or even better out of the country,
although we may have to agree to live with him somewhat longer. I feel that his own
facility for getting into trouble will drive him from the scene later if not sooner.
In conditioning the military for a satisfactory compromise, we will draw heavily upon the
Department advice contained in paragraph 6 of Deptel 1347,/2/ pointing out to the
generals that the sure way to get in Phase II is to line up with Huong, intensify the
campaign against the Viet-Cong, push pacification and help the government to get going
again. Of course, the more definite we can be, the more leverage we will have.
Considering the Vietnamese capacity for misinterpretation, there is danger of creating
misunderstandings and of raising expectations which are not subsequently realized.
/2/Document 465.
If worse comes to worst and a straw civilian government unable to control the military
with Khanh at their head is the outcome, we are in for a bad time. Under these
circumstances we could try to carry on about as we are now, hoping time and his own
ineptitude will eliminate Khanh from the scene and that a sounder government-military
relationship will eventually evolve. But I doubt that we have this kind of time.
Alternatively, we might seek to disengage from the present intimacy of relationship with
the GVN, withdrawing the bulk of our advisers and turning over a maximum number of
functions now performed by Americans and, while continuing sufficient economic and
MAP support to keep GVN operating at present levels, shrink MACV to the status of a
MAAG and USOM to an economic-budgetary advisory group. At the same time, we
would continue to accept responsibility for the air and maritime defense of SVN against
the DRV. By this means we might hope somewhat to disengage ourselves from an
unreliable ally and give the GVN the chance to walk on its own legs and be responsible
for its own stumbles. The hope would be that, having to accept full responsibility, SVN
would rise to the challenge and "pull up its political socks". The danger is that, panicked
by what could be interpreted as abandonment, the leaders here would rush to compete
with each other in making a deal with the National Liberation Front. This danger could be
offset if at the time we were engaged in reprisal attacks or had initiated Phase II
operations against DRV.
With regard to the occasion for initiating Phase II operations against North Viet-Nam,
such operations could be considered under three possible conditions: [unknown amount of
source text missing] initiation of Phase II operations. Without Phase II operations, we see
slight chance of moving toward a successful solution./3/
/3/At 8:06 p.m. on December 31, the Department of State cabled Taylor that with regard
to this last paragraph, NSAM 314 (Document 345) had been superseded by the December
7 policy statement (Document 440), and that, while the policy statement remained in
force, the Department did not envisage that this action was automatic. (Telegram 1380 to
Saigon; Department of State, Central Files. POL 27 VIET S)
Taylor
Commander, Military Assistance Command, Vietnam (Westmoreland)/1/
/1/Source: Johnson Library, Westmoreland Papers, Message File, 1964. Secret. Also sent
to CINCPAC for Admiral Sharp.
JCS 5485. 1. I still have not received information as to the factors which influenced
highest authority to disapprove recommendations of Ambassador Taylor, CINCPAC,
AND JCS to undertake reprisal for Brink bombing. While reasons are no doubt numerous,
on reflection recalling meetings on Vietnamese problem in general and BOQ bombing in
particular, I surmise that the following items might have exerted a strong influence:
a. The presence of U.S. dependents in South Vietnam. This has been a matter of
continuing concern to highest authority and was specifically referred to by Secretary Rusk
at out meeting on 28 December./2/ There is concern in Washington, amounting almost to
conviction, that our dependents are liable to attack as VC/DRV reprisal to a U.S. attack
against the DRV. While our dependents remain in South Vietnam, I consider that forceful
action by the U.S. outside the borders of South Vietnam is practically precluded.
b. Doubt in some Washington sectors that security measures of critical installations in
Saigon and elsewhere are adequate. While you may question the bearing that U.S./South
Vietnam security arrangements have on whether or not we should execute reprisals, the
fact remains that there is an attitude of mind here in some areas to the effect that lax
security not only invites but in some curious way justifies a VC attack and thereby
inhibits us from retaliatory action.
c. A widespread and strong belief, shared by some DOD senior officials, that reprisals
must be executed within 24-36 hours. In discussing this the other day, I was confronted
with the view that delay beyond the upper limit cited effectively removed a U.S. military
act against the DRV from the reprisal to the offensive area. In other words, the hypothesis
is that a reprisal action undertaken subsequent to 36 hours would be, in effect, an
escalatory act based upon a desire to "shoot our way out of a political difficulty." While I
myself do not accept this rationale, it is a hard fact of life that many people in positions of
policy importance do accept it.
d. The fact the U.S. policy determination currently is limited to the decision to exert a
limited squeeze on the DRV; no decision has yet been taken to move militarily against the
North. This being so, the GVN disarray on Christmas Eve did not permit an affirmative
decision to execute a reprisal for the Brink bombing. To express this another way, the
political confusion in Saigon does not encourage nor, indeed, permit the U.S. to increase
the stakes in Southeast Asia.
2. As a sidelight to c. and d. above, one of the principals who opposed on 23 December

the proposed attack on target 36 expressed the view that we should continue to maintain
the capability to execute a reprisal action within 6 hours subsequent to a VC/DRV
provocation which justified action by the U.S. I pointed out then and later that, under
current relationships with the GVN and ARVN, an additional 24 hours would be needed
to crank into a reprisal action VNAF participation. My observation, based on
COMUSMACV's cable on this subject,/3/ was accepted without comment.
3. The foregoing represents sort of a year-end wrap-up of Washington views on the
problem of South Vietnam and North Vietnam. While I would be hard put to document in
detail each of the above items, they reflect my analysis of Washington attitudes and
provide a degree of guidance as to what, lacking changes in the situation, can be expected
from Washington in future months. Of this, I anticipate during the forthcoming session of
Congress sharp inquiries into U.S. policy in South Vietnam, the conduct of the war and
the reasons for our lack of success. The Congress and the American people are
increasingly concerned about the situation in Southeast Asia. While many people may not
realize it, I believe that their concern is not that we are engaged in a war but are frustrated
that we are not winning the war.
4. This message does not require a reply, of course, unless either or both of you desire to
do so. I have tried to lay out for your consideration certain vexing aspects of the over-all
problem which gall our policymakers and inhibit them from action. It is obvious to me
that we must continue to maintain our retaliatory capabilities as specified above, with and
without VNAF participation; that we must continue to press the military and the civilians
in Saigon to submerge their differences and fabricate a reasonably sound governmental
structure; and that we must somehow convince the Washington policymakers that our
security arrangements are as good as the type of war we are fighting will permit. As to
dependents, I add nothing to what I have set out above except to assure you that, in my
opinion, their continued presence in South Vietnam is a hurdle which trips decisions.
5. Happy New Year.

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FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES

United States Government Printing Office

The Khanh coup, January 1-31

FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES

published Foreign Relations volumes must on occasion be supplemented by information

FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES

POL 15-4 VIET S, administration of government

DEF 19-9 US-VIET S, advisory assistance and training, U.S.-South Vietnam

Massachusetts Historical Society. Boston, Massachusetts

The Declassified Documents Quarterly Catalog and microfiche. Woodbridge, CT:

FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES

DCI, Director of Central Intelligence

GOA, Government of Australia

MEF, Marine Evacuation Force Emergency

PA, Bureau of Public Affairs, Department of State

RTG, Royal Thai Government

UNESCO, United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization

FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES

Harriman, W. Averell, Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs

Planning, Bureau of Far East Affairs

Throckmorton, Lieutenant General John L., USA, Deputy Commander, Military

Wilson, Donald M., Deputy Director, United States Information Agency

FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES

2. Memorandum From Senator Mike Mansfield to the President/1/

/3/Foreign Relations, 1961-1963, vol. IV, pp. 691-692.

3. Telegram From the President to the Ambassador in Vietnam (Lodge)/1/

4. Memorandum From the President's Special Assistant for National Security

Washington, January 7, 1964.

5. Letter From the Director of Central Intelligence (McCone) to the Secretary of

6. Message From the President to the Ambassador in Vietnam (Lodge)/1/

Washington, January 7, 1964--8:09 p.m.

7. Memorandum From Michael V. Forrestal of the National Security Council Staff

8. Memorandum From the President's Special Assistant for National Security

bring about the Chinese Communist entrance into the UN.

10. Telegram From the Embassy in Vietnam to the Department of State/1/

11. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Vietnam/1/

Saigon, January 20, 1964.

destruction of petroleum reserves and of naval installations."

15. Telegram From the Embassy in Vietnam to the Department of State/1/

/3/Reference is to a memorandum from the Office of National Estimates to McCone,

17. Editorial Note

19. Telegram From the Embassy in Vietnam to the Department of State/1/

21. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Vietnam/1/

/5/This assessment is taken from telegram 1443 from Saigon.

24. Telegram From the Embassy in Vietnam to the Department of State/1/

"(2) They will probably try it again now."

27. Editorial Note

FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES

II. U.S. Assessment of the Khanh Government, February 1 - March 4

29. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Vietnam/1/

Documents, 1975, 215D.

30. Telegram From the Embassy in Vietnam to the Department of State/1/

government in Viet Nam. It is very much subject to change as we move along.

31. Editorial Note

32. Memoranda of Telephone Conversations Between the Assistant Secretary of

a. What stronger courses of action can we take?

sending still another team out there.

Washington, February 7, 1964.

38. Report From the Executive Director-Comptroller of Central Intelligence

40. Editorial Note

41. Memorandum of a Conversation, White House/1/

42. Paper Prepared in the Defense Intelligence Agency/1/

46. National Security Action Memorandum No. 280/1/