Beruflich Dokumente
Kultur Dokumente
Spouses Samar
GR NO. 197329
DATE: September 8, 2014
DOCTRINE: Just compensation for the property must be based on its
value at the time of the taking of said property, not at the time of
the filing of the complaint.
PETITIONER: NATIONAL POWER CORPORATION
RESPONDENT: LUIS SAMAR and MAGDALENA SAMAR
FACTS:
Civil Case No. IR-2243
Sometime in 1990, petitioner National Power Corporation (NPC) filed
Civil Case No. IR-2243 with the RTC, seeking to expropriate respondent
spouses Luis and Magdalena Samar's 1,020-square meter lot covered by
Tax Declaration No. 30573 and situated in San Jose (Baras), Nabua,
Camarines Sur which NPC needed for the construction of a transmission
line. In an August 29, 1990 Order, the RTC directed the issuance of a Writ of
Condemnation in favor of NPC. Accordingly, NPC entered the subject lot and
constructed its transmission line, denominated as Tower No. 83. However, on
July 12, 1994, the trial court issued another Order dismissing Civil Case No.
IR-2243 without prejudice for failure to prosecute because after almost
three (3) years since the said order was issued, the Committee has not met
nor deliberated on said matter and the parties in this case have not exerted
efforts in pursuing their claims despite so long a time.
Civil Case No. IR-2678
On December 5, 1994, respondents filed with the same trial court a
Complaint, 7 docketed as Civil Case No. IR-2678, for compensation and
damages against NPC relative to the subject lot which NPC took over but for
which it failed to pay just compensation on account of the dismissal of Civil
Case No. IR-2243. The complaint prayed, among others, that the defendant
compensate the plaintiff of [sic] the lot they are now occupying in
accordance with the current market value existing in the place. After
conducting their appraisal, the commissioners submitted their individual
reports. Atty. Wenifredo Pornillos, commissioner for the respondents,
recommended a valuation within the range of P1,000.00 to P1,500.00 per
square meter. Lorenzo C. Orense, commissioner for NPC, did not set an
amount, although he stated that the lot should be valued at the prevailing
market prices of agricultural, and not residential, lands within the area. The
court representative, Esteban D. Colarina, proposed a P1,100.00 per square
meter valuation.
On February 21, 2003, the RTC rendered a Decision pegging the value
of the subject lot at P1,000.00 per square meter and the CA, on NPCs
appeal, affirmed the same. Further, the CA held that in the resolution of Civil
Case No. IR-2678, the principles and rules of procedure in eminent domain
cases under Rule 67 of the 1964 Rules of Court cannot apply; thus, the
rule that just compensation shall be computed from the time of the taking or
filing of the expropriation case is inapplicable, since the case is not one for
expropriation. Instead, Civil Case No. IR-2678 should be treated as a simple
case for the recovery of damages. Finally, the CA held that the trial court
properly exercised its judicial function of ascertaining the fair market value of
the property as just compensation. NPC thus instituted the instant Petition.
ISSUE:
WON Section 4, Rule 67 of the 1964 Rules of Court should apply to Civil
Case No. IR-2678; therefore, just compensation should be based not on 1995
market values, but on those prevailing on the date of taking or the filing of
the expropriation case in 1990
HELD:
YES.
In Republic v. Court of Appeals, the Supreme Court held that:
Just compensation is based on the price or value of the property
at the time it was taken from the owner and appropriated by the
government. However, if the government takes possession
before the institution of expropriation proceedings, the value
should be fixed as of the time of the taking of said possession,
not of the filing of the complaint. The value at the time of the
filing of the complaint should be the basis for the determination
of the value when the taking of the property involved coincides
with or is subsequent to the commencement of the proceedings.
The procedure for determining just compensation is set forth in
Rule 67 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure. Section 5 of Rule 67
partly states that 'upon the rendition of the order of
expropriation, the court shall appoint not more than three (3)
competent and disinterested persons as commissioners to
ascertain and report to the court the just compensation for the
property sought to be taken.' However, we held in Republic v.
Court of Appeals that Rule 67 presupposes a prior filing of
complaint for eminent domain with the appropriate court by the
expropriator. If no such complaint is filed, the expropriator is
considered to have violated procedural requirements, and hence,
waived the usual procedure prescribed in Rule 67, including the
appointment of commissioners to ascertain just compensation. In
National Power Corporation v. Court of Appeals, we clarified that
when there is no action for expropriation and the case involves
only a complaint for damages or just compensation, the
provisions of the Rules of Court on ascertainment of just
compensation (i.e., provisions of Rule 67) are no longer
applicable, and a trial before commissioners is dispensable . . . .
In this case, Records show that sometime in 1990, NPC filed an
expropriation case docketed as Civil Case No. IR-2243. However, in an Order
dated July 12, 1994, the expropriation case was dismissed by the RTC for
failure of NPC to prosecute. Subsequently, or on December 5, 1994,
respondents filed Civil Case No. IR-2678 which is a complaint for
compensation and recovery of damages. Considering the dismissal of the
expropriation case for failure of the NPC to prosecute, it is as if no
expropriation suit was filed. Hence, pursuant to the above-quoted ruling, NPC
is deemed "to have violated procedural requirements, and hence, waived the
usual procedure prescribed in Rule 67, including the appointment of
commissioners to ascertain just compensation." Nevertheless, just
compensation for the property must be based on its value at the time of the
taking of said property, not at the time of the filing of the complaint.
Consequently, the RTC should have fixed the value of the property at the
time NPC took possession of the same in 1990, and not at the time of the
filing of the complaint for compensation and damages in 1994 or its fair
market value in 1995.
Rule 67 no. 2
NAPOCOR v. Spouses Cruz, G.R. No. 165386, July 29, 2013
Petitioners: National Power Corporation (NAPOCOR)
as
commissioners was
Held:
NO. In this case, the Court finds that the appointment of the PAC as
commissioners substantially complies with Section 5, Rule 67 of the
Rules of Court. It is immaterial that the RTC appointed a committee
instead of three persons to act as commissioners, since the PAC is
composed of three members the Provincial Assessor, the Provincial
Engineer, and the Provincial Treasurer. Considering their positions, we
find each member of the PAC competent to perform the duty required
of them, i.e., to appraise the valuation of the affected lots. As
correctly found by the CA, they "are government officials entrusted with
the updating and time-to-time determination of currently assessed, as
well as, market value of properties within their jurisdiction." The mere
fact that they are government officials does not disqualify them as
disinterested persons, as the provincial government has no significant
interest in the case.
If Napocor found the appointment of the PAC to be objectionable, it
should have filed its objections early on and not belatedly raise them
in its appeal with the CA. We find nothing in the records indicating
that Napocor seasonably objected to the appointment of the PAC or to
any aspect in the order of appointment. Instead, Napocor belatedly
raised its objections only in its appeal with the CA. For its failure to
comply with the Rules, we consider Napocor to have waived its
objections against any supposed irregularity in the appointment of the
PAC.
If Napocor had any objections on the amount of just compensation
fixed in the commissioners' report, its remedy was to file its objections
within ten (10) days from receipt of the notice of the report. However, as
with the objections to the appointment of the PAC, Napocor failed to
make a timely objection to the report of the commissioners and raised
them only before the CA
It appears to us that Napocor has demonstrated a pattern of
procrastination in this case. We note that not only did it belatedly file
its objections to the appointment of the PAC and to the commissioners'
report; it also failed to submit copies of the compromise agreement
with the CA despite the numerous extensions it requested. Significantly,
the execution of the compromise agreement, by itself, did not enjoin
the CA from resolving the appeal. By its terms and as found out by
the CA, the compromise agreement required the approval of the CA for
it to take effect. Thus, Napocor can no longer assail the CA's authority
to resolve the appeal after it consistently failed to furnish the CA a
copy of the agreement.
RULE 67 NO. 3
REPUBLIC v. SAMSON-TATAD
GR NO. 187677
April 17, 2013
PETITIONER:
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, represented by the DEPARTMENT OF
PUBLIC WORKS AND HIGHWAYS (DPWH),
RESPONDENT:
HON. ROSA SAMSON-TATAD, as Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial
Court, Branch 105, Quezon City, and SPOUSES WILLIAM AND
REBECCA GENATO,
FACTS:
Petitioner Republic of the Philippines, represented by DPWH, filed a
Complaint for the expropriation of several parcels of land affected by the
construction of the EDSA-Quezon Avenue Flyover. Private respondents,
Spouses Genato, are the registered owners of a piece of land.
During the pendency of the proceedings, petitioner received a letter
from Engr.Gatan, reporting that the subject property was "government land
and that the title of the respondent is of dubious origin and of fabrication as
it encroached or overlapped on a government property. As a result, petitioner
filed an Amended Complaint seeking to limit the coverage of the
proceedings.
Petitioner filed a Manifestation and Motion to have the subject property
"declared or considered of uncertain ownership or subject to conflicting
claims. The RTC admitted petitioners Amended Complaint, deferred the
release to respondents the amount of (P18,400,000) deposited in the bank,
equivalent to the current zonal valuation of the land, and declared the
property as the subject of conflicting claims.
ISSUE
Whether or not petitioner may be barred from presenting evidence to assail
the validity of respondents title.
HELD
We rule that petitioner may be allowed to present evidence to assert
its ownership over the subject property, but for the sole purpose of
determining who is entitled to just compensation.
Thus, such findings of ownership in an expropriation proceeding should
not be construed as final and binding on the parties. By filing an action for
expropriation, the condemnor (petitioner), merely serves notice that it is
taking title to and possession of the property, and that the defendant is
asserting title to or interest in the property, not to prove a right to
possession, but to prove a right to compensation for the taking. Here, the
attempt of petitioner to present evidence cannot be characterized as an
"attack." It must be emphasized that the objective of the case is to
appropriate private property, and the contest on private respondents' title
arose only as an incident to the issue of whom should be rightly
compensated.
The Court GRANTS the Petition for Review on Certiorari and the prayer
for a Writ of Preliminary Injunction. The assailed Decision and Resolution the
CA and RTC are hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE.
DOCTRINE:
FACTS: Manila City Mayor Joselito L. Atienza approved Ordinance No. 7951
an expropriation measure authorizing him to acquire by negotiation or
expropriation real property along Maria Clara and Governor Forbes Streets
where low-cost housing units could be built and then awarded to bona fide
residents. The covered property measures 1,425 square meters, and includes
the 475-square-meter lot owned by respondent Melba Tan Te. Respondent
had acquired the property from the heirs of Emerlinda Dimayuga Reyes in
1996, and back then it was being occupied by families whose leasehold
rights had long expired even prior to said sale. In 1998, respondent had
sought before MTC the ejectment case. The favorable ruling in that case
evaded execution; hence, the court, despite opposition of the City of Manila,
issued a Writ of Demolition at respondent's instance. The City of Manila had
instituted an expropriation case thereof. RTC dismissed the first compliant
upon motion by Melba for failure to show that an ordinance authorized the
expropriation and non-compliance with the provisions of Republic Act 7279.
On November 16, 2000, petitioner filed this second Complaint for
expropriation before the RTC, attaching a copy of Ordinance No. 7951 and it
had already offered to buy the property from Melba, which the latter failed to
retrieve from the post office despite notice. The city was thereby compelled
to file the complaint, after depositing in trust with the Land Bank of the
Philippines P1,000,000.00 in cash, representing the just compensation
required by law.
Melba, instead of filing, filed a motion to dismiss, and raised the
ISSUES:
1. WON socialized housing falls within the confines of public use.
2. WON petitioner that by virtue of its power of eminent domain included in
its charter is not bound by the provisions of Republic Act 7279
HELD:
1. YES. The Supreme Court ruled in Sumulong v. Guerrero, citing the earlier
case of Heirs of Juancho Ardona v. Reyes: The public use requirement for a
valid exercise of the power of eminent domain is a flexible and evolving
concept influenced by changing conditions. The taking to be valid must be
for public use. As long as the purpose of the taking is public, then the power
of eminent domain comes into play. . . . The constitution in at least two
cases, to remove any doubt, determines what is public use. One is the
expropriation of lands to be divided into small lots for resale at cost to
individuals. The other is in the transfer, through the exercise of this power, of
utilities and other enterprise to the government. It is accurate to state then
that at present whatever may be beneficially employed for the general
welfare satisfies the requirement of public use. The term "public use" has
acquired a more comprehensive coverage. To the literal import of the term
signifying strict use or employment by the public has been added the
broader notion of indirect public benefit or advantage. . . . Specifically,
urban renewal or development and the construction of low-cost
housing are recognized as a public purpose, not only because of the
expanded concept of public use but also because of specific
provisions in the Constitution. . . .
The 1987 Constitution [provides]: The State shall promote a just and
dynamic social order that will ensure the prosperity and independence of the
nation and free the people from poverty through policies that provide
adequate social services, promote full employment, a rising standard of
living and an improved quality of life for all. (Article II, Section 9)
The State shall, by law and for the common good, undertake, in cooperation
with the private sector, a continuing program for urban land reform and
housing which will make available at affordable cost decent housing and
basic services to underprivileged and homeless citizens in urban centers and
resettlement areas. . . . In the implementation of such program the State
shall respect the rights of small property owners. (Article XIII, Section 9)
Housing is a basic human need. Shortage in housing is a matter of state
concern since it directly and significantly affects public health, safety, the
environment and in sum, the general welfare. The public character of
housing measures does not change because units in housing projects cannot
be occupied by all but only by those who satisfy prescribed qualifications. A
beginning has to be made, for it is not possible to provide housing for all who
This case is remanded to the trial court for the proper determination of just
compensation, in conformity with this Decision.
Camarines Norte Electric Cooperative, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, GR
No. 109338,
Conrad L. Leviste filed with the Regional Trial Court, Daet, Camarines Norte, a
complaint for collection of a sum of money and foreclosure of mortgage
against Philippine Smelter Corporation (PSC). Judgment was rendered in
favor of Leviste. When the decision became final and executory, the trial
court issued a writ of execution and respondent sheriff Eduardo R. Moreno
levied upon two (2) parcels of land. The parcels of land were sold at public
auction in favor of Vines Realty Corporation (Vines Realty). A copy of the writ
of possession was served on petitioner as owner of the power lines standing
on certain portions of the subject property.
Vines Realty filed an amended motion for an order of demolition and removal
of improvements on the subject land. Among the improvements for removal
were the power lines and electric posts belonging to petitioner. Respondent
Vines Realty cut down petitioners electric posts professedly using a
chainsaw and resulting in a loud blast affecting the area. The sheriff, at the
request of Vines Realty demolished the remaining electric posts resulting in
the cutting off of power supply to various business establishments and
barangays.
It was the contention that Vines Realty was the owner of the roadside and
that petitioner could not construct power lines therein without its permission.
Petitioner promptly replied that the power lines were constructed within the
right of way of the provincial road leading to the port of Osmea as granted
by the District Engineer of DPWH.
ISSUE:
Whether petitioner is entitled to retain possession of the power lines located
in the land sold at public auction as a result of extra-judicial foreclosure of
mortgage.
HELD: YES.
Among the powers granted to electric cooperatives by virtue of
Presidential Decree No. 269[36] are:
Section 16 Powers-
FACTS:
The National Housing Authority filed with the Regional Trial Court of
Cebu City, Branch 11, an Amended Complaint for eminent domain against
Associacion Benevola de Cebu, Engracia Urot and the Heirs of Isidro
Guivelondo. The purpose for this expropriation proceeding is that the
affected lands are to be developed as a specialized housing project by
ISSUE:
Whether or not an action for eminent domain may be dismissed where
the case had been decided and the judgment had already become final and
executory.
HELD:
No. Expropriation proceedings consists of two stages: first,
condemnation of the property after it is determined that its acquisition will
be for a public purpose or public use and, second, the determination of just
compensation to be paid for the taking of private property to be made by the
court with the assistance of not more than three commissioners. The
outcome of the first phase of expropriation proceedings, which is either an
order of expropriation or an order of dismissal, is final since it finally disposes
1 Judgment of the complaint for eminent domain which adopted the
recommendation of the Commissioners and fixing the just compensation of the
lands of respondent Heirs of Isidro Guivelondo at P11,200.00 per square meter.
of the case. On the other hand, the second phase ends with an order fixing
the amount of just compensation. Both orders, being final, are appealable.
Once the first order becomes final and no appeal thereto is taken, the
authority to expropriate and its public use can no longer be questioned.
In the case at bar, petitioner did not appeal the Order of the trial court
which declared that it has a lawful right to expropriate the properties of
respondent Heirs of Isidro Guivelondo. Hence, the Order became final and
may no longer be subject to review or reversal in any court. A final and
executory decision or order can no longer be disturbed or reopened no
matter how erroneous it may be. Although judicial determinations are not
infallible, judicial error should be corrected through appeals, not through
repeated suits on the same claim.
Moreover, petitioners argument that the intended public use was
rendered nugatory by the unreasonable just compensation fixed by the
court, which is beyond the means of the intended beneficiaries of the
socialized housing project is tenuous. The public purpose of the socialized
housing project is not in any way diminished by the amount of just
compensation that the court has fixed. The need to provide decent housing
to the urban poor dwellers in the locality was not lost by the mere fact that
the land cost more than petitioner had expected. Respondent landowners
had already been prejudiced by the expropriation case. Petitioner cannot be
permitted to institute condemnation proceedings against respondents only to
abandon it later when it finds the amount of just compensation
unacceptable.
Napocor v. Bongbong
Republic v. Gingoyon
FACTS
The case involves the matter of just compensation due the contractor for the
terminal complex it built. The present controversy has its roots with the
promulgation of the Court's decision in Agan v. PIATCO, promulgated in 2003
(2003 Decision). This decision nullified the "Concession Agreement for the
Build-Operate-and-Transfer Arrangement of the Ninoy Aquino International
ISSUE
1. Whether or not the Resolution permits expropriation
2. Whether Rule 67 of the Rules of Court or Rep. Act No. 8974 governs the
expropriation proceedings in this case.
HELD
continues to apply.
The most crucial difference between Rule 67 and Rep. Act No. 8974 concerns
the particular essential step the Government has to undertake to be entitled
to a writ of possession.
Rule 67 merely requires the Government to deposit with an authorized
government depositary the assessed value of the property for expropriation
for it to be entitled to a writ of possession. On the other hand, Rep. Act No.
8974 requires that the Government make a direct payment to the property
owner before the writ may issue.
Rule 67 cannot apply in this case without violating the 2004 Resolution. Even
assuming that Rep. Act No. 8974 does not govern in this case, it does not
necessarily follow that Rule 67 should then apply. After all, adherence to the
letter of Section 2, Rule 67 would in turn violate the Court's requirement in
the 2004 Resolution that there must first be payment of just compensation to
PIATCO before the Government may take over the property.
NOTE: The Proper Amount to be Paid under Rep. Act No. 8974
There could be no "BIR zonal valuations" on the NAIA 3 facility, as provided in
Rep. Act No. 8974, since zonal valuations are only for parcels of land, not for
airport terminals. Its entitlement to just compensation should be limited to
the value of the improvements and/or structures themselves. Thus, the
determination of just compensation cannot include the BIR zonal valuation
under Section 4 of Rep. Act No. 8974.
"in case the completion of a government infrastructure project is of utmost
urgency and importance, and there is no existing valuation of the area
concerned, the implementing agency shall immediately pay the owner of
the property its proferred value, taking into consideration the standards
prescribed in Section 5 [of the law]." As regards the amount, the Court sees
no impediment to recognize this sum of P3 Billion as the proffered value.
Still, we cannot deem the Government as having faithfully complied with
Rep. Act No. 8974. For the law plainly requires direct payment to the
property owner, and not a mere deposit with the authorized government
depositary. Without such direct payment, no writ of possession may be
obtained.
-Writ of Possession May Not Be Implemented Until Actual Receipt by PIATCO
of Proferred Value
FACTS:
Petitioner Republic of the Philippines, represented by the Department of
Public Works and Highways (DPWH), filed a Complaint against several
defendants, including private respondents, for the expropriation of several
parcels of land affected by the construction of the EDSA-Quezon Avenue
Flyover. Private respondents, Spouses William and Rebecca Genato, are the
registered owners of a piece of land ("subject property") covered by Transfer
Certificate of Title (TCT).
During the pendency of the proceedings, petitioner received a letter from
Engr. Patrick B. Gatan, Project Manager IV of the DPWH-NCR, reporting that
the subject property was "government land and that the transfer certificate
of title of the said claimant [respondent] . . . is of dubious origin and of
fabrication as it encroached or overlapped on a government property." As a
result, petitioner filed an Amended Complaint seeking to limit the coverage
of the proceedings to an area conforming to the findings of the DPWH.
Petitioner filed a Manifestation and Motion to have the subject property
"declared or considered of uncertain ownership or subject to conflicting
claims."
While petitioner was presenting evidence to show that the subject property
actually belonged to the Government, private respondents interposed
objections saying that petitioner was barred from presenting the evidence,
as it constituted a collateral attack on the validity of their TCT. The RTC then
required the parties to submit their respective Memoranda.
RTC
Upon receipt of the Memoranda, the trial court issued an Order finding that
the issue of the validity of the TCT can only be raised in an action expressly
instituted for that purpose and not in this instant proceeding.
Petitioner filed with the CA a Petition for Certiorari with Prayer for the
Issuance of a Temporary Restraining Order and/or Writ of Preliminary
Injunction.
CA
The CA dismissed the petition. Hence, this petition.
In this petition, petitioner argues that under Section 9, Rule 67 of the Rules of
Court, if the ownership of a property to be expropriated is uncertain, the
court in the same expropriation proceeding is also given authority to make a
proper adjudication of the matter.
This view is allegedly supported by Republic v. Court of First Instance of
Pampanga, presided formerly by Judge L. Pasicolan (Republic) in which the
trial court hearing the expropriation proceeding was also allowed to resolve
the issue of ownership.
Private respondents, on the other hand, invoke Section 48 of P.D. 1529, viz.:
SECTION 48. Certificate Not Subject to Collateral Attack. A
certificate of title shall not be subject to collateral attack. It
cannot be altered, modified, or cancelled except in a direct
proceeding in accordance with law.
ISSUE: Whether or not petitioner may be barred from presenting evidence to
assail the validity of respondents' title under the TCT.
HELD:
The SC ruled that petitioner may be allowed to present evidence to assert its
ownership over the subject property, but for the sole purpose of determining
who is entitled to just compensation.
Proper interpretation of Section 9, Rule 67
The SC first had the occasion to interpret Section 9, Rule 67 in the case of
Republic v. Court of First Instance of Pampanga, presided formerly by Judge
L. Pasicolan. In addressing the issue of "whether or not the court that hears
the expropriation case has also jurisdiction to determine, in the same
proceeding, the issue of ownership of the land sought to be condemned," the
Court answered in the affirmative:
The sole issue in this case, i.e., whether or not the court
that hears the expropriation case has also jurisdiction to
determine, in the same proceeding, the issue of ownership
of the land sought to be condemned, must be resolved in
the affirmative. That the court is empowered to entertain
the conflicting claims of ownership of the condemned or
sought to be condemned property and adjudge the rightful
owner thereof, in the same expropriation case, is evident
from Section 9 of the Revised Rule 69, which provides:
SEC. 9.Uncertain ownership. Conflicting claims.
If the ownership of the property taken is uncertain,
or there are conflicting claims to any part thereof,
the court may order any sum or sums awarded as
compensation for the property to be paid to the
clerk of court for the benefit of the persons
adjudged in the same proceeding to be entitled
thereto. But the judgment shall require the
payment of the sum or sums awarded to either the
defendant or the clerk before the plaintiff can enter
upon the property, or retain it for the public use or
purpose if entry has already been made.
In fact, the existence of doubt or obscurity in the title of the person or
persons claiming ownership of the properties to be expropriated would not
preclude the commencement of the action nor prevent the court from
assuming jurisdiction thereof. The Rules merely require, in such
eventuality, that the entity exercising the right of eminent domain should
state in the complaint that the true ownership of the property cannot be
ascertained or specified with accuracy.
Such findings of ownership in an expropriation proceeding should not be
construed as final and binding on the parties. By filing an action for
expropriation, the condemnor (petitioner), merely serves notice that it is
taking title to and possession of the property, and that the defendant is
asserting title to or interest in the property, not to prove a right to
possession, but to prove a right to compensation for the taking.
Inapplicability of Section 48, P.D. 1529