FUNDAMENTAL POWERS OF THE STATE

merely prescribe retention limits for landowners, there is an

(a) Police Power exercise of the police power for the regulation of private
(b) Power of Eminent Domain property in accordance with the Constitution. But where, to
(c) Power of Taxation carry out such regulation, it becomes necessary to deprive
such owners of whatever lands they may own in excess of
Similarities: the maximum area allowed, there is definitely a taking under
Inherent the power of eminent domain for which payment of just
Necessary compensation is imperative. The taking contemplated is not
Methods which State interferes with private property a mere limitation of the use of the land. What is required is
Presuppose compensation the surrender of the title to and the physical possession of
Exercised by Legislature primarily the said excess and all beneficial rights accruing to the owner
in favor of the farmer-beneficiary. This is definitely an
Distinctions: exercise not of the police power but of the power of eminent
Police Power Power of Power of domain. (Association of Small Landowners in the Philippines,
Eminent Domain Taxation Inc. v. Secretary of Agrarian Reform, G.R. No. 78742, 79310,
Regulates both Affects only Affects only 79744, 79777, [July 14, 1989], 256 PHIL 777-827)
liberty and property rights property rights
property POLICE POWER
Exercised only by May be exercised Exercised only by Definition:
the government by private entities the government The police power is simply defined as the power inherent in
Property usually Property is Property is the State to regulate liberty and property for the promotion
taken is noxious or wholesome and wholesome and of the general welfare. By reason of its function, it extends to
intended for a devoted to public devoted to public all the great public needs and is described as the most
noxious purpose use or purpose use or purpose pervasive, the least limitable and the most demanding of the
and may thus be three inherent powers of the State, far outpacing taxation
destroyed and eminent domain. (Ynot v. Intermediate Appellate Court,
Compensation is Compensation is Compensation is G.R. No. 74457, [March 20, 1987], 232 PHIL 615-632)
the intangible, the full and fair the protection
altruistic feeling equivalent of the given and/or public salus populi suprema lex
that the individual property taken improvements The health of the people should be the supreme law
has contributed to instituted by
the public good government for sic utere tuo ut alienum non laedas
the taxes paid
Use your own property in such a way that you do not injure
other peoples
There are traditional distinctions between the police power
and the power of eminent domain that logically preclude the
application of both powers at the same time on the same It has been defined as the "state authority to enact
subject. To the extent that the measures under challenge legislation that may interfere with personal liberty or
property in order to promote the general welfare." As
defined, it consists of (1) an imposition of restraint upon
liberty or property, (2) in order to foster the common good. It
is not capable of an exact definition but has been, purposely,
veiled in general terms to underscore its all-comprehensive
embrace. (Philippine Association of Service Exporters, Inc. v.
Drilon, G.R. No. 81958, [June 30, 1988], 246 PHIL 393-406)
It constitutes an implied limitation on the Bill of Rights. The
Bill of Rights itself does not purport to be an absolute
guaranty of individual rights and liberties "Even liberty itself,
the greatest of all rights, is not unrestricted license to act
according to one's will." It is subject to the far more
overriding demands and requirements of the greater number.
(Philippine Association of Service Exporters, Inc. v. Drilon,
G.R. No. 81958, [June 30, 1988], 246 PHIL 393-406)
Scope/Characteristics:
This is because, in the exercise of police power and the
general welfare clause, property rights of individuals may be
subjected to restraints and burdens in order to fulfill the
objectives of the government. Otherwise stated, the
government may enact legislation that may interfere with
personal liberty, property, lawful businesses and occupations
to promote the general welfare. (Aquino v. Municipality of
Malay, Aklan, G.R. No. 211356, [September 29, 2014])
"Its scope, ever-expanding to meet the exigencies of the
times, even to anticipate the future where it could be done,
provides enough room for an efficient and flexible response
to conditions and circumstances thus assuring the greatest
benefits." (Philippine Association of Service Exporters, Inc. v.
Drilon, G.R. No. 81958, [June 30, 1988], 246 PHIL 393-406)
"The police power of the State . . . is a power coextensive
with self-protection, and it is not inaptly termed the 'law of
overwhelming necessity.' It may be said to be that inherent
and plenary power in the State which enables it to prohibit all
things hurtful to the comfort, safety, and welfare of
society." (Philippine Association of Service Exporters, Inc. v.
Drilon, G.R. No. 81958, [June 30, 1988], 246 PHIL 393-406)
Especially is it so under a modern democratic framework
where the demands of society and of nations have multiplied
to almost unimaginable proportions; the field and scope of
police power has become almost boundless, just as the fields
of public interest and public welfare have become almost all-
embracing and have transcended human foresight.
Otherwise stated, as we cannot foresee the needs and
demands of public interest and welfare in this constantly
changing and progressive world, so we cannot delimit
beforehand the extent or scope of police power by which and
through which the State seeks to attain or achieve public
interest or welfare. So it is that Constitutions do not define
the scope or extent of the police power of the State; what
they do is to set forth the limitations thereof. The most
important of these are the due process clause and the equal
protection clause. (Ichong v. Hernandez, G.R. No. L-7995,
[May 31, 1957], 101 PHIL 1155-1195)
As stated in Johnson vs. State ex rel. Marey, with reference
to the citrus industry in Florida
"The protection of a large industry constituting
one of the great sources of the state's wealth
and therefore directly or indirectly affecting the
welfare of so great a portion of the population of
the State is affected to such an extent by public
interests as to be within the police power of the
sovereign." (128 So. 857) (Lutz v. Araneta, G.R. No. L-
7859, [December 22, 1955], 98 PHIL 148-154)
In the case of Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, Justice Holmes
said:
 Every restriction upon the use of property
imposed in the exercise of the police power
deprives the owner of some right theretofore
enjoyed, and is, in that sense, an abridgment
by the State of rights in property without
making compensation. But restriction imposed
to protect the public health, safety or morals
from dangers threatened is not a taking. The
restriction here in question is merely the
prohibition of a noxious use. The property so
restricted remains in the possession of its
owner. The state does not appropriate it or
make any use of it. The state merely prevents
the owner from making a use which interferes
with paramount rights of the public. Whenever
the use prohibited ceases to be noxious as it
may because of further changes in local or
social conditions the restriction will have to
be removed and the owner will again be free
to enjoy his property as
heretofore. (Association of Small Landowners
in the Philippines, Inc. v. Secretary of Agrarian
Reform, G.R. No. 78742, 79310, 79744,
79777, [July 14, 1989], 256 PHIL 777-827)
The police power of the state has been described as "the
most essential, insistent and illimitable of powers" which
enables it to prohibit all things hurtful to the comfort, safety
and welfare of society. It is power not emanating from or
conferred by the constitution, but inherent in the state,
plenary, "suitably vague and far from precisely defined,
rooted in the conception that man in organizing the state and
imposing upon the government limitations to safeguard
constitutional rights did not intend thereby to enable
individual citizens or group of citizens to obstruct unreason
able the enactment of such salutary measures to ensure
communal peace, safety, good order and welfare." The
enactment of B.P. 22 is a declaration by the legislature that,
as a matter of public policy, the making and issuance of a
worthless check is deemed a public nuisance to be abated by
the imposition of penal sanctions. The effect of the issuance
of a worthless checks transcends the private interests of the
parties directly involved in the transaction and touches the
interests of the community at large. The mischief it creates is
not only a wrong to the payee or holder, but also an injury to
the public. In sum, we find the enactment of B.P. 22 a valid
exercise of the police power and is not repugnant to the
constitutional inhibition against imprisonment for
debt. (Lozano v. Martinez, G.R. No. L-63419, L-66839-42,
71654, 74524-25, 75122-49, 75812-13, 725765-67, 75789,
[December 18, 1986], 230 PHIL 406-428)
Who may exercise the power:
Under existing laws, the office of the mayor is given powers
not only relative to its function as the executive official of the
town; it has also been endowed with authority to hear issues
involving property rights of individuals and to come out with
an effective order or resolution thereon. (Aquino v.
Municipality of Malay, Aklan, G.R. No. 211356, [September
29, 2014])
It bears stressing that police power is lodged primarily in the
National Legislature. It cannot be exercised by any group or
body of individuals not possessing legislative power. The
National Legislature, however, may delegate this power to
the President and administrative boards as well as the
lawmaking bodies of municipal corporations or local
government units. Once delegated, the agents can
exercise only such legislative powers as are conferred on
them by the national lawmaking body. (Metropolitan Manila
Development Authority v. Bel-Air Village Association, Inc.,
G.R. No. 135962, [March 27, 2000], 385 PHIL 586-622)
Limitations (Test for Valid Exercise):
Police power is validly exercised if (a) the interests of the
public generally, as distinguished from those of a particular
class, require the interference of the State, and (b) the
means employed are reasonably necessary to the attainment
of the object sought to be accomplished and not unduly
oppressive upon individuals. The proper exercise of the police
power requires the concurrence of a lawful subject and a
lawful method. (Department of Education, Culture and Sports
v. San Diego, G.R. No. 89572, [December 21, 1989], 259 PHIL
1016-1024)
Police power is usually exercised in the form of mere
regulation or restriction in the use of liberty or property for
the promotion of the general welfare. It does not involve the
taking or confiscation of property with the exception of a few
cases where there is a necessity to confiscate private
property in order to destroy it for the purpose of protecting
the peace and order and of promoting the general welfare as
for instance, the confiscation of an illegally possessed article,
such as opium and firearms. (City Government of Quezon
City v. Ericta, G.R. No. L-34915, [June 24, 1983], 207 PHIL
648-657)
Additional Limitations (When exercised by delegate):
Notwithstanding its extensive sweep, police power is not
without its own limitations. For all its awesome
consequences, it may not be exercised arbitrarily or
unreasonably. Otherwise, and in that event, it defeats the
purpose for which it is exercised, that is, to advance the
public good. Thus, when the power is used to further private
interests at the expense of the citizenry, there is a clear
misuse of the power. (Philippine Association of Service
Exporters, Inc. v. Drilon, G.R. No. 81958, [June 30, 1988], 246
PHIL 393-406)
Aquino v Municipality of Malay Aklan
FACTS:
Boracay Island West Cove Management Philippines, Inc. applied for a
building permit covering the construction of a hotel over a parcel of land in
Malay, Aklan, which is covered by a Forest Land Use Agreement for Tourism
Purposes. The Municipal Zoning Administrator denied the application
because the site was within the no build zone. Petitioner appealed the
denial action to the Office of the Mayor but no action was taken.
A Cease and Desist Order was issued by the municipal government,
enjoining the expansion of the resort, the Office of the Mayor issued the
assailed EO 10, ordering the closure and demolition of Boracay West
Coves hotel. EO 10 was partially implemented and demolished the
improvements introduced by Boracay West Cove.
Petitioner filed a Petition for Certiorari with prayer for injunctive relief with
the CA Alleging that the order was issued and executed with grave abuse
of discretion
Contentions of West Cove:
1) The hotel cannot summarily be abated because it is not a nuisance per
se, given the hundred million peso-worth of capital.
2) Municipality of Malay, Aklan should have first secured a court order
before proceeding with the demolition.
Contention of the Mayor:
The demolition needed no court order because the municipal mayor has
the express power under the Local Government Code (LGC) to order the
removal of illegally constructed buildings
ISSUE:
Whether or not the municipal mayor committed a grave abuse of discretion
HELD:
The Court ruled that the property involved cannot be classified as
a nuisance per se which can therefore be summarily abated. Here, it is
merely the hotels particular incident, its location and not its inherent
qualities that rendered it a nuisance. Had it not been constructed in the no
build zone, Boracay West Cove could have secured the necessary permits
without issue. As such, even if the hotel is not a nuisance per se, it is still a
nuisance per accidens.
Generally, LGUs have no power to declare a particular thing as a nuisance
unless such a thing is a nuisance per se. Despite the hotels classification
as a nuisance per accidens, however, the LGU may nevertheless properly
order the hotels demolition.
This is because, in the exercise of
police power and the general welfare clause,
property rights of individuals may be subjected to restraints and
burdens in order to fulfill the objectives of the government.
Moreover, the Local Government Code authorizes city and
municipal governments, acting through their local chief
executives, to issue demolition orders. The office of the mayor has
quasi-judicial powers to order the closing and demolition of
establishments.
MMDA v Bel-air
FACTS:
Bel-Air Village Association (BAVA), received a letter of request from MMDA
to open Neptune Street of Bel-Air Village for the use of the public. The said
opening of Neptune Street will be for the safe and convenient movement of
persons and to regulate the flow of traffic in Makati City. This was pursuant
to RA 7924. On the same day, BAVA was appraised that the perimeter wall
separating the subdivision and Kalayaan Avenue would be demolished.
To stop the opening of the said street and demolition of the wall, BAVA
filed a preliminary injunction and a temporary restraining order.
Contention of BAVA:
That the MMDA has no authority to order the opening of Neptune Street, a
private subdivision road and cause the demolition of its perimeter walls. It
held that the authority is lodged in the City Council of Makati by ordinance.
Contention of MMDA:
That it has the authority to open Neptune Street to public traffic because it
is an agent of the state endowed with police power in the delivery of basic
services in Metro Manila. |||
ISSUE:
Whether or not the MMDA has the mandate to open Neptune Street to
public traffic pursuant to its regulatory and police powers.
HELD:
The Court held that the MMDA does not have the capacity to exercise
police power. Police power is primarily lodged in the National
Legislature. However, police power may be delegated to
government units. Petitioner herein is a development authority and not a
political government unit. Therefore, the MMDA cannot exercise police
power because it cannot be delegated to them. It is not a legislative unit of
the government. Republic Act No. 7924 does not empower the MMDA to
enact ordinances, approve resolutions and appropriate funds for the
general welfare of the inhabitants of Manila. There is no syllable in the said
act that grants MMDA police power.
It is an agency created for the purpose of laying down policies and
coordinating with various national government agencies, peoples
organizations, non-governmental organizations and the private sector for
the efficient and expeditious delivery of basic services in the vast
metropolitan area.
PASEI v Drilon
FACTS:
Phil association of Service Exporters, Inc., is engaged principally in the
recruitment of Filipino workers, male and female of overseas employment.
It challenges the constitutional validity of Dept. Order No. 1 (1998) of DOLE
entitled Guidelines Governing the Temporary Suspension of Deployment
of Filipino Domestic and Household Workers.
Contentions of PASEI:
1) The Order does not apply to all Filipino workers but only to domestic
helpers and females with similar skills, thus, discriminatory, and that it is in
violation of the right to travel. PASEI invokes Sec 3 of Art 13 of the
Constitution.
2) It is an invalid exercise of the lawmaking power It is held likewise to be
an invalid exercise of the lawmaking power, police power being legislative,
and not executive, in character.
Contentions of DOLE (Drilon as Secretary of Labor and Employment):
That Department Order No. 1 is in the nature of a police power measure.
They have lifted the deployment ban in some states where there exists
bilateral agreement with the Philippines and existing mechanism providing
for sufficient safeguards to ensure the welfare and protection of the Filipino
workers.
ISSUE:
Whether or not D.O. No. 1 of DOLE is constitutional as it is an exercise of
police power.
RULING:
The right to travel is subject, among other things, to the requirements of
"public safety," "as may be provided by law." The petitioner assumes that it
is unreasonable simply because of its impact on the right to travel, but as
we have stated, the right itself is not absolute.
Department Order No. 1 is a valid implementation of the Labor Code, in
particular, its basic policy to "afford protection to labor," pursuant to the
respondent Department of Labor's rule-making authority vested in it by the
Labor Code. The disputed Order is a valid qualification thereto.
Neither is there merit in the contention that Department Order No. 1
constitutes an invalid exercise of legislative power. It is true that police
power is the domain of the legislature, but it does not mean that
such an authority may not be lawfully delegated. The Labor
Code itself vests the Department of Labor and Employment with rule-
making powers in the enforcement whereof.
The petitioners' reliance on the Constitutional guaranty of worker
participation "in policy and decision-making processes affecting their rights
and benefits." is not well-taken. The right granted, again, must submit to
the demands and necessities of the State's power of regulation.
Ichong v Hernandez
FACTS:
The Legislature passed R.A. 1180 (An Act to Regulate the Retail Business).
Its purpose was to prevent persons who are not citizens of the Phil. from
having a strong hold upon the peoples economic life. A prohibition against
aliens and against associations, partnerships, or corporations the capital of
which are not wholly owned by Filipinos, from engaging directly or
indirectly in the retail trade
Citizens and juridical entities of the United States were exempted from this
Act.
Lao Ichong, in his own behalf and behalf of other alien residents,
corporations and partnerships affected by the Act, filed an action to
declare it unconstitutional.
Contentions of Lao Ichong:
RA 1180 denies to alien residents the equal protection of the laws and
deprives them of their liberty and property without due process
Contentions of the Fiscal City of Manila:
The Act was passed in the valid exercise of the police power of the State,
which exercise is authorized in the Constitution in the interest of national
economic survival
ISSUE:
WON the RA 1180 is a valid exercise of police power
HELD:
The law is a valid exercise of police power and it does not deny the aliens
the equal protection of the laws. There are real and actual, positive and
fundamental differences between an alien and a citizen, which fully justify
the legislative classification adopted.
The equal protection clause does not demand absolute equality among
residents. The difference in status between citizens and aliens constitutes
a basis for reasonable classification in the exercise of police power.
Official statistics point out to the ever-increasing dominance and control by
alien of the retail trade. It is this domination and control that is the
legislatures target in the enactment of the Act. The mere fact of alienage
is the root cause of the distinction between the alien and the national as a
trader. The alien is naturally lacking in that spirit of loyalty and enthusiasm
for the Phil. where he temporarily stays and makes his living. The alien
owes no allegiance or loyalty to the State, and the State cannot rely on
him/her in times of crisis or emergency.
The disputed law was enacted to remedy a real actual threat and
danger to national economy posed by alien dominance and control
of the retail business and free citizens and country from such
dominance and control; that the enactment clearly falls within the
scope of the police power of the State, thru which and by which it
protects its own personality and insures its security and future.
Lutz v Araneta
FACTS:
Walter Lutz in his capacity as the Judicial Administrator of the intestate of
the deceased Antonio Jayme Ledesma, seeks to recover from the Collector
of the Internal Revenue the total sum of P 14, 666.40 paid by the estate as
taxes, under section 3 of Commonwealth Act No. 567, also known as the
Sugar Adjustment Act
Commonwealth Act. 567 Section 2 provides for an increase of the existing
tax on the manufacture of sugar on a graduated basis, while section 3
levies on the owners or persons in control of the land devoted to the
cultivation of sugarcane and ceded to others for consideration, on lease or
otherwise.
It was alleged that such tax is unconstitutional and void, being levied for
the aid and support of the sugar industry exclusively, which in plaintiff's
opinion is not a public purpose for which a tax may be constitutionally
levied. The action was dismissed by the CFI thus the plaintiff appealed
directly to the Supreme Court.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the tax imposition in the Commonwealth Act No. 567 are
unconstitutional.
RULING:
Sugar production is one of the greatest industries of our nation, sugar
occupying a leading position among its export product, giving employment
to thousands of laborers in the country, it is a great source of the state's
wealth, and is one of the most important source of foreign exchange
needed by our government and is thus pivotal in the plans of a regime
committed to a policy of currency stability.
As the protection and promotion of the sugar industry is a matter of public
concern the Legislature may determine within reasonable bounds what is
necessary for its protection and expedient for its promotion. Here, the
legislative must be allowed full play, subject only to the test of
reasonableness; and it is not contended that the means provided in section
6 of Commonwealth Act No. 567 bear no relation to the objective pursued
or are oppressive in character. If objective and methods are alike
constitutionally valid, no reason is seen why the state may not levy taxes
to raise funds for their prosecution and attainment. Taxation may be made
the implement. Taxation may be made the implement of the state's police
power
The subject tax is levied with a regulatory purpose, to provide means for
the rehabilitation and stabilization of the threatened sugar industry. In
other words, the act is primarily a valid exercise of police power.
Association of Small Land Owners v Secretary of Agrarian Reform
FACTS:
These are consolidated cases involving common legal questions including
serious challenges to the constitutionality of R.A. No. 6657 also known as
the "Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law of 1988"
In G.R. No. 79777, the petitioners are questioning the P.D No. 27 and E.O
Nos. 228 and 229 on the grounds inter alia of separation of powers, due
process, equal protection and the constitutional limitation that no private
property shall be taken for public use without just compensation.
In G.R. No. 79310, the petitioners in this case claim that the power to
provide for a Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program as decreed by the
Constitution belongs to the Congress and not to the President, the also
allege that Proclamation No. 131 and E.O No. 229 should be annulled for
violation of the constitutional provisions on just compensation, due process
and equal protection. They contended that the taking must be
simultaneous with payment of just compensation which such payment is
not contemplated in Section 5 of the E.O No. 229.
In G.R. No. 79744, the petitioner argues that E.O Nos. 228 and 229 were
invalidly issued by the President and that the said executive orders
violate the constitutional provision that no private property shall be taken
without due process or just compensation which was denied to the
petitioners.
In G.R. No 78742 the petitioners claim that they cannot eject their tenants
and so are unable to enjoy their right of retention because the Department
of Agrarian Reform has so far not issued the implementing rules of the
decree. They therefore ask the Honorable Court for a writ of mandamus to
compel the respondents to issue the said rules.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the laws being challenged is a valid exercise of Police
power or Power of Eminent Domain.
RULING:
There are traditional distinctions between the police power and the power
of eminent domain that logically preclude the application of both powers at
the same time on the same subject. The cases before us present no knotty
complication insofar as the question of compensable taking is concerned.
To the extent that the measures under challenge merely prescribe
retention limits for landowners, there is an exercise of the police power for
the regulation of private property in accordance with the Constitution. But
where, to carry out such regulation, it becomes necessary to deprive such
owners of whatever lands they may own in excess of the maximum area
allowed, there is definitely a taking under the power of eminent domain for
which payment of just compensation is imperative. The taking
contemplated is not a mere limitation of the use of the land. What is
required is the surrender of the title to and the physical possession of the
said excess and all beneficial rights accruing to the owner in favor of the
farmer-beneficiary. This is definitely an exercise not of the police power but
of the power of eminent domain.
Lozano v Martinez
FACTS:
This is a consolidated case, the petition arose from cases involving
prosecution of offenses under the BP 22 also known as Bouncing Check
Law. The defendant in these case moved seasonably to quash
the information on the ground that the acts charged did not constitute an
offense, the statute being unconstitutional. The motions were denied by
the respondent trial court, except in one case, which is the subject of G.R
No. 75789, wherein the trial court declared the law unconstitutional and
dismissed the case. The parties adversely affected have come to the court
for remedy.
ISSUE:
Whether or not BP 22 or the Bouncing Check Law is unconstitutional.
RULING:
No, the enactment of the assailed statute is a valid exercise of Police power
and is not repugnant to the constitutional inhibition against imprisonment
for debt. It may be constitutionally impermissible for the legislature to
penalize a person for non-payment of debt ex contractu, but certainly it is
within the prerogative of the lawmaking body to prescribe certain acts
deemed pernicious and inimical to public welfare. Acts mala in se are not
only acts which the law can punish. An act may not be considered by
society as inherently wrong, hence, not malum in se, but because of the
harm that it inflicts on the community, it can be outlawed and criminally
punished as malum prohibitum. The state can do this in the exercise
of its police power.
The enactment of the said statute is a declaration by the legislature that,
as a matter of public policy, the making and issuance of a worthless check
is deemed a public nuisance to be abated by the imposition of penal
sanctions.
Department of Education, Culture and Sports v San Diego
Facts:
Respondent San Diego has flunked the NMAT (National Medical Admission
Test) three times. When he applied to take again, petitioner rejected his
application based on the three-flunk-rule. He then filed a petition before
the RTC on the ground of due process and equal protection and challenging
the constitutionality of the order. The petition was granted by the RTC
therefore this petition.
Issue:
Whether or not the NMAT three-flunk-rule order is valid and
constitutional.
Ruling:
Yes. It is the right and responsibility of the State to insure that the medical
profession is not infiltrated by incompetents to whom patients may
unwarily entrust their lives and health. The method employed by the
challenged regulation is not irrelevant to the purpose of the law nor is it
arbitrary or oppressive. The right to quality education is not absolute. The
Constitution provides that every citizen has the right to choose a
profession or course of study, subject to fair, reasonable and equitable
admission and academic requirements. It is not enough to simply invoke
the right to quality education as a guarantee of the Constitution but one
must show that he is entitled to it because of his preparation and promise.
The subject of the challenged regulation is certainly within the
ambit of the police power. It is the right and indeed the
responsibility of the State to insure that the medical profession is
not infiltrated by incompetents to whom patients may unwarily
entrust their lives and health. The method employed by the
challenged regulation is not irrelevant to the purpose of the law
nor is it arbitrary or oppressive. The three-flunk rule is intended to
insulate the medical schools and ultimately the medical profession from
the intrusion of those not qualified to be doctors. Petition was granted and
the RTC ruling was reversed.
Ynot v Intermediate Appellate Court
FACTS:
On January 13, 1984, the petitioner transported six carabaos in a pump
boat from Masbate to Iloilo when the same was confiscated by the police
station commander of Barotac Nuevo, Iloilo for the violation of E.O. 626-A.
A case was filed by the petitioner questioning the constitutionality of
executive order and the recovery of the carabaos. After considering the
merits of the case, the confiscation was sustained and the court declined
to rule on the constitutionality issue. The petitioner appealed the decision
to the Intermediate Appellate Court but it also upheld the ruling of RTC.
ISSUE:
Is E.O. 626-A unconstitutional?
RULING:
The SC ruled that the EO is not valid as it indeed violates due process. EO
626-A ctreated a presumption based on the judgment of the executive. The
movement of carabaos from one area to the other does not mean a
subsequent slaughter of the same would ensue. Ynot should be given to
defend himself and explain why the carabaos are being transferred before
they can be confiscated. The SC found that the challenged measure
is an invalid exercise of the police power because the method
employed to conserve the carabaos is not reasonably necessary to
the purpose of the law and, worse, is unduly oppressive. Due
process is violated because the owner of the property confiscated is denied
the right to be heard in his defense and is immediately condemned and
punished. The conferment on the administrative authorities of the power to
adjudge the guilt of the supposed offender is a clear encroachment on
judicial functions and militates against the doctrine of separation of
powers. There is, finally, also an invalid delegation of legislative powers to
the officers mentioned therein who are granted unlimited discretion in the
distribution of the properties arbitrarily taken.
City Government of Quezon City v Ericta
FACTS:
Quezon City enacted an ordinance entitled ORDINANCE REGULATING THE
ESTABLISHMENT, MAINTENANCE AND OPERATION OF PRIVATE MEMORIAL
TYPE CEMETERY OR BURIAL GROUND WITHIN THE JURISDICTION OF
QUEZON CITY AND PROVIDING PENALTIES FOR THE VIOLATION THEREOF.
The law basically provides that at least six (6) percent of the total area of
the memorial park cemetery shall be set aside for charity burial of
deceased persons who are paupers and have been residents of Quezon
City for at least 5 years prior to their death, to be determined by
competent City Authorities. QC justified the law by invoking police power.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the ordinance is valid.
HELD:
The SC held the law as an invalid exercise of police power. There is no
reasonable relation between the setting aside of at least six (6) percent of
the total area of all private cemeteries for charity burial grounds of
deceased paupers and the promotion of health, morals, good order, safety,
or the general welfare of the people. The ordinance is actually a taking
without compensation of a certain area from a private cemetery to benefit
paupers who are charges of the municipal corporation. Instead of building
or maintaining a public cemetery for this purpose, the city passes the
burden to private cemeteries.
Jacobson v Massachusetts
FACTS:
Cities in Massachusetts could require that all residents be vaccinated, as
authorized by a state statute. This type of regulation was adopted by the
city of Cambridge. Pastor Henning Jacobson refused to comply with the
requirement for vaccination. A leader in his community, Jacobson was one
of the few who resisted mandatory vaccinations for smallpox in the early
20th century in Cambridge, Massachusetts. While many were pleased to
hear about a vaccine for smallpox, others were alarmed by the idea of
being stabbed by a needle and having cowpox injected inside of them.
Jacobson was distraught by this and took his case to the Supreme Court in
1905 against mandatory vaccinations. He refused the vaccine stating it
was an "invasion of his liberty.
ISSUE:
In order to protect public health and safety, does the scope of the states
police power include the authority to enact reasonable regulations to do
so?
HELD:
Yes. In order to protect public health and safety, the scope of the states
police power includes the authority to enact reasonable regulations to do
so. The Constitution secures liberty for every person within its jurisdiction,
but does not give an absolute right for each person to be free from
restraint at all times and in all circumstances. Every person is required to
be subject to various restraints for the common good. The efforts by
Cambridge to stamp out smallpox are substantially related to the
protection of public health and safety. There has been nothing to clearly
justify the Court holding the statute to be unconstitutional. Affirmed.
Pennsylvania Coal Co. v Mahon
FACTS:
The Kohler Act prohibited mining that would cause subsidence of homes
and surfaces near residential properties. The Pennsylvania Coal Co. had
relied in contract and deeds to retain the valuable estate in the land
beneath the surface. The property owners sought to enjoin the
Pennsylvania Coal Co. from mining beneath their homes. The trial court
found that the Pennsylvania Coal Co.s mining would cause the subsidence
damage and danger prohibited by the Kohler Act and sought prevention by
injunction. The subsurface estate could not be valuably mined for profit
and still support the surface above. The owner had consented to the deed
with the express reservation of the coal rights. As such the deed gave
Pennsylvania Coal Co. both contract and property rights which the Kohler
Act rendered useless.
ISSUE:
Whether the statute was permissible under the police power or instead
constituted an exercise of eminent domain that required just
compensation.
HELD:
The Court argued as follows: (1) The damage done by the activity
prohibited by the act is a private, not a public nuisance; there is no public
safety justification for the statute, as notice before mining would suffice to
protect public safety. On the other hand, the damage done by the statute is
significant, insofar as it abolishes an estate in land and a binding contract.
(2) The statute, in general, purports to extinguish the mining rights to
valuable properties under surfaces owned by the public and the
government. The statute makes prohibitively expensive the mining of coal
in these areas, and thereby effectively destroys the right, after all owning
coal is not worth anything if the coal cannot be mined. The rights of the
public to its streets and other property are rights paid for. If the
representatives of the public have been so shortsighted as not to pay for
the mining rights of the land as well, there is no authority to grant those
rights without compensation. (If the land above required compensation, so
therefore does the land below.)
The doctrine of regulatory taking, "The general rule at least is that while
property may be regulated to a certain extent, if regulation goes too far it
will be recognized as a taking." The regulation that went "too far" was a
law prohibiting mining which might cause the subsidence of structures for
human habitation constructed on the land surface. This was resisted by a
coal company which had earlier granted a deed to the land over its mine
but reserved all mining rights thereunder, with the grantee assuming all
risks and waiving any damage claim. The Court held the law could not be
sustained without compensating the grantor. Justice Brandeis filed a lone
dissent in which he argued that there was a valid exercise of the police
power.
POWER OF EMINENT DOMAIN
Definition/Scope:
Eminent domain is a fundamental state power that is
inseparable from sovereignty. It is the power of a sovereign
state to appropriate private property within its territorial
sovereignty to promote public welfare. The exercise of this
power is based on the State's primary duty to serve the
common need and advance the general welfare. It is an
inherent power and is not conferred by the Constitution. It is
inalienable and no legislative act or agreement can serve to
abrogate the power of eminent domain when public necessity
and convenience require its exercise. (Republic v. Mupas,
G.R. Nos. 181892, 209917, 209696 & 209731, [September 8,
2015])
The government's exercise of eminent domain is not
absolute. It is subject, first and foremost, to constitutional
restrictions enshrined in the Bill of Rights, viz.:
Section 1. No person shall be
deprived of life, liberty, or property without
due process of law, nor shall any person be
denied the equal protection of the laws.
xxx xxx xxx
Section 9. Private property shall not
be taken for public use without just
compensation.
Exactly the same sequential restrictive provisions
were likewise found in Article III of the 1935 Constitution,
then in force at the time the property in issue was taken.
The Bill of Rights aims to protect the people against
arbitrary and discriminatory use of political power. The
basic rights and restrictions enumerated therein
guarantee the preservation of our natural rights, which
include personal liberty and security against invasion by
 the government or any of its branches or
instrumentalities. In relation to the present controversy, it
extends to the citizens a sense of security in their
property rights, despite the implied understanding that
the sovereign can, at any time, reclaim from them the
possession and ownership over portions of its territory. It,
in fine, affords the citizens a mantle of protection from
indiscriminate land-grabbing by the government, through
the installation of defined safeguards from expropriation,
without which, the exercise of the power of eminent
domain can become oppressive. (Secretary of the
Department of Public Works and Highways v. Spouses
Tecson, G.R. No. 179334 (Resolution), [April 21, 2015])
Normally, of course, the power of eminent domain results
in the taking or appropriation of title to, and possession
of, the expropriated property; but no cogent reason
appears why the said power may not be availed of to
impose only a burden upon the owner of condemned
property, without loss of title and possession. It is
unquestionable that the real property may, through
expropriation, be subjected to an easement of right of
way. The use of the PLDT's lines and services to allow
interservice connection between both telephone systems
is not much different. In either case private property is
subjected to a burden for public use and benefit. If, under
Section 6, Article XIII, of the Constitution, the State may,
in the interest of national welfare, transfer utilities to
public ownership upon payment of just compensation,
there is no reason why the State may not require a public
utility to render services in the general interest, provided
just compensation is paid therefor.|||(Republic v.
Philippine Long Distance Telephone Co., G.R. No. L-18841,
[January 27, 1969], 136 PHIL 20-36)
Who may exercise the power:
The decision to exercise the power of eminent domain rests
with the legislature which has the exclusive power to
prescribe how and by whom the power of eminent domain is
to be exercised. Thus, the Executive Department cannot
condemn properties for its own use without direct authority
from the Congress. (Republic v. Mupas, G.R. Nos. 181892,
209917, 209696 & 209731, [September 8, 2015])
Section 19 of RA 7160, which delegates to LGUs the power of
eminent domain, also lays down the parameters for its
exercise. It provides as follows: "Section 19. Eminent Domain.
A local government unit may, through its chief executive and
acting pursuant to an ordinance, exercise the power of
eminent domain for public use, or purpose, or welfare for the
benefit of the poor and the landless, upon payment of just
compensation, pursuant to the provisions of the Constitution
and pertinent laws: . . . In the case at bar, the local chief
executive sought to exercise the power of eminent domain
pursuant to a resolution of the municipal council. Thus, there
was no compliance with the first requisite that the mayor be
authorized through an ordinance. If Congress intended to
allow LGUs to exercise eminent domain through a mere
resolution, it would have simply adopted the language of the
previous Local Government Code. But Congress did not. In a
clear divergence from the previousLocal Government Code,
Section 19 of RA 7160 categorically requires that the local
chief executive act pursuant to an ordinance. (Municipality of
Paraaque v. V.M. Realty Corp., G.R. No. 127820, [July 20,
1998], 354 PHIL 684-698)
Requisites for exercise:
a) Necessity
The very foundation of the right to exercise eminent
domain is a genuine necessity, and that necessity
must be of a public character. The ascertainment of
the necessity must precede, and not follow, the taking
of the property. The general power to exercise the right
of eminent domain must not be confused with the right
 to exercise it in a particular case. (City of Manila v.
Chinese Community of Manila, G.R. No. 14355,
[October 31, 1919], 40 PHIL 349-385)
The Legislature may directly determine the necessity
for appropriating private property for a particular
improvement for public use, and it may select the
exact location of the improvement. In such a case, it
is well settled that the utility of the proposed
improvement, the existence of the public necessity
for its construction, the expediency of constructing it,
the suitableness of the location selected, and the
consequent necessity of taking the lands selected,
are all questions exclusively for the legislature to
determine, and the courts have no power to interfere
or to substitute their own views for those of the
representatives of the people. But when the law does
not designate the property to be taken, nor how
much may be taken, then the necessity of taking
private property is a question for the courts.(City of
Manila v. Chinese Community of Manila, G.R. No.
14355, [October 31, 1919], 40 PHIL 349-385)
b) Private Property
c) Taking
'Taking' under the power of eminent domain may be
defined generally as entering upon private property for
more than a momentary period, and, under the
warrant or color of legal authority, devoting it to a
public use, or otherwise informally appropriating or
injuriously affecting it in such a way as substantially to
oust the owner and deprive him of all beneficial
enjoyment thereof. (Republic v. Vda. de Castellvi, G.R.
No. L-20620, [August 15, 1974], 157 PHIL 329-364)
The threshold requisites for a lawful taking of private
property for public use need to be examined here: one
is the necessity for the taking; another is the legal
authority to effect the taking. (Philippine Press
Institute, Inc. v. Commission on Elections, G.R. No.
119694 (Resolution), [May 22, 1995], 314 PHIL 131-
149)
d) Public use
Public use, as an eminent domain concept, has now
acquired an expansive meaning to include any use
that is of "usefulness, utility, or advantage, or what is
productive of general benefit [of the public]." If the
genuine public necessity the very reason or
condition as it were allowing, at the first instance,
the expropriation of a private land ceases or
disappears, then there is no more cogent point for the
government's retention of the expropriated land. The
same legal situation should hold if the government
devotes the property to another public use very much
different from the original or deviates from the
declared purpose to benefit another private person. It
has been said that the direct use by the state of its
power to oblige landowners to renounce their
productive possession to another citizen, who will use
it predominantly for that citizen's own private gain, is
offensive to our laws. (National Power Corp. v. Posada,
G.R. No. 191945 , [March 11, 2015])
Subsequently, in Metropolitan Water District v. De Los
Angeles, the Court had occasion to apply the above-
quoted ruling when the petitioner, during the
pendency of the expropriation case, resolved that the
land sought to be condemned was no longer necessary
in the maintenance and operation of its system of
waterworks. It was held: The fundamental basis then
of all actions brought for the expropriation of lands,
under the power of eminent domain, is public use.
That being true, the very moment that it appears at
any stage of the proceedings that the expropriation is
not for a public use, the action must necessarily fail
and should be dismissed, for the reason that the
action cannot be maintained at all except when the
expropriation is for some public use. That must be true
even during the pendency of the appeal of [sic] at any
other stage of the proceedings. If, for example, during
the trial in the lower court, it should be made to
appear to the satisfaction of the court that the
expropriation is not for some public use, it would be
the duty and the obligation of the trial court to dismiss
the action. And even during the pendency of the
appeal, if it should be made to appear to the
satisfaction of the appellate court that the
expropriation is not for public use, then it would
become the duty and the obligation of the appellate
court to dismiss it. (National Power Corp. v. Posada,
G.R. No. 191945 , [March 11, 2015])
The "public use" requirement for a valid exercise of the
power of eminent domain is a flexible and evolving
concept influenced by changing conditions. In this
jurisdiction, the statutory and judicial trend has been
summarized as follows:
The taking to be valid must be for public use. There
was a time when it was felt that a literal meaning
should be attached to such a requirement. Whatever
project is undertaken must be for the public to enjoy,
as in the case of streets or parks. Otherwise,
expropriation is not allowable. It is not anymore. As
long as the purpose of the taking is public, then the
power of eminent domain comes into play. As just
noted, the constitution in at least two cases. to remove
any doubt, determines what is public use. One is the
expropriation of lands to be subdivided into small lots
for resale at cost to individuals. The other is in the
transfer, through the exercise of this power, of utilities
and other private enterprise to the government. It is
accurate to state then that at present whatever may
be beneficially employed for the general welfare
satisfies the requirement of public use. (Sumulong v.
Guerrero, G.R. No. L-48685, [September 30, 1987])
The validity of the exercise of the power of eminent
domain for traditional purposes is beyond question; it
is not at all to be said, however, that public use should
thereby be restricted to such traditional uses. The idea
that "public use" is strictly limited to clear cases of
"use by the public" has long been discarded. (Manosca
v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 106440, [January 29,
1996], 322 PHIL 442-454)
e) Just compensation
The 1987 Constitution embodies two constitutional
safeguards against the arbitrary exercise of eminent
domain: first, private property shall not be taken for
public use without just compensation; and second,
no person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or
property without due process of law.
Just compensation is defined as "the full and fair
equivalent of the property taken from its owner by
the expropriator." The word "just" is used to qualify
the meaning of the word "compensation" and to
convey the idea that the amount to be tendered for
the property to be taken shall be real, substantial, full
and ample. On the other hand, the word
"compensation" means "a full indemnity or
remuneration for the loss or damage sustained by
the owner of property taken or injured for public
use."
Simply stated, just compensation means that the
former owner must be returned to the monetary
equivalent of the position that the owner had when
the taking occurred. To achieve this monetary
equivalent, we use the standard value of "fair market
value" of the property at the time of the filing of the
complaint for expropriation or at the time of the
taking of property, whichever is earlier. (Republic v.
Mupas, G.R. Nos. 181892, 209917, 209696 &
209731, [September 8, 2015])
The Constitution does not explicitly define this power
but subjects it to a limitation: that it be exercised
only for public use and with payment of just
compensation. Whether the use is public or whether
the compensation is constitutionally just will be
determined finally by the courts. (National Power
Corp. v. Posada, G.R. No. 191945 , [March 11, 2015])
Just compensation means the value of the property at
the time of the taking. It means a fair and full
equivalent for the loss sustained. All the facts as to the
condition of the property and its surroundings, its
improvements and capabilities, should be considered.
In this particular case, the tax declarations presented
by the petitioner as basis for just compensation were
made by the Lapu-Lapu municipal, later city assessor
long before martial law, when land was not only much
cheaper but when assessed values of properties were
stated in figures constituting only a fraction of their
true market value. The private respondent was not
even the owner of the properties at the time. It
purchased the lots for development purposes. To peg
the value of the lots on the basis of documents which
are out of date and at prices below the acquisition cost
of present owners would be arbitrary and confiscatory.
(Export Processing Zone Authority v. Dulay, G.R. No. L-
59603, [April 29, 1987], 233 PHIL 313-326)
Writ of Possession:
Plaintiffs right to dismiss the complaint in eminent domain:
Right to repurchase or re-acquire the property:
Expropriation:
The taking of property is different from the transfer of the
property title from the private owner to the
Government. Under Rule 67 of the Rules of Court, there are
two phases of expropriation: (a) the condemnation of the
property after it is determined that its acquisition will be for a
public purpose or public use; and (b) the determination of
just compensation to be paid for the taking of private
property to be made by the court with the assistance of not
more than three commissioners.
The first phase is concerned with the determination of the
Government's authority to exercise the power of eminent
domain and the propriety of its exercise in the context of the
facts involved in the suit. The court declares that the
Government has a lawful right to take the property sought to
be condemned, for the public use or purpose described in the
complaint.
The second phase relates to the just amount that the
Government shall compensate the property owner. (Republic
v. Mupas, G.R. Nos. 181892, 209917, 209696 & 209731,
[September 8, 2015])
National Power Corp. v. Posada
FACTS:
The National Power Corporation instituted expropriation proceedings for
the acquisition of a right-of-way easement over parcels of land located in
Barangay Marinawa, Bato, Catanduanes owned by respondents Socorro T.
Posada and others. The expropriation was for the construction and
maintenance of its Substation Island Grid Project. The National Power
Corporation offered the price of P500.00 per square meter. In their Answer,
respondents objected to the offer and alleged that the value of the
properties was P2,000.00 per square meter.
RTC confirmed the National Power Corporation's right to expropriate the
properties and ordered the creation of a commission to determine the
amount of just compensation to be paid to respondents which
recommended a fair market value of P1,500.00 per square meter.
NPC opposed the recommendation of the commissioners but deposited
with Land Bank of the Philippines the amount of P580,769.93, alleging
that this represented the value of the 3,954 square meters sought to be
expropriated.
The RTC fixed the value of the structures and improvements on the land
in the amount of P827,000.00, based on the value determined by the
commissioners. It ordered the NPC to deposit an additional amount of
P262,639.17. The National Power Corporation failed to deposit the
additional amount. The writ of possession was correctly recalled by the
lower court.
ISSUE:
Whether or not NPC must first pay respondents the amount determined by
the trial court before they take possession of the property
HELD:
The rule, therefore, is that expropriation proceedings must be dismissed
when it is determined that it is not for a public purpose, except when:
First, the trial court's order already became final and executory;
Second, the government already took possession of the property; and
Lastly, the expropriation case already caused prejudice to the landowner.
The expropriation case is not automatically dismissed when the property
ceases to be for public use. The state must first file the appropriate Motion
to Withdraw before the trial court having jurisdiction over the proceedings.
The grant or denial of any Motion to Withdraw in an expropriation
proceeding is always subject to judicial discretion.
Respondents have not yet been deprived of their property since the
National Power Corporation was never able to take possession. We cannot
determine whether damages have been suffered as a result of the
expropriation. This case needs to be remanded to the trial court to
determine whether respondents have already been prejudiced by the
expropriation.
The withdrawal of the Petition before this court will have no practical effect
other than to make the trial court's order of condemnation final and
executory. In order to prevent this absurdity, the National Power
Corporation should file the proper Motion to Withdraw before the trial
court. It is now the burden of the National Power Corporation to plead and
prove to the trial court its reasons for discontinuing with the expropriation.
Respondents may also plead and prove damages incurred from the
commencement of the expropriation, if any.
Secretary of DPWH v Tecson
FACTS:
Spouses Heracleo are the co-owners of a land which is among the private
properties traversed by MacArthur Highway in Bulacan, a government
project undertaken sometime in 1940. The taking was taken without the
requisite expropriation proceedings and without their consent. In 1994,
Heracleo demanded the payment of the fair market value of the property.
The DPWH offered to pay 0.70 centavos per sqm., as recommended by the
appraiser committee of Bulacan. Unsatisfied, Heracleo filed a complaint for
recovery of possession with damages. Favorable decisions were rendered
by the RTC and the CA, with valuation of P 1,500 per sqm and 6% interest
per annum from the time of filing of the until full payment. The SC Division
reversed the CA ruling and held that computation should be based at the
time the property was taken in 1940, which is 0.70 per sqm. But because
of the contrasting opinions of the members of the Division and
transcendental importance of the issue, the case was referred to the En
Banc for resolution.
ISSUE:
W/N the taking of private property without due process should be nullified
HELD:
No. The governments failure to initiate the necessary expropriation
proceedings prior to actual taking cannot simply invalidate the States
exercise of its eminent domain power, given that the property subject of
expropriation is indubitably devoted for public use, and public policy
imposes upon the public utility the obligation to continue its services to the
public. To hastily nullify said expropriation in the guise of lack of due
process would certainly diminish or weaken one of the States inherent
powers, the ultimate objective of which is to serve the greater good.
Thus, the non-filing of the case for expropriation will not necessarily lead to
the return of the property to the landowner. What is left to the landowner is
the right of compensation.
City of Manila v Chinese Community
FACTS:
The City of Manila, plaintiff herein, prayed for the expropriation of a portion
private cemetery for the conversion into an extension of Rizal Avenue.
Plaintiff claims that it is necessary that such public improvement be made
in the said portion of the private cemetery and that the said lands are
within their jurisdiction.
Defendants herein answered that the said expropriation was not necessary
because other routes were available. They further claimed that the
expropriation of the cemetery would create irreparable loss and injury to
them and to all those persons owing and interested in the graves and
monuments that would have to be destroyed.
The lower court ruled that the said public improvement was not necessary
on the particular-strip of land in question. Plaintiff herein assailed that they
have the right to exercise the power of eminent domain and that the courts
have no right to inquire and determine the necessity of the expropriation.
Thus, the same filed an appeal.
Issue: Whether or not the courts may inquire into, and hear proof of the
necessity of the expropriation.
Held: The courts have the power of restricting the exercise of eminent
domain to the actual reasonable necessities of the case and for the
purposes designated by the law. The moment the municipal corporation or
entity attempts to exercise the authority conferred, it must comply with the
conditions accompanying the authority. The necessity for conferring the
authority upon a municipal corporation to exercise the right of eminent
domain is admittedly within the power of the legislature. But whether or
not the municipal corporation or entity is exercising the right in a particular
case under the conditions imposed by the general authority, is a question
that the courts have the right to inquire to.
Egranting that a necessity exists for the opening of the street in question,
the record contains no proof of the necessity of opening the same through
the cemetery. The record shows that adjoining and adjacent lands have
been offered to the city free of charge, which will answer every purpose of
the plaintiff.
Republic v PLDT
FACTS:
Public petitioner commenced a suit against private respondent praying for
the right of the Bureau of Telecommunications to demand interconnection
between the Government Telephone System and that of PLDT, so that the
Government Telephone System could make use of the lines and facilities of
the PLDT. Private respondent contends that it cannot be compelled to enter
into a contract where no agreement is had between them.
ISSUE:
Whether or not interconnection between PLDT and the Government
Telephone System can be a valid object for expropriation.
HELD:
Yes, in the exercise of the sovereign power of eminent domain, the
Republic may require the telephone company to permit interconnection as
the needs of the government service may require, subject to the payment
of just compensation. The use of lines and services to allow inter-service
connection between the both telephone systems, through expropriation
can be a subject to an easement of right of way.
People v Fajardo
FACTS:
Juan Fajardo was the mayor of Baoo, Camarines Sur. During his term the
municipal council passed Ordinance No. 7 which prohibited the
construction or repair of any building without a written permit from the
mayor prior to construction or repairing.
Fajardo and Babillonia (Fajardos son-in-law) applied for a permit to
construct a building adjacent to their gas station, still on Fajardos private
land, separated from public plaza by a creek. The request denied because
it would destroy the view of the public plaza. But proceeded to construct
even without a permit because they claimed that they needed a residence
badly due to a typhoon destroying their previous place of residence
Fajardo et at., were charged and convicted by peace court of Baoo for
violating Ordinance no. 7
ISSUE:
W/N Ordinance No. 7 is a valid exercise police power in its regulation of
property.
HELD:
NO. Ordinance No. 7 went beyond the authority that the municipality could
enact and is therefore null and void. Fajardo et al., acquitted.
The ordinance is not merely lacking in providing standards to guide and/or
control the discretion vested by the ordinance. STANDARDS ARE ENTIRELY
LACKING IN THIS CASE. Ordinance grants mayor arbitrary and unrestricted
power to grant/deny construction/repair permits. Legislation may validly
regulate property in the interest of general welfare Prohibition of
offensive structures. HOWEVER, the state may not under the guise of
police power permanently divest owners of the beneficial use of their
property and practically confiscate them solely to preserve or assure the
aesthetic appearance of the community.
Republic v Vda. De Castellvi
FACTS:
After the owner of a parcel of land that has been rented and occupied by
the government in 1947 refused to extend the lease, the latter
commenced expropriation proceedings in 1959. During the assessment of
just compensation, the government argued that it had taken the property
when the contract of lease commenced and not when the proceedings
begun. The owner maintains that the disputed land was not taken when
the government commenced to occupy the said land as lessee because the
essential elements of the taking of property under the power of eminent
domain, namely (1) entrance and occupation by condemnor upon the
private property for more than a momentary period, and (2) devoting it to
a public use in such a way as to oust the owner and deprive him of all
beneficial enjoyment of the property, are not present.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the taking of property has taken place when the
condemnor has entered and occupied the property as lesse.
HELD:
No, the property was deemed taken only when the expropriation
proceedings commenced in 1959.
The essential elements of the taking are: (1) Expropriator must enter a
private property, (2) for more than a momentary period, (3) and under
warrant of legal authority, (4) devoting it to public use, or otherwise
informally appropriating or injuriously affecting it in such a way as (5)
substantially to oust the owner and deprive him of all beneficial enjoyment
thereof.
In the case at bar, these elements were not present when the government
entered and occupied the property under a contract of lease.
PPI v Comelec
FACTS:
Respondent Comelec promulgated Resolution No. 2772 directing
newspapers to provide free Comelec space of not less than one-half page
for the common use of political parties and candidates. The Comelec space
shall be allocated by the Commission, free of charge, among all candidates
to enable them to make known their qualifications, their stand on public
Issue and their platforms of government. The Comelec space shall also be
used by the Commission for dissemination of vital election information.
Petitioner Philippine Press Institute, Inc. (PPI), a non-profit organization of
newspaper and magazine publishers, asks the Supreme Court to declare
Comelec Resolution No. 2772 unconstitutional and void on the ground that
it violates the prohibition imposed by the Constitution upon the
government against the taking of private property for public use without
just compensation. On behalf of the respondent Comelec, the Solicitor
General claimed that the Resolution is a permissible exercise of the power
of supervision (police power) of the Comelec over the information
operations of print media enterprises during the election period to
safeguard and ensure a fair, impartial and credible election.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Comelec Resolution No. 2772 is unconstitutional
HELD:
The Supreme Court declared the Resolution as unconstitutional. It held
that to compel print media companies to donate Comelec space amounts
to taking of private personal property without payment of the just
compensation required in expropriation cases. Moreover, the element of
necessity for the taking has not been established by respondent Comelec,
considering that the newspapers were not unwilling to sell advertising
space. The taking of private property for public use is authorized by the
constitution, but not without payment of just compensation. Also
Resolution No. 2772 does not constitute a valid exercise of the police
power of the state. In the case at bench, there is no showing of existence
of a national emergency to take private property of newspaper or
magazine publishers.
Sumulong v Guerrero
FACTS:
The National Housing Authority (NHA) filed a complaint for expropriation of
parcels of land for the expansion of Bagong Nayon Hosing Project to
provide housing facilities to low-salaried government employees, covering
approximately twenty five (25) hectares in Antipolo, Rizal. This included
the lots of petitioners Lorenzo Sumulong (6,667 sq.m.) and Emilia Vidanes-
Balaoing (3,333 sq.m.). The land sought to be expropriated were valued by
the NHA at one peso (P1.00) per square meter adopting the market value
fixed by the provincial assessor in accordance with presidential decrees
prescribing the valuation of property in expropriation proceedings.
The NHA deposited the amount of P158,980.00 with the Phil. Natl Bank,
representing the total market value of the subject 25 ha. of land,
pursuant to P.D. No. 1224 which defines the policy on the expropriation of
private property for socialized housing upon payment of just
compensation.
Judge Buenaventura S. Guerrero issued a writ of possession pertaining to
the subject parcels of land. Petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration on
the ground that they had been deprived of the possession of their property
without due process of law. This was however, denied. Hence, this petition
challenging the orders of respondent Judge and assailing the
constitutionality of P.D. No. 1224, as amended.
Petitioners contend that the taking of their property subsumed under the
topics of public use, just compensation, and due process.
ISSUE:
Whether socialized housing as defined in P.D. 1224, as amended, for the
purpose of condemnation proceedings is not public use since it will
benefit only a handful of people, bereft of public character, hence it is
not a valid exercise of the States power of eminent domain.
HELD:
P.D. 1224 defines socialized housing as, the construction of dwelling
units for the middle and lower class members of our society, including
the construction of the supporting infrastructure and other facilities. The
public use requirement for a valid exercise of the power
of eminent domain is a flexible and evolving concept influenced by
changing conditions. The taking to be valid must be for public use. As long
as the purpose of the taking is public, then the power of eminent domain
comes into play. It is accurate to state then that at present, whatever may
be beneficially employed for the general welfare satisfies the requirement
of public use. Ergo, socialized housing falls within the confines of public
use.
Manosca v CA
FACTS:
Petitioners inherited a piece of land when the parcel was ascertained by
the National Historical Institute to have been the birth site of Felix Y.
Manalo, the founder of Iglesia Ni Cristo, it passed Resolution No. 1,
declaring the land to be a national historical landmark. Petitioners moved
to dismiss the complaint on the main thesis that the intended expropriation
was not for a public purpose and, incidentally, that the act would constitute
an application of public funds, directly or indirectly, for the use, benefit, or
support of Iglesia ni Cristo, a religious entity, contrary to the provision of
Section 29(2), Article VI, of the 1987 Constitution.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the expropriation of the land whereat Manalo was born is
valid and constitutional.
HELD:
Yes. The taking to be valid must be for public use. There was a time when it
was felt that a literal meaning should be attached to such a requirement.
Whatever project is undertaken must be for the public to enjoy, as in the
case of streets or parks. Otherwise, expropriation is not allowable. It is not
so any more. As long as the purpose of the taking is public, then the power
of eminent domain comes into play. As just noted, the constitution in at
least two cases, to remove any doubt, determines what public use is. One
is the expropriation of lands to be subdivided into small lots for resale at
cost to individuals. The other is the transfer, through the exercise of this
power, of utilities and other private enterprise to the government. It is
accurate to state then that at present whatever may be beneficially
employed for the general welfare satisfies the requirement of public use.
EPZA v Dulay
FACTS:
The four parcels of land which are the subject of this case is where the
Mactan Export Processing Zone Authority in Cebu (EPZA) is to be
constructed. Private respondent San Antonio Development Corporation
(San Antonio, for brevity), in which these lands are registered under,
claimed that the lands were expropriated to the government without them
reaching the agreement as to the compensation. Respondent Judge Dulay
then issued an order for the appointment of the commissioners to
determine the just compensation. It was later found out that the payment
of the government to San Antonio would be P15 per square meter, which
was objected to by the latter contending that under PD 1533, the basis of
just compensation shall be fair and according to the fair market
valuedeclared by the owner of the property sought to be expropriated, or
by the assessor, whichever is lower. Such objection and the subsequent
Motion for Reconsideration were denied and hearing was set for the
reception of the commissioners report. EPZA then filed this petition for
certiorari and mandamus enjoining the respondent from further hearing
the case.
ISSUE:
Whether or Not the exclusive and mandatory mode of determining just
compensation in PD 1533 is unconstitutional.
HELD:
The Supreme Court ruled that the mode of determination of just
compensation in PD 1533 is unconstitutional.
The method of ascertaining just compensation constitutes impermissible
encroachment to judicial prerogatives. It tends to render the courts inutile
in a matter in which under the Constitution is reserved to it for financial
determination. The valuation in the decree may only serve as guiding
principle or one of the factors in determining just compensation, but it may
not substitute the courts own judgment as to what amount should be
awarded and how to arrive at such amount. The determination of just
compensation is a judicial function. The executive department or the
legislature may make the initial determination but when a party claims a
violation of the guarantee in the Bill of Rights that the private party may
not be taken for public use without just compensation, no statute, decree,
or executive order can mandate that its own determination shall prevail
over the courts findings. Much less can the courts be precluded from
looking into the justness of the decreed compensation.
Thus, although in an expropriation proceeding the court technically would
still have the power to determine the just compensation for the property,
following the applicable decrees, its task would be relegated to
simply stating the lower value of the property as declared either by the
owner or the assessor. As a necessary consequence, it would be useless for
the court to appoint commissioners under Rule 67 of the Rules of Court.
Moreover, the need to satisfy the due process clause in the taking of
private property is seemingly fulfilled since it cannot be said that a judicial
proceeding was not had before the actual taking. However, the strict
application of the decrees during the proceedings would be nothing short
of a mere formality or charade as the court has only to choose between the
valuation of the owner and that of the assessor, and its choice is always
limited to the lower of the two. The court cannot exercise its discretion or
independence in determining what is just or fair. Even a grade school pupil
could substitute for the judge insofar as the determination of constitutional
just compensation is concerned.
Municipality of Paranaque v VM Realty Corp.
FACTS:
Petitioner sought to exercise its power of eminent domain based on a
resolution by the municipal council. Petitioner cites a previous case
wherein a resolution gave authority to exercise eminent domain. Petitioner
also relies on the Implementing Rules, which provides that a resolution
authorizes a Local Government Unit to exercise eminent domain.
ISSUE:
Whether or Not an LGU can exercise its power of eminent domain pursuant
to a resolution by its law-making body.
HELD:
Under Section 19, of the present Local Government Code (RA 7160), it is
stated as the first requisite that LGUs can exercise its power of
eminent domain if there is an ordinance enacted by its legislative body
enabling the municipal chief executive. A resolution is not an ordinance,
the former is only an opinion of a law-making body, the latter is a law. The
case cited by Petitioner involves BP 337, which was the previous Local
Government Code, which is obviously no longer in effect. RA 7160 prevails
over the Implementing Rules, the former being the law itself and the latter
only an administrative rule which cannot amend the former.