JACKIE LACEY

District Attorney CONFORMED COPY

ORIGINAL FILED
JOHN LEWIN (State Bar No. 154338) Superior Court Of California
County Of Loll Angela.
HABIB A. BALIAN (State Bar No. 179344)
DAVID YAROSLAVSKY (State Bar No. 255574)
Deputy District Attorneys JAN 1 7 2011
211 West Temple Street, Suite 1130 A
Los Angeles, CA 90012 Sherri R. Carter, Executive OtticerClerk

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(213) 257-2242 By: Robin Armstrong, Deputy

Attorneys for Plaintiff

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SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

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FOR THE COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES

CASE NO.: SA089983

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PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA,)
) NOTICE OF MOTION; MOTION TO
Plaintiff, ) COLLATERALLY ESTOP DEFENDANT
) FROM CHALLENGING 1) THE
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vs. ) LEGALITY OF HIS NEW ORLEANS
) ARREST; AND 2) THE LEGALITY OF
ROBERT DURST, ) THE SEARCH OF HIS NEW ORLEANS
) HOTEL ROOM; MEMORANDUM OF
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Defendant. ) POINTS AND AUTHORITIES IN

) SUPPORT THEREOF

) DEPT: 81
) DATE: February 15, 2017
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) TIME: 10:00 a.m.

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 1 TO THE HONORABLE JUDGE MARK E. WINDHAM, TO THE CLERK OF THE ABOVE-

2 ENTITLED COURT, AND TO THE DEFENDANT AND HIS ATTORNEYS OF RECORD:

PLEASE TAKE NOTICE that on February 15, 2017 at 10:00 AM, or as soon

thereafter as can be heard in Dept. No. 81 of the above-entitled court, located at 11701 La

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5 Cienega Blvd., Los Angeles, CA, 90045, the PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA,

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6 Plaintiff, will move the Court to collaterally estop Defendant Robert Durst from challenging the

7 legality of Defendant's New Orleans arrest and subsequent search of his hotel room.

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This motion is brought pursuant to the doctrine of collateral estoppel and section 402 of

9 the Evidence Code, and it is based upon the attached declarations, the attached memorandum of

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10 points and authorities filed herein, all other papers and pleadings in the Clerk's file in this action,

11 and any oral or documentary evidence to be presented at the hearing of this motion.
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14 DATED: January 17, 2017 JACKIE LACEY

District Attorney
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By:
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Lewin
puty District Attorney
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 I. INTRODUCTION

During the January 6, 2017 hearing before this Court, the defense confidently asserted:

"There is such a thing as issue preclusion." (Dick DeGuerin, January 6, 2017, Hearing on Motion

to Preclude Prosecution From Conditional Examinations.) The People agree.

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5 In 2015, Defendant Robert Durst ("Defendant") was charged in Louisiana Federal court

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with unlawful drug and gun possession. In that case, Defendant sought to suppress physical

evidence that resulted from his arrest and the subsequent searches of his hotel room. After

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8 extensive briefing on the issues, District Court Judge Helen G. Berrigan denied Defendant's

9 Motion to Suppress in its entirety, ruling that the arrest and the search pursuant to the warrant

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10 obtained by Los Angeles Police Department Robbery Homicide Detectives ("LAPD/RHD")

11 were lawful. Ultimately, Defendant pleaded guilty on the Federal charge and waived his
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12 appellate rights, rendering the judgment on the merits final.

The doctrine of issue preclusion, or collateral estoppel, prevents Defendant from now
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relitigating these issues before this Court. This Court must examine whether three elements are

15 present in order to trigger collateral estoppel. First, the issue in the present case must be identical

16 to the issue necessarily decided at the prior proceeding. This ensures that only those issues fully
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17 litigated previously may be precluded from further argument. Second, the prior proceeding must

18 have resulted in a final judgment on the merits. This ensures that the result of the litigation on the
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19 issue previously decided cannot be undone. Lastly, the party against whom collateral estoppel is

20 asserted must have been a party (or in privity with a party) at the prior proceeding. This ensures
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21 that the decisions and efforts of one party do not bind those of an unrelated future litigant. As

22 each element is present in this case, the doctrine of collateral estoppel clearly controls.
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In the prior Louisiana proceeding, Defendant was the identical party litigating the

24 identical issue. In that case, Defendant challenged his arrest and the searches of his hotel room

25 through an extensive series of motions. Judge Berrigan diligently analyzed the facts, applied the

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 1 law, and soundly rejected Defendant's arguments. This is the exact situation for which the

2 doctrine of collateral estoppel, or issue preclusion, was created, as it functions to prevent a party

3 from relitigating identical issues in different jurisdictions. It promotes finality, prevents

inconsistent results in different in jurisdictions, and results in judicial economy.

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Accordingly, the People move to prevent Defendant from rehashing the identical issues

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6 that he previously and extensively litigated in his Federal Motion to Suppress, i.e., the legality of

7 his 2015 arrest and subsequent searches of his hotel room.

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II. FACTUAL BACKGROUND AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

9 On March 14, 2015, FBI Agents arrested Defendant at the J.W. Marriott Hotel located at

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10 614 Canal Street, New Orleans Louisiana. (Lewin Decl., Ex. 1 [FBI 302 of Durst Arrest], at p.1.)

11 The Los Angeles Police Department Fugitive Coordinator had advised FBI Special Agent
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12 William "Chuck" Williams ("SA Williams") that a probable cause arrest warrant had been issued

13 in California for Defendant's arrest. (Ibid.) Upon seeing a person who matched the description of
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14 Defendant (later fully identified as Defendant) in the hotel lobby, SA Williams approached and

15 called the name, "Mr. Durst." (Id. at p.2.) Defendant looked at him, but did not respond. (Ibid.)

16 SA Williams asked for identification; Defendant responded that he did not have any. (Ibid.) SA
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17 Williams asked what name Defendant used to check in to the hotel under; Defendant responded,

18 "Everette Ward." (Ibid.) SA Williams then detained Defendant pending confirmation of the
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19 probable cause arrest warrant issued out of Los Angeles; LAPD/RHD Detectives advised SA

20 Williams soon thereafter that the warrant was valid and would be imminently entered into NCIC.
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21 (Id. at pp. 2-3.)

SA Williams advised Defendant that the arrest warrant was verified and that he would be
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transported to Orleans Parish Prison. (Lewin Decl., Ex. 1 [FBI 302 of Durst Arrest], at p.3.) SA

24 Williams advised Defendant that he wanted to collect Defendant's personal belongings so they

25 would not be abandoned. (Ibid.) Defendant did not object. (Ibid.) Upon being asked, Defendant

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 1 advised that he was staying in room 2303 of the hotel. (Ibid.) SA Williams and SA Crystal

2 Bender ("SA Bender") entered room 2303 to gather, catalogue, and transport Defendant's

3 belongings for safekeeping. (Ibid.) They informed him of these reasons for their entry into the

4 hotel room and Defendant did not object. (Ibid.) While inventorying Defendant's belongings,

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5 Defendant volunteered that he had a revolver in a jacket pocket in the closet. (Ibid.)

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While FBI Special Agents were inventorying the contents of room 2303, LAPD/RHD

7 Detectives contacted FBI Task Force Officer Craine and SA Williams separately, requesting that

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8 the FBI cease all inventory activity until LAPD/RHD obtained a search warrant. (Lewin Decl.,

9 Ex. 1 [FBI 302 of Durst Arrest], at p.4.) All inventory activity ceased, and no items were

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10 removed before that search warrant was authorized. (Ibid.) Shortly after 2:00 a.m. on March 15,

11 Magistrate Commissioner Jonathan P. Friedman signed a warrant authorizing the search of room
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12 2303. (Lewin Decl., Ex. 2 [Order for Search Warrant].) No information or evidence gathered by

13 SA Williams during his initial entry into the room was used or mentioned in the affidavit
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14 supporting the issuance of this warrant. The search began immediately thereafter. (Lewin Decl.,

15 Ex. 3 [FBI 302 of Search of Room 2303], at p.1.) Various items were subsequently seized

16 pursuant to the warrant, including a latex mask, over $40,000 in cash, a passport, a false
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17 identification, and a loaded .38 caliber Smith & Wesson. (Id. at pp. 1-3.)i

The United States Government charged Defendant with illegal weapons possession. On
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June 4, 2015, Defendant filed a Motion to Suppress the physical evidence seized from his hotel

20 room. (Lewin Decl., Ex. 4 [Defendant Robert Durst's Motion to Suppress, 6-4-15].) Specifically,
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21 he moved to suppress evidence resulting from "(1) his arrest; (2) the subsequent interrogation;

22 (3) the warrantless search of his hotel room[;] and[] (4) the execution of a search warrant on that
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1 The next morning, on March 15, 2015, Defendant was interviewed while in custody by Los Angeles County
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Deputy District Attorney John Lewin, and LAPD/RHD Detectives Mike Whelan and Luis Romero. The interview
was audiotaped and was also captured on a close circuit video camera without accompanying audio. This
25 information is included simply to inform the Court of the order and timing of events.
same hotel room after arresting agents had already completed their warrantless search." (Lewin

Decl., Ex. 4 [Defendant Robert Durst's Motion to Suppress, 6-4-15].) Extensive pleadings

followed, including supplemental memoranda filed at the request of Judge Berrigan. (Lewin

Decl., Exs. 5-8 [Various Pleadings].)

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Ultimately, Judge Berrigan considered and rejected each of Defendant's contentions. She

found that the FBI agents were notified of a validly issued arrest warrant from California and

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acted in good faith upon that warrant by arresting Durst in New Orleans. (Lewin Decl., Ex. 9

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[Order Denying Motion to Suppress, 10/16/15.] at p.10.) She found that Defendant had not made

the requisite preliminary showing for a Franks hearing, and therefore could not challenge the

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affidavit in support of the arrest warrant. (Id. at p.15.) She found that the statements Defendant

made in the hotel lobby were not in response to questions that required Miranda warnings, and
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even had they been, the information he disclosed would have been inevitably discovered. (Ibid.)

Finally, she found that although Defendant had standing to challenge the warrantless search of
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his hotel room, the search warrant provided an untainted, independent source of the physical

evidence discovered therein. (Ibid.) In short, there was "no legal basis to order the suppression of

any of the physical evidence and the motion to suppress [was] denied." (Ibid.)
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Defendant subsequently pleaded guilty to the charges of 18 U.S.C. sections 922(g)(1) and

924(a)(2). (Lewin Decl., Ex. 10 [Plea Agreement, 2-3-16].) As part of that plea, Defendant
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waived any appellate rights he had with two exceptions. (Ibid.) The two exceptions were for (1)

ineffective assistance of counsel and (2) challenging the sentence if it exceeded the statutory
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maximum. (Ibid.) Defendant specifically waived his rights to challenge any pretrial rulings.

(Ibid.) His plea and waiver of appellate rights rendered the judgment final.
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 III. HAVING LOST A THOROUGHLY CONTESTED MOTION CHALLENGING

THE LEGALITY OF HIS NEW ORLEANS ARREST AND HOTEL ROOM

SEARCHES, DEFENDANT IS COLLATERALLY ESTOPPED FROM

RELITIGATING THE IDENTICAL ISSUES IN THIS ACTION

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Collateral estoppel bars relitigation of an issue decided at a previous trial if (1) the issue

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6 necessarily decided at the previous trial is identical to the one which is sought to be relitigated; if

7 (2) the previous trial resulted in a final judgment on the merits; and if (3) the party against whom

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8 collateral estoppel is asserted was a party or in privity with a party at the prior trial. 2 (People v.

9 Vogel (2007) 148 Cal,App.4th 131, 136 [citations omitted].) Collateral estoppel may be used

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10 offensively by the prosecution in a criminal action with regard to evidence suppression issues.

11 (Cf. People v. Burns (2011) 19 Cal.App.4th 726, 731 ["In general, such offensive use of
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12 collateral estoppel has been limited to alienage and evidence suppression issues."] [holding that

13 collateral estoppel cannot be used to give preclusive effect to a factual determination made by a
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14 jury but still open to direct attack on appeal].)

15 Specifically, California recognizes that collateral estoppel is properly employed against a

16 criminal defendant with regard to multiple pretrial suppression motions litigated in different
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17 jurisdictions. (See, e.g., People v. Vogel, supra, 148 Cal.App.4th 131 [precluding defendant from

18 relitigating in one jurisdiction a motion to suppress previously lost in a second].) That the
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19 previous case took place in Federal court and the current case takes place in State court is no bar

20 to finding that the issues litigated in each are identical. (Cf. People v. Meredith (1992) 11
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2 This last factor, incidentally, is the reason why the People in the above-captioned action cannot be collaterally
22 estopped from litigating (for the first time) issues that Defendant has previously litigated. Conversely, Defendant
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cannot himself use the doctrine to bind the People with any findings or rulings of the Federal court because they
23 were not a party or in privity with a party in that litigation. For the same reason, Defendant is likewise prohibited
from utilizing the doctrine to bind the People with any findings or rulings that the Galveston state court made during
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Defendant's trial for the murder of Morris Black. Moreover, the fact that Defendant was able to obtain an acquittal
in that prosecution does not collaterally estop the People from presenting evidence of his killing and dismemberment
of Mr. Black, so long as such evidence comports with the relevant sections of the Evidence Code. That said,
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Defendant, as the same party in both cases, may at the People's request, be collaterally estopped from relitigating
any pretrial issue decided by the Galveston state court that is identical to an issue in this prosecution.

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 Cal.App.4th 1548, 1556 [finding the issues raised in the suppression motion filed in the earlier,

Federal case to have been identical to the issues raised in the current, State case; but finding no

3 issue preclusion because the People were not a party nor in privity with a party to the Federal

4 litigation].) "A plea of guilty and the ensuing conviction comprehend all of the factual and legal

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5 elements necessary to sustain a binding, final judgment of guilt and a lawful sentence." (United

States v. Broce (1989) 488 U.S. 563, 569.)

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The case of People v. Vogel, supra, 148 Cal.App.4th 131 is instructive. There, the Red

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Bluff Police Department arrested the defendant after investigating a report he was trying to take

9 pictures of children at Red Bluff High School. (Id. at 134.) Red Bluff is in Tehama County.

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10 Based on evidence obtained as a result of the arrest, the defendant was charged with offenses in

11 two separate cases, one in Siskiyou County and one in Placer County. (Ibid.) In the Siskiyou
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12 case, Defendant challenged his arrest, alleging that the arresting officer lacked probable cause to

13 arrest him, and moved to suppress the evidence obtained as a result thereof. (Ibid.) The Siskiyou
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14 trial court denied the motion, ruling the arresting officer had probable cause to arrest. (Ibid.)

15 After pleading guilty, defendant appealed the ruling on the suppression motion, which the Court

16 of Appeal rejected; the California Supreme Court denied petition for review, making the
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17 judgment final. (Ibid.)

18 A subsequent prosecution of the defendant took place in Placer County two years after
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19 the Supreme Court's denial of his petition for review in the Siskiyou case. As part of the Placer

20 prosecution, the defendant moved to suppress the evidence obtained as the result of his arrest,
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21 again claiming that the arrest lacked probable cause. (People v. Vogel, supra, 148 Cal.App.4th at

22 134.) The prosecutor argued that the motion to suppress should be denied on collateral estoppel
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23 grounds. (Id. at 135.) The trial court denied the motion to suppress, noting the Court of Appeal

24 decision arising out of the Siskiyou case, and concurring with the facts and findings in that

25 opinion. (Ibid.)

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 The Court of Appeal found that the defendant was "collaterally estopped from relitigating

2 whether [there was] probable cause to arrest . . . ." (People v. Vogel, supra, 148 Cal.App.4th at

3 136.) It noted that:

(1) Defendant, against whom the People assert the doctrine, was also the defendant

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in the Siskiyou County case; (2) that case resulted in a final judgment of conviction,
which was affirmed on appeal; and (3) the issue defendant seeks to litigate here
whether Sergeant Wiley had probable cause to arrest himis identical to the issue

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expressly decided both by the trial court and this court in the Siskiyou County case.

7 (Ibid.) The Court added that it was irrelevant that the charges were different and that the

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8 evidence used was different. (Id. at 137.) The Court held:

9 As long as (1) the search and seizure issue involved in both cases is the same, (2)
that issue was necessarily decided in the earlier case, (3) the earlier case was

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10 resolved by a final judgment, (4) the same person was the defendant in both cases,
and (5) that person had a full and fair opportunity to litigate that issue in the earlier
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case, then we perceive no rational basis for refusing to give preclusive effect to the
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judicial determination of that issue in the earlier case.

13 (Id. at 140.)
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14 Here, the elements laid out in Vogel are clearly met. First, Defendant was the same party

15 in both the Federal prosecution in Louisiana and the current prosecution in California. Although

16 not necessary to prove this factor, Defendant's incentives in the Federal case were also identical
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17 to his incentives here, i.e., to seek to suppress the identical evidence obtained after his arrest and

18 hotel room searches. Moreover, though also not required, not only is Defendant the same party in
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19 each action, but his attorneys here are the same as those who represented him and made the

20 motion to suppress in Louisiana Federal court. (See Lewin Decl., Ex. 4 [Deft. Motion to
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21 Suppress, 6-4-15], Notice of Motion p. 3 [listing Dick DeGuerin, Chip Lewis, and David

22 Chesnoff as his attorneys].)

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2 Second, the judgment of the prior case is final and on the merits. Judge Berrigan rejected

24 Defendant's Motion to Suppress in its entirety, and Defendant subsequently pleaded guilty. As

25 part of his plea, he waived any appellate rights. Specifically, Defendant "waive[d] and [gave] up

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 1 any right to appeal or contest his guilty plea, conviction . . . including but not limited to any right

2 to appeal any rulings on pretrial motions of any kind whatsoever . . . ." (Lewin Decl., Ex. 10

3 [Plea Agreement, 2-3-16].) As a result, Defendant's case resolved with a final judgment on the

4 merits, and he cannot attack the validity of Judge Berrigan's rulings. (United States v. Broce,

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5 supra, 488 U.S. at 569.)

Finally, just as in Vogel, the issues for which the People seek preclusion are identical to

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7 the search and seizure issues litigated in the Louisiana Federal case. The defense made numerous

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8 arguments in the 45 pages of pleadings in the points and authorities they filed. They argued that

9 "Durst's Arrest on the Ramey Warrant Violated the Fourth Amendment." (Lewin Decl., Ex. 4

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10 [Defendant Motion to Suppress, 6-4-15] at p. 9.) They argued that the "Evidence from Durst's

11 Arrest Must Be Suppressed Because the Ramey Warrant Affidavit Was Fatally Flawed under
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12 Franks." (Id. at 10.) They argued that there were material omissions and misleading statements

13 in the affidavit for the Ramey warrant and that it failed to state probable cause as written. (Id. at
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14 13-15.) They argued that the information obtained in the hotel lobby after Defendant's arrest

15 violated Miranda and that "The Warrantless Search of Durst's Hotel Room Violated the Fourth

16 Amendment." (Id. at pp. 19-32.) Finally, they argued that the subsequent search pursuant to the
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17 search warrant did not cure the "unconstitutional arrest, interrogation and warrantless search."

18 (Id. at pp. 33-43.)

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19 Defendant has restated these identical arguments in pleadings before this Court, albeit in

20 reference to motions unrelated to any of the search and seizure issues. In his Opposition to the
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21 People's Motion to Appoint a Special Master, Defendant argued that the Ramey warrant was

22 improper, that law enforcement questioned him in violation of Miranda in the hotel lobby, that
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23 law enforcement searched his hotel room without a warrant, and that the subsequent search

24 pursuant to a warrant contained alleged deficiencies. (Deft. Opp. to Mtn. to Appoint Special

25 Master, 12-15-16, pp. 4-10.) It is clear that it is Defendant's intent to raise these identical issues
 1 in motion after motion.3 Unless and until Defendant creates some new theory as to why the arrest

2 and subsequent search was illegal, he should be precluded from repeating the same arguments

before this Court.4

IV. CONCLUSION

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Defendant must be collaterally estopped from relitigating the identical issues that he

argued and lost in Louisiana. All of the requirements for issue preclusion with regard to the

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7 legality of Defendant's arrest, the propriety of the searches of his hotel room, and the seizure of

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8 the evidence therefrom are present here. In the interests of avoiding inconsistent rulings in

9 different jurisdictions, of establishing the finality of previously and thoroughly litigated issues,

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10 and of promoting judicial economy, Defendant should be collaterally estopped from relitigating

11 these issues.
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DATED: January 17, 2017

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Respectfully submitted,
JACKIE LACEY
15 District A rney

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JOHN WIN
Deput District Attorney

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3 Moreover, not only are the issues identical, but large swaths of Defendant's Federal court briefs, down to the
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exhibits, were cut and pasted without alteration, into Defendant's State court papers. (Compare Deft. Opp. to Mtn.
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to Appoint Special Master, 12-15-16, at pp. 4:8 - 10:23 ["Factual Background . . . Not surprisingly, the search
21 pursuant to Detective Whelan's warrant produced the same evidence as the FBI's warrantless search that preceded
it."] with Lewin Decl., Ex. 4 [Defendant Robert Durst's Motion to Suppress, 6-4-15] pp. 2 8 ["Factual Background
22 . . . Not surprisingly, the search pursuant to Detective Whelan's warrant produced the same evidence as the FBI's
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warrantless search that preceded it."].)

23 4 Only with regard to the statement Defendant provided to law enforcement in the hotel lobby, could it be reasonably
argued there is no issue preclusion. Judge Berrigan did not necessarily decide the absence of a Miranda violation.
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Although she concluded that there was none, it was not necessary to her decision. This was because Defendant
argued, contrary to established law, that there was a suppression remedy for physical evidence seized as a result of
Miranda defective statements. As Judge Berrigan recognized, there is none.
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 DECLARATION OF SERVICE BY ELECTRONIC MAIL
The undersigned declares under the penalty of perjury that the following is true and

correct:

I am over eighteen years of age, not a party to the above cause, and employed in the
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office of the District Attorney of Los Angeles County with offices at 211 West Temple Street,
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Room 1130A, Los Angeles, California 90012. On the date of execution hereof, at the prior

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request of defense counsel, I served the attached document by sending a true copy by Electronic
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Mail (E-Mail) addressed as follows:

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chipblewis@aol.com

donaldmre@yahoo.com
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ddeguerin@aol.com

dzchesnoff@cslawoffice.net
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Executed on January 17, 2017, at Los Angeles, California.
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JOHN LEWIN
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1
 CONFORMED COPY
JACKIE LACEY ORIGINAL FILED
superior Court Of caufernin
1 District Attorney coluify Of LPP Mirk' .

JOHN LEWIN (State Bar No. 154338)

2 HABIB A. BALIAN (State Bar No. 179344) JAN 1 7 1017
DAVID YAROSLAVSKY (State Bar No. 255574)
3
Deputy District Attorneys Sherri R. Carter, Executive O(ficer/Cieric
211 West Temple Street, Suite 1130 A By: Robin Armstrong, Deputy
Los Angeles, CA 90012
4 (213) 257-2242

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5 Attorneys for Plaintiff

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7 SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

FOR THE COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES

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9
) CASE NO.: SA089983

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10 PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA,)
) DECLARATION OF JOHN LEWIN IN
Plaintiff, ) SUPPORT OF PEOPLE'S MOTION TO
) COLLATERALLY ESTOP DEFENDANT
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12 VS. ) FROM CHALLENGING 1) THE
) LEGALITY OF HIS NEW ORLEANS
13 ROBERT DURST, ) ARREST; AND 2) THE LEGALITY OF
) THE SEARCH OF HIS NEW ORLEANS
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Defendant. ) HOTEL ROOM

) DEPT: 81
) DATE: February 15, 2017
) TIME: 10:00 a.m.
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 DECLARATION OF JOHN LEWIN
I, JOHN LEWIN, declare, under penalty of perjury, that the following is true and correct

of my personal knowledge, information, and belief:

1. I am a Deputy District Attorney assigned to handle the above-captioned case;

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2. Attached as Exhibit 1 is a true and correct copy of the FBI 302 Report regarding the

arrest of Robert Durst in New Orleans.

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3. Attached as Exhibit 2 is a true and correct copy of the search warrant issued to search

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room 2303 of the New Orleans JW Marriott Hotel.

4. Attached as Exhibit 3 is a true and correct copy of the FBI 302 Report regarding the

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search of room 2303 of the New Orleans JW Marriott Hotel.

5. Attached as Exhibit 4 is a true and correct copy of Defendant's Motion to Suppress filed
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12 in case 2:15-cr-00091, United States v. Robert Durst, E.D.La.
13 6. Attached as Exhibit 5 is a true and correct copy of the Government's Opposition to
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Defendant's Motion to Suppress filed in case 2:15-cr-00091, United States v. Robert Durst,

E.D.La.

7. Attached as Exhibit 6 is a true and correct copy of Defendant's Reply to the

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Government's Opposition to Defendant's Motion to Suppress filed in case 2:15-cr-00091,

United States v. Robert Durst, E.D.La.

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8. Attached as Exhibit 7 is a true and correct copy of Defendant's Memorandum Regarding

20 Whether a Hearing on his Motion to Suppress Is Warranted filed in case 2:15-cr-00091,
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21 United States v. Robert Durst, E.D.La.

22 9. Attached as Exhibit 8 is a true and correct copy of the Government's Supplemental
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23 Memorandum on the Question of Whether an Evidentiary Hearing Is Necessary filed in case

24 2:15-cr-00091, United States v. Robert Durst, E.D.La. There were exhibits attached in the
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 original filing of that pleading, but they were attached manually. These exhibits are not

unattached hereto, but they are available upon request.

3 10.Attached as Exhibit 9 is a true and correct copy of United States District Judge Helen G.

4 Berrigan's Order and Reasons denying Defendant's Motion to Suppress filed in case 2:15-cr-

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00091, United States v. Robert Durst, E.D.La.

11.Attached as Exhibit 10 is a true and correct copy of the plea agreement between the

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United States Government and Defendant filed in case 2:15-cr-00091, United States v.

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Robert Durst, E.D.La.

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10 Executed at Los Angeles, California on January 17, 2017.

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JOt LEWIN, Declarant
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