Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

THIRD DIVISION

G.R. No. L-53984 May 5, 1988

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
EDUARDO ANTONIO y VILLAPANA, accused-appellant.

The Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellee.

Teofilo F. Manalo Law Office for accused-appellant.

CORTES, J.:

Eduardo Antonio interposes this appeal from a decision of the Court of First Instance of
Rizal (Caloocan City) which convicted him of rape as charged by Maria Timajo
Macaranas in a complaint which reads:

That on or about the 16th day of April 1976 in Caloocan City, Philippines and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused with lewd designs and by
means of force, threats and intimidation employed on the person of the undersigned
complainant, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously lie and have sexual
intercourse with complainant Maria Timajo Macaranas, widow, 35 years of age, against
her will and without her consent.

CONTRARY TO LAW.

Macaranas' version is that on April 16, 1976, at around 11 o'clock p.m., she was in her
room sleeping with her seven-year old daughter. She was awakened by a notice coming
from her window. She sat up on her bed and saw her door being opened. Then she saw
Antonio enter her room. (The fluorescent lamp was lighted.) He grabbed her left hand
and poked a knife at her breast. She did not shout as she was afraid. He then dragged
her to the kitchen where she was made to lie on a wooden bed. He boxed her thighs and
breast until she felt weak. Antonio took off Maria's pajamas and panty. He laid on top of
her with his knees against her thighs, her left hand underneath her back and her
upstretched right hand above her head held by Antonio. He then inserted his finger and
penis into Maria's private parts. She shouted, "Aray ko po, nanay ko po, tulungan ninyo
ako," but appellant succeeded in ravishing her. After raping complainant, accused went to
his room in the upper floor of the house. After dressing up, Maria rested for a while then
went to her Comadre Miling, Antonio's "aunt" (only because she carried the same family
name, Villapana, Antonio's mother), to show what he did to her.

On April 22, 1976, Macaranas went to the Barangay Captain to report the incident. The
following day, the Barangay Captain accompanied her to the police where she lodged a
complaint. That afternoon, Maria was examined by Dr. Ampil at the National Bureau of
Investigation.

At this point, it may be stated that Dr. Ampil never took the witness stand. Neither was
any medico-legal report presented as evidence in court.
On the other hand, Antonio denied all the allegations of the complaint. Even as he admits
having performed the sexual act with Macaranas, he claims that, contrary to her
assertions, there was no force or intimidation employed. His story is that he and
Macaranas were sweethearts. Prior to April 16, 1976, they had been going out on dates,
seeing movies together and eating out. On April 16, 1976 at 11 o'clock, he was invited by
Macaranas to her room. While in the room, he sat down and she seated herself beside
him. Then she started kissing him. She asked him to go to the kitchen with her so they
would not wake up her seven year old child. In the kitchen she lay on the wooden bed.
He removed his pants and lay down beside her. They had sexual intercourse twice.

At the time of the incident, accused-appellant Eduardo Antonio was still single, in his
20's. On the other hand, complainant Maria Timajo Vda. de Macaranas was already a
middle-aged widow. She had four children by her late husband who died in 1969.

Arraigned on April 20, 1977, Antonio pleaded "not guilty." Thereupon the case proceeded
to trial. On October 26, 1969, the CFI-Caloocan convicted the accused of the crime of
rape, sentencing him to life imprisonment and ordering him to indemnify Macaranas in
the sum of P 12,000. From the judgment of conviction, Antonio brought this appeal
assigning the following as errors:

1. THAT THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN BASING ITS DECISION OF CONVICTION OF

APPELLANT ON THE UNCORROBORATED TESTIMONY OF THE COMPLAINANT.

2. THAT THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN NOT BELIEVING THE TESTIMONY OF THE
APPELLANT AS CORROBORATED BY HIS WITNESSES.

3. THAT THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FINDING THE ACCUSED GUILTY BEYOND
REASONABLE DOUBT NOTWITHSTANDING STANDING THE FACT THAT THE
TESTIMONY OF THE COMPLAINANT IS NOT ONLY UNCORROBORATED BUT IS
INCONSISTENT WITH HUMAN EXPERIENCE AND BEHAVIOR.

4. THAT THE COURT ERRED IN NOT TAKING INTO CONSIDERATION THE

DEMEANOR OF COMPLAINANT ON THE WITNESS STAND.

There is no question that there was sexual union between Antonio and Macaranas on
April 16, 1976. But did Antonio employ force to consummate the act? Or as he claims,
was there mutual consent?

One of the peculiarities of rape is that it is one offense to which, oftentimes, only two
people the accused and the complainant can testify. Inasmuch as it is the bounden
duty of this Court to convict only if the guilt of the accused has been proved beyond
reasonable doubt, it behooves us to exert the most painstaking effort to weigh and
appraise the conflicting testimonies if only to satisfy judicial conscience that the appellant
committed the criminal act imputed against him.

There are three (3) settled principles to guide an appellate court in reviewing the
evidence in rape cases: (1) An accusation for rape can be made with facility; it is difficult
to prove it but more difficult for the person accused, though innocent, to disprove it; (2) In
view of the intrinsic nature of the crime of rape where two persons are usually involved,
the testimony of the complainant must be scrutinized with extreme caution; and (3) The
evidence for the prosecution must stand or fall on its own merits, and cannot be allowed
to draw strength from the weakness of the evidence for the defense. [People v. Quintal,
G.R. No. L-49656, November 25, 1983 125 SCRA 734.]

Additionally, we have to take note that in this case, the judge who heard the evidence for
the prosecution is not the same judge who decided the case. It was Judge Serafin
Salvador who heard the testimonies of complainant and her witness before his
retirement. Whereas, it was Judge Romulo Quimbo who decided the case relying solely
on the transcripts of stenographic notes in appreciating Macaranas' and her witness'
testimonies. Even as this Court has consistently been guided by the precept that findings
of trial courts on credibility of witnesses are accorded great weight and must not be
disturbed as it was the trial judge who had the opportunity to observe the demeanor of
the witnesses while they were testifying, this case should be an exception in view of the
fact that the judge who decided the case is NOT the same judge who heard the
evidence. [See People v. Escalante, et al., G.R. No. L-371457, August 22, 1984, 131
SCRA 237.] Thus, the Court should all the more exercise utmost care in evaluating the
evidence presented in the instant case so as to render justice not only to the accused,
but also to the complainant and the State as well.

To buttress the argument that force was exerted by the accused on the complainant, the
Solicitor General relies in part on what is claimed to be a medico-legal report which
allegedly states that contusions and hematoma were found by Dr. Ampil on complainant's
arms and thighs. [Brief for the Appellee, p. 8]

No evidentiary value can be given the alleged medico-legal report as it was not offered in
evidence. 'The court shall consider no evidence which has not been formally offered."
[Rule 132, Section 35.] The only exhibit presented by the prosecution is the statement of
Macaranas before the investigating policeman, and no other. [See TSN, January 4, 1978,
p. 13.]

Hence, as the trial court observed, the case for the prosecution rests solely on the
uncorroborated testimony of Macaranas. "While we have frequently held that the
uncorroborated testimony of the offended party in cases of this kind may be sufficient
under certain circumstances to warrant conviction, yet from the very nature of the charge
and the ease with which it may be made and the difficulty which surrounds the accused
in disproving it where the point is as to whether the cohabitation was with or without the
use of force or threats, it is imperative that such testimony should be scrutinized with the
greatest caution." [U.S. v. Flores, 26 Phil. 262, 268 (1913).] The evidentiary rule is that "in
crimes against chastity, the testimony of the injured woman should not be received with
precipitate incredulity; and when the conviction depends at any vital point upon her
uncorroborated testimony, it should not be accepted unless her sincerity and candor are
free from suspicion," [People v. Estacio, G.R. No. 54221, January 30, 1982, 111 SCRA
537; People v. Francisco, 192 Phil. 752 (1981), 105 SCRA 516.]

In the case at bar numerous circumstances detract from the credibility of Macaranas'
version of what happened on the night of April 16, 1976. Thus, the Court has no option
but to declare that the prosecution has failed to meet the exacting test of moral certainty
and proof of guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt. A reversal of the trial court's
guilty verdict is inevitable.

The conduct of complainant immediately before, during, and subsequent to the alleged
rape are not those which might be reasonably expected of the victim under the
circumstances. [See U.S. v. Flores, supra.]

She claims that while she was sleeping with her seven-year old daughter, she was
awakened when a person was trying to pry open her window. That person failed in his
attempt to open the window, so he forced open the door to her room, which is one of
three, small rooms on the ground floor of a two-storey apartment. [TSN, September 6,
1977, pp. 4-6.] The normal reaction of any person under such circumstances would have
been to call for help or make an outcry to awaken her neighbors and/or call their
attention, or do something to repel the intruder, and protect her home, herself and her
daughter from any harm.
Macaranas likewise testified that during the sexual act, the accused covered her mouth
with his own lips so that she could not shout, and yet she was able to shout, "Aray ko po,
nanay ko po, tulungan po ninyo ako." [TSN, September 6, 1977, pp. 29-30.] Covering the
mouth of another with one's own lips is certainly not an effective way of preventing the
former from shouting. Moreover, for a rapist to cover the mouth of his victim with his own
lips is to invite the danger of being bitter by the latter. Yet, Macaranas does not seem to
have taken the opportunity to ward off her assailant. It has been said that "(a) woman's
most precious asset is the purity of her womanhood. She will resist to the last ounce of
her strength any attempt to defile it." [People v. Tapao, 195 Phil. 203 (1981a), 108 SCRA
351, 356.] It seems more likely that, as appellant claims, they were kissing each other as
they were engaged in the sexual act.

Furthermore, her claim that she was able to shout out loud [TSN, September 6, 1977, p.
34.] does not inspire belief as no one among the tenants of the other rooms (including
her very own Comadre Miling who lives in the room almost immediately above
complainant's) heard the outcry. In fact, her Comadre Miling testified that when
complainant went to her (Miling's) room at 2 'clock in the morning of April 17, 1976, what
she (Macaranas) said was that they, meaning complainant and accused, had "lost control
of themselves." [TSN, September 6, 1978, p. 4.] To lose control of oneself is definitely not
the same as to be raped.

Then too, even after the supposed culprit had turned his back and left, thereby
eliminating whatever alleged danger or threat there was on complainant's life or limb, no
outcry was heard from the complainant. [See People v. Estacio, supra] Instead, she
claims that she rested for a while, then went up to her Comadre Miling. [TSN, Sept. 6,
1977, pp. 4-12]

The accused lives on the upper-floor of the same two-storey apartment where
complainant lives. It appears from the evidence that accused went to bed after the sexual
intercourse. It seems unlikely that if one did an act as bestial and dastardly as raping a
woman, one would go to his room in the same building as the situs of the crime, and not
take precautions from possible reprisal. It seems all the more unnatural and unbelievable
that a woman whose honor had just been outraged would do nothing to immediately
bring the culprit to justice. [See People v. Estacio, supra.]

In fact, it took six (6) days before complainant decided to bring the matter to the attention
of the Barangay Captain. She went to the Barangay Captain only after she first went to
Felipe Villapana uncle of the accused and her own "bilas" (her late husband was the
brother of Felipe's wife.), to ask Felipe to talk to the accused so that the latter would
marry her. Complainant has not offered any satisfactory explanation for the delay. In
previous occasions, the Court had expressed suspicion when the complainant failed to
denounce her assailant at once. [People v. Jervoso, G.R. No. L-46530, September 29,
1983, 124 SCRA 765; People v. Torio, G.R. No. L-48731, December 21, 1983, 126 SCRA
265.]

Furthermore, complainant's demeanor at the witness stand has also betrayed her
insincerity. Her conduct while testifying on what was supposed to have been a most
harrowing experience is revealed in this excerpt:

ATTY. MANALO

May I make of record that while witness is testifying she is smiling, you Honor.

COURT:

Make it of record as a manifestation. [TSN, Sept. 6, 1977, p, 17]

The foregoing circumstances more than suffice to cast doubt on the credibility of
Macaranas. The theory of the prosecution does not inspire belief. Conversely, appellant's
version gains more credence.

Despite complainant's denials, there is ample proof to show that Antonio and Macaranas
were really sweethearts. Aside from the testimony of the accused both Felipe VillapaNa
and Orotencia Salazar, neighbor of Antonio and Macaranas, testified that the conduct of
the accused and complainant revealed the special relationship between them.
Complainant herself admitted that at one time, as she was seated by the window of her
room, the accused passed by and got the ring she was then wearing and which she
inherited from her deceased husband, and that she had to write him a note as the
husband's relatives might see the ring on his finger. [TSN, September 6, 1977, pp. 36-
40.] The defense claims, however, that the ring was voluntarily given to him by
complainant as "prenda" or as a token of their love and affection for each other. [TSN,
August 7, 1979, pp. 13-14.]

Granting that accused indeed grabbed the ring from complainant's finger, it can only be
that accused had the courage to do so because there was some friendly relationship
between them. For a close neighbor does not just grab a ring from one's finger except for
a special reason.

Given their closeness to one another, it is not unlikely that they "lost control of
themselves," as complainant herself is said to have put it.

Appellant would not, however, marry the complainant until such time that he has regular
employment. [TSN, May 21, 1978, p. 10.] The defense claims that his unwillingness to
marry her after she had given him everything prompted the institution of this criminal
case.

WHEREFORE, the decision of the trial court is hereby REVERSED. Accused-appellant is

hereby ACQUITTED of the charge against him. No costs.

SO ORDERED.

Fernan (Chairman), Gutierrez, Jr., Feliciano and Bidin, JJ., concur.

 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila

THIRD DIVISION

G.R. No. 81817 July 27, 1989

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
BERNARD ALDANA, defendant-appellant.

The Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellee.

Jose V. Juan, Bartolome P. Reus and Froilan L. Valdez for defendant-appellant.

CORTES, J.:

This is an appeal from the decision of the Regional Trial Court of Bacoor, Cavite, Branch
XIX in Criminal Case No. B-85-49, convicting the accused-appellant Bernard Aldana of
the crime of rape and sentencing him to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua, to
indemnify the offended party Stephanie B. Hutchison in the amount of P30,000, and to
pay costs.

Based on a complaint filed by Mrs. Ofelia Barrioquinto-Hutchison mother of the alleged

victim, before the Municipal Court of Bacoor, Cavite on August 29, 1984, an information
dated December 29, 1984 was filed charging the accused with the crime of rape,
committed as follows:

xxx xxx xxx

That on or about the 18th day of August 1984, in the Municipality of Bacoor, Province of
Cavite, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named
accused, by means of force violence and intimidation, did, then and there, wilfully,
unlawfully and feloniously abuse, ravish and have carnal knowledge of one Stephanie B.
Hutchison, against her will and without her consent, resulting to her damage and
prejudice.

xxx xxx xxx

[Rollo, p. 11.]

The accused having entered a plea of NOT GUILTY, trial ensued.

The prosecution sought to prove the following essential facts:

Stephanie B. Hutchison, a thirteen and one half (13 1/2) year old high school student,
and Bernard Aldana, an eighteen (18) year old college student, were neighbors since
1982 in Talaba, Bacoor, Cavite. Their respective two-storey houses were only two to
three meters apart. The accused started to court Stephanie in early 1984, but she
refused to be his girlfriend [TSN, July 8, 1987, p. 2].
According to the prosecution, on August 19, 1984, * at about 3:00 o'clock in the morning, Stephanie was
awakened from her sleep and felt the presence of someone inside her bedroom (a room she shared with her mother) located
on the second floor of the house. She was about to scream when the accused covered her mouth with his right hand and
pointed a knife at her. Despite her resistance, the accused succeeded in having sexual intercourse with her. Having
accomplished what he came for, the accused stood up, put on his briefs and left through the ungrilled window of the room
from which three slats of glass jalousies had been earlier removed by him to gain entry into the room [TSN, May 20, 1985,
pp. 4-8; TSN, June 11, 1985, pp. 14-25].

Immediately thereafter, Stephanie transferred to her younger brothers' room and cried.
She did not tell anyone about the incident until August 26, 1984 when her mother came
home from work for the week. (During the months of June, July and August, her mother
who was then working with the Bureau of Customs at the Manila International Airport
from 6 P.M. to 3 A.M, and as a caretaker of a friend's house in Dasmarinas Village,
Makati, did not go home every day.) Stephanie and her mother reported the incident to
the police and she, thereafter, submitted herself to a medical examination by Dr. Alberto
M. Reyes of the National Bureau of Investigation [TSN, May 20, 1985, pp. 8-16; TSN,
June 11, 1985, pp. 5-11].

Dr. Reyes testified and submitted a report concluding that although there were genital
findings compatible with sexual intercourse with a man on or about the alleged date of
commission, there was no evident sign of extragenital physical injuries noted on
Stephanie at the time of examination [Exhibit "D"].

On the other hand, the defense sought to establish the innocence of the accused by
proving that he and Stephanie were sweethearts and that, by mutual consent, they
developed a sexually intimate relationship.

Accused claimed that soon after Stephanie accepted his offer of love on June 4, 1984,
Stephanie suggested to Bernard that since her mother infrequently went home from
work, they should see each other in her bedroom. Stephanie told him that she would
remove three slats of the ungrilled jalousie window so that he could enter the room. The
accused agreed to the plan. Thus, on four subsequent occasions, the accused climbed
into Stephanie's room at around midnight, and the couple would spend about an hour
talking and caressing each other [TSN, October 7, 1985, pp. 9-15, 20-22.]

On August 11, 1984, the accused and Stephanie had sexual intercourse for the first time.
On two more occasions, August 13 and 15, the accused returned to her room and the
young lovers made love [TSN October 7, 1985 pp. 22-24; TSN, November 5, 1985, pp. 9-
10].

In the early morning of the 18th of August, as Bernard once again entered her room,
Stephanie warned him that her maid was sleeping in the room with her. But as he was
about to leave, the maid woke up and turned on the lights of the room. The maid asked
him what he was doing, and he revealed that he was there at Stephanie's invitation. The
accused then hurriedly left the room [TSN, October 7, 1985, pp. 24-25; TSN, January 7,
1986, pp. 4-6].

After trial, the court rendered judgment on November 2, 1987 finding the accused guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of rape.

On appeal, the accused raises the following errors:

I. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN NOT GIVING CREDENCE TO THE EVIDENCE FOR
THE DEFENSE;

II. THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN FINDING THE ACCUSED GUILTY
BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT OF THE CRIME CHARGED.
In the review of the evidence presented in the case, this Court was guided by three
established principles, to wit: (1) an accusation for rape can be made with facility; it is
difficult to prove but more difficult for the person accused, though innocent, to disprove;
(2) in view of the intrinsic nature of the crime of rape where only two persons are usually
involved, the testimony of the complainant must be scrutinized with extreme caution; and,
(3) the evidence for the prosecution must stand or fall on its own merits, and cannot be
allowed to draw strength from the weakness of the evidence for the defense [People v.
Quintal, G.R. No. L-49656, November 25, 1983,125 SCRA 734; People v. Antonio, G.R.
No. 53984, May 5, 1988; People v. Geneveza, G.R. No. 74047, January 13, 1989].

For while it is undeniable that rape is a most detestable crime and, therefore, its
perpetrators should be severely and impartially punished, the testimony of the alleged
victim should not be accorded unquestioning acceptance by the courts. The evidentiary
rule is that in crimes against chastity "when the conviction depends on any vital point
upon her (the alleged victim's) uncorroborated testimony, it should not be accepted
unless her sincerity and candor are free from suspicion. A little insight into human nature
is of most value in judging matters of this kind" (People v. Fausto, 51 Phil. 852, 856
(1982); See People v. Francisco, 192 Phil. 752 (1981); People v. Estacio, G.R. No.
54221, January 30, 1982, 111 SCRA 537; People v. Cui, G.R. No. L-48084, June 20,
1988; People v. Ymana, G.R. Nos. 54161-62, March 9, 1989].

In the light of the foregoing principles and after a painstaking study of the evidence on
record, the Court finds that the prosecution has failed to prove the guilt of the accused
beyond reasonable doubt.

A. The uncorroborated testimony of the alleged victim as to the manner by which the
accused allegedly overpowered and violated her through force and intimidation does not
inspire belief.

Stephanie testified that soon after she detected his presence in the room, the accused
covered her mouth with his right hand to prevent her from screaming or shouting for help.
The accused held in his left hand a knife and poked it at her waist, instilling fear in her.
The accused allegedly twisted her right hand behind her back and forced her down the
bed by pulling her feet with his left hand, and pressed the weight of his body against her.
Nevertheless, she struggled by kicking his legs and moving her body (torso) from side to
side. The accused however held down her feet with his left hand. Also with the use of his
left hand, the accused stripped off her pajama pants and panty, as well as his briefs. But
because of the effort she made to try to free herself, the accused was unable to strip off
her pajama top. Unfortunately, despite her efforts at swaying her torso from side to side
and keeping her legs together, the accused succeeded in parting her thighs with his legs
and feet and penetrated her without the aid of his hands [TSN, May 20, 1985, pp. 4-20;
June 11, 1985, pp. 13-23; June 13, 1985, pp. 3-25].

It is worth noting that Stephanie categorically declared on several occasions that the
accused never took away his right hand from her mouth, thus preventing her from
screaming for help, nor loosened the grip of his left hand on his knife poised at her right
side until after he had raped her (See TSN, June 11, 1985, pp. 21-25; TSN, June 13,
1985, pp. 9-16, 22-25].

Testimony to be believed must not only proceed from a credible witness, but must itself
be credible. No better test has yet been found to determine the value of the testimony of
a witness than its conformity to the knowledge and common experience of mankind
[People v. Baquiran, G.R. No. L-20153, June 29, 1987, 20 SCRA 451; People v. Peruelo
G.R. No. 50631, June 29, 1981, 105 SCRA 226]. Considering the degree of resistance
the alleged victim purportedly made and the very peculiar position assumed by the
accused all throughout the incident, i.e. his body pressed down on the left side of her
body, his right hand covering her mouth and his left hand holding a knife at her side
(notably the same hand which was used to unclothe her, to remove his briefs and to hold
her feet down), the Court finds incredible the claim that the accused was able to
penetrate her as she described [People v. Apari, G.R. No. L-28323, June 29, 1982,114
SCRA 620; People v. Cabading, G.R. No. 74352, June 6, 1989]. Unless the accused
were an adept contortionist of extraordinary strength and virility, which he was not shown
to be, or the alleged victim were paralyzed with fear, which her testimonies on direct and
cross examination refute, Stephanie's version of the incident fails the test of common
knowledge and experience.

Moreover, Stephanie's admission that she did not use her unrestrained left arm and hand
either to pull the hair of the accused or to box him when he mounted her [TSN, June 13,
1985, pp. 10-19] betrays a significant inconsistency in her testimony .

Stephanie testified that the accused neither held nor pinned down her left arm and hand.
Yet she admitted that she only used her left arm and hand to ward off the accused as he
was pressing her down on the bed and removing her pants and panty [TSN, June 13,
1985, pp. 10-19]. She claimed that she ceased using her left arm and hand to fight the
accused because she feared that he would harm her with his knife. But this explanation
is not consistent with her claim that she unwaveringly struggled and fought the accused
by kicking his feet and legs, and by swaying her torso from side to side, even as he
penetrated her and notwithstanding the knife pointed at her side [TSN, May 20, 1985, pp.
4-7; TSN, June 13, 1985, pp. 6-19, 23-24]. At any rate, this inexplicable inconsistency
casts serious doubt on the veracity of the alleged victim's testimony.

Finally, Stephanie's conduct after the alleged rape incident does not correspond with the
normal reaction of a victim of this hideous crime.

On the one hand, Stephanie testified that because the accused threatened her, she did
not shout or scream for help even after the accused left her room. She merely left her
room and transferred to her younger brothers' room and cried. She did not attempt to get
in touch with her mother while the latter was away at work; she reasoned that she was
afraid to leave her house because the accused warned her not to reveal what had
happened. Neither did she bother to tell her uncle, Arnold Perez, who was then staying
with her family, or her brothers and close friends. The only time she informed anyone of
the incident was when her mother arrived from work a week later [TSN, June 11, 1985,
pp. 3-11].

But on the other hand, she admitted that on the evening following the day she was
allegedly raped, she slept once again in her bedroom alone [TSN, June 13, 1985, pp. 27-
31].

If indeed Stephanie were a victim of rape through force and intimidation, why would she
continue to sleep alone in the very same room where she was forcibly violated? The
normal reaction of a thirteen (13) year old victim, especially one who had not confided to
anyone that she was raped, would have been to avoid that room which would remind her
of the disturbing incident and trigger overwhelming fright and confusion.

On rebuttal, Stephanie and her maid Joela Almonte testified that the accused returned to
Stephanie's room in the early morning of August 24, 1984; but this time Joela or "Ella"
(who had just arrived from the province the day before) was also in the room.

Joela testified that she was awakened by the presence of somebody else in the room
and switched on the lights. She saw the accused inside the room standing by the window
while Stephanie was sitting in a corner. Joela demanded to know what he was doing
there. Then she went downstairs to get help from the uncle of Stephanie but he was not
in the house. Meanwhile, the accused hurriedly climbed out of the room through the
same window he had used on August 19, 1984. When Joela returned to the room, she
found Stephanie crying. Afterwards, both of them fell back to sleep. The next day, when
Stephanie's mother arrived, she told her what happened [TSN, Joela Almonte, May 15,
1987, pp. 17-22].

Stephanie testified as follows:

xxx xxx xxx

ATTY. VICTORIANO:

On that occasion August 24 did you converse with accused?

A No, sir.

Q Did anyone converse with him?

A No, sir.

Q About Ella. Did she talk to the accused?

A She asked, Why are you here. We were surprised because another on was inside.

Q What was the reply? If there was any?

A There was no reply.

Q What happened after that?

A When Ella went to the door to get some help downstairs, the accused suddenly left.

Q How about you? You did not do anything when the accused was inside the bedroom?

A What can I do? Because I was confused, I was crying.

Q You did not tell Ella to do anything?

A No, sir. Because I was confused.

Q You did not attempt to leave your bedroom at that time?

A I did not know what to do. I just sat down on a corner.

Q As a matter of fact, you did not even shout nor scream?

A I couldn't do that. I was confused.

xxx xxx xxx

[TSN July 8, 1987, pp. 8-9].

Assuming that the presence of Joela calmed Stephanie's fears enough to allow her to
sleep in her room of the evening of August 23, 1984, a stronger outburst of fear and
repulsion from Stephanie is reasonably expected after a second intrusion by the
accused. Instead, although Stephanie was supposedly crying in a corner after the
accused left, no testimony was made by either one of them that Stephanie had to be
comforted or consoled. As a matter-of-fact, Joela claimed that after the accused left the
room, she and Stephanie fell back to sleep in the same room until next morning. Neither
one of them bothered to look for and replace the three glass jalousies supposedly
removed by the accused to gain entry, nor to shut and lock the window after the accused
left. It is also relevant to note that Stephanie did not disclose to her maid that the intruder
had raped her the week before. Stephanie's behavior and explanation for it do not
sustain belief in her testimony.

B. For its part, the defense presented as witnesses Mrs. Erlinda Aldana, mother of the
accused, and Mrs. Josefina Guadarama a friend of the Aldana family and an
acquaintance of Mrs. Ofelia Hutchison. Both ladies testified that on June 16, 1985, they
went to the house of Mrs. Hutchison with the primary purpose of convincing the latter to
withdraw the case against the accused. Mrs. Hutchison however refused to agree and
revealed that she was mad at the parents of the accused, specifically his father, and had
in fact made it appear that the accused threatened Stephanie with a knife so as to make
the charge graver [TSN, E. Aldana, February 11, 1986, pp. 9-14; TSN, J. Guadarama
December 8, 1986, pp. 5-8].

The trial court regarded their testimonies an implied admission of guilt [RTC Decision, pp.
17-18; Records, pp. 49-50]. The Court must disagree. This presumption does not arise in
the instant case. It is clear from the testimonies of these two witnesses that they had
sought to persuade Mrs. Hutchison to withdraw the case because they knew that the
youngsters were sweethearts and they believed that the accused was innocent of the
crime charged.

Significantly, their testimonies were not refuted by the prosecution, not even by Mrs.
Hutchison when she was presented on rebuttal [TSN, O. Hutchison, April 6, 1987].

Mr. Manuel Gorobat was also presented as a defense witness to bolster the testimony of
the accused that Stephanie came to visit him in the early mornings of October 17 and 19,
1984, at about 1:00 o'clock, after her mother had filed a complaint against him. The
accused stated that Stephanie went to his house and confided to him that it was her
mother who forced her to say that he had raped her [TSN, October 7, 1985, pp. 25-27].

On direct and cross examination, Mr. Gorobat testified that while passing through the
alleyway outside the Aldana house on the aforementioned dates, he saw Stephanie and
Bernard seated side by side in the latter's terrace. He further claimed that when the
accused saw him, the former waved at him to go away. He was candid enough to admit
that he did not hear them conversing [TSN, October 8, 1986, pp. 2-14].

There being no cogent reason to doubt the sincerity of the witness, the Court finds that
the foregoing testimony renders more doubtful the veracity of Stephanie's claim. A victim
of rape would not voluntarily meet with her alleged rapist, much less sit beside him in his
terrace unescorted at 1:00 o'clock in the morning.

Finally, to support the theory that the youngsters were sweethearts, that they had met on
several occasions in her room, and that they were keeping their relationship a secret
because Stephanie feared the anger of her mother, the defense submitted in evidence
two pictures and various letters and notes sent by Stephanie to Bernard.
The accused testified that when they were still friends, Stephanie had sent him two
pictures of herself on April 21, 1982 and January 23, 1984, respectively [TSN October 7,
1985, pp. 3-8]. These pictures were presented as Exhibits "1" and "2".

In April 1984, when the accused started writing love letters to her, Stephanie, using her
nickname "Apple", wrote him a letter dated April 15, 1984, the contents of which reads as
follows:

April 15, 1984

Bernard,

I'm still fine upon receiving your letter. Nasabi sa akin ni Connie, alam mo nagtataka ako
sayo kung bakit ako ang nakita mo samantala marami na mang magaganda sa
Paraaque at sa school ninyo. To correct you hindi ko naging bata iyon dahil nagkamali
ako at saka kung ipagpipilitan mo wala akong magagawa basta ako malinis ang
konsensiya ko. Alam mo pala na magagalit ang Mommy ko, bakit ka pa sumulat, pero
asahan mo na walang makakaalam nito. Natandaan ko ngayong sinabi mo sa akin, pero
hindi ako itinago ng mommy ko, ikaw itong umalis. At paano mo nasabi na diyan ka na
titira pagdating sa semester ay wala ka na diyan at ako hindi dito magka-college.

Apple

P.S.

Pls. don't say bad words again.

Same

[Exhibit "3"].

Stephanie sent the accused another letter dated "Good Friday", which reads as follows:

Bernard,

Alam mo, hindi ako mahirap kausapin kaya lang umiiwas ako sa intriga dito, lalo na 'yang
nasa tabi ninyo. Ngunit sa iyong pagsulat ay baka may makahalata, di ba walang lihim na
di nabubunyag. At saka bakit ka maiinis sa sarili mo? How foolish can your questions be.
Of course I can accept you, but love I have to think of it. Because I have to finish my
studies. And if you do love me you have to wait even if it's a long time, and if you can't
wait for that time you to stop thinking of me, okey. Mabuti at hindi mo nababanggit iyon at
kung nagkataon, kahit isang salita magkakagalit tayo. Thanx sa papuri mo and don't feel
sad about it. Two years na lang tayo magkikita dahilan sa hindi ako dito sa college mag-
aaral.

Apple

P.S.

Pls. do rip my first letter.

Same

[Exhibit "4"].

The accused also testified that on July 11, 1984, when they were already sweethearts, he
received a letter written on a yellow pad paper [Exhibit "5"] from Stephanie urging him not
to go to her bedroom for fear that their relationship would be discovered. The accused
testified that Stephanie adopted pseudonyms, i.e "mama" for her and "papa" for
appellant, as a precautionary measure in case the note was intercepted by her mother.

PAPA,

Wala sa akin iyon, Hindi naman sa ayaw kong magpasundo sa iyo kaya nga lang ay
doon din nag-aaral si Ricky at si Jimmy eh, kung makita tayo wala na akong ibang
dahilan pa.

Tungkol naman sa Sabado hindi ko alam kung makakatiyak ako dahil sa baka hindi
pumasok and MOMMY ko. Kung makaalis man siya tiyak ng hindi ako papayagan ng Tita
ko, (kung) saka na lang tayo magkita. Ako na lang ang magsasabi sa iyo kung kailan at
saan. Huwag ka muna aakyat dito mahirap nang mabuko tayo palipasin muna natin ng
two weeks saka ka na pumanhik dito di ba ikaw din ang maysabi na nakakahalata na sa
inyo, para sa atin din naman ito. Hindi naman ako magagalit sayo at lalo naring hindi ako
magsasawa sa iyo, sa Sabado from 5:00 p.m. at 8:00 p.m. hintayin mo na lang ang
tawag ko.

Sweet kisses & tight embraces

MAMA

P.S.

Sleep early but pray first.

[Exhibit "5"]

On two subsequent occasions, Stephanie again left notes on his window warning him not
to come to her bedroom because, on one occasion, her mother was sleeping with her,
and on the other, her aunt was keeping her company for the night [Exhibits "6" and "7"].
She likewise adopted their pseudonyms (TSN, October 7, 1985, pp. 15-20).

On the witness stand, Stephanie admitted that she sent her pictures to the accused
through a mutual friend and wrote the two letters marked as Exhibits "3" and "4". But she
denied having written the letter and notes marked as Exhibits "5", "6" and "7".

Thus, the defense presented as expert witness Jovito R. Gutierrez, a document examiner
of the PC-INP Crime Laboratory, who, by order of the trial court, examined these notes as
well as other documents in the possession of the accused which were used as standard
handwritings of Stephanie, i.e. Exhibits "3" and "4", a handwritten schedule of
Stephanie's classes [Exhibit "9"], and a sheet containing Stephanie's bio-data [Exhibit
"8"].

Mr. Gutierrez testified, and was duly cross-examined, on the manner and findings of his
examination as summarized in his official report [TSN, April 21, 1986, May 16, 1986 and
June 16, 1986). His report which was presented and admitted as evidence for the
defense contained the following:

xxx xxx xxx

F I N D I N G S:
Comparative examination and analysis of the questioned and the standard writings
reveal significant similarities in handwriting movement, stroke structure and other
individual handwriting characteristics.

C O N C L U S I O N:

The questioned handwritten letter/note previously marked Exh. "5", "6" &" 7" and the
standard handwritings of Stephanie Hutchison previously marked "Exh. "1", "2", "2-A",
"3", "4", "8" & "9" WERE WRITTEN BY ONE AND THE SAME PERSON.

xxx xxx xxx

[Exhibit 11].

The trial court, however, did not consider as binding the findings of Mr. Gutierrez [RTC
Decision, pp. 25-26; Records, pp. 57-58].

Admittedly, findings of expert witnesses will only serve as a guide for the courts to arrive
at a finding after considering all the facts of a given case. But in the light of the evidence
presented by both parties in the instant action, the above findings further engender doubt
in the prosecution's theory of the case.

While the Court generally desists from disturbing the findings of the trial court,
considering that the latter is in a better position to pass upon the matter of credibility of
witnesses, the Court will not hesitate to take exception to this rule in order to keep faith
with the principle that every criminal conviction must be supported by proof beyond
reasonable doubt [People v. Ola, G.R. No. L-47147, July 3, 1987, 152 SCRA 1; People v.
Mejias, G.R. No. 79677, November 28, 1988]. The proof against the accused must
survive the test of moral certainty. The conscience must be satisfied that on the
defendant could be laid the responsibility for the offense charged [People v. Dramayo,
G.R. No. L-21325, October 29, 1971, 42 SCRA 59].

In view of the foregoing, the Court declares that the prosecution failed to discharge its
burden of proving the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt. The implausible
tenor of the testimony of the alleged rape victim weighed against the evidence presented
for the accused casts serious doubt on the guilt of the accused.

WHEREFORE, the accused-appellant's guilt not having been proved beyond reasonable
doubt, he is hereby ACQUITTED of the crime charged.

SO ORDERED.

Fernan, C.J., Gutierrez, Jr., Feliciano and Bidin, JJ., concur.