VI. CONSEQUENCES OF MARRIAGE
The objection is proper; and
1. PERSONAL RELATIONS
Art. 15. Laws relating to family rights and duties, or to the
status, condition and legal capacity of persons are
binding upon citizens of the Philippines, even though
living abroad. (9a)
Family Code
Art. 69. The husband and wife shall fix the family domicile. In
case of disagreement, the court shall decide.
The court may exempt one spouse from living with the
other if the latter should live abroad or there are other
valid and compelling reasons for the exemption.
However, such exemption shall not apply if the same
is not compatible with the solidarity of the family.
(110a)
Art. 70. The spouses are jointly responsible for the support of
the family. The expenses for such support and other
conjugal obligations shall be paid from the community
property and, in the absence thereof, from the income
or fruits of their separate properties. In case of
insufficiency or absence of said income or fruits, such
obligations shall be satisfied from the separate
properties. (111a)
Art. 73. Either spouse may exercise any legitimate profession,
occupation, business or activity without the
1 consent of
the other. The latter may object only on valid, serious,
and moral grounds.
In case of disagreement, the court shall decide
whether or not:
1.
2. Benefit has occurred to the family prior to the
objection or thereafter. If the benefit accrued prior
to the objection, the resulting obligation shall be
enforced against the separate property of the
spouse who has not obtained consent.
The foregoing provisions shall not prejudice the rights
of creditors who acted in good faith. (117a)
Muslim Code
Art. 34. Mutual rights and obligations.
1. The husband and the wife are obliged to live
together, observe mutual respect and fidelity, and
render mutual help and support in accordance
with this Code.
2. When one of the spouses neglects his or her duties
to the conjugal union or brings danger, dishonor or
material injury upon the other, the injured party
may petition the court for relief. The court may
counsel the offender to comply with his or her
duties, and take such measures as may be proper.
3. The husband and the wife shall inherit from each
other in accordance with this Code.
4. The husband and the wife shall have the right to
divorce in accordance with this Code.
Art. 35. Rights and obligations of the husband. The husband
shall fix the residence of the family. The court may
exempt the wife from living with her husband on any
of the following grounds:
a. Her dower is not satisfied in accordance with the
stipulations; or
 b. The conjugal dwelling is not in keeping with her
social standing or is, for any reason, not safe for
the members of the family or her property.
Art. 36. Rights and obligations of the wife.
1. The wife shall dutifully manage the affairs of the
household. She may purchase things necessary for the
maintenance of the family, and the husband shall be
bound to reimburse the expenses, if he has not
delivered the proper sum.
2. The wife cannot, without the husband's consent,
acquire any property by gratuitous title, except from
her relatives who are within the prohibited degrees in
marriage.
3. The wife may, with her husband's consent, exercise
any profession or occupation or engage in lawful
business which is in keeping with Islamic modesty and
virtue. However, if the husband refuses to give his
consent on the ground that his income is sufficient for
the family according to its social standing or his
opposition is based on serious and valid grounds, the
matter shall be referred to the Agama Arbitration
Council.
4. The wife shall have the right to demand the
satisfaction of her mahr.
5. Unless otherwise stipulated in the marriage
settlements, the wife retain ownership and
administration of her exclusive property.
6. The wife shall be entitled to an equal and just
treatment by the husband. 2 shall govern their relations;
2. PROPERTY RELATIONS
Civil Code:
Art. 15. Laws relating to family rights and duties, or to the
status, condition and legal capacity of persons are
binding upon citizens of the Philippines, even though
living abroad. (9a)
Art. 117. The wife may exercise any profession or occupation or
engage in business. However, the husband may
object, provided:
1.His income is sufficient for the family,
according to its social standing, and
2.His opposition is founded on serious and valid
grounds.
In case of disagreement on this question, the parents
and grandparents as well as the family council, if any,
shall be consulted. If no agreement is still arrived at,
the court will decide whatever may be proper and in
the best interest of the family. (n)
Art. 118. The property relations between husband and wife shall
be governed in the following order:
a. By contract executed before the marriage;
b. By the provisions of this Code; and
c. By custom. (1315a)
Art. 124. If the marriage is between a citizen of the Philippines
and a foreigner, whether celebrated in the Philippines
or abroad, the following rules shall prevail:
1. If the husband is a citizen of the Philippines while
the wife is a foreigner, the provisions of this Code
 2. If the husband is a foreigner and the wife is a
citizen of the Philippines, the laws of the
husband's country shall be followed, without
prejudice to the provisions of this Code with regard
to immovable property. (1325a)
Art. 144. When a man and a woman live together as husband
and wife, but they are not married, or their marriage is
void from the beginning, the property acquired by
either or both of them through their work or industry
or their wages and salaries shall be governed by the
rules on co-ownership. (n)
Family Code:
Art. 74. A marriage in articulo mortis may also be solemnized
by the captain of a ship or chief of an airplane during a
voyage, or by the commanding officer of a military
unit, in the absence of a chaplain, during war. The
duties mentioned in the two preceding articles shall be
complied with by the ship captain, airplane chief or
commanding officer. (n)
Art. 75. Marriages between Filipino citizens abroad may be
solemnized by consuls and vice-consuls of the
Republic of the Philippines. The duties of the local civil
registrar and of a judge or justice of the peace or
mayor with regard to the celebration of marriage shall
be performed by such consuls and vice-consuls. (n)
Art. 76. No marriage license shall be necessary when a man
and a woman who have attained the age of majority
and who, being unmarried, have lived together as
husband and wife for at least five years,3 desire to
marry each other. The contracting parties shall state
the foregoing facts in an affidavit before any person
authorized by law to administer oaths. The official,
priest or minister who solemnized the marriage shall
also state in an affidavit that he took steps to
ascertain the ages and other qualifications of the
contracting parties and that he found no legal
impediment to the marriage. (n)
Art. 77. In case two persons married in accordance with law
desire to ratify their union in conformity with the
regulations, rites, or practices of any church, sect, or
religion it shall no longer be necessary to comply with
the requirements of Chapter 1 of this Title and any
ratification made shall merely be considered as a
purely religious ceremony. (23)
Art. 80. The following marriages shall be void from the
beginning:
1. Those contracted under the ages of sixteen and
fourteen years by the male and female
respectively, even with the consent of the parents;
2. Those solemnized by any person not legally
authorized to perform marriages;
3. Those solemnized without a marriage license, save
marriages of exceptional character;
4. Bigamous or polygamous marriages not falling
under Article 83, Number 2;
5. Incestuous marriages mentioned in Article 81;
6. Those where one or both contracting parties have
been found guilty of the killing of the spouse of
either of them;
7. Those between stepbrothers and stepsisters and
other marriages specified in Article 82. (n)
Art. 147. When a man and a woman who are capacitated to
marry each other, live exclusively with each other as
husband and wife without the benefit of marriage or
 under a void marriage, their wages and salaries shall
be owned by them in equal shares and the property
acquired by both of them through their work or
industry shall be governed by the rules on co-
ownership.
In the absence of proof to the contrary, properties
acquired while they lived together shall be presumed
to have been obtained by their joint efforts, work or
industry, and shall be owned by them in equal shares.
For purposes of this Article, a party who did not
participate in the acquisition by the other party of any
property shall be deemed to have contributed jointly
in the acquisition thereof if the former's efforts
consisted in the care and maintenance of the family
and of the household.
Neither party can encumber or dispose by acts inter
vivos of his or her share in the property acquired
during cohabitation and owned in common, without
the consent of the other, until after the termination of
their cohabitation.
When only one of the parties to a void marriage is in
good faith, the share of the party in bad faith in the
co-ownership shall be forfeited in favor of their
common children. In case of default of or waiver by
any or all of the common children or their
descendants, each vacant share shall belong to the
respective surviving descendants. In the absence of
descendants, such share shall belong to the innocent
party. In all cases, the forfeiture shall take place upon
termination of the cohabitation. (144a)
Art. 148. In cases of cohabitation not falling under the
preceding Article, only the properties acquired by both
of the parties through their actual joint contribution
4 of
money, property, or industry shall be owned by them
in common in proportion to their respective
contributions. In the absence of proof to the contrary,
their contributions and corresponding shares are
presumed to be equal. The same rule and presumption
shall apply to joint deposits of money and evidences of
credit.
If one of the parties is validly married to another, his
or her share in the co-ownership shall accrue to the
absolute community or conjugal partnership existing
in such valid marriage. If the party who acted in bad
faith is not validly married to another, his or her shall
be forfeited in the manner provided in the last
paragraph of the preceding Article.
The foregoing rules on forfeiture shall likewise apply
even if both parties are in bad faith. (144a)
Muslim Code:
Art. 37. How governed. The property relations between
husband and wife shall be governed in the following
order:
a. By contract before or at the time of the celebration
of marriage;
b. By the provisions of this Code; and
c. By custom.
Art. 38. Regime of property relations. The property relations
between the spouses, in the absence of any stipulation
to the contrary in the marriage settlements or any
other contract, shall be governed by the regime of
complete separation of property in accordance with
this Code and, in a suppletory manner, by the general
principles of Islamic law and the Civil Code of the
Philippines.
Collector vs. Fisher
Facts:
This case relates to the determination and settlement of the
hereditary estate left by the deceased Walter G. Stevenson, and the
laws applicable thereto. Walter G. Stevenson (born in the Philippines
on August 9, 1874 of British parents and married in the City of Manila
on January 23, 1909 to Beatrice Mauricia Stevenson another British
subject) died on February 22, 1951 in San Francisco, California,
U.S.A. whereto he and his wife moved and established their
permanent residence since May 10, 1945. In his will executed in
San Francisco on May 22, 1947, and which was duly probated in the
Superior Court of California on April 11, 1951, Stevenson instituted
his wife Beatrice as his sole heiress to the following real and
personal properties acquired by the spouses while residing in
the Philippines.
Ancillary administration proceedings were instituted in the Court of
First Instance of Manila for the settlement of the estate in the
Philippines. In due time Stevenson's will was duly admitted to probate
by our court and Ian Murray Statt was appointed ancillary
administrator of the estate, filed a preliminary estate and inheritance
tax return with the reservation of having the properties declared
therein finally appraised at their values six months after the death of
Stevenson. Preliminary return was made by the ancillary administrator
in order to secure the waiver of the Collector of Internal Revenue on
the inheritance tax due on the 210,000 shares of stock in the
Mindanao Mother Lode Mines Inc. which the estate then desired to
dispose in the United States. Acting upon said return, the Collector of
Internal Revenue accepted the valuation of the personal properties
declared therein, but increased the appraisal of the two parcels of land
located in Baguio City by fixing their fair market value. After allowing
the deductions claimed by the ancillary administrator for funeral
expenses in the amount of P2,000.00 and for judicial and
administration expenses in the sum of P5,500.00, the Collector
assessed the state the amount of P5,147.98 for estate tax and
P10,875,26 or inheritance tax, or a total of P16,023.23. Both of these
assessments were paid by the estate.
The ancillary administrator filed in amended estate and
inheritance tax return in pursuance of his reservation
5 made at
the time of filing of the preliminary return and for the purpose
of availing of the right granted by section 91 of the National
Internal Revenue Code.
Beatrice Mauricia Stevenson assigned all her rights and interests in
the estate to the spouses, Douglas and Bettina Fisher, respondents
herein.
The ancillary administrator filed a second amended estate and
inheritance tax return. This return declared the same assets of the
estate stated in the amended return of September 22, 1952, except
that it contained new claims for additional exemption and
deduction to wit: (1) deduction in the amount of P4,000.00
from the gross estate of the decedent as provided for in
Section 861 (4) of the U.S. Federal Internal Revenue Code
which the ancillary administrator averred was allowable by
way of the reciprocity granted by Section 122 of the National
Internal Revenue Code, as then held by the Board of Tax Appeals in
case No. 71 entitled "Housman vs. Collector," August 14, 1952; and (2)
exemption from the imposition of estate and inheritance taxes
on the 210,000 shares of stock in the Mindanao Mother Lode
Mines, Inc. also pursuant to the reciprocity proviso of Section
122 of the National Internal Revenue Code. In this last return, the
estate claimed that it was liable only for the amount of P525.34 for
estate tax and P238.06 for inheritance tax and that, as a
consequence, it had overpaid the government. The refund of the
amount of P15,259.83, allegedly overpaid, was accordingly requested
by the estate. The Collector denied the claim. For this reason,
action was commenced in the Court of First Instance of Manila by
respondents, as assignees of Beatrice Mauricia Stevenson, for the
recovery of said amount. Pursuant to Republic Act No. 1125, the case
was forwarded to the Court of Tax Appeals which court, after hearing,
rendered decision :
that: (a) the one-half () share of the surviving spouse in the
conjugal partnership property as diminished by the obligations
properly chargeable to such property should be deducted from the
net estate of the deceased Walter G. Stevenson, pursuant to Section
89-C of the National Internal Revenue Code; (b) the intangible
personal property belonging to the estate of said Stevenson is
exempt from inheritance tax, pursuant to the provision of section
122 of the National Internal Revenue Code in relation to the California
Inheritance Tax Law but decedent's estate is not entitled to an
exemption of P4,000.00 in the computation of the estate tax; (c) for
purposes of estate and inheritance taxation the Baguio real estate of
the spouses should be valued at P52,200.00, and 210,000 shares of
stock in the Mindanao Mother Lode Mines, Inc. should be appraised at
P0.38 per share; and (d) the estate shall be entitled to a deduction of
P2,000.00 for funeral expenses and judicial expenses of P8,604.39.
Issue: whether or not foreign law needs to be proved in our
jurisdiction?
Ruling:
It is well-settled that foreign laws do not prove themselves in
our jurisdiction and our courts are not authorized to take
judicial notice of them. Like any other fact, they must be alleged
and proved. Section 41, Rule 123 of our Rules of Court prescribes the
manner of proving foreign laws before our tribunals. However,
although we believe it desirable that these laws be proved in
accordance with said rule, we held in the case of Willamette Iron and
Steel Works v. Muzzal, 61 Phil. 471, that "a reading of sections 300
and 301 of our Code of Civil Procedure (now section 41, Rule 123) will
convince one that these sections do not exclude the presentation of
other competent evidence to prove the existence of a foreign law." In
that case, we considered the testimony of an attorney-at-law
of San Francisco, California who quoted verbatim a section of
California Civil Code and who stated that the same was in
force at the time the obligations were contracted, as sufficient
evidence to establish the existence of said law. In line with this
view, we find no error, therefore, on the part of the Tax Court in
considering the pertinent California law as proved by respondents'
witness.
VII. Dissolution of Marriage
1. Annulment
Civil Code:
Art. 66. When either or both of the contracting parties are
citizens or subjects of a foreign country, 6 it shall be
necessary, before a marriage license can be obtained,
to provide themselves with a certificate of legal
capacity to contract marriage, to be issued by their
respective diplomatic or consular officials. (13a)
Art. 71. All marriages performed outside the Philippines in
accordance with the laws in force in the country where
they were performed, and valid there as such, shall
also be valid in this country, except bigamous,
polygamous, or incestuous marriages as determined
by Philippine law. (19a)
Family Code
Art. 45. A marriage may be annulled for any of the following
causes, existing at the time of the marriage:
1. That the party in whose behalf it is sought to have
the marriage annulled was eighteen years of age
or over but below twenty-one, and the marriage
was solemnized without the consent of the
parents, guardian or person having substitute
parental authority over the party, in that order,
unless after attaining the age of twenty-one, such
party freely cohabited with the other and both
lived together as husband and wife;
2. That either party was of unsound mind, unless
such party after coming to reason, freely
cohabited with the other as husband and wife;
3. That the consent of either party was obtained by
fraud, unless such party afterwards, with full
knowledge of the facts constituting the fraud,
freely cohabited with the other as husband and
wife;
4. That the consent of either party was obtained by
force, intimidation or undue influence, unless the
same having disappeared or ceased, such party
thereafter freely cohabited with the other as
husband and wife;
5. That either party was physically incapable of
consummating the marriage with the other, and
 such incapacity continues and appears to be
incurable; or
6. That either party was afflicted with a sexually-
transmissible disease found to be serious and
appears to be incurable. (85a)
Art. 46. Any of the following circumstances shall constitute
fraud referred to in Number 3 of the preceding Article:
1. Non-disclosure of a previous conviction by final
judgment of the other party of a crime involving
moral turpitude;
2. Concealment by the wife of the fact that at the
time of the marriage, she was pregnant by a man
other than her husband;
3. Concealment of sexually transmissible disease,
regardless of its nature, existing at the time of the
marriage; or
4. Concealment of drug addiction, habitual
alcoholism or homosexuality or lesbianism existing
at the time of the marriage.
No other misrepresentation or deceit as to character,
health, rank, fortune or chastity shall constitute such
fraud as will give grounds for action for the annulment
of marriage. (86a)
Art. 47. The action for annulment of marriage must be filed by
the following persons and within the periods indicated
herein:
1. For causes mentioned in number 1 of7Article 45 by
the party whose parent or guardian did not give
his or her consent, within five years after attaining
the age of twenty-one, or by the parent or
guardian or person having legal charge of the
minor, at any time before such party has reached
the age of twenty-one;
2. For causes mentioned in number 2 of Article 45,
by the same spouse, who had no knowledge of the
other's insanity; or by any relative or guardian or
person having legal charge of the insane, at any
time before the death of either party, or by the
insane spouse during a lucid interval or after
regaining sanity;
3. For causes mentioned in number 3 of Article 45,
by the injured party, within five years after the
discovery of the fraud;
4. For causes mentioned in number 4 of Article 45,
by the injured party, within five years from the
time the force, intimidation or undue influence
disappeared or ceased;
5. For causes mentioned in number 5 and 6 of Article
45, by the injured party, within five years after the
marriage. (87a)
Art. 48. In all cases of annulment or declaration of absolute
nullity of marriage, the Court shall order the
prosecuting attorney or fiscal assigned to it to appear
on behalf of the State to take steps to prevent
collusion between the parties and to take care that
evidence is not fabricated or suppressed.
In the cases referred to in the preceding paragraph, no
judgment shall be based upon a stipulation of facts or
confession of judgment. (88a)
Art. 49. During the pendency of the action and in the absence
of adequate provisions in a written agreement
between the spouses, the Court shall provide for the
support of the spouses and the custody and support of
their common children. The Court shall give
paramount consideration to the moral and material
 welfare of said children and their choice of the parent
with whom they wish to remain as provided to in Title
IX. It shall also provide for appropriate visitation rights
of the other parent. (n)
Art. 52.
Art. 50. The effects provided for by paragraphs (2), (3), (4) and
(5) of Article 43 and by Article 44 shall also apply in
the proper cases to marriages which are declared ab
initio or annulled by final judgment under Articles 40
and 45.
the properties already received under the decree of
annulment or absolute nullity shall be considered as
advances on their legitime. (n)
The judgment of annulment or of absolute nullity of
the marriage, the partition and distribution of the
properties of the spouses and the delivery of the
children's presumptive legitimes shall be recorded in
the appropriate civil registry and registries of property;
otherwise, the same shall not affect third persons. (n)

The final judgment in such cases shall provide for the
liquidation, partition and distribution of the properties
of the spouses, the custody and support of the
common children, and the delivery of third
presumptive legitimes, unless such matters had been
adjudicated in previous judicial proceedings.
All creditors of the spouses as well as of the absolute
community or the conjugal partnership shall be
notified of the proceedings for liquidation.
In the partition, the conjugal dwelling and the lot on
which it is situated, shall be adjudicated in accordance
with the provisions of Articles 102 and 129.
Art. 53. Either of the former spouses may marry again after
compliance with the requirements of the immediately
preceding Article; otherwise, the subsequent marriage
shall be null and void.chan robles virtual law library
Art. 54. Children conceived or born before the judgment of
annulment or absolute nullity of the marriage under
Article 36 has become final and executory shall be
considered legitimate. Children conceived or born of
the subsequent marriage under Article 53 shall
likewise be legitimate.
Art. 55. A petition for legal separation may be filed on any of the
following grounds:

Art. 51. In said partition, the value of the presumptive
legitimes of all common children, computed as of the
date of the final judgment of the trial court, shall be
delivered in cash, property or sound securities, unless
the parties, by mutual agreement judicially approved,
had already provided for such matters.
The children or their guardian or the trustee of their
property may ask for the enforcement of the
judgment. 8 petitioner, a common child, or a child of the
The delivery of the presumptive legitimes herein
prescribed shall in no way prejudice the ultimate
successional rights of the children accruing upon the
death of either of both of the parents; but the value of
1. Repeated physical violence or grossly abusive
conduct directed against the petitioner, a
common child, or a child of the petitioner;
2. Physical violence or moral pressure to compel
the petitioner to change religious or political
affiliation;
3. Attempt of respondent to corrupt or induce the
petitioner, to engage in prostitution, or
connivance in such corruption or inducement;
 4. Final judgment sentencing the respondent to Art. 27. By a husband. Notwithstanding the rule of Islamic law
imprisonment of more than six years, even if permitting a Muslim to have more than one wife but
pardoned; one wife unless he can deal with them with equal
companionship and just treatment as enjoined by
5. Drug addiction or habitual alcoholism of the Islamic law and only in exceptional cases.
respondent;
Art. 34. Mutual rights and obligations.
6. Lesbianism or homosexuality of the
respondent; 1. The husband and the wife are obliged to live
together, observe mutual respect and fidelity, and
7. Contracting by the respondent of a render mutual help and support in accordance
subsequent bigamous marriage, whether in with this Code.
the Philippines or abroad;
2. When one of the spouses neglects his or her duties
8. Sexual infidelity or perversion; to the conjugal union or brings danger, dishonor or
material injury upon the other, the injured party
may petition the court for relief. The court may
9. Attempt by the respondent against the life of counsel the offender to comply with his or her
the petitioner; or duties, and take such measures as may be
proper. .chan robles virtual law library
10. Abandonment of petitioner by respondent
without justifiable cause for more than one 3. The husband and the wife shall inherit from each
year. other in accordance with this Code.

For purposes of this Article, the term "child" shall 4. The husband and the wife shall have the
include a child by nature or by adoption. (9a) right to divorce in accordance with this
Code.
2. Absolute Divorce

Civil Code:

Art. 15, supra

ROEHR VS. RODRIGUEZ
Art. 17, Supra

9 Facts:
Muslim Code:
Petitioner Wolfgang Roehr, a German citizen, married a Filipina,
45-55 supra Carmen Rodriguez in Germany. The marriage was ratified in Tayasan,
Negros Oriental. Private respondent filed a petition for the declaration
of nullity of marriage before the RTC of Makati. Petitioner filed a
motion to dismiss but was denied by the trial court. The petitioner
obtained a decree of divorce from the Court of First Instance of
Hamburg - Blankenese and granting the custody of the children to the
father.
Issue:
Whether or not the legal effects of a divorce obtained from a foreign
country such as support and custody of the children can be
determined in our courts?
Held:
Yes. In order to take effect, a foreign judgement must clearly
show that the opposing party has been given ample
opportunity to do so under the Rules of Civil Procedure.
Accordingly, the respondent was not given the opportunity to challenge
the judgement of the German Court, therefore, legal effects of divorce
must be determined in our courts. The court held that the trial court
has jurisdiction over the issue between the parties as to who has the
parental custody.
RECTO VS. HARDEN
100 Phil 427
Facts:
Recto and Harden entered into a contract for professional
services wherein the latter engaged the services of the former as her
counsel against her husband for a claim in their conjugal property. Mr.
Harden previously filed for divorce against the Mrs. The Court awarded
Mrs. Harden an amount totaling to almost 4 million pesos plus litis
expensae.
Subsequently however, Mrs. Harden ordered her counsel to
vacate all orders and judgments rendered therein, and abandon
and nullify all her claims to the conjugal partnership existing
10 between
her and Mr. Harden. Later, she entered into an amicable settlement
with Mr. Harden agreeing to a share of a lesser amount.
Appellee counsel for Mrs. Harden alleged that the purpose of
the said instruments, executed by Mr. and Mrs. Harden, was to
defeat the claim of the former for attorneys fees, for which reason, he
prayed that the court grant him the necessary fees.
Appellants assail the contract for professional services as void,
mainly, upon the grounds that:
1. that Mrs. Harden cannot bind the conjugal partnership without
her husbands consent; c
2. that Article 1491 of the Civil Code of the Philippines in effect
prohibits contingent fees; c
3. that the contract in question has for its purpose to secure a
decree of divorce, allegedly in violation of Articles 1305, 1352
and 1409 of the Civil Code of the Philippines;
4. that the terms of said contract are harsh, inequitable and
oppressive.
Held:
The first objection has no foundation in fact, for the contract
in dispute does not seek to bind the conjugal partnership. By
virtue of said contract, Mrs. Harden merely bound herself or
assumed the personal obligation to pay, by way of contingent fees,
20% of her share in said partnership. The contract neither gives, nor
purports to give, to the Appellee any right whatsoever, personal or
real, in and to her aforesaid share. The amount thereof is simply a
basis for the computation of said fees.
For the same reason, the second objection is, likewise, untenable.
Moreover, it has already been held that contingent fees are not
prohibited in the Philippines and are impliedly sanctioned by
our Cannons (No. 13) of Professional Ethics. (see, also, Ulanday vs.
Manila Railroad Co., 45 Phil., 540, 554.) Such is, likewise, the rule in
the United States (Legal Ethics by Henry S. Drinker, p. 176).
in the United States, the great weight of authority recognizes the
validity of contracts for contingent fees, provided such contracts are
not in contravention of public policy, and it is only when the
attorney has taken an unfair or unreasonable advantage of his
client that such a claim is condemned. (See 5 Am. Jur. 359 et
seq; Ballentine, Law Dictionary, 2nd ed., p. 276.)
The third objection is not borne out, either by the language of the
contract between them, or by the intent of the parties thereto. Its
purpose was not to secure a divorce, or to facilitate or
promote the procurement of a divorce. It merely sought to
protect the interest of Mrs. Harden in the conjugal partnership, during
the pendency of a divorce suit she intended to file in the United
States. What is more, inasmuch as Mr. and Mrs. Harden are
admittedly citizens of the United States, their status and the
dissolution thereof are governed pursuant to Article 9 of the
Civil Code of Spain (which was in force in the Philippines at
the time of the execution of the contract in question) and
Article 15 of the Civil Code of the Philippines by the laws of
the United States, which sanction divorce. In short, the contract
of services, between Mrs. Harden and herein Appellee, is not contrary
to law, morals, good customs, public order or public policy.
It is a basic principle that status, once established by the
personal law of the party, is given universal recognition.
Therefore, aliens can sue and be sued in our courts subject to
Philippine procedural law even on matters relating to their
status and capacity. However, the law to be applied by
Philippine courts in determining their capacity and status is
their personal law.
The last objection is based upon principles of equity, but, pursuant
thereto, one who seeks equity must come with clean hands (Bastida,
et al., vs. Dy Buncio & Co., 93 Phil., 195; 30 C.J. S. 475), and
Appellants have not done so, for the circumstances surrounding the
case show, to our satisfaction, that their aforementioned agreements,
ostensibly for the settlement of the differences between husband and
wife, were made for the purpose of circumventing or defeating the
rights of herein Appellee, under his above-quoted contract of services
with Mrs. Harden.
TENCHAVEZ V. ESCANO 15 SCRA 355
Facts:
11
Pastor Tenchavez married Vicenta Escano on Feb. 24, 1948 in Cebu
City. As of June 1948, the newly-weds were already estranged.
Vicenta left for the US and filed a verified complaint for divorce
against the Pastor in the State of Nevada on the ground of
"extreme cruelty, entirely mental in character."
A decree of divorce was issued by the Nevada Court. Later on,
Vicenta married an American, Russell Leo Moran in Nevada. She
now lives with him in California and has begotten children. She
acquired American citizenship on August 8, 1958. On July 30,
1955, Pastor filed a complaint for legal separation and damages
against Vicenta and her parents in the CFI-Cebu.
HELD:
At the time the divorce decree was issued, Vicenta, like
her husband, was still a Filipino citizen. She was then
subject to Philippine laws under Art. 15 of the New Civil
Code. Philippine law, under the NCC then now in force, does not
admit absolute divorce but only provides for legal separation.
For Philippine courts to recognize foreign divorce decrees
between Filipino citizens would be a patent violation of the
declared policy of the State, especially in view of the 3rd
par. of Art. 17, of the New Civil Code which reads:
Prohibitive laws concerning persons, their acts or property,
and those which have, for their object, public order, public
policy and good customs shall not be rendered ineffective
by laws or judgments promulgated, or by determinations
or conventions agreed upon in a foreign country. Moreover,
recognition would give rise to scandalous discrimination in favor of
wealthy citizens to the detriment of those members of our society
whose means do not permit them to sojourn abroad and obtain
absolute divorce outside the Philippines.
Therefore, a foreign divorce between Filipino citizens, sought and
decreed after the effectivity of the NCC, is not entitled to
recognition as valid in this jurisdiction.
ARCA V. JAVIER
95 PHIL 579
 Dissatisfied with the decision of the Court of First Instance of
Cavite ordering him to give a monthly allowance of P60 to
plaintiffs beginning March 31, 1953, and to pay them attorney's
fees in the amount of P150 defendant took the case directly to this
Court attributing five errors to the court below. The facts are not
disputed.
Javier and Arca got married in Manila. Javier, an enlisted US Navy
personnel left for the States 7 years after the birth of their first
born. At such time, Arca lived with Javiers parents. However, due
to strained relations with the latter, she left and transferred to her
hometown. Thereafter, Javier filed a case for divorce in Alabama
against Arca alleging abandonment. Arca made her reply claiming
among other things that she never abandoned her husband and
that their separation was due to a physical impossibility which
justifies her separation if the husband moves to ultra-marine
colonies. The divorce however was granted.
Javier got married the 2nd time but was subsequently divorced.
After a few years, he went back to the Philippines, and believing
that the first two divorces were valid, remarried the 3rd time.
Issue:
Did the Circuit Court of Mobile County acquire jurisdiction of both
spouses and effectively rendered a judgment in rem when it granted
divorce to Javier?
Held:
No, one of the essential conditions for the validity of a
decree of divorce is that the court must have jurisdiction over
the subject matter and in order that this may be acquired,
plaintiff must be domiciled in good faith in the State in
which it is granted (Cousins Hix vs. Fluemer, 55 Phil., 851, 856).
While it is true that Salud R. Arca filed an answer in the divorce
case instituted at the Mobile County in view of the 12 summons
served upon her in this jurisdiction, but this action cannot be
interpreted as placing her under the jurisdiction of the court
because its only purpose was to impugn the claim of
appellant that his domicile or legal residence at that time
was Mobile County, and to show that the ground of desertion
imputed to her was baseless and false. Such answer should be
considered as a special appearance the purpose of which is
to impugn the jurisdiction of the court over the case.
It is established by the great weight of authority that the
court of a country in which neither of the spouses is
domiciled and to which one or both of them may resort
merely for the purpose of obtaining a divorce has no
jurisdiction to determine their matrimonial status; and a
divorce granted by such a court is not entitled to recognition
elsewhere. (See Note to Succession of Benton, 59 L. R. A., 143)
The voluntary appearance of the defendant before such a tribunal
does not invest the court with jurisdiction. (Andrews vs.
Andrews, 188 U. S., 14; 47 L. ed., 366.)
It follows that, to give a court jurisdiction on the ground of
the plaintiff's residence in the State or country of the
judicial forum, his residence must be bona fide. If a spouse
leaves the family domicile and goes to another State for the sole
purpose of obtaining a divorce, and with no intention of remaining,
his residence there is not sufficient to confer jurisdiction on the
courts of the State. (Ramirez vs. Gmur, 82 Phil., 855.)
But even if his residence had been taken up is good faith, and the
court had acquired jurisdiction to take cognizance of the divorce
suit, the decree issued in his favor is not binding upon the
appellant; for the matrimonial domicile of the spouses being the
City of Manila;
Ramirez v. Gmur
42 Phil 855
Leona Castro was the natural daughter of decedent Samuel Bischoff.
Whereas Ana Ramirez was the latter's widow to which they had no
children. Leona was married to Kauffman. They had 3 children, Elena,
Federico, and Ernesto. Later, Kauffman brought Leona to Switzerland
to recuperate her health. A few years later, she fell for a Dr. Mory to
whom she had a child, Leontina. She informed Kauffman that she no
longer wished to stay with him to which the latter obtained a divorce
in France where Leona was in default. Leona, after the divorce got
married in London, and after which bore two children from which the
last childbirth caused Leona her life. The heirs of Leona from the first
marriage and the second now claims the Estate of Samuel to which
Ana Ramirez opposed since Leona is not a recognized natural child.
MANILA SURETY & FIDELITY VS. TEODORO
Held:
FACTS:
The status of Leona Castro as recognized natural daughter of Samuel Jose Corominas, Jr. and Sonia Lizares were married in Iloilo on January
Bischoff is fully and satisfactorily shown. 5, 1935. On November 29,1954, a decree of divorce was granted by
the Court of the State of Nevada dissolving the bonds of matrimony
With reference to the right of the von Kauffman children, it is
between Sonia Lizares and Jose Corominas, Jr. . . .
enough to say that they are legitimate children, born to their
parents in lawful wedlock; and they are therefore entitled to
participate in the inheritance which would have devolved upon their Trinidad Teodoro met Jose Corominas, Jr. in Hongkong on October 30,
mother, if she had survived the testator. 1955. . . . On March 26, 1956, they went through a Buddhist wedding
ceremony in Hongkong. Upon their return to the Philippines they took
The Court is of the opinion that the decree of divorce upon up residence in a rented house at No. 2305 Agno Street . . . Manila. On
which reliance is placed by the representation of the Mory
September 5, 1961, plaintiff and Jose Corominas, Jr. were married for a
children cannot be recognized as valid in the courts of the
Philippine Islands. The French tribunal has no jurisdiction to second time on Washoe County, Nevada. U.S.A.
entertain an action for the dissolution of a marriage contracted in
these Islands by person domiciled here, such marriage being Additional Pertinent facts, also mentioned in the decision under review
indissoluble under the laws then prevailing in this country. and controverted by the parties, are that Sonia Lizares is still living
and that the conjugal partnership formed by her marriage to
The evidence shows that the decree was entered against the
defendant in default, for failure to answer, and there is nothing to Corominas was dissolved by the Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court
show that she had acquired, or had attempted to acquire, a of Manila upon their joint petition, the decree of dissolution having
permanent domicile in the City of Paris. It is evident of course that the been issued on October 21, 1957. Trinidad questioned the levy on the
presence of both the spouses in that city was due merely to the property since the property in question was her paraphernal property.
mutual desire to procure a divorce from each other.
ISSUE:
It is established by the great weight of authority that the
court of a country in which neither of the spouses is domiciled
and to which one or both of them may resort merely for the Whether or not the properties in question are conjugal?
purpose of obtaining a divorce has no jurisdiction to
determine their matrimonial status; and a divorce granted by
RULING:
such a court is not entitled to recognition elsewhere.
There is no doubt that the decree of divorce granted by the
It follows that, to give a court jurisdiction on the ground of the
Court of Nevada in 1954 is not valid under Philippine law,
plaintiff's residence in the State or country of 13 the judicial
which has outlawed divorce altogether; that the matrimonial
forum, his residence must be bona fide. If a spouse leaves the
bonds between Jose Corominas, Jr. and Sonia Lizares have not been
family domicile and goes to another State for the sole purpose of
dissolved, although their conjugal partnership was terminated in 1957;
obtaining a divorce, and with no intention of remaining, his residence
and that the former's subsequent marriage in Hongkong to Trinidad
there is not sufficient to confer jurisdiction on the courts of that State.
Teodoro is bigamous and void.
This is especially true where the cause of divorce is one not
recognized by the laws of the State of his own domicile.
In the present case, however, we find no need to pass on this
question. The particular properties involved here which were
admittedly acquired by respondent Teodoro, cannot be deemed to
belong to such co-ownership because, as found by the trial court and
confirmed by the Court of Appeals, the funds used in acquiring
said properties were fruits of respondent's paraphernal
investments which accrued before her "marriage" to
Corominas. In other words they were not acquired by either or both
of the partners in the void marriage through their work or industry or
their wages and salaries, and hence cannot be the subject of co-
ownership under Article 144. They remain respondent's exclusive
properties, beyond the reach of execution to satisfy the judgment debt
of Corominas.
VAN DORN V. ROMILLO
139 SCRA 139
Facts:
Petitioner Alice Reyes Van Dorn is a citizen of the Philippines while
private respondent Richard Upton is a US citizen; they were
married in Hong Kong in 1972; after the marriage, they
established their residence in the Philippines and begot 2
children; Alicia filed for divorce in Nevada; the parties were
divorced in Nevada, US, in 1982; and petitioner has remarried also
in Nevada, this time to Theodore Van Dorn.
On June 18, 1983 Upton filed a suit against petitioner in the RTC-
Pasay, stating that petitioner's business in Ermita, Manila (the
Galleon Shop), is conjugal property and asking that petitioner be
ordered to render an accounting of that business, and that Upton
be declared as having the right to manage the conjugal property.
Held:
Owing to the nationality principle embodied 14in Art. 13,
NCC, only Philippine nationals are covered by the policy
against absolute divorce the same being considered
contrary to our concept of public policy and morality.
However, aliens may obtain divorce abroad, which may be
recognized in the Philippines provided they are valid according to
their national law.
In this case, the divorce in Nevada released private
respondents from the marriage from the standards of
American law, under which divorce dissolves the marriage.
Court said that Ours is not only a court of law but also a
court of equity. The Court could not turn its back on its citizen
when the foreign national itself benefited from such divorce
decree;
Thus, pursuant to his national law, Upton is no longer the
husband of petitioner. He would have no standing to sue in the
case below as petitioner's husband who is entitled to exercise
control over conjugal assets.
To maintain, as Upton does, that under our laws, petitioner has to
be considered still married to him and still subject to a wife's
obligations under the NCC cannot be just. Petitioner should not be
obliged to live together with, observe respect and fidelity, and
render support to private respondent. The latter should not
continue to be one of her heirs w/ possible rights to conjugal
properties. She should not be discriminated against in her own
country if the ends of justice are to be observed.
PILAPIL V. IBAY-SOMERA
174 SCRA 653
Petitioner Imelda Manalaysay Pilapil, a Filipino citizen, and private
respondent Erich Ekkehard Geiling, a German national, were
married in the Federal Republic of Germany. The marriage started
auspiciously enough, and the couple lived together for some time
in Malate, Manila where their only child, Isabella Pilapil Geiling,
was born on April 20, 1980.
 Thereafter, marital discord set in, with mutual recriminations
between the spouses, followed by a separation de facto between
them.
After about three and a half years of marriage, private respondent
initiated a divorce proceeding against petitioner in Germany. He
claimed that there was failure of their marriage and that they had
been living apart since April, 1982. Petitioner, on the other hand,
filed an action for legal separation, support and separation of
property before the Regional Trial Court of Manila.
Thereafter a decree of divorce was promulgated. The records show
that under German law said court was locally and internationally
competent for the divorce proceeding and that the dissolution of
said marriage was legally founded on and authorized by the
applicable law of that foreign jurisdiction.
More than five months after the issuance of the divorce
decree, private respondent filed two complaints for adultery
before the City Fiscal of Manila alleging that, while still married to
said respondent, petitioner "had an affair with a certain William
Chua as early as 1982 and with yet another man named Jesus
Chua sometime in 1983".
Issue:
WON the adultery case be sustained even though there has already
been a finality of a divorce decree.
Held:
The law specifically provides that in prosecutions for 15
adultery and
concubinage the person who can legally file the complaint should
be the offended spouse, and nobody else.
Corollary to such exclusive grant of power to the offended
spouse to institute the action, it necessarily follows that
such initiator must have the status, capacity or legal
representation to do so at the time of the filing of the
criminal action. This is a familiar and express rule in civil actions;
in fact, lack of legal capacity to sue, as a ground for a motion to
dismiss in civil cases, is determined as of the filing of the
complaint or petition. In these cases, therefore, it is indispensable
that the status and capacity of the complainant to commence the
action be definitely established and, as already demonstrated,
such status or capacity must indubitably exist as of the time he
initiates the action.
In the present case, the fact that private respondent
obtained a valid divorce in his country, the Federal
Republic of Germany, it is deemed admitted. Said divorce
and its legal effects may be recognized in the Philippines insofar
as private respondent is concerned in view of the nationality
principle in our civil law on the matter of status of persons.
Therefore, private respondent, being no longer the
husband of petitioner, had no legal standing to commence
the adultery case under the imposture that he was the
offended spouse at the time he filed suit.
LLORENTE V. COURT OF APPEALS
GR No. 124371, November 23, 2000
FACTS:
Lorenzo Llorente and petitioner Paula Llorente were married
in 1937 in the Philippines. Lorenzo was an enlisted serviceman
of the US Navy. Soon after, he left for the US where through
naturalization, he became a US Citizen. Upon his visit to his wife,
he discovered that she was living with his brother and a child was
born. The child was registered as illegitimate but the name of
the father was left blank. Llorente filed a divorce in California in
which Paula was represented by counsel, John Riley, and actively
participated in the proceedings, which later on became final. He
married Alicia and they lived together for 25 years bringing 3 children.
He made his last will and testament stating that all his properties will
be given to his second marriage. He filed a petition of probate that
made or appointed Alicia his special administrator of his estate. Before
the proceeding could be terminated, Lorenzo died. Paula filed a letter
of administration over Llorentes estate. The trial granted the letter
and denied the motion for reconsideration. An appeal was made to the
Court of Appeals, which affirmed and modified the judgment of the
Trial Court that she be declared co-owner of whatever properties, she
and the deceased, may have acquired in their 25 years of
cohabitation.
ISSUE:
Whether or not national law shall apply?
RULING:
Art. 15. Laws relating to family rights and duties, or to the status,
condition and legal capacity of persons are binding upon citizens of
the Philippines, even though living abroad.
Art. 16. Real property as well as personal property is subject to the
law of the country where it is situated.
First, there is no such thing as one American law. The "national law"
indicated in Article 16 of the Civil Code cannot possibly apply to
general American law. There is no such law governing the validity of
testamentary provisions in the United States. Each State of the union
has its own law applicable to its citizens and in force only within the
State. It can therefore refer to no other than the law of16the State of
which the decedent was a resident. Second, there is no showing
that the application of the renvoi doctrine is called for or
required by New York State law.
However, intestate and testamentary succession, both with respect
to the order of succession and to the amount of successional rights
and to the intrinsic validity of testamentary provisions, shall be
regulated by the national law of the person whose succession
is under consideration, whatever may be the nature of the property
and regardless of the country wherein said property may be found.
(emphasis ours)
Likewise, Lorenzo Llorente was already an American citizen
when he divorced Paula. Such was also the situation when he
married Alicia and executed his will. As stated in Article 15 of the
civil code, aliens may obtain divorces abroad, provided that
they are valid in their National Law. Thus the divorce obtained by
Llorente is valid because the law that governs him is not Philippine
Law but his National Law since the divorce was contracted after he
became an American citizen. Furthermore, his National Law allowed
divorce.
The case was remanded to the court of origin for determination of the
intrinsic validity of Lorenzo Llorentes will and determination of the
parties successional rights allowing proof of foreign law.
GARCIA V. RECIO
October 2, 2001
Rederick Recio, a Filipino, married Editha Samson, an Australian in
Malabon Rizal. However, on 1989, they got divorced in an
Australian family court.
On 1992, Rederick became an Australian Citizen. He later married
Petitioner in 1994 in Cabanatuan City.
Thereafter, the two separated and petitioner filed a complaint for
Declaration of Nullity of Marriage on the ground of bigamy.
While the suit was pending, Rederick was able to obtain a divorce
decree in Australia. Trial Court declared the marriage dissolved
based on the subsequent divorce decree obtained by the
respondent.
Issues:

Whether the divorce between respondent and Editha Samson was
proven;
Whether respondent was proven to be legally capacitated to marry
petitioner;
Held:
A divorce obtained abroad by an alien may be recognized in our
jurisdiction, provided such decree is valid according to the national law
of the foreigner. However, the divorce decree and the governing
personal law of the alien spouse who obtained the divorce
must be proven. Our courts do not take judicial notice of foreign laws
and judgment; hence, like any other facts, both the divorce decree
and the national law of the alien must be alleged and proven
according to our law on evidence.
Was the first divorce validly obtained and binding?
At the outset, the Court lays the following basic legal principles;
Philippine law does not provide for absolute divorce; hence, Philippine
courts cannot grant it. A marriage between two Filipinos cannot be
dissolved even by a divorce obtained abroad, because of Articles 1522
and 1723 of the Civil Code. In mixed marriages involving a
Filipino and a foreigner, Article 26 of the Family Code allows
the former to contract a subsequent marriage in case the
divorce is "validly obtained abroad by the alien spouse
capacitating him or her to remarry." A divorce obtained abroad by
a couple, who are both aliens, may be recognized in the Philippines,
provided it is consistent with their respective national laws.
Before a foreign divorce decree can be recognized by our
courts, the party pleading it must prove the divorce as a fact
and demonstrate its conformity to the foreign law allowing it.
Presentation solely of the divorce decree is insufficient. In the case at
bar, Respondent only presented the divorce decree;
Likewise, before a foreign judgment is given presumptive 17
evidentiary value, the document must first be presented and
admitted in evidence. A divorce obtained abroad is proven by the
divorce decree itself. Indeed the best evidence of a judgment is the
judgment itself. The decree purports to be a written act or record of an
act of an officially body or tribunal of a foreign country.
However, under Sections 24 and 25 of Rule 132, a writing or document
may be proven as a public or official record of a foreign country by
either (1) an official publication or (2) a copy thereof attested
by the officer having legal custody of the document. If the
record is not kept in the Philippines, such copy must be (a)
accompanied by a certificate issued by the proper diplomatic
or consular officer in the Philippine Foreign Service stationed
in the foreign country in which the record is kept and (b)
authenticated by the seal of his office.
The divorce decree between respondent and Editha Samson appears
to be an authentic one issued by an Australian family court. However,
appearance is not sufficient; compliance with the aforementioned
rules on evidence must be demonstrated.
Fortunately for respondent, this matter was not objected to by
the petitioner, thus by virtue of such waiver, is deemed
admitted as evidence.
Who has the burden of proving a foreign law?
Respondent has the burden of proof; The burden of proof lies
with "the party who alleges the existence of a fact or thing
necessary in the prosecution or defense of an action." It is a
well-settled that courts cannot take judicial notice of foreign laws. Like
any other facts, they must be alleged and proved. Australian marital
laws are not among those matters that judges are supposed to know
by reason of their judicial function. The power of judicial notice must
be exercised with caution, and every reasonable doubt upon the
subject should be resolved in the negative.
2nd Issue: Is Respondent legally capacitated to remarry?
Divorce means the legal dissolution of a lawful union for a cause
arising after marriage. But divorces are of different types. The two
basic ones are (1) absolute divorce or a vinculo matrimonii
and (2) limited divorce or a mensa et thoro. The first kind
terminates the marriage, while the second suspends it and leaves the
bond in full force. There is no showing in the case at bar which
type of divorce was procured by respondent.
Respondent presented a decree nisi or an interlocutory decree a
conditional or provisional judgment of divorce. It is in effect the same
as a separation from bed and board, although an absolute
divorce may follow after the lapse of the prescribed period
during which no reconciliation is effected.
On its face, the herein Australian divorce decree contains a restriction
that reads:
"1. A party to a marriage who marries again before this decree
becomes absolute (unless the other party has died) commits
the offence of bigamy."
This quotation bolsters the Courts contention that the divorce
obtained by respondent may have been restricted. It did not
absolutely establish his legal capacity to remarry according to his
national law.
Significance of the Certificate of Legal Capacity
Legal capacity to contract marriage is determined by the national law
of the party concerned. The certificate mentioned in Article 21 of the
Family Code would have been sufficient to establish the legal capacity
of respondent, had he duly presented it in court. A duly
authenticated and admitted certificate is prima facie evidence
of legal capacity to marry on the part of the alien applicant for
a marriage license.
In the case at bar, there is absolutely no evidence that proves
respondent's legal capacity to marry petitioner.
Based on the above records, the Court cannot conclude that
respondent, who was then a naturalized Australian citizen, was legally
capacitated to marry petitioner on January 12, 1994. The court a quo
erred in finding that the divorce decree ipso facto clothed
respondent with the legal capacity to remarry without
requiring him to adduce sufficient evidence to show the
Australian personal law governing his status; or at the very least, to
prove his legal capacity to contract the second marriage.
Neither can the Court grant petitioner's prayer to 18 declare her
marriage to respondent null and void on the ground of bigamy.
After all, it may turn out that under Australian law, he was really
capacitated to marry petitioner as a direct result of the divorce decree.
Hence, case was remanded to the court a quo for further
determination of legal capacity and to receive evidence to determine
if bigamy has been committed;
Zamoranos vs People
Facts:
These are three (3) consolidated petitions for review on certiorari
under Rule 45, assailing the Decision dated July 30, 2010 of the Court
of Appeals (CA), dismissing the petition for certiorari filed by petitioner
Atty. Marietta D. Zamoranos (Zamoranos), thus, affirming the Order of
the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Lanao del Norte for Bigamy filed by
petitioner Samson R. Pacasum, Sr.
On May 3, 1982, Zamoranos wed Jesus de Guzman, a Muslim convert,
in Islamic rites. Prior thereto, Zamoranos was a Roman Catholic who
had converted to Islam on April 28, 1982. Subsequently, on July 30,
1982, the two wed again, this time, in civil rites before Judge Perfecto
Laguio (Laguio) of the RTC, Quezon City.
A little after a year, on December 18, 1983, Zamoranos and De
Guzman obtained a divorce by talaq. The court held that after
evaluating the testimonies of the parties, it is fully convinced that both
the complainant and the respondent have been duly converted to the
faith of Islam prior to their Muslim wedding and finding that there is no
more possibility of reconciliation by and between them, hereby issues
this decree of divorce. Consequently, the marriage between Marietta
(Mariam) D. Zamoranos de Guzman and Jesus (Mohamad) de Guzman
was dissolved by the Sharia Circuit District Court in Isabela, Basilan.
Zamoranos married anew on December 20, 1989. As she had
previously done in her first nuptial to De Guzman, Zamoranos wed
Samson Pacasum, Sr. (Pacasum), her subordinate at the Bureau of
Customs where she worked, under Islamic rites and in order to
strengthen the ties of their marriage, Zamoranos and Pacasum
renewed their marriage vows in a civil ceremony.
Zamoranos and Pacasum were then de facto separated. Pacasum filed
cases for the annulment of their marriage, criminal case for bigamy
and an administrative case for disbarment against Zamoranos.
Pacasum contracted a second marriage. The prosecutor found prima
facie evidence to hold Zamoranos liable for Bigamy but the same was
thereafter dismissed upon a motion for reconsideration filed by
Zamboranos.
Pacasum filed a Petition for Review before the Office of the Secretary
of Justice assailing the dismissal of the complaint for bigamy. The DOJ
Secretary granted the petition and reversed the dismissal. Zamoranos
immediately filed an Omnibus Motion and Supplement to the Urgent
Omnibus Motion: (1) for Reconsideration; (2) to Hold in Abeyance
Filing of the Instant Case; and (3) to Hold in Abeyance or Quash
Warrant of Arrest before the Secretary of Justice. Unfortunately for
Zamoranos, her twin motions were denied by the Secretary of Justice
in a resolution. Zamoranos second motion for reconsideration, as
with her previous motions, was likewise denied.
On the other civil litigation front on the Declaration of a Void Marriage,
the lower court rendered a decision in favor of Zamoranos, dismissing
the petition of Pacasum for lack of jurisdiction. The court found that
Zamoranos and De Guzman are Muslims, and were such at the time of
their marriage, whose marital relationship was governed by
Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 1083, otherwise known as the Code of
Muslim Personal Laws of the Philippines, which provides that the
Sharia Circuit Courts shall have exclusive original jurisdiction over the
same. And any divorce proceeding undertaken before the Shari[a]
Court is valid, recognized, binding and sufficient divorce proceedings.
The court held that the affirmative defenses which are in the nature of
motion to dismiss is hereby granted. The CA and the SC affirmed the
dismissal and the same became final and executory and was 19 recorded
in the Book of Entries of Judgments.
The RTC of Iligan, upon motion of Pacasum, issued an Order reinstating
criminal case for Bigamy against Zamoranos.
Zamoranos filed a Motion to Quash the Information, arguing that the
RTC had no jurisdiction over her person and over the offense charged.
Zamoranos asseverated, in the main, that the decision of the RTC
categorically declared her and Pacasum as Muslims, resulting in the
mootness and the inapplicability of the RPC provision on Bigamy to
her marriage to Pacasum and prayed for the dismissal of the case.
The motion to quash and motion for reconsideration filed by
Zamoranos was denied. She then filed a petition for certiorari for the
nullification and reversal of the order of the RTC. The CA dismissed
Zamoranos petition. The CA dwelt on the propriety of a petition for
certiorari to assail the denial of a Motion to Quash the Information.
She now comes to the SC in a petition for certiorari alleging grave
abuse of discretion.
Issue:
Whether or not an appeal is a legally permissible remedy in an order
denying a motion to quash.
Held:
No. The Court granted the petition for certiorari and granted the
motion to quash filed by Zamoranos. The denial of a motion to quash,
as in the case at bar, is not appealable. It is an interlocutory order
which cannot be the subject of an appeal.
Moreover, it is settled that a special civil action for certiorari and
prohibition is not the proper remedy to assail the denial of a motion to
quash an information. The established rule is that, when such an
adverse interlocutory order is rendered, the remedy is not to resort
forthwith to certiorari or prohibition, but to continue with the case in
due course and, when an unfavorable verdict is handed down, to take
an appeal in the manner authorized by law.
However, on a number of occasions, we have recognized that in
certain situations, certiorari is considered an appropriate remedy to
assail an interlocutory order, specifically the denial of a motion to
quash. We have recognized the propriety of the following exceptions:
(a) when the court issued the order without or in excess of jurisdiction
or with grave abuse of discretion; (b) when the interlocutory order is
patently erroneous and the remedy of appeal would not afford
adequate and expeditious relief; (c) in the interest of a "more
enlightened and substantial justice"; (d) to promote public welfare and
public policy; and (e) when the cases "have attracted nationwide
attention, making it essential to proceed with dispatch in the
consideration thereof." The first four of the foregoing exceptions occur
in this instance.
Contrary to the asseverations of the CA, the RTC, Branch 6, Iligan City,
committed an error of jurisdiction, not simply an error of judgment, in
denying Zamoranos motion to quash.
As a rule, certiorari lies when: (1) a tribunal, board, or officer exercises
judicial or quasi-judicial functions; (2) the tribunal, board, or officer has
acted without or in excess of its or his jurisdiction, or with grave abuse
of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction; and (3) there
is no appeal, or any plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the
ordinary course of law.
The writ of certiorari serves to keep an inferior court within the bounds
of its jurisdiction or to prevent it from committing such a grave abuse
of discretion amounting to excess or lack of jurisdiction, or to relieve
parties from arbitrary acts of courtsacts which courts have no power
or authority in law to perform.
True, the Sharia Circuit Court is not vested with jurisdiction over
offenses penalized under the RPC. Certainly, the RTC, Branch 6, Iligan
City, is correct when it declared that:
20
The Regional Trial Courts are vested the exclusive and original
jurisdiction in all criminal cases not within the exclusive original
jurisdiction of any court, tribunal, or body. [Sec. 20 (b), BP Blg. 129]
The Code of Muslim Personal Laws (PD 1083) created the Sharia
District Courts and Sharia Circuit Courts with limited jurisdiction.
Neither court was vested jurisdiction over criminal prosecution of
violations of the Revised Penal Code. There is nothing in PD 1083 that
divested the Regional Trial Courts of its jurisdiction to try and decide
cases of bigamy. Hence, this Court has jurisdiction over this case.
Nonetheless, it must be pointed out that even in criminal cases, the
trial court must have jurisdiction over the subject matter of the
offense. In this case, the charge of Bigamy hinges on Pacasums claim
that Zamoranos is not a Muslim, and her marriage to De Guzman was
governed by civil law. This is obviously far from the truth, and the fact
of Zamoranos Muslim status should have been apparent to both lower
courts, the RTC, Branch 6, Iligan City, and the CA.
The subject matter of the offense of Bigamy dwells on the accused
contracting a second marriage while a prior valid one still subsists and
has yet to be dissolved. At the very least, the RTC, Branch 6, Iligan
City, should have suspended the proceedings until Pacasum had
litigated the validity of Zamoranos and De Guzmans marriage before
the Sharia Circuit Court and had successfully shown that it had not
been dissolved despite the divorce by talaq entered into by
Zamoranos and De Guzman.
Zamoranos was correct in filing the petition for certiorari before the CA
when her liberty was already in jeopardy with the continuation of the
criminal proceedings against her.
In a pluralist society such as that which exists in the Philippines, P.D.
No. 1083, or the Code of Muslim Personal Laws, was enacted to
"promote the advancement and effective participation of the National
Cultural Communities x x x, [and] the State shall consider their
customs, traditions, beliefs and interests in the formulation and
implementation of its policies."
Trying Zamoranos for Bigamy simply because the regular criminal
courts have jurisdiction over the offense defeats the purpose for the
enactment of the Code of Muslim Personal Laws and the equal
recognition bestowed by the State on Muslim Filipinos.
If both parties are Muslims, there is a presumption that the Muslim
Code or Muslim law is complied with. If together with it or in addition
to it, the marriage is likewise solemnized in accordance with the Civil
Code of the Philippines, in a so-called combined Muslim-Civil marriage
rites whichever comes first is the validating rite and the second rite is
merely ceremonial one. But, in this case, as long as both parties are
Muslims, this Muslim Code will apply. In effect, two situations will arise,
in the application of this Muslim Code or Muslim law, that is, when
both parties are Muslims and when the male party is a Muslim and the
marriage is solemnized in accordance with Muslim Code or Muslim law.
A third situation occur[s] when the Civil Code of the Philippines will
govern the marriage and divorce of the parties, if the male party is a
Muslim and the marriage is solemnized in accordance with the Civil
Code.
One of the effects of irrevocable talaq, as well as other kinds of
divorce, refers to severance of matrimonial bond, entitling one to
remarry. It stands to reason therefore that Zamoranos divorce from
De Guzman, as confirmed by an Ustadz and Judge Jainul of the Sharia
Circuit Court, and attested to by Judge Usman, was valid, and, thus,
entitled her to remarry Pacasum in 1989. Consequently, the RTC,
Branch 6, Iligan City, is without jurisdiction to try Zamoranos for the
crime of Bigamy.
CORPUZ vs. STO. TOMAS
FACTS:
This is a petition for review on certiorari seeking a direct appeal from
the decision of the Regional Trial Court of Laoag City. Petitioner
Gerbert R. Corpus is a naturalized Canadian citizen who married
respondent Daisylyn Tirol Sto. Tomas but subsequently left for Canada
due to work and other professional commitments. When21he returned
to the Philippines, he discovered that Sto. Tomas was already
romantically involved with another man. This brought about the filing
of a petition for divorce by Corpuz in Canada which was eventually
granted by the Court Justice of Windsor, Ontario, Canada. A month
later, the divorce decree took effect. Two years later, Corpuz has fallen
in love with another Filipina and wished to marry her. He went to Civil
Registry Office of Pasig City to register the Canadian divorce decree of
his marriage certificate with Sto. Tomas. However, despite the
registration, an official of National Statistics Office informed Corpuz
that the former marriage still subsists under the Philippine law until
there has been a judicial recognition of the Canadian divorce by a
competent judicial court in view of NSO Circular No. 4, series of 1982.
Consequently, he filed a petition for judicial recognition of foreign
divorce and/or declaration of dissolution of marriage with the RTC.
However, the RTC denied the petition reasoning out that Corpuz
cannot institute the action for judicial recognition of the foreign
divorce decree because he is a naturalized Canadian citizen. It was
provided further that Sto. Tomas was the proper party who can
institute an action under the principle of Article 26 of the Family Code
which capacitates a Filipino citizen to remarry in case the alien spouse
obtains a foreign divorce decree.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code
grants aliens like Corpuz the right to institute a petition for judicial
recognition of a foreign divorce decree.
HELD:
Petition GRANTED. RTC Decision REVERSED.
The foreign divorce decree is presumptive evidence of a right
that clothes the party with legal interest to petition for its
recognition in this jurisdiction
We qualify our above conclusion i.e., that the second paragraph
of Article 26 of the Family Code bestows no rights in favor of
aliens with the complementary statement that this
conclusion is not sufficient basis to dismiss Gerberts petition
before the RTC.In other words, the unavailability of the second
paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code to aliens does not
necessarily strip Gerbert of legal interest to petition the RTC
for the recognition of his foreign divorce decree. The foreign
divorce decree itself, after its authenticity and conformity with
the aliens national law have been duly proven according to
our rules of evidence, serves as a presumptive evidence of
right in favor of Gerbert, pursuant to Section 48, Rule 39 of
the Rules of Court which provides for the effect of foreign
judgments.
A remand, at the same time, will allow other interested parties to
oppose the foreign judgment and overcome a petitioners presumptive
evidence of a right by proving want of jurisdiction, want of notice to a
party, collusion, fraud, or clear mistake of law or fact. Needless to
state, every precaution must be taken to ensure conformity with our
laws before a recognition is made, as the foreign judgment, once
recognized, shall have the effect of res judicata between the parties,
as provided in Section 48, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court.
1. Legal Separation
Civil Code:
Art. 97. A petition for legal separation may be filed:
Art. 55. A petition for legal separation may be filed on any of the
following grounds:
(1) Repeated physical violence or grossly abusive conduct
directed against the petitioner, a common child, or a child of
the petitioner;
(2) Physical violence or moral pressure to compel the
petitioner to change religious or political affiliation;
(3) Attempt of respondent to corrupt or induce the petitioner,
a common child, or a child of the petitioner, to engage in
prostitution, or connivance in such corruption or inducement;
(4) Final judgment sentencing the respondent to imprisonment
of more than six years, even if pardoned;
(5) Drug addiction or habitual alcoholism of the respondent;
(6) Lesbianism or homosexuality of the respondent;
(7) Contracting by the respondent of a subsequent bigamous
marriage, whether in the Philippines or abroad;

1. For adultery on the part of the wife and for

(8) Sexual infidelity or perversion;
concubinage on the part of the husband as defined
in the Penal Code; or
(9) Attempt by the respondent against the life of the
2. An attempt by one spouse against the life of the petitioner; or
other. (n)
(10) Abandonment of petitioner by respondent without
Art. 99. No person shall be entitled to a legal separation who justifiable cause for more than one year.
has not resided in the Philippines for one year prior to
the filing of the petition, unless the cause for the legal
For purposes of this Article, the term "child" shall include a child by
separation has taken place within the territory of this
nature or by adoption. (9a)
Republic. (Sec. 2a, Act No. 2710)
22
TITLE II Art. 56. The petition for legal separation shall be denied on any of the
following grounds:
LEGAL SEPARATION
(1) Where the aggrieved party has condoned the offense or
act complained of;
 (2) Where the aggrieved party has consented to the
commission of the offense or act complained of;
(3) Where there is connivance between the parties in the
commission of the offense or act constituting the ground for
legal separation;
(4) Where both parties have given ground for legal separation;
(5) Where there is collusion between the parties to obtain
decree of legal separation; or
(6) Where the action is barred by prescription. (100a)
Art. 57. An action for legal separation shall be filed within five years
from the time of the occurrence of the cause. (102)
Art. 58. An action for legal separation shall in no case be tried before
six months shall have elapsed since the filing of the petition. (103)
Art. 59. No legal separation may be decreed unless the Court has
taken steps toward the reconciliation of the spouses and is fully
satisfied, despite such efforts, that reconciliation is highly improbable.
(n)
Art. 60. No decree of legal separation shall be based upon a stipulation
of facts or a confession of judgment.
In any case, the Court shall order the prosecuting attorney or fiscal
assigned to it to take steps to prevent collusion between the parties
and to take care that the evidence is not fabricated or suppressed.
(101a)
Art. 61. After the filing of the petition for legal separation, the spouses
shall be entitled to live separately from each other. 23
The court, in the absence of a written agreement between the
spouses, shall designate either of them or a third person to administer
the absolute community or conjugal partnership property. The
administrator appointed by the court shall have the same powers and
duties as those of a guardian under the Rules of Court. (104a)
Art. 62. During the pendency of the action for legal separation, the
provisions of Article 49 shall likewise apply to the support of the
spouses and the custody and support of the common children. (105a)
Art. 63. The decree of legal separation shall have the following effects:
(1) The spouses shall be entitled to live separately from each
other, but the marriage bonds shall not be severed;
(2) The absolute community or the conjugal partnership shall
be dissolved and liquidated but the offending spouse shall
have no right to any share of the net profits earned by the
absolute community or the conjugal partnership, which shall
be forfeited in accordance with the provisions of Article 43(2);
(3) The custody of the minor children shall be awarded to the
innocent spouse, subject to the provisions of Article 213 of this
Code; and
(4) The offending spouse shall be disqualified from inheriting
from the innocent spouse by intestate succession. Moreover,
provisions in favor of the offending spouse made in the will of
the innocent spouse shall be revoked by operation of law.
(106a)
Art. 64. After the finality of the decree of legal separation, the innocent
spouse may revoke the donations made by him or by her in favor of
the offending spouse, as well as the designation of the latter as
beneficiary in any insurance policy, even if such designation be
stipulated as irrevocable. The revocation of the donations shall be
recorded in the registries of property in the places where the
properties are located. Alienations, liens and encumbrances registered
in good faith before the recording of the complaint for revocation in
the registries of property shall be respected. The revocation of or
change in the designation of the insurance beneficiary shall take effect
upon written notification thereof to the insured.
The action to revoke the donation under this Article must be brought
within five years from the time the decree of legal separation become
final. (107a)
Art. 65. If the spouses should reconcile, a corresponding joint
manifestation under oath duly signed by them shall be filed with the
court in the same proceeding for legal separation. (n)
Art. 66. The reconciliation referred to in the preceding Articles shall
have the following consequences:
(1) The legal separation proceedings, if still pending, shall
thereby be terminated at whatever stage; and
(2) The final decree of legal separation shall be set aside, but
the separation of property and any forfeiture of the share of
the guilty spouse already effected shall subsist, unless the
spouses agree to revive their former property regime.
The court's order containing the foregoing shall be recorded in the
proper civil registries. (108a)
Art. 67. The agreement to revive the former property regime referred
to in the preceding Article shall be executed under oath and shall
specify:
(1) The properties to be contributed anew to the restored
regime;
(2) Those to be retained as separated properties of each
spouse; and
(3) The names of all their known creditors, their addresses and
the amounts owing to each.
24
The agreement of revival and the motion for its approval shall be filed
with the court in the same proceeding for legal separation, with copies
of both furnished to the creditors named therein. After due hearing,
the court shall, in its order, take measure to protect the interest of
creditors and such order shall be recorded in the proper registries of
properties.
The recording of the ordering in the registries of property shall not
prejudice any creditor not listed or not notified, unless the debtor-
spouse has sufficient separate properties to satisfy the creditor's
claim. (195a, 108a)
Capacity to Remarry
Art. 26. All marriages solemnized outside the Philippines, in
accordance with the laws in force in the country where
they were solemnized, and valid there as such, shall
also be valid in this country, except those prohibited
under Articles 35 (1), (4), (5) and (6), 3637 and 38.
(17a)
Where a marriage between a Filipino citizen and
a foreigner is validly celebrated and a divorce is
thereafter validly obtained abroad by the alien
spouse capacitating him or her to remarry, the
Filipino spouse shall have capacity to remarry
under Philippine law. (As amended by Executive
Order 227)
Nota bene:
Formal validity law of the place of celebration; lex loci contractus
rule
Substantial validity governed by:
1. Personal law: status/legal capacity National law of the parties
2. lex loci celebrationis:
exceptions:
Family Code Art. 26, paragraph 1
Consular Marriages consul granted by the accepting
country where such consular office was located to
solemnize marriage
GARCIA V. RECIO
October 2, 2001
 a couple, who are both aliens, may be recognized in the Philippines,
Rederick Recio, a Filipino, married Editha Samson, an Australian in provided it is consistent with their respective national laws.
Malabon Rizal. However, on 1989, they got divorced in an
Australian family court. Before a foreign divorce decree can be recognized by our
On 1992, Rederick became an Australian Citizen. He later married courts, the party pleading it must prove the divorce as a fact
Petitioner in 1994 in Cabanatuan City. and demonstrate its conformity to the foreign law allowing it.
Thereafter, the two separated and petitioner filed a complaint for Presentation solely of the divorce decree is insufficient. In the case at
Declaration of Nullity of Marriage on the ground of bigamy. bar, Respondent only presented the divorce decree;
While the suit was pending, Rederick was able to obtain a divorce
Likewise, before a foreign judgment is given presumptive
decree in Australia. Trial Court declared the marriage dissolved
evidentiary value, the document must first be presented and
based on the subsequent divorce decree obtained by the
admitted in evidence. A divorce obtained abroad is proven by the
respondent.
divorce decree itself. Indeed the best evidence of a judgment is the
judgment itself. The decree purports to be a written act or record of an
Issues:
act of an officially body or tribunal of a foreign country.
Whether the divorce between respondent and Editha Samson was
However, under Sections 24 and 25 of Rule 132, a writing or document
proven;
may be proven as a public or official record of a foreign country by
either (1) an official publication or (2) a copy thereof attested
Whether respondent was proven to be legally capacitated to marry
by the officer having legal custody of the document. If the
petitioner;
record is not kept in the Philippines, such copy must be (a)
accompanied by a certificate issued by the proper diplomatic
Held:
or consular officer in the Philippine Foreign Service stationed
in the foreign country in which the record is kept and (b)
A divorce obtained abroad by an alien may be recognized in our
authenticated by the seal of his office.
jurisdiction, provided such decree is valid according to the national law
of the foreigner. However, the divorce decree and the governing
The divorce decree between respondent and Editha Samson appears
personal law of the alien spouse who obtained the divorce
to be an authentic one issued by an Australian family court. However,
must be proven. Our courts do not take judicial notice of foreign laws
appearance is not sufficient; compliance with the aforementioned
and judgment; hence, like any other facts, both the divorce decree
rules on evidence must be demonstrated.
and the national law of the alien must be alleged and proven
according to our law on evidence.
Fortunately for respondent, this matter was not objected to by
the petitioner, thus by virtue of such waiver, is deemed
Was the first divorce validly obtained and binding?
admitted as evidence.
At the outset, the Court lays the following basic legal principles;
Philippine law does not provide for absolute divorce; hence, Philippine
Who has the burden of proving a foreign law?
courts cannot grant it. A marriage between two Filipinos cannot be
dissolved even by a divorce obtained abroad, because of 25
Articles 1522
Respondent has the burden of proof; The burden of proof lies
and 1723 of the Civil Code. In mixed marriages involving a
with "the party who alleges the existence of a fact or thing
Filipino and a foreigner, Article 26 of the Family Code allows
necessary in the prosecution or defense of an action." It is a
the former to contract a subsequent marriage in case the
well-settled that courts cannot take judicial notice of foreign laws. Like
divorce is "validly obtained abroad by the alien spouse
any other facts, they must be alleged and proved. Australian marital
capacitating him or her to remarry." A divorce obtained abroad by
laws are not among those matters that judges are supposed to know
by reason of their judicial function. The power of judicial notice must
be exercised with caution, and every reasonable doubt upon the
subject should be resolved in the negative.
2nd Issue: Is Respondent legally capacitated to remarry?
Divorce means the legal dissolution of a lawful union for a cause
arising after marriage. But divorces are of different types. The two
basic ones are (1) absolute divorce or a vinculo matrimonii
and (2) limited divorce or a mensa et thoro. The first kind
terminates the marriage, while the second suspends it and leaves the
bond in full force. There is no showing in the case at bar which
type of divorce was procured by respondent.
Respondent presented a decree nisi or an interlocutory decree a
conditional or provisional judgment of divorce. It is in effect the same
as a separation from bed and board, although an absolute
divorce may follow after the lapse of the prescribed period
during which no reconciliation is effected.
On its face, the herein Australian divorce decree contains a restriction
that reads:
"1. A party to a marriage who marries again before this decree
becomes absolute (unless the other party has died) commits
the offence of bigamy."
This quotation bolsters the Courts contention that the divorce
obtained by respondent may have been restricted. It did not
absolutely establish his legal capacity to remarry according to his
national law.
Significance of the Certificate of Legal Capacity
Legal capacity to contract marriage is determined by the national law
of the party concerned. The certificate mentioned in Article 21 of the
Family Code would have been sufficient to establish the legal capacity
of respondent, had he duly presented it in court. 26 A duly
authenticated and admitted certificate is prima facie evidence
of legal capacity to marry on the part of the alien applicant for
a marriage license.
In the case at bar, there is absolutely no evidence that proves
respondent's legal capacity to marry petitioner.
Based on the above records, the Court cannot conclude that
respondent, who was then a naturalized Australian citizen, was legally
capacitated to marry petitioner on January 12, 1994. The court a quo
erred in finding that the divorce decree ipso facto clothed
respondent with the legal capacity to remarry without
requiring him to adduce sufficient evidence to show the
Australian personal law governing his status; or at the very least, to
prove his legal capacity to contract the second marriage.
Neither can the Court grant petitioner's prayer to declare her
marriage to respondent null and void on the ground of bigamy.
After all, it may turn out that under Australian law, he was really
capacitated to marry petitioner as a direct result of the divorce decree.
Hence, case was remanded to the court a quo for further
determination of legal capacity and to receive evidence to determine
if bigamy has been committed;
REPUBLIC V. ORBECIDO
GR NO. 154380, October 5, 2005
Facts:
On May 24, 1981, Cipriano Orbecido III married Lady Myros M.
Villanueva in the Philippines in Lam-an, Ozamis City. Their marriage
was blessed with a son and a daughter.
In 1986, Ciprianos wife left for the United States bringing
along their son Kristoffer. A few years later, Cipriano discovered
that his wife had been naturalized as an American citizen.
Sometime in 2000, Cipriano learned from his son that his wife
had obtained a divorce decree and then married a certain Innocent
Stanley. She, Stanley and her child by him currently live in San
Gabriel, California.
Cipriano thereafter filed with the trial court a petition for
authority to remarry invoking Paragraph 2 of Article 26 of the
Family Code. No opposition was filed. Finding merit in the petition,
the court granted the same. The Republic, herein petitioner, through
the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), sought
reconsideration but it was denied.
The OSG contends that Paragraph 2 of Article 26 of the Family
Code is not applicable to the instant case because it only
applies to a valid mixed marriage; that is, a marriage celebrated
between a Filipino citizen and an alien. Furthermore, the OSG argues
there is no law that governs respondents situation. The OSG posits
that this is a matter of legislation and not of judicial determination.
Held:
Taking into consideration the legislative intent and applying the rule of
reason, we hold that Paragraph 2 of Article 26 should be
interpreted to include cases involving parties who, at the time
of the celebration of the marriage were Filipino citizens, but
later on, one of them becomes naturalized as a foreign citizen and
obtains a divorce decree. The Filipino spouse should likewise be
allowed to remarry as if the other party were a foreigner at
the time of the solemnization of the marriage. To rule otherwise
would be to sanction absurdity and injustice. Where the interpretation
of a statute according to its exact and literal import would lead to
27
mischievous results or contravene the clear purpose of the legislature,
it should be construed according to its spirit and reason, disregarding
as far as necessary the letter of the law. A statute may therefore be
extended to cases not within the literal meaning of its terms, so long
as they come within its spirit or intent.
In view of the foregoing, we state the twin elements for the application
of Paragraph 2 of Article 26 as follows:
2. There is a valid marriage that has been celebrated
between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner; and
3. A valid divorce is obtained abroad by the alien spouse
capacitating him or her to remarry.
The reckoning point is not the citizenship of the parties at the
time of the celebration of the marriage, but their citizenship
at the time a valid divorce is obtained abroad by the alien
spouse capacitating the latter to remarry.