MAXIMO CALALANG vs A. D. WILLIAMS, ET AL.
, On August 2, 1940, the Director recommended to the Secretary the approval
G.R. No. 47800 December 2, 1940
Doctrine: Social Justice
LAUREL, J.:
Facts:
The National Traffic Commission, in its resolution of July 17, 1940,
resolved to recommend to the Director of the Public Works and to the
Secretary of Public Works and Communications that animal-
drawn vehicles be prohibited from passing along the following for a period
of one year from the date of the opening of the Colgante Bridge to traffic:
1) Rosario Street extending from Plaza Calderon de la Barca to Dasmarias
Street from 7:30Am to 12:30 pm and from 1:30 pm to 530 pm; and
2) along Rizal Avenue extending from the railroad crossing at Antipolo
Street to
Echague Street from 7 am to 11pm
The Chairman of the National Traffic Commission on July 18, 1940
recommended to the Director of Public Works with the approval of the
Secretary of Public Works the adoption of
thethemeasure proposed in the resolution aforementioned in pursuance of th
e provisions of theCommonwealth Act No. 548 which authorizes said Direc
tor with the approval from the
Secretary of the Public Works and Communication to promulgate rules and
regulations to regulate and control the use of and traffic on national roads.
of the recommendations made by the Chairman of the National Traffic
Commission with modifications. The Secretary of Public Works approved
the recommendations on August 10,1940. The Mayor of Manila and the
Acting Chief of Police of Manila have enforced and caused to be enforced
the rules and regulation. As a consequence, all animal-drawn vehicles are
not allowed to pass and pick up passengers in the places above mentioned to
the detriment not only of their owners but of the riding public as well.
Issues:
1) Whether the rules and regulations promulgated by the respondents
pursuant to the provisions of Commonwealth Act NO. 548 constitute an
unlawful inference with legitimate business or trade and abridged the right
to personal liberty and freedom of locomotion?
2) Whether the rules and regulations complained of infringe upon the
constitutional precept regarding the promotion of social justice to insure the
well-being and economic security of all the people?
Held:
1) No. The promulgation of the Act aims to promote safe transit upon and
avoid obstructions on national roads in the interest and convenience of the
public. In enacting said law, the National Assembly was prompted by
considerations of public convenience and welfare. It was inspired by the
desire to relieve congestion of traffic, which is a menace to the public
safety. Public welfare lies at the bottom of the promulgation of the said law
and the state in order to promote the general welfare may interfere with
personal liberty, with property, and with business and occupations. Persons
and property may be subject to all kinds of restraints and burdens in order to
secure the general comfort, health, and prosperity of the State. To this
fundamental aims of the government, the rights of the individual are
subordinated. Liberty is a blessing which should not be made to prevail over
authority because society will fall into anarchy. Neither should authority be
made to prevail over liberty because then the individual will fall into
slavery. The paradox lies in the fact that the apparent curtailment of liberty
is precisely the very means of insuring its preserving.
2) No. Social justice is neither communism, nor despotism, nor atomism,
nor anarchy, but the humanization of laws and the equalization of social
and economic forces by the State so that justice in its rational and
objectively secular conception may at least be approximated. Social justice
means the promotion of the welfare of all the people, the adoption by the
Government of measures calculated to insure economic stability of all the
competent elements of society, through the maintenance of a proper
economic and social equilibrium in the interrelations of the members of the
community, constitutionally, through the adoption of measures legally
justifiable, or extra-constitutionally, through the exercise of powers
underlying the existence of all governments on the time-honored principles
of salus populi estsuprema lex.
Social justice must be founded on the recognition of the necessity of
interdependence among divers and diverse units of a society and of the
protection that should be equally and evenly extended to all groups as a
combined force in our social and economic life, consistent with the
fundamental and paramount objective of the state of promoting health,
comfort and quiet of all persons, and of bringing about the greatest good to
the greatest number.
ICHONG v. HERNANDEZ
101 PHIL 115
FACTS:
Petitioner, also in behalf of other alien residents corporations and
partnerships, brought this action to obtain a judicial declaration that RA
1180 is unconstitutional. Petitioner contends, among others, that said act
violate the equal protection of laws and that it violates the treaty of the
Philippines with China. Solicitor General contends that the act was a valid
exercise of the police power and that not a single treaty was infringed by
said act.
ISSUE:
Whether or not RA 1180 violates the equal protection of laws
HELD:
The equal protection of the law clause is against undue favor and individual
or class privilege, as well as hostile discrimination on oppression of
inequality. The real question at hand is whether or not the exclusion in the
future aliens for the retail trade unreasonable. The equal protection clause
is not infringed by a specified class if it applies to all persons within such
class and reasonable grounds exist for making a distinction between those
who fall within such class and those who do not. Aliens are under no
special constitutional protection which forbids a classification otherwise
justified simply because the limitation of the class falls along the lines of
nationality. The difference in status between citizens and aliens constitute a
basis for reasonable classification in the exercise of police power.
The Supreme Court has said that police power is so far-reaching that it has
almost become impossible to limit its sweep. It derives its existence from
the very existence of the State itself, it does not need to be expressed or
defined in its scope; it is said to be co-extensive with self-protection and
survival, and as such it is the most positive and active of all governmental
processes, the most essential, insistent and illimitable. Especially it is so
under the modern democratic framework where the demands of society and
nations have multiplied to almost unimaginable proportions. The field and
scope of police power have become almost boundless, just as the fields of
public interest and welfare, they cannot delimit beforehand the extent or
scope of the police power by which and through which the state seeks to
attain or achieve public interest and welfare.
Lutz vs. Araneta
Facts: Commonwealth Act No. 567, otherwise known as Sugar Adjustment
Act was promulgated in 1940 to stabilize the sugar industry so as to
prepare it for the eventuality of the loss of its preferential position in the
United States market and the impositionof export taxes. Plaintiff, Walter
Lutz, in his capacity as Judicial Administrator of the Intestate Estate of
Antonio Jayme Ledesma, seeks to recover from the Collector of Internal
Revenue the sum of P14,666.40 paid by the estate as taxes, under Sec.3 of
the Act, alleging that such tax is unconstitutional and void, being levied for
the aid and support of the sugar industry exclusively, which in plaintiffs
opinion is not a public purpose for which a tax may be constitutionally
levied. The action has been dismissed by the Court of First Instance.
Issue: Whether or not the tax imposed is constitutional.
Held: Yes. The act is primarily an exercise of the police power. It is shown
in the Act that the tax is levied with a regulatory purpose, to provide means
for the rehabilitation and stabilization of the threatened sugar industry.
It is inherent in the power to tax that a state be free to select the subjects of
taxation, and it has been repeatedly held that inequalities which result from
a singling out of one particular class for taxation or exemption infringe no
constitutional limitation.
The funds raised under the Act should be exclusively spent in aid of the
sugar industry, since it is that very enterprise that is being protected. It may
be that other industries are also in need of similar protection; but the
legislature is not required by the Constitution to adhere to a policy of all or
none.
Ermita Malate v City of Manila 20 SCRA 849 (1967)
J. Fernando
Facts:
Ermita-Malate Hotel and Motel Operators Association, and one of its
members Hotel del Mar Inc. petitioned for the prohibition of Ordinance
4670 on June 14, 1963 to be applicable in the city of Manila.
They claimed that the ordinance was beyond the powers of the Manila City
Board to regulate due to the fact that hotels were not part of its regulatory
powers. They also asserted that Section 1 of the challenged ordinance was
unconstitutional and void for being unreasonable and violative of due
process insofar because it would impose P6,000.00 license fee per annum
for first class motels and P4,500.00 for second class motels; there was also
the requirement that the guests would fill up a form specifying their
personal information.
There was also a provision that the premises and facilities of such hotels,
motels and lodging houses would be open for inspection from city
authorites. They claimed this to be violative of due process for being vague.
The law also classified motels into two classes and required the
maintenance of certain minimum facilities in first class motels such as a
telephone in each room, a dining room or, restaurant and laundry. The
petitioners also invoked the lack of due process on this for being arbitrary.
It was also unlawful for the owner to lease any room or portion thereof
more than twice every 24 hours.
There was also a prohibition for persons below 18 in the hotel.
The challenged ordinance also caused the automatic cancellation of the
license of the hotels that violated the ordinance.
The lower court declared the ordinance unconstitutional.
Hence, this appeal by the city of Manila.
Issue:
Whether Ordinance No. 4760 of the City of Manila is violative of the due
process clause?
Held: No. Judgment reversed.
Ratio:
"The presumption is towards the validity of a law. However, the Judiciary
should not lightly set aside legislative action when there is not a clear
invasion of personal or property rights under the guise of police regulation.
O'Gorman & Young v. Hartford Fire Insurance Co- Case was in the scope of
police power. As underlying questions of fact may condition the
constitutionality of legislation of this character, the resumption of
constitutionality must prevail in the absence of some factual foundation of
record for overthrowing the statute." No such factual foundation being laid
in the present case, the lower court deciding the matter on the pleadings and
the stipulation of facts, the presumption of validity must prevail and the
judgment against the ordinance set aside.
There is no question but that the challenged ordinance was precisely
enacted to minimize certain practices hurtful to public morals, particularly
fornication and prostitution. Moreover, the increase in the licensed fees was
intended to discourage "establishments of the kind from operating for
purpose other than legal" and at the same time, to increase "the income of
the city government."
Police power is the power to prescribe regulations to promote the health,
morals, peace, good order, safety and general welfare of the people. In view
of the requirements of due process, equal protection and other applicable
constitutional guaranties, however, the power must not be unreasonable or
violative of due process.
There is no controlling and precise definition of due process. It has a
standard to which the governmental action should conform in order that
deprivation of life, liberty or property, in each appropriate case, be valid.
What then is the standard of due process which must exist both as a
procedural and a substantive requisite to free the challenged ordinance from
legal infirmity? It is responsiveness to the supremacy of reason, obedience
to the dictates of justice. Negatively put, arbitrariness is ruled out and
unfairness avoided.
Due process is not a narrow or "technical conception with fixed content
unrelated to time, place and circumstances," decisions based on such a
clause requiring a "close and perceptive inquiry into fundamental principles
of our society." Questions of due process are not to be treated narrowly or
pedantically in slavery to form or phrase.
Nothing in the petition is sufficient to prove the ordinances nullity for an
alleged failure to meet the due process requirement.
Cu Unjieng case: Licenses for non-useful occupations are also incidental to
the police power and the right to exact a fee may be implied from the power
to license and regulate, but in fixing amount of the license fees the
municipal corporations are allowed a much wider discretion in this class of
cases than in the former, and aside from applying the well-known legal
principle that municipal ordinances must not be unreasonable, oppressive,
or tyrannical, courts have, as a general rule, declined to interfere with such
discretion. Eg. Sale of liquors.
Lutz v. Araneta- Taxation may be made to supplement the states police
power.
In one case- much discretion is given to municipal corporations in
determining the amount," here the license fee of the operator of a massage
clinic, even if it were viewed purely as a police power measure.
On the impairment of freedom to contract by limiting duration of use to
twice every 24 hours- It was not violative of due process. 'Liberty' as
understood in democracies, is not license; it is 'liberty regulated by law.'
Implied in the term is restraint by law for the good of the individual and for
the greater good of the peace and order of society and the general well-
being.
Laurel- The citizen should achieve the required balance of liberty and
authority in his mind through education and personal discipline, so that
there may be established the resultant equilibrium, which means peace and
order and happiness for all.
The freedom to contract no longer "retains its virtuality as a living principle,
unlike in the sole case of People v Pomar. The policy of laissez faire has to
some extent given way to the assumption by the government of the right of
intervention even in contractual relations affected with public interest.
What may be stressed sufficiently is that if the liberty involved were
freedom of the mind or the person, the standard for the validity of
governmental acts is much more rigorous and exacting, but where the
liberty curtailed affects at the most rights of property, the permissible scope
of regulatory measure is wider.
On the law being vague on the issue of personal information, the
maintenance of establishments, and the full rate of payment- Holmes-
We agree to all the generalities about not supplying criminal laws with
what they omit but there is no canon against using common sense in
construing laws as saying what they obviously mean."
City of Manila vs. Judge Laguio (G.R. No. 118127)
Facts:
The private respondent, Malate Tourist Development Corporation
(MTOC) is a corporation engaged in the business of operating hotels,
motels, hostels, and lodging houses. It built and opened Victoria Court
in Malate which was licensed as a motel although duly accredited with
the Department of Tourism as a hotel.
March 30, 1993 - City Mayor Alfredo S. Lim approved an ordinance
enacted which prohibited certain forms of amusement, entertainment,
services and facilities where women are used as tools in entertainment
and which tend to disturb the community, annoy the inhabitants, and
adversely affect the social and moral welfare of the community. The
Ordinance prohibited the establishment of sauna parlors, massage
parlors, karaoke bars, beerhouses, night clubs, day clubs, cabarets,
motels, inns. Owners and operators of the enumerated establishments
are given three months to wind up business operations or transfer to
any place outside Ermita-Malate or convert said businesses to other
kinds allowable within the area. The Ordinance also provided that in
case of violation and conviction, the premises of the erring
establishment shall be closed and padlocked permanently.
June 28, 1993 - MTOC filed a Petition with the lower court, praying
that the Ordinance, insofar as it included motels and inns as among its
prohibited establishments, be declared invalid and unconstitutional for
several reasons but mainly because it is not a valid exercise of police
power and it constitutes a denial of equal protection under the law.
Judge Laguio ruled for the petitioners. The case was elevated to the
Supreme Court.
Issue:
WON the Ordinance is constitutional.
Held:
SC held that the ordinance is unconstitutional for several reasons.
First, it did not meet the valid exercise of police power. To successfully
invoke the exercise of police power, not only must it appear that (1)the
interest of the public generally, as distinguished from those of a
particular class, require an interference with private rights, but (2)the
means employed must be reasonably necessary for the accomplishment
of the purpose and not unduly oppressive. The object of the ordinance
was the promotion and protection of the social and moral values of the
community. The closing down and transfer of businesses or their
conversion into businesses allowed under the ordinance have no
reasonable relation to its purpose. Otherwise stated, the prohibition of
the enumerated establishments will not per se protect and promote
social and moral welfare of the community. It will not itself eradicate
prostitution, adultery, fornication nor will it arrest the spread of sexual
disease in Manila.
Second. The modality employed constitutes unlawful taking. The
ordinance is unreasonable and oppressive as it substantially divests the
respondent of the beneficial use of its property. The ordinance forbids
running of the enumerated businesses in Ermita-Malate area and
instructs owners/operators to wind up their business operations or to
transfer outside the area or convert said business into allowed business.
An ordinance which permanently restricts the use of property that it
cannot be used for any reasonable purpose goes beyond regulation and
must be recognized as a taking of the property without just
compensation. It is intrusive and violative of the private property rights
of individuals. There are two types of taking: A possessory taking and
a regulatory taking. The latter occurs when the governments
regulation leaves no reasonable economically viable use of the property,
as in this case.
Third. The ordinance violates the equal protection clause. Equal
protection requires that all persons or things similarly situated should
be treated alike, both as to the rights conferred and responsibilities
imposed. Similar subjects, in other words, should not be treated
differently, so as to give undue favor to some. Legislative bodies are
allowed to classify the subjects of legislation provided the classification
is reasonable. To be valid, it must conform to the following
requirements: (1)It must be based on substantial distinction; (2)It must
be germane to the purpose of the law; (3)It must not be limited to
existing conditions only; and (4)It must apply equally to all members of
the class. In the Courts view, there are no substantial distinction
between motels, inns, pension houses, hotels, lodging houses or other
similar establishments. By definition, all are commercial establishments
providing lodging and usually meals and other services for the public.
No reason exists for prohibiting motels and inns but not pension houses,
hotels, lodging houses or other similar establishments. The Court
likewise cannot see the logic for prohibiting the business and operation
of motels in the Ermita-Malate area but not outside this area. A noxious
establishment does not become any less noxious if located outside the
area.
Fourth. The ordinance is repugnant to general laws, thus it is ultra
vires. The ordinance is in contravention of the Revised Administrative
Code as the Code merely empowers the local government units to
regulate, and not prohibit, the establishments enumerated. Not only
that, it likewise runs counter to the provisions of P.D. 499. The P.D. Had
already converted the residential Ermita-Malate area into a
commercial area. The decree allowed the establishment and operation
of all kinds of commercial establishments.
WHITE LIGHT CORPORATION v. CITY OF MANILA January 20,
2009
TINGA, J.:
FACTS:
The City Mayor, Alfredo Lim signed into law Ordinance No. 7774 which is
entitled, "An Ordinance Prohibiting Short-Time Admission, Short-Time
Admission Rates, and Wash-Up Rate Schemes in Hotels, Motels, Inns,
Lodging Houses, Pension Houses, and Similar Establishments in the City of
Manila" on December 3, 1992.
petitioners in this case filed a case before the RTC praying that the
ordinance be declared invalid and unconstitutional. RTC eventually
rendered its decision declaring the said ordinance null and void. It was then
elevated to the Court of Appeals which reversed the decision of the RTC
and affirmed the constitutional of the ordinance.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the said Ordinance is null and Void
RULING:
Yes, though the goal of the ordinance According to the Supreme Court, is to
eliminate and if not, minimize the use of covered establishments for illicit
sex, prostitution, drug use and alike. These goals by themselves are
unimpeachable and certainly fall within the ambit of the police power of the
State. However, the desirability of these ends do not sanctify any all means
for their achievement. Those means must align with the Constitution, and
our emerging sophisticated analysis of its guarantees to the people. The Bill
of Rights stands as a rebuke to the seductive theory of Macchiavelli, and,
sometimes even, the political majorities animated by his cynicism.
The Ordinance prevents the lawful uses of wash rate depriving patrons of a
product and the petitioners of lucrative business ties in with another
constitutional requisite for the legitimacy of the Ordinance as police power
measure. It must appear that the interest of the public, generally, as
distinguished from those of particular class, require an interference with
private rights and that the means employed be reasonably necessary for the
accomplishment of the purpose and not unduly oppressive of private rights.
It must be evident that no other alternative for the accomplishment of the
purpose less intrusive of the private rights can work. More importantly, a
reasonable relation must exist between the purpose of the measure and the
means employed for its accomplishment, for even under the guise of
protecting the public interest, personal rights and those pertaining to private
property will not be permitted to be arbitrarily invaded. Lacking a
concurrence of these requisites, the police measure shall be struck down as
an arbitrary intrusion into private rights.
Metropolitan Manila Development Authority vs. Trackworks Rail
Transit Advertising, Vending and Promotions, Inc.
Facts: In 1997, the Government, through the Department of Transportation
and Communications, entered into a build-lease-transfer agreement (BLT
agreement) with Metro Rail Transit Corporation, Limited (MRTC) pursuant
to Republic Act No. 6957 (Build, Operate and Transfer Law), under which
MRTC undertook to build MRT3 subject to the condition that MRTC would
own MRT3 for 25 years, upon the expiration of which the ownership would
transfer to the Government. In 1998, respondent Trackworks Rail Transit
Advertising, Vending & Promotions, Inc. (Trackworks) entered into a
contract for advertising services with MRTC. Trackworks thereafter
installed commercial billboards, signages and other advertising media in the
different parts of the MRT3. In 2001, however, MMDA requested
Trackworks to dismantle the billboards, signages and other advertising
media pursuant to MMDA Regulation No. 96-009, whereby MMDA
prohibited the posting, installation and display of any kind or form of
billboards, signs, posters, streamers, in any part of the road, sidewalk, center
island, posts, trees, parks and open space. After Trackworks refused the
request of MMDA, MMDA proceeded to dismantle the formers billboards
and similar forms of advertisement.
Issue: Whether MMDA has the power to dismantle, remove or destroy the
billboards, signages and other advertising media installed by Trackworks on
the interior and exterior structures of the MRT3.
Ruling: That Trackworks derived its right to install its billboards, signages
and other advertising media in the MRT3 from MRTCs authority under the
BLT agreement to develop commercial premises in the MRT3 structure or to
obtain advertising income therefrom is no longer debatable. Under the BLT
agreement, indeed, MRTC owned the MRT3 for 25 years, upon the
expiration of which MRTC would transfer ownership of the MRT3 to the
Government.
Considering that MRTC remained to be the owner of the MRT3 during the
time material to this case, and until this date, MRTCs entering into the
contract for advertising services with Trackworks was a valid exercise of
ownership by the former. In fact, in Metropolitan Manila Development
Authority v. Trackworks Rail Transit Advertising, Vending &
Promotions, Inc., this Court expressly recognized Trackworks right to
install the billboards, signages and other advertising media pursuant to said
contract. The latters right should, therefore, be respected.
It is futile for MMDA to simply invoke its legal mandate to justify the
dismantling of Trackworks billboards, signages and other advertising
media. MMDA simply had no power on its own to dismantle, remove, or
destroy the billboards, signages and other advertising media installed on the
MRT3 structure by Trackworks. In Metropolitan Manila Development
Authority v. Bel-Air Village Association, Inc., Metropolitan Manila
Development Authority v. Viron Transportation Co., Inc., and Metropolitan
Manila Development Authority v. Garin, the Court had the occasion to rule
that MMDAs powers were limited to the formulation, coordination,
regulation, implementation, preparation, management, monitoring, setting
of policies, installing a system, and administration. Nothing in Republic Act
No. 7924 granted MMDA police power, let alone legislative power.
The Court also agrees with the CAs ruling that MMDA Regulation No. 96-
009 and MMC Memorandum Circular No. 88-09 did not apply to
Trackworks billboards, signages and other advertising media. The
prohibition against posting, installation and display of billboards, signages
and other advertising media applied only to public areas, but MRT3, being
private property pursuant to the BLT agreement between the Government
and MRTC, was not one of the areas as to which the prohibition applied.
ASSOCIATION OF SMALL LANDOWNERS V SECRETARY OF
AGRARIAN REFORM
FACTS:
These are consolidated cases involving common legal questions including
serious challenges to the constitutionality of R.A. No. 6657 also known as
the "Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law of 1988"
In G.R. No. 79777, the petitioners are questioning the P.D No. 27 and E.O
Nos. 228 and 229 on the grounds inter alia of separation of powers, due
process, equal protection and the constitutional limitation that no private
property shall be taken for public use without just compensation.
In G.R. No. 79310, the petitioners in this case claim that the power to
provide for a Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program as decreed by the
Constitution belongs to the Congress and not to the President, the also
allege that Proclamation No. 131 and E.O No. 229 should be annulled for
violation of the constitutional provisions on just compensation, due process
and equal protection. They contended that the taking must be simultaneous
with payment of just compensation which such payment is not contemplated
in Section 5 of the E.O No. 229.
In G.R. No. 79744, the petitioner argues that E.O Nos. 228 and 229 were
invalidly issued by the President and that the said executive orders
violate the constitutional provision that no private property shall be taken
without due process or just compensation which was denied to the
petitioners.
In G.R. No 78742 the petitioners claim that they cannot eject their tenants
and so are unable to enjoy their right of retention because the Department of
Agrarian Reform has so far not issued the implementing rules of the decree.
They therefore ask the Honorable Court for a writ of mandamus to compel
the respondents to issue the said rules.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the laws being challenged is a valid exercise of Police
power or Power of Eminent Domain.
RULING:
Police Power through the Power of Eminent Domain, though there
are traditional distinction between the police power and the power of
eminent domain, property condemned under police power is noxious or
intended for noxious purpose, the compensation for the taking of such
property is not subject to compensation, unlike the taking of the property in
Eminent Domain or the power of expropriation which requires the payment
of just compensation to the owner of the property expropriated.
YNOT V INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT
FACTS:
Petitioner in this case transported six carabaos in a pump boat from Masbate
to Iloilo on January 13, 1984, when they were confiscated by the police
station commander of Barotac Nuevo, Iloilo for the violation of E.O. No.
626-A which prohibits the slaughter of carabaos except under certain
conditions. Petitioner sued for recovery, and the trial Court of Iloilo issued a
writ of replevin upon his filing of a supersedeas bond of twelve thousand
pesos (P 12, 000.00). After considering the merits of the case, the court
sustained the confiscation of the said carabaos and, since they could no
longer be produced, ordered the confiscation of the bond. The court also
declined to rule on the constitutionality of the E.O, as raised by the
petitioner, for lack of authority and also for its presumed validity.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the said Executive Order is unconstitutional.
RULING:
Yes, though police power was invoked by the government in this case for
the reason that the present condition demand that the carabaos and the
buffaloes be conserved for the benefit of the small farmers who rely on
them for energy needs, it does not however, comply with the second
requisite for a valid exercise of the said power which is, "that there be a
lawful method." The reasonable connection between the means employed
and the purpose sought to be achieved by the questioned measure is
missing.
The challenged measure is an invalid exercise of Police power because the
method employed to conserve the carabaos is not reasonably necessary to
the purpose of the law and, worse, is unduly oppressive. To justify the State
in the imposition of its authority in behalf of the public, it must be:
1) The interest of the public generally, as distinguished from those of a
particular class, require such interference;
2) that the means employed are reasonably necessary for the
accomplishment of the purpose, and not unduly oppressive upon
individuals.
PASEI v. Drilon
G.R. No. 81958 June 30, 1988, Sarmiento, J.
(Labor Standards, Police Power defined)
FACTS:
Phil association of Service Exporters, Inc., is engaged principally in the
recruitment of Filipino workers, male and female of overseas employment.
It challenges the constitutional validity of Dept. Order No. 1 (1998) of
DOLE entitled Guidelines Governing the Temporary Suspension of
Deployment of Filipino Domestic and Household Workers. It claims that
such order is a discrimination against males and females. The Order does
not apply to all Filipino workers but only to domestic helpers and females
with similar skills, and that it is in violation of the right to travel, it also
being an invalid exercise of the lawmaking power. Further, PASEI invokes
Sec 3 of Art 13 of the Constitution, providing for worker participation in
policy and decision-making processes affecting their rights and benefits as
may be provided by law. Thereafter the Solicitor General on behalf of
DOLE submitting to the validity of the challenged guidelines involving the
police power of the State and informed the court that the respondent have
lifted the deployment ban in some states where there exists bilateral
agreement with the Philippines and existing mechanism providing for
sufficient safeguards to ensure the welfare and protection of the Filipino
workers.
ISSUE:
Whether or not D.O. No. 1 of DOLE is constitutional as it is an exercise of
police power.
RULING:
[Police power] has been defined as the "state authority to enact legislation
that may interfere with personal liberty or property in order to promote the
general welfare." As defined, it consists of (1) an imposition of restraint
upon liberty or property, (2) in order to foster the common good. It is not
capable of an exact definition but has been, purposely, veiled in general
terms to underscore its all-comprehensive embrace.
The petitioner has shown no satisfactory reason why the contested measure
should be nullified. There is no question that Department Order No. 1
applies only to "female contract workers," but it does not thereby make an
undue discrimination between the sexes. It is well-settled that "equality
before the law" under the Constitution does not import a perfect Identity of
rights among all men and women. It admits of classifications, provided that
(1) such classifications rest on substantial distinctions; (2) they are germane
to the purposes of the law; (3) they are not confined to existing conditions;
and (4) they apply equally to all members of the same class.
The Court is satisfied that the classification made-the preference for female
workers rests on substantial distinctions.
LOZANO V MARTINEZ
FACTS:
This is a consolidated case, the petition arose from cases involving
prosecution of offenses under the BP 22 also known as Bouncing Check
Law. The defendant in these case moved seasonably to quash
the information on the ground that the acts charged did not constitute an
offense, the statute being unconstitutional. The motions were denied by the
respondent trial court, except in one case, which is the subject of G.R No.
75789, wherein the trial court declared the law unconstitutional and
dismissed the case. The parties adversely affected have come to the court
for remedy. Those who question the constitutionality of the said statute
insist the following ground:
1) It offends the constitutional provision forbidding imprisonment for debt;
2) it impairs freedom of contract;
3) it contravenes the equal protection clause;
4) it unduly delegates legislative and executive powers; and
5) its enactment is flawed in the sense that during its passage the interim
Batasan violated the constitutional provision prohibiting to a bill on Third
Reading.
ISSUE:
Whether or not BP 22 or the Bouncing Check Law is unconstitutional.
RULING:
No, the enactment of the assailed statute is a valid exercise of Police power
and is not repugnant to the constitutional inhibition against imprisonment
for debt. It may be constitutionally impermissible for the legislature to
penalize a person for non-payment of debt ex contractu, but certainly it is
within the prerogative of the lawmaking body to prescribe certain acts
deemed pernicious and inimical to public welfare. Acts mala in se are not
only acts which the law can punish. An act may not be considered by
society as inherently wrong, hence, not malum in se, but because of the
harm that it inflicts on the community, it can be outlawed and criminally
punished as malum prohibitum. The state can do this in the exercise of its
police power.
The enactment of the said statute is a declaration by the legislature that, as a
matter of public policy, the making and issuance of a worthless check is
deemed a public nuisance to be abated by the imposition of penal sanctions.
DECS V SAN DIEGO
Facts:
Respondent San Diego has flunked the NMAT (National Medical
Admission Test) three times. When he applied to take again, petitioner
rejected his application based on the three-flunk-rule. He then filed a
petition before the RTC on the ground of due process and equal protection
and challenging the constitutionality of the order. The petition was granted
by the RTC therefore this petition.
Issue:
Whether or not the NMAT three-flunk-rule order is valid and
constitutional.
Ruling:
Yes. It is the right and responsibility of the State to insure that the medical
profession is not infiltrated by incompetents to whom patients may unwarily
entrust their lives and health. The method employed by the challenged
regulation is not irrelevant to the purpose of the law nor is it arbitrary or
oppressive. The right to quality education is not absolute. The Constitution
provides that every citizen has the right to choose a profession or course
of study, subject to fair, reasonable and equitable admission and academic
requirements. It is not enough to simply invoke the right to quality
education as a guarantee of the Constitution but one must show that he is
entitled to it because of his preparation and promise. Petition was granted
and the RTC ruling was reversed.
CITY GOVERNMENT OF QUEZON CITY V ERICTA
Facts:
Section 9 of Ordinance No. 6118, S-64 provides that at least 6% of the total
area of the memorial park cemetery shall be set aside for the charity burial
of deceased persons who are paupers and have been residents of Quezon
City for at least 5 years prior to their death. As such, the Quezon City
engineer required the respondent, Himlayang Pilipino Inc, to stop any
further selling and/or transaction of memorial park lots in Quezon City
where the owners thereof have failed to donate the required 6% space
intended for paupers burial.
The then Court of First Instance and its judge, Hon. Ericta, declared Section
9 of Ordinance No. 6118, S-64 null and void.
Petitioners argued that the taking of the respondents property is a valid and
reasonable exercise of police power and that the land is taken for a public
use as it is intended for the burial ground of paupers. They further argued
that the Quezon City Council is authorized under its charter, in the exercise
of local police power, to make such further ordinances and resolutions not
repugnant to law as may be necessary to carry into effect and discharge the
powers and duties conferred by this Act and such as it shall deem necessary
and proper to provide for the health and safety, promote the prosperity,
improve the morals, peace, good order, comfort and convenience of the city
and the inhabitants thereof, and for the protection of property therein.
On the otherhand, respondent Himlayang Pilipino, Inc. contended that the
taking or confiscation of property was obvious because the questioned
ordinance permanently restricts the use of the property such that it cannot be
used for any reasonable purpose and deprives the owner of all beneficial use
of his property.
Issue:Is Section 9 of the ordinance in question a valid exercise of the police
power?
Held:
No. The Sec. 9 of the ordinance is not a valid exercise of the police power.
Occupying the forefront in the bill of rights is the provision which states
that no person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property without due
process of law (Art. Ill, Section 1 subparagraph 1, Constitution). On the
other hand, there are three inherent powers of government by which the
state interferes with the property rights, namely-. (1) police power, (2)
eminent domain, (3) taxation. These are said to exist independently of the
Constitution as necessary attributes of sovereignty.
An examination of the Charter of Quezon City (Rep. Act No. 537), does not
reveal any provision that would justify the ordinance in question except the
provision granting police power to the City. Section 9 cannot be justified
under the power granted to Quezon City to tax, fix the license fee, and
regulate such other business, trades, and occupation as may be established
or practised in the City. The power to regulate does not include the power to
prohibit or confiscate. The ordinance in question not only confiscates but
also prohibits the operation of a memorial park cemetery.
Police power is defined by Freund as the power of promoting the public
welfare by restraining and regulating the use of liberty and property. It is
usually exerted in order to merely regulate the use and enjoyment of
property of the owner. If he is deprived of his property outright, it is not
taken for public use but rather to destroy in order to promote the general
welfare. In police power, the owner does not recover from the government
for injury sustained in consequence thereof.
Under the provisions of municipal charters which are known as the general
welfare clauses, a city, by virtue of its police power, may adopt ordinances
to the peace, safety, health, morals and the best and highest interests of the
municipality. It is a well-settled principle, growing out of the nature of well-
ordered and society, that every holder of property, however absolute and
may be his title, holds it under the implied liability that his use of it shall not
be injurious to the equal enjoyment of others having an equal right to the
enjoyment of their property, nor injurious to the rights of the community. A
property in the state is held subject to its general regulations, which are
necessary to the common good and general welfare. Rights of property, like
all other social and conventional rights, are subject to such reasonable
limitations in their enjoyment as shall prevent them from being injurious,
and to such reasonable restraints and regulations, established by law, as the
legislature, under the governing and controlling power vested in them by the
constitution, may think necessary and expedient. The state, under the police
power, is possessed with plenary power to deal with all matters relating to
the general health, morals, and safety of the people, so long as it does not
contravene any positive inhibition of the organic law and providing that
such power is not exercised in such a manner as to justify the interference of
the courts to prevent positive wrong and oppression.
However, in the case at hand, there is no reasonable relation between the
setting aside of at least six (6) percent of the total area of an private
cemeteries for charity burial grounds of deceased paupers and the
promotion of health, morals, good order, safety, or the general welfare of the
people. The ordinance is actually a taking without compensation of a certain
area from a private cemetery to benefit paupers who are charges of the
municipal corporation. Instead of building or maintaining a public cemetery
for this purpose, the city passes the burden to private cemeteries.
The expropriation without compensation of a portion of private cemeteries
is not covered by Section 12(t) of Republic Act 537, the Revised Charter of
Quezon City which empowers the city council to prohibit the burial of the
dead within the center of population of the city and to provide for their
burial in a proper place subject to the provisions of general law regulating
burial grounds and cemeteries. When the Local Government Code, Batas
Pambansa Blg. 337 provides in Section 177 (q) that a Sangguniang
panlungsod may provide for the burial of the dead in such place and in
such manner as prescribed by law or ordinance it simply authorizes the city
to provide its own city owned land or to buy or expropriate private
properties to construct public cemeteries. This has been the law and practise
in the past. It continues to the present. Expropriation, however, requires
payment of just compensation. The questioned ordinance is different from
laws and regulations requiring owners of subdivisions to set aside certain
areas for streets, parks, playgrounds, and other public facilities from the
land they sell to buyers of subdivision lots. The necessities of public safety,
health, and convenience are very clear from said requirements which are
intended to insure the development of communities with salubrious and
wholesome environments. The beneficiaries of the regulation, in turn, are
made to pay by the subdivision developer when individual lots are sold to
home-owners.
WHEREFORE, the petition for review is hereby DISMISSED. The decision
of the respondent court is affirmed.
OFFICE OF THE SOLICITOR GENERAL V AYALA LAND INC.
Facts
This is a petition for review on certiorari seeking the reversal and setting
aside of the decision of the court of appeals which
affirmed the decision of the Makati RTC in two civil cases and the
resolution of the appellate court in the same case which denied
the motion for reconsideration filed by the OSG.
Respondents herein are operators of shopping malls in various locations in
Metro Manila that have parking facilities (inside the
main buildings, in separate buildings and/or in adjacent lots solely provided
for parking use). The respondents are also the one
which maintains the parking spaces and in turn, they collect parking fees
subject to their imposed parking rates.
The Senate Committee on Trade and Commerce and on Justice and Human
Rights conducted a joint investigation to inquire on the
legality of the parking fees and to find out the basis and reasonableness of
the parking rates. More importantly, to determine the legality of the policy
of the shopping malls denying liability in cases of theft, robbery or
carnapping by invoking the waiver clause at
the back of the parking tickets.
After the public hearings, the Senate Committees jointly concluded that the
collection parking fee is contrary to the National
Building Code and that the reasonable interpretation of the code is that the
parking spaces are for free; thus, the Committee
recommended that the Office of the Solicitor General should institute the
necessary action to enjoin the collection of parking fees as
well as to enforce the penal sanctions of the National Building Code.
Two civil cases arise and by being of the same subject matter, the RTC
Makati issued an order to consolidate the cases. The court
ruled that the respondents are not obligated to provide parking spaces that
are free of charge, compelling them to do so would be
an unlawful taking of property right without just compensation. The
petitioners sought for relief by filing a Motion for Reconsideration
in the Court of Appeals but the appellate court denied the appeal and
affirmed the joint decision by the RTC.
Hence, this present petition with a single assignment of error that the Court
of Appeals erred in affirming the ruling of the lower Court.
ISSUES: 1. Whether the CA erred in affirming the ruling of RTC that
respondents are not obliged to provide free parking spaces to their
customers or the public.
2. Whether the petition of OSG for prohibiting the collection of parking fees
is a valid exercise of the police power of State.
HELD: Consequently, the OSG cannot claim that in addition to fixing the
minimum requirements for parking spaces for buildings, Rule XIX of the
IRR also mandates that such parking spaces be provided by building owners
free of charge. If Rule XIX is not covered by the enabling law, then it
cannot be added to or included in the implementing rules. The rule-making
power of administrative agencies must be confined to details for regulating
the mode or proceedings to carry into effect the law as it has been enacted,
and it cannot be extended to amend or expand the statutory requirements or
to embrace matters not covered by the statute. Administrative regulations
must always be in harmony with the provisions of the law because any
resulting discrepancy between the two will always be resolved in favor of
the basic law.
2. No. The petition of OSG to prohibit collection of parking fees is not a
valid exercise of the police power of State.
It is not sufficient for the OSG to claim that the power to regulate and
control the use, occupancy, and maintenance of buildings and structures
carries with it the power to impose fees and, conversely, to control, partially
or, as in this case, absolutely, the imposition of such fees. Firstly, the fees
within the power of regulatory agencies to impose are regulatory fees. It has
been settled law in this jurisdiction that this broad and all-compassing
governmental competence to restrict rights of liberty and property carries
with it the undeniable power to collect a regulatory fee. It looks to the
enactment of specific measures that govern the relations not only as
between individuals but also as between private parties and the political
society. True, if the regulatory agencies have the power to impose regulatory
fees, then conversely, they also have the power to remove the same. Even
so, it is worthy to note that the present case does not involve the imposition
by the DPWH Secretary and local building officials of regulatory fees upon
respondents; but the collection by respondents of parking fees from persons
who use the mall parking facilities. Secondly, assuming arguendo that the
DPWH Secretary and local building officials do have regulatory powers
over the collection of parking fees for the use of privately owned parking
facilities, they cannot allow or prohibit such collection arbitrarily or
whimsically. Whether allowing or prohibiting the collection of such parking
fees, the action of the DPWH Secretary and local building officials must
pass the test of classic reasonableness and propriety of the measures or
means in the promotion of the ends sought to be accomplished.
Without using the term outright, the OSG is actually invoking police power
to justify the regulation by the State, through the DPWH Secretary and local
building officials, of privately owned parking facilities, including the
collection by the owners/operators of such facilities of parking fees from the
public for the use thereof. The Court finds, however, that in totally
prohibiting respondents from collecting parking fees, the State would be
acting beyond the bounds of police power.
Police power is the power of promoting the public welfare by restraining
and regulating the use of liberty and property. It is usually exerted in order
to merely regulate the use and enjoyment of the property of the owner. The
power to regulate, however, does not include the power to prohibit. A
fortiori, the power to regulate does not include the power to confiscate.
Police power does not involve the taking or confiscation of property, with
the exception of a few cases where there is a necessity to confiscate private
property in order to destroy it for the purpose of protecting peace and order
and of promoting the general welfare; for instance, the confiscation of an
illegally possessed article, such as opium and firearms.
When there is a taking or confiscation of private property for public use, the
State is no longer exercising police power, but another of its inherent
powers, namely, eminent domain. Eminent domain enables the State to
forcibly acquire private lands intended for public use upon payment of just
compensation to the owner.
Normally, of course, the power of eminent domain results in the taking or
appropriation of title to, and possession of, the expropriated property; but no
cogent reason appears why the said power may not be availed of only to
impose a burden upon the owner of condemned property, without loss of
title and possession. It is a settled rule that neither acquisition of title nor
total destruction of value is essential to taking. It is usually in cases where
title remains with the private owner that inquiry should be made to
determine whether the impairment of a property is merely regulated or
amounts to a compensable taking. A regulation that deprives any person of
the profitable use of his property constitutes a taking and entitles him to
compensation, unless the invasion of rights is so slight as to permit the
regulation to be justified under the police power. Similarly, a police
regulation that unreasonably restricts the right to use business property for
business purposes amounts to a taking of private property, and the owner
may recover therefor.
Although in the present case, title to and/or possession of the parking
facilities remain/s with respondents, the prohibition against their collection
of parking fees from the public, for the use of said facilities, is already
tantamount to a taking or confiscation of their properties. The State is not
only requiring that respondents devote a portion of the latters properties for
use as parking spaces, but is also mandating that they give the public access
to said parking spaces for free. Such is already an excessive intrusion into
the property rights of respondents. Not only are they being deprived of the
right to use a portion of their properties as they wish, they are further amounts to a taking of respondents property without payment of just
prohibited from profiting from its use or even just recovering therefrom the compensation.
expenses for the maintenance and operation of the required parking
facilities.
In conclusion, the total prohibition against the collection by respondents of
parking fees from persons who use the mall parking facilities has no basis in
the National Building Code or its IRR. The State also cannot impose the
same prohibition by generally invoking police power, since said prohibition