WARRANTLESS ARRESTS
RODOLFO ESPANO vs. COURT OF APPEALS and
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
G.R. No. 120431 April 1, 1998
Facts: Pat. Pagilagan together with other police
officers went to Zamora and Pandacan Streets, Manila
to confirm reports of drug pushing in the area. They
saw petitioner selling something to another person.
After the alleged buyer left, they approached
petitioner, identified themselves as policemen, and
frisked him. The search yielded two plastic cellophane
tea bags of marijuana. When asked if he had more
marijuana, he replied that there was more in his
house. The policemen went to his residence where
they found ten more cellophane tea bags of marijuana.
Petitioner was brought to the police headquarters
where he was charged of possession of prohibited
drugs.
Issue: Whether or not the pieces of evidence were
inadmissible
Ruling: The Supreme Court held that Section 5 Rule
113 of the Rules of Court provides:
Arrest without warrant; when lawful a peace officer
or a private person may, without a warrant, arrest a
person:
When, in the presence, the person to be arrested has
committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to
commit an offense . . .
Petitioners arrest falls squarely under the
aforecited rule. He was caught in flagrante as a result
of a buy bust operation conducted by police officers on
the basis of information received regarding the illegal
trade of drugs within the area. The police officer saw
petitioner handling over something to an alleged
buyer. After the buyer left, they searched him and
discovered two cellophane of marijuana. His arrest
was, therefore, lawful and the two cellophane bag of
marijuana seized were admissible in evidence, being
fruits of the crime.
SORIANO MATA vs HON. JOSEPHINE K. BAYONA
FACTS: The contention is that the search warrant
issued by respondent Judge was based merely on
application for Search Warrant and a joint affidavit of
private respondents which were wrongfully allegedly
subscribed, and sworn to before the Clerk of Court.
Furthermore, there was allegedly a failure on the part
of the respondent Judge to attach the necessary
papers pertinently under PD 810, as amended by
PD1306, the information against him alleging that
Soriano Mata offered, took, and arranged bets on the
Jai Alai game by selling illegal tickets knows as Masiao
tickets without any authority from the Philippine Jai
Alai and Corporation or from the government
authorities concerned.
ISSUE: Whether or not Search Warrant is valid?
HELD: No. The Search Warrant is declared as illegal.
RATIONALE:
Deposition, sometimes used in a broad sense to
describe any written statement verified by oath; but in
its more technical and appropriate sense the meaning
of the word is limited to written testimony of a witness
given in the course of a judicial proceeding in advance
of the trial or hearing upon oral examination.
Mere affidavits of the complainant and his witnesses
are thus not sufficient. The examining Judge has to
take depositions in writing of the complainant and the
witnesses he may produce and to attach them to the
record. Such written deposition is necessary in order
that the Judge may be able to property determine the
existence or non-existence of the probable cause, to
hold liable for perjury the person giving if it will be
found later his declarations are false.
PEOPLE VS. DEL ROSARIO [234 SCRA 246; G.R.
NO. 109633; 20 JUL 1994]
Facts: Accused was charged and convicted by the
trial court of illegal possession of firearms and illegal
possession and sale of drugs, particularly
methamphetamine or shabu. After the issuance of the
search warrant, which authorized the search and
seizure of an undetermined quantity of
methamphetamine and its paraphernalias, an
entrapment was planned that led to the arrest of del
Rosario and to the seizure of the shabu, its
paraphernalias and of a .22 caliber pistol with 3 live
ammunition.
Issue: Whether or Not the seizure of the firearms was
proper.
Held: No. Sec 2 art. III of the constitution specifically
provides that a search warrant must particularly
describe the things to be seized. In herein case, the
only objects to be seized that the warrant determined
was themethamphetamine and the paraphernalias
therein. The seizure of the firearms was
unconstitutional.
Wherefore the decision is reversed and the accused is
acquitted.
Umil vs. Ramos
FACTS: This consolidated case of 8 petitions for
habeas corpus assails the validity of the arrests and
searches made by the military on the petitioners. The
arrests relied on the confidential information that the
authorities received. Except for one case where
inciting to sedition was charged, the rest are charged
with subversion for being a member of the New
Peoples Army.
ISSUE:
RULING: The arrests were legal. Regarding the
subversion cases, the arrests were legal since
subversion is a form of a continuing crime together
with rebellion, conspiracy or proposal to commit
rebellion/subversion, and crimes committed in
furtherance thereof or in connection therewith. On the
inciting to sedition case, the arrest was legal since an
information was filed prior to his arrest. Lastly, the
arrests were not fishing expeditions but a result of an
in-depth surveillance of NPA safe houses pinpointed by
none other than members of the NPA.
The right to preliminary investigation should be
exercised by the offender as soon as possible.
Otherwise, it would be considered as impliedly waived
and the filing of information can proceed. This sort of
irregularity is not sufficient to set aside a valid
judgment upon a sufficient complaint and after a trial
free from error.
DISSENT: (Sarmiento, J.) The confidential information
was nothing but hearsay. The searches and arrests
made were bereft of probable cause and that the
petitioners were not caught in flagrante delicto or in
any overt act. Utmost, the authorities was lucky in
their fishing expeditions.
2. The Bill of Rights can only be invoked only against
the state. People vs. Marti -- Marti and his wife went to
the booth of the "Manila Packing and Export
Forwarders" carrying with them four (4) gift-wrapped
packages. Marti informed the owner that the packages
simply contained books, cigars and gloves as gifts to
his friends in Zurich and refused to allow the owner to
examine and inspect the packages. However, before
the delivery of the box to the Bureau of Customs, the
owner's husband inspected the package and found
marijuana which was later turned over to the NBI. A
case was filed against Marti. Marti invoked his right
against illegal searches and seizure. Held: The
constitutional proscription against unlawful searches
and seizures therefore applies as a restraint directed
only against the government and its agencies tasked
with the enforcement of the law. Thus, it could only be
invoked against the State to whom the restraint
against arbitrary and unreasonable exercise of power
is imposed.
Corollarily, alleged violations against unreasonable
search and seizure may only be invoked against the
State by an individual unjustly traduced by the
exercise of sovereign authority. To agree with appellant
that an act of a private individual in violation of the Bill
of Rights should also be construed as an act of the
State would result in serious legal complications and
an absurd interpretation of the constitution
PEOPLE VS. SUCRO
FACTS: Roy Fulgencio was instructed by P/Lt. Vicente
Seraspi, Jr. (Station Commander of the INP) to monitor
the activities of appellant Edison Sucro, because of
information gathered by Seraspi that Sucro was selling
marijuana.
Pat. Fulgencio saw appellant enter the chapel, taking
something which turned out later to be marijuana from
the compartment of a cart found inside the chapel,
and then return to the street where he handed the
same to a buyer, Aldie Borromeo. After a while
appellant went back to the chapel and again came out
with marijuana which he gave to a group of persons.
Pat. Fulgencio called up Seraspi to report that a third
buyer later Identified as Ronnie Macabante, was
transacting with appellant.
At that point, the team of P/Lt. Seraspi proceeded to
the area and while the police officers were at the Youth
Hostel at Maagma St., Pat. Fulgencio told P/Lt. Seraspi
to intercept Macabante and appellant.
Upon seeing the police, Macabante threw something to
the ground which turned out to be a tea bag of
marijuana.
When confronted, Macabante readily admitted that he
bought the same from Sucro. The police team was able
to overtake and arrest appellant and recovered 19
sticks and 4 teabags of marijuana from the cart inside
the chapel and another teabag from Macabante
ISSUES: Whether or not the arrest without warrant of
the accused is lawful and consequently.
Whether or not the evidence resulting from such arrest
is admissible.
HELD: The Court ruled in the affirmative. Section 5,
Rule 113 of the Rules on Criminal Procedure provides
for the instances where arrest without warrant is
considered lawful. The rule states:
A peace officer or private person may, without
warrant, arrest a person:
(a) When in his presence, the person to be arrested
has committed, is actually committing, or is
attempting to commit an offense;
(b) When an offense has in fact just been committed,
and he has personal knowledge of facts indicating that
the person to be arrested has committed it;
An offense is committed in the presence or
within the view of an officer, within the meaning of the
rule authorizing an arrest without a warrant, when the
officer sees the offense, although at a distance, or
hears the disturbances created thereby and proceeds
at once to the scene thereof. Fulgencio, within a
distance of two meters saw Sucro conduct his
nefarious activity and the fact that Macabante, when
intercepted by the police, was caught throwing the
marijuana stick and when confronted, readily admitted
that he bought the same from accused-appellant
clearly indicates that Sucro had just sold the marijuana
stick to Macabante, and therefore, had just committed
an illegal act of which the police officers had personal
knowledge, being members of the team which
monitored Sucro's nefarious activity. Police officers
have personal knowledge of the actual commission of
the crime when it had earlier conducted surveillance
activities of the accused.
That searches and seizures must be supported
by a valid warrant is not an absolute rule. Among the
exceptions granted by law is a search incidental to a
lawful arrest under Sec. 13, Rule 126 of the Rules on
Criminal Procedure, which provides that a person
lawfully arrested may be searched for dangerous
weapons or anything which may be used as proof of
the commission of an offense, without a search
warrant. There is nothing unlawful about the arrest
considering its compliance with the requirements of a
warrantless arrest. Ergo, the fruits obtained from such
lawful arrest are admissible in evidence.
PEOPLE V. RODRIGUEZA [205 SCRA 791; G.R. No.
95902; 4 Feb 1992]
Facts: NARCOM agents staged a buy-bust
operation, after gaining information that there was an
ongoing illegal traffic of prohibited drugs in Tagas,
Albay. The participating agents were given money
treated with ultraviolet powder. One of the agents
went to said location, asked for a certain Don.
Thereafter, the Don, herein accused, met with him and
a certain object wrapped in a plastic
later identified as marijuana was given in exchange for
P200. The agent went back to headquarters and made
a report, based on which, a team was subsequently
organized and a raid was conducted in the house of
the father of the accused. During the raid, the
NARCOM agents were able to confiscate dried
marijuana leaves and a plastic syringe among others.
There was no authorization by any search warrant. The
accused was found positive of ultraviolet powder. The
lower court, considering the evidences obtained and
testimonies from the prosecution, found him guilty of
violating the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972 and
sentenced him to reclusion perpetua.
Issue: Whether or Not the lower court was correct in
its judgment.
Held: The NARCOM agents procedure in the
entrapment of the accused failed to meet the
qualification that the suspected drug dealer must be
caught red-handed in the act of selling marijuana to a
person posing as a buyer, since the operation was
conducted after the actual exchange. Said raid also
violated accused right against unreasonable search
and seizure, as the situation did not fall in
the circumstances wherein a search may be validly
made even without a search warrant, i.e. when the
search is incidental to a lawful arrest; when it involves
prohibited articles in plain view. The NARCOM agents
could not have justified their act by invoking the
urgency and necessity of the situation because the
testimonies of the prosecution witnesses reveal that
the place had already been put under surveillance for
quite some time. Had it been their intention to conduct
the raid, then they should, because they easily could,
have first secured a search warrant during that time.
The Court further notes the confusion and ambiguity in
the identification of the confiscated marijuana leaves
and other prohibited drug paraphernalia presented as
evidence against appellant:
CIC Taduran, who acted as the poseur buyer,
testified that appellant sold him 100 grams of dried
marijuana leaves wrapped in a plastic bag.
Surprisingly, and no plausible explanation has been
advanced therefor, what were submitted to and
examined by the PCCL and thereafter utilized as
evidence against the appellant were the following
items:
One (1) red and white colored plastic bag containing
the following:
Exh. "A"Thirty (30) grams of suspected dried
marijuana fruiting tops contained inside a transparent
plastic bag.
Exh. "B" Fifty (50) grams of suspected dried
marijuana leaves and seeds contained inside
a white colored plastic labelled "Robertson".
Exh. "C" Four (4) aluminum foils each containing
suspected dried marijuana fruiting tops having a total
weight of seven grams then further wrapped with a
piece of aluminum foil.
Exh. "D" Five (5) small transparent plastic bags each
containing suspected dried marijuana fruiting tops
having a total weight of seventeen grams.
Exh. "E" One plastic syringe.
Evidently, these prohibited articles were among those
confiscated during the so-called follow-up raid in the
house of Rodriguezas father. The unanswered
question then arises as to the identity of the marijuana
leaves that became the basis of appellant's conviction.
In People vs. Rubio, thisCourt had the occasion to rule
that the plastic bag and the dried marijuana leaves
contained therein constitute the corpus delicti of the
crime. As such, the existence thereof must be proved
with certainty and conclusiveness. Failure to do so
would be fatal to the cause of the prosecution.
Conviction is reversed and set aside and accused is
acquitted.
Go vs CA
Facts: Rolito Go while traveling in the wrong
direction on a one-way street, nearly bumped Eldon
Maguans car. Go alighted from his car, shot Maguan
and left the scene. A security guard at a nearby
restaurant was able to take down petitioners car plate
number. The police arrived shortly thereafter at the
scene of the shooting. A manhunt ensued.
Six days after, petitioner presented himself
before the San Juan Police Station to verify news
reports that he was being hunted by the police; he was
accompanied by two (2) lawyers. The police forthwith
detained him. An eyewitness to the shooting, who was
at the police station at that time, positively identified
petitioner as the gunman.
Petitioner posted bail, the prosecutor filed the
case to the lower court, setting and commencing trial
without preliminary investigation. Prosecutor reasons
that the petitioner has waived his right to preliminary
investigation as bail has been posted and that such
situation, that petitioner has been arrested without a
warrant lawfully, falls under Section 5, Rule 113 and
Section 7, Rule 112 of The 1985 Rules of Criminal
Procedure which provides for the rules and procedure
pertaining to situations of lawful warrantless arrests.
Petitioner argues that he was not lawfully
arrested without warrant because he went to the
police station six (6) days after the shooting which he
had allegedly perpetrated. Thus, petitioner argues, the
crime had not been just committed at the time that
he was arrested. Moreover, none of the police officers
who arrested him had been an eyewitness to the
shooting of Maguan and accordingly none had the
personal knowledge required for the lawfulness of a
warrantless arrest. Since there had been no lawful
warrantless arrest, Section 7, Rule 112 of the Rules of
Court which establishes the only exception to the right
to preliminary investigation, could not apply in respect
of petitioner.
Issue/s: Whether or not a lawful warrantless arrest
had been effected by the San Juan Police in respect of
petitioner Go;
Held:
1. No. The Court does not believe that the warrantless
arrest or detention of petitioner in the instant case
falls within the terms of Section 5 of Rule 113 of the
1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure which provides as
follows:
Sec. 5. Arrest without warrant; when lawful. A
peace officer or a private person may, without a
warrant, arrest a person;
(a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested
has committed, is actually committing, or is
attempting to commit an offense;
(b) When an offense has in fact just been committed,
and he has personal knowledge of facts indicating that
the person to be arrested has committed it; and
(c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who
has escaped from a penal establishment or place
where he is serving final judgment or temporarily
confined while his case is pending, or has escaped
while being transferred from one confinement to
another.
In cases falling under paragraphs (a) and (b)
hereof, the person arrested without a warrant shall be
forthwith delivered to the nearest police station or jail,
and he shall be proceeded against in accordance with
Rule 112, Section 7.
Petitioners arrest took place six (6) days after
the shooting of Maguan. The arresting officers
obviously were not present, within the meaning of
Section 5(a), at the time petitioner had allegedly shot
Maguan. Neither could the arrest effected six (6)
days after the shooting be reasonably regarded as
effected when [the shooting had] in fact just been
committed within the meaning of Section 5 (b).
Moreover, none of the arresting officers had any
personal knowledge of facts indicating that
petitioner was the gunman who had shot Maguan. The
information upon which the police acted had been
derived from statements made by alleged
eyewitnesses to the shooting one stated that
petitioner was the gunman; another was able to take
down the alleged gunmans cars plate number which
turned out to be registered in petitioners wifes name.
That information did not, however, constitute
personal knowledge.
It is thus clear to the Court that there was no lawful
warrantless arrest of petitioner within the meaning of
Section 5 of Rule 113.
POSADAS VS. COURT OF APPEALS
Facts: Members of the Integrated National Police (INP)
of the Davao Metrodiscom assigned with the
Intelligence Task Force, Pat. Ursicio Ungab and Pat.
Umbra Umpar conducted surveillance along
Magallanes Street, Davao City. While in the vicinity of
Rizal Memorial Colleges they spotted petitioner
carrying a "buri" bag and they noticed him to be acting
suspiciously. They approached the petitioner
and identified themselves as members of the INP.
Petitioner attempted to flee but his attempt to get
away was unsuccessful. They then checked the "buri"
bag of the petitioner where they found one (1) caliber .
38 Smith & Wesson revolver with Serial No. 770196,
two (2) rounds of live ammunition for a .38 caliber gun,
a smoke (tear gas) grenade, and two (2) live
ammunitions for a .22 caliber gun. They brought the
petitioner to the police station for further investigation.
In the course of the same, the petitioner was asked
to show the necessary license or authority to possess
firearms and ammunitions found in his possession but
he failed to do so. He was then taken to the Davao
Metro discom office and the
prohibited articles recovered from him were indorsed
to M/Sgt. Didoy the officer then on duty. He was
prosecuted for illegal possession of firearms and
ammunitions in the Regional Trial Court of Davao City.
Issue: Whether or Not the warantless search is valid.
Held: In justifying the warrantless search of the buri
bag then carried by the petitioner, argues that under
Section 12, Rule 136 of the Rules of Court a person
lawfully arrested may be searched for dangerous
weapons or anything used as proof of a commission of
an offense without a search warrant. It is further
alleged that the arrest without a warrant of the
petitioner was lawful under the circumstances.
In the case at bar, there is no question that,
indeed, it is reasonable considering that it was
effected on the basis of a probable cause. The
probable cause is that when the petitioner acted
suspiciously and attempted to flee with the buri bag
there was a probable cause that he was concealing
something illegal in the bag and it was the right and
duty of the police officers to inspect the same.
It is too much indeed to require the police
officers to search the bag in the possession of the
petitioner only after they shall have obtained a search
warrant for the purpose. Such an exercise may prove
to be useless, futile and much too late.
Clearly, the search in the case at bar can be
sustained under the exceptions heretofore discussed,
and hence, the constitutional guarantee against
unreasonable searches and seizures has not been
violated.
PEOPLE V. MENGOTE [210 SCRA 174; G.R. NO. 87059;
22 JUN 1992]
Facts: The Western Police District received a
telephone call from an informer that there were three
suspicious looking persons at the corner of Juan Luna
and North Bay Boulevard in Tondo, Manila. A
surveillance team of plainclothesmen was forthwith
dispatched to the place. The patrolmen saw two men
looking from side to side, one of whom holding his
abdomen. They approached the persons
and identified themselves as policemen, whereupon
the two tried to run but unable to escape because the
other lawmen surrounded them. The suspects were
then searched. One of them the accused-appellant was
found with a .38 caliber with live ammunitions in it,
while his companion had a fan knife. The weapons
were taken from them and they were turned over to
the police headquarters for investigation. An
information was filed before the RTC convicting the
accused of illegal possession of firearm arm. A witness
testified that the weapon was among
the articles stolen at his shop, which he reported to the
police including the revolver. For his part, Mengote
made no effort to prove that he owned thefire arm or
that he was licensed to possess it but instead, he
claimed that the weapon was planted on him at the
time of his arrest. He was convicted for violation of
P.D.1866 and was sentenced to reclusion perpetua. In
his appeal he pleads that the weapon was not
admissible as evidence against him because it had
been illegally seized and therefore the fruit of a
poisonous tree.
Issue: Whether or not the warrantless search and
arrest was illegal.
Held: An evidence obtained as a result of an illegal
search and seizure inadmissible in any proceeding for
any purpose as provided by Art. III sec 32 of the
Constitution. Rule 113 sec.5 of the Rules of Court,
provides arrest without warrant lawful when: (a) the
person to be arrested has committed,
is actually committing, or is attempting to commit an
offense, (b) when the offense in fact has just
been committed, and he has personal knowledge of
the facts indicating the person arrested
has committed it and (c) the person to be arrested has
escaped from a penal establishment or a place where
he is serving final judgment or temporarily confined
while his case is pending, or has escaped while being
transferred from one confinement to another.
These requirements have not been established
in the case at bar. At the time of the arrest in question,
the accused appellant was merely looking from side to
side and holding his abdomen, according to the
arresting officers themselves. There was apparently no
offense that has just beencommitted or was
being actually committed or at least being attempt by
Mengote in their presence. Moreover a person may not
be stopped and frisked in a broad daylight or on a busy
street on unexplainedsuspicion.
Judgment is reversed and set aside. Accused-
appellant is acquitted.
PEOPLE VS. AMMINUDIN [163 SCRA 402; G.R. L-74869;
6 Jul 1988]
Facts: Idel Aminnudin, accused-appellant was arrested
on June 25, 1984, shortly after disembarking from the
M/V Wilcon 9 at about 8:30 in the evening, in Iloilo City.
The PC officers who were in fact waiting for him
because of a tip from one their informers simply
accosted him, inspected his bag and finding what
looked liked marijuana leaves took him to their
headquarters for investigation. The two bundles of
suspect articles were confiscated from him and later
taken to the NBI laboratory for examination. It was
found to contain three kilos of what were later
analyzed as marijuana leaves by an
NBI forensic examiner. An information for violation of
the Dangerous Drugs Act was filed against him. Later,
the information was amended to include Farida Ali y
Hassen, who had also been arrested with him that
same evening and likewise investigated. Both were
arraigned and pleaded not guilty. Subsequently,
the fiscal filed a motion to dismiss the charge against
Ali on the basis of a sworn statement of the arresting
officers absolving her after a 'thorough investigation."
The motion was granted, and trial proceeded only
against the accused-appellant, who was eventually
convicted . In his defense, Aminnudin disclaimed the
marijuana, averring that all he had in his bag was his
clothing consisting of a jacket, two shirts and two pairs
of pants. He alleged that he was arbitrarily arrested
and immediately handcuffed. His bag was confiscated
without a search warrant. At the PC headquarters, he
was manhandled to force him to admit he was carrying
the marijuana, the investigator hitting him with a piece
of wood in the chest and arms even as he parried
the blows while he was still handcuffed. He insisted he
did not even know what marijuana looked like and that
his business was selling watches and sometimes
cigarettes. However the RTC rejected his allegations.
Saying that he only has two watches during that time
and that he did not sufficiently proved the injuries
allegedly sustained.
Issue: Whether or not search of defendants bag is
legal.
Held: The search was illegal. Defendant was not
caught in flagrante delicto, which
could allow warrantless arrest or search. At the
moment of his arrest, he was not committing a crime.
Nor was he about to do so or had just done so. To all
appearances, he was like any of the other passengers
innocently disembarking from the vessel. The said
marijuana therefore could not be appreciated as
evidence against the defendant, and furthermore he is
acquitted of the crime as charged.
SECTION 3 PRIVACY OF COMMUNICATION AND
CORRESPONDENCE
Ramirez v. CA
Facts: A civil case damages was filed by petitioner
Socorro Ramirez in the Quezon City RTC alleging that
the private respondent, Ester Garcia, in a confrontation
in the latters office, allegedly vexed, insulted and
humiliated her in a hostile and furious mood and in a
manner offensive to petitioners dignity and
personality, contrary to morals, good customs and
public policy.
In support of her claim, petitioner produced a
verbatim transcript of the event and sought damages.
The transcript on which the civil case was based was
culled from a tape recording of the confrontation made
by petitioner.
 As a result of petitioners recording of the event
and alleging that the said act of secretly taping the
confrontation was illegal, private respondent filed a
criminal case before the Pasay RTC for violation of
Republic Act 4200, entitled An Act to prohibit and
penalize wire tapping and other related violations of
private communication, and other purposes.
Petitioner filed a Motion to Quash the
Information, which the RTC later on granted, on the
ground that the facts charged do not constitute an
offense, particularly a violation of R.A. 4200.
The CA declared the RTCs decision null and void
and denied the petitioners MR, hence the instant
petition.
Issue: W/N the Anti-Wiretapping Act applies in
recordings by one of the parties in the conversation
Held: Yes. Section 1 of R.A. 4200 entitled, An Act to
Prohibit and Penalized Wire Tapping and Other Related
Violations of Private Communication and Other
Purposes, provides:
Sec. 1. It shall be unlawful for any person, not being
authorized by all the parties to any private
communication or spoken word, to tap any wire or
cable, or by using any other device or arrangement, to
secretly overhear, intercept, or record such
communication or spoken word by using a device
commonly known as a dictaphone or dictagraph or
detectaphone or walkie-talkie or tape recorder, or
however otherwise described.
The aforestated provision clearly and unequivocally
makes it illegal for any person, not authorized by all
the parties to any private communication to secretly
record such communication by means of a tape
recorder. The law makes no distinction as to whether
the party sought to be penalized by the statute ought
to be a party other than or different from those
involved in the private communication. The statutes
intent to penalize all persons unauthorized to make
such recording is underscored by the use of the
qualifier any. Consequently, as respondent Court of
Appeals correctly concluded, even a (person) privy to
a communication who records his private conversation
with another without the knowledge of the latter (will)
qualify as a violator under this provision of R.A. 4200.
A perusal of the Senate Congressional Records,
moreover, supports the respondent courts conclusion
that in enacting R.A. 4200 our lawmakers indeed
contemplated to make illegal, unauthorized tape
recording of private conversations or communications
taken either by the parties themselves or by third
persons.
The nature of the conversations is immaterial to
a violation of the statute. The substance of the same
need not be specifically alleged in the information.
What R.A. 4200 penalizes are the acts of secretly
overhearing, intercepting or recording private
communications by means of the devices enumerated
therein. The mere allegation that an individual made a
secret recording of a private communication by means
of a tape recorder would suffice to constitute an
offense under Section 1 of R.A. 4200. As the Solicitor
General pointed out in his COMMENT before the
respondent court: Nowhere (in the said law) is it
required that before one can be regarded as a violator,
the nature of the conversation, as well as its
communication to a third person should be professed.
Petitioners contention that the phrase private
communication in Section 1 of R.A. 4200 does not
include private conversations narrows the ordinary
meaning of the word communication to a point of
absurdity. The word communicate comes from the latin
word communicare, meaning to share or to impart.
In its ordinary signification, communication connotes
the act of sharing or imparting signification,
communication connotes the act of sharing or
imparting, as in a conversation, or signifies the
process by which meanings or thoughts are shared
between individuals through a common system of
symbols (as language signs or gestures)
These definitions are broad enough to include verbal
or non-verbal, written or expressive communications of
meanings or thoughts which are likely to include the
emotionally-charged exchange, on February 22, 1988,
between petitioner and private respondent, in the
privacy of the latters office. Any doubts about the
legislative bodys meaning of the phrase private
communication are, furthermore, put to rest by the
fact that the terms conversation and
communication were interchangeably used by
Senator Taada in his Explanatory Note to the Bill.
Zulueta vs. Court of Appeals
FACTS: Petitioner, Cecilia Zulueta went to the clinic of
her husband, private respondent Dr. Alfredo Martin. In
the presence of her mother, a driver and Martins
secretary, she forcibly opened the drawers and cabinet
in the clinic and took 157 documents consisting of
private correspondence between Martin and his
alleged paramours. The documents were seized for
use as evidence in a case for legal separation and for
disqualification from the practice of medicine which
Zulueta had filed against her Martin. Martin filed
an action for recovery of the documents and for
damages against Zulueta. The RTC, decided in favor of
Martin, declaring him the capital/exclusive owner of
properties described and ordering Zulueta to return
the properties to Martin and pay him nominal and
moral damages and attorneys fees, and cost of the
suit. Furthermore, Zulueta and her attorneys were
enjoined from using or submitting/admitting as
evidence the documents and papers in question. On
appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed the decision
of the Regional Trial Court. Hence, this petition.
ISSUE: Whether the documents and papers in
question are admissible in evidence.
HELD: NO. The Supreme Court held that the
documents and papers in question are inadmissible in
evidence. The constitutional injunction declaring the
privacy of communication and correspondence [to be]
inviolable (Sec.3, Par.1, Art.III, 1987 Constitution) is no
less applicable simply because it is the wife who is the
party against whom the constitutional provision is to
be enforced. The only exception to the provision in the
constitution is if there is a lawful order from a court or
when public safety or order requires otherwise as
provide by law. (Sec.3, Par.1, Art. III, 1987
Constitution) Any violation of this provision renders
the evidence obtained inadmissible for any purpose in
any proceeding. (Sec.3, Par.2, Art. III,1987
Constitution)
The intimacies between husband and wife do not
justify any one of them in breaking the drawers and
cabinets of the other and in ransacking them for any
telltale evidence of marital infidelity. A person, by
contracting marriage does not shed his/her integrity or
his right to privacy as an individual and the
constitutional protection is ever available to him or to
her.
The law ensures absolute freedom of communication
between the spouses by making it privileged. Neither
husband nor wife may testify for or against the other
without consent of the affected spouse while the
marriage subsists. (Sec.22, Rule130, Rules of Court).
Neither maybe examined without the consent of the
other as to any communication received in confidence
by one from the other during the marriage, save for
specified exceptions. (Sec.24, Rule 130, Rules of Court)
PETITION DENIED. (Zulueta vs Court of Appeals, 253
SCRA 699, GR No. 107383, February 20, 1996)
Navarro vs. Court of Appeals, 313 SCRA 153
(1999)
FACTS: Two local media men, Stanley Jalbuena,
Enrique Lingan, in Lucena City wnet to the police
station to report alledged indecent show in one of the
night establishment shows in the City. At the station, a
heated confrontation followed between victim Lingan
and accused policeman Navarro who was then having
drinks outside the headquarters, lead to a fisticuffs.
The victim was hit with the handle of the accused's
gun below the left eyebrow, followed by a fist blow,
resulted the victim to fell and died under treatment.
The exchange of words was recorded on tape,
specifically the frantic exclamations made by Navarro
after the altercation that it was the victim who
provoked the fight. During the trial, Jalbuena, the other
media man , testified. Presented in evidence to
confirm his testimony was a voice recording he had
made of the heated discussion at the police station
between the accused police officer Navarro and the
deceased, Lingan, which was taken without the
knowledge of the two.
ISSUES:
1. Whether or not the voice recording is
admissible in evidence in view of RA 4200, which
prohibits wire tapping.
HELD:
1. The answer is affirmative, the tape is admissible
in view of RA 4200, which prohibits wire tapping.
Jalbuena's testimony is confirmed by the voice
recording he had made.
The law prohibits the overhearing, intercepting, or
recording of private communications (Ramirez v
Cpourt of Appeals, 248 SCRA 590 [1995]). Snce the
exchange between petitioner Navarro and Lingan was
not private, its tape recording is not prohibited.
Ople v Torres G.R. No. 127685. July 23, 1998.
Facts: Petitioner Ople prays that we invalidate
Administrative Order No. 308 entitled "Adoption of a
National Computerized Identification Reference
System" on two important constitutional grounds, viz:
one, it is a usurpation of the power of Congress to
legislate, and two, it impermissibly intrudes on our
citizenry's protected zone of privacy. We grant the
petition for the rights sought to be vindicated by the
petitioner need stronger barriers against further
erosion.
A.O. No. 308 was published in four newspapers of
general circulation on January 22, 1997 and January
23, 1997. On January 24, 1997, petitioner filed the
instant petition against respondents, then Executive
Secretary Ruben Torres and the heads of the
government agencies, who as members of the Inter-
Agency Coordinating Committee, are charged with the
implementation of A.O. No. 308. On April 8, 1997, we
issued a temporary restraining order enjoining its
implementation.
Issue: Petitioner contends:
C. THE IMPLEMENTATION OF A.O. NO. 308
INSIDIOUSLY LAYS THE GROUNDWORK FOR A SYSTEM
WHICH WILL VIOLATE THE BILL OF RIGHTS ENSHRINED
IN THE CONSTITUTION."
Held: IN VIEW WHEREOF, the petition is granted and
Administrative Order No. 308 entitled "Adoption of a
National Computerized Identification Reference
System" declared null and void for being
unconstitutional. SO ORDERED.
Ratio: It cannot be simplistically argued that A.O.
No. 308 merely implements the Administrative Code of
1987. It establishes for the first time a National
Computerized Identification Reference System. Such a
System requires a delicate adjustment of various
contending state policies the primacy of national
security, the extent of privacy interest against dossier-
gathering by government, the choice of policies, etc.
Indeed, the dissent of Mr. Justice Mendoza states that
the A.O. No. 308 involves the all-important freedom of
thought.
Nor is it correct to argue as the dissenters do that
A.O. No. 308 is not a law because it confers no right,
imposes no duty, affords no protection, and creates no
office. Under A.O. No. 308, a citizen cannot transact
business with government agencies delivering basic
services to the people without the contemplated
identification card. No citizen will refuse to get this
identification card for no one can avoid dealing with
government. It is thus clear as daylight that without
the ID, a citizen will have difficulty exercising his rights
and enjoying his privileges. Given this reality, the
contention that A.O. No. 308 gives no right and
imposes no duty cannot stand.
In view of right to privacy
Unlike the dissenters, we prescind from the premise
that the right to privacy is a fundamental right
guaranteed by the Constitution, hence, it is the burden
of government to show that A.O. No. 308 is justified by
some compelling state interest and that it is narrowly
drawn. A.O. No. 308 is predicated on two
considerations: (1) the need to provide our citizens
and foreigners with the facility to conveniently
transact business with basic service and social security
providers and other government instrumentalities and
(2) the need to reduce, if not totally eradicate,
fraudulent transactions and misrepresentations by
persons seeking basic services. It is debatable whether
these interests are compelling enough to warrant the
issuance of A.O. No. 308. But what is not arguable is
the broadness, the vagueness, the overbreadth of A.O.
No. 308 which if implemented will put our people's
right to privacy in clear and present danger.
The heart of A.O. No. 308 lies in its Section 4 which
provides for a Population Reference Number (PRN) as a
"common reference number to establish a linkage
among concerned agencies" through the use of
"Biometrics Technology" and "computer application
designs." A.O. No. 308 should also raise our antennas
for a further look will show that it does not state
whether encoding of data is limited to biological
information alone for identification purposes. In fact,
the Solicitor General claims that the adoption of the
Identification Reference System will contribute to the
"generation of population data for development
planning." This is an admission that the PRN will not be
used solely for identification but for the generation of
other data with remote relation to the avowed
purposes of A.O. No. 308. Clearly, the indefiniteness of
A.O. No. 308 can give the government the roving
authority to store and retrieve information for a
purpose other than the identification of the individual
through his PRN .
His transactions with the government agency will
necessarily be recorded whether it be in the
computer or in the documentary file of the agency. The
individual's file may include his transactions for loan
availments, income tax returns, statement of assets
and liabilities, reimbursements for medication,
hospitalization, etc. The more frequent the use of the
PRN, the better the chance of building a huge and
formidable information base through the electronic
linkage of the files. The data may be gathered for
gainful and useful government purposes; but the
existence of this vast reservoir of personal information
constitutes a covert invitation to misuse, a temptation
that may be too great for some of our authorities to
resist.
Well to note, the computer linkage gives other
government agencies access to the information. Yet,
there are no controls to guard against leakage of
information. When the access code of the control
programs of the particular computer system is broken,
an intruder, without fear of sanction or penalty, can
make use of the data for whatever purpose, or worse,
manipulate the data stored within the system. It is
plain and we hold that A.O. No. 308 falls short of
assuring that personal information which will be
gathered about our people will only be processed for
unequivocally specified purposes. 60 The lack of
proper safeguards in this regard of A.O. No. 308 may
interfere with the individual's liberty of abode and
travel by enabling authorities to track down his
movement; it may also enable unscrupulous persons
to access confidential information and circumvent the
right against self-incrimination; it may pave the way
for "fishing expeditions" by government authorities
and evade the right against unreasonable searches
and seizures. The possibilities of abuse and misuse of
the PRN, biometrics and computer technology are
accentuated when we consider that the individual
lacks control over what can be read or placed on his
ID, much less verify the correctness of the data
encoded. They threaten the very abuses that the Bill of
Rights seeks to prevent.
In Morfe v. Mutuc, we upheld the constitutionality of
R.A. 3019, the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, as
a valid police power measure. We declared that the
law, in compelling a public officer to make an annual
report disclosing his assets and liabilities, his sources
of income and expenses, did not infringe on the
individual's right to privacy. The law was enacted to
promote morality in public administration by curtailing
and minimizing the opportunities for official corruption
and maintaining a standard of honesty in the public
service.
In no uncertain terms, we also underscore that the
right to privacy does not bar all incursions into
individual privacy. The right is not intended to stifle
scientific and technological advancements that
enhance public service and the common good. It
merely requires that the law be narrowly focused and a
compelling interest justify such intrusions. Intrusions
into the right must be accompanied by proper
safeguards and well-defined standards to prevent
unconstitutional invasions.
Pollo v. Constantino-David, G.R. No. 181881, 18
October 2011
Facts: Respondent CSC Chair Constantino-David
received an anonymous letter complaint alleging of an
anomaly taking place in the Regional Office of the CSC.
The respondent then formed a team and issued a
memo directing the team to back up all the files in
the computers found in the Mamamayan Muna (PALD)
and Legal divisions.
Several diskettes containing the back-up files
sourced from the hard disk of PALD and LSD computers
were turned over to Chairperson David. The contents
of the diskettes were examined by the CSCs Office for
Legal Affairs (OLA). It was found that most of the files
in the 17 diskettes containing files copied from the
computer assigned to and being used by the
petitioner, numbering about 40 to 42 documents, were
draft pleadings or lettersin connection with
administrative cases in the CSC and other tribunals.
On the basis of this finding, Chairperson David issued
the Show-Cause Order, requiring the petitioner, who
had gone on extended leave, to submit his explanation
or counter-affidavit within five days from notice. In his
Comment, petitioner denied the accusations against
him and accused the CSC Officials of fishing
expedition when they unlawfully copied and printed
personal files in his computer.He was charged of
violating R.A. No. 6713 (Code of Conduct and Ethical
Standards for Public Officials and Employees). He
assailed the formal charge and filed an Omnibus
Motion ((For Reconsideration, to Dismiss and/or to
Defer) assailing the formal charge as without basis
having proceeded from an illegal search which is
beyond the authority of the CSC Chairman, such power
pertaining solely to the court.
The CSC denied the omnibus motion and treated the
motion as the petitioners answer to the charge. In
view of the absence of petitioner and his counsel, and
upon the motion of the prosecution, petitioner was
deemed to have waived his right to the formal
investigation which then proceeded ex parte.
The petitioner was dismissed from service. He filed a
petition to the CA which was dismissed by the latter on
the ground that it found no grave abuse of discretion
on the part of the respondents. He filed a motion for
reconsideration which was further denied by the
appellate court. Hence, this petition.
Issue: WON the search conducted by the CSC on the
computer of the petitioner constituted an illegal search
and was a violation of his constitutional right to
privacy
Ruling: The search conducted on his office computer
and the copying of his personal files was lawful and did
not violate his constitutional right.
Ratio Decidendi
In this case, the Court had the chance to present the
cases illustrative of the issue raised by the petitioner.
Katz v. United States 389 U.S. 437 (1967), the
US Supreme Court held that the act of FBI agents in
electronically recording a conversation made by
petitioner in an enclosed public telephone booth
violated his right to privacy and constituted a search
and seizure. Because the petitioner had a
reasonable expectation of privacy in using the
enclosed booth to make a personal telephone call, the
protection of the Fourth Amendment extends to such
area. Moreso, the concurring opinion of Mr. Justice
Harlan noted that the existence of privacy right under
prior decisions involved a two-fold requirement: first,
that a person has exhibited an actual (subjective)
expectation of privacy; and second, that the
expectation be one that society is prepared to
recognize as reasonable (objective).
Mancusi v. DeForte 392 U.S. 364, 88 S.Ct. 2120, 20
L.Ed2d 1154 (1968),thus recognized that employees
may have a reasonable expectation of privacy against
intrusions by police.
OConnor v. Ortega 480 U.S. 709 (1987), the Court
categorically declared that [i]ndividuals do not lose
Fourth Amendment rights merely because they work
for the government instead of a private employer.
In OConnor the Court recognized that special needs
authorize warrantless searches involving public
employees for work-related reasons. The Court thus
laid down a balancing test under which government
interests are weighed against the employees
reasonable expectation of privacy. This reasonableness
test implicates neither probable cause nor the warrant
requirement, which are related to law enforcement.
Social Justice Society (SJS) v. Dangerous Drugs
Board G.R. Nos. 157870, 158633 and 161658,
November 3, 2008, 570 SCRA 410, 427, (citing Ople v.
Torres, G.R. No. 127685, July 23, 1998, 293 SCRA 141,
169), recognized the fact that there may be such
legitimate intrusion of privacy in the workplace.
The Court ruled that the petitioner did not have a
reasonable expectation of privacy in his office and
computer files.
As to the second point of inquiry, the Court answered
in the affirmative. The search authorized by the CSC
Chair, the copying of the contents of the hard drive on
petitioners computer reasonable in its inception and
scope.
The Court noted that unlike in the case of Anonymous
Letter-Complaint against Atty. Miguel Morales, Clerk of
Court, Metropolitan Trial Court of Manila A.M. Nos. P-
08-2519 and P-08-2520, November 19, 2008, 571
SCRA 361, the case at bar involves the computer from
which the personal files of the petitioner were
retrieved is a government-issued computer, hence
government property the use of which the CSC has
absolute right to regulate and monitor.
Rhonda Vivares vs St. Theresas College, G.R.
No. 202666, September 29 2014
Facts: In January 2012, Angela Tan, a high school
student at St. Theresas College (STC), uploaded on
Facebook several pictures of her and her classmates
(Nenita Daluz and Julienne Suzara) wearing only their
undergarments.
Thereafter, some of their classmates reported said
photos to their teacher, Mylene Escudero. Escudero,
through her students, viewed and downloaded said
pictures. She showed the said pictures to STCs
Discipline-in-Charge for appropriate action.
Later, STC found Tan et al to have violated the
students handbook and banned them from
marching in their graduation ceremonies scheduled
in March 2012.
The issue went to court but despite a TRO (temporary
restraining order) granted by the Cebu RTC enjoining
the school from barring the students in the graduation
ceremonies, STC still barred said students.
Subsequently, Rhonda Vivares, mother of Nenita, and
the other mothers filed a petition for the issuance of
the writ of habeas data against the school. They
argued, among others, that:
1. The privacy setting of their childrens Facebook
accounts was set at Friends Only. They, thus, have a
reasonable expectation of privacy which must be
respected.
2. The photos accessed belong to the girls and, thus,
cannot be used and reproduced without their consent.
Escudero, however, violated their rights by saving
digital copies of the photos and by subsequently
showing them to STCs officials. Thus, the Facebook
accounts of the children were intruded upon;
3. The intrusion into the Facebook accounts, as well as
the copying of information, data, and digital images
happened at STCs Computer Laboratory;
They prayed that STC be ordered to surrender and
deposit with the court all soft and printed copies of the
subject data and have such data be declared illegally
obtained in violation of the childrens right to privacy.
The Cebu RTC eventually denied the petition. Hence,
this appeal.
ISSUE: Whether or not the petition for writ of habeas
data is proper.
HELD: Yes, it is proper but in this case, it will n ot
prosper.
Contrary to the arguments of STC, the Supreme Court
ruled that:
1. The petition for writ of habeas data can be availed
of even if this is not a case of extralegal killing or
enforced disappearance; and
2. The writ of habeas data can be availed of against
STC even if it is not an entity engaged in the business
of gathering, collecting, or storing data or information
regarding the person, family, home and
correspondence of the aggrieved party.
First, the Rule on Habeas Data does not state that it
can be applied only in cases of extralegal killings or
enforced disappearances. Second, nothing in the Rule
would suggest that the habeas data protection shall be
available only against abuses of a person or entity
engaged in the business of gathering, storing, and
collecting of data.
Right to Privacy on Social Media (Online Networking
Sites)
The Supreme Court ruled that if an online networking
site (ONS) like Facebook has privacy tools, and the
user makes use of such privacy tools, then he or she
has a reasonable expectation of privacy (right to
informational privacy, that is). Thus, such privacy must
be respected and protected.
In this case, however, there is no showing that the
students concerned made use of such privacy tools.
Evidence would show that that their post (status) on
Facebook were published as Public.
Facebook has the following settings to control as to
who can view a users posts on his wall (profile
page):
(a) Public the default setting; every Facebook user
can view the photo;
(b) Friends of Friends only the users Facebook
friends and their friends can view the photo;
(c) Friends only the users Facebook friends can view
the photo;
(d) Custom the photo is made visible only to
particular friends and/or networks of the Facebook
user; and
(e) Only Me the digital image can be viewed only by
the user.
The default setting is Public and if a user wants to
have some privacy, then he must choose any setting
other than Public. If it is true that the students
concerned did set the posts subject of this case so
much so that only five people can see them (as they
claim), then how come most of their classmates were
able to view them. This fact was not refuted by them.
In fact, it was their classmates who informed and
showed their teacher, Escudero, of the said pictures.
Therefore, it appears that Tan et al never use the
privacy settings of Facebook hence, they have no
reasonable expectation of privacy on the pictures of
them scantily clad.
STC did not violate the students right to privacy. The
manner which the school gathered the pictures cannot
be considered illegal. As it appears, it was the
classmates of the students who showed the picture to
their teacher and the latter, being the recipient of said
pictures, merely delivered them to the proper school
authority and it was for a legal purpose, that is, to
discipline their students according to the standards of
the school (to which the students and their parents
agreed to in the first place because of the fact that
they enrolled their children there).
Alejano v. Cabuay, GR 160792, August 25, 2005
FACTS: A directive was issued to all Major Service
Commanders to take into custody the military
personnel under their command who took part in the
Oakwood incident. Petitioners filed a petition for
habeas corpus with SC. The SC issued a resolution,
which required respondents to make a return of the
writ and to appear and produce the persons of the
detainees before the CA. CA dismissed the petition
because the detainees are already charged of coup
detat. Habeas corpus is unavailing in this case as the
detainees confinement is under a valid indictment.
ISSUE: What is the objective of the writ of habeas
corpus?
HELD: The duty to hear the petition for habeas corpus
necessarily includes the determination of the propriety
of the remedy. The remedy of habeas corpus has one
objective: to inquire into the cause of detention of a
person. The purpose of the writ is to determine
whether a person is being illegally deprived of his
liberty. If the inquiry reveals that the detention is
illegal, the court orders the release of the person. If,
however, the detention is proven lawful, then the
habeas corpus proceedings terminate. The use of
habeas corpus is thus very limited. It is not a writ of
error. Neither can it substitute for an appeal.
SECTION 4 FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION
U.S. v Bustos G.R. No. L-12592 March 8, 1918
Facts:In 1915, 34 Pampanga residents signed a
petition to the Executive Secretary regarding charges
against Roman Punsalan, the justice of the peace of
Macabebe. They wanted to oust him from his office.
Specific allegations against him included bribery
charges, involuntary servitude, and theft.
The justice denied the charges. In the CFI, not all the
charges were proved. But, the judge still found him
guilty.
Punsalan filed charges alleging that he was the victim
of prosecution and one Jaime, an auxiliary justice,
instigated the charges against him for personal
reasons. He was acquitted.
The complainants filed an appeal to the Governor
General but it wasnt acted upon.
Criminal action was instituted aganst the residents by
Punsalan.
The CFI found almost all of the 34 defendants guilty
and sentenced them to pay 10 pesos or suffer
imprisonment in case of insolvency.
The defendants filed a motion for a retrial to retire the
objection made by Punsalan. The trial court denied the
motion. All except 2 of the defendants appealed.
Making assignments of error.
1. The court erred in overruling motion for retrial.
2. Error in not holding that the libelous statement was
not privileged
3. Error in not acquitting defendants
4. Evidence failed to show guilt of defendants beyond
reasonable doubt.
5. Erred in making defendants prove that the libelous
statements were true.
6. Error in sustaining the prosecutions objection to the
introduction in evidence by the accused of the
affidavits upon which the petition forming the basis of
the libelous charge was based.
7. Erred in refusing to permit the defendants to retire
the objection in advertently interposed by their
counsel to the admission in evidence of the expediente
administrativo out of which the accusation in this case
arose.
Issue: Whether or not the defendants and appellants
are guilty of a libel of Roman Punsalan, justice of the
peace in Pampanga.
Held: Yes. Defendants acquitted.
Ratio: Freedom of speech was non existent in the
country before 1900. There were small efforts at
reform made by the La Solidaridad. The Malolos
Constitution, on the other hand, guaranteed freedom
of speech.
During the U.S. period, President McKinley himself laid
down the tenet Magna Charta of Philippine Liberty
when he wrote, that no law shall be passed abridging
the freedom of speech or of the press or of the rights
of the people to peaceably assemble and petition the
Government for a redress of grievances." This was in
the Philippine Bill.
In the American cases it was held, there were
references to public opinion should be the constant
source of liberty and democracy. It also said the
guaranties of a free speech and a free press include
the right to criticize judicial conduct. The
administration of the law is a matter of vital public
concern. Whether the law is wisely or badly enforced
is, therefore, a fit subject for proper comment. If the
people cannot criticize a justice of the peace or a
judge the same as any other public officer, public
opinion will be effectively muzzled. Attempted
terrorization of public opinion on the part of the
judiciary would be tyranny of the basest sort.
It is a duty which every one owes to society or to the
State to assist in the investigation of any alleged
misconduct. It is further the duty of all who know of
any official dereliction on the part of a magistrate or
the wrongful act of any public officer to bring the facts
to the notice of those whose duty it is to inquire into
and punish them.
The right to assemble and petition is the necessary
consequence of republican institutions and the
complement of the part of free speech. Assembly
means a right on the part of citizens to meet
peaceably for consultation in respect to public affairs.
Petition means that any person or group of persons
can apply, without fear of penalty, to the appropriate
branch or office of the government for a redress of
grievances. The persons assembling and petitioning
must, of course, assume responsibility for the charges
made.
Public policy has demanded protection for public
opinion. The doctrine of privilege has been the result
of this. Privilged communications may in some
instances afford an immunity to the slanderer. Public
policy is the unfettered administration of justice.
Privilege is either absolute or qualified. Qualified
privilege is prima facie which may be lost by proof of
malice. This is apparent in complaints made in good
faith against a public officials conduct having a duty in
the matter. Even if the statements were found to be
false, the protection of privilege may cover the
individual given that it was in good faith. There must
be a sense of duty and not a self-seeking motive.
A communication made bona fide upon any subject-
matter in which the party communicating has an
interest, or in reference to which has a duty, is
privileged, if made to a person having a corresponding
interest or duty, although it contained criminatory
matter which without this privilege would be
slanderous and actionable.
In the usual case malice can be presumed from
defamatory words. Privilege destroys that
presumption. The onus of proving malice then lies on
the plaintiff. The plaintiff must bring home to the
defendant the existence of malice as the true motive
of his conduct. Falsehood and the absence of probable
cause will amount to proof of malice.
It is true that the particular words set out in the
information, if said of a private person, might well be
considered libelous per se. The charges might also
under certain conceivable conditions convict one of a
libel of a government official. As a general rule words
imputing to a judge or a justice of the peace
dishonesty or corruption or incapacity or misconduct
touching him in his office are actionable. But as
suggested in the beginning we do not have present a
simple case of direct and vicious accusations published
in the press, but of charges predicated on affidavits
made to the proper official and thus qualifiedly
privileged. Express malice has not been proved by the
prosecution. Further, although the charges are
probably not true as to the justice of the peace, they
were believed to be true by the petitioners. Good faith
surrounded their action. Probable cause for them to
think that malfeasance or misfeasance in office existed
is apparent. The ends and the motives of these citizens
 to secure the removal from office of a person
thought to be venal were justifiable. In no way did
they abuse the privilege. These respectable citizens
did not eagerly seize on a frivolous matter but on
instances which not only seemed to them of a grave
character, but which were sufficient in an investigation
by a judge of first instance to convince him of their
seriousness. No undue publicity was given to the
petition. The manner of commenting on the conduct of
the justice of the peace was proper.
People vs. Alarcon [GR 46551, 12 December
1939]
Facts: As an aftermath of the decision rendered by the
Court of First Instance of Pampanga in criminal case
5733 (People s vs. Salvador Alarcon, et al.), convicting
the accused therein except one of the crime of
robbery committed in band, a denunciatory letter,
signed by one Luis M. Taruc, was addressed to His
Excellency, the President of the Philippines. A copy of
said letter found its way to Federico Mangahas who, as
columnist of the Tribune, a newspaper of general
circulation in the Philippines, quoted the letter in an
article published by him in the issue of that paper of
23 September 1937. The article provides, in part, that
"Fifty-two (52) tenants in Floridablanca, Pampanga,
have been charged and convicted on a trumped up
charge of robbery in band because they took each a
few cavans of palay for which they issued the
corresponding receipts, from the bodega in the
hacienda where they are working. These tenants
contend that they have the right to take the palay for
their food as the hacienda owner has the obligation to
give them rations of palay for their main tenance and
their families to be paid later with their share of their
crop. But this is not all. When the convicted tenants
appealed the case and were released on bail pending
their appeal, court and public officials exerted pressure
upon one of their bondsmen, as this bondsman
informed the tenants, to withdraw his bail for them,
and the fifty two tenants were arrested again and put
in jail." On 29 September 1937, the provincial fiscal of
Pampanga filed with the Court of First Instance of that
province to cite Federico Mangahas for contempt. On
the same date, the lower court ordered Mangahas to
appear and show cause. Mangahas appeared and filed
an answer,alleging, among others, that the
publication of the letter in question is in line with the
constitutional guarantee of freedom of the press. On
29 November 1937, the lower court entered an order,
imposing upon Mangahas the nominal fine of P25, or in
case of insolvency, 5 days in prison; this without
prejudice to the action for libel that the public
prosecutor believes to be advisable to file against Luis
M. Taruc. Magahas appealed from this order to the
Court of Appeals which later certified the case to the
Supreme Court as involving only a question of law.
Issue: Whether the trial court properly cited
Mangahas for contempt inasmuch as the robbery-in-
band case is still pending appeal.
Held: Newspaper publications tending to impede,
obstruct, embarrass, or influence the courts in
administering justice in a pending suit or proceeding
constitutes criminal contempt which is summarily
punishable by the courts. The rule is otherwise after
the cause is ended. It must, however, clearly appear
that such publications do impede, interfere with, and
embarrass the administration of justice before the
author of the publications should be held for contempt.
What is thus sought to be shielded against the
influence of newspaper comments is the all-important
duty of the court to administer justice in the decision
of a pending case. There is no pending case to speak
of when and once the court has come upon a decision
and has lost control either to reconsider or amend it.
That is the present case, for here the letter complained
of was published after the Court of First Instance of
Pampanga had decided the criminal case for robbery in
band, and after that decision had been appealed to the
Court of Appeals. The fact that a motion to reconsider
its order confiscating the bond of the accused therein
was subsequently filed may be admitted; but, the
important consideration is that it was then without
power to reopen or modify the decision which it had
rendered upon the merits of the case, and could not
have been influenced by the questioned publication. If
it be contended, however, that the publication of the
questioned letter constitutes contempt of the Court of
Appeals where the appeal in the criminal case was
then pending, the interrelation of the different courts
forming our integrated judicial system, one court is not
an agent or representative of another and may not, for
this reason, punish contempts in vindication of the
authority and de corum which are not its own. The
appeal transfers the proceedings to the appellate
court, and this last court becomes thereby charged
with the authority to deal with contempts committed
after the perfection of the appeal.
AYER PRODUCTIONS VS. CAPULONG [160 SCRA
861; G.R. NO. L-82380; 29 APR 1988]
Facts: Petitioner McElroy an Australian film maker,
and his movie production company, Ayer Productions,
envisioned, sometime in 1987, for commercial viewing
and for Philippine and international release, the
historic peaceful struggle of the Filipinos at EDSA. The
proposed motion picture entitled "The Four Day
Revolution" was endorsed by the MTRCB as and other
government agencies consulted. Ramos also signified
his approval of the intended film production.
It is designed to be viewed in a six-hour mini-series
television play, presented in a "docu-drama" style,
creating four fictional characters interwoven with real
events, and utilizing actual documentary footage as
background. David Williamson is Australia's leading
playwright and Professor McCoy (University of New
South Wales) is an American historian have developed
a script.
Enrile declared that he will not approve the use,
appropriation, reproduction and/or exhibition of his
name, or picture, or that of any member of his family
in any cinema or television production, film or other
medium for advertising or commercial exploitation.
petitioners acceded to this demand and the name of
Enrile was deleted from the movie script, and
petitioners proceeded to film the projected motion
picture. However, a complaint was filed by Enrile
invoking his right to privacy. RTC ordered for the
desistance of the movie production and making of any
reference to plaintiff or his family and from creating
any fictitious character in lieu of plaintiff which
nevertheless is based on, or bears substantial or
marked resemblance to Enrile. Hence the appeal.
Issue: Whether or Not freedom of expression was
violated.
Held: Yes. Freedom of speech and of expression
includes the freedom to film and produce motion
pictures and exhibit such motion pictures in theaters
or to diffuse them through television. Furthermore the
circumstance that the production of motion picture
films is a commercial activity expected to yield
monetary profit, is not a disqualification for availing of
freedom of speech and of expression.
The projected motion picture was as yet uncompleted
and hence not exhibited to any audience. Neither
private respondent nor the respondent trial Judge
knew what the completed film would precisely look
like. There was, in other words, no "clear and present
danger" of any violation of any right to privacy. Subject
matter is one of public interest and concern. The
subject thus relates to a highly critical stage in the
history of the country.
At all relevant times, during which the momentous
events, clearly of public concern, that petitioners
propose to film were taking place, Enrile was a "public
figure:" Such public figures were held to have lost, to
some extent at least, their right to privacy.
The line of equilibrium in the specific context of the
instant case between the constitutional freedom of
speech and of expression and the right of privacy, may
be marked out in terms of a requirement that the
proposed motion picture must be fairly truthful and
historical in its presentation of events.
Borjal v Court of Appeals 301 SCRA 1 January 14,
1999
Facts: A civil action for damages based on libel was
filed before the court against Borjal and Soliven for
writing and publishing articles that are allegedly
derogatory and offensive against Francisco Wenceslao,
attacking among others the solicitation letters he send
to support a conference to be launch concerning
resolving matters on transportation crisis that is
tainted with anomalous activities. Wenceslao however
was never named in any of the articles nor was the
conference he was organizing. The lower court ordered
petitioners to indemnify the private respondent for
damages which was affirmed by the Court of Appeals.
A petition for review was filed before the SC
contending that private respondent was not
sufficiently identified to be the subject of the published
articles.
Issue: Whether or not there are sufficient grounds to
constitute guilt of petitioners for libel.
Held: In order to maintain a libel suit, it is essential
that the victim be identifiable although it is not
necessary that he be named. It is also not sufficient
that the offended party recognized himself as the
person attacked or defamed, but it must be shown that
at least a third person could identify him as the object
of the libelous publication. These requisites have not
been complied with in the case at bar. The element of
identifiability was not met since it was Wenceslaso
who revealed he was the organizer of said conference
and had he not done so the public would not have
known.
The concept of privileged communications is implicit in
the freedom of the press and that privileged
communications must be protective of public opinion.
Fair commentaries on matters of public interest are
privileged and constitute a valid defense in an action
for libel or slander. The doctrine of fair comment
means that while in general every discreditable
imputation publicly made is deemed false, because
every man is presumed innocent until his guilt is
judicially proved, and every false imputation is
deemed malicious, nevertheless, when the
discreditable imputation is directed against a public
person in his public capacity, it is not necessarily
actionable. In order that such discreditable imputation
to a public official may be actionable, it must either be
a false allegation of fact or a comment based on a
false supposition. If the comment is an expression of
opinion, based on established facts, then it is
immaterial that the opinion happens to be mistaken,
as long as it might reasonably be inferred from the
facts.
The questioned article dealt with matters of public
interest as the declared objective of the conference,
the composition of its members and participants, and
the manner by which it was intended to be funded no
doubt lend to its activities as being genuinely imbued
with public interest. Respondent is also deemed to be
a public figure and even otherwise is involved in a
public issue. The court held that freedom of expression
is constitutionally guaranteed and protected with the
reminder among media members to practice highest
ethical standards in the exercise thereof.
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A privileged communication may be either:
1. Absolutely privileged communication those which
are not actionable even if the author has acted in bad
faith. An example is found in Sec. 11, Art.VI, of the
1987 Constitution which exempts a member of
Congress from liability for any speech or debate in the
Congress or in any Committee thereof.
2. Qualifiedly privileged communications those
containing defamatory imputations are not actionable
unless found to have been made without good
intention justifiable motive. To this genre belong
"private communications" and "fair and true report
without any comments or remarks."
Reyes v Bagatsing, G.R. NO. L-65366, 125
SCRA 553 (November 9,
1983)
Facts: Petitioner sought a permit from the City of
Manila to hold a peaceful march and rally on October
26, 1983 from 2:00 to 5:00 in the afternoon, starting
from the Luneta to the gates of the United States
Embassy. Once there, and in an open space of public
property, a short program would be held. The march
would be attended by the local and foreign
participants of such conference. That would be
followed by the handing over of a petition based on
the resolution adopted at the closing session of the
Anti-Bases Coalition. There was likewise an assurance
in the petition that in the exercise of the constitutional
rights to free speech and assembly, all the necessary
steps would be taken by it "to ensure a peaceful march
and rally. However the request was denied. Reference
was made to persistent intelligence reports affirming
the plans of subversive/criminal elements to infiltrate
or disrupt any assembly or congregations where a
large number of people is expected to attend.
Respondent suggested that a permit may be issued if
it is to be held at the Rizal Coliseum or any other
enclosed area where the safety of the participants
themselves and the general public may be ensured. An
oral argument was heard and the mandatory injunction
was granted on the ground that there was no showing
of the existence of a clear and present danger of a
substantive evil that could justify the denial of a
permit. However Justice Aquino dissented that the rally
is violative of Ordinance No. 7295 of the City of Manila
prohibiting the holding of rallies within a radius of five
hundred (500) feet from any foreign mission or
chancery and for other purposes. Hence the Court
resolves.
Issue: Whether or Not the freedom of expression and
the right to peaceably assemble violated.
Held: Yes. The invocation of the right to freedom of
peaceable assembly carries with it the implication that
the right to free speech has likewise been disregarded.
It is settled law that as to public places, especially so
as to parks and streets, there is freedom of access. Nor
is their use dependent on who is the applicant for the
permit, whether an individual or a group. There can be
no legal objection, absent the existence of a clear and
present danger of a substantive evil, on the choice of
Luneta as the place where the peace rally would start.
Time immemorial Luneta has been used for purposes
of assembly, communicating thoughts between
citizens, and discussing public questions.
Such use of the public places has from ancient times,
been a part of the privileges, immunities, rights, and
liberties of citizens.
With regard to the ordinance, there was no showing
that there was violation and even if it could be shown
that such a condition is satisfied it does not follow that
respondent could legally act the way he did. The
validity of his denial of the permit sought could still be
challenged.
A summary of the application for permit for rally: The
applicants for a permit to hold an assembly should
inform the licensing authority of the date, the public
place where and the time when it will take place. If it
were a private place, only the consent of the owner or
the one entitled to its legal possession is required.
Such application should be filed well ahead in time to
enable the public official concerned to appraise
whether there may be valid objections to the grant of
the permit or to its grant but at another public place. It
is an indispensable condition to such refusal or
modification that the clear and present danger test be
the standard for the decision reached. Notice is given
to applicants for the denial.