Case 11

THIRD DIVISION

FERDINAND A. CRUZ, 332 Edang St.,Pasay City, G.R. No. 154464

Petitioner,
Present:
- versus -
*
TINGA, J.,
JUDGE PRISCILLA MIJARES, Presiding Judge, Regional CHICO-NAZARIO,
Trial Court, Branch 108, Pasay City, Metro Manila, Acting Chairperson,
*
Public Respondent. VELASCO, JR.,
NACHURA, and
BENJAMIN MINA, JR., 332 Edang St.,Pasay City, REYES, JJ.
Private Respondent.
Promulgated:

September 11, 2008

x------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x

DECISION

NACHURA, J.:

This is a Petition for Certiorari, Prohibition and Mandamus, with prayer for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction under
[1] [2]
Rule 65 of the Rules of Court. It was directly filed with this Court assailing the Resolutions dated May 10, 2002 and July 31, 2002 of
the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 108, Pasay City, which denied the appearance of the plaintiff Ferdinand A. Cruz, herein petitioner,
as party litigant, and the refusal of the public respondent, Judge Priscilla Mijares, to voluntarily inhibit herself from trying the case. No writ
of preliminary injunction was issued by this Court.

The antecedents:

On March 5, 2002, Ferdinand A. Cruz (petitioner) sought permission to enter his appearance for and on his behalf, before the RTC,
Branch 108, Pasay City, as the plaintiff in Civil Case No. 01-0410, for Abatement of Nuisance. Petitioner, a fourth year law student,
[3]
anchors his claim on Section 34 of Rule 138 of the Rules of Court that a non-lawyer may appear before any court and conduct his
litigation personally.

During the pre-trial, Judge Priscilla Mijares required the petitioner to secure a written permission from the Court Administrator
before he could be allowed to appear as counsel for himself, a party-litigant. Atty. Stanley Cabrera, counsel for Benjamin Mina, Jr., filed
a Motion to Dismiss instead of a pre-trial brief to which petitioner Cruz vehemently objected alleging that a Motion to Dismiss is not allowed
after the Answer had been filed. Judge Mijares then remarked, Hay naku, masama yung marunong pa sa Huwes. Ok? and proceeded to
hear the pending Motion to Dismiss and calendared the next hearing on May 2, 2002.
[4]
On March 6, 2002, petitioner Cruz filed a Manifestation and Motion to Inhibit, praying for the voluntary inhibition of Judge
Mijares. The Motion alleged that expected partiality on the part of the respondent judge in the conduct of the trial could be inferred from
the contumacious remarks of Judge Mijares during the pre-trial. It asserts that the judge, in uttering an uncalled for remark, reflects a
[5]
negative frame of mind, which engenders the belief that justice will not be served.
[6]
In an Order dated April 19, 2002, Judge Mijares denied the motion for inhibition stating that throwing tenuous allegations of
partiality based on the said remark is not enough to warrant her voluntary inhibition, considering that it was said even prior to the start of
[7]
pre-trial. Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration of the said order.
[8]
On May 10, 2002, Judge Mijares denied the motion with finality. In the same Order, the trial court held that for the failure of
petitioner Cruz to submit the promised document and jurisprudence, and for his failure to satisfy the requirements or conditions under
Rule 138-A of the Rules of Court, his appearance was denied.
[9]
In a motion for reconsideration, petitioner reiterated that the basis of his appearance was not Rule 138-A, but Section 34 of
Rule 138. He contended that the two Rules were distinct and are applicable to different circumstances, but the respondent judge denied
[10]
the same, still invoking Rule 138-A, in an Order dated July 31, 2002.

On August 16, 2002, the petitioner directly filed with this Court, the instant petition and assigns the following errors:

1

 I.

THE RESPONDENT REGIONAL TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED AND ABUSED ITS DISCRETION WHEN IT
DENIED THE APPEARANCE OF THE PETITIONER, FOR AND IN THE LATTERS BEHALF, IN CIVIL CASE NO. 01-
0401 [sic] CONTRARY TO RULE 138, SECTION 34 OF THE RULES OF COURT, PROVIDING FOR THE
APPEARANCE OF NON-LAWYERS AS A PARTY LITIGANT;

II.

THE RESPONDENT COURT GRAVELY ERRED AND ABUSED ITS DISCRETION WHEN IT DID NOT
VOLUNTARILY INHIBIT DESPITE THE ADVENT OF JURISPRUDENCE [sic] THAT SUCH AN INHIBITION IS
PROPER TO PRESERVE THE PEOPLES FAITH AND CONFIDENCE TO THE COURTS.

The core issues raised before the Court are: (1) whether the extraordinary writs of certiorari, prohibition and mandamus under
Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Court may issue; and (2) whether the respondent court acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to
lack or excess of jurisdiction when it denied the appearance of the petitioner as party litigant and when the judge refused to inhibit herself
from trying the case.

This Courts jurisdiction to issue writs of certiorari, prohibition, mandamus and injunction is not exclusive; it has concurrent
jurisdiction with the RTCs and the Court of Appeals. This concurrence of jurisdiction is not, however, to be taken as an absolute,
[11]
unrestrained freedom to choose the court where the application therefor will be directed. A becoming regard of the judicial hierarchy
most certainly indicates that petitions for the issuance of extraordinary writs against the RTCs should be filed with the Court of
[12]
Appeals. The hierarchy of courts is determinative of the appropriate forum for petitions for the extraordinary writs; and only in
exceptional cases and for compelling reasons, or if warranted by the nature of the issues reviewed, may this Court take cognizance of
[13]
petitions filed directly before it.

Considering, however, that this case involves the interpretation of Section 34, Rule 138 and Rule 138-A of the Rules of Court,
the Court takes cognizance of herein petition. Nonetheless, the petitioner is cautioned not to continue his practice of filing directly before
this Court petitions under Rule 65 when the issue raised can be resolved with dispatch by the Court of Appeals. We will not tolerate
litigants who make a mockery of the judicial hierarchy as it necessarily delays more important concerns before us.

In resolving the second issue, a comparative reading of Rule 138, Section 34 and Rule 138-A is necessary.

Rule 138-A, or the Law Student Practice Rule, provides:

RULE 138-A

LAW STUDENT PRACTICE RULE

Section 1. Conditions for Student Practice. A law student who has successfully completed his 3rd year of the regular
four-year prescribed law curriculum and is enrolled in a recognized law school's clinical legal education
program approved by the Supreme Court, may appear without compensation in any civil, criminal or administrative
case before any trial court, tribunal, board or officer, to represent indigent clients accepted by the legal clinic of the law
school.

Sec. 2. Appearance. The appearance of the law student authorized by this rule, shall be under the direct supervision
and control of a member of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines duly accredited by the law school. Any and all
pleadings, motions, briefs, memoranda or other papers to be filed, must be signed by the supervising attorney for and
in behalf of the legal clinic.

The respondent court held that the petitioner could not appear for himself and on his behalf because of his failure to comply with
Rule 138-A. In denying petitioners appearance, the court a quo tersely finds refuge in the fact that, on December 18, 1986, this Court
issued Circular No. 19, which eventually became Rule 138-A, and the failure of Cruz to prove on record that he is enrolled in a recognized
schools clinical legal education program and is under supervision of an attorney duly accredited by the law school.

However, the petitioner insisted that the basis of his appearance was Section 34 of Rule 138, which provides:

Sec. 34. By whom litigation is conducted. - In the court of a justice of the peace, a party may conduct his litigation in
person, with the aid of an agent or friend appointed by him for that purpose, or with the aid of an attorney. In any other
court, a party may conduct his litigation personally or by aid of an attorney, and his appearance must be either
personal or by a duly authorized member of the bar.

and is a rule distinct from Rule 138-A.

From the clear language of this provision of the Rules, it will have to be conceded that the contention of the petitioner has merit.
It recognizes the right of an individual to represent himself in any case to which he is a party. The Rules state that a party may conduct
his litigation personally or with the aid of an attorney, and that his appearance must either be personal or by a duly authorized member
of the Bar. The individual litigant may personally do everything in the course of proceedings from commencement to the termination of
[14]
the litigation. Considering that a party personally conducting his litigation is restricted to the same rules of evidence and procedure as
[15]
those qualified to practice law, petitioner, not being a lawyer himself, runs the risk of falling into the snares and hazards of his own
ignorance. Therefore, Cruz as plaintiff, at his own instance, can personally conduct the litigation of Civil Case No. 01-0410. He would
then be acting not as a counsel or lawyer, but as a party exercising his right to represent himself.

The trial court must have been misled by the fact that the petitioner is a law student and must, therefore, be subject to the
conditions of the Law Student Practice Rule. It erred in applying Rule 138-A, when the basis of the petitioners claim is Section 34 of Rule
138. The former rule provides for conditions when a law student may appear in courts, while the latter rule allows the appearance of a
non-lawyer as a party representing himself.

2

 The conclusion of the trial court that Rule 138-A superseded Rule 138 by virtue of Circular No. 19 is misplaced. The Court never
intended to repeal Rule 138 when it released the guidelines for limited law student practice. In fact, it was intended as an addendum to
the instances when a non-lawyer may appear in courts and was incorporated to the Rules of Court through Rule 138-A.
[16]
It may be relevant to recall that, in respect to the constitutional right of an accused to be heard by himself and counsel, this
[17]
Court has held that during the trial, the right to counsel cannot be waived. The rationale for this ruling was articulated in People v.
[18]
Holgado, where we declared that even the most intelligent or educated man may have no skill in the science of law, particularly in the
rules of procedure, and without counsel, he may be convicted not because he is guilty but because he does not know how to establish
his innocence.

The case at bar involves a civil case, with the petitioner as plaintiff therein. The solicitous concern that the Constitution accords
the accused in a criminal prosecution obviously does not obtain in a civil case. Thus, a party litigant in a civil case, who insists that he
can, without a lawyers assistance, effectively undertake the successful pursuit of his claim, may be given the chance to do so. In this
case, petitioner alleges that he is a law student and impliedly asserts that he has the competence to litigate the case himself. Evidently,
he is aware of the perils incident to this decision.

In addition, it was subsequently clarified in Bar Matter 730, that by virtue of Section 34, Rule 138, a law student may appear as
an agent or a friend of a party litigant, without need of the supervision of a lawyer, before inferior courts. Here, we have a law student
who, as party litigant, wishes to represent himself in court. We should grant his wish.

Additionally, however, petitioner contends that the respondent judge committed manifest bias and partiality by ruling that there
is no valid ground for her voluntary inhibition despite her alleged negative demeanor during the pre-trial when she said: Hay naku, masama
yung marunong pa sa Huwes. Ok? Petitioner avers that by denying his motion, the respondent judge already manifested conduct
indicative of arbitrariness and prejudice, causing petitioners and his co-plaintiffs loss of faith and confidence in the respondents
impartiality.

We do not agree.
[19]
It must be noted that because of this incident, the petitioner filed an administrative case against the respondent for violation
of the Canons of Judicial Ethics, which we dismissed for lack of merit on September 15, 2002. We now adopt the Courts findings of fact
in the administrative case and rule that there was no grave abuse of discretion on the part of Judge Mijares when she did not inhibit
herself from the trial of the case.

In a Motion for Inhibition, the movant must prove the ground for bias and prejudice by clear and convincing evidence to disqualify
[20]
a judge from participating in a particular trial, as voluntary inhibition is primarily a matter of conscience and addressed to the sound
discretion of the judge. The decision on whether she should inhibit herself must be based on her rational and logical assessment of the
[21]
circumstances prevailing in the case before her. Absent clear and convincing proof of grave abuse of discretion on the part of the
judge, this Court will rule in favor of the presumption that official duty has been regularly performed.

WHEREFORE, the Petition is PARTIALLY GRANTED. The assailed Resolution and Order of the Regional Trial Court, Branch
108, Pasay City are MODIFIED. Regional Trial Court, Branch 108, Pasay City is DIRECTED to ADMIT the Entry of Appearance of
petitioner in Civil Case No. 01-0410 as a party litigant.

No pronouncement as to costs.

SO ORDERED.

3

Case 12
SECOND DIVISION
[G.R. No. 109149. December 21, 1999]
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. LEONCIO SANTOCILDES, JR. y SIGA-AN, accused-appellant.
DECISION
QUISUMBING, J.:
Where an accused was not duly represented by a member of the Philippine Bar during trial, the judgment should be set aside and
the case remanded to the trial court for a new trial. A person who misrepresents himself as a lawyer shall be held liable for indirect
contempt of court.
Subject of the present appeal is the decision dated October 29, 1992, of the Regional Trial Court of Iloilo City, Branch 33, convicting
accused-appellant of the crime of rape, sentencing him to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua, and ordering him to pay the offended
party the amount of P50,000.00 and to pay the costs.
The antecedent facts of the case are as follows:
[1]
On February 17, 1992, appellant was charged with the crime of rape of a girl less than nine (9) years old, committed on December
28, 1991, in the town of Barangay San Luis, San Joaquin, Iloilo.
Upon arraignment, appellant entered a plea of not guilty. Trial ensued and the prosecution presented as its witnesses the victim,
her mother, her six (6) year-old playmate, and the medico-legal officer who examined the victim.
For the defense, appellant presented one German Toriales and himself. Appellant denied committing the rape and claimed that he
merely tried to stop the two girls, the victim and her playmate, from quarreling.
[2]
On October 29, 1992, the trial court rendered a decision finding appellant guilty as charged. The dispositive portion of the decision
states:
WHEREFORE, the Court finds the accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of rape and sentences him to suffer the
penalty of reclusion perpetua together its accessory penalty. The accused is ordered to pay the amount of P50,000.00 to the
complainant and another amount for costs, without subsidiary penalty in case of failure to pay the civil liability and the cost.
If qualified under Art. 29 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by R.A. 6127, as amended, and he has agreed in writing to abide by
the same rules imposed upon convicted prisoners, he shall be credited with the full duration of his preventive imprisonment; otherwise,
he shall only be credited with 4/5 of the same.
SO ORDERED.
[3] [4]
Hence, appellant duly filed a Notice of Appeal. In his brief, appellant made the following assignment of errors:
I. THE HONORABLE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED REVERSIBLE ERROR IN FINDING THAT THE ACCUSED IS GUILTY OF RAPE
INSPITE OF CONFLICTING TESTIMONIES OF THE PRIVATE COMPLAINANT AND HER WITNESSES ON MATERIAL POINTS.
II. THAT THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT WAS DEPRIVED THOUGH NO FAULT OF HIS OWN TO BE DEFENDED BY A PERSON
AUTHORIZED TO PRACTICE LAW AMOUNTING TO DENIAL OF DUE PROCESS.
Considering the importance of the constitutional right to counsel, we shall now first resolve the issue of proper representation by a
member of the bar raised by appellant.
Appellant contends that he was represented during trial by a person named Gualberto C. Ompong, who for all intents and purposes
acted as his counsel and even conducted the direct examination and cross-examinations of the witnesses. On appeal, however, appellant
secured the services of a new lawyer, Atty. Igmedio S. Prado, Jr., who discovered that Gualberto C. Ompong is actually not a member of
[5]
the bar. Further verification with the Office of the Bar Confidant confirmed this fact. Appellant therefore argues that his deprivation of
the right to counsel should necessarily result in his acquittal of the crime charged.
The Office of the Solicitor General, on the other hand, maintains that notwithstanding the fact that appellants counsel during trial
was not a member of the bar, appellant was afforded due process since he has been given an opportunity to be heard and the records
reveal that said person presented the evidence for the defense with the ability of a seasoned lawyer and in general handled the case of
appellant in a professional and skillful manner. However, the right of the accused to be heard by himself and his counsel, in our view,
goes much deeper than the question of ability or skill. It lies at the heart of our adversarial system of justice. Where the interplay of basic
rights of the individual may collide with the awesome forces of the state, we need a professional learned in the law as well as ethically
committed to defend the accused by all means fair and reasonable.
On the matter of proper representation by a member of the bar, we had occasion to resolve a similar issue in the case of Delgado
[6]
v. Court of Appeals. In Delgado, petitioner and two others were convicted by the trial court of the crime of estafa thru falsification of
public and/or official documents. One accused did not appeal. Petitioner Delgado and her remaining co-accused appealed to the Court
of Appeals, which affirmed petitioners conviction but acquitted her co-accused. After entry of judgment, petitioner discovered that her
lawyer was not a member of the bar and moved to set aside the entry of judgment. The Court of Appeals denied petitioners motion,
hence, she filed a petition for certiorari with this Court. The Court set aside the assailed judgment and remanded the case to the trial court
for a new trial, explaining that -
This is so because an accused person is entitled to be represented by a member of the bar in a criminal case filed against her before
the Regional Trial Court. Unless she is represented by a lawyer, there is great danger that any defense presented in her behalf will be
inadequate considering the legal perquisites and skills needed in the court proceedings. This would certainly be a denial of due
[7]
process.
Indeed, the right to counsel is of such primordial importance that even if an accused was represented by three successive counsels
from the Public Attorneys Office, the Court has ordered the remand of a rape case when it found that accused was given mere perfunctory
representation by aforesaid counsels such that appellant was not properly and effectively accorded the right to counsel. In the recent en
banc case of People v. Bermas, G.R. No. 120420, April 21, 1999, the Court, speaking through Justice Vitug, admonished three (3) PAO
lawyers for failing to genuinely protect the interests of the accused and for having fallen much too short of their responsibility as officers
of the court and as members of the Bar. Verily, we can do no less where the accused was not even duly represented by a certified
member of the Philippine Bar, no matter how zealous his representation might have been.
[8]
The presence and participation of counsel in criminal proceedings should never be taken lightly. Even the most intelligent or
educated man may have no skill in the science of the law, particularly in the rules of procedure, and, without counsel, he may be convicted
[9]
not because he is guilty but because he does not know how to establish his innocence. The right of an accused to counsel is guaranteed
to minimize the imbalance in the adversarial system where the accused is pitted against the awesome prosecutory machinery of the
[10]
State. Such a right proceeds from the fundamental principle of due process which basically means that a person must be heard before
being condemned. The due process requirement is a part of a persons basic rights; it is not a mere formality that may be dispensed with
[11]
or performed perfunctorily.
The right to counsel of an accused is enshrined in no less than Article III, Sections 12 and 14 (2) of the 1987 Constitution. This
constitutional mandate is reflected in Section 1 of Rule 115 of the 1985 Rules of Criminal Procedure which declares the right of the
accused at the trial to be present in person and by counsel at every stage of the proceedings from the arraignment to the promulgation
of judgment. In turn, Section 5 of Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution vests the power to promulgate rules concerning the admission to
the practice of law to the Supreme Court.Section 1 of Rule 138 of the Rules of Court explicitly states who are entitled to practice law in
the Philippines, and Section 2 thereof clearly provides for the requirements for all applicants for admission to the bar. Jurisprudence has
also held that the right to practice law is not a natural or constitutional right but is in the nature of a privilege or franchise. It is limited to
persons of good moral character with special qualifications duly ascertained and certified. The right does not only presuppose in its
possessor integrity, legal standing and attainment, but also the exercise of a special privilege, highly personal and partaking of the nature
4

 [12] [13]
of a public trust. Indeed, so strict is the regulation of the practice of law that in Beltran, Jr. v. Abad, a Bar candidate who has already
successfully hurdled the Bar examinations but has not yet taken his oath and signed the roll of attorneys, and who was caught in the
unauthorized practice of law was held in contempt of court. Under Section 3 (e) of Rule 71 of the Rules of Court, a person who undertakes
the unauthorized practice of law is liable for indirect contempt of court for assuming to be an attorney and acting as such without authority.
WHEREFORE, the assailed judgment is SET ASIDE, and the case is hereby REMANDED to the trial court for new trial.
With respect to the unauthorized practice of law by the person named Gualberto C. Ompong in connection with this case, the local
Chapter of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines of Iloilo City is DIRECTED to conduct a prompt and thorough investigation regarding this
matter and to report its recommendations to the Court within ninety (90) days from notice of this order. Let all concerned parties, including
the Office of the Bar Confidant, be each furnished a copy of this Decision for their appropriate action.
No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.

5

Case 13
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC

G.R. No. L-23959 November 29, 1971

PHILIPPINE ASSOCIATION OF FREE LABOR UNIONS (PAFLU), ENRIQUE ENTILA & VICTORIANO TENAZASpetitioners,
vs.
BINALBAGAN ISABELA SUGAR COMPANY, COURT OF INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS, & QUINTIN MUNINGrespondents.
Cipriano Cid & Associates for petitioners.
Ceferino Magat and Manuel C. Gonzales for respondent Quintin Muning.

REYES, J.B.L., J.:

May a non-lawyer recover attorney's fees for legal services rendered? This is the issue presented in this petition for review of an order,
dated 12 May 1964, and the en banc resolution, dated 8 December 1964, of the Court of Industrial Relations, in its Case No. 72-ULP-
Iloilo, granting respondent Quintin Muning a non-lawyer, attorney's fees for professional services in the said case.
The above-named petitioners were complainants in Case No. 72-ULP-Iloilo entitled, "PAFLU et al. vs. Binalbagan Isabela Sugar Co., et
al." After trial, the Court of Industrial Relations rendered a decision, on 29 March 1961, ordering the reinstatement with backwages of
complainants Enrique Entila and Victorino Tenazas. Said decision became final. On 18 October 1963, Cipriano Cid & Associates,
counsel of record for the winning complainants, filed a notice of attorney's lien equivalent to 30% of the total backwages. On 22
November 1963, Atty. Atanacio Pacis also filed a similar notice for a reasonable amount. Complainants Entila and Tenazas on 3
December 1963, filed a manifestation indicating their non-objection to an award of attorney's fees for 25% of their backwages, and, on
the same day, Quentin Muning filed a "Petition for the Award of Services Rendered" equivalent to 20% of the backwages. Munings
petition was opposed by Cipriano Cid & Associates the ground that he is not a lawyer.
The records of Case No. 72-ULP-Iloilo show that the charge was filed by Cipriano Cid & Associates through Atty. Atanacio Pacis. All
the hearings were held in Bacolod City and appearances made in behalf of the complainants were at first by Attorney Pacis and
subsequently by respondent Quintin Muning.
On 12 May 1964, the Court of Industrial Relations awarded 25% of the backwages as compensation for professional services rendered
in the case, apportioned as follows:
Attys. Cipriano Cid & Associates ............................................. 10%
Quintin Muning ......................................................................... 10%
Atty. Atanacio Pacis ................................................................. 5%
The award of 10% to Quintin Muning who is not a lawyer according to the order, is sought to be voided in the present petition.
Respondent Muning moved in this Court to dismiss the present petition on the ground of late filing but his motion was overruled on 20
1
January 1965. He asked for reconsideration, but, considering that the motion contained averments that go into the merits of the case,
this Court admitted and considered the motion for reconsideration for all purposes as respondent's answer to the petitioner for
2 3
review. The case was considered submitted for decision without respondent's brief.
Applicable to the issue at hand is the principle enunciated in Amalgamated Laborers' Association, et al. vs. Court of Industrial Relations,
4
et al., L-23467, 27 March 1968, that an agreement providing for the division of attorney's fees, whereby a non-lawyer union president
is allowed to share in said fees with lawyers, is condemned by Canon 34 of Legal Ethics and is immoral and cannot be justified. An
award by a court of attorney's fees is no less immoral in the absence of a contract, as in the present case.
The provision in Section 5(b) of Republic Act No. 875 that
In the proceeding before the Court or Hearing Examiner thereof, the parties shall not be required to be represented
by legal counsel ...
is no justification for a ruling, that the person representing the party-litigant in the Court of Industrial Relations, even if he is not a lawyer,
is entitled to attorney's fees: for the same section adds that
it shall be the duty and obligation of the Court or Hearing Officer to examine and cross examine witnesses on behalf
of the parties and to assist in the orderly presentation of evidence.
thus making it clear that the representation should be exclusively entrusted to duly qualified members of the bar.
The permission for a non-member of the bar to represent or appear or defend in the said court on behalf of a party-litigant does not by
itself entitle the representative to compensation for such representation. For Section 24, Rule 138, of the Rules of Court, providing
Sec. 24. Compensation of attorney's agreement as to fees. An attorney shall be entitled to have and recover from
his client no more than a reasonable compensation for his services, ...
imports the existence of an attorney-client relationship as a condition to the recovery of attorney's fees. Such a relationship cannot exist
unless the client's representative in court be a lawyer. Since respondent Muning is not one, he cannot establish an attorney-client
relationship with Enrique Entila and Victorino Tenezas or with PAFLU, and he cannot, therefore, recover attorney's fees. Certainly
public policy demands that legal work in representation of parties litigant should be entrusted only to those possessing tested
qualifications and who are sworn, to observe the rules and the ethics of the profession, as well as being subject to judicial disciplinary
control for the protection of courts, clients and the public.
On the present issue, the rule in American jurisdictions is persuasive. There, it is stated:
But in practically all jurisdictions statutes have now been enacted prohibiting persons not licensed or admitted to the
bar from practising law, and under statutes of this kind, the great weight of authority is to the effect that compensation
for legal services cannot be recovered by one who has not been admitted to practice before the court or in the
5
jurisdiction the services were rendered.
No one is entitled to recover compensation for services as an attorney at law unless he has been duly admitted to
6
practice ... and is an attorney in good standing at the time.
7
The reasons are that the ethics of the legal profession should not be violated; that acting as an attorney with authority constitutes
8
contempt of court, which is punishable by fine or imprisonment or both, and the law will not assist a person to reap the fruits or benefit
9
of an act or an act done in violation of law; and that if were to be allowed to non-lawyers, it would leave the public in hopeless
confusion as to whom to consult in case of necessity and also leave the bar in a chaotic condition, aside from the fact that non-lawyers
10
are not amenable to disciplinary measures.
And the general rule above-stated (referring to non-recovery of attorney's fees by non-lawyers) cannot be
11
circumvented when the services were purely legal, by seeking to recover as an "agent" and not as an attorney.
The weight of the reasons heretofore stated why a non-lawyer may not be awarded attorney's fees should suffice to refute the possible
argument that appearances by non-lawyers before the Court of Industrial Relations should be excepted on the ground that said court is
a court of special jurisdiction; such special jurisdiction does not weigh the aforesaid reasons and cannot justify an exception.
The other issue in this case is whether or not a union may appeal an award of attorney's fees which are deductible from the backpay of
some of its members. This issue arose because it was the union PAFLU, alone, that moved for an extension of time to file the present
petition for review; union members Entila and Tenazas did not ask for extension but they were included as petitioners in the present

6

petition that was subsequently filed, it being contended that, as to them (Entila and Tenazas), their inclusion in the petition as co-
petitioners was belated.
We hold that a union or legitimate labor organization may appeal an award of attorney's fees which are deductible from the backpay of
12
its members because such union or labor organization is permitted to institute an action in the industrial court, on behalf of its
13
members; and the union was organized "for the promotion of the emloyees' moral, social and economic well-being"; hence, if an
award is disadvantageous to its members, the union may prosecute an appeal as an aggrieved party, under Section 6, Republic Act
875, which provides:
Sec. 6. Unfair Labor Practice cases Appeals. Any person aggrieved by any order of the Court may appeal to the
Supreme Court of the Philippines ...,
since more often than not the individual unionist is not in a position to bear the financial burden of litigations.
Petitioners allege that respondent Muning is engaged in the habitual practice of law before the Court of Industrial Relations, and many
of them like him who are not licensed to practice, registering their appearances as "representatives" and appearing daily before the said
court. If true, this is a serious situation demanding corrective action that respondent court should actively pursue and enforce by
positive action to that purpose. But since this matter was not brought in issue before the court a quo, it may not be taken up in the
present case. Petitioners, however, may file proper action against the persons alleged to be illegally engaged in the practice of law.
WHEREFORE, the orders under review are hereby set aside insofar as they awarded 10% of the backwages as attorney's fees for
respondent Quintin Muning. Said orders are affirmed in all other respects. Costs against respondent Muning.
Concepcion, C.J., Makalintal, Zaldivar, Castro, Fernando, Teehankee, Barredo, Villamor and Makasiar, JJ. concur.

7

Case 14
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 111474 August 22, 1994
FIVE J TAXI and/or JUAN S. ARMAMENTO, Petitioners, v. NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION, DOMINGO MALDIGAN
and GILBERTO SABSALON, Respondents.
Edgardo G. Fernandez for petitioners.
R E SO L U T I O N
REGALADO, J.:
1
Petitioners Five J Taxi and/or Juan S. Armamento filed this special civil action for certiorari to annul the decision of respondent
National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) ordering petitioners to pay private respondents Domingo Maldigan and Gilberto
Sabsalon their accumulated deposits and car wash payments, plus interest thereon at the legal rate from the date of promulgation of
judgment to the date of actual payment, and 10% of the total amount as and for attorney's fees.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles
virtual law library
We have given due course to this petition for, while to the cynical the de minimis amounts involved should not impose upon the
valuable time of this Court, we find therein a need to clarify some issues the resolution of which are important to small wage earners
such as taxicab drivers. As we have heretofore repeatedly demonstrated, this Court does not exist only for the rich or the powerful, with
their reputed monumental cases of national impact. It is also the Court of the poor or the underprivileged, with the actual quotidian
problems that beset their individual lives.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library
2
Private respondents Domingo Maldigan and Gilberto Sabsalon were hired by the petitioners as taxi drivers and, as such, they worked
for 4 days weekly on a 24-hour shifting schedule. Aside from the daily "boundary" of P700.00 for air-conditioned taxi or P450.00 for
non-air-conditioned taxi, they were also required to pay P20.00 for car washing, and to further make a P15.00 deposit to answer for any
deficiency in their "boundary," for every actual working day.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library
In less than 4 months after Maldigan was hired as an extra driver by the petitioners, he already failed to report for work for unknown
reasons. Later, petitioners learned that he was working for "Mine of Gold" Taxi Company. With respect to Sabsalon, while driving a
taxicab of petitioners on September 6, 1983, he was held up by his armed passenger who took all his money and thereafter stabbed
him. He was hospitalized and after his discharge, he went to his home province to recuperate.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles
virtual law library
In January, 1987, Sabsalon was re-admitted by petitioners as a taxi driver under the same terms and conditions as when he was first
employed, but his working schedule was made on an "alternative basis," that is, he drove only every other day. However, on several
occasions, he failed to report for work during his schedule.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library
On September 22, 1991, Sabsalon failed to remit his "boundary" of P700.00 for the previous day. Also, he abandoned his taxicab in
Makati without fuel refill worth P300.00. Despite repeated requests of petitioners for him to report for work, he adamantly refused.
Afterwards it was revealed that he was driving a taxi for "Bulaklak Company."chanrobles virtual law library
Sometime in 1989, Maldigan requested petitioners for the reimbursement of his daily cash deposits for 2 years, but herein petitioners
told him that not a single centavo was left of his deposits as these were not even enough to cover the amount spent for the repairs of
the taxi he was driving. This was allegedly the practice adopted by petitioners to recoup the expenses incurred in the repair of their
taxicab units. When Maldigan insisted on the refund of his deposit, petitioners terminated his services. Sabsalon, on his part, claimed
that his termination from employment was effected when he refused to pay for the washing of his taxi seat
covers.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library
On November 27, 1991, private respondents filed a complaint with the Manila Arbitration Office of the National Labor Relations
Commission charging petitioners with illegal dismissal and illegal deductions. That complaint was dismissed, the labor arbiter holding
that it took private respondents two years to file the same and such unreasonable delay was not consistent with the natural reaction of a
person who claimed to be unjustly treated, hence the filing of the case could be interpreted as a mere
afterthought.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library
Respondent NLRC concurred in said findings, with the observation that private respondents failed to controvert the evidence showing
that Maldigan was employed by "Mine of Gold" Taxi Company from February 10, 1987 to December 10, 1990; that Sabsalon
abandoned his taxicab on September 1, 1990; and that they voluntarily left their jobs for similar employment with other taxi operators. It,
accordingly, affirmed the ruling of the labor arbiter that private respondents' services were not illegally terminated. It, however, modified
the decision of the labor arbiter by ordering petitioners to pay private respondents the awards stated at the beginning of this
resolution.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library
Petitioners' motion for reconsideration having been denied by the NLRC, this petition is now before us imputing grave abuse of
discretion on the part of said public respondent.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library
This Court has repeatedly declared that the factual findings of quasi-judicial agencies like the NLRC, which have acquired expertise
because their jurisdiction is confined to specific matters, are generally accorded not only respect but, at times, finality if such findings
3
are supported by substantial evidence. Where, however, such conclusions are not supported by the evidence, they must be struck
4
down for being whimsical and capricious and, therefore, arrived at with grave abuse of discretion. chanrobles virtual law library
Respondent NLRC held that the P15.00 daily deposits made by respondents to defray any shortage in their "boundary" is covered by
the general prohibition in Article 114 of the Labor Code against requiring employees to make deposits, and that there is no showing that
the Secretary of Labor has recognized the same as a "practice" in the taxi industry. Consequently, the deposits made were illegal and
the respondents must be refunded therefor.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library
Article 114 of the Labor Code provides as follows:
Art. 114. Deposits for loss or damage. - No employer shall require his worker to make deposits from which deductions shall be made for
the reimbursement of loss of or damage to tools, materials, or equipment supplied by the employer, except when the employer is
engaged in such trades, occupations or business where the practice of making deposits is a recognized one, or is necessary or
desirable as determined by the Secretary of Labor in appropriate rules and regulations.
It can be deduced therefrom that the said article provides the rule on deposits for loss or damage to tools, materials or equipments
supplied by the employer. Clearly, the same does not apply to or permit deposits to defray any deficiency which the taxi driver may
incur in the remittance of his "boundary." Also, when private respondents stopped working for petitioners, the alleged purpose for which
petitioners required such unauthorized deposits no longer existed. In other case, any balance due to private respondents after proper
accounting must be returned to them with legal interest.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library
However, the unrebutted evidence with regard to the claim of Sabsalon is as follows:
YEAR DEPOSITS SHORTAGES VALES
1987 P 1,403.00 P 567.00 P 1,000.00
1988 720.00 760.00 200.00
1989 686.00 130.00 1,500.00
1990 605.00 570.00
1991 165.00 2,300.00
---- ---- ----
P 3,579.00 P 4,327.00 P 2,700.00
The foregoing accounting shows that from 1987-1991, Sabsalon was able to withdraw his deposits through vales or he incurred
shortages, such that he is even indebted to petitioners in the amount of P3,448.00. With respect to Maldigan's deposits, nothing was
8

mentioned questioning the same even in the present petition. We accordingly agree with the recommendation of the Solicitor General
that since the evidence shows that he had not withdrawn the same, he should be reimbursed the amount of his accumulated cash
5
deposits. chanrobles virtual law library
On the matter of the car wash payments, the labor arbiter had this to say in his decision: "Anent the issue of illegal deductions, there is
no dispute that as a matter of practice in the taxi industry, after a tour of duty, it is incumbent upon the driver to restore the unit he has
driven to the same clean condition when he took it out, and as claimed by the respondents (petitioners in the present case),
complainant(s) (private respondents herein) were made to shoulder the expenses for washing, the amount doled out was paid directly
to the person who washed the unit, thus we find nothing illegal in this practice, much more (sic) to consider the amount paid by the
6
driver as illegal deduction in the context of the law." (Words in parentheses added.)chanrobles virtual law library
Consequently, private respondents are not entitled to the refund of the P20.00 car wash payments they made. It will be noted that there
was nothing to prevent private respondents from cleaning the taxi units themselves, if they wanted to save their P20.00. Also, as the
Solicitor General correctly noted, car washing after a tour of duty is a practice in the taxi industry, and is, in fact, dictated by fair
play.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library
On the last issue of attorney's fees or service fees for private respondents' authorized representative, Article 222 of the Labor Code, as
amended by Section 3 of Presidential Decree No. 1691, states that non-lawyers may appear before the NLRC or any labor arbiter only
(1) if they represent themselves, or (2) if they represent their organization or the members thereof. While it may be true that Guillermo
H. Pulia was the authorized representative of private respondents, he was a non-lawyer who did not fall in either of the foregoing
categories. Hence, by clear mandate of the law, he is not entitled to attorney's fees.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law
library
Furthermore, the statutory rule that an attorney shall be entitled to have and recover from his client a reasonable compensation for his
7
services necessarily imports the existence of an attorney-client relationship as a condition for the recovery of attorney's fees, and such
8
relationship cannot exist unless the client's representative is a lawyer. chanrobles virtual law library
WHEREFORE, the questioned judgment of respondent National Labor Relations Commission is hereby MODIFIED by deleting the
awards for reimbursement of car wash expenses and attorney's fees and directing said public respondent to order and effect the
computation and payment by petitioners of the refund for private respondent Domingo Maldigan's deposits, plus legal interest thereon
from the date of finality of this resolution up to the date of actual payment thereof.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law
library
SO ORDERED.

9

Case 15
SECOND DIVISION
[G.R. No. 126625. September 23, 1997]
KANLAON CONSTRUCTION ENTERPRISES CO., INC., petitioner, vs. NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION, 5TH
DIVISION, and BENJAMIN RELUYA, JR., EDGARDO GENAYAS, ERNESTO CANETE, PROTACIO ROSALES, NESTOR
BENOYA, RODOLFO GONGOB, DARIO BINOYA, BENJAMIN BASMAYOR, ABELARDO SACURA, FLORENCIO SACURA,
ISABELO MIRA, NEMESIO LACAR, JOSEPH CABIGKIS, RODRIGO CILLON, VIRGILIO QUIZON, GUARINO
EVANGELISTA, ALEJANDRO GATA, BENEDICTO CALAGO, NILO GATA, DIONISIO PERMACIO, JUANITO SALUD,
ADOR RIMPO, FELIPE ORAEZ, JULIETO TEJADA, TEOTIMO LACIO, ONOFRE QUIZON, RUDY ALVAREZ, CRESENCIO
FLORES, ALFREDO PERMACIO, CRESENCIO ALVIAR, HERNANI SURILA, DIOSDADO SOLON, CENON ALBURO,
ZACARIAS ORTIZ, EUSEBIO BUSTILLO, GREGORIO BAGO, JERRY VARGAS, EDUARDO BUENO, PASCUAL HUDAYA,
ROGELIO NIETES, and REYNALDO NIETES, respondents.
DECISION
PUNO, J.:
In this petition for certiorari, petitioner Kanlaon Construction Enterprises Co., Inc. seeks to annul the decision of respondent National
Labor Relations Commission, Fifth Division and remand the cases to the Arbitration Branch for a retrial on the merits.
Petitioner is a domestic corporation engaged in the construction business nationwide with principal office at No. 11 Yakan St., La
Vista Subdivision, Quezon City. In 1988, petitioner was contracted by the National Steel Corporation to construct residential houses for
its plant employees in Steeltown, Sta. Elena, Iligan City. Private respondents were hired by petitioner as laborers in the project and worked
under the supervision of Engineers Paulino Estacio and Mario Dulatre. In 1989, the project neared its completion and petitioner started
terminating the services of private respondents and its other employees.
In 1990, private respondents filed separate complaints against petitioner before Sub-Regional Arbitration Branch XII, Iligan
City. Numbering forty-one (41) in all, they claimed that petitioner paid them wages below the minimum and sought payment of their salary
differentials and thirteenth-month pay. Engineers Estacio and Dulatre were named co-respondents.
Some of the cases were assigned to Labor Arbiter Guardson A. Siao while the others were assigned to Labor Arbiter Nicodemus
G. Palangan. Summonses and notices of preliminary conference were issued and served on the two engineers and petitioner through
Engineer Estacio. The preliminary conferences before the labor arbiters were attended by Engineers Estacio and Dulatre and private
respondents. At the conference of June 11, 1990 before Arbiter Siao, Engineer Estacio admitted petitioner's liability to private respondents
and agreed to pay their wage differentials and thirteenth-month pay on June 19, 1990. As a result of this agreement, Engineer Estacio
[1]
allegedly waived petitioner's right to file its position paper. Private respondents declared that they, too, were dispensing with their
[2]
position papers and were adopting their complaints as their position paper.
On June 19, 1990, Engineer Estacio appeared but requested for another week to settle the claims. Labor Arbiter Siao denied this
request. On June 21, 1990, Arbiter Siao issued an order granting the complaint and directing petitioner to pay private respondents'
claims. Arbiter Siao held:
"x x x.
"Considering the length of time that has elapsed since these cases were filed, and what the complainants might think as to how this
branch operates and/or conducts its proceedings as they are now restless, this Arbiter has no other alternative or recourse but to order
the respondent to pay the claims of the complainants, subject of course to the computation of the Fiscal Examiner II of this Branch
pursuant to the oral manifestation of respondent. The Supreme Court ruled: 'Contracts though orally made are binding on the parties.'
(Lao Sok v. Sabaysabay, 138 SCRA 134).
"Similarly, this Branch would present in passing that 'a court cannot decide a case without facts either admitted or agreed upon by the
parties or proved by evidence.' (Yu Chin Piao v. Lim Tuaco, 33 Phil. 92; Benedicto v. Yulo, 26 Phil. 160),
"WHEREFORE, premises considered, the respondent is hereby ordered to pay the individual claims of the above-named complainants
representing their wage differentials within ten (10) days from receipt of this Order.
"The Fiscal Examiner II of this Branch is likewise hereby ordered to compute the individual claims of the herein complainants.
[3]
"SO ORDERED."
On June 29, 1990, Arbiter Palangan issued a similar order, thus:
"When the above-entitled cases were called for hearing on June 19, 1990 at 10:00 a.m. respondent thru their representative manifested
that they were willing to pay the claims of the complainants and promised to pay the same on June 28, 1990 at 10:30 a.m.
"However, when these cases were called purposely to materialize the promise of the respondent, the latter failed to appear without any
valid reason.
"Considering therefore that the respondent has already admitted the claims of the complainants, we believe that the issues raised
herein have become moot and academic.
"WHEREFORE, premises considered, the above-entitled cases are hereby ordered Closed and Terminated, however, the respondent
is hereby ordered to pay the complainants their differential pay and 13th-month pay within a period of ten (10) days from receipt hereof
based on the employment record on file with the respondent.
[4]
"SO ORDERED."
Petitioner appealed to respondent National Labor Relations Commission. It alleged that it was denied due process and that
Engineers Estacio and Dulatre had no authority to represent and bind petitioner. Petitioner's appeal was filed by one Atty. Arthur
Abundiente.
In a decision dated April 27, 1992, respondent Commission affirmed the orders of the Arbiters.
Petitioner interposed this petition alleging that the decision of respondent Commission was rendered without jurisdiction and in grave
abuse of discretion. Petitioner claims that:
"I
"THE QUESTIONED DECISION RENDERED BY THE HONORABLE COMMISSION IS A NULLITY, IT HAVING BEEN ISSUED
WITHOUT JURISDICTION;
II
"PUBLIC RESPONDENT NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION GRAVELY ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN ARBITRARILY,
CAPRICIOUSLY AND WHIMSICALLY MAKING THE FOLLOWING CONCLUSIONS BASED NOT ON FACTS AND EVIDENCE BUT
ON SPECULATION, SURMISE AND CONJECTURE:
A. Petitioner was deprived of the constitutional right to due process of law when it was adjudged by the NLRC liable without trial on the
merits and without its knowledge;
B. The NLRC erroneously, patently and unreasonably interpreted the principle that the NLRC and its Arbitration Branch are not strictly
bound by the rules of evidence;
C. There is no legal nor actual basis in the NLRC's ruling that petitioner is already in estoppel to disclaim the authority of its alleged
representatives.
D. The NLRC committed manifest error in relying merely on private respondents unsubstantiated complaints to hold petitioner liable for
[5]
damages."
In brief, petitioner alleges that the decisions of the labor arbiters and respondent Commission are void for the following reasons: (1)
there was no valid service of summons; (2) Engineers Estacio and Dulatre and Atty. Abundiente had no authority to appear and represent

10

petitioner at the hearings before the arbiters and on appeal to respondent Commission; (3) the decisions of the arbiters and respondent
Commission are based on unsubstantiated and self-serving evidence and were rendered in violation of petitioner's right to due process.
Service of summons in cases filed before the labor arbiters is governed by Sections 4 and 5 of Rule IV of the New Rules of Procedure
of the NLRC. They provide:
"Section 4. Service of Notices and Resolutions.-- (a) Notices or summons and copies of orders, resolutions or decisions shall be served
on the parties to the case personally by the bailiff or duly authorized public officer within three (3) days from receipt thereof or by
registered mail; Provided that where a party is represented by counsel or authorized representative, service shall be made on such
counsel or authorized representative; provided further that in cases of decision and final awards, copies thereof shall be served on both
the parties and their counsel; provided finally, that in case where the parties are so numerous, service shall be made on counsel and
upon such number of complainants as may be practicable, which shall be considered substantial compliance with Article 224 (a) of the
Labor Code, as amended.
"x x x.
"Section 5. Proof and completeness of service.-- The return is prima facie proof of the facts indicated therein. Service by registered mail
is complete upon receipt by the addressee or his agent. x x x."
Under the NLRC Rules of Procedure, summons on the respondent shall be served personally or by registered mail on the party himself. If
the party is represented by counsel or any other authorized representative or agent, summons shall be served on such person.
It has been established that petitioner is a private domestic corporation with principal address in Quezon City. The complaints
against petitioner were filed in Iligan City and summonses therefore served on Engineer Estacio in Iligan City. The question now is whether
Engineer Estacio was an agent and authorized representative of petitioner.
To determine the scope or meaning of the term "authorized representative" or "agent" of parties on whom summons may be served,
[6]
the provisions of the Revised Rules of Court may be resorted to.
[7]
Under the Revised Rules of Court, service upon a private domestic corporation or partnership must be made upon its officers,
such as the president, manager, secretary, cashier, agent, or any of its directors. These persons are deemed so integrated with the
[8]
corporation that they know their responsibilities and immediately discern what to do with any legal papers served on them.
[9]
In the case at bar, Engineer Estacio, assisted by Engineer Dulatre, managed and supervised the construction project. According
to the Solicitor General and private respondents, Engineer Estacio attended to the project in Iligan City and supervised the work of the
employees thereat. As manager, he had sufficient responsibility and discretion to realize the importance of the legal papers served on
him and to relay the same to the president or other responsible officer of petitioner. Summons for petitioner was therefore validly served
on him.
Engineer Estacio's appearance before the labor arbiters and his promise to settle the claims of private respondents is another
matter.
The general rule is that only lawyers are allowed to appear before the labor arbiter and respondent Commission in cases before
them. The Labor Code and the New Rules of Procedure of the NLRC, nonetheless, lists three (3) exceptions to the rule, viz:
"Section 6. Appearances.-- x x x.
"A non-lawyer may appear before the Commission or any Labor Arbiter only if:
"(a) he represents himself as party to the case;
"(b) he represents the organization or its members, provided that he shall be made to present written proof that he is properly
authorized; or
"(c) he is a duly-accredited member of any legal aid office duly recognized by the Department of Justice or the Integrated Bar of the
[10]
Philippines in cases referred thereto by the latter. x x x."
A non-lawyer may appear before the labor arbiters and the NLRC only if: (a) he represents himself as a party to the case; (b) he
represents an organization or its members, with written authorization from them; or (c) he is a duly accredited member of any legal aid
[11]
office duly recognized by the Department of Justice or the Integrated Bar of the Philippines in cases referred to by the latter.
Engineers Estacio and Dulatre were not lawyers. Neither were they duly-accredited members of a legal aid office. Their appearance
before the labor arbiters in their capacity as parties to the cases was authorized under the first exception to the rule. However, their
appearance on behalf of petitioner required written proof of authorization. It was incumbent upon the arbiters to ascertain this authority
especially since both engineers were named co-respondents in the cases before the arbiters. Absent this authority, whatever statements
and declarations Engineer Estacio made before the arbiters could not bind petitioner.
The appearance of Atty. Arthur Abundiente in the cases appealed to respondent Commission did not cure Engineer Estacio's
representation. Atty. Abundiente, in the first place, had no authority to appear before the respondent Commission. The appellants' brief
[12]
he filed was verified by him, not by petitioner. Moreover, respondent Commission did not delve into the merits of Atty. Abundiente's
appeal and determine whether Engineer Estacio was duly authorized to make such promise. It dismissed the appeal on the ground that
notices were served on petitioner and that the latter was estopped from denying its promise to pay.
Nevertheless, even assuming that Engineer Estacio and Atty. Abundiente were authorized to appear as representatives of
petitioner, they could bind the latter only in procedural matters before the arbiters and respondent Commission. Petitioner's liability arose
from Engineer Estacio's alleged promise to pay. A promise to pay amounts to an offer to compromise and requires a special power of
attorney or the express consent of petitioner. The authority to compromise cannot be lightly presumed and should be duly established by
[13]
evidence. This is explicit from Section 7 of Rule III of the NLRC Rules of Procedure, viz:
"Section 7. Authority to bind party.-- Attorneys and other representatives of parties shall have authority to bind their clients in all matters
of procedure; but they cannot, without a special power of attorney or express consent, enter into a compromise agreement with the
opposing party in full or partial discharge of a client's claim."
The promise to pay allegedly made by Engineer Estacio was made at the preliminary conference and constituted an offer to settle
the case amicably. The promise to pay could not be presumed to be a single unilateral act, contrary to the claim of the Solicitor
[14]
General. A defendant's promise to pay and settle the plaintiff's claims ordinarily requires a reciprocal obligation from the plaintiff to
[15]
withdraw the complaint and discharge the defendant from liability. In effect, the offer to pay was an offer to compromise the cases.
[16]
In civil cases, an offer to compromise is not an admission of any liability, and is not admissible in evidence against the offeror. If
[17]
this rule were otherwise, no attempt to settle litigation could safely be made. Settlement of disputes by way of compromise is an
[18]
accepted and desirable practice in courts of law and administrative tribunals. In fact, the Labor Code mandates the labor arbiter to
[19]
exert all efforts to enable the parties to arrive at an amicable settlement of the dispute within his jurisdiction on or before the first hearing.
Clearly, respondent Commission gravely abused its discretion in affirming the decisions of the labor arbiters which were not only
based on unauthorized representations, but were also made in violation of petitioner's right to due process.
Section 3 of Rule V of the NLRC Rules of Procedure provides:
"Section 3. Submission of Position Papers/Memorandum.-- Should the parties fail to agree upon an amicable settlement, in whole or in
part, during the conferences, the Labor Arbiter shall issue an order stating therein the matters taken up and agreed upon during the
conferences and directing the parties to simultaneously file their respective verified position papers.
"x x x."
After petitioner's alleged representative failed to pay the workers' claims as promised, Labor Arbiters Siao and Palangan did not
order the parties to file their respective position papers. The arbiters forthwith rendered a decision on the merits without at least requiring
private respondents to substantiate their complaints. The parties may have earlier waived their right to file position papers but petitioner's
waiver was made by Engineer Estacio on the premise that petitioner shall have paid and settled the claims of private respondents at the

11

scheduled conference. Since petitioner reneged on its "promise," there was a failure to settle the case amicably. This should have
prompted the arbiters to order the parties to file their position papers.
Article 221 of the Labor Code mandates that in cases before labor arbiters and respondent Commission, they "shall use every and
all reasonable means to ascertain the facts in each case speedily and objectively and without regard to technicalities of law or procedure,
all in the interest of due process." The rule that respondent Commission and the Labor Arbiters are not bound by technical rules of
[20]
evidence and procedure should not be interpreted so as to dispense with the fundamental and essential right of due process. And this
[21]
right is satisfied, at the very least, ' when the parties are given the opportunity to submit position papers. Labor Arbiters Siao and
Palangan erred in dispensing with this requirement.
Indeed, the labor arbiters and the NLRC must not, at the expense of due process, be the first to arbitrarily disregard specific
provisions of the Rules which are precisely intended to assist the parties in obtaining the just, expeditious and inexpensive settlement of
[22]
labor disputes.
IN VIEW WHEREOF, the petition for certiorari is granted. The decision of the National Labor Relations Commission, Fifth Division,
is annulled and set aside and the case is remanded to the Regional Arbitration Branch, Iligan City for further proceedings.
SO ORDERED.

12

Case 16

THIRD DIVISION

REY J. VARGAS AND EDUARDO A. PANES, JR., A.C. No. 8096

Complainants,
Present:

CARPIO MORALES, J.,

- versus - Chairperson,
BRION,
BERSAMIN,
*
ABAD, and
ATTY. MICHAEL A. IGNES, ATTY. LEONARD VILLARAMA, JR., JJ.
BUENTIPO MANN, ATTY. RODOLFO U. VIAJAR,
JR., AND ATTY. JOHN RANGAL D. NADUA,
Respondents. Promulgated:

July 5, 2010

x- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x

RESOLUTION
VILLARAMA, JR., J.:
[1]
Before the Court is a petition for review of Resolution No. XVIII-2008-335 passed on July 17, 2008 by the Board of Governors of the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) in CBD Case No. 07-1953. The IBP Board of Governors dismissed the disbarment case filed by
the complainants against the respondents.
The facts and proceedings antecedent to this case are as follows:
Koronadal Water District (KWD), a government-owned and controlled corporation (GOCC), hired respondent Atty. Michael A. Ignes as
[2]
private legal counsel for one (1) year effective April 17, 2006. The Office of the Government Corporate Counsel (OGCC) and the
[3]
Commission on Audit (COA) gave their consent to the employment of Atty. Ignes. However, controversy later erupted when two (2)
different groups, herein referred to as the Dela Pea board and Yaphockun board, laid claim as the legitimate Board of Directors of KWD.
[4]
On December 28, 2006, the members of the Dela Pea board filed Civil Case No. 1793 for Injunction and Damages, seeking
to annul the appointment of two (2) directors, Joselito T. Reyes and Carlito Y. Uy, who will allegedly connive with Director Allan D.
Yaphockun whose hostility to the present Board of Directors, the Dela Pea board, is supposedly of public knowledge.
[5]
On January 18, 2007, the Dela Pea board also adopted Resolution No. 009 appointing respondents Atty. Rodolfo U. Viajar, Jr. and
Atty. Leonard Buentipo Mann as private collaborating counsels for all cases of KWD and its Board of Directors, under the direct
supervision and control of Atty. Ignes.
Subsequently, on February 9, 2007, Attys. Ignes, Viajar, Jr. and Mann filed SCA Case No. 50-24 for Indirect Contempt of
[6]
Court entitled Koronadal Water District (KWD), represented herein by its General Manager, Eleanor Pimentel-Gomba v. Efren V.
[7]
Cabucay, et al. On February 19, 2007, they also filed Civil Case No. 1799 for Injunction and Damages entitled Koronadal Water District
(KWD), represented herein by its General Manager, & Eleanor Pimentel-Gomba v. Rey J. Vargas. OnMarch 9, 2007, KWD and Eleanor
[8]
Pimentel-Gomba filed a supplemental complaint in Civil Case No. 1799.
[9]
Meanwhile, in Contract Review No. 079 dated February 16, 2007, the OGCC had approved the retainership contract of Atty. Benjamin
B. Cuanan as new legal counsel of KWD and stated that the retainership contract of Atty. Ignes had expired onJanuary 14, 2007.
[10]
In its letter dated March 2, 2007, the OGCC also addressed Eleanor P. Gombas insistence that the retainership contract of Atty. Ignes
will expire on April 17, 2007. The OGCC stated that as stipulated, the KWD or OGCC may terminate the contract anytime without need
of judicial action; that OGCCs grant of authority to private counsels is a privilege withdrawable under justifiable circumstances; and that
the termination of Atty. Igness contract was justified by the fact that the Local Water Utilities Administration had confirmed the Yaphockun
board as the new Board of Directors of KWD and that said board had terminated Atty. Igness services and requested to hire another
counsel.
[11]
Alleging that respondents acted as counsel for KWD without legal authority, complainants filed a disbarment complaint against the
respondents before the IBP Commission on Bar Discipline (CBD), docketed as CBD Case No. 07-1953.Complainants alleged that
respondents filed SCA Case No. 50-24 and Civil Case No. 1799 as counsels of KWD without legal authority. They likewise stated in their
[12]
position paper that Atty. Ignes continued representing KWD even after the OGCC had confirmed the expiration of Atty. Igness contract
[13]
in its April 4, 2007 manifestation/motion in Civil Case No. 1796-25 entitled Koronadal Water District (KWD), represented herein by its
General Manager, Eleanor Pimentel Gomba v. Supreme Investigative and Security Agency, represented by its Manager Efren Y.
Cabucay.
[14]
In his defense, Atty. Mann stated that he and his fellow respondents can validly represent KWD until April 17, 2007 since Atty. Ignes
was not notified of his contracts pre-termination. Atty. Mann also stated that he stopped representing KWD afterApril 17, 2007 in deference
[15]
to the OGCCs stand. Attys. Ignes, Viajar, Jr. and Nadua echoed Atty. Manns defense.
[16]
On March 10, 2008, complainants filed a manifestation before the IBP with the following attachments: (1) the transcript of stenographic
notes taken on January 28, 2008 in Civil Case No. 1799, and (2) the notice of appeal dated February 28, 2008 of the January 7, 2008
Order dismissing Civil Case No. 1799. Aforesaid transcript showed that Atty. Ignes appeared as counsel of KWD and Ms. Gomba. He
also signed the notice of appeal.
[17]
In his report and recommendation, the Investigating Commissioner recommended that the charge against Atty. Ignes be dismissed for
lack of merit. The Investigating Commissioner held that Atty. Ignes had valid authority as counsel of KWD for one (1) year, from April
2006 to April 2007, and he was unaware of the pre-termination of his contract when he filed pleadings in SCA Case No. 50-24 and Civil
Case No. 1799 in February and March 2007.
As to Attys. Viajar, Jr., Mann and Nadua, the Investigating Commissioner recommended that they be fined P5,000 each for appearing as
[18]
attorneys for a party without authority to do so, per Santayana v. Alampay. The Investigating Commissioner found that they failed to
secure the conformity of the OGCC and COA to their engagement as collaborating counsels for KWD.
As aforesaid, the IBP Board of Governors reversed the recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner and dismissed the case for
lack of merit.
Hence, the present petition.
Complainants contend that the IBP Board of Governors erred in dismissing the case because respondents had no authority from
the OGCC to file the complaints and appear as counsels of KWD in Civil Case No. 1799, SCA Case No. 50-24 and Civil Case No. 1796-
25. Complainants point out that the retainership contract of Atty. Ignes had expired on January 14, 2007; that the Notice of Appeal filed
13

by Atty. Ignes, et al. in Civil Case No. 1799 was denied per Order dated April 8, 2008 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) for being filed by
one not duly authorized by law; and that the authority of Attys. Viajar, Jr. and Mann as collaborating counsels is infirm since Resolution
No. 009 of the Dela Pea board lacks the conformity of the OGCC. As a consequence, according to complainants, respondents are liable
for willfully appearing as attorneys for a party to a case without authority to do so.
In his comment, Atty. Ignes admits that their authority to represent KWD had expired on April 17, 2007, but he and his fellow respondents
stopped representing KWD after that date. He submits that they are not guilty of appearing as counsels without authority. In their comment,
Attys. Viajar, Jr. and Nadua propound similar arguments. They also say that their fees were paid from private funds of the members of
the Dela Pea board and KWD personnel who might need legal representation, not from the public coffers of KWD. In his own comment,
Atty. Mann submits similar arguments.
After a careful study of the case and the parties submissions, we find respondents administratively liable.
At the outset, we note that the parties do not dispute the need for OGCC and COA conformity if a GOCC hires private
lawyers. Nonetheless, we shall briefly recall the legal basis of this rule. Under Section 10, Chapter 3, Title III, Book IV of theAdministrative
Code of 1987, it is the OGCC which shall act as the principal law office of all GOCCs. And Section 3 of Memorandum Circular No.
[19]
9, issued by President Estrada on August 27, 1998, enjoins GOCCs to refrain from hiring private lawyers or law firms to handle their
cases and legal matters. But the same Section 3 provides that in exceptional cases, the written conformity and acquiescence of the
Solicitor General or the Government Corporate Counsel, as the case may be, and the written concurrence of the COA shall first be
[20]
secured before the hiring or employment of a private lawyer or law firm. In Phividec Industrial Authority v. Capitol Steel Corporation, we
listed three (3) indispensable conditions before a GOCC can hire a private lawyer: (1) private counsel can only be hired in exceptional
cases; (2) the GOCC must first secure the written conformity and acquiescence of the Solicitor General or the Government Corporate
Counsel, as the case may be; and (3) the written concurrence of the COA must also be secured.
In the case of respondents, do they have valid authority to appear as counsels of KWD?
We find that Attys. Nadua, Viajar, Jr. and Mann had no valid authority to appear as collaborating counsels of KWD in SCA Case No. 50-
24 and Civil Case No. 1799. Nothing in the records shows that Atty. Nadua was engaged by KWD as collaborating counsel. While the
th
4 Whereas Clause of Resolution No. 009 partly states that he and Atty. Ignes presently stand as KWD legal counsels, there is no proof
that the OGCC and COA approved Atty. Naduas engagement as legal counsel or collaborating counsel. Insofar as Attys. Viajar, Jr. and
Mann are concerned, their appointment as collaborating counsels of KWD under Resolution No. 009 has no approval from the OGCC
and COA.
Attys. Nadua, Viajar, Jr. and Mann are in the same situation as the private counsel of Phividec Industrial Authority in Phividec. In that
case, we also ruled that said private counsel of Phividec Industrial Authority, a GOCC, had no authority to file the expropriation case in
[21]
Phividecs behalf considering that the requirements set by Memorandum Circular No. 9 were not complied with. Thus, Resolution No.
009 did not grant authority to Attys. Nadua, Viajar, Jr. and Mann to act as collaborating counsels of KWD. That Atty. Ignes was not notified
of the pre-termination of his own retainership contract cannot validate an inexistent authority of Attys. Nadua, Viajar, Jr. and Mann as
collaborating counsels.
In the case of Atty. Ignes, he also appeared as counsel of KWD without authority, after his authority as its counsel had expired. True, the
OGCC and COA approved his retainership contract for one (1) year effective April 17, 2006. But even if we assume as true that he was
not notified of the pre-termination of his contract, the records still disprove his claim that he stopped representing KWD after April 17,
2007.
Atty. Ignes offered no rebuttal to the verified manifestation of complainants filed with the IBP on March 10, 2008. Attached therein was
[22]
the transcript of stenographic notes in Civil Case No. 1799 taken on January 28, 2008 when Atty. Ignes argued the extremely urgent
motion for the immediate return of the facilities of the KWD to the KWD Arellano Office. The RTC was compelled to ask him why he seeks
the return of KWD properties if he filed the motion as counsel of Ms. Gomba. When the RTC noted that KWD does not appear to be a
party to the motion, Atty. Ignes said that KWD is represented by Ms. Gomba per the caption of the case. Atty. Ignes also manifested that
they will file a motion for reconsideration of the orders dismissing Civil Case No. 1799 and Civil Case No. 1793. The RTC ruled that it will
not accept any motion for reconsideration in behalf of KWD unless he is authorized by the OGCC, but Atty. Ignes later filed a notice of
[23]
appeal dated February 28, 2008, in Civil Case No. 1799. As the notice of appeal signed by Atty. Ignes was filed by one (1) not duly
[24]
authorized by law, the RTC, in its Order dated April 8, 2008, denied due course to said notice of appeal.
As we see it, Atty. Ignes portrayed that his appearance on January 28, 2008 was merely as counsel of Ms. Gomba. He indicted himself,
however, when he said that Ms. Gomba represents KWD per the case title. In fact, the extremely urgent motion sought the return of the
facilities of KWD to its Arellano Office. Clearly, Atty. Ignes filed and argued a motion with the interest of KWD in mind. The notice of
appeal in Civil Case No. 1799 further validates that Atty. Ignes still appeared as counsel of KWD after his authority as counsel had
expired. This fact was not lost on the RTC in denying due course to the notice of appeal.
Now did respondents willfully appear as counsels of KWD without authority?
The following circumstances convince us that, indeed, respondents willfully and deliberately appeared as counsels of KWD without
authority. One, respondents have admitted the existence of Memorandum Circular No. 9 and professed that they are aware of our ruling
[25]
in Phividec. Thus, we entertain no doubt that they have full grasp of our ruling therein that there are indispensable conditions before a
GOCC can hire private counsel and that for non-compliance with the requirements set by Memorandum Circular No. 9, the private counsel
would have no authority to file a case in behalf of a GOCC. Still, respondents acted as counsels of KWD without complying with what the
rule requires. They signed pleadings as counsels of KWD.They presented themselves voluntarily, on their own volition, as counsels of
KWD even if they had no valid authority to do so.
Two, despite the question on respondents authority as counsels of KWD which question was actually raised earlier in Civil Case No. 1799
[26]
by virtue of an urgent motion to disqualify KWDs counsels dated February 21, 2007 and during the hearing on February 23,
[27]
2007 respondents still filed the supplemental complaint in the case on March 9, 2007. And despite the pendency of this case before
the IBP, Atty. Ignes had to be reminded by the RTC that he needs OGCC authority to file an intended motion for reconsideration in behalf
of KWD.
With the grain of evidence before us, we do not believe that respondents are innocent of the charge even if they insist that the professional
fees of Attys. Nadua, Viajar, Jr. and Mann, as collaborating counsels, were paid not from the public coffers of KWD. To be sure, the facts
were clear that they appeared as counsels of KWD without authority, and not merely as counsels of the members of the Dela Pea board
and KWD personnel in their private suits.
Consequently, for respondents willful appearance as counsels of KWD without authority to do so, there is a valid ground to impose
disciplinary action against them. Under Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court, a member of the bar may be disbarred or suspended
from his office as attorney by the Supreme Court for any deceit, malpractice, or other gross misconduct in such office, grossly immoral
conduct, or by reason of his conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude, or for any violation of the oath which he is required to take
before admission to practice, or for a willful disobedience of any lawful order of a superior court, or for corruptly or willfully appearing as
an attorney for a party to a case without authority to do so.
Disbarment, however, is the most severe form of disciplinary sanction, and, as such, the power to disbar must always be exercised with
great caution, and should be imposed only for the most imperative reasons and in clear cases of misconduct affecting the standing and
moral character of the lawyer as an officer of the court and member of the bar. Accordingly, disbarment should not be decreed where any
[28] [29]
punishment less severe such as a reprimand, suspension or fine, would accomplish the end desired. In Santayana, we imposed a
fine of P5,000 on the respondent for willfully appearing as an attorney for a party to a case without authority to do so. The respondent
therein also appeared as private counsel of the National Electrification Administration, a GOCC, without any approval from the OGCC
and COA.
14

Conformably with Santayana, we impose a fine of P5,000 on each respondent.
On another matter, we note that respondents stopped short of fully narrating what had happened after the RTC issued four (4) orders
[30]
on March 24, 2007 and on April 13, 2007 in Civil Case No. 1799. As willingly revealed by complainants, all four (4) orders were nullified
[31]
by the Court of Appeals. We are compelled to issue a reminder that our Code of Professional Responsibility requires lawyers, like
[32]
respondents, to always show candor and good faith to the courts.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The assailed Resolution No. XVIII-2008-335 passed on July 17, 2008 by the IBP Board of
Governors in CBD Case No. 07-1953 is REVERSED and SET ASIDE.
Respondents Attys. Michael A. Ignes, Leonard Buentipo Mann, Rodolfo U. Viajar, Jr., and John Rangal D. Nadua are found GUILTY of
willfully appearing as attorneys for a party to a case without authority to do so and FINED P5,000 each, payable to this Court within ten
(10) days from notice of this Resolution. They are STERNLY WARNED that a similar offense in the future will be dealt with more severely.
Let a copy of this Resolution be attached to respondents personal records in the Office of the Bar Confidant.
SO ORDERED.

15

Case 17
THIRD DIVISION

SPOUSES CONSTANTE AGBULOS AND ZENAIDA G.R. No. 176530

PADILLA AGBULOS,
Petitioners,
Present:

YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.,
Chairperson,
- versus - CHICO-NAZARIO,
VELASCO, JR.,
NACHURA, and
PERALTA, JJ.

NICASIO GUTIERREZ, JOSEFA GUTIERREZ and

ELENA G. GARCIA,
Respondents. Promulgated:

June 16, 2009

x-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x
RESOLUTION

NACHURA, J.:
[1]
This petition for review on certiorari seeks the review of the Decision of the Court of Appeals (CA) dated February 6, 2007 in
CAG.R. CV No. 83994 which set aside the dismissal of a complaint for declaration of nullity of contract, cancellation of title, reconveyance
and damages.

The case stems from the following antecedents:

On October 16, 1997, respondents, Dr. Nicasio G. Gutierrez, Josefa Gutierrez de Mendoza and Elena G. Garcia, through their
counsel, Atty. Adriano B. Magbitang, filed with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Gapan, Nueva Ecija, a complaint against petitioners,
spouses Constante Agbulos and Zenaida Padilla Agbulos, for declaration of nullity of contract, cancellation of title, reconveyance and
damages. The complaint alleged that respondents inherited from their father, Maximo Gutierrez, an eight-hectare parcel of land located
in Callos, Penaranda, Nueva Ecija, covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. NT-123790 in the name of Maximo Gutierrez.
Through fraud and deceit, petitioners succeeded in making it appear that Maximo Gutierrez executed a Deed of Sale on July 21, 1978
when, in truth, he died on April 25, 1977. As a result, TCT No. NT-123790 was cancelled and a new one, TCT No. NT-188664, was
issued in the name of petitioners. Based on the notation at the back of the certificate of title, portions of the property were brought under
the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program (CARP) and awarded to Lorna Padilla, Elenita Nuega and Suzette Nuega who were issued
Certificates of Land Ownership Award (CLOAs).

In their defense, petitioners averred that respondents were not the real parties in interest, that the Deed of Sale was regularly
executed before a notary public, that they were possessors in good faith, and that the action had prescribed.

On the day set for the presentation of the respondents (plaintiffs) evidence, petitioners filed a Motion to Dismiss, assailing the
jurisdiction of the RTC over the subject matter of the case. Petitioners contended that the Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication
Board (DARAB), not the RTC, had jurisdiction since the subject land was covered by the CARP, and CLOAs had been awarded to tenants.
Respondents opposed the motion, arguing that the motion had been filed beyond the period for filing an Answer, that the RTC had
jurisdiction over the case based on the allegations in the complaint, and that the DARAB had no jurisdiction since the parties had no
tenancy relationship.
[2]
In an Order dated October 24, 2002, the RTC granted the petitioners motion and dismissed the complaint for lack of jurisdiction.
The RTC held that the DARAB had jurisdiction, since the subject property was under the CARP, some portions of it were covered by
[3]
registered CLOAs, and there was prima facie showing of tenancy.
[4]
Respondents filed a motion for reconsideration. On November 13, 2003, the RTC denied the motion.
[5] [6]
Atty. Magbitang filed a Notice of Appeal with the RTC, which gave due course to the same. The records reveal that on
December 15, 2003, respondent Elena G. Garcia wrote a letter to Judge Arturo M. Bernardo, Acting Judge of RTC Gapan, Branch 87,
stating that they were surprised to receive a communication from the court informing them that their notice of appeal was ready for
disposition. She also stated in the letter that there was no formal agreement with Atty. Magbitang as to whether they would pursue an
[7]
appeal with the CA, because one of the plaintiffs was still in America.

On February 6, 2007, the CA rendered a Decision in favor of respondents. The dispositive portion of the decision reads:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the appeal is hereby GRANTED and the assailed Order dated October
24, 2002 issued by the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Gapan, Nueva Ecija, Branch 87, is
REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Accordingly, the subject complaint is

16

 reinstated and the records of the case is (sic) hereby remanded to the RTC for further proceedings.
[8]
SO ORDERED.

The CA concluded that the dispute between the parties was purely civil, not agrarian, in nature. According to the CA, the
allegations in the complaint revealed that the principal relief sought was the nullification of the purported deed of sale and reconveyance
of the subject property. It also noted that there was no tenurial, leasehold, or any other agrarian relations between the parties.

Thus, this petition, raising the following issues for the resolution of this Court:

1. Whether or not the CA erred in not dismissing the appeal despite the undisputed fact that Atty. Magbitang
filed the notice of appeal without respondents knowledge and consent;

2. Whether or not the CA erred in giving due course to the appeal despite the fact that Atty. Magbitangs
appellants brief failed to comply with the mandatory requirements of Section 13, Rule 44 of the Rules of Court regarding
the contents of an appellants brief; and

3. Whether or not the CA erred in ruling that the RTC (Regional Trial Court), not the DARAB (Department of
Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board) or the PARAD/RARAD (Provincial/Regional Agrarian Provincial Agrarian Reform
[9]
Adjudicator), has jurisdiction over respondents complaint.

The CA did not err in giving due course to the appeal, on both procedural and substantive grounds.

A lawyer who represents a client before the trial court is presumed to represent such client before the appellate court. Section
22 of Rule 138 creates this presumption, thus:

SEC. 22. Attorney who appears in lower court presumed to represent client on appeal. An attorney who
appears de parte in a case before a lower court shall be presumed to continue representing his client on appeal, unless
he files a formal petition withdrawing his appearance in the appellate court.

A reading of respondent Elena Garcias letter to the RTC would show that she did not actually withdraw Atty. Magbitangs authority
to represent respondents in the case. The letter merely stated that there was, as yet, no agreement that they would pursue an appeal.

In any case, an unauthorized appearance of an attorney may be ratified by the client either expressly or impliedly. Ratification
[10]
retroacts to the date of the lawyers first appearance and validates the action taken by him. Implied ratification may take various forms,
[11]
such as by silence or acquiescence, or by acceptance and retention of benefits flowing therefrom. Respondents silence or lack of
remonstration when the case was finally elevated to the CA means that they have acquiesced to the filing of the appeal.
[12]
Moreover, a lawyer is mandated to serve his client with competence and diligence. Consequently, a lawyer is entreated not
[13]
to neglect a legal matter entrusted to him; otherwise, his negligence in connection therewith shall render him liable. In light of such
mandate, Atty. Magbitangs act of filing the notice of appeal without waiting for her clients to direct him to do so was understandable, if
not commendable.

The CA was likewise correct in holding that the case is within the jurisdiction of the RTC, not the DARAB.

For the DARAB to have jurisdiction over a case, there must be a tenancy relationship between the parties. It is, therefore,
essential to establish all the indispensable elements of a tenancy relationship, to wit: (1) that the parties are the landowner and the tenant
or agricultural lessee; (2) that the subject matter of the relationship is an agricultural land; (3) that there is consent between the parties to
the relationship; (4) that the purpose of the relationship is to bring about agricultural production; (5) that there is personal cultivation on
the part of the tenant or agricultural lessee; and (6) that the harvest is shared between the landowner and the tenant or agricultural
[14]
lessee.
[15]
Basic is the rule that jurisdiction is determined by the allegations in the complaint. Respondents complaint did not contain any
allegation that would, even in the slightest, imply that there was a tenancy relation between them and the petitioners. We are in full
agreement with the following findings of the CA on this point:

x x x A reading of the material averments of the complaint reveals that the principal relief sought by plaintiffs-appellants
is for the nullification of the supposedly forged deed of sale which resulted in the issuance of TCT No. NT-188664
covering their 8-hectare property as well as its reconveyance, and not for the cancellation of CLOAs as claimed by
defendants-appellees. Moreover, the parties herein have no tenurial, leasehold, or any other agrarian relations
whatsoever that could have brought this controversy under the ambit of the agrarian reform laws. Neither were the
CLOA awardees impleaded as parties in this case nor the latters entitlement thereto questioned. Hence, contrary to
the findings of the RTC, the herein dispute is purely civil and not agrarian in nature falling within the exclusive jurisdiction
of the trial courts.

On the alleged deficiency of the appellants brief filed before the CA by the respondents, suffice it to state that the requirements
in Section 13, Rule 44 are intended to aid the appellate court in arriving at a just and proper resolution of the case. Obviously, the CA
found the appellants brief sufficient in form and substance as the appellate court was able to arrive at a just decision. We have repeatedly
held that technical and procedural rules are intended to help secure, not to suppress, substantial justice. A deviation from a rigid
enforcement of the rules may, thus, be allowed in order to attain this prime objective for, after all, the dispensation of justice is the core
[16]
reason for the existence of courts.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is DENIED. The Court of Appeals Decision dated February 6, 2007
is AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.

17

Case 18
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 82760 August 30, 1990
FELIMON MANANGAN, petitioner,
vs.
COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE OF NUEVA VIZCAYA, BRANCH 28, respondent.

MELENCIO-HERRERA, J.:
For abuse of Court processes, hopping from one forum to another, filing a labyrinth of cases and pleadings, thwarting the smooth
prosecution of Criminal Case No. 639 against him for no less than twelve (12) years, and for masquerading as Filemon Manangan
when his real name is Andres Culanag, petitioner has brought upon himself the severest censure and a punishment for contempt. The
Petition for Certiorari he has filed likewise calls for dismissal.
The Petition, Amended Petition, and Second Amended Petition seek the annulment of the entire proceedings in Criminal Case No. 639
of respondent Court, including the Alias Warrant of Arrest issued by it, dated 19 July 1979, "for being stale/functus officio." It is
claimed, inter alia, that respondent Court committed grave abuse of discretion in making it appear that petitioner was duly tried and
convicted when the contrary was true, and that the AliasWarrant of Arrest was irregularly issued because respondent Court had already
accepted a property bond.
In the Amended Petition, petitioner further alleges that respondent Court had irregularly assumed jurisdiction as it is the Sandiganbayan
that has exclusive original jurisdiction over the case considering that he was Legal Officer I of the Bureau of Lands, Region II, and that
he had supposedly committed the offense in relation to that office.
Piecing together the facts from the hodgepodge of quotations from the Decisions in the different cases filed by petitioner, we recite the
relevant ones below.
On 7 November 1977, petitioner, representing himself as a lawyer, was appointed Legal Officer I of the Bureau of Lands in Region II (p.
98, Rollo).
On 30 June 1978, Criminal Case No. 639 entitled "People v. Filemon Manangan alias Andres Culanag" (Annex D, Petition, Rollo, UDK
3906, p. 20) was filed before the then Court of First Instance of Nueva Vizcaya, First Judicial District, Bayombong, charging petitioner
with "Execution of Deeds by Intimidation" under Article 298 of the Revised Penal Code (the Criminal Case, for short). Apparently, the
Director of Lands had given his imprimatur to the charge.
On the same date, an Order of Arrest was issued by then Judge Gabriel Dunuan of respondent Court (Rollo, UDK 3906, p. 21).
On 18 April 1979, petitioner filed before this Court a Petition for Certiorari, Prohibition and mandamus with Writ of Preliminary Injunction
entitled "Filemon de Asis Manangan v. Court of First Instance, et al.," in UDK No. 3906, assailing the jurisdiction of respondent Court to
try the criminal case and seeking to stay the Order of Arrest of 30 June 1978. The petition was dismissed on 7 May 1979 for non-
payment of legal fees (p. 99, Rollo).
On 10 and 18 July 1978, the dates set for preliminary investigation, petitioner did not show up and, in fact, disappeared for about a
year.
On 31 July 1978, a Second Amended Information was filed (Comment, Solicitor General, p. 61, Rollo), this time Identifying the accused
as "Andres Culanag (alias Andres M. Culanag, Filemon Manangan Atty. Filemon A. Manangan and Atty. Ross V. Pangilinan)."
On 8 July 1979, petitioner surfaced and, through counsel, posted a bailbond with the Municipal Circuit Court of San Miguel, Zamboanga
del Sur (Resolution of the RTC, Nueva Vizcaya, 25 March 1983, Annex B, Petition, p. 2).
On 19 July 1979, an Alias Warrant of Arrest was by Judge Gabriel Dunuan. It is this Alias Warrant that is challenged herein.
On 12 September 1979, petitioner filed an ex-parte Motion to Dismiss the Criminal Case, which was denied by respondent Court (see
CA-G.R. No. 11588-SP, p. 2).
Petitioner then resorted to a Petition for Certiorari and Mandamus before the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. No. 11588-SP entitled
"Filemon Manangan v. Director of Lands and CFI of Nueva Vizcaya." The Petition sought to (1) nullify the decision of the Director of
Lands, dated 27 March 1980, finding petitioner guilty of extortion, impersonation and abandonment of office and ordering his dismissal
from the service; and (2) "require respondent CFI of Nueva Ecija to dismiss Criminal Case No. 639 pending in its Court." In a Decision,
promulgated on 27 February 1981, the Appellate Court dismissed the Petition for "absolute lack of legal and factual basis" and holding,
among others, that "the non-withdrawal of the Information for execution of deeds by intimidation . . . is not covered by mandamus"
1
(hereinafter, the German Decision).
On 30 October 1981, before respondent Court, a Motion for Reconsideration was filed by petitioner, ostensibly through counsel, Atty.
Benjamin Facun, asking that the Criminal Case be dismissed on the ground that the accused had already died on 29 September 1971
such that respondent Court had not acquired jurisdiction over his person. The Motion was denied.
On 22 February 1982, erroneously construing the German Decision as a final judgment of conviction, respondent Court reset the
promulgation to 19 April 1982 and ordered the bondsmen to produce the body of the accused on said date (Annex A, Petition).
Realizing the mistake, on 9 July 1982, respondent Court vacated said order and ruled that "the warrant of arrest issued by this Court
through Judge Gabriel Dunuan on 19 July 1979, shall remain in full force and effect" (Annex F, Petition).
On 25 June 1982, petitioner again resorted to the Court of Appeals in another Petition for Certiorari (CA-G.R. No. SP-14428) filed by
one Atty. Benjamin Facun as counsel for petitioner, this time praying for the annulment of the proceedings in the Criminal Case "on the
ground that the accused was already dead when the decision finding him guilty of the crime . . . was rendered." The pleading alleged
"that petitioner is of age, Filipino, deceased, but has come to this Honorable Court through counsel. . . ." In a Decision promulgated on
29 November 1982,Certiorari was denied for being devoid of merit inasmuch as "there is nothing on record to show that such dismissal
2
had been sought before the decision was rendered" (briefly, the Kapunan Decision). (Actually, no judgment has been rendered by
respondent Court).
Unfazed by the adverse Kapunan Decision, the supposed heirs of the accused, on 10 February 1983, filed a Manifestation before
respondent Court asking for the dismissal and termination of the Criminal Case on the same ground that the accused had allegedly
died.
On 25 March 1983, Judge Quirino A. Catral of respondent Court refused to declare the case closed and terminated inasmuch as the
accused was alive on 8 July 1979 when he posted his bailbond (citing the Kapunan Decision) and reiterated that the "alias warrant
issued by the Court on July 19, 1979 which up to the present has not yet been served upon the accused as in full force and effect."
For the third time, the case was elevated to the then Intermediate Appellate Court in AC-G.R. No. SP-00707, entitled "Heirs of the
Deceased Filemon Manangan v. Hon. Quirino A. Catral, etc." The Petition sought to annul the Order of Judge Catral of 25 March 1983
denying the closure and termination of the Criminal Case.
On 28 May 1983, the then IAC, after quoting at length from the Kapunan Decision and the Catral Order, dismissed the Petition
3
(hereinafter, the Aquino Decision) holding, inter alia, that "whether or not its denial of the motion to dismiss that case constitutes a
grave abuse of discretion, was already passed upon by this Court in CA-G.R. No. SP-14428 (Kapunan Decision), hence, it is res
adjudicata. It may not be litigated anew, no matter what form the action for that purpose may take."

18

On 28 June 1984, before the respondent Court, petitioner-accused filed an Omnibus Motion with Motion for New Trial, which was
denied for lack of merit in the Order of 19 November 1984. In the same Order, respondent Court ordered the case archived until such
time that the accused is brought to the Court.
On 19 June 1986, counsel for petitioner-accused filed a Motion to Quash on the grounds that: "(1) the court trying the case has no
jurisdiction over the offense charged or the person of the accused; and (2) the accused has been previously convicted or in jeopardy of
being convicted of the offense charged."
It was at that stage of the case below, without awaiting disposition on the Motion to Quash, that the present Petition was instituted.
The obvious conclusion from the recital of facts given is that the Petition is without merit. Petitioner-accused had a pending Motion to
Quash before respondent Court and should have awaited resolution thereon. He had a plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the
ordinary course of law and resort to this Petition is decidedly premature.
Contrary to petitioner's pretensions, the Alias Warrant of Arrest is valid. Petitioner had evaded arrest by disappearing from the
jurisdiction of respondent Court. Neither is there any indication in the records that the property bond, filed by petitioner-accused in the
Municipal Circuit Court of San Miguel, Zamboanga del Sur, had been accepted by respondent Court and petitioner discharged on the
basis thereof. The Alias Warrant is not "stale or functus officio," as alleged. Unlike a warrant, which is valid for only ten (10) days from
date (Rule 126, Sec. 9), a Warrant of Arrest remains valid until arrest is effected or the Warrant lifted. Respondent Court, therefore,
cannot be faulted with grave abuse of discretion for holding that said Warrant is in full force and effect.
Although there may have been some initial confusion on the part of respondent Court arising from the Kapunan Decision, that was
timely rectified. In the final analysis, respondent Court has not made it appear that petitioner-accused has already been arraigned and
tried, let alone convicted. No jeopardy has attached, as alleged. Again, therefore, no grave abuse of discretion can be attributed to
respondent Court.
Petitioner's argument in his Amended Petition and Second Amended Petition that it is the Sandiganbayan that has exclusive jurisdiction
over the Criminal Case neither holds water considering that not only is he ineligible for the position of Legal Officer I in the Bureau of
Lands, Region II, for not being a lawyer, but also because he was dismissed from the service on 27 March 1980 by the Director of
Lands, who found him, with the approval of the Minister of Natural Resources, guilty of extortion, impersonation and abandonment of
office CA-G.R. No. 11588-SP, p. 2).
The foregoing conclusions could dispose of the case.
However, on 8 June 1989, the Solicitor General filed a "Manifestation/Motion to Strike Out" the present petition for being fictitious and
that by reason thereof petitioner should be cited for contempt of Court. The Solicitor General has also prayed that he be excused from
filing a Comment on petitioner's Second Amended Petition, which we resolve to grant.
The Solicitor General maintains that a re-examination of the records in the Criminal shows that:
a. Filemon A. Manangan is only an alias of Andres M. Culanag, the person charged in Criminal Case No. 639;
b. Filemon A. Manangan was a lawyer from San Marcelino, Zambales, who died on September 29, 1971 in the
vicinity of his residence where he and his driver died on the spot; and
c. [Andres M. Culanag] knew the real Filemon Manangan and knowing about the latter's death, assumed the name,
qualifications and other personal circumstances of Filemon Manangan. By means thereof, he was able to pass
himself off as a lawyer and to actually practice law, using even the Certificate of Admission to the Philippine Bar of
Filemon Manangan which states that he was admitted to the Bar on March 6, 1964. By this guise, [Andres M.
Culanag] succeeded in obtaining a position as legal Officer I in the Bureau of Lands.
In opposition, petitioner maintains that he is not a fictitious person, having been born out of the lawful wedlock of Segundino Manangan
and Felipa Asis; and that assuming that there is sufficient basis to charge him for contempt, it will no longer prosper on the ground of
prescription.
Petitioner's posturings are completely bereft of basis. As the Solicitor General had also disclosed in the German Decision, petitioner
[Andres Culanag] had, on 23 February 1977, filed Sp. Procs. No. 23 with the Court of First Instance of Nueva Ecija, San Jose City
Branch, for the change of his name from Andres Culanag to Filemon Manangan. In that petition, he claimed that his real name is
Andres Culanag; that his entire school records carry his name as Filemon Manangan: and that he is the same person as Andres
Culanag, the latter being his real name. The imprisonment was carried to the extreme when, in petitioner's Manifestation, dated 10
February 1983, before respondent Court, his supposed heirs alleged that accused had died before the filing of the Information on 29
September 1971, the exact date of death of the real Filemon Manangan. More, petitioner also masquerades under the name of Atty.
Benjamin M. Facun in the several pleadings filed in connection with the Criminal Case.
In the German Decision, it was additionally pointed out that petitioner had also committed imprisonation when, representing himself as
Atty. Ross V. Pangilinan, he filed a petition with this Court praying that his right to practice law be affirmed (Misc. Bar-I and Misc. Bar-2).
In those cases, we ruled that petitioner Filemon Manangan is "really Andres Culanag, an impostor;" dismissed the petitions; and
directed Andres Culanag to show cause why he should not be punished for contempt for filing the two false petitions (In re: Andres
Culanag, September 30, 1971, 41 SCRA 26). He explained that "he thought this Court would not discover that he is a poseur, for which
reason he apologizes to the Court promising that he would not commit the same act if he is excused and given another chance." On 12
November 1971, after finding his explanation unsatisfactory, we adjudged him guilty of indirect contempt of Court under Rule 71,
4
Section 3(e) of the Rules of Court and sentenced him to suffer imprisonment for six (6) months.
Parenthetically, we also take judicial notice of Bar Matter No. 190, entitled "In Re Andres Culanag alias Atty. Ross V. Pangilinan" and
Bar Matter No. 206, entitled "Eriberto H. Decena vs. Andres Culanag" wherein, on 9 October 1984, this Court Resolved "to direct that
petitioner be subjected to mental examination by a doctor from the National Mental Hospital" after noting that petitioner was suffering
from some kind of mental alienation. This mitigates somewhat petitioner's present liability for contempt.
It is the height of chicanery, indeed, that despite the foregoing antecedents, petitioner still has the gall to claim that he is, in truth and in
fact, Filemon Manangan. The evidence on hand, without need for more, and with petitioner having been sufficiently heard, amply
establishes that petitioner Filemon Manangan, is an impostor. He is guilty of continued fraudulent misrepresentation and highly
improper conduct tending directly to impede, obstruct, degrade, and make a mockery of the administration of justice (Rule 71, Sec. 3
[d]).
While it may be that some pronouncements in the pertinent decisions allude to Filemon Manangan and that Andres Culanag is just
an alias of Filemon Manangan, those statements actually refer to the person of Andres Culanag and not to the real Filemon Manangan,
long since dead.
The action for contempt has not prescribed since it is apparent that the contumacious acts continue to this day.
WHEREFORE, (1) the Petition, Amended Petition, and the Second Amended Petition are hereby dismissed for utter lack of merit; (2)
petitioner is adjudged in contempt of Court, severely censured, and sentenced to suffer three (3) months imprisonment, the same to be
served at the Provincial Jail of Nueva Vizcaya to ensure his appearance during the trial of the subject criminal case; (3) respondent
Court is hereby directed to retrieve Criminal Case No. 639 from its archives and to proceed to its determination with deliberate dispatch;
(4) all Courts are directed not to recognize any person representing himself as Filemon Manangan, Atty. Filemon Manangan, or Atty.
Benjamin M. Facun; and (5) petitioner's real name is declared to be Andres Culanag.
Treble costs against petitioner.
SO ORDERED.

19

Case 19

EN BANC
[A.C. No. 5829. October 28, 2003]
DANIEL LEMOINE, complainant, vs. ATTY. AMADEO E. BALON, JR., respondent.
DECISION
PER CURIAM:
[1]
On December 17, 1999, complainant Daniel Lemoine, a French national, filed a verified complaint against respondent Atty.
Amadeo E. Balon, Jr., for estafa and misconduct before the Integrated Bar of the Philippines. The case, docketed as CBD Case No. 99-
679, was referred by the Commission on Bar Discipline to an Investigator for investigation, report and recommendation.
The facts that spawned the filing of the complaint are as follows:
In early 1998, complainant filed a car insurance claim with the Metropolitan Insurance Company (Metropolitan Insurance), the insurer
[2]
of his vehicle which was lost. As complainant encountered problems in pursuing his claim which was initially rejected, his friend, a
certain Jesus Jess Garcia (Garcia), arranged for the engagement of respondents services.
[3]
By letter of October 21, 1998 addressed to Elde Management, Inc., ATTN: Mr. Daniel Lemoine, under whose care complainant
could be reached, respondent advised complainant, whom he had not before met, that for his legal services he was charging 25% of the
actual amount being recovered. . . payable upon successful recovery; an advance payment of P50,000.00 to be charged [to complainant]
to be deducted from whatever amount [would] be successfully collected; P1,000.00 as appearance and conference fee for each and
every court hearings, conferences outside our law office and meetings before the Office of the Insurance Commission which will be also
charged to our 25% recovery fee; and legal expenses such as but not limited to filing fee, messengerial and postage expenses . . . and
other miscellaneous but related expenses, to be charged to complainants account which would be reimbursed upon presentation of
statement of account.
The letter-proposal of respondent regarding attorneys fees does not bear complainants conformity, he not having agreed therewith.
[4]
It appears that Metropolitan Insurance finally offered to settle complainants claim, for by letter of December 9, 1998 addressed to
it, respondent confirmed his acceptance of its offer to settle the claim of complainant in an ex-gratia basis of 75% of his policy coverage
which is therefore FIVE HUNDRED TWENTY FIVE THOUSAND (P525,000.00) PESOS.
[5]
A day or a few days before December 23, 1998 when complainant left for France, he, on the advice of respondent, signed an
[6]
already prepared undated Special Power of Attorney authorizing respondent and/or Garcia to bring any action against Metropolitan
Insurance for the satisfaction of complainants claim as well as to negotiate, sign, compromise[,] encash and receive payment from it. The
Special Power of Attorney was later dated December 23, 1998 on which same date Metropolitan Insurance issued a Chinabank Check
[7]
No. 841172 payable to complainant in the amount of P525,000.00 as full settlement of the claim. The check was received by
respondent.
[8]
In the meantime, complainant returned to the Philippines in early January 1999 but left again on the 24th of the same month. On
inquiry about the status of his claim, Garcia echoed to complainant what respondent had written him (Garcia) in respondents
[9]
letter of March 26, 1999 that the claim was still pending with Metropolitan Insurance and that it was still subject of negotiations in which
Metropolitan Insurance offered to settle it for P350,000.00 representing fifty percent thereof. In the same letter to
Garcia, respondentsuggested the acceptance of the offer of settlement to avoid a protracted litigation.
On December 6, 1999, on complainants personal visit to the office of Metropolitan Insurance, he was informed that his claim had
[10]
long been settled via a December 23, 1998 check given to respondent the year before. Complainant lost no time in going to the law
office of respondent who was not around, however, but whom he was able to talk by telephone during which he demanded that he turn
[11]
over the proceeds of his claim.
[12]
Respondent thereupon faxed to complainant a December 7, 1999 letter wherein he acknowledged having in his possession the
proceeds of the encashed check which he retained, however, as attorneys lien pending complainants payment of his attorneys fee,
equivalent to fifty percent (50%) of entire amount collected. In the same letter, respondent protested what he branded as the uncivilized
and unprofessional behavior complainant reportedly demonstrated at respondents office. Respondent winded up his letter as follows,
quoted verbatim:
We would like to make it clear that we cannot give you the aforesaid amount until and unless our attorneys fees will be forthwith agreed
and settled. In the same manner, should you be barbaric and uncivilized with your approached, we will not hesitate to make a proper
representation with the Bureau of Immigration and Deportation for the authenticity of your visa, Department of Labor and Employment
for your working status, Bureau of Internal Revenue for your taxation compliance and the National Bureau of Investigation [with] which
we have a good network...
While it [is your] prerogative to file a legal action against us, it is also our prerogative to file a case against you. We will rather suggest if
you could request your lawyer to just confer with us for the peaceful settlement of this matter. (Underscoring and emphasis supplied)
[13]
As despite written demands, respondent refused to turn over the proceeds of the insurance claim and to acknowledge the
unreasonableness of the attorneys fees he was demanding, complainant instituted the administrative action at bar on December 17,
1999.
In his Complaint-Affidavit, complainant alleged that [i]t appears that there was irregularity with the check, it having been issued
[14]
payable to him, but and/or AMADEO BALON was therein intercalated after his (complainants) name.
[15]
Maintaining that respondent was entitled to only P50,000.00 in attorneys fees, complainant decried respondents continued
[16] [17]
possession of the proceeds of his claim and his misrepresentations that the recovery thereof was fraught with difficulties.
[18]
In his Counter-Affidavit of February 18, 2000, respondent asserted that his continued retention of the proceeds of complainants
claim is in lawful exercise of his lien for unpaid attorneys fees. He expressed readiness, however, to account for and turn them over once
he got paid fifty percent (50%) thereof, he citing the so called contingent fee billing method of no cure, no pay adopted by practicing
[19]
lawyers in the insurance industry as the basis of the amount of his attorneys fees, which to him was justified in the absence of an
[20]
attorney-client contract between him and complainant, the latter having rejected respondents letter-proposal of October 21, 1998.
Respondent also highlighted the value of the time and efforts he extended in pursuing complainants claim and the expenses he
incurred in connection therewith. He went on to assert that his inability to contact complainant whose whereabouts he did not know
prompted him to encash the check and keep the proceeds thereof in conformity with the Special Power of Attorney executed in his
[21]
favor.
During the hearings conducted by the IBP Investigator, complainant echoed his allegations in his Complaint-Affidavit and stressed
that he turned down as unreasonable respondents proposal in his October 21, 1998 letter that he be paid 25% of the actual amount
[22]
collected for his legal services. And he presented documentary evidence, including the March 26, 1999 letter of respondent informing
his co-attorney-in-fact Garcia of the supposedly still unrecovered claim and suggesting acceptance of the purported offer of Metropolitan
Insurance to settle complainants claim at P350,000.00.
Explaining how his above-mentioned March 26, 1999 letter to Garcia came about, respondent declared that it was made upon
[23]
Garcias request, intended for a certain Joel Ramiscal (Ramiscal) who was said to be Garcias business partner.
[24]
Respondent later submitted a June 13, 2001 Supplement to his Counter-Affidavit reiterating his explanation that it was on Garcias
express request that he wrote the March 26, 1999 letter, which was directed to the fax number of Ramiscal.
Additionally, respondent declared that in the first week of May 1999, on the representation of Garcia that he had talked to
[25]
complainant about respondents retention of fifty percent (50%) of the insurance proceeds for professional fees less expenses, he gave
Garcia, on a staggered basis, the total amount of P233,000.00 which, so respondent averred, is the amount of insurance claim
20

 [26]
complainant is entitled to receive less attorneys fees and expenses. Thus, respondent claimed that he gave Garcia the amount of
P30,000.00 on May 31, 1999 at Dulcinea Restaurant in Greenbelt, Makati; the amounts of P50,000.00, P20,000.00 and P30,000.00 on
different occasions at his (respondents) former address through his executive secretary Sally I. Leonardo; the amount of P20,000.00 at
the office of his (respondents) former employer Commonwealth Insurance Company through his subordinate Glen V. Roxas; and several
[27]
other payments at Dulcinea, and at Manila Intercontinental Hotels coffee shop sometime in October 1999. Respondent submitted the
[28]
separate sworn statements of Leonardo and Roxas.
Explaining why no written memorandum of the turn over of various payments to Garcia was made, respondent alleged that there
was no need therefor since he very well knew Garcia who is a co-Rotarian and co-attorney-in-fact and whom he really dealt with regarding
[29]
complainants claim.
Respondent furthermore declared that he rejected complainants offer to pay him P50,000.00 for his services, insisting that since
there had been no clear-cut agreement on his professional fees and it was through him that Metropolitan Insurance favorably reconsidered
[30]
its initial rejection of complainants claim, he is entitled to a contingent fee of 50% of the net proceeds thereof.
Finally, respondent declared that he, in connection with his follow-up of the insurance claim, incurred representation expenses of
P35,000.00, entertainment and other representation expenses on various occasions of P10,000.00, and transportation and gasoline
[31]
expenses and parking fees of P5,000.00; and that his retention of complainants money was justified in light of his apprehension that
complainant, being an alien without a valid working permit in the Philippines, might leave the country anytime without settling his
[32]
professional fees.
[33]
The Investigating Commissioner, by Report and Recommendation of October 26, 2001, found respondent guilty of misconduct
and recommended that he be disbarred and directed to immediately turn over to complainant the sum of P475,000.00 representing the
amount of the P525,000.00 insurance claim less respondents professional fees of P50,000.00, as proposed by complainant.
The Board of Govenors of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, acting on the Investigators Report, issued Resolution No. XV-2002-
[34]
401 on August 3,2002, reading:
RESOLVED to ADOPT and APPROVE, as it is hereby ADOPTED and APPROVED, the Report and Recommendation of the
Investigating Commissioner of the above-entitled case, herein made part of this Resolution/Decision as Annex A; and, finding the
recommendation fully supported by the evidence on record and the applicable laws and rules, with modification, and considering
respondents dishonesty which amounted to grave misconduct and grossly unethical behavior which caused dishonor, not merely to
respondent but the noble profession to which he belongs, Respondent is hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of law for six (6)
months with the directive to turn over the amount of Five Hundred Twenty Five Thousand (P525,000.00) Pesos to the
complainant without prejudice to respondents right to claim attorneys fees which he may collect in the proper forum. (Underscoring
supplied)
The records of the case are before this Court for final action.
[35]
Respondent, by a Motion for Reconsideration filed with this Court, assails the Investigating Commissioners Report and
Recommendation as not supported by clear, convincing and satisfactory proof. He prays for the reopening of the case and its remand to
the Investigator so that Garcia can personally appear for his (respondents) confrontation.
There is no need for a reopening of the case. The facts material to its resolution are either admitted or documented.
This Court is in full accord with the findings of the IBP Investigator that respondent violated the following provisions of the Code of
Professional Responsibility, to wit:
RULE 1.01 - A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct.
xxx
CANON 15 - A lawyer shall observe candor, fairness and loyalty in all his dealings and transactions with his clients.
RULE 15.06 - A lawyer shall not state or imply that he is able to influence any public official, tribunal or legislative body.
xxx
CANON 16 - A lawyer shall hold in trust all moneys and properties of his client that may come into his possession.
RULE 16.01 - A lawyer shall account for all money or property collected or received for or from the client.
RULE 16.02 - A lawyer shall keep the funds of each client separate and apart from his own and those of others kept by him.
RULE 16.03 - A lawyer shall deliver the funds and property of his client when due or upon demand. However, he shall have a lien over
the funds and may apply so much thereof as may be necessary to satisfy his lawful fees and disbursements, giving notice promptly
thereafter to his client. He shall also have a lien to the same extent on all judgments and executions he has secured for his client as
provided for in the Rules of Court.
xxx
CANON 17 - A lawyer owes fidelity to the cause of his client and he shall be mindful of the trust and confidence in him.
xxx
RULE 18.04 - A lawyer shall keep the client informed of the status of his case and shall respond within a reasonable time to the clients
request for information.
xxx
RULE 21.02 - A lawyer shall not, to the disadvantage of his client, use information acquired in the course of employment, nor shall he
use the same to his advantage or that of a third person, unless the client with full knowledge of the circumstances consents thereto.
Specifically with respect to above-quoted provision of Canon 16 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, the Filipino lawyers
principal source of ethical rules, which Canon 16 bears on the principal complaint of complainant, a lawyer must hold in trust all moneys
and properties of his client that he may come to possess. This commandment entails certain specific acts to be done by a lawyer such
[36]
as rendering an accounting of all money or property received for or from the client as well as delivery of the funds or property to the
[37]
client when due or upon demand. Respondent breached this Canon when after he received the proceeds of complainants insurance
claim, he did not report it to complainant, who had a given address in Makati, or to his co-attorney-in-fact Garcia who was his contact with
respect to complainant.
In fact, long after respondent received the December 23, 1998 check for P525,000.00 he, by his letter of March 26, 1999 to Garcia,
had even the temerity to state that the claim was still pending and recommend acceptance of the 50% offer . . . which isP350,000.00
pesos. His explanation that he prepared and sent this letter on Garcias express request is nauseating. A lawyer, like respondent, would
not and should not commit prevarication, documented at that, on the mere request of a friend.
By respondents failure to promptly account for the funds he received and held for the benefit of his client, he committed professional
[38]
misconduct. Such misconduct is reprehensible at a greater degree, for it was obviously done on purpose through the employment of
deceit to the prejudice of complainant who was kept in the dark about the release of the check, until he himself discovered the same, and
has to date been deprived of the use of the proceeds thereof.
A lawyer who practices or utilizes deceit in his dealings with his client not only violates his duty of fidelity, loyalty and devotion to the
[39]
clients cause but also degrades himself and besmirches the fair name of an honorable profession.
[40]
That respondent had a lien on complainants funds for his attorneys fees did not relieve him of his duty to account for it. The
lawyers continuing exercise of his retaining lien presupposes that the client agrees with the amount of attorneys fees to be charged. In
case of disagreement or when the client contests that amount for being unconscionable, however, the lawyer must not arbitrarily apply
[41]
the funds in his possession to the payment of his fees. He can file, if he still deems it desirable, the necessary action or proper motion
[42]
with the proper court to fix the amount of such fees.
In respondents case, he never had the slightest attempt to bring the matter of his compensation for judicial determination so that
his and complainants sharp disagreement thereon could have been put to an end. Instead, respondent stubbornly and in bad faith held
21

on to complainants funds with the obvious aim of forcing complainant to agree to the amount of attorneys fees sought. This is an appalling
abuse by respondent of the exercise of an attorneys retaining lien which by no means is an absolute right and cannot at all justify inordinate
delay in the delivery of money and property to his client when due or upon demand.
Respondent was, before receiving the check, proposing a 25% attorneys fees. After he received the check and after complainant
had discovered its release to him, he was already asking for 50%, objection to which complainant communicated to him. Why respondent
had to doubly increase his fees after the lapse of about one year when all the while he has been in custody of the proceeds of the check
defies comprehension. At any rate, it smacks of opportunism, to say the least.
As for respondents claim in his June 2001 Supplement to his Counter-Affidavit that he had on several occasions
from May 1999 to October 1999 already delivered a total of P233,000.00 out of the insurance proceeds to Garcia in trust for complainant,
this does not persuade, for it is bereft of any written memorandum thereof. It is difficult to believe that a lawyer like respondent could have
entrusted such total amount of money to Garcia without documenting it, especially at a time when, as respondent alleged, he and Garcia
[43]
were not in good terms. Not only that. As stated earlier, respondents Counter-Affidavit of February 18, 2000 and his December 7,
1999 letter to complainant unequivocally contained his express admission that the total amount of P525,000.00 was in his custody. Such
illogical, futile attempt to exculpate himself only aggravates his misconduct. Respondents claim discredited, the affidavits of Leonardo
and Roxas who, acting allegedly for him, purportedly gave Garcia some amounts forming part of the P233,000.00 are thus highly suspect
and merit no consideration.
The proven ancillary charges against respondent reinforce the gravity of his professional misconduct.
The intercalation of respondents name to the Chinabank check that was issued payable solely in favor of complainant as twice
[44]
certified by Metropolitan Insurance is clearly a brazen act of falsification of a commercial document which respondent resorted to in
order to encash the check.
Respondents threat in his December 7, 1999 letter to expose complainant to possible sanctions from certain government agencies
with which he bragged to have a good network reflects lack of character, self-respect, and justness.
It bears noting that for close to five long years respondent has been in possession of complainants funds in the amount of over half
a million pesos. The deceptions and lies that he peddled to conceal, until its discovery by complainant after about a year, his receipt of
the funds and his tenacious custody thereof in a grossly oppressive manner point to his lack of good moral character. Worse, by
respondents turnaround in his Supplement to his Counter-Affidavit that he already delivered to complainants friend Garcia the amount of
P233,000.00 which, so respondent claims, is all that complainant is entitled to, he in effect has declared that he has nothing more to turn
over to complainant. Such incredible position is tantamount to a refusal to remit complainants funds, and gives rise to the conclusion that
[45]
he has misappropriated them.
In fine, by respondents questioned acts, he has shown that he is no longer fit to remain a member of the noble profession that is
the law.
WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Amadeo E. Balon, Jr., is found GUILTY of malpractice, deceit and gross misconduct in the practice
of his profession as a lawyer and he is hereby DISBARRED. The Office of the Clerk of Court is directed to strike out his name from the
Roll of Attorneys and to inform all courts and the Integrated Bar of the Philippines of this Decision.
Respondent is ordered to turn over to complainant, Daniel Lemoine, the amount of P525,000.00 within thirty (30) days from notice,
without prejudice to whatever judicial action he may take to recover his attorneys fees and purported expenses incurred in securing the
release thereof from Metropolitan Insurance.
SO ORDERED.

22

Case 20
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC

G.R. Nos. 115908-09 December 6, 1995

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
DANNY GODOY, * accused-appellant.

REGALADO, J.:
Often glossed over in the emotional arguments against capital punishment is the amplitude of legal protection accorded to the offender.
Ignored by the polemicist are the safeguards designed to minimally reduce, if not altogether eliminate, the grain of human fault. Indeed,
there is no critique on the plethora of rights enjoyed by the accused regardless of how ruthlessly he committed the crime. Any margin of
judicial error is further addressed by the grace of executive clemency. But, even before that, all convictions imposing the penalty of
death are automatically reviewed by this Court. The cases at bar, involving two death sentences, apostrophize for the condemned the
role of this ultimate judicial intervention.
Accused-appellant Danny Godoy was charged in two separate informations filed before the Regional Trial Court, for Palawan and
Puerto Princesa City, Branch 47, with rape and kidnapping with serious illegal detention, respectively punished under Articles 335 and
267 of the Revised Penal Code, to wit:
In Criminal Case No. 11640 for Rape:
That on or about the evening of the 21st day of January, 1994, at Barangay Pulot Center, Municipality of Brooke's
Point, Province of Palawan, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the said accused by
means of force, threat and intimidation, by using a knife and by means of deceit, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully
1
and feloniously have carnal knowledge with one Mia Taha to her damage and prejudice.
In Criminal Case No. 11641 for Kidnapping with Serious Illegal Detention:
That on or about the 22nd day of January, 1994, at Barangay Ipilan, Municipality of Brooke's Point, Province of
Palawan, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the said accused, a private individual, and
being a teacher of the victim, Mia Taha, and by means of deceit did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously
kidnap or detained (sic) said Mia Taha, a girl of 17 years old (sic), for a period of five (5) days thus thereby depriving
said Mia Taha of her liberty against her will and consent and without legal justification, to the damage and prejudice
2
of said Mia Taha.
During the arraignment on both indictments, appellant pleaded not guilty to said charges and, after the pre-trial was terminated, a joint
3
trial of the two cases was conducted by the trial court.
According to complainant Mia Taha, at around 7:00 P.M. of January 21, 1994, she went to the boarding house of her cousin, Merlylyn
Casantosan, at Pulot Center, Brooke's Point which is near the Palawan National School (PNS), Pulot Branch, where she was studying.
When she saw that the house was dark, she decided to pass through the kitchen door at the back because she knew that there was
nobody inside. As soon as she opened the door, somebody suddenly grabbed her, poked a knife on her neck, dragged her by the hand
and told her not to shout. She was then forced to lie down on the floor. Although it was dark, complainant was able to recognize her
assailant, by the light coming from the moon and through his voice, as accused-appellant Danny Godoy who was her Physics teacher
at PNS.
When she was already on the floor, appellant removed her panty with one hand while holding the knife with the other hand, opened the
zipper of his pants, and then inserted his private organ inside her private parts against her will. She felt pain because it was her first
experience and she cried. Throughout her ordeal, she could not utter a word. She was very frightened because a knife was continually
pointed at her. She also could not fight back nor plead with appellant not to rape her because he was her teacher and she was afraid of
him. She was threatened not to report the incident to anyone or else she and her family would be killed.
Thereafter, while she was putting on her panty, she noticed that her skirt was stained with blood. Appellant walked with her to the gate
of the house and she then proceeded alone to the boarding house where she lived. She did not see where appellant went after she left
him at the gate. When she arrived at her boarding house, she saw her landlady but she did not mention anything about the incident.
The following morning, January 22, 1994, complainant went home to her parents' house at Ipilan, Brooke's Point. She likewise did not
tell her parents about the incident for fear that appellant might make good his threat. At around 3:00 P.M. of that same day, appellant
arrived at the house of her parents and asked permission from the latter if complainant could accompany him to solicit funds because
she was a candidate for "Miss PNS Pulot." When her parents agreed, she was constrained to go with appellant because she did not
want her parents to get into trouble.
Appellant and complainant then left the house and they walked in silence, with Mia following behind appellant, towards the highway
where appellant hailed a passenger jeep which was empty except for the driver and the conductor. She was forced to ride the jeep
because appellant threatened to kill her if she would not board the vehicle. The jeep proceeded to the Sunset Garden at the poblacion,
Brooke's Point where they alighted.
At the Sunset Garden, appellant checked in and brought her to a room where they staye d for three days. During the entire duration of
their stay at the Sunset Garden, complainant was not allowed to leave the room which was always kept locked. She was continuously
guarded and constantly raped by appellant. She was, however, never drunk or unconscious. Nonetheless, she was forced to have sex
with appellant because the latter was always carrying a knife with him.
In the early morning of January 25, 1994, appellant brought her to the house of his friend at Edward's Subdivision where she was raped
by him three times. She was likewise detained and locked inside the room and tightly guarded by appellant. After two days, or on
January 27, 1994, they left the place because appellant came to know that complainant had been reported and indicated as a missing
person in the police blotter. They went to see a certain Naem ** from whom appellant sought help. On that same day, she was released
but only after her parents agreed to settle the case with appellant.
Immediately thereafter, Mia's parents brought her to the District Hospital at Brooke's Point where she was examined by Dr. Rogelio
Divinagracia who made the following medical findings:
GENERAL: Well developed, nourished, cooperative, walking, conscious, coherent Filipina.
BREAST: Slightly globular with brown colored areola and nipple.
EXTERNAL EXAM.: Numerous pubic hair, fairly developed labia majora and minora, hymenal opening stellate in
shape, presence of laceration superficial, longitudinal at the fossa navicularis, approximately 1/2 cm. length.
INTERNAL EXAM.: Hymenal opening, stellate in shape, laceration noted, hymenal opening admits 2 fingers with
slight resistance, prominent vaginal rugae, cervix closed.
CONCLUSION: Hymenal opening admits easily 2 fingers with slight resistance, presence of laceration, longitudinal at
the fossa navicularis approximately 1/2 cm. length. Hymenal opening can admit an average size penis in erection
4
with laceration.
Dr. Divinagracia further testified that the hymenal opening was in stellate shape and that there was a laceration, which shows that
complainant had participated in sexual intercourse. On the basis of the inflicted laceration which was downward at 6 o'clock position, he
23

could not say that there was force applied because there were no scratches or bruises, but only a week-old laceration. He also
examined the patient bodily but found no sign of bruises or injuries. The patient told him that she was raped.
During the cross-examination, complainant denied that she wrote the letters marked as Exhibits "1" and "2"; that she never loved
appellant but, on the contrary, she hated him because of what he did to her; and that she did not notice if there were people near the
boarding house of her cousin. She narrated that when appellant started to remove her panty, she was already lying down, and that
even as appellant was doing this she could not shout because she was afraid. She could not remember with which hand appellant held
the knife. She was completely silent from the time she was made to lie down, while her panty was being removed, and even until
appellant was able to rape her.
When appellant went to their house the following day, she did not know if he was armed but there was no threat made on her or her
parents. On the contrary, appellant even courteously asked permission from them in her behalf and so they left the house with appellant
walking ahead of her. When she was brought to the Sunset Garden, she could not refuse because she was afraid. However, she
admitted that at that time, appellant was not pointing a knife at her. She only saw the cashier of the Sunset Garden but she did not
notice if there were other people inside. She likewise did not ask the appellant why he brought her there.
Complainant described the lock in their room as an ordinary doorknob, similar to that on the door of the courtroom which, even if
locked, could still be opened from the inside, and she added that there was a sliding lock inside the room. According to her, they stayed
at Sunset Garden for three days and three nights but she never noticed if appellant ever slept because everytime she woke up,
appellant was always beside her. She never saw him close his eyes.
Helen Taha, the mother of complainant, testified that when the latter arrived at their house in the morning of January 22, 1994, she
noticed that Mia appeared weak and her eyes were swollen. When she asked her daughter if there was anything wrong, the latter
merely kept silent. That afternoon, she allowed Mia to go with appellant because she knew he was her teacher. However, when Mia
and appellant failed to come home at the expected time, she and her husband, Adjeril, went to look for them at Ipilan. When they could
not find them there, she went to the house of appellant because she was already suspecting that something was wrong, but appellant's
wife told her that he did not come home.
Early the next morning, she and her husband went to the Philippine National Police (PNP) station at Pulot, Brooke's Point and had the
incident recorded in the police blotter. The following day, they went to the office of the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) at Puerto
Princess City, then to the police station near the NBI, and finally to the radio station airing the Radyo ng Bayan program where she
made an appeal to appellant to return her daughter. When she returned home, a certain Naem was waiting there and he informed her
that Mia was at Brooke's Point. He further conveyed appellant's willingness to become a Muslim so he could marry Mia and thus settle
the case. Helen Taha readily acceded because she wanted to see her daughter.
In the morning of January 27, 1994, she went to the house of Naem who sent somebody to fetch complainant. She testified that when
Mia arrived, she was crying as she reported that she was raped by appellant, and that the latter threatened to kill her if she did not
return within an hour. Because of this, she immediately brought Mia to the hospital where the latter was examined and then they
proceeded to the municipal hall to file a complaint for rape and kidnapping. Both Mia and Helen Taha executed separate sworn
statements before the PNP at Brooke's Point.
Later, Fruit Godoy, the wife of appellant, went to their house and offered P50,000.00 for the settlement of the case. On their part, her
husband insisted that they just settle, hence all three of them, Adjeril, Helen and Mia Taha, went to the Office of the Provincial
Prosecutor where they met with the mother of appellant who gave them P30,000.00. Adjeril and Helen Taha subsequently executed an
affidavit of desistance in Criminal Case No. 7687 for kidnapping pending in the prosecutor's office, which was sworn to before
Prosecutor II Chito S. Meregillano. Helen Taha testified that she agreed to the settlement because that was what her husband wanted.
Mia Taha was dropped from the school and was not allowed to graduate. Her father died two months later, supposedly because of what
happened.
The defense presented a different version of what actually transpired.
According to appellant, he first met Mia Taha sometime in August, 1993 at the Palawan National School (PNS). Although he did not
court her, he fell in love with her because she often told him "Sir, I love you." What started as a joke later developed into a serious
relationship which was kept a secret from everybody else. It was on December 20, 1993 when they first had sexual intercourse as
lovers. Appellant was then assigned at the Narra Pilot Elementary School at the poblacion because he was the coach of the Palawan
delegation for chess. At around 5:00 P.M. of that day, complainant arrived at his quarters allegedly because she missed him, and she
then decided to spend the night there with him.
Exactly a month thereafter, specifically in the evening of January 20, 1994, Erna Baradero, a teacher at the PNS, was looking inside the
school building for her husband, who was a security guard of PNS, when she heard voices apparently coming from the Orchids Room.
She went closer to listen and she heard a girl's voice saying "Mahal na mahal kita, Sir, iwanan mo ang iyong asawa at tatakas tayo."
Upon hearing this, she immediately opened the door and was startled to see Mia Taha and Danny Godoy holding hands. She asked
them what they were doing there at such an unholy hour but the two, who were obviously caught by surprise, could not answer. She
then hurriedly closed the door and left. According to this witness, complainant admitted to her that she was having an affair with
appellant. Desirous that such illicit relationship must be stopped, Erna Baradero informed appellant's wife about it when the latter
arrived from Manila around the first week of February, 1994.
Upon the request of appellant's wife, Erna Baradero executed an affidavit in connection with the present case, but the same was not
filed then because of the affidavit of desistance which was executed and submitted by the parents of complainant. In her sworn
statement, later marked in evidence as Exhibit "7", Erna Baradero alleged that on January 21, 1994, she confronted Mia Taha about the
latter's indiscretion and reminded her that appellant is a married man, but complainant retorted, "Ano ang pakialam mo," adding that
she loves appellant very much.
Appellant testified that on January 21, 1994, at around 7:00 P.M., Mia Taha went to his office asking for help with the monologue that
she would be presenting for the Miss PNS contest. He agreed to meet her at the house of her cousin, Merlylyn Casantosan. However,
when he reached the place, the house was dark and he saw Mia waiting for him outside. Accordingly, they just sat on a bench near the
road where there was a lighted electric post and they talked about the matter she had earlier asked him about. They stayed there for
fifteen minutes, after which complainant returned to her boarding house just across the street while appellant headed for home some
fifteen meters away.
It appears that while complainant was then waiting for appellant, Filomena Pielago, a former teacher of Mia at PNS and who was then
on her way to a nearby store, saw her sitting on a bench and asked what she was doing there at such a late hour. Complainant merely
replied that she was waiting for somebody. Filomena proceeded to the store and, along the way, she saw Inday Zapanta watering the
plants outside the porch of her house. When Filomena Pielago returned, she saw complainant talking with appellant and she noticed
that they were quite intimate because they were holding hands. This made her suspect that the two could be having a relationship. She,
therefore, told appellant that his wife had finished her aerobics class and was already waiting for him. She also advised Mia to go home.
Prior to this incident, Filomena Pielago already used to see them seated on the same bench. Filomena further testified that she had
tried to talk appellant out of the relationship because his wife had a heart ailment. She also warned Mia Taha, but to no avail. She had
likewise told complainant's grandmother about her activities. At the trial, she identified the handwriting of complainant appearing on the
letters marked as Exhibits "1" and "2", claiming that she is familiar with the same because Mia was her former student. On cross-
examination, Filomena clarified that when she saw the couple on the night of January 21, 1994, the two were talking naturally, she did
not see Mia crying, nor did it appear as if appellant was pleading with her.
In the afternoon of the following day, January 22, 1994, appellant met Mia's mother on the road near their house and she invited him to
come up and eat "buko," which invitation he accepted. Thirty minutes thereafter, complainant told him to ask permission from her
24

mother for them to go and solicit funds at the poblacion, and he did so. Before they left, he noticed that Mia was carrying a plastic bag
and when he asked her about it, she said that it contained her things which she was bringing to her cousin's house. Appellant and Mia
went to the poblacion where they solicited funds until 6:30 P.M. and then had snacks at the Vic Tan Store.
Thereafter, complainant told appellant that it was already late and there was no more available transportation, so she suggested that
they just stay at Sunset Garden. Convinced that there was nothing wrong in that because they already had intimate relations, aside
from the fact that Mia had repeatedly told him she would commit suicide should he leave her, appellant was prevailed upon to stay at
the hotel. Parenthetically, it was complainant who arranged their registration and subsequently paid P400.00 for their bill from the funds
they had solicited. That evening, however, appellant told complainant at around 9:00 P.M. that he was going out to see a certain Bert
Dalojo at the latter's residence. In truth, he borrowed a motorcycle from Fernando Rubio and went home to Pulot. He did not bring
complainant along because she had refused to go home.
The following morning, January 23, 1994, appellant went to the house of complainant's parents and informed them that Mia spent the
night at the Sunset Garden. Mia's parents said that they would just fetch her there, so he went back to Sunset Garden and waited for
them outside the hotel until 5:00 P.M. When they did not arrive, he decided to go with one Isagani Virey, whom he saw while waiting
near the road, and they had a drinking session with Virey's friends. Thereafter, Virey accompanied him back to Sunset Garden where
they proceeded to Mia's room. Since the room was locked from the inside, Virey had to knock on the door until it was opened by her.
Once inside, he talked to complainant and asked her what they were doing, but she merely answered that what she was doing was of
her own free will and that at that moment her father was not supposed to know about it for, otherwise, he would kill her. What
complainant did not know, however, was that appellant had already reported the matter to her parents, although he opted not to tell her
because he did not want to add to her apprehensions. Isagani Virey further testified that when he saw appellant and complainant on
January 23 and 24, 1994, the couple looked very happy.
Appellant denied that they had sexual intercourse during their entire stay at Sunset Garden, that is, from January 22 to 24, 1994,
because he did not have any idea as to what she really wanted to prove to him. Appellant knew that what they were doing was wrong
but he allegedly could not avoid Mia because of her threat that she would commit suicide if he left her. Thus, according to appellant, on
January 24, 1994 he asked Isagani Virey to accompany him to the house of Romy Vallan, a policeman, to report the matter.
Additionally, Virey testified that appellant and Mia went to see him at his aunt's house to ask for assistance in procuring transportation
because, according to appellant, the relatives of Mia were already looking for them and so they intend to go to Puerto Princesa City.
Virey accompanied them to the house of Romy Vallan, whose wife was a co-teacher of appellant's wife, but the latter refused to help
because of the complicated situation appellant was in.
Nevertheless, Vallan verified from the police station whether a complaint had been filed against appellant and after finding out that there
was none, he told appellant to just consult a certain Naem who is an "imam." Appellant was able to talk to Naem at Vallan's house that
same day and bared everything about him and Mia. Naem suggested that appellant marry complainant in Muslim rites but appellant
refused because he was already married. It was eventually agreed that Naem would just mediate in behalf of appellant and make
arrangements for a settlement with Mia's parents. Later that day, Naem went to see the parents of complainant at the latter's house.
The following day, January 25, 1994, allegedly because complainant could no longer afford to pay their hotel bills, the couple were
constrained to transfer to the house of appellant's friend, Fernando Rubio, at Edward's Subdivision where they stayed for two days.
They just walked along the national highway from Sunset Garden to Edward's Subdivision which was only five hundred to seven
hundred meters away. The owner of the house, Fernando Rubio, as well as his brother Benedicto Rubio, testified that the couple were
very happy, they were intimate and sweet to each other, they always ate together, and it was very obvious that they were having a
relationship.
In fact, Fernando Rubio recalled that complainant even called appellant "Papa." While they were there, she would buy food at the
market, help in the cooking, wash clothes, and sometimes watch television. When Fernando Rubio once asked her why she chose to
go with appellant despite the fact the he was a married man, Mia told him that she really loved appellant. She never told him, and
Fernando Rubio never had the slightest suspicion, that she was supposed to have been kidnapped as it was later claimed. He also
testified that several police officers lived within their neighborhood and if complainant had really been kidnapped and detained, she
could have easily reported that fact to them. Mia was free to come and go as she pleased, and the room where they stayed was never
locked because the lock had been destroyed.
On cross-examination, Fernando Rubio declared that appellant was merely an acquaintance of his; that it was Naem who went to the
lodging house to arrange for Mia to go home; that complainant's mother never went to his house; and that it was Chief of Police Eliseo
Crespo who fetched appellant from the lodging house and brought him to the municipal hall.
Shortly before noon of January 26, 1994, Naem again met with appellant at Edward's Subdivision and informed him that complainant's
parents were willing to talk to him at Naem's house the next day. The following morning, or on January 27, 1994, appellant was not able
to talk to complainant's parents because they merely sent a child to fetch Mia at Edward's Subdivision and to tell her that her mother,
who was at Naem's house, wanted to see her. Appellant permitted complainant to go but he told her that within one hour he was be
going to the police station at the municipal hall so that they could settle everything there.
After an hour, while appellant was already on his way out of Edward's Subdivision, he was met by Chief of Police Eliseo Crespo who
invited him to the police station. Appellant waited at the police station the whole afternoon but when complainant, her parents and
relatives arrived at around 5:00 P.M., he was not given the chance to talk to any one of them. That afternoon of January 27, 1994,
appellant was no longer allowed to leave and he was detained at the police station after Mia and her parents lodged a complaint for
rape and kidnapping against him.
During his detention, Mia's cousin, Lorna Casantosan, delivered to appellant on different occasions two letters from complainant dated
February 27, 1994 and March 1, 1994, respectively. As Mia's teacher, appellant is familiar with and was, therefore, able to identify the
handwriting in said letters as that of Mia Taha. After a time, he came to know, through his mother, that an affidavit of desistance was
reportedly executed by complainants. However, he claims that he never knew and it was never mentioned to him, not until the day he
testified in court, that his mother paid P30,000.00 to Mia's father because, although he did not dissuade them, neither did he request his
mother to talk to complainants in order to settle the case.
Under cross-examination, appellant denied that he poked a knife at and raped Mia Taha on January 21, 1994. However, he admitted
that he had sex with Mia at the Sunset Garden but that was already on January 24, 1994. While they were at Edward's Subdivision,
they never had sexual relations. Appellant was told, when complainant visited him in jail, that her father would kill her if she refused to
testify against him, although by the time she testified in court, her father had already died.
Appellant further testified that complainant has had several illicit relations in the boarding house of her cousin, Merlylyn Casantosan,
which was a well-known fact in Pulot. However, he decided to have a relationship with her because he wanted to change her and that
was what they had agreed upon. Appellant denied that, during the time when they were staying together, Mia had allegedly asked
permission to leave several times but that he refused. On the contrary, he claimed that on January 27, 1994 when she told him that her
parents wanted to see her, he readily gave her permission to go.
He also identified the clothes that Mia brought with her when they left her parents' house on January 22, 1994, but which she left
behind at the Rubios' lodging house after she failed to return on January 27, 1994. The bag of clothes was brought to him at the
provincial jail by Benedicto Rubio.
Appellant likewise declared that he had been detained at the provincial jail since January 27, 1994 but the warrant for his arrest was
issued only on January 28, 1994; and that he did not submit a counter-affidavit because according to his former counsel, Atty. Paredes,
it was no longer necessary since the complainants had already executed an affidavit of desistance. He admits having signed a "Waiver
of Right to Preliminary Investigation" in connection with these cases.
25

On rebuttal, Lorna Casantosan, the cousin of Mia Taha, denied that she delivered any letter to appellant when the latter was still
detained at the provincial jail. She admitted, on cross-examination, that she was requested by Mia Taha to testify for her, although she
clarified that she does not have any quarrel or misunderstanding with appellant.
Mia Taha was again presented on rebuttal and she denied the testimony of Erna Baradero regarding the incident at the Orchids Room
because, according to her, the truth was that she was at the boarding house of Toto Zapanta on that date and time. She likewise
negated the claim that Erna Baradero confronted her on January 21, 1994 about her alleged relationship with appellant contending that
she did not see her former teacher on that day. Similarly, she disclaimed having seen and talked to Filemona Pielago on the night of
January 21, 1994. She vehemently disavowed that she and appellant were lovers, much less with intimate relations, since there never
was a time that they became sweethearts.
She sought to rebut, likewise through bare denials, the following testimonies of the defense witnesses: that she told appellant "iwanan
mo ang iyong asawa at tatakas tayo;" that she answered "wala kang pakialam" when Erna Baradero confronted her about her
relationship with appellant; that she was the one who registered them at Sunset Garden and paid for their bill; that appellant left her at
Sunset Garden to go to Ipil on January 22, 1994; that Isagani Virey came to their room and stayed there for five minutes, because the
only other person who went there was the room boy who served their food; that they went to the house of Virey's aunt requesting help
for transportation; and that she was free to roam around or to go out of the lodging house at Edward's Subdivision.
Mia Taha also rejected as false the testimony of appellant that she went to see him at Narra, Palawan to have sex with him and claims
that the last time she went to Narra was when she was still in Grade VI; that she ever told him "I love you, sabik no sabik ako sa iyo"
when she allegedly went to Narra; that she wrote to him, since the letters marked as Exhibits "1" and "2" are not hers; that she
threatened to commit suicide if appellant would leave her since she never brought a blade with her; and that at Sunset Garden and at
Edward's Subdivison, she was not being guarded by appellant.
However, on cross-examination, complainant identified her signature on her test paper marked as Exhibit "4" and admitted that the
signature thereon is exactly the same as that appearing on Exhibits "1" and "2". Then, contradicting her previous disclaimers, she also
admitted that the handwriting on Exhibits "1" and "2" all belong to her.
On sur-rebuttal, Armando Pasion, a provincial guard of the Provincial Jail, Palawan who volunteered to testify in these cases, identified
Lorna Casantosan as the person who visited appellant in jail on February 27, 1994 at around 4:00 P.M. Since he was on duty at that
time, he asked her what she wanted and she said she would just visit appellant. Pasion then called appellant and told him he had a
visitor. Lorna Casantosan and appellant talked at the visiting area which is around ten meters away from his post, and then he saw her
hand over to appellant a letter which the latter immediately read. This witness declared that appellant never requested him to testify.
Another sur-rebuttal witness, Desmond Selga, a jeepney driver, testified that in the afternoon of January 22, 1994, he was plying his
regular route in going to Brooke's Point and, when he passed by Ipilan, he picked up appellant and Mia Taha. At that time, there were
already several passengers inside his jeepney. The two got off at the poblacion market. He denied that he brought them to the Sunset
Garden.
5
On May 20, 1994, the court a quo rendered judgment finding appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crimes of rape and
6
kidnapping with serious illegal detention, and sentencing him to the maximum penalty of death in both cases. By reason of the nature
of the penalty imposed, these cases were elevated to this Court on automatic review.
7 8
The records show that, on the basis of the complaints for rape and kidnapping with serious illegal detention filed by Mia Taha and
9
Helen Taha, respectively, the Municipal Trial Court of Brooke's Point issued a resolution on February 4, 1994 finding the existence of
a prima facie case against appellant. On February 10, 1994, the spouses Adjeril Taha and Helen Taha executed an affidavit of
10 11
desistance withdrawing the charge of kidnapping with serious illegal detention. However, pursuant to a joint resolution issued on
March 11, 1994 by Prosecutor II Reynaldo R. Guayco of the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor, two separate informations for rape and
for kidnapping with serious illegal detention were nevertheless filed against appellant Danny Godoy with no bail recommended in both
charges.
Appellant is now before us seeking the reversal of the judgment of the court below, on the following assignment of errors:
I. The trial court erred in convicting the accused-appellant (of) the crime of rape despite the fact that the prosecution
failed to prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt.
II. The trial court erred by failing to adhere to the doctrine/principle in reviewing the evidence adduced in a
prosecution for the crime of rape as cited in its decision reiterating the case of People vs. Calixto (193 SCRA 303).
III. The trial court erred in concluding that the accused-appellant had consummated the crime of rape against private
complainant.
IV. The trial court erred by its failure to give any credence to Exhibits "1" and "2" as evidence of the defense.
V. The trial court erred in convicting the accused-appellant of the crime of kidnapping with serious illegal detention as
the prosecution failed to prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt.
VI. The trial court erred in giving full faith and credence to the testimonies of prosecution witnesses and completely
ignoring the testimonies of the defense witnesses.
VII. The trial court erred in concluding that there was implied admission of guilt on the part of the accused-appellant in
view of the offer to compromise.
VIII. The trial court erred in ordering that the complainant be indemnified in the sum of one hundred thousand pesos
(P100,000.00) for each of the alleged crimes committed.
IX. The trial court gravely erred by imposing the death penalty for each of the crimes charged on the accused-
12
appellant despite the fact that the crimes were allegedly committed prior to the effectivity of Republic Act No. 7659.
A. The Rape Case
A rape charge is a serious matter with pernicious consequences. It exposes both the accused and the accuser to humiliation, fear and
anxieties, not to mention the stigma of shame that both have to bear for the rest of their
13
lives. By the very nature of the crime of rape, conviction or acquittal depends almost entirely on the credibility of the complainant's
14
testimony because of the fact that usually only the participants can testify as to its occurrence. This notwithstanding, the basic rule
remains that in all criminal prosecutions without regard to the nature of the defense which the accused may raise, the burden of proof
remains at all times upon the prosecution to establish his guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. If the accused raises a sufficient doubt as to
any material element, and the prosecution is then unable to overcome this evidence, the prosecution has failed to carry its burden of
15
proof of the guilt of the accused beyond a reasonable doubt and the accused must be acquitted.
The rationale for the rule is that, confronted by the full panoply of State authority, the accused is accorded the presumption of
innocence to lighten and even reverse the heavy odds against him. Mere accusation is not enough to convict him, and neither is the
weakness of his defense. The evidence for the prosecution must be strong per se, strong enough to establish the guilt of the accused
16
beyond reasonable doubt. In other words, the accused may be convicted on the basis of the lone uncorroborated testimony of the
offended woman, provided such testimony is clear, positive, convincing and otherwise consistent with human nature and the normal
course of things.
There are three well-known principles that guide an appellate court in reviewing the evidence presented in a prosecution for the crime
of rape. These are: (1) while rape is a most detestable crime, and ought to be severely and impartially punished, it must be borne in
mind that it is an accusation easy to be made, hard to be proved, but harder to be defended by the party accused, though
17
innocent; (2) that in view of the intrinsic nature of the crime of rape where only two persons are usually involved, the testimony of the
18
complainant must be scrutinized with extreme caution; and (3) that the evidence for the prosecution must stand or fall on its own
19
merits and cannot be allowed to draw strength from the weakness of the evidence for the defense.
26

In the case at bar, several circumstances exist which amply demonstrate and ineluctably convince this Court that there was no rape
committed on the alleged date and place, and that the charge of rape was the contrivance of an afterthought, rather than a truthful
plaint for redress of an actual wrong.
I. Two principal facts indispensably to be proven beyond reasonable doubt for conviction of the crime of rape under paragraph (1),
Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code are, first, that the accused had carnal knowledge of the complainant; and, second, that the same
was accomplished through force or intimidation.
1. The prosecution has palpably failed to prove beyond peradventure of doubt that appellant had sexual congress with complainant
against her will. Complainant avers that on the night of January 21, 1994, she was sexually assaulted by appellant in the boarding
house of her cousin, Merlelyn Casantosan. Appellant, on the other hand, denied such a serious imputation and contends that on said
date and time, he merely talked with complainant outside that house. We find appellant's version more credible and sustained by the
evidence presented and of record.
According to complainant, when she entered the kitchen of the boarding house, appellant was already inside apparently waiting for her.
If so, it is quite perplexing how appellant could have known that she was going there on that particular day and at that time, considering
that she does not even live there, unless of course it was appellant's intention to satisfy his lustful desires on anybody who happened to
come along. But then this would be stretching the imagination too far, aside from the fact that such a generic intent with an
indeterminate victim was never established nor even intimated by the prosecution.
Moreover, any accord of credit to the complainant's story is precluded by the implausibility that plagues it as regards the setting of the
20
supposed sexual assault. It will be noted that the place where the alleged crime was committed is not an ordinary residence but a
boarding house where several persons live and where people are expected to come and go. The prosecution did not even bother to
elucidate on whether it was the semestral break or that the boarding house had remained closed for some time, in order that it could be
safely assumed that nobody was expected to arrive at any given time.
Appellant, on the other hand, testified that on that fateful day, he went to the boarding house upon the invitation of complainant because
the latter requested him to help her with her monologue for the Miss PNS contest. However, they were not able to go inside the house
because it was locked and there was no light, so they just sat on a bench outside the house and talked. This testimony of appellant was
substantially corroborated by defense witness Filomena Pielago. She affirmed that in the evening of January 21, 1994, she saw both
appellant and complainant seated on a bench outside the boarding house, and that she even advised them to go home because it was
already late and appellant's wife, who was the head teacher of witness Pielago, was waiting for him at the school building. On rebuttal,
complainant could only deny that she saw Pielago that night. Doctrinally, where the inculpatory facts and circumstances are capable of
two or more explanations one of which is consistent with the innocence of the accused and the other consistent with his guilt, then the
21
evidence does not fulfill the test of moral certainty and is not sufficient to support a conviction.
It was further alleged by complainant that after her alleged ravishment, she put on her panty and then appellant openly accompanied
her all the way to the gate of the house where they eventually parted ways. This is inconceivable. It is not the natural tendency of a man
22
to remain for long by the side of the woman he had raped, and in public in a highly populated area at that. Given the stealth that
accompanies it and the anxiety to end further exposure at the scene, the logical post-incident impulse of the felon is to distance himself
from his victim as far and as soon as practicable, to avoid discovery and apprehension. It is to be expected that one who is guilty of a
crime would want to dissociate himself from the person of his victim, the scene of the crime, and from all other things and
circumstances related to the offense which could possibly implicate him or give rise to even the slightest suspicion as to his guilt. Verily,
the guilty flee where no man pursueth.
It is of common knowledge that facts which prove or tend to prove that the accused was at the scene of the crime are admissible as
23
relevant, on the theory that such presence can be appreciated as a circumstance tending to identify the appellant. Consequently, it is
not in accord with human experience for appellant to have let himself be seen with the complainant immediately after he had allegedly
24
raped her. It thus behooves this Court to reject the notion that appellant would be so foolhardy as to accompany complainant up to
25
the gate of the house, considering its strategic locationvis-a-vis complainant's boarding house which is just across the street, and the
26
PNS schoolbuilding which is only around thirty meters away.
Complainant mentioned in her narration that right after the incident she went directly to her boarding house where she saw her
landlady. Yet, the landlady was never presented as a witness to corroborate the story of complainant, despite the fact that the former
was the very first person she came in contact with from the time appellant allegedly left her at the gate of the Casantosan boarding
house after her alleged traumatic ordeal. Even though they supposedly did not talk, the landlady could at least have testified on
complainant's physical appearance and to attest to the theorized fact that indeed she saw complainant on said date and hour, possibly
with dishevelled hair, bloody skirt and all.
We are, therefore, justifiedly inclined to believe appellant's version that it was Mia Taha who invited him to the boarding house to help
her with the monologue she was preparing for the school contest. This is even consonant with her testimony that appellant fetched her
the following day in order to solicit funds for her candidacy in that same school affair.
In contrast, complainant's professed reason for going to the boarding house is vague and tenuous. At first, she asserted that she was at
the boarding house talking with a friend and then, later, she said it was her cousin. Subsequently, she again wavered and said that she
was not able to talk to her cousin. Furthermore, she initially stated that on January 21, 1994 at around 7:00 P.M., she was at the
boarding house conversing with her cousin. Then in the course of her narration, she gave another version and said that when she
reached the boarding house it was dark and there was nobody inside.
The apparent ease with which she changed or adjusted her answers in order to cover up or realign the same with her prior inconsistent
statements is readily apparent from her testimony even on this single episode, thus:
Q Sometime on January 21, 1994, at about 7:00 o'clock in the evening, do you remember where
you were?
A Yes, sir.
Q Where were you?
A I was in the boarding house of Merlylyn Casantosan, Sir.
xxx xxx xxx
Q Why were you there?
A I was conversing with my friend there, Sir.
COURT:
Q Conversing with whom?
A With my cousin, Your Honor.
Q Your cousin's name?
A Merlylyn Casantosan, Your Honor.
xxx xxx xxx
PROSECUTOR GUAYCO:
Q You said that this Dane or Danny Godoy raped you, will you please relate to this Honorable
Court how that rape happened?
A On Friday and it was 7:00 o'clock in the evening.
COURT:
Q Of what date?
A January 21, 1994, Your Honor.
27

 xxx xxx xxx
PROSECUTOR GUAYCO:
Q Then what happened?
A I went to the boarding house of my cousin Merlylyn Casantosan. I passed (through) the kitchen
and then when I opened the door somebody grabbed me suddenly.
xxx xxx xxx
Q During that time were there other people present in that boarding house where you said Danny
Godoy raped you?
A None, Sir.
COURT:
Q So, the house was empty?
A Yes, Your Honor.
Q I thought your cousin was there and you were conversing?
27
A When I went there she was not there, Your Honor. (Corrections and emphasis supplied.)
2. Complainant testified that appellant raped her through the use of force and intimidation, specifically by holding a knife to her neck.
However, the element of force was not sufficiently established. The physical facts adverted to by the lower court as corroborative of the
prosecution's theory on the use of force are undoubtedly the medico-legal findings of Dr. Rogelio Divinagracia. Upon closer scrutiny,
however, we find that said findings neither support nor confirm the charge that rape was so committed through forcible means by
appellant against complainant on January 21, 1994.
The reported hymenal laceration which, according to Dr. Divinagracia, was a week old and already healed, and the conclusion
therefrom that complainant had sexual intercourse with a man on the date which she alleged, do not establish the supposed rape since
the same findings and conclusion are likewise consistent with appellant's admission that coitus took place with the consent of
28
complainant at Sunset Garden on January 24, 1994. Further, rather than substantiating the prosecution's aforesaid theory and the
supposed date of commission of rape, the finding that there were no evident signs of extra-genital injuries tends, instead, to lend more
credence to appellant's claim of voluntary coition on a later date and the absence of a struggle or the lack of employment of physical
29
force. In rape of the nature alleged in this case, we repeat, the testimony of the complainant must be corroborated by physical
30
evidence showing use of force.
Thus, on the basis of the laceration inflicted, which is superficial at 6 o'clock position, the aforesaid medico-legal expert opined that it
could not be categorically stated that there was force involved. On further questioning, he gave a straightforward answer that force was
31 32
not applied. He also added that when he examined the patient bodily, he did not see any sign of bruises. The absence of any sign
33
of physical violence on the complainant's body is an indication of complainant's consent to the act. While the absence in the medical
34
certificate of external signs of physical injuries on the victim does not necessarily negate the commission of rape, the instant case is
clearly an exception to this rule since appellant has successfully cast doubt on the veracity of that charge against him.
Even granting ex gratia argumenti that the medical report and the laceration corroborated complainant's assertion that there was sexual
intercourse, of course the same cannot be said as to the alleged use of force. It has been held that such corroborative evidence is not
considered sufficient, since proof of facts constituting one principal element of the crime is not corroborative proof of facts necessary to
35
constitute another equally important element of the crime.
Complainant testified that she struggled a little but it was not really strong because she was afraid of appellant. Again assuming that a
sexual assault did take place as she claims, we nevertheless strongly believe that her supposed fear is more imaginary than real. It is
36
evident that complainant did not use the manifest resistance expected of a woman defending her honor and chastity. She failed to
make any outcry when appellant allegedly grabbed her and dragged her inside the house. There is likewise no evidence on record that
she put up a struggle when appellant forced her to lie on the floor, removed her panty, opened the zipper of his trousers, and inserted
his organ inside her genitals. Neither did she demonstrate that appellant, in committing the heinous act, subjected her to any force of
whatever nature or form.
Complainant's explanation for her failure to shout or struggle is too conveniently general and ruefully unconvincing to make this Court
believe that she tenaciously resisted the alleged sexual attack on her by appellant. And, if ever she did put up any struggle or objected
at all to the involuntary intercourse, such was not enough to show the kind of resistance expected of a woman defending her virtue and
37 38
honor. Her failure to do anything while allegedly being raped renders doubtful her charge of rape, especially when we consider the
actual mise-en-scene in the context of her asseverations.
There is a rule that the rape victim's panty and blood-stained dress are not essential, and need not be presented, as they are not
39
indispensable evidence to prove rape. We incline to the view, however, that this general rule holds true only if there exist other
corroborative evidence sufficiently and convincingly proving the rape charge beyond reasonable doubt. The rule should go the other
way where, as in the present case, the testimony of complainant is inherently weak and no other physical evidence has been presented
to bolster the charge of sexual abuse except for the medical report which, as earlier discussed, even negated the existence of one of
the essential elements of the crime. We cannot, therefore, escape the irresistible conclusion that the deliberate non-presentation of
complainant's blood-stained skirt, if it did exist, should vigorously militate against the prosecution's cause.
II. The conduct of the outraged woman immediately following the alleged assault is of the utmost importance as tending to establish the
truth or falsity of the charge. It may well be doubted whether a conviction for the offense of rape should even be sustained from the
uncorroborated testimony of the woman unless the court is satisfied beyond doubt that her conduct at the time when the alleged rape
was committed and immediately thereafter was such as might be reasonably expected from her under all the circumstances of the
40
case.
Complainant said that on the day following the supposed rape, appellant went to her parents' house and asked permission from them to
allow her to go with him to solicit funds for her candidacy. Nowhere throughout her entire testimony did she aver or imply that appellant
was armed and that by reason thereof she was forced to leave with him. In brief, she was neither threatened nor intimidated by
appellant. Her pretense that she was afraid of the supposed threat previously made by appellant does not inspire belief since appellant
was alone and unarmed on that occasion and there was no showing of any opportunity for him to make good his threat, even assuming
that he had really voiced any. On the contrary, complainant even admitted that appellant respectfully asked permission from her parents
for her to accompany him.
Complainant's enigmatic behavior after her alleged ravishment can only be described as paradoxical: it was so strangely normal as to
41
be abnormal. It seems odd, if not incredible, that upon seeing the person who had allegedly raped her only the day before, she did
42
not accuse, revile or denounce him, or show rage, revulsion, and disgust. Instead, she meekly went with appellant despite the
presence of her parents and the proximity of neighbors which, if only for such facts, would naturally have deterred appellant from
pursuing any evil design. From her deportment, it does not appear that the alleged threat made by appellant had instilled any fear in the
mind of complainant. Such a nonchalant, unconcerned attitude is totally at odds with the demeanor that would naturally be expected of
43
a person who had just suffered the ultimate invasion of her womanhood.
III. Rape is a very emotional word, and the natural human reactions to it are categorical: admiration and sympathy for the courageous
female publicly seeking retribution for her outrageous violation, and condemnation of the rapist. However, being interpreters of the law
and dispensers of justice, judges must look at a rape charge without those proclivities, and deal with it with extreme caution and
circumspection. Judges must free themselves of the natural tendency to be overprotective of every woman decrying her having been
sexually abused, and demanding punishment for the abuser. While they ought to be cognizant of the anguish and humiliation the rape

28

victim goes through as she demands justice, judges should equally bear in mind that their responsibility is to render justice based on
44
the law.
45
The rule, therefore, that this Court generally desists from disturbing the conclusions of the trial court on the credibility of witnesses will
not apply where the evidence of record fails to support or substantiate the lower court's findings of fact and conclusions; or where the
lower court overlooked certain facts of substance and value that, if considered, would affect the outcome of the case; or where the
46
disputed decision is based on a misapprehension of facts.
The trial court here unfortunately relied solely on the lone testimony of complainant regarding the January 21, 1994 incident. Indeed, it
is easy to allege that one was raped by a man. All that the victim had to testify to was that appellant poked a knife at her, threatened to
kill her if she shouted and under these threats, undressed her and had sexual intercourse with her. The question then that confronts the
47
trial court is whether or not complainant's testimony is credible. The technique in deciphering testimony is not to solely concentrate on
isolated parts of that testimony. The correct meaning of the testimony can often be ascertained only upon a perusal of the entire
48
testimony. Everything stated by the witness has to be considered in relation to what else has been stated.
In the case at bar, the challenged decision definitely leaves much to be desired. The court below made no serious effort to
dispassionately or impartially consider the totality of the evidence for the prosecution in spite of the teaching in various rulings that in
49
rape cases, the testimony of the offended party must not be accepted with precipitate credulity. In finding that the crime of rape was
committed, the lower court took into account only that portion of the testimony of complainant regarding the January 21, 1994 incident
and conveniently deleted the rest. Taken singly, there would be reason to believe that she was indeed raped. But if we are to consider
the other portions of her testimony concerning the events which transpired thereafter, which unfortunately the court a quo wittingly or
unwittingly failed or declined to appreciate, the actual truth could have been readily exposed.
There are easily perceived or discernible defects in complainant's testimony which inveigh against its being accorded the full credit it
was given by the trial court. Considered independently of any other, the defects might not suffice to overturn the trial court's judgment of
conviction; but assessed and weighed conjointly, as logic and fairness dictate, they exert a powerful compulsion towards reversal of
50
said judgment. Thus:
1. Complainant said that she was continuously raped by herein appellant at the Sunset Garden and around three times at Edward's
Subdivision. In her sworn statement she made the same allegations. If this were true, it is inconceivable how the investigating
prosecutor could have overlooked these facts with their obvious legal implications and, instead, filed an information charging appellant
with only one count of rape. The incredibility of complainant's representations is further magnified by the fact that even the trial court did
not believe it, as may be inferred from its failure to consider this aspect of her testimony, unless we were to uncharitably assume that it
was similarly befuddled.
2. She claims that appellant always carried a knife, but it was never explained how she was threatened with the same in such a manner
that she was allegedly always cowed into giving in to his innumerable sexual demands. We are not unaware that in rape cases, this
claim that complainant now advances appears to be a common testimonial expedient and face-saving subterfuge.
3. According to her, they stayed at Sunset Garden for three days and three nights and that she never noticed if appellant slept because
she never saw him close his eyes. Yet, when asked if she slept side by side with appellant, complainant admitted that everytime she
51
woke up, appellant was invariably in bed beside her.
4. She alleged that she could never go out of the room because it was always locked and it could not be opened from the inside. But,
this was refuted by complainant's own testimony, as follows:
Q And yet the door could be opened by you from the inside?
A No, Sir, it was locked.
Q Can you describe the lock of that room?
A It's like that of the door where there is a doorknob.
ATTY. EBOL:
Let it be recorded that the lock is a doorknob and may I ask that the door be locked and opened
from the inside.
COURT:
Alright (sic) you go down the witness stand and find out for yourself if you can open that door from
the inside.
CLERK OF COURT:
Witness holding the doorknob.
COURT:
The key is made to open if you are outside, but as you're were (sic) inside you can open it?
A Yes, sir.
Q Is there no other lock aside from that doorknob that you held?
A There was, Your Honor.
Q What is that?
A The one that slides, Your Honor.
Q And that is used when you are already inside?
52
A Yes, Your Honor. (Emphases ours.)
5. During their entire stay at the Sunset Garden or even at Edward's Subdivision, beyond supposedly offering token or futile resistance
53
to the latter's sexual advances, she made no outcry, no attempt to flee or attract attention to her plight. In her own declaration,
complainant mentioned that when they checked in at Sunset Garden, she saw the cashier at the information counter where appellant
registered. She did not do anything, despite the fact that appellant at that time was admittedly not armed. She likewise stated that a
room boy usually went to their room and brought them food. If indeed she was bent on fleeing from appellant, she could have grabbed
every possible opportunity to escape. Inexplicably, she did not. What likewise appears puzzling is the prosecution's failure to present
these two people she mentioned and whose testimonies could have bolstered or corroborated complainant's story.
6. When appellant fetched complainant in the afternoon of January 22, 1994, they left the house together and walked in going to the
highway. In her own testimony, complainant stated that appellant went ahead of her. It is highly improbable, if appellant really had evil
motives, that he would be that careless. It is likewise beyond comprehension that appellant was capable of instilling such fear in
complainant that she could not dare take advantage of the situation, in spite of the laxity of appellant, and run as far away from him as
possible despite all the chances therefor.
7. Helen Taha, the mother of Mia, testified that as a result of the filing of the rape case, complainant was dropped from school and was
not allowed to graduate. This is absurd. Rather than support and commiserate with the ill-fated victim of rape, it would appear that the
school authorities were heartless people who turned their backs on her and considered her an outcast. That would be adding insult to
injury. But what is more abstruse yet significant is that Mia and her parents were never heard to complain about this apparent injustice.
Such complacency cannot but make one think and conclude that there must necessarily have been a valid justification for the drastic
action taken by the school and the docile submission thereto by the Taha family.
On the other hand, in evaluating appellant's testimony, the trial court's decision was replete with sweeping statements and
generalizations. It chose to focus on certain portions of appellant's testimony, declared them to be preposterous and abnormal, and
then hastened to conclude that appellant is indeed guilty. The court in effect rendered a judgment of conviction based, not on the
strength of the prosecution's evidence, but on the weakness of that of the defense, which is totally repugnant to the elementary and
54
time-honored rule that conviction should be made on the basis of strong, clear and compelling evidence of the prosecution.
29

IV. The main defense proffered by appellant is that he and complainant were sweethearts. While the "sweetheart theory" does not often
gain favor with this Court, such is not always the case if the hard fact is that the accused and the supposed victim are, in truth,
intimately related except that, as is usual in most cases, either the relationship is illicit or the victim's parents are against it. It is not
improbable that in some instances, when the relationship is uncovered, the alleged victim or her parents for that matter would rather
take the risk of instituting a criminal action in the hope that the court would take the cudgels for them than for the woman to admit to her
own acts of indiscretion. And this, as the records reveal, is precisely what happened to appellant.
Appellant's claim that he and complainant were lovers is fortified by the highly credible testimonies of several witnesses for the
defense, viz.:
1. Filomena Pielago testified that on the night of January 21, 1994, she saw appellant and complainant sitting on a bench in front of the
house where the sexual attack allegedly took place, and the couple were talking intimately. She had warned Mia about the latter's illicit
affair with appellant.
2. Fernando Rubio, an acquaintance of appellant and owner of the house at Edward's Subdivision, testified that he asked Mia why she
55
decided to have an affair with appellant who is a married man. Mia answered that she really loves him. He heard her call appellant
56 57
"Papa". The couple looked happy and were sweet to each other.
3. Benedicto Rubio, the younger brother of Fernando, testified on redirect examination that he asked Mia if she knew what she getting
into and she answered, "Yes;" then he asked her if she really loved Sir Godoy, and she again answered in the affirmative. When he
58
was trying to give counsel to appellant, complainant announced that if appellant left her, she would commit suicide. He could see that
59
the couple were happy together.
4. Isagani Virey, who knew appellant because the Municipal Engineering Office where he worked was located within the premises of
PNS, attested that he was able to talk to the couple and that when he was advising appellant that what he was doing is wrong because
he is married and Mia is his student, complainant reacted by saying that no matter what happened she would not leave Godoy, and that
60 61
if she went home her father would kill her. He also observed that they were happy.
5. Erna Baradero, a co-teacher of appellant, saw the couple the day before the alleged rape incident, inside one of the classrooms and
they were holding hands, and she heard Mia tell appellant, "Mahal na mahal kita Sir, iwanan mo ang iyong asawa at tatakas
62 63
tayo." She tried to dissuade complainant from continuing with her relationship with appellant.
The positive allegations of appellant that he was having an intimate relationship with complainant, which were substantially
corroborated by several witnesses, were never successfully confuted. The rebuttal testimony of complainant merely consisted of bare,
64
unexplained denials of the positive, definite, consistent and detailed assertions of appellant. Mere denials are self-serving negative
65
evidence. They cannot obtain evidentiary weight greater than the declarations of credible disinterested witnesses.
Besides, appellant recounted certain facts that only he could have supplied. They were replete with details which could have been
66
known only to him, thereby lending credence and reliability thereto. His assertions are more logical, probable and bear the earmarks
of truth. This is not to say that the testimony of appellant should be accorded full credence. His self-interest must have colored his
account, even on the assumption that he could be trusted to stick to the literal truth. Nonetheless, there is much in his version that does
67
not strain the limits of credulity. More to the point, there is enough to raise doubts that do appear to have some basis in reality.
Thus, the trial court's hasty pontification that appellant's testimony is improbable, ridiculous, nonsensical and incredible is highly
68
uncalled for. The rule of falsus in uno, falsus in omnibus is not mandatory. It is not a positive rule of law and is not an inflexible one. It
does not apply where there is sufficient corroboration on many grounds of the testimony and the supposed inconsistencies arise merely
69
from a desire of the witness to exculpate himself although not completely.
Complainant's denial that she and appellant were lovers is belied by the evidence presented by the defense, the most telling of which
are her two handwritten letters, Exhibits "1" and "2", which she sent to the latter while he was detained at the provincial jail. For analysis
and emphasis, said letters are herein quoted in full:
27 Feb. 94
Dane,
Kumusta kana? Kong ako hito hindi na makatiis sa sakit.
Sir, sumulat ako sa inyo dahil gusto kong malaman mo ang situation ko. Sir, kong mahal mo ako gagawa kang
paraan na mailayo ako dito sa bahay. nalaman ng nanay at tatay ko na delayed ang mens ko ng one week.
pinapainom nila ako ng pampalaglag pero ayaw ko. pagnalaman nila na hindi ko ininom ang gamot sinasaktan nila
ako.
Sir, kong maari ay huwag ng maabutan ng Martes. dahil naabutan nila akong maglayas sana ako. kaya ngayon hindi
ako makalabas ng bahay kong wala akong kasama, kong gaano sila kahigpit noon doble pa ngayon. ang mga gamit
ko ngayon ay wala sa lalagyan ko. tinago nila hindi ko makita, ang narito lang ay ang bihisan kong luma. Sir kong
manghiram ka kaya ng motor na gagamitin sa pagkuha sa akin. Sa lunes ng gabi manonood kami Ng Veta eksakto
alas 9:00 ay dapat dito ka sa lugar na may Veta. tanungin mo lang kay Lorna kong saan ang Veta nila Navoor Lozot.
Mag busina ka lang ng tatlo bilang senyas na lalabas na ako at huwag kang tatapat ng bahay dahil nandoon ang
kuya ko. kong ano ang disisyon mo maari bang magsulat ka at ipahatid kay Lorna.
alang-alang sa bata. Baka makainon ako ng gamot dahil baka pagkain ko hahaluan nila.
Please sir . . .
70
(Sgd.) Mia Taha
3/1/94
Dane,
I'm sorry kong problem ang ipinadala o sinulat sa iyo sa halip sa kasiyahan. oo nag usap na tayo nagawa ko lang
naman ang sumulat sa iyo dahil naiinis na ako sa pagmumukha ng mga magulang kong suwapang. Ang paglayas ko
sana ay dahil sa narinig ko. Sir narinig ko na magreklamo si nanay kay Arquero yong superentende sa Palawan high
tapos ang sabi ay magreklamo itong si Arquero sa DECS para matanggal ka sa pagtuturo yan ang dahilan kong bakit
naisipan kong lumayas ng wala sa oras at wala akong tensyon na masama laban so iyo. hindi ko sinabi sa kanila na
delayed ako ay sinabi sa iyo ni Eden na sa harap niya mismo binigyan ako ng gamot samantalang noong Sabado ng
gabi lang nalaman dahil gusto kong masuka. Oo aaminin ko nagkasala ako sa iyo, pinabilanggo kita dahil nagpanig
ako sa mga magulang ko nadala nila ako sa sulsul nila. hindi ko naipaglaban ang dapat kong ipaglaban ngunit kong
iniisip mong minahal lang kita dahil sa may kailangan lang ako sa iyo nagkakamali ka. alam ng Diyos na hindi ganon
ang hangarin ko sa iyo. higit pa sa binilanggo ang kalagayan ko kong alam mo. kinukunsinsiya, nagtitiis na saktan at
pagsasakripisyo ng damdamin ko na gusto kang makita at yakapin ka pero ano ang magagawa ko kong ang
paglabas ko ng bahay ay hindi ako makalabas ng mag isa may guardiya pa. tanungin mo si Lorna kong ano
ginagawa nilang pagbantay sa akin para akong puganti. hindi ito ayon sa kagustuhan ng mga magulang ko sarili
kong plano ito. Magtitiis pa ba akong hindi makakain maghapon tubig lang ang laman ng tiyan, kong may masama
akong hangarin sa iyo.
Oo, magtiis ako para maipakita kong mahal rin kita. March 2 darating ako sa bahay na sinasabi mo. hindi ko matiyak
kong anong oras dahil kukuha pa ako ng tiyempo na wala rito ang tatay ko. Alam mo bang pati ang kapatid kong si
Rowena ay inuutusan akong lumayas dahil naawa no siya sa situation ko. siya lang ang kakampi ko rito sa bahay
malaki ang pag-asa kong makalabas ako ng bahay sa tulong niya.
Love
you
30

 (Sgd.)
Mia
71
Taha
There is absolutely nothing left to the imagination. The letters eloquently speak for themselves. It was complainant's handwriting which
spilled the beans, so to speak. Aside from appellant, two other defense witnesses identified the handwriting on the letters as belonging
to Mia Taha. They are Filomena Pielago and Erna Baradero who were admittedly the former teachers of complainant and highly familiar
with her handwriting. The greatest blunder committed by the trial court was in ignoring the testimonies of these qualified witnesses and
refusing to give any probative value to these two vital pieces of evidence, on the dubious and lame pretext that no handwriting expert
was presented to analyze and evaluate the same.
Well-entrenched by now is the rule that resort to questioned document examiners, more familiarly called handwriting experts, is not
72
mandatory. Handwriting experts, while probably useful, are not indispensable in examining or comparing handwriting. This is so since
under Section 22, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court, the handwriting of a person may be proved by any witness who believes it to be the
handwriting of such person, because he has seen the person write, or has seen writing purporting to be his upon which the witness has
acted or been charged, and has thus acquired knowledge of the handwriting of such person. The said section further provides that
evidence respecting the handwriting may also be given by a comparison, made by the witness or the court, with writings admitted or
73
treated as genuine by the party against whom the evidence is offered or proved to be genuine to the satisfaction of the judge.
The defense witnesses were able to identify complainant's handwriting on the basis of the examination papers submitted to them by her
in their respective subjects. This Court has likewise carefully examined and compared the handwriting on the letters with the standard
writing appearing on the test papers as specimens for comparison and, contrary to the observations and conclusions of the lower court,
we are convinced beyond doubt that they were written by one and the same person. More importantly, complainant herself categorically
admitted that the handwriting on the questioned letters belongs to her.
It is, therefore, extremely disconcerting, to say the least, why the trial court again chose to turn a deaf ear to this conclusive portion of
complainant's testimony:
ATTY. EBOL:
Q Did I get you right on rebuttal that Mrs. Erna Baradero and Filomena Pielago were your
teachers?
A Yes, sir.
Q And they have been your teachers for several months before this incident of January 21, 1994,
am I not correct?
A That is true, sir.
Q And you have (sic) during these past months that they have been your teachers you took
examinations in their classes in their particular subject(s)?
A Yes, sir.
Q And some of those test papers are in the possession of your teachers, am I correct?
A Yes, sir.
Q I will show you Exhibit "4" previously marked as Exhibit "4", it appears to be your test paper and
with your signature and the alphabet appears in this exhibit appears to be that of Mia Taha, please
examine this and tell the Honorable Court if that is your test paper?
A Yes, sir.
Q That signature Mia Taha I understand is also your signature?
A Yes, sir.
Q I will show you Exhibit "4-A", will you please examine this Exhibit "4-A" and tell this Honorable
Court if you are familiar with that.
A What subject is that?
Q I am just asking you whether you are familiar with that.
A I cannot remember if I have this kind of subject, sir.
Q How about this signature Mia Taha, are you not familiar with that signature?
A That is min(e), sir.
Q I will show you Exhibit "4-C" which appears to be that in Math, are you familiar with that
signature?
A Yes, sir.
Q That is your signature?
A Yes, sir.
Q In fact, these letters in alphabet here are in your own handwriting?
A Yes, sir.
xxx xxx xxx
Q You will deny this Exhibit "1" your signature?
xxx xxx xxx
Q You will deny that this is your handwriting?
A That is my handwriting, sir.
Q Also Exhibit "2"?
74
A Yes, sir.
While rebuttal witness Lorna Casantosan insisted that she never delivered any letter of complainant to herein appellant, the witness
presented by the defense on sur-rebuttal, Armando Pasion, who was the guard on duty at the provincial jail at that time, testified of his
own accord because he knew that what Casantosan said was a blatant lie. Appellant never talked to Amando Pasion nor requested him
to testify for the defense, as related by the witness himself. Hence, there exists no reason whatsoever to disbelieve the testimony of
witness Pasion to the effect that Lorna Casantosan actually went to visit appellant in jail and in truth handed to him what turned out to
be the letters marked as Exhibits "1" and "2" for the defense.
V. The prosecution insists that the offer of compromise made by appellant is deemed to be an admission of guilt. This inference does
not arise in the instant case. In criminal cases, an offer of compromise is generally admissible as evidence against the party making it. It
is a legal maxim, which assuredly constitutes one of the bases of the right to penalize, that in the matter of public crimes which directly
affect the public interest, no compromise whatever may be entered into as regards the penal action. It has long been held, however,
that in such cases the accused is permitted to show that the offer was not made under a consciousness of guilt, but merely to avoid the
inconvenience of imprisonment or for some other reason which would justify a claim by the accused that the offer to compromise was
75
not in truth an admission of his guilt or an attempt to avoid the legal consequences which would ordinarily ensue therefrom.
A primary consideration here is that the evidence for the defense overwhelmingly proves appellant's innocence of the offense charged.
Further, the supposed offer of marriage did not come from appellant but was actually suggested by a certain Naem, who is an imam or
Muslim leader and who likewise informed appellant that he could be converted into a Muslim so he could marry complainant. As a
matter of fact, when said offer was first made to appellant, he declined because of the fact that he was already married. On top of
these, appellant did not know, not until the trial proper, that his mother actually paid P30,000.00 for the settlement of these cases.

31

Complainant's own mother, Helen Taha, testified that present during the negotiations were herself, her husband, Mia, and appellant's
76
mother. Appellant himself was never present in any of said meetings.
It has been held that where the accused was not present at the time the offer for monetary consideration was made, such offer of
77
compromise would not save the day for the prosecution. In another case, this Court ruled that no implied admission can be drawn
from the efforts to arrive at a settlement outside the court, where the accused did not take part in any of the negotiations and the effort
to settle the case was in accordance with the established tribal customs, that is, Muslim practices and traditions, in an effort to prevent
78
further deterioration of the relations between the parties.
VI. Generally, an affidavit of desistance by the complainant is not looked upon with favor. It may, however, create serious doubts as to
79
the liability of appellant, especially if it corroborates appellant's explanation about the filing of criminal charges.
In the cases at bar, the letters written by complainant to appellant are very revealing. Most probably written out of desperation and
exasperation with the way she was being treated by her parents, complainant threw all caution to the winds when she wrote: "Oo,
aaminin ko nagkasala ako sa iyo, pinabilanggo kita dahil nagpanig ako sa mga magulang ko nadala nila ako sa sulsul nila, hindi ko
naipaglaban ang dapat kong ipaglaban," obviously referring to her ineptitude and impotence in helping appellant out of his predicament.
It could, therefore, be safely presumed that the rape charge was merely an offshoot of the discovery by her parents of the intimate
relationship between her and appellant. In order to avoid retribution from her parents, together with the moral pressure exerted upon
her by her mother, she was forced to concoct her account of the alleged rape.
The Court takes judicial cognizance of the fact that in rural areas in the Philippines, young ladies are strictly required to act with
circumspection and prudence. Great caution is observed so that their reputations shall remain untainted. Any breath of scandal which
80
brings dishonor to their character humiliates their entire families. It could precisely be that complainant's mother wanted to save face
in the community where everybody knows everybody else, and in an effort to conceal her daughter's indiscretion and escape the
wagging tongues of their small rural community, she had to weave the scenario of this rape drama.
Although the trial court did observe that a mother would not sacrifice her daughter to tell a story of defloration, that is not always the
81
case as this Court has noted a long time ago. The books disclose too many instances of false charges of rape. While this Court has,
in numerous cases, affirmed the judgments of conviction rendered by trial courts in rape charges, especially where the offended parties
were very young and presumptively had no ill motives to concoct a story just to secure indictments for a crime as grave as rape, the
Court has likewise reversed judgments of conviction and acquitted the accused when there are strong indications pointing to the
82
possibility that the rape charges were merely motivated by some factors except the truth as to their commission. This is a case in
point. The Court, therefore, cannot abdicate its duty to declare that the prosecution has failed to meet the exacting test of moral
certainty and proof of guilt of appellant beyond reasonable doubt.
This is not to say that the Court approves of the conduct of appellant. Indisputably, he took advantage of complainant's feelings for him
and breached his vow of fidelity to his wife. As her teacher, he should have acted as adviser and counselor to complainant and helped
83
her develop in manners and virtue instead of corrupting her. Hence, even as he is freed from physical detention in a prison as an
instrument of human justice, he remains in the spiritual confinement of his conscience as a measure of divine retribution. Additionally,
these ruminations do not rule out such other legal options against him as may be available in the arsenal of statutory law.
VII. The trial court, in holding for conviction, relied on the presumptio hominis that a young Filipina will not charge a person with rape if it
is not true. In the process, however, it totally disregarded the more paramount constitutional presumption that an accused is deemed
innocent until proven otherwise.
It frequently happens that in a particular case two or more presumptions are involved. Sometimes the presumptions conflict, one
tending to demonstrate the guilt of the accused and the other his innocence. In such case, it is necessary to examine the basis for each
presumption and determine what logical or social basis exists for each presumption, and then determine which should be regarded as
the more important and entitled to prevail over the other. It must, however, be remembered that the existence of a presumption
indicating guilt does not in itself destroy the presumption against innocence unless the inculpating presumption, together with all of the
evidence, or the lack of any evidence or explanation, is sufficient to overcome the presumption of innocence by proving the defendant's
84
guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. Until the defendant's guilt is shown in this manner, the presumption of innocence continues.
The rationale for the presumption of guilt in rape cases has been explained in this wise:
In rape cases especially, much credence is accorded the testimony of the complaining witness, on the theory that she
will not choose to accuse her attacker at all and subject herself to the stigma and indignities her accusation will entail
unless she is telling the truth. The rape victim who decides to speak up exposes herself as a woman whose virtue
has been not only violated but also irreparably sullied. In the eyes of a narrow-minded society, she becomes a
cheapened woman, never mind that she did not submit to her humiliation and has in fact denounced her assailant. At
the trial, she will be the object of lascivious curiosity. People will want to be titillated by the intimate details of her
violation. She will squirm through her testimony as she describes how her honor was defiled, relating every
embarrassing movement of the intrusion upon the most private parts of her body. Most frequently, the defense will
argue that she was not forced to submit but freely conjoined in the sexual act. Her motives will be impugned. Her
chastity will be challenged and maligned. Whatever the outcome of the case, she will remain a tainted woman, a
pariah because her purity has been lost, albeit through no fault of hers. This is why many a rape victim chooses
instead to keep quiet, suppressing her helpless indignation rather than denouncing her attacker. This is also the
reason why, if a woman decides instead to come out openly and point to her assailant, courts
85
are prone to believe that she is telling the truth regardless of its consequences. . . .
The presumption of innocence, on the other hand, is founded upon the first principles of justice, and is not a mere form but a substantial
part of the law. It is not overcome by mere suspicion or conjecture; a probability that the defendant committed the crime; nor by the fact
86
that he had the opportunity to do so. Its purpose is to balance the scales in what would otherwise be an uneven contest between the
lone individual pitted against the People and all the resources at their command. Its inexorable mandate is that, for all the authority and
influence of the prosecution, the accused must be acquitted and set free if his guilt cannot be proved beyond the whisper of a
87
doubt. This is in consonance with the rule that conflicts in evidence must be resolved upon the theory of innocence rather than upon a
88
theory of guilt when it is possible to do so.
On the basis of the foregoing doctrinal tenets and principles, and in conjunction with the overwhelming evidence in favor of herein
appellant, we do not encounter any difficulty in concluding that the constitutional presumption on the innocence of an accused must
prevail in this particular indictment.
B. The Kidnapping/Illegal Detention Case
It is basic that for kidnapping to exist, there must be indubitable proof that the actual intent of the malefactor was to deprive the
89
offended party of her liberty. In the present charge for that crime, such intent has not at all been established by the prosecution.
Prescinding from the fact that the Taha spouses desisted from pursuing this charge which they themselves instituted, several grave and
irreconcilable inconsistencies bedevil the prosecution's evidence thereon and cast serious doubts on the guilt of appellant, as
hereunder explained:
To recall, complainant testified that appellant by himself went to fetch her at her parents' house the day after the alleged rape incident.
In her own words, appellant courteously asked her parents to permit her to help him solicit contributions for her candidacy. When they
left the house, appellant walked ahead of her, obviously with her parents and their neighbors witnessing their departure. It is difficult to
comprehend how one could deduce from these normal and innocuous arrangement any felonious intent of appellant to deprive
complainant of her liberty. One will look in vain for a case where a kidnapping was committed under such inauspicious circumstances
as described by complainant.
32

Appellant declared that when they left the house of the Taha family, complainant was bringing with her a plastic bag which later turned
out to contain her clothes. This bag was left behind by Mia at Edward's Subdivision, as hereinbefore noted, and was later delivered to
appellant by Benedicto Rubio. Again, we cannot conceive of a ridiculous situation where the kidnap victim was first allowed to prepare
and pack her clothes, as if she was merely leaving for a pleasant sojourn with the criminal, all these with the knowledge and consent of
her parents who passively looked on without comment.
Complainant alleged that appellant always kept her locked inside the room which they occupied, whether at Sunset Garden or at
Edward's Subdivision, and that she could not unlock the door from the inside. We must, however, recall that when she was asked on
cross-examination about the kind of lock that was used, she pointed to the doorknob of the courtroom. The court then ordered that the
door of the courtroom be locked and then asked complainant to open it from the inside. She was easily able to do so and, in fact, she
admitted that the two locks in the room at Sunset Garden could also be opened from the inside in the same manner. This demonstrably
undeniable fact was never assailed by the prosecution. It also failed to rebut the testimony of Fernando Rubio that the room which was
occupied by the couple at Edward's Subdivision could not even be locked because the lock thereof was broken.
When the couple transferred to Edward's Subdivision, they walked along the national highway in broad daylight. Complainant,
therefore, had more than ample opportunity to seek the help of other people and free herself from appellant if it were true that she was
90
forcibly kidnapped and abused by the latter. In fact, several opportunities to do so had presented themselves from the time they left
complainant's home and during their extended stay in the hotel and in the lodging house.
According to appellant, he went to see the parents of complainant the day after they went to Sunset Garden to inform them that Mia
spent the night in said place. This was neither denied nor impugned by Helen Taha, her husband, or any other person. On the other
hand, the allegation of Helen Taha that she made a report to the police about her missing daughter was not supported by any
corroborative evidence, such as the police blotter, nor was the police officer to whom she allegedly reported the incident ever identified
or presented in court.
We agree with appellant's contention that the prosecution failed to prove any motive on his part for the commission of the crime
91
charged. In one case, this Court rejected the kidnapping charge where there was not the slightest hint of a motive for the crime. It is
true that, as a rule, the motive of the accused in a criminal case is immaterial and, not being an element of a crime, it does not have to
92
be proved. Where, however, the evidence is weak, without any motive being disclosed by the evidence, the guilt of the accused
93
becomes open to a reasonable doubt and, hence, an acquittal is in order. Nowhere in the testimony of either the complainant or her
mother can any ill motive of a criminal nature be reasonably drawn. What actually transpired was an elopement or a lovers' tryst,
immoral though it may be.
As a closing note, we are bewildered by the trial court's refusal to admit in evidence the bag of clothes belonging to complainant which
was presented and duly identified by the defense, on its announced supposition that the clothes could have easily been bought from a
department store. Such preposterous reasoning founded on a mere surmise or speculation, aside from the fact that on rebuttal the
prosecution did not even seek to elicit an explanation or clarification from complainant about said clothes, strengthens and reinforces
our impression of an apparently whimsical exercise of discretion by the court below. Matters which could have been easily verified were
thus cavalierly dismissed and supplanted by a conjecture, and on such inferential basis a conclusion was then drawn by said court.
We accordingly deem it necessary to reiterate an early and highly regarded disquisition of this Court against the practice of excluding
evidence in the erroneous manner adopted by the trial court:
It has been observed that justice is most effectively and expeditiously administered where trivial objections to the
admission of proof are received with least favor. The practice of excluding evidence on doubtful objections to its
materiality or technical objections to the form of the questions should be avoided. In a case of any intricacy it is
impossible for a judge of first instance, in the early stages of the development of the proof, to know with any certainty
whether the testimony is relevant or not; and where there is no indication of bad faith on the part of the attorney
offering the evidence, the court may as a rule safely accept the testimony upon the statement of the attorney that the
proof offered will be connected later. Moreover, it must be remembered that in the heat of the battle over which he
presides, a judge of first instance may possibly fall into error in judging the relevancy of proof where a fair and logical
connection is in fact shown. When such a mistake is made and the proof is erroneously ruled out, the Supreme Court,
upon appeal, often finds itself embarrassed and possibly unable to correct the effects of the error without returning
the case for a new trial, a step which this court is always very loath to take. On the other hand, the admission of proof
in a court of first instance, even if the question as to its form, materiality, or relevancy is doubtful, can never result in
much harm to either litigant, because the trial judge is supposed to know the law and it is its duty, upon final
consideration of the case, to distinguish the relevant and material from the irrelevant and immaterial. If this course is
followed and the cause is prosecuted to the Supreme Court upon appeal, this court then has all the materials before it
94
necessary to make a correct judgment.
At any rate, despite that procedural lapse, we find in the records of these cases sufficient and substantial evidence which warrant and
demand the acquittal of appellant. Apropos thereto, we take this opportunity to repeat this age-old observation and experience of
mankind on the penological and societal effect of capital punishment: If it is justified, it serves as a deterrent; if injudiciously imposed, it
generates resentment.
Finally, we are constrained to reiterate here that Republic Act No. 7659 which reimposed the death penalty on certain heinous crimes
took effect on December 31, 1993, that is, fifteen days after its publication in the December 16, 1993 issues of the Manila Bulletin,
95
Philippine Star, Malaya and Philippine Times Journal, and not on January 1, 1994 as is sometimes misinterpreted.
WHEREFORE, the judgment appealed from is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE, and accused-appellant Danny Godoy is hereby
ACQUITTED of the crimes of rape and kidnapping with serious illegal detention charged in Criminal Cases Nos. 11640 and 11641 of
the Regional Trial Court for Palawan and Puerto Princesa City, Branch 49. It is hereby ORDERED that he be released forthwith, unless
he is otherwise detained for any other valid cause.
SO ORDERED.

33

Case 21
SECOND DIVISION
[G.R. No. 146783. July 29, 2002]
IN THE MATTER OF THE APPLICATION FOR HABEAS CORPUS OF MAXIMINO GAMIDO; MAXIMINO B. GAMIDO, petitioner,
vs. NEW BILIBID PRISON, respondent.
RESOLUTION
QUISUMBING, J.:
Before us is the Motion for Relief filed on January 17, 2002 by Espiridion J. Dela Cruz, of Suite 416 William Liyao Bldg., Rizal
Avenue, Manila, who styles himself as counsel for petitioner Maximino B. Gamido. Two issues were tendered during the hearing of said
motion today, attended by Dela Cruz and the counsels for respondent led by the Assistant Solicitor General Rodolfo Urbiztondo, OSG,
to wit:
1. Whether or not there has been a violation of the rule against forum-shopping; and
2. Whether or not Espiridion J. Dela Cruz may appear as counsel for petitioner in this case, considering allegations that he is
not a member of the Philippine Bar.
It appearing that earlier the petitioner himself filed under date of February 12, 2001, personally his Motion to Withdraw Petition, and
that the Court in its Resolution dated March 12, 2001, granted the withdrawal of his petition for habeas corpus, the Court
herebyRESOLVES that the instant Motion for Relief, which was filed without authority of the petitioner and clearly without merit, should
be and is hereby DENIED.
Further, considering representations by the self-styled counsel for petitioner that he, Espiridion J. Dela Cruz, is a lawyer with a law
office bearing his name at Suite 416 William Liyao Bldg., Rizal Avenue, Manila, and for this purpose he used the title of attorney and
indicated in his pleadings filed before this Court an IBP number, which turned out to be spurious, it having been shown and admitted by
him that he is not a member of the Philippine Bar as certified by the Office of the Bar Confidant, after he was made to show cause why
he should not be disciplinarily dealt with for appearing as counsel in this case without license to practice law, and although he asked the
Court for forgiveness for the wrong he had done, the Court RESOLVED to declare ESPIRIDION J. DELA CRUZ GUILTY of indirect
contempt of this Court. WHEREFORE, he is hereby sentenced to pay a FINE of TEN THOUSAND PESOS (P10,000) within thirty days
from notice hereof, OR suffer IMPRISONMENT for a period of one month and one day to be served at the National Bureau of Investigation
(NBI) detention center, Taft Avenue, Manila, with the warning that a repetition of the same or similar act would be dealt with more severely.
SO ORDERED.
Bellosillo, (Chairman), Mendoza, and Corona, JJ., concur.

34

Case 22
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-24864 November 19, 1985
FORTUNATO HALILI, doing business under the name and style HALILI TRANSIT (substituted by Emilia de Vera de
Halili), petitioner
vs.
COURT OF INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS and HALILI BUS DRIVERS AND CONDUCTORS UNION (PTGWO),respondents.
G.R. No. L-27773 November 19, 1985
EMILIA DE VERA VDA. DE HALILI, petitioner,
vs.
COURT OF INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS and HALILI BUS DRIVERS AND CONDUCTORS UNION (PTGWO),respondents.
G.R. No. L-38655 November 19, 1985
FELICIDAD M. TOLENTINO, et al., petitioners,
vs.
COURT OF INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS, et al., respondents.
G.R. No. L-30110 November 19, 1985
EMILIA DE VERA. VDA. DE HALILI, petitioner,
vs,
HALILI BUS DRIVERS AND CONDUCTORS UNION (PTGWO) and COURT OF INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS,respondents.
Ruben C. Asedillo counsel for Manila Bank.
Pedro A. Lopez counsel for Halili Bus Drivers Transport Hall.
RESOLUTION

MAKASIAR, C.J.:
On April 30, 1985, We resolved an urgent motion to cite Atty. Benjamin C. Pineda, Ricardo Capuno and Manila Bank (Cubao Branch) in
contempt for their continued failure to comply with this Court's temporary mandatory restraining order issued on September 1, 1983 and
with Its resolution dated September 13, 1983 which required compliance with the aforesaid restraining order. WE disposed of the above
motion in the following terms:
WHEREFORE, ATTY. BENJAMIN PINEDA IS HEREBY FOUND GUILTY OF INDIRECT CONTEMPT OF COURT
FOR WHICH HE IS HEREBY SENTENCED TO IMPRISONMENT IN THE MANILA CITY JAIL UNTIL THE ORDERS
OF THIS COURT DATED SEPTEMBER 1 AND SEPTEMBER 13, 1983 ARE COMPLIED WITH.
ATTY. BENJAMIN PINEDA IS ALSO DIRECTED TO SHOW CAUSE WHY HE SHOULD NOT BE DISBARRED
UNDER RULE 138 OF THE REVISED RULES OF COURT.
LET COPIES OF THIS RESOLUTION AND THE RESOLUTION OF OCTOBER 18,1983 BE FURNISHED THE
MINISTRY OF LABOR AND THE TANODBAYAN FOR APPROPRIATE ACTION (p. 424, L- 27773 rec.).
Atty. Benjamin Pineda moved for reconsideration of the aforecited resolution on May 13, 1985, therein stating, among other things, that
he could not comply with Our resolution of September 1, 1983 since after withdrawals and disbursements, only P 2,022.70 remained
from his account with the Manila Bank (Cubao Branch); that he admits the wrong he has committed, apologizes for the same and
promises that he will do his best to make restitution; that as evidence of his act of repentance and restitution, he delivered to the NLRC
on May 10, 1985 TCT No. 181023 covering his registered real estate property consisting of 633 square meters and the amount of
P30,000.00 in cash, in partial compliance with this Court's resolution of April 30, 1985; that he helped in facilitating the sale in order to
pay the accumulated real estate taxes; and that his retainer's contract was annotated at the back of the title of said property (TCT No.
205785) as attorney's lien, Movant Pineda now prays for a reconsideration of Our April 30, 1985 resolution (p. 426, L-27773 rec.).
On May 21, 1985, movant Pineda filed his supplement to motion for reconsideration therein stating, among other things, that in
compliance with this Court's resolution of October 18, 1983, remanding these cases to the NLRC for further proceedings, Labor Arbiter
Antonio Tria Tirona conducted a hearing on May 20, 1985 where the union, Atty. Jose C. Espinas, Atty. Pedro Lopez and herein
movant appeared; and, that the aforenamed parties agreed on these terms:
1. that movant is still answerable for the uncontested amount of P407,424.00 representing the 10% excess attorney's
fees in the amount of P203,712.00, to be refunded to the Union and the 10% attomey's fees due to Atty. Espinas and
Atty. Lopez in the amount of P203,712.00, as per NLRC order dated April 24, 1985. Said order awarded 7%
attorney's fees to Atty. Espinas; 3% to Atty, Lopez and 10% to movant Pineda, which apportionment corresponds to
the 20% attorney's fees as adjudged in subject resolution.
2. that the real property covered by TCT No. 181023 which movant delivered to the NLRC plus the amount of
P30,000.00 remitted to the NLRC shall answer for his obligation; and he will sell the said property and deposit the
proceeds therefrom to the NLRC, for further proceedings.
In the aforesaid supplement, movant reiterates his averments that he negotiated the sale of the union property in 1983 under the
impression that the NLRC had the authority to allow the questioned transaction and that it was as honest opinion that when the CIR
was abolished and replaced by the NLRC, the jurisdiction, power and functions of the former were transferred to the latter agency
which, he presumed, had the authority to authorize the purchase. Finally, he claims that his acts were all done in good faith and
reiterates his contrition and is making restitution for the same (p. 435, L- 27773 rec.).
On May 21, 1985, this Court issued a resolution denying movant's motion for reconsideration of April 30, 1985 for lack of merit (p. 431
L-27773 rec.).
Movant counsel filed on June 6, 1985 his second motion for reconsideration of Our original subject resolution and the aforecited minute
resolution dated May 21, 1985 denying his first motion for reconsideration and the supplement thereto for lack of merit. In this motion,
movant alleges that his accountability as of June 5, 1985 (date of motion) has been reduced to P377,424.00 and not anymore
P710,969.30 as originally computed; that he restates that his accountability to Attys. Jose C. Espinas and Pedro Lopez and the union is
P407,424.00 only which amount was arrived at and agreed upon by the parties in the proceedings held on May 20, 1985 and which
represents the 20% attorney's fees due the three lawyers on record (Pineda, Espinas and Lopez). The aforesaid attorney's fees were
awarded in the order of the NLRC issued on April 24, 1985; that per NLRC records, Atty, Espinas has already been paid P50,000.00
and Atty. Lopez has already received P20,000.00 as partial attomey's fees; that movant's accountability remains at P377,424.00 after
deducting the amount of P30,000.00 (remitted on May 10, 1985) from the above amount of P407,424.00; that movant has been doing
his best to comply with this Court's order and purge himself of the contempt citation in these cases; and, not being able to produce
immediately the amount of P 407,424:00, he initially remitted the said amount of P30,000.00 and delivered to the NLRC the title to his
property as aforesaid; that in the hearing before the NLRC on June 3, 1985, movant manifested on record in the presence of Atty.
Espinas and the union officers that he is selling as other properties to satisfy his remaining obligation and that Atty. Espinas and the
union officers gave him reasonable time within which to sell said other properties; and, that in the June 3 hearing at the NLRC, movant
submitted a xerox copy of Cashier's Check No. 340573 dated June 23, 1983 of the Manila Bank -in the amount of P101,856.00 paid by
him to the Halili Bus Drivers & Conductors Union, for the account of the payee only. Movant now prays for the necessary correction of
35

his accountability from P710,969.30 to the reduced amount of P377,424.00 and for a chance to sell his properties, as agreed upon by
the parties, to enable him to pay the remaining amount of P377,424.00 (p. 444, L-27773, rec.).
On June 19, 1985, Arbiter Raymundo Valenzuela filed his manifestation and/or comment wherein he contends, among other things,
that sometime in the second week of August, 1982, the Office of the Executive Labor Arbiter Benigno L. Vivar of the NCR, NLRC
endorsed to him a pleading entitled "Motion and/or Manifestation" under caption of "Halili Bus Drivers and Conductors Union (PTGWO),
complainants, versus Fortunato F. Halili doing business under the name and style Halili Transit, "Respondent, CIR Case No. 1099-V";
and, that said motion was signed under the heading "B.C. Pineda, Counsel for the Complainant, c/o North Harbor Labor Federation-
TUCP 1106-1005 Marcos Road Fronting Pier 6, North Harbor, Tondo, Manila." Also, he claims that the aforecited motion with three
attached documents (Notice of Judgment dated May 3, 1976 in G.R. Nos.
L-38655 and L30110; TCT No. 205755 and Order dated February 9, 1983 of herein movant) were the only records endorsed to him for
the resolution of Atty. Pineda's motion and that he was verbally informed by the former that the records of CIR Case No. 1099-V could
not be located anymore at the NLRC offices. He furthere alleges that since there were no other records except the aforesaid motion of
Atty. Pineda with the three annexes and, for the reasons that Atty. Pineda is a brother in the profession and an officer of the Court and
that this case started in 1958 and transferred from the defunct CIR to the NLRC, he had reasonable ground to believe that the records
of the case could not be found anymore. Labor Arbiter Valenzuela also claims Chat as labor arbiter, he has the power, under Article
300 of the labor Code, to execute and implement final and executory judgments. Finally, he avers that since the motion of Atty. Pineda
filed on December 1, 1982 with this Court praying for authority to dispose of subject property was merely "Noted" by said Court, such
action bolstered his belief that his office possesses the jurisdiction to authorize the questioned sale (p. 491, L-27773 rec.).
On June 25, 1985, Atty. Jose C. Espinas submitted his comment on the motions for reconsideration of Atty. B.C. Pineda and on the
manifestation and/or comment of Labor Arbiter Valenzuela, On the latter's manifestation and/or comment, Atty. Espinas points to the
following inaccuracies in the aforesaid pleading of Labor Arbiter Valenzuela:
1. Labor Arbiter Valenzuela, in citing the inscription at the transfer certificate of title, omitted some words which would show that there
are other counsel in these cases. He quotes the acurate notation thus:
PE-1101/T-205755Attorney's LienThis property is subject to attorney's lien and other counsel in CIR Case No.
1099-B pursuant to their retainer contracts. (Doc No. 75, Page No. 16, Book I of the Notary Public of Rizal, A.G.
Gatmaytan).
2. It is not correct to say that in the "Notice of Judgment" by this Court in Cases L-38655 and L-301 10, the counsel named therein for
the union was only Atty. Pineda when the fact is that the decision of this Court in the aforecited cases dated February 27 1976,
acknowledges the representation of other lawyers in these words of its dispositive portion: "subject to attorney's lien in favor of Atty, B.C
Pineda and other counsel in said case pursuant to their retainer contracts. (Emphasis supplied).
3. It is inaccurate for Labor Arbiter Valenzuela to allege That he did not determine attomey's fees in his orders when it appears that in
his order of February 9, 1983, the following was ordered:
(b) The Attorney's Lien equivalent to Thirty-Five percent (35%) of the total purchase price of said parcel of land
covered by TCT No 205755, as annotated at the back of said Title per Entry PE-1101/T-205755 in favor of Atty.
Benjamin C. Pineda. ...
4. While Labor Arbiter Valenzuela manifests that in cases L-38655 and
L-30110, Volume 69 of the SCRA which published the decision, carries the name of Atty. B.C. Pineda as counsel for the union, he
nevertheless avoids pointing out that in L-24864 which was previously published in Volume 22 of the SCRA, Atty. Jose C. Espinas was
named as the lone counsel.
5. Before Labor Arbiter Valenzuela acted on the motions of Atty. B.C. Pineda, he should have first exerted all efforts to reconstitute the
records since he very well knew that the records were not complete. He should have informed the Executive labor Arbiter, who
assigned to him the case that the records thereof were missing. He committed an act of omission.
6. It is incorrect for Labor Arbiter Valenzuela to state that Atty. J.C. Espinas sought for a reduction of attorney's fees from 35% to 20%
when the evidence would have shown, if a hearing on the two motions was conducted, that the contract for services was contingent
(20%) only for all lawyers of the firm per resolution of the union's general membership) as found by Arbiter Tirona in his decision of April
24, 1985.
Atty. Espinas submits the following comment on Atty. Pineda's motion for reconsideration:
1. Atty. Pineda has never complied with this Court's three resolutions dated September 1, September 13 and October 18, 1983. Except
for the check he issued on June 23, 1983 in the amount of P2,022.70 in favor of the union, he allegedly spent P710,959.30 within a
period of 2 months and 7 days (between June 23 and September 1, 1983). The declaration of Atty. Pineda that the temporary
mandatory restraining orders have become moot and academic by reason of exhaustion of the funds imply that said orders are
unimportant to him.
2. When Atty. Pineda filed his motion requesting for authority to sell the property on August 9, 1982, he attached a zerox copy of the
certificate of title thereto. The notation on the said title showed that he was not the only lawyer in his case, Yet, he represented before
Arbiter Valenzuela that he alone and the latter readily believed him. one was the counsel
3. Atty. Pineda's apologetic stance and allegation of good faith are negated by the fact that the additional cash payment P25.000.00 to
the union when the property was transferred to them intended for the payment of taxes, was never accounted for; and, the fact that in
alienating subject properly which was held in trust by the union, the consent of the members workers, not only their leaders, is legally
required.
4. The reduction of Atty. Pineda's accountability to P377,424.00 is premature since the proceedings for the determination of his liability
is still pending consideration before Arbiter Tirona. The determination of his liability for P101,856.00 given to the union through
Domingo Cabading and legal interests and damages claimed by the anion members against him are also pending resolution.
5. In his order dated April 24, 1985, Labor Arbiter Tirona directed Atty. Pineda to deposit 25% of the 35% attorney's fees collected by
him (minus P2,022,70) previously deposited with the Commission for proper disposition, because Atty. Pineda did not comply with the
temporary mandatory restraining order of this Court (p. 538, L-27773 rec.).
The Solicitor General filed on July 28, 1985 his comment on the two motions for reconsideration and the supplement hereto of Atty.
B.C. Pineda. The Solicitor General submits that the attorney's fees of P 203,712.00 is deductible since Atty. Pineda is entitled to said
fees as per order of Arbiter Tirona: that the amount of P30,000.00 may also be deducted since it corresponds to partial restitution of his
liability; and, that the alleged donation of P101,856.00 may not be deducted because it amounts to a rebate or a commission as already
noted by this Court. He also submits that such donation is a violation of Canon 34 of Legal Ethics. Furthermore. he reports that there
was nothing in the hearing of May 20, 1985 which authorizes Atty. Pineda to deduct the above donation and that after deducting all
amounts the latter has deposited including the P20,000.00 on June 19, 1985, his accountability remains at P457,257.30 The Solicitor
General finally submits that contemnor Pineda's repeated protestations of good faith have no basis considering that he responded in
cavalier fashion to this Court's resolutions by simply stating in effect that since he has already spent the money, the orders should be
deemed moot and academic; that he maintained an arrogant attitude towards the proceedings in the NLRC; and that he utterly failed,
as union counsel, to protect the rights of the workers when he allowed realty taxes on the lot to accumulate for 8 years, when he did not
exert utmost diligence in causing the sale of the lot and when he charged excessive attorney's fees amounting to over half a million
pesos and spending the amount in over two months. The Solicitor General thus prays for the denial of the motions for reconsideration
for lack of merit (p. 225, L-38655, rec.).
On August 7, 1985, contemnor Atty. B.C. Pineda filed his comment on the comment of Atty. Jose C. Espinas dated June 25, 1985. He
substantially alleges that Atty. Espinas continues harping on the "scheme" allegedly employed by the former In this case: what Atty.
36

Espinas file his urgent motion of August 25, 1983 when they failed to agree on the "balato" or token payment which said lawyer asked
of am; that contemnor Atty. Pineda is not running away from his obligations to the parties concerned, which obligation is the reduced
amount of P355,401.30; and, that he be given time, up to September, 1985, to dispose of his property in Mindoro, to enable him to pay
his accountability, aside from his property in Quezon City which is also for sale (p. 237, L-38655, rec.).
The Solicitor General filed its manifestation and motion in lieu of reply on August 30, 1985 in compliance with Our resolution of June 27,
1985. In the above pleading, the Solicitor General submits that reply to the manifestation and or comment of Arbiter Valenzuela should
be referred to the Ministry of Labor and Employment since the said ministry, has direct supervision and control over Valenzuela and it
possesses the resources the veracity of his explanations. The Solicitor General further resources with which to conduct an exhaustive
investigation her manifests that with respect to the comment of Atty. Jose Espinas on the two motions for reconsideration of Atty.
Pineda he received a copy of such comment as early as July 1, 1985 and hence, he was then able to incorporate some of Atty.
Espinas' observations to which he concurs in his consolidated comment on the same two motions which was later filed on July 23,
1985. With regard to the comment of Atty. Espinas on the manifestation of Atty. Pineda, he reiterates his submission that the MOLE is
in a better position to investigate the veracity of Valenzuela's claim, and also to appreciate the observations and conclusions of Atty.
Espinas on such claims.
He therefore prays to be excused from filing a reply (p. 243, L-38655 rec.).
We will first tackle the two motions for reconsideration of B.C. Pineda. WE intend to treat separately the manifestation and/or comment
of Labor Arbiter Raymundo
The two motions for reconsideration of Atty. B.C. Pineda And the supplement thereto seeking a reconsideration of Our resolution dated
April 30, 1985 and praying for relief from contumacy are without merit.
In the aforecited resolution We have clearly established the continued defiance by contemnor Pineda of Our previous resolutions of
September 1 and 13, 1983. and adjudged him guilty of the indirect contempt charge.
WE stand firm on Our pronouncements in the April 30, 1985 resolution which We restate hereunder:
For civil contempt, Section 7, Rule 71 of the Revised Rules of court explicitly provides:
Sec. 7, Rule 71Imprisonment until order obeyed. When the contempt consists in the omission to
do an act which is vet in the power of the accused to perform, he may be imprisoned by order of a
superior court until he performs it.'
Thus, in the case of Harden vs. Director of Prisons (L-234981 Phil. 741 [Oct. 22, 1948]), where petitioner was
confined in prison for contempt of court, this Court, in denying the petition and resolving the question of petitioner's
indefinite confinement, had the occasion to apply and clarify the aforequoted provision in tile following tenor:
The penalty complained of is neither cruel, unjust nor excessive. In Ex-parte Kemmler 136 U.S.
436, the United States Supreme Court said that punishments are cruel when they involve torture or
a lingering death, but the punishment of death is not cruel, within the meaning of that word as used
in the constitution. It implies there something inhuman and barbarous, something more than the
extinguishment of life.
The punishment meted out to the petitioner is not excessive. It is suitable and adapted to its
objective: and it accords with Section 7, Rule 64 of the Rules of Court which provides that "when
the contempt consists in the omission to do an act which is vet in the power of the accused to
perform, he may be imprisoned by order of a superior court until he performs it.
If the term of imprisonment in this case is indefinite and might last through the natural life of the petitioner, vet by the
terms of the sentence the way is left open for him to avoid serving any part of it by complying with the orders of the
court, and in to manner put an end to his incarceration. In these circumstances, the judgment cannot be said to be
excessive or unjust (Davis vs. Murphy [1947], 188 P. 229-231). As stated in a more recent case (De Wees [1948],
210 S.W., 2d, 145-147), "to order that one be imprisoned for an indefinite period in a civil contempt is purely a
remedial measure. Its purpose is to coerce the contemnor to do an act within his or her power to perform, He must
have the means by which he may purge himself of the contempt." The latter decision cites Staley vs. South Jersey
Realty Co., 83 N.J. Eq., 300, 90 A., 1042, 1043, in which the theory is expressed in this language:
In a civil contempt the proceeding is remedial, it is a step in the case the object of which is to coerce one party for the
benefit of the other party to do or to refrain from doing some act specified in the order of the court. Hence, if
imprisonment be ordered, it is remedial in purpose and coercion in character, and to that end must relate to
something to be done by the defendant by the doing of which he may discharge himself, As quaintly expressed, the
imprisoned man "carries the keys to his prison in his own pocket" (pp. 747-748).
Likewise, American courts had long enunciated these rulings:
The commitment of one found in contempt of a court order only until the contemnor shall have purged himself of such
contempt by complying with the order is a decisive characteristic of civil contempt, Maggio v. Zeitz 333 US 56, 92 L.
ed, 476, 68 S Ct 401.
Civil or quasi-criminal contempt is contemplated by a statute providing that if any person refused to obey or perform
any rule, order, or judgment of court, such court shall have power to fine and imprison such person until the rule,
order or judgment shall be complied with. Evans v. Evans, 193 Miss 468, 9 So 2d. 641. [17 Am. Jur. 2d] (pp, 418-420,
L-27773 rec., emphasis supplied).
This Court takes note of the fact that in compliance with its resolution dated October 18, 1983, Labor Arbiter Antonio Tria Tirona of the
NLRC, after due hearing where all the parties concerned were present, issued an order on April 24, 1985 definitely fixing the
percentages to which the union and the lawyers should be entitled. The dispositive portion of the said order thus provides:
Wherefore, based on the records and the participation of all the lawyers in the case, Atty. Espinas is entitled to
attorney's fees equal to 7% of the total proceeds of the sale; Atty. Lopez35% and Atty. Pineda10%. The excess
of 15% fees on the 35% fees charged should be refunded to the union for distribution to its members. Not having
complied with the mandatory restraining order of the Supreme Court on September 1, 1983, Atty. Benjamin C. Pineda
is directed to deposit 25% out of the 35% collected by him as fees (minus P2,022.70 previously deposited by the
Manila Bank for his account) with the commission for proper disposition.
The aforesaid apportionment is fair and reasonable. Atty. Pineda collected the amount of P712,992. 00 or 35% of the selling price of
P2,037,120.00.
Since his share in the fees is only P203,712.00, which is 10% of P2,037,120.00, Atty. Pineda is now accountable for and should return
the following amounts to:
1. Atty. Jose EspinasP14259840 or 7% of P2,037,120.00
2. Atty. Pedro LopezP61,113.60 or 3% or 3% P2,037, 120.00
3. Union P305,568.00 or 15% of P2,037,120.00
The total amount, therefore, which contemnor Pineda should account for is P509,280.00 (before any remittance or payments were
made). By far lie has only paid or remitted thru NLRC P2,022.70 plus P50,000.00 (to Atty. Espinas) plus P20,000.00 (to Atty. Lopez) as
per as allegation in his second motion for reconsideration filed on June 6, 1985, or a total or P72,022.70.
Evidently, it appears from the within records that contemnor Pineda is still far from returning the remaining accountability of
P437,257.80, exclusive of interests. He has not even satisfied 15% of the original accountability of P509,280.00. Deliberately or
inadvertently, contemnor failed to include in his accounting (reflected in his second motion for reconsideration? the amount of
37

P305,568.00 which corresponds to the 15% Secs collected beyond the 20% allowed for attorney's fees. Likewise, the within records
bring out the fact that the amount of P101,856.00 which contemnor Pineda allegedly donated to the. Union was actually taken from the
purchase price of P2,037,120.00 and not from P712,992.00 which he originally collected.
From the foregoing, contemnor Pineda has miserably failed to commonly with Our resolution dated April 30, 1985. For such non-
compliance or better still, for not fully performing the act required of him, he cannot as yet purge himself of contumacy
For, it is clear from the provision of Section 7, Rule 17 of the Revised Rules of Court that the rationale behind the punishment of the
contemnor is for him to make complete restitution to the party injured by the violation of an order. Thus, if the contumacious act consists
in the failure to perform an act or obligation which is yet in the power of the contemnor to do, he may be imprisoned indefinitely until full
and complete compliance with our order or resolution.
The essence of the imposition of an indefinite imprisonment on the contemnor is the ultimate and total performance of an obligation
required by an order of a superior court. This is why contumacy should be indivisible it cannot be the subject of piece-meal compliance;
otherwise, the very reason for which it is imposed, which is the complete compliance with an order, would be defeated. Court orders
and injunctions would be easily defied or ignored by litigants if, every time a contemnor partially satisfies the same, he would be
released from the contempt charge. This premature purging of contumacy would not prevent the other party from filing another motion
for contempt and this would naturally result in endless litigations. hence, unless and until our courts show they mean business in
exacting. full compliance with their orders, the contempt of court might, become a futile exercise of judicial power. And eventually,
litigants and their counsel might lose respect for our courts.
Significantly, some American courts have the following pronouncements on the matter. Thus:
Except where the fundamental power of the court to imprison for contempt has been restricted by statute, and subject
to constitutional prohibitions, where a contemnor fails or refuses to obey an order of the court for the payment of
money lie may be imprisoned to compel obedience to such order. [Fla.Revell v. Dishong 175 So. 129 Fla. 9; Va
Branch v. Branch, S.E. 303; 144 Va. 244]. (17 C.J.S. 287).
xxx xxx xxx
...It has been said that imprisonment for contempt as means of coercion for civil purpose cannot be resorted to until
all other means fail [Mich.Atchison, etc. R. Co. v. Jennison, 27 N.W. 6, 60 Mich. 232], but the court's power to order
the contemnor's detention continues so long as the contumacy persists [Ark.Lane v. Alexander, 271 S.W. 710, 168
Ark. 700] (17 C.J.S. 289).
Even as contemnor Atty, Pineda pleads good faith in having committed the contumacious acts and offers contrition, apologies and
restitution, such posture is not enough to purge himself of his legal and moral obligations particularly so because he is a counsel for the
workers whose interests he is duty bound to protect. Instead, he exploited their ignorance.
What really comes to Our minds now is this question: After all that the contemnor has done, could he still be considered a competent,
trustworthy and decent member of the Bar? Thus, in the case of Borromeo vs. Court of Appeals (L-39253, 87 SCRA 67 [November 24,
1978]), this Court had the candor to say that good faith alone is not a ground for exoneration of the contempt charge.
Nevertheless, We are constrained to point out certain observations on and assessment of the manifestation and/or comment of Arbiter
Valenzuela which has been addressed to this Court. Offhand, his allegations therein suffer from flaws and unwarranted assumptions,
even misrepresentations.
Thus, when Arbiter Valenzuela quoted the inscription at the back of the Transfer Certificate of Title relative to attorney's lien, he did not
put the complete wording which should include the words "and other counsel in CIR Case No. 1099-B" after the words "attorney's hen."
Without the complete inscription, one would get the impression that there were no other lawyers in the transaction.
Then again, Arbiter Valenzuela did not reveal the fact that in this Court's decision in L-38655 and L-301 10 dated February 27, 1976,
said Court recognized the presence of other lawyers by stating therein thus: "subject to attorney's liens in favor of Atty. B.C. Pineda and
other counsel in said case pursuant to their retainer contracts" (please see paragraph one, page 6 of manifestation; underlining
supplied).
Arbiter Valenzuela also disclaims that he never determined the extent of attorney's fees in his questioned order dated February 9, 1983,
when the fact is that in letter (b) of said order's dispositive portion, he specifically fixed the attorney's lien equivalent to 35% of the total
purchase price of the parcel of land in favor of Atty. B.C. Pineda,
It is indeed quite revealing for Arbiter Valenzuela to say that "on the basis of the available records then in the possession of the
undersigned Labor Arbiter, and the non-disclosure by A Atty. B. C Pineda that there are other lawyers involved" he awarded attorney's
fees in favor of contemnor Pineda only. This shows that Arbiter Valenzuela issued the two questioned orders on the basis of patently
wrong assumptions. He assumed that even without the intervention of the NLRC, as successor of the CIR, the property could be
disposed of. He forgot that there are still existing laws which should be considered. Again, he erred in assuming that when the motions
of Atty. Pineda with annexes were indorsed to him for resolution in 1983, there were no other records which he could dig up. He
wrongly assumed that just because Atty. Pineda was a "brother in the profession and an Officer of the Court", the latter's verbal
representation that the other records of Case No. 1099-V could not be found, should be accepted readily. Finally, when contemnor
Pineda's motion filed on December 1, 1982 before this Court seeking authority to sell the subject property was merely "noted" by said
Court, Arbiter Valenzuela likewise wrongly assumed that his Office had the jurisdiction to authorize the sale of the same. As a lawyer,
he should have known that the word "noted" did not mean approval or inaction. He should have filed a motion with this Court for the
necessarily clarification. Instead he acted with precipitate haste.
All the foregoing facts indicate his connivance with Atty. Pineda.
Arbiter Valenzuela now assumes that as such labor arbiter, is empowered under Article 300 of the Labor Code, as amended, to execute
final judgments. But a thorough reading of said article does not show any such provision, which reads thus:
Art. 300. Disposition of pending casesAll cases pending before the Court of Industrial Relations and the National
Labor Relations Commission established under Presidential Decree No. 21 on the date of effectivity of this Code shall
be transferred to and processed by the corresponding labor relations divisions or the National Labor Relations
Commission created under this Code having cognizance of the same in accordance with the procedure laid down
herein and its implementing rules and regulations. Cases on labor relations on appeal with the Secretary of Labor or
the Office of the President of the Philippines as of the date of effectivity of this Code shall remain under their
respective jurisdiction and shall be decided in accordance with the rules and regulations in force at the time of appeal.
All workmen's compensation cases pending before the Workmen's Compensation Units in the regional offices of the
Department of Labor and those pending before the Workmen's Compensation Commission as of March 31, 1975,
shall be processed and adjudicated in accordance with the law, rules and procedure existing, prior to the effectivity of
the Employees' Compensation and State Insurance Fund.
It is very sad to note that for a lawyer who has served the government for 29 years, Arbiter Valenzuela puts up the defense that when
he acted on the two motions of Atty. Pineda, he was primarily guided by his conscience. Then all of a sudden he says that if there was
an error, it was an error of the mind and not of the heart,
From the foregoing, it appears that Arbiter Valenzuela failed to observe the degree of prudence expected of him as a government
lawyer of 29 years. When the motions of Atty. Pineda were indorsed to him for proper action, he should have first exhausted all efforts
in locating or reconstructing the records upon as discovery that the same were incomplete. He should have informed as superior officer
or the one who assigned to him the motions that the records were lacking. He should have initiated a reconstitution of the records by
requiring all the lawyers in the case to produce their own records or have sought their assistance in locating the records,

38

It took Atty. Espinas and some workers to locate and produce such records. Arbiter Valenzuela's acts may be treated as nonfeasance
and gross neglect of duty.
WHEREFORE, THE MOTIONS FOR RECONSIDERATION OF ATTY. BENJAMIN C. PINEDA ARE HEREBY DENIED FOR LACK OF
MERIT. FOR CONTEMPT OF COURT, HE IS ORDERED IMPRISONED IN THE MANILA CITY JAIL UNTIL HE COMPLIES FULLY
WITH THE RESOLUTION OF THIS COURT DATED APRIL 30,1985.
EIGHT (8) MEMBERS OF THE COURT VOTED TO DELETE THE THIRD PARAGRAPH ON PAGE 30 OF THE RESOLUTION OF
APRIL 30,1985, WHICH READS AS FOLLOWS:
LABOR ARBITER RAYMUNDO VALENZUELA SHOULD BE MADE TO ANSWER FOR HAVING ACTED WITHOUT
OR BEYOND HIS AUTHORITY IN PROPER ADMINISTRATIVE CHARGES, HE COULD ALSO BE PROSECUTED
BEFORE THE TANODBAYAN UNDER THE PROVISIONS OF THE ANTI GRAFT LAW, INDEPENDENTLY OF HIS
LIABILITIES AS A GOVERNMENT OFFICER ' HE COULD BE THE SUBJECT OF DISBARMENT PROCEEDINGS
UNDER SECTION 27, RULE 138 OF THE REVISED RULES OF COURT.
LET COPIES OF THIS RESOLUTION BE FURNISHED THE MINISTRY OF LABOR AND EMPLOYMENT AND THE TANODBAYAN
FOR APPROPRIATE ACTION,

39

Case 23

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC

G.R. No. L-36800 October 21, 1974

JORGE MONTECILLO and QUIRICO DEL MAR, petitioners,
vs.
FRANCISCO M. GICA, MAGNO S. GATMAITAN, JOSE N. LEUTERIO, and RAMON G. GAVIOLA, Justices of the Court of
Appeals, respondents. In Re Quirico del Mar, For Disciplinary action as member of the Philippine Bar, respondent.

ESGUERRA, J.:p
Petitioner Atty. Quirico del Mar of Cebu City in G. R. No. L-36800, and as respondent in contempt proceedings both in the Court of
Appeals and in this Court, virtually focused the limelight on himself and relegated to insignificance the limelight on himself and relegated
to insignificance the principal issue raised in the petition forcertiorari to review the entitled "Francisco M. Gica vs. Hon. Santiago O.
Taada, et al" which was denied due course by this Court's resolution dated May 14, 1973, for lack of merit.
Although the petition for certiorari has been denied, it becomes imperatively necessary to elucidate upon the antecedents of this case
even if Our only justification in so doing is to seek a reason or motive for the acts of contempt perpetrated by respondent Quirico del
Mar that might serve to lighten the enormity of his wrongdoing as a member of the Bar.
As a result of an alleged slander committed by Jorge Montecillo on Francisco M. Gica (the former allegedly calling the latter "stupid" or
a "fool'), Mr. Gica filed a criminal complaint for oral defamation against Montecillo (Criminal Case No. R-28782 in Branch VII of the
Cebu City Court) and a case for damages arising from the same incident (Civil Case No. R-13075 in Branch VI of the Cebu City Court).
Montecillo was acquitted in Criminal Case No. R-28782, and in Civil Case No. R-13075, the Cebu City Court found that Montecillo did
not call Gica "stupid". Finding the counter-claim of Montecillo meritorious, the City Court rendered judgment against Gica for him to pay
Montecillo five hundred pesos as moral damages, two hundred pesos as compensatory damages and three hundred pesos as
attorney's fees, plus costs.
Francisco Gica appealed from the decision of the City Court of Cebu in Civil Case No. R-13075 to the Court of First Instance of Cebu
presided by Hon. Santiago O. Taada but the Court of First Instance upheld the decision of the City Court. The case was then elevated
to the Court of Appeals by petition for review by petitioner Francisco M. Gica and it was docketed therein as CA-G.R. No. 46504-R.
The Fourth Division of the Court of Appeals in a decision penned by the Hon. Magno S. Gatmaitan and concurred in by Associate
Justices Jose N. Leuterio and Ramon G. Gaviola, Jr. (promulgated on Sept. 27, 1972), reversed the decision of the Court of First
Instance of Cebu; ruled in favor of petitioner Gica on the ground that the preponderance of evidence favored petitioner Francisco M.
Gica on the principle that positive must prevail over the negative evidence, and that "some words must have come from Montecillo's lips
that were insulting to Gica". The appellate court concluded that its decision is a vindication of Gica and instead, awarded him five
hundred pesos as damages.
It is from this point that trouble began for respondent Atty. Quirico del Mar when, as counsel for Montecillo, he moved for a
reconsideration of the Appellate Court's decision with a veiled threat by mentioning the provisions of the Revised Penal Code on
"Knowingly rendering unjust judgment" and "judgment rendered through negligence", and the innuendo that the Court of Appeals
allowed itself to be deceived. When the Appellate Court denied the motion for reconsideration in its Resolution of October 24, 1972, it
observed that the terminology of the motion insinuated that the Appellate Court rendered an unjust judgment, that it abetted a
falsification and it permitted itself to be deceived. It admonished Atty. del Mar to remember that threats and abusive language cannot
compel any court of justice to grant reconsideration. Respondent del Mar persisted and in his second motion for reconsideration, filed
without leave of court, made another threat by stating that "with almost all penal violations placed under the jurisdiction of the President
of the Philippines, particularly Articles 171, 204 and 205 of the Revised Penal Code, as Commander in Chief of the AFP, by virtue of the
proclamation of martial law, the next appeal that will he interposed, will be to His Excellency, the President of the Philippines."
The Appellate Court in its resolution of Nov. 27, 1972, noticed that notwithstanding its admonition in its resolution of Oct. 24, 1972, for
Atty. del Mar to refrain from abusive language and threats, he reiterated his threats, and that the Appellate Court, impelled to assert its
authority, ordered respondent del Mar to explain within 10 days (and to appear on January 10, 1973) why he should not be punished for
contempt of court.
On December 5, 1972, respondent del Mar made a written explanation wherein he said that the Appellate Court could not be
threatened and he was not making any threat but only informing the Appellate Court of the course of action he would follow. On the
same date, respondent sent a letter to the Justices of the 4th Division of the Court of Appeals informing them that he sent a letter to the
President of the Philippines, furnishing them a copy thereof, and requesting the Justices to take into consideration the contents of said
letter during the hearing of the case scheduled for January 10, 1973. Not content with that move, on December 8, 1972, respondent
sent another letter to the same Justices of the Court of Appeals wherein he reminded them of a civil case he instituted against Justices
of the Supreme Court for damages in the amount of P200,000 for a decision rendered not in accordance with law and justice, stating
that he would not like to do it again but would do so if provoked. We pause here to observe that respondent del Mar seems to be of that
frame of mind whereby he considers as in accordance with law and justice whatever he believes to be right in his own opinion and as
contrary to law and justice whatever does not accord with his views. In other words, he would like to assume the role of this Court,
personally and individually, in the interpretation and construction of the laws, evaluation of evidence and determination of what is in
accordance with law and justice.
The documented incidents as narrated in the Appellate Court's Resolution of March 5, 1973, cannot more eloquently depict the very
manifest and repeated threats of respondent del Mar to bludgeon the Justices of the Fourth Davison into reconsidering its decision
which happened to be adverse to respondent's client. Respondent del Mar, instead of presenting lucid and forceful arguments on the
merits of his plea for a reconsideration to convince the Justices of the Fourth Division of the alleged error in their decision, resorted to
innuendos and veiled threats, even casting downright aspersion on the Justices concerned by insinuating that for their decision they
could be criminally and civilly liable for knowingly rendering unjust judgment, or doing it through ignorance.
We quote with approval this portion of the Appellate Court's Resolution (March 5, 1973):
A just man can never be threatened, p. 145, rollo, is not at all true; any man, just or unjust, can be threatened; if he is
unjust, he will succumb, if he is just, he will not, but the offense is committed, whether the threats do or do not
succeed. As to his (respondent del Mar's reference to the New Society, p. 150, in his letter to his Excellency,
complaining against those justices, let it be said that precisely it was under the Former Society that there had been so
much disrespect for the constituted authorities, there was abuse, worse than abuse, there was arrogant abuse, of the
so-called civil liberties, against the authorities, including the courts, not excluding even the President; it is this anarchy
that is the program to cure in the New.
This Resolution of the Appellate Court of March 5, 1973, fittingly concluded that "counsel del Mar is found guilty of contempt and
condemned to pay a fine of P200.00 and ordered suspended from the practice of law and pursuant to Sec. 9 of Rule 139, let certified
copies of these papers be elevated to the Honorable Supreme Court". We upheld the Court of Appeals and gave full force and effect to

40

this order of suspension from the practice of law when in Our resolution dated Nov. 19, 1973, the Judicial Consultant of this Court was
directed to circularize all courts about the order of the Court of Appeals suspending Atty. Quirico del Mar from the practice of law.
Not satisfied with the wrong that he had already done against Associate Justices Magno S. Gatmaitan, Jose N. Leuterio and Ramon
Gaviola, Jr., respondent del Mar sued the three Justices for damages in Civil Case No. R-13277 of the Court of First Instance of Cebu,
trying to hold them liable for their decision in CA-G.R. No. 46504-R; that the case for damages (R-13277)was terminated by
compromise agreement after Mr. del Mar himself moved for the dismissal of his complaint apologized to the Court of Appeals and the
Justices concerned, and agreed to pay nominal moral damages in favor of the defendants-justices. This is the undeniable indication
that respondent del Mar did not only threaten the three Justices of the Appellate Court but he actually carried out his threat, although he
did not succeed in making them change their minds in the case they decided in accordance with the exercise of their judicial discretion
emanating from pure conviction.
To add insult to injury, respondent del Mar had the temerity to file his motion on October 10, 1973, before Us, asking that his
suspension from the practice of law imposed by the Court of Appeals be ignored because of the amicable settlement reached in Civil
Case No. R-13277 of the Court of First Instance of Cebu which was the action for damages filed against the three Justices of the
Appellate Court.
Respondent del Mar's ire at the Appellate Court, fanned by the wind of frustration, turned against Us when We denied on May 14, 1973,
his petition for review on certiorari of the decision of the Appellate Court, G. R. No. L-36800, for on May 25, 1973, he filed his motion for
reconsideration and wrote a letter addressed to the Clerk of this Court requesting the names of the Justices of this Court who supported
the resolution denying his petition, together with the names of the Justices favoring his motion for reconsideration. This motion for
reconsideration We denied for lack of merit in Our resolution dated June 15, 1973. He, then, filed a manifestation dated July 1, 1973,
before Us, stating brazenly, among other things, "I can at this time reveal to you that, had your Clerk of Court furnished me with certified
true copies of the last two Resolutions of the Supreme Court confirming the decision of the Court of Appeals in the case entitled
Francisco M. Gica vs. Jorge Montecillo, I would have filed against the Justices supporting the same, civil and criminal suit as I did to the
Justices of the Court of Appeals who, rewarding the abhorent falsification committed by Mr. Gica, reversed for him the decisions of the
City Court and the Court of First Instance of Cebu, not with a view to obtaining a favorable judgment therein but for the purpose of
exposing to the people the corroding evils extant in our Government, so that they may well know them and work for their extermination"
(Emphasis supplied. In one breath and in a language certainly not complimentary to the Appellate Court and to Us, respondent del Mar
again made his veiled threat of retribution aimed at the Appellate Court and at Us for Our judicial acts in CA-G. R. No. 46504-R and G.
R. No. L-36800.
Our immediate reaction to this manifestation, dictated by the impulse of placing on a pedestal beyond suspicion the integrity and honor
of this Court and that of any of our other courts of justice, was to require by Resolution of July 16, 1973, respondent del Mar to show
cause why disciplinary action should not be taken against him for the contemptuous statements contained in his manifestation.
At this juncture, We pause to reexamine the act of the Appellate Court in CA-G. R. No. 46504-R and our own in G. R. No. L-36800 to
determine what error we might have committed to generate such a vengeful wrath of respondent del Mar which drove him to make his
contemptuous statements.
The crucial issue in the case of oral defamation filed by Francisco M. Gica against Jorge Montecillo is as to what was the statement
really uttered by Montecillo on the occasion in question "binuang man gud na" (That act is senseless or done without thinking) or
"buang man gud na siya" (He is foolish or stupid). If the statement uttered was the former, Montecillo should be exonerated; if the latter,
he would be liable. The Appellate Court on evaluating the evidence ruled that the preponderance thereof favored Gica "on the principle
that the positive evidence must prevail over the negative" and, therefore, what was really uttered by Montecillo on that occasion was
"buang man gud na siya" (He is foolish or stupid), thus making him liable for oral defamation. When We denied in G. R. No. L-36800
the petition for review on certiorari of the Appellate Court's decision in CA-G. R. No. 46504-R, We did so because We could find no
reason for disturbing the Appellate Court's finding and conclusion on the aforementioned lone question of fact which would warrant
overturning its decision.
On July 13, 1973, Our resolution of May 14, 1973, denying the petition for review on certiorari of the decision of the Appellate Court in
CA-G. R. No. 46504-R, became final and executory and the Court of Appeals was so informed.
To Our resolution of July 16, 1973, requiring respondent del Mar to show cause why he should not be disciplined for his statements
contained in his manifestation of July 1, 1973, he submitted an explanation dated August 1, 1973, wherein he stated that "..., he is
attaching hereto the criminal case he filed with the President of the Philippines (copy marked as Annex "A") and the civil case he
instituted in the Court of First Instance of Cebu (copy marked as Annex "B") against Justices Magno S. Gatmaitan, Jose N. Leuterio
and Ramon G. Gaviola, Jr., which embody the corroding evils he complained of as extant in the Government needing correction. He
would have followed suit were it not for the fact that he is firmly convinced that human efforts in this direction will be fruitless. As
manifested, he, therefore, decided to retire from a life of militancy to a life of seclusion leaving to God the filling-up of human
deficiencies" (Emphasis supplied).
This so-called explanation is more, in its tenor, of a defiant justification of his contemptuous statements contained in the manifestation
of July 1, 1973. Its contents reveal a continued veiled threat against the Justices of this Court who voted to deny del Mar's petition for
review on certiorari of the decision of the Court of Court Appeals in CA-G R. No. 46504-R.
Our resolution of September 4, 1973, required respondent Atty. Quirico del Mar to appear personally at the hearing of his explanation
on November 5, 1973. On September 26, 1973, respondent filed an additional explanation with this Court, wherein he stated, among
other things: "Graft, corruption and injustice are rampant in and outside of the Government. It is this state of things that convinced me
that all human efforts to correct and/or reform the said evils will be fruitless and, as stated in my manifestation to you, I have already
decided to retire from a life of militancy to a life of seclusion, leaving to God the filling-up of human deficiencies."
Again We noticed that the tenor of this additional explanation is a toned-down justification(as compared to his explanation of August 1,
1973) of his previous contemptuous statements without even a hint of apology or regret. Respondent is utilizing what exists in his mind
as state of graft, corruption and injustice allegedly rampant in and outside of the government as justification for his contemptuous
statements. In other words, he already assumed by his own contemptuous utterances that because there is an alleged existence of
rampant corruption, graft, and injustice in and out of the government, We, by Our act in G. R. No. L-36800, are among the corrupt, the
grafters and those allegedly committing injustice. We are at a complete loss to follow respondent del Mar's logic and We certainly
should, with understanding condescension, commiserate in the pitiable state of mind of a brother in the legal profession who seems to
have his reasoning and sense of proportion blurred or warped by an all-consuming obsession emanating from a one-track mind that
only his views are absolutely correct and those of others are all wrong.
When this Court in the resolution dated November 19, 1973, directed the Judicial Consultant to circularize to all courts concerning the
order of the Court of Appeals suspending Atty. Quirico del Mar from the practice of law, respondent del Mar filed a motion for
reconsideration on December 12, 1973, requesting Us to reconsider said directive. In Our resolution dated December 17, 1973,
respondent del Mar, after he had been interpellated by the Court, was given a period of five days to submit a memorandum in support
of his explanation. In view of respondent's manifestation that there was no need for further investigation of the facts involved, in
accordance with Section 29 of Rule 138, We resolved that the matter be deemed submitted for decision.
In the memorandum entitled "Explanation" dated December 20, 1973, respondent del Mar stated that he suffered repeated strokes of
high blood pressure which rendered him dizzy and unstable mentally and physically; that his sight is blurred and his reasoning is faulty;
he easily forgets things and cannot readily correlate them; that for any and all mistakes he might have committed he asked for
forgiveness; he reiterated that "blunders" were committed by the Court of Appeals in its decision and that the Justices thereof knowingly
rendered the same in violation of Article 204 of the Penal Code; he persisted in his view that the Court of Appeals committed an error in
41

its decision; justified his act of invoking Article 204 of the Penal Code in trying to make the Appellate Justices liable; that he was high in
his academic and scholastic standing during his school days; that "with all the confusion prevailing nowadays, the undersigned has
decided for reasons of sickness and old age to retire from the practice of law. He hopes and expects that, with the approval thereof by
the Supreme Court, he could have himself released from the obligation he has contracted with his clients as regards all his pending
cases."
It is Our observation that the tenor of this explanation although pleading mental and physical ailment as a mitigation of the
contemptuous acts, is still that of arrogant justification for respondent's previous statements. We quote:
The undersigned was asked if he had not filed against the Justices of the Supreme Court a case for damages against
them. He answered in the affirmative, but the case was dismissed by Judge Villasor, of the Court of First Instance of
Cebu, because of an American ruling that a justice of the Supreme Court of the Philippines cannot be civilly held
liable. The ruling cited was rendered during the American regime in the Philippines which was still subject to the
jurisdiction of the American laws. But the Philippines is now independent and Article 204 of the Penal Code still
remains incorporated therein for observance and fulfillment. Up to now, there is not yet any definite ruling of the
Supreme Court thereon
While still persistently justifying his contemptuous statements and at the same time pleading that his physical and mental ailment be
considered so that We may forgive respondent del Mar he shrewdly stated at the end of his explanation that he has decided for reasons
of sickness and old age to retire from the practice of law, in practical anticipation of whatever penalty We may decide to impose on him
and thus making it appear that he has voluntarily done so with honor and in complete evasion of whatever this Court may decide to do
in this case.
With full realization that a practicing lawyer and officer of the court facing contempt proceedings cannot just be allowed to voluntarily
retire from the practice of law, an act which would negate the inherent power of the court to punish him for contempt in defense of its
integrity and honor, We resolve, by resolution of January 10, 1974, to deny said prayer of Atty. del Mar without prejudice to his making
arrangement directly with his clients.
To aged brethren of the bar it may appear belated to remind them that second only to the duty of maintaining allegiance to the Republic
of the Philippines and to support the Constitution and obey the laws of the Philippines, is the duty of all attorneys to observe and
maintain the respect due to the courts of justice and judicial officers (Sec. 20 (b) Rule 138, Rules of Court). But We do remind them of
said duty to emphasize to their younger brethren its paramount importance. A lawyer must always remember that he is an officer of the
court exercising a high privilege and serving in the noble mission of administering justice.
It is the duty of the lawyer to maintain towards the courts a respectful attitude (People vs. Carillo, 77 Phil. 572). As an officer of the
court, it is his duty to uphold the dignity and authority of the court to which he owes fidelity, according to the oath he has taken. Respect
for the courts guarantees the stability of our democratic institutions which, without such respect, would be resting on a very shaky
foundation. (In re Sotto 82 Phil. 595).
As We stated before:
We concede that a lawyer may think highly of his intellectual endowment. That is his privilege. And, he may suffer
frustration at what he feels is others' lack of it. This is his misfortune. Some such frame of mind, however, should not
be allowed to harden into a belief that he may attack a court's decision in words calculated to jettison the time-
honored aphorism that courts are the temples of right. He should give due allowance to the fact that judges are but
men; and men are encompassed by error, fettered by fallibility.
... To be sure, lawyers may come up with various methods, perhaps much more effective, in calling the Court's
attention to the issues involved. The language vehicle does not run short of expressions, emphatic but respectful,
convincing but not derogatory, illuminating but not offensive (Rheem of the Philippines vs. Ferrer G. R. No. L-22979,
June 26, 1967; 20 SCRA 441, 444-445)
Criminal contempt has been defined as a conduct that is directed against the dignity and authority of the court or a judge acting
judicially. It is an act obstructing the administration of justice which tends to bring the court into disrepute or disrespect (17 C. J. S. 7).
We have held that statements contained in a motion to disqualify a judge, imputing to the latter conspiracy or connivance with the
prosecutors or concocting a plan with a view to securing the conviction of the accused, and implicating said judge in a supposed
attempt to extort money from the accused on a promise or assurance of the latter's acquittal, all without basis, were highly derogatory
and serve nothing but to discredit the judge presiding the court in an attempt to secure his disqualification. Statements of that nature
have no place in a court pleading and if uttered by a member of the bar, constitute a serious disrespect. We said:
As an officer of the court, it is his sworn and moral duty to help build and not destroy unnecessarilythe high esteem
and regard towards the court so essential to the proper administration of justice(Emphasis supplied). (People vs.
Carillo, 43 O.G. No. 12, p. 5021; De Joya et al vs. C. F. I. of Rizal and Rilloraza 52 0. G. 6150).
As already stated, the decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G. R. No. 46504-R was based on its evaluation of the evidence on only
one specific issue. We in turn denied in G. R. No. L-36800 the petition for review oncertiorari of the decision because We found no
reason for disturbing the appellate court's finding and conclusion. In both instances, both the Court of Appeals and this Court exercised
judicial discretion in a case under their respective jurisdiction. The intemperate and imprudent act of respondent del Mar in resorting to
veiled threats to make both Courts reconsider their respective stand in the decision and the resolution that spelled disaster for his client
cannot be anything but pure contumely for said tribunals.
It is manifest that respondent del Mar has scant respect for the two highest Courts of the land when on the flimsy ground of alleged
error in deciding a case, he proceeded to challenge the integrity of both Courts by claiming that they knowingly rendered unjust
judgment. In short, his allegation is that they acted with intent and malice, if not with gross ignorance of the law, in disposing of the case
of his client.
We note with wonder and amazement the brazen effrontery of respondent in assuming that his personal knowledge of the law and his
concept of justice are superior to that of both the Supreme Court and the Court of Appeals. His pretense cannot but tend to erode the
people's faith in the integrity of the courts of justice and in the administration of justice. He repeatedly invoked his supposed quest for
law and justice as justification for his contemptuous statements without realizing that, in seeking both abstract elusive terms, he is
merely pursuing his own personal concept of law and justice. He seems not to comprehend that what to him may be lawful or just may
not be so in the minds of others. He could not accept that what to him may appear to be right or correct may be wrong or erroneous
from the viewpoint of another. We understand that respondent's mind delves into the absolute without considering the universal law of
change. It is with deep concern that We view such a state of mind of a practicing lawyer since what We expect as a paramount
qualification for those in the practice of law is broadmindedness and tolerance, coupled with keen perception and a sound sense of
proportion in evaluating events and circumstances.
For a lawyer in the twilight of his life, with supposed physical and mental ailments at that, who dares to challenge the integrity and honor
of both the Supreme Court and Court of Appeals, We have nothing but commiseration and sympathy for his choosing to close the book
of his long years of law practice not by voluntary retirement with honor but in disciplinary action with ignominy and dishonor. To those
who are in the practice of law and those who in the future will choose to enter this profession, We wish to point to this case as a
reminder for them to imprint in their hearts and minds that an attorney owes it to himself to respect the courts of justice and its officers
as a fealty for the stability of our democratic institutions.
WHEREFORE, the resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. No. 46504-R, dated March 5, 1973, suspending Atty. Quirico del Mar
from the practice of law, as implemented by Our resolution of November 19, 1973, is hereby affirmed.

42

Respondent Atty. Quirico del Mar for his misconduct towards the Supreme Court, shall be, as he is hereby, suspended from the
practice of law until further orders of this Court, such suspension to take effect immediately. (In re Almacen, No. L-27654, Feb. 18,
1970, 31 SCRA, p. 562.)
The Judicial Consultant of this Court is directed to circularize all courts and the Integrated Bar of the Philippines regarding the indefinite
suspension of Atty. Quirico del Mar from the practice of law.
SO ORDERED.

43

Case 24

Republic of the Philippines

Supreme Court
Manila

EN BANC

VALERIANO F. NUEZ, A.M. No. RTJ-06-1984

Complainant, (Formerly OCA IPI No. 05-2255-RTJ)

Present:

PUNO, C.J.,
QUISUMBING,
YNARES-SANTIAGO,
CARPIO,
- versus - CORONA,
*
CARPIO MORALES,
CHICO-NAZARIO,
VELASCO, JR.,
NACHURA,
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO,
BRION,
PERALTA, and
BERSAMIN, JJ.
JUDGE FRANCISCO B. IBAY, Regional Trial
Court, Promulgated:
Branch 135, Makati City,
Respondent. June 30, 2009
x-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x

DECISION

PERALTA, J.:

[1]
Before this Court is a Sinumpaang Salaysay dated April 22, 2005 filed by complainant Valeriano F. Nuez with the Office of the Court
Administrator (OCA) against respondent Judge Francisco B. Ibay of Branch 135 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Makati City, charging
the latter with grave abuse of authority.

Complainant alleged the following in his complaint:

Complainant was a driver at the Engineering Department of the Makati City Hall. On April 1, 2005, at around five oclock in the afternoon,
he parked the government vehicle which he was driving, an L-300 van with plate number SFN-767, at the basement of the Makati City
Hall and left the key in their office because drivers were not allowed to bring such vehicles home. After the flag ceremony on April 4,
[2]
2005, complainant went to the Office of the Engineering Department where he received an Order from respondent Judge, directing the
former to appear before the latter on that same day at ten oclock in the morning and to explain why he occupied the parking space allotted
for respondent Judge.

When complainant appeared before respondent Judge, the latter asked him if he had a lawyer. Although complainant replied in the
negative, respondent Judge still further questioned the complainant. Complainant apologized and explained that he did not intend to park
in respondent Judges space, and that he did not know that such space was reserved for respondent Judge.

However, respondent Judge refused to accept complainants apology and, instead, found the latter guilty of direct contempt of court for
using the formers parking space, sentencing complainant to five (5) days imprisonment and a fine of one thousand pesos
[3]
(P1,000.00). Respondent then ordered the jail guard to bring complainant to the City Jail in Fort Bonifacio, where the latter was
[4]
incarcerated for two days. On April 5, 2005, complainant was released after filing a Motion for Reconsideration and paying the fine
of P1,000.00.
[5]
In his Comment dated June 27, 2005, respondent Judge alleged that judges were assigned their respective parking spaces in the
basement of the City Hall of Makati City. Respondent Judge, in particular, placed a marker with his name at the space allotted to him,
facilitating the orderly parking which allowed him to work as early as seven oclock in the morning, almost daily. He stated that he already
programmed his activities to maintain and/or improve his present position as the third ranking judge for the year 2004 among the RTC
judges of Makati City.

Respondent Judge claimed that on the date and time in question, he was set to dispose a criminal case, and over the weekend, had even
conceptualized the matter on how to administer the proceedings to accomplish the requirements of that criminal case. However, the
inconsiderate and improper parking of complainant disturbed his train of thought as to the intended disposition of his cases.

In addition, respondent Judge recounted that there were similar incidents which happened to him. Sometime in August 2002, Allan
Macrohon, Rodrigo Gonzales, and Redeem Ongtinco caused an overflow of water into the chambers of respondent Judge, damaging his
computer system at the old RTC. On March 18, 2005, Venancio P. Inonog, security-driver of the Chief of the Business Permit Section of
Makati City, also parked his vehicle at respondents parking slot. On April 12, 2005, John Panaligan, electrician of the Makati City Hall,
erroneously switched off the electrical outlets of respondent Judges sala.

44

Respondent Judge cited Macrohon, Gonzales, Ongtinco, Inonog, and Panaligan in contempt on the ground that they disrupted respondent
Judges performance of official duties. In turn, Macrohon et al., Inonog, and Panaligan all filed their respective administrative
[6]
complaints against respondent Judge.

On November 25, 2005, the OCA recommended that the instant complaint be redocketed as a regular administrative matter, and that
[7]
respondent Judge be fined ten thousand pesos (P10,000.00) for grave abuse of authority.
[8]
In its Resolution dated March 15, 2006, the Court referred the administrative case to Associate Justice Renato Dacudao of the Court of
Appeals for investigation, report and recommendation within ninety (90) days from receipt of the records. OnJune 22, 2006, the
Investigating Justice issued an Order setting the said case for hearing.

The Investigating Justice submitted a Partial Report on September 6, 2006 in which he stated that he had just finished receiving the
evidence for the parties and required them to submit their respective memorandum. He also asked for an extension of two months
from September 20, 2006, or until November 20, 2006, within which to submit his Final Investigation, Report and Recommendation.

In his Investigation, Report and Recommendation dated September 22, 2006, the Investigating Justice concluded:

Based on the testimonies of both parties and their witnesses, the undersigned Investigating Justice believes that the
complainant was not the person who parked the van on respondent judges parking slot, but rather that it was Oscar de
los Reyes. Complainant during the hearing maintained that he parked the L-300 van in the middle, and not on the side,
which was the parking slot assigned to respondent judge. Although the witness, Oscar de los Reyes testified that, after
buying merienda (on April 2, 2005), he parked the van at the same place, he failed to explain where exactly he parked
the van. Thus, we cannot discount the possibility that De los Reyes might have parked the van at the same place,
meaning the basement parking, but not necessarily on the very same spot or slot.

But whether it was complainant or it was Oscar de los Reyes who parked the van, it would not change or alter the fact
that respondent judge committed grave abuse of authority in holding the complainant in contempt of court for parking
on his slot. Respondent judge himself declared that had he known that it was De los Reyes who parked the van he
would not have asked complainant to explain, but instead De los Reyes. x x x In addition, why still subject complainant
to further humiliation by having him handcuffed, like a common criminal, after citing him for contempt of court?
Obviously, respondent judge was really bent on citing for contempt of court the person responsible for doing the parking
in the parking slot which he believed, (perhaps erroneously), was his assigned parking slot. Obviously, too, there is a
streak of cruel sadism, of pettiness or meanness, in respondent judges character, as it would seem that he could not
refrain from exhibiting such excesses as causing the manacling (apparently in open court at that), of an unintentional
offender like the complainant herein, who had the misfortune to injure, if innocuously, his wounded pride and ego as a
judge.

xxxx

In this case, the undersigned Investigating Justice finds no reason why complainants act of parking on the parking slot
of respondent judge would constitute contempt of court. It may have caused respondent judge some delay in
immediately parking his car that morning of April 4, 2005, but to say that the one-hour disruption delayed the
administration of justice would be stretching the logic of the situation too much. According to respondent judge, time is
of the essence in his decision-making program. But the irony of it is that the amount of time respondent judge allotted
in hearing the explanation as well as the motion for reconsideration of complainant in this case must have cost him
more than the one hour he claimed he lost.

As justification for his actions, respondent judge said that because of the prior or previous incidents he was convinced
that the particular incident was intentional and deliberate. Such reasoning is unacceptable. There was no showing that
complainant or Oscar de los Reyes intentionally or deliberately parked the van on respondent judges slot in order to
purposely annoy or irk him. And, even if it did annoy or irk respondent judge, he should remember that, the power to
cite persons in contempt is at his disposal for purposes that are strictly impersonal, because that power is intended as
a safeguard not for the judges as persons, but for the official functions that they exercise or perform.

Besides, it was unfair for respondent judge to assume that complainant knew of the prior or previous incident, where
respondent judge cited a driver for contempt of court for parking on his parking slot, just because both drivers are
employees of the Makati City Hall; this is clearly a non-sequitur. And, assuming that complainant knew of the said
incident, this alone would not prove that what he did was intentional or deliberate.

Neither would respondent judges allegation, that someone, an unknown person inside, is orchestrating the filing of
these cases against him for the chief or sole purpose of harassing him, exonerate him of the charge. To begin with, he
failed to present any proof to substantiate this allegation. All he could point to are mere coincidences or speculations.
What is more, respondent judge seemed to have taken some kind of pleasurable satisfaction in citing these
complainants in contempt of court simply for parking on the slot which he assumed was allot(t)ed to him; or for switching
the lights off in his office; or for accidentally drenching his computers. He, in fact, even admitted having issued all these
Orders to punish the complainants in these cases for disrupting or disturbing him in performing his duties; hence, he
cannot blame these persons for filing a case or cases against him, as these persons must have felt aggrieved by his
actuations in precipitately citing them for contempt. Nor can he accuse an unknown person of orchestrating all of these.
All the cases or incidents he mentioned only strengthened the undersigned Investigating Justices perception that
respondent judge has an unseemly propensity for abusing the power granted to him by law.

Respondent judge ought to be reminded that as a member of the bench, he is expected to take recourse to the contempt
power only as a last resort, when all other alternative courses of action are exhausted in the pursuit of maintaining
respect for the court and its processes; and that when a less harsh remedy can be availed of by the judge, he should
at all times hesitate to use his contempt power, and instead opt for the less harsh remedy.

Thus, if respondent judge wanted to teach complainant a lesson, he could have done so by merely reprimanding or
admonishing him considering that when complainant appeared before respondent judge he immediately begged for
forgiveness.

45

 Respondent judges act of citing complainant in contempt of court for parking on his slot is a violation of Rule 2.01 of
the Code of Judicial Conduct, which provides that A judge should so behave at all times as to promote public confidence
in the integrity and impartiality of the judiciary.

xxxx

For the reasons heretofore stated, the undersigned Investigating Justice finds respondent judge guilty of grave abuse
of authority for using contempt as a retaliatory measure aggravated in this case by a streak of cruel sadism, of pettiness
or meanness, in respondents character, as elsewhere indicated.

RECOMMENDATIONS

Notwithstanding the finding of guilt of the respondent judge, the undersigned Investigating Justice deems that certain
circumstances must be considered in imposing the proper penalty.

It must be noted that respondent judge has a very good performance record. His strong adherence to the Supreme
Courts reminder that, members of the judicial branch judges and judicial personnel alike to be conscientious, diligent
and thorough in the performance of their functions. At all time(s) they must observe the high standard of public service
required of them. is quite admirable and commendable. Also, he already admitted his error in declaring complainant in
contempt of court. All these may be taken as mitigating circumstances which could alleviate his culpability.

UPON THE VIEW WE TAKE OF THIS CASE, THUS, the undersigned Investigating Justice hereby recommends that
the respondent Judge be fined in the amount of PESOS: FIVE THOUSAND (Php5,000.00) with a stern warning that
a repetition of the same or similar acts in the future will be dealt with more severely.

In a Resolution dated February 7, 2007, the Court referred the administrative matter to the OCA for evaluation, report and
recommendation, within thirty (30) days from notice, on the propriety of consolidating the instant case with the other administrative cases
filed against respondent Judge.

In its Memorandum dated March 30, 2007, the OCA observed that:

After a cautious evaluation of the entire records of the instant case, this Office agrees with the Investigating Justices
findings that respondent committed grave abuse of authority in citing complainant in contempt of court. Respondent
wrongly argues that complainant delayed the administration of justice when he improperly parked the van on
respondents assigned slot which disrupted his scheduled disposition of cases. Respondents reaction to the
complainants mistake is exaggerated. The complainants act may have caused inconvenience to the respondent but it
could not delay the administration of justice.

There is no evidence to show that complainant Nuez parked the van at respondents slot purposely to annoy him or he
was aware of the previous similar incident which involved Venancio Inonog. In fact, complainant explained that his
mistake was not deliberate and he asked for respondents forgiveness. Respondent likewise failed to substantiate his
allegation that someone is orchestrating the filing of administrative cases against him for the sole purpose of harassing
him. The other complainants cannot be faulted for filing the said cases as they may have felt aggrieved by respondents
actuations in citing them for contempt for flimsy and personal reasons.

xxxx

Respondents order dated April 4, 2005 citing complainant Nuez in contempt of court betrays not only his ignorance as
regards the Rule on Contempt of Court, but it also shows his despotic nature. The fact that respondent had also
declared Inonog, Panaligan, Macrohon and two others in contempt of court shows that he does not possess the judicial
temperament which a judge should possess. x x x

The power to punish for contempt must be used sparingly with due regard to the provisions of the law and the
constitutional rights of the individual. It should be exercised strictly for the preservation of the dignity of the court and
its proceedings. In the instant complaint, respondent exercised the said power in an arbitrary and oppressive manner
and for purposes that are purely personal.

The exacting standards of conduct demanded from judges are designed to promote public confidence in the integrity
and impartiality of the judiciary. When the judge himself becomes the transgressor of the law which he is sworn to
apply, he places his office in disrepute, encourages disrespect for the law and impairs public confidence in the integrity
of the judiciary itself.

After a cautious evaluation of the entire records of the instant case, this Office finds the recommended penalty not
commensurate to respondents offense. This is not respondents first offense. He had been administratively sanctioned
for grave abuse of authority and was ordered by the Court to pay a fine on June 21, 2006 in the case of Panaligan v.
Ibay docketed as A.M. No. RTJ-06-1972. In the case filed by Allan Macrohon, et al., docketed as A.M. No. RTJ-06-
1970, respondent was ordered by the Court to pay a fine of P25,000.00 for gravely abusing his authority and was also
warned that a repetition of the same or similar offense shall be dealt with more severely. Respondent has another
pending case filed by Venancio Inonog for the same charge. In the said case of Allan Macrohon, et al. against
respondent, the Court stated that the similarity of the charges in these administrative complaints against him betrays a
deplorable proclivity for the use of contempt powers at the slightest provocation.

Taking into consideration that the instant complaint is a third transgression of a similar offense, this Office recommends
that respondent Judge Francisco B. Ibay be SUSPENDED for FOUR (4) MONTHS with STERN WARNING that a
repetition of similar act shall be dealt with more severely.

In its Resolution dated July 25, 2007, the Court required the parties to manifest whether they were willing to submit the case for decision
on the basis of the pleadings/records already filed and submitted within 30 days from notice.

46

In its Resolution dated November 21, 2007, the Court deemed as served upon the complainant the copy of the Resolution dated July 25,
2007 which was sent to complainant, but was returned unserved with postmans notation RTS-Unknown.
In its Resolution dated March 3, 2008, after failure of respondent Judge to manifest whether he was willing to submit the case for decision
on the basis of the pleadings/records already filed and submitted as required in the Resolution dated July 25, 2007, the Court deemed
the case for decision.

The issue which lies before this Court is whether respondent Judge can be held administratively liable for grave abuse of authority in
citing complainant for contempt of court.

The power to hold a person in direct contempt is provided for under Section 1, Rule 71 of the Rules of Court, which reads:

SECTION 1. Direct contempt punished summarily. A person guilty of misbehavior in the presence of or so near a court
as to obstruct or interrupt the proceedings before the same, including disrespect toward the court, offensive
personalities toward others, or refusal to be sworn or to answer as a witness, or to subscribe an affidavit or deposition
when lawfully required to do so, may be summarily adjudged in contempt by such court and punished by a fine not
exceeding two thousand pesos or imprisonment not exceeding ten (10) days, or both, if it be a Regional Trial Court or
a court of equivalent or higher rank, or by a fine not exceeding two hundred pesos or imprisonment not exceeding one
(1) day or both, if it be a lower court.

[9]
In Sison v. Caoibes, Jr., the Court held that the power to declare a person in contempt of court, however plenary as it may seem, must
be exercised judiciously and sparingly. A judge should never allow himself to be moved by pride, prejudice, passion or pettiness in the
performance of his duties.

Respondent Judge averred that someone was out to harass and embarrass him, which was why six different complaints were
simultaneously filed against him, prompting him to cite the complainants for contempt of court. He explained that the individual acts of
the complainants were contemptuous, including herein complainants improper parking, because they disrupted the speedy administration
of justice.

The Court disagrees. Aside from the fact that respondent Judge failed to substantiate his allegation, the Court does not see how the
improper parking by complainant, or by a certain Oscar dela Cruz, could, even in the remotest manner, disrupt the speedy administration
of justice. At most, it would cause respondent Judge inconvenience or annoyance, but still, this does not fall under any of the
aforementioned acts for which a person could be cited for contempt. Neither does it appear from the records, nor from the evidence
presented, that complainant intended any disrespect toward respondent Judge. In fact, upon being summoned, complainant immediately
apologized for his mistake.
[10]
In Oclarit v. Paderanga, the Court held that the power to punish for contempt must be exercised on the preservative, not vindicative,
principle and on the corrective and not retaliatory idea of punishment. Courts must exercise the power to punish for contempt for purposes
that are impersonal, because that power is intended as a safeguard not for the judges as persons, but for the functions that they exercise.

By the time the instant complaint was filed, respondent Judge had already cited six persons for contempt, including herein complainant.
Worse, respondent Judge immediately detained complainant, thereby preventing him from resorting to the remedies provided under
Section 2, Rule 71 of the Rules of Court, cited as follows:
SEC.2. Remedy therefrom. The person adjudged in direct contempt by any court may not appeal therefrom,
but may avail himself of the remedies of certiorari or prohibition. The execution of the judgment shall be suspended
pending resolution of such petition, provided such person files a bond fixed by the court which rendered the judgment
and conditioned that he will abide by and perform the judgment should the petition be decided against him.

Such abusive behavior on the part of respondent Judge fails to show his integrity, which is essential not only to the proper discharge of
[11]
the judicial office, but also to his personal demeanor. In addition, Sections 1 and 2, Canon 2 of the New Code of Judicial Conduct for
[12]
the Philippine Judiciary state that:

SECTION 1. Judges shall ensure that not only is their conduct above reproach, but that it is perceived to be so in the
view of a reasonable observer.

SEC. 2. The behavior and conduct of judges must reaffirm the peoples faith in the integrity of the judiciary. Justice must
not merely be done but must also be seen to be done.

The Court believes that the frequency of his offenses already constitutes gross misconduct. Gross has been defined as flagrant and
shameful, while misconduct means a transgression of some established and definite rule of action, willful in character, improper or wrong
[13]
behavior. Under Section 8(3), Rule 140 of the Rules of Court, gross misconduct is classified as a serious offense punishable under the
sanctions enumerated under the same Rule, Section 11 of which provides that:

SEC. 11. Sanctions. If the respondent is guilty of a serious charge, any of the following sanctions may be imposed:
1. Dismissal from the service, forfeiture of all or part of the benefits as the Court may
determine and disqualification from reinstatement or appointment to any public office, including
government-owned or controlled corporations. Provided, however, that the forfeiture of benefits shall
in no case include accrued leave credits;

2. Suspension from office with salary and other benefits for more than three (3), but not exceeding six (6) months; or

3. A fine of more than P20,000.00, but not exceeding P40,000.00.

In previous cases wherein judges cited persons for contempt without legal basis, the Court has found respondents guilty of grave abuse
[14]
of authority and usually imposed a penalty of reprimand with a warning, or a fine of P5,000.00 with a warning.

However, respondent Judge has been twice administratively sanctioned by the Court for the same offense. In Panaligan v.
[15]
Ibay, respondent Judge was found to have abused his authority in citing a person for contempt without sufficient legal basis, for which
he was sentenced to pay a fine of P5,000.00, with a stern warning that a repetition of the same or similar acts in the future would be dealt
47

 [16]
with more severely. In Macrohon v. Ibay, he was again found liable for the same offense and sentenced to pay a fine of P25,000.00,
with a stern warning that a repetition of the same or similar acts would be dealt with more severely.

In view of respondent Judges penchant for citing persons for contempt even without legal basis, the Investigating Justice recommended
that he be ordered to pay a fine of P5,000.00 with a stern warning, while the OCA recommended that he be suspended for four (4) months
with a stern warning. Considering that respondent Judge had opted to avail himself of the Optional Retirement under Republic Act (R.A.)
No. 910, as amended by R.A. No. 5095 and Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 1438, effective at the close of office hours of August 18, 2007,
[17]
which was approved by the Court (First Division) per Resolution dated November 14, 2007, provided that the amount of Four Hundred
Thousand (P400,000.00) Pesos shall be retained/withheld from his retirement benefits to answer for whatever adverse decision the Court
may later impose upon him in A.M. No. RTJ-06-1984 (herein case) and OCA IPI No. 05-2248-RTJ, the Court, therefore, deems it
appropriate to impose a fine of P40,000.00, with a stern warning that a repetition of the same or similar acts in the future would be dealt
with more severely.

WHEREFORE, respondent Judge Francisco B. Ibay is found GUILTY of grave abuse of authority for citing complainant Valeriano F.
Nuez for contempt without legal basis, and is ORDERED to PAY a FINE of Forty Thousand Pesos (P40,000.00), to be deducted from his
retirement benefits, which in this case shall be deductible from the Four Hundred Thousand Pesos (P400,000.00) withheld from his
retirement benefits, per Resolution dated November 14, 2007.
SO ORDERED.

48

Case 25

ROGELIO A. TAN, NORMA TAN G.R. No. 169517

and MALIYAWAO PAGAYOKAN,
Petitioners, Present:
Panganiban, C.J. (Chairperson),
- versus - Ynares-Santiago,
Austria-Martinez,
Callejo, Sr., and
Chico-Nazario, JJ.
BENEDICTO M. BALAJADIA,
Respondent. Promulgated:

March 14, 2006

x ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- x

DECISION

YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:

[1]
Before us is an original petition for contempt filed by petitioners Rogelio Tan, Norma Tan and Maliyawao Pagayokan against
respondent Benedicto Balajadia.

Petitioners allege that on May 8, 2005, respondent filed a criminal case against them with the Office of the City
of Prosecutor of Baguio City for usurpation of authority, grave coercion and violation of city tax ordinance due to the alleged illegal
collection of parking fees by petitioners from respondent. In paragraph 5 of the complaint-affidavit, respondent asserted that he is a
[2]
practicing lawyer based in Baguio City with office address at Room B-207, 2/F Lopez Building, Session Road, BaguioCity. However,
[3] [4]
certifications issued by the Office of the Bar Confidant and the Integrated Bar of the Philippines showed that respondent has never
been admitted to the Philippine Bar. Hence, petitioners claim that respondent is liable for indirect contempt for misrepresenting himself
as a lawyer.
[5]
In his Comment, respondent avers that the allegation in paragraph 5 of the complaint-affidavit that he is a practicing lawyer
was an honest mistake. He claims that the secretary of Atty. Paterno Aquino prepared the subject complaint-affidavit which was patterned
[6]
after Atty. Aquinos complaint-affidavit. It appears that Atty. Aquino had previously filed a complaint-affidavit against petitioners involving
the same subject matter.

Respondent claims that two complaint-affidavits were drafted by the same secretary; one for the May 5, 2005 parking incident
at 10:00 oclock in the morning and another for the parking incident on the same date but which occurred at 1:00 oclockin the
afternoon. Respondent insists that the complaint-affidavit regarding the 1:00 oclock parking incident correctly alleged that he is a
[7]
businessman with office address at Room B-204, 2/F Lopez Building, Session Road, Baguio City. However, the complaint-affidavit
regarding the 10:00 oclock parking incident, which is the subject of the instant petition, erroneously referred to him as a practicing lawyer
because Atty. Aquinos secretary copied verbatim paragraph 5 of Atty. Aquinos complaint-affidavit. Hence, it was inadvertently alleged
that respondent is a practicing lawyer based in Baguio City with office address at Room B-207, 2/F Lopez Building, Session
Road, Baguio City, which statement referred to the person of Atty. Aquino and his law office address.
[8]
Liza Laconsay, Atty. Aquinos secretary, executed an affidavit admitting the mistake in the preparation of the complaint-affidavit.
Respondent alleged that he did not read the complaint-affidavit because he assumed that the two complaint-affidavits contained the same
allegations with respect to his occupation and office address. Respondent claims that he had no intention of misrepresenting himself as
a practicing lawyer.
[9]
In their Reply, petitioners reiterate that respondent should be made liable for indirect contempt for having made untruthful
statements in the complaint-affidavit and that he cannot shift the blame to Atty. Aquinos secretary.

The sole issue for resolution is whether respondent is liable for indirect contempt.

Section 3(e), Rule 71 of the Rules of Court provides:

Section 3. Indirect contempt to be punished after charge and hearing. After a charge in writing has been filed,
and an opportunity given to the respondent to comment thereon within such period as may be fixed by the court and to
be heard by himself or counsel, a person guilty of any of the following acts may be punished for indirect contempt:

xxxx

(e) Assuming to be an attorney or an officer of a court, and acting as such without authority;

x x x x.
[10]
In several cases, we have ruled that the unauthorized practice of law by assuming to be an attorney and acting as such
without authority constitutes indirect contempt which is punishable by fine or imprisonment or both. The liability for the unauthorized
practice of law under Section 3(e), Rule 71 of the Rules of Court is in the nature of criminal contempt and the acts are punished because
they are an affront to the dignity and authority of the court, and obstruct the orderly administration of justice. In determining liability for
criminal contempt, well-settled is the rule that intent is a necessary element, and no one can be punished unless the evidence makes it
[11]
clear that he intended to commit it.

In the case at bar, a review of the records supports respondents claim that he never intended to project himself as a lawyer to
the public. It was a clear inadvertence on the part of the secretary of Atty Aquino. The affidavit of Liza Laconsay attesting to the
circumstances that gave rise to the mistake in the drafting of the complaint-affidavit conforms to the documentary evidence on
record. Taken together, these circumstances show that the allegation in paragraph 5 of respondents complaint-affidavit was, indeed, the
result of inadvertence.
49

 Respondent has satisfactorily shown that the allegation that he is a practicing lawyer was the result of inadvertence and cannot,
by itself, establish intent as to make him liable for indirect contempt. In the cases where we found a party liable for the unauthorized
[12]
practice of law, the party was guilty of some overt act like signing court pleadings on behalf of his client; appearing before court hearings
[13] [14]
as an attorney; manifesting before the court that he will practice law despite being previously denied admission to the bar; or
deliberately attempting to practice law and holding out himself as an attorney through circulars with full knowledge that he is not licensed
[15]
to do so.

In the case at bar, no evidence was presented to show that respondent acted as an attorney or that he intended to practice
law. Consequently, he cannot be made liable for indirect contempt considering his lack of intent to illegally practice law.

However, while the evidence on record failed to prove respondents deliberate intent to misrepresent himself as an attorney and
act as such without authority, he is hereby warned to be more careful and circumspect in his future actions.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED. Respondent is WARNED to be more careful and circumspect in his future actions.

SO ORDERED.

50

Case 26
EN BANC
[G.R. Nos. 151809-12. April 12, 2005]
PRESIDENTIAL COMMISSION ON GOOD GOVERNMENT (PCGG), petitioner, vs. SANDIGANBAYAN (Fifth Division), LUCIO C.
TAN, CARMEN KHAO TAN, FLORENCIO T. SANTOS, NATIVIDAD P. SANTOS, DOMINGO CHUA, TAN HUI NEE,
MARIANO TAN ENG LIAN, ESTATE OF BENITO TAN KEE HIONG (represented by TARCIANA C. TAN), FLORENCIO N.
SANTOS, JR., HARRY C. TAN, TAN ENG CHAN, CHUNG POE KEE, MARIANO KHOO, MANUEL KHOO, MIGUEL KHOO,
JAIME KHOO, ELIZABETH KHOO, CELSO RANOLA, WILLIAM T. WONG, ERNESTO B. LIM, BENJAMIN T. ALBACITA,
WILLY CO, ALLIED BANKING CORP., ALLIED LEASING AND FINANCE CORPORATION, ASIA BREWERY, INC., BASIC
HOLDINGS CORP., FOREMOST FARMS, INC., FORTUNE TOBACCO CORP., GRANDSPAN DEVELOPMENT CORP.,
HIMMEL INDUSTRIES, IRIS HOLDINGS AND DEVELOPMENT CORP., JEWEL HOLDINGS, INC., MANUFACTURING
SERVICES AND TRADE CORP., MARANAW HOTELS AND RESORT CORP., NORTHERN TOBACCO REDRYING PLANT,
PROGRESSIVE FARMS, INC., SHAREHOLDINGS, INC., SIPALAY TRADING CORP., VIRGO HOLDINGS &
DEVELOPMENT CORP., and ATTY. ESTELITO P. MENDOZA, respondents.
DECISION
PUNO, J.:
This case is prima impressiones and it is weighted with significance for it concerns on one hand, the efforts of the Bar to upgrade
the ethics of lawyers in government service and on the other, its effect on the right of government to recruit competent counsel to defend
its interests.
In 1976, General Bank and Trust Company (GENBANK) encountered financial difficulties. GENBANK had extended considerable
financial support to Filcapital Development Corporation causing it to incur daily overdrawings on its current account with the Central
[1]
Bank. It was later found by the Central Bank that GENBANK had approved various loans to directors, officers, stockholders and related
[2]
interests totaling P172.3 million, of which 59% was classified as doubtful and P0.505 million as uncollectible. As a bailout, the Central
[3]
Bank extended emergency loans to GENBANK which reached a total of P310 million. Despite the mega loans, GENBANK failed
to recover from its financial woes. On March 25, 1977, the Central Bank issued a resolution declaring GENBANKinsolvent and
[4]
unable to resume business with safety to its depositors, creditors and the general public, and ordering its liquidation. A public bidding
of GENBANKs assets was held from March 26 to 28, 1977, wherein the Lucio Tan group submitted the winning
[5]
bid. Subsequently, former Solicitor General Estelito P. Mendoza filed a petition with the then Court of First Instance praying for
the assistance and supervision of the court in GENBANKs liquidation as mandated by Section 29 of Republic Act No. 265.
In February 1986, the EDSA I revolution toppled the Marcos government. One of the first acts of President Corazon C. Aquino was
to establish the Presidential Commission on Good Government (PCGG) to recover the alleged ill-gotten wealth of former President
Ferdinand Marcos, his family and his cronies. Pursuant to this mandate, the PCGG, on July 17, 1987, filed with the Sandiganbayan a
complaint for reversion, reconveyance, restitution, accounting and damages against respondents Lucio Tan, Carmen Khao Tan,
Florencio T. Santos, Natividad P. Santos, Domingo Chua, Tan Hui Nee, Mariano Tan Eng Lian, Estate of Benito Tan Kee Hiong, Florencio
N. Santos, Jr., Harry C. Tan, Tan Eng Chan, Chung Poe Kee, Mariano Khoo, Manuel Khoo, Miguel Khoo, Jaime Khoo, Elizabeth Khoo,
Celso Ranola, William T. Wong, Ernesto B. Lim, Benjamin T. Albacita, Willy Co, Allied Banking Corporation (Allied Bank), Allied Leasing
and Finance Corporation, Asia Brewery, Inc., Basic Holdings Corp., Foremost Farms, Inc., Fortune Tobacco Corporation, Grandspan
Development Corp., Himmel Industries, Iris Holdings and Development Corp., Jewel Holdings, Inc., Manufacturing Services and Trade
Corp., Maranaw Hotels and Resort Corp., Northern Tobacco Redrying Plant, Progressive Farms, Inc., Shareholdings, Inc., Sipalay
Trading Corp., Virgo Holdings & Development Corp., (collectively referred to herein as respondents Tan, et al.), then President Ferdinand
E. Marcos, Imelda R. Marcos, Panfilo O. Domingo, Cesar Zalamea, Don Ferry and Gregorio Licaros. The case was docketed as Civil
[6]
Case No. 0005 of the Second Division of the Sandiganbayan. In connection therewith, the PCGG issued several writs of
sequestration on properties allegedly acquired by the above-named persons by taking advantage of their close relationship and influence
with former President Marcos.
Respondents Tan, et al. repaired to this Court and filed petitions for certiorari, prohibition and injunction to nullify, among others, the
[7]
writs of sequestration issued by the PCGG. After the filing of the parties comments, this Court referred the cases to
theSandiganbayan for proper disposition. These cases were docketed as Civil Case Nos. 0096-0099. In all these cases, respondents
Tan, et al. were represented by their counsel, former Solicitor General Estelito P. Mendoza, who has then resumed his private practice
of law.
On February 5, 1991, the PCGG filed motions to disqualify respondent Mendoza as counsel for respondents Tan, et al. with
[8] [9]
the Second Division of the Sandiganbayan in Civil Case Nos. 0005 and 0096-0099. The motions alleged that respondent Mendoza,
[10]
as then Solicitor General and counsel to Central Bank, actively intervened in the liquidation of GENBANK, which was subsequently
acquired by respondents Tan, et al. and became Allied Banking Corporation. Respondent Mendoza allegedly intervened in the acquisition
of GENBANK by respondents Tan, et al. when, in his capacity as then Solicitor General, he advised the Central Banks officials on
the procedure to bring about GENBANKs liquidation and appeared as counsel for the Central Bank in connection with its petition for
assistance in the liquidation of GENBANK which he filed with the Court of First Instance (now Regional Trial Court) of Manila and was
docketed as Special Proceeding No. 107812. The motions to disqualify invoked Rule 6.03 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility. Rule 6.03 prohibits former government lawyers from accepting engagement or employment in connection with any
matter in which he had intervened while in said service.
On April 22, 1991 the Second Division of the Sandiganbayan issued a resolution denying PCGGs motion to disqualify respondent
[11]
Mendoza in Civil Case No. 0005. It found that the PCGG failed to prove the existence of an inconsistency between respondent
Mendozas former function as Solicitor General and his present employment as counsel of the Lucio Tan group. It noted that respondent
[12]
Mendoza did not take a position adverse to that taken on behalf of the Central Bank during his term as Solicitor General. It further ruled
that respondent Mendozas appearance as counsel for respondents Tan, et al. was beyond the one-year prohibited period under Section
7(b) of Republic Act No. 6713 since he ceased to be Solicitor General in the year 1986. The said section prohibits a former public official
or employee from practicing his profession in connection with any matter before the office he used to be with within one year from his
[13] [14]
resignation, retirement or separation from public office. The PCGG did not seek any reconsideration of the ruling.
[15]
It appears that Civil Case Nos. 0096-0099 were transferred from the Sandiganbayans Second Division to the Fifth Division. In
its resolution dated July 11, 2001, the Fifth Division of the Sandiganbayan denied the other PCGGs motion to disqualify respondent
[16]
Mendoza. It adopted the resolution of its Second Division dated April 22, 1991, and observed that the arguments were the same in
substance as the motion to disqualify filed in Civil Case No. 0005. The PCGG sought reconsideration of the ruling but its motion was
[17]
denied in its resolution dated December 5, 2001.
Hence, the recourse to this Court by the PCGG assailing the resolutions dated July 11, 2001 and December 5, 2001 of the Fifth
[18]
Division of the Sandiganbayan via a petition for certiorari and prohibition under Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure. The
PCGG alleged that the Fifth Division acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in issuing the
assailed resolutions contending that: 1) Rule 6.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility prohibits a former government lawyer from
accepting employment in connection with any matter in which he intervened; 2) the prohibition in the Rule is not time-bound; 3) that
Central Bank could not waive the objection to respondent Mendozas appearance on behalf of the PCGG; and 4) the resolution in Civil
[19]
Case No. 0005 was interlocutory, thus res judicata does not apply.

51

 The petition at bar raises procedural and substantive issues of law. In view, however, of the import and impact of Rule 6.03 of the
Code of Professional Responsibility to the legal profession and the government, we shall cut our way and forthwith resolve the substantive
issue.
I
Substantive Issue
The key issue is whether Rule 6.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility applies to respondent Mendoza. Again, the prohibition
states: A lawyer shall not, after leaving government service, accept engagement or employment in connection with any matter in which
he had intervened while in the said service.
I.A. The history of Rule 6.03
A proper resolution of this case necessitates that we trace the historical lineage of Rule 6.03 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility.
In the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, ethical standards for lawyers were pervasive in England and other parts of Europe.
The early statements of standards did not resemble modern codes of conduct. They were not detailed or collected in one source but
surprisingly were comprehensive for their time. The principal thrust of the standards was directed towards the litigation conduct of lawyers.
It underscored the central duty of truth and fairness in litigation as superior to any obligation to the client. The formulations of the litigation
duties were at times intricate, including specific pleading standards, an obligation to inform the court of falsehoods and a duty to explore
settlement alternatives. Most of the lawyer's other basic duties -- competency, diligence, loyalty, confidentiality, reasonable fees and
service to the poor -- originated in the litigation context, but ultimately had broader application to all aspects of a lawyer's practice.
The forms of lawyer regulation in colonial and early post-revolutionary America did not differ markedly from those in England.
The colonies and early states used oaths, statutes, judicial oversight, and procedural rules to govern attorney behavior. The difference
from England was in the pervasiveness and continuity of such regulation. The standards set in England varied over time, but the variation
in early America was far greater. The American regulation fluctuated within a single colony and differed from colony to colony. Many
regulations had the effect of setting some standards of conduct, but the regulation was sporadic, leaving gaps in the substantive
standards. Only three of the traditional core duties can be fairly characterized as pervasive in the formal, positive law of the colonial and
[20]
post-revolutionary period: the duties of litigation fairness, competency and reasonable fees.
The nineteenth century has been termed the dark ages of legal ethics in the United States. By mid-century, American legal
reformers were filling the void in two ways. First, David Dudley Field, the drafter of the highly influential New York Field Code, introduced
a new set of uniform standards of conduct for lawyers. This concise statement of eight statutory duties became law in several states in
the second half of the nineteenth century. At the same time, legal educators, such as David Hoffman and George Sharswood, and many
other lawyers were working to flesh out the broad outline of a lawyer's duties. These reformers wrote about legal ethics in unprecedented
detail and thus brought a new level of understanding to a lawyer's duties. A number of mid-nineteenth century laws and statutes, other
than the Field Code, governed lawyer behavior. A few forms of colonial regulations e.g., the do no falsehood oath and the deceit
prohibitions -- persisted in some states. Procedural law continued to directly, or indirectly, limit an attorney's litigation behavior. The
developing law of agency recognized basic duties of competence, loyalty and safeguarding of client property. Evidence law started to
recognize with less equivocation the attorney-client privilege and its underlying theory of confidentiality. Thus, all of the core duties, with
the likely exception of service to the poor, had some basis in formal law. Yet, as in the colonial and early post-revolutionary periods, these
standards were isolated and did not provide a comprehensive statement of a lawyer's duties. The reformers, by contrast, were more
[21]
comprehensive in their discussion of a lawyer's duties, and they actually ushered a new era in American legal ethics.
Toward the end of the nineteenth century, a new form of ethical standards began to guide lawyers in their practice the bar
association code of legal ethics. The bar codes were detailed ethical standards formulated by lawyers for lawyers. They combined the
two primary sources of ethical guidance from the nineteenth century. Like the academic discourses, the bar association codes gave detail
to the statutory statements of duty and the oaths of office. Unlike the academic lectures, however, the bar association codes retained
some of the official imprimatur of the statutes and oaths. Over time, the bar association codes became extremely popular that states
adopted them as binding rules of law. Critical to the development of the new codes was the re-emergence of bar associations themselves.
Local bar associations formed sporadically during the colonial period, but they disbanded by the early nineteenth century. In the late
nineteenth century, bar associations began to form again, picking up where their colonial predecessors had left off. Many of the new bar
associations, most notably the Alabama State Bar Association and the American Bar Association, assumed on the task of drafting
[22]
substantive standards of conduct for their members.
In 1887, Alabama became the first state with a comprehensive bar association code of ethics. The 1887 Alabama Code of Ethics
[23]
was the model for several states codes, and it was the foundation for the American Bar Association's (ABA) 1908 Canons of Ethics.
In 1917, the Philippine Bar found that the oath and duties of a lawyer were insufficient to attain the full measure of public respect
to which the legal profession was entitled. In that year, the Philippine Bar Association adopted as its own, Canons 1 to 32 of the ABA
[24]
Canons of Professional Ethics.
As early as 1924, some ABA members have questioned the form and function of the canons. Among their concerns was
the revolving door or the process by which lawyers and others temporarily enter government service from private life and then leave it
[25]
for large fees in private practice, where they can exploit information, contacts, and influence garnered in government service. These
concerns were classified as adverse-interest conflicts and congruent-interest conflicts. Adverse-interest conflicts exist where the
matter in which the former government lawyer represents a client in private practice is substantially related to a matter that the lawyer
[26]
dealt with while employed by the government and the interests of the current and former are adverse. On the other hand,congruent-
[27]
interest representation conflicts are unique to government lawyers and apply primarily to former government lawyers. For several
years, the ABA attempted to correct and update the canons through new canons, individual amendments and interpretative opinions. In
[28]
1928, the ABA amended one canon and added thirteen new canons. To deal with problems peculiar to former government
lawyers, Canon 36 was minted which disqualified them both for adverse-interest conflicts and congruent-interest representation
[29]
conflicts. The rationale for disqualification is rooted in a concern that the government lawyers largely discretionary actions would be
influenced by the temptation to take action on behalf of the government client that later could be to the advantage of parties who might
[30]
later become private practice clients. Canon 36 provides, viz.:
36. Retirement from judicial position or public employment
A lawyer should not accept employment as an advocate in any matter upon the merits of which he has previously acted in a judicial
capacity.
A lawyer, having once held public office or having been in the public employ should not, after his retirement, accept
employment in connection with any matter he has investigated or passed upon while in such office or employ.
Over the next thirty years, the ABA continued to amend many of the canons and added Canons 46 and 47 in 1933 and 1937,
[31]
respectively.
[32]
In 1946, the Philippine Bar Association again adopted as its own Canons 33 to 47 of the ABA Canons of Professional Ethics.
By the middle of the twentieth century, there was growing consensus that the ABA Canons needed more meaningful revision. In
1964, the ABA President-elect Lewis Powell asked for the creation of a committee to study the adequacy and effectiveness of the ABA
Canons. The committee recommended that the canons needed substantial revision, in part because the ABA Canons failed to distinguish
between the inspirational and the proscriptive and were thus unsuccessful in enforcement. The legal profession in the United States
likewise observed that Canon 36 of the ABA Canons of Professional Ethics resulted in unnecessary disqualification of lawyers for
negligible participation in matters during their employment with the government.

52

 [33]
The unfairness of Canon 36 compelled ABA to replace it in the 1969 ABA Model Code of Professional Responsibility. The
basic ethical principles in the Code of Professional Responsibility were supplemented by Disciplinary Rules that defined minimum rules
[34] [35]
of conduct to which the lawyer must adhere. In the case of Canon 9, DR 9-101(b) became the applicable supplementary norm. The
drafting committee reformulated the canons into the Model Code of Professional Responsibility, and, in August of 1969, the ABA House
[36]
of Delegates approved the Model Code.
Despite these amendments, legal practitioners remained unsatisfied with the results and indefinite standards set forth by DR 9-
101(b) and the Model Code of Professional Responsibility as a whole. Thus, in August 1983, the ABA adopted new Model Rules of
Professional Responsibility. The Model Rules used the restatement format, where the conduct standards were set-out in rules, with
comments following each rule. The new format was intended to give better guidance and clarity for enforcement because the only
enforceable standards were the black letter Rules. The Model Rules eliminated the broad canons altogether and reduced the emphasis
on narrative discussion, by placing comments after the rules and limiting comment discussion to the content of the black letter rules. The
[37]
Model Rules made a number of substantive improvements particularly with regard to conflicts of interests. In particular, the ABA did
away with Canon 9, citing the hopeless dependence of the concept of impropriety on the subjective views of anxious clients as
[38]
well as the norms indefinite nature.
In cadence with these changes, the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) adopted a proposed Code of Professional
Responsibility in 1980 which it submitted to this Court for approval. The Code was drafted to reflect the local customs, traditions,
and practices of the bar and to conform with new realities. On June 21, 1988, this Court promulgated the Code of Professional
[39]
Responsibility. Rule 6.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility deals particularly with former government lawyers, and
provides,viz.:
Rule 6.03 A lawyer shall not, after leaving government service, accept engagement or employment in connection with any matter in
which he had intervened while in said service.
Rule 6.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility retained the general structure of paragraph 2, Canon 36 of the Canons of
Professional Ethics but replaced the expansive phrase investigated and passed upon with the word intervened. It is, therefore,
properly applicable to both adverse-interest conflicts and congruent-interest conflicts.
The case at bar does not involve the adverse interest aspect of Rule 6.03. Respondent Mendoza, it is conceded, has no adverse
interest problem when he acted as Solicitor General in Sp. Proc. No. 107812 and later as counsel of respondents Tan, et al. in Civil Case
No. 0005 and Civil Case Nos. 0096-0099 before the Sandiganbayan. Nonetheless, there remains the issue of whether there exists
a congruent-interest conflict sufficient to disqualify respondent Mendoza from representing respondents Tan, et al.
I.B. The congruent interest aspect of Rule 6.03
The key to unlock Rule 6.03 lies in comprehending first, the meaning of matter referred to in the rule and, second, the metes and
bounds of the intervention made by the former government lawyer on the matter. The American Bar Association in its FormalOpinion
342, defined matter as any discrete, isolatable act as well as identifiable transaction or conduct involving a particular situation and specific
party, and not merely an act of drafting, enforcing or interpreting government or agency procedures, regulations or laws, or briefing
abstract principles of law.
Firstly, it is critical that we pinpoint the matter which was the subject of intervention by respondent Mendoza while he was the
Solicitor General. The PCGG relates the following acts of respondent Mendoza as constituting the matter where he intervened as a
[40]
Solicitor General, viz:
The PCGGs Case for Atty. Mendozas Disqualification
The PCGG imputes grave abuse of discretion on the part of the Sandiganbayan (Fifth Division) in issuing the assailed Resolutions
dated July 11, 2001 and December 5, 2001 denying the motion to disqualify Atty. Mendoza as counsel for respondents Tan, et al. The
PCGG insists that Atty. Mendoza, as then Solicitor General, actively intervened in the closure of GENBANK by advising the Central
Bank on how to proceed with the said banks liquidation and even filing the petition for its liquidation with the CFI of Manila.
As proof thereof, the PCGG cites the Memorandum dated March 29, 1977 prepared by certain key officials of the Central Bank, namely,
then Senior Deputy Governor Amado R. Brinas, then Deputy Governor Jaime C. Laya, then Deputy Governor and General Counsel
Gabriel C. Singson, then Special Assistant to the Governor Carlota P. Valenzuela, then Asistant to the Governor Arnulfo B. Aurellano
and then Director of Department of Commercial and Savings Bank Antonio T. Castro, Jr., where they averred that on March 28, 1977,
they had a conference with the Solicitor General (Atty. Mendoza), who advised them on how to proceed with the liquidation of
GENBANK. The pertinent portion of the said memorandum states:
Immediately after said meeting, we had a conference with the Solicitor General and he advised that the following procedure should be
taken:
1. Management should submit a memorandum to the Monetary Board reporting that studies and evaluation had been made
since the last examination of the bank as of August 31, 1976 and it is believed that the bank can not be reorganized or
placed in a condition so that it may be permitted to resume business with safety to its depositors and creditors and the
general public.
2. If the said report is confirmed by the Monetary Board, it shall order the liquidation of the bank and indicate the manner of
its liquidation and approve a liquidation plan.
3. The Central Bank shall inform the principal stockholders of Genbank of the foregoing decision to liquidate the bank and the
liquidation plan approved by the Monetary Board.
4. The Solicitor General shall then file a petition in the Court of First Instance reciting the proceedings which had been taken
and praying the assistance of the Court in the liquidation of Genbank.
The PCGG further cites the Minutes No. 13 dated March 29, 1977 of the Monetary Board where it was shown that Atty. Mendoza was
furnished copies of pertinent documents relating to GENBANK in order to aid him in filing with the court the petition for assistance in the
banks liquidation. The pertinent portion of the said minutes reads:
The Board decided as follows:
...
E. To authorize Management to furnish the Solicitor General with a copy of the subject memorandum of the Director,
Department of Commercial and Savings Bank dated March 29, 1977, together with copies of:
1. Memorandum of the Deputy Governor, Supervision and Examination Sector, to the Monetary Board, dated
March 25, 1977, containing a report on the current situation of Genbank;
2. Aide Memoire on the Antecedent Facts Re: General Bank and Trust Co., dated March 23, 1977;
3. Memorandum of the Director, Department of Commercial and Savings Bank, to the Monetary Board, dated
March 24, 1977, submitting, pursuant to Section 29 of R.A. No. 265, as amended by P.D. No. 1007, a repot
on the state of insolvency of Genbank, together with its attachments; and
4. Such other documents as may be necessary or needed by the Solicitor General for his use in then CFI-praying
the assistance of the Court in the liquidation of Genbank.
Beyond doubt, therefore, the matter or the act of respondent Mendoza as Solicitor General involved in the case at bar is advising
the Central Bank, on how to proceed with the said banks liquidation and even filing the petition for its liquidation with the CFI of Manila.
In fine, the Court should resolve whether his act of advising the Central Bank on the legal procedure to liquidate GENBANK is included
within the concept of matter under Rule 6.03. The procedure of liquidation is given in black and white in Republic Act No. 265, section
29, viz:
The provision reads in part:
53

 SEC. 29. Proceedings upon insolvency. Whenever, upon examination by the head of the appropriate supervising or
examining department or his examiners or agents into the condition of any bank or non-bank financial intermediary
performing quasi-banking functions, it shall be disclosed that the condition of the same is one of insolvency, or that its
continuance in business would involve probable loss to its depositors or creditors, it shall be the duty of the department head
concerned forthwith, in writing, to inform the Monetary Board of the facts, and the Board may, upon finding the statements of
the department head to be true, forbid the institution to do business in the Philippines and shall designate an official of the
Central Bank or a person of recognized competence in banking or finance, as receiver to immediately take charge of its
assets and liabilities, as expeditiously as possible collect and gather all the assets and administer the same for the benefit of
its creditors, exercising all the powers necessary for these purposes including, but not limited to, bringing suits and
foreclosing mortgages in the name of the bank or non-bank financial intermediary performing quasi-banking functions.
...
If the Monetary Board shall determine and confirm within the said period that the bank or non-bank financial
intermediary performing quasi-banking functions is insolvent or cannot resume business with safety to its depositors,
creditors and the general public, it shall, if the public interest requires, order its liquidation, indicate the manner of its
liquidation and approve a liquidation plan. The Central Bank shall, by the Solicitor General, file a petition in the Court of First
Instance reciting the proceedings which have been taken and praying the assistance of the court in the liquidation of such
institution. The court shall have jurisdiction in the same proceedings to adjudicate disputed claims against the bank or non-
bank financial intermediary performing quasi-banking functions and enforce individual liabilities of the stockholders and do all
that is necessary to preserve the assets of such institution and to implement the liquidation plan approved by the Monetary
Board. The Monetary Board shall designate an official of the Central Bank, or a person of recognized competence in banking
or finance, as liquidator who shall take over the functions of the receiver previously appointed by the Monetary Board under
this Section. The liquidator shall, with all convenient speed, convert the assets of the banking institution or non-bank financial
intermediary performing quasi-banking functions to money or sell, assign or otherwise dispose of the same to creditors and
other parties for the purpose of paying the debts of such institution and he may, in the name of the bank or non-bank
financial intermediary performing quasi-banking functions, institute such actions as may be necessary in the appropriate
court to collect and recover accounts and assets of such institution.
The provisions of any law to the contrary notwithstanding, the actions of the Monetary Board under this Section and
the second paragraph of Section 34 of this Act shall be final and executory, and can be set aside by the court only if there is
convincing proof that the action is plainly arbitrary and made in bad faith. No restraining order or injunction shall be issued by
the court enjoining the Central Bank from implementing its actions under this Section and the second paragraph of Section
34 of this Act, unless there is convincing proof that the action of the Monetary Board is plainly arbitrary and made in bad faith
and the petitioner or plaintiff files with the clerk or judge of the court in which the action is pending a bond executed in favor
of the Central Bank, in an amount to be fixed by the court. The restraining order or injunction shall be refused or, if granted,
shall be dissolved upon filing by the Central Bank of a bond, which shall be in the form of cash or Central Bank cashier(s)
check, in an amount twice the amount of the bond of the petitioner or plaintiff conditioned that it will pay the damages which
the petitioner or plaintiff may suffer by the refusal or the dissolution of the injunction. The provisions of Rule 58 of the New
Rules of Court insofar as they are applicable and not inconsistent with the provisions of this Section shall govern the
issuance and dissolution of the restraining order or injunction contemplated in this Section.
Insolvency, under this Act, shall be understood to mean the inability of a bank or non-bank financial intermediary
performing quasi-banking functions to pay its liabilities as they fall due in the usual and ordinary course of business.
Provided, however, That this shall not include the inability to pay of an otherwise non-insolvent bank or non-bank financial
intermediary performing quasi-banking functions caused by extraordinary demands induced by financial panic commonly
evidenced by a run on the bank or non-bank financial intermediary performing quasi-banking functions in the banking or
financial community.
The appointment of a conservator under Section 28-A of this Act or the appointment of a receiver under this Section
shall be vested exclusively with the Monetary Board, the provision of any law, general or special, to the contrary
notwithstanding. (As amended by PD Nos. 72, 1007, 1771 & 1827, Jan. 16, 1981)
We hold that this advice given by respondent Mendoza on the procedure to liquidate GENBANK is not the matter contemplated by
Rule 6.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. ABA Formal Opinion No. 342 is clear as daylight in stressing that the
drafting, enforcing or interpreting government or agency procedures, regulations or laws, or briefing abstract principles of law are acts
which do not fall within the scope of the term matter and cannot disqualify.
Secondly, it can even be conceded for the sake of argument that the above act of respondent Mendoza falls within the definition of
matter per ABA Formal Opinion No. 342. Be that as it may, the said act of respondent Mendoza which is the matter involved in Sp. Proc.
No. 107812 is entirely different from the matter involved in Civil Case No. 0096. Again, the plain facts speak for themselves. It is given
that respondent Mendoza had nothing to do with the decision of the Central Bank to liquidate GENBANK. It is also given that he did not
participate in the sale of GENBANK to Allied Bank. The matter where he got himself involved was in informing Central Bank on
the procedure provided by law to liquidate GENBANK thru the courts and in filing the necessary petition in Sp. Proc. No. 107812 in the
then Court of First Instance. The subject matter of Sp. Proc. No. 107812, therefore, is not the same nor is related to but is different
from the subject matter in Civil Case No. 0096. Civil Case No. 0096 involves the sequestration of the stocksowned by respondents
Tan, et al., in Allied Bank on the alleged ground that they are ill-gotten. The case does not involve the liquidation of GENBANK. Nor does
it involve the sale of GENBANK to Allied Bank. Whether the shares of stock of the reorganized Allied Bank are ill-gotten is far
removed from the issue of the dissolution and liquidation of GENBANK. GENBANK was liquidated by the Central Bank due, among
others, to the alleged banking malpractices of its owners and officers. In other words, the legality of the liquidation of GENBANK is not an
issue in the sequestration cases. Indeed, the jurisdiction of the PCGG does not include the dissolution and liquidation of banks. It goes
without saying that Code 6.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility cannot apply to respondent Mendoza because his alleged
intervention while a Solicitor General in Sp. Proc. No. 107812 is an intervention on a matter different from the matter involved
in Civil Case No. 0096.
Thirdly, we now slide to the metes and bounds of the intervention contemplated by Rule 6.03. Intervene means, viz.:
1: to enter or appear as an irrelevant or extraneous feature or circumstance . . . 2: to occur, fall, or come in between points of time or
events . . . 3: to come in or between by way of hindrance or modification: INTERPOSE . . . 4: to occur or lie between two things (Paris,
[41]
where the same city lay on both sides of an intervening river . . .)
On the other hand, intervention is defined as:
[42]
1: the act or fact of intervening: INTERPOSITION; 2: interference that may affect the interests of others.
There are, therefore, two possible interpretations of the word intervene. Under the first interpretation, intervene includes
[43]
participation in a proceeding even if the intervention is irrelevant or has no effect or little influence. Under the second interpretation,
[44]
intervene only includes an act of a person who has the power to influence the subject proceedings. We hold that this second meaning
is more appropriate to give to the word intervention under Rule 6.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility in light of its history. The
evils sought to be remedied by the Rule do not exist where the government lawyer does an act which can be considered as innocuous
such as x x x drafting, enforcing or interpreting government or agency procedures, regulations or laws, or briefing abstract principles of
law.

54

 In fine, the intervention cannot be insubstantial and insignificant. Originally, Canon 36 provided that a former government lawyer
should not, after his retirement, accept employment in connection with any matter which he has investigated or passed uponwhile in
such office or employ. As aforediscussed, the broad sweep of the phrase which he has investigated or passed upon resulted in unjust
disqualification of former government lawyers. The 1969 Code restricted its latitude, hence, in DR 9-101(b), the prohibition extended only
to a matter in which the lawyer, while in the government service, had substantial responsibility. The 1983 Model Rules further
constricted the reach of the rule. MR 1.11(a) provides that a lawyer shall not represent a private client in connection with a matter in which
the lawyer participated personally and substantially as a public officer or employee.
It is, however, alleged that the intervention of respondent Mendoza in Sp. Proc. No. 107812 is significant and substantial. We
disagree. For one, the petition in the special proceedings is an initiatory pleading, hence, it has to be signed by respondent Mendoza
as the then sitting Solicitor General. For another, the record is arid as to the actual participation of respondent Mendoza in the
subsequent proceedings. Indeed, the case was in slumberville for a long number of years. None of the parties pushed for its early
termination. Moreover, we note that the petition filed merely seeks the assistance of the court in the liquidation of GENBANK. The
principal role of the court in this type of proceedings is to assist the Central Bank in determining claims of creditors against the
GENBANK. The role of the court is not strictly as a court of justice but as an agent to assist the Central Bank in determining the claims of
creditors. In such a proceeding, the participation of the Office of the Solicitor General is not that of the usual court litigator protecting the
interest of government.
II
Balancing Policy Considerations
To be sure, Rule 6.03 of our Code of Professional Responsibility represents a commendable effort on the part of the IBP to upgrade
the ethics of lawyers in the government service. As aforestressed, it is a take-off from similar efforts especially by the ABA which have
not been without difficulties. To date, the legal profession in the United States is still fine tuning its DR 9-101(b) rule.
In fathoming the depth and breadth of Rule 6.03 of our Code of Professional Responsibility, the Court took account of various
policy considerations to assure that its interpretation and application to the case at bar will achieve its end without necessarily
prejudicing other values of equal importance. Thus, the rule was not interpreted to cause a chilling effect on government recruitment
of able legal talent. At present, it is already difficult for government to match compensation offered by the private sector and it is unlikely
that government will be able to reverse that situation. The observation is not inaccurate that the only card that the government may play
to recruit lawyers is have them defer present income in return for the experience and contacts that can later be exchanged for higher
[45]
income in private practice. Rightly, Judge Kaufman warned that the sacrifice of entering government service would be too great for
most men to endure should ethical rules prevent them from engaging in the practice of a technical specialty which they devoted years in
[46]
acquiring and cause the firm with which they become associated to be disqualified. Indeed, to make government service more difficult
[47]
to exit can only make it less appealing to enter.
In interpreting Rule 6.03, the Court also cast a harsh eye on its use as a litigation tactic to harass opposing counsel as well as
deprive his client of competent legal representation. The danger that the rule will be misused to bludgeon an opposing counsel is not a
mere guesswork. The Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia has noted the tactical use of motions to disqualify counsel in order to
delay proceedings, deprive the opposing party of counsel of its choice, and harass and embarrass the opponent, and observed that the
[48]
tactic was so prevalent in large civil cases in recent years as to prompt frequent judicial and academic commentary. Even the United
[49]
States Supreme Court found no quarrel with the Court of Appeals description of disqualification motions as a dangerous game. In the
case at bar, the new attempt to disqualify respondent Mendoza is difficult to divine. The disqualification of respondent Mendoza has long
been a dead issue. It was resuscitated after the lapse of many years and only after PCGG has lost many legal incidents in the hands of
respondent Mendoza. For a fact, the recycled motion for disqualification in the case at bar was filed more than four years after the filing
of the petitions for certiorari, prohibition and injunction with the Supreme Court which were subsequently remanded to
[50]
the Sandiganbayan and docketed as Civil Case Nos. 0096-0099. At the very least, the circumstances under which the motion to
disqualify in the case at bar were refiled put petitioners motive as highly suspect.
Similarly, the Court in interpreting Rule 6.03 was not unconcerned with the prejudice to the client which will be caused by
its misapplication. It cannot be doubted that granting a disqualification motion causes the client to lose not only the law firm of choice, but
[51]
probably an individual lawyer in whom the client has confidence. The client with a disqualified lawyer must start again often without the
[52]
benefit of the work done by the latter. The effects of this prejudice to the right to choose an effective counsel cannot be overstated for
it can result in denial of due process.
The Court has to consider also the possible adverse effect of a truncated reading of the rule on the official independence
of lawyers in the government service. According to Prof. Morgan: An individual who has the security of knowing he or she can find
private employment upon leaving the government is free to work vigorously, challenge official positions when he or she believes them to
be in error, and resist illegal demands by superiors. An employee who lacks this assurance of private employment does not enjoy such
[53]
freedom. He adds: Any system that affects the right to take a new job affects the ability to quit the old job and any limit on the ability to
[54]
quit inhibits official independence. The case at bar involves the position of Solicitor General, the office once occupied by respondent
Mendoza. It cannot be overly stressed that the position of Solicitor General should be endowed with a great degree of
independence. It is this independence that allows the Solicitor General to recommend acquittal of the innocent; it is this independence
that gives him the right to refuse to defend officials who violate the trust of their office. Any undue dimunition of the independence of the
Solicitor General will have a corrosive effect on the rule of law.
No less significant a consideration is the deprivation of the former government lawyer of the freedom to exercise his
profession. Given the current state of our law, the disqualification of a former government lawyer may extend to all members of his law
[55]
firm. Former government lawyers stand in danger of becoming the lepers of the legal profession.
It is, however, proffered that the mischief sought to be remedied by Rule 6.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility is
the possible appearance of impropriety and loss of public confidence in government. But as well observed, the accuracy of gauging
[56] [57]
public perceptions is a highly speculative exercise at best which can lead to untoward results. No less than Judge Kaufman doubts
that the lessening of restrictions as to former government attorneys will have any detrimental effect on that free flow of information between
[58]
the government-client and its attorneys which the canons seek to protect. Notably, the appearance of impropriety theory has been
[59]
rejected in the 1983 ABA Model Rules of Professional Conduct and some courts have abandonedper se disqualification based on
Canons 4 and 9 when an actual conflict of interest exists, and demand an evaluation of the interests of the defendant, government, the
[60]
witnesses in the case, and the public.
It is also submitted that the Court should apply Rule 6.03 in all its strictness for it correctly disfavors lawyers who switch sides. It is
claimed that switching sides carries the danger that former government employee may compromise confidential official information in
the process. But this concern does not cast a shadow in the case at bar. As afore-discussed, the act of respondent Mendoza in informing
the Central Bank on the procedure how to liquidate GENBANK is a different matter from the subject matter of Civil Case No. 0005 which
is about the sequestration of the shares of respondents Tan, et al., in Allied Bank. Consequently, the danger that confidential official
information might be divulged is nil, if not inexistent. To be sure, there are no inconsistent sides to be bothered about in the case at
bar. For there is no question that in lawyering for respondents Tan, et al., respondent Mendoza is not working against the interest of
Central Bank. On the contrary, he is indirectly defending the validity of the action of Central Bank in liquidating GENBANK and selling it
later to Allied Bank. Their interests coincide instead of colliding. It is for this reason that Central Bank offered no objection to the
lawyering of respondent Mendoza in Civil Case No. 0005 in defense of respondents Tan, et al.There is no switching of sides for no
two sides are involved.

55

 It is also urged that the Court should consider that Rule 6.03 is intended to avoid conflict of loyalties, i.e., that a government
[61]
employee might be subject to a conflict of loyalties while still in government service. The example given by the proponents of this
argument is that a lawyer who plans to work for the company that he or she is currently charged with prosecuting might be tempted to
[62]
prosecute less vigorously. In the cautionary words of the Association of the Bar Committee in 1960: The greatest public risks arising
from post employment conduct may well occur during the period of employment through the dampening of aggressive administration of
[63] [64]
government policies. Prof. Morgan, however, considers this concern as probably excessive. He opines x x x it is hard to imagine
that a private firm would feel secure hiding someone who had just been disloyal to his or her last client the government. Interviews with
lawyers consistently confirm that law firms want the best government lawyers the ones who were hardest to beat not the least qualified
[65]
or least vigorous advocates. But again, this particular concern is a non factor in the case at bar. There is no charge against
respondent Mendoza that he advised Central Bank on how to liquidate GENBANK with an eye in later defending respondents Tan, et al.
of Allied Bank. Indeed, he continues defending both the interests of Central Bank and respondents Tan, et al. in the above cases.
Likewise, the Court is nudged to consider the need to curtail what is perceived as the excessive influence of former officials or
[66]
their clout. Prof. Morgan again warns against extending this concern too far. He explains the rationale for his warning, viz: Much of
what appears to be an employees influence may actually be the power or authority of his or her position, power that evaporates quickly
[67]
upon departure from government x x x. More, he contends that the concern can be demeaning to those sitting in government. To
quote him further: x x x The idea that, present officials make significant decisions based on friendship rather than on the merit says more
about the present officials than about their former co-worker friends. It implies a lack of will or talent, or both, in federal officials that does
not seem justified or intended, and it ignores the possibility that the officials will tend to disfavor their friends in order to avoid even the
[68]
appearance of favoritism.
III
The question of fairness
Mr. Justices Panganiban and Carpio are of the view, among others, that the congruent interest prong of Rule 6.03 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility should be subject to a prescriptive period. Mr. Justice Tinga opines that the rule cannot apply retroactively to
respondent Mendoza. Obviously, and rightly so, they are disquieted by the fact that (1) when respondent Mendoza was the Solicitor
General, Rule 6.03 has not yet adopted by the IBP and approved by this Court, and (2) the bid to disqualify respondent Mendoza was
made after the lapse of time whose length cannot, by any standard, qualify as reasonable. At bottom, the point they make relates to the
unfairness of the rule if applied without any prescriptive period and retroactively, at that. Their concern is legitimate and deserves to be
initially addressed by the IBP and our Committee on Revision of the Rules of Court.
IN VIEW WHEREOF, the petition assailing the resolutions dated July 11, 2001 and December 5, 2001 of the Fifth Division of
the Sandiganbayan in Civil Case Nos. 0096-0099 is denied.
No cost.
SO ORDERED.

56

Case 27

EN BANC

[G.R. No. L-19450. May 27, 1965.]

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. SIMPLICIO VILLANUEVA, Defendant-Appellant.

Magno T. Bueser, for Defendant-Appellant.

Solicitor General for Plaintiff-Appellee.

SYLLABUS

1. ATTORNEYS-AT-LAW EMPLOYED IN THE GOVERNMENT; PROHIBITION TO ENGAGE IN PRIVATE PRACTICE; MEANING.

Practice is more than an isolated appearance, for it consists in frequent or customary actions a succession of acts of the same kind.
The practice of law by attorneys employed in the government, to fall within the prohibition of statute has been interpreted as customarily
or habitually holding ones self out to the public, as a lawyer and demanding payment for such services. The appearance as counsel on
one occasion, is not conclusive as determinative of engagement in the private practice of law. The word private practice of law implies
that one must have presented himself to be in the active and continued practice of the legal profession and that his professional
services are available to the public for a compensation, as a source of his livelihood or in consideration of his said services.

2. ID.; ID.; ASSISTANT CITY ATTORNEY HANDLING CASE FOR RELATIVE WITH PERMISSION OF SUPERIOR NOT IN
PROHIBITED PRIVATE PRACTICE. The isolated appearance as a private prosecutor, previously authorized by his superior, of an
assistant city attorney in a criminal case for malicious mischief before a justice of the peace court where the offended party is his
relative, does not violate Section 32, Rule 127, now Sec. 35, Rule 138, Revised Rules of Court, which bars certain attorneys from
practicing.

DECISION

PAREDES, J.:

On September 4, 1959, the Chief of Police of Alaminos, Laguna, charged Simplicio Villanueva with the crime of Malicious Mischief,
before the Justice of the Peace Court of said municipality. Said accused was represented by counsel de oficio, but later on replaced by
counsel de parte. The complainant in the same case was represented by City Attorney Ariston Fule of San Pablo City, having entered
his appearance as private-prosecutor, after securing the permission of the Secretary of Justice. The condition of his appearance as
such, was that every time he would appear at the trial of the case, he would be considered on official leave of absence, and that he
would not receive any payment for his services. The appearance of City Attorney Fule as private prosecutor was questioned by the
counsel for the accused, invoking the case of Aquino, Et Al., v. Blanco, Et Al., 79 Phil. 647 wherein it was ruled that "when an attorney
had been appointed to the position of Assistant Provincial Fiscal or City Fiscal and therein qualified, by operation of law, he ceased to
engage in private law practice." Counsel then argued that the JP Court in entertaining the appearance of City Attorney Fule in the case
is a violation of the above ruling. On December 17, 1960 the JP issued an order sustaining the legality of the appearance of City
Attorney Fule.

Under date of January 4, 1961, counsel for the accused presented a "Motion to Inhibit Fiscal Fule from Acting as Private Prosecutor in
this Case," this time invoking Section 32, Rule 127, now Sec. 35, Rule 138, Revised Rules, which bars certain attorneys from
practicing. Counsel claims that City Attorney Fule falls under this limitation. The JP Court ruled on the motion by upholding the right of
Fule to appear and further stating that he (Fule) was not actually engaged in private law practice. This Order was appealed to the CFI of
Laguna, presided by the Hon. Hilarion U. Jarencio, which rendered judgment on December 20, 1961, the pertinent portions of which
read:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"The present case is one for malicious mischief. There being no reservation by the offended party of the civil liability, the civil action was
deemed impliedly instituted with the criminal action. The offended party had, therefore, the right to intervene in the case and be
represented by a legal counsel because of her interest in the civil liability of the accused.

"Sec. 31, Rule 127 of the Rules of Court provides that in the court of a justice of the peace a party may conduct his litigation in person,
with the aid of an agent or friend appointed by him for that purpose, or with the aid of an attorney. Assistant City Attorney Fule appeared
in the Justice of the Peace Court as an agent or friend of the offended party. It does not appear that he was being paid for his services
or that his appearance was in a professional capacity. As Assistant City Attorney of San Pablo he had no control or intervention
whatsoever in the prosecution of crimes committed in the municipality of Alaminos, Laguna, because the prosecution of criminal cases
coming from Alaminos are handled by the Office of the Provincial Fiscal and not by the City Attorney of San Pablo. There could be no
possible conflict in the duties of Assistant City Attorney Fule as Assistant City Attorney of San Pablo and as private prosecutor in this
criminal case. On the other hand, as already pointed out, the offended party in this criminal case had a right to be represented by an
agent or a friend to protect her rights in the civil action which was impliedly instituted together with the criminal action.

"In view of the foregoing, this Court holds that Asst. City Attorney Ariston D. Fule may appear before the Justice of the Peace Court in
Alaminos, Laguna as private prosecutor in this criminal case as an agent or a friend of the offended party.

"WHEREFORE, the appeal from the order of the Justice of the Peace Court of Alaminos, Laguna, allowing the appearance of Ariston D.
Fule as private prosecutor is dismissed, without costs."cralaw virtua1aw library

The above decision is the subject of the instant proceedings.

The appeal should be dismissed, for patently being without merits.

57

Aside from the considerations advanced by the learned trial judge, heretofore reproduced, and which We consider plausible, the fallacy
of the theory of defense counsel lies in his confused interpretation of Section 32 of Rule 127 (now Sec. 35, Rule 138, Revised Rules),
which provides that "no judge or other official or employee of the superior courts or of the office of the Solicitor General, shall engage in
private practice as a member of the bar or give professional advice to clients." He claims that City Attorney Fule, in appearing as private
prosecutor in the case was engaging in private practice. We believe that the isolated appearance of City Attorney Fule did not constitute
private practice, within the meaning and contemplation of the Rules. Practice is more than an isolated appearance, for it consists in
frequent or customary action, a succession of acts of the same kind. In other words, it is frequent habitual exercise (State v. Cotner,
127, p. 1, 87 Kan. 864, 42 LRA, N.S. 768). Practice of law to fall within the prohibition of statute has been interpreted as customarily or
habitually holding ones self out to the public, as a lawyer and demanding payment for such services (State v. Bryan, 4 S. E. 522, 98 N.
C. 644, 647). The appearance as counsel on one occasion, is not conclusive as determinative of engagement in the private practice of
law. The following observation of the Solicitor General is noteworthy:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"Essentially, the word private practice of law implies that one must have presented himself to be in the active and continued practice of
the legal profession and that his professional services are available to the public for a compensation, as a source of his livelihood or in
consideration of his said services."cralaw virtua1aw library

For one thing, it has never been refuted that City Attorney Fule had been given permission by his immediate superior, the Secretary of
Justice, to represent the complainant in the case at bar, who is a relative.

CONFORMABLY WITH ALL THE FOREGOING, the decision appealed from should be, as it is hereby affirmed, in all respects, with
costs against Appellant.

58

Case 28

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
A.M. No. 2266 October 27, 1983
HERMINIO R. NORIEGA, complainant,
vs.
ATTY. EMMANUEL R. SISON, respondent.
Herminio R. Noriega for complainant.
Emmanuel R. Sison in his own behalf.

GUERRERO, J.:
This is a complaint for disbarment filed on June 3, 1981 by Herminio R. Noriega against Atty. Emmanuel R. Sison "admitted to the Bar
on March 31, 1976) on the ground of malpractice through gross misrepresentation and falsification.
Complainant Noriega alleges that respondent Sison is a regular and permanent employee of the Securities and Exchange Commission
(SEC) as a Hearing Officer and as such, "is mandated to observe strictly the civil service rules and regulations, more particularly ... the
prohibition of government employees to practice their professions"; that to circumvent the prohibition and to evade the law, respondent
assumed a different name, falsified his Identity and represented himself to be one "Atty. Manuel Sison", with offices at No. 605 EDSA,
Cubao, Quezon City, "at the times that he will handle private cases"; that "Manuel Sison" is not listed as a member of the Bar in the
records of the Supreme Court; that under his said assumed name, respondent is representing one Juan Sacquing, the defendant in
Case No. E01978 before the Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court of Manila, submitting pleadings therein signed by him respondent)
under his assumed name, despite his full knowledge That "Manuel Sison" is not a member of the Bar and that his acts in doing so are
1
illegal and unlawful. Xerox copies of pertinent documents, pleadings, orders and notices are annexed to the complaint to support the
material allegations therein.
As requireD, respondent filed his Answer on August 20, 1981. He attached thereto a copy of the written authorization given by Julio A.
Sulit, Jr., Associate Commissioner of the Securities and Exchange Commission, for him to appear as counsel of Juan Sacquing, a close
family friend, in the Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court JDRC of Manila, Respondent alleges that he never held himself out to the
public as a practicing lawyer; that he provided legal services to Sacquing in view of close family friendship and for free; that he never
represented himself deliberately and intentionally as "Atty. Manuel Sison" in the Manila JDRC where, in the early stages of his
appearance, he always signed the minutes as "Atty. Emmanuel R. Sison", and in one instance, he even made the necessary correction
when the court staff wrote his name as Atty Manuel Sison"; that due to the "inept and careless work of the clerical staff of the JDRC",
notices were sent to "Atty. Manuel Sison", at 605 EDSA, Cubao, Quezon City, where respondent's parents conduct a printing office and
establishment, which notices were honored by the personnel of said office as respondent's family has called respondent by the
nickname "Manuel"; that respondent did not feel any necessity to correct this error of the JDRC since he "could use his nickname
'Manuel' interchangeably with his original true name as a formal name, and its use was not done for a fraudulent purpose nor to
misrepresent"; and, that this administrative case is only one of the numerous baseless complaints brought by complainant against
respondent, the former being a disgruntled loser in an injunction case in the SEC heard before respondent as Hearing Officer.
In resolving this disbarment case, We must initially emphasize the degree of integrity and respectability attached to the law profession.
There is no denying that the profession of an attorney is required after a long and laborious study. By years of patience, zeal and ability
the attorney acquires a fixed means of support for himself and his family. This is not to say, however, that the emphasis is on the
pecuniary value of this profession but rather on the social prestige and intellectual standing necessarily arising from and attached to the
same by reason of the fact that every attorney is deemed an officer of the court.
The importance of the dual aspects of the legal profession has been wisely put by Chief Justice Marshall of the United States Court
when he said:
On one hand, the profession of an Atty. is of great importance to an individual and the prosperity of his life may
depend on its exercise. The right to exercise it ought not to be lightly or capriciously taken from him. On the other
hand, it is extremely desirable that the respectability of the Bar should be maintained and that its harmony with the
bench should be preserved. For these objects, some controlling power, some discretion ought to be exercised with
2
great moderation and judgment, but it must be exercised.
The purpose of disbarment, therefore, is not meant as a punishment depriving him of a source of livelihood but is rather intended to
protect the administration of justice by requiring that those who exercise this function should be competent, honorable and reliable in
3
order that the courts and clients may rightly repose confidence in them.
In disbarment proceedings, the burden of proof rests upon the complainant, and for the court to exercise its disciplinary powers, the
case against the respondent must be established by clear, convincing, and satisfactory proof. Considering the serious consequences of
the disbarment or suspension of a member of the Bar, this Court has consistently held that clear preponderant evidence is necessary to
4
justify the imposition of the administrative penalty.
5
This Court has also held in re Atty. Felizarda M. de Guzman that to be made the basis of suspension or disbarment, the record must
disclose as free from doubt a case which compels the exercise by this Court of its disciplinary powers. The dubious character of the act
done as well as the motivation thereof must be clearly demonstrated. An attorney enjoys the legal presumption that he is innocent of
the charges preferred against him until the contrary is proved; and as an officer of the court, that he performed his duty in accordance
with his oath.
Examining the facts of this case, We hold that the allegations in the complaint do not warrant disbarment of the respondent. There is no
evidence that the respondent has committed an act constituting deceit, immoral conduct, violation of his oath as a lawyer, wilful
disobedience of any lawful order of the court, or corruptly and willfully appearing as an attorney to a part to a case without attorney to
6
do so.
There is no violation of the Civil Service Rules and Regulations for his appearance as counsel for the defendant in the JDRC Case No.
E-01978 was with authority given by the Associate Commisioner Of SEC, Julio A. Sulit, Jr.
This Court also holds that under the facts complained of supported by the annexes and the answer of respondent likewise sustained by
annexes attached thereto and the reply of the complainant, the accusation that respondent with malice and deliberate intent to evade
the laws, assumed a different name, falsified his Identity and represented himself to be one "ATTY. MANUEL SISON" with offices at
No. 605 EDSA, Cubao, Quezon City at the times that he will handle private cases, is not meritorious. Neither is the charge referred to is
that pending the slantiated. The only case DRC Case No. E-01978 wherein respondent appeared as counsel for the defendant. It being
an isolated case, the same does not constitute the practice of law, more so since respondent did not derive any pecuniary gain for his
appearance because respondent and defendant therein were close family friends. Such act of the respondent in going out of his way to
aid as counsel to a close family friend should not be allowed to be used as an instrument of harrassment against respondent.
The ruling in Zeta vs. Malinao (87 SCRA 303) wherein the respondent was dismissed from the service because being a government
employee, he appeared as counsel in a private case, cannot be applied in the case at bar because the respondent in said Zeta case
had appeared as counsel without permission from his superiors.
Although the complaint alleges violation of civil service rules, the complainant however states that the basis of his complaint for
7
disbarment is not the respondent's act of appearing as counsel but the unauthorized use of another name.
59

A perusal of the records however, reveals that whereas there is indeed a pleading entitled "Objection/Opposition to the 2 Formal Offer
of Evidence" (Annex "C" to the Complaint for Disbarment, which is signed as "Manuel Sisori", counsel for defendant, 605 EDSA,
Cubao, Quezon City, p. 7 of the Records), there is, however, no showing that respondent was thus motivated with bad faith or malice,
for otherwise lie would not have corrected the spelling of his name when the court staff misspelled it in one of the minutes of the
proceeding. Moreover, We find no reason or motive for respondent to conceal his true name when he have already given express
authority by his superior to act as counsel for Juan Sacquing in the latter's case pending before the JDRC And while it may be True that
subsequent errors were made in sending notices to him under the name "Atty. Manuel Sison, ' the errors were attributable to the JDRC
clerical staff and not to the respondent.
At most, this Court would only counsel the respondent to be more careful and cautious in signing his name so as to avoid unnecessary
confusion as regards his Identity.
At this point, We are constrained to examine the motives that prompted the complainant in filing the present case. An examination of
the records reveals that the complainant was a defendant in the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) Case No. 1982 filed by
the Integrated Livestock Dealers Inc. and Teofisto Jiao against seven (7) respondents including the complainant, seeking to oust the
complainant and his codefendants from acting as officers of the Integrated Livestock Dealers lnc. then pending before respondent as
Hearing Officer of the SEC, who after trial decided the case against the herein complainant. From this antecedent fact, there is cast a
grave and serious doubt as to the true motivation of the complainant in filing the present case, considering further that other
administrative charges were filed by the complainant against respondent herein before the SEC, JDRC and the Fiscal's office in Manila.
We hold that complainant's repeated charges or accusations only indicate his resentment and bitterness in losing the SEC case and not
with the honest and sincere desire and objectives "(1) to compel the attorney to deal fairly and honestly with his client;" (Strong vs.
Munday 52 N.J. Eq. 833, 21 A. 611) and "(2) to remove from the profession a person whose misconduct has proved him unfit to be
entrusted with the duties and responsibilities belonging to the office of an attorney." (Ex parte Brounsal Cowp 829; 83 Reprint; 6 C.J., p.
581; see In re de los Angeles Adm. Case No. 225, Sept. 31, 1959, cited in Moran, Comments on the Rules of Court, Vol. 6, p. 242).
In the light of the foregoing, We find no reason or necessity to refer this complaint to the Solicitor General for investigation, report and
recommendation.
WHEREFORE, this case is hereby DISMISSED for lack of merit.
SO ORDERED.

60

Case 29

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
A.C. No. 6705 March 31, 2006
RUTHIE LIM-SANTIAGO, Complainant,
vs.
ATTY. CARLOS B. SAGUCIO, Respondent.
DECISION
CARPIO, J.:
The Case
This is a disbarment complaint against Atty. Carlos B. Sagucio for violating Rule 15.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility and
for defying the prohibition against private practice of law while working as government prosecutor.
The Facts
1
Ruthie Lim-Santiago ("complainant") is the daughter of Alfonso Lim and Special Administratrix of his estate. Alfonso Lim is a
2
stockholder and the former President of Taggat Industries, Inc.
3
Atty. Carlos B. Sagucio ("respondent") was the former Personnel Manager and Retained Counsel of Taggat Industries, Inc. until his
4
appointment as Assistant Provincial Prosecutor of Tuguegarao, Cagayan in 1992.
Taggat Industries, Inc. ("Taggat") is a domestic corporation engaged in the operation of timber concessions from the government. The
5 6
Presidential Commission on Good Government sequestered it sometime in 1986, and its operations ceased in 1997.
Sometime in July 1997, 21 employees of Taggat ("Taggat employees") filed a criminal complaint entitled "Jesus Tagorda, Jr. et al. v.
7
Ruthie Lim-Santiago," docketed as I.S. No. 97-240 ("criminal complaint"). Taggat employees alleged that complainant, who took over
the management and control of Taggat after the death of her father, withheld payment of their salaries and wages without valid cause
8
from 1 April 1996 to 15 July 1997.
9
Respondent, as Assistant Provincial Prosecutor, was assigned to conduct the preliminary investigation. He resolved the criminal
10 11 12
complaint by recommending the filing of 651 Informations for violation of Article 288 in relation to Article 116 of the Labor Code
13
of the Philippines.
Complainant now charges respondent with the following violations:
1. Rule 15.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility
Complainant contends that respondent is guilty of representing conflicting interests. Respondent, being the former Personnel Manager
and Retained Counsel of Taggat, knew the operations of Taggat very well. Respondent should have inhibited himself from hearing,
14
investigating and deciding the case filed by Taggat employees. Furthermore, complainant claims that respondent instigated the filing
15
of the cases and even harassed and threatened Taggat employees to accede and sign an affidavit to support the complaint.
2. Engaging in the private practice of law while working as a government prosecutor
Complainant also contends that respondent is guilty of engaging in the private practice of law while working as a government
prosecutor. Complainant presented evidence to prove that respondent received P10,000 as retainers fee for the months of January
16 17 18
and February 1995, another P10,000 for the months of April and May 1995, and P5,000 for the month of April 1996.
Complainant seeks the disbarment of respondent for violating Rule 15.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility and for defying the
prohibition against private practice of law while working as government prosecutor.
Respondent refutes complainants allegations and counters that complainant was merely aggrieved by the resolution of the criminal
19
complaint which was adverse and contrary to her expectation.
Respondent claims that when the criminal complaint was filed, respondent had resigned from Taggat for more than five
20 21
years. Respondent asserts that he no longer owed his undivided loyalty to Taggat. Respondent argues that it was his sworn duty to
22
conduct the necessary preliminary investigation. Respondent contends that complainant failed to establish lack of impartiality when
23
he performed his duty. Respondent points out that complainant did not file a motion to inhibit respondent from hearing the criminal
24 25
complaint but instead complainant voluntarily executed and filed her counter-affidavit without mental reservation.
Respondent states that complainants reason in not filing a motion to inhibit was her impression that respondent would exonerate her
from the charges filed as gleaned from complainants statement during the hearing conducted on 12 February 1999:
xxx
Q. (Atty. Dabu). What do you mean you didnt think he would do it, Madam Witness?
A. Because he is supposed to be my fathers friend and he was working with my Dad and he was supposed to be trusted by my father.
26
And he came to me and told me he gonna help me. x x x.
Respondent also asserts that no conflicting interests exist because he was not representing Taggat employees or complainant.
27
Respondent claims he was merely performing his official duty as Assistant Provincial Prosecutor. Respondent argues that
28
complainant failed to establish that respondents act was tainted with personal interest, malice and bad faith.
Respondent denies complainants allegations that he instigated the filing of the cases, threatened and harassed Taggat employees.
Respondent claims that this accusation is bereft of proof because complainant failed to mention the names of the employees or present
29
them for cross-examination.
Respondent does not dispute his receipt, after his appointment as government prosecutor, of retainer fees from complainant but claims
that it
30
was only on a case-to-case basis and it ceased in 1996. Respondent contends that the fees were paid for his consultancy services
and not for representation. Respondent submits that consultation is not the same as representation and that rendering consultancy
31
services is not prohibited. Respondent, in his Reply-Memorandum, states:
x x x [I]f ever Taggat paid him certain amounts, these were paid voluntarily by Taggat without the respondents asking, intended as
token consultancy fees on a case-to-case basis and not as or for retainer fees. These payments do not at all show or translate as a
specie of conflict of interest. Moreover, these consultations had no relation to, or connection with, the above-mentioned labor
32
complaints filed by former Taggat employees.
Respondent insists that complainants evidence failed to prove that when the criminal complaint was filed with the Office of the
33
Provincial Prosecutor of Cagayan, respondent was still the retained counsel or legal consultant.
While this disbarment case was pending, the Resolution and Order issued by respondent to file 651 Informations against complainant
34
was reversed and set aside by Regional State Prosecutor of Cagayan Rodolfo B. Cadelina last 4 January 1999. Hence, the criminal
35
complaint was dismissed.
The IBPs Report and Recommendation
The Integrated Bar of the Philippines Investigating Commissioner Ma. Carmina M. Alejandro-Abbas ("IBP Commissioner Abbas") heard
36 37
the case and allowed the parties to submit their respective memoranda. Due to IBP Commissioner Abbas resignation, the case
38
was reassigned to Commissioner Dennis A.B. Funa ("IBP Commissioner Funa").
After the parties filed their memoranda and motion to resolve the case, the IBP Board of Governors issued Resolution No. XVI-2004-
39
479 ("IBP Resolution") dated 4 November 2004 adopting with modification IBP Commissioner Funas Report and Recommendation
("Report") finding respondent guilty of conflict of interests, failure to safeguard a former clients interest, and violating the prohibition
61

against the private practice of law while being a government prosecutor. The IBP Board of Governors recommended the imposition of a
penalty of three years suspension from the practice of law. The Report reads:
Now the issue here is whether being a former lawyer of Taggat conflicts with his role as Assistant Provincial Prosecutor in deciding
I.S. No. 97-240. A determination of this issue will require the test of whether the matter in I.S. No. 97-240 will conflict with his former
position of Personnel Manager and Legal Counsel of Taggat.
I.S. No. 97-240 was filed for "Violation of Labor Code" (see Resolution of the Provincial Prosecutors Office, Annex "B" of Complaint).
Herein Complainant, Ruthie Lim-Santiago, was being accused as having the "management and control" of Taggat (p. 2, Resolution of
the Prov. Pros. Office, supra).
Clearly, as a former Personnel Manager and Legal Counsel of Taggat, herein Respondent undoubtedly handled the personnel and
labor concerns of Taggat. Respondent, undoubtedly dealt with and related with the employees of Taggat. Therefore, Respondent
undoubtedly dealt with and related with complainants in I.S. No. 97-240. The issues, therefore, in I.S. No. 97-240, are very much
familiar with Respondent. While the issues of unpaid salaries pertain to the periods 1996-1997, the mechanics and personalities in that
case are very much familiar with Respondent.
A lawyer owes something to a former client. Herein Respondent owes to Taggat, a former client, the duty to "maintain inviolate the
clients confidence or to refrain from doing anything which will injuriously affect him in any matter in which he previously represented
him" (Natam v. Capule, 91 Phil. 640; p. 231, Agpalo, Legal Ethics, 4th ed.)
Respondent argues that as Assistant Provincial Prosecutor, he does not represent any client or any interest except justice. It should not
be forgotten, however, that a lawyer has an immutable duty to a former client with respect to matters that he previously handled for
that former client. In this case, matters relating to personnel, labor policies, and labor relations that he previously handled as Personnel
Manager and Legal Counsel of Taggat. I.S. No. 97-240 was for "Violation of the Labor Code." Here lies the conflict. Perhaps it would
have been different had I.S. No. 97-240 not been labor-related, or if Respondent had not been a Personnel Manager concurrently as
Legal Counsel. But as it is, I.S. No. 97-240 is labor-related and Respondent was a former Personnel Manager of Taggat.
xxxx
While Respondent ceased his relations with Taggat in 1992 and the unpaid salaries being sought in I.S. No. 97-240 were of the years
1996 and 1997, the employees and management involved are the very personalities he dealt with as Personnel Manager and
Legal Counsel of Taggat. Respondent dealt with these persons in his fiduciary relations with Taggat. Moreover, he was an employee
of the corporation and part of its management.
xxxx
As to the propriety of receiving "Retainer Fees" or "consultancy fees" from herein Complainant while being an Assistant Provincial
Prosecutor, and for rendering legal consultancy work while being an Assistant Provincial Prosecutor, this matter had long been
settled. Government prosecutors are prohibited to engage in the private practice of law (see Legal and Judicial Ethics, Ernesto
Pineda, 1994 ed., p. 20; People v. Villanueva, 14 SCRA 109; Aquino v. Blanco 70 Phil. 647). The act of being a legal consultant is a
practice of law. To engage in the practice of law is to do any of those acts that are characteristic of the legal profession (In re: David, 93
Phil. 461). It covers any activity, in or out of court, which required the application of law, legal principles, practice or procedures and
calls for legal knowledge, training and experience (PLA v. Agrava, 105 Phil. 173; People v. Villanueva, 14 SCRA 111; Cayetano v.
Monsod, 201 SCRA 210).
Respondent clearly violated this prohibition.
As for the secondary accusations of harassing certain employees of Taggat and instigating the filing of criminal complaints, we find the
evidence insufficient.
Accordingly, Respondent should be found guilty of conflict of interest, failure to safeguard a former clients interest, and violating the
40
prohibition against the private practice of law while being a government prosecutor.
41
The IBP Board of Governors forwarded the Report to the Court as provided under Section 12(b), Rule 139-B of the Rules of Court.
The Ruling of the Court
The Court exonerates respondent from the charge of violation of Rule 15.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility ("Code").
However, the Court finds respondent liable for violation of Rule 1.01, Canon 1 of the Code of Professional Responsibility against
42
unlawful conduct. Respondent committed unlawful conduct when he violated Section 7(b)(2) of the Code of Conduct and Ethical
Standards for Public Officials and Employees or Republic Act No. 6713 ("RA 6713").
43
Canon 6 provides that the Code "shall apply to lawyers in government service in the discharge of their official duties." A government
44
lawyer is thus bound by the prohibition "not [to] represent conflicting interests." However, this rule is subject to certain limitations. The
prohibition to represent conflicting interests does not apply when no conflict of interest exists, when a written consent of all concerned is
45
given after a full disclosure of the facts or when no true attorney-client relationship exists. Moreover, considering the serious
consequence of the disbarment or suspension of a member of the Bar, clear preponderant evidence is necessary to justify the
46
imposition of the administrative penalty.
Respondent is also mandated under Rule 1.01 of Canon 1 not to engage in "unlawful x x x conduct." Unlawful conduct includes
violation of the statutory prohibition on a government employee to "engage in the private practice of [his] profession unless authorized
47
by the Constitution or law, provided, that such practice will not conflict or tend to conflict with [his] official functions."
Complainants evidence failed to substantiate the claim that respondent represented conflicting interests
48
In Quiambao v. Bamba, the Court enumerated various tests to determine conflict of interests. One test of inconsistency of interests is
whether the lawyer will be asked to use against his former client any confidential information acquired through their connection or
49
previous employment. In essence, what a lawyer owes his former client is to maintain inviolate the clients confidence or to refrain
50
from doing anything which will injuriously affect him in any matter in which he previously represented him.
In the present case, we find no conflict of interests when respondent handled the preliminary investigation of the criminal complaint filed
by Taggat employees in 1997. The issue in the criminal complaint pertains to non-payment of wages that occurred from 1 April 1996 to
15 July 1997. Clearly, respondent was no longer connected with Taggat during that period since he resigned sometime in 1992.
In order to charge respondent for representing conflicting interests, evidence must be presented to prove that respondent used against
Taggat, his former client, any confidential information acquired through his previous employment. The only established participation
respondent had with respect to the criminal complaint is that he was the one who conducted the preliminary investigation. On that basis
alone, it does not necessarily follow that respondent used any confidential information from his previous employment with complainant
or Taggat in resolving the criminal complaint.
The fact alone that respondent was the former Personnel Manager and Retained Counsel of Taggat and the case he resolved as
government prosecutor was labor-related is not a sufficient basis to charge respondent for representing conflicting interests. A lawyers
immutable duty to a former client does not cover transactions that occurred beyond the lawyers employment with the client. The intent
of the law is to impose upon the lawyer the duty to protect the clients interests only on matters that he previously handled for the former
client and not for matters that arose after the lawyer-client relationship has terminated.
Further, complainant failed to present a single iota of evidence to prove her allegations. Thus, respondent is not guilty of violating Rule
15.03 of the Code.
Respondent engaged in the private practice of law while working as a government prosecutor
The Court has defined the practice of law broadly as
x x x any activity, in or out of court, which requires the application of law, legal procedure, knowledge, training and experience. "To
engage in the practice of law is to perform those acts which are characteristics of the profession. Generally, to practice law is to give
51
notice or render any kind of service, which device or service requires the use in any degree of legal knowledge or skill."
62

"Private practice of law" contemplates a succession of acts of the same nature habitually or customarily holding ones self to the public
52
as a lawyer.
Respondent argues that he only rendered consultancy services to Taggat intermittently and he was not a retained counsel of Taggat
from 1995 to 1996 as alleged. This argument is without merit because the law does not distinguish between consultancy services and
retainer agreement. For as long as respondent performed acts that are usually rendered by lawyers with the use of their legal
knowledge, the same falls within the ambit of the term "practice of law."
Nonetheless, respondent admitted that he rendered his legal services to complainant while working as a government prosecutor. Even
53
the receipts he signed stated that the payments by Taggat were for "Retainers fee." Thus, as correctly pointed out by complainant,
respondent clearly violated the prohibition in RA 6713.
However, violations of RA 6713 are not subject to disciplinary action under the Code of Professional Responsibility unless the violations
also constitute infractions of specific provisions of the Code of Professional Responsibility. Certainly, the IBP has no jurisdiction to
investigate violations of RA 6713 the Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public Officials and Employees unless the acts
involved also transgress provisions of the Code of Professional Responsibility.
Here, respondents violation of RA 6713 also constitutes a violation of Rule 1.01 of Canon 1, which mandates that "[a] lawyer shall not
engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct." Respondents admission that he received from Taggat fees for legal
services while serving as a government prosecutor is an unlawful conduct, which constitutes a violation of Rule 1.01.
Respondent admitted that complainant also charged him with unlawful conduct when respondent stated in his Demurrer to Evidence:
In this instant case, the complainant prays that the respondent be permanently and indefinitely suspended or disbarred from the
practice of the law profession and his name removed from the Roll of Attorneys on the following grounds:
xxxx
54
d) that respondent manifested gross misconduct and gross violation of his oath of office and in his dealings with the public.
On the Appropriate Penalty on Respondent
55
The appropriate penalty on an errant lawyer depends on the exercise of sound judicial discretion based on the surrounding facts.
Under Civil Service Law and rules, the penalty for government employees engaging in unauthorized private practice of profession is
56
suspension for six months and one day to one year. We find this penalty appropriate for respondents violation in this case of Rule
1.01, Canon 1 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.
WHEREFORE, we find respondent Atty. Carlos B. Sagucio GUILTY of violation of Rule 1.01, Canon 1 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility. Accordingly, we SUSPEND respondent Atty. Carlos B. Sagucio from the practice of law for SIX MONTHS effective upon
finality of this Decision.
Let copies of this Decision be furnished the Office of the Bar Confidant to be appended to respondents personal record as an attorney,
the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, the Department of Justice, and all courts in the country for their information and guidance.
SO ORDERED.

63

Case 30

FIRST DIVISION

WILFREDO M. CATU, A.C. No. 5738

Complainant,
Present:

PUNO, C.J., Chairperson,

SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ,
- v e r s u s - CORONA,
AZCUNA and
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, JJ.

ATTY. VICENTE G. RELLOSA,

Respondent. Promulgated:
February 19, 2008

x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x

RESOLUTION
CORONA, J.:

[1]
Complainant Wilfredo M. Catu is a co-owner of a lot and the building erected thereon located at 959 San Andres Street, Malate, Manila.
[2] [3]
His mother and brother, Regina Catu and Antonio Catu, contested the possession of Elizabeth C. Diaz-Catu and Antonio Pastor of
one of the units in the building. The latter ignored demands for them to vacate the premises. Thus, a complaint was initiated against them
th [4]
in the Lupong Tagapamayapa of Barangay 723, Zone 79 of the 5 District of Manila where the parties reside.
[5]
Respondent, as punong barangay of Barangay 723, summoned the parties to conciliation meetings. When the parties failed
to arrive at an amicable settlement, respondent issued a certification for the filing of the appropriate action in court.

Thereafter, Regina and Antonio filed a complaint for ejectment against Elizabeth and Pastor in the Metropolitan Trial Court of Manila,
Branch 11. Respondent entered his appearance as counsel for the defendants in that case. Because of this, complainant filed the instant
[6]
administrative complaint, claiming that respondent committed an act of impropriety as a lawyer and as a public officer when he stood
as counsel for the defendants despite the fact that he presided over the conciliation proceedings between the litigants as punong
barangay.

In his defense, respondent claimed that one of his duties as punong barangay was to hear complaints referred to the barangays Lupong
Tagapamayapa. As such, he heard the complaint of Regina and Antonio against Elizabeth and Pastor. As head of theLupon, he performed
his task with utmost objectivity, without bias or partiality towards any of the parties. The parties, however, were not able to amicably settle
their dispute and Regina and Antonio filed the ejectment case. It was then that Elizabeth sought his legal assistance. He acceded to her
request. He handled her case for free because she was financially distressed and he wanted to prevent the commission of a patent
injustice against her.

The complaint was referred to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for investigation, report and recommendation. As there was no
factual issue to thresh out, the IBPs Commission on Bar Discipline (CBD) required the parties to submit their respective position papers.
[7]
After evaluating the contentions of the parties, the IBP-CBD found sufficient ground to discipline respondent.

According to the IBP-CBD, respondent admitted that, as punong barangay, he presided over the conciliation proceedings and
heard the complaint of Regina and Antonio against Elizabeth and Pastor. Subsequently, however, he represented Elizabeth and Pastor
in the ejectment case filed against them by Regina and Antonio. In the course thereof, he prepared and signed pleadings including the
answer with counterclaim, pre-trial brief, position paper and notice of appeal. By so doing, respondent violated Rule 6.03 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility:

Rule 6.03 A lawyer shall not, after leaving government service, accept engagement or employment in
connection with any matter in which he intervened while in said service.
[8]
Furthermore, as an elective official, respondent contravened the prohibition under Section 7(b)(2) of RA 6713:

SEC. 7. Prohibited Acts and Transactions. In addition to acts and omissions of public officials and employees
now prescribed in the Constitution and existing laws, the following shall constitute prohibited acts and transactions of
any public official ands employee and are hereby declared to be unlawful:

xxx xxx xxx

(b) Outside employment and other activities related thereto. Public officials and employees during their incumbency
shall not:

xxx xxx xxx

(2) Engage in the private practice of profession unless authorized by the Constitution or law, provided
that such practice will not conflict or tend to conflict with their official functions; xxx (emphasis supplied)

According to the IBP-CBD, respondents violation of this prohibition constituted a breach of Canon 1 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility:

CANON 1. A LAWYER SHALL UPHOLD THE CONSTITUTION, OBEY THE LAWS OF THE LAND, PROMOTE
RESPECT FOR LAW AND LEGAL PROCESSES. (emphasis supplied)

64

 For these infractions, the IBP-CBD recommended the respondents suspension from the practice of law for one month with a
[9]
stern warning that the commission of the same or similar act will be dealt with more severely. This was adopted and approved by the
[10]
IBP Board of Governors.

We modify the foregoing findings regarding the transgression of respondent as well as the recommendation on the imposable
penalty.

RULE 6.03 OF THE CODE

OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY APPLIES ONLY TO FORMER
GOVERNMENT LAWYERS

Respondent cannot be found liable for violation of Rule 6.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. As worded, that Rule
applies only to a lawyer who has left government service and in connection with any matter in which he intervened while in said service.
[11]
In PCGG v. Sandiganbayan, we ruled that Rule 6.03 prohibits former government lawyers from accepting engagement or
employment in connection with any matter in which [they] had intervened while in said service.

Respondent was an incumbent punong barangay at the time he committed the act complained of. Therefore, he was not covered
by that provision.

SECTION 90 OF RA 7160, NOT SECTION 7(B)(2) OF RA 6713, GOVERNS THE

PRACTICE OF PROFESSION OF ELECTIVE LOCAL GOVERNMENT
OFFICIALS

Section 7(b)(2) of RA 6713 prohibits public officials and employees, during their incumbency, from engaging in the private
practice of their profession unless authorized by the Constitution or law, provided that such practice will not conflict or tend to conflict with
their official functions. This is the general law which applies to all public officials and employees.
[12]
For elective local government officials, Section 90 of RA 7160 governs:
SEC. 90. Practice of Profession. (a) All governors, city and municipal mayors are prohibited from practicing
their profession or engaging in any occupation other than the exercise of their functions as local chief executives.
(b) Sanggunian members may practice their professions, engage in any occupation, or teach in schools
except during session hours: Provided, That sanggunian members who are members of the Bar shall not:
(1) Appear as counsel before any court in any civil case wherein a local government unit or any
office, agency, or instrumentality of the government is the adverse party;
(2) Appear as counsel in any criminal case wherein an officer or employee of the national or local
government is accused of an offense committed in relation to his office;
(3) Collect any fee for their appearance in administrative proceedings involving the local government
unit of which he is an official; and
(4) Use property and personnel of the Government except when the sanggunian member concerned
is defending the interest of the Government.
(c) Doctors of medicine may practice their profession even during official hours of work only on occasions of
emergency: Provided, That the officials concerned do not derive monetary compensation therefrom.

This is a special provision that applies specifically to the practice of profession by elective local officials. As a special law with a
definite scope (that is, the practice of profession by elective local officials), it constitutes an exception to Section 7(b)(2) of RA 6713, the
[13]
general law on engaging in the private practice of profession by public officials and employees. Lex specialibus derogat generalibus.

Under RA 7160, elective local officials of provinces, cities, municipalities and barangays are the following: the governor, the vice
governor and members of the sangguniang panlalawigan for provinces; the city mayor, the city vice mayor and the members of
the sangguniang panlungsod for cities; the municipal mayor, the municipal vice mayor and the members of the sangguniang bayan for
municipalities and the punong barangay, the members of the sangguniang barangay and the members of the sangguniang kabataan for
barangays.

Of these elective local officials, governors, city mayors and municipal mayors are prohibited from practicing their profession or
engaging in any occupation other than the exercise of their functions as local chief executives. This is because they are required to render
full time service. They should therefore devote all their time and attention to the performance of their official duties.

On the other hand, members of the sangguniang panlalawigan, sangguniang panlungsod or sangguniang bayan may practice
their professions, engage in any occupation, or teach in schools except during session hours. In other words, they may practice their
professions, engage in any occupation, or teach in schools outside their session hours. Unlike governors, city mayors and municipal
mayors, members of the sangguniang panlalawigan, sangguniang panlungsod or sangguniang bayan are required to hold regular
[14]
sessions only at least once a week. Since the law itself grants them the authority to practice their professions, engage in any occupation
or teach in schools outside session hours, there is no longer any need for them to secure prior permission or authorization from any other
person or office for any of these purposes.

While, as already discussed, certain local elective officials (like governors, mayors, provincial board members and councilors)
are expressly subjected to a total or partial proscription to practice their profession or engage in any occupation, no such interdiction is
[15]
made on the punong barangay and the members of the sangguniang barangay. Expressio unius est exclusio alterius. Since they are
excluded from any prohibition, the presumption is that they are allowed to practice their profession. And this stands to reason because
[16]
they are not mandated to serve full time. In fact, the sangguniang barangay is supposed to hold regular sessions only twice a month.

Accordingly, as punong barangay, respondent was not forbidden to practice his profession. However, he should have procured
prior permission or authorization from the head of his Department, as required by civil service regulations.

65

A LAWYER IN GOVERNMENT SERVICE WHO IS NOT PROHIBITED TO
PRACTICE LAW MUST SECURE PRIOR AUTHORITY FROM THE HEAD OF
HIS DEPARTMENT

A civil service officer or employee whose responsibilities do not require his time to be fully at the disposal of the government can engage
[17]
in the private practice of law only with the written permission of the head of the department concerned. Section 12, Rule XVIII of the
Revised Civil Service Rules provides:

Sec. 12. No officer or employee shall engage directly in any private business, vocation, or profession or
be connected with any commercial, credit, agricultural, or industrial undertaking without a written permission from
the head of the Department: Provided, That this prohibition will be absolute in the case of those officers and
employees whose duties and responsibilities require that their entire time be at the disposal of the
Government; Provided, further, That if an employee is granted permission to engage in outside activities, time so
devoted outside of office hours should be fixed by the agency to the end that it will not impair in any way the efficiency
of the officer or employee: And provided, finally, that no permission is necessary in the case of investments, made by
an officer or employee, which do not involve real or apparent conflict between his private interests and public duties,
or in any way influence him in the discharge of his duties, and he shall not take part in the management of the
enterprise or become an officer of the board of directors. (emphasis supplied)

As punong barangay, respondent should have therefore obtained the prior written permission of the Secretary of Interior and
Local Government before he entered his appearance as counsel for Elizabeth and Pastor. This he failed to do.

The failure of respondent to comply with Section 12, Rule XVIII of the Revised Civil Service Rules constitutes a violation of his oath as a
lawyer: to obey the laws. Lawyers are servants of the law, vires legis, men of the law. Their paramount duty to society is to obey the law
and promote respect for it. To underscore the primacy and importance of this duty, it is enshrined as the first canon of the Code of
Professional Responsibility.

In acting as counsel for a party without first securing the required written permission, respondent not only engaged in the unauthorized
practice of law but also violated civil service rules which is a breach of Rule 1.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility:
Rule 1.01 A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct. (emphasis
supplied)

For not living up to his oath as well as for not complying with the exacting ethical standards of the legal profession, respondent failed to
comply with Canon 7 of the Code of Professional Responsibility:

CANON 7. A LAWYER SHALL AT ALL TIMES UPHOLD THE INTEGRITY AND THE DIGNITY OF THE LEGAL
PROFESSION AND SUPPORT THE ACTIVITIES OF THE INTEGRATED BAR. (emphasis supplied)

Indeed, a lawyer who disobeys the law disrespects it. In so doing, he disregards legal ethics and disgraces the dignity of the
legal profession.

Public confidence in the law and in lawyers may be eroded by the irresponsible and improper conduct of a member of the
[18] [19]
bar. Every lawyer should act and comport himself in a manner that promotes public confidence in the integrity of the legal profession.
[20]
A member of the bar may be disbarred or suspended from his office as an attorney for violation of the lawyers oath and/or for
breach of the ethics of the legal profession as embodied in the Code of Professional Responsibility.

WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Vicente G. Rellosa is hereby found GUILTY of professional misconduct for violating his oath as a lawyer
and Canons 1 and 7 and Rule 1.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. He is therefore SUSPENDEDfrom the practice of law for
a period of six months effective from his receipt of this resolution. He is sternly WARNED that any repetition of similar acts shall be dealt
with more severely.

Respondent is strongly advised to look up and take to heart the meaning of the word delicadeza.

Let a copy of this resolution be furnished the Office of the Bar Confidant and entered into the records of respondent Atty. Vicente G.
Rellosa. The Office of the Court Administrator shall furnish copies to all the courts of the land for their information and guidance.

SO ORDERED.

66