1 CPA officers concerned, including Mrs.
Sotto, acting for the accounting
DAVID P. LLORENTE, petitioner, vs. THE SANDIGANBAYAN (THIRD
DIVISION), and PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.
Padilla Law Office for petitioner.
1991 Oct 3
En Banc
G.R. No. 85464
DECISION
SARMIENTO, J.:
The petitioner questions the Decision of the Sandiganbayan ** holding him
civilly liable in spite of an acquittal. The facts are not disputed:
Atty. Llorente was employed in the PCA a public corporation (Sec. 1, PD
1468) from 1975 to August 31, 1986, when he resigned. He occupied the
positions of Assistant Corporate Secretary for a year, then Corporate Legal
Counsel until November 2, 1981, and, finally, Deputy Administrator for
Administrative Services, Finance Services and Legal Affairs Departments . . .
As a result of a massive reorganization in 1981, hundreds of PCA employees
resigned effective October 31, 1981. Among them were Mr. Curio, Mrs.
Perez, Mr. Azucena, and Mrs. Javier (TSN, Oct. 22/87, p. 2; Exhs. M-2, N-1,
and O-1).
They were all required to apply for PCA clearances in support of their gratuity
benefits (Exhs. C, M-2, N-1, and O-1). Condition (a) of the clearance
provided:
"The clearance shall be signed by the CPA officers concerned only when
there is no item appearing under "PENDING ACCOUNTABILITY" or after
every item previously entered thereunder is fully settled. Settlement thereof
shall be written in RED ink." (Exhs. D or D-1 and 1-B).
After the clearance was signed by the PCA officers concerned, it was to be
approved, first, by Atty. Llorente, in the case of a rank-and-file employee, or
by Col. Dueas, the acting administrator, in the case of an officer, and then
by Atty. Rodriguez, the corporate auditor . . .
Notwithstanding Condition (a) just quoted, the clearances of Mrs. Perez and
Mr. Azucena both dated October 30, 1981, were favorably acted upon by the
division, even if the clearances showed they had pending accountabilities to
the GSIS and the UCPB, and subsequently approved by Attys. Llorente and
Rodriguez (Exhs. M and N). Thereafter, the vouchers for their gratuity
benefits also indicating their outstanding obligations were approved, among
others, by Atty. Llorente, and their gratuity benefits released to them after
deducting those accountabilities . . .
The clearance of Mrs. Javier of the same date of October 30, 1981, was also
signed by all PCA officers concerned, including Mrs. Sotto even though the
former had unsettled obligations noted thereon, viz: GSIS loan P5,387.00
and UCPB car loan P19,705.00, or a total of P25,092.00, and later on
approved by Col. Dueas, Mrs. Javier being an officer, and Atty. Rodriguez
(Exh. O). Similarly, the voucher of Mrs. Javier for her gratuity benefits
likewise recited her accountabilities of P25,092.00 plus P92,000.00, which
was handwritten. Both amounts were deducted from her gratuity benefits,
and the balance released to her on November 16, 1981. The voucher passed
post-audit by Atty. Rodriguez on December 1, 1981 (Exhs. L, L-1, L-2, and L-
3).
The said P92,000.00 was the disallowed portion of the cash advances
received by Mr. Curio in connection with his duties as "super cargo" in the
distribution of seed nuts throughout the country. He received them through
and in the name of Mrs. Javier from the UCPB. When the amount was
disallowed, the UCPB withheld from the PCA certain receivables; the later, in
turn, deducted the same amount from the gratuity benefits of Mrs. Javier, she
being primarily liable therefor (Exhs. L, L-1, L-2, and L-3). At the time of the
deduction, the additional liquidation papers had already been submitted and
were in process. Just in case she would not be successful in having the
entire amount wiped out, she requested Mr. Curio, who admittedly received
it, to execute, as he did, an affidavit dated November 26, 1981, in which he
assumed whatever portion thereof might not be allowed . . .
The clearance of Mr. Curio dated November 4, 1981, (Exh. D or D-1) likewise
favorably passed all officers concerned, including Mrs. Sotto, the latter
signing despite the notation handwritten on December 8, 1981, that Mr. Curio
had pending accountabilities, namely: GSIS loan 2,193.74, 201 accounts
receivable P3,897.75, and UCPB loan P3,623.49, or a total of
P10,714.78.
1
However, when the clearance was submitted to Atty. Llorente for approval, he
refused to approve it. For this reason, the clearance was held up in his office
and did not reach Atty. Rodriguez, . . .
The reason given by Atty. Llorente was that when the clearance was
presented to him on December 8, 1981, he was already aware of the affidavit
dated November 26, 1981, in which Mr. Curio assumed to pay any residual
liability for the disallowed cash advances, which at the time, December 8,
1981, stood at P92,000.00 (Exhs. 2 and 2-A). Moreover, Mr. Curio had other
pending obligations noted on his clearance totalling P10,714.98 (Exh. 1-a).
To justify his stand, Atty. Llorente invoked Condition (a) of the clearance
(Exhs. D and I-B), which, he said, was "very stringent" and could not be
interpreted in any other way . . .
On December 1, 1982, Mr. Curio brought the matter of his unapproved
clearance to Col. Dueas (Exh. G), who referred it to the Legal Department,
which was under Atty. Llorente as Deputy Administrator for legal affairs. After
follow-up in that department, Mr. Curio received the answer of Col. Dueas
dated February 11, 1983, saying that the clearance was being withheld until
the former settled his alleged accountability for P92,000.00 reduced already
to P55,000.00 (Exh. I). Mr. Curio elevated the matter to the Chairman of the
PCA Board, who indorsed it to Col. Dueas, who, in turn, sent it to the Legal
Department. This time the latter, through its Manager, Manuel F. Pastor, Jr.,
first cousin of Atty. Llorente, submitted a formal report under date of August
14, 1986, to the PCA Chairman, justifying the action taken by Atty. Llorente
and Col. Dueas (Exh. 12). The PCA Chairman did not respond in writing,
but advised Mr. Curio to wait for the resolution of the Tanodbayan with which
he (Mr. Curio) had filed this case initially against Atty. Llorente and, later on,
against Col. Dueas also. On August 31, 1986, Atty. Llorente resigned from
the PCA; the clearance, however, could not be issued because, according to
the PCA Corporate Legal Counsel, Arthur J. Liquete, the PCA did not want to
preempt the Tanodbayan. On November 12, 1986, the latter decided to
institute this case in court . . .
Nine days thereafter, or on November 21, 1986, Mr. Curio accomplished
another clearance, which no longer imposed Condition (a) of his earlier
clearance (Exh. E). The new clearance was approved, even if he still had
pending accountabilities, totalling P10,714.78 that had remained unsettled
since December 1981. His voucher was also approved, and his gratuity
benefits paid to him in the middle of December 1986, after deducting those
obligations (Exh. F). Nothing was mentioned anymore about the disallowed
cash advances of P92,000.00, which had been reduced to P55,000.00 . . .
Between December 1981 and December 1986, Mr. Curio failed to get gainful
employment; as a result, his family literally went hungry. In 1981, he applied
for work with the Philippine Cotton Authority, but was refused, because he
could not present his PCA clearance. The same thing happened when he
sought employment with the Philippine Fish Marketing Administration in
January 1982. In both prospective employers, the item applied for was
P2,500.00 a month At that time, he was only about 45 years old and still
competitive in the job market. But in 1986, being already past 50 years, he
could no longer be hired permanently, there being a regulation to that effect.
His present employment with the Philippine Ports Authority, which started on
March 16, 1987, was casual for that reason. Had his gratuity benefits been
paid in 1981, he would have received a bigger amount, considering that
since then interest had accrued and the foreign exchange rate of the peso to
the dollar had gone up . . . 1
On December 10, 1986, an Information for violation of Section 3(c) of the
Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act was filed against the petitioner:
That on or about December 8, 1981 and or subsequent thereto, in Quezon
City, Philippines, and within the Jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, accused
David Pastor Llorente, Deputy Administrator for the Philippine Coconut
Authority (PCA), and as such was empowered among others to approve
clearances of employees thereat, taking advantage of his position, through
evident bad faith, did then and there, wilfully and unlawfully refuse to issue a
certificate of clearance to Herminigildo M. Curio, an employee thereat, who
was forced to resign as a result of the abolition of his item pursuant to the
1981 reorganization of the PCA, resulting in his deprivation to receive his
gratuity benefits amounting to P29,854.90, and to secure employment with
other offices to his damage and prejudice, and that of the public service.
CONTRARY TO LAW.
Manila, Philippines, December 10, 1986. 2
As indicated at the outset, the Sandiganbayan acquitted the petitioner in the
absence of any evidence that he acted in bad faith. 3 The Sandiganbayan
cited three considerations that precluded bad faith:
2
First, when Atty. Llorente withheld favorable action on the clearance on and
after December 8, 1981, there was still the possibility, remote though it was
when viewed after the fact, that the accountability, which Mrs. Javier was
primarily liable therefor and which was fully settled by deduction from her
gratuity benefits on November 16, 1981 (Exhs. L, L-1, L-2, and L-3), would
be reinstated and charged directly to Mr. Curio, for the latter executed on
November 26, 1981, an affidavit assuming responsibility for the obligation to
the extent of the amount finally disallowed, and the affidavit was on
December 8, 1981, already pending consideration by the PCA management
(Exhs. 2 and 2-A).
Second, Atty. Llorente was appointed Deputy Administrator for administrative
services, finance services, and legal affairs departments only on November
2, 1981 (TSN, March 9/87, p. 3). Being new in his job, it was but natural that
he was zealous in the performance of his functions in fact, overzealous in
the protection of the PCA interests, even if that protection was not necessary,
as the P92,000.00 accountability had already been paid (See Exh. 12, 4th
paragraph).
Finally, Atty. Llorente was officiously, though incidentally, taking care also of
the interest of Mrs. Javier who, justice and equity demanded, should not be
made to shoulder the P92,000.00 unliquidated cash advances, for the reason
that it was Mr. Curio who admittedly spent them or who, at the very least,
should be able to get reimbursement of what she paid, totally or partially,
from his gratuity benefits (See Exh. 5, pp. 2-3). 4
The Sandiganbayan, as we also indicated earlier, took the petitioner to task
civilly, and ordered him to pay "compensatory damages" in the sum of
P90,000.00. According to the Sandiganbayan, the petitioner was guilty
nonetheless of abuse of right (under Article 19 of the Civil Code) and as a
public officer, he was liable for damages suffered by the aggrieved party
(under Article 27).
The petitioner claims that the Sandiganbayan's Decision is erroneous even if
the Sandiganbayan acquitted him therein, because he was never in bad faith
as indeed found by the Sandiganbayan.
Under the 1985 Rules of Criminal Procedure, amending Rules 110 through
127 of the Rules of Court, the judgment of the court shall include, in case of
acquittal, and unless there is a clear showing that the act from which the civil
liability might arise did not exist, "a finding on the civil liability of the accused
in favor of the offended party." 5 The rule is based on the provisions of
substantive law, 6 that if acquittal proceeds from reasonable doubt, a civil
action lies nonetheless.
The challenged judgment found that the petitioner, in refusing to issue a
certificate of clearance in favor of the private offended party, Herminigildo
Curio, did not act with "evident bad faith," one of the elements of Section 3(e)
of Republic Act No. 3819. 7 We agree with the judgment, insofar as it found
lack of evident bad faith by the petitioner, for the reasons cited therein,
basically, because the petitioner was acting within the bounds of law in
refusing to clear Curio although "[t]he practice was that the clearance was
nevertheless approved, and then the amount of the unsettled obligation was
deducted from the gratuity benefits of the employee." 8
We also agree with the Sandiganbayan (although the Sandiganbayan did not
say it) that although the petitioner did not act with evident bad faith, he acted
with bad faith nevertheless, for which he should respond for damages.
The records show that the office practice indeed in the Philippine Coconut
Authority was to clear the employee (retiree) and deduct his accountabilities
from his gratuity benefits. There seems to be no debate about the existence
of this practice (the petitioner admitted it later on) and in fact, he cleared
three employees on the condition that their obligations should be deducted
from their benefits. 9 We quote:
Confronted with these evidence [sic], Atty. Llorente conceded, albeit
grudgingly, the existence of the practice by the accounting division of not
complying with Condition (a). He, however, claimed that he learned of the
practice only during the trial of this case and that he must have inadvertently
approved the clearances of Mrs. Perez, Mr. Azucena, and, possibly others
who were similarly situated (TSN, March 9/88, pp. 4-5). This the evidence
belies. First, he himself testified that when the clearance of Mr. Curio was
presented to him in December 1981, it already bore the signature of Mrs.
Sotto of the accounting division and the notation set opposite her name
about the outstanding accountabilities of Mr. Curio; but he (Atty. Llorente)
significantly did not ask her why she signed the clearance (TSN, Nov. 24/87,
pp. 24-25). Second, in that month, Atty. Llorente approved Mrs. Perez's and
Mr. Azucena's vouchers showing that they had pending obligations to the
GSIS and the UCPB, which were being deducted from their gratuity benefits.
3
Attached to those vouchers were the clearances as supporting documents
(Exhs. M-2 and N-1; TSN, Dec. 7/87, pp. 13, 23). And third, in that same
month, Atty. Llorente was already aware of the case of Mrs. Javier whose
clearance and voucher were, according to him, precisely withheld because of
her unsettled accountability for the cash advances of P92,000.00, but here
later on given due course; and her gratuity benefits released on November
16, 1981, minus that amount (TSN, Nov. 24/87, pp. 31-32; Exhs. L, L-1, L-2
and L-3).
The cash advances of P92,000.00 were the primary obligation of Mrs. Javier,
since they were secured through her and in her name from the UCPB. That
was why they were charged to and deducted from, her gratuity benefits.
Consequently, as early as that date and in so far as the PCA and the UCPB
were concerned, the accountability was already fully paid. The assumption of
residual liability by Mr. Curio for the cash advances on November 26, 1981,
was a matter between him and Mrs. Javier (Exhs. 2 and 2-A). 10
The general rule is that this Court is bound by the findings of fact of the
Sandiganbayan. 11
As we said, the acts of the petitioner were legal (that is, pursuant to
procedures), as he insists in this petition, yet it does not follow, as we said,
that his acts were done in good faith. For emphasis, he had no valid reason
to "go legal" all of a sudden with respect to Mr. Curio, since he had cleared
three employees who, as the Sandiganbayan found, "were all similarly
circumstanced in that they all had pending obligations when, their clearances
were filed for consideration, warranting similar official action." 12
The Court is convinced that the petitioner had unjustly discriminated against
Mr. Curio.
It is no defense that the petitioner was motivated by no ill-will (a grudge,
according to the Sandiganbayan), since the facts speak for themselves. It is
no defense either that he was, after all, complying merely with legal
procedures since, as we indicated, he was not as strict with respect to the
three retiring other employees. There can be no other logical conclusion that
he was acting unfairly, no more, no less, to Mr. Curio.
It is the essence of Article 19 of the Civil Code, under which the petitioner
was made to pay damages, together with Article 27, that the performance of
duty be done with justice and good faith. In the case of Velayo vs. Shell Co.
of the Philippines, 13 we held the defendant liable under Article 19 for
disposing of its property a perfectly legal act in order to escape the reach
of a creditor. In two fairly more recent cases, Sevilla vs. Court of Appeals 14
and Valenzuela vs. Court of Appeals, 15 we held that a principal is liable
under Article 19 in terminating the agency again, a legal act when
terminating the agency would deprive the agent of his legitimate business.
We believe that the petitioner is liable under Article 19.
The Court finds the award of P90,000.00 to be justified by Article 2202 of the
Civil Code, which holds the defendant liable for all "natural and probable"
damages. Hermenegildo Curio presented evidence that as a consequence of
the petitioner's refusal to clear him, he failed to land a job at the Philippine
Cotton Authority and Philippine First Marketing Authority. He also testified
that a job in either office would have earned him a salary of P2,500.00 a
month, or P150,000.00 in five years. Deducting his probable expenses of
reasonably about P1,000.00 a month, or P60,000.00 in five years, the
petitioner owes him a total of actual damages of P90,000.00.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Petition is DENIED. No
pronouncement as to costs.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
Fernan (C.J.), Narvasa, Melencio-Herrera, Gutierrez, Jr., Cruz, Paras,
Feliciano, Padilla, Bidin, Grio-Aquino, Medialdea, Regalado and Davide, Jr.,
JJ., concur.
Footnotes
1. Rollo, 62-66.
2. Id., 49-50.
3. In the case of Mejorada vs. Sandiganbayan, Nos. 57065-72, June 30,
1987, 151 SCRA 399, the Court cited three elements making up violations of
Section 3(e) of the Anti-Graft Law: "First, that the accused must be a public
officer charged with the duty of granting licenses or permits or other
concessions. Petitioner contends that inasmuch as he is not charged with the
duty of granting licenses, permits or other concessions, then he is not the
officer contemplated by Section 3(e).
4
 Section 3 cited above enumerates in eleven subsections the corrupt 4. Rollo, id., 72.
practices of any public officers declared unlawful. Its reference to "any public 5. RULES OF COURT, Rule 120, sec. 2.
officer" is without distinction or qualification and it specifies the acts declared 6. CIVIL CODE, art. 29.
unlawful. We agree with the view adopted by the Solicitor General that the 7. See Mejorada vs. Sandiganbayan, supra.
last sentence of paragraph (e) is intended to make clear the inclusion of 8. Rollo, id., 53.
officers and employees of offices or government corporations which, under 9. Id., 70, 71, 75.
the ordinary concept of "public officers" may not come within the term. It is a 10. Id., 70-71.
strained construction of the provision to read it as applying exclusively to 11. Castillo vs. Sandiganbayan, Nos. 52352-57, June 20, 1987, 151 SCRA
public officers charged with the duty of granting licenses or permits or other 425.
concessions. 12. Rollo, id., 71.
13. 120 Phil. 187 (1956).
The first element, therefore, of Section 3(e) is that the accused must 14. Nos. L-41182-83, April 15, 1988, 160 SCRA 171.
be a public officer. This, the informations did not fail to allege. 15. G.R. No. 83122, October 19, 1990, 190 SCRA 1.

Second, that such public officer caused undue injury to any party,
including the Government, or gave any private party unwarranted benefits,
advantage or preference in the discharge of his official administrative or
judicial functions.

Petitioner denies that there was injury or damage caused the

Government because the payments were allegedly made on the basis of a
document solely made by the Highway District Engineer to which petitioner
had no hand in preparing. The fact, however, is that the government suffered
undue injury as a result of the petitioner's having inflated the true claims of
complainants which became the basis of the report submitted by the
Highway District Engineer to the Regional Director of the Department of
Highways and which eventually became the basis of payment. His contention
that he had no participation is belied by the fact that as a right-of-way-agent,
his duty was precisely to negotiate with property owners who are affected by
highway constructions for the purpose of compensating them.

On the part of the complainants, the injury caused to them consists in

their being divested of a large proportion of their claims and receiving
payment in an amount even lower than the actual damage they incurred.
They were deprived of the just compensation to which they are entitled.

Third, the injury to any party, or giving any private party any
unwarranted benefits, advantage or preference was done through manifest
partiality, evident bad faith or gross inexcusable negligence." (Supra, 405-
406.).

5
 2 Respondent de Ocampo, upon the other hand, predicates his claim on an
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner, vs. THE HONORABLE
COURT OF APPEALS, ALFREDO V. DE OCAMPO, and OSCAR ANGLO,
respondents.
1978 May 31
En Banc
G.R. Nos. L-31303-04
DECISION
SANTOS, J:
An appeal by certiorari filed on December 5, 1969 by petitioner, Republic of
the Philippines (Republic. for short), from the resolution of the Court of
Appeals dated August 21,1969 1 dismissing petitioner's appeal in CA-G.R.
Nos. 40683-84-R, as well as from the resolution of the said Court dated
November 14, 1969 2 denying petitioner's motion for reconsideration thereof.
The relevant and essential factual and procedural antecedents follow. Both
Republic and respondents Alfredo V. de Ocampo and Oscar Anglo claim
ownership over the same lots, i.e., Nos. 817 and 2509 of the Sagay-
Escalante Cadastre, Negros Occidental, subject matter of this litigation. The
basis of Republic's claim is that said lots were bequeathed to the Bureau of
Education (now Bureau of Public Schools) on September 21, 1926 by the
late Esteban Jalandoni through his will. 3 Republic further alleged that the
said parcels of land were already registered under the Torrens System
"before 1919 in a cadastral case in the name of Meerkamp and Company" in
whose favor Original Certificate of Title (OCT, for short) No. 370 was issued;
that said company sold the lots to Esteban Jalandoni who was issued
Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT, for short) No. 1251; that TCT No. 6014 was
issued to the Bureau of Education when the subject property was
bequeathed to it; and that as a matter of fact, a sugar quota (Plantation Audit
No. 24-10) was issued for the lots under the name of the Bureau of
Education. 4 The lots have a total area of 289.47 hectares. 5
application for registration of the same Lots Nos. 817 and 2509 in Land
Registration Case No. N-4, LRC Rec. No. N-19196, wherein a decree of
registration No. 105538 was issued over the lots, followed by the issuance in
his name of OCT No. 576, on October 1, 1965. 6 He averred that the lots
were unregistered lands belonging to and possessed by him, by virtue of a
donation dated November 10, 1911 from one Luis Mosquera. 7
Respondent Anglo intervened in the case on February 21, 1966, having
allegedly bought the same lots from respondent de Ocampo on January 6,
1966. TCT No. 42217 was issued to him (Anglo) on January 12, 1966. 8
Procedurally, the records show that the Bureau of Public Schools, then
represented by the Provincial Fiscal of Negros Occidental initiated on
December 24, 1958, a forcible entry and detainer case against de Ocampo
over Lots Nos. 817 and 2509. On appeal, the Court of First Instance of
Negros Occidental dismissed the complaint (Civil Case No. 5353). 9
Then on June 29, 1960, de Ocampo filed an application for registration of the
same two parcels of land in Land Registration Case No. N-4 LRC Rec. No.
N-19196, entitled "Alfredo V. de Ocampo, Applicant, v. Republic of the
Philippines, Oppositor." Republic filed its opposition in due time. 10
On May 2, 1961, Republic, represented by the Solicitor General filed a
complaint against de Ocampo with the Court of First Instance of Negros
Occidental (Branch VII) for the recovery of possession of the subject lots,
with prayer for the issuance of a writ of preliminary mandatory injunction,
docketed therein as Civil Case No. 264 (6154), entitled "Republic of the
Philippines v. Alfredo v. de Ocampo, Defendant." 11 De Ocampo averred in
his answer that the properties alleged to have been donated by Esteban
Jalandoni to the then Bureau of Education were different from the properties
involved in this case, the former being titled lands (TCT No. 1251) containing
two million nine hundred and twelve thousand four hundred and seventy four
square meters (2,912,474), while Lots Nos. 817 and 2509 applied for by de
Ocampo and which Republic sought to recover were unregistered lands, and
that granting, without admitting, that they are the same lands, the court no
6
longer had jurisdiction over the subject matter of the action since the issue of
possession over said lots was already decided by the Court of First Instance
of Negros Occidental. 12
On May 26, 1961, a preliminary hearing was held before Branch IV of the
Court of First Instance of Negros Occidental, where the land registration case
was pending, but inasmuch as the issues involved in both Civil Case No. 264
(6154) for recovery of possession and the land registration case were
identical, the parties agreed to a joint trial, this time before Branch VII, Judge
Jose D. Divinagracia, presiding, where the civil case was pending. 13
After a joint trial of the above-mentioned two (2) cases, the Court of First
Instance rendered judgment on August 3, 1965, dismissing the complaint in
Civil Case No. 264 (6154) and adjudging the registration of the subject two
lots in the name of the then applicant de Ocampo. On October 1, 1965, OCT
No. 576 was issued in his name. 14
It is admitted by Republic that it received a copy of the decision on August
13, 1965 15 but no appeal was taken therefrom. However, Republic later
filed with the trial court on December 28, 1965, a "Petition for Relief from
Judgment with Preliminary Injunction Pending Proceeding" 16 (petition, for
short) praying, among other things, that de Ocampo be restrained from
enforcing the decision dated 3 August 1965, and that after the hearing, an
order be issued declaring the said decision to be not yet final and executory,
and granting Republic the right to file a motion for reconsideration and/or
appeal within the period granted, to commence upon receipt of the order.
The petition alleged inter alia that the Republic's failure to appeal was due to
accident, mistake and/or excusable negligence, specifically, stating that its
docket clerk, Cesar Salud, merely committed excusable negligence when he
inadvertently attached the copy of the decision to the file of another case;
that it was only on November 5, 1965, that Cesar Salud found the copy of the
same, and that petitioner has a substantial cause of action in Civil Case No.
264 (6154) and a good and substantial defense in Land Registration Case
No. N-4 Rec. No. N-19196.
An opposition to the petition was filed by respondent de Ocampo on
February 5, 1966 17 or the ground that the same was filed beyond the
reglementary period. The petition was, however, given due course on
January 11, 1966. 18 On February 21, 1966, respondent Oscar Anglo filed a
motion for intervention alleging that he bought the subject two (2) Lots Nos.
817 and 1509 from respondent de Ocampo on January 6, 1966 and that TCT
No. 42217 of the Register of Deeds for Negros Occidental was issued to him
(Anglo) on January 12, 1966. 19 He also filed an answer in opposition to
Republic's petition for relief from judgment 20 on the grounds, among others,
that the decree of registration and certificate of title had already been issued
and that a writ of preliminary injunction will not lie to restrain enforcement of
the decision of the trial court.
On June 6, 1966, after respondents filed their respective memoranda, the
trial court dismissed the Republic's petition for lack of competent proof,
pursuant to Section 6, Rule 38, of the Rules of Court which the court said
required a hearing. 21
On July 25, 1966, petitioner Republic filed a motion for reconsideration of the
aforesaid order dismissing its petition; 22 and on August 4, 1966, it filed a
manifestation averring additional grounds in support of the motion for
reconsideration. 23 Respondent Anglo and de Ocampo opposed the same.
24
On September 28, 1966, Republic filed an "Amended Petition for Relief from
Judgment and/or Review of Decree with Preliminary Injunction" 25
(Amended Petition, for short). In specific regard to the petition for review of
the decree, Republic contended, inter alia, that actual fraud had been
perpetrated by respondent de Ocampo in securing the lower court's decision
ordering the registration of the lots in his name, as well as the issuance of the
decree of registration and the corresponding certificate of title, on the
grounds which, briefly restated, advert to respondent de Ocampo's alleged
misrepresentations that the two parcels of land applied for by him in the land
registration case were "different from the two parcels of land of the same lot
numbers, technical descriptions and areas belonging to the Government,
knowing such allegations to be false, the truth of the matter being that said
7
parcels of land are the same property owned by the Government"; 26 that
there was previous registration of the same parcels of land, Lots Nos. 817
and 2509, under the Torrens System in favor of Meerkamp and Company
which later sold the same to Jalandoni who, in turn, gave the lots to the
Bureau of Education as a legacy; and that the Court of First Instance no
longer had jurisdiction to decree again the registration of Lots Nos. 817 and
2509, in favor of respondent de Ocampo, in view of the earlier registration of
the same lands in favor of Meerkamp and Company.
In a subsequent hearing on June 6, 1967, the trial court ordered Republic to
present its evidence in the absence of respondents, who objected thereto for
lack of jurisdiction, the parcels of land having been already registered in the
name of respondent de Ocampo and in fact transferred to an alleged buyer in
good faith, the other private respondent, Anglo.

Additionally, Republic claimed that its counsel was not given notice of de On August 30, 1967, the trial court rendered its decision on the Amended
Ocampo's motion and the corresponding order dated September 16, 1965, Petition 38 against Republic, upon resolution of what it considered the
for the issuance of the decree of registration and the issuance of the decree "decisive" issue, i.e., that the allegations in the said petition did not constitute
itself by the Land Registration Commission, "in violation of its constitutional actual and extrinsic fraud which is the only ground available to review or
rights to due process"; 27 that it has also been "in continuous peaceful, reopen a decree in cadastral cases pursuant to Section 38 of Act 496. 39
adverse, open and public owner and possessor, in good faith and with just
title" of the lots "deriving the fruits and products of said properties and
appropriating them to the purpose and purposes they were intended for"; 28
On the other issues, the trial court found that it was through mistake,
that they were in fact declared for tax purposes; 29 that on April 11, 1927,
accident and excusable negligence that the decision of August 3, 1965 was
the lands were leased for ten (10) years but the lease was amended several
not brought to the attention of Solicitor Emerito Salva "as it was inadvertently
times to extend the same 30 as that on September 17, 1964, Republic's
clipped to the record of another case". 40 However, while the petition for
counsel filed a "Petition for an Order to Produce the Original Documentary
relief itself was filed within the reglementary period prescribed in Section 3,
Exhibits and Submit Same to the NBI for Examination," 31 which petition
Rule 38, of the Rules of Court 41 the remedy of relief from judgment was no
was communicated to de Ocampo's lawyers, Atty. Gemarino and Garingalao,
longer available since the decree, and later the title, were already issued in
earlier on September 7, 1964; that they did not object or state that the
the name of respondent de Ocampo." 42 It also held that the amended
originals were burned or lost; that it was only on September 28, 1964 that de
petition was still legally available as it was filed within one (1) year after the
Ocampo's lawyers revealed for the first time in their "Manifestation and
issuance of the decree, pursuant to Section 38 of Act No. 496, "in case of
Reply" that the purported originals were burned in the house of Atty.
actual fraud" and that it had jurisdiction to entertain the amended petition and
Gemarino on May 16, 1963; 32 and that the "supposed originals were fake
to receive evidence in support thereof, 43 but it had to deny the relief prayed
and their alleged burning was false and these pretenses were intentionally
for on grounds already adverted to. In regard to respondent Anglo's claim
resorted to only to evade the examination of the spurious documents by the
that the petition for review was no longer tenable as against him because he
NBI and as camouflage to hide their fraudulent character." 33
was a purchaser in good faith, the trial court ruled that competent evidence to
that effect should be submitted considering, among other things, that the
case was pending when he acquired his interest. 44 Finally, it held that the
On October 4, 1966, the trial court set aside its order of June 6, 1966, fact that the Republic was not notified of the motion and the corresponding
dismissing the petition for relief, 34 having found Republic's motion for issuance of the decree and title was immaterial since petitions for issuance of
reconsideration well-founded, and scheduled December 1 and 2, 1966, for decrees in cadastral cases are analogous to petitions for execution in
Republic's witnesses to testify, and likewise gave respondents, a chance to ordinary cases and parties are not entitled to notice thereof as a matter of
oppose the amended petition. Respondents and Republic filed their right. 45 Thus
opposition 35 and reply; 36 respectively. Republic alleged in the said reply
that "(T)he lands in question and their incomes are used exclusively for a
public purpose: public education." 37

8
"In the light of the decision of this Court dated August 3, 1965, Section 39 of
Act No. 496 and the authorities cited . . . this court is persuaded to conclude
as it hereby holds, that the evidence adduced by the petitioner in this incident
does not establish actual and constructive fraud which is the only kind of
fraud that is considered a legal ground to review, reopen or set aside the
decree which has already been issued in the name of Alfredo V. de Ocampo.
PREMISES CONSIDERED, the petition for Relief from Judgment and/or
Review of Decree is hereby dismissed without pronouncement as to costs."
46
From the said decision, Republic appealed to the Court of Appeals, docketed
therein as CA G.R. Nos. 4083-84-R. Private respondents de Ocampo and
Anglo moved to dismiss the appeal which was opposed by petitioner,
Republic. 47 A supplemental motion to the same effect was later filed by
respondent de Ocampo for failure of the record on appeal to show on its face
that it was filed on time, 48 followed by an ex parte motion to consider the
Solicitor General to have waived his right to oppose the said supplemental
motion to dismiss and that the case be submitted for resolution. 49 A new
party, Salvacion Maranon, sought to intervene in the case and also filed a
motion to dismiss the appeal before respondent appellate court.
In its minute resolution of August 21, 1969, 50 the Court of Appeals resolved
"(1) To DISMISS . . . the appeal . . . for failure of the record on appeal to
show on its face that the record on appeal was filed within the period fixed by
the Rules (Secs. 3 & 6, Rule 41, Sec 1[a] & [b], Rule 50, Rules of Court), it
appearing that appellant's motion for extension of 20 days from October 14,
1967 to file the record on appeal was never granted by the lower court (there
being no showing to that effect in the record on appeal); and even if there
was such an order granting it, the extension asked for would have expired on
November 3, 1967 and, therefore, the record on appeal filed on November 9,
1967 was filed six days later . . . ; and
(2) to DENY the motion to intervene of intervenor Salvacion Maraon
following the doctrine enunciated in Hant, et al. vs. O'Leary, et al. page 993.
At any rate, the purpose of intervening; which is to join the appellees in their
motion to dismiss the appeal of the appellant, has already been served by
the dismissal of the instant appeal."
On September 11, 1969, Republic filed a motion for reconsideration 51 but
on November 14, 1969, the Court of Appeals
"RESOLVED TO DENY the said motion for reconsideration. Rulings in the
pertinent cases are equally applicable to the Republic of the Philippines
where the Latter is the appellant that recourse to the original records is
immaterial because it is what appears in the record on appeal that is
essential." 52
Hence, this appeal by certiorari on the following assignment of errors, i.e.,
that the Court of Appeals erred in not holding that (1) prescription, the
statute of limitations and laches do not be against the Republic, as a
sovereign state, and that, it is not bound or prejudiced by the faults or
mistakes of its officers and employees, (2) the dismissal of Republic's appeal
is not in accordance with the liberal construction of the Rules of Court and
the promotion of its object to assist the parties in obtaining just, speedy and
inexpensive determination of actions and proceedings; (3) the trial court has
no jurisdiction to entertain the application for land registration of Alfredo V. de
Ocampo on the ground that Lots Nos. 817 and 2509 were already registered
under the Torrens System before 1919; (4) the dismissal of Republic's appeal
placed technicality over substance; and (5) the dismissal of Republic's
appeal will abet and promote land grabbing. 53
Private respondents in turn stress in their respective briefs, inter alia, (1) that
Republic shed its immunity and sovereignty and assumed the garb of an
ordinary private litigant when it initiated an action for forcible entry and
detainer case over Lots Nos. 817 and 2509 against respondent de Ocampo,
filed its opposition in the land registration case, and instituted Civil Case No.
264 (6154); 54 (2) that Republic should comply with the mandatory and
jurisdictional requirements of the rules on perfection of appeals, citing cases;
9
55 that there cannot be one set of Rules for ordinary private litigants, and
another set for the State otherwise the set-up will result in the denial of due
process and equal protection of law to private litigants as well as chaos in the
administration of justice; 56 and (4) that public policy and sound practice
demand that, at the risk of occasional errors, judgments of courts should
become final at some definite date fixed by the law. 57
The threshold and, in the ultimate analysis, the decisive issue raised by this
petition is whether the dismissal by respondent Court of Appeals of
Republic's appeal from the decision of the trial court denying its Amended
Petition, is not proper and should be set aside as contended by Republic, or
correct and should be maintained, as argued by respondents. The issue
framed in the context of the suit's true significance to the parties involved in
this protracted proceeding and in the light of the value the protagonists attach
to the outcome of the litigation may be stated thus Should the government,
represented by petitioner Republic not be permitted by respondent Court of
Appeals to show that it stands to lose thru fraudulent machinations close to
three hundred (300) hectares of prime sugar land to the private respondents,
who have allegedly secured their titles to these holdings long after the same
parcels of land were already titled in the name of the original owner,
Meerkamp and Company and, therefore, the trial court's action in directing
the issuance of the title in the name of respondent de Ocampo is null and
void ab initio and of no legal effect, simply because petitioner Republic failed
to show in its record on appeal that it was perfected on time and that it
actually filed its record on appeal six (6) days late?
Respondent Court of Appeals, in a very simplistic approach, which
disregards the substantive merits of the appeal dismissed, the same on the
grounds that the record on appeal did not show on its face that it was
perfected on time, and, additionally, that even if it were to be assumed that
the motion for extension of 20 days to file the record on appeal was indeed
granted, the appeal was still not perfected on time because the record on
appeal was filed November 9, six (6) days after November 3, 1967, when
petitioner's requested extension expired.
If respondents' line of reasoning were to be upheld, the dismissal of the
appeal may be sustained. For, as stated, in its notice of appeal filed on
October 12, 1967, petitioner Republic received a copy of the decision of the
trial court on September 14, 1967. 58 Therefore, it had until October 14,
1967 within which to file its record on appeal. The record on appeal does not
show that the extension prayed for was granted, but the lower court in its
order of December 4, 1967 approved the same, as there was no opposition
to its approval. There is also no mention in the order approving the record on
appeal as to whether or not it was filed on time. The record on appeal is,
however, dated November 9, 1967. Assuming then that this was also the
actual filing date, and on the further assumption that the 20-day extension
was impliedly granted with its approval, it was still filed six (6) days late, after
the requested extension expired on November 3, 1967. 59 And, as to the
legal ground for the dismissal on the foregoing bases, this Court has
repeatedly construed Section 6, Rule 41, of the Rules of Court 60 as
mandatory and jurisdictional in nature, non-compliance with which justifies
the dismissal of the appeal. 61
However, a consideration in depth of the unique and peculiar facts attendant
to this case and the procedural and substantive implications of the dismissal
of the appeal now sought to be reviewed and reconsidered; and a due and
proper regard to the merits of the case rather than a fascile reliance on
procedural rules, compel this Court to reverse and set aside the dismissal of
Republic's appeal by respondent Court of Appeals for the following reasons,
viz: Should Republic prove that the subject Lots Nos. 817 and 2509 were
registered in favor of Meerkamp and Company before 1919, the trial court's
decision decreeing again the same lots in the name of respondent de
Ocampo in 1965 is null and void ab initio for lack of jurisdiction and a fatal
infirmity necessarily attaches to the said decision; (2) There are strong and
substantial allegations of fraudulent misrepresentations and machinations
employed by respondent de Ocampo in securing his title. Relevant to this is
the express finding of the trial court that the Petition for Relief was filed within
the reglementary period prescribed in Section 3, Rule 38 of the Rules of
Court, and the Amended Petition was filed within one year from issuance of
the decree. If the appeal is dismissed without considering its merits, the
above periods will resumed to run and will lapse, and the reliefs sought
herein will be forever foreclosed to Republic; (3) Assuming that respondents
can invoke the material data rule, and/or the fact that Republic's appeal was
filed out of time because the record on appeal was submitted to the Court six
(6) days beyond the requested extension of 20 days, it always in the power
of this Court to suspend its rules or to except certain cases therefrom
whenever countervailing considerations so warrant; and (4) This Court is not
powerless to prevent gross miscarriage of justice, which would follow if
Republic's appeal is dismissed since it stands to lose close to 300 hectares
10
of prime sugar land already titled in its blame and devoted to educational
purposes if it is true that the land registration court was without jurisdiction to
issue a second decree of registration in favor of respondent de Ocampo and,
if it is also true that fraudulent misrepresentations and machinations attended
respondent de Ocampo's application for registration and likewise prevented
Republic from exposing the fake exhibits, on the basis of which he secured
his title. 62
1. Specifically, both Republic and respondents claim ownership over the
same Lots Nos. 817 and 2509, hence, this controversy. If Republic's
contentions are true that the said lots had been registered twice, with OCT
No. 370 issued in favor of Meerkamp and Company before 1919 and
another, OCT No. 576, issued in the name of respondent de Ocampo in 1965
or some forty-six (46) years later then the decision of the trial court, sitting as
land registration court, is null and void ab initio and suffers from a fatal
infirmity, which is also a ground for the review of a decree of registration,
provided no innocent purchaser for value will be prejudiced. 63
It is very significant in this connection that respondent de Ocampo admitted
the donation of Jalandoni in favor of the Bureau of Education, but averred
that the lots so donated were titled (TCT No. 1251), 64 while Lots Nos. 817
and 2509 applied for by him in the land registration case were "unregistered".
65 Yet, both parties claim to be the owners of the same Lots Nos. 817 and
2509. Respondent de Ocampo also gave the area of the lots covered by TCT
No. 1251, in the name of Jalandoni, as two million nine hundred and twelve
thousand four hundred and seventy four (2,912,474) square meters, or 291
hectares plus. 66 Coincidentally, Lots Nos. 817 and 2509 claimed by
Republic have a total area of 289.47 hectares, 67 or only about two (2)
hectares less. These factors, brought to light by respondent de Ocampo
himself, cannot simply be ignored in reaching the conclusion that the
disputed resolutions of respondent Court of Appeals be reversed.
It is also important to advert to the documentary exhibits adduced by
Republic in the hearing of the Amended Petition below, one of which was a
certification dated November 8, 1952 signed by the Register of Deeds of
Negros Occidental, stating that on May 13, 1919, there was registered a sale
executed by Meerkamp and Company in favor of Esteban Jalandoni and as a
result OCT No. 370 in the name of the Company was cancelled and TCT No.
1251 was issued to Jalandoni; that TCT No. 1251 was later cancelled by
virtue of the will of Jalandoni leaving the parcel of land to the then Bureau of
Education; that TCT No. 6014 was correspondingly issued to the Bureau of
Education; and that lease contracts were annotated in TCT No. 6014 in favor
of Francisco Copper, executed by the Division Superintendent of Schools.
68 However, the above certification does not mention the lot numbers, and
no certificates of title were exhibited in court, the incumbent Register of
Deeds having declared that the titles could not be found in his Office. 69
The trial court also made the express finding that the alleged deed of
donation by Luis Mosquera in favor of respondent de Ocampo, dated
November 10, 1911, acknowledged before one Notary Public John
Boardman does not appear in his notarial book which is on file in the Bureau
of Record Management, Manila, from October 16, 1911 to May, 1913. 70
The Provincial Assessor of Negros Occidental likewise issued a certification,
dated November 29, 1966, stating that Lots Nos. 817 and 2509 were never
declared in the name of Mosquera. 71 His later certification states that the
said lots were assessed in the name of the Bureau of Education, and that the
technical descriptions in the Bureau of Lands records show that the same
lots were in the name of Meerkamp and Company. 72
Authorities are in agreement that a land registration court is without
jurisdiction to decree again the registration of land already registered in an
earlier registration case, and that the second decree entered for the same
land is null and void. 73 If there is no valid and final judgment by the land
registration court to speak of, then the filing of an admittedly late appeal from
the decision denying the Amended Petition would be immaterial and of no
moment, in so far as these proceedings are concerned in view of the
congenitally fatal infirmity that attaches to the main decision, decreeing for
the second time the registration of the same Lots Nos. 817 and 2509 in favor
of respondent de Ocampo, despite an earlier registration in the name of
Meerkamp and Company. Jurisprudence holds that the appellant's failure to
perfect an appeal on time, "although ordinarily decisive, carries no
persuasive force" and may be completely disregarded if the trial court acted
without jurisdiction. 74 As held in United States v. Jayme, 75 lack of
11
jurisdiction over the subject matter is fatal and may be raised at any stage of
the proceedings. Jurisdiction is conferred by the sovereign authority which
organizes the court; it is given only by law, and in the manner prescribed by
law and an objection on the lack of such jurisdiction cannot be waived by the
parties. The infirmity cannot be cured by silence, acquiescence, or even by
express consent, 76 or by will of the parties. 77
In the interest of justice, which is the paramount consideration in all
litigations, and especially considering the cloud surrounding the decision of
the land registration court, as aforesaid, the more judicious course to follow is
for respondent Court of Appeals to entertain Republic's appeal, not to dismiss
it, so that if it finds the same to be meritorious, and the decision appealed
from is reversed, the correct identity of the lots that were donated to the then
Bureau of Education (admitted by respondent de Ocampo), as well as those
parcels of land applied for by said respondent in the land registration case,
may already be ascertained once and for all, in the trial court below, and in
this same proceeding, without Republic having to resort to relitigation to
prove its claim. Further proceedings will not prejudice respondents. On the
contrary, the cloud over their titles, OCT No. 576 and TCT No. 42217, issued
in favor of respondents de Ocampo and Anglo, respectively, will be removed
if Republic's claim is not true.
2. There is a serious charge, which is also crucial to the issue between the
parties, that respondent de Ocampo used fraudulent misrepresentations and
machinations in securing his title. Firstly, there was the averment in his
Answer in Civil Case No. 264 (6154) for recovery of possession of the
subject lots by Republic, which case was jointly tried with the land
registration case, that the properties alleged to have been donated by
Jalandoni to the then Bureau of Education were "different" from Lots Nos.
817 and 2509, applied for by him, the Jalandoni holdings being "titled" lands,
while Lots Nos. 817 and 2509 were "unregistered" lands. The then applicant
de Ocampo even cited TCT No. 1251 of the Register of Deeds of Negros
Occidental as the title covering the lots in the name of Jalandoni, further
stating that the lands donated by him to the Bureau of Education had an area
of 2,912,474 square meters, 78 or 291 hectares plus. Lots Nos. 817 and
2509 have a total area of 289.47 hectares, 79 or a difference of only 2
hectares, more or less. The coincidence in area is highly significant since
both claim to be the owners of the same lots. Secondly, certain documents
which were presented as exhibits by respondent de Ocampo, on the basis of
which he secured OCT 576 in his name, were withdrawn from the files of the
trial court, and, thereafter were allegedly lost by fire. As a result, Republic's
pending motion to have the said exhibits produced for examination of their
genuineness by the NBI could not be made. Unless successfully traversed,
the inference is strong that respondents did not want a full disclosure of the
true nature of the same by the NBI and that the truth had been suppressed.
The inference is also buttressed by the Republic's claim that despite their
counsel's knowledge of Republic's intention to file the said motion which was
orally communicated to them earlier, the alleged loss was not revealed to
Republic's counsel. 80
If the charge is true, there is the element of wilfull intent to deprive Republic
of just rights which constitutes the essential characteristics of actual as
distinguished from legal fraud. 81 As Justice Fernando stressed, "Nicolas v.
Director of Lands 82 should erase any doubt as to the extreme judicial
displeasure at this species of fraud of an applicant seeking to include as a
part of the property to which title is sought land actually in possession of
another." 83 This is very relevant in view of the denial of the Amended
Petition which was premised on the conclusion that allegations in the said
petition did not constitute actual and extrinsic fraud and which, according to
the trial court, is "the only ground" available to review or reopen the decree of
related significance is the express finding of the trial court that the original
Petition for Relief was filed within the reglementary period pursuant to
Section 3, Rule 38 of the Rules of Court, and the Amended Petition was filed
within one year from issuance of the decree. For, if the appeal is dismissed
notwithstanding allegations of fraud which appear to be supported by the
evidence adduced during the hearing of the Amended Petition below the
appealed decision will become final and executory, and the aforesaid periods
will lapse, foreclosing forever to Republic the reliefs prayed for in the
Amended Petition. Although Republic may seek to recover the lots in a
different action that may still be legally available to it after the appeal is
dismissed, that recourse will involve not only a re-litigation and, therefore,
multiplicity of suits, but will also entail the risk that subject lots may be
disposed of to innocent purchasers for value to put them beyond recovery. As
it is, the other respondent, Anglo, has already intervened, alleging that he
bought the same lots from respondent de Ocampo on January 6, 1966, and
that TCT No 42217 was in fact issued to him. 84 A new party, Salvacion
Maraon, also sought to intervene in the case and filed in respondent Court
of Appeals a motion to dismiss Republic's appeal before the said Court. 85
12

Finally, We held in Reyes, et al. v. Borbon, et al. 86 "(W)hen the attention of
the Court of Land Registration is called to the fact that the same land has
been registered in the name of two different persons, it is the duty of said
court to order an investigation of that fact and that should be done without
even without requiring the parties to show that a fraud has been committed in
securing the double registration. When it is established that the same has
been registered in the name of two different persons, the title should remain
in the name of the person securing the first registration." This Court further
held that "(T)he very purpose of the Torrens System would be destroyed if
the same land may be subsequently brought under a second action for
registration." 87
3.The foregoing overriding considerations then the alleged lack of
jurisdiction and the alleged fraudulent misrepresentations and machinations,
which, buttressed by strong evidence, can nullify the second registration
and/or set aside OCT 576 issued to respondent de Ocampo taken in relation
with the procedural and substantive implications which could and would arise
if the appeal were dismissed, namely, the risk that the holdings may be
transacted to third parties and the fact that Republic's action to recover the
holdings would give rise to multiplicity of suits compel Us to conclude that
the only recourse in the interest of just and expeditious proceedings,
considering that these have been pending for close to twenty (20) years now
is to suspend Our rules and/or except this case from their operation. For
when the operation of the Rules of will lead to an injustice We have, in
justifiable instances, resorted to this extraordinary remedy to prevent it. 88
The Rules have been drafted with the primary objective of enhancing fair
trials and expediting justice. 89 As a corollary, if their application and
operation tend to subvert and defeat instead of promote and enhance it, their
suspension is justified. In the words of Justice Antonio P. Barredo in his
concurring opinion in Estrada v. Sto. Domingo, "(T)his Court, through the
revered and eminent Mr. Justice Abad Santos, found occasion in the case of
C. Viuda de Ordoveza v. Raymundo, to lay down for recognition in this
jurisdiction, the sound rule in the administration of justice holding that 'it is
always in the power of the court (Supreme Court) to suspend its own rules or
to except a particular case from its operation, whenever the purposes of
justice required it. . ." 90
Exceptions to the operation of the mandatory and jurisdictional character of
the rules on perfection of appeals are to be noted in Sarmiento v. Salud, et
al.,, 91 penned by Justice J.B.L. Reyes, Dequito v. Lopez 92 and Carillo v.
Allied Workers Association of the Philippines 93 both written for the Court by
Justice E. M. Fernando, decided years after the Revised Rules of Court took
effect in January, 1964. In the Sarmiento case, the late appeal was allowed
on the ground of laches on the part of the appellees, the filing of the motion
to dismiss having taken place six (6) years after the brief for appellees was
filed, and after the case was submitted for decision. This, according to the
Court, "constitutes a unique instance of laches without comparable precedent
in the records of the Court." 94 The Dequito and Carillo cases, upon the
other hand, took into account the fact that labor cases were involved. Justice
Fernando expressly noted in the Dequito case that "m the light of the
constitutional as well as codal and statutory mandates, there being an explicit
command of protection to labor as well as the promotion of social justice," 95
the motion to dismiss the late appeal which was "filed much too late" hardly
deserved sympathy or consideration. 96 In the Carillo case, no question
whatsoever as to the late appeal was raised, hence, "it would seem that
whatever right to contest the jurisdiction could have been availed of is by now
no longer in existence. 97 Continuing, Justice Fernando stated that "Social
justice would be a meaningless term if in a situation like the present, an
element of rigidity would be affixed to procedural precepts and made to
recover the matter. Flexibility should not be ruled out. Precisely, what is
sought to be accomplished by such a fundamental principle expressly so
declared by the Constitution is the effectiveness of the community's effort to
assist the economically underprivileged." The responsibility to protect labor is
incumbent "not only on the legislative and executive branches but also on the
judiciary, to translate this pledge into a living reality. " 98
While the above exceptions are predicated on different grounds, they
nevertheless support the view that the rigid adherence to the rules on
perfection of appeals may and should be relaxed where compelling reasons
80 warrant. The grounds invoked in this case not only lack of jurisdiction but
gross injustice itself more than justify the exception considering further that
the delay in the perfection of the appeal involved six (6) days only.
4. Finally, enshrined in our legal and judicial annuals is the maxim that no
person should enrich himself at the expense or prejudice of others. 99
13
Courts should not be used as instruments to disregard this elemental and
basic norm which is the essence of justice and fair play. The whole trust of
our laws on civil relations enjoys all those who come before the courts of
justice to observe true faith and candor in their dealings with one another the
government included. 100 The commendable and determined efforts on the
part of the citizenry to fashion a New Society rid of graft, corruption and the
persistent malaise of land grabbing, will be set back, if the subject lots
consisting of close to 300 hectares which are devoted to educational
purposes have indeed been wrongfully titled to respondent de Ocampo.
Happily, We can at this stage still prevent this, if true, by setting aside the
dismissal of Republic's appeal and according the parties the opportunity in
this proceeding, and without further need to re-litigate, to terminate this
litigation, which has been pending for close to twenty (20) long years in
fairness to both parties.
PREMISES CONSIDERED, the resolution of the Court of Appeals, dated
August 21, 1969, dismissing the appeal, as well as its resolution of
November 14, 1969, denying petitioner Republic's motion for reconsideration
in CA G.R. Nos. 40683-84 are hereby SET ASIDE. The case is remanded to
the said Court to give due course to and consider on its merits Republic's
appeal. No costs.
Castro, C J., Fernando, Muoz Palma, Concepcion, Jr., Fernandez and
Guerrero, JJ., concur.
Barredo, Makasiar and Antonio, JJ., took no part.
Separate Opinions
TEEHANKEE, J., concurring:
This case illustrates graphically once more the correctness of the Court's
turning away from and setting aside of the rigid material data rule in the
perfection of appeals and its adoption, in the interest of substantial justice as
against mere technicality, of the liberal rule since the leading case of
Berkenkotter vs. Court of Appeals 1 that "the mere absence of a formal order
granting the motion for extension of time to file the record on appeal should
not be fatal to the petitioner if the record on appeal filed within the requested
extension period was approved by the court a quo."
Here, even conceding that the record on appeal was filed six (6) days later
beyond the requested extension period, special considerations have been
shown in the case at bar for the application of the principle of substantial
justice as set out in the main opinion of Mr. Justice Santos. Among others, it
should be stressed that the State's record on appeal was approved as per
the trial court's order of December 4, 1967 with the express statement that
there was no opposition from respondents-appellees to its approval; and that
the State's claims, that its evidence preponderantly shows that the trial court
had no jurisdiction to entertain the land registration application of respondent
de Ocampo filed belatedly after forty-six years and with alleged fraudulent
misrepresentations and machinations since the lots in question (some 289
hectares of prime sugar land) were long ago before 1919 already duly
registered in the name of the predecessor-vendor of Esteban Jalandoni who
subsequently bequeathed the same to the Bureau of Education exclusively
for educational purposes, which were rejected by the trial court on erroneous
grounds, raise a jurisdictional issue that should properly be reviewed and
determined by the appellate court.
It should be further stressed that to uphold the appellate court's peremptory
dismissal of the State's appeal would bar the State "from seeking again to
recover the lots in a different action that may still be legally available to it
after the appeal is dismissed" notwithstanding the main opinion's declaration
to this effect 2 since the petitioner State would be foreclosed by the principle
of res adjudicata from filing still another suit for the recovery of the lots in
question. And the State itself in its comment of February 13, 1970 on
respondents' motion to dismiss (filed through then Solicitor General now a
member of this Court, Associate Justice Felix Q. Antonio) expressly so
admitted "that if the petition is dismissed, thereby sustaining the resolution of
the Court of Appears dismissing the appeal by the Government, then the
latter would have no further remedy. Certainly, to lose a remedy resulting in
unjust deprivation of one's property cannot be categorized except as
substantial" 3
14
The precedent of Paulino vs. Court of Appeals 4 where the Court ordered the
dying of due course to an appeal not withstanding that the same was
admittedly filed two days beyond the reglementary period and had been
therefore rejected by the appellate court is fury applicable to the case at bar.
We cited therein inter alia the demands of substantial justice and the
presence of special circumstances (as in this case) for giving due course to
the appeal and reiterated that "(T)he underlying principle in the administration
of justice and application of the rules is substantial justice and fair play. As
restated by the Court in Obut vs. Court of Appeals 5 , '(W)e cannot look with
favor on a course of action which would place the administration of justice in
a straight jacket for then the result would be a poor kind of justice if there
would be justice at all. Verily, judicial orders, such as the one subject of this
petition, are issued to be obeyed, nonetheless a non-compliance is to be
dealt with as the circumstances attending the case may warrant. What
should guide judicial action is the principle that a party-litigant is to be given
the fullest opportunity to establish the merits of his complaint or defense
rather than for him to lose life, liberty, honor or property on technicalities."
As in the case of Carco Motor Sales, Inc. vs. Court of Appeals, 6 wherein we
also set aside the appellate court's dismissal of an appeal for failure to file
appellant's brief due to the fault and negligence of counsel's office secretary,
we are herein persuaded that the higher interests of justice and fairness
justify the setting aside of respondent court's peremptory dismissal of
petitioner's appeal and that the exercise of the Court's "inherent right" to
reinstate an appeal that was dismissed as the result of fraud, mistake or
unavoidable casualty is fully justified under the circumstances of the case at
bar.
Referring briefly to the view expressed that the State's record on appeal be
remanded so that its appeal would cover not only the denial of its petition for
relief but the lower court's adverse judgment on the merits, 7 it should be
noted that as stated hereinafter the trial court in effect granted the petition for
relief and reopened the case, setting aside its first adverse decision of
August 3, 1965, (from which no appeal was taken), although it again
rendered an adverse judgment against the State as per its decision of August
30, 1967, which is the subject of the State's appeal. The judgment of the
Court has therefore properly ordered the reinstatement of the State's appeal
and remanded the same to respondent Court of Appeals for determination on
its merits without need of amending the record on appeal, since the State's
notice of appeal (as well as its pleadings and briefs duly appealed from the
trial court's decision of August 30, 1967 "on the ground that said decision is
not in accordance with law and the evidence adduced in these cases." 8
One final word. The record shows a sorry lack of care and dedication to duty
on the part of the staff of the State's counsel that almost cost the State by
default the forfeiture and loss of the valuable lots involved, were it not for the
special circumstances and the interests of substantial justice which have led
the Court to set aside respondent court's summary dismissal of the appeal.
The State's suit against respondents for recovery of the land was first
dismissed by the trial court in its judgment of August 3, 1965 and although
the State was duly served with copy thereof on August 13, 1965, it took no
appeal therefrom since the docket clerk misfiled the same in another case
and the period for appeal lapsed. 9 Fortunately, the State's petition for relief
from judgment was eventually granted by the trial court which reopened the
case and received additional evidence from the State, although ultimately it
rendered its questioned judgment of August 30, 1967 again dismissing the
State's suit. Here again, the appeal taken by the State appears to have been
perfected late by six (6) days, which normally would have meant forfeiture of
the right of appeal. The attention of the Solicitor General should be caused to
these acts of carelessness and neglect so that the proper remedial and
administrative measures may be taken to avoid the recurrence thereof.
AQUINO, J., concurring:
I concur in the well-written opinion of Justice Santos. I will even go farther. I
vote for the remand of the case to the trial court so that the State can amend
its record on appeal and appeal from the lower court's decision of August 3,
1965, dismissing its complaint for recovery of the possession of the disputed
land and ordering the registration thereof in the name of Alfredo V. de
Ocampo. The appeal from a judgment denying relief Under Rule 38 includes
the review of the judgment on the merits (Sec. 2, Rule 41, Rules of Court).
The ultimate issue is whether the laud already registered as patrimonial
property of the State (for the use of the Bureau of Public Schools), as
15
allegedly shown in TCT No. 6014, can still be registered in the name of
another person. My answer is that it cannot be done because section 46 of
Act 496 provides that "no title to registered land in derogation to that of the
registered owner shall be acquired by prescription or adverse possession".
The action to recover possession of registered land does not prescribe.
3 deliveries, and SEACOM brought action to recover said amount plus interest
SEA COMMERCIAL COMPANY, INC., petitioner, vs. THE HONORABLE
COURT OF APPEALS, JAMANDRE INDUSTRIES, INC. and TIRSO
JAMANDRE, respondents.
1999 Nov 25
3rd Division
G.R. No. 122823
DECISION
GONZAGA-REYES, J.:
In this petition for review by certiorari, SEA Commercial Company, Inc.
(SEACOM) assails the decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV NO.
31263 affirming in toto the decision of the Regional Trial Court of Manila,
Branch 5, in Civil Case No. 122391, in favor of Jamandre Industries, Inc. (JII)
et al., the dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of the defendant and
against the plaintiff, ordering the plaintiff:
1) To pay defendant the sum of P66,156.15 (minus 18,843.85) with legal
interest thereon, from the date of the filing of the counterclaim until fully paid;
2) To pay defendant P2,000.00 as moral and exemplary damages;
3) To pay attorneys fees in the sum of P10,000.00; and
4) To pay the costs of this suit.
SO ORDERED.
SEACOM is a corporation engaged in the business of selling and distributing
agricultural machinery, products and equipment. On September 20, 1966,
SEACOM and JII entered into a dealership agreement whereby SEACOM
appointed JII as its exclusive dealer in the City and Province of Iloilo[1] Tirso
Jamandre executed a suretyship agreement binding himself jointly and
severally with JII to pay for all obligations of JII to SEACOM[2]. The
agreement was subsequently amended to include Capiz in the territorial
coverage and to make the dealership agreement on a non-exclusive basis[3].
In the course of the business relationship arising from the dealership
agreement, JII allegedly incurred a balance of P18,843.85 for unpaid
and attorneys fees.
JII filed an Answer denying the obligation and interposing a counterclaim for
damages representing unrealized profits when JII sold to the Farm System
Development Corporation (FSDC) twenty one (21) units of Mitsubishi power
tillers. In the counterclaim, JII alleged that as a dealer in Capiz, JII
contracted to sell in 1977 twenty-four (24) units of Mitsubishi power tillers to a
group of farmers to be financed by said corporation, which fact JII allegedly
made known to petitioner, but the latter taking advantage of said information
and in bad faith, went directly to FSDC and dealt with it and sold twenty one
(21) units of said tractors, thereby depriving JII of unrealized profit of eighty-
five thousand four hundred fifteen and 61/100 pesos (P85,415.61).
The trial court rendered its decision on January 24, 1990 ordering JII to pay
SEACOM the amount of Eighteen Thousand Eight Hundred Forty Three and
85/100 (P18,843.85) representing its outstanding obligation. The trial court
likewise granted JIIs counterclaim for unrealized profits, and for moral and
exemplary damages and attorney fees as above quoted.
SEACOM appealed the decision on the counterclaim.
The Court of Appeals held that while there exists no agency relationship
between SEACOM and JII, SEACOM is liable for damages and unrealized
profits to JII.
This Court, however, is convinced that with or without the existence of an
agency relationship between appellant SEACOM and appellee JII and
notwithstanding the error committed by the lower court in finding that an
agency relationship existed between appellant and defendant corporation the
former is liable for the unrealized profits which the latter could have gained
had not appellant unjustly stepped in and in bad faith unethically intervened.
16
It should be emphasized that the very purpose of the dealership agreement
is for SEACOM to have JII as its dealer to sell its products in the provinces of
Capiz and Iloilo. In view of this agreement, the second assigned error that
the lower court erred in holding that appellant learned of the FSDC
transaction from defendant JII is clearly immaterial and devoid of merit. The
fact that the dealership is on a non-exclusive basis does not entitle appellant
SEACOM to join the fray as against its dealer. To do so, is to violate the
norms of conduct enjoined by Art. 19 of the Civil Code. By virtue of such
agreement, the competition in the market as regards the sale of farm
equipment shall be between JII, as the dealer of SEACOM and other
companies, not as against SEACOM itself. However, SEACOM, not satisfied
with the presence of its dealer JII in the market, joined the competition even
as the against the latter and, therefore, changed the scenario of the
competition thereby rendering inutile the dealership agreement which they
entered into the manifest prejudice of JII. Hence, the trial court was correct
when it applied Art. 19 of the Civil Code in the case at bar in that appellant
SEACOM acted in bad faith when it competed with its own dealer as regards
the sale of farm machineries, thereby depriving appellee JII of the opportunity
to gain a clear profit of P85,000.00.
and affirmed the judgment appealed from in toto.
Hence this petition for review on certiorari, which submits the following
reasons for the allowance thereof:
THE RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS DECIDED QUESTIONS OF
SUBSTANCE IN A WAY NOT IN ACCORDANCE WITH LAW AND
JURISPRUDENCE, CONSIDERING THAT:
A
THE RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN RULING
THAT PETITIONER IS LIABLE TO PAY DAMAGES AND UNREALIZED
PROFITS TO THE PRIVATE RESPONDENTS DESPITE THE FACT THAT
NO AGENCY RELATIONSHIP EXISTS BETWEEN THEM.
B after JII informed SEACOM about the preference of the farmers to buy
THE RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN RULING
THAT PETITIONER ACTED IN BAD FAITH AGAINST THE PRIVATE
RESPONDENT CORPORATION DESPITE THE FACT THAT SAID RULING
IS CONTRARY TO THE EVIDENCE ON RECORD.
C
THE RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN RULING
THAT THE NON-EXCLUSIVITY CLAUSE IN THE DEALERSHIP
AGREEMENT EXECUTED BETWEEN THE PETITIONER AND PRIVATE
RESPONDENT CORPORATION PRECLUDES THE PETITIONER FROM
COMPETING WITH THE PRIVATE RESPONDENT CORPORATION.
D
THE RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN RULING
THAT PRIVATE RESPONDENT IS ENTITLED TO UNREALIZED PROFITS,
MORAL AND EXEMPLARY DAMAGES AND ATTORNEYS FEES.[4]
Petitioner SEACOM disputes the conclusion of the Court of Appeals that
despite the fact that no agency relationship existed between the parties, the
SEACOM is still liable in damages and unrealized profits for the reason that it
acted in bad faith. Petitioner SEACOM invokes the non-exclusivity clause in
the dealership agreement and claims that the transaction with FSDC was
concluded pursuant to a public bidding and not on the basis of alleged
information it received from private respondent Tirso Jamandre. Moreover,
petitioner SEACOM claims that it did not underprice its products during the
public bidding wherein both SEACOM and JII participated. Petitioner also
disputes the award of moral damages to JII which is a corporation, in the
absence of any evidence that the said corporation had a good reputation
which was debased.
Private respondents in their comment, contends that the four assigned errors
raise mixed questions of fact and law and are therefore beyond the
jurisdiction of the Supreme Court which may take cognizance of only
questions of law. The assigned errors were also refuted to secure affirmance
of the appealed decision. JII maintains that the bidding set by FSDC on
March 24, 1997 was scheduled after the demonstration conducted by JII, and
Mitsubishi tillers. JII further rebuts the SEACOMs contention that the
transaction with FSDC was pursuant to a public bidding with full disclosure to
the public and private respondent JII considering that JII had nothing to do
with the list of 37 bidders and cannot be bound by the listing made by
17
SEACOMs employee; moreover, JII did not participate in the bidding not
having been informed about it. Furthermore, the price at which SEACOM
sold to FSDC was lower than the price it gave to JII. Also, even if the
dealership agreement was not exclusive, it was breached when petitioner in
bad faith sold directly to FSDC with whom JII had previously offered the
subject farm equipment. With respect to the awards of moral and exemplary
damages, JII seeks an affirmation of the ruling of the Court of Appeals
justifying the awards.
SEACOM filed Reply defending the jurisdiction of this Court over the instant
petition since the decision of the Court of Appeals was based on a
misapprehension of facts. SEACOM insists that FSDCs purchase was
made pursuant to a public bidding, and even if SEACOM did not participate
thereon, JII would not necessarily have closed the deal since thirty seven
(37) bidders participated. SEACOM contends that no evidence was
presented to prove that the bidding was a fraudulent scheme of SEACOM
and FSDC. SEACOM further controverts JIIs contention that JII did not take
part in the bidding as Tirso Jamandre was one of the bidders and that
SEACOM underpriced its products to entice FSDC to buy directly from it. In
fine, JII is not entitled to the award of unrealized profits and damages.
In its Rejoinder, private respondents insist that there is an agency
relationship, citing the evidence showing that credit memos and not cash
vouchers were issued to JII by SEACOM for every delivery from November
26, 1976 to December 24, 1978. Private respondents maintain that
SEACOM torpedoed the emerging deal between JII and FSDC after being
informed about it by JII by dealing directly with FSDC at a lower price and
after betraying JII, SEACOM would cover up the deceit by conniving with
FSDC to post up a sham public bidding.
SEACOMs sur-rejoinder contains basically a reiteration of its contention in
previous pleadings. Additionally, it is contended that private respondents are
barred from questioning in their Rejoinder, the finding of the Court of Appeals
that there is no agency relationship between the parties since this matter was
not raised as error in their comment.
The core issue is whether SEACOM acted in bad faith when it competed with
its own dealer as regards the sale of farm machineries to FSDC.
Both the trial court and the Court of Appeals held affirmatively; the trial court
found that JII was an agent of SEACOM and the act of SEACOM in dealing
directly with FSDC was unfair and unjust to its agent, and that there was
fraud in the transaction between FSDC and SEACOM to the prejudice of JII.
On the other hand, the Court of Appeals ruled that there was no agency
relationship between the parties but SEACOM is nevertheless liable in
damages for having acted in bad faith when it competed with its own dealer
in the sale of the farm machineries to FSDC. Both courts invoke as basis for
the award Article 19 of the Civil Code which reads as follows:
"Art. 19. Every person must, in the exercise of his rights and in the
performance of his duties, act with justice, give everyone his due and
observe honesty and good faith.
The principle of abuse of rights stated in the above article, departs from the
classical theory that he who uses a right injures no one. The modern
tendency is to depart from the classical and traditional theory, and to grant
indemnity for damages in cases where there is an abuse of rights, even
when the act is not illicit.[5]
Article 19 was intended to expand the concept of torts by granting adequate
legal remedy for the untold number of moral wrongs which is impossible for
human foresight to provide specifically in statutory law.[6] If mere fault or
negligence in ones acts can make him liable for damages for injury caused
thereby, with more reason should abuse or bad faith make him liable. The
absence of good faith is essential to abuse of right. Good faith is an honest
intention to abstain from taking any unconscientious advantage of another,
even through the forms or technicalities of the law, together with an absence
of all information or belief of fact which would render the transaction
unconscientious. In business relations, it means good faith as understood by
men of affairs.[7]
While Article 19 may have been intended as a mere declaration of
principle[8], the cardinal law on human conduct expressed in said article
has given rise to certain rules, e.g. that where a person exercises his rights
but does so arbitrarily or unjustly or performs his duties in a manner that is
not in keeping with honesty and good faith, he opens himself to liability.[9]
The elements of an abuse of rights under Article 19 are: (1) there is a legal
right or duty; (2) which is exercised in bad faith; (3) for the sole intent of
prejudicing or injuring another.[10]
The issue whether JII is entitled to recovery on its counterclaim for
unrealized profit in the twenty one (21) units of Mitsubishi power tillers sold
18
by SEACOM to FSDC was resolved by the trial court in favor of JII on the
basis of documentary evidence[11] showing that (1) JII has informed
SEACOM as early as February 1977 of the promotions undertaken by JII for
the sale of 24 contracted units to FSDC and in connection therewith,
requested a 50% discount to make the price competitive, and to increase the
warranty period for eight months to one year. In said letter Jamandre
clarified that they were not amenable to SEACOMs offering directly to
FSDC and to be only given the usual overriding commission as we have
considerable investments on this transaction. (2) In response, the general
sales manager of SEACOM declined to give the requested 50% discount and
offered a less 30% less 10% up to end March xxx on cash before delivery
basis, granted the requested extension of the warranty period and stated
that we are glad to note that you have quite a number of units pending with
the FSDC.
The trial court ruled that with said information, SEACOM dealt directly with
FSDC and offered its units at a lower price, leaving FSDC no choice but to
accept the said offer of (SEACOM).
In affirming the judgment of the of the trial court, the Court of Appeals held
that by virtue of the dealership agreement the competition in the market as
regards the sale of farm equipment shall be between JII, as the dealer of
SEACOM, and other companies, not as against SEACOM itself, the Court
stated:
However, SEACOM not satisfied with the presence of its dealer JII in the
market, joined the competition even as against the latter, and thereby
changed the scenario of the competition thereby rendering inutile the
dealership agreement which they entered into to the manifest prejudice of JII.
Hence the trial court trial court was correct when it applied Art. 19 of the Civil
Code in the case at bar in that appellant SEACOM acted in bad faith when it
competed with its own dealer as regards the sale of farm machineries,
thereby depriving appellee JII of the opportunity to gain a clear profit of
P85,000.00.
We find no cogent reason to overturn the factual finding of the two courts that
SEACOM joined the bidding for the sale of the farm equipment after it was
informed that JII was already promoting the sales of said equipment to the
FSDC. Moreover, the conclusion of the trial court that the SEACOM offered
FSDC a lower price than the price offered by JII to FSDC is supported by the
evidence: the price offered by JII to FSDC is P27,167 per unit[12] but the
prices at which SEACOM sold to FSDC were at P22,867.00 for Model CT 83-
2, P21,093.50 for model CT 83-E, and P18,979.25 for model CT 534. The
fact that SEACOM may have offered to JII, in lieu of a requested 50%
discount, a discount effectively translating to 37% of the list price and actually
sold to FSDC at 35% less than the list price[13] does not detract from the fact
that by participating in the bidding of FSDC, it actually competed with its own
dealer who had earlier conducted demonstrations and promoted its own
products for the sale of the very same equipment, Exh. N for the plaintiff
confirms that both SEACOM and Jamandre participated in the bidding.[14]
However, the SEACOM was awarded the contract directly from Manila.[15]
The testimony of Tirso Jamandre that JII was the sole representative of
SEACOM in the local demonstrations to convince the farmers and
cooperative officers to accept the Mitsubishi brand of equipment in
preference to other brands, was unrebutted by SEACOM.
Clearly, the bad faith of SEACOM was established. By appointing as a
dealer of its agricultural equipment, SEACOM recognized the role and
undertaking of JII to promote and sell said equipment. Under the dealership
agreement, JII was to act as a middleman to sell SEACOMs products, in its
area of operations, i.e. Iloilo and Capiz provinces, to the exclusion of other
places,[16] to send its men to Manila for training on repair, servicing and
installation of the items to be handled by it, and to comply with other
personnel and vehicle requirements intended for the benefit of the
dealership.[17] After being informed of the demonstrations JII had conducted
to promote the sales of SEACOM equipment, including the operations at JIIs
expense conducted for five months, and the approval of its facilities (service
and parts) by FSDC,[18] SEACOM participated in the bidding for the said
equipment at a lower price, placing itself in direct competition with its own
dealer. The actuations of SEACOM are tainted by bad faith.
Even if the dealership agreement was amended to make it on a non-
exclusive basis,[19] SEACOM may not exercise its right unjustly or in a
manner that is not in keeping with honesty or good faith; otherwise it opens
itself to liability under the abuse of right rule embodied in Article 19 of the
Civil Code above-quoted. This provision, together with the succeeding article
on human relation, was intended to embody certain basic principles that are
to be observed for the rightful relationship between human beings and for the
stability of the social order.[20] What is sought to be written into the law is
the pervading principle of equity and justice above strict legalism.[21]
19
We accordingly resolve to affirm the award for unrealized profits. The Court THIRD DIVISION
of Appeals noted that the trial court failed to specify to which the two
appellees the award for moral and exemplary damages is granted. However, G.R. No. 161921, July 17, 2013
in view of the fact that moral damages are not as a general rule granted to a
corporation, and that Tirso Jamandre was the one who testified on his feeling JOYCE V. ARDIENTE, Petitioner, v. SPOUSES JAVIER AND MA.
very aggrieved and on his mental anguish and sleepless nights thinking of THERESA PASTORFIDE, CAGAYAN DE ORO WATER DISTRICT AND
how SEACOM dealt with us behind (our) backs,[22] the award should go to GASPAR GONZALEZ,* JR., Respondents.
defendant Jamandre, President of JII.
DECISION
WHEREFORE, the judgment appealed from is AFFIRMED with the
modification that the award of P2,000.00 in moral and exemplary damages PERALTA, J.:
shall be paid to defendant Tirso Jamandre.

Costs against appellant. Before the Court is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the
Rules of Court seeking to reverse and set aside the Decision 1 and
SO ORDERED. Resolution2 of the Court of Appeals (CA), dated August 28, 2003 and
December 17, 2003, respectively, in CA-G.R. CV No. 73000. The CA
Decision affirmed with modification the August 15, 2001 Decision 3 of the
Melo, (Chairman), Vitug, Panganiban, and Purisima, JJ., concur.
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Cagayan de Oro City, Branch 24, while the CA
Resolution denied petitioner's Motion for Reconsideration.

The facts, as summarized by the CA, are as follows:cralavvonlinelawlibrary

[Herein petitioner] Joyce V. Ardiente and her husband Dr. Roberto S. Ardiente
are owners of a housing unit at Emily Homes, Balulang, Cagayan de Oro City
with a lot area of one hundred fifty-three (153) square meters and covered by
Transfer Certificate of Title No. 69905.

On June 2, 1994, Joyce Ardiente entered into a Memorandum of Agreement

(Exh. B, pp. 470-473, Records) selling, transferring and conveying in favor
of [respondent] Ma. Theresa Pastorfide all their rights and interests in the
housing unit at Emily Homes in consideration of P70,000.00. The
Memorandum of Agreement carries a stipulation:cralavvonlinelawlibrary

4. That the water and power bill of the subject property shall be for the
account of the Second Party (Ma. Theresa Pastorfide) effective June 1,
4
1994. (Records, p. 47)
JOYCE V. ARDIENTE, Petitioner, v. SPOUSES JAVIER AND MA.
THERESA PASTORFIDE, CAGAYAN DE ORO WATER DISTRICT AND vis-a-vis Ma. Theresa Pastorfide's assumption of the payment of the
mortgage loan secured by Joyce Ardiente from the National Home Mortgage
GASPAR GONZALEZ,* JR., Respondents.
(Records, Exh. A, pp. 468-469)

For four (4) years, Ma. Theresa's use of the water connection in the name of
Joyce Ardiente was never questioned nor perturbed (T.S.N., October 31,

20
2000, pp. 7-8) until on March 12, 1999, without notice, the water connection For doing the act because Ardiente told them, they were negligent.
of Ma. Theresa was cut off. Proceeding to the office of the Cagayan de Oro Defendant Joyce Ardiente should have requested before the cutting off of the
Water District (COWD) to complain, a certain Mrs. Madjos told Ma. Theresa water supply, plaintiffs to pay. While she attempted to tell plaintiffs but she did
that she was delinquent for three (3) months corresponding to the months of not have the patience of seeing them. She knew that it was plaintiffs who had
December 1998, January 1999, and February 1999. Ma. Theresa argued been using the water four (4) years ago and not hers. She should have been
that the due date of her payment was March 18, 1999 yet (T.S.N., October very careful. x x x5
31, 2000, pp. 11-12). Mrs. Madjos later told her that it was at the instance of
Joyce Ardiente that the water line was cut off (T.S.N., February 5, 2001, p. The dispositive portion of the trial court's Decision reads,
31). thus:cralavvonlinelawlibrary
WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered ordering
On March 15, 1999, Ma. Theresa paid the delinquent bills (T.S.N., October defendants [Ardiente, COWD and Gonzalez] to pay jointly and severally
31, 2000, p. 12). On the same date, through her lawyer, Ma. Theresa wrote a plaintiffs, the following sums:cralavvonlinelawlibrary
letter to the COWD to explain who authorized the cutting of the water line (a) P200,000.00 for moral damages;chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
(Records, p. 160). (b) 200,000.00 for exemplary damages; and
(c) 50,000.00 for attorney's fee.
On March 18, 1999, COWD, through the general manager, [respondent] The cross-claim of Cagayan de Oro Water District and Engr. Gaspar
Gaspar Gonzalez, Jr., answered the letter dated March 15, 1999 and Gonzales is hereby dismissed. The Court is not swayed that the cutting off of
reiterated that it was at the instance of Joyce Ardiente that the water line was the water supply of plaintiffs was because they were influenced by defendant
cut off (Records, p. 161). Joyce Ardiente. They were negligent too for which they should be liable.

Aggrieved, on April 14, 1999, Ma. Theresa Pastorfide [and her husband] filed SO ORDERED.6
[a] complaint for damages [against petitioner, COWD and its manager
Gaspar Gonzalez] (Records, pp. 2-6). Petitioner, COWD and Gonzalez filed an appeal with the CA.

In the meantime, Ma. Theresa Pastorfide's water line was only restored and On August 28, 2003, the CA promulgated its assailed Decision disposing as
reconnected when the [trial] court issued a writ of preliminary mandatory follows:cralavvonlinelawlibrary
injunction on December 14, 1999 (Records, p. 237).4 IN VIEW OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the appealed decision is AFFIRMED,
with the modification that the awarded damages is reduced to P100,000.00
After trial, the RTC rendered judgment holding as each for moral and exemplary damages, while attorney's fees is lowered to
follows:cralavvonlinelawlibrary P25,000.00. Costs against appellants.
x x x x
SO ORDERED.7
In the exercise of their rights and performance of their duties, defendants did
not act with justice, gave plaintiffs their due and observe honesty and good The CA ruled, with respect to petitioner, that she has a legal duty to honor
faith. Before disconnecting the water supply, defendants COWD and Engr. the possession and use of water line by Ma. Theresa Pastorfide pursuant to
Gaspar Gonzales did not even send a disconnection notice to plaintiffs as their Memorandum of Agreement and that when [petitioner] applied for its
testified to by Engr. Bienvenido Batar, in-charge of the Commercial disconnection, she acted in bad faith causing prejudice and [injury to] Ma.
Department of defendant COWD. There was one though, but only three (3) Theresa Pastorfide.8
days after the actual disconnection on March 12, 1999. The due date for
payment was yet on March 15. Clearly, they did not act with justice. Neither As to COWD and Gonzalez, the CA held that they failed to give a notice of
did they observe honesty. disconnection and derelicted in reconnecting the water line despite payment
of the unpaid bills by the [respondent spouses Pastorfide]. 9
They should not have been swayed by the prodding of Joyce V. Ardiente.
They should have investigated first as to the present ownership of the house. Petitioner, COWD and Gonzalez filed their respective Motions for

21
Reconsideration, but these were denied by the CA in its Resolution dated
December 17, 2003.
COWD and Gonzalez filed a petition for review on certiorari with this Court,
which was docketed as G.R. No. 161802. However, based on technical
grounds and on the finding that the CA did not commit any reversible error in
its assailed Decision, the petition was denied via a Resolution 10 issued by
this Court on March 24, 2004. COWD and Gonzalez filed a motion for
reconsideration, but the same was denied with finality through this Court's
Resolution11 dated June 28, 2004.
Petitioner, on the other hand, timely filed the instant petition with the following
Assignment of Errors:cralavvonlinelawlibrary
7.1 HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS (ALTHOUGH IT HAS REDUCED
THE LIABILITY INTO HALF) HAS STILL COMMITTED GRAVE AND
SERIOUS ERROR WHEN IT UPHELD THE JOINT AND SOLIDARY
LIABILITY OF PETITIONER JOYCE V. ARDIENTE WITH CAGAYAN DE
ORO WATER DISTRICT (COWD) AND ENGR. GASPAR D. GONZALES
FOR THE LATTER'S FAILURE TO SERVE NOTICE UPON RESPONDENTS
SPOUSES PASTORFIDE PRIOR TO THE ACTUAL DISCONNECTION
DESPITE EVIDENCE ADDUCED DURING TRIAL THAT EVEN WITHOUT
PETITIONER'S REQUEST, COWD WAS ALREADY SET TO EFFECT
DISCONNECTION OF RESPONDENTS' WATER SUPPLY DUE TO NON-
PAYMENT OF ACCOUNT FOR THREE (3) MONTHS.
7.2 THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED GRAVE AND
SERIOUS ERROR WHEN IT RULED TOTALLY AGAINST PETITIONER
AND FAILED TO FIND THAT RESPONDENTS ARE GUILTY OF
CONTRIBUTORY NEGLIGENCE WHEN THEY FAILED TO PAY THEIR
WATER BILLS FOR THREE MONTHS AND TO MOVE FOR THE
TRANSFER OF THE COWD ACCOUNT IN THEIR NAME, WHICH WAS A
VIOLATION OF THEIR MEMORANDUM OF AGREEMENT WITH
PETITIONER JOYCE V. ARDIENTE. RESPONDENTS LIKEWISE
DELIBERATELY FAILED TO EXERCISE DILIGENCE OF A GOOD FATHER
OF THE FAMILY TO MINIMIZE THE DAMAGE UNDER ART. 2203 OF THE
NEW CIVIL CODE.
7.3 THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS SERIOUSLY ERRED WHEN
IT DISREGARDED THE FACT THAT RESPONDENT SPOUSES
PASTORFIDE ARE LIKEWISE BOUND TO OBSERVE ARTICLE 19 OF THE
NEW CIVIL CODE, i.e., IN THE EXERCISE OF THEIR RIGHTS AND IN THE
PERFORMANCE OF THEIR DUTIES TO ACT WITH JUSTICE, GIVE
EVERYONE HIS DUE AND OBSERVE HONESTY AND GOOD FAITH.
7.4 THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED WHEN IT
GRANTED AN AWARD OF MORAL AND EXEMPLARY DAMAGES AND
ATTORNEY'S FEES AS AGAINST PETITIONER ARDIENTE.12
At the outset, the Court noticed that COWD and Gonzalez, who were
petitioner's co-defendants before the RTC and her co-appellants in the CA,
were impleaded as respondents in the instant petition. This cannot be done.
Being her co-parties before the RTC and the CA, petitioner cannot, in the
instant petition for review on certiorari, make COWD and Gonzalez,
adversary parties. It is a grave mistake on the part of petitioner's counsel to
treat COWD and Gonzalez as respondents. There is no basis to do so,
considering that, in the first place, there is no showing that petitioner filed a
cross-claim against COWD and Gonzalez. Under Section 2, Rule 9 of the
Rules of Court, a cross-claim which is not set up shall be barred. Thus, for
failing to set up a cross-claim against COWD and Gonzalez before the RTC,
petitioner is already barred from doing so in the present petition.
More importantly, as shown above, COWD and Gonzalez's petition for review
on certiorari filed with this Court was already denied with finality on June 28,
2004, making the presently assailed CA Decision final and executory insofar
as COWD and Gonzalez are concerned. Thus, COWD and Gonzalez are
already precluded from participating in the present petition. They cannot
resurrect their lost cause by filing pleadings this time as respondents but,
nonetheless, reiterating the same prayer in their previous pleadings filed with
the RTC and the CA.
As to the merits of the instant petition, the Court likewise noticed that the
main issues raised by petitioner are factual and it is settled that the resolution
of factual issues is the function of lower courts, whose findings on these
matters are received with respect and considered binding by the Supreme
Court subject only to certain exceptions, none of which is present in this
instant petition.13 This is especially true when the findings of the RTC have
been affirmed by the CA as in this case.14
In any case, a perusal of the records at hand would readily show that the
instant petition lacks merit.
Petitioner insists that she should not be held liable for the disconnection of
respondent spouses' water supply, because she had no participation in the
actual disconnection. However, she admitted in the present petition that it
was she who requested COWD to disconnect the Spouses Pastorfide's water
supply. This was confirmed by COWD and Gonzalez in their cross-claim
against petitioner. While it was COWD which actually discontinued
respondent spouses' water supply, it cannot be denied that it was through the
22
instance of petitioner that the Spouses Pastorfide's water supply was
disconnected in the first place.
It is true that it is within petitioner's right to ask and even require the Spouses
Pastorfide to cause the transfer of the former's account with COWD to the
latter's name pursuant to their Memorandum of Agreement. However, the
remedy to enforce such right is not to cause the disconnection of the
respondent spouses' water supply. The exercise of a right must be in
accordance with the purpose for which it was established and must not be
excessive or unduly harsh; there must be no intention to harm another. 15
Otherwise, liability for damages to the injured party will attach. 16 In the
present case, intention to harm was evident on the part of petitioner when
she requested for the disconnection of respondent spouses water supply
without warning or informing the latter of such request. Petitioner claims that
her request for disconnection was based on the advise of COWD personnel
and that her intention was just to compel the Spouses Pastorfide to comply
with their agreement that petitioner's account with COWD be transferred in
respondent spouses' name. If such was petitioner's only intention, then she
should have advised respondent spouses before or immediately after
submitting her request for disconnection, telling them that her request was
simply to force them to comply with their obligation under their Memorandum
of Agreement. But she did not. What made matters worse is the fact that
COWD undertook the disconnection also without prior notice and even failed
to reconnect the Spouses Pastorfides water supply despite payment of their
arrears. There was clearly an abuse of right on the part of petitioner, COWD
and Gonzalez. They are guilty of bad faith.
The principle of abuse of rights as enshrined in Article 19 of the Civil Code
provides that every person must, in the exercise of his rights and in the
performance of his duties, act with justice, give everyone his due, and
observe honesty and good faith.
In this regard, the Court's ruling in Yuchengco v. The Manila Chronicle
Publishing Corporation17 is instructive, to wit:cralavvonlinelawlibrary
x x x x
This provision of law sets standards which must be observed in the exercise
of ones rights as well as in the performance of its duties, to wit: to act with
justice; give everyone his due; and observe honesty and good faith.
In Globe Mackay Cable and Radio Corporation v. Court of Appeals, it was
elucidated that while Article 19 lays down a rule of conduct for the
government of human relations and for the maintenance of social order, it
does not provide a remedy for its violation. Generally, an action for damages
under either Article 20 or Article 21 would be proper. The Court
said:cralavvonlinelawlibrary
One of the more notable innovations of the New Civil Code is the codification
of "some basic principles that are to be observed for the rightful relationship
between human beings and for the stability of the social order." [REPORT
ON THE CODE COMMISSION ON THE PROPOSED CIVIL CODE OF THE
PHILIPPINES, p. 39]. The framers of the Code, seeking to remedy the defect
of the old Code which merely stated the effects of the law, but failed to draw
out its spirit, incorporated certain fundamental precepts which were
"designed to indicate certain norms that spring from the fountain of good
conscience" and which were also meant to serve as "guides for human
conduct [that] should run as golden threads through society, to the end that
law may approach its supreme ideal, which is the sway and dominance of
justice." (Id.) Foremost among these principles is that pronounced in Article
19 x x x.
x x x x
This article, known to contain what is commonly referred to as the principle of
abuse of rights, sets certain standards which must be observed not only in
the exercise of one's rights, but also in the performance of one's duties.
These standards are the following: to act with justice; to give everyone his
due; and to observe honesty and good faith. The law, therefore, recognizes a
primordial limitation on all rights; that in their exercise, the norms of human
conduct set forth in Article 19 must be observed. A right, though by itself
legal because recognized or granted by law as such, may nevertheless
become the source of some illegality. When a right is exercised in a
manner which does not conform with the norms enshrined in Article 19
and results in damage to another, a legal wrong is thereby committed
for which the wrongdoer must be held responsible. But while Article 19
lays down a rule of conduct for the government of human relations and for
the maintenance of social order, it does not provide a remedy for its violation.
Generally, an action for damages under either Article 20 or Article 21 would
be proper.
Corollarilly, Article 20 provides that every person who, contrary to law,
willfully or negligently causes damage to another shall indemnify the latter for
the same. It speaks of the general sanctions of all other provisions of law
which do not especially provide for its own sanction. When a right is
exercised in a manner which does not conform to the standards set forth in
the said provision and results in damage to another, a legal wrong is thereby
committed for which the wrongdoer must be responsible. Thus, if the
provision does not provide a remedy for its violation, an action for damages
under either Article 20 or Article 21 of the Civil Code would be proper.
23
The question of whether or not the principle of abuse of rights has been Velasco, Jr., (Chairperson), Abad, Mendoza, and Leonen, JJ., concur.
violated resulting in damages under Article 20 or other applicable provision of
law, depends on the circumstances of each case. x x x18 July 24, 2013

To recapitulate, petitioner's acts which violated the abovementioned N O T I C E OF J U D G M E N T

provisions of law is her unjustifiable act of having the respondent spouses'
water supply disconnected, coupled with her failure to warn or at least notify
respondent spouses of such intention. On the part of COWD and Gonzalez, it
is their failure to give prior notice of the impending disconnection and their Sirs/Mesdames:cralavvonlinelawlibrary
subsequent neglect to reconnect respondent spouses' water supply despite
the latter's settlement of their delinquent account. Please take notice that on July 17, 2013 a Decision, copy attached herewith,
was rendered by the Supreme Court in the above-entitled case, the original
On the basis of the foregoing, the Court finds no cogent reason to depart of which was received by this Office on July 19, 2013 at 2:25 p.m.
from the ruling of both the RTC and the CA that petitioner, COWD and Very truly yours,
Gonzalez are solidarily liable. (SGD)
LUCITA ABJELINA SORIANO
The Spouses Pastorfide are entitled to moral damages based on the Division Clerk of Court
provisions of Article 2219,19 in connection with Articles 20 20 and 2121 of the
Civil Code.

As for exemplary damages, Article 2229 provides that exemplary damages

may be imposed by way of example or correction for the public good.
Nonetheless, exemplary damages are imposed not to enrich one party or
impoverish another, but to serve as a deterrent against or as a negative
incentive to curb socially deleterious actions.22 In the instant case, the Court
agrees with the CA in sustaining the award of exemplary damages, although
it reduced the amount granted, considering that respondent spouses were
deprived of their water supply for more than nine (9) months, and such
deprivation would have continued were it not for the relief granted by the
RTC.

With respect to the award of attorney's fees, Article 2208 of the Civil Code
provides, among others, that such fees may be recovered when exemplary
damages are awarded, when the defendant's act or omission has compelled
the plaintiff to litigate with third persons or to incur expenses to protect his
interest, and where the defendant acted in gross and evident bad faith in
refusing to satisfy the plaintiffs plainly valid, just and demandable claim.

WHEREFORE, instant petition for review on certiorari is DENIED. The

Decision and Resolution of the Court of Appeals, dated August 28, 2003 and
December 17, 2003, respectively, in CA-G.R. CV No. 73000 are AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.

24
 5
CONRADO BUNAG, JR., petitioner, vs. HON. COURT OF APPEALS, First
Division, and ZENAIDA B. CIRILO, respondents.
1992 July 10
2nd Division
G.R. No. 101749
DECISION
REGALADO, J.:
Petitioner appeals for the reversal of the decision 1 of respondent Court of
Appeals promulgated on May 17, 1991 in CA-G.R. CV No. 07054, entitled
"Zenaida B. Cirilo vs. Conrado Bunag, Sr. and Conrado Bunag, Jr.," which
affirmed in toto the decision of the Regional Trial Court, Branch XI at Bacoor,
Cavite, and, implicitly, respondent court's resolution of September 3, 1992 2
denying petitioner's motion for reconsideration.
Respondent court having assiduously discussed the salient antecedents of
this case, vis-a-vis the factual findings of the court below, the evidence of
record and the contentions of the parties, it is appropriate that its findings,
which we approve and adopt, be extensively reproduced hereunder:
"Based on the evidence on record, the following facts are considered
indisputable: On the afternoon of September 8, 1973, defendant-appellant
Bunag, Jr. brought plaintiff-appellant to a motel or hotel where they had
sexual intercourse. Later that evening, said defendant-appellant brought
plaintiff-appellant to the house of his grandmother Juana de Leon in
Pamplona, Las Pias, Metro Manila, where they lived together as husband
and wife for 21 days, or until September 29, 1973. On September 10, 1973,
defendant-appellant Bunag, Jr. and plaintiff-appellant filed their respective
applications for a marriage license with the Office of the Local Civil Registrar
of Bacoor, Cavite. On October 1, 1973, after leaving plaintiff-appellant,
defendant-appellant Bunag, Jr. filed an affidavit withdrawing his application
for a marriage license.
"Plaintiff-appellant contends that on the afternoon of September 8, 1973,
defendant-appellant Bunag, Jr., together with an unidentified male
companion, abducted her in the vicinity of the San Juan de Dios Hospital in
Pasay City and brought her to a motel where she was raped. The court a
quo, which adopted the evidence, summarized the same which we
paraphrased as follows:
`Plaintiff was 26 years old on November 5, 1974 when she testified, single
and had finished a college course in Commerce (t.s.n., p. 4, Nov. 5, 1974). It
appears that on September 8, 1973, at about 4:00 o'clock in the afternoon,
while she was walking along Figueras Street, Pasay City on her way to the
San Juan de Dios Canteen to take her snack, defendant, Conrado Bunag,
Jr., came riding in a car driven by a male companion. Plaintiff and defendant
Bunag, Jr. were sweethearts, but two weeks before September 8, 1973, they
had a quarrel, and Bunag, Jr. wanted to talk matters over with plaintiff, so
that he invited her to take their merienda at the Aristocrat Restaurant in
Manila instead of at San Juan de Dios Canteen, to which plaintiff obliged, as
she believed in his sincerity (t.s.n., pp. 8-10, Nov. 5, 1974).'
`Plaintiff rode in the case and took the front seat beside the driver while
Bunag, Jr. seated himself by her right side. The car traveled north on its way
to the Aristocrat Restaurant but upon reaching San Juan Street in Pasay City,
it turned abruptly to the right, to which plaintiff protested, but which the duo
ignored and instead threatened her not to make any noise as they were
ready to die and would bump the car against the post if she persisted.
Frightened and silenced, the car traveled its course thru F.B. Harrison
Boulevard until they reached a motel. Plaintiff was then pulled and dragged
from the car against her will, and amidst her cries and pleas. In spite of her
struggle she was no match to the joint strength of the two male combatants
because of her natural weakness being a woman and her small stature.
Eventually, she was brought inside the hotel where the defendant Bunag, Jr.
deflowered her against her will and consent. She could not fight back and
repel the attack because after Bunag, Jr. had forced her to lie down and
embraced her, his companion held her two feet, removed her panty, after
which he left. Bunag, Jr. threatened her that he would ask his companion to
come back and hold her feet if she did not surrender her womanhood to him,
thus he succeeded in feasting on her virginity. Plaintiff described the pains
she felt and how blood came out of her private parts after her vagina was
penetrated by the penis of the defendant Bunag, Jr. (t.s.n., pp. 17-24, Nov. 5,
1974).
`After that outrage on her virginity, plaintiff asked Bunag, Jr. once more to
allow her to go home but the latter would not consent and stated that he
would only let her go after they were married as he intended to marry her, so
much so that she promised not to make any scandal and to marry him.
Thereafter, they took a taxi together after the car that they used had already
gone, and proceeded to the house of Juana de Leon, Bunag, Jr.'s
25
grandmother in Pamplona, Las Pias, Metro Manila where they arrived at
9:30 o'clock in the evening (t.s.n., p. 26, Nov. 5, 1974). At about ten (10)
o'clock that same evening, defendant Conrado Bunag, Sr., father of Bunag,
Jr. arrived and assured plaintiff that the following day which was a Monday,
she and Bunag, Jr. would go to Bacoor, to apply for a marriage license, which
they did. They filed their applications for marriage license (Exhibits `A' and
`C') and after that plaintiff and defendant Bunag, Jr. returned to the house of
Juana de Leon and lived there as husband and wife from September 8, 1973
to September 29, 1973.
`On September 29, 1973 complaint Bunag, Jr. left and never returned,
humiliating plaintiff and compelled her to go back to her parents on October
3, 1973. Plaintiff was ashamed when she went home and could not sleep
and eat because of the deception done against her by defendant-appellants
(t.s.n., p. 35, Nov. 5, 1974).
`The testimony of plaintiff was corroborated in toto by her uncle, Vivencio
Bansagan who declared that on September 8, 1973 when plaintiff failed to
arrive home at 9:00 o'clock in the evening, his sister who is the mother of
plaintiff asked him to look for her but his efforts proved futile, and he told his
sister that plaintiff might have married (baka nag-asawa, t.s.n., pp. 5-6,
March 18, 1976). However, in the afternoon of the next day (Sunday), his
sister told him that Francisco Cabrera, accompanied by barrio captain
Jacinto Manalili of Ligas, Bacoor, Cavite, informed her that plaintiff and
Bunag, Jr. were in Cabrera's house, so that her sister requested him to go
and see the plaintiff, which he did, and at the house of Mrs. Juana de Leon in
Pamplona, Las Pias, Metro Manila he met defendant Conrado Bunag, Sr.,
who told him, `Pare, the children are here already. Let us settle the matter
and have them married.'
`He conferred with plaintiff who told that as she had already lost her honor,
she would bear her sufferings as Boy Bunag, Jr. and his father promised they
would be married.'
"Defendants-appellants, on the other hand, deny that defendant-appellant
Conrado Bunag, Jr. abducted and raped plaintiff-appellant on September 8,
1973. On the contrary, plaintiff-appellant and defendant-appellant Bunag, Jr.
eloped on that date because of the opposition of the latter's father to their
relationship.
"Defendants-appellants claim that defendant-appellant Bunag, Jr. and
plaintiff-appellant had earlier made plans to elope and get married, and this
fact was known to their friends, among them, Architect Chito Rodriguez. The
couple made good their plans to elope on the afternoon of September 8,
1973, when defendant-appellant Bunag, Jr., accompanied by his friend
Guillermo Ramos, Jr., met plaintiff-appellant and her officemate named Lydia
in the vicinity of the San Juan de Dios Hospital. The foursome then
proceeded to (the) aforesaid hospital's canteen where they had some
snacks. Later, Guillermo Ramos, Jr. took Lydia to Quirino Avenue where she
could get a ride home, thereby leaving the defendant-appellant Bunag, Jr.
and plaintiff-appellant alone. According to defendant-appellant Bunag, Jr.,
after Guillermo Ramos, Jr. and Lydia left, he and plaintiff-appellant took a taxi
to the Golden Gate and Flamingo Hotels where they tried to get a room, but
these were full.
They finally got a room at the Holiday Hotel, where defendant-appellant
registered using his real name and residence certificate number. Three hours
later, the couple checked out of the hotel and proceeded to the house of
Juana de Leon at Pamplona, Las Pias, where they stayed until September
19, 1973. Defendant-appellant claims that bitter disagreements with plaintiff-
appellant over money and the threats made to his life prompted him to break
off their plan to get married.
"During this period, defendant-appellant Bunag, Sr. denied having gone to
the house of Juan de Leon and telling plaintiff-appellant that she would be
wed to defendant-appellant Bunag, Jr. In fact, he phoned Atty. Conrado
Adreneda, member of the board of directors of Mandala Corporation,
defendant-appellant Bunag, Jr.'s employer, three times between the evening
of September 8, 1973 and September 9, 1973 inquiring as to the
whereabouts of his son. He came to know about his son's whereabouts when
he was told of the couple's elopement late in the afternoon of September 9,
1973 by his mother Candida Gawaran. He likewise denied having met
relatives and emissaries of plaintiff-appellant and agreeing to her marriage to
his son. 3
A complaint for damages for alleged breach of promise to marry was filed by
herein private respondent Zenaida B. Cirilo against petitioner Conrado
Bunag, Jr. and his father, Conrado Bunag, Sr., as Civil Case No. N-2028 of
the Regional Trial Court, Branch XIX at Bacoor, Cavite. On August 20, 1983,
on a finding, inter alia, that petitioner had forcibly abducted and raped private
respondent, the trial court rendered a decision 4 ordering petitioner Bunag,
Jr. to pay private respondent P80,000.00 as moral damages, P20,000.00 as
26
exemplary damages, P20,000.00 by way of temperate damages, and
P10,000.00 for and as attorney's fees, as well as the costs of suit. Defendant
Conrado Bunag, Sr. was absolved from any and all liability.
Private respondent appealed that portion of the lower court's decision
disculpating Conrado Bunag, Sr. from civil liability in this case. On the other
hand, the Bunags, as defendants-appellants, assigned in their appeal several
errors allegedly committed by the trial court, which were summarized by
respondent court as follows: (1) in finding that defendant-appellant Conrado
Bunag, Jr. forcibly abducted and raped plaintiff-appellant; (2) in finding that
defendants-appellants promised plaintiff-appellant that she would be wed to
defendant-appellant Conrado Bunag, Jr.; and (3) in awarding plaintiff-
appellant damages for the breach of defendants-appellants' promise of
marriage. 5
As stated at the outset, on May 17, 1991 respondent Court of Appeals
rendered judgment dismissing both appeals and affirming in toto the decision
of the trial court. His motion for reconsideration having been denied,
petitioner Bunag, Jr. is before us on a petition for review, contending that (1)
respondent court failed to consider vital exhibits, testimonies and incidents
for petitioner's defense, resulting in the misapprehensions of facts and
violative of the law on preparation of judgments; and (2) it erred in the
application of the proper law and jurisprudence by holding that there was
forcible abduction with rape, not just a simple elopement and an agreement
to marry, and in the award of excessive damages. 6
Petitioner Bunag, Jr. first contends that both the trial and appellate courts
failed to take into consideration the alleged fact that he and private
respondent had agreed to marry, and that there was no case of forcible
abduction with rape, but one of simple elopement and agreement to marry. It
is averred that the agreement to marry has been sufficiently proven by the
testimonies of the witnesses for both parties and the exhibits presented in
court.
This submission, therefore, clearly hinges on the credibility of the witnesses
and evidence presented by the parties and the weight accorded thereto in
the factual findings of the trial court and the Court of Appeals. In effect, what
petitioner would want this Court to do is to evaluate and analyze anew the
evidence, both testimonial and documentary, presented before and calibrated
by the trial court, and as further meticulously reviewed and discussed by
respondent court.
The issue raised primarily and ineluctably involves questions of fact. We are,
therefore, once again constrained to stress the well-entrenched statutory and
jurisprudential mandate that findings of fact of the Court of Appeals are, as a
rule, conclusive upon this Court. Only questions of law, distinctly set forth,
may be raised in a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules
of Court, subject to clearly settled exceptions in case law.
Our jurisdiction in cases brought to us from the Court of Appeals is limited to
reviewing and revising the errors of law imputed to the latter, its findings of
fact being conclusive. This Court has emphatically declared that it is not its
function to analyze or weigh such evidence all over again, its jurisdiction
being limited to reviewing errors of law that might have been committed by
the lower court. Barring, therefore, a showing that the findings complained of
are totally devoid of support in the record, or that they are so glaringly
erroneous as to constitute serious abuse of discretion, such findings must
stand, for this Court is not expected required to examine or contrast the oral
and documentary evidence submitted by the parties. 7 Neither does the
instant case reveal any feature falling within any of the exceptions which
under our decisional rules may warrant a review of the factual findings of the
Court of Appeals. On the foregoing considerations and our review of the
records, we sustain the holding of respondent court in favor of private
respondent.
Petitioner likewise asserts that since the action involves a breach of promise
to marry, the trial court erred in awarding damages.
It is true that in this jurisdiction, we adhere to the time-honored rule that an
action for breach of promise to marry has no standing in the civil law, apart
from the right to recover money or property advanced by the plaintiff upon
the faith of such promise. 8 Generally, therefore, a breach of promise to
marry per se is not actionable, except where the plaintiff has actually incurred
expenses for the wedding and the necessary incidents thereof.
However, the award of moral damages is allowed in cases specified in or
analogous to those provided in Article 2219 of the Civil Code. Correlatively,
under Article 21 of said Code, in relation to paragraph 10 of said Article 2219,
any person who wilfully causes loss or injury to another in a manner that is
contrary to morals, good customs or public policy shall compensate the latter
for moral damages. 9 Article 21 was adopted to remedy the countless gaps
in the statutes which leave so many victims of moral wrongs helpless even
27
though they have actually suffered material and moral injury, and is intended
to vouchsafe adequate legal remedy for that untold number of moral wrongs
which is impossible for human foresight to specifically provide for in the
statutes. 10
Under the circumstances obtaining in the case at bar, the acts or petitioner in
forcibly abducting private respondent and having carnal knowledge with her
against her will, and thereafter promising to marry her in order to escape
criminal liability, only to thereafter renege on such promise after cohabiting
with her for twenty-one days, irremissibly constitutes acts contrary to morals
and good customs. These are grossly insensate and reprehensible
transgressions which indisputably warrant and abundantly justify the award
of moral and exemplary damages, pursuant to Article 21, in relation to
paragraphs 3 and 10, Article 2219, and Articles 2229 and 2234 of the Civil
Code.
Petitioner would, however, belabor the fact that said damages were awarded
by the trial court on the basis of a finding that he is guilty of forcible abduction
with rape, despite the prior dismissal of the complaint therefor filed by private
respondent with the Pasay City Fiscal's Office.
as to the competency of witnesses and the quantum of evidence in criminal
civil proceedings. In a criminal action, the State must prove its case by
evidence which shows the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt,
while in a civil action it is sufficient for the plaintiff to sustain his cause by
preponderance of evidence only. 13 Thus, in Rillon, et al. vs. Rillon, 14 we
stressed that it is not now necessary that a criminal prosecution for rape be
first instituted and prosecuted to final judgment before a civil action based on
said offense in favor of the offended woman can likewise be instituted and
prosecuted to final judgment.
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DENIED for lack of merit, and the
assailed judgment and resolution are hereby AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
Narvasa, (C.J., Chairman) and Padilla, JJ., concur.
Nocon, J., No part.

Generally, the basis of civil liability from crime is the fundamental postulate of
our law that every person criminally liable for a felony is also civilly liable. In
other words, criminal liability will give rise to civil liability ex delicto only if the
same felonious act or omission results in damage or injury to another and is
the direct and proximate cause thereof. 11 Hence, extinction of the penal
action does not carry with it the extinction of civil liability unless the extinction
proceeds from a declaration in a final judgment that the fact from which the
civil might arise did not exist. 12

In the instant case, the dismissal of the complaint for forcible abduction with
rape was by mere resolution of the fiscal at the preliminary investigation
stage. There is no declaration in a final judgment that the fact from which the
civil case might arise did not exist. Consequently, the dismissal did not in any
way affect the right of herein private respondent to institute a civil action
arising from the offense because such preliminary dismissal of the penal
action did not carry with it the extinction of the civil action.

The reason most often given for this holding is that the two proceedings
involved are not between the same parties. Furthermore, it has long been
emphasized, with continuing validity up to now, that there are different rules
28
 6 petitioner is already married to someone living in Bacolod City. Private
GASHEM SHOOKAT BAKSH, petitioner, vs. HON. COURT OF APPEALS
and MARILOU T. GONZALES, respondents.
1993 Feb 19
3rd Division
G.R. No. 97336
DECISION
DAVIDE, JR., J p:
This is an appeal by certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court seeking to
review and set aside the Decision 1 of the respondent Court of Appeals in
CA-G.R. CV No. 24256 which affirmed in toto the 16 October 1989 Decision
or Branch 38 (Lingayen) of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Pangasinan in
Civil Case No. 16503. Presented is the issue of whether or not damages may
be recovered for a breach of promise to marry on the basis of Article 21 of
the Civil Code of the Philippines.
The antecedents of this case are not complicated:
On 27 October 1987, private respondent, without the assistance of counsel,
filed with the aforesaid trial court a complaint 2 for damages against the
petitioner for the alleged violation of their agreement to get married. She
alleges in said complaint that: she is twenty-two (22) years old, single,
Filipino and a pretty lass of good moral character and reputation duly
respected in her community; petitioner, on the other hand, is an Iranian
citizen residing at the Lozano Apartments, Guilig, Dagupan City, and is an
exchange student taking a medical course at the Lyceum Northwestern
Colleges in Dagupan City; before 20 August 1987, the latter courted and
proposed to marry her; she accepted his love on the condition that they
would get married; they therefore argued to get married after the end of the
school semester, which was in October of that year; petitioner then visited
the private respondent's parents in Baaga, Bugallon, Pangasinan to secure
their approval to the marriage; sometime in 20 August 1987, the petitioner
forced her to live with him in the Lozano Apartments; she was a virgin before
she began living with him; a week before the filing of the complaint,
petitioner's attitude towards her started to change; he maltreated and
threatened to kill her; as a result of such maltreatment, she sustained
injuries, during a confrontation with a representative of the barangay captain
of Guilig a day before the filing of the complaint, petitioner repudiated their
marriage agreement and asked her not to live with him anymore and; the
respondent then prayed for judgment ordering the petitioner to pay her
damages in the amount of not less than P45,000.00, reimbursement for
actual expenses amounting to P600.00, attorney's fees and costs, and
granting her such other relief and remedies as may be just and equitable.
The complaint was docketed as Civil Case No 16503.
In his Answer with Counterclaim, 3 petitioner admitted only the personal
circumstances of the parties as averred in the complaint and denied the rest
of the allegations either for lack of knowledge or information sufficient to form
a belief as to the truth thereof or because the true facts are those alleged as
his Special and Affirmative Defenses. He thus claimed that he never
proposed marriage to or agreed to be married with the private respondent; he
neither sought the consent and approval of her parents nor forced her to live
in his apartment; he did not maltreat her, but only told her to stop coming to
his place because he discovered that she had deceived him by stealing his
money and passport; and finally, no confrontation took place with a
representative of the barangay captain. Insisting, in his Counterclaim, that
the complaint is baseless and unfounded and that as a result thereof, he was
unnecessarily dragged into court and compelled to incur expenses, and has
suffered mental anxiety and a besmirched reputation, he prayed for an award
of P5,000.00 for miscellaneous expenses and P25,000.00 as moral
damages.
After conducting a pre-trial on 25 January 1988, the trial court issued a Pre-
Trial Order 4 embodying the stipulated facts which the parties had agreed
upon, to wit:
"1. That the plaintiff is single and resident (sic) of Baaga, Bugallon,
Pangasinan, while the defendant is single, Iranian, citizen and resident (sic)
of Lozano Apartment, Guilig, Dagupan City since September 1, 1987 up to
the present;
2. That the defendant is presently studying at Lyceum-Northwestern,
Dagupan City, College of Medicine, second year medicine proper.
3. That the plaintiff is (sic) an employee at Mabuhay Luncheonette,
Fernandez Avenue, Dagupan City since July, 1986 up to the present and a
(sic) high school graduate;
29
4. That the parties happened to know each other when the Manager of the
Mabuhay Luncheonette, Johnny Rabino introduced the defendant to the
plaintiff on August 3, 1986."
After trial on the merits, the lower court, applying Article 21 of the Civil Code,
rendered on 16 October 1989 a decision 5 favoring the private respondent.
The petitioner was thus ordered to pay the latter damages and attorney's
fees; the dispositive portion of the decision reads:
"IN THE LIGHT of the foregoing consideration, judgment is hereby rendered
in favor of the plaintiff and against the defendant.
1. Condemning (sic) the defendant to pay the plaintiff the sum of twenty
thousand (P20,000.00) pesos as moral damages.
2. Condemning further the defendant to pay the plaintiff the sum of three
thousand (P3,000.00) pesos as atty's fees and two thousand (P2,000.00)
pesos at (sic) litigation expenses and to pay the costs.
3. All other claims are denied." 6
The decision is anchored on the trial court's findings and conclusions that (a)
petitioner and private respondent were lovers, (b) private respondent is not a
woman of loose morals or questionable virtue who readily submits to sexual
advances, (c) petitioner, through machinations, deceit and false pretenses,
promised to marry private respondent, (d) because of his persuasive promise
to marry her, she allowed herself to be deflowered by him, (e) by reason of
that deceitful promise, private respondent and her parents - in accordance
with Filipino customs and traditions - made some preparations for the
wedding that was to be held at the end of October 1987 by looking for pigs
and chickens, inviting friends and relatives and contracting sponsors, (f)
petitioner did not fulfill his promise to marry her and (g) such acts of the
petitioner, who is a foreigner and who has abused Philippine hospitality, have
offended our sense of morality, good customs, culture and traditions. The trial
court gave full credit to the private respondent's testimony because, inter alia,
she would not have had the temerity and courage to come to court and
expose her honor and reputation to public scrutiny and ridicule if her claim
was false. 7
The above findings and conclusions were culled from the detailed summary
of the evidence for the private respondent in the foregoing decision, digested
by the respondent Court as follows:
"According to plaintiff, who claimed that she was a virgin at the time and that
she never had a boyfriend before, defendant started courting her just a few
days after they first met. He later proposed marriage to her several times and
she accepted his love as well as his proposal of marriage on August 20,
1987, on which same day he went with her to her hometown of Banaga,
Bugallon, Pangasinan, as he wanted to meet her parents and inform them of
their relationship and their intention to get married. The photographs Exhs.
"A" to "E" (and their submarkings) of defendant with members of plaintiff's
family or with plaintiff, were taken that day. Also on that occasion, defendant
told plaintiff's parents and brothers and sisters that he intended to marry her
during the semestral break in October, 1987, and because plaintiff's parents
thought he was good and trusted him, they agreed to his proposal for him to
marry their daughter, and they likewise allowed him to stay in their house and
sleep with plaintiff during the few days that they were in Bugallon. When
plaintiff and defendant later returned to Dagupan City, they continued to live
together in defendant's apartment. However, in the early days of October,
1987, defendant would tie plaintiff's hands and feet while he went to school,
and he even gave her medicine at 4 o'clock in the morning that made her
sleep the whole day and night until the following day. As a result of this live-in
relationship, plaintiff became pregnant, but defendant gave her some
medicine to abort the foetus. Still plaintiff continued to live with defendant and
kept reminding him of his promise to marry her until he told her that he could
not do so because he was already married to a girl in Bacolod City. That was
the time plaintiff left defendant, went home to her parents, and thereafter
consulted a lawyer who accompanied her to the barangay captain in
Dagupan City. Plaintiff, her lawyer, her godmother, and a barangay tanod
send by the barangay captain went to talk to defendant to still convince him
to marry plaintiff, but defendant insisted that he could not do so because he
was already married to a girl in Bacolod City, although the truth, as stipulated
by the parties at the pre-trial, is that defendant is still single.
Plaintiff's father, a tricycle driver, also claimed that after defendant had
informed them of his desire to marry Marilou, he already looked for sponsors
for the wedding, started preparing for the reception by looking for pigs and
chickens, and even already invited many relatives and friends to the
forthcoming wedding." 8
30
Petitioner appealed the trial court's decision to the respondent Court of
Appeals which docketed the case as CA-G R. CV No. 24256. In his Brief, 9
he contended that the trial court erred (a) in not dismissing the case for lack
of factual and legal basis and (b) in ordering him to pay moral damages,
attorney's fees, litigation expenses and costs.
On 18 February 1991, respondent Court promulgated the challenged
decision 10 affirming in toto the trial court's ruling of 16 October 1989. In
sustaining the trial court's findings of fact, respondent Court made the
following analysis:
"First of all, plaintiff, then only 21 years old when she met defendant who was
already 23 years old at the time, does not appear to be a girl of loose morals.
It is uncontradicted that she was a virgin prior to her unfortunate experience
with defendant and never had a boyfriend. She is, as described by the lower
court, a barrio lass 'not used and accustomed to the trend of modern urban
life', and certainly would (sic) not have allowed 'herself to be deflowered by
the defendant if there was no persuasive promise made by the defendant to
marry her.' In fact, we agree with the lower court that plaintiff and defendant
must have been sweethearts or so the plaintiff must have thought because of
the deception of defendant, for otherwise, she would not have allowed
herself to be photographed with defendant in public in so (sic) loving and
tender poses as those depicted in the pictures Exhs. "D" and "E". We cannot
believe, therefore, defendant's pretense that plaintiff was a nobody to him
except a waitress at the restaurant where he usually ate. Defendant in fact
admitted that he went to plaintiff's hometown of Banaga, Bugallon,
Pangasinan, at least thrice; at (sic) the town fiesta on February 27, 1987 (p.
54, tsn May 18, 1988), at (sic) a beach party together with the manager and
employees of the Mabuhay Luncheonette on March 3, 1987 (p. 50, tsn id.),
and on April 1, 1987 when he allegedly talked to plaintiff's mother who told
him to marry her daughter (pp. 55-56, tsn id.). Would defendant have left
Dagupan City where he was involved in the serious study of medicine to go
to plaintiff's hometown in Banaga, Bugallon, unless there was (sic) some kind
of special relationship between them? And this special relationship must
indeed have led to defendant's insincere proposal of marriage to plaintiff,
communicated not only to her but also to her parents, and (sic) Marites
Rabino, the owner of the restaurant where plaintiff was working and where
defendant first proposed marriage to her, also knew of this love affair and
defendant's proposal of marriage to plaintiff, which she declared was the
reason why plaintiff resigned from her job at the restaurant after she had
accepted defendant's proposal (pp. 6-7, tsn March 7, 1988).
Upon the other hand, appellant does not appear to be a man of good moral
character and must think so low and have so little respect and regard for
Filipino women that he openly admitted that when he studied in Bacolod City
for several years where he finished his B.S. Biology before he came to
Dagupan City to study medicine, he had a common-law wife in Bacolod City.
In other words, he also lived with another woman in Bacolod City but did not
marry that woman, just like what he did to plaintiff. It is not surprising, then,
that he felt so little compunction or remorse in pretending to love and
promising to marry plaintiff, a young, innocent, trustful country girl, in order to
satisfy his lust on her." 11
and then concluded:
"In sum, we are strongly convinced and so hold that it was defendant-
appellant's fraudulent and deceptive protestations of love for and promise to
marry plaintiff that made her surrender her virtue and womanhood to him and
to live with him on the honest and sincere belief that he would keep said
promise, and it was likewise these (sic) fraud and deception on appellant's
part that made plaintiff's parents agree to their daughter's living-in with him
preparatory to their supposed marriage. And as these acts of appellant are
palpably and undoubtedly against morals, good customs, and public policy,
and are even gravely and deeply derogatory and insulting to our women,
coming as they do from a foreigner who has been enjoying the hospitality of
our people and taking advantage of the opportunity to study in one of our
institutions of learning, defendant-appellant should indeed be made, under
Art. 21 of the Civil Code of the Philippines, to compensate for the moral
damages and injury that he had caused plaintiff, as the lower court ordered
him to do in its decision in this case." 12
Unfazed by his second defeat, petitioner filed the instant petition on 26 March
1991; he raises therein the single issue of whether or not Article 21 of the
Civil Code applies to the case at bar. 13
It is petitioner's thesis that said Article 21 is not applicable because he had
not committed any moral wrong or injury or violated any good custom or
public policy; he has not professed love or proposed marriage to the private
respondent; and he has never maltreated her. He criticizes the trial court for
liberally invoking Filipino customs, traditions and culture, and ignoring the
fact that since he is a foreigner, he is not conversant with such Filipino
customs, traditions and culture. As an Iranian Moslem, he is not familiar with
31
Catholic and Christian ways. He stresses that even if he had made a promise
to marry, the subsequent failure to fulfill the same is excusable or tolerable
because of his Moslem upbringing; he then alludes to the Muslim Code
which purportedly allows a Muslim to take four (4) wives and concludes that
on the basis thereof, the trial court erred in ruling that he does not possess
good moral character. Moreover, his controversial "common law wife" is now
his legal wife as their marriage had been solemnized in civil ceremonies in
the Iranian Embassy. As to his unlawful cohabitation with the private
respondent, petitioner claims that even if responsibility could be pinned on
him for the live-in relationship, the private respondent should also be faulted
for consenting to an illicit arrangement. Finally, petitioner asseverates that
even if it was to be assumed arguendo that he had professed his love to the
private respondent and had also promised to marry her, such acts would not
be actionable in view of the special circumstances of the case. The mere
breach of promise is not actionable. 14
On 26 August 1991, after the private respondent had filed her Comment to
the petition and the petitioner had filed his Reply thereto, this Court gave due
course to the petition and required the parties to submit their respective
Memoranda, which they subsequently complied with.
As may be gleaned from the foregoing summation of the petitioner's
arguments in support of his thesis, it is clear that questions of fact, which boil
down to the issue of the credibility of witnesses, are also raised. It is the rule
in this jurisdiction that appellate courts will not disturb the trial court's findings
as to the credibility of witnesses, the latter court having heard the witnesses
and having had the opportunity to observe closely their deportment and
manner of testifying, unless the trial court had plainly overlooked facts of
substance or value which, if considered, might affect the result of the case.
15
Petitioner has miserably failed to convince Us that both the appellate and trial
courts had overlooked any fact of substance or value which could alter the
result of the case.
Equally settled is the rule that only questions of law may be raised in a
petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. It is not
the function of this Court to analyze or weigh all over again the evidence
introduced by the parties before the lower court. There are, however,
recognized exceptions to this rule. Thus, in Medina vs. Asistio, Jr., 16 this
Court took the time, again, to enumerate these exceptions:
xxx xxx xxx
"(1) When the conclusion is a finding grounded entirely on speculation,
surmises or conjectures (Joaquin v. Navarro, 93 Phil. 257 [1953]); (2) When
the inference made is manifestly mistaken, absurd or impossible (Luna v.
Linatok, 74 Phil. 15 [1942]); (3) Where there is a grave abuse of discretion
(Buyco v. People, 95 Phil. 453 [1955]); (4) When the judgment is based on a
misapprehension of facts (Cruz v. Sosing, L-4875, Nov. 27, 1953); (5) When
the findings of fact are conflicting (Casica v. Villaseca, L-9590 Ap. 30, 1957;
unrep.) (6) When the Court of Appeals, in making its findings, went beyond
the issues of the case and the same is contrary to the admissions of both
appellant and appellee (Evangelista v. Alto Surety and Insurance Co., 103
Phil. 401 [1958]); (7) The findings of the Court of Appeals are contrary to
those of the trial court (Garcia v. Court of Appeals, 33 SCRA 622 [1970];
Sacay v. Sandiganbayan, 142 SCRA 593 [1986]); (8) When the findings of
fact are conclusions without citation of specific evidence on which they are
based (Ibid.,); (9) When the facts set forth in the petition as well as in the
petitioners' main and reply briefs are not disputed by the respondents (Ibid.,);
and (10) The finding of fact of the Court of Appeals is premised on the
supposed absence of evidence and is contradicted by the evidence on
record (Salazar v. Gutierrez, 33 SCRA 242 [1970])."
Petitioner has not endeavored to point out to Us the existence of any of the
above quoted exceptions in this case. Consequently, the factual findings of
the trial and appellate courts must be respected.
And now to the legal issue.
The existing rule is that a breach of promise to marry per se is not an
actionable wrong. 17 Congress deliberately eliminated from the draft of the
New Civil Code the provisions that would have made it so. The reason
therefor is set forth in the report of the Senate Committee on the Proposed
Civil Code, from which We quote:
"The elimination of this chapter is proposed. That breach of promise to marry
is not actionable has been definitely decided in the case of De Jesus vs.
Syquia. 18 The history of breach of promise suits in the United States and in
England has shown that no other action lends itself more readily to abuse by
designing women and unscrupulous men. It is this experience which has led
32
to the abolition of rights of action in the so-called Heart Balm suits in many of
the American states .." 19
This notwithstanding, the said Code contains a provision, Article 21, which is
designed to expand the concept of torts or quasi-delict in this jurisdiction by
granting adequate legal remedy for the untold number of moral wrongs which
is impossible for human foresight to specifically enumerate and punish in the
statute books. 20
As the Code Commission itself stated in its Report:
"'But the Code Commission has gone farther than the sphere of wrongs
defined or determined by positive law. Fully sensible that there are countless
gaps in the statutes, which leave so many victims of moral wrongs helpless,
even though they have actually suffered material and moral injury, the
Commission has deemed it necessary, in the interest of justice, to
incorporate in the proposed Civil Code the following rule:
'ART. 23. Any person who wilfully causes loss or injury to another in a
manner that is contrary to morals, good customs or public policy shall
compensate the latter for the damage.'
'An example will illustrate the purview of the foregoing norm: 'A' seduces the
nineteen-year old daughter of 'X.' A promise of marriage either has not been
made, or can not be proved. The girl becomes pregnant. Under the present
laws, there is no crime, as the girl is above eighteen years of age. Neither
can any civil action for breach of promise of marriage be filed. Therefore,
though the grievous moral wrong has been committed, and though the girl
and her family have suffered incalculable moral damage, she and her
parents cannot bring any action for damages. But under the proposed article,
she and her parents would have such a right of action.
Thus at one stroke, the legislator, if the foregoing rule is approved, would
vouchsafe adequate legal remedy for that untold number of moral wrongs
which it is impossible for human foresight to provide for specifically in the
statutes." 21
Article 2176, of the Civil Code, which defines a quasi-delict thus:
"Whoever by act or omission causes damage to another, there being fault or
negligence, is obliged to pay for the damage done. Such fault or negligence,
if there is no pre-existing contractual relation between the parties, is called a
quasi-delict and is governed by the provisions of this Chapter."
is limited to negligent acts or omissions and excludes the notion of willfulness
or intent. Quasi-delict, known in Spanish legal treatises as culpa aquiliana, is
a civil law concept while torts is an Anglo-American or common law concept.
Torts is much broader than culpa aquiliana because it includes not only
negligence, but intentional criminal acts as well such as assault and battery,
false imprisonment and deceit. In the general scheme of the Philippine legal
system envisioned by the Commission responsible for drafting the New Civil
Code, intentional and malicious acts. with certain exceptions, are to. be
governed by the Revised Penal Code while negligent acts or omissions are
to be covered by Article 2176 of the Civil Code. 22 In between these
opposite spectrums are injurious acts which, in the absence of Article 21,
would have been beyond redress. Thus, Article 21 fills that vacuum. It is even
postulated that together with Articles 19 and 20 of the Civil Code, Article 21
has greatly broadened the scope of the law on civil wrongs; it has become
much more supple and adaptable than the Anglo-American law on torts. 23
In the light of the above laudable purpose of Article 21, We are of the opinion,
and so hold, that where a man's promise to marry is in fact the proximate
cause of the acceptance of his love by a woman and his representation to
fulfill that promise thereafter becomes the proximate cause of the giving of
herself unto him in a sexual congress, proof that he had, in reality, no
intention of marrying her and that the promise was only a subtle scheme or
deceptive device to entice or inveigle her to accept him and to obtain her
consent to the sexual act, could justify the award of damages pursuant to
Article 21 not because of such promise to marry but because of the fraud and
deceit behind it and the willful injury to her honor and reputation which
followed thereafter. It is essential, however, that such injury should have
been committed in a manner contrary to morals, good customs or public
policy.
In the instant case, respondent Court found that it was the petitioner's
"fraudulent and deceptive protestations of love for and promise to marry
plaintiff that made her surrender her virtue and womanhood to him and to live
with him on the honest and sincere belief that he would keep said promise,
and it was likewise these fraud and deception on appellant's part that made
plaintiff's parents agree to their daughter's living-in with him preparatory to
their supposed marriage." 24 In short, the private respondent surrendered
her virginity, the cherished possession of every single Filipina, not because of
33
lust but because of moral seduction - the kind illustrated by the Code
Commission in its example earlier adverted to. The petitioner could not be
held liable for criminal seduction punished under either Article 337 or Article
338 of the Revised Penal Code because the private respondent was above
eighteen (18) years of age at the time of the seduction.
Prior decisions of this Court clearly suggest that Article 21 may be applied-in
a breach of promise to marry where the woman is a victim of moral
seduction. Thus, in Hermosisima vs. Court of Appeals, 25 this Court denied
recovery of damages to the woman because:
" . . . we find ourselves unable to say that petitioner is morally guilty of
seduction, not only because he is approximately ten (10) years younger than
the complainant - who was around thirty-six (36) years of age, and as highly
enlightened as a former high school teacher and a life insurance agent are
supposed to be - when she became intimate with petitioner, then a mere
apprentice pilot, but, also, because the court of first instance found that,
complainant 'surrendered herself' to petitioner because, 'overwhelmed by her
love' for him, she 'wanted to bind' him 'by having a fruit of their engagement
even before they had the benefit of clergy.'"
In Tanjanco vs. Court of Appeals, 26 while this Court likewise hinted at
possible recovery if there had been moral seduction, recovery was eventually
denied because We were not convinced that such seduction existed. The
following enlightening disquisition and conclusion were made in the said
case:
"The Court of Appeals seems to have overlooked that the example set forth
in the Code Commission's memorandum refers to a tort upon a minor who
had been seduced. The essential feature is seduction, that in law is more
than mere sexual intercourse, or a breach of a promise of marriage; it
connotes essentially the idea of deceit, enticement, superior power or abuse
of confidence on the part of the seducer to which the woman has yielded
(U.S. vs. Buenaventura, 27 Phil. 121; U.S. vs. Arlante, 9 Phil. 595).
It has been ruled in the Buenaventura case (supra) that -
'To constitute seduction there must in all cases be some sufficient promise or
inducement and the woman must yield because of the promise or other
inducement. If she consents merely from carnal lust and the intercourse is
from mutual desire, there is no seduction (43 Cent Dig. tit. Seduction, par.
56). She must be induced to depart from the path of virtue by the use of
some species of arts, persuasions and wiles, which are calculated to have
and do have that effect, and which result in her ultimately submitting her
person to the sexual embraces of her seducer' (27 Phil. 123).
And in American Jurisprudence we find:
'On the other hand, in an action by the woman, the enticement, persuasion or
deception is the essence of the injury; and a mere proof of intercourse is
insufficient to warrant a recovery.
Accordingly it is not seduction where the willingness arises out sexual desire
or curiosity of the female, and the defendant merely affords her the needed
opportunity for the commission of the act. It has been emphasized that to
allow a recovery in all such cases would tend to the demoralization of the
female sex, and would be a reward for unchastity by; which a class of
adventuresses would be swift to profit.' (47 Am. Jur. 662).
xxx xxx xxx
Over and above the partisan allegations, the facts stand out that for one
whole year, from 1958 to 1959, the plaintiff-appellee, a woman of adult age,
maintained intimate sexual relations with appellant, with repeated acts of
intercourse. Such conduct is incompatible with the idea of seduction. Plainly
there is here voluntariness and mutual passion; for had the appellant been
deceived, had she surrendered exclusively because of the deceit, artful
persuasions and wiles of the defendant, she would not have again yielded to
his embraces, much less for one year, without exacting early fulfillment of the
alleged promises of marriage, and would have cut short all sexual relations
upon finding that defendant did not intend to fulfill his promise. Hence, we
conclude that no case is made under Article 21 of the Civil Code, and no
other cause of action being alleged, no error was committed by the Court of
First Instance in dismissing the complaint." 27
In his annotations on the Civil Code, 28 Associate Justice Edgardo L. Paras,
who recently retired from this Court, opined that in a breach of promise to
marry where there had been carnal knowledge, moral damages may be
recovered:
" . . . if there be criminal or moral seduction, but not if the intercourse was
due to mutual lust. (Hermosisima vs. Court of Appeals, L-14628, Sept. 30,
34
1960; Estopa vs. Piansay, Jr., L-14733, Sept. 30, 1960; Batarra vs. Marcos, 7
Phil. 56 (sic); Beatriz Galang vs. Court of Appeals, et al., L-17248, Jan. 29,
1962). (In other words, if the CAUSE be the promise to marry, and the
EFFECT be the carnal knowledge, there is a chance that there was criminal
or moral seduction, hence recovery of moral damages will prosper. If it be the
other way around, there can be no recovery of moral damages, because
here mutual lust has intervened). . . . ."
together with "ACTUAL damages, should there be any, such as the expenses
for the wedding preparations (See Domalagon v. Bolifer, 33 Phil. 471)."
Senator Arturo M. Tolentino 29 is also of the same persuasion:
"It is submitted that the rule in Batarra vs. Marcos 30 still subsists,
notwithstanding the incorporation of the present article 31 in the Code. The
example given by the Code Commission is correct, if there was seduction,
not necessarily in the legal sense, but in the vulgar sense of deception. But
when the sexual act is accomplished without any deceit or qualifying
circumstance of abuse of authority or influence, but the woman, already of
age, has knowingly given herself to a man, it cannot be said that there is an
injury which can be the basis for indemnity.
But so long as there is fraud, which is characterized by wilfullness (sic), the
action lies. The court, however, must weigh the degree of fraud, if it is
sufficient to deceive the woman under the circumstances, because an act
which would deceive a girl sixteen years of age may not constitute deceit as
to an experienced woman thirty years of age. But so long as there is a
wrongful act and a resulting injury, there should be civil liability, even if the act
is not punishable under the criminal law and there should have been an
acquittal or dismissal of the criminal case for that reason."
We are unable to agree with the petitioner's alternative proposition to the
effect that granting, for argument's sake, that he did promise to marry the
private respondent, the latter is nevertheless also at fault. According to him,
both parties are in pari delicto; hence, pursuant to Article 1412(1) of the Civil
Code and the doctrine laid down in Batarra vs. Marcos, 32 the private
respondent cannot recover damages from the petitioner. The latter even
goes as far as stating that if the private respondent had "sustained any injury
or damage in their relationship, it is primarily because of her own doing," 33
for:
" . . . She is also interested in the petitioner as the latter will become a doctor
sooner or later. Take notice that she is a plain high school graduate and a
mere employee . . (Annex C ) or a waitress (TSN, p. 51, January 25, 1988)
in a luncheonette and without doubt, is in need of a man who can give her
economic security. Her family is in dire need of financial assistance (TSN, pp.
51-53, May 18, 1988). And this predicament prompted her to accept a
proposition that may have been offered by the petitioner." 34
These statements reveal the true character and motive of the petitioner. It is
clear that he harbors a condescending, if not sarcastic, regard for the private
respondent on account of the latter's ignoble birth, inferior educational
background, poverty and, as perceived by him, dishonorable employment.
Obviously then, from the very beginning, he was not at all moved by good
faith and an honest motive. Marrying with a woman so circumstanced could
not have even remotely occurred to him. Thus, his profession of love and
promise to marry were empty words directly intended to fool, dupe, entice,
beguile and deceive the poor woman into believing that indeed, he loved her
and would want her to be his life s partner. His was nothing but pure lust
which he wanted satisfied by a Filipina who honestly believed that by
accepting his proffer of love and proposal of marriage, she would be able to
enjoy a life of ease and security. Petitioner clearly violated the Filipino s
concept of morality and so brazenly defied the traditional respect Filipinos
have for their women. It can even be said that the petitioner committed such
deplorable acts in blatant disregard of Article 19 of the Civil Code which
directs every person to act with justice, give everyone his due and observe
honesty and good faith in the exercise of his rights and in the performance of
his obligations.
No foreigner must be allowed to make a mockery of our laws, customs and
traditions.
The pari delicto rule does not apply in this case for while indeed, the private
respondent may not have been impelled by the purest of intentions, she
eventually submitted to the petitioner in sexual congress not out of lust, but
because of moral seduction. In fact, it is apparent that she had qualms of
conscience about the entire episode for as soon as she found out that the
petitioner was not going to marry her after all, she left him. She is not,
therefore, in pari delicto with the petitioner. Pari delicto means "in equal fault;
in a similar offense or crime; equal in guilt or in legal fault." 35 At most, it
could be conceded that she is merely in delicto.
35
"Equity often interferes for the relief of the less guilty of the parties, where his UNITED AIRLINES, INC., petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS, ANICETO
transgression has been brought about by the imposition or undue influence FONTANILLA, in his personal capacity and in behalf of his minor son
of the party on whom the burden of the original wrong principally rests, or MYCHAL ANDREW FONTANILLA respondents.
where his consent to the transaction was itself procured by fraud." 36
2001 Apr 20
In Mangayao vs. Lasud, 37 We declared: 1st Division

"Appellants likewise stress that both parties being at fault, there should be no G.R. No. 124110
action by one against the other (Art. 1412, New Civil Code). This rule,
DECISION
however, has been interpreted as applicable only where the fault on both
sides is, more or less, equivalent. It does not apply where one party is literate
or intelligent and the other one is not (c.f. Bough vs. Cantiveros, 40 Phil.
209)." KAPUNAN, J.:

We should stress, however, that while We find for the private respondent, let
it not be said that this Court condones the deplorable behavior of her parents
in letting her and the petitioner stay together in the same room in their house
after giving approval to their marriage. It is the solemn duty of parents to
protect the honor of their daughters and infuse upon them the higher values
of morality and dignity.
On March 1, 1989, private respondent Aniceto Fontanilla purchased from
petitioner United Airlines, through the Philippine Travel Bureau in Manila,
three (3) Visit the U.S.A. tickets for himself, his wife and his minor son
Mychal for the following routes:

WHEREFORE, finding no reversible error in the challenged decision, the

(a) San Francisco to Washington (15 April 1989);
instant petition is hereby DENIED, with costs against the petitioner.

SO ORDERED.
(b) Washington to Chicago (25 April 1989);
Feliciano, J., (Acting Chairman), Bidin, Romero and Melo, JJ., concur.

Gutierrez, Jr., J., (Chairman), is on terminal leave. (c) Chicago to Los Angeles (29 April 1989);

(d) Los Angeles to San Francisco (01 May 1989 for petitioners wife and 05
May 1989 for petitioner and his son).[1]

All flights had been confirmed previously by United Airlines.[2]

7
The Fontanillas proceeded to the United States as planned, where they used
the first coupon from San Francisco to Washington. On April 24, 1989,

36
Aniceto Fontanilla bought two (2) additional coupons each for himself, his
wife and his son from petitioner at its office in Washington Dulles Airport.
After paying the penalty for rewriting their tickets, the Fontanillas were issued
tickets with corresponding boarding passes with the words CHECK-IN
REQUIRED, for United Airlines Flight No. 1108, set to leave from Los
Angeles to San Francisco at 10:30 a.m. on May 5, 1989.[3]
The cause of the non-boarding of the Fontanillas on United Airlines Flight No.
1108 makes up the bone of contention of this controversy.
Private respondents' version is as follows:
Aniceto Fontanilla and his son Mychal claim that on May 5, 1989, upon their
arrival at the Los Angeles Airport for their flight, they proceeded to United
Airlines counter where they were attended by an employee wearing a
nameplate bearing the name LINDA. Linda examined their tickets, punched
something into her computer and then told them that boarding would be in
fifteen minutes.[4]
When the flight was called, the Fontanillas proceeded to the plane. To their
surprise, the stewardess at the gate did not allow them to board the plane, as
they had no assigned seat numbers. They were then directed to go back to
the check-in counter where Linda subsequently informed them that the
flight had been overbooked and asked them to wait.[5]
The Fontanillas tried to explain to Linda the special circumstances of their
visit. However, Linda told them in arrogant manner, So what, I can not do
anything about it.[6]
Subsequently, three other passengers with Caucasian features were
graciously allowed to board, after the Fontanillas were told that the flight had
been overbooked.[7]
The plane then took off with the Fontanillas baggage in tow, leaving them
behind.[8]
The Fontanillas then complained to Linda, who in turn gave them an ugly
stare and rudely uttered, Its not my fault. Its the fault of the company. Just
sit down and wait.[9] When Mr. Fontanilla reminded Linda of the
inconvenience being caused to them, she bluntly retorted, Who do you think
you are? You lousy Flips are good for nothing beggars. You always ask for
American aid. After which she remarked Dont worry about your baggage.
Anyway there is nothing in there. What are you doing here anyway? I will
report you to immigration. You Filipinos should go home.[10] Such rude
statements were made in front of other people in the airport causing the
Fontanillas to suffer shame, humiliation and embarrassment. The chastening
situation even caused the younger Fontanilla to break into tears.[11]
After some time, Linda, without any explanation, offered the Fontanillas
$50.00 each. She simply said Take it or leave it. This, the Fontanillas
declined.[12]
The Fontanillas then proceeded to the United Airlines customer service
counter to plead their case. The male employee at the counter reacted by
shouting that he was ready for it and left without saying anything.[13]
The Fontanillas were not booked on the next flight, which departed for San
Francisco at 11:00 a.m. It was only at 12:00 noon that they were able to
leave Los Angeles on United Airlines Flight No. 803.
Petitioner United Airlines has a different version of what occurred at the Los
Angeles Airport on May 5, 1989.
According to United Airlines, the Fontanillas did not initially go to the check-in
counter to get their seat assignments for UA Flight 1108. They instead
proceeded to join the queue boarding the aircraft without first securing their
37
seat assignments as required in their ticket and boarding passes. Having no
seat assignments, the stewardess at the door of the plane instructed them to
go to the check-in counter. When the Fontanillas proceeded to the check-in b) P200,000.00 as exemplary damages;
counter, Linda Allen, the United Airlines Customer Representative at the
counter informed them that the flight was overbooked. She booked them on
the next available flight and offered them denied boarding compensation. c) P50, 000.00 as attorneys fees.
Allen vehemently denies uttering the derogatory and racist words attributed
to her by the Fontanillas.[14]
No pronouncement as to costs.

The incident prompted the Fontanillas to file Civil Case No. 89-4268 for
damages before the Regional Trial Court of Makati. After trial on the merits, SO ORDERED.[16]
the trial court rendered a decision, the dispositive portion of which reads as
follows:
Petitioner United Airlines now comes to this Court raising the following
assignment of errors:
WHEREFORE, judgment is rendered dismissing the complaint. The
counterclaim is likewise dismissed as it appears that plaintiffs were not
actuated by legal malice when they filed the instant complaint.[15]
I

On appeal, the Court of Appeals ruled in favor of the Fontanillas. The

RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN RULING THAT
appellate court found that there was an admission on the part of United
THE TRIAL COURT WAS WRONG IN FAILING TO CONSIDER THE
Airlines that the Fontanillas did in fact observe the check-in requirement. It
ALLEGED ADMISSION THAT PRIVATE RESPONDENT OBSERVED THE
ruled further that even assuming there was a failure to observe the check-in
CHECK-IN REQUIREMENT.
requirement, United Airlines failed to comply with the procedure laid down in
cases where a passenger is denied boarding. The appellate court likewise
gave credence to the claim of Aniceto Fontanilla that the employees of
United Airlines were discourteous and arbitrary and, worse, discriminatory. In II
light of such treatment, the Fontanillas were entitled to moral damages. The
dispositive portion of the decision of the respondent Court of Appeals dated
29 September 1995, states as follows: RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN RULING THAT
PRIVATE RESPONDENTS FAILURE TO CHECK-IN WILL NOT DEFEAT
HIS CLAIMS BECAUSE THE DENIED BOARDING RULES WERE NOT
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, judgment appealed herefrom is COMPLIED WITH.
hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE, and a new judgment is entered
ordering defendant-appellee to pay plaintiff-appellant the following:
III

a) P200,000.00 as moral damages;

38
RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN RULING THAT
PRIVATE RESPONDENT IS ENTITLED TO MORAL DAMAGES OF P200,
000.
IV
RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN RULING THAT
PRIVATE RESPONDENT IS ENTITLED TO EXEMPLARY DAMAGES OF
P200,000.
V
RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN RULING THAT
PRIVATE RESPONDENT IS ENTITLED TO ATTORNEYS FEES OF P50,
000.[17]
On the first issue raised by the petitioner, the respondent Court of Appeals
ruled that when Rule 9, Section 1 of the Rules of Court,[18] there was an
implied admission in petitioner's answer in the allegations in the complaint
that private respondent and his son observed the check-in requirement at
the Los Angeles Airport. Thus:
A perusal of the above pleadings filed before the trial court disclosed that
there exists a blatant admission on the part of the defendant-appellee that
the plaintiffs-appellants indeed observed the check-in requirement at the
Los Angeles Airport on May 5, 1989. In view of defendant-appellees
admission of plaintiffs-appellants material averment in the complaint, We find
no reason why the trial court should rule against such admission.[19]
We disagree with the above conclusion reached by respondent Court of
Appeals. Paragraph 7 of private respondents' complaint states:
7. On May 5, 1989 at 9:45 a.m., plaintiff and his son checked in at
defendants designated counter at the airport in Los Angeles for their
scheduled flight to San Francisco on defendants Flight No. 1108.[20]
Responding to the above allegations, petitioner averred in paragraph 4 of its
answer, thus:
4. Admits the allegation set forth in paragraph 7 of the complaint except to
deny that plaintiff and his son checked in at 9:45 a.m., for lack of knowledge
or information at this point in time as to the truth thereof.[21]
The rule authorizing an answer that the defendant has no knowledge or
information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth of an averment and
giving such answer the effect of a denial, does not apply where the fact as to
which want of knowledge is asserted is so plainly and necessarily within the
defendant's knowledge that his averment of ignorance must be palpably
untrue.[22] Whether or not private respondents checked in at petitioner's
designated counter at the airport at 9:45 a.m. on May 5, 1989 must
necessarily be within petitioner's knowledge.
While there was no specific denial as to the fact of compliance with the
check-in requirement by private respondents, petitioner presented evidence
to support its contention that there indeed was no compliance.
Private respondents then are said to have waived the rule on admission. It
not only presented evidence to support its contention that there was
compliance with the check-in requirement, it even allowed petitioner to
present rebuttal evidence. In the case of Yu Chuck vs. "Kong Li Po," we
ruled that:
The object of the rule is to relieve a party of the trouble and expense in
proving in the first instance an alleged fact, the existence or non-existence of
39
which is necessarily within the knowledge of the adverse party, and of the
necessity (to his opponents case) of establishing which such adverse party
is notified by his opponents pleadings.
The plaintiff may, of course, waive the rule and that is what must be
considered to have done (sic) by introducing evidence as to the execution of
the document and failing to object to the defendants evidence in refutation;
all this evidence is now competent and the case must be decided thereupon.
[23]
The determination of the other issues raised is dependent on whether or not
there was a breach of contract in bad faith on the part of the petitioner in not
allowing the Fontanillas to board United Airlines Flight 1108.
It must be remembered that the general rule in civil cases is that the party
having the burden of proof of an essential fact must produce a
preponderance of evidence thereon.[24] Although the evidence adduced by
the plaintiff is stronger than that presented by the defendant, a judgment
cannot be entered in favor of the former, if his evidence is not sufficient to
sustain his cause of action. The plaintiff must rely on the strength of his own
evidence and not upon the weakness of the defendants.[25] Proceeding
from this, and considering the contradictory findings of facts by the Regional
Trial Court and the Court of Appeals, the question before this Court is
whether or not private respondents were able to prove with adequate
evidence his allegations of breach of contract in bad faith.
We rule in the negative.
Time and again, the Court has pronounced that appellate courts should not,
unless for strong and cogent reasons, reverse the findings of facts of trial
courts. This is so because trial judges are in a better position to examine
real evidence and at a vantage point to observe the actuation and the
demeanor of the witnesses.[26] While not the sole indicator of the credibility
of a witness, it is of such weight that it has been said to be the touchstone of
credibility.[27]
Aniceto Fontanillas assertion that upon arrival at the airport at 9:45 a.m., he
immediately proceeded to the check-in counter, and that Linda Allen punched
in something into the computer is specious and not supported by the
evidence on record. In support of their allegations, private respondents
submitted a copy of the boarding pass. Explicitly printed on the boarding
pass are the words Check-In Required. Curiously, the said pass did not
indicate any seat number. If indeed the Fontanillas checked in at the
designated time as they claimed, why then were they not assigned seat
numbers? Absent any showing that Linda was so motivated, we do not buy
into private respondents' claim that Linda intentionally deceived him, and
made him the laughing stock among the passengers.[28] Hence, as correctly
observed by the trial court:
Plaintiffs fail to realize that their failure to check in, as expressly required in
their boarding passes, is the very reason why they were not given their
respective seat numbers, which resulted in their being denied boarding.[29]
Neither do we agree with the conclusion reached by the appellate court that
private respondents' failure to comply with the check-in requirement will not
defeat his claim as the denied boarding rules were not complied with.
Notably, the appellate court relied on the Code of Federal Regulation Part on
Oversales, which states:
250.6 Exceptions to eligibility for denied boarding compensation.
A passenger denied board involuntarily from an oversold flight shall not be
eligible for denied board compensation if:
(a) The passenger does not comply with the carriers contract of carriage or
tariff provisions regarding ticketing, reconfirmation, check-in, and
acceptability for transformation.
40
The appellate court, however, erred in applying the laws of the United States
as, in the case at bar, Philippine law is the applicable law. Although, the
contract of carriage was to be performed in the United States, the tickets
were purchased through petitioners agent in Manila. It is true that the tickets
were rewritten in Washington, D.C. However, such fact did not change the
nature of the original contract of carriage entered into by the parties in
Manila.
In the case of Zalamea vs. Court of Appeals,[30] this Court applied the
doctrine of lex loci contractus. According to the doctrine, as a general rule,
the law of the place where a contract is made or entered into governs with
respect to its nature and validity, obligation and interpretation. This has been
said to be the rule even though the place where the contract was made is
different from the place where it is to be performed, and particularly so, if the
place of the making and the place of performance are the same. Hence, the
court should apply the law of the place where the airline ticket was issued,
when the passengers are residents and nationals of the forum and the ticket
is issued in such State by the defendant airline.
The law of the forum on the subject matter is Economic Regulations No. 7 as
amended by Boarding Priority and Denied Boarding Compensation of the
Civil Aeronautics Board, which provides that the check-in requirement be
complied with before a passenger may claim against a carrier for being
denied boarding:
SEC. 5. Amount of Denied Boarding Compensation Subject to the
exceptions provided hereinafter under Section 6, carriers shall pay to
passengers holding confirmed reserved space and who have presented
themselves at the proper place and time and fully complied with the carriers
check-in and reconfirmation procedures and who are acceptable for carriage
under the Carriers tariffs but who have been denied boarding for lack of
space, a compensation at the rate of: xx
Private respondents' narration that they were subjected to harsh and
derogatory remarks seems incredulous. However, this Court will not attempt
to surmise what really happened. Suffice to say, private respondent was not
able to prove his cause of action, for as the trial court correctly observed:
xxx plaintiffs claim to have been discriminated against and insulted in the
presence of several people. Unfortunately, plaintiffs limited their evidence to
the testimony [of] Aniceto Fontanilla, without any corroboration by the people
who saw or heard the discriminatory remarks and insults; while such limited
testimony could possibly be true, it does not enable the Court to reach the
conclusion that plaintiffs have, by a preponderance of evidence, proven that
they are entitled to P1,650,000.00 damages from defendant.[31]
As to the award of moral and exemplary damages, we find error in the award
of such by the Court of Appeals. For the plaintiff to be entitled to an award of
moral damages arising from a breach of contract of carriage, the carrier must
have acted with fraud or bad faith. The appellate court predicated its award
on our pronouncement in the case of Zalamea vs. Court of Appeals, supra,
where we stated:
Existing jurisprudence explicitly states that overbooking amounts to bad faith,
entitling passengers concerned to an award of moral damages. In Alitalia
Airways v. Court of Appeals, where passengers with confirmed booking were
refused carriage on the last minute, this Court held that when an airline
issues a ticket to a passenger confirmed on a particular flight, on a certain
date, a contract of carriage arises, and the passenger has every right to
expect that he would fly on that flight and on that date. If he does not, then
the carrier opens itself to a suit for breach of contract of carriage. Where an
airline had deliberately overbooked, it took the risk of having to deprive some
passengers of their seats in case all of them would show up for check in. For
the indignity and inconvenience of being refused a confirmed seat on the last
minute, said passenger is entitled to moral damages. ( mphasis supplied.)
However, the Courts ruling in said case should be read in consonance with
existing laws, particularly, Economic Regulations No. 7, as amended, of the
Civil Aeronautics Board:
41
Sec 3. Scope. This regulation shall apply to every Philippine and foreign air
carrier with respect to its operation of flights or portions of flights originating
from or terminating at, or serving a point within the territory of the Republic of Pardo, J., on sick leave.
the Philippines insofar as it denies boarding to a passenger on a flight, or
portion of a flight inside or outside the Philippines, for which he holds
confirmed reserved space. Furthermore, this Regulation is designed to cover
only honest mistakes on the part of the carriers and excludes deliberate and
willful acts of non-accommodation. Provided, however, that overbooking not
exceeding 10% of the seating capacity of the aircraft shall not be considered
as a deliberate and willful act of non-accommodation.

What this Court considers as bad faith is the willful and deliberate
overbooking on the part of the airline carrier. The above-mentioned law
clearly states that when the overbooking does not exceed ten percent (10%),
it is not considered as deliberate and therefore does not amount to bad faith.
While there may have been overbooking in this case, private respondents
were not able to prove that the overbooking on United Airlines Flight 1108
exceeded ten percent.

As earlier stated, the Court is of the opinion that the private respondents
were not able to prove that they were subjected to coarse and harsh
treatment by the ground crew of United Airlines. Neither were they able to
show that there was bad faith on part of the carrier airline. Hence, the award
of moral and exemplary damages by the Court of Appeals is improper.
Corollarily, the award of attorney's fees is, likewise, denied for lack of any
legal and factual basis.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The decision of the Court of

Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 37044 is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE.
The decision of the Regional Trial Court of Makati City in Civil Case No. 89-
4268 dated April 8, 1991 is hereby REINSTATED.

SO ORDERED.

Davide, Jr., C.J. (Chairman), Puno, and Ynares-Santiago, JJ., concur.

42
 8 Cesar Zalamea. The two others, on the other hand, at No. 34, being ranked
SPOUSES CESAR & SUTHIRA ZALAMEA AND LIANA ZALAMEA,
petitioners, vs. HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS AND TRANSWORLD
AIRLINES, INC., respondents.
1993 Nov 18
2nd Division
G.R. No. 104235
DECISION
NOCON, J.:
Disgruntled over TransWorld Airlines, Inc.'s refusal to accommodate them in
TWA Flight 007 departing from New York to Los Angeles on June 6, 1984
despite possession of confirmed tickets, petitioners filed an action for
damages before the Regional Trial Court of Makati, Metro Manila, Branch
145. Advocating petitioners' position, the trial court categorically ruled that
respondent TransWorld Airlines (TWA) breached its contract of carriage with
petitioners and that said breach was "characterized by bad faith." On appeal,
however, the appellate court found that while there was a breach of contract
on respondent TWA's part, there was neither fraud nor bad faith because
under the Code of Federal Regulations by the Civil Aeronautics Board of the
United States of America it is allowed to overbook flights.
The factual backdrop of the case is as follows:
Petitioners-spouses Cesar C. Zalamea and Suthira Zalamea, and their
daughter, Liana Zalamea, purchased three (3) airline tickets from the Manila
agent of respondent TransWorld Airlines, Inc. for a flight from New York to
Los Angeles on June 6, 1984. The tickets of petitioners-spouses were
purchased at a discount of 75% while that of their daughter was a full fare
ticket. All three tickets represented confirmed reservations.
While in New York, on June 4, 1984, petitioners received notice of the
reconfirmation of their reservations for said flight. On the appointed date,
however, petitioners checked in at 10:00 a.m., an hour earlier than the
scheduled flight at 11:00 a.m. but were placed on the wait-list because the
number of passengers who had checked in before them had already taken all
the seats available on the flight. Liana Zalamea appeared as No. 13 on the
wait-list while the two other Zalameas were listed as "No. 34, showing a party
of two." Out of the 42 names on the wait-list, the first 22 names were
eventually allowed to board the flight to Los Angeles, including petitioner
lower than 22, were not able to fly. As it were, those holding full-fare tickets
were given first priority among the wait-listed passengers. Mr. Zalamea, who
was holding the full-fare ticket of his daughter, was allowed to board the
plane; while his wife and daughter, who presented the discounted tickets
were denied boarding. According to Mr. Zalamea, it was only later when he
discovered that he was holding his daughter's full-fare ticket.
Even in the next TWA flight to Los Angeles Mrs. Zalamea and her daughter,
could not be accommodated because it was also fully booked. Thus, they
were constrained to book in another flight and purchased two tickets from
American Airlines at a cost of Nine Hundred Eighteen ($918.00) Dollars.
Upon their arrival in the Philippines, petitioners filed an action for damages
based on breach of contract of air carriage before the Regional Trial Court of
Makati, Metro Manila, Branch 145. As aforesaid, the lower court ruled in favor
of petitioners in its decision 1 dated January 9, 1989 the dispositive portion
of which states as follows:
"WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered ordering the defendant to pay
plaintiffs the following amounts:
"(1) US $918.00, or its peso equivalent at the time of payment, representing
the price of the tickets bought by Suthira and Liana Zalamea from American
Airlines, to enable them to fly to Los Angeles from New York City;
"(2) US $159.49, or its peso equivalent at the time of payment, representing
the price of Suthira Zalamea's ticket for TWA Flight 007;
"(3) Eight Thousand Nine Hundred Thirty-four Pesos and Fifty Centavos
(P8,934.50), Philippine Currency, representing the price of Liana Zalamea's
ticket for TWA Flight 007;
"(4) Two Hundred Fifty Thousand Pesos (250,000.00), Philippine Currency,
as moral damages for all the plaintiffs;
"(5) One Hundred Thousand Pesos (P100,000.00), Philippine Currency, as
and for attorney's fees; and
"(6) The costs of suit.
43
"SO ORDERED." 2
On appeal, the respondent Court of Appeals held that moral damages are
recoverable in a damage suit predicated upon a breach of contract of
carriage only where there is fraud or bad faith. Since it is a matter of record
that overbooking of flights is a common and accepted practice of airlines in
the United States and is specifically allowed under the Code of Federal
Regulations by the Civil Aeronautics Board, no fraud nor bad faith could be
imputed on respondent TransWorld Airlines.
Moreover, while respondent TWA was remiss in not informing petitioners that
the flight was overbooked and that even a person with a confirmed
reservation may be denied accommodation on an overbooked flight,
nevertheless it ruled that such omission or negligence cannot under the
circumstances be considered to be so gross as to amount to bad faith.
Finally, it also held that there was no bad faith in placing petitioners in the
wait-list along with forty-eight (48) other passengers where full-fare first class
tickets were given priority over discounted tickets.
The dispositive portion of the decision of respondent Court of Appeals 3
dated October 25, 1991 states as follows:.
"WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, the decision under review is
hereby MODIFIED in that the award of moral and exemplary damages to the
plaintiffs is eliminated, and the defendant-appellant is hereby ordered to pay
the plaintiffs the following amounts:
"(1) US$159.49, or its peso equivalent at the time of payment, representing
the price of Suthira Zalamea's ticket for TWA Flight 007;
"(2) US$159.49, or its peso equivalent at the time of payment, representing
the price of Cesar Zalamea's ticket for TWA Flight 007;
"(3) P50,000.00 as and for attorney's fees.
"(4) The costs of suit.
"SO ORDERED." 4
Not satisfied with the decision, petitioners raised the case on petition for
review on certiorari and alleged the following errors committed by the
respondent Court of Appeals, to wit:
I.
". . . IN HOLDING THAT THERE WAS NO FRAUD OR BAD FAITH ON THE
PART OF RESPONDENT TWA BECAUSE IT HAS A RIGHT TO OVERBOOK
FLIGHTS.
II.
". . . IN ELIMINATING THE AWARD OF EXEMPLARY DAMAGES.
III.
". . . IN NOT ORDERING THE REFUND OF LIANA ZALAMEA'S TWA
TICKET AND PAYMENT FOR THE AMERICAN AIRLINES TICKETS." 5
That there was fraud or bad faith on the part of respondent airline when it did
not allow petitioners to board their flight for Los Angeles in spite of confirmed
tickets cannot be disputed. The U.S. law or regulation allegedly authorizing
overbooking has never been proved. Foreign laws do not prove themselves
nor can the courts take judicial notice of them. Like any other fact, they must
be alleged and proved. 6 Written law may be evidenced by an official
publication thereof or by a copy attested by the officer having the legal
custody of the record, or by his deputy, and accompanied with a certificate
that such officer has custody. The certificate may be made by a secretary of
an embassy or legation, consul general, consul, vice-consul, or consular
agent or by any officer in the foreign service of the Philippines stationed in
the foreign country in which the record is kept, and authenticated by the seal
of his office. 7
Respondent TWA relied solely on the statement of Ms. Gwendolyn Lather, its
customer service agent, in her deposition dated January 27, 1986 that the
Code of Federal Regulations of the Civil Aeronautics Board allows
overbooking. Aside from said statement, no official publication of said code
was presented as evidence. Thus, respondent court's finding that
overbooking is specifically allowed by the US Code of Federal Regulations
has no basis in fact.
Even if the claimed U.S. Code of Federal Regulations does exist, the same is
not applicable to the case at bar in accordance with the principle of lex loci
contractus which requires that the law of the place where the airline ticket
44
was issued should be applied by the court where the passengers are
residents and nationals of the forum and the ticket is issued in such State by
the defendant airline. 8 Since the tickets were sold and issued in the
Philippines, the applicable law in this case would be Philippine law.
Existing jurisprudence explicitly states that overbooking amounts to bad faith,
entitling the passengers concerned to an award of moral damages. In Alitalia
Airways v. Court of Appeals, 9 where passengers with confirmed bookings
were refused carriage on the last minute, this Court held that when an airline
issues a ticket to a passenger confirmed on a particular flight, on a certain
date, a contract of carriage arises, and the passenger has every right to
expect that he would fly on that flight and on that date. If he does not, then
the carrier opens itself to a suit for breach of contract of carriage. Where an
airline had deliberately overbooked, it took the risk of having to deprive some
passengers of their seats in case all of them would show up for check in. For
the indignity and inconvenience of being refused a confirmed seat on the last
minute, said passenger is entitled to an award of moral damages.
Similarly, in Korean Airlines Co., Ltd. v. Court of Appeals, 10 where private
respondent was not allowed to board the plane because her seat had already
been given to another passenger even before the allowable period for
passengers to check in had lapsed despite the fact that she had a confirmed
ticket and she had arrived on time, this Court held that petitioner airline acted
in bad faith in violating private respondent's rights under their contract of
carriage and is therefore liable for the injuries she has sustained as a result.
In fact, existing jurisprudence abounds with rulings where the breach of
contract of carriage amounts to bad faith. In Pan American World Airways,
Inc. v. Intermediate Appellate Court, 11 where a would-be passenger had
the necessary ticket, baggage claim and clearance from immigration all
clearly and unmistakably showing that she was indeed a confirmed
passenger and that she was, in fact, included in the passenger manifest of
said flight, and yet was denied accommodation in said flight, this Court did
not hesitate to affirm the lower court's finding awarding her damages.
A contract to transport passengers is quite different in kind and degree from
any other contractual relation. So ruled this Court in Zulueta v. Pan American
World Airways, Inc. 12 This is so, for a contract of carriage generates a
relation attended with public duty - a duty to provide public service and
convenience to its passengers which must be paramount to self-interest or
enrichment. Thus, it was also held that the switch of planes from Lockheed
1011 to a smaller Boeing 707 because there were only 138 confirmed
economy class passengers who could very well be accommodated in the
smaller plane, thereby sacrificing the comfort of its first class passengers for
the sake of economy, amounts to bad faith. Such inattention and lack of care
for the interest of its passengers who are entitled to its utmost consideration
entitles the passenger to an award of moral damages. 13
Even on the assumption that overbooking is allowed, respondent TWA is still
guilty of bad faith in not informing its passengers beforehand that it could
breach the contract of carriage even if they have confirmed tickets if there
was overbooking. Respondent TWA should have incorporated stipulations on
overbooking on the tickets issued or to properly inform its passengers about
these policies so that the latter would be prepared for such eventuality or
would have the choice to ride with another airline.
Respondent TWA contends that Exhibit I, the detached flight coupon upon
which were written the name of the passenger and the points of origin and
destination, contained such a notice. An examination of Exhibit I does not
bear this out. At any rate, said exhibit was not offered for the purpose of
showing the existence of a notice of overbooking but to show that Exhibit I
was used for Flight 007 in first class of June 11, 1984 from New York to Los
Angeles.
Moreover, respondent TWA was also guilty of not informing its passengers of
its alleged policy of giving less priority to discounted tickets. While the
petitioners had checked in at the same time, and held confirmed tickets, yet,
only one of them was allowed to board the plane ten minutes before
departure time because the full-fare ticket he was holding was given priority
over discounted tickets. The other two petitioners were left behind.
It is respondent TWA's position that the practice of overbooking and the
airline system of boarding priorities are reasonable policies, which when
implemented do not amount to bad faith. But the issue raised in this case is
not the reasonableness of said policies but whether or not said policies were
incorporated or deemed written on petitioners' contracts of carriage.
Respondent TWA failed to show that there are provisions to that effect.
Neither did it present any argument of substance to show that petitioners
were duly apprised of the overbooked condition of the flight or that there is a
hierarchy of boarding priorities in booking passengers. It is evident that
petitioners had the right to rely upon the assurance of respondent TWA, thru
its agent in Manila, then in New York, that their tickets represented confirmed
45
seats without any qualification. The failure of respondent TWA to so inform
them when it could easily have done so thereby enabling respondent to hold
on to them as passengers up to the last minute amounts to bad faith.
Evidently, respondent TWA placed its self-interest over the rights of
petitioners under their contracts of carriage. Such conscious disregard of
petitioners' rights makes respondent TWA liable for moral damages. To deter
breach of contracts by respondent TWA in similar fashion in the future, we
adjudge respondent TWA liable for exemplary damages, as well.
Petitioners also assail the respondent court's decision not to require the
refund of Liana Zalamea's ticket because the ticket was used by her father.
On this score, we uphold the respondent court. Petitioners had not shown
with certainty that the act of respondent TWA in allowing Mr. Zalamea to use
the ticket of her daughter was due to inadvertence or deliberate act.
Petitioners had also failed to establish that they did not accede to said
arrangement. The logical conclusion, therefore, is that both petitioners and
respondent TWA agreed, albeit impliedly, to the course of action taken.
The respondent court erred, however, in not ordering the refund of the cost of
the American Airlines tickets purchased and used by petitioners Suthira and
Liana. The evidence shows that petitioners Suthira and Liana were
constrained to take the American Airlines flight to Los Angeles not because
they "opted not to use their TWA tickets on another TWA flight" but because
respondent TWA could not accommodate them either on the next TWA flight
which was also fully booked. 14 The purchase of the American Airlines
tickets by petitioners Suthira and Liana was the consequence of respondent
TWA's unjustifiable breach of its contracts of carriage with petitioners. In
accordance with Article 2201, New Civil Code, respondent TWA should,
therefore, be responsible for all damages which may be reasonably attributed
to the non-performance of its obligation. In the previously cited case of
Alitalia Airways v. Court of Appeals, 15 this Court explicitly held that a
passenger is entitled to be reimbursed for the cost of the tickets he had to
buy for a flight on another airline. Thus, instead of simply being refunded for
the cost of the unused TWA tickets, petitioners should be awarded the actual
cost of their flight from New York to Los Angeles. On this score, we differ
from the trial court's ruling which ordered not only the reimbursement of the
American Airlines tickets but also the refund of the unused TWA tickets. To
require both prestations would have enabled petitioners to fly from New York
to Los Angeles without any fare being paid.
The award to petitioners of attorney's fees is also justified under Article
2208(2) of the Civil Code which allows recovery when the defendant's act or
omission has compelled plaintiff to litigate or to incur expenses to protect his
interest. However, the award for moral and exemplary damages by the trial
court is excessive in the light of the fact that only Suthira and Liana Zalamea
were actually "bumped off." An award of P50,000.00 moral damages and
another P50,000.00 exemplary damages would suffice under the
circumstances obtaining in the instant case.
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby GRANTED and the decision of the
respondent Court of Appeals is hereby MODIFIED to the extent of adjudging
respondent TransWorld Airlines to pay damages to petitioners in the following
amounts, to wit:
(1) US$918.00 or its peso equivalent at the time of payment representing the
price of the tickets bought by Suthira and Liana Zalamea from American
Airlines, to enable them to fly to Los Angeles from New York City;
(2) P50,000.00 as moral damages;
(3) P50,000.00 as exemplary damages;
(4) P50,000.00 as attorney's fees; and
(5) Costs of suit.
SO ORDERED.
Narvasa, (C.J., Chairman), Padilla, Regalado and Puno, JJ., concur.
---------------
46
 9 letter or notice of termination received by you before this date has no
ESTERIA F. GARCIANO, petitioner, vs. THE HON. COURT OF APPEALS,
EMERITO LABAJO, LUNISITA MARODA, LALIANA DIONES, CANONISA
PANINSORO, DIONISIO ROSAL, REMEDIOS GALUSO, FLORDELUNA
PETALCORIN, MELCHIZEDECH LOON, NORBERTA MARODA and
JOSEPH WIERTZ, respondents.
1992 Aug 10
1st Division
G.R. No. 96126
DECISION
GRIO-AQUINO, J.:
This is a petition for review of the decision of the Court of Appeals dismissing
the complaint for damages filed by the petitioner against the private
respondents.
The petitioner was hired to teach during the 1981-82 school year in the
Immaculate Concepcion Institute in the Island of Camotes. On January 13,
1982, or before the school year ended, she applied for an indefinite leave of
absence because her daughter was taking her to Austria where her daughter
was employed (Exh. B). The application was recommended for approval by
the school principal, Emerito O. Labajo, and approved by the President of the
school's Board of Directors (Exh. B-1).
On June 1, 1982, Emerito Labajo addressed a letter to the petitioner through
her husband, Sotero Garciano (for she was still abroad), informing her of the
decision of Fr. Joseph Wiertz, the school's founder, concurred in by the
president of the Parent-Teachers Association and the school faculty, to
terminate her services as a member of the teaching staff because of: (1) the
absence of any written contract of employment between her and the school
due to her refusal to sign one; and (2) the difficulty of getting a substitute for
her on a temporary basis as no one would accept the position without a
written contract (Exhs. C and 1). Upon her return from Austria in the later part
of June, 1982, she received the letter informing her that her services at the
Immaculate Concepcion Institute had been terminated. She made injuries
from the school about the matter and, on July 7, 1982, the members of the
Board of Directors of the school, with the exception of Fr. Joseph Wiertz,
signed a letter notifying her that she was "reinstated to report and do your
usual duties as Classroom Teacher . . . effective July 5, 1982," and that "any
sanction or authority by the Board of Directors of this Institution, therefore it is
declared null and void . . . " (Exhs. D and 2).
On July 9, 1982, the president, vice president, secretary, and three members
of the Board of Directors, out of a membership of nine (9), resigned their
positions from the Board "for the reason that the ICI Faculty, has reacted
acidly to the Board's deliberations for the reinstatement of Mrs. Esteria F.
Garciano, thereby questioning the integrity of the Board's decision" (Exh. E).
On September 3, 1982, petitioner filed a complaint for damages in the
Regional Trial Court, Cebu, Branch XI, against Fr. Wiertz, Emerito Labajo,
and some members of the faculty of the school for discrimination and unjust
and illegal dismissal.
After trial, the lower court rendered a decision on August 30, 1985, ordering
the defendants jointly and severally to pay her P200,000 as moral damages,
P50,000 as exemplary damages, P32,400 as lost earnings for nine years,
and P10,000 as litigation expenses and attorney's fees.
The defendants (now private respondents) appealed to the Court of Appeals
(CA-G.R. CV No. 10692), which on August 30, 1990 reversed the trial court's
decision thus:
"WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is reversed, the complaint is
dismissed, and defendants-appellants are absolved from any liability to
plaintiff-appellee. With costs against plaintiff-appellee." (p. 13, Rollo.)
The plaintiff-appellee (now petitioner) filed a motion for reconsideration which
the Court of Appeals denied on October 26, 1990. Hence, this petition for
review wherein the lone error assigned by petitioner reads:
"Respondent Court of Appeals gravely erred in absolving the private
respondents from liability by faulting the petitioner for her failure to report
back to her work." (p. 6, Rollo.)
After a careful perusal of the petition and the respondents' comments, the
Court resolved to deny the petition for lack of merit.
The board of directors of the Immaculate Concepcion Institute, which alone
possesses the authority to hire and fire teachers and other employees of the
47
school, did not dismiss the petitioner. It in fact directed her to report for work.
While the private respondents sent her a letter of termination through her
husband, they admittedly had no authority to do so. As the Court of Appeals
aptly observed:
"We agree with defendants-appellants, however, that they should not have
been held liable to plaintiff-appellee for damages. Defendants-appellants had
no authority to dismiss plaintiff-appellee and the latter was aware of this.
Hence, the letter of termination sent to her through her husband (Exhs. C
and 1) by defendants-appellants had no legal effect whatsoever. It did not
effectively prevent her from reporting for work. What is more, it was
subsequently repudiated by the Board of Directors which directed her to
report for work. (Exhs. D and 2) There was, therefore, no reason why she did
not continue with her teaching in the school. No evidence had been
presented to show that defendants-appellants prevented her from reporting
for work. The fact that defendants-appellants had 'acidly' received the action
of the Board of Directors repudiating their decision to terminate plaintiff-
appellee is not proof that defendants-appellants had effectively and
physically prevented plaintiff-appellee from resuming her post. It was nothing
more than a reaction to what defendants-appellants perceived as an affront
to their collective prestige. It would appear, therefore, that plaintiff-appellee
had voluntarily desisted from her teaching job in the school and has no right
to recover damages from defendants-appellants." (p. 13, Rollo.)
Liability for damages under Articles 19, 20 and 21 of the Civil Code arises
only from unlawful, willful or negligent acts that are contrary to law, or morals,
good customs or public policy.
"Art. 19. Every person must, in the exercise of his rights and in the
performance of his duties, act with justice, give everyone his due, and
observe honesty and good faith.
"Art. 20. Every person who, contrary to law, wilfully or negligently causes
damage to another, shall indemnify the latter for the same.
"Art. 21. Any person who wilfully causes loss or injury to another in a
manner that is contrary to morals, good customs or public policy shall
compensate the latter for the damage."
The Court of Appeals was correct in finding that petitioner's discontinuance
from teaching was her own choice. While the respondents admittedly wanted
her service terminated, they actually did nothing to physically prevent her
from reassuming her post, as ordered by the school's Board of Directors.
That the school principal and Fr. Wiertz disagreed with the Board's decision
to retain her, and some teachers allegedly threatened to resign en masse,
even if true, did not make them liable to her for damages. They were simply
exercising their right of free speech or their right to dissent from the Board's
decision. Their acts were not contrary to law, morals, good customs or public
policy. They did not "illegally dismiss" her for the Board's decision to retain
her prevailed. She was ordered to report for work on July 5, 1982, but she
did not comply with that order. Consequently, whatever loss she may have
incurred in the form of lost earnings was self-inflicted. Volenti non fit injuria.
With respect to petitioner's claim for moral damages, the right to recover
them under Article 21 is based on equity, and he who comes to court to
demand equity, must come with clean hands. Article 21 should be construed
as granting the right to recover damages to injured persons who are not
themselves at fault (Mabutas vs. Calapan Electric Co. [CA] 50 OG 5828,
cited in Padilla, Civil Code Annotated, Vol. 1, 1975 Ed., p. 87). Moral
damages are recoverable only if the case falls under Article 2219 in relation
to Article 21 (Flordelis vs. Mar, 114 SCRA 41). In the case at bar, petitioner is
not without fault. Firstly, she went on an indefinite leave of absence and
failed to report back in time for the regular opening of classes. Secondly, for
reasons known to herself alone, she refused to sign a written contract of
employment. Lastly, she ignored the Board of Directors' order for her to
report for duty on July 5, 1982.
The trial court's award of exemplary damages to her was not justified for she
is not entitled to moral, temperate or compensatory damages (Art. 2234, Civil
Code).
In sum, the Court of Appeals correctly set aside the damages awarded by the
trial court to the petitioner for they did not have any legal or factual basis.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED for lack of merit and the decision
of the Court of Appeals is AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
Cruz (Chairman), Medialdea and Bellosillo, JJ., concur.
48

10
OSE B. LEDESMA, petitioner, vs. HON. COURT OF APPEALS, Spouses
PACIFICO DELMO and SANCHA DELMO (as private respondents),
respondents.
1988 Apr 15
3rd Division
G.R. No. L-54598
DECISION
GUTIERREZ, JR., J.:
This petition seeks to reverse the decision of the respondent Court of
Appeals which affirmed the decision of the Court of First Instance of Iloilo,
adjudging the petitioner, who was then the President of the West Visayas
College, liable for damages under Article 27 of the Civil Code of the
Philippines for failure to graduate a student with honors.
The facts are not disputed.
An organization named Student Leadership Club was formed by some
students of the West Visayas College. They elected the late Violeta Delmo as
the treasurer. In that capacity, Delmo extended loans from the funds of the
club to some of the students of the school. The petitioner claims that the said
act of extending loans was against school rules and regulations. Thus, the
petitioner, as President of the School, sent a letter to Delmo informing her
that she was being dropped from the membership of the club and that she
would not be a candidate for any award or citation from the school.
Delmo asked for a reconsideration of the decision but the petitioner denied it.
Delmo, thus, appealed to the Office of the Director of the Bureau of Public
Schools.
The Director, after due investigation, rendered a decision on April 13, 1966
which provided:
"Records of the preliminary investigation conducted by one of the legal
officers of this Office disclosed the following. That Violeta Delmo was the
treasurer of the Student Leadership Club, an exclusive student organization;
that pursuant to Article IX of the Constitution and By-Laws of the club, it
passed Resolution No. 2, authorizing the treasurer to disburse funds of the
Club to students for financial aid and other humanitarian purposes; that in
compliance with said resolution and as treasurer of the Club, Violeta Delmo
extended loans to some officers and members of the Club upon proper
application duly approved by the majority of the members of the Executive
Board; and that upon receiving the report from Mr. Jesse Dagoon, adviser of
the funds of the Club, that Office conducted an investigation on the matter
and having been convinced of the guilt of Violeta Delmo and the other
officers and members of the Club, that Office rendered the order or decision
in question. In justifying that Office's order or decision, it is contended that
approval by that Office of the Constitution and By-Laws of the Club is
necessary for its effectivity and validity and since it was never submitted to
that Office, the Club had no valid constitution and By-Laws and that as a
consequence, Resolution No. 2 which was passed based on the Constitution
and By-Laws is without any force and effect and the treasurer, Violeta Delmo,
who extended loans to some officers and members of the Club pursuant
thereto are illegal (sic), hence, she and the other students involved are
deemed guilty of misappropriating the funds of the Club. On the other hand,
Raclito Castaneda, Nestor Golez and Violeta Delmo, President, Secretary
and Treasurer of the Club, respectively, testified that the Club had adopted its
Constitution and By-Laws in a meeting held last October 3, 1965, and that
pursuant to Article I of said Constitution and By-Laws, the majority of the
members of the Executive Board passed Resolution No. 2, which resolution
became the basis for the extension of loans to some officers and members of
the Club, that the Club honestly believed that its Constitution and By-Laws
has been approved by the superintendent because the adviser of the Club,
Mr. Jesse Dagoon, assured the President of the Club that he will cause the
approval of the Constitution and By-Laws by the Superintendent; the officers
of the Club have been inducted to office on October 9, 1965 by the
Superintendent and that the Club had been likewise allowed to co-sponsor
the Education Week Celebration.
"After a careful study of the records, this Office sustains the action taken by
the Superintendent in penalizing the adviser of the Club as well as the
officers and members thereof by dropping them from membership therein.
However, this Office is convinced that Violeta M. Delmo had acted in good
faith, in her capacity as Club Treasurer, in extending loans to the officers and
members of the Student Leadership Club. Resolution No. 2 authorizing the
Club treasurer to discharge funds to students in need of financial assistance
and other humanitarian purposes had been approved by the Club adviser,
Mr. Jesse Dagoon, with the notation that approval was given in his capacity
as adviser of the Club and extension of the Superintendent's personality.
49
Aside from misleading the officers and members of the Club, Mr. Dagoon,
had unsatisfactorily explained why he failed to give the Constitution and By-
Laws of the Club to the Superintendent for approval despite his assurance to
the Club president that he would do so. With this finding of negligence on the
part of the Club adviser, not to mention laxity in the performance of his duties
as such, this Office considers as too severe and unwarranted that portion of
the questioned order stating that Violeta Delmo `shall not be a candidate for
any award or citation from this school or any organization in this school.'
Violeta Delmo, it is noted, has been a consistent full scholar of the school
and she alone has maintained her scholarship. The decision in question
would, therefore, set at naught all her sacrifice and frustrate her dreams of
graduating with honors in this year's commencement exercises.
"In view of all the foregoing, this Office believes and so holds and hereby
directs that appellant Violeta M. Delmo, and for that matter all other Club
members or officers involved in this case, be not deprived of any award,
citation or honor from the school, if they are otherwise entitled thereto."
(Rollo, pp. 28-30)
On April 27, 1966, the petitioner received by mail the decision of the Director
and all the records of the case. On the same day, petitioner received a
telegram stating the following:
"AIRMAIL RECORDS DELMO CASE MISSENT THAT OFFICE"
The Director asked for the return only of the records but the petitioner
allegedly mistook the telegram as ordering him to also send the decision
back. On the same day, he returned by mail all the records plus the decision
of the Director to the Bureau of Public Schools.
The next day, the petitioner received another telegram from the Director
ordering him to furnish Delmo with a copy of the decision. The petitioner, in
turn, sent a night letter to the Director informing the latter that he had sent the
decision back and that he had not retained a copy thereof.
On May 3, 1966, the day of the graduation, the petitioner received another
telegram from the Director ordering him not to deprive Delmo of any honors
due her. As it was impossible by this time to include Delmo's name in the
program as one of the honor students, the petitioner let her graduate as a
plain student instead of being awarded the Latin honor of Magna Cum
Laude.
To delay the matter further, the petitioner on May 5, 1966, wrote the Director
asking for a reconsideration of the latter's decision because he believed that
Delmo should not be allowed to graduate with honors. The Director denied
the petitioner's request.
On July 12, 1966, the petitioner finally instructed the Registrar of the school
to enter into the scholastic records of Delmo the honor, "Magna Cum Laude."
On July 30, 1966, Delmo, then a minor, was joined by her parents in filing an
action for damages against the petitioner. During the pendency of the action,
however, Delmo passed away, and thus, an Amended and Supplemental
Complaint was filed by her parents as her sole and only heirs.
The trial court after hearing rendered judgment against the petitioner and in
favor of the spouses Delmo. The court said:
"Let us go to specific badges of the defendant's (now petitioner's) bad faith.
Per investigation of Violeta Delmo's appeal to Director Vitaliano Bernardino
of the Bureau of Public Schools (Exhibit "L"), it was the defendant who
inducted the officers of the Student Leadership Club on October 9, 1965. In
fact the Club was allowed to co-sponsor the Education Week Celebration.
(Exh. "L"). If the defendant did not approve of the constitution and by-laws of
the Club, why did he induct the officers into office and allow the Club to
sponsor the Education Week Celebration? It was through his own act that the
students were misled to do as they did. Coupled with the defendant's tacit
recognition of the Club was the assurance of Mr. Jesse Dagoon, Club
Adviser, who made the students believe that he was acting as an extension
of Mr. Ledesma's personality. (Exhibit "L").
"Another badge of the defendant's want of good faith is the fact that,
although, he knew as early as April 27, 1966 that per decision of Director
Bernardino, Exhibit "L," he was directed to give honors to Miss Delmo, he
kept said information to himself. He told the Court that he knew that the letter
of Director Bernardino directed him not to deprive Miss Delmo the honors
due her, but she (sic) says that he has not finished reading the letter
decision, Exhibit "L," of Director Bernardino, directing him to give honors to
Miss Delmo. (Tsn, Feb. 5, 1974, testimony of Mr. Ledesma, pp. 33-35). It
could not be true that he has not finished reading the letter-decision, Exh.
"L," because said letter consisted of only three pages, and the portion which
directed that Miss Delmo `be not deprived of any award, citation or honor
50
from the school, if otherwise entitled thereto' is found at the last paragraph of
the same. How did he know the last paragraph if he did not read the letter.
"Defendant's actuations regarding Miss Delmo's case had been one of bias
and prejudice. When his action would favor him, he was deliberate and
circumspect to the utter prejudice and detriment of Miss Delmo. Thus,
although, as early as April 27, 1966, he knew of the exoneration of Miss
Delmo by Director Bernardino, he withheld the information from Miss Delmo.
This is eloquently dramatized by Exh. "11" and Exh. "13." On April 29, 1966,
Director Bernardino cabled him to furnish Violeta Delmo copy of the
Decision, Exh. "L," but instead of informing Miss Delmo about the decision,
since he said he mailed back the decision on April 28, 1988, he sent a night
letter on April 29, 1966, to Director Bernardino, informing the latter that he
had returned the decision (Exh. "13"), together with the record. Why a night
letter when the matter was of utmost urgency to the parties in the case,
because graduation day was only four days ahead? An examination of the
telegrams sent by the defendant shows that he had been sending ordinary
telegrams and not night letters. (Exh. "5," Exhibit "7"). At least, if the
defendant could not furnish a copy of the decision, (Exh. "L"), to Miss Delmo,
he should have told her about it or directed that Miss Delmo's honors and
citation in the commencement programs be announced or indicated. But Mr.
Ledesma is one who cannot admit a mistake. Very ungentlemanly! this is
borne out by his own testimony, despite his knowledge that his decision to
deprive Miss Delmo of honors due to her was overturned by Director
Bernardino, he insisted on his wrong belief. To quote the defendant, I
believed that she did not deserve those honors.' (Tsn. Feb. 5, 1974, p. 43,
talics supplied). Despite the telegram of Director Bernardino which the
defendant received hours before the commencement exercises on May 3-4,
1966, he did not obey Director Bernardino because he said in his testimony
that he would be embarrassed. Tsn ---- Feb. 5, 1974, p. 46). Evidently, he
knew only his embarrassment and not that of Director Bernardino whose
order was being flagrantly and wantonly disregarded by him. And certainly,
not the least of Miss Delmo's embarrassment. His acts speak eloquently of
his bad faith and unjust frame of mind ---- warped by his delicate sensitivity
for having been challenged by Miss Delmo, a mere student.
Xxx xxx xxx
"Finally, the defendant's behaviour relative to Miss Delmo's case smacks of
contemptuous arrogance, oppression and abuse of power. Come to think of
it. He refused to obey the directive of Director Bernardino and instead, chose
to feign ignorance of it." (Record on Appeal, p. 72-76).
The trial court awarded P20,000.00 to the estate of Violeta Delmo and
P10,000.00 to her parents for moral damages; P5,000.00 for nominal
damages to Violeta's estate; exemplary damages of P10,000.00 and
P2,000.00 attorney's fees.
On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed the decision. Hence, this petition.
The issues raised in this petition can be reduced to the sole question of
whether or not the respondent Court of Appeals erred in affirming the trial
court's finding that petitioner is liable for damages under Article 27 of the New
Civil Code.
We find no reason why the findings of the trial and appellate courts should be
reversed. It cannot be disputed that Violeta Delmo went through a painful
ordeal which was brought about by the petitioner's neglect of duty and
callousness. Thus, moral damages are but proper. As we have affirmed in the
case of Prudenciado v. Alliance Transport System, Inc., 148 SCRA 440, 448):
"There is no argument that moral damages include physical suffering, mental
anguish, fright, serious anxiety, besmirched reputation, wounded feelings,
moral shock, social humiliation, and similar injury. Though incapable of
pecuniary computation, moral damages may be recovered if they are the
proximate result of defendant's wrongful act or omission." (People v. Baylon,
129 SCRA 62 (1984)).
The Solicitor-General tries to cover-up the petitioner's deliberate omission to
inform Miss Delmo by stating that it was not the duty of the petitioner to
furnish her a copy of the Director's decision. Granting this to be true, it was
nevertheless the petitioner's duty to enforce the said decision. He could have
done so considering that he received the decision on April 27, 1966 and even
though he sent it back with the records of the case, he undoubtedly read the
whole of it which consisted of only three pages. Moreover, the petitioner
should have had the decency to meet with Mr. Delmo, the girl's father, and
inform the latter, at the very least of the decision. This, the petitioner likewise
failed to do, and not without the attendant bad faith which the appellate court
correctly pointed out in its decision, to wit:
51
"Third, assuming that defendant could not furnish Miss Delmo of a copy of
the decision, he could have used his discretion and plain common sense by
informing her about it or he could have directed the inclusion of Miss Delmo's
honor in the printed commencement program or announced it during the
commencement exercises.
"Fourth, defendant despite receipt of the telegram of Director Bernardino
hours before the commencement exercises on May 3-4, 1966, disobeyed his
superior by refusing to give the honors due Miss Delmo with a lame excuse
that he would be embarrassed if he did so, to the prejudice of and in
complete disregard of Miss Delmo's rights.
"Fifth, defendant did not even extend the courtesy of meeting Mr. Pacifico
Delmo, father of Miss Delmo, who tried several times to see defendant in his
office thus Mr. Delmo suffered extreme disappointment and humiliation.
Xxx xxx xxx
"Defendant, being a public officer should have acted with circumspection and
due regard to the rights of Miss Delmo. Inasmuch as he exceeded the scope
of his authority by defiantly disobeying the lawful directive of his superior,
Director Bernardino, defendant is liable for damages in his personal capacity.
. . . ." (Rollo, pp. 57-58)
Based on the undisputed facts, exemplary damages are also in order. In the
same case of Prudenciado v. Alliance Transport System, Inc., supra., at p.
450, we ruled:
"The rationale behind exemplary or corrective damages is, as the name
implies, to provide an example or correction for the public good (Lopez, et al.
v. Pan American World Airways, 16 SCRA 431)."
However, we do not deem it appropriate to award the spouses Delmo
damages in the amount of P10,000.00 in their individual capacity, separately
from and in addition to what they are already entitled to as sole heirs of the
deceased Violeta Delmo. Thus, the decision is modified insofar as moral
damages are awarded to the spouses in their own behalf.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED for lack of merit. The decision of
the Court of Appeals is AFFIRMED with the slight modification as stated in
the preceding paragraph. This decision is immediately executory.
SO ORDERED.
Fernan (Chairman), Feliciano, Bidin and Cortes, JJ., concur.
11
FRANCISCO HERMOSISIMA, petitioner, vs. THE HON. COURT OF
APPEALS, ET AL., respondents.
1960 Sep 30
En Banc
G.R. No. L-14628
DECISION
CONCEPCION, J.:
An appeal by certiorari, taken by petitioner Francisco Hermosisima, from a
decision of the Court of Appeals modifying that of the Court of First Instance
of Cebu.
On October 4, 1954, Soledad Cagigas, hereinafter referred to as
complainant, filed with said court of first instance a complaint for the
acknowledgment of her child, Chris Hermosisima, as natural child of said
petitioner, as well as for support of said child and moral damages for alleged
breach of promise. Petitioner admitted the paternity of child and expressed
willingness to support the later, but denied having ever promised to marry the
complainant. Upon her motion, said court ordered petitioner, on October 27,
1954, to pay, by way of alimony pendente lite, P50.00 a month, which was,
on February 16, 1955, reduced to P30.00 a month. In due course, later on,
said court rendered a decision the dispositive part of which reads:
"WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered, declaring the child, Chris
Hermosisima, as the natural daughter of defendant, and confirming the order
pendente lite, ordering defendant to pay to the said child, through plaintiff,
the sum of thirty pesos (P30.00), payable on or before the fifth day of every
month; sentencing defendant to pay to plaintiff the sum of FOUR
THOUSAND FIVE HUNDRED PESOS (P4,500.00) for actual and
compensatory damages; the sum Of FIVE THOUSAND PESOS (P5,000.00)
as moral damages; and the further sum of FIVE HUNDRED PESOS
(P500.00) as attorney's fees for plaintiff, with costs against defendant."
On appeal taken by petitioner, the Court of Appeals affirmed this decision,
except as to the actual and compensatory damages and the moral damages,
which were increased to P5,614.25 and P7,000.00, respectively.
The main issue before us is whether moral damages are recoverable, under
our laws, for breach of promise to marry. The pertinent facts are:
52
Complainant Soledad Cagigas, was born in July 1917. Since 1950, Soledad
then a teacher in the Sibonga Provincial High School in Cebu, and petitioner,
who was almost ten (10) years younger than she, used to go around together
and were regarded as engaged, although he had made no promise of
marriage prior thereto. In 1951, she gave up teaching and became a life
insurance underwriter in the City of Cebu, where intimacy developed among
her and the petitioner, since one evening, in 1953, when after coming from
the movies, they had sexual intercourse in his cabin on board M/V "Escao"
to which he was then attached as apprentice pilot. In February, 1954,
Soledad advised petitioner that she was in the family way, whereupon he
promised to marry her. Their child, Chris Hermosisima, was born on June 17,
1954, in a private maternity and clinic. However, subsequently, or on July 24,
1954, defendant married one Romanita Perez. Hence, the present action,
which was commenced on or about October 4, 1954.
Referring now to the issue above referred to, it will be noted that the Civil
Code of Spain permitted the recovery of damages for breach of promise to
marry. Articles 43 and 44 of said Code provides:
ART. 43. "A mutual promise of marriage shell not give rise to an
obligation to contract marriage. No court shell entertain any complaint by
which the enforcement of such promise is sought."
ART. 44. "If the promise has been in a public or private instrument by
an adult, or by a minor with the concurrence of the person whose consent is
necessary for the celebration of the marriage, or if the banns have been
published, the one who without just cause refuses to marry shall be obliged
to reimburse the other for the expenses which he or she may have incurred
by reason of the promised marriage.
"The action for reimbursement of expenses to which the foregoing article
refers must be brought within one year, computed from the day of the refusal
to celebrate the marriage."
Inasmuch as these articles were never in force in the Philippines, this Court
ruled in de Jesus vs. Syquia (58 Phil., 866), that "the action for breach of
promise to marry has no standing in the civil law, apart from the right to
recover money or property advanced . . . upon the faith of such promise".
The Code Commission charged with the drafting of the Proposed Civil Code
of the Philippines deemed it best, however, to change the law thereon. We
quote from the report of the Code Commission on said Proposed Civil Code:
"Articles 43 and 44 of the Civil Code of 1889 refer to the promise of marriage.
But these articles are not in force in the Philippines. The subject is regulated
in the proposed Civil Code not only as to the aspects treated of in said
articles but also in other particulars. It is advisable to furnish legislative
solutions to some questions that might arise relative to betrothal. Among the
provisions proposed are: That authorizing the adjudication of moral
damages, in case of breach of promise of marriage, and that creating liability
for causing a marriage engagement to be broken."
Accordingly, the following provisions were inserted in said Proposed Civil
Code, under Chapter I, Title III, Book I thereof:
"ART. 56. A mutual promise to marry may be made expressly or
impliedly."
"ART. 57. An engagement to be married must be agreed directly by the
future spouses."
"ART. 58. A contract for a future marriage cannot, without the consent
of the parent or guardian, be entered into by a male between the ages of
sixteen and twenty years or by a female between the ages of sixteen and
eighteen years. Without such consent of the parents or guardian, the
engagement to marry cannot be the basis of a civil action for damages in
case of breach of the promise.
"ART. 59. A promise to marry when made by a female under the age of
fourteen years is not civilly actionable, even though approved by the parent
or guardian."
"ART. 60. In cases referred to in the preceding articles, the criminal
and civil responsibility of a male for seduction shall not be affected."
"ART. 61. No action for specific performance of a mutual promise to
marry may be brought."
"ART. 62. An action for breach of promise to marry may be brought by
the aggrieved party even though a minor without the assistance of his or her
parent or guardian. Should the minor refuse to bring suit, the parent or
guardian may institute the action."
"ART. 63. Damages for breach of promise to marry shall include not
only material and pecuniary losses but also compensation for mental and
moral suffering."
"ART. 64. Any person, other than a rival, the parents, guardians and
grandparents, of the affianced parties, who causes a marriage engagement
to be broken shall be liable for damages, both material and moral, to the
engaged person who is rejected."
"ART. 65. In case of breach of promise to marry, the party breaking the
engagement shall be obliged to return what he or she has received from the
other as gift on account of the promise of the marriage."
These articles were, however, eliminated in Congress. The reason therefor
are set forth in the report of the corresponding Senate Committee, from
which we quote:
"The elimination of this Chapter is proposed. That breach of promise to marry
is not actionable has been definitely decided in the case of De Jesus vs.
53
Syquia, 53 Phil., 366. The history of bleach of promise suits in the United younger than the complainant - who was around thirty-six (36) years of age,
States and in England has shown that no other action lends itself more and as highly enlightened as a former high school teacher and a life
readily to abuse by designing women and unscrupulous man. It is this insurance agent are supposed to be - when she became intimate with
experience which has led to the abolition of rights of action in the so-called petitioner, then a mere apprentice pilot, but, also, because, the court of first
Balm suits in many of the American States. instance found that, complainant "surrendered herself" to petitioner because,
See statutes of: "overwhelmed by her love" for him, she "wanted to bind" him "by having a
Florida 1945 - pp. 1342-1344 fruit of their engagement even before they had the benefit of clergy."
Maryland 1945 - pp. 1759-1762 The court of first instance sentenced petitioner to pay the following: (1) a
Nevada 1948 - p. 74 monthly pension of P30.00 for the support of the child; (2) P4,500,
Maine 1941 - pp. 140-141 representing the income that complainant had allegedly failed to earn during
New Hampshire1941 - p. 223 her pregnancy and shortly after the birth of the child, as actual and
California 1939 - p. 1245 compensatory damages; (3) P5,000, as moral damages; and (4) P500.00, as
Massachusetts 1938 - p. 326 attorney's fees. The Court of Appeals added to the second item the sum of
Indiana 1936 - p. 1009 P1,114.25 - consisting of P144.20, for hospitalization and medical
Michigan 1935 - p. 201 attendance, in connection with the parturiation, and the balance representing
New York 1935 expenses incurred to support the child - and increased the moral damages to
Pennsylvania p. 450 P7,000.00.
"The Commission perhaps thought that it has followed the more progressive With the elimination of this award for moral damages, the decision of the
trend in legislation when it provided for breach of promise to marry suits. But Court of Appeals is hereby affirmed, therefore, in all other respects, without
it is clear that the creation of such causes of action at a time when so many special pronouncement as to costs in this instance. It is so ordered.
States, in consequence of years of experience are doing away with them, Paras, C.J., Bengzon, Padilla, Bautista Angelo, Labrador, Reyes, J.B.L.,
may well prove to be a step in the wrong direction. (Congressional Record, Barrera, Gutierrez David, Paredes, and Dizon, JJ., concur.
Vol. IV, No. 79, Thursday, May 19, 1949, p. 2352.)"
The views thus expressed were accepted by both houses of Congress. In the
light of the clear and manifest intent of our law making body not to sanction
actions for breach of promise to marry, the award of moral damages made by
the lower court is, accordingly, untenable. The Court of Appeals said in
justification of said award:
"Moreover, it appearing that because of defendant-appellant's seductive
powers, plaintiff-appellee, overwhelmed by her love for him finally yielded to
his sexual desires in spite of her age and self- control, she being a woman
after all, we hold that said defendant- appellant is liable for seduction and,
therefore, moral damages may be recovered from him under the provisions
of Article 2219, paragraph 3, of the new Civil Code."
Apart from the fact that the general tenor of said Article 2219, particularly the
paragraphs preceding and those following the one cited by the Court of
Appeals, and the language used in said paragraph strongly indicates that the
"seduction" therein contemplated is the crime punished as such in Articles
337 and 338 of the Revised Penal Code, which admittedly does not exist in
the present case, we find ourselves unable to say that petitioner is morally
guilty of seduction, not only because he is approximately ten (10) years
54
 12
MANILA ELECTRIC COMPANY and PEDRO YAMBAO, petitioners-
appellants, vs. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS and ISAAC
CHAVEZ, SR., ISAAC O. CHAVEZ, JR., ROSENDO O. CHAVES, and
JUAN O. CHAVES, respondents-appellees.
1988 Jan 22
2nd Division
G.R. No. L-39019
DECISION
YAP, J.:
In an action for recovery of damages for embarassment, humiliation,
wounded feelings and hurt pride, caused to herein private respondents, by
reason of the disconnection of their electrical service by the petitioners, the
then Court of First Instance of Manila, Sixth Judicial District, Branch XXIV,
rendered a decision dated December 13, 1967, ordering herein petitioners
jointly and severally to pay private respondents the sum of Ten Thousand
(P10,000.00) Pesos as moral damages, Two Thousand (P2,000.00) Pesos
as exemplary damages and One Thousand (P1,000.00) Pesos as attorney's
fees, and dismissing petitioners' counterclaim.
On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed in toto the trial court's decision.
Their Motion for Reconsideration having been denied, petitioners filed the
instant petition for certiorari.
Petitioner Manila Electric Company (MERALCO) is a public utility corporation
providing electric power for the consumption of the general public in Metro
Manila. Petitioner Pedro Yambao is a bill collector of MERALCO.
Private respondents Isaac Chaves and Juana O. Chaves, husband and wife,
filed the complaint for damages, together with their children, Isaac O.
Chaves, Jr. and Rosendo O. Chaves. Isaac Sr. and Isaac Jr. and Rosendo
were members of the Philippine Bar; Isaac, Sr. and Isaac, Jr. were practicing
lawyers and Rosendo was a Legal Officer at the Agricultural Productivity
Commission. Juana O. Chaves was a public school teacher.
The facts as found by the trial court and adopted by the Court of Appeals are
as follows:
"Plaintiff Isaac Chaves became a customer of defendant MERALCO in the
year 1953 when he and his family were residing at No. 211-D Rubi, Manila.
In connection with the contract for electrical service, he deposited the sum of
P5.00 (Exh. 'A') with defendant MERALCO on February 12, 1953. This
deposit in the name of plaintiff Isaac Chaves was retained by MERALCO and
made to apply to subsequent contracts for electrical service entered into after
subsequent transfers of the Chaves family to other residences and up to the
time this family went to reside at the place aforementioned, at No. 2656
Mercedes Street, Singalong, Manila. . . .
"At or about the end of March, 1965, defendant Pedro Yambao went to the
residence of plaintiffs and presented two overdue bills, one for January 11 to
February 9, 1965, for the sum of P7.90 (Exhibit 'C'), and the other for
February 9 to March 10, 1965, for the amount of P7.20 (Exhibit 'C-1'). Juana
O. Chaves, however, informed Yambao that these bills would be paid at the
MERALCO main office.
"Accordingly, on April 2, 1965, Isaac Chaves went to the defendant's main
office at San Marcelino, Manila, but paid only the bill marked as Exhibit 'C'
leaving the other bill identified as Exhibit 'C-1' unpaid.
"Past 2:30 o'clock in the afternoon of April 21, 1965, MERALCO caused the
electric service in plaintiff's residence to be discontinued and the power line
cut off.
"The next day, April 22, 1965, at about 9:00 a.m., plaintiff Rosendo O.
Chaves went to the MERALCO main office and paid the amount of P7.20 for
the bill marked as Exhibit 'C-1', and the sum of P7.00 for the subsequent bill
corresponding to the period from March 10 up to April 8, 1965 (Exhibit 'C-2')
after his attention was called to the latter account. Rosendo O. Chaves then
sought the help of Atty. Lourdy Torres, one of the defendants' counsel, and,
thereafter, the power line was reconnected and electric service restored to
the Chaves residence at about 7:00 p.m. of that same day." 1
Petitioners dispute the finding that there was no notice given to herein
respondent. However, since only questions of law may be raised in a petition
for certiorari under Rule 45 of the Revised Rules of Court, petitioners, "for the
sake of argument and for the purpose of giving focus on the legal issues", do
not take issue with such finding.
55
Petitioners contend that in the absence of bad faith, they could not be held
liable for moral and exemplary damages as well as attorney's fees. The
failure to give a notice of disconnection to private respondents might have
been a breach of duty or breach of contract, but by itself does not constitute
bad faith or fraud; it must be shown that such a failure was motivated by ill
will or done with fraudulent intent. Petitioners also maintain that since private
respondents were in arrears in the payment of their electricity bills when their
electric service was disconnected, no moral damages may be recovered by
them under the "clean hands" doctrine enunciated in Mabutas vs. Calapan
Electric Company, CA-G.R. No. L-9583-R, May 26, 1964.
In its decision, the respondent Court of Appeals held that MERALCO's right
to disconnect the electric service of a delinquent customer "is an absolute
one, subject only to the requirement that defendant MERALCO should give
the customer a written notice of disconnection 48 hours in advance." This
requirement is embodied in Section 97 of the Revised Order No. 1 of the
Public Service Commission, which provides as follows:
"Section 97. Payment of bills. A public service, may require that bills for
service be paid within a specified time after rendition. When the billing period
covers a month or more, the minimum time allowed will be ten days and
upon expiration of the specified time, service may be discontinued for the
non-payment of bills, provided that a 48 hours' written notice of such
disconnection has been given the customer: Provided, however, that
disconnections of service shall not be made on Sundays and official holidays
and never after 2 p.m. of any working day: Provided, further, that if at the
moment the disconnection is to be made the customer tenders payment of
the unpaid bill to the agent or employee of the operator who is to effect the
disconnection, the said agent or employee shall be obliged to accept tender
of payment and issue a temporary receipt for the amount and shall desist
from disconnecting the service." 2
The respondent court stressed the importance and necessity of the 48-hour
advance written notification before a disconnection of service may be
effected. Said the court:
". . . It sets in motion the disconnection of an electrical service of the
customer by giving the notice, determining the expiration date thereof, and
executing the disconnection. It, therefore, behooves the defendant
MERALCO that before it disconnects a customer's electrical service, there
should be sufficient evidence that the requirements for the disconnection had
been duly complied with, otherwise, the poor consumer can be subjected to
the whims and caprices of the defendant, by the mere pretension that the
written notice had been duly served upon the customer." 3
We find no reversible error in the decision appealed from. One can not deny
the vital role which a public utility such as MERALCO, having a monopoly of
the supply of electrical power in Metro Manila and some nearby
municipalities, plays in the life of people living in such areas. Electricity has
become a necessity to most people in these areas, justifying the exercise by
the State of its regulatory power over the business of supplying electrical
service to the public, in which petitioner MERALCO is engaged. Thus, the
state may regulate, as it has done through Section 97 of the Revised Order
No. 1 of the Public Service Commission, the conditions under which and the
manner by which a public utility such as MERALCO may effect a
disconnection of service to a delinquent customer. Among others, a prior
written notice to the customer is required before disconnection of the service.
Failure to give such prior notice amounts to a tort, as held by us in a similar
case, 4 where we said:
". . . petitioner's act in "disconnecting respondent Ongsip's gas service
without prior notice constitutes breach of contract amounting to an
independent tort. The prematurity of the action is indicative of an intent to
cause additional mental and moral suffering to private respondent. This is a
clear violation of Article 21 of the Civil Code which provides that 'any person
who wilfully causes loss or injury to another in a manner that is contrary to
morals, good customs or public policy shall compensate the latter for
damages.' This is reiterated by paragraph 10 of Article 2219 of the Code.
Moreover, the award of moral damages is sanctioned by Article 2220 which
provides that wilfull injury to property may be a legal ground for awarding
moral damages if the court should find that, under the circumstances, such
damages are justly due. The same rule applies to breached of contract
where the defendant acted fraudulently or in bad faith."
Likewise, we find no merit in petitioners' contention that being in arrears in
the payment of their bills, the private respondents are not entitled to moral
damages under the doctrine that "he who comes to court in demand of
equity, must come with clean hands." We rejected this argument in the
Manila Gas Corporation case, supra, wherein we held that respondents'
default in the payment of his bills "cannot be utilized by petitioner to defeat or
nullify the claim for damages. At most, this circumstance can be considered
56
as a mitigating factor in ascertaining the amount of damages to which
respondent . . . is entitled."
Accordingly, we find no grave abuse of discretion committed by respondent
court in affirming the trial court's decision. The petition is hereby DISMISSED
for lack of merit.
SO ORDERED.
Melencio-Herrera, Paras, Padilla and Sarmiento, JJ., concur.
---------------------
13
MANILA GAS CORPORATION, petitioner-appellant, vs. COURT OF
APPEALS and ISIDRO M. ONGSIP, respondent-appellees.
1980 Oct 30
1st Division
G.R. No. L-44190
DECISION
MAKASIAR, J.:
This petition for certiorari treated as a special civil action seeks to review the
decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. No. 50956-R dated July 6, 1976
affirming the decision of the Court of First Instance of Rizal, Pasay City
Branch VII in Civil Case No. 3019-P dated May 2, 1972.
Manila Gas Corporation, the petitioner herein, is a public utility company duly
authorized to conduct and operate the gainful business of servicing and
supplying gas in the City of Manila and its suburbs for public necessity and
convenience while private respondent, Isidro M. Ongsip, is a businessman
holding responsible positions in a number of business firms and associations
in the Philippines.
On May 20, 1964, respondent Ongsip applied for gas service connection with
petitioner Manila Gas Corporation. A 1 x 4 burner gas was installed by
petitioner's employees in respondent's kitchen at his residence at 2685 Park
Avenue, Pasay City.
On July 27, 1965, respondent Ongsip requested petitioner to install additional
appliances as well as additional gas service connections in his 46-door
Reyno Apartment located also in the same compound. In compliance with
said request, petitioner installed two 20-gallon capacity water storage heaters
and two heavy-duty gas burners and replaced the original gas meter with a
bigger 50-light capacity gas meter. The installations and connections were all
done solely by petitioner's employees. There was no significant change in the
meter reading despite additional installations.
In May and June of 1966 no gas consumption was registered in the meter,
prompting petitioner to issue a 'meter order' with instructions to change the
gas meter in respondent's residence.
On August 17, 1966, at around 1 o'clock in the afternoon, petitioner's
employee led by Mariano Coronel, the then Chief of the Distribution
Department, went to Ongsip's place. After identifying themselves to the
houseboy therein that they are from the Manila Gas Corporation, but without
notifying or in forming respondent Ongsip, they changed the gas meter and
installed new tube connections. At the time the work was being undertaken,
private respondent was taking a nap but he was informed afterwards of what
had taken place by his houseboy.
On that same afternoon, at about 5 o'clock, petitioner's employees returned
with a photographer who took pictures of the premises. Respondent Ongsip
inquired from Coronel why they were taking pictures but the latter simply
gave him a calling card with instructions to go to his (Coronel's) office. There,
he was informed about the existence of a by-pass valve or "jumper" in the
gas connection and that unless he gave Coronel P3,000.00, he would be
deported. Respondent Ongsip refused to give the money, saying that he was
not afraid as he had committed no wrong and that he could not be deported
because he is already a Filipino citizen. By the end of August, a reading was
made on the new meter and expectedly, it registered a sudden increase in
gas consumption.
Thereafter, in October, 1966, a complaint for qualified theft was filed by
petitioner against respondent Ongsip in the Pasay City Fiscal's Office
docketed as I.S. No. 51441 (p. 3, Folder of Exhibits).
In February, 1967, pending investigation of the criminal complaint, petitioner
disconnected respondent's gas service for alleged failure and/or refusal to
57
pay his gas consumptions from July, 1965 to January, 1967 in violation of
petitioner's regulation agreed upon in the 'Application for Gas Service' which
states that:
xxx xxx xxx
"(8) The Corporation is authorized to discontinue service to the customer for
any of the following reasons:
After 72 hours' notice in writing for
a) violation of the conditions herein set forth;
b) Non-payment of bills overdue;
xxx xxx
xxx" (p. 1, Folder of Exhibits).
Subsequently, the complaint was dismissed by the city fiscal of Pasay City in
a resolution dated May 29, 1967, on the ground that -
". . . there is no evidence to establish the fact that there is an illegal
installation or jumper in the premises of Isidro Ongsip and this is sustained
by the fact that the prosecution witnesses did not attempt to excavate the
premises of Isidro Ongsip in order to determine with certainty that there is an
illegal installation. Without excavating the premises of Isidro Ongsip it is
impossible to conclude with reasonable certainty that there is a jumper or
illegal installation because illegal installation or jumper must not only proceed
from an assumption but must be based from actual facts as proved" (pp. 4-6
Folder of Exhibits).
On July 14, 1967, following the dismissal by the investigating fiscal of the
complaint for qualified theft and the disconnection by petitioner of his gas
service, respondent Ongsip filed a complaint with the Court of First Instance
of Rizal, Pasay City Branch VII for moral and exemplary damages against
petitioner Manila Gas Corporation based on two causes of action, firstly: the
malicious, oppressive and malevolent filing of the criminal complaint as a
result of which "plaintiff has suffered mental anguish, serious anxiety, social
humiliation, ridicule, embarrassment and degradation in the eyes of his
business associates, friends, relatives and the general public"; and,
secondly: the illegal closure of respondent Ongsip's gas service connection
without court order and without notice of warning purely "to further harass,
humiliate and ridicule plaintiff, thereby again exposing unjustly, cruelly and
oppressively the plaintiff, as well as his family, to social humiliation and
degradation, to public contempt and ridicule, to personal discredit and
dishonor and thus causing the plaintiff and the members of his family
irreparable injuries consisting of business and social humiliation, personal
dishonor, mental anguish, serious anxieties, wounded feelings and
besmirched reputation". In addition to attorney's fees and costs of litigation,
respondent Ongsip likewise prayed that "pending final determination of the
case that a writ of preliminary mandatory injunction forthwith issue,
commanding the defendant corporation, its agents and employees to
reconnect the gas service and supply at the residence and apartment of
plaintiff at 2685 Park Avenue, Pasay City" (pp. 1-11, ROA).
On July 19, 1967, petitioner filed a motion to dismiss alleging the complaint
states no valid cause of action. Respondent Ongsip filed an opposition
thereto (pp. 12-24, ROA).
On August 11, 1967, the trial court issued an order denying petitioner's
motion to dismiss (pp. 24-25, ROA).
Consequently, on September 8, 1967, petitioner filed its answer stating that
the filing of the criminal complaint in the Pasay City Fiscal's Office which was
made the basis of the first cause of action was precipitated by the discovery
of an illegal by-pass tube or "jumper" in the kitchen cabinet and immediately
below the gas burners in respondent's residence. With respect to the second
cause of action, petitioner stated that the cutting off or the disconnection of
private respondent's gas service was on account of the latter's failure to
settle and pay outstanding and due payments representing gas
consumptions from July, 1965 to January, 1967. In both instances, according
to petitioner, there was no intent to threaten, ridicule, embarrass or humiliate
respondent Ongsip. A counterclaim for actual or compensatory damages and
exemplary damages was interposed therein (pp. 24-31, ROA).
In the meantime, the court had issued an order dated September 6, 1967
granting the writ of preliminary mandatory injunction as prayed for in the
complaint for damages upon respondent Ongsip's filing of a bond in the
amount of P10,000.00 (pp. 33-34, ROA).
On May 2, 1972, the trial court rendered its decision.
58
"(a) Ordering defendant to pay plaintiff:
"(1) P50,000.00 as moral damages in the FIRST CAUSE OF ACTION;
"(2) P10,000.00 as exemplary damages in the FIRST CAUSE OF ACTION;
"(3) P30,000.00 as moral damages in the SECOND CAUSE OF ACTION;
"(4) P5,000.00 as exemplary damages in the SECOND CAUSE OF ACTION;
"(5) P10,000.00 as attorney's fees; and
"(6) the costs of the suit; AND
"(b) Dismissing the defendant's counterclaim" [pp. 44-76, ROA].
Within the reglementary period, petitioner appealed to the Court of Appeals
assigning two errors, to wit:
"The lower court erred in concluding that the filing of the criminal complaint
was motivated purely 'to harass, threaten, and ridicule' plaintiff despite clear
and convincing evidence showing the actual existence of a gas jumper by-
pass in plaintiff's establishment.
"The lower court erred in concluding without basis and findings of facts that
the closure of plaintiff's gas service was arrogant and abusive despite
provision of a contract to the contrary" (p. 7, Brief for Defendant Appellant).
On July 6, 1976, the said Court rendered its decision, pertinent portions of
which are quoted hereinbelow:
"We are inclined to concur with the court a quo that the existence of a
'jumper' was merely a presumption on the part of Coronel. Indeed the
discrepancy or fluctuation in the gas consumption in appellee's place could
very well be attributed to many factors, such as a defective meter or a
reduction in the use of the appliances on the premises considering that the
restaurant/hotel business is transient. Neither can appellant attribute any
defect in the installation of the appliances to the appellee as the installation
was undertaken by the former's employees (T.S.N. pp. 12-13, December 17,
1968). Similarly, the gas meter was installed by defendant corporation, so
that when a report was made that the original meter was defective, a new
one was installed (T.S.N., pp. 27-28, December 1, 1970).
"Again, according to the testimony of Delfin Custodio, mechanical engineer of
defendant-appellant, the second meter that was installed on August 11, 1966
was replaced as being defective because 'some of its parts were worn out
and that it was not properly registering,' (T.S.N., pp. 14-15, December 2,
1970). Therefore, rather than impute the fluctuation in gas consumption to a
'jumper' in the service connection, it would be more in keeping with the
circumstances of the case to attribute this to the faulty meter installed by
defendant-appellant. Indeed, from the evidence for the appellant itself that
the old installation was embedded in the cement wall (which was later
changed by appellant to exposed pipes; t.s.n. p. 55, March 3, 1971). We are
of the belief that it was unlikely for the appellee to install a 'jumper' in the
cement wall, a conclusion which bears support in the report of the City Fiscal,
Pasay City that 'Isidro Ongsip was agreeable to have his place excavated
and demolished provided that if there is no illegal installation or jumper found
in the premises, the Manila Gas Corporation should answer for whatever
damages that may be incurred in connection with its excavation of the
premises 'which offer was declined by appellant, indicating that it was not
certain as to the existence of such jumper (Resolution, Exhibit 'D'). In the
light of the foregoing, appellant's first assignment of error must necessarily
fail.
"Anent the second assignment of error, it appears that the gas service to
appellee's compound was disconnected on the basis of non-payment of three
months bills, which were admittedly computed only on the average
consumption registered, without benefit of meter reading (T.s.n. p. 13, April
30, 1971), and without previous notice of disconnection or reminder to pay
(T.s.n. pp. 44-45, id., p. 30, May 18, 1971).
"Considering that the availability of the gas service was of utmost importance
to appellee in the pursuit of his business venture (hotel-motel restaurant), it is
not difficult to foresee the losses that the business must have incurred as a
consequence of appellant's unwarranted and arbitrary act. It may not be
amiss to take note at his juncture that in assessing the damages in favor of
appellee, the court a quo did not award him actual damages, but merely
moral and exemplary damages plus attorney's fees pursuant to Articles 2208
paragraphs (1) and (11); Articles 2217, 2219 paragraph (8) and 2229 of the
New Civil Code. And, considering further the provisions of Article 2216 of
said Code:
59

"No proof of pecuniary loss is necessary in order that moral, nominal,
temperate, liquidated or exemplary damages may be adjudicated. The
assessment of such damages, except liquidated ones, is left to the discretion
of the Court, according to the circumstances of each case; which is amply
supported by the evidence on record, taking into consideration appellee's
standing in the community, WE find that the award must be sustained.
WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is hereby affirmed in toto, it being
in accordance with the law and evidence adduced during the trial. Costs
against appellant" (pp. 75-85, rec.).
Hence, on September 1, 1976, Manila Gas Corporation filed a petition for
review by way of appeal to this Court based on the following grounds, to wit:
"I. The decision is not supported by the facts and the evidence. Rather, the
decision is belied and rebuked by the clear and overwhelming evidence.
"A. The finding that witness Mariano Coronel is an unreliable witness is
totally unsupported by any evidence.
"B. The filing of the criminal complaint against Ongsip was not actuated by
malice on the part of petitioner.
"C. The filing of the criminal complaint against respondent Ongsip was
based on probable cause.
"D. The closure of Ongsip's gas service was made after due notice to pay
his back accounts was given and after a warning of disconnection.
"II. The decision of respondent court is contrary to settled jurisprudence
enunciated by this Honorable Supreme Court and is unsupported by any
evidence.
"A. Advice of counsel is a complete defense against a suit for malicious
prosecution.
"III. The decision of respondent court on the Second Cause of Action of
respondent Ongsip is based on a misapprehension of facts.
"IV. Under the facts and the law, petitioner is not liable for moral and
exemplary damages.
"V. Assuming arguendo that the petitioner is liable for moral and exemplary
damages, the amount awarded by the trial court and affirmed by the Court of
Appeals are grossly, exorbitant as to call for a review thereof" (pp. 22-23,
rec.).
On December 13, 1976, this Court, after considerating the allegations, issues
and arguments adduced in the petition for review on certiorari of the decision
of the Court of Appeals, private respondent's comment thereon as well as
petitioner's reply to said comment, resolved to GIVE LIMITED DUE COURSE
to the petition as to whether or not the damages awarded by the trial court as
affirmed by the Court of Appeals per its decision of July 6, 1976 are
excessive and should be reduced and to TREAT the petition for review as a
special civil action.
WE are thus constricted to a single issue in this case: whether or not the
amount of moral and exemplary damages awarded by the trial court and
affirmed by the Court of Appeals is excessive.
Article 2217 of the Civil Code states that "moral damages include physical
suffering, mental anguish, fright, serious anxiety, besmirched reputation,
wounded feelings, moral shock, social humiliation, and similar injury. Though
incapable of pecuniary computation, moral damages may be recovered if
they are the proximate result of the defendant's wrongful act or omission." On
the other hand, Article 2229 provides that "exemplary or corrective damages
are imposed, by way of example or correction for the public good, in addition
to the moral, temperate, liquidated or compensatory damages".
The first cause of action, for which respondent Ongsip was awarded moral
and exemplary damages in the amount of P50,000.00 and P10,000.00,
respectively, is predicated on Article 2219 of the Civil Code which states that
"moral damages may be recovered in the following and analogous cases: . . .
(8) malicious prosecution; . . . ."
To constitute malicious prosecution, there must be proof that the prosecution
was prompted by a siniter design to vex and humiliate a person that it was
initiated deliberately by the defendant knowing that his charges were false
and groundless. Concededly, the mere act of submitting a case to the
authorities for prosecution does not make one liable for malicious
60
prosecution. (Salao vs. Salao, 70 SCRA 65 [March 16, 1976]; Ramos vs.
Ramos, 61 SCRA 284 [December 3, 1974]; Solis & Yarisantos vs. Salvador,
14 SCRA 887] [August 14, 1965]; Buenaventura, et al. vs. Sto. Domingo, et
al., 103 Phil. 239 [1958]; Barreto vs. Arevalo, 99 Phil. 771 [1956]).
In the instant case, however, there is reason to believe that there was
malicious intent in the filing of the complaint for qualified theft. This intent is
traceable to that early afternoon of August 17, 1966, when petitioner's
employees, upon being ordered, came to private respondent's residence and
changed the defective gas meter and tube connections without notice. In
other words, respondent Ongsip had no opportunity to observe the works.
Nonetheless, if indeed he had installed an illegal by-pass tube or jumper, he
could have easily asked for its immediate removal soon alter his houseboy
told him what petitioner's employees did. As established by the facts, he had
not even attempted to refuse entrance to petitioner's employees headed by
Mariano Coronel nor to question their authority upon their return later that
same afternoon with a photographer. Little did he realize that the pictures of
the premises that were being taken would be used as evidence against him.
Surprisingly, when respondent Ongsip asked Coronel why they were taking
pictures, Coronel just gave him a calling card and instructed him to go to his
office. It was quite an unusual gesture. Obviously, Coronel had something in
mind. As correctly observed by the trial court in its decision -
"A significant fact brought about by the testimony of Coronel himself is the
total absence of immediate accusation against Plaintiff right at the very
moment when the by-pass valve was allegedly discovered. Right then and
there Coronel should have told Plaintiff that he was using a by-pass valve
and in effect stealing gas from Defendant. There would have been nothing
wrong with that. The circumstance was familiar to that of catching a thief in
flagrante delicto. But the truth is that when Coronel and his men entered
Plaintiff's compound and made changes therein, Plaintiff was sleeping. He
had no knowledge of what was then going on. Coronel and his men told the
'boy' of Plaintiff that the changes were being made so that the consumption
of gas could be decreased. So that when Plaintiff woke up at four o'clock in
the afternoon, Coronel and his men had already made the changes and had
already gone. They returned however at five o'clock, this time with a
photographer. This was the time when Plaintiff met Coronel. Here was then
the opportunity for Coronel to confront Plaintiff with the allegedly discovered
'by-pass valve' and bluntly, even brutally, tell him that there was thievery of
gas. This, Coronel did not do. . . . ."
It bears noting that when he was informed as to the existence of a 'jumper' in
his gas connection, respondent Ongsip did not show any sign of fear or
remorse and did not yield to the threatening demand of Coronel. Experience
tells us that this is not the attitude of a guilty person. On the contrary, this is
the attitude of someone who knows how to take a firm stand where his
principles and rights are concerned. To prove his innocence, he was even
willing to have his place excavated but petitioner would not dare take the
consequences. Besides, Delfin Custodio, petitioner's own mechanical
engineer, testified that the second gas meter was replaced as being defective
because "some of its parts were worn out and that it was not properly
registering."
Evidently, petitioner Manila Gas Corporation, in failing to recover its lost
revenue caused by the gas meter's incorrect recording, sought to vindicate
its financial loss by filing the complaint for qualified theft against respondent
Ongsip knowing it to be false. It was actually intended to vex and humiliate
private respondent and to blacken his reputation not only as a businessman
but also as a person. Qualified theft is a serious offense indicating moral
depravity in an individual. To be accused of such crime without basis is
shocking and libelous. It stigmatized private respondent causing him
emotional depression and social degradation. Petitioner should have realized
that what is believed to be a vindication of a proprietary right is no
justification for subjecting one's name to indignity and dishonor. One can thus
imagine the anguish, anxiety, shock and humiliation suffered by respondent
Ongsip. The fact that the complaint for qualified theft was dismissed by the
Pasay City fiscal is no consolation. The damage had been done. Necessarily,
indemnification had to be made.
The trial court awarded P50,000.00 as moral damages and P10,000.00 as
exemplary damages.
WE give due consideration to respondent Ongsip's social and financial status
as a businessman and the mental anguish he suffered as a result of the false
imputation. However, We also consider petitioner's financial capability.
Petitioner is a public utility corporation whose primary concern is service to
the people, the profit motive being merely secondary. Under the
circumstances, We are of the opinion that the award of moral and exemplary
damages should be reduced to 0P25,000,00 and P5,000.00, respectively.
This award is sanctioned by Article 2234 of the Civil Code which states that:
61
"When the amount of the exemplary damages need not be proved, the
plaintiff must show that he is entitled to moral, temperate or compensatory
damages before the court may consider the question of whether or not
exemplary damages should be awarded. In case liquidated damages have
been agreed upon, although no proof of loss is necessary in order that such
liquidated damages may be recovered, nevertheless, before the court may
consider the question of granting exemplary in addition to the liquidated
damages, the plaintiff must show that he would be entitled to moral,
temperate or compensatory damages were it not for the stipulation for
liquidated damages".
On the second cause of action which is based on the illegal disconnection of
respondent Ongsip's gas service constituting breach of contract, the trial
court awarded P30,000.00 as moral damages and P5,000.00 as exemplary
damages.
Petitioner contends that the disconnection was on account of respondent
Ongsip's failure to pay his gas consumptions for more than three months.
While private respondent admits having accounts with petitioner, he denies
having been notified thereof or having received any warning of the
disconnection. In determining the propriety of the award, it is material to
establish that prior notice or warning had been given to respondent Ongsip
before the gas service was disconnected, in accordance with the terms of the
contract. In this regard, We find the trial court's observation in its decision to
be well-founded, to quote:
"Defendant would insist that the household helpers inside Plaintiff's premises
refused to receive notices or to sign them. Defendant has not given the Court
any plausible reason why these persons would refuse to receive, or sign for,
notices of demands for payments or warnings of threatened disconnection of
the service. The very evidence of Defendants indicates that Plaintiff had long
been a customer of Defendant. Plaintiff has been paying his bills. Plaintiff had
not suffered any financial reverses. As a matter of fact, upon the suggestion
of the Court, Plaintiff readily made payment of his account with Defendant.
He made payment not because the service would be restored. When he
made the payment the Court had already issued a mandatory preliminary
injunction, ordering Defendant to restore gas service in the premises of
Plaintiff. Plaintiff made the payment to comply with the suggestion of the
Court because the Court rather than enforce its order, would like the parties
to settle the case amicably.
"What is peculiar in the stand of Defendant is that while it would insist on the
giving of notices and warnings, it did not have any competent and sufficient
evidence to prove the same. Demands in open were made by Plaintiff's
counsel whether Defendant could show any written evidence showing that
notices and warnings were sent to Plaintiff. Not a single piece of evidence
was produced. Normally, if a notice is refused, then the original and its copies
would still be in the hands of the public utility concerned. In the instant case,
it has to he repeated, not a single copy, original or duplicate, triplicate, etc. of
any notice to pay or warning of disconnection was produced in court. The
court cannot believe that Defendant, as what the testimonies of its witnesses
would like to impress upon this Court, conducts its business that way.
Defendant is a big business concern and it cannot be said that it treats its
business as a joke. Its personnel should realize this, for only with such an
awareness can they respond faithfully to their responsibilities as members of
a big business enterprise imbued with public interest over which the
Philippine Government is concerned."
Quite obviously, petitioner's act in disconnecting respondent Ongsip's gas
service without prior notice constitutes breach of contract amounting to an
independent tort. The prematurity of the action is indicative of an intent to
cause additional mental and moral suffering to private respondent. This is a
clear violation of Article 21 of the Civil Code which provides that "any person
who wilfully causes loss or injury to another in a manner that is contrary to
morals, good customs or public policy shall compensate the latter for
damages." This is reiterated by paragraph 10 of Article 2219 of the Code.
Moreover, the award of moral damages is sanctioned by Article 2220 which
provides that "willful injury to property may be a legal ground for awarding
moral damages if the court should find that, under the circumstances, such
damages are justly due. The same rule applies to breaches of contract where
the defendant acted fraudulently or in bad faith".
WE are not unmindful of the fact that at the time the gas service was
disconnected, respondent Ongsip admitted having been in default of at least
three months' bills. WE have established however that no notice to that effect
has been served on him. It must be pointed out that respondent Ongsip is an
old man involved in a number of business and social undertakings. It is quite
natural and understandable that at times he forgets some minor obligations
and details of his concern. This is the time when reminders and friendly
notices become indispensable. The rudiments of procedural due process
dictate that he should have been notified of any back accounts. In the past,
respondent Ongsip had not been remiss in the payment of his bills. Petitioner
62
should have at least accorded him the courtesy, if not the right, as per
contract, of being notified before effecting disconnection so that he could
take steps or initiate measures to avoid such embarrassment. Apparently,
such misconduct or omission on the part of petitioner formed part of a
malevolent scheme to harass and humiliate private respondent, exposing
him to further ignominy and greater mental torture. Respondent Ongsip's
default in payment cannot be utilized by petitioner to defeat or nullify the
claim for damages. At most, this circumstance can be considered as a
mitigating factor in ascertaining the amount of damages to which respondent
Ongsip is entitled. In consequence thereof, We reduce the amount of moral
damages to P15,000.00. The award of P5,000.00 as exemplary damages, on
the other hand, is sustained, being similarly warranted by Article 2234 of the
Civil Code aforequoted as complemented by Article 2220.
The award of attorney's fees in the amount of P10,000.00 is justified under
the circumstances.
WHEREFORE, PETITIONER MANILA GAS CORPORATION IS HEREBY
DIRECTED TO PAY.
(1) RESPONDENT ISIDRO M. ONGSIP P25,000.00 AS MORAL DAMAGES
AND P5,000.00 AS EXEMPLARY DAMAGES FOR THE FIRST CAUSE OF
ACTION, P15,000.00 AS MORAL DAMAGES AND P5,000.00 AS
EXEMPLARY DAMAGES FOR THE SECOND CAUSE OF ACTION, AND
P10,000.00 AS ATTORNEY'S FEES; AND
(2) THE COSTS.
MODIFIED AS ABOVE STATED, THE DECISION OF RESPONDENT
COURT OF APPEALS IS HEREBY AFFIRMED IN ALL OTHER RESPECTS.
SO ORDERED.
Teehankee, Acting C.J., Fernandez, Guerrero and Melencio-Herrera, JJ.,
concur.
14
[SAMUEL DUMLAO, petitioner, vs. THE HONORABLE COURT OF
APPEALS, FLORANTE, PACIFICO, LEO, ANGELES, CHRISTOPHER,
JEAN, LAURA, HANNIBAL and ROMULUS, minors and all surnamed
CERVANTES-ELIZALDE, respondents.
1982 May 31
2nd Division
G.R. No. L-39172
DECISION
DE CASTRO, J.:
Petitioner was one of the defendants in this suit for damages filed by private
respondent in the Court of First Instance of Davao resulting from a vehicular
accident. The other defendants, Hermanos de Yap and the City of Davao, did
not appeal from the decision of the Court of Appeals which affirmed the
decision of the Court of First Instance of Davao holding all defendants,
including petitioner herein, liable jointly and severally in the total sum of
P61,395.00, by way of damages in favor of private respondents.
The relevant facts as found by the respondent court are recited in its decision
as follows:
"On February 28, 1964, about 11:30 in the night, Isauro Elizalde,
accompanied by his wife Hanidena Elizalde, while driving his jeep
southwards from Davao City, thru Talomo Bridge, suddenly and unexpectedly
came upon a hole on the south end of said bridge right on his way, about 1
meter in diameter and 8 ft. deep, surrounded by boulders, thus blocking his
lane. To avoid it he swerved his jeep abruptly to the left side of the road
where he was confronted by a steep embankment. He swerved his jeep back
to the right to get into his lane after passing the boulders and the destroyed
portion of the road (sketch Exh. "A") but he collided with the truck of
defendant Hermanos de Yap driven by Dulcesimo Dacoy who came from the
opposite direction. As a result of the collision, Isauro Elizalde died on the spot
in his jeep while his wife who was found on the road, severely injured but
was still alive, died soon after in the hospital.
"The left end of the truck's fender was bent while the portion of its left hood
just below the front headlight and its edge just above the left front wheel were
slightly dented. The jeep which was enveloped in flames from the incident
was badly damaged. The road where the two vehicles collided is a straight
one and judging from the sketch made by the police investigator (Exh. "A")
63
both drivers could have noticed each other even when they were yet far from
each other. The same sketch also shows that the jeep had already passed
the boulders and the destroyed portion of the road and was way beyond such
hazards when the collision took place.
"By reason of this incident, the plaintiffs as heirs of both deceased sued the
Hermanos de Yap but the suit was dismissed for failure of plaintiffs to
prosecute. However, same plaintiffs filed the present complaint on May 16,
1966, which, aside from the original defendant, now includes the City of
Davao and City Engineer Samuel Dumlao alleging that while Hermanos de
Yap was negligent not only because its driver operated their truck carelessly,
recklessly, and negligently, but also because it was itself negligent in the
selection and supervision of its employees, the City of Davao and City
Engineer Samuel Dumlao were also negligent in not repairing the road where
the accident took place and in not taking the necessary precautions to warn
the public of the hazards on said road, thereby causing the collision which
resulted in the destruction of the jeep and also in the death of its occupants."
[1]
Petitioner seeks to be relieved from liability on grounds he has indicated in
the following issues which he raised in the present petition:
"1. The allegations in the complaint being to the effect that petitioner
Samuel Dumlao was sued in his official capacity for being the City Engineer,
may respondent court correctly hold that he was sued in his personal
capacity?;
"2. No evidence having been adduced or found that petitioner acted in bad
faith or was guilty of gross negligence in connection with his official duties,
may respondent court hold him personally liable in this action?; and
"3. Republic Act 4354 having no provision for retroactivity, may the said
law be applied to deprive petitioner of his property by giving said statute
retroactive effect?" [2]
His assignment of errors are as follows:
"1. Respondent court erred in holding that private respondents, as set forth
in their complaint, sued petitioner in his personal capacity because the
allegations therein clearly state that he was sued in his official capacity as
City Engineer;
"2. The law is clear that in the absence of bad faith or gross negligence, a
public official may not be held personally liable for any act or omission in
connection with the discharge of his duties' therefore, respondent court
gravely erred on this point;
"3. Respondent court erred in applying Republic Act 4354 retroactively
against the petitioner." [3]
In discussing the above assignment of errors, he first cites the provision of
Article 2189 of the Civil Code as properly serving the basis of the liability of
the City of Davao, which does not include that of any of city officials. This
proposition is quite clear from the language of the cited provision and needs
no further elaboration to show its validity. The aforecited provision reads:
"Art. 2189. Provinces, cities and municipalities shall be liable for damages
for the death of, or injuries suffered by any person by reason of the defective
condition of the roads, streets, bridges, public buildings and other public
works under their control or supervision."
Nevertheless, it is a well-settled principle of law that a public official may be
liable in his personal private capacity for whatever damage he may have
caused by his act done with malice and in bad faith, [4] or beyond the scope
of his authority or jurisdiction. [5]
The question, therefore, is whether petitioner did act in any of the manner
aforesaid.
Petitioner contends that, contrary to the holding of the respondent Court of
Appeals, he was not sued in his personal capacity, but in his official capacity.
Neither was malice or bad faith alleged against him in the complaint, much
less proven by the evidence, as the respondent court made no such finding
of malice or bad faith.
Examining the allegations of the complaint and reviewing the evidence it
would indeed be correct to say that petitioner was sued in his official
capacity, and that the most that was imputed to him is act of culpable
neglect, inefficiency and gross indifference in the performance of his official
duties. Verily, this is not imputation of bad faith or malice, and what is more
was not convincingly proven.
64
We are, therefore, constrained to hold that from the complaint itself, no
sufficient cause of action was alleged, and the evidence utterly fails to
provide a basis for imposing on petitioner the liability as has been declared
against him jointly with his co-defendants, the City of Davao and Hermanos
de Yap, by the trial court. The latter defendants must have already satisfied
the judgment against them, for they no longer took appeal from the decision
of the respondent Court of Appeals, and the private respondents did not
bother to file their brief in this instant proceedings, for they did not even ask
for extension of time to do so if they had any desire to file the appellees' brief.
There remains the only question of whether Section 5 of R. A. No. 4354
under which the respondent Court of Appeals found petitioner properly
included as a defendant whom it considered sued in his private capacity, was
properly applied by said Court. In its own words, the Court of Appeals
(Second Division) said that "the Revised Charter of the City of Davao (Act
4354) which took effect on June 19, 1965, cannot retroact to effect (sic) a
case that occurred on February 28, 1964." But surprisingly, the same Court
went on to say: "Moreover, in the case of defendant City Engineer Samuel
Dumlao, his inclusion in the complaint, as shown in paragraph 3 thereof is in
his private capacity and conforms with the provision of Section 5 of Act
4354." This very patent inconsistency may well be said to reflect how infirm is
the appealed decision of the Court of Appeals insofar as petitioner, who
incidentally has long retired, is concerned.
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby granted, and the decision appealed
from is reversed insofar as petitioner Samuel Dumlao is concerned, who is
accordingly declared without liability for damages as sought in the complaint
in Civil Case No. 5042 of the Court of First Instance of Davao (Annex D to
Petition). No costs.
SO ORDERED.
Barredo (Chairman), Guerrero, Abad Santos and Escolin, JJ., concur.
Aquino, J., concurs in the result. Petitioner's neglect or omission to cause the
repair of the hole in the bridge could have been the subject of an
administrative complaint against him.
Concepcion, Jr., J., took no part.
15
ANTONIO GELUZ, petitioner, vs. THE HON. COURT OF APPEALS and
OSCAR LAZO, respondents.
1961 Jul 20
En Banc
G.R. No. L-16439
DECISION
REYES, J.B.L., J.:
This petition for certiorari brings up for review the question whether the
husband of a woman, who voluntarily procured her abortion, could recover
damages from the physician who caused the same.
The litigation was commenced in the Court of First Instance of Manila by
respondent Oscar Lazo, the husband of Nita Villanueva, against petitioner
Antonio Geluz, a physician. Convinced of the merits of the complaint upon
the evidence adduced, the trial court rendered judgment in favor of plaintiff
Lazo and against defendant Geluz ordering the latter to pay P3,000 as
damages, P700 as attorney's fees and the costs of the suit. On appeal, the
Court of Appeals, in a special division of five, sustained the award by a
majority vote of three justices as against two, who rendered a separate
dissenting opinion.
The facts are set forth in the majority opinion as follows:
"Nita Villanueva came to know the defendant (Antonio Geluz) for the first
time in 1948 through her aunt Paula Yambot. In 1950 she became
pregnant by her present husband before they were legally married. Desiring
to conceal her pregnancy from her parent, and acting on the advice of her
aunt, she had herself aborted by the defendant. After her marriage with the
plaintiff, she again became pregnant. As she was then employed in the
Commission on Elections and her pregnancy proved to be inconvenient, she
had herself aborted again by the defendant in October 1953. Less than two
years later, she again became pregnant. On February 21, 1955,
accompanied by her sister Purificacion and the latter's daughter Lucida, she
again repaired to the defendant's clinic on Carriedo and P. Gomez streets in
Manila, where the three met the defendant and his wife. Nita was again
aborted, of a two-month old foetus, in consideration of the sum of fifty pesos,
Philippine currency. The plaintiff was at this time in the province of Cagayan,
campaigning for his election to the provincial board; he did not know of, nor
gave his consent to, the abortion."
65
It is the third and last abortion that constitutes plaintiffs basis in filing this
action and award of damages. Upon application of the defendant Geluz, we
granted certiorari.
The Court of Appeals and the trial court predicated the award of damages in
the sum of P3,000.00 upon the provisions of the initial paragraph of Article
2206 of the Civil Code of the Philippines. This we believe to be error, for the
said article, in fixing a minimum award of P3,000 for the death of a person,
does not cover the case of an unborn foetus that is not endowed with
personality. Under the system of our Civil Code, "la criatura abortiva no
alcanza la categoria de persona natural y en consecuencia es un ser no
nacido a la vida del Derecho" (Casso-Cervera, "Diccionario de Derecho
Privado" Vol. 1, p. 49). being incapable of having rights and obligations.
Since an action for pecuniary damages on account of personal injury or
death pertains primarily to the one injured, it is easy to see that if no action
for such damages could be instituted on behalf of the unborn child on
account of the injuries it received, no such right of action could derivatively
accrue to its parents or heirs. In fact, even if a cause of action did accrue on
behalf of the unborn child, the same was extinguished by its pre-natal death,
since no transmission to anyone can take place from one that lacked juridical
personality (or juridical capacity, as distinguished from capacity to act). It is
no answer to invoke the provisional personality of a conceived child
(conceptus pro nato habetur) under Article 40 of the Civil Code, because that
same article expressly limits such provisional personality by imposing the
condition that the child should be subsequently born alive: "provided it be
born later with the conditions specified in the following article". In the present
case, there is no dispute that the child was dead when separated from its
mother's womb.
The prevailing American jurisprudence is to the same effect; and is generally
held that recovery can not be had for the death of an unborn child (Stafford
vs. Roadway Transit Co., 70 F. Supp. 555; Dietrich vs. Northhampton, 52 Am.
Rep. 242; and numerous cases collated in the editorial note, 10 ALR (2d)
639).
This is not to say that the parents are not entitled to collect any damages at
all. But such damages must be those inflicted directly upon them, as
distinguished from the injury or violation of the rights of the deceased, his
right to life and physical integrity. Because the parents can not expect either
help, support or services from an unborn child, they would normally be
limited to moral damages for the illegal arrest of the normal development of
the spes hominis that was the foetus, i.e. on account of distress and anguish
attendant to its loss, and the disappointment of their parental expectations
(Civ. Code, Art. 2217), as well as to exemplary damages, if the
circumstances should warrant them (Art. 2230). But in the case before us,
both the trial court and the Court of Appeals have not found any basis for an
award of moral damages, evidently because the appellee's indifference to the
previous abortions of his wife, also caused by the appellant herein, clearly
indicates that he was unconcerned with the frustration of his parental hopes
and affections. The lower court expressly found, and the majority opinion of
the Court of Appeals did not contradict it, that the appellee was aware of the
second abortion; and the probabilities are that he was likewise aware of the
first. Yet despite the suspicious repetition of the event, he appeared to have
taken no steps to investigate or pinpoint the causes thereof, and secure the
punishment of the responsible practitioner. Even after learning of the third
abortion, the appellee does not seem to have taken interest in the
administrative and criminal cases against the appellant. His only concern
appears to have been directed at obtaining from the doctor a large money
payment, since he sued for P50,000 damages and P3,000 attorneys fees, an
"indemnity" claim that, under the circumstances of record, was clearly
exaggerated.
The dissenting Justices of the Court of Appeals have aptly remarked that:
"It seems to us that the normal reaction of a husband who righteously feels
outraged by the abortion which his wife has deliberately sought at the hands
of a physician would be high-minded rather than mercenary; and that his
primary concern would be to see to it that the medical profession was purged
of an unworthy member rather than turn his wife's indiscretion to personal
profit, and with that idea in mind to press either the administrative or the
criminal cases he had filed, or both, instead of abandoning them in favor of a
civil action for damages of which not only he, but also his wife, would be the
beneficiaries."
It is unquestionable that the appellant's act in provoking the abortion of
appellee's wife, without medical necessity to warrant it, was a criminal and
morally reprehensible act, that can not be too severely condemned; and the
consent of the woman or that of her husband does not excuse it. But the
immorality or illegality of the act does not justify an award of damages that,
under the circumstances on record, have no factual or legal basis.
The decision appealed from is reversed, and the complaint ordered
dismissed. Without costs.
Let a copy of this decision be furnished the Department of Justice and the
Board of Medical Examiners for their information and such investigation and
action against the appellee Antonio Geluz as the facts may warrant.
Bengzon, C.J., Padilla, Labrador, Barrera, Paredes, Dizon and Natividad, JJ.,
concur.
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