1/3/2017 AWestphalianPeacefortheMiddleEast

Home>AWestphalianPeacefortheMiddleEast

Monday,October10,2016
AWestphalianPeacefortheMiddleEast
WhyanOldFrameworkCouldWork
MichaelAxworthyandPatrickMilton

MICHAELAXWORTHYisSeniorLecturerandDirectoroftheCentreforPersianandIranian
StudiesattheUniversityofExeter,UnitedKingdom.

PATRICKMILTONisaPostdoctoralResearchFellowatFreeUniversityofBerlin.

TheideasinthisarticlearedrawnfromaprojecttoexplorewaysinwhichthePeaceofWestphalia
caninformpeacemakinginthecontemporaryMiddleEast.ThisprojectwaslaunchedbyBrendan
Simmsandourselvesatthebeginningof2016undertheaegisoftheCambridgeForumfor
Geopolitics,andwillbetakenforwardfromthisautumninassociationwiththeKoerberStiftungin
Berlin.

Between1618and1648,centralEurope,andtheHolyRomanEmpireinparticular,wasdevastated
byaseriesofconflictsthatwerecausedbycompetingvisionsofpoliticalorder,greatpower,and
dynasticrivalries,andthatwereexacerbatedbyreligiousdifferences.Thissooncametobecalled
theThirtyYearsWar.ButthePeaceofWestphalia,whichsuccessfullyendedtheGermanphaseof
theconflict,hasbeenmuchmisunderstood.

The1648settlementiswidelythoughttohaveinauguratedamodernsystemofsovereign
independentnationstatesinEurope(oftenreferredtoastheWestphaliansystem).And,asthe
argumentgoes,whenthatconceptwaslaterappliedtotheMiddleEastafterthefalloftheOttoman
Empire,itactuallycontributedtomuchoftheregionscurrentdysfunction.Butinreality,the
Westphaliasettlementdidsomethingquitedifferentfromwhathasbeencommonlythought.Itset
upasystemoflimitedsovereigntyforthenumerousstatesoftheHolyRomanEmpire(formally
knownasimperialestates,whichwerethecomponentterritoriesoftheempire,ruledbyprincesor
citycouncils).Italsocreatedlegalmechanismsforsettlingdisputesandofferedmutualguarantees
forupholdingthetreatysterms,whichtakenaltogether,formedasystemofcollectivesecurity.

Correctingthismischaracterizationisnotonlyimportantforourunderstandingofmodernconflictsin
theMiddleEast,butalsoforfindingwaystoendthem.Westphaliacanbeused,notasablueprint
foranewtreatyfortheregion,butratherasaguideandatoolboxofideasandtechniquesfor
negotiatingafuturepeace.

THEREALWESTPHALIA

TheThirtyYearsWarbeganwitharebellionbyProtestantnoblesinHabsburgBohemia(the
presentdayCzechRepublic)againstthecentralizingpoliciesoftheHabsburgEmperorFerdinandII
(whoreignedfrom161937),whichweredisadvantageousfornonCatholics.Thewarspreadfrom
theHabsburglandsandengulfedlargepartsofGermanyaftertheelectorPalatine(therulerofa
substantialProtestantterritorialstateandalsoafeudalsubjectoftheemperor)decidedtoaccept
theBohemiancrown,whichtherebelshadwrestedfromFerdinand.Facedwiththismoreserious,
largerscalerevolt,whichthreatenedthestabilityoftheempireasawhole,Ferdinandreceivedaid

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frombothCatholicandProtestantGermanpowerslikeBavariaandSaxony,aswellasfromhis
SpanishHabsburgcousins.HisProtestantopponentsintheempire,meanwhile,drewsupportfrom
foreignpowersofbothconfessions:Denmark,Sweden,andCatholicFrance.Thesesuccessive
foreigninterventionsprolongedthewarandmadeitmuchmoredestructive.

Thefundamentalproblembehindthewarwascompetingvisionsofconstitutionalbalance,which
occurredontwolevels:betweentheprerogativesoftheemperorandthoseoftheprinces,aswell
asbetweentheprinces(includingtheHabsburgemperorasanimperialestate)andtheirrespective
subjectpopulationswithintheirterritories.Thequestionofconfessionalbalance,andofhowthe
divisionscausedbytheReformationshouldbemanagedandaccommodatedbytheimperial
constitution,wasintertwinedwithbothoftheseissues.

ThefinalsettlementofWestphaliaconsistedofthreemainelements:areformedimperial
constitutionalpoliticalsystemrelatedtothis,arevampedreligioussettlementfortheempireand
aninternationalpeacetreatybetweentheHolyRomanEmpireandtheprincipalEuropean
belligerents,FranceandSweden.Althoughittookfiveyears,theeventualsuccessofthepeace
negotiationsattheWestphaliancongresstownsofMnsterandOsnabrckwasdueinnosmall
measuretotheparticipationofmostimperialestates.Anallinclusivesummitofthisscalewas
unprecedentedatthetimeanditwasthewillingnessoftheparticipantstoexploreunknown
diplomaticterrainthathelpeditsucceed.Thismadeitauniversalcongress,andallowedfora
settlementthatwassatisfactorytoallmembersoftheempire.Theroleofinformaldiscussion
amongtheenvoysanddignitariesindevelopingmoreformalstructures,andeventually,treaty
provisions,wasimportanttothesuccessofWestphalia.Alsovitalwasthelatearrivalonthescene
ofacoregroupingofprincesfrombothreligionswhowerepreparedtocompromiseandwhoacted
asinformalmediatorsbetweentheemperorandforeigncrowns.Suchacrossconfessionalparty
wasunprecedentedandgreatlypropelledthepeaceprocessforwardinitsfinalphase.The
participationoftheimperialprincestothepeaceprocessin164748resultedinanultimatumtothe
emperorFerdinandIII,whoreignedfrom163757,forcinghimtoreachasettlementorrisklosing
theirsupportentirely.Thisinterventionoccurredatacrucialmomentwhenthecongressrisked
completecollapseasithadbecomeclearthattheSpanishFrenchpeaceaccord,whichwasalso
beingnegotiated,wouldnotbeachievableatMnster.(Itwasonlyconcludedmuchlater,in1659.)
Theinterventionofthisthirdpartythusensuredthat,althoughauniversalpeaceaccordwouldbe
unattainable,peacewouldbesecuredinthecrucialcentralEuropeantheateroftheempire.

Theinclusionoftheimperialestatesinthepeaceprocessalsoshiftedtheconstitutionalbalanceof
powerbetweentheemperorandtheprincesinthetreatytext.Oneofthecompromisesinthetreaty
involvedconfirmingtheprincesterritorialsuperiority,orpoliticalautonomy,aswellastheirrights
toparticipateindecisionsonmajorimperialpolicyareas,concludeallianceswithotherimperial
estatesandforeignpowers,maintainarmies,wagewar,andmakepeace.Butacrucialcaveatwas
thattheprincescouldnotforgealliances(astheyhaddoneduringtheThirtyYearsWar)thatwould
bedirectedagainsttheemperor,theempire,orthepeacesettlement.Theprincesremained
subjectsoftheemperor,whoretainedhispowerastheirfeudalandjudicialoverlord.Similarly,the
empireanditssupremecourtsretainedjudicialoversightandjurisdictionovertheprincely
territories.ThecommonviewthatWestphaliacreatedasystemofequal,sovereignstatesthatwere
immunefrominterventionintheirdomesticaffairsisthusfallaciousallthemoresogiventhe
treatieshollowingoutoftheprincespreviouslyextensiveprerogativesinreligiousaffairs,andthe
rightestablishedatWestphaliaforexternalguarantorstointerveneintheempire.

Thetruediplomaticmasterstrokeofthepeacesettlementwasitsadjustedreligiousconstitution,
whichimprovedthejuridificationofsectarianconflictinotherwords,providinglegalratherthan
militarymeansforresolvingdisputes.Thereligiousclausesdevelopedabasicframeworkthathad
existedintheempiresince1555,whichtriedtomanagereligiouscoexistencelegallyandpolitically,
whilebracketingoutcontentiousandintractablequestionsoftheologicaltruth.TheWestphalia
treatiesdidthisbyextendinglegalprotectiontoCalvinistsasathirdrecognizedconfession,andby

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reducingtheauthorityoftheprincesovertheirsubjectsinreligiousmatters,therebyaddressingthe
concernsofsubjectpopulations.Afterlongnegotiationsandnumericalhaggling,theparties
selectedtheyear1624asthenormativeyear,atwhichdatereligiousproperty(churchesand
endowedmonasticland,forexample),rightsofpublicworship,andtheconfessionalstatusofeach
territorywerelocked.Thismeantthattheprincescouldnolongerimposetheirfaithontheir
subjects,andtheprincesthatconvertedtoadifferentconfessioncouldnolongeralterthe
confessionalstatusoftheirterritory.Itwasaninnovativevehicleforthereestablishmentoftrust
betweenProtestantsandCatholics.AsCatholicimperialestatesoutnumberedProtestantones,it
wasdecidedthatmajorityvotingwouldnolongerbedecisiveinrepresentativebodiessuchasthe
Reichstag(ImperialDiet)inconfessionalmatters.Instead,theprincesrepresentativeswereto
separateintoreligiouspartiesandreachasettlementthroughdirectnegotiations.Thisprincipleof
confessionalparitywasalsoappliedtotheimperialjudiciary,withtheProtestantmembersofthe
twosupremecourtsbeinggrantedadefactorightofveto.

ACHIEVINGPEACE

Naturally,theanalogybetweenseventeenthcenturyEuropeandtodaysMiddleEastdemandsan
imaginativeleap,giventheinterveningfourcenturiesandthecontrastingpolitical,sociocultural,
andeconomiccontexts.Nevertheless,thereareremarkablesimilaritiesonmanybasiclevels.Fora
start,thereisthelengthandintensityofconflict,thebewilderingcomplexityofthepointsofdispute,
theroleofinternalrebellionsescalatingintowiderconflicts,andtheinvolvementofforeignpowers.
Thereisalsotheintensityofreligiousanimosityamongthemilitants,themultipolarityofthe
internationalscene,therivalryofnumerousmonarchicalprincelydynasties,andthefusion(and
confusion)ofreligiousandpoliticalconstitutionalmatters.Bothconflictshaveseentheuseof
smallerproxiesbylargerpowerstofightouttheirgrievancestheexacerbationofmoreorless
paranoidsecurityfearsthroughreligiousprejudiceandthedrawinginofnewpowerstotheconflict,
forfearthattheirsecurityinterestswouldbedamagediftheyremainedinactive.Bothhaveseenthe
exploitationofnewformsofinformationtechnologytoexacerbatesectarianism(printinginthe
seventeenthcenturyandtheInternettoday)andbothhaveledtoaterribleintensityofhuman
suffering.(ItisbelievedthatGermanylostuptoonethirdofitspopulationbetween1618and1648,
andlargenumbersweredisplacedasrefugees).Althoughsectarianismwasexploitedforpower
politicalendsinbothcontexts,itwasalsoadestabilizingfactorinitsownright.BeforetheThirty
YearsWartherehadbeenaworkingcompromisebetweentheCatholicandLutheranprinces,but
imperialpoliticsbecamemoreconfrontationalandconfessionalagaininthelatesixteenthcentury.
Similarly,sectarianrelationsintheMiddleEastbetweenSunnisandShiiteshavedeterioratedinthe
last30orsoyears,andprevioussecularmindedforcesinregionalpoliticshavebeenpushedout
andmarginalized.

ThemainlessonfromtheEuropeanexperienceisthattoachievepeace,aneffectivesettlement
mustbeginwithamultilateralconferenceorcongressinwhichalltheprimaryregionalactorscome
togethertonegotiate.Participationshouldbeasinclusiveasispossiblehowever,certaindisruptive
orotherwiseunpalatableactorsmayhavetobeexcluded.Exilesthathadrebelledagainstthe
HabsburgswerebarredfromparticipationatWestphalia,justastheIslamicState(orISIS)wouldbe
today.Participantsmustbewillingtoworkflexiblyandbreaknewdiplomaticground.Withthe
encouragementofthecongress,andaspartoftheprocess,participantsmustbeprepared,as
GermanForeignMinisterFrankWalterSteinmeiersaidinarecentspeechinHamburg,toopenup
theirsecurityintereststransparently,andtomakesomesacrificesandcompromisestoachieve
peace.IftheMiddleEastisnotyetreadyforthis,theexperienceoftheThirtyYearsWarsuggests
thattheregionwillhavetoenduremorebloodshedbeforeitiseventuallycompelledtoadoptthe
positiveandcooperativeattitudesneededforforgingpeace.HerrSteinmeieralsosuggestedthatat
crucialjunctures,theroleofathirdpartyofsmallerpowerscouldbedecisiveingivingthepeace
processacrucialpushtowardcompletion,asoccurredin164748.HenotedthattheEuropean
statesmightplaysucharoleintheMiddleEasttoday.Itisworthaddingherethatthenegotiatorsat
Westphaliadidnotinsistonadurableceasefirebeforeinitiatingpeacetalks.Thenegotiations
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beganandcontinuedasthefightingstilledraged,andwereaffectedbytheswingingfortunesof
war.WithintheWestphalianegotiationsitwasnecessaryfortheparticipantstodevelopadegreeof
mutualtrust,tofacilitategreatertransparencybetweenthemabouttheirsecurityconcerns,and
fosterasenseofsharedpurposetowardlastingpeace.Thiswasnoteasythen,andwouldnotbe
easynowbutitispossible.Ittakestime.

AcentralissuetodayistheSaudiIranianrivalry.IftheMiddleEastistoachieveitsown
Westphalia,representativesfromtheregionstwomainadversaries,SaudiArabiaandIran,must
participateactivelyandconstructivelyinthenegotiations.Inthisvein,itishelpfultostudythe
parallelsbetweenthegovernmentofSaudiArabia,givenitscentralitytoSunnisminthe
contemporaryMiddleEast,andtheHabsburgemperor,whowassimilarlycentraltotheHoly
RomanEmpireandtheWestphaliasettlement.Thereareanumberofpointsofsimilaritybetween
thealSaudfamilyandtheseventeenthcenturyHabsburgs.TheSaudishavestruggledwiththegap
betweentheirpositionofauthorityasprotectorsoftheholyplacesofMeccaandMedinaandthe
factthattheyarenotcaliphstheAustrianHabsburgsstruggledwiththegapbetweentheir
theoreticalpreeminenceasHolyRomanemperorsandgeopoliticalreality.TheHabsburgsfeared
andresentedtheerosionoftheregionalsupremacythattheyhadpreviouslyenjoyed,asdothe
Saudisnow.ForSaudioil,therewasthegoldandsilveroftheAmericas,whichpaidforthemilitary
supportforwardedtotheemperorbyhisSpanishHabsburgcousins.ForSaudisponsored
WahhabismanditshatredofShiism,therewastheCatholicCounterReformation,thatsoughtto
rollbackProtestantgainsthroughanarrowCatholicinterpretationofimperiallaw,exemplifiedby
the1629EdictofRestitution.Thecontainment(atleast)ofSaudiWahhabismwillhavetobea
majorpartofanyfutureMiddleEastsettlement.ButSaudiArabiawillhavetobenursedthrough
anysuchnegotiationprocess,justastheotherpartiesatWestphaliahadtocatertotheemperors
interests.

SECURINGPEACE

AnynewsettlementintheMiddleEastmustbuildontraditionalreligious,legal,andotherstructures
nativetotheregion,justasWestphaliawassquarelybasedonapreexistingbutrenegotiated
imperialsystem.ImposingaEuropeantemplateisoutofthequestiontheideaisrathertoapplythe
underlyingprinciplesandtheexperienceofWestphaliatotheMiddleEast.

Thefirstprincipleinvolveslimitingthesovereigntyofmoststatesorrulersintheregionbygivinga
degreeofprotectiontocitizensagainsttheirownrulers,andgivingsubjectsorcitizenstherightto
appealtoahigherlegalauthority.Thiscouldbesomeformofacourt,aswasthecaseintheHoly
RomanEmpire,wherelitigationbecamecrucialindefusingtensionsandpreventingconflict.

TheHolyRomanEmpirestwosupremejudicialtribunalswerecrucialinthedefenseofWestphalian
termsandrights.Thecourtsmoreoftenmediatedbetweenconflictingprincesthandoledout
verdictsafteratrial,butthiswasagoodexamplewhereinformalconflictresolutionmechanisms
workedbetterthanformalones.ByincludingbothCatholicsandProtestantsamongitsjudges,the
courtsregainedadegreeofconfidenceamongthevariousconfessions,andmanycaseswere
resolvedwithoutevercomingtoaformaljudgement.

Byacceptingappealsfromsubjectswhocouldsuetheirrulersatthecourts,theimperialjudicial
systemservedasasafetyvalveagainstpentuppopulardiscontent.Thecourtshelpedtomaintain
thestatusquo,andinparticular,theconditionalsovereigntythatlimitedimperialprincespowerby
overseeingandpolicingtheirconduct,includingtheirtreatmentoftheirsubjects.TheMiddleEast
hasnopreexistingsuprastataljudicialstructureassuch,buttheUnitedNationsasaninstitution
doeshaveaninternationalcourtssystemandconflictresolutionmechanismsthatcouldbeadapted
tothispurpose.Somestatesmaybereluctanttoacceptlimitationsontheirsovereignty,butifsuch
limitationsweretocomewithaUNlabeltheymaybemorepalatable,especiallyasitbecomesclear
thattheonlyalternativeisunendingviolence.

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Asecondprincipleisrecognizingthatpeacewillonlylastifexternalguarantorscollectivelyenforce
respectamongstatesfortheirpeoplesbasicrightsofreligion,property,anddueprocess.Oneof
thekeylegaciesoftheWestphaliansystemwasitsinnovativeguarantorsystem,whichenabledthe
signatoriestoenforcethetermsofthesettlementandsetupacollectivesecuritysystemthat
encompassedboththeinternalguarantors(emperorandprinces)andtheexternalguarantors
(FranceandSweden).Thelatterintegratedthissystemintothebroaderinternationalorderofearly
modernEurope.

Theguaranteewasmostsalientwhentheintegrityandtheconstitutionalbalanceoftheempirewas
underthreat,whichinsomecasesemanatedfromoneormoreoftheguarantorsthemselves
notablyfromtheFrenchmonarch,LouisXIV,inthelatterpartoftheseventeenthcentury.The
guarantorsthatwerenotpartytothedisputewouldthenusuallystepinanddefendtheWestphalian
ordereitheroutofprincipledconvictionorgeopoliticalselfinterest,oracombinationofthetwo.

Sincenoneoftheinternaljudicialmechanismscouldcompeltheemperortoadheretoimperiallaw,
theexternalguaranteewasanecessarycomplementitencouragedrestraintonthepartofboththe
emperorandtheprinces,deterredobviousbreachesofthepeaceagreementandthelaw,and
incentivizedrespectfortheconfessionalrightsandprincelyprerogativesthatwereconfirmedat
Westphalia.Theguarantorsystemalsoprovedabletoevolveandgrowinresponsetoshifting
internationalcurrents:Swedensgeopoliticaldeclineoverthecourseoftheeighteenthcenturymade
itlesscapableofexercisingtheguaranteeeffectively(althoughinformalterms,itretaineditsfull
statusuntilthedemiseoftheempirein1806),whereasRussiasgrowingpowervaulteditinto
guarantorstatusin1779.AguarantorsystemfortheMiddleEastwouldneedtobesimilarlyflexible.

AlthoughLouisXIVandothermonarchstriedtotakeadvantageoftheirguarantorstatustoadvance
theirpowerorpoliticalselfinterest,thenormsestablishedbyWestphaliaservedasarestrainteven
whenbreached.Forinstance,thequestionofbreachwasdiscussed,includingbythekinghimself,
intermsoftheWestphalianorms,withaninherentprejudicetowardpeace.Eventually,LouisXIVs
geopoliticaladventuresendedinfailureandthenormsofbehaviorestablishedbyWestphalia
playedanimportantpartinobstructinghisambitionsandbringingtogetherotherEuropeanstatesin
anallianceagainsthim.Thesuccessoftheguarantorsystemwasdue,inpart,toawidespread
normativeacceptanceofoutsideinterventionfortheprotectionofrightsandliberties.Therewas
alsoacorresponding,entrenchedtraditionwithintheempireofseekingforeignassistance.This,
alongwiththedecentralizednatureoftheempire,helpedmaketheexternalguarantorsystem
effective.

InordertofindappropriateexternalguarantorsforafutureMiddleEasternsettlement,onewould
needtoestablishmechanismsthatreflectprevailingpowerdistributions,butthatalsohaveregional
legitimacy.SomehavesuggestedthattheEuropeansystemintheearlymodernperiodhada
greaterdegreeofculturalhomogeneitythantheMiddleEasthasnow.Inthatsense,having
SwedenandFranceserveasguarantorsdidnotseemasexternalastheUnitedStatesandthe
EuropeanUnion,forexample,wouldbetotheMiddleEasttoday.TheUnitedNationsmaybethe
onlypotentialexternalguarantorwithreallegitimacysinceitincludesMiddleEastern
representation,butitslegitimacycomesatthecostofeffectiveness,tosomeextent.

Foranexternalguaranteesystemtobeeffectiveitneedstobebackedupbymilitaryforce,evenif
thatforceisneverused.AlthoughtheUnitedStatesandtheEUwouldbereluctanttocommitto
suchanarrangement,regionalpowerslikeSaudiArabiaandIranmightbemorewilling.Turkey
mightalsobewillingtotakeonagreaterrole.Inthiscontext,onemustfacetheriskofguarantor
interventionsexacerbatingexistingtensionsontheground,notleastforbeingperceivedasguided
byselfinterest,aswasthecaseofFranceunderLouisXIV.Therefore,itwouldbedesirablewhen
establishingtheguarantorsystemtomatchtheinterestsoftheguarantorswithwhatisneededto
maintainthesystem.ForSaudiArabia,itisimportanttomaintaintheregimespositionasthe

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preeminentstateofSunniIslam,boostedbyitsroleastheguardianoftheholyplacesofMecca
andMedina.IransleadersfeelacertaindutytospeakforthemoreorlessoppressedShiite
minoritiesintheregion.

AthirdprincipleorelementderivedfromWestphaliacouldbefortheMiddleEasttodetermineits
ownnormativeyeartoresettherightsofpublicworshipandtheintercommunalbalanceoflocal
statesandactorsatanequitable,agreedupondateinthepast.Nosubjectorcitizencouldbe
legallyexcludedfromcivicofficeonthebasisofreligion.Withineachstate,therewouldbea
guaranteeofatleastaminimumlevelofrightsandprotectionsforminoritygroups.Thisprovision
alsoimpliesthattheestablishedbordersbetweenstatesintheregionwouldbepreservedand
upheldaspartofthesettlement,aswasthecaseatWestphalia.Selectingadateforthenormative
yearwouldbecontentious,anditmightbemoreusefultodosoinsomecontextsthanothers.But
appliedjudiciouslyandflexibly(intheWestphaliatreatiestherewassomevariablegeometryonthis
point,with1624beingthegeneralnormativedate,but1618usedinsomespecialcases)itcouldbe
ausefultoolinpeacemaking.InsteadofconfessionalconflictbeingeradicatedbyWestphalia,itwas
transformedintolegalprocessesanotherexampleofthejuridificationofconflictcharacteristicof
theHolyRomanEmpire.Litigation,negotiation,anddiplomacybecamecrucialindefusingtensions
andturninghotconflictintodiplomatictension,notablyduringtheGermanconfessionalcrisisof
1719.ThiswastriggeredbytheattemptsofseveralCatholicprincesintheRhinelandtoundermine
theirProtestantsubjectsreligiousrights.Inresponse,northGermanProtestantpowersthreatened
armedintervention.Armedconflictwasavoidedbecausetheinvolvedpartiescompliedwith
politicojudicialmandatesfromViennatorestorethestatestotheirprecrisisconditions.

ItisalmostconventionalwisdomthattheheterogeneityofactorsintheMiddleEastunderminesthe
chancesofreachingageneralsettlementlikethatofWestphalia.ButtheHolyRomanEmpirealso
containedadiversesetofactorsandinterests,traumaticallydividedbywarandatrocity.Evenifitis
impossible(andperhapsundesirable)totrytotransportsolutionswholesaleasblueprintsor
templatesfromregiontoregion,theexperienceofWestphaliaisvaluable.Itshows,importantly,that
peacecanalwaysbebrokeredregardlessofthecomplexity,duration,andintensityoftheconflict
withsomehelp,astheGermanForeignMinisterSteinmeierhassaid,fromdiscreet,experienced,
andauthoritativediplomaticnegotiators.And,centurieslater,Westphaliashowsushowsuchpeace
canbefound.

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