John Locke Two treatises of Government 2

First Treatise

The First Treatise is an extended attack on Sir Robert Filmer's Patriarcha. Locke's argument proceeds
along two lines: first, he undercuts the Scriptural support that Filmer had offered for his thesis, and second he
argues that the acceptance of Filmer's thesis can lead only to slavery (and absurdity). Locke chose Filmer as his
target, he says, because of his reputation and because he "carried this Argument [jure divino] farthest, and is
supposed to have brought it to perfection" (1st Tr., 5).

Filmer's text presented an argument for a divinely ordained, hereditary, absolute monarchy. According to
Filmer, the Biblical Adam in his role as father possessed unlimited power over his children and this authority
passed down through the generations. Locke attacks this on several grounds. Accepting that fatherhood grants
authority, he argues, it would do so only by the act of begetting, and so cannot be transmitted to one's children
because only God can create life. Nor is the power of a father over his children absolute, as Filmer would have
it; Locke points to the joint power parents share over their children outlined in the Bible. In the Second
Treatise Locke returns to a discussion of parental power. (Both of these discussions have drawn the interest of
modern feminists such as Carole Pateman.)

Filmer also suggested that Adam's absolute authority came from his ownership over all the world. To
this, Locke rebuts that the world was originally held in common (a theme that will return in the Second
Treatise). But, even if it were not, he argues, God's grant to Adam covered only the land and brute animals, not
human beings. Nor could Adam, or his heir, leverage this grant to enslave mankind, for the law of nature forbids
reducing one's fellows to a state of desperation, if one possesses a sufficient surplus to maintain oneself
securely. And even if this charity were not commanded by reason, Locke continues, such a strategy for gaining
dominion would prove only that the foundation of government lies in consent.

Locke intimates in the First Treatise that the doctrine of divine right of kings (jure divino) will
eventually be the downfall of all governments. In his final chapter Locke asks, "Who heir?" If Filmer is correct,
there should be only one rightful king in all the worldthe heir of Adam. But since it is impossible to discover
the true heir of Adam, no government, under Filmer's principles, can require that its members obey its rulers.
Filmer must therefore say that men are duty-bound to obey their present rulers. Locke writes:

I think he is the first Politician, who, pretending to settle Government upon its true Basis, and to
establish the Thrones of lawful Princes, ever told the World, That he was properly a King, whose Manner of
Government was by Supreme Power, by what Means soever he obtained it; which in plain English is to say, that
Regal and Supreme Power is properly and truly his, who can by any Means seize upon it; and if this be, to
be properly a King, I wonder how he came to think of, or where he will find, an Usurper. (1st Tr., 79)

Locke ends the First Treatise by examining the history told in the Bible and the history of the world
since then; he concludes that there is no evidence to support Filmer's hypothesis. According to Locke, no king
has ever claimed that his authority rested upon his being the heir of Adam. It is Filmer, Locke alleges, that is the
innovator in politics, not those who assert the natural equality and freedom of man.
Second Treatise

In the Second Treatise Locke develops a number of notable themes. It begins with a depiction of
the state of nature, wherein individuals are under no obligation to obey one another but are each themselves
judge of what the law of nature requires. It also covers conquest and slavery, property, representative
government, and the right of revolution.

State of nature
Locke defines the state of nature thus:
"To properly understand political power and trace its origins, we must consider the state that all people
are in naturally. That is a state of perfect freedom of acting and disposing of their own possessions and persons
as they think fit within the bounds of the law of nature. People in this state do not have to ask permission to act
or depend on the will of others to arrange matters on their behalf. The natural state is also one of equality in
which all power and jurisdiction is reciprocal and no one has more than another. It is evident that all human
beingsas creatures belonging to the same species and rank and born indiscriminately with all the same natural
advantages and facultiesare equal amongst themselves. They have no relationship of subordination or
subjection unless God (the lord and master of them all) had clearly set one person above another and conferred
on him an undoubted right to dominion and sovereignty."[11] [1]
The work of Thomas Hobbes made theories based upon a state of nature popular in 17th-century
England, even as most of those who employed such arguments were deeply troubled by his absolutist
conclusions. Locke's state of nature can be seen in light of this tradition. There is not and never has been any
divinely ordained monarch over the entire world, Locke argues. However, the fact that the natural state of
humanity is without an institutionalized government does not mean it is lawless. Human beings are still subject
to the laws of God and nature. In contrast to Hobbes, who posited the state of nature as a hypothetical
possibility, Locke takes great pains to show that such a state did indeed exist. Actually, it still exists in the area
of international relations where there is not and is never likely to be any legitimate overarching government
(i.e., one directly chosen by all the people subject to it). Whereas Hobbes stresses the disadvantages of the state
of nature, Locke points to its good points. It is free, if full of continual dangers (2nd Tr., 123). Finally, the
proper alternative to the natural state is not political dictatorship/tyranny but democratically elected government
and the effective protection of basic human rights to life, liberty, and property under the rule of law.
Nobody in the natural state has the political power to tell others what to do. However, everybody has the
right to authoritatively pronounce justice and administer punishment for breaches of the natural law. Thus, men
are not free to do whatever they please. "The state of nature has a law of nature to govern it, which obliges
every one: and reason, which is that law, teaches all mankind, who will but consult it, that... no one ought to
harm another in his life, health, liberty, or possessions" (2nd Tr., 6). The specifics of this law are unwritten,
however, and so each is likely to misapply it in his own case. Lacking any commonly recognised, impartial
judge, there is no way to correct these misapplications or to effectively restrain those who violate the law of
nature.
The law of nature is therefore ill enforced in the state of nature.
IF man in the state of nature be so free, as has been said; if he be absolute lord of his own person and
possessions, equal to the greatest, and subject to no body, why will he part with his freedom? Why will he give
up this empire, and subject himself to the dominion and control of any other power? To which it is obvious to
answer, that though in the state of nature he hath such a right, yet the enjoyment of it is very uncertain, and
constantly exposed to the invasion of others: for all being kings as much as he, every man his equal, and the
greater part no strict observers of equity and justice, the enjoyment of the property he has in this state is very
unsafe, very unsecure. This makes him willing to quit a condition, which, however free, is full of fears and
continual dangers: and it is not without reason, that he seeks out, and is willing to join in society with others,
who are already united, or have a mind to unite, for the mutual preservation of their lives, liberties and estates,
which I call by the general name, property. (2nd Tr., 123)
It is to avoid the state of war that often occurs in the state of nature, and to protect their private property that
men enter into civil or political society, i.e., state of society.

Conquest and slavery

Ch. 4 ("Of Slavery") and Ch. 16 ("Of Conquest") are sources of some confusion: the former provides a
justification for slavery, the latter, the rights of conquerors. Because the Fundamental Constitutions of
Carolina provided that a master had perfect authority over his slaves, some[who?] have taken these chapters to be
an apology for the institution of slavery in Colonial America.
Most Locke scholars[who?] roundly reject this reading, as it is directly at odds with the text. The extent of
Locke's involvement in drafting the Fundamental Constitutions is a matter of some debate, but even attributing
full culpability for its contents and for his having profited from the Atlantic slave trade, the majority of experts
will concede that Locke may have been a hypocrite in this matter, but are adamant that no part of the Two
Treatises can be used to provide theoretical support for slavery by bare right of conquest.
In the rhetoric of 17th-century England, those who opposed the increasing power of the kings claimed
that the country was headed for a condition of slavery. Locke therefore asks, facetiously, under what conditions
such slavery might be justified. He notes that slavery cannot come about as a matter of contract (which became
the basis of Locke's political system). To be a slave is to be subject to the absolute, arbitrary power of another;
as men do not have this power even over themselves, they cannot sell or otherwise grant it to another. One that
is deserving of death, i.e., who has violated the law of nature, may be enslaved. This is, however, "but the state
of war continued" (2nd Tr., 24), and even one justly a slave therefore has no obligation to obedience.
In providing a justification for slavery, he has rendered all forms of slavery as it actually exists invalid.
Moreover, as one may not submit to slavery, there is a moral injunction to attempt to throw off and escape it
whenever it looms. Most scholars take this to be Locke's point regarding slavery: submission to absolute
monarchy is a violation of the law of nature, for one does not have the right to enslave oneself.
The legitimacy of an English king depended on (somehow) demonstrating descent from William the
Conqueror: the right of conquest was therefore a topic rife with constitutional connotations. Locke does not say
that all subsequent English monarchs have been illegitimate, but he does make their rightful authority dependent
solely upon their having acquired the people's approbation.
Locke first argues that, clearly, aggressors in an unjust war can claim no right of conquest: everyth
ing they despoil may be retaken as soon as the dispossessed have the strength to do so. Their children
retain this right, so an ancient usurpation does not become lawful with time. The rest of the chapter then
considers what rights a just conqueror might have.
The argument proceeds negatively: Locke proposes one power a conqueror could gain, and then
demonstrates how in point of fact that power cannot be claimed. He gains no authority over those that
conquered with him, for they did not wage war unjustly: thus, whatever other right William may have had in
England, he could not claim kingship over his fellow Normans by right of conquest. The subdued are under the
conqueror's despotical authority, but only those who actually took part in the fighting. Those who were
governed by the defeated aggressor do not become subject to the authority of the victorious aggressor. They
lacked the power to do an unjust thing, and so could not have granted that power to their governors: the
aggressor therefore was not acting as their representative, and they cannot be punished for his actions. And
while the conqueror may seize the person of the vanquished aggressor in an unjust war, he cannot seize the
latter's property: he may not drive the innocent wife and children of a villain into poverty for another's unjust
acts. While the property is technically that of the defeated, his innocent dependents have a claim that the just
conqueror must honour. He cannot seize more than the vanquished could forfeit, and the latter had no right to
ruin his dependents. (He may, however, demand and take reparations for the damages suffered in the war, so
long as these leave enough in the possession of the aggressor's dependants for their survival).
In so arguing, Locke accomplishes two objectives. First, he neutralises the claims of those who see all
authority flowing from William I by the latter's right of conquest. In the absence of any other claims to authority
(e.g., Filmer's primogeniture from Adam, divine anointment, etc.), all kings would have to found their authority
on the consent of the governed. Second, he removes much of the incentive for conquest in the first place, for
even in a just war the spoils are limited to the persons of the defeated and reparations sufficient only to cover
the costs of the war, and even then only when the aggressor's territory can easily sustain such costs (i.e., it can
never be a profitable endeavour). Needless to say, the bare claim that one's spoils are the just compensation for a
just war does not suffice to make it so, in Locke's view.

Property
In the Second Treatise, Locke claims that civil society was created for the protection of property.[12] In
saying this, he relies on the etymological root of "property," Latin proprius, or what is one's own, including
oneself (cf. French propre). Thus, by "property" he means "life, liberty, and estate." By saying that political
society was established for the better protection of property, he claims that it serves the private (and non-
political) interests of its constituent members: it does not promote some good that can be realised only in
community with others (e.g., virtue).
For this account to work, individuals must possess some property outside of society, i.e., in the state of
nature: the state cannot be the sole origin of property, declaring what belongs to whom. If the purpose of
government is the protection of property, the latter must exist independently of the former. Filmer had said that,
if there even were a state of nature (which he denied), everything would be held in common: there could be no
private property, and hence no justice or injustice (injustice being understood as treating someone else's goods,
liberty, or life as if it were one's own). Thomas Hobbes had argued the same thing. Locke therefore provides an
account of how material property could arise in the absence of government.
He begins by asserting that each individual, at a minimum, "owns" himself; this is a corollary of each
individual's being free and equal in the state of nature. As a result, each must also own his own labour: to deny
him his labour would be to make him a slave. One can therefore take items from the common store of goods by
mixing one's labour with them: an apple on the tree is of no use to anyoneit must be picked to be eatenand
the picking of that apple makes it one's own. In an alternate argument, Locke claims that we must allow it to
become private property lest all mankind have starved, despite the bounty of the world. A man must be allowed
to eat, and thus have what he has eaten be his own (such that he could deny others a right to use it). The apple is
surely his when he swallows it, when he chews it, when he bites into it, when he brings it to his mouth, etc.: it
became his as soon as he mixed his labour with it (by picking it from the tree).
 This does not yet say why an individual is allowed to take from the common store of nature. There is a
necessity to do so to eat, but this does not yet establish why others must respect one's property, especially as
they labour under the like necessity. Locke assures his readers that the state of nature is a state of plenty: one
may take from communal store if one leaves a) enough and b) as good for others, and since nature is bountiful,
one can take all that one can use without taking anything from someone else. Moreover, one can take only so
much as one can use before it spoils. There are then two provisos regarding what one can take, the "enough and
as good" condition and "spoilage."
Gold does not rot. Neither does silver, or any other precious metal or gem. They are, moreover, useless,
their aesthetic value not entering into the equation. One can heap up as much of them as one wishes, or take
them in trade for food. By the tacit consent of mankind, they become a form of money (one accepts gold in
exchange for apples with the understanding that someone else will accept that gold in exchange for wheat). One
can therefore avoid the spoilage limitation by selling all that one has amassed before it rots; the limits on
acquisition thus disappear.
In this way, Locke argues that a full economic system could, in principle, exist within the state of nature.
Property could therefore predate the existence of government, and thus society can be dedicated to the
protection of property.
In the 20th century, Marxist scholars viewed Locke as the founder of bourgeois capitalism. Those who
were opposed to communism accepted this reading of Locke, and celebrated him for it. He has therefore
become associated with capitalism
Representative government
Locke did not demand a republic. Rather, Locke felt that a legitimate contract could easily exist between
citizens and a monarchy, an oligarchy or some mixed form (2nd Tr., sec. 132). Locke uses the term Common-
wealth to mean "not a democracy, or any form of government, but any independent community" (sec. 133) and
"whatever form the Common-wealth is under, the Ruling Power ought to govern by declared and received laws,
and not by extemporary dictates and undetermined resolutions." (sec 137)
Locke does, however, make a distinction between an executive (e.g. a monarchy), a "Power always
in being" (sec 144) that must perpetually execute the law, and the legislative that is the "supreme power
of the Common-wealth" (sec 134) and does not have to be always in being. (sec 153) Furthermore, governments
are charged by the consent of the individual, "i.e. the consent of the majority, giving it either by themselves, or
their representatives chosen by them." (sec 140)
His notions of people's rights and the role of civil government provided strong support for the
intellectual movements of both revolutions.

Right of revolution
The concept of the right of revolution was also taken up by John Locke in Two Treatises of
Government as part of his social contract theory. Locke declared that under natural law, all people have the right
to life, liberty, and estate; under the social contract, the people could instigate a revolution against the
government when it acted against the interests of citizens, to replace the government with one that served the
interests of citizens. In some cases, Locke deemed revolution an obligation. The right of revolution thus
essentially acted as a safeguard against tyranny.
Locke affirmed an explicit right to revolution in Two Treatises of Government: whenever the
Legislators endeavor to take away, and destroy the Property of the People, or to reduce them to Slavery under
Arbitrary Power, they put themselves into a state of War with the People, who are thereupon absolved from any
farther Obedience, and are left to the common Refuge, which God hath provided for all Men, against Force and
Violence. Whensoever therefore the Legislative shall transgress this fundamental Rule of Society; and either by
Ambition, Fear, Folly or Corruption, endeavor to grasp themselves, or put into the hands of any other an
Absolute Power over the Lives, Liberties, and Estates of the People; By this breach of Trust they forfeit the
Power, the People had put into their hands, for quite contrary ends, and it devolves to the People, who have a
Right to resume their original Liberty. (sec. 222)