EN BANC

GR No. L-597 August 29, 1947

PURE KALAW LEDESMA LEDESMA and RAFAEL, plaintiffs-appellees, vs..
EMILIO PICTAIN, defendant-appellant.
D. Tomas P. Panganiban in representation of appellant.
Mr. Antonio Gonzalez in representation of the appellees.
PAUL, J.:
Were a started in the Municipal Court of Manila that conform witha sued by
conviction, appealed to in the Court dePrimera Instance. After the corresponding
view, this Court condemned the defendant developed lojar the street fincasituada R.
Hidalgo, No. 1100, Manila, to pay the plaintiffs the monthly alquier elprimero P40
from August 1945 to vacate and pay the court costs. In the same judgment autorizaal
defendant to remove the improvements brought by the, local dejandoel the same
condition it was in before poneraquellas eg.
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On appeal, the defendant does not dispute the fact conclusionesde the original ruling.
Only right cuestionesde raises, saying the lower court errors to noaplicar Law No. 689
to the present case and dismiss it no complaint for lack of cause of action.
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The appellant alleges that the approval of Law No. 689en October 15, 1945,
arrendamientoque contract, according to Article 1581 of the Civil Code, was to
entendersede month to month, extended stay automaticante aseis months the lease that
comenzodesde the date the law came into force, was extendidohasta the April 15,
1946, that after this date fuesolamente when the cause of action born of
demandantes.Por this reason, - argues the defendant, - debiohaber been dismissed the
demand.
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To safeguard the welfare of war-torn habitantesdelasciudades to preserve the

saludpublica and avoid unnecessary disorders community, Congress using its police
power aprobola Act No. 689, which provides that the contract dearrendamientode
month to month - to absence of expressed sobresu duration - "shall mean done for six
months." Comola law passed was not commensurate with the situation exigenciasde,
Congress, in the NEXT period desesiones, the amended so that the contract is for one
year entiendahecho. (Article 1. Of Commonwealth Act No. 689 as it has been
amended by Republic Act No. 66de.) This one-year count "fromthe time occupation
has started in virtudde semenjante contract." A contract refers to the occupation? The
contract under the provisions delCodigo been Civil or under the provisions of the new
law?
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If the tenant, say for example, has acupadola estate since the first of January 1940 on
a monthly rent, and continued automatic renewal enmes month, was I occupied until
October 18 1946fecha that was passed Republic Act No . 66, since when we have year
lease? There are three theories: (1) from the first occupation of acuerdocon the
provisions of the Civil Code or the first of JANUARY 1940 in the proposed case, (2)

approval from dela Law No. 66 of the Republic, and (3) from the primeratacita
renewal after the approval of this Act
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If we count from 1. January 1940, which is the original occupation under the Code
Civl, the arrendatarioya would have no right to that within a year because
haterminado and on December 31 the same year, the elapsed plazoha excess. There
will be no Congress intenciondel been computed within one year from the original
occupancy pursuant to the provisions of CodigoCivil. In this case the term granted by
law would be illusory, if not absurd.
If the words of the law is liable to more than one acceptation, how absurd is an
interpretation would result unargumento force against their adoption. (Chartered
Bankof India, Australia and China against Imperial and National Bank, 48 Phil., 983.)
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In the interpretation of the law must always determine ydar effect to the intention of
the legislature, and the courts are not the words of a atendrana cuandro law deviates
from the true object of the legislature intenciony and inconsistent conclusions ileve
withthe spirit of the Law . Sutherland On this matter, the autoridadmas significant
modes of legal hermeneutics, says:
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The intent of the law is. - If debeproducir law validates its effects according to the
purpose and intent of legialador. The intention is vital, dla essence of the law, andthe
main rule interpretation is to determine and give effect to laintencion. The intention of
the legislature to enact a law is lamisma law and should be enforced when
determined, even cuandono is conform to the letter of the law when it deviates from
the true intent and general purpose of the law. The intention is espirituque gives life to
a legislative sanction. When interpreting a law is proposed to follow proper procedure
laid and adjustarse to laverdadera intention of the legislature and adopt the meaning
that the text harmonicemas encourage the better the politicay end of the legislature.
"(2 Sutherland, Statutory construction, 693.) Torres against Limjap, 56 Phil., 153.
If we count from the date of the approval dela law - October 18, 1946 - we would not
have absolutamenteningun based on the law, as is expressly disponeque the new
period must begin "from the time the occupation has begun inwhichthe under
semejantecontrato" without any reference to the date on which entroen force law.
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library

If we count the first automatic renewal term after the adoption of the law, then elano
begins from the first of November 1946 ytermina on October 30, 1947. Of the three
theories is the last ointerpretaciones this agreement withthe intention of the legislator,
which provides a reasonable remediopositivo and the current housing crisis.
Furthermore, it is possible that Congress has put in a worse situation qeurido a former
tenant who has been occupying a farm for many years that a new quesolo occupies the
property after the adoption of the law: andcannot dictate a discriminatory law. The
reason the law was cardinalde leave things status quo to minimize effects of war that
houses would not have thrown suficientespara the court, if reclamasenel arrendores
eviction of tenants under the provisions of Article 1581 of the Civil Code.
Urgentenecesidad had to restrict the grounds for eviction in biende the community, as
an order was necessary because a complete demoratoria economic dislocation.
Congress provided that "Except as provided in Article (eleven) twelve this Act, no
tenant eviction cases will uocupante than the faltavoluntaria and payment of Rent to

deliberate or when elarrendador must acupar the edificcio given on lease. " (Sec. 2 of
Commonwealth Act No. 689 talcomo was amended by Republic Act No. 66.) This
legal provision any tenant, afterthe the approval of the law, will be evicted unless (a)
voluntary and deleberadamente stop paying the rent, or (b) that the landlord has the
need to occupy the property, or (c) that the lessee sublet without the landlord's
consentimientoescrito. 1 (Sec. 11.)
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According to the court ruling, the plaintiffs have needfor ocuapr the only house they
stay, part of which now occupies the defendant. All other houses had been burned
during the entry of the liberating troops, and currently live in a house the
calleValenzuela No. 241, Manila, P250 mensualde paying rent. These findings of fact
of the appealed decision should not be reviewed. (Rule 42, Article 2.) It is unfair that
the plaintiffs, having a house of their own, they can not occupy it and have to live in
otray pay a monthly rent? If it is inhumane, under current lascircuntancias, kick a
tenant of a casaarrendada, it is also inhumane to deprive the owner occupies
yourhome in preference to any other person, that it is not bound to the plight of living
in a strange house, paying rent more or less exorbitant.
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The provision of the law that any tenant will develop huciado but only in cases
specified esmandatoria, and should be applied in pending cases inthe courts at the
time of approval. Esley emerging character, and will be in vigordurante only four
years since the date of its approval. Inthe explanatory note, the authors of the bill
introduced in the Senate, said: "As this is speculation castigaruna is creadads
circuntanciasespeciales product of the war, the law ceases to govern encuanto
emergency expires." The puedsenobrar trubunales otherwise not.
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The need for the plaintiffs to use the house is its cause of action to evict the defendant.
No errors the court a quo in not discharging demand.
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It confirms the judgment appealed against the costs elapelante.

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Moran, CJ, Paras, Briones, Hontiveros and Tuason, MM., Are satisfied.

PERFECT, M.:

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In accordance with the result.

Separate Opinions

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FAIR, J., dissenting and concurring:

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Under Commonwealth Act No. 689, as amended byRepublic Act No. 66, as construed
by This Court in thecase of Santos vs. De Alvarez (78 Phil., 503), the tenant onlycases
In Which May to be ousted are (1) deliberatefailure to pay the rents, (2) sublease of
the premiseswithout the consent of the lessor, and (3) ofthe necessity landlord to
occupy the premises.
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A lessee May be ousted, even before the expiration ofthe term of lease stipulated by
the parties or provided bylaw, if the lessee (1) deliberately fails to pay the rents, or (2)
sublease the property to another without the lessor'sconsent. But if the landlord needs
to occupy the leased proerty, May I oust the tenant before the expiration of theterm of
lease stipulated in the contract of lease, or extendedby Act No. 689? The majority
decision holds the affirmative, and we the negative for the Following cogent reasons:
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The Provisions of section 1, Act No. 689 as amended Act No. 66 byRepublic Provides
that contracts of lease ofresidential building which do not specify any term, shallbe
Considered Counted as one year duration from the dateof occupation by virtue of said
contract of lease, at theoption of the lessee. If the lessee May be ousted before the
expiration of the term of lease stipulated by the partiesor extended by law if I needs
the premises, what is theuse of Such extension? It would be absolutely useless
orsuperflous for the law to Provide for Such an extension by the law itself, if the
lessor May oust the lessee at anytime if I needs the leased property. It is
elementarythat if a law contains several Provisions or particulars, if possible Such a
construction will be ADOPTED as will give effect to all (section 58, Rule 123).
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Besides, there can not be any doubt That Act No. 689, as amended, was Enacted by
Congress for the benefit of tenants rather than That of landlords. Generally
poorpeople are tenants who can not afford to live in a house of Their Own, and
landlords are well-to-do persons Who Have To Have Sufficient means residential or
build houses for themselves. To Hold That, under Act No. 689, as amended,
conventional legal or term of lease That is binding upon the lessee, the lessor does not
bind if the Latter needs the leased premises, would be to place the lessor in a better
position than the lease. It is True that there are exceptional cases in Which the
landlord May need badly the property leased and cannotafford to have any other
house to live in except the leased property, but it is to be Presumed Such That the
lessor under circumstance or having Such perspective, would not have his leased
property at all, or it would not have leased without term but for a short term so as to
Prevent the application of the law Which considers as a lease for one if there is no
fixed term by the party, in order That Have the premises whenever service hemay
May be I need to occupy it.
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There is no reasonable ground on Which to Base theconclusion That the period of

extension provided by Act No. 689 is applicable to the present case in Which
thecontract of lease was Entered into in 1940, for there evidence beingno That a
period or term of lease was stipulated by the parties, the legal presumption Is that the
original lease was from month to month, Because the rent was paid by month, and
That the occpuation of the property leasedmust have Begun at the time the original
lease was perfected. And there is no legal Considering the first was for tacit renewal
after the approval of said Act as the contract of lease term without Entered into by the
parties, Referred to in section 1 of Act No. 689, as amended, since tacit renewal (tacit
renewal) is not a contract without term Entered into by the parties, but an implied
renewal of a previous contract. A tacit renewal Takes place only if before the
expiration of fifteen days after the expirationof the previous term of a contract of
lease, not demand to recover the possession of the property leased from the tenant has
been made by the landlord or lessor. There can not be a tacit renewal without a prior
contract.
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We are of the review That the trial court did not err in not dismissing the complaint,
Because the Plaintiffs need the premises for Their Own According To use the
evidence, and THEREFORE the judgment appealed from is Affirmed with costs
against the appellant.

YARN, J., concurring:

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I concur in the decision of the majority Which Affirms the judgment appealed from.
But my Reasons are Those Which Have Been set forth at length in my
dissentingopinion in Moya vs. Barton, p. 14, above. The fact That the owner, as found
by the court below, needs the premisesis one of the Reasons impelling affirmance, but
it is by no means the only, The most important, much less an essential reason, as I
believe having Demonstrated in the aforesaid dissenting opinion.

Bengzon, J., concurring:

I concur in the result.

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This litigation Requires interpretation or application of sections 1 and 2 of

Commonwealth Act No. 689 (October15, 1945) as amended by Republic Act No. 66
(October18, 1946). They will be in force four years, and partly read as follows:
"SECTION 1. A lease for the occupation as dwelling of a building or part thereof
Which is not a room or rooms of an hotel, or lot, que does not specify any term, Shall
be Considered of one year's duration Counted from the date of occupation by virtue of
said leaseat the option of the lessee ....
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"SEC. 2 .... Except as provided in section twelve of thisAct, lessee or occupant Shall
not be ejected in case other than for willful and deliberate nonpayment of rents or
When the lessor has to occupy the building leased."
The above-quoted portion of section 1 Necessarily amends article 1581 of the Civil
Code providing That "in default of an agreement as to the duration of the lease, it is
Understood as being from year to year, whan an annual rent has been fixed, from
month to month When the rent is monthly, and from day to day when it is daily. "
However, Doubts Will Arise upon the question Whether the amendment Governs
contracts existing before its approval, like the one Between the litigants at bar.
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Important limitation upon the exercise of legislative power is the constitutional

injunction That "no law impairing the obligation of contracts Shall be passed."
(Article III, section 1, paragraph 10.) Is similar to a provision in the United States
Constitution, it has always been apart of our organic acts, beginning with the
Philippine Bill in 1902. It has been enforced, more than once, by Philippine Courts in
the holding That a contract is not ordinarily Affected by any amendment to the law
under Which it was Entered, said law part ofevery Being Considered to contract. 1
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Sanctity of contracts is Malthus definitely a key in our juridical structure. However,

superior to it, there exists the all-pervading police power 2 permitting the
promulgation of laws Such as May be found reasonably Necessary to the health,
safety and comfort of the Citizens at large. That is to say, the Legislature may, under
some Circumstances, by virtue of the police power, approve laws affecting, the
Obligations of existing contracts. Known examples are the so-called mortgage
moratorium laws Enacted in a number of states for the relief of mortgagors During the
existence of an emergency (see 16 CJ S, p. 843) and the emergency housing laws
suspending a landlord's right to dispossess a holdover tenant by summary proceedings
or by ejectment (16 CJ s., p. 845). Nevertheless, the intention to Affect existing
agreements Should be clear; Because, having in mind the law's concern forthe
plighted world, courts will, if possible, give prospective effect to all new legislation
modifying contractual Obligations, and will apply new rules to existing contracts only
When a positive unavoidable command is found in the enactment.
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Now, I see in section 1 of Act No. 689, as amended, not inconsistent directive With its
future operation. HENCE, I believe it does not Affect contracts existing at the time of
its passage.
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On the other hand, section 2 orders That "lessee or occupant Shall not be ejected"
except "for willful and deliberate non-payment of rents or When the lessor has to
occupy the building leased." 3 These terms compel immediate application to instant
lawsuits . No court would now be Justified in decreeing the ouster of tenants except
for the causes Indicated. The purpose of the law is plain: to avoid speculation on rents
and to afford relief to tenants, Whose precarious condition Has Become Widespread
acute by the devastation of the last war. The Legislature has spoken: During the fouryear period, not lessee Shall be turned out except for the causes listed. Courts must
obey the prohibition, que although modifying previous contracts Declared May not be
judicially invalid, porque is Undoubtedly a police measure, designed to meet a real
emergency endangering the life and the health and the welfare of so many members of
the public generally.

PADILLA, M., concurring and dissenting:

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I concur with the majority in falloobjeto confirmation of lacing, but not the reasons
exponenpara support it.
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The action was initiated on August 10, 1945, prior to the approval of Commonwealth
Act No. 689. Estase parobo on October 15, 1945. Reason underlying the action of the
plaintiff in the law then in force, that is, the Civil Code, and, so I put it in her
juzgadomunicipal. In the first instance, to which I raise in grade elasunto appeal, the
plaintiff no cause for action speed change, it could not because it was not permissible
to do so. The defendant did not invoke in their contestacionque was presented on
September 29 laMancomunidad Act No. 689, it still had not approved the law. Only
invoke in its memorandum submitted on January 14, 1946. The court a quo decided
the asuntoa basis of law in force when the action instituted. Did not even mention the
failure of the law invoked by the defendant in his memorandum. Can this Court in the
exercise of its jurisdiction to review application or enforce a law that did not exist

regia ypor therefore not while it is taken out the action? If the statement materialize
object to review the appellate ruling - the reason for action in juiciado; declares on
contestacional defendant's argument that the Commonwealth law invoked by the No.
689 does not apply to litigation, and confirm the fault subject of appeal, it would have
to escribiresta opinion. But the sentence makes pronouncements about the law
invoked by the defendant and gives aentender law giving application to a lawsuit
which arose or national action motivode long before this leyentrara into force. And
what's worse pronuncimientos ago regarding the law of the Republic No. 66, adopted
on October 18, 1946, amendatory of the former.
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El motivo de accion de la parte actora era la expiraciondel plazo de arrendamiento que

a falta de convenio lo supiola ley, o sea, el Codigo Civil. El hecho de que larazon que
le movio a la parte actora a entablar la accion,o sea, de que necesitaba para su uso
personal de la fincaobjeto de desahucio, coincida con uno de los motivos quela nueva
ley invocada por el demandado provee para ellanzamiento de un inquilino, no faculta
a este Tribunal dara dicha ley un efecto retroactivo. Si la opinion contrariaprevaleciera
de que los tribunales inferiores diesen tambienefecto retroactivo a leyes que no les es
permitido dar porque por su espiritu o por su texto no lo autorizan. No eseste el asunto
ni es esta la ocasion en que debamos analizary determinar el alcance de los articulos
1. y 2. de la Leyde la Mancomunidad No. 689, tal como fue reformada.
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La sentencia declara que "No habra sido la intencion del Congreso computar el plazo
de un ao del Codigo Civil.En tal caso el plazo que concede la ley seria ilusorio, si no
absurdo."
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La absurdidad que advierte la sentencia no esta en la ley sino en interpretacion y

aplicacion que se da a ella.Si no se diese a la ley efecto retroactivo no se caeria en
ningun absurdo.
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La ley provee que todo contrato de arrendamiento parala ocupacion de un edificio o

parte de el destinado a habitacion - que no sea habitacion o aposento de un hotel - o
terreno, en wque no se estipule el plazo de arrendamiento,se entendera hecho por un
ao, a opcion del arrendatario,a contar desde la fechaen que haya comenzado la
ocupacion en virtud de dicho contrato. Esta disposicion es clara.Se refiere a contratos
de arrendamiento que se celebraren despues de la aprobacion de la ley. Para el
computo del ao la ocupacion no comienza desde la fecha en que entroen vigor la ley,
ni desde la fecha en que caduco o expiro elplazo de la tacita reconduccion, sino
"desde la fecha de la ocupacion en virtud de dicho contrato." Este es el contratoque
dio al arrendatario derecho a ocupar la finca arrendada y no otro contrato. No se
refiere a la tacita reconduccion,que no es un contrato las partes, sino lo que provee la
ley en el caso de que el arrendatario siguiera ocupando la finca arrendada por quince
dias despues de caducado el plazo estipiulado en el contrato de arrendamiento
(articulo1566, Codigo Civil); ni puede referirse a contratos de arrendamiento que se
celebraron antes de la vigencia dela ley cuyos plazos convencionales todavin no
hubiesenexpirado despues de nulidad por infringir derechos contractuales existentes,
contrario a las disposiciones de la Constitucion. Repito que si diese a la ley efecto
retroactivono se incurriria en ningun absurdo ni se encontraria dificultad en la
solucion del problema que nos ocupa.
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No es cierto lo que se afirma en la sentencia de que seriaun descrimen el no conceder

el beneficio del ao que proveela ley a un antiguo arrendatario que hubiese estado
ocupandola finca arrendada, porque, aparte de que concediendole tal plazo se
infringirian derechos contractuales existentes,de todos modos si dicho arrendatario
continuaradespueds de la aprobacion de la ley en le goce de la finca arrendada, ya
tacita reconduccion, ya porque el plazo estipulado todavia no hubiese expirado, no
podria ser lanzado de la finca por espacio de cuatro aos desde la aprobacion de la
ley, sino por cualquiera de los tres motivos que la referida ley senala en sus articulos
2. y 11. delos previstos en el Codigo Civil que no estan derogrados ni modificados. El
arrendatario que comenzare a gozar dela posesion de una finca despues de aprobada la
ley, en virtud de contrato en que no se estipulase ningun plazo, tendria derecho a un
ao de arrendamiento; y caducado eseplazo legal, tampoco podria ser lanzado durante
cuatro aos desde la aprobacion de la ley, sino por cualquiera de los motivos que
dicha lkey y el Codigo Civil disponen. El arendatario que ocupare una finca despues
de la vigencia dela ley en virtud de un contrato celebrado en que el plazo estipulado
fuese menos de un ao, tampoco podira ser lanzado cuatro aos desde la aprobacion
de la ley, sino porcualquiera de los motivos previstos en la aludida ley y enel Codigo
Civil.
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El plazo legal de un ano la ley provee no se absoluto, porque si dentro de ese ao el

arrendatario volunaria ydeliberadamente no pagase el alquiler; si dentro de ese ao el
arrendador tuvierse necesidad de la finca arrendada para su uso personal; si dentro de
ese ano el arrendatario subarrendase la finca o parte de ella sin el consentimiento por
escrito del arrendador; si dentro de ese ao el arrendatario infringiese estipulaciones
del contrato; y si dentro de ese ao el arrendatario hiciese improprio uso de la finca, el
podria ser lanzado de ella. Si esta no fuese la verdadera intencion del legislador, se
sancionaria la ocupacion de la finca por un ao sin pago de alquiler; se privaria de la
finca durante ese ao al arrendador que necesitase de ellapara su uso personal; se
permitiria durante ese ao al arrendatario, que ya no necesitase de la finca por haberla
sub-arrendado, seguir en el goce legal de la misma, no obstante no necesitaria para su
habitacion, dando lugar a que por el sub-arriendo el arrendatario pudiera especularo
percibir un alquiler que no le corresponderia; se tendria que tolerar infracciones del
contrato y usos de la finca que la pusiesen en peligro de desctruccion.
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No se puede concebir que el legislador sancionara la ocupacion por un ao finca

residencial en virtud de un contrato de arrendamiento, aun cuando el arrendatario no
pagase el alquiler estipulado, porque ello haria de la ley ineficaz por infringir la
Constitucion. Sabido es que las fincas residenciiles estan afectas a una gabela directa el impuesto territorial - que se paga anualmente. La morosidad en el pago del
impuesto daria por resultadola confiscacion (forfeiture) de la finca. Como se exigiriael
pago morosidad en el pago del impuesto, cuando lacausa al arrendatario a ocupar la
finca aun cuando no pagase el alquiler estipulado? El articulo 1. del titutlo II de la
Constitucion prohibe se prive a cualquiera persona de su propiedad sin debido proceso
de ley.
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Tampoco puede concebirse que el legislador concediera al arrendatario por un periodo

de un ao mas derecho que al dueo de la finca cuando este la necesitase para su uso
personal. De ahi que este motivo pueda ejercitarse porel arrendador aun durante el
plazo de un ao que la ley provee.
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Igualmente, es inconcebible que el legislador permitiera al arrendatario ocupar la

finca arrendada por espacio de un ao por medio de sub-arrendatarios cuando el ya no
necesitase de ella.
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In the case of Santos v. De Alvarez, GR No. L-332 whose decision is prolmulgo June
18 this year, I made mention of this as the basis of my dissent, is this statement:
"Under This provision, a lessee can not be ejected even for non-payment of rents,
where Such non-payment is not willful and deliberate and the lessor never subleased
it without authority. In other words, a lessee who is unable to pay on time the Agreed
rents Because of poverty or of any other circumstance beyond his check can not,
under the present law, be ejected from the leased property, if the other two
Circumstances are not present. " (78 Phil., 503.)
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This trans just describe is, in my opinion, wrong and unfair, and if that faithfully
reflect the intention of the legislature, then the law would be subversive and contrary
to the Constitution, for being one of the public duties of the State to "promote justice
ensure social welfare and economic stability of all the people "(Article 5, Title II), the
state rather than comply, building, for example, housing for the underprivileged
Defortuna and using this resource the Treasury , the majority of this Court puts on the
shoulders of the landlord or owner of residential property to do so by the State
without partakers in that burden on other citizens., and this ruling is nonetheless
constitutional inhibition that not expropriate (taken) private property for public use
without just compendsacion (paragraph 2, Article 1, Title III), it is what would amount
although on a small scale to allow a tenant to occupy a property for a year even if they
pay residential stipulated rent. And not peoraun is that most do not allow the release
of a tenant "who could not pay the rent stipulated time by reason of poverty or other
accidents," without the concurrence of the other two reasons, or are, (1) the need for
the leased property from the lessor for personal use and (2) the sub-lease of the
property oparte lella by the lessee without the consent of the lessor porescrito. The
three reasons specified by law are not a time to attend. One of them is sufficient.
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The Community Act No. 689, as reformadapor Republic Act No. 66, not detoga and
replaces the Civil Code in the matter, even temporarily, because the law has
application to contracts in which the lessee arrendamineto It treats to continue living
on a residential estate paid the stipulated rent. You will be protected by the law,
because by the housing shortage would be difficult to find another you where to
move. Just for any of the reasons specified by law and could throw off the farm for
the inhabited.
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Article 1569 of the Civil Code provides four reasons why conventional or expiration
of the legal term, is modified by law, in the sense discussed above, ie that no tenant
could launch within four years from the approval of Republic Act No. 66, but only for
any of the reasons stated in losarticulos 2., 11. of Moncomunidad Act No. 689, as is
renovated. The second, that is, lack IO payment of rent stipulated, this well renovated,
in the sense that non-payment of rent must servoluntaria and deliberate, that is, that
the failure to pay the stipulated rent a tenant must be queteniendo with pay does not.
In other words, the law would not cover the tenant to live acosta quiese others. You
have no case law application of a arrendatarion indigent or that some time after the
contract quedase decelebrado insolvent, because if they inluyera within the scope of
the law, it would put a burden on the State, as stated above but in the shoulders of the

owner of the leased property. The beggar who, pretending to have means or has to
lease a residential estate, lease and occupy consiguerse not only would not be covered
by the law, but that would have to face a process. The law can not impose a property
owner of the duty to allow a residential estate duty to allow a homeless or occupy
bankrupt the laquiler or without payment of just compensation, because it would
deprive the owner though temporarily the use of your property without due process of
law. The third is not repealed by Act even temporarily. And the reason is obvious. If a
tenant in breach of the terms of the contract, take off the woodwork of the housetop,
later, the walls separating the rooms, and later the windows, to use as firewood, such
tenant could not be released yobligado addition to pay damages? If the answers yes,
as there may be another, then it is erroneous thesis that the law repeals and replaces
the Civil Code in the matter, even temporarily. The fourth is not abrogated by the law
even temporalmente.Y the reason is also clear and evident. If a tenant does not dwell
or lived in the leased property and had closed all the time, or if she would deposit
nitroglycerin, such tenant could not be released from the leased property? I think the
affirmative prevails. Therefore can not sustain the proposition that struck down the
law substituyoo Civil Code in the matter even temporarily (Act No. 689, as amended).
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And if all the above were not enough to demostrarde incontrovertible and irrefutable
way that it is due to give retroactive effect to the Commonwealth Act No. 689 and of
the Republic No. 66, enmendatario of the above, I would suffice to quote Article 14.
primeraley of which provides: "This law will be in effect for the first two years after
its passage." This same article, as amended by Republic Act No. 66, states: "This law
will be in force for a period of four years after its passage." And Article 2.
Amendatory law provides: "This Act came into force tanpronto be approved." These
provisions are not irrefutable proof of the non-retroactivity of the law? Under that
principle or rule of legal hermeneutics could be converted preterite imperfect future?

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Most not to lie in the grave consequences it brings the law giving retroactive effect. If
sediese law to that effect, tenants would have the right to bring action, which reason
had not prescribed, to recover excess rent paid hubeieran before the passage of the
law, such excess constitute a breach of Article 3. of the law. Landlords blockers that
law went into effect cocbrado hubiersen rent directly or indirectly by an amount
greater than that permitted by the law in its Article 3., Could be processed in
accordance with Article 9. Law. The legislator did not consider these consequences,
because it was not his intention to pass the bill with retroactive character. If he had
had such intention, those consequences nohubiesen your eye gone unnoticed avior. I
can not creere the legislature with full knowledge of these consequences character
passed the law retroactive, because the processing of a landlord rent a larger amount
of the permitidad by law in its Article 3., Seriainsostenible, for the law to authorize
procesamientoseria such ex post facto and therefore unconstitutional. LaConstuticion
prohibits any citizen be prosecuted for an act which was not punishable when it was
undertaken, although lofuese the initiation of the process (paragraph 11, Article 4,
tituloIII).
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I insist that there is an absurdity icurriria or would find DIFFICULTY in solving the
problem at hand, if not the law be given retroactive effect. Giving law that purpose,
besides the absurdity incurred and the difficulty encountered in the resolution of the
lawsuit, it commits the grave error to solve it based not prosecuted according to law,

but on the basis of a law that did not exist and therefore not regia, the action
entablarsela time.
RESOLUTION

December 1, 1947
PAUL, M.:

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En su mocion de reconsideracion y nueva vista, el demandado alega que los

demandantes en las causas Nos.71044, 71277 y 71278, habian pedido el desahucio de
las arrendatarias Esperanza Poblete, Rosa Aguinaldo y Mary Lardizabal de los locales
ocupados por ellas, y vencidas enjuicio correspondiente, los desocuparon. Los
demandantes en vez de ocuparlos para vivienda, los han arrendado a otros inquilinos
que pagan mejor alquiler. La casa ocupada antiguamento por Rosa Aguinaldo bajo
alquiler deP20 mensual esta hoy ocupado por Pablo Decena con una renta de P80; la
ocupada antiguamente por Esperanza Poblete por P35 mensual fue cedida a
Underwood Business College por P200 y la ocupada antiguamente por Mary
Lardizabal bajo alquiler mensual de P16.50 esta hoy ocupada porAndres Castro por
P75. Y el demandado pregunta: "que ha pasado con las alegaciones de los
demandantes de que ellos necesitan las casas para su uso en ls tresdemandas
presentadas? Aungue hasta ahora la casa ocupada por el demandado no esta cedida
aun a otra persona como sucedio a las casas ocupadas por las senoras ya
nombradas,puede correr la misma suerte cuando este desocupada. Los demandantes concluye el demandado su argumento - por su posicion social, por su riqueza, no
ocuparian los bajos de una pequea accesoria."
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Los demandantes en contestacion a esta mocion de reconsiderarion en vez de

desvirtuar los tres casos desahucio mencionados, citan una declaracion urada suscrita
por Rafael Ledesma, uno de los demandantes, del tenor siguiente:
Yo, Rafael Ledesma, esposo de Pura Kalaw Ledesma, uno de los demandantes y
apelados en esta causa, bajo juramento prestado enlegal forma, declaro:
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"Que el local objeto de esta causa; situado en la calle R. Hidalgo No. 1100 es
necesario que lo vaque el demandado y apelante porque desde un principio lo
necesitaba para establecer alli un negocio de importacion que tengo por organizar con
otros compaeros, y nopuede abrirlo en ese sitio porque demandado y apelante lo
retiene;
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Que dicho sitio es un sitio comercial y no residencial, pues, ellocal esta situado en la
calle R. Hidalgo, Manila, en donde estan muchas casa comerciales, como la Estrella
del Norte, Squire & Bingham, Riu Hermanos, La Suiza, el establecimineto de taller de
escultura del seor Vicente, etc., y el mismo demandado estautilizando el local para su
negocio de barberia como el mismo lo admite;
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Que los demandantes y apelados no desahucian al demandado parafines de subir la

renta, sino porque el infrascrito lo necesita para su indicado negocio.

Los hechos admitidos en esta declaracion jurada demuestranque los demandantes no

tienen necesidad del local para su habitacion sino para establecer juntamante con otros
compaeros un negocio de importacion. Entonces no tienen derecho a desahuciar al
demandado porque elarticulo 2. de la Ley No. 689 del Commonwealth, tal como ha
sido enmendado por la Ley de la Republica No. 66, dispone que "ningun arrendatario
u ocupante sera des ahuciado en casos que no sean la falta voluntaria y deliberada del
pago de alquileres o cuando el arrendador tiene que ocupar el edificio cedido en
arrendamiento ." La ocupacion de que habla este articulo tiene que ser para habitacion
y no para abrir un negocio de una sociedad en proyecto. El espiritu que informa la
Ley No. 66 es reducir en tres las causas de desahucio, haciendo mas humanas, mas en
consonancia con las condiciones anormales que nostrajo la guerra las disposiciones
sobre arrendamientode fincas urbanas. Es tan facil desahuciar, bajo el CodigoCivil, a
un arrendatario que en un momento dado, si asiles place a los arrendadores, habria
tantos lanzamientos que no habria habitaciones suficientes para tantos necesitados.
Habria que obligar a muchas familias a vivir a la intemperie, expuestas as las
inclemencias del tiempo, habria malestar general, la salud publica quedaria en peligro,
la voragine de pasiones e intereses encontrados daria lugar aun incalculable caos. Si
una tercera parte de los arrendatarios en Manila fuesen desahudiados por orden
judicial podra disponer el gobierno de bastante fuerza para verificar su lanzamiento?
Un dueo, bajo la nueva ley, debe tener derecho preferente para habitar su casa; pero
si no es para habitacion, sino para un negocio en proyecto, el arrendatario no debe ser
echado.
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Los demandantes arguyen que el local en cuestion estaen una calle comercial en
donde estan la Estrella de Norte, Squires Bingham, Riu Hermanos, La Suiza, y que no
estasujeto a las disposiciones de la Ley No. 66 de la Republica. Segun la misma
declaracion jurada de uno de los demandantes, el local ocupado por el demandado lo
utiliza el para una barberia y para vivienda de su familia. Ese local es mas
indispensable para la manutencion de la familia del demandado que para un negocio
en perspectiva de los demandantes. El alojamiento es para el hombre tan necesario
como el alimento. Desahuciar, bajo las presentes circunstancias,al demandado es
desposeerle del unico medio de que se vale para alimentar a su familia. Los
demandantes, aun sin ese proyectado negocio, pueden continuar viviendo. El
demandado no debe ser desahuciado del local; el articulo 1. de la Ley No. 689 del
Commonwealth, tal como fue enmendado por la Ley No. 66 de la Republica, dice
que"se considerara incluido en las disposiciones de esta Ley, el edifio usado no
solamente como habitacion del arrendatario sino tambien como lugar de negocio de
este para industrias caseras destinadas a la manutencion de su familia." Esta
disposicion legal esta inspirada indudablementeen el sentimiento elevado y sublime
que distingue el hombre de los demas seres: el de no privar al projimo de su pan de
cada dia.
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Los demandantes contienden que las conclusiones de hecho del Juzgado inferior no
pueden ser alteradas, ni modificadas; que solamente las cuestiones de derecho
suscitadas por el demandado en apelacion son las que este Tribunal debe resolver. It is
true. En efecto, confirmamosla sentencia apelada aplicando la ley sobre las
conclusiones de hecho del Juzgado a quo , no discutidas por las partes.
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Puesto que la mocion de nueva vista del demandado se basa en la prueba nuevamente
descubierta del hecho de quelos demandantes no necesitan la casas para si, admitido

porel demandante Rafael Ledesma en su declaracion jurada, tenemos que acceder a la

mocion y, sin necesidad de abrir de nuevo el juicio declarar probado el hecho
admitido por ambas partes y dictar esta resolucion. No alteramos las pruebas: son los
demandantes los que sometieron otros hechos sobre los cuales hemos hecho estos
nuevos pronunciamientos legales en cuanto a la aplicacion de las disposicionesde la
Ley No. 689 del Commonwealth, tal comofueron enmendadas por la Ley No. 66 de la
Republica.
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Se revoca la sentencia del Juzgado a quo : se sobresee la demanda. Los demandantes

pagaran las costas.
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Moran, Pres., Paras, Feria, Bengzon, Briones y Tuason, MM., estan conformes.

PERFECTO, J., dissenting:

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We cannot agree with he resolution reversing the decision promulgated in this case on
August 29, 1947.
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There are no new facts and there is no new situation justifying the reversal.

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We also wish to dissent from the reaffirmation in the resolution of the theory of the
retroactive effect of Commonwealth Act No. 689 as amended by Republic Act No.66.
Our position against the retroactivity of either or both Acts is extensively explained
and argued in our opinionin the case of Santos vs. De Alvarez (78 Phil., 503).

HILADO, J., dissenting:

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I dissent from the resolution on the motion for reconsideration. The contract of lease
involved herein having antedated by several years the enactment of Commonwealth
Act No. 689 and Republic Act No. 66, the provisions ofsaid Acts invoked in the
resolution should not be applied, and the few facts stated in the resolution are
absolutely immaterial. For these reasons and in view of the other considerations set
forth in my dissent in Moya vs. Barton , p. 14, ante , I am of the considered opinion
that the motion for reconsideration should be denied.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
DECISION
August 29, 1947
GR No. L-597
PURE KALAW LEDESMA LEDESMA and RAFAEL, plaintiffs-appellees,
vs.
EMILIO PICTAIN, defendant-appellant.
HORRILLENO, J
, J.:
This is an issue this certificate by the Appeals Court, and has connection with case
No. 6189 of the Court of First Instance of Laguna and case No. 2432 of the Court of
Peace of San Pablo, Laguna. The cause No. 6189 was one of execution of mortgage,
and detainer case No. 2432, and both were initiated by the Philippine Education Co.,
Inc., against the late Nemesio Cabrera and Artemio Fule.
It is, according to the facts, that the mortgaged property in case No. 6189 was sold at
public auction and awarded to the mortgage creditor, the plaintiff in this cause, that
the executed having refused to surrender possession thereof to the corporation
demandane , this present case No. 2432 in the Magistrates Court of San Pablo,
Laguna, by detainer against such debtors mortgage, Nemesio Cabrera and Artemio
Fule. Dico magistrate ruling the matter in favor of the plaintiff, ordering the
defendants to hand over possession of the land the subject of the complaint. The cause
No. 6189 was presented on December 6, 1932 in the Court of First Instance of
Laguna, the cause NO. Justice of the Peace 2432 San Pablo will strike up to the July
3, 1934. The July 21, 1936, Basilia Cabrera, in its capacity as administrator of the
estate of the deceased intestate Nemesio Cabrera, one of the defendants in these cases
of execution of mortgage and detainer, presented at the said Court of First Instance of
Laguna , lawsuit against the Philippine Education Co., Inc. in which it annulled pedia
all proceedings in civil cases Nos. 6189 referring to 2432, alleging that the Court of
First Instance of Laguna, as well as the Peace of San Pablo in the same province,
lacked jurisdiction to hear and determine the issues mentioned. Having been failed
case against her appeal of the judgment to the Court of Appeal that, as we have said,
certify the matter to this superiority, to be discussed in the issues of jurisdiction. Not
introduced yet the origin of this certification, we fail the subject, which is old, for
practical purposes.
The appellant, to support the allegation of lack of jurisdiction, states that the
defendants Nemesio Cabrera and Artemio Fule, in cases No. 6189 of the Court of
First Instance of Laguna and No. 2432 of the Court of Peace of San Pablo, were not
legally summoned to appear and answer the complaint, both the first and second

cause, and added, moreover, that even assuming that in the last case, ie, at No. 2432 in
the Magistrates Court, the defendants have been duly summoned, however, the
judgment in this case is zero because it is based on a confession of judgment
(confession of judgment) that has not been signed by the defendant Nemesio Cabrera
but only by the respondent Artemio Fule, who signed for if and Nemesio Cabrera said
confession of judgment.
The first-issue, therefore, offered is a fact, that is, if the defendants in both cases Nos.
6189 and 2432 were deployed or not in demand. There is no dispute between the
parties that in 6189 because the Court of First Instance, the site was included in the
sheriff's office in Laguna province by counsel, Mr. Demetrio Hernandez, who said the
defendants be Nemesio Cabrera and Artemio Fule , that Demetrio Hernandez, as such,
arraigned in the case and answer the demand representation of such defendants, that
the site in case No. 2432 of the Peace Court was delivered by unpolicia personally to
these defendants, although these do not wanted to sign copies of the site claiming they
wanted to consult the case with your attorney. As such the facts, understand that the
lower court stating that errors do not substantially the defendants were properly
deployed in the two cases, according to the law, and therefore I act right not to accept
the proposal supported by the appellant on this point.
As if in case No. 2432 had been submitted or not the confession of judgment with
knowledge and consent of Nemesio Cabrera, although there is direct evidence on this
point, the facts and circumstances proved in the case indicate that the confession of
judgment was filed with acquiescence of said Nemesio Cabrera. Artemio Fule, his codefendant and son, the eon lived in the same house. Did the (Cabrera) who had
promoted and appealed by the defendant, in the Court of First Instance of Laguna, a
mortgage foreclosure action against him and his son. I knew, also, that this case was
ruled in favor of the defendant, and that judgment having become final, was executed
sold, in consequence, the mortgaged property at public auction, and the defendant
having been the best bidder in the sale , ascribed to such property mortgaged. The
defendant had always been willing to beg Fule and his wife, to allow them to retract
the goods, but for some reason or another, neither the applicant nor Fule and Nemesio
Cabrera could not. When Fule arraigned before the Justice of Peace of San Pablo, for
the hearing of the case in that court, signed the confession of judgment in case for his
father Cabrera, who, as we have said, he and his wife lived in the same house and in
which the defendant and appellee occasion, at the request of Fule, agreed that this
would give an opportunity to recover the assets that were awarded to those in the
aforementioned sale at public auction. All of which leads us to believe that Nemesio
Cabrera had knowledge - and nodded to it - of acts done by his son Fule, in relation to
sequidos procedures in the Magistrates Court in Case No. 2432.
In view of the foregoing, it is our feeling that the matter should be handed down to,
and it failed stating that the procedures followed in both case No. 6189 of the Court of
First Instance of Laguna, as in case No. 2432 of the Court of Peace St. Paul, which
were in accordance with the law
Accordingly, we uphold all parts of the judgment under raised, the costs borne by the
appellant. So ordered.
Avancea, CJ, Diaz, Laurel and Moran, MM., Are satisfied.