Beruflich Dokumente
Kultur Dokumente
The court held that from 1860 to 1892 there was no law in force in
these Islands by which the plaintiffs could obtain the ownership of
these lands by prescription, without any action by the State, and that
the judgment below declaring the defendant the owner of the lands
must be affirmed.
2. Cansino vs Valdez, G.R. No. L-2468, July 16, 1906
3. Carino vs Insular Government, 212 U. S., 449
FACTS:
1. That in the year 1860, the plaintiffs, and each one of them,
entered into the peaceful and quiet occupation and possession of the
larger part of the lands described in the complaint of the plaintiffs, to
wit [description]:
2. That on the date on which the plaintiffs entered into the occupation
and possession of the said lands, as above set forth, these lands and
every part thereof were public, untilled, and unoccupied, and
belonged to the then existing Government of the Philippine Islands.
That immediately after the occupation and possession of the said
lands by the plaintiffs, the plaintiffs began to cultivate and improve
them in a quiet and peaceful manner.
3. That from the said year 1860, the plaintiffs continued to occupy
and possess the said lands, quietly and peacefully, until the year
1892, by themselves, by their agents and tenants, claiming that they
were the exclusive owners of said lands.
4. That on or about the 16th day of January, 1892, Manuel Murciano,
defendant in this proceeding, acting on behalf of and as attorney in
fact of Candido Capulong, by occupation a cook, denounced the said
lands to the then existing Government of the Philippine Islands,
declaring that the said lands every part thereof were public, untilled,
and unoccupied lands belonging to the then existing Government of
the Philippine Islands, and petitioned for the sale of the same to him.
5. That before the execution of the sale heretofore mentioned,
various proceedings were had for the survey and measurement of the
lands in question at the instance of the defendant, Murciano, the
latter acting as agent and attorney in fact of said Candido Capulong, a
written protest, however, having been entered against these
proceedings by the plaintiff Andres Valenton.
6. That on the 14th day of July, 1892, Don Enrique Castellvie Ibarrola,
secretary of the treasury of the Province of Tarlac, in his official
capacity as such secretary, executed a contract of purchase and sale,
by which said lands were sold and conveyed by him to the defendant,
Manuel Murciano, as attorney for the said Candido Capulong.
7. That on the 19th day of July, 1892, said Candido Capulong
executed a contract of purchase and sale, by which he sold and
conveyed the said lands to the defendants, Manuel Murciano.
8. That from the said 14th day of July, 1892, Manuel Murciano has at
no time occupied or possessed all of the land mentioned, but has
possessed only certain in distinct and indefinite portions of the same.
That during all this time the plaintiffs have opposed the occupation of
the defendant, and said plaintiffs during all the time in question have
been and are in the possession and occupation of part of the said
lands, tilling them and improving them by themselves and by their
agents and tenants.
9. That never, prior to the said 14th day of July,, 1892, has the
defendant, Manuel Murciano, been in
the peaceful and quiet possession and occupation of the said lands, or
in the peaceful and quiet occupation of any part thereof.
ISSUE:
Whether or not during the years from 1860 to 1890 a private person,
situated as the plaintiffs were, could have obtained as against the
State the ownership of the public lands of the State by means of
occupation.
HELD:
NO. The court finds that at the time of the entry by the plaintiff in
1860 the lands were vacant and were public lands belonging to the
then existing Government. The plaintiffs do not claim to have ever
obtained from the Government any deed for the lands, nor any
confirmation of their possession.
and that as far as the decision in Civil Case No. 26, L.R. Case No. 601
which was affirmed in the appellate court in CA G.R. No. 5847R is
concerned, there is already "resadjudicata"
in other words, the cause of action of the applicant is now barred
by prior judgment and that this Court has no more jurisdiction over
the subject matter, the decision of the Court in said case having
transferred to the Director of Lands.
- On November 15, 1960 the De Villas (De Villa, Sr. was subsequently
included as oppositor) filed a motion to dismiss, invoking the same
grounds alleged in its opposition, but principally the fact that the land
applied for had already been declared public land by the judgment in
the former registration case.
- The trial court, over the objection of the applicants, granted the
motion to dismiss by order dated January 27, 1961, holding, inter
alia, that "once a parcel of land is declared or adjudged public land by
the court having jurisdiction x x x it cannot be the subject anymore of
another land registration proceeding x x x (that) it is only the Director
of Lands who can dispose of the same by sale, by lease, by free
patent or by homestead."
ISSUE:
Whether or not the 1949 judgment in the previous case, denying the
application of Vicente S. de Villa, Sr., and declaring the 107 hectares
in question to be public land, precludes a subsequent application by
an alleged possessor for judicial confirmation of title on the basis of
continuous possession for at least thirty years, pursuant to Section
48, subsection (b) of the Public Land Law,
C.A. 141, as amended.
HELD: YES.
It should be noted that appellants' application is in the alternative: for
registration of their title of ownership under Act 496 or for judicial
confirmation of their "imperfect" title or claim based on adverse and
continuous possession for at least thirty years. It may be that
although they were not actual parties in that previous case the
judgment therein is a bar to their claim as owners under the first
alternative, since the proceeding was in rem, of which they
and their predecessor had constructive notice by publication.
II. Land Classification
Agencies Involved
1. DOJ Opinion No. 23, Series of 1995 (17 Mar 1995 )
Reconsideration of DOJ Opinion No. 169, s. 1993, on the DOJ
affirmative stand on whether the prohibition against the
reclassification of forest lands applies to "unclassified public forest"
DOJ Opinion No. 169, s. 1993 (09 Dec 1993 )
Whether the prohibition in Section 4(a) of the Comprehensive
Agrarian Reform Law to reclassify forest and mineral lands to
alienable and disposable land applies to unclassified public forest
2. DENR vs Yap (G.R. No. 167707, October 08, 2008)
Agricultural Land
1. de Aldecoa vs Insular Government (G.R. No. 3894. March
12, 1909)
2. Krivenko vs. Register of Deeds of Manila (18 G.R. No. L-630.
November 15, 1947)
Mineral Lands
1. Lepanto Consolidated Mining Co. vs. Dumyung (GR No. L31666, April 20, 1929)
2. Republic vs. Court of Appeals and dela Rosa (GR No. L43938, April 15, 1988)
Ancestral Domain
(RA No. 8371) "The Indigenous Peoples Rights Act of 1997
1. Cruz vs. DENR Secretary (G.R. No. 135385, December 6,
2000)
Survey Error
1. Republic vs. Peralta, et al., En Banc (G.R. No. 150327, June
18, 2003) FACTS:
- On September 26, 1994, Marilyn A. Peralta, Rosie A. Lavalan, Grace
A. Reyes, Alberto B. Alonday, Mercy B. Alonday, Rochelieu B. Alonday,
Azucena B. Alonday, Benedicto B. Alonday, and Janeta A. Baluran filed
a complaint for recovery of possession and ownership of real property
with the Regional Trial Court of Davao City, Branch 13, against the
defendants Republic of the Philippines, the Regional Executive
Director of Region XI of the Department of Environment and Natural
Resources (DENR) and the Conservation Officer in said region. The
plaintiffs alleged therein, inter alia, that they are the heirs of
Benedicto B. Alonday who applied for and was granted Homestead
Patent No. V11244 by the then Secretary of Agriculture and Natural
Resources (DENR) over Lot 3561 with an area of 237,898 square
meters the said lot was a portion of Lot 2988 of the Guiang Cadastre
located in Guiang, Davao City and that on the basis of said patent,
Benedicto Alonday was issued Original Certificate of Title No. P275
over the said property by the Register of Deeds they purchased the
said property from their father Benedicto and were issued on April 25,
1988 Transfer Certificate of Title No. T134231 in their names the
property was allegedly alienable and disposable property within
Project 1B, certified on January 13, 1931 as per LC Map No. 1412
approved by the Director of Bureau of Forestry, as confirmed by the
letter of the petitioner Regional Director, dated February 15, 1994
they had been in possession of the said property as owner thereof
since November 1965 and that some time in 1969, officers of the
Bureau of Forest Development (BFD) sought his permission to use a
portion of said property with an area of five hectares the BFD caused
the construction of a big concrete building on said portion of the
property on June 28, 1971, Benedictos lawyer wrote a letter to the
BFD demanding that it vacate the said portion of his property on
which the building was constructed but said letter was ignored on
February 24, 1979, Forest Conservation Officer Marion Abundio, Sr.
asked permission from Benedicto to allow the BFD to install on a
portion of the subject property consisting of twenty five square
meters a small generator to provide electricity to the existing building
and compound of the Philippine Eagles Acclimatization and Breeding
Center Benedicto did not give his assent to these requests of the
aforenamed government officials despite which they still caused the
construction of the building and installation of the generator unit the
plaintiffs demanded that the defendants vacate the property on July
14, 1994 but the latter refused. The plaintiffs prayed that after due
proceedings judgment be rendered in their favor and that the
defendants be ordered to vacate the subject property and pay the
plaintiffs damages and litigation expenses.
- The plaintiffs appended as annexes to their petition copies of the
aforesaid title and letters of the BFD officials. In their answer to the
complaint, the defendants, through the Office of the Solicitor General
(OSG), interposed the special and affirmative defenses that: (a) the
complaint did not state a cause of action against them (b) the
building constructed by the defendants was within the perimeter of
the Mt. Apo National Park, a forest reserve under Proclamation No.
annulment of Decree No. 381928 on the ground that the trial court
did not have jurisdiction to adjudicate a portion of the subject
property which was allegedly still classified as timber land at the time
of the issuance of Decree No. 381928.
ISSUE:
Whether the Court had jurisdiction to determine whether the subject
property, including the disputed portion, applied for was agricultural,
timber or mineral land.
HELD:
The Court DENIED the petition and DISMISSED the petitioners
complaint. The Court ruled that:
We are inclined to agree with the respondent that it is legally doubtful
if the authority of the Governor General to declare lands as alienable
and disposable would apply to lands that have become private
property or lands that have been impressed with a private right
authorized and recognized by Act 2874 or any valid law. By express
declaration of Section 45 (b) of Act 2874 which is quoted above,
those who have been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious
possession and occupation of agricultural lands of the public domain
under a bona fide claim of acquisition of ownership since July 26,
1894 may file an application with the Court of First Instance of the
province where the land is located for confirmation of their claims and
these applicants shall be conclusively presumed to have performed all
the conditions essential to a government grant and shall be entitled to
a certificate of title. When the land registration court issued a decision
for the issuance of a decree which was the basis of an original
certificate of title to the land, the court had already made a
determination that the land was agricultural and that the applicant
had proven that he was in open and exclusive possession of the
subject land for the prescribed number of years. It was the land
Ibid.) that there are overlappings on the boundaries of the two (2)
lands (Nos. 226, 27, 28 and 29, Ibid.) and that the overlappings are
due to the defect in the survey on petitioner's land since it did not
duly conform with the previously approved survey of Lot 1, 113218
As with this case, when the trial court issued the decision for the
under OCT 8565 (No. 25, lbid). He ended his report by submitting
issuance of Decree No. 381928 in 1930, the trial court had jurisdiction that private respondents' land, TCT No. 8565, prevails over
to determine whether the subject property, including the disputed
petitioner's land, TCT No. 45764, since the former was surveyed and
portion, applied for was agricultural, timber or mineral land. The trial
titled ahead.
court determined that the land was agricultural and that spouses
Carag proved that they were entitled to the decree and a certificate of ISSUE:
title. The government, which was a party in the original proceedings
Who between the two title holders is entitled to the land in dispute?
in the trial court as required by law, did not appeal the decision of the
trial court declaring the subject land as agricultural. Since the trial
HELD:
court had jurisdiction over the subject matter of the action, its
It must be stated that private respondents and their predecessor or
decision rendered in 1930, or 78 years ago, is now final and beyond
predecessors never possessed, much less, claimed the overlapped
review.
portions. Petitioner has been always in possession of the same in the
concept of an owner, and his possession was disturbed only in
Bureaucratic Constraints in Classification of Lands
February, 1966, when the private respondents caused to be placed
two (2) monuments inside his land. It will be recalled that, as per
report of Surveyor Jovino B. Dauz (Record on Appeal, pp. 2128),
1. Republic of the Philippines vs. Court of Appeals, En Banc
private respondents' land (TCT8565 is Lot No. 1, 118218)
(G.R. No. 127245, January 30, 2001)
was surveyed on March 11, 1913 and originally titled and registered
on March 1, 1918 in the name of Dominga Balanga. On the other
III. Identifying Lands - surveying and mapping
hand, petitioner's land (TCT No. 45764) is LotA of Subdivision plan,
Psd14013, a portion of land described in OCT No. 126) was surveyed
1. Golloy v. Court of Appeals, (G.R. No. 47491, May 4, 1989)
on March 18, 1918 and subsequently titled and registered in the
name of Agustin Golloy. The said lands, having been surveyed and
FACTS:
thereafter registered, it follows that monuments were placed therein
- Herein petitioner, for more than twenty (20) years, has been the
registered owner and in possession of a 41,545square meter parcel of to indicate their respective boundaries. It is hardly persuasive that
land covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. 45764. The Southwest private respondents' predecessor, Dominga Balanga, believing that
she has a rightful claim to the overlapped portions, did not make any
portion of this land is bounded by herein private respondents' land
move to question the placement of the monuments. She could have
which is covered by Certificate of Title No. 8565. Sometime in
easily objected to the placement and pointed out that the placement
February, 1966, private respondents subdivided their land among
of the monuments excluded the overlapped portions from her
themselves. In the course of the subdivision, private respondents
caused to be placed two (2) monuments inside the Southwest, portion property. However, no such objection was made. These facts could
of petitioner's land. Hence, petitioner filed with the then Court of First only be construed to mean that private respondents' predecessor,
Dominga Balanga, never believed that she has a right and legal claim
Instance of Tarlac, presided over by Judge Arturo B. Santos an
action to quiet title. The same was docketed therein as Civil Case No. to the overlapped portion. There appears to be no evidence to
support claims of repeated demands against petitioner to refrain from
4312.
cultivating the contested portion, much less an action filed in court to
enforce such demands.
- Private respondents, in their filed motion to dismiss with
counterclaim, alleged that they never encroached upon the
landholding of petitioner and nothing has been placed on his land
which would create any cloud thereon and that the truth of the
matter was that they merely subdivided their own land according to
their title and therefore there was nothing for petitioner to quiet or
remove cloud on his title. .
- In the pretrial of December 12, 1967, the parties agreed that
inasmuch as the only issue in dispute referred ultimately to the
question of the boundaries of their respective lots, the same might be
resolved by appointing a public surveyor of the Bureau of Lands to
relocate the disputed area with the end in view of determining the
true and correct boundaries of their parcels. .
- The trial court, in line with the abovesaid agreement, in an Order
dated December 13, 1968, ordered the Director of Lands to appoint
an impartial public land surveyor to conduct the relocation survey on
the disputed area.
- On May 20, 1968, Jovino B. Dauz, Surveyor of the Bureau of Lands,
Dagupan City, submitted his Report (Record on Appeal, pp. 2128,
Rollo, p. 34), which states in substance, that petitioner's land is Lot A
of the Subdivision plan, Psd1413, being a portion of the land
described in Original Certificate of Title No. 126 in the name of
Agustin Golloy (No. 11, Record on Appeal, p. 23) that the land titled
under OCT No. 126 was surveyed on March 18, 1918 and
subsequently titled and registered on August 15, 1919 (No. 12, Ibid)
that on the other hand, private respondents' land is Lot No. 1,
118218 in the name of Domingo Balanga, surveyed on March 11,
1913 and originally titled and registered on March 1, 1918 (No. 15,
FACTS:
By virtue of an application filed by Maximo Alfafara, the Bureau of
Forestry granted him a permit on February 1, 1923, by virtue of which
LIST OF CASES (2)
he was authorized to construct and maintain a fishpond within lot No.
741 of the Carcar cadastre. Said permittee constructed fishpond dikes
IV. Modes of Acquiring Title to Public Lands
along the side of the land facing General Luna street and running
parallel to the river. Said dikes were destroyed by the flood which
Balboa vs. Farrales, G.R. No. L-27059, February 14, 1928
occurred in the same year. In 1926, the permittee abandoned the
idea of converting the land into a fishpond and, instead, he decided to
FACTS:
convert it into a ricefield. To this effect, the permittee entered into an
(1)in the year 1913, the plaintiff Buenaventura Balboa filled with the
agreement with the respondents whereby the latter would convert the
Bureau of Lands an application for homestead, No. 10619, under the
land into a ricefield on condition that they would take for themselves
provisions of Act No. 926, covering a tract of land situated in the
the harvests for the first three years and thereafter the crop would be
barrio of Culis, municipality of Hermosa, Province of Bataan,
divided share and share alike between the permittee and the
containing 14 hectares, 49 ares and 77 centares.
respondents. In 1930, the permittee ceded his rights and interests in
(2) Five years thereafter, or in 1918, Balboa submitted proof, showing the land to his son, Catalino Alfafara, who continued improving the
his residence upon, and cultivation of said land, as well as his
same by constructing more rice paddies and planting nipa palms
compliance with all of the other requirements of section 3 of said Act
along its border. Having converted the land into a ricefield, Catalino
No. 926, which final proof was approved by the Director of Lands on
Alfafara filed a homestead application therefor in his name while at
February 15, 1918. On July 1, 1919, said Act No. 926 was repealed
the same time continuing the same agreement with respondents as
by Act No. 2874.
share croppers. Upon the death of Catalino Alfafara in 1945, the
(3) On September 10, 1920, or over a year after Act No. 2874 had
respondents, after the harvest in 1946, began asserting their own
gone into effect, the homestead patent for said land, otherwise known right over the land and refused to give the share corresponding to
as certificate of title No. 91 was issued n favor of Buenventura Balboa Catalino Alfafara to his widow, the herein petitioner.
by the Governor-General of the Philippine Islands.
(4) On August 11, 1924, said Buenaventura Balboa, for and in
The claim of respondents that they improved the land in their own
consideration of the sum of P950, sold said land to the defendant
right and not with permission of petitioner's predecessors-in-interest,
Cecilio L. Farrales; and on October 16, 1924, the latter secured in his was not given credence by the Bureau of Lands, for its agents found,
name transfer certificate of title No. 650 of said land. On March 6,
not only from the evidence presented, but also from their ocular
1926, the plaintiff commenced the present action for the purpose of
inspection, that the land has been under the rightful possession of
having said sale declared null and void on the ground of lack of
Maximo Alfafara since 1923, and that the respondents were only able
consent on his part and fraud on the part of the defendant, and on
to work thereon upon his permission on a share basis. By virtue of
the further ground that said sale was contrary to, and in violation of
these findings of the Director of Lands, the homestead application of
the provisions of section 116 of Act No. 2874.The lower court Judge
petitioner was given due course.
rendered a decision on the basis that the said sale was null and void
since, The sale was done before the lapse of five years upon the
ISSUE:
issuance of the certificate, which in accordance with act no. 2874.
Whether or not the petitioner or any of her predecessors-in-interest
ISSUE:
acquired any right to the land under the provisions of the Public Land
Whether or not Act 2874, and not Act 926, shall be applicable to
Law.
HELD: YES.
Even in the supposition that the permit we granted to Maximo Alfafara
by the Bureau of Forestry to possess the land and work it out for his
benefit be against the law and as such can have no legal effect, the
fact however is that Maximo Alfafara has acted thereon in good faith
honestly believing that his possession of the land was legal and was
given to him under the virtue of the authority of the law. Likewise, it
cannot be reasonably disputed that when Maximo Alfafara entered
into a contract with the respondents for the conversion of the land
into a ricefield with the understanding that the respondents, as a
reward for their service, would get for themselves all the harvest for
the first three years, and thereafter the harvest would be divided
between them and Maximo Alfafara share and share alike both
Alfafara and respondents have acted in good faith in the honest belief
that what they were doing was legal and in pursuance of the permit
granted to Alfafara under the authority of the law. Having entered
into that contractual relation in good faith no other conclusion can be
drawn than that such contract has produced as a necessary
consequence the relation of landlord and tenant so much so that the
respondents worked the land only on the basis of such undertaking.
And this relation continued not only when Maximo Alfafara assigned
his right under the permit to his son Catalino, but also when the later
died and his widow, the herein petitioner, took over and continued
possessing the land as successor-in-interest of her husband. And it
was only in 1946, after the death of Catalino Alfafara, that
respondents got wise and taking advantage of the helplessness of his
widow, coveted the land and decided to assert their own right over it
by filing their own application for homestead with the Bureau of
Lands. Such a conduct cannot be regarded as one done in good faith
and, in our opinion, cannot serve as basis for a grant of public land
under the ruling invoked by the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural
Resources.
FACTS:
This case involves claims to 14.25 hectares of public land in
Bambang, Sto. Domingo,Nueva Vizcaya. The land was originally
applied for as homestead by Jose Aquino. Upon his death, Aquino was
succeeded by his children who sold their rights to the land to the
present appellee, Serapio Dauan on December 16, 1943, appellee
sold his rights to one-half of the land to appellant Simon Ilarde and
that on July 24, 1951, he sold his rights to 4 hectares to appellant
Lord Calangan and to 3 hectares to appellant Basilia Tomas. On March
28, 1955, Calangan and Tomas in turn sold their rights to some part
of the land to Santos Baysa. These sales were all made without the
previous approval of the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural
Resources.
ISSUE:
Whether the transfer of homestead right is valid even without the
approval of the Director of Land?
HELD:
NO, the court ruled that under of Public Land Act (Commonwealth Act
No. 141). Sec. 20 states that if at any time after the approval of the
application and before the patent is issued, the applicant shall prove
to the satisfaction of the Director of Lands that he has complied with
all requirements of the law. However, such cannot continue with his
homestead if through no fault of his own, there is a bona fide
purchaser for the rights and improvements of the applicant on the
land, and the conveyance is not made for purposes of speculation. In
this case, the applicant, with the previous approval of the Secretary of
Agriculture and Commerce, may transfer his rights to the land and
improvements to any person legally qualified to apply for a
homestead. Such transferee may legally acquire the land should the
he file a homestead application to the land so acquired including the
rights and obligations of the previous homesteader from the date of
application. Any person who has so transferred his rights may again
apply For a new homestead.
FACTS:
Plaintiffs-appellees brought this action, alleging that they are absolute
owners of land situated in Barrio Aneg, Tumauini, Isabela; that said
land was acquired as a homestead by MariaDiaz in the year 1939, by
virtue of her H.A. No. 229763 (Entry No. 138890), approved by the
Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources on November 29,
1950; that plaintiffs herein,parents of Maria Diaz, succeeded to the
possession of the said homestead. The defendants illegally took
possession of a portion of the said homestead, containing area of 6
hectares and yielding an annual harvest of 480 cavans of palay valued
at P7.00 percavan. The defendants Pascual Macalinao is another
homestead applicant and his application conflicts with that of the late
Maria Diaz, predecessor-in-interest of the plaintiffs, and that the
other defendants have no interest or right over the land subject
matter of the action.
FACTS:
Sinforoso Pascua obtained ownership of a homestead. On March 23,
1936, Florentino Pascua acquired said homestead by inheritance. On
August 2, 1940, Florentino sold the above-mentioned land to Jose
Talens. In 1943, Florentino demanded re-conveyance of the land
pursuant to section 117 of Act No. 2874. The defendant refused.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the Director of Lands has the jurisdiction to determine
which of the rival homesteaders should be entitled to possess.
HELD:
Yes. A homestead entry having been permitted by the Director of
Lands the homestead is segregated from the public domain and the
Director of Lands is divested of the control and possession thereof.
The only exception is if the application is finally disapproved and the
entry annulled or revoked.
Dauan vs. Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources, 19
SCRA 223
ISSUE:
Whether or not an heir may exercise right of repurchase by the
homesteader under Act no. 2874.
HED:
YES, the right to repurchase exists not only when the original
homesteader makes the conveyance, but also when it is made by his
widow or heirs. Section 117 of Act No. 2874 states that "Every
conveyance of land acquired under the free patent or homestead
provisions, when proper, shall be subject to repurchase by the
applicant, his widow, or legal heirs, for a period of five years from the
date of the conveyance."
Simeon v. Pea, GR No. L-29049, December 29, 1970;
public domain. And that ownership and possession of the land sought
to be registered by the applicant was duly recognized by the
government. The Director of Lands takes issue to the applicability of
the 1935 Constitution to the matter at hand. He asserts that, the
registration proceedings have been commenced only on July 17,
1981, or long after the 1973 Constitution had gone into effect, and
since section 11 of its Article XIV prohibits private corporations or
associations from holding alienable lands of the public domain, except
by lease not to exceed 1,000 hectares, it was reversible error to
decree registration in favor of Acme.
ISSUE:
Whether the title that the Infiels had transferred to Acme in 1962
could be confirmed.
HELD:
YES. The question turns upon a determination of the character of the
lands at the time of institution of the registration proceedings in
1981. The correct rule, as enunciated in the line of cases already
referred to, is that alienable public land held by a possessor,
personally or through his predecessors-in-interest, openly,
continuously and exclusively for the prescribed statutory period (30
years under The Public Land Act, as amended) is converted to private
property by the mere lapse or completion of said period, ipso jure.
Following that rule and on the basis of the undisputed facts, the land
subject of this appeal was already private property at the time it was
acquired from the Infiels by Acme. Acme thereby acquired a
registrable title, there being at the time no prohibition against said
corporation's holding or owning private land.
Susana Meguinto, et al. vs. Republic of the Philippines, GR No.
134308, December 14, 2000).
Republic vs. de Guzman, 326 SCRA 574
Republic of the Philippines vs. East Silverland Realty
Development Corporation; G.R. No. 186961, February 20, 2012
FACTS:
The Republic assails the decision of the CSA, affirming the RTCs grant
to East Silverlane Realty Development Corporation (ESRDC) of its
petition for registration of a parcel of land situated in El Salvador,
Misamis Oriental. ESRDC purchased a portion of the subject property
from Francisca Oco in November 27, 1990 and the remaining portion
from Rosario U.Tan Lim, Nemesia Tan and Mariano U. Tan on April 11,
1991. It was claimed that the respondents predecessors-in-interest
had been in open, notorious, continuous and exclusive possession of
the subject property since June 12, 1945. The Republic alleges that
the respondent failed to prove that its predecessors-in-interest
possessed the subject property in the manner and for the length of
time CA No. 141 and PD No. 1529.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the respondent has proven itself entitled to the
benefits of the CA No.141 and PD No. 1529 on confirmation of
imperfect or incomplete titles.
HELD:
NO. On the premise that the application for registration, which was
FACTS:
filed in 1995, is based on Section 14 (2), it was not proven that the
Respondent Acme Plywood & Veneer Co., Inc. acquired five parcels of respondent and its predecessors-in-interest had been in possession of
land from Mariano and Acer Infiel, members of the Dumagat tribe.
the subject property in the manner prescribed by law and for the
The possession of the applicant Acme Plywood & Veneer Co., Inc., is
period necessary before acquisitive prescription may apply. While the
continuous, adverse and public from 1962 to the present and tacking
subject land was supposedly declared alienable and disposable on
the possession of the Infiels who were granted from whom the
December 31, 1925 per the April 18, 1997 Certification and July 1,
applicant bought said land on October 29, 1962, hence the possession 1997 Report of the Community Environment and Natural Resources
is already considered from time immemorial. The land sought to be
Office(CENRO), the Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR) converted
registered is a private land pursuant to the provisions of Republic Act
the same from agricultural to industrial only on October 16, 1990.
No.3872 granting absolute ownership to members of the nonAlso, it was only in 200 that the Municipality of El Salvador passed a
Christian Tribes on land occupied by them or their ancestral lands,
Zoning Ordinance, including the subject property in the industrial
whether with the alienable or disposable public land or within the
zone. Therefore, it was only in 1990 that the subject property had
HELD:
The court ruled in favor of Cortes saying that the portion of land
included in the technical description presented by the applicant,
situated between the lot to which said instrument refers and the bed
of the Meisic Creek, has been gradually formed alluvion, as the result
of the current in the said stream. The said portion of land belongs by
right of accretion to the owner of the land. The Law of Waters
provides that the accretion resulting from the gradual deposit by or
sedimentation from the waters belongs to the owners of the land
bordering on streams, torrents,lakes and rivers. Furthermore, there is
no evidence to prove that the addition to the said property was
ISSUE:
artificially made by the owner. This means that the accretion is a work Whether or not respondents could claim the property by virtue of
petitioners assail certain provisions of the IPRA and its IRR on the
ground that these amount to an unlawful deprivation of the States
ownership over lands of the public domain as well as minerals and
other natural resources therein, in violation of the regalian doctrine
embodied in section 2, Article XII of the Constitution.
ISSUE:
Do the provisions of IPRA contravene the Constitution?
HELD:
No, the provisions of IPRA do not contravene the Constitution.
Examining the IPRA, there is nothing in the law that grants to the
ICCs/IPs ownership over the natural resources within their ancestral
domain. Ownership over the natural resources in the ancestral
domains remains with the State and the rights granted by the IPRA to
the ICCs/IPs over the natural resources in their ancestral domains
merely gives them, as owners and occupants of the land on which the
resources are found, the right to the small scale utilization of these
resources, and at the same time, a priority in their large scale
development and exploitation.
FACTS:
The Grandes are owners of a parcel of land in Isabela, by inheritance
from their deceased mother, Patricia Angui, who likewise, inherited it
from her parents. In the early 1930s,the Grandes decided to have
their land surveyed for registration purposes. The land was described
to have Cagayan River as the northeastern boundary, as stated in the
title.
Additionally, ancestral lands and ancestral domains are not part of the
lands of the public domain. They are private lands and belong to the
ICCs/IPs by native title, which is a concept of private land title that
existed irrespective of any royal grant from the State. However, the
right of ownership and possession by the ICCs/IPs of their ancestral
domains is a limited form of ownership and does not include the right
to alienate the same.