VOL.

335,JULY13,2000 567
MercuryDrugCorporationvs.CourtofAppeals
*
G.R.No.138571.July13,2000.

MERCURY DRUG CORPORATION, petitioner, vs. THE

HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, and the SPOUSES
EDUARDOANDCARMENYEE,respondents.

RemedialLawCivilProcedureRelief from Judgment When a party

hasanotherremedyavailabletohim,whichmaybeeitheramotionfornew
trial or appeal from an adverse decision of the trial court, and he was not
prevented by fraud, accident, mistake or excusable negligence from filing
such motion or taking such appeal, he cannot avail himself of this petition
Petitioner must show that the petition was filed within the reglementary
periodwhichisreckonedfromthetimethepartyscounselreceivesnoticeof
the decision.A petition for relief from judgment is an equitable remedy
thatisallowedonlyinexceptionalcaseswhenthereisnootheravailableor
adequateremedy.Whenapartyhasanotherremedyavailabletohim,which
may be either a motion for new trial or appeal from an adverse decision of
the trial court, and he was not prevented by fraud, accident, mistake or
excusablenegligencefromfilingsuch

_______________

*THIRDDIVISION.

568

568 SUPREMECOURTREPORTSANNOTATED

MercuryDrugCorporationvs.CourtofAppeals

motion or taking such appeal, he cannot avail himself of this petition. In

order for a petition for relief to be entertained by the court, the petitioner
mustsatisfactorilyshowthathehasfaithfullyandstrictlycompliedwiththe
provisionsofRule38.Itisalsoincumbentuponthepetitionertoshowthat
thesaidpetitionwasfiledwithinthereglementaryperiodspecifiedinSection
3,Rule38(withinsixty[60]daysafterthepetitionerlearnsofthejudgment,
final order, or other proceeding to be set aside, and not more than six [6]
months after such judgment or final order was entered, or such proceeding
wastaken).Andtheruleisthatthereglementaryperiodisreckonedfromthe
timethepartyscounselreceivesnoticeofthedecisionfornoticetocounsel
ofthedecisionisnoticetothepartyforpurposesofSection3ofRule38.
SameSameSameFailureofapartyscounseltonotifyhimontimeof
theadversejudgmenttoenablehimtoappealtherefromisnegligencewhich
is not excusable.This Court has consistently held that the failure of a
partyscounseltonotifyhimontimeoftheadversejudgmenttoenablehim
to appeal therefrom is negligence, which is not excusable. However, notice
senttocounselofrecordisbindingupontheclientandtheneglectorfailure
ofcounseltoinformhimofanadversejudgmentresultinginthelossofhis
righttoappealisnotagroundforsettingasideajudgmentvalidandregular
onitsface.
Same Same Same Relief will not be granted to a party who seeks
avoidance from the effects of the judgment when the loss of remedy at law
wasduetohisownnegligence.WearenotpersuadedbytheYEESclaim
thattheyweredenieddueprocessinasmuchastheywerenotdeniedtheirday
in court. In fact, they were able to prosecute their action and actively
participatedthroughcounselintheproceedingsbeforethelowercourt.Their
failuretofileanappealfromthedecisionrenderingitfinalandexecutoryis
notadenialofdueprocess.Theymayhavelosttheirrighttoappealbutthey
werenotdeniedtheirdayincourt.Therighttoappealisnotanaturalright
or a part of due process it is merely a statutory privilege, and may be
exercised only in the manner and in accordance with the provisions of the
law. In the same manner, the YEES failure to file their petition for relief
withintheperiodprovidedforundertheRulesisnottantamounttoadenial
of due process. x x x Relief will not be granted to a party who seeks
avoidance from the effects of the judgment when the loss of remedy at law
wasduetohisownnegli

569

VOL.335,JULY13,2000 569

MercuryDrugCorporationvs.CourtofAppeals

gence otherwise the petition for relief can be used to revive the right to
appealwhichhadbeenlostthoughinexcusablenegligence.

PETITIONforreviewoncertiorariofadecisionoftheCourtof
Appeals.

ThefactsarestatedintheopinionoftheCourt.
 ConstantinoG.Jaruala&FrancisSaturninoJuanLawOffice
forpetitioner.
DamasingLawOfficeandAssociatesforprivaterespondents.

GONZAGAREYES,J.:

This Petition for Review on Certiorari

1
seeks the reversal of the
Decision of the Court of Appeals in CAG.R. SP No. 437765
entitled SPOUSES EDUARDO AND CARMEN YEE versus
HONORABLE ALEJANDRO VELEZ, RTC JUDGE, BRANCH
20, CAGAYAN DE ORO CITY and MERCURY DRUG
CORPORATION.
The following facts as found by the Court of Appeals are
undisputed:

On 27 January, 1993, petitioners filed a complaint docketed as Civil Case

No. 93055 in the Regional Trial Court of Cagayan de Oro City against
herein private respondent for annulment and/or reformation of contract of
lease dated 31 March 1984 (Rollo, p. 26) covering (5) twostorey units
specifiedasdoornumbers3,4,5,6and7ofacommercialbuildingowned
bypetitionerslocatedinfrontofCarmenMarket,Carmen,CagayandeOro
City.Thecomplaintprayedthatthecontractbeeitherannulledortherentals
increased from P6,900.00 a month as originally stipulated therein to
P50,000.00amonthbasedonparagraphno.3thereofwhichreads:

_______________

1 Thirteenth Division composed of the ponente J. Portia AlioHormachuelos and the

members:J.Buenaventura,J.Guerrero(Chairman),andJ.CandidoV.Rivera,concurring.

570

570 SUPREMECOURTREPORTSANNOTATED
MercuryDrugCorporationvs.CourtofAppeals

3.IncaseofofficialdevaluationofthePhilippinepesos,thepartiesheretoshallby
mutualconsentmakethenecessaryadjustmentintherateofrentals.Shouldtheyfail
toagreeontherateofrentals,thesameshallbesubmittedtoagroupofarbitrators
composedofthree(3)members,onetobeappointedbyLESSOR,anotherbyLESSEE
andathirdonetobeagreeduponbythetwo(2)arbitratorspreviouslychosenandthe
partiesheretoshallsubmittothedecisionofthearbitrators

Petitioners demand for increase of rentals had been refused by private

respondent lessee Mercury Drug Corporation on the ground that there was
noofficialdevaluationofthepesothusnobasisforarentalincrease.
On28February1995,thelowercourtrenderedjudgmentasfollows:

WHEREFORE,judgmentisherebyrenderedinfavorofthedefendantcorporationand
againstthehereinplaintiffs,dismissingthecomplaintsandtheclaimforannulment
and/orreformationofleasecontractaswellastheclaimfordamagesfornotbeing
supportedbythelawandthepertinentjurisprudenceonthematter,withcostsagainst
plaintiffsherein.
However,inthespiritofequityandhumanjusticeasdefendanthasnotshownany
unwillingness to quiet the unease of the plaintiffs if the obligation is not every
burdensome and onerous the defendant corporation, to maintain the good and
harmoniousrelationsbetweenthepartiesherein,isherebyorderedtopayarelative
increaseinrentoverthepropertyinquestion,totheplaintiffsspouses,inthefollowing
manner:

a) anincreaseoffifteen(15)percentoftheleasecontractrentalfromAugust1,
1992uptotheendofthesecondfiveyearsonMay31,1994
b) anincreaseoftwenty(20)percentinrentfromJune1,1994toMay31,1999
whichistheendofthethirdthirdfive(5)yearsofthecontractbasedonthe
newrateoftherentalincreaseintheimmediateprecedingparagraphand
c) anincreaseofthirty(30)percentofrentfromJune1,1999toMay31,2004
basedonthenewrateof

571

VOL.335,JULY13,2000 571
MercuryDrugCorporationvs.CourtofAppeals

therentalincreaseintheimmediateprecedingparagraphasthecomputation,without
interest.
Inviewofthedesireofthecourttoputanendtolitigationandpreservethepeace,
nopronouncementshallbemadebythiscourtonthecounterclaim.
SOORDERED.(Rollo,pp.3940)

basedprincipallyontherulingwas(sic)thattherewasnodevaluationof
thepesoasaresultofanextraordinaryinflation.
The former counsel for the petitioners Atty. Ralph Lou I. Willkom
received a copy of the decision on 3 March 1995 but did not inform
petitioners nor take any step to protect the interests of his clients by
presenting a motion for reconsideration or taking an appeal. Petitioners
learnedofthejudgmentonlyon24March1995whentheyvisitedhisoffice.
The 15day period within which to appeal lapsed. On 15 May 1995
petitionersfiledthrutheirpresentcounselapetitionforrelieffromjudgment
underRule38(Rollo,p.43).Thelowercourtdeniedthepetition,rulingas
follows:

ItistruethatunderSec.2,Rule38oftheNewRulesofCourttheverifiedpetition
suchasthismustbefiledwithin60daysafterpetitionerslearnofthejudgmentand
nor(sic)morethansix(6)monthsaftersuchjudgmentororderwasissued
TherecordshowsthatAtty.RalphLouI.Willkom,formercounselofpetitioners,
didnotinformthepetitionersthathereceivedthejudgmentinquestiononMarch3,
1995.ItwasonlyonMarch24,1995thatpetitionerslearnedofthejudgment.These
factsare,admittedbypetitionersonrecordintheirpleadingssothatthereisnofurther
needtodiscussthismatter.
 Evenifcounseldidnotinformhisclientofthejudgmentforreasonsonlyknownto
himstillsuchfailureisruledbytheSupremeCourtasanactbindinguponhisclients
andinthiscasethehereinpetitioners.(B.R.SebastianEnterprises,Inc.vs.CA, 206
SCRA28Suarezvs.CA,220SCRA274Ilascovs.CA,228SCRA413) Since the
judgmentatbarwasreceivedonMarch3,1995bypetitionerscounselthesixty(60)
daysperiodwillexpireafterMay3,1995.TheinstantpetitionwasfiledonMay15,
1995somuchsothatitwasfiledtwelve(12)daysafterthe60dayperiodfixedbythe
Rulesbutcertainlythepetitionwasfiledwithinsix(6)monthsfromthedateitwas
issuedonFebruary28,1995.

572

572 SUPREMECOURTREPORTSANNOTATED
MercuryDrugCorporationvs.CourtofAppeals

In several cases the Supreme court had uniformly ruled that both the 60 days from
knowledge and the six (6) months from issuance must concur before a petition for
relieffromthejudgmentcanbegivenduecourse,whentheSupremeCourtsaidthis
wise,towit:

Motionforrelieffromjudgmentis,subjecttoafixedperiodinextendible,neverinterrupted
andcannotbesubjectedtoanyconditionorcontingency.(Arcillavs.Arcilla,Sept.16,1985)

Consideringtheruleofnoticetocounselasnoticetoclientitbecomesevidently
clearthattherequirementsfixedbylawandjurisprudenceonpetitionerforrelieffrom
judgmenthavenotbeenmetbythepetitionersherein,ergothepetitionmustfallonits
owndeadweight.Besides,thiscourtdoesnotconsiderthattherewasnegligenceon
thepartofAtty.RalphWillkominnottakinganyappealfromthejudgmentofthis
court especially if one considers the character and the convictions of a person who
adherestohislawyersoath.Lawyersofknownperceptionsnormallydonotappeal
from a judgment that had granted an award in equity even in the face of a very
palpablyadverserulingoftheSupremeCourtthatbesethisclients.Theactofcounsel
in respecting the final judgment is one that led to a conflict of interest between
attorneyandclientbutcertainlynotanactofomissionorneglectonhispart.
The other grounds raised like devaluation and reformation of contract does not
meritanyfurtherdiscussionherebecausepetitionersdonothaveanylegalauthorityto
declaretheirnationaldevaluationthrutheexpedienceofthispetition.Partiesnever
availed of the arbitration procedure as agreed in the contract hence, the matter of
increaseinrentbytheavenuesofthecontractwastotallyforeclosedbythefailureof
theplaintiffstoexhaustalladministrativeremediesbeforegoingtocourt.
WHEREFORE, except that portion which as in all good faith rectified by this
courtasfarasthebuildinginquestionisconcernedasbelongingtoandhavingbeen
builtbythehereinpetitioners,forlackofmeritandlegalbasis,thepetitionishereby
DISMISSED by reason of the foregoing premises, with costs against petitioners.
(Rollo,pp.5960)

573

VOL.335,JULY13,2000 573
 MercuryDrugCorporationvs.CourtofAppeals

Petitioners
2
motion for reconsideration was likewise denied (Rollo, p.
61).
3
Aggrieved by the Order of the RTC, the spouses Eduardo and
CarmenYee(YEES),thehereinrespondents,appealedtotheCourt
of Appeals, which granted their Petition and set aside the order of
theRTCthedispositiveportionoftheDecisionreads:

WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby GRANTED. The assailed orders as

wellastheDecisiondatedFebruary28,1995areherebySETASIDE.This
caseisremandedtothecourtaquoforfurtherproceedingsandthereafterto
renderjudgmentaccordingly.Withoutpronouncementastocosts.

In reversing the RTC, the Court of Appeals held inapplicable the

general rule that notice to counsel is notice to client. The Court of
Appealsconsideredthatitwaspreciselytheinactionofthecounsel
oftheYEESinnotinformingthemofthedecisionwhichresultedin
thelapseoftheperiodtoappealforcingthemtofiletheirpetitionfor
relief through another lawyer. Their former counsel also failed to
point out the erroneous finding of the lower court that it was
MERCURY which constructed the building subject of the lease
contract.Suchfinding,whichwaslatercorrectedbythetrialcourt,
was the basis for said courts ruling that the YEES were bound to
acceptlowrentalsinasmuchasthebuildingsupposedlyconstructed
by MERCURY would in the end be owned by the YEES after the
expiration of the lease. These facts led the Court of Appeals to
concludethattheYEEScounselwasgrosslynegligentandclearly
demonstrateswhythelowercourtratiocinatedasfollows:

Under the foregoing circumstances, we hold inapplicable the commonly

observedrulethatnoticetocounselbedeemednoticetotheclientfortodo
otherwisewouldresultinagravemiscarriageof

_______________

2Decision,pp.28Rollo,pp.3945.

3Recordpp.5860.

574

574 SUPREMECOURTREPORTSANNOTATED
MercuryDrugCorporationvs.CourtofAppeals

justice. The rule that mistakes of counsel bind his client should not be
applied, when as a result of counsels reckless and gross negligence, the
client (would be) deprived of his property without due process of law
(Legardavs.CourtofAppeals,195SCRA418).
 Our courts are not only courts of justice but also of equity (Air Manila
Inc. vs. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 83 SCRA 589). Procedural
technicalities should not be made a bar to the vindication of a legitimate
grievance(Peoples Homesite & Housing Corporation PHHC) vs. Tiongco,
Nov. 28, 1964 (12 SCRA 471). In the foregoing case our Supreme Court
allowedthelatefilingofapetitionforrelieffromjudgmentarisingfromthe
mistake of counsel when as a result of counsels reckless and gross
negligence, the client was deprived of due process of law. Thus, the period
tofilewascomputedfromthedateofreceiptofthewritofexecutionbythe
client.
There,asinthiscase,theveryallegationsinthepetitionforreliefjustify
the setting aside of the assailed Decision and the remand of the case to the
courtaquotohearanddeterminethecaseasifatimelymotionfornewtrial
or reconsideration
4
has been granted by it (Rule 38 sec. 6, Rules of Civil
Procedure).
5
MotionforReconsiderationwasdenied. Hencethispetitionwhere
the petitioner, Mercury Drug Corporation (MERCURY) raises the
followingissues:

A. WhethertheCourtofAppealserredinnotapplyingthelaw
and jurisprudence providing that notice to counsel is
likewisenoticetotheparty
B. WhethertheCourtofAppealserredindisregardingtherule
thatapartylitigantisboundbythemistakesofhiscounsel
C. WhethertheCourtofAppealserredinreckoningthesixty
day period to file the Petition for Relief from judgment
fromtheallegeddateofactualreceiptbyRespondentsofa
copyofthedecisionofthetrialcourtandnotfromthedate
ofreceiptthereofbytheircounsel
D. Whether the Court of Appeals departed from the accepted
and usual course of judicial proceedings when it decided
the merits of Respondents Petition for Relief from
Judgmentnotwithstanding

_______________

4Decision,p.13Rollo,p.49.

5ResolutiondatedMay4,1999Rollo,pp.5253.

575

VOL.335,JULY13,2000 575
MercuryDrugCorporationvs.CourtofAppeals

thattheonlyissuethatshouldhavebeenpasseduponinthe
certiorari petition before it was whether the trial court
 gravely abused its discretion in dismissing the Petition for
RelieffromJudgmentforhavingbeenfiledoutoftimeand
E. WhethertheCourtofAppealserredinremandingthecase
to the trial court for further proceedings notwithstanding
that theremedyofreformation of the Contract of Lease is
clearly not available to any of the parties there being no
mistake or ambiguity
6
in the instrument embodying the
termsthereof.

Thepetitionercontendsthattherespondentspetitionforrelieffrom
judgment failed to comply with the requirements of the Rules of
Courtinasmuchasthepetitionwasfiledmorethansixtydaysfrom
the receipt by their lawyer of the decision of the RTC. Petitioner
arguesthatitislongestablishedbyjurisprudencethatnoticetothe
counselisbindingupontheclientandthattheclientisboundbythe
mistakes of his lawyer. The failure of the YEES lawyer to inform
them of the decision resulting in the failure to appeal therefrom is
nottheaccident,mistakeorexcusablenegligencereferredtointhe
Rulesthatwouldwarrantthegrantingofthepetitionforrelief.The
petitioner further argues that respondents counsel did not
corroboratetheirallegationthattheyonlylearnedofthejudgmentin
CivilCaseNo.93055againstthemonMarch24,1995.Itshouldbe
presumedthattheirlawyer,AttorneyWillkom,communicatedtothe
respondents receipt by him of the judgment. MERCURY also
maintains that the YEES cannot claim that they were denied due
process considering that the YEES were given a chance to present
andsubmittheirevidenceduringthetrialofthemeritsofthecase.
Their failure to appeal the decision against them cannot be
consideredadenialofdueprocessfortherighttoappealispurely
statutoryandmustbeprosecutedwithinthetimeandpursuanttothe
7
procedureprescribedforit.

_______________

6PetitionersMemorandum,pp.89.

7PetitionersMemorandum,p.29.

576

576 SUPREMECOURTREPORTSANNOTATED
MercuryDrugCorporationvs.CourtofAppeals

Thethresholdissuetoberesolvedinthispresentpetitioniswhether
theYEEStimelyfiledtheirpetitionforrelief.
Afteracarefulanalysisoftheissuespresentedforconsideration,
weruleinthenegativeandfindthepetitionimpressedwithmerit.
A petition for relief from judgment is governed by Rule 38
RELIEF FROM JUDGMENTS, ORDERS, OR OTHER
8
PROCEEDINGSofthe1997RulesonCivilProcedure. Sections
 8
PROCEEDINGSofthe1997RulesonCivilProcedure. Sections
1and3oftheaforementionedruleread:

Section1.Petitionforrelieffromjudgment,order,orotherproceedings.
When a judgment or final order is entered, or any other proceeding is
thereaftertakenagainstapartyinanycourtthroughfraud,accident,mistake,
orexcusablenegligence,hemayfileapetitioninsuchcourtandinthesame
caseprayingthatthejudgment,orderorproceedingbesetaside.
Sec. 3. Time for filing petition contents and verification.A petition
providedforineitheroftheprecedingsectionsoftheRulemustbeverified,
filedwithinsixty(60)daysafterthepetitionerlearnsofthejudgment,final
order,orotherproceedingtobesetaside,andnotmorethansix(6)months
after such judgment or final order was entered, or such proceeding was
takenandmustbeaccompaniedwithaffidavitsshowingthefraud,accident,
mistake, or excusable negligence relied upon, and the facts constituting the
petitionersgoodandsubstantialcauseofactionordefense,asthecasemay
be.

A petition for relief from judgment is an equitable remedy that is

allowedonlyinexceptionalcaseswhenthereisnootheravailableor
adequate remedy. When a party has another remedy available to
him,whichmaybeeitheramotionfornewtrialorappealfroman
adverse decision of the trial court, and he was not prevented by
fraud, accident, mistake or excusable negligence from filing such
motion 9or taking such appeal, he cannot avail himself of this
petition. Inorderfora

_______________

8 The petition for relief was also governed by Rule 38 of the old rules of Civil

Procedure.
9Tuasonvs.CourtofAppeals,256SCRA158atp.167[1996].

577

VOL.335,JULY13,2000 577
MercuryDrugCorporationvs.CourtofAppeals

petitionforrelieftobeentertainedbythecourt,thepetitionermust
satisfactorilyshowthathehasfaithfullyandstrictlycompliedwith
10
theprovisionsofRule38. Itisalsoincumbentuponthepetitioner
to show that the said petition was filed within the reglementary
period specified in Section 3, Rule 38 (within sixty (60) days after
thepetitionerlearnsofthejudgment,finalorder,orotherproceeding
tobesetaside,andnotmorethansix(6)monthsaftersuchjudgment
11
orfinalorderwasentered,orsuchproceedingwastaken). Andthe
rule is that the reglementary period is reckoned from the time the
partyscounselreceivesnoticeofthedecisionfornoticetocounsel
of the decision
12
is notice to the party for purposes of Section 3 of
Rule38.
In the present case, the YEES were served a copy of the
judgment of the lower court through their counsel, Attorney Ralph
LouI.WillkomonMarch3,1995.Thus,theYEESareconsideredto
have received notice on March 3, 1995 when their counsel was
servednoticeandnotonMarch24,1995whentheyactuallylearned
oftheadversedecision.Consequently,theirpetitionforrelief,which
was filed on May 15, 1995 or over sixty days from notice of their
counsel,wasfiledoutoftime.ThisCourthasconsistentlyheldthat
thefailureofapartyscounseltonotifyhimontimeoftheadverse
judgmenttoenablehimtoappealtherefromisnegligence,whichis
13
notexcusable. However,noticesenttocounselofrecordisbinding
upontheclientandtheneglectorfailureofcounseltoinformhimof
anadversejudgmentresultinginthelossofhisrighttoappealisnot 14
agroundforsettingasideajudgmentvalidandregularonitsface.

_______________

10Arcillavs.Arcilla,138SCRA560atp.566[1985].

11Ibid.

12Franciscovs.Puno,108SCRA427atp.433[1981].

13Tuasonvs.CourtofAppeals,Supraatp.166.

14Ibid.Palancavs.AmericanFoodManufacturingCo.,24SCRA819atpp.825

830[1968].

578

578 SUPREMECOURTREPORTSANNOTATED
MercuryDrugCorporationvs.CourtofAppeals

Wefindnobasisforrespondentsinsistenceontheapplicationofthe 15
doctrinesenunciatedbythisCourtinLegardavs.CourtofAppeals16
and Peoples Homesite and Housing Corporation vs. Tiongco,
where this Court departed from the established rule that notice to
counsel is notice to the client considering that in said cases, the
lawyersmiserablyfailedintheirdutytomaintaintheirclientscause
and that the lawyers inaction and wanton disregard of procedural
ruleswereextremelyrecklessandgrosslynegligentandamountedto
adeprivationoftheirclientspropertywithoutdueprocessoflaw.
First,thisCourtreverseditsrulinginLegardaonreconsideration
17
in a Resolution dated October 16, 1997 for the reason that the
judgment sought to be annulled became final when the petitioner
failed to avail of the remedies available to her, such as filing a
motion for reconsideration or appealing the case despite her claim
thatherlawyerneverinformedherofthedecisionagainsther.This
Courtemphasizedtheneedtoimposefinalityonjudgmentsandthat
public policy and sound practice demand that, at the risk of
occasional errors, judgments should become final at some definite
date fixed by law. And when judgments of lower courts become
final,noteventheSupremeCourtcaninanywayreviewormodify
18
them directly or indirectly. This Court clearly recognized that the
negligence of the petitioners counsel in failing to protect her
interests was binding upon her despite counsels failure to inform
heroftheadversedecisionofhercase.
Second,thecaseofPeoplesHomesiteisnotsquarelyinpoint.In
saidcase,wegaveduecoursetoapetitionforrelieffromjudgment
despitethefactthatitwasfiledoutoftime,thelawyerhavingfailed
toinformhisclientsofthescheduledhearingofthecasewhichwas
heardintheirabsence.Whenjudgmentwasrenderedagainstthem,
theirlawyerfailedto

_______________

15195SCRA419[1991].

1612SCRA471[1964].

17Legardavs.CourtofAppeals,280SCRA642[1997].

18Ibid.,atp.661.

579

VOL.335,JULY13,2000 579
MercuryDrugCorporationvs.CourtofAppeals

take any steps to protect the interest of their clients. In giving due
course to the petition for relief, this Court found that there was
somethingfishywiththeactuationsoftheirlawyerwhichdeprived
thepetitionersoftheirdayincourt.Consequently,weruledthatthe
clientwasdenieddueprocessandgaveduecoursetotheirpetition.
The circumstances in the case at bar are different. We are not
persuaded by the YEES claim that they were denied due process
inasmuch as they were not denied their day in court. In fact, they
wereabletoprosecutetheiractionandactivelyparticipatedthrough
counsel in the proceedings before the lower court. Their failure to
file an appeal from the decision rendering it final and executory is
notadenialofdueprocess.Theymayhavelosttheirrighttoappeal
buttheywerenotdeniedtheirdayincourt.Therighttoappealisnot
a natural right or a part of due process it is merely a statutory
privilege, and may be exercised only19 in the manner and in
accordancewiththeprovisionsofthelaw. Inthesamemanner,the
YEES failure to file their petition for relief within the period
provided for under the Rules is not tantamount to a denial of due
process. More important, no evidence was presented to support
respondents bare and selfserving allegation that their lawyer did
notinformthemofthedecisionagainstthem.Itbearsstressthatwe
arenotconcerningourselveswiththelawyersdutytohisclientbut
with the timeliness of the filing of the petition for relief which
cannotbegivenduecourseonthesimpleandexpedientclaimofa
party that their lawyer failed to inform them of the decision in the
case.Reliefwillnotbegrantedtoapartywhoseeksavoidancefrom
theeffectsofthejudgmentwhenthelossofremedyatlawwasdue
tohisownnegligenceotherwisethepetitionforreliefcanbeused
torevivetherighttoappealwhichhadbeenlostthoughinexcusable
20
negligence.
Parenthetically, it is noted that in its decision, the Court of
Appealsstatedthatthefindingofownershipwasapivotal

_______________

19Ortizvs.CourtofAppeals,299SCRA708atp.713[1998].

20Tuasonvs.CourtofAppeals,Supraatp.167.

580

580 SUPREMECOURTREPORTSANNOTATED
MercuryDrugCorporationvs.CourtofAppeals

considerationforthetrialcourtsrulingtotheeffectthattheYEES
were bound to accept low rentals because the building which was
supposed to be constructed by MERCURY would ultimately be
ownedbytheYEES.However,areadingofthetrialcourtsdecision
shows that the primary basis for its ruling was that there was no
devaluation in currency, which would entitle the YEES to a
reformation of their contract. On the contrary, the trial court, in
grantingtheYEESanincreaseinthestipulatedrentalscontainedin
their contract with MERCURY based its ruling on the meteoric
boom that the City of Cagayan de Oro was experiencing which
equity and human justice could not ignore. Moreover, MERCURY
did not show unwillingness to the said adjustments in order to
maintaingoodandharmoniousrelationswiththeYEES.Thus,even
assuming arguendo that the YEES petition for relief is given due
course,thejudgmentofthetrialcourtdenyingtheYEESprincipal
prayertoreformthecontractonthegroundofthedevaluationofthe
currency is not affected for the reason that the finding of the trial
courtastowhetheritisMercuryortheYEESwhobuiltthebuilding
is irrelevant to the determination of whether there was indeed a
devaluationinthecurrency.
ACCORDINGLY, the instant petition is GRANTED and the
decision of the Court of Appeals in CAG.R. SP No. 43765 is
REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The Order of the Regional Trial
Court of Misamis Oriental, Branch 20 dated October 17, 1995
dismissing the respondents Petition for Relief from judgment is
herebyAFFIRMEDandREINSTATED.
Nopronouncementastocosts.
 SOORDERED.

Melo (Chairman), Vitug, Panganiban and Purisima, JJ.,

concur.

Petition granted, judgment reversed and set aside. Order of the

courtaquoaffirmedandreinstated.

Note.A petition for relief from judgment is an equitable

remedywhichisallowedonlyinexceptionalcasesbecauseas

581

VOL.335,JULY14,2000 581
Rarovs.Sandiganbayan

aruleafinaljudgmentshouldnotbedisturbedwhereapartycould
have appealed or availed himself of another remedy. (Tenebro vs.
CourtofAppeals,275SCRA81[1997])

o0o

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