Collector of Internal Revenue vs Antonio Campos Rueda Further, the Supreme Court noted that there is already an existing

Further, the Supreme Court noted that there is already an existing jurisprudence (Collector vs De Lara) which provides

GR L 13250 that even a tiny principality, that of Liechtenstein, hardly an international personality in the sense, did fall under the

exempt category provided for in Section 22 of the Tax Code. Thus, recognition is not necessary. Hence, since it was proven

42 SCRA 23 Political Law Definition of State that Tangier provides such exemption to personal properties of Filipinos found therein so must the Philippines honor the

exemption as provided for by our tax law with respect to the doctrine of reciprocity.
In January 1955, Doa Maria de la Estrella Soriano Vda. de Cerdeira died in Tangier, Morocco (an international zone [foreign

country] in North Africa). At the time of her death, she was a Spanish citizen and was a resident of Tangier. She however left AKBAYAN-Youth vs Commission on Election

some personal properties (shares of stocks and other intangibles) in the Philippines. The designated administrator of her
GR 147066
estate here is Antonio Campos Rueda.

In the same year, the Collector of Internal Revenue (CIR) assessed the estate for deficiency tax amounting to about P161k.

Campos Rueda refused to pay the assessed tax as he claimed that the estate is exempt from the payment of said taxes
Political Law Election Laws Right of Suffrage Extension of Voters Registration
pursuant to section 122 of the Tax Code which provides:

On January 25, 2001, AKBAYAN-Youth, together with other youth movements sought the extension of the registration of
That no tax shall be collected under this Title in respect of intangible personal property (a) if the decedent
voters for the May 2001 elections. The voters registration has already ended on December 27, 2000. AKBAYAN-Youth asks
at the time of his death was a resident of a foreign country which at the time of his death did not impose a
that persons aged 18-21 be allowed a special 2-day registration. The Commission on Elections (COMELEC) denied the
transfer tax or death tax of any character in respect of intangible person property of the Philippines not
petition. AKBAYAN-Youth the sued COMELEC for alleged grave abuse of discretion for denying the petition. AKBAYAN-Youth
residing in that foreign country, or (b) if the laws of the foreign country of which the decedent was a
alleged that there are about 4 million youth who were not able to register and are now disenfranchised. COMELEC invoked
resident at the time of his death allow a similar exemption from transfer taxes or death taxes of every
Section 8 of Republic Act 8189 which provides that no registration shall be conducted 120 days before the regular election.
character in respect of intangible personal property owned by citizens of the Philippines not residing in
AKBAYAN-Youth however counters that under Section 28 of Republic Act 8436, the COMELEC in the exercise of its residual
that foreign country.
and stand-by powers, can reset the periods of pre-election acts including voters registration if the original period is not

observed.
Campos Rueda was able to prove that there is reciprocity between Tangier and the Philippines.

ISSUE: Whether or not the COMELEC exercised grave abuse of discretion when it denied the extension of the voters
However, the CIR still denied any tax exemption in favor of the estate as it averred that Tangier is not a state as
registration.
contemplated by Section 22 of the Tax Code and that the Philippines does not recognize Tangier as a foreign country.

HELD: No. The COMELEC was well within its right to do so pursuant to the clear provisions of Section 8, RA 8189 which
ISSUE: Whether or not Tangier is a state.
provides that no voters registration shall be conducted within 120 days before the regular election. The right of suffrage is not

absolute. It is regulated by measures like voters registration which is not a mere statutory requirement. The State, in the
HELD: Yes. For purposes of the Tax Code, Tangier is a foreign country.
exercise of its inherent police power, may then enact laws to safeguard and regulate the act of voters registration for the

A foreign country to be identified as a state must be a politically organized sovereign community independent of outside ultimate purpose of conducting honest, orderly and peaceful election, to the incidental yet generally important end, that even

control bound by penalties of nationhood, legally supreme within its territory, acting through a government functioning under a pre-election activities could be performed by the duly constituted authorities in a realistic and orderly manner one which is

regime of law. The stress is on its being a nation, its people occupying a definite territory, politically organized, exercising by not indifferent and so far removed from the pressing order of the day and the prevalent circumstances of the times. RA 8189

means of its government its sovereign will over the individuals within it and maintaining its separate international personality. prevails over RA 8436 in that RA 8189s provision is explicit as to the prohibition. Suffice it to say that it is a pre-election act

that cannot be reset.


Further, even if what is asked is a mere two-day special registration, COMELEC has shown in its pleadings that if it is
allowed, it will substantially create a setback in the other pre-election matters because the additional voters from the special
two day registration will have to be screened, entered into the book of voters, have to be inspected again, verified, sealed,
then entered into the computerized voters list; and then they will have to reprint the voters information sheet for the update
and distribute it by that time, the May 14, 2001 elections would have been overshot because of the lengthy processes after
the special registration. In short, it will cost more inconvenience than good. Further still, the allegation that youth voters are
disenfranchised is not sufficient. Nowhere in AKBAYAN-Youths pleading was attached any actual complaint from an individual
youth voter about any inconvenience arising from the fact that the voters registration has ended on December 27, 2001. Also,
AKBAYAN-Youth et al admitted in their pleading that they are asking an extension because they failed to register on time for
some reasons, which is not appealing to the court. The law aids the vigilant and not those who slumber on their rights.
G.R. No. 162759 August 4, 2006
Right of Suffrage
LOIDA NICOLAS-LEWIS, GREGORIO B. MACABENTA, ALEJANDRO A. ESCLAMADO, ARMANDO B. HEREDIA,
REUBEN S. SEGURITAN, ERIC LACHICA FURBEYRE, TERESITA A. CRUZ, JOSEFINA OPENA DISTERHOFT,
MERCEDES V. OPENA, CORNELIO R. NATIVIDAD, EVELYN D. NATIVIDAD, Petitioners,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, Respondent.
Facts: Nicolas-Lewis and the other petitioners were dual citizens who re-acquired their Philippine citizenship
under RA 9225, the Citizens Retention and Re-acquisition Act of 2003. They filed a petition to the COMELEC
praying to avail themselves the right of suffrage under RA 9189, the Overseas Absentee Voting Act of 2003
before the May 2004 elections. The COMELEC rejected their petition arguing that upon acquisition by the
petitioners of their foreign citizenship, they have renounced their Philippine citizenship and have abandoned
their domicile. The COMELEC further stated that before they could exercise the right of suffrage, they had to
meet the residency requirement among others provided in Section 1 Article 5 of the Constitution by first
establishing their domicile in the Philippines.
Issue: Whether or not the dual citizens who have re-acquired their Philippine citizenship pursuant to RA 9225
can exercise their right of suffrage under RA 9189?
Held: Yes. Section 5 of RA 9225 states that those who retained or reacquired their citizenship under this act
shall enjoy full civil and political rights, subject to certain conditions including the fulfillment of the
requirements under Section 1 Article 5 of the Constitution and RA 9189. The phrase all citizens of the
Philippines not otherwise authorized by law served as the guide to Congress in establishing a system for
absentee voting. Applying the doctrine of necessary implication, the strategic location of Section 2 Article 5 of
the Constitution indicates that it provides for an exception to the residency requirement in Section 1 which is
the affidavit to express the intention to reacquire the domicile in the Philippines without the requirement to
physically stay in the Philippines.
Roa v. collector of Customs
TRANQUILINO ROA, Petitioner-Appellant , vs. INSULAR COLLECTOR OF CUSTOMS, Respondent-Appellee.
Doctrine: Series of Conflicting SC Decisions re Citizenship
Date: October 30, 1912
Ponente: Justice Trent
Facts:
This is an appeal from an order of the Court of First Instance of Cebu recommitting the appellant, Tranquilino Roa,
to the custody of the Collector of Customs and declaring the Collector's right to effect appellant's deportation to China as
being a subject of the Chinese Empire and without right to enter and reside in the Philippine Islands. There is no dispute as to
the facts.
Tranquilino Roa, was born in the town of Luculan, Mindanao, Philippine Islands, on July 6, 1889. His father was
Basilio Roa Uy Tiong Co, a native of China, and his mother was Basilia Rodriguez, a native of this country. His parents were
legally married in the Philippine Islands at the time of his birth.
The father of the appellant went to China about the year 1895, and died there about 1900. Subsequent to the death
of his father, in May, 1901, the appellant was sent to China by his mother for the sole purpose of studying (and always with
the intention of returning) and returned to the Philippine Islands on the steamship Kaifong, arriving at the port of Cebu
October 1, 1910, from Amoy, China, and sought admission to the Philippine Islands. At this time the appellant was a few days
under 21 years and 3 months of age.
After hearing the evidence the board of special inquiry found that the appellant was a Chinese person and a subject
of the Emperor of China and not entitled to land.
In view of the fact that the applicant for admission was born in lawful wedlock
On appeal to the Insular Collector of Customs this decision was affirmed, and the Court of First Instance of Cebu in
these habeas corpus proceedings remanded the appellant to the Collector of Customs
Under the laws of the Philippine Islands, children, while they remain under parental authority, have the
nationality of their parents. Therefore, the legitimate children born in the Philippine Islands of a subject of the Emperor of
China are Chinese subjects and the same rule obtained during Spanish sovereignty
Issue: WON Roa is a citizen of the Philippines
Held: YES, The nationality of the appellant having followed that of his mother, he was therefore a citizen of the Philippine
Islands on July 1, 1902, and never having expatriated himself, he still remains a citizen of this country.
We therefore conclude that the appellant is a citizen of the Philippine Islands and entitled to land. The judgment appealed
from is reversed and the appellant is ordered released from custody, with costs de oficio.
Ratio:
His mother, before her marriage, was, as we have said, a Spanish subject.
 Section 4 of the Philippine Bill provides:
That all inhabitants of the Philippine Islands continuing to reside therein who were Spanish subjects on the
eleventh day of April, eighteen hundred and ninety-nine, and then resided in said Islands, and their
children born subsequent thereto, shall be deemed and held to be citizens of the Philippine Islands and as
such entitled to the protection of the United States, except such as shall have elected to preserve their
allegiance to the Crown of Spain in accordance with the provisions of the treaty of peace between the
United States and Spain signed at Paris December tenth, eighteen hundred and ninety-eight.
On the death of her husband she ipso facto reacquired the nationality of the country of her birth, as she was then
living in that country and had never left it. She was then the natural guardian of Tranquilino. Upon the dissolution of a
marriage between a female citizen of the United States and a foreigner, she ipso facto reacquires American citizenship, if at
that time she is residing in the United States.
There is no statutory declaration on the question as to whether or not her minor children would follow that of their widowed
mother. If the children were born in the United States, they would be citizens of that country. If they were born in the country of
which their father (and their mother during coverture) was a citizen, then they would be a citizens of that country until the
death of their father.
But after his death, they being minors and their nationality would, as a logical consequence, follow that of their
mother, she having changed their domicile and nationality by placing them within the jurisdiction of the United
States.
But, of course, such minor children, on reaching their majority, could elect, under the principle that expatriation is an
inherent right of all people, the nationality of the country of
"no principle has been more repeatedly announced by the judicial tribunals of the country, and more constantly
acted upon, than that the leaning, in questions of citizenship, should always be in favor of the claimant of it." Quoted with
approval in the case of Boyd vs. Thayer (143 U.S., 135)
JOSE TAN CHONG v. THE SECRETARY OF LABORG.R. No. 47616, September 16, 1947 LAM SWEE SANG v. THE
COMMONWEALTH OF THE PHILIPPINESG.R. No. 47623, September 16, 1947
Facts:
Petitioners on two cases, above-mentioned, are both born of a Chinese Father and a Filipino Mother. The first petitioner Tan
Chong was granted Writ of Habeas Corpus since he was declared to be a Filipino citizen due to the doctrine of Jus Soli. The
principle of Jus Soli applies in the determination of citizenship. Basically, the citizenship of a person is determined by the
place of his birth. Meaning, when one is born in a country, he acquires the citizenship of that country. This is also the situation
with the second petitioner. Second petitioners Petition for Naturalization was dismissed because he no longer needed to be
naturalized. However, the Solicitor General opposed the said Decision, saying that the two petitioners are NOT citizens of the
Philippines, pursuant to the laws existing during the time of birth. The principle of Jus Soli was adopted from the U.S. Constitution,
which states that all those born and naturalized in the US and placed under its jurisdiction is a citizen of the U.S. A contention
from the Solicitor General was made, saying that the principle of Jus Soli was not extended to the Philippines. Furthermore, if
ever the principle of jus soli was extended, it had its limitations. The law that prevailed, then mentioned that if one was born
after a certain date and in accordance with other conditions, which would only be the time when one is considered a citizen.
Otherwise, they are not to be considered citizens.
Issue:
Whether or not the principle of Stare Decisis should be followed on the precedents mentioned above, regarding ones
citizenship?
Held:
No, the principle of Stare Decisis does not mean being blind adherence to precedents.
Ratio:
Even if the doctrines laid down have been followed for years, if it has been found to be contrary to law, it should beabandoned
or reconsidered. Principle of Stare Decisis should not be applied if there is conflict between law and precedent. Given that the law enforced
during the time of birth of the petitioners, it does not allow them to be citizens of the Philippines, even if precedence tells that
they be allowed to be citizens of the Philippines, thus, cannot be declared Filipino citizens.
Republic vs. Sagun
G.R. No. 187567, February 15, 2012
FACTS:
Respondent is the legitimate child of father, aChinese national, and mother, a Filipino citizen. She was born on August 8, 1959 in Baguio
Cityand did not elect Philippine citizenship upon reaching the age of majority. At the age of 33, she executed an Oath of Allegianceto the
Republic of the Philippines. The document was notarized but was not recorded and registered with the Local Civil Registrar of Baguio
City. In 2005, she applied for a Philippine passport but was denied due to the citizenship of her father and there being no annotation on her
birth certificate that she has elected Philippine citizenship. Consequently, she sought a judicial declaration of her election of Philippine
citizenship and prayed that the Local Civil Registrar of Baguio City be ordered to annotate the same on her birth certificate.
ISSUE/s:
Whether respondents petition for declaration of election of Philippine citizenship is authorized by the Rules of Court and jurisprudence;
and
Whether the respondent has effectively elected Philippine citizenship in accordance with the procedure prescribed by law.
RULING:
Yes. But it should be stressed that there is no specific statutory or procedural rule which authorizes the direct filing of a petition for
declaration of election of Philippine citizenship before the courts. Respondent cannot now be allowed to seek the intervention of the court
to confer upon her Philippine citizenship when clearly she has failed to validly elect Philippine citizenship.
No. Based on the foregoing circumstances, respondent clearly failed to comply with the procedural requirements for a valid and effective
election of Philippine citizenship. Respondent cannot assert that the exercise of suffrage and the participation in election exercises
constitutes a positive act of election of Philippine citizenship since the law specifically lays down the requirements for acquisition of
citizenship by election.All that is required of the elector is to execute an affidavit of election of Philippinecitizenship and, thereafter, file
the same with the nearest civil registry. Having failed to comply with the foregoing requirements, respondents petition before the trial
court must be denied.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Decision of the Regional Trial Court is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The petition for
judicial declaration of election of Philippine citizenship filed by respondent Nora Fe Sagun is hereby DISMISSED for lack of merit.
SO ORDERED.
Case Digest: Republic v. Lao Ong
G.R. No. 175430 : June 18, 2012
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner, v. KERRY LAO ONG, Respondent.
DEL CASTILLO, J.:
FACTS:
Respondent Ong, then 38 years old, filed a Petition for Naturalization. Ong alleged in his petition that he has been a
"businessman/business manager" since 1989, earning an average annual income of P150,000.00. When he testified,
however, he said that he has been a businessman since he graduated from college in 1978. Moreover, Ong did not specify or
describe the nature of his business.
As proof of his income, Ong presented four tax returns for the years 1994 to 1997. Based on these returns, Ongs gross
annual income was P60,000.00 for 1994; P118,000.00 for 1995; P118,000.00 for 1996; and P128,000.00 for 1997. On
November 23, 2001, the trial court granted Ongs petition.
The Republic, through the Solicitor General, appealed to the CA. The Republic faulted the trial court for granting Ong's
petition despite his failure to prove that he possesses a known lucrative trade, profession or lawful occupation as required
under Section 2, fourth paragraph of the Revised Naturalization Law.
The Republic posited that, contrary to the trial courts finding, respondent Ong did not prove his allegation that he is a
businessman/business manager earning an average income of P150,000.00 since 1989. His income tax returns belie the
value of his income. Moreover, he failed to present evidence on the nature of his profession or trade, which is the source of
his income. Considering that he has four minor children (all attending exclusive private schools), he has declared no other
property and/or bank deposits, and he has not declared owning a family home, his alleged income cannot be considered
lucrative. Under the circumstances, the Republic maintained that respondent Ong is not qualified as he does not possess a
definite and existing business or trade.
The appellate court dismissed the Republic's appeal. The appellate court denied the Republic's motion for reconsideration.
ISSUE: Whether or not respondent Ong has proved that he has some known lucrative trade, profession or lawful occupation
in accordance with Section 2, fourth paragraph of the Revised Naturalization Law?
HELD: Court of Appeals decision is reversed and set aside.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: naturalization
The courts must always be mindful that naturalization proceedings are imbued with the highest public interest.Naturalization
laws should be rigidly enforced and strictly construed in favor of the government and against the applicant. The burden of
proof rests upon the applicant to show full and complete compliance with the requirements of law.
Based on jurisprudence, the qualification of "some known lucrative trade, profession, or lawful occupation" means "not only
that the person having the employment gets enough for his ordinary necessities in life. It must be shown that the employment
gives one an income such that there is an appreciable margin of his income over his expenses as to be able to provide for an
adequate support in the event of unemployment, sickness, or disability to work and thus avoid ones becoming the object of
charity or a public charge." His income should permit "him and the members of his family to live with reasonable comfort, in
accordance with the prevailing standard of living, and consistently with the demands of human dignity, at this stage of our
civilization."
It has been held that in determining the existence of a lucrative income, the courts should consider only the applicant's
income; his or her spouses income should not be included in the assessment. The spouses additional income is immaterial
"for under the law the petitioner should be the one to possess some known lucrative trade, profession or lawful occupation to
qualify him to become a Filipino citizen." Lastly, the Court has consistently held that the applicant's qualifications must be
determined as of the time of the filing of his petition.
A review of the decisions involving petitions for naturalization shows that the Court is not precluded from reviewing the factual
existence of the applicant's qualifications. In fact, jurisprudence holds that the entire records of the naturalization case are
open for consideration in an appeal to this Court. Indeed, "[a] naturalization proceeding is so infused with public interest that it
has been differently categorized and given special treatment. x x x [U]nlike in ordinary judicial contest, the granting of a
petition for naturalization does not preclude the reopening of that case and giving the government another opportunity to
present new evidence. A decision or order granting citizenship will not even constitute res judicata to any matter or reason
supporting a subsequent judgment cancelling the certification of naturalization already granted, on the ground that it had been
illegally or fraudulently procured. For the same reason, issues even if not raised in the lower court may be entertained on
appeal. As the matters brought to the attention of this Court x x x involve facts contained in the disputed decision of the lower
court and admitted by the parties in their pleadings, the present proceeding may be considered adequate for the purpose of
determining the correctness or incorrectness of said decision, in the light of the law and extant jurisprudence." In the case at
bar, there is even no need to present new evidence. A careful review of the extant records suffices to hold that respondent
Ong has not proven his possession of a "known lucrative trade, profession or lawful occupation" to qualify for naturalization.
Republic won the case.
Republic of the Philippines vs Chuley Lim
Constitutional Law Citizenship Electing Filipino Citizenship
In 1999, Chuley Lim filed a petition for correction of entries in her birth certificate with the regional trial court of Lanao del
Norte. Her maiden name was Chuley Yu and thats how it appears in all her official records except that in her birth certificate
where it appears as Chuley Yo. She said that it was misspelled. The Republic of the Philippines through the local city
prosecutor raised the issue of citizenship because it appears that Lims birth certificate shows that she is a Filipino. The
prosecutor contends that Lims father was a Chinese; that she acquired her fathers citizenship pursuant to the 1935
Constitution in place when she was born; that she never elected Filipino citizenship when she reached the age of majority
(she is already 47 years old at that time); that since she is a Chinese, her birth certificate should be amended to reflect that
she is a Chinese citizen. Lim contends that she is an illegitimate child hence she is a Filipino.
ISSUE: Whether or not Lim is a Chinese citizen.
HELD: No. The provision which provides the election of Filipino citizenship applies only to legitimate children. In the case at
bar, Lims mother was a Filipino. Lims mother never married the Chinese father of Lim hence Lim did not acquire the Chinese
citizenship of her father. What she acquired is the Filipino citizenship of her mother. Therefore, she is a natural born Filipino
and she does not need to perform any act to confer on her all the rights and privileges attached to Philippine citizenship.
Co vs. Electoral Tribunal
G.R. Nos. 92191-92, July 30, 1991
Facts:
On May 11, 1987, the congressional election of Northern Samar was held.Among the candidate is herein respondent Jose Ong,
Jr. Respondent Ong was proclaimed the duly elected representative of the second district of Northern Samar. Petitioners questioned the
citizenship of respondent Ong since Ongs father was only a naturalized Filipino citizen and questioned Ongs residence qualificationsince
Ong does not own any property in Samar.
ISSUE/s:
Whether the decision of HRET is appealable;
Whether respondent is a citizen of the Philippines; and
WhetherOng is a resident of Samar.
RULING:
Yes. The Constitution explicitly provides that the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal (HRET) and the Senate Electoral Tribunal
(SET) shall be the sole judges of all contests relating to the election, returns, and qualifications of their respective members. In the case at
bar, the Court finds no improvident use of power, no denial of due process on the part of the HRET which will necessitate the exercise of
the power of judicial review by the Supreme Court.
Yes. On April 28, 1955, Jose OngChuan, respondents father, an immigrant from China was declared a Filipino citizen by the CFI of
Samar. At the time Jose OngChuan took his oath, the private respondent then is a minor of nine years, was finishing his elementary
education in the province of Samar. Hence, there is no ground to deny the Filipino citizenship of respondent Ong. Respondent Ong was
also born of a natural-born Filipino mother, thus the issue of citizenship is immaterial.
Yes. The framers of the Constitution adhered to the earlier definition given to the word residence which regarded it as having the same
meaning as domicile. The domicile of origin of the private respondent, which was the domicile of his parents, is fixed at Laoang,
Samar. Contrary to the petitioners' imputation, Jose Ong, Jr. never abandoned said domicile; it remained fixed therein even up to the
present. Hence, the residency of respondent Ong has sufficiently proved.
WHEREFORE, the petitions are hereby DISMISSED.
Juan Frivaldo vs Commission on Elections
 174 SCRA 245 Law on Public Officers Citizenship of a Public Officer
In 1988, Juan Frivaldo won as governor of Sorsogon. Salvador Estuye, President of the League of Municipalities of Sorsogon,
filed with the COMELEC a petition for annulment of Frivaldos election and proclamation because apparently, Frivaldo, in
1983, was naturalized as an American. In his defense, Frivaldo said that he was forced to be naturalized because the then
President Marcos was after him; but that participating in the Philippine elections, he has effectively lost his American
citizenship pursuant to American laws. He also assailed the petition as he claimed that it is in the nature of a quo warranto
which is already filed out of time, the same not being filed ten days after his proclamation.
ISSUE: Whether or not Frivaldo can validly serve as a governor.
HELD: No. He has not regained Filipino citizenship. As far as Philippine law is concerned, he is not a Filipino. He lost his
citizenship when he declared allegiance to the United States. Even if he did lose his US citizenship, that did not restore his
being a Filipino because he did not undergo naturalization or repatriation proceedings. Neither did his participation in the 1988
elections restore his Philippine citizenship. At best, he is a stateless person. He cannot serve as governor when he owes
allegiance to a foreign state. The fact that he was elected by the people of Sorsogon does not excuse this patent violation of
the salutary rule limiting public office and employment only to the citizens of this country. The qualifications prescribed for
elective office cannot be erased by the electorate alone. The will of the people as expressed through the ballot cannot cure
the vice of ineligibility, especially if they mistakenly believed, as in this case, that the candidate was qualified. Obviously, this
rule requires strict application when the deficiency is lack of citizenship. If a person seeks to serve in the Republic of the
Philippines, he must owe his total loyalty to this country only, abjuring and renouncing all fealty and fidelity to any other state.
ANGAT V RP
G.R. No. 132244, 14 September 1999 [Naturalization; Reacquisition; RA No. 8171]
FACTS:
Gerardo Angat, a natural born Filipino citizen, asked to regain his status as a Philippine citizen before the RTC Marikina. RTC
allowed him to take his Oath of Allegiance on October 3, 1996 and the following day, the RTC declared him as citizen of the
Philippines pursuant to R.A. No. 8171.
OSG filed a Manifestation and Motion in March 1997, asserting that the petition should have been dismissed by the court for
lack of jurisdiction.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the RTC has jurisdiction in deciding over repatriation case.
RULING:
No. A petition for repatriation should be filed with the Special Committee on Naturalization and not with the RTC which has no
jurisdiction.Therefore, the court's order was null and void.
RA No. 8171, which has lapsed into law on October 23 1995, is an act providing for repatriation of Filipino women who have
lost their Philippine citizenship by marriage to aliens and of natural-born Filipinos who have lost the Philippine citizenship on
account of political or economic necessity.
Moreover, petitioner was incorrect when he initially invoked RA 965 and RA 2630, since these laws could only apply to
persons who had lost their Philippine citizenship by rendering service to, or accepting commission in, the armed forces of an
allied country or the armed forces of the US, a factual matter not alleged in his petition. Parenthetically, under these statutes,
the person desiring to reacquire his Philippine citizenship would not even required to file a petition in court; all he had to do is
to take an Oath of Allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines and to register the said oath with the proper civil registry.
ALTAREJOS V COMELEC
G.R. No. 163256, 10 Nov 2004 [Naturalization; Reacquisition]
FACTS:
Private respondents filed with the COMELEC to disqualify and deny due course or cancel the certificate of candidacy of
Ciceron P. Altarejos, on the ground that he is not a Filipino citizen and that he made a false representation in his COC that he
was not a permanent resident of the Municipality of San Jacinto, Masbate, the town he's running for as mayor in the May 10,
2004 elections. Altarejos answered that he was already issued a Certificate of Repatriation by the Special Committee on
Naturalization in December 17, 1997.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the registration of petitioners repatriation with the proper civil registry and with the Bureau of Immigration a
prerequisite in effecting repatriation.
RULING:
Yes. The registration of certificate of repatriation with the proper local civil registry and with the Bureau of Immigration is a
prerequisite in effecting repatriation. Petitioner completed all the requirements of repatriation only after he filed his certificate
of candidacy for a mayoralty position but before the elections. Petitioners repatriation retroacted to the date he filed his
application and was, therefore, qualified to run for a mayoralty position in the government in the May 10, 2004 elections.
AZNAR VS. COMELEC
GR # 83820, May 25, 1990 (Constitutional Law Alien, Loss of Citizenship)
FACTS: In the case at bar, petitioner challenged respondents right to hold public office on the ground that the latter was an
alien. Respondent maintains that he is a son of a Filipino, was a holder of a valid subsisting passport, a continuous resident of
the Philippines and a registered voter since 1965. He was, however, also a holder of an alien registration certificate.

ISSUE: Whether or not respondent is an alien.
HELD: No, because by virtue of his being a son of a Filipino, it is presumed that he was a Filipino and remained Filipino until
proof could be shown that he had renounced or lost his Philippine citizenship. In addition, possession of an alien registration
certificate unaccompanied by proof of performance of acts whereby Philippine citizenship had been lost is not adequate proof
of loss of citizenship.
AASJS V DATUMANONG
G.R. No. 160869, May 11, 2009 [Dual Citizenship; Dual Allegiance; RA 9225 - Citizenship Reacquisition Act of 2003]
FACTS:
Petitioner prays for a writ of prohibition be issued to stop respondent from implementing RA 9225, or Act Making the
Citizenship of the Philippine Citizens Who Acquire Foreign Citizenship Permanent, Amending for the Purpose Commonwealth
Act No. 63, as Amended, and for Other Purposes. Petitioner avers that said Act is unconstitutional as it violates Section 5,
Article IV of the 1987 Constitution: "Dual allegiance of citizens is inimical to the national interest and shall be dealt with by
law."
ISSUE:
Whether or not RA 9225 is unconstitutional by recognizing and allowing dual allegiance.
RULING:
No. Section 5, Article IV of the Constitution is a declaration of policy and is not self-executing provision.
What RA 9225 does is to allow dual citizenship to natural-born Filipino citizens who have lost their Philippine citizenship, by
reason of naturalization as citizens of a foreign country. In its face, it does not recognize dual allegiance.
VILLANUEVA, RESPONDENTS.
EUSEBIO EUGENIO K. LOPEZ, PETITIONER, VS. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS AND TESSIE P. VILLANUEVA, RESPONDENTS.
RESOLUTION
A Filipino-American or any dual citizen cannot run for any elective public position in the Philippines unless he or she personally swears to a renunciation
of all foreign citizenship at the time of filing the certificate of candidacy.
FACTS: Petitioner Lopez, a dual citizen, was a candidate for the position of Chairman of Barangay Bagacay, San Dionisio, Iloilo City held on
October 29, 2007, who eventually emerged as the winner.
On October 25, 2007, respondent Villanueva filed a petition before the Provincial Election Supervisor of the Province of Iloilo, praying for the
disqualification of Lopez (American citizen), hence, ineligible from running for any public office.
Lopez argued that he is a Filipino-American, by virtue of the Citizenship Retention and Re- acquisition Act of 2003.He said, he possessed all the
qualifications to run for Barangay Chairman.
On February 6, 2008, COMELEC issued the Resolution granting the petition for disqualification of Lopez from running as Barangay Chairman.
COMELEC said, to be able to qualify as a candidate in the elections, Lopez should have made a personal and sworn renunciation of any and all foreign
citizenship.
His motion for reconsideration having been denied, Lopez resorted to petition for certiorari, imputing grave abuse of discretion on the part of the
COMELEC for disqualifying him from running and assuming the office of Barangay Chairman.
RULING: SC dismissed the petition. The COMELEC committed no grave abuse of discretion in disqualifying petitioner as candidate for Chairman in
the Barangay elections of 2007
Lopez was born a Filipino but he deliberately sought American citizenship and renounced his Filipino citizenship. He later on became a dual citizen by re-
acquiring Filipino citizenship.
R.A. No. 9225 expressly provides for the conditions before those who re-acquired Filipino citizenship may run for a public office in the Philippines. Section
5 of the said law states:
Section 5. Civil and Political Rights and Liabilities. - Those who retain or re-acquire Philippine citizenship under this Act shall enjoy full civil and
political rights and be subject to all attendant liabilities and responsibilities under existing laws of the Philippines and the following conditions:
(2) Those seeking elective public office in the Philippines shall meet the qualification for holding such public office as required by the Constitution and
existing laws and, at the time of the filing of the certificate of candidacy, make a personal and sworn renunciation of any and all foreign citizenship
before any public officer authorized to administer an oath. (Emphasis added)
Lopez was able to regain his Filipino Citizenship by virtue of the Dual Citizenship Law when he took his oath of allegiance before the Vice Consul of the
Philippine Consulate General's Office in Los Angeles, California, the same is not enough to allow him to run for a public office.
Lopez's failure to renounce his American citizenship as proven by the absence of an affidavit that will prove the contrary leads this
Commission to believe that he failed to comply with the positive mandate of law.
Under the law, for the renunciation to be valid, it must be contained in an affidavit duly executed before an officer of law who is authorized to administer
an oath. The affiant must state in clear and unequivocal terms that he is renouncing all foreign citizenship for it to be effective.
While it is true that petitioner won the elections, took his oath and began to discharge the functions of Barangay Chairman, his victory can not cure the
defect of his candidacy. Garnering the most number of votes does not validate the election of a disqualified candidate because the application of the
constitutional and statutory provisions on disqualification is not a matter of popularity
MANUEL B. JAPZON VS COMELEC and JAIME S. TY
G.R. NO. 180088
January 19, 2009
FACTS: Manuel B. Japzon (Japzon) and Jaime S. Ty (Ty) were candidates for Mayor of the Municipality of Gen. Macarthur,
Eastern Samar in the elections of May 14, 2007. Japzon filed a petition to disqualify Ty on the ground of material
misrepresentation.
Japzon averred that:
1. Ty was a former natural-born Filipino, born in what was then Pambujan Sur, Hernani Eastern Samar (now Gen.
Macarthur, Easter Samar) to a Chinese father and a Filipino mother.
2. Ty migrated to the USA, became a citizen thereof, and resided therein for the last 25 years.
3. Ty falsely represented in his COC that he was a resident of Gen. Macarthur for one year prior to elections, and was
not a permanent resident or immigrant of any foreign country.
4. While Ty may have applied for reacquisition of his Philippine citizenship, he never actually resided Gen
Macarthur, Eastern Samar, for a period of 1 year immediately preceding the date of election as required under the
Local Government Code.
5. Ty continued traveling to the USA and comporting himself as a US citizen even after filing his COC and taking his
Oath of Allegiance.
6. He failed to renounce his foreign citizenship as required by RA No. 9225 (Citizenship Retention and Reacquisition
Act of 2003).
Ty responded to wit:
1. He was a natural-born Filipino who went to the USA to work and subsequently became a naturalized American
citizen. However, prior to filing his COC, he already filed with the Philippine Consulate General in Los Angeles,
California, USA, an application for the reacquisition of his Philippine citizenship.
2. He executed an Oath of Allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines before the Vice Consul of the Philippine
Consulate
3. He applied for and was issued a Philippine passport indicating that his residence in the Philippines was at A. Mabini
St., Barangay 6, Poblacion, General Macarthur, Eastern Samar.
4. He personally secured his Community Tax Certificate (CTC) in Gen. Macarthur, Eastern Samar.
5. He was registered as a voter at Gen Macarthur, Eastern Samar.
6. He executed on 19 March 2007 a duly notarized Renunciation of Foreign Citizenship.
Ty won the elections and was proclaimed Mayor of Gen Macarthur by the BOC in the interim.
The COMELEC found that Ty complied with all the requirements of RA 9225 and dismissed the petition. E vidence revealed
that Ty executed an Oath of Allegiance in the USA and a Renunciation of Foreign Citizenship on March 19, 2007, in
compliance with R.A. No. 9225. There was no material misrepresentation in his COC. Although Ty has lost his domicile when
he was naturalized as U.S. citizen, the reacquisition of Philippine citizenship and subsequent acts proved that he has been a
resident of Barangay 6, Poblacion, General Macarthur, Eastern Samar for at least 1 year prior to elections as stated in his
COC.
COMELEC went on to explain that the term residence is to be understood not in its common acceptation as referring to
dwelling or habitation, but rather to domicile or legal residence or the place where a party actually or constructively has his
permanent home, where he, no matter where he may be found at any given time, eventually intends to return and remain
(animus manendi). A domicile of origin is acquired by every person at birth until the same is abandoned by acquisition of new
domicile (domicile of choice).
Japzons motion for reconsideration was denied, in the same manner as his petition with the COMELEC En Banc failed.
The COMELEC En Banc held that a Natural born Filipino who obtains foreign citizenship, and subsequently renounces the
same, constitutes acts of repatriation and hence becomes qualified to run as a candidate for any local post.
ISSUE: Did the COMELEC err in its ruling by disregarding the parameters for the acquisition of a new domicile of choice and
residence? Did the COMELEC err in refusing to cancel Tys COC and to declare Japzon as the duly elected Mayor?
HELD: No
Japzons arguments:
1. When Ty became a naturalized American citizen, he lost his domicile of origin.
2. Ty did not establish his residence in Gen Macarthur, Eastern Samar, just because he reacquired his Philippine
citizenship. He failed to prove that he established a new domicile of choice.
3. Ty did not become a resident of Gen. Macarthur by merely executing the Oath of Allegiance under Republic Act No.
9225.
4. Ty did not meet the one-year residency requirement for running as mayor.
5. Japzon is the only placer in the elections and should be declared as the duly elected mayor.
Tys arguments:
1. COMELEC already found sufficient evidence to prove that Ty was a resident of the Gen Macarthur, Eastern Samar,
1 year prior to the local elections. Findings of fact of the COMELEC are binding on the Court.
2. Even if Ty is indeed disqualified from running, Japzon as the second placer cannot take his place.
OSGs position:
Ty failed to meet the one-year residency requirement. He was unable to prove that he intended to remain in the Philippines for
good and make it his new domicile. The OSG still prays for the dismissal of the petition considering that Japzon cannot be
declared the duly elected Mayor even if Ty is found to be disqualified.
RATIO: Ty was a natural-born Filipino. Even if he left to work in the USA and eventually became an American citizen, he
reacquired his Philippine citizenship by taking his Oath of Allegiance to the Republic before the Vice Consul in Los Angeles,
California in accordance with RA No. 9225. He then, became a dual citizen. It was only on March 19, 2007 that he renounced
his American citizenship before a notary public and became a pure Philippine citizen again.
RA No 9225 imposes no residency requirement for the reacquisition or retention of Philippine citizenship; nor d oes it mention
any effect of reacquisition or retention of Philippine citizenship on the current residence of the natural-born Filipino.
Citizenship and residence are independently treated in RA No 9225. Residency only becomes relevant when the natural-born
Filipino with dual citizenship runs for public office. He must: (1) meet the qualifications for holding such public office as
required by the Constitution and existing laws; and (2) make a personal and sworn renunciation of any and all foreign
citizenships before any public officer authorized to administer an oath.
Ty complied with the second requirement when he personally executed a Renunciation of Foreign Citizenship on March 19,
2007 before a notary public. By the time he filed his COC on March 28, 2007, he had already effectively renounced his
American citizenship.
Under Section 39 of the Local Government Code (RA No 7160), it is required that an elective official be a resident
of the independent component cities, component cities, or municipalites where he intends to be elected for at least
1 year immediately preceding the day of the election.
Ty admitted that he became a naturalized American citizen, which meant he must have abandoned Gen Macarthur, Eastern
Samar as his domicile of origin and transferred to the USA as his domicile of choice. His reacquisition of Philippine citizenship
had no impact on his residence/domicile. He did not necessarily regain his domicile in Gen. Macarthur, but merely had the
option to establish his domicile of choice therein. The length of his residence shall be determined from the time he made it his
domicile of choice and shall not retroact to the time of his birth.
Under Papandayan Jr., vs COMELEC, it is the fact of residence that is the decisive factor. The principle of animus revertendi
has been used to determine whether a candidate has an intention to return to the place where he seeks to be elected. Thus, it
is important to determine whether there has been an abandonment of his former residence. Absence from residence to
pursue studies or practice his profession does not constitute loss of residence.
In order to acquire a new domicile by choice, there must concur (1) residence or bodily presence in the new locality, (2)
an intention to remain there, and (3) an intention to abandon the old domicile. There must be animus manendi coupled
with animus non revertendi. The purpose to remain in or at the domicile of choice must be for an indefinite period of time; the
change of residence must be voluntary; and the residence at the place chosen for the new domicile must be actual.
The COMELEC found that Ty had been a resident of Gen Macarthur 1 year prior to the elections. Factual findings of
administrative agencies, such as the COMELEC, are binding and conclusive on the SC, most especially since the
Constitution intended to place the COMELEC on a level higher that other administrative organs.
Tys intent to establish a new domicile of choice became apparent when, immediately after reacquiring his Philippine
citizenship on October 2, 2005, he applied for a Philippine passport indicating his address at A. Mabini St., Barangay 6,
Poblacion, Gen Macarthur, Eastern Samar. He paid his community tax, securing CTCs and stating his address in Gen
Macarthur. Thereafter, Ty applied for and was registered as a voter on July 17, 2006 in the same town. He has also been
bodily present in the municipality since his arrival on May 4, 2006. His trips abroad are further manifestations of his animus
manendi and animus revertendi. Even with his trips to other countries, Ty was actually present in Gen Macarthur, for at least 9
of the 12 months preceding the local elections.
There is nothing wrong in an individual changing residences so he could run for an elective post, for as long as he is able to
prove that he has effected a change of residence for election law purposes for the period required by law. Ty has proven that
he had established residence/domicile a little over a year prior to the local elections, in which he ran for Mayor and in which
he garnered the most number of votes.
TEODORA SOBEJANA-CONDON, Petitioner, vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, LUIS M. BAUTISTA, ROBELITO V.
PICAR and WILMA P. PAGADUAN,Respondents.
Facts:
The petitioner is a natural-born Filipino citizen having been born of Filipino parents on August 8, 1944. On December 13,
1984, she became a naturalized Australian citizen owing to her marriage to a certain Kevin Thomas Condon.
On December 2, 2005, she filed an application to re-acquire Philippine citizenship before the Philippine Embassy in Canberra,
Australia pursuant to Section 3 of R.A. No. 9225 otherwise known as the "Citizenship Retention and Re-Acquisition Act of
2003."5 The application was approved and the petitioner took her oath of allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines on
December 5, 2005.
On September 18, 2006, the petitioner filed an unsworn Declaration of Renunciation of Australian Citizenship before the WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, the petition is hereby DISMISSED. The Resolution dated September 6, 2011 of
Department of Immigration and Indigenous Affairs, Canberra, Australia, which in turn issued the Order dated September 27, the Commission on Elections en bane in EAC (AE).
2006 certifying that she has ceased to be an Australian citizen.6

The petitioner ran for Mayor in her hometown of Caba, La Union in the 2007 elections. She lost in her bid. She again sought BM 1678
elective office during the May 10, 2010 elections this time for the position of Vice-Mayor. She obtained the highest numbers of
votes and was proclaimed as the winning candidate. She took her oath of office on May 13, 2010.
Petition for Leave to Reclaim Practice of Law of Benjamin Dacanay
7 8
Soon thereafter, private respondents Robelito V. Picar, Wilma P. Pagaduan and Luis M. Bautista, (private respondents) all
registered voters of Caba, La Union, filed separate petitions for quo warranto questioning the petitioners eligibility before the
RTC. The petitions similarly sought the petitioners disqualification from holding her elective post on the ground that she is a 540 SCRA 424 Civil Law Private International Law Nationality Theory Practice of Law is Reserved for Filipinos
dual citizen and that she failed to execute a "personal and sworn renunciation of any and all foreign citizenship before any
public officer authorized to administer an oath" as imposed by Section 5(2) of R.A. No. 9225.
In 1998, Atty. Benjamin Dacanay went to Canada to seek medical help. In order for him to take advantage of Canadas free
The petitioner denied being a dual citizen and averred that since September 27, 2006, she ceased to be an Australian citizen. medical aid program he became a Canadian citizen in 2004. In 2006 however, he re-acquired his Philippine citizenship
She claimed that the Declaration of Renunciation of Australian Citizenship she executed in Australia sufficiently complied with
Section 5(2), R.A. No. 9225 and that her act of running for public office is a clear abandonment of her Australian citizenship. pursuant to Republic Act 9225 of the Citizenship Retention and Re-Acquisition Act of 2003. In the same year, he returned to

the Philippines and he now intends to resume his practice of law.

The trial decision ordered by the trial court declaring Condon disqualified and ineligible to hold office of vice mayor of Caba La
union and nullified her proclamation as the winning candidate.
ISSUE: Whether or not Benjamin Dacanay may still resume his practice of law.
After that the decision was appealed to the comelec, but the appeal was dismissed y the second division and affirmed the
decision of the trial court.
HELD: Yes. As a rule, the practice of law and other professions in the Philippines are reserved and limited only to Filipino
The petitioner contends that since she ceased to be an Australian citizen on September 27, 2006, she no longer held dual
citizenship and was only a Filipino citizen when she filed her certificate of candidacy as early as the 2007 elections. Hence, citizens. Philippine citizenship is a requirement for admission to the bar. So when Dacanay became a Canadian citizen in
the "personal and sworn renunciation of foreign citizenship" imposed by Section 5(2) of R.A. No. 9225 to dual citizens seeking
2004, he ceased to have the privilege to practice law in the Philippines. However, under RA 9225, a Filipino lawyer who
elective office does not apply to her.
becomes a citizen of another country is deemed never to have lost his Philippine citizenship if he reacquires his Filipino
Issue: W/N petitioner disqualified from running for elective office due to failure to renounce her Australian Citizenship in
accordance with Sec. 5 (2) of R.A 9225 citizenship in accordance with RA 9225. Hence, when Dacanay reacquires his Filipino citizenship in 2006, his membership

to the Philippine bar was deemed to have never been terminated.

Ruling:

R.A. No. 9225 allows the retention and re-acquisition of Filipino citizenship for natural-born citizens who have lost their But does this also mean that he can automatically resume his practice of law right after reacquisition?
Philippine citizenship18 by taking an oath of allegiance to the Republic.

Natural-born citizens of the Philippines who, after the effectivity of this Act, become citizens of a foreign country shall retain No. Dacanay must still comply with several conditions before he can resume his practice of law, to wit:
their Philippine citizenship upon taking the aforesaid oath.

The oath is an abbreviated repatriation process that restores ones Filipino citizenship and all civil and political rights and (a) the updating and payment in full of the annual membership dues in the IBP;
obligations concomitant therewith, subject to certain conditions imposed in Section 5.

Section 5, paragraph 2 provides: (b) the payment of professional tax;

(2) Those seeking elective public office in the Philippines shall meet the qualification for holding such public office as required
by the Constitution and existing laws and, at the time of the filing of the certificate of candidacy, make a personal and sworn (c) the completion of at least 36 credit hours of mandatory continuing legal education; this is especially significant to refresh
renunciation of any and all foreign citizenship before any public officer authorized to administer an oath.
the applicant/petitioners knowledge of Philippine laws and update him of legal developments and
On September 18, 2006, or a year before she initially sought elective public office, she filed a renunciation of Australian
citizenship in Canberra, Australia. Admittedly, however, the same was not under oath contrary to the exact mandate of Section
(d) the retaking of the lawyers oath which will not only remind him of his duties and responsibilities as a lawyer and as an
5(2) that the renunciation of foreign citizenship must be sworn before an officer authorized to administer oath.
officer of the Court, but also renew his pledge to maintain allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines.
The supreme court said that, the renunciation of her Australian citizenship was invalid due to it was not oath before any public
officer authorized to administer it rendering the act of Condon void.
Compliance with these conditions will restore his good standing as a member of the Philippine bar. The original vendee, Lee Liong, has since died and the land has been inherited by his heirs and subsequently their heirs,
petitioners herein. Petitioners are Filipino citizens, a fact the Solicitor General does not dispute.
Lee vs. Director of Lands
The constitutional proscription on alien ownership of lands of the public or private domain was intended to protect lands
G.R. No. 128195
from falling in the hands of non-Filipinos. In this case, however, there would be no more public policy violated since the
October 3, 2001
land is in the hands of Filipinos qualified to acquire and own such land.
FACTS:
If land is invalidly transferred to an alien who subsequently becomes a citizen or transfers it to a citizen, the flaw in the
original transaction is considered cured and the title of the transferee is rendered valid.
Sometime in March 1936, the Dinglasans sold to Lee Liong (Chinese citizen) a parcel of land situated at the corner of
Roxas Avenue and Pavia Street, Roxas City. Thus, the subsequent transfer of the property to qualified Filipinos may no longer be impugned on the basis of the
In 1993, Elizabeth Manuel-Lee and Pacita Yu Lee filed with the RTC of Roxas City a petition for reconstitution of title of invalidity of the initial transfer. The objective of the constitutional provision to keep our lands in Filipino hands has been
achieved.
the lot. (Alleging that the transfer certificate of title issued to Lee Liong was lost or destroyed during World War II.)
Petitioners Elizabeth and Pacita alleged that they were the widows of the deceased Lee Bing Hoo and Lee Bun Incidentally, it must be mentioned that reconstitution of the original certificate of title must be based on an owners
Ting, who were the heirs of Lee Liong, the owner of the lot. duplicate, secondary evidence thereof, or other valid sources of the title to be reconstituted.
The RTC approved reconstitution of the lost or destroyed certificate of title in the name of Lee Liong on the basis of an
approved plan and technical description.
Solicitor General filed with the Court of Appeals a petition for annulment of the RTC decision alleging that the 2. Reconstitution was void for lack of factual support
RTC had no jurisdiction over the case.
The Solicitor General contended that the petitioners were not the proper parties in the reconstitution of title, since their
In this case, reconstitution was based on the plan and technical description approved by the Land Registration Authority.
predecessor-in-interest Lee Liong did not acquire title to the lot because he was a Chinese citizen and was
This renders the order of reconstitution void for lack of factual support. A judgment with absolutely nothing to support it is
constitutionally not qualified to own the subject land. void.
CA declared the reconstitution void. Hence this petition.
Elizabeth and Pacita emphasized that the ownership of the land had been settled in two previous cases of the Supreme As earlier mentioned, a reconstitution of title is the re-issuance of a new certificate of title lost or destroyed in its
Court, where the Court ruled in favor of their predecessor-in-interest, Lee Liong. original form and condition. It does not pass upon the ownership of the land covered by the lost or destroyed title.
They also pointed out that they acquired ownership of the land through actual possession of the lot and their consistent
payment of taxes over the land for more than sixty years. Any change in the ownership of the property must be the subject of a separate suit. Thus, although petitioners are in
possession of the land, a separate proceeding is necessary to thresh out the issue of ownership of the land.
On the other hand, the Solicitor General submitted that the decision in the reconstitution case was void; otherwise,
it would amount to circumventing the constitutional proscription against aliens acquiring ownership of private or public The SC Court REVERSES and SETS ASIDE the decision of the CA.
agricultural lands.

ISSUES:

1. WON Lee Liong has the qualification to own land in the Philippines. NO
Borromeo vs Descallar
2. WON the reconstitution was valid. NO
G.R. No. 159310 February 24, 2009

HELD:
CAMILLO F. BORROMEO, petitioner, vs. ANTONIETTA O DESCALLAR, respondent.
1. Lee Liong was not qualified but the ownership of the lot was already acquired by Filipino citizens Lee Liong was
disqualified to acquire the land under the 1935 Constitution. The sale of the land in question was consummated
sometime in March 1936, during the effectivity of the 1935 Constitution. FACTS:

Wilhelm Jambrich, an Austrian, met respondent Antonietta Opalla-Descallar. They fell in love and live together. They bought a
Under the 1935 Constitution aliens could not acquire private agricultural lands, save in cases of hereditary succession.
house and lot and an Absolute Deed of Sale was issued in their names. However, when the Deed of Absolute Sale was
Thus, Lee Liong, a Chinese citizen, was disqualified to acquire the land in question.
presented for registration, it was refused on the ground that Jambrich was an alien and could not acquire alienable lands of
The fact that the Court did not annul the sale of the land to an alien did not validate the transaction. It was still contrary to
the constitutional proscription against aliens acquiring lands of the public or private domain. the public domain. Consequently, his name was erased but his signature remained and the property was issued on the name
of the Respondent alone. However their relationship did not last long and they found new love.
The proper party to assail the sale is the Solicitor General.
Jambrich met the petitioner who was engaged in business. Jambrich indebted the petitioner for a sum of money and to pay
This was what was done in this case when the Solicitor General initiated an action for annulment of judgment of his debt, he sold some of his properties to the petitioner and a Deed of Absolute Sale/Assignment was issued in his favor.
reconstitution of title. While it took the Republic more than sixty years to assert itself, it is not barred from initiating such However, when the Petitioner sought to register the deed of assignment it found out that said land was registered in the name
action. Prescription never lies against the State.
of Respondent. Petitioner filed a complaint against respondent for recovery of real property.
The land is now in the hands of Filipinos.
ISSUES:
1. Whether or not Jambrich has no title to the properties in question and may not transfer and assign any rights and interest in
favor of the petitioner?
2. Whether or not the registration of the properties in the name of respondents make his the owner thereof.
RULINGS:
1. The evidence clearly shows that as between respondent and Jambrich, it was Jambrich who possesses the financial
capacity to acquire the properties in dispute. At the time of the acquisition of the properties, Jamrich was the source of funds
used to purchase the three parcels of land, and to construct the house. Jambrich was the owner of the properties in question,
but his name was deleted in the Deed of Absolute Sale because of legal constraints. Nevertheless, his signature remained in
the deed of sale where he signed as a buyer. Thus, Jambrich has all authority to transfer all his rights, interest and
participation over the subject properties to petitioner by virtue of Deed of Assignment. Furthermore, the fact that the disputed
properties were acquired during the couples cohabitation does not help the respondent. The rule of co-ownership applies to a
man and a woman living exclusively with each other as husband and wife without the benefit of marriage, but otherwise
capacitated to marry each other does not apply. At the case at bar, respondent was still legally married to another when she
and Jambrich lived together. In such an adulterous relationship and no co-ownership exists between the parties. It is
necessary for each of the partners to prove his or her actual contribution to the acquisition of property in order to able to lay
claim to any portion of it.
2. It is settled rule that registration is not a mode of acquiring ownership. It is only a means of confirming the existence with
notice to the world at large. The mere possession of a title does not make one the true owner of the property. Thus, the mere
fact that respondent has the titles of the disputed properties in her name does not necessarily, conclusively and absolutely
make her the owner.
IDEALS vs PSALMS
GR 192088, 9 Oct 2012Petitioners: IDEALS et al Respondents: PSALM et al
FACTS:
PSALM is a GOCC created by virtue of the EPIRA law. Said law mandated PSALM to manage privatization of NPC. When PSALM commenced the
privatization an invitation to bid was published and the highest bidder K-Water was identified. The sale to K-Water was sought to be
enjoined by petitioners who contend that PSALM gravely abused its discretion when, in the conduct of the bidding it violated
the
peoples right to information without having previously released to the public critical information about the sale.
ISSUES:
1.Can the bid documents, etc. used in the on-going negotiation for the privatization and sale of Angat hydro plant be accessed via the right to information?
2.Is the duty to disclose information the same with the duty to permit access to information on matters of public concern?
HELD:
1.Yes. The court reiterated that the constitutional right to information includes official information on on-going negotiations before a final contract. The information,
however, must constitute definite propositions by the government and should not cover recognized exceptions like privileged information, military and
diplomatic secrets and similar matters affecting national security and public order.
2.No. Unlike the disclosure of information which is mandatory under the Constitution, the other
aspect of the peoples
right to know requires a demand or request for one to gain access to documents and paper of the particular agency. Moreover, the duty to
disclose covers only transactions involving public interest, while the duty to allow access has a broader scope of information
which embraces not only transactions involving public interest, but any matter contained in official communications and public documents
of the government agency
People vs. Sandiganbayan (2nd Division)
[GR 145951, 12 August 2003]
First Division, Ynares-Santiago (J): 4 concur
Facts: Jose S. Ramiscal, Jr., Julian Alzaga, Manuel Satuito, Elizabeth Liang and Jesus Garcia were all charged with
Malversation through Falsification of Public Documents before the Sandiganbayan in Criminal Case 25741. The Information
alleged that Ramiscal, et. al. misappropriated and converted for their personal use the amount of P250,318,200.00 from the
funds of the Armed Forces of the Philippines Retirement and Separation Benefits System (AFP-RSBS). On 12 November
1999, Ramiscal filed with the Sandiganbayan an "Urgent Motion to Declare Nullity of Information and to Defer Issuance of
Warrant of Arrest." He argued, inter alia, that the Sandiganbayan had no jurisdiction over the case because the AFP-RSBS is
a private entity. The said Urgent Motion was later adopted by Alzaga and Satuito. The Urgent Motion was denied by the
Sandiganbayan in a Resolution promulgated on 6 January 2000. Ramiscal, et. al. filed a Motion for Reconsideration. In a
Resolution issued on 12 May 2000, the Sandiganbayan sustained Ramiscal, et. al.'s contention that the AFP-RSBS is a
private entity. Hence, it reconsidered its earlier Resolution and ordered the dismissal of Criminal Case 25741. Upon denial of
its Motion for Reconsideration, the prosecution filed the present special civil action for certiorari with the Supreme Court.
Issue: Whether the AFP-RSBS is a government-owned or controlled corporation or a private corporation and, corollarily,
whether its funds are public or private.
Held: The AFP-RSBS was created by Presidential Decree 361. Its purpose and functions are akin to those of the GSIS and
the SSS, as in fact it is the system that manages the retirement and pension funds of those in the military service. Members of
the Armed Forces of the Philippines and the Philippine National Police are expressly excluded from the coverage of The GSIS
Act of 1997. Therefore, soldiers and military personnel, who are incidentally employees of the Government, rely on the
administration of the AFP-RSBS for their retirement, pension and separation benefits. For this purpose, the law provides that
the contribution by military officers and enlisted personnel to the System shall be compulsory. Its enabling law further
mandates that the System shall be administered by the Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces of the Philippines through an
agency, group, committee or board, which may be created and organized by him and subject to such rules and regulations
governing the same as he may, subject to the approval of the Secretary of National Defense, promulgate from time to time.
Moreover, the investment of funds of the System shall be decided by the Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces of the Philippines
with the approval of the Secretary of National Defense. The funds of the AFP-RSBS, except for the initial seed money, come
entirely from contributions and that no part thereof come from appropriations. While it may be true that there have been no
appropriations for the contribution of funds to the AFP-RSBS, the Government is not precluded from later on adding to the
funds in order to provide additional benefits to the men in uniform. The above considerations indicate that the character and
operations of the AFP-RSBS are imbued with public interest. As such, we hold that the same is a government entity and its
funds are in the nature of public funds.
People's Homesite and Housing Corporation (PHHC) vs. Court of Industrial Relations (CIR)
Facts:
The PHHC seeks a reversal of the Resolution of the CIR en banc in ordering them to pay private respondents wage
differential for work. The Philippine government and World Food Program (WFP) entered into an agreement in a plan for the
Sapang Palay resettlement area in the PHHC proposing a self-help project to be undertaken by the squatter families for the
construction of two dams. The undertaking is for the purpose of water irrigation to be used for additional food production. In
recruiting participants to the program, the WFP issued an application form mentioning the voluntary nature of the work to be
rendered. The participants were assigned to work on canals and roads; however, the projects agreed between the PHHC and
WFP were never fully implemented. They were ordered to accomplish a time sheet which is the basis for the payment of 50
centavos/day and a weekly food ration. They were also provided with work tools and assigned a work supervisor to manage
and administer the Sapang Palay project in which the latter also conducted ocular inspection in the area. However, the
participants went to the Department of Labor complaining about their work and compensation which Secretary Ople suggest
that the workers in the said project must be paid in minimum wage law. After that, petitioner suspended work and the workers
assert their minimum wage and the 50 centavos be paid to them. The petitioner answered before the CIR that they were
exercising governmental functions and that they did not hire private respondents and CIR had no jurisdiction over them. The
Court dismissed the action of the petitioner since there was no evidence that private respondents rendered overtime work.
The petitioner moved to reconsider before the CIR but denied the claims. Thus, they elevated the case to the Supreme Court.
Issue:
WON the CIR has jurisdiction over PHHC, a government owned and/or controlled corporation performing governmental
function.

Held:
The Court ruled that the Court of First Instance had jurisdiction over labor disputes involving GOCC but not the
performing governmental functions. Since the National Housing Association was created, the Philippine government has
carried mass housing and resettlement program to meet the needs of Filipinos. The PHHC is governmental institution
performing governmental functions. Thus, the Court grant the petition and set aside the assailed resolution of the Court of
CIR.
SPOUSES FONTANILLA VS HON. MALIAMAN, digested
GR # 55963 and 61045, Feb. 27, 1991 (Constitutional Law Government Agency, Proprietary Functions)
FACTS: National Irrigation Administration (NIA), a government agency, was held liable for damages resulting to the death of
the son of herein petitioner spouses caused by the fault and/or negligence of the driver of the said agency. NIA maintains that
it is not liable for the act of its driver because the former does not perform primarily proprietorship functions but governmental
functions.
ISSUE: Whether or not NIA may be held liable for damages caused by its driver.
HELD: Yes. NIA is a government agency with a corporate personality separate and distinct from the government, because its
community services are only incidental functions to the principal aim which is irrigation of lands, thus, making it an agency
with proprietary functions governed by Corporation Law and is liable for actions of their employees.
Government of the Philippine Islands vs El Monte de Piedad Y Caja De Ahorras De Manila
35 Phil. 728 Political Law Parens Patriae
In June 1863 a devastating earthquake occurred in the Philippines. The Spanish Government then provided $400,000.00 as
aid for the victims and it was received by the Philippine Treasury. Out of the said amount, $80,000.00 was left untouched; it
was then invested in the Monte de Piedad Bank which in turn invested the amount in jewelries. But when the Philippine
government later tried to withdraw the said amount, the bank cannot provide for the amount. The government then filed a
complaint. The bank argued that the Philippine government is not an affected party hence has no right to institute a complaint.
The bank argues that the government was not the intended beneficiary of the said amount.
ISSUE: Whether or not the Philippine government is competent to file a complaint against the respondent bank.
HELD: Yes. The Philippine government is competent to institute action against Monte de Piedad, this is in accordance with
the doctrine of Parens Patriae. The government being the protector of the rights of the people has the inherent supreme
power to enforce such laws that will promote the public interest. No other party has been entrusted with such right hence as
parents of the people the government has the right to take back the money intended for the people.
GAUDENCIO E. FERNANDO and RUDY ESTORNINOS vs. COURT OF
APPEALSG.R. No. 159751 December 6, 2006QUISUMBING,
J care towards the child than the uncle will. The application of parens patriae here is in consonance with this countrys tradition
FACTS:
The National Police Criminal Investigation and Detection Group in the National Capital Region (PNP-CIDG NCR) conducted
police surveillance on the store bearing the name of Gaudencio E. Fernando Music Fair (Music Fair). Judge Perfecto Laguio
issued a search warrant against Gaudencio E. Fernando and a certain Warren Tingchuy. The warrant ordered the search of
Gaudencio E. Fernando Music Fair and the seizure of obscene pictures and pornographic shows. After searching the
premises and confiscating twenty-five (25) VHS tapes and ten (10) different magazines, which they deemed pornographic,
Petitioners with Warren Tingchuy, were charged for selling and exhibiting obscene copies of x-rated VHS Tapes pursuant
to Article 201of the Revised Penal Code.
ISSUE:
Whether or not obscenity is a ground for the State to exercise its police power to restrain the Constitutional guarantee of
freedom of speech.
HELD:
Court of Appeals affirming the Decision of the Regional Trial Court of Manila is hereby affirmed.
OBITER DICTUM:
Obscenity is an unprotected speech which the State has the right to regulate, the State in pursuing its mandate to protect, as
parens patriae, the public from obscene, immoral and indecent materials must justify the regulation or limitation. Obscenity as
defined in People v. Kottinger, is something which is offensive to chastity, decency or delicacy. In this case, the trial court
found the confiscated materials obscene and the Court of Appeals affirmed such findings. Pictures of men and women in the
nude doing the sexual act appearing in the nine (9) confiscated magazines and two (2) issues of QUI are offensive to morals
and are made and shown not for the sake of art but rather for commercial purposes, that is gain and profit as the exclusive
consideration in their exhibition. The pictures in the magazine exhibited indecent and immoral scenes and acts. The exhibition
of the sexual act in their magazines is but a clear and unmitigated obscenity, indecency and an offense to public morals,
inspiring lust and lewdness, exerting a corrupting influence especially on the youth.
Melchora Cabanas vs Francisco Pilapil
58 SCRA 94 Political Law Parens Patriae Strengthening the Family
Florentino Pilapil insured himself and he indicated in his insurance plan that his child will be his beneficiary. He also indicated
that if upon his death the child is still a minor; the proceeds of his benefits shall be administered by his brother, Francisco
Pilapil. The child was only ten years of age when Florentino died and so Francisco then took charge of Florentinos insurance
proceeds for the benefit of the child.
On the other hand, the mother of the child Melchora Cabanas filed a complaint seeking the delivery of the insurance
proceeds in favor and for her to be declared as the childs trustee. Francisco asserted the terms of the insurance policy and
that as a private contract its terms and obligations must be binding only to the parties and intended beneficiaries.
ISSUE: Whether or not the state may interfere by virtue of parens patriae to the terms of the insurance policy.
HELD: Yes. The Constitution provides for the strengthening of the family as the basic social unit, and that whenever any
member thereof such as in the case at bar would be prejudiced and his interest be affected then the judiciary if a litigation has
been filed should resolve that case according to the best interest of that person. The uncle here should not be the trustee, it
should be the mother as she was the immediate relative of the minor child and it is assumed that the mother shall show more
of favoring conflicts in favor of the family hence preference to the parent (mother) is observed.

DELA CRUZ vs. GARCIA
G.R. NO. 177728. July 31, 2009.
FACTS:
For several months in 2005, then 21-year old Jenie San Juan dela Cruz (Jenie) and then 19-year old Christian Dominique
Sto. Tomas Aquino (Dominique) lived together as husband and wife without the benefit of marriage. They resided in the house
of Dominique's parents Domingo B. Aquino and Raquel Sto. Tomas Aquino at Teresa, Rizal. On September 4, 2005,
Dominique died. After almost two months, Jenie, who continued to live with Dominique's parents, gave birth to her minor child
Christian dela Cruz "Aquino" at the Antipolo Doctors Hospital, Antipolo City. Jenie applied for registration of the child's birth,
using Dominique's surname Aquino, with the Office of the City Civil Registrar, Antipolo City, in support of which she submitted
the child's Certificate of Live Birth, Affidavit to Use the Surname of the Father (AUSF) which she had executed and signed,
and Affidavit of Acknowledgment executed by Dominique's father Domingo Butch Aquino. Both affidavits attested, inter
alia, that during the lifetime of Dominique, he had continuously acknowledged his yet unborn child, and that his paternity had
never been questioned. Jenie attached to the AUSF a document entitled "AUTOBIOGRAPHY" which Dominique, during his
lifetime, wrote in his own handwriting.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the minor child can bear the surname of the deceased.
HELD:
Yes. It is thus the policy of the Family Code to liberalize the rule on the investigation of the paternity and filiation of children,
especially of illegitimate children. The State as parens patriae affords special protection to children from abuse, exploitation
and other conditions prejudicial to their development. In the eyes of society, a child with an unknown father bears the stigma
of dishonor. It is to petitioner minor child's best interests to allow him to bear the surname of the now deceased Dominique
and enter it in his birth certificate.
Malto v. People, GR 16473 (Case Digest)
Focus Topics: Abuse; Minors and Incapacitated; Parens Patriae; Government; Elements; State
Whereas, mankind owes to the child the best it has to give.
FACTS
Sometime during the month of November 1997 to 1998, Malto seduced his student, AAA, a minor, to indulge in sexual
intercourse several times with him. Prior to the incident, petitioner and AAA had a mutual understanding and became
sweethearts. Pressured and afraid of the petitioners threat to end their relationship, AAA succumbed and both had sexual
intercourse.
Upon discovery of what AAA underwent, AAAs mother lodged a complaint in the Office of the City Prosecutor of Pasay City.
Assistant City Prosecutor charged the petitioner in an Information a violation of Section 5(a), Article III, RA 7610. During the
month of November 1997 up to 1998, in Pasay City, Michael John. Z. Malto, a professor, did then and there willfully, unlawfully
and feloniously take advantage and exert influence, relationship and moral ascendancy and induce and/or seduce his student
at Assumption College, complainant, AAA, a minor of 17 years old, to indulge in sexual intercourse and lascivious conduct for
several times with him as in fact said accused has carnal knowledge.
The trial court found the evidence for the prosecution sufficient to sustain petitioners conviction and rendered a decision
finding petitioner guilty beyond reasonable doubt for violation of Article III, Section 5(a), par. 3 of RA 7610, as amended and
sentenced him to reclusion temporal.
In a decision, the appellate court affirmed his conviction even if it found that his acts were not covered by paragraph (a) but by
paragraph (b) of Section 5, Article III of RA 7610; and thereby sentenced to an indeterminate penalty prision mayor.
ISSUE
Whether or not the CA erred in sustaining petitioners conviction on the grounds that there was no rape committed since their
sexual intercourse was consensual by reason of their sweetheart relationship
HELD
NEGATIVE. Petitioner is wrong.
Petitioner violated Section 5(b), Article III of RA 7610, as amended. The first element of Section 5(b), Article III of RA 7610
pertains to the act or acts committed by the accused. The second element refers to the state or condition of the offended
party. The third element corresponds to the minority or age of the offended party. Since all three elements of the crime were
present, the conviction of petitioner was proper.
Consent of the child is immaterial in criminal cases involving violation of Sec. 5, Art. III of RA 7610. Petitioner claims that AAA
welcomed his kisses and touches and consented to have sexual intercourse with him. They engaged in these acts out of
mutual love and affection. The sweetheart theory applies in acts of lasciviousness and rape, felonies committed against or
without the consent of the victim. It operates on the theory that the sexual act was consensual. It requires proof that the
accused and the victim were lovers and that she consented to the sexual relations.30
For purposes of sexual intercourse and lascivious conduct in child abuse cases under RA 7610, the sweetheart defense is
unacceptable. A child exploited in prostitution or subjected to other sexual abuse cannot validly give consent to sexual
intercourse with another person.
A child cannot give consent to a contract under our civil laws. This is on the rationale that she can easily be the victim of fraud
as she is not capable of fully understanding or knowing the nature or import of her actions. The State, as parens patriae, is
under the obligation to minimize the risk of harm to those who, because of their minority, are as yet unable to take care of
themselves fully. Those of tender years deserve its protection.
The harm which results from a childs bad decision in a sexual encounter may be infinitely more damaging to her than a bad
business deal. Thus, the law should protect her from the harmful consequences of her attempts at adult sexual behavior. For
this reason, a child should not be deemed to have validly consented to adult sexual activity and to surrender herself in the act
of ultimate physical intimacy under a law which seeks to afford her special protection against abuse, exploitation and
discrimination. In other words, a child is presumed by law to be incapable of giving rational consent to any lascivious act or
sexual intercourse.
To provide special protection to children from all forms of abuse, neglect, cruelty, exploitation and discrimination, and other
conditions prejudicial to their development; provide sanctions for their commission and carry out a program for prevention and
deterrence of and crisis intervention in situations of child abuse, exploitation, and discrimination. [A]s well as to intervene on
behalf of the child when the parents, guardian, teacher or person having care or custody of the child fails or is unable to
protect the child against abuse, exploitation, and discrimination or when such acts against the child are committed by the
said parent, guardian, teacher or person having care and custody of the same.
The best interest of children shall be the paramount consideration in all actions concerning them, whether undertaken by
public or private social welfare institutions, courts of law, administrative authorities, and legislative bodies, consistent with the
principles of First Call for Children as enunciated in the United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child. Every effort
shall be exerted to promote the welfare of children and enhance their opportunities for a useful and happy life.
Bacolod City Water District v. Bayona, GR 168780 (Case Digest)
Focus topics: Retirees; Parens Patriae; Government; Elements; State
FACTS
In the case of Davao Water District, et al. vs. Civil Service Commission (CSC), the Supreme Court declared that a water
district is a corporation created pursuant to PD 198. As such, its officers and employees should seek coverage under the Civil
Service Law and not the Labor Code. This decision was promulgated on September 13, 1991, and obtained finality on March
12, 1992.
Unaware of said ruling, Bacolod City Water District (BACIWA) and its employees entered into a Collective Bargaining
Agreement on October 1, 1991, to govern their employer-employee relationship until September 30, 1996. To resolve the
conflict on whether or not to apply the jurisprudence mentioned above or the provisions of the CBA, a tripartite committee was
organized. Said committee issued guidelines and agreed that, all benefits provided under the duly existing CBAs entered into
prior to March 12, 1992 shall continue up to the Respective Expiry Dates of the benefits or CBAs, whichever comes earlier.
On May 16, 1994, an employee of BACIWA, Juanito H. Bayona, reached the age of 60. He had been with BACIWA for the
past 13 years. He sought clarification on the applicable retirement age for the employees of BACIWA and was informed that
water district employees could retire at age 65.
Section 2 of Article XVI of the CBA between BACIWAs Union and BACIWA provides that the cumpolsary retirement age is 60
years old. BACIWA extended the term of Bayona until 31 December 1995.
CSC provided that the provisions of P.D. 1146 otherwise known as the Revised Government Service Insurance Act of 1977
providing for a compulsory retirement age of sixty-five (65) years with at least fifteen (15) years of service should prevail.
Bayona wrote another letter to the CSC. Now considered retired from service, Bayona informed the CSC about his request to
BACIWA for his immediate reinstatement. It was ruled by the CSC that the compulsory retirement age for personnel of the
Bacolod City Water District is sixty-five (65) years with an option to retire earlier at age sixty (60) years.
BACIWA filed a motion for reconsideration and asked whether the CSCs ruling that the compulsory retirement age for
BACIWA personnel is 65 years, with an option to retire earlier at 60 years, applies specifically to Bayona. BACIWA insisted
that the compulsory decision should be made applicable only after 30 September 1996, the expiry of the CBA.
The CSC ruled that BACIWAs retirement plan, as stated in the CBA, violates PD 1146, an existing law. BACIWA filed a
petition for review before the appellate court. The appellate court affirmed the decision of CSC. The omission of the claim for
reinstatement and back salaries should not be construed as a bar to award what is a necessary consequence of Bayonas
illegal removal.
ISSUE
Whether or not BACIWA should reinstate Bayona and is liable to pay the award of back salaries and other benefits
HELD
AFFIRMATIVE. In case of illegal termination, the employee shall be reinstated with payment of back salaries. x x x The
Revised Uniform Rules took effect on 14 September 1999. Clearly, when the CSC issued a resolution and awarded Bayona
his back salaries and benefits, the Revised Uniform Rules were already in effect.
BACIWA insists that there should be no award of back salaries and other benefits because of the appellate courts declaration
that [w]ith the Tripartite Committee (that included the CSC), agreeing to continue the existence of said CBA up to its expiry
date, there was no bad faith involved in BACIWAs decision to retire Bayona. BACIWA cannot rely on this declaration.
Substantial justice cannot be served if we continue to allow BACIWA to treat Bayona as retired at age 60 even after the
annulment of its CBA provision mandating retirement at 60 years. When the appellate court stated that PD 1146 gives
Bayona a right to be compulsorily retired at age 65 and he cannot waive that right because such waiver is contrary to public
policy,21 the appellate court definitely did not bar Bayonas reinstatement and payment of back salaries and other benefits.
The state as parens patriae fixed the compulsory retirement age of members of its personnel to ensure their welfare as well
as the good of the State. The chosen age is based upon vital considerations like, among others, the general physical and
mental health of the employee, his productivity or creativity; economic benefit to the employee and the financial constraints of
the government agency concerned. It is clear to this Court that the fixing of the compulsory retirement age at 65 is a public
policy.
Macariola v.Asuncion, A.M. No. 133-J (Case Digest)
Focus Topics: Effects of Change in Sovereignty; Sovereignty; Elements; State
FACTS
On August 6, 1968 Bernardita R. Macariola charged respondent Judge Elias B. Asuncion of the Court of First Instance of
Leyte, now Associate Justice of the Court of Appeals, with acts unbecoming a judge when the latter purchased a property
which was previously the subject of litigation on which he rendered decision. Respondent and his wife were also members of
Traders Manufacturing and Fishing Industries Inc. to which their shares and interests in said property were conveyed.
According to the petitioner, respondent allegedly violated Article 1491, par. 5, of the New Civil Code in acquiring by purchase
a portion of Lot No. 1184-E which was one of those properties involved in in a case decided by him and that he likewise
violated Article 14, par. 1 and 5 of the Code of Commerce, Section 3, par. H, of R.A. 3019, Sec. 12, Rule XVIII of the Civil
Service Rules, and Canon 25 of the Canons of Judicial Ethics, by associating himself with the Traders Manufacturing and
Fishing Industries, Inc., as a stockholder and a ranking officer while he was a judge of the Court of First Instance of Leyte.
ISSUES
I. Whether or not respondent Judge violated Article 1491, paragraph 5, of the New Civil Code in acquiring by purchase a
portion of Lot No. 1184-E.
II. Whether or not respondent Judge violated paragraphs 1 and 5, Article 14 of the Code of Commerce when he associated
himself with the Traders Manufacturing and Fishing Industries, Inc.
HELD
I Campos, Jr., March 19, 1993
NEGATIVE. [The Court] find that there is no merit in the contention of complainant that respondent Judge Elias B. Asuncion
violated Article 1491, paragraph 5, of the New Civil Code in acquiring by purchase a portion of Lot No. 1184-E which was one
of those properties involved in Civil Case No. 3010.
The prohibition in the aforesaid Article applies only to the sale or assignment of the property which is the subject of litigation to
the persons disqualified therein. In the case at bar, when the respondent Judge purchased on March 6, 1965 a portion of Lot
1184-E, the decision in Civil Case No. 3010 which he rendered on June 8, 1963 was already final because none of the parties
therein filed an appeal; hence, the lot in question was no longer subject of the litigation.
Finally, while it is. true that respondent Judge did not violate paragraph 5, Article 1491 of the New Civil Code in acquiring by
purchase a portion of Lot 1184-E which was in litigation in his court, it was, however, improper for him to have acquired the
same. He should be reminded of Canon 3 of the Canons of Judicial Ethics which requires that: A judges official conduct
should be free from the appearance of impropriety, and his personal behavior, not only upon the bench and in the
performance of judicial duties, but also in his everyday life, should be beyond reproach.
II
NEGATIVE. Respondent Judge cannot be held liable under [paragraphs 1 and 5, Article 14 of the Code of Commerce]
because there is no showing that respondent participated or intervened in his official capacity in the business or transactions
of the Traders Manufacturing and Fishing Industries, Inc. In the case at bar, the business of the corporation in which
respondent participated has obviously no relation or connection with his judicial office. The business of said corporation is not
that kind where respondent intervenes or takes part in his capacity as Judge of the Court of First Instance.
It is [the Courts] considered view that although [paragraphs 1 and 5, Article 14] is incorporated in the Code of Commerce
which is part of the commercial laws of the Philippines, it, however, partakes of the nature of a political law as it regulates the
relationship between the government and certain public officers and employees, like justices and judges.
Article 14 of the Code of Commerce partakes more of the nature of an administrative law because it regulates the conduct of
certain public officers and employees with respect to engaging in business: hence, political in essence. It is significant to note
that the present Code of Commerce is the Spanish Code of Commerce of 1885, with some modifications made by the
Commission de Codificacion de las Provincias de Ultramar, which was extended to the Philippines by the Royal Decree of
August 6, 1888, and took effect as law in this jurisdiction on December 1, 1888.
Upon the transfer of sovereignty from Spain to the United States and later on from the United States to the Republic of the
Philippines, Article 14 of this Code of Commerce must be deemed to have been abrogated because where there is change of
sovereignty, the political laws of the former sovereign, whether compatible or not with those of the new sovereign, are
automatically abrogated, unless they are expressly re-enacted by affirmative act of the new sovereign.
Likewise, in People vs. Perfecto (43 Phil. 887, 897 [1922]), this Court stated that: It is a general principle of the public law
that on acquisition of territory the previous political relations of the ceded region are totally abrogated.
There appears no enabling or affirmative act that continued the effectivity of the aforestated provision of the Code of
Commerce after the change of sovereignty from Spain to the United States and then to the Republic of the Philippines.
Consequently, Article 14 of the Code of Commerce has no legal and binding effect and cannot apply to the respondent, then
Judge of the Court of First Instance, now Associate Justice of the Court of Appeals.
Republic vs. Sandoval
Topic: Sovereignty - Suit not against the State - Beyond the Scope of Authority
Facts:
The heirs of the deceased of the January 22, 1987 Mendiola massacre together with those injured (Caylao group),
instituted the petition, seeking the reversal and setting aside of the orders of respondent Judge Sandoval (May 31 and Aug 8,
1988) in "Erlinda Caylao, et al. vs. Republic of the Philippines, et al." which dismissed the case against the Republic of the
Philippines
May 31 order: Because the impleaded military officers are being charged in their personal and official
capacity, holding them liable, if at all, would not result in financial responsibility of the government
Aug 8 order: denied the motions filed by both parties for reconsideration
In January 1987, farmers and their sympathizers presented their demands for what they called "genuine agrarian
reform"
The Kilusang Magbubukid ng Pilipinas (KMP), led by Jaime Tadeo, presented their problems and demands such
as:
giving lands for free to farmers
zero retention of lands by landlords
stop amortizations of land payments
Dialogue between the farmers and then Ministry of Agrarian Reform (MAR) began on January 15, 1987
On January 20, 1987, Tadeo met with MAR Minister Heherson Alvarez
Alvarez was only able to promise to do his best to bring the matter to the attention of then President Cory Aquino
during the January 21 Cabinet meeting
Tension mounted the next day
The farmers, on their 7th day of encampment, barricaded the MAR premises and prevented the employees from
going inside their offices
On January 22, 1987, following a heated discussion between Alvarez and Tadeo, Tadeo's group decided to march
to Malacanang to air their demands
On their march to Malacanang, they were joined by Kilusang Mayo Uno (KMU), Bagong Alyansang Makabayan
(BAYAN), League of Filipino Students (LFS), and Kongreso ng Pagkakaisa ng Maralitang Lungsod (KPML)
Government intelligent reports were also received that the KMP was heavily infliltrated by CPP/NPA elements, and
that an insurrection was impending
Government anti-riot forces assembled at Mendiola
The marchers numbered about 10,000 to 15,000 at around 4:30 pm
From CM Recto, they proceeded toward the police lines. No dialogue took place; "pandemonium broke loose"
After the clash, 12 marchers were officially confirmed dead (13 according to Tadeo)
39 were wounded by gunshots and 12 sustained minor injuries, all belonging to the group of marchers
Of the police and military, 3 sustained gunshot wounds and 20 suffered minor physical injuries
The "Citizens' Mendiola Commission" submitted its report on the incident on February 27, 1987 as follows
The march did not have any permit
 The police and military were armed with handguns prohibited by law The recommendations by the Commission does not in any way mean that liability automatically attaches
The security men assigned to protect the government units were in civilian attire (prohibited by law) to the State
The Commission was simply a fact-finding body; its findings shall serve only as cause of action for
There was unnecessary firing by the police and military
litigation; it does not bind the State immediately
The weapons carried by the marchers are prohibited by law
President Aquino's speeches are likewise not binding on the State; they are not tantamount to a waiver
It is not clear who started the firing by the State
The water cannons and tear gas were not put into effective use to disperse the crowd; the water cannons 2. Some instances when a suit against the State is proper:
and fire trucks were not put into operation because: When the Republic is sued by name;
there was no order to use them
When the suit is against an unincorporated government agency
they were incorrectly prepositioned
When the suit is on its face against a government officer but the case is such that the ultimate liability will
they were out of range of the marchers belong not to the officer but to the government
The Commission recommended the criminal prosecution of four unidentified, uniformed individuals shown either on Although the military officers and personnel were discharging their official functions during the
tape or in pictures, firing at the direction of the marchers incident, their functions ceased to be official the moment they exceeded their authority
The Commission also recommended that all the commissioned officers of both the Western Police District (WPD) There was lack of justification by the government forces in the use of firearms.
and Integrated National Police (INP) who were armed be prosecuted for violation of par. 4(g) of the Public Assembly Act of
1985 Their main purpose in the rally was to ensure peace and order, but they fired at the crowd instead

Prosecution of the marchers was also recommended No reversible error by the respondent Judge found. Petitions dismissed.
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES (PCGG) vs. SANDIGANBAYAN
It was also recommended that Tadeo be prosecuted both for holding the rally without permit and for inciting sedition
Administrative sanctions were recommended for the following officers for their failure to make effective use of their G.R. No. 88858/ G.R. No. 88809 July 10, 1991
skill and experience in directing the dispersal operations in Mendiola:
Gen. Ramon E. Montao
FACTS: Private respondent Eduardo Conjuangco, Jr., as a stockholder of record, sought authority to inspect
Police Gen. Alfredo S. Lim and examine the corporate records of United Coconut Planters Bank and San Miguel Corporation. Since the
Police Gen. Edgar Dula Torres shares of private respondent in the UCPB and SMC have been sequestered by the PCGG, private respondent
Police Maj. Demetrio dela Cruz was advised to course his request through the PCGG. Thereafter, private respondent filed a petition for
Cezar Nazareno prohibition and mandamus before the Sandiganbayan seeking to enforce his stockholder's right to inspect the
Maj. Filemon Gasmin corporate records of UCPB and SMC. The Sandiganbayan on its resolution dated May 9, 1989 and May 18,
1989, allowed respondent Cojuangco to inspect the corporate records of UCPB and SMC respectively. Hence,
Last and most important recommendation: for the deceased and wounded victims to be compensated by the
government the instant petition for certiorari with prayer for the issuance of TRO. On June 13, 1989 and July 20, 1989,
Court issued a TRO.
It was this portion that petitioners (Caylao group) invoke in their claim for damages from the government
No concrete form of compensation was received by the victims
ISSUE: Whether or not sequestration of the shares of private respondent in the UCPB and SMC automatically
On January, 1988, petitioners instituted an action for damages against the Republic of the Philippines, deprives him of his right of inspection.
together with the military officers, and personnel involved in the Mendiola incident
Solicitor general filed a Motion to Dismiss on the ground that the State cannot be sued without its consent
RULING: The right of a stockholder to inspect and/or examine the records of a corporation is explicitly
Petitioners said that the State has waived its immunity from suit provided in Section 74 of the Corporation Code. The PCGG does not become, ipso facto, the owner of the
Judge Sandoval dismissed the case on the ground that there was no such waiver shares just because the same have been sequestered, nor does it become the stockholder of record by virtue
Motion for Reconsideration was also denied of such sequestration. Records indicate that private respondent is the ostensible owner of a substantial
number of shares and is a stockholder of record in SMC and UCPB. * Being a stockholder beyond doubt, there
Issues:
is therefore no reason why private respondent may not exercise his statutory right of inspection in accordance
1. Whether or not the State has waived its immunity from suit (i.e. Whether or not this is a suit against the State with
its consent) with Sec. 74 of the Corporation Code, the only express limitation being that the right of inspection should be
exercised at reasonable hours on business days; 2) the person demanding to examine and copy excerpts from
Petitioners argue that by the recommendation made by the Commission for the government to indemnify
the corporation's records and minutes has not improperly used any information secured through any previous
the heirs and victims, and by public addresses made by President Aquino, the State has consented to be sued
examination of the records of such corporation; and 3) the demand is made in good faith or for a legitimate
2. Whether or not the case qualifies as a suit against the State
purpose. The latter two limitations, however, must be set up as a defense by the corporation if it is to merit
Holding: judicial cognizance. As such, and in the absence of evidence, the PCGG cannot unilaterally deny a stockholder
1. No. from exercising his statutory right of inspection based on an unsupported and naked assertion that private
This is not a suit against the State with its consent. respondent's motive is improper or merely for curiosity or on the ground that the stockholder is not in friendly
2. No. terms with the corporation's officers.
Ratio:
1. Art. XIV, Sec. 3, 1987 Constitution: The State may not be sued without its consent
While it may be true that the right of inspection granted by Sec. 74 of the Corporation Code is not absolute, as
when the stockholder is not acting in good faith and for a legitimate purpose or when the demand is purely
speculative or merely to satisfy curiosity, the same may not be said in the case of private respondent. In the
case at bar, petitioner failed to discharge the burden of proof to show that private respondent's action in
seeking examination of the corporate records was moved by unlawful or ill-motivated designs which could
appropriately call for a judicial protection against the exercise of such right. Save for its unsubstantiated
allegations, petitioner could offer no proof, nay, not even a scintilla of evidence that respondent Cojuangco, Jr.,
was motivated by bad faith; that the demand was for an illegitimate purpose or that the demand was impelled
by speculation or idle curiosity. Surely, respondent's substantial shareholdings in the SMC and UCPB cannot be
an object of mere curiosity.
PHILROCK vs Board of Liquidators 180 SCRA 171 G.R. No. 84992 (1989)
examiner found the subject shipment reflective of the declaration, Bagong Buhay paid the duties and taxes due which was
paid through the Bank of Asia. Thereafter, the customs appraiser made a return of duty.
Acting on the strength of an information that the shipment consisted of "mosquito net" made of nylon, the Office of the
Collector of Customs ordered a re-examination of the shipment which revealed that the shipment consisted of 80 bales of
screen net, each bale containing 20 rolls or a total of 1,600 rolls. The value of the shipment was re-appraised. Furthermore,
the Collector of Customsdetermined the subject shipment as made of synthetic (polyethylene) woven fabric classifiable under
Tariff Heading No. 51.04-B at 100% ad valorem. Thus, Bagong Buhay Trading was assessed P272,600.00 as duties and
taxes due on the shipment in question. Since the shipment was also misdeclared as to quantity and value, the Collector of
Customs forfeited the subject shipment in favor of the government which was also affirmed by the Commissioner of Customs.

Petitioner: Philippine Rock Industries, Inc. However, the Court of Tax Appeals reversed the decision of the Commissionerdeclaring that the latter erred in imputing fraud
Respondent: Board of Liquidators, as Liquidator of the defunct Reparations Commission (REPACOM)
upon private respondent because fraud is never presumed and thus concluded that the forfeiture of the articles in question
Facts: was not in accordance with law. As a consequence, several motions were filed and private respondent demands that
the Bureau of Customs be ordered to pay for damages
PHILROCK filed in the RTC of Manila a complaint against the Board of Liquidators, as liquidator of the defunct REPACOM,
for: (1) the replacement of the defective rock pulverizing machinery purchased from REPACOM, or, as alternative, to refund
ISSUE:
the purchase at 31% of its contract price; (2) reparation for losses incurred due to the increased expenses of maintaining the
plant at Php5,000 a month and Php4,000 per day as unrealized profits and exemplary damages; and (3) Php50,000 attorney
fees plus expenses and costs of the suit. Whether or not the Collector of Customs may be held liable.
The RTC decided in favor of PHILROCK. The Solicitor General, in behalf of the State, filed a notice of appeal on the ground
that the payment for damages are public funds, hence, exempt from attachment and execution. Nevertheless, the RTC judge HELD:
issued a Writ of Execution. Subsequently the Board of Liquidators filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition in the Court of
Appeals where the Court of Appeals set aside the Writ of Execution by the RTC. Hence, this petition for review. The Bureau of Customs cannot be held liable for actual damages that the private respondent sustained with regard to its
goods. Otherwise, to permit private respondent's claim to prosper would violate the doctrine of sovereign immunity. Since it
Issue: Whether or not the Board of Liquidators, as a government agency without juridical capacity, may be sued and held
liable as litigators of REPACOM. demands that the Commissioner of Customs be ordered to pay for actual damages it sustained, for which ultimately liability
will fall on the government, it is obvious that this case has been converted technically into a suit against the state.
Ruling:
No. The Board of Liquidators is a government agency, created under E.O. 372 to administer the assets and pay the liabilities On this point, the political doctrine that "the state may not be sued without its consent," categorically applies. As an
of the defunct REPACOM, thus it has no juridical personality, separate and distinct from the government, and therefore, as a
unincorporated government agency without any separate juridical personality of its own, the Bureau of Customs enjoys
general rule, suing it is akin to suing the State. The State enjoys immunity from suit except when it conducts business through
a government-owned and controlled corporation or a non-corporate agency set up primarily for a business purpose, and even immunity from suit. Along with the Bureau of Internal Revenue, it is invested with an inherent power of sovereignty, namely,
then, the State may not be liable for damages since the purse of the State, or the disbursement of public funds is in the taxation. As an agency, the Bureau of Customs performs the governmental function of collecting revenues which is definitely
discretion of the Legislature. The functions and public services rendered by the State cannot be allowed to be paralyzed or
not a proprietary function. Thus, private respondent's claim for damages against the Commissioner of Customs must fail.
disrupted by the diversion of public funds from their legitimate specific objectives, as appropriated by law. Although the liability
of REPACOM has been ascertained, the State is at liberty to determine for itself how to satisfy such liability. Funds should be
G.R. No. 159402 : February 23, 2011
appropriated by the Legislature for the specific purpose of satisfying the judgement in favor of PHILROCK before said
judgement may be paid.
AIR TRANSPORTATION OFFICE,Petitioner, v. SPOUSES DAVID*ELISEA RAMOS, Respondents.
FAROLAN VS. COURT OF TAX APPEALS
G.R. No. 42204, January 21 1993, 217 SCRA 298 BERSAMIN, J.:

FACTS:
FACTS:

Respondent Spouses discovered that a portion of their registered land in Baguio City was being used as part of the runway
On January 30, 1972, the vessel S/S "Pacific Hawk" arrived at the Port of Manila carrying, among others, 80 bales of screen and running shoulder of the Loakan Airport being operated by petitioner Air Transportation Office (ATO). The respondents
net consigned to Bagong Buhay Trading (Bagong Buhay). Said importation was declared through a customs broker which agreed after negotiations to convey the affected portion by deed of sale to the ATO in consideration of the amount of
was classified under Tariff Heading No. 39.06-B of the Tariff and Customs Code at 35% ad valorem. Since the customs P778,150.00. However, the ATO failed to pay despite repeated verbal and written demands.

Thus, the respondents filed an action for collection against the ATO and some of its officials in the RTC. In their answer, the
ATO and its co-defendants invoked as an affirmative defense the issuance of Proclamation No. 1358, whereby President
Marcos had reserved certain parcels of land that included the respondents affected portion for use of the Loakan Airport. They
asserted that the RTC had no jurisdiction to entertain the action without the States consent considering that the deed of sale
had been entered into in the performance of governmental functions.
The RTC held in favor of the Spouses, ordering the ATO to pay the plaintiffs Spouses the amount of P778,150.00 being the
value of the parcel of land appropriated by the defendant ATO as embodied in the Deed of Sale, plus an annual interest of
12% from August 11, 1995, the date of the Deed of Sale until fully paid; (2) The amount of P150,000.00 by way of moral
damages and P150,000.00 as exemplary damages; (3) the amount of P50,000.00 by way of attorneys fees plus P15,000.00
representing the 10, more or less, court appearances of plaintiffs counsel; (4) The costs of this suit.
On appeal, the CA affirmed the RTCs decision with modification deleting the awarded cost, and reducing the moral and
exemplary damage to P30,000.00 each, and attorneys fees is lowered to P10,000.00.
Hence, this appeal by petition for review on certiorari.
ISSUE: Whether the ATO could be sued without the State's consent.
HELD: The decision of the Court of Appeals is sustained.
POLITICAL LAW state immunity
An unincorporated government agency without any separate juridical personality of its own enjoys immunity from suit because
it is invested with an inherent power of sovereignty. Accordingly, a claim for damages against the agency cannot prosper;
otherwise, the doctrine of sovereign immunity is violated. However, the need to distinguish between an unincorporated
government agency performing governmental function and one performing proprietary functions has arisen. The immunity has
been upheld in favor of the former because its function is governmental or incidental to such function; it has not been upheld
in favor of the latter whose function was not in pursuit of a necessary function of government but was essentially a business.
National Airports Corporation v. Teodoro, Sr. and Phil. Airlines Inc., 91 Phil. 203 (1952)
Civil Aeronautics Administration vs. Court of Appeals (167 SCRA 28 [1988]),the Supreme Court, reiterating the
pronouncements laid down in Teodoro, declared that the CAA (predecessor of ATO) is an agency not immune from suit, it
being engaged in functions pertaining to a private entity.
The Civil Aeronautics Administration comes under the category of a private entity. Although not a body corporate it was
created, like the National Airports Corporation, not to maintain a necessary function of government, but to run what is
essentially a business, even if revenues be not its prime objective but rather the promotion of travel and the convenience of
the travelling public. It is engaged in an enterprise which, far from being the exclusive prerogative of state, may, more than the
construction of public roads, be undertaken by private concerns. National Airports Corp. v. Teodoro, 91 Phil. 203 (1952)
The CA thereby correctly appreciated the juridical character of the ATO as an agency of the Government not performing a
purely governmental or sovereign function, but was instead involved in the management and maintenance of the Loakan
Airport, an activity that was not the exclusive prerogative of the State in its sovereign capacity. Hence, the ATO had no claim
to the States immunity from suit. We uphold the CAs aforequoted holding.
The doctrine of sovereign immunity cannot be successfully invoked to defeat a valid claim for compensation arising from the
taking without just compensation and without the proper expropriation proceedings being first resorted to of the plaintiffs
property.Republic v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 90478, Nov. 2, 1991.
DENIED.
HOME DEVELOPMENT MUTUAL FUND, petitioner,
vs.
COMMISSION ON AUDIT, respondents.
G.R. No. 142297, June 15, 2004
Facts:
Republic Act No. 6971, "An Act to Encourage Productivity and Maintain Industrial Peace by Providing Incentives to Both
Labor and Capital," was approved on November 22, 1990, and took effect on December 9, 1990. Section 3 of said Act states:
Sec. 3. Coverage.-- This Act shall apply to all business enterprises with or without existing and duly recognized or certified
labor organizations, including government-owned and controlled corporations performing proprietary functions. It shall cover
all employees and workers including casual, regular, supervisory and managerial employees
On June 4, 1991, the Secretary of Labor and Employment and the Secretary of Finance promulgated the Rules
Implementing Republic Act No. 6971. Rule II of said implementing rules provides:
Section 1. Coverage. These Rules shall apply to:
(a) All business enterprises with or without existing duly recognized or certified labor organizations, including government-
owned and controlled corporations performing proprietary functions;
(b) All employees and workers including casual, regular, rank-and-file, supervisory and managerial employees.
On November 21, 1991, petitioner HDMF granted Productivity Incentive Bonus equivalent to one month salary plus
allowance to all its personnel pursuant to Republic Act No. 6971, and its Implementing Rules despite the advice on August 26,
1991 of Undersecretary Salvador Enriquez of the Department of Budget and Management (DBM) to all government-owned
and controlled corporations (GOCCs) and government financial institutions (GFIs) with original charters performing proprietary
functions to defer payment of the productivity incentive bonus to their employees, pending the issuance of a definite ruling by
the Office of the President on the matter.
On December 27, 1991, the Department of Labor and Employment and the Department of Finance issued the Supplemental
Rules Implementing Republic Act No. 6971, which provides that paragraph (a) Section 1, Rule II of the Rules Implementing
RA 6971, shall be amended to read as follows:
(a) All business enterprises with or without existing duly certified labor organizations including government-owned and
controlled corporations performing proprietary functions which are established solely for business or profit or gain and
accordingly excluding those created, maintained or acquired in pursuance of a policy of the state, enunciated in the
constitution or by law, and those whose officers and employees are covered by the Civil Service. (Emphasis
supplied.)
On November 29, 1996, the grant of productivity incentive bonus to the HDMF personnel was disallowed in audit under
notice of disallowance. The disallowance was based on COA Decision No. 96-288, dated June 4, 1996, stating that R.A. No.
6971 does not apply to government-owned or controlled corporations or to government financial institutions with original
charters performing proprietary functions, such as the HDMF.
In a letter-request, HDMF, through its President and Chief Executive Officer, Zorayda Amelia C. Alonzo, requested for the
lifting of the disallowance. Alonzo argued that R.A. No. 6971 applies to the employees of HDMF since the coverage of the
said law includes government-owned and controlled corporations performing proprietary functions, and the supplemental
rules excluding it from coverage was issued after the HDMF had already granted the productivity incentive bonus to its
employees.
The COA affirmed the audit disallowance in a later decision stating that it finds the HDMFs argument, that the supplemental
rules should not be given retroactive effect, untenable. It must be noted that the grant of the Productivity Incentive Bonus was
made on November 21, 1991 or after receipt of the advice of the Department of Budget and Management Undersecretary
dated August 26, 1991 to defer payment of Productivity Incentive Bonus to all GOCCs/GFIs with original charters performing
proprietary functions, pending definite ruling of the Office of the President. Despite the said notice, management proceeded
with the payment.
 HDMF filed a motion for reconsideration that was denied by the Commission on Audit in Resolution No. 2000-086 dated Whether or not petitioner was liable.
March 7, 2000.
RULING:
Issue/s:
Whether or not the Commission on Audit acted in excess of its jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to
lack of jurisdiction in affirming the audit disallowance.

The petitioner cannot be held liable by virtue of the non-suability of the State.
Ruling:
No, Commission on Audit did not commit grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction in affirming the audit
The general rule Is that the State may not be sued except when it gives consent to be sued (Article XVI, Sec. 3 of
disallowance.
the Constitution.) Express consent may be embodied in a general law or a special law. The standing consent of the State to
Petitioner is a government-owned and controlled corporation performing proprietary functions with original charter or be sued in case of money claims involving liability arising from contracts is found in Act No. 3083. Consent is implied when
created by special law, specifically Presidential Decree (PD) No. 1752, amending PD No. 1530. As such, petitioner HDMF is the government enters into business contracts and also when the State files a complaint. Municipal corporations are agencies
covered by the Civil Service pursuant to Article IX, Section 2(1) of the 1987 Constitution, and, therefore, excluded from the of the State when they are engaged in governmental functions and therefore should enjoy the sovereign immunity from suit.
coverage of Republic Act No. 6971. Nevertheless, they are subject to suit even in the performance of such functions because their charter provided that they can
sue and be sued. However, the circumstance that a state is suable does not necessarily mean that it is liable; on the other
Since Republic Act No. 6971 intended to cover only government-owned and controlled corporations incorporated under
hand, it can never be held liable if it does not first consent to be sued. Liability is not conceded by the mere fact that the state
the general corporation law, the power of administrative officials to promulgate rules in the implementation of the statute is
necessarily limited to what is intended and provided for in the legislative enactment. Hence, the Supplemental Rules clarified has allowed itself to be sued. When the state does waive its sovereign immunity, it is only giving the plaintiff the chance to
that government-owned and controlled corporations performing proprietary functions which are "created, maintained or prove, if it can, that the defendant is liable.
acquired in pursuance of a policy of the state, enunciated in the constitution or by law, and those whose officers and Municipal corporations are suable because their charters grant them the competence to sue and be sued. Nevertheless, they
employees are covered by the Civil Service" are excluded from the coverage of Republic Act No. 6971. are generally not liable for torts committed by them in the discharge of governmental functions and can be held answerable
only if it can be shown that they were acting in a proprietary capacity Here, the driver of the dump truck of the municipality
Therefore, even if petitioner HDMF granted the Productivity Incentive Bonus before the Supplemental Rules were issued
insists that he was on his way to the Naguilian river to get a load of sand and gravel for the repair of San Fernandos
clarifying that petitioner was excluded from the coverage of Republic Act No. 6971, the employees of HDMF did not acquire a
vested right over said bonus because they were not entitled to it under Republic Act No. 6971. municipal streets. In the absence of any evidence to the contrary, the regularity of the performance of official duty is
presumed pursuant to Section 3(m) of Rule 131 of the Revised Rules of Court.
Moreover, the DBM advised petitioner herein, HDMF, on August 26, 1991, to defer payment of the productivity incentive
bonus to their employees, pending the issuance of a definite ruling by the Office of the President on the matter. Despite said Hence, the SC held that the driver of the dump truck was performing duties or tasks pertaining to his office. Municipality
advice, the Board of Trustees of HDMF opted to grant the said bonus on a voluntary basis as stated in its Resolution No. 91-
cannot be held liable for the torts committed by its regular employee, who was then engaged in the discharge of governmental
549, Series of 1991. It expressed its "concern over the welfare of the officers and employees of the Fund rather than adhering
to the stringent technicality of the law." The Board, therefore, was aware that possibly HDMF may not be covered by Republic functions.
Act No. 6971. It should have exercised prudence by awaiting the definite ruling on the coverage to prevent legal problems.
Shell Philippines Exploration B. V. vs. Efren Jalos, et al.,
G.R. No. 179918, September 8, 2010
San Fernando v. Firme .
FACTS:
Petitioner here claimed that it could not be sued pursuant to the doctrine of state immunity without the consent of the Republic
G.R. N. L-579 [April 8, 1991] of the Philippines, on the basis that under Service Contract 38,
i t s e r v e d m e r e l y a s a n a g e n t o f t h e P h i l i p p i n e government in the development of the Malampaya gas
reserves. Petitioner s main undertaking under Servi ce Con tract 38 is to Perform all petroleum operations and
FACTS:
provide all necessary technology and finance as well
aso t h e r c o n n e c t e d s e r v i c e s t o t h e P h i l i p p i n e g o v e r n m e n t . A s d e f i n e d u n d e r t h e contract,
On December 16, 1965, a collision occurred involving a passenger jeepney driven by Balagot and owned by the Estate of pe troleum operation mean s the searchin g for and obtainin g Pe tro leum within the Philippines, including the
Macario Nieveras, a gravel and sand truckdriven by Jose Manandeg and owned by Tanquilino Velasquez and a dump truck of transportation, storage, handling and sale of p e t r o l e u m w h e t h e r f o r e x p o r t o r d o m e s t i c c o n s u m p t i o n .
P e t i t i o n e r s p r i m a r y obligation under the contract is not to represent the Philippine government for
the Municipality of San Fernando, La Union and driven by Alfredo Bislig. Several passengers of the jeepney including
thep u r p o s e o f t r a n s a c t i n g b u s i n e s s w i t h t h i r d p e r s o n s . R a t h e r , i t s c o n t r a c t u a l c
Laureano Bania Sr. died as a result of the injuries they sustained and 4 others suffered varying degrees of physical injuries. ommitment is to develop and manage petroleum operations on behalf of the State. Conse quen tl y, it i s not an a gent of
the Philipp ine government, but a provider of services, technology and financing for the Malampaya Natural Gas
The heirs of Bania Sr. filed a complaint for damages against the Estate of Nieveras and Balagot. However, the Project. Notably, the Philippine government itself recognized that petitioner could be sued in relation to the project. This is
aforesaid defendants filed a Third Party Complaint against the petitioner and the driver of a dump truck of petitioner. The case evident in the stipulations agreed upon by the parties under Service Contract 38.
ISSUES:
was transferred to branch presided by Judge Firme. The heirs of Bania Sr. amended the complaint wherein the petitioner - W h e t h e r o r n o t t h e c o m p l a i n t i s a p o l l u t i o n c a s e t h a t f a l l s w i t h i n t h e p r i m a r y jurisdiction of
and its regular employee Bislig were impleaded asdefendants. Judge Firme in its decision rendered the Municipality of San the PAB; -Whether or not the complaint sufficiently alleges a
Fernando and Bislig jointly and severally liable to pa funeral expenses, lot expected earnings, moral damages and attorneys causeo f a c t i o n a g a i n s t S h e l l ; a n d - W h e t h e r o r
fees. n o t t h e s u i t i s a c t u a l l y against the State and is barred under the doctrine of state
immunity.
HELD:
ISSUE:
 The Court ruled that petitioner cannot claim immunity from suit because it is not an agent of the Republic of the Philippines,
but the latters service contractor
fort h e e x p l o r a t i o n a n d d e v e l o p m e n t o f o n e o f t h e c o u n t r y s n a t
u r a l g a s reserves.
W h i l e t h e R e p u b l i c o f t h e P h i l i p p i n e s a p p o i n t e d p e t i t i o n e r a s t h e exclusive party
to condu ct pe troleum operations in the Cama go -Malampa yo area under the States full control and supervision, it
does not follow that petitioner has become the States agen t wi thin the meaning of the la w. An a gent is a
person who binds himself to render some service or to do something in representation or on behalf of another, with the
consent or authority of the latter. The essence of an a gency is the agen ts abili ty to represen t his principal and
brin g abou t busine ss relations between the latter and third persons. An agents ultimate undertaking is to execute juridical
acts that would create, modify or extinguish relations between his principal and third persons. It is this power to affect the
principals contractual relations with third persons that differentiates the agent from a service contractor.
Republic vs. Feliciano (Consti1)
Republic of the Philippines, petitioner-appellee, vs. Pablo Feliciano and Intermediate Appellate Court, respondents-
appellants.
March 12, 1987
Yap, J:
Facts:
Respondent Pablo Feliciano filed a complaint with the Court of First Instance against the Republic of the
Philippines, represented by the Land Authority, for the recovery of ownership and possession of a parcel of land.
The trial court rendered a decision declaring Lot No. 1 to be the private property of Feliciano and the rest of the
property reverted to the public domain.
The trial court reopened the case due to the filing of a motion to intervene and to set aside the decision of the trial
court by 86 settlers, alleging that they had been in possession of the land for more than 20 years under claim of ownership.
The trial court ordered the settlers to present their evidence but they did not appear at the day of presentation of
evidence. Feliciano, on the other hand, presented additional evidence. Thereafter, the case was submitted for decision and
the trial court ruled in favor of Feliciano.
The settlers immediately filed a motion for reconsideration and then the case was reopened to allow them to
present their evidence.
Feliciano filed a petition for certiorari with the Appellate Court but it was denied.
The settlers filed a motion to dismiss on the ground that the Republic of the Philippines cannot be sued without its
consent and hence the action cannot prosper. The motion was opposed by Feliciano.
Issue:
Whether or not the state can be sued for recovery and possession of a parcel of land.
Held:
No
Ratio:
A suit against the state is not permitted, except upon a showing that the state has consented to be sued, either
expressly or by implication through the use of statutory language too plain to be misinterpreted.
The complaint involves land not owned by the state but private land belonging to Feliciano, hence the government
is not being divested of any of its properties.
Case Digest: PCGG v. Silangan Investors & Sandiganbayan
G.R. Nos. 167055-56: March 25, 2010
PRESIDENTIAL COMMISSION ON GOOD GOVERNMENT, Petitioner, v. SILANGAN INVESTORS AND MANAGERS, INC.
and SANDIGANBAYAN, Respondents.
CARPIO, Acting C.J.:
FACTS:
Silangan and Polygon owned 25,429 (39.999%) and 12,700 (19.977%) shares of stock, respectively, in Oceanic. The
Presidential Commission on Good Government by authority of the President of the Philippines, ordered the sequestration of
the shares which belong to or are owned or controlled by ROBERTO S. BENEDICTO, JOSE L. AFRICA, VICTOR A. AFRICA
AND ALFREDO L. AFRRICA in the following business entities, including whatever emoluments or benefits may be due the
said shares.
PCGG filed before the Sandiganbayan a complaint for reconveyance, accounting and damages against Jose, Manuel H.
Nieto, Jr. (Nieto, Jr.), Ferdinand E. Marcos, Imelda R. Marcos, Ferdinand R. Marcos, Jr., Benedicto, Juan Ponce Enrile, and
Potenciano Ilusorio. The case was docketed as Civil Case No. 0009. By virtue of the writs of sequestration, PCGG
sequestered majority of Oceanics shares of stock and took over its management. PCGG voted the shares of stock registered
in the names of Silangan and Polygon, reorganized the board of directors, elected its own set of officers, and declared cash
dividends.
Benedicto and PCGG entered into a compromise agreement. PCGG filed before the Sandiganbayan a complaint for
injunction and damages against Victor, Jose, Nieto, Jr., and Juan De Ocampo. Jose, Nieto, Jr., Andres L. Africa, Aerocom,
Polygon, Belgor Investment, Inc., and Silangan filed before the Sandiganbayan a petition for certiorari and prohibition under
Rule 65 of the Rules of Court against PCGG.
In its 25 April 1994 Decision, the Sandiganbayan held that (1) the 15 June 1988 writs of sequestration were void because the
PCGG failed to commence judicial action within the required six-month period; (2) the 11 April 1986 writ of sequestration was
void because it was signed by only one commissioner; and (3) the acts of PCGG in managing Oceanic were void. PCGG filed
a motion for reconsideration, which was denied by the Sandiganbayan in its 30 March 1995 Resolution.
In its 31 July 1998 Order, the Sandiganbayan placed the cash dividends declared by Oceanic in custodia legis. PCGG filed
before the Court a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, challenging the Sandiganbayans 25
April 1994 Decision. In Presidential Commission on Good Government v. Sandiganbayanthe Court affirmed the
Sandiganbayans Decision.
In its 21 June 2004 Resolution, the Sandiganbayan granted Silangans 1 June 2004 motion and released the uncontested
49% of the cash dividends, with interest, declared by Oceanic. Upon denial of PCGGs motion for reconsideration, it filed the
present.
ISSUE: Whether or not the Sandiganbayan committed grave abuse of discretion when it ordered the release of the cash
dividends, with interest, to Silangan and Polygon
HELD:
REMEDIAL LAW
In petitions for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, petitioner must show that respondent tribunal acted
with grave abuse of discretion
Grave abuse of discretion is defined as such capricious or whimsical exercise of judgment equivalent to lack of jurisdiction.
The abuse of discretion must be so patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of a positive duty or a virtual refusal to
perform a duty enjoined by law, or to act at all in contemplation of law as where the power is exercised in an arbitrary and
despotic manner by reason of passion or hostility.
PCGG failed to show that the Sandiganbayan acted with grave abuse of discretion. The Resolutions ordering the release to
Silangan and Polygon of their Oceanic cash dividends, with interest, were grounded on sound legal and factual bases: (1)
PCGG agreed to the release to Silangan of 49% of its cash dividends, with interest; (2) Benedicto ceded to the government
his 51% equity in Silangan, not Oceanic; (3) Silangan, being a stockholder of Oceanic, was entitled to the cash dividends
declared by the company; (4) Silangan engaged the services of M.M. Lazaro & Associates and agreed to pay 15% of the total
amount it may recover as contingent fee; (5) in its 25 April 1994 Decision, the Sandiganbayan declared void PCGGs
sequestration of the Oceanic shares of stock in the names of Polygon, Aerocom, Silangan, Belgor, Jose and Victor Silanan
and Polygon were not sequestered; (6) In Presidential Commission, the Court affirmed the Sandiganbayans 25 April 1994
Decision; (7) Presidential Commission became final and executory and was entered in the Book of Entries of Judgments; (8)
the Sandiganbayan issued a writ of execution, dated 30 September 2003, to implement the 25 April 1994 Decision; and (9)
the 30 September 2003 writ of execution was implemented.
POLITICAL LAW
The actions contemplated by the Constitution should be those which include the corporation not as a mere annex to
the complaint but as defendant. This is the minimum requirement of the due process guarantee.
Such is the fate of the subject writ of sequestration, unfortunately. Whether the 18-month period expired on July 26, 1988 (as
claimed by Aerocom, in line with the computation of time under Article 13 of the Civil Code and the ruling in "National
Marketing Corp. v. Tecson," 29 SCRA 70) or on August 2, 1988 (the PCGGs position), the fact remains that service of the writ
on Aerocom on August 3, 1988 was made beyond these dates.
The PCGG cannot justify its failure, as found by the Sandiganbayan, to file the corresponding judicial action against Aerocom
within the six (6)-month period as provided for under the same constitutional provision in focus (Section 26, Article XVIII,
second paragraph) by the fact that Aerocom was mentioned in the complaint of the PCGG in Civil Case No. 0009 (the Nieto,
Africa, et al. case) and in Annex "A" thereof notwithstanding that Aerocom was not impleaded as party-defendant, and on the
argument that the filing of Civil Case No. 0009 against the "Nieto, Africa, et al. group" is enough compliance with the "judicial
action" requirement.
There is no existing sequestration to talk about in this case, as the writ issued against Aerocom, to repeat, is invalid for
reasons hereinbefore stated. Ergo, the suit in Civil Case No. 0009 against Mr. Nieto and Mr. Africa as shareholders in
Aerocom is not and cannot ipso facto be a suit against the unimpleaded Aerocom itself without violating the fundamental
principle that a corporation has a legal personality distinct and separate from its stockholders.
In cases where stocks of a corporation were allegedly the fruits of ill-gotten wealth, it should be remembered that in most of
these cases the stocks involved constitute a substantial if not controlling interest in the corporations. The basic tenets of fair
play demand that these corporations be impleaded as defendants since a judgment in favor of the government will
undoubtedly substantially and decisively affect the corporations as distinct entities. The judgment could strip them of
everything without being previously heard as they are not parties to the action in which judgment is rendered.
DISMISSED
SPOUSES FONTANILLA VS HON. MALIAMAN, digested
GR # 55963 and 61045, Feb. 27, 1991 (Constitutional Law Government Agency, Proprietary Functions)
FACTS: National Irrigation Administration (NIA), a government agency, was held liable for damages resulting to the death of
the son of herein petitioner spouses caused by the fault and/or negligence of the driver of the said agency. NIA maintains that
it is not liable for the act of its driver because the former does not perform primarily proprietorship functions but governmental
functions.
ISSUE: Whether or not NIA may be held liable for damages caused by its driver.
HELD: Yes. NIA is a government agency with a corporate personality separate and distinct from the government, because its
community services are only incidental functions to the principal aim which is irrigation of lands, thus, making it an agency
with proprietary functions governed by Corporation Law and is liable for actions of their employees.
SANDIGANBAYAN, BIENVENIDO R. TANTOCO, JR. and DOMINADOR R.SANTIAGO,
respondents
.G.R. No. 90478 November 21, 1991
FACTS:
The case was commenced on July 21, 1987 by the Presidential Commission on Good Government (PCGG) in behalf of the
Republic of the Philippines. The complaint which initiated the action was denominated one "for reconveyance, reversion,
accounting, restitution and damages," and was avowedly filed pursuant to Executive Order No. 14 of President Corazon C.
Aquino. After having been served with summons, Tantoco, Jr. and Santiago, instead of filing their answer, jointly filed a
"Motion to Strike Out Some Portions of the Complaint and For Bill of Particulars of Other Portions." The PCGG filed an
opposition thereto,
and the movants, a reply to the opposition. Tantoco and Santiago then presented a "motion for leave to file interrogatories
under Rule 25 of the Rules of Court" of which the PCGG responded by filing a motion. On March 18, 1988, in compliance with
the Order of January 29, 1988, the PCGG filed an Expanded Complaint of which the Sandiganbayan denied with a
Resolution. Tantoco and Santiago then filed an Answer with Compulsory Counterclaim. On July 27, 1989 Tantoco and
Santiago filed with the Sandiganbayan a pleading denominated "Interrogatories to Plaintiff," and on August 2, 1989, an
"Amended Interrogatories to Plaintiff"' as well as a Motion for Production and Inspection of Documents. The Sandiganbayan
admitted the Amended Interrogatories and granted the motion for production and inspection of documents respectively.
PCGG filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the Resolution of August 25, 1989, it also filed an opposition to the Amended
Interrogatories. Tantoco and Santiago filed a reply and opposition. After hearing, the Sandiganbayan promulgated two (2)
Resolutions. Hence, this present petition.
ISSUES:
1. WON PETITIONER CAN OBJECT TO THE INTERROGATORIES SERVED ON IT INACCORDANCE WITH RULE 25 OF
THE RULES OF COURT.
2. WON SANDIGANBAYAN ERRED IN ORDERING FOR THE PRODUCTION ANDINSPECTION OF SPECIFIED
DOCUMENTS AND THINGS ALLEGEDLY IN THEPOSSESSION OF PCGG.
HELD:
1. No. The State is, of course, immune from suit in the sense that it cannot, as a rule, be sued without its consent. But
it is axiomatic that in filing an action, it divests itself of its sovereign character and sheds its immunity from suit,
descending to the level of an ordinary litigant. The PCGG cannot claim a superior or preferred status to the State,
even while assuming to represent or act for the State.
2. No. The Court gives short shrift to the argument that some documents sought to be produced and inspected had
already been presented in Court and marked preliminarily as PCGG's exhibits, the movants having in fact viewed,
scrutinized and even offered objections thereto and made comments thereon. Obviously, there is nothing secret or
confidential about these documents. No serious objection can therefore be presented to the desire of the private
respondents to have copies of those documents in order to study them some more or otherwise use them during
the trial for any purpose allowed by law.
Blaquera vs. Alcala G.R. No. 109406, September 11, 1998
Labels: Case Digests, Political Law
Facts: On Feb. 21, 1992, then Pres. Aquino issued AO 268 which granted each official and employee of the government the
productivity incentive benefits in a maximum amount equivalent to 30% of the employees one month basic salary but which
amount not be less than P2, 000.00. Said AO provided that the productivity incentive benefits shall be granted only for the
year 1991. Accordingly, all heads of agencies, including government boards of government-owned or controlled corporations
and financial institutions, are strictly prohibited from granting productivity incentive benefits for the year 1992 and future years
pending the result of a comprehensive study being undertaken by the Office of the Pres.
The petitioners, who are officials and employees of several government departments and agencies, were paid incentive
benefits for the year 1992. Then, on Jan. 19, 1993, then Pres. Ramos issued AO 29 authorizing the grant of productivity
incentive benefits for the year 1992 in the maximum amount of P1,000.00 and reiterating the prohibition under Sec. 7 of AO
268, enjoining the grant of productivity incentive benefits without prior approval of the President. Sec. 4 of AO 29 directed all
departments, offices and agencies which authorized payment of productivity incentive bonus for the year 1992 in excess of
P1, 000.00 to immediately cause the refund of the excess. In compliance therewith, the heads of the departments or agencies
of the government concerned caused the deduction from petitioners salaries or allowances of the amounts needed to cover
the alleged overpayments.
Issue: Whether or not AO 29 and AO 268 were issued in the valid exercise of presidential control over the executive
departments
Held: The Pres. is the head of the government. Governmental power and authority are exercised and implemented through
him. His power includes the control of executive departments as provided under Sec. 17, Art. VII of the Constitution.
Control means the power of an officer to alter or modify or set aside what a subordinate officer had done in the performance
of his duties and to substitute the judgment of the former for that of the latter. The Pres. can, by virtue of his power of control,
review, modify, alter or nullify any action or decision of his subordinate in the executive departments, bureau or offices under
him.
When the Pres. issued AO 29 limiting the amount of incentive benefits,enjoining heads of government agencies from granting
incentive benefits without approval from him and directing the refund of the excess over the prescribed amount, the Pres. was
just exercising his power of control over executive departments.
The Pres. issued subject AOs to regulate the grant of productivity incentive benefits and to prevent discontent, dissatisfaction
and demoralization among government personnel by committing limited resources of government for the equal payment of
incentives and awards. The Pres. was only exercising his power of control by modifying the acts of the heads of the
government agencies who granted incentive benefits to their employees without appropriate clearance from the Office of the
Pres., thereby resulting in the uneven distribution of government resources.
The Presidents duty to execute the law is of constitutional origin. So, too, is his control of executive departments.
DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION, DIVISION OF ALBAY v. ONATE (2007)
Facts: Onate Spouses owns the disputed lot. In 1940 Bagumbayan Elementary School was constructed on a portion of the
lot. The Dep Ed developed and built various school buildings and facilities on the lot. The grand child of the spouses filed a
case in the RTC of Legaspi for reconstitution proceedings. The Dep Ed responded that the Municpality of Daraga donated the
disputed lot.
Issue: Whether CA erred in ruling that DEPED may be sued in violation of the States immunity from suit
Held: The threshold issue is whether petitioner DECS can be sued in Civil Case No. 8715 without its consent. A
supplementary issue is whether petitioner DECS can be sued independently of the Republic of the Philippines.
We rule that petitioner DECS can be sued without its permission as a result of its being privy to the Deed of Donation
executed by the Municipality of Daraga, Albay over the disputed property. When it voluntarily gave its consent to the donation,
any dispute that may arise from it would necessarily bring petitioner DECS down to the level of an ordinary citizen of the State
vulnerable to a suit by an interested or affected party. It has shed off its mantle of immunity and relinquished and forfeited its
armor of non-suability of the State.
The auxiliary issue of non-joinder of the Republic of the Philippines is likewise resolved in the negative. While it is true that
petitioner is an unincorporated government agency, and as such technically requires the Republic of the Philippines to be
impleaded in any suit against the former, nonetheless, considering our resolution of the main issue below, this issue is
deemed mooted. Besides, at this point, we deem it best to lift such procedural technicality in order to finally resolve the long
litigation this case has undergone. Moreover, even if we give due course to said issue, we will arrive at the same ruling.
The Republic of the Philippines need not be impleaded as a party-defendant in Civil Case No. 8715 considering that it
impliedly gave its approval to the involvement of petitioner DECS in the Deed of Donation. In a situation involving a contract
between a government department and a third party, the Republic of the Philippines need not be impleaded as a party to a
suit resulting from said contract as it is assumed that the authority granted to such department to enter into such contract
carries with it the full responsibility and authority to sue and be sued in its name.
EPG Construction Co. vs. Vigilar
Second Division
Buena, March 16, 2001
Topic: Sovereignty - Suits not against the State - Justice and Equity
Facts:
In 1983, the Ministry of Human Settlement (MHS), through the BLISS Development Corporation, intiated a housing project on
a government property along the east bank of Manggahan Floodway in Pasig
The MHS entered into a Memorandum of Agreement (MOA) with Ministry of Public Works and Highways (MPWH) where the
latter undertook to develop the housing site and construct thereon 145 housing units
By virtue of the MOA, MPWH forged individual contracts with petitioners EPG, Ciper, Septa, Phil. Plumbing, Home
Construction, World Builders, Glass World, Performance Builders, and De Leon Araneta Construction for the construction of
the housing units
Under the contracts, the scope of construction and funding covered only around "2/3 of each housing unit"
Petitioners agreed to undertake and perform "additional constructions" for the completion of the housing units despite the fact
that there was only a verbal promise, and not a written contract, by the MPWH Undersecretary Aber Canlas that additional
funds will be available and forthcoming
Unpaid balance for the additional constructions amounted to P5,918,315.63
Upon a demand letter from the petitioners, on November 14, 1988, DPWH Asst. Secretary Madamba opined that payment of
petitioners' money claims should be based on quantum meruit (what one has earned) and should be forwarded to the
Commission on Audit (COA)
In a Letter of the Undersecretary of Budget and Management dated December 20, 1994, the amount of P5,819,316.00 was
then released for the payment of the petitioners' money claims under Advise of Allotment No. A4-1303-04-41-303
In an indorsement dated December 27, 1995, the COA referred anew the money claims to the DPWH
In a letter dated August 26, 1996, respondent Secretary Gregorio Vigilar denied the subject money claims
Petitioners filed before the RTC of QC, Branch 226 a Petition for Mandamus to order the respondent to pay petitioners their
money claims plus damages and attorney's fees.
Lower court denied the petition on February 18, 1997
Issue:
1. Whether or not the implied, verbal contracts between the petitioners and then Undersecretary Canlas should be
upheld
2. Whether or not the State is immune from suit
Holding:
1. Yes.
2. No.
 Ratio:
1. While the court agrees with the respondent that the implied contracts are void, in view of violation of applicable laws, auditing
rules, and lack of legal requirements, it still finds merit in the instant petition
The illegality of the implied contracts proceeds from an express declaration or prohibition by law, not from any intrinsic
illegality
"in the interest of substantial justice," petitioners-contractors' right to be compensated is upheld, applying the principle of
quantum meruit
Even the DPWH Asst. Sec. for Legal Affairs recommends their compensation; even the DPWH Auditor did not object to the
payment of the money claims
2. The respondent may not conveniently hide under the State's cloak of invincibility against suit, considering that this principle
yields to certain settled exceptions.
The State's immunity cannot serve as an instrument perpetrating injustice
Petition granted. RTC decision reversed and set aside.
G.R. No. 187425 : March 28, 2011.
COMMISSIONER OF CUSTOMS, Petitioner v. AGFHA INCORPORATED, Respondent.
FACTS:
On December 12, 1993, a shipment containing bales of textile grey cloth arrived at the Manila International
Container Port(MICP).The Customs Commissioner (Commissioner), however, held the subject shipment
because its owner/consignee was allegedly fictitious.AGFHA intervened and alleged that it was the owner and
actual consignee of the subject shipment. Eventually, this dispute reached the SC, which ended with a Writ of
Execution ordering the immediate release of the subject shipment to AGFHA. Asked to explain its consistent
failure to execute the writ, the Commissioner explained, inter alia, that despite diligent efforts to obtain the
necessary information and considering the length of time that had elapsed since the subject shipment arrived
at the Bureau of Customs, the Chief of the Auction and Cargo Disposal Division of the MICP could not
determine the status, whereabouts and disposition of said shipment.
Acting on a complaint by AGFHA, the CTA-Second Division adjudged the Commissioner liable to AGFHA,
ordering the Bureau of Customs to pay AGFHA the value of the lost shipment in the amount of
US$160,348.08),subject however, to the payment of the prescribed taxes and duties, at the time of the
importation, and that the Bureau of Customs liability may be paid in Philippine Currency, computed at the
exchange rate prevailing at the time of actual payment. The CTA En Banc and the CA affirmed.
The Commissioner basically argues that the exchange rate on the amount of payment should be computed
not on the time of payment, but on its acquisition cost at the time of importation; and that this case has been
transformed into a suit against the State because the satisfaction of AGFHAs claim will have to be taken from
the national coffers.
ISSUES:
1. Whether or not AGFHA is entitled to recover the value of the lost shipment based only on its acquisition
cost at the time of importation
2. Whether or not the suit has been converted into a suit against the State
HELD:
TAXATION:
First issue: In the case of C.F. Sharp and Co., Inc. v. Northwest Airlines, Inc.the Court ruled that the rate of
exchange for the conversion in the peso equivalent should be the prevailing rate at the time of
payment. Likewise, in the case of Republic of the Philippines represented by the Commissioner of Customs
v. UNIMEX Micro-Electronics GmBH, which involved the seizure and detention of a shipment of computer game
items which disappeared while in the custody of the Bureau of Customs, the Court upheld the decision of the
CA holding thatpetitioners liability may be paid in Philippine currency, computed at the exchange rate
prevailing at the time of actual payment. The Court therefore agrees with the CAs ruling.
POLITICAL LAW
Second issue: On the issue regarding the state immunity doctrine, the Commissioner cannot escape liability
for the lost shipment of goods. This was clearly discussed in the UNIMEX Micro-Electronics GmBH decision,
where the Court wrote: "the Court cannot turn a blind eye to BOC's ineptitude and gross negligence in the
safekeeping of respondent's goods.The situation does not allow us to reject respondent's claim on the mere
invocation of the doctrine of state immunity. Succinctly, the doctrine must be fairly observed and the State
should not avail itself of this prerogative to take undue advantage of parties that may have legitimate claims
against it."
DENIED
G.R. Nos. 170270 & 179411 April 2, 2009
NEWSOUNDS BROADCASTING NETWORK INC. and CONSOLIDATED BROADCASTING SYSTEM, INC., Petitioners,
vs.
HON. CEASAR G. DY, FELICISIMO G. MEER, BAGNOS MAXIMO, RACMA FERNANDEZ-GARCIA and THE CITY OF
CAUAYAN, Respondents.
Facts:
Petitioners operate and run Bombo Radyo DZNC Cauayan (DZNC), an AM radio broadcast station, and Star FM DWIT
Cauayan, an FM radio broadcast station, in Cauayan Citry, Isabela. Back in 1996, Newsounds commenced relocation of its
broadcasting station, management office, and transmitters on propery located in Minante 2, Cauayan City, Isabela.
On July 1996, the Housing & Land Use Regulatory Board (HLURB) and Office of the Municipal Planning and Development
Coordinator (OMPDC) affirmed and certified that the commercial structure to be constructed conformed to local zoning
regulations, noting as well that the location is classified as a commercial area. The radio station was able to fully operate
smoothly thereafter.
In 2002 however, when petitioners applied for a renewal of mayors permit, City Zoning Administratior-Designate Bagnos
Maximo refused to issue zoning clearance on the grounds that petitioners were not able to submit conversion papers showing
that the agricultural land was converted to commercial land. Petitioners asked the court to compel the issuance of mayors
permit but the court denied the action. In the meantime, the Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR) Region II office issued to
petitioners a formal recognition of conversion of the property from agricultural to commercial.
In 2003, petitioners again filed their application for renewal of mayors permit, attaching the DAR Order. Respondent
Felicisimo Meer, acting City Administrator of Cauayan City denied the same, claiming that it was void on the grounds that they
did not have record of the DAR Order.
The deadline lapsed on Febuary 15, 2004, and respondents Meer and Racma Fernandez-Garcia, City Legal Officer of
Cauayan City, closed the radio station. Due to the prvosion of Omnibus Election Code which prohibits the closure of radio
station during the pendency of election period, COMELEC issued an order allowing the petitioners to operate before Febuary
17, 2004, but was barred again by respondent Mayor Ceasar Dy on the grounds that the radio station had no permit.
Nonetheless, COMELEC allowed them to run again until June 10, 2004 after elections.
Petitioners filed the case to the RTC and CA for the issuance of mayors permit but both courts denied the petition.
A municipal or city mayor is likewise authorized under the LGC to issue licenses and permits, and suspend or revoke the
same for any violation of the conditions upon which said licenses or permits had been issued, pursuant to law or ordinance. In
case of Cauayan City, the authority to require a mayors permit was enacted through Ordinance No. 92-004, enacted in 1993.
However, nothing in the ordinance requires an application for a mayors permit to submit either an approved land conversion
papers from DAR, showing that its property was converted from prime agricultural land or an approved resolution from the
Sangguniang Bayan or Sangguniang Panglungsod authorizing the reclassification of property from agricultural to commercial
land.
In 1996, the HLURB issued a zoning decision that classified the property as commercial. Petitioners are also armed with
several certifications stating that the property is indeed a commercial area. Also, petitioners paid real property taxes based on
the classification of property as commercial without objections raised by the respondents.
Petitioners argued that this consistent recognition by the local government of Cauayan of the commercial character of the
property constitutes estoppels against respondents from denying the fact before the courts. The lower courts had ruled that
the government of Cauayan City is not bound by estoppels, but petitioners classified that this concept is understood to only
refer to acts and mistakes of its official especially to those which are irregular.
Issue:
Whether the lower court is correct in contending that the government of Cauayan City is not bound by estoppels on the
grounds that the state is immune against suits.
Held:
No. While it is true that the state cannot be put in estoppels by mistake or error of its officials or agents, there is an exception.
Estoppels against the public are little favored. They should not be invoked except in rare and unusual circumstances, and
may not be invoked where they would operate to defeat the effective operation of a policy adopted to protect the public. They
must be applied with circumspection and should be applied only in those special cases where the interests of justice clearly
require it. Nevertheless, the government must not be allowed to deal dishonorably or capriciously with its citizens, and must
not play an ignoble part or do a shabby thing; and subject to limitations . . ., the doctrine of equitable estoppel may be invoked
against public authorities as well as against private individuals
Thus, when there is no convincing evidence to prove irregularity or negligence on the part of the government official whose
acts are being disowned other than the bare assertion on the part of the State, the Supreme Court have declined to apply
State immunity from estoppel. Herein, there is absolutely no evidence other than the bare assertions of the respondents that
the Cauayan City government had previously erred when it certified that the property had been zoned for commercial use.
The absence of any evidence other than bare assertions that the 1996 to 2001 certifications were incorrect lead to the
ineluctable conclusion that respondents are estopped from asserting that the previous recognition of the property as
commercial was wrong.
Respondents were further estopped from disclaiming the previous consistent recognition by the Cauayan City government
that the property was commercially zoned unless they had evidence, which they had none, that the local officials who issued
such certifications acted irregularly in doing so. It is thus evident that respondents had no valid cause at all to even require
petitioners to secure approved land conversion papers from the DAR showing that the property was converted from prime
agricultural land to commercial land.
Respondents closure of petitioners radio stations is clearly tainted with ill motvies. Petitioners have been aggressive in
exposing the widespread election irregularities in Isabela that appear to have favored respondent Dy and his political dynasty.
Such statement manifests and confirms that respondents denial of the renewal applications on the ground that property is
commercial and merely a pretext, and their real agenda is to remove petitioners from Cauayan City and suppress the latters
voice. This is a blatant violation of constitutional right to press freedom.
WHEREFORE, the petitions are GRANTED. The assailed decisions of the Court of Appeals and the Regional Trial Court of
Cauayan City, Branch 24, are hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The instant petition for mandamus is hereby GRANTED
and respondents are directed to immediately issue petitioners zoning clearances and mayors permits for 2004 to petitioners.
THE HOLY SEE vs. THE HON. ERIBERTO U. ROSARIO, JR., as Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court of Makati,
Branch 61 and STARBRIGHT SALES ENTERPRISES, INC.
G.R. No. 101949 December 1, 1994
FACTS: Petitioner is the Holy See who exercises sovereignty over the Vatican City in Rome, Italy, and is represented in the
Philippines by the Papal Nuncio; Private respondent, Starbright Sales Enterprises, Inc., is a domestic corporation engaged in
the real estate business.
This petition arose from a controversy over a parcel of land consisting of 6,000 square meters located in the Municipality of
Paranaque registered in the name of petitioner. Said lot was contiguous with two other lots registered in the name of the
Philippine Realty Corporation (PRC).
The three lots were sold to Ramon Licup, through Msgr. Domingo A. Cirilos, Jr., acting as agent to the sellers. Later, Licup
assigned his rights to the sale to private respondent.
In view of the refusal of the squatters to vacate the lots sold to private respondent, a dispute arose as to who of the parties
has the responsibility of evicting and clearing the land of squatters. Complicating the relations of the parties was the sale by
petitioner of Lot 5-A to Tropicana Properties and Development Corporation (Tropicana).
private respondent filed a complaint with the Regional Trial Court, Branch 61, Makati, Metro Manila for annulment of the sale
of the three parcels of land, and specific performance and damages against petitioner, represented by the Papal Nuncio, and
three other defendants: namely, Msgr. Domingo A. Cirilos, Jr., the PRC and Tropicana
petitioner and Msgr. Cirilos separately moved to dismiss the complaint petitioner for lack of jurisdiction based on sovereign
immunity from suit, and Msgr. Cirilos for being an improper party. An opposition to the motion was filed by private respondent.
the trial court issued an order denying, among others, petitioners motion to dismiss after finding that petitioner shed off [its]
sovereign immunity by entering into the business contract in question Petitioner forthwith elevated the matter to us. In its
petition, petitioner invokes the privilege of sovereign immunity only on its own behalf and on behalf of its official
representative, the Papal Nuncio.
ISSUE: ISSUE: W/N the CA erred in sustaining the trial court's decision that petitioners have waived their immunity from suit by using
Whether the Holy See is immune from suit insofar as its business relations regarding selling a lot to a private entity as its basis the provision in the Maintenance Agreement.

RULING:
The Republic of the Philippines has accorded the Holy See the status of a foreign sovereign. The Holy See, through its
HELD: The mere entering into a contract by a foreign state with a private party cannot be construed as the ultimate test of
Ambassador, the Papal Nuncio, has had diplomatic representations with the Philippine government since 1957 (Rollo, p. 87).
whether or not it is an act juri imperii or juri gestionis. Such act is only the start of the inquiry. There is no dispute that the
This appears to be the universal practice in international relations.
establishment of a diplomatic mission is an act juri imperii. The state may enter into contracts with private entities to maintain
There are two conflicting concepts of sovereign immunity, each widely held and firmly established. According to the classical
the premises, furnishings and equipment of the embassy. The Republic of Indonesia is acting in pursuit of a sovereign activity
or absolute theory, a sovereign cannot, without its consent, be made a respondent in the courts of another sovereign.
when it entered into a contract with the respondent. The maintenance agreement was entered into by the Republic of
According to the newer or restrictive theory, the immunity of the sovereign is recognized only with regard to public acts or acts
Indonesia in the discharge of its governmental functions. It cannot be deemed to have waived its immunity from suit.
jure imperii of a state, but not with regard to private acts or acts jure gestionis
If the act is in pursuit of a sovereign activity, or an incident thereof, then it is an act jure imperii, especially when it is not
undertaken for gain or profit. State Immunity
In the case at bench, if petitioner has bought and sold lands in the ordinary course of a real estate business, surely the said
transaction can be categorized as an act jure gestionis. However, petitioner has denied that the acquisition and subsequent China National Machinery and Equipment Corp. v. Santamaria (2012)
disposal of Lot 5-A were made for profit but claimed that it acquired said property for the site of its mission or the Apostolic
Nunciature in the Philippines. Private respondent failed to dispute said claim. Facts: CNMEG and NorthRail entered into Memorandum of Understanding for the feasibility study on apossible railway line
Lot 5-A was acquired by petitioner as a donation from the Archdiocese of Manila. The donation was made not for commercial from Manila to La Union ( NorthRail Project). CNMEG and NorthRail executed a Contract of Agreement for the construction of
purpose, but for the use of petitioner to construct thereon the official place of residence of the Papal Nuncio. The right of a the Phase 1 of Northrail. The respondents filed a Complaint for Annulment of Contract and Injunction in the RTC of Makati.
foreign sovereign to acquire property, real or personal, in a receiving state, necessary for the creation and maintenance of its CNMEG filed a motion to dismiss. CNMEG filed a motion to dismiss arguing that the Trial Court did not have jurisdiction over
diplomatic mission, is recognized in the 1961 Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations (Arts. 20-22). This treaty was its person as it was an agent of the Chinese government making it immune from suit, and the subject matter as the Northrail
concurred in by the Philippine Senate and entered into force in the Philippines on November 15, 1965. was product of an executive agreement.
The decision to transfer the property and the subsequent disposal thereof are likewise clothed with a governmental character.
Petitioner did not sell Lot 5-A for profit or gain. It merely wanted to dispose off the same because the squatters living thereon
made it almost impossible for petitioner to use it for the purpose of the donation. The fact that squatters have occupied and Issue: Whether CNMEG is entitled to immunity precluding it from being sued before a local court
are still occupying the lot, and that they stubbornly refuse to leave the premises, has been admitted by private respondent in
its complaint Held: CNMEG claims immunity on the ground that the Aug 30 MOU on the financing of the Northrail Project was signed by the
Private respondent is not left without any legal remedy for the redress of its grievances. Under both Public International Law Philippine and Chinese governments, and its assignment as the Primary Contractor meant that it was bound to perform a
and Transnational Law, a person who feels aggrieved by the acts of a foreign sovereign can ask his own government to governmental function on behalf of China. However, the Loan Agreement, which originated from the same Aug 30 MOU,
espouse his cause through diplomatic channels. belies this reasoning, viz:
Private respondent can ask the Philippine government, through the Foreign Office, to espouse its claims against the Holy
See. Its first task is to persuade the Philippine government to take up with the Holy See the validity of its claims. Of course, Article 11. xxx (j) Commercial Activity The execution and delivery of this Agreement by the Borrower constitute, and the
the Foreign Office shall first make a determination of the impact of its espousal on the relations between the Philippine Borrowers performance of and compliance with its obligations under this Agreement will constitute, private and commercial
government and the Holy See (Young, Remedies of Private Claimants Against Foreign States, Selected Readings on acts done and performed for commercial purposes under the laws of the Republic of the Philippines and neither the
Protection by Law of Private Foreign Investments 905, 919 [1964]). Once the Philippine government decides to espouse the Borrower nor any of its assets is entitled to any immunity or privilege (sovereign or otherwise) from suit, execution
claim, the latter ceases to be a private cause. or any other legal process with respect to its obligations under this Agreement, as the case may be, in any
jurisdiction. Notwithstanding the foregoing, the Borrower does not waive any immunity with respect of its assets which are (i)
WHEREFORE, the petition for certiorari is GRANTED and the complaint in Civil Case No. 90-183 against petitioner is used by a diplomatic or consular mission of the Borrower and (ii) assets of a military character and under control of a military
DISMISSED. authority or defense agency and (iii) located in the Philippines and dedicated to public or governmental use (as distinguished
from patrimonial assets or assets dedicated to commercial use). (Emphasis supplied.)
REPUBLIC OF INDONESIA vs. JAMES VINZON [G.R. No. 154705. June 26, 2003]
FACTS: Petitioner entered into a Maintenance Agreement with respondent. The maintenance agreement includes the (k) Proceedings to Enforce Agreement In any proceeding in the Republic of the Philippines to enforce this Agreement, the
following specific equipments: air conditioning units, generator sets, electrical facilities, water heaters and water motor pumps. choice of the laws of the Peoples Republic of China as the governing law hereof will be recognized and such law will be
The agreement shall be effective for 4 years. applied. The waiver of immunity by the Borrower, the irrevocable submissions of the Borrower to the non-exclusive jurisdiction
of the courts of the Peoples Republic of China and the appointment of the Borrowers Chinese Process Agent is legal, valid,
binding and enforceable and any judgment obtained in the Peoples Republic of China will be if introduced, evidence for
enforcement in any proceedings against the Borrower and its assets in the Republic of the Philippines provided that (a) the
The new Minister Counsellor allegedly found respondent's work and services unsatisfactory and not in compliance with the court rendering judgment had jurisdiction over the subject matter of the action in accordance with its jurisdictional rules, (b)
standards set in the Agreement. The respondent terminated the agreement with the respondent. The latter claim that it was the Republic had notice of the proceedings, (c) the judgment of the court was not obtained through collusion or fraud, and (d)
unlawful and arbitrary. Respondent filed a Motion to Dismiss alleging that the Republic of Indonesia, as a foreign state, has such judgment was not based on a clear mistake of fact or law.
sovereign immunity from suit and cannot be sued as party-defendant in the Philippines.
Further, the Loan Agreement likewise contains this express waiver of immunity:
15.5 Waiver of Immunity The Borrower irrevocably and unconditionally waives, any immunity to which it or its property may at
any time be or become entitled, whether characterized as sovereign immunity or otherwise, from any suit, judgment, service
of process upon it or any agent, execution on judgment, set-off, attachment prior to judgment, attachment in aid of execution
to which it or its assets may be entitled in any legal action or proceedings with respect to this Agreement or any of the
transactions contemplated hereby or hereunder. Notwithstanding the foregoing, the Borrower does not waive any immunity in
respect of its assets which are (i) used by a diplomatic or consular mission of the Borrower, (ii) assets of a military character
and under control of a military authority or defense agency and (iii) located in the Philippines and dedicated to a public or
governmental use (as distinguished from patrimonial assets or assets dedicated to commercial use).
Thus, despite petitioners claim that the EXIM Bank extended financial assistance to Northrail because the bank was
mandated by the Chinese government, and not because of any motivation to do business in the Philippines,it is clear from the
foregoing provisions that the Northrail Project was a purely commercial transaction.
Admittedly, the Loan Agreement was entered into between EXIM Bank and the Philippine government, while the Contract
Agreement was between Northrail and CNMEG. Although the Contract Agreement is silent on the classification of the legal
nature of the transaction, the foregoing provisions of the Loan Agreement, which is an inextricable part of the entire
undertaking, nonetheless reveal the intention of the parties to the Northrail Project to classify the whole venture as
commercial or proprietary in character.
Thus, piecing together the content and tenor of the Contract Agreement, the Memorandum of Understanding dated 14
September 2002, Amb. Wangs letter dated 1 October 2003, and the Loan Agreement would reveal the desire of CNMEG to
construct the Luzon Railways in pursuit of a purely commercial activity performed in the ordinary course of its business.
G.R. Nos. 109095-109107 February 23, 1995ELDEPIO LASCO, RODOLFO ELISAN, URBANO BERADOR, FLORENTINOESTOBIO,
MARCELINO MATURAN, FRAEN BALIBAG, CARMELITO GAJOL,DEMOSTHENES MANTO, SATURNINO BACOL, SATURNINO LASCO,
RAMONLOYOLA, JOSENIANO B. ESPINA, all represented by MARIANO R.ESPINA,petitioner,vs.UNITED NATIONS REVOLVING FUND FOR
NATURAL RESOURCESEXPLORATION (UNRFNRE) represented by its operations manager, DR. KYRIACOSLOUCA, OSCAR N. ABELLA,
LEON G. GONZAGA, JR., MUSIB M. BUAT,Commissioners of National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC), Fifth Division, Cagayande Oro City
and IRVING PETILLA, Labor Arbiter of Butuan City, respondents.
Facts:
Petitioners were dismissed from their employment with private respondent, the United Nations
R evolving Fund for Natural ResourcesExploration (UNRFNRE), which is a special fund andsubsidiary organ of the United
Nations. The UNRFNRE is involved in a joint project of
thePhilippine Government and the United Nations for exploration work in Dinagat Island.Petitioners are the complainants for
illegal dismissal and damages. Private respondent alleged that respondent Labor Arbiter had no jurisdiction over its
personality since it enjoyed diplomatic immunity.
Issue:
WON specialized agencies enjoy diplomatic immunity
Held:
Petition is dismissed. This is not to say that petitioner have no recourse. Section 31 of the Convention on the Privileges and
Immunities of the Specialized Agencies of the United Nations states that each specialized agency shall make a provision for
appropriate modes of settlement of (a) disputes arising out of contracts or other disputes of private character to which the
specialized agency is a party.
Private respondent is not engaged in a commercial venture in the Philippines. Its presence is by virtue of a joint project
entered into by the Philippine Government and the United Nations for mineral exploration in Dinagat Island.
DFAvs NLRC Case Digest
Diplomatic Immunity, Suits against International Agencies
(DFA vs NLRC, G.R. No. 113191, 18 September 1996)
Facts:
On 27 January 1993, private respondent Magnayi filed an illegal dismissal case against Asian Development Bank. Two
summonses were served, one sent directly to the ADB and the other through the Department of Foreign Affairs. ADB and the
DFA notified respondent Labor Arbiter that the ADB, as well as its President and Officers, were covered by an immunity from
legal process except for borrowings, guaranties or the sale of securities pursuant to Article 50(1) and Article 55 of the
Agreement Establishing the Asian Development Bank (the "Charter") in relation to Section 5 and Section 44 of the Agreement
Between The Bank and The Government Of The Philippines Regarding The Bank's Headquarters (the "Headquarters
Agreement").
The Labor Arbiter took cognizance of the complaint on the impression that the ADB had waived its diplomatic immunity from
suit and, in time, rendered a decision in favor Magnayi. The ADB did not appeal the decision. Instead, on 03 November 1993,
the DFA referred the matter to the NLRC; in its referral, the DFA sought a "formal vacation of the void judgment." When DFA
failed to obtain a favorable decision from the NLRC, it filed a petition for certiorari.
Issues:
1. Whether or not ADB is immune from suit
2. Whether or not by entering into service contracts with different private companies, ADB has descended to the level of an
ordinary party to a commercial transaction giving rise to a waiver of its immunity from suit
3. Whether or not the DFA has the legal standing to file the present petition
4. Whether or not the extraordinary remedy of certiorari is proper in this case
Held:
1. Under the Charter and Headquarters Agreement, the ADB enjoys immunity from legal process of every form, except in the
specified cases of borrowing and guarantee operations, as well as the purchase, sale and underwriting of securities. The
Banks officers, on their part, enjoy immunity in respect of all acts performed by them in their official capacity. The Charter and
the Headquarters Agreement granting these immunities and privileges are treaty covenants and commitments voluntarily
assumed by the Philippine government which must be respected.
Being an international organization that has been extended a diplomatic status, the ADB is independent of the municipal
law. "One of the basic immunities of an international organization is immunity from local jurisdiction, i.e., that it is immune from
the legal writs and processes issued by the tribunals of the country where it is found. The obvious reason for this is that the
subjection of such an organization to the authority of the local courts would afford a convenient medium thru which the host
government may interfere in their operations or even influence or control its policies and decisions of the organization;
besides, such subjection to local jurisdiction would impair the capacity of such body to discharge its responsibilities impartially
on behalf of its member-states."
2. No. The ADB didn't descend to the level of an ordinary party to a commercial transaction, which should have constituted a
waiver of its immunity from suit, by entering into service contracts with different private companies. There are two conflicting
concepts of sovereign immunity, each widely held and firmly established. According to the classical or absolute theory, a
sovereign cannot, without its consent, be made a respondent in the Courts of another sovereign. According to the newer or
restrictive theory, the immunity of the sovereign is recognized only with regard to public acts or acts jure imperii of a state, but
not with regard toprivate act or acts jure gestionis.
Certainly, the mere entering into a contract by a foreign state with a private party cannot be the ultimate test. Such an act
can only be the start of the inquiry. The logical question is whether the foreign state is engaged in the activity in the regular
course of business. If the foreign state is not engaged regularly in a business or trade, the particular act or transaction must
then be tested by its nature. If the act is in pursuit of a sovereign activity, or an incident thereof, then it is an act jure imperii,
especially when it is not undertaken for gain or profit.
The service contracts referred to by private respondent have not been intended by the ADB for profit or gain but are official
acts over which a waiver of immunity would not attach.
3. Yes. The DFA's function includes, among its other mandates, the determination of persons and institutions covered by
diplomatic immunities, a determination which, when challenged, entitles it to seek relief from the court so as not to seriously
impair the conduct of the country's foreign relations. The DFA must be allowed to plead its case whenever necessary or
advisable to enable it to help keep the credibility of the Philippine government before the international community. When
international agreements are concluded, the parties thereto are deemed to have likewise accepted the responsibility of seeing
to it that their agreements are duly regarded. In our country, this task falls principally on the DFA as being the highest
executive department with the competence and authority to so act in this aspect of the international arena. In Holy See vs.
Hon. Rosario, Jr., this Court has explained the matter in good detail; viz:
"In Public International Law, when a state or international agency wishes to plead sovereign or diplomatic immunity in a
foreign court, it requests the Foreign Office of the state where it is sued to convey to the court that said defendant is entitled to
immunity.
"In the United States, the procedure followed is the process of 'suggestion,' where the foreign state or the international
organization sued in an American court requests the Secretary of State to make a determination as to whether it is entitled to
immunity. If the Secretary of State finds that the defendant is immune from suit, he, in turn, asks the Attorney General to
submit to the court a 'suggestion' that the defendant is entitled to immunity.
"In the Philippines, the practice is for the foreign government or the international organization to first secure an executive
endorsement of its claim of sovereign or diplomatic immunity. But how the Philippine Foreign Office conveys its endorsement
to the courts varies. In International Catholic Migration Commission vs. Calleja, 190 SCRA 130 (1990), the Secretary of
Foreign Affairs just sent a letter directly to the Secretary of Labor and Employment, informing the latter that the respondent-
employer could not be sued because it enjoyed diplomatic immunity. In World Health Organization vs. Aquino, 48 SCRA 242
(1972), the Secretary of Foreign Affairs sent the trial court a telegram to that effect. In Baer vs. Tizon, 57 SCRA 1 (1974), the
U.S. Embassy asked the Secretary of Foreign Affairs to request the Solicitor General to make, in behalf of the Commander of
the United States Naval Base at Olongapo City, Zambales, a 'suggestion' to respondent Judge. The Solicitor General
embodied the 'suggestion' in a manifestation and memorandum as amicus curiae.
"In the case at bench, the Department of Foreign Affairs, through the Office of Legal Affairs moved with this Court to be
allowed to intervene on the side of petitioner. The Court allowed the said Department to file its memorandum in support of
petitioner's claim of sovereign immunity.
"In some cases, the defense of sovereign immunity was submitted directly to the local courts by the respondents through their
private counsels. In cases where the foreign states bypass the Foreign Office, the courts can inquire into the facts and make
their own determination as to the nature of the acts and transactions involved."
4. Yes. Relative to the propriety of the extraordinary remedy of certiorari, the Court has, under special circumstances, so
allowed and entertained such a petition when (a) the questioned order or decision is issued in excess of or without
jurisdiction, or (b) where the order or decision is apatent nullity, which, verily, are the circumstances that can be said to obtain
in the present case. When an adjudicator is devoid of jurisdiction on a matter before him, his action that assumes otherwise
would be a clear nullity.
Petition for certiorari is GRANTED, and the decision of the Labor Arbiter, dated 31 August 1993 is VACATED for being NULL
AND VOID.
GENSON v ADARLE
FACTS
Arbatin was the successful bidder in a public auction of junk and other unserviceable government property in the Highway
District Engineers Office of Roxas City. Arbatin then employed Adarle to help him haul the junk. On a non-working day, when
Adarle and Buensalido, the driver of the payloader, were at the site continuing to gather the junk, a bucket from the payloader
fell and injured Adarle to the point of paralyzing his lower extremities. Adarle instituted an actionagainst Arbatin, Buensalido,
Marcelino (Civil Engineer), and Genson (Highway District Engineer). RTC ruled in favor of Adarle. IAC modified the previous
ruling, absolving Marcelino from liability, and averring that the liability of Genson is based on fault, by allowing Arbatin and his
men to work on the premises on a non-working day, in contravention of his offices policy. Petitioner Genson then appealed
the decision to the SC, stating that the facts upon which the IAC declared that his liability is based on fault by allowing the
men to work on a non-working holiday is without basis. Furthermore, he contends that by filing a suit against him, Adarle is
then filing a suit against the Republic, which violates the non-suability of the State.
ISSUE
Whether or not Genson should be held liable, personally or officially?
HELD
NO. With regard to the non-suability contention, Adarle filed a suit against Genson personally, in his capacity as the Highway
District Engineer, and not the State or his office. As for the main issue, there was no evidence to prove Gensons presence
when the accident occurred, nor was there anybasis for the lower courts to hold that Genson was at fault by authorizing
Arbatin and his men to work on a non-working day. It might even be proven that working on a Saturday for the specific
purpose of hauling junk would be the time when the most work can be done, as it has less traffic. The Master-Servant doctrine
in tort law cannot apply either, since despite the fact that Buensalido, Gensons employee, was moonlighting on a non-
working holiday, Buensalidos arrangement with Arbatin was purely private in nature, and had nothing to do with his being
employed under Genson. Thus, absent the showing of malice, bad faith or gross negligence on the part of Genson, he cannot
be held liable for the acts committed by Buensalido and Arbatin.
VITAL GOZON VS. CA (G.R. No. 129132)
FACTS: Executive Order No. 119 issued on January 30, 1987 ordered the reorganization of the various offices of the Ministry
of Health where Dr. Alejandro S. de la Fuente was demoted to Medical Specialist II from being the Chief of the Clinics of the
National Children's Hospital. De la Fuente filed a protest with the DOH Reorganization Board but was ignored and she
brought this to Civil Service Commission. While the case was pending, the position of Chief of Clinics were turned over to and
were allowed to be exercised by Dr. Jose D. Merencilla. Dr. de la Fuente's case was decided and declared that the
demotion/transfer of appellant de la Fuente, Jr. from Chief of Clinics to Medical Specialists II as null and void, the resolution
became final. De la Fuente there upon sent two (2) letters to Dr. Vital-Gozon, the Medical Center Chief of National Children's
Hospital, demanding the implementation of the Commission's decision but she did not answer Dr. de la Fuente's letters or to
take steps to comply or otherwise advise compliance, with the final and executory Resolution of the Civil Service Commission.
She instituted in the Court of Appeals an action of " mandamus and damages with preliminary injunction" to compel Vital-
Gozon, and the Administrative Officer, Budget Officer and Cashier of the NCH to comply with the final and executory
resolution but Vital-Gozon did not respond to the order of the court. Thus CA declared, that the said resolution declared dela
Fuente as the lawful and de jure Chief of Respondents, particularly Dr. Isabelita Vital-Gozon, had no discretion or choice on
the matter; the resolution had to be complied with. A writ of execution was issued thereafter. On her motion for
reconsideration, Vital-Gozon argued that the Appellate Court had no jurisdiction over the question of damages in a mandamus
action and referred this to the Office of Solicitor General. Court of Appeals denied the motion and ruled that the Solicitor
General has no authority to appear as counsel for respondent Gozon.
ISSUE: Whether or not the Court of Appeals has jurisdiction, in a special civil action of mandamus against a public officer, to
take cognizance of the matter of damages sought to be recovered from the defendant officer
HELD: The Solicitor General's Office evidently searched said Section 9 for an explicit and specific statement regarding "
actions for moral and exemplary damages, " and finding none, concluded that the Court of Appeals had not been granted
competence to assume cognizance of claims for such damages. The conclusion is incorrect. Section 19, governing the
exclusive original jurisdiction of Regional Trial Courts in civil cases, contains no reference whatever to claims "for moral and
exemplary damages," and indeed does not use the word "damages" at all; yet it is indisputable that said courts have power to
try and decide claims for moral, exemplary and other classes of damages accompanying any of the types or kinds of cases
falling within their specified jurisdiction. The Solicitor General's theory that the rule in question is a mere procedural one
allowing the joining of an action of mandamus and another for damages, is untenable, for it implies that a claim for damages
arising from the omission or failure to do an act subject of a mandamus suit may be litigated separately from the latter, the
matter of damages not being inextricably linked to the cause of action for mandamus, which is certainly not the case. It being
quite evident that Dr. Vital-Gozon is not here charged with a crime, or civilly prosecuted for damages arising from a crime,
there is no legal obstacle to her being represented by the Office of the Solicitor General. The petition was DENIED and the
resolution was affirmed.
Calub and Valencia vs. CA G.R. No. 115634, April 27, 2000
Labels: Case Digests, Political Law
Facts: The Forest Protection and Law Enforcement Team of the Community Environment and Natural Resources Office of
the DENR apprehended 2 motor vehicles loaded with illegally sourced lumber. The drivers of the vehicles failed to present
proper documents. Thus, the apprehending team impounded the vehicles and its load of lumber. The impounded vehicles
were forcibly taken by the drivers from the custody of DENR. Thereafter, one of the 2 vehicles was again apprehended by a
composite team of DENR-CENRO and Phil. Army elements. The vehicle was again loaded with forest products.
Private respondents Manuela Babalcon, the vehicle owner, and Constancio Abuganda, the driver, filed a complaint for the
recovery of possession of the vehicle with an application for replevin against petitioners DENR and DENR Officer Calub.
Issue: Whether or not the complaint for the recovery of possession of impounded vehicles, with an application for replevin, is
a suit against the State
Held: Well established is the doctrine that the State may not be sued without its consent. And a suit against a public officer for
his official acts is, in effect, a suit against the State if its purpose is to hold the State ultimately liable. However, the protection
afforded to public officers by this doctrine generally applies only to activities within the scope of their authority in good faith
and without willfulness, malice or corruption.
In the present case, the acts for which the petitioners are being called to account were performed by them in the discharge of
their official duties. The acts in question are clearly official in nature. In implementing and enforcing Secs. 78-A and 89 of the
Forestry Code through the seizurecarried out, petitioners were performing their duties and functions as officers of the DENR,
and did so within the limits of their authority. There was no malice or bad faith on their part. Hence, a suit against the
petitioners who represent the DENR is a suit against the State. It cannot prosper without the States consent.
G.R. No. 182358 : February 20, 2013
DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH, THE SECRETARY OF HEALTH, and MA. MARGARITA M. GALON, Petitioners, v .PHIL
PHARMAWEALTH, INC., Respondent.
DEL CASTILLO, J.:
FACTS:
On August 28, 2000, the DOH issued Memorandum No. 171-C which provided for a list and category of sanctions to be
imposed on accredited government suppliers of pharmaceutical products in case of adverse findings regarding their products
(e.g. substandard, fake, or misbranded) or violations committed by them during their accreditation.
In line with Memorandum No. 171-C, the DOH, through former Undersecretary Ma. Margarita M. Galon(Galon), issued
Memorandum No. 209 series of 2000,inviting representatives of 24 accredited drug companies, including herein respondent
Phil Pharmawealth, Inc. (PPI) to a meeting on October 27, 2000. During the meeting, Undersecretary Galon handed them
copies of a document entitled "Report on Violative Products issued by the Bureau of Food and Drugs (BFAD), which detailed
violations or adverse findings relative to these accredited drug companies products. Specifically, the BFAD found that PPI
products which were being sold to the public were unfit for human consumption.
During the October 27, 2000 meeting, the 24 drug companies were directed to submit within 10 days, or until November 6,
2000, their respective explanations on the adverse findings covering their respective products contained in the Report on
Violative Products.
Instead of submitting its written explanation within the 10-day period as required, PPI belatedly sent a letter dated November
13, 2000 addressed to Undersecretary Galon, informing her that PPI has referred the Report on Violative Products to its
lawyers with instructions to prepare the corresponding reply. However, PPI did not indicate when its reply would be submitted;
nor did it seek an extension of the 10-day period, which had previously expired on November 6, 2000, much less offer any
explanation for its failure to timely submit its reply.
In a letter-reply dated November 23, 2000 Undersecretary Galon found "untenable" PPI November 13, 2000 letter and therein
informed PPI that, effective immediately, its accreditation has been suspended for two years pursuant to AO 10 and
Memorandum No. 171-C.
In another December 14, 2000 letter addressed to Undersecretary Galon, PPI through counsel questioned the suspension of
its accreditation, saying that the same was made pursuant to Section VII of AO 10 which it claimed was patently illegal and
null and void because it arrogated unto the DOH Accreditation Committee powers and functions which were granted to the
BFAD under Republic Act (RA) No. 3720 and Executive Order (EO) No. 175. PPI added that its accreditation was suspended
without the benefit of notice and hearing, in violation of its right to substantive and administrative due process. It thus
demanded that the DOH desist from implementing the suspension of its accreditation, under pain of legal redress.
On December 28, 2000, PPI filed before the Regional Trial Court of Pasig City a Complaint seeking to declare null and void
certain DOH administrative issuances, with prayer for damages and injunction against the DOH, former Secretary Romualdez
and DOH Undersecretary Galon.
In their Amended Answer,the DOH, former Secretary Romualdez, then Secretary Dayrit, and Undersecretary Galon sought
the dismissal of the Complaint, stressing that PPI accreditation was suspended because most of the drugs it was importing
and distributing/selling to the public were found by the BFAD to be substandard for human consumption. They added that the
DOH is primarily responsible for the formulation, planning, implementation, and coordination of policies and programs in the
field of health; it is vested with the comprehensive power to make essential health services and goods available to the people,
including accreditation of drug suppliers and regulation of importation and distribution of basic medicines for the public.
In a January 8, 2001 Order, the trial court partially granted PPI prayer for a temporary restraining order, but only covering PPI
products which were not included in the list of violative products or drugs as found by the BFAD.
In a Manifestation and Motion dated July 8, 2003, petitioners moved for the dismissal of Civil Case No. 68200, claiming that
the case was one against the State; that the Complaint was improperly verified; and lack of authority of the corporate officer to
commence the suit, as the requisite resolution of PPI board of directors granting to the commencing officer PPI Vice President
for Legal and Administrative Affairs, Alan Alambra, the authority to file Civil Case No. 68200 was lacking. The trial court
dismissed Civil Case No. 68200, declaring the case to be one instituted against the State, in which case the principle of state
immunity from suit is applicable.
On appeal, the CA, in the herein assailed Decision, reversed the trial court ruling and ordered the remand of the case for the
conduct of further proceedings. The CA concluded that it was premature for the trial court to have dismissed the Complaint.
The CA further held that instead of dismissing the case, the trial court should have deferred the hearing and resolution of the
motion to dismiss and proceeded to trial. It added that it was apparent from the Complaint that petitioners were being sued in
their private and personal capacities for acts done beyond the scope of their official functions. Thus, the issue of whether the
suit is against the State could best be threshed out during trial on the merits, rather than in proceedings covering a motion to
dismiss.
ISSUE: Whether or not Civil Case No. 68200 should be dismissed for being a suit against the State?
HELD: Civil Case No. 68200 should be dismissed.
The doctrine of non-suability - This Court in Department of Agriculture v. National Labor Relations
Commission discussed:
The basic postulate enshrined in the constitution that t)he State may not be sued without its consent,reflects nothing less than
a recognition of the sovereign character of the State and an express affirmation of the unwritten rule effectively insulating it
from the jurisdiction of courts. It is based on the very essence of sovereignty. x x x [A] sovereign is exempt from suit, not
because of any formal conception or obsolete theory, but on the logical and practical ground that there can be no legal right
as against the authority that makes the law on which the right depends. True, the doctrine, not too infrequently, is derisively
called the royal prerogative of dishonesty because it grants the state the prerogative to defeat any legitimate claim against it
by simply invoking its nonsuability. We have had occasion to explain in its defense, however, that a continued adherence to
the doctrine of non-suability cannot be deplored, for the loss of governmental efficiency and the obstacle to the performance
of its multifarious functions would be far greater in severity than the inconvenience that may be caused private parties, if such
fundamental principle is to be abandoned and the availability of judicial remedy is not to be accordingly restricted.
The rule, in any case, is not really absolute for it does not say that the state may not be sued under any circumstance. On the
contrary, as correctly phrased, the doctrine only conveys, the state may not be sued without its consent; it's clear import then
is that the State may at times be sued. The State consent may be given either expressly or impliedly. Express consent may be
made through a general law or a special law. x xx Implied consent, on the other hand, is conceded when the State itself
commences litigation, thus opening itself to a counterclaim or when it enters into a contract. In this situation, the government
is deemed to have descended to the level of the other contracting party and to have divested itself of its sovereign immunity.
This rule, x x x is not, however, without qualification. Not all contracts entered into by the government operate as a waiver of
its non-suability; distinction must still be made between one which is executed in the exercise of its sovereign function and
another which is done in its proprietary capacity.
As a general rule, a state may not be sued. However, if it consents, either expressly or impliedly, then it may be the subject of
a suit. There is express consent when a law, either special or general, so provides. On the other hand, there is implied
consent when the state "enters into a contract or it itself commences litigation." However, it must be clarified that when a state
enters into a contract, it does not automatically mean that it has waived its non-suability. The State "will be deemed to have
impliedly waived its non-suability [only] if it has entered into a contract in its proprietary or private capacity. [However,] when
the contract involves its sovereign or governmental capacity[,] x x x no such waiver may be implied.""Statutory provisions
waiving [s]tate immunity are construed in strictissimi juris. For, waiver of immunity is in derogation of sovereignty."
The DOH can validly invoke state immunity. The DOH is an unincorporated agency which performs sovereign or
governmental functions because it has not consented, either expressly or impliedly, to be sued. Significantly, the
DOH is an unincorporated agency which performs functions of governmental character.
As regards the other petitioners, to wit, Secretaries Romualdez and Dayrit, and Undersecretary Galon, it must be stressed
that the doctrine of state immunity extends its protective mantle also to complaints filed against state officials for acts done in
the discharge and performance of their duties. "The suability of a government official depends on whether the official
concerned was acting within his official or jurisdictional capacity, and whether the acts done in the performance of official
functions will result in a charge or financial liability against the government." Otherwise stated, "public officials can be held
personally accountable for acts claimed to have been performed in connection with official duties where they have acted ultra
vires or where there is showing of bad faith."
It is beyond doubt that the acts imputed against Secretaries Romualdez and Dayrit, as well as Undersecretary Galon, were
done while in the performance and discharge of their official functions or in their official capacities, and not in their personal or
individual capacities. Secretaries Romualdez and Dayrit were being charged with the issuance of the assailed orders. On the
other hand, Undersecretary Galon was being charged with implementing the assailed issuances. By no stretch of imagination
could the same be categorized as ultra vires simply because the said acts are well within the scope of their authority. Section
4 of RA 3720 specifically provides that the BFAD is an office under the Office of the Health Secretary. Also, the Health
Secretary is authorized to issue rules and regulations as may be necessary to effectively enforce the provisions of RA 3720.
As regards Undersecretary Galon, she is authorized by law to supervise the offices under the DOH authority, such as the
BFAD. Moreover, there was also no showing of bad faith on their part. The assailed issuances were not directed only against
PPI. The suspension of PPI accreditation only came about after it failed to submit its comment as directed by Undersecretary
Galon. It is also beyond dispute that if found wanting, a financial charge will be imposed upon them which will require an
appropriation from the state of the needed amount. Thus, based on the foregoing considerations, the Complaint against them
should likewise be dismissed for being a suit against the state which absolutely did not give its consent to be sued. Based on
the foregoing considerations, and regardless of the merits of PPI case, this case deserves a dismissal. Evidently, the very
foundation of Civil Case No. 68200 has crumbled at this initial juncture.
Sanders v. Veridano
GR No. L-46930; June 10, 1988
FACTS:
Petitioner Dale Sanders was the special services of the US Naval Station (NAVSTA) in Olongapo city. Private respondents
Anthony Rossi and Ralph Wyers are American citizens permanently residing in the Philippines and who were employed as
gameroom attendants in the special services department of NAVSTA. On October 3, 1975, the respondents were advised that
their employment had been converted from permanent full-time to permanent part-time. In a letter addressed to petitioner
Moreau, Sanders disagreed with the hearing officers report of the reinstatement of private respondents to permanent full-time
status plus backwages. Respondents allege that the letters contained libellous imputations which caused them to be ridiculed
and thus filed for damages against petitioners.
ISSUE:
1) Were the petitioners acting officially or only in their private capacities when they did the acts for which the private
respondents sued them for damages?
2) Does the court have jurisdiction over the case?
HELD:
It is abundantly clear in the present case that the acts for which the petitioner are being called to account were performed by
them in the discharge of their official duties. Given the official character of the letters, the petioners were, legally speaking,
being sued as officers of the United States government. As such, the complaint cannot prosper unless the government sought
to be held ultimately liable has given its consent to be sued. The private respondents must pursue their claim against the
petitioners in accordance with the laws of the Unites States of which they are all citizens and under whose jurisdiction the
alleged offenses were committed for the Philippine courts have no jurisdiction over the case.
Case Digest: KHOSROW MINUCHER vs. HON. COURT OF APPEALS and ARTHUR SCALZO (G.R. No. 142396 February 11, 2003)
Facts
Violation of the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972, was filed against Minucher following a buy-bust operation conducted by
Philippine police narcotic agents accompanied by Scalzo in the house of Minucher, an Iranian national, where heroin was said
to have been seized. Minucher was later acquitted by the court.
Minucher later on filed for damages due to trumped-up charges of drug trafficking made by Arthur Scalzo.
Scalzo on his counterclaims that he had acted in the discharge of his official duties as being merely an agent of the Drug
Enforcement Administration of the United States Department of Justice.
Scalzo subsequently filed a motion to dismiss the complaint on the ground that, being a special agent of the United States
Drug Enforcement Administration, he was entitled to diplomatic immunity. He attached to his motion Diplomatic Note of the
United States Embassy addressed to DOJ of the Philippines and a Certification of Vice Consul Donna Woodward, certifying
that the note is a true and faithful copy of its original. Trial court denied the motion to dismiss.
ISSUE
Whether or not Arthur Scalzo is indeed entitled to diplomatic immunity.
RULING
YES.
A foreign agent, operating within a territory, can be cloaked with immunity from suit as long as it can be established that he is
acting within the directives of the sending state.
The consent or imprimatur of the Philippine government to the activities of the United States Drug Enforcement Agency,
however, can be gleaned from the undisputed facts in the case.
The official exchanges of communication between agencies of the government of the two countries
Certifications from officials of both the Philippine Department of Foreign Affairs and the United States Embassy
Participation of members of the Philippine Narcotics Command in the buy-bust operation conducted at the
residence of Minucher at the behest of Scalzo
These may be inadequate to support the diplomatic status of the latter but they give enough indication that the Philippine
government has given its imprimatur, if not consent, to the activities within Philippine territory of agent Scalzo of the United
States Drug Enforcement Agency.
The job description of Scalzo has tasked him to conduct surveillance on suspected drug suppliers and, after having
ascertained the target, to inform local law enforcers who would then be expected to make the arrest.
In conducting surveillance activities on Minucher, later acting as the poseur-buyer during the buy-bust operation, and then
becoming a principal witness in the criminal case against Minucher,
Scalzo hardly can be said to have acted beyond the scope of his official function or duties.
G.R. No. 171182 : August 23, 2012
UNIVERSITY OF THE PHILIPPINES, JOSE V. ABUEVA, RAUL P. DE GUZMAN, RUBEN P. ASPIRAS, EMMANUEL P.
BELLO, WILFREDO P. DAVID, CASIANO S. ABRIGO, and JOSEFINA R. LICUANAN, Petitioners,
v.
HON. AGUSTIN S. DIZON, his capacity as Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 80,
STERN BUILDERS, INC., and SERVILLANO DELA CRUZ, Respondents.
FACTS:
University of the Philippines (UP) entered into a General Construction Agreement with respondent Stern Builders Corporation
(Stern Builders) for the construction and renovation of the buildings in the campus of the UP in Los Bas. UP was able to pay
its first and second billing. However, the third billing worth P273,729.47 was not paid due to its disallowance by the
Commission on Audit (COA). Thus, Stern Builders sued the UP to collect the unpaid balance.
On November 28, 2001, the RTC rendered its decision ordering UP to pay Stern Builders. Then on January 16, 2002, the UP
filed its motion for reconsideration. The RTC denied the motion. The denial of the said motion was served upon
Atty. Felimon Nolasco (Atty.Nolasco) of the UPLB Legal Office on May 17, 2002. Notably, Atty. Nolasco was not the counsel of
record of the UP but the OLS inDiliman, Quezon City.
Thereafter, the UP filed a notice of appeal on June 3, 2002. However, the RTC denied due course to the notice of appeal for
having been filed out of time. On October 4, 2002, upon motion of Stern Builders, the RTC issued the writ of execution.
On appeal, both the CA and the High Court denied UPs petition. The denial became final and executory. Hence, Stern
Builders filed in the RTC its motion for execution despite their previous motion having already been granted and despite the
writ of execution having already issued. On June 11, 2003, the RTC granted another motion for execution filed on May 9,
2003 (although the RTC had already issued the writ of execution on October 4, 2002). Consequently, the sheriff served
notices of garnishment to the UPs depositary banks and the RTC ordered the release of the funds.
Aggrieved, UP elevated the matter to the CA. The CA sustained the RTC. Hence, this petition.
ISSUES:
I. Whether or not the UPs funds can be validly garnished?
II. Whether or not the UPs appeal dated June 3, 2002 has been filed out of time?
HELD: The petition for review is meritorious.
FIRST ISSUE: UPs funds, being government funds, are not subject to garnishment.
POLITICAL LAW: garnishment of public funds; suability vs. liability of the State
Despite its establishment as a body corporate, the UP remains to be a "chartered institution" performing a legitimate
government function. Irrefragably, the UP is a government instrumentality, performing the States constitutional mandate of
promoting quality and accessible education. As a government instrumentality, the UP administers special funds sourced from
the fees and income enumerated under Act No. 1870 and Section 1 of Executive Order No. 714, and from the yearly
appropriations, to achieve the purposes laid down by Section 2 of Act 1870, as expanded in Republic Act No. 9500. All the
funds going into the possession of the UP, including any interest accruing from the deposit of such funds in any banking
institution, constitute a "special trust fund," the disbursement of which should always be aligned with the UPs mission and
purpose, and should always be subject to auditing by the COA. The funds of the UP are government funds that are public in
character. They include the income accruing from the use of real property ceded to the UP that may be spent only for the
attainment of its institutional objectives.
A marked distinction exists between suability of the State and its liability. As the Court succinctly stated in Municipality of San
Fernando, La Union v. Firme: A distinction should first be made between suability and liability. "Suability depends on the
consent of the state to be sued, liability on the applicable law and the established facts. The circumstance that a state is
suable does not necessarily mean that it is liable; on the other hand, it can never be held liable if it does not first consent to be
sued. Liability is not conceded by the mere fact that the state has allowed itself to be sued. When the state does waive its
sovereign immunity, it is only giving the plaintiff the chance to prove, if it can, that the defendant is liable.
The Constitution strictly mandated that "no money shall be paid out of the Treasury except in pursuance of an appropriation
made by law." The execution of the monetary judgment against the UP was within the primary jurisdiction of the COA. It was
of no moment that a final and executory decision already validated the claim against the UP.
SECOND ISSUE: Period of appeal did not start without effective service of decision upon counsel of record.
REMEDIAL LAW: doctrine of immutability of a final judgment; service of judgments; fresh-period rule; computation of time
At stake in the UPs plea for equity was the return of the amount of P16,370,191.74 illegally garnished from its trust funds.
Obstructing the plea is the finality of the judgment based on the supposed tardiness of UPs appeal, which the RTC declared
on September 26, 2002. It is true that a decision that has attained finality becomes immutable and unalterable, and cannot be
modified in any respect, even if the modification is meant to correct erroneous conclusions of fact and law, and whether the
modification is made by the court that rendered it or by this Court as the highest court of the land. But the doctrine of
immutability of a final judgment has not been absolute, and has admitted several exceptions, among them: (a) the correction
of clerical errors; (b) the so-called nunc pro tunc entries that cause no prejudice to any party; (c) void judgments; and (d)
whenever circumstances transpire after the finality of the decision that render its execution unjust and inequitable. We rule
that the UPs plea for equity warrants the Courts exercise of the exceptional power to disregard the declaration of finality of the
judgment of the RTC for being in clear violation of the UPs right to due process.
Firstly, the service of the denial of the motion for reconsideration upon Atty. Nolasco of the UPLB Legal Office was invalid and
ineffectual because he was admittedly not the counsel of record of the UP. Verily, the service of the denial of the motion for
reconsideration could only be validly made upon the OLS in Diliman, and no other. It is settled that where a party has
appeared by counsel, service must be made upon such counsel. This is clear enough from Section 2, second paragraph, of
Rule 13, Rules of Court, which explicitly states that: "If any party has appeared by counsel, service upon him shall be made
upon his counsel or one of them, unless service upon the party himself is ordered by the court. Where one counsel appears
for several parties, he shall only be entitled to one copy of any paper served upon him by the opposite side."
Secondly, even assuming that the service upon Atty. Nolasco was valid and effective, such that the remaining period for the
UP to take a timely appeal would end by May 23, 2002, it would still not be correct to find that the judgment of the RTC
became final and immutable thereafter due to the notice of appeal being filed too late on June 3, 2002. In so declaring the
judgment of the RTC as final against the UP, the CA and the RTC applied the rule contained in the second paragraph of
Section 3, Rule 41 of the Rules of Court to the effect that the filing of a motion for reconsideration interrupted the running of
the period for filing the appeal; and that the period resumed upon notice of the denial of the motion for reconsideration. For
that reason, the CA and the RTC might not be taken to task for strictly adhering to the rule then prevailing.
However, equity calls for the retroactive application in the UPs favor of the fresh-period rule that the Court first announced in
mid-September of 2005 through its ruling in Neypes v. Court of Appeals, viz: "to standardize the appeal periods provided in
the Rules and to afford litigants fair opportunity to appeal their cases, the Court deems it practical to allow a fresh period of 15
days within which to file the notice of appeal in the Regional Trial Court, counted from receipt of the order dismissing a motion
for a new trial or motion for reconsideration." The retroactive application of the fresh-period rule, a procedural law that aims "to
regiment or make the appeal period uniform, to be counted from receipt of the order denying the motion for new trial, motion
for reconsideration (whether full or partial) or any final order or resolution," is impervious to any serious challenge. This is
because there are no vested rights in rules of procedure.
Consequently, even if the reckoning started from May 17, 2002, when Atty. Nolasco received the denial, the UPs filing on
June 3, 2002 of the notice of appeal was not tardy within the context of the fresh-period rule. For the UP, the fresh period of
15-days counted from service of the denial of the motion for reconsideration would end on June 1, 2002, which was a
Saturday. Hence, the UP had until the next working day, or June 3, 2002, a Monday, within which to appeal, conformably with
Section 1 of Rule 22, Rules of Court, which holds that: "If the last day of the period, as thus computed, falls on a Saturday, a
Sunday, or a legal holiday in the place where the court sits, the time shall not run until the next working day."
G.R. No. 185918: April 18, 2012
LOCKHEED DETECTIVE AND WATCHMAN AGENCY, INC., Petitioner, v. UNIVERSITY OF THE PHILIPPINES,
Respondent.
VILLARAMA, JR.,J.:
FACTS:
Petitioner Lockheed Detective and Watchman Agency, Inc. (Lockheed) entered into a contract for security services with
respondent University of the Philippines (UP).
In 1998, several security guards assigned to UP filed separate complaints against Lockheed and UP for payment of underpaid
wages, 25% overtime pay, premium pay for rest days and special holidays, holiday pay, service incentive leave pay, night shift
differentials, 13th month pay, refund of cash bond, refund of deductions for the Mutual Benefits Aids System (MBAS), unpaid
wages from December 16-31, 1998, and attorneys fees.
The LA held Lockheed and UP as solidarily liable to complainants. As the parties did not appeal the NLRC decision, the same
became final and executory. A writ of execution was then issued but later quashed by the Labor Arbiter upon motion of UP
due to disputes regarding the amount of the award. Later, however, said order quashing the writ was reversed by the NLRC.
The NLRC order and resolution having become final, Lockheed filed a motion for the issuance of an alias writ of execution
which was subsequently granted. A Notice of Garnishment was issued to Philippine National Bank (PNB) UP Diliman Branch
for the satisfaction of the award.
UP filed an Urgent Motion to Quash Garnishment. UP contended that the funds being subjected to garnishment at PNB are
government/public funds. The Labor Arbiter, however, dismissed the urgent motion for lack of merit. UP filed a petition for
certiorari before the CA. The CA held that although the subject funds do not constitute public funds, in light of the ruling in the
case of National Electrification Administration v. Morales mandates that all money claims against the government must first be
filed with the Commission on Audit (COA). Hence, petitioner filed this petition before the SC.
ISSUE: Whether or not the garnishment is against the funds of UP is valid.
HELD: No.
Political Law Doctrine: It is the COA which has primary jurisdiction to examine, audit and settle "all debts and claims
of any sort" due from or owing the Government or any of its subdivisions, agencies and instrumentalities, including
government-owned or controlled corporations and their subsidiaries.
This Court finds that the CA correctly applied theNEAcase. Like NEA, UP is a juridical personality separate and distinct from
the government and has the capacity to sue and be sued. Thus, also like NEA, it cannot evade execution, and its funds may
be subject to garnishment or levy. However, before execution may be had, a claim for payment of the judgment award must
first be filed with the COA.
Under Commonwealth Act No. 327, as amended by Section 26 of P.D. No. 1445, it is the COA which has primary jurisdiction
to examine, audit and settle "all debts and claims of any sort" due from or owing the Government or any of its subdivisions,
agencies and instrumentalities, including government-owned or controlled corporations and their subsidiaries. With respect to
money claims arising from the implementation of Republic Act No. 6758,their allowance or disallowance is for COA to decide,
subject only to the remedy of appeal by petition for certiorari to this Court.
A reading of the pertinent Commonwealth Act provision clearly shows that it does not make any distinction as to which of the
government subdivisions, agencies and instrumentalities, including government-owned or controlled corporations and their
subsidiaries whose debts should be filed before the COA.
As to the fait accompli argument of Lockheed, contrary to its claim that there is nothing that can be done since the funds of
UP had already been garnished, since the garnishment was erroneously carried out and did not go through the proper
procedure (the filing of a claim with the COA), UP is entitled to reimbursement of the garnished funds plus interest of 6% per
annum, to be computed from the time of judicial demand to be reckoned from the time UP filed a petition for certiorari before
the CA which occurred right after the withdrawal of the garnished funds from PNB.

DENIED.
Civil Aeronautics Administration v Court of Appeals
G.R. No. L-51806, November 8, 1988
o TORTS: What constitutes "Negligence"; "Contributory Negligence" defined
FACTS:
Ernest E. Simke, a naturalized Filipino citizen, was Honorary Consul General of Israel in the Philippines. He went to Manila
International Airport to meet his future son-in-law. As the plane was landing, he and his companions went to the viewing deck
to watch the arrival of the plane. While walking, Simke slipped on an elevation 4 inches high and fell on his back, breaking his
thigh bone in the process. He underwent a 3-hour operation and after recovery he filed a claim for damages against the Civil
Aeronautics Administration (CAA), which was the government entity in charge of the airport.
ISSUE:
Whether or not CAA was negligent
HELD:
CAA contended that the elevation in question "had a legitimate purpose for being on the terrace and was never intended to
trip down people and injure them. It was there for no other purpose but to drain water on the floor area of the terrace."
But upon ocular inspection by the trial court, it was found that the terrace was in poor condition. Under RA 776, the CAA is
charged with the duty of planning, designing, constructing, equipping, expanding, maintenance...etc. of the Manila
International Airport.
Responsibility of CAA
The SC held that pursuant to Art. 1173, "the fault or negligence of the obligor consists in the omission of that diligence which
is required by the nature of the obligation and corresponds with the circumstances of the person, of the time, and of the
place." Here, the obligation of the CAA in maintaining the viewing deck, a facility open to the public, requires that CAA insure
the safety of the viewers using it. As these people come to look to where the planes and the incoming passengers are and not
to look down on the floor or pavement of the viewing deck, the CAA should have thus made sure that no dangerous
obstructions or elevations exist on the floor of the deck to prevent any undue harm to the public.
Contributory Negligence
Under Art. 2179, contributory negligence contemplates a negligent act or omission on the part of the plaintiff, which although
not the proximate cause of his injury, CONTRIBUTED to his own damage. The Court found no contributory negligence on the
part of the plaintiff, considering the following test formulated in the early case of Picart v. Smith, 37 Phil. 809 (1918):
The test by which to determine the existence of negligence in a particular case may be stated as follows: Did the defendant in
doing the alleged negligent act use that reasonable care and caution which an ordinarily prudent man would have used in the
same situation? If not, then he is guilty of negligence. The law here in effect adopts the standard supposed to be supplied by
the imaginary conduct of the discreet paterfamilias of the Roman law. The existence of the negligence in a given case is not
determined by reference to the personal judgment of the actor in the situation before him. The law considers what would be
reckless, blameworthy, or negligent in the man of ordinary intelligence and prudence and determines liability by that.
The question as to what would constitute the conduct of a prudent man in a given situation must of course be always
determined in the light of human experience and in view of the facts involved in the particular case. Abstract speculations
cannot be here of much value but this much can be profitably said: Reasonable men-overn their conduct by the
circumstances which are before them or known to them. They are not, and are not supposed to be omniscient of the future.
Hence they can be expected to take care only when there is something before them to suggest or warn of danger. Could a
prudent man, in the case under consideration, foresee harm as a result of the course actually pursued' If so, it was the duty of
the actor to take precautions to guard against that harm. Reasonable foresight of harm, followed by the ignoring of the
suggestion born of this prevision, is always necessary before negligence can be held to exist.... [Picart v. Smith, supra, p. 813]
The private respondent, who was the plaintiff in the case before the lower court, could not have reasonably foreseen the harm
that would befall him, considering the attendant factual circumstances. Even if the private respondent had been looking where
he was going, the step in question could not easily be noticed because of its construction.
"WHEREFORE, finding no reversible error, the Petition for review on certiorari is DENIED and the decision of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. No. 51172-R is AFFIRMED. SO ORDERED."
WYLIE v. RARANG (28 May 1992)
Petitioners: M.H. Wylie and Capt. James Williams
Respondents: Aurora I. Rarang and the IAC
Nature: Petition for review
Ponente: Gutierrez, Jr.
AT THE NAVAL BASE. In Feb. 1978, M.H. Wylie was the assistant administrative officer and Capt. James Williams was the
commanding officer of the US Naval Base in Subic Bay, Olongapo City. Aurora I. Rarang was employed as a merchandise
control guard in the Office of the Provost Marshal.
THE POD. Wylie, in his capacity as asst. admin. officer, supervised the publication of the Naval Base stations Plan of the
Day (POD), which featured important announcements, necessary precautions, and general matters of interest to military
personnel. One of its regular features was the action line inquiry.
THE CAUSE OF THIS MESS. On Feb. 3, 1978, the POD published, under the NAVSTA Action Line Inquiry, the ff:
Question: I have observed that Merchandise Control inspector/ inspectress are (sic) consuming for their own benefit things
they have confiscated from Base Personnel. The observation is even more aggravated by consuming such confiscated items
as cigarettes and food stuffs PUBLICLY. This is not to mention Auring who is in herself, a disgrace to her division and to the
Office of the Provost Marshal. In lieu of this observation, may I therefore, ask if the head of the Merchandise Control Division
is aware of this malpractice?
Answer: Merchandise Control Guards and all other personnel are prohibited from appropriating confiscated items for their
own consumption or use. Two locked containers are installed at the Main Gate area for deposit of confiscated items and the
OPM evidence custodian controls access to these containers. Merchandise Control Guards are permitted to eat their meals at
their worksite due to heavy workload. Complaints regarding merchandise control guards procedure or actions may be made
directly at the Office of the Provost Marshal for immediate and necessary action.
Rarang was the Auring referred to here, as she was the only one with that name in the Office of the Provost Marshall, and
Wylies letter of apology for the inadvertent publication was also conclusive proof of this.
AN ACTION FOR DAMAGES was instituted by Rarang against Wylie, Williams, and the US Naval Base. She prayed for
P300K moral damages, exemplary damages, and P50K attorneys fees.
RARANGS ALLEGATIONS: the article constituted false, injurious, and malicious defamation and libel tending to impeach her
honesty, virtue and reputation exposing her to public hatred, contempt and ridicule; and that the libel was published and
circulated in the English language and read by almost all the U.S. Naval Base personnel.
WYLIE, WILLIAMS, THE NAVAL BASE FILED A MOTION TO DISMISS, BASED ON THESE GROUNDS:
1. Wylie and Williams acted in the performance of their official functions as officers of the US Navy and are immune from suit;
2. The US Naval Base is an instrumentality of the US government which cannot be sued without its consent; and
3. lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter and the parties.
MOTION DENIED.
THE TCS DECISION: the acts of Wylie and Williams werent official acts of the US government in the operation and control of
the Base but personal and tortious acts which are exceptions to the general rule that a sovereign country cant be sued in the
court of another country without its consent. Thus their acts werent imputable against the US government but were done in
their individual and personal capacities. They were ordered to pay Rarang P100K moral and exemplary damages, and P30K
attorneys fees. However, the suit against the US Naval Base was dismissed.
BOTH PARTIES APPEALED. Wylie and Williams asserted that they are immune from suit since the publication was made in
their official capacities as officers of the U. S. Navy, and that they did not intentionally and maliciously cause the publication.
Rarang appealed as she wasnt satisfied with the award.
THE IAC MODIFIED THE TCS DECISION: Rarang was awarded P175K moral damages and P60K exemplary damages.
WYLIE AND WILLIAMS ARGUMENT in this Petition for Review: they made the publication in the performance of their official
functions as administrative assistant (Wylie) and commanding officer (Williams) of the US Navy and were, therefore, immune
from suit for their official actions.
ISSUE: WON Wylie and Williams are liable for the published article in the POD. Does the grant of rights, power, and authority
to the US under the RP-US Bases Treaty cover immunity of its officers from crimes and torts?
HELD: YES and NO respectively.
THE PRINCIPLE OF STATE IMMUNITY FROM SUIT, QUOTING US v. GUINTO: The rule that a state may not be sued
without its consent, now expressed in Article XVI, Section 3, of the 1987 Constitution, is one of the generally accepted
principles of international law that we have adopted as part of the law of our land under Article II, Section 2Even without
such affirmation, we would still be bound by the generally accepted principles of international law under the doctrine of
incorporation As applied to the local state, the doctrine of state immunity is based on the justification given by Justice
Holmes that there can be no legal right against the authority which makes the law on which the right depends! (Kawanakoa v.
Polybank) There are other practical reasons for the enforcement of the doctrine. In the case of the foreign state sought to be
impleaded in the local jurisdiction, the added inhibition is expressed in the maxim par in parem, non habet imperium . All
states are sovereign equals and cannot assert jurisdiction over one another. A contrary disposition would, in the language of a
celebrated case, unduly vex the peace of nations. (Da Haber v. Queen of Portugal)
While the doctrine appears to prohibit only suits against the state without its consent, it is also applicable to complaints filed
against officials of the state for acts allegedly performed by them in the discharge of their duties. The rule is that if the
judgment against such officials will require the state itself to perform an affirmative act to satisfy the same, such as the
appropriation of the amount needed to pay the damages awarded against them, the suit must be regarded as against the
state itself although it has not been formally impleaded (Garcia v. Chief of Staff). In such a situation, the state may move to
dismiss the complaint on the ground that it has been filed without its consent.
The doctrine is sometimes derisively called the royal prerogative of dishonesty because of the privilege it grants the state to
defeat any legitimate claim against it by simply invoking its non-suability. That is hardly fair, at least in democratic societies, for
the state is not an unfeeling tyrant unmoved by the valid claims of its citizens. In fact, the doctrine is not absolute and does
not say the state may not be sued under any circumstance. On the contrary, the rule says that the state may not be sued
without its consent, which clearly imports that it may be sued if it consents. The consent of the state to be sued may be
manifested expressly or impliedly. Express consent may be embodied in a general law or a special law. Consent is implied
when the state enters into a contract it itself commences litigationThe above rules are subject to qualification. Express
consent is effected only by the will of the legislature through the medium of a duly enacted statute. (Rep. v. Purisima) not all
contracts entered into by the government will operate as a waiver of its non-suability; distinction must be made between its
sovereign and proprietary acts (US v. Ruiz). As for the filing of a complaint by the government, suability will result only where
the government is claiming affirmative relief from the defendant. (Lim v. Brownell)
THE NATURE AND EXTENT OF IMMUNITY FROM SUIT, ALSO UNDER US v. GUINTO: In the case of the US, the
customary rule of international law on state immunity is expressed with more specificity in the RP-US Bases Treaty
The petitioners also rely heavily on Baer v. Tizon to support their position that they are not suable, the US not having
waived its sovereign immunity from suit. It is emphasized that in Baer, the Court held:
The invocation of the doctrine of immunity from suit of a foreign state without its consent is appropriate insofar as alien
armed forces are concerned, the starting point is Raquiza v. Bradford, a 1945 decision. In dismissing a habeas corpus petition
for the release of petitioners confined by American army authorities, Justice Hilado cited Coleman v. Tennessee, where it was
explicitly declared: It is well settled that a foreign army, permitted to march through a friendly country or to be stationed in it,
by permission of its government or sovereign, is exempt from the civil and criminal jurisdiction of the place. Two years later, in
Tubb and Tedrow v. Griess, this Court relied on Raquiza v. Bradford and cited in support excerpts from the works of the
authoritative writers Accuracy demands the clarification that after the conclusion of the Philippine-American Military Bases
Agreement, the treaty provision should control on such matter, the assumption being that there was a manifestation of the
submission to jurisdiction on the part of the foreign power whenever appropriate. More to the point is Syquia v. Almeda Lopez
It was the ruling that respondent Judge acted correctly considering that the action must be considered as one against the
U.S. Government. The opinion of Justice Montemayor continued: It is clear that the courts of the Philippines including the
Municipal Court of Manila have no jurisdiction over the present case for unlawful detainer. The question of lack of jurisdiction
was raised and interposed at the very beginning of the action. The U.S. Government has not given its consent to the filing of
this suit which is essentially against her, though not in name. Moreover, this is not only a case of a citizen filing a suit against
his own Government without the latters consent but it is of a citizen filing an action against a foreign government without said
governments consent, which renders more obvious the lack of jurisdiction of the courts of his country. The principles of law
behind this rule are so elementary and of such general acceptance that we deem it unnecessary to cite authorities in support
thereof.
The above observations do not confer on the US a blanket immunity for all acts done by it or its agents in the Philippines.
Neither may the other petitioners claim that they are also insulated from suit in this country merely because they have acted
as agents of the US in the discharge of their official functions. There is no question that the US, like any other state, will be
deemed to have impliedly waived its non-suability if it has entered into a contract in its proprietary or private capacity. It is only
when the contract involves its sovereign or governmental capacity that no such waiver may be implied In the words of
Justice Vicente Abad Santos:
The traditional rule of immunity excepts a State from being sued in the courts of another State without its consent or waiver.
This rule is a necessary consequence of the principles of independence and equality of States. However, the rules of
International Law are not petrified; they are constantly developing and evolving. And because the activities of states have
multiplied, it has been necessary to distinguish them-between sovereign and governmental acts (jure imperii) and private,
commercial and proprietary acts (jure gestionis). The result is that State immunity now extends only to acts jure imperii... The
restrictive application of State immunity is proper only when the proceedings arise out of commercial transactions of the
foreign sovereign, its commercial activities or economic affairs. Stated differently, a State may be said to have descended to
the level of an individual and can thus be deemed to have tacitly given its consent to be sued only when it enters into
business contracts. It does not apply where the contract relates to the exercise of its sovereign functions.
The other petitioners in the cases before us all aver they have acted in the discharge of their official functions as officers or
agents of the US. However, this is a matter of evidence. The charges against them may not be summarily dismissed on their
mere assertion that their acts are imputable to the US, which has not given its consent to be sued. In fact, the defendants are
sought to be held answerable for personal torts in which the US itself is not involved. If found liable, they and they alone must
satisfy the judgment.
SUMMARY OF THE EVENTS. The POD was published under the direction and authority of the commanding officer. The
administrative assistant, among his other duties, is tasked to prepare and distribute the POD. The NAVSTA Action Line Inquiry
is a regular feature of the POD , which was to provide personnel access to the Commanding Officer on matters they feel
should be brought to his attention for correction or investigation . According to Wylie, the action line naming Auring was
received about 3 weeks prior to the articles publication. It was forwarded to the Provost Marshal for comment, and the
response included a short note stating that if the article was published, to remove the name. This note was forwarded to
the executive officer and to the commanding officer for approval. The approval of the commanding officer was forwarded to
the office of the Administrative Assistant for inclusion in the POD. A clerk typist in the office of the Administrative Assistant
prepared the smooth copy of the POD and Wylie, the administrative assistant signed the smooth copy of the POD but failed to
notice the reference to Auring in the action line inquiry.
As the article implied that Rarang was consuming and appropriating confiscated items, she was investigated by her
supervisor. Before the article came out, she had been the recipient of commendations by her superiors for honesty in the
performance of her duties.
PART OF OFFICIAL FUNCTIONS. Wylie and Williams actively participated in screening the features and articles in the POD
as part of their official functions. Under the rule that US officials in the performance of their official functions are immune from
suit, then it should follow that they may not be held liable for the questioned publication.
BUT: TAKE NOTE THAT THEY WERE SUED IN THEIR PERSONAL CAPACITIES for their alleged tortious acts in publishing
a libelous article. And our laws and, we presume, those of the US dont allow the commission of crimes in the name of official
duty, and these arent covered by the immunity agreement.
CHAVEZ v. SANDIGANBAYAN on the law on immunity from suit of public officials is applicable here: the general rule is that
public officials can be held personally accountable for acts claimed to have been performed in connection with official duties
where they have acted ultra vires or where there is showing of bad faith A mere invocation of the immunity clause does not
ipso facto result in the charges being automatically dropped. In the case of PCGG v. Pea, Chief Justice Teehankee added a
clarification of the immunity accorded PCGG officials under Section 4(a) of Exec. Order No. I as follows:
First, the main opinion does not claim absolute immunity for the members of the Commission, The cited section provides
the Commissions members immunity from suit thus: No civil action shall lie against the Commission or any member thereof
for anything done or omitted in the discharge of the task contemplated by this order. No absolute immunity like that sought by
Mr. Marcos in his Constitution for himself and his subordinates is herein involved. It is understood that the immunity granted
the members of the Commission by virtue of the unimaginable magnitude of its task to recover the plundered wealth and the
States exercise of police power was immunity from liability for damages in the official discharge of the task granted the
members of the Commission much in the same manner that judges are immune from suit in the official discharge of the
functions of their office.
Immunity from suit cannot institutionalize irresponsibility and nonaccountability nor grant a privileged status not claimed by
any other official of the Republic. Where the petitioner exceeds his authority as Solicitor General, acts in bad faith, or
maliciously conspir(es) with the PCGG commissioners in persecuting respondent Enrile by filing against him an evidently
baseless suit in derogation of the latters constitutional rights and liberties, there can be no question that a complaint for
damages does not confer a license to persecute or recklessly injure another. The actions governed by Articles 19, 20, 21, and
32 of the Civil Code on Human Relations may be taken against public officers or private citizens alike.
ARGUMENT: that Williams as commanding officer is far removed in the chain of command from the offensive publication and
it would be asking too much to hold him responsible for everything which goes wrong on the base.
WHILE THIS IS TRUE AS A GEN. RULE, FOR THIS CASE NO. The records show that the offensive publication was sent to
the commanding officer for approval and he approved it. Art. 2176 prescribes a civil liability for damages caused by a persons
act or omission constituting fault or negligence. Fault or negligence in this Article covers not only acts not punishable by
law but also acts criminal in character, whether intentional or voluntary or negligent. Moreover, Art. 2219(7) provides that
moral damages may be recovered in case of libel, slander or any other form of defamation. In effect, the offended party in
these cases is given the right to receive from the guilty party moral damages for injury to his feelings and reputation in
addition to punitive or exemplary damages .
ULTRA VIRES ACT CANT BE PART OF OFFICIAL DUTY. Indeed the imputation of theft contained in the POD is a
defamation against Rarangs character and reputation. Wylie himself admitted that the Office of the Provost Marshal explicitly
recommended the deletion of the name if the article was published, but they were negligent because under their direction they
issued the publication without deleting the name. Such act or omission is ultra vires and cannot be part of official duty. It was a
tortious act which ridiculed Rarang, and as a result she suffered besmirched reputation, serious anxiety, wounded feelings
and social humiliation, specially so, since the article was baseless and false. Wylie and Williams alone, in their personal
capacities, are liable for the damages they caused.
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DISMISSED. The questioned decision and resolution of the IAC are AFFIRMED.
Nessia vs. Fermin
220 SCRA 615
GR. NO. 102918
March 30, 1993
PARTIES:
PETITIONER: Jose V. Nessia
RESPONDENTS: Jesus M. Fermin and Municipality of Victorias, Negros Occidental
PONENTE: Bellosillo, J.
FACTS:
Jose Nessia complained about Mr. Fermin's negligence and non-payment of the former's vouchers to reimburse his
travel expense allowances incurred from doing his official duty as a deputy municipal assessor of Victorias. The respondent
countered that he did not approve Nessia's claims because he exceeded the budget. The Municipality of Victorias supported
Fermin and added that the petitioner didn't give an explanation why he exceeded the budget.
The trial court ruled in favor of the petitioner because it found in the evidence that Fermin refused to act on his
vouchers through his inaction over the petitioner's follow-up letters inquiring the status of the reimbursement. The court
granted the compensation to Nessia, although it was less than what he prayed for. Both parties elevated the case to the C.A.
Nessia prayed for an increase in the damages awarded to him and Fermin sought release from liability. The Municipality of
Victorias did not appeal.
The appellate court dismissed Nessia's complaint on the ground of lack of cause. From its own findings, the C.A.
held that the real issue is that Nessia accused Fermin of failure to act on the vouchers, which were not proved to be received
by the latter. Even if he was able to receive them, they could not be approved because they were late and not supported by
an appropriation.
The petitioner elevated the case to the Supreme Court under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court.
ISSUE:
Whether respondent court may reverse the decision of the trial court which has become final and executory.
RULING:
No. The Supreme Court was inclined to sustain the trial court because its appraisal of conflicting testimonies is
afforded greater weight and respect. Thus, the determination of the trial court that they were actually received should be
followed.
Between the findings of the CA, which were simply drawn from reviewing the records and transcripts of the hearing,
the determination of the trial court deserves greater acceptance because it actually heard the case, even if both conclusions
are supported by evidence. Moreover, Philippine jurisprudence substantially provides that "If the decision of the Court of
Appeals on the controversial matter suffers... from some ambiguity, the doubt should be resolved to sustain the trial court in
the light of the familiar accepted rule that 'the judge who tries a case in the court below, has vastly superior advantage for the
ascertainment of truth and the detection of falsehood over an appellate court sitting as a court of review" (Roque v. Buan,
G.R. No. L-22459, 1967).
The Supreme Court granted Nessias petition, set aside the CAs dismissal of the petitioners motion for
reconsideration, and reinstated and affirmed the RTCs decision.