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9 People v.

Sanchez [GR 121039-45, 18 October 2001] Resolution of First Division,


Melo (J) : 3 concur Facts: (The Sarmenta-Gomez rape-slay) On 28 June 1993, Luis
and Rogelio "Boy" Corcolon approached Eileen Sarmenta and Allan Gomez, forcibly
took the two and loaded them at the back of the latter's van, which was parked in
front of Caf Amalia, Agrix Complex, Los Banos, Laguna. George Medialdea, Zoilo
Ama, Baldwin Brion and Pepito Kawit also boarded the van while Aurelio Centeno
and Vicencio Malabanan, who were also with the group, stayed in the ambulance.
Both vehicles then headed for Erais Farm situated in Barangay Curba, which was
owned by Mayor Antonio Sanchez of Calauan, Laguna. The two youngsters were
then brought inside the resthouse where Eileen was taken to the Mayors room.
Allan was badly beaten up by Luis, Boy, Ama and Medialdea and thereafter thrown
out of the resthouse. At around 1:00 a.m. of the next day, a crying Eileen was
dragged out of the resthouse by Luis and Medialdea her hair disheveled, mouth
covered by a handkerchief, hands still tied and stripped of her shorts. Eileen and
Allan were then loaded in the Tamaraw van by Medialdea, et. al. and headed for
Calauan, followed closely by the ambulance. En route to Calauan, gunfire was heard
from the van. The van pulled over whereupon Kawit dragged Allan, whose head was
already drenched in blood, out of the vehicle onto the road and finished him off with
a single gunshot from his armalite. The ambulance and van then sped away. Upon
reaching a sugarcane field in Sitio Paputok, Kilometro 74 of Barangay Mabacan,
Eileen was gang-raped by Luis Corcolon, Medialdea, Rogelio Corcolon, Ama, Brion
and Kawit. After Kawits turn, Luis Corcolon shot Eileen with his baby armalite.
Moments later, all 8 men boarded the ambulance and proceeded to Calauan,
leaving the Tamaraw van with Eileens remains behind. Initially, the crime was
attributed to one Kit Alqueza, a son of a feared general (Dictador Alqueza). Luis and
Rogelio Corcolon were also implicated therein. However, further investigation, and
forensic findings, pointed to the group of Mayor Sanchez. Centeno and Malabanan
bolstered the prosecution's theory. On 11 March 1995, Judge Harriet O. Demetriou of
the Regional Trial Court (Pasig City, Branch 70) found Mayor Sanchez, Medialdea,
Ama, Brion, Luis Corcolon, Rogelio Corcolon and Kawit guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of the crime of rape with homicide, ordering them to pay Eileen Sarmenta the
amount of P50,000 and additionally, the amount of P700,000.00 to the heirs of
Eileen Sarmenta and Allan Gomez as additional indemnity. On 25 January 1999, the
Supreme Court, through Justice Martinez, affirmed in toto the judgment of
conviction rendered by the trial court. Antonio Sanchez, Zoilo Ama, Baldwin Brion
and Pepito Kawit seasonably filed their respective motions for reconsideration. The
Office of the Solicitor General filed its Comment on 6 December 1999. Sanchez
avers that he is a victim of trial and conviction by publicity, besides claims that
principal witness Centeno and Malabanan lack credibility, that the testimony of his
13- year old daughter should have been given full faith and credit, and that the
gargantuan damages awarded have no factual and legal bases. Ama, Brion and
Kawit maintain that Centeno and Malabanan were sufficiently impeached by their
inconsistent statements pertain to material and crucial points of the events at issue,
besides that independent and disinterested witnesses have destroyed the
prosecutions version of events. On 2 February 1999, Justice Martinez retired in
accordance with AM 99-8-09. The motions for reconsideration was assigned to
Justice Melo for study and preparation of the appropriate action on 18 September
2001. Issue: Whether the publicity of the case impaired the impartiality of the judge
handling the case. Held: Pervasive publicity is not per se prejudicial to the right of
an accused to fair trial. The mere fact that the trial of Mayor Sanchez, et. al., was

given a day-to-day, gavel-to-gavel coverage does not by itself prove that publicity
so permeated the mind of the trial judge and impaired his impartiality. The right of
an accused to a fair trial is not incompatible to a free press. Responsible reporting
enhances an accused's right to a fair trial. The press does not simply publish
information about trials but guards against the miscarriage of justice by subjecting
the police, prosecutors, and judicial processes to extensive public scrutiny and
criticism. Our judges are learned in the law and trained to disregard off-court
evidence and on camera performances of parties to a litigation. Their mere
exposure to publications and publicity stunts does not per se fatally infect their
impartiality. To warrant a finding of prejudicial publicity, there must be allegation
and proof that the judges have been unduly influenced by the barrage of publicity.
Records herein do not show that the trial judge developed actual bias against Mayor
Sanchez, et. al., as a consequence of the extensive media coverage of the pre-trial
and trial of his case. The totality of circumstances of the case does not prove that
the trial judge acquired a fixed position as a result of prejudicial publicity which is
incapable of change even by evidence presented during the trial. Mayor Sanchez,
et. al., has the burden to prove this actual bias and he has not discharged the
burden.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs.
ANTONIO L. SANCHEZ, ARTEMIO AVERION, LANDRITO "DING" PERADILLAS and LUIS CORCOLON,accused,
ANTONIO L. SANCHEZ and ARTEMIO AVERION, accused-appellants.
G.R. No. 131116
August 27, 1999
PARDO, J.:
FACTS:
The RTC found accused Antonio L. Sanchez, Luis Corcolon y Fadialan, Landrito "Ding" Peradillas and
Artemio Averion guilty beyond reasonable doubt of murder committed Nelson Pealosa and Rickson
Pealosa.
On April 13, 1991, accused Mayor Sanchez ordered the three other accused to kill Nelson Pealosa, one
of the political leaders of Dr. Virvilio Velecina, the latter being Sanchezs opponent in the mayoralty
seat. On the same night, while Nelson and Rickson Pealosa were leaving the birthday party of Dr.
Velecina, the accused fired at the victims while they were pursuing the Pealosas. Inside the pursuing
car were Peradillas, Averion, Corcolon and the witness, Vivencio Malabanan. Later, both the victims
died of gunshot wounds. The trial court considered the crime as a complex crime of double murder
punishable under Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code.
Accused Mayor Antonio L. Sanchez and Artemio Averion jointly appealed from the decision to the
Supreme Court.
ISSUE:
1. WON the prosecution adequately established accuseds guilt beyond reasonable doubt.
2. WON there is a presence of a complex crime of double murder.
HELD:
1. Accused-appellants raised that Malabanan's delay in reporting the involvement of the accused in the
crime casts doubt on his credibility. However, jurisprudence teaches us that delay in revealing the

identity of the perpetrators of a crime does not necessarily impair the credibility of a witness,
especially where such witness gives a sufficient explanation for the delay. It was natural for Malabanan
to keep silent during that time for, aside from being a co-conspirator, Mayor Sanchez was a powerful
opponent. Consequently, we find that accused-appellant's defenses of alibi and denial are bereft of
merit. The defenses of alibi and denial are worthless in the face of positive testimony of a witness
showing the involvement of each of the accused.
2. In People v. Vargas, Jr., we ruled that "several shots from a Thompson sub-machine, in view of its
special mechanism causing several deaths, although caused by a single act of pressing the trigger, are
considered several acts. Although each burst of shots was caused by one single act of pressing the
trigger of the sub-machinegun, in view of its special mechanism the person firing it has only to keep
pressing the trigger of the sub-machinegun, with his finger and it would fire continually. Hence, it is
not the act of pressing the trigger which should be considered as producing the several felonies, but
the number of bullets which actually produced them."In the instant case, Malabanan testified that he
heard three bursts of gunfire from the two armalites used by accused Corcolon and Peradillas. Thus,
the accused are criminally liable for as many offenses resulting from pressing the trigger of the
armalites. Therefore, accused are liable for two counts of murder committed against the victims,
Nelson and Rickson Pealosa, instead of the complex crime of double murder.

People vs. Abella, et.al.


Post under case digests, Criminal Law at Sunday, February 05, 2012 Posted by Schizophrenic Mind

Facts: It all started with an altercation during a basketball


game. 3 days later, the 5 victims bodies were found in the
Pasig River. Victims were Marlon and Joseph Ronquillo,
Erwin and Andres Lojero and Felix Tamayo.
Marlons hands were tied at the back with an electric cord,
he had wounds and died from a gunshot to the head.
Andres hands were also bound at the back with a rope,
his genitals were cut off and had wounds in his body as
well, cause of death was asphyxia by strangulation.
Josephs hands were tied at the back with a basketball tshirt, had wounds and died of strangulation as well.
Erwins and Felixs body had abrasions and burns, there
were cord impressions on his wrists, a fracture in his skull
and
died
by
drowning.
The accused are Abella, Granada, De Guzman, Valencia

(all surnames), for MURDER, qualified by treachery and


evident premeditation. There were other accused but their
names were dropped from the information later on.
March 1992, the victims Ronquillo brothers were played 3
rounds of basketball in Sta. Mesa Manila against the team
of Joey de los Santos. The Ronquillos brothers won the
first 2 rounds but the 3rd one ended in a brawl. Later that
afternoon, Joey went back to the place carrying 2 pillboxes
but were apprehended. So, Joey and his brother just threw
stones at the Ronquillos house. The neighbors saw this
and
ran
after
them
and
mauled
them.
That night, the victims were in front of the Ronquillos
house. Suddenly, a white Ford Fiera without a plate
number stopped in front of the group. There were 10-13
people on board, including Joey and his brother. The
passengers in the Fiera alighted, faces covered with
handkerchiefs and they were armed. The victims tried to
run but a shot was fired and Felix (victim) was shot. They
were boxed, kicked and hit and dragged into the van. They
were brought to a basement in a compound where witness
Elena saw them being mauled, whipped with a gun,
beaten with steel tubes and lead pipes. They also had a
blowtorch and the victims hands were tied. The victims
begged for mercy. Afterwards, they were herded back to
the car, seeming almost dead. 2 days later, their bodies
were
found
in
the
Pasig
river.
Accused defense was an alibi, that they are INC members
and were attending a panata that night. According to them,

when they read their names in the newspapers as the


perpetrators of the crime, they consulted the INC Central
Office and were then accompanied by a lawyer to go to
the police station to clear their names, They were later
on identified in a police line-up. The RTC convicted all of
them for MURDER, with a penalty of reclusion perpetua.
Issue: Whether or not the accused are entitled to the
mitigating
circumstance
of
voluntary
surrender.
Held: No. First of all, the witnesses were able to fully
establish and prove and connect the appellants-accused
to the crime. The SC is sufficiently satisfied that their guilt
was
proven
beyond
reasonable
doubt.
The killing was characterized by treachery. Though
treachery should normally attend at the inception of the
aggression, the facts show that the victims were first
seized and bound and then slain, hence treachery is
present. In this case, it is enough to point out that the
victims hands were tied at the back when their bodies
were found floating in Pasig River. This fact clearly shows
that the victims were rendered defenseless and helpless,
thereby allowing the appellants to commit the crime
without risk at all to their persons. The circumstance of
abuse of superior strength was absorbed in treachery.
The appellants move to clear their names cannot be
accepted as voluntary surrender. For a surrender to be
voluntary, it must be spontaneous and should show the
intent of the accused to submit himself unconditionally to

the authorities, either because (1) he acknowledges his


guilt or (2) he wishes to save the government the trouble
and expense necessarily included for his search and
capture. When the accused goes to a police station merely
to clear his name and not to give himself up, voluntary
surrender may not be appreciated.

People vs Hernandez
People vs Hernandez
G.R. No. L-6025
May 30, 1964
Facts:
This is the appeal prosecuted by the defendants from the judgment rendered by the Court of First
Instance of Manila, Hon. Agustin P. Montesa, presiding, in its Criminal Case No. 15841, People vs.
Amado V. Hernandez, et al., and Criminal Case No. 15479, People vs. Bayani Espiritu, et al. In Criminal
Case No. 15841 (G.R. No. L-6026) the charge is for Rebellion with Multiple Murder, Arsons and
Robberies. The appellants are Amado V. Hernandez, Juan J. Cruz, Genaro de la Cruz, Amado Racanday,
Fermin Rodillas and Julian Lumanog; Aquilino Bunsol, Adriano Samson and Andres Baisa, Jr. were
among those sentenced in the judgment appealed from, but they have withdrawn their appeal. In Criminal
Case No. 15479 (G.R. No. L-6026) the charge is for rebellion with murders, arsons and kidnappings. The
accused are Bayani Espiritu Teopista Valerio and Andres Balsa, Jr.; they all appealed but Andres Balsa,
Jr. withdrew his appeal.
A joint trial of both cases was held, after which the court rendered the decision subject of the present
appeals.
Issue:
Whether or not the defendants-appelants are liable for the crime of conspiracy and proposal to commit
rebellion or insurrection under Art. 136 of the RPC?
Held:
The court found defendants-appellants Hernandez, member of the Communist Party of the Philippines,
President of the Congress of Labor Organizations (CLO), had close connections with the Secretariat of
the Communist Party and held continuous communications with its leaders and its members, and others,
guilty as principal of the crime charged against him and sentenced him to suffer the penalty of reclusion
perpetua with the accessories provided by law, and to pay the proportionate amount of the costs.

In the testimonies shown in court, it further appears that Taruc and other CPP leaders used to send notes
to appellant Hernandez, who in turn issued press releases for which he found space in the local papers.
His acts in this respect belong to the category of propaganda, to which he appears to have limited his
actions as a Communist.
However, in their appeal, defendants-appellants Amado V. Hernandez, Juan J. Cruz, Amado Racanday
and Genaro de la Cruz are absolved from the charges contained in the information, with their
proportionate share of the costs de oficio.
But other defendants-appellants, namely, Julian Lumanog and Fermin Rodillas, Bayani Espiritu and
Teopista Valerio were found guilty of the crime of conspiracy to commit rebellion, as defined and punished
in Article 136 of the Revised Penal Code, and each and everyone of them is hereby sentenced to suffer
imprisonment for five years, four months and twenty-one days of prision correccional, and to pay a fine of
P5,000.00, with subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency and to pay their proportional share of the
costs.
Advocacy of Communism put into Action
The advocacy of Communism or Communistic theory and principle is not to be considered as a criminal
act of conspiracy unless transformed or converted into an advocacy of action. In the very nature of things,
mere advocacy of a theory or principle is insufficient unless the communist advocates action, immediate
and positive, the actual agreement to start an uprising or rebellion or an agreement forged to use force
and violence in an uprising of the working class to overthrow constituted authority and seize the reins of
Government itself. Unless action is actually advocated or intended or contemplated, the Communist is a
mere theorist, merely holding belief in the supremacy of the proletariat a Communist does not yet
advocate the seizing of the reins of Government by it. As a theorist the Communist is not yet actually
considered as engaging in the criminal field subject to punishment. Only when the Communist advocates
action and actual uprising, war or otherwise, does he become guilty of conspiracy to commit rebellion.
Legal considerations on the Appeal of the defendant-appellants
All the other defendants were found guilty as accomplices in the crime of rebellion as charged in the
information and were each sentenced to suffer the penalty of 10 years and one day of prision mayor, with
the accessories provided by law, and to pay their proportionate share of the costs.
Legal Considerations Before proceeding to consider the appeals of the other defendants, it is believed
useful if not necessary to lay dawn the circumstances or facts that may be determinative of their criminal
responsibility or the existence or nature thereof. To begin with, as We have exhaustively discussed in
relation to the appeal of Hernandez, we do not believe that mere membership in the Communist Party or
in the CLO renders the member liable, either of rebellion or of conspiracy to commit rebellion, because
mere membership and nothing more merely implies advocacy of abstract theory or principle without any
action being induced thereby; and that such advocacy becomes criminal only if it is coupled with action or
advocacy of action, namely, actual rebellion or conspiracy to commit rebellion, or acts conducive thereto
or evincing the same. On the other hand, membership in the HMB (Hukbalahap) implies participation in
an actual uprising or rebellion to secure, as the Huks pretend, the liberation of the peasants and laboring
class from thraldom. By membership in the HMB, one already advocates uprising and the use of force,
and by such membership he agrees or conspires that force be used to secure the ends of the party. Such

membership, therefore, even if there is nothing more, renders the member guilty of conspiracy to commit
rebellion punishable by law.

Facts: Defendant was charged with Statutory Rape. Defendant and the victim were not married, and
had been companions for several months prior to January 3, 1961 the date of the commission of
the alleged offense. On that date she was 17 years 9 months old and voluntarily entered into sexual
intercourse with the defendant.
Issue: Whether the defendant possessed the necessary intent and knowledge at the time of the
commission of the crime?
Holding: No
Procedure: Convicted by a bench trial for misdemeanor. Reversed.
Rule: Act of sexual intercourse, accomplished with a female, not the wife of the perpetrator, where
the female is under the age of 18.
There must be a union, or joint operation of act and intent, or criminal negligence.
One is not capable of committing a crime who commits an act under ignorance or mistake of fact
which disproves any criminal intent.
Ct. Rationale: Lack of consent is a required element of the crime as the legislature mandated. By
the statutory language there must be a union, or joint operation of act and intent, the elements of
conduct and mental state that must be infused. The defendant participated in a mutual act of sexual
intercourse, believing his partner to be beyond the age of consent. The defendant entertained a
reasonable belief that his partner, whom he resided with, was beyond the age of consent.
PL A: The victim cannot consent because she is below the legal age of capacity to consent.
Therefor the defendant assumes the criminal responsibility when he voluntarily dismisses the duty to
reasonably investigate.
Def A: The necessary culpability never formed as a necessary element. Both parties entered into
the act, free of intent or knowledge to commit a crime, believing each was beyond the legal age.

Enrile vs Salazar
G.R. No. 92163
June 5, 1990
Facts:
In the afternoon of February 27, 1990, Senate Minority Floor Leader Juan Ponce Enrile was arrested by
law enforcement officers led by Director Alfredo Lim of the National Bureau of Investigation on the
strength of a warrant issued by Hon. Jaime Salazar of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City Branch

103, in Criminal Case No. 9010941.


The warrant had issued on an information signed and earlier that day filed by a panel of prosecutors
composed of Senior State Prosecutor Aurelio C. Trampe, State Prosecutor Ferdinand R. Abesamis and
Assistant City Prosecutor Eulogio Mananquil, Jr., charging Senator Enrile, the spouses Rebecco and
Erlinda Panlilio, and Gregorio Honasan with the crime of rebellion with murder and multiple frustrated
murder allegedly committed during the period of the failed coup attempt from November 29 to December
10, 1990.
Senator Enrile was taken to and held overnight at the NBI headquarters on Taft Avenue, Manila, without
bail, none having been recommended in the information and none fixed in the arrest warrant. The
following morning, February 28, 1990, he was brought to Camp Tomas Karingal in Quezon City where he
was given over to the custody of the Superintendent of the Northern Police District, Brig. Gen. Edgardo
Dula Torres.
On the same date of February 28, 1990, Senator Enrile, through counsel, filed the petition for habeas
corpus herein (which was followed by a supplemental petition filed on March 2, 1990), alleging that he
was deprived of his constitutional rights.
Issue:
(a) Whether the petitioner has committed complex crimes (delito compleio) arising from an offense being
a necessary means for committing another, which is referred to in the second clause of Article 48 of the
Revised Penal Code?
Held:
There is one other reason and a fundamental one at that why Article 48 of the Penal Code cannot be
applied in the case at bar. If murder were not complexed with rebellion, and the two crimes were punished
separately (assuming that this could be done), the following penalties would be imposable upon the
movant, namely: (1) for the crime of rebellion, a fine not exceeding P20,000 and prision mayor, in the
corresponding period, depending upon the modifying circumstances present, but never exceeding 12
years of prision mayor, and (2) for the crime of murder, reclusion temporal in its maximum period to death,
depending upon the modifying circumstances present. In other words, in the absence of aggravating
circumstances, the extreme penalty could not be imposed upon him. However, under Article 48 said
penalty would have to be meted out to him, even in the absence of a single aggravating circumstance.
Thus, said provision, if construed in conformity with the theory of the prosecution, would be unfavorable to
the movant.
The plaint of petitioner's counsel that he is charged with a crime that does not exist in the statute books,
while technically correct so far as the Court has ruled that rebellion may not be complexed with other
offenses committed on the occasion thereof, must therefore be dismissed as a mere flight of rhetoric.
Read in the context of Hernandez, the information does indeed charge the petitioner with a crime defined
and punished by the Revised Penal Code: simple rebellion.
Petitioner finally claims that he was denied the right to bail. In the light of the Court's reaffirmation of
Hernandez as applicable to petitioner's case, and of the logical and necessary corollary that the
information against him should be considered as charging only the crime of simple rebellion, which is
bailable before conviction, that must now be accepted as a correct proposition. But the question remains:
Given the facts from which this case arose, was a petition for habeas corpus in this Court the appropriate
vehicle for asserting a right to bail or vindicating its denial? The criminal case before the respondent
Judge was the normal venue for invoking the petitioner's right to have provisional liberty pending trial and
judgment. The original jurisdiction to grant or deny bail rested with said respondent. The correct course
was for petitioner to invoke that jurisdiction by filing a petition to be admitted to bail, claiming a right to bail
per se by reason of the weakness of the evidence against him. Only after that remedy was denied by the
trial court should the review jurisdiction of this Court have been invoked, and even then, not without first

applying to the Court of Appeals if appropriate relief was also available there.
The Court reiterates that based on the doctrine enunciated in People vs. Hernandez, the questioned
information filed against petitioners Juan Ponce Enrile and the spouses Rebecco and Erlinda Panlilio
must be read as charging simple rebellion only, hence said petitioners are entitled to bail, before final
conviction, as a matter of right. The Court's earlier grant of bail to petitioners being merely provisional in
character, the proceedings in both cases are ordered remanded to the respondent Judge to fix the
amount of bail to be posted by the petitioners. Once bail is fixed by said respondent for any of the
petitioners, the corresponding bail bond flied with this Court shall become functus oficio. No
pronouncement as to costs.

In February 1990, Senator Juan Ponce Enrile was arrested for the crime of rebellion with
murder and multiple frustrated murder. The warrant of arrest was issued by Judge Jaime
Salazar. Said crime arose from the failed coup attempts against then president Corazon
Aquino. There was no bail set for Enrile due to the seriousness of the crime charged against
him. Enrile was then brought to Camp Karingal. Enrile later filed a petition for habeas
corpus questioning his detention and alleging that the crime being charged against him is
nonexistent. He insists that there is no such crime asrebellion with murder and multiple
frustrated murder. Enrile invoked the ruling in the landmark case of People vs
Hernandezwhere it was ruled that rebellion cannot be complexed with common crimes such
as murder; as such, the proper crime that should have been charged against him is simple
rebellion which is bailable.
Enrile also questioned the regularity of the issuance of the warrant of arrest against him. He
claimed that it only took Judge Salazar one hour and twenty minutes (from the raffling of the
case to him) to issue the warrant. Enrile claimed that such period is so short that it was
impossible for the judge to have been able to examine the voluminous record of the case
from the prosecutions office that being, the constitutional provision that a judge may only
issue a warrant of arrest after personally determining the existence of probable cause has
not been complied with.
For the prosecution, the Solicitor General argued that the Hernandezruling should be
abandoned and that it should be ruled that rebellion cannot absorb more serious crimes like
murder.
ISSUES:
1. Whether or not the Hernandez ruling should be abandoned.
2. Whether or not Judge Salazar personally determined probable cause in the case at bar.

HELD:
1. No, the said case is still good law. The Supreme Court also noted that there was actually
a previous law (P.D. 942) which sought to abandon the Hernandez doctrine. The said law
provided that graver crimes may not be complexed with rebellion. However, President
Corazon Aquino repealed said law (by virtue of the power granted to her by the 1986
Freedom Constitution). That being, the Hernandez doctrine, which reflects the rebellion law
under the Revised Penal Code, still stands. The courts cannot change this because courts
can only interpret laws. Only Congress can change the rebellion law (which the SC
suggested in order to strengthen the rebellion law). But as it stands, Enrile is correct, there
is no such crime as rebellion with murder. Common crimes such as murder are absorbed.
He can only be charged with rebellion which is bailable.
2. Yes. There is nothing irregular on the fact that Judge Salazar only took an hour and
twenty minutes to issue the warrant from the time the case was raffled to him despite the
fact that the prosecution transmitted quite a voluminous record from the preliminary
investigation it conducted. It is sufficient that the judge follows established procedure by
personally evaluating the report and the supporting documents submitted by the
prosecutor. Just because Judge Salazar had what some might consider only a relatively
brief period within which to comply with that duty, gives no reason to assume that he had
not, or could not have, so complied; nor does that single circumstance suffice to overcome
the legal presumption that official duty has been regularly performed.

G.R. No. L-28519

February 17, 1968

RICARDO PARULAN, petitioner,


vs.
DIRECTOR OF PRISONS, respondent.
Ricardo Parulan for and in his own behalf as petitioner. Office of the Solicitor General
for respondent.
RESOLUTION
ANGELES, J.:
On petition for a writ of habeas corpus, filed by Ricardo Parulan, directed to
the Director of the Bureau of

Prisons, praying that the latter be ordered "to release immediately and without
delay the body of the petitioner
from unlawful and illegal confinement", anchoring the relief prayed for on certain
allegations in the petition, to
the effect that petitioner's confinement in the state penitentiary at Muntinglupa,
Rizal, under the administrative
and supervisory control of the respondent Director of Prisons, is illegal, for the
reason that the sentence of
conviction imposed upon said petitioner for the crime of evasion of service of
sentence, penalized under Article
157 of the Revised Penal Code, was rendered by a court without jurisdiction over his
person and of the offense
with which he was charged.
It appears that the petitioner, as alleged in the petition, was confined in the
state penitentiary at
Muntinglupa, Rizal, serving a sentence of life imprisonment which, however, was
commuted to twenty (20)
years by the President of the Philippines. In October, 1964, he was transferred to
the military barracks of Fort
Bonifacio (formerly Fort Wm. McKinley) situated at Makati, Rizal, under the custody
of the Stockade Officer of
the said military barracks. In that month of October, 1964, while still serving his
prison term as aforesaid, he
effected his escape from his confinement. Petitioner was recaptured in the City of
Manila. Prosecuted for the
crime of evasion of service of sentence, penalized under Article 157 of the Revised
Penal Code, before the
Court of First Instance of Manila, after due trial, petitioner was found guilty of the
offense charged and
sentenced accordingly with the imposable penalty prescribed by law, on August 3,
1966.
Assuming the correctness of the facts as alleged in the petition, and on the
basis thereof, we shall

proceed to discuss the merits of the case regarding the validity and legality of the
decision sentencing the
petitioner to a prison term for the crime of evasion of sentence.
Settled is the rule that for deprivation of any fundamental or constitutional
rights, lack of jurisdiction of the
court to impose the sentence, or excessive penalty affords grounds for relief by
habeas corpus.
The issue, therefore, as posed in the petition is: Was the Court of First
Instance of Manila with
jurisdiction to try and decide the case and to impose the sentence upon the
petitioner, for the offense with
which he was charged evasion of service of sentence?
Section 14, Rule 110 of the Revised Rules of Court provides:
Place where action is to be instituted. (a) In all criminal prosecutions the
action shall be instituted and
tried in the court of the municipality of province where the offense was committed
or any of the essential
ingredients thereof took place.
There are crimes which are called transitory or continuing offenses because
some acts material and
essential to the crime occur in one province and some in another, in which case, the
rule is settled that the
court of either province where any of the essential ingredients of the crime took
place has jurisdiction to try
the case.1 As Gomez Orbaneja opines
Que habiendo en el delito continuado tantos resultados como hechos
independientes en sentido natural,
el principio del resultado no basta para fijar el forum delicti commisi, y ha de
aceptarse que el delito se comete
en cualquiera de los lugares donde se produzca uno de pesos plurales resultados.2
There are, however, crimes which although all the elements thereof for its
consummation may have

occurred in a single place, yet by reason of the very nature of the offense
committed, the violation of the law is
deemed to be continuing. Of the first class, the crime of estafa or malversation3
and abduction 4 may be
mentioned; and as belonging to the second class are the crimes of kidnapping and
illegal detention where the
deprivation of liberty is persistent and continuing from one place to another 5 and
libel where the libelous matter
is published or circulated from one province to another. 6 To this latter class may
also be included the crime of
evasion of service of sentence, when the prisoner in his attempt to evade the
service of the sentence imposed
upon him by the courts and thus defeat the purpose of the law, moves from one
place to another; for, in this
case, the act of the escaped prisoner is a continuous or series of acts, set on foot by
a single impulse and
operated by an unintermittent force, however long it may be. It may not be validly
said that after the convict
shall have escaped from the place of his confinement the crime is fully
consummated, for, as long as he
continues to evade the service of his sentence, he is deemed to continue
committing the crime, and may be
arrested without warrant, at any place where he may be found. Rule 113 of the
Revised Rules of Court may be
invoked in support of this conclusion, for, under section 6[c] thereof, one of the
instances when a person may
be arrested without warrant is where he has escaped from confinement. 7
Undoubtedly, this right of arrest
without a warrant is founded on the principle that at the time of the arrest, the
escapee is in the continuous act
of committing a crime evading the service of his sentence.
WHEREFORE, the writ is denied. Without costs.

Concepcion, C.J., Reyes, J.B.L., Dizon, Makalintal, Bengzon, J.P., Zaldivar, Sanchez,
Castro and Fernando,
JJ., concur. 1wph1.t

** Umil v Ramos 187 SCRA 311 (1990)


As for cases of rebellion, the case of Umil vs. Ramos (187 SCRA 311), clearly states that since rebellion
is a continuing offense, a rebel may be arrested at any time, with or without a warrant, as he is deemed to
be in the act of committing the offense at any time of the day or night.

PER CURIAM
These are 8 petitions for habeas corpus (HC) filed bef. the Court. The Court finds that the
persons detained have not been illegally arrested nor arbitrarily deprived of their constitutional
right to liberty and that the circumstances attending these cases do not warrant their release
on HC.
An arrest w/o a warrant, under Sec. 5, pars. (a) and (b) of Rule 113, ROC, as amended is
justified when the person arrested is caught in flagrante delicto, viz., in the act of committing an
offense; or when an offense has just been committed and the person making the arrest has
personal knowledge of the facts indicating that the person arrested has committed it.
The persons in whose behalf these petitions for HC have been filed had freshly committed
or were actually committing an offense, when apprehended, so that their arrests, w/o warrant
were clearly justified, and that they are, further detained by virtue of valid informations filed
against them in court.
I
In Umil v. Ramos, RIOU-CAPCOM received confidential info. about a member of the
NPA-Sparrow unit being treated for a gunshot wound at the St. Agnes Hospital in
Roosevelt Ave.
, Q.C. It was found that the wounded person, who was listed in the hospital records as Ronnie
Javelon, is actually Rolando Dural, a member of the NPA liquidation squad, responsible for the
killing of 2 CAPCOM soldiers the day before. Dural was then transferred to the Regional
Medical Services of the CAPCOM.
Upon positive identification by an eyewitness, Dural was referred to the Caloocan City
Fiscal who conducted an inquest and thereafter filed w/ the RTC-Caloocan City an info. charging
Dural w/ the crime of "Double Murder w/ Assault upon agents of persons in authority."
The petition for HC, insofar as Umil & Villanueva are concerned, is now moot and
academic and is accordingly dismissed, since the writ does not lie in favor of an accused in a
crim. case, who has been released on bail.

As to Dural, he was not arrested while in the act of shooting the 2 soldiers. Nor was he
arrested after the commission of said offense for his arrest came a day after the shooting
incident. However, Dural was arrested for being a member of the NPA, an outlawed subversive
organization. Subversion being a continuing offense, the arrest of Dural w/o warrant is justified
as it can be said that he was committing an offense when arrested.
The arrest of persons involved in rebellion whether as its fighting armed elements, or for
committing non-violent acts but in furtherance of rebellion, is more an act of capturing them in
the course of an armed conflict, to quell the rebellion, than for the purpose of immediately
prosecuting them in court for a statutory offense. The arrest, therefore, need not follow the
usual procedure in the prosecution of offenses w/c requires the determination by a judge of the
existence of probable cause bef. the issuance of a judicial warrant and the granting of bail if the
offense is bailable. Obviously, the absence of a judicial warrant is no legal impediment to
arresting or capturing persons committing overt acts of violence against govt forces, or any other
milder acts but equally in pursuance of the rebellious movement. xxx (Garcia-Padilla v. Enrile.)
Dural was found guilty of the charge and is now serving the sentence imposed upon him
by the trial court. Thus, the writ of HCis no longer available

UMIL V RAMOS (1990)


PER CURIAM

The main issue in this case is WON the arrests were valid and WON the writ of Habeas Corpus may be
granted to the petitioners
The court here will decide each case based on the individual attending circumstances of all the accused
These are 8 consolidated petitions for habeas corpus because the issues herein are similar
RESPONDENTS
PETITIONERS
The persons sought to be produced were all legally Informations were null and void
arrested and are detained by virtue of valid Detention is unlawful
informations hence a writ of HC cannot be used to arrests made with no warrant
set them free
no preliminary investigations conducted
COURT: arrests are LEGAL, circumstances do not warrant the release through habeas corpus

Warrantless arrests are recognized by law

ROC- Rule 113 - Sec. 5. Arrest without warrant; when lawful. A peace officer or a private person may,
without a warrant, arrest a person:
(a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually committing, or is attempting
to commit an offense;
xxxxx

Evidence shows that persons arrested herein had all freshly committed or were actually
committing an offense arrests justified and that they are detained by virtue of valid informations
filed against them in court

o
o

UMIL v RAMOS
They were arrested in connection with the killing of 2 capcom soldiers
Dural was captured and identified 1 day after the incident because he needed medical care
FEB 6, 1988 petition for habeas corpus was filed with the court on behalf of Umil, Dural and Villanueva
FEB 26, 1988 Umil and Villanueva posted bail before RTC Pasay where charges for violation of
the Anti-Subversion Act they were released HC of Umil and Villanueva = moot and academic
Dural was not arrested DURING the shooting nor was he arrested JUST AFTER arrested a DAY
AFTER = seemingly unjustified
BUT court said the Dural was arrested for being a member of the NPA an outlawed subversive organization
Subversion is a continuing offense = arrest without warrant is justified
Furthermore evidence shows that the case against Dural was tried in court wherein they were
found GUILTY = now serving sentence = HC no longer available

Lacson Vs. Perez


357 SCRA 756 G.R. No. 147780
May 10, 2001
Facts: President Macapagal-Arroyo declared a State of Rebellion (Proclamation No. 38) on May 1,
2001 as well as General Order No. 1 ordering the AFP and the PNP to suppress the rebellion in the
NCR. Warrantless arrests of several alleged leaders and promoters of the rebellion were thereafter
effected. Petitioner filed for prohibition, injunction, mandamus and habeas corpus with an application
for the issuance of temporary restraining order and/or writ of preliminary injunction. Petitioners assail
the declaration of Proc. No. 38 and the warrantless arrests allegedly effected by virtue thereof.
Petitioners furthermore pray that the appropriate court, wherein the information against them were
filed, would desist arraignment and trial until this instant petition is resolved. They also contend that
they are allegedly faced with impending warrantless arrests and unlawful restraint being that hold
departure orders were issued against them.
Issue: Whether or Not Proclamation No. 38 is valid, along with the warrantless arrests and hold
departure orders allegedly effected by the same.
Held: President Macapagal-Arroyo ordered the lifting of Proc. No. 38 on May 6, 2006, accordingly
the instant petition has been rendered moot and academic. Respondents have declared that the
Justice Department and the police authorities intend to obtain regular warrants of arrests from the
courts for all acts committed prior to and until May 1, 2001. Under Section 5, Rule 113 of the Rules
of Court, authorities may only resort to warrantless arrests of persons suspected of rebellion in
suppressing the rebellion if the circumstances so warrant, thus the warrantless arrests are not based
on Proc. No. 38. Petitioners prayer for mandamus and prohibition is improper at this time because
an individual warrantlessly arrested has adequate remedies in law: Rule 112 of the Rules of Court,
providing for preliminary investigation, Article 125 of the Revised Penal Code, providing for the
period in which a warrantlessly arrested person must be delivered to the proper judicial authorities,
otherwise the officer responsible for such may be penalized for the delay of the same. If the

detention should have no legal ground, the arresting officer can be charged with arbitrary detention,
not prejudicial to claim of damages under Article 32 of the Civil Code. Petitioners were neither
assailing the validity of the subject hold departure orders, nor were they expressing any intention to
leave the country in the near future. To declare the hold departure orders null and void ab initio must
be made in the proper proceedings initiated for that purpose. Petitioners prayer for relief regarding
their alleged impending warrantless arrests is premature being that no complaints have been filed
against them for any crime, furthermore, the writ of habeas corpus is uncalled for since its purpose is
to relieve unlawful restraint which Petitioners are not subjected to.
Petition is dismissed. Respondents, consistent and congruent with their undertaking earlier adverted
to, together with their agents, representatives, and all persons acting in their behalf, are hereby
enjoined from arresting Petitioners without the required judicial warrants for all acts committed in
relation to or in connection with the May 1, 2001 siege of Malacaang.

FACTS:
On May 1, 2001, President Macapagal-Arroyo, faced by an angry mob assaulting and attempting to break into
Malacaang, issued Proclamation No. 38 declaring that there was a state of rebellion in the National Capital Region.
She likewise issued General Order No. 1 directing the Armed Forces of the Philippines and the Philippine National
Police to suppress the rebellion in the National Capital Region. Warrantless arrests of several alleged leaders and
promoters of the rebellion were thereafter effected.
Aggrieved by the warrantless arrests, and the declaration of a state of rebellion, which allegedly gave a semblance
of legality to the arrests, four related petitions were filed before the Court assailing the declaration of a state of
rebellion by the President and the warrantless arrests allegedly effected by virtue thereof, as having no basis both in
fact and in law.
1.
On May 6, 2001, the President ordered the lifting of the declaration of a state of rebellion in Metro Manila.
Accordingly, the instant petitions have been rendered moot and academic.
2.
As to petitioners claim that the proclamation of a state of rebellion is being used by the authorities to justify
warrantless arrests, there are actually general instructions to law enforcement officers and military agencies to
implement Proclamation No. 38 and obtain regular warrants of arrests from the courts. This means that preliminary
investigations will be conducted.
3.
Moreover, petitioners contention that they are under imminent danger of being arrested without warrant do
not justify their resort to the extraordinary remedies of mandamus and prohibition, since an individual subjected to
warrantless arrest is not without adequate remedies in the ordinary course of law.
4.
Petitioners cannot ask the Court to direct the courts before whom the informations against the petitioners are
filed to desist from arraigning and proceeding with the trial of the case. Such relief is clearly premature considering
that as of this date, no complaints or charges have been filed against any of the petitioners for any crime.
5.
Hold departure orders issued against petitioners cannot be declared null and void since petitioners are not
directly assailing the validity of the subject hold departure orders in their petition.

6.
Petitioner Defensor-Santiago has not shown that she is in imminent danger of being arrested without a
warrant. Hence, her petition of mandamus cannot be issued since such right to relief must be clear at the time of the
award.
7.
Petitioner Lumbao, leader of the Peoples Movement against Poverty (PMAP), argues that the declaration of a
state of rebellion is violative of the doctrine of separation of powers, being an encroachment on the domain of the
judiciary to interpret what took place on May 1. The Court disagreed since the President as the Commander-in-Chief
of all armed forces of the Philippines, may call out such armed forces to prevent or suppress lawless violence.
8.
As for petitioner Laban ng Demokratikong Pilipino (LDP), it is not a real party-in-interest. LDP has not
demonstrated any injury to itself which would justify resort to the Court. Petitioner is a juridical person not subject to
arrest. Thus, it cannot claim to be threatened by a warrantless arrest. Nor is it alleged that its leaders, members and
supporters are being threatened with warrantless arrest and detention for the crime of rebellion.
Even if instant petition may be considered as an action for declaratory relief, the Supreme Court does not have
jurisdiction in the first instance over such a petition.
PETITIONS DISMISSED (However, petitioners cannot be arrested without the required judicial warrant for all acts
committed in relation to or in connection with the May 1, 2001 siege)