27 Beamer

Training Manual Table of Contents
A318/A319/A320/A321 EASA Part 66 Cat. B1B2
27 Flight Controls Aileron and Hydraulic Actuation. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

General . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
5
5
Aileron Servocontrol - Operation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
27-00 General Normal Operation with the Servocontrol Pressurized . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
Description of Primary Flight Controls . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2 Operation after an Electrical Failure . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
General Principles. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2 Operation after a Hydraulic Failure . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
Electrical Flight Control System. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 Maintenance and Rigging Facilities. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
General . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
Ailerons 27-10. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 27-20 Rudder
Rudder 27-20 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 General . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
Elevators 27-30 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 Flight Augmentation Computer . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
Trimmable Horizontal Stabilizer 27-40 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 YAW Damper . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
Spoilers 27-60. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 Rudder Trim . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
Speedbrake Control . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 Rudder Travel Limitation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
Ground Spoiler Control . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 Rudder Mechanical Control. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
Flap and Slat Control . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9 General . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
Flight Controls Power Supply. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10 Component Description. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
Electrical Power Supply . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10 Stops and Rigging Facilities . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
Hydraulic Power Supply . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11 Rudder Trim Actuation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
Priority Valves . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11 General . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
Leakage Measurement Valves . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11 Rudder Trim Actuator . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
Safety Valve . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11 Maintenance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
Artificial Feel and Rudder Travel Limiting - Actuation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
27-01 EFCS Control Laws Rudder Artificial Feel . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
General . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2 Rudder Travel Limiting . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
Pitch Normal Law . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 General . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
Pitch Alternate Law . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 Normal Control Circuit . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
Pitch Direct Law . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 Emergency Control Circuit . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
Lateral Normal Law . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 General . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
Protections . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8 Component Location . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
Reduced Protections. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10 Rudder Servocontrol Component Description. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
Operation. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
27-10 Aileron Test . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
Aileron. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2 Yaw Damper Actuation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
General . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2 General . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
System Description . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2 Component Location . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
Sep08/Technical Training for training purposes only

Contents - I
Copyright by SR Technics
Component Description . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20 Pitch Trim Actuator . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12

Yaw Damper Servo-Actuator . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20 Position Transducer . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
General . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20 Normal Operation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
Maintenance and Rigging Facilities . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21 Mechanical Control Operation. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
Airbus Industrie . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24 Ground Operation from the Electric Pumps . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
Operation in Failure Conditions. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
27-30 Elevator Ground Test . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
Elevator Control . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 Technical Data of THS Actuator . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
General . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 THS Position Indicating . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
Interface with the Autopilot System (22-70) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
Elevator-Servocontrol Simultaneous-Pressurization Logic . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 27-60 Spoiler
Elevator Oscillation Detection . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 General . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
Pitch Control . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2 System Description . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
Elevator and Hydraulic Actuation. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 System Description . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
General . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 Spoiler Hydraulic Actuation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
Component Location. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 General . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
Elevator Servocontrol Description. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 Operation. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
General . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 Indication . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
Operation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
27-75 Flaps
27-40 Trimmable Horizontal Stabilizer General . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
Trimmable Horizontal Stabilizer (THS). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 Controls and Indication . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
General . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 Electrical Supply . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
THS Control . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 System Description . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
System Description . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2 Electrical Control and Monitoring System . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
THS Mechanical Control . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 Hydraulic Actuation and Power Transmission. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
General . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 Extension and Retraction of the Flaps . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
Stop and Rigging Facilities . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 Hydraulic Actuation and Power Transmission. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
Cable Tension Regulator . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 Asymmetry and Power Transmission Monitoring . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
THS Hydraulic Actuation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 System Ground Operation Inhibit . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
General . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 Position Indicating . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
Pitch Trim Actuator Description . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 Flaps Electrical Control and Monitoring . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
Fail-Safe Ball Screw-Jack . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8 General . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
Hydraulic Motors . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10 Electrical Control . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
Control Valve Blocks. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10 Power Control Unit . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
Gearbox . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10 Monitoring . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
Pressure-Off Brakes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10 Feedback Position Pick-Off Unit (FPPU). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14

Contents - II
FPPU / APPU Adjustment. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14 Actuator . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11

Asymmetry Position Pick-Off Unit (APPU) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14 Operation. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
Flap Interconnecting Strut. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16 Slat Tracks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
Flap-Attachment Failure Detection Sensors . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16 SLT System Data . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
Wing Tip Brake and WTB Control. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
Power Supply . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20 27-90 EFCS
Interfaces . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22 LAF (Load Alleviation Function) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
Flaps Hydraulic Actuation and Power Transmission . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24 General . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
General . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24 Operation. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
Power Transmission . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24 FCDC System (Flight Control Data Concentrator) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
Right Angle Gearbox 6203CM (6253CM) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26 General . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
Line Gearbox 6209CM (6259CM). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26 Power Supply . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
Bevel Gearbox 6217CM (6267CM). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27 Interface . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
Torque Shafts and Steady Bearings . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27 Operation. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
Flap Actuators. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28 Test . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
Flap Carriages . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31 Maintenance and Safety Tests/Bite . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
Flap and Track Fairing Operating Mechanism . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32 General . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
Flaps Position Indicating. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34 Interface . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
General . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34 Operation. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
System Description . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34 Test . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
Power Supply . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34 Panels, Controls and Indications . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
Instrumentation Position Pickoff-Unit (IPPU) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34
CFDS - Related System Monitoring . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37 27-Study Questions
27-80 Slats
General . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
System Description . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
Power Supply . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
Slats Hydraulic Actuation and Power Transmission . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
General . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
Component Location. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
Component Description . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
Power Control Unit (6001CM) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
Bevel Gearbox, 19 Degree (6003CM) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
Tee Gearbox (6005CM) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
Bevel Gearbox, 63.5 Degree . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
Torque Shafts and Steady Bearings . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11

Contents - III

Contents - IV
Training Manual Flight Controls
A318/A319/A320/A321 27-00
27 Flight Controls

27-00-1
Copyright by SRTechnics
A318/A319/A320/A321 27-00 General
27-00 General General Principles

The control is achieved through conventional surfaces.
On A319 / A320 / A321 Figure 1: Flight Control Surfaces on page 3
Description of Primary Flight Controls
The roll and pitch controls of the aircraft are electrical. They are based on two dif-
ABBREVIATION SIGNIFICATION ferent types of digital computers (ELAC and SEC), each of them being able to con-
trol the aircraft in both axes. Monitoring and redundancy within the flight control
ADC Air Data Computer system, aircraft sensors, power and hydraulic generation ensure a high degree of
ADIRS Air Data/Inertial Reference System availability of the electrical control. The basic yaw control is hydromechanical as
well as the alternate horizontal stabilizer control, thus providing the ability to keep
CFDIU Centralized Fault Display Interface Unit the aircraft in flight during a temporary complete loss of electrical power. However,
in normal conditions, some rudder control functions (trim, travel limitation) are
DMU Data Management Unit
achieved by the FAC.
ECAM Electronic Centralized Aircraft Monitoring The normal pitch control law is basically the closed loop control of the load factor,
EFCC Electronic Flight Control Computer and includes flight envelope protections. The normal lateral control law combines
the roll rate control, turn coordination and Dutch roll damping functions.
EFCS Electrical Flight Control System
ELAC Elevator Aileron Computer
FAC Flight Agmentation Computer
FCDC Flight Control Data Concentrator
FMGC Flight Management and Guidance Computer
IRS Inertial Reference System
LVDT Linear Variable Differential Transducer
RVDT Rotary Variable Differential Transducer
SEC Spoiler Elevator Computer
SFCC Slat Flap Control Computer

27-00-2
A318/A319/A320/A321 27-00 General
Figure 1: Flight Control Surfaces

FLY BY WIRE MECHANICAL CONTROL
- ELEVATORS - RUDDER
- AILERONS - THS
- ROLL SPOILERS HYDRAULIC ACTUATION OF ALL SURFACES (TRIMMABLE HORIZONTAL
- THS STABILIZER)
- SLATS AND FLAPS
- SPEED BRAKES/GROUND SPOILERS
- TRIM (YAW AND ROLL)
RUDDER
ELEVATOR
SLATS AILERON
FLAPS TRIMMABLE HORIZONTAL

STABILIZER
SPEED-BRAKES
ROLL SPOILERS
LAF
GROUND SPOILERS

27-00-3
A318/A319/A320/A321 27-00 General
Electrical Flight Control System Electrical routes 1 are used for items powered from the emergency electrical sup-
ply, routes 2 are used for items powered from the normal electrical supply.
General Control signals are routed in routes S, monitoring signals are routed in routes M.
In the sections exposed to the engine burst the EFCS cables are shared between
Figure 3: EFCS on page 7
the normal and deviated routes.
The Electrical Flight Control System includes the ELACs, the SECs, the Flight
Protection against lightning strikes: in the exposed areas the wires are installed in
Control Data Concentrators (FCDCs) and vertical accelerometers.
metal shields for each signal the wires are twisted. The grounding of signals is not
The EFCS is built according to the principles below: achieved in the exposed areas. Aileron-related wires are routed in the leading
edge whereas spoiler-related wires are in the trailing edge. The inputs of the com-
Redundancy and Dissimilarity puters include low-pass filters and overvoltage protections if the associated wires
The EFCS includes two ELACs, three SECs, two FCDCs and four accelerome- are routed in exposed areas.
ters. The ELACs and SECs are both able to achieve the roll and pitch control of
the aircraft. These two types of computer differ by their internal architecture, hard- Ailerons 27-10
ware, type of microprocessor, software. For each computer type, the control and
The roll control of the aircraft is achieved by one wing tip aileron augmented by
monitoring software are different.
four spoilers on each wing. The ailerons are manually controlled from the side
Monitoring stick controllers or automatically in autopilot function.
The monitoring of each computer (ELAC, SEC) is achieved as follows: Each aileron can be powered by two servocontrols signalled by two Elevator and
Aileron Computers (ELAC) and supplied from different hydraulic systems. In nor-
Monitoring channel: Each computer consists of two physically and electrically- mal operation, the roll function of the ailerons is achieved through the ELAC 1 and
separated channels, one being dedicated to the control functions, the other to the the associated servocontrols in active mode, the ELAC 2 being in standby and its
monitoring of these. These two channels perform the actuator command signal associated servocontrols in damping mode. In the event of a failure, the ailerons
computation using different digital processes. The monitoring channel permanent- become automatically controlled by the ELAC 2 (roll) and the associated servo-
ly compares the results of these computations and inhibits the signal to the actu- controls switched to the active mode, the others being now damped. If a multiple
ator, should a discrepancy occur. failure condition causes the loss of the control of the two servocontrols of an ailer-
Self-monitoring capacity: Each channel is able to detect the failure of the critical on, the servocontrols automatically switch to the damping mode. This operating
signals it receives or emits and to detect internal failures by test of the processor mode is also automatically engaged in the event of loss of pressure.
and monitoring of its internal power supply. Two independent side stick controllers are installed in the cockpit. They include
Cross-talk: Each control and associated monitoring channel permanently ex- the roll and pitch position transducers and feel mechanisms, and a solenoid-oper-
changes information via digital buses, therefore consolidating and validating infor- ated detent that locks the control lever in neutral position when the autopilot is en-
mation received from different sensors. gaged.
Automatic power-on and pressure-on safety tests performed without movement of
the surfaces.
Installation
The installation takes into account the principles below:
Wiring installation: specific connectors are used for the EFCS.

27-00-4
A318/A319/A320/A321 27-00 General
Rudder 27-20 Elevators 27-30

The rudder mainly permits to achieve the yaw control. The pitch control of the aircraft is achieved by two mechanically independent ele-
The rudder is actuated by three servo controls. vators controlled manually from the side stick controllers or automatically in auto-
pilot function.
The servo controls can be driven:
Each elevator can be driven by two electrohydraulic servocontrols signalled by the
in manual mode: ELACs or SEC 1 or 2, and supplied from different hydraulic systems.
either mechanically from the pedals,
In normal operation the elevators are controlled by the ELAC 2 and the associated
or electrically from the side stick and/or the rudder pedals
servocontrols in active mode, the other computers being in standby and the ser-
in autopilot control mode: vocontrols in damping mode. In the event of a high load-factor demand that would
from the FMGECs. cause one servocontrol to stall, the second servocontrol is operated. In the event
The rudder is powered by three servo controls mechanically signalled from the of failure, the elevators are controlled by ELAC1, then by SEC2 or SEC1. In the
pedals through a single load path linkage fitted with a centering spring device that event of the loss of control of the two servocontrols of the elevator, the servocon-
holds the servocontrol input in the neutral position if a disconnection occurs. trols are automatically switched to a centering mode and hold the surface in the
neutral position (Electrical control loss). In the event of the loss of the two hydraulic
Each set of pedals is fitted with a position transducer. systems supplying the servocontrols of one elevator, the damping mode becomes
Feel is provided by a spring rod, the zero force position of which is controlled by automatically engaged.
an electrical trim actuator. The side stick controller operation for the pitch control is similar to the roll control
A solenoid-operated mechanism increases the feel force threshold when the au- as described in para. 1.B.
topilot is engaged.
Two yaw-damper electrohydraulic servoactuators connected to a common output Trimmable Horizontal Stabilizer 27-40
lever drive the linkage through a differential lever arrangement. The pitch trim function is achieved by the Trimmable Horizontal Stabilizer (THS)
One servoactuator is normally operating, the other being by-passed. A spring rod either automatically in normal in-flight manual mode or autopilot function or man-
is provided to center the actuators when both of them are depressurized. ually from the handwheels in normal ground operation or in-flight failure condition.
The maximum control stroke is restricted by the Travel Limitation Unit as a func- The THS is moved and held by a THS actuator that includes a double load-path
tion of the airspeed. ball screw powered by two differentially coupled hydraulic motors mechanically
servocontrolled. The ball screw is fitted with a no-back brake, the motors are fitted
The trim actuator, the yaw damper servoactuators and the travel limitation unit are with pressure-off brakes. The control loops include a device that applies both pres-
normally controlled by the Flight Augmentation Computer (FAC) 1, the FAC 2 be- sure-off brakes in the event of either control valve jamming.
ing in standby.
The input shaft of the THS actuator is normally driven by an electrical motor ser-
In addition to their basic function, the trim actuator and the yaw damper servoac- vocontrolled by the ELAC 2, two other motors controlled respectively by ELAC 1
tuators are used to introduce the autopilot signals. or SEC 1 and SEC 2.
Rudder immobilization or runaway in the event of a servocontrol valve jamming is The input shaft of the THS actuator can also be manually driven by the pilots
prevented by a spring rod and pressure relief valve arrangement. through a mechanical linkage normally moved by the handwheels.
An overriding mechanism gives the priority to the mechanical control over the
electrical control.
Spoilers 27-60 Five spoiler surfaces are provided on each wing to achieve the functions below:

27-00-5
A318/A319/A320/A321 27-00 General
roll spoiler (surfaces 2 to 5) In the event of an electrical failure, the associated surface is hydraulically held
speedbrake (surfaces 2 to 4) down. In the event of a hydraulic failure, the servocontrol is hydraulically locked in
ground spoilers (all surfaces). one direction to prevent the surface from raising. In both cases the control of the
symmetrical surface is automatically inhibited.
These surfaces are manually controlled from the side stick controllers (roll spoil-
ers), speedbrake control lever (speedbrake) or automatically in autopilot and Speedbrake Control
ground spoiler function.
This is the control of the position of the spoiler surfaces 2 to 4 from the speedbrake
Each surface is controlled by one servocontrol supplied from the Green, Yellow or control lever.
Blue system and signalled from the SEC 1, 2 or 3.
The combination of the different functions is achieved in the computers. Ground Spoiler Control
This is the automatic full deployment of all the spoiler surfaces at touch down.
Figure 2: Electrical Flight Control System (EFCS) General Architecture

27-00-6
A318/A319/A320/A321 27-00 General
Figure 3: EFCS
GND-SPLR GND-SPLR
LOAD ALLEVIATION FUNCTION LOAD ALLEVIATION FUNCTION -LAF-*
ROLL ROLL
SPEED BRAKE SPEED BRAKE
SPOILER SPOILER
5 4 3 2 1 1 2 3 4 5
G Y B Y G G Y B Y G
L-AILERON R-AILERON
B G G B
ELAC] 1 2 NORM 1 2 [ELAC

2 1 1 3 3 CONTROL 3 3 1 1 2
SEC] [SEC
HYDRAULIC THS ACTUATOR

B
B:BLUE SYSTEM MECHANICAL
G:GREEN SYSTEM TRIM G Y FAC 1 G
Y:YELLOW SYSTEM
Y
FAC 2 Y
L-ELEVATOR R-ELEVATOR
RUDDER
B G Y B G
SURFACE
RUDDER
ELAC] 1 2 2 1 2 1[ELAC
PEDALS
SEC] 1 2 1 2 2 1[SEC
COMPUTERS EFCS
ELAC1 SEC1 FAC1

2 2 2
3
2 ELEVATOR AILERON COMPUTERS 3 SPOILER ELEVATOR COMPUTERS 2 FLIGHT AUGMENTATION COMPUTERS

27-00-7
A318/A319/A320/A321 27-00 General
Figure 4: Fly by Wire Concept

FEEDBACK
FMGC (A/P)
ORDER
2 ELAC
3 SEC FEEDBACK
2 FAC
AIRCRAFT
SURFACE
RESPONSE
PILOT COMMAND
3 ADIRU
(MANUAL FLIGHT)
SIDE STICK
RELEASED
SIDE STICK
RELEASED
10 10 10
10
10 10
10 10 10
10
10 10

27-00-8
A318/A319/A320/A321 27-00 General
Flap and Slat Control A321 have dual element flaps
Flap Control 27-50 Slat Control Lift Augmenting 27-80

Achieved on each wing by one inboard flap and one outboard flap. Achieved on each wing by five slats.
A319 / A320 have single element flaps Figure 5: Slat / Flap Presentation on page 9
Figure 5: Slat / Flap Presentation

27-00-9
A318/A319/A320/A321 27-00 General
Flight Controls Power Supply Figure 6: Elec.Power Supply

401PP
Electrical Power Supply 28VDC
ESS BUS
15CE1 C/B
FLT CTL/ELAC1/NORM/SPLY
The ELAC 1 and SEC 1 are each supplied from a DC essential busbar (4PP for 2CE1
THS MOT2
the ELAC 1 and SEC 1), the battery 1 taking over instantaneously through a ded- 19CE2C/B ELAC1
FLT CTL/THS ACTR/MOT2
icated diode device (Power Supply Uncoupling Unit) when the voltage level drops
below the battery output voltage. A relay ensures the battery supply line breaking
on the ground 30s after the second engine shut down. 21CE1 C/B
FLT CTL/SEC1/NORM/SPLY
The ELAC 2, and the THS motor 1 are normally supplied from the DC normal bus-
bar 2PP. 801PP
3CE1
FCDC1
1CE1
28VDC 20CE1 C/B SEC1
In case of loss of this busbar (particularly after the loss of both main generation SHED FLT CTL/FCDC1/SPLY
ESS BUS
channels, or after a double main TRU failure), these supplies are automatically
switched over to the battery 2 by means of two relays, for a fixed period of 30s. 703PP 22CE C/B FLIGHT GROUND
28VDC FLT CTL/SEC1/STBY/SPLY
The SEC 2, the SEC 3, the THS electrical motor 3, and FCDC 2 are supplied from HOT
BUS
the DC normal busbar 2PP.
16CE1 C/B FLIGHT GROUND
The THS electrical motor 2 is supplied from the DC essential busbar 4PP. FLT CTL/ELAC1/STBY/SPLY
The FCDC 1 is supplied from the DC essential busbar 8PP.

202PP
28VDC 15CE2 C/B NORM STBY
BUS2 FLT CTL/NORM/SPLY
2CE2
ELAC2
19CE1 C/B NORM STBY

THS MOT1
704PP 16CE2 C/B

28VDC FLT CTL/ELAC2 THS/STBY/SPLY
HOT
BUS
1CE2
204PP SEC2
28VDC 21CE2 C/B
BUS2 FLT CTL/SEC2/SPLY
1CE3
21CE3 C/B SEC3
FLT CTL/SEC3/SPLY
3CE2
20CE2 C/B FCDC2
FLT CTL/FCDC2/SPLY
THS MOT3
19CE3 C/B

27-00-10
A318/A319/A320/A321 27-00 General
Hydraulic Power Supply

The flight controls are powered by the three independent hydraulic systems; re-
dundancy is such that with two hydraulic systems failed, the remaining system can
operate the aircraft within an acceptable range of the flight envelope.
Hydraulic characteristics of flight control components are given in the component
description paragraphs.
Priority Valves
Priority valves are installed upstream of the components below:
Blue system: slat power control unit (PCU) motor
Green system: flap and slat PCU motors
Yellow system: flap PCU motor
in order to avoid supply pressure of the main flight control components dropping
below approximately 130 bars (1885 psi) when various hydraulic user systems are
operated simultaneously.
Leakage Measurement Valves

Ground maintenance isolation valve blocks are installed in the flight controls hy-
draulic supply lines to allow measurement of internal leakage of the components
installed downstream of these valves and valve jamming detection tests.
Safety Valve
To preserve the Green system in case of engine burst, a safety valve is installed.

27-00-11
A318/A319/A320/A321 27-00 General
Figure 7: Hydr. Power Supply

BLUE GREEN YELLOW
RESERVOIR RESERVOIR RESERVOIR
HAND
PUMP
RAT
70L/mn M 25 L/mn PUMP 1 PUMP 2 M 25 L/mn
140 L/mn 140L/mn
MAIN MAIN MAIN

ACC. ACC. ACC.
PTU
LEAK MEASUREMENT LEAK MEASUREMENT LEAK MEASUREMENT
VALVE S VALVE S VALVE
S
L & R AILERON L & R AILERON L & R SPOILER 2

L & R SPOILER 3 L & R SPOILER 5
PRIORITY PRIORITY PRIORITY L & R SPOILER 4
RUDDER VALVE L & R SPOILERS 1 VALVE VALVE
RUDDER
P P P
L & R ELEVATOR RUDDER R ELEVATOR
L. ELEVATOR THS
SLATS L & R WTB
THS
FLAPS L & R WTB
YAW DAMPER
YAW DAMPER
L. SLATS
FLAPS L WTB
CSM/G SLATS L & R WTB
REVERSE ENG 2
FLAPS R WTB
CARGO DOORS
REVERSE ENG 1
WHEELS BRAKES
WHEELS BRAKES
PRESSURE TRANSMITTER
L. FLAPS
PRESSURE SWITCH R.FLAPS
R.SLATS
LANDING GEAR SAFETY

F
VALVE
NOSE WHEEL
STEERING

27-00-12
A318/A319/A320/A321 27-00 General
Figure 8: Cockpit Flight Control and Indicating

27-00-13
A318/A319/A320/A321 27-00 General
Side Stick Controller Figure 9: Side Stick Unit

Two side stick controllers are used for pitch and roll manual control one on the
captain lateral console, another one on the first officer lateral console.
The two side sticks are electrically coupled. HAND GRIP
The arm rest is fixed on the seat.

General concept is a fail safe concept i.e. mainly that a single failure provides:
Neither total loss of artificial feel
Nor undetected uncontrolled pilot order.
The hand grip includes 2 switches:
A/P disconnect pushbutton is used for:
A/P disconnection in A/P mode
Priority logic between sticks in manual mode
Push-to-talk button.
Space provision is provided for mounting of a datum-adjust button (used in A/P
mode).
DAMPER
The side stick includes:
a hand grip
a protection boot
two axes DAMPER
two spring rods for pitch artificial feel

two springs for roll artificial feel.
two transducer units; one for roll, the other one for pitch
one solenoid to introduce; in AP mode, a higher threshold to move the side
stick out of the zero position. PITCH ARTIFICIAL FEEL
TRANSDUCER UNITS

27-00-14
A318/A319/A320/A321 27-00 General
Figure 10: Side Stick
Glareshield Panel, LH side
Sidestick
The sidesticks, one on each lateral console, are used for Sidestick Priority Lights
manual pitch and roll control. They are springloaded to neutral. Red arrow light:
When the AP is engaged, both sticks are locked in the neutral CHRONO
position. If a force above a given threshold is applied, the AP Illuminates - In front of the Pilot who's sidestick authority
disconnects and manual control is restored: is lost, indicating priority has been taken
- Pitch 5 kg over by opposite sidestick.
Sidestick SIDE STICK PRIORITY
- Roll 3.5 kg
Extinguishes - If the opposite take-over P/B is released
Priority logic: within 40 sec.
When only one sidestick is operated, the command is send to CAPT
- If the latched priority situation has been
the EFCS. canceled.
When both sidesticks are operated at a time, the inputs are
algebraically added and the result is sent to the EFC S. The Green CAPT, green F/O light:
addition of both inputs is limited to single stick maximum
deflection. Flashes - When both sidesticks are deflected
Both green CAPT and F/O SIDE STICK PRIORITY lights flash simultaneously but no side has taken
and a DU AL INPUT" voice message is given every 5 seconds Glareshield Panel, RH side priority.
as long as both pilots operate their sidestick simultaneously .
Illuminates - In front of the pilot who has taken over
Take-Over P/B control priority if the opposite sidestick is
Pressing either take-over P/B will: not in the neutral position, indicating a
- Disengage the AP if engaged. potential and unwanted control demand.
- Deactivate the opposite stick and secure entire control CHRONO
Extinguishes - If the opposite side stick is returned to the
priority as long as the P/B is kept pressed. If pressed for
neutral position.
Push-T o-T alk Button more than 40 sec, the system will latch, thus allowing the
P/B to be released without loosing priority . SIDE STICK PRIORITY NOTE: - An aural "PRIORITY LEFT" or "PRIORITY RIGHT"
Springloaded to neutral position,
If both sidestick take-over P/Bs are pressed, the last Pilot to message will sound each time priority is taken over.
press will get the priority. - If on ground take-off mode engages with one stick
F/O
A deactivated sidestick can be reactivated at any time by deactivated, the TAKE OFF CONFIG warning is
momentarily pressing the take-over P/B on either stick. triggered.
Sidestick Order Indication

The combined CAPT / FO sidestick order is displayed in white
on ground after first engine start. The indication disappears
after lift-off . 10 10
Sidestick Deflection
The maximum range for sidestick deflection is displayed in
white on ground after first engine start. The indication
disappears after lift-off .

27-00-15
A318/A319/A320/A321 27-00 General
Transducer Units Associated to Side Stick Controllers Figure 11: Transducer Units
Two identical transducer units are associated to each controller one for roll
control, another one for pitch control. ROLL ARTIFICIAL SPRING FEEL
Four sets of 3 plastic track potentiometers are fitted in each unit.

The design is fail safe from the mechanical inputs (two input levers) to the input
drive of each potentiometer set. The purpose of this design is to avoid the loss of
the mechanical drive of more than one potentiometer set subsequent to a single
mechanical failure.
The gear ratio between unit input and potentiometer sets is 3. ROLL DAMPER STICK LOCKS
The unit mid stroke position is accurately determined by a rigging pin between in-
put levers and the body. The potentiometers are rigged to mid stroke for this input ROLL TRANSDUCER UNIT
lever position in the unit manufacturer facilities.
Then no electrical rigging is needed when a transducer unit is replaced. The hand
grip being maintained to zero by artificial feel threshold and the unit input being PITCH ARTIFICIAL SPRING FEEL
fixed to mid stroke by the pin, the length of the two input rods is adjusted to con-
nect each of them to the corresponding input lever.
The rigging pin is removed after mechanical connection is achieved.
Ten potentiometers are used in each transducer unit used for roll control, one po-
tentiometer being associated to each COM and each MON unit of the 2 ELACs STICK-LOCK SOLENOID
and 3 SECs. The COM and MON units of each computer do not use potentiome- BALANCE WEIGHT PITCH TRANSDUCER UNIT
ters of the same group.
PITCH DAMPER
Only 8 potentiometers, 2 in each group, are used in each transducer unit used for
pitch control.
They are associated to the two ELACs and to SEC 1 and 2. The COM and MON
units of each computer use potentiometers of the same group.
Each potentiometer track power supply is achieved by the associated computer
unit.
The position signal is delivered between the sliding contact and the mid point of
the track.

27-00-16
A318/A319/A320/A321 27-00 General
Figure 12: Sidestick Assembly
HAND GRIP
RIGGING
& LOCKING PIN
ARTIFICIAL FEEL
RIGGING
PIN
RIGGING
PIN
TRANSDUCER
UNITS

27-00-17
A318/A319/A320/A321 27-00 General
Figure 13: Indication

27-00-18
A318/A319/A320/A321 27-01 EFCS Control Laws
27-01 EFCS Control Laws

27-01-1
General
The Electronic Flight Control System EFCS computes control commands to the
flight control surfaces to fulfill the crew and/or AP requests according to following
control laws:
Normal law is active in normal A/C configuration.
Sidestick deflection is proportional to a defined flight parameter (e.g. g-load, roll
rate). The commanded flight control deflection is a function of various signals and
aircraft response feedbacks necessary to comply with the flight parameter de-
mand.
Alternate law is active in case of computer or sensor failures.
Flight control commands are computed to provide the basic Normal law functions,
but protections and limitations are reduced and/or lost.
Direct law is active in specified flight conditions as well as in case of com-
puter or sensor failures.
The commanded flight control deflection corresponds to the sidestick deflec-
tion.Depending on the number and nature of failures (sensors, electric system, hy-
draulic system or flight control computer), the EFCS automatically reverts from
normal law to either alternate or direct law.
Control laws are available for pitch (longitudinal) control and combined roll/yaw
(lateral) control.

27-01-2
Figure 1: Simplified Summary of EFCS Laws

27-01-3
Pitch Normal Law AP also disconnects by rudder pedal deflection (10 out of trim) or by manual
trim input on the pitch trim wheel.
Ground Mode All protections remain active.
The ground law is a direct law establishing a proportional sidestick to elevator de-
flection relationship without automatic pitch trim. It is active on ground. Flare Mode
The trimmable horizontal stabilizer (THS) is automatically set at 0 (inside the The Flare normal law is a pitch attitude demand law. Passing 50 ft RH, the flare
green band). Manual setting according to CG has priority for take-off. mode engages. The A/C current pitch attitude is memorized and becomes the in-
itial reference for pitch attitude control. Passing 30 ft RH, the memorized value is
During the take-off roll at 70 kt, the max up elevator deflection is reduced from 30 progressively reduced to 2 nose down over a period of 8 seconds. Stick deflection
to 20 and the rotation maneuver is flown in direct law. corresponds to a pitch attitude demand with stick neutral = -2 in pitch. Therefore,
After the A/C becomes airborne, ground mode is replaced by the flight mode. manual positive action on the sidestick is necessary to flare the A/C for landing.
Flight Mode Pitch Alternate Law

The pitch normal law is a load factor demand law with automatic pitch trim and full
flight envelope protection. It is active from take-off to landing. It provides control of Ground Mode
elevator and THS to achieve a load factor proportional to stick deflection. As in pitch normal ground mode, the ground law is a direct law establishing a pro-
The side stick at neutral, wings level, corresponds to a 1g command in pitch cor- portional sidestick to elevator deflection relationship without automatic pitch trim.
rected for pitch attitude.
Flight Mode
Automatic pitch trim: Pitch trim is automatic in both manual control and with AP
The pitch alternate law is similar to the pitch normal law, however, protections are
engaged. There is no need to trim with speed, thrust or configuration changes.
reduced. Automatic pitch trim is available.
In normal turns (up to 33 bank) no pitch correction is required once the turn is es-
tablished. Flare Mode
Automatic pitch trim is inhibited in the following cases: Flight mode transitions to flare mode at selection of L/G down. The flare alternate
Manual trim order. law is a direct law establishing a proportional sidestick to elevator deflection rela-
Radio heights below 50 ft (100 ft with AP engaged). tionship without automatic pitch trim.
Load factor falls below 0.5g. Pitch Direct Law
In high speed/Mach protection (except in the event of L/R ELEV FAULT).
The pitch direct law establishes a proportional sidestick to elevator deflection re-
Automatic pitch trim is limited between the actual THS setting and 3.5 nose down lationship with full authority for all normal take-off and landing configurations. In all
to inhibit further nose up trim in the following cases: configurations the maximum elevator deflection is varied as a function of the cur-
If angle of attack protection is activated. rent C.G. It provides a compromise between adequate controllability at forward
If 33 bank angle is exceeded. C.G. and not too sensitive control at aft C.G.
If 1.25g load factor is exceeded. No automatic pitch trim is provided. USE MAN PITCH TRIM amber message is
Control with AP engaged: displayed on the FMAs. No protections are available except overspeed and stall
The AP commands are limited by the ELACs or SECs. warnings as for alternate law.
A threshold force must be applied to move the sidestick with AP engaged. If The A/THR ALPHA FLOOR function is lost.
the threshold force is exceeded, the AP will disconnect.

27-01-4
Figure 2: Pitch Control - Normal Law Modes

27-01-5
Lateral Normal Law

Roll Ground Mode
The ground law is active on ground before take-off and after landing. It is a direct
law establishing a proportional sidestick to aileron/roll spoiler deflection relation-
ship depending on the current speed. Rudder is controlled through the mechanical
linkage with the pedals with an automatic yaw damping function.
Roll Flight Mode

The roll normal law is a roll rate demand providing roll rate and bank angle protec-
tion, turn through combined control of ailerons and spoilers 2-5. The complete
sidestick range corresponds to a roll rate range from 15/sec. Maintaining the side-
stick in neutral position will command zero roll rate and A/C current bank attitude
is maintained. It is active from take-off to landing.
Roll Direct Law

The roll direct law establishes a direct relationship between sidestick and surface
deflection. The gains are automatically set according to slat/flap configuration.
Roll rate is limited to approximately:
Clean 30/sec / Slats extended 25/sec
For roll rate limitation, the roll direct law involves only ailerons and spoilers 4 and
5. If spoiler 4 has failed, it is replaced by spoiler 3. If ailerons have failed, all spoil-
ers are activated.
Yaw Mechanical Control

Yaw is manually controlled from the rudder pedals.
Turn coordination and yaw damping are lost.
Manual Backup
In case of a complete loss of electrical power or failure of all ELACs, SECs and
FACs the A/C can be controlled manually via:
Pitch THS trim wheel.
Induced roll rudder pedals.
Yaw rudder pedals.
The side sticks are inoperative. MAN PITCH TRIM ONLY message is displayed in
red on the FMA.

27-01-6
Figure 3: Roll Control - Normal Law Modes

27-01-7
Protections With high speed protection active:

The normal law provides complete flight envelope protection.
The AP will disconnect.
Load Factor Protection Automatic pitch trim is inhibited.
The load factor is automatically limited to:
Flaps retracted +2.5g /-1g High Angle of Attack Protection
Flaps extended 2g / 0g In pitch normal law, when the current angle of attack (AOA) exceeds A prot, the
elevator control law is switched from the normal g-load demand to a AOA demand
Automatic pitch trim is inhibited when the load factor falls below 0.5g. - Auto-
where AOA is proportional to sidestick deflection.
matic pitch trim is limited between the actual THS setting and 3.5 nose down
when the load factor exceeds 1.25g. With AOA protection active, the sidestick aft deflection range corresponds to the
AOA range from A-prot to a-max.
Pitch Attitude Protection Therefore A max cannot be exceeded, even with the side stick pulled to the fully
Pitch attitude is limited in function of A/C configuration to: back position. If the sidestick is released the AOA returns to and maintains A- prot
FLAPS 0 to 3 30 ANU This protection against stall and windshear conditions, has priority over all other
At low speed progressively reduced to 25 ANU protections. V prot, V floor, V max varies according to the weight, current Mach
and the A/C configuration.
FLAPS FULL 25 ANU
To deactivate the angle of attack protection, the sidestick must be pushed:
At low speed progressively reduced to 20 ANU more than 8.0 forward or,
Any FLAPS position 15 AND more than 0.5 forward for at least 0.5 seconds with < A max.
FD bars are removed when pitch attitude exceeds 25 ANU or 13 AND. FD When AOA protection is active:
bars reappear when A/C pitch attitude lays within 22 ANU or 10 AND.
High Speed Protection The AP will disconnect.

The aircraft recovers automatically following a high speed upset. Depending on Automatic pitch trim is limited between the actual THS setting and 3.5 nose
the flight conditions (high acceleration, low pitch attitude) the High Speed Protec- down.
tion is activated at/or above V MO /M MO. Slat retraction is inhibited.
When it is activated, the pitch trim is frozen. Positive spiral stability is introduced Speed brake activation is inhibited.
to 0 bank angle (instead of 33 in normal law), so that with the sidestick released, A.FLOOR protection is available from lift-off down to 100ft RH before landing. This
the aircraft always returns to a bank angle of 0. The bank angle limit is reduced function is inhibited in engine out operation when FLAPS 0.
from 67 to 45. As the speed increases above V MO /M MO, the sidestick nose-
down authority is progressively reduced, and a permanent nose-up order is ap- Bank Angle Protection
plied to aid recovery to normal flight conditions. Inside the normal flight envelope, positive spiral stability is provided above 33
The High Speed Protection is deactivated when the aircraft speed decreases be- bank angle. This means, if the sidestick is released with a bank angle greater than
low V MO /M MO, where the usual normal control laws are recovered. 33, the bank angle is automatically reduced to 33. If the sidestick is released with
The ECAM displays an O/SPEED" warning at V MO +4knots and M MO +0.006. a bank angle lower than 33, the current roll attitude is held.

27-01-8
Figure 4: Protections.
Low Speed / High AOA Protection Bank Angle Protection
RDINATION PROV
N COO IDED
TU R
Lift curve Airspeed scale
CL 140 VLS BANK REMAIN CONS
AND TAN
CH
PIT T NO
N PI
IO T
V prot S AT CH
RE
N

33
PE
CO
D
V floor
M
TO
UC
CO
PE
S
ES
NS
CE
CH
120 V max
TO
AT
DU
PIT
ION
33
RE
NO

VS1g Decrease of lift BAN IT
KA LIM
NG LE
max Maximum attainable AOA with t LE NG
fully aft sidestick deflection LIM KA
IT
BAN
floor A.FLOOR mode engagement
Maximum attainable AOA with t
prot sidestick in neutral position
VLS Minimum selectable speed
protected by A/THR

27-01-9
Sideslip Target Reduced Protections

In case of engine failure, without any crew action, the EFCS target is to reestablish
a zero roll rate and zero yaw rate condition. The A/C will therefore be stabilized in Load Factor Limitation
an quasi-steady attitude of constant bank angle and constant yaw. The sideslip in- Load factor limitation is similar to normal law.
dication is shifted by the amount of the target sideslip necessary to ensure opti-
mum rudder for engine failure compensation. Pitch Attitude Protection
Sideslip target computation is performed by the FACs. No pitch attitude protection is provided.
Sideslip target indication is available in take-off configurations 1, 2, 3. It is activat- Alternate High Angle of Attack Protection
ed when asymmetric thrust is detected (35% N 1), and at least one engine is
above 80% N 1. A low speed stability replaces the normal high AOA protection.
The sideslip indication changes from yellow to blue. The low speed stability is active from 5-10 kt above stall warning speed, depend-
ing on aircraft weight and slats/flaps configuration.
Figure 5: When active, a slightly progressive nose down demand is introduced to prevent
further speed decrease.
Bank angle compensation is provided.
In addition an audio stall warning is activated if following AOA thresholds are ex-
ceeded:
With slats < 15 at 8AOA
With slats > 15 at 13AOA
The PFD speed scale is modified to display a black/red barber pole below the stall
warning speed V SW.
The A/THR ALPHA FLOOR function is lost.
Alternate High Speed Protection

A high speed stability replaces the normal high speed protection.
Above V MO /M MO a nose up demand is introduced to avoid an excessive speed
increase. This demand can be overridden by manual sidestick input.
The conventional ECAM V MO /M MO and aural overspeed warning is provided
at V MO +4kt or M MO +0.006.
The AP will disconnect if V MO /M MO is exceeded.
Bank Angle Protection

No bank angle protection is provided.
The AP will disconnect if bank angle exceeds 45.

27-01-10
Abnormal Attitude Law

An abnormal attitude law in pitch and roll is provided if the A/C is in flight and any
of these parameters is exceeded for more than 2 seconds:
Pitch attitude >50ANU or 30AND Bank angle >125
AOA >30 or <-10
Speed >440kt or <60kt
Mach >0.91 or <0.1
While the abnormal attitude law is active, EFCS reverts to:
Pitch alternate law without autotrim and protections except load factor protection.
Roll direct law.
Yaw mechanical control.
After a normal attitude has been recovered, EFCS restores:
Pitch alternate law with autotrim and without protections except load factor protec-
tion.
Roll direct law.
Yaw alternate law.
No reversion to pitch direct law will occur at L/G extension.

27-01-11
Figure 6: Flight Control Law Reversion

27-01-12
A318/A319/A320/A321 27-10 Aileron
27-10 Aileron

27-10-1
A318/A319/A320/A321 27-10 Aileron
Aileron System Description

Full authority of surfaces is:
General + or - 25 deg for the ailerons,
One aileron (operational at all speeds) and four spoilers ensure roll control on - 35 deg for the spoilers.
each wing.
The spoilers 2, 3, 4 and 5 use the same deflection; from configuration 0 to config-
The Elevator and Aileron Computers electrically control the ailerons.The Spoilers uration 3, a threshold is included to minimize the drag.
and Elevator Computers electrically control the spoilers. A 5 deg downward deflection of the ailerons (droop) is active when the flaps are
The two side stick controllers deliver electrical signals which are used for the com- extended. This position is identified by an index on the AIL scale of the ECAM F/
putation of the control orders. CTL page (Ref 31-51).
The operation of the artificial feel system is independent of the flight conditions. The aileron droop function is ensured by each ELAC.
There is no roll trim control. The aileron droop function is active on ground or in flight when the flaps are
Two electrohydraulic servocontrols hydraulically actuate each aileron. extended; in that case, a 5 deg downward deflection of the ailerons is ordered
by the ELAC1 (or by the ELAC2 if it is active on the control of the ailerons).
One electrohydraulic servocontrol hydraulically actuates each spoiler.
The aileron droop function is available as long as one ELAC is able to control
The position of the surfaces is indicated on the lower ECAM display unit through the ailerons.
the Flight Control Data Concentrator (FCDC) (Ref. 27-95). The ailerons are normally controlled by the ELAC1 through the left Blue and
On ground, with hydraulic systems not pressurized, the ailerons may or may not the right Green servo-controls (active mode). The ELAC2 is in stand-by, and
droop down to the servocontrol stop depending on the scatter of bearing and seal the associated servo-controls are in damping mode.
friction. In case of ELAC1 failure, the control of the ailerons is automatically transferred to
the ELAC2 which becomes active through the left Green and right Blue servo-con-
trols; in that case, the servo-controls dedicated to the ELAC1 revert to the damp-
ing mode.
In case of double ELAC failure, or Blue and Green hydraulic low pressure, all ai-
lerons servo-controls are in the damping mode.

27-10-2
A318/A319/A320/A321 27-10 Aileron
Aileron Servoloops Lateral Control

An ELAC can be engaged in lateral if at least one of the two aileron servoloops is
valid.
General
The normal law for the lateral control includes the roll and yaw axis control.
If the ELAC 1 can only drive one aileron, the ELAC 2 drives the other aileron from
the order computed by the ELAC 1. The ailerons and the spoilers 2, 3, 4 and 5 are the roll control surfaces. The main
characteristics of the lateral control law are as follows:
An aileron servoloop is declared valid when the result of the monitorings below is
satisfactory: side stick movement in roll processed as a roll rate demand,
monitoring of the servovalve current, turn coordination automatically ensured,
monitoring of the servovalve failures, lateral attitude limitation provided.
monitoring of the servocontrol position transducer, Lateral Normal Law
monitoring of the discrete links between ELAC 1 and ELAC 2 (performed in the
Two phases must be considered:
ELAC 1 only).
flight,
result of automatic (launched or third hydraulic rise) test:
ground.
monitoring of the mode selector valve transducer,
monitoring of the servocontrol modes. The ground law is activated 0.5s after landing with long. attitude lower than 8.
The flight law is activated 0.5s after take-off with long.attitude higher than 8.
Interface with the Autopilot System (Ref. 22-60)
In AP mode, the FMGC orders are received by the ELACs which transfer to the Flight Law
SECs the order which correspond to roll spoiler control. The side stick movement in roll controls a roll rate in which the gains are function
The position of the side stick control is not slaved to the AP control orders. of Vc and of the configuration. The maximum roll rate is 15 /s.
The pilots can cancel the automatic mode, through the override of a disengaging The characteristics of the roll law are:
system (which includes a spring device and a solenoid) installed in each side stick in turn configuration, lateral attitude maintained up to 33 with side stick at zero,
unit. lateral attitude limited to 67 for full side stick deflection,
automatic turn coordination,
Dutch roll damping,
minimization of sideslip.
Ground Law
All feedbacks are inhibited. The side stick movement directly controls the roll con-
trol surfaces (ailerons and spoilers).
The rudder is mechanically controlled by the pedals with the yaw damper function
always active.

27-10-3
A318/A319/A320/A321 27-10 Aileron
Figure 1: Aileron Control Schematic

Flight Control Panel, LH side SYSTEM DISPLAY
SIDE STICK PRIORITY SIDE STICK PRIORITY
CAPT F/O GBY
SPD BRK R
Flight Control Panel, RH side AIL AIL

B ELAC 1 B
PITCH TRIM
UP
FMGC (ATA 22) R
RUD
B GBY B
FAC (ATA 22)

CFDIU DMU
FCDC 1 FCDC 2
TAT - 5C 23H56 60300
SAT - 30C
FAC (ATA 22) FAC (ATA 22)
SFCC SFCC FMGC (ATA 22)
ACCELEROMETER ADIRS ACCELEROMETER ADIRS

SEC 1 SEC 2 SEC 3 ELAC 1 ELAC 2
G G G PRESS TRANSMITTER
B B B
Y Y Y
PRESSURE PRESSURE
SWITCHES SWITCHES
POS
FEED
BACK Y B Y G
G Y B Y
G G B
B
SV SV SV SV
EV EV EV EV
5 4 3 2 1 1 2 3 4 5
AILERON ROLL SPOILER SURFACES AILERON

ROLL SPOILER SURFACES

27-10-4
A318/A319/A320/A321 27-10 Aileron
Aileron and Hydraulic Actuation Figure 2: Aileron Actuator Location
General
The hydraulic actuation is achieved by two electrohydraulic servocontrols for each
aileron.

27-10-5
A318/A319/A320/A321 27-10 Aileron
Table 1: Servo Control Modes

Modes for Yaw Damper Servo Actuator
Mode Computer(s) Solenoid Valves Hydraulic Active Mode - Energized (2) Normal
Pressure
Bypass Mode - De-Energized Normal
- - Off
Modes for Elevator Servo Control
Active Mode Normal De-Energized Normal
Damping Mode Siby or active Energized (1 or 2) Normal Spoiler Actuator Modes

Ch. fails
Mode Remarks Hydraulic pressure
- - Off
Re-Centering Mode All failed De-Energized Normal

(Both Servo Con- Normal Mode Command Signal Normal Normal
trols of elevator)
Biased Mode Command Signal lost Normal
Biased Servo Valve retracts
Spoiler hydraulically
Modes for Aileron Servo Control
Locked Mode Aerodynamic Forces move Lost/Off
Active Mode Normal Energized Normal Spoiler down
Damping Mode Fail De-Energized Normal Manual Mode Inspection Purposes Off
On Ground only
Normal - Off
Modes for Rudder Servo Control
Active Mode - - Normal
Damping Mode - - Off
Note: In case of a jammed servo control unit valve, the remaining servo con-
trols overpower the disabled servo control.

27-10-6
A318/A319/A320/A321 27-10 Aileron
Aileron Servocontrol - Operation Figure 4: Aileron Servocontrol in Active Mode
Normal Operation with the Servocontrol Pressurized

The pressurization of the servocontrol involves the opening of the pressure-line
closing valve (2) and of the return-line closing valve (3). Thus, the servovalve (4)
is supplied from the HP system and the return system of the servocontrol is con-
nected to the LP system.
Servocontrol in the Active Mode

In this case, the solenoid valve (1) is energized by its related ELAC and lets in the
HP flow which puts the mode selector valve (5) in the active mode.
The two chambers of the actuator are thus connected to the servovalve control
lines. The servocontrol is then in the active mode. The Linear Variable-Differential
Transducer (LVDT) (11) supplies an electrical signal which identifies this change
of state.
The feedback transducer (LVDT) (10) gives the servoloop feedback and position
indication on System Display F/CTL Page via FCDC.
Figure 3: Aileron Servocontrol in Active Mode

27-10-7
A318/A319/A320/A321 27-10 Aileron
Servocontrol in the Damping Mode Figure 5: Aileron Servocontrol in Damping Mode

In this configuration, the solenoid valve is de-energized and the mode selector-
valve moves under the action of its spring. This causes the two chambers of the
actuator to be interconnected through the damping orifice (6).
The linear variable-differential transformer identifies this change of state.
The check valve (7) and the fluid reserve (9) hold the volume of fluid in the actuator
chambers:
if the temperature of the hydraulic fluid changes
if there is a leakage.
The reserve of fluid is permanently connected to the return line of the servovalve.
The return relief valve (8) increases the pressure in the return line and permits to
fill the reserve of fluid.
Operation after an Electrical Failure

In this case the solenoid valve is de-energized and the operation is identical to the
one of paragraph A. (2).
Operation after a Hydraulic Failure

The closing valves (2) and (3) close and isolate the servocontrol from the hydraulic
system of the aircraft.
If there is a rupture of the aircraft return line, the return relief valve holds the vol-
ume of fluid in the fluid reserve.
The mode selector valve moves under the action of its spring. Then the servocon-
trol operates in the damping mode.

27-10-8
A318/A319/A320/A321 27-10 Aileron
Maintenance and Rigging Facilities Adjustment of the aileron when the blue outboard servocontrol is pressurized.
The maintenance is "on condition". To adjust an aileron, you must adjust the surface with one servocontrol ac-
tive and then the other.
The items given below are Line Replaceable Units:
filter
servovalve 1. Put a ruler in position on the trailing edge of the wing (inboard end of the wing)
(see detail E).
solenoid valve
2. Use a graduated ruler to measure the position of the aileron in relation to the
linear variable-differential transducer. ruler.
Figure 6: Aileron Servo Control To optimize the theoretical loft line, the ailerons position must be as close
as possible to the nominal values.
If the position of the aileron is not satisfactory, adjust the Blue servocon-
trol as follows:
a) Cut and remove the lockwire from the bolts (3).
b) Remove the bolts (3) and the lock plate (1).
c) Set the control surface to zero with the adjusting nut (2).
Always turn the adjusting nut (2) in the same direction to adjust the clear-
ances and the hysteresis.
d) Install the lock plate (1) and the bolts (3).

e) Safety the bolts (3) with the lockwire.

27-10-9
A318/A319/A320/A321 27-10 Aileron
Figure 7: Adjustment of the Aileron
D A
B
A B L .WING R .WING
Z 675
675 KB
B OUTBOARD
FLAP
Z 575
B
AILERON RULE E E RULE AILERON
D
575 KB
3 1
E C B
L. WING
C
GRADUATED RULE
02mm
00.0787in. 100mm mini
3.9370in. 2
INBD
AREA OF
MEASUREMENT
WING
40mm
1.5748in.
INBOARD END OF
THE AILERON

27-10-10
A318/A319/A320/A321 27-10 Aileron
Aileron Servocontrol Damping Test Figure 8: Aileron Damping Test

The test is driven by the FCDC and performed by the two ELACs.
E FCS 1
The ELACs control the deflections of the surfaces by pressurizing each servocon- 1L L A S T L EG RE P OR T 1R
trol simultaneously then alternatively. 2L P RE V I OUS L EG S RE POR T 2R
If the test is possible: 3L L RU I D EN T I F I CA T I ON 3R
4L GRO UN D S C A N MEMORY 4R
For each movement, the FCDC memorizes a deflection speed and a pressure
5L CL ASS 3 FAUL T S T EST 5R
drop, then it deducts a damping coefficient.
6L RE T UR N 6R
The test result is displayed on the MCDU in the form R AIL TEST OK or L AIL
TEST OK. E FCS 1
The value of the damping coefficient can be obtained and displayed through the 1L 1R
TEST REPORT. 2L E L E V A T OR DAMP I NG T E S T 2R
3L A I L E RON DAMP I NG T E S T 3R
If the test is not possible: 4L 4R
The test result is displayed on the MCDU in the form AIL TEST NOT POSSIBLE. 5L 5R
E FCS 1
The computer which have identified the anomaly, and the engagement condition 1L A I L E RO N DAMP I N G T E S T 1R
6L RE T U RN 6R
code are displayed on the MCDU. 2L - S E L EC T E L A C 1 + 2 ON 2R

- S E L EC T S EC 1 + 2 OF F
3L - S E L EC T BGY HYD P RE S S 3R
- S E L EC T A D I RU 1 + 2 + 3 OF F
4L S T ART L E F T T ES T 4R
5L S T A R T R I GH T T E S T 5R
6L RE T UR N 6R
TEST Y
POSSIBLE
EFCS 1 E FCS 1
1L A I L E RO N DAMP I N G T E S T 1R 1L A I L E RON D AMP I NG T E S T 1R
2L AIL T E S T NOT POS S I B L E 2R 2L L A I L T E S T OK 2R

M I N I M UM V A L U E 0 . 60
3L B Y F C DC XXXX 3R 3L B DAMP F A C TOR UP X . XX 3R
B DAMP F A C TOR DOWN X . XX
4L BY E L AC 1 XXXX 4R 4L G DAMP F A C TOR UP X . XX 4R
G DAMP F A C TOR DOWN X . XX
5L 5R
5L BY E L AC 2 XXXX 5R
6L RE T U RN 6R 6L RE T U RN 6R
PR I NT
B
SEE AIL TEST NOT POSSIBLE

27-10-11
A318/A319/A320/A321 27-10 Aileron
Figure 9: Aileron Test not Possible

B HEXA MESSAGE
BY FCDC
BIT PARAMETER
0 AIL LAF TEST
1 LEFT AIL TEST
2 RIGHT AIL TEST
3 AIRCRAFT IN FLT
4 ENG 1 OIL HIPR
5 ENG 2 OIL HIPR
6 WHEEL SPEED GT. 66KTS
7 ON GROUND AND WHEEL SPEED LT. 6KTS
8 HYD GREEN PRESS
9 HYD BLUE PRESS
10 HYD YELLOW PRESS
11 OPPOSITE ELAC TEST FCDC CONFIG
HEXA MESSAGE DECODING 12 S 1 PUSHBUTTON SWITCH OFF
13 S 2 PUSHBUTTON SWITCH OFF
X X X X 14 E 1 FAULT
15 E 2 FAULT
B
I 3.2.1.0 1
T NORMALY: 3.F.8 2
S 7.6.5.4
4
11.10.9.8
15.14.13.12
EXAMPLE: BY ELAC 1
0 0 3 F BY ELAC 1
BITS STATUS BIT PARAMETER
CODE CONVERSION TABLE BITS 3 2 1 0 0 A/C ON GROUND E1C
1 1 1 1 1 A/C ON GROUND E1M
2 L AIL E1C AVAIL
3 L AIL E1M AVAIL
BITS 7 6 5 4 4 R AIL E1C AVAIL
0 0 1 1 5 R AIL E1M AVAIL
6 FCDC E1C FAIL
7 FCDC E1M FAIL
BITS 11 10 9 8 8 IR1 E1C FAIL
0 0 0 0 9 IR2 E1M FAIL
10 IR3 E1C FAIL
11 ADR1 E1C FAIL
BITS 15 14 13 12 12 ADR2 E1M FAIL
0 0 0 0 13 ADR3 E1C FAIL
14
15
NORMALY: 3F3F
BY ELAC 2
CODE CONVERSION TABLE
BIT PARAMETER
(X) HEXADECIMAL BINARY DECIMAL 0 A/C ON GROUND E2C
1 A/C ON GROUND E2M
0 0000 0 2 L AIL E2C AVAIL
1 0001 1 3 L AIL E2M AVAIL
2 0010 2 4 R AIL E2C AVAIL
3 0011 3 5 R AIL E2M AVAIL
4 0100 4 6 FCDC E2C FAIL
5 0101 5 7 FCDC E2M FAIL
6 0110 6 8 IR1 E2C FAIL
7 0111 7 9 IR2 E2M FAIL
8 1000 8 10 IR3 E2C FAIL
9 1001 9 11 ADR1 E2C FAIL
A 1010 10 12 ADR2 E2M FAIL
B 1011 11 13 ADR3 E2C FAIL
C 1100 12 14
D 1101 13 15
E 1110 14
F 1111 15 NORMALY: 3F3F

27-10-12
A318/A319/A320/A321 27-20 Rudder
27-20 Rudder YAW Damper

Two yaw damper servo-actuators are installed between the artificial feel and trim
unit and the travel limitation unit.
General They drive the aft control via a differential linkage.
One rudder surface provides the yaw control. The signals of the yaw damper servo-actuators are added to those of the pilots up
The main control is mechanical by the pedals. to the maximum travel allowed by the travel limitation unit.
The trim control is electrically signalled. When the autopilot is not engaged, the Elevator Aileron Computer (ELAC) calcu-
lates the yaw damper order with the normal law.
The artificial feel is ensured by:
The yaw damper order calculated by the ELAC provides turn coordination, dutch
a spring rod, the stiffness of which is independent from the flight conditions,
roll damping and engine failure compensation.
a centering spring
If both ELACs fail, only the dutch roll damping (alternate law) is computed by the
At high speeds, a travel limitation unit limits the rudder travel in relation to the air- Flight Augmentation Computer (FAC) using the ADIRS data.
speed.This is to prevent the transmission of excessive loads to the structure by
the rudder. When the autopilot is engaged, the FAC calculates the yaw damper order except
in LAND mode where it is computed by the Flight Management and Guidance
Three fixed-body servocontrols with mechanical input provide the hydraulic actu- Computer (FMGC).
ation.
When the AP is engaged:
The position of the rudder is shown on the lower display unit of the ECAM system. Dutch roll damping law is provided by the FAC using ADIRS data.
Flight Augmentation Computer Engine failure compensation fast law is provided by the FAC using the ADIRS
data in TO, GA or RWY modes only.
The aircraft is equipped with two FACs. They interface either: Turn coordination law computes the yaw order to the FMGC roll order.
With the ELACs if both AP are disengaged or
In LAND mode, the FMGC yaw order controls the yaw damper actuators via the
with the FMGC if at least one AP is engaged. FAC.
Both FACs are automatically engaged at power up but may be disengaged or re- The yaw orders from the roll normal law are sent to the yaw damper servo-actua-
set separately by the respective FAC P/B on the FLT CTL overhead Panels. tors and added to the servocontrol mechanical input.
In case the FACs are disengaged but still valid, the flight envelope function re- Authority of these orders is given in the table below:
mains active.
The FAC accomplishes its functions using independent channels: Table 1: Yaw Damper Authority
Yaw damper.
Rudder trim. V Cas (kts) < = 160 200 300 380
Rudder travel limitation. A319 25 10.8 4.8 2.7
Flight envelope.
A320 20.8 10.8 4.8 2.7
If both FACs are valid, FAC 1 controls the yaw damper, turn coordination, rudder
trim and rudder travel limit and FAC 2 is in standby. A321 21 10.8 4.8 2.7

27-20-1
A318/A319/A320/A321 27-20 Rudder
Rudder Trim Rudder Travel Limitation

An electric trim actuator is connected to the artificial feel and trim unit upstream of The rudder travel limitation is computed by the FAC and sent to the Rudder Travel
the travel limitation unit. Limiting unit.
Maximum deflection is limited: The FAC Rudder Travel Limiting law computes this limit using the calibrated air-
A319 + / - 25 speed (Vc) provided by the ADIRS.
A320 + / - 20 The limitation of the rudder maximum deflection is given in the table below:
A321 + / - 20
Table 2: Rudder Travel Limitation
Rudder Trim Speed is 1 / sec
In all the modes, it drives the complete control via a spring device that the pilots V Cas (kts) < = 160 200 240 320 380
can override.
In the manual mode, the rudder trim is controlled by the RUD TRIM selector via A319 30 14.5 8.8 4.8 3.4
the FAC. A320 25 14.5 8.8 4.8 3.4
In the rudder trim auto mode, the FAC computes the engine failure compensation
and the turn coordination. When the AP is engaged: A321 25 13 7.9 4.3 2.9
The turn coordination law computes the yaw orders related to the FMGC roll
order. Interface with the Braking System
Signals are simultaneously sent to the rudder trim actuator and the yaw damp- Levers attached to each pedal provide braking inputs when the pedals turn about
er actuators. their axis.
The engine failure compensation slow law orders are sent to the rudder trim
actuator. Interface with the Nosewheel Steering System
The pedal transducer units send data to the BSCU via the ELACs for the nose-
wheel steering system.

27-20-2
A318/A319/A320/A321 27-20 Rudder
Figure 1: Rudder System Schematic
Flight Control Panel, LH side Flight Control Panel, RH side
CENTERING SPRING
SYSTEM DISPLAY RUDDER SERVO CONTROL

TRAVEL LIMITATION UNIT
GBY
ELAC ELAC FAC FAC FMGC FMGC

1 2 1 2 1 2 AIL
SPD BRK R
AIL
B ELAC 1 B
PITCH TRIM R
UP
B B
RUD
GBY
DFDR
TO BSCU SDAC 1/2

NOSE
WHEEL POS XDCR
STEERING TAT - 5C 60300
SAT - 30C 23H56
YAW DAMPER
SERVO ACTUATOR
A/P SOL (FMGC)

FAC
POS XDCR ARTIFICIAL FEEL
TRIM SCREWJACK
TO BRAKE CONTROL PEDAL ADJUSTMENT DEVICE
TRIM ACTUATOR
PEDAL POS. TRANSDUCER UNIT
TENSION REGULATOR

27-20-3
A318/A319/A320/A321 27-20 Rudder
Rudder Mechanical Control Stops and Rigging Facilities
General Pedal Stops

Pedal maximum travel is limited in both directions by non adjustable stops.
Three mechanically-controlled fixed-body servocontrols operate the rudder.
Two interconnected pairs of pedals drive a mechanical linkage. This linkage is sin- Rudder Operational Stops
gle up to the artificial feel and trim unit and up to the actuating lever of the middle Maximum input to the servocontrols is limited by the travel limitation unit.
servocontrol.
An adjuster which consists of a lever-controlled rack assembly is used to adjust Rudder Travel Stops
the position of the pedal assembly. These are the stroke end stops (non adjustable) of the servocontrols, never
Downstream of the actuating lever of the middle servocontrol, the linkage is dupli- reached in normal operation.
cated up to the travel limitation unit (which is fail safe).
Adjustable Lever
Thus, any single disconnection does not involve a loss of travel limitation without
a loss of rudder control. This is to avoid a hidden failure of the travel limitation due The length of one of the levers between the pedals and the tension regulator is
to single failure. adjustable in order to maintain maximum travel of the rudder within the design lim-
its.
The yaw damper signals are introduced through a differential mechanism, located
downstream of the aft cable run. Pedals Position Adjustment
Figure 4: Rudder Pedal Adjustment on page 6
Component Description
The rudder pedals adjustment range is approximately 0 to 12 graduations.
Cable Tension Regulator
Figure 3: Tension Regulator on page 6
One cable tension regulator maintains a constant tension on the cable (22 daN
plus or minus 3 daN (49.5 lbf plus or minus 7 lbf)).
It has a provision for the installation of a special tool used to install the regulator
on the aircraft.
Servocontrol Actuating Spring Rod

The actuating spring rod of the rudder servocontrol prevents the runaway of the
control system if an input lever jams on its servocontrol body.
It permits the control of the other two servocontrols if a spool valve jams.
Centering Spring Rod of the Upper and Middle Servocontrols

This centering spring-rod is used in the event of a rupture or disconnection of the
linkage between the artificial feel and the middle-servocontrol actuating lever.
It avoids a rudder deflection greater than 2 deg. with vertical acceleration Mz = 1g
and greater than 15 deg. with vertical acceleration Mz = 2.5g.

27-20-4
A318/A319/A320/A321 27-20 Rudder
Figure 2: Rudder Mechanical Control

SERVO CONTROL
CENTERING SPRING ROD
PIN HOLE
RACK ASSEMBLY TRAVEL LIMITATION UNIT
STOPS PIN HOLE
RVDT BOX
ADJUSTABLE BELLCRANK
PIN HOLE
PIN HOLE
PIN
SOLENOID HOLES
TENSION REGULATOR
ARTIFICIAL FEEL SPRING ROD
TRIM SCREWJACK
YAW DAMPER TRANSDUCER UNIT
TRIM ACTUATOR
PIN HOLE
YAW DAMPER YAW DAMPER ACTUATOR (CHAP.22)

RETURN SPRING ROD
TRANSDUCER UNIT
PIN HOLE

27-20-5
A318/A319/A320/A321 27-20 Rudder
Figure 3: Tension Regulator Figure 4: Rudder Pedal Adjustment

COLD POSITION
T: TIGHTEN
HOT POSITION
R: RELEASE
T
O
R
0
T R
FWD
LOCKING TOOL
T
H O
T
GRADUATION OF THE FIXED SCALE
6
OF TEMPERATURE FACING THE FIXED INDEX
5
-20 -15 -10 -5 5 10 15 20 25 30 35 40 C

1 AMBIENT
TEMPERATURE
2 STABILIZED
E.G:
STABLE AMBIENT TEMP.:7 3
INDEX POS:1T.
4
NOTE:THIS CURVE CAN BE EXTENDED
5
R

27-20-6
A318/A319/A320/A321 27-20 Rudder
Rudder Trim Actuation Figure 5: Rudder Trim Components
A
General Z325
The rudder trim control is electrically signalled. An electric actuator installed in the
tail area drives a trim screwjack via a rotary shaft and universal joints. A
The actuator is manually controlled via the FACs (Ref. ATA 22) from the control
panel located on the center pedestal, at a constant speed.
RUD TRIM Control Switch

This is a 3-position rotary switch spring-loaded to the neutral (center) position.
The direction of rudder trim travel depends on the direction of the switch rotation. B
RESET Pushbutton Switch 10CC

RUDDER TRIM
This pushbutton switch permits to automatically reset the rudder trim to zero. ACTUATOR
After a RESET selection through push action on the pushbutton switch, this switch
returns to its initial position. B
RUD TRIM Indicator
A digital indicator (1/10 resolution) shows the rudder trim travel together with the
direction (L or R).
The FACs also control the trim actuator in AP mode.
110VU
The maximum admissible rudder trim limits indicated on the control panel
when the aircraft is stabilized in heading with the AP engaged are RH 1 DEG C
and LH 2.3 DEG.
RUD TRIM
+- NOSE NOSE
L R
25
9CC
RESET ROTARY SWITCH
OFF
PARKING BRK
ON

27-20-7
A318/A319/A320/A321 27-20 Rudder
Rudder Trim Actuator Figure 6: Actuator

1. The actuator has two 3-phase asynchronous motors installed on the same
shaft (but they are electrically independent and controlled by independent plug-
in electronic assemblies).
The motors are permanently coupled to a reduction gear which drives the out-
put shafts via a torque limiter.
2. Non-locking rotary stops limit the actuator stroke.
3. The main output shaft is internally duplicated by a second shaft which permits
a duplicate recopy (this duplication prevents the loss of the four transducers if
there is a single rupture).
4. The output shaft drives four inductive transducer units:
the main output shaft drives the feedback transducer unit of one channel
and SHAFT
the monitoring transducer unit of the other channel through a reduction gear
the internal output shaft drives the other two transducer units in the same
manner.
5. An externally-visible index on the last actuating gear of one of the transducer
units shows the zero position of the output shaft. A
6. A tapered rigging pin is used to set the output shaft at mid angular travel (zero
trim position and zero reference for setting of transducers).
There is no damage if a motor is energized with the pin in position.
7. The actuator is sealed and has a desiccant patch, the color of which is exter- A
nally visible.
8. Electronic assembly:
MOBILE RED INDEX
a monitoring output makes the test of the electronic circuitry possible MOBILE RED INDEX (SHAFT TURNED BY
360 DEGREES)
a monitoring power supply permits the automatic test of the electronic as-
sembly at each FAC.
Maintenance Z E RO P O S I T I O N
The component below is a line-replaceable unit (LRU):

electronic assembly

27-20-8
A318/A319/A320/A321 27-20 Rudder
Figure 7: Rudder Trim Schematics

27-20-9
A318/A319/A320/A321 27-20 Rudder
Artificial Feel and Rudder Travel Limiting - Actuation

Rudder Artificial Feel
An artificial feel and trim unit is installed downstream of the cable quadrant.
It consists of a trim screwjack (Ref. 27-22) and a constant-resisting load spring-
rod that the trim screwjack holds in the neutral position.
The artificial feel and trim unit also comprises a system which overrides the auto-
pilot.
This system is engaged when the AP mode is selected.
The function of the spring rod is:
to provide an artificial feel load proportional to the rudder deflection,
to provide an accurate centering of the surface to neutral in the absence of a
control input,
to hold the upstream control at neutral when the yaw damper servoactuator
supplies signals to the servocontrol.
The centering spring force is added to the artificial feel force that the artificial
feel and trim unit supplies (Ref. 27-21).

27-20-10
A318/A319/A320/A321 27-20 Rudder
Figure 8: Artificial Feel and Trim Unit
FROM RUDDER
TRIM ACTUATOR

27-20-11
A318/A319/A320/A321 27-20 Rudder
Rudder Travel Limiting Normal Control Circuit

The rudder-travel limiting system limits the control inputs to the servocontrols to The motor itself is a 3-phase asynchronous motor with no brushes:
change the rudder travel in relation to the airspeed (Vc). the associated electronic set supplies the motor windings with variable voltage
The limitation is such that the maximum deflection of the rudder remains lower and variable frequency which are function of the input signal (representative of
than the deflection which would induce limit loads on the structure, throughout the the position error),
flight envelope. the system permits to get torque/speed characteristics for the motor equivalent
The system is made of a travel limitation unit which is under the control of the to those obtained with a DC motor,
Flight Augmentation Computers (FACs) (Ref. ch. 22). a relay isolates the motor windings from the electronic set output when its coil
is not energized by the enable signal.
A simplified emergency control system (open loop) brings back automatically the
stops to the "low-speed" position when the two FACs are failed and slats are ex- Moreover, in this situation, the output signals are sent back to the monitoring cir-
tended. cuits for comparison with fixed thresholds
the command signal that the computer dedicated to each electronic set sends
General is a DC current which varies between plus or minus 8 mA into a 500-ohm re-
sistor (for the computer, the motor is equivalent to a standard servovalve),
The mechanical design of the TLU is such that a single mechanical failure (rupture
or disconnection) cannot cause the loss of the travel limitation function. another relay upstream of the actuator and controlled by the computer supplies
the 28VDC power.
The TLU has two brushless electric motors separately controlled by an electronic
assembly. To prevent icing, there is a heating system which includes two coils and their reg-
ulating thermostats.
Each motor drives two screws via a reduction gear and permits the symmetrical
linear displacement of two nuts used as adjustable stops. (The two nuts have op- Emergency Control Circuit
posite pitches).
Figure 10: Emergency Control on page 14
A non-locking rotary stop limits the stroke of one of the screw/nut assemblies
which are irreversible. If both FACs fail, the rudder travel limitation value is frozen immediately. In this
case, an emergency control brings back the stops to the low speed configuration
There are two levers on each connection shaft; one is connected to the input rod
(maximum possible deflection of the rudder) when slats are extended.
and the other is used as a punctual stop.
To bring back the stops to the low speed configuration, the motors are
The movement of each screw is transmitted to a transducer unit (RVDT) via a re-
used as 2-phase asynchronous motor energized by 26V 400 Hz power.
duction gear which permits to indicate the position of the variable stop.
This control mode is achieved when the coil of a specific relay (each motor
Two rigging pins are used to set the two levers to the zero position (mid stroke). has a relay) is energized for a period of 30 s approximately. This time is
sufficient to bring back the stops to the low speed configuration.

27-20-12
A318/A319/A320/A321 27-20 Rudder
Figure 9: Component Location and Deflection Diagram
A A
B
B
4CC
TRAVEL LIMITATION UNIT

27-20-13
A318/A319/A320/A321 27-20 Rudder
Figure 10: Emergency Control

27-20-14
A318/A319/A320/A321 27-20 Rudder
General Figure 12: Rudder Servo Control Locations

Three fixed-body servocontrols with mechanical input are used to hydraulically ac-
tuate the rudder.
Each servocontrol is powered by a different hydraulic system.
The three servocontrols are interchangeable.
Component Location
1025GM SERVO CTL-RUDDER, G 325 325BL 27-24-51
2025GM SERVO CTL-RUDDER, B 325 325DL 27-24-51
3025GM SERVO CTL-RUDDER, Y 325 325CL 27-24-51
Figure 11: TLU Motor Control

27-20-15
A318/A319/A320/A321 27-20 Rudder
Rudder Servocontrol Component Description Maintenance, Rigging Facilities, Periodic Tests

The maintenance is "On condition".
Operation The items given below are Line-Replaceable Unit:
Normal Operation with the Servocontrol Pressurized Filter
The moving piston rod of the servocontrol is slaved to the mechanical input signal Actuator eye-end.
via the input lever (10). This lever is hinged in the middle on the rotary input lever To replace the servocontrol, it is necessary to have simultaneously the surface
(11). It is connected at one end to the input rod and at the other end to the feed- and the servocontrol in the neutral position.
back rod (12). To this end, the adjustment of the servocontrol is obtained through the adjustment
The rotary lever (11) actuates the control valve (8) and the stops (1) limit its travel. of the spring rod length.
In the event of overpressure in one of the chambers, the chamber overpressure is
applied against one of the two pistons (2) and/or (3). Test
It sets the damping and pressure-relief valve (5) to the bypass position. A single operational periodic test is performed on the three hydraulic systems
(through the use of leakage measurement valves).
Then the chambers are isolated from the control valve and connected via the
damping hole (6). Its purpose is to make sure that there is no valve jamming and no mechanical dis-
connection.
The high pressure is connected to the return via the heating orifice (9).
This ensures permanent heating leakage.
The vent hole (13) serves to vent over or under pressure of air occurring in the in-
ternal chamber of the cylinder assy.
Operation on the Ground with the Servocontrol Depressurized

When the servocontrol is depressurized, the spring (4) sets the damping and pres-
sure-relief valve to the bypass position.
If the rudder is subjected to external forces, the pressure increases in one of the
two chambers. This causes the movement of the servocontrol piston.
The fluid goes from one chamber to the other via the damping orifice and provides
a ground gust-damping function for gust speeds up to 80 Kts.
Two anti-cavitation valves permit the suction of the necessary volume of hydraulic
fluid to compensate for the thermal retraction on ground, in the damping mode.

27-20-16
A318/A319/A320/A321 27-20 Rudder
Figure 13: Rudder Servocontrol Operation Modes

27-20-17
A318/A319/A320/A321 27-20 Rudder
Figure 14: Rudder Servocontrol Pressurized

27-20-18
A318/A319/A320/A321 27-20 Rudder
Yaw Damper Actuation Figure 15: Yaw Damper Location
General
Two electrohydraulic yaw damper servo-actuators under the control of the FACs
(Ref. 22-61) are installed between the artificial feel and trim unit and the travel lim-
itation unit (TLU). They drive the aft control via a differential linkage.
The yaw damper servo-actuator orders are added to those of the pilots up to the
maximum travel that the TLU permits.
One of the two servo-actuators is active, the other remains in standby (bypass
mode).
In the event of a double hydraulic failure, a centering spring rod sets the two yaw
damper servo-actuators to the neutral position.
Component Location
3CC1 SERVO ACTR-YAW DAMPER, 1 325 325BL 27-26-51
3CC2 SERVO ACTR-YAW DAMPER, 2 325 325BR 27-26-51

27-20-19
A318/A319/A320/A321 27-20 Rudder
Component Description Figure 16: Yaw Damper Actuator in Active Mode
Yaw Damper Servo-Actuator

General
The two electrohydraulic servo-actuators are interchangeable.
Each servo-actuator includes:
one piston with a transducer unit (LVDT) isolated from the hydraulic fluid
one valve group which includes mainly:
one servovalve (2)
two solenoid valves (1)
two mode selector valves (3)
one pressure switch (5)
The design is such that a single failure cannot prevent the selection of the bypass
mode.
Normal Operation with the Actuator Pressurized

The servo-actuator pressurization directly involves the supply of the servovalve
(2) by the HP system.
Yaw Damper in the Active Mode

The two solenoid valves (1) must be energized to set the two selector valves (3)
to the active mode; i.e to connect the two piston chambers to the servovalve out-
puts.
Then, the servo-actuator is put in the active mode and the pressure switch (5) is
not activated.
The feedback transducer (LVDT) (4) provides the servoloop feedback.

27-20-20
A318/A319/A320/A321 27-20 Rudder
Yaw Damper in the Bypass Mode (Standby Configuration) Figure 17: Yaw Damper Actuator in Bypass Mode
The two-solenoid valves are de-energized and the associated selector valves are
set to the bypass mode under the action of their spring. The two-piston chambers
are, in this case, interconnected. The pressure switch is not activated.
Operation in Case of a Simple Electrical Failure

One solenoid valve is de-energized and the operation is identical to that of yaw
damper in bypass mode.
But the pressure switch is activated because the two selector valves are not in the
same position.In this way, by means of the pressure switch, which is now connect-
ed to the supply pressure, this abnormal configuration is indicated to the FACs.
Maintenance and Rigging Facilities

The maintenance is "on condition".
The items below are Line Replaceable Units:
filter
servovalve
solenoid valves
pressure switch
No rigging operation is necessary to replace the yaw damper.

27-20-21
A318/A319/A320/A321 27-20 Rudder
Figure 18: Yaw Damper Actuator in Bypass Mode (Simple Electrical Failure)

27-20-22
A318/A319/A320/A321 27-20 Rudder
Operation after a Hydraulic Failure In this case, the pressure switch is not activated.
With no hydraulic pressure, the two selector valves are set, under the action of
their spring, in bypass mode, thus the two chambers of the piston are intercon-
nected.
Figure 19: Yaw Damper Actuator in Bypass Mode (Hydraulic Failure)

27-20-23
A318/A319/A320/A321 27-20 Rudder
Airbus Industrie onds), the hard logic associated to the RTLU back-up function considers a
dual FAC fault (validity of the FACs being under confirmation / FAULT legend
Service Information Letter shown on push buttons).
APPLICABLE TO: A320/A321 2. Recommendation:
SUBJECT: INHIBITION OF THE RUDDER TRAVEL LIMITATION UNIT BACK- In order to prevent any RTLU back-up function activation on ground and to
UP FUNCTION DURING MAINTENANCE. avoid further reoccurrences of RTLU stroke mechanical stop damage, it is rec-
ommended in case SLATS have to be extended during maintenance to inhibit
1. Reason: this function before the SLATS extension by opening C/Bs 14CC1 (AUTO
During Rudder Travel Limitation Unit (RTLU) repairs in the vendor (ARTUS) FLT/FAC1 - 49VU210) and 14CC2 (AUTO FLT/FAC2 - 121VU212) located on
workshops, several cases of fatigue damage of RTLU stroke mechanical stops the RTLU electrical motors 26V 400Hz power supply (refer to ASM 22-68-00).
have been reported. This inhibition has to be kept as long as SLATS are extended during the main-
Investigation results have revealed that the too frequent activation of the RTLU tenance period.
back-up (emergency) function is the cause of above mentioned findings. It is advised to attach a warning notice to opened C/Bs in order that mainte-
This function is activated when both FACs (Flight Augmentation Computer) nance people do not forget to close the two C/Bs once SLATS are back in the
are faulty (not able to ensure the normal control) and that SLATS are extended. retracted position.
It is reminded that when the RTLU back-up function is activated, the two elec- Furthermore, complying with the FCOM CHAP. 3.03.24 standard operating
trical motors of the RTLU are supplied by 26V 400Hz power and operate simul- procedures AFTER LANDING which requests that the FLAP lever is set to the
taneously in open loop to bring the RTLU adjustable stops to a configuration position 0 after landing, prevents any RTLU back-up function activation dur-
enabling the +/- 30 DEG maximum possible deflection of the rudder. (Low ing aircraft stops.
Speed) AMM chapters 27-50-00 P 9.201 and 27-80-00 P 9.201 describing respectively
At this time the stroke mechanical stops are reached and the rotation of the FLAPS extension/retraction and SLATS extension/retraction on ground has
RTLU driving internal mechanism is no longer possible although motors are been amended for the AMM MAY 01/94 revision to include the above men-
still energized. tioned recommendation.
It has to be pointed out that, during the aircraft operation as per FCOM proce-
dure, the activation of the RTLU back-up function is extremely remote with
the existing system definition.
On ground when SLATS are retracted, RTLU adjustable stops are normally set
to the low speed configuration limiting the rudder deflection to +/- 25 DEG and
RTLU stroke mechanical stops are never reached.
However, if SLATS are extended for any reason, and both FACs are selected
OFF (push buttons released) while the electrical power is available on aircraft
with all C/Bs closed or both FACs are simultaneously under power-up testing
(after aircraft electrical circuits energisation with both FAC push buttons de-
pressed or with electrical power available on aircraft after depressing at the
same time both FAC push buttons previously released), with all C/Bs closed,
then the RTLU back-up function is activated and the stroke mechanical stops
are reached.
For information, when the power-up test is simultaneously in progress on
both FACs (approx. minimum duration for this test accomplishment = 10 sec-

27-20-24
A318/A319/A320/A321 27-30 Elevator
27-30 Elevator Elevator-Servocontrol Simultaneous-Pressurization Logic

The four servocontrols can be simultaneously active (the two servo controls which
are normally in damping mode become active in addition to the two normally active
Elevator Control ones) in the cases below:
elevator demand amplitude greater than a threshold function of Vc,
General in flare law or landing direct law if the deflection demand is greater than 30 /s
two elevators hinged on the trimmable horizontal stabilizer (THS) ensure the in case of undetermined mode detection (not in active, not in damping).
pitch control (Ref. 27-40). The three possible configurations are:
The elevators are controlled by: when the ELAC2 has priority
the Elevator and Aileron Computers in the normal mode ELAC 2 commands the active mode to the other servocontrol which is control-
the Spoiler and Elevator Computers in case of ELAC failure. led by the ELAC 1,
Normally one actuator is in active mode, while the other is in damping mode. ELAC 2 commands the active mode to the other servocontrol which is control-
led by the SEC 1,
In case of total computer failure, the actuators will be in centering mode as long
as hydraulic power is available. when the ELAC1 has priority
ELAC 1 commands the active mode to the other servocontrol which is control-
The control orders are computed from signals that the two electrically-coupled led by the SEC 2,
side stick controllers send.
When the four servocontrols become active, the surface deflection rate can reach
The artificial feel system operates independently of the flight conditions.
50/s.
Two electrohydraulic servocontrols hydraulically actuate each elevator.
When SEC 2 has priority
The position of the elevators is shown on the lower display unit of the ECAM sys- SEC 2 commands the active mode to the other servocontrol which is controlled
tem via the Flight Control Data Concentrator (FCDC). by the SEC 1.
On ground, with hydraulic systems not pressurized, the elevators may or may not
droop down to the servocontrol stop depending on the scatter of bearing and seal Elevator Oscillation Detection
friction. The ELACs include a function to monitor specific oscillations of elevator surfaces
in order to protect the aircraft structure.
Interface with the Autopilot System (22-70)
If this system is activated the elevator deflection is limited to few tenths of a degree
In the AP mode, the ELACs receive the FMGC orders and transfer them to the ser- around zero and both servocontrols are simultaneously pressurized (on one sur-
vocontrols. face only) when speed is above 170 kts. Full authority is progressively restored
The pilots can cancel the automatic mode through the override of a disengage- from 170 kts to 150 kts. If the protection is activated it remains latched until next
ment system, installed on each side stick controller. ELAC long autotest (ELAC low hydraulic reset).
The disengagement system includes a spring device and a solenoid energized by
the FMGCs.

27-30-1
A318/A319/A320/A321 27-30 Elevator
Pitch Control Ground Law

The C* law is the fundamental mode of manual pitch control. The side stick outputs directly control the surface position.
The law generates a load factor demand from the position of the side stick and the Elevator kinematics on ground:
inertial feedbacks. Protection against excessive load factor, Mach or speed or an- ELACs "on", 2 or 3 ADIRUs "on" and SECs "off".
gle of attack pitch attitude are also provided.
* If Vc < 70 kts, the deflection is + 15, - 30.
Pitch Control Law * If Vc > 70 kts, the deflection is + 15, - 20.
Three phases are considered: ELACs "on" , ADIRUs "off" and SECs "off".
flight, * Fixed Vc = 80 kts, the deflection is + 15, - 20.
flare, SECs "on" and ELACs "off", the deflection is + 15, - 30.
ground.
These phases are determined by the computers and consolidated by the informa- Protections
tion below:
Alpha (AOA) Protection
radioaltimeter altitude,
R and L L/G compressed signals from the LGCIUs, In the normal law, when an angle-of-attack threshold is reached (ALPHA PROT),
the C* law is replaced by an alpha protection law.
Pitch attitude from the ADIRS,
wheel speed and spoiler activation from the SECs. In this case, an angle-of-attack value, proportional to the side stick position, is cal-
culated.
Flight Law The ALPHA PROT value is associated to a null order of the side stick.
The C* law is activated. It combines the elevator control and the THS controls (AU- The ALPHA MAX value is associated to a full nose-up order of the side stick.
TOTRIM function). This protection is de-activated by a pitch-down side stick order.
It generates a load factor demand as a function of the position of the side sticks
and inertial feedbacks. The Load factor limitation is restricted to: High-Speed Protection
clean configuration: - 1 g, + 2.5 g, (CONF 0 - CONF 1) If a Vc or Mach threshold is reached, a positive load factor demand is added to the
flaps extended: 0, + 2g. (CONF 1+F, 2, 3, F) C* law.
The maximum surface deflection controlled by the computers are: This positive load factor demand is proportional to the difference between the ac-
Elevator deflection: +15, -30 deg tual Vc or Mach and the related threshold.
THS deflection: +3.5, -11 deg. This value is limited and decreases the pilot's authority in nose down direction.
This protection is active from takeoff to landing.
Flare Law
This law generates a longitudinal attitude value as a function of the side stick de-
mand, Nz feedbacks and pitch rate. The gains are function of the speed (Vc) and
center of gravity.
The purpose of this law is to restore the behaviour of a conventional aircraft down
to the ground.

27-30-2
A318/A319/A320/A321 27-30 Elevator
Figure 1: Elevator System Schematic

CAPT F/O GBY
SPD BRK R

B ELAC 1 B
PITCH TRIM
UP
FMGC (ATA 22) R
RUD
BG GBY YB
FAC (ATA 22)

CFDIU DMU
FCDC 1 FCDC 2
TAT - 5C 23H56 60300
SAT - 30C

B B B
Y Y Y
PRESSURE PRESSURE
SWITCHES SWITCHES
B G Y B
SV SV SV SV
EV EV XDCR UNIT XDCR UNIT EV EV
EV EV
ELEV LH ELEV RH EV EV
LH ELEVATOR RH ELEVATOR
E1 E2 E2 E1
S1 S2 S2 S1

27-30-3
A318/A319/A320/A321 27-30 Elevator
Accelerometer Elevator and Hydraulic Actuation

Vertical acceleration values are needed for pitch control laws computation.
Four specific accelerometers are fitted in the fuselage for this purpose. General
The accelerometer is servo-accelerometer type. Two electrohydraulic servocontrols hydraulically actuate each elevator.
Each of them receives + 28VDC and delivers on four separate outputs an analog Component Location
signal representative of the vertical acceleration referenced to the aircraft body.
Figure 3: Elevator Component Location on page 5
Each output is connected to a COM or MON unit of an ELAC or SEC. Each com-
puter unit receives the values of the load factor measured by 2 accelerometers
and the IRS.
Elevator Servocontrol Description
Monitoring of the difference between the 2 accelerometers received and elimina- General
tion of the erroneous accelerometers through comparison of the load factor value
from the IRS. Each elevator is equipped with two interchangeable fixed-body electrically-con-
trolled servo controls.
In normal operation, the measured load factor value which is used in the pitch nor-
mal law is the half-sum of the two accelerometer signals. Each servo control is connected to two ELACs and to two SECs.
vibrations could occur in the following configuration:
Figure 2: Accelerometers.
FR25 vibrations along the cabin and in the cockpit and
FR26
FR27 FLOOR CABIN C elevator control with SECs active and ELACs not active,
FR28 No trouble shooting is necessary (elevator oscillations are wider in SEC mode
FR29 than ELAC mode).
Each elevator is actuated by a servo control in the active mode, while the other is
in the damping mode.
the active computer achieves the closed loop control of one servo control and
commands the damping mode on the adjacent servo control.
In the normal configuration, the inboard servo control is in the active mode.
C
12CE1, 12CE3
12CE1 12CE2 12CE2, 12CE4
12CE3 12CE4 ACCELEROMETER
FLOOR CARGO

27-30-4
A318/A319/A320/A321 27-30 Elevator
Figure 3: Elevator Component Location Figure 4: Elevator Control

1 NORMAL OPERATION 2 WHEN ELAC 2 CONTROL IS LOST
SV SV
EV1 L. ELEVATOR EV1 L. ELEVATOR

ELAC 2 ELAC 2
SERVO CTL SERVO CTL
EV2 OUTBD BLUE EV2 OUTBD BLUE

ELAC 1 ELAC 1
SERVO CTL SERVO CTL
EV2 INBD GREEN EV2 INBD GREEN
SV SV
A 34CE 4 SV SV
A 34CE 2
SEC 2
EV1 R. ELEVATOR SEC 2
EV1 R. ELEVATOR
SERVO CTL SERVO CTL
A 34CE 1 EV2 INBD YELLOW EV2 INBD YELLOW
ALTERNATIVE SOLUTION A 34CE 3

SEC 1
EV1 R. ELEVATOR SEC 1
EV1 R. ELEVATOR
SERVO CTL SERVO CTL
SV SV
3 WHEN ELAC 2, ELAC 1 CONTROLS 4 WHEN ELAC 2, ELAC 1, SEC 2

ARE LOST CONTROLS ARE LOST
A SV SV

ELAC 2 ELAC 2
SERVO CTL SERVO CTL

ELAC 1 ELAC 1
SERVO CTL SERVO CTL
EV2 INBD GREEN EV2 INBD GREEN
SV SV
SV SV
EV1 R. ELEVATOR EV1 R. ELEVATOR

SEC 2 SEC 2
SERVO CTL SERVO CTL
EV2 INBD YELLOW EV2 INBD YELLOW
EV1 R. ELEVATOR EV1 R. ELEVATOR

SEC 1 SEC 1
SERVO CTL SERVO CTL
SV SV
ACTIVE CONTROL SV: SERVOVALVES (ACTIVE CONTROL)

DAMPING COMMAND EV1,EV2: SOLENOID VALVES (DAMPING COMMAND)

27-30-5
A318/A319/A320/A321 27-30 Elevator
Operation Figure 5: Elevator Servo Controlt

1. SOLENOID VALVE
1 2 15 3
General 2. PRESSURE LINE CLOSING VALVE
3. RETURN LINE CLOSING VALVE
4. SERVOVALVE
Each servo control has three operating modes: 5. MODE SELECTOR VALVE
6. DAMPING ORIFICE
7. CHECK VALVE
the active mode which permits the actuation of the elevator depending on elec- 8. RETURN RELIEF VALVE
9. FLUID RESERVE
trical orders, 10. FEEDBACK TRANSDUCER
11.MODE SELECTOR VALVE TRANSDUCER
12. SERVOVALVE TRANSDUCER P R
the damping mode which prevents the appearance of flutter in the event of mul- 13. CENTERING DEVICE
16
14. SERVOVALVE MECHANICAL INPUT
tiple failures (mainly dual hydraulic or electrical failures, disconnection of one 15. DRAINAGE CONNECTED FOR FLUID RESERVE
16. DIFFERENTIAL PRESSURE INDICATOR
servocontrol associated to the hydraulic or electrical failure of the other servo 8
control),
1
the centering mode which permits to bring back and hold the elevator in the 0 ALTERNATIVE
SOLUTION
position in the event of a loss of the electrical control of the two servo controls 10 4 9
of a surface. 5
Normal Operation with the Servocontrol Pressurized 11
The pressurization of the servocontrol involves the opening of the pressure-line 12

R U2 U1 P
closing valve (2) and of the return-line closing valve (3). 14
6
Thus, the servovalve (4) is supplied from the HP system and the return system of 13
10
the servocontrol is connected to the LP system. ACTIVE OR CENTERING MODE
7
Servocontrol in the Active Mode
In this case, the two solenoid valves (1) are de-energized and let out the HP flow
which sets the mode selector valve (5) in the active mode.
Thus, the two actuator chambers are connected to the servovalve control line and
the servovalve passes in the active mode.
The mode selector-valve transducer (11) supplies an electrical signal which iden-
tifies this change of state.
One of the two feedback transducers (10) gives the servoloop feedback. The other
is in standby and used in case of failure.
If three feedback transducers are installed, the third is not used.
The elevator position transducer-unit is used for the monitoring.

The servovalve transducer (12) is also used for the monitoring.

27-30-6
A318/A319/A320/A321 27-30 Elevator
Figure 6: Elevator Servocontrol in Active Mode

27-30-7
A318/A319/A320/A321 27-30 Elevator
Servocontrol in the Damping Mode

One solenoid valve at least is energized and the mode selector is displaced in the
damping mode under the action of its spring.
This causes the interconnection of the two actuator chambers through the damp-
ing orifice.
The mode selector-valve transducer identifies this change of state.
The check valve and the fluid reserve hold the volume of fluid in the actuator
chambers:
if the temperature of the hydraulic fluid changes,
if there is a leakage.
The return relief valve increases the pressure in the return line and permits to fill
the reserve of fluid.
Operation after a Simple Electrical Failure

In this case, the solenoid valve is energized and the servocontrol operates in the
damping mode.
Operation after a Hydraulic Failure

The closing valves and close and isolate the servocontrol from the aircraft hydrau-
lic system.
If there is a rupture of the aircraft return line, the return relief- valve holds the fluid
volume in the fluid reserve. The mode selector- valve is set to the damping mode
under the action of its spring.
Thus, the servocontrol operates in the damping mode.

27-30-8
A318/A319/A320/A321 27-30 Elevator
Figure 7: Elevator Servocontrol in Damping Mode

27-30-9
A318/A319/A320/A321 27-30 Elevator
Servocontrol in the Re-Centering Mode

When the elevator servo control is in the re-centering mode, it is pressurized, the
solenoid valves and servo valve are de-energized, the servo valve is centered to
the neutral position by its mechanical input.
Due to the centering device, the servo control actuator is maintained hydraulically
in its neutral position.
Operation after a Total Electrical Failure

In this case, the solenoid valves and the servovalves are de-energized and the
servocontrol operates in the centering mode.

27-30-10
A318/A319/A320/A321 27-30 Elevator
Figure 8: Elevator Servocontrol in Centering Mode

27-30-11
A318/A319/A320/A321 27-30 Elevator
Maintenance and Rigging Facilities Figure 9: Elevator Servocontrol

The items given below are Line Replaceable Units:
Filter
Mode selector-valve transducer
Solenoid valves
Servovalve
Actuator eye-end.
To replace the servocontrol, it is necessary to have simultaneously the surface
and the servocontrol in the neutral position.
This is done through the adjustment of the spring rod length.
Particular Points
During flight, vibrations may occur with the current elevator neutral setting com-
bined with backlash at the elevator servo control attachments. To avoid this situ-
ation, the elevator zero position is shifted 0.5 deg nose-up, trailing edge upwards.
Special Case
After hydraulic depressurization, a difference in droop speed and travel between
the two elevators is possible.

27-30-12
A318/A319/A320/A321 27-30 Elevator
Elevator Servocontrol Damping Test Figure 10: Elevator Damping Test

This test is initiated from the MCDU: indications given by the MCDU provide guid-
ance to conduct the test. E FCS 1
1L L A S T L EG RE P OR T 1R
The test is driven by the FCDC and is performed by the SEC1 and SEC2. 2L P RE V I OUS L EG S RE POR T 2R
The SECs control the deflections of the surfaces by pressurizing each servocon- 3L L RU I D EN T I F I CA T I ON 3R
trol simultaneously then alternatively. 4L GRO UN D S C A N MEMORY 4R
If the test is possible 5L CL ASS 3 FAUL T S T EST 5R
6L RE T UR N 6R
drop, then it deducts a damping coefficient. E FCS 1
The test result is displayed on the MCDU in the form L ELEV TEST OK or R ELEV 1L 1R
TEST OK. 2L E L E V A T OR DAMP I NG T E S T 2R
3L A I L E RON DAMP I NG T E S T 3R
The value of the damping coefficient can be obtained and displayed through the 4L S PO I L E R L A F T E S T 4R
TEST REPORT. 5L A I L E RON L A F T E S T 5R
If the test is not possible E FCS 1

6L RE T U RN 6R
1L E L E V A T O R DAMP I NG T E S T 1R
The test result is displayed on the MCDU in the form ELEV TEST NOT POSSI- 2L - S E L EC T E L A C 1 + 2 O F F 2R
- S E L EC T S EC 1 + 2 O N
BLE. 3L - S E L EC T BGY HYD P RE S S 3R
The computer which have identified the anomaly, and the engagement condition 4L S T ART L E F T E L EV T ES T 4R
code are displayed on the MCDU. 5L S T A R T R I GH T E L E V T E S T 5R
6L RE T UR N 6R
TEST Y
POSSIBLE
EFCS 1 E FCS 1
1L E L E V A T O R DAMP I NG T E S T 1R 1L E L E V A T O R DAMP I NG T E S T 1R
2L E L E V T E S T NOT POS S I B L E 2R 2L L E L E V T E S T OK 2R
M I N I MUM V A L U E 0 . 25
3L B Y F C DC XXXX 3R 3L B DAMP F A C TOR UP X . XX 3R
B DAMP F A C TOR DOWN X . XX
4L B Y S EC 1 XXXX 4R 4L G DAMP F A C TOR UP X . XX 4R
G DAMP F A C TOR DOWN X . XX
5L 5R
5L B Y S EC 2 XXXX 5R
6L RE T U RN 6R 6L RE T U RN 6R
PR I NT
REF FIGURE 014

27-30-13
A318/A319/A320/A321 27-30 Elevator
Figure 11: Elevator Damping Test not Possible

A HEXA MESSAGE
BY FCDC
BIT PARAMETER
0
1 LEFT ELEV TEST
2 RIGHT ELEV TEST
3 AIRCRAFT IN FLT
4 ENG 1 OIL HIPR
5 ENG 2 OIL HIPR
6 WHEEL SPEED GT. 66KTS
7 ON GROUND AND WHEEL SPEED LT. 6KTS
8 HYD GREEN PRESS
9 HYD BLUE PRESS
10 HYD YELLOW PRESS
11 OPPOSITE SEC TEST FCDC CONFIG
HEXA MESSAGE DECODING 12 E 1 PUSHBUTTON SWITCH OFF
13 E 2 PUSHBUTTON SWITCH OFF
X X X X 14 S 1 FAULT
15 S 2 FAULT
B
I 3.2.1.0 1
T NORMALY: 3.F.8 2
S 7.6.5.4
4
11.10.9.8
15.14.13.12
EXAMPLE: BY SEC 1
0 3 F F BY SEC 1
BITS STATUS BIT PARAMETER
CODE CONVERSION TABLE BITS 3 2 1 0 0 WHEEL SPEED S1C LESS THAN 6KTS
1 1 1 1 1 WHEEL SPEED S1M LESS THAN 6KTS
2 A/C ON GROUND S1C
3 A/C ON GROUND S1M
BITS 7 6 5 4 4 SPLR X S1C AVAIL
1 1 1 1 5 SPLR X S1M AVAIL
6 L ELEV S1C AVAIL
7 L ELEV S1M AVAIL
BITS 11 10 9 8 8 R ELEV S1C AVAIL
0 0 1 1 9 R ELEV S1M AVAIL
10 FCDC S1C FAIL
11 FCDC S1M FAIL
BITS 15 14 13 12 12
0 0 0 0 13
14
15
NORMALY: 03FF
BY SEC 2
CODE CONVERSION TABLE
BIT PARAMETER
(X) HEXADECIMAL BINARY DECIMAL 0 WHEEL SPEED S2C LESS THAN 6KTS
1 WHEEL SPEED S2M LESS THAN 6KTS
0 0000 0 2 A/C ON GROUND S2C
1 0001 1 3 A/C ON GROUND S2M
2 0010 2 4 SPLR X S2C AVAIL
3 0011 3 5 SPLR X S2M AVAIL
4 0100 4 6 L ELEV S2C AVAIL
5 0101 5 7 L ELEV S2M AVAIL
6 0110 6 8 R ELEV S2C AVAIL
7 0111 7 9 R ELEV S2M AVAIL
8 1000 8 10 FCDC S2C FAIL
9 1001 9 11 FCDC S2M FAIL
A 1010 10 12
B 1011 11 13
C 1100 12 14
D 1101 13 15
E 1110 14
F 1111 15
NORMALY: 03FF

27-30-14
A318/A319/A320/A321 27-40 Trimmable Horizontal Stabilizer
27-40 Trimmable Horizontal Stabilizer THS Control

Autotrim
Trimmable Horizontal Stabilizer (THS) The elevator orders are progressively transferred to the THS through a low-speed
integrator to decrease the drag. This is the AUTOTRIM function. The THS move-
General ment is inhibited:
under 50 ft in manual mode (100 ft in AP mode),
A trimmable horizontal stabilizer (THS) hinged on the rear part of the fuselage en-
sures the pitch trim control. when the high-speed and Mach protection is active,
in case of manual action on the hand wheel,
The two elevators are hinged on the THS.
when the load factor is lower than 0.5 g,
An actuator with a fail-safe ball screwjack drives the THS, its structural attach-
in case of abnormal condition law.
ments are also fail-safe.
The THS movement is limited in up direction:
THS maximum travel is from 4 deg A/C nose down to 13.5 deg A/C nose up
when the alpha protection is active,
Three electric motors ensure the normal control of the actuator. They are under when the load factor is higher than 1.25g,
the control of the two ELACs and the two SECs.The maximum travel of the THS
is limited by the computers to 4 A/C nose down and 11 A/C nose up. when the bank angle is above 33 deg,
in case of low speed protection (alternate law).
The actuator achieves the autotrim function of the manual or auto-flight modes
and automatically places the THS at the center of the green band at touchdown. Detection of a Manual Action on the Pitch-Trim Control Wheel
The standby control is mechanical. The pilots can override the electrical control If the pilot acts on the pitch-trim control wheel he forces the position commanded
via the mechanical control system, through the application of a sufficient force to to the THS. (Electrical control is overriden by the mechanical control).
the control wheels. Mechanical control is used on ground or as a backup mode if
electrical control of THS is lost. The electrical control has again priority as soon as the pilot releases the control
wheel.
An override mechanism in the THS actuator is used for that purpose.
The override mechanism reverts to the electrical control after release of the me- THS Ground-Setting Logic
chanical control. 5s after landing the ELAC 1 set the THS in the 0 position.
The priority logic for the ground setting function is as follows:
E1 ------> E2 ------> S2 ------> S1.

27-40-1
System Description
The THS of the aircraft is operated by the THS actuator to get the longitudinal
pitch-trim control of the aircraft.
The THS actuator controls the deflection of the THS mechanically by a servosys-
tem. The servosystem has an input signal which is an electrical position sequence,
transmitted by the Elevator Aileron Computer (ELAC) and the Spoiler Elevator
Computer (SEC). The input signal is transmitted to the PTA which is part of the
THS actuator and moves the gear trains of the control loop.
A mechanical input link is connected to the gear trains of the control loop through
an override mechanism. This permits the pilot to override the ELAC and SEC sig-
nals with the control wheel in the cockpit.
If there is a loss of the hydraulic power or control signal, the THS actuator makes
sure that the THS is fully immobilized.
The two hydraulic systems supply fluid independently to the hydraulic motors.
Output force from the hydraulic motors is transmitted to the screw shaft through a
power differential gear followed by a reducing gear. Therefore it is possible to op-
erate on one circuit at half of the maximum speed.
Normal speed with two hydraulic systems available is 2 / sec.
Half speed THS actuator deflection in single-system operation is 1 / sec.
Electrical control rate limitation:
0.3 / sec when flap position < 0.5 deg
0.7 / sec when flap position > 0.5 deg
The double control loop gear sends the input and the reset signals to the valve
blocks.
A comparison system makes sure that the THS actuator is immobilized if one con-
trol valve or one of the control gear loops locks.
In the normal operation mode, the SEC and the ELAC automatically or electrically
signal the pitch trim. The computers transmit the signals to one of the three electric
motors of the PTA. The electric motor moves the double control gear loop.

27-40-2
Figure 1: Trimmable Horizontal Stabilizer Schematic

CAPT F/O GBY
SPD BRK R

B ELAC 1 B
PITCH TRIM G Y
0.2 UP
FMGC (ATA 22) R
RUD
BG GBY YB
FAC (ATA 22)

CFDIU DMU
FCDC 1 FCDC 2
TAT - 5C 23H56 60300
SAT - 30C

B B B
Y Y Y
PRESSURE PRESSURE
SWITCHES SWITCHES
PTA
(Pitch Trim
RVDT'S Actuators)
STOP WASHERS 1 E2
2 E1 S1
RVDT'S
3 S2
DIFF.
GEARBOX
G Y
STOP WASHERS
THS ELEVATOR
CABLE TENSION
COMPENSATOR

27-40-3
THS Mechanical Control Figure 2: Tension Regulator
General
Figure 3: THS Mechanical Control on page 5
An actuator operates the trimmable horizontal stabilizer.
15C AMBIENT TEMPERATURE
The mechanical control includes two rotating control wheels installed on the cent- POSITION
er pedestal.
They drive a chain and cable loop up to the mechanical input of the actuator.
Stop and Rigging Facilities HOT

POSITION
COLD POSITION
A non-adjustable rotation stop installed in the center pedestal limits the travel of
the control wheel.
Another mechanical rotation stop is installed in the THS actuator, at the input
shaft.
The end-of-stroke stops of the actuator ball screwjack provide the structural stops
of the THS.
Rigging pin holes are provided to facilitate the rigging.
Cable Tension Regulator

Figure 2: Tension Regulator on page 4
One cable tension regulator maintains a constant tension on the cables. Normal
cable tension is 20 +8 -4 daN (45 +18 -9 lbf). EQ: INDEX POSITION
STABLE AMBIENT TEMP:0C NO
INDEX POS:6C ST
EP
40
30
STABLE
20 AMBIENT
TEMPERATURE
-10 0 10 20 30 40
10
-10
SETTING CURVE FOR CABLE TENSION

COMPENSATOR
RIGGING
SCALE

27-40-4
Figure 3: THS Mechanical Control

TRIMMABLE
HORIZONTAL
STABILIZER
CONTROL WHEEL
THS ACTUATOR
INDICATOR
PITCH TRIM
STOP AND GEARSET
UNIT PITCH TRIM
TURNBUCKLES
CABLE TENSION COMPENSATOR

27-40-5
THS Hydraulic Actuation a mechanical indicator to show no-back wear,

a mechanically latched indicator shows if the control loop gears or the spool
General valves are jammed, (if installed)
two mounting devices are on each side of the gear box; this permits an easier
The Trimmable Horizontal Stabilizer (THS) actuator moves the control surface of
removal,
the THS. The THS actuator is an electro-hydraulic unit that changes the mechan-
ical or the electrical pitch-trim commands into mechanical movements. an oil level sight glass to see the level of the oil in the gear box.
The THS actuator has two hydraulic motors and a Pitch-Trim Actuator (PTA). The Oil servicing is performed with the THS at 0 position. The oil level can be checked
PTA controls the hydraulic actuation. Two hydraulic systems, the Yellow and the at the sight glass.
Green hydraulic system supply the hydraulic motors. The Yellow and Green hy-
draulic systems have independent fluid supplies.
The access door 312AR gives access to the THS actuator.
Pitch Trim Actuator Description

The THS actuator moves the THS. The THS actuator is an electro-hydraulic unit.
Its component parts are:
two hydraulic motors,
one pitch trim actuator,
one fail-safe ball screwjack,
one mechanical input shaft,
two pressure-off brakes,
two position transducer packs,
one gear box,
two hydraulic valve blocks.
The THS actuator has the subsequent items to make maintenance easier.
These items include:
inspection windows which permit a visual inspection of the power gear teeth,
a cranking shaft which is used to manually crank the power differential output
shaft.
This then permits the release of the pressure-off brakes with a special tool, also to
test the pressure-off brakes with both brakes engaged,
an oil drain port with a magnetic plug,
the fill and drain adaptors to replace oil,
an oil breather to keep the interior of the gear box at atmospheric pressure,
a rigging pin located at the mechanical input to put the stabilizer at the zero de-
gree position,

27-40-6
Figure 4: Pitch Trim Actuator

THS ACTUATOR
SECONDARY UPPER ATTACHMENT
9CE
HYDRAULIC MOTORS
PRIMARY UPPER ATTACHMENT
Z310
OIL FILL PLUG COMMAND POSITION

TRANSDUCER PACKAGE
HYDRAULIC MOTORS
A 312AR
(YELLOW AND GREEN) FR74
A FR72
GEARBOX MECHANICAL
INPUT SHAFT
FR70
PITCH TRIM ACTUATOR
(EQUIPPED WITH THREE BORESCOPE
SERVO MOTORS) PLUG
PITCH TRIM ACTUATOR

(EQUIPPED WITH THREE
SERVO MOTORS AND
CONTROL ELECTRONICS)
OIL FILL
PLUG
DRAIN
MECHANICAL
TUBES
INPUT SHAFT
GEARBOX
HYDRAULIC VALVE BLOCKS
(AND PRESSURE-OFF BRAKE) MONITOR POSITION
TRANSDUCER PACKAGE
CHAIN
HYDRAULIC
VALVE BLOCKS
(YELLOW
AND GREEN)
BALL SCREWJACK
C
BALL SCREW JACK

27-40-7
Fail-Safe Ball Screw-Jack Figure 5: Ball Return
Fail Safe System

A fail-safe tie bar goes through the center of the screw shaft and prevents axial
separation of the screw shaft. The fail-safe ball screw-jack has two load paths. The
primary load path transmits the load and the secondary path stays free of any
load. If the primary load path is axially separated, the secondary path takes the
load and prevents damage to the ball screw-jack. Therefore the two ends continue
to turn if the screw shaft is fractured.
Ball Screw-Jack
The ball screw-jack is made up of the ball screw and the fail-safe ball nut. The fail-
safe ball nut has three transport guides, a threaded fail-safe unit wiper and ice
chipper. The mechanical input shaft limits the range of travel of the screw-jack.
The structural components include:
The attachments to the horizontal stabilizer,
The attachments to the THS actuator and to the structure.
The ball screw and the ball nut.
The THS actuator is connected to the horizontal stabilizer through the dual con-
centric axles, the attachment plates and the fail safe plates. These are installed to
the trunnions of the ball nut.
A primary ring gimbal attaches the THS actuator to the structure. The primary ring
gimbal is installed on the two linking axles of the no-back housing spigots.
The structural components are of a two-path configuration. On the secondary load
path there is usually no load.

27-40-8
Figure 6: Primary and Secondary Nut

27-40-9
Hydraulic Motors a shut-off valve,

Two hydraulic motors are installed on the THS actuator. Each hydraulic motor is a POB control valve,
a fixed displacement type. The hydraulic fluid enters the pressure port and causes a control device for the shut-off valve.
the rotating group to turn. The rotating group has nine pistons. These pistons The control valve blocks supply pressure to the hydraulic motors and to the brake
move in their bores in the cylinder barrel when the cylinder turns. Turning of the release piston. The control valve blocks can be installed on the left hand (LH) or
cylinder barrel gives the necessary torque. The torque is transmitted through a on the right hand (RH) side of the THS actuator.
splined drive shaft to the gear box of the THS actuator.
Two drain tubes are installed below the flanges of the hydraulic motors. These Gearbox
drain tubes drain the leakage of the hydraulic motors. The gearbox is in a split housing. The two housing parts are made of a light metal
alloy. The two housing parts are referred to as the upper casing and the lower cas-
No-Back System ing. The upper casing holds the screw and no-back housing assembly. It also sup-
The THS actuator has a no-back system that has a no-back brake which is of a ports the two hydraulic motors, the mechanical input lever and the control position
ratchet and pawl type. The no-back brake holds the ball screw in its last position. transducer.
It prevents movement of the ball screw under aerodynamic loads. A no-back wear
The lower casing supports:
detection device in the form of an indicator (no-back wear indicator) is installed on
the lower side of the gear box. The indicator has a cam roller which faces the top the PTA,
edge of the claw-stop. This finds the gap which agrees with the wear limit to be the monitor position transducer,
detected. the two pressure-off brakes,
If a high wear does occur, a compressive external load causes the top claw-stop two hydraulic block valves,
to move up to a higher position. This causes the top claw-stop to touch the cam a mechanical latched indicator,
roller of the indicator. This then makes the red finger of the indicator "pop" out and the magnetic drain plug.
give a visual wear alarm.
In the gearbox is the oil which is necessary to lubricate the internal components.
If the red pop-out is released, examine the position of the roller on the detec- The level of the oil can be checked visually through an oil level sight glass. The oil
tion device. level sight glass is on the upper casing.
1. If the roller is in position TRIPPED BY VIBRATION, reset the red pop-out:
Push the roller with a tool, for example a small screwdriver, in the reset posi- Pressure-Off Brakes
tion. Each hydraulic motor shaft has a POB. Each POB is located at the output shaft of
2. If the roller is in position TRIPPED BECAUSE OF NO BACK WEAR, replace their related hydraulic motor. The POB is a dry brake with a hydraulic release
the THS-Actuator. which is used to lock the shaft of the motor. The shaft of the motor is locked if a
failure occurs in the hydraulic system or in a hydraulic motor. It thus lets the sec-
Control Valve Blocks ond motor fully control the ball screw through the power differential.
The THS actuator has two control valve blocks. The two valve blocks control the If a failure occurs, a mechanical indicator located below the valve block comes out.
operation of the THS actuator. Each valve block has: This indicator is installed on older aircraft and is removed if SB 27-1094 was per-
a high pressure (HP) filter, formed.
an inlet and outlet port,
two input control shafts,
a control valve,

27-40-10
Figure 7: No Back Wear Indicator and Screw Shaft
A
B
FR74
312AR
FR72
FR70
RED POP-IN
C
MAGNETIC DRAIN PLUG 32
RESET POSITION
31 (RED POP-OUT)
RED POP-OUT
32
TRIPPED BY VIBRATION
RED POP-OUT
POSITION B 30
TRANSDUCER
SCREW
SHAFT
32
TRIPPED BECAUSE OF "NO BACK" WEAR

27-40-11
Pitch Trim Actuator a control valve detent,

The pitch trim actuator (PTA) has: a control valve command shaft.
3. Three brushless motors, each with an electro-magnetic clutch. In the normal The hydraulic fluid is so supplied to both hydraulic motors referred to the control
mode, one clutch will be applied (energized) and the others de-clutched (de- valve opening.
energized). The output of the three motors is connected to move the input shaft The epicyclic control differential output moves the control valve.
through a reduction gear.
With the control valves open, the hydraulic fluid flows to the hydraulic motors.Both
4. Three electronic sets, one to control each motor. The electronic sets also con- hydraulic motors operate at the same time and move the ball screw through:
trol the signal from the ELAC/SEC computers.
the power differential,
5. An override mechanism with three microswitches. It is installed downstream of
the power gear train.
the reduction gearbox. The override mechanism is connected mechanically to
the input shaft. As the PTA output continues to rotate, it keeps the control valve open and so the
hydraulic motors operate to move the ball screw.
Position Transducer When the PTA output gets to the position specified by the signal given on the ser-
The THS actuator has two inductive position transducer packages. They are the vomotor, the control differential input is stopped.
command position transducer and the monitor position transducer. The feedback gears moves the control differential output which decreases the
The command position transducer is used to find the position of the override opening of the control valve.
mechanism output/input control sequence to the control system of the THS actu- The control valve closes and the hydraulic flow to the motors stop. The ball screw-
ator. jack then stops at the specified position.
The monitor position transducer is used to find the position of the ball screw. Interval stops attached to the mechanical input keep the travel of the ball screw-
jack shaft to a limit. The ball screw has claw-type stops attached at each end. The
Normal Operation stops prevent any mechanical overrun if the internal stops do not operate.
The Green and Yellow hydraulic systems send hydraulic power through the valve
blocks to the POB of the hydraulic motors. When the POB receive the hydraulic Mechanical Control Operation
power, they release the shafts of the hydraulic motors. The two hydraulic motors The input shaft which is connected to the cable control moves the mechanical ser-
are ready for operation. voloop mechanism through an override mechanism. The override mechanism in-
The electrical pitch trim signal of the PTA operates the servomotor No. 1. This ser- stalled in the pitch trim actuator makes sure that the mechanical control cancels
vomotor operates both control valves in the open configuration while the other two the electrical control.
servomotors are in stand-by. The servomotor No. 1 operates through a path that
has:
a PTA reduction gear,
a mechanical override mechanism.
Then two separate gear paths which are connected by an idler are moved.
Each of the separate gear paths have:
a primary detent,
an epicyclic control differential,
a control gear train, which has an eccentric device

27-40-12
Figure 8: THS Actuator Schematic

27-40-13
Following descriptions refer to Operation with a Blocked Control Valve

When a control valve is blocked, the jamming protection device operates to stop
Operation with the PTA in the Off Mode hydraulic power. The control valve opening in the defective circuit lets the hydrau-
If a manual command signal is applied with the handwheel to drive the THS actu- lic motor continue to operate. This causes the ball screw to continue to operate
ator because the PTA is inoperative, the override mechanism stays off. The input and move the feed-back gear after the serviceable control valve reaches its neu-
signal is transmitted directly to the control valves of the valve block. tral position. This makes the primary detent in the defective control loop break out.
The primary detent tries to operate the serviceable control valve to open.
Operation of the Override Mechanism
As soon as the serviceable control valve is operated, it activates the comparator
If an electrical pitch trim command controls the PTA servomotor, the manual com- (COMP) which is connected to both control valves. The piston of the COMP oper-
mand signal applied through the mechanical input causes the override mecha- ates both shut-off valves. The shut-off valves isolate the hydraulic power supply
nism to break out. This mechanically disconnects the PTA output from the from the THS actuator on both circuits. This makes the motor stop which is usually
command loop of the THS actuator. Both control valves are then driven through supplied by the defective valve. Thus the POB is activated and stops the ball
the manual command signal of the THS actuator. screw. At the same time, a mechanical indicator comes out and shows that there
The overriding procedure is possible when the THS actuator is controlled in a fixed is a defect in the system. To set the mechanical indicator again, the hydraulic pres-
position (the handwheel stands still). sure must be released and the defect repaired.
The overriding procedure is also possible when the THS actuator moves on a de- In the event that a control valve blocks in a position that is not in the limits of the
mand of a variable electrical command signal (the handwheel turns). protection device:
the two hydraulic motors can operate in the opposite direction at a low speed,
Ground Operation from the Electric Pumps the THS actuator does not move,
During operation with low available flow conditions, the pressure maintaining the jamming detection is sensitive and makes sure that a permanent flow rate
valve keeps the pressure-off brakes released. of fluid is supplied to prevent overheating.
Operation in Failure Conditions Operation with Disconnected Ball Screw

If the ball screw is disconnected, the no-back brake holds it in its last signalled po-
Operation with Loss of the Hydraulic Power sition.
The THS actuator is usually supplied with power from two independent hydraulic the THS actuator does not move,
systems. When one hydraulic supply to the THS actuator does not operate, the the jamming detection is sensitive and makes sure that a permanent flow rate
related POB is activated. of fluid is supplied to prevent overheating.
The POB stops and holds the hydraulic motor shaft. If this occurs, the THS actu-
ator is operated by the other hydraulic system at half speed, but the necessary
maximum performance is still achieved.
If a full loss of hydraulic power occurs, the POB and the no-back brake operate.
They keep the ball screw-jack in the last specified position against aerodynamic
pressure.

27-40-14
Figure 9: Blocked Control Valve

CIRCUIT NO.1 CIRCUIT NO.2
PRESSURE SHUT-OFF
SHUT-OFF
MAINTAINING VALVE
VALVE
DEVICE COMMAND
DEVICE
P P
SHUT-OFF
SPOOL
R R
CONTROL
VALVE
LINKAGE COMPARATOR
LEVERS OUTPUT PISTON
PRESSURE-OFF
BRAKE
NOTE: OPERATION WITH ONE CONTROL VALVE BLOCKED

27-40-15
Ground Test Figure 10: THS Manual Drive Location

Different checks can be done when the Yellow and Green hydraulic systems are
depressurized. The subsequent tests/checks are:
The operational/test of the valve-jamming protection system.
The functional test of the pressure off brake.
The functional test of the no-back brake assembly.
To check the integrity of the ball screw shaft and the tie bar.
The visual inspection of the power gears in position with a borescope.
The visual inspection of the oil level in the gear box through an oil level sight-
glass.
Technical Data of THS Actuator

Mechanical
THS actuator travel with a total THS angular movement17.5 degrees
Operation travel 513.75 mm (20.23 in.)
Stop-to-stop travel 531.75 mm (20.94 in.)
Weight (when filled with fluid) 54.3 kg (119.7 lbs)
Hydraulic
Supply Pressure 3000 psi
Normal Return Pressure 50.72 psi
Maximum flow for each circuit 27 l/min
Maximum internal leakage 1 to 1.5 l/min
Maximum external leakage Nil
Operation pressure of pressure-off brake 100 bar (1450 psi)
Performance
Speed with no load (electrical) 1/s
Max operating speed (mechanical) 1.25/s
Maximum Static Load
Tension Limit Load 12700 daN (28550 lbf)
Compression Limit Load 20500 daN (46085 lbf)

27-40-16
THS Position Indicating The THS position is repeated via the FCDC (Ref. 27-95) on the lower ECAM dis-
play unit, together with the hydraulic systems still available for the actuator.
On the center pedestal, adjacent to each pitch-trim control wheel, the THS position There is also a special reference mark painted on the THS and on the adjacent
is indicated by an index on a scale painted green over the normal takeoff range. fuselage structure.
On A319: (3 deg. aircraft NOSE DN to 3.5 deg. aircraft NOSE UP).
Figure 12: F/CTL System Display
On A320: (2.5 deg. aircraft NOSE DN to 2.5 deg. aircraft NOSE UP).
On A321: (3.5 deg. aircraft NOSE DN to 4.5 deg. aircraft NOSE UP).
Figure 11: Pitch Trim Control Wheel
PITCH TRIM Wheel
Both pitch trim wheels provide mechanical control of the THS
and have priority over electrical control.
- Crew action on pitch trim wheel does not disconnect the
ELAC's (micro switches actuated by the override
mechanism ensure that the computers remain
synchronized with the manually selected position.).
- Trim position is indicated in degrees on a scale adjacent
to each trim wheel.
- A CG scale is also provided to give the relation between
CG location and pitch trim setting.
- Normal range is marked by a green band.
- The THS mechanical control must be used when pitch
direct law is in use.
Following touch down, pitch trim is automatically reset to 0
as the pitch attitude becomes less than 2,5 provided the
green and yellow systems are pressurized.
Pitch Trim Position Indication

Indication is green. Becomes amber in case of green and
yellow low pressure.
PITCH TRIM indication is white. Becomes amber in case of
pitch trim jam.

27-40-17

27-40-18
A318/A319/A320/A321 27-60 Spoiler
27-60 Spoiler

27-60-1
A318/A319/A320/A321 27-60 Spoiler
General System Description

Five spoilers numbered 1 thru 5 inboard to outboard are provided on the rear up-
per surface of each wing.
Roll Function
Each surface is actuated by one servo control supplied from either the green, yel-
The spoilers are used for:
low or blue hydraulic system which is controlled from SEC 1, 2 or 3.
Roll function
Surfaces are automatically retracted to zero position when a fault is detected by
Speedbrake function
the corresponding computer or when not electrically controlled.
Ground spoilers function
ln case of loss of hydraulic supply the surface remains at the existing deflection or
Each spoiler is electrically controlled and hydraulically actuated by an electrohy- less if pushed down by aerodynamic forces.
draulic servocontrol.
When a spoiler surface on one wing fails, the symmetric one on the other wing is
They are two type of servocontrol with different overhaul: inhibited.The spoilers 2 thru 5 assist the ailerons in roll control.
The inboard type for spoilers 1,2 and 3.
The Roll axis is controlled and monitored by the three SEC's associated with ai-
The outboard type for spoilers 4 and 5. lerons.
Three Spoiler Elevator Computer (SEC) elaborate the surface deflection order.
Speedbrake Function
The spoilers 1 and 2 are associated with SEC 3.
The speedbrake function is ensured by the spoilers 2, 3 and 4 and the associated
The spoilers 3 and 4 are associated with SEC 1. SECs.
The spoiler 5 is associated with SEC 2. The speedbrake deflection order is dependent upon the speedbrake control lever
Each SEC is organized around two channel: position.
Command channel Extension of the spoilers 2 is half the extension of the spoilers 3 and 4.
Monitor channel The speedbrake order is combined with roll orders.
The Command channel receives analog sensor data, Arinc data and discrete sig- For surfaces 2, 3 and 4 (which perform roll and speed brake functions) the roll
nals in order to generate the flight commands used to drive the correspondent ser- function has priority: When the sum of a roll order and a simultaneous speed brake
vo control. The Monitor channel receives independently the sensor information order on one surface is greater than the maximum deflection achievable in flight,
required to compute the control law. the symmetrical one is retracted until the difference between the two surfaces is
Each SEC is also connected to two Flight Concentrator Data Computer (FCDC). equal to the roll order.
The FCDC serves as an interface between the SEC's and: When one surface has failed on one wing, the symmetric one on the other wing is
Display System and Warning (EIS Ref 31-60,FWC Ref 31-53), inhibited.
Maintenance System (CFDS Ref 31-30),
Recording System (FDIU,DFDR,QAR Ref 31-33).
The position of all spoilers and other surface are indicated on the lower ECAM Dis-
play Unit (Ref 31-64) via the FCDC.

27-60-2
A318/A319/A320/A321 27-60 Spoiler
Figure 1: Spoiler System Schematic

GBY
SPD BRK R
Flight Control Panel, RH side AIL
AIL
B ELAC 1 B
PITCH TRIM
UP
ROLL ORDERS R
RUD
B GBY B
CFDIU
FMGC FCDC 1 FCDC 2 THRUST
LEVER TAT - 5C 60300
DMU POSITION 23H56
SAT - 30C
(POT)
RADIO ALT (FROM ELAC)

ADIRS
SFCC
GROUND SPOILER
ACCELEROMETER SEC 1 SEC 2 SEC 3 PRESELECTION
G
B SPEED BRAKE ORDER
Y
PRESSURE
SWITCHES
WHEEL G Y B Y G G Y B Y G
LGCIU
1+2 SPEED
1-4
5 4 3 2 1 1 2 3 4 5
ROLL SPOILER SURFACES ROLL SPOILER SURFACES
GROUND SPOILER SURFACES GROUND SPOILER SURFACES

S2 S1 S1 S3 S3 S3 S3 S1 S1 S2

27-60-3
A318/A319/A320/A321 27-60 Spoiler
System Description In flight, when the aircraft speed is more than 315 knots or Mach 0.75 with the au-
topilot engaged, the speedbrake retraction rate decreases (approximately 25 sec-
Roll Function onds are necessary to retract the speedbrakes from FULL to IN).
Each surface is actuated by one servo control supplied from either the green, yel- The deflection rate is limited to 5 /sec.
low or blue hydraulic system which is controlled from SEC 1, 2 or 3. In order to do the test of the spoiler 1 on the ground, a 6 extension of the spoiler
Surfaces are automatically retracted to zero position when a fault is detected by 1 is possible with the speedbrake control lever.
the corresponding computer or when not electrically controlled. A319: Maximum speed brakes deflection:
In case of loss of hydraulic supply the surface remains at the existing deflection or 25 for spoilers 3 and 4.
less if pushed down by aerodynamic forces. 12,5 for spoiler 2 in configuration 3.
When a spoiler surface on one wing fails, the symmetric one on the other wing is 17,5 for spoiler 2 in configuration 0, 1, and 2.
inhibited.The spoilers 2 thru 5 assist the ailerons in roll control.
A320: Maximum speed brakes deflection in manual flight:
The Roll axis is controlled and monitored by the three SEC's associated with ai- 40 for spoilers 3 and 4.
lerons.
20 for spoiler 2.
The SEC's elaborate the surface deflection orders:
A320: Maximum speed brakes deflection with AP engaged:
In manual control mode, mainly from the side stick
25 for spoilers 3 and 4.
In autopilot mode from FMGES (Ref 22-10).
12,5 for spoiler 2.
Full authority of surfaces is:
The max speed brakes deflection, AP engaged, is achieved with half speed
35 deg (On A321 (7 deg limitation for spoiler 3). brakes lever deflection.
The spoilers 2, 3, 4 and 5 use the same deflection; from configuration 0 to config- A321: Maximum speed brakes deflection:
uration 3, a threshold is included to minimize the drag.
25 for spoilers 2, 3 and 4.
Speedbrake Function The speedbrake control order is inhibited:
The speedbrake function is ensured by the spoilers 2, 3 and 4 and the associated if the monitoring of the speedbrake control transducer unit has detected a fail-
SECs. ure
The speedbrake deflection order is dependent upon the speedbrake control lever if the alpha protection is active,
position. A319 / A320 in FLAPS FULL configuration, A321 in Flaps 3 and FULL
Extension of the spoilers 2 is half the extension of the spoilers 3 and 4. Thrust Levers above MCT position
in case of loss of one elevator control (due to pitch flutter detection),
The speedbrake order is combined with roll orders.
in case of single elevator configuration,
For surfaces 2, 3 and 4 (which perform roll and speed brake functions) the roll
in case of loss of the Blue and Green hydraulic pressures.
function has priority: When the sum of a roll order and a simultaneous speed brake
order on one surface is greater than the maximum deflection achievable in flight, If speed brakes are extended, they are automatically retracted and kept retracted
the symmetrical one is retracted until the difference between the two surfaces is until inhibition condition disappears and lever reset (speed brake can be extended
equal to the roll order. again at least 10 sec after lever reset).
When one surface has failed on one wing, the symmetric one on the other wing is
inhibited.

27-60-4
A318/A319/A320/A321 27-60 Spoiler
Figure 2: Spoiler System Schematic

GBY
SPD BRK R
Flight Control Panel, RH side AIL
AIL
B ELAC 1 B
PITCH TRIM
UP
ROLL ORDERS R
RUD
B GBY B
CFDIU
FMGC FCDC 1 FCDC 2 THRUST
LEVER TAT - 5C 60300
DMU POSITION 23H56
SAT - 30C
(POT)
RADIO ALT (FROM ELAC)

ADIRS
SFCC
GROUND SPOILER
ACCELEROMETER SEC 1 SEC 2 SEC 3 PRESELECTION
G
B SPEED BRAKE ORDER
Y
PRESSURE
SWITCHES
WHEEL G Y B Y G G Y B Y G
LGCIU
1+2 SPEED
1-4
5 4 3 2 1 1 2 3 4 5
ROLL SPOILER SURFACES ROLL SPOILER SURFACES

S2 S1 S1 S3 S3 S3 S3 S1 S1 S2

27-60-5
A318/A319/A320/A321 27-60 Spoiler
Figure 3: Speedbrake Function
23VU 24VU
FLT CTL FLT CTL
ELAC 1 SEC 1 FAC 1 ELAC 2 SEC 2 SEC 3 FAC 2
FAULT FAULT FAULT UPPER FAULT FAULT FAULT FAULT

DISPLAY
OFF OFF OFF UNIT OFF OFF OFF OFF
SPD BRK CONTROL

TRANSDUCER
UNITS
LOWER
DISPLAY
UNIT
FAC
(CHAP 22) ADC IRS
CFDIU
SFCC
FMGC
SEC 1 SEC 2 SEC 3 FCDC 1 FCDC 2
LO PR G
B
Y DMU
SERVO CTL
PRESSURE
SWITCHES
Y B Y Y B Y
4 3 2 2 3 4
SPEED BRAKE SURFACES SPEED BRAKE SURFACES

27-60-6
A318/A319/A320/A321 27-60 Spoiler
Speed Brake Function on GND Figure 4: Spoiler 1 Activation Logic on GND in SEC 3
The speed brake control lever gives the command of the speed brake.
The SECs receive the information from the Slats and Flaps Control Computers
(SFCCs) and the throttle lever transducer unit. Speed brake extension is inhibited
in following cases:
SEC 1 and 3 fault,
elevator left or right (in this case only spoiler 3 & 4 are inhibited),
Angle-Of-Attack (AOA) protection is active,
in FLAP FULL configuration (A319/320) or FLAPS 3 position (A321).
If speed brakes are extended, they automatically retract and kept retracted until
inhibition condition disappears and lever reset.

27-60-7
A318/A319/A320/A321 27-60 Spoiler
Figure 5: Speedbrake Logic

27-60-8
A318/A319/A320/A321 27-60 Spoiler
Ground Spoiler Function Partial Lift Dumping

The ground spoilers extend partially (10) when reverse is selected (on at least
General one engine other thrust lever at or near idle) and one main landing gear strut is
Ground spoilers are armed when the speed brake control lever is pulled up into compressed.
the armed position. When a ground spoiler surface on one wing fails, the symmet-
This partial extension by decrease the lift, eases the compression of the second
ric one on the other wing is inhibited.
main landing gear strut, and consequently leads to the normal spoiler extension.
The ground spoiler function is ensured by all the spoilers.
Figure 6: Spoiler Handle
The surface deflection is 50 deg with an extension rate of 20 deg/s (in autopilot or
manual mode).
Activation of the Ground Spoiler Function

The activation of the ground spoiler function is dependent upon:
the function preselection, or one throttle lever at reverse
the two engines at low rate
wheel speed information (of both main gears)
the main landing gear wheel rotation more than 72kts TRANSDUCER UNITS
Condition on wheel speed is inhibited after GND/FLT transition.
The condition is rearmed if wheel rotation stops.

Consequently after an A/C bounce (A/C airborne):
the spoilers remain extended with thrust lever at idle
the spoilers retract if thrust is increased above idle (GA), and extend again after
the next touch down. TO SEC 1 / 2 / 3
elevator pre command at the extension of the ground spoilers (autopilot and
manual) only valid for A319 and A321
the both main landing gears compressed while the altitude less than 6ft
The preselection is made with the speedbrake control lever. The lever position
must be lower than - 2 deg. GROUND SPOILERS
CAM
This preselection can also be made through the selection of reverse thrust on both ARMED
throttle control levers, or only one throttle control lever with the other control lever
in position less than 20 deg. TRAVEL OF LEVER
EXTENSION OF
The "two throttle levers at low rate" information is given when the position of the SPEED BRAKES
two throttle control levers is less than 20 deg. GROUND SPOILERS
SPOILER RETRACTED
SELECTION

27-60-9
A318/A319/A320/A321 27-60 Spoiler
Figure 7: Ground Spoiler Function
23VU 24VU
FLT CTL FLT CTL
ELAC 1 SEC 1 FAC 1 ELAC 2 SEC 2 SEC 3 FAC 2
FAULT FAULT FAULT FAULT FAULT FAULT FAULT
OFF OFF OFF OFF OFF OFF OFF
CFDIU
FMGC
DMU
FCDC 1 FCDC 2
UPPER
DISPLAY
UNIT
GROUND SPOILER PRESELECTION

LO PR
LOR R ENGINE REVERSE
B
Y
SEC 1 SEC 2 SEC 3 SERVO CTL
LOWER LOR R ENGINE IDDLE (MANUAL MODE) PRESSURE
DISPLAY SWITCHES
UNIT FMGC (A/P MODE)
MLG COMPRESSED
WHEEL SPEED 72 KTS
G Y B Y G G Y B Y G
5 4 3 2 1 1 2 3 4 5

27-60-10
A318/A319/A320/A321 27-60 Spoiler
Figure 8: Ground Spoiler Logic

27-60-11
A318/A319/A320/A321 27-60 Spoiler
Speedbrake Control Transducer Unit The input lever drives one end of a fail safe axis which has a friction brake at the
The speedbrake control is achieved through a specific unit located on the aft left other end to provide an artificial feel and to freeze the lever position when it is out
part of the center pedestal. of the zero selection.
A duplicate system is used to drive two sets of 3 plastic track potentiometers with
Figure 9: Speedbrake Control Transducer Unit a gear ratio of 3.
SPEED BRAKE Lever The mechanical design is such that a single mechanical failure is not able to cause
The lever controls: simultaneous loss of the two potentiometer drives or to disconnect input lever and
- The position of the speed brake surfaces. to forbid in the same time the brake to freeze the position.
- Manual preselection of the ground spoilers. The COM unit of each SEC computer is connected to one potentiometer of
To select speed brake surface to a required position, one set, the MON unit being connected to a potentiometer of the other set.
the lever has to be pushed down and selected to the
required position. Electrical characteristics of the potentiometers are the same as for potentiometers
A "hard point" is provided at " 1/2 " SPEED BRAKE fitted in the side stick control unit.
position. Potentiometers are rigged to mid stroke position for selector lever in zero position.
To arm the ground spoilers, the lever must be pulled up
when in RET position. Figure 10: Transducer LRU
When the lever is armed, or reverse thrust is selected,
all spoilers will automatically extend at landing or in
case of rejected take-off .

27-60-12
A318/A319/A320/A321 27-60 Spoiler
Spoiler Hydraulic Actuation Maintenance and Rigging Facilities

General The items below are line Replaceable Units (LRUs):
The hydraulic actuation is achieved by one electrohydraulic servocontrol with filter
asymmetrical chambers, for each spoiler.The five fixed body servocontrols (one servovalve.
per spoiler) are interchangeable.
The length of the actuator piston rod is adjustable to allow to obtain the spoiler
Figure 11: Component Location neutral position when the piston rod is fully retracted.
31CE5 Figure 12: Spoiler Servocontrol
32CE1 31CE3
32CE3 31CE1
31CE2 32CE4
31CE4 32CE2
31CE6

27-60-13
A318/A319/A320/A321 27-60 Spoiler
Operation Operation in Case of High Pressure Decrease

When the HP decreases but remains sufficient to keep the bypass valve in the ac-
Normal Operation with the Servocontrol Pressurized tive mode, the piston retracts under external forces. These forces are higher than
In this case, the high pressure is applied to the bypass valve (3) and to the plunger those delivered by the large chamber pressure. They cause the servovalve spool
(7) which hold the closing valve (6). Thus the two actuator chambers are connect- valve to open in the direction which connects the large chamber to the pressure
ed to the servovalve control lines. line.
The feedback transducer (11) provides the servoloop feedback. Then the check valve (2) allows to servovalve retraction at low speed as the fluid
The servovalve has a biased zero. When the input signal is equivalent to the elec- transits through the servovalve leakages.
trical zero, its spool valve is open at 25% of its max. stroke and connects the sup-
ply line of the small chamber to the high pressure.
Operation on the Ground with the Servocontrol Depressurized
In the event of a thermal overpressure in the small chamber, the pressure increas-
When the spoiler is at neutral, it is held against the servocontrol stop by nulling the
ing valve (8) pushes the plunger (7) which causes the valve (6) to open, and thus
current of the servovalve.
the small chamber is unlocked.
The servovalve then feeds the high pressure to the small chamber and applies the
piston rod to its internal retraction stop. Maintenance Mode
In order to enable ground maintenance operations, the small chamber can also be
Operation after an Electrical Failure unlocked manually by means of the maintenance unlocking crank-lever (10).
In this case the servovalve input signal is nulled. This biases the servovalve in or- This lever also holds the maintenance pressure-inhibiting valve (9), thus the con-
der to make the piston rod retract.
trol chamber of the bypass valve is connected to the return line.
Operation after a Hydraulic Failure This action avoids spoiler movement even if the servocontrol is then pressurized.
When the pressure drops: see Figure 17: Servocontrol Maintenance Device on page 17
the relief valve (2) moves under the action of its spring. This isolates the ser-
vovalve from the high pressure
the plunger (7) frees the closing valve (6). This prevents the extension of the
piston rod
the bypass valve (3) moves rearward under the action of its spring.
This isolates the piston chambers from the servovalve control lines then the two
piston chambers are interconnected in the retraction direction via the closing valve
(6).
The servocontrol can be retracted by external forces.
The calibration valve (4) and the anti-cavitation valve (5) prevent any low pressure
in the small chamber by slowing, down, the transit of the fluid surplus of the large
chamber in the return line.

27-60-14
A318/A319/A320/A321 27-60 Spoiler
Active Mode Figure 13: Active Mode

In active mode the servo control actuator is hydraulically supplied.
According to the command signal to the servo valve the spoiler surface will extend
or retract.
Biased Mode
The servo-control actuator is pressurized.
Due to an electrical failure the command signal is lost.
The biased servo valve pressurizes the retraction chamber. The spoiler actuator
stays pressurized and the spoiler remains retracted.
Locked Mode
In locked mode, the hydraulic pressure is lost. The closing valve closes the retrac-
tion chamber. The surface can only be moved towards the retracted position,
pushed by aerodynamic forces.
Manual Mode
The servo control actuator must be depressurized.
Then the maintenance unlocking lever can be turned.
The spoiler surface can be raised manually for inspection purposes.

27-60-15
A318/A319/A320/A321 27-60 Spoiler
Figure 14: Bias Mode Figure 16: Locked Mode
Figure 15: Manual Mode

27-60-16
A318/A319/A320/A321 27-60 Spoiler
Figure 17: Servocontrol Maintenance Device
C
C
C
C
O
MAINTANANCE DEVICE
M
MAINTENANCE
DEVICE Pre-Mod Post-Mod

27-60-17
A318/A319/A320/A321 27-60 Spoiler
Indication
SYSTEM DISPLAY
Hydraulic System Indication GBY
Normally green. Becomes amber in case of hydraulic system
low pressure.
Spoilers / Speed Brake Indication

Green Spoiler deflected more than 2,5.
Green Spoiler retracted.
1 Amber Spoiler fault deflected.
1 Amber Spoiler fault retracted.
ELAC / SEC Indication

Normally green. Becomes amber in case of ELAC / SEC
failure or in case of failure of both FCDC.
Box normally white. Becomes amber associated with ELAC
SEC indication. Moreover amber XX is displayed if
associated surface is unserviceable.

27-60-18
A318/A319/A320/A321 27-75 Flaps
27-75 Flaps Controls and Indication

(see Figure 1: Controls and Indication on page 2)
AMM reference for Flaps is 27-50 Electrical Supply
BUS BAR AC DC
General A/C SYS
AC DC
ESS ESS
HOT
System Configuration SFCC 1 Slats X
FLAPS SFCC 1 Flaps X

The aircraft has four flaps (two on each trailing edge of the wing) and ten slats (five COMPUTERS
SLATS SFCC 2 Slats DC2
on each leading edge of the wing) (Ref. 27-80-00) to increase lift during take-off
SFCC 2 Flaps DC2
and landing.
Lost in elec emer config.
On A321 the inboard flap and the outboard flap each have tabs attached to their
trailing edges.
The tabs are attached to the rear spar of the inboard and the outboard flaps by System Description
hinges. They are operated by control rods connected to the hinge 1A mechanism
and to the track 2, 3 and 4 roller carriages. A fairing covers each track and hinge. Electrical Control and Monitoring System
The slat and flap control lever controls the position of the flaps. The Command
The outboard flap is connected to the flap track carriage at the track 3 and the Sensor Unit (CSU) identifies the position of the slat and flap control lever and
track 4 positions by a failsafe bolt assembly. The inboard flap is connected to the sends related signals to each SFCC. Each SFCC controls the valve block of a hy-
track 2 carriage by a failsafe bolt assembly and to the pendulum assembly on the draulic motor, which is part of the flap PCU.
track 1 carriage by the flap trunnion. The carriages move along the tracks which The FPPU, which is part of the flap PCU, and the two APPUs send related signals
are part of the flap-track beam assemblies. to the SFCCs. If the SFCCs find a failure in the system, the Wing Tip Brakes
An interconnecting strut connects the inboard and the outboard flaps. Proximity (WTB) operate to hold the transmission and the PCU is stopped.
sensors on the interconnecting strut send signals to stop the flap movement, if the
strut moves more than the specified limit. Hydraulic Actuation and Power Transmission
Two Slat/Flap Control Computers (SFCC1 and SFCC2) monitor and control the A hydro-mechanical PCU supplies mechanical power to the power transmission
flaps. An Instrumentation Position Pick-Off Unit (IPPU) is installed on the Power system. The PCU has two separate hydraulic motors and two Pressure-Off Brakes
Control Unit (PCU). The IPPU sends signals to the Electronic Instrument System (POB). Each hydraulic motor has an electrically controlled valve block, which re-
(EIS), which shows the position of the flaps. ceives signals from a SFCC.
A Feedback Position Pick-Off Unit (FPPU) gives signals of the output shaft posi- Torque shafts and gearboxes in the fuselage and the wings transmit the mechan-
tion of the PCU. Two Asymmetry Position Pick-Off Units (APPU) give signals of ical power from the flap PCU to the actuators, which move the flaps. Each flap has
the flap position or speed. The SFCC1 and the SFCC2 receive and monitor the two actuators. Actuator 1 is installed on track beam 1 and the actuators 2, 3 and
signals from the FPPU and the APPUs. 4 are installed on the rear spar. Torque limiters in the actuators prevent the me-
chanical overload of the structure.

27-75-1
A318/A319/A320/A321 27-75 Flaps
Figure 1: Controls and Indication
S, F Indication
FLAPS Lever Normally green, displayed amber in case of:

- Both relevant hydraulic systems loss, except on ground
The FLAPS lever selects simultaneous operation of slats and with both engines stopped.
flaps. - Wing tip brakes application.
- Slats or flaps fault.
Before selection of any position, the lever must be pulled out
of detent. Moreover, balks are provided at position 1 and 3 to
FLAP Indication
avoid excessive flap / slat travel demand by a pilot action.
"FLAP" indication appears when the slats or the flaps are not
NOTE: It is not possible to select an intermediate lever position.
fully retracted.
- White when selected position is achieved.
- Blue when flaps or slats are in transit.
- Amber in case of:
E/W DISPLAY Both relevant hydraulic system loss (except on ground
with engines stopped).
Flaps/slat lever position Wing tip brakes application.
Slats and flaps fault.
Flaps Flaps Flaps Indication
Position Slats
A319 A320 A321 on ECAM Slats Flaps Position:
0 0 0 0 0 White points:
Selectable position. Not displayed in clean configuration.
0 0 0 1
* 1 18 Green triangles:
10 10 10 1+F Actual position, displayed amber in case of:
- Both relevant hydraulic system loss (except on ground
2 22 15 15 14 2
3 22 20 20 21 3 - Wing tip brakes application.
- Slats and flaps fault.
FULL 27 40 35 25 FULL
Blue triangles:
Selected position. (Blue triangles may disappear before the
* Take-off in FLAPS 1: selected position is reached).
1 + F (18/10) is selected.
If FLAPS 0 is not selected after take-off , the flaps automatically Flap lever position
retract at 210kts.
0, 1 + F, 1, 2, 3, or FULL indication is displayed.
- Green when selected position is achieved. 0 not displayed
when clean configuration is achieved.
- Blue during transit.
S (F) LOCKED indication appears amber associated with
ECAM caution when wing tip brakes are applied or when non
alignment between 2 flaps is detected,
A-L OCK indication pulses blue when the slat alpha/speed
lock is active.

27-75-2
A318/A319/A320/A321 27-75 Flaps
Figure 2: Flap System A319 / A320 Figure 3: Flap System A321

27-75-3
A318/A319/A320/A321 27-75 Flaps
Extension and Retraction of the Flaps When one SFCC monitors a failure condition:
The operation of the flaps is hydro-mechanical. The PCU operates the mechanical the other SFCC receives a WTB-arm signal
transmission system which moves the flaps to the set position. the related PCU motor stops and its POB operates
The CSU changes the mechanical signals from the slat and flap control lever into the system operates at half speed.
electrical signals. These are sent to the SFCC1 and the SFCC2. They compare If the other SFCC also sends a WTB-arm signal:
the position signal with that from the FPPU. When there is a difference between the applicable WTBs operate
the signals, the SFCC sends a discrete signal to its related valve block of the flap the other PCU motor stops
PCU.
the system locks and gives a warning to the flight crew.
Each valve block lets hydraulic fluid flow to and from its hydraulic motor, in relation
to the signal from the SFCC. It thus controls the direction in which the hydraulic System Ground Operation Inhibit
motor turns (for extension and retraction of the flaps) and its speed (low or high
speed). The System Ground Operation Inhibit prevents flap system 2 operation during car-
go door operation.
The torque from the hydraulic motors is transmitted to the differential gearbox,
which connects the two motors. The mechanical transmission system then trans- The SFCC 2 gets a signal when the Yellow hydraulic system is pressurized and
mits the torque to the actuators which move the flaps. the FWD or AFT cargo doors are operated.
Hydraulic Actuation and Power Transmission Position Indicating

The two hydraulic motors in the PCU give hydraulic actuation. Each hydraulic mo- The upper display unit of the ECAM system shows the position of the flaps. The
tor gets power from a different hydraulic system, the Green hydraulic system or IPPU, which is installed on the PCU, supplies flap position data to the flight data
the Yellow. recorder and the Flight Warning Computer (FWC).
Each hydraulic motor has a valve block and POB. The valve blocks control the di- A visual check of the position of the flaps can be done through the windows in the
rection of rotation and the speed of the output shaft of the PCU. The POB holds fuselage that are adjacent to the flaps. The windows to be used are identified by
the output shaft of the hydraulic motor: a brown triangle on the sidewall panel above them.
against torque from the airloads
when there is a failure in its related hydraulic system
to lock the transmission at the same time as the WTB.
The flap system will operate at half speed if there is a failure of:
one electrical supply
one hydraulic system
one SFCC, or the failure of one of two electrical components
one engine.
Asymmetry and Power Transmission Monitoring

The SFCC1 and the SFCC2 continuously compare position data from the APPUs
and the FPPU to monitor the system. They use this data to find asymmetry, runa-
way, overspeed and uncommanded movement failure conditions.

27-75-4
A318/A319/A320/A321 27-75 Flaps
Figure 4: Slat Flap System Schematic
COMMAND
SENSOR
UNIT (CSU)
ECAM
FWC 1 IPPU FWC 2

SFCC 1 FPPU SFCC 2
1 2
SFCC
DIFF
ASSYMETRY GEAR
POSITION
PICK UP BOX
UNIT
M POB POB M
TO SYS 1 SLAT PCU TO SYS 2
- SLAT WTB - SLAT WTB
- FLAP WTB - FLAP WTB
WING TIP BRAKE VALVE BLOCK VALVE BLOCK
1 2 1 2 B G 1 2 1 2
SFCC SFCC FROM SYS 1 FROM SYS 2 SFCC SFCC
- CSU SFCC 1 SFCC 2 - CSU
- APPU'S - APPU'S
- FPPU'S
- LGCIU 1
G Y - FPPU'S
- LGCIU 2
FLAP PCU
VALVE BLOCK VALVE BLOCK
DIFF
M POB POB M
GEAR
SFCC SFCC SFCC SFCC
1 2 1 2 BOX
1 2 1 2
SFCC 1 FPPU SFCC 2

FWC 1 IPPU FWC 2
ECAM
SFCC 1
LGCIU 1
LGCIU 2 FLAP ATTACHMENT
SENSOR'S
SFCC 2

27-75-5
A318/A319/A320/A321 27-75 Flaps
Flaps Electrical Control and Monitoring Electrical Control

The CSU is installed in the cockpit, immediately below the slat and flap control le-
General ver on the panel 114VU. The CSU changes the mechanical signals from the con-
The electrical control and monitoring system of the flaps has: trol lever into electrical signals to the SFCC1 and SFCC2.
a manually operated slat/flap control lever The two SFCCs are installed in racks in the forward avionics compartment. The
a Command Sensor Unit (CSU) 51CV SFCCs have power supplies with no relation between them. Each SFCC has the
same function and includes one flap channel and one slat channel. The flap chan-
two Slat and Flap Control Computers (SFCC1 and SFCC2) 21CV, 22CV
nels each control one of the two valve blocks on the flaps PCU. Each valve block
two electrically controlled valve blocks 23CV(24CV) installed on the flaps Pow- has its own different hydraulic supply.
er Control Unit (PCU) 6201CM
There are three solenoid valves at each valve block. For the low speed mode, the
a Feedback Position Pick-Off Unit (FPPU) 27CV
SFCCs energize the retract/extend solenoid valves and the POB solenoid. For the
two Asymmetry Position Pick-Off Units (APPU) 29CV(30CV) high speed mode, the SFCCs energize the extend solenoid valve and the POB so-
two Wing Tip Brakes (WTB) 33CV(34CV) lenoid. The POB solenoid permits the release of the POB of the hydraulic motor.
two flap interconnecting struts, each with two flap-attachment failure detection An FPPU, which is attached to the PCU, sends signals on the position of the flap
sensors 37CV, 39CV (38CV, 40CV). transmission to the two SFCCs. The PCU gearbox moves the FPPU.
The functions of the flaps electrical control and monitoring system are: The FPPU has two synchro transmitters, which are the same. One sends signals
to control the valve blocks electrically to the SFCC1, the other one to the SFCC2.
to control the WTBs electrically
to receive data from and send data to the related systems
to monitor the power transmission for correct operation
to monitor the control system and power transmission for component failure
to monitor the inputs from and outputs to the related systems.
The slat/flap control lever controls the position of the flaps. The CSU identifies the
position of the slat/flap control lever and sends related signals to each SFCC.
Each SFCC controls a valve block of a hydraulic motor, which is part of the flap
PCU.
The two SFCCs monitor the operation of the transmission system. The FPPU
(which is part of the flaps PCU) and the two APPUs send signals to the SFCCs.
They identify component failures of the transmission system and the control sys-
tem. The Pressure-Off Brakes (POB) of the PCU and the WTBs stop and hold the
transmission system when a failure occurs.

27-75-6
A318/A319/A320/A321 27-75 Flaps
Figure 5: Flap PCU 1 Electrical Control
701PP 1 2 AC AA A A
28VDC 10 28VDC WTB POWER CSU INPUT #4 A1 13A <E N
3 4 31-54SCH06 CSU INPUT #4 A5 14B B 5 3 <C
HOT BUS 11 28VDC WTB RETURN
24-68-12
3 UNSD 4 1 2
10CV C/B- 6
FLIGHT CONTROLS 4 4
3 SFCC CHASSIS GROUND CSU INPUT #4 A4 13B T 4A 1A <D
WTB/FLAP/SYS 1 C C
121VU220 7 28VDC RETURN CSU REFERENCE 1 15C A P
AC 2 1
FLAP AA AB
SYS 1 14A 6D CSU INPUT #4 A3 15A U 3 5 R
FAULT AA FLAP 1 FAULT CSU INPUT #4 A2 14A V <B
SCH02 7D A A
SCH02 UNSD 6F
7F
FLAP 1
LOCKED
1WV2 SDAC-2 AB 5 3
86VU128
31-54 CSU
THE CSU SENDS DISCRETE SIGNALS TO THE FLAP CHANNEL 1 2
27-81SCH03
27-81SCH03
OF EACH SFCC. THE SWITCH PATTERN OF THE CSU CHANGES
FLAP WHEN THE SLAT AND FLAP CONTROL LEVER MOVES. THIS 4 4
SYS 1 AA CAUSES THE SFCC TO GET DIFFERENT SIGNALS FROM THE 4B 1B
FAULT 14A 5-TRACK SWITCHES IN THE CSU. FOR A CORRECT SIGNAL, C C
SCH02 AA EACH CHANNEL MUST RECEIVE THE SAME DETENT
PATTERN FROM THE TWO SETS OF SWITCHES. THE SFCC 2 1
SCH02 MEMORY KEEPS THE LAST CORRECT SIGNAL, WHICH
CONTROLS THE SLAT AND FLAP POSITION. THE SFCCS
1WV1 SDAC-1 COMPARE A NEW CSU SIGNAL WITH THE FLAP POSITION 3 5
85VU127 SIGNAL WHICH COMES FROM THE FPPU. IF A CHANGE OF
31-54 FLAP ANGLE IS NECESSARY, THE PCU SOLENOIDS GET
ELECTRICAL POWER. THE FLAPS MOVE TOWARDS THE FRICTION
NEW POSITION. WHEN THE POSITION DATA FROM THE BRAKE
FPPU IS THE SAME AS THE CSU SIGNAL, THE FLAPS SCH03/27-81SCH02/03
STOP.
51CV COMMAND SENSOR UNIT (CSU)-
1 114VU220
UNSD 2 A
AA CSU INPUT #1 A1 13J
X UNSD 10E
11H
SPARE
OPERATION INHIBIT
CSU INPUT #1 A5
CSU REFERENCE 2
14K
15H
Z 2J CSU INPUT #1 A4 13K
CSU INPUT #1 A3 15J
3J CSU INPUT #1 A2 14J
AA AA
91CV RELAY- AC
PANEL FLAP SYS 1 8 28VDC RETURN
114VU FAULT
2 28VDC SFCC PWR
187VU121 AC A
AB UNSD N
A 12D EXT PWR INPUT M
12F RET PWR INPUT L POB A
14C POB PWR INPUT AB SOLENOID
AB POB SOL OUTPUT 15C K
UNSD 1 AA
2 A 10D A/C ON GND U EXTEND
AA EXT SOL
VALVE BLOCK OUTPUT 13D T SOLENOID DRIVE SHAFT
401PP
28VDC X THE FLAP CHANNELS EACH CONTROL ONE OF
7.5 Z THE TWO VALVE BLOCKS ON THE FLAPS
ESS BUS PCU. EACH VALVE BLOCK HAS ITS OWN J
6CV C/B- RETRACT
24-68-08 DIFFERENT HYDRAULIC SUPPLY. THERE ARE RET SOL
FLIGHT CONTROLS/ SOLENOID
FLAP/CTL & MON/SYS 1
THREE SOLENOID VALVES AT EACH VALVE OUTPUT 13F H 51CV
95CV RELAY- BLOCK. FOR THE LOW SPEED MODE, THE LVDT 14H B COMMAND
49VU220 A/C ON GND SFCCS ENERGISE THE RETRACT/EXTEND EXCITATION 15H C
SOLENOID VALVES AND THE POB SOLENOID. AB E SENSOR UNIT
187VU121
FOR THE HIGH SPEED MODE, THE SFCCS A
ENERGISE THE EXTEND SOLENOID AND THE UNSD S
32-62SCH01 POB SOLENOID.THE POB SOLENOID PERMITS V
AB THE RELEASE OF THE POB OF THE HYDRAULIC AA P CONNECTOR A
L&R 1A MOTOR. AN FPPU WHICH IS ATTACHED TO LVDT V2 1A R CONNECTOR B
MAIN AB THE PCU, SENDS SIGNALS ON THE POSITION COM 2A D LVDT
WIRING DIAGRAM OF THE FLAP TRANSMISSION TO THE TWO INPUT V1 3A F
L/G
SFCCS. THE PCU GEARBOX MOVES THE FPPU. AA
27-51-01 COMP G
27-51-03 SCH06/08/09/10/27-81SCH02/06/08/09/10 A
27-51-05 SCH02
21CV SFCC-1 23CV VALVE BLOCK-
27-51-07 5GA1 LGCIU-1 85VU127 FLAP SYS 1 PCU
27-51-09 94VU122 148
32-31

27-75-7
A318/A319/A320/A321 27-75 Flaps
Power Control Unit Valve Block

The flap PCU has two valve blocks which are electrically controlled. Each valve
Description block controls the flow of hydraulic fluid to its related hydraulic motor and POB.
The flap PCU is a hydro-mechanical unit. The main body, which is a case, con- The Linear Variable Differential Transducer (LVDT) is installed on one end of the
tains a differential gearbox. valve block. The LVDT supplies a signal to the SFCC so that the SFCC can mon-
The Line Replaceable Units (LRUs) of the PCU are as follows: itor the position of the control valve spool. Installed on the valve block opposite the
two hydraulic motors LVDT are two directional solenoid valves and one POB solenoid valve. The direc-
two Pressure-Off Brakes (POB) tional solenoid valves operate as the extend or the retract solenoid valves. The
POB solenoid valve operates as the brake solenoid valve.
two valve blocks
six solenoid valves The valve blocks are interchangeable with those fitted to the slat PCU. Removal
of the valve blocks is possible without the removal of the PCU from the aircraft.
two inlet filters
one Feedback Position Pick-off Unit (FPPU) The primary components of a valve block are:
one Instrumentation Position Pick-off Unit (IPPU). a main control valve
an inlet filter
Hydraulic Motor five restrictors
Each multi-piston hydraulic motor receives hydraulic pressure from a valve block. two check valves
The output shaft of the motor is connected to a POB. Hydraulic fluid lubricates the a pressure port
motor. The cylinders of the motor are connected to two ports, referred to as the a return port
extend and retract ports.
an electrical connector.
When the valve block supplies hydraulic fluid to the extend port, the motor moves
in the direction necessary to extend the flaps. When hydraulic pressure is supplied Solenoid Valve
to the retract port, the motor moves in the opposite direction and the flaps retract. The solenoid valves of the PCU are the same and interchangeable with each other
and those on the WTB. Their removal is possible without the removal of the valve
Pressure-Off Brake (POB) blocks from the PCU.
A POB is attached to each hydraulic motor. It holds the output shaft of the hydrau-
lic motor when: Filter
the hydraulic motors do not operate The inlet filter is installed at the pressure port. Its removal is possible without the
the related hydraulic system does not supply sufficient hydraulic power removal of the valve block from the PCU.
the WTB stops the flap transmission system because of some system failures.
Differential Gearbox
The POB has a multiple friction-disk pack. Splines connect the stators to the POB
casing and the rotors to the shaft in the center of the POB. Springs hold the friction The differential gearbox contains a reduction and differential gear. The reduction
disks together. When hydraulic pressure is applied to the POB, the friction disks and differential gear transmits the movement from the hydraulic motors through
are disengaged (against the pressure of the springs). the PCU output bevel gear to the flap transmission system. The casing of the dif-
ferential gearbox also contains the intermediate gear which transmits the move-
To remove the POB, you must remove the related hydraulic motor first. ment to the IPPU and the FPPU. On the differential gearbox casing are primary
and secondary load points for the attachment of the PCU to the aircraft structure.

27-75-8
A318/A319/A320/A321 27-75 Flaps
Figure 6: Flap Power Control Unit

27-75-9
A318/A319/A320/A321 27-75 Flaps
Hydraulic Actuation there is a system failure or if the startup sequence occurs near to the commanded
Two of the three hydraulic systems supply fluid pressure through a priority valve position.
to the PCU:
Static Mode
the GREEN hydraulic system supplies valve block 23CV
In the static mode:
the YELLOW hydraulic system supplies valve block 24CV
there is no electrical power at all three solenoid valves
the priority valves are set when the pressure drops below 140 bar (2030 psi).
the centering effect of the springs holds the control valve spool in the neutral
Each valve block controls the flow of hydraulic fluid to the related hydraulic motor position
and its POB.
the lands on the valve spool seal the main pressure and return lines
Each POB stops and holds the output shaft of the related hydraulic motor when: the chambers at each end of the valve and the line to the POB are open to re-
the solenoids of the related valve block are de-energized because of a normal turn. The return is through the solenoid valves
PCU shutdown sequence
there is not enough pressure in the related hydraulic system Figure 7: PCU.
one of the failures given in occurs. RETRACT EXTEND
SOLENOID
PRESSURE OFF
SOLENOID BRAKE SOLENOID
(DE-ENERGIZED) (DE-ENERGIZED)
A differential gearbox connects the output shafts of the hydraulic motors and (DE-ENERGIZED)
transmits their torque to the power transmission system. If a POB engages and
holds its motor, the remaining motor moves the transmission system at half speed
but at full torque. CHECK
VALVE
TO PRESSURE
OFF BRAKE
Operation ELECTRICAL
CONNECTOR
The Slat/Flap Control Computers (SFCC 1 and SFCC 2) control the PCU solenoid
valves. The SFCC 1 controls and monitors (through the valve block) the operation RESTRICTOR RESTRICTOR
of the motor 1 and the SFCC 2 does the same for the motor 2.
The POB, extend and retract solenoid valves, when energized, permit pressure LINEAR
VARIABLE
fluid flow: DIFFERENTIAL
TRANSDUCER
to the POB CONTROL
VALVE CONTROL
to the chambers at each end of the control valve. SPRINGS VALVE
SPOOL
When the spool of the control valve moves away from the neutral position, the hy- MOTOR
draulic system of the aircraft is connected to the related motor as follows:
the direction in which the valve spool moves controls the direction in which the
motor turns
the distance that the valve spool moves controls the speed at which the motor
turns. PRESSURE RETURN
During normal operation, the valve blocks and the motors operate at the same FILTER
time. They operate at the same time in the static mode, the normal startup se-
quence and the normal shutdown sequence. Other sequences operate when

27-75-10
A318/A319/A320/A321 27-75 Flaps
Normal Startup Sequence Normal Shutdown Sequence

the SFCC energizes one of the directional (extend or retract) solenoid valves electrical power is removed from the drive-direction solenoid when the flaps
the applicable end of the control valve gets fluid pressure are 6.69 deg. (FPPU) away from the set position.
the valve spool moves in response to the increased fluid pressure at its appli- the opposite direction solenoid is energized at this time.
cable end full hydraulic system pressure moves the spool towards the center position.
the LVDT sends a signal to the SFCC to indicate a movement of the valve Restrictors control the speed of this movement of the spool.
spool the drive-direction solenoid is now energized again when the spool gets to the
the movement of the valve spool causes the POB solenoid valve to get fluid Low Speed operation position. Spring pressure now moves the spool, at a
pressure slower speed, towards the center position. A restriction of hydraulic fluid into
when the valve spool reaches the "pressure on point", the SFCC energizes the the pressure-line upstream of the solenoid valve now controls the speed of
POB solenoid valve to release the POB movement of the spool.
the hydraulic motor receives fluid flow and starts to turn the transmission the motor now operates at Low Speed" because of the decreased size of the
pressure and pressure-return connections.
with the valve spool fully moved, the motor gets the maximum available fluid
flow and turns at full speed. electrical power is removed from the drive-direction solenoid and the POB so-
lenoid valve when the flaps are 0.177 deg. (FPPU) away from the set position.
RETRACT EXTEND PRESSURE OFF when the LVDT indicates that the valve spool is 1.5 mm from the center posi-
SOLENOID SOLENOID BRAKE SOLENOID
(DE-ENERGIZED) (DE-ENERGIZED) (DE-ENERGIZED) tion the SFCC removes power from the opposite direction solenoid valve.
the valve spool moves to the center position and stops.
CHECK
Pressure Maintaining Function
VALVE
TO PRESSURE Emergency or stand-by hydraulic power has a limited flow capacity. At a time of
OFF BRAKE
ELECTRICAL
operation with emergency or stand-by hydraulic power, it is necessary to prevent
CONNECTOR a sudden decrease in supply pressure.
RESTRICTOR RESTRICTOR A sudden decrease in supply pressure can occur because of too much demand
by the flap system. This could cause an application of the POB at any time.
LINEAR
VARIABLE
The force and the rate of the spring, together with the port area/valve movement
DIFFERENTIAL property, give the function that maintains the pressure of the valve.
TRANSDUCER
CONTROL As the supply pressure decreases, the valve closes slowly. This reduces the flow
VALVE CONTROL
SPRINGS VALVE
rate to the motor and thus the work-load on the pump. This prevents the work-load
SPOOL of the slat/flap system to cause a sudden decrease of the supply pressure.
MOTOR
Single System Operation

The loss of the hydraulic pressure to one of the two motors causes the POB to ap-
ply and hold the motor output shaft. This locks one half of the differential gearbox.
The serviceable motor then gives sufficient output torque at half speed, at the
PRESSURE RETURN
gearbox output shaft.
FILTER

27-75-11
A318/A319/A320/A321 27-75 Flaps
Monitoring To monitor the power transmission system, the SFCCs compare the CSU signals
with the position data. The SFCCs receive the position data from:
The two SFCCs monitor the flap system continuously for failures in:
the two APPUs
the operation of the power transmission system
the FPPU
the Line Replaceable Units (LRU)
the valve blocks
the input and output signals
the flap-attachment failure detection sensors.
the power supplies.
An APPU is installed at the end of the transmission system in each wing. The AP-
Failures in the flap system will not give, but may lead to class 1 level 3 warnings PUs are the same as, and interchangeable with, the FPPU. One synchro transmit-
which are generated by the Electronic Centralized Aircraft Monitoring (ECAM)
ter in each APPU sends position data to the SFCC1. The other synchro transmitter
system. in each APPU sends position data to the SFCC2.
The ECAM system shows class 1, level 1 and level 2 cautions to the flight crew The control valve of each valve block has a Linear Variable Differential Transducer
(Ref. 31-50-00). The SFCCs supply failure data to the ECAM system through: (LVDT) (Ref. 27-54-00). The LVDT sends valve position data to its related SFCC.
the System Data Acquisition Concentrators (SDAC) (Ref. 31-55-00) The position of the valve is directly related to the hydraulic pressure available at
the Flight Warning Computers (FWC) (Ref. 31-53-00) the valve block.
the Display Management Computers (DMC) (Ref. 31-62-00). An interconnecting strut connects the inboard and the outboard flaps. It has two
The ECAM gives a Maintenance Status Reminder for class 2 failures. flap-attachment failure detection sensors. The flap-attachment failure detection
sensors monitor the connected flaps for a position difference out of the specified
The SFCCs supply all the related data of failures to the Centralized Fault Display
limits.
System (CFDS).
Each flap-attachment failure detection sensor sends a signal to one of the two
Monitoring of the Power Transmission Systems Landing Gear Control and Interface Units (LGCIU). Each LGCIU gets a signal
The SFCCs monitor the power transmission system for these failures: from one sensor on each wing and sends the data to its related SFCC. The SFCC
monitors the data and sends it to the other SFCC through the cross-computer link.
asymmetry (a position difference between the two APPUs)
The SFCCs receive data from all four flap-attachment failure detection sensors.
runaway (a position difference between the APPUs and the FPPU)
uncommanded movement (a movement in the wrong direction, or movement
away from the last set position)
overspeed (the faster movement of one or more PPUs)
flap disconnect
system jam
half speed
low hydraulic pressure
control valve position.

27-75-12
A318/A319/A320/A321 27-75 Flaps
Figure 8: Flap System 1 Monitoring

29CV(30CV) APPU (FITTED ON A AB
CLOCKWISE 33CV(34CV)
ACTUATOR ASSY NO. 4 ONLY) A 14G H SYNC EXCIT ACCESS PANELS
B 15G C 575DB & 575EB
1 APPU/FPPU
AB (675DB & 675EB)
APPU/FPPU OUTPUTS ARE PROCESSED
AA
BY THE ARINC SYNCRO MODULE AND ARE
X C 2G Y USED TO MONITOR FLAP SURFACE
CT Y D 1G X R APPU INPUT
Z E 3G Z POSITIONS.THE FPPU IS ALSO USED FOR
POSITIONAL FEEDBACK WHEN THE 6201CM
F SURFACES ARE MOVING. PCU
SCH 07 A
THE SFCC COMPARES THE L APPU WITH
30CV APPU- THE R APPU TO DETECT ASYMMETRY IN 37CV, 39CV
R FLAP
675 FLAP MOVEMENT. (38CV,40CV)
CLOCKWISE A THE L APPU, R APPU AND FPPU ARE ALSO 29CV(30CV)

A MONITORED FOR OVERSPEED MOVEMENT OF ACCESS
REAR SPAR B THE FLAPS. PANEL
575FB ELECTRICAL
X C 2E Y (675FB) CONNECTOR
DRIVE LEVER TYPICAL CT Y D 1E X FPPU INPUT IF 'RUNAWAY' (DEFINED AS A 33CV-A
ACTUATOR Z E 3E Z
POSITIONAL DIFFERENCE BETWEEN BOTH (34CV-A)
ASSEMBLY APPUs AND THE FPPU OR SURFACE ELECTRICAL
F
MOVEMENT AWAY FROM THE COMMANDED
CONNECTOR
33CV-B
33CV(34CV) WTB
SCH 07 A POSITION) IS DETECTED: (34CV-B)
1) DRIVE SIGNALS TO THE POWER
27CV FPPU-
FLAP CONTROL UNIT ARE REMOVED
148 2) THE WTB CONTROL CIRCUITS ARE
ARMED
1 27CV FPPU COUNTER A 3) AN ECAM WARNING APPEARS HYDRAULIC HYDRAULIC
CLOCKWISE SYSTEM SYSTEM
A
B
X C 1C X THE ABOVE 3 ACTIONS ALSO OCCUR IF SOLENOIDS
CT Y D 2C Y L APPU INPUT ASYMMETRY OR OVERSPEED ARE
Z E 3C Z DETECTED.
F
SCH 07 A
HYDRAULIC MANIFOLD
29CV APPU-
3 L FLAP
575 FLAP INBOARD
R WTB OUTPUT AB A
INTERCONNECTING FLAP
STRUT 39CV + 14K A
WING TIP BRAKE(WTB) - 15K B
VALVE
BLOCKS WING TIP BRAKES ARE AUTOMATICALLY C
APPLIED; A
1) IF THE FLAPS BECOME ASYMMETRICALLY SCH 07
CONFIGURED, 34CV BRAKE-
2) IF THEY ARE OPERATING TOO QUICKLY, R WING TIP
6201CM 3) OR A FAILURE, LIKE SHAFT FRACTURE, 675
POWER CONTROL UNIT OCCURS
37CV L WTB OUTPUT A
THE WTB CAN ONLY BE RESET ON THE GROUND
OUTBOARD FLAP + 14A A
THROUGH THE CFDS
AA - 15A B
A 6A R FLAP DISCONNECT AB C
UNSD C
B 6B 32-62 SCH 01 FLAP ATTACHMENT FAILURE DETECTION SENSOR A SCH 07
2 IF THE SFCC MONITORS SENSORS 1 & 2 AS FAILED,
THE LGCIU FOR EXAMPLE, DUE TO IMPACT DAMAGE, THE 33CV BRAKE-
38CV SENSOR-1 A 7540VC PROCESSES THE DRIVE SIGNALS TO THE POWER CONTROL UNIT ARE L WING TIP
R FLAP ATTACHMENT 681 SIGNALS FROM BUS 1 AA 575
FAIL DETECTION THE SENSORS AND REMOVED AND THE 'FLAPS LOCKED-SENSORS FAILED'
INFORMS THE A 13K 4F A ECAM WARNING APPEARS.
681 B 15K 5F B WIRING DIAGRAMS
SFCC VIA
LABEL 023 IF THE SFCC MONITORS AN ATTACHMENT FAILURE,
LABEL 023 AA AA NOTES:
32-61 FOR EXAMPLE, DUE TO A 'TARGET FAR' CONDITION, 27-51-11
SCH 02 THE DRIVE SIGNALS TO THE POWER CONTROL UNIT 27-51-13
A 5J 1 THE TWO APPUs ARE THE SAME AS AND 27-51-15
UNSD C L FLAP DISCONNECT ARE REMOVED AND THE 'FLAPS LOCKED-ALIGNMENT
32-62 SCH 01 INTERCHANGEABLE WITH THE FPPU. 27-51-17
B 5K FAULT' ECAM WARNING APPEARS. 27-51-19
SCH 02 2 FOR 39CV(40CV) SEE SCH 07. 27-51-22
2 AA SCH 01 32-61-05
ACCESS TO THE FPPU 27CV IS
37CV SENSOR-1 A 7541VC 21CV SFCC-1 3 THROUGH THE MAIN DOORS
L FLAP ATTACHMENT 581 5GA1 LGCIU-1 85VU127
FAIL DETECTION 93VU121 (734/744) OF THE MLG.
581 32-31

27-75-13
A318/A319/A320/A321 27-75 Flaps
Feedback Position Pick-Off Unit (FPPU) FPPU / APPU Adjustment

Figure 9: FPPU and APPU Location and Adjustment on page 15 To adjust the FPPU/APPU electrically to zero, no electrical test equipment is nec-
The FPPU has: essary.
a splined input shaft For zero adjustment, there are three moving and three fixed indicators:
a spring-loaded locking plate two fixed pointers on the reduction gear housing
the reduction gears one zero mark on the driving gear
a reduction gear housing one orange zero indicator
two synchro transmitters which work independently one fixed zero mark on the input shaft locking plate
a synchro cover one zero mark on the end of the input shaft.
an electrical connector block
a cover plate.
Asymmetry Position Pick-Off Unit (APPU)
Figure 9: FPPU and APPU Location and Adjustment on page 15
The spring-loaded locking plate holds the splined input shaft from the removed
FPPU. When the FPPU is installed in the aircraft, the mount of the FPPU pushes The two APPUs are the same as and interchangeable with the FPPU
the locking plate away from the shaft splines. The input shaft moves the reduction
gears which are in the reduction gear housing. The reduction gears turn the two
synchro transmitters which are below the synchro cover.
The electrical connector block is installed on the reduction gear housing. The elec-
trical connector block has two connectors, one for each synchro transmitter. The
connectors are identified as A and B. The cover plate is installed on the reduction
gear housing. There is a window in the cover plate to monitor adjustment of the
FPPU to zero.
On A319 / A320
When the input shaft turns through 140 revolutions it gives 360 deg. synchro trans-
mitter output. For full travel of the flaps, the angular output of each syncro trans-
mitter is 251.97 deg.
On A321
When the input shaft turns through 140 revolutions it gives 360 deg. synchro trans-
mitter output. For full travel of the flaps, the angular output of each syncro trans-
mitter is 242.1 deg.

27-75-14
A318/A319/A320/A321 27-75 Flaps
Figure 9: FPPU and APPU Location and Adjustment
STA10204/RIB 19
STA9704/RIB 18
A
A
FEEDBACK POSITION
PICK-OFF UNIT 27CV
A 575FB
(675FB)
Z148 A
Z147
AC T UATO R 4 S H OW N
B AC T UATO R S 2 A N D 3 S I M I L A R
STA2082/FR46
A S Y M M E T RY P O S I T I O N
AC T UATO R P I C K - O F F U N I T ( T R AC K 4 O N LY )
6233CM/6283CM
DRIVING GEAR
ZERO MARK
D R OTA RY OFFSET TO R Q U E
AC T UATO R G E A R B OX LIMITER
I N D I C ATO R
FIXED POINTER
SYNCHRO
ORANGE ZERO INDICATOR COVER VIEWING
FIXED POINTER WINDOW
REDUCTION
GEAR HOUSING TO R Q U E
SHAFT
B
C CONNECTOR B
UNIVERSAL
JOINT
CONNECTOR A FW
REAR
D
S PA R
C
SPLINED
INPUT SHAFT INPUT DRIVE
LEVER
ZERO MARK D
ELECTRICAL
SHAFT
CONNECTOR LOCKING
BLOCK PLATE
COVER
PLATE
FIXED ZERO
MARK

27-75-15
A318/A319/A320/A321 27-75 Flaps
Flap Interconnecting Strut Flap-Attachment Failure Detection Sensors

Figure 10: Flap Interconnecting Strut on page 17 The SFCCs monitor the flap-attachment failure detection sensors to find connec-
The flap interconnecting strut has these functions: tion failure. If the SFCCs receive a flap disconnect signal:
it lets the inner and the outer flaps move independently by a specified limit the valve block solenoids on the PCU are de-energized
it gives a different load path for the flap drive system if there is an attachment the POBs lock the two hydraulic motors
failure the SFCCs give a class 1 level 2 caution and the ECAM display unit shows a
it sends data to the SFCC when the independent movement of the inner and failure message.
outer flaps is more than the specified limit System reset is only possible on the ground.
it absorbs energy if a flap drive disconnect occurs. The ECAM display unit shows a failure message if:
The flap interconnecting strut has: the SFCC gets different data from the two sensors on the same wing or
a housing one sensor gives incorrect data.
two flap-attachment failure detection sensors
an actuating rod
a target
a ball piece
a sleeve.
The housing contains the actuating rod, the sleeve and the ball piece. The target
is at the end of the actuating rod. The two sensors on the housing align with the
targets on the actuating rod, with the flaps in their normal postion.
The actuating rod has a total travel of 18 mm (0.7086 in.) in each direction from
the center position. The limit of independent movement between the flaps is 14.5
mm (0.5708 in.). The sensors send a target-far signal to the LGCIU if the target
moves more than 15 mm (0.5905 in.) from the center position.

27-75-16
A318/A319/A320/A321 27-75 Flaps
Figure 10: Flap Interconnecting Strut
FLAP
A INTERCONNECTING
LINK
INNER FLAP
FLAP RH DISCONNECT FLAP RH DISCONNECT

SENSOR 1 (38CV) SENSOR 2 (40CV)
Z680
Z580
FLAP LH DISCONNECT
OUTER FLAP
SENSOR 1 (37CV) ACTUATING
ROD BALLPIECE
RIGGING
PIN HOLE
B HOUSING
A FLAP LH DISCONNECT
SENSOR 2 (39CV)
18.0mm
(0.71in) SLEEVE TARGET
18.0mm
(0.71in) SENSOR

27-75-17
A318/A319/A320/A321 27-75 Flaps
Wing Tip Brake and WTB Control When the solenoids are energized, the fluid pressure moves the piston to release
the spring force and puts the brake on. When the solenoids are de-energized, the
The WTB is an electro-hydraulic pressure-on brake. It is installed near the end of
fluid pressure returns through the solenoid valves and lets the brake off.
the transmission system in each wing. The WTBs stop and hold the transmission
if the SFCCs find some given types of failures. Each WTB has two solenoid Leakage of fluid past the piston seals returns through a drilled hole. If hydraulic
valves. Each solenoid valve controls one part of a WTB. The hydraulic supply to pressure is not available to one piston, the remaining piston gives sufficient force
each WTB is as follows: to act against the spring to let the brake off.
the Blue and Yellow systems supply the left WTB
Operation of the Wing Tip Brake
the Blue and Green systems supply the right WTB.
The WTBs lock the transmission system if a failure occurs.
The two battery buses (701PP for system 1 and 702PP for system 2) supply power
1. If one or the other lane of the flap channel finds a failure:
to the WTB solenoids through the SFCCs. This makes sure that power is available
to the WTB if there is an engine power failure. Each busbar supplies one solenoid the lane arms its own WTB circuits
on each WTB. When the solenoids are energized, the system latches the circuit the other channel receives a WTB-arm discrete signal.
to keep the solenoid valves open. When the WTBs operate, the transmission 2. If one or the other lane in the second flap channel also finds the failure:
locks. The circuit can only be set back (reset) on the ground through the Central- the lane arms its own WTB circuits
ized Fault Display System (CFDS). the first channel receives a WTB-arm discrete signal.
The two SFCCs control the LH and the RH WTB. Each SFCC controls one sole- When the SFCCs receive a WTB-arm signal they energize the related WTB sole-
noid on each WTB. noid valves. The WTBs lock the transmission system.
Component Description If one SFCC does not operate, the other SFCC receives a WTB-arm signal auto-
matically. If the other SFCC finds a failure, one solenoid valve on each WTB gets
The WTB is an electro-hydraulic, pressure-on disc-brake. The WTB has:
electrical power.
a central housing
3. Reset
a friction disc pack
The WTB can only be reset on the ground through the CFDS.
a through torque shaft
two hydraulic manifolds
two annular pistons
two solenoid valves
two electrical connectors.
The central housing contains the friction disc pack which has an alternate stator
and rotor discs. The central housing holds the stator discs, external splines on the
torque shaft drive the rotor discs. The internal splines at each end of the torque
shaft engage with the flap transmission system. At each end of the central housing
is a hydraulic manifold which contains an annular piston. The torque shaft passes
through the center of the two pistons. A solenoid valve and an electrical connector
are installed on each manifold.
A special hydraulic system supplies each hydraulic manifold. The solenoid valves
control the supply of fluid pressure to the pistons.

27-75-18
A318/A319/A320/A321 27-75 Flaps
Figure 11: Flap Wing Tip Brake
STA8744/RIB 16
WING TIP BRAKE

A A 33CV (34CV)
575DB ELECTRICAL
(675DB) CONNECTOR
ELECTRICAL
LH 33 CVA
CONNECTOR
(34 CVA)
LH 33 CVB
(34 CVB)
LH AND RH
WTB'S BLUE
HYDRAULIC
SYSTEM
LH WTB YELLOW
RH WTB GREEN
HYDRAULIC SYSTEM
SOLENOID
CENTRAL HOUSING
HYDRAULIC
MANIFOLD
SOLENOID SOLENOID
VALVE VALVE
PRESSURE PRESSURE LH AND RH

LH WTB YELLOW PORT PORT WTB'S BLUE
RH WTB GREEN
RETURN RETURN HYDRAULIC
HYDRAULIC SYSTEM
PORT PORT SYSTEM
OUTBOARD
PISTON PISTON
FRICTION DISC PACK

27-75-19
A318/A319/A320/A321 27-75 Flaps
Power Supply
The electrical power supplies for the flap control and monitoring system are:
the essential bus 401PP
the normal bus 204PP
the battery buses 701PP and 702PP.
The essential bus 401PP supplies:
the SFCC1 flap channel
the related PCU solenoids
the synchro and LVDT excitation voltages.
The battery bus 701PP supplies the WTB solenoids related to the SFCC1.
The normal bus 204PP supplies:
the SFCC2 flap channel
If the WTBs are operated, the battery buses keep the solenoids energized during
a SFCC power failure.

27-75-20
A318/A319/A320/A321 27-75 Flaps
Figure 12: Slat / Flap Power Supply
COMPUTER COMPUTER
REMOVED REMOVED
FAULT FAULT
A/C ON GND SYS 1 SYS 2 A/C ON GND
FLT 95CV FLT 96CV
GND 91CV 93CV GND

21CV 22CV
AA AA SFCC1 SFCC2 AA AA
10D 3J 2J 2J 3J 10D
401PP 202PP
AC AC
2 POWER POWER 2
6CV 8 SUPPLY 8 8CV
SUPPLY
28VDC 7 UNIT UNIT 7 28VDC
11 11 702PP
701PP WTB WTB
LATCH LATCH
10 10
10CV 3 12CV
3 AC 28VDC
28VDC AC
12F 12D 14C 15C 13D 13F 15A 14A 15K 14K 15G 14G 15H 14H 14H 15H 14G 15G 14K 15K 14A 15A 13F 13D 15C 14C 12D 12F
AB AB AB AB
A B
C B A A B C
WTB WTB
LH LH
33CV-A 33CV-B
A A
L K U T J H H J T U K L
A A A A A A B B B B
POB EXTEND RETRACT C B A F B A F B A F B A C B B C A B F A B F A B F A B C RETRACT EXTEND POB
WTB APPU APPU LVDT LVDT APPU APPU WTB
PCU FPPU FPPU PCU
RH LH RH PCU PCU RH LH RH
23CV 34CV-A 29CV-A 30CV-A 27CV-A 23CV 24CV 27CV-B 30CV-B 29CV-B 34CV-B 24CV

27-75-21
A318/A319/A320/A321 27-75 Flaps
Interfaces Figure 13: Interfaces

The SFCCs send and receive discrete and analog electrical signals to and from
the components of the flap system. Each SFCC has an ARINC 429 interface,
which connects it to the other systems.

27-75-22
A318/A319/A320/A321 27-75 Flaps
Figure 14: SFCC Interfaces

27-75-23
A318/A319/A320/A321 27-75 Flaps
Flaps Hydraulic Actuation and Power Transmission Drive levers on the actuator output shafts move the flaps through flap link arms.
Bolts attach the flap link arms to the flap bottom surface.
General To prevent extension or retraction overtravel each drive lever has mechanical
stops. Engagement of the stops does not occur at a time of normal operation.
A hydromechanical Power Control Unit (PCU) in the fuselage supplies the me-
chanical power to the flap transmission system. The PCU has two hydraulic mo- Wing Tip Brakes (WTB) give asymmetry and runaway protection (Ref. 27-51-00).
tors. Each motor has a Pressure-Off Brake (POB) and a valve block, which is The offset gearbox of the track 4 actuator drives an Asymmetry Position Pick-off
electrically controlled. Unit (APPU)
Torque shafts and gearboxes transmit the mechanical power from the PCU to the Carriages, which roll freely on staight tracks, hold each flap. Track installation is
offset gearboxes of the actuators. The offset gearboxes then transmit the power on beams below the wing. Vertical-load rollers and side-load rollers keep the car-
through their torque limiters to the rotary actuators, which move the flap transmis- riages on the tracks. Each carriage has a containment device to hold it on the track
sion system. if a failure occurs.
The torque limiters control the transmission of torque from the offset gearboxes to The carriages, tracks and beams at tracks 2, 3 and 4 are made almost the same.
keep the torque in the specified limits. The torque limiters prevent the mechanical Attached to the fuselage is track 1, which uses a different configuration as that at
overload of the rotary actuators. tracks 2, 3 or 4. Attached to the flap bottom surface at tracks 2, 3 and 4 are brack-
ets. Connected to the brackets is a linkage which operates the hinged part of the
Power Transmission track fairing during flap extension and retraction.
In each wing, the transmission system includes: At the end of each track are mechanical stops. The stops prevent retraction over-
torque shafts travel and makes sure that the flap do not disengage at the end of flap extension.
a right angle gearbox at the wing root. This changes the drive alignment Engagement of the stops does not occur at a time of normal operation.
through 90 degrees for input to the track 1 actuator On A321:
a line gearbox. This moves the drive path forward onto the rear face of the false Hinge mechanisms connect the trailing edge of the tab surface to the primary sur-
rear spar face of the flap. Five hinge mechanisms hold the outboard flap tab to the outboard
a 19 degree bevel gearbox. This puts the drive into line with the rear spar flap and three hinge mechanisms hold the inboard flap tab to the inboard flap. The
four actuators. Each actuator consists of an offset gearbox, a torque limiter and tabs and flaps move in relation to each other during extension and retraction.
a plug-in rotary actuator
a Wing Tip Brake (WTB)
an Asymmetry Position Pick-Off Unit (APPU).
The torque shafts transmit power from the PCU to the gearboxes and actuators.
Universal joints connect the torque shafts and steady bearings support them.
Each input gearbox has a torque limiter which operates in both directions. Each
torque limiter has a lock-out torque value set as necessary for its location. The
torque limiters protect the wing structure and the actuators from a torque overload
which could occur by a flap mechanism failure. A mechanical indicator on each ac-
tuator latches if a lock-out occurs. You can set the indicator again when the aircraft
is on the ground.

27-75-24
A318/A319/A320/A321 27-75 Flaps
Figure 15: Flaps Power Transmission
Z570(670) Z570(670)
A
A
POWER CONTROL UNIT

6201CM POWER CONTROL UNIT
6201CM
ACTUATOR ASSY 1 RIGHT ANGLE GEARBOX
A 6205CM (6255CM) 6203CM (6253CM) A
ACTUATOR ASSY 1 RIGHT ANGLE GEARBOX
6205CM (6255CM) 6203CM (6253CM)
TRACK 1 TRACK 1
TAB HINGE 1A
INBOARD FLAP
INNER TAB
TAB HINGE 1B
L I N E AG E G E A R B OX LINE GEARBOX
6209CM (6259CM) 6209CM (6259CM) FLAP TRACK 2
ACTUATOR ASSY 2 T R AC K 2 ACTUATOR ASSY 2

6211CM (6261CM) 6211CM (6261CM)
INNER MAIN FLAP
OUTER MAIN FLAP

B E V E L G E A R B OX BEVEL GEARBOX
6217CM (6267CM) 6217CM (6267CM) TAB HINGE 3A
FLAP TRACK 3
ACTUATOR ASSY 3 T R AC K 3 ACTUATOR ASSY 3

6221CM (6271CM) 6221CM (6271CM)
OUTER TAB
TAB HINGE 3B
WING TIP BRAKE WING TIP BRAKE
TAB HINGE 3C
ASYMMETRY POSITION
OUTBOARD FLAP PICK-OFF UNIT
FLAP TRACK 4
A S Y M M E T RY P O S I T I O N
PICK-OFF UNIT
ACTUATOR ASSY 4 ACTUATOR ASSY 4

6233CM (6283CM) 6233CM (6283CM)
T R AC K 4
A319 / A320 A321

27-75-25
A318/A319/A320/A321 27-75 Flaps
Right Angle Gearbox 6203CM (6253CM) Line Gearbox 6209CM (6259CM)

A right-angle gearbox is installed in each wing. Their gear ratio is 1:1. Bolts attach The line gearbox has a ratio of 1:1. Bearings, seals and the procedures for lubri-
each right-angle gearbox to the structure. cation and inspection are almost the same as those used on the right angle gear-
The input and output shafts have splined ends for connection to the torque shafts box.
of the transmission system. The input and output shafts have reversed lip seals
which make sure that unwanted material does not get into the gearbox. The gear-
box is filled with grease. There are inspection plugs through which you can exam-
ine the lubricant.
573AB (673AB)
A A
LIP SEAL
LINE GEARBOX
A 6029CM (6259CM)
BEARING
RIGHT ANGLE GEARBOX

6203CM (6253CM)
INSPECTION
PLUG
INSPECTION
HOLE
LIP SEAL
BEARING

27-75-26
A318/A319/A320/A321 27-75 Flaps
Bevel Gearbox 6217CM (6267CM) Torque Shafts and Steady Bearings

The bevel gearbox has a ratio of 1:1. Bearings, seals and the procedures for lubri- Each torque shaft is a splined/bolted assembly which has, as applicable:
cation and inspection are almost the same as those used on the right angle gear- universal joints
box. flexible joints
a plunging joint.
Universal joints have two forkends connected with a cruciform bearing and can
have splined connections or flanged connections. Flanged connections are bolted
to flanges on the mating torque shaft and the splined connections connect with
575AB (675AB)
mating splines. Splined connections can be one of two types, the movable type
('M'), or the fixed type ('F'). Movable joints are free to move along the splines.
A Fixed joints have a pin installed to stop any movement. The pins are held in posi-
tion with a spring clip.
Universal joints let the torque shafts have large angular changes of alignment as
TRAILING EDGE
RIB
they turn.
The flexible joint is an articulating spline-joint assembly that has a male splined
coupling and a female splined coupling. The couplings are connected together
A with a swaged retainer to make a movable joint. The flexible joints let the torque
shafts have small angular changes of alignment as they turn.
The plunging joint has a universal joint which moves on splines inside a short
BEVEL GEARBOX
19 DEG. 6217CM (6267CM) drive shaft. The plunging joint gives a flexible joint:
on the output side of the flap 1 actuator
on the input side of the line gearbox.
BEARINGS
Each torque shaft assembly has at least one movable end connection. The mov-
able end connection has an indicator groove. This goes out of view when the
splines at the connection are correctly engaged.
Steady bearings, which hold the torque shafts, are attached to the structure with
bolts. Two types of steady bearing are installed:
a self-aligning ball bearing only
a self-aligning ball bearing and univeral joint assembly.
INSPECTION
PLUG
LIP SEAL

27-75-27
A318/A319/A320/A321 27-75 Flaps
Flap Actuators Figure 16: Flap Actuator (Typical)

Track 1 is shown as an example. 2, 3 and 4 are similar in design and operation.
The actuator is an assembly that has:
an offset gearbox
a rotary actuator.
Offset Gearbox - Track 1

The offset gearbox casing contains:
a through shaft
the torque limiter
A
reduction gearing
Z147
the rotary actuator. Z148
The power goes from the through shaft through the torque limiter to spur gears.
The spur gears move the input shaft of the rotary actuator.
TORQUE LIMITER
OFFSET
GEARBOX
ACTUATOR
6205CM/6255 CM
ROTARY ACTUATOR

27-75-28
A318/A319/A320/A321 27-75 Flaps
Torque Limiter - Track 1 Figure 17: Torque Limiter

TORQUE LIMITER
The torque limiter has:
a ball ramp device FRICTION INPUT
INDICATOR DISC PACK MEMBER
a friction disk pack spline-mounted to release too much torque through the
gearbox casing into the aircraft structure
a spring disk pack that is set to a limit of a minimum of 120% of the maximum
torque for operation SPRING 'B'
an indicator with a spring clip which usually stays in the retracted position.
The torque limiter is made to stop the transmission of too much torque into the out-
put. It also makes sure that the indication of torque peaks, which momentarily en-
gage and release the torque limiter, does not occur. OUTPUT TO
ACTUATOR 2
Operation
The power input from the torque shaft turns the through shaft of the torque limiter. THROUGH
SHAFT
The power transmits to the reduction gears, then the rotary actuator, through the
SPRING
input gear. If the torque necessary at the input to the rotary actuator is more than
the bevel-gear shaft supplies (so the input gear causes resistance):
OUTPUT MEMBER INPUT FROM RIGHT
the balls move up the ramp in the ball and ramp coupling ANGLE GEARBOX
the input gear moves axially against the spring disks "A"
the movement of the input gear compresses the friction disks against the
earthed plates in the friction disk pack SPUR GEAR
REDUCTION
the compression of the friction disk pack causes the input gear to "lock-out"
the pressure on the spring disks "A" pushes the spring cup against the spring
disks "B" CASING
the spring cup pushes the plunger

the indicator extends to show that a lock-out torque occured. INPUT TO ROTARY
ACTUATOR
The indication of the lock-out torque occurs only:
when hydraulic-power-given torque is released through the gearbox casing
into the aircraft structure because of too much load downstream. ROTARY
ACTUATOR
The system can be set again by operation in the opposite direction. The indicator
stays extended until it is cancelled manually.

27-75-29
A318/A319/A320/A321 27-75 Flaps
Rotary Actuator - Track 1 Figure 18: Rotary Actuator.

O-RING SEAL
Bolts attach the rotary actuator to the offset gearbox casing. The gearbox output
shaft turns the rotary actuator. A first-stage gear train transmits input torque from
LONG FLANGED
the offset gearbox to the power stage of the actuator. The power stage includes E L A S TO M E R I C
SEAL H U B A S S E M B LY
nine planet gears held by rings. This gives an equal share of the load between the FIXED
RING GEAR OUTPUT LONG OUTPUT
driven output carrier drive, and the earth annulus gear. The differential gear ratio RING FLANGED SHAFT
GEAR HUB
between the planet gears, the earth annulus gear and the output ring gears gives RO L L E R S
a high torque/low speed output PLANT GEARS

( F I R S T S TAG E )
BEARINGS
INPUT
E N D - OV E R
JOURNAL RING
PLANET GEARS
( P OW E R - S TAG E )
OUTPUT
E N D - C OV E R
INPUT GEAR
( F I R S T S TAG E
SUN GEAR)
R E TA I N I N G
P L AT E
ANNULUS GEAR
D OW E L A S S E M B LY
S H O RT- F L A N G E D R OTAT I N G
HUB RING GEAR
S H O RT- F L A N G E D
H U B A S S E M B LY

27-75-30
A318/A319/A320/A321 27-75 Flaps
Flap Carriages Figure 19: Flap Carriages
Carriage - Track 1
The carriage at track 1 is machined from aluminium alloy forging. Four vertical-
load and two side-load rollers hold the carriage on its track. The rollers are lubri-
cated through grease points on the carriage.
Carriage - Track 2, 3 and 4

The carriages at tracks 2, 3 and 4 are machined from aluminium alloy forgings. All
three carriages are almost the same. Six vertical-load and four side-load rollers
hold each carriage on its track. The rollers are lubricated through grease points on
the carriage. A fail-safe hook keeps the flap on the track if there is a structural fail-
ure of the carriage.
Bolts attach the carriages to the flaps. The bolts have eccentrics which let you ad-
just the flaps.
Flap and Track Fairing Operating Mechanism
Attached to the flap bottom surface, immediately outboard of each track position,
is a flap link arm. Bolted to the drive lever, on its related actuator, is the forward
end of each link arm. At tracks 1 and 4 are links arms made of machined alumin-
ium. At tracks 2 and 3 are link arms made of machined titanium. The link arms
transmit the movement from the rotary actuators to the flap surface.
Attached to the flap bottom surface, at tracks 2, 3 and 4, is an arm which operates
the track fairing. Attached to the operating arm is a linkage which operates the
moveable track fairing during flap extension and retraction.

27-75-31
A318/A319/A320/A321 27-75 Flaps
Flap and Track Fairing Operating Mechanism Figure 20: A319 / A320 Flap Operating Mechanism
Figure 20: A319 / A320 Flap Operating Mechanism on page 32
Attached to the flap bottom surface, immediately outboard of each track position,
is a flap link arm. Bolted to the drive lever, on its related actuator, is the forward
end of each link arm. At tracks 1 and 4 are link arms made of machined aluminium.
At tracks 2 and 3 are link arms made of machined titanium. The link arms transmit
the movement from the rotary actuators to the flap surface.
A321 Inboard and Outboard Fairing Operating Mechanism
Figure 21: A321 Flap Fairing Operating Mechanism on page 33
Attached to the flap bottom surface, at tracks 2, 3 and 4, is an arm which operates
the track fairing. Attached to the operating arm is a linkage which operates the
moveable track fairing during flap extension and retraction.
Fairings attached to the flap and tab bottom surfaces cover the hinges at the 1A,
1B, 3A, 3B and 3C positions.
A321 Inboard and Outboard Tab Operating Mechanism
The inboard tab is attached to the rear spar of the flap at hinge 1A, hinge 1B and
at flap Track 2.
The outboard tab is attached to the rear spar of the flap at the tracks 3 and 4 and
at the hinges 3A, 3B and 3C.
When the flaps move, the tabs are operated by a linkage connected from:
the shroud box assembly to the hinge 1A tab attachment bracket
the roller carriages of the tracks 2, 3 and 4 to the tab attachment brackets.

27-75-32
A318/A319/A320/A321 27-75 Flaps
Figure 21: A321 Flap Fairing Operating Mechanism

27-75-33
A318/A319/A320/A321 27-75 Flaps
Flaps Position Indicating Power Supply

The 431XP ESS BUS and the 231XP Bus 2 supply 26V AC:
General 431XP ESS BUS supplies circuit breaker 1CN
The upper display unit of the Electronic Centralized Aircraft Monitoring (ECAM) 231XP BUS 2 supplies circuit breaker 2CN
system shows the flap position. The display unit shows the flap position together 1CN supplies 26V AC to IPPU connector A
with the slat position and the direction of their movement. 2CN supplies 26V AC to IPPU connector B.
The Instrumentation Position Pick-Off Unit (IPPU) 3CN monitors the movement of If the alpha-lock/speed baulk-function operates, the caution A-LOCK (cyan) flash-
the mechanical transmission system. It thus monitors the operation and position es below the wing indication.
of the flaps.
If the slats/flaps do not move freely, the FLAP indication changes from cyan to am-
System Description ber.
Figure 23: Flaps Position Indication on page 36 Instrumentation Position Pickoff-Unit (IPPU)
The IPPU is attached to the flap Power Control Unit (PCU). An intermediate gear
The IPPU has:
transmits the movement from the output shaft of the differential gearbox to the IP-
PU. The IPPU sends the flap position data to the Flight Warning Computers a splined input shaft
(FWC1, FWC2) (Ref. 31-53-00). The FWCs send the data to the Electronic Instru- a spring-loaded locking plate
ment System (EIS). The EIS shows the position of the flaps on the upper display reduction gears
unit of the ECAM system. a reduction gear housing
The upper display unit uses the shape of a wing to show the slat and flap positions. two synchro transmitters which operate independently
A grey symbol shows the fixed center section of the wing. Green indications show a synchro cover
the correct position of the slats and flaps. When the slats and flaps are fully retract- an electrical connector assembly
ed, the green symbols are shown on the two sides of the center section of the
a cover plate.
wing.
When the IPPU is removed, the spring-loaded locking plate holds the splined input
White points show the position of the slats and flaps on the display. The white
points are not shown when the slats and flaps are fully retracted (clean configura- shaft from the removed IPPU. When the IPPU is installed, the mount of the IPPU
tion). The indications S and F, which are usually green, show the slat and flap part pushes the locking plate away from the shaft splines. The input shaft moves the
reduction gears which are in the reduction gear housing. The reduction gears turn
of the display. The indications are not shown when the aircraft is in the clean con-
figuration. the two synchro transmitters which are below the synchro cover.
The upper display unit also shows: The electrical connector assembly is installed on the reduction gear housing. The
electrical connector assembly has two connectors, one for each synchro transmit-
the position of the slat and flap control lever ter. The connectors are identified as A and B. The cover plate is installed over an
the direction of the slat and flap surface movement opening in the reduction gear housing. There is a window in the cover plate to
the limit of the selected movement monitor adjustment of the IPPU to zero.
the position of the slat and flap surfaces during movement The IPPU is the same as the Feedback Position Pick-Off Unit (FPPU).
when the slat alpha-lock/speed baulk-function is in operation
when the flap auto-command function is engaged.
Figure 1: Controls and Indication on page 2

27-75-34
A318/A319/A320/A321 27-75 Flaps
Figure 22: Flap Position Indication

27-75-35
A318/A319/A320/A321 27-75 Flaps
Figure 23: Flaps Position Indication

27-75-36
A318/A319/A320/A321 27-75 Flaps
CFDS - Related System Monitoring

Detected Faults
Assymmetry
Runaway
Overspeed
Uncommanded Movement
CSU Misadjust
Flap Disconnect
Jam
Half Speed
Low Pressure
PCU Valve Block
Figure 24: Assymetry

27-75-37
A318/A319/A320/A321 27-75 Flaps
Figure 25: Overspeed

27-75-38
A318/A319/A320/A321 27-75 Flaps
Figure 26: Uncommanded Movement

27-75-39
A318/A319/A320/A321 27-75 Flaps
Figure 27: CSU Misadjust

27-75-40
A318/A319/A320/A321 27-75 Flaps
Figure 28: Flap Disconnect

FLAP
A INTERCONNECTING
LINK
INNER FLAP
OUTER FLAP ACTUATING

ROD BALLPIECE
RIGGING
PIN HOLE
B HOUSING
18.0mm
(0.71in) SLEEVE TARGET
18.0mm
(0.71in) SENSOR

27-75-41
A318/A319/A320/A321 27-75 Flaps
Figure 29: System Jam

27-75-42
A318/A319/A320/A321 27-75 Flaps
Figure 30: Half Speed Operation

27-75-43
A318/A319/A320/A321 27-75 Flaps
Figure 31: Hydraulic Low Pressure

27-75-44
A318/A319/A320/A321 27-75 Flaps
Figure 32: PCU Valve Block Fault

27-75-45
A318/A319/A320/A321 27-75 Flaps

27-75-46
A318/A319/A320/A321 27-80 Slats
27-80 Slats

27-80-1
A318/A319/A320/A321 27-80 Slats
General The function resets if alpha decreases below 7.6 deg. or CAS increases over 154
knots.
System Configuration Alpha lock/speed baulk is not possible if:
The aircraft has five slats on the leading edge of each wing. Together with the the slat retraction is set before alpha is more than 8.5 deg. or CAS less than
flaps (Ref. 27-50-00) they are used to increase lift. The slats are installed on tracks 148 knots
which are attached to the leading edge of each wing. the aircraft is on the ground with CAS below 60 knots.
The slats are attached, at the forward end, to circular-arc tracks. The tracks oper- When the function is active, the ECAM shows the message A-Lock (cyan, pulsing)
ate in guide rollers. Two tracks support each of the four slats outboard of the en- below the slat position indication (Ref. 27-85-00).
gine pylon. Four tracks support the track inboard of the engine pylon. Two of the
tracks inboard, and each of the tracks outboard of the engine pylon, have curved Slat Alpha Lock/Speed Baulk on A321
rack gears fitted.
The Air Data/Inertial Reference Units (ADIRU) supply corrected angle-of-attack
Each curved rack gear engages with a pinion. Plug-in rotary actuators move the (alpha) and computed air speed (CAS) data to the SFCC. The SFCC use the data
pinions. Power to the plug-in rotary actuators comes from the transmission. An to prevent slat retraction at high alpha and/or low CAS. Slat retraction is not pos-
electrically controlled hydro-mechanical Power Control Unit (PCU) gives power to sible if:
move the transmission. the alpha is more than 8.0 deg.
Two Slat/Flap Control Computers (SFCC1 and SFCC2) monitor and control the the CAS is less than 165 knots.
slats. An Instrumentation Position Pick-Off Unit (IPPU) is installed on the Power
Control Unit (PCU). It sends signals to the Electronic Instrument System (EIS), The function resets if alpha decreases below 7.1 deg. or CAS increases over 171
knots.
which identifies the position of the slats.
Alpha lock/speed baulk is not possible if:
A Feedback Position Pick-Off Unit (FPPU) gives signals of the output shaft posi-
tion of the PCU. Two Asymmetry Position Pick-Off Units (APPU) give signals of the slat retraction is set before alpha is more than 8.0 deg. or CAS less than
the slat position or speed. The SFCC1 and the SFCC2 receive and monitor the 165 knots
signals from the FPPU and the APPUs. the aircraft is on the ground with CAS below 60 knots.
When the function is active, the ECAM shows the message A-Lock (cyan, pulsing)
System Description below the slat position indication (Ref. 27-85-00).
Electrical Control and Monitoring Hydraulic Actuation and Power Transmission
The electrical control and monitoring system of the slats is similar to the flap sys- Two of the three hydraulic systems supply fluid pressure through a priority valve
tem. Therefore only specific differences to the flap system are discussed in this to the PCU:
chapter 27-80. the BLUE hydraulic system supplies valve block 25CV
Slat Alpha Lock/Speed Baulk on A319 / A320 the GREEN hydraulic system supplies valve block 26CV
the priority valves are set when the pressure drops below 140 bar (2030 psi).
The Air Data/Inertial Reference Units (ADIRU) supply corrected angle-of-attack
(alpha) and computed air speed (CAS) data to the SFCC. The SFCC use the data Each hydraulic motor has its own valve block and POB. The valve blocks control
to prevent slat retraction at high alpha and/or low CAS. Slat retraction is not pos- the direction of rotation and the speed of the output shaft of the PCU.
sible if: The two hydraulic motors move the transmission system through a differential
the alpha is more than 8.5 deg. gearbox. This causes the slat control surfaces to move to the set position.
the CAS is less than 148 knots.

27-80-2
A318/A319/A320/A321 27-80 Slats
The POB holds the output shaft of the hydraulic motor: Figure 1: Slat System Layout
against torque from the airloads
when there is a failure in its related hydraulic system
to lock the transmission at the same time as the WTB.
Each POB stops and holds the output shaft of the related hydraulic motor when:
the solenoids of the related valve block are de-energized because of a normal
PCU shutdown sequence
there is not enough pressure in the related hydraulic system
loss of one electrical supply
loss of one hydraulic system
failure of one SFCC, or failure of one of two electrical components
failure of one engine.
asymmetry, runaway, overspeed or uncommanded movements is detected
A differential gearbox connects the output shafts of the hydraulic motors and
transmits their torque to the power transmission system. If a POB engages and
holds its motor, the remaining motor moves the transmission system at half speed
but at full torque.

27-80-3
A318/A319/A320/A321 27-80 Slats
Figure 2: Slat System Schematic Position Indicating

The upper display unit of the ECAM system shows the position of the slats. In-
stalled on the PCU is an IPPU which supplies flap position data. The IPPU also
gives data to the flight data recorder and the Flight Warning System (FWC).
See 27-50
A visual check of the position of the slats can be done through the windows in the
fuselage that are adjacent to the slats. The windows to be used are identified by
a brown triangle on the sidewall panel above them.
Power Supply
The electrical power supplies for the slat control and monitoring system are:
the essential bus 401PP
the normal bus 202PP
the battery buses 701PP and 702PP.
The essential bus 401PP supplies:
the SFCC1 slat channel
The normal bus 202PP supplies:
the SFCC2 slat channel
If the WTBs are operated, the battery buses keep the solenoids energized during
a SFCC power failure.

27-80-4
A318/A319/A320/A321 27-80 Slats
Figure 3: Slat Power Supply

COMPUTER COMPUTER
REMOVED REMOVED
FAULT FAULT
A/C ON GND SYS 1 SYS 2 A/C ON GND
FLT 94CV FLT 96CV
GND 92CV GND

21CV 22CV
AD AD SFCC1 SFCC2 AD AD
10D 3J 2J 2J 3J 10D
401PP 202PP
AF AF
2 POWER POWER 2
5CV 8 SUPPLY 8 7CV
SUPPLY
28VDC 7 UNIT UNIT 7 28VDC
11 11 702PP
701PP WTB WTB
LATCH LATCH
10 10
9CV 3 11CV
3 AF 28VDC
28VDC AF
12F 12D 14C 15C 13D 13F 15A 14A 15K 14K 15G 14G 15H 14H 14H 15H 14G 15G 14K 15K 14A 15A 13F 13D 15C 14C 12D 12F
AB AE AE AE
A B
C B A A B C
WTB WTB
LH LH
33CV-A 35CV-B
A
L K J H U T T U H J K L
A A A A A A B B B B
POB EXTEND RETRACT C B A F B A F B A F B A C B B C A B F A B F A B F A B C RETRACT EXTEND POB
WTB APPU APPU LVDT LVDT APPU APPU WTB
PCU FPPU FPPU PCU
RH LH RH PCU PCU RH LH RH
25CV 36CV-A 31CV-A 32CV-A 28CV-A 25CV 26CV 28CV-B 32CV-B 31CV-B 36CV-B 26CV

27-80-5
A318/A319/A320/A321 27-80 Slats
Slats Hydraulic Actuation and Power Transmission Attachment of the actuators is to housings. Bolts attach the housings to the struc-
ture at tracks 2, 3 and 5 thru 12.
General Each actuator moves its related track through a pinion. The actuator output shaft
moves the pinion which engages with a gear rack. Bolts attach the gear rack to the
A hydromechanical Power Control Unit (PCU) in the aircraft fuselage supplies me-
track. The tracks operate in vertical-load rollers and side-load rollers. The tracks
chanical power to the slat transmission system. The PCU has two hydraulic mo-
retract through holes in the front spar into sealed containers. The sealed contain-
tors. Each motor has a Pressure-Off Brake (POB) and a valve block, which is
ers make a projection into the fuel tanks.
electrically controlled.
Tracks 1 and 4 are made almost the same as the moved tracks but without the
Torque shafts and gearboxes in the fuselage and the wings transmit the mechan-
gear rack. They are to prevent that slat 1 falls away if there is a slat attachment
ical power from the slat PCU to the actuators, which move the slats. There are two
failure.
actuators for each slat. The actuators are installed on the aircraft structure.
Torque limiters in the transmission system and in the actuators make sure that the
load applied to the structure is not too high.
Wing tip brakes give asymmetry and runaway protection.
Component Location
Power Transmission
(Ref. Fig. 001)
The slat transmission system includes:
torque shafts in the fuselage and wings
a 19 degree bevel gearbox which changes the direction in which the drive is
aligned
a T-gearbox which changes the direction in which the drive is aligned through
90 degrees. This gives an output to each wing
two 63.5 degree bevel gearboxes at each wing root. These gearboxes move
the drive from below wing level to the wing leading edge
ten rotary actuators (two per slat) in each wing.
The torque shafts transmit power from the PCU to the gearboxes and actuators.
Universal joints connect the torque shafts and steady bearings support them.
Each input gearbox has a torque limiter which operates in the two directions (ex-
tend/retract). Each torque limiter has a lock-out torque value set as necessary for
its location. The torque limiters protect the wing structure and the actuators from
a torque overload which could occur by a slat transmission failure. A mechanical
indicator on each actuator latches if a lock-out occurs. You can set the indicator
again when the aircraft is on the ground.

27-80-6
A318/A319/A320/A321 27-80 Slats
Figure 4: Slat Power Transmission

27-80-7
A318/A319/A320/A321 27-80 Slats
Component Description
Power Control Unit (6001CM)
The slat PCU is similar to the flap PCU. Access is through the main lnading gear
doors or through a accesspanel located at the belly fairing.
Figure 5: PCU
SEAL DRAIN
INSTRUMENTION A
ELCTRICAL POSITION DIFFERENTIAL
CASE MOTOR
CONNECTOR PICK-OFF GEARBOX
DRAIN
UNIT
FEEDBACK TORQUE SHAFT
POSITION
PICK-OFF UNIT
(6002CM) FW
D
A PRESSURE - OFF
BRAKE
Z147/148
LINEAR
VARIABLE-
DIFFERENTIAL
TRANSDUCER
TRANSFER
TUBE
ENABLE
(BRAKE)
SOLENOID
CONTROL
VALVE VALVE
BLOCK
BLUE
RETURN RETRACT
SOLENOID
BLUE CASE
PRESSURE DRAIN FILTER
EXTEND
SOLENOID GREEN
RETURN
GREEN
PRESSURE

27-80-8
A318/A319/A320/A321 27-80 Slats
Bevel Gearbox, 19 Degree (6003CM) The gearbox is filled with grease. There are inspection plugs through which you
can examine the lubricant.
The bevel gearbox has a ratio of 1:1. The input and output shafts have reversed
lip seals which make sure that unwanted material does not get into the gearbox.
Figure 6: Bevel Gearbox
A LIP SEAL
BEVEL GEARBOX
19DEG. (6003CM)
INSPECTION
BEARINGS
PLUG

27-80-9
A318/A319/A320/A321 27-80 Slats
Tee Gearbox (6005CM) Bevel Gearbox, 63.5 Degree

The T-gearbox has a ratio of 1:1. Bearings, seals and the procedures for lubrica- The four 63.5 degree bevel gearboxes have a 1:1 ratio and are the same. Bear-
tion and inspection are almost the same as those used on the 19 degree bevel ings, seals and the procedure for lubrication and inspection are almost the same
gearbox. as those used on the 19 degree bevel gearbox.
A
A
A
BEVEL GEARBOX
6011CM (6061CM)
BEVEL GEARBOX
6009CM (6059CM)
T GEARBOX
6005CM
INSPECTION
PLUG

27-80-10
A318/A319/A320/A321 27-80 Slats
Torque Shafts and Steady Bearings a friction disc pack spline-mounted to release too much torque through the
gearbox casing into the aircraft structure
The torque shafts are made of stainless steel. They have end fittings, which are
welded. The end fittings have a flange for a bolted joint or splines for a sliding end a spring pack that is set to a limit of a minimum of 120% of the maximum torque
connection. Bolts attach universal joints and splined movable joints to the flanges for operation
where necessary. The universal joints permit large angular changes of alignment an indicator which a spring clip usually keeps in the retracted position.
and the splined movable joints allow small angular changes of alignment. The torque limiter stops the transmission of too much torque into the output. It also
Each shaft has at least one sliding end connection. The external part of the sliding makes sure that the indication of torque peaks, which momentarily engage and re-
end connection has an indicator groove. It shows when the engagement of the ex- lease the torque limiter, does not occur.
ternal and internal parts is below a minimum.
Steady bearings, which support the torque shafts, are attached to the structure
Operation
with bolts. Power input to the actuator through-shaft moves the sun gear through the torque
limiter.
Actuator In the small diameter actuator, the sun gear transmits power directly to the power
Figure 7: Slat Actuator on page 12 output stage. The power is then transmitted to the output shaft.
There are two types of actuator in each wing. Those on tracks 2 and 3 are larger In the large diameter actuator, the sun gear moves the power output stage through
in diameter and include more gearing than the other actuators. The assembly and the first-stage reduction gear.
operation is almost the same for all actuators. When the torque necessary at the actuator output shaft is more than the load val-
Each actuator includes: ue of the torque limiter spring:
a cylindrical casing the output member of the ball ramp moves slowly, which causes the balls to
a through shaft move up the ramp
a bidirectional torque limiter with latching indicator the output member moves axially against spring 'A' into the clearance in the
friction disc pack
a sun gear
as input torque increases, brake friction in the friction disc pack sends too
a power output stage. (This includes a compound differential planetary ar- much input torque through the gearbox casing into the aircraft structure. This
rangement of six planets, supported by rings)
limits the output torque
an output shaft which engages the track drive pinion. more increase in input torque causes more axial movement of the output mem-
The large diameter actuator has a first-stage reduction gear between the sun gear ber against spring 'B'
and the power output stage. The differential ratio across the power output stage as spring 'B' compresses, the brake friction in the friction disc pack makes sure
provides the high torque/low speed operation of the actuators. that the input shaft does not turn
Grease fills the actuators for life-time lubrication. It is not possible to lubricate at the indicator extends to show that lock-out torque has occurred.
regular times. Collected moisture drains through bleed holes in the casing. Pivot- The indication of the lock-out torque occurs only:
ed cover plates over the bleed holes make sure that unwanted material does not
get into the actuator. The cover plates turn to permit the removal of grease from when hydraulic-power-given torque is released through the gearbox casing
the bleed holes. This helps the collected moisture to drain. into the aircraft structure because of too much load downstream.
The torque limiter has: The system can be set again by operation in the opposite direction. The indicator
stays extended until it is cancelled manually.
a ball ramp device with input and output members

27-80-11
A318/A319/A320/A321 27-80 Slats
Figure 7: Slat Actuator

BALL RAMP
OUTPUT MEMBER
BALL RAMP
INPUT MEMBER
INPUT OUTPUT
MEMBER MEMBER
NORMAL RUNNING
CONDITION
B
RAMP
AXIAL
DISPLACEMENT
RAMP
ACTIVATED
CONDITION

27-80-12
A318/A319/A320/A321 27-80 Slats
Slat Tracks on the rear of the track prevent that the slat falls from the wing when the transmis-
sion system is disconnected. Engagement of the stops does not occur during nor-
The circular-arc tracks are machined from steel and move in grease-lubricated
mal operation.
vertical-load and side-load rollers.
The tracks are of inverted-U section. Tracks 2, 3 and 5 thru 12 have a steel gear
Attached to the forward face of the front spar are two ribs, one inboard and one rack bolted in the track channel. The gear rack engages with a pinion. Bearings
outboard of the track. Attached to the ribs are the rollers. between the track ribs support the pinion. The actuator output shaft moves the pin-
The tracks retract through holes in the front spar into sealed containers. The ion.
sealed containers make a projection into the fuel tanks.
When tracks 1 and 4 are made, they can have spacers installed in the inverted-U
At each end of each moved track is a fixed stop. On retraction, the forward stops channel. This is to get the correct tolerance. The number of spacers can be be-
prevent damage to the track containers, slat and leading edge structure. The stops tween zero and four.
Figure 8: Slat Tracks

27-80-13
A318/A319/A320/A321 27-80 Slats
SFCC CFDS System Tests Figure 9:

Normally two SFCC menu pages are transmitted to the CFDS by the selected
SFCC.
But, in case of:
PIN PROGRAMMING DISAGREEMENT
If there is a Pin Programming disagreement installation, the SFCC transmits a "
PIN PROG DISAGREE " message.
In this case, no further pages shall be provided.
SLAT CHANNEL NOT AVAILBLE
If slat channel is selected but not available the SFCC transmits a "SLAT NOT
AVAILABLE" message in all options.
SLT System Status

The display features the faults (class 1 or 2) affecting the system at the time of in-
terrogation.

27-80-14
A318/A319/A320/A321 27-80 Slats
Figure 10: SFCC Page Presentation

27-80-15
A318/A319/A320/A321 27-80 Slats
Slat Test Reset

SFCC Test Failure Report (Memory Read Out)
Failure data from the automatic integrity test (PWR UP TEST) or from the mainte-
nance test (SFCC-TEST) is stored in the SFCC TEST FAILURE REPORT.
If there is no failure, therefore no report, the "NO FAULTS" message is displayed.
To read the failure message, the corresponding failure report has to be selected.
On selection of one PWR UP TEST report, the failure message is displayed.
"L1: OUTPUT DISCRETES" denotes failure messages about LANE 1.
"L2: OUTPUT DISCRETES" denotes failure messages about LANE 2.
WTB-Reset
When the START WTB RESET key is pressed, the associated WTB solenoid
valves are reset and the result is displayed.

27-80-16
A318/A319/A320/A321 27-80 Slats
Figure 11: Slat Test reset Page

27-80-17
A318/A319/A320/A321 27-80 Slats
SLT System Data

PPU
The slat PPU data is refreshed every 5 seconds with updated data.
"272.3" represents the decimal value of the synchro angles.
"C1A" represents the hexadecimal value of the same data.
ARINC 429 Input Status

Whatever the selection SLAT ARINC INPUT STATUS or FLAP ARINC INPUT
STATUS the display has the same presentation. Except for FLAP an additional
STATUS message is displayed concerning ARINC 429 inputs from
LGCIU: ("LGCIU OK").
Discrete Inputs
The status of the slat discrete inputs is displayed on the MCDU.
"$" represents function set (1) or function reset (0).
"%" represents logic 1 or logic 0 as determined by input circuit.
"AOG" means Aircraft On Ground.
"SGOI" means System Ground Operation Inhibit.
The following data are available only in the flap channel.
"XX...XX" replaces FLAP RELIEF ENABLED or FLAP RELIEF DISABLED or
FLAP RELIEF CODING FAIL
"YY...YY" replaces MAX FLAP 25 DEG or MAX FLAP CODING FAIL
X-Link Input
Each channel receives and validates the following information:
LABEL 23 Attachment data
LABEL 60 Diagnosis data
LABEL 61 Unused
LABEL 62 System Status Word data
LABEL 63 FPPU Synchro Angle data
LABEL 64 LH APPU Synchro Angle data
LABEL 65 RH APPU Synchro Angle data
LABEL 67 WTB/POB data word

27-80-18
A318/A319/A320/A321 27-80 Slats
Figure 12: Slat System Data

27-80-19
A318/A319/A320/A321 27-80 Slats
SFCC-1
TROUBLE SHOOTING DATA
The "TROUBLE SHOOTING DATA" item provides additional data about the fail-
ures (all classes) recorded during the last and previous legs.
The failure selected on the previous page is displayed with its snapshot data at the
occurence of this failure.
ON GROUND FAULTS
The MCDU displays the faults stored in the "on ground failure memory"(generally
limited to the 3 last faults recorded).
If no failures are stored, the MCDU displays the "NO FAULTS" message.

27-80-20
A318/A319/A320/A321 27-80 Slats
Figure 13: Slat Trouble Shooting Data

27-80-21
A318/A319/A320/A321 27-80 Slats
SFCC Bite Test - Main Modes SFCC - Automatic Integrity Test

The Built in Test Equipment of the SFCC performs several tests to detect and iso- The SFCC has no power up test.
late any failure or failed component. The Automatic Integrity Test is the only test which is automatically performed once
The Built In Test Equipment (BITE) operates in 3 main modes: a day, 60 seconds after the SFCC is powered, the A/C is on ground and a new
Automatic Integrity Test mode. date is received from the CFDS.
MCDU Test mode (SFCC SELF Test). If no date is received from the CFDS and the A/C is on ground the Automatic In-
Permanent Monitoring mode. tegrity Test will be performed 60 seconds after each power interrupt which is long-
er than 10 milliseconds.
Figure 14: SFCC Bite Test - Main Modes
The Automatic Integrity Test takes approximatively 2 seconds. The Automat-
ic Integrity Test tests all the internal SFCC circuits.

27-80-22
A318/A319/A320/A321 27-80 Slats
Automatic Integrity Test NOT OK The reading of the SFCC BITE contents, through the CFDS, on the LAST LEG
The Automatic Integrity Test is not OK, here is an example of what is displayed on REPORT page gives the faulty message. Additional failure data from the automat-
the UPPER ECAM. You have to dialog with the SFCC through the CFDS in order ic integrity test is stored in the SFCC FAILURE REPORT.
to get more information. This is a class 1 failure.
Figure 15: Automatic Integrity Test NOT OK

27-80-23
A318/A319/A320/A321 27-80 Slats
SFCC - Self Test (Initiated by MCDU) SFCC - Permanent Monitoring

The MCDU TEST, also called SELF TEST, is performed from the MCDU-SFCC During the Permanent Monitoring au the components and functions are moni-
menu when the A/C is on ground. tored.
It tests all the internal SFCC circuits and the SFCC peripheral LRUs. The two SFCCs continually monitor the flaps and slats for failures in:
These LRUs are the FPPUs, APPUs and Wing Tip Brake solenoids. the operation of the power transmission system
(asymmetry, runaway, overspeed, flap disconnect, system jam
Example of Failed SFCC Self Test the Line Replaceable Unit
To confirm a class 1 failure a test has been performed on the MCDU. (SFCC, Command Sensor Unit, the WTBs, the APPUs, the FPPUs, on the
Here is failure data given by the SFCC BITE. PCUs: the valveblocks, the hydraulic motors, the flap proximity sensors ).
the input and output signals
Figure 16: Example of Failed SFCC Self TestSFCC - Permanent Monitoring
(the ARINC inputs, the installation code, the operation mode coding
the power supplies
(the SFCC DC supply, the WTB DC supply and synchro exitation power).

27-80-24
A318/A319/A320/A321 27-80 Slats
Display and Message after a Slat Asymmetry

The pilots reports F/CTL SLATS LOCKED. Here is an example of what is dis-
played on the upper ECAM.
Figure 17: Slat Locked

27-80-25
A318/A319/A320/A321 27-80 Slats
Figure 18: SFCC Test - Failure Messages List (1 of 3)

27-80-26
A318/A319/A320/A321 27-80 Slats
Figure 19: SFCC Test - Failure Messages List (2 of 3

27-80-27
A318/A319/A320/A321 27-80 Slats
Figure 20: SFCC Test - Failure Messages List (3 of 3)

27-80-28
A318/A319/A320/A321 27-90 EFCS
27-90 EFCS
If the LAF performance is reduced or inoperative, a LAF DEGRADED message
or a LAF INOP message is shown on the F/CTL page of the ECAM system.
LAF (Load Alleviation Function) Figure 1: LAF Surfaces
General GND-SPLR
The load alleviation function permits to alleviate the loads imposed on the wings LAF
upon gust application. This is done through the simultaneous upward deflection of
ROLL
the two ailerons and of the spoilers 4 and 5 at very high rate (200 /s).
SPD-BRK
The LAF orders are added to those generated by the other laws.
Operation
The LAF law generates a load factor demand from: SPOILER
the vertical acceleration, 1 2 3 4 5
the acceleration due to a bank, G Y B Y G
the acceleration due to a stick order in pitch. R-ALL
G B
A surface deflection order is generated from this load factor demand.
NORM 1 2 [ELAC
This order is limited: CTL 3 3 1 1 2
[SEC
for the ailerons to - 10,
for the spoilers to - 25.
An elevator deflection demand proportional to the LAF demand takes place to

compensate the nose-down effect induced by the aileron and spoiler deflection.
Activation
For a vertical acceleration higher than 0.3 g, the LAF is active for at least 500 ms.
Inhibition
The LAF is inhibited if:
Vc < 200 kts,
the flaps and slats are not in clean configuration,
the wing tip brakes are activated,
the pitch is controlled in direct law.

27-90-1
A318/A319/A320/A321 27-90 EFCS
Figure 2: LAF Accumulator
STA8744/RIB 16
STA9235/RIB 17
STA11198/RIB 21
575HB
(675HB)
575EB
(675EB)
A
575GB
(675GB)
A
RIB 22 RIB 21 RIB 20 RIB 17 RIB 16
3622 GM
B 1622 GM B (3623 GM)
(1623 GM) YELLOW SYSTEM
GREEN SYSTEM
B
ACCUMULATOR
(REF ONLY)
5 C
2
3
4

27-90-2
A318/A319/A320/A321 27-90 EFCS
FCDC System (Flight Control Data Concentrator) Particular Points

In the event of multiples failures affecting certain LRUs of a same type, the FCDC
General will, in certain cases, give only one message; (e.g left and right throttles failed: one
message only however, if accelerometers 1 and 2 failed: two messages).
The Flight Control Data Concentrator (FCDC) is a part of the Electrical Flight Con-
trol System (EFCS). The surface position is given by the computer which controls the surface except
for the ailerons, the position is given by the computer in standby.
It is a centralized subsystem that provides access to EFCS status and failure in-
formation. The indication SPOILER OUT is given for a deflection higher than 2.5 deg.
The function of the FCDC is based on the validation and concentration of in-flight Some periodic tests are performed by the FCDC
and on-ground status and failure data. Test generated by the FCDC are: Damping tests.
The result of this operation will be stored in the FCDC failure memory or sent back
to the EFCS or transmitted to associated A/C subsystems.
Power Supply
The FCDC 1 is supplied from DC essential bus bar 8PP and the FCDC 2 is sup-
plied from DC normal bus bar 2PP.
Interface
Figure 3: FCDC Interface on page 4
Operation
Data Concentration (FCDC Functions)
Based on data received from ELACs, SECs and various other sources, the FCDC
generates and transmits the following digital information to the ECAM system:
the position and availability of flight control surfaces
failure signals.
The FCDC commands also the illumination of the lights indicating the priority be-
tween side sticks. But the side sticks priority logic is implemented inside the ELAC
and SEC.
Maintenance Functions
The above information is also transmitted to the Centralized Fault Display Unit.

27-90-3
A318/A319/A320/A321 27-90 EFCS
Figure 3: FCDC Interface

ELAC 1
FAULT
OFF FDIU DMC2 FMGC2 FWC 2 FWC 1 FMGC1 CFDIU DMC1
ELAC 2 RLY
ANN SPLY
FAULT ELAC 1
OFF
SEC 1 RLY
ANN SPLY
FAULT ELAC 2
OFF SIDE STICK PRIORITY SIDE STICK PRIORITY
SEC 2 DMU DMC3 RLY
ANN SPLY
FAULT CAPT F/O SEC 1
OFF
SEC 3 RLY
ANN SPLY
FAULT SEC 2
OFF
RLY
ANN SPLY
SEC 3
OFF SSTU PRIORITY BUS FAILED OFF BUS SSTU PRIORITY FAILED
O/P O/P
INTERCONNECT INTERCONNECT
FOR BUS BUS FOR
LAF POS O/P BUS INPUT BUS INPUT O/P LAF
POS
L/G L/G
FCDC 1 FCDC 2
XDCR XDCR
PRESS PRESS
ACCU ACCU
L-Y L-G
XDCR XDCR
PRESS PRESS
ACCU COM MON COM MON COM MON COM MON COM MON ACCU
R-Y R-G
ELAC 1 ELAC 2 SEC 1 SEC 2 SEC 3
LGCIU 1 LGCIU 2

27-90-4
A318/A319/A320/A321 27-90 EFCS
Test Figure 4: Self Test
General RESET
The FCDC is equipped with integrated test functions which provide a high degree
of failure detection, identification and isolation. Confirmed failures are stored in a
particular zone of non-volatile memory for later display in a maintenance mode.
POWER UP
SEQUENCE
Self Test
Upon power-on, the FCDC is initialized and starts its internal self test-functions
(BITE).
2 OF FOLLOWING
These are: CONDITIONS TRUE YES
PROTECTION
- A/C ON GROUND
partial BITE if power supply interrupt is less than 3 seconds A/C on ground or - ENG1 OIL LOW PRESS
MECHANISM
if power supply interrupt is more than 3 seconds A/C in flight - ENG2 OIL LOW PRESS
complete BITE if power supply interrupt is more than 3 seconds A/C on

NO
ground.
ON GROUND
OPERATION MODE IN SHOP (ATEC)
TEST SOFTWARE
APPLICATION SOFTWARE
YES POWER SUPPLY CUT OFF NO

DURATION 3s
NO A/C ON GROUND AND

NOT MOVING
YES
SMALL BITE COMPLETE BITE

DURATION 500ms DURATION 3s
ACCESS TO
MODE MENU ACCESS NORMAL MODE
IF MCDU DEMAND AND IF
- A/C ON GROUND AND
- ENG1 OIL LOW PRESS AND
- ENG2 OIL LOW PRESS

27-90-5
A318/A319/A320/A321 27-90 EFCS
Maintenance and Safety Tests/Bite

General
Maintenance
The EFCS maintenance system is built around the two FCDCs. See Figure 5 on
page 7.
The FCDCs
collect the failures detected by the ELACs and the SECs
consolidate the received data
elaborate and generate the maintenance messages to the CFDIU.
Periodic Tests
There are two periodic tests launched by the CFDIU via the MCDU
aileron servocontrol damping test
elevator servocontrol damping test
Automatic Tests
These tests are built in order to detect hidden failures on standby channels and
failures which cannot be detected by continuous monitoring.
Interface
For the Centralized Fault Display System (CFDS) the FCDCs are type-1 systems
i.e. their inputs/outputs are connected with the Centralized Fault Display Interface
Unit (CFDIU) by ARINC 429 buses.
Data concerning:
maintenance messages,
tests,
control surface positions are transmitted through the ARINC 429 buses.

27-90-6
A318/A319/A320/A321 27-90 EFCS
Figure 5: EFCS Maintenance System
PRINTER
FAULT (OPTIONNAL)
OFF/R
MCDU
ELECTRICAL
FLIGHT CFDIU
CONTROL
SYSTEM
SENSORS
FIDS
AIRCRAFT 2
SYSTEM FIDS
SENSORS FAC 1
GROUND ECAM
ENGINE
E/W
ELAC 2 WARNING
2 2 3
ELAC 1 FCDC FWC 2
SEC 1 1 DMC
SEC 3 1 SYSTEM
S/S
2 STATUS
SEC 1
DMU FDIU
SIDE STICK AIDS DFDR MASTER

PRIORITY CAUTION
INDICATION LIGHTS
LIGHTS

27-90-7
A318/A319/A320/A321 27-90 EFCS
Operation LRU Identification

This page indicates the part numbers of the flight control computers
Maintenance
The LRU failures detected in flight by the ELACs and the SECs are memorized by Ground Scan
the FCDCs in non-volatile memories and are permanently transmitted to the This function is used on the ground to display the failures which are present at the
CFDIU under label 356. time of the request.
On the ground, using the Multipurpose Control and Display Unit (MCDU), the dis- Thus this function can confirm a troubleshooting.
play in the cockpit of maintenance messages in clear language is effected accord-
ing to two types: Trouble Shooting Data
display specific to the CFDS for line maintenance (rapid troubleshooting) The TROUBLE SHOOTING DATA allows to display complementary fault informa-
display specific to flight controls for deeper maintenance. tion and data concerning the system status before and after the failure occurrence.
This information is stored with each failure message.
F/CTL Menu
The TROUBLE SHOOTING DATA can be called from the "LAST LEG REPORT",
This menu is mainly provided for main-base maintenance of flight controls.
"PREVIOUS LEG REPORT" and "GROUND REPORT".
The 4 sub-menus below are displayed:
EFCS 1 via FCDC 1 Memory
EFCS 2 via FCDC 2 The function MEMORY is used to read internal memories; it provides BITE data
SFCC 1 for shop use or information for equipment sellers.
SFCC 2
The EFCS maintenance messages are processed in the EFCS 1 or 2 sub-menus.
Last Leg Report

Only the failures of the last flight, affecting flight controls are displayed.
These messages include:
the date,
the aircraft identification,
the flight number,
the time,
the failed LRU with its ATA reference.
Previous Legs Report

Only the failures of the last 64 flights, affecting flight controls are displayed.
The display is identical with that of CFDS menu (Ref. Para. (1) (b)).

27-90-8
A318/A319/A320/A321 27-90 EFCS
Figure 6: CFDS Page Architecture (for EFCS)

27-90-9
A318/A319/A320/A321 27-90 EFCS
Figure 7: EFCS Menu

27-90-10
A318/A319/A320/A321 27-90 EFCS
Test The test result is displayed on the MCDU in the form R AIL TEST OK or L AIL
TEST OK.
This function is presented on the MCDU by the FCDCs. It has two purposes:
initiate tests related to flight controls, The value of the damping coefficient can be obtained and displayed through the
TEST REPORT.
display the test results on the MCDU.
If the test is not possible
Two tests are available:
elevator servocontrol damping test The test result is displayed on the MCDU in the form AIL TEST NOT POSSIBLE.
aileron servocontrol damping test The computer which have identified the anomaly, and the engagement condition
code are displayed on the MCDU.
Elevator Servocontrol Damping Test
This test is initiated from the MCDU: indications given by the MCDU provide guid-
Conditions Required by the FCDC to Initialize the Test
ance to conduct the test. For all tests
The test is driven by the FCDC and is performed by the SEC1 and SEC2. Aircraft on ground and not moving condition:
The SECs control the deflections of the surfaces by pressurizing each servocon- at least one ELAC and two SECs send ground condition
trol simultaneously then alternatively. LGCIU "NOSE GEAR STATUS" wired signal is at compressed state
If the test is possible "ENGINE PRESSURE STATUS" is at low state
at least two SECs give "WHEEL SPEED less than 6 KTS" information
drop, then it deducts a damping coefficient. no SEC sends "WHEEL SPEED more than 66 KTS" information
3 hydraulic system pressure on:
The test result is displayed on the MCDU in the form L ELEV TEST OK or R ELEV
TEST OK. at least 3 computers (ELAC or SEC) send "B, G, Y HIGH PRESSURE" infor-
mation.
The value of the damping coefficient can be obtained and displayed through the
TEST REPORT. For aileron damping test
SEC1 & SEC2 P/BSW "OFF"
If the test is not possible
both ELACs OK
The test result is displayed on the MCDU in the form ELEV TEST NOT POSSI-
BLE. For elevator damping test
ELAC1 & ELAC2 P/BSW "OFF"
The computer which have identified the anomaly, and the engagement condition
code are displayed on the MCDU. SEC1 & SEC2 OK
Aileron Servocontrol Damping Test Conditions Required by ELAC to Initialize Test

both ELACs available
(Ref. Fig. 06)
3 hydraulic pressure available
The test is conducted in the same manner as the elevator servocontrol test.
ground condition
The test is driven by the FCDC and performed by the two ELACs. both side sticks at neutral
If the test is possible wheel speed less than 6 KTS
Measurements identical with that on elevators are performed. 3 ADIRS switched off

27-90-11
A318/A319/A320/A321 27-90 EFCS
both FCDCs available the aircraft is on ground and not moving

3 hydraulic pressures are available
Conditions Required by the SEC to Initialize the Test the elevators are at neutral and it is stopped as soon as one of these conditions
ground condition disappears. If case of unsuccessful test a warning "AIL SERVO FAULT" and a
ADR OFF maintenance message are displayed.
wheel speed < 6kts
both FCDCs available Elevator Test
(a) Mechanical disconnection monitoring
When a test is not possible on hexa code is display on the MCDU in order to
help the operator. This monitoring is ensured the by ELAC1 in order to check that its associated el-
When the FCDC is in MENUE mode. the FCDC FAULT warning is displayed on evator servocontrols are not disconnected from the elevator.
the upper ECAM. If there is a disconnection, the failure is detected during the check list and the
warning "ELEV SERVO FAULT" and a maintenance message are displayed.
Automatic Tests (b) Elevator changeover test
These tests are built in order to detect failures which are not seen by the perma- The conditions to launch this test are the same as for the aileron test.
nent monitoring.
Each ELAC checks its capability to drive the mode of the elevator servocontrol.
Generally these tests are allowed when the aircraft is on ground and not moving. Any failure will induce the loss of pitch control in the affected ELAC and the loss
THS Test of elevator control in the associated SEC (if the SEC is affected by the failure).
This failure will give the warning "ELAC PITCH FAULT" or "ELEV SERVO FAULT"
This test is performed by the ELACs and SECs in the following conditions: and a maintenance message.
the aircraft is on ground and not moving.
3 hydraulic systems pressurized Spoiler Servovalve Relay Test
pitch attitude lower than 5 deg. The monitoring of the relay is made by the reading of the normally-closed contact
The AIM of this test is to check the capability of each computer to control either status:
the THS electrical motor power supply switching or the THS enable signal. when hydraulic pressure is high, the relays are closed
when hydraulic pressure is low, the relays are open.
In case of unsuccessful test a warning "ELAC PITCH FAULT" (when an ELAC is
affected) or a CLASS2 message (when a SEC is affected) and a specific mainte- If a discrepancy is detected, the affected SEC disconnects. This failure will give
nance message are displayed. "SEC FAULT" warning.
In addition the ground setting of the THS is normally ensured by the ELAC1 in or-
der to check the availability of the ELAC1 THS control loop.
Aileron Changeover Test

This test is made only by the ELACs.
It is launched one time per flight in order to check that each ELAC is able to drive
the aileron servocontrol mode (active or damped).
The test is enabled when:

27-90-12
A318/A319/A320/A321 27-90 EFCS
Panels, Controls and Indications
A Flight Control Panel, LH side

Sidestick Deflection FAC P/Bs
The maximum range for sidestick deflection is displayed in OFF - The corresponding computer is not
white on ground after first engine start. The indication active. Switching OFF, then ON resets the
disappears after lift-off . computer.
FAULT - Illuminates amber accompanied by
Sidestick Order Indication ECAM caution activation when a failure is
detected. The FAULT light extinguishes
The combined CAPT / FO sidestick order is displayed in white when OFF is selected.
on ground after first engine start. The indication disappears B Flight Control Panel, RH side
after lift-off. SEC P/Bs
OFF - The corresponding computer is not
active. Switching OFF, then ON resets the
C PFD indications computer.
FAULT - Illuminates amber accompanied by
ECAM caution activation when a failure is
detected. The FAULT light extinguishes
when OFF is selected.
ELAC P/Bs
A OFF - The corresponding computer is not
active. Switching OFF, then ON resets the
B computer.
E FAULT - Illuminates amber accompanied by
ECAM caution activation:
When a failure is detected.
C During ELAC power up test (8 sec
duration). Power up test occurs at
D electrical power application or after
electrical transient.
- Extinguishes when OFF is selected, or at
the end of the power up test, if completed
satisfactory.

27-90-13
A318/A319/A320/A321 27-90 EFCS
Sidestick Priority Lights Sidestick

Red arrow light: The sidesticks, one on each lateral console, are used for
Illuminates - In front of the Pilot who's sidestick authority manual pitch and roll control. They are springloaded to neutral.
is lost, indicating priority has been taken D Sidestick When the AP is engaged, both sticks are locked in the neutral
position. If a force above a given threshold is applied, the AP
over by opposite sidestick.
disconnects and manual control is restored:
Extinguishes - If the opposite take-over P/B is released - Pitch 5kg
within 40 sec. - Roll 3.5kg
- If the latched priority situation has been
canceled. Priority logic:
When only one sidestick is operated, the command is send to
Green CAPT, green F/O light: the EFCS.
Flashes - When both sidesticks are deflected When both sidesticks are operated at a time, the inputs are
simultaneously but no side has taken algebraically added and the result is sent to the EFC S. The
priority. addition of both inputs is limited to single stick maximum
Illuminates - In front of the pilot who has taken over deflection.
control priority if the opposite sidestick is Both green CAPT and F/O SIDE STICK PRIORITY lights flash
not in the neutral position, indicating a and a DU AL INPUT" voice message is given every 5 seconds
potential and unwanted control demand. as long as both pilots operate their sidestick simultaneously .
Extinguishes - If the opposite side stick is returned to the Take-Over P/B
neutral position.
Pressing either take-over P/B will:
NOTE: - An aural "PRIORITY LEFT" or "PRIORITY RIGHT" - Disengage the AP if engaged.
message will sound each time priority is taken over. - Deactivate the opposite stick and secure entire control
- If on ground take-off mode engages with one stick priority as long as the P/B is kept pressed. If pressed for
deactivated, the TAKE more than 40sec, the system will latch, thus allowing the
triggered. P/B to be released without loosing priority .
If both sidestick take-over P/Bs are pressed, the last Pilot to
E Glareshield Panel, LH side E Glareshield Panel, RH side press will get the priority.
A deactivated sidestick can be reactivated at any time by
momentarily pressing the take-over P/B on either stick.
Push-T o-T alk Button

Springloaded to neutral position,

27-90-14
A318/A319/A320/A321 27-90 EFCS
Figure 8: Rudder Trim Selector/Speedbrake Lever
Rudder Trim Position Indicator

Displays the rudder trim direction (L or R ) and value (0 to 20).
A
RUD TRIM Selector
Controls the rudder trim actuator which moves the neutral
point of the artificial feel by equivalent of 1 / sec of rudder
travel.
NOTE: Rudder trim rotary selector is not active with A/P
engaged.
A
B Rudder Trim RESET P/B
When pushed, the rudder trim system is reset to zero,
achieved by the FAC which controls the rudder trim actuator .
SPEED BRAKE Lever

B
The lever controls:
- The position of the speed brake surfaces.
- Manual preselection of the ground spoilers.
To select speed brake surface to a required position,
the lever has to be pushed down and selected to the
required position.
A "hard point" is provided at " 1/2 " SPEED BRAKE
position.
To arm the ground spoilers, the lever must be pulled up
when in RET position.
When the lever is armed, or reverse thrust is selected,
all spoilers will automatically extend at landing or in
case of rejected take-off .

27-90-15
A318/A319/A320/A321 27-90 EFCS
Figure 9: Stabilizer Trim Wheel
PITCH TRIM Wheel

Both pitch trim wheels provide mechanical control of the THS
and have priority over electrical control.
- Crew action on pitch trim wheel does not disconnect the
ELAC's (micro switches actuated by the override
mechanism ensure that the computers remain
synchronized with the manually selected position.).
- Trim position is indicated in degrees on a scale adjacent
to each trim wheel.
- A CG scale is also provided to give the relation between
CG location and pitch trim setting.
- Normal range is marked by a green band.
- The THS mechanical control must be used when pitch
direct law is in use.
Following touch down, pitch trim is automatically reset to 0
as the pitch attitude becomes less than 2,5 provided the
green and yellow systems are pressurized.

27-90-16
A318/A319/A320/A321 27-90 EFCS
Figure 10: ECAM Lower Display/Flight Control Page
SYSTEM DISPLAY Hydraulic System Indication GBY

Normally green. Becomes amber in case of hydraulic system
low pressure.

Aileron Position Indication

White scale and green index. Becomes amber when both
(green and blue) hydraulic actuators are not available.
Neutral position in clean configuration.
Neutral position when flaps are extended

(5 aileron droop).
Aileron / Elevator Actuator Indication

G and B, Y and B are normally displayed in green.
Becomes amber when the corresponding actuator is not
Elevator Position Indication available (hydraulic low pressure, jamming, computer fail,
etc.). Moreover it is partially boxed amber in case of
White scale and green index. Becomes amber when both associated computer failure
(blue and green) hydraulic actuators are not available.
ELAC / SEC Indication
Pitch Trim Position Indication
Normally green. Becomes amber in case of ELAC / SEC
Indication is green. Becomes amber in case of green and failure or in case of failure of both FCDC.
yellow low pressure. Box normally white. Becomes amber associated with ELAC
PITCH TRIM indication is white. Becomes amber in case of SEC indication. Moreover amber XX is displayed if
pitch trim jam. associated surface is unserviceable.

27-90-17
A318/A319/A320/A321 27-90 EFCS
Figure 11: ECAM Lower Display/Flight Control Page/Wheel Page
SYSTEM DISPLAY
SPD BRK Indication
Indication appears amber when N1 > 50%.
Rudder Indications
Rudder Position Indication:

Normally green. Rudder symbol and
scale become amber in case of blue,
green and yellow hydraulic low pressure.
Rudder Travel Limiter:

Indication of high speed position.
Rudder Trim Position:

Normally cyan. Becomes amber if rudder
trim reset is failed.
SYSTEM DISPLAY


27-90-18
A318/A319/A320/A321 27-90 EFCS
Figure 12: Flap Slat Control Lever
A A FLAPS Lever
The FLAPS lever selects simultaneous operation of slats and
flaps.
Before selection of any position, the lever must be pulled out
of detent. Moreover, balks are provided at position 1 and 3 to
avoid excessive flap / slat travel demand by a pilot action.
NOTE: It is not possible to select an intermediate lever position.
Flaps/slat lever position
Flaps Flaps Flaps Indication

Position Slats
A319 A320 A321 on ECAM
0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 1
1 18
10 10 10 1+F
2 22 15 15 14 2
3 22 20 20 21 3
FULL 27 40 35 25 FULL
* Take-off in FLAPS 1:
1 + F (18/10) is selected.
If FLAPS 0 is not selected after take-off , the flaps automatically
retract at 210kts.

27-90-19
A318/A319/A320/A321 27-90 EFCS
Figure 13: ECAM Upper (E/W) Display/Flap and Slat Position
S, F Indication
Normally green, displayed amber in case of:
- Both relevant hydraulic systems loss, except on ground
with both engines stopped.
- Wing tip brakes application.
- Slats or flaps fault.
FLAP Indication
"FLAP" indication appears when the slats or the flaps are not
fully retracted.
- White when selected position is achieved.
- Blue when flaps or slats are in transit.
- Amber in case of:
E/W DISPLAY Both relevant hydraulic system loss (except on ground
Wing tip brakes application.
Slats and flaps fault.
Slats Flaps Position:

White points:
Flap lever position
Selectable position. Not displayed in clean configuration.
0, 1 + F, 1, 2, 3, or FULL indication is displayed.
Green triangles:
- Green when selected position is achieved. 0 not displayed
Actual position, displayed amber in case of:
when clean configuration is achieved.
- Both relevant hydraulic system loss (except on ground
- Blue during transit.
S (F) LOCKED indication appears amber associated with - Wing tip brakes application.
ECAM caution when wing tip brakes are applied or when non - Slats and flaps fault.
alignment between 2 flaps is detected,
Blue triangles:
A-L OCK indication pulses blue when the slat alpha/speed Selected position. (Blue triangles may disappear before the
lock is active. selected position is reached).

27-90-20
A318/A319/A320/A321 27-90 EFCS
Figure 14: EFCS Warnings and Cautions (Part 1 of 3)

E / WD : FAILURE TITLE SD LOCAL FLT
AURAL MASTER
PAGE WARNING PHASE
WARNING LIGHT
Conditions CALLED LIGHT INHIB
CONFIG
SLATS/FLAPS NOT IN T.O. CONFIG
RUDDER TRIM NOT IN T.O. RANGE.
SPD BRK NOT RETRACTED or
PITCH TRIM NOT IN T.O. RANGE NIL 5, 6, 7, 8
RUD TRIM NOT IN T.O. RANGE MASTER
CRC
A/C not in T.O. configuration when thrust levers are WARNING
set at T.O. or Flex T.O. or when pressing T.O.
CONFIG P/B.
L + R ELEV F AULT PFD

Loss of both elevators. F/CTL message
ELAC 1 FAULT FAULT on

Failure of 1 ELAC (pitch and roll channel) or ELAC P/B
Side stick transducer fault. NIL 3, 4, 5, 7, 8
SEC 1 (2) (3) F AULT FAULT on

Failure of one SEC. SEC P/B
FCDC 1 + 2 F AULT
NIL 4, 5, 7
Failure of both FCDC.
FAULT on
IR DISAGREE ELAC P/B
Disagree between two IR, with the third one failed. and PFD
NIL message 3, 4, 5, 7
ADR DISAGREE FAULT on

SINGLE MASTER
Disagree between two ADR, with the third one failed. ELAC P/B
CHIME CAUTION
GND SPLR FAULT
Loss of ground spoiler function in SEC 1+3 or 1+2 or NIL 3, 4, 5
2+3 or 1+2+3.
SPD BRK DISAGREE

Position disagree between surfaces and lever position.
3 4
3, 4, 5
SPD BRK FAULT
F/CTL
SPD brake lever transducers to SEC 1 and 3 failed.
STABILIZER JAM NIL

4, 5
Jamming of stabilizer.
L (R) ELEV FAULT

Loss of both hydr. actuators on one elevator or activation 4, 5
of elevator flutter protection in ELAC.

27-90-21
A318/A319/A320/A321 27-90 EFCS
Figure 15: EFCS Warnings and Cautions (Part 2 of 3

AURAL MASTER
PAGE WARNING PHASE
WARNING LIGHT
L (R) AIL F AULT

4, 5
Loss of both hydr. actuators on one aileron.
SINGLE MASTER
SPLR FAULT CHIME CAUTION
3, 4, 5, 7
Loss of one or more spoilers.
ELAC 1 PITCH FAULT

Failure of pitch channel in ELAC 1.
ELAC 2 PITCH FAULT 3, 4, 5, 7, 8

Failure of pitch channel in ELAC 2 or loss of one or both
ELAC rudder pedal transducers.
F/CTL
GND SPLR 1 + 2 (3 + 4) NIL 3, 4, 5
Gnd spoiler channel failed in SEC 3 (1).
SPD BRK 2 (3 + 4) F AULT NIL NIL 3, 4, 5, 7, 8

SPD brake lever transducers to SEC 3 (1) failed.
ELEV SERVO FAULT

3, 4, 5
Loss of one hydr. actuator on one elevator.
AIL SERVO FAULT

Loss of one hydr. actuator on one aileron or loss of one
or both ELAC 1 rudder pedal transducers. 3, 4, 5, 7, 8
FAULT
FCDC 1 (2) FAULT NIL
5MIN AFTER
1500 ft
ELEC PWR
800 ft
STARTED
2ND ENG
SHUT DN
LIFT OFF
1ST ENG
1ST ENG
TO PWR
TOUCH
DOWN
80 kt
80 kt
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
MEMO DISPLAY
- SPEED BRK message is displayed in green if speed brakes are extended. Message flashes amber whenever IDLE is not
indicated on E/WD in flight if one engine N1 is above 50%.
- GND SPLRS ARMED message is displayed in green if ground spoilers are armed.

27-90-22
A318/A319/A320/A321 27-90 EFCS
Figure 16: EFCS Warnings and Cautions (Part 3 of 3)

AURAL MASTER
PAGE WARNING PHASE
WARNING LIGHT
SIDESTICK PRIORITY 3, 4, 5, 6, 7,
NIL NIL NIL NIL
Failure in a sidestick priority circuit. 8, 9
CONFIG: R (L) SIDESTICK F AULT RED *
L or R sidestick is inoperative (take-over P/B pressed MASTER ARROW 5, 6, 7, 8,
CRC NIL
for more than 40 sec) when thrust levers are set at WARNING PRIORITY 10
take-off or when pressing T .O. CONFIG P/B. LIGHT
ALTN LAW
NIL NIL
EFCS alternate laws are active
DIRECT LAW
EFCS direct laws are active 4, 5, 7, 8
FMA
USE MAN PITCH TRIM
message
Message displayed in amber on the FMAs (flashing for
9 sec then steady).
FAULT on
ELAC 1 (2) F AULT SINGLE MASTER ELAC P/B
Failure of 1 ELAC (pitch and roll channel) or CHIME CAUTION
3, 4, 5, 7, 8
Side stick transducer fault.

R (L) SIDESTICK F AULT F/CTL
NIL
Transducers on pitch or roll axis are failed on one -
sidestick.
SEC 1 (2) (3) F AULT FAULT on
Failure of one SEC. SEC P/B
ELAC 1 PITCH FAULT
Failure of pitch channel in ELAC 1. 3,, 4,, 5,, 7,, 8
ELAC 2 PITCH FAULT NIL
Failure of pitch channel in ELAC 2 or loss of one or both
NIL NIL
ELAC rudder pedal transducers.
MAN PITCH TRIM ONLY
FMA
Message displayed in red on the FMAs(flashing
FMAs (flashing for 9 sec NIL 4 5
4,
message
then steady) in case of failure of all ELACs and SECs.
* The red SIDESTICK PRIORITY light comes on as soon as the sidestick becomes inoperative.
5MIN AFTER
1500 ft
ELEC PWR
800 ft
STARTED
2ND ENG
SHUT DN
LIFT OFF
1ST ENG
1ST ENG
TO PWR
TOUCH
DOWN
80 kt
80 kt
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10

27-90-23
A318/A319/A320/A321 27-90 EFCS
Figure 17: Flap and Slat Warnings and Cautions

AURAL MASTER
PAGE WARNING PHASE
WARNING LIGHT
CONFIG SLATS (FLAPS) NOT IN T.O. CONFIG

Slats or flaps are not in take-off configuration when MASTER 5, 6, 7, 8,
CRC
thrust levers are set at T.O. or FLEX T.O. or when WARNING 10
depressing T.O. CONFIG P/B.
SLATS (FLAPS) FAULT

Failure of both slat or flap channels.
SINGLE MASTER
SLAT (FLAPS) LOCKED 4, 5, 8
CHIME CAUTION
Slat or flaps wing tip brakes applied or non aliment
detected between 2 flaps.
NIL NIL
SLAT SYS 1 (2) FAULT
Failure of slat channel in one SFCC.
FLAP SYS 1 (2) FAULT

Failure of flap channel in one SFCC.
SLAT (FLAP) TIP BRK F AULT NIL NIL 3, 4, 5, 7, 8

Failure of one wing tip brake on slat or flaps or failure of
one wing tip brake solenoid on slats or flaps.
FLAPS ATTACH SENSOR

Failure of flap attachment failure detection sensor.
5MIN AFTER
1500 ft
ELEC PWR
800 ft
STARTED
2ND ENG
SHUT DN
LIFT OFF
1ST ENG
1ST ENG
TO PWR
TOUCH
DOWN
80 kt
80 kt
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10

27-90-24
Training Manual Study Questions
A318/A319/A320/A321 Flight Controls
27-Study Questions
27-00 General 5. What can SEC 2 control in case of a dual ELAC failure?
1. Which computers belong to the EFCS?
6. Which surfaces are used for lift dumping?

2. What does the ELAC 1 normally control?
7. Which surfaces are used for roll control?
3. What does the ELAC 2 normally control?
8. How influences a dual EFCS failure the rudder and THS operation?
4. What do the SEC,s normally control?
9. What does FAC 1 control?
Sep08/Technical Training For training purposes only

Study Questions 27-1
10.Which purposes serves the take-over button on each sidestick? 27-01 Control Laws
16.How do you interpret the term "fly by wire"?
11.What happens if both side sticks are moved in the same or opposite direction?
17.What are the active protections in flare mode under normal conditions?
12.How can a deactivated sidestick be reactivated?
18.What are the active protections in direct law?
13.How are the ailerons, elevators and rudders actuated?
27-10 Aileron
14.Which surfaces are lost upon a green and yellow hydraulic system failure? 19.Which computers normally control the roll axis ?
15.Which flight controls have a mechanical (back-up) control system?

20.Which conditions put an aileron servo control actuator in "damping mode"? 27-20 Rudder
24. Which sort of signals cause rudder pedals to move?
21.Are the ailerons mechanically interconnected?
25.How many hydraulic systems power the rudder?
22.Which control surfaces are lost after a dual ELAC failure?
26.How many servocontrol actuators operate the rudder simultaneously?
23.How and where are non-available ELAC,s and SEC,s indicated?
27.Which modes exist for a rudder servocontrol actuator?

28.Where is the rudder trim position indicated? 32. What results from an additional FAC 2 failure?
29.How is the rudder travel limiter controlled after a dual FAC failure?
27-30 Elevator
33.The elevator and the THS are normally controlled by ELAC 2. What happens
if ELAC 2 fails?
30.Can a FMGC control the yaw damper function?
34.What is the typical function of "C*LAW"?
31.What happens in yaw control if FAC 1 fails?
35.Are the elevators mechanically interconnected?

36.Suppose both solenoid valves on an elevator servo control are de-energized, 27-40 THS
no command signal being received and pressure available. In what mode is the
actuator? 40.How and where is a jammed THS actuator indicated and how can it be reset?
41.How many electric motors are installed to control the hydraulic motors of THS?
37.Suppose one solenoid valve is energized on an elevator servo control and hy-
draulic is available. What mode is the servo control in?
42.What happens if an electric trim motor fails?
38.Name all "modes" for pitch normal law:
43.Do auto pitch trim functions rotate the trim wheel?
39.How many different control laws are provided for pitch control?
44.How and where is THS position indication provided?

27-50 Flaps 51.How is the pressure off brake controlled?
45.How are the slats and flaps controlled and operated after a SFCC 1 failure?
52.How is low speed provided toward the end of each flap movement?
46.When is the PCU retract solenoid valve energized during flap extension?
53.Where are the flap wing tip brakes located?

47.Is automatic flap retraction possible on the ground?
48.What happens after selection of an intermediate flap position? (out of detent)

54.Where are torque limiters installed and how are the indicators reset?
49.How and where are the slat / flap positions indicated?

55.Describe how to reset a locked torque limiter.
50.What is the difference between the flaps of an A320 and A321? 56.Which computers provide the flap disconnect data for the SFCC,s?

57.Which sensors allow the SFCC,s to monitor asymmetry? 62.Following a hydraulic system failure in flight what do the respective spoilers
do?
58.When and how are the WTB applied?
63.How can a spoiler be raised on ground?
59.How is a runaway condition detected by the SFCC,s?
64.How is the maintenance unlocking lever "reset" to operating position?
60.How can a locked WTB be reset?
65.On ground, speed brakes extended. Which actions cause the immediate re-
traction of the speed brake?
27-60 Spoiler
61.Which spoiler serve as speed brakes?
66.Which surfaces are used for: - Lift dumping, - Roll control

67.Explain the spoiler indication: 71.Can the slats operate alone? If yes, how?
27-80 Slats
68.Why are four tracks on slat 1?
27-90 FCDC
72.What is the function of FCDC 1+ 2?
69.In flight which conditions inhibit slat retraction from position "1" to "0"?
73.To which EFCS computers is the CFDIU connected?
70.Where are the slat torque limiters located?
74.The F/CTL menu on the CFDS offers EFCS 1+2. What is the difference?


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Training Manual Table of Contents

A318/A319/A320/A321 EASA Part 66 Cat. B1B2

27 Flight Controls Aileron and Hydraulic Actuation. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Sep08/Technical Training for training purposes only

Component Description . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20 Pitch Trim Actuator . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12

Sep08/Technical Training for training purposes only

FPPU / APPU Adjustment. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14 Actuator . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11

Sep08/Technical Training for training purposes only

Sep08/Technical Training for training purposes only

Sep08/Technical Training for training purposes only

27-00 General General Principles

Sep08/Technical Training for training purposes only

Figure 1: Flight Control Surfaces

FLAPS TRIMMABLE HORIZONTAL

Sep08/Technical Training for training purposes only

Sep08/Technical Training for training purposes only

Rudder 27-20 Elevators 27-30

Sep08/Technical Training for training purposes only

Sep08/Technical Training for training purposes only

LOAD ALLEVIATION FUNCTION LOAD ALLEVIATION FUNCTION -LAF-*

SPEED BRAKE SPEED BRAKE

ELAC] 1 2 NORM 1 2 [ELAC

HYDRAULIC THS ACTUATOR

ELAC1 SEC1 FAC1

2 ELEVATOR AILERON COMPUTERS 3 SPOILER ELEVATOR COMPUTERS 2 FLIGHT AUGMENTATION COMPUTERS

Sep08/Technical Training for training purposes only

Figure 4: Fly by Wire Concept

Sep08/Technical Training for training purposes only

Flap and Slat Control A321 have dual element flaps

Flap Control 27-50 Slat Control Lift Augmenting 27-80

Figure 5: Slat / Flap Presentation

Sep08/Technical Training for training purposes only

Flight Controls Power Supply Figure 6: Elec.Power Supply

The FCDC 1 is supplied from the DC essential busbar 8PP.

19CE1 C/B NORM STBY

704PP 16CE2 C/B

Sep08/Technical Training for training purposes only

Hydraulic Power Supply

Leakage Measurement Valves

Sep08/Technical Training for training purposes only

Figure 7: Hydr. Power Supply

MAIN MAIN MAIN

L & R AILERON L & R AILERON L & R SPOILER 2

LANDING GEAR SAFETY

Sep08/Technical Training for training purposes only

Figure 8: Cockpit Flight Control and Indicating

Sep08/Technical Training for training purposes only

Side Stick Controller Figure 9: Side Stick Unit

The arm rest is fixed on the seat.

two spring rods for pitch artificial feel

Sep08/Technical Training for training purposes only

Figure 10: Side Stick

Glareshield Panel, LH side

Sidestick Order Indication

Sep08/Technical Training for training purposes only

Four sets of 3 plastic track potentiometers are fitted in each unit.

Sep08/Technical Training for training purposes only

Figure 12: Sidestick Assembly

Sep08/Technical Training for training purposes only

Figure 13: Indication

Sep08/Technical Training for training purposes only

27-01 EFCS Control Laws

Sep08/Technical Training for training purposes only