Review of the OVIDIU SINCAI

European School 2009/2010

“Ovidiu Şincai” European School
Bucharest, Romania
Phone/Fax: +4021-2300301
E-mail: scoalaovidiusincai@yahoo.com
Website: www.seos.ro

2
 Summary
Foreword: “The crisis of leadership in European democracies. Searching for new models”
by Anne JUGĂNARU………………………………………………………………………………………………. 4
Activities of the 2009-2010 Edition……………………………………………………………………………. ….. 6
“Liberalisation of the EU energy sector – side effects” by Dan Marcel BĂRBUŢ……………………………... 8
“The Lisbon Treaty – short analytical look” by Adrian CONSTANTINESCU……………………………..... 12
“Democracy in time of crisis” by Veronica FRUMUZACHE………………………………………………….. 16
“Uninominal vote – from high expectations to disturbing consequences. The Romanian case”
by Iulia HUIU ………………………………………………………………………………………………. …… 20
“The myth of the providential leader in Romanian politics” by Barbu MATEESCU………………………… 24
“Romanian crisis – serious and atypical” by Alina Daniela MOISE……………………………………. ……. 29
“Voting on the Internet, future elections” by Marinela RAŢĂ……………………………………. …………... 31
“The European Union and Kosovo: transforming, containing or losing it?” by Roxana RIZEA……………. 34
Organizers of the Sixth Edition of the “Ovidiu Şincai” European School 2009-2010……………. …………... 38
Lecturers………………………………………………………………………………………………. …………. 39
Participants……………………………………………………………………………………………. …………. 41

3
 Foreword: The crisis of leadership in European democracies.
Searching for new models
by Anne Jugănaru
During the last two decades
it was often discussed about a
general crisis of leadership in
European politics. After 1989 and
the fall of communism in Central
and Eastern Europe, democracy
seems to have become an abstract
notion supported by a few
technocrats and experts without charisma or popular
exposure. Meanwhile, the extremist forces began to
bring forth several strong personalities, often
controversial but ultimately perceived as authoritative.
This explains why, during the last years, traditional
democratic parties within the EU had modest and
sometimes extremely bad results in the local, national or
European elections.
In theory, politicians should be models for the
entire society. But especially the political leaders are the
ones who should be capable to cause such a dynamic
effort within the society that their personal behaviour
and performance has an impact over ordinary people.
This type of influence is similar with the impact actors
4
from Hollywood movies have over large numbers of
viewers, who become their fans. At a different scale, the
political leader needs to represent a model that could be
embraced by the society, both for his success and for
leaving his mark over the country he leads. This can
only be done through a coherent rational project
accompanied by an entire strategy of communication
and personal exceptional qualities: empathy and
charisma.
One can argue that traditional democratic parties,
at least lately, did not perform well in terms of
charismatic personalities. Instead, it was much easier for
extremist to promote distinct, non-conformist
personalities, who distinguished themselves by an anti-
system behaviour and thus gained notoriety. If, at the
rhetoric level, a populist communication was also used,
then the success in promoting leaders was extremely
high. One cannot draw an ideological line between right
and left concerning charisma, as this was more an
accidental development, or a specific trend in some
societies rather than a conservative or social democratic
feature. At European level, the tradition that the right
had in some countries to bring forward charismatic
people, such as De Gaulle in France and Adenauer in
Germany was matched by the left in other or the same
nations. For example, during the 80s, European politics
was dominated by strong figures of the left such as
Francois Mitterrand in France and Felipe Gonzalez in
Spain.
The political system of the various Member
States of the European Union could also have had an
impact over this development. Thus, we can notice that
in the case of France, the existence of a dual executive
system, favouring a strong president, led to the
predominance of charismatic characters which
accomplished this function, such as the ones mentioned
before and their heirs, Jacques Chirac and Nicolas
Sarkozy. In other countries, such as Italy or the United
Kingdom, where parliamentarian systems are in place,
charismatic leaders were the exception rather than the
rule.
One of the possible answers of European
democracies in their search for future leadership models
could be its emphasis upon woman politicians. During
the second half of the last century women increasingly
began to choose politics to express their views.
Marginalized at first by most of the men politicians,
who had a traditionalist opinion about the political field,
women began to be accepted and gradually pushed for
5
gender balance within political parties. This trend was
especially successful in Nordic countries, where it even
became a fact of life, but also in other Western
countries. In Central and Eastern Europe, the
communist regimes used to support the emancipation
of women. However, this was made more in
quantitative than in qualitative terms, as women were
often used as manoeuvre leverage by some man
politicians against others.
At European level, women have undisputedly
gained a higher role in politics, but their role as
individual leaders is not yet valued as it should. Women
are too much prone to act collectively at this level and
less to become leaders. Surprisingly or not, European
and world woman leaders used to come more from the
right. It is the widely cited example of Margaret
Thatcher, British Prime Minister between 1979 and
1990 and, more recently, Angela Merkel, the acting
German Chancellor since 2005.
These examples emphasize the need for
considering a new model of woman leadership for
European democracy. As women are increasingly
becoming a political majority, it would be useful to also
think about them as leaders and not only as first ladies.
But, in order to be successful in this enterprise, one
should overcome certain psychological, cultural and
behavioural barriers. This requires time and painstaking.
 Activities of the 2009-2010 Edition
In October 2009 a selection for the sixth
edition of the Ovidiu Şincai European School was
organized. As a result, 35 people became participants in
this edition.
The first national seminar, having as main theme
Facing Multiple Crises in Romania. Challenges and
Solutions, was organized in the interval 4-7 February
2010 in the mountain resort of Bran. The lectures were
presented by Ilie Şerbănescu, economic analyst,
former Minister of Reform (December 1997 – April
1998) – “The Impact of the Economic Crisis over
Romania – Solutions”, Vladimir Pasti, Professor,
State University for Political Studies and
Administration, Bucharest – “The Crisis of Romanian
Society – Increasing Polarization”, Emil
Constantinescu, President of Romania (1996-2000) –
“Is there a Political Crisis in Romania?”, Anne
Jugănaru, Director of the “Ovidiu Şincai” European
School, Member of the Board, Romanian Public
Television Service – “Romanian Mass Media –
Freedom and Responsibility” and Cristian
Pîrvulescu, Dean of the Faculty of Political Science,
State University for Political Studies and
6
Administration, Bucharest – “Challenges for the Rule
of Law in Romania”.
The Second Seminar, having as main theme
Preparing the elites for communicating in the
public space, was organized in the interval 22-25 April
2010 at the Târnava Hotel from Odorheiu Secuiesc.
The lectures were presented by Doru Pop, Professor,
Faculty of Theatre and Television, Babes-Bolyai
University, Cluj-Napoca – “Preparing the Contact
with Mass Media”, Cristian Pîrvulescu, Dean of the
Faculty of Political Science, State University for Political
Studies and Administration, Bucharest – “Media and
Power in Politics”, Ioan Deac, Professor, “Carol I”
National Defence University, Bucharest –
“Communication in Crisis Situations”, Anne
Jugănaru, Director of the “Ovidiu Şincai” European
School – “Communication and Political Marketing”
and Aurora Liiceanu, Senior Researcher within the
Psychology Institute of the Romanian Academy,
Bucharest – “The Psychological Dimension of
Communication in the Public Space”.
The Third Seminar, having as main theme
Politics and Society in a European Democracy, was
organized in the interval 11-14 June 2009 at the Mila 35
Complex from the Danube Delta. The lectures were
presented by Alexandru Athanasiu, former Minister of
Labour and Social Protection (1996-1999) and of
Education, Research and Youth (2003-2004) – “A
Project for Romania”, Alexandru Radu, Professor,
Faculty of Political Science, “Dimitrie Cantemir”
Christian University, Bucharest – part in the Fifth Summer University for Democracy,
“Parliamentarianism, semi-presidentialism or
presidentialism?”, Daniel Barbu, Professor, Faculty
of Political Science, University of Bucharest – “Limits
of Democracy”, Anne Jugănaru, Director of the
7
Ovidiu Sincai European School – “The Crisis of
Leadership in European Democracies. Searching
for new models” and Teodor Meleşcanu, Senator,
former Minister of Foreign Affairs (1992-1996) and of
Defence (2007-2008) – “A Project for Romania”.
In the period 28 June – 2nd July 2010, the
Romanian participants of the 2009-2010 edition took
which took place in Strasbourg, under the organization
of the Council of Europe, together with their fellows
from the other 15 schools in the Council’s network.
 Liberalisation of the EU energy sector – side effects
by Dan Marcel BĂRBUŢ
Liberalisation of energy is
part of a broader trend of
liberalization and withdrawal of
Member States’ involvement in
infrastructure industries. Currently,
the liberalization of European
energy market is globally the most
extensive reform of energy sector.
This means an integration of
markets with different levels of involvement of national
governments. Liberalisation of the energy sector still has
its ups and downs, with the risk of increasing
dependence of European countries on Russia.
In the United States, after the energy crisis of the
2000s, the restructuring process has slowed significantly
and many states have passed reform plans on the
waiting list. In addition, a small number of countries,
leaders in the reform of the energy system such as
Australia, New Zealand, Chile and Argentina, many
other countries worldwide, have made limited progress
towards a free energy market to ensure the strategic
lines are followed. The electricity crisis in California
8
with those in New York and parts of Europe have
diminished enthusiasm for political reform although it
appeared that between the reform process and the crisis
there is virtually no connection.
EU – a world engine to liberalization of the energy
sector
In the context of a slowing world energy reform
process, the effort led by the European Commission
was the main force that kept the programme moving.
Due to the strategic position of the power sector in
national policies, in the absence of policies at EU level,
the reform process in many Member States would have
been very slow. Yet, even if there is relative progress in
the liberalization process, it does not mean that we have
a successful integration of its European Electricity
Market.
A key factor of implementation of directives
authorizing the energy is emanating from the EU bodies
in Member States’ regulatory process. It is instrumental
in planning and control which implements the steps
described in regulations issued for the energy sector. A
regulatory process is carried out at EU and national
level, through institutions specifically created.
An important component of European energy
policy is the promotion of green energy. The Lisbon
Strategy sets out several key objectives relating to the
production of renewable energy and energy policy is the
tool by which these objectives will be carried out.
Liberalizing the energy sector strategy in theory
There is a lack of current studies regarding the
effects of energy market liberalization. It is true that the
drafting of the European Union has not ended but
European directives concerning the liberalization
process have already had a significant impact in Member
States and at EU level. Most existing studies stop at
9
2005, not considering the effects less than expected
when the liberalization process began. There are no
studies to put the effects of energy market liberalization
in the context of EU energy security, a very important
issue in the foreign policy community. Several reports
and strategies undertaken by various local administrative
bodies to reproduce content are limited to national
energy strategies so far without a single contribution to
the general process. Published works on European
energy policy comes down more to explain short-term
effects of EU directives, without taking into account the
effects of these directives in the long term on energy
giants especially active in Europe.
Short path from deregulation to addiction –
scenario
Side effects of European energy policy are
important because they give an indication of the
Member States to what extent regulatory bodies and
regulations imposed by central directives affect your
objectives and create situations that can become
dangerous in the long term. I am referring to increasing
EU energy dependence from third countries by allowing
these to operate directly on the European energy
market, where external players are competing with those
already existing here. An example of a dangerous
scenario, which shows that the laws governing the free
market can get energy and increase the vulnerability of • Russian gas resources are above the EU’s
the single market, could be that Gazprom is able to resources, which could be used in
control the EU energy market under agreements with electricity production especially after the
major companies in the European electricity sector such construction of North Stream and South
as ENI, E-ON and Stream pipelines.
ENEL. Gazprom’s To the extent that no major European company
European market in the energy market (in addition to EDF) is not state
presence, based on property, more than 50% of the competition is
these agreements, somewhat over European energy companies. European
will be directly or companies, such as E-ON and ENI have direct
indirectly by their contracts with Gazprom for gas supplied to the EU. In
companies, as part other words, they sell Russian gas to their customers;
of the ownership of the same gas that Gazprom will sell to the same
major players which customers when, due to energy market liberalization, it
are already will be free to compete with European companies
integrated into the which also provide gas from Gazprom. Due to large
market. Given this situation and due to the same rules quantities of energy resources, Gazprom will be able to
of the market, the Russian company could very easily, in practice very low prices on the European market, which
time, become a serious threat to companies that now is a short-term benefit to the European customer and in
hold primacy in the European market. The reasons for agreement with the stated objectives of energy policy;
which Gazprom could become a concern for European but the long term effects on EU energy giants will be a
energy companies but also for energy regulatory bodies decrease of their market position. A decrease in the
are: market positions of companies that have at least 50,000
• Gazprom is privatized at a rate of 49.99%, employees each means a series of dissatisfaction among
enjoying thus protection from the Russian the population, these arising from attempts of
state; companies to cut costs to remain competitive.

10
 On the other hand however there may be some
direct positive effect on EU energy market, due to
Gazprom. Thus the EU will no longer deal with crises
such as during the last winter, when the Russians used
the pretext that Ukraine steals of its pipes and froze the
continent for 11 days.
Once present in the energy market in Europe,
Gazprom will have to meet trade rules and thus will be
forced to engage in competition with other big
11
European players. The winner of this confrontation
competitive on the short term will be the end user
because the price of energy is likely to decline.
However, the situation set out above is only one
possible scenario that has not considered the long-term
effect of an energy policy and all the other factors that
could affect EU policies, directly or indirectly related to
energy policy.
 The Lisbon Treaty – short analytical look
by Adrian CONSTANTINESCU
The Lisbon Treaty (LT) was
desired to be a revitalization of a
communitarian structure of
incertitude and crisis. Even if the
Europe of separations remained in
the past, it is clear that the problems
to which the European community
is confronted haven’t disappeared,
on the contrary they are, from other perspectives and
points of view, present.
Widely, this is the context for the ratification of
the LT, treaty through which it is tried to reform
institutions and to create intra-community cohesion.
The document represents the long time effort about the
reforming of the legal framework of the Union. It is, in
its essence, the document that we have been expecting
since 2002, when it was beyond any doubt that Nice
hadn’t resolved the problems to which the enlarged
Europe was to confront, especially in the subsequent
conditions of enlarging the community frame through
the passing from 15 to 27 Member States, following the
fifth wave of expansion. The reference and analyzing
12
theme in this context was an essential one: simplifying
the treaties, a clearer delimitation of the competences
between the Member States and the European Union,
the status of the Charter of Fundamental Rights and the
part of the national parliaments.
As a reference or a historical chronology, the idea
of the LT is the result of a line of thinking with deep
roots in the thinking of the 50s, through which it was
tried to achieve what we can generically call “the project
of political union” between the Member States. So, after
the Second World War, we speak about the resonant
failure of a cooperation attempt, when the French
parliamentary assembly rejected in 1954 a project
proposed by France, through which a European
Community of Defence was to be instituted. After this
moment, the attempts of European cohesion regarded
less the political aspects, being oriented towards
economical cooperation. This is why the fundamental
attributes of the sovereignty of the states, such as
defence and foreign policy, remained solely in the
attribution of the states. After the mentioned episode,
there were other two attempts, in 1960-1961, when the
two “Fouchet” Plans established as an objective the
creation of a “Europe of the Homelands”, which also
failed.
It has to be mentioned that, finally, the political
cooperation on a community level began to take shape
only at Maastricht, through the second pillar of the
Union, Foreign Affairs and Common Security.
About the initiation and the preparation of a
harmonized and coagulated debate on the future of the
Union spoke the Foreign Minister of Germany, Joschka
Fisher, in 2000, at the Humboldt University,
announcing a project of clear and precise reformation
of the institutions in the Community, and also about the
“parliamentarization” of the Union.
Debate around a European Constitution was the
next point on the new agenda. By the end of 2001, the
Member States adopted “the Laeken Declaration”, in
which the necessity for the Union to become “more
democratic, more transparent and more efficient” was
restated. Subsequently, in 2002, the works of “The
Convention on the Future of Europe” were launched,
developed under the mandate of Valery Giscard
d’Estaing, a former president of France. The
Convention was to find solutions for some of the
urgent problems of the Union, such as repartition of
competences between institutions, the integration of the
Charter of Fundamental Rights in the main Treaty.
13
Following the debates, a “Draft Treaty
Establishing a Constitution for Europe” was
established. The Constitutional Treaty was signed on 29
October 2004 in Rome, and was ratified by 16 of the 25
Member States, and also by Romania and Bulgaria,
candidate states at that time. It couldn’t come into
force, due to the rejection of the document in 2005, in
France (on 29 May) and in Holland (on the 1st of June).
The process of ratification was stopped in the countries
that didn’t start yet the specific procedure.
It followed a so called “reflection period”,
finished at the beginning of 2007, when Germany took
over the president of the Union and began a inter-
governmental process of writing a new Treaty that took
over some of the provisions of the Constitutional
Treaty. The Amato Group was charged with the writing
of the new text, which was proposed to the
Intergovernmental Conference in Lisbon on 23 July
2007. The text was to avoid making reference to any
constitutional model, especially to the symbols of the
Union, and also to any constitutional terminology. The
final text of the Reform Treaty was adopted on the
Lisbon Informal European Council, on 18 and 19
October 2007, being signed in Lisbon on 13 December
2009, coming into force after being signed by all
Member States on the 1st of December 2009.
 As an example, we name some of the innovative
changes brought by the LT. The European Union will
have a stabile president of the European Council, with a
term of two and a half years, with the possibility of
being renewed only one time; EU will have a High
Representative for Foreign and Security Policy; the
Charter of Fundamental Rights has a mandatory
juridical statute; national parliaments have the right to
follow the legislative acts of the Union; EU has juridical
personality; Member States can withdraw from EU,
following the procedure regarding the withdrawal
clause; new challenges on the Union are admitted, such
as fighting the climate changes, the Member States’
solidarity on the field of energy being promoted; the
reconfiguration and the extension of the vote through
qualified majority; the extension of the co-decision
procedure etc.
It has to be mentioned that the ratification of the
LT wasn’t without obstacles and difficulties, all the
more many States desired to reposition themselves
towards some compromises they had made when first
signing the Constitutional Treaty. An example of this is
that of Poland, which roughly negotiated its number of
votes within the Union’s institutions. This is why the
late president Lech Kaczynski postponed until the last
moment the promulgation of the ratifying of the Treaty,
this being signed, finally, on 10 October, 2009.
14
Equally, other Member States didn’t want to
participate in some lines of EU policy. There have to be
reminded here the examples of Great Britain and, again,
Poland, which manifested the desire not to be under the
juridical power of the Charter of Fundamental Rights,
appreciating that, in this way, the constitutional
supremacy is harmed. Another example is the non-
participation of Great Britain and Ireland in the
decisions of the qualified majority concerning asylum,
visas and immigration. All these decisions materialized
in additional protocols made to the Treaty.
Beyond scepticism and even pessimism, in the
rough context of the economical crisis and of the intra-
state tensions, we can perceive the LT as a resuscitation
of some inert institutions at some point, detached from
the citizens and their needs. So, it is clear that the LT
brought new opportunities of action for the EU and its
Member States also at the level of Community policies,
but also at the level of foreign affairs. An example of
optimism would be the simplification of the mechanism
for implementing the cohesion policy, to facilitate the
absorption of European funds, through structural
instruments. Regarding Romania, the opportunities are
tangible, along with the absorption of structural funds
we can remember the promoting of national position
regarding the European Union’s Strategy for the
Danube Delta, and also the full access of Romanian
workers on the work market in EU, and even the
adoption of Euro (the target 2014/ 2015).
As is already showed by the specialized literature,
the LT, already seen as an historical landmark in the life
of the Union, will offer the appropriate instruments and
needed means to face the challenges of contemporary
15
life, such as climate changes, energetic security,
sustainable development, the environment, organised
crime, the breaking of fundamental rights and liberties,
immigration. It is left for us to see who will triumph in
the eternal fighting of euro-optimism versus euro-
scepticism.
 Democracy in time of crisis
by Veronica FRUMUZACHE
Democracy in the original
meaning of „people’s power” can
no longer be thought today
without a connection between the
political system and the economic
one. And nothing can restore
democracy in its true sense more
like the acute economic crisis that
affects the Western world at this time. What is freedom
without the decency of living, and can the individual
decide a fate of his own in the absence of material
resources to ensure the respect of others?
The issue is precisely that if you attack the
meaning of his wealth, even the free world citizen seems
rather willing to give up freedom and sovereignty of his
decision, namely democracy, only to receive the comfort
that has been promised in the democratic election
process. That fact that a party with communist ideology
has now about 20 percent popularity in Greece, haunted
by the riots and recession shows that democracy will
not survive without economic foundation for a
minimum decency of living. The people throwing
16
Molotov cocktails at the banks of Greece care less
about the budget deficit and foreign debt of their
country. This issue has not concerned them until the
deficit reached into their pockets.
This form of refusing the democracy which no
longer provides welfare paradise is not an innovation of
the Greeks, as was the philosophy and “polis” more or
less democratic about 2,000 years ago. Maybe it’s just
fate’s irony that the signal of the downfall of democracy
has been given now from the pedestal where she was
born, i.e. Athens. The temple on the Acropolis, recently
renovated, perhaps is the signal of a possible resignation
at the end of a story that was born right there, at his feet
in the days when the Greeks worshiped the gods. One
thing is certain: democracy will not be the same after
this crisis! And not because of low living standards in
many European countries, but many years will pass until
it will return to the point it reached in 2007-2008.
There is no use for observers to wonder why
Ukraine turned her head to East, choosing the same
pro-Russian president, the same president they tried to
remove by sacrifices and “orange” revolutions several
years earlier. The answer might be found in the gas
prices, which for the Ukrainians is more important than
the ideology or the ideals of western institutions,
because those won’t keep them warm and eastern
winters are hard to bare. What the crisis started to
prove, but the ideologist won’t simply admit is that
democracy as well as love “goes through the stomach”.
And if this proved to be true, not only in the
countryside, but also in the city, in which democracy
was born, then about the rest there is no need to
mention.
I avoided a little bit the Romanian case, circling
through south and north, trying to show that we are
surrounded by negative examples. Wouldn’t it be
ideological to believe that in front of the crisis
Romanians will act more democratic than their
neighbours? Fortunately, at the time the crisis hit
Romania, in this area there is no hard core of extremists
who could rapidly be reactivated only by hearing bad
news. In the meantime the news becomes certitude and
it is not difficult to suppose that radicalism will be
reactivated, if not in an organized way, certainly under
the impression of emotions and revolts.
And what are we talking about when we ask
ourselves the question regarding democracy, if not
about what happens to us and the test this system must
pass at the time it is confronted with its opponent.
17
What democracy has always claimed was superiority,
not only moral, but also material, before other forms of
order. Democracy couldn’t win in a different way
against communism in Eastern Europe, but specifically
by the spell of the consumer society, as a Marxist would
call this interpretation. Outside democracy there is no
wealth, paraphrasing the famous Western ideologists,
who said “Extra Ecclesiam nulla salus” (no salvation outside
the Church) which was used by the parents of Christianity
in the fourth century, who were trying to unify Europe
and even the world in an institutionalised ideological
framework.
Excited by the fall of the Berlin Wall and the
great confederation of Europe which was reunited by
the same values, the democracy followers behaved like
the apostles who relied more on faith than on facts in
their preaching. Now maybe Europe’s optimists will be
amazed by how easy the old democracy followers are
burning banks like in Greece or voting extremist parties
like in Hungary, that once was a Central-European
democracy example.
Along with the money ran out also the beautiful
dreams, this would be the diagnosis about democracy
today, and do not believe that this interpretation stops
at Europe’s gates. More and more political powers,
some of them traditionally democratic, knowingly go to
China’s High Gate to renegotiate with no shame better
prices for their products, this way keeping satisfied their
voters and making their fewer money valuable. They are
doing the same thing with Russia, the former public
enemy. Everything is allowed as long as it is cheap. That
is all that Europe’s democracy crisis is about. And all
this is because voters have rights and also expect
something in return. What is surely hard to believe is
that the democratic game itself and the consciousness of
the European citizens are obliging their leaders to pass
any borders and to negotiate with anybody, to keep the
consumption at a satisfying quota.
To save democracy (because, we must say, when
capitalism is under siege, democracy has no longer time)
the system should be redesigned to not be dependent
on material values and consumerism. It should mean
more than the remuneration and the opportunity to
shop at leisure in the supermarket. The question is
whether Western democracy is more than that (above
all of this).
As for the United States, idealistic values of the
Founding Fathers (as well as of the founders of the
European Union) got thinner, leaving less sublime
desires of comfort and consumer rights. How much
democracy is worth for a regular, normal citizen? A car,
a house, an account? Sounds vulgar, but democracy
might have become, in the way that Baudrillard says, “an
object of consumption, that is simply material”. If democracy
18
could not shake its foundations when materials are
attacked, we could say that the spiritual meaning is
stronger or even that it still exists. As long as democracy
turns to extremism of any kind and anarchy at the
lowest living standards, as it happened in the interwar
period, there we can say that we have a democratic
crisis.
What does democracy mean in a time when
people are going out in the streets to demand a better
life? The rule for living a better life is wellness. And why
do we wonder that every time their welfare is attacked,
the citizens will shift to other systems? The problem is
that democracy was based, whatever the idealists will
say, on material values in the more frustrated meaning
of the term. When the material was depleted, people
have reacted as the Grand Inquisitor says in
Dostoyevsky: “They were ready to give their freedom on a piece
of bread”. And it appears they are ready to do the same
thing again.
Capitalism is in crisis? To deny this would be
insane. Even those who have managed successfully in
this system, such as George Soros, speak clearly of a
deep crisis of capitalism very difficult to overcome.
First, I think we should expect the worst. And
not because of Romanians’ proverbial pessimism but
because of the realism of this vision. Arguments in
support of long-term pessimism are beyond, of course,
the Romanian borders, although there are even easier to
embrace.
On the medium and long term, the basic
material resources upon which democracy is based,
without which people won’t accept democracy, as
shown, are endangered. Concerning oil or other forms
of energy, it is hard to imagine what democracy would
mean when water becomes a rare resource (in fact, this
is already happening in Africa where “the power of
democracy” is beyond any imagination!). We certainly
have examples for all situations. It was enough a
terrorist attack with thousands of casualties for the US
to abandon many of their democratic rights and to
adopt a Patriot Act that would make proud even the
NKVD men of Beria!
I know that’s not de bon ton to talk bad democracy
or the future of mankind, because we all learned that
optimism leads to good things. But if we are talking in
real terms, I think, we have enough signals to admit that
democracy is not feeling very well. Similarly, not even
the planet as a whole; the ecological disasters are not at
all beneficial for peace and understanding among
peoples.
A solution for the future of democracy may
sound so idealistic that it might be better to not
mention it. Well, a system of democratic normality
would survive in the conditions of progressive
19
deterioration of living standards, only if people would
exceed the primacy of biological needs and would be
able to live for something other than what has been
normal so far, like the stones of Maslow’s pyramid.
Why this is not a right thing to say? Because it is
unlikely to happen. But otherwise, in circumstances
where resources are over, but wishes are growing, things
are running well in economic math: spending without
producing leads you at the bottom of the bag. If you
continue to eat you become utterly indebted.
So, following Greece, Argentina or other cases
on how not to become. But the world continues to
consume, although it reached the bottom of the bag, at
least in terms of world resources. The problem is that
water or air we don’t have to borrow from because
there isn’t an International Air and Water Fund of
where to take when it ends. And if the solution to
restrict the consumption of life and focus on different
levels as a way to save democracy is too idealistic to be
taken seriously, we could only wish democracy a long
life and hope that as always in history or at least, like in
Hollywood movies, positive values will win, Bruce
Willis will catch terrorists and we, the viewers, can once
again applaud the victory of good against evil.
Otherwise we’d be left with no one to applaud us, so we
have no reason to worry.
 Uninominal vote – from high expectations to disturbing
consequences. The Romanian case
by Iulia HUIU
When
In 2008 the Romanian
electoral system was changed. The
proportional list system was
replaced by direct voting in
uninominal colleges, with a
redistribution formula meant to
ensure proportional representation
in the final configuration of the
Parliament.
The introduction of the uninominal vote was the
result of a prolonged debate, with a significant political
and electoral background. For several years, the
uninominal vote had been used by different political
parties as a rhetorical instrument for gaining popular
support. The opinion polls have constantly shown a
high preference for this type of voting, as opposed to
the party list, considered less transparent and resulting
from an internal selection process, based on
questionable criteria. It is hard to estimate to what
degree the public opinion had a real interest in such a
20
political issue or the answers from the surveys just fit
the logical, conformist pattern. When asked whether
they prefer to choose a party list or a person, people
tend to opt for uninominal vote, irrespective of their
degree of understanding the political process or the
consequences of such an option. However, the subtle
aspects of the debate upon the electoral system eluded
the understanding of a large majority.
Before 2007, introducing uninominal system
rather remained at the rhetorical level. In spite of some
particular attempts to enact it through legislative means,
there was no political consensus either on changing the
electoral system, or on the precise form of such a
change. In 2007, under particular circumstances and
under different types of political pressure, the political
class agreed upon reforming the electoral system and
shifted from mere rhetoric to approving the necessary
legislation.
How
However, the process itself was neither a smooth
nor a simple one, as different political actors had
different views on the form and extent of the electoral
reform. There is a vast political science literature dealing
with the electoral system and its consequences upon
shaping the party-system. Actually, the electoral system
is one of the independent variables which determine the
type of party-system. Changes in the electoral system
lead to changes in the party-system, to a lesser or higher
degree, depending on the nature of those changes. So,
while there was a rather general agreement on the
principle, there was a major dispute on the exact type of
voting. Both the paternity and the final form of the
electoral reform were strongly disputed between the
President and his supporters, on one hand and the
Government, on the other. In conflicting with each
other, the President and the Prime-minister, both
representing the executive power, used their own
institutional instruments. While the President called a
referendum in which he asked the public support for a
majority electoral system, the Government assumed
responsibility in front of the Parliament on a different
electoral law, which introduced uninominal vote, while
preserving proportional representation. Although it
took place in the same day as the first European
elections in Romania (25 November), the referendum
was a failure, as the turnout was only 26.37%.
The governmental legislative project, which was
finally approved and enacted, gave a solution for
21
applying the uninominal principle without tempering
with the proportional representation, in such a way that
the public will, expressed through free elections, should
be fairly represented in the legislative. More precisely,
the deputies and senators are directly elected, in
uninominal colleges. The distribution of seats takes
place in two stages: first, the candidates having more
than 50% in a single college obtain a mandate; second,
the remaining seats are distributed through an
algorithm, in such a way that the percentage obtained by
a party, as a whole, reflects itself in the exact number of
seats within the Parliament.
What was expected?
Generally speaking, the uninominal vote was
expected to bring significant improvement in terms of
accountability and efficiency and to reshape the
relationship between the electorate and its
representatives. The common opinion was that voting
for a person and not for a party list would lead to
rewriting the terms of the “political contract” between
the voter and the MPs.
The first major expectation was to create a direct
connection, which would bring more responsibility and
efficiency in delivering the promises, especially those
made during the electoral campaigns. Moreover, by
being directly elected, the MPs gained more
“independence” from the party line, which was
supposed to make them more powerful in fighting for
local interest or dealing with local problems.
The second expectation was to improve the
“quality” of the political class, since no more hiding
behind a party name was possible. The so resented type
of MP, who is placed by the national leadership on a
party list, in a county which he/she has no connection
to and forgets about during the four years term, was
expected to disappear.
Another expectation was to change the focus and
the actual motivation one has when voting. It is known
there are three main reasons why people vote in a
certain way: they either vote for a person; or they give a
structural vote, making a choice for a party; or they vote
according to their interest on a specific issue. The
uninominal vote was anticipated to bring some changes
in the dynamic between these three elements, favouring
a choice for a person instead of a preference for a
political party.
Furthermore, the uninominal vote was supposed
to show to what extent the personality and skills of a
candidate might be more important than his or her
political identity. As a consequence, some parties
expected that promoting better candidates would make
them more competitive and bring them more electoral
support, above the political vote.
22
Disturbing consequences
One and a half year after the Parliamentary
elections (November 2008), the big picture looks quite
different. There are a few changes, at least at the
rhetorical level. The lack of responsibility or the
dissatisfaction with the functioning of public
institutions, especially the Parliament, cannot be
explained in the same terms. Voting on party lists
cannot be pointed out as their cause any more.
However, introducing uninominal vote had major
side effects and unexpected consequences. First, the
political vote was prevalent. In very few cases the
personality of a candidate mattered more than the
political identity. At the same time, since many
candidates had a rather low notoriety, their main
“quality” was being member of a certain party. The
strategy of identifying a candidate with a party was
successful in many cases, while in other cases the
political party became the main drawback for candidates
with rather high favourability in the opinion surveys.
Second, the electoral campaign meant higher
costs, much higher than anticipated and much higher
than a campaign on party lists. The political campaign
transformed itself in a resource competition rather than
a political competition and even less a policy
competition. The extreme commercialization of the
campaign and of the political process is one of the
major consequences the uninominal vote had. In these
terms, basically, the electoral competition becomes
prohibited to those who do not have the necessary
resources to support an electoral campaign. Or, if they
do enter the competition, their chances of success are
very poor.
Third, the political parties experienced a shift
from national to local, in terms of power and influence.
The tendency of local leaders and local organization to
gain more power in the internal equation of the parties
and to be more demanding was not new. But it was
significantly amplified. The centre of the decision
making process, within the parties, moved towards the
local leaders, many of them becoming key characters in
the national leadership. This tendency, in itself, was not
undesirable, unless it led to replacing the national
perspective with a local, more limited one. While
decentralizing political decisions may be beneficial in
terms of local politics, the lack of a national vision may
be rather detrimental, especially when replaced with a
too biased local perspective.
Last, but not least, the uninominal vote did not
bring the anticipated “quality” improvement, for two
reasons. One resides in the redistribution of seats,
which introduced a high degree of randomness and
allowed candidates with very few votes to become MPs.
The other is a perverted effect of what supposed to be
23
more responsibility and more “independence” of the
directly elected MPs, when it comes to “defend” the
interests of their electorate. Unfortunately, for some of
them, the uninominal vote became the perfect
justification of political migration. The phenomenon of
migration from one party to another was not at all new,
but it reached an unprecedented level during the last
one and a half years. Many of those who chose to
change their political identity used, at the rhetorical
level, the uninominal system as the ultimate source of
legitimacy and explained their option in terms of “best
interest” of their voters.
This article is a short analysis of the Romanian
experience regarding the uninominal vote. However, all
the unexpected consequences described above must be
regarded in a larger context. These consequences
occurred on a specific background, which includes
shortcomings in the democratic consolidation and in the
participative political culture.
 The myth of the providential leader in Romanian politics
by Barbu MATEESCU
Democracy, if void of
charismatic leadership, is a
meaningless tangle of bureaucratic
interests and social apathy. A
democratic model which is posited
on the excessive empowerment of
charismatic individuals, on the
other hand, is marred by
frustration, division and the excessive personalization of
the political arena; its electoral landscape is rocked by
sudden bursts of hope and disappointment; the state
institutions are frail, or perceived as such – sometimes a
threat, often an object of reform but never a partner.
The Romanian electorate is highly vulnerable in this
respect due its over-reliance on providential leaders;
furthermore, if one analyzes the post-Communist
period this situation has worsened in time – after brief
periods of recoil the Romanian political scene is more
over-personalized than at any time since 1990. The
following items of hard data are the evidence for the
statements above:
24
- more Romanians voted in the second round of
the presidential election in 2009 (57% of all registered
voters) than at the parliamentary elections of 2008 (less
than 40%);
- recent opinion polls indicate that the
charismatic leaders of the main political parties have
more credibility than the parties they lead or support, in
many cases twice more;
- the institution of the president is several times
more popular than that of the parliament (between 34%
and 43% as compared to between 9% and 12%);
- when, in 2007, the Romanian Parliament
impeached the president by an overwhelming majority
(322 votes to 108), the electorate overturned the
decision in a decisive fashion in the ensuing referendum
(6 million votes were cast against the impeachment
procedure, representing 75% of all the voters who took
part in the referendum);
- the current President and winner of the last two
presidential elections has made a title of glory and a
defining message of his public appearances that he is
„alone against the whole political class”, against the
financial establishment and the mass-media, and that
only the population is on his side.
Traian Băsescu’s communicational strategy was
not and is not an innovation: indeed, it continued a
pattern of individualization of political projects that had
become a salient feature of Romanian democracy. The
very first elections after the fall of Communism saw this
pattern emerge: the National Salvation Front, a catch-all
organization that had taken control of the country in
December 1989, took 67% of the parliament seats just
several months later. Its leader, Ion Iliescu, won 85% of
the presidential votes, a difference which may be
considered significant. Ten years later, as the economy
plummeted due to strict economic reform, a nationalist
demagogue reached the second round of the
presidential elections, shocking the left and right into a
temporary alliance with the goal of halting his electoral
evolution.
One of the reasons for the emergence of this
political model to the forefront of Romanian politics
has to do with the unique brand of communism
practiced in Romania from 1965 on, one which defined
the national collective consciousness for decades
afterwards. The dictatorship of Nicolae Ceauşescu was
organized around a severe personality cult; one of its
features was the assimilation of Ceauşescu’s figure with
heroic individuals from the country’s past. Medieval
25
kings were pointedly identified as precursors of
Ceauşescu’s foreign policy of non-alignment with the
USSR. Romania’s pre-Communist history also displays
several examples of “providential leaders”, supposedly
arriving at the right time to right the country’s wrongs
(usually these wrongs are identified as the corrupt
political elite). After the formation of Romania in 1859,
under the leadership of Prince A. I. Cuza, he introduced
several reforms – such as land distribution to peasants
by reducing the size of great land estates – which
ensured that he would hold a positive position in the
nation’s collective consciousness. His disrespect for the
political establishment led to his replacement by Carol
of Hohenzollern-Sigmaringen, a German prince who is
perceived by historians and the population at large as a
modernizing figure with enormously beneficial
consequences.
In the troubled inter-war period various figures,
such as fascist leader Corneliu Zelea Codreanu, King
Carol II and Marshal Ion Antonescu attempted with
various degrees of success to assume a similar role in
the public’s psyche and thus to harness popularity.
While the vision of each of these three individuals as to
the future of Romania was different, the similarities
between their stances consist of:
- a profound dislike of democracy and the
mechanisms by which it ensures the control
 of those who govern by those who are
governed;
- an emphasis on individual charisma rather
than on a rational social, political and
economic program;
- a propensity for the use of violence in order
to eliminate political opposition and to silence
the more discontent sections of the
population;
- the conversion of the state into a tool at the
service of the “Illustrious Individual”, as
opposed to defining public institutions as
serving the population.
There are numerous flaws of the “providential
model” as far as the evolution of Romanian politics is
concerned. The current study can only list the most
important – while some are prevalent, others exact a
more insidious influence on the political scene and are
not as visible to the naked eye:
- a constant and pervasive vulnerability to
demagogic leaders and initiatives;
- a limited social conscience, unable to respond
to political interference and overly reliant on a
“magical saviour”, who will right all wrongs
without the need for civic involvement;
- distrust of institutions, political platforms and
technical expertise (should the latter become
26
part of the political field). These organized
forms of political thinking are widely
considered to be fake, groundless and
inefficient structures, by default inferior to an
“enlightened” individual’s will;
- the rejection of ideological discussions as
“useless”, since they imply an appeal to
rational values and not to confidence – an
essentially emotional aspect of political beliefs;
- excessive concentration of public attention on
presidential elections and the relative lack of
interest in parliamentary elections, even if
according to the Constitution the latter
institution plays a more important role in state
governance.
Proposing a set of measures which would halt or
harm the evolution of “providentialism” would be an
idealistic endeavour. The actors and institutions
involved in such a process would be too numerous, and
their agendas too different, for these measures to have a
practical effect. It would be far more useful to see what
are the possible evolutions of this political model, as far
as Romania’s medium and long term future is
concerned.
Obviously, one of the possibilities that must be
taken into consideration is the installation of a de facto
dictatorship, which would halt all democratic processes
and which would force the population at large into
massive, anti-regime demonstrations. This situation
would actually mimic the pre-1989 situation and the
anti-communist revolution; there is no guarantee that
afterwards the cycle wouldn’t repeat itself. Also, one
must consider this possibility is somewhat reduced by
the fact that Romania belongs to a string of
international organizations, such as NATO or the EU,
which possess some of the regulatory mechanisms
necessary from halting a budding dictatorship from
developing in the direction of a full-scale attack on
human rights.
It would seem more in line with Romanian
history, both in the pre- and post-Communist sense, to
have a continuation of the providential model of
leadership in the political arena: populist, demagogic
leaders would fall in popularity only to be replaced by
others who have carefully positioned themselves as
“the” authentic solution to the nation’s problems. This
political dance would take place within the constraints
of a democratic system of government; indeed, the
inability of one demagogue after another to create a
coalition with the governmental bureaucracy, the private
sector and the other political forces would inevitably
result in his or her doom, lack of electoral performance
and replacement by another figure of the same type.
The result would be a continual weakening of
27
institutional structures, with sudden jolts provided by
the election of one providential president after another.
A slower but more fruitful change from the
perspective of the population would have as a result the
abandonment of the providential model. This option
takes into consideration the institutional changes
brought along by the growth of capitalism and the
modernization of Romania as an EU country.
Perceptions concerning the role of government and of
specific positions within the state hierarchy (i.e. the
President) would then shift also.
Last, but not least, the Romanian electorate could
find itself abandoning the providential model of
leadership should the political establishment focus on
creating teams of experienced, qualified individuals. The
constraints of the media limit the ability of such
constructions to actually create a popular impact – in
any country, with a strong democratic tradition or not, a
team elicits a less positive response than an individual.
Creativity, opportunity and resources may still be
juggled in a satisfactory fashion. Of course, once in
power the team-based effort must succeed in a
convincing way, so as to block populist politicians from
claiming that “a one-man team is the best team”. A
subset of this option consists of value-driven political
organizations: in such cases the actual identity of the
person leading the movement is secondary as long as
he/she maintains a strong relationship with the
electorate by adhering to the values that have attracted
voters in the first place. This “ideological” option
implies shifting the emphasis from the individual to the
idea; from the leader to the doctrine; and from
confidence to rational belief.
Providentialism fails by definition; in an intricate
world, it is next to impossible for an individual – no
28
matter how charismatic or intelligent – to control the
course of government as he or she wishes. Shifting away
from a charismatic model should be a priority both for
the Romanian political class and for society at large; this
feature harms Romania’s democratic processes and
principals, confuses the electorate and has a detrimental
effect on the country’s economic situation.
 Romanian crisis – serious and atypical
by Alina Daniela MOISE
Romanian society is in deep
crisis, generalized and not typical of
other European Union countries.
Romania is a country with a
mentality almost impossible to
explain, because over national
psychological dimension undefined
and difficult to understand, have
entailed communism’s
disadvantages and a partially
successful implantation of capitalism and democracy.
Former President of Romania Ion Iliescu explained the
facts of a plastic expression and very close to reality,
“crony capitalism and original democracy”.
In Romania, the economic crisis cannot be
contained by conventional weapons because it very
closely entwined with a moral crisis, social and political
– system crisis, that even the identity and authority of
state institutions stagger increasingly dangerous.
It started in the communist period, when this
nation was crippled soul. Communism has acted
systematically and by the book, through destruction or
29
perversion of values directly, physically but especially in
the collective mind. The elites of this nation in all areas
have been effectively decimated in prisons, in order to
compromise them directly or through their forced
collaboration. Many were killed or had spent hard years
in prison, and were later banned to show their skills.
Opportunists have preferred their collaboration to save
their lives and careers, but in this they were more or less
voluntary than the forced destruction or perversion of
values, hierarchy, morality and even of faith.
The atheist educational system, limited and highly
indoctrinated in the communist period formed the
generation of “new people”. Beliefs and traditions were
most affected. And it is known that a man who does not
truly believe in something or even in someone has a
predisposition to instability and psychological
discomfort and cannot form a proper relationship with
the others, morally and spiritually.
At this pre-existing background, the lifestyle of
the twenty years of post-communism had a devastating
effect on the great majority of the population, totally
unprepared for dealing with socio-economic problems
of increasingly “wild capitalism” in our country. Thus
appeared serious psychological problems, mostly
untreated due to lack of education, the material
possibilities or the simply lack of confidence in so few
specialists in this field.
But the biggest problem facing Romania at this
time is political. There are serious slips in democratic
principles and the separation of powers that go almost
unnoticed by our partners in the European Union,
because all the attention go to generalized economic
crisis in the Eurozone and the problems faced by each
member state in private.
Why did we come to this dangerous point after
20 years of “original democracy”? Firstly, because the
democratic principles were introduced mechanically,
artificially, without a real process of awareness raising
and understanding among the vast majority of the
population. In Romania even civil society was created
artificially or with financial support from abroad, in very
few cases or directly by political or business
environment from the country, and only in their own
interest. So, our citizens were not educated in a truly
democratic spirit and we cannot talk about the pressure
of public opinion in this area. And there has been
deterioration, even a partial destruction by under-
funding of the education institutionalized system of
state, by incompetence, carelessness or politicking.
30
We woke up in the year of grace 2010 that we
have not really related to nothing. Overturned hierarchy
of values by the communist regime, promoting the
incompetence on the principle of “human resources’
rotation”, continued after 1989 being achieved by
promoting non-values based on political partisanship in
all post-communist governments. The phenomenon of
purchasing degrees and scientific titles just blended
perfectly with preventing access of those with real
potential but no money or party membership cards to
public offices or sometimes even to education.
This Romanian atypical crisis becomes a
trademark of the lack of moral compass, promoting
non-values and a deadly combination with increasingly
frequent democratic drift generated by the Romanian
president Traian Basescu and the ruling Democratic
Liberal party.
 Voting on the Internet, future elections
by Marinela RAŢĂ
Electronic voting is,
without mourning, one of the
most anticipated applications of
new technologies, but perhaps
the most important democratic
elections. Like other European
countries, Romania has taken
into account the possibility that
in the near future citizens could
vote on a virtual platform. I intend to underline the
benefits, but also the weaknesses of such a voting
system, under which elections in recent years have
shown us every time allegations of fraud not from
those who won elections but from the losers.
A most recent debate on this subject in Romania
took place after the presidential elections of 2009. After
the second round, polls showed the winner was Social
Democratic president, Mircea Geoană, but after
counting the votes, Democratic Liberal Traian Băsescu
was declared winner. It was even said that Băsescu was
made president of the Diaspora, who decided to
overthrow the final score. Accusations from the Social
31
Democrats and the release of election fraud in polling
stations abroad followed. Moreover, the Central
Electoral Bureau showed a record number of votes
from the Romanians abroad: over 140,000. There were
doubts on how elections were held in France, where
thousands of voters put on the ballot every three
seconds. In this context, it was resumed in Romania to
talk about electronic voting via the Internet.
But why would politicians want to introduce this
scheme? One possible reason is the dramatic decline of
voter turnout, especially among youth. So, politicians
argue that it will be convenient for voters, that it could
increase participation among young people, that it could
result in a cheap and effective counting and could
reduce the incidence of human error. Development of
electronic voting technology is stimulated by national
governments and in the context of Framework
Programmes EU15. Switching to Internet elections
would give voters a choice from home or at work. The
main difference between remote electronic voting (Ved)
and traditional voting is that remote electronic voting
can be done in privacy and safety of their own home
rather than vote in the constituency section. People are
not forced to flee their homes to express their views.
Citizens living abroad, who are unable to leave the
house or away on business, everyone can use a
computer to submit an online vote.
Electronic voting, a possible high security risk
On the other side, opponents of electronic voting
say that such a method assumes a very high security risk
and does not provide equal access to the Internet for all
citizens. For example, in Romania out of the 18 million
voters there were only about 5 million Internet
connections. In addition, opponents say the vote on the
Internet, or no matter which system, is unlikely to
increase attendance at the polls. In addition, the same
voices argue that the introduction of electronic vote
fraud suspicion should be removed. In electronic
voting, voters must be identified by the system; the
program should be capable of counting votes by the
voters to distinguish the suitcases made of non-eligible
voters. Meanwhile, the votes should remain anonymous
and secret. Nobody should be able to determine how a
particular individual voted, and voters would not be able
to prove how they voted, as this would facilitate vote
selling or handling, a study of researchers Anne-Marie
Oostveen and Peter van den Besselaar, from the
University of Amsterdam shows. The two say “vote will
32
ensure remote intimacy never offered by a polling booth”. But
remote electronic voting increases the risk of
manipulation of voting, for example from a dominant
husband, a teacher at the school or the head office.
Let us see some steps that have been
accomplished so far in Europe for testing such a system
of voting. In Italy, an electronic vote counting system
was tested in April 2006 elections. The system has been
used in some polling stations in parallel with
conventional operations counting the number of votes.
Observers counting operations officials accused the
serious problems, from the security system used to the
“human element” involved. At a polling station in
Rome, one observer found a copy of the vote-counting
software and access keys in a basket near the station.
The system also allowed manual correction of errors in
data entry, putting into question both the computer
system, which cost the Italian state 37 million euros, and
training people who used it. Also, it has been alleged by
groups such as the UK-based Open Rights Group that “a
lack of testing, inadequate audit procedures, and insufficient
attention given to system or process design with electronic voting
leaves elections open to error and fraud”.
An example of good practice is Estonia. Most
voters in Estonia can cast their vote in local and
parliamentary elections, if they want to, via the Internet.
This system works very well, because most Estonians
carry a national identity card equipped with a computer-
readable microchip and it is these cards which they use
to get access to the online ballot. All a voter needs is a
computer, an electronic card reader, their ID card and
its PIN, and they can vote from anywhere in the world.
33
Thus, for any voting system citizens’ confidence
is the most important. Virtual vote seems inevitable
from the perspective that it has low costs, but real
chances to be put into practice will increase in
proportion to people’s trust and internet access.
 The European Union and Kosovo: transforming, containing or losing it?
by Roxana RIZEA
Western Balkans has been a
constant unease for the global
powers, due to their strategic
position. The Kosovo issue is
perhaps the bone of contention in
the repeated Balkan crises. As the
unilateral independence claimed by
Kosovo and the principle of
territorial integrity proclaimed by
Serbia seem to be diametrically
opposed the only viable solution that appears to be
more and more promoted is that of resolution between
the two parties inside the European Union.
After the dissolution of the Socialist Federal
Republic of Yugoslavia (SFRY) into five independent
states in 1992 – Slovenia, Macedonia (FYROM),
Croatia, Bosnia-Herzegovina, the Federal Republic of
Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) – the autonomous
province of Kosovo also proclaimed its independence,
bringing forward as arguments not only a de facto right
under the former SFRY Constitution to proceed as
such, but also the constant infringement of its
autonomy by the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY).
34
As its independence was recognized at that moment
only by Albania, a decade of conflict followed between
Kosovo, in its quest for self-determination, and the
FRY, of which it was legally a part. The atrocities of the
Milosevic regime determined the intervention of NATO
forces against the FRY in 1999, followed by the
adoption of UN Security Council Resolution 1244
(1999), setting up a transitional international
administration for Kosovo and aiming to find a solution
to the “future status” of Kosovo. However, in February
2008, Kosovo proclaimed again its independence,
recognized so far by three out of five permanent
members of the UNSC, and in total, by 68 out of 192
members of the United Nations. The International
Court of Justice is soon to give its advisory opinion, at
the request of the General Assembly of the UN, on the
conformity of Kosovo’s unilateral declaration of
independence (UDI) with international law.
The positions of the members of the
international community with regard to Kosovo’s
recognition of independence remain divergent, as no
party can convince the other of the validity of its
arguments. This deadlock dialogue can be overcome
only by addressing the real issue, which is not
recognition, but the capacity of Kosovo to fulfil the
criteria of statehood. As long as no agreement on
Kosovo’s potential of bringing stability in the region
will be reached, reconciliation between the situation on
the ground and the legal status of Kosovo in the
international order cannot be achieved. Therefore,
according to many European voices, a feasible solution
could arise only from an internal consolidation of
Kosovo, reaching its full capacity as a State, which
would allow then the acceptance of the legal status by
the entire international community.
Only through addressing the internationally
accepted criteria for statehood (The Montevideo
Convention on the Rights and the Duties of States,
1933, enshrined the following criteria of statehood: a
defined territory, a permanent population, an effective government
and the capacity to enter into relations with other states), it
would be difficult to conclude the debate around the
subject of Kosovo’s attributes as a state, which actually
lies at the core of the real problem. While, indeed the
territory of Kosovo is submitted to the control of the
internationally created and supervised institutions,
serious doubts still remain among most of the
international community members with regard to
Kosovo’s actual independence from international
support (in political, administrative and security terms)
35
and to Kosovo’s sustainability as a state, when left on its
own. Moreover, the capacity of the Kosovo authorities
to exercise their control over the whole territory in
respect of which the independence was declared is at
least doubtful since the northern part of the region
inhabited, mostly by Serbs, still refuses to recognize the
legitimacy of state institutions in Prishtina. The reality
that Kosovo is not yet a viable state, but a state in its
original form, cannot be changed by its recognition.
Nonetheless, Kosovo should be helped in the process
of fulfilling the criteria for being a state; otherwise it has
the potential of destabilizing (again) the entire region.
Another relevant debate is that concerning
Kosovo’s right to self-determination (through secession
from FRY/Serbia). Under international law, only the
federative entities of SFRY had the right of forming,
after the dissolution of SFRY, independent states.
Autonomous provinces such as Kosovo were not
entitled to this right. Moreover, the international law
does not give a right for unilateral secession, even in
cases of flagrant infringement of internal self-
determination (the argument advanced by Kosovo). The
“remedial secession” of Kosovo from Serbia, based on
the so-called safeguard clause contained in the UN
General Assembly Resolution 2625, could not apply in
the case of Kosovo, as it was not recognized as an entity
entitled to self determination under international law
(argument advanced by Serbia). Furthermore, it is
doubtful whether the argument of remedial secession
could still be invoked in 2008, almost ten years after
Milosevic’s oppressive regime came to an end. On the
other hand, Kosovo’s position with regard to UNSC
Resolution 1244 (that it was meant to preserve the
territorial integrity of FRY and that, once FRY was
dissolved, UNSC 1244 lost its applicability) cannot be
easily discarded.
With regard to the most relevant legal document
on the Kosovo issue, namely UN Security Council
(UNSC) Resolution 1244 (1999), both Kosovo and
Serbia developed opposing interpretations of it. For
Kosovo, the UNSC resolution 1244 (1999) sets two
stages in the achievement of a solution: an interim
international administration of Kosovo within Serbia,
followed by a political settlement regarding Kosovo’s
future status, which does not exclude independence and
does not necessarily require Serbia’s consent. For
Serbia, the UNSC resolution 1244 (1999) confirms its
sovereignty and territorial integrity, while stating that
the final settlement on Kosovo could be reached only
by the mutual agreement of the two parties involved
and providing for an enhanced status for Kosovo, a
substantial greater degree of autonomy and meaningful
self-administration within Serbia. One could find,
however, a possibility to bring closer the positions of
36
Serbia and Kosovo by interpreting the UNSC
Resolution as an expression of the will of the
international community, endorsed by all stakeholders,
to grant Kosovo a status of sui generis “independence”
circumstantiated to its quality as a subject of a
federation to which Serbia is also a part. A consequence
of that interpretation might be that the only way to keep
both Serbia and Kosovo, at the same time, separated
and parts of a single trans-national entity will be their
integration in the EU.
Finally, the ICJ advisory opinion, while bearing a
certain political significance, will most probably not lead
per se to any change in the positions of the states.
Against this background, two possible scenarios could
be envisaged. In a first scenario, the ICJ could choose to
give its advisory opinion only on the issue of the
conformity of the UDI with international law. On the
one hand, if it concludes to the validity or to the non-
contradiction of the act with international law, then the
matter of the statehood of Kosovo is not touched upon.
This would in return not influence the current situation
among the countries having recognized Kosovo’s
independence and those who have not done so. If, on
the other hand, the ICJ concludes to the invalidity of
the UDI, then the current state of affairs still could not
be reversed: the States that have not recognized
Kosovo’s independence would find an argument to
maintain their position, while the 1/3 of UN States,
having already recognized the entity as a State based on
that declaration, would find it difficult to withdraw their
recognition.
On the other hand, the ICJ may decide to extend
the matter under scrutiny beyond the analysis regarding
the conformity of the UDI with international law, in
such a way as to include its opinion on the right of
external self-determination of Kosovo and/or its
statehood. In this situation, the alternative would be
either to deliver an ambiguous position, that would
provide both parties with the necessary arguments in
support of their interpretation, or to confirm Serbia’s
37
arguments. Both possibilities would not facilitate the
search for a sustainable political agreement: the first
option would lead us back to the status quo ante, while
the second one would preserve the status quo. Neither
the status quo ante, nor the status quo could provide for a
reintegration of Kosovo into the international legal
order.
All in all, the advisory character of the opinion is
not expected to produce serious changes in the already
adopted positions of international community members
with respect to Kosovo. Nonetheless, as already
mentioned above, a certain political significance could
be attached to the opinion.
Organizers of the Sixth Edition of the “Ovidiu Şincai” European School
2009-2010

Adrian SEVERIN, Anne JUGĂNARU,

President of the Advisory Board Director of the “Ovidiu Şincai” European School
of the “Ovidiu Şincai” European School

Diana RISTA, George-Vadim TIUGEA,

Project Assistant, Project Assistant,
“Ovidiu Şincai” European School “Ovidiu Şincai” European School

38
Lecturers of the Sixth Edition of the “Ovidiu Şincai” European School 2009-
2010
Alexandru ATHANASIU,
former Minister of Labour
and Social Protection (1996-1999)
and of Education, Research and Youth
(2003-2004)
Alexandru RADU,
Professor, Faculty of Political Science,
“Dimitrie Cantemir” Christian University, Bucharest

Anne JUGĂNARU,
Director of the Ovidiu Sincai
European School

Aurora LIICEANU,
Senior Researcher within the Psychology
Institute of the Romanian Academy

Cristian PÎRVULESCU,
Dean of the Faculty of Political Science,
State University for Political Studies
and Administration, Bucharest

Daniel BARBU,
Professor, Faculty of Political Science,
University of Bucharest

39
Doru POP,
Professor, Faculty of Theatre
and Television, Babes-Bolyai University,
Cluj-Napoca

Emil CONSTANTINESCU,
President of Romania (1996-2000)

Ilie ŞERBĂNESCU,
economic analyst,
former Minister of Reform
(December 1997 – April 1998)

Ioan DEAC,
Professor, “Carol I” National Defence
University, Bucharest

Teodor MELEŞCANU,
Senator, former Minister
of Foreign Affairs (1992-1996)
and of Defence (2007-2008)
Vladimir PASTI,
Professor, State University for
Political Studies and Administration,
Bucharest

40
Participants to the Sixth Edition of the “Ovidiu Şincai” European School
2009-2010
Andrei ANCA,
Social Inspector,
Territorial Labour Inspectorate, Timis County,
Member of the Democratic Liberal Party
Anca Daniela ANTON,
Advisor, National Commission for
Hospital Accreditation

Dan Marcel BĂRBUŢ,

State Inspector,
Ministry of Transport and Infrastructure

Mihaela BOTIZAN,
Legal Advisor, National Authority
for Property Restitution

Eugen COJOCARIU,
Secretary General,
Radio Romania International

Adrian CONSTANTINESCU,
Lawyer, Vrancea Bar

41
Mirela DINCU,
English Language Teacher,
“Spiru Haret” National College, Bucharest

Maria Mirela DRĂGĂSTAN,

Director Coordinator, Romanian
Post Company - Bacau branch

George Ionuţ DUMITRICĂ,

Member of Parliament,
National Liberal Party

Adriana ENACHE,
Administrative Assistant,
Embassy of Canada

Rucsandra FILLOREANU,
Programme Assistant, QVORUM European Institute
for Participative Democracy

Veronica FRUMUZACHE,
Chief-Economist, Agriteam
Expert Company

42
Iulia HUIU,
Head of Analysis and Strategy Direction,
National Liberal Party

Dan Alexandru IONESCU,

Expert, National Bank
of Romania

Andrei Constantin IONIŢĂ,

Lawyer, Arad Bar

IUGA Tibor,
Advisor, Executive Presidium,
of the Hungarian Democratic Union

KEDVES Zalan,
Advisor, Ministry of Regional Development
and Tourism

Andrei KOSZTI,
Lawyer, Bucharest Bar

43
 Barbu MATEESCU,
Researcher, "Ovidiu Sincai" Institute

MIKLOSI Ildiko,
Media Advisor, Executive Presidium
of the Hungarian Democratic Union

Alina Daniela MOISE,

Psychologist, Executive Secretary,
Conservative Party, Bucharest branch

George Marius MOLDOVEANU,

Local Councillor, 4th District,
Bucharest, Conservative Party

Andrei ORBAN,
Director of the Timis County
Prefect Chancellery, Member of
the Democratic Liberal Party

Emanuela PENDIUC,
TV Moderator and Journalist,
Romanian Public Television

44
George PETRE,
Legal Advisor, Human Rights Department,
Romani CRISS

Luiza-Maria PETRESCU,
Legal Advisor, National
Authority for Property Restitution

Lucian Traian POENARU,

Lawyer, Stoica & Associates Law Firm,
Bucharest

Andreea POPESCU-CREŢULESCU,
Special Reporter and Moderator,
Realitatea TV channel

Marinela RAŢĂ,
Editor, Political Section,
Evenimentul zilei daily newspaper

Roxana RIZEA,
Advisor, European Parliament

45
Victoria STOICIU,
Project Coordinator,
Friedrich Ebert Stiftung - Bucharest Office

Ionuţ-Marian STROE,
Member of Parliament,
National Liberal Party

Mugurel SURUPĂCEANU,
Member of Parliament,
Deputy Leader of the
Social Democratic Party Group

Cristian TABĂRĂ,
Director of the Movie Department,
Romanian Public Television

Cristian Gabriel WINZER,

Associate Lawyer,
Dănilă, Petre & Partners law firm,
Bucharest

46
 MondoMedia Editorial Group
Director: Anne Jugănaru
Edited by George-Vadim Tiugea
Bucharest, Romania
June 2010

ISSN 1844 – 6574

47
48