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"Besides, there is no showing that the levied firearms are the

[G.R. No. 88114 : December 20, 1990.]


only firearms that the respondent-appellant has in its possession.
192 SCRA 492 We affirmatively believe therefore that there are firearms still
PENTAGON SECURITY and INVESTIGATION AGENCY, hidden in its armory sufficient enough to answer the call of its
Petitioner, vs.VICENTE T. JIMENEZ, ET AL., and NATIONAL security trade or business. In the remote assumption that no
LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION, SECOND DIVISION, firearms remains in respondent's custody, as practically flowing
Respondents. from the view of Labor Arbiter Magno, respondent can lease or
buy from legitimate sources. There (sic) are some of the
PADILLA, J.: alternatives which even common layman can expediently
FACTS: comprehend."
Petitioner, a single proprietorship engaged in security services, was
ordered to pay the amount of ONE HUNDRED FIFTY SEVEN The Solicitor General's as well as private respondent's comments submit
THOUSAND ONE HUNDRED NINETEEN PESOS AND FOUR that firearms of a security agency are not exempt from execution under
CENTAVOS (P157,119.04) representing wages and COLA differentials Rule 39, Sec. 12, par. (b) of the Rules of Court which provides:
due its employees, as computed in a Decision of the NLRC dated 21
February 1986. On 22 June 1988, a notice of garnishment was issued "Sec. 12. Property exempt from execution. Except as otherwise
against petitioner, addressed to the PC-SUSIA c/o Col. Norberto M. expressly provided by law, the following property, and no other, shall be
Lina, Camp Crame, EDSA, Q.C. On 5 June 1988, Deputy Sheriff exempt from execution:
Silvino B. Santos issued a Notice of Levy and Sale on Execution of '(b) Tools and implements necessarily used by him in his trade or
Personal Properties against herein petitioner, which personal properties employment;'"
are the licensed firearms in question.
Respondents contend that from the above provision, three (3) things can
Petitioner filed an urgent petition to quash Notice of Levy and Sale be deduced, viz:
on Execution, claiming exemption from execution under Sec. 12,
"(a) Except in paragraphs (j) and (m), Sec. 12, Rule 39, Rules of Court,
par. (b), Rule 39 of the Rules of Court.
the exemptions are accorded to individual debtors.
Labor Arbiter Eduardo Magno denied the petition. The Motion for
(b) The exempt properties are used personally by the debtor or his
Reconsideration was likewise denied. On 21 March 1989, the NLRC
family, or as tools or implements of the debtor in his trade or
issued its resolution which is the subject of this petition.
employment.
The NLRC held:
(c) The properties are necessary for the livelihood of the debtor and his
"Respondent is a security agency. It is admitted that the licensed family."
firearm is an important implement used in the business but this
The term "tools and implements" refers to instruments of husbandry or
licensed firearm is not the tools and implements exempted from
manual labor needed by an artisan craftsman or laborer to obtain his
execution. The question, therefore is whether a person can run
living. Here petitioner is a business enterprise. It does not use the
his trade or employment without such licensed firearm. The
firearms personally, but they are used by its employees. Not being a
answer is in the affirmative since the person can still run the
natural person, petitioner cannot claim that the firearms are necessary
business or engage in his trade even without such firearm
for its livelihood. Private respondent invites the Court to take judicial
because there are other alternatives open to him.
notice of the fact that there are security guards rendering service without
firearms. CORONA, J.:
Petitioner without filing any reply moves for the resolution of the
FACTS:
petition.
Sometime in 1977, Ernesto Olson entered into a dealership
ISSUE: agreement with respondent Planters Products, Inc. whereby he agreed to
W/N there is grave abuse of discretion on the part of the NLRC purchase, in cash or credit, fertilizers and agricultural chemicals from
in upholding the sheriff's issuance of Notice of Levy and Sale on respondent for resale. To secure Olsons faithful compliance of his
Execution against licensed firearms owned and used by the obligations, Vista Surety and Insurance, Co. (Vista Insurance) and
petitioner, a security agency, in its operations? petitioner executed a surety undertaking in favor of respondent.
After several deliveries, Olson failed to pay respondent prompting the
HELD: NO! latter to claim the amount due from petitioner and Vista Insurance.
There is no question, in our mind, that a security agency without However, both refused to settle their liabilities to respondent as Olsons
firearms to equip its guards is useless. sureties.
On June 25, 1979, respondent filed an action for collection of sum
However, it would appear that the exemption contemplated by the of money against Olson, Vista Insurance and petitioner in the Regional
provision involved is personal, available only to a natural person, Trial Court (RTC) of Makati, Branch 58. Summons were accordingly
such as a dentist's dental chair and electric fan (Belen v. de Leon, served (except as to Olson whose address could not be located).
G.R. No. L-16412, 30 Nov. 1962). As pointed out by the Solicitor The trial court found petitioner and Vista Insurance liable to
General, if properties used in business are exempt from execution, respondent. They were ordered to pay the following: (1) P372,502
there can hardly be an instance when a judgment claim can be representing the unpaid principal amount plus interest; (2) 25% of the
enforced against the business entity. total amount recoverable as attorneys fees and (3) cost of suit.
ACCORDINGLY, the petition is DISMISSED. However, for security Petitioner alone appealed to the Court of Appeals (CA).
reasons, and to prevent the possibility that the firearms to be sold at the On December 7, 1992, the CA dismissed petitioners appeal for
execution sale may fall into the hands of lawless and subversive failure to pay the required docket fees. On March 12, 1993, the
elements, the sale at public auction should be with the prior clearance dismissal of petitioners appeal became final and executory; entry of
and under supervision of the PC-INP authorities. judgment followed on May 27, 1993.
On October 12, 1993, respondent filed in the RTC a motion for
execution of judgment following the CAs dismissal of petitioners
appeal. The RTC issued the writ on October 21, 1993. The writ,
G.R. No. 149053 however, was not implemented so respondent filed an ex parte motion
for the issuance of an alias writ of execution which the trial court
CENTRAL SURETY AND INSURANCE COMPANY, granted on February 24, 1994.
Petitioner, Present: In the CA, petitioner filed a Very Urgent Motion to Set Aside the
CA Resolution of December 7, 1992 and to Re-Open Appeal with
PLANTERS PRODUCTS, INC., Prayer for Preliminary Injunction/Temporary Restraining Order. On
Respondent.Promulgated: March 3, 1994, the appellate court issued a resolution restraining the
RTC judge and the deputy sheriff from enforcing the writ but, on motion
March 7, 2007 of respondent, the CA lifted the TRO and dismissed petitioners urgent
motion on March 24, 1994.
Through a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, ISSUE:
petitioner elevated the CAs dismissal of its urgent motion to this Court. W/N the execution of a final judgment may be made by mere
In its petition, petitioner argued that it failed to pay the docket fees only motion despite the lapse of five years?
because the CAs judicial records division did not re-send the notice for
it to pay said fees. On July 11, 1994, we dismissed the petition and this HELD: YES! In this case, we answer in the affirmative.
dismissal became final on September 14, 1994.
On June 18, 1999 or 6 years from the entry of judgment of the Under Rule 39, Section 6, the rule is that a final judgment
RTCs decision, respondent filed another motion for issuance of alias may be executed by mere motion within five years from the date of
writ of execution in the trial court. On August 20, 1999, the trial court entry of judgment. However, the rule is not absolute and admits one
issued an order granting the writ. Petitioner filed an MR of said order notable exception and that is when the delay in enforcing the
but the RTC denied it. judgment is caused by the party assailing the filing of the motion.
Petitioner thereafter went to the CA via a special civil action for In Republic v. Court of Appeals, we declared that, on
certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules ascribing grave abuse of discretion meritorious grounds, execution of final judgment by mere motion may
on the part of the RTC judge for issuing the writ despite the fact that be allowed even after the lapse of five years when delay in the execution
more than five years had elapsed since the RTCs decision of November is caused or occasioned by the actions of the judgment debtor and/or is
6, 1991 became final and executory. Invoking Rule 39, Section 6 of the incurred for his benefit.
Rules, petitioner insisted that the RTC decision could no longer be Similarly, in Camacho v. Court of Appeals, we ruled that the
enforced by mere motion but only by court action. five-year period allowed for enforcement of judgment by mere action is
The CA dismissed the petition for patent lack of merit. It held that: deemed effectively interrupted or suspended when the delay in the
execution is occasioned by the oppositors own initiatives in order to
While it is true that the judgment sought to be gain an undue advantage.
executed became final and executory on March 12, 1993, Based on the attendant facts, the present case falls within the
it bears stressing that the delay was caused by petitioners exception. Petitioner triggered the series of delays in the execution of
dilatory maneuvers filed in this Court and all the way to the RTCs final decision by filing numerous motions and appeals in the
the Supreme Court, viz: the Very Urgent Motion to Set appellate courts, even causing the CAs issuance of the TRO enjoining
Aside Resolution of December 7, 1992 and to Re-Open the enforcement of said decision. It is obvious that petitioner is merely
the Appeal with Prayer for Preliminary resorting to dilatory maneuvers to skirt its legal obligation.
Injunction/Temporary Restraining Order which resulted Lastly, in Republic and Camacho, we ruled that the purpose of
in the issuance of the Court of Appeals Resolution dated the law in prescribing time limitations for enforcing a judgment or
March 3, 1994 enjoining respondents from enforcing the action is to prevent a party from sleeping on his rights. Far from
subject decision; the Motion for Reconsideration of [the] sleeping on its rights, respondent pursued its claim by persistently
Court of Appeals Resolution dated March 24, 1994; and seeking the execution of the RTCs final judgment of November 6,
Petition for Certiorari before the Supreme Court which 1991. It would be unjust to frustrate respondents effort to collect
was ultimately dismissed by the High Court on July 11, payment from petitioner on sheer technicality. While strict
1994. compliance to the rules of procedure is desired, liberal
interpretation is warranted in cases where a strict enforcement of
Petitioner filed an MR but this was likewise denied by the CA. the rules will not serve the ends of justice.
Hence, this petition.
G.R. No. 168913 March 14, 2007 LRC No. 1437-N?
ROLANDO TING,Petitioner,
vs. HELD: YES!
HEIRS OF DIEGO LIRIO, namely: FLORA A. LIRIO, AMELIA The petition fails.
L. ROSKA, AURORA L. ABEJO, ALICIA L. DUNQUE, Section 30 of Presidential Decree No. 1529 or the Property
ADELAIDA L. DAVID, EFREN A. LIRIO and JOCELYN Registration Decree provides:
ANABELLE L. ALCOVER, Respondents. SEC. 30. When judgment becomes final; duty to cause issuance of
decree. The judgment rendered in a land registration proceeding
CARPIO MORALES, J.: becomes final upon the expiration of thirty days to be counted from the
date of receipt of notice of the judgment. An appeal may be taken from
FACTS: the judgment of the court as in ordinary civil cases.
In a Decision of December 10, 1976 in Land Registration Case The land registration proceedings being in rem, the land registration
(LRC) No. N-983, then Judge Alfredo Marigomen of the then Court of courts approval in LRC No. N-983 of spouses Diego Lirio and Flora
First Instance of Cebu, Branch 7, granted the application filed by the Atienzas application for registration of the lot settled its ownership, and
Spouses Diego Lirio and Flora Atienza for registration of title to Lot No. is binding on the whole world including petitioner.
18281 (the lot) of the Cebu Cadastral 12 Extension, Plan Rs-07-000787. Petitioners insist that the duty of the respondent land registration
The decision in LRC No. N-983 became final and executory on January officials to issue the decree is purely ministerial. It is ministerial in the
29, 1977. Judge Marigomen thereafter issued an order of November 10, sense that they act under the orders of the court and the decree must be
1982 directing the Land Registration Commission to issue the in conformity with the decision of the court and with the data found in
corresponding decree of registration and the certificate of title in favor the record, and they have no discretion in the matter. However, if they
of the spouses Lirio. are in doubt upon any point in relation to the preparation and issuance of
On February 12, 1997, Rolando Ting (petitioner) filed with the Regional the decree, it is their duty to refer the matter to the court. They act, in
Trial Court (RTC) of Cebu an application for registration of title to the this respect, as officials of the court and not as administrative officials,
same lot. The application was docketed as LRC No. 1437-N.1 and their act is the act of the court. They are specifically called upon to
The herein respondents, heirs of Diego Lirio, namely: Flora A. Lirio, "extend assistance to courts in ordinary and cadastral land registration
Amelia L. Roska, Aurora L. Abejo, Alicia L. Dunque, Adelaida L. proceedings."
David, Efren A. Lirio and Jocelyn Anabelle L. Alcover, who were As for petitioners claim that under Section 6, Rule 39 of the Rules of
afforded the opportunity to file an opposition to petitioners application Court reading:
by Branch 21 of the Cebu RTC, filed their Answer calling attention to SEC. 6. Execution by motion or by independent action. A final
the December 10, 1976 decision in LRC No. N-983 which had become and executory judgment or order may be executed on motion within
final and executory on January 29, 1977 and which, they argued, barred five (5) years from the date of its entry. After the lapse of such time,
the filing of petitioners application on the ground of res judicata. and before it is barred by the statute of limitations, a judgment may
After hearing the respective sides of the parties, Branch 21 of the Cebu be enforced by action. The revived judgment may also be enforced
RTC, on motion of respondents, dismissed petitioners application on by motion within five (5) years from the date of its entry and
the ground of res judicata. thereafter by action before it is barred by the statute of limitations,
Hence, the present petition for review on certiorari the December 10, 1976 decision became "extinct" in light of the
failure of respondents and/or of their predecessors-in-interest to
ISSUE: execute the same within the prescriptive period, the same does not
W/N the decision in LRC No. N-983 constitutes res judicata in lie.
ARABAY, INC.,petitioner,
13
Sta. Ana v. Menla, et al. enunciates the raison detre why vs.
Section 6, Rule 39 does not apply in land registration proceedings, Hon. SERAFIN SALVADOR, Presiding Judge of the Court of First
viz: Instance of Rizal, Caloocan City Branch, and BENJAMIN M.
THAT THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN ORDERING THAT THE PASCUAL,respondents.
DECISION RENDERED IN THIS LAND REGISTRATION CASE ON Araneta, Mendoza & Papa for petitioner.
NOVEMBER 28, 1931 OR TWENTY SIX YEARS AGO, HAS NOT AQUINO, J.:
YET BECOME FINAL AND UNENFORCEABLE.
Authority for this theory is the provision in the Rules of Court to the FACTS:
effect that judgment may be enforced within 5 years by motion, and In a decision dated October 7, 1968 in Civil Case No. 71710 of
after five years but within 10 years, by an action (Sec. 6, Rule 39.) This the Court of First Instance of Manila, "Arabay, Inc. vs. Florencio A.
provision of the Rules refers to civil actions and is not applicable to Soyangco", Judge Manuel P. Barcelona ordered Soyangco to pay the
special proceedings, such as a land registration case. This is so plaintiff the sum of P36,874.49 plus six percent interest from
because a party in a civil action must immediately enforce a January 10, 1967 and P2,000 as attorney's fees.
judgment that is secured as against the adverse party, and his Soyangco did not appeal. Pursuant to the writ of execution issued in that
failure to act to enforce the same within a reasonable time as case, a deputy sheriff of Rizal levied upon forty pieces of personal
provided in the Rules makes the decision unenforceable against the property found in Soyangco's residence at Navotas, Rizal and served
losing party. In special proceedings the purpose is to establish a notice that the same would be auctioned off to the highest bidder on
status, condition or fact; in land registration proceedings, the March 8, 1969.
ownership by a person of a parcel of land is sought to be On March 6, 1969 Benjamin M. Pascual filed a third-party
established. After the ownership has been proved and confirmed by claim with the sheriff. He alleged that he owned the said pieces of
judicial declaration, no further proceeding to enforce said personal property because they were sold to him by the deputy
ownership is necessary, except when the adverse or losing party had sheriff of Caloocan City for P8,106.16 to satisfy a judgment against
been in possession of the land and the winning party desires to oust Soyangco in Civil Case No. 61193, "Esteban F. Ferrer vs. Florencio
him therefrom. Soyangco"of the Court of First Instance of Manila, as shown in the
Furthermore, there is no provision in the Land Registration Act similar certificate of sale dated June 30, 1967.
to Sec. 6, Rule 39, regarding the execution of a judgment in a civil On March 13, 1969 Arabay, Inc. posted an indemnity bond for
action, except the proceedings to place the winner in possession by P8,106.16 in favor of the sheriff. The auction sale was rescheduled on
virtue of a writ of possession. The decision in a land registration case, March 28, 1969 but the sale did not take place because Pascual sued the
unless the adverse or losing party is in possession, becomes final sheriff and Arabay, Inc. in Civil Case No. C-1545 of the Court of First
without any further action, upon the expiration of the period for Instance of Rizal, Caloocan City Branch XIV. Pascual prayed in that
perfecting an appeal. case that the auction sale be enjoined, that the levy be declared void and
that the defendants be ordered to pay moral damages and attorney's fees.
The Caloocan court in an ex parte order dated March 26, 1969 enjoined
the sheriff from proceeding with the auction sale.
Arabay, Inc. filed a motion to dismiss the injunction suit. It
invoked the rule that no court has the power to interfere by
injunction with the judgments or decrees of a court of concurrent or
G.R. No. L-31077 March 17, 1978 coordinate jurisdiction.
Pascual opposed the motion to dismiss. He cited the rule that a sheriff against the sheriff in case an indemnity bond was filed by the judgment
has no authority to attach the property of a person other than the creditor. The third-party claimant may file a separate and
judgment debtor. independent action to establish ownership to the property levied
The Caloocan court in its order of may 19, 1969 denied the motion to upon by the sheriff. In that action, he may secure an injunction to
dismiss and reiterated its prior order that upon the filing or a bond in the restrain the sale of the attached property.
sum of P5,000 a writ of injunction should be issued to enjoin the auction When the sheriff, acting beyond the bound of his authority, seizes a
sale. The motion for the reconsideration of that order was denied in the stranger's property, the writ of injunction, which is issued to stop the
court's order of July 11, 1969. auction sale of that property, is not an interference with the writ of
On October 13, 1969 Arabay, Inc. filed in this court the instant petition execution issued by another court because the writ of execution issued
for certiorari and prohibition wherein it assailed the injunction order. by another court because the writ of execution was improperly
implemented by the sheriff. Under that writ, he could attach the property
ISSUE: of the judgment debtor. He is not authorized to levy upon the property of
W/N at the instance of a third-party claimant the Caloocan the third-party claimant.
court can enjoin the sheriff from selling the properties which he has In the instant case, respondent Judge acted within his
levied upon to satisfy the judgment of the Court of First Instance of jurisdiction and did not commit any grave abuse of discretion in
Manila? enjoining the auction sale because, as already stated, "a sheriff has
no authority to attach the property of any person under an
HELD: YES! execution except that of the judgment debtor. If he does so, the writ
We hold that the Caloocan court can stop the execution of the Manila of execution affords him no justification for the action is not in
court's judgment against properties not belonging to the judgment obedience to the mandate of the writ. So long as the officer confines
debtor. The injunction in that case would not constitute an interference his acts which are not justified by the writ are without authority of
with the process of a court of coordinate and co-equal jurisdiction. law. An injunction is a proper remedy to prevent a sheriff from selling
as a third-party claimant, Pascual has the right to vindicate his the property of one person for the purpose of paying the debts of
claim to the properties levied upon by means of a proper action. another.".
That right is recognized in Rule 39 of the Rules of Court, which
provides: It is noteworthy that, generally, the rule, that no court has authority to
SEC. 17. Proceedings where property claimed by third person. If interfere by injunction with the judgments or decrees of a concurrent or
property levied on be claimed by any other person than the coordinate jurisdiction having equal power to grant the injunctive relief,
judgment debtor or his agent, and such person make an affidavit of is applied in cases, where no third-party claimant is involved, in order
his title thereto or right to the possession thereof, stating the to prevent one court from nullifying the judgment or process of another
grounds of such right or title, and serve the same upon the officer court of the same rank or category, a power which devolves upon the
making the levy, and a copy thereof upon the judgment creditor, the proper appellate court.
officer shall not be bound to keep the property, unless such The raison d'etre for that rule is that an effective ordering of legal
judgment creditor or his agent, on demand of the officer, indemnify relationships in civil society is possible only when each court is granted
the officer against such claim by a bond in a sum not greater such exclusive jurisdiction over the property brought to it. To allow
than the value of the property levied on. In case of disagreement as coordinate courts to interfere with each other's judgments or decrees by
to such value, the same shall be determined by the court issuing the injunctions would obviously lead to confusion and might seriously
writ of execution. hinder the proper administration of justice, especially if they are
The third-party claimant is to obligated to file an action for damages branches of the same court.
That rule is not violated when the judge of another branch, who annuls ALFONSO ESCOVILLA, JR., CECILIO M. MERIS and CUISON
or modifies the order issued by another judge, acts in the same case and ENGINEERING and MACHINERY CO., INC.,petitioners,
belongs to the same court (Eleazar vs. Zandueta, 48 Phil. 193). vs.
On the other hand, it should be noted that a Court of First Instance or a THE HON. COURT OF APPEALS, SIBAGAT TIMBER
branch thereof has the authority and jurisdiction to take cognizance of, CORPORATION and CONCHITA DEL ROSARIO,respondents.
and to act in, a suit to annul a final and executory judgment or order
rendered by another Court of First Instance or by another branch of the GUTIERREZ, JR., J.:
same court. In such a case, there is no interference by one branch of the
court with the judgment of another branch of the same court because FACTS:
after a case had been finally terminated in one branch and an action to In Civil Case No. 13699, entitled Cuison Engineering and
annul the judgment is filed in another branch, the cause of action in the Machinery Co., Inc. v. del Rosario and Sons Logging Enterprises, Inc.",
second case would be different from that in the first case. a decision dated March 24, 1981 was rendered by the then Court of First
Instance, Branch II, Davao City awarding to Cuison Engineering and
Machinery Co., Inc. a certain sum of money and damages. The Court of
Appeals eventually affirmed the decision which became final and
executory on June 29, 1984. Thereafter, Cuison Engineering and
Machinery Co. sought the execution of the subject decision and a
corresponding writ of execution was issued on December 27, 1984 by
the RTC, Branch IX, Davao City.
On January 26, 1985, petitioner Deputy Sheriff Alfonso Escovilla, Jr.
levied and seized one (1) unit electric welding machine. A third party
claim over said item was filed by Mariano Rana office manager of
Sibagat Timber Corporation, one of the private respondents.
Because of such levy, Special Civil Case No. 454 which was an action
for prohibition with preliminary injunction and damages was filed on
February 5, 1985 before the RTC, Branch IV of Butuan City entitled,
"Sibagat Timber Corp., Petitioner v. Alfonso Escovilla, Jr. and Cuison
Engineering and Machinery Corp., Inc., Respondents."
On February 7, 1985, petitioner Deputy Sheriff Cecilio M. Meris
seized and levied one (1) unit motor launch named "Pixie Boy No. 5" by
virtue of the writ of execution issued in Civil Case No. 13699.
On February 8, 1985, private respondent Conchita del Rosario, claiming
ownership over the motor launch filed a third party claim over the
subject property.
Consequently, a sheriff's indemnity bond filed for the third party claim
of Conchita del Rosario was approved by the Davao Court.
On the same date, February 8, 1985, petitioner Cecilio M. Meris
prepared the notice of sale setting the auction sale of the motor launch
G.R. No. 84497 November 6, 1989 on February 14, 1985.
On February 11, 1985, Special Civil Case No. 454 was amended to W/N AN ACTION FOR PROHIBITION WILL STILL
include as additional petitioner, Conchita del Rosario and as additional PROSPER AS A REMEDY FOR ACTS ALREADY
respondent, Cecilio M. Meris. As prayed for in the petition, a temporary ACCOMPLISHED?
restraining order was issued directing the respondents to refrain from
proceeding with the public auction sale scheduled on February 14, 1985. HELD: YES!
However on March 6, 1985, after the temporary restraining order had The petitioners' contention is untenable.
lapsed and upon motion of Cuison Engineering & Machinery Co., the There is no dispute that the private respondents are indeed the
RTC of Davao City issued an order in Civil Case No. 13699 directing actual owners of the subject properties by virtue of a sale in their
Deputy Sheriff Escovilla to proceed with the auction sale of the subject favor by Del Rosario and Sons Logging Enterprises, Inc. Such
motor launch "Pixie Boy No. 5" with authority to lawfully retrieve the finding is based on evidence on record which this Court does not
same wherever it may be stored or berthed. find any reason to disturb. Moreover, there is nothing in the petition
Pursuant to such order, Escovilla took custody of the motor launch and nor in the petitioners' memorandum to suggest that the properties
set the auction sale on March 27, 1985. sold in execution of the judgment in Civil Case No. 13699 belonged
Despite the orders of the court in Special Civil Case No. 454 directing to the judgment-debtor in that case. This petition merely attacks the
the Sheriff to return the motor launch and to desist from proceeding with procedure adopted by the respondents.
the auction sale, the auction sale was conducted upon motion of Cuison In such a case, the point to be borne in mind is that the power of the
Engineering and Machinery Co., Inc. and upon order of Judge Saludares court in the execution of judgments extends only over properties
in Civil Case No. 13699. unquestionably belonging to the judgment debtor. As the Court
On March 27, 1985, the subject motor launch was sold at public auction stated in Bayer Philippines, Inc. v. Agana, (63 SCRA 355 [1975] ):
by Deputy Sheriff Joseymour R. Robiza in lieu of Escovilla who was We intimated that the levy by the sheriff of a property by virtue of a
then in Gen. Santos City, South Cotabato. writ of attachment may be considered as made under authority of the
Trial on the merits was held in Special Civil Case No. 454, and court only when-the property levied upon unquestionably belongs to the
on June 5, 1986, the court rendered a decision Commanding defendant. If he attaches properties other than those of the defendant, he
respondent Sheriff Alfonso Escovilla, Jr. to return the motor launch acts beyond the limits of his authority. Otherwise stated, the court
Pixie Boy No. 5 at his own expense to its rightful owner Conchita C. issuing a writ of execution is supposed to enforce its authority only over
del Rosario in Butuan City in the same condition when it was taken properties of the judgment debtor, and should a third party appear to
in 1985; or, in the event of loss or inability to recover said motor claim the property levied upon by the sheriff, the procedure laid down
launch, to pay its value of P500,000.00; by the Rules is that such claim should be the subject of a separate and
They are also ordered to pay Sibagat limber Corporation in the sum of independent action.
P22,500.00 as actual and compensatory damages for the deprivation of This is precisely the very nature of the proceedings in the action for
the use of the electric welding machine; prohibition with preliminary injunction filed by the private respondents
Both respondents are also ordered to pay, jointly and severally, with the Regional Trial Court of Butuan City which is sanctioned by
P15,000.00 as and for attorney's fees, plus the cost of this suit. Section 17, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court. As held in Rivera vs.
From said decision, the petitioners appealed to the Court of Florendo (144 SCRA 643 [1986] ):
Appeals which affirmed the decision of the RTC, Butuan City with Another fundamental rule which appears to have been violated in
some modifications, to wit: the case at bar is that no advantage may be given to one to the
Hence this petition. prejudice of the other, a court should not by means of a preliminary
injunction transfer the property in litigation from the possession of
ISSUE: one party to another where the legal title is in dispute and the party
having possession asserts ownership thereto. (Rudolfo V. Alonso, 76 by the Regional Trial Court of Davao City which is its coordinate and
Phil. 225, February 28, 1946). Similarly, the primary purpose of an co-equal authority on matters properly brought before it. This issue has
injunction is to preserve the status quo, that is the last actual peaceable been clearly settled in the case of Traders Royal Bank v. Intermediate
uncontested status which preceded the controversy. Appellate Court, (133 SCRA 141 [1984] ) where the Court held:
In the instant case, the private respondents properly instituted Special Generally, the rule that no court has the power to interfere by
Civil Case No. 454 which is a separate and independent action to injunction with the judgments or decrees of a concurrent or
vindicate their claims over the subject properties. If at all the petitioners coordinate jurisdiction having equal power to grant the injunctive
had any doubts as to the veracity of the third-party claims, then the relief sought by injunction, is applied in cases where no third-party
separate action instituted was the proper forum to ventilate such claimant is involved, in order to prevent one court from nullifying
protestations. The action for prohibition was filed on February 5, 1985. the judgment or process of another court of the same rank or
On February 18, 1985 the respondent Sheriffs admitted having seized category, a power which devolves upon the proper appellate court
the disputed properties but assured the court that they will not remove (Arabay Inc. v. Salvadro, 82 SCRA 138). The purpose of the rule is to
them from its jurisdiction nor sell or dispose of the same. avoid conflict of power between different courts of coordinate
From the start, the petitioners were cognizant of the third-party claims jurisdiction and to bring about a harmonious and smooth functioning of
filed with the sheriff and the separate action instituted against them so their proceedings.
they were fully aware of their liabilities to these third-party claimants
who were not even parties to the case sought to be executed.
The rule is clear. If a third party claim is filed, the sheriff is not
bound to proceed with the levy of the property unless he is given by
the judgment creditor an indemnity bond against the claim. The A.M. No. P-92-766 March 27, 1995
judgment creditor, by giving an indemnity bond, assumes the LOURDES SUMALJAG EVANGELISTA,complainant,
direction and control of the sheriffs action; so far as it might vs.
constitute a trespass and thus he becomes, to that extent, the LUISA PENSERGA,respondent.
principal and the sheriff, his agent. This makes him responsible for BIDIN, J.:
the continuance of the wrongful possession and for the sale and
conversion of the goods and for all real damages which the owner FACTS:
might sustain. Herein complainant was the plaintiff in Civil Case No. 2171 of the
Thus, in this case, even if the auction sale has been conducted and MTCC of Ormoc City for unlawful detainer against defendant spouses
the sheriffs certificate of sale was issued in favor of the winning bidder, Jose and Zoila Aguirre. Judgment was rendered by the MTCC of Ormoc
the liability of the judgment creditor and consequently, the purchaser to City in favor of complainant, ordering the defendant spouses to vacate
the real owners of the properties levied and executed is not the subject property (a parcel of land described as Lot 1326 with a house
extinguished. We also take note of the trial court's finding that Sheriffs thereon) and to pay complainant the sum of P8,120.00 in accrued
Escovilla and Meris misled the Davao court as to the ownership of the rentals. On appeal, the decision of the MTCC was affirmed by the RTC
properties they had seized knowing quite well that the petitioners in of Ormoc City. Thereafter, the trial court issued a writ of execution on
Special Civil Case No. 454, the prohibition case, were the actual April 28, 1992. The writ was implemented by herein respondent as
owners of the property. This brings us to the other point raised in this Clerk of Court IV and Ex-Oficio Sheriff of the MTCC of Ormoc City.
petition. On April 30, 1992, the writ was returned by respondent, who stated in
Corollary to the main issue raised is the argument that the Regional Trial her return that the writ was partially satisfied and that the defendants
Court of Butuan City cannot restrain or interfere with the orders issued had already vacated the subject house. In satisfaction of the money
judgment, respondent accepted the sum P100.00 and a promissory note The Commissioner refrained from making a pronouncement in his
from the defendants/judgment debtors promising to pay P100.00 report as to whether the Aguirres' house is inside or outside the property
monthly until the entire amount of P8,120.00 is fully paid. Respondent of complainant. He recommended that a surveyor be appointed at the
alleged that she accepted the sum of money and the promissory note expense of the parties to determine whether the house the Aguirres were
from the defendants because she found that none of the movables found occupying at the time the writ was served is on the land of complainant.
in the house where the defendants were staying belonged to them. This recommendation was not acted upon by Executive Judge Escano.
When respondent turned over the payment to the complainant, the latter The latter in turn submitted a Report to this Court based on the
objected to the manner of implementation of the writ, alleging that the Commissioner's findings and the testimonies of the witnesses of both
same was contrary to the court's judgment, and maintaining that the parties.
defendants were still occupying the subject property. Respondent In his Report, Judge Escano pointed out that respondent misled the court
explained that the defendant showed her documents evidencing their in making it appear in her return that the defendants had already vacated
granddaughter's title to and ownership of the house they were the house subject of the decision when in fact defendants were still
occupying, as well as their son-in-law's ownership of the movables in living in the same house standing on the same lot but already renovated
the said house. by defendant's daughter's common law husband, Raymundo Codilla.
Complainant filed the instant administrative complaint against
respondent for unreasonably refusing to implement the writ of ISSUE:
execution in Civil Case No. 2171 alleging among others that the W/N should have continued to implement the writ of execution
documents referred to by respondent were already considered by despite the presence of an alleged claim of a third person on the
the court in the ejectment case. subject property?
In a resolution dated June 30, 1994, the Court referred the case for
investigation, report and recommendation to the Executive Judge HELD: NO!
Francisco H. Escano, Jr. of the RTC of Ormoc City, Branch 12.
During the hearing and investigation of the case, a dispute arose as to After a careful examination of the record, We find that no valid reasons
whether the property owned by complainant included that presently exist to warrant respondent's inability to implement the writ insofar as
occupied by the Aguirres, the judgment debtors. The parties consented effecting the ejectment of the Aguirres from the disputed house is
to an ocular inspection of the premises in dispute. Judge Escano concerned. Respondent should have continued to implement the writ of
appointed the Clerk of Court of the RTC to act as Commissioner to execution despite the presence of an alleged claim of a third person on
conduct the ocular inspection and submit a report thereon. the subject property pursuant to and as provided for in Sections 13, 15
The ocular inspection revealed that complainant's lot, Lot No. 1326, is and 17 of Rule 39 of the Rules of Court.
alleged by her to be facing the Agua Dulce Street and from there
continues down to the edge of the Malbasag River. The house of the This Court had occasion to rule on the remedies of a third person
Aguirres stands on an old abandoned river bed, which respondent claims whose property was seized by a sheriff to answer for the obligation
is public land. While not contesting complainant's claim that the of a judgment debtor. The third party owner may invoke the
boundary of her property is the Malbasag River, respondent contends supervisory power of the court which authorized such execution.
that said boundary is only up to the Aguirres' house since the river Upon due application by the third person and after summary
flowed through and over the land where the Aguirres' house now stands hearing, the court may command that the property be released from
before it changed its course. No one could say with certainty when the the mistaken levy and restored to the rightful owner or possessor
river changed its course and whether complainant's lot covers the area (Sy v. Discaya, 181 SCRA 382 [1990]).
down to the present location of the Malbasag River.
Another remedy which the third person may avail of is the remedy caution and attention which careful men usually exercise in the
known as terceria as provided in Section 17, Rule 39 of the Rules of management of their affairs. The sheriff, an officer of the court upon
Court. This is done by serving on the officer making the levy an whom the execution of a final judgment depends must be circumspect
affidavit of his title and a copy thereof upon the judgment creditor. and proper in his behavior
According to the said rule, the officer shall not be bound to keep the
property, unless such judgment creditor or his agent, on demand of the
officer, indemnifies the officer against such claim by a bond in a sum
not greater than the value of the property levied on. An action for
damages may be later on brought against the sheriff.
The above mentioned remedies are without prejudice to any proper
action that a third-party claimant may deem suitable, to vindicate
his claim to the property. This proper action is distinct and separate
from that in which the judgment is being enforced (Ong v. Tating, 149
SCRA 265 [1987]). Hence, a person other than the judgment debtor who
claims ownership or right over levied properties is not precluded from
taking other legal remedies to prosecute his claim (Consolidated Bank
and Trust Corp. v. Court of Appeals, 193 SCRA 158 [1991]).
Respondent acted without and in excess of her official duty in securing
such manner of payment from the judgment debtors.
Under the law, respondent was only authorized to do the following: oust G.R. No. L-37051 August 3l, 1977
the Aguirres from the subject property; place complainant in possession ANITA U. LORENZANA,petitioner,
thereof; satisfy back rentals out of the personal properties of the vs.
Aguirres, and if personal properties could not be found, satisfy the POLLY CAYETANO and COURT OF APPEALS,respondents.
money judgment out of the real property of the Aguirres, as required by GUERRERO, J.:
Sections 13 and 15 of Rule 39 of the Rules of Court.
Respondent failed to follow the procedure laid down by the Rules FACTS:
of Court on execution of final judgment. She simply should have filed The records show that 'In 1958, petitioner filled n the Municipal
a return stating why she could not execute the writ of execution Court of Manila ejectment cases for non-payment of rentals against her
instead of entering into the "compromise" with the judgment debtors tenants occupying different stalls in that quonset hut situated in the San
(the Aguirres), which she is not authorized to do. Lazaro Estate with a floor area of 360 square meters. leased by her from
In the present case, respondent's duty was to implement the Writ of the Manila Railroad Company and later from the Bureau of Lands
Execution. His claim that third persons happen to claim the subject together with the use of the land north and south of the Quonset hut with
property does not justify his partial enforcement of the writ. an area of 340 square meters.
From the foregoing, it is very clear that respondent failed to observe the The private respondent, on the other hand, occupied the area north
proper procedures laid down by the Rules on execution of final of the quonset hut which area was also leased by her from the Manila
judgments when the property to be levied upon is claimed by third Railroad Company and subsequently from the Bureau of Lands, and on
persons. Instead, she opted to settle issues raised by the alleged third which her house stood.
persons/owners of the subject property which is beyond her power to do. Hence, the areas occupied by the two principal protagonists are
As a sheriff, respondent is bound to discharge her duties with prudence, adjacent to each other.
The ejectment. cases having been decided by the Municipal Court in lawyer, Atty. Paculdo, and Sheriff Cruz went back and moved the fence
favor of the petitioner, the same were appealed to the Court of First 1 Meter more into the premises of the respondent; that on February 19,
Instance of Manila, Branch I. The Court affirmed the decision of 1960, the respondent filed an ex-parte motion to withdraw the petition
the municipal court and ordered the defendants-tenants to vacate for contempt on the ground that "conferring with Judge Bayona after
the premises leased. Upon refusal of the tenants to vacate the premises, this petition was heard, the petitioner was informed that not being a
the court granted a partial execution of the judgment and on July 20, party to the above-numbered cases, she is like an intruder to act on her
1959, a writ of demolition was issued, specifically commanding the petition.".
Sheriff of Manila "to demolish the premises subject of the above-name On October 1, 1959, the respondent Polly Cayetano filed in the Court of
cases". First Instance of Manila, Civil Case No. 42001 against the petitioner
Thereupon on July 27, 1959, Petitioner together with her counsel, Atty. Anita U. Lorenzana, Atty. Nereo J. Paculdo and Deputy Sheriff Jose L.
Nereo Paculdo and Deputy Sheriff Jose L. Cruz proceeded and entered Cruz for damages with mandatory injunction. The defendants therein
the premises of the respondent and in spite of her protests that she was filed a motion to dismiss, which was opposed by the plaintiff, and the
not a party to the ejectment cases in which the demolition order was Court, Branch XVII, denied on December 19, 1959 the motion to
secured and that her premises was not subject of said ejectment cases, dismiss and the petition for issuance of the writ of preliminary
they destroyed the latter's fence including flower pots trellises and injunction. The defendants filed their answers.
electric installations and carted away the materials thereof and built Under date of March 9, 1962, the Court issued the Decision dismissing
another fence 5 meters into the premises of the respondent, boring holes the complaint of the plaintiff as well as the counterclaim of the
into the cemented garden or patio of her house. defendants Anita U. Lorenzana and Atty. Nereo J. Paculdo for lack of
On August 3, 1959, respondent presented to the court a motion sufficient evidence. A motion for reconsideration was filed by the
to declare petitioner, her counsel and the sheriff guilty of contempt; plaintiff but denied by the Court. Not satisfied with the Decision of the
that they be punished and held liable in damages to the petitioner. Court, Polly Cayetano appealed to the Court of Appeals. The Court of
The presiding judge held the motion in abeyance until the decision Appeals reversed the decision appealed from, and ordered
of the court in the ejectment cases shall have been rendered. "defendant-appellee Lorenzana to restore to appellant the
Acting upon the petitioner's ex-parte motion and urgent motion for possession of the property invaded and occupied by her as shown in
demolition in the two appealed ejectment cases, Civil Case No. 29664 Exh. L-1 to L-4; to put back appellant's fence and other valuable
and Civil Case No. 29665, the court on September 28, 1959 ordered that improvements in their place before the writ of demolition was
"a writ of demolition be issued ordering the Sheriff of Manila or any of served; ordering defendants, Lorenzana and Cruz, to pay jointly
his deputies to demolish any or all improvements erected and existing and severally to the plaintiff-appellant the sum of P5,500.00 as
on the parcel of land subject of the above- entitled cases. which consists actual and moral damages, and pay the costs, except defendant,
of an area of about 700 square meters.". The writ of demolition was Paculdo."
issued by the Sheriff on September 30, 1959. The above Decision is now sought to be reviewed in the instant petition
Upon procurement of this order or demolition, petitioner, together with for certiorari.
her counsel and the deputy sheriff proceeded once more to respondent's
premises on October 1, 1959 and moved the fence where it was illegally ISSUE:
placed by them on July 27, 1959. On the same day, October 1, 1959, W/N the issuance of the writ of demolition by Judge Bayona
respondent filed an urgent motion for the suspension of the execution of could legally effected against the respondent?
the writ of demolition, which motion was denied by the court the next
day, October 2, 1959. HELD: NO!
The records further establish that on November 27, 1959, petitioner, her There is no merit to this contention and We find no error in the
ruling of the Court of Appeals that the writ of demolition could not petitions were filed after the promulgation of the decision in the
be legally effected against the respondent. ejectment cases and while in the process of execution. It is not proper to
It must be noted that respondent was not a party to any of the 12 speak of an intention in a case already terminated by final judgment .
ejectment cases wherein the writs of demolition had been issued; she did Respondent, not being bound thereby, may avail herself of the
not make her appearance in and during the pendency of these ejectment proper action afforded by Section 17, Rule 39 of the Revised Rules
cases. Respondent only went to court to protect her property from of Court which provides the proceedings where property levied
demolition after the judgment in the ejectment cases had become final upon is claimed by a third person, stating as follows:
and executory. Hence, with respect to the judgment in said ejectment ...Tile officer is not liable for damages, for the taking or keeping of
cases, respondent remains a third person to such judgement, which the property to any third-party claimant unless a claim is made by
does not bind her; 1 nor can its writ of execution be enforced against the latter- and unless an action for damages is brought by him
her since she was not afforded her day in court in said ejectment against the officer within one hundred twenty (120) days from the
cases. 2 date of the filing of the bond. But nothing herein contained shall
We also find no merit in the contention of the petitioner that prevent such claimant o any third person ffrom windicating his claim
respondent having been duly heard by the Court, she was not deprived to the property by any proper action...
of her day in court and was accorded the due process of law. Respondent acted within and exercised her right when she filed the
It cannot be said that the constitutional requirements of due process proper action to vindicate her claim afforded to her by Sec. 17, Rule 39
were sufficiently complied with because the respondent had been duly of the Revised Rules of Court, against the instruders or trespassers
heard. Indeed, respondent was heard but simply hearing her did not before the Court of First Instance of Manila, Branch XVII, in Civil Case
fulfill the basic conditions of procedural due process in courts. When No. 42001 for dam with mandatory injunction. If she did not insist on
respondent appeared before the court to protect and preserve her her motion for contempt which the court held in abeyance and was later
property, the Court had not lawfully acquired jurisdiction over the withdrawn by her, if she did not appeal from the order of the court
property of the respondent because the premises of the respondent was denying her motion to suspend the writ of demolition, such failure did
not included in the ejectment cases and the judgment in said cases could not amount to a waiver of her right to pursue the proper action or
not affect her property, much less demolish the same. remedy provided to her by the Rules of Court. It is of no moment that
the requirements of due process is satisfied if the following the respondent did not file a motion to quash the writ of execution or file
conditions are present namely: a petition for relief under Rule 38 of the Revised Rules of Court or file a
(1) There must be a court or tribunal clothed with judicial petition for certiorari and prohibition with a higher court after her
power to hear and determine the matter before it; petition to suspend the writ of demolition had been denied as suggested
(2) jurisdiction must be lawfully acquired over the person of the by petitioner. The law has specifically given her the remedies to
defendant or over the property which is the subject of the vindicate her claim to the property. When the property of one person is
proceedings: unlawfully taken by another, the former has a right of action against the
(3) the defendant must be given an opportunity to be heard; and latter for the recovery of the property or for damages for the taking or
(4) judgment must be rendered upon lawful hearing. retention, and he is entitled to his choice of these two remedies. 7
Intervening as a prejudiced owner of improvements being We find no legal compulsion for respondent to pursue the remedies
wrongly demolished merely to oppose such order of demolition suggested by the petitioner, for the rights of a third party claimant
upon learning that the said order was directed against premises not should not be decided in the action where the third-party claim has been
her own, is not the same as being a party to the suit to the extent of presented, but in a separate action to be instituted by the third person.
being bound by the judgment in the case where such order of
demolition was issued. 5 Furthermore, it must be noted that said No court has power to interfere by injunction with the judgments or
decrees of a court of concurrent or coordinate jurisdiction having equal RIZAL,petitioners,
power to grant the relief sought by injunction. vs.
For this doctrine to apply, the injunction issued by one court must SPS. ANTONIO P. SANTOS and DRA. ROSARIO M. SANTOS
interfere with the judgment or decree issued by another court of equal or and HON. PEDRO C. NAVARRO, Presiding Judge, CFI-Rizal, Br.
coordinate jurisdiction and the relief sought by such injunction must be III,respondents.
one which could be granted by the court which rendered the judgment or W. Espiritu Taganas for petitioners.
issued the decree. Sta. Ana & Fonacier Law Office for private respondents.
Under Section 17 of Rule 39 a third person who claims property levied
upon on execution may vindicate such claim by action. A judgment FACTS:
rendered in his favor - declaring him to be the owner of' the property On May 3, 1976, the spouses Jose Pulido and Iluminada M. Pulido
would not constitute interference with the powers or processes of the mortgaged to Pasay City Savings and Loan Association, Inc. their land
court which rendered the judgment to enforce which the execution was covered by TCT No. 471634, subject of this case, to secure a loan of
levied. If that be so and it is so because the property, being that of a P10,000.00. The said mortgage was registered with the Registry of
stranger, is not subject to levy then an interlocutory order, such as Deeds on the same date and was duly annotated in the title of the
injunction, upon a claim and prima facie showing of ownership by the property.
claimant, cannot be considered as such interference either On May 18, 1976, the said mortgaged land was levied upon by the
The right of a person who claims to be the owner of property levied City Sheriff of Quezon City pursuant to a writ of execution issued by the
upon on execution to file a third-party claim with the sheriff is not then Court of First Instance of Quezon City in Civil Case No. Q-2029
exclusive, and he may file an action to vindicate his claim even if the entitled, "Milagros C. Punzalan vs. Iluminada Manuel-Pulido"; and
judgment creditor files an indemnity bond in favor of the sheriff to eventually, on July 19, 1976, the same was sold to herein petitioner
answer for any damages that may be suffered by the third-party Josefina B. Cenas who was the highest bidder in the execution sale.
claimant. By "action," as stated in the Rule, what is meant is a separate On January 18, 1977, Pasay City Savings and Loan Association, Inc.
and independent action. assigned to petitioner Cenas all its rights, interests, and participation to
With respect to the fourth assignment of error, petitioner's the said mortgage, for the sum of P8,110.00, representing the unpaid
contention appears to be quite tenable in that under See. 14, Rule 39 principal obligation of the Pulidos as of October 6, 1976, including
of the Revised Rules of Court which the Court of Appeals applied, interest due and legal expenses. Thus, petitioner became the purchaser at
the notice required before demolition of the improvements on the the public auction sale of the subject property as well as the assignee of
property subject of the execution, is notice to the judgment debtor, the mortgage constituted thereon.
and not to a stranger or third party to the case like the private On July 19, 1977, herein private respondent Dra. Rosario M. Santos
respondent herein. Nonetheless, the claim that the Court of Appeals redeemed the said property, paying the total sum of P15,718.00, and was
misconstrued the aforecited Rule is as immaterial and accordingly issued by the City Sheriff of Quezon City a Certificate of
inconsequential as the application of this legal provision is Redemption.
superflous and unnecessary for the affirmance of the Court's On April 17, 1977, petitioner Cenas, as the assignee of the mortgage
decision. loan of the Pulidos which remained unpaid, filed with the Office of the
Provincial Sheriff of Rizal, a verified petition for extra-judicial
foreclosure of the mortgage constituted over the subject property.
Accordingly, the subject property was advertised for sale at public
G.R. No. L-49576 November 21, 1991 auction on May 15, 1978.
JOSEFINA B. CENAS and THE PROVINCIAL SHERIFF OF On the other hand, private respondents, spouses Antonio P. Santos and
Dra. Rosario M. Santos, apprised of the impending auction sale of the together with the amount of any assessments or taxes which the
said property, filed an affidavit of adverse claim with the Provincial purchaser may have paid thereon after purchase, and interest on
Sheriff of Rizal, claiming that they had become the absolute owners of such last-named amount at the same rate; and if the purchaser be
the property by virtue of Certificate of Redemption, dated July 20, 1977, also a creditor having a prior lien to that of the redemptioner, other
issued by the City Sheriff of Quezon City; and on May 11, 1978, filed than the judgment under which such purchase was made, the amount
with the respondent court a verified Petition for Prohibition with of such other lien, with interest. . . . .
Preliminary Injunction to enjoin the Provincial Sheriff of Rizal from Under the above-quoted provision, if the purchaser is also a creditor
proceeding with the public auction sale of the property in question. having a prior lien to that of the redemptioner, other than the judgment
Private respondents filed a Motion to Amend Petition together with the under which such purchase was made, the redemptioner has to pay, in
Amended Petition, which was opposed by the petitioners. The trial addition to the prescribed amounts, such other prior lien of the creditor-
court, in its Order of July 17, 1978, denied the motion and ordered the purchaser with interest.
parties to submit simultaneous memoranda. In the instant case, it will be recalled that on May 3,1976, the
The trial court rendered its judgment dated August 28, 1978 in Pulidos mortgaged the subject property to Pasay City Savings and Loan
favor of private respondents, Association, Inc. who, in turn, on January 8, 1977, assigned the same to
The trial court held that the redemption of the subject property petitioner Cenas. Meanwhile, on July 19, 1976, pursuant to the writ of
effected by the herein private respondents, "wipe out and execution issued in Civil Case No. Q-2029 (Petitioner Cenas is not a
extinguished the mortgage executed by the Pulido spouses favor of party in this case No. Q-2029), the subject property was sold to
the Pasay City Savings and Loan Association, Inc." petitioner Cenas, being the highest bidder in the execution sale. On July
Petitioners filed a Motion for Reconsideration but the trial court, in its 19, 1977, private respondent Dra. Rosario M. Santos redeemed the
Order of December 4, 1978, denied the same. subject property. Therefore, there is no question that petitioner Cenas as
Hence, the instant petition. assignee of the mortgage constituted over the subject property, is also a
creditor having a prior (mortgage) lien to that of Dra. Rosario M.
ISSUE: Santos. Accordingly, the acceptance of the redemption amount by
W/Nthe redemption of the questioned property by herein private petitioner Cenas, without demanding payment of her prior lien the
respondents wiped out and extinguished the pre-existing mortgage mortgage obligation of the Pulidos cannot wipe out and extinguish
obligation of the judgment debtor, Iluminada M. Pulido for the security said mortgage obligation. The mortgage directly and immediately
of which (mortgage debt) the subject property had been encumbered. subjects the property upon which it is imposed, whoever the possessor
may be, to the fulfillment of the obligation for whose security it was
HELD: NO! constituted (Art. 2126, Civil Code). Otherwise stated, a mortgage
The answer is in the negative. creates a real right which is enforceable against the whole world. Hence,
Section 30, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court, provides for the time, even if the mortgaged property is sold (Art. 2128) or its possession
manner and the amount to be paid to redeem a sold by virtue of a transferred to another (Art. 2129), the property remains subject to the
writ of execution. Pertinent portion reads: fulfillment of the obligation for whose security it was constituted.
Sec. 30. Time and manner of, and amounts payable on, successive It will be noted that Rule 39 of the Rules of Court is silent as to the
redemptions. Notice to be given and filed. The judgment debtor, or effect of the acceptance by the purchaser, who is also a creditor,
redemptioner, may redeem the property from the purchaser, at any having a prior lien to that of the redemptioner, of the redemption
time within twelve (12) months after the sale, on paying the amount, without demanding payment of her prior lien. Neither does it
purchaser the amount of his purchase, with one per centumper provide whether or not the redemption of the property sold in
month interest thereon in addition, up to the time of redemption, execution sale freed the redeemed property from prior liens. However,
where the prior lien consists of a mortgage constituted on the property
redeemed, as in the case at bar, such redemption does not extinguish
the mortgage (Art. 2126). Furthermore, a mortgage previously G.R. No. L-53798 November 8, 1988
registered, like in the instant case, cannot be prejudiced by any ALBERTO C. ROXAS and NENITA DE GUIA,petitioners,
subsequent lien or encumbrance annotated at the back of the certificate vs.
of title. MARINA BUAN, COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE OF
Moreover, it must be stressed that private respondents redeemed the ZAMBALES, BRANCH 1 AND THE PROVINCIAL SHERIFF OF
property in question as "successor in interest" of the judgment debtor, ZAMBALES THRU HIS DEPUTY, ATILANO G.
and as such are deemed subrogated to the rights and obligations of the NANQUIL,respondents.
judgment debtor and are bound by exactly the same condition relative to
the redemption of the subject property that bound the latter as debtor FACTS:
and mortgagor (Sy vs. Court of Appeals, 172 SCRA 125 [1989]; citing On August 19, 1975, Arcadio Valentin constituted a Deed of Real
the case of Gorospe vs. Santos, G.R. No. L-30079, January 30, 1976, 69 Estate Mortgage on a two-storey residential house and lot in favor of
SCRA 191). Private respondents, by stepping in the judgment private respondent, Marina Buan, to secure the loan of P78,328.08
debtor's shoes, had the obligation to pay the mortgage debt, granted by the latter to the former.
otherwise, the debt would and could be enforced against the Upon failure of Valentin to pay the loan on its maturity date, Buan
property mortgaged (Tambunting vs. Rehabilitation Finance applied for an extrajudicial foreclosure of mortgage which was duly
Corporation, 176 SCRA 493 [1989]). published and advertised for public auction by Olongapo City Sheriff
Ramon Y. Pardo on September 29, 1977. Private respondent was the
winning bidder in the auction sale and the City Sheriff issued a
Certificate of Sale duly registered with the Office of the Register of
Deeds on October 26, 1977. Valentin had a period of one (1) year from
the date of registration within which to redeem the mortgaged
properties. The period for the redemption of the property in question
having expired without the property being redeemed by Valentin, a Final
Bill of Sale was thereafter issued by the City Sheriff or, November 3,
1978.
After Valentin failed to deliver possession of the properties, Buan filed
before the Court of First Instance of Zambales a "Petition for the
Issuance of a Writ of Possession." As this was not contested, a decision
was rendered by respondent court on June 19, 1979
A writ of possession addressed to the Provincial Sheriff of Zambales
was issued on August 22, 1979. The return on the writ as embodied in
the Sheriff's Report dated August 28, 1979 showed that when Deputy
Sheriff Atilano G. Nanquil tried to execute the writ of possession, he
found that petitioners were occupying the premises and refused to
vacate the same, on the alleged claim of Atty. Roxas that he bought the
house and lot in question from Valentin in the amount of P100,00.00.
Atty. Roxas also told Sheriff Nanquil that he introduced improvements
consisting of one bungalow house and one store and that Valentin is no Under Sec. 35, Rule 39 of the Revised Rules of Court, which was
longer residing in the premises. made applicable to the extrajudicial foreclosure of real estate mortgages
In view of the petitioners' refusal to abide by the writ of possession, by Sec. 6 Act No. 3135, the possession of the mortgaged property
private respondent filed on August 30, 1979 a "Motion for Contempt" may be awarded to a purchaser in extrajudicial foreclosures "unless
against Alberto Roxas and Nenita de Guia. On September 12, 1979, the a third party is actually holding the property adversely to the judgment
petitioners through counsel filed with the respondent court their answer debtor."
thereto arguing that they cannot be held guilty of contempt of court As explained by the Court in IFC Service Leasing and Acceptance
because they were not made parties to the main action. Corp. v. Nera,
On January 16, 1980, the respondent trial court, finding merit in ... The applicable provision of Act No. 3135 is Section 6 which provides
petitioners' position that they could not be declared in contempt. that, in cases in which an extrajudicial sale is made, "redemption shall
The respondents Atty. Alberto Roxas and Mrs. Nenita de Guia are, be governed by the provisions of sections four hundred and sixty-four to
however, ordered to immediately vacate the disputed house and lot in four hundred and sixty-six, inclusive, of the Code of Civil Procedure in
question within a period of fifteen (15) days from receipt of this Order so far as these are not inconsistent with the provisions of this Act."
under pain of contempt of Court. Sections 464-466 of the Code of Civil Procedure were superseded by
Disagreeing with the portion of the order directing them to vacate the Sections 25-27 and Section 31 of Rule 39 of the Rules of Court
property, petitioners filed a Motion for Reconsideration on January 28, which in turn were replaced by Sections 29-31 and Section 35 of
1980. However, the respondent court, denied their motion on February Rule 39 of the Revised Rules of Court. Section 35 of the Revised
28, 1980. Rules of Court expressly states that "If no redemption be made within
Thus, petitioners filed the instant petition for certiorari and prohibition twelve (12) months after the sale, the purchaser, or his assignee, is
on April 12, 1979. This Court issued a Temporary Restraining Order on entitled to a conveyance and possession of the property ..." The
May 19, 1980. possession of the property shall be given to the purchaser or last
The petitioners maintain that the respondent court gravely abused its redemptioner by the officer unless a party is actually holding the
discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction in issuing the order property adversely to the judgment debtor.
complained of, upon the theory that it was predicated upon a writ of Assuming this to be true, it is readily apparent that Roxas holds
possession which was ineffective as against them, being third parties. title to and possesses the property as Valentin's transferee. Any right
Thus, the order is null and void. They also insist that the private he has to the property is necessarily derived from that of Valentin.
respondent should file an independent action to recover the property, As transferee, he steps into the latter's shoes. Thus, in the instant
otherwise, there will be a violation of due process of law if they are not case, considering that the property had already been sold at public
given their day in court to prove their adverse claim. auction pursuant to an extrajudicial foreclosure, the only interest
that may be transferred by Valentin to Roxas is the right to redeem
ISSUE: it within the period prescribed by law. Roxas is therefore the
W/N respondent court gravely abused its discretion amounting successor-in-interest of Valentin, to whom the latter had conveyed
to lack of jurisdiction in issuing the order complained of, upon the his interest in the property for the purpose of redemption.
theory that it was predicated upon a writ of possession which was Consequently, Roxas' occupancy of the property cannot be considered
ineffective as against the petitioners, being third parties? adverse to Valentin.
It does not matter that petitioner Roxas was not specifically named
HELD: NO! in the writ of possession, as he merely stepped into the shoes of
The Court finds petitioners' contention without any legal or factual Valentin, being the latter's successor-in-interest. On the other hand,
basis. petitioner de Guia was occupying the house as Roxas' alleged tenant.
Moreover, respondent court's decision granting private respondent ... Witness testified that sometime in 1980, National Power Corporation
Buan's petition for the issuance of a writ of possession ordered the and defendant Batong Buhay Gold Mines Inc. entered into an
Provincial Sheriff of Zambales or any of his deputies to remove Valentin agreement, whereby at that time Batong Buhay Gold Mines Inc. needed
or any person claiming interest under him" from the property. the supply of electricity from NPC, however, at that time there was no
Undeniably, petitioners fell under this category. transmission lines connecting the mining site to the lines of NPC and it
As petitioners have failed to establish that grave abuse of discretion, as was not yet within the program of activities of NPC to construct those
would warrant the issuance of the writ of certiorari and prohibition lines. Thus, Batong Buhay ... offered to finance the construction of the
prayed for, tainted the issuance of the assailed order, the petition must line which they did . Under that arrangement, NPC is going to reimburse
fail. Batong Buhay Gold Mines Inc. the amount that they have spent for the
G.R. No. 87140 September 7, 1989 construction of the line by crediting 25% of defendant's monthly electric
NATIONAL POWER CORPORATION,petitioner, power bills until the actual cost shall have been fully paid and without
vs. interest.
HON. ARSENIO M. GONONG, Judge, RTC, Manila, Br. 8, (T)he transmission lines were in fact erected and installed by
DOMINADOR B. ADRIANO, Deputy Sheriff, ALLIED CONTROL defendant and NPC supplied electric power to the mining site and as
& ELECTRIC CORPORATION, and PHILIPPINE NATIONAL agreed upon NPC deducted from the monthly power bills of defendant
BANK,respondents. the sums equivalent to 25% thereof, as shown graphically in Exh. 'A-2-
NARVASA, J.: Motion' from October 15, 1983 to October 11, 1985. As reflected in
Exh. 'A-Motion' an amount of P 51,745,319.15 was due to defendant as
FACTS: of December 31, 1982 and after deducting the 25%, a balance of
The case had been instituted by Allied Control and Electric P37,532,763.17 was left due to defendant. However, ... when defendant
Corporation (hereafter, simply ACEC) to recover a sum of money from ceased operation in 1985 it left unpaid electric power bills in the amount
Batong Buhay Gold Mines, Inc. (hereafter, BBGMI). The judgment of P15,941,625.35 plus interest of P2,643,514.76 as of August, 1986 or
ordered BBGMI to pay ACEC its indebtedness of P 264,401.00 interest in the total amount of P18,585,140.11; deduct this from the
thereon at the rate of 16% per annum and "penalty charge" at 3% per P37,532,763.17 and a balance of P18,947.623.06 was left due to
month beginning May 15, 1985, and the further sum of P 66,100.00 defendant but Mr. Vinoya further testified that it is not due to Batong
equivalent to 25% of the overdue obligation as attorney's fees. The Buhay Gold Mines, Inc. but a balance of the advances made by Batong
judgment having become final, execution was ordered by the Court at Buhay Gold Mines Inc. in the construction of the power lines.
ACEC's instance on December 18, 1987. On the strength of this testimony -- which included, it must be stressed,
Evidently the attempt at execution failed. Hence, ACEC filed on August a denial by the witness that the amount of P18,947,623.06 was due to
19, 1988 an "Ex-Parte Motion for Examination of Debtor of Judgment BBGMI, this being "but a balance of the advances made by ... (the
Debtor," alleging that the National Power Corporation (NPC) was a latter) in the construction of the power lines respondent Judge resolved
debtor of BBGMI and praying that certain officials of the NPC be to direct the NPC to pay ACEC "its judgment rendered in October
required to appear before the Court and examined regarding its debt to 8,1987 out of the remaining credit NPC holds in favor of defendant,"
BBGMI. This was granted by respondent Judge, who scheduled the and ordered his deputy sheriff (respondent Adriano) "to garnish and
examination 49 on September 28, 1988 and on posterior dates." The attach the said credit due Batong Buhay Gold Mines, Inc." In
Manager of NPCs General Accounts Division, Ariel Vinoya, appeared in justification His Honor invoked Section 15, Rule 39 of the Rules of
response to subpoena and was duly examined on oath. The gist of his Court, authorizing the sheriff charged with execution of a money
testimony is set out in respondent Judge's Order of November 15,1988 2 judgment to levy on "debts" and "credits" 3 in addition to "real
viz: property, stocks, shares, .. and other personal property, or any
interest in either real or personal property," pointing out, too, that affidavit of a party or otherwise, to the satisfaction of the judge, that
the NPC official, Vinoya, had later admitted that "this amount of a person, corporation, or other legal entity has property of such
P18,947,623.06 is due to defendant Batong Buhay Gold Mines Inc." judgment debtor, or is indebted to him, the judge may, by an order,
Sheriff Adriano accordingly garnished such of the funds of the NPC on require such person, corporation or other legal entity, or any officer
deposit at the Philippine National Bank, Escolta, Manila, as were or member thereof, to appear before the judge, or a commissioner
"sufficient to cover the sum" required to be paid by respondent Judge's appointed by him, at a time a place within the province in which the
Decision of October 8, 1987. order is served, to answer concerning the same. The service of an
Hence, the present action of certiorari instituted by NPC praying order shall bind all credits due the judgment debtor and all money
for "the setting aside of respondent Judge's Order dated November 15, and property of the judgment debtor in the possession or in the
1988 ..and commanding respondent to desist from executing the writ of control of such person, corporation, or legal entity from the time of
garnishment issued by respondent Sheriff in Civil Case No. 87-39301." service; and the judgment may also require notice of such
proceedings to be given to any party to the action in such manner as
ISSUE: he may deem proper.
W/N respondent Judge correctly ordered the respondent to It was thus clearly within respondent Judge's prerogative to require
desist from executing the writ of garnishment issued by respondent the appearance, by subpoena, of officials of the NPC to appear and be
Sheriff? questioned regarding the latter's claimed indebtedness to the judgment
debtor, BBGMI. But just as clearly, it was not within His Honor's power
HELD: NO! to order the payment by the alleged debtor of the judgment debtor to
pay the claimed debt without indubitable admission or conclusive proof
For the reasons shortly to be explained, the Court decreed on March that the debt existed and was demandable. The applicable provision is
15, 1989 the issuance of a temporary restraining order "enjoining the not, as was respondent Judge's erroneous notion, Section 15 of Rule
respondents from enforcing and/or implementing the (challenged) 39, which merely states the procedure that the sheriff should follow
Order," and a preliminary mandatory injunction "commanding in the enforcement of a money judgment against the judgment
respondent Deputy Sheriff Dominador B. Adriano and/or Allied Control debtor himself, i.e., to levy on property of the judgment debtor,
and Electric Corporation to RETURN to respondent Philippine National including "debts" or "credits," and sell the same, etc., but which
Bank the amount of P828,806.20 ... debited from petitioner's ... Account obviously does not at all treat of the propriety and requisites for
SA No. 010-572194-3." The Court subsequently gave due course to collecting such "debts" or "credits" from third persons. The relevant
the petition and required the parties to submit memoranda. Said provisions are those embodied in Sections 42 and 45 of the same Rule
memoranda have since been received. 39.
The Court rules that in authorizing the execution of the judgment in
Civil Case No. 87-39301 against l stranger to the action, on the theory
that the latter was a "debtor of the judgment debtor," respondent Judge Section 42 reads as follows:
was guilty of grave abuse of discretion tantamount to lack or excess of SEC. 42. Order for application of property and income in satisfaction
jurisdiction. of judgement.- The judge may order any property of the judgment
It is true that Rule 39 empowers a Court to order the examination debtor, or money due him, not exempt from execution, in the hands
of a judgment debtor. This is clear from Section 39 of the rule: of either himself or other person, or of a corporation or other legal
SEC. 39. Examination of debtor of judgment debtor.- After an entity, to be applied to the satisfaction of the judgment, subject to
execution against the property of a judgment debtor has been any prior rights over such property, ....
returned unsatisfied in whole or in part, and upon proof, by
Section 45, on the other hand, states the following: [G.R. No. 132497. November 16, 1999]
SEC. 45. Proceedings when in debtedness denied or another person LUIS MIGUEL YSMAEL and JOHANN C.F. KASTEN V,
claims the property. - If it appears that a person or corporation, petitioners vs. COURT OF APPEALS and Spouses PACIFICO
alleged to have property of the judgment debtor or to be indebted to LEJANO and ANASTACIA LEJANO, respondents.
him claims an interest in the property adverse to him or denies the D EC I S I O N
debt, the court or judge may authorize, by an order made to that MENDOZA, J.:
effect, the judgment creditor to institute an action against such
person or cor poration for the recovery of such interest or debt, FACTS:
forbid a transfer or other disposition of such interest or debt until Petitioners brought suit for sum of money against private
an action can be commenced and prosecuted to judgment, and may respondents in the then Court of First Instance of Rizal, Branch 29, and
punish disobedience of such order as for contempt. Such order may obtained judgment in their favor on October 2, 1980.
be modified or vacated by the judge granting the same, or by the The decision remained unexecuted for a long time as petitioners
court in which the action is brought at anytime, upon such terms as were unable to locate property belonging to private respondents.
may be just. However, in 1989, before the right of action upon the judgment could
.. the only power of the court in proceedings supplemental to prescribe, petitioners filed a case for the revival of the judgment in the
execution is to make an order authorizing the creditor to sue in the Regional Trial Court, Branch 70, Pasig City, which on March 14, 1990,
proper court to recover an indebtedness due to the judgment debtor. The rendered a decision reviving the judgment in Civil Case No. 3039.
court has no jurisdiction to try summarily the question whether the third Private respondents appealed to the Court of Appeals, but their appeal
party served with notice of execution and levy is indebted to defendant was dismissed in a resolution dated October 8, 1992 of the appellate
when such indebtedness is denied. To make an order in relation to court. Private respondents brought the matter to this Court which
property which the garnishee claimed to own in his own right, requiring likewise dismissed private respondents petition on January 11, 1993.
its application in satisfaction of judgment of another, would be to Accordingly, on September 9, 1993, the trial court issued a writ of
deprive the garnishee of property upon summary proceeding and execution, as a result of which the rights, interests, and participation of
without due process of law. private respondents in several parcels of lands, covered by TCT Nos. T-
The only disposition that said Court could legitimately have 47699, T-50009, T-54010, T-50011, T-50391, T-50392, T-50393, T-
made in the premises, was that indicated in Section 46 of Rule 39, 50394, and 16274 of the Register of Deeds of Batangas, were levied on
above quoted, i.e., authorize ACEC, as judgment creditor, to bring a execution.On March 15, 1995, private respondents rights, interests, and
separate action against NPC, as alleged debtor of BBGMI, the participation in said lands were sold at public auction to
judgment debtor, for establishment by satisfactory proof of the petitioners,represented by their counsel of record Atty. Fernando R.
postulated indebtedness of NPC to BBGMI, and consequent Arguelles, Jr., who offered the highest bid for P700,000.00. The sale to
payment to it ACEC of so much of that indebtedness as corresponds petitioners was registered in the Office of the Register of Deeds of
to the amount of its judgment. Nasugbu, Batangas on July 25, 1995. The certificate of sale stated in
pertinent parts:
The periodof redemptionof the real properties described above will
expire one (1) year from and after the date of registration of this
Certificate of Sale.
It is hereby required of said highest bidder, that a statement of any
amount of assessment or taxes which may have been paid on account of
SECOND DIVISION this purchase and such other liens chargeable to the redemptioners, with
PROOF hereof, be submitted within thirty (30) days immediately further argue that they cannot be faulted for their failure to give
preceding the expiration of the period of redemption, furnishing the defendants a statement of the total amount of the redemption price since
defendants a copy thereof, as required by law, for purposes of that is so provided in Sec. 30, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court (Rejoinder,
computing the actual amount payable by the defendants in case of par. C).Be that as it may, since the aforecited section in providing for the
redemption. amount payable to the purchaser (herein plaintiffs) by way of
On July 16, 1996, private respondents counsel wrote to redemption speaks of the amount of his (their) purchase, with one per
petitioners counsel Atty. Fernando R. Arguelles, Jr. and Deputy centum per month interest thereon in addition, up to the time of the
Sheriff Sofronio M. Villarin, informing them that private redemption,
respondents were exercising their right of redemption. Private togetherwiththeamountofanyassessmentsortaxeswhichthepurchasermayh
respondents asked petitioners for a computation of the redemption price. avepaidthereonafterpurchase,andinterestonsuchlast-
The twelve-month period of redemption expired on July 19, 1996. namedamountatthesamerate; x x x (underlining supplied), there would
Although the certificate of sale was registered on July 25, 1995, the appear to be a need for the judgment debtor or redemptioner to inquire
twelve-month period ended on July 19, 1996, considering that the latter as to the total amount of redemption money to be paid and, therefore, it
year was a leap year.However, thinking that the last day of the period of would not be proper to argue that the plaintiffs or the Sheriff to whom
redemption was on July 25, 1996, private respondent Pacifico Lejano the aforestated letter was addressed could not be faulted for not
went to the office of Atty. Arguelles on said date and tendered to him answering the query.Thus the delay in paying the correct amount of the
two cashiers checks drawn on Far East Bank and Trust Company in the redemption price could not be solely attributed to the defendants since
total amount of P784,000.00.One check was for P700,000.00, the plaintiffs or the Sheriff are partly to blame.At least the defendants
representing the purchase price at the execution sale, and another was have shown their good faith in trying to settle the redemption price
for P84,000.00, representing 1% interest per month on the purchase within the period provided by law which was simply ignored by the
price from July 25, 1995 to July 25, 1996.The checks came with a letter, plaintiffs who appeared to profit more if the properties are not redeemed
dated July 25, 1996, giving notice of private respondents intention to by reason of the higher value of said properties.
exercise their right of redemption.Atty. Arguelles, however, refused to As to the other argument that there was no valid tender of payment of
accept the payment. In a note to private respondent Pacifico Lejano, the redemption price because the cashiers checks are not considered
Atty. Arguelles claimed he had no authority to receive payment for legal tender, suffice it to state that in Ramon Tan v. Court of Appeals, et
petitioner Luis Ysmael. al., (G.R. No. 100555, December 20, 1944), the Supreme Court ruled:
Accordingly, private respondent called up petitioner Ysmaels office, but Now, what was presented for deposit in the instant case was not just
he was informed that petitioner Ysmael was not in, and it was not an ordinary check but a cashiers check payable to the depositor himself.
known when he would return.Unable to make a tender of payment, A cashiers check is a primary obligation of the issuing bank and
private respondent filed the next day, July 26, 1996, a motion for accepted in advance by its mere issuance.By its very nature, a cashiers
consignation in the trial court.Petitioners opposed the motion, arguing check is a banks order to pay drawn upon itself, committing in effect its
that the period of redemption had already expired and that there was no total resources, integrity and honor behind the check.A cashiers check
valid tender of payment because the cashiers checks were insufficient to by its peculiar character and general use in the commercial world is
cover the total redemption price. regarded substantially to be as good as the money which it represents. . .
In the order dated October 21, 1996, the trial court granted .
private respondents motion for consignation, Anent the objection that the total amount covered by the two cashiers
This was well within the redemption period which expired on July 19, checks falls short of the correct amount of the redemption price tendered
1996 per computation of the period made by the plaintiffs. Plaintiffs or by the defendants, the same should be rectified by requiring them to pay
the Sheriff never bothered to answer the letter.In this regard, plaintiffs the right amount.
Petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration.As their motion Nasugbu, Batangas on July 25, 1995.Consequently, the right of
was denied, they filed a petition for certiorari and mandamus in the redemption should have been exercised on or before July 19, 1996,
Court of Appeals.However, the appellate court dismissed their the 360th day after July 25, 1995 considering that 1996 was a leap
petition on January 26, 1998. year.
Hence, this petition for review on certiorari. However, apparently equating the phrase twelve (12) months in
Rule 39, 30 with one year of 365 days, private respondents reckoned
ISSUE: the period of redemption as ending on July 25, 1996 since the sale
W/N the petitioner is still entitled for redemption? was registered on July 25, 1995.Indeed, the certificate of sale stated
that the period of redemption . . . will expire one (1) year from and after
HELD: YES! the date of registration. . .There was thus an honest mistake on a
First.Rule 39, 30 of the 1964 Rules of Court provided that within question of law. Rule 39, 28 of the 1997 Rule of Civil Procedure now
twelve months after the sale, the judgment debtor may redeem the provides that the period of redemption shall be at any time within
property sold at public auction, thus: one (1) year from the date of registration of the certificate of sale, so
Sec. that the period is now to be understood as composed of 365
30.Timeandmannerof,andamountspayableon,successiveredemptions.Not days.Neither petitioners nor the sheriff corrected private respondents
icetobegivenandfiled. - The judgment debtor, or redemptioner, may mistaken impression, leading the latter to believe that July 25, 1996 was
redeem the property from the purchaser, at any time within twelve (12) indeed the last day of the period of redemption.
months after the sale, on paying the purchaser the amount of his Moreover, private respondents on July 16, 1996 and July 17, 1996,
purchase, with one per centum per month interest thereof in addition, up i.e.,within 12-month period as provided in Rule 39, 30 of the former
to the time of redemption, together with the amount of any assessments Rules of Court, gave notice to Deputy Sheriff Sofronio and petitioners
or taxes which the purchaser may have paid thereon after purchase, and counsel of their intention to redeem the lands sold. In the same letter,
interest on such last named amount at the same rate. . . private respondents requested a statement of the redemption price which
Written notice of any redemption must be given to the officer who petitioners and the deputy sheriff chose to ignore.When private
made the sale and a duplicate filed with the registrar of deeds of the respondent Lejanos tender of payment was refused by Atty. Arguelles,
province, and if any assessments or taxes are paid by the redemptioner Jr., private respondents consigned payment in the trial court on July 26,
or if he has or acquires any lien other than that upon which the 1996. The combination of these circumstances makes it inequitable to
redemption was made, notice thereof must in like manner be given to rule that private respondents lost the right of redemption by his delay of
the officer and filed with the registrar of deeds; if such notice be not six days to redeem the property. Both the trial court and the Court of
filed, the property may be redeemed without paying such assessments, Appeals correctly held that private respondents had tried in good
taxes, or liens. faith to exercise their right of redemption.As the appellate court
Under Art. 13 of the Civil Code, a month, unless designated by name, is stated:
understood to be equivalent to 30 days, while a year is understood to be . . .such special circumstances exist, namely: (1) the highest bidders
of 365 days.Thus, the rulings of this Court under the 1964 Rules stated (petitioners) did not submit a statement of any amount of assessment or
that the 12-month period of redemption under Rule 39, 30 is equivalent taxes which may have been paid on account of their purchase to be
to 360 days counted from the registration of the certificate of sale. submitted within 30 days immediately preceding the expiration of the
Within the said period, the redemptioner must pay the purchaser the full period of redemption, furnishing the defendants (private respondents) a
amount of the redemption price, otherwise the redemption is ineffectual. copy thereof, as directed in the certificate of sale; (2) despite receipt of
In the instant case, there is no question that the certificate of the letters from private respondents, petitioners and deputy sheriff
sale was registered in the Office of the Register of Deeds of Villarin never made a reply; (3) notwithstanding that petitioners counsel
was their agent in the auction sale in which the properties in question himself to:
were sold to petitioners, said counsel, Atty. Fernando R. Arguelles, Jr., (1) Pay the respondent the amount of One Million Pesos (P1,000,000)
when private respondents wanted to exercise their right of redemption representing her entire share in their conjugal partnership of gains, Five
went into technicalities by saying his authority was limited to just the Hundred Thousand (P500,000) of which is payable upon signing of the
bidding. compromise agreement while the remaining balance of Five Hundred
Thousand (P500,000) must be paid within one (1) year from the
execution of the compromise agreement.
(2) Establish a trust fund in the amount of Three Million Pesos
(P3,000,000) in favor of his children Antonio Amelo and Ana Maria Pia
Isabel within sixty (60) days from the approval of the compromise
agreement.
(3) Obtain an educational plan or an investment plan to cover tuition and
other matriculation fees for the college education of Ana Maria Pia
Isabel within one (1) year from the approval of the compromise
agreement.
Since petitioner failed to comply with his obligations under the
compromise agreement despite the lapse of the periods provided therein,
[G.R. No. 156829. June 8, 2004] respondent Teresa filed a motion for the execution of the judgment. The
RAMON D. MONTENEGRO, petitioner, vs.MA. TERESA L. trial court granted the motion and issued a writ of execution on 15
MONTENEGRO, for herself and as the mother and natural February 1999.
guardian of the minors, ANTONIO AMELO and ANA MARIA PIA A second writ of execution and a notice of garnishment, issued by the
ISABEL, both surnamed MONTENEGRO, respondents. trial court on 21 May 2001 and on 28 May 2001, respectively, were
DECISION returned unsatisfied.
DAVIDE, JR., C.J.: In several conferences called by the trial court, petitioner admitted his
failure to comply with his obligations under the compromise agreement
FACTS: but alleged that he was no longer in a position to do so as he was already
On 14 June 1994, respondent Ma. Teresa V. Lizares-Montenegro, insolvent. In the conference held on 6 March 2002, respondent Teresa
for herself and as mother and guardian of her two minor children manifested that she would file a motion for examination of petitioner as
Antonio Amelo and Ana Maria Pia Isabel, filed with the trial court judgment obligor. The trial court gave her 30 days within which to file
below a complaint for support against her husband, herein petitioner the appropriate motion and informed petitioner that he would have 30
Ramon D. Montenegro. The case was docketed as Civil Case No. 94- days to file a comment or reply to the motion.
8467. Four years after the filing of the complaint, petitioner and On 14 March 2002, respondent Teresa filed a motion to examine
respondent Teresa executed a compromise agreement which was petitioner as judgment obligor under Sections 36 and 38 of Rule 39
submitted to the trial court for approval on 13 October 1998. of the Rules of Court. In her motion, she alleged that there is an
On the same date, the trial court rendered a Decision approving the urgency for the examination to be conducted at the earliest time since
compromise agreement and ordering the parties to comply with it. The petitioner was about to migrate to Canada. Acting on the said motion,
parties did not appeal from the Decision; hence, it became final and the trial court issued on 19 March 2002 an Order granting the motion for
executory. examination of petitioner as judgment obligor and setting his
Under the terms of the compromise agreement, petitioner obligated examination on 22 March 2002. On the same day the motion for
examination was granted, petitioner filed with the court a Manifestation Teresa also caused the service of the subpoena at
alleging that the grant of the motion for examination was premature 8051 Estrella Avenue, San Antonio
because he still would have 30 days from receipt of the motion, or until Village, MakatiCity where petitioner is allegedly residing.
April 14, 2002, within which to file a comment or opposition thereto as The 3 July 2002 hearing did not push through as the petitioner filed a
agreed upon during the conference on 6 March 2002. Motion to Quash Subpoena Ad Testificandum on 28 June 2002. In the
On 22 March 2002, neither petitioner nor his counsel appeared for the motion, petitioner admitted that 8051 Estrella Avenue, San Antonio
scheduled hearing. On that date, the trial court issued an order re- Village, MakatiCity, is his present address but alleged that Makati City
scheduling the hearing to 10 April 2002 and requiring the petitioner to is more than 100 kilometers away from Bacolod City; thus, he may not
explain why he should not be held in contempt of court for disobeying be compelled by subpoena to attend the 3 July 2002 hearing in Bacolod
the 19 March 2002 Order. City. In this motion, petitioner did not allege that he was still in Canada.
On 26 March 2002, petitioner filed a Compliance with Motion to Re- In its Order of 2 September 2002, the trial court denied the Motion to
schedule Proceedings. He explained that he did not attend the 22 March Quash Subpoena Ad Testificandum, but re-scheduled the hearing to 23
2002 hearing because he was under the impression that he still had 30 October 2002. On 22 October 2002, the day before the scheduled
days from the filing of the motion to examine him as judgment obligor hearing, petitioner filed a manifestation informing the trial court that he
within which to respond to the motion; besides, his counsel was not was still in Canada and would not be able to attend the 23 October 2002
available on 22 March 2002 due to previously scheduled hearings. hearing; however, he would be in Manila on the first week of December
At the hearing on 4 April 2002 of the Compliance with Motion to Re- 2002. He moved that the hearing be re-scheduled on 9 December 2002.
schedule Proceedings, counsel for petitioner manifested that his client The manifestation, however, did not contain a notice of hearing.
already left for Canada on 26 March 2002 and will be unable to attend On 23 October 2002, petitioner did not appear at the scheduled hearing,
the 10 April 2002 hearing, and that petitioner would be available for prompting the trial court to issue an order citing him in contempt of
examination on the last week of July or first week of August 2002. court.
Counsel prayed that the hearing be thus reset accordingly. The trial court In its Order of 8 November 2002, the trial court declared
denied the motion and informed the parties that the hearing scheduled petitioner in contempt of court under Section 38 of Rule 39 of the
on 10 April 2002 will proceed as scheduled. Rules of Court and imposed on him the penalty of imprisonment for
On 5 April 2002, petitioner filed a manifestation reiterating that he three months and ordered him to pay a fine of P20,000. His motion
would be unable to attend the 10 April 2002 hearing because he was for reconsideration of the Order having been denied by the trial
already in Canada. Counsel for petitioner likewise manifested that he court in its Order of 3 January 2003, petitioner filed the petition in
would also be unavailable on the said date because he would be in the case at bar.
Manila to attend to his other cases.
On 17 June 2002, the trial court issued an Order directing the petitioner ISSUE:
to show cause why he should not held in contempt of court for failure to W/N the trial court erred in holding the petitioner guilty of
appear on the 10 April 2002 hearing for his examination as judgment indirect contempt?
obligor. In his Compliance and Explanation filed on 28 June 2002,
petitioner alleged that he was unable to attend the 10 April 2002 hearing HELD: NO!
because he was in Canada and had no intention to abscond from his We rule in the negative.
obligation. The totality of petitioners acts clearly indicated a deliberate and
On 13 June 2002, the trial court issued an Order setting the case for the unjustified refusal to be examined as a judgment obligor at the time the
examination of the petitioner on 3 July 2002. A subpoena was issued examination was scheduled for hearing by the trial court. His acts
against the petitioner and served at his address of record.Respondent tended to degrade the authority and respect for court processes and
impaired the judiciary's duty to deliver and administer justice. Petitioner custody of an officer by virtue of an order or process of a court held
tried to impose his will on the trial court. by him.
Contempt of court involves the doing of an act, or the failure to do an In relation to the foregoing, Section 38 of Rule 39 of the Rules of
act, in such a manner as to create an affront to the court and the Court also provides that a party or other person may be compelled, by
sovereign dignity with which it is clothed. It is defined as disobedience an order or subpoena, to attend before the court or commissioner to
to the court by acting in opposition to its authority, justice and dignity. testify as provided in the two preceding sections, and upon failure to
The power to punish contempt is inherent in all courts, because it is obey such order or subpoena or to be sworn, or to answer as a witness
essential to the preservation of order in judicial proceedings, and to the or to subscribe his deposition, may be punished for contempt as in other
enforcement of judgments, orders and mandates of the courts; and, cases. This provision relates specifically to Section 3(b) of Rule 71 of
consequently, to the due administration of justice. the Rules of Court.
The Rules of Court penalizes two types of contempt, namely, direct Indirect contempt may either be initiated (1) motu proprio by the court
contempt and indirect contempt. Direct contempt is committed in the by issuing an order or any other formal charge requiring the respondent
presence of or so near a court as to obstruct or interrupt the proceedings to show cause why he should not be punished for contempt or (2) by the
before the same, and includes disrespect toward the court, offensive filing of a verified petition, complying with the requirements for filing
personalities toward others, or refusal to be sworn or to answer as a initiatory pleadings. In the present case, the trial court initiated the
witness, or to subscribe an affidavit or deposition when lawfully proceedings for indirect contempt by issuing two orders directing the
required to do so. petitioner to show cause why he should not be punished for indirect
On the other hand, Section 3 of Rule 71 of the Rules of Court contempt.
enumerates particular acts which constitute indirect contempt,
thus: In the present case, the contemptuous act was the petitioners refusal
(a) Misbehavior of an officer of a court in the performance of his to attend a hearing for his examination as judgment obligor, upon
official duties or in his official transactions; motion by the respondent Teresa. It must be pointed out that the purpose
(b) Disobedience of or resistance to a lawful writ, process, order, or of Section 36 of Rule 39 is to provide the judgment obligee a remedy in
judgment of a court, including the act of a person who, after being case where the judgment obligor continues to fail to comply with its
dispossessed or ejected from any real property by the judgment or obligation under the judgment. Petitioners refusal to be examined,
process of any court of competent jurisdiction, enters or attempts or without justifiable reason, constituted indirect contempt which is
induces another to enter into or upon such real property, for the civil in nature.
purpose of executing acts of ownership or possession, or in any Petitioners deliberate willfulness and even malice in disobeying the
manner disturbs the possession given to the person adjudged to be orders of the trial court are clearly shown in the pleadings he
entitled thereto; himself had filed before the trial court.
(c) Any abuse of or any unlawful interference with the processes or Section 36 of Rule 39 of the Rules of Court allows, as a matter of
proceedings of a court not constituting direct contempt under right, the plaintiff who is a judgment obligee to examine the defendant
section 1 of this Rule; as judgment obligor, at any time after the return of the writ of execution
(d) Any improper conduct tending, directly or indirectly, to impede, is made. Section 36 reads as follows:
obstruct, or degrade the administration of justice; Sec. 36. Examination of judgment obligor when judgment unsatisfied.
(e) Assuming to be an attorney or an officer of a court, and acting as When the return of a writ of execution issued against property of a
such without authority; judgment obligor, or any one of several obligors in the same judgment,
(f) Failure to obey a subpoena duly served; shows that the judgment remains unsatisfied, in whole or in part, the
(g) The rescue, or attempted rescue, of a person or property in the judgment obligee, at any time after such return is made, shall be
entitled to an order from the court which rendered the said judgment, FACTS:
requiring such judgment obligor to appear and be examined concerning This is a case for damages filed by Nestor B. Sunga Jr.,
his property and income before such court or before a commissioner businessman and owner of the NBS Machineries Marketing and the
appointed by it, at a specified time and place; and proceedings may NAP-NAP Transit. Plaintiff alleged that he purchased a passenger
thereupon be had for the application of the property and income of the minibus Mazda from the Motor center, Inc. at Calasiao, Pangasinan on
judgment obligor towards the satisfaction of the judgment. But no March 21, 1978 and for which he executed a promissory note to cover
judgment obligor shall be so required to appear before a court or the amount of P62,592.00 payable monthly in the amount of P2,608.00
commissioner outside the province or city in which such obligor resides for 24 months due and payable the 1st day of each month starting May
or is found. 1, 1978 thru and inclusive of May 1, 1980.
Thus, the trial court committed no abuse of discretion in scheduling On the same date, however, a chattel mortgage was executed by him
the examination of petitioner on 22 March 2002. On the contrary, it in favor of the Motor center, Inc. The Chattel Mortgage and Assignment
acted with utmost judiciousness to avoid a miscarriage of justice was assigned to the Filinvest Credit Corporation with the conformity of
because petitioner was reported to be about to leave for Canada, a fact the plaintiff.
which petitioner did not refute in his Manifestation of 19 March 2002. Nestor Sunga claimed that on October 21, 1978, the minibus was
In the present case, however, the act which the trial court ordered seized by two (2) employees of the defendant Filinvest Credit
the petitioner to do has already been performed, albeit belatedly and not Corporation upon orders of the branch manager Mr. Gaspar de los
without delay for an unreasonable length of time. As such, the penalty of Santos, without any receipt, who claimed that he was delinquent in the
imprisonment may no longer be imposed despite the fact that its non- payments of his vehicle.
implementation was due to petitioners absence in the Philippines. The plaintiff reported the loss to the PC and after proper verification
We are not unmindful of the nature of the judgment from which the from the office of the Filinvest, the said vehicle was recovered from the
present controversy arose. Six years have elapsed from the time the Crisologo Compound which was later released by Rosario Fronda
compromise agreement for the support of the children of petitioner and Assistant Manager of the Filinvest, and Arturo Balatbat as caretaker of
respondent was executed. We take judicial notice of the amount of the compound. The police blotter of the Integrated National Police of
expenses which a travel outside the country, particularly to Canada, Dagupan City shows that Nestor Sunga and T/Sgt. Isidro Pascual of the
entails, much more so when the person traveling to Canada is trying to 153rd PC Company sought the assistance of the Dagupan police and one
establish himself in the said country as an immigrant. Petitioners claim Florence Onia of the Filinvest explained that the minibus was
for insolvency is negated by his frequent travels to Canada. We thus confiscated because the balance was already past due. After verification
exhort the parties, specifically the petitioner, to resort to all reasonable that his accounts are all in order, Florence Onia admitted it was their
means to fully satisfy the judgment for support based on the fault. The motor vehicle was returned to the plaintiff upon proper
compromise agreement, for the paramount interests of their minor receipt.
children.
After trial, the court a quo rendered its decision:
G.R. No. L-65935 September 30, 1988 (1) ORDERING the defendant Filinvest Credit Corporation to pay the
FILINVEST CREDIT CORPORATION,petitioner, plaintiff Nestor Sunga Jr. the following damages, to wit:
vs. (a) Moral Damages P30,000.00
THE INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT and NESTOR B. (b) Loss on Income of the minibus for three days 600.00
SUGA JR.,respondents. (c) Actual damages 500.00
SARMIENTO, J.: (d) Litigation expenses 5,000.00
(e) Attorney's Fees 10,000.00
(2) And to pay the costs. jurisdiction" where the court has jurisdiction but has transcended the
same or acted without any statutory authority. "Grave abuse of
Dissatisfied with the aforecited decision, the defendant (petitioner discretion" implies such capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment
herein), interposed a timely appeal with the respondent court. as is equivalent to lack of jurisdiction or in other words, where the
On September 30, 1983, the latter promulgated its decision affirming in power is exercised in an arbitrary or despotic manner by reason of
toto the decision of the trial court dated July 17, 1981, "except with passion or personal hostility, and it must be so patent and gross as to
regard to the moral damages which, under the circumstances of the amount to an evasion of positive duty or to a virtual refusal to perform
accounting error incurred by Filinvest, is hereby increased from the duty enjoined or to act at all in contemplation of law.
P30,000.00 to P50,000.00." 7 As the reconsideration of said decision (F)or certiorari to lie, there must be capricious, arbitrary, and
proved futile in view of its denial by the respondent court in its whimsical exercise of power, the very antithesis of the judicial
resolution of December 16, 1983, the petitioners come to us thru this prerogative in accordance with centuries of civil law and common law
instant petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court. tradition."
We had occasion to state that "there is no hard and fast rule in the
ISSUE: determination of what would be a fair amount of moral damages, since
W/N the respondent court a) in allegedly ignoring the various each case must be governed by its own peculiar circumstances." 25 Be
assigned errors in petitioners brief; b) in resolving issues not raised that as it may and in amplification of this generalization, we set the
at the trial and on appeal; c) in increasing the amount of moral criterion that "in the case of moral damages, the yardstick should be that
damages; and (d) in adhering to its decision in Edilberto Rebosura the "amount awarded should not be palpably and scandalously
et al. vs. Rogaciano Oropeza, CA-G.R. No. 63048-R, as well as to excessive" so as to indicate that it was the result of passion, prejudice or
Batasan Bill No. 3075, which is yet to be enacted into law, acted with corruption on the part of the trial court. Moreover, the actual losses
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction? sustained by the aggrieved parties and the gravity of the injuries must be
considered in arriving at reasonable levels ... ." 26
HELD: YES! There is no dispute that the private respondent, a businessman and
WE hold that the respondent court committed a grave abuse of owner of the NBS Machineries Marketing and NAP-NAP Transit, is
discretion in increasing extravagantly the award of moral damages entitled to moral damages due to the unwarranted seizure of the minibus
and in granting litigation expenses. In those respects, the petition is Mazda, allegedly because he was delinquent in the payment of its
granted and to that extent the questioned decision is modified. monthly amortizations, which as stated above, turned out to be
"Well settled is the rule in this jurisdiction that whenever an appeal incorrect. 27 No doubt such intent tainted private respondent Sunga's
is taken in a civil case an appellee who has not himself appealed cannot reputation in the business community, thus causing him mental anguish,
obtain from the appellate court any affirmative relief other than the ones serious anxiety, besmirched reputation, wounded feelings, moral shock,
granted in the decision of the court below." and social humiliation. "damages are not intended to enrich the
Verily the respondent court disregarded such a well settled rule complainant at the expense of a defendant. They are awarded only to
when it increased the award for moral damages from P30,000.00 to enable the injured parties to obtain means, diversions or amusements
P50,000.00, notwithstanding the fact that the private respondent did not that will serve to alleviate the moral sufferings the injured parties have
appeal from the judgment of the trial court, an act indicative of grave undergone by reason of defendant's culpable action.
abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction. We do not agree with private respondent's argument that the increase in
Certiorari lies when a court has acted without or in excess of jurisdiction the award of moral damages is justified by the prayer in its brief, to wit:
or with grave abuse of discretion. 'without jurisdiction' means that the FURTHER REMEDIES AND RELIEFS DEEMED JUST AND
court acted with absolute want of jurisdiction. There is "excess of EQUITABLE UNDER AND WITHIN THE PREMISES ARE PRAYED
FOR. Such statement is usually extant in practically all pleadings as a situated at Sitio Palaypay, municipality of San Dionisio, province of
final statement; it is rhetorical flourish as it were and could not be a Iloilo, for the latter's fishpond area of about 24 hectares located at sitio
substitute for appeal as required by the rules for "the appellee cannot Talaba-an, municipality of Cadiz, province of Negros Occidental
seek modification or reversal of the judgment or affirmative relief, That Juan Quibete, also in 1932, applied for a Fish and Game
unless he has also appealed therefrom." Special Permit over the area (F.P.L.A. No. 1709). The application was
G.R. No. 48766 February 9, 1993 disapproved because the area covered thereby was not yet declared
GODELIVA S. DULAY,Petitioner, vs. THE HONORABLE available for fishpond purposes. The records of that application were
MINISTER OF NATURAL RESOURCES, as a formal party and in lost during World War II so much so that Juan Quibete had to renew his
his Official Capacity, THE DIRECTOR OF THE BUREAU OF application in 1945 (Fp. A. No. 716). His application was approved on
FISHERIES & AQUATIC RESOURCES, in his Official Capacity, February 10, 1949 and Fishpond Permit No. F-738-E was issued
and ANGELES DICO, in her Private Capacity,Respondents. That on February 6, 1958, private respondent (Angeles Dico) filed
her fishpond application (Fp. A. No. 18206) to occupy the area covered
NOCON, J.: by petitioner's fishpond lease agreement
That her application was disapproved on the ground that the area
FACTS: she applied had already been awarded to Juan Quibete, predecessor-in-
Petitioner Godeliva S. Dulay comes to this Court and asks Us to interest of the petitioner, under Fishpond Permit No. F-738-E, and that a
confine public respondent Director of the Bureau of Fisheries and motion for reconsideration thereon was denied
Aquatic Resources within his jurisdiction and to uphold the principle of That on February 29, 1964, Juan Quibete meanwhile sold and/or
res judicata in administrative proceedings by nullifying (1) his February transferred his rights and interests over the area under Fishpond Permit
24, 1978 order giving due course to the letter-petition of private No. F-738-E to one Petronilo Retirado
respondent Angeles D. Dico requesting for the reopening of Fishpond That on April 28, 1964, private respondent Angeles Dico filed a
Conflict case of Mrs. Angeles Dico against Juan Quibete, Petronilo protest with the Philippine Fisheries Commission alleging that Juan
Retirado and petitioner Mrs. Godeliva S. Dulay and the "Cancellation of Quibete was occupying and improving lot (Lot No. 489-C) which was
Fishpond Lease Agreement No. 2165 of Mrs. Godeliva S. Dulay" and not the area covered by his fishpond permit and that he transferred his
(2) his telegrams dated August 14, 1978 stating that petitioner's motion rights and interests over the said area without the approval of the
for reconsideration of said February 24, 1978 interlocutory order Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources
"cannot be entertained" and advising petitioner of the continuation of That the Philippine Fisheries Commissioner dismissed the protest
the formal investigation of the private respondent's letter-petition on October 16, 1964 and declared that Lot No. 489-C was the same area
scheduled for September 4 to 9, 1978. granted to Juan Quibete under his fishpond permit and not any other lot
This present conflict stems from two earlier cases decided by the Office That from the decision private respondent Angeles Dico brought her
of the President, both of which have attained finality. As condensed by case to the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources who
the Office of the Solicitor General, these are as follows: dismissed her appeal on December 7, 1965
That after denial of a motion for reconsideration, she appealed to
1. Re: DANR Case No. 2898 the Office of the President. Her appeal was in turn dismissed in the
entitled "Angeles Dico v. Juan Quibete" decision of November 14, 1969
The salient antecedent facts stated in the decision of the Office of
the President dated November 14, 1969, are as follows: 2. Re: DANR Case No. 3447
That by a barter agreement entered into between Juan Quibete and entitled "F.P.A. No.V-3-3852, Angeles Dico,
Jose Padios sometime in 1932, the former exchanged his parcel of land Applicant-Appellant v. Juan Quibete, Claimant-Appellee"
The facts of the case are as follows: 6. On October 28, 1977, private respondent (Angeles Dico) submitted a
That on November 13, 1965, while DANR Case No. 2898, supra, letter-petition to the respondent officials requesting for a "reopening of
was still pending decision by the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural fishpond conflict of Angeles Dico vs. Juan Quibete, Petronilo Retirado
Resources, private respondent Angeles Dico filed with the Director of and Mrs. Godeliva S. Dulay based on newly discovered evidence". It
Lands a free patent application for a 4-hectare dry portion of Lot 489-C was there alleged that Fishpond Permit No. F-738-E of Juan Quibete did
covered by Fishpond Permit No. F-738-E of Juan Quibete not cover the area in question (Lot No. 489-C) located in Sitio Talaba-
That Juan Quibete, claiming preferential right over the area applied an, Municipality of Cadiz (now Cadiz City) but Lot No. 487 located in
for, protested to the application Barrio Luna, Cadiz City. She prayed that petitioner's Fishpond Lease
That the Director of Lands, in a decision dated May 30, 1967, Agreement No. 2169 be cancelled and, in lieu thereof, a new one be
rejected the application of private respondent Dico and directed Juan issued in her name.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law
Quibete to file the appropriate public land application, if qualified, for library
the 4-hectare dry portion 7. Petitioner moved to dismiss the letter-petition on the ground of res
That a motion for reconsideration having been denied, private judicata(Annex "M"). She argued that the two administrative decisions
respondent Dico appealed to the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural in DANR Case No. 2898 and DANR Case No. 3447 (Annexes "A" and
Resources "F"), involving the same parties, subject matter and cause of action,
That under the same set of facts found in DANR Case No. 2898 have already become final and settled the matter once and for all
aforesaid, the Secretary affirmed on July 9, 1970 the decision of the 8. Claiming that res judicata is not applicable, private respondent
Director of Lands, stating that the 4-hectare area subject of the appeal opposed the motion to dismiss. This was the subject of a rejoinder which
covered a portion of the same tract of land which was the subject matter was again excepted to by private respondent on the argument that res
of DANR Case No. 2898 judicata does not apply in cases where the government has to exercise
That private respondent Dico moved to reconsider the Secretary's its inherent power to regulate.
decision, Annex "F", but her motion was denied on January 26, 1971. A Respondent Director held resolution of the motion to dismiss in
second motion for reconsideration was likewise denied per Order dated abeyance. In an "Interlocutory Order" dated February 24, 1978, he
May 5, 1971. reserved to resolve the motion "until after termination of the
3. As already stated, Petronilo Retirado became the successor-in-interest investigation" brought about by private respondent's letter-petition.
of Juan Quibete by virtue of a deed of transfer of rights and By reason of the denial not only of her Motion to Dismiss the letter-
improvements executed by Juan Quibete in favor of Petronilo Retirado petition of respondent Angeles Dico dated October 28, 1977 but also the
on February 29, 1964 over the area covered by Fishpond Permit No. F- denial of her motion for reconsideration5and the insistence of respondent
738-E of Juan Quibete Director in conducting his investigation on September 4 to 9, 1978 at
4. Ultimately, petitioner (Godeliva S. Dulay) succeeded to the rights and the Bacolod City Fisheries Office,6the situation had become urgent for
interests over the area in question. On May 21, 1973, the heirs of petitioner.
Petronilo Retirado executed a "Deed of Sale of Fishpond Improvements Thus, she filed the instant petition praying for the issuance of a writ
and Transfer of Rights" transferring their rights and interests in favor of of preliminary injunction or restraining order claiming that unless one is
the petitioner over a portion of Lot No. 489-C consisting of 19.15 immediately issued, respondent will proceed with the investigation as
hectares, more or less, and covered by their Fishpond Permit No. 158-2. scheduled, and if petitioner refuses or fails to appear in said
5. On October 22, 1974, after application with the Department of investigation by reason of this petition, the respondents will proceed
Agriculture and Natural Resources, petitioner was issued a fishpond with the investigation and reception of evidence ex-parte as clearly
lease agreement (No. 2169) over a portion of Lot 489-C consisting of threatened by the respondent Director in his telegrams to the petitioner
18.3675 hectares, expiring on December 31, 1998. and his counsel, marked as Annexes "I", "U", "W" and "W-1" herein.
Private respondent Angeles Dico's request for the reopening of the case quasi-judicial authority, have, upon their finality, the force and
of "Dico vs. Quibete, et al." and the cancellation of the Fishpond Lease binding effect of a final judgment within the purview of the doctrine
Agreement of petitioner Godeliva S. Dulay on the ground of fraud of res judicata. The rule of res judicata which forbids the reopening
committed by Juan Quibete and Petronila Retirado is anchored, of a matter once judicially determined by competent authority
allegedly, on the following pieces of newly-discovered evidence, to wit: applies as well to the judicial and quasi-judicial acts of public,
(1) Order of then Philippine Fisheries Commissioner Arsenio N. Rolden, executive or administrative officers and boards acting within their
dated May 12, 1964, recognizing the fishpond application (No. 18206) jurisdiction.
of private respondent, dated Feb. 6, 1958, over the area in question
located at Barrio Daga, Talaba-an, Diotay, Cadiz City DANR Case No. 2898, entitled "Angeles Dico vs. Juan Quibete" was
(2) The Plan of the Bureau of Lands for the entire area of Lot 489 of decided by the Office of the President on November 14, 1969. Since the
which the subject area is a portion same was not brought to the courts for judicial review, the same has
(3) The Fishpond Application (No. 18950) of Juan Quibete (herein long become final and executory.
petitioner's successor-in-interest) for 5 hectares covered by Lot 489-B
(25 hectares), situated at Barrio Daga, Talaba-an, Diotay, Cadiz City, DANR Case No. 3447, entitled "Angeles Dico vs. Juan Quibete"
was denied by Hon. Jose R. Montilla Assistant Director of Fisheries on involved Free Patent Application No. V-3-385 of private respondent
May 19, 1960 because Juan Quibete was already a holder of a Dico. The Director of Lands in a decision dated May 30, 1967 rejected
previously approved fishpond application under Permit No. 738-E under her application. The Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources
Lot 487 covering a 20-hectare area situated at Barrio Luna, Cadiz City affirmed the same on July 9, 1970. 12The findings of fact in said DANR
(4) The Plan of the aforesaid Lot 487 case, which were found by the Secretary to be the same facts in DANR
(5) Affidavits of three (3) persons who attest to the fact that Juan Case No. 2898, are deemed conclusive by operation of law. 13Said
Quibete's fishpond area (Lot 487) is located at Barrio Luna, Cadiz City. DANR case, not having been brought likewise to the courts for judicial
The witnesses are Mansueto D. Alarcon, then Municipal Secretary of the review has also become final and executory.
Municipality of Cadiz, Negros Occidental dated January 6, 1965;
Patrolman Eligio O. Javier, member of the police force of Cadiz, Negros To sum up, the matter of which lot Juan Quibete improved as a fishpond
Occidental, dated October 22, 1963 and Melecio Quibete, son of Juan, and which rights he sold to Retirado was investigated TWICE after the
executed in May 1964. Philippine Fisheries Commission reinstated private respondent's
Fishpond Application No. 18206 in its Order of May 12, 1964. Both
ISSUE: investigations - more than three years apart with investigators from
W/N the Res Judicata will set in the case at bar? different offices - showed that Juan Quibete occupied and improved Lot
489-C although in the different documents, including maps, which make
HELD: YES! up this case, it was designated as Lot 487. Thus, no merit can be given
We grant the petition and make permanent the temporary to private respondent's alleged pieces of evidence, number 2 and 5(page
restraining order issued earlier on September 7, 1978. 7-8, supra) as all these HAD already been studied thoroughly by both
Private respondent's letter-petition, filed October 28, 1977, states clearly Investigator Alelis and Atty. Bautista in these separate
that it is a "Request for Reopening of Fishpond Conflict of Mrs. Angeles investigations.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library
Dico vs. Juan Quibete, Petronilo Retirado and Mrs. Godeliva S. Dulay
based on New Discovered Evidence . . . ." The matter having become final as of August or September 1970, 27it
It is already well-settled in our jurisprudence that the decisions was grave abuse of discretion on the part of public respondent
and orders of administrative agencies rendered pursuant to their Director of the Bureau of Fisheries and Aquatic Resources to give
due course to private-respondent's letter-petition of October 28, husband changed their minds. They did not register the deeds of sale.
1977 requesting for a re-opening of the fishpond conflict involved Instead, they continued in possession of the properties, and exercised
herein. other acts of ownership, including the mortgaging of the lots subject of
the deeds.
The relationship between the Salud and Guerrero families soured.
On June 4, 1980, the late Clemente Guerrero, husband of private
respondent, filed with the Court of First Instance (CFI), now
G.R. No. 100156 June 27, 1994 Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Cavite, two (2) complaints docketed
ISIDORA SALUD,petitioner, as Civil Cases No. 3022 and 3023. In Civil Case No. 3022, he sued
vs. Eusebio Salud, Jr., the spouses Norma Salud and Artemio Vianzon
THE COURT OF APPEALS and MELANIA and Maripol Guerrero. In Civil Case No. 3023, he sued Eusebio
GUERRERO,respondents. Salud, Jr., and Teodoro G. Salud. He sought to exercise his right of
redemption as a co-owner of the controverted properties.
PUNO, J.: In Civil Case No. 3022, defendants were declared in default. Petitioner
claims that said defendants were then in the United States and were
FACTS: unable to answer the Complaint. On February 19, 1982, the then CFI of
Petitioner Isidora Guerrero Salud and her late husband, Eusebio B. Cavite rendered a decision granting the late Guerrero the right to
Salud, are the registered owners of an undivided one-half () share in redeem the properties in question. The Court of Appeals affirmed
certain parcels of land situated in Bacoor, Cavite. They are referred to as the decision which became final and executory on July 31, 1986.
the Poblacion and Habay properties and the San Nicolas property, Efforts of petitioner to intervene in the appellate court were in vain.
respectively covered by TCT No. RT-9269 and TCT No. RT-9268 of the
Cavite City Register of Deeds. 1 To be exact, these properties are
registered in the name of "Isidora Guerrero . . . married to Eusebio On the other hand, the Complaint in Civil Case No. 3023 was tried
Salud, and Clemente Guerrero . . . married to Melania Andico." on its merit. Teodoro G. Salud was able to answer Guerrero's
Petitioner Isidora Guerrero Salud and Clemente Guerrero are sister and Complaint. After trial, the trial court dismissed the Complaint on
brother. The latter is the deceased husband of private respondent. January 10, 1982. It held that the late Guerrero had no right to
On October 20, 1967, petitioner and her late husband, executed a deed redeem the litigated property as its sale "is not in esse." The Court
wherein they sold their one-half (1/2) share in the Poblacion property to of Appeals, in G.R. No. CV-2529, also affirmed this Decision.
their daughter Maripol Guerrero for TWO THOUSAND PESOS
(P2,000.00), while the Habay property was sold to their children Norma The controversy between the parties did not die down. To frustrate the
Salud Vianzon and Eusebio G. Salud, Jr., for FIVE THOUSAND right of redemption granted to the deceased Clemente Guerrero in Civil
PESOS (P5,000.00). 2 Case No. 3022, petitioner Isidora Salud initiated Civil Case No. BCV-
86-60, dubbed an Action to Quiet Title/Remove Cloud from Title,
On November 3, 1967, petitioner and her late husband, also sold their Declaratory Relief plus Damages before the RTC of Imus, Cavite. Sued
one-half () share in the San Nicolas property in favor of their children was Clemente's widow, private respondent Melania Guerrero. The
Eusebio Salud, Jr., and Teodoro G. Salud for THREE THOUSAND latter moved to dismiss the complaint on ground, among others, of
PESOS (P3,000.00). 3 res judicata.
In an Order 4 dated March 19, 1987, the trial court granted the motion to
After the execution of the deeds, it is alleged that petitioner and her late dismiss. Petitioner appealed to the respondent Court of Appeals which,
however, rendered an affirmance. The second aspect is traditionally known as collateral estoppel; in
Hence, this petition. modern terminology, it is called issue preclusion. 9

ISSUE: There is universal agreement on the principles underlying res judicata, 10


W/N Res Judicata will set in the case? viz:
. . . . Two maxims of the English common law best summarize the
HELD: NO! general policies underlying this doctrine.
They are: first, that no person should be twice vexed by the same claim;
The rules of res judicata are of common law origin and they initially and second, that it is in the interest of the state that there be an end to
evolved from court decisions. It is now considered a principle of litigation.
universal jurisprudence forming a part of the legal system of all Thus, principles of res judicata serve both private and public interests.
civilized nations. 5 In our jurisdiction, the principle of res judicata was The interest of the judicial system in preventing relitigation of the same
incorporated as part of our statutory law. dispute recognizes that judicial resources are finite and the number of
cases that can be heard by the court is limited. Every dispute that is
The principle was enacted as sections 306 and 307 of Act No. 190. 6 reheard means that another will be delayed. In modern times when court
Later, it became sections 44 and 45 of former Rules 39. 7 Under the dockets are filled to overflowing, this concern is of critical importance.
present Rules of Court, it appears in section 49 of Rule 39, viz: Res judicata thus conserves scarce judicial resources and promotes
Sec. 49. Effect of judgments. The effect of a judgment or final order efficiency in the interest of the public at large.
rendered by a court or judge of the Philippines, having jurisdiction to Once a final judgment has been rendered, the prevailing party also has
pronounce the judgment or order, may be as follows: an interest in the stability of that judgment. Parties come to the courts in
xxx xxx xxx order to resolve controversies; a judgment would be of little use in
(b) In other cases the judgment or order is, with respect to the matter resolving disputes if the parties were free to ignore it and to litigate the
directly adjudged or as to any other mater that could have been raised in same claims again and again. Although judicial determinations are not
relation thereto, conclusive between the parties and their successors-in- infallible, judicial error should be corrected through appeals procedures,
interest by title subsequent to the commencement of the action or not through repeated suits on the same claim. Further, to allow
special proceeding, litigating for the same thing and under the same title relitigation creates the risk of inconsistent results and presents the
and in the same capacity; embarrassing problem of determining which of two conflicting
(c) In any other litigation between the same parties or their successors- decisions is to be preferred. Since there is no reason to suppose that the
in-interest, that only is deemed to have been adjudged in a former second or third determination of a claim necessarily is more accurate
judgment which appears upon its face to have been so adjudged, or than the first, the first should be left undisturbed.
which was actually and necessarily included therein or necessary In some cases the public at large also has an interest in seeing that rights
thereto. and liabilities once established remain fixed. If a court quiets title to
The above rule expresses the two (2) aspects of res judicata. As pointed land, for example, everyone should be able to rely on the finality of that
out by Moran, the first aspect is the effect of a judgment as a bar to the determination. Otherwise, many business transactions would be clouded
prosecution of a second action upon the same claim, demand or cause of by uncertainty. Thus, the most important purpose of res judicata is to
action. The second aspect precludes the relitigation of a particular fact provide repose for both the party litigants and the public. As the
of issue in another action between the same parties on a different claim Supreme Court has observed, "res judicata thus encourages reliance on
or cause of action. 8 The first aspect is known in traditional terminology judicial decision, bars vexatious litigation, and frees the courts to
as merger or bar; in modern terminology, it is called claim preclusion. resolve other disputes."
Civil Case No. 3022, and hence is bound by its judgment. Case law,
In our age, where courts are harassed by crowded dockets and both here and in the United States, recognizes privity of interest under
complaints against slow foot justice, frequent technical reliance on the the following situation: 12
preclusive breadth of res judicata is understandable. The importance of The historic and most common situation in which privity is upheld
judicial economy and avoidance of repetitive suits are strong norms in a exists when a person acquires an interest in the subject matter of the suit
society in need of swift justice. Be that as it may, there should not be a after it was filed or decided. Successors-in-interest, whether they obtain
mechanical and uncaring reliance on res judicata where more important their interests by virtue of an assignment, by inheritance or by law are
societal values deserve protection. So we held in Suarez vs. Court of bound along with their predecessors by the rules of res judicata and
Appeals, et al., 11 collateral estoppel. This is necessary in order to preserve the finality of
judgments; otherwise a person confronted with an adverse decision
The case at bench presents an exceptional instance where an might subject the winning party to the prospect of continual litigation
inflexible application of the doctrine of res judicata will not serve simply by transferring his interest in the subject matter of the suit to
our constitutional policy favoring fairness, the heart of due process. another who could begin the suit anew.
Petitioner was not a party in Civil Case No. 3022 and was not A second well-defined privity relationship arises when legal appointed
given any chance to contest the claim of Guerrero. Her children, then in representative parties, such as trustees and executors, are involved;
the United States, were the ones sued. They failed to answer, and were those individuals are deemed in privity with those whom they represent.
declared in default. Thus, the late Clemente Guerrero, husband of Since parties litigating in representative capacity have no interests of
private respondent, obtained a favorable judgment by default from the their own, but either sued or are sued on behalf of the beneficiaries
trial court pursuant to which he was given the right of preemption over whom they serve.
the contested lots. Petitioner attempted to intervene in the case but Privity also has been universally recognized when it is determined that
unfortunately, her motion for intervention was denied. The late the newly named party in the second suit actually controlled or
Guerrero, therefore, prevailed primarily because his claim was not participated in litigating the first action. Although the non-party will not
disputed. In contrast was the result in Civil Case No. 3023 where be bound by res judicata because different claims are involved, identical
Guerrero claimed the same right of preemption against the other issues that were necessarily and actually litigated will be precluded.
children of petitioner. In this case, however, one of the children of Having received one opportunity to defend or prosecute those issues, he
petitioner sued by Guerrero, was in the Philippines and he answered the may not be allowed another.
Complaint. The case was tried on its merit and the trial court dismissed Petitioner does not fall in any of the above categories. She is not a
the Complaint of Guerrero. It found that the right of preemption of successor-in-interest of her children in Civil Case No. 3022. Petitioner's
Guerrero was not yet in esse. children were not sued in Civil Case No. 3022 in a representative
capacity. It is also clear that petitioner did not control or participate in
The difference in the results of Civil Cases No. 3022 and 3023 Civil Case No. 3022 for her motion to intervene was denied. Petitioner's
accentuates the necessity not to give res judicata effect to the default interest, therefore, was not at all represented in Civil Case No. 3022
judgment in Civil Case No. 3022 where petitioner was a non-party. The where judgment was obtained by default. The doctrine of res judicata
demands of due process present a weightier consideration than the need is a rule of justice and cannot be rigidly applied where it will result
to bring an end to the parties' litigation. For more important than the in injustice.
need to write finis to litigation is to finish it justly, and there can be no
justice that satisfies unless the litigants are given the opportunity to be
heard. The constitutional right to due process of petitioner cannot be
defeated by the argument that petitioner is a privy of her children in
fabricated or suppressed.
In the cases referred to in the preceding paragraph, no judgment shall be based upon a
stipulation of facts or confession of judgment.
The trial court and the public prosecutor also ignored Rule 18, Section 6 of the 1985 Rules of
Court (now Rule 9, Section 3[e] of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure) which provides:
Sec. 6. No defaults in actions for annulment of marriage or for legal separation. If the
defendant in an action for annulment of marriage or for legal separation fails to answer, the court
shall order the prosecuting attorney to investigate whether or not a collusion between the parties
exits, and if there is no collusion, to intervene for the State in order to see to it that the evidence
submitted is not fabricated.
In the case of Republic v. Court of Appeals, this Court laid down the guidelines in the
interpretation and application of Art. 48 of the Family Code, one of which concerns the role of
ANCHETA vs. ANCHETA the prosecuting attorney or fiscal and the Solicitor General to appear as counsel for the State:
Facts:Marietta and Rodolfo were married in 1959. They had 8 children. In 1992, Rodolfo left (8) The trial court must order the prosecuting attorney or fiscal and the Solicitor General to
the conjugal home and abandoned Marietta and their children. Two years after, Marietta filed a appear as counsel for the state. No decision shall be handed down unless the Solicitor General
complaint for the dissolution of the conjugal partnership and judicial separation of property with issues a certification, which will be quoted in the decision, briefly stating therein his reasons for
a plea for support and support pendente lite. At that time, Marietta lived in Las Pinas. The parties his agreement or opposition, as the case may be, to the petition. The Solicitor General, along
entered into a compromise agreement wherein their property located in Carmona, Cavite was with the prosecuting attorney, shall submit to the court such certification within fifteen (15) days
adjudicated to Marietta and her children. The court rendered judgment based on the compromise from the date the case is deemed submitted for resolution of the court. The Solicitor General
agreement. Conformably thereto, Marietta and her children moved and began residence at the shall discharge the equivalent function of the defensor vinculi contemplated under Canon 1095.
said Carmona property. The task of protecting marriage as an inviolable social institution requires vigilant and zealous
In 1995, Rodolfo, wanting to marry again, filed a case for the declaration of nullity of his participation and not mere pro-forma compliance. The protection of marriage as a sacred
marriage with the Marietta on the ground of psychological incapacity. Although the Rodolfo institution requires not just the defense of a true and genuine union but the exposure of an
knew that the Marietta was already residing in Carmona, Cavite, he, nevertheless, alleged in his invalid one as well.
petition that the Marietta was residing at No. 72 CRM Avenue corner CRM Corazon, BF Homes, A grant of annulment of marriage or legal separation by default is fraught with the danger of
Almanza, Las Pias, Metro Manila. The sheriff served the summons and a copy of the petition collusion. Hence, in all cases for annulment, declaration of nullity of marriage and legal
by substituted service on the the parties son, Venancio Mariano B. Ancheta III, at his residence separation, the prosecuting attorney or fiscal is ordered to appear on behalf of the State for the
in Bancal, Carmona, Cavite. purpose of preventing any collusion between the parties and to take care that their evidence is
Marietta failed to file an answer and was declared in default. Rodolfo was allowed adduce not fabricated or suppressed. If the defendant-spouse fails to answer the complaint, the court
evidence ex-parte. On July 7, 1995, the trial court issued an Order granting the petition and cannot declare him or her in default but instead, should order the prosecuting attorney to
declaring the marriage of the parties void ab initio. The clerk of court issued a Certificate of determine if collusion exists between the parties. The prosecuting attorney or fiscal may oppose
Finality of the Order of the court on July 16, 1996. the application for legal separation or annulment through the presentation of his own evidence, if
in his opinion, the proof adduced is dubious and fabricated.
On July 7, 2000, the Marietta filed a verified petition against the Rodolfo with the Court of Our constitution is committed to the policy of strengthening the family as a basic social
Appeals under Rule 47 of the Rules of Court, as amended, for the annulment of the order of the institution. Our family law is based on the policy that marriage is not a mere contract, but a
RTC. social institution in which the State is vitally interested. The State can find no stronger anchor
than on good, solid and happy families. The break-up of families weakens our social and moral
Marietta, alleged, among others, that the order of the trial court nullifying her and the Rodolfos fabric; hence, their preservation is not the concern of the family members alone. Whether or not
marriage was null and void for the court a quos failure to order the public prosecutor to conduct a marriage should continue to exist or a family should stay together must not depend on the
an investigation on whether there was collusion between the parties, and to order the Solicitor whims and caprices of only one party, who claims that the other suffers psychological
General to appear for the State. imbalance, incapacitating such party to fulfill his or her marital duties and obligations (Ancheta
Held: The records show that for the petitioners failure to file an answer to the complaint, the vs. Ancheta, G.R. No. 145370, March 4, 2004)
trial court granted the motion of the respondent herein to declare her in default. The public
prosecutor condoned the acts of the trial court when he interposed no objection to the motion of
the respondent. The trial court forthwith received the evidence of the respondent ex-parte and
rendered judgment against the petitioner without a whimper of protest from the public
prosecutor. The actuations of the trial court and the public prosecutor are in defiance of Article
48 of the Family Code, which reads:
Article 48. In all cases of annulment or declaration of absolute nullity of marriage, the Court
shall order the prosecuting attorney or fiscal assigned to it to appear on behalf of the State to
take steps to prevent collusion between the parties and to take care that evidence is not