Sps. Dadang vs.

Court of Appeals

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

SECOND DIVISION

G.R. No. 140138 October 11, 2006

SPS. ANGEL L. SADANG and MARITONI A.

SADANG, petitioners,
vs.
HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS and CATHAY LAND,
INC., respondents.

DECISION

AZCUNA, J.:

This is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the

Rules of Court questioning the Decision of the Court of Appeals
which granted the petition for certiorari, prohibition and
mandamus of private respondent which sought to annul the the
following orders: An order of the Regional Trial Court of Pasig,
Branch 160, denying private respondents motion to dismiss
petitioners complaint for damages, revocation/annulment of
development permit, barangay certification, MMDA certification,
with prayer for temporary restraining order and a writ of
preliminary injunction; and the order denying the motion for
reconsideration.

The facts are as follows:

Petitioners filed a complaint with the Regional Trial Court of Pasig
City, Branch 160, on July 21, 1997.1 The complaint was
denominated "For Damages, Revocation/Annulment of
Development Permit, Barangay Certification, MMDA Certification
With Prayer For Temporary Restraining Order and Later Writ of
Preliminary Injunction."

The following were alleged in the complaint:

Plaintiffs, herein petitioners, Angel L. Sadang and his wife,

Maritoni A. Sadang are registered owners of a house and lot
located at No. 2 Gen. Malvar Street, San Antonio Village, Pasig
City.

Sometime in 1986, defendant, herein private respondent Cathay

Land, Inc. (Cathay) purchased four residential lots in the same
San Antonio Village, which are adjacent to plaintiffs residence,
and located at the corner of Amber Avenue, Gen. Araneta and
General Lukban Streets. After its purchase of the said four lots,
Cathay made known its plans to construct two 35-storey
residential condominium buildings to be known as the Astoria
Plaza.

The residents of San Antonio Village, particularly plaintiffs

immediately objected to the construction of the two 35-storey
residential condominium buildings through letters of the president
of the San Antonio Village Association, Inc. (AVA), Roy Eduardo T.
Lucero to Gregorio R. Rupisan, Barangay Captain of their
barangay, and Wilfredo I. Imperial, Regional Director of the
HLURB. Despite the objections, Cathay proceeded to construct
through its retained construction company, Golangco.

Regional Director of the HLURB Imperial initially denied Cathays

development permit on the ground that there was apparently an
inadvertent misprint of the zoning map which caused the zoning
map and the actual location of the streets to not conform.
Imperial found that the subject properties are within a Light
Intensity Residential Zone. Even assuming that the properties are
within a commercial zone, the height of the structures cannot
exceed four storeys since they are adjoining a residential area,
pursuant to Sec. 10 of Metro Manila Zoning Ordinance series of
81-01. Allegedly, Imperial suddenly reversed the denial of the
development permit by granting Cathays motion for
reconsideration.

According to plaintiffs, Barangay Captain Rupisan granted the

locational clearance, through a certification dated September 11,
1995, misrepresenting therein that Barangay San Antonio had no
objections to the project.

The City Development and Planning Officer of Pasig City, Luisa S.

Soriano, issued a certification dated September 5, 1995 attesting
that the four lots owned by Cathay are within a Medium Intensity
Commercial Zone.

The Acting Metro Manila Zoning Administrator, or the Metro

Manila Authority, issued a certification dated September 18, 1995
allowing Cathay and Golangco to proceed with the construction.

Questioning Cathays continuing construction and the

development permit, certification for construction and MMDA
certification issued, plaintiffs filed the abovementioned complaint
in the Regional Trial Court.2 Plaintiffs prayed for the following:

(1) Immediately upon filing of this complaint, a temporary

restraining order or a cease and desist order be issued
enjoining defendants Cathay and Golangco from continuing
with the construction of the 35-storey Astoria Plaza located
at the corner of Amber Avenue, Gen. Araneta and Gen.
Lukban Streets within the San Antonio Village, Pasig City
adjacent to plaintiffs residence;

(2) After notice and hearing , a writ of preliminary injunction

issue enjoining defendants Cathay and Golangco from
continuing with the construction of the 35-storey Astoria
Plaza, located at the corner of Amber Avenue, Gen. Araneta
and Gen. Lukban Streets, within the San Antonio Village,
Pasig City adjacent to plaintiffs residence;

(3) After hearing, judgment be rendered as follows:

(a) Permanently enjoining defendants Cathay and

Golangco from continuing the construction of the 35-
storey Astoria Plaza located at the corner of Amber
Avenue, Gen. Araneta, Gen. Lukban Streets, within the
San Antonio Village, Pasig City adjacent to plaintiffs
residence;

(b) Declaring null and void the following:

(1) Development Permit dated 1 December 1995

issued by defendant Wilfredo I. Imperial, Regional
Director, ENCRFO, HLURB;

(2) Locational Clearance dated 11 September 1995

issued by Gregorio Rupisan, Barangay Captain,
San Antonio Village;

(3) Certification to Construct in a C-2 Zone issued

by Luisa S. Soriano, City Development & Planning
Officer, Pasig City;

(4) MMDA Certification dated 18 September 1995

issued by Orlando Malabanan Metro Manila Zoning
Administration, MMDA.

(c) Ordering defendants jointly and severally to pay

plaintiffs:

1. Actual damages - P 100,000

 2. Moral damages - P1,000,000

3. Attorneys fees - P 100,000

Plaintiffs pray for such other relief and remedy which may be
deemed just and equitable under the premises. 3

Defendant Cathay filed a motion to dismiss the complaint, which

the trial court denied. After a motion for reconsideration was
denied, defendant filed a petition for certiorari, prohibition and
mandamus with a prayer for the issuance of a writ of preliminary
injunction and/or temporary restraining order with the Court of
Appeals.4

The Court of Appeals decided, as follows:

There can be no debate that private respondents first cause

of action pertains to the same subject matter as that of
HLURB No. REM-A-960603 earlier initiated by private
respondent Angel L. Sadang against petitioner before the
HLURB. Both proceedings are for the nullification of one and
the same development permit covering Astoria Plaza
Condominium. A decision was rendered by the HLURB
against them which was appealed to the Office of the
President where it is pending. Surely, he cannot now seek in
the RTC for the annulment of the development permit issued
pursuant to the HLURB decision without awaiting the final
outcome of the HLURB case. This would be a violation of the
doctrine of primary jurisdiction. The doctrine of primary
jurisdiction simply calls for the determination of
administrative questions, which are ordinarily questions of
fact, by administrative agencies rather than courts of justice.
Increasingly, the Supreme Court has been committed to the
view that unless the law speaks clearly unequivocally, the
choice should fall on an administrative agency.

True, private respondents rightly argue they are not buyers

of subdivision lots or condominium units who are the owner
or developer, as envisioned by the enabling act of [the]
HLURB. The undeniable fact, however, is that private
respondent Angel L. Sadang invoked the jurisdiction of the
HLURB by filing a complaint before it in connection with the
Astoria Plaza Condominium and the decision thereof is
pending appeal brought by him before the Office of the
President. He must await the definitive decision of the
administrative case before he can claim a cause of action in
the present complaint. He is also estopped to dispute now
the legal competence of HLURB on the issue.

The [claim that the HLURB case is a] "mere incident to the

damage suit ruling" of respondent Judge is not conducive to
orderly administration of justice. Precisely, one of the
reasons for the primary jurisdiction rule in administrative
cases is to avoid conflicting rulings between administrative
agencies and the courts. To repeat, the instant complaint
specifically seeks the declaration of nullity of the
development permit dated 01 December 1995 issued by
HLURB - the same relief sought in the HLURB and now
pending appeal before the Office of the President. Under the
aforesaid doctrine, the suit before the RTC seeking the same
relief is, therefore, premature.

Private respondents cannot also ask for the annulment of (a)

the locational clearance of the barangay captain, (b)
certification to construct in a C-2 Zone issued by the City
Development Planning Officer, Pasig City, and, (c) the MMDA
certification issued by Metro Manila Zoning Administration in
the present case. They never opposed the issuances of the
aforementioned documents at their offices/agencies of
origin. If they did not know beforehand of their issuances,
upon learning of their existence, they did not file any motion
for reconsideration with the agency concerned before
commencing the instant case. This is in line with the doctrine
of exhaustion of administrative remedies which means that
an administrative decision must first be appealed to the
administrative superiors up to the highest level before it may
be elevated to a court of justice for review. And it may be
added that the case does not fall under the established
exceptions.

Significantly, there is no allegation at all in the complaint

that private respondents first sought reconsideration of the
issuances of the three aforesaid documents with their
respective agencies of origins prior to this suit. This is a
condition precedent to the existence of a cause of action.

To be sure, the complaint may be treated as one for

damages based on the allegations of the fifth cause of
action, above quoted. Reprinting private respondents words
in their comment:

Plaintiffs questions as to the validity of defendants

building permits as well as zoning violations are
incidental issues to their suit, the main controversy
being their claim for damages arising from quasi-delict.

A suit of this nature is within the legal competence of the

RTC, pursuant to Section 19 (1), BP 129 as amended. But,
that approach will be academic in the light of the resolution
of the succeeding issue.

Coming to the issue of forum shopping, it is a matter of

record that the complaints first cause of action was priorly
brought to [HLURB] by private respondent Angel L. Sadang
and the president of [San] Antonio Village Association. In the
affidavit of non-forum shopping Angel signed, and he
certified under oath that -
 xxx

3. I have not commenced any other action or

proceeding involving the same issues in the Supreme
Court, the Court of Appeals, or different divisions
thereof or any other tribunal or agency;

4. To the best of my knowledge, no such action or

proceeding is pending in the Court of Appeals, or any
division thereof or other tribunal or agency;

5. If I should thereafter learn that a similar action or

proceeding has been filed or is pending before the
Supreme Court, Court of Appeals or any division thereof
or any other tribunal or agency, I undertake to report
this fact within five (5) days therefrom to the aforesaid
courts, other tribunal or agency;

The consequent question is: could there be a violation of the

non-forum shopping rule when one of the causes of action in
the complaint is pending before another agency, and with
the full knowledge of the plaintiff? If in the affirmative,
should the entire case be dismissed?

Private respondent Angel L. Sadang signed the letter-

complaint to the HLURB as one of the complainants. At the
time he filed the case at bar, said HLURB case was pending -
as in fact it is still pending except that it is on appeal before
the Office of the President made by private respondent Angel
and his co-signor to the letter complaint. The fact that
private respondent Angel L. Sadang still signed the
certificate of non-forum shopping under the aforementioned
circumstances is a clear case of a "submission of a false
certification or non-compliance with any of the undertaking
therein x x x". And the rules say "failure to comply with the
foregoing requirements shall not be curable by mere
amendment of the complaint or other initiatory pleading but
 shall be cause for the dismissal of the case without
prejudice, unless otherwise provided, upon motion and after
hearing." Forum-shopping and/or violation of Section 5, Rule
7 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure was the third ground in
petitioners Motion to Dismiss before respondent Judge.
Private respondents filed their "Omnibus Opposition" to said
motion, followed by their "Motion to Submit Additional
Evidence In Support of Opposition to Motion to Dismiss." For
the questioned order dated 12 December 1997 of
respondent Judge, there was due hearing.

Stated simply, the provision on non-forum shopping (Sec. 5,

Rule 7) of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure applies. As there
is breach thereof, "dismissal of the case without prejudice" is
in order.

By way of recap, since the contested orders were issued with

grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction, certiorari must be granted.

WHEREFORE, the orders dated 12 December 1997 and 02

February 1998 are hereby SET ASIDE and Civil Case No.
66375 entitled "Spouses Angel L. Sadang and Maritoni A.
Sadang, plaintiffs, vs. Cathay Land Inc., William Golangco
Construction Corp., Wilfredo I. Imperial, Gragorio B. Rupisan,
Luisa Soriano and Orlando Malabanan, defendants" is
DISMISSED without prejudice.

SO ORDERED.

From the decision of the Court of Appeals, petitioners filed this

petition for review, raising the following issues:

PUBLIC RESPONDENT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE LOWER

COURT LACKS JURISDICTION IN ENTERTAINING PETITIONERS
ACTION FOR DAMAGES, REVOCATION/ANNULMENT OF
 DEVELOPMENT PERMITS, BARANGAY CERTIFICATION, MMDA
CERTIFICATION WITH PRAYER FOR TEMPORARY RESTRAINING
ORDER AND LATER WRIT OF PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION.

II

PUBLIC RESPONDENT ERRED IN RULING THAT PETITIONERS

ARE GUILTY OF FORUM SHOPPING.

Petitioners prayed that "the Decision of the Honorable Court of

Appeals promulgated on April 30, 1999 as well as its Resolution
promulgated on September 17, 1999 be set aside and that this
case be remanded to the Regional Trial Court, Branch 160, Pasig
City, for continuation of trial on the merits."

This Court fully agrees with the Court of Appeals that there has
been a violation of the rule on forum shopping by the non-
disclosure of the filing with an administrative agency, the HLURB,
of a complaint raising the same issues as those brought before
the Regional Trial Court by petitioners herein. For while the
decision of the HLURB may not necessarily constitute res
judicata to bar the suit filed in the Regional Trial Court, so that
strictly speaking it is not a lis pendens relative to the suit filed in
court, the purpose of including the words "or agency" in addition
to "any other tribunal" in the non-forum shopping certificate
required is to advise the court of the possible application of the
doctrine of primary jurisdiction, namely, that technical matters
such as zoning classifications and building certifications should be
primarily resolved first by the administrative agency whose
expertise relates thereto.

As the Court of Appeals rightly pointed out, petitioner Angel I.

Sadang himself filed the complaint before the HLURB and took the
appeal from its decision to the Office of the President. The non-
disclosure of this fact in his non-forum shopping certification
provided sufficient ground to dismiss the complaint. After all, the
dismissal is, as stated in the dispositive portion of the decision of
the Court of Appeals, "without prejudice."

This Court thus finds no reversible error committed by the Court

of Appeals.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED for lack of merit. Costs

against petitioners.

SO ORDERED.

Puno, J., Chairperson, Sandoval-Gutierrez, Corona, and Garcia,

JJ., concur
In Re Adoption of Stephanie Garcia, GR No. 148311
Posted: October 5, 2011 in Case Digests
Tags: Adoption, Illegitimate Child
0
ADOPTION; ILLEGITIMATE CHILD

Facts: Honorato B. Catindig filed a petition to adopt his minor

illegitimate child Stephanie Astorga Garcia. He averred that
Stephanie was born on June 26, 1994; that Stephanie had been
using her mothers middle name and surname; and that he is now
a widower and qualified to be her adopting parent. He prayed that
Stephanies middle name be changed to Garcia, her mothers
surname, and that her surname Garcia be changed to
Catindig his surname.
The RTC granted the petition for adoption, and ordered that
pursuant to article 189 of the Family Code, the minor shall be
known as Stephanie Nathy Catindig.

Honorato filed a motion for classification and/or reconsideration

praying that Stephanie be allowed to use the surname of her
natural mother (Garcia) as her middle name. The lower court
denied petitioners motion for reconsideration holding that there
is no law or jurisprudence allowing an adopted child to use the
surname of his biological mother as his middle name.
Issue: Whether or not an illegitimate child may use the surname
of her mother as her middle name when she is subsequently
adopted by her natural father.

Held:
One of the effects of adoption is that the adopted is deemed to be
a legitimate child of the adapter for all intents and purposes
pursuant to Article 189 of the Family Code and Section 17 of
Article V of RA 8557.

Being a legitimate by virtue of her adoption, it follows that

Stephanie is entitled to all the rights provided by law to a
legitimate child without discrimination of any kind, including the
right to bear the surname of her father and her mother. This is
consistent with the intention of the members of the Civil Code and
Family Law Committees. In fact, it is a Filipino custom that the
initial or surname of the mother should immediately precede the
surname of the father.
Republic vs. Hernandez, GR No. 117209, February
9, 1996_digested
Posted by Pius Morados on March 27, 2012

(Special Proceedings Adoption: Change of Name)

Facts: The RTC granted the petition for adoption of Kevin Earl
Bartolome Moran and simultaneously granted the prayer therein
for the change of the first name of said adoptee to Aaron Joseph,
to complement the surname Munson y Andrade which he acquired
consequent to his adoption.

Petitioner opposed the inclusion of the relief for change of name

in the same petition for adoption objecting to the joinder of the
petition for adoption and the petitions for the change of name in a
single proceeding, arguing that these petition should be
conducted and pursued as two separate proceedings.

Petitioner argues that a petition for adoption and a petition for

change of name are two special proceedings which, in substance
and purpose, are different from and are not related to each other,
being respectively governed by distinct sets of law and rules.
Petitioner further contends that what the law allows is the change
of the surname of the adoptee, as a matter of right, to conform
with that of the adopter and as a natural consequence of the
adoption thus granted. If what is sought is the change of the
registered given or proper name, and since this would involve a
substantial change of ones legal name, a petition for change of
name under Rule 103 should accordingly be instituted, with the
substantive and adjective requisites therefor being conformably
satisfied.

Private respondents, on the contrary, admittedly filed the petition

for adoption with a prayer for change of name predicated upon
Section 5, Rule 2 which allows permissive joinder of causes of
action in order to avoid multiplicity of suits and in line with the
policy of discouraging protracted and vexatious litigations. It is
argued that there is no prohibition in the Rules against the joinder
of adoption and change of name being pleaded as two separate
but related causes of action in a single petition.
Issue: WON respondent judge erred in granting prayer for the
change of the given or proper name if the adoptee in a petition
for adoption.

Held: No.

Par (1), Art. 189 of the Family Code provides one of the legal
effect of adoption:

(1) For civil purposes, the adopted shall be deemed to be a

legitimate child of the adopters and both shall acquire the
reciprocal rights and obligations arising from the relationship of
parent and child, including the right of the adopted to use the
surname of the adopters;

The law allows the adoptee, as a matter of right and obligation, to

bear the surname of the adopter, upon issuance of the decree of
adoption. It is the change of the adoptees surname to follow that
of the adopter which is the natural and necessary consequence of
a grant of adoption and must specifically be contained in the
order of the court, in fact, even if not prayed for by petitioner.

However, the given or proper name, also known as

the first or Christian name, of the adoptee must remain as it was
originally registered in the civil register. The creation of an
adoptive relationship does not confer upon the adopter a license
to change the adoptees registered Christian or first name. The
automatic change thereof, premised solely upon the adoption
thus granted, is beyond the purview of a decree of adoption.
Neither is it a mere incident in nor an adjunct of an adoption
proceeding, such that a prayer therefor furtively inserted in a
petition for adoption, as in this case, cannot properly be granted.

The official name of a person whose birth is registered in the civil

register is the name appearing therein. If a change in ones name
is desired, this can only be done by filing and strictly complying
with the substantive and procedural requirements for a special
proceeding for change of name under Rule 103 of the Rules of
Court, wherein the sufficiency of the reasons or grounds therefor
can be threshed out and accordingly determined.
A petition for change of name being a proceeding in rem, strict
compliance with all the requirements therefor is indispensable in
order to vest the court with jurisdiction for its adjudication. It is an
independent and discrete special proceeding, in and by itself,
governed by its own set of rules. A fortiori, it cannot be granted
by means of any other proceeding. To consider it as a mere
incident or an offshoot of another special proceeding would be to
denigrate its role and significance as the appropriate remedy
available under our remedial law system.
 [G.R. No. L-20914. December 24, 1965.]

IN THE MATTER OF THE ADOPTION OF THE MINOR, ENGRACIO GULIGADO, JR MRS. DINTOY TAN
SUAREZ, Petitioner-Appellee, v. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Oppositor-Appellant.

Dominador Sobrevias and Francisco Escudero for Petitioner-Appellee.

Solicitor General for Oppositor-Appellant.

SYLLABUS

1. ADOPTION; PROOF OF CONSENT OF THE MINORS NATURAL PARENTS; CASE AT BAR. The statement,
subscribed and sworn to before a notary public, by the natural parents of the child sought to be adopted,
wherein they expressed their conformity to the adoption of their minor child by the petitioner, was correctly
admitted in evidence, although no testimonial evidence identifying the signatures on the said statement had
been introduced by the petitioner, because said statement was duly authenticated and the other evidence on
record strongly indicate that it is what it purports to be.

2. ID.; ADOPTED CHILD CANNOT BEAR ADOPTERS SURNAME AS A MARRIED WOMAN. An adopted child
cannot bear the surname of the adopter, as a married woman, where the latters husband had not joined her
in the petition for adoption and can not join it, because he has children by a previous marriage.

DECISION

CONCEPCION, J.:

Appeal by the Solicitor General from a decision of the Court of First Instance of Sulu, granting the petition of
appellee, Mrs. Dintoy Tan Suarez, for the adoption of the minor Engracio Guligado, Jr., and declaring that the
latter shall hereafter be known as Engracio Tan Suarez. Appellant maintains that the lower court erred: 1) in
authorizing the adoption, despite the alleged absence of competent proof of the consent thereto of the
natural parents of said minor; and 2) in permitting the latter to bear the petitioners surname as a married
woman, although her husband has not joined in the adoption.

The minor Engracio Guligado, Jr. is the son of Capt. Engracio Guligado and Guneng T. Guligado. The latter is
a younger sister of petitioner herein. Engracio Guligado is, in turn, a half-brother of petitioners husband,
Col. Alejandro Suarez, Ret., who has several children by a previous marriage and has expressly consented to
the adoption of said child by his wife. Shortly after the birth of Engracio Guligado Jr. in Jolo, Sulu, on May
28, 1951, his parents left him in the custody of petitioner herein, a resident of said island. Since then, the
child had lived continuously with petitioner, whom he regards as his mother, who, in turn, has treated him as
such, and supported him, as well as sent him to school. Meanwhile, his natural parents had left Jolo and are
now residing in San Juan del Monte, Rizal.

Petitioner testified that she had written to them about her intention to apply for the adoption of the minor
and that they had given their consent thereto. And understandably so, for, in addition to their close
relationship by consanguinity and affinity, petitioner is fairly well of financially, inasmuch as she owns real
estate in the Islands of Jolo and Siasi with an aggregate assessed value (for real estate tax purposes) of
P73,310, aside from a 35-door building under construction in the Jolo townsite when this case was heard. In
fact, petitioner has attached to the petition a statement, subscribed and sworn to before a notary public, on
February 4, 1958, by Captain Engracio Guligado and his wife Guneng T. Guligado, confirming the foregoing
facts, and expressing their conformity to the adoption of Engracio Guligado, Jr. by petitioner herein, not only
for the reasons already adverted to, but, also, because the affiants now have several other children,
whereas petitioner has none. However, no testimonial evidence, identifying the signatures on said
statement, was introduced by petitioner herein and, hence, the assistant provincial fiscal, who appeared at
the hearing of this case in the lower court, objected to the admission of said statement, when petitioner
offered it as part of her evidence.
The lower court did not err in overruling said objection, admitting said statement in evidence, and
considering, as a proven fact, that the natural parents of the minor being adopted had given their written
consent to the adoption. Apart from the fact that said statement was duly authenticated by a Notary Public,
the other evidence on record strongly indicate that it is what it purports to be.

We agree, however, with appellant herein that the minor cannot bear petitioners surname as a married
woman, for her husband has not joined in this petition for adoption and can not join it, because he has
children by a previous marriage. As stated in the case of the adoption of the minor Ana Isabel Henriette
Antonia Concepcion Georgiana, L-18284 (April 30, 1963),

"Since the adoption gives the person adopted the same rights and duties as if he were a legitimate child of
the adopter (Art. 341, par. 1, Civil Code), much confusion would indeed result, as correctly pointed out by
the Solicitor General, if the minor child herein were allowed to use the surname of the spouse who did not
join in the adoption.

"For one thing, to allow the minor to adopt the surname of the husband of the adopter, would mislead the
public into believing that she has also been adopted by the husband, which is not the case. And when later,
questions of successional rights arise, the husbands consent to the adoption might be presented to prove
that he has actually joined in the adoption.

"It is to forestall befuddling situations that may arise in the future, that this Court is inclined to apply strictly
provision of the Civil Code to the effect that an adopted child use the surname of the adopter himself or
herself, and not that which is acquired by marriage." cralaw virtua1aw library

With the modification that the minor shall hereafter be known as Engracio Tan, the decision appealed from
is, therefore, affirmed in all other respects, without special pronouncement as to costs. It is so ordered.

Bengzon, C.J., Bautista Angelo, Reyes, J.B.L., Dizon, Regala, Makalintal, Bengzon, J.P. and Zaldivar, JJ.,
concur.

Barrera, J., took no part.

LAHOM VS SIBULO
Posted by kaye lee on 7:49 PM
G.R. No. 143989 July 14, 2003

FACTS:
A childless couple adopted the wife's nephew and brought him up as their own. In 1972, the
trial court granted the petition for adoption, and ordered the Civil Registrar to change the
name Jose Melvin Sibulo to Jose Melvin Lahom. Mrs. Lahom commenced a petition to rescind
the decree of adoption, in which she averred, that, despite the her pleas and that of her
husband, their adopted son refused to use their surname Lahom and continue to use Sibulo
in all his dealing and activities. Prior to the institution of the case, in 1998, RA No. 8552
went into effect. The new statute deleted from the law the right of adopters to rescind a
decree of adoption (Section 19 of Article VI).
These turn of events revealing Jose's callous indifference, ingratitude and lack of care and
concern prompted Lahom to file a petition in Court in December 1999 to rescind the decree
of adoption previously issued way back on May 5, 1972. When Lahom filed said petition
there was already a new law on adoption, specifically R.A. 8552 also known as the Domestic
Adoption Act passed on March 22,1998, wherein it was provided that: "Adoption, being in the
interest of the child, shall not be subject to rescission by the adopter(s). However the
adopter(s) may disinherit the adoptee for causes provided in Article 919 of the Civil Code"
(Section 19).

ISSUE:
Whether or not the subject adoption still be revoked or rescinded by an adopter after the
effectivity of R.A. No. 8552, and if in the affirmative, whether or not the adopters action
prescribed.

RULING:
Jurisdiction of the court is determined by the statute in force at the time of the
commencement of the action. The controversy should be resolved in the light of the law
governing at the time the petition was filed. In this case, it was months after the effectivity
of RA 8552 that Lahom filed an action to revoke the decree of adoption granted in 1972. By
then the new law had already abrogated and repealed the right of the adopter under the
Civil Code and the family Code to rescind a decree of adoption. So the rescission of the
adoption decree, having been initiated by Lahom after RA 8552 had come into force, could
no longer be pursued.

Besides, even before the passage of RA8552, an action to set aside the adoption is subject
to the five year bar rule under Rule 100 of the Rules of Court and that the adopter would
lose the right to revoke the adoption decree after the lapse of that period. The exercise of
the right within a prescriptive period is a condition that could not fulfill the requirements of a
vested right entitled to protection. Rights are considered vested when the right to the
enjoyment is a present interest, absolute, unconditional and perfect or fixed and irrefutable.
The concept of a "vested right" is a consequence of the constitutional guarantee of due
process that expresses a present fixed interest which in right reason and natural justice is
protected against arbitrary state action. While adoption has often been referred to in the
context of a "right", it is not naturally innate or fundamental but rather a right merely
created by statute. It is more of a privilege that is governed by the state's determination on
what it may deem to be for the best interest and welfare of the child. Matters relating to
adoption, including the withdrawal of the right of the adopter to nullify the adoption decree,
are subject to State regulation. Concomitantly, a right of action given by a statute may be
taken away at any time before it has been exercised.
But an adopter, while barred from severing the legal ties of adoption, can always for valid
reasons cause the forfeiture of certain benefits otherwise accruing to an undeserving child,
like denying him his legitime, and by will and testament, may expressly exclude him from
having a share in the disposable portion of his estate.
Categories: Adoption, G.R. No. 143989, Persons and Family Relations, Philippine Civil Code
Landingin vs. Republic, GR No. 164948, June 27,
2006, digested
Posted by Pius Morados on March 17, 2012

(Special Proceedings Adoption: Consent and Abandonment)

Facts: Diwata Ramos Landingin, a US citizen of Filipino parentage

filed a petition for the adoption of 3 minors, natural children of
Manuel Ramos, the formers brother, and Amelia Ramos. She
alleged in her petition that when her brother died, the children
were left to their paternal grandmother for their biological mother
went to Italy, re-married there and now has 2 children by her
second marriage and no longer communicates from the time she
left up to the institution of the adoption. After the paternal
grandmother passed away, the minors were being supported by
the petitioner and her children abroad and gave their written
consent for their adoption.

A Social Worker of the DSWD submitted a Report recommending

for the adoption and narrated that Amelia, the biological mother
was consulted with the adoption plan and after weighing the
benefits of adoption to her children, she voluntarily consented.

However, petitioner failed to present the said social worker as

witness and offer in evidence the voluntary consent of Amelia
Ramos to the adoption. Petitioner also failed to present any
documentary evidence to prove that Amelia assent to the
adoption.

Issue: WON a petition for adoption be granted without the written

consent of the adoptees biological mother.

Held: No. Section 9, par (b) of RA 8552, provides that the

consent of the biological parent(s) of the child, if known is
necessary to the adoption. The written consent of the legal
guardian will suffice if the written consent of the biological
parents cannot be obtained.

The general requirement of consent and notice to the natural

parents is intended to protect the natural parental relationship
from unwarranted interference by interlopers, and to insure the
opportunity to safeguard the best interests of the child in the
manner of the proposed adoption.

The written consent of the biological parents is indispensable for

the validity of the decree of adoption. Indeed, the natural right of
a parent to his child requires that his consent must be obtained
before his parental rights and duties may be terminated and re-
establish in adoptive parents. In this case, petitioner failed to
submit the written consent of Amelia Ramos to the adoption.

Moreover, abandonment means neglect and refusal to perform

the filial and legal obligations of love and support. Merely
permitting the child to remain for a time undisturbed in the care
of others is not such abandonment. To dispense with the
requirements of consent, the abandonment must be shown to
have existed at the time of adoption.