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IN THE SUPREME COURT

APPEAL NO. SC 110/2015

UNDER S.14 Supreme Court Act 2003, S.27(1,2)

Bill of Rights Act 1990, and Human
Rights Act 1993

BETWEEN Friedrich Joachim Fehling

Appellant, in person

AND Douglas John Appleby

Respondent

DATED 24 th September 2015

______________________________________________________________________

(APPLICATION FOR LEAVE TO) APPEAL:

QUESTIONS OF LAW WITH ARGUMENTATION incl.

EXCEPTIONAL CIRCUMSTANCES and

PUBLIC IMPORTANCE/INTEREST AND INTEREST OF JUSTICE

pursuant to SS.8,13(1,2(a,b),4),14 of the Supreme Court Act

against [2014] NZHC 75
______________________________________________________________________

TO The Registrar, Supreme Court, 85 Lambton Quay, Wellington

TO The Registrar, High Court, P.O.Box 29, Greymouth

AND TO The above named respondent

AND TO The General Public

AND TO The German Embassy
ALSO TO Kim Dotcom

Appellant’s Address: Fritz Fehling, Post Office Box 95, Harihari 7863, South Westland
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CONTENTS page
Explanatory Note (abbreviation references) 3

Questions of law 3

Argumentation 7
Conclusion 10
Exceptional Circumstances 10
Public Importance/Interest and Interest of Justice 10

Appendix (Argumentation to High Court dated 20/10/14):

Chronological Summary 2
Main Questions of Law on Appeal to High Court 3
Fundamental Questions of Law raised in the Tribunal hearing 3
Constitutional Priority Question of Law 4
Argumentation to the 13 Questions of Law (CIV-2014-418-000021) 5
Principles of Natural Justice requires Definition 5
Human Rights Act includes Victimisation relating to Privacy Act 5
Unlawful Indirect Discrimination does not require Specific Intent 5
Trespass Act cannot overrule HRA 7
Natural-Justice Precision should be Maximised 7
Insolvency Act cannot overrule HRA 8
Education Act cannot overrule HRA 9
Tribunal has Jurisdiction over HRA’s Offence Provision 9
S.135 HRA is Incompatible with HRA Part 1B and Bill of Rights Act 10
Referral of Questions of Law to High Court 10
Remedies 10
Costs 11
Conclusion 11

Appendix A (224-page transcript of the HRRT hearing of the Claim)

Appendix B (detailed argumentation with Appeal-Court case law proving the

BORA to be a constitutional law contrary to the common invalidating
interpretation of S.4; It contains pages 3-6)

Appendix C (Universal Democracy Constitution showing the Bill of Rights

Act’s central constitutional character in a constitutional democracy)

Appendix D (Hokitika Guardian newspaper article showing the courts’ use

of direct natural-person (company director) defendant status in addition to
Companies-Act status in a Health-And-Safety-In-Employment-Act case)

Appendix E (list of Natural-Justice principles (dated 17/2/2015)

The complete files of the Human Rights Review Tribunal and the High
Court (esp. “Counter Argumentation Against Defendant’s Submissions
27/5/14 (2/11/14)” are relevant admissible evidence, incl. interlocutory
decisions, exhibits and memoranda, and part of this Supreme-Court
argumentation and file.
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APPEAL ON QUESTIONS OF LAW WITH ARGUMENTATION

Against High Court Decision [2015] NZHC 75 , Human Rights Act

[0.] Chronological Summary

The chronological summary of the High-Court argumentation 20/10/2014

(the APPENDIX) HA[0.1-0.7] is inserted unchanged at this position.

Paramount Constitutional Question of Law (Natural-Justice definition)

[1] Should the High Court have started precedence case law under
the HRA by defining/interpreting principles of “Natural Justice” per
SS.6,27(1) Bill of Rights Act 1990 BORA and S.105(1,2(a)) Human
Rights Act 1993 HRA according to article 2.1. of the Universal
Democracy Constitution, in order to reduce the monarch’s courts’
totalitarian at-will discriminatory discretion:

Natural: Following the logical causal chain, arranging real causes/

events and their real results/consequences in the time-correct
sequence; It does not mean first-past-the-post, virtual or mad!
Justice: Balance of the adherence to reasonable agreements,
including democratically originated laws, under the safeguarding
frame of this constitutional NZ Bill of Rights Act 1990; It includes
correction of breaches with compensation of victims as one part, with
the aim to prevent repetition of breaches ?

Priority Constitutional Question of Law (BORA interpretation direction)

[2] Have the interpretations of S.27(1) constitutional Bill of Rights

Act 1990 BORA (Natural Justice) and SS.65,66,105(1,2(a)) Human
Rights Act 1993 HRA (indirect discrimination, victimization, Natural-
Justice principles) to be in line with S.6 BORA?
Related Subquestion of law
Is the constitutional BORA case law [1992] 3NZLR 260 CA Court of
Appeal a valid case law or mere window-dressing for royal-fascistic
might-is-right, and are case examples of S.6-BORA-free jurisdictions
admissible for law interpretations required to be in line with BORA?

_______Explanatory note________
The square brackets refer to paragraph numbers of :
HD[ no. ] – [2014] NZHC 75 (appealed High Court decision)
HT[ no.] -- [2014] NZHC 75 (transcript)
HA[ no. ] – Argumentation to High Court dated 20/10/14, APPENDIX;
(its wording “Tribunal” is synonymous to “High Court”)
D[ no. ] -- [2014]NZHRRT 24 (appealed Tribunal decision)
T[ p. no. ] -- [2014]NZHRRT 24 (transcript of 2-day hearing, Appendix A)
ID[ no. ] -- [2014]NZHRRT 17 (refusal of Insolvency-Act application)
SD[ no. ] -- [2013]NZHRRT 19 (refusal of strike-out)
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[3] Fundamental Questions of Law raised in the High Court hearing:

Specific HRA Main Questions of Law (Questions HA[1,2],HD[31[1,2]])

[3.1] Does S.66(1(v)) Human Rights Act HRA (victimisation threat

for having otherwise done anything under reference to HRA) allow the
courts (incl. the Tribunal/High Court) to invalidate it for Privacy-Act-
S.89-proceedings-related (and thus with HRA part-4 reference) prima-
facie-proven victimisation ?

[3.2] Does S.65 (indirect discrimination) mention the unlawfully

discriminating effect through a not apparently unlawful conduct
lacking “good reason”, instead of any specific intent (added: including
the expressions “by reason of ”, “material link to unlawful grounds” ?

Further HRA Questions of Law (Questions HA[3-12],HD[31[3-12]])

These questions were discarded by dismissing their S.65 pre-condition:

[3.3] Does S.4(1,2) Trespass Act 1980 invalidate discriminatory

offences & unlawful acts (refusal of public-places access) per
SS.42,134 HRA ?
{High Court/Tribunal evaded all Trespass-Act/S.134 issues}
[3.4] Does S.65 HRA (indirect discrimination) require the
offender/discriminator to have stated directly the discriminatory
grounds for his act(s) in order to become statutorily valid ?
{This is question [3.2], differently worded}
[3.5] Do proceedings under the Privacy Act’s information provisions
preclude or disable proceedings under the HRA’s anti-discrimination
provisions that are brought as a consequence of the resulting
emerging information ?
{answered by deed of proceeding, but included for completeness}
[3.6] Should proceedings of offences per SS.42,134 HRA aim to
maximise the Bill of Rights’ Natural-Justice provision S.27(1) and
minimise punishment of innocent persons associated with an
organisation, by preferably naming specific executive(s)/official(s) of
such organisations as direct defendant(s) to alleged personal
wrongdoings, instead of using Companies-Act practice as screen ?
{partly answered by defendant’s identity, but not for remedies}
[3.7] Should SS.76,232 Insolvency Act limit or otherwise influence the
jurisdiction of the Tibunal per SS.92I (remedies), 95 (interim order),
121 (enforcement), 134/42 (offence, unlawful act) HRA, [added: SS.
89,92B(4),92T (enforcement of decision-substituting settlement)] ?
{Tribunal gave ambiguous insufficient answer}
[3.8] Does Schedule 6, S.4(a) Education Act (defendant not liable if
he acted in “good faith” in school-board function) overrule the “good-
reason” and offence/unlawful-act provisions per SS.65,42,134 HRA ?
{This question of law has been answered in favour of the HRA, but has
been subverted again by not adhering to the wording of S.65; it is included
as a case example, also for answering questions [3.3,3.6,3.7,3.9].}
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[3.9] Does the continued issuing of a 2-year trespass notice

preventing access to public facilities for 2 years without “good
reason” per S.65 fulfill offence/unlawful-act provisions per
SS.65,42,134 ?
{High Court/Tribunal evaded all Trespass-Act/S.134 issues…}
[3.10] Has the Tribunal concurrently with S.42 (unlawful act)
jurisdiction about the non-convictable offence per S.134 HRA, instead
of invalidating this statutory section by requiring a double-jeopardy
repetition of the hearing in the District Court ?

[3.11] Should the Tribunal via its decision have notified Parlament
that the requirement of the Attorney-General’s agreement before any
judicial hearing per S.135 HRA for an offence prosecution per S.134
contravenes the general law practice and undermines this democracy-
protecting HRA per S.20L {by enabling protection of fascistic mates
against lawful prosecutions for criminal discrimination offences; This
political interference in judicial matters per S.135 contravenes SS.4,5,19
Bill of Rights by not being demonstrably justifiable in a free &
democratic society, and should have led the grossly incompetent
Attorney-General to inform Parlament per S.7 Bill of Rights} ?

[3.12] Should the Tribunal have referred above questions of law to the
High Court per S.122 (1,1A)(referral of questions of law to High
Court), because the Tribunal’s previous unlawful case examples
obviously disabled it to judge lawfully the above questions of law ?
{The courts generally invalidate such referral laws}

As the High Court has followed and whitewashed the Tribunal’s decision,
these questions have either been wrongly-in-law answered or ignored
without reasoning, and are valid law questions for this appeal.

Added Question of Law

[3.13] Do falsifications or wrong interpretations of established facts

(here: for determination of discriminatory effects) leading to wrong
law applications (here: S.65 HRA indirect discrimination) become
appealable under the relevant law questions (here: law questions
[1-3.13]) per S.27(1,2) BORA (Natural (logical causal chain) Justice)?

This added public-interest law question aims to stop the judiciary from using
its devious unlawful trick of pretending that appeals on questions of law are
on un-appealable questions of fact, so that criminal wrongdoings of fascistic
freemason gang members and affiliates can be covered-up.
In any case, this appeal is a law-matter appeal, because a purely-hypothetical
fact-question appeal to the High Court required 2 added Tribunal members
sitting on the bench per S.126(1) HRA, not just judge Whata alone…
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ARGUMENTATION TO THE 15 QUESTIONS OF LAW

[4] (to question of law [1]) This is a self-answering rhetorical question,

and it is at least the 5th time that such fundamental Natural-Justice definition
was requested from the monarch’s judiciary, which again failed this basic
competence test! It is the only available reasonable all-including definition in
line with the BORA, and had therefore to be applied and settled in case law.
This was also necessary in order to determine/define Natural-Justice
principles per S.105(1,2(a)) HRA so that this law section becomes valid in
law praxis! Adhering to reasonable wordings of laws is a Natural-Justice
principle, and the judge erred in law not to define and decide thus.
APPENDIX HA[14,18,19.8(a),24] provide further detailed arguments.

[5] (to question of law [2]) Appendix B page 5 is inserted here; It is a

summary of relevant quotes of the 1992 Appeal Court majority decision for
law interpretations to be in line with the BORA. Noteworthy is following:
[5.1] Quote 3) shows that it is not the correct approach to develop the law
(incl. case law) by preserving the status quo (called “I am not prepared to
depart from what appears to be orthodoxy”; judge Whata in HD[75]).
It is erroneous in law to have relied on an English “common”-law case law
(footnote 31), because royal-colonial-fascistic motherland England has not
yet achieved a constitutional BORA with its S.6 interpretation direction due
to a monarchic lack of democracy (status quo); It cannot even achieve the
democracy minimum of proportional parliamentary representation…
[5.2] Quote 4) shows that BORA’s democratic values are relevant, not
royal-judicial might-is-right.
[5.3] Quote 5) shows that S.6 BORA (interpretation direction) applies also
to BORA itself, “as a duty of the courts”, synonymous to “must” in quote 6.
[5.4] Quote 6) shows that consistency with BORA “… must be done even
if it involves departure from previous interpretations” (“orthodoxy”…).
[5.5] Quote 7) shows that interpretation consistency with the BORA “…is
to be preferred…”, which is synonymous to “must” in quote 6.
[5.6] Consequently, as there were no other reasonably BORA-consistent
interpretations presented or even available at all, the wordings of S.27(1)
BORA (Natural Justice) and SS.65,66,105(1,2(a)) Human Rights Act 1993
HRA (indirect discrimination, victimization, Natural-Justice principles) had
to be applied according to the appellant’s definition/interpretation in line
with the BORA! It was utterly incompetent and wrong in law not to have
done so, esp. when these quotes were referred to in HA[14,17,22] and
provided to the High Court.

[6] (to question of law [3.1]) S.66(1(a(v))) under the headline “Other
Forms of Discrimination” reads: “…or having otherwise done anything
under or by reference to HRA”; It is not limited to S.21 HRA unlawful-
discrimination grounds, because this anti-victimisation provision forbids
threat or factual discrimination (it in law contains the broad definition of
discrimination) on the ground of an action referenced to the HRA --
Here SS.82,83,89 Privacy-Act proceedings that are statutorily & expressly
run under [reference to] part 4 HRA. The judge invalidated this law without
BORA justification, while not invalidating BORA-contradicting S.135 [3.11]!
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[6.1] The defence against this proceeding had also at least the effect, if not
intention, to cover-up the underlying indirect discrimination under SS.65/21
HRA that resulted from Privacy-Act-case info which is central to this case.
[6.2] This S.66 therefore forbids victimizing discrimination to prevent
court-contemptuous and damaging intimidation for insisting on the right to
Natural Justice per S.27(1) BORA and SS.82,83,89 Privacy Act regardless of
any potential or existing unlawful-discrimination-ground proceeding, and
this interpretation had to be prima-facie applied (see point [5]). This was
explained to the judge in the hearing, but he wrongly-in-law preferred the
fascistic-mates-protecting “orthodoxy” of invalidating this statutory law.

[7] (to question of law [3.2]) In HD[75-78,89(b)] judge Whata answers

this law question favourably, and reasons that proof of specific intent/
material link is not necessary, because it could even undermine the HRA’s
anti-discrimination policy, an interpretation in line with BORA! He thus
followed the conclusion HA[26 with 17] that otherwise SS.65,42,134 HRA
(indirect discrimination with unlawful act & offence) would be effectively
invalidated contrary to the obvious purpose of their statutory existence.
In HD[79,89(c)] he comes to the view that the Tribunal did not require such
proof and was unable to find any linkage to prohibited grounds.
[7.1] But in HD[24,80,83,85,89(d)] he overturned this answer by relying on
the Tribunal’s point D[35] that the critical issue was whether the
[discriminatory] trespass notice was issued by reason of one or more of the
prohibited grounds of discrimination. “By reason of ” means motivated
by/intended on, meaning a specific intent as causal/material nexus. This is
illogically contradicting the above and wrong in law (a dud of a judgment);
[7.2] He further recorded in HD[25,82] that the Tribunal in D[42]
concluded that the evidence “..does not establish the presence of a
prohibited ground…” so that the case(s) under S.65 must fail;
[7.3] The wordings of SS.65,21(2(a,b(i))) HRA do not require such factual
true presence of a prohibited ground and thus proof of a specific intend/
reason/motivation, only the effect as if there were such true presence! It is
relevant & sufficient for the victim to establish the subjective but reasonable
(not trivial, frivolous or vexatious, which would be weeded-out in the
Human-Rights-Commission mediation stage) experience of such effects
with unlawful-grounds criteria, as was done thoroughly not only regarding
race/nationality, but several others (see HA[16.1-16.4] with footnote
referrals). This interpretation of S.65 HRA is to be the preferred
interpretation, and it doesn’t even require an apparent “material link”;
[7.4] In HD[85] judge Whata states that there was no overt differential/
discriminatory treatment, and that the Tribunal found that the trespass
notice and comments were ostensibly neutral as between classes of persons.
However, the trespass notice was explicitly clearly directed only against the
appellant’s total person and had thus obvious prima-facie discriminatory
character. In SD[15] the Tribunal found that the comments were clearly
referring to the appellant as the only person in Harihari having been
trespassed and rewarded $10,000, and that “…it can also be inferred that
the comments were implicitly in breach of SS.63 and 65 of the Act.” !
Again, S.65 mentions not apparent unlawful conduct, which includes no
overt differential treatment or ostensible neutrality between classes …;
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[7.5] Furthermore, in HD[86] he accepts that there was at least an indirect

link between prohibited discrimination and the trespass notice, and that
there was no good reason for it;
[7.6] He proved another linkage to unlawful grounds in HD[87] with the
hypothetical reasoning that the naming of the school board as defendant
instead of Mr Appleby could have fulfilled such grounds; If the school
board fulfilled it, then its chairman Appleby as its only acting representative
during holidays certainly did so, too!;
[7.7] Furthermore, such “material link” is inherent in the victim’s/
appellant’s person; If the totality of the victim’s person had been
discriminated against (here via a person-excluding trespass notice), and this
person obviously (by his German name Fritz, and commonly known!) is of
different nationality, philosophy/religion and/or other criteria of unlawful
grounds per S.21(2(a,b(i))) HRA, such link is automatically established – esp.
when there was prima-facie no good reason for such gross discrimination;
[7.8] In the written Counter Argumentation Against Defendant’s
Submissions the appellant proved in point [6] that the defendant knew T[187
l.6-18] about hostility in the community contrary to his pretence when
making his statement. In HA[16.4],T[204 l.26] the defendant even proved his
own still persisting blankly discriminating hostility when issuing/upholding
the trespass notice! This established beyond reasonable doubt a link that
compels the inference that Mr Appleby not only discriminatingly recklessly
invited /caused injury to the appellant, but had the unspecified intend. This
applies to victimization & claim 1). It proves HD[87] erroneous in law;
This in turn compels the inference of fulfillment of indirect discrimination
claim 2) with unlawful act/offence via trespass notice contrary to
HD[79,80,86,88]; As there was prima-facie no good reason, the 2 S.65 claims
were prima-facie proven beyond reasonable doubt and judicial discretion;
The judicial discretion should then have fully kicked-in at the remedy stage.

[8] The Supreme Court case law in HD[74(a)/footnote 28,32] deals with
the Employment Relations Act that specifies a different level of
unlawful-grounds proof than S.21(2(a,b(i))) and esp. S.65 HRA require,
but forbids constructive dismissal with no or unjustified reason (the ERA’s
version of S.65 HRA!), which can consequently realistically be remedied. It
has only laterally (not literally) comparing legal and educational value here!

[9] The judge wrongly-in-law adopted the English case law’s combination
of unlawful-grounds proof as integral part of “discrimination”, instead of
firstly using S.66’s broad definition, then examining S.21’s unlawful grounds.

[10] (to questions of law [3.3,3.6,3.9-3.12]) HD[74(c)-78] indicates that if

the unlawfully discriminating effect is paired with a lack of good reason per
S.65, then the inference of prohibited-ground discrimination having passed
“the salient threshold test” expressed at S.42 HRA (unlawful act with strict
liability) can be drawn. It was wrong in law not to have drawn this inference.

[11] (to question of law [3.9]) The judge erred in law to limit S.65 HRA
application only to the original issuing of the trespass notice rather than the
continued issuing/upholding of it for whole 2 years without good reason.
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[12] (to question of law [3.6]) As was shown in the “Counter

Argumentation Against Defendant’s Submissions” points [9,11,13,14], the
defendant was correctly named (he admitted that his published comment
“maybe somewhat more personal” and thus beyond school-board activity),
and that the remedies for claim 2) should have included the indirect partial
re-distribution of the preceding Privacy-Act-case remedy in order to
maximise Natural-Justice precision:
The evidence for discrimination came to light through the defendant’s public
statement after the Privacy-Act case! The appellant also argued that it must
be discouraged that invoking of the Privacy Act is misused to cover-up more
serious discrimination with an unlawful-act/offence per HRA in the public
interest, and that persons innocently associated with the organisation that
was misused for this purpose by eg. directors/board members should only
be involved if direct personal wrongdoing cannot be readily established.
Therefore the appellant asked for half of the monetary HRA remedies to be
awarded to the school, but not more than the $10,000, in order to reduce
indirect victimisation of school persons incl. pupils in a precedence.
In any case, the Tribunal’s remedies can never fully compensate the
appellant’s injuries, and would be peanuts if he were a wealthy business man.
SD[20] reads: “…For all we {the Tribunal} know Mr Fehling could well
reply that until he succeeded in those {Privacy-Act} proceedings he did not
have the information he needed to bring the present proceeding under the
HRA…”
{This maximization of Natural Justice with part re-distribution of the
preceding Privacy-Act-case remedies was already mentioned in the original
claims form that started the Human-Rights-Review-Tribunal proceeding.}

[13] (to question of law [3.8]) The wording “in good faith” is
unjustifiable in a secular, free and democratic society per SS.4,5,6 BORA as
presented and proved beyond reasonable doubt in the appealed hearing:
[13.1] by the following hypothetical defence: “I have good faith in Allah, so
I prevented this infidel from accessing school grounds”
[13.2] that a “good-faith” defence can only be disproven by proving “bad
faith” (almost impossible to prove) synonymous to bad/specific intent,
which contravenes the explicit HRA purpose and its provisions of a proof
of an intent not being needed (see Conclusion).
[13.3] that the claim was brought under the HRA, not the Education Act,
which does not contain any explicit exemption from the HRA’s anti-
discrimination and unlawful-act/offence provisions with their remedies.
[13.4] inherently that acting recklessly constitutes a bad intent (see HA[16]).
{This above page was added to the Appeal-Court argumentation to ensure
sufficiently detailed and lawful Supreme-Court judgment.

[14] (to question of law [3.10]) The infringement offence charged under
S.134 HRA is not a category 1 offence per S.4(1(e)) Criminal Procedure Act!

[15] The APPENDIX is inserted at this position as active argumentation.

Appendix E shows a list of Natural-Justice principles (dated 17/2/2015) in a
concise way, so that even judges can understand them…
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Conclusion

[16] The HRA reinforces in a triple way the message that proof of specific
intend (incl. derivatives like “by reason of ” and “material link to unlawful
grounds”) must not be required for fulfillment of indirect discrimination:

a) S.92I(4): remedies provision is independent of specific intend

b) S.21(2(a,b(i))): unlawful discrimination grounds are independent of
proof of the offender’s specific knowledge
c) S.65: indirect discrimination via not apparent unlawful-grounds effects
d) SS.6,27(1) BORA reinforce the wordings of Parliament laws in line with
Human Rights and BORA, which is the purpose of this constitution!
e) 2 case laws of Appeal Court and Supreme Court (laterally) also reinforce
this message; see points [5,8]

It is now obvious that the appealed judgment is fundamentally wrong in law!

If this cannot convince the monarch’s judiciary to accept the democratic
public’s laws, then it has to be restructured/replaced by any workable means!

Exceptional Circumstances (per S.14 Supreme Court Act)

[17] The monarch’s courts have been forced to prove to the public that
Parliament’s laws and Democracy are window-dressing conjecture/rubbish,
which are the exceptional circumstances (former Appeal-Court judge and
monarch’s Governor-General Hardie-Boys unlawfully limited exceptional
circumstances to a violent revolution only -- where the public would not
ask these monarch’s prostitutes for permission!).
The Appeal-Court judges have declared the first-ever definition of Natural
Justice and the use of Parliament’s Bill-of-Rights-law, esp. its interpretation
direction, as irrelevant & aberrant (not accepted [royal-fascistic] standard)!
They also effectively accepted the appeal (esp. law questions [3.5,3.6, etc.] by
overturning the lower-courts’ reasoning, but abused the special-leave-to-
appeal and illogically refused it in order to disable a direct Supreme-Court
appeal without the extreme additional exceptional-circumstances hurdle!

Public Importance/Interest and Interests of Justice SS.13(1,2(a,b),4),14

[18] The extreme public (and thus also private) interest is shown by the 2
constitutional BORA law questions aiming to stop the monarch’s judiciary
from violating the democratic public with its Parliament and its laws without
justified reasons in a criminal totalitarian way, permanently declaring war!
There cannot be higher public-interest law questions, as the next step would
be a revolution with violent reprisals against the fascistic royals and their
judicial might-is-right prostitutes, regardless of any thus invalidated law etc.!
The questions of law, esp. [3.1,2.], aim to finally validate anti-discriminatory
Human Rights and the Human Rights Act according to its wording, and
consequently also all other statutory laws (even against royal fascistic mates).
It aims to prevent setting wrong-in-law case examples by the lower courts.
Appendix F shows the transcript of oral public-interest argumentation.
 Page 11 of 22

Harihari, this 24th September 2015 …………………………..

(Fritz Fehling)

Remarks for the reading public

This discriminatory trespass notice (including even the private tenancy

property on which the appellant was lawfully residing; Nobody is usually
discriminated even that far!) was originally used by police to unlawfully
arrest the appellant, inducing a 3 ½ day hunger and thirst strike; Among
many other crimes, the police discriminatingly refused to charge a convicted
criminal for holding a loaded gun against the appellant’s cheek (the
monarch’s police complaints authority refused to deal with it!). These are the
“either-you-submit,-or-we-cause-your-injury/murder” criminal methods of
the fascistic monarchy for more than 1000 years to intimidate the public and
to uphold its anti-democratic rule behind its maliciously smiling glitter
fassade, paid for by the world’s public…

Civilization via Democracy and Constitutional Bill of (Human) Rights

Act aim to prevent such primitivity with resulting ultimate violence!

High-Court judge Whata lost his courage and honour (honesty)/mana long
ago (a common if not general pre-condition for appointment as monarch’s
judge), and submitted to judicial hierarchy/”peer” pressure/government in
best traditional Treaty style, thus perpetuing the age-old war for absolute
royal rule/supremacy via its judicial might-is-right prostitutes against the
democratic public ; The High-Court/Appeal-Court judges proved even so
extreme & deliberate incompetent that it can only be described as criminal
fascistic corruption (the unworthy names of the judges were Nation,
Harrison, French and Cooper)! They complained that the appellant’s
language with precise German punctuation and truthful directness (a
necessity for corruption-restricting public-informing democracy) was an
unacceptable contempt of court, inadvertently showing their own character.

The judiciary generally designs judgments in such way as to omit or falsify

appellants’ disliked law questions (often pretending that they were only fact
questions - a justice-perverting trick…) and argumentations in order to
limit/prevent/redirect publicity of official malpractise and corruption..

The distribution of this fundamental argumentation over the internet will

introduce constitutionally safeguarded democracy proportionally; The
Universal Democracy Constitution provides a blueprint derived from
German Basic Law, Canadian/NewZealand Bill of Rights and Swiss
Constitution. This will not cause violence, but the lack of pro-democracy
actions and honour(honesty) of the inert royals and their criminal-fascistic
freemason gang will, have always done so; They are used to violence as a
systemic tool, and they sadistic-primitively love it, because mentally growing-
up is just too difficult for these spoilt brats raised on golden spoons (they
believe in themselves being gods, having reduced the Christian god to
inferior status of “lord”) …
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__________________________________________________________

APPENDIX:

HIGH-COURT APPEAL ON QUESTIONS OF LAW,

WITH CHRONOLOGICAL SUMMARY

Pursuant to S.123(2) of the Act against [2014] NZHRRT 24

___________________________________________________________
 Page 13 of 22

APPEAL ON QUESTIONS OF LAW WITH ARGUMENTATION

Against the Human Rights Review Tribunal’s [2014] NZHRRT 24

[0.] Chronological Summary

[0.1.] The [2012] NZHRRT 15 judgment made the withholding of the

informants’ identity in those specific circumstances unlawful and awarded
$10,000 to the appellant; The informants’ accusations were unfounded, and
led to a 2-year trespass notice that prevented the appellant from accessing
public facilities in the school (incl. library, community centre, swimming
pool) in a seriously discriminating way, severely injuring his feelings and
reputation. D[1,13.1-13.17,25]
[0.2.] After the appellant cashed-in the award, leaving $1000 to the school’s
poor-pupil fund and $4000 to his friend, the school’s senior teacher, the
respondent (the chairman of the School Board of Trustees) stated in a
newspaper that he would do it again, referring to the discriminatory
protection of the informants’ identity privacy against the appellant’s privacy
rights, causing general discriminatory ill-will against him with further serious
injury to feelings and reputation. D[19-21]
[0.3.] The appellant then filed 2 claims with the Tribunal for indirect
discrimination on several unlawful grounds with a related offence; A
victimisation claim was inserted later. D[2] T[75l.12]
[0.4.] The respondent answered with an unsuccessful strike-out application,
followed by a likewise recusal application to change the judges, and then a
likewise Insolvency-Act application. Law questions [3-5] below were raised
to counter the strike-out application, and were quoted in that interlocutory
decision to indicate their relevance for the main hearing. D[5,6] SD[9]
[0.5.] 3 weeks before the hearing the Attorney-General was asked for his
agreement to the offence prosecution; no reply was ever received, re-
inforcing his contempt of Parlament, Human Rights and Courts! T[49]
[0.6.] The appealed decision overruled the wording of Parlament’s law
sections after a well-structured 2-day case presentation; a cost application
was discouraged due to above 3 unsuccessful applications. D[51]
[0.7.] An appeal to the High Court was filed; On 5/8/14 judge Whata
declined security of costs due to the public interest in correcting the
Tribunal’s unlawful exclusion of the victimisation provisions for the Privacy
Act (and thus also for health- & disability-complaints victimisation!).
_______Explanatory note________
The square brackets at the end of points refer to paragraph numbers of :
D[ no. ] -- [2014]NZHRRT 24 (appealed decision)
SD[ no. ] -- [2013]NZHRRT 19 (refusal of strike-out)
ID[ no. ] -- [2014]NZHRRT 17 (refusal of Insolvency-Act application)
T[ p. no. ] -- [2014]NZHRRT 24 (transcript of 2-day hearing, Appendix A)
As the following questions of law prove, the Tribunal has unlawfully and
knowingly invalidated the HRA’s very fundamental provisions relating to
indirect discrimination and victimisation of individuals. The brackets in
these questions of law are concise summaries of the respective law’s
wording true to its meaning; The complete wording should be taken from
the statutes, as it is not the purpose of this appeal to endlessly repeat such
wording and inflate & convolute the paperwork.
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Main Questions of Law on Appeal to High Court:

[1] Does S.66(1(v)) Human Rights Act HRA (victimisation threat

under reference to HRA) allow the courts (incl. the Tribunal) to
invalidate it for Privacy-Act-S.89-proceedings-related (and thus with
HRA part-4 reference) prima-facie-proven victimisation ?
D[45,47] T[71l.18]
[2] Does S.65 (indirect discrimination) mention the unlawfully
discriminating effect through a not apparently unlawful conduct
lacking “good reason”, instead of any specific intent ?
D[35,41,42,46-48] T[72,73]

Fundamental Questions of Law raised in the Tribunal hearing:

These law issues were relevant, but were unlawfully discarded by dismissing
their indirect-discrimination pre-condition:

[3] Does S.4(1,2) Trespass Act 1980 invalidate discriminatory offences

& unlawful acts (refusal to public-places access) per SS.42,134 HRA ?
D[49] SD[9] T[30]
[4] Does S.65 HRA (indirect discrimination) require the
offender/discriminator to have stated directly the discriminatory
grounds for his act(s) in order to become statutorily valid ?
D[35,41,42,46-48] SD[9] T[66]
[5] Do proceedings under the Privacy Act’s information provisions
preclude or disable proceedings under the HRA’s anti-discrimination
provisions that are brought as a consequence of the resulting
emerging information ? SD[9,20] T[66,67]
{answered by deed of proceeding, but included for completeness}
[6] Should proceedings of offences per SS.42,134 HRA aim to
maximise the Bill of Rights’ Natural-Justice provision S.27(1) and
minimise punishment of innocent persons associated with an
organisation, by preferably naming specific executive(s)/official(s) of
such organisations as direct defendant(s) to alleged personal
wrongdoings, instead of using Companies-Act practice as screen ?
{partly answered by defendant’s identity} D[8] T[67l.16]
[7] Should SS.76,232 Insolvency Act limit or otherwise influence the
jurisdiction of the Tibunal per SS.92I (remedies), 95 (interim order),
121 (enforcement), 134/42 (offence, unlawful act) HRA, [added: SS.
89,92B(4),92T (enforcement of decision-substituting settlement)] ?
D[7.1] ID[14] T[13l.20,20-22]
[8] Does Schedule 6, S.4(a) Education Act (defendant not liable if he
acted in “good faith” in school-board function) overrule the “good-
reason” and offence/unlawful-act provisions per SS.65,42,134 HRA ?
{This question of law has been answered in favour of the HRA, but has
been subverted again by not adhering to the wording of S.65; it is included
as a case example, also for answering questions [3,6,7,9].}
D[8,9] T[11,23]
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The following questions of law were inherent in the written argumentation,

but have been ignored by the Tribunal:

[9] Does the continued issuing of a 2-year trespass notice preventing

access to public facilities for 2 years without “good reason” per S.65
fulfill offence/unlawful-act provisions per SS.65,42,134 ?
D[39] T[40l.2-8]
[10] Has the Tribunal concurrently with S.42 (unlawful act)
jurisdiction about the non-convictable offence per S.134 HRA, instead
of invalidating this statutory section by requiring a double-jeopardy
repetition of the hearing in the District Court ?
D[7.2] T[60l.10]
[11] Should the Tribunal via its decision have notified Parlament that
the requirement of the Attorney-General’s agreement before any
judicial hearing per S.135 HRA for an offence prosecution per S.134
contravenes the general law practice and undermines this democracy-
protecting HRA per S.20L {by enabling protection of fascistic mates
against lawful prosecutions for criminal discrimination offences; This
political interference in judicial matters per S.135 contravenes SS.4,5,19
Bill of Rights by not being demonstrably justifiable in a free &
democratic society, and should have led the grossly incompetent
Attorney-General to inform Parlament per S.7 Bill of Rights} ?
D[7.2] T[44,45,48l.28,49]
[12] Should the Tribunal have referred above questions of law to the
High Court per S.122 (1,1A)(referral of questions of law to High
Court), because the Tribunal’s previous unlawful case examples
obviously disabled it to judge lawfully the above questions of law ?
T[81l.16]

Constitutional Priority Question of Law

This paramount constitutional law question should have been answered by
adhering to the wording of Parlament’s laws:

[13] Should the Tribunal have started precedence case law under the
HRA by defining/interpreting principles of “Natural Justice” per
SS.6,27(1) Bill of Rights and S.105(1,2(a)) HRA according to article
2.1. of the Universal Democracy Constitution, in order to reduce the
monarch’s courts’ totalitarian at-will discriminatory discretion
{article 2.1.:
Natural: Following the logical causal chain, arranging real causes/
events and their real results/consequences in the time-correct
sequence; It does not mean first-past-the-post, virtual or mad!
Justice: Balance of the adherence to reasonable agreements,
including democratically originated laws under the safeguarding
frame of this Constitution (Bill of Rights); It includes correction of
breaches with compensation of victims as one part, with the aim to
prevent repetition of breaches. }?
D[7.1,7.2,8,9,35,39,41,42,45-49] SD[9] ID[14] T[12,13]
 Page 16 of 22

Argumentation to the 13 Questions of Law (CIV-2014-418-000021)

Reasonable clarifying questions of law (ie. in argumentations and appeal

requirements, also per S.124HRA) imply that they are directly and clearly
answered by the courts:

[14] Principles of Natural Justice requires Definition

(to question of law [13]) Per S.105(1,2(a)) HRA the Tribunal is required
to apply the principles of Natural Justice; The constitutional Bill of Rights
BORA S.27(1) also elevates Natural Justice to be the foundation of the
judicial practice, and S.6 requires Natural Justice to be interpreted in line
with the wording of the BORA!
However, Natural Justice has never been defined in the monarchy’s legal
system, and Legal Definitions (Butterworth) do not contain such definition,
but only the pre-condition of the right to present a defence or case.
In order to apply these principles, the courts (incl. Tribunal) need first to
establish such a definition, and a most reasonable definition was presented
to the Tribunal in the preceding Privacy-Act case and then in the HRA
hearing. It included the logical reasonable adherence to laws and thus their
wording in order to prevent the primitivity of effectively invalidating
language and Parlament! Some of these natural-justice principles are already
contained in SS.3(d),7(1),8,9 Sentencing Act (purposes incl. provisions for
victims’ interests, principles of sentencing, aggravating/mitigating factors).
The Tribunal was wrong in law not to have applied these principles and
started case law by defining Natural Justice in such way.
See also Appendix B for detailed SS.4,5,6 BORA argumentation, and
Appendix C for its constitutionality proof. Point [22] below and T[12] shows
the constitutional-court character of the Tribunal above other laws.

[15] Human Rights Act includes Victimisation relating to Privacy Act

(to question of law [1]) S.66(1(v)) HRA mentions “…done anything
under reference to this Act…”, while S.89 Privacy Act mentions Part 4 HRA
as its tool for Tribunal proceedings, thus referring to HRA! The Tribunal
was wrong in law to exclude Privacy-Act-related victimisation, which is not
open for other interpretations and was prima-facie proven; It even accepted
in D[47] that the respondent’s public comments “..were clearly a reference to
the proceedings brought by Mr Fehling under the Privacy Act..” T[71l.18]
Remark: The Tribunal’s chairperson Haines knew about an appeal to the
High Court and then to the Supreme Court headed “Under the HRA via
S.89 Privacy Act” as part of the above-mentioned Privacy Act proceedings!

[16] Unlawful Indirect Discrimination does not require Specific Intent

(to questions of law [2,4,9]) S.65 HRA mentions discriminating effect
through a not apparently unlawful conduct; It was therefore wrong in law
for the Tribunal to have effectively invalidated S.65 for individuals by raising
the level of proof to a very apparent admission of unlawful grounds and
thus a specific intent by the discriminator, which is almost impossible to
obtain. T[23,32,33,38l.10,39,40,58,66,72,73l.10,74,75-78,103l.20,104-
114,115,130l.8,131,219]
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This is strongly supported by S.92I(4) HRA (remedies), explicitly stating that

proof of a specific or even any intent is not required for application of
remedies. S.65 is a modern democracy-protecting law taking regard to the
victim, not an old-style fascistic-brotherhood-mates-protecting meddling,
expecting from discriminators to think about the consequences of their
actions on the persons discriminated against, before undertaking them.
S.65’s “good-reason” provision safeguards against its misuse. Discrimination
can also have libel character by resulting reputation damage, although libel
proceedings are only accessible and worthwhile for wealthy persons asking
for huge discriminatory awards… T[74,81l.10/25,82-90,191l.12]
SS.145(1),171 Crimes Act (criminal nuisance, manslaughter) and the Health
And Safety In Employment Act (see Appendix D) are other law examples
not requiring a specific intent as proof, because they centre on the deed of
knowingly endangering any individual’s safety, without a specific intent.

[16.1] In the hearing the appellant compared the level of proof for S.65
[indirect non-apparent unlawful-discrimination effects per S.21] with that for
careless/dangerous/reckless driving [here discriminating], where a specific
intent to injure [here feelings by unlawful discrimination] other persons is
not required, because the proof to disregard other persons’ fundamental
Human Rights is indirectly inherent to such driving [here discriminatory
conduct without “good reason”]! As S.65 states, these unlawful grounds
need not be apparent, and were truly obviously & plentifully established in
the hearing!!! T[73l.15,74-78,81,90,91,93l.33,94]
[16.2] When asked by Ms Gilchrist for the reason to uphold the trespass
notice for full 2 years, the defendant said while giving evidence in the
Tribunal hearing that he had no reason, which includes no “good reason”!
This also elevates the prima-facie-proven indirect discrimination beyond
reasonable doubts, a requirement for the offence per SS.65,134!
T[94l.19-32,186l.26]
[16.3] Furthermore, D[26.1.-26.4.] shows that he did not consider the
appellant a danger, that he did not even ask the caretaker for her reasons of
fear, that he was not aware of community hostility against the appellant
(despite that the complaints obviously showed them…), and that the senior
teacher’s rental property should never have been included in the trespass
notice (but he left it unchanged anyway, severely interfering in privacy…)
D[26.1.-26.4.] T[174,180l.25,182,187,220,191l.12]
[16.4] When asked by the Tribunal for the reason to issue the trespass
notice, the defendant stated that “we sort-of can’t have that sort of
people around school children”, despite that the tribunal hearing showed
that those discriminators and the school children could learn some basic
civilised skills from the appellant instead of primitive fascistic redneck
indoctrination! T[204l.26]
This constitutes a blank, unlawful, all-including and continuing dis-
crimination of the appellant’s whole person, and prima-facie fulfilled all
non-apparent unlawful grounds fitting to the appellant per S.21 HRA even
without them being mentioned in detail! This together with the defendant’s
reduced credibility in the proceeding (as stated by the decision) should have
cemented the proof per S.65 beyond reasonable doubt, a requirement for
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the offence per SS.65,134 beyond the proof of an unlawful act per S.42. The
Tribunal was wrong in law to have ignored the evidence in points [16.2,16.4].
[16.5] In any case, indirect-discrimination claim 1 (see point [0.2,15] and
consequently also claim 2 was prima-facie proven, because the Privacy-Act
decision eliminated any “good”-reason argumentation by the defendant.

[17] Trespass Act cannot overrule HRA

(to questions of law [3,9]) As a consequence of refusing to apply the
wording of the HRA, this questions of law was pre-emptively ignored,
which was wrong in law per SS.42,134 HRA. Due to its closeness to the
constitutional BORA, its later creation, the “limitation” of the Tribunal’s
jurisdiction to HRA only, and the seriousness of unlawful act/offence
provisions per SS.42,134, any insufficiency or ambiguity in the Trespass Act
is overruled by the HRA. S.4(1,2) Trespass Act (occupier can issue
warning/trespass notice if s/he has reasonable cause to suspect further
trespass) can well be interpreted in line with S.65 HRA (reasonable-
grounds exemption) if the originating reason for the notice remains
causally justified, which should be a preferred interpretation per SS.6,19
BORA (see BORA case law Appendix B page 5, and points [16.2-16.4]).
Otherwise SS.42,134 would effectively be invalidated, because they apply
only to lawful occupiers having authority to issue trespass notices, as other
occupiers can be dealt-with via S.196 Crimes Act (common assault).
Furthermore, the Tribunal’s D[9] reads: “Quite simply, neither a board nor
its chairperson can discriminate against a person in breach of HRA part 2.”
T[34,37,40,94-99,198l.5,222,233]
[18] Natural-Justice Precision should be Maximised
(to questions of law [6,13], and closely related to question of law [8])
The respondent raised the proper-defendant status in the strike-out
application D[8] SD[8], trying to replace himself with the school board.
Furthermore, the Tribunal made an ambiguous interlocutory decision in a
related parallel case [2014] NZHRRT 43 point [10], overly emphasising the
practices of Companies Act’s cover-up screen that should not generally be
used for a case’s defendant status. Therefore this question of law was
included to clarify in a general, compact, concise and public-interest way this
natural-justice principle and the resulting attribution of remedies. It
appears wrong in law for the Tribunal not to have explicitly answered this
question in a precise way, but to have opted-out by removing the pre-
condition, refusing to apply the wording of the HRA.
[18.1] T[67-70] shows the appellant’s valid argumentation for this law issue:
“When dealing with [this law question] it would make good sense for the
Tribunal to further detail the difference between primary discrimination that
justifies a claim against the offending natural person, and secondary
discrimination (eg. actively supporting discrimination by another person due
to employment-relationship dependency, including discriminatory company
policies) that would justify a less serious claim against the offending
company per Companies Act [practice]. However, the situation where an
employer as a natural person, incl. company bosses, issues direct policies or
instructions to force employees to enact unlawful discrimination in order to
avoid being personally held accountable by the Tribunal needs precedential
clarification in a compact reliable case example like this one…”
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[18.2] Appendix D shows the courts’ use of direct natural-person

(company director) defendant status in addition to Companies-Act status.

[19] Insolvency Act cannot overrule HRA (see also point [24])
(to question of law [7]) As a consequence of refusing to apply the
wording of the HRA (see main questions of law) the Tribunal was wrong in
law not to have applied S.92I (remedies provision) and thus not to have
clarified its own vague ruling ID[14]) that made the refusal of granting
monetary remedies due to Insolvency-Act interference a possibility, leaving
victims with legal costs and uncompensated injuries as punishment for
pursuing civilized resolution methods, also contrary to the Costs In Criminal
Cases Act (see point [25]! The relevant argumentation was presented in the
hearing, and its points T[15-18,197l.5] are inserted unchanged at this place:
[19.1] “ The defendant is contemptuously misleading by quoting in point 6
the Sentencing Act’s S.106 (discharge without conviction) being the only
section that relates to overriding S.76 Insolvency Act by defining what is not
a provable debt (incl. fine, penalty, sentence or reparation). Firstly, this
S.232(2) Insolvency Act reasonably lists fine, penalty, sentence incl.
reparation as not being a provable debt in a general sense, then explicitly
including S.106, and thus HRA!
[19.2] S.232(1(b)) shows that a provable debt is an obligation incurred by
the bankrupt; the definition of “obligation/obligee” is an act of contractual
moral or legal nature to which the obligee is bound (Oxford Dictionary 10th
edition).
[19.3] The defendant’s discriminatory actions were not made in his function
of farm-ownership that is the cause for the bankrupty, but in a school-
board-trustee-related private function. The plaintiff never entered into any
contract whatsoever with the defendant, and has never met him before the
Privacy-Act case (the plaintiff is principally not entering non-cash contracts
due to the fascistic theft-like law practice that allows debtor banks to steal
the mortgage etc. object without re-imbursing that value that the mortgagee
should own!).
[19.4] The damages to the plaintiff incurred by the defendant’s
discriminative, victimising and offensive conduct is similar to a theft, without
any contractual basis or agreement.
[19.5] As already mentioned, HRRT proceedings do not fall under
Insolvency Act, and it has no jurisdiction under that Act, because
proceedings are not to recover any provable debt, but to establish
wrongdoings under the HRA in order to prevent repetitions if necessary by
setting a precedence – the HRA does not mention provable debt.
[19.6] The offence nature of unlawful discrimination is made very clear by
S.121(2) HRA (enforcement): It is declared to be an offence to refuse to
comply with or to contravene any order of the HRRT under S.92I
(remedies) or S.95 (interim order), while enforcement of such order is
transferred to District-Court jurisdiction (not HRRT jurisdiction!) and thus
also Sentencing Act for non-payment of fines & remedies, etc.
[19.7] S.232(2(b) Insolvency Act also indicates the statutory practice that
fines penalties, sentence of reparation do not disappear after the bankrupt is
discharged from bankrupty; It is Ministry-of Justice practice to make
offenders pay fines by eg. invoking an attachment order to their income so
 Page 20 of 22

that a portion is automatically deducted each week until the fine is paid –
independent of non-available assets.
[19.8] The Sentencing Act’s interpretation defines offenders as someone
liable to be dealt with for non-payment of money, disobedience or contempt
of court – this does not mean contractual debtor/defaulter per Insolvency
Act, but relates to fines, penalties, reparation; A bankrupt is to my
knowledge not necessarily an offender, although most of them should be.
Again, it would fundamentally undermine the whole law structure if
someone damages other persons with the knowledge that an upcoming
bankrupty would pat him on the back. “
Remarks: (a) A reliable precedence for monetary remedies should be created
in general first, which can then be adjusted to a defendant’s income/assets
after s/he filed a Schedule-1 Judicature-Act financial statement that can later
also be used for enforcement per S.121 HRA. After all, for wealthy persons
the Tribunal’s remedies are peanuts, while they could break a poor camel’s
back; SS.8(h),12(1),14(1,2) Sentencing Act provide for this, too. T[41-43,222]
(b) 20 years ago the appellant was unlawfully kicked out of a new tenancy
agreement, because locals discriminated against him in favour of another
person; The courts invalidated parlament’s laws to cover it up in a criminal
way similar to this case, trying with help of police etc. to stop lawful appeals.
A High-Court bankrupty ruling was not feasible and available to the
appellant when he had no income or assets whatsoever, and was charged
with refusing to pay unlawful bicycle-helmet fines that led to his 7-years
hiding under severe hardship. If the courts make such discriminative evasion
of victimisation/discrimination remedies and unlawful-act/offence penalties
via the Insolvency Act again lawful, it would make these Insolvency-Act
provisions similarly incompatible with the HRA and BORA as described in
point [22] below, as this would give individuals the right to severely inflict
real natural justice independent of the monarch’s official system! T[20,127]

[20] Education Act cannot overrule HRA (see also point [18])
(to question of law [8]) Although the Tribunal answered this question of
law in favour of the HRA, it was wrong in law not to apply this ruling to the
unlawful-act/offence and remedies provisions of the HRA by refusing to
apply the relevant section’s wordings, thus subverting its ruling: T[11]
The “good-faith” test fails the BORA requirements similarly to point [22],
and is superseded by S.65’s “good-reason” test.
T[12,19l.17,23,69,70,129,196l.19,197]
[21] Tribunal has Jurisdiction over HRA’s Offence Provision
(to question of law [10]) The Tribunal was wrong in law to shift
jurisdiction about S.134 HRA (offence) to the District Court, as this offence
is on a non-convictable lower-scale, neither do HRA nor Sentencing Act
explicitly require such jurisdiction transfer. In a doubt case this was clearly a
law matter justifying referral to the High Court (see point [23] below),
because such a shift would require an at least partial re-hearing of the case in
the District Court in a costly and unconstitutionally invalidating double-
jeopardy manner – the wordings of S.42 (unlawful act) and S.134 (offence)
are identical, showing that the offence inherently fulfills S.42 and is to be
dealt-with in a concurrent hearing process: T[33,55,57,58,60,61]
 Page 21 of 22

[22] S.135 HRA is Incompatible with HRA Part 1B and Bill of Rights Act
(to question of law [11]) The Tribunal was wrong in law to have omitted
to declare S.135 incompatible with the S.19 BORA (anti-discrimination
provision) per SS.20I,20J(1(b)),20K(d),20L; This S.135 HRA enables indirect
discrimination on all unlawful grounds per S.21 HRA by the govt’s Attorney-
General in favour of arbitrarily protecting fascistic brotherhood- and other
mates against S.134 HRA (offence definition) and Natural Justice, which
fundamentally undermines the HRA’s inherent democracy protection! S.135
HRA is not demonstrably justifiable in a free and democratic society per
S.4.5,19 BORA and thus S.20L(1,2(b)) HRA; see also Appendix B pages 4-6
and point [14]. T[33,43-45,48,49,60,61]
Remarks: The Privacy and Health & Disability Acts have similar
unconstitutional provisions. In the Privacy-Act case’s interlocutory decision
[2011] NZHRRT 14 point [7] the chairperson raised SS.82,83(b(i,ii))
(exclusion of aggrieved person from the suit by requiring the Director’s
permission to bring the suit, acting “on the aggrieved person’s behalf ”).
After the claimant responded that he cannot entrust his Human Rights to
this govt-appointed conflict-of-interest Director, that it contravenes the
current Natural-Justice provision of the claimant/victim to be heard, and
that the Tribunal should inform the Attorney-General for S.7 BORA about
incompatibility of these sections, the Tribunal then corrected/invalidated
them by deed of proceeding without any involvement of this Director,
although not explicitly mentioning these BORA or HRA provisions!

[23] Referral of Questions of Law to High Court

(to question of law [12]) The Tribunal chairman was made aware of
questions of law regarding the laws’ wordings, and was asked to refer them
to the High Court under S.122 HRA if he cannot deal with them, which he
obviously could not according to their wording! The Tribunal was therefore
wrong in law not to have formed the opinion for referral per S.122 (1,1A),
which resulted in unnecessary efforts and costs for all parties and the
public’s courts (Lay appellants are usually unsuccessful to drive an appeal
past the registries, resulting in severe injustice and prevention of correction
of law practice) which S.122 aims to prevent in the public interest! T[81l.16]

[24] Remedies
As a consequence of refusing to adhere to the relevant laws’ wordings as
described above, the Tribunal was also wrong in law not to have dealt with
the issue of remedies per SS.92I(2,3(c)(h),4),92M(1(c)),92O(1,2(i)), 92P(f)
HRA that exist to compensate the victim/appellant for humiliation, loss of
dignity, injury to feelings, and to prevent repetitions of such unlawful
behavior in the general public interest as a Natural-Justice principle (see
also point [14]). Proof of a specific or even any intent is explicitly not
required per S.92I(4). Here again the effects of the victimising discriminating
behavior were described in the hearing, and the appellant also raised several
aggravating factors in the hearing; These hearing/transcript parts need to be
considered “again”: D[51] T[147-158,187l.6-18]
The lack of precedence case examples/law could be regarded as a mitigating
factor, because it led to the defendant’s lawyer convincing him that the
current practice of corrupt law perversion would prevail.
 Page 22 of 22

[25] Costs
Due to the constitutional powers of the Tribunal to correct the
discriminatory invalidation/limitation of the Costs In Criminal Cases Act
against effort costs of self-represented persons contrary to the victim-
supporting Natural-Justice principle (see points [14,22]), the appellant
applies for such costs for pursuing the claims with their offence provision.
These effort costs could be included in the remedies above much like the
Tribunal did in the Privacy-Act case [2012] NZHRRT 15 point [107], but be
preferably dealt with under guidance of SS.4(1,4),11 of this Costs Act. It is
grossly unjust that an unsuccessful person is liable to pay the other party’s
lawyer costs, while a successful person cannot get compensation for his own
efforts to bring/defend a case, which the Police exploits with unjust charges!

[26] Conclusion
The Tribunal enabled wrongly-in-law that persons can be trespassed/dis-
criminated from public-access facilities “without any reason”, as long as no
unlawful ground per S.21 is directly mentioned by the discriminator(s) ---
SS.65,42,134 HRA exist to prevent exactly this!!!

[27] Appendix A is the transcript of the Hearing Argumentation of the

Claim with its Questions of Law, and is to be inserted at this place as
integral expedient argumentation and evidence for above questions of law;
The added number highlighting shows the relevant points for this appeal.
Appendix B is a detailed argumentation with Appeal-Court case law
proving the BORA to be a constitutional law contrary to the common
invalidating interpretation of S.4; It is a copy of earlier proceedings, and
contains pages 3-6.
Appendix C is the Universal Democracy Constitution showing the Bill of
Rights Act’s central constitutional character in a constitutional democracy.
Appendix D is a Hokitika Guardian newspaper article showing the courts’
use of direct natural-person (company director) defendant status in addition
to Companies-Act status in a Health-And-Safety-In-Employment-Act case.

[28] Application for leave to Appeal

In the case that the judge ignors or determines any of the 13 questions of
law against the appellant’s favour, he herewith applies for leave to appeal per
S.124(1) HRA on those relevant law questions in the public interest. This
application is made to shortcut the generally practiced unconstitutional
refusal by the same judge in a conflict of interest (a method to unnecessarily
increase costs and discourage correction of unlawful law-practices via lawful
appeals; The Criminal Procedure Act has already removed such nonsensical
requirement in general, and also for S.308 Resource Management Act...).

Harihari, this 20th day of October 2014 .........……...……………

(Fritz Fehling)
Remark: The obvious gross unwillingness by the Tribunal’s chairperson to
improve the practice of law in line with the BORA and HRA shows the
extreme clash-of-interest shortcomings of the monarchy’s practice to let a
single indirectly government-appointed Solicitor-/Attorney-General appoint
judges as “constitutional” watchdogs over its own fascistic malpractices.