CONSTI 2 DIGEST

SEARCHES AND SEIZURES

Cases in book

Case #1: Stonehill vs Diokno

Facts: Respondent (prosecution) made possible the issuance of 42

search warrants against the petitioner and the corporation to search
persons and premises of several personal properties due to an
alleged violation of Central Bank Laws, Tariff and Custom Laws,
Internal Revenue Code and the Revised Penal Code of the
Philippines. As a results, search and seizures were conducted in the
both the residence of the petitioner and in the corporation's
premises.

2.The petitioner contended that the search warrants are null and
void as their issuance violated the Constitution and the Rules of
Court for being general warrants. Thus,he filed a petition with the
Supreme Court for certiorari, prohibition, mandamus and injunction
to prevent the seized effects from being introduced as evidence in
the deportation cases against the petitioner. The court issued the
writ only for those effects found in the petitioner's residence.

Issue: Whether or not the petitioner can validly assail the legality of
the search and seizure in both premises

Ruling: No. See ADONIS NOTES

Case #2: Pita vs CA

Facts: Pursuant to the Anti-Smut Campaign of Mayor Ramon

Bagatsng, policemen seized and confiscated from dealers,
distributors, newsstand owners and peddlers along Manila
sidewalks, magazines, publications and other reading materials
believed to be obscene, pornographic, and indecent and later
burned the seized materials in public. Among the publications seized
and later burned was "Pinoy Playboy" magazines published and co-
edited by plaintiff Leo Pita. After his injunctive relief was dismissed
by the RTC and his appeal rejected by CA, he seeks review with SC,
invoking the guaranty against unreasonable searches and seizure.

Issue: W/N the search and seizure was illegal

HELD: YES. It is basic that searches and seizure may be done only
through a judicial warrant , otherwise, they become unreasonable
and subject to challenge. In Burgos v Chief of Staff (133 SCRA 800) ,
the SC countermanded the orders of the RTC authorizing the serach
of the premises WE Forum and Metropolitan Mail, two Metro Manila
Dailies, by reason of a defective warrant. There is a greater reason
in this case to reprobate the questioned raid, in the complete
absence of a warrant, valid or invalid. The fact that the instant case
involves an obscenity rap makes it no different from Burgos, a
political case, because speech is speech, whether political or
"obscene". The authorities must apply for the issuance of the a
search warrant from the judge , if in their opinion, an obscenity rap
is in order. They must convince the court that the materials sought
to be seized are "obscene" and pose a clear and present danger of
an evil substantive enough to warrant State interference and action.
The judge must determine WON the same are indeed "obscene": the
question is to be resolved on a case-to-case basis and on the judge's
sound discretion. If probable cause exist, a search warrant will issue.

Case #3: Disini vs Executive Secretary

TOPIC: Cybercrime law

Facts: Petitioners assail the validity of several provision of the

Republic Act (R.A.) 10175, the Cybercrime Prevention Act of 2012.

Petitioners claim that the means adopted by the cybercrime law for
regulating undesirable cyberspace activities violate certain of their
constitutional rights. The government of course asserts that the law
merely seeks to reasonably put order into cyberspace activities,
punish wrongdoings, and prevent hurtful attacks on the system.

Issue: W/N Section 19 is violative of the constitutional guarantee to

unreasonable searches and seizures

Ruling: Yes. Section 2, Article III of the 1987 Constitution provides

that the right to be secure in ones papers and effects against
unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any
purpose shall be inviolable. Further, it states that no search warrant
shall issue except upon probable cause to be determined personally
by the judge. Here, the Government, in effect, seizes and places the
computer data under its control and disposition without a warrant.
The Department of Justice order cannot substitute for judicial search
warrant.

The content of the computer data can also constitute speech. In

such a case, Section 19 operates as a restriction on the freedom of
expression over cyberspace. Certainly not all forms of speech are
protected. Legislature may, within constitutional bounds, declare
certain kinds of expression as illegal. But for an executive officer to
seize content alleged to be unprotected without any judicial warrant,
it is not enough for him to be of the opinion that such content
violates some law, for to do so would make him judge, jury, and
executioner all rolled into one.
Not only does Section 19 preclude any judicial intervention, but it
also disregards jurisprudential guidelines established to determine
the validity of restrictions on speech. Restraints on free speech are
generally evaluated on one of or a combination of three tests: the
dangerous tendency doctrine, the balancing of interest test, and the
clear and present danger rule. Section 19, however, merely requires
that the data to be blocked be found prima facie in violation of any
provision of the cybercrime law. Taking Section 6 into consideration,
this can actually be made to apply in relation to any penal provision.
It does not take into consideration any of the three tests mentioned
above.

The Court is therefore compelled to strike down Section 19 for being

violative of the constitutional guarantees to freedom of expression
and against unreasonable searches and seizures.

SUB Q: What is Section 19?

A: Sec. 19. Restricting or Blocking Access to Computer Data. When a

computer data is prima facie found to be in violation of the
provisions of this Act, the DOJ shall issue an order to restrict or block
access to such computer data.

Case #4: Soliven vs Makasiar

Facts: In these consolidated cases, three principal issues were

raised: (1) whether or not petitioners were denied due process when
informations for libel were filed against them although the finding of
the existence of a prima facie case was still under review by the
Secretary of Justice and, subsequently, by the President; and (2)
whether or not the constitutional rights of Beltran were violated
when respondent RTC judge issued a warrant for his arrest without
personally examining the complainant and the witnesses, if any, to
determine probable cause. Subsequent events have rendered the
first issue moot and academic. On March 30, 1988, the Secretary of
Justice denied petitioners' motion for reconsideration and upheld the
resolution of the Undersecretary of Justice sustaining the City
Fiscal's finding of a prima facie case against petitioners. A second
motion for reconsideration filed by petitioner Beltran was denied by
the Secretary of Justice on April 7, 1988. On appeal, the President,
through theExecutive Secretary, affirmed the resolution of the
Secretary of Justice on May 2, 1988. The motion for reconsideration
was denied by theExecutive Secretary on May 16, 1988. With these
developments, petitioners' contention that they have been denied
the administrative remedies available under the law has lost factual
support.

Ruling: See ADONIS NOTES

Case #5: Morano vs Vivo

Facts: Chan Sau Wah, a Chinese citizen, together with her minor son
in her first marriage, Fuyan Fun arrived in the Philippines to visit her
cousin. they are permitted only into the Philippines under a
temporary visitor's visa for two months and after they posted a cash
bond of 4,000. afterwards, Chan married Esteban Morano, native
Filipino citizen. to prolong their stay in the Philippines, chan and Fu
obtained several extension. The last extension expired on
September 10, 1962.

In a letter, the commissioner of Immigration ordered Chan and Fu to

leave the country on or before September 10 with a warning that
upon failure so to do, he will issue a warrant for their arrest and will
cause the confiscation of their bond.

Instead of leaving the country they petitioned the court of first

instance for mandamus to compel the commissioner of immigration
to cancel petitioners' alien certificate of registration, prohibition to
stop the issuance of warrant of arrest and preliminary injunction to
restrain the confiscation of their cash bond.

Issue: Whether or not the commissioner of immigration can issue

warrant of arrest

Ruling: See ADONIS NOTES

Case #6: Salazar vs Achacoso

Facts: This concerns the validity of the power of the Secretary of

Labor to issue warrants of arrest and seizure under Article 38 of the
Labor Code, prohibiting illegal recruitment.

On October 21, 1987, Rosalie Tesoro filed with the POEA a complaint
against petitioner. Having ascertained that the petitioner had no
license to operate a recruitment agency, public respondent
Administrator Tomas D. Achacoso issued his challenged CLOSURE
AND SEIZURE ORDER.

The POEA brought a team to the premises of Salazar to implement

the order. There it was found that petitioner was operating Hannalie
Dance Studio. Before entering the place, the team served said
Closure and Seizure order on a certain Mrs. Flora Salazar who
voluntarily allowed them entry into the premises. Mrs. Flora Salazar
informed the team that Hannalie Dance Studio was accredited with
Moreman Development (Phil.). However, when required to show
credentials, she was unable to produce any. Inside the studio, the
team chanced upon twelve talent performers practicing a dance
number and saw about twenty more waiting outside, The team
confiscated assorted costumes which were duly receipted for by
Mrs. Asuncion Maguelan and witnessed by Mrs. Flora Salazar.

A few days after, petitioner filed a letter with the POEA demanding
the return of the confiscated properties. They alleged lack of hearing
and due process, and that since the house the POEA raided was a
private residence, it was robbery.

On February 2, 1988, the petitioner filed this suit for prohibition.

Although the acts sought to be barred are already fait accompli,
thereby making prohibition too late, we consider the petition as one
for certiorari in view of the grave public interest involved.

ISSUE: May the Philippine Overseas Employment Administration (or

the Secretary of Labor) validly issue warrants of search and seizure
(or arrest) under Article 38 of the Labor Code?

Ruling: No. SEE ADONIS NOTES

Case #7: PICOP vs Asuncion

Facts: On January 25, 1995, Police Chief Inspector Napoleon B.

Pascua applied for a search warrant before the RTC of Quezon City,
stating: 1. That the management of Paper Industries Corporation of
the Philippines, located at PICOP compound, is in possession or ha[s]
in [its] control high powered firearms, ammunitions, explosives,
which are the subject of the offense, or used or intended to be used
in committing the offense, and which . . . are [being kept] and
conceal[ed] in the premises described; 2. That a Search Warrant
should be issued to enable any agent of the law to take possession
and bring to the described properties. After propounding several
questions to Bacolod, Judge Maximiano C. Asuncion issued the
contested search warrant. On February 4, 1995, the police enforced
the search warrant at the PICOP compound and seized a number of
firearms and explosives. Believing that the warrant was invalid and
the search unreasonable, the petitioners filed a Motion to Quash
before the trial court. Subsequently, they also filed a Supplemental
Pleading to the Motion to Quash and a Motion to
SuppressEvidence. On March 23, 1995, the RTC issued the first
contested Order which denied petitioners motions. On August 3,
1995, the trial court rendered its second contested Order denying
petitioners Motion for Reconsideration.

ISSUE: WON the search warrant issued was valid

Ruling: The requisites of a valid search warrant are: (1) probable

cause is present; (2) such presence is determined personally by the
judge; (3) the complainant and the witnesses he or she may
produce are personally examined by the judge, in writing and under
oath or affirmation; (4) the applicant and the witnesses testify on
facts personally known to them; and (5) the warrant specifically
describes the place to be searched and the things to be seized. In
the present case, the search warrant is invalid because (1) the trial
court failed to examine personally the complainant and the other
deponents; (2) SPO3 Cicero Bacolod, who appeared during the
hearing for the issuance of the search warrant, had no personal
knowledge that petitioners were not licensed to possess the subject
firearms; and (3) the place to be searched was not described with
particularity.

Case #8: Nolasco vs Pano

Facts: Milagros Aguilar-Roque was arrested together with Cynthia

Nolasco by the Constabulary Security Group (CSG). Milagros had
been wanted as a high ranking officer of the CPP. The arrest took
place at 11:30 a.m. of August 6, 1984. At noon of the same day, her
premises were searched and 428 documents, a portable typewriter
and 2 boxes were seized.

Earlier that day, Judge Cruz Pao issued a search warrant to be

served at Aguilar-Roques leased residence allegedly an
underground house of the CPP/NPA. On the basis of the documents
seized, charges of subversion and rebellion by the CSG were filed by
but the fiscals office merely charged her and Nolasco with illegal
possession of subversive materials. Aguilar-Roque asked for
suppression of the evidence on the ground that it was illegally
obtained and that the search warrant is void because it is a general
warrant since it does not sufficiently describe with particularity the
things subject of the search and seizure, and that probable cause
has not been properly established for lack of searching questions
propounded to the applicants witness.

ISSUE: WON the search warrant was valid

RUuling: NO. Section 3, Article IV of the Constitution, guarantees the

right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and
effects against unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever
nature and for any purpose. It also specifically provides that no
Search Warrant shall issue except upon probable cause to be
determined by the Judge or such other responsible officer as may be
authorized by law, after examination under oath or affirmation of
the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly
describing the place to be searched and the things to be seized.

It is at once evident that the foregoing Search Warrant authorizes

the seizure of personal properties vaguely described and not
particularized. It is an all- embracing description which includes
everything conceivable regarding the Communist Party of the
Philippines and the National Democratic Front. It does not specify
what the subversive books and instructions are; what the manuals
not otherwise available to the public contain to make them
subversive or to enable them to be used for the crime of rebellion.
There is absent a definite guideline to the searching team as to what
items might be lawfully seized thus giving the officers of the law
discretion regarding what articles they should seize as, in fact, taken
also were a portable typewriter and 2 wooden boxes.

It is thus in the nature of a general warrant and infringes on the

constitutional mandate requiring particular description of the things
to be seized. In the recent rulings of this Court, search warrants of
similar description were considered null and void for being too
general.

Case #9: Espano vs CA

Facts: Pat. Pagilagan together with other police officers went to

Zamora and Pandacan Streets, Manila to confirm reports of drug
pushing in the area. They saw petitioner selling something to
another person. After the alleged buyer left, they approached
petitioner, identified themselves as policemen, and frisked him. The
search yielded two plastic cellophane tea bags of marijuana. When
asked if he had more marijuana, he replied that there was more in
his house. The policemen went to his residence where they found
ten more cellophane tea bags of marijuana. Petitioner was brought
to the police headquarters where he was charged of possession of
prohibited drugs.

Issue: Whether or not the pieces of evidence were inadmissible

Ruling: The Supreme Court held that Section 5 Rule 113 of the Rules
of Court provides:

Arrest without warrant; when lawful a peace officer or a private

person may, without a warrant, arrest a person:

When, in the presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is

actually committing, or is attempting to commit an offense . . .

Petitioners arrest falls squarely under the aforecited rule. He

was caught in flagrante as a result of a buy bust operation
conducted by police officers on the basis of information received
regarding the illegal trade of drugs within the area. The police
officer saw petitioner handling over something to an alleged buyer.
After the buyer left, they searched him and discovered two
cellophane of marijuana. His arrest was, therefore, lawful and the
two cellophane bag of marijuana seized were admissible in
evidence, being fruits of the crime.

Case #10: Terry vs Ohio

Facts: Cleveland, Ohio detective McFadden was on a downtown beat

that he had been patrolling for many years when he observed two
strangers (Terry and another man, Chilton) at a street corner. He
saw them proceed alternately back and forth along an identical
route, pausing to stare in the same store window, which they did for
a total of about 24 times. Each completion of the route was followed
by a conference between the two on a corner, at one of which they
were joined by a third man (Katz) who thereafter left swiftly.

Suspecting the two men of casing a job, a stick-up, the officer

followed them and saw them rejoin the third man a couple of blocks
away in front of a store. The officer approached the three, identified
himself as a policeman, and asked their names. The men mumbled
something, whereupon McFadden spun Terry around, patted down
his outside clothing, and felt in his overcoat pocket but was unable
to remove a pistol. He removed Terrys overcoat, took out a
revolver, and ordered the three to face the wall with their hands
raised. He patted down the outer clothing of Chilton and Katz and
seized a revolver from Chiltons outside overcoat pocket. He did not
put his hands under the outer garments of Katz (since he discovered
nothing in his pat-down which might have been a weapon), or under
Terrys or Chiltons outer garments until he felt the guns.

Terry and Chilton were charged with carrying concealed weapons.

The defense moved to suppress the weapons, which was denied by
the trial court. Terry eventually went to the U.S. Supreme Court to
question the admissibility of the gun and his resulting conviction.

II. THE ISSUE

Was the gun seized from Terry admissible in evidence against him
and thus his conviction of carrying concealed weapon was proper?

III. THE RULING

[The U.S. Supreme Court voted 8-1 to AFFIRM Terrys conviction of

carrying a concealed weapon.]

YES, the gun seized from Terry was admissible in evidence against
him; thus, his conviction of carrying concealed weapon was proper.

First, in assessing the reasonableness of stop-and-frisk as a valid

form of warrantless search, the U.S. Supreme Court held:
The crux of this case, however, is not the propriety of Officer
McFaddens taking steps to investigate [Terrys] suspicious behavior,
but rather, whether there was justification for McFaddens invasion
of Terry's personal security by searching him for weapons in the
course of that investigation. We are now concerned with more than
the governmental interest in investigating crime; in addition, there
is the more immediate interest of the police officer in taking steps to
assure himself that the person with whom he is dealing is not armed
with a weapon that could unexpectedly and fatally be used against
him. Certainly it would be unreasonable to require that police
officers take unnecessary risks in the performance of their duties.
xxx

xxx [W]e cannot blind ourselves to the need for law enforcement
officers to protect themselves and other prospective victims of
violence in situations where they may lack probable cause for an
arrest. When an officer is justified in believing that the individual
whose suspicious behavior he is investigating at close range is
armed and presently dangerous to the officer or to others, it would
appear to be clearly unreasonable to deny the officer the power to
take necessary measures to determine whether the person is in fact
carrying a weapon and to neutralize the threat of physical harm.

xxx xxx xxx

xxx. A search for weapons in the absence of probable cause to

arrest, however, must, like any other search, be strictly
circumscribed by the exigencies which justify its initiation. Thus it
must be limited to that which is necessary for the discovery of
weapons which might be used to harm the officer or others nearby,
and may realistically be characterized as something less than a full
search, even though it remains a serious intrusion.

Next, on the distinction between protective search for weapons

under stop-and-frisk on one hand, and arrest (and the search
incidental thereof) on the other hand, it was declared:

An arrest is a wholly different kind of intrusion upon individual

freedom from a limited search for weapons, and the interests each
is designed to serve are likewise quite different. An arrest is the
initial stage of a criminal prosecution. It is intended to vindicate
society's interest in having its laws obeyed, and it is inevitably
accompanied by future interference with the individuals freedom of
movement, whether or not trial or conviction ultimately follows. The
protective search for weapons, on the other hand, constitutes a
brief, though far from inconsiderable, intrusion upon the sanctity of
the person. It does not follow that because an officer may lawfully
arrest a person only when he is apprised of facts sufficient to
warrant a belief that the person has committed or is committing a
crime, the officer is equally unjustified, absent that kind of evidence,
in making any intrusions short of an arrest. Moreover, a perfectly
reasonable apprehension of danger may arise long before the officer
is possessed of adequate information to justify taking a person into
custody for the purpose of prosecuting him for a crime. Petitioners
reliance on cases which have worked out standards of
reasonableness with regard to seizures constituting arrests and
searches incident thereto is thus misplaced. It assumes that the
interests sought to be vindicated and the invasions of personal
security may be equated in the two cases, and thereby ignores a
vital aspect of the analysis of the reasonableness of particular types
of conduct under the [right against unreasonable search and
seizure].

Our evaluation of the proper balance that has to be struck in this

type of case leads us to conclude that there must be a narrowly
drawn authority to permit a reasonable search for weapons for the
protection of the police officer, where he has reason to believe that
he is dealing with an armed and dangerous individual, regardless of
whether he has probable cause to arrest the individual for a crime.
The officer need not be absolutely certain that the individual is
armed; the issue is whether a reasonably prudent man in the
circumstances would be warranted in the belief that his safety or
that of others was in danger.

xxx xxx xxx

xxx [The protective search for weapons under stop-and-frisk], unlike

a search without a warrant incident to a lawful arrest, is not justified
by any need to prevent the disappearance or destruction of
evidence of crime. The sole justification of the search in the present
situation is the protection of the police officer and others nearby,
and it must therefore be confined in scope to an intrusion
reasonably designed to discover guns, knives, clubs, or other hidden
instruments for the assault of the police officer. (Emphasis
supplied)

Revolver seized from Terry admissible in evidence

The U.S. Supreme Court concluded that the revolver seized from
Terry was properly admitted in evidence against him, thus:

xxx. At the time he seized [Terry] and searched him for weapons,
Officer McFadden had reasonable grounds to believe that petitioner
was armed and dangerous, and it was necessary for the protection
of himself and others to take swift measures to discover the true
facts and neutralize the threat of harm if it materialized. The
policeman carefully restricted his search to what was appropriate to
the discovery of the particular items which he sought. Each case of
this sort will, of course, have to be decided on its own facts. We
merely hold today that where a police officer observes unusual
conduct which leads him reasonably to conclude in light of his
experience that criminal activity may be afoot and that the persons
with whom he is dealing may be armed and presently dangerous,
where in the course of investigating this behavior he identifies
himself as a policeman and makes reasonable inquiries, and where
nothing in the initial stages of the encounter serves to dispel his
reasonable fear for his own or others safety, he is entitled for the
protection of himself and others in the area to conduct a carefully
limited search of the outer clothing of such persons in an attempt to
discover weapons which might be used to assault him. Such a
search is a reasonable search under the [contest of the
constitutional right against unreasonable search and seizure], and
any weapons seized may properly be introduced in evidence against
the person from whom they were taken. (Emphasis supplied)

Case #11: Valmonte vs De Villa

Facts: On 20 January 1987, the National Capital Region District

Command (NCRDC) was activated pursuant to Letter of Instruction
02/87 of the Philippine General Headquarters, AFP, with the mission
of conducting security operations within its area of responsibility
and peripheral areas, for the purpose of establishing an effective
territorial defense, maintaining peace and order, and providing an
atmosphere conducive to the social, economic and political
development of the National Capital Region. As part of its duty to
maintain peace and order, the NCRDC installed checkpoints in
various parts of Valenzuela, Metro Manila.

Petitioners Atty. Ricardo Valmonte, who is a resident of Valenzuela,

Metro Manila, and the Union of Lawyers and Advocates For Peoples
Rights (ULAP) sought the declaration of checkpoints in Valenzuela,
Metro Manila and elsewhere as unconstitutional. In the alternative,
they prayed that respondents Renato De Villa and the National
Capital Region District Command (NCRDC) be directed to formulate
guidelines in the implementation of checkpoints for the protection of
the people. Petitioners contended that the checkpoints gave the
respondents blanket authority to make searches and seizures
without search warrant or court order in violation of the
Constitution.

ISSUE: Do the military and police checkpoints violate the right of the
people against unreasonable search and seizures?

Ruling: No. SEE ADONIS NOTES

Case #12: