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Introduction
A trend of outsourcing to minimizing the cost and maximising the profit becomes
the general business model in modern corporations. The organisation aims to
expand internally their production and manufacturing to the low labour wage
level and competitive production costs, especially Chian and South East Asian.
Even though the direct benefit of outsourcing to lower cost product sites, the
hidden issues are related to the complexity of networking, long distance
management, business goals alignment, compatibility, and sustainability. The
organizational theory can be applied to estimate the risk though the shareholder
behaviours that can assist in decision-making for business cooperation
(Christensen & Raynor 2003). This study uses the Nike Inc. as the case study of
using agency theory and stewardship theory to assess the current issues and its
possible recommendations. These two theories have a strong correlation but
they address in different domains. To assess the issue caused by the complexity
of business network of Nike, these theories will help Nike to establish the risk
management to moral hazard on their business.
Nike Inc. was established in 1962 by Bill Bowerman and Phil Knight and today
becomes one of the most recognizable companies in the world. Nike offers all the
athletic shoes, sport apparel, and accessories. In addition, Nike is the largest
sellers of athletic footwear and apparel in the world positioned with more than
50% of market-share. In 2015, Nike has 62,600 employees worldwide and more
than 790 contracted manufactures over 40 countries to sever their entire supply
chain.
Nike is considered one of the outstanding sustainability initiatives since they had
been public captured and criticised the issue of fair and equality labour wage
across their shareholders in 1998 (Porteous & Rammohan 2013) . Nike improved
their sustainability model and concern the public voice and issues on
environment, social, and employees. They have been working with both
government and non-governmental organisation to improve that situation. With
15 years of their journey, Nike has success improved and gained their
sustainability and innovation.
The main issues of Nike during end of 2000 was the lack of transparency from
the top management, their employees throughout the contracted manufactures
outside US. Nike integrated their corporate responsivity teams to get involve in
management decision-making with high consideration of sustainability in every
stage of Nike supply chain. Nike also set their internal KPI or sustainability
indexes to assist the decision-making on raw material selection, partners or
contracted manufactures, country of partners, footwear, and apparel (Connolly
2015). With the internal KPIs, Nike is able to control their shareholders though
this sustainability initiative. Moreover, Nike have been developed their new
products based on a disruptive innovation model to build the new market disrupt
on existing customers. As a result, Nike became one of the top innovate
companies in the world (Carr 2013). With this high attempt from Nike inside-out,
Nike has significantly improved their sustainability and innovation and resulted
positive public response on their issues of labour practices, environmental and
social impacted, and sustainability related.
The current issue of Nike under this theory analysis can be assumed as the lack
of organisational goals and objectives achieved through the stewardship (or
mangers at contract factories) with initial trust disposition. As Nike has a large
scale of shareholders, this issue becomes more different to promote the
involvement-orientation management philosophy through the network. The
different environment, culture, individual goals, psychology, and sociology make
this problem becomes more complex. However, the fundamental of internal and
external stakeholders have been significantly improved since 1998, including
labour wage, ethic, and human resource management. Nike human resource
management best practice has delivered to their contract factories. The special
training and knowledge information update has regularly conducted. However,
the issue of principle-stewards still remains. The recommendation to cooperate
this issue include shared goal setup and trust to promote goal alignment,
reducing the threat of opportunistic behaviour, reward contract factories though
nonpecuniary mechanisms, and reducing the use of legal contracts to enforce
behaviours (Van Slyke 2007).
Conclusion
The case study of Nike Inc. has been discussed and analysed using two key
organisational theories; agency theory and stewardship theory. The issues of
complex network of Nike to manage their contract factories was raised the key
issue to discuss in this essay. Nike have been improving their sustainability and
innovation to be top of the role models. Nike had been captured from public as
inability to conduct the equality on labour wage, and less concern on
environmental and social impacts. The agency theory has applied to evaluate the
current situation of Nike in terms of principle-agent relations. However, the
stewardship theory focused in stewards (agents) involvement and their
alignment through their behaviour, psychology, and sociology. The
recommendations to improve the partnership-agent can be classified into three
domains; reduce risks of agents, maintain agents, and promote agents. With
highly concern in their contract factories of Nike, the problem of moral hazard
will be minimised. The sustainability and capability in network management will
be increased as its consequences.
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