DUE PROCESS means law in its regular course of administration
- Purpose of the Guarantee through courts of justice."
HURTADO v. CALIFORNIA [110 U.S. 516 (1884)]
FACTS: Joseph Hurtado discovered that his wife had
been unfaithful to him, having carried on an affair
with a family friend. Hurtado sought to remedy the
situation both by sending his wife away and by
assaulting her lover. After Hurtados efforts proved
ineffective and terminated the extramarital liaison,
he shot and killed his wifes lover. He was arrested
and charged with murder. However, under California
law (and the California Constitution) Hurtado was
never indicted by a grand jury. Rather, the State of
California prosecuted Hurtado based on an
information subject to the examination of a
magistrate. The magistrate in Hurtados case made
the required finding that sufficient evidence existed
to proceed to trial. At trial, Hurtado was convicted
and sentenced to death. He appealed his conviction,
arguing that California had violated his Due Process
rights under the Fourth Amendment by failing to
secure a grand jury indictment.
ISSUE: WON the Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment require states to secure
grand jury indictments in order to prosecute
defendants for felonies?
HELD: No. The words "due process of law" in the
Fourteenth Amendment of the Constitution of the
United States do not necessarily require an
indictment by a grand jury in a prosecution by a
State for murder. The substitution of an indictment
by a grand jury by an information, which certified
the probable guilt of defendant, combined with his
right to the aid of counsel and to cross-examination
of the witnesses, did not violate due process of law.
While the Court looks to both history and
constitutional limitations, due process does not have
a single, fixed meaning with a required list of all
particulars. While the Court may conclude that some
requirements are necessary, fundamental, and
required, that is not the same as saying every
conceivable procedure in widespread usage is
constitutionally required. Furthermore, Justice
Matthews explained that the requirements of due
process are not forever fixed, instead allowing for
adaption. Next, the Court explained that the
constitution served as a check on legislative
authority, primarily as a means to safeguard liberty
and not as a means to establish universal, required
procedures. Turning to the constitutional text, the
Court made two observations. First, the right to a
grand jury is listed separate from general due
process rights in the Fifth Amendment, suggesting
that the Framers did not include the right to trial by
jury under any necessary understanding of due
process. Second, the drafters of the Fourteenth
Amendment included a due process guarantee-
enforceable against the states- but did not
separately protect the right to grand jury indictment.
Based on those observations, the Court concluded
that grand jury indictments are not necessary to
basic due process guarantees. Based on those
observations, the Court concluded that grand jury
indictments are not necessary to basic due process
guarantees.
According to Chancellor Kent, 2 Com. 13 "The better
and larger definition of due process of law is that it
This accords with what is said in Westervelt v.
Gregg, 1 N.Y. 202, by Denio, J., p. 212:
"The provision was designed to protect the
citizen against all mere acts of power, whether
flowing from the legislative or executive branches
of the government."
The principal and true meaning of the phrase has
never been more tersely or accurately stated
than by Mr. Justice Johnson, in Bank of Columbia
v. Okely, 4 Wheat. 235-244:
"As to the words from Magna Charta, were
intended to secure the individual from the
arbitrary exercise of the powers of government,
unrestrained by the established principles of
private right and distributive justice."
And the conclusion rightly deduced is, as stated
by Mr. Cooley, Constitutional Limitations, 36:
"The principles, then, upon which the process is
based are to determine whether it is 'due
process' or not, and not any considerations of
mere form. Administrative and remedial process
may be changed from time to time, but only with
due regard to the landmarks established for the
protection of the citizen."
- Life, Liberty and Property
CHAVEZ vs ROMULO [G.R. No. 157036 June
09, 2004]
FACTS: Acting on President Arroyos directive in
her speech on the need for a nationwide gun ban
in all public places to avert the rising crime
incidents, respondent Ebdane issued the assailed
Guidelines in the Implementation of the Ban on
the Carrying of Firearms Outside of
Residence.Petitioner, Francisco I. Chavez, a
licensed gun owner to whom a PTCFOR has been
issued, requested the DILG to reconsider the
implementation of the assailed Guidelines. The
request was denied. Hence the petition for
prohibition and injunction against Executive
Secretary Alberto Romulo and PNP Chief Ebdane.
ISSUES: WON the PNP Guidelines violate the due
process clause?
HELD: No. In evaluating a due process claim, the
first and foremost consideration must be whether
life, liberty or property interest exists. The bulk of
jurisprudence is that a license authorizing a
person to enjoy a certain privilege is neither a
property nor property right. In Tan vs. The
Director of Forestry, it was ruled that a license is
merely a permit or privilege to do what otherwise
would be unlawful, and is not a contract between
the authority granting it and the person to whom
it is granted; neither is it property or a property
right, nor does it create a vested right. In a more
emphatic pronouncement, in Oposa vs. Factoran,
Jr. all licenses may thus be revoked or rescinded
by executive action. It is not a contract, property
or a property right protected by the due process
clause of the Constitution.
In our jurisdiction, the PNP Chief is granted broad
discretion in the issuance of PTCFOR. A PTCFOR
does not constitute a property right protected under
our Constitution. Consequently, a PTCFOR, just like
ordinary licenses in other regulated fields, may be
revoked any time. It does not confer an absolute
right, but only a personal privilege to be exercised
under existing restrictions, and such as may
thereafter be reasonably imposed. A licensee takes
his license subject to such conditions as the
Legislature sees fit to impose, and one of the
statutory conditions of this license is that it might be
revoked by the selectmen at their pleasure. Such a
license is not a contract, and a revocation of it does
not deprive the defendant of any property,
immunity, or privilege within the meaning of these
words in the Declaration of Rights. The correlative
power to revoke or recall permission is a necessary
consequence of the main power. A mere license by
the State is always revocable.
LIBANAN vs SANDIGANBAYAN [233 SCRA 163]
FACTS: Petitioner Marcelino C. Libanan, the
incumbent Vice-Governor of Eastern Samar, was a
member of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of that
province prior to the 11 May 1992 elections.
He was charged in conspiring to other members to
prevent and exclude Respondent, a qualified
replacement of a deceased member, from exercising
his rights and prerogatives as a member of the said
body.In effect, the SANDIGANBAYAN issued a
resolution suspending their respective public
position and office for 90 days.
Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration, alleging
three grounds: [1] Order of Suspension if executed
shall affront the petitioners right for due process; [2]
the suspension would assault his covenant to the
people of Samar as their vice-governor; and [3] the
reasons sought to be prevented by the suspension
no longer exist.
Petitioner contends that the order of suspension,
being predicated on his acts supposedly committed
while still a member of the Sangguniang Bayan, can
no longer attach to him now that he is the duly
elected and incumbent Vice-Governor of Eastern
Samar. The implementation of the suspension order,
he further claims, would amount to a deprivation of
property without due process of law.
ISSUE: WON the suspension order would amount to
deprivation of property without due process of law?
HELD: No. The suspension order cannot amount to a
deprivation of property without due process of law.
Public office is "a public agency or trust," and it is
not the property envisioned by the Constitutional
provision which petitioner invokes.
The Court ruled that the term "office" used in the law
could apply to any office which the officer charged
might currently be holding and not necessarily the
particular office under which he was charged. The
petitioner is wrong in his contention that the
suspension order can no longer attach to him now
that he is the duly elected and incumbent Vice-
Governor of Eastern Samar.
- Substantive Due Process
RUBI VS. PROVINCIAL BOARD OF MINDORO [ 39
PHIL 660]
FACTS: The provincial board of Mindoro adopted
resolution No. 25 wherein non-Christian
inhabitants (uncivilized tribes) will be directed to
take up their habitation on sites on unoccupied
public lands. It is resolved that under section
2077 of the Administrative Code, 800 hectares of
public land in the sitio of Tigbao on Naujan Lake
be selected as a site for the permanent
settlement of Mangyanes in Mindoro. Further,
Mangyans may only solicit homesteads on this
reservation providing that said homestead
applications are previously recommended by the
provincial governor.
In that case, pursuant to Section 2145 of the
Revised Administrative Code, all the Mangyans in
the townships of Naujan and Pola and the
Mangyans east of the Baco River including those
in the districts of Dulangan and Rubi's place in
Calapan, were ordered to take up their habitation
on the site of Tigbao, Naujan Lake. Also, that any
Mangyan who shall refuse to comply with this
order shall upon conviction be imprisoned not
exceed in sixty days, in accordance with section
2759 of the revised Administrative Code.
Said resolution of the provincial board of Mindoro
were claimed as necessary measures for the
protection of the Mangyanes of Mindoro as well
as the protection of public forests in which they
roam, and to introduce civilized customs among
them.
It appeared that Rubi and those living in his
rancheria have not fixed their dwelling within the
reservation of Tigbao and are liable to be
punished.
It is alleged that the Manguianes are being
illegally deprived of their liberty by the provincial
officials of that province. Rubi and his
companions are said to be held on the
reservation established at Tigbao, Mindoro,
against their will, and one Dabalos is said to be
held under the custody of the provincial sheriff in
the prison at Calapan for having run away form
the reservation.
ISSUES: 1.Whether or Not Section 2145 of the
Administrative Code deprives a person of his
liberty?
2.Thus, whether or not Section 2145 of the
Administrative Code of 1917 is constitutional?
HELD: The Court held that section 2145 of the
Administrative Code does not deprive a person of
his liberty of abode and does not deny to him the
equal protection of the laws, and that
confinement in reservations in accordance with
said section does not constitute slavery and
involuntary servitude. The Court is further of the
opinion that section 2145 of the Administrative
Code is a legitimate exertion of the police power.
Section 2145 of the Administrative Code of 1917
is constitutional.
Assigned as reasons for the action: (1) attempts
for the advancement of the non-Christian people
of the province; and (2) the only successfully
method for educating the Manguianes was to
oblige them to live in a permanent settlement.
The Solicitor-General adds the following; (3) The
protection of the Manguianes; (4) the protection
of the public forests in which they roam; (5) the
necessity of introducing civilized customs among the
Manguianes.
One cannot hold that the liberty of the citizen is
unduly interfered without when the degree of
civilization of the Manguianes is considered. They
are restrained for their own good and the general
good of the Philippines.
Liberty regulated by law": Implied in the term is
restraint by law for the good of the individual and for
the greater good of the peace and order of society
and the general well-being. No man can do exactly
as he pleases. None of the rights of the citizen can
be taken away except by due process of law.
Therefore, petitioners are not unlawfully imprisoned
or restrained of their liberty. Habeas corpus can,
therefore, not issue.
VILLEGAS vs HIU CHIONG TSAI PAO HO
[G.R. No. L-29646; November 10, 1978]
FACTS: The Municipal Board of Manila enacted
Ordinance 6537 requiring aliens (except those
employed in the diplomatic and consular missions of
foreign countries, in technical assistance programs
of the government and another country, and
members of religious orders or congregations) to
procure the requisite mayors permit so as to be
employed or engage in trade in the City of Manila.
The permit fee is P50, and the penalty for the
violation of the ordinance is 3 to 6 months
imprisonment or a fine of P100 to P200, or both.
Private respondent Hiu Chiong Tsai Pao Ho who was
employed in Manila, filed a petition with the CFI of
Manila, praying for the issuance of the writ of
preliminary injunction and restraining order to stop
the enforcement of Ordinance No. 6537 as well as
for a judgment declaring said Ordinance No. 6537
null and void. Respondent Judge issued the writ of
preliminary injunction and rendered judgment
declaring Ordinance No. 6537 null and void and
making permanent the writ of preliminary injunction.
Contesting the aforecited decision of respondent
Judge, then Mayor Antonio J. Villegas filed the
present petition.
ISSUE: WON Ordinance no.6537 violates the due
process and equal protection clauses of the
Constitution?
HELD: Yes. The ordinance in question violates the
due process of law and equal protection rule of the
Constitution.
Requiring a person before he can be employed to
get a permit from the City Mayor of Manila who may
withhold or refuse it at will is tantamount to denying
him the basic right of the people in the Philippines to
engage in a means of livelihood. While it is true that
the Philippines as a State is not obliged to admit
aliens within its territory, once an alien is admitted,
he cannot be deprived of life without due process of
law. This guarantee includes the means of livelihood.
The shelter of protection under the due process and
equal protection clause is given to all persons, both
aliens and citizens.
It is obvious that the purpose of the ordinance is to
raise money under the guise of regulation.The
P50.00 fee is unreasonable not only because it is
excessive but because it fails to consider valid
substantial differences in situation among
individual aliens who are required to pay it.
Although the equal protection clause of the
Constitution does not forbid classification, it is
imperative that the classification should be based
on real and substantial differences having a
reasonable relation to the subject of the
particular legislation. The same amount of P50.00
is being collected from every employed alien
whether he is casual or permanent, part time or
full time or whether he is a lowly employee or a
highly paid executive.
- Void for Vagueness/Overbreadth
DAVID vs ARROYO [G.R. No. 171396, May 3,
2006]
FACTS: As the Filipino nation celebrated the 20th
Anniversary of the EDSA People Power I,
President Arroyo issued PP 1017, implemented by
G.O. No. 5, declaring a state of national
emergency.
In their presentation of the factual bases of PP
1017 and G.O. No. 5, respondents stated that the
proximate cause behind the executive issuances
was the conspiracy among some military officers,
leftist insurgents of the New Peoples Army, and
some members of the political opposition in a
plot to unseat or assassinate President Arroyo.
They considered the aim to oust or assassinate
the President and take-over the reins of
government as a clear and present danger.
Petitioners David and Llamas were arrested
without warrants on their way to EDSA.
Meanwhile, the offices of the newspaper Daily
Tribune, which was perceived to be anti-Arroyo,
was searched without warrant at about 1:00 A.M.
on February 25, 2006. Seized from the premises
in the absence of any official of the Daily Tribune
except the security guard of the building were
several materials for publication. The law
enforcers, a composite team of PNP and AFP
officers, cited as basis of the warrantless arrests
and the warrantless search and seizure was
Presidential Proclamation 1017 issued by then
President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo in the exercise
of her constitutional power to call out the Armed
Forces of the Philippines to prevent or suppress
lawless violence.
ISSUE: 1. Whether or not the warrantless arrests
of petitioners David, et al., made pursuant to PP
1017, are valid.
2. Whether or not PP 11017 is constitutional.
HELD: 1. No, the warrantless arrests of
petitioners David, et al., made pursuant to PP
1017, were not valid.
Searches, seizures and arrests are normally
unreasonable unless authorized by a validly
issued search warrant or warrant of arrest.
Section 5, Rule 113 of the Revised Rules on
Criminal Procedure provides [for the following
circumstances of valid warrantless arrests:
Sec. 5. Arrest without warrant; when lawful. - A
peace officer or a private person may, without a
warrant, arrest a person:
(a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested
has committed, is actually committing, or is
attempting to commit an offense.
(b) When an offense has just been committed and he
has probable cause to believe based on personal
knowledge of facts or circumstances that the person
to be arrested has committed it; and Justice
Mendoza also stated that PP 1017 is not a
declaration of Martial Law. It is no more than a call
by the President to the armed forces to prevent or
suppress lawless violence. As such, it cannot be used
to justify acts that only under a valid declaration of
Martial Law can be done. Its use for any other
purpose is a perversion of its nature and scope, and
any act done contrary to its command is ultra vires.
Justice Mendoza further stated that specifically, (a)
arrests and seizures without judicial warrants; (b)
ban on public assemblies; (c) take-over of news
media and agencies and press censorship; and (d)
issuance of Presidential Decrees, are powers which
can be exercised by the President as Commander-in-
Chief only where there is a valid declaration of
Martial Law or suspension of the writ of habeas
corpus. Based on the above disquisition, it is clear
that PP 1017 is not a declaration of Martial Law. It is
merely an exercise of President Arroyos calling-out
power for the armed forces to assist her in
preventing or suppressing lawless violence
2. Partially. The Court rules that PP 1017 is
constitutional insofar as it constitutes a call by
President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo on the AFP to
prevent or suppress lawless violence. However, the
provisions of PP 1017 commanding the AFP to
enforce laws not related to lawless violence, as well
as decrees promulgated by the President, are
declared unconstitutional. In addition, the provision
in PP 1017 declaring national emergency under
Section 17, Article VII of the Constitution is
constitutional, but such declaration does not
authorize the President to take over privately-owned
public utility or business affected with public interest
without prior legislation.
The Court partially granted the petitions.
JOSEPH EJERCITO ESTRADA VS.
SANDIGANBAYAN
[G.R. No. 148560 November 19, 2001]
FACTS: The Office of the Ombudsman accuses
President Estrada of the crime of plunder defined
and penalized under R.A. No. 7080 as amended by
Sec. 12 R.A. No. 7659.
During the term of President Estrada, he wilfully,
unlawfully and criminally amass, accumulate and
acquire by himself, directly or indirectly ill-gotten
wealth amounting to 4,097,804,173.17, thereby
unjustly enriching himself or themselves at the
expense and to the damage of the Filipino people
and the Republic of the Philippines.
Under RA 7080 An Act Defining and Penalizing the
Crime of Plunder as amended by RA 7659 Section
2, the crime of plunder is defined as an act of any
public officer who, by himself or in connivance with
members of his family, relatives by affinity or
consanguinity, business associates, subordinates or
other persons, amasses, accumulates or acquires ill-
gotten wealth through a combination or a series of
overt or criminal acts described in Section 1(d)
hereof in the aggregate amount or total value of at
least 50,000,000 and shall be punished by
reclusion perpetua to death.
Section 1. x x (d) "Ill-gotten wealth" means any
asset, property, business, enterprise or material
possession of any person within the purview of
Section Two (2) hereof, acquired by him directly
or indirectly through dummies, nominees, agents,
subordinates and/or business associates by any
combination or series of the following means or
similar schemes:
(1) Through misappropriation, conversion,
misuse, or malversation of public funds or raids
on the public treasury;
(2) By receiving, directly or indirectly, any
commission, gift, share, percentage, kickbacks or
any other form of pecuniary benefit from any
person and/or entity in connection with any
government contract or project or by reason of
the office or position of the public office
concerned;
(3) By the illegal or fraudulent conveyance or
disposition of assets belonging to the National
Government or any of its subdivisions, agencies
or instrumentalities, or government owned or
controlled corporations and their subsidiaries;
(4) By obtaining, receiving or accepting directly
or indirectly any shares of stock, equity or any
other form of interest or participation including
the promise of future employment in any
business enterprise or undertaking;
(5) By establishing agricultural, industrial or
commercial monopolies or other combinations
and/or implementation of decrees and orders
intended to benefit particular persons or special
interests; or
(6) By taking advantage of official position,
authority, relationship, connection or influence to
unjustly enrich himself or themselves at the
expense and to the damage and prejudice of the
Filipino people and the Republic of the
Philippines.
Petitioner Estrada questions the validity of the
law for it is void for vagueness. He bewails the
failure of the law to provide for the statutory
definition of the terms and combination and
series in the key phrase a combination or a
series of overt or criminal acts found in Section
1 par. d, and the word pattern in Section
ISSUE: WON the Plunder Law is unconstitutional
for it suffers from the vice of vagueness?
HELD: The Supreme Court ruled that a statute or
act may be said to be vague when it lacks
comprehensible standards that men of common
intelligence must necessarily guess at its
meaning and differ in its application. In such
instance, the statute is repugnant to the
Constitution in 2 respects - it violates due process
for failure to accord persons, especially the
parties targeted by it, fair notice of what conduct
to avoid; and, it leaves law enforcers unbridled
discretion in carrying out its provisions and
becomes an arbitrary flexing of the Government
muscle. But the doctrine does not apply as
against legislations that are merely couched in
imprecise language but which nonetheless
specify a standard though defectively phrased; or to
those that are apparently ambiguous yet fairly
applicable to certain types of activities. The first may
be "saved" by proper construction, while no
challenge may be mounted as against the second
whenever directed against such activities. With more
reason, the doctrine cannot be invoked where the
assailed statute is clear and free from ambiguity, as
in this case.
The test in determining whether a criminal statute is
void for uncertainty is whether the language
conveys a sufficiently definite warning as to the
proscribed conduct when measured by common
understanding and practice. It must be stressed,
however, that the "vagueness" doctrine merely
requires a reasonable degree of certainty for the
statute to be upheld - not absolute precision or
mathematical exactitude, as petitioner seems to
suggest. Flexibility, rather than meticulous
specificity, is permissible as long as the metes and
bounds of the statute are clearly delineated. An act
will not be held invalid merely because it might have
been more explicit in its wordings or detailed in its
provisions, especially where, because of the nature
of the act, it would be impossible to provide all the
details in advance as in all other statutes.
ONG vs. SANDIGANBAYAN [GR No. 126858;
Sept 16, 2005]
FACTS: Congressman Bonifacio Gallego executed a
complaint against petitioner Ong, a former
Commissioner of the BIR claiming that petitioner has
amassed properties worth disproportionately more
than his lawful income. The Director of the Fact
Finding Committee of the office of the Ombudsman
ordered the conduct of investigation on the matter;
of which petitioner was required to submit counter
affidavit and controverting evidence. Petitioner filed
a counter-affidavit submitting his Statements of
Assets and Liabilities, income tax return, bank
certificates showing that he obtained a loan from
Allied Banking Corporation, certificate from SGV and
company and other documents explaining the
sources of funds with which he acquired the
questioned assets. Ombudsman finds and
recommend for recovery of ill-gotten wealth under
Ra 1379, in relation to RAs 3019 and 6770 against
Ong and all other persons concerned.
ISSUES: 1.WON, the right to preliminary
investigation is withheld by RA 1379 from a co-
respondent Nelly Ong, who is not herself a public
officer or employee?
2.WON, petitioner is correct in his contention that
the office of the Ombudsman is disqualified to file a
petition for forfeiture considering of the duality of
function, as investigator and prosecutor of the case?
3.WON, petitioner is correct in the contention that
RA1379 is unconstitutional since it violates the
presumption of innocence and the right against self
incrimination?
HELD: 1.No, even if RA 1379 appears to be directed
only against the public officer or employee who has
acquired during his incumbency an amount of
property which is manifestly out of proportion to his
salary and his other lawful income and the income
from legitimately acquired property, the reality thst
the application of the law is such that the conjugal
share of Nelly Ong stands to be subjective to the
penalty of forfeiture grants her the right, in line
with the due process clause of the constitution, to
a preliminary investigation.
2.No, Supreme Court declared that the office of
the Ombudsman has the correlative powers to
investigate and initiate the proper action for the
recovery of ill-gotten and/or unexplained wealth.
3.No, the court ruled that petitioner cannot
invoked constitutional assurance against self
incrimination because such right is a prohibition
against the use of physical or moral compulsion
to extort communications to the accused. In this
case, petitioners are not compelled to present
themselves as witnesses in rebutting the
presumption established by law. They may
present documents evidencing the purported
bank loans, money market placements and other
fund sources in their defense.
BLAS OPLE VS RUBEN TORRES [292 SCRA
141 (1998)]
FACTS: President Fidel V. Ramos issued
Administrative Order 308 entitled Adoption of
National and Computerized Identification
Reference System. The purposes of the said
order are: (a) it will provide the Filipino and
foreign residents with the convenience to
transact businesses with basic service and social
security providers and other government
instrumentalities (b) it will reduce if not totally
eradicate fraudulent transactions and
misrepresentations because it will require a
computerized system to properly and efficiently
identify person seeking basic services on social
security.
Petitioner Senator Blas Ople prays to invalidate
A.O. 308 for two vital constitutional grounds: (a)
it is a usurpation of power of Congress to
legislate (b) it intrudes the citizenrys protected
zone of privacy.
ISSUE: Whether or not Administrative Order 308
is unconstitutional for being overbreadth?
HELD: The Supreme Court ruled that it is
inarguable that the broadness, vagueness and
overbreadth of A.O. 308 will put the peoples
right to privacy in clear and present danger.
Administrative Order 308 does not state: (a) what
specific biological characteristics will be gathered
(b) what particular biometrics technology will be
employed (c) whether data is limited to use for
identification purposes only (d) how data will be
handled (e)who shall control and access the data.
Thus A.O 308 does not assure the individual of a
reasonable expectation of privacy because, as
technology advances, the level of reasonable
expected privacy decreases.
- Procedural Due Process
(Publication Requirement)
PHILIPPINE INTERNATIONAL TRADING
CORPORATION vs. JUDGE ANGELES
[G.R. No. 108461 October 21, 1996]
FACTS: Petitioner issued AO No. SOCPEC 89-08-
01, under which, applications to the PITC for
importation from the People's Republic of China
(PROC, for brevity) must be accompanied by a
viable and confirmed Export Program of
Philippine Products to PROC carried out by the
improper himself or through a tie-up with a
legitimate importer in an amount equivalent to
the value of the importation from PROC being
applied for, or, simply, at one is to one ratio.
Private respondents Remington and Firestone
individually applied for authority to import from
PROC with the petitioner. They were granted
such authority after satisfying the requirements
for importers, and after they executed
respective undertakings. Subsequently, for
failing to comply with their undertakings to
submit export credits equivalent to the value of
their importations, further import applications
were withheld by petitioner PITC from private
respondents, such that the latter were both
barred from importing goods from PROC. As a
result, the private respondents filed a Petition
for Prohibition and Mandamus against the PITC.
The court ruled that declared the Administrative
Order to be null and void, since the same was
not published, contrary to Article 2 of the New
Civil Code.
ISSUE: WON the Administrative Order issued by
PITC is null and void on the ground that it was
not published in accordance with Article 2 of the
New Civil Code?
HELD: Yes. The questioned Administrative
Order, legally, until it is published, is invalid
within the context of Article 2 of Civil Code,
which reads:
Art. 2. Laws shall take effect fifteen days
following the completion of their publication in
the Official Gazette (or in a newspaper of
general circulation in the Philippines), unless it
is otherwise provided. . . .
The original Administrative Order issued on
August 30, 1989, under which the respondents
filed their applications for importation, was not
published in the Official Gazette or in a
newspaper of general circulation. The fact that
the amendments to Administrative Order No.
SOCPEC 89-08-01 were filed with, and published
by the UP Law Center in the National
Administrative Register, does not cure the
defect related to the effectivity of the
Administrative Order.
We agree that the publication must be in full or
it is no publication at all since its purpose is to
inform the public of the contents of the laws.
The Administrative Order under consideration is
one of those issuances which should be
published for its effectivity, since its purpose is
to enforce and implement an existing law
pursuant to a valid delegation, i.e., P.D. 1071, in
relation to LOI 444 and EO 133.
TAADA vs. HON. TUVERA [G.R. No. L-
63915 Dec 29, 1986]
FACTS: The Court affirmed the necessity for
the publication to the Official Gazette all
unpublished presidential issuances which are
of general application, and unless so
published, they shall have no binding force
and effect. Decision was concurred only by 3
judges. Petitioners move for
reconsideration / clarification of the decision
on various questions. Solicitor General avers
that the motion is a request for advisory
opinion. February Revolution took place,
which subsequently required the new
Solicitor General to file a rejoinder on the
issue.
ISSUE: Whether or not publication is still
required in light of the clause unless
otherwise provided?
HELD: Yes. The clause unless it is otherwise
provided, in Article 2 of the Civil Code,
refers to the date of effectivity and not to the
requirement of publication itself, which
cannot in any event be omitted. This clause
does not mean that the legislature may
make the law effective immediately upon
approval, or on any other date, without its
previous publication. The legislature may in
its discretion provide that the usual fifteen-
day period shall be shortened or extended.
Publication requirements applies to (1) all
statutes, including those of local application
and private laws; (2) presidential decrees
and executive orders promulgated by the
President in the exercise of legislative
powers whenever the same are validly
delegated by the legislature or directly
conferred by the Constitution; (3)
Administrative rules and regulations for the
purpose of enforcing or implementing
existing law pursuant also to a valid
delegation; (4) Charter of a city
notwithstanding that it applies to only a
portion of the national territory and directly
affects only the inhabitants of that place; (5)
Monetary Board circulars to fill in the
details of the Central Bank Act which that
body is supposed to enforce. Further,
publication must be in full or it is no
publication at all since its purpose is to
inform the public of the contents of the laws.
The Supreme Court declared that all laws as
above defined shall immediately upon their
approval, or as soon thereafter as possible,
be published in full in the Official Gazette, to
become effective only after 15 days from
their publication, or on another date
specified by the legislature, in accordance
with Article 2 of the Civil Code.
REPUBLIC vs. EXTELCOM [G.R. No.
147096 January 15, 2002]
FACTS: The International Communications
Corporation (now Bayantel) filed an application
with the NTC for a CPCN to install, operate and
maintain a digital Cellular MobileTelephone
System/Service (CMTS) with prayer for a
Provisional Authority (PA).
However, ExpressTelecommunication Co., Inc.
(Extelcom) filed in NTC an Opposition praying
for the dismissal of Bayantels application. The
NTC issued an Order granting in favor of
Bayantel, applying Rule 15, Section 3 of its
1978 Rules of Practice and Procedure. Extelcom
filed with the CA a petition seeking the
annulment of the Order of the RTC, which was
eventually granted by the CA. Aggrieved,
Bayantel brought the case to the SC.
Extelcom contends that the NTC should have
applied the Revised Rules which were filed with
the Office of the NAR on February 3, 1993. The
NTC, on the other hand, issued a certification to
the effect that inasmuch as the 1993 Revised
Rules have not been published in a newspaper
of general circulation, the NTC has been
applying the 1978 Rules. Thus, the present
petition.
ISSUE: WON the 1978 or 1993 NTC Rules of
Practice and Procedure should govern in the
approval of Bayantels application
HELD: The 1978 NTC Rules should govern. The
absence of publication, coupled with the
certification by the Commissioner of the NTC
stating that the NTC was still governed by the
1978 Rules, clearly indicate that the 1993
Revised Rules have not taken effect at the time
of the grant of the provisional authority to
Bayantel.
There is nothing in the Administrative Code of
1987 which implies that the filing of the rules
with the UP Law Center is the operative act that
gives the rules force and effect. Still,
publication in the Official Gazette or a
newspaper of general circulation is a condition
sine qua non before statutes, rules or
regulations can take effect. The Rules of
Practice and Procedure of the NTC, which
implements Section 29 of the Public Service Act
(Commonwealth Act 146, as amended), fall
squarely within the scope of these laws.
Administrative rules and regulations must be
published if their purpose is to enforce or
implement existing law pursuant to a valid
delegation.
The only exceptions are interpretative
regulations, those merely internal in nature, or
those so-called letters of instructions issued by
administrative superiors concerning the rules
and guidelines to be followed by their
subordinates in the performance of their duties.
- Procedural Due Process
(Impartial Court or Tribunal)
FELICIDAD ANZALDO vs. JACOBO C.
CLAVE
[G.R. No. L-54597 December 15, 1982]
FACTS: In 1974, the position of Science
Research Supervisor II (Medical Research
Department) became vacant when the
incumbent, Dr. Kintanar, became Director of
the Biological Research Center of the
National Institute of Science and Technology
(NIST). Dr. Anzaldo and Dr. Venzon were both
next-in-rank to the vacant position, both
holding positions of Scientist Research
Associate IV.
Aside from her civil service eligibility as a
pharmacist, she is a registered medical
technologist and supervisor (unassembled).
She started working in the NIST in 1954 and
has served for 28 years. On the other hand,
Dr. Venzon finished Medicine (1957, UST).
She started working in the NIST in 1960 and
has served for 21 years. Dr. Anzaldo is senior
to her in point of service. Dr. Quintin Kintanar
recommended Dr. Venzon for the position.
Dr. Anzaldo protested against such
recommendation, to which the NIST
Reorganization Committee found such
protest to be valid and meritorious. Due to
the impasse, the NIST Commissioner,
however, did not resolve the issue. The
position was not filled up.
Dr. Pedro Afable, Vice Chairman, later
became OIC of the NIST. He appointed Dr.
Anzaldo to the position effective 4 January
1978, after thorough study and screening of
the qualifications of both doctors and upon
recommendation of the NIST Staff Evaluation
(88-61 votes). The Civil Service Commission
approved the appointment. Dr. Venzon
appealed to the Office of the President of the
Philippines (addressed to Presidential
Executive Assistant Jacobo Clave, who was
concurrently the Chairman of the CSC). The
appeal was forwarded to the NIS OIC Jose P.
Planas, who reiterated Dr. Afables decision.
The appeal-protest was later sent to the CSC.
CSC Chairman Clave and Commissioner Jose
A. Melo recommended in Resolution 1178
dated 23 August 1979 that Dr. Venzon be
appointed to the position, in conflict with the
1978 appointment of Dr. Anzaldo which was
duly attested and approved by the CSC.
The Resolution was made in pursuance to
Section 19(6) of the Civil Service Decree of
the Philippines (PD 807, 6 October 1975),
which provides that "before deciding a
contested appointment, the Office of the
President shall consult the Civil Service
Commission." On 5 January 1980, after
denial of her motion for the reconsideration
of the resolution, Dr. Anzaldo appealed to the
Office of the President of the Philippines.
Presidential Executive Assistant Clave in his
decision of 20 March 1980 revoked Dr.
Anzaldo's appointment and ruled that, "as
recommended by the Civil Service Commission"
(meaning Chairman Clave himself and
Commissioner Melo), Dr. Venzon should be
appointed to the contested position but that Dr.
Anzaldo's appointment to the said position
should be considered "valid and effective during
the pendency" of Dr. Venzon's protest. In a
resolution dated 14 August 1980, Presidential
Executive Assistant Clave denied Dr. Anzaldo's
motion for reconsideration. On 25 August 1980,
Dr. Anzaldo filed in the Supreme Court the
special civil action of certiorari.
ISSUE: WON CSC Commissioner Jacobo Clave
can concur with the recommendation of the
Presidential Executive Assistant, who is himself,
in the appointment of Dr. Venzon?
HELD: No. The 20 March 1980 decision of
Presidential Executive Assistant Clave
implemented the 23 August 1979 Resolution
1178 of Clave (as CSC Chairman), concurred
with by Commissioner Melo, recommending the
appointment of Dr. Venzon as Science Research
Supervisor II in place of Dr. Anzaldo. When
Presidential Executive Assistant Clave said in
his decision that he was "inclined to concur in
the recommendation of the Civil Service
Commission", what he meant was that he was
concurring with Chairman Clave's
recommendation.
It is evident that Doctor Anzaldo was denied
due process of law when Presidential Executive
Assistant Clave concurred with the
recommendation of Chairman Clave of the Civil
Service Commission. Common sense and
propriety dictate that the commissioner in the
Civil Service Commission, who should be
consulted by the Office of the President, should
be a person different from the person in the
Office of the President who would decide the
appeal of the protestant in a contested
appointment.
PEOPLE VS CA [262 SCRA 452]
FACTS: There are no preliminary facts provided
regarding "People vs. Hon. Pedro S. Espina et
al." (In Court of Appeals), "People vs. Cristeta
Reyes, et al.," and "People of the Philippines vs.
Jane C. Go" (both in RTC branch presided by
Judge Pedro Espina) in the present resolution;
except the fact that Jane Go is the principal
accused in the killing of her husband Dominador
Go.
The Office of the SolGen filed a petition for
review with urgent prayer for a writ of
preliminary injunction and/or restraining order
to annul and set aside the decision of the Court
of Appeals in CA-GR SP 31733 in so far as it
denied Peoples prayer for the inhibition of
Judge Espina in hearing Criminal cases 93-01-38
and 93-01-39, and enjoining the judge from
conducting further proceedings in such
criminal cases, before the Supreme Court.
The Court resolved to require Cristeta Reyes
and Roger Doctora, Johny Santos and
Antonio Alegro, and Jane C. Go to comment
within 10 days from notice, to issue the
temporary restraining order prayed for, and
to enjoin Judge Pedro S. Espina from taking
further action in Criminal Cases 93-01-38
and 93-01-39 until further orders from the
Court. Reyes, Doctora, Santos, Alegro, and
Go failed to file their respective comments
within the reglementary period, nor within
the second deadline.
As the latter are already in detention and
that sanction relating to delay in the
submission of the comments may not
amount to much, and as not to unduly delay
the disposition of Criminal Cases 93-01-38
and 93-01-39, the Court resolved to dispense
with the latter's comments and to proceed
with the disposition of the petition.
ISSUE: Whether or not the decision of a
Judge favorable to the accused in a different
special civil proceeding is enough basis to
render the Judge to be partial or bias in the
present criminal case.
HELD: Yes. One of the essential
requirements of procedural due process in a
judicial proceeding is that there must be an
impartial court or tribunal clothed with
judicial power to hear and determine the
matter before it.
Thus, every litigant, including the State, is
entitled to the cold neutrality of an impartial
judge. The judge must not only be impartial
but must also appear to be impartial as an
added assurance to the parties that his
decision will be just. They should be sure
that when their rights are violated they can
go to a judge who shall give them justice.
They must believe in his sense of fairness,
otherwise they will not seek his judgment.
Due process is intended to insure that
confidence by requiring compliance with the
rudiments of fair play. Fair play calls for
equal justice. There cannot be equal justice
where a suitor approaches a court already
committed to the other party and with a
judgment already made and waiting only to
be formalized after the litigants shall have
undergone the charade of a formal hearing.
The Judge will reach his conclusions only
after all the evidence is in and all the
arguments are filed, on the basis of the
established facts and the pertinent law.
Herein, Judge Pedro Espina cannot be
considered to adequately possess such cold
neutrality of an impartial judge as to fairly
assess both the evidence to be adduced by
the prosecution and the defense in view of
his previous decision in Special Civil Action 92-
11-219 wherein he enjoined the preliminary
investigation at the Regional State Prosecutor's
Office level against Jane Go, the principal
accused in the killing of her husband Dominador
Go.
Judge Espina's decision in favor of Jane Go
serves as sufficient and reasonable basis for the
prosecution to seriously doubt his impartiality in
handling the criminal cases. It would have been
more prudent for Judge Espina to have
voluntarily inhibited himself from hearing the
criminal cases.
TABUENA vs. SANDIGANBAYAN [G.R. Nos.
103501-03;Feb 17, 1997]
FACTS: Then President Marcos instructed Luis
Tabuena over the phone to pay directly to the
president's office and in cash what the Manila
International Airport Authority (MIAA) owes the
Philippine National Construction Corporation
(PNCC), pursuant to the memorandum of then
Minister Trade and Industry Roberto Ongpin.
Tabuena agreed.
About a week later, Tabuena received from Mrs.
Fe Roa-Gimenez, then private secretary of
Marcos, a Presidential Memorandum dated 8
January 1986 reiterating in black and white
such verbal instruction. In obedience to
President Marcos' verbal instruction and
memorandum, Tabuena, with the help of
Gerardo G. Dabao and Adolfo Peralta, caused
the release of P55 Million of MIAA funds by
means of 3withdrawals.
The first withdrawal was made for P25 Million,
following a letter of even date signed by
Tabuena and Dabao requesting the PNB
extension office at the MIAA the depository
branch of MIAA funds, to issue a manager's
check for said amount payable to Tabuena. The
check was encashed, however, at the PNB
Villamor Branch. Dabao and the cashier of the
PNB Villamor branch counted the money after
which, Tabuena took delivery thereof. The P25
Million in cash was delivered on the same day
to the office of Mrs. Gimenez. Mrs. Gimenez did
not issue any receipt for the money received.
Similar circumstances surrounded the second
withdrawal/encashment and delivery of another
P25 Million, made on 16 January 1986. The third
and last withdrawal was made on 31 January
1986 for P5 Million. Peralta was Tabuena's co-
signatory to the letter- request for a manager's
check for this amount. Peralta accompanied
Tabuena to the PNB Villamor branch as Tabuena
requested him to do the counting of the P5
Million. After the counting, the money was
loaded in the trunk of Tabuena's car. Peralta did
not go with Tabuena to deliver the money to
Mrs. Gimenez' office. It was only upon delivery
of the P5 Million that Mrs. Gimenez issued a
receipt for all the amounts she received from
Tabuena.
The receipt, Tabuena and Peralta were
charged for malversation of funds, while
Dabao remained at large. One of the justices
of the Sandiganbayan actively took part in
the questioning of a defense witness and of
the accused themselves; the volume of the
questions asked were more the combined
questions of the counsels.
They were found guilty beyond reasonable
doubt. Tabuena and Peralta filed separate
petitions for review, appealing the
Sandiganbayan decision dated 12 October
19990 and the Resolution of 20 December
1991.
ISSUE: Whether Tabuena and Peralta were
denied due process by the active
participation of a Sandiganbayan justice in
the questioning witnesses in the trial?
HELD: Yes. Due process requires no less
than the cold neutrality of an impartial
judge. Bolstering this requirement, we have
added that the judge must not only be
impartial but must also appear to be
impartial, to give added assurance to the
parties that his decision will be just. The
parties are entitled to no less than this, as a
minimum guaranty of due process.
Our courts should refrain from showing any
semblance of one-sided or more or less
partial attitude in order not to create any
false impression in the minds of the litigants.
For obvious reasons, it is the bounden duty
of all to strive for the preservation of the
people's faith in our courts. Respect for the
Constitution is more important than securing
a conviction based on a violation of the
rights of the accused.
The Court was struck by the way the
Sandiganbayan actively took part in the
questioning of a defense witness and of the
accused themselves, as shown in the
records. The volume of questions hurled by
the Sandiganbayan was more the combined
questions of the counsels. More importantly,
the questions of the court were in the nature
of cross examinations characteristic of
confrontation, probing and insinuation.
We have not adopted in this country the
practice of making the presiding judge the
chief inquisitor. It is better to observe our
time-honored custom of orderly judicial
procedure, even at the expense of
occasional delays. The impartiality of the
judge; his avoidance of the appearance of
becoming the advocate of either one side or
the other of the pending controversy is a
fundamental and essential rule of special
importance in criminal cases.
The Sandiganbayans decision is reversed
and set aside. Tabuena and Peralta are
acquitted of the crime of malversation. The
majority believes that the interference by the
Sandiganbayan Justices was just too excessive
that it cannot be justified under the norm
applied to a jury trial, or even under the
standard employed in a non-jury trial where the
judge is admittedly given more leeway in
propounding questions to clarify points and to
elicit additional relevant evidence.
It is never proper for a judge to discharge the
duties of a prosecuting attorney. However
anxious a judge may be for the enforcement of
the law, he should always remember that he is
as much judge in behalf of the defendant
accused of crime, and whose liberty is in
jeopardy, as he is judge in behalf of the state,
for the purpose of safeguarding the interests of
society.
TAADA vs. PHILIPPINE ATOMIC ENERGY
COMMISSION
[G.R. No. 70632 February 11, 1986]
FACTS: The Official Philippine Atomic Energy
Commission (PAEC) pamphlet, entitled "The
Philippine Nuclear Power Plant-1" was published
in 1985 when Commissioners Manuel Eugenio,
Quirino Navarro, and Alejandro Ver Albano had
already been appointed to their present
positions. Other pamphlets entitled "Nuclear
Power Safe, Clean, Economical, and
Available," and Nuclear Power Plant and
Environmental Safety were issued earlier, but
the majority of the Commissioners even then
were already occupying positions of
responsibility in the PAEC.
Commissioner Eugenio was Acting Chief of the
PAEC Department on Nuclear Technology and
Engineering from June, 1980 to July, 1984;
Commissioner Navarro was PAEC Chief Science
Research Specialist from May, 1980 to
September, 1984; and Commissioner Albano
was PAEC Deputy Commissioner from March,
1980 to September, 1984. These pamphlets
continued to be distributed by PAEC as late as
March 1985. Their official distribution continued
after the filing of National Power Corporation
(Napocor)'s motion for conversion on 27 June
1984 and even after PAEC had issued its order
dated 26 February 1985 formally admitting the
said motion for conversion.
In GR 70632, the competence of the PAEC
Commissioners to pass judgment on the safety
of the Philippine Nuclear Power Plant-1 (PNPP-1)
was questioned; (2) the validity of Napocor's
motion/application for the conversion of its
construction permit into an operating license for
PNPP-1 was assailed, and (3) PAEC
Commissioners were charged with bias and
prejudgment.
ISSUE: Whether or not the PAEC Commissioner
may sit in judgment in determining the safety of
PNPP-1.
HELD: No. The PAEC Commissioners would
be acting with grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack of jurisdiction were they to
sit in judgment upon the safety of the plant,
absent the requisite objectivity that must
characterize such an important inquiry
because they already have prejudged the
safety of PNPP-1.
The PAEC Commissioners cannot escape
responsibility from the official pamphlets,
which clearly indicate the prejudgment that
PNPP-1 is safe. The official distribution of the
pamphlets continued when the
Commissioners had already been appointed
to their present positions and and even after
PAEC had issued its order dated 26 February
1985 formally admitting Napocors motion
for conversion.
The Court therefore Resolved to RESTRAIN
respondent PAEC Commissioners from
further acting in PAEC Licensing Proceedings
No. 1-77.
CAYETANO A. TEJANO, JR. vs.
OMBUDSMAN
[G.R. No. 159190 June 30, 2005]
FACTS: Aniano A. Desierto, then the Special
Prosecutor, concurred in the approval of his
subordinates on the filing of the proper
information for violation of Section 3(e) of
Republic Act No. 3019 against petitioner
Cayetano A. Tejano, Jr., Juana dela Cruz and
Vicente dela Cruz of V&G. Afterwards, the
case was filed with the Sandiganbayan,
petitioner filed with the Sandiganbayan an
Urgent Motion for a Period of Time to File
Motion for Reinvestigation.
Sandiganbayan granted the motion for
reinvestigation and ordered the Officeof the
Special Prosecutor to conduct the
reinvestigation. Upon reinvestigation,
convinced that no probable cause existed to
indict petitioner Tejano, and spouses Juana
and Vicente delaCruz, Special Prosecutor
Micael, recommended the dismissal of the
case.
Ombudsman Aniano A. Desierto, who earlier
participated in the initial preliminary
investigation as Special Prosecutor,
disapproved the recommendation for the
dismissal of thecase with the marginal note
assign the case to another prosecutor to
prosecute the case aggressively.
ISSUE: WON Ombudsman Desierto
committed grave abuse of discretion in
disapproving the 03 November 1999
memorandum of Special Prosecutor Jesus
Micael recommending the dismissal of
Criminal Case No. 21654 against petitioner
Tejano, and spouses Juana and Vicente dela
Cruz of V&G for violation of Section 3(e) of
Rep. Act No. 3019, where he had earlier
participated in the preliminary investigation of
the said criminal case recommending the filing
of the information?
HELD: Yes. Ombudsman Desierto, in this case,
committed grave abuse of discretion. Petitioner
attributes partiality on the part of Ombudsman
Desierto for having participated in the
reinvestigation of the instant case despite the
fact that he earlier participated in the initial
preliminary investigation of the same when he
was a Special Prosecutor by concurring in the
recommendation for the filing of the information
before the Sandiganbayan.
Having participated in the initial preliminary
investigation of the instant case and having
recommended the filing of an appropriate
information, it behooved Ombudsman Desierto
to recuse himself from participating in the
review of the same during the reinvestigation.
He should have delegated the review to his
Deputies pursuant to Section 15 of Rep. Act No.
6770, which provides:
Sec. 15. Powers, Functions and Duties. The
Office of the Ombudsman shall have the
following powers, functions and duties:
. . . (10) Delegate to the Deputies, or its
investigators or representatives such authority
or duty as shall ensure the effective exercise or
performance of the powers, functions and
duties herein or hereinafter provided; . . .
In earlier recommending the filing of
information, then Special Prosecutor Desierto
was already convinced, from that moment, that
probable cause exists to indict the accused. It
becomes a farfetched possibility that in a
subsequent review of the same, Ombudsman
Desierto would make a turnabout and take a
position contradictory to his earlier finding.
Due process dictates that one called upon to
resolve a dispute may not review his decision
on appeal.
TUMEY v. STATE OF OHIO [273 U.S. 510]
FACTS: Tumey was arrested at White Oak, and
was brought before Mayor Pugh, of the village
of North College Hill, charged with unlawfully
possessing intoxicating liquor. He moved for his
dismissal because of the disqualification of the
mayor to try him under the 14th Amendment.
The mayor denied the motion, proceeded to the
trial, convicted Tumey of unlawfully possessing
intoxicating liquor within Hamilton county as
charged, fined him $100, and ordered that he
be imprisoned until the fine and costs were
paid.
Tumey obtained a bill of exceptions and carried
the case on error to the court of common pleas
of Hamilton County. That court heard the case
and reversed the judgment, on the ground that
the mayor was disqualified as claimed. The
state sought review by the Court of Appeals of
the First Appellate District of Ohio, which
reversed the common pleas and affirmed the
judgment of the mayor.
The state SC refused Tumey's application to
require the Court of Appeals to certify its
record in the case. Tumey then filed a
petition in error in that court as of right,
asking that the judgment of the mayor's
court and of the appellate court be reversed
on constitutional grounds. The SC adjudged
that the petition be dismissed for the reason
that no debatable constitutional question
was involved in the cause. The judgment
was then brought to the US Supreme Court
upon a writ of error allowed by the Chief
Justice of the state SC, to which it was rightly
directed.
ISSUE: WON the pecuniary interest of the
Mayor and his village, and the system of
courts in prosecuting violations of the
Prohibition Act, renders the mayor
disqualified from hearing the case?
HELD: Yes. All questions of judicial
qualification may not involve constitutional
validity. Thus matters of kinship, personal
bias, state policy, remoteness of interest
would seem generally to be matters merely
of legislative discretion. But it certainly
violates the 14th Amendment and deprives a
defendant in a criminal case of due process
of law to subject his liberty or property to the
judgment of a court, the judge of which has
a direct, personal, substantial pecuniary
interest in reaching a conclusion against him
in his case.
Herein, the mayor has authority, which he
exercised in the case, to order that the
person sentenced to pay a fine shall remain
in prison until the fine and costs are paid.
The mayor thus has a direct personal
pecuniary interest in convicting the
defendant who came before him for trial, in
the $12 of costs imposed in his behalf, which
he would not have received if the defendant
had been acquitted. This was not
exceptional, but was the result of the normal
operation of the law and the ordinance. The
system by which an inferior judge is paid for
his service only when he convicts the
defendant has not become so embedded by
custom in the general practice, either at
common law or in this country, that it can be
regarded as due process of law, unless the
costs usually imposed are so small that they
may be properly ignored as within the
maxim "de minimis non curat lex."
The Court cannot regard the prospect of
receipt or loss of such an emolument in each
case as a minute, remote, trifling, or
insignificant interest. It is certainly not fair to
each defendant brought before the mayor for
the careful and judicial consideration of his
guilt or innocence that the prospect of such a
prospective loss by the mayor should weigh
against his acquittal. But the pecuniary interest
of the mayor in the result of his judgment is not
the only reason for holding that due process of
law is denied to the defendant here.
The statutes were drawn to stimulate small
municipalities, in the country part of counties in
which there are large cities, to organize and
maintain courts to try persons accused of
violations of the Prohibition Act everywhere in
the county. The inducement is offered of
dividing between the state and the village the
large fines provided by the law for its violations.
The trial is to be had before a mayor without a
jury, without opportunity for retrial, and with a
review confined to questions of law presented
by a bill of exceptions, with no opportunity by
the reviewing court to set aside the judgment
on the weighing of evidence, unless it should
appear to be so manifestly against the evidence
as to indicate mistake, bias, or willful disregard
of duty by the trial court.
Thus, no matter what the evidence was against
him, the defendant had the right to have an
impartial judge. He seasonably raised the
objection, and was entitled to halt the trial
because of the disqualification of the judge,
which existed both because of his direct
pecuniary interest in the outcome, and because
of his official motive to convict and to graduate
the fine to help the financial needs of the
village. There were thus presented at the outset
both features of the disqualification. The
judgment of the Supreme Court of Ohio is
reversed, and the cause remanded for further
proceedings not inconsistent with the present
opinion.
- Procedural Due Process
(Prejudicial Publicity)
PEOPLE vs SANCHEZ [G.R. No. 121039-45,
October 18 2001]
FACTS: (The Sarmenta-Gomez rape-slay) Luis
and Rogelio Corcolon approached Eileen
Sarmenta and Allan Gomez, forcibly took the
two and loaded them at the back of the latter's
van, which was parked in front of Caf Amalia,
Agrix Complex, Los Banos, Laguna. George
Medialdea, Zoilo Ama, Baldwin Brion and Pepito
Kawit also boarded the van while Aurelio
Centeno and Vicencio Malabanan, who were
also with the group, stayed in the ambulance.
Both vehicles then headed for Erais Farm
situated in Barangay Curba, which was owned
by Mayor Antonio Sanchez of Calauan, Laguna.
The two youngsters were then brought inside
the resthouse where Eileen was taken to the
Mayors room. Allan was badly beaten up by
Luis, Boy, Ama and Medialdea and thereafter
thrown out of the resthouse. At around 1:00
a.m. of the next day, a crying Eileen was
dragged out of the resthouse by Luis and
Medialdea her hair disheveled, mouth
covered by a handkerchief, hands still tied
and stripped of her shorts. Eileen and Allan
were then loaded in the Tamaraw van by
Medialdea, et. al. and headed for Calauan,
followed closely by the ambulance. En route
to Calauan, gunfire was heard from the van.
The van pulled over whereupon Kawit
dragged Allan, whose head was already
drenched in blood, out of the vehicle onto
the road and finished him off with a single
gunshotfrom his armalite. The ambulance
and van then sped away. Upon reaching a
sugarcane field in Sitio Paputok, Kilometro 74
of Barangay Mabacan, Eileen was gang-
raped by Luis Corcolon, Medialdea, Rogelio
Corcolon, Ama, Brion and Kawit. After Kawits
turn, Luis Corcolon shot Eileen with his baby
armalite. Moments later, all 8 men boarded
the ambulance and proceeded to Calauan,
leaving the Tamaraw van with Eileens
remains behind. Initially, the crime was
attributed to one Kit Alqueza, a son of a
feared general (Dictador Alqueza). Luis and
Rogelio Corcolon were also implicated
therein. However, further investigation, and
forensic findings, pointed to the group of
Mayor Sanchez. Centeno and Malabanan
bolstered the prosecution's theory.
Judge Demetriou of the RTC found Mayor
Sanchez, Medialdea, Ama, Brion, Luis
Corcolon, Rogelio Corcolon and Kawit guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of
rape with homicide, ordering them to pay
Eileen Sarmenta the amount of P50,000 and
additionally, the amount of P700,000.00 to
the heirs of Eileen Sarmenta and Allan
Gomez as additional indemnity. SC, through
Justice Martinez, affirmed in toto the
judgment of conviction rendered by the trial
court. Antonio Sanchez, Zoilo Ama, Baldwin
Brion and Pepito Kawit seasonably filed their
respective motions for reconsideration. The
Office of the Solicitor General filed its
Comment on 6 December 1999. Sanchez
avers that he is a victim of trial and
conviction by publicity, besides claims that
principal witness Centeno and Malabanan
lack credibility, that the testimony of his 13-
year old daughter should have been given
full faith and credit, and that the gargantuan
damages awarded have no factual and legal
bases. Ama, Brion and Kawit maintain that
Centeno and Malabanan were sufficiently
impeached by their inconsistent statements
pertain to material and crucial points of the
events at issue, besides that independent
and disinterested witnesses have destroyed
the prosecutions version of events. Justice
Martinez retired in accordance with AM 99-8-
09. The motions for reconsideration was
assigned to Justice Melo for study and
preparation of the appropriate action.
ISSUE: Whether or not the publicity of the case
impaired the impartiality of the judge handling
the case.?
RULING: No. Pervasive publicity is not per se
prejudicial to the right of an accused to fair trial.
The mere fact that the trial of Mayor Sanchez,
et. al., was given a day-to-day, gavel-to-gavel
coverage does not by itself prove that publicity
so permeated the mind of the trial judge and
impaired his impartiality. The right of an
accused to a fair trial is not incompatible to a
free press. Responsible reporting enhances an
accused's right to a fair trial.
The press does not simply publish information
about trials but guards against the miscarriage
of justice by subjecting the police, prosecutors,
and judicial processes to extensive public
scrutiny and criticism. Our judges are learned in
the law and trained to disregard off-court
evidence and on camera performances of
parties to a litigation. Their mere exposure to
publications and publicity stunts does not per
se fatally infect their impartiality. To warrant a
finding of prejudicial publicity, there must be
allegation and proof that the judges have been
unduly influenced by the barrage of publicity.
Records herein do not show that the trial judge
developed actual bias against Mayor Sanchez,
et. al., as a consequence of the extensive media
coverage of the pre-trial and trial of his case.
The totality of circumstances of the case does
not prove that the trial judge acquired a fixed
position as a result of prejudicial publicity which
is incapable of change even by evidence
presented during the trial. Mayor Sanchez, et.
al., has the burden to prove this actual bias and
he has not discharged the burden.
PEREZ vs ESTRADA [AM No. 01-4-03 SC,
Sept. 13, 2001]
FACTS: This is a motion for reconsideration of
the decision denying petitioners request for
permission to televise and broadcast live the
trial of former President Estrada before the
Sandiganbayan. The motion was filed by the
Secretary of Justice, as one of the petitioners,
who argues that there is really no conflict
between the right of the people to public
information and the freedom of the press, on
the one hand, and, on the other, the right of the
accused to a fair trial; that if there is a clash
between these rights, it must be resolved in
favor of the right of the people and the press
because the people, as the repository of
sovereignty, are entitled to information; and
that live media coverage is a safeguard against
attempts by any party to use the courts as
instruments for the pursuit of selfish interests.
On the other hand, former President Estrada
reiterates his objection to the live TV and radio
coverage of his trial on the ground that its
allowance will violate the sub judice rule and
that, based on his experience with the
impeachment trial, live media coverage will
only pave the way for so-called "expert
commentary" which can trigger massive
demonstrations aimed at pressuring the
Sandiganbayan to render a decision one way
or the other. Mr. Estrada contends that the
right of the people to information may be
served through other means less distracting,
degrading, and prejudicial than live TV and
radio coverage.
ISSUE: WON television and radio coverage
of plunder case be allowed?
HELD: No. The Court has considered the
arguments of the parties on this important
issue and, after due deliberation, finds no
reason to alter or in any way modify its
decision prohibiting live or real time
broadcast by radio or television of the trial of
the former president. By a vote of nine (9) to
six (6) of its member, the Court denies the
motion for reconsideration of the Secretary
of Justice.
In lieu of live TV and radio coverage of the
trial, the Court, by the vote of 8 Justices, has
resolved to order the audio-visual recording
of the trial for documentary purposes. 7
Justices vote against the audio-visual
recording of the trial. Considering the
significance of the trial before the
Sandiganbayan of former President Estrada
and the importance of preserving the records
thereof, the Court believes that there should
be an audio-visual recording of the
proceedings. The recordings will not be for
live or real time broadcast but for
documentary purposes. Only later will they
be available for public showing, after the
Sandiganbayan shall have promulgated its
decision in every case to which the recording
pertains. The master film shall be deposited
in the National Museum and the Records
Management and Archives Office for
historical preservation and exhibition
pursuant to law.
RE: REQUEST FOR LIVE TV COVERAGE
OF THE TRIAL OF FORMER PRESIDENT
JOSEPH ESTRADA
[AM No. 01-30 SC, June 29, 2001]
FACTS: The KBP sent a letter requesting this
Court to allow live media coverage of the
anticipated trial of the plunder and other
criminal cases filed against former President
Joseph E. Estrada before the
Sandiganbayan. The petitioners invoked
other than the freedom of the press, the
constitutional right of the people to be
informed of matters of public concern which
could only be recognized, served and
satisfied by allowing live radio and television
coverage of the court proceedings.
Moreover, the live radio and television
coverage of the proceedings will also serve
the dual purpose of ensuring the desired
transparency in the administration of justice.
However, in the Resolution of the Court, in a
case for libel filed by then President Corazon C.
Aquino read that the Court resolved to prohibit
live radio and television coverage of court
proceedings in view of protecting the parties
right to due process, to prevent distraction of
the participants in the proceedings and to avoid
miscarriage of justice.
ISSUES: WON live media coverage of the trial
of the plunder and other criminal cases filed
against former President Joseph Estrada should
be permitted by the court?
RULING: The courts recognize the
constitutionally embodied freedom of the press
and the right to public information. It also
approves of media's exalted power to provide
the most accurate and comprehensive means of
conveying the proceedings to the public and in
acquainting the public with the judicial process
in action; nevertheless, within the courthouse,
the overriding consideration is still the
paramount right of the accused to due
process which must never be allowed to suffer
diminution in its constitutional proportions.
Due process guarantees the accused a
presumption of innocence until the contrary is
proved in a trial that is not lifted above its
individual settings nor made an object of
public's attention and where the conclusions
reached are induced not by any outside force or
influence but only by evidence and argument
given in open court, where fitting dignity and
calm ambiance is demanded. "Television can
work profound changes in the behavior of the
people it focuses on." The conscious or
unconscious effect that such coverage may
have on the testimony of witnesses and the
decision of judges cannot be evaluated but, it
can likewise be said, it is not at all unlikely for a
vote of guilt or innocence to yield to it.
Although an accused has a right to a public trial
but it is a right that belongs to him, more than
anyone else, where his life or liberty can be
held critically in balance. A public trial aims to
ensure that he is fairly dealt with and would not
be unjustly condemned and that his rights are
not compromised. A public trial is not
synonymous with publicized trial; it only implies
that the court doors must be open to those who
wish to come, sit in the available seats, conduct
themselves with decorum and observe the trial
process. In the constitutional sense, a until the threat abates, or transfer it to
courtroom should have enough facilities for a
reasonable number of the public to observe the
proceedings, not too small as to render the
openness negligible and not too large as to
distract the trial participants from their proper
functions, who shall then be totally free to
report what they have observed during the
proceedings.
SHEPPARD VS. MAXWELL [384 U.S. 333
(1966)]
FACTS: Petitioner's wife was bludgeoned to
death on July 4, 1954. From the outset,
officials focused suspicion on petitioner, who
was arrested on a murder charge July 30 and
indicted August 17. His trial began October
18 and terminated with his conviction
December 21, 1954. During the entire
pretrial period virulent and incriminating
publicity about petitioner and the murder
made the case notorious, and the news
media frequently aired charges and
countercharges besides those for which
petitioner was tried. Three months before
trial he was examined for more than five
hours without counsel in a televised three-
day inquest conducted before an audience of
several hundred spectators in a gymnasium.
Pervasive publicity was given to the case
throughout the trial, much of it involving
incriminating matter not introduced at the
trial, and the jurors were thrust into the role
of celebrities. Despite his awareness of the
excessive pretrial publicity, the trial judge
failed to take effective measures against the
massive publicity which continued
throughout the trial or to take adequate
steps to control the conduct of the trial. The
petitioner filed a habeas corpus petition
contending that he did not receive a fair
trial. The District Court granted the writ. The
Court of Appeals reversed.
ISSUE: WON the prejudicial publicity
constitutes a violation of the due process
clause guaranteed by the Fourteenth
Amendment?
RULING: Yes. Sheppard was deprived of the
chance to receive a fair hearing consistent
with due process clause of the fourteenth
amendment. Due process requires that the
accused receive a trial by an impartial jury
free from outside influences. Given the
pervasiveness of modern communications
and the difficulty of effacing prejudicial
publicity from the minds of the jurors, the
trial courts must take strong measures to
ensure that the balance is never weighed
against the accused. And appellate tribunals
have the duty to make an independent
evaluation of the circumstances. Where
there is a reasonable likelihood that
prejudicial news prior to trial will prevent a
fair trial, the judge should continue the case
another county not so permeated with
publicity. Since the state trial judge did not
fulfill his duty to protect Sheppard from the
inherently prejudicial publicity which
saturated the community and to control
disruptive influences in the courtroom, we
must reverse the denial of the habeas
petition. The case is remanded to the District
Court with instructions to issue the writ and
order that Sheppard be released from custody
unless the State puts him to its charges again
within a reasonable time.
WEBB vs DE LEON [G.R. No. 121234,
August 23, 1995]
FACTS: This was a highly-publicized case
(dubbed as Vizconde Massacre, and involves a
son of a Philippine Senator). The NBI filed with
the DOJ a letter-complaint charging petitioners
Hubert Webb, Michael Gatchalian. Antonio J.
Lejano and 6 other persons, with the crime of
Rape with Homicide. Forthwith, the DOJ formed
a panel of prosecutors headed by Assistant
Chief State prosecutor Jovencito R. Zuo to
conduct the preliminary investigation of those
charged with the rape and killing of Carmela N.
Vizconde, her mother Estrellita Nicolas-
Vizoonde, and sister Anne Marie Jennifer in their
home at Paraaque. During the preliminary
investigation, the NBI presented the sworn
statements of Maria Jessica Alfaro, 2 former
housemaids of the Webb family, Carlos
Cristobal , Lolita Birrer, 2 of Vizcondes maids,
Normal White and Manciano Gatmaitan. The NBI
also submitted the autopsy report involving
Estrellita, Carmela , and Jennifer; and the
genital examination of Carmela confirming the
presence of spermatozoa. The NBI submitted
photocopies of the documents requested by
Webb in his Motion for Production and
Examination of Evidence and Documents,
granted by the DOJ Panel. Webb claimed during
the preliminary investigation that he did not
commit the crime as he went to the United
States on 1 March 1991 and returned to the
Philippines on 27 October 1992. The others
Fernandez, Gatchalian, Lejano, Estrada,
Rodriguez and Biong submitted sworn
statements, responses, and a motion to dismiss
denying their complicity in the rape-killing of
the Vizcondes. Only Filart and Ventura failed to
file their counter-affidavits though they were
served with subpoena in their last known
address. The DOJ Panel issued a 26-page
Resolution "finding probable cause to hold
respondents for trial" and recommending that
an Information for rape with homicide be filed
against Webb, et. al. On the same date, it filed
the corresponding Information against Webb, et.
al. with the RTC Paraaque. Docketed as
Criminal Case 95-404 and raffled to Branch 258
presided by Judge Zosimo V. Escano. It was,
however, Judge Raul de Leon, pairing judge of
Judge Escano, who issued the warrants of arrest
against Webb, et. al. Judge Escano voluntarily
inhibited himself from the case to avoid any
suspicion about his impartiality considering his
employment with the NBI before his
appointment to the bench. The case was re-
raffled to branch 274, presided by Judge
Amelita Tolentino who issued new warrants of
arrest against Webb, et. al. Webb voluntarily
surrendered to the police authorities at Camp
Ricardo Papa Sr., in Taguig. Webb, et. al. filed
petitions for the issuance of the
extraordinary writs of certiorari, prohibition
and mandamus with application for
temporary restraining order and preliminary
injunction with the Supreme Court to: (1)
annul and set aside the Warrants of Arrest
issued against petitioners by respondent
Judges Raul E. de Leon and Amelita Tolentino
in Criminal Case No. 95-404; (2) enjoin the
respondents from conducting any proceeding
in the aforementioned criminal case; and (3)
dismiss said criminal case or include Jessica
Alfaro as one of the accused therein.
Gatchalian and Lejano likewise gave
themselves up to the authorities after filing
their petitions before the Court.
ISSUE: Whether or not the attendant
publicity of the case deprived Webb, et.al, of
their right to fair trial?
RULING: No. Pervasive and prejudicial
publicity under certain circumstances can
deprive an accused of his due process right
to fair trial. Herein, however, nothing in the
records that will prove that the tone and
content of the publicity that attended the
investigation of petitioners fatally infected
the fairness and impartiality of the DOJ
Panel. The DOJ Panel is composed of an
Assistant Chief State Prosecutor and Senior
State Prosecutors; and their long experience
in criminal investigation is a factor to
consider in determining whether they can
easily be blinded by the klieg lights of
publicity. At no instance in the case did
Webb, et. al. seek the disqualification of any
member of the DOJ Panel on the ground of
bias resulting from their bombardment of
prejudicial publicity. Further, on the
contention of the denial of their
constitutional right to due process and
violation of their right to an impartial
investigation, records show that the DOJ
Panel did not conduct the preliminary
investigation with indecent haste. Webb, et.
al. were given fair opportunity to prove lack
of probable cause against them. Still, the
Supreme Court reminds a trial judge in high
profile criminal cases of his/her duty to
control publicity prejudicial to the fair
administration of justice. The ability to
dispense impartial justice is an issue in every
trial and in every criminal prosecution, the
judiciary always stands as a silent accused.
More than convicting the guilty and
acquitting the innocent, the business of the
judiciary is to assure fulfillment of the
promise that justice shall be done and is
done, and that is the only way for the
judiciary to get an acquittal from the bar of
public opinion.
- Procedural Due Process
(Notice and Hearing)
BUDIONGAN VS DE LA CRUZ
(G.R. No. 170288; September 22, 2006)
FACTS: This Petition for Certiorari under Rule
65 of the Rules of Court assails the
Memorandum of the Office of the Special
Prosecutor, Office of the Ombudsman,
recommending that petitioners be charged with
violation of Section 3(e) of RA No. 3019 and
petitioner Pedro E. Budiongan with violation of
Section 3(h) of R.A. No. 3019. Also assailed is
the Resolution denying petitioners' motion for
reconsideration.
By virtue of Municipal Ordinance No. 2, series of
2001, the Municipality of Carmen, Bohol
appropriated the amount of P450,000.00 for the
purchase of a road roller for the municipality.
However the Municipal Development Council
through Resolution No. 3 recommended that the
amount of P450,000.00 be realigned and used
for the asphalt laying of a portion of the Tan
Modesto Bernaldez Street.3 The proposed
realignment was included in the December 21,
2001 agenda of the Sangguniang Bayan of
Carmen but discussion thereon was deferred.
Petitioner Municipal Treasurer Paa, issued a
Certificate of Availability of Funds for the
project. Thereafter, the Office of the Municipal
Engineer prepared a Program of Works and Cost
Estimates duly noted/approved by Municipal
Budget Officer Taciana B. Espejo and Mayor
Budiongan.
Bidding was conducted. The next day, Mayor
Budiongan issued the Notice of Award and
Notice to Commence Work in favor of Herbert
Malmis General Merchandise and Contractor,
Inc. who emerged as the lowest complying
bidder. The Sangguniang Bayan passed
Resolution No. 60 authorizing Mayor Budiongan
to sign and enter into contract with Malmis
relative to the above project in the amount of
P339,808.00. With such authority, Malmis
commenced with the project.
Thereafter, it was discovered that there was yet
no ordinance approving the realignment of the
funds. Thus, the Sangguniang Bayan passed
Ordinance No. 8, approving the realignment of
the fund. Malmis was paid the contract price.
Private respondents Palgan and Nadala filed a
complaint against the petitioners before the
Office of the Deputy Ombudsman for Visayas
alleging illegality in the conduct of the bidding,
award and notice to commence work since
there was no fund appropriated for the purpose.
The Office of the Deputy Ombudsman for
Visayas found probable cause and
recommended the filing of an information for
violation of Article 2207 of the Revised Penal
Code against the petitioners. However, the
complaint against Logrono, Gudia, Jr. and
Malmis was dismissed for lack of merit.
Upon review, the Case Assessment, Review
and Reinvestigation Bureau of the Office of
the Special Prosecutor, issued the assailed
Memorandum, modifying the charge from
violation of Article 220 of the RPC to (1)
violation of Section 3(e) of R.A. No. 3019
against petitioners for allegedly giving
unwarranted benefit to Malmis and (2)
violation of Section 3(h) of R.A.No. 3019
against petitioner Budiongan for allegedly
"directly or indirectly having financial or
pecuniary interest in a contract or
transaction in connection with which he
intervenes or takes part in his official
capacity."
Thus, two separate Informations were filed
before the Sandiganbayan (1) for violation of
Section 3(e) of R.A. No. 3019 against the
petitioners docketed as Criminal Case No.
28075 and (2) for violation of Section 3(h) of
R.A. No. 3019 against petitioner Budiongan
docketed as Criminal Case No. 28076.
Thereafter, petitioners filed a Motion to
Quash the information charging them with
violation of Sec. 3(e) of R.A. No. 3019. In a
Resolution, the Sandiganbayan granted the
motion to quash and remanded Criminal
Case No. 28075 to the Office of the
Ombudsman for amendment of the
Information. It held that although Malmis
benefited from the contract, the same is not
unwarranted considering that the project
was implemented, executed and completed.
An Amended Information was filed charging
petitioners with violation of Sec. 3(e) of R.A.
No. 3019, alleging that petitioners, by
prematurely awarding to Malmis the project
despite the absence of funds specifically
appropriated for such purpose, and
thereafter paying the contract price from the
Municipal Treasury which was originally
appropriated for the purchase of a road
roller, caused damage and undue injury to
the government.
Finding that the Amended Information
contains all the material averments
necessary to make out a case for the first
mode of violating Section 3(e) of R.A. No.
3019, i.e., causing any undue injury to any
party, including the government, the
Sandiganbayan admitted the Amended
Information in its Resolution.
On even date, petitioners filed with the
Sandiganbayan a Motion for Leave of Court
to File Motion for Reinvestigation13 arguing
that the above Informations were filed
without affording them the opportunity to file
counter-affidavits to answer/rebut the
modified charges. Sandiganbayan issued a
Resolution14 denying the motion insofar as
Criminal Case No. 28076 is concerned. It
held that it is too late in the day to remand
the case for reinvestigation considering that
Budiongan had already been arraigned and the
case had long been set for pre-trial
proceedings, with both parties having filed their
respective briefs. As regards Criminal Case No.
28075, the Sandiganbayan noted that although
the conduct of the preliminary investigation was
regular, petitioners however were not given the
opportunity to seek reconsideration of the
modified charges. Thus, it granted leave to the
petitioners to file with the Office of the Special
Prosecutor a motion for reconsideration of the
said office's Memorandum.
Petitioners filed a Motion for Reconsideration
with the Office of the Special Prosecutor which
was denied for lack of merit in the Resolution.
ISSUE: Whether the refusal or failure to
conduct a re-investigation has violated
petitioners' right to due process.
HELD: NO. The petition lacks merit.
The right to a preliminary investigation is not a
constitutional right, but is merely a right
conferred by statute. The absence of a
preliminary investigation does not impair the
validity of the Information or otherwise render
the same defective. It does not affect the
jurisdiction of the court over the case or
constitute a ground for quashing the
Information.15 If absence of a preliminary
investigation does not render the Information
invalid nor affect the jurisdiction of the court
over the case, then the denial of a motion for
reinvestigation cannot likewise invalidate the
Information or oust the court of its jurisdiction
over the case.
Petitioners were not deprived of due process
because they were afforded the opportunity to
refute the charges by filing their counter-
affidavits. The modification of the offense
charged did not come as a surprise to the
petitioners because it was based on the same
set of facts and the same alleged illegal acts.
Moreover, petitioners failed to aver newly
discovered evidence nor impute commission of
grave errors or serious irregularities prejudicial
to their interest to warrant a reconsideration or
reinvestigation of the case as required under
Section 8, Rule III of the Rules of Procedure of
the Office of the Ombudsman.16 Thus, the
modification of the offense charged, even
without affording the petitioners a new
preliminary investigation, did not amount to a
violation of their rights.
CO VS BARBERS (G.R. No. 129952. June 16,
1998)
FACTS: Petitioner through this special civil
action for certiorari and prohibition, with prayer
for temporary restraining order/writ of
preliminary injunction, seeks to nullify the Order
of the Deputy Ombudsman directing her
preventive suspension.
Quirino Congressman Cua filed a complaint
before the Ombudsman against Governor Co
and Provincial Engineer Ringor. Congressman
Cua alleged that in the course of its
investigation in aid of legislation, the House
of Representatives Committee on Good
Government chaired by him uncovered
irregularities in the purchase of heavy
equipment by the Governor and the
Provincial Engineer. Congressman Cua
charged that the equipment purchased was
reconditioned instead of brand new as
required by resolutions of the provinces
Sanggunian authorizing such purchase.
Other irregularities claimed to have been
committed included overpricing, lack of
public bidding, lack of inspection, advance
payment prior to delivery in violation of
Section 338 of the Local Government Code,
and an attempt to cover up such
irregularities. Congressman Cua thus
accused Governor Castillo-Co and Provincial
Engineer Ringor of violating Sections 3(e)
and 3(g) of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt
Practices Act,[1] as amended, and Articles
213[2] and 217[3] of the RPC.
In an Order, that is, a week after the
complaint was filed, Governor Castillo-Co
and Provincial Engineer Ringor were placed
under preventive suspension for a period of
6 months. Said order was signed by Emilio A.
Gonzalez III, Director, and approved by Jesus
Guerrero, Deputy Ombudsman for Luzon.
Governor Co and Provincial Engineer Ringor
thereafter filed separate motions for
reconsideration. Both motions were denied in
a Joint Order signed by Director Gonzales
and approved by Deputy Ombudsman
Guerrero.
Governor Co filed the present petition.
Petitioner imputes grave abuse of discretion
upon the Deputy Ombudsman for issuing the
order of preventive suspension against her.
As may be deduced from the petition, the
grounds invoked in support thereof one of
which is The issuance of such order was
hasty and selective, and deprived petitioner
of due process.
ISSUE: Whether or not the petitioner denied
due process because she was not afforded
the opportunity to controvert the evidence
against her before the order of preventive
suspension was issued?
HELD: NO. A preventive suspension,
however, can be decreed on an official under
investigation after charges are brought and
even before the charges are heard since the
same is not in the nature of a penalty, but
merely a preliminary step in an
administrative investigation. Thus, in
Lastimosa vs. Vasquez, we quoted with favor
our pronouncement in Nera vs. Garcia:
In connection with the suspension of petitioner
before he could file his answer to the
administrative complaint, suffice it to say that
the suspension was not a punishment or
penalty for the acts of dishonesty and
misconduct in office, but only as a preventive
measure. Suspension is a preliminary step in an
administrative investigation. If after such
investigation, the charges are established and
the person investigated is found guilty of acts
warranting his removal, then he is removed or
dismissed. This is the penalty. There is,
therefore, nothing improper in suspending an
officer pending his investigation and before the
charges against him are heard and be given an
opportunity to prove his innocence.
The fact that the said order was issued seven
days after the complaint was filed did not
constitute grave abuse of discretion. The
immediate issuance of such order is required in
order to prevent the subject of the suspension
from committing further irregularities
LIM VS. COURT OF APPEALS (GR 111397,
12 August 2002)
FACTS: Bistro Pigalle Inc. filed before the trial
court a petition for mandamus and prohibition,
with prayer for temporary restraining order or
writ of preliminary injunction, against Alfredo
Lim in his capacity as Mayor of Manila.
The Bistro filed the case because policemen
under Lims instructions inspected and
investigated the Bistros license as well as the
work permits and health certificates of its staff.
This caused the stoppage of work in the Bistros
night club and restaurant operations (i.e. the
New Bangkok Club and the Exotic Garden
Restaurant). Lim also refused to accept the
Bistros application for a business license, as
well as the work permit applications of the
Bistros staff, for the year 1993.
Acting on the Bistros application for injunctive
relief, the trial court issued the temporary
restraining order, ordering Lim and/or his
agents to refrain from inspecting or otherwise
interfering in the operation of the
establishments of the Bistro.
At the hearing, the parties submitted their
evidence in support of their respective
positions.The trial court granted the Bistros
application for a writ of prohibitory preliminary
injunction. However, despite the trial courts
order, Lim still issued a closure order on the
Bistros operations effective 23 January 1993,
even sending policemen to carry out his closure
order.
Lim insisted that the power of a mayor to
inspect and investigate commercial
establishments and their staff is implicit in the
statutory power of the city mayor to issue,
suspend or revoke business permits and
licenses. This statutory power is expressly
provided for in Section 11 (l), Article II of the
Revised Charter of the City of Manila and in
Section 455, paragraph 3 (iv) of the Local
Government Code of 1991.
The Bistro filed an "Urgent Motion for
Contempt" against Lim and the policemen
who stopped the Bistros operations. At the
hearing of the motion for contempt, the
Bistro withdrew its motion on condition that
Lim would respect the courts injunction.
However, on February 12, 13, 15, 26 and 27,
and on March 1 and 2, 1993, Lim, acting
through his agents and policemen, again
disrupted the Bistros business operations.
Meanwhile, on 17 February 1993, Lim filed a
motion to dissolve the injunctive order and
to dismiss the case. The trial court denied
Lims motion to dissolve the injunction and
to dismiss the case in an order.
Lim filed with the Court of Appeals a petition
for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus
against the Bistro and Judge Wilfredo Reyes.
The Court of Appeals sustained the RTC
orders in a decision, and denied Lim's motion
for reconsideration in a resolution.
Manila City Ordinance 778314 took effect.
On the same day, Lim ordered the Western
Police District Command to permanently
close down the operations of the Bistro,
which order the police implemented at once.
Lim filed the petition for review on certiorari
before the Supreme Court.
ISSUE: Whether the Bistro should be given
an opportunity to rebut the allegations that it
violated the conditions of its licenses and
permits.
HELD: From the language of Section 11 (l),
Article II of the Revised Charter of the City of
Manila and Section 455 (3) (iv) of the Local
Government Code, it is clear that the power
of the mayor to issue business licenses and
permits necessarily includes the corollary
power to suspend, revoke or even refuse to
issue the same.
However, the power to suspend or revoke
these licenses and permits is expressly
premised on the violation of the conditions of
these permits and licenses. The laws
specifically refer to the "violation of the
condition(s)" on which the licenses and
permits were issued.
Similarly, the power to refuse to issue such
licenses and permits is premised on non-
compliance with the prerequisites for the
issuance of such licenses and permits. The
mayor must observe due process in
exercising these powers, which means that
the mayor must give the applicant or
licensee notice and opportunity to be heard.
True, the mayor has the power to inspect and
investigate private commercial establishments
for any violation of the conditions of their
licenses and permits. However, the mayor has
no power to order a police raid on these
establishments in the guise of inspecting or
investigating these commercial establishments.
Lim has no authority to close down Bistros
business or any business establishment in
Manila without due process of law.
Lim cannot take refuge under the Revised
Charter of the City of Manila and the Local
Government Code. There is no provision in
these laws expressly or impliedly granting the
mayor authority to close down private
commercial establishments without notice and
hearing, and even if there is, such provision
would be void.
The due process clause of the Constitution
requires that Lim should have given the Bistro
an opportunity to rebut the allegations that it
violated the conditions of its licenses and
permits.
MARIVELES SHIPYARD VS CA (415 SCRA
573)
FACTS: Sometime on October 1993, Mariveles
Shipyard Corporation engaged the services of
Longest Force Investigation and Security
Agency, Inc. to render security services at its
premises. Pursuant to their agreement, Longest
Force deployed its security guards, the private
respondents herein, at the petitioners shipyard
in Mariveles, Bataan.
According to petitioner, it religiously complied
with the terms of the security contract with
Longest Force, promptly paying its bills and the
contract rates of the latter. However, it found
the services being rendered by the assigned
guards unsatisfactory and inadequate, causing
it to terminate its contract with Longest Force
on April 1995. Longest Force, in turn,
terminated the employment of the security
guards it had deployed at petitioners shipyard.
Private respondents filed a case for illegal
dismissal, underpayment of wages pursuant to
the PNPSOSIA-PADPAO rates, non-payment of
overtime pay, premium pay for holiday and rest
day, service incentive leave pay, 13th month
pay and attorneys fees, against both Longest
Force and petitioner, before the Labor Arbiter.
The case sought the guards reinstatement with
full back wages and without loss of seniority
rights.
Longest Force admitted that it employed private
respondents and assigned them as security
guards at the premises of petitioner rendering a
12 hours duty per shift for the said period. It
likewise admitted its liability as to the non-
payment of the alleged wage differential in the
total amount of P2,618,025 but passed on the
liability to petitioner
The petitioner denied any liability on account
of the alleged illegal dismissal, stressing that
no employer-employee relationship existed
between it and the security guards. It further
pointed out that it would be the height of
injustice to make it liable again for monetary
claims which it had already paid. Anent the
cross-claim filed by Longest Force against it,
petitioner prayed that it be dismissed for
lack of merit. Petitioner averred that Longest
Force had benefited from the contract; it was
now estopped from questioning said
agreement on the ground that it had made a
bad deal.
The Labor Arbiter rendered judgment that
Longest Force and Mariveles Shipping be
jointly and severally liable to pay the money
claims of the complainants. Petitioner
appealed the foregoing to the NLRC. The
labor tribunal, affirmed the decision of the
Labor Arbiter. Petitioner moved for
reconsideration, but this was denied by the
NLRC.
The petitioner then filed a special civil action
for certiorari assailing the NLRC judgment for
having been rendered with grave abuse of
discretion with the Court of Appeals. The
Court of Appeals denied due course to the
petition and dismissed it outright.
ISSUE: Did the appellate court err in not
holding that petitioner was denied due
process of law by the NLRC?
HELD: NO. Well settled is the rule that the
essence of due process is simply an
opportunity to be heard, or, as applied to
administrative proceedings, an opportunity
to explain ones side or an opportunity to
seek a reconsideration of the action or ruling
complained of.
Not all cases require a trial-type hearing. The
requirement of due process in labor cases
before a Labor Arbiter is satisfied when the
parties are given the opportunity to submit
their position papers to which they are
supposed to attach all the supporting
documents or documentary evidence that
would prove their respective claims, in the
event the Labor Arbiter determines that no
formal hearing would be conducted or that
such hearing was not necessary.
In any event, as found by the NLRC,
petitioner was given ample opportunity to
present its side in several hearings
conducted before the Labor Arbiter and in
the position papers and other supporting
documents that it had submitted. We find
that such opportunity more than satisfies the
requirement of due process in labor cases.
MMDA vs GARIN (G.R. No. 130230, April
15, 2005)
FACTS: Respondent Dante O. Garin, a lawyer,
was issued a traffic violation receipt (TVR) and
his driver's license confiscated for parking
illegally along Gandara Street, Binondo, Manila.
Shortly before the expiration of the TVR's
validity, the respondent addressed a letter to
then MMDA Chairman Prospero Oreta
requesting the return of his driver's license, and
expressing his preference for his case to be filed
in court.
Receiving no immediate reply, Garin filed the
original complaint with application for
preliminary injunction contending that, in the
absence of any implementing rules and
regulations, Sec. 5(f) of Rep. Act No. 7924
grants the MMDA unbridled discretion to
deprive erring motorists of their licenses, pre-
empting a judicial determination of the validity
of the deprivation, thereby violating the due
process clause of the Constitution. The
respondent further contended that the provision
violates the constitutional prohibition against
undue delegation of legislative authority,
allowing as it does the MMDA to fix and impose
unspecified and therefore unlimited - fines and
other penalties on erring motorists. Garin
alleged that he suffered and continues to suffer
great and irreparable damage because of the
deprivation of his license and that, absent any
implementing rules from the Metro Manila
Council, the TVR and the confiscation of his
license have no legal basis.
Judge Helen Bautista-Ricafort issued a
temporary restraining order extending the
validity of the TVR as a temporary driver's
license for twenty more days. A preliminary
mandatory injunction was granted and the
MMDA was directed to return the respondent's
driver's license.
ISSUE: Whether or not the confiscation of
Garins drivers license constitutes a violation of
due process.
RULING: Yes. The summary confiscation of a
driver's license without first giving the driver an
opportunity to be heard; depriving him of a
property right (driver's license) without DUE
PROCESS; not filling in Court the complaint of
supposed traffic infraction, cannot be justified
by any legislation hence unconstitutional.
The temporary writ of preliminary injunction is
hereby made permanent; the MMDA is directed
to return to plaintiff his driver's license; the
MMDA is likewise ordered to desist from
confiscating driver's license without first giving
the driver the opportunity to be heard in an
appropriate proceeding.
OFFICE OF THE COURT ADMINISTRATOR V.
PASCUAL
A.M. No. MTJ-93-783. July 29, 1996
FACTS: Sometime in February, 1993, a certain
Ceferino Tigas wrote a letter, addressed to Hon.
Reynaldo Suarez of the Office of the Court
Administrator of the Supreme Court,
charging that irregularities and corruption
were being committed by the respondent
Presiding Judge of the Municipal Trial Court of
Angat, Bulacan.
The letter was referred to the NBI in order
that an investigation on the alleged illegal
and corrupt practices of the respondent may
be conducted. Ordered to conduct a
discreet investigation by the then NBI
Director Epimaco Velasco were: SA Edward
Villarta, team leader, SI Reynaldo Olazo, HA
Teofilo Galang, SI Florino Javier and SI Jose
Icasiano.
They proceeded to Angat, Bulacan, in order
to look for Ceferino Tigas, the letter writer.
Tigas, the NBI team realized was a fictitious
character. In view of their failure to find
Tigas, they proceeded to the residence of
Candido Cruz, an accused in respondents
sala.
In his affidavit executed before SA Edward
Villarta, Cruz declared that he was the
accused in Criminal Case No. 2154, charged
with the crime of Frustrated Murder.
Respondent judge, after conducting the
preliminary investigation of the case,
decided that the crime he committed was
only physical injuries and so, respondent
judge assumed jurisdiction over the case.
Cruz believed that he was made to
understand by the respondent that, in view
of his favorable action, Cruz was to give to
respondent the sum of P2,000.00.
Respondent judge is believed to be a
drunkard and, in all probability, would need
money to serve his vice. In view of this
statement, the NBI agents assigned to the
case caused respondent judge to be
entrapped, for which reason, the judge was
thought to have been caught in flagrante
delicto. NBI agents Villarta and Olazo filed
the following report:
On 25 March 1993, at about 4:00 in the
afternoon, CANDIDO CRUZ met with Judge
PASCUAL at the Colegio de Sta. Monica, near
the Municipal Building of Angat, Bulacan,
where Subject is attending the graduation of
his daughter. CANDIDO CRUZ told Judge
PASCUAL that he already had the P2,000.00
which he (Judge PASCUAL) is asking him.
However, Judge PASCUAL did not receive the
money because according to him there were
plenty of people around. He then instructed
CANDIDO CRUZ to see him (Judge PASCUAL)
at his office the following day. At about 8:30
in the morning of the following day (26
March 1993), CANDIDO CRUZ proceeded to
the office of Judge PASCUAL at the Municipal
Trial Court of Angat, Bulacan, and thereat
handed to him four (4) pieces of P500.00
bills contained in a white mailing envelope
previously marked and glazed with fluorescent
powder.
In the meantime, the Undersigned stayed
outside the court room and after about 15
minutes, CANDIDO CRUZ came out of the room
and signaled to the Undersigned that Judge
PASCUAL had already received the marked
money. The Undersigned immediately entered
the room and informed Subject about the
entrapment. Subject denied having received
anything from CANDIDO CRUZ, but after a
thorough search, the marked money was found
inserted between the pages of a blue book on
top of his table. Subject was invited to the
Office of the NBI-NCR, Manila wherein he was
subjected to ultra violet light examination. After
finding Subjects right hand for the presence of
fluorescent powder, he was booked,
photographed and fingerprinted in accordance
with our Standard Operating Procedure (S.O.P.).
On even date, the results of our investigation
together with the person of Judge FILOMENO
PASCUAL was referred to the Inquest Prosecutor
of the Office of the Special Prosecutor,
Ombudsman, with the recommendation that he
be charged and prosecuted for Bribery as
defined and penalized under Article 210 of the
Revised Penal Code of the Philippines.
ISSUE: Whether or not the evidences presented
against Judge Filomeno Pascual were strong
enough to convict him.
HELD: We find that the evidence on record
does not warrant conviction.
We note that the only bases for the Report and
Recommendation submitted by Executive Judge
Natividad G. Dizon consist of: The Complaint,
the Answer, the Memorandum of the
respondent, and the transcript of stenographic
notes of the hearing of the bribery case of
respondent judge at the Sandiganbayan. The
respondent was, therefore, not afforded the
right to open trial wherein respondent can
confront the witnesses against him and present
evidence in his defense.
This lapse in due process is unfortunate. The
Rules, even in an administrative cases, demand
that, if the respondent judge should be
disciplined for grave misconduct or any graver
offense, the evidence against him should be
competent and should be derived from direct
knowledge.
The Judiciary to which respondent belongs
demands no less. Before any of its members
could be faulted, it should be only after due
investigation and after presentation of
competent evidence, especially since the
charge is penal in character.
The above-quoted Report and Recommendation
of the investigating judge had fallen short of the
requirements of due process.
PEOPLE V. ESTRADA (G.R. NO. 130487;
19 June 2000)
FACTS: Roberto Estrada y Lopez sat at the
bishops chair while the sacrament of
confirmation was being performed at the St.
Johns Cathedral, Dagupan City. Rogelio
Mararac, the security guard at the cathedral,
was summoned by some churchgoers.
Mararac went near Estrada and told him to
vacate the Bishop's chair. Mararac twice
tapped Estradas hand with his nightstick.
When Mararac was about to strike again,
Estrada drew a knife from his back, lunged at
Mararac and stabbed him, hitting him below
his left throat. Mararac fell. Wounded and
bleeding, Mararac slowly dragged himself
down the altar.
SP01 Conrado Francisco received a report of
the commotion inside the cathedral, went
inside the cathedral, approached Estrada
who was sitting on the chair, and advised the
latter to drop his knife. Estrada obeyed.
However, when Chief Inspector Wendy
Rosario, Deputy Police Chief, who was also at
the confirmation rites, went near Estrada,
Estrada embraced Rosario and two wrestled
with each other. Rosario was able to subdue
Estrada. Estrada was brought to the police
station and placed in jail. Maranac expired a
few minutes after arrival at the hospital.
Estrada was charged with the crime of
murder for the killing of Mararac. On 6
January 1995, at the arraignment, the Public
Attorney's Office, filed an "Urgent Motion to
Suspend Arraignment and to Commit
Accused to Psychiatric Ward at Baguio
General Hospital." It was alleged that
Estrada could not properly and intelligently
enter a plea because he was suffering from a
mental defect; that before the commission of
the crime, he was confined at the psychiatric
ward of the Baguio General Hospital in
Baguio City.
The motion was opposed by the City
Prosecutor. The trial court, motu proprio,
propounded several questions on Estrada.
Finding that the questions were understood
and answered by him "intelligently," the
court denied the motion that same day. The
arraignment proceeded and a plea of not
guilty was entered by the court on Estrada's
behalf.
The trial court (RTC Dagupan City) rendered
a decision upholding the prosecution
evidence and found Estrada guilty of the
crime charged and thereby sentenced him to
death, and ordered him to pay P50,000 for
indemnity, P18,870 for actual expenses, and
P100,000 as moral damages. Estradas
counsel appealed.
ISSUE: Whether a mental examination of the
accused should be made before the accused
may be subjected to trial.
HELD: The rule barring trial or sentence of an
insane person is for the protection of the
accused, rather than of the public. It has been
held that it is inhuman to require an accused
disabled by act of God to make a just defense
for his life or liberty.
To put a legally incompetent person on trial or
to convict and sentence him is a violation of the
constitutional rights to a fair trial and due
process of law.
Section 12, Rule 116 of the 1985 Rules on
Criminal Procedure speaks of a "mental
examination." An intelligent determination of an
accused's capacity for rational understanding
ought to rest on a deeper and more
comprehensive diagnosis of his mental
condition than laymen can make through
observation of his overt behavior. Once a
medical or psychiatric diagnosis is made, then
can the legal question of incompetency be
determined by the trial court.
By depriving appellant of a mental examination,
the trial court effectively deprived appellant of
a fair trial. The trial court's negligence was a
violation of the basic requirements of due
process; and for this reason, the proceedings
before the said court must be nullified.
PICHAY, JR. vs OFFICE OF DEPUTY
SECRETARY FOR LEGAL AFFAIRS (G.R. No.
196425, July 24, 2012)
FACTS: President Aquino III issued E.O. 13,
abolishing the PAGC and transferring its
functions to the Office of the Deputy Executive
Secretary for Legal Affairs (ODESLA), more
particularly to its newly-established
Investigative and Adjudicatory Division (IAD).
Respondent Finance Secretary Purisima filed
before the IAD-ODESLA a complaint affidavit for
grave misconduct against petitioner Prospero A.
Pichay, Jr., Chairman of the Board of Trustees of
the Local Water Utilities Administration (LWUA),
as well as the incumbent members of the LWUA
Board of Trustees, namely, Renato Velasco,
Susana Dumlao Vargas, Bonifacio Mario M.
Pena, Sr. and Daniel Landingin, which arose
from the purchase by the LWUA of 445,377
shares of stock of Express Savings Bank, Inc.
Petitioner received an Order signed by
Executive Secretary Paquito N. Ochoa, Jr.
requiring him and his co-respondents to submit
their respective written explanations under
oath. In compliance therewith, petitioner filed a
Motion to Dismiss Ex Abundante Ad Cautelam
manifesting that a case involving the same
transaction and charge of grave misconduct
entitled, "Rustico B. Tutol, et al. v. Prospero
Pichay, et al.", and is already pending before
the Office of the Ombudsman.
ISSUE: Whether or not Executive Order No.
13 is unconstitutional for violating the
guarantee of due process.
RULING: No. His right to due process was
not violated when the IAD-ODESLA took
cognizance of the administrative complaint
against him since he was given sufficient
opportunity to oppose the formal complaint
filed by Secretary Purisima. In administrative
proceedings, the filing of charges and giving
reasonable opportunity for the person so
charged to answer the accusations against
him constitute the minimum requirements of
due process, which simply means having the
opportunity to explain ones side. Hence, as
long as petitioner was given the opportunity
to explain his side and present evidence, the
requirements of due process are
satisfactorily complied with because what
the law abhors is an absolute lack of
opportunity to be heard. The records show
that petitioner was issued an Order requiring
him to submit his written explanation under
oath with respect to the charge of grave
misconduct filed against him. His own failure
to submit his explanation despite notice
defeats his subsequent claim of denial of due
process
ROXAS VS VASQUEZ (GR 114944, 19
June 2001)
FACTS: Manuel C. Roxas and Ahmed S.
Nacpil were Chairman and Member,
respectively, of the Bids and Awards
Committee of the PC-INP. Sometime in
September 1990, the PC-INP invited bids for
the supply purchase of 65 units of fire trucks,
and accordingly, the public bidding was held
on 14 September 1990. The lowest bidder,
Aeolus Philippines, was disqualified since its
fire trucks had a water tank capacity of only
1,800 liters, far below the required 3,785
liter capacity.
After ocular inspections made by a A
Technical Evaluation Committee, two fire
trucks, namely Morita Isuzu and Nikki-Hino,
were recommended. The Bids and Awards
Committee, however, voted to award the
contract in favor of the Korean company
CISC, which offered Ssangyong fire trucks.
To avoid the possibility of failure to bid, the
Bids and Awards Committee reviewed its
recommendations, and thus limited its
choice to the two brands recommended by
Gen. Tanchanco and, by majority vote,
elected Nikki-Hino of the Tahei Co., Ltd. as
the lower bidder. Thereafter, the Contract of
Purchase and Sale of 65 units of Nikki-Hino
fire trucks was executed between Gen.
Nazareno, on behalf of the PC-INP, and Tahei
Company, Ltd.
The corresponding Purchase Order was then
prepared. Pursuant to a disbursement voucher,
the PNP paid Tahei Co., Ltd. the amount of
P167,335,177.24, representing marginal deposit
for the 65 units of fire truck. The Disbursement
Voucher showed that, while the bid price of
Tahei Co. was only P2,292,784.00 per unit, the
price appearing on the Purchase Order was
P2,585,562.00 per unit. Hence, there was a
discrepancy of P292,778.00 per unit of fire
truck, or a total of P19,030,570.00 for all 65 fire
trucks.
The Commission on Audit discovered the
irregularities in the bidding, awarding and
purchase of the 65 fire trucks, thus prompting
then DILG Secretary Rafael Alunan III to file a
complaint for violation of Section 3 (e) of
Republic Act 3019 before the Ombudsman. The
Deputy Ombudsman recommended the
indictment of all, except Generosa Ramirez. On
review, the Office of the Special Prosecutor
Review Commttee recommended the dismissal
of the complaints against Roxas, Nacpil, Codoy,
Kairan and Ramirez.
This latter recommendation was approved by
the Special Prosecutor and the Ombudsman in a
Memorandum. Accordingly, the appropriate
Information was filed by the Ombudsman before
the Sandiganbayan, against Nazareno, Flores,
Tanchanco, Custodio, Osea, Espena and Santos.
Roxas, Nacpil, Codoy, Kairan and Ramirez were
not included among the accused. However,
upon motion of Generals Flores and Tanchanco,
a reinvestigation was conducted by the Office of
the Special Prosecutor. On 19 October 1993,
without any notice to or participation of Roxas
and Nacpil, the Office of the Special Prosecutor
issued an Order, dismissing the charges against
Flores and Tanchanco, and recommending that
Roxas, Nacpil, and Kairan be likewise indicted.
Deputy Special Prosecutor Jose de Ferrer voted
for the approval of the recommendation, while
Special Prosecutor Aniano A. Desierto dissented.
Ombudsman Conrado M. Vasquez approved the
recommendation. Roxas and Nacpil, together
with Kairan, filed a Motion for Reconsideration.
The Review Committee of the Office of the
Special Prosecutor recommended that the
Motion be granted and the charge against the
movants be dismissed. However, Deputy
Special Prosecutor de Ferrer and Ombudsman
Vasquez disapproved the recommendation in
the second assailed Order. Thus, the Office of
the Ombudsman filed an Amended Information
with respondent Sandiganbayan, impleading
Roxas and Nacpil as additional accused. Roxas
and Nacpil filed a petition for certiorari and
prohibition before the Supreme Court.
ISSUE: Whether the lack of notice to Roxas and
Nacpil at the reinvestigation render the
issuance of Office of the Ombudsman null and
void.
HELD: It is not material either that no new
matter or evidence was presented during the
reinvestigation of the case. It should be
stressed that reinvestigation, as the word
itself implies, is merely a repeat
investigation of the case.
New matters or evidence are not
prerequisites for a reinvestigation, which is
simply a chance for the prosecutor, or in this
case the Office of the Ombudsman, to review
and re-evaluate its findings and the evidence
already submitted. Neither do the lack of
notice to, or participation of, Roxas and
Nacpil at the reinvestigation render the
questioned issuances of Office of the
Ombudsman null and void. At any rate,
Roxas and Nacpil cannot argue that they
have been deprived of due process.
The rule is well established that due process
is satisfied when the parties are afforded fair
and reasonable opportunity to explain their
side of the controversy or an opportunity to
move for a reconsideration of the action or
ruling complained of. Herein, the record
clearly shows that petitioners not only filed
their respective Counter-Affidavits during the
preliminary investigation, they also filed
separate Motions for Reconsideration of the
19 October 1993 Order of the Ombudsman
impleading them as accused.
SEC. OF JUSTICE vs LANTION (G.R. No.
139465, October 17, 2000)
FACTS: Then President Marcos issued PD
1069 "Prescribing the Procedure for the
Extradition of Persons Who Have Committed
Crimes in a Foreign Country".Then Secretary
of Justice Franklin M. Drilon, representing the
Government of the Republic of the
Philippines, signed in Manila the "Extradition
Treaty Between the Government of the
Republic of the Philippines and the
Government of the USA. "The Senate, by
way of Resolution 11, expressed its
concurrence in the ratification of said treaty.
It also expressed its concurrence in the
Diplomatic Notes correcting Paragraph (5)
(a), Article 7 thereof (on the admissibility of
the documents accompanying an extradition
request upon certification by the principal
diplomatic or consular officer of the
requested state resident in the Requesting
State).
The DOJ received from the DFA U. S. Note
Verbale 0522 containing a request for the
extradition of Mark Jimenez to the United
States. Attached to the Note Verbale were
the Grand Jury Indictment, the warrant of
arrest issued by the U.S. District Court,
Southern District of Florida, and other
supporting documents for said extradition.
Jimenez was charged in the United States for
violation. On the same day, the Secretary
issued Department Order 249 designating and
authorizing a panel of attorneys to take charge
of and to handle the case. Pending evaluation of
the aforestated extradition documents, Jimenez
(on 1 July 1999) requested copies of the official
extradition request from the US Government, as
well as all documents and papers submitted
therewith, and that he be given ample time to
comment on the request after he shall have
received copies of the requested papers. The
Secretary denied the request.
Jimenez filed with the RTC a petition against the
Secretary of Justice, the Secretary of Foreign
Affairs, and the Director of the NBI, for
mandamus (to compel the Justice Secretary to
furnish Jimenez the extradition documents, to
give him access thereto, and to afford him an
opportunity to comment on, or oppose, the
extradition request, and thereafter to evaluate
the request impartially, fairly and objectively);
certiorari (to set aside the Justice Secretarys
letter dated 13 July 1999); and prohibition (to
restrain the Justice Secretary from considering
the extradition request and from filing an
extradition petition in court; and to enjoin the
Secretary of Foreign Affairs and the Director of
the NBI from performing any act directed to the
extradition of Jimenez to the United States),
with an application for the issuance of a
temporary restraining order and a writ of
preliminary injunction. The trial court ruled in
favor of Jimenez. The Secretary filed a petition
for certiorari before the Supreme Court. By a
vote of 9-6, the Supreme Court dismissed the
petition and ordered the Justice Secretary to
furnish Jimenez copies of the extradition
request and its supporting papers and to grant
him a reasonable period within which to file his
comment with supporting evidence. The
Secretary timely filed an Urgent Motion for
Reconsideration.
ISSUE: Whether or not Jimenez had the right to
notice and hearing during the evaluation stage
of an extradition process.
RULING: No. Presidential Decree (PD) 1069
which implements the RP-US Extradition Treaty
provides the time when an extraditee shall be
furnished a copy of the petition for extradition
as well as its supporting papers, i.e., after the
filing of the petition for extradition in the
extradition court (Section 6). It is of judicial
notice that the summons includes the petition
for extradition which will be answered by the
extraditee. There is no provision in the Treaty
and in PD 1069 which gives an extraditee the
right to demand from the Justice Secretary
copies of the extradition request from the US
government and its supporting documents and
to comment thereon while the request is still
undergoing evaluation. The DFA and the DOJ, as
well as the US government, maintained that the
Treaty and PD 1069 do not grant the extraditee
a right to notice and hearing during the
evaluation stage of an extradition process. It is
neither an international practice to afford a
potential extraditee with a copy of the
extradition papers during the evaluation
stage of the extradition process. Jimenez is,
thus, bereft of the right to notice and hearing
during the extradition process evaluation
stage. Further, as an extradition proceeding
is not criminal in character and the
evaluation stage in an extradition proceeding
is not akin to a preliminary investigation, the
due process safeguards in the latter do not
necessarily apply to the former. The
procedural due process required by a given
set of circumstances "must begin with a
determination of the precise nature of the
government function involved as well as the
private interest that has been affected by
governmental action." The concept of due
process is flexible for "not all situations
calling for procedural safeguards call for the
same kind of procedure." Thus, the
temporary hold on Jimenez's privilege of
notice and hearing is a soft restraint on his
right to due process which will not deprive
him of fundamental fairness should he
decide to resist the request for his
extradition to the US. There is no denial of
due process as long as fundamental fairness
is assured a party.
SUMMARY DISMISSAL BOARD vs
TORCITA
(G.R. No. 130442, April 6, 2000)
FACTS: A red Cortina Ford, driven by C/Insp.
Lazaro Torcita, with his aide, PO2 Java, in the
front seat and his wife with two ladies at the
backseat, were overtaken by a Mazda pick-
up owned by Congressman Manuel Puey and
driven by one Reynaldo Consejo with 4
passengers. After the Mazda pick-up has
overtaken the red Cortina Ford, and after a
vehicular collision almost took place, it
accelerated speed and proceeded to
Hacienda Aimee, a sugarcane plantation
owned by the congressman. The red Cortina
Ford followed also at high speed until it
reached the hacienda where Torcita and Java
alighted and the confrontation with del
Rosario and Jesus Puey occurred. Torcita
identified himself but the same had no
effect. PO2 Java whispered to him that there
are armed men around them and that it is
dangerous for them to continue. That at this
point, they radioed for back-up. Torcita,upon
the arrival of the back-up force of PNP Cadiz
City, proceeded to the place where Capt.
Jesus Puey and Alex Edwin del Rosario were.
On 6 July 1994, 12 verified administrative
complaints were filed against Torcita for
Conduct Unbecoming of a Police Officer,
Illegal Search, Grave Abuse of Authority and
Violation of Domicile, and Abuse of Authority
and Violation of COMELEC Gun Ban. The 12
administrative complaints were consolidated
into 1 major complaint for conduct
unbecoming of a police officer. The Summary
Dismissal Board, however, did not find sufficient
evidence to establish that Torcita threatened
anybody with a gun, nor that a serious
confrontation took place between the parties,
nor that the urinating incident took place, and
held that the charges of violation of domicile
and illegal search were not proven. Still, while
the Board found that Torcita was "in the
performance of his official duties" when the
incident happened, he allegedly committed a
simple irregularity in performance of duty (for
being in the influence of alcohol while in
performance of duty) and was suspended for 20
days and salary suspended for the same period
of time. Torcita appealed his conviction to the
Regional Appellate Board of the PNP, but the
appeal was dismissed for lack of jurisdiction.
Whereupon, Torcita filed a petition for certiorari
in the Regional Trial Court of Iloilo City,
questioning the legality of the conviction of an
offense for which he was not charged (lack of
procedural due process of law). The Board filed
a motion to dismiss, which was denied. The RTC
granted the petition for certiorari and annulled
the dispositive portion of the questioned
decision insofar as it found Torcita guilty of
simple irregularity in the performance of duty.
The Board appealed from the RTC decision, by
petition of review to the Court of Appeals, which
affirmed the same for the reason that the
respondent could not have been guilty of
irregularity considering that the 12 cases were
eventually dismissed. The Board filed the
petition for review on certiorari before the
Supreme Court.
ISSUE: Whether or not Torcita may be
proceeded against or suspended for breach of
internal discipline, when the original charges
against him were for Conduct Unbecoming of a
Police Officer, Illegal Search, Grave Abuse of
Authority and Violation of Domicile, and Abuse
of Authority and Violation of COMELEC Gun Ban.
RULING: No. Notification of the charges
contemplates that the respondent be informed
of the specific charges against him. The
absence of specification of the offense for which
he was eventually found guilty is not a proper
observance of due process. There can be no
short-cut to the legal process. While the
definition of the more serious offense is broad,
and almost all-encompassing a finding of guilt
for an offense, no matter how light, for which
one is not properly charged and tried cannot be
countenanced without violating the rudimentary
requirements of due process. Herein, the 12
administrative cases filed against Torcita did not
include charges or offenses mentioned or made
reference to the specific act of being drunk
while in the performance of official duty. There
is no indication or warning at all in the summary
dismissal proceedings that Torcita was also
being charged with breach of internal discipline
consisting of taking alcoholic drinks while in the
performance of his duties. The omission is
fatal to the validity of the judgment finding
him guilty of the offense for which he was
not notified nor charged. Further, the cursory
conclusion of the Dismissal Board that Torcita
"committed breach of internal discipline by
taking drinks while in the performance of
same" should have been substantiated by
factual findings referring to this particular
offense. Even if he was prosecuted for
irregular performance of duty, he could not
have been found to have the odor or smell of
alcohol while in the performance of duty
because he was not on duty at the time that
he had a taste of liquor; he was on a private
trip fetching his wife.
- Procedural Due Process
(Opportunity to be Heard)
DE BISSHOP VS GALANG (8 SCRA 244
(1963)
FACTS: Petitioner-appellee George de
Bisschop, an American citizen, was allowed
to stay in this country for three years as the
prearranged employee of the Bissmag
Production, Inc., of which he is president and
general manager. He applied for extension of
stay with the Bureau of Immigration, in a
letter dated 10 July 1959. In view, however,
of confidential and damaging reports of
Immigration Officer Benjamin de Mesa to the
effect that the Bissmag Production, Inc., is
more of a gambling front than the enterprise
for promotion of local and imported shows
that it purports to be, and that de Bisschop is
suspect of having evaded payment of his
income tax.
The Commissioner of Immigration advised
him that his application for extension of stay
as a prearranged employee has been denied
by the Board of Commissioners, and that he
should depart within 5 days.
De Bisshop filed the present case for
prohibition to desist from arresting and
detaining him.
ISSUE: WON the Commissioners of
Immigration are required by law to conduct
formal hearings on all applications for
extension of stay of aliens.
HELD: The administration of immigration
laws is the primary and exclusive
responsibility of the Executive branch of the
government. Extension of stay of aliens is
purely discretionary on the part of the
immigration authorities. Since
Commonwealth Act No. 613, otherwise
known as the Philippine Immigration Act of
1940, is silent as to the procedure to be
followed in these cases, we are inclined to
uphold the argument that courts have no
jurisdiction to review the purely
administrative practice of immigration
authorities of not granting formal hearings in
certain cases as the circumstances may
warrant, for reasons of practicability and
expediency. This would not violate the due
process clause if we take into account that, in
this particular case, the letter of appellant-
commissioner advising de Bisschop to depart in
5 days is a mere formality, a preliminary step,
and, therefore, far from final, because, as
alleged in paragraph 7 of appellant's answer to
the complaint, the "requirement to leave before
the start of the deportation proceedings is only
an advice to the party that unless he departs
voluntarily, the State will be compelled to take
steps for his expulsion". It is already a settled
rule in this jurisdiction that a day in court is not
a matter of right in administrative proceedings.
The fact should not be lost sight of that we are
dealing with an administrative proceeding and
not with a judicial proceeding. As Judge Cooley,
the leading American writer on Constitutional
Law, has well said, due process of law is not
necessarily judicial process; much of the
process by means of which the Government is
carried on, and the order of society maintained,
is purely executive or administrative, which is
as much due process of law, as is judicial
process. While a day in court is a matter of right
in judicial proceedings, in administrative
proceedings, it is otherwise since they rest upon
different principles. . . . In certain proceedings,
therefore, of all administrative character, it may
be stated, without fear of contradiction, that the
right to a notice and hearing are not essential
to due process of law.
MAROHOMBSAR VS JUDGE ADIONG
(A.M. No. RTJ-02-1674. January 22, 2004)
FACTS: Herein complainant Bailinang P.
Marohombsar was the defendant in a civil case
for injunction with prayer for preliminary
injunction filed by Yasmira Pangandapun
questioning the legality of Marohombsars
appointment as provincial social welfare officer
V of the DSWD-ARMM. Prior to Marohombsars
appointment, Pangandapun used to occupy said
position as officer in charge.
Judge Adiong issued the temporary restraining
order. During the hearing on the application for
the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction,
none of the lawyers appeared. Hence,
respondent considered it submitted for
resolution and issued the preliminary injunction
the following day.
A complaint was thereafter filed against Judge
Santos B. Adiong of the RTC, Branch 8, Marawi
City, Lanao del Sur, Marohombsar for gross
ignorance of the law, abuse of discretion and
conduct unbecoming of a judge in connection
with his issuance of a temporary restraining
order and a preliminary restraining order in the
civil case involving herein complainant.
ISSUE: Whether or not the complainant was
denied due process because the preliminary
injunction was issued without hearing.
HELD: In applications for preliminary
injunction, the dual requirement of prior
notice and hearing before injunction may
issue has been relaxed to the point that not
all petitions for preliminary injunction need
undergo a trial-type hearing, it being
doctrinal that a formal or trial-type hearing is
not, at all times and in all instances,
essential to due process. The essence of due
process is that a party is afforded a
reasonable opportunity to be heard and to
present any evidence he may have in
support of his defense. In the present case,
complainant was able to move for a
reconsideration of the order in question,
hence her right to due process was not in
anyway transgressed. We have ruled that a
party cannot claim that he has been denied
due process when he has availed of the
opportunity to present his position.
PHILCOMSAT VS. ALCUAZ (180 SCRA
218)
FACTS: Herein petitioner, Philippine
Communications Satellite Corporation, is
engaged in providing for services involving
telecommunications. Charging rates for
certain specified lines that were reduced by
order of herein respondent Jose Alcuaz
Commissioner of the National
Telecommunications Commission. The rates
were ordered to be reduced by fifteen
percent (15%) due to Executive Order No.
546 which granted the NTC the power to fix
rates. Said order was issued without prior
notice and hearing.
ISSUE: Whether or Not E.O. 546 is
unconstitutional because it violates
procedural due process for having been
issued without prior notice and hearing and
that the rate reduction it imposes is unjust,
unreasonable and confiscatory, thus
constitutive of a violation of substantive due
process.
HELD: The order in question which was
issued by respondent Alcuaz no doubt
contains all the attributes of a quasi-judicial
adjudication. Foremost is the fact that said
order pertains exclusively to petitioner and
to no other. Further, it is premised on a
finding of fact, although patently superficial,
that there is merit in a reduction of some of
the rates charged- based on an initial
evaluation of petitioner's financial
statements-without affording petitioner the
benefit of an explanation as to what
particular aspect or aspects of the financial
statements warranted a corresponding rate
reduction. No rationalization was offered nor
were the attending contingencies, if any,
discussed, which prompted respondents to
impose as much as a fifteen percent (15%) rate
reduction. It is not far-fetched to assume that
petitioner could be in a better position to
rationalize its rates vis-a-vis the viability of its
business requirements. The rates it charges
result from an exhaustive and detailed study it
conducts of the multi-faceted intricacies
attendant to a public service undertaking of
such nature and magnitude. We are, therefore,
inclined to lend greater credence to petitioner's
ratiocination that an immediate reduction in its
rates would adversely affect its operations and
the quality of its service to the public
considering the maintenance requirements, the
projects it still has to undertake and the
financial outlay involved. Notably, petitioner
was not even afforded the opportunity to cross-
examine the inspector who issued the report on
which respondent NTC based its questioned
order.
While respondents may fix a temporary rate
pending final determination of the application of
petitioner, such rate-fixing order, temporary
though it may be, is not exempt from the
statutory procedural requirements of notice and
hearing, as well as the requirement of
reasonableness. Assuming that such power is
vested in NTC, it may not exercise the same in
an arbitrary and confiscatory manner.
Categorizing such an order as temporary in
nature does not perforce entail the applicability
of a different rule of statutory procedure than
would otherwise be applied to any other order
on the same matter unless otherwise provided
by the applicable law.
It is thus clear that with regard to rate-fixing,
respondent has no authority to make such order
without first giving petitioner a hearing,
whether the order be temporary or permanent,
and it is immaterial whether the same is made
upon a complaint, a summary investigation, or
upon the commission's own motion as in the
present case.
WHEREFORE, the writ prayed for is GRANTED
and the order of respondents is hereby SET
ASIDE.
ROXAS VS VASQUEZ (G.R. No. 114944;
June 19, 2001)
FACTS: A complaint was filed by the then DILG
Secretary Rafael Alunan III before the
Ombudsman against certain officers of the
Philippine National Police including herein
petitioners Police General Manuel C. Roxas and
Police Colonel Ahmed S. Nacpil for violation of
Section 3(e) of Republic Act No. 3019 (Anti Graft
and Corrupt Practices Act). This was after the
Commission on Audit discovered the
irregularities in the bidding, awarding and
purchasing of sixty fire trucks.
After a review of the preliminary investigation
conducted, an Information was filed by the
Ombudsman before the Sandiganbayan
which excluded herein petitioners and three
others among the accused.
However, upon motion, a reinvestigation was
conducted by the Office of the Special
Prosecutor. Without any notice to or
participation of the petitioners, the Office of
the Special Prosecutor issued the first
assailed Order, dismissing the charges
against Generals Flores and Tanchanco, and
recommending that the petitioners together
with P/Lt. Col. Julian Kairan be likewise
indicted.
Petitioners Roxas and Nacpil, together with
Kairan, filed a Motion for Reconsideration,
however it was disapproved. Thus, the Office
of the Ombudsman filed an Amended
Information with respondent Sandiganbayan,
impleading petitioners as additional accused.
ISSUE: Whether or not the petitioners
indictment, on reinvestigation, was without
notice nor participation of petitioners, hence,
null and void for being violative of their
constitutional right to due process.
HELD: Neither do the lack of notice to, or
participation of, petitioners at the
reinvestigation render the questioned
issuances of respondent Office of the
Ombudsman null and void. This was firmly
settled in the recent case of Espinosa v.
Office of the Ombudsman, where we held as
follows --
xxx. And even without such notice, we
agree with the observations of the
Sandiganbayan that under the Rules of
Procedures of the Office of the Ombudsman
[Administrative Order No. 07], particularly
Sec. 7, in relation to Sec. 4, while
complainants in preliminary investigation
before the Ombudsman actively participated
therein, their participation is no longer
accorded to them as a matter of right in the
stage of the reinvestigation. In
administrative proceedings, moreover,
technical rules of procedure and evidence
are not strictly applied; administrative due
process cannot be fully equated with due
process in its strict judicial sense.
At any rate, petitioners cannot argue that
they have been deprived of due process.
The rule is well established that due process
is satisfied when the parties are afforded fair
and reasonable opportunity to explain their
side of the controversy or an opportunity to
move for a reconsideration of the action or
ruling complained of. In the case at bar, the
record clearly shows that petitioners not only
filed their respective Counter-Affidavits
during the preliminary investigation, they
also filed separate Motions for
Reconsideration of the October 19, 1993
Order of the Ombudsman impleading them as
accused in Criminal Case No. 18956.
SUNTAY VS. PEOPLE (101 Phil 833 (1957))
FACTS: On or about June 21, 1954, Emilio
Suntay took Alicia Nubla from St. Paul's Colleges
in Quezon City with lewd design and took her
somewhere near the U.P. compound in Diliman,
Quezon City and was then able to have carnal
knowledge with her. Alicia Nubla is a minor of
16 years. Alicias father, Dr. Antonio Nubla,
filed a verified complaint against accused in the
Office of the City Attorney of Quezon City. The
complaint was dismissed for lack of merit.
The petitioner applied for and was granted a
passport by the Department of Foreign Affairs.
He left the Philippines for San Francisco, where
he enrolled in school.
The offended girl subscribed and swore to a
complaint charging the petitioner with
seduction which was filed in the CFI after
preliminary investigation had been conducted.
The private prosecutor filed a motion praying
the Court to issue an order "directing such
government agencies as may be concerned,
particularly the NBI and the DFA, for the
purpose of having the accused brought back to
the Philippines so that he may be dealt with in
accordance with law." Hence, this petition to
annul the order.
ISSUES: 1.WON the Courts order for the
cancellation of the petitioners passport is
illegal.
2.WON the Secretary for Foreign Affairs can
exercise his discretion of cancelling the
passport without hearing.
HELD: The petitioner's contention cannot be
sustained. The petitioner is charged with
seduction. And the order of the respondent
Court directing the Department of Foreign
Affairs "to take proper steps in order that the
accused . . . may be brought back to the
Philippines, so that he may be dealt with in
accordance with law," is not beyond or in
excess of its jurisdiction. In issuing the order in
question, the respondent Secretary was
convinced that a miscarriage of justice would
result by his inaction and as he issued it in the
exercise of his sound discretion, he cannot be
enjoined from carrying it out.
Hearing would have been proper and necessary
if the reason for the withdrawal or cancellation
of the passport were not clear but doubtful. But
where the holder of a passport is facing a
criminal a charge in our courts and left the
country to evade criminal prosecution, the
Secretary for Foreign Affairs, in the exercise of
his discretion to revoke a passport already
issued, cannot be held to have acted
whimsically or capriciously in withdrawing and
cancelling such passport. Due process does not
necessarily mean or require a hearing. When
discretion is exercised by an officer vested
with it upon an undisputed fact, such as the
filing of a serious criminal charge against the
passport holder, hearing maybe dispensed
with by such officer as a prerequisite to the
cancellation of his passport; lack of such
hearing does not violate the due process of
law clause of the Constitution; and the
exercise of the discretion vested in him
cannot be deemed whimsical and capricious
of because of the absence of such hearing. If
hearing should always be held in order to
comply with the due process of law clause of
the Constitution, then a writ of preliminary
injunction issued ex parte would be violative
of the said clause.
VAR ORIENT SHIPPING CO., INC. VS.
ACHACOSO
(161 SCRA 232 (1988)
FACTS: The petitioners filed a complaint
with the Workers' Assistance and
Adjudication Office, POEA against the private
respondents Edgar T. Bunyog, Vedasto
Navarro, Eugenio Capalad, Raul Tumasis,
Antonio Tanioan, Celestino Cason, Danilo
Manela and Roberto Genesis, crew members
of the MPV "Silver Reefer," for having
allegedly violated their Contracts of
Employment with the petitioners which
supposedly resulted in damages arising from
the interdiction of the vessel by the
International Transport Workers' Federation
(ITF) at Kiel Canal, Germany, in March 1986.
After joinder of the issues, the case was
heard on March 4, 1987 where the parties
agreed to submit their respective position
papers and thereafter the case would be
submitted for decision. Only the private
respondents submitted a position paper.
Public respondent rendered judgment and
dismissed the case for some of the
employees; other employees were entitled to
payments by the complainant. A copy of the
decision was sent by registered mail and
delivered by the postman to the petitioners'
counsel at his address, through the
receptionist. According to Attorney Figura,
he did not receive the envelope containing
the decision
Petitioners allegedly learned about the
decision only when the writ of execution was
served. Petitioners, through new counsel,
filed an 'urgent Motion to Recall Writ of
Execution' on the ground that the decision
had not been received by the petitioners,
hence, it was not yet final and executory.
Hence, this petition to annul the judgment
by public respondent and the writ of
execution be set aside.
ISSUE: WON the petitioner was denied due
process of law because Administrator resolved
the case without any formal hearing.
HELD: Equally unmeritorious is the petitioners
'allegation that they were denied due process
because the decision was rendered without a
formal hearing. The essence of due process is
simply an opportunity to be heard or, as applied
to administrative proceedings, an opportunity to
explain one's side or an opportunity to seek a
reconsideration of the action or ruling
complained of.
The fact is that at the hearing of the case on
March 4, 1987, it was agreed by the parties that
they would file their respective memoranda and
thereafter consider the case submitted for
decision. This procedure is authorized by law to
expedite the settlement of labor disputes.
However, only the private respondents
submitted memoranda. The petitioners did not.
On June 10, 1987, the respondents filed a
motion to resolve. The petitioners' counsel did
not oppose either the "Motion to Resolve" or the
respondents "Motion for Execution of Decision"
dated October 19, 1987, both of which were
furnished them through counsel. If it were true,
as they now contend, that they had been
denied due process in the form of a formal
hearing, they should have opposed both
motions.
The petition for certiorari is denied for lack of
merit.
- Procedural Due Process
(Administrative_Quasi-Judicial Due
Process)
ALCUAZ vs. PSBA (161 SCRA 7, 1988)
FACTS: Students and some teachers of PSBA
rallied and barricaded the school because they
wanted to admin to hear their grievances with
regards to not being able to participate in the
policy-making of the school, despite the
regulations set by the admin with regards to
protest actions.
During the regular enrollment period,
petitioners and other students similarly situated
were allegedly blacklisted and denied admission
for the second semester of school year 1986-
1987.
Court ordered the school authorities to create a
special investigating committee to conduct an
investigation, who made recommendations
which the school adopted
A lot of procedural crap, petitioners and
respondents filing and answering the
complaints.
Petitioners claim that they have been deprived
of due process when they were barred from re-
enrollment and for intervenors teachers whose
services have been terminated as faculty
members, on account of their participation in
the demonstration or protest charged by
respondents as "anarchic" rallies, and a
violation of their constitutional rights of
expression and assembly.
Petitioners allege that they have been
deprived of procedural due process which
requires that there be due notice and hear
hearing and of substantive due process
which requires that the person or body to
conduct the investigation be competent to
act and decide free from bias or prejudice.
ISSUE: 1.Whether or not there has been
deprivation of due process ?
2.WON there was contempt of Court by the
respondents
HELD: 1.NO. there was no deprivation of
due process.
There is no existing contract between the
two parties. Par 137 of Manual of Regulations
for Private Schools states that when a
college student registers in a school, it is
understood that he is enrolling for the entire
semester. Likewise, it is provided in the
Manual, that the "written contracts" required
for college teachers are for 'one semester.
after the close of the first semester, the
PSBA-QC no longer has any existing contract
either with the students or with the
intervening teachers. It is a time-honored
principle that contracts are respected as the
law between the contracting parties The
contract having been terminated, there is no
more contract to speak of. The school cannot
be compelled to enter into another contract
with said students and teachers. "The courts,
be they the original trial court or the
appellate court, have no power to make
contracts for the parties."
The Court has stressed, that due process in
disciplinary cases involving students does
not entail proceedings and hearings similar
to those prescribed for actions and
proceedings in courts of justice.
Standards of procedural due process are:
a. the students must be informed in writing
of the nature and cause of any accusation
against them;
b. they shall have the right to answer the
charges against them, with the assistance of
counsel, if desired:
c. they shall be informed of the evidence
against them;
d. they shall have the right to adduce
evidence in their own behalf and
e.the evidence must be duly considered by
the investigating committee or official
designated by the school authorities to hear
and decide the case.
Printed Rules and Regulations of the PSBA-Q.C.
were distributed at the beginning of each school
Enrollment in the PSBA is contractual in nature
and upon admission to the School, the Student
is deemed to have agreed to bind himself to all
rules/regulations promulgated by the Ministry of
Education, Culture and Sports. Furthermore, he
agrees that he may be required to withdraw
from the School at any time for reasons deemed
sufficiently serious by the School
Administration.
Petitioners clearly violated the rules set out by
the school with regard to the protest actions.
Necessary action was taken by the school when
the court issued a temporary mandatory
injunction to accept the petitioners for the first
sem & the creation of an investigating body.
The Court, to insure that full justice is done both
to the students and teachers on the one hand
and the school on the other, ordered an
investigation to be conducted by the school
authorities, in the resolution of November 12,
1986.
Findings of the investigating committee:
1. students disrupted classes
2. petitioners involved were found to be
academically deficient & the teachers are found
to have committed various acts of misconduct.
The right of the school to refuse re-enrollment
of students for academic delinquency and
violation of disciplinary regulations has always
been recognized by this Court Thus, the Court
has ruled that the school's refusal is sanctioned
by law. Sec. 107 of the Manual of Regulations
for Private Schools considers academic
delinquency and violation of disciplinary
regulations vs as valid grounds for refusing re-
enrollment of students. The opposite view
would do violence to the academic freedom
enjoyed by the school and enshrined under the
Constitution.
Court ordinarily accords respect if not finality to
factual findings of administrative tribunals,
unless :
1. the factual findings are not supported by
evidence;
2. where the findings are vitiated by fraud,
imposition or collusion;
3. where the procedure which led to the factual
findings is irregular;
4. when palpable errors are committed; or
5. when a grave abuse of discretion,
arbitrariness, or capriciousness is manifest.
Investigation conducted was fair, open,
exhaustive and adequate.
2.No. The urgent motion of petitioners and
intervenors to cite respondents in contempt
of court is likewise untenable.
No defiance of authority by mere filing of
MOR coz respondent school explained that
the intervenors were actually reinstated as
such faculty members after the issuance of
the temporary mandatory injunction.
Respondent school has fully complied with
its duties under the temporary mandatory
injunction The school manifested that while
the investigation was going on, the
intervenors-faculty members were teaching
and it was only after the investigation, that
the recommendations of the Committee
were adopted by the school and the latter
moved for the dismissal of the case for
having become moot and academic.
ANG TIBAY VS CIR (GR 46496, 27
February 1940)
FACTS: Ang Tibay, has filed an opposition
both to the motion for reconsideration of the
CIR and to the motion for new trial of the
National Labor Union.
The SC found it not necessary to pass upon
the motion for reconsideration of the Sol-
Gen, as it found no substantial evidence to
indicate that the exclusion of the 89 laborers
here was due to their union affiliation or
activity. The Court granted the motion for a
new trial and the entire record of this case
shall be remanded to the CIR, with
instruction that it reopen the case, receive
all such evidence as may be relevant, and
otherwise proceed in accordance with the
requirements set forth.
Principles behind the case:
1.The Court of Industrial Relations; Departure
from rigid concept of separation of powers
The Court of Industrial Relations is a special
court whose functions are specifically stated
in the law of its creation (CA 103). It is more
an administrative board than a part of the
integrated judicial system of the nation. It is
not intended to be a mere receptive organ of
the Government. Unlike a court of justice
which is essentially passive, acting only
when its jurisdiction is invoked and deciding
only cases that are presented to it by the
parties litigant, the function of the Court of
Industrial Relations, as will appear from
perusal of its organic law, is more active,
affirmative and dynamic. It not only
exercises judicial or quasijudicial functions in
the determination of disputes between
employers and employees but its functions
are far more comprehensive and extensive.
It has jurisdiction over the entire Philippines,
to consider, investigate, decide, and settle any
question, matter controversy or dispute arising
between, and/or affecting, employers and
employees or laborers, and landlords and
tenants or farm-laborers, and regulate the
relations between them, subject to, and in
accordance with, the provisions of CA 103
(section 1). It shall take cognizance for
purposes of prevention, arbitration, decision
and settlement, of any industrial or agricultural
dispute causing or likely to cause a strike or
lockout, arising from differences as regards
wageshares or compensation, hours of labor or
conditions of tenancy or employment, between
employers and employees or laborers and
between landlords and tenants or farm-laborers,
provided that the number of employees,
laborers or tenants or farm-laborers involved
exceeds thirty, and such industrial or
agricultural dispute is submitted to the Court by
the Secretary of Labor or by any or both of the
parties to the controversy and certified by the
Secretary of Labor as existing and proper to be
death with by the Court for the sake of public
interest. It shall, before hearing the dispute and
in the course of such hearing, endeavor to
reconcile the parties and induce them to settle
the dispute by amicable agreement. When
directed by the President of the Philippines, it
shall investigate and study all pertinent facts
related to the industry concerned or to the
industries established in a designated locality,
with a view to determining the necessity and
fairness of fixing and adopting for such industry
or locality a minimum wage or share of laborers
or tenants, or a maximum canon or rental to
be paid by the inquilinos or tenants or lessees
to landowners. In fine, it may appeal to
voluntary arbitration in the settlement of
industrial disputes; may employ mediation or
conciliation for that purpose, or recur to the
more effective system of official investigation
and compulsory arbitration in order to
determine specific controversies between labor
and capital in industry and in agriculture. There
is in reality here a mingling of executive and
judicial functions, which is a departure from the
rigid doctrine of the separation of governmental
powers.
2. The CIR free from rigidity of certain
procedure requirements, but not free to ignore
or disregard fundamental and essential
requirements of due process involving
proceedings of administrative character. The
fact, however, that the CIR may be said to be
free from the rigidity of certain procedural
requirements does not mean that it can, in
justiciable cases coming before it, entirely
ignore or disregard the fundamental and
essential requirements of due Process in trials
and investigations of an administrative
character.
3. Cardinal primary rights respected in
administrative proceedings; Guidelines
a. Right to a hearing which includes the right
of the party interested or affected to present
his own case and submit evidence in support
thereof. The liberty and property of the
citizen shall be protected by the rudimentary
requirements of fair play.
b. The tribunal must consider the evidence
presented, after the party is given an
opportunity to present his case and to
adduce evidence tending to establish the
rights which he asserts. The right to adduce
evidence, without the corresponding duty on
the part of the board to consider it, is vain.
Such right is conspicuously futile if the
person or persons to whom the evidence is
presented can thrust it aside without notice
or consideration.
c. Wile the duty to deliberate does not
impose the obligation to decide right, it does
imply a necessity which cannot be
disregarded, namely, that of having
something to support its decision. A decision
with absolutely nothing to support it is a
nullity, a place when directly attached. This
principle emanates from the more
fundamental principle that the genius of
constitutional government is contrary to the
vesting of unlimited power anywhere. Law is
both a grant and a limitation upon power.
d. Not only must there be some evidence to
support a finding or conclusion but the
evidence must be substantial. Substantial
evidence is more than a mere scintilla. It
means such relevant evidence as a
reasonable mind might accept as adequate
to support a conclusion.
e. The decision must be rendered on the
evidence presented at the hearing, or at
least contained in the record and disclosed
to the parties affected.
f. The CIR or any of its judges, therefore,
must act on its or his own independent
consideration of the law and facts of the
controversy, and not simply accept the views
of a subordinate in arriving at a decision.
g. The CIR should, in all controversial
questions, render its decision in such a
manner that the parties to the proceeding
can know the vario issues involved, and the
reasons for the decisions rendered. The
performance of this duty is inseparable from
the authority conferred upon it.
New trial granted under circumstances
The interest of justice would be better
served if the movant is given opportunity to
present at the hearing the documents
referred to in his motion and such other
evidence as may be relevant to the main
issue involved. The legislation which created
the Court of Industrial Relations and under
which it acts is new. The failure to grasp the
fundamental issue involved is not entirely
attributable to the parties adversely affected by
the result.
ATENEO vs. CA (145 SCRA 100, 1986)
FACTS: Carmelita Mateo, a waitress inside the
university charged Juan Ramon Guanzon, a
boarder and first year student of the university
with unbecoming conduct committed on
December 12, 1967 at about 5:15 in the
evening at the Cervini Hall's cafeteria
"Mr. Guanzon, a boarder at Cervini was
asking for 'siopao.' I was at the counter and I
told him that the 'siopao' had still to be heated
and asked him to wait for a while. Then Mr.
Guanzon started mumbling bad words directed
to me, in the hearing presence of other
boarders. I asked him to stop cursing, and he
told me that was none of my business. Since he
seemed impatient, I was going to give back his
money without any contempt. He retorted that
he did not like to accept the money. He got
madder and started to curse again. Then he
threatened to strike me with his fist. I tried to
avoid this. But then he actually struck me in my
left temple. Before he could strike again, his
fellow boarders held him and Dr. Bella and
Leyes coaxed him to stop; I got hold of a bottle
so I could dodge him. It was then that Fr.
Campbell arrived. The incident was hidden from
Fr. Campbell by the boarders. I could not tell
him myself as I had gone into the kitchen crying
because I was hurt."
The university conducted an investigation of the
slapping incident. Based on the investigation
results, Juan Ramon was dismissed from the
university. This triggered the filing of a
complaint for damages by his parents against
the university in the then Court of First Instance
of Negros Occidental at Bacolod City. The
complaint states that Juan Ramon was expelled
from school without giving him a fair trial in
violation of his right to due process and that
they are prominent and well known residents of
Bacolod City, with the unceremonious expulsion
of their son causing them actual, moral, and
exemplary damages as well as attorney's fees.
In its answer, the university denied the material
allegations of the complaint and justified the
dismissal of Juan Ramon on the ground that his
unbecoming behavior is contrary to good
morals, proper decorum, and civility, that such
behavior subjected him as a student to the
university's disciplinary regulations' action and
sanction and that the university has the sole
prerogative and authority at any time to drop
from the school a student found to be
undesirable in order to preserve and maintain
its integrity and discipline so indispensable for
its existence as an institution of learning.
After due trial, the lower court ruled in favor of
the Guanzons and ordered the university to pay
them P92.00 (actual damages); P50,000.00
(moral damages); P5,000.00 (attorney's
fees) and to pay the costs of the suit
Upon appeal to the Court of Appeals by the
university, the trial court's decision was
initially reversed and set aside. The
complaint was dismissed.
However, upon motion for reconsideration
filed by the Guanzons, the appellate court
reversed its decision and set it aside through
a special division of five. In the resolution
issued by the appellate court, the lower
court's decision was reinstated. The motion
for reconsideration had to be referred to a
special division of five in view of the failure
to reach unanimity on the resolution of the
motion, the vote of the regular division
having become 2 to 1.
The petitioner now asks to review and
reverse the resolution of the division of five
ISSUES: 1.WON Juan Ramon Guanzon was
not accorded due process of law
2.WON respondents complaint for recovery
of damages was premature because
administrative remedies have not yet been
exhausted
3.WON private respondents are entitled to
damages
HELD: Petition granted in favor of Ateneo.
CA ruling reversed.
1.No, he was accorded due process.
Exceptions to the rule on finality of factual
findings of trial courts and administrative
agencies
The appellate court resolution invoked the
rule that findings of facts by administrative
officers in matters falling within their
competence will not generally be reviewed
by the courts, and the principle that findings
of facts of the trial court are entitled to great
weight and should not be disturbed on
appeal.
The court does not agree. The statement
regarding the finality given to factual
findings of trial courts and administrative
tribunals is correct as a general principle.
However, it is subject to well established
exceptions. Factual findings of trial courts
are disregarded when - (1) the conclusion is
a finding grounded on speculations,
surmises, and conjectures; (2) the inferences
made are manifestly mistaken, absurd, or
impossible; (3) there is a grave abuse of
discretion; (4) there is a misapprehension of
facts; and (5) the court, in arriving at its
findings, went beyond the issues of the case
and the same are contrary to the admissions
of the parties or the evidence presented.
A similar rule applies to administrative
agencies. By reason of their special knowledge
and expertise, we ordinarily accord respect if
not finality to factual findings of administrative
tribunals. However, there are exceptions to this
rule and judicial power asserts itself whenever
(1) the factual findings are not supported by
evidence; (2) where the findings are vitiated by
fraud, imposition, or collusion; (3) where the
procedure which led to the factual findings is
irregular; (4) when palpable errors are
committed; or when a grave abuse of
discretion, arbitrariness, or capriciousness is
manifest
Why he is deemed to have been accorded due
process
When the letter-complaint was read to Juan
Ramon, he admitted the altercation with the
waitress and his slapping her on the face. Rev.
Welsh (Dean of men) did not stop with the
admission. He interviewed Eric Tagle, Danny Go,
Roberto Beriber, and Jose Reyes, friends of Juan
Ramon who were present during the incident.
The Board of Discipline was made up of
distinguished members of the faculty -Fr.
Francisco Perez, Biology Department Chairman;
Dr. Amando Capawan, a Chemistry professor;
Assistant Dean Piccio of the College; and Dr.
Reyes of the same College. There is nothing in
the records to cast any doubt on their
competence and impartiality insofar as this
disciplinary investigation is concerned.
Juan Ramon himself appeared before the Board
of Discipline. He admitted the slapping incident,
then begged to be excused so he could catch
the boat for Bacolod City. Juan Ramon,
therefore, was given notice of the proceedings;
he actually appeared to present his side; the
investigating board acted fairly and objectively;
and all requisites of administrative due process
were met.
The claim that there was no due process
because the private respondents, the parents of
Juan Ramon were not given any notice of the
proceedings will also not stand. Juan Ramon,
who at the time was 18 years of age, was
already a college student, intelligent and
mature enough to know his responsibilities. In
fact, in the interview with Rev. Welsh, he even
asked if he would be expelled because of the
incident. He was fully cognizant of the gravity of
the offense he committed. When informed
about the December 19, 1967 meeting of the
Board of Discipline, he was asked to seek
advice and assistance from his guardian and or
parents. Juan Ramon is assumed to have
reported this serious matter to his parents. The
fact that he chose to remain silent and did not
inform them about his case was not the fault of
the petitioner university.
Moreover, notwithstanding the non-participation
of the private respondents, the university, as
stated earlier, undertook a fair and objective
investigation of the slapping incident. Due
process in administrative proceedings also
requires consideration of the evidence
presented and the existence of evidence to
support the decision (Halili v. Court of
Industrial Relations, 136 SCRA 112).
Carmelita Mateo was not entirely blameless
for what happened to her because she also
shouted at Juan Ramon and tried to hit him
with a cardboard box top, but this did not
justify Juan Ramon's slapping her in the face.
The evidence clearly shows that the
altercation started with Juan Ramon's
utterance of the offensive language "bilat ni
bay," an Ilongo phrase which means sex
organ of a woman. It was but normal on the
part of Mateo to react to the nasty remark.
Moreover, Roberto Beriber, a friend of Juan
Ramon who was present during the incident
told Rev. Welsh during the investigation of
the case that Juan Ramon made threatening
gestures at Mateo prompting her to pick up a
cardboard box top which she threw at Juan
Ramon. The incident was in public thus
adding to the humiliation of Carmelita Mateo.
There was "unbecoming conduct" and
pursuant to the Rules of Discipline and Code
of Ethics of the university, specifically under
the 1967-1969 Catalog containing the rules
and academic regulation (Exhibit 19), this
offense constituted a ground for dismissal
from the college. The action of the petitioner
is sanctioned by law. Section 107 of the
Manual of Regulations for Private Schools
recognizes violation of disciplinary
regulations as valid ground for refusing re-
enrollment of a student.
Before Juan Ramon was admitted to enroll,
he received (1) the College of Arts and
Sciences Handbook containing the general
regulations of the school and the 1967-1969
catalog of the College of Arts and Sciences
containing the disciplinary rules and
academic regulations and (2) a copy of the
Rules and Regulations of the Cervini-Elizo
Halls of the petitioner university one of the
provisions of which is as follows: under the
title "Dining Room" -"The kitchen help and
server should always be treated with civility."
Miss Mateo was employed as a waitress and
precisely because of her service to boarders,
not to mention her sex, she deserved more
respect and gracious treatment.
The petitioner is correct in stating that there
was a serious error of law in the appellate
court's ruling on due process.
2. No, complaint was not premature.
The petitioner raises the issue of "exhaustion
of administrative remedies" in view of its
pending appeal from the decision of the
Ministry of Education to the President of the
Philippines. It argues that the private
respondents' complaint for recovery of
damages filed in the lower court was
premature.
The issue raised in court was whether or not the
private respondents can recover damages as a
result of the dismissal of their son from the
petitioner university. This is a purely legal
question and nothing of an administrative
nature is to or can be done. The case was
brought pursuant to the law on damages
provided in the Civil Code. The jurisdiction to try
the case belongs to the civil courts.
3.No, there is no basis for recovery of damages.
There is no basis for the recovery of damages.
Juan Ramon was afforded due process of law.
The penalty is based on reasonable rules and
regulations applicable to all students guilty of
the same offense. He never was out of school.
Before the decision could be implemented, Juan
Ramon asked for an honorable dismissal which
was granted. He then enrolled at the De la Salle
University of Bacolod City and later transferred
to another Jesuit school. Moreover, his full and
complete tuition fees for the second semester
were refunded through the representation of Mr.
Romeo Guanzon, Juan Ramon's father.
There was no bad faith on the part of the
university. In fact, the college authorities
deferred any undue action until a definitive
decision had been rendered. The whole
procedure of the disciplinary process was get up
to protect the privacy of the student involved.
There is absolutely no indication of malice,
fraud, and improper or wilful motives or conduct
on the part of the Ateneo de Manila University
in this case.
MERALCO VS PSC (11 SCRA 317, 1964)
FACTS: Meralco made several applications for
the revision and reduction of its rate, which
were approved by the Commission. On June 9,
1954, upon petition of Dr. Pedro Gil, the
Commission requested the Auditor General to
cause an audit and examination of Meralco's
books of accounts. It was then examined and a
report was submitted to the commission.
Hearing was reset from May 30, 1956 to June
22, 1956. On said date, the parties appeared
and Atty. Venancio L. de Peralta, Technical
Assistant and Chief of the Finance and Rate
Division of the Commission, who was duly
authorized to receive the evidence of the
parties, announced that the hearing was an
"informal hearing", and its purpose was to hear
any remarks or statements of the parties and to
define the issues "so that at the hearing we
know exactly what are disputed at this informal
hearing".
After reports had been submitted with regards
to the auditing, Meralco was given by the
Commission a period of 30 days within which
to file an answer, specifying its objections to
the report of the GAO.
Without having (1) first reset the said 3
cases for hearing; (2) Without having given
the Meralco an opportunity, as requested by
it, to cross-examine the officers of the GAO
who prepared the report dated May 11,
1956, on which report the Commission based
its decision; and (3) Without having given
the Meralco an opportunity, as requested by
it, to present evidence in support of its
answer to refute the facts alleged in said
report and controverted by Meralco, on
December 27, 1957, the said Commission
handed down a decision, wherein Meralco is
required to reduce its present authorized
rates effective January 1, 1958 based on the
authorized rates.
Hence, the present petition for review with
preliminary injunction which was issued by
this Court
ISSUE: Whether or Not there was a violation
of due process, thus the decision of the court
is considered void.
HELD: The record shows that no hearing
was held.
Parties appeared before "Attorney Vivencio L.
Peralta, Technical Assistant, and Chief,
Finance and Rate Division, Public Service
Commission, who was duly authorized to
receive the evidence of the parties", and the
record shows that the hearing held before
the said Commissioner was merely an
informal hearing because, using his own
words, "I said at the beginning that this is
only preliminary because I want that the
parties could come to some kind of
understanding.
The record further shows that after the
"preliminary hearing" held on June 22, 1956,
no other hearing was held; the cases were
never set for hearing; and Meralco was not
given an opportunity to present evidence to
rebut the audit report
The decision therefore was null and void
having been rendered without any hearing;
the Commission could not validly
make findings of fact without affording
petitioner the right to cross-examine and
confront witnesses, as well as the right to
present its evidence; the decision contained
findings contrary to law and at any event,
the decision was based
on obsolete allegations of fact, and since the
submission of the audit report of the GAO, on
whose allegations the decision was
predicated, there had occurred recent
developments which had substantially
altered the situation of the Meralco and
which have to be taken into account by the
Commission, in fixing just and reasonable rates
It should be remembered that there should be
no short cuts in the disposition of the time-
honored principle that no one should be
deprived of his life, liberty and property, without
due process of law. Considering the fact that
the reduction of rates herein sought might
involve huge amounts of money and the errors,
alleged to have been committed, if true, would
affect likewise not only the right of the
petitioner but also public interest, it would have
been a better part of valor and wisdom to have
delayed a little bit the final resolution of the
controversy
"Even if the Commission is not bound by the
rules of judicial proceedings, it must how its
head to the constitutional mandate that no
person shall be deprived of right without due
process of law", which binds not only the
government of the Republic, but also each and
everyone of its branches, agencies, etc. "Due
process of law guarantees notice and
opportunities to be heard to persons who would
be affected by the order or act contemplated.
MONTEMAYOR VS ARANETA UNIVERSITY
FOUNDATION
(77 SCRA 321, 1977)
FACTS: Petitioner was a professor at the
Araneta University Foundation. On 7/8/74, he
was found guilty of making homosexual
advances on one Leonardo De Lara by a faculty
investating committee. On 11/8/74, another
committee was appointed to investigate
another charge of a similar nature against
petitioner. Petitioner, through counsel, asked
for the postponement of the hearing set for
11/18 and 19, 1974, but the motion was
denied. The committee then proceeded to hear
the testimony of the complainants and on
12/5/74, submitted its report recommending the
separation of petitioner from the University. On
12/12/74, the University applied w/ the NLRC for
clearance to terminate petitioner's
employment. Meanwhile, petitioner filed a
complaint w/ the NLRC for reinstatement and
backwages. Judgement was rendered in
petitioner's favor, but on appeal to the Sec. of
Labor, the latter found petitioner's dismissal to
be justified. Hence, this petition for certiorari.
ISSUE: Whether or not there was a violation of
due process.
HELD: The Constitution assures to workers
security of tenure. In the case of petitioner, this
guarantee is reinforced by the provision on
academic freedom. In denying petitioner's
motion for postponement of the hearing, the
committee did not accord procedural due
process to the petitioner. This was, however,
remedied at the mediation conference called at
the Dept. of Labor during w/c petitioner was
heard on his evidence. There he was given the
fullest opportunity to present his case.
Furthermore, with regards to petitioners
filing of MFR contending that the hearing in
the NLRC did not conform to their
requirements of due process as the
witnesses against him were not called so
that petitioner could cross-examine them,
this cannot be given credit. Petitioner did not
object to the presentation of the testimony
of the complainant and the witnesses at the
school investigation and did not assert his
right to cross-examine them. Petitioner
waived his right to confront the witnesses,
relying solely on the strength of his
evidence. Nor was it incumbent on resp. to
present the witnesses in the NLRC.
Petitioner's only right is to be heard Petition
dismissed.
NON vs. DANES (GR No. 89317, May 30,
1990)
FACTS: Petitioner students of Mabini
Colleges were not allowed to re-enroll
because they participated in student mass
actions against their school the preceding
sem
The date of the resumption of classes at
Mabini College, petitioners continued their
rally picketing, even though without any
renewal permit, physically coercing students
not to attend their classes, thereby
disrupting the scheduled classes and
depriving a great majority of students of
their right to be present in their classes
Together with the abovementioned fact, the
lower court considered that in signing their
enrollment forms, they waived the privilege
to be re-enrolled. The Mabini College
reserves the right to deny admission of
students xxx whose activities unduly
disrupts or interfere with the efficient
operation of the college xxx
In addition the students signed pledges
saying they respect their alma matter, that
they will conduct themselves in a manner
that would not put the college in a bad light.
Judge Dames decision considering these
facts said that what the students assert is a
mere privileges not a legal right. Respondent
Mabini College is free to admit or not to
admit the petitioners for re-enrollment in
view of the academic freedom enjoyed by
the school.
ISSUE: WON the doctrine laid down in
Alcuaz insofar as it allowed schools to bar
the re-admission or re-enrollment of students
on the ground of termination of contract
should be reversed. The re-admission or re-
enrollment of students on the ground of
termination of contract should be reversed?
HELD: YES. In Alcuaz, it was said that
enrollment is a written contract for one
semester and contracts are respected as the deficiencies these do not warrant non-
law between the contracting parties. At the end readmission. Also there are more students
of each sem, the contract is deemed with sores deficiencies who are re-admitted.
terminated. And some of the petitioners had no failing
marks.
However, this case is not a simple case about a
school refusing re-admission. The refusal to The court held that the students were denied
readmit or to re-enroll petitioners was decided due process in that there was no due
upon and implemented by school authorities as investigation. In fact it would appear from
a reaction to student mass action. the pleadings that the decision to refuse
them re-enrollment because of failing grades
This is a case that focuses on the right to was a mere afterthought.
speech and assembly as exercised by students
vis--vis the right of school officials to discipline Discipline may be warranted but penalty shld
them. be commensurate to the offense committed
with due process.
The student does not shed his constitutionally
protected rights at the schoolgate. In protesting But penalty, if any is deserved should not
grievances disorder is more or less expected anymore be enforced. Moot and academic.
because emotions run high. That the protection Theyve already suffered enough.
to the cognate rights of speech and assembly
guaranteed by the Consti is similarly available
to students is well-settled in our jurisdiction.
Right to discipline cannot override constitutional
safeguards. Citing Malabanan and Villar the
court reiterated that the exercise of the
freedom of assembly could not be a basis for
barring students from enrolling. Under
academic freedom, students my be barred from
re-enrollment based on academic deficiencies.
Permissible limitations on student exercise of
constitutional rights within the school.
Constitutional freedom of free speech and
assembly also not absolute. However,
imposition of disciplinary sanctions requires
observance of procedural due process and
penalty imposed must be proportionate to the
offense committed. (procedural due process:
right to be informed in writing, right to ans the
charges, right to be informed of the charges
against them, right to adduce evidence, and for
this evidence to be duly considered)
The nature of contract between a school and its
students is not an ordinary contract but is
imbued with public interest. The Consti allows
the State supervisory and regulatory powers
over all educational institutions. According to
par 107 and 137 of the respondent schools
manual, a student is enrolled not just for one
sem but for the entire period necessary for the
student to complete his/her course. BP blg 232
gives the students the right to continue their
course up to graduation.
Academic freedom not a ground for denying
students rights. In Villar, the right of an
institution of higher learning to set academic
standards cannot be utilized to discriminate
against students who exercise their
constitutional rights to speech and assembly,
for otherwise there will be a violation of their
right to equal protection.
School said most of them had failing grades
anyway. In answer students say they are
graduating students and if there are any