SYMBOLIC LOGIC

HISTORY

The historical roots of logic go back to the work of Aristotle (384322 BCE), whose syllogistic reasoning was the standard account of
the validity of arguments. Syllogistic reasoning treats arguments of a limited form: They have two premises and a single conclusion,
and each judgment has a form like all people are mortal, some Australian is poor, or no politician is popular.

The discipline of symbolic logic exploded in complexity as techniques of algebra were applied to issues of logic in the work of George
Boole (18151864), Augustus de Morgan (18061871), Charles Sanders Peirce (18391914), and Ernst Schrder (18411902) in
the nineteenth century1. They applied the techniques of mathematics to represent propositions in arguments algebraically, treating
the validity of arguments like equations in applied mathematics. This tradition survives in the work of contemporary algebraic
logicians.

Connections between mathematics and logic developed into the twentieth century with the work of Gottlob Frege (18481925) and
Bertrand Russell (18721970), who used techniques in logic to study mathematics. Their goals were to use the newfound precision
in logical vocabulary to give detailed accounts of the structure of mathematical reasoning, in such a way as to clarify the definitions
that are used, and to make fully explicit the commitments of mathematical reasoning. Russell and Alfred North Whiteheads (1861
1947) Principia Mathematica (1912) is the apogee of this project of logicism.

1 Ewald, William, ed. 1996. From Kant to Hilbert: A Source Book in the Foundations of Mathematics. Oxford: Oxford
University Press.
With the development of these logical tools came the desire to use them in different fields. In the early part of the twentieth century,
the logical positivists attempted to put all of science on a firm foundation by formalizing it: by showing how rich theoretical claims bear
on the simple observations of experience. The best example of this is the project of Rudolf Carnap (18911970), who attempted to
show how the logical structure of experience and physical, psychological, and social theory could be built up out of an elementary
field of perception2. This revival of empiricism was made possible by developments in logic, which allowed a richer repertoire of
modes of construction or composition of conceptual content. On an Aristotelian picture, all judgments have a particularly simple form.
The new logic of Frege and Russell was able to encompass much more complex kinds of logical structure, and so with it, theorists
were able to attempt much more3.

However, the work of the logical positivists is not the enduring success of the work in logic in the twentieth century. The radical
empiricism of the logical positivists failed, not because of external criticism, but because logic itself is more subtle than the positivists
had expected. We see this in the work of the two great logicians of the mid-twentieth century. Alfred Tarski (19021983) clarified our
view of logic by showing that we can understand logic by means of describing the language of logic and the valid arguments by
giving an account of proofs. However, we view logic by viewing the models of a logical language, and taking a valid argument as one
for which there is no model in which the premises are true and the conclusion false. Tarski clarified the notion of a model and he
showed how one could rigorously define the notion of truth in a language, relative to these models4. The other great logician of the
twentieth century, Kurt Gdel (19061978), showed that these two views of logic (proof theory and model theory) can agree. He

2 Carnap, Rudolf. 1967. The Logical Structure of the World, and Pseudoproblems in Philosophy. Trans. Rolf A. George.
New York: Routledge and Kegan Paul.

3 Coffa, J. Alberto. 1991. The Semantic Tradition from Kant to Carnap: To the Vienna Station, ed. Linda Wessels.
Cambridge, U.K.: Cambridge University Press.

4 Tarski, Alfred. 1956. Logic, Semantics, Metamathematics: Papers from 1923 to 1938. Trans. J. H. Woodger. Oxford:
Clarendon.
showed that in the standard picture of logic, validity defined with proofs and validity defined by models agree5. Gdels most famous
and most misunderstood result is his incompleteness theorem: This result showed that any account of proof for mathematical
theories, such as arithmetic, must either be completely intractable (we can never list all of the rules of proof) or incomplete (it does
not provide an answer for every mathematical proposition in the domain of a theory), or the theory is inconsistent. This result brought
an end of the logicist program as applied to mathematics and the other sciences. We cannot view the truths of mathematics as the
consequences of a particular theory, and the same holds for the other sciences6

Regardless, logic thrives. Proof theory and model theory are rich mathematical traditions, their techniques have been applied to
many different domains of reasoning, and connections with linguistics and computer science have strengthened the discipline and
brought it new applications.

Logical techniques are tools that may be used whenever it is important to understand the structure of the claims we make and the
ways they bear upon each other. These tools have been applied in clarifying arguments and analyzing reasoning, and they feature
centrally in the development of allied tools, such as statistical reasoning.

One contemporary debate over our understanding of logic also bears on the social sciences. We grant that using languages is a
social phenomenon. How does the socially mediated fact of language-use relate to the structure of the information we are able to
present with that use of language? Should we understand language as primarily representational, with inference valid when what is
represented by the premises includes the representation of the conclusion, or should we see the social role of assertion in terms of
its inferential relations? We may think of assertion as a social practice in which the logical relations of compatibility and reason-

5 von Heijenhoort, Jan. 1967. From Frege to Gdel: A Source Book in Mathematical Logic, 18791931. Cambridge,
MA: Harvard University Press.

6 Ibid
giving are fundamental. Once we can speak with each other, my assertions have a bearing on yours, and so logic finds its home in
the social practice of expressing thought in word7

Logical Symbols

The following table presents several logical symbols, their name and meaning, and any relevant notes. The name of the symbol
(under meaning links to a page explaining the symbol or term and its use). Note that different symbols have been used by different
logicians and systems of logic. For the sake of clarity, this site consistently uses the symbols in the left column, while the Notes
column may indicate other commonly-used symbols.

Symbol Meaning Notes

Operators (Connectives)

negation (NOT) The tilde ( ) is also often used.

conjunction (AND) The ampersand ( & ) or dot ( ) are also often used.

disjunction (OR) This is the inclusive disjunction, equivalent to and/or in English.

exclusive means that only one of the connected propositions is true,

equivalent to eitheror. Sometimes is used.

7 Brandom, Robert. 2000. Articulating Reasons: An Introduction to Inferentialism. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University
Press.
 disjunction (XOR)

alternative
| Means not both. Sometimes written as
denial (NAND)

joint denial (NOR) Means neither/nor.

Many logicians use the symbol instead. This is also known as

conditional (if/then)
material implication.

Means if and only if is sometimes used, but this site reserves that
biconditional (iff)
symbol for equivalence.

Quantifiers

universal quantifier Means for all, so xPx means that Px is true for every x.

existential quantifier Means there exists, so xPx means that Px is true for at least one x.

Relations

implication means that follows from

 Also . Equivalence is two-way implication, so means
equivalence
and .

Shows provable inference. means that from we can prove

provability
that .

Used to signify the conclusion of an argument. Usually taken to mean

therefore implication, but often used to present arguments in which the
premises do not deductively imply the conclusion.

forces A relationship between possible worlds and sentences in modal logic.

Truth-Values

tautology May be used to replace any tautologous (always true) formula.

May be used to replace any contradictory (always false) formula.

contradiction
Sometimes F is used.

Parentheses

Used to group expressions to show precedence of operations. Square

() parentheses
brackets [ ] are sometimes used to clarify groupings.
Set Theory

Denotes membership in a set. If a , then a is a member (or an

membership
element) of set .

Used to join sets. If S and T are sets of formula, S T is a set

union
containing all members of both.

The overlap between sets. If S and T are sets of formula, S Tis a set
intersection
containing those elemenets that are members of both.

subset A subset is a set containing some or all elements of another set.

proper subset A proper subset contains some, but not all, elements of another set.

= set equality Two sets are equal if they contain exactly the same elements.

(S) is the set of all things that are not in the set S. Sometimes written
absolute complement
as C(S), S or SC.

T - S is the set of all elements in T that are not also in S. Sometimes

- relative complement
written as T \ S.

empty set The set containing no elements.

Modalities

Used only in modal logic systems. Sometimes expressed as [] where

necessarily
the symbol is unavailable.

Used only in modal logic systems. Sometimes expressed as <> where

possibly
the symbol is unavailable.

Propositions, Variables and Non-Logical Symbols

The use of variables in logic varies depending on the system and the author of the logic being presented. However, some common
uses have emerged. For the sake of clarity, this site will use the system defined below.

Symbol Meaning Notes

Uppercase Roman letters signify individual propositions. For example, P may symbolize the proposition
A, B, C Z propositions
Pat is ridiculous. P and Q are traditionally used in most examples.

Lowercase Greek letters signify formulae, which may be themselves a proposition (P), a formula (P
, , formulae
Q) or several connected formulae ( ).

x, y, z variables Lowercase Roman letters towards the end of the alphabet are used to signify variables. In logical
systems, these are usually coupled with a quantifier, or , in order to signify some or all of some
 unspecified subject or object. By convention, these begin with x, but any other letter may be used if
needed, so long as they are defined as a variable by a quantifier.

Lowercase Roman letters, when not assigned by a quantifier, signifiy a constant, usually a proper
a, b, c, z constants noun. For instance, the letter j may be used to signify Jerry. Constants are given a meaning before
they are used in logical expressions.

Uppercase Roman letters appear again to indicate predicate relationships between variables and/or
constants, coupled with one or more variable places which may be filled by variables or constants. For
Ax, Bx instance, we may definite the relation x is green as Gx, and x likes y as Lxy. To differentiate them
predicate symbols
Zx from propositions, they are often presented in italics, so while P may be a proposition, Px is a predicate
relation for x. Predicate symbols are non-logical they describe relations but have neither operational
function nor truth value in themselves.

Uppercase Greek letters are used, by convention, to refer to sets of formulae. is usually used to
, , sets of formulae represent the first site, since it is the first that does not look like Roman letters. (For instance, the
uppercase Alpha () looks identical to the Roman letter A)

In modal logic, uppercase greek letters are also used to represent possible worlds. Alternatively, an
, , possible worlds
uppercase W with a subscript numeral is sometimes used, representing worlds as W0, W1, and so on.

Curly brackets are generally used when detailing the contents of a set, such as a set of formulae, or a
{} sets
set of possible worlds in modal logic. For instance, = { , , , }

SYMBOLIC MODERN LOGIC

- Modern Logic and Its Symbolic Language Symbols Greatly facilitate our thinking about arguments Enable us to
get to the heart of an argument, exhibiting its essential nature and putting aside what is not essential
- With symbols, we can perform some logical operations almost mechanically, with the eye, which might
otherwise demand great effort A symbolic language helps us to accomplish some intellectual tasks without
having to think too much
- Modern Logic Logicians look now to the internal structure of propositions and arguments, and to the logical
links very few in number that are critical in all deductive arguments No encumbered by the need to
transform deductive arguments in to syllogistic form It may be less elegant than analytical syllogistics, but is
more powerful