Professional Video, Inc. v. TESDA
) Yes, TESDAs funds are public in character, hence exempt from attachment or
G.R. No. 155504, June 26, 2009
Facts:
TESDA entered into a negotiated contract with Professional Video, Inc.(PROVI) for
an order of security-printed certification and/or PVC cards to be issued to trainees
who passed the certification TESDA Pre-qualification Bids Committee.
PROVI signed and executed their Contract Agreement Project: PVD ID Card
amounting to P39,475,00 Both parties executed an Addendum to the contract
agreement.
TESDA paid 30% of the total cost of the materials 30 days after the receipt and
acceptance of the contracted supplies with the balance payable within 30 days.
Despite the two demand letters sent by POVI, TESDA failed to pay their balance
P35,735,500. This prompted PROVI to file writ of preliminary
attachment/garnishment against TESDA.
RTC favored the garnishment and ordered the manager of the Land Bank of the
Philippines to produce TESDAs bank statement
CA set aside the RTCs orders after finding out the following:
A) TESDAs funds are public in nature and therefore exempt from
garnishment
B) TESDAs purchase of the PVC cards was necessary from
garnishment
Issue:
1.) May TESDA be sued because it has effectively waived its immunity when it entered
into a contract with Professional Video, Inc. for a commercial purpose?
2.) Are TESDAs funds exempt from attachment or garnishment?
Ruling:
1.) No, the fact that a non-corporate government entity performs a function proprietary
in nature does not necessarily result in its being suable. If said non-governmental
function is undertaken as an incident to its governmental function, there is no
waiver thereby of the sovereign immunity from suit extended to such government
entity.
TESDA sells the PVC cards to its trainees for a fee does not characterize the
transaction as industrial or business; the sale, expressly authorized by the TESDA
35
Act, cannot be considered separately from TESDAs general governmental
functions, as they are undertaken in the discharge of these functions. TESDA is not
engaged in business, and there is nothing in the records to show that its purchase
of the PVC cards from PROVI is for a business purpose. While TESDA admits that
it will charge the trainees with a fee for the PVC cards, it claims that this fee is only
to recover their costs and is not intended for profit.
2.
garnishment.
Even assuming that TESDA entered into a proprietary contract with PROVI
and thereby gave its implied consent to be sued, TESDAs funds are still public in
nature and, thus, cannot be the valid subject of a writ of garnishment or
attachment. Under Section 33 of the TESDA Act, the TESDA budget for the
implementation of the Act shall be included in the annual General Appropriation
Act; hence, TESDA funds, being sourced from the Treasury, are moneys belonging
to the government, or any of its departments, in the hands of public officials.
THE DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH, SECRETARY MANUEL M. DAYRIT,USEC. MA. MARGARITA
GALON and USEC. ANTONIO M. LOPEZ,
vs.
PHIL. PHARMAWEALTH, INC.
FACTS: Respondent Phil. Pharmawealth, Inc. is a domestic corporation engaged in the
business of manufacturing and supplying pharmaceutical products to government hospitals in
the Philippines. Then Secretary of Health Alberto G. Romualdez, Jr. issued Administrative Order
(A.O.) No. 27 outlining the guidelines and procedures on the accreditation of government
suppliers for pharmaceutical products. A.O. No. 27 was later amended by providing for additional
guidelines for accreditation of drug suppliers aimed at ensuring that only qualified bidders can
transact business with petitioner.
Respondent submitted to petitioner DOH a request for the inclusion of additional items in its list
of accredited drug products, including the antibiotic "Penicillin GBenzathine." DOH issued an
Invitation for Bids for the procurement of 1.2 million units vials of Penicillin G Benzathine.
Despite the lack of response from petitioner DOH regarding respondents request for inclusion of
additional items in its list of accredited products, respondent submitted its bid for the Penicillin
GBenzathine contract. Only two companies participated, the respondent being the lower bidder.
In view, however, of the non-accreditation of respondents Penicillin GBenzathine product, the
contract was awarded to the other company. Hence, respondent filed a complaint injunction,
mandamus and damages against DOH.
ISSUE: WON DOH can invoke immunity from suit.
HELD:
NO. The suability of a government official depends on whether the official concerned was acting
within his official or jurisdictional capacity, and whether the acts done in the performance of
official functions will result in charge or financial liability against the government. In the first case,
the Constitution itself assures the availability of judicial review, and it is the official concerned
who should be impleaded as the proper party. As regards petitioner DOH, the defense
of immunity from suit will not avail despite its being an unincorporated agency of the
government, for the only causes of action directed against it are preliminary injunction and
mandamus.
Republic vs. Nolasco
Republic of the Philippines, Represented by Department of Public Works and Highways
(DPWH) under Secretary Simeon Datumanong and Undersecretary Edmundo V. Mir, then
Chairman of Bid and Awards Committee (BAC), Assistant Secretary Bashir D. Rasuman,
BAC Vice-Chairman, Director Oscar D. Abundo, BAC Member Director OIC-director
Antonio V. Malano, Jr., BAC Member and Project Director Philip F. Menez, Petitioners,
vs.
Emiliano R. Nolasco, Respondent.
Second Division
Tinga, April 27, 2005
Topic: Sovereignty - Suits not against the State - Contracts Connected with Sovereign Functions
Facts:
The funding for the Agno Rover Flood Control Project, a public works project, was to be
derived primarily through a loan from the Japan Bank for International Cooperation
(JBIC)
DPWH constituted a Bid and Awards Committee (BAC) for the purpose of conducting
international competitive bidding for the procurement of the contract
Among the 6 pre-qualified bidders are present intervenors Daewoo and China
International
Nolasco, invoking his right as a taxpayer, prayed that the DPWH and BAC be
restrained from awarding the contract to Daewoo and have Daewoo disqualified as a
bidder
He alleged having obtained copies of "Confidential Reports from an Unnamed DPWH
Consultant"
He said that based on the reports, Daewoo's bid was unacceptable and the putative
award to Daewoo illegal, immoral, and prejudicial to the government and the Filipino
taxpayers
March 27, 2002: the RTC of Manila dismissed Nolasco's petition
According to the RTC, it was a suit against the State, which had been sued without its
consent
Meanwhile, BAC resolved to recommend the award of the contract to Daewoo as it has
the lowers bid; DPWH Secretary Datumanong approved (i.e signed) the
recommendation
Issue:
Whether or not the petition was a suit against the State without its consent
Holding:
Yes.
Ratio:
An unincorporated government agency such as the DPWH is without any separate
juridical personality of its own and hence enjoys immunity from suit.
It cannot be said that the DPWH was deemed to have given its consent to be sued by
entering into a contract, for at the time the petition was filed by Nolasco, the DPWH had
not yet entered into a contract with respect to the project
The presumption is that the State and its elements act correctly unless otherwise
proven
PNR v. IAC
GR No. 70547; January 22, 1993
FACTS:
The passenger express train of Philippine National Railways (PNR) and a passenger bus of
Baliwag Transit Inc. collided at the railroad crossing at Barrio Balungao, Calumpit Bulacan at
1:30 in the afternoon of August 10, 1947 causing damage to the bus and its passengers, 18 of
whom died and 53 suffered physical injuries. Plaintiff alleges that the collision was due to the
negligence and imprudence of PNR and its engineer Honorio Cirbado in operating in a busy
intersection without any bars, semaphores, signal lights, flagman or switchman.
ISSUE:
1) Who between the petitioner and respondent was negligent?
2) Is PNR immune from suit?
HELD:
There is no admissible evidence to show that the bus driver did not take necessary precaution in
traversing the track. Contributory negligence may not be ascribed to the bus driver for he had
taken necessary precautions before passing over the railway track. The failure of PNR, on the
other hand, to put a cross bar, or signal light, flagman, or switchman or semaphores is evidence
of negligence on their part.
By the doctrine of implied powers, the power to sue and be sued is implicit from the faculty to
transact private business. PNR is not exercising governmental powers, as such it is not immune
from suit.
Laurel v. Desierto
GR No. 145368, April 12, 2002
Facts:
Petitioner Vice-President Salvador Laurel was appointed as the head of the National Centennial
Commission, a body constituted for the preparation of the National Centennial celebration in
1998. He was subsequently appointed as the Chairman of ExpoCorp., and was one of the nine
(9) incorporators. A controversy erupted on the alleged anomalies with the bidding contracts to
some entities and the petitioner was implicated. By virtue of an investigation conducted by the
Office of the Ombudsman, the petitioner was indicted for alleged violation of the Anti-Graft and
Corrupt Practices Act (RA 3019). The petitioner filed a Motion to Dismiss questioning the
jurisdiction of the Office of the Ombudsman, which was denied. He further filed a motion for
reconsideration which was also denied, hence this petition for certiorari.
The petitioner assails the jurisdiction of the Ombudsman and contended that he is not a public
officer since ExpoCorp is a private corporation.
Issue: W/N the petitioner is a public officer
Held:
Yes, the Ombudsman has jurisdiction over the case of the petitioner since he is a public officer.
The NCC is an office performing executive functions since one of its mandate is to implement
national policies. Moreover, the said office was established by virtue of an executive order. It is
clear that the NCC performs sovereign functions, hence it is a public office. Since petitioner is
chair of the NCC, he is therefore a public officer. The fact that the NCC was characterized by EO
128 as an 'ad-hoc body' make it less of a public office. Finally, the fact that the petitioner did not
receive any compensation during his tenure is of no consequence since such is merely an
incidence and forms no part of the office.
G.R. No. 71159 November 15, 1989
CITY OF MANILA, and EVANGELINE SUVA, petitioners,
vs.
HON. INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT, IRENE STO. DOMINGO and for and in behalf of
her minor children, VIVENCIO, JR., IRIS, VERGEL and IMELDA, all surnamed STO.
DOMINGO, respondents.
Facts:
Vivencio Sto. Domingo, Sr. deceased husband of plaintiff Irene Sto. Domingo and
father of the litigating minors, died on June 4,1971 and buried on June 6,1971 in Lot No. 159,
Block No. 194 of the North Cemetery which lot was leased by the city to Irene Sto. Domingo
from June 6, 1971 to June 6, 2021. Full payment of the rental therefor of P50.00 is evidenced by
the said receipt which appears to be regular on its face. Apart from the aforementioned receipt,
no other document was executed to embody such lease over the burial lot in question.
In accordance with Administrative Order No. 5, the City Mayor of Manila prescribing
uniform procedure and guidelines in the processing of documents pertaining to and for the use
and disposition of burial lots and plots within the North Cemetery, subject lot was certified on
January 25, 1978 as ready for exhumation. On the basis of such certification, the authorities of
the North Cemetery then headed by defendant Joseph Helmuth authorized the exhumation and
removal from subject burial lot the remains of the late Vivencio Sto. Domingo, Sr., placed the
bones and skull in a bag or sack and kept the same in the depository or bodega of the cemetery.
Subsequently, the same lot in question was rented out to another lessee so that when the
plaintiffs herein went to said lot on All Souls Day in their shock, consternation and dismay, that
the resting place of their dear departed did not anymore bear the stone marker which they
lovingly placed on the tomb. Indignant and disgusted over such a sorrowful finding.
Issue:
W/N the operations and functions of a public cemetery are a governmental, or a corporate or
proprietary function of the City of Manila.
Held:
Under Philippine laws, the City of Manila is a political body corporate and as such
endowed with the faculties of municipal corporations to be exercised by and through its city
government in conformity with law, and in its proper corporate name. It may sue and be sued,
and contract and be contracted with. Its powers are twofold in character-public, governmental or
political on the one hand, and corporate, private and proprietary on the other. Governmental
powers are those exercised in administering the powers of the state and promoting the public
welfare and they include the legislative, judicial, public and political. Municipal powers on the one
hand are exercised for the special benefit and advantage of the community and include those
which are ministerial, private and corporate. In connection with the powers of a municipal
corporation, it may acquire property in its public or governmental capacity, and private or
proprietary capacity. The New Civil Code divides such properties into property for public use and
patrimonial properties (Article 423), and further enumerates the properties for public use as
provincial roads, city streets, municipal streets, the squares, fountains, public waters,
promenades, and public works for public service paid for by said provisions, cities or
municipalities, all other property is patrimonial without prejudice to the provisions of special laws.
Under the foregoing considerations and in the absence of a special law, the North Cemetery is a
patrimonial property of the City of Manila which was created by resolution of the Municipal
Board. The City of Manila furthermore prescribes the procedure and guidelines for the use and
dispositions of burial lots and plots within the North Cemetery through Administrative Order No.
5. With the acts of dominion, there is, therefore no doubt that the North Cemetery is within the
class of property which the City of Manila owns in its proprietary or private character.
Furthermore, there is no dispute that the burial lot was leased in favor of the private
respondents. Hence, obligations arising from contracts have the force of law between the
contracting parties. Thus a lease contract executed by the lessor and lessee remains as the law
between them. Therefore, a breach of contractual provision entitles the other party to damages
even if no penalty for such breach is prescribed in the contract.
CITY GOVERNMENT OF TAGAYTAY v. HON. GUERRERO
G.R. Nos. 140743 & 140745, G.R. Nos. 141451-52, September 17, 2009
NACHURA, J.:
FACTS: Tagaytay-Taal Tourist Development Corporation (TTTDC) is the registered owner of two
parcels of land and it incurred real estate tax liabilities on the said properties for the tax years
1976 to 1983. The City Government of Tagaytay offered the properties for sale at a public
auction. Being the only bidder, a certificate of sale was executed in favor of the City of Tagaytay
and was correspondingly inscribed on the titles of the lands . The City of Tagaytay filed an
unnumbered petition for entry of new certificates of title in its favor before the Regional Trial
Court (RTC) of Cavite. RTC granted the petition. The TTTDC appealed to the CA. The subject
properties were later purchased by Amuerfina Melencio-Herrera and Emiliana Melencio-
Fernando (Melencios) for the amount equivalent to the taxes and penalties due to the same.
Meanwhile, during the pendency of the case before the CA, TTTDC filed a petition for
nullification of the public auction involving the disputed properties on the ground that the
properties were not within the jurisdiction of the City of Tagaytay and thus, beyond its taxing
authority. On the other hand, the City of Tagaytay averred that based on its Charter, said
properties are within its territorial jurisdiction. The RTC denied this motion.
ISSUE: WON the City of Tagaytay is liable for damages to the Melencios
HELD: YES. The City of Tagaytay acted in bad faith when it levied real estate taxes on the
subject properties, and should be held accountable for all the consequences thereof, including
the void sale of the properties to the Melencios. The City of Tagaytay is accountable for
erroneously assessing taxes on properties outside its territorial jurisdiction. The failure of the city
officials in this case to verify if the property is within its jurisdiction before levying taxes on the
same constitutes gross negligence. The negligence of its officers in the performance of their
official functions gives rise to an action ex contractu and quasi ex-delictu. Under the doctrine of
respondeat superior, the City of Tagaytay is liable for all the necessary and natural
consequences of the negligent acts of its city officials. It is liable for the tortious acts committed
by its agents who sold the properties to the Melencios despite the clear mandate of RA No 1418,
separating Barrio Birinayan from its jurisdiction and transferring the same to the Province of
Batangas. The City of Tagaytay is liable to return the full amount paid by the Melencios during
the auction sale of the subject properties by way of actual damages. Moral damages are
awarded to enable the injured party to obtain means, diversions or amusements that will serve to
alleviate the moral suffering the person has undergone, by reason of defendant's culpable
action. The award is aimed at restoration, as much as possible, of the spiritual status quo ante.
Thus, it must be proportionate to the suffering inflicted. The Melencios are likewise entitled to
exemplary damages. Exemplary or corrective damages are imposed by way of example or
correction for the public good, in addition to the moral, temperate, liquidated, or compensatory
damages.
ATCI OVERSEAS CORPORATION, AMALIA G. IKDAL and MINISTRY OF PUBLIC HEALTH-
KUWAIT Petitioners, vs. MA. JOSEFA ECHIN, Respondent.
G.R. No. 178551
October 11, 2010
FACTS:
Respondent Echin was hired by petitioner ATCI in behalf of its principal co-petitioner, Ministry of
Public Health of Kuwait, for the position of medical technologist under a two-year contract with a
monthly salary of US$1,200.00.Within a year, Respondent was terminated for not passing the
probationary period which was under the Memorandum of Agreement.
Ministry denied respondents request and she returned to the Philippines shouldering her own
fair. Respondent filed with the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) a complaint against
ATCI for illegal dismissal. Labor Arbiter rendered judgment in favor of respondent and ordered
ATCI to pay her $3,600.00, her salary for the three months unexpired portion of the contract.
ATCI appealed Labor Arbiters decision, however, NLRC affirmed the latters decision and
denied petitioner ATCIs motion for reconsideration. Petitioner appealed to the Court Appeals
contending that their principal being a foreign government agency is immune from suit, and as
such, immunity extended to them.
Appellate Court affirmed NLRCs decision. It noted that under the law, a private employment
agency shall assume all responsibilities for the implementation of the contract of employment of
an overseas worker; hence, it can be sued jointly and severally with the foreign principal for any
violation of the recruitment agreement or contract of employment.
Petitioners motion for reconsideration was denied; hence, this present petition.
Issue: Whether or not petitioners be held liable considering that the contract specifically
stipulates that respondents employment shall be governed by the Civil Service Law and
Regulations of Kuwait.
Ruling:
Court denied the petition. According to RA 8042: The obligations covenanted in the recruitment
agreement entered into by and between the local agent and its foreign principal are not
coterminous with the term of such agreement so that if either or both of the parties decide to end
the agreement, the responsibilities of such parties towards the contracted employees under the
agreement do not at all end, but the same extends up to and until the expiration of the
employment contracts of the employees recruited and employed pursuant to the said recruitment
agreement. In international law, the party who wants to have a foreign law applied to a dispute or
case has the burden of proving the foreign law. Where a foreign law is not pleaded or, even if
pleaded, is not proved, the presumption is that foreign law is the same as ours. Thus, we apply
Philippine labor laws in determining the issues presented before us.
THE PRINCIPLE OF STATE IMMUNITY FROM SUIT US v. GUINTO: The rule that a state may
not be sued without its consent, now expressed in Article XVI, Section 3, of the 1987
Constitution, is one of the generally accepted principles of international law that we have
adopted as part of the law of our land under Article II, Section 2Even without such affirmation,
we would still be bound by the generally accepted principles of international law under the
doctrine of incorporation As applied to the local state, the doctrine of state immunity is based
on the justification given by Justice Holmes that there can be no legal right against the authority
which makes the law on which the right depends! (Kawanakoa v. Polybank) There are other
practical reasons for the enforcement of the doctrine. In the case of the foreign state sought to
be impleaded in the local jurisdiction, the added inhibition is expressed in the maxim par in
parem, non habet imperium . All states are sovereign equals and cannot assert jurisdiction over
one another. A contrary disposition would, in the language of a celebrated case, unduly vex the
peace of nations. (Da Haber v. Queen of Portugal)
USA vs. GUINTO, 182 SCRA 644 Case Digest
These are cases that have been consolidated because they all involve the doctrine of
state immunity. The United States of America was not impleaded in the case at bar but has
moved to dismiss on the ground that they are in effect suits against it to which it has not
consented.
FACTS:
1. USA vs GUINTO (GR No. 76607)
The private respondents are suing several officers of the US Air Force in Clark Air Base in
connection with the bidding conducted by them for contracts for barber services in the said base,
which was won by Dizon. The respondents wanted to cancel the award because they claimed
that Dizon had included in his bid an area not included in the invitation to bid, and also, to
conduct a rebidding.
2. USA vs RODRIGO (GR No. 79470)
Genove filed a complaint for damages for his dismissal as cook in the US Air Force
Recreation Center at Camp John Hay Air Station. It had been ascertained after investigation that
 Genove had poured urine into the soup stock used in cooking the vegetables served to the club
customers. The club manager suspended him and thereafter referred the case to a board of
arbitrators, which unanimously found him guilty and recommended his dismissal.
3. USA vs CEBALLOS (GR No. 80018)
Bautista, a barracks boy in Camp O Donnell, was arrested following a buy-bust operation
conducted by petitioners, who were USAF officers and special agents of the Air Force Office. An
information was filed against Bautista and at the trial, petitioners testified against him. As a result
of the charge, Bautista was dismissed from his employment. He then filed for damages against
petitioners claiming that it was because of the latters acts that he lost his job.
4. USA vs VERGARA (GR No. 80258)
A complaint for damages was filed by private respondents against petitioners (US military
officers) for injuries allegedly sustained by the former when defendants beat them up,
handcuffed them and unleashed dogs on them. The petitioners deny this and claim that
respondents were arrested for theft but resisted arrest, thus incurring the injuries.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the defendants were immune from suit under the RP-US Bases Treaty
for acts done by them in the performance of their official duties.
RULING:
The rule that a State may not be sued without its consent is one of the generally
accepted principles of international law that were have adopted as part of the law of our land.
Even without such affirmation, we would still be bound by the generally accepted principles of
international law under the doctrine of incorporation. Under this doctrine, as accepted by the
majority of the states, such principles are deemed incorporated in the law of every civilized state
as a condition and consequence of its membership in the society of nations. All states are
sovereign equals and cannot assert jurisdiction over one another. While the doctrine appears to
prohibit only suits against the state without its consent, it is also applicable to complaints filed
against officials of the states for acts allegedly performed by them in the discharge of their
duties. The rule is that if the judgment against such officials will require the state itself to perform
an affirmative act to satisfy the same, the suit must be regarded as against the state although it
has not been formally impleaded. When the government enters into a contract, it is deemed to
have descended to the level of the other contracting party and divested of its sovereign immunity
from suit with its implied consent.
It bears stressing at this point that the aforesaid principle do not confer on the USA a
blanket immunity for all acts done by it or its agents in the Philippines. Neither may the other
petitioners claim that they are also insulated from suit in this country merely because they have
acted as agents of the United States in the discharge of their official functions.
There is no question that the USA, like any other state, will be deemed to have
impliedly waived its non-suability if it has entered into a contract in its proprietary or private
capacity (commercial acts/jure gestionis). It is only when the contract involves its sovereign or
governmental capacity (governmental acts/jure imperii) that no such waiver may be implied.
In US vs GUINTO, the court finds the barbershops subject to the concessions granted
by the US government to be commercial enterprises operated by private persons. The Court
would have directly resolved the claims against the defendants as in USA vs RODRIGO, except
for the paucity of the record as the evidence of the alleged irregularity in the grant of the
barbershop concessions were not available. Accordingly, this case was remanded to the court
below for further proceedings.
In US vs RODRIGO, the restaurant services offered at the John Hay Air Station partake
of the nature of a business enterprise undertaken by the US government in its proprietary
capacity, as they were operated for profit, as a commercial and not a governmental activity. Not
even the US government can claim such immunity because by entering into the employment
contract with Genove in the discharge of its proprietary functions, it impliedly divested itself of its
sovereign immunity from suit. But, the court still dismissed the complaint against petitioners on
the ground that there was nothing arbitrary about the proceedings in the dismissal of Genove, as
the petitioners acted quite properly in terminating Genoves employment for his unbelievably
nauseating act.
In US vs CEBALLOS, it was clear that the petitioners were acting in the exercise of
their official functions when they conducted the buy-bust operation and thereafter testified
against the complainant. For discharging their duties as agents of the United States, they cannot
be directly impleaded for acts imputable to their principal, which has not given its consent to be
sued.
In US vs VERGARA, the contradictory factual allegations in this case need a closer
study of what actually happened. The record was too meager to indicate if the defendants were
really discharging their official duties or had actually exceeded their authority when the incident
occurred.The needed inquiry must first be made by the lower court so it may assess and resolve
the conflicting claims of the parties.
NOTE:
1. A STATE MAY BE SAID TO HAVE DESCENDED TO THE LEVEL OF AN INDIVIDUAL AND
CAN THUS BE DEEMED TO HAVE TACITLY GIVEN ITS CONSENT TO BE SUED ONLY
WHEN IT ENTERS INTO BUSINESS CONTRACTS.
2. Jure Gestionis by right of economic or business relations, may be sued. (US vs Guinto)
Jure Imperii by right of sovereign power, in the exercise of sovereign functions. No implied
consent. (US v. Ruiz, 136 SCRA 487)
SEAFDEC VS. NLRC
G.R. Nos. 97468-70, September 2 1993, 241 SCRA 580
FACTS:
Two labor cases were filed by the herein private respondents against the petitioner, Southeast
Asian Fisheries Development Center (SEAFDEC), before the National Labor Relations
Commission (NLRC), Regional Arbitration Branch, Iloilo City. In these cases, the private
respondents claim having been wrongfully terminated from their employment by the petitioner.
The petitioner, who claims to be an international inter-government organization composed of
various Southeast Asian countries, filed a Motion to Dismiss, challenged the jurisdiction of the
public respondent in taking cognizance of the above cases.
The private respondents, as well as respondent labor arbiter, allege that the petitioner is not
immune from suit and assuming that if, indeed, it is an international organization, it has,
however, impliedly, if not expressly, waived its immunity by belatedly raising the issue of
jurisdiction.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the petitioner is immune from suit.
RULING:
The Court ruled for the petitioner. It is beyond question that petitioner SEAFDEC is an
international agency enjoying diplomatic immunity. It has already been held in Southeast Asian
Fisheries Development Center-Aquaculture Department vs. National Labor Relations
Commission (G.R. No. 86773, 206 SCRA 283/1992). Petitioner Southeast Asian Fisheries
Development Center-Aquaculture Department (SEAFDEC-AQD) is an international agency
beyond the jurisdiction of public respondent NLRC.
Being an intergovernmental organization, SEAFDEC including its Departments (AQD), enjoys
functional independence and freedom from control of the state in whose territory its office is
located. One of the basic immunities of an international organization is immunity from local
jurisdiction, i.e., that it is immune from the legal writs and processes issued by the tribunals of
the country where it is found. The obvious reason for this is that the subjection of such an
organization to the authority of the local courts would afford a convenient medium thru which the
host government may interfere in their operations or even influence or control its policies and
decisions of the organization; besides, such objection to local jurisdiction would impair the
capacity of such body to discharge its responsibilities impartially on behalf of its member-states.
ERNESTO CALLADO vs. INTERNATIONAL RICE RESEARCH INSTITUTE (IRRI)
G.R. No. 106483 May 22, 1995/ ROMERO, J.:
Facts: Ernesto Callado, petitioner, was employed as a driver at the IRRI. One day while driving
an IRRI vehicle on an official trip to the NAIA and back to the IRRI, petitioner figured in an
accident.
Petitioner was informed of the findings of a preliminary investigation conducted by the IRRI's
Human Resource Development Department Manager. In view of the findings, he was charged
with:
(1) Driving an institute vehicle while on official duty under the influence of liquor;
(2) Serious misconduct consisting of failure to report to supervisors the failure of the vehicle to
start because of a problem with the car battery, and
(3) Gross and habitual neglect of duties.
Petitioner submitted his answer and defenses to the charges against him. However, IRRI issued
a Notice of Termination to petitioner.
Thereafter, petitioner filed a complaint before the Labor Arbiter for illegal dismissal, illegal
suspension and indemnity pay with moral and exemplary damages and attorney's fees.
IRRI wrote the Labor Arbiter to inform him that the Institute enjoys immunity from legal process
by virtue of Article 3 of Presidential Decree No. 1620, 5 and that it invokes such diplomatic
immunity and privileges as an international organization in the instant case filed by petitioner, not
having waived the same.
While admitting IRRI's defense of immunity, the Labor Arbiter, nonetheless, cited an Order
issued by the Institute to the effect that "in all cases of termination, respondent IRRI waives its
immunity," and, accordingly, considered the defense of immunity no longer a legal obstacle in
resolving the case.
The NLRC found merit in private respondent's appeal and, finding that IRRI did not waive its
immunity, ordered the aforesaid decision of the Labor Arbiter set aside and the complaint
dismissed.
In this petition petitioner contends that the immunity of the IRRI as an international organization
granted by Article 3 of Presidential Decree No. 1620 may not be invoked in the case at bench
inasmuch as it waived the same by virtue of its Memorandum on "Guidelines on the handling of
dismissed employees in relation to P.D. 1620."
Issue: Did the (IRRI) waive its immunity from suit in this dispute which arose from an employer-
employee relationship?
Held: No.
P.D. No. 1620, Article 3 provides:
Art. 3. Immunity from Legal Process. The Institute shall enjoy immunity from any penal, civil and
administrative proceedings, except insofar as that immunity has been expressly waived by the
Director-General of the Institute or his authorized representatives.
The SC upholds the constitutionality of the aforequoted law. There is in this case "a categorical
recognition by the Executive Branch of the Government that IRRI enjoys immunities accorded to
international organizations, which determination has been held to be a political question
conclusive upon the Courts in order not to embarass a political department of Government.
It is a recognized principle of international law and under our system of separation of powers that
diplomatic immunity is essentially a political question and courts should refuse to look beyond a
determination by the executive branch of the government, and where the plea of diplomatic
immunity is recognized and affirmed by the executive branch of the government as in the case at
bar, it is then the duty of the courts to accept the claim of immunity upon appropriate suggestion
by the principal law officer of the government or other officer acting under his direction.
The raison d'etre for these immunities is the assurance of unimpeded performance of their
functions by the agencies concerned.
The grant of immunity to IRRI is clear and unequivocal and an express waiver by its Director-
General is the only way by which it may relinquish or abandon this immunity.
In cases involving dismissed employees, the Institute may waive its immunity, signifying that
such waiver is discretionary on its part.
Aberca vs. Ver Case Digest L-69866 April 15, 1988
FACTS:
This case stems from alleged illegal searches and seizures and other violations of the rights and
liberties of plaintiffs by various intelligence units of the Armed Forces of the Philippines, known
as Task Force Makabansa (TFM) ordered by General Fabian Ver "to conduct pre-emptive strikes
against known communist-terrorist (CT) underground houses in view of increasing reports about
CT plans to sow disturbances in Metro Manila," Plaintiffs allege, among others, that complying
with said order, elements of the TFM raided several places, employing in most cases defectively
issued judicial search warrants; that during these raids, certain members of the raiding party
confiscated a number of purely personal items belonging to plaintiffs; that plaintiffs were arrested
without proper warrants issued by the courts; that for some period after their arrest, they were
denied visits of relatives and lawyers; that plaintiffs were interrogated in violation of their rights to
silence and counsel; that military men who interrogated them employed threats, tortures and
other forms of violence on them in order to obtain incriminatory information or confessions and in
order to punish them; that all violations of plaintiffs constitutional rights were part of a concerted
and deliberate plan to forcibly extract information and incriminatory statements from plaintiffs
and to terrorize, harass and punish them, said plans being previously known to and sanctioned
by defendants.
Seeking to justify the dismissal of plaintiffs' complaint, the respondents postulate the view that as
public officers they are covered by the mantle of state immunity from suit for actsdone in the
performance of official duties or function
ISSUE:whether the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus bars a civil action for
damages for illegal searches conducted by military personnel and other violations of rights and
liberties guaranteed under the Constitution. If such action for damages may be maintained, who
can be held liable for such violations: only the military personnel directly involved and/or their
superiors as well.
RATIO DICIDENDI:
SC: We find respondents' invocation of the doctrine of state immunity from suit totally misplaced.
The cases invoked by respondents actually involved acts done by officers in the performance
of official duties written the ambit of their powers.
It may be that the respondents, as members of the Armed Forces of the Philippines, were merely
responding to their duty, as they claim, "to prevent or suppress lawless violence, insurrection,
rebellion and subversion" in accordance with Proclamation No. 2054 of President Marcos,
despite the lifting of martial law on January 27, 1981, and in pursuance of such objective, to
launch pre- emptive strikes against alleged communist terrorist underground houses. But this
cannot be construed as a blanket license or a roving commission untramelled by any
constitutional restraint, to disregard or transgress upon the rights and liberties of the individual
citizen enshrined in and protected by the Constitution. The Constitution remains the supreme
law of the land to which all officials, high or low, civilian or military, owe obedience
and allegiance at all times.
Article 32 of the Civil Code which renders any public officer or employee or any private individual
liable in damages for violating the Constitutional rights and liberties of another, as enumerated
therein, does not exempt the respondents from responsibility. Only judges are excluded from
liability under the said article, provided their acts or omissions do not constitute a violation of the
Penal Code or other penal statute.
We do not agree. We find merit in petitioners' contention that the suspension of the privilege of
the writ of habeas corpus does not destroy petitioners' right and cause of action for damages for
illegal arrest and detention and other violations of their constitutional rights. The suspension
does not render valid an otherwise illegal arrest or detention. What is suspended is merely the
right of the individual to seek release from detention through the writ of habeas corpus as a
speedy means of obtaining his liberty.
Firstly, it is wrong to at the plaintiffs' action for damages 5 Section 1, Article 19. to
'acts ofalleged physical violence" which constituted delict or wrong. Article 32 clearly specifies as
actionable the act of violating or in any manner impeding or impairing any of the constitutional
rights and liberties enumerated therein, among others
The complaint in this litigation alleges facts showing with abundant clarity and details, how
plaintiffs' constitutional rights and liberties mentioned in Article 32 of the Civil Code were violated
and impaired by defendants. The complaint speaks of, among others, searches made without
search warrants or based on irregularly issued or substantially defective warrants; seizures and
confiscation, without proper receipts, of cash and personal effects belonging to plaintiffs and
other items of property which were not subversive and illegal nor covered by the search
warrants; arrest and detention of plaintiffs without warrant or under irregular, improper and illegal
circumstances; detention of plaintiffs at several undisclosed places of 'safehouses" where they
were kept incommunicado and subjected to physical and psychological torture and other
inhuman, degrading and brutal treatment for the purpose of extracting incriminatory statements.
The complaint contains a detailed recital of abusesperpetrated upon the plaintiffs violative of
their constitutional rights.
Secondly, neither can it be said that only those shown to have participated "directly" should be
held liable. Article 32 of the Civil Code encompasses within the ambit of its provisions those
directly, as well as indirectly, responsible for its violation.
The responsibility of the defendants, whether direct or indirect, is amply set forth in the
complaint. It is well established in our law and jurisprudence that a motion to dismiss on the
ground that the complaint states no cause of action must be based on what appears on the face
of the complaint. 6 To determine the sufficiency of the cause of action, only the factsalleged in
the complaint, and no others, should be considered. 7 For this purpose, the motion to dismiss
must hypothetically admit the truth of the facts alleged in the complaint. 8
Lansang vs. Court of Appeals (Consti1)
Amado J. Lansang, petitioner, vs. Court of Appeals, General Assembly of the Blind, Inc.,
and Jose Iglesias, respondents.
February 23, 2000
Quisumbing, J:
Facts:
Private respondent General Assembly of the Blind (GABI) were allegedly awarded a
verbal contract of lease in Rizal Park by the National Parks Development Committee (NPDC).
However, this verbal contract accommodation was unclear because there was no document or
instrument involved.
With the change of government, the new Chairman of NPDC, petitioner Amado J.
Lansang, sought to clean up Rizal Park and terminated the said verbal agreement with GABI
and demanded that they vacate the area.
 The notice was signed by the president of GABI, private respondent Jose Iglesias,
allegedly to indicate his conformity to its contents but later on claimed that he was deceived into
signing the notice.
On the day of the supposed eviction, GABI filed an action for damages and injunction in
the RTC against the petitioner but it was dismissed, ruling that the complaint was actually
directed against the state which could not be sued without its consent.
On appeal, the Court of Appeals reversed the decision of the trial court and ruled that a
government official being sued in his official capacity is not enough to protest such official from
liability for acts done without or in excess of his authority.
Issues:
Whether or not private respondents' complaint against petitioner Lansang, as Chairman
of NPDC, is in effect a suit against the state which cannot be sued without its consent.
Whether or not petitioner Lansang abused his authority in ordering the ejectment of
private respondents from Rizal Park.
Held:
No, the complaint is not a suit against the state.
No, Lansang did not abuse his authority.
Ratio:
The doctrine of state immunity from suit applies to complaints filed against public
officials for acts done in the performance of their duties. The rule is that the suit must be
regarded as one against the state where satisfaction of the judgment against the public official
concerned will require the state itself to perform a positive act.
Lansang was sued not in his capacity as NPDC Chairman but in his personal
capacity. It is evident from the complaint that Lansang was sued allegedly for having personal
motives in ordering the ejectment of GABI from Rizal Park.
There was no evidence of abuse of authority.