Beruflich Dokumente
Kultur Dokumente
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FIRST DIVISION.
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facts not disputed by the parties and which, if properly considered, would
justify a different conclusion.
Negotiable Instruments Law; Checks; The weight of authority is that
the mere possession of a negotiable instrument does not in itself
conclusively establish either the right of the possessor to receive payment,
or of the right of one who has made payment to be discharged from liability.
Section 49 of the Negotiable Instruments Law contemplates a situation
whereby the payee or indorsee delivers a negotiable instrument for value
without indorsing it, thus: Transfer without indorsement; effect of.Where
the holder of an instrument payable to his order transfers it for value without
indorsing it, the transfer vests in the transferee such title as the transferor
had therein, and the transferee acquires in addition, the right to have the
indorsement of the transferor. But for the purpose of determining whether
the transferee is a holder in due course, the negotiation takes effect as of the
time when the indorsement is actually made. It bears stressing that the above
transaction is an equitable assignment and the transferee acquires the
instrument subject to defenses and equities available among prior parties.
Thus, if the transferor had legal title, the transferee acquires such title and,
in addition, the right to have the indorsement of the transferor and also the
right, as holder of the legal title, to maintain legal action against the maker
or acceptor or other party liable to the transferor. The underlying premise of
this provision, however, is that a valid transfer of ownership of the
negotiable instrument in question has taken place. Transferees in this
situation do not enjoy the presumption of ownership in favor of holders
since they are neither payees nor indorsees of such instruments. The weight
of authority is that the mere possession of a negotiable instrument does not
in itself conclusively establish either the right of the possessor to receive
payment, or of the right of one who has made payment to be discharged
from liability. Thus, something more than mere possession by persons who
are not payees or indorsers of the instrument is necessary to authorize
payment to them in the absence of any other facts from which the authority
to receive payment may be inferred.
Same; Same; Crossed Checks; If instruments payable to named payees
or to their order have not been indorsed in blank, only such payees or their
indorsees can be holders and entitled to receive payment in their own right.
In State Investment House v. IAC, 175
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SCRA 310 (1989), the Court enumerated the effects of crossing a check,
thus: (1) that the check may not be encashed but only deposited in the bank;
(2) that the check may be negotiated only onceto one who has an account
with a bank; and (3) that the act of crossing the check serves as a warning to
the holder that the check has been issued for a denite purpose so that such
holder must inquire if the check has been received pursuant to that purpose.
Thus, even if the delay in the demand for reimbursement is taken in
conjunction with Salazars possession of the checks, it cannot be said that
the presumption of ownership in Templonuevos favor as the designated
payee therein was sufciently overcome. This is consistent with the
principle that if instruments payable to named payees or to their order have
not been indorsed in blank, only such payees or their indorsees can be
holders and entitled to receive payment in their own right.
Same; Same; Presumptions; Words and Phrases; The presumption
under Section 131(s) of the Rules of Court stating that a negotiable
instrument was given for a sufcient consideration will not inure to the
benet of someone who was merely the transferee of the physical possession
of the instrumentthe phrase given or indorsed in the context of a
negotiable instrument refers to the manner in which such instrument may be
negotiated.The presumption under Section 131(s) of the Rules of Court
stating that a negotiable instrument was given for a sufcient consideration
will not inure to the benet of Salazar because the term given does not
pertain merely to a transfer of physical possession of the instrument. The
phrase given or indorsed in the context of a negotiable instrument refers
to the manner in which such instrument may be negotiated. Negotiable
instruments are negotiated by transfer to one person or another in such a
manner as to constitute the transferee the holder thereof. If payable to bearer
it is negotiated by delivery. If payable to order it is negotiated by the
indorsement completed by delivery. The present case involves checks
payable to order. Not being a payee or indorsee of the checks, private
respondent Salazar could not be a holder thereof.
Same; Same; It is an exception to the general rule for a payee of an
order instrument to transfer the instrument without indorsement.It is an
exception to the general rule for a payee of an order instrument to transfer
the instrument without indorsement. Pre-
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cisely because the situation is abnormal, it is but fair to the maker and to
prior holders to require possessors to prove without the aid of an initial
presumption in their favor, that they came into possession by virtue of a
legitimate transaction with the last holder. Salazar failed to discharge this
burden, and the return of the check proceeds to Templonuevo was therefore
warranted under the circumstances despite the fact that Templonuevo may
not have clearly demonstrated that he never authorized Salazar to deposit
the checks or to encash the same. Noteworthy also is the fact that petitioner
stamped on the back of the checks the words: All prior endorsements
and/or lack of endorsements guaranteed, thereby making the assurance that
it had ascertained the genuineness of all prior endorsements. Having
assumed the liability of a general indorser, petitioners liability to the
designated payee cannot be denied.
Same; Banks and Banking; Checks; A bank generally has a right of
set-off over the deposits therein for the payment of any withdrawals on the
part of a depositorthe right of a collecting bank to debit a clients account
for the value of a dishonored check that has previously been credited has
fairly been established by jurisprudence.The right of set-off was
explained in Associated Bank v. Tan, 446 SCRA 282 (2004): A bank
generally has a right of set-off over the deposits therein for the payment of
any withdrawals on the part of a depositor. The right of a collecting bank to
debit a clients account for the value of a dishonored check that has
previously been credited has fairly been established by jurisprudence. To
begin with, Article 1980 of the Civil Code provides that [f]ixed, savings,
and current deposits of money in banks and similar institutions shall be
governed by the provisions concerning simple loan. Hence, the relationship
between banks and depositors has been held to be that of creditor and
debtor. Thus, legal compensation under Article 1278 of the Civil Code may
take place when all the requisites mentioned in Article 1279 are present,
as follows: (1) That each one of the obligors be bound principally, and that
he be at the same time a principal creditor of the other; (2) That both debts
consist in a sum of money, or if the things due are consumable, they be of
the same kind, and also of the same quality if the latter has been stated; (3)
That the two debts be due; (4) That they be liquidated and demandable; (5)
That over neither of them there be any retention or controversy, commenced
by third persons and communicated in due time to the debtor.
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with malice and bad faith, if the former suffered mental anguish, serious
anxiety, embarrassment and humiliation. Moral damages are not meant to
enrich a complainant at the expense of defendant. It is only intended to
alleviate the moral suffering she has undergone. The award of exemplary
damages is justied, on the other hand, when the acts of the bank are
attended by malice, bad faith or gross negligence. The award of reasonable
attorneys fees is proper where exemplary damages are awarded. It is proper
where depositors are compelled to litigate to protect their interest.
Rollo, p. 57.
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SO ORDERED.
Private respondent Templonuevo admitted that he was doing business under the name and
Rollo, p. 106.
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Sec. 191. Denition and meaning of terms.In this Act, unless the contract
otherwise requires:
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Holder means the payee or indorsee of a bill or note who is in possession of it,
or the bearer thereof;
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Id., at p. 107.
13
Madrigal v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 142944, April 15, 2005, 456 SCRA
247; Bernardo v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 101680, December 7, 1992, 216 SCRA
224; Remalante v. Tibe, G.R. No. L-59514, February 25, 1988, 158 SCRA 138.
14
Borromeo v. Sun, G.R. No. 75908, October 22, 1999, 317 SCRA 176.
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these are issues of fact which are not reviewable by the Court.
This rule, however, is not absolute and admits of certain
exceptions, namely: a) when the conclusion is a nding grounded
entirely on speculations, surmises, or conjectures; b) when the
inference made is manifestly mistaken, absurd, or impossible; c)
when there is a grave abuse of discretion; d) when the judgment is
based on a misapprehension of facts; e) when the ndings of fact are
conicting; f) when the CA, in making its ndings, went beyond the
issues of the case and the same are contrary to the admissions of
both appellant and appellee; g) when the ndings of the CA are
contrary to those of the trial court; h) when the ndings of fact are
conclusions without citation of specic evidence on which they are
based; i) when the nding of fact of the CA is premised on the
supposed absence of evidence but is contradicted by the evidence on
record; and j) when the CA manifestly overlooked certain relevant
facts not disputed by the parties and16 which, if properly considered,
would justify a different conclusion.
In the present case, the records do not support the nding made
by the CA and the trial court that a prior arrangement existed
between Salazar and Templonuevo regarding the transfer of
ownership of the checks. This fact is crucial as Salazars entitlement
to the value of the instruments is based on the assumption that she is
a transferee within the contemplation of Section 49 of the
Negotiable Instruments Law.
Section 49 of the Negotiable Instruments Law contemplates a
situation whereby the payee or indorsee delivers a negotiable
instrument for value without indorsing it, thus:
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15
Paterno v. Paterno, G.R. No. 63680, March 23, 1990, 183 SCRA 630.
16
Arcaba v. Tabancura, 421 Phil. 1096; 370 SCRA 414 (2001); Martinez v. Court
of Appeals, G.R. No. 123547, May 21, 2001, 358 SCRA 38.
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The CA and the trial court surmised that the subject checks belonged
to private respondent Salazar based on the pre-trial stipulation that
Templonuevo incurred a one-year delay in demanding
reimbursement for the proceeds of the same. To the Courts mind,
however, such period of delay is not of such unreasonable length as
to estop Templonuevo from asserting ownership over the checks
especially considering that it was readily apparent on the face of the
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instruments that these were crossed checks.
20
In State Investment House v. IAC, the Court enumerated the
effects of crossing a check, thus: (1) that the check may not be
encashed but only deposited in the bank; (2) that the check may be
negotiated only onceto one who has an account with a bank; and
(3) that the act of crossing the check serves as a warning to the
holder that the check has been issued for a denite purpose so that
such holder must inquire if the check has been received pursuant to
that purpose.
Thus, even if the delay in the demand for reimbursement is taken
in conjunction with Salazars possession of the checks, it cannot be
said that the presumption of ownership in Templonuevos favor as
the designated payee therein was sufciently overcome. This is
consistent with the principle that if instruments payable to named
payees or to their order have not been indorsed in blank, only such
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Id.
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Prudential Bank v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 125536, March 16, 2000, 328
SCRA 264; Simex International [Manila], Inc. v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 88013,
March 19, 1990, 183 SCRA 360; Bank of the Phil. Iskands v. Intermediate Appellate
Court, G.R. No. 69162, February 21, 1992, 206 SCRA 408.
27
Banco de Oro Savings and Mortgage Bank v. Equitable Banking Corp., G.R.
Associated Bank v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 89802, May 7, 1992, 208 SCRA
465; City Trust Banking Corp. v. Intermediate Appellate Court, G.R. No. 84281, May
27, 1994, 232 SCRA 559.
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The records further bear out the fact that respondent Salazar had
issued several checks drawn against the account of A.A. Salazar
Construction and Engineering Services prior to any notice of
deduction being served. The CA sustained private respondent
Salazars claim of damages in this regard:
The act of the bank in freezing and later debiting the amount of
P267,692.50 from the account of A.A. Salazar Construction and
Engineering Services caused plaintiff-appellee great damage and prejudice
particularly when she had already issued checks drawn against the said
account. As can be expected, the said checks bounced. To prove this,
plaintiff-appellee presented as exhibits photocopies of checks dated
September 8, 1991, October 28, 1991, and November 14, 1991 (Exhibits
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D, E and F respectively).
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pp. 8-9.
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SO ORDERED.
Puno (C.J., Chairman), Sandoval-Gutierrez, Corona and
Garcia, JJ., concur.