CRITIQUE OF HEGELS BEING (SEIN)

Paul Gerard Horrigan, Ph.D., 2016.

Purely Indeterminate Being

For the absolute idealist Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel (1770-1831),1 the starting point
of knowledge is purely indeterminate being, being as the indeterminate immediate or immediate

1
Studies on Hegel: E. CAIRD, Hegel, Blackwood, Edinburgh, 1883 ; W. WALLACE, Prolegomena to the Study of
Hegels Philosophy, The Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1894 ; J. BAILLIE, The Origin and Significance of Hegels
Logic, Macmillan, New York, 1901 ; G. P. ADAMS, The Mystical Element in Hegels Early Theological Writings,
University of California Press, Berkeley, 1910 ; K. FISCHER, Hegels Leben, Werke und Lehre, Winter, Heidelberg,
1911 ; J. M. E. McTAGGART, Studies in Hegelian Cosmology, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, 1918 ; W. T.
STACE, The Philosophy of Hegel, Macmillan, London, 1924 ; B. HEIMANN, System und Methode in Hegels
Philosophie, Meiner, Leipzig, 1927 ; C. NINK, Kommentar zu den grundlegenden Abschnitten von Hegels
Phnomenologie des Geistes, Habbel, Regensburg, 1931 ; J. SCHWARZ, Hegels philosophische Entwicklung,
Klostermann, Frankfurt a.M, 1938 ; L. PELLOUX, La logica di Hegel, Vita e Pensiero, Milan, 1938 ; J. MAIER, On
Hegels Critique of Kant, Columbia University Press, New York, 1939 ; G. R. G. MURE, An Introduction to Hegel,
The Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1940 ; S. VANNI ROVIGHI, La concezione hegeliana della storia, Milan, 1942 ; H.
NIEL, De la mdiation dans la philosophie de Hegel, Aubier, Paris, 1945 ; F. OLGIATI, Il panlogismo hegeliano,
Milan, 1946 ; J. HYPPOLITE, Gense et structure de la Phnomnologie de lEsprit de Hegel, Aubier, Paris, 1946 ;
H. A. OGIERMANN, Hegels Gottesbeweise, Rome, 1948 ; J. HYPPOLITE, Introduction la philosophie de
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neoscolastica, 42 (1950), pp. 289-312 ; J. WAHL, Le malheur de la conscience dans la philosophie de Hegel,
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N. FINDLAY, Hegel: A Re-examination, George Allen & Unwin, London, 1958 ; A. BRINKLEY (ed.), Studies in
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; D. C. TRAVIS, A Hegel Symposium, University of Texas Press, Austin, TX, 1962 ; J. MCTAGGART, Studies in
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CHIEREGHIN, Hegel e la metafisica classica, Cedam, Padua, 1966 ; J. DHONDT, Hegel, philosophe de lhistoire
vivante, Presses Universitaires de France, Paris, 1966 ; C. CARBONARA, Le prove dellesistenza di Dio secondo
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University Press, New Haven, Conn., 1974 ; J. DHONDT (ed.), Hegel et la sicle des lumieres, Presses
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INWOOD, Hegel, Routledge, Kegan & Paul, London, 1983 ; A. WHITE, Absolute Knowledge: Hegel and the
Problem of Metaphysics, Ohio University Press, Athens, 1983 ; Q. LAUER, Essays in Hegelian Dialectic, Fordham
University Press, New York, 1983 ; Q. LAUER, Hegels Idea of Philosophy, Fordham University Press, Fordham,

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NY, 1983 ; C. TAYLOR, Hegel e la societ moderna, Il Mulino, Bologna, 1984 ; B. DE DONATO, G. W. F. Hegel
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and Politics of the Spirit, 1770-1807, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1987 ; H. KAINZ, Paradox,
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University Press, Cambridge, 1989 ; M. FORSTER, Hegel and Scepticism, Harvard University Press, Cambridge,
Mass., 1989 ; L. BIGNAMI, Concetto e compito della filosofia in Hegel, Verifiche, Trent, 1990 ; V. HLSE, Hegel
e la fondazione dellidealismo oggettivo, Guerini e Associati, Milan, 1991 ; P. ROSSI (ed.), Hegel: guida storica e
critica, Laterza, Bari, 1992 ; M. DON, SullAssoluto. Per una reinterpretazione dellidealismo hegeliano, Einaudi,
Turin, 1992 ; A. NUZZO, Logica e sistema: sullidea hegeliana di filosofia, Pantograf, Genoa, 1992 ; V. VERRA,
Letture hegeliane: Idea, natura e storia, Il Mulino, Bologna, 1992 ; M. PAGANO, Hegel. La religione e
lermeneutica del concetto, Edizioni Scientifiche Italiane, Naples, 1992 ; V. VERRA, Introduzione a Hegel, Laterza,
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C. BEISER (ed.), The Cambridge Companion to Hegel, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1996 ; P.
REDDING, Hegels Hermeneutics, Cornell University Press, Ithaca, 1996 ; R. R. WILLIAMS, Hegels Ethics of
Recognition, University of California Press, Berkeley, 1997 ; P. FRANCO, Hegels Philosophy of Freedom, Yale
University Press, New Haven, 1999 ; F. NEUHOUSER, Foundations of Hegels Social Theory: Actualizing
Freedom, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, MA, 2000 ; T. PINKARD, Hegel: A Biography, Cambridge
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2001 ; F. C. BEISER, Hegel, Routledge, London, 2005 ; S. HOULGATE, An Introduction to Hegel: Freedom, Truth
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Philosophy, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2008 ; R. B. PIPPIN, Hegels Practical Philosophy: Rational
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University Press, Oxford, 2009 ; R. D. WINFIELD, Hegel and Mind: Rethinking Philosophical Psychology,
Palgrave Macmillan, London, 2009 ; A. HONNETH, The Pathologies of Individual Freedom: Hegels Social
Theory, Princeton University Press, Princeton, NJ, 2010 ; N. G. LIMNATIS (ed.), The Dimensions of Hegels
Dialectic, Continuum, London, 2010 ; D. MOYAR and M. QUANTE (eds.), Hegels Phenomenology of Spirit: A
Critical Guide, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2011 ; G. A. MAGEE, The Hegel Dictionary, Bloomsbury
Academic, London, 2011 ; J. STEWART, The Unity of Hegels Phenomenology of Spirit: A Systematic
Interpretation, Northwestern University Press, Evanston, IL, 2011 ; S. THERON, Hegels Philosophy of Universal
Reconciliation: Logic as Form of the World, Cambridge Scholars Publishing, Newcastle upon Tyne, 2013 ; S.
ROSEN, The Idea of Hegels Science of Logic, University of Chicago Press, Chicago, 2013 ; R. STERN, The
Routledge Guidebook to Hegels Phenomenology of Spirit, Routledge, London, 2013 ; S. HOULGATE, Hegels
Phenomenology of Spirit: A Readers Guide, Bloomsbury Academic, London, 2013 ; D. S. STERN (ed.), Essays
on Hegels Philosophy of Subjective Spirit, SUNY Press, Albany, NY, 2014 ; T. SPARBY, Hegels Conception of
the Determinate Negation, Brill, Leiden, 2014 ; R. STERN, Hegel and the Structure of the Object, Routledge,
London, 2014 ; M. BAUR, G. W. F. Hegel: Key Concepts, Routledge, London, 2014 ; S. SEDGWICK, Hegels
Critique of Kant: From Dichotomy to Identity, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2014 ; J. A. BATES, Hegels
Theory of Imagination (SUNY Series in Hegelian Studies), SUNY Press, Albany, NY, 2014 ; L. SIEP, Hegels
Phenomenology of Spirit, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2014 ; J. M. FRITZMAN, Hegel (Classic

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indeterminate.2 Hegel describes his purely indeterminate being understood as pure objectivity,
the most abstract and general idea of an object, as follows: This simple immediacy is, in
consequence, pure being. And just as pure knowledge should signify no more than knowledge as
such, likewise pure being should not signify more than being in general: being, nothing more,
with no other determinations or complements.3 Such is beings emptiness that Hegel states that
this being as mere object is, in fact, nothing. He writes in his Encyclopedia of the Philosophical
Sciences: This being is pure abstraction and, therefore, is the absolutely negative which, also
taken immediately, is nothingness.4 In his Science of Logic, Hegel states: in this first stage,
it can be affirmed that pure being and pure nothingness are the same.5 Gilson writes that, for
Hegel, taken in itself, being is the immediate indetermination, that is to say, not that already
determined indetermination which comes before a further determination, but absolute
indetermination. Being is the indetermination which precedes all determinations. And that total
indetermination is the very stuff which being is. How can it be grasped by thought? Since being
is totally abstract, it cannot be perceived by any sensation; and, since it is completely void of
content, it cannot become an object of any representation or of any intellectual intuition. Being is
not even essence, for essence as such already entails many additional determinations of being.
Now, if being is not perceived, nor represented, nor intuited, and yet is known, only one
hypothesis still remains to be made about it, namely, that being is identical with thought. To
think is to think being, or, if it seems clearer that way, being is thought when thought takes itself
for its own object. This is why it can be said that the beginning of philosophy coincides with the
beginning of the history of philosophy, for that history actually begins with Parmenides. By
positing being as the absolute substance, Parmenides identified absolute reality with pure
thought, which itself is thought about being ; and for us, too, who after so many centuries are
recommencing the ever-present experiment of Parmenides, to think being simply and solely is to
think simply and solely. Let us now proceed a little farther. This being, which is completely void
of all determinations, is thereby absolute emptiness. Whatever else could be ascribed to it, we
should have to deny it. In other words, since it is neither this nor that nor any other thing, it is
nothing. Nothing is the absolute negative taken in its immediateness. That is, nothing is not a
relative negation, such as those which presuppose some preceding affirmation (a is not b); it is
that negation which comes before any other negation. If it seems scandalous to say that being is
nothingness, this is merely because we fail to realize that, since there is nothing which being is,
being is nothing. Pure being and pure non-being are one, and no wonder, since these two
beginnings are but empty abstractions, and each of them is just as empty as the other one. In this
extreme degree of indetermination the equivalence of these two terms appears evident.6

Thinkers), Polity, Cambridge, 2014 ; A. DE LAURENTIS and J. EDWARDS (eds.), The Bloomsbury Companion to
Hegel, Bloomsbury Academic, London, 2015 ; B. BOWMAN, Hegel and the Metaphysics of Absolute Negativity,
Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2015 ; R. ZAMBRANA, Hegels Theory of Intelligibility, University of
Chicago Press, Chicago, 2015 ; J. N. FINDLAY, Hegel: A Re-Examination, Routledge, London, 2015 ; J.
KREINES, Reason in the World: Hegels Metaphysics and Its Philosophical Appeal, Oxford University Press,
Oxford, 2015 ; S. HOULGATE and M. BAUR (eds.), A Companion to Hegel (Blackwell Companions to
Philosophy), Wiley-Blackwell, Hoboken, NJ, 2015 ; S. HERRMANN-SINAI and L. ZIGLIOLI (eds.), Hegels
Philosophical Psychology, Routledge, London, 2016 ; M. MACDONALD, Hegel and Psychoanalysis: A New
Interpretation of Phenomenology of Spirit, Routledge, London, 2016.
2
Cf. G. W. F. HEGEL, The Science of Logic, I, 54.
3
Ibid.
4
G. W. F. HEGEL, Encyclopedia of the Philosophical Sciences, 87.
5
G. W. F. HEGEL, The Science of Logic, I, 67.
6
. GILSON, Being and Some Philosophers, Pontifical Institute of Mediaeval Studies, Toronto, 1952, pp. 136-137.

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 For Hegel, the absolute beginning of knowledge is being as the indeterminate immediate.
This being is indefinable because in this case the term to be defined would have to enter into the
definition; but it is possible to make some statements about it. According to Hegel, being is the
indeterminate immediate (das unbestimmte Unmittelbare). It is free from all determinateness as
regards essence; it simply is; it is not this or the other.

This being has nothing to differentiate it from what is not itself, since it has no
determinateness; it is pure indeterminateness and emptiness. If we try to intuit or think of being,
we intuit nothing; if it were otherwise, we would intuit something (Etwas) and this would not be
pure being. When I try to think of being, what I think of is nothingness. Thus, from being we
pass to nothingness. But naturally, it is being itself that makes the transition, and not the ego.
Being, the indeterminate immediate, is in fact nothingness, nothing more or less than nothing.

We have seen in being these two characteristics which Hegel gives us at the outset:
immediacy and indeterminateness. The characteristic of indeterminateness is being nothing; that
of immediacy is being first. From being we were hurled into nothingness. But what is
nothingness? It is perfect emptiness, the absence of determinateness and content, the incapacity
to be separate from itself. To think of or to intuit nothingness is just this: to intuit nothingness;
this is pure intuition, pure thought. Thus we see that to intuit nothingness is the same as to intuit
being. Pure being and pure nothingness are one and the same thing. Being, through its internal
movement, has hurled us into nothingness, and nothingness into being, and we cannot remain
stationary in either of the two. What does this mean?

the manner of being which being has is that of ceasing to be being and coming to
nothingness; and that the manner of being which nothingness has is, likewise, that of inability
to remain within itself and coming to be being. being has passed into nothingness and
nothingness has passed into being. This is becoming (Werden, fieri, ).7

The Dialectic

Hegel explains that pure being, because it is absolutely empty, must include its own
contradiction within itself, namely, nothingness. In Hegels dialectic purely indeterminate being
is thesis, while non-being or nothingness is antithesis. From the tension between being and non-
being or nothingness, between thesis and antithesis, arises the first synthesis, which is becoming.
This synthesis of becoming (Werden) is the negation of the negation, the unity of Sein and
Nichts, the identity of identity and non-identity.

How does the Hegelian dialectic progress? By means of a continuous recourse to

negativity and contradiction (contradiction is at the heart of reality). Llano explains this role of
negation and contradiction in the Hegelian progression of knowledge, writing: The continual
recourse to negativity, to contradiction: here is the procedure to go about filling the initial
emptiness, to progressively determine the completely indeterminate, to gain real concreteness on
the basis of mere thought abstraction. Here we find ourselves facing the dialectical version of the
dilemma of Spinoza: omnis determinatio est negatio.

7
J. MARAS, History of Philosophy, Dover, New York, 1967, pp. 321-322.

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 Knowledge advances when, from within itself, it overcomes the indeterminacy of
abstract and empty being without recurring to anything transcendent. The progress of philosophy
consists in the unfolding of an absolute method which continually increments determinacy,
discoursing from the abstract to the concrete, from the indeterminate to the determinate. This
display of absolute knowledge is the complete and remainderless knowledge which the Absolute
has of itself. It does not aim at being simple human knowledge, but rather divine wisdom which
at the terminus of the dialectic progress attains to the Absolute Idea, which is fully determinate
being8

Becoming and Contradiction. Gilson explains that, for Hegel, to say that being is non-
being is to unite these two terms in a third one. To unite them actually means to conceive that,
just as being is non-being, so also non-being is being. In other words, if it is true to say that being
is non-being, and conversely, then the truth of being is in non-being, and conversely. This very
unity, which consists in the passing of the one into the other and of the other into the one, is a
motion; properly, it is becoming.

The whole newness of Hegels method thus appears in full from the very step of his
philosophical journeyCompletely built upon the principle of non-contradiction, dogmatic
metaphysics has always used it in order to divide and to exclude. In a logic entirely devoted to
abstract concepts, it may be true that no thing can be, at one and the same time, itself and its
contrary; but it is not so in reality, where things always are, at one and the same time, themselves
and their very contraries. The principle of non-contradiction may well be the law for abstract
concepts; contradiction itself is the law of reality. When Hegel says that his own universals are
concrete, he means precisely that, contrary to the abstract logical notions used by Wolff, his own
metaphysical notions include in their unity the dialectical becoming which begets them.
Moreover, when Hegel says that his metaphysics is not dogmatic, he means to say that, unlike
those ancient metaphysics which were always making their choice between two contradictory
terms, his own philosophy never makes any choice between two contradictory things. It takes
them both, by uniting them in a third thing whose very concreteness is the reciprocal passing into
one another of its contradictory constituents. For these constituents have to be two, in order that
they may be one. Contradiction is the motive power which begets Hegelian dialectic and, since it
is the same thing, Hegelian reality.9

Llano observes that in the absolute idealist dialectic of Hegel, contradiction is what is
most real: The rejection of the analogical nature of the principle of non-contradiction is also to
be found at the summit of modern rationalism. Whether in the Hegelian dialectic or its
derivatives Marxist, Sartrean, etc. this principle is recognized as valid only in formal logic
and in the immediate and superficial knowledge of things; but the substance of reality itself is
precisely contradiction. Hegel goes so far as to affirm: Contradiction must be considered as that
which is most profound, most essential. In effect, in contrast to contradiction, identity is only the
determination of the simple immediate, of dead being; contradiction, contrariwise, is the root of
all movement and vitality, because only by containing a contradiction within itself does a thing
move, does it have impulse and vitality.10 For the dialectic, contradiction is what is most real.

8
A. LLANO, Gnoseology, Sinag-Tala, Manila, 2001, pp. 101-102.
9
. GILSON, op. cit., pp. 137-138.
10
G. W. F. HEGEL, The Science of Logic, ed. Lasson, vol. 2, p. 58.

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But in order to admit that contradiction is real, it is necessary to accept a middle term between
being and nothingness. This is precisely what the classic principle of the excluded middle
(between two contradictories there is no middle ground) denies; its defense based on the
principle of non-contradiction warns us against the errors of the dialectic.

A typical argument of the Hegelian dialectic popularized by dialectical materialism

is rooted in the attempt to demonstrate that movement calls into question the principle of non-
contradiction: something moves not only because at this particular moment it is here and at
another moment it is there, but rather because at one and the same moment it is both here and not
there, because in this here it simultaneously exists and does not exist.11 Aristotle already
examined the opinion of those who based their skepticism about the first principle on the fact
that contradictories and contraries happen simultaneously.12 In general these positions presume
that changes in sensible things are an obstacle to truth and they insist that everything moves,
even that which seems stable. Nonetheless, this absolute mobility is not real, since even in the
moment of change there is one true thing: this-specific-being-which-changes, in which there is
something of the term a quo and the term ad quem. Therefore, movement can also be the object
of science physics and it is an intelligible reality, for which ontological principles and
phenomenical laws can be sought.13

Answer to Hegel: What is the Principle of Non-Contradiction?

A principle is that from which something else proceeds.14 Being (ens), the primum
cognitum, is the first principle of apprehension, while the first of all first principles of judgment
is the principle of non-contradiction.15

11
G. W. F. HEGEL, op. cit., vol. 2, p. 59.
12
ARISTOTLE, Metaphysics, IV, 5, 1009a 23-24.
13
A. LLANO, op. cit., p. 72.
14
Cf. Summa Theologiae, I, q. 33, a. 1.
15
Studies on the principle of non-contradiction: J. H. NICOLAS, Lintuition de ltre et le premier principe, Revue
Thomiste, 47 (1947), pp. 113-134 ; A. MARCHESI, Il principio di non contraddizione in Aristotele e in Kant e la
funzione del tempo, Rivista di filosofia neo-scolastica, 52 (1960), pp. 416-421 ; L. ELDERS, Le premier
principe de la vie intellective, Revue Thomiste, 62 (1962), pp. 571-586 ; E. BERTI, Il principio di non
contraddizione come criterio supremo di significanza nella metafisica aristotelica, Accademia Nazionale dei Lincei,
Rome, 1967 ; E. BERTI, Il valore teologico del principio di non contraddizione nella metafisica aristotelica,
Rivista di filosofia neo-scolastica, 60 (1968), pp. 1-24 ; E. BERTI, Sulla formulazione aristotelica del principio di
non contraddizione, Rivista di filosofia neo-scolastica, 61 (1969), pp. 9-16 ; P. C. COURTS, Cohrence de ltre
et Premiere Principe selon Saint Thomas dAquin, Revue Thomiste, 70 (1970), pp. 387-423 ; M. CASULA, La
prova aristotelica del principio di contraddizione dal linguaggio, Giornale di Metafisica, 25 (1970), pp. 641-673 ;
G. CENACCHI, Il principio di non-contraddizione fondamento del discorso filosofico, Aquinas, 16 (1973), pp.
255-277 ; M. C. BARTOLOMEI, Tomismo e principio di non contraddizione, CEDAM, Padua, 1973 ; L.
IAMMARRONE, Tomismo e principio di non contraddizione (1), Divus Thomas, 79 (1976), pp. 419-433 ; L.
CLAVELL, Il primo principio della conoscenza intellettuale, in Atti del VIII Congresso Tomistico Internazionale
(VII), Libreria Editrice Vaticana, Vatican City, 1982, pp. 62-73 ; F. A. SEDDON, The Principle of Contradiction in
Metaphysics Gamma, Pittsburgh, 1988 ; M. J. DEGNAN, Aristotles Defence of the Principle of Non-
Contradiction, Minneapolis, 1990 ; M. PEREZ DE LABORDA, possibile negare il principio di contraddizione?,
Acta Philosophica, 6 (1997), pp. 277-288 ; A. ROBIGLIO, La logica dellateismo. Il principio di non
contraddizione secondo C. Fabro, Divus Thomas, 102.2 (1999), pp. 120-143 ; T. V. UPTON, The Law of Non-
Contradiction and Aristotles Epistemological Realism, The Thomist, 66 (2002), pp. 457-471 ; A. DONATO, La
formulazione del principio di non contraddizione in Aristotele e in Tommaso dAquino, Sensus Communis, 4
(2003), pp. 128-149 ; C. A. TESTI, Il principio di contraddizione in Tommaso dAquino, in Jan Lukasiewicz, Del

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 If being (ens) is the first notion of our intelligence (being [ens] is the first notion that our
intellect attains), and which is implied in any consequent notion, there is also an intellectual
judgment that comes naturally first and which is presupposed by all other consequent judgments:
It is impossible to be and not be at the same time and in the same respect. This first judgment
is called the principle of non-contradiction for it expresses the most basic condition of things,
that is, that they cannot be self-contradictory. Such a principle is founded upon being (ens) and
expresses the consistency of being (ens) and its opposition to non-being (non-ens). There is a
radical incompatibility between being and non-being, for the act of being (esse), the act of all
acts and the perfection of all perfections, confers upon being (ens) a real perfection that is
absolutely opposed to the privation of that perfection.

Why do we say at the same time in our formulation of the first principle? Because it is
not at all contradictory, for example, for the leaves of a tree to be green in one season and yellow
in another. Therefore, we should say: The leaves of this tree in front of me are green today, this
fifth day of the month of March. Why in the same respect in our formulation? Because it is
not at all contradictory, for example, for a student to be learned in algebra and ignorant in
English literature. If we affirm that the student is learned, we must specify what particular area
he is learned in.

There are different ways of expressing this first of first principles. It is above all a
judgment that concerns reality itself; it regards real beings that are. Hence, the more profound
formulations of the principle of non-contradiction are metaphysical in nature. For example,
Aristotle states in the fourth book of his Metaphysics that it is impossible for one and the same
thing to be and not to be,16 and further on, that it is impossible for a thing to be and at the same
time not to be.17

Logical formulations of the principle of non-contradiction include: we cannot both

affirm and deny something of the same subject at the same time and in the same sense as well
as that contradictory propositions about the same subject cannot be simultaneously true.

Critique of Hegels Rejection of the Objective Validity of the Principle of Non-

Contradiction in the Real Order (the Order of Being or Ontological Order)

The absolute idealist Hegel attempted to deny the objective, ontological validity of the
principle of non-contradiction as is attested to here in a passage from his Wissenshaft der
Logik18: The distinction between Being and Nothing is, in the first place, only implicit, and not
yet actually made: they only ought to be distinguished. A distinction, of course, implies two
things, and that one of them possesses an attribute which is not found in the other. Being,
however, is an absolute absence of attributes, and so is Nothing. Hence, the distinction between

principio di contraddizione in Aristotele, edited by G. Franci and C. A. Testi, Quodlibet, Macerata, 2003, pp. 193-
218.
16
ARISTOTLE, Metaphysics, IV, 3, 1005b 25.
17
ARISTOTLE, op. cit., IV, 4, 1006a 3.
18
For a critique of Hegels denial of the objective, ontological validity of the principle of non-contradiction, see: A.
DEVIZZI, Il significato del principio di contraddizione nella logica hegeliana, Rivista di Filosofia Neoscolastica,
21 (1939), pp. 463-473 ; E. BERTI, La critica di Hegel al principio di contraddizione, Filosofia, (1980), pp. 629-
640.

7
the two is only meant to be; it is quite a nominal distinction, which is at the same time no
distinction. In all other cases of difference there is some common point which comprehends both
things. Suppose, e.g., we speak of two different species: the genus forms a common ground for
both. But in the case of mere Being and Nothing, distinction is without a bottom to stand upon:
hence, there can be no distinction, both determinations being the same bottomlessness
Nothing, if it is thus immediate and equal to itself, is also the same as Being isIn Being we
have Nothing, and in Nothing BeingIn Becoming the Being which is one with Nothing, and
the Nothing which is one with Being, are only vanishing factors; they are and they are not.19 In
the light of realism, in reference to what is, such reasoning, a flagrant violation of the first of all
first principles of judgment, is simply absurd and destroys the foundations of all knowledge,
whether scientific or philosophical.

Jean Weber, of the school of Bergson, sums up Hegels denial of the objective,
metaphysical validity of the principle of non-contradiction in the name of being as the
indeterminate immediate: Being is the most universal of all notions, but for this very reason it is
also the poorest and the most negative of notions. To be white or black, to have extension, to be
good, means to be something; but to be without any determination, is to be nothing, is simply not
to be. Pure and simple being is, therefore, equivalent to not-being. It is at one and the same time
itself and its contrary. If it were merely itself, it would remain immobile and sterile; if it were
mere nothingness, it would be synonymous with zero, and in this case also completely powerless
and infecund. It is because it is the one and the other that it becomes something, another thing,
everything. The contradiction contained in the notion of being resolves itself into becoming,
development. To become is at the same time to be and not to be (that which will be). The two
contraries which engender it, namely, being and non-being, are rediscovered, blended and
reconciled in becoming. The result is a new contradiction, which will resolve itself into a new
synthesis, and thus the process will continue until the absolute idea is reached.20

Garrigou-Lagrange objects to such fallacious reasoning, writing: To perceive the

sophism contained in this argument, we need only to cast it into syllogistic form: Pure being is
pure indetermination. But pure indetermination is pure non-being. Therefore, pure being is pure
non-being. The middle term, pure indetermination, is used in two different senses. In the major
it means the negation of all determination, generic, specific, or individual, but not the negation of
(ideal or real) being, which transcends the generic determinations of which it is susceptible. In
the minor, on the other hand, pure indetermination is not only the negation of all generic,
specific, and individual determination, but also implies the negation of any further determination
of which being is capable. Therefore, the argument amounts to this: that pure being is
undetermined being; but undetermined being is pure non-being. The minor is evidently false.21
Garrigou-Lagrange also adds: Besides, there is no apparent reason why becoming should
emerge from this realized contradiction, this identification of contradictories. On the contrary,
we must hold with Aristotle that to maintain that being and non-being are identical, is to admit

19
G. W. F. HEGEL, Logic, volume 2, The Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1892, 87, 88, 89, pp. 162, 163, 167, and
169.
20
As quoted in R. GARRIGOU-LAGRANGE, God: His Existence and Nature, vol. 1, B. Herder, London, 1946, pp.
173-174. Cf. G. NOEL, La Logique de Hegel, Paris 1897, pp. 23-52, 135-159.
21
R. GARRIGOU-LAGRANGE, op. cit., p. 174. Cf. T. M. ZIGLIARA, Summa philosophica in usum scholarum,
vol. 1, Critica, Rome, 1876, pp. 247-252.

8
permanent repose rather than perpetual motion. There is in fact nothing into which beings can
transform themselves, because everything includes everything(IV Metaph., c. v).22

For Garrigou-Lagrange, this absolute intellectualism of Hegel is no less destructive of

all knowledge than is the anti-intellectualism of Heraclitus and Bergson. All reasoning
presupposes that every idea employed in the process represents a reality, the nature of which
remains the same; but for Hegel, the principle of identity is merely a law of inferior logic, of the
mind working with abstractions, and not a law of superior logic, of reason and reality. From this
it follows, as Aristotle remarked (IV Metaphy., c. iv), that one can with equal right affirm or
deny everything of all things, that all men tell the truth and that all lie, and that each one admits
that he is a liar. For the rest, Hegel himself acknowledges that if it is true to say that being and
non-being are one and the same, it is also true to say that they differ, and that the one is not the
other.23 It follows from this that, according to Hegel, nothing can be affirmed and everything
can be affirmed. If this attitude does not destroy all science, it cannot at least be said to have
more than a relative value, and hence to possess nothing more than the name of science.24

Frederick Wilhelmsen explains that Hegels panlogicism was another erroneous attempt
to deny the objective, ontological validity of the principle of non-contradiction: Hegel identified
the orders of thought and existence. Being functions the way thinking functions, taught Hegel,
because being is a concretization of absolute spirit. In thought, said Hegel, every proposition
has its contradictory. Posit any judgment and you thereby posit its opposite. On this point, Hegel
merely repeated a truth known to logicians since the time of Plato. Aristotle systematised this
law of the mind in his well-known Square of Opposition: The proposition every cow is black is
contradicted by some cow is not black; no academician is a fool is contradicted by some
academician is a fool, and so forth. Hegel pushed this opposition of judgments to the order of
being itself. Being is being is contradicted by being is not-being. Given the first proposition,
the second automatically follows. Therefore being contradicts itself, and this contradiction is the
most fundamental law of the spirit. If we grant Hegels identification of spirit and reality, his
position makes good sense. It was the only way he could account for progress in the universe, for
change. If the real is basically the same thing as the rational, one of two conclusions follow:
either the real is given once and for all or it is not. If we grant the first supposition, we must
conclude with Hegel that spirit never gets anywhere at all; spirit does nothing but analytically
dissect an order already given at the outset, an order of ideas and laws to which nothing new is
ever added. Refuse the first supposition because of the fact of change in the world and it follows
that reality could only advance by contradicting itself. Begin with a given call it A and
assume that only A is given. How do we get from A to B, when B is not given? We move from A
to B only if A contradicts itself. Fundamentally, B is nothing but As negation of itself; B is non-
A. In this fashion we can move from one point in the real order to another. We can account for
change, for the advance of spirit. If we refuse Hegels identification of spirit and reality, if we
judge his position in the light of realism, we can easily see that his error consisted in treating the
metaphysical order, the real order, as though it were the logical. But the whole point about being,
in reality, is that it is being. The contradictory to being, not in the order of ideas but in the order
of things, would be non-being. But in reality there is no such thing as an existing non-being. A

22
R. GARRIGOU-LAGRANGE, op. cit., p. 174.
23
G. W. F. HEGEL, Wissenschaft der Logik, volume 1, Stuttgart, p. 404.
24
R. GARRIGOU-LAGRANGE, op. cit., pp. 174-175.

9
man does not need an armory full of logical and dialectical weapons to understand this; all he
needs is some existing thing which he can contemplate for a short time. Concentrate for a
moment on the piece of paper before your eyes; formulate the proposition, the paper exists;
now contradict the first proposition with the paper does not exist. The two judgments contradict
each other in the logical order, in your mind. The contradiction exists mentally because the two
judgments can be entertained as logical opposites. Now return your attention to the piece of
paper itself, not as it exists in a proposition in your mind, but as it is in itself. What is the
contradictory of the existence of the paper in the order of being? In that order, the order of things
as they exist beyond your thinking of them, there simply is no contradictory to the piece of
paper. The non-existence of the paper that exists is a metaphysical zero. To see this is to see that
Hegel confused the two orders.25

Reasons for Defending the Principle of Non-Contradiction

In the Metaphysics, Aristotle replies to those who would be so foolish as to negate the
principle of non-contradiction, writing that in order to deny this principle, one has to reject all
meaning in language. If man were the same as non-man, it would not, in fact, mean anything
at all. Any word would signify all things and would not, therefore, denote anything; everything
would be the same. Consequently, all communication or understanding between persons would
be impossible. Thus, whenever anyone says a word, he is already acknowledging the principle of
non-contradiction, since he undoubtedly wants the word to mean something definite and distinct
from its opposite. Otherwise, he would not even speak.Anyone who rejects this first principle
should behave like a plant, since even animals move in order to attain an objective which they
prefer over others, as when they seek food.26 Besides, denying this principle in fact implies
accepting it, since in rejecting it, a person acknowledges that affirming and denying are not the
same. If a person maintains that the principle of non-contradiction is false, he already admits that
being true and being false are not the same, thereby accepting the very principle he wishes to
eliminate.27

Garrigou-Lagrange summarizes for us Aristotles eight principal reasons for defending

the necessity and objective validity of the principle of non-contradiction: (1) to deny this
necessity and this validity would be to deprive words of their fixed meaning and to render speech
useless; (2) all idea of the reality of an essence, or thing or substance as such, would have to be
abandoned; there would be only a becoming without anything which is on the way of becoming;
it would be like saying that there can be a flux without a fluid, a flight without a bird, a dream
without a dreamer; (3) there would no longer be any distinction between things, between a
galley, a wall, and a man; (4) it would mean the destruction of all truth, for truth follows being;
(5) it would destroy all thought, even all opinion; for its very affirmation would be a negation. It
would not be an opinion which Heraclitus had when he affirmed that contradictories were true at
the same time; (6) it would mean the destruction of all desire and all hatred; there would be only
absolute indifference, for there would be no distinction between good and evil; there would be no
reason why we should act; (7) it would no longer be possible to distinguish degrees of error,
everything would be equally false and true at the same time; (8) it would put an end to the very

25
F. WILHELMSEN, Mans Knowledge of Reality, Prentice-Hall, Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey, 1956, pp. 47-49.
26
ARISTOTLE, Metaphysics, IV, 4.
27
ARISTOTLE, Metaphysics, XI, 5.

10
notion of becoming; for there would be no distinction between the beginning and the end of a
movement; the first would already be the second, and any transition from one state to another
would be impossible. Moreover, becoming could not be explained by any of the four causes.
There would be no subject of becoming; the process would be without any efficient or final
cause, and without specification, and it would be both attraction and repulsion, concretion as
well as fusion.28

Bittles Critique of Hegels Being as the Indeterminate Immediate and the Dialectic
of Being-Nothing-Becoming

Celestine Bittle critiques Hegels absolute idealist being as the indeterminate immediate
and the dialectic of Sein-Nichts-Werden, as being in violation of the Principle of Change,
writing: The implications of the Principle of Change29 show the futility of the attempt of Hegel
to deduce all things through the logical evolution of the concept of being. The concept of
being, with which Hegel begins, is not the concept of God as Pure Actuality; it is the concept of
being in general, so empty of all real content that he considers it absolutely void and equal to
nothing. As he himself states: Being is not a particular of definite thought, and hence, being
quite indeterminate, is a thought not to be distinguished from Nothing.30 But being does not
remain in this indeterminate condition; it becomes, and through this becoming it evolves into
all determinate being, into nature and spirit and eventually into the Absolute. Becoming is the
first concrete thought, and therefore the first notion: whereas Being and Nothing are empty
abstractions.31

This becoming then gives rise, according to Hegel, to determinate being in the
following interesting process of logical evolution: Even our ordinary conception of Becoming
implies that somewhat [something] comes out of it, and that Becoming therefore has a
resultBecoming always contains Being and Nothing in such a way that these two are always
changing into each other, and reciprocally cancel each other. Thus Becoming stands before us in
utter restlessness unable, however, to maintain itself in this abstract restlessness: for since
Being and Nothing vanish in Becoming (and that is the very notion of Becoming), the latter must
vanishThe result of this process, however, is not empty Nothing, but Being identical with the
negation what we call Being Determinate (being then and there): the primary import of which
evidently is that it has become.32

In evaluating Hegels views, as given above, we must remember that he was actuated by
the purpose, laudable in itself, of effecting a supreme synthesis. But in this endeavor he was
misled into attempting to synthesize thought and thing into the ultimate ground of being in
general, of abstract and indeterminate being; he thereby hoped to harmonize not only the
conflicting elements of being, but also the contradictions or antinomies of thought. Hence his
contention that all being is thought realized and all becoming is a logical development. He
28
R. GARRIGOU-LAGRANGE, op. cit., p. 168.
29
The Principle of Change reads: Whatever changes, is changed by another; or, nothing ever passes from receptive
potency to act except under the influence of another being already in act; or, no being can bring itself from receptive
potency to act. In every change the result is the acquisition of a new state of being.
30
G. W. F. HEGEL, Logic, translation by W. Wallace, Clarendon Press, 1892, vol. 2, 87, p. 163.
31
G. W. F. HEGEL, op. cit., 88, p. 167.
32
G. W. F. HEGEL, op. cit., 89, p. 170.

11
therefore begins with the idea of being; and since this idea is also the reality of being, it
actually develops itself from indeterminateness to determinateness (determinate being) by
means of an eternal logical process of internal evolution. At first being is so indeterminate that
it is equivalent to nothing, but through this process of logical becoming it gradually unfolds
itself into every kind of determinate being: it is a process of self-actualization.

This, however, is an essential error in Hegels idealistic monism, because it is in

contradiction to the Principle of Change (Becoming), as shown above. From both a logical and
ontological viewpoint, Hegels Being is incapable of evolving in this manner. As a logical
entity, his Being is abstract, indeterminate, empty of content, equivalent to Nothing. Since it
contains nothing, nothing can arise out of it; hence, determinate being can never be deduced
from it. As an ontological entity (supposing it to be such), it is devoid of all actuality and
therefore purely potential. This Being does not contain all actuality in itself like coins in a
purse or peas in a pod; it is rather, according to Hegels own statement, empty Nothing.33
Consequently, this Being must be pure potentiality. It develops into all determinate being, not
through some other being distinct from itself (for how can there be any being outside the whole
class of being?), but by means of the intrinsic self-actualization of its potentiality. But this is
unintelligible and impossible. Since Being contains no actuality, it cannot give any actuality to
itself, because no one can give what one does not possess. And this Being cannot receive it
from another being, because outside the totality of Being there is only Nothing, and Nothing
has nothing to give. If, then, Hegels contention were correct that the origin of all things comes
from indeterminate Being, which is equivalent to Nothing, no determinate beings could ever
come into existence. But the universe is here. Hence, it did not originate from this abstract,
empty Being, and Hegels monism must be rejected as inadequate and false.34

Fabros Critique of Hegels Indeterminate Being (Unbestimmtes Sein) - Empty Being

(Leeres Sein) as Starting Point of Knowledge, in Favor of Real, Concrete, Corporeal Being
(Ens) as Starting Point

Cornelio Fabro (1911-1995) writes in his 1966 article The Transcendentality of Ens-Esse
and the Ground of Metaphysics: The error of Hegel, and subsequently of Heidegger, is in
having posited as a beginning a pure Sein, that is, an empty act, and an emptiness such that it
must vanish in nothingness. Thus they have posited a pseudo-beginning and, therefore, no
beginning at all, and have made everything vanish into simple happening.35

Hegels Being (Sein) of the first immediacy is to be found at the beginning of his
Wissenschaft der Logik. Fabro notes concerning Hegels Sein: But what is being (Sein)? This is
for Hegel, we already know, the pure beginning, absolutely indeterminate being (unbestimmtes
Sein), empty being (leeres Sein). It is the pure immediate that is given per se at the beginning and
that in se is found again as identity per se or in se at the end.36

33
G. W. F. HEGEL, op. cit., 88, p. 167.
34
C. BITTLE, The Domain of Being: Ontology, Bruce, Milwauee, 1941, pp. 109-111.
35
C. FABRO, The Transcendentality of Ens-Esse and the Ground of Metaphysics, International Philosophical
Quarterly, 6 (1966), p. 418.
36
C. FABRO, Dallessere allesistente, xli-xlv.

12
 Fabro observes in his Breve discorso sullessere: Kants Sein is completely outside the
sphere of predicates; it is not a predicate but rather, the predicating or, as Kant makes clear, the
copula that unites the terms of every judgment or in other words, the act of the synthesis. In
this synthesis Kant admits the need to refer to sensible affection which is the umbilical cord for
the position of the thing-in-itself (Ding an sich): idealisms progress and Hegels in particular
beyond Kant is in the abolition of the conditioning on behalf of the thing-in-itself and,
therefore, in the identification of the actuality of Sein with the actuality of consciousness. But
while Kant, by referring to sensible affection, has at least the pretext of coming to affirm a
content, Hegel must start from the simple act of consciousness, which identifies in itself the
absolutely empty being and, therefore, ought to resign itself to remain in empty hands since the
jump of the dialectic which begins from nothing cannot but fall into nothing.37

Hegel begins with being, which, for him, is a completely empty or absolutely
undetermined infinitive being (Sein). This starting point is erroneous for one must begin with
real, concrete corporeal being (ens), a synthesis of subject (content) and act, and not leeres Sein,
Fabro writes in his La prima riforma della dialettica hegeliana (published posthumously in
2004): Like Hegel, St. Thomas makes the beginning of philosophizing with the problem of
Being according to the plexus ens-esse, but according to a opposing movement of the dialectic:
in fact, while Hegel thought that he should start from completely empty being or absolutely
indeterminate being, as the infinitive form of To Be-Sein, St. Thomas, on the other hand, places
the beginningin theconcreteensthe synthesisof subject-content and act of quod est
and esse

Hegel, like decadent Scholasticism, proceeds with a formal abstractive method, with the
difference of transferring the abstraction from the object (essence as content of the object,
emptied of all determination) to the subject (consciousness, which is thus the beginning insofar
as it is emptied of all content): Empty Being which is [said] to equal to Nothing and to the
passing to Nothing. [] [F]or Hegel, Sein is referred to the subject since it is the speculative
formula itself of the initial absolute doubt and pure cogito; Sein expresses consciousness in se in
the initial moment of the absolutely indeterminate or of the non-reference to the other: the
second immediacy (true and authentic) presupposes the first immediacy (non-true). Hegelian
abstraction, then, consists in the progressive and total emptying of consciousness of any
content...38

The beginningis indicated by St. Thomas in the dialectical plexus of ens, without any
hesitation or ambiguity: Illud autem quod primo intellectus concipit quasi notissimum et in quod
omnes conceptiones resolvit est ens(De Veritate, q. 1, a. 1).39

The Apprehension of Being (Ens)

Being (ens) is that which is (ens est id quod est),40 that which has the act of being (ens est
id quod habet esse).41 And being (ens) is the primum cognitum.42 How does the intellect first

37
C. FABRO, Breve discorso sullessere, in Lessere-problema-teoria-storia, Studium, Rome, 1967, p. 376.
38
C. FABRO, La prima riforma della dialettica hegeliana, EDIVI, Segni, 2004, pp. 211-212.
39
C. FABRO, op. cit., p. 229.
40
Cf. In I Phys., lect. 3, n. 21; In Boeth. De Hebd., lect. 2, n. 24: id quod est, sive ens

13
know being (ens)? In apprehension. St. Thomas writes in the Summa Theologiae: The intellect
apprehends primarily being (ens) itself (Intellectus autem per prius apprehendit ipsum ens)43;
That which, before aught else, falls under apprehension, is being (ens), the notion of which is
included in all things whatsoever the intellect apprehends () Being (ens) is the first thing that
falls under the apprehension simply (Nam illud quod primo cadit in apprehensione est ens, cuius
intellectus includitur in omnibus quaecumque quis apprehendit () Ens est primum quod cadit
in apprehensione simpliciter).44 More specifically, being (ens) as primum cognitum is obtained
by means of an immediate synthetic apprehension, according to Fabro.45 Being (ens) as primum
cognitum is obtained, according to him, by a conjoint apprehension which regards the
apprehension of essentia (content) and an experience of esse (act): Just as the notio entis is a
synthesis of content and act, so also it is a certain ineffable form of conjoint apprehension of
content on the part of the mind and act on the part of experience46 In his book Pensar el ser,
published in 1994 by Peter Lang (Bern), Luis Romera explains that, in the thought of Fabro, the
primum cognitum is a plexus of content (essence) and act, which one can express with the
formula id quod habet esse. It is not the mere apprehension of a form or of the most general
formality, or directly knowing actus essendi as such. It is rather a plexus that includes a duality.
From this we gather that the understanding is not initially of forms (simplex apprehensio), while
in a second moment it will affirm existence (in judgment). On the contrary, it grasps in its origin
the plexus of formal content (minimal) and of act, of actuation, of insertion in reality. As a
participle, our author sustains that ens says act, the being in act of esse. This means that already
in the first knowledge we know although in a confused way the act of being; not insofar as it
is properly act (as resolutive metaphysical notion of the real), but yes insofar as to the actual
character of the real insofar as it is real. The understanding is not, we insist, initially formal, in
order to later come to the real as such in a second moment; the intellect comes to the notion of
the real from the beginning.47

Explaining how being (ens) is the first object of our intellectual knowledge, Romera
writes that, for Fabro, following the doctrine of St. Thomas, ens constitutes the absolutely first
object of our intellectual knowledge.48 The character of first is specified as a primum, not only
psychological, but also critical-ontological.49 Thus, we are dealing with a first not only in the
analytical order, in the sense that analyzing any object one ultimately finds the notion of ens; but

41
Cf. In I Sent., d. 37, q. 1, a. 1, sol.
42
Primo in intellectu cadit ens(In I Metaphysicorum, lect. 2, n. 45); illud autem quod primo intellectus concipit
quasi notissimum () est ens(De Veritate, q. 1, a. 1).
43
Summa Theologiae, I, q. 16, a. 4, ad 2.
44
Summa Theologiae, I-II, q. 94, a. 2. Cf. In IV Metaphys., lect. 6, n. 605: In prima autem operatione est aliquod
primum quod cadit in conceptione intellectus, scilicet hoc dico ens: nec aliquid hac operatione potest concipi, nisi
intelligatur ens.
45
For a basic explanation of Fabros position on the primum cognitum, see: C. FERRARO, Appunti di metafisica,
Lateran University Press, 2013, pp. 41-48. For Italian epistemologist Antonio Livi (Prato, 1938) on the immediate
synthetic apprehension of being (ens), see: A. LIVI, Metafisica e senso commune. Sullo statuto epistemologico della
filosofia prima, Casa Editrice Leonardo da Vinci, Rome, 2010, pp. 77-81.
46
C. FABRO, Tomismo e pensiero moderno, Lateran University Press, Rome, 1969, p. 355.
47
L. ROMERA, Pensar el ser. Anlisis del conocimiento del Actus essendi segn C. Fabro, Peter Lang, Bern,
1994, pp. 331-332 (Note: Translations into English of the Romera quotes are by Jason Mitchell).
48
See: C. FABRO, Problematica del tomismo di scuola, Rivista di Filosofia Neoscolastica, 75 (1983), p. 198.
49
See: C. FABRO, Partecipazione e causalit, Opere Complete 11, Editrice del Verbo Incarnato, Segni, 2010, p.
173.

14
also of a first, both on the psychological plane since it is the first that comes to our intellect, it
is the unveiling and awakening of our mind50 and on the critical-ontological plane, since it is
the fundament to which the critical problem remits and the basis of openness of the mind to
reality, on which the metaphysical problem is sustained and has meaning.51

Concerning how, for Fabro, the apprehension of being (ens) is immediate and synthetic,
Jason Mitchell notes that Fabro explains in Problematica del tomismo di scuola (1983), that the
first object of intellectual knowledge refers to knowing things that are in act. To this
corresponds, not a simple abstraction according to the essence, but rather a synthetic
apprehension according to the act of being. This is an apprehension since it is something
immediate and of an intellectual nature; it is synthetic since it embraces both act and content. It is
something vague in the beginning, yet becomes clearer according to the psychic development of
the subject.5253

With regard to the anti-formalistic gnoseological thought of Fabro pertaining to the

formation of the primum cognitum, Romera explains that, for Fabro, because it is the first
knowledge and by making reference to the real as real and to the act that this has, the primum
cognitum is not an abstract notion situated next to other abstract essences. Nor does it
correspond to judgment. The grasping of ens is neither an abstraction, nor an intuition; it is rather
a simple and synthetic apprehension (of content and act) which is had thanks to the primary and
constitutive convergence of the sensible and the intelligible. It is an intellectual apprehension,
prepared for by the experimentum, made by the intellect in the act of perceiving the singular.54

Concerning Fabros treatment of the role of perception in the formation of the primum
cognitum, Mitchell writes that in Chapter Six of his book, Romera takes into consideration the
role of perception: The apprehension of ens consists in grasping ens-esse thanks to the
convergence had between the sensitive and the intellectual spheres due to mans substantial
unity.55 The relationship between the perceptive act and the immediate, synthetic apprehension is
dealt with in Percezione e pensiero, which indicates that the primary knowledge of ens is
prepared by the senses by means of experimentum, the operation of experience by means of
which the intellect stays in direct contact with reality.56 In the perceptive act, the existence of
what we perceive is immediately given. It is not obtained by way of argumentation, but rather
due to the presence of what is known. According to Fabro, there is not a sic et simpliciter
intuition of the existence of the existent, but rather an immediate, perceptive persuasion of the
existence of the existent.57

50
See: C. FABRO, Nozione metafisica di partecipazione secondo san Tommaso dAquino, Opere Complete 3,
Editrice del Verbo Incarnato, Segni 2005, p. 187.
51
L. ROMERA, op. cit., p. 135.
52
See: L. ROMERA, op. cit., p. 178.
53
J. MITCHELL, Being and Participation. The Method and Structure of Metaphysical Reflection According to
Cornelio Fabro, volume 2, Ateneo Pontificio Regina Apostolorum, Rome, 2012, p. 702.
54
L. ROMERA, op. cit., p. 332.
55
See: L. ROMERA, op. cit., p. 179.
56
See: L. ROMERA, op. cit., p. 179.
57
See: L. ROMERA, op. cit., p. 180.

15
 In the primum cognitum we grasp both something and existing immediately, although in
a confused way. The interplay between the senses, experimentum, common sense, the cogitativa,
means that this grasping and knowledge of essence and existence is founded in sensible
knowledge.58 An important role is given to the conversio ad phantasmata due to its functional
continuity between the senses and understanding, in that it is by means of the conversio that our
understanding has knowledge of the singular, and this of the ratio entis.59 In Partecipazione e
causalit, Fabro specifies that the primum cognitum refers to an immediate experience of the
being of ens in act and not of esse as act. Here, our author, following his distinction between esse
in actu and esse ut actus, makes it clear that such experience is only of esse in actu and not of
esse ut actus.60 Esse, as act, is grasped in ens.6162

Being (Ens)

Being (ens) is that which is (ens est id quod est). Being (ens) is that which has the act of
being (esse).63 The notion of being (ens) is not a simple notion, but implies a composition of a
subject (that something which is and is the real subject to which the act of being belongs), and
an act (the very act of being or esse of that something). A cat, a dog, a rock are all beings
(entia). They are all things or realities. However, strictly speaking, being (ens) does not have
the same meaning as thing or reality (res), for while the term res or thing is derived from
essence (essentia), being (ens) is derived from esse (dicitur res secundum quod habet
quidditatem vel essentiam quamdam; ens vero secundum quod habet esse64). Being (ens) is the
present participle of the verb to be (Latin: esse) and we say that being (ens) signifies things in
so much as they are, somewhat in the same way that a swimmer designates a person who
swims, or a painter, someone who paints, or a student, designating someone who studies.

Being (ens) is not a simple notion but implies a composition of a subject and an act:
The notion of being (ens) is not a simple notion; it implies the composition of a subject (id
quod) and an act (est). Two elements are involved in this notion: something which is and the
very act of being (esse) of that thing. That something plays the role of a subject, that is, the
particular reality to which the esse belongs (as the subject of the act of laughing is the person
who laughs).

Nevertheless, the two elements constitute a unity: one element (ens) implies the
presence of the other element. When we say being (ens) we refer implicitly to its esse even

58
See: L. ROMERA, op. cit., p. 182: Resumiendo, en el primum cognitum captamos el algo y el existir, ambos
inmediatamente, aunque de forma confusa. Tal captacin ambivalente se hace por el mismo material que presenta la
sensibilidad, el experimentum que preparan el sentido comn y la cogitativa, dndose aqu esa continuidad entre las
dos esferas de nuestro conocimiento. De tal forma el conocimiento sensible es el fundamento para el conocimiento
de la esencia y de la existencia, aunque no lo sea del mismo modo.
59
See: L. ROMERA, op. cit., pp. 182-183. Romera is summarizing Fabros exposition found in Partecipazione e
causalit, pp. 380-382.
60
L. ROMERA, op. cit., p. 183.
61
See: L. ROMERA, op. cit., p. 184. Phenomenological reflection obtains an initial knowledge of existence by
distinguishing beween essential content and existence; knowledge of esse as first act is obtained by means of
metaphysical reflection.
62
J. MITCHELL, op. cit., pp. 703-704.
63
Cf. In I Sent., d. 37, q. 1, a. 1, sol.
64
In II Sent., q. 37, q. 1, a. 1, sol.

16
though we do not yet form the judgment it is or that something is. Likewise, when we hear
the verb is alone, we either assume its subject, or we discover the absence of a subject of the
act.

We can sum this up as follows: 1) Being (ens) signifies principally the thing which is:
being (ens) designates it insofar as it has the act of being (esse) ; 2) Consequently, being (ens)
signifies concomitantly the esse of that thing, because a thing can only be if it possesses the act
of being (esse) ; 3) Therefore, being (ens) refers to something that exists in reality.65

Essence (essentia) is that which makes a thing to be what it is, while act of being (esse) is
that which makes a thing to be. Every finite being (ens) has a real distinction between essence
(essentia) and act of being (esse) as two metaphysical co-principles.66 With God, the Infinite
Being, on the other hand, essentia and esse are identified. Gods Essence is Esse.

The Act of Being (Esse)

The principal element of being (ens, which is that which is or that which has esse67)
is its act of being (esse).68 If essence (essentia) is that which makes a thing to be what it is, the
act of being (esse) is that which makes a thing to be.

65
T. ALVIRA, L. CLAVELL, T. MELENDO, Metaphysics, Sinag-Tala, Manila, 1991, pp. 18-19.
66
Being is a real and intelligible principle, and the knowledge of its reality cannot be separated from the knowledge
of its intelligibility. This dissociation has been carried out in formalistic scholasticism which speaks of the
distinction between essence and existence, instead of the genuinely metaphysical theory of the real composition of
essence and act of being. The former distinction is made between between actual existence, considered as mere
facticity, and the essence considered merely as possible. Essence and existence are, then, no more than two different
states of mind with respect to the same thing considered respectively as a possibility, and as actually existing.
Existence, in this case, does no more than add the concrete and irrational character of the fact to the abstract and
intelligible notes of the essence. Some scholastics even ended up speaking about a distinction between the esse
essentiae, and the esse actualis existentiae, which corresponds to a merely logical starting point (as a reply to the
question what is a thing quid est and if a thing is an est ), but this is a starting point without any
metaphysical dimension.
The real distinction between essence and act of being is not to be identified with the couple to be thought to
really be. The authentic real composition of essentia esse is not the formal nexus of two modes of a being, but
rather the structuring of two real co-principles which make up the primary reality of being.
This composition is the transcendental structure of reality, which occurs in all finite beings inasmuch as they are
beings. This composition of essence and act of being (esse) is real: they are really distinct metaphysical principles
which constitute the radical unum which is being. It is necessary to admit this composition as real (and not only
cum fundamento in re), because finite things are, but they are not the act of being (esse), they do not exhaust being
(esse) either in intensity or in extension. They are, but without being being (esse): they have being (esse), they
participate in being (esse). The participating principle (the potency: essence) cannot be really identified with that
which is participated (the act: being esse). If essence and esse were identified, the real principle of limitation
(imperfection) would be the same as the real principle of perfection, which would violate the principle of non-
contradiction. There would be no proper explanation for the real existence of finite beings: we would be denying
either their reality or their finiteness(A. LLANO, Gnoseology, Sinag-Tala, Manila, 2001, pp. 116-117).
67
Summa Contra Gentiles, I, 22: Amplius. Omnis res est per hoc quod habet esse ; Summa Theologiae, I-II, q. 26,
a. 4: ens simpliciter est quod habet esse(Leon. 6.190).
68
Studies on the act of being (esse): R. J. HENLE, Existentialism and the Judgment, Proceedings of the American
Catholic Philosophical Association, 21 (1946), pp. 40-52 ; H. RENARD, The Metaphysics of the Existential
Judgment, The New Scholasticism, 23 (1949), pp. 387-394 ; M. PONTIFEX, The Meaning of Esse: A Thomistic
View Examined, The Downside Review, 67 (1949), pp. 395-405 ; E. A. SILLEM, Saint Thomas Aquinas on the
Meaning of Esse, The Downside Review, 68 (1950), pp. 414-428 ; M. PONTIFEX, The Meaning of Esse: A Reply,

17
 Explaining certain features of the act of being (esse) as act, Alvira, Clavell and Melendo
state: a) Above all, esse is an act, that is, a perfection of all reality. The term act is used in
metaphysics to designate any perfection or property of a thing; therefore, it is not to be used
exclusively to refer to actions or operations (the act of seeing or walking, for instance). In this
sense, a white rose is a flower that has whiteness as an act which gives the rose a specific
perfection. Similarly, that is which is applied to things indicates a perfection as real as the

The Downside Review, 68 (1950), pp. 429-438 ; E. NICOLETTI, Existentia e actus essendi in S. Tommaso,
Aquinas, 1 (1958), pp. 241-267 ; C. FABRO, La problematica dellesse Tomistico, Aquinas, 2 (1959), pp. 194-
225 ; E. BRAUN, Le problme de lesse chez saint Thomas, Archive de Philosophie, 36 (1959), pp. 211-226, 529-
565 ; H. J. JOHN, The Emergence of the Act of Existing in Recent Thomism, International Philosophical Quarterly,
2 (1962), pp. 595-620 ; C. FABRO, Per la determinazione dellessere Tomistico, Aquinas, 5 (1962), pp. 170-205 ;
D. OGRADY, Further Notes on Being, Esse, and Essence in an Existential Metaphysics, International
Philosophical Quarterly, 3 (1963), pp. 610-616 ; D. OGRADY, Esse and Metaphysics, The New Scholasticism,
39 (1965), pp. 283-294 ; C. FABRO, The Transcendentality of Ens-Esse and the Ground of Metaphysics,
International Philosophical Quarterly, 6 (1966), pp. 389-487 ; C. FABRO, Notes pour la fondation mtaphysique
de ltre, Revuew Thomiste, 66 (1966), pp. 214-237 ; J. MARITAIN, Rflexions sur la nature blesse et sur
lintuition de ltre, Revue Thomiste, 68 (1968), pp. 5-40 ; F. D. WILHELMSEN, The Triplex Via and the
Transcendence of Esse, The New Scholasticism, 44 (1970), pp. 223-235 ; E. GILSON, Propos sur ltre et sa
notion, in Studi tomistici (III): San Tommaso e il pensiero moderno, Rome, 1974, pp. 7-17 ; C. GIACON, Il
contributo originale di S. Tommaso allontologia classica, in Tommaso dAquino nel suo VII centenario. Congresso
internazionale, Rome-Naples, 1974, pp. 281-294 ; B. LAKEBRINK, La interpretacin existencial del concepto
tomista del acto de ser, in Veritas et Sapientia, EUNSA, Pamplona, 1975, pp. 21-40 ; J. OWENS, Aquinas on
Knowing Existence, Review of Metaphysics, 29 (1976), pp. 670-690 ; F. D. WILHELMSEN, The Concept of
Existence and the Structure of Judgment: A Thomistic Paradox, The Thomist, 41 (1977), pp. 317-349 ; F. D.
WILHELMSEN, Existence and Esse, The New Scholasticism, 50 (1976), pp. 20-45 ; A. DALLEDONNE,
Lautentico esse Tomistico e lequivoco neoscolastico sulla esistenza come atto in Carlo Giacon, Divus
Thomas, (1978), pp. 68-82 ; J. R. CATAN, Aristotele e San Tommaso intorno allactus essendi, Rivista di
Filosofia Neo-scolastica, 73 (1981), pp. 639-655 ; J. C. MALONEY, Esse in the Metaphysics of Thomas Aquinas,
The New Scholasticism, 55 (1981), pp. 159-177 ; M. GIGANTE, Actus essendi e atto libero nel pensiero di S.
Tommaso, in Atti del VIII Congresso Tomistico Internazionale, vol. 5, Libreria Editrice Vaticana, Vatican City,
1982, pp. 249-282 ; G. BONTADINI, Lessere come atto, Aquinas, 26 (1983), pp. 325-332 ; J. NIJENHUIS, To
Be or To Exist: That is the Question, The Thomist, 50 (1986), pp. 353-394 ; R. DIODATO, Tra Esse e Deissi:
Note per una conferma linguistica dellontologia gilsoniana, Rivista di Filosofia Neo-Scolastica, 78 (1986), pp. 3-
33 ; Y. FLOUCAT, tienne Gilson et la mtaphysique de lacte dtre, Revue Thomiste, 94 (1994), pp. 360-395 ;
A. CT, La question de lesse chez Thomas dAquin et Boce, Revue Philosophique de Louvain, 92 (1994), pp.
327-335 ; O. J. GONZALEZ, The Apprehension of the Act of Being in Aquinas, American Catholic Philosophical
Quarterly, 68.4 (1995), pp. 475-500 ; P. P. RUFFINENGO, Lipsum esse non ancora lactus essendi di S.
Tommaso, Aquinas, 38 (1995), pp. 631-635 ; R. ESCHAURI MORE, La nocin de esse en los primeros escritos
de Santo Toms de Aquino, Sapientia (Buenos Aires), 51 (1996), pp. 59-70 ; L. DEWAN, St. Thomas and the
Distinction Between Form and Esse in Caused Things, Gregorianum, 80.2 (1999), pp. 353-370 ; R. DI CEGLIE,
Fondazione critica dellactus essendi. Tra metafisica e pensiero cristiano in margine allanalisi ontologica della
soggettivit proposta da P. P. Ruffinengo, Rivista di Filosofia Neoscolastica, 96 (2004), pp. 529-556 ; S. L.
BROCK, On Whether Aquinass Ipsum Esse is Platonism, Review of Metaphysics, 60 (2006), pp. 723-757 ; A.
GONZLEZ GATICA, El pensamiento de Gilson sobre el actus essendi tomista, Pontificia Universit della Santa
Croce, Rome, 2006 ; J. F. X. KNASAS, Haldanes Analytic Thomism and Aquinass actus essendi, in Analytical
Thomism: Traditions in Dialogue, edited by C. Paterson and M. S. Pugh, Ashgate, Aldershot and Burlington, 2006,
pp. 233-251 ; S. L. BROCK, Harmonizing Plato and Aristotle on Esse: Thomas Aquinas and the De hebdomadibus,
Nova et Vetera, English Edition, 5.3 (2007), pp. 465-494 ; M. PAOLINI PAOLETTI, Esse ut actus e giudizio
desistenza: sulla riflessione metafisica di . Gilson, Euntes Docete, 63.1 (2010), pp. 191-215 ; M. PAOLINI
PAOLETTI, Conoscere lessere: Fabro, Gilson e la conoscenza dellactus essendi, in Crisi e destino della filosofia:
Studi su Cornelio Fabro, edited by A. Acerbi, EDUSC, Rome, 2012, pp. 157-172 ; J. MITCHELL, Being and
Participation: The Method and Structure of Metaphysical Reflection According to Cornelio Fabro, 2 vols, Pontifical
Athenaeum Regina Apostolorum, Rome, 2012.

18
perfection of life in living things. In the case of esse, however, we are obviously dealing with a
special perfection.

b) Esse is a universal act, that is, it belongs to all things. Esse is not exclusive to some
particular kind of reality, since without esse, there would be nothing at all. Whenever we talk
about anything, we have to acknowledge, first of all, that it is: the bird is, gold is, the clouds
are.

c) Esse is also a total act: it encompasses all that a thing is. While other acts only
refer to some part or aspects of being, esse is a perfection which includes everything that a thing
has, without any exception. Thus, the act of reading does not express the entirety of the
perfection of the person reading, but esse is the act of each and of all the parts of a thing. If a tree
is, then the whole tree is, with all its aspects and parts its color, shape, life and growth in
short, everything in it shares in its esse. Thus, esse encompasses the totality of a thing.

Esse is a constituent act, and the most radical or basic of all perfections because it is
that by which things are. As essence is that which makes a thing to be this or that (chair, lion,
man), esse is that which makes things to be. This can be seen from various angles:

(i) Esse is the most common of all acts. What makes all things to be cannot reside in
their principles of diversity (their essence), but precisely in that act whereby they are all alike,
namely, the act of being.

(ii) Esse is by nature prior to any other act. Any action or property presupposes a
subsisting subject in which it inheres, but esse is presupposed by all actions and all subjects, for
without it, nothing would be. Hence esse is not an act derived from what things are; rather it is
precisely what makes them to be.

(iii) We have to conclude, by exclusion, that esse is the constituent act. No physical or
biological property of beings their energy, molecular or atomic structure can make things be,
since all of these characteristics, in order to produce their effects, must, first of all, be.

In short, esse is the first and innermost act of a being which confers on the subject, from
within, all of its perfections. By analogy, just as the soul is the form of the body by giving life
to it, esse intrinsically actualizes every single thing. The soul is the principle of life, but esse is
the principle of entity or reality of all things.69

Explaining how the act of being (esse) is an act which encompasses all perfections, how
it is an act in the fullest sense, and how, in the final analysis, the act of being (esse) is the
ultimate act of a being (ens), Alvira, Clavell and Melendo write that the multiplicity of creatures
reveals the existence of diverse perfections. But, at the same time, it also reveals a perfection
which is common to all beings, namely esse. Esse transcends any other perfection, since it is
present in an analogous manner in each one of them. Every act presupposes and reveals esse,
although it does so in different ways: life, a color, a virtue, and an action all share in the act of
being in different degrees.
69
T. ALVIRA, L. CLAVELL, T. MELENDO, op. cit., pp. 20-22

19
 This common sharing in the act of being and the accompanying diversity in the way it is
possessed and revealed, are an expression of the fact that all creatures are composed of an act
(esse), which eminently encompasses all their perfections, and a potency (essence), which limits
esse to a determinate degree.

Esse (the actus essendi) is an act which encompasses all perfections. Just as every
man possesses a substantial form (act on the level of essence), which makes him a man, all
things have an act (esse) by which they are all beings. If the human substantial form were to exist
isolated from individual men, it would contain to the fullest possible degree all the perfections
which individual men have in a limited manner, in terms of number and intensity. If it is, in fact,
found to be restricted, this is due to the potency which receives it and limits it. Similarly, the act
of being of creatures, which is an image of the divine esse, is found to be restricted by a potency
(the essence) which limits the formers degree of perfection.

There is, however, an important difference between esse and the other perfections of a
being (the substantial and accidental forms). If any other act were to exist separated from every
potency, it would have the perfection belonging to its own mode of being (a subsistent
humanity would be man in his fullness), but would not possess any of the further perfections
which belong solely to other species. In contrast, the act of being, of itself, encompasses the
perfections, not only of a particular species, but of all real and possible ones.

Esse is an act in the fullest sense. It can be seen then, that the act of being is an act in
the full and proper sense, since it does not of itself include any limitation. The other acts, in
contrast, are particular ways of being and, therefore, only potency with respect to the act of
being. In this sense, they have being, not absolutely, but only in a specific way. Hence, it can be
said that they limit esse as a potency limits its act.70

Since esse possesses most fully the characteristics of act, it can subsist independently of
any potency. Thus, we are able to understand how God can be designated metaphysically as pure
Act of Being, who possesses fully and simply all perfections present among creatures. This pure
Act of Being infinitely surpasses the entire perfection of the whole universe.

In the final analysis, esse can be fittingly described as the ultimate act of a being (ens),
since all things and each of their perfections or acts are nothing but modes of being or forms
which possess, in a limited way (by participation), the radical act, without which, nothing would
be.

Esse is the act of all other acts of a being, since it actualizes any other perfection,
making it be. Human activity, for instance, which is second act, has its basis in operative
powers, which constitute first act in the accidental order. Along with other accidental

70
John Duns Scotus gave a formalist slant to metaphysics, thereby destroying the Thomistic doctrine of esse as act.
The same trend was followed by Suarez, Leibniz, Wolff, and Kant; these philosophers considered esse not as act,
but as effect (being in act): from esse ut actus to esse actu. Hartmann held the same viewWhen Heidegger
reproached Western metaphysics for having lost sight of being, he was in fact referring to the kind of metaphysics
which he had known, namely, the formalist type. It is quite well known that Heidegger had a scant knowledge of the
metaphysics of St. Thomas Aquinas; he had a greater familiarity with Scotus metaphysics.

20
perfections, these powers receive their actuality from the substantial form, which is the first act
of the essence. The entire perfection of the essence, however, stems in turn from esse, which is
therefore quite fittingly called the ultimate act and the act of all the acts of a being (ens).71

Prez de Laborda writes concerning the act of being (esse) as the actuality of all acts and
the perfection of all perfections: San Tommaso afferma che latto di essere un atto ultimo, in
quanto tutte le cose desiderano lessere,72 ed latto pi perfetto, in quanto pone in atto tutte le
perfezioni.73 dunque atto di tutti gli atti, poich li attualizza tutti, li fa essere: nessuna delle
forme (essenziali e accidentali) possono attualizzare le rispettive potenze, se non esiste la
sostanza. Ed essa sussiste in virt dellessere che ha ricevuto. Lessere, pertanto, atto rispetto a
tutte le realt sostanziali, ma anche rispetto a tutte le loro forme (che possono anche chiamarsi
atti).

Lessere inoltre perfezione di ogni perfezione. Senza lessere della sostanza, ogni sua
perfezione resta una pura possibilit, unidea astratta non realizzata nella realt. Tutte le
perfezioni, dunque, perch siano reali, presuppongono lessere. Ma lessere , come abbiamo
annunciato, una perfezione ben diversa a tutte le altre, una perfezione di un ordine che non
formale.74 Essendo di un ordine diverso, non una perfezione che si possa aggiungere alle altre
perfezioni, come se fosse una determinazione formale in pi. Non una tra le perfezioni
possedute, ma ci che rende possibile lavere delle perfezioni. Possiamo dire, con san Tommaso,
che lessere una perfezione intima e profonda,75 che si manifesta nelle molteplici perfezioni di
una realt. inoltre una perfezione ricevuta: infatti, proprio dellente creato non
semplicemente essere, ma aver lessere e averlo ricevuto per partecipazione.76

71
T. ALVIRA, L. CLAVELL, T. MELENDO, op. cit., pp. 107-109.
72
Latto ultimo lessere: essendo infatti ogni movimento un passagio dalla potenza allatto, ultimo atto ci a cui
tende ogni moto; e poich il moto naturale tende a ci che naturalmente desiderato, necessario che latto ultimo
sia ci che tutte le cose desiderano, e questo lessere(Compendium, I, 11).
73
Fra tutte le cose lessere la pi perfetta, poich verso tutte sta in rapporto di atto. Nulla infatti ha lattualit se
non in quanto esiste: perci lessere stesso lattualit di tutte le cose, anche delle stesse forme. Quindi esso non sta
in rapporto alle altre cose come il ricevente al ricevuto, ma piuttosto come il ricevuto al ricevente(Summa
Theologiae, I, a. 4, a. 1, ad 3).
74
Non si deve pensare che quando si attribuisce ad una cosa lessere le si aggiunge una qualche cosa che le sia
propria in modo pi formale, determinandola, cos come latto fa con la potenza: lessere tale da essere diverso
essenzialmente da ci cui viene aggiunto per determinarlo(De Potentia, q. 7, a. 2, ad 9).
75
Cfr. Summa Theologiae, I, q. 8, a. 1.
76
M. PREZ DE LABORDA and L. CLAVELL, Metafisica, EDUSC, Rome, 2006, pp. 163-164.

21