The Last 'Big Lie' of Vietnam Kills U. S.

Soldiers in Iraq

By Maj. Anthony F. Milavic, USMC (Ret.)

At a Vietnam Special Forces base during 1964, I watched a soldier fire 15 rounds
of .223 caliber ammunition into a tethered goat from an AR—15 rifle; moments after the
last round hit, the goat fell over. Looking at the dead goat, I saw many little bullet entry
—holes on one side; and when we turned him over, I saw many little bullet exit—holes
on the other side. Over time, those observations were confirmed and reconfirmed,
revealing that the stories we were told on the lethality of the .223 caliber cartridge were
fabrications. Those false reports drove the adoption of the .223 caliber cartridge as the
5.56mm NATO cartridge and, ever since, Americans have been sent to war with a
cartridge deficient in combat lethality; a deficiency that has recently caused the deaths of
U.S. soldiers in Iraq.

What is efficient combat lethality? The book Black Hawk Down quotes SFC Paul Howe's
description of SFC Randy Shughart, a soldier who elected to carry the 7.62mm M—14
into the urban battlefield in 1993 rather than the 5.56mm CAR—15 (M—16—variant):

'His rifle may have been heavier and comparatively awkward and
delivered a mean recoil, but it damn sure knocked a man down
with one bullet, and in combat, one shot was all you got. You
shoot a guy, you want to see him go down; you don't want to be
guessing for the next five hours whether you hit him, or whether
he's still waiting for you in the weeds.' [1]

With the wisdom of a combat veteran, Howe describes the lethality necessary for a
cartridge in combat—one—round knockdown power.

How did we get from military cartridges with proven one—round knockdown power such
as the 30—06 and 7.62mm to the 5.56mm? The journey starts with the term 'tumbling.'
This term has been associated with the .223 cal./5.56mm cartridge, since early in its
marketing as a potential military cartridge to this day. The very word, tumbling, prompts
images of a bullet traveling end over end through the human body in 360—degree loops:
in reality, it does not move this way at all.

Dr. Martin L. Fackler, COL., (Ret.) served as a surgeon Vietnam during 1968 and,
subsequently, pursued the research of terminal ballistics by observing the effects of
bullets fired into blocks of ballistic gelatin. In 'Wounding patterns for military rifle
bullets,' he reports the observation that 'all' non—deforming pointed bullets—this
included the 30—06 and 7.62mm military full—metal jacket bullets—— 'yawed' 180
degrees while passing through the gelatin to exit base—forward; i.e., heaviest end
forward. The 5.56mm projectile acted in the same manner with a very precise exception:
These rounds 'yawed' to 90—degrees, and then fragmented at their weakened serrated
band (cannelure) into two or more pieces when fired into ballistic gelatin. However, the
5.56mm projectile does NOT always yaw or fragment. Under field conditions, the
probability of these effects is reduced by the following factors:

——The round strikes the target at less than 2700 feet per second. That velocity is
reduced by: the farther the range to the target, the greater reduction in velocity; shortened
weapon barrel length as is the case with the shorter M—4 carbine; and/or, manufacturing
variances in the cartridge.

——Variances in human body thickness and flesh density and consistency.

In those cases, the bullet neither yaws nor fragments and causes only a pencil size hole
through the body; i.e., small hole in, small hole out. Neither Dr. Fackler nor anyone else
has provided any empirical data or estimate on the incidence of the 5.56mm
yaw/fragmentation effect on enemy soldiers. Conversely, since first used by Americans
in combat, there has been a consistent observation from the field—enemy soldiers
continue to fire their weapons after being hit by multiple 5.56mm bullets; evidently, no
yaw/fragmentation effect. Nevertheless, the term 'tumble' was apparently derived from
idealized yaw action and, as suggested by the following, was chosen in lieu of the word
yaw because it would 'sell' better. [2]

The book, The Black Rifle, M16 Retrospective by Edward C. Ezell and R. Blake Stevens,
' . . . is, so far as [the authors] could make it so, the truth about the controversial 5.56mm
caliber AR—15 (M16)—what it is, what it is not, where it came from, and why.'

Edward C. Ezell, Ph.D., now deceased, was the Curator/Supervisor of the Division of
Armed Forces History, National Museum of American History, Smithsonian Institution,
Washington, DC and the editor of perhaps the world's most famous gun book, Small
Arms of the World. The Black Rifle contains one of the earliest characterizations that the .
223 cal. bullet tumbled in a brochure produced by Colt's Patent Fire Arms Manufacturing
Company, Inc. The caption written by the book's authors reads, 'From the first Colt AR—
15 brochure, produced in a desperate attempt to interest somebody — anybody — in the
merits of the AR—15's 'unmatched superiority.'' In one of the three internal brochure
illustrations is text reading, in part, 'On impact the tumbling action of the .223 caliber
ammunition increases effectiveness.' [3]

In 1961, Colt's did get somebody's attention. The Advanced Research Project Agency
(ARPA) of the Department of Defense (DoD) was enjoined by the Kennedy
Administration to explore how the United States could support a foreign ally in a 'limited'
war. In the spring of 1961, ARPA's Project AGILE was implemented to supply 'research
and engineering support for the military and paramilitary forces engaged in or threatened
by conflict in remote areas of the world.' In October of 1961, ARPA provided ten Colt's
AR—15's to Vietnamese Forces in Saigon to conduct a limited test. The Black Rifle
remarks of this test, 'The number of rifles might have been small, but the enthusiastic
reaction of the Vietnamese and their American advisors alike who handled and fired the
AR—15s was just as [Colt's marketing agent] had predicted.' Armed with these positive
results, ARPA succeeded in expanding the Project AGILE study by procuring 1,000 AR
—15s for distribution among select Vietnamese units for field—testing. Ezell & Stevens
write that this approval resulted in ' . . . saving Colt's from almost sure financial disaster
and also setting the stage for the most influential yet controversial document so far in the
history of the already controversial AR—15.' [4]

The purpose of this test, as set forth in, ARPA, 'Report of Task 13A, Test of ArmaLite
Rifle, AR—15,' dated 31 July 1962, was ' . . . a comparison between the AR—15 and the
M2 Carbine to determine which is a more suitable replacement for shoulder weapons in
selected units of the Republic of Vietnam Armed Forces (RVNAF).' The Project AGILE
results were summed up, in part, by ARPA as follows: 'The suitability of the AR—15 as
the basic shoulder weapon for the Vietnamese has been established. For the type of
conflict now occurring in Vietnam, the weapon was also found by its users and by MAAG
advisors to be superior in virtually all respects to the M1 Rifle, M1 and M2 Carbines,
Thompson Sub—Machine Gun, and Browning Automatic Rifle.' NOTE: This study and its
recommendations concerned the suitability of the AR—15 for Vietnamese soldiers, who
were described by the testers to be of 'small stature, body configuration and light weight,'
NOT larger stature United States soldiers. [5]

In any case, the report was widely read and some of its components came under serious
question, especially those purporting to describe the demonstrated lethality of the .223
caliber cartridge. The following are three such examples from the Project AGILE report:

Example 1. 'On 160900 June, one platoon from the 340 Ranger company was on a
ground operation . . . and contacted 3 armed VC in heavily forested jungle.. . . At a
distance of approximately 15 meters, one Ranger fired an AR—15 full automatic hitting
one VC with 3 rounds with the first burst. One round in the head took it completely off.
Another in the right arm, took it completely off. One round hit him in the right side,
causing a hole about 5 inches in diameter.. . . (Rangers)'

Example 2. 'On 9 June a Ranger Platoon from the 40th Infantry Regt. Was given the
mission of ambushing an estimated VC Company.. . .

a. Number of VC killed: 5 [Descriptions of the one—round killing wounds follow.]

1. Back wound, which caused the thoracic cavity to explode.

2. Stomach wound, which caused the abdominal cavity to explode.
3. Buttock wound, which destroyed all tissue of both buttocks.
4. Chest wound from right to left; destroyed the thoracic cavity.
5. Heel wound; the projectile entered the bottom of the right foot causing
the leg to split from the foot to the hip.

These deaths were inflicted by the AR—15 and all were instantaneous except the
buttock wound. He lived approximately five minutes. (7th Infantry Division)'

Example 3. 'On 13 April, a Special Forces team made a raid on a small village. In the
raid, seven VC were killed. Two were killed by AR—15 fire. Range was 50 meters. One
man was hit in the head; it looked like it exploded. A second man was hit in the chest, his
back was one big hole. (VN Special Forces)' [6.]

The above 'field—reports' are incredulous on their face and some in DoD requested that
these results be duplicated scientifically. The Army Wound Ballistics Laboratory at
Edgewood Arsenal attempted to do just that. Using .223 caliber Remington ammunition
provided by Colt's representative, they conducted their 'standard lethality trials that
consisted of measuring the cavitational and other effects of firing at known distances into
blocks of ballistic gelatin, and where necessary, anaesthetized goats.' They failed to
duplicate the explosive effects reported by Project AGILE. In November 1962, the Army
initiated 'Worldwide' tactical and technical tests of the AR—15 by U. S soldiers.
Edgewood was tasked to perform further lethality tests using modified .223 caliber
ammunition. Ezell and Stevens describe the modifications: 'They had modified some 55—
grain .223 caliber ball bullets of Remington manufacture by cutting approximately 1/4
inch off the nose and drilling a 3/32—inch—diameter hole about 1/4 inch deep into the
lead core of each bullet.' The results? The authors continue, 'As it turned out, even the
hollow—points failed to duplicate anything like the spectacular effects recorded by the
Vietnamese unit commanders and their American advisors, which had subsequently been
taken as fact and much used as propaganda.' [7.]

The .223 caliber cartridge was morphed into the 5.56mm NATO cartridge and adopted
for the United States Service Rifle M—16 (formerly, AR—15) replacing the 7.62mm M
—14. How could such propaganda have convinced the Department of Defense to adopt
the .223 caliber cartridge? 'All this was inspired by the principle —— which is quite true
in itself —— that in the big lie there is always a certain force of credibility; because the
broad masses of a nation are always more easily corrupted in the deeper stata of their
emotional nature than consciously or voluntarily, and thus in the primitive simplicity of
their minds they more readily fall victims to the big lie than the small lie, since they
themselves often tell small lies in little matters but would be ashamed to resort to large—
scale falsehoods.'
Adolph Hitler, Mein Kampf [8.]

As is usually the case, a judgment based on lies was to adversely affect those at the
'pointy end of the spear.' American warriors reported enemy soldiers continuing to close
and fire their weapons after sustaining multiple hits by 5.56mm bullets. This happened as
early as 9 December 1965 in the official 'After Action Report of the Ia Drang Valley
Operation . . ..' popularized by the movie and book We Were Soldiers Once . . . and
Young. The commanding officer of the battalion engaged there, Col. Harold G. Moore,
USA, writes of assaulting enemy soldiers being hit by 5.56mm rounds: "Even after being
hit several times in the chest, many continued firing and moving for several more steps
before dropping dead." [9.]

Later in that war, a similar experience is voiced by Col. John Hayworth, USA (Ret.): 'In
one fire—fight, I saw my RTO place three rounds [of 5.56 mm] in the chest of a charging
NVA regular at 50 yards. He kept firing his AK and never slowed down. At 30 yards, I
hit him with a blast of double ought buck. It picked him up off his feet and he didn't get
up again.' [10.]

In the aftermath of the Vietnam War, the DoD increased the weight of the 5.56mm 55—
grain bullet (M193) to 62—grains, replaced some of its lead core with a tungsten steel
core, painted the bullet tip green and designated the new cartridge M855. In 1991, the
Pentagon sent its warriors to the Gulf War with this new green—tip cartridge. Maj.
Howard Feldmeier, USMC (Ret.) was there: ' . . . several Marines commented that they
had to shoot Iraqi soldiers 2—3 or more times with the 62—grain 5.56mm green tip
ammo before they stopped firing back at them . . ..' That report is exemplified by one of
an Iraqi officer who was thrown from his vehicle and set afire by an explosion:
'Somehow he managed to hold on to his AK—47. He also got up, still on fire, faced the
firing line of Marines and charged forward firing his weapon from the hip. He didn't hit
anyone but two Marines each nailed him with a three round burst from their M—16A2s.
One burst hit him immediately above his heart, the other in his belly button. [He] . . .
kept right on charging and firing until his magazine was empty. When he got up to the
Marines two of them tackled him and rolled him in the sand to put out the fire. . . . He
was quickly carried back to the battalion aid station . . .. The surgeons told me he
certainly died of burns, but not necessarily from the six 5.56mm wounds . . ..' [11.]

In spite of the above 'lesson learned,' the DoD dispatched its warriors to combat in
Somalia in 1993 with the same flawed 'green tip' cartridge as testified in Mark Bowden's
book Black Hawk Down: 'His weapon was the most sophisticated infantry rifle in the
world, a customized CAR—15, and he was shooting the army's new 5.56mm green tip
round. . . . The bullet made a small, clean hole, and unless it happened to hit the heart or
spine, it wasn't enough to stop a man in his tracks. Howe felt he had to hit a guy five or
six times just to get his attention.'

The Pentagon remained unmoved by that experience of its warriors and continued to send
them to war underpowered. On 4 April 2002, I received an e—mail from a trooper in
Afghanistan who appeals, in part: 'The current—issue 62gr 5.56mm (223) round,
especially when fired from the short—barreled, M—4 carbine, is proving itself (once
again) to be woefully inadequate as [a] man stopper. Engagements at all ranges are
requiring multiple, solid hits to permanently bring down enemy soldiers. Penetration is
also sadly deficient. Even light barriers are not perforated by this rifle/cartridge
combination.' [12.]

Additional observations of the impotence of the 5.56mm round soon appeared in official
and professional publications. In their official briefing 'Lessons Learned in Afghanistan'
dated April 2002, LTC C. Dean, USA and SFC S. Newland, USA of the U. S. Army
Natick Soldier Center reported: 'Soldiers asked for a weapon with a larger round. 'So it
will drop a man with one shot.'' In the October 2002 issue of the Marine Corps Gazette
magazine, Capt Philip Treglia, USMC reflected on his Afghanistan experience in
December 2001 by reporting that, 'the 5.56 mm round will not put a man to the ground
with two shots to the chest.' Capt Treglia's men were trained to fire two bullets into an
enemy's chest and if that did not knock him down, they were to shift fire to the head. This
is the corrective action implemented for these Marines and many others in the Armed
Forces for the impotent 5.56mm cartridge rather than equipping them with a rifle that
fired a bullet with one—round knockdown power. And, as Capt Treglia reported,
multiple hits with the 5.56mm bullet didn't work any better in Afghanistan than it did
anytime in the past.

In a 3 March 2003 written briefing, LCdr. Gary K. Roberts, USNR recommended to

RAdm. Albert M. Calland, Commander, Naval Special Warfare (NSW) Command that
he upgrades his command's 5.56mm weapons to the 6.8mm cartridge. That briefing,
entitled, 'Enhancement of NSW Carbine & Rifle Capability,' opens by observing:

Recent combat operations have highlighted terminal performance problems, generally

manifested as failures to rapidly incapacitate opponents, during combat operations when
M855 62gr. 'Green Tip' FMJ is fired from 5.56mm rifles and carbines. Failure to rapidly
incapacitate armed opponents increases the risk of forces being injured or killed and
jeopardizes mission success. [13.]

That statement was prophetic.

On 12 September 2003, in Ar Ramadi, Iraq elements of the 3rd Battalion, 5th Special
Forces Group engaged enemy forces in a firefight. An insurgent was struck in the torso
by several rounds of 5.56mm ammunition from their M—4 carbines (this is the current
shortened version of the M—16 Service Rifle). He continued to fire his AK—47 and
mortally wounded MSgt Kevin N. Morehead, age 33, from Little Rock, Arkansas. The
engagement continued with the same insurgent surprising SFC William M. Bennett, age
35, from Seymour, Tennessee from a hiding place and killing him instantly with a three
—round burst to the head and neck. SSgt Robert E Springer, threw away his M—4
carbine, drew an obsolete WWI/WWII vintage .45 caliber pistol and killed the insurgent
with one shot. A close inspection of the enemy's corpse revealed that he had been hit by
seven 5.56 mm rounds in his torso. Also, in this engagement, these soldiers were
provided with a commercially produced 5.56mm round of 77—grain weight vice the 62
—grain bullets in use by general—purpose forces. Obviously, the larger 5.56mm round
was of little consequence. [14.]

These reports are consistent with my own experience during three tours of duty in
Vietnam from the goat incident in 1964 described above to service with the 3rd Marine
Division in 1968—69; experience that repeatedly reminded me that this 5.56mm
cartridge was nothing more than the full—metal jacket military version of the
commercial .223 caliber Remington cartridge. The .223 caliber Remington was and is
today commercially advertised and sold as a 'varmint cartridge' for hunting groundhogs,
prairie dogs and woodchucks. The cartridge is offered with soft point, hollow point,
fragmentation, or projectiles incorporating two or more of these attributes to enhance its
lethality and assure a 'clean kill': one—round knockdown power on varmints. States such
as the Commonwealth of Virginia do not permit it to be used for hunting deer or bear
because its lethality—with or without those enhancements——does not assure a 'clean
kill' on big game. [15] Yet, its full metal jacket military counterpart continues to be
issued to American warriors in spite of almost 40 years of Lessons Learned that enemy
soldiers continue to fire their weapons and have even killed our soldiers after sustaining
multiple hits from 5.56mm bullets.

The lethality of the 5.56mm cartridge, sold on lies, cannot be fixed in truth. It is time the
Department of Defense recognizes this 'Big Lie' from the Vietnam War and in the names
of MSgt Kevin N. Morehead and SFC William M. Bennett replaces this varmint cartridge
with one that gives our warriors that critical capability described by SFC Paul Howe
above——one—round knockdown power!

The author's 25—year Marine career included service as an infantryman

and intelligence officer with highlights of three tours of duty in Vietnam
and, ultimately, representing the Defense Intelligence Agency as a briefer
to the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Secretary of Defense and other
Washington area decision makers. He currently manages MILINET an
Internet forum on international political/military affairs.

1. Bowden, M, Black Hawk Down, Penguin Books, 2000, p. 208.

2. Fackler, ML,"Wounding patterns of military rifle bullets," International Defense

Review, January 1989, pp. 59—64.

3. Ezell, EC & Stevens, RB, The Black Rifle, M16 Retrospective, Collector Grade
Publications, Inc., 1994, p. 98.

4. Ibid. pp.99—100.

5. Ibid. pp.101—106.

6. Ibid. pp. 106—107.

7. Ibid. p. 116.

8. Hitler, A, Mein Kampf. James Murphy, translator. London, New York, Melbourne: Hurst
and Blackett Ltd; April 1942; page 134.

9. Moore, Col. HG, 'After Action Report, Ian Drang Valley Operation 1st Battalion, 7th
Cavalry 14—16 November 1965,' dated, 9 December 1965, p. 8.

10. Hayworth, Col. J, E—Mail to author, 23 April 2002.

11. Feldmeier, Maj. H, E—Mail to author, 21 May 2002.

12. Anonymous, E—Mail to MILINET, 26 March 2002.

13. Roberts, USNR, LCdr. Gary K., Brief to RAdm Albert M. Calland, CMDR
NAVSPECWARCOM, 'Enhancement of NSW Carbine & Rifle Capability' brief, 3 March 2003.

14. Jones, Bruce L., 'MILINET: Case Studies in Combat Failures of 5.56mm Ammunition,' 3
November 2003
15. http://www.dgif.state.va.us/hunting/regs/section6.html#legaluse