No forum shopping if employees, during the pendency of the case under

Article 128, are dismissed and subsequently filed an illegal dismissal case with
the Labor Arbiter.

In Consolidated Broadcasting System, Inc. vs. Oberio,1 the respondents at

first filed an inspection case before the DOLE Regional Director. While the case
was pending, respondents were dismissed and consequently filed an illegal
dismissal case with the Labor Arbiter. It was held that such filing of the complaint
for illegal dismissal does not constitute forum-shopping. In cases where the
complaint for violation of labor standard laws preceded the termination of the
employee and the filing of the illegal dismissal case, it would not be in consonance
with justice to charge the dismissed employees with engaging in forum-shopping
when the remedy available to them at the time their causes of action arose was to
file separate cases before different fora.

2011 NLRC Rules of Procedure

RULE V. PROCEEDINGS BEFORE LABOR ARBITERS

SECTION 1. JURISDICTION OF LABOR ARBITERS. Labor Arbiters have

original and exclusive jurisdiction to hear and decide the following cases involving
all workers, whether agricultural or non-agricultural:
xxxxx

b) Termination disputes; x x x x x

SECTION 20. REVIVAL AND RE-OPENING OR RE-FILING OF

DISMISSED CASE and LIFTING OF WAIVER. A party may file a motion to
revive or re-open a case dismissed without prejudice, within (10) calendar days
from receipt of notice of the order dismissing the same; otherwise, the only remedy
shall be to re-file the case. A party declared to have waived his/her right to file
position paper may, at any time after notice thereof and before the case is
submitted for decision, file a motion under oath to set aside the order of waiver
upon proper showing that his/her failure to appear was due to justifiable and
meritorious grounds.

Art. 220. Compulsory Arbitration. The Commission or any Labor Arbiter shall
have the power to ask the assistance of other government officials and qualified
private citizens to act as compulsory arbitrators on cases referred to them and to fix
1
G.R. No. 168424, June 8, 2007.
and assess the fees of such compulsory arbitrators, taking into account the nature
of the case, the time consumed in hearing the case, the professional standing of the
arbitrators, the financial capacity of the parties, and the fees provided in the Rules
of Court. (Repealed by Section 16, Batas Pambansa Bilang 130, August 21, 1981)

Title VII-A: Grievance Machinery and Voluntary Arbitration.

Art. 260. Grievance Machinery and voluntary arbitration. The parties to a
Collective Bargaining Agreement shall include therein provisions that will ensure
the mutual observance of its terms and conditions. They shall establish a
machinery for the adjustment and resolution of grievances arising from the
interpretation or implementation of their Collective Bargaining Agreement and
those arising from the interpretation or enforcement of company personnel
policies.

All grievances submitted to the grievance machinery which are not settled
within seven (7) calendar days from the date of its submission shall automatically
be referred to voluntary arbitration prescribed in the Collective Bargaining
Agreement. x x x

Art. 261. Jurisdiction of Voluntary Arbitrators or panel of Voluntary

Arbitrators. The Voluntary Arbitrator or panel of Voluntary Arbitrators shall
have original and exclusive jurisdiction to hear and decide all unresolved
grievances arising from the interpretation or implementation of the Collective
Bargaining Agreement and those arising from the interpretation or enforcement of
company personnel policies referred to in the immediately preceding article.
Accordingly, violations of a Collective Bargaining Agreement, except those which
are gross in character, shall no longer be treated as unfair labor practice and shall
be resolved as grievances under the Collective Bargaining Agreement. For
purposes of this article, gross violations of Collective Bargaining Agreement shall
mean flagrant and/or malicious refusal to comply with the economic provisions of
such agreement.

The Commission, its Regional Offices and the Regional Directors of the
Department of Labor and Employment shall not entertain disputes, grievances or
matters under the exclusive and original jurisdiction of the Voluntary Arbitrator or
panel of Voluntary Arbitrators and shall immediately dispose and refer the same to
the Grievance Machinery or Voluntary Arbitration provided in the Collective
Bargaining Agreement.
Art. 262-A. Procedures. The Voluntary Arbitrator or panel of Voluntary
Arbitrators shall have the power to hold hearings, receive evidences and take
whatever action is necessary to resolve the issue or issues subject of the dispute,
including efforts to effect a voluntary settlement between parties.

All parties to the dispute shall be entitled to attend the arbitration

proceedings. The attendance of any third party or the exclusion of any witness
from the proceedings shall be determined by the Voluntary Arbitrator or panel of
Voluntary Arbitrators. Hearing may be adjourned for cause or upon agreement by
the parties.

Unless the parties agree otherwise, is shall be mandatory for the Voluntary
Arbitrator or panel of Voluntary Arbitrators to render an award or decision within
twenty (20) calendar days from the date of submission of the dispute to voluntary
arbitration.

The award or decision of the Voluntary Arbitrator or panel of Voluntary

Arbitrators shall contain the facts and the law on which it is based. It shall be final
and executory after ten (10) calendar days from the receipt of the copy of the
award or decision by the parties. x x x

Art. 217. Jurisdiction of the Labor Arbiters and the Commission. x x x (c) Cases
arising from the interpretation or implementation of the collective bargaining
agreements and those arising from the interpretation or enforcement of company
personnel policies shall be disposed of by the Labor Arbiter by referring the same
to the grievance machinery and voluntary arbitration as may be provided in said
agreements. (As amended by Section 9, Republic Act 6715, March 21, 1989).

Termination case is not a grievable issue.

In Navarro III vs. Damasco,2 the Supreme Court held that a termination case
is not a grievable issue that must be submitted to a grievance machinery.

In another case, San Miguel Corporation vs. NLRC,3 it was similarly held
that dismissals do not call for the interpretation of the enforcement of company
personnel policies and so they may not be considered grievable or arbitrable by
virtue of Article 217 [c].
2
G.R. No. 101875, July 14, 1995.
3
G.R. No. 108001, March 15, 1996.
 In Maneja vs. NLRC,4 it was declared that termination cases fall under the
original and exclusive jurisdiction of the Labor Arbiters, not of Voluntary
Arbitrators. The dismissal of the petitioner does not fall within the phrase
grievances arising from the interpretation or implementation of the collective
bargaining agreement and those arising from the interpretation of company
personnel policies, the jurisdiction of which pertains to the grievance machinery
or thereafter, to a voluntary arbitrator or panel of voluntary arbitrators.

In Negros Metal Corp. vs. Lamayo, it was held that termination disputes
should be brought before a Labor Arbiter, except when the parties, under Article
262, unmistakably express that they agree to submit the same to voluntary
arbitration.

JURISDICTION OVER CASES PROPERLY COGNIZABLE BY THE

GRIEVANCE MACHINERY OR VOLUNTARY ARBITRATORS.

Original and exclusive jurisdiction of Grievance Machinery or Voluntary

Arbitrators.

Although the Labor Arbiters have original and exclusive jurisdiction to hear
and decide the enumerated cases in Article 217, one should not lose sight of the
fact that under the amendatory provisions of R.A. No. 6715, the grievance
machinery, under Article 260, has original and exclusive jurisdiction to adjust and
resolve the following grievances:

1. those arising from the interpretation or implementation of the CBA; and

2. those arising from the interpretation or enforcement of company personnel
policies.

If the same are not settled within seven (7) calendar days from the date of
their submission, they shall automatically be referred to a Voluntary Arbitrator or
panel of Voluntary Arbitrators who, under Article 261, have the original and
exclusive jurisdiction to hear and decide all such unresolved grievances arising
from the interpretation or implementation of the CBA and those arising the
interpretation or enforcement of company personnel policies.

This explains the last paragraph of Article 217 which provides that (c)ases
arising from the interpretation or implementation of collective bargaining
4
G.R. No. 124013, June 5, 1998.
agreements and those arising from the interpretation or enforcement of company
personnel policies shall be disposed of by the Labor Arbiter by referring the same
to the grievance machinery and voluntary arbitration as may be provided in said
agreements. By so providing, Article 217 acknowledges in no uncertain terms the
jurisdiction of the grievance machinery under Article 260 and that of the Voluntary
Arbitrator or panel of Voluntary Arbitrators under Article 261 over these issues.

Some principles on jurisdiction of Voluntary Arbitrators

1. Cases cognizable by Voluntary Arbitrators but filed with the Labor Arbiters,
DOLE Regional Offices or NCMB should be referred to the Voluntary Arbitrators
mutually chosen by the parties. They are required to immediately dispose and refer
the same to the appropriate grievance machinery or voluntary arbitration provided
in the CBA.
2. Cases cognizable by Voluntary Arbitrators but filed with the regular courts
should be dismissed.
3. WHEN A CASE DOES NOT INVOLVE THE PARTIES TO A CBA THE
EMPLOYER AND THE BARGAINING UNION IT IS NOT SUBJECT TO
VOLUNTARY ARBITRATION. Only disputes involving the union and the
company shall be referred to the grievance machinery or voluntary arbitrators.

TERMINATION DISPUTES
4. A termination dispute is not a grievable issue; hence, grievance machinery and
Voluntary Arbitrators have no jurisdiction over the issue. Termination cases do not
call for the interpretation or enforcement of company personnel policies and so
they may not be considered grievable or arbitrable.
5. In termination cases, if the bargaining union is not named a party to the illegal
dismissal suit either because it failed to object to the dismissal of the employee or
the suit was initiated by the employee alone, without the assistance of his union,
Voluntary Arbitrator has no jurisdiction thereover.
6. Even if it is the policy of the State to promote voluntary arbitration as a mode of
settling disputes, this does not foreclose the filing of a termination case with the
Labor arbiter.
7. To confer jurisdiction with the Voluntary Arbitrator over termination disputes,
there must be express agreement between employer and the bargaining agent to
submit the termination case to voluntary arbitration.
8. Even if the CBA provides that termination disputes are grievable, the same is
merely discretionary on the part of the parties thereto.
 In Maneja vs. NLRC and Manila Midtown Hotel,5 the Supreme Court
elucidated in this wise:

The legal issue in this case is whether or not the Labor Arbiter has
jurisdiction over the illegal dismissal case.

The respondent Commission, in holding that the Labor Arbiter lacks

jurisdiction to hear the illegal dismissal case, cited as basis therefor Article 217 of
the Labor Code, as amended by Republic Act No. 6715. It said:

While it is conceded that under Article 217(a), Labor Arbiters shall have
original and exclusive jurisdiction over cases involving termination disputes, the
Supreme Court, in a fairly recent case ruled:

The procedure introduced in RA 6715 of referring certain grievances

originally and exclusively to the grievance machinery, and when not settled at this
level, to a panel of voluntary arbitrators outlined in CBAs does not only include
grievances arising from the interpretation or implementation of the CBA but
applies as well to those arising from the implementation of company personnel
policies. No other body shall take cognizance of these cases. x x x. (Sanyo vs.
Caizares, 211 SCRA 361, 372)

We find that the respondent Commission has erroneously interpreted the

aforequoted portion of our ruling in the case of Sanyo, as divesting the Labor
Arbiter of jurisdiction in a termination dispute.

Article 217 of the Labor Code gives us the clue as to the jurisdiction of the
Labor Arbiter, to wit:

Article 217. Jurisdiction of Labor Arbiters and the Commission. a) Except as

otherwise provided under this Code the Labor Arbiters shall have original and
exclusive jurisdiction to hear and decide within thirty (30) calendar days after the
submission of the case by the parties for decision without extension even in the
absence of stenographic notes, the following cases involving all workers, whether
agricultural or non-agricultural:
1. Unfair labor practice cases;
2. Termination disputes;

5
G.R. No. 124013, June 5, 1998.
 3. If accompanied with a claim for reinstatement, those cases that workers may
file involving wages, rates of pay, hours of work and other terms and
conditions of employment;
4. Claims for actual, moral, exemplary and other forms of damages arising
from the employer-employee relations;
5. Cases arising from any violation of Article 264 of this Code, including
questions involving the legality of strikes and lockouts;
6. Except claims for Employees Compensation, Social Security, Medicare and
maternity benefits, all other claims, arising from employer-employee
relations, including those of persons in domestic or household service,
involving an amount exceeding five thousand pesos (P5,000.00) regardless
of whether accompanied with a claim for reinstatement.

b) The Commission shall have exclusive appellate jurisdiction over all cases
decided by Labor Arbiters.

c) Cases arising from the interpretation or implementation of collective bargaining

agreements and those arising from the interpretation or enforcement of company
personnel policies shall be disposed of by the Labor Arbiter by referring the same
to the grievance machinery and voluntary arbitration as may be provided in said
agreements.

As can be seen from the aforequoted Article, termination cases fall under the
original and exclusive jurisdiction of the Labor Arbiter. It should be noted,
however, that in the opening paragraph there appears the phrase: Except as
otherwise provided under this Code x x x. It is paragraph (c) of the same Article
which respondent Commission has erroneously interpreted as giving the voluntary
arbitrator jurisdiction over the illegal dismissal case.

However, Article 217 (c) should be read in conjunction with Article 261 of
the Labor Code which grants to voluntary arbitrators original and exclusive
jurisdiction to hear and decide all unresolved grievances arising from the
interpretation or implementation of the collective bargaining agreement and those
arising from the interpretation or enforcement of company personnel policies. Note
the phrase unresolved grievances. In the case at bar, the termination of petitioner
is not an unresolved grievance.

The stance of the Solicitor General in the Sanyo case is totally the reverse of
its posture in the case at bar. In Sanyo, the Solicitor General was of the view that a
distinction should be made between a case involving interpretation or
implementation of Collective Bargaining Agreement or interpretation or
enforcement of company personnel policies, on the one hand and a case
involving termination, on the other hand. It argued that the dismissal of the private
respondents does not involve an interpretation or implementation of a Collective
Bargaining Agreement or interpretation or enforcement of company personnel
policies but involves termination. The Solicitor General further said that where
the dispute is just in the interpretation, implementation or enforcement stage, it
may be referred to the grievance machinery set up in the Collective Bargaining
Agreement or by voluntary arbitration. Where there was already actual termination,
i.e., violation of rights, it is already cognizable by the Labor Arbiter. We fully agree
with the theory of the Solicitor General in the Sanyo case, which is radically
apposite to its position in this case.

Moreover, the dismissal of petitioner does not fall within the phrase
grievances arising from the interpretation or implementation of collective
bargaining agreement and those arising from the interpretation or enforcement of
company personnel policies, the jurisdiction of which pertains to the grievance
machinery or thereafter, to a voluntary arbitrator or panel of voluntary arbitrators.
It is to be stressed that under Article 260 of the Labor Code, which explains the
function of the grievance machinery and voluntary arbitrator, (T)he parties to a
Collective Bargaining Agreement shall include therein provisions that will ensure
the mutual observance of its terms and conditions. They shall establish a
machinery for the adjustment and resolution of grievances arising from the
interpretation or implementation of their Collective Bargaining Agreement and
those arising from the interpretation or enforcement of company personnel
policies. Article 260 further provides that the parties to a CBA shall name or
designate their respective representative to the grievance machinery and if the
grievance is unsettled in that level, it shall automatically be referred to the
voluntary arbitrators designated in advance by the parties to a CBA of the union
and the company. It can thus be deduced that only disputes involving the union and
the company shall be referred to the grievance machinery or voluntary arbitrators.

In the case at bar, the union does not come into the picture, not having
objected or voiced any dissent to the dismissal of the herein petitioner. The reason
for this, according to petitioner is that the practice in said Hotel in cases of
termination is that the latter cases are not referred anymore to the grievance
committee; and that the terminated employee who wishes to question the legality
of his termination usually goes to the Labor Arbiter for arbitration, whether the
termination arose from the interpretation or enforcement of the company personnel
policies or otherwise.
 As we ruled in Sanyo, Since there has been an actual termination, the
matter falls within the jurisdiction of the Labor Arbiter. The aforequoted doctrine
is applicable foursquare in petitioners case. The dismissal of the petitioner does
not call for the interpretation or enforcement of company personnel policies but is
a termination dispute which comes under the jurisdiction of the Labor Arbiter.

It should be explained that company personnel policies are guiding

principles stated in broad, long-range terms that express the philosophy or beliefs
of an organizations top authority regarding personnel matters. They deal with
matters affecting efficiency and well-being of employees and include, among
others, the procedure in the administration of wages, benefits, promotions, transfer
and other personnel movements which are usually not spelled out in the collective
agreement. The usual source of grievances, however, are the rules and regulations
governing disciplinary actions.

In Vivero vs. Court of Appeals,6 the Supreme Court held:

Private respondents attempt to justify the conferment of jurisdiction over the

case on the Voluntary Arbitrator on the ground that the issue involves the proper
interpretation and implementation of the Grievance Procedure found in the CBA.
They point out that when petitioner sought the assistance of his Union to avail of
the grievance machinery, he in effect submitted himself to the procedure set forth
in the CBA regarding submission of unresolved grievances to a Voluntary
Arbitrator.

The argument is untenable. The case is primarily a termination dispute. It is

clear from the claim/assistance request form submitted by petitioner to AMOSUP
that he was challenging the legality of his dismissal for lack of cause and lack of
due process. The issue of whether there was proper interpretation and
implementation of the CBA provisions comes into play only because the grievance
procedure provided for in the CBA was not observed after he sought his Union's
assistance in contesting his termination. Thus, the question to be resolved
necessarily springs from the primary issue of whether there was a valid
termination; without this, then there would be no reason to invoke the need to
interpret and implement the CBA provisions properly.

In San Miguel Corp. vs. National Labor Relations Commission this Court
held that the phrase "all other labor disputes" may include termination disputes
6
G.R. No. 138938, October 24, 2000.
provided that the agreement between the Union and the Company states "in
unequivocal language that [the parties] conform to the submission of termination
disputes and unfair labor practices to voluntary arbitration." Ergo, it is not
sufficient to merely say that parties to the CBA agree on the principle that "all
disputes" should first be submitted to a Voluntary Arbitrator. There is a need for an
express stipulation in the CBA that illegal termination disputes should be resolved
by a Voluntary Arbitrator or Panel of Voluntary Arbitrators, since the same fall
within a special class of disputes that are generally within the exclusive original
jurisdiction of Labor Arbiters by express provision of law. Absent such express
stipulation, the phrase "all disputes" should be construed as limited to the areas of
conflict traditionally within the jurisdiction of Voluntary Arbitrators, i.e., disputes
relating to contract-interpretation, contract-implementation, or interpretation or
enforcement of company personnel policies. Illegal termination disputes - not
falling within any of these categories - should then be considered as a special area
of interest governed by a specific provision of law.

In this case, however, while the parties did agree to make termination
disputes the proper subject of voluntary arbitration, such submission remains
discretionary upon the parties. A perusal of the CBA provisions shows that Sec. 6,
Art. XII (Grievance Procedure) of the CBA is the general agreement of the parties
to refer grievances, disputes or misunderstandings to a grievance committee, and
henceforth, to a voluntary arbitration committee. The requirement of specificity is
fulfilled by Art. XVII (Job Security) where the parties agreed -

Sec. 1. Promotion, demotion, suspension, dismissal or disciplinary action of the

seaman shall be left to the discretion of the Master, upon consultation with the
Company and notification to the Union. This notwithstanding, any and all
disciplinary action taken on board the vessel shall be provided for in Appendix "B"
of this Agreement x x x x

Sec. 4. x x x x Transfer, lay-off or discipline of seamen for incompetence,

inefficiency, neglect of work, bad behavior, perpetration of crime, drunkenness,
insubordination, desertion, violation of x x x regulations of any port touched by the
Company's vessel/s and other just and proper causes shall be at Master's discretion
x x x in the high seas or foreign ports. The Master shall refer the case/dispute upon
reaching port and if not satisfactorily settled, the case/dispute may be referred to
the grievance machinery or procedure hereinafter provided (emphasis supplied).[24]
The use of the word "may" shows the intention of the parties to reserve the right to
submit the illegal termination dispute to the jurisdiction of the Labor Arbiter, rather
than to a Voluntary Arbitrator. Petitioner validly exercised his option to submit his
case to a Labor Arbiter when he filed his Complaint before the proper government
agency.

Private respondents invoke Navarro III vs. Damasco wherein the Court held
that "it is the policy of the state to promote voluntary arbitration as a mode of
settling disputes." It should be noted, however, that in Navarro III all the parties
voluntarily submitted to the jurisdiction of the Voluntary Arbitrator when they filed
their respective position papers and submitted documentary evidence before him.
Furthermore, they manifested during the initial conference that they were not
questioning the authority of the Voluntary Arbitrator. In the case at bar, the dispute
was never brought to a Voluntary Arbitrator for resolution; in fact, petitioner
precisely requested the Court to recognize the jurisdiction of the Labor Arbiter
over the case. The Court had held in San Miguel Corp. v. NLRC that neither
officials nor tribunals can assume jurisdiction in the absence of an express legal
conferment. In the same manner, petitioner cannot arrogate into the powers of
Voluntary Arbitrators the original and exclusive jurisdiction of Labor Arbiters over
unfair labor practices, termination disputes, and claims for damages, in the absence
of an express agreement between the parties in order for Art. 262 of the Labor
Code to apply in the case at bar. In other words, the Court of Appeals is correct in
holding that Voluntary Arbitration is mandatory in character if there is a specific
agreement between the parties to that effect. It must be stressed however that, in
the case at bar, the use of the word "may" shows the intention of the parties to
reserve the right of recourse to Labor Arbiters.

The CBA clarifies the proper procedure to be followed in situations where

the parties expressly stipulate to submit termination disputes to the jurisdiction of a
Voluntary Arbitrator or Panel of Voluntary Arbitrators. For when the parties have
validly agreed on a procedure for resolving grievances and to submit a dispute to
voluntary arbitration then that procedure should be strictly observed. Non-
compliance therewith cannot be excused, as petitioner suggests, by the fact that he
is not well-versed with the "fine prints" of the CBA. It was his responsibility to
find out, through his Union, what the provisions of the CBA were and how they
could affect his rights. As provided in Art. 241, par. (p), of the Labor Code -
(p) It shall be the duty of any labor organization and its officers to inform its
members on the provisions of its constitution and by-laws, collective bargaining
agreement, the prevailing labor relations system and all their rights and obligations
under existing labor laws.

In fact, any violation of the rights and conditions of union membership is a

"ground for cancellation of union registration or expulsion of officer from office,
whichever is appropriate. At least thirty percent (30%) of all the members of a
union or any member or members especially concerned may report such violation
to the Bureau [of Labor Relations] x x x x"

It may be observed that under Policy Instruction No. 56 of the Secretary of

Labor, dated 6 April 1993, "Clarifying the Jurisdiction Between Voluntary
Arbitrators and Labor Arbiters Over Termination Cases and Providing Guidelines
for the Referral of Said Cases Originally Filed with the NLRC to the NCMB,"
termination cases arising in or resulting from the interpretation and implementation
of collective bargaining agreements and interpretation and enforcement of
company personnel policies which were initially processed at the various steps of
the plant-level Grievance Procedures under the parties' collective bargaining
agreements fall within the original and exclusive jurisdiction of the voluntary
arbitrator pursuant to Art. 217 (c) and Art. 261 of the Labor Code; and, if filed
before the Labor Arbiter, these cases shall be dismissed by the Labor Arbiter for
lack of jurisdiction and referred to the concerned NCMB Regional Branch for
appropriate action towards an expeditious selection by the parties of a Voluntary
Arbitrator or Panel of Arbitrators based on the procedures agreed upon in the CBA.

As earlier stated, the instant case is a termination dispute falling under the
original and exclusive jurisdiction of the Labor Arbiter, and does not specifically
involve the application, implementation or enforcement of company personnel
policies contemplated in Policy Instruction No. 56. Consequently, Policy
Instruction No. 56 does not apply in the case at bar. In any case, private
respondents never invoked the application of Policy Instruction No. 56 in their
Position Papers, neither did they raise the question in their Motion to Dismiss
which they filed nine (9) months after the filing of their Position Papers. At this
late stage of the proceedings, it would not serve the ends of justice if this case is
referred back to a Voluntary Arbitrator considering that both the AMOSUP and
private respondents have submitted to the jurisdiction of the Labor Arbiter by filing
their respective Position Papers and ignoring the grievance procedure set forth in
their CBA.

After the grievance proceedings have failed to bring about a resolution,

AMOSUP, as agent of petitioner, should have informed him of his option to settle
the case through voluntary arbitration. Private respondents, on their part, should
have timely invoked the provision of their CBA requiring the referral of their
unresolved disputes to a Voluntary Arbitrator once it became apparent that the
grievance machinery failed to resolve it prior to the filing of the case before the
proper tribunal. The private respondents should not have waited for nine (9)
months from the filing of their Position Paper with the POEA before it moved to
dismiss the case purportedly for lack of jurisdiction. As it is, private respondents
are deemed to have waived their right to question the procedure followed by
petitioner, assuming that they have the right to do so. Under their CBA, both Union
and respondent companies are responsible for selecting an impartial arbitrator or
for convening an arbitration committee;[30] yet, it is apparent that neither made a
move towards this end. Consequently, petitioner should not be deprived of his
legitimate recourse because of the refusal of both Union and respondent companies
to follow the grievance procedure.

WHEREFORE, the Decision of the Court of Appeals is SET ASIDE and

the case is remanded to the Labor Arbiter to dispose of the case with dispatch until
terminated considering the undue delay already incurred.
SO ORDERED.

In Atlas Farms vs. NLRC,7 the Supreme Court held:

Petitioner contends that the dismissal of private respondents was for a just
and valid cause, pursuant to the provisions of the companys rules and regulations.
It also alleges lack of jurisdiction on the part of the labor arbiter, claiming that the
cases should have been resolved through the grievance machinery, and eventually
referred to voluntary arbitration, as prescribed in the CBA.

For their part, private respondents contend that they were illegally dismissed
from employment because management discovered that they intended to form
another union, and because they were vocal in asserting their rights. In any case,
according to private respondents, the petition involves factual issues that cannot be
properly raised in a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Revised
Rules of Court.

In fine, there are three issues to be resolved: 1) whether private respondents

were legally and validly dismissed; 2) whether the labor arbiter and the NLRC had
jurisdiction to decide complaints for illegal dismissal; and 3) whether petitioner is
liable for costs of the suit.

The first issue primarily involves questions of fact, which can serve as basis
for the conclusion that private respondents were legally and validly dismissed. The
burden of proving that the dismissal of private respondents was legal and valid
7
G.R. No. 142244, November 18, 2002.
falls upon petitioner. The NLRC found that petitioner failed to substantiate its
claim that both private respondents committed certain acts that violated company
rules and regulations, hence we find no factual basis to say that private
respondents dismissal was in order. We see no compelling reason to deviate from
the NLRC ruling that their dismissal was illegal, absent a showing that it reached
its conclusion arbitrarily. Moreover, factual findings of agencies exercising quasi-
judicial functions are accorded not only respect but even finality, aside from the
consideration here that this Court is not a trier of facts.

Anent the second issue, Article 217 of the Labor Code provides that labor
arbiters have original and exclusive jurisdiction over termination disputes. A
possible exception is provided in Article 261 of the Labor Code, which provides
that- The Voluntary Arbitrator or panel of voluntary arbitrators shall have original
and exclusive jurisdiction to hear and decide all unresolved grievances arising from
the interpretation or implementation of the Collective Bargaining Agreement and
those arising from the interpretation or enforcement of company personnel policies
referred to in the immediately preceding article. Accordingly, violations of a
Collective Bargaining Agreement, except those which are gross in character, shall
no longer be treated as unfair labor practice and shall be resolved as grievances
under the Collective Bargaining Agreement. For purposes of this article, gross
violations of Collective Bargaining Agreement shall mean flagrant and or
malicious refusal to comply with the economic provisions of such agreement.

The Commission, its Regional Offices and the Regional Directors of the
Department of Labor and Employment shall not entertain disputes, grievances or
matters under the exclusive and original jurisdiction of the Voluntary Arbitrator or
panel of Voluntary Arbitrators and shall immediately dispose and refer the same to
the grievance Machinery or Arbitration provided in the Collective Bargaining
Agreement.

But as held in Vivero vs. CA, petitioner cannot arrogate into the powers of
Voluntary Arbitrators the original and exclusive jurisdiction of Labor Arbiters over
unfair labor practices, termination disputes, and claims for damages, in the absence
of an express agreement between the parties in order for Article 262 of the Labor
Code [Jurisdiction over other labor disputes] to apply in the case at bar.

Moreover, per Justice Bellosillo:

It may be observed that under Policy Instruction No. 56 of the Secretary of

Labor, dated 6 April 1993, Clarifying the Jurisdiction Between Voluntary
Arbitrators and Labor Arbiters Over Termination Cases and Providing Guidelines
for the Referral of Said Cases Originally Filed with the NLRC to the NCMB,
termination cases arising in or resulting from the interpretation and implementation
of collective bargaining agreements and interpretation and enforcement of
company personnel policies which were initially processed at the various steps of
the plant-level Grievance Procedures under the parties collective bargaining
agreements fall within the original and exclusive jurisdiction of the voluntary
arbitrator pursuant to Art. 217 (c) and Art. 261 of the Labor Code; and, if filed
before the Labor Arbiter, these cases shall be dismissed by the Labor Arbiter for
lack of jurisdiction and referred to the concerned NCMB Regional Branch for
appropriate action towards an expeditious selection by the parties of a Voluntary
Arbitrator or Panel of Arbitrators based on the procedures agreed upon in the CBA.
As earlier stated, the instant case is a termination dispute falling under the original
and exclusive jurisdiction of the Labor Arbiter, and does not specifically involve
the application, implementation or enforcement of company personnel policies
contemplated in Policy Instruction No. 56. Consequently, Policy Instruction No. 56
does not apply in the case at bar. x x x

Records show, however, that private respondents sought without success to

avail of the grievance procedure in their CBA. On this point, petitioner maintains
that by so doing, private respondents recognized that their cases still fell under the
grievance machinery. According to petitioner, without having exhausted said
machinery, the private respondents filed their action before the NLRC, in a clear
act of forum-shopping. However, it is worth pointing out that private respondents
went to the NLRC only after the labor arbiter dismissed their original complaint for
illegal dismissal. Under these circumstances private respondents had to find
another avenue for redress. We agree with the NLRC that it was petitioner who
failed to show proof that it took steps to convene the grievance machinery after the
labor arbiter first dismissed the complaints for illegal dismissal and directed the
parties to avail of the grievance procedure under Article VII of the existing CBA.
They could not now be faulted for attempting to find an impartial forum, after
petitioner failed to listen to them and after the intercession of the labor arbiter
proved futile. The NLRC had aptly concluded in part that private respondents had
already exhausted the remedies under the grievance procedure. It erred only in
finding that their cause of action was ripe for arbitration.

In the case of Maneja vs. NLRC, we held that the dismissal case does not fall
within the phrase grievances arising from the interpretation or implementation of
the collective bargaining agreement and those arising from the interpretation or
enforcement of company personnel policies. In Maneja, the hotel employee was
dismissed without hearing. We ruled that her dismissal was unjustified, and her
right to due process was violated, absent the twin requirements of notice and
hearing. We also held that the labor arbiter had original and exclusive jurisdiction
over the termination case, and that it was error to give the voluntary arbitrator
jurisdiction over the illegal dismissal case.

In Vivero vs. CA, private respondents attempted to justify the jurisdiction of

the voluntary arbitrator over a termination dispute alleging that the issue involved
the interpretation and implementation of the grievance procedure in the CBA.
There, we held that since what was challenged was the legality of the employees
dismissal for lack of cause and lack of due process, the case was primarily a
termination dispute. The issue of whether there was proper interpretation and
implementation of the CBA provisions came into play only because the grievance
procedure in the CBA was not observed, after he sought his unions assistance.
Since the real issue then was whether there was a valid termination, there was no
reason to invoke the need to interpret nor question an implementation of any CBA
provision.

One significant fact in the present petition also needs stressing. Pursuant to
Article 260 of the Labor Code, the parties to a CBA shall name or designate their
respective representatives to the grievance machinery and if the grievance is
unsettled in that level, it shall automatically be referred to the voluntary arbitrators
designated in advance by the parties to a CBA. Consequently only disputes
involving the union and the company shall be referred to the grievance machinery
or voluntary arbitrators. In these termination cases of private respondents, the
union had no participation, it having failed to object to the dismissal of the
employees concerned by the petitioner. It is obvious that arbitration without the
unions active participation on behalf of the dismissed employees would be
pointless, or even prejudicial to their cause.

Coming to the merits of the petition, the NLRC found that petitioner did not
comply with the requirements of a valid dismissal. For a dismissal to be valid, the
employer must show that: (1) the employee was accorded due process, and (2) the
dismissal must be for any of the valid causes provided for by law. No evidence was
shown that private respondents refused, as alleged, to receive the notices requiring
them to show cause why no disciplinary action should be taken against them.
Without proof of notice, private respondents who were subsequently dismissed
without hearing were also deprived of a chance to air their side at the level of the
grievance machinery. Given the fact of dismissal, it can be said that the cases were
effectively removed from the jurisdiction of the voluntary arbitrator, thus placing
them within the jurisdiction of the labor arbiter. Where the dispute is just in the
interpretation, implementation or enforcement stage, it may be referred to the
grievance machinery set up in the CBA, or brought to voluntary arbitration. But,
where there was already actual termination, with alleged violation of the
employees rights, it is already cognizable by the labor arbiter.

In sum, we conclude that the labor arbiter and then the NLRC had
jurisdiction over the cases involving private respondents dismissal, and no
error was committed by the appellate court in upholding their assumption of
jurisdiction. However, we find that a modification of the monetary awards is in
order. As a consequence of their illegal dismissal, private respondents are entitled
to reinstatement to their former positions. But since reinstatement is no longer
feasible because petitioner had already closed its shop, separation pay in lieu of
reinstatement shall be awarded.[24] A terminated employees receipt of his
separation pay and other monetary benefits does not preclude reinstatement or full
benefits under the law, should reinstatement be no longer possible.
As held in Cario vs. ACCFA:

Acceptance of those benefits would not amount to estoppel. The reason is

plain. Employer and employee, obviously, do not stand on the same footing. The
employer drove the employee to the wall. The latter must have to get hold of the
money. Because out of job, he had to face the harsh necessities of life. He thus
found himself in no position to resist money proffered. His, then, is a case of
adherence, not of choice. One thing sure, however, is that petitioners did not relent
their claim. They pressed it. They are deemed not to have waived their rights.
Renuntiato non praesumitur.

Conformably, private respondents are entitled to separation pay equivalent to

one months salary for every year of service, in lieu of reinstatement. As regards
the award of damages, in order not to further delay the disposition of this case, we
find it necessary to expressly set forth the extent of the backwages as awarded by
the appellate court. Pursuant to R.A. 6715, as amended, private respondents shall
be entitled to full backwages computed from the time of their illegal dismissal up
to the date of promulgation of this decision without qualification, considering that
reinstatement is no longer practicable under the circumstances.

Having found private respondents dismissal to be illegal, and the labor

arbiter and the NLRC duly vested with jurisdiction to hear and decide their cases,
we agree with the appellate court that petitioner should pay the costs of suit.
[
 WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED for lack of merit. The decision of
the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 52780 is AFFIRMED with the
MODIFICATION that petitioner is ordered to pay private respondents (a)
separation pay, in lieu of their reinstatement, equivalent to one months salary for
every year of service, (b) full backwages from the date of their dismissal up to the
date of the promulgation of this decision, together with (c) the costs of suit.
SO ORDERED.

In Negros Metal Corporation vs. Lamayo,8 the Supreme Court held:

Articles 217, 261, and 262 of the Labor Code outline the jurisdiction of
labor arbiters and voluntary arbitrators as follows:

Art. 217. Jurisdiction of the Labor Arbiters and the Commission. - (a) Except as
otherwise provided under this Code, the Labor Arbiters shall have original and
exclusive jurisdiction to hear and decide, within thirty (30) calendar days after the
submission of the case by the parties for decision without extension, even in the
absence of stenographic notes, the following cases involving all workers, whether
agricultural or non-agricultural:

1. Unfair labor practice cases;

2. Termination disputes;

3. If accompanied with a claim for reinstatement, those cases that workers may file
involving wages, rates of pay, hours of work and other terms and conditions of
employment;

4. Claims for actual, moral, exemplary and other forms of damages arising from
the employer-employee relations;

5. Cases arising from any violation of Article 264 of this Code, including questions
involving the legality of strikes and lockouts; and

6. Except claims for Employees Compensation, Social Security, Medicare and

maternity benefits, all other claims arising from employer-employee relations,
including those of persons in domestic or household service, involving an amount
8
G.R. No. 186557, August 25, 2010.
exceeding five thousand pesos (P5,000.00) regardless of whether accompanied
with a claim for reinstatement.

(b) The Commission shall have exclusive appellate jurisdiction over all cases
decided by Labor Arbiters.

(c) Cases arising from the interpretation or implementation of collective bargaining

agreements and those arising from the interpretation or enforcement of company
personnel policies shall be disposed of by the Labor Arbiter by referring the same
to the grievance machinery and voluntary arbitration as may be provided in said
agreements. (emphasis and underscoring supplied)
xxxx

Art. 261. Jurisdiction of Voluntary Arbitrators or panel of Voluntary

Arbitrators. - The Voluntary Arbitrator or panel of Voluntary Arbitrators shall
have original and exclusive jurisdiction to hear and decide all unresolved
grievances arising from the interpretation or implementation of the Collective
Bargaining Agreement and those arising from the interpretation or
enforcement of company personnel policies referred to in the immediately
preceding article. Accordingly, violations of a Collective Bargaining Agreement,
except those which are gross in character, shall no longer be treated as unfair labor
practice and shall be resolved as grievances under the Collective Bargaining
Agreement. For purposes of this article, gross violations of Collective Bargaining
Agreement shall mean flagrant and/or malicious refusal to comply with the
economic provisions of such agreement.

The Commission, its Regional Offices and the Regional Directors of the
Department of Labor and Employment shall not entertain disputes, grievances or
matters under the exclusive and original jurisdiction of the Voluntary Arbitrator or
panel of Voluntary Arbitrators and shall immediately dispose and refer the same to
the Grievance Machinery or Voluntary Arbitration provided in the Collective
Bargaining Agreement. (emphasis and underscoring supplied)

ART. 262. Jurisdiction over other labor disputes. - The Voluntary

Arbitrator or panel of Voluntary Arbitrators, upon agreement of the parties,
shall also hear and decide all other labor disputes including unfair labor
practices and bargaining deadlocks. (emphasis and underscoring supplied)

Under Art. 217, it is clear that a labor arbiter has original and exclusive
jurisdiction over termination disputes. On the other hand, under Article 261, a
voluntary arbitrator has original and exclusive jurisdiction over grievances
arising from the interpretation or enforcement of company policies.

As a general rule then, termination disputes should be brought before a labor

arbiter, except when the parties, under Art. 262, unmistakably express that they
agree to submit the same to voluntary arbitration.

In the present case, the CBA provision on grievance machinery being

invoked by petitioner does not expressly state that termination disputes are
included in the ambit of what may be brought before the company's grievance
machinery. Thus, the pertinent provision in the parties' CBA reads:

Article IV

GRIEVANCE MACHINERY

Section 1. The parties hereto agree on principle that all disputes between
labor and management may be settled through friendly negotiations that the parties
have the same interest in the continuity of work until all points in dispute shall
have been discussed and settled. x x x For this purpose, a grievance is defined
as any disagreement between the UNION and the EMPLOYER or between a
worker or group of workers on one hand and the EMPLOYER on the one
hand as to the application and interpretation of any of the provisions of this
contract. Other matters subject of collective bargaining or regulated by existing
labor laws shall not be considered as grievances. (emphasis and underscoring
supplied)

Even assuming, however, that the suspension of an employee may be

considered as a "disagreement" which bears on the "application and interpretation
of any of the provisions" of the CBA, respondent could not have bound himself to
bring the matter of his suspension to grievance procedure or voluntary arbitration
in light of the documented fact that he had resigned from the union more than a
year before his suspension, not to mention the fact that he denied having a hand in
the preparation of the union president Ronquillo's letter invoking the grievance
procedure. In fine, the labor tribunal had original and exclusive jurisdiction over
respondent's complaint for illegal dismissal.

On the merits, as did the appellate court, the Court sustains the Labor
Arbiter's ruling that respondent was illegally dismissed absent a showing that he
was accorded due process when he was summarily terminated. The Court is not a
trier of facts. It is not tasked to review the evidence on record, documentary and
testimonial, and reassess the probative weight thereof, especially in view of the
well-entrenched rule that findings of fact of administrative officials, such as labor
arbiters, who have acquired expertise on account of their specialized jurisdiction
are accorded by the courts not only respect but, most often, with finality,
particularly when affirmed on appeal.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED.

SO ORDERED.

Failure to observe grievance procedure; effect.

In Central Pangasinan Electric Cooperative, Inc. vs. Macaraeg,9 the parties

voluntarily agree to submit the issue of illegal dismissal for voluntary arbitration
without passing through grievance machinery. However, before the Supreme
Court, this was raised as an issue. The Supreme Court ruled: At the outset, we
hold that the first issue raised in the petition pertaining to the alleged violation of
the CBA grievance procedure is moot and academic. The parties active
participation in the voluntary arbitration proceedings, and their failure to insist that
the case be remanded to the grievance machinery, shows a clear intention on their
part to have the issue of respondents illegal dismissal directly resolved by the
voluntary arbitrator. We therefore find it unnecessary to rule on the matter in light
of their preference to bring the illegal dismissal dispute to voluntary arbitration
without passing through the grievance machinery.

National Conciliation and Mediation Board

The word Board as used in the Labor Code refers to the National
Conciliation and Mediation Board (NCMB). It is an agency attached to the
Department of Labor and Employment principally in-charge of the settlement of
labor disputes through conciliation, mediation and promotion of voluntary
approaches to labor dispute prevention and settlement.

In Tabigue vs. International Copra Export Corporation, 10 based on the

functions of the NCMB, as enumerated in Section 22 of Executive Order No. 126
9
G.R. No. 145800, January 22, 2003.
10
G.R. No. 183335, December 23, 2009.
(the Reorganization Act of Ministry of Labor and Employment), it cannot be
considered a quasi-judicial agency. Hence, NCMBs decisions cannot be elevated
to the Court of Appeals under Rule 43 of the Rules of Court.

Prescriptive Period

The prescriptive period is three (3) years under Article 291 of the Labor
Code. The prescriptive period of all money claims and benefits arising from
employer-employee relationship is 3 years from the time the cause of action
accrued; otherwise, they shall forever be barred.

The prescriptive period provided under the law commences to run only upon
the accrual of the cause of action. The three (3) elements of a cause of action are
as follows:
1. A right of the plaintiff by whatever means and under whatever law it
arises or is created;
2. An obligation on the part of the named defendant to respect or not to
violate such right; and
3. An act or omission on the part of such defendant violative of the right of
the plaintiff or constituting breach of the obligation of the defendant to the
plaintiff.

The general rule is that all money claims arising from an employer-
employee relationship shall be filed within three (3) years from the time the cause
of action accrued; otherwise, they shall be forever barred. This means that if it is
established that the benefits being claimed have been withheld from the employee
for a period longer than three (3) years, the amount pertaining to the period beyond
the three-year prescriptive period is barred by prescription. The amount that can
only be demanded by the aggrieved employee shall be limited to the amount of the
benefits withheld within three (3) years before the filing of the complaint.

It is settled that in illegal dismissal cases, the cause of action accrues from
the time the employment of the worker was unjustly terminated. Thus, as a general
rule, the 4-year prescriptive period shall be counted and computed from the date of
the employees dismissal up to the date of the filing of complaint for unlawful
termination of employment.

An action for illegal dismissal prescribes in four (4) years from accrual of
cause of action.
Interruption of running of prescriptive period.

Like other causes of action, the prescriptive period for money claims is
subject to interruption, and in the absence of an equivalent Labor Code provision
for determining whether the said period may be interrupted, Article 1155 of the
Civil Code may be applied.

The said provision states:

Article 1155. The prescription of actions is interrupted when they are filed
before the Court when there is a written extrajudicial demand by the creditors, and
when there is any written acknowledgment of the debt by the debtor.

(a) the filing of an action;

(b) a written extrajudicial demand by the creditor; and
(c) a written acknowledgment of the debt by the debtor.

The Court has previously employed various tests in determining whether or

not there is identity of causes of action as to warrant the application of the principle
of res judicata. One test of identity is the absence of inconsistency test where it
is determined whether the judgment sought will be inconsistent with the prior
judgment sought will be inconsistent with the prior judgment. If no inconsistency
is shown, the prior judgment shall not constitute a bar to subsequent actions.11

The rule of res judicata forbids the reopening of a matter once judicially
determined by competent authority applies as well to the judicial and quasi-judicial
acts of public, executive or administrative officers and boards acting within their
jurisdiction as to the judgments of courts having general judicial powers.12

In the case at bar, the issue of illegal dismissal was first brought within the
jurisdiction of the Voluntary Arbitrator, where he rendered a decision dismissing
the case without prejudice and remanded the case to the grievance machinery for
exhaustive proceedings. It is clear that the decision rendered was not based on the
merits or disposed of with finality. Accordingly, the proceedings brought before the
Voluntary Arbitrator did not constitute forum shopping when Mr. Dagum
subsequently filed a similar complaint for illegal dismissal before the Labor
Arbiter. (emphasis ours)

11
Lee vs. Chong, G.R. No. 209535, June 15, 2015.
12
Heirs of Tabia vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. Nos. 129377 & 129399, February 22, 2007.
 In Heirs of Sotto vs. Palicte13 citing Ao-as vs. Court of Appeals,14 the
Supreme Court discussed how forum shopping is committed, thus:

As the present jurisprudence now stands, forum shopping can be

committed in three ways: (1) filing multiple cases based on the same
cause of action and with the same prayer, the previous case not having
been resolved yet (litis pendentia); (2) filing multiple cases based on the
same cause of action and the same prayer, the previous case having been
finally resolved (res judicata); and (3) filing multiple cases based on the
same cause of action but with different prayers (splitting of causes of
action, where the ground for dismissal is also either litis pendentia or res
judicata). If the forum shopping is not considered willful and deliberate, the
subsequent cases shall be dismissed without prejudice on one of the two
grounds mentioned above. However, if the forum shopping is willful and
deliberate, both (or all, if there are more than two) actions shall be
dismissed with prejudice. (emphasis supplied)

Settled is the rule that when one is arbitrarily and unjustly deprived of his
job or means of livelihood, the action instituted to contest the legality of ones
dismissal from employment constitutes, in essence, an action predicated upon an
injury to the rights of the plaintiff, as contemplated under Article 114615 of the New
Civil Code which must be brought within four years.16

Under Article 290 (offenses penalized under the Labor Code), and Article
291 (money claims), of the Labor Code of the Philippines, the complaint of this
nature should have been filed within three (3) years from the time the cause of
action accrued.17

The prescriptive period for filing an illegal dismissal complaint is four years
from the time the cause of action accrued. This four-year prescriptive period, not
the three-year period for filing money claims under Article 291 18 of the Labor
Code, applies to claims for backwages and damages due to illegal dismissal.19

13
G.R. No. 159691, June 13, 2013.
14
G.R. No. 128464, June 20, 2006.
15
Art. 1146. The following actions must be instituted within four years: (1) Upon an injury to the rights of the plaintiff. x x x x
16
Montero, et.al. vs. Times Transportation Co., Inc., et.al., G.R. No. 190828, March 16, 2015.
17
Rollo, p. 19
18
Art. 291. Money Claims. - All money claims arising from employer-employee relations accruing during the effectivity of this
Code shall be filed within three (3) years from the time of the cause of action accrued; otherwise, they shall forever be barred. x x
x
19
Arriola vs. Pilipino Star Ngayon and Belmonte, G.R. No. 175689, August 13, 2014.
In Rivera vs. United Laboratories, Inc.,20

In the present case, the earliest incident covered by Article 1155 is the
extrajudicial demand which came on January 7, 1995. As the CA correctly
computed, the period for prescription started to run on January 15, 1993, and was
interrupted on January 7, 1995. UNILAB only answered the petitioner's January 7,
1995 letter on February 26, 1996, with a categorical denial of the petitioner's
demand; the running of the prescription period re-started on the date of this denial,
but again stopped again on August 9, 1996, when the complaint before the NLRC
was filed. Adding all the running periods yields a total of less than three (3) years;
hence, the petitioner seasonably filed her monetary claim when she filed her
complaint before the NLRC.

In ruling on the prescription issue, the CA cited De Guzman v. Court of

Appeals where we ruled that based on Article 1155, the three-year prescriptive
period can be interrupted by a claim filed at the proper judicial or quasi-judicial
forum, an extra-judicial demand on the employer or the employer's
acknowledgment of its debt or obligation. De Guzman, in turn, cited the case of
Manuel L. Quezon University Association v. Manuel L. Quezon Educational
Institution (MLQU) which UNILAB argues to be a mere obiter dictum. Whether or
not the MLQU decision controls is a non-issue as the above discussion of the
applicable laws shows and as confirmed by the CA in De Guzman:

Thus, contrary to respondent's contention that such a pronouncement in the

MLQU case was merely an obiter dictum, this judicial declaration that the
prescriptive period for labor-related money claims can be interrupted by an extra-
judicial demand on the employer is indeed a controlling principle as confirmed in
the aforesaid De Guzman case.

Therefore, when petitioner made that extra-judicial demand upon respondent via
her January 7, 1995 letter. The running of the filing period was stopped until
February 26, 1996 when answered petitioner's demand such that she was left with
one year and eight days more of the three-year period of up to about March 5, 1997
within which to file her claim.

When petitioner then brought her case to the NLRC on August 9, 1996 it
was well within the prescriptive period.

20
G.R. No. 155639, April 22, 2009.
Furthermore, the fact that the YBL has voluntarily submitted to the jurisdiction of
the Office of the Voluntary Arbitrator then presided by the herein counsel of the
respondent and likewise, the fact that the respondent through its former counsel of
record had filed a manifestation before this Labor Arbiter praying for the dismissal
of the previous complaint on the ground of pendency of the same causes of action
with the NCMB or Office of the Voluntary Arbitrator and thereby praying for the
dismissal of the said previous case on the alleged ground of Forum Shopping, the
respondent is then estopped from raising this issue of prescription. The respondent
is clearly estopped from denying the competent or concurrent jurisdiction of the
NCMB or Office of the Voluntary Arbitrator which it itself invoked to have
jurisdiction in the first place. Such being the case, the period of time when this case
was pending at the Grievance Machinery and later Office of the Voluntary
Arbitrator presided himself by the herein respondents counsel has clearly stalled
the prescriptive period. The inconsistent stance of the respondent of not
recognizing the period of time when this case was filed and heard before the
Grievance Machinery and the Office of the Voluntary Arbitrator is untenable,
contrary to law, rules and previous conduct.21

YBL contends that even if Mr. Dagums claims are well-founded, the latters
cause of action accrued on or before 6 December 2000. Thus, his complaint
should have been instituted within three (3) years from September 28, 2008 or
before September 28, 2011. YBL further contends that even assuming that the
running of the period of prescription began only on June 22, 2012, the date when
Mr. Dagums first complaint was dismissed without prejudice, his claims would
have prescribed on June 22, 2015. Since Mr. Dagum filed his complaint on
December 9, 2014, the same had not prescribed.

Under Rule V. Proceedings Before Labor Arbiters, Section 22 of the 2014

Rules of Procedure:

Section 22. Revival and re-opening or re-filing of dismissed case

and lifting of waiver. A party may file a motion to revive or re-open a case
dismissed without prejudice, within ten (10) calendar days from receipt of
notice of the order dismissing the same; otherwise, the only remedy shall be
to re-file the case. A party declared to have waived his/her right to file
position paper may, at any time after notice thereof and before the case is
submitted for decision, file a motion under oath to set aside the order of
waiver upon proper showing that his/her failure to appear was due to
justifiable and meritorious grounds.

21
Rollo, Rejoinder to Respondents Reply, pp. 62 - 63
 The applicability of Article 115522 of the Civil Code in labor cases was
upheld in the case of Intercontinental Broadcasting Corporation vs. Panganiban23
where the Court held that although the commencement of a civil action stops the
running of the statute of prescription or limitations, its dismissal or voluntary
abandonment by plaintiff leaves the parties in exactly the same position as though
no action had been commenced at all.

On the second issue, while it is true that complainant has also filed a
complaint with the NCMB (Voluntary Arbitrator), it is however unclear exactly
how long the case thereat was pending. It is stressed that since the prayers in both
the instant case and the first case was for payment of separation pay and other
monetary benefits, these reliefs prayed are classified as money claims which
prescribes in three (3) years. Nonetheless our resolution of the first issue in
respondents favor (supra) renders the second issue moot and academic, hence we
find no further necessity in discussing the same.24

Records reveal that after his termination from employment on September 28,
2008, Mr. Dagum filed on July 3, 2011 a complaint for illegal dismissal before the
Arbitration Branch of the NLRC. His complaint was dismissed by the Labor
Arbiter on the same date. In accordance with Section 16, Rule V of the NLRC
Rules of Procedure, Mr. Dagum can re-file a case in the Arbitration Branch of
origin. Since the filing of his first complaint on 28 May 2001 tolled the running of
the period of prescription, both the NLRC and the CA were correct in ruling that
the filing of respondents second complaint with money claims on 13 December
2004 was clearly filed on time.

22
Art. 1155. The prescription of actions is interrupted when they are filed before the court, when there is a written extrajudicial
demand by the creditors, and when there is any written acknowledgment of the debt by the debtor.
23
G.R. No. 151407, February 6, 2007.
24
Rollo, p. 74