THIRDDIVISION

[G.R.No.147745.April9,2003]

MARIA BUENA OBRA, petitioner, vs. SOCIAL SECURITY SYSTEM (Jollar

IndustrialSalesandServicesInc.),respondents.
DECISION
PUNO,J.:

OnappealistheDecision[1]oftheCourtofAppealsinCAG.R.SPNo.60704datedSeptember
27, 2000 sustaining the Decision[2] of the Employees Compensation Commission dated April 13,
2000, as well as its subsequent Resolution[3] dated March 6, 2001 denying petitioners Motion for
Reconsideration.
Thefactsofthecaseareasfollows:
JuanitoBuenaObra,husbandofpetitioner,workedasadriverfortwentyfour(24)yearsandfive
(5)months.Hisfirstandsecondemployerswereloggingcompanies.Thereafter,hewasemployedat
JollarIndustrialSalesandServicesInc.asadumptruckdriverfromJanuary1980toJune1988.He
wasassignedtothefollowingprojects:[4]
1.January1980toDecember1981F.F.CruzProject,Nabua,CamarinesSurhauling/deliveryoffillingmaterials
fromquarrytojobsite
2.January1982toDecember1983F.F.Cruz,300MWCoalFireThermalPlant,Calaca,BacunganandMakban
GeothermalPlant,LosBaos,Lagunahauling/deliveryoffillingmaterialsfromquarrytojobsite
3.January1984toDecember1985DizonCopperSilverMines,Pili,SanMarcelino,Zambaleshauling/delivery
fillingmaterialsfromquarrytojobsite
4.January1986toJune1988MetroManilaHaulingProject
On 27 June 1988, Juanito suffered a heart attack while driving a dump truck inside the work
compound, and died shortly thereafter. In the Report of Death[5] submitted by his employer to the
SocialSecuritySystem(SSS),JuanitoexpiredattheWorker'sQuartersat10:30a.m.,ofMyocardial
Infarction.
PetitionerMariaM.BuenaobraimmediatelyfiledherclaimfordeathbenefitsundertheSSSlaw.
ShestartedreceivingherpensioninNovember1988.Petitionerwas,however,unawareoftheother
compensation benefits due her under Presidential Decree No. 626, as amended, or the Law on
Employees Compensation. In September 1998, or more than ten (10) years after the death of her
husband,thatshelearnedofthebenefitsunderP.D.No.626throughthetelevisionprogramofthen
broadcasterTedFailonwhoinformedthatonemayclaimforEmployeesCompensationCommission
(ECC)benefitsifthespousediedwhileworkingforthecompany.Petitionerpreparedthedocuments
tosupportherclaimforECCbenefits.On23April1999,shefiledwiththeSSSherclaimforfuneral
benefitsunderP.D.No.626,asamended,whichwasdocketedasSSS#0400893260.[6]
On28July1999,theSSSdeniedtheclaimofpetitionerforfuneralbenefitsrulingthatthecause
ofdeathofJuanitowasnotworkconnected,absentacausalrelationshipbetweentheillnessandthe

job. Caridad R. Borja, Assistant VicePresident National Capital Region (AVP NCR) Central of the
SSSMemberAssistanceCenterinQuezonCitywrote:
PleasebeinformedthatfuneralclaimundertheEmployeesCompensationisherebydenied.Permedical
evaluation,causeofdeathofsubjectmembers(sic)cannotbeconsideredworkconnectedsincethereisno
causalrelationshipbetweentheillnessandthejob.
On 8 October 1999, petitioner wrote to Atty. Teofilo E. Hebron, Executive Director of the ECC,
appealing the denial of her claim. On 11 November 1999, Atty. Hebron ordered Dr. Simeon Z.
Gonzales, Assistant VicePresident (AVP) of the Medical Services Group of the SSS to review the
claimofpetitioner.
On23November1999,theMedicalServicesGroupthroughDr.PerlaA.Taday,AVPforMedical
Operations,concludeditsreevaluationandaffirmedthedenialofpetitionersclaim.Itreiteratedthat
there is no causal relationship between the cause of death/illness and members job as dump truck
driver.[7]Pursuant to Section 5, Rule XVIII of the Implementing Rules of PD 626, the records of the
deceasedJuanitowereelevatedtotheCommission.
On 13 April 2000, the Commission rendered a decision, dismissing the appeal.[8] It ruled that
petitionerfailedtoshowbysubstantialevidencethatherhusbandscauseofdeathwasdueto,orthe
riskofcontractinghisailmentwasincreasedbyhisoccupationandworkingconditions,asperSection
1(b),RuleIIIofP.D.No.626,asamended.Inaddition,theCommissiondeclaredthatpetitionersclaim
hasprescribed,citingECCResolutionNo.93080068.
Petitioner appealed to the Court of Appeals. She alleged that her cause of action had not
prescribedbecausethefilingofherclaimforSSSbenefitsshortlyafterJuanitosdeathsuspendedthe
runningoftheprescriptiveperiodforfilingECclaims,asperItemNo.IIIofECCResolutionNo.9003
0022dated23March1990.Theappellatecourtdismissedthepetition.Itruledthatpetitioner'sfilingof
herclaimforSSSbenefitsshortlyafterJuanitosdeathdidnotsuspendtherunningoftheprescriptive
periodforfilingECclaims.ItinterpretedtheaforementionedECCResolutionstomeanthataclaimant
mustindicatethekindofclaimfiledbeforetherunningoftheprescriptiveperiodforfilingECclaims
maybeinterrupted.Inthecaseatbar,petitionerindeedfiledaclaimwithSSS.Infact,shehasbeen
receivingherpensionsinceNovember1988.However,shefailedtospecifywhetherthebasisofher
claimwasanycontingencywhichmaybeheldcompensableundertheECProgram.[9]
Inaddition,theCourtofAppealscitedP.D.No.626whichstatesthatacontingencymaybeheld
compensable if listed in Annex "A" of the Rules Implementing Employees' Compensation as an
occupationaldisease,andsatisfyingallconditionssetforththereinorifnotlistedasanoccupational
disease,orlistedbuthasnotsatisfiedtheconditionssetforththerein,itmustbeprovenbysubstantial
evidence that the risk of contracting the disease which caused the death of the member, was
increasedbythemember'sworkingconditions.[10]
The appellate court likewise held that the threeyear prescriptive period does not apply in the
instantcase.Instead,itappliedArt.1142(2)oftheCivilCodewhichreads:
Art.1144.Thefollowingactionsmustbebroughtwithinten(10)yearsfromthetimetherightofactionaccrues:
(1)Uponawrittencontract
(2)Uponanobligationcreatedbylaw
(3)Uponajudgment.[Emphasissupplied.]
The appellate court then held that the petitioner's cause of action has prescribed. Petitioner's
husbanddiedon27June1988.ShefiledherclaimforfuneralbenefitsunderP.D.No.626ortheLaw
onEmployees'Compensationonlyon23April1999,ormorethanten(10)yearsfromhisdeath.

Lastly, the appellate court ruled that even assuming petitioner's cause of action has not
prescribed,herclaimforEmployees'Compensationbenefitscannotprosperbecauseofherfailureto
provebysubstantialevidencethatherhusband'sworkingconditionsincreasedtheriskofcontracting
themyocardialinfarctionthatcausedhisdeath.
Petitioners Motion for Reconsideration dated 27 September 2000 was denied by the appellate
courtinaResolutionpromulgatedon6March2001.
Hence,thispetition.Thefollowingissuesareraised:[11]
(1)WHETHER,INDEED,THECLAIMOFPETITIONER,HADPRESCRIBED.
(2)WHETHERORNOTTHEILLNESSOFPETITIONERSHUSBAND,MYOCARDIAL
INFARCTION,ISWORKRELATED.
Onthefirstissue,werulethattheclaimofpetitionerforfuneralbenefitsunderP.D.No.626,as
amended,hasnotyetprescribed.
The issue of prescription in the case at bar is governed by P.D. No. 626, or the Law on
Employees'Compensation.Art.201ofP.D.No.626andSec.6,RuleVIIofthe1987AmendedRules
onEmployees'Compensationbothreadasfollows:
NoclaimforcompensationshallbegivenduecourseunlesssaidclaimisfiledwiththeSystemwithinthree
yearsfromthetimethecauseofactionaccrued.
Thisisthegeneralrule.TheexceptionsarefoundinBoardResolution93080068andECCRulesof
Procedure for the Filing and Disposition of Employees Compensation Claims. Board Resolution 93
080068issuedon5August1993,states:
Aclaimforemployee'scompensationmustbefiledwithSystem(SSS/GSIS)withinthree(3)yearsfromthe
timethecauseofactionaccrued,providedhowever,thatanyclaimfiledwithintheSystemforany
contingencythatmaybeheldcompensableundertheEmployee'sCompensationProgram(ECP)shallbe
consideredastheECclaimitself.Thethreeyearprescriptiveperiodshallbereckonedfromtheonsetof
disability,ordateofdeath.Incaseofpresumptivedeath,thethree(3)yearslimitationshallbecountedfromthe
datethemissingpersonwasofficiallydeclaredtobepresumptivelydead.(emphasissupplied)
Inaddition,Section4(b),Rule3oftheECCRulesofProcedurefortheFilingandDispositionof
EmployeesCompensationClaims,reads:
RULE3.FILINGOFCLAIM
Section4.Whentofile.
(a)BenefitclaimsshallbefiledwiththeGSISortheSSSwithinthree(3)yearsfromthedateoftheoccurrence
ofthecontingency(sickness,injury,disabilityordeath).
(b)Claimsfiledbeyondthe3yearprescriptiveperiodmaystillbegivenduecourse,providedthat:
1.AclaimwasfiledforMedicare,retirementwithdisability,burial,deathclaims,orlife(disability)insurance,
withtheGSISwithinthree(3)yearsfromtheoccurrenceofthecontingency.
2.Inthecaseoftheprivatesectoremployees,aclaimforMedicare,sickness,burial,disabilityordeath
wasfiledwithinthree(3)yearsfromtheoccurrenceofthecontingency.
3.Inanyoftheforegoingcases,theemployeescompensationclaimshallbefiledwiththeGSISortheSSS
withinareasonabletimeasprovidedbylaw.[Emphasissupplied.]

We agree with the petitioner that her claim for death benefits under the SSS law should be
consideredastheEmployeesCompensationclaimitself.Thisisbutlogicalandreasonablebecause
the claim for death benefits which petitioner filed with the SSS is of the same nature as her claim
before the ECC. Furthermore, the SSS is the same agency with which Employees Compensation
claimsarefiled.Ascorrectlycontendedbythepetitioner,whenshefiledherclaimfordeathbenefits
withtheSSSundertheSSSlaw,shehadalreadynotifiedtheSSSofheremployeescompensation
claim, because the SSS is the very same agency where claims for payment of
sickness/disability/deathbenefitsunderP.D.No.626arefiled.
Section 4(b)(2), Rule 3 of the ECC Rules of Procedure for the Filing and Disposition of the
Employees Compensation Claims, quoted above, also provides for the conditions when EC claims
filed beyond the threeyear prescriptive period may still be given due course.Section 4(b)(2) states
the condition for private sector employees, requiring that a claim for Medicare, sickness, burial,
disabilityordeathshouldbefiledwithinthree(3)yearsfromtheoccurrenceofthecontingency.Inthe
instantcase,thepetitionerwasabletofileherclaimfordeathbenefitsundertheSSSlawwithinthe
threeyearprescriptiveperiod.Infact,shehasbeenreceivingherpensionundertheSSSlawsince
November1988.
It is true that under the proviso, the employees compensation claim shall be filed with the
GSIS/SSS within a reasonable time as provided by law. It should be noted that neither statute nor
jurisprudencehasdefinedthelimitsofreasonabletime.Thus,whatisreasonabletimedependsupon
thepeculiarfactsandcircumstancesofeachcase.[12]Inthecaseatbar,wealsofindpetitionersclaim
to havebeenfiled within a reasonable time considering the situation andconditionofthepetitioner.
WehaveruledthatwhenthepetitionerfiledherclaimfordeathbenefitsundertheSSSlaw,herclaim
for the same benefits under the Employees Compensation Law should be considered as filed. The
evidenceshowsthattheSystemfailedtoprocesshercompensationclaim.Underthecircumstances,
thepetitionercannotbemadetosufferforthelapsecommittedbytheSystem.Itistheavowedpolicy
oftheStatetoconstruesociallegislationsliberallyinfavorofthebeneficiaries.[13]Thiscourthastime
andagainupheldthepolicyofliberalityofthelawinfavoroflabor.PresidentialDecreeNo.626itself,
initsArt.166reads:
ART.166.Policy.TheStateshallpromoteanddevelopataxexemptemployees'compensationprogram
wherebyemployeesandtheirdependents,intheeventofworkconnecteddisabilityordeath,maypromptly
secureadequateincomebenefit,andmedicalorrelatedbenefits.(emphasissupplied)
Furthermore, Art. 4 of P.D. No. 442, as amended, otherwise known as the Labor Code of the
Philippines,whichP.D.No.626formsapartof,readsasfollows:
ART.4.Constructioninfavoroflabor.Alldoubtsintheimplementationandinterpretationoftheprovisions
ofthisCode,includingitsimplementingrulesandregulations,shallberesolvedinfavoroflabor.
Particularly, the policy of liberality in deciding claims for compensability was given emphasis by this
courtinthecaseofEmployeesCompensationCommissionvs.CourtofAppeals,[14]whereitheldthat:
...theliberalityoflawinfavoroftheworkingmanandwomanstillprevailsandtheofficialagencychargedby
lawtoimplementtheconstitutionalguaranteeofsocialjusticeshouldadoptaliberalattitudeinfavorofthe
employeeindecidingclaimsforcompensability,especiallyinlightofcompassionatepolicytowardslaborwhich
the1987Constitutionvivifiesandenhances.Elsewisestated,ahumanitarianimpulse,dictatedbynolessthan
theConstitutionitselfunderthesocialjusticepolicy,callsforaliberalandsympatheticapproachtolegitimate
appealsofdisabledpublicservantsorthatalldoubtstotherighttocompensationmustberesolvedinfavorof
theemployeeorlaborer.Verilythepolicyistoextendtheapplicabilityofthelawonemployeescompensationto
asmanyemployeeswhocanavailofthebenefitsthereunder.
ClaimsfallingundertheEmployeesCompensationActshouldbeliberallyresolvedtofulfillitsessence
asasociallegislationdesignedtoaffordrelieftotheworkingmanandwomaninoursociety.[15]

Thesecondissueofwhetherornottheillnessofpetitionershusband,myocardialinfarctionwhich
wasthecauseofhisdeathisworkrelated,mustlikewiseberesolvedinfavorofthepetitioner.
Under the law on employees compensation, death is compensable only when it results from a
workconnectedinjuryorsickness.Intheinstantcase,thecauseofpetitionershusbandsdeathwas
myocardial infarction and it must be considered workconnected. While it is true that myocardial
infarction is not among the occupational diseases listed under Annex A of the Amended Rules on
EmployeesCompensation,theCommission,underECCResolutionNo.432datedJuly20,1977,laid
downtheconditionsunderwhichcardiovascularorheartdiseasescanbeconsideredasworkrelated
andthuscompensable,viz:
(a)Iftheheartdiseasewasknowntohavebeenpresentduringemployment,theremustbeproofthatan
acuteexacerbationwasclearlyprecipitatedbytheunusualstrainbyreasonsofthenatureof
his/her/herwork.
(b)Thestrainofworkthatbringsaboutanacuteattackmustbeofsufficientseverityandmustbe
followedwithin24hoursbytheclinicalsignsofacardiacinsulttoconstitutecausalrelationship.
(c)Ifapersonwhowasapparentlyasymptomaticbeforebeingsubjectedtostrainatworkshowedsigns
andsymptomsofcardiacinjuryduringtheperformanceofhis/herworkandsuchsymptomsand
signspersisted,itisreasonabletoclaimacausalrelationship.
Myocardial infarction is also known as heart attack. It results in permanent heart damage or
death.A heartattackiscalledmyocardialinfarction because part of the heart muscle (myocardium)
may literally die (infarction). This occurs when a blood clot blocks one of the coronary arteries (the
blood vessels that bring blood and oxygen to the heart muscle). When the heart muscle does not
obtain the oxygenrich blood that it needs, it will begin to die.The severity of a heart attack usually
depends on how much of the heart muscle is injured or dies during the heart attack. Heart attack
accountsfor1outofevery5deaths.Itisamajorcauseofsuddendeathinadults.Heavyexertionor
emotionalstresscantriggeraheartattack.[16]
Inthecaseatbar,thepetitionershusbandsheartdiseasefallsunderthesecondconditionofECC
ResolutionNo. 432 dated July 20, 1977 which states that the strain of work that brought about the
acuteattackmustbeofsufficientseverityandmustbefollowedwithin24hoursbytheclinicalsignsof
acardiacinsulttoconstitutecausalrelationship.Petitionershusbandwasdrivingadumptruckwithin
thecompanypremiseswheretheywerestackinggravelandsandwhenhesufferedtheheartattack.
He had to be taken down from the truck and brought to the workers quarters where he expired at
10:30a.m.,justafewminutesaftertheheartattack,whichismuchlessthanthe24hoursrequiredby
ECCResolutionNo.432.Thisisaclearindicationthatseverestrainofworkbroughtabouttheacute
attackthatcausedhisdeath.
Professional drivers, especially truck drivers like the decedent in the instant case, carry the
burden of being more exposed and subjected to the stress and strain of everyday traffic, and the
greaterphysicalexertionbroughtaboutbydrivingalargeandheavyvehicle.Inaddition,accordingto
thepetitioner,herhusbandwasunderalotofstressintheworkplace.Hewasamodelworkerandhis
employerhighlydependedonhim.Hebecametheobjectofenvyofhiscoworkerswhichcausedhim
muchemotionalstress.Addtothisthefactthathehasbeenatruckdriverformorethantwentyfour
(24)years.Duetothecombinationofemotionalstressandvigorousphysicalexertion,itwaseasyfor
himtosuccumbtotheheartailment.Weholdthattheillnessofthedecedentwhichcausedhisdeath
isworkconnected,andthuscompensablebyvirtueofECCResolutionNo.432dated20July1977.
As a final note, we find it necessary to reiterate that P.D. No. 626, as amended, is a social
legislationwhoseprimordialpurposeistoprovidemeaningfulprotectiontotheworkingclassagainst
thehazardsofdisability,illnessandothercontingenciesresultinginthelossofincome.Thus,asthe
official agents charged by law to implement social justice guaranteed by the Constitution, the ECC
and the SSS should adopt a liberal attitude in favor of the employee in deciding claims for

compensabilityespeciallywherethereissomebasisinthefactsforinferringaworkconnectionwith
theillnessorinjury,asthecasemaybe.Itisonlythiskindofinterpretationthatcangivemeaningand
substance to the compassionate spirit of the law as embodied in Article 4 of the New Labor Code
which states that all doubts in the implementation and interpretation of the provisions of the Labor
Codeincludingitsimplementingrulesandregulationsshouldberesolvedinfavoroflabor.[17]
INVIEWWHEREOF,thepetitionisGRANTED.TheDecisionoftheCourtofAppealsinCAG.R.
SP No. 60704 dated 27 September 2000 and its Resolution dated 06 March 2001 are hereby SET
ASIDE.TheSSSisherebydirectedtopayhereinpetitionerthedeath/funeralbenefitsduehimunder
theexistinglaw.
SOORDERED.
Panganiban,SandovalGutierrez,Corona,andCarpioMorales,JJ.,concur.
[1]Rollo,pp.121128.
[2]Id.at110117.
[3]Id.at189.
[4]CARollo,p.26.
[5]Id.at33.
[6]Id.at39.
[7]Id.at46.
[8]Id.at51.
[9]Rollo,p.125.
[10]Id.,p.126,citingEmployeesCompensationCommissionvs.CA,264SCRA248.
[11]Id.at18.
[12]FarEastRealtyInvestment,Inc.vs.CourtofAppeals,G.R.No.L36549,05October1988.
[13]GovernmentServiceInsuranceSystemvs.CourtofAppeals,G.R.No.132648,04March1999.
[14]G.R.No.121545,14November1996,264SCRA248,citingNituravs.EmployeesCompensationCommission,201

SCRA278,Aris(Phils.),Inc.vs.NLRC,200SCRA246,andDiopenesvs.GSIS,205SCRA331.
[15]Santosvs.EmployeesCompensationCommission,221SCRA182,188.
[16]LeeB.Weitzman,M.D.,FACC,FCCP,HeartAttack,(2001)<http://www.heartcenteronline.com/>
[17]Nituravs.EmployeesCompensationCommission,201SCRA278,283(1991)Santosvs.EmployeesCompensation

Commission,221SCRA182,188(1993).