CDL Core Files 2016-17-2nd Semester Version FINAL

CDL Core Files 2016-2017
Index
CDL Core Files

Index
CDL Core Files Index......................................................................................... 1
Bilateral Investment Treaty AFFIRMATIVE.........................................................8
Vocabulary.................................................................................................... 9
Bilateral Investment Treaty 1AC..................................................................11
Contention One: Harms (The Global Economy)........................................12
Contention Two: Harms (US-China War)...................................................15
Contention Three: Solvency.....................................................................17
2AC AT Global Economy #1China Investment High.................................19
2AC AT Global Economy #2Economic Decline War..................................21
2AC AT Global Economy #3BIT Hurts Economy.......................................23
2AC AT Global Economy #4Economies Improving...................................27
2AC AT US-China War #1No US/China War..............................................30
2AC AT US-China War #2China Expansion Solves War.............................32
2AC AT US-China War #3Brink Passed Already........................................34
2AC AT US-China War #4Chinas not a threat..........................................35
2AC AT Solvency #1Diplomacy Fails........................................................38
2AC AT Solvency #2Diplomacy High Now................................................41
2AC AT Solvency #3China will say No...................................................42
2AC AT: China Will Punish the US Economically...........................................43
Bilateral Investment Treaty NEGATIVE............................................................44
1NC The Global Economy Frontline.............................................................45
2NC/1NR Global Economy #1--Investment High Now Extensions...............48
2NC/1NR Global Economy #2Economic Decline Does Not Cause War.....50
Index
2NC/1NR Global Economy #3BIT Hurts the Economy..............................52

2NC/1NR Global Economy #4Economy Stable Extensions.......................54
1NC US-China War Frontline........................................................................56
2NC/1NR US-China War #1--No War Extensions..........................................59
2NC/1NR US-China War #2China Expansion Solves War Extension.........60
2NC/1NR US-China War #3No Brink.........................................................61
2NC/1NR US-China War #4China Not a Threat.........................................63
1NC Solvency Frontline............................................................................... 66
2NC/1NR Solvency #1Diplomacy Fails.....................................................68
2NC/1NR Solvency #2BIT Not Enough.....................................................69
2NC/1NR Solvency #3China Will Say No..................................................71
Human Rights AFFIRMATIVE...........................................................................73
China Human Rights 1AC............................................................................75
Contention One: Harms (Human Rights)..................................................76
Contention Two: Harms (Democracy).......................................................80
Contention Three: Solvency.....................................................................83
Advantage __: Harms (US Credibility)..........................................................85
Advantage ___: Harms (China Stability)......................................................91
Advantage ___: Harms (US Trade Competitiveness)....................................93
2AC Human Rights AT #1China Improving Human Rights.......................95
2AC Human Rights AT #2--No Moral Obligation..........................................98
2AC Human Rights AT #3High Magnitude Impacts Outweigh..................99
2AC Democracy AT #1US Violates Democracy......................................102
2AC Democracy AT #2Chinese Democracy Improving...........................106
2AC Democracy AT #3Countries Model US Democracy.........................110
2AC Solvency AT #1Human Rights Appeals Fail.....................................113
2AC Solvency AT #2Human Rights are Imperialism...............................116
2AC Solvency AT #3Sullivan Principles Hurt Economy...........................118
2AC Harms (US Credibility) Extensions...................................................121
Index
2AC Answers to: China Relations DA.........................................................124

2AC Answers to: EU Counterplan..............................................................125
Human Rights NEGATIVE.............................................................................. 127
1NC Human Rights Frontline.....................................................................128
2NC/1NR Human Rights #1China Improving..........................................130
2NC/1NR Human Rights #2No Obligation..............................................132
2NC/1NR Human Rights #3--Extinction/War First Extensions....................134
1NC Democracy Frontline..........................................................................136
2NC/1NR Democracy #1No Brink..........................................................139
2NC/1NR Democracy #2Democracy Improving.....................................140
2NC/1NR Democracy #3Countries Model the US...................................142
1NC Solvency Frontline............................................................................. 144
2NC/1NR Solvency #1Human Rights Appeals Fail..................................148
2NC/1NR Solvency #2Imperialism.........................................................150
2NC/1NR Solvency #3Sullivan Principles Bad for the Economy.............152
1NC- U.S. Credibility Frontline...................................................................153
1NC- Harms (CCP Stability) Frontline.........................................................158
1NC- Harms (U.S. Trade Competitiveness) Frontline.................................161
North Korea AFFIRMATIVE............................................................................. 162
Vocabulary................................................................................................ 163
North Korea 1AC........................................................................................ 166
Contention One: Inherency....................................................................167
Contention Two: Harms (North Korean War)...........................................168
Contention Three: Harms (Regime Change)...........................................171
Contention Four: Solvency.....................................................................174
2AC Harms (North Korean War) AT #1No Nuclear Ability/Backlash........176
2AC Harms (North Korean War) AT #2No North Korea War....................178
2AC Harms (North Korean War) AT #3North Korea Wont Give up the
Bomb......................................................................................................... 181
Index
2AC Harms (Regime Change) AT #1Regime Change Coming Now........184

2AC Harms (Regime Change) AT #2--No Moral Obligation........................185
2AC Harms (Regime Change) AT #3High Magnitude Impacts Outweigh 186
2AC Harms (Regime Change) - North Korea Oppression Extensions.........189
2AC Solvency AT #1China Cant Solve...................................................191
2AC Solvency AT #2Sanctions Fail.........................................................195
2AC Solvency AT #3Six Party Talks Fail..................................................200
2AC Solvency Extensions..........................................................................203
North Korea NEGATIVE.................................................................................205
1NC Harms (North Korean War) Frontline..................................................206
2NC/1NR Harms (North Korean War) #1No Nukes and Backlash...........209
2NC/1NR Harms (North Korean War) #2No War.....................................211
1NC Harms (Regime Change) Frontline.....................................................214
2NC/1NR Harms (Regime Change) #1Change Inevitable.......................216
2NC/1NR Harms (Regime Change) #2No Obligation..............................218
2NC/1NR Harms (Regime Change) #3--Extinction/War First Extensions. . .220
2NC/1NR Solvency #1China Fails...........................................................224
2NC/1NR Solvency #2Sanctions High....................................................226
2NC/1NR Solvency #3Talks Fail..............................................................228
Currency Manipulation AFFIRMATIVE............................................................230
Vocabulary................................................................................................ 231
Currency Manipulation 1AC.......................................................................234
Contention One: Inherency....................................................................235
Contention Two: Harms - Economy........................................................236
Contention Three: Solvency...................................................................240
2AC Inherency AT #1US Acting Now......................................................241
2AC Inherency AT #2China Not Manipulating........................................242
Index
2AC Harms (US Economy) AT #1Manipulation Doesnt Hurt US Economy

.................................................................................................................. 244
2AC Harms (US Economy) AT #2Economy is Resilient...........................245
2AC Harms (US Economy) AT #3Domestic Matters More......................247
2AC Harms (US Economy) AT #4Deficit Good.......................................248
2AC Solvency AT #1Other Countries Manipulate...................................249
2AC Solvency AT #2China Wont Follow WTO........................................250
2AC Solvency AT #3Plan Takes Years.....................................................252
Currency Manipulation NEGATIVE.................................................................253
1NC Inherency Frontline............................................................................254
2NC/1NR Inherency #1US Taking Steps to Solve Currency Manipulation
.................................................................................................................. 256
2NC/1NR Inherency #2China not Manipulating......................................257
1NC Harms (US Economy) Frontline..........................................................258
2NC/1NR Harms (US Economy) #1Manipulation Doesnt Hurt the US. . .262
2NC/1NR Harms (US Economy) #2The Economy is Resilient.................263
2NC/1NR Harms (US Economy) #3Domestic Economy More Important.267
2NC/1NR Harms (US Economy) #4Deficit Good.....................................268
2NC/1NR Solvency #1Other Countries Manipulate................................271
2NC/1NR Solvency #2China Wont Change...........................................272
2NC/1NR Solvency #3Plan Takes Years..................................................273
China Nationalism Disadvantage.................................................................274
Vocabulary................................................................................................ 275
1NC China Nationalism Disadvantage Shell..............................................277
2NC/1NR AT #1China already in SCS.....................................................280
2NC/1NR AT #2Cooperation is Popular..................................................282
2NC/1NR AT #3Case Outweighs.............................................................284
2NC/1NR AT #4Xi Looks Weak...............................................................285
2NC/1NR AT #5Nationalists Dont Matter...............................................289
Index
2NC/1NR AT #6Cooperation Solves Conflict...........................................292

2NC/1NR Human Rights Link.....................................................................294
2NC/1NR Currency Manipulation Link........................................................297
2NC/1NR AT: China Already Trades with the US.........................................298
2AC Affirmative Answers to China Nationalism Disadvantage.....................299
China Politics Disadvantage.........................................................................303
Vocabulary................................................................................................ 304
1NC China Politics Disadvantage Shell......................................................305
2NC/1NR Diplomatic Engagement Link Extensions...................................309
2NC/1NR BIT Link...................................................................................... 311
2NC/1NR Currency Manipulation, North Korea and Human Rights Link.....312
2NC/1NR Impact Extensions......................................................................313
2NC/1NR AT #1Xi Not Pushing Reforms.................................................315
2NC/1NR AT #3US-China Meet Regularly...............................................319
2NC/1NR AT #4Reforms Cause Collapse................................................321
2NC/1NR AT #5No Political Capital Loss.................................................324
2NC/1NR ATXi has no Political Capital.................................................326
2AC Affirmative Answers to China Politics Disadvantage.............................327
Taiwan Relations Disadvantage....................................................................364
Vocabulary................................................................................................ 365
1NC Taiwan Relations Disadvantage.........................................................368
2NC/1NR AT #1China Taiwan War Now..................................................370
2NC/1NR AT #3Diplomacy Solves War...................................................374
2NC/1NR AT #4No Link/No Trade Of......................................................375
2NC/1NR AT #5No Brink.........................................................................376
2NC/1NR AT #6No Impact......................................................................378
2NC/1NR Diplomacy Links.........................................................................381
Index
2NC/1NR Economic Links..........................................................................385

2AC Affirmative Answers to Taiwan Relations Disadvantage........................386
Topicality...................................................................................................... 409
Vocabulary................................................................................................ 410
1NC Bilateral Investment Treaty Topicality................................................411
2NC/1NR Bilateral Investment Treaty Topicality - AT #1We Meet...........413
2NC/1NR Bilateral Investment Treaty Topicality AT #2Counter
Interpretation............................................................................................ 414
2NC/1NR Bilateral Investment Treaty Topicality AT--#3AContext...........415
2NC/1NR Bilateral Investment Treaty Topicality AT #3BGround.............416
2NC/1NR Bilateral Investment Treaty Topicality AT #3CReal World
Education.................................................................................................. 417
2NC/1NR Bilateral Investment Treaty Topicality AT #4Reasonability......418
1NC Currency Manipulation Topicality - Engagement is Quid Pro Quo
(Conditional Engagement)........................................................................419
2NC/1NR Currency Manipulation Quid Pro Quo Topicality - AT #1We
Meet.......................................................................................................... 421
2NC/1NR Currency Manipulation Quid Pro Quo Topicality AT #2Counter
Interpretation............................................................................................ 423
2NC/1NR Currency Manipulation Quid Pro Quo Topicality AT--#3AContext
.................................................................................................................. 424
2NC/1NR Currency Manipulation Quid Pro Quo Topicality AT #3BGround
.................................................................................................................. 425
2NC/1NR Currency Manipulation Quid Pro Quo Topicality AT #3CReal
World Education........................................................................................ 426
2NC/1NR Currency Manipulation Quid Pro Quo Topicality AT #4
Reasonability............................................................................................. 427
1NC Human Rights Topicality Engagement = Government to Government
.................................................................................................................. 428
2NC/1NR Human Rights Topicality AT #1We Meet.................................429
2NC/1NR Human Rights Topicality AT #2Counter Interpretation............430
2NC/1NR Human Rights Topicality AT #3A Overlimiting............................431
2NC/1NR Human Rights Topicality AT #3BGround.................................432
Index
2NC/1NR Human Rights Topicality AT #3CEducation.............................433

2NC/1NR Human Rights Topicality AT #4Reasonability..........................434
1NC North Korea Topicality Engagement Military................................435
2NC/1NR North Korea Topicality Engagement Military AT #1We Meet
.................................................................................................................. 436
2NC/1NR North Korea Topicality Engagement Military AT #2Counter
Interpretation............................................................................................ 437
2NC/1NR North Korea Topicality Engagement Military AT #3ACore of
the Topic.................................................................................................... 438
2NC/1NR North Korea Topicality Engagement Military AT #3BGround
.................................................................................................................. 439
2NC/1NR North Korea Topicality Engagement Military AT #3C
Reasonable Limits..................................................................................... 440
2NC/1NR North Korea Topicality Engagement Military AT #4
Reasonability............................................................................................. 441
2AC Affirmative Topicality Answers..............................................................442
2AC Bilateral Investment Treaty Topicality Answers..................................443
1AR Bilateral Investment Treaty Topicality Extensions..............................445
2AC Human Rights Topicality Answers......................................................448
2AC North Korea Topicality Engagement Military Answers...............449
1AR North Korea Topicality Engagement Military Extensions...........451
2AC Currency Manipulation - Topicality Engagement = Quid Pro Quo
Answers.................................................................................................... 452
European Union Counterplan.......................................................................454
Vocabulary................................................................................................ 455
1NC Bilateral Investment Treaty European Union Counterplan.................457
2NC/1NR Bilateral Investment Treaty EU CP Solvency Extensions............458
1NC North Korea European Union CP........................................................462
2NC/1NR North Korea EU CP Solvency Extensions....................................463
2NC/1NR North Korea EU CP Answer to Perm: US-EU Cooperation.........464
1NC Human Rights European Union CP.....................................................465
2NC/1NR Human Rights EU CP Solvency Extensions.................................466
Index
2NC/1NR Human Rights EU CP AT: the EU already regulates....................468

1NC Currency Manipulation European Union CP.......................................469
2NC/1NR Currency Manipulation EU CP Solvency Extensions...................471
2NC/1NR Currency Manipulation EU CP Solvency Extensions...................472
2NC/1NR EU CP AT #1CP Takes a Long Time..........................................473
2NC/1NR EU CP AT #2 and #3Perm.......................................................474
2NC/1NR EU CP AT #4No Solvency........................................................476
2NC/1NR EU CP AT #5Hegemony Add On..............................................477
1NC European Union CP OBOR Internal Net Benefit Shell.........................480
2NC/1NR EU CP Internal Net Benefit AT #1No OBOR Funding................484
2NC/1NR EU CP Internal Net Benefit AT #2Case outweighs the DA.......485
2NC/1NR EU CP Internal Net Benefit AT #3EU/China Relations High......486
2NC/1NR EU CP Internal Net Benefit AT #4One Issue Isnt Enough.......489
2NC/1NR EU CP Internal Net Benefit AT #5OBOR Bad Impact Turn........491
2NC/1NR EU CP Internal Net Benefit - OBOR Solves Terrorism/Drug Trade
Extensions................................................................................................. 494
2NC/1NR EU CP Internal Net Benefit - OBOR Solves EU Economy.............495
2AC European Union Counterplan Answers..................................................496
2AC EU CP OBOR Net Benefit Answers.........................................................500
Pressure Counterplan................................................................................... 503
Vocabulary................................................................................................ 504
1NC Human Rights Pressure CP................................................................505
2NC/1NR Solvency Human Rights Extensions...........................................506
2NC/1NR AT: Human Rights Pressure Destabilizes China.......................507
1NC Currency Manipulation Pressure CP...................................................509
2NC/1NR Currency Manipulation Solvency Extensions..............................510
1NC North Korea Pressure CP....................................................................512
2NC/1NR Pressure CP- North Korea Affirmative- Solvency Overview.........513
1NC BIT Pressure CP.................................................................................. 514
Index
2NC/1NR Pressure CP- BIT - Solvency Overview........................................515

2NC/1NR Pressure CP AT # --CP Doesnt Solve.........................................516
2NC/1NR Pressure CP Human Rights AT: Perm Do Both..........................517
2NC/1NR- Pressure CP- Currency Manipulation- AT: Permutation do Both. 518
1NC Hegemony Net Benefit Shell..............................................................519
2NC/1NR- Pressure CP- Hegemony Net Benefit AT: Non-Unique.............521
2NC/1NR Pressure CP- Hegemony Net Benefit AT: No Link.....................522
2AC Affirmative Answers to Pressure Counterplan.......................................524
2AC- Pressure CP- Human Rights Affirmative............................................525
2AC- Pressure CP- Currency Manipulation Affirmative...............................528
2AC- Pressure CP- North Korea Affirmative................................................529
2AC- Pressure CP- BIT Affirmative.............................................................531
2AC Affirmative Answers to Pressure CP- Hegemony Net-Benefit.............532
China Securitization Kritik............................................................................ 535
Vocabulary................................................................................................ 536
1NC China Securitization Kritik Shell.........................................................538
Specific Links............................................................................................ 542
Economic Link........................................................................................ 543
Bilateral Investment Treaty/South China Sea Link..................................544
Nuclear Weapon/North Korea Link..........................................................546
Democracy Link..................................................................................... 547
Human Rights Link................................................................................. 549
2NC/1NR War Impact Extensions..............................................................550
2NC/1NR Alternative Extensions...............................................................553
2NC/1NR ATChina is a Threat..............................................................557
2NC/1NR Your Authors are Biased Extensions...........................................558
2NC/1NR China Securitization Kritik Overview..........................................560
2NC/1NR AT #1Framework.....................................................................561
2NC/1NR AT #2Perm: Do Both...............................................................563
Index
2NC/1NR AT #3Engagement Link Turn...................................................564

2NC/1NR AT #4Cede the Political...........................................................565
2NC/1NR AT #5Impact Calculus.............................................................567
2NC/1NR AT #6No Impact/Security Inevitable.......................................568
2AC Affirmative Answers to China Securitization Kritik................................569
Positive Peace Kritik (Human Rights)............................................................574
1NC Positive Peace Kritik - Human Rights Affirmative...............................575
1NC Positive Peace Kritik - Economy Link.................................................579
2NC/1NR Positive Peace K- Human Rights Affirmative- Overview..............581
2NC/1NR- Positive Peace K- Human Rights Affirmative- AT: Permutation do
Both.......................................................................................................... 582
2NC/1NR Positive Peace K- Human Rights Link Extension.........................584
2NC- Positive Peace K- Human Rights Affirmative- AT: Alternative Cant
Solve......................................................................................................... 585
2AC Affirmative Answers to Positive Peace Kritik (Human Rights Affirmative)
..................................................................................................................... 586
Diplomatic Capital Disadvantage (January 2017 Update)............................590
Vocabulary................................................................................................ 591
1NC Diplomatic Capital Disadvantage Shell..............................................594
Chinese Diplomacy Link............................................................................ 598
North Korea Specific Link..........................................................................600
2NC/1NR AT #1Cant Speculate on Trumps Agenda..............................601
2NC/1NR AT #2Trump wont be Distracted............................................603
2NC/1NR AT #3Diplomacy Fails.............................................................605
2NC/1NR AT #4Fix Tough Issues First.....................................................608
2NC/1NR AT #5 ISIS Threat Exaggerated..................................................609
2NC/1NR AT #7 Diplomats Fill In............................................................613
2AC Affirmative Answers to Diplomatic Capital Disadvantage (January 2017
Update)........................................................................................................ 614
2AC Diplomatic Capital Disadvantage Answers........................................615
Index
1AR Extensions to 2AC #1: Cant Predict Trump Foreign Policy...............619

1AR Extensions to 2AC #3: Diplomacy Fails..............................................620
Taiwan Relations Disadvantage (January 2017 Update)...............................621
Taiwan Relations Disadvantage (January 2017 Update) NEG UNIQUENESS
.................................................................................................................. 622
Taiwan Relations Disadvantage AFF Answers (January 2017 Update).....623
China Relations Disadvantage (January 2017 Update).................................624
Vocabulary................................................................................................ 625
1NC- China Relations Disadvantage Shell.................................................628
1NC- China Relations Disadvantage Human Rights Link...........................630
1NC- China Relations Disadvantage - North Korea Link.............................631
1NC China Relations Disadvantage - Currency Manipulation Link.............632
2NC/1NR- China Relations Disadvantage - North Korea Link Extensions...633
2NC/1NR China Relations Disadvantage AT: #1 Non-Unique: Relations Bad
Now........................................................................................................... 634
2NC/1NR China Relations Disadvantage AT: #2 Plan Helps China Relations
.................................................................................................................. 637
2NC/1NR China Relations Disadvantage AT: #3 LINK TURN Plan is a Win-
Win.......................................................................................................... 638
2NC/1NR China Relations Disadvantage AT: #4 NO LINK: Trump is a loose
cannon..................................................................................................... 640
2NC/1NR China Relations Disadvantage AT: #5 No Nuclear Proliferation
.................................................................................................................. 643
2AC Affirmative Answers to China Relations Disadvantage (January 2017
Update)........................................................................................................ 644
1AR Extension to 2AC #1: NON-UNIQUE: Relations Bad Now....................647
China Nationalism Disadvantage (January 2017 Update).............................650
China Nationalism Disadvantage (January 2017 Update) AFF Answer
Updates..................................................................................................... 651
China Nationalism Disadvantage (Jan 2017 Update) NEG BRINK............652
BIT Af
Bilateral Investment Treaty

AFFIRMATIVE
BIT Af
Vocabulary
Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP): Major trade deal which
expands investment, economic cooperation, and reduces taxes.
Its signed, but it has not been ratified by the US so all the good
things about it are not happening. It includes 12 countries in the
Pacific Rim area, but does not include China.
Bilateral Investment Treaty (BIT): A BIT is an agreement
between two countries that sets up rules of the road for foreign
investment in each others countries. BITs give US investors
better access to foreign marketsand on fairer terms. The United
States currently has BITs with 42 countries. A high-quality US-
China BIT would give American companies better access to
Chinas market, and equal rights as Chinese firms.
South China Seas (SCS): Part of the Pacific Ocean just
southeast of China. It is near Taiwan, the Philippines, Cambodia,
and Vietnam. A great deal of goods are moved through the area
and theres supposedly a lot of oil in the sea bed. There are
serious disputes about who actually owns it and thus many
countries are fighting over it.
BIT Af
BIT Af
Senkaku Islands: Islands in the East China sea that have no one
living on them. The US gave them to Japan, but China disagrees.
These islands, like the South China Sea, are areas where fighting
might erupt.
Xi Jinping (She jin-PING): General Secretary of the Communist
Party of China, the President of the People's Republic of China,
and the Chairman of China's Central Military Commission. Hes
like Obama, but even more powerful since China does not have
the same political structure as the US. Essentially, hes the
president of China.
Gross Domestic Product (GDP): value of all goods and
services made in a particular country, usually counted yearly. This
is a good indicator of how well an economy is doingthe higher
the GDP the better.
Foreign Direct Investment: When a foreign company owns a
business in another country. It also includes general investment
from one country to another. For example, US companies invest
and own companies in China.
State Owned Enterprise (SOE): a business that is partially or
entirely owned by the state or the government. The US is
worried about these in China because they are worried that the
Chinese government will give better treatment to their
companies than US ones.
Peoples Liberation Army (PLA): The Chinese armed forces.
Basically the accumulation of all the Chinese military. It is the
largest military in the world.
BIT Af
Communist Party of China (CCP): Main political party of China.

They have large control over the entire country and believe in a
strong government with control over the people and economy. Xi
Jinping is the leader of the party.
AT=Answers To
BIT Af
1AC
Bilateral Investment Treaty 1AC

First, our PLAN: The United
States federal government
should ratify the bilateral
investment treaty with the
Peoples Republic of China.
BIT Af
1AC
Contention One: Harms (The Global Economy)
1. Chinas economic slowdown causes social unrest and
collapse of the country
Council on Foreign Relations, February 2016 [International bipartisan

organization, Xi Jinping on the Global Stage Chinese Foreign
Policy Under a Powerful but Exposed Leader", February]
Aside from the perceptual costs posed by such economic downturns, Xi faces
the considerable risk that a prolonged slowdown will directly afect the
welfare of the average Chinese citizen. The possibility of a hard landing
looms, and an economic wreck or a serious financial crisis could
produce years of prolonged stagnation and slow growth that could
shake the party to its core. Even absent such a disaster, if growth continues
to slow, it will worsen a number of internal trends. The labor market already
struggles to absorb the eight million college graduates Chinas universities
produce each year. Blue-collar wages that had risen for a decade have been
stagnant for well over a year as layofs continue in coastal factories, with
labor disputes doubling in 2014 and again in 2015.25 Chinese companies also
face challenges, as corporate debt grows to 160 percent of Chinas GDP, up
from 98 percent in 2008 and more than twice the current U.S. level of 70
percent. The fragile recovery in the countrys property market could face a
reversal that would undercut what is the biggest store of household wealth
for Chinese families. These problems could intertwine with the psychic impact
of another stock market swing or economic crisis, which could further erode
consumer confidence and jeopardize Chinas economic reorientation.26
Business and investor trust have similarly been hit, largely because the
governments panicked attempts to control the market signaled the hesitancy
of its commitment to reform. If the governments reputation is diminished
and economic growth remains stagnant, then the leadership will grow
increasingly worried about social unrest. Past economic crises
contributed to outbreaks of mass protests, including those in 1986 and
1989 that brought down two Chinese leaders, Hu Yaobang and Zhao Ziyang,
and led to the violence in Tiananmen Square. Although the party weathered
the stock market slumps reasonably well, there is no guarantee it will be so
fortunate in a future crisis. The reputational challenges and economic
obstacles Xi faces will not abate in the next few years. Removing them will
require implementing a number of costly reforms to inefficient SOEs,
providing afordable capital to the private sector, allowing workers greater
geographic mobility, reducing inefficient forms of infrastructure investment,
and building the commercial rule of law. These inherently disruptive moves
BIT Af
1AC
would break Chinas old growth model but could risk increased social
instability, leaving Xi struggling to choose between high-quality growth
tomorrow and societal order today. If Xi largely abandons reforms and
doubles down on the current model, he will only delay the day of reckoning; if
he pursues reforms, it could take years before he sees results. Regardless of
which course he chooses, or if he tries to square the circle, Chinas economy
will likely slow for the next few years and the reputational risks to Xi will
continue to rise as domestic frustrations mount.
2. The global economy is headed for a recession
Whitefoot, April 2016 [John, editor at Lombardi Financial, specializing

in low-priced investment opportunities. He contributes to
Lombardis Profit Confidential newsletter. John has been a
financial writer since the late 1990s. Economic Collapse: Janet
Yellen Terrified of Coming Financial Crisis? April 29,
http://www.profitconfidential.com/economy/economic-collapse-
janet-yellen-terrified-of-coming-financial-crisis/]
Yellen
Weakest GDP Growth in Two Years In the Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC) statement,
observed that U.S. economic activity had slowed and reduced levels of
consumer spending. Thats not good news for an economy that gets the vast majority of its GDP
from consumer spending. Still, the eerily uninformed analysts on Wall Street continue to wax eloquence
U.S. GDP has been declining
about the strengths of the U.S. economy. One wonders why when
for the last four quarters and most recently, we learned that the U.S. economy lurched ahead at
a 0.5% pace in the first quarter as consumers put the brakes on spending and businesses cut back on
investments. (Source: Gross Domestic Product: First Quarter 2016 (Advance Estimate), Bureau of
Economic Analysis, April 28, 2016.) Expecting first-quarter GDP to advance a princely 0.7%, analysts seem
surprised that the economy remains weak. After all, the global economy doesnt seem all that
bad, employers are hiring, and the stock market has recovered from the mid-February lows. Thats all a
Chinas first-quarter GDP growth decreased to its slowest pace since
little rich.
the first quarter of 2009, expanding 6.7%. Chinas economy expanded at a
seasonally adjusted rate of 1.1% in the first quarter from the fourth quarter of
2015. Thats the lowest quarterly expansion since 2010. China, the worlds
second-biggest economy, reported 2015 GDP growth of 6.9%, its weakest
growth rate in a quarter-century . (Source: China first quarter GDP growth slowest since 2009,
International Business Times, April 15, 2016.) As for U.S. jobs, employment did rebound in March, adding
215,000 jobs. Most of the employment gains (48,000) came from low-paying retail and food services
(25,000), while job losses came from the higher-paying manufacturing (-29,000) and mining (-12,000)
areas. The official unemployment rate is five percent, but the underemployment rate has only fallen by
about one percent since last March and stands at 9.9%. (Source: Employment Situation Summary,
Bureau of Labor Statistics, April 1, 2016.) Stocks Rise Along Despite Declining Earnings The stock market
has made a remarkable recovery from its February lows. But those gains arent a result of stunning first-
The markets are rebounding because investors
quarter earnings and revenue growth.
are ignoring the earnings recession we are in and, being impatient, are
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hanging their investing cap on artificially low interest rates and the well-
intentioned notion that the U.S. economy is going to rebound soon. Theyre going
to have to wait a while longer. The U.S. is in an earnings recession . Its difficult to see how
weak earnings point to higher stock valuations and are a reflection of an improving U.S. economy. I enter
as evidence, on December 31, 2015, the estimated earnings growth rate for the first quarter of 2016,
which was 0.3%. Fast-forward to March 18 and the estimated earnings decline was -8.4%. At the end of the
quarter, the estimated earnings decline for the first quarter increased to -8.7%. (Source: Earnings
Insight, FactSet, April 15, 2016.) Welcome first-quarter earnings season. By April 15, the first-quarter
blended earnings decline was -9.3%. By April 22, with 26% of companies in the S&P 500 reporting first-
quarter earnings, the blended earnings decline improved to just -8.9%. (Source: Earnings Insight,
FactSet, April 22, 2016.) Keep in mind that 74% of S&P 500 companies need to report first-quarter
earnings. That number will invariably change. Any improvements to blended earnings will be marginal at
best. If the S&P 500 reports a decline in earnings for the first quarter, it will mark the first time the index
has seen four consecutive quarters of year-over-year declines in earnings since the fourth quarter of 2008
through the third quarter of 2009. At a time when corporate America is warning that earnings will be down
significantly, stock valuations have been rising. Since the markets bottomed in the middle of February, the
S&P 500 has soared more than 13%.
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3. Economic decline causes nuclear war
Mead, 2009 [Walter Russell Mead, Henry A. Kissinger senior fellow for U.S.
foreign policy at the Council on Foreign Relations, 2/4/2009, The New
Republic, Only Makes You Stronger, http://www.tnr.com/politics/story.html?
id=571cbbb9-2887-4d81-8542-92e83915f5f8&p=2]
So far, such half-hearted experiments not only have failed to work; they have
left the societies that have tried them in a progressively worse position,
farther behind the front-runners as time goes by. Argentina has lost ground to
Chile; Russian development has fallen farther behind that of the Baltic states
and Central Europe. Frequently, the crisis has weakened the power of the
merchants, industrialists, financiers, and professionals who want to develop a
liberal capitalist society integrated into the world. Crisis can also strengthen
the hand of religious extremists, populist radicals, or authoritarian
traditionalists who are determined to resist liberal capitalist society for a
variety of reasons. Meanwhile, the companies and banks based in these
societies are often less established and more vulnerable to the consequences
of a financial crisis than more established firms in wealthier societies. As a
result, developing countries and countries where capitalism has relatively
recent and shallow roots tend to sufer greater economic and political
damage when crisis strikes--as, inevitably, it does. And, consequently,
financial crises often reinforce rather than challenge the global distribution of
power and wealth. This may be happening yet again. None of which means
that we can just sit back and enjoy the recession. History may suggest that
financial crises actually help capitalist great powers maintain their leads--but
it has other, less reassuring messages as well. If financial crises have been a
normal part of life during the 300-year rise of the liberal capitalist system
under the Anglophone powers, so has war. The wars of the League of
Augsburg and the Spanish Succession; the Seven Years War; the American
Revolution; the Napoleonic Wars; the two World Wars; the cold war: The list of
wars is almost as long as the list of financial crises. Bad economic times can
breed wars. Europe was a pretty peaceful place in 1928, but the poisoned
German public opinion and helped bring Adolf Hitler to power. If the current
crisis turns into a depression, what rough beasts might start slouching toward
Moscow, Karachi, Beijing, or New Delhi to be born? The United States may
not, yet, decline, but, if we can't get the world economy back on track, we
may still have to fight.
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Contention Two: Harms (US-China War)
1. China is building up its military in the South China
SeaThis guarantees miscalculation and war
TIME, February 2016 [Mark Thompson, U.S.-China Showdown Keeps

Inching Closer, http://time.com/4236409/united-states-china-
south-china-sea/, Feb 24]
China is playing a game of chicken with the United States in the South China
Sea. All signs suggest that Beijing is betting the U.S. will blink and swerve
away before it comes to war. China is brazenly challenging the hegemony
that the U.S. has enjoyed on East Asian seas since World War II, as the top
U.S. admiral in the Pacific warns that a shrinking U.S. military is leaving him
without sufficient forces to counter the rising superpower. While the U.S. has
repeatedly called for diplomacy to settle multiple disputes over islands
sprinkled across the South China Sea, China is unilaterally staking its claims
by moving military gear to a growing number of them. It has been dredging
the sea bottom to enlarge islets, and has built a 10,000-foot runway on one of
them. Its goal is clear: to lay claim to 90% of the South China Sea, a
vital commercial waterway that carries $5 trillion in annual trade. Regional
powersincluding Brunei, the Philippines, Taiwan and Vietnamare
nervously, and so far vainlywaiting for the U.S. to do something to thwart
the Chinese advance. Marine General Joseph Dunford, left, meets last week in
Hawaii with Admiral Harry Harris, chief of the U.S. Pacific Command. Chinas
latest moves echo its pattern of asserting itself even as it appears to be
currying favor with Washington. Five years ago, Beijing flew its top-secret J-20
stealth fighter while then-Defense Secretary Robert Gates was in Beijing. In
2013, the U.S. says a U.S. Navy cruiser almost collided with a Chinese
warship that cut across its bow in the South China Sea while Vice President
Joe Biden was in the Chinese capital. Last summer, a flotilla of five Chinese
ships made an unprecedented trip into the Bering Sea of the coast of Alaska,
while Obama was visiting the state. Last week, the U.S. confirmed that China
has deployed HQ-9 anti-aircraft missile batteries to Woody Island in the South
China Sea as Obama was meeting with Southeast Asian leaders in Palm
Springs, Calif. And on Tuesday, the Pentagon said the Chinese air force had
dispatched J-11 and JH-7 warplanes to the same island, as Chinese Foreign
Minister Wang Yi was in the middle of a visit to Washington. The fact is there
have been steps by China, by Vietnam, by others that have unfortunately
created an escalatory cycle, Secretary of State John Kerry said during a
press conference with Wang on Tuesday. What were trying to do is break
that. Wang said nations in the region could settle their own diferences.
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There have not been any problems with freedom of navigation in the South
China Sea, he said. This is happening as much of Washingtons national-
security apparatus is focused on the war against ISIS and the increasing
momentum of an anti-U.S. alliance among Syrian dictator Bashar Assad and
his Iranian and Russian partners. But U.S. Navy officials, who have ruled the
seas of Chinas coast for more than 70 years, are increasingly sounding the
alarm. Chinas intent to militarize the South China Sea is as certain
as a traffic jam in D.C., Admiral Harry Harris, chief of U.S. Pacific
Command, told the House Armed Services Committee on Wednesday. I need
weapon systems of increase lethality that go faster, go further and are more
survivable., he added. Im comfortable where we are today, but today were
not at war, and I think an important point. On Tuesday, before the Senate
Armed Services Committee, Harris said that the Navy is providing him with
only about 62% of the attack-submarine patrols he says he need. He
acknowledged the U.S. is stretched in the region, saying he has encouraged
U.S. allies in the region to conduct regular freedom-of-navigation operations
near the islands claimed by China to make clear they dont accept Beijings
territorial claims. Unsurprisingly, all this is likely to increase tensions. A
significant increase in Chinese forces and capabilities will lead to more
frequent run-ins with its neighbors in the South China Sea , warns Gregory
Poling, director of the Asia Maritime Transparency Initiative at the Center for
Strategic and International Studies, a Washington think tank. This year, he
adds, promises to be a much tenser year in the South China Sea.
2. South China Sea conflict causes nuclear war
Tikhonova, 2015 [Polina, writer, journalist and a certified translator. Over the past 7 years, she has
worked for a wide variety of top European, American, Russian, and Ukrainian media outlets. Polina holds a
Master's Degree in English Philology from the University of Oxford and a Bachelor's Degree in Journalism
from the Saint Petersburg State University, US Faces Nuclear War Threat Over South China Sea Chinese
Professor, November 28, http://www.valuewalk.com/2015/11/us-nuclear-war-south-china-sea/]
Beijings rhetoric after an incident with a U.S. warship sailed to the South
China Sea suggests that Chinese decision-makers could resort to more
concrete and forceful measures to counter the U.S. Navy, according to
Zhang Baohui, Professor of Political Science and Director of the Centre for
Asian Pacific Studies at Lingnan University in Hong Kong. If so, a face-of
between the two navies becomes inevitable. Even worse, the face-of may
trigger an escalation towards military conflicts, the professor wrote in a
piece for RSIS Commentary. But, according to Baohui, the U.S. military is
oblivious to this scenario, since Washington decision-makers think
Americas conventional military superiority discourages China from
responding to such provocations in the South China Sea militarily. However,
this U.S. expectation is flawed, as China is a major nuclear power, the
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professor wrote. When cornered, nuclear-armed states can threaten
asymmetric escalation to deter an adversary from harming its key interests,
he added. Baohui then refers to the military parade in Beijing that took place
on Sept. 3 and revealed that Chinas new generation of tactical missiles
such as the DF-26 are capable of being armed with nuclear warheads.
Moreover, according to the latest reports, Chinas air-launched long-range
cruise missiles can also carry tactical nuclear warheads. U.S. could provoke
nuclear war with China And while the U.S. does not have its core interests in
the South China Sea, the disputed islands present Chinas strategic interests,
which is why this kind of asymmetry in stakes would certainly give Beijing an
advantage in the balance of resolve over Washington, according to the
professor. And if the South China Sea situation escalates and starts spiraling
into a nuclear confrontation between the U.S. and China, Washington will face
a choice of either backing down first or fighting a nuclear-armed power and
the worlds largest military force with a strength of approximately 2.285
million personnel. Neither option is attractive and both exact high costs,
either in reputation or human lives, for the U.S., Baohui wrote. So it would be
unwise for the U.S. to further provoke China in the disputed area, since
Chinas willingness to defend its interests, reputation and deterrence
credibility could easily escalate the conflict into a military confrontation that
would ultimately harm U.S. interests, according to the professor.
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Contention Three: Solvency
1. A US-China BIT will not pass now. However, the plan
passes BIT and opens up investment and reduces
trade barriers
The Diplomat, March 2016 [Shannon Tiezzi, premier

international current-afairs magazine for the Asia-Pacific region,
Are China and the US Close to Sealing an Investment Treaty?
March 24, http://thediplomat.com/2016/03/are-china-and-the-us-
close-to-sealing-an-investment-treaty/]
Chens announcement came as something of a surprise, because the BIT has

largely faded from the spotlight when it comes to the U.S.-China relationship.
Overshadowed by the South China Sea and cyber issues, the BIT didnt even
make it into the White Houses main fact sheet on outcomes of President Xi
Jinpings visit to the United States in September. A separate fact sheet
specifically on economic relations saw Presidents Obama and Xi reaffirm as a
top economic priority the negotiation of a high standard BIT. But there were
no targets set for completing the agreement, only a promise to intensify the
negotiations and to work expeditiously to conclude the negotiation of a
mutually beneficial treaty. That was a disappointment to optimists who had
theorized the treaty could be finalized in time for Xis big visit. According to
the U.S.-China Business Council, U.S. foreign direct investment in China has
remained fairly steady, at between $2.7 and $4.1 billion per year, since 2008.
Chinese investment in the United States, however, has skyrocketed in the
same period going from less than $1 billion in 2008 to $11.9 billion in 2014
(down from a high of $14 billion in 2013). As these numbers indicate, the
objectives of both sides are diferent. U.S. firms hope that a successful BIT
could open up what has become a stagnant investment environment in
China. Chinese firms which are in the midst of drastically expanding their
investments in America seek a streamlined investment process that would
eliminate fears of bias and excess scrutiny from the Committee on Foreign
Investment in the U.S. (CFIUS). Currently, United States (and other foreign
firms) are blocked from investing in a laundry list of industries in China, from
genetically-modified agricultural products and domestic parcel delivery
services to news outlets, publishing houses, and television stations. Other
sectors are restricted and may require foreign investment to come as part
of a Chinese majority-owned joint venture. Even the Shanghai Free Trade
Zone, which is supposed to be an experimental zone with fewer restrictions
than the country at large, comes with a lengthy negative list of of-limits
industries, including automobile manufacturing, telecommunications, and
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banks. And to many business leaders, it seems China is getting less not
more receptive to foreign investment; witness, for example, a new rule that
bans any company with foreign investment from publishing content online.
According to the U.S.-China Business Councils 2015 China Business
Environment Survey, China has made little progress on the issue over the
past few years, despite repeated commitments to opening its markets. Even
in sectors where foreign investment is allowed, USCBC also found that 80
percent of American companies believe their Chinese competitors receive
preferential treatment and thats just for private enterprises. When it
comes to Chinas state-owned firms, 97 percent of respondents said SOEs are
receiving a competitive boost from the government.
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2. China can either be a partner or an adversary
economic cooperation is the only way to solve global
economic decline and war
Mendis and Wang, May 2016 [Joey and Patrick, Mendis is

senior fellow of Kennedy School of Governments Ash Center for
Democratic Governance and Innovation at Harvard and Wang is a
defense analyst and graduate of Naval War College, National
Defense University, and Kennedy School, Who Can Contain
China When U.S. Policy Fails?, May 1,
http://www.theglobalist.com/who-can-contain-china-when-united-
states-policy-fails/]
Throughout these intervening 20th century years, the meager trading

relationship went through fits and starts. Nonetheless, when Deng Xiaoping
took Chinas helm and embarked on a path toward trade liberalization and
modernization, Chinas significance to the world economy began to emerge.
Eventually this led to its accession to the WTO in 2001. With U.S. assistance,
via trade policy, China has crossed the economic Rubicon where there is no
return. According to a September 2015 Congressional Research Service
report, total U.S. trade has risen from $2 million in 1979 to $591 billion in
2014: China is currently the United States second-largest trading partner,
its third largest export market, and its biggest source of imports. Chinas
fixation with security in the South China Sea, Indian Ocean and other sea
lines of communication (SLOCs) is not without cause. Seven of the worlds top
ten container ports are in China. Chinas export economy survives by these
trade routes. Any disruption to these routes would be a significant impact not
only to its economy but also to the American and global economies. The
latter has been demonstrated by the ripple efects of recent stock exchange
plunges in Shanghai and Shenzhen. Autonomous but Interdependent. Indeed,
Chinas rise could easily be viewed as an existential threat. Beijings ability to
project power today has never been greater, both economically and militarily.
And the signs of aspiring hegemony are underscored by that ability. Yet,
Chinas rising power could also be welcomed as another global force capable
of burden-sharing. One that can contribute to fighting a myriad of threats,
such as participating with multinational forces in maintaining the security of
SLOCs, counterpiracy, humanitarian assistance, disaster relief, and a variety
of other global missions. These are the threats that China and the rest of the
world really face. In other words, with great power comes great responsibility.
Recognizing that any disruption to Chinas economy would mean a disruption
to the U.S. economy, the United States should support China in maintaining a
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healthy trade relationship. It should also continue to focus on building a much
needed trust, promoting fair competition and engaging China to join rule-
based institutions and paving the road toward a MAP doctrine.
CDL Core Files 2016-2017 BIT Af
2AC Harms (Global Economy)
2AC AT Global Economy #1China

Investment High
They say the US and China already trade heavily, but
[Give :05 summary of opponents single argument]
1. Extend our Diplomat evidence.

[PUT IN YOUR AUTHORS NAME]
Its much better than their Morrison evidence because:
[PUT IN THEIR AUTHORS NAME]
[CIRCLE ONE OR MORE OF THE FOLLOWING OPTIONS]:
(its newer) (the author is more qualified) (it has
more facts)
(their evidence is not logical/contradicts itself) (history proves it
to be true)
(their evidence has no facts) (Their author is biased) (it takes into
account their argument)
( ) ( )
[THINK OF YOUR OWN!] [THINK OF YOUR OWN!]
[EXPLAIN HOW YOUR OPTION IS TRUE BELOW]

The evidence says that the US and China are yet to agree on a BIT.
That means there are many parts of the economy where the US and
China do not cooperate at all. Just because the US and China sell
cars together is not how the whole economy works. Also, their
evidence does not talk about future trade.
and this reason matters because:
[EXPLAIN YOUR REASONING BELOW]
While there may be some economic cooperation, the US and China
need much more to prevent economic collapse. Our facts are better
so we still have our advantage.
2 Foreign Direct Investment is quite lowthis evidence
is from your author
Morrison, 2015 [Wayne, Specialist in Asian Trade and Finance,

China-U.S. Trade Issues, December 15,
https://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/RL33536.pdf]
The level of foreign direct investment (FDI) flows between China and the
United States is relatively small given the large volume of trade between the
two countries. Many analysts contend that an expansion of bilateral FDI flows
could greatly expand commercial ties. The U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis
(BEA) is the main U.S. federal agency that collects data on FDI flows to and
from the United States.35 It reported that in 2014 the flow of Chinese FDI to
the United States was $968 million, (in comparison, Japanese FDI was $33.8
billion), while U.S. FDI in China in 2014 was $6.3 billion. Annual U.S. FDI flows
to China have changed significantly from year to year (the peak year for U.S.
FDI in China was 2008 at $16 billion), and in some years, U.S. net FDI flows to
China have been negative (reflecting an outflow of funds by U.S. investors in
China back to the United States).
3 US-China economic cooperation limitedUS is

hesitant to work with China

Despite growing commercial ties, the bilateral economic relationship has

become increasingly complex and often fraught with tension. From the U.S.
perspective, many trade tensions stem from Chinas incomplete transition to
a free market economy. While China has significantly liberalized its economic
and trade regimes over the past three decades, it continues to maintain (or
has recently imposed) a number of state-directed policies that appear to
distort trade and investment flows. Major areas of concern expressed by U.S.
policymakers and stakeholders include Chinas alleged widespread cyber
economic espionage against U.S. firms; relatively poor record of intellectual
property rights (IPR) enforcement; discriminatory innovation policies; mixed
record on implementing its World Trade Organization (WTO) obligations;
extensive use of industrial policies (such as financial support of state-owned
firms and trade and investment barriers) in order to promote and protect
industries favored by the government; and interventionist policies to control
the value of its currency. Many U.S. policymakers argue that such policies
negatively impact U.S. economic interests and have contributed to U.S. job
losses. There are a number of U.S. views on how to better address
commercial disputes with China:
2AC AT Global Economy #2

Economic Decline War
They say economic decline does not cause war, but
[GIVE :05 SUMMARY OF OPPONENTS SINGLE ARGUMENT]
1. Extend our Mead evidence.

Its much better than their analytic argument because:

(its newer) (the author is more qualified) (it has more
facts)
to be true)
( ) (their evidence supports our argument)
[WRITE IN YOUR OWN!]

Our Mead evidence shows that economic decline causes war through
WWII. When Germany was hurt economically, a strong ruler rose up
and killed millions. This could happen today again if the economy
truly crashed.
[EXPLAIN WHY YOUR OPTION MATTERS BELOW]

This matters because:
Economic decline is a huge impact and could cause a war where
millions would die. That will outweigh the negative impacts and we
should win.
2 Economic decline causes warthree warrants
Royal, 2010 [DOD COOPERATIVE THREAT REDUCTION DIRECTOR Jedediah Royal, Director of
Cooperative Threat Reduction at the U.S. Department of Defense, 2010, Economic Integration, Economic
Signaling and the Problem of Economic Crises, in Economics of War and Peace: Economic, Legal and
Political Perspectives, ed. Goldsmith and Brauer, p. 213-215
Less intuitive is how periods of economic decline may increase the likelihood of
external conflict. Political science literature has contributed a moderate degree of
attention to the impact of economic decline and the security and defense behavior of
interdependent states. Research in this vein has been considered at systemic, dyadic
and national levels. Several notable contributions follow. First, on the systemic level,
Pollins (2008) advances Modelski and Thompsons (1996) work on leadership cycle
theory, finding that rhythms in the global economy are associated with the rise and
fall of a pre-eminent power and the often bloody transition from one pre-eminent
leader to the next. As such, exogenous shocks such as economic crisis could usher in
a redistribution of relative power (see also Gilpin, 1981) that leads to uncertainty
about power balances, increasing the risk of miscalculation (Fearon, 1995).
Alternatively, even a relatively certain redistribution of power could lead to a
permissive environment for conflict as a rising power may seek to challenge a
declining power (Werner, 1999). Seperately, Pollins (1996) also shows
that global economic cycles combined with parallel leadership cycles impact the
likelihood of conflict among major, medium and small powers, although he suggests
that the causes and connections between global economic conditions and security
conditions remain unknown. Second, on a dyadic level, Copelands (1996, 2000)
theory of trade expectations suggests that future expectation of trade is a
significant variable in understanding economic conditions and security behaviours of
states. He argues that interdependent states are likely to gain specific benefits from
trade so long as they have an optimistic view of future trade relations, However, if
the expectations of future trade decline, particularly for difficult to replace items such
as energy resources, the likelihood for conflict increases, as states will be inclined to
use force to gain access to those resources. Crisis could potentially be the trigger for
decreased trade expectations either on its own or because it triggers protectionist
moves by interdependent states. Third, others have considered the link between
economic decline and external armed conflict at a national level. Blomberg and Hess
(2002) find a strong correlation between internal conflict and external conflict,
particularly during periods of economic downturn. They write, The linkages between
internal and external conflict and prosperity are strong and mutually
reinforcing. Economic conflict tends to spawn internal conflict, which in turn returns
the favor. Moreover, the presence of a recession tends to amplify the extent to which
international and external conflict self-reinforce each other. (Blomberg & Hess, 2002.
P. 89) Economic decline has been linked with an increase in the likelihood of
terrorism (Blomberg, Hess, & Weerapana, 2004), which has the capacity to spill
across borders and lead to external tensions. Furthermore, crises generally reduce
the popularity of a sitting government. Diversionary theory suggests that, when
facing unpopularity arising from economic decline, sitting governments have
increased incentives to fabricate external military conflicts to create a rally around
the flag efect. Wang (1996), DeRouen (1995), and Blomberg, Hess, and Thacker
(2006) find supporting evidence showing that economic decline and use of force are
at least indirectly correlated. Gelpi (1997), Miller (1999), and Kisangani and Pickering
(2009) suggest that the tendency towards diversionary tactics are greater for
democratic states than autocratic states, due to the fact that democratic leaders are
generally more susceptible to being removed from office due to lack of domestic
support. DeRouen (2000) has provided evidence showing that periods of weak
economic performance in the United States, and thus weak Presidential
popularity, are statistically linked to an increase in the use of force. In
summary, recent economic scholarship positively correlated economic integration
with an increase in the frequency of economic crises, whereas political science
scholarship links economic decline with external conflict at systemic, dyadic and
national levels. This implied connection between integration, crisis and armed conflict
has not featured prominently in the economic-security debate and deserves more
attention.
2AC AT Global Economy #3BIT

Hurts Economy
They say the BIT hurts the economy, but
1. Extend our evidence.

Its much better than their evidence because:
facts)
to be true)

______________________________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________________________

______________________________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________________________
2 A mutually benefitting BIT is possible and would
include higher investment, transparency, a legal
framework, and an equal playing field.

The United States and China have held negotiations on reaching a bilateral
investment treaty (BIT) with the goal of expanding bilateral investment
opportunities. U.S. negotiators hope such a treaty would improve the
investment climate for U.S. firms in China by enhancing legal protections and
dispute resolution procedures, and by obtaining a commitment from the
Chinese government that it would treat U.S. investors no less favorably than
Chinese investors. In April 2012, the Obama Administration released a Model
Bilateral Investment Treaty that was developed to enhance U.S. objectives in
the negotiation of new BITs.102 The new BIT model establishes mechanisms
to promote greater transparency, labor and environment requirements,
disciplines to prevent parties from imposing domestic technology
requirements, and measures to boost the ability of investors to participate in
the development of standards and technical regulations on a
nondiscriminatory basis.103 During the July 10-11, 2013, session of the
S&ED, China indicated its intention to negotiate a high-standard BIT with the
United States that would include all stages of investment and all sectors, a
commitment U.S. official described as a significant breakthrough, and the
first time China has agreed to do so with another country.104 A press
release by the Chinese Ministry of Commerce stated that China was willing to
negotiate a BIT on the basis of nondiscrimination and a negative list, meaning
the agreement would identify only those sectors not open to foreign
investment on a nondiscriminatory basis (as opposed to a BIT with a positive
list which would only list sectors open to foreign investment). During the July
9-10, 2014, S&ED session, the two sides agreed to a broad timetable for
reaching agreement on core issues and major articles of the treaty text and
committed to initiate the negative list negotiation early in 2015.105 During
BIT negotiations held in June 2015, each side submitted their first negative
list proposals, and later agreed to submit a revised list in September 2015.
While some progress was reportedly made in September 2015, a
breakthrough was not achieved in time for Presidents Xis summit visit to the
United States. Many analysts contend the negotiation of a U.S.-China BIT
could have significant implications for bilateral commercial relations
and the Chinese economy. According to USTR, Michael Froman, such an
agreement offer a major opportunity to engage on Chinas domestic
economic reforms and to pursue greater market access, a more level
playing field, and a substantially improved investment environment
for U.S. firms in China.106 For China, a high-standard BIT could help
facilitate greater competition in China and result in more efficient use of
resources, factors which economists contend could boost economic growth.
Some observers contend that Chinas pursuit of a BIT with the United States
represents a strategy that is being used by reformers in China to jumpstart
widespread economic reforms (which appear to have been stalled in recent
years). This strategy, it is argued, is similar to that used by Chinese reformers
in their eforts to get China into the WTO in 2001. Such international
agreements may give political cover to economic reformers because they can
argue that the agreements build on Chinas eforts to become a leader in
global afairs. This may make it harder for vested interests in China who
benefit from the status quo to resist change.
3 China is a HUGE growing market for goodsBIT gives

US access

Many trade analysts argue that China could prove to be a much more
significant market for U.S. exports in the future. China is one of the worlds
fastest-growing economies, and healthy economic growth is projected to
continue in the years ahead, provided that it implements new comprehensive
economic reforms.7 Chinas goals of modernizing its infrastructure, upgrading
its industries, boosting the services sector, and improving rural living
standards could generate substantial demand for foreign goods and services.
Finally, economic growth has substantially improved the purchasing power of
Chinese citizens, especially those living in urban areas along the east coast of
China. In addition, Chinas growing economy, large foreign exchange reserves
(at nearly $3.6 trillion as of August 2015), and its 1.37 billion population,
make it a potentially enormous market. To illustrate: According to a
report by McKinsey & Company, China could have 630 million middle class
households (45% of the entire nation) by 2022.8 Although Chinese private
consumption as a percent of GDP is much lower than that of most other major
economies, the rate of growth of Chinese private consumption has been
rising rapidly. From 2002 to 2013, the annual average rate of growth in
Chinese private consumption was 10.3%, compared to 2.5% for the United
States.9 Chinas government has indicated that it plans to step up eforts to
boost domestic spending to help lessen its dependence on exports as the
major contributor to Chinas economic growth. Chinas goals of developing its
western regions, expanding and modernizing its infrastructure, boosting its
social safety net (such as health care and pensions), modernizing and
developing key industries, reducing pollution, and raising incomes of the rural
poor will likely result in large-scale government spending levels. Chinas 12th
Five-Year Plan (2011-2015) reportedly planned to spend $1 trillion on
infrastructure spending.10 China has the worlds largest mobile phone
network and one of the fastest- growing markets, with 1.29 billion mobile
phone subscribers as of June 2015.11 Boeing Corporation predicts that over
the next 20 years (2014-2033), China will need 6,020 new airplanes valued at
$870 billion, and will be Boeings largest commercial airplane customer
outside the United States.12 During President Xis visit to the United States in
September 2015, China announced plans to buy 300 aircraft at $38 billion.
China replaced the United States as the worlds largest Internet user in 2008.
As of June 2015, China had an estimated 668 million users, double the U.S.
population.13 Yet, the percentage of the Chinese population using the
Internet is small relative to the United States: 47% versus 87%, respectively
as of June 2014.14 In 2009, China became the worlds largest producer of
motor vehicles as well as the largest market for new vehicles, and has
remained the largest for each through 2014. Chinas motor vehicle production
in 2014 was 23.7 million vehicles versus 11.7 million for the United States,
while Chinese motor vehicle sales in that year were 23.5 million (U.S. levels
were 16.8 million vehicles).15 General Motors (GM) reported that it sold more
cars and trucks in China than in the United States each year from 2010 to
2014.16 GMs China sales in 2014 were 3.5 million vehicles compared to 2.9
million vehicle sales in the United States.
4 Investment between the US and China is low now,
but a BIT would substantially improve both
economies
Peterson Institute for International Economics, 2015 [private, nonprofit

institution for rigorous, intellectually open, and indepth study and
discussion of international economic policy. Toward a US-China
Investment TreatyFebruary, http://www.goldmansachs.com/our-
thinking/pages/us-china-bilateral-investment-
dialogue/multimedia/papers/toward-a-us-china-investment-
treaty.pdf]
Given the large economic footprint of both economies, the size of cross-
border investment in each others markets is surprisingly small. US FDI in
China in 2012, valued around $54 billion, represented only about 1.2 percent
of the $2.2 trillion of total FDI in China.2 And China accounted for an even
smaller share of FDI in the United States.3 Removing discriminatory
investment restrictions via a US-China BIT could yield a significant payof, not
simply as a means of encouraging two-way investment but also as a means
of helping resolve investment-related disputes.4 But getting agreement on
such a pact will require reconciling diferences regarding the scope and
coverage of the prospective pact and addressing the extensive complaints
that both have about FDI policies in the others market. There is ample
precedent for the success of investment treaties. Both the United States and
China have used BITs over the years to advance their investment relations.
Existing pacts have helped reduce policy bar Given the large economic
footprint of both economies, the size of cross-border investment in each
others markets is surprisingly small. US FDI in China in 2012, valued around
$54 billion, represented only about 1.2 percent of the $2.2 trillion of total FDI
in China.2 And China accounted for an even smaller share of FDI in the United
States.3 Removing discriminatory investment restrictions via a US-China BIT
could yield a significant payof, not simply as a means of encouraging two-
way investment but also as a means of helping resolve investment-related
disputes.4 But getting agreement on such a pact will require reconciling
diferences regarding the scope and coverage of the prospective pact and
addressing the extensive complaints that both have about FDI policies in the
others market. There is ample precedent for the success of investment
treaties. Both the United States and China have used BITs over the years to
advance their investment relations. Existing pacts have helped reduce policy
bar riers limiting FDI and enhance the investment climate between the
partner countries. Put simply, BITs are designed to encourage foreign
investment and to establish reciprocal rules for the treatment of firms and
protection of investments. The number of BITs globally has now reached more
than 2,850.5 The United States has 41 BITs in force, the majority of which are
with developing countries. China has 104 BITs in force, of which 78 are with
developing countries and 26 are with developed countries, including Canada,
Germany, and the United Kingdom.
2AC AT Global Economy #4

Economies Improving
They say the economy is strong, but

facts)
to be true)
(their evidence has no facts) (Their author is biased) (it takes into account
their argument)

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2 China and Europes economies are faltering
Profit Confidential, May 2016 [financial news and opinion

site, all information is cited from other sources, Reality
Check: These 3 Numbers Point to a Global Economic
Collapse, May 15,
http://www.profitconfidential.com/economy/reality-check-
these-3-numbers-point-to-a-global-economic-collapse/]
On Friday, several economic indicators sent a warning sign that the economic
collapse is almost here. To put it mildly, the numbers dont look good. They
tell a story of an economy plagued by weakness and indecision. Here are a
few of the worst indicators: China Slowdown Spreads Past Mainland: Our first
indication of an impending economic collapse came from the Far East. Hong
Kongs economy contracted in the first quarter of 2016, shrinking 0.4% from
the previous quarter. Economists had been expecting growth to remain
positive, but have those glorified fortune-tellers been right about anything?
Another quarter of negative growth would put Hong Kong officially in a
recession. It is yet another piece of evidence that Chinas crash is on the
horizon. (Source: Hong Kongs Economy Unexpectedly Contracts in First
Quarter, Bloomberg, May 13, 2016.) Eurozone Outlook Worsens: Those of us
who really pay attention to economic data have noticed a weird pattern that
should concern everyone. Government officials have a system of cloaking the
economys weakness when they have something to hide. First, they publish
really bullish estimates on the economy. Next, they revise those estimates
downward by a few points so the official numbers will look better by
comparison. After a few weeks, even the official number is revised
downward. For instance, eurozone officials just clarified that the European
economy didnt actually expand at 0.5% in the first quarter of 2016it was
more like 0.4%. But they could keep lowering those numbers in the future. Its
a sleazy trick. (Source: Eurozone growth estimate revised down a notch,
BBC News, May 13, 2016.) Britains Got the Blues: Political landmines are
another reason the global economy is tanking, and theres no better proof of
that than in Britain. The upcoming referendum on whether or not to stay in
the European Union is causing a lot of uncertainty. During the month of
March, construction spending fell by 3.6% in the U.K. Its fairly obvious that
businesses are sitting on their cash until the result is clear. (Source: UK
construction sector sufers sharp slowdown, The Guardian, May 13, 2016.)
Dear readers, if you should take away anything from this article, let it be this:
there are no safe havens anymore. The entire world economy is being
dragged down by rogue central bankers and their political cronies. All major
economies are slowing, but unlike 2008, China wont be here to save the day.
Thats rightalthough liberal policymakers in D.C. try to take credit, it was
really Chinese demand that kept the world turning. And how did China keep
its economic engine running? With credit, of course! Chinese corporations
borrowed heavily to prop up economic output after 2008, spending money
that they didnt really have.
3 Chinese economic slowdown causes riots
Council on Foreign Relations, February 2016 [International,

bipartisan organization, Xi Jinping on the Global Stage Chinese
Foreign Policy Under a Powerful but Exposed Leader", February]
Some analysts are skeptical that the situation is quite so serious. In their
more sanguine view, economies naturally slow as they get bigger and Chinas
economy is already twice as large as it was seven years ago. Mathematically,
this means that even if growth slows to half its previous pace, it will still
generate income gains that are just as large in absolute terms. This fact,
however, by no means guarantees political stability. Even if some Western
economists believe that 5 percent growth is healthy, that is no guarantee or
even likelihood that Chinese citizens or Chinese elites will agree. First, the
distribution of Chinas economic growth matters enormously. Given Chinas
exceptional and widening inequality, the benefits of economic growth do not
easily benefit the average citizen. Second, citizens who have known rapid
income growth for their entire working lives will be disappointed at the
slowdown especially if it leads to layofs and higher unemployment that
actually worsen the average quality of life. Signs of unrest already abound,
with labor disputes and mass incidents on the rise, as noted earlier.27
Finally, widespread corruption, environmental degradation, pervasive societal
inequality, and repressive autocracy are more palatable when incomes are
climbing quickly; when they are not, these simmering issues can boil over
into protest. Senior Chinese leaders clearly think in such terms, many
including former Premier Wen Jiabaohaving previously stated that 8 percent
growth is needed to maintain social stability.28 Such growth is no longer
attainable, and at a senior conclave of top Chinese economic officials held in
December 2015, many acknowledged the possibility of stagnant growth for
years to come.
2AC Harms (US-China War)
2AC AT US-China War #1No

US/China War
They say the US and China wont go to war, but
1. Extend our TIME evidence.

Its much better than their Think Progress evidence
because: [PUT IN
THEIR AUTHORS NAME]
facts)
to be true)
their argument)

Our TIME evidence is from 2016 and their evidence is from 2014. A
whole lot can change in two years especially in international politics.
We have the most recent evidence on Chinese military policy.
China may not have wanted war a few years ago, but our evidence is
about this year and the future. There will be more accidents and the
risk becomes worse in the future. A US-China war would be huge and
a reason to vote aff.
2 Computer simulations show all out Asian war is
inevitable without diplomacy
The Telegraph, April 2016 [Riccardo Cociani is a second year
undergraduate student in war Studies at King's College London
and Chair of the KCL Crisis Team Is war with China
inevitable?April 18,
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/2016/04/18/is-war-with-china-
inevitable/]
The nightmare come true War breaks out between North Korea and Japan,
and between China and the US. While China continued the militarisation of
their artificial islands in the South China Sea, the US responded by increasing
their naval and military presence in the South China Sea, eventually leading
to a direct military confrontation between the two countries. While the US
was distracted and focused on Chinese military activity, North Korea took the
opportunity to conduct false-flag operations in order to attack and destroy
Japan. Diplomatic solutions did not even seem close to the horizon. While this
was only a crisis simulation, it raises concerns over the current situation. Will
war break out between China and the US, or between China and Japan? Will
North Korea attack Japan? Our simulation suggests that if China continues to
increase their military and naval activities in the South China Sea, without
being transparent and communicating the purpose of their activities,
misunderstandings and rising tensions could be the spark that starts a war.
Over the East China Sea, on the other hand, while the US and China went at it
against each other, North Korea took the opportunity to increase their military
activities by launching attacks against an abandoned Japan, as the US was
too distracted about China. South Korea found itself in between all this, and
had to make difficult decisions over which side to be with. Chaos reigned the
waters, and the perfect storm hit. Can war be prevented? Diplomacy
unfortunately failed. After numerous discussions and cases made in the
United Nations Security Council committee, no decision or action was made
to prevent war, let alone decrease military activity in the South China Sea.
Bilateral talks only helped to reach limited strategic goals, but not enough to
prevent war from occurring. Mistrust and betrayal flowed and rose like waves
as the simulation progressed. Therefore, the strongest lesson learnt and
recommendation we could ofer is to call for an increased diplomatic efort,
most importantly, between China and Japan, and between China and the US.
The waters and the dragons have risen, and only peaceful, diplomatic
discussions can ease the tensions and bring these countries closer. However,
the initial challenge is to reach a consensus to firstly meet. Once reached,
only time will tell, but an increased diplomatic efort can only take us closer
to such point.
2AC AT US-China War #2China

Expansion Solves War
They say China expansion solves war between smaller countries, but
1. Extend our TIME and Tikhonova evidence.

Its much better than their Li and Yanzhuo evidence
because: [PUT IN THEIR
AUTHORS NAME]
facts)
(their evidence is not logical/contradicts itself) (history
proves it to be true)
their argument)

Their evidence says that China needs to lay out a blueprint to make
sure other countries back down, but China is not doing this at all.
Our TIME and Tikhonova evidence says that these countries are
terrified of China and are waiting for US help. Also, China has not
made its intentions clearthey just put ships and weapons in the
South China Sea.
Chinese expansion causes war and does not solve it. We still have
our large war impact to weigh against the neg.
2 Tension between the U.S. and China is increasing
conflict is inevitable in the South China Sea
Mendis and Wang, May 2016 [Patrick and Joey, Mendis is a

Rajawali senior fellow of the Kennedy School of Governments Ash
Center for Democratic Governance and Innovation at Harvard
University and Wang is a defense analyst and a graduate of the
Naval War College, the National Defense University, and the
Harvard Kennedy School, Who Can Contain China When U.S.
Policy Fails?, May 1, http://www.theglobalist.com/who-can-
contain-china-when-united-states-policy-fails/]
In the midst of escalating tensions between the United States and China,
particularly in the East and South China Seas, serious questions are being
raised about the future of peace, security and prosperity in the region.
Reflecting on these tensions, we need to return to the founding principles
that originally brought wealth and mutual prosperity to both nations. Over the
past several decades, much has been written about Chinas peaceful rise.
But with this meteoric rise in economic development, there has been a rise in
Chinas military modernization and its ever-increasing assertiveness in
defense posture. This has raised concerns among Chinas neighbors
regarding its intentions. The Credibility Issue Beijing, for its part, has not
helped to clarify these intentions. Instead, President Xi Jinping muddled the
situation. First, he declared that China would not pursue militarization of
the South China Sea. Then, he proceeded not to fulfill that pledge by
installing surface-to-air missile batteries on Woody Island in the Paracels and
conducting exercises shooting down unmanned aircraft. This has created not
only a credibility issue for him, but also elevated concerns about his ability to
control the military. For its part, the United States has responded to Chinas
rise by blowing the dust of of the old containment playbook of the former
Soviet era and modifying it with an element of economic engagement. This
congagement (containment and engagement) would seek to contain China
militarily while continuing to engage China economically. No doubt, China
wants peace and prosperity in the region. However, it is doing precisely the
opposite of that which would bring about this possibility. Washington, for its
part, claims it welcomes Chinas peaceful rise. Yet, it treats China like a
parvenu or an upstart, who suddenly got rich but doesnt fit into the
American-led world order. If so, Beijing continually needs to be humbled.
2AC AT US-China War #3Brink

Passed Already
They say Conflict happens all the time and our impacts havent happened,
but

facts)
to be true)
their argument)
( ) ( their evidence supports our argument)

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2AC AT US-China War #4Chinas

not a threat
They say China is reducing spending on its military, but
facts)
to be true)
their argument)

______________________________________________________________________________
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______________________________________________________________________________
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2 China is aggressively building up their military

MANY warrants
Krepinevich, 2015 [Andrew, President of the Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments ,
How to Deter China The Case for Archipelagic Defense March/April,
https://www.foreignafairs.com/articles/china/2015-02-16/how-deter-china]
China claims that its rise is intended to be peaceful, but its actions tell a
diferent story: that of a revisionist power seeking to dominate the western
Pacific. Beijing has claimed sovereignty over not only Taiwan but also Japans
Senkaku Islands (known in China as the Diaoyu Islands) and most of the 1.7
million square miles that make up the East China and South China Seas,
where six other countries maintain various territorial and maritime claims.
And it has been unapologetic about pursuing those goals. In 2010, for
example, Chinas then foreign minister, Yang Jiechi, dismissed concerns over
Beijings expansionism in a single breath, saying, China is a big country, and
other countries are small countries, and that is just a fact. Consider Beijings
recent bullying in the South China Sea. In March 2014, Chinese coast guard
boats blocked the Philippines from accessing its outposts on the Spratly
Islands. Two months later, China moved an oil rig into Vietnams exclusive
economic zone, clashing with Vietnamese fishing boats. The moves echoed
earlier incidents in the East China Sea. In September 2010, as punishment for
detaining a Chinese fishing boat captain who had rammed two Japanese
coast guard vessels, China temporarily cut of its exports to Japan of rare-
earth elements, which are essential for manufacturing cell phones and
computers. And in November 2013, China unilaterally declared an air
defense identification zone, subject to its own air traffic regulations, over the
disputed Senkaku Islands and other areas of the East China Sea, warning that
it would take military action against aircraft that refused to comply. Some
have suggested that as its military grows stronger and its leaders feel more
secure, China will moderate such behavior. But the opposite seems far more
likely. Indeed, Beijings provocations have coincided with the dramatic
growth of its military muscle. China is now investing in a number of new
capabilities that pose a direct challenge to regional stability. For example,
Chinas Peoples Liberation Army is bolstering its so-called anti-access/area-
denial capabilities, which aim to prevent other militaries from occupying or
crossing vast stretches of territory, with the express goal of making the
western Pacific a no-go zone for the U.S. military. That includes developing
the means to target the Pentagons command-and-control systems, which
rely heavily on satellites and the Internet to coordinate operations and
logistics. The PLA has made substantial progress on this front in recent years,
testing an antisatellite missile, using lasers to blind U.S. satellites, and
waging sophisticated cyberattacks on U.S. defense networks. China is also
enhancing its capacity to target critical U.S. military assets and limit the U.S.
Navys ability to maneuver in international waters. The PLA already has
conventional ballistic and cruise missiles that can strike major U.S. facilities in
the region, such as the Kadena Air Base, in Okinawa, Japan, and is developing
stealth combat aircraft capable of striking many targets along the first island
chain. To detect and target naval vessels at greater distances, the PLA has
deployed powerful radars and reconnaissance satellites, along with
unmanned aerial vehicles that can conduct long-range scouting missions. And
to stalk U.S. aircraft carriers, as well as the surface warships that protect
them, the Chinese navy is acquiring submarines armed with advanced
torpedoes and high-speed cruise missiles designed to strike ships at long
distances. Beijings actions cannot be explained away as a response
to a U.S. arms buildup. For the last decade, Washington has focused its
energy and resources primarily on supporting its ground troops in Afghanistan
and Iraq. The U.S. defense budget, which until recently stood at above four
percent of the countrys GDP, is projected to decline to less than three
percent by the end of the decade. Simply put, the Pentagon is shedding
military capabilities while the PLA is amassing them. Yet if the past is
prologue, China will not seek to resolve its expansionist aims through overt
aggression. Consistent with its strategic culture, it wants to slowly but
inexorably shift the regional military balance in its favor, leaving the rest of
the region with little choice but to submit to Chinese coercion. For the most
part, Chinas maritime neighbors are convinced that diplomatic and economic
engagement will do little to alter this basic fact. Several of them, including
Japan, the Philippines, and Vietnam, are increasingly focusing their
militaries on the task of resisting Chinese ambitions. They know full
well, however, that individual action will be insufficient to prevent Beijing
from carrying its vision forward. Only with U.S. material support can they
form a collective front that deters China from acts of aggression or coercion.
3 Chinese expansion and declining diplomatic relations

make war inevitable
Quirk, 2015 [Sean, Lieutenant (junior grade), a U.S. Navy Surface Warfare
Officer stationed in Pearl Harbor. He is also a Young Leader and non-resident
WSD-Handa Fellow with the Pacific Forum CSIS. Reconciling Chinas PLAN:
Strategic Intervention, Tactical Engagement, November 9,
http://thediplomat.com/2015/11/reconciling-chinas-plan-strategic-
intervention-with-tactical-engagement
Ships that pass in the night, and speak each other in passing.
Passing, harassing, and shadowing in the case of Chinese vessels
meeting U.S. warships. Such exchanges comprise the unfortunate core of
U.S.-China military-to-military (mil-to-mil) engagement. Chinas harassment
of the USNS Impeccable in 2009 and USS Cowpens in 2013 are but the most
prominent cases of its persistent belligerence in the South China Sea. This
tactically aggressive behavior from the Peoples Liberation Army-Navy (PLAN)
reflects a grander expansion strategy emanating from Beijing. From new
Chinese passports with the infamous nine-dashed line, media trumpeting
Chinese claims over Japanese-governed Senkaku Islands, and maritime
occupation of Scarborough Shoal, Chinas maritime expansion is the well-
orchestrated foreign policy of the Chinese Communist Party through its
national ministries. Betting that war will not result, China is pushing the
boundaries literally of its maritime claims, incrementally. American
military analyst Robert Haddick calls the strategy salami slicing, or the
slow accumulation of small changes, none of which in isolation amounts to a
casus belli, but which can add up over time to a significant strategic change
(p. 77). By building facts on the ground through occupation and declaration
of new maritime territory, Beijing builds precedent and physical justification
for Chinese claims. Beijings recent island construction and aggressive
territorial incursions are the most recent events testing the will of the
international community and United States. These events are not signals but
rather dynamic action by Beijing to unilaterally dominate Chinas near seas.
Deteriorating U.S.-China Relations Earlier this September, the ninth track-II
U.S.-China Strategic Dialogue convened in Honolulu, Hawaii, hosted by the
Pacific Forum Center for Strategic International Studies (CSIS) and the Naval
Postgraduate School. Some fifty U.S. and Chinese officials, military officers,
and academics met in their private capacity for the unofficial discussions. The
general consensus on both sides was the deteriorating state of U.S.-
China relations and the need for both governments to have
productive dialogue on their security concerns. This deep and
widening chasm of distrust is leading to greater potential for
misunderstanding and lethal miscalculation in times of crisis. The
demand on both sides is for clear, substantive dialogue and binding
agreements to sustain peace, yet one retired senior PLA official articulated
the current state of afairs. He said, If the U.S. wants to make China a threat,
China will become a threat. China can only respond. If a country wanted to
become threatening in this era, a good start would be to declare indisputable
sovereignty over an entire sea. It would repeatedly send government vessels
into the territorial waters of an adjacent state. It would declare a new air
defense identification zone (ADIZ) overlapping the established zones of its
neighbors. It might even go so far as secretly build new military installations
in international waters with airstrips for fighter and bomber aircraft. No, China
is not a threat to the region because a threat merely signals potential
hostility. China is not threatening the security and stability of international
law in the Asia-Pacific China is actively undermining it. Washington needs to
say so. It should unambiguously call out Beijings plan for what it is:
encroaching on the international commons and destabilizing geopolitical
peace to enlarge Chinas sovereign territory. Due to geographic distance, the
American public can more easily ignore the writing on the walls and have.
Chinas neighbors cannot and have not, and neither can U.S. forward-
deployed forces in the region.
2AC Solvency
2AC AT Solvency #1Diplomacy

Fails
They say Diplomacy fails, but
1. Extend our Mendis and Wang evidence.

Its much better than their Li and Yanzhuo evidence because:
facts)
to be true)
their argument)
(our evidence is more specific) (their evidence supports our argument)

The Mendis and Wang evidence offers many facts about economic
benefits of the plan and how a BIT would fit into Chinese self-
interest. Their evidence is about the US and diplomacy. Our plan
cooperates economically and gives China something it wants.

We can solve our entire case through economic diplomacy and thus
can access our impacts.
2AC Solvency
2AC Solvency
2 Strong economic relations with Asia are key to global

prosperity and security
US Department of State, 2015 [Charles Rivkin, assistant secretary of

state, Rivkin leads a bureau at the U.S. State Department that is
responsible for managing trade negotiations, investment treaties,
economic sanctions, transportation afairs, telecommunications
policy, international finance and development related issues, as
well as intellectual property right protection, Advancing U.S.
Economic Engagement in Asia, May 14,
http://www.state.gov/e/eb/rls/rm/2015/242411.htm]
Asia and the broader Asia-Pacific is a diverse and vibrant region that is full of
potential for the U.S. economy. Economic growth in the region has lifted
millions out of poverty, and the region includes some of the fastest growing
economies on the planet. East Asia and the Pacific is home to more than one-
third of the worlds population, a growing percentage of which is middle-class,
and many nations there now enjoy democratic forms of government. These
are all reasons why this Administration is committed to advancing our
economic engagement with Asia. Our commitment to the region is deep,
enduring, and expanding, covering many more issues and programs than we
are able to fully discuss today. Our bilateral trade in goods and services is at
an all-time high, reaching over $1.4 trillion in 2013. U.S. businesses remain
the largest source of foreign investment in East Asia and the Pacific. We also
provide hundreds of millions of dollars in assistance each year to developing
East Asia, training thousands of officials on issues vital to our interests such
as trade facilitation, financial regulation, energy efficiency, environmental
governance and resources management, and disaster preparedness. Our
Vision for the Asia-Pacific Region. The United States has a strong commitment
to promoting Asias economic growth and prosperity. The reason for these
eforts is obvious. A prosperous Asia will not only be more peaceful it will
create greater opportunities for the United States to benefit. We are a leading
trader and investor in the Asia-Pacific, and this supports high-paying jobs and
raises incomes here at home. The Obama Administration is focused on
increasing economic opportunities in the region, for ourselves and for others.
Through our engagement, we aim to build a system for Asia-Pacific trade and
investment that is open, free, transparent, and fair. Open to all comers, from
both inside and outside the region. Free from unwarranted at-the-border or
behind-the-border barriers to international economic activity. Transparent so
that all players can understand the rules. And fair so that no entities have
2AC Solvency
any improper advantage, whether based on ownership, political relationships,

or any other advantages.
2AC Solvency
3 US-Chinese trade solves conflictmultiple historical

examples
Mendis and Wang, May 2016 [Patrick and Joey, Mendis is a Rajawali
senior fellow of the Kennedy School of Governments Ash Center
for Democratic Governance and Innovation at Harvard University
and Wang is a defense analyst and a graduate of the Naval War
College, the National Defense University, and the Harvard
Kennedy School, Who Can Contain China When U.S. Policy
Fails?, May 1, http://www.theglobalist.com/who-can-contain-
china-when-united-states-policy-fails/]
MAD doctrine versus MAP doctrine If Washington really wants peace and
prosperity in the region, words must be matched by deeds. Cold War
mindsets like mutually assured destruction (MAD) with that of escalating
nuclear armament doesnt work in the more complex Sino-American
relationship. Indeed, historically, the Chinese experience with the United
States from the start has more often been a case of economic engagement
that worked toward mutually assured prosperity (MAP). This commercial
relationship is far older than Deng Xiaopings opening to the West. In 1784,
the American ship Empress of China built for privateering but converted for
commerce when the Revolutionary War ended in 1783 set sail for China.
Turning swords into ploughshares, the Empress of China made its maiden
voyage from New York Harbor to Canton (Guangzhou) with a cargo of Spanish
dollars, ginseng, furs, lead and wine. The ship returned home in May 1785,
bearing Chinese tea, silk and porcelain. The seaports of the new American
nation, from Boston to Charleston, could now trade not just with Europe, but
directly with China. That led to a rich, coastal commercial civilization in the
emerging republic. This mutually enriching commercial intercourse continued
until Britains Opium Wars, the Civil War, and the Taiping Rebellion all of
which shattered Chinas status as the premiere economy in the world. Then
both nations turned inward between the two World Wars and during the Cold
War.
2AC Solvency
2AC AT Solvency #2Diplomacy

High Now
They say diplomatic cooperation is high now , but
1. Extend our Diplomat evidence.

Its much better than their argument because:
[PUT IN THEIR AUTHORS
NAME]
facts)
to be true)

Our Diplomat evidence says the US and China do cooperation now,
but on other issues. Just because they cooperate does not mean the
BIT will pass.

If our evidence assumes their evidence, ours is much better. It must
be true because our author knows our opponents argument. Then,
we still need the BIT in order to fix our advantage.
2AC Solvency
2AC Solvency
2AC AT Solvency #3China will

say No
They say China will say no to the BIT, but

facts)
to be true)
their argument)

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______________________________________________________________________________
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2AC Solvency
2AC AT: China Will Punish the US

Economically
1. China wont use trade retaliationtheyre incredibly
tied to the US economy

In the past, some analysts have raised concerns that Chinas large holdings of
U.S. debt securities could give China leverage over U.S. foreign policy,
including trade policy. They argue, for example, that China might attempt to
sell (or threaten to sell) a large share of its U.S. debt securities as punishment
over a policy dispute, which could damage the U.S. economy. Others counter
that Chinas holdings of U.S. debt give it very little practical leverage over the
United States. They argue that, given Chinas economic dependency on a
stable and growing U.S. economy, and its substantial holdings of U.S.
securities, any attempt to try to sell a large share of those holdings would
likely damage both the U.S. and Chinese economies. Such a move could also
cause the U.S. dollar to sharply depreciate against global currencies, which
could reduce the value of Chinas remaining holdings of U.S. dollar assets.
Analysts also note that, while China is the largest foreign owner of U.S.
Treasury securities, those holdings are equal to only 6.8% of total U.S. public
debt (as of December 2014). Finally, it is argued that, as long as China
continues to largely peg the RMB to the U.S. dollar, it has little choice but to
purchase U.S. dollar assets in order to maintain that peg.
CDL Core Files 2016-2017 BIT Neg
Bilateral Investment Treaty

NEGATIVE
1NC Harms (Global Economy) Frontline
1NC The Global Economy Frontline

1. Investment between the countries is high now

U.S.-China economic ties have expanded substantially over the past three
decades. Total U.S.- China trade rose from $2 billion in 1979 to $591
billion in 2014. China is currently the United States second-largest trading
partner, its third-largest export market, and its biggest source of imports. In
addition, according to one estimate, sales by foreign affiliates of U.S. firms in
China totaled $364 billion in 2013. Many U.S. firms view participation in
Chinas market as critical to staying globally competitive. General Motors
(GM), for example, which has invested heavily in China, sold more cars in
China than in the United States each year from 2010 to 2014. In addition,
U.S. imports of low-cost goods from China greatly benefit U.S. consumers,
and U.S. firms that use China as the final point of assembly for their products,
or use Chinese-made inputs for production in the United States, are able to
lower costs. China is the largest foreign holder of U.S. Treasury securities
($1.26 trillion as of September 2015). Chinas purchases of U.S. government
debt help keep U.S. interest rates low.
2. No Impact--Economic decline does not cause warIn

2008, the economy went down substantially and no
one went to war. In fact, the US fought two wars in
the Middle East when the economy was good.
3. Solvency Turn: BIT outsources American jobs and
hurts the economy
Dayen, March 2016 [David, contributing writer to Salon.com who also writes
for The Intercept, The New Republic, and The Fiscal Times, The Job-Killing
Trade Deal Youve Never Heard Of: The China Bilateral Investment Treaty,
March 18, http://prospect.org/article/job-killing-trade-deal-youve-never-
heard-china-bilateral-investment-treaty]
The U.S. has implemented 41 BITs over the years, as well as investment
chapters in a dozen free-trade agreements. But the U.S. already attracts
more foreign direct investment than any country in the world, with $168
billion flowing in just in 2012. That includes investments from countries that
until now have lacked the protections of a BIT, like China. Its pitched as a
way to promote investment, said Celeste Drake, trade and globalization
policy specialist at the AFL-CIO. Were one of the top countries for foreign
investment anyway. We dont need to give away rights for foreign investors.
Few investors have the capital to undertake and manage businesses
overseas. Invariably, large multinational corporations, or investment vehicles
like hedge funds and private equity firms, engage in foreign direct
investment. And a BIT ofers them the ability to lock in profits while
neutralizing the risks that go along with investing abroad. For example, U.S.
companies operating in China encounter local corruption, preferential
treatment for their domestic producers, intellectual property theft, and ever-
changing regulatory demands. The BIT sweeps away such hurdles, and allows
foreign investors to use ISDS to recoup lost profits if foreign governments use
those maneuvers to hamper their business. It effectively removes
American companies one big motivation for keeping manufacturing
statesideour relatively stable judicial and regulatory systems and rule of
law. If companies can get all that guaranteed in China, theres
nothing keeping their factories here. The BIT, then, is a recipe for more
outsourcing. China currently protects many of its industries by excluding
foreign investment in certain sectors. The key to the BIT is whats known in
trade deal parlance as the negative lista list of which sectors would stay
excluded. U.S. corporations want to whittle down that list and pry open more
sectors where they can invest in China, and subsequently move production
overseas. On the flip side, theres already substantial Chinese investment in
the U.S.more than U.S. investment in China, in factbut we dont have
good information on its impact. Many Chinese companies are state-owned or
state-influenced, subsidized from home, and freed from having to run an
immediate profit. Michael Wessel, a commissioner on the U.S.-China
Economic and Security Review Commission, warns that Chinese-subsidized
firms could squeeze domestic competitors by undercutting them on price.
Despite this uncertainty, Wessel contends that not single case study on
Chinese-invested firms has been undertaken by an independent expert. We
have no idea what Chinese companies are doing in the U.S., he says. Not all
investment has [the] same impact. Our negotiators are flying blind.
4. No Impact: China is economically fineyour cards
exaggerate
Reuters, 2015 [China sees steady economic growth of 'around' 7

percent in third quarter, September 25,
http://www.reuters.com/article/us-china-economy-gdp-
idUSKCN0RP0IV20150925]
China's economic growth will be largely stable in the third quarter as the
impact from a stock market plunge will be limited, the National Bureau of
Statistics said on Friday. Bureau spokesman Sheng Laiyun also defended the
accuracy of Chinese data - amid widespread skepticism - saying that the 7
percent growth pace reported for the first half was "generally in line with"
changes in the country's power consumption, rail freight and bank lending in
that period. Chinese officials have been trying to reassure global markets that
Beijing is able to manage the world's second-largest economy, after a shock
devaluation of the yuan and a stock market plunge fanned fears of a sharp
growth slowdown. Sheng said China's economic growth in the third quarter
will not derivate much from the 7 percent annual pace Beijing reported for
the second quarter. "Judging from indicators in July and August, we feel that
the economic trend is still stable, there may be some deviation, up or down,
but it won't be big," he told a briefing. China's economic growth remains
within a "reasonable range" and the government will be able to achieve its
annual growth target of "around" 7 percent this year, despite some downward
pressures, Sheng said. SLOWDOWN FEARS A run of downbeat data, including
factory output and investment, showed the economy may have lost further
momentum in the third quarter, raising the possibility that full-year growth
rate may fall below 7 percent. Sheng said his "personal view" was that full-
year growth between 6.5 percent and 7.5 percent would be considered as
"around" 7 percent. The bureau is due to publish third-quarter GDP data on
Oct. 19. Sheng also said that China's survey-based unemployment rate in
August stood at around 5.1 percent. Global investors and policymakers are on
edge over China after the U.S. central bank a week ago held of from raising
interest rates, saying it was unsure if international problems, and China's
slowdown in particular, will hurt the U.S. recovery. An interest rate hike in the
United States will have only limited impact on China, Sheng said. He said
China's economic slowdown was partly due to weaker global demand and
expectations of the U.S. rate rise have contributed to the global financial
market volatility. "The United States should not exaggerate the impact of
China's growth slowdown on the global economy," Sheng said.
2NC/1NR Harms (Global Economy)
2NC/1NR Global Economy #1--

Investment High Now Extensions
They say US-China Investment is low now , but
1. Extend our Morrison evidence.

Its much better than their Diplomat evidence because:
more facts)
to be true)
their argument)

Our Morrison evidence has an insane amount of facts about US and
Chinese economies. It says Total U.S.- China trade rose from $2 billion in
1979 to $591 billion in 2014. China is currently the United States
second-largest trading partner, its third-largest export market, and
its biggest source of imports. These numbers are pretty clear that
trade is high.
This matters because: the US and China trade enough to fix the
economy. There is no need for the aff because the status quo solves
the problem and their impact wont happen.
2 China is breaking records for investments in the U.S.

Voice of America, April 2016 [News organization, Why China
is Investing More Money in the US, April 27,
http://www.voanews.com/content/chinese-investiment-in-the-
united-states-surge/3304768.html]
HONG KONG Chinese investment in the United States is expected to break

records this year, as massive amounts of money continue to flow from
China. Chinese companies looking to expand and merge with U.S. firms are
expected to invest $20 billion to $30 billion in many sectors. Sean Miner
oversees the China program at the Peterson Institute for International
Economics, and said this is good news for the U.S. economy. Its going to
bring thousands of direct and indirect jobs," the company says. Officially as
the composition of the Chinese investment in the U.S. changes now, around
two-thirds of that investment is in services, from entertainment, health care,
IT and financial services. Chinese companies are not just going to merge with
these firms, purchase these firms, but also create new investment, improve
this process. China invested $11.9 billion in the United States in 2014;
investment grew to $15 billion last year.
3 Investment between countries high now

At the end of 2014, the stock of Chinese FDI in the United States on a
historical-cost basis (i.e., the book value), was estimated by BEA at $9.5
billion (up 12.4% over the previous year), making China the 22nd largest
overall source of U.S. FDI inflows through 2014.36 The stock of U.S. FDI in
China (on a historical-cost basis,) through 2014 was estimated at $65.8 billion
(up 9.7% over the previous year), making China the 17th largest destination
of U.S. FDI.37 In 2013, total sales of foreign affiliates of U.S. multinational
corporations were $364 billion, and such firms employed 1.7 million workers.
Chinese-invested firms had $10.6 million in sales in 2012 (most recent year
available) in the United States and employed 14,400 workers. The Rhodium
Group, a private consulting firm, estimates Chinese FDI in the United States
to be significantly higher than BEA estimates. The Rhodium Group notes that:
Official data often exhibit a 1-2 year time lag and do not capture major
trends, due to problems such as significant round tripping and trans-shipping
of investments. For example, Rhodiums approach is to calculate the full
value of a Chinese acquisition in the year it was made and to attribute that
acquisition to China if it was made by a Chinese entity, regardless of where
the financing of the deal originated from (such as through Hong Kong and
Caribbean ofshore centers, which often occurs). The Rhodium Group
estimates that Chinese FDI flows to the United States in 2014 totaled $11.9
billion and that the stock through 2014 was $47.6 billion (see Figure 7).38
Chinas official data on FDI flows with the United States difer from U.S. data,
due largely to diferent methodologies used.39 Chinese data report the stock
of U.S. FDI in China through 2014 at $27.1 billion, and the flow of FDI to the
United States in 2014 at $5.2 billion. Chinas reported annual FDI flows to and
from the United States for 2005-2014 are shown in Figure 8. These data
would indicate that Chinese FDI in the United States has exceeded FDI in
China annually since 2012, which some analysts contend is an indicator that
the United States is more open to Chinese investment than China is for U.S.
investors. As indicated in the text box, a number of Chinese firms have
invested in the United States in recent years.
2NC/1NR Global Economy #2

Economic Decline Does Not Cause
War
They say Economic Decline causes war but
1. Extend our analytic evidence.
facts)
to be true)
their argument)

______________________________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________________________
2 No impact to another recession.

KEYSTONE RESEARCH, 2011 [Main Street Newsletter, 3 Ways the Next Recession Will Be
Diferent, http://keystoneresearch.org/media-center/media-coverage/3-ways-next-recession-will-be-
diferent]
All of this has only renewed concerns among analysts and average
Americans that the U.S. would sufer a dreaded double-dip recession, but
according to several economists MainStreet spoke with, even if we do
enter into another recession later this year or in early 2012, it wont
be nearly as damaging as the Great Recession of 20 08.If there is
another recession, I think it wouldnt be as severe and it would also
be shorter, says Gus Faucher, senior economist at Moodys
Analytics. And the reason for that is a lot of the imbalances that
drove the previous recession have been corrected. As Faucher
and others point out, banks are better capitalized now, the housing
market has shed (however painfully) many delinquent homeowners
who signed up forsubprime mortgages before the recession and U.S.
corporations have trimmed their payrolls and are sitting on ample
cash reserves to help weather another storm. At the same time,
consumers have gradually improved their own balance sheets by spending
less and paying of more of their debt.
3 Economic Decline does not cause warhistory proves
it
FERGUSON, 2006 [Niall, MA, D.Phil., is Laurence A. Tisch Professor of History at

Harvard University and William Ziegler Professor of Business Administration at
Harvard Business School. He is also a Senior Research Fellow at Jesus College, Oxford
University, and a Senior Fellow at the Hoover Institution, Stanford University, Foreign
Afairs, Sept/Oct, The Next War of the World]
Nor can economic crises explain the bloodshed. What may be the
most familiar causal chain in modern historiography links the Great
Depression to the rise of fascism and the outbreak of World War II. But that
simple story leaves too much out. Nazi Germany started the war in
Europe only after its economy had recovered. Not all the countries
afected by the Great Depression were taken over by fascist regimes, nor did
all such regimes start wars of aggression. In fact, no general
relationship between economics and conflict is
discernible for the century as a whole. Some wars came after
periods of growth, others were the causes rather than the
consequences of economic catastrophe, and some severe economic
crises were not followed by wars.
2NC/1NR Global Economy #3BIT

Hurts the Economy
They say __________________________________________________, but

facts)
to be true)
their argument)

______________________________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________________________
2 The Chinese only buy American companies to get
technology and military secrets

Some critics of Chinas current FDI policies and practices contend that they
are largely focused on mergers and acquisitions that are geared toward
boosting the competitive position of Chinese firms and enterprises favored by
the Chinese government for development (some of which also may be
receiving government subsidies). Some argue that such investments are
often made largely to obtain technology and know-how for Chinese firms, but
do little to boost the U.S. economy by, for example, building new factories
and hiring workers. Another major issue relating to Chinese FDI in the United
States is the relative lack of transparency of Chinese firms, especially in
terms of their connections to the central government. When Chinese SOEs
attempt to purchase U.S. company assets, some U.S. analysts ask what role
government officials in Beijing played in that decision. Chinese officials
contend that investment decisions by Chinese companies, including SOEs and
publicly held firms (where the government is the largest shareholder), are
solely based on commercial considerations, and have criticized U.S.
investment policies as protectionist. According to the Foreign Investment
and National Security Act (FINSA) of 2007 (P.L. 110-149), the Committee on
Foreign Investment in the United States (CFIUS) may conduct an investigation
on the efect of an investment transaction on national security if the covered
transaction is a foreign government-controlled transaction (in addition to if
the transaction threatens to impair national security, or results in the control
of a critical piece of U.S. infrastructure by a foreign person).53 The House
report on the bill (H.Rept. 110-24, H.R. 556) noted: The Committee believes
that acquisitions by certain government-owned companies do create
heightened national security concerns, particularly where government-owned
companies make decisions for inherently governmentalas opposed to
commercialreasons. There have been several instances in which eforts by
Chinese firms (oftentimes these have been SOEs or state-favored firms) have
raised concerns of some U.S. policymakers and/or U.S. stakeholders: In July
2015, several U.S. media reports stated that Chinese state-owned Tsinghua
Unigroup Ltd. was seeking to acquire Micron Technologies (a memory and
semiconductor technology producer) for $23 billion.54 Such reports prompted
Senator Charles Schumer to send a letter (dated August 12, 2015) to
Secretary of the Treasury Jacob Lew, stating that he was deeply concerned
with the potential national security and economic ramifications of allowing a
Chinese state-owned enterprise (SOE) to acquire a major U.S. technology
firm, especially the principal American manufacturer of computer memory
chips. He further urged the disapproval of any Chinese acquisition of a U.S.
technology firm by a Chinese SOE until China has undertaken reforms to
their existing policies that constrain U.S. technology firms access to Chinas
markets and violate U.S. intellectual property rights.55
2NC/1NR Global Economy #4

Economy Stable Extensions
They say The global economy is on the brink of collapse, but
1. Extend our Reuters evidence.

Its much better than their Council on Foreign Relations and
Whitefoot evidence because: [PUT IN THEIR
AUTHORS NAME]
facts)
to be true)

Chinas economy is stable and growing despite a small slowdown.
They are not going to collapse. Their authors tend to exaggerate
because they have large investments on the stock market and are
worried about the stability of the economy.
This matters because: their economic collapse impact wont happen
if the economy is stable and improving.
2 The US economy is growing nicely
New York Times, May 2016 [U.S. Economy Better Than

Thought, but Still Weak, May 27,
http://www.nytimes.com/2016/05/28/business/economy/us-
economy-gdp-q1-growth-revision.html?_r=0]
On Friday, the Commerce Department raised its estimate of the pace of

growth in the first quarter of 2016 to 0.8 percent, a move driven mostly by
better data on inventories and housing. Other areas of the economy,
especially manufacturing and mining, still face significant headwinds. One
explanation for the hesitancy of businesses to spend is pressure on earnings
after several years of expanding margins. The Commerce Department said
corporate profits rose just 0.3 percent in the first quarter, after a 7.8 percent
drop in the fourth quarter of 2015. It just confirms that we had a soft start to
the year but not quite as bad as we thought, Ethan Harris, head of global
economics at Bank of America Merrill Lynch, said on Friday. Business
investment was very weak, but the one bit of positive news was a surge in
home construction. Were still in the recovery stage in the real estate market,
especially for multifamily buildings. The governments initial estimate of
first-quarter economic activity, released in late April, showed an annual
growth rate of 0.5 percent. The third and final estimate for growth will be
released on June 28. For the second quarter, which covers April, May and
June, most experts forecast that the pace will pick up to about 2.5 percent.
Underscoring the consumers ability to shrug of the anxiety that has gripped
some businesses, the University of Michigan said on Friday that its monthly
survey of consumer confidence in May showed sentiment at its healthiest
level since June 2015. Expectations for future growth improved among both
high- and middle-income households, according to the University of Michigan
researchers. The reports on Friday also suggest that 2016s economic
trajectory will follow an arc that has bedeviled forecasters for years: a soft
first quarter followed by a turnaround in the spring even though underlying
conditions remain largely the same throughout the period.
1NC Harms (US-China War) Frontline
1NC US-China War Frontline

1. No US-China Warpeople know the consequences
and miscommunication happens all of the time
Think Progress, 2014 [News outlet, Why Everyone Needs To Stop

Freaking Out About War With China, February 7,
http://thinkprogress.org/world/2014/02/07/3222021/china-japan-
war/]
But theres one big factor shaping the balance of power in East Asia that
means the talk is likely to remain just that: nuclear weapons. The tagline for
World War I in 1914 The War To End All Wars would have a decidedly
diferent meaning in 2014, as wars end would be accomplished by the
worlds end. So whereas, in 1914, all of the European powers thought they
could win the war decisively, East Asias great powers recognize the risk of a
nuclear exchange between the United States and China to be catastrophic.
Carleton Universitys Stephen Saideman calls this the end of the preemption
temptation; nobody thinks they can win by striking first anymore. Indeed,
despite the words of some of its military leaders, China (at least nominally)
has a no-clash-with-Japan policy in place over the islands. That also helps
explain why the most commonly-cited Senkaku/Diaoyu spark, accidental
escalation, isnt as likely as many suggest. When The Wall Street Journals
Andrew Browne writes that theres a real risk of an accident leading to a
standof from which leaders in both countries would find it hard to back down
in the face of popular nationalist pressure, hes not wrong. But it wont
happen just because two planes happen across each other in the
sky. In 2013, with tensions running high the whole year, Japan scrambled
fighters against Chinese aircraft 433 times. Indeed, tensions have flared up a
number of times throughout the years (often sparked by nationalist activists
on side of the other) without managing to bleed over into war. Thats
because, as MIT East Asia expert M. Taylor Fravel argues, there are deep
strategic reasons why each side is, broadly speaking, OK with the status quo
over and above nuclear deterrence. China has an interest in not seeming like
an aggressor state in the region, as thats historically caused other regional
powers to put away their diferences and line up against it. Japan currently
has control over the islands, which would make any strong moves by China
seem like an attempt to overthrow the status quo power balance. The United
States also has a habit of constructive involvement, subtly reminding both
sides when tensions are spiking that the United States and its rather
powerful navy would prefer that there be no fighting between the two
states. Moreover, the whole idea of accidental war is also a little bit
confusing . Militaries dont just start shooting each other by mistake and then
decide its time to have a war. Rather, an incident thats truly accidental
say, a Japanese plane firing on a Chinese aircraft in one of the places where
their Air Defense Identification Zones (ADIZs) overlap changes the
incentives to go to war, as the governments start to think (perhaps wrongly)
that war is inevitable and the only way to win it is to escalate. Its hard to
envision this kind of shift in calculation in East Asia, for all of the
aforementioned reasons.
2. Impact Turn: China expansion solves war between

Southeast Asian countries
Li and Yanzhuo, 2015 [Xue and Xu, Director of the Department of

International Strategy at the Institute of World Economics and Politics,
Chinese Academy of Social Sciences. Xu Yanzhuo received her doctorate from
Durham University (UK) in December 2014 and studies international
responsibility, South China Sea disputes, and Chinese foreign policy. The US
and China Won't See Military Conflict Over the South China Sea, June 19,
http://thediplomat.com/2015/06/the-us-and-china-wont-see-military-conflict-
over-the-south-china-sea/]
For its part, China is determined to build artificial islands and several airstrips
in the Spratlys, which I argue would help promote the resolution of SCS
disputes. But its worth noting that if China establishes an ADIZ and
advocates a 200 nautical miles EEZ (as the U.S. fears), it would push ASEAN
claimants and even non-claimants to stand by the United States. Obviously,
the potential consequences contradict with Chinas One Belt, One Road
strategy. In February 2014, in response to reports by Japans Asahi Shimbun
that a South China Sea ADIZ was imminent, Chinas Ministry of Foreign Afairs
hinted that China would not necessarily impose an ADIZ. The Chinese side
has yet to feel any air security threat from the ASEAN countries and is
optimistic about its relations with the neighboring countries and the general
situation in the South China Sea region, a spokesperson said. Since the Belt
and Road is Beijings primary strategic agenda for the coming years, it is
crucial for China to strengthen its economic relationship with ASEAN on the
one hand while reducing ASEAN claimants security concerns on the other
hand. As a result, it should accelerate the adjustment of its South China Sea
policy; clarify Chinas stand on the issue, and propose Chinas blueprint for
resolving the disputes.
3. Brink PassedAll of their evidence says that there
will be a war extremely soon. The BIT will take time
to pass and relations to develop. This means that
their impacts will happen before they can fix them.
4. China is reducing military spendingtheyre not a
threat
VOA News, March 2016 [News organization centered around China,

China Cuts Defense Spending as Economy Stumbles, March 4,
http://www.voanews.com/content/china-defense-budget-slows-as-
economy-stumbles/3219375.html]
Fu Ying, a spokeswoman for Chinas largely rubber-stamp parliament, told

reporters Friday the military will see an increase of seven to eight percent this
year. The announced increase is the first time Chinas spending on defense
has slipped below double-digit growth in six years, and follows more than a
decade of nearly consistent double-digit growth. The official figure will be
announced Saturday when Chinas National Peoples Congress, the countrys
top legislative body, begins its annual meetings in Beijing, Fu Ying said.
Chinas military budget is based on two key things: the needs of military
development as well as economic development and government revenues,
she said. Last year, China announced it was cutting its massive military by
300,000 troops, even as its territorial claims in the region have increasingly
been a point of controversy. 'New normal' Analysts said the reduction is very
much in line with what China describes as its new normal for slower
economic growth. With overall GDP growth in China moving below seven
percent, it would be appropriate, I think, in the eyes of the leadership to
calibrate defense expenditure more in line with that new normal, said
Alexander Neill, a Shangri-La Dialogue senior fellow for Asia at the Institute
for International Institute for Strategic Studies in Singapore. For more than a
decade the PLA (Peoples Liberation Army) has been the recipient of a lot of
cash from the central leadership and this may very well represent a gradual
tapering down of that, he added. Transparency concerns China is the worlds
second biggest military spender, and while its annual budget last year
increased by 10.1 percent, for a total of more than $135 billion, it still pales in
comparison to the United States.
2NC/1NR Harms (US-China War)
2NC/1NR US-China War #1--No

War Extensions
They say There will be a US-China War, but
1. Extend our Think Progress evidence.
Its much better than their TIME evidence because:
facts)
to be true)
their argument)

Historically, countries thought they could win without many
problems during WWI. Today, nations know the cost of war. Also, the
US and China have had many military problem situations that should
have caused a war, but they didnt.
This matters because: the odds of a US-China war are very low. That
means that the judge to look to our impacts first.
2 Economic ties and war cost deter conflict
Think Progress, 2014 [Why Everyone Needs To Stop Freaking Out About War With China
http://thinkprogress.org/world/2014/02/07/3222021/china-japan-war/]
Its wrong to talk about incentives to go war in purely military terms. A key
component of the Senkaku/Diaoyou is economic: the islands contain a ton of
natural resources, particularly oil and gas. But far more valuable are the trade
ties between the two countries. China is Japans largest export market, so war
would hurt Japan more than China, but itd be pretty painful for both.
Proponents of the World War I parallel find a lot to criticize about this point.
They like to cite Norman Angell, a pre-World War I international relations
theorist famous for arguing that war was becoming economically obsolete.
Angell is now often used interchangeably with Dr. Pangloss in international
relations talk, a symbol of optimism gone analytically awry. But Angell gets a
bad rap. He didnt actually say war was impossible; he merely claimed that it
no longer was worth the cost (if you remember the aftermath of World War I,
he was right about that). The real upshot of Angells argument is that, unless
theres some other overwhelming reason to go to war, mutually profitable
trade ties will serve as a strong deterrent to war. Despite a year of heated
rhetoric and economic tensions over the Senkaku/Diaoyu dispute, bilateral
trade has been recovering nicely of late. Angell may have been wrong about
Europe, but hes probably right about East Asia. M.G. Koo, a political scientist
at Chung-Ang University, surveyed several Senkaku-Diaoyu flareups between
1969 and 2009. He found that economic ties between the two countries
played an increasingly large role in defusing tensions as the trade
relationship between the two countries deepened.
2NC/1NR US-China War #2China

Expansion Solves War Extension
They say China Expansion causes war, but
1. Extend our Li and Yanzhuo evidence.

Its much better than their TIME and Tikhonova evidence
because: [PUT IN THEIR AUTHORS
NAME]
more facts)
to be true)
their argument)

Both writers are from international think tanks and specialize in the
field of Chinese military policy. They know best about island
disputes. Also, the evidence makes a nuanced hegemony theory
argument that conflict between the Philippines, Vietnam, Taiwan,
and Brunei would happen without Chinese action.

This matters because: Chinese expansion actually solves war. This is
a reason the neg fixes a major war scenario, not causes one.
2NC/1NR US-China War #3No

Brink
They say __________________________________________________, but

facts)
to be true)
their argument)

______________________________________________________________________________
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2 Accidents and threats happen all the time and have
not caused a war
International Business Times, March 2016 [International news political

website, US naval fleet enters South China Sea near disputed
territories, March 4, http://www.ibtimes.co.uk/us-naval-fleet-
enters-south-china-sea-near-disputed-territories-1547475]
An American naval fleet spearheaded by the aircraft carrier, USS John C

Stennis, is sailing in the South China Sea closer to disputed territories in an
apparent show of force against Beijing. The vessel is accompanied by cruisers
Mobile Bay and Antietam, and destroyers USS Stockdale and USS Chung-
Hoon, along with thousands of US sailors. US officials have said it is a regular
patrol mission in the region, where China has recently racked up tensions by
mobilising surface-to-air missiles, fighter jets and military radar system. The
presence of the US carrier strike group, a relatively small armada, is bound to
infuriate Beijing officials. The war of words between China and the US has
been intensifying in recent months over increasing activities in the South
China Sea region, a breeding ground of bitter geopolitical territorial disputes.
"We feel that the US actions in sending vessels and planes near to the Spratly
islands and reefs as a show of force are not a good thing. It arouses a feeling
of disgust among the Chinese people," Fu Ying, spokesperson of the National
People's Congress (NPC) and a former vice-president, told reporters on 4
March. "The US has said it doesn't take a stance on South China Sea
territorial disputes but its actions seem to be aimed at agitating tensions,
which raise serious questions over its motives." The US has long been
accusing Beijing of militarisation of the South China Sea. But Beijing says the
deployments are for defence purposes as it unilaterally claims the mineral-
rich islands as its sovereign territories. "The accusation [that China is
militarising the region] can lead to a miscalculation of the situation. If you
take a look at the matter closely, it's the US sending the most advanced
aircraft and military vessels to the South China Sea," added Fu. The US has
conducted two controversial navigational patrols in the South China Sea since
October 2015. During one of the patrols, a US warship sailed 12 nautical
miles of a disputed island in a move dubbed provocative by Beijing.
2NC/1NR US-China War #4China

Not a Threat
They say __________________________________________________, but

facts)
to be true)
their argument)

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2 China will decline and naturally cooperate with the
USFive reasons
Forbes, 2014 [Five Reasons China Won't Be A Big Threat To America's Global
Power, June 6, http://www.forbes.com/sites/lorenthompson/2014/06/06/five-
reasons-china-wont-be-a-big-threat-to-americas-global-
power/#760645a01b5c
1. Geographical constraints. Unlike America, which spent much of its history

expanding under doctrines such as Manifest Destiny, Chinas potential for
territorial growth is severely limited by geography. To the west it faces the
barren Tibetan plateau and Gobi Desert. To the south the Himalayan
mountains present an imposing barrier to the Indian Subcontinent. To the
north vast and largely empty grasslands known as the Steppes provide a
bufer with Russia. And to the east stretches the worlds largest ocean (there
are over 6,000 miles of water between Shanghai and San Francisco). So aside
from the hapless Vietnamese who share the southern coastal plain and
Chinas historical claim to Taiwan, there isnt much opportunity for wars of
conquest on Chinas periphery. Ironically, Chinas disputes with neighbors
over the disposition of minor islands and reefs underscores how little real
potential Beijing has for growing its territory the way other powers have. 2.
Demographic trends. At 1.3 billion, China has the largest population of any
country. However, that population is aging rapidly due to the one-child policy
imposed in 1979. The current fertility rate of 1.6 children per woman is well
below the level of 2.1 required to maintain a stable population over the long
run, and also far below the birthrates seen in other emerging Asian nations.
What this means in economic terms, to quote a paper recently published by
the International Monetary Fund, is that within a few years, the working age
population will reach a historical peak and then begin a sharp decline. The
vast pool of cheap labor that fueled Chinas economic miracle has already
begun disappearing, driving up wages and leading some labor-intensive
industries to move out. In the years ahead, a growing population of old
people will undermine eforts to stimulate internal demand while creating
pressure for increased social-welfare spending. 3. Economic dependency.
China has followed the same playbook as its Asian neighbors in using trade
as a springboard to economic development. According to the CIAs 2014
World Factbook, exports of goods and services comprise over a quarter of
Chinas gross domestic product. But even if the low-cost labor that made this
possible wasnt drying up, the reliance of an export-driven economy on
foreign markets makes Chinas prosperity per capita GDP is below $10,000
much more vulnerable than Americas. China has sold over $100 billion
more in goods to the U.S. so far this year than it has bought, but that
longstanding boost to the Chinese economy wont persist if the labor cost
diferential between the two countries keeps narrowing or Washington
decides Beijing is a real danger to its interests. China is so dependent on
ofshore resources, markets and investors to keep its economy growing that it
cant run the risk of really scaring its trading partners. 4. Political culture.
Because the Communist Party monopolizes power in China, there is little
opportunity for fundamental reform of the political system. Party officials at
all levels routinely leverage that monopoly to engage in epic corruption.
Bribery, embezzlement, kickbacks and property theft are endemic. The
Guardian reports that military posts are sold for the equivalent of hundreds
of thousands of pounds each, creating a vicious circle as officers who have
paid for their places seek to recoup the cost. Favoritism towards state-
controlled industries and well-connected industrialists results in massive
inefficiencies. President Xi Jinpings crackdown on graft resulted in over 8,000
cases being investigated during just the first three months of this year,
suggesting a culture of corruption reminiscent of New Yorks Tweed Ring. But
Tweed was driven from power through democratic processes, whereas
Chinas political culture ofers no such solution. 5. Military weakness. That
brings me to the subject with which most defense analysts would have begun
this commentary Chinese military power. Military.com reports today that the
Pentagon is out with its latest ominous assessment of Chinas military
buildup, which is said to encompass everything from stealthy fighters to
maneuvering anti-ship missiles to anti-satellite weapons. Those programs
actually exist, but the threat they pose to the U.S. at present is not so clear.
For instance, Beijing doesnt have the reconnaissance network needed to
track and target U.S. warships, and if it did the weapons it launched would
face the most formidable air defenses in the world. Much has been written
about Chinas supposedly growing investment in nuclear weapons, but the
best public information available suggests that China has about 250
warheads in its strategic arsenal, most of which cant reach America; the U.S.
has 4,600 nuclear warheads available for delivery by missile or plane, and an
additional 2,700 in storage. Beijings decision to sustain only a modest
some would say minimal nuclear deterrent seems incompatible with the
notion that it seeks to rival U.S. power. Until recently it has not possessed a
credible sea-based deterrent force, it still does not have a single operational
aircraft carrier, and many of its submarines use diesel-electric propulsion
rather than nuclear power. When these less-than-imposing features of the
Chinese military posture are combined with widely reported deficiencies in
airlift, reconnaissance, logistics and other key capabilities, the picture that
emerges is not ominous. China is an emerging regional power that is unlikely
to ever match America in the main measures of military power unless
dysfunctional political processes in Washington impair our nations economy
and defenses. In fact, secular trends are already at work within the Chinese
economy, society and political culture that will tend to make the Middle
Kingdom look less threatening tomorrow, rather than like a global rival of
America.
1NC Solvency Frontline

1. Diplomacy fails to fix military relations
Li and Yanzhuo, 2015 [Xue and Xu, Director of the Department of

International Strategy at the Institute of World Economics and Politics,
Chinese Academy of Social Sciences. Xu Yanzhuo received her doctorate from
Durham University (UK) in December 2014 and studies international
responsibility, South China Sea disputes, and Chinese foreign policy. The US
and China Won't See Military Conflict Over the South China Sea, June 19,
http://thediplomat.com/2015/06/the-us-and-china-wont-see-military-conflict-
over-the-south-china-sea/]
At the beginning, the United States tried to stop China through private
diplomatic mediation, yet it soon realized that this approach was not efective
in persuading China. So Washington started to tackle the issue in a more
aggressive way, such as encouraging India, Japan, ASEAN, the G7, and the
European Union to pressure Beijing internationally. Domestically, U.S. officials
from diferent departments and diferent levels have opposed Chinas
changing the status quo in this area. Since 2015, Washington has increased
its pressure on China. It sent the USS Fort Worth, a littoral combat ship, to sail
in waters near the Spratly area controlled by Vietnam in early May. U.S.
official are also considering sending naval and air patrols within 12 nautical
miles of the Spratly Islands controlled by China. Washington has recognized
that it could hardly stop Chinas construction in Spratly Islands. Therefore, it
has opted to portray Beijing as a challenger to the status quo, at the same
time moving to prevent China from establishing a South China Sea ADIZ and
an EEZ of 200 nautical miles around its artificial islands. This was the logic
behind the U.S. sending a P-8A surveillance plane with reporters on board to
approach three artificial island built by China. China issued eight warnings to
the plane; the U.S. responded by saying the plane was flying through
international airspace.
2. No Solvency: The US and China cooperate all of the

time. Theres nothing that makes this plan any
different. The status quo is enough to solve the
harms. Also, the aff would have to cooperate over
military matters, not economic ones.
3. China will say no to the plantheyre resistant to
foreign companies
The Hill, 2015 [Political news organization, Bilateral investment

treaty with China more than a 'BIT' of trouble, October 29,
http://thehill.com/blogs/pundits-blog/international/258486-
bilateral-investment-treaty-with-china-more-than-a-bit-of]
China is discriminating more intensely against foreign companies, with an eye

toward continuing to extract technology. Early this year, Qualcomm was fined
almost $1 billion for supposed antitrust violations even as China
simultaneously maintains a slew of state monopolies. More recently, Western
Digital finally received Chinese approval for its global acquisition of Hitachi
Global Storage, three-and-a-half years after initial consideration. This step,
however, was only taken after Western Digital agreed to sell a 15 percent
stake to a Chinese SOE. France's Alcatel learned from this and inked its China
joint venture early in its own approval process. It should go without saying
that competition policy which extorts multinationals is not
compatible with being a good BIT partner. Another problem is far worse.
China's policies with regard to its SOEs are antithetical to a core principle of
the BIT that foreign firms should receive the same treatment as domestic
(national treatment). Multinationals may receive the same treatment as
private Chinese firms but they are nowhere close to receiving the same
treatment as SOEs. SOEs are protected from competition in two dozen
sectors. They are not allowed to fail for commercial reasons. They receive
huge sums of what are essentially costless loans. These are established
Chinese policies and the fall 2013 Communist Party meeting was supposed to
inaugurate a new era of pro-market reform. But the principal corporate
reform was allowing private firms to take minority stakes in SOEs. This is the
exact opposite of what needs to occur, which is more competition between
SOEs and the private sector. The SOE reform guidelines issued last month
affirm this harmful notion of "reform." Remarkably, this failure was so
blatant as to be recognized in the official press. It is odd that the
U.S. is even negotiating with a country with such policies. A possible
explanation is that the China BIT can be connected to an even bigger
international economic initiative, the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP). Not
coincidentally, BIT negotiations with China quickly turned serious after Japan
joined the TPP. There is a chapter in the TPP concerning SOEs this could
provide a template for how to blunt bad policies. Unfortunately, it appears as
if the opposite is true with regard to China: The TPP leaves the door wide
open to more predatory behavior. Final TPP text is not yet available, but a
New Zealand government fact sheet indicates a number of flaws that will be
exploited by governments committed to using SOEs as core economic actors.
For example, under the TPP, monopolies can (apparently) behave in non-
commercial fashion when fulfilling the terms of their designation, as assigned
by their government. This is acceptable for countries that have no desire to
hand out mandate after mandate to SOEs, but there should be no doubt that
China will do exactly that. In addition, services supplied by SOEs in their own
territories are (apparently) allowed to be subsidized. This could block access
to the Chinese market for American services firms. Another vital issue that
cannot be evaluated at present is that of nonconforming measures, the
exceptions granted in specific areas. The nonconforming measures of a China
BIT must be extremely limited. With countries such as Singapore and Vietnam
boasting large SOEs, this weakness is a drawback for the TPP. However, it
would undermine the point of any agreement with China certainly including
a BIT. With few efective restrictions on what is by far the world's largest state
sector in absolute size, the opportunities truly unlocked by a China BIT would
turn out to be minimal. The TPP does not appear to provide anything close to
a sufficient framework to restrict Chinese SOEs. The Obama administration
will need to deliver an improbably strong BIT for it to deserve consideration.
2NC/1NR Solvency
2NC/1NR Solvency #1Diplomacy

Fails
They say Diplomacy solves military conflict, but
1. Extend our Li and Yanzhuo evidence.

Its much better than their Mendis and Wang evidence
NAME]
facts)
their argument)

Their evidence can claim to change things and really fix conflict in
the South China Seas, but all historical information disagrees. The
US has made hundreds of diplomatic attempts and China has only
expanded. There is no reason it will change now.
This matters because: if the Aff cant solve at all, then theres no
point in trying. The military will expand and their war will happen no
matter what.
2 Military cooperation and economic engagement are

distinctstraight from Xis mouth
2NC/1NR Solvency
Financial Times, June 2016 [Major academic news outlet focused on the economy,
Xi Jinping warns on limits to diplomacy as China-US talks begin, June 6,
http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/5f66b2d2-2b7e-11e6-bf8d-26294ad519fc.html#axzz4BQ2c9lDG]
From the contested waters of the South China Sea to the management of the
global economy and stewardship of the environment, it is ever more evident
that the worlds two great powers, the US and China, must find ways to
resolve their diferences. But as his government gathered for a final cabinet-
level meeting with the Obama administration, Chinese president Xi Jinping
ofered a sober assessment of the room for compromise, and the limits of
diplomacy. Some diferences can be solved through hard work, Mr Xi said at
the annual Sino-US Strategic and Economic Dialogue. Some differences
cannot be solved at the moment, he added. In particular, Mr Xi
acknowledged the need for more communication between the two sides on
economic matters, where they have routinely clashed over foreign exchange
rates, industrial capacity and other irritants. As the worlds largest
developing country and largest developed country, we must increase our co-
ordination on macroeconomic policy. John Kerry, US secretary of state, noted
the two sides previous agreements on climate change and emphasised that
the US wanted to see a peaceful resolution to Chinas various territorial
disputes with its neighbours in the South and East China seas.
2NC/1NR Solvency
2NC/1NR Solvency #2BIT Not

Enough
They say __________________________________________________, but

facts)
to be true)
their argument)

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______________________________________________________________________________
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2NC/1NR Solvency
2 The US and China already economically and
diplomatically cooperate
The White House, 2015 [FACT SHEET: U.S.-China Economic

Relations, https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-
office/2015/09/25/fact-sheet-us-china-economic-relations]
The United States and China recognize their shared interest in promoting a
strong and open global economy, inclusive growth and sustainable
development, and a stable international financial system, supported by the
multilateral economic institutions founded at the end of World War II that
have benefited the peoples of both nations. Both countries recognize and
value the substantial contributions that the international financial institutions
have made to global growth, higher incomes, the alleviation of poverty, and
the maintenance of financial stability since their establishment. The rules-
based international economic system has helped to propel Chinas
unprecedented economic growth over the past 35 years, lifting hundreds of
millions of people out of poverty. The United States has also benefited from
the emergence of a global middle class that, by 2030, is projected to include
more than 3 billion consumers in Asia alone. U.S. exports of goods and
services supported approximately 12 million jobs in the United States in
2014. China has a strong stake in the maintenance and further strengthening
and modernization of global financial institutions, and the United States
welcomes China's growing contributions to financing development and
infrastructure in Asia and beyond. The international financial architecture has
evolved over time to meet the changing scale, scope, and diversity of
challenges and to include new institutions as they incorporate its core
principles of high standards and good governance. Both countries are
committed to supporting this international architecture and welcome the
greater role of the G-20 in global economic governance to ensure an
inclusive, resilient, and constantly improving international economic
architecture to meet challenges now and in the future. In light of Chinas
increased share of global economic activity and increased capacity, the
United States welcomes China playing a more active role in and taking on
due responsibility for the international financial architecture, as well as
expanded bilateral cooperation to address global economic challenges. To
this end:
2NC/1NR Solvency
2NC/1NR Solvency #3China Will

Say No
They say __________________________________________________, but

facts)
to be true)
their argument)

______________________________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________________________
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______________________________________________________________________________
2NC/1NR Solvency
2 Technology disagreements prove Chinas resistance
to BIT
Financial Times, 2014 [Economic news outlet, US warns China over

tech trade deal, July 6, http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/aa877ee0-
0376-11e4-9195-00144feab7de.html#axzz4BQ8OR8Jw]
The top US trade official has warned China that a proposed bilateral
investment treaty and other global negotiations could be in jeopardy if the
two sides fail to resolve a stand-of over liberalising the $2tn annual trade in
high-tech products. In an interview with the Financial Times, Mike Froman, the
US trade representative, said Washington was eager to use this weeks
annual US-China Strategic and Economic Dialogue to break the deadlock over
updating the 1996 Information Technology Agreement. A failure to get a deal
on trade in IT would amplify opposition in the US Congress to other trade
deals with China, according to US officials. It would also be an important
data point as to other negotiations that China may be interested in as well,
Mr Froman added. The stand-of has hinged on Chinas push to exclude
around 60 new product categories, including medical devices and next-
generation silicon chips, from the ITA. Under the agreement, countries
commit not to impose tarifs and other trade barriers on IT products. Now the
worlds biggest exporter of IT products, China remains eager to protect some
of its nascent high-tech industries, which are not yet competitive with those
in the US and other developed markets. Mr Froman said the US and China had
made progress in negotiations both at, and since, an Apec trade ministers
meeting in May. Other people close to the talks said the discussions have
narrowed to about a dozen product categories on Chinas long list that the US
is particularly interested in including in the agreement. But Mr Froman
warned that a counter-ofer by China last week had fallen short of US
expectations and hard negotiations would have to happen in Beijing during
the July 9-10 meetings between top US and Chinese officials.
CDL Core Files 2016-2017 Human Rights Af
Human Rights AFFIRMATIVE

Vocabulary
Multi-National Corporations (MNCs): A corporation that has
factories or offices in a foreign country. For example, a US
company that has a factory in China is an MNC. These include
Ford, Apple, Nike, and Gap to name a few.
Sullivan Principles/Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR):
These are guidelines for MNCs in foreign countries. These rules
must be followed if the company or the government makes them
law. These rules/principles protect basic workplace rights
including discrimination, unionization, pay, environmental, and
safety. These can difer from country-to-country and company-to-
company but these are Global Sullivan Principles found at
http://hrlibrary.umn.edu/links/sullivanprinciples.html
Expressoursupportforuniversalhumanrightsand,particularly,thoseofouremployees,
thecommunitieswithinwhichweoperate,andpartieswithwhomwedobusiness.
Promoteequalopportunityforouremployeesatalllevelsofthecompanywithrespectto
issuessuchascolor,race,gender,age,ethnicityorreligiousbeliefs,andoperatewithout
unacceptableworkertreatmentsuchastheexploitationofchildren,physicalpunishment,
femaleabuse,involuntaryservitude,orotherformsofabuse.
Respectouremployees'voluntaryfreedomofassociation.
Compensateouremployeestoenablethemtomeetatleasttheirbasicneedsandprovide
theopportunitytoimprovetheirskillandcapabilityinordertoraisetheirsocialand
economicopportunities.
Provideasafeandhealthyworkplace;protecthumanhealthandtheenvironment;and
promotesustainabledevelopment.
Promotefaircompetitionincludingrespectforintellectualandotherpropertyrights,and
notoffer,payoracceptbribes.
Workwithgovernmentandcommunitiesinwhichwedobusinesstoimprovethequality
oflifeinthosecommunitiestheireducational,cultural,economicandsocialwellbeing
andseektoprovidetrainingandopportunitiesforworkersfromdisadvantaged
backgrounds.
Promotetheapplicationoftheseprinciplesbythosewithwhomwedobusiness.
Tibet: Region in China originally inhabited by Tibetans. Tibetans

are a distinct culture from the rest of China and want their
independence. China politically, religiously, and physically
persecutes the people of Tibet.
Uyghur (Wee-Grr): Ethnic group originally of Turkish descent.
Like the Tibetans, they live in China, but are discriminated
against because of ethnic diference.
Apartheid: Afrikaans word meaning separateness. Apartheid

normally refers to the awful racial discrimination in South Africa
from the 1940s to 1990s. The AFF argues that the Sullivan
Principles influenced South Africa to move away from their legal
racism.
president of China.
AT=Answers To
1AC
China Human Rights 1AC
First, the PLAN: The United

should pass legislation
mandating multi-national
corporations located in the
Peoples Republic of China to
follow the Sullivan Principles.
1AC
1
Contention One: Harms (Human Rights)
1. Progress is a myth in China2015 was their worst
year for human rights violations. People who speak
out against the government are put in jail for years
or executed. Women are forced to have abortions
while human trafficking is on the rise.
Williams, March 2016 [Thomas D., Ph.D. Theologian. Permanent research fellow at the Center for Ethics and
Culture, Notre Dame University, 3/8 http://www.breitbart.com/big-government/2016/03/08/report-china-had-worst-year-
ever-for-human-rights-abuses-in-2015/]
Human rights and rule of law conditions in China have been on a downward trend
since Xi Jinping took power as Chinese Communist Party General Secretary in 2012,
resulting in 2015 being the worst year on record for human rights violations
in China, according to a recent Congressional report. For the commemoration of
International Womens Day on March 8, rights groups denounced Chinas dismal
record of rights abuses targeting women, especially regarding Chinas draconian
family control policy. Reggie Littlejohn, President of Womens Rights Without
Frontiers, told Breitbart News that forced abortion and involuntary sterilization
continue under Chinas new Two-Child Policy. Unmarried women and third children
continue to be forcibly aborted, Littlejohn said. Women are still routinely sterilized
after their second child. On International Womens Day, we call upon the Chinese
government to call of the womb police and immediately to abandon all coercive
population control. In its 2015 report, the Congressional-Executive Commission on
China (CECC) documented measures by the Chinese government to silence dissent,
suppress human rights advocacy, and control civil society, resulting in a situation of
oppression that is broader in scope than any other period documented since the
Commission started issuing Annual Reports in 2002. On March 1, 2016 the
Commission released a Chinese-language Translation of an Executive Summary of its
report, stating that 2015 saw the tightening of controls over the media, universities,
civil society, and rights advocacy, and on members of ethnic minorities. In its report,
the Commission said that Chinas coercive population control policy, now known as
the Two-Child Policy, continued to employ torture methods such as forced abortion
and sterilization despite a widespread public outcry. Many provincial laws in China
explicitly instruct officials to carry out abortions for illegal pregnancies, with no
requirement for consent. The CECC report highlighted the anti-woman practices of
Communist authorities, who just before International Womens Day had detained five
women and held them in abusive conditions for more than five weeks for planning
to distribute brochures against sexual harassment. To make up for the enormous
gender gap caused by decades of sex-selective abortions, trafficking of women and
girls for forced marriage and sexual exploitation is on the rise in China, the report
said. There are currently approximately 37 million more men living in China than
women. CECC leaders said that Chinas recent switch to a Two-Child Policy was a
mere distraction from the reality of the deadliest and most hated policy of forced
population control, and called on President Obama and world leaders to insist that
China abolish the practice completely. Families that want a third child will still face
1AC
1
the pressure to abort their child or pay exorbitant fines, said CECC Chair Rep. Chris
Smith regarding the Two-Child Policy, which began officially on January 1. The
Congressional report states that China is not moving toward a rule of law system,
but is instead further entrenching a system where the Party utilizes statutes to
strengthen and maintain its leading role and power over the country. Many of
Chinas religious and political prisoners are subject to harsh and lengthy prison
sentences as well as various forms of extralegal and administrative detention,
including arbitrary detention in black jails and legal education centers, the report
stated. The report said that Chinas Communist Party leaders are seeking a new
type of U.S.-China relations and aim to play an expanded role in global institutions,
while continuing to ignore international human rights norms. Chinas entrenchment in
absolutist control over the lives of citizens in defiance of the rule of law have
significant implication for U.S. foreign policy, the report said. The security of U.S.
investments and personal information in cyberspace, the health of the economy and
environment, the safety of food and drug supplies, the protection of intellectual
property, and the stability of the Pacific region are all linked to China, the report
stated.
2. China abuses rights with authoritarian-style

governance. The government kicks ethnic minorities
out of their homes and children with disabilities are
discriminated against
Human Rights Watch, 2014 [Independent human rights organization, World Report 2014:
China, https://www.hrw.org/world-report/2014/country-chapters/china-and-tibet]
Rapid socio-economic change in China has been accompanied by relaxation

of some restrictions on basic rights, but the government remains an
authoritarian one-party state. It places arbitrary curbs on
expression, association, assembly, and religion; prohibits
independent labor unions and human rights organizations; and
maintains Party control over all judicial institutions. The government
censors the press, the Internet, print publications, and academic research,
and justifies human rights abuses as necessary to preserve social stability.
It carries out involuntary population relocation and rehousing on a massive
scale, and enforces highly repressive policies in ethnic minority areas in Tibet,
Xinjiang, and Inner Mongolia. Though primary school enrollment and basic
literacy rates are high, Chinas education system discriminates against
children and young people with disabilities. The government obstructs
domestic and international scrutiny of its human rights record, insisting it is
an attempt to destabilize the country. At the same time, citizens are
increasingly prepared to challenge authorities over volatile livelihood issues,
such as land seizures, forced evictions, environmental degradation,
miscarriages of justice, abuse of power by corrupt cadres, discrimination, and
economic inequality. Official and scholarly statistics, based on law
1AC
1
enforcement reports, suggest there are 300-500 protests each day, with
anywhere from ten to tens of thousands of participants. Despite the
risks, Internet users and reform-oriented media are aggressively pushing
censorship boundaries by advocating for the rule of law and transparency,
exposing official wrongdoing, and calling for political reforms. Civil society
groups and advocates continue to slowly expand their work despite their
precarious status, and an informal but resilient network of activists monitors
and documents human rights cases as a loose national weiquan (rights
defense) movement. These activists endure police monitoring, detention,
arrest, enforced disappearance, and torture. The Xi Jinping administration
formally assumed power in March, and proposed several reforms to
longstanding policies, including abolishing one form of arbitrary detention,
known as re-education through labor (RTL), and changes to the household
registration system. It staged high-profile corruption investigations, mostly
targeting political rivals. But it also struck a conservative tone, opposing
constitutional rule, press freedom, and western-style rule of law, and
issuing harsher restrictions on dissent, including through two legal documents
making it easier to bring criminal charges against activists and Internet
critics. Bo Xilai, once a rising political star, was sentenced to life
imprisonment in September after a show trial that captured public attention
but fell short of fair trial standards and failed to address widespread abuses
of power committed during his tenure in Chongqing.
1AC
1
3. Human rights must be protected in all instancesIts
a moral obligation and a more probable impact
Gibney, 2008 [Mark, he Belk Distinguished Professor at the

University of North Carolina-Asheville. His latest book is
International Human Rights Law: Returning to Universal
Principles, Responsibilities for Protecting Human Rights,
February, https://global-ejournal.org/2008/02/15/gibney/]
Human rights are universal, meaning that each person possesses certain
human rights by the mere fact of this persons humanity. What does not
matter or at least what should not matter is where a person lives, how
much money a person has (or does not have), whether that persons country
has (or has not) became a party to any particular international human rights
treaties, and so on. Who has the responsibility for meeting these universal
rights? The (universal) response of states has been that each country is
responsible for protecting human rights within its own borders but that no
state has human rights obligations that extend outside of its own territorial
jurisdiction. But what if a country is not able or is not willing to protect the
human rights of its citizens? Or what if human rights are being violated, in
large part due to the actions of outside states? It is here that the silence of
the international community has been deafening. Thus, notwithstanding near-
universal declarations of the universality of human rights, the responsibility
for protecting human rights has been based almost exclusively on territorial
considerations. What has this territorial approach to human rights given us?
Unfortunately, not nearly enough. Looking at violations of economic rights
alone, we live in a world where an average of 50,000 people die every
single day due to preventable causes. Yet, notwithstanding this
incredible level of human rights atrocities, the territorial approach to human
rights has essentially gone unchallenged. However, this has started to
change and it has come from the most unlikely of sources: the war on
terror. To state matters bluntly, the reason why enemy combatants are
being held at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba and not in some location in this country
is that American government officials are of the mind that U.S. obligations
under international law do not extend outside the territorial boundaries of the
United States. Under this (territorial) approach to human rights, the U.S.
government is not bound by the Torture Convention and the Covenant on
International Civil and Political Rights (both of which the U.S. is a party to)
when it is operating outside the territorial borders of the United States. This
same kind of rationale is behind the policy of extraordinary rendition. The
idea is that the U.S. has not done anything wrong or unlawful when
individuals outside the United States are being kidnapped and sent to some
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third country for interrogation purposes albeit at the behest of, and under
the direction and control of, American authorities. Again, the argument is that
American obligations under international law are only applicable to actions
within the United States. Fortunately, most people have been able to see
behind this faade. That is, they have recognized that territorial
considerations should not be used in this manner to demarcate where a
countrys human rights obligations begin but, more importantly, where they
end. Most people seem to believe that torture is illegal whether it takes place
in Fort Benning, Georgia, or Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, or at the Abu Ghraib
prison in Iraq. In that way, the war on terror has helped us see that
territorial considerations oftentimes make little sense in the context of
protecting human rights. This is not to suggest that territory does not
matter at all or that states have the same human rights obligations outside
their borders as they do domestically. Neither of these propositions happens
to be true. Rather, each state has the primary responsibility for protecting
human rights within its own domestic borders. However, what we have
completely failed to recognize are the secondary responsibilities that the rest
of the international community has when the territorial state has not been
willing or able to ofer human rights protection. And what also has to be said
is that this is not simply a moral obligation wouldnt it be a nice
gesture if we provided some assistance to starving children in some
other land rather, it is a legal obligation. This is most clearly seen in
the language of the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural
Rights, one of the so-called International Bill of Rights, whereby each state
party to the Covenant has (legally) obligated itself to protect the economic
rights of everyone by means of international assistance and cooperation.
What does international assistance and cooperation mean? What it means
is that when children in a particular country are being denied an education
(to choose one example), this not only constitutes a violation of human rights
by the territorial state but this also constitutes a human rights
violation on the part of the rest of the international community,
which has pledged to protect those rights. The point is that human
rights are universal, but so are the duties and responsibilities to
meet those rights. This is what the framers of the International Bill of
Rights, and all of the other international human rights treaties, sought to
achieve. This is the only way that the notion of human rights makes any
sense. If human rights protection were something that individual states could
(and would) do individually, there would be no need for any international
conventions. Stripped to their barest essentials, what each one of these
treaties represents is nothing less than this: that everyone has an ethical as
well as a legal obligation to protect the human rights of all other people.
Sadly enough, our inability to recognize the extent of our own human rights
obligations has constituted the greatest human rights failure of all.
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Contention Two: Harms (Democracy)
1. Chinese crack downs against democracy cause
massive violence and result in country collapse
Diamond, 2012 [Larry, Senior fellow at Hoover Institute Why East Asia
Including ChinaWill Turn Democratic Within a Generation, March 24,
http://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2012/01/why-east-asia-
including-china-will-turn-democratic-within-a-generation/251824/]
It is not only modernization--the spread of democratic values and capacities

in tandem with rising incomes and information--that is feeding the escalating
pressure for democratic change in China. As Yun-han Chu notes in his
contribution to this set of essays, the growing density of ties between
mainland China and Taiwan--including direct access (through travel and
satellite television) to political news from the highly competitive and even
raucous democracy that is Taiwan--is serving as an additional stimulant to the
growth of democratic norms and aspirations in China. The irony of Communist
China's relentless push for closer integration with Taiwan is that it may well
begin to generate political convergence--but not in the way that the
Communist leaders imagined. Rowen's projections were a bit mechanical in
assuming that economic growth would necessarily drive gradual political
change toward democracy in China. Instead, it seems increasingly likely that
political change in China will be sudden and disruptive. The Communist Party
leadership still shows no sign of embarking on a path of serious political
liberalization that might gradually lead to electoral democracy, as their
counterparts in Taiwan's then-dominant Nationalist Party did several decades
ago. Instead, the rulers in Beijing are gripped by a fear of ending up like the
USSR's Mikhail Gorbachev, who launched a process of political opening in
hopes of improving and refurbishing Soviet Communist rule only to see it
crumble and the Soviet Union itself fall onto the ash heap of history. Torn by
intense divisions within their own ranks and weakened by the draining away
of power and energy from the center to the provinces and a congeries of
increasingly divergent lower-level authorities, China's political leaders seem
as frozen and feckless on the grand question of long-term political reform as
they are brisk and decisive in making daily decisions on spending and
investments. As Francis Fukuyama notes in an essay in the Journal of
Democracy, the one flaw in the otherwise impressive institutionalization of
Chinese Communist rule is its lack of adaptability. For a regime whose
specialty is producing rapid economic change, such rigidity is a potentially
fatal defect. With every month or year that ticks by while corruption,
routine abuses of power, and stifling constraints on expression go
unchecked, citizens' frustration mounts. Already, protests erupt with
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ominous frequency across tens of thousands of Chinese localities every year,
while subversive and democratic ideas, images, and allusions proliferate
online, despite the best eforts of fifty-thousand Internet police to keep
Chinese cyberspace free of "harmful content." As Minxin Pei has been arguing
for some time and as he asserts again in his essay here, the strength of the
authoritarian regime in China is increasingly an illusion, and its
resilience may not last much longer. As frustration with corruption,
collusion, criminality, and constraints on free expression rise, so do the
possibilities for a sudden crisis to turn into a political catastrophe
for the Chinese Communist Party (CCP). Beyond the ongoing frustrations
with censorship, insider dealing, abuse of power, environmental degradation,
and other outrages that can only be protested by antisystem activity of one
sort or another, there are, as Fukuyama notes, the big looming social and
economic challenges that China faces as the consequences of its one-child
policy make themselves felt in a rapidly aging (and disproportionately male)
population. Jack Goldstone reports that China's labor force stopped growing in
2010 and has begun shrinking half a percent a year, which "will, by itself,
knock 2.2 percentage points of China's annual economic growth potential."
Urbanization, a key driver of productivity increases, is also slowing
dramatically, and the growth of education "has clearly reached a limit," as
the number of college graduates has expanded faster than the ability of the
economy--even as it faces labor shortages in blue-collar industries--to
generate good white-collar jobs. The Chinese economy will have to pay for
rapidly rising wages and cope with industrial labor shortages even as it
comes under pressure to finance pension, welfare, and healthcare benefits for
the massive slice of the populace that is now moving toward retirement.
Moreover, as it manages all this, China will need to address growing
frustration among college graduates who cannot find jobs to match their
expectations. If the suspected bubbles in the real-estate and financial
markets burst as these twin generational challenges are gathering force,
political stability in the world's most populous country may well become no
more than a memory. Increasingly, the CCP faces the classic contradiction
that troubles all modernizing authoritarian regimes. The Party cannot rule
without continuing to deliver rapid economic development and rising living
standards--to fail at this would invite not gradual loss of power but a sudden
and probably lethal crisis. To the extent that the CCP succeeds, however, it
generates the very forces--an educated, demanding middle class and a
stubbornly independent civil society--that will one day decisively mobilize to
raise up a democracy and end CCP rule for good. The CCP, in other words, is
damned if it does not, and damned if it does. The only basis for its political
legitimacy and popular acceptance is its ability to generate steadily
improving standards of living, but these will be its undoing
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2. Other countries model Chinas politicsthe result is
war, inequality, and totalitarianism
Lagon, 2015 [Mark, PhD, is president of Freedom House and former U.S. ambassador-at-large to
combat trafficking in person, Prosperity Without Democracy? Demystifying the China Model, July 28,
https://freedomhouse.org/blog/prosperity-without-democracy-demystifying-china-model]
Chinas immense economic growth without political freedom has led many
foreign leaders to emulate its model. In Africa, Ethiopia and Rwanda have done
so, achieving significant gains in the wake of war and genocide. But the recent
Chinese stock-market crash, which saw shares plunge by some 30 percent
between June and July, hints at major systemic flaws. If one looks below the
surface, there is ample reason to question the proposition that autocratic regimes
are better equipped to produce prosperity for their people than their democratic
counterparts. The implications are twofold. On the cautionary side, states
that adopt Chinas model not only limit political and civil rights to which
all people are entitled. They also risk producing the same stark
inequality seen in China, which could ultimately undermine social and
political stability and hold back further growth. On the opportunity side,
political liberalization in China would not just serve the universal values of
freedom, pluralism, and transparency. It would also accelerate innovation and
growth, and create a more equitable economic order in the country. Such a
democratic and hence more dynamic China would truly be a model for
developing states around the world.
3. Global democracy prevents nuclear war and

extinction.
DIAMOND, 1995 [Larry, Senior fellow at Hoover Institute;

http://carnegie.org/fileadmin/Media/Publications/PDF/Promoting%20Democracy%20in%20the%201990s
%20Actors%20and%20Instruments,%20Issues%20and%20Imperatives.pdf]
This hardly exhausts the lists of threats to our security and well being in the
coming years and decades. In the former Yugoslavia nationalist aggression tears
at the stability of Europe and could easily spread. The flow of illegal drugs
intensifies through increasingly powerful international crime syndicates that have
made common cause with authoritarian regimes and have utterly corrupted the
institutions of tenuous, democratic ones. Nuclear, chemical, and biological
weapons continue to proliferate. The very source of life on Earth, the global
ecosystem, appears increasingly endangered. Most of these new and
unconventional threats to security are associated with or aggravated by the
weakness or absence of democracy, with its provisions for legality,
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accountability, popular sovereignty, and openness. LESSONS OF THE TWENTIETH
CENTURY The experience of this century ofers important lessons. Countries that
govern themselves in a truly democratic fashion do not go to war with one
another. They do not aggress against their neighbors to aggrandize themselves
or glorify their leaders. Democratic governments do not ethnically "cleanse" their
own populations, and they are much less likely to face ethnic insurgency.
Democracies do not sponsor terrorism against one another. They do not build
weapons of mass destruction to use on or to threaten one another. Democratic
countries form more reliable, open, and enduring trading partnerships. In the
long run they ofer better and more stable climates for investment. They are
more environmentally responsible because they must answer to their own
citizens, who organize to protest the destruction of their environments. They are
better bets to honor international treaties since they value legal obligations and
because their openness makes it much more difficult to breach agreements in
secret. Precisely because, within their own borders, they respect competition,
civil liberties, property rights, and the rule of law, democracies are the only
reliable foundation on which a new world order of international security and
prosperity can be built.
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1. The Sullivan Principles protect fair wages, race,
safety, unionization, ethical guidelines, and
monitoring
Lee, 2008 [Daniel, professor of ethics at Augustana College

(Illinois) and director of the Augustana Center for the Study of
Ethics, Human Rights and the Ethics of Investment in China,
Spring/Summer, http://www.jstor.org/stable/23562835]
In a piece that ran in the Washington Post with the headline "Business Can
Change China," Jim Hoagland, characterizing the Sullivan Principles as "a
turning point in the struggle against apartheid [in South Africa]," suggests
that the South African experience provides a precedent for what U.S.
companies might do in China. He notes, "The Sullivan Principles shifted the
discussion from self-justifying theories about business advancing social
change to the practical steps of what happened every day in the workplace."
He adds, however, "Neither the original code of conduct nor the more general
Global Sullivan Principles announced at the United Nations in 1999 fit the
situation exactly. That is why U.S. firms need to develop a similar code of
business conduct with Chinese characteristics."59 Unfortunately, like
newspaper columnists everywhere, Hoagland ran out of space before he got
to the specifics. He is right, however, in suggesting that U.S. firms need to be
involved in drafting such a set of guidelines. The Global Sullivan Principles
can provide a framework. To be fully useful, however, they need to be
augmented by guidelines more specifically tailored for China, just as the
original Sullivan Principles were specifically tailored for South Africa. And they
need to specify concrete courses of action that it is realistic for U.S. and other
multinational companies to accomplish. There would be considerable
incongruity, of course, in (1) suggesting that U.S. and other multinational
companies need to be involved in drafting these guidelines and (2) then
proceeding to specify what these guidelines should be. It might be helpful,
however, to bring up particular areas of concern to put on the table for
discussion. These include: 1. compensation guidelines, including specification
of minimum wage guidelines for areas of China that do not have such
guidelines; 2. prohibition of practices such as levying fines on employees that
reduce their take-home pay below levels specified by compensation
guidelines; 3. specification of what "respect [for] employees' voluntary
freedom of association" means with respect to the possibility of unionization
and collective bargaining; 4. minimum workplace health and safety
standards; 5. specification of responsibilities for improving the quality of life
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for employees outside the workplace; 6. appropriate ethical guidelines for
suppliers; and 7. efective ways of monitoring compliance.
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2. The Plan solves in two ways. One, the workplace
respect is modeled and spills over into broader
society. Second, China will protect human rights
because they want to keep US companies in their
country

Rather, the moral responsibilities of U.S. and other multinational companies

are more narrowly focused. In particular, these responsibilities pertain to the
ways that they conduct their own operationsmatters such as treating their
employees with respect and dignity, providing a safe work environment and
appropriate levels of compensation, and, as noted above, doing what they
can to ensure that their suppliers comply with appropriate ethical standards,
threatening termination or nonrenewal of contracts if suppliers fail to comply
with the ethical standards specified in supplier codes of conduct. It also
means that when they use their ability to influence government policy, which,
as the case of the proposed new labor law noted above illustrates, is far
greater than many imagine, they ought to do so in ways that are supportive
of their employees' rights and well-being. In short, what is needed is
constructive engagement, not destructive engagement. There is a
related point to be made here as well. The more that the Chinese economy
and the U.S. economy are intertwined, the more difficult it will be for the
Chinese government to ignore U.S. concerns with respect to human rights
and other matters. Moreover, as participation in the global economy fosters
the emergence of a rapidly growing Chinese middle class, the socioeconomic
conditions will be in place for the Chinese people to demand a greater
measure of freedom and more participatory forms of governance. Put in
slightly diferent terms, though it might not be the job of U.S. and other
multinational corporations operating in China to serve as advocates for house
churches, contributing to the prosperity of the growing Chinese middle class
might well help create a situation in which the Chinese government, with
whatever degree of reluctance it might be inclined, gives in to growing social
pressures and allows a greater measure of freedom of religion. The same is
true with respect to freedom of speech, freedom of the press,
freedom of assembly, and other basic freedoms, as well as more
democratic forms of governance. Hoagland is right. Business can change
China. China today is vibrant, rapidly growing, and changing. It is a land of
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opportunity but also a country with a flawed human rights record. Progress
has been made in the struggle to ensure universal human rights for all those
living in this, the most populous country in the world. Much, however,
remains to be done. Guided by a revised set of Sullivan Principles specifically
tailored for China and/or by internally generated codes of conduct that are
specific and focused, U.S. and other foreign companies can be a positive
force for change. Such is the vision of what is possible. And such is their
obligation if they are to take seriously the most basic notions of social
responsibility.
Harms (US Credibility)
Advantage __: Harms (US

Credibility)
1. The plan builds US human rights and business
credibility which is modeled by other countries
Burtless, 2001 Gary, senior fellow, Economic Studies, Brooks Institution- Workers' Rights: Labor
standards and global trade http://www.brookings.edu/research/articles/2001/09/fall-globaleconomics-
burtless
Proponents of workers' rights argue that trading nations should be held to strict labor
standardsand they ofer two quite diferent justifications for their view. The first is a
moral argument whose premise is that many labor standards, such as freedom of
association and the prohibition of forced labor, protect basic human rights. Foreign
nations that wish to be granted free access to the world's biggest and richest markets
should be required to observe fundamental human values, including labor rights. In short,
the lure of market access to the United States and the European Union should be used to
expand the domain of human rights. The key consideration here is the efficacy of labor
standards policies. Will they improve human rights among would-be trading partners? Or
will they slow progress toward human rights by keeping politically powerless workers
mired in poverty? Some countries, including China, might reject otherwise appealing trade
deals that contain enforceable labor standards. By insisting on tough labor standards, the
wealthy democracies could lay claim to the moral high ground. But they might have to
forgo a trade pact that could help their own producers and consumers while boosting the
incomes and political power of impoverished Chinese workers. The second argument for
strict labor standards stresses not the welfare of poor workers, but simple economic self-
interest. A trading partner that fails to enforce basic protections for its workers can gain
an unfair trade advantage, boosting its market competitiveness against countries with
stronger labor safeguards. Including labor standards in trade deals can encourage
countries in a free trade zone to maintain worker protections rather than abandoning
them in a race to the bottom. If each country must observe a common set of minimum
standards, member countries can ofer and enforce worker protections at a more nearly
optimal level. This second argument, unlike the first, can be assessed with economic
theory and evidence. Evaluating these arguments requires answering three questions.
First, what labor standards are important to U.S. trade and foreign policy? Second, how
can labor standards, once negotiated, be enforced? Finally, does it make sense to insist
that our trade partners adhere to a common set of core labor standards?and if so, which
standards? Which Labor Standards Matter Most? Although the international community
agrees broadly on the need to respect labor standards, agreement does not extend to
what those standards should be. Forced labor and slavery are almost universally regarded
as repugnant, but other labor safeguards thought vital in the world's richest countries are
not widely observed elsewhere. The International Labor Organization, created by the
Treaty of Versailles after World War I, has published labor standards in dozens of areas,
but it has identified eight essential core standards (see box on page 13), most of which
refer to basic human rights. Of the 175 ILO member countries, overwhelming majorities
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have ratified most of the eight standards. More than 150 have ratified the four treating
forced labor and discrimination in employment and wages. Washington has ratified just
two standards, one abolishing forced labor and the other eliminating the worst forms of
child labor, placing the United States in the company of only eight other ILO member
countries, including China, Myanmar, and Oman. Many proponents of labor standards
would expand the core list of ILO protections to cover workplace safety, working
conditions, and wages. The U.S. Trade Act of 1974 defines "internationally recognized
worker rights" to include "acceptable conditions of work with respect to minimum wages,
hours of work, and occupational safety and health." The University of Michigan, for
example, obliges producers of goods bearing its insignia to respect the core ILO standards
and also requires them to pay minimum wages and to ofer a "safe and healthy working
environment." The labor standards that might be covered by a trade agreement fall
along a continuum from those that focus on basic human rights to those that stress
working conditions and pay. On the whole, the case for the former is more persuasive.
Insisting that other nations respect workers' right of free association reflects our moral
view that this right is fundamental to human dignity. Workers may also have a "right" to a
safe and healthy workplace, but that right comes at some cost to productive efficiency.
Insisting that other nations adopt American standards for a safe and healthy workplace
means that they must also adopt our view of the appropriate trade-of between health
and safety, on the one hand, and productive efficiency, on the other.
2. A US commitment to human rights causes China to

change their policy
Foreign Policy, 2015 The U.S. Just Botched Yet Another Chance to Press for
Human Rights in China http://foreignpolicy.com/2015/07/07/the-u-s-just-
botched-yet-another-chance-to-press-for-human-rights-in-china/
But even these relatively strong remarks betray a growing problem in

U.S.-China high-level interactions: the unwillingness of American diplomats to
raise publicly with their Chinese counterparts specific cases of human rights
abuses. Neither Kerry nor Blinken raised Beijings concerted eforts to destroy Yirenping, an anti-
discrimination group, or the New Citizens Movement, a civic rights forum. There was no public mention in
this setting of well-known cases, such as imprisoned Nobel Peace Prize winner Liu Xiaobo, or even of Li
Tingting, Wang Man, Wei Tingting, Wu Rongrong, and Zheng Churan, the five feminists detained (and later
As a result, there were
released) this spring, on whose behalf U.S. officials spoke up in April.
few facts offered to challenge Chinese State Councilor Yang Jiechis
insistence that, In advancing human rights, Chinas achievements
are there for all to see. And there was little evidence that courageous
activists in China could see, of the United States taking seriously its
purported whole of government approach. U.S. Vice President Joe Biden
lowered the bar in his opening remarks. Biden didnt remind his audience that China
has freely undertaken a slew of legally binding human rights commitments or the
extent to which its violating those. Instead, Biden gingerly introduced the topic
by cautioning that he wasnt lecturing and then rattled of a list of human
rights abuses without specifying that those abuses are taking place right
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now in China, enabled or tolerated by some of the very Chinese officials
listening to the speech. Having sidestepped the opportunity to challenge those
officials, or at least make a principled argument, Biden concluded that responsible
competitors by which he presumably meant governments that respect human
rights do so not just because its the right thing to do, but because its absolutely
economically necessary. He then mentioned his friendships with people in the
leadership but named no human rights defenders from China. Even Chinas plans to
host a commemoration this September of the landmark 1995 Fourth World
Conference on Women on womens rights went unchallenged: U.S. officials did not
in public sessions challenge Chinas ongoing harassment of the five feminists,
who are released but remain criminal suspects, but opted instead to call the
September gathering a critical opportunity. Rather, they elected to broadly
reference restrictions on civil society, the exclusion of women from
opportunities for economic success, and domestic violence. But no specifics
were given only broad, vague principles, which posed no meaningful
challenge to the Chinese officials present. And the White Houses readout of U.S.
President Barack Obamas meeting with Chinese representatives to the Dialogue
contains no reference to human rights. On top of this, the United States committed
to enhance counterterrorism cooperation with China. Such an agreement gives
credibility where it is manifestly not due, given Chinas proposed counterterrorism
law, which is nothing more than a legal veneer for human rights abuses. Although
China does sufer a number of deadly and apparently politically motivated attacks
directed against the general population, the Chinese government long has
manipulated the threat of terrorism to justify its crackdown on the 10 million ethnic
Uighurs in Xinjiang province. U.S. officials will no doubt insist that it is better to have
discussions that create opportunities to raise precisely those concerns. But clearly
whatever concerns the United States raised at last years counterterrorism dialogue
were brushed aside in the drafting of this law. The United States should set far higher
standards for China to meet before engaging in any sort of cooperation on this issue.
No doubt U.S. officials will point to their naming of individual cases at the overdue
release of the State Departments human rights report the day after the Dialogue
finished and describe which cases they raised behind closed doors. These are
necessary but far from sufficient. If publicly identifying individual cases and
using them to challenge the Chinese government is a good enough strategy
to use sometimes, it ought to be good enough to use in the forums
where it matters most: at high-level summits where it has the power
to potentially embarrass Chinese officials into behaving differently.
Some senior U.S. officials shy away from causing embarrassment to senior
Chinese officials, arguing that it is counterproductive . Its hard to know that
definitively, especially when former political prisoners tell us and others that their
treatment improved when their cases were publicly raised, suggesting that
embarrassment does prompt a change in behavior. And these U.S. officials logic
concern about causing discomfort doesnt seem to apply when discussing equally
tense issues not related to human rights, like cybersecurity or currency manipulation.
Some may think that raising individual cases or major issues like democracy will
interfere with other priorities in the relationship. But both sides regularly state
that the sum of the relationship is far greater than any individual issue,
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suggesting that bilateral ties will not collapse if the United States
publicly calls for the release of a half-dozen critics of the Chinese
government. In fact, some U.S. officials note with surprise that an unusual
number of issues not related to human rights in the June 2012 Strategic &
Economic Dialogue were dealt with efficiently despite the parallel, global
headline-making story of Chen Guangchengs escape from house arrest in Shandong
province to the U.S. Embassy in Beijing. And some may think it more efective to be
bland in public and push hard in private, as we know many U.S. diplomats have done.
But despite those and other eforts, the results are there for all to see: a manifestly
deteriorating human rights environment. The United States shares this view but
is inexplicably unwilling to use all the tools at its disposal despite its claims
to a whole of government approach to change that reality. Above all,
speaking about individuals also gives critical hope to those in China who are
sufering or jailed for trying to assert their rights, and no diplomat should
ever shy away from an opportunity to mitigate that torment. That no single
U.S. diplomat saw fit to do so publicly is a betrayal of all those in China
fighting for their rights.
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3. Human rights credibility is the foundation for all
other diplomatic efforts. Its credibility is key to all US
international policies
JBI, 2010 The Jacob Blaustein Institute for the Advancement of Human Rights
The Role of Human Rights in US Foreign Policy: Setting Examples or
Exercising Leadership http://www.jbi-humanrights.org/jacob-blaustein-
institute/2010/09/the-role-of-human-rights-in-us-foreign-policy-setting-
examples-or-exercising-leadership.html
Second, the U.S. must integrate human rights into U.S. bilateral diplomacy. To
be efective, human rights must be "part and parcel to our diplomacy with the
countries whose practices were trying to change" as well as with other relevant and
influential countries, Nossel explained. An example was the way the U.S. mobilized, together with
Europeans and others, to prevent Iran's election to the UN Human Rights Council. As a result, despite very
aggressive lobbying by Iran initially, Teheran ultimately withdrew from the race when it realized it would
To be "more credible and efective," the U.S. should "begin with
be defeated.
dialogue and a conversation," according to Nossel. When she and her colleagues have
discussions with Beijing and Moscow, they "try to be forthright when it comes to serious issues that need
to be raised and serious human rights concerns and abuses that have to be called to account." Yet at the
same time, human rights are "not the only dimension" to the bilateral relations. There are many other
officials in the system; those whose job is to raise human rights must coordinate with others and try to fit
in the issues when dealing with other countries; these dialogues are "constructive" but as Nossel
concedes, "they dont necessary yield results as quickly as some might like, and perhaps as we all might
like." In cases when engagement does not succeed, the U.S. may seek to create a foundation for more
forceful action perhaps at the multilateral level. But precisely in such cases, our eforts are more credible
Third, the U.S. must develop
and efective if they begin with a dialogue, according to Nossel.
stronger multilateral tools for the promotion of human rights. For example, on Iran,
the task is to broaden the range of voices that are speaking out, so that advancing rights is not only a U.S.
agenda item. That also means working within the UN system because it has a unique credibility and a
statement can be heard a diferent way in Tehran when it comes from the UN rather than from the U.S. It
can often be more efective. As an example, Nossel pointed to a cross-regional statement critical of Iran
to be delivered the following day in Geneva, signed by more than 50 countries. Of course, the limitations of
the multilateral system of human rights are well known, especially to the Jacob Blaustein Institute. For
example, the U.S. was deeply concerned over the UN's approach to the Goldstone report, and with the
flotilla to Gaza. Ultimately the UN Security Council adopted a more measured approach that the U.S. could
support, but in Geneva, the Human Rights Council "reverted to form" and the resolution was one-sided.
"We look at every single session of the Human Rights Council as an important opportunity to try to move
the ball forward and the Council to take on more issues in a serious way," says Nossel. The U.S. also faces
new challenges with new groupings such as the Organization of the Islamic Conference now playing a
much bigger role than they did previously. The U.S. continues to fight the efort to impose a norm of
Fourth, there is
"defamation of religion" which would in fact ban speech that is critical of religion.
the power of norms, and the U.S. is working on new norms, but also on
countering aggressive norms. Secretary Clinton has also worked to champion Internet
freedom, standing up for bloggers and content providers on the Internet despite unhappiness from China
and others. The U.S. is very careful about what it supports, unlike many other countries that join
resolutions casually. The U.S. will not sign on to anything without a thorough review, to ensure that we can
adhere to the agreement fully. An example of a success of this administration's approach at the UN is the
joint resolution with Egypt at the Human Rights Council on freedom of expression, which grew out of the
Cairo speech. Of course, the practices of Egypt regarding journalists and bloggers is nowhere near the
1
Nossel emphasized that a key reason for the U.S.
language affirmed in the resolution
being present and engaged in the multilateral human rights bodies is to
counter aggressive norms and that this was demonstrated clearly in the
fight over the defamation of religions which the U.S. actively opposed.
Its still a work in progress but its very important that we are there to
counter what is an aggressive initiative, she stated.
1
4. Effective U.S. diplomacy is necessary to prevent the
escalation of wars, nuclear proliferation, climate
change, and a host of other impacts
Keck, 2014
(Zachary, Deputy Editor of e-International Relations and has interned at the
Center for a New American Security and in the U.S. Congress, where he
worked on defense issues, 1-24-14, Americas Relative Decline: Should We
Panic?, The Diplomat, http://thediplomat.com/2014/01/americas-relative-
decline-should-we-panic/)
Regardless of your opinion on U.S. global leadership over the last two
decades, however, there is good reason to fear its relative decline compared
with China and other emerging nations. To begin with, hegemonic transition
periods have historically been the most destabilizing eras in history. This is
not only because of the malign intentions of the rising and established
power(s). Even if all the parties have benign, peaceful intentions, the rise of
new global powers necessitates revisions to the rules of the road . This is
nearly impossible to do in any organized fashion given the anarchic nature of
the international system, where there is no central authority that can govern
interactions between states. We are already starting to see the potential
dangers of hegemonic transition periods in the Asia-Pacific (and arguably the
Middle East). As China grows more economically and militarily powerful, it has
unsurprisingly sought to expand its influence in East Asia. This necessarily
has to come at the expense of other powers, which so far has primarily
meant the U.S., Japan, Vietnam and the Philippines. Naturally, these powers
have sought to resist Chinese encroachments on their territory and influence,
and the situation grows more tense with each passing day. Should China
eventually emerge as a global power, or should nations in other regions enjoy
a similar rise as Kenny suggests, this situation will play itself out elsewhere in
the years and decades ahead. All of this highlights some of the advantages of
a unipolar system. Namely, although the U.S. has asserted military force
quite frequently in the post-Cold War era, it has only fought weak powers and
thus its wars have been fairly limited in terms of the number of casualties
involved. At the same time, Americas preponderance of power has prevented
a great power war, and even restrained major regional powers from coming
to blows. For instance, the past 25 years havent seen any conflicts on par
with the Israeli-Arab or Iran-Iraq wars of the Cold War. As the unipolar era
comes to a close, the possibility of great power conflict and especially major
regional wars rises dramatically. The world will also have to contend with
conventionally inferior powers like Japan acquiring nuclear weapons to
protect their interests against their newly empowered rivals. But even if the
1
transitions caused by Chinas and potentially other nations rises are
managed successfully, there are still likely to be significant negative efects
on international relations. In todays globalized world, it is commonly
asserted that many of the defining challenges of our era can only be solved
through multilateral cooperation. Examples of this include climate change,
health pandemics, organized crime and terrorism, global financial crises, and
the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, among many others. A
unipolar system, for all its limitations, is uniquely suited for organizing
efective global action on these transnational issues. This is because there is
a clear global leader who can take the initiative and, to some degree, compel
others to fall in line. In addition, the unipoles preponderance of power
lessens the intensity of competition among the global players involved. Thus,
while there are no shortages of complaints about the limitations of global
governance today, there is no question that global governance has been
many times more efective in the last 25 years than it was during the Cold
War. The rise of China and potentially other powers will create a new bipolar
or multipolar order. This, in turn, will make solving these transnational issues
much more difficult. Despite the optimistic rhetoric that emanates from
official U.S.-China meetings, the reality is that Sino-American competition is
likely to overshadow an increasing number of global issues in the years
ahead. If other countries like India, Turkey, and Brazil also become significant
global powers, this will only further dampen the prospects for efective global
governance.
5. Climate change will cause extinction.
Mazo, 2010 PhD in Paleoclimatology from UCLA

(Jefrey Mazo, Managing Editor, Survival and Research Fellow for
Environmental Security and Science Policy at the International Institute for
Strategic Studies in London, 3-2010, Climate Conflict: How global warming
threatens security and what to do about it, pg. 122)
The best estimates for global warming to the end of the century range from 2.5-4.~C above pre-industrial levels, depending on the scenario.
Even in the best-case scenario, the low end of the likely range is 1.goC, and in the worst 'business as usual' projections, which actual
emissions have been matching, the range of likely warming runs from 3.1--7.1C. Even keeping emissions at constant 2000 levels (which have
already been exceeded), global temperature would still be expected to reach 1.2C (O'9""1.5C)above pre-industrial levels by the end of the
Without early and severe reductions in emissions, the efects of climate

century."
change in the second half of the twenty-first century are likely to be

catastrophic for the stability and security of countries in the developing world - not to mention the associated human tragedy.
Climate change could even undermine the strength and stability of emerging
and advanced economies, beyond the knock-on efects on security of
widespread state failure and collapse in developing countries .' And although they have
been condemned as melodramatic and alarmist, many informed observers believe that unmitigated climate change
1
could pose an existential threat to civilisation." What is
beyond the end of the century
certain is that there is no precedent in human experience for such rapid

change or such climatic conditions, and even in the best case adaptation to
these extremes would mean profound social, cultural and political changes .
Harms (China Stability)
Advantage ___: Harms (China

Stability)
1. Promoting labor rights in China is critical for their
economy because it will grow the middle class
Levin, 2002 SANDER LEVIN, A U.S. REPRESENTATIVE FROM MICHIGAN

https://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CHRG-107hhrg78790/html/CHRG-
107hhrg78790.htm
Separately, respect for labor rights will help further develop a middle class in
China. Although some claim that more trade in and of itself will automatically lead to a middle class, I
do not believe that is the case. When workers have the right to organize and bargain
collectively, they can enjoy a larger share of the profits that they help
create. The Commission will provide a key tool to Congress and the Administration to help improve
labor rights in China. It will provide a source of information and monitoring that both the Administration
and Congress can trust. I hope the Commission will also make useful recommendations on ways to work
with China to improve the respect for worker rights.
2. A strong Chinese economy is critical to ensure that

the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) will stay in power
Shirk and Lam, 2007 China: Fragile Superpower Susan Shirk (director of the University of California
system-wide Institute on Global Conflict and Cooperation) and Ho Miu Lam (professor of China and Pacific
Relations at IR/PS and Deputy Assistant Secretary of State in the Bureau of East Asia and Pacific Afairs)
2007
the greatest political risk lying ahead of them is the

As China's leaders well know,
possibility of an economic crash that throws millions of workers out of their
jobs or sends millions of depositors to withdraw their savings from the shaky
banking system. A massive environmental or public health disaster also could trigger regime
collapse, especially if people's lives are endangered by a media cover-up imposed by Party authorities.
Nationwide rebellion become a real possibility when large numbers of people
are up-set about the same issue at the same time. Another dangerous
scenario is a domestic or international crisis in which the CCP leaders feel
compelled to lash out against Japan, Taiwan, or the United States because
from their point of view not lashing out might endanger Party rule.
Harms (China Stability)
1
3. If the CCP loses power it will cause a nuclear war
Yee and Storey, 2002 (Herbert Yee, Professor of Politics and International
Relations at the Hong Kong Baptist University, and Ian Storey, Lecturer in
Defence Studies at Deakin University, 2002, The China Threat: Perceptions,
Myths and Reality, p. 5.)
The fourth factor contributing to the perception of a China threat is the fear of
political and economic collapse in the PRC , resulting in territorial fragmentation, civil war
and we of refugees pouring into neighbouring countries. Naturally, any or all of these scenarios would have
a profoundly negative impact on regional stability.Today the Chinese leadership faces a raft
of internal problems, including the increasing political demands of its citizens,
a growing population, a shortage of natural resources and a deterioration in
the natural environment caused by rapid industrialisation and pollution . There
problems are putting a strain on the central government's ability to govern efectively. Political
disintegration or a Chinese civil war might result in millions of Chinese
refugees seeking asylum in neighbouring countries . Such an unprecedented exodus of
refugees from a collapsed PRC would no doubt put a severe strain on the limited resources of China's
neighbours.
A fragmented China could also result in another nightmare
scenario nuclear weapons falling into the hands of irresponsible
local provincial leaders or warlords.. From this perspective, a
disintegrating China would also pose a threat to its neighbours and the world.
Harms (US Trade Competitiveness)
Advantage ___: Harms (US Trade

Competitiveness)
1. A disregard for labor rights will give China an unfair
advantage in world trade. This will threaten U.S.
trade competitiveness
Levin, 2002 SANDER LEVIN, A U.S. REPRESENTATIVE FROM MICHIGAN
https://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CHRG-107hhrg78790/html/CHRG-
107hhrg78790.htm
The Commission also has a key role to play in monitoring labor rights in China. Democratic staf from the
Ways and Means Committee were recently in Cambodia examining the operation of the U.S.-Cambodia
textiles and apparel agreement. This agreement addressed the labor rights issue in an innovative way--
labor rights through positive market access incentives. One of
encouraging Cambodia to improve its
the issues that became clear on that trip was that China enjoyed an
advantage because of its failure to respect labor rights : As one factory owner
comparing his labor practices in his factory in Cambodia with his practices in his factory in China stated,
``I can do whatever I want in China.'' As China's accession to the WTO takes
hold, other countries, particularly neighbors of China, will find it difficult to
compete with China in attracting labor-intensive industries if China
continues to allow investors there to ignore labor rights. There will truly be
pressure for a race to the bottom.
2. Now is the key time to curb Chinese gains over U.S.

trade- Currency manipulation already threatens our
global advantage over China
Wall Street Journal, June 2016 June 2, Wall Street Journal, U.S.-
China Trade Troubles Grow http://www.wsj.com/articles/u-s-china-trade-
troubles-grow-1464887897
Chinese leaders, worried about a deeper economic slowdown, are trying to

keep factories humming and prevent the kind of market unrest that gripped
global investors over the past year. U.S. Treasury and State Department officials fly to Beijing
early next week for two days of talks to try to calm some of the trade irritants and address ongoing
geopolitical tensions, particularly over the South China Sea, where their militaries are operating in
sometimes dangerous proximity. The U.S., which moved on Wednesday to cut of North
1
Korea from the banking system, wants Beijing to help rein in its increasingly
belligerent ally. U.S. officials also will seek reassurance from Chinese officials about moving ahead
with promised reforms, such as restructuring state-owned enterprises and reducing industrial overcapacity,
and try to advance talks on an investment treaty. Implementing this reform agendaand resisting the
urge to hang on to an outdated growth modelofers the best formula for China to achieve an orderly
transition and put its economy on a more sustainable footing, said Nathan Sheets, U.S. Treasurys
undersecretary for international afairs. Chinas Vice Finance Minister Zhu Guangyao, while acknowledging
at a media briefing Thursday major challenges for Chinas economy, insisted Beijing would adhere to its
reform agenda and commitments made by the Group of 20 against competitive currency devaluation.
Some analysts think President Xi Jinping, wanting to consolidate power in the
Communist Party ahead of a leadership transition next year, has paused
reform eforts and instead is revving up the old playbook of credit-fueled
growth and infrastructure spending. His aim: Ensure economic stability and
mollify rivals, they say. An attempt last year by Beijing to allow markets to play a role in setting its
exchange rate was mismanaged, adding to a summertime of woe for Chinas financial markets and
sparking global jitters. The reaction surprised Chinese officials and created a headache for reformers. The
Chinese government is keeping steel mills, coal plants and a host of manufacturing industries afloat
despite dwindling demand and a tumble in commodity prices that should have closed many. The U.S.
recently slapped Chinese cold-rolled steel imports with duties worth 267%, accusing the country of selling
supporting excess production capacity, the Chinese
products below production cost. By
government is engaged in economic warfare against the U.S., said John
Ferriola, chief executive of North Carolina steel giant Nucor Corp. Thousands
of hardworking Americans have lost their jobs because of these illegal, unfair
trade practices. The Chinese economy has decelerated after decades of double-digit expansion.
Growth is clocking in at 6.7%, its slowest pace since the global financial crisis amid rising debt, growing
labor unrest and factory output well above demand. China acknowledges it has an excess-capacity
problem. But we have to prevent massive unemployment, Premier Li Keqiang said in March. When
President Bill Clinton persuaded Congress to in 2000 to back Chinas entry into the World Trade
Organization, the U.S. counted on expanded trade as the catalyst for political change in the Communist
state. U.S. firms hoped to capitalize on the industrialization of the worlds most populous nation. A
decade and a half later, U.S. firms and voters are growing increasingly
frustrated despite Chinas promises to open up the country. Cheaper wages and
costs pulled production out of the U.S., Chinese imports surged and American manufacturing declined as a
share of the economy. The U.S. trade deficit with China has swollen to $365 billion, now about 2% of U.S.
economic output. U.S. presidential contenders are leveraging anger at China over lost jobs into potential
votes. Many of the areas hit hardest by Chinas rise have shown some of the strongest support for
Republican candidate Donald Trump, who has threatened to slap a 45% tarif on China as a way to force a
change in Beijings trade policies. A Chinese worker polishing steel at an ofshore oil-engineering platform
in Qingdao, in east China's Shandong province on Wednesday. PHOTO: AGENCE FRANCE-PRESSE/GETTY
IMAGES The Obama administration points to the yuans broader appreciation since 2005, renewed talks for
a bilateral investment treaty and Beijings vows to allow markets to play a greater role in the economy as
But the yuan's recent depreciation and
proof that its diplomacy has yielded gains.
continued obstacles to U.S. corporate access threaten to erode those
advances. Theres a growing risk that if China remains closed, were going to
see more and more concern about a growing investment imbalance, said
Jeremie Waterman, a U.S. Chamber of Commerce executive overseeing China.
3. U.S trade competitiveness is key to prevent global

wars
1
Walt, 2002 (Stephen, Academic Dean at the John F. Kennedy School of
Government at Harvard University, Robert and Renee Belfer Professorship in
International Afairs, American Primacy: Its prospects and pitfalls, Naval War
College Review, Spring 2002, Vol. LV, No. 2)
By facilitating the development of a more open and liberal world economy,

American primacy also fosters global prosperity . Economic interdependence is
often said to be a cause of world peace, but it is more accurate to say that
peace encourages interdependenceby making it easier for states to accept
the potential vulnerabilities of extensive international intercourse.10
Investors are more willing to send money abroad when the danger of war is
remote, and states worry less about being dependent on others when they
are not concerned that these connections might be severed. When states are
relatively secure, they will also be less fixated on how the gains from
cooperation are distributed. In particular, they are less likely to worry that extensive cooperation
will benefit others more and thereby place them at a relative disadvantage over time.11 By providing
a tranquil international environment, in short, U.S. primacy has created
political conditions that are conducive to expanding global trade and
investment. Indeed, American primacy was a prerequisite for the creation and
gradual expansion of the European Union , which is often touted as a triumph of economic
self-interest over historical rivalries . Because the United States was there to protect the
Europeans from the Soviet Union and from each other, they could safely
ignore the balance of power within Western Europe and concentrate on
expanding their overall level of economic integration. The expansion of world
trade has been a major source of increased global prosperity, and U.S.
primacy is one of the central pillars upon which that system rests .12 The
United States also played a leading role in establishing the various
institutions that regulate and manage the world economy. As a number of
commentators have noted, the current era of globalization is itself partly an
artifact of American power. As Thomas Friedman puts it, Without America on duty, there will be
no America Online.13
2AC Harms (Human Rights)
2AC Human Rights AT #1China

Improving Human Rights
They say China is improving human rights now, but

facts)
to be true)
their argument)

______________________________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________________________
1
2 Labor rights are violated creating a chilling effect in
the workplace

There is no national minimum wage law, though Chinese labor law does al
low local governments to mandate minimum wages, provided they are
consistent with Ministry of Labor and Social Security regulations. Some local
governments have done so, though enforcement of these laws is very
uneven.38 Chinese labor law prohibits forced labor. Though the Chinese
government denies that forced labor occurs, it has worked to resolve cases in
which it is alleged that products made with prison labor have been exported
for sale in other countries. Chinese labor law also prohibits child labor
(defined as employment of children under the age of sixteen), though reports
of child labor are not infrequent.39 For example, family members allege that
child Y widely employed at the Lihua Textile Factory in Hebei Province, *
reported, five teenage girls living in factory dormitories died of asphyxiation
Occupational health and safety continues to be a very serious problem.
According to official statistics, in 2006 industrial accidents killed 14,382
workers, though that was 9.4 percent fewer deaths than in the previous
year.41 The coal industry accounted for 4,746 fatalities (which is perhaps the
reason that the An hui provincial government allows coal miners to have
more than one child).42 According to a report issued by Amnesty
International, the situation is particularly difficult for rural-to-urban migrants
(estimated to number 150 to 200 million) who have moved to China's cities in
search of work. Many are denied access to health care and decent housing
and do not receive the state benefits available to permanent urban residents.
The report states, "They experience discrimination in the workplace, and are
routinely exposed to some of the most exploitative conditions of work. [Their]
insecure legal status, social isolation, sense of cultural inferiority and relative
lack of knowledge of their rights leaves them particularly vulnerable, enabling
employers to deny their rights with impunity."43 Wang Yuancheng, a rural-to-
urban migrant who experienced a greater degree of success than most
migrants, observes, "The lives of migrant workers are miserable. They have
to live in makeshift shelters, eat the cheapest bean curd and cabbage. They
have no insurance and their wages are often delayed. And most of all, they
are discriminated against by urban people."44
1
3 Womens rights are limited
Human Rights Watch, 2014 [Independent human rights organization,

World Report 2014: China, https://www.hrw.org/world-
report/2014/country-chapters/china-and-tibet]
Womens reproductive rights and access to reproductive health remain

severely curtailed under Chinas population planning regulations. While the
government announced in November that Chinese couples will now be
allowed two children if either parent was a single child, the measure does not
change the foundations of Chinas government-enforced family planning
policy, which includes the use of legal and other coercive measuressuch as
administrative sanctions, fines, and coercive measures, including forced
abortionto control reproductive choices. The governments punitive
crackdowns on sex work often lead to serious abuses, including physical and
sexual violence, increased risk of disease, and constrained access to justice
for the countrys estimated 4 to 10 million sex workers, most of whom are
women. Sex workers have also documented abuses by public health
agencies, such as coercive HIV testing, privacy infringements, and
mistreatment by health officials. In January, the Supreme Peoples Court
upheld a death sentence against Li Yan, a woman convicted of murdering her
physically abusive husband. Domestic violence is not treated as a mitigating
factor in court cases. In May, Ye Haiyan, Chinas most prominent sex worker
rights activist, was detained by police for several days after being assaulted
at her home in Guangxi province over her exposure of abusive conditions in
local brothels. Although the government acknowledges that domestic
violence, employment discrimination, and gender bias are widespread, it
limits the activities of independent womens rights groups working on these
issues by making it difficult for them to register, monitoring their activities,
interrogating their staf, and prohibiting some activities.
4 LGBTQ rights are violated
Human Rights Watch, 2014 [Independent human rights organization, World

Report 2014: China, https://www.hrw.org/world-report/2014/country-
chapters/china-and-tibet]
The Chinese government classified homosexuality as a mental illness until

2001. To date there is still no law protecting people from
1
discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation or gender identity,
which remains common especially in the workplace. Same-sex partnership
and marriage are not recognized under Chinese law. In February, a lesbian
couple attempted to register at the marriage registry in Beijing but their
application was rejected. On May 17, the International Day against
Homophobia, Changsha city authorities detained Xiang Xiaohan, an organizer
of a local gay pride parade, and held him for 12 days for organizing an illegal
march. In China, demonstrations require prior permission, which is rarely
granted.
2AC Human Rights AT #2--No

Moral Obligation
They say Theres no moral obligation to improve human rights , but
1. Extend our Gibney evidence.

Its much better than their analytic evidence because:
more facts)
their argument)

First, our author is a professor and ethical expert at the college
level. We should trust his logical argument. Second, their argument
does not make sense. We should always try to protect human rights
even if we cant fix all violations. If people thought that way, we
wouldnt try to fix any of the worlds problems.
This matters because: this frames the debate. The judge should
always vote to protect human rights and we do that best.
2 US human rights protections are modeled globally

its ethical and practical to protect them
1
Human Rights First, 2012 [nonprofit, nonpartisan international human rights organization based
in New York and Washington D.C., How to Integrate Human Rights into U.S.-China Relations, December,
https://www.ciaonet.org/attachments/24330/uploads]
On human rights, the United States must be a beacon. Activists fighting for
freedom around the globe continue to look to us for inspiration and count on
us for support. Upholding human rights is not only a moral obligation; its a
vital national interest. America is strongest when our policies and actions
match our values. Human Rights First is an independent advocacy and action
organization that challenges America to live up to its ideals. We believe
American leadership is essential in the struggle for human rights so we press
the U.S. government and private companies to respect human rights and the
rule of law. When they dont, we step in to demand reform, accountability and
justice. Around the world, we work where we can best harness American
influence to secure core freedoms. We know that it is not enough to expose
and protest injustice, so we create the political environment and policy
solutions necessary to ensure consistent respect for human rights. Whether
we are protecting refugees, combating torture, or defending persecuted
minorities, we focus not on making a point, but on making a diference. For
over 30 years, weve built bipartisan coalitions and teamed up with frontline
activists and lawyers to tackle issues that demand American leadership.
2AC Human Rights AT #3High

Magnitude Impacts Outweigh
They say Large wars outweigh human rights, but

Its much better than their Ochs evidence because:
facts)
to be true)
( Probability is more important than magnitude) (their evidence
supports our argument)

Our Gibney evidence discusses the point that their Ochs evidence
makes. Gibney argues that logic is wrong because it lets thousands
die daily. Furthermore, the more probable impact should be
preferred because, while their impact is bad, theres an infinitely
small chance it will happen.
This matters because: if human rights protections come first, the
judge must vote for the aff. We outweigh all of their impacts.
1
2 Low risk, high magnitude impacts are extremely
flawedits propaganda and causes war
PARRY, 2012 [Robert, broke many of the Iran-Contra stories in the 1980s
for the Associated Press and Newsweek, Return of Cheneys One Percent
Doctrine, Feb. 4, https://consortiumnews.com/2012/02/04/return-of-cheneys-
one-percent-doctrine/]
But it should be clear what the game is. Israeli hardliners and American
neocons want a return to former Vice President Dick Cheneys one percent
doctrine, as described by author Ron Suskind. That is, if there is even a one
percent chance that a terrorist attack might be launched against the United
States, it must be treated as a certainty, thus justifying any preemptive
military action that U.S. officials deem warranted. That was the mad-hatter
policy that governed the U.S. run-up to the Iraq War, when even the most
dubious and dishonest claims by self-interested Iraqi exiles and their neocon
friends were treated as requiring a bloody invasion of a country then at
peace. In those days, not only was there a flood of disinformation from
outside the U.S. government, there also was a readiness inside George W.
Bushs administration to channel those exaggerations and lies into a powerful
torrent of propaganda aimed at the American people, still shaken from the
barbarity of the 9/11 attacks. So, the American people heard how Iraq might
dispatch small remote-controlled planes to spray the United States with
chemical or biological weapons, although Iraq was on the other side of the
globe. The New York Times hyped bogus claims about aluminum tubes for
nuclear centrifuges. Other news outlets spread false stories about Iraq
seeking uranium from Niger and about supposed Iraqi links to al-Qaeda
terrorists. There was a stampede of one-upsmanship in the U.S. news media
as everyone competed to land the latest big scoop about Iraqs nefarious
intentions and capabilities. Even experienced journalists were sucked in . In
explaining one of these misguided articles, New York Times correspondent
Chris Hedges told the Columbia Journalism Review that We tried to vet the
defectors and we didnt get anything out of Washington that said, these guys
are full of shit. Based in Paris, Hedges said he would get periodic calls from
his editors asking that he check out defector stories originating from Ahmed
Chalabis pro-invasion Iraqi National Congress. I thought he was unreliable
and corrupt, but just because someone is a sleazebag doesnt mean he might
not know something or that everything he says is wrong, Hedges said. More
Scary Talk Even after the U.S. invasion of Iraq in 2003 and the eventual
realization that the fear-mongering was based on falsehoods, President Bush
kept up the scary talk with claims about Iraq as the central front in the war
on terror and al-Qaeda building a caliphate stretching from Indonesia to
1
Spain and thus threatening the United States. Fear seemed to be the
great motivator for getting the American people to line up behind
actions that, on balance, often created greater dangers for the
United States. Beyond the illegality and immorality of attacking other
countries based on such fabrications, there was the practical issue of
unintended consequences. Which is the core logical fallacy of Cheneys one
percent doctrine. Overreacting to an extremely unlikely threat can
create additional risks that also exceed the one percent threshold,
which, in turn, require more violent responses, thus cascading
outward until the country essentially destroys itself in pursuit of the
illusion of perfect security. The one percent doctrine is like the
scene in The Sorcerers Apprentice as the lazy helper enchants a
splintering broom to carry water for him but then cannot control the
ensuing chaos of a disastrous flood. The rational approach to national
security is not running around screaming about imaginary dangers but
evaluating the facts carefully and making judgments as to how the threats
can be managed without making matters worse.
3 Failure to prevent human rights abuses risks nuclear

war
Mawdsley, 2008 (Christy, Texas A&M U. An Interest in Intervention: A Moral Argument for Darfur.
http://asq.africa.ufl.edu/files/Mawdsley-Vol10Issue1.pdf)
Scholars and policymakers who propose that international stability is not relevant
to U.S. national interests misunderstand the very nature of a globalized world . A
globalized world, by definition, is one that entails aggregated systems of all types: economic,
communications, transportation, ecological, and others. International stability levels have the
potential to feed in to each one of these systems , thereby afecting American quality of
life either positively or negatively (albeit to varying degrees). Genocide and similar atr ocities have
historically shown to have destabilizing efects. Because of globalization, this may have
an (indirect or direct) negative efect on the American national interest. In the Darfur genocide, for
instance, millions of refugees have fled over the SudaneseChadian border into Chad, contributing to higher
monetary and resource costs for the already poor government of Chad. The humanitarian crisis that has
ensued in both Chad and Sudan divert resources from important areas in need of funding such as
education, the fight against the HIV/AIDS epidemic, and economic development. In a world of independent
nations, U.S. policymakers could write this of as irrelevant to the national interest. But in a globalized
world, airplanes cross borders thousands of times a day, and the U.S. imports goods and resources from
nuclear weapons can be launched from one continent and
hundreds of nations, and
hit another. Though these impacts might be irrelevant in the Darfur genocide, they might
become far more relevant in a future genocide in a more strategically-
relevant location. Ideas and products flow freely in this age, and it is certainly in the U.S. national
interest to prevent the spread of the instability caused by genocide in our globalized world. What makes an
activist approach when faced with genocide or similar events far more compelling is the argument that
action is not only consistent with U.S. interests but also with U.S. values. Values are important because, in
a multi-cultural, multi-lingual, multi-ethnic country such as the United States, they are precisely what bring
American citizens together as a nation. The values upheld in the U.S. Declaration of Independence and
1
Constitution are the glue that gives American people a shared identity. They are thus of immense weight in
U.S. survival as a nation. Our values should be upheld consistently both in domestic and foreign policy. An
inconsistent application of our values in the broadest sense will lead to an erosion of the strength of the
United States as a common nation as values are indeed the foundation.
2AC Harms (Democracy)
2AC Democracy AT #1US

Violates Democracy
They say The US violates democracy, but
1. Extend our Williams and Human Rights Watch

evidence.
Its much better than their Guardian evidence because:
more facts)
to be true)

Their evidence quotes high-level Chinese government officials. Of
course theyre going to say the US is bad democratically because
they want to make themselves look better in comparison. Moreover,
our evidence talks about the truly horrible abuses of democracy
where people dont get a fair trial, theres no freedom of speech,
and the internet is censored. While Trump is a bad guy, it doesnt
compare.
This matters because: we get our democracy harms and lead to our
impact. If we dont do the aff, then our democracy impact is
inevitable.
1
Cross-apply our human rights advantageall of the violence against
women, Tibetans, workers, and the LGBTQ community prove that
democracy is comparatively worse in China than the US.
1
2 Chinese democracy is in decline as those who
disagree are silenced. A strong arm ruler will be
elected and strike militarilythey have their own
Trump problems
The Atlantic, 2015 [ Chinese Democracy Isn't Inevitable, May 29,

http://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2015/05/chinese
-democracy-isnt-inevitable/394325/]
The flaws in Chinas political system are obvious. The government doesnt
even make a pretense of holding national elections and punishes those who
openly call for multiparty rule. The press is heavily censored and the Internet
is blocked. Top leaders are unconstrained by the rule of law. Even more
worrisome, repression has been ramped up since Xi Jinping took power in
2012, suggesting that the regime is increasingly worried about its legitimacy.
The Democracy Report Some China expertsmost recently David
Shambaugh of George Washington Universityinterpret these ominous signs
as evidence that the Chinese political system is on the verge of
collapse. But such an outcome is highly unlikely in the near future. The
Communist Party is firmly in power, its top leader is popular, and no political
alternative currently claims widespread support. And what would happen if
the Partys power did indeed crumble? The most likely result, in my view,
would be rule by a populist strongman backed by elements of the countrys
security and military forces. The new ruler might seek to buttress his
legitimacy by launching military adventures abroad. President Xi would
look tame by comparison. A more realistic and, arguably, desirable outcome
would involve political change that builds on the advantages of the current
system. But what exactly are the good parts of the Chinese political model?
And how can they be advanced without repression? I believe the model can
be improved in a more open political environment and, eventually, put before
the people in a popular referendum.
1
3 Even if its partially contradictory, its still good to do
Cihangir-Tetik , 2014 Damla Cihangir-Tetik is a Ph.D Candidate in Political Science, Sabanci

University/Istanbul as well as Project Coordinator for Transparency International Turkey, pg online @
http://idsmagazine.org/human-rights-and-democracy-promotion-as-foreign-policy-tools-of-transatlantic-
partners-by-damla-cihangir-tetik/
Regarding human rights protection and democracy promotion, the discrepancy

of the West argument reached its peak with the war on terrorism policy of the
US after the 9/11 terrorist attacks. Western democracy promotion and human
rights norms deteriorated with the US-led operation in Afghanistan in order to
fight against global terrorism and with the invasion of Iraq by the US and
Britain. Additionally, the treatment of prisoners by the US officials in Guantanamo
Bay, Bagram in Afghanistan and Abu Ghraib was perceived as aggressive,
paternalistic, neo-imperialist and a combination of all those by the rest of the
international community (Burnell 2010, 2). Importantly, the EU and especially
the US are faced with an important credibility problem at the moment
concerning their efforts towards international human rights protection
and democracy promotion in the rest of the world. Credibility refers to the fact
that democratization is hardly ever the only foreign policy goal of those
governments who provide democracy assistance (Burnell 2010). As Bermeo
explains, even though the US has spent hundreds of millions of dollars on
democracy and good governance in Egypt, its military aid, which is much more
higher than the ones for democratization, increases the scepticism towards the
priority of the US in Egypt (Bermeo 2009). Democracy promotion can therefore
only succeed if it is embedded within the overall set of foreign policies of the
promoting country and if the promoting country itself adheres to the rules,
norms and values it claims to want to become more widespread (Burnell
2010). Similarly, concerning international human rights protection, the US fails to
accede to the ICC with others including China, India, Indonesia, Saudi Arabia
and this discourages these states and also the others from engaging in activities
that promote human rights (Muftuler-Bac and Peterson 2014). As a result, at the
moment it is not expected from the US to be a global leader of human
rights protection and democracy promotion internationally. However, one has
to keep in mind that the US under President Wilsons administration was leading
both bilateral and multilateral means of democracy promotion at the beginning of
the 20th century. The US has established USAID in 1961 and the National
Endowment for Democracy as its main democracy promotion instruments. In the
mission statement of the State Department, democracy promotion is underlined
as a political purpose for the US; advance freedom for benefit of the American
people and the international community by helping to build and sustain a more
democratic, secure and prosperous world composed of well-governed states that
respond to the needs of their people, reduce widespread poverty, and act
responsibly within the international system (US Department of State 2007). As
Babayan mentions, diferent US administrations have diferent modes of
democracy promotion and human rights protection. While in the 1990s President
1
Clinton made democracy promotion one of the three main pillars of his foreign
policy, President George W. Bush adopted a diferent democracy promotion
rhetoric, which is combined with military means and which President Obama later
distanced himself from (Babayan 2013, Babayan and Huber 2012, 3). Even
though he continues to apply human rights and democracy promotion policies,
he is much more cautious than his predecessors because of increasing
multipolarity in global security environment and increasing domestic
pressures. According to discussed outcomes of diverse Western-led human
rights protection and democracy promotion policies there is no certain, clear
answer to the question of do human rights protection and democracy promotion
policies of the West work? The answer is both yes and no. As Gravingholt et.
al. mention, the foremost reason for this blurriness is the unknown precise rules
of democratization (Gravingholt et. al. 2009). It is the same for human rights
protection, an area where international legal norms and rules are not specified,
internationalized and applicable until now, even though some improved steps
regarding the creation of enforceable rules of International Criminal Court (ICC)
and International Criminal Tribunals for the former Yugoslavia and Rwanda. Even
the US and the EU have diferent approaches regarding human rights protection
and democracy promotion and several disagreements on some issues, ranging
from counterterrorism policies to private data collection and their
shared security measures. As mentioned above, even though there is a
continuation of the discrepancy of the West and/or the credibility
problem of the West, the transatlantic partners still lead human rights
protection and democracy promotion internationally. Therefore, they have been
pushing other states, IOs and non-state actors for the creation of international
norms in the multilateral framework. However, this leadership perception is
now insufficient to abolish the question: Has the West dropped human
rights protection and democracy as a norm in response to the emergence of
alternative political regimes to the Western democracy, especially by the rise of
China and Russia as global powers?
4 U.S. domestic policy has no effect on the ability for

us to project human rights norms credibly
MORAVCSIK, 2005 Andrew Moravcsik 5, PhD and a Professor of Politics and

International Afairs at Princeton, 2005, "The Paradox of U.S. Human Rights
Policy," American Exceptionalism and Human Rights,
http://www.princeton.edu/~amoravcs/library/paradox.pdf
What are the consequences of U.S. "exemptionalism and

It is natural to ask:
noncompliance? International lawyers and human rights activists regularly
issue dire warnings about the ways in which the apparent hypocrisy of the United
States encourages foreign governments to violate human rights , ignore
1
international pressure, and undermine international human rights institutions .
In Patricia Derian's oft-cited statement before the Senate in I979: "Ratification by
the United States significantly will enhance the legitimacy and acceptance of
these standards. It will encourage other countries to join those which have already accepted the treaties. And, in
countries where human rights generally are not respected, it will aid citizens in raising human rights issues.""' One
constantly hears this refrain. Yet there is little empirical reason to
accept it. Human rights norms have in fact spread widely without much
attention to U.S. domestic policy. In the wake of the "third wave"
democratization in Eastern Europe, East Asia, and Latin America, government
after government moved ahead toward more active domestic and international
human rights policies without attending to U.S. domestic or international
practice." The human rights movement has firmly embedded itself in public
opinion and NGO networks, in the United States as well as elsewhere,
despite the dubious legal status of international norms in the United
States. One reads occasional quotations from recalcitrant governments citing
American noncompliance in their own defense-most recently Israel and Australia-but there is little
evidence that this was more than a redundant justification for policies
made on other grounds . Other governments adhere or do not adhere to
global norms, comply or do not comply with judgments of tribunals, for
reasons that seem to have little to do with U.S. multilateral policy.
2AC Democracy AT #2Chinese

Democracy Improving
They say Chinas democracy is getting better, but

facts)
to be true)
their argument)

______________________________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________________________
1
2 Expression of ideas and internet information is
silenced
Human Rights Watch, 2014 [Independent human rights organization,

World Report 2014: China, https://www.hrw.org/world-
report/2014/country-chapters/china-and-tibet]
Freedom of expression deteriorated in 2013, especially after the government

launched a concerted efort to rein in micro-blogging. The government and
the Party maintain multiple layers of control over all media and publications.
Internet censors shape online debate and maintain the Great Firewall,
which blocks outside content from reaching Internet users in China. Despite
these restrictions, the Internet, especially microblog services known as
weibo and other social media tools, are popular as a relatively free space in
which Chinas 538 million users can connect and air grievances. However,
those who breach sensitive taboos are often swiftly identified and their
speech deleted or disallowed; some are detained or jailed. In January,
Southern Weekly, a Guangzhou-based newspaper known for its boundary-
pushing investigative journalism, was enveloped in a censorship row after the
papers editors found that their New Years special editorial was rewritten on
the censors orders and published without their consent. The original editorial
had called for political reform and respect for constitutionally guaranteed
rights, but the published version instead praised the Chinese Communist
Party. The papers staf publicly criticized the provincial top censor, called for
his resignation and went on a strike; the paper resumed printing a week later.
In May, the General Office of the Chinese Communist Partys Central
Committee issued a gag order to universities directing them to avoid
discussions of seven taboos, which included universal values and the
Partys past wrongs, according to media reports. Since August, authorities
have waged a campaign against online rumors. The campaign has targeted
influential online opinion leaders and ordinary netizens. The authorities have
detained hundreds of Internet users for days, closed down over 100 illegal
news websites run by citizen journalists, and detained well-known liberal
online commentator Charles Xue. Also in August, the government official in
charge of Internet afairs warned Internet users against breaching seven
bottom lines, including Chinas socialist system, the countrys national
interests, and public order. In September, the Supreme Peoples Court and
the Supreme Peoples Procuratorate (state prosecutor) issued a new judicial
interpretation applying four existing criminal provisions to Internet
expression, providing a more explicit legal basis for charging Internet users.
1
1
3 Political dissidents and racial minorities are
imprisoned or murdered by the thousands
Human Rights Watch, 2014 [Independent human rights organization, World

Report 2014: China https://www.hrw.org/world-report/2014/country-
chapters/china-and-tibet]
Tibet The Chinese government systematically suppresses political, cultural,

religious and socio-economic rights in Tibet in the name of combating what it
sees as separatist sentiment. This includes nonviolent advocacy for Tibetan
independence, the Dalai Lamas return, and opposition to government policy.
At time of writing, 123 Tibetans had self-immolated in protest against Chinese
policies since the first recorded case in February 2009. Arbitrary arrest and
imprisonment remains common, and torture and ill-treatment in detention is
endemic. Fair trials are precluded by a politicized judiciary overtly tasked with
suppressing separatism. Police systematically suppress any unauthorized
gathering. On July 6, police opened fire in Nyitso, Dawu prefecture (Ch.
Daofu), on a crowd that had gathered in the countryside to celebrate the
Dalai Lamas birthday. Several people were injured. The government
censored news of the event. In an apparent efort to prevent a repetition of
the popular protests of 2008, the government in 2013 maintained many of
the measures it introduced during its brutal crackdown on the protest
movementa massive security presence composed largely of armed police
forces, sharp restrictions on the movements of Tibetans within the Tibetan
plateau, increased controls on monasteries, and a ban on foreign journalists
in the Tibetan Autonomous Region (TAR) unless part of a government-
organized tour. The government also took significant steps to implement a
plan to station 20,000 new officials and Party cadres in the TAR, including in
every village, to monitor the political views of all residents. The government
is also subjecting millions of Tibetans to a mass rehousing and relocation
policy that radically changes their way of life and livelihoods, in some cases
impoverishing them or making them dependent on state subsidies, about
which they have no say. Since 2006, over two million Tibetans, both farmers
and herders, have been involuntarily rehousedthrough government-
ordered renovation or construction of new housesin the TAR; hundreds of
thousands of nomadic herders in the eastern part of the Tibetan plateau have
been relocated or settled in New Socialist Villages. Xinjiang Pervasive
ethnic discrimination, severe religious repression, and increasing cultural
suppression justified by the government in the name of the fight against
separatism, religious extremism, and terrorism continue to fuel rising
tensions in the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region. In 2013, over one
hundred peopleUyghurs, Han, and other ethnicitieswere killed in various
1
incidents across the region, the highest death toll since the July 2009 Urumqi
protests. In some cases, heavy casualties appear to have been the result of
military-style assaults on groups preparing violent attacks, as in Bachu
prefecture on April 23, and in Turfan prefecture on June 26. But in other cases
security forces appear to have used lethal force against crowds of
unarmed protesters. On June 28, in Hetian prefecture, police tried to
prevent protesters from marching toward Hetian municipality to protest the
arbitrary closure of a mosque and the arrest of its imam, ultimately shooting
into the crowd and injuring dozens of protesters. On August 8, in Aksu
prefecture, police forces prevented villagers from reaching a nearby mosque
to celebrate a religious festival, eventually using live ammunition and injuring
numerous villagers. After each reported incident the government
ritualistically blames separatist, religious extremist, and terrorist forces,
and obstructs independent investigations. Arbitrary arrest, torture, and
disappearance of those deemed separatists are endemic and instill
palpable fear in the population. In July, Ilham Tohti, a Uyghur professor at
Beijings Nationalities University published an open letter to the government
asking for an investigation into 34 disappearance cases he documented. Tohti
was placed under house arrest several times and prevented from traveling
abroad. The government continues to raze traditional Uyghur neighborhoods
and rehouse families in planned settlements as part of a comprehensive
development policy launched in 2010. The government says the policy is
designed to urbanize and develop Xinjiang.
4 New law shows Chinese commitment to repressing

human rights and democracy
Human Rights Watch, April 2016 [Independent non-profit

organization, China: New Law Escalates Repression of Groups,
April 28, https://www.hrw.org/news/2016/04/28/china-new-law-
escalates-repression-groups]
However, the fundamental focus of the legislation to subject foreign groups

to tighter police oversight and prohibit any activities considered to endanger
China's national unity, national security, or ethnic unity has not changed,
Human Rights Watch said. This is likely to disproportionately harm the work of
groups engaged on issues the government deems sensitive. The NGO Law
requires that foreign groups must be sponsored by a Chinese government
organization and be registered with the police, rather than the Ministry of
Civil Afairs, as has been the case. It grants police extensive investigation and
enforcement powers, including the ability to arbitrarily summon
representatives of overseas groups, cancel activities deemed a threat to
1
national security, blacklist groups considered to be involved in vaguely
defined subversive or separatist activities, and permanently bar them
from setting up offices or organize activities in the country. The ability to
summon NGO representatives creates a legal basis for a longstanding
practice, and there appears to be little if any opportunity for organizations to
contest their treatment. The NGO Law permits police investigating foreign
NGOs to: Enter its premises and seize documents and other information;
Examine its bank accounts and limit incoming funds; Cancel activities, revoke
registration, and impose administrative detention; and Participate in the
annual assessment of foreign NGOs, which determines whether a group can
continue operating. If foreign NGOs have carried out acts that are seen by the
authorities as splitting the state, damaging national unity, or subverting
state power, police can hand down administrative detentions. Foreigners
found to have breached the new law can either be barred from leaving China
or deported. The law also steps up financial scrutiny of foreign NGOs,
imposing strict regulations on the source of funding and account
management of the groups, requiring that the organizations financial
accounts be audited and announced publicly. Regulations on
nongovernmental organizations should not undermine the rights to freedom
of association, expression, and peaceful assembly, which are protected under
the Chinese constitution and international law, Human Rights Watch said.
Registration requirements should also be minimal and free of surveillance.
2AC Democracy AT #3Countries

Model US Democracy
They say __________________________________________________, but

facts)
to be true)
their argument)

______________________________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________________________
1
2 Chinas politics are modeled globallyThey can be a
symbol of peaceful democracy
Varoufakis, 2015 [Yanis, Greek economist who was a member of the

Parliament of Greece between January and September 2015. The
economic case for authentic democracy, December 9,
http://ilmanifesto.global/the-economic-case-for-authentic-
democracy/]
Democracy: In the West we make the colossal mistake of taking it for granted.
We see democracy not as the most fragile of flowers that it really is but as
part of our societys furniture as an intransient given. We also believe that
capitalism inevitably begets democracy. It doesnt! Capitalism may have
yielded liberal democracies in America and Europe but there is nothing
inevitable about it. Singapores Lee Kwan Yew and his great imitators in
Beijing have demonstrated that capitalism can flourish, economic growth can
be spectacular, while politics remains democracy-free. It would not be
inaccurate to say that most of the emerging societies in Asia and Africa may
be training their antennae toward Silicon Valley but they are not terribly keen
to emulate our Western experiment with liberal democracy. China and
Singapore will do for them as role models. Indeed, liberal democracy is
now receding fast even in the places in which it evolved. Earlier this year, as
the finance minister of a freshly elected Greek government, I was told in the
Eurogroup, the governing body of the Eurozone, that my nations democratic
process, our elections, could not be allowed to interfere with established
economic policy. I can think of no more powerful vindication of Lee Kwan Yew,
of the Chinese Communist Party and of cynical friends who keep telling me
that democracy would be banned if it ever threatened to change anything.
Today, now, I wish to present to you the economic case in favour of an
authentic democracy. To argue, against the edicts of Lee Kwan Yew, the
Chinese Communist Party and the Eurogroup, that a genuine, boisterous
democracy is necessary. That without it, our economic future will be bleak,
our societies nasty, and our technological innovations wasted.
1
3 Democracy and human rights must be seen as
successful in China or other countries will become
authoritarian
The Atlantic, 2013 [Can the U.S. Help Advance Human Rights in
China?, June 13,
http://www.theatlantic.com/china/archive/2013/06/can-the-us-
help-advance-human-rights-in-china/276841/]
I think it is important to recognize the urgency of attempting to advance

human rights in the U.S.-China relationship. First and foremost, it is urgent
because such a vast number of persons in China itself are deeply afected.
Second, it is urgent because it is impossible to promote human rights
globally if there is no advance in human rights in China. One of the
reasons that the United States and some of its Western allies
succeeded a quarter of a century ago in promoting human rights in
Soviet bloc countries is that they persuaded many in those countries
that human rights and economic success went hand in hand. In recent
years, however, China's economic success during a period of economic
trouble in the West has conveyed an opposite message. The difficulty of
promoting human rights globally in these circumstances is exacerbated by
the way that China uses its economic clout in its relations with other
countries. Western pressures to promote rights often are defeated by China's
assertiveness in making clear that its trade and aid are not subject to human
rights conditions. This has become an important factor in countering
pressures for human rights in Africa, in Central Asia and in other parts of the
world.
4 Even if thats true, the US needs to support

democracy globally to be a good model
Human Rights First, 2012 [nonprofit, nonpartisan international human rights

organization based in New York and Washington D.C., How to Integrate
Human Rights into U.S.-China Relations, December,
When to press Chinas leadership on human rights, how hard, and with what
tools has been an ever-changing calculation, as successive U.S.
administrations have tried to balance Americas strategic and economic
interests in the expanding U.S.-China relationship with Americas leadership
1
as an advocate for and protector of universal rights and freedoms. Today,
China is not only an Asian power, but an emerging global power with the
capacity to help or hinder U.S. policy on a broad range of issues. As a result,
the imperative for the United States to have a cooperative, productive, stable
relationship with China grows. And as it grows, so does the temptation
for the U.S. government to place human rights further down the
priority list on the agenda. Human Rights First recommends that the
Obama Administration elevate the priority placed on the promotion of human
rights in China, and maximize the potential for progress by developing a
comprehensive, integrated approach built on a strategy that advances
human rights through other issues on the U.S.-China agenda. The record of
progress, still woefully inadequate, demands an aggressive approach that
treats human rights as a mainstream issue rather than as an obstacle to the
relationship.
2AC Solvency
2AC Solvency AT #1Human

Rights Appeals Fail
They say Human Rights appeals fail, but
1. Extend our Two pieces of Lee evidence.

Its much better than their Christenson evidence because:
more facts)
to be true)
their argument)

Our Lee evidence explains the three ways that the plan solves for
human right reform. First, workplace rights are modeled so society
will change as a whole. Second, better labor rights will earn people
more money and they will demand political reform from the
government. Third, China will change its policies to keep the
companies in the country making China money. It worked in South
Africa during apartheid.
This matters because: if we can solve, then we should win. We can
fix the human rights issues in China.
2 China is showing some signs of openness to human

right changes
2AC Solvency
1
Human Rights Watch, 2014 [Independent human rights organization, World Report 2014:
China, https://www.hrw.org/world-report/2014/country-chapters/china-and-tibet]
Despite Chinas continued rise as a global power and its 2013 leadership
transition, including the appointment of a new foreign minister, long-
established foreign policy views and practices remained relatively
unchanged. China has become more engaged with various United Nations
mechanisms but has not significantly improved its compliance with
international human rights standards or pushed for improved human rights
protections in other countries. In a notable exception, shortly after it was
elected to the UN Human Rights Council in November, China publicly urged
Sri Lanka to make eforts to protect and promote human rights. Even in the
face of the rapidly growing death toll in Syria and evidence in August 2013
that the Syrian government used chemical weapons against civilians, Beijing
has continued to object to any significant Security Council measures to
increase pressure on the Assad regime and abusive rebel groups. It has
opposed referral of the situation to the International Criminal Court (ICC) and
an arms embargo against forces that commit widespread human rights or
laws of war violations. China has also slowed down Security Council-driven
eforts to deliver desperately needed humanitarian assistance across the
border to rebel controlled areas in northern Syria. In a minor change of
tactics, if not of longer-term strategy, Chinese authorities have become
modestly more vocal in their public and private criticisms of North Korea,
particularly following actions by Pyongyang that increased tensions between
members of the six-party talks aimed at addressing security concerns posed
by North Koreas nuclear weapons program.
3 Sullivan Principles protect essential human rights

they historically worked during South Africas
apartheid
Lee, 2008 [Daniel, professor of ethics at Augustana College (Illinois) and director of the Augustana
Center for the Study of Ethics, Human Rights and the Ethics of Investment in China, Spring/Summer,
http://www.jstor.org/stable/23562835]
In 1971, the Reverend Leon H. Sullivan, a prominent civil rights leader, was invited to join the board of
directors of General Motors, which at that time was the largest employer of blacks in South Africa. Sullivan
decided to use his position on the board to move General Motors in the direction of placing economic
pressure on the government of South Africa in an efort to end apart heid.53 Six years after joining General
Motors' board of directors, he drafted a set of principles that became an international standard for
companies operating in South Africa. In their original form, the Sullivan Principles called upon U.S.
companies and other foreign companies operating in South Africa to commit to 1. Nonsegregation of the
races in all eating, comfort, and work facilities. 2. Equal and fair employment practices for all employees.
3. Equal pay for all employees doing equal or comparable work for the same period of time. 4. Initiation of
and development of training programs that will prepare, in substantial numbers, blacks and other
nonwhites for supervisory, administrative, clerical, and technical jobs. 5. Increasing the number of blacks
2AC Solvency
1
and other nonwhites in management and supervisory positions. 6. Improving the quality of life for blacks
and other nonwhites outside the work environment in areas such as housing, transportation, school,
recreation, and health facilities.54 In 1984, Sullivan added a seventh principle that called upon businesses
to commit to "working to eliminate laws and customs that impede social, eco nomic, and political
In 1987, discouraged
justice."55 In all cases, Sullivan insisted, progress must be measurable.
with the rate of progress, Sullivan called upon U.S. companies to divest their
businesses in South Africa. In 1990, Nelson Mandela, a leader of the African
National Congress dedicated to ending apartheid, was released after being
imprisoned for twenty-seven years. In 1994, he was elected president of South Africa, and the
apartheid structure was dismantled.56 Though originally drafted to combat apartheid in South Africa, the
Sullivan Principles live on in the form of the Global Sullivan
Principles of Social Responsibility, drafted by Sullivan in 1997 at the request of world
and industry leaders. Intended to provide guidance for multinational corporations in
a global economy, the principles challenge companies to make a strong
commitment to human rights. They state: As a company which endorses the Global Sullivan
Principles we will respect law, and as a responsible member of society, we will apply these Principles with
integrity consistent with the legitimate role of business. We will develop and implement company policies,
procedures, training and internal reporting structures to ensure commitment to these Principles through
We believe the application of these Principles will achieve
our organization.
greater tolerance and better understanding among peoples, and advance the
culture of peace. Accordingly, we will: Express our support for universal
human rights and, particularly, those of our employees, the communities
within which we operate, and parties with whom we do business. Promote
equal opportunity for our employees at all levels of the company with respect
to issues such as color, race, gender, age, ethnicity or religious beliefs, and
operate without unacceptable worker treatment such as the exploitation of
children, physical punishment, female abuse, involuntary servitude, or other
forms of abuse. Respect our employees' voluntary freedom of association.
Compensate our employees to enable them to meet at least their basic needs
and provide the opportunity to improve their skill and capability in order to raise
their social and economic opportunities. Provide a safe and healthy workplace; protect human health and
the environment; and promote sustainable development. Promote fair competition including respect for
intellectual and other property rights, and not ofer, pay or accept bribes. Work with governments and
communities in which we do business to improve the quality of life in those communitiestheir
educational, cultural, economic and social well-beingand seek to provide training and opportunities for
workers from disadvantaged backgrounds; Promote the application of these Principles by those with
whom we do business. We will be transparent in our implementation of these Principles and provide
information which demonstrates publicly our commitment to them.57 More than 150 companies have
endorsed the Global Sullivan Principles. Endorsers with direct investment in China include American
Airlines, T. Baird, Chevron, Coca-Cola, Ford, General Motors, Owens Corning, Pepsi Cola, Pfizer, Procter &
Gamble, and Unocal.58
4. Human rights measures can work in China
Human Rights First, 2012 [nonprofit, nonpartisan international human

rights organization based in New York and Washington D.C., How
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to Integrate Human Rights into U.S.-China Relations, December,
Chens case ofers important lessons for the Obama Administration as it

pursues the human rights agenda with China. First, the imperative to have a
working relationship exists for both sides, suggesting that the U.S.-China
relationship is stronger than the diferences between the two countries imply.
Chinese officials dislike the American focus on human rights issues, and they
come to the relationship with a fair amount of mistrust of American
intentions. But they understand that, just as China is in a position to afect
U.S. interests, the United States is in a position to afect theirs. And both
sides recognize that maintaining a constructive relationship requires
continual engagement across a host of issues, even when disagreement in
one area challenges the relationship. Second, the case demonstrates
that human rights issues can be pursued vigorously and
simultaneously with other issues on the American agenda with
China. They do not have to be sidelined, or compartmentalized, or
minimized. Indeed, the Chen case illustrates the impracticality of
trying to quarantine human rights from the larger relationship.
Human rights cannot be ignored, but the issue does have to be argued with
recognition of Chinese interests as well as those of the United States.
2AC Solvency
2AC Solvency AT #2Human

Rights are Imperialism
They say Human rights are western imperialism , but
1. Extend our Lagon and Diamond evidence.

Its much better than their Callahan evidence because:
facts)
to be true)
their argument)
(Theres no brink) (their evidence supports our argument)

Theres much worse imperialism in the world including military,
physical, and economic which we dont do. Theres no brink to their
impact about how much imperialism causes their impact. Also, we fix
imperialism by changing how governments act globally. We solve
government violence and imperialism of their own people.
This matters because: their turn does not apply and we still get to
weigh our human rights and democracy impacts against their
impacts.
2 Even if theyre a little imperialist, human rights

protections stabilize the country and prevent larger
violence
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The Atlantic, 2013 [Can the U.S. Help Advance Human Rights in China?, June 13,
http://www.theatlantic.com/china/archive/2013/06/can-the-us-help-advance-human-rights-in-
china/276841/]
We should remind our politicians that promoting China's adherence to

universal human rights norms is not just a matter of moral idealism,
but also a matter of sound strategy. First, everyone will feel safer as
businesspeople, scholars, and tourists when China has rule of law, and this
includes not only Americans but other foreigners and Chinese as well.
Second, China's strategic intentions will be more transparent if they are
shaped in an open political process, and this will reduce suspicion of China by
all of China's neighbors and the U.S., which also will be good for China itself.
Third, China will be more stable politically once the regime is grounded in the
consent of the people, and a stable and prosperous China is in the interests of
the rest of the world. Finally, a world with a robust set of international norms
and institutions that regulate fields such as trade, investment, the
environment, arms control, and human rights will be a more predictable and
peaceful world, where conflicts of interest can be sorted out and common
interests advanced in reliable ways. Such a world cannot be built without
the full participation of a rising great power like China.
3 We are morally obligated to protect the Tibetan and

Uyghur people. This racism is the root of all wars
MEMMI, 2000 [Albert; Professor Emeritus of Sociology at Unversity Of Paris,

RACISM, pp.163-165]
The struggle against racism will be long, difficult, without intermission,

without remission, probably never achieved, yet for this very reason, it is a
struggle to be undertaken without surcease and without concessions. One
cannot be indulgent toward racism. One cannot even let the monster in the
house, especially not in a mask. To give it merely a foothold means to
augment the bestial part in us and in other people which is to diminish what
is human. To accept the racist universe to the slightest degree is to endorse
fear, injustice, and violence. It is to accept the persistence of the dark history
in which we still largely live. It is to agree that the outsider will always be a
possible victim (and which man is not himself an outsider relative to someone
else?). Racism illustrates in sum, the inevitable negativity of the condition of
the dominated; that is it illuminates in a certain sense the entire human
condition. The anti-racist struggle, difficult though it is, and always in
question, is nevertheless one of the prologues to the ultimate passage from
animality to humanity. In that sense, we cannot fail to rise to the racist
challenge. However, it remains true that ones moral conduct only emerges
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from a choice: one has to want it. It is a choice among other choices, and
always debatable in its foundations and its consequences. Let us say,
broadly speaking, that the choice to conduct oneself morally is the condition
for the establishment of a human order for which racism is the very negation.
This is almost a redundancy. One cannot found a moral order, let alone a
legislative order, on racism because racism signifies the exclusion of the
other and his or her subjection to violence and domination. From an ethical
point of view, if one can deploy a little religious language, racism is the truly
capital sin.fn22 It is not an accident that almost all of humanitys spiritual
traditions counsel respect for the weak, for orphans, widows, or strangers. It
is not just a question of theoretical counsel respect for the weak, for orphans,
widows or strangers. It is not just a question of theoretical morality and
disinterested commandments. Such unanimity in the safeguarding of the
other suggests the real utility of such sentiments. All things considered, we
have an interest in banishing injustice, because injustice engenders violence
and death. Of course, this is debatable. There are those who think that if
one is strong enough, the assault on and oppression of others is permissible.
But no one is ever sure of remaining the strongest. One day, perhaps, the
roles will be reversed. All unjust society contains within itself the seeds of its
own death. It is probably smarter to treat others with respect so that they
treat you with respect. Recall, says the bible, that you were once a
stranger in Egypt, which means both that you ought to respect the stranger
because you were a stranger yourself and that you risk becoming once again
someday. It is an ethical and a practical appeal indeed, it is a contract,
however implicit it might be. In short, the refusal of racism is the condition
for all theoretical and practical morality. Because, in the end, the ethical
choice commands the political choice. A just society must be a society
accepted by all. If this contractual principle is not accepted, then only
conflict, violence, and destruction will be our lot. If it is accepted, we can
hope someday to live in peace. True, it is a wager, but the stakes are
irresistible.
2AC Solvency
2AC Solvency AT #3Sullivan

Principles Hurt Economy
They say The af just hurts China and the USs economies, but

facts)
to be true)
their argument)

______________________________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________________________
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2 There will be monitoring of the MNCs to guarantee
they follow the lawprotects economic rights too

As noted above, when articulating the original Sullivan Principles pertaining

to South Africa, Sullivan insisted on measurable progress, thus placing strong
emphasis on monitoring compliance. Sullivan recognized that ethical
guidelines for business mean nothing if they are ignored. Some companies do
a conscientious job of internally monitoring compliance. In other cases,
monitoring is far less rigorous. A case can be made for the external
monitoring of compliance. Signatories of the original Sullivan Principles
contracted with Arthur D. Little, Inc., to monitor compliance. Based on
information included in annual reports and periodic onsite visits to
signatories' facilities in South Africa, Little rated signatories as "making good
progress," "making progress," "needs to become more active," or "failing to
make progress."62 Constructing a similar monitoring sys tem for companies
doing business in China merits serious consideration. Groundwork done by
the Global Reporting Initiative (GRI), a worldwide network of experts
committed to sustainable development, might serve as a foundation for the
construction of such a monitoring system. GRI has made available online a
reporting framework that enables multinational corporations to assess and
report their performance with respect to sustainable development. Its website
notes, "GRI's vision is that reporting on economic, environmental, and social
performance by all organizations [will be] as routine and comparable as
financial reporting."63 A final note: Though monitoring of suppliers can be
done, at least to some extent, monitoring of suppliers' suppliers is very
difficult. Even with the best of intentions, monitoring systems tend to break
down at this point. Yet doing what can be done to monitor compliance is
better than ignoring compliance issues altogether. A glass half full is surely
preferable to a glass that is entirely empty.
3 Sullivan Principles historically solved in South Africa

business relationships spillover into society

2AC Solvency
1
Before the dismantling of the apartheid system in South Africa,

there were strong voices for social justice calling for U.S. and other
multinational companies to refrain from investing in South Africa
and, if there, to divest. Those who asserted that multinational companies
had no business being involved in the land of apartheid typically argued that
by being there and paying taxes to the apartheid government, they were
implicity supporting apartheid. We do not hear similar voices calling for
divestment from China. Why not? There are significant diferences between
South Africa during the days of apartheid and China today. In South Africa,
apartheid was the law of the land, supported by various structures of
government. In China today, as noted above, statements affirming human
rights are included in the country's Constitution, as well as in other official
government documents. Though these statements might be window dressing
primarily intended to deflect external criticism, they do provide a framework
for addressing issues of human rights. Does this then mean that it is fine for
U.S. and other multinational companies to invest in China, guided only by
what is good for the bottom line? Was the Nobel laureate Milton Friedman
right when he asserted, "Few trends could so thoroughly undermine the very
foundations of our free society as the acceptance by corporate officials of a
social responsibility other than to make as much money for their stockholders
as possible" (a view that is perhaps reflected in the American Chamber of
Commerce's opposition to the proposed Chinese law that would give labor
unions more power)?48 He was not right if one affirms an ethic of corporate
responsibility that entails more than blind pursuit of profitsand not if one
has a broader vision of what business enterprises should be doing. In a talk
titled "The Great Corporation: Vigorous Competition, Cardinal Virtues, and
Value Creation," Deere & Company chairman and chief executive officer
Robert W. Lane, a deeply conscientious person with strong faith
commitments, suggested that "the ultimate objective of economic
organizations in society should be the overarching good of human
flourishing."49 In a book titled Business through the Eyes of Faith, Richard C.
Chewning, John W. Eby, and Shirley J. Roels, who are contemporary Calvinists,
state: "Business success for Christians is defined in terms of service. It is not
enough to look at the bottom line of the financial statement to determine how
well a firm is doing. We must also look at such factors as how the firm treats
its employees; whether or not it uses natural resources carefully; and
whether or not the products it makes really lead to a better life for those who
use them."50 This broader vision, it should be noted, is by no means limited
to those who view the world from a Christian perspective. Ryuzaburo Kaku,
the former president and chairman of Canon, Inc., believes that kyosei, a
2AC Solvency
1
concept with roots in traditional Japanese culture, provides useful ethical
guidelines for business and made it the central feature of Canon's corporate
philosophy.51 Canon defines kyosei and its corporate philosophy as follows:
The corporate philosophy of Canon is kyosei. A concise definition of this word
would be "Living and working together for the common good," but our
definition is broader: "All people, regardless of race, religion or culture,
harmoniously living and working together into the future." Unfortunately, the
presence of imbalances in our world in such areas as trade, income levels
and the environment hinders the achievement of kyosei. Addressing these
imbalances is an ongoing mission, and Canon is doing its part by actively
pursuing kyosei. True global companies must foster good relations, not only
with their customers and the communities in which they operate, but also
with nations and the environment. They must also bear the responsibility for
the impact of their activities on society. For this reason, Canon's goal is to
contribute to global prosperity and the well-being of humankind, which will
lead to continuing growth and bring the world closer to achieving kyosei.52 In
short, there is a middle path between, on the one hand, refusing to
invest in countries with questionable human rights records, and, on
the other hand, letting the bottom line determine everything. The
middle path is that of constructive engagement.
Harms (US Credibility) Extensions
2AC Harms (US Credibility)

Extensions
1. Engagement over human rights issues with China will
boost the U.S.s reputation on human rights issues
Lum, 2011 Thomas, Specialist in Asian Afairs, July 18 Human Rights in China
and U.S. Policy https://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/RL34729.pdf
The U.S.-China human rights dialogue was established in 1990. It is one of

eight government-to- government dialogues between China and other
countries on human rights. Beijing formally suspended the process in 2004 after the Bush
Administration sponsored an unsuccessful U.N. resolution criticizing Chinas human rights record. The
talks were resumed in May 2008, the first round in six years. The Obama
Administration has participated in two rounds, the fourteenth round held in
May 2010 in Washington and the fifteenth round in May 2011 in Beijing. Both
were co-chaired by U.S. Assistant Secretary of State for Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor Michael
Posner and PRC Ministry of Foreign Afairs, Department of International Organizations Director General
Chen Xu. In the 2010 meetings, topics included Chinese political prisoners, freedom of religion and
expression, labor rights, the rule of law, and conditions in Tibet and Xinjiang. The Chinese delegation also
visited the U.S. Supreme Court and were briefed on ways in which human rights issues are handled in the
United States. During the 2011 talks, Assistant Secretary Posner raised the Obama Administrations deep
Discussions of
concerns about the PRC crackdown on rights defenders and government critics.
Chinas backsliding on human rights reportedly dominated the talks, which
the U.S. side described as tough and Chinese officials portrayed as frank
and thorough. Posner characterized the dialogue process,however, as a
forum for candid discussion, not negotiation . Although no breakthroughs or
concrete outcomes were reported during the latest rounds, Administration
officials have continued to perceive the dialogue as an important means
by which to emphasize and reiterate U.S. positions on human rights
issues. They have suggested that, given the deep disagreements on human rights
and other contentious issues, the holding of the dialogue and the agreement
to continue them represent positive steps. Furthermore, some observers have
contended, the absence of the dialogue would undermine other U.S.
efforts to promote human rights in China.
1
2. In order to have credibility, the U.S. must lead by
example. This means seizing every opportunity to
condemn human rights abuses
American Constitution Society, 2008 American Constitution Society for Law

and Policy, October, Human Rights at Home: A Domestic Blueprint for the
New Administration, http://www.acslaw.org/files/C%20Powell
%20Blueprint.pdf
Reaffirming and implementing the U.S. commitment to human rights

at home is critical for two reasons. First, human rights principles are at the core of
Americas founding values, and Americans (as well as others within our borders or in U.S. custody), no less than others
around the world, are entitled to the full benefit of these basic guarantees. That can hardly be open to debate. The second reason is
perhaps less obvious, but equally compelling. When the United States fails to practice at home
what it preaches to others, it loses credibility and undermines its

ability to play an effective leadership role in the world. Leading
through the power of our example rather than through the example of our
power3 is particularly critical now, at a juncture when the United States
needs to cultivate international cooperation to address pressing issues such as the
current economic downturn that have global dimensions. Perhaps not surprisingly, then, an overwhelming majority of Americans strongly
embrace the notion of human rights: that is, the idea that every person has basic rights regardless of whether or not the government
recognizes those rights.4 This Blueprint therefore suggests ways in which the new Administration can take concrete steps to ensure that
human rights principles are considered and implemented within the process of U.S. domestic policymaking. It
does not address in any detail the substance of particular policies in areas such as equality, health care, or the prohibition on torture;5 rather ,
it identifies and evaluates mechanisms by which human rights principles can
be integrated into policymaking in all areas of U.S. domestic policy where they are
relevant. BACKGROUND The United States was founded on the human rights principle expressed in the American Declaration of Independence:
that we all have certain basic, unalienable rights simply by virtue of our humanity. Declaring rights to be inherent, not based on the generosity
of the state, was transformative. Two hundred years later, the United States can point to a tradition of promoting human rights in principle, if
not always in practice. The United States was a leader in ending the atrocities of World War II and in developing international institutions and
instruments aimed at securing peace in the world and human rights for all people. The Universal Declaration of Human Rights, which
celebrates its sixtieth anniversary this year, was inspired in part by Franklin D. Roosevelts Four Freedoms speech and drafted in part by
Eleanor Roosevelt, the first President of the U.N. Human Rights Commission. Just as the New Deal redefined the concept of security at home
to include economic security for all Americans, so too these post-war international regimes redefined the notion of security internationally to
include human security.6 Indeed, for Americans, recognition that the gross human rights violations of the Holocaust were intertwined with Nazi
A robust human rights

aggression underscored the inextricable link between our principles and our national interests.
policy supports the rule of law, democratic institutions, accountability

mechanisms for serious abuses, a humane global economy, and U.S. global
leadership in reducing violence, instability, and refugee flows .7 Oftentimes, in fact,
principled policy directly serves U.S. national interests because it allows us to demand reciprocal treatment of our citizens abroad, as in the
case of humane treatment of detainees captured in war. Beyond the concern for reciprocity, the strong bipartisan commitment to human
rights that has developed over the last several decades emerges from an understanding that ensuring the enjoyment of human rights at home
there remains a
and around the world serves not only Americas deeply held values but also its national interests. Even so,
gap between the human rights ideals that the United States professes and
its actual domestic practice, resulting in both a gap in credibility and
a weakening of U.S. moral authority to lead by example . Human rights include the
right to be free from torture or cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment, and yet the United States has committed
such acts in the name of counterterrorism eforts . Human rights include the rights to emergency
shelter, food, and water, as well as security of person, and yet the United States failed to adequately guarantee these rights in the aftermath
of Hurricane Katrina. Human rights include the right to equality of opportunity, and yet inequalities persist in access to housing, education,
1
Human rights include the right to equality in the application of
jobs, and health care.
law enforcement measures, and yet there are gross racial disparities in the application of the death penalty,
and racial and ethnic profiling has been used unfairly to target African
Americans, Latinos, and those who appear Arab, Muslim, South Asian, or
immigrant (whether through traffic stops, airport screening, or immigration raids ).
Human rights include the right to equal pay and gender equality, and yet a pay gap persists between female and male workers. Certainly,
the journey to fully realizing human rights is a work-in-progress, but to make

progress, we must work through smart, principled policies that advance the
ability of the United States to live up to its own highest ideals.
3. The U.S. needs to be vocal and steadfast on human

rights issues with China in order to have global
credibility
The Atlantic, 2013 June 13, Can the U.S. Help Advance Human Rights in
China? http://www.theatlantic.com/china/archive/2013/06/can-the-us-help-
advance-human-rights-in-china/276841/
Second, the U.S. government needs to be consistent in the way it raises

its concerns on human rights, and not be shy to use vocal diplomacy when
private diplomacy yields no result. Too often, the U.S. is sending conflicting messages, one
day stressing its attachment to universal human rights norms, and the next
stating that the U.S. and China "agree to disagree" on a range of issues,
including human rights. This undermines the universality of human
rights. Third, the U.S. must mainstream human rights perspectives across
the full spectrum of its engagement with China. The compartmentalization of
human rights as a minor rubric of diplomacy is bound to fail, because the
Chinese side knows human rights have no bearings on other aspects of the
bilateral relationship. The business environment for U.S. companies
operating in China is directly linked to issues intimately connected
to human rights, such as the elastic character of China's state secrecy laws or the introduction of
provisions in the criminal law that allows for secret detention by the police. Fourth, the U.S. must
forge partnerships and coordinate more efectively with other rights-
respecting countries in their efort to press China on specific issues and
cases. There has been very little said by any head of state about the fact that China is the only country
in the world that holds a Nobel Peace Laureate in prison (while his wife is imprisoned at her home outside
of any legal procedure.) Finally, the U.S. must be ready to take steps when the situation demands it. For
instance, given China's absolute refusal to engage on any issue related to the situation in Tibetan areas,
the U.S. must be ready to upgrade its contacts with the Dalai Lama, and encourage other countries to do
so. The Democracy ReportThe
United States does more to raise human rights issues
with China than any other country, but it often conveys the implicit message
that it does so out of moral convictions, not out of well-understood national
1
interest and concern for human rights globally, and that greatly diminishes
the efectiveness of such statements.
2AC Answers to China Relations Disad
2AC Answers to: China Relations

DA
1. The negative misunderstands the nature of our
relations with China. Yes, human rights issues are
contentious, but failure to acknowledge these
differences will strain relations further
Council on Foreign Relations, September 2016 September 22,

How to Improve U.S.-China Relations http://www.cfr.org/china/improve-us-
china-relations/p37044
But if this is the model, then the United States and China are heading in
divergent historical directions. A host of new friction points now center around the abridgement
of individual rights in China: arrests of human rights lawyers, growing restrictions on civil society activities,
new controls on academic freedom, a more heavily censored media, more limited public dialogue, visas
denied to foreign press, and domestic journalists and foreign correspondents sufering more burdensome
These trends grow out of diferences in our systems of
forms of harassment.
governance and values.Whether we should confront these diferences head
on or seek some artful way to set them aside so the two countries can get on
with other serious issues of common interest is a question we have hardly
dared even think about. The elephant is still in the room, and the fact
that no one knows quite how to address it lays at the root of our
human rights disagreements. These diferences often gain such an
antagonistic dimension that they not only inhibit our ability to make progress
on the rights front, but also undermine the rest of the U.S.-China relationship.
2. Engagement over human rights issues will not strain

relations with Beijing
Moon and Park, 2014 Richard Park, research assistant, Brookings Institute,
Katherine H.S., H.S. Moon is the inaugural holder of the SK-Korea Foundation
Chair in Korea Studies and senior fellow at the Brookings Center for East Asia
Policy Studies, http://www.brookings.edu/blogs/up-front/posts/2014/11/14-
human-rights-diplomacy-park-moon
Bilateral relations were normalized in 1979, and in spite of documented

human rights violations, Washington developed a constructive and mutually
beneficial relationship with Beijing. In 1992, President George H.W. Bush boldly vetoed
Congressional eforts to link the renewal of Most Favored Nation (MFN) status in trade with improvement in
2AC Answers to China Relations Disad
1
Chinas human rights situation and nuclear cooperation with Iran. President Bill Clinton pushed to grant
permanent MFN status to China, breaking from his campaign promise to link the privileged trade status to
Chinas human rights record. Finally, in December 2001, President George W. Bush and the U.S. Congress
ended the annual review of Chinas MFN privilege by granting it permanent MFN status. This same China,
which is expected to veto any resolution referring North Korea to the ICC, is now the number two trading
partner of the United States (after Canada) and working to cooperate with the U.S. on multiple fronts such
as climate change, anti-terror measures, containing Iran, tightening the belt on North Korea, and fighting
China is openly criticized by the U.S. on its human
disease in Africa. Like North Korea,
rights record. Yet, these accusations do not seem to hinder both
countries from working together on common goals and improving
bilateral relations. The November 17 conference at Brookings will feature experts on China,
Taiwan, and Japan (Richard C. Bush III, Alexis Dudden, Steven Goldstein, Jonathan Pollack) who study this
complex dynamic between cooperation and tension between the U.S. and China.
2AC Answers to EU Counterplan
2AC Answers to: EU Counterplan

1. Only the perm solves The US and EU being on the
same page about human rights gives added
credibility that neither the Counterplan alone lacks
because of current trade disputes between China and
Europe
Guangcheng and McMillan-Scott, 2013 Chen; Civil rights activists, Edward;

Liberal Democrat MEP for Yorkshire & Humber and vice-president of the
European Parliament for Democracy & Human Rights, and Transatlantic
Relations, "China: The West Needs to Promote Both Trade and Human Rights
", Huffington Post, http://www.huffingtonpost.com/chen-guangcheng/china-
trade-human-rights_b_3443081.html, June 14, 2013
The historic meeting between Chinese President Xi Jinping and President

Obama last week, billed as a chance to improve relations between the two
superpowers, revolved largely around sensitive economic issues such as
industrial cyber-espionage. Meanwhile, the news that the European Union has
just lodged a complaint at the World Trade Organization against China is just
the latest development in a rapidly escalating trade dispute. This growing
preoccupation with trade threatens to sideline the wider issue of how best to
promote human rights and democratic reform in China, a country whose
political future is set to determine the course of the 21st century. The Chinese
leadership tends to stress its economic achievements in order to justify the
continued oppression of its people, pointing to the millions who have been
lifted out of poverty through three decades of rapid economic growth. But
while it is important to recognize this progress, it in no way excuses the
ongoing imprisonment and torture of political dissidents or the complete
suppression of freedom of speech. It is completely disingenuous to suggest
that China must choose between economic prosperity and political freedom.
It can and must have both. A handful of high-profile dissidents, including one
of the authors of this piece, have come to embody the voice of Chinese
protest in the West. But we are merely the tip of the iceberg. The brutal
imposition of the one-child policy, endemic corruption and relentless political
repression are all causing widespread anger with the Chinese authorities,
from the victims of illegal land grabs to the growing numbers in the educated
middle class who find themselves locked out of a decent career through lack
of political connections. Whether it is through traditional rural demonstrations
or new, modern forms of online protest, the Chinese people are increasingly
expressing their frustration with the ruling Communist Party. Their voices
cannot be ignored forever. As economic growth begins to slow and China
1
faces up to its momentous social, environmental and demographic problems,
calls for political reform will become impossible to ignore. For the West, the
question arises of how best to aid this process of reform. Some, both in
Europe and the U.S., are demanding a much tougher approach towards
China, including the imposition of punitive sanctions and high import tarifs.
But this is undeniably motivated more by a desire to protect vested domestic
economic interests, rather than as a way to put political pressure on the
Chinese government. Crucially, such an approach risks fueling the perception
that the voicing of human rights concerns is only used as a means of criticism
in order to justify protectionist measures against China. This would play into
the hands of the Chinese Communist Party, which is keen to portray any
Western interference as an attempt to contain Chinas growing global
economic power. Moreover, putting up greater trade barriers would punish
ordinary Chinese citizens and threaten the process of economic engagement
that is bringing them into closer contact with the outside world. Finally,
indiscriminate China-bashing risks unwittingly bolstering support for the
current regime - by stoking the flames of nationalism and provoking
resentment towards the West. Instead, a targeted approach is needed which
clearly distinguishes between the Chinese people and their government. Last
months decision by the US government to impose sanctions on 18 individual
Russians accused of human rights violations is a good example. Another case
in point is Germany, which has seen an explosive growth in trade with China
over the last decade but has also taken a robust approach to human rights.
Angela Merkel has led the way in trying to defuse the recent trade row
between the EU and China. But since coming to power she has also been
vocal in criticizing Chinas human rights record. This shows that the
promotion of trade and human rights need not be mutually exclusive. Close
engagement with China over economic issues should be combined with a
strong and consistent line on human rights. Last month, we launched a
transatlantic pact between the EU and US to highlight individual human rights
abuses in China and around the world. We believe that a strong and
coordinated approach will prevent China from playing a divide and rule
strategy, and that the combined economic and political clout of the EU and
U.S. will draw more attention to the plight of political prisoners and help to
secure their release. Furthermore, such an approach should amplify the
voices of Chinese political activists and civil society groups and embolden
their calls for bottom-up political reform. However, such eforts will be
undermined if the U.S. and EU member states are perceived to criticize the
Chinese government solely for their own self-interested economic reasons.
Western governments must also guard against hypocrisy by addressing their
own human rights problems. The recent revelations over U.S. online
surveillance, as well as longstanding issues such as Guantanamo Bay and
drone strikes, all give ammunition to the Chinese regime, which now
publishes its own highly critical annual human rights reports on the United
States. The failure of Western countries to condemn the human rights abuses
1
of close allies such as Saudi Arabia and Bahrain also gives rise to accusations
of double standards. Such hypocrisy must be addressed if the West is to be
truly credible in its eforts to promote human rights abroad. Ultimately, the
Chinese government will not be able to resist the growing internal pressure
for political reform. Throughout history, there has been no authoritarian
regime which has not eventually crumbled before the inherent human desire
for justice and freedom. But by showing solidarity with political dissidents
while promoting Chinas ongoing integration into the global economy, the
U.S. and Europe can strengthen progressive social and political forces and
encourage a stable, democratic transition. Combining economic
engagement with consistent political pressure over human rights is
the best way to promote Chinas emergence as a peaceful global power,
and ensure that the Chinese people are given the government they deserve.
CDL Core Files 2016-2017 Human Rights Neg
Human Rights NEGATIVE

1NC Harms (Human Rights)
1NC Human Rights Frontline

1. China is making incredible progress on human rights
Contorno, 2014 [Steve, Writer for Politifact, University of Illinois with a

bachelor's degree in news-editorial journalism and a minor in political
science, and holds a master's degree in public afairs reporting from the
University of Illinois-Springfield, Does the world agree that China has made
'enormous progress' on human rights? November 17,
http://www.politifact.com/truth-o-meter/statements/2014/nov/17/xi-
jinping/chinese-president-world-agrees-china-had-made-enor/]
There is some good news. Experts and human rights advocates we spoke with
say that improving economic conditions have indeed produced better living
conditions for many Chinese citizens. As it is, when Chinese leaders claim
progress in human rights, they are mostly referring to "human welfare," said
Patrick Keenan, an expert in human rights and international law at the
University of Illinois. "They're thinking about China's incredible economic
growth and the ways that that economic growth has improved the lives of
poor people in China," Keenan said. "China's growth hasn't helped everyone,
of course, but it is true that poor people, on average, are better of than they
were a generation ago." The reform era of the 1970s that opened Chinas
doors to a degree to the rest of the world resulted in a vast economic
expansion, especially in the urban centers. Some social freedoms followed,
such as the ability to move or take diferent jobs. However, such gains only
accrued to certain sectors of the population. For example, according to
Human Rights Watch, millions of farmers and herders who are Tibetan an
ethnic minority in China have been subjected to a mass rehousing-and-
relocation policy that forced them into socialist villages. And more generally,
outside Chinas rapidly growing cities, the economic gains have been less
significant. There are two other notable areas of progress, each with limits.
First, China has signed several international conventions and treaties
pertaining to human rights. While there are clear examples of these
agreements being ignored, the simple fact that China has agreed to them "is
important because it creates an opportunity to make claims against the
state," said Richardson of Human Rights Watch. All told, China has signed 10
of the 16 United Nations agreements pertaining to human rights. However, in
most cases, China has attached a stated "reservation" that says they wont
abide by parts of the agreement that interfere with state laws. For example,
while China agreed to an anti-torture convention, it added that it would not
recognize a clause that allows the United Nations to investigate suspected
torture, thus eliminating the enforcement mechanism. Second, Human Rights
1NC Harms (Human Rights)
1
Watch notes some growth in civil society within China, such as new legal-aid
services to victims of domestic violence, disabled children and other at-risk
groups. These services often do not enjoy recognition from the state, though,
and their leaders face imprisonment. Still, they represent seeds of change.
"That degree of organization, participation and serving as a counter to the
state is incredibly important," Richardson said.
2. No moral obligationhuman rights violations happen

daily. Their own evidence says that thousands die
from preventable diseases. We arent responsible for
everything wrong in the world. We should try to stop
the largest, most pressing impact instead.
3. Existence before human rights. We need to be alive
to protect human rights
Ochs, 2002 (Richard- MA in Natural Resource Management from Rutgers

University and Naturalist at Grand Teton National Park, BIOLOGICAL
WEAPONS MUST BE ABOLISHED IMMEDIATELY, Jun 9,
http://www.freefromterror.net/other_...s/abolish.html)
Against this tendency can be posed a rational alternative policy. To preclude

possibilities of human extinction, "patriotism" needs to be redefined to make
humanitys survival primary and absolute. Even if we lose our cherished
freedom, our sovereignty, our government or our Constitution,
where there is life, there is hope. What good is anything else if humanity
is extinguished? This concept should be promoted to the center of national
debate. For example, for sake of argument, suppose the ancient Israelites
developed defensive bioweapons of mass destruction when they were
enslaved by Egypt. Then suppose these weapons were released by design or
accident and wiped everybody out? As bad as slavery is, extinction is
worse. Our generation, our century, our epoch needs to take the long view.
We truly hold in our hands the precious gift of all future life. Empires may
come and go, but who are the honored custodians of life on earth? Temporal
politicians? Corporate competitors? Strategic brinksmen? Military gamers?
Inflated egos dripping with testosterone? How can any sane person believe
that national sovereignty is more important than survival of the species? Now
that extinction is possible, our slogan should be "Where there is life, there is
hope." No government, no economic system, no national pride, no religion,
no political system can be placed above human survival. The egos of leaders
must not blind us. The adrenaline and vengeance of a fight must not blind us.
The game is over. If patriotism would extinguish humanity, then patriotism is
the highest of all crimes.
2NC/1NR Harms (Human Rights)
2NC/1NR Human Rights #1China

Improving
They say China is awful on human rights, but
1. Extend our Contorno evidence.

Its much better than their Williams evidence because:
facts)
to be true)
their argument)
(its predictive/talks about the future) (their evidence supports our
argument)

While China still has a ways to go when it comes to human rights,
they are making incredible strides. They will continue to open up
and expand human rights agreements in the future.
This matters because: it seriously reduces their harms argument.
China will protect human rights in the future and their impact is not
nearly as bad.
1
2 China will protect human rights in the future
Western judgement is hypocritical
Ruike, 2015 [Xu, a PhD at the School of Politics and IR, University of
Nottingham, Talking about Chinas human rights, October 28,
http://blogs.nottingham.ac.uk/chinapolicyinstitute/2015/10/28/tal
king-about-chinas-human-rights/]
It is a clich to claim improvement of Chinas human rights by referring to

how many people have been lifted out of poverty. Economic progress does
not necessarily improve the human rights situation. However, it is an
indispensable precondition for improving human rights. Without satisfying
basic needs, it is impossible for people to have a strong motivation
to defend their human rights and to make efforts to improve the
rights of others. In this regard, the Chinese governments long-standing
commitment to developing Chinas economy has played an important part in
creating favourable conditions for improving the human rights of the Chinese
people. With the rapidly growing economy, Chinese society has become more
dynamic and more tolerant. Chinese people, especially the younger
generations, are increasingly vocal about defending their rights and also
more enthusiastic in ofering support to the disadvantaged groups in society.
With the younger generations gaining more influence in society, China will
most certainly improve its human rights in the future. It is
disappointing to see most of British journalists and commentators fail to
make a balanced judgement on Chinas human rights. They are inclined to
criticise the Chinese governments wrongdoings without realizing how much
the Chinese government has done to help improve human rights in China.
From their perspective, a communist government like like that in China
cannot improve human rights because only democracies purportedly cherish
human rights. Therefore, they habitually exaggerate any scandals of
human right violations in China and invariably criticise the Chinese
government for such wrongdoings. Whether they realize it or not, their
pride in their countrys superiority in advocating and protecting human rights
leads to prejudice regarding Chinas human rights situation. Improvement of
human rights in any country is a long-term process. It takes time, patience
and hard-work. No country has a perfect record of human rights. Britain today
has a high standard in protecting human rights. However, the British
government was recently accused of violating disabled peoples human rights
because of its welfare reforms. British people are proud of their traditions of
protecting human rights because of the Magna Carta heritage. But in the
past, it was a human rights violator in the eyes of many countries.
2NC/1NR Human Rights #2No

Obligation
They say We have a moral obligation, but
1. Extend our Analytic evidence.

Its much better than their Gibney evidence because:
facts)
their argument)

Their own evidence says that thousands die every day from
preventable diseases. This means that we shouldnt do the aff, but
instead stop those diseases. Their argument is illogical and would
mean we would bounce around trying to fix every problem.

This matters because: were not obligated to do the Aff. That means
their impact is actually very small.
1
2 The Democratic Republic of Congo is a much worse
human rights problemtheres no brink
Council on Foreign Relations, June 2016 [Peer reviewed

journal, Violence in the Democratic Republic of Congo, June 10,
http://www.cfr.org/global/global-conflict-
tracker/p32137#!/conflict/violence-in-the-democratic-republic-of-
congo]
At least seventy armed groups are believed to be currently operating in the

eastern region of the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC). Despite the
stabilizing presence of nineteen thousand UN peacekeepers, the stronger
militant groups in the region, like the Democratic Forces for the Liberation of
Rwanda (FDLR) and the Ugandan Allied Democratic Forces (ADF), continue to
terrorize communities and control weakly governed areas of the country,
financing their activities by exploiting the countrys rich natural resources.
Millions of civilians have been forced to flee the fighting: the United Nations
estimates that currently there are at least 2.7 million internally displaced
persons in the DRC, and approximately 450,000 DRC refugees in other
nations. In addition to the violence caused by armed groups, President Joseph
Kabila has caused further political instability by indicating a possible desire to
delay the upcoming 2016 election and to stay in power after his term ends. In
December 2015, Kabila called for political dialogue with opposition parties,
but the police have violently cracked down on internal dissent. This includes
the November 2015 use of tear gas against student protesters and the
breakup of a January 2015 protest, in which police fired shots and killed over
forty people. Moise Katumbi, a popular opposition leader who was governor of
the mineral-rich Katanga province, declared his candidacy for the presidential
election in early May 2015. Since his announcement, mass protests and
clashes between the police and civilians have become increasingly tense and
common.
2NC/1NR Human Rights #3--

Extinction/War First Extensions
They say __________________________________________________, but

facts)
to be true)
their argument)

______________________________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________________________
1
2 We massively outweigh on magnitudeExtinction
includes the 500 trillion people who are yet to be
born
Matheny, 2007 [Jason G., Department of Health Policy and Management,

Bloomberg School of Public Health, Johns Hopkins University, Reducing the
Risk of Human Extinction, Risk Analysis Vol. 27 Issue 5 Pgs. 1335-1344]
Discussing the risks of "nuclear winter," Carl Sagan (1983) wrote: Some have
argued that the diference between the deaths of several hundred million
people in a nuclear war (as has been thought until recently to be a
reasonable upper limit) and the death of every person on Earth (as now
seems possible) is only a matter of one order of magnitude. For me, the
diference is considerably greater. Restricting our attention only to those who
die as a consequence of the war conceals its full impact. If we are required to
calibrate extinction in numerical terms, I would be sure to include the number
of people in future generations who would not be born. A nuclear war
imperils all of our descendants, for as long as there will be humans.
Even if the population remains static, with an average lifetime of the order of
100 years, over a typical time period for the biological evolution of a
successful species (roughly ten million years), we are talking about some
500 trillion people yet to come. By this criterion, the stakes are one
million times greater for extinction than for the more modest nuclear wars
that kill "only" hundreds of millions of people. There are many other possible
measures of the potential lossincluding culture and science, the
evolutionary history of the planet, and the significance of the lives of all of
our ancestors who contributed to the future of their descendants. Extinction
is the undoing of the human enterprise.
1NC Harms (Democracy) Frontline
1NC Democracy Frontline

1. Democracy is violated in the US too so theres no
brink
The Guardian, March 2016 [Democracy is a joke, says China

just look at Donald Trump, March 17,
http://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2016/mar/17/democracy-is-
a-joke-says-china-just-look-at-donald-trump]
When there is upheaval within Chinas own borders riots, protests, vicious
political power struggles hardly a snif of it will be found in the pages of the
countrys heavily-controlled press. When it happens elsewhere and
particularly when it underscores the perils and pitfalls of democracy it
becomes front-page news. Such is the case of Republican presidential
frontrunner Donald Trump, who, for Chinas authoritarian rulers, has become
the latest example of how allowing the masses a say in choosing their leaders
is a bad idea. The rise of a racist in the US political area worries the whole
world, the party-controlled Global Times crowed this week ahead of of
Trumps victory in the latest round of primaries. He has even been called
another Benito Mussolini or Adolf Hitler by some western media. It added,
darkly: Mussolini and Hitler came to power through elections, a heavy lesson
for western democracy. Trump, or Chuanpu as they call him in China, has
been a gift to Communist party spin doctors paid to convince the countrys
1.4 billion citizens that rule of the people is a sure path to chaos and
destruction. They are relishing this moment, says Zhou Fengsuo, a US-
based democracy activist who fled his native China following the deadly 1989
Tiananmen crackdown. They are very happy. They are laughing over this. To
them [Trump] is a good character to show the deficiencies of the democratic
system, that such a person could become president. It is just unbelievable.
Beijing is definitely gloating over this.
1
2. Chinese democracy is coming nowthis evidence is
from their impact author
Diamond, 2012 [Larry, Senior fellow at Hoover Institute Why East

AsiaIncluding ChinaWill Turn Democratic Within a
Generation, March 24,
http://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2012/01/why-
east-asia-including-china-will-turn-democratic-within-a-
generation/251824/]
If there is going to be a big new lift to global democratic prospects

in this decade, the region from which it will emanate is most likely to
be East Asia. With the eruption of mass movements for democratic change
throughout the Arab world in 2011, hopeful analysts of global democratic
prospects have focused attention on the Middle East. Three Arab autocracies
(Tunisia, Egypt, and Libya) have fallen in the past year. At least two more
(Yemen and Syria) also seem destined for demise soon, and pressures for real
democratic change figure to mount in Morocco, Jordan, the Palestinian
Authority, and perhaps Kuwait, and to persist in Bahrain. Yet among these
and other countries in the Middle East (including Iraq and Iran), only Tunisia
has a good chance of becoming a democracy in the relatively near future.
Aspirations for more democratic and accountable government run deep
throughout the Middle East, and for years to come the region will be a lively
and contested terrain of possibilities for regime evolution. But if a new
regional wave of transitions to democracy unfolds in the next five to ten
years, it is more likely to come from East Asia--a region that has been
strangely neglected in recent thinking about the near-term prospects for
expansion of democracy. And East Asia is also better positioned to increase
the number of liberal and sustainable democracies. China will face a new
opportunity for democratic transition in the next two decades and possibly
much sooner Unlike the Arab world, East Asia already has a critical mass of
democracies. Forty percent of East Asian states (seven of the
seventeen) are democracies, a proportion slightly higher than in South
Asia or sub-Saharan Africa, though dramatically lower than in Latin America
or Central and Eastern Europe, where most states are democracies. As a
result of the third wave of global democratization, East Asia has gone from
being the cradle and locus of "developmental authoritarianism," with Japan as
its lone democracy--and a longstanding one-party-dominant system at that--
to at least a mixed and progressing set of systems. Today, Japan, South
Korea, and Taiwan are all consolidated liberal democracies. East Timor,
1
Indonesia, Mongolia, and the Philippines are at least electoral democracies
with some resilience.
3. Countries model US democracy, not Chinas
CSIS, 2013 [Center for Strategic and International Studies released a

bipartisan statement of principles signed by members of a high-level working
group to emphasize the role of the United States in supporting democratic
reforms and inclusive societies abroad as a central pillar of our national
security strategy., Democracy, Democratic Governance, and Transparent
Institutions in the American Interest, January 18,
https://www.americanprogress.org/issues/progressive-
movement/report/2013/01/18/50085/democracy-democratic-governance-and-
transparent-institutions-in-the-american-interest
Of particular importance are sustained investments to support political

pluralism in the Arab World. Free elections are going to have a variety of
outcomes, and whatever those outcomes are, governments need to support
human rights and respect international agreements. If individual and
collective rights are to be protected, international norms and agreements to
be respected and held accountable, and pluralist institutions to be created,
the international community must remain engaged and invest in the
individuals and institutions that will form the backbone of emerging
democratic societies. Helping parliamentarians become more responsive to
citizen concerns, professionalizing civil society, building modern, moderate
political parties, supporting independent media and think tanks, and
improving the institutions that create the rules of the game for trade and
investment are all critically important undertakings. Protection of ethnic and
religious minorities is also important to U.S. policy, as support for tolerance
and diversity will help ensure that the tenets of democracy are not broken by
those seeking to impose their beliefs on others. The United States is
blessed with an ecosystem of partners in democracy assistance,
starting with the National Endowment for Democracy and the so-called NED
family of core institutions: the Solidarity Center; the Center for International
Private Enterprise, or CIPE; the International Republican Institute, or IRI; and
the National Democratic Institute, or NDI. Additionally, there is a broad
network of specialty, nonprofit groups focused on electoral systems,
independent media, and rule of law, all of which bring unique expertise to
improving governance. Along with the NED and its core institutes, these
organizations have established extensive global relationships that can
contribute to their democratic development eforts. This ecosystem is a
strategic partner for the United States. The United States should also work
closely with religious organizations, as they often have a history of seeking
1
greater human liberty and have reach and credibility that the United States
alone often does not have. In addition, the United States has many
friends and allies who will be able to draw upon their own
experience of building democratic governance institutions and serve
as effective partners. A large number of Eastern European countries,
including Poland, Slovakia, and the Czech Republic, and other countries such
as Spain, South Africa, Turkey, and Indonesia all have unique assets to bring
to expanding human freedom and, in partnership with American groups, are
already sharing their experiences and knowledge with others. Therefore, we,
the undersigned, believe that: The United States should view democracy and
governance as a central pillar of national security. The United States should
sustain our official investments in democracy and governance funding even
as we deal with very real budget challenges. In contributing to democracy
and governance, the United States should increase its focus on opportunities
for synergistic partnerships with nongovernmental organizations. The United
States should continue to work closely with our friends and allies, many of
which have become democracies in living memory, and leverage their unique
assets and experiences. The United States investments in democracy and
governance should reflect a strong understanding of democracy as a process,
not an event, and support good governance of newly democratic societies.
The United States should seek to promote inclusive societies that protect the
rights of minoritiesreligious, ethnic, and otherwise. The United States
should continue to support democratic reformers in autocratic regimes in
Latin America, Eastern Europe, the broader Middle East, Africa, and Asia. The
United States should maintain an adequate level of investment to support
developing countries in efectively managing the upcoming natural resource
boom.
2NC/1NR Harms (Democracy)
2NC/1NR Democracy #1No Brink

They say We need to protect democracy, but
1. Extend our Guardian evidence.

Its much better than their Williams evidence because:
facts)
to be true)
their argument)
(More realistic) (their evidence supports our argument)

Democracy is violated daily across the globe. The US is especially
bad for democracy with the rise of Trump fascism. While it would be
great to protect it all the time, thats unrealistic and impossible.
This matters because: democracy loss globally makes their Diamond
impact happen. They cant fix it even if the plan brought democracy
to China.
2 The US prison system violates democracy and human

rights
The Atlantic, 2013 [Academic magazine, How Prisons Change the Balance of Power in America,
October 7, http://www.theatlantic.com/national/archive/2013/10/how-prisons-change-the-balance-of-power-
in-america/280341
1
What has it really cost the United States to build the worlds most massive
prison system? To answer this question, some point to the nearly two million
people who are now locked up in an American prisonoverwhelmingly this
nations poorest, most mentally ill, and least-educated citizensand ponder
the moral costs. Others have pointed to the enormous expense of having
more than seven million Americans under some form of correctional
supervision and argued that the system is not economically sustainable. Still
others highlight the high price that our nations already most-fragile
communities, in particular, have paid for the rise of such an enormous
carceral state. A few have also asked Americans to consider what it means
for the future of our society that our system of punishment is so deeply
racialized. With so many powerful arguments being made against our current
criminal justice system, why then does it persist? Why havent the American
people, particularly those who are most negatively afected by this most
unsettling and unsavory state of afairs, undone the policies that have led us
here? The answer, in part, stems from the fact that locking up unprecedented
numbers of citizens over the last forty years has itself made the prison
system highly resistant to reform through the democratic process. To an
extent that few Americans have yet appreciated, record rates of incarceration
have, in fact, undermined our American democracy, both by impacting who
gets to vote and how votes are counted.
2NC/1NR Democracy #2
Democracy Improving
They say __________________________________________________, but

facts)
to be true)
their argument)

______________________________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________________________
1
2 China has multiple ways it will transition to a more
democratic country
Pei, 2013 [Minxin, professor of government at Claremont McKenna

College, 5 Ways China Could Become a Democracy, February
13, http://thediplomat.com/2013/02/5-ways-china-could-become-
a-democracy/?allpages=yes]
First, there is the logic of authoritarian decay. One-party regimes, however

sophisticated, sufer from organizational ageing and decay. Leaders get
progressively weaker (in terms of capabilities and ideological commitment);
such regimes tend to attract careerists and opportunists who view their role
in the regime from the perspective of an investor: they want to maximize
their returns from their contribution to the regimes maintenance and
survival. The result is escalating corruption, deteriorating governance, and
growing alienation of the masses. Empirically, the organizational decay of
one-party regime can be measured by the limited longevity of such regimes.
To date, the record longevity of a one-party regime is 74 years (held by the
former Communist Party of the Soviet Union). One-party regimes in Mexico
and Taiwan remained in power for 71 and 73 years respectively (although in
the case of Taiwan, the accounting is complicated by the Kuomintangs
military defeat on the mainland). Moreover, all of the three longest-ruling
one-party regimes began to experience system-threatening crisis roughly a
decade before they exited political power. If the same historical experience
should be repeated in China, where the Communist Party has ruled for 63
years, we may reasonably speculate that the probability of a regime
transition is both real and high in the coming 10-15 years, when the
CCP will reach the upper-limit of the longevity of one-party regimes. Second,
the efects of socioeconomic change rising literacy, income, and
urbanization rates, along with the improvement of communications
technologies greatly reduce the costs of collective action, de-legitimize
autocratic rule, and foster demands for greater democracy. As a result,
authoritarian regimes, which have a relatively easy time ruling poor and
agrarian societies, find it increasingly difficult and ultimately impossible to
maintain their rule once socioeconomic development reaches a certain level.
Statistical analysis shows that authoritarian regimes become progressively
more unstable (and democratic transitions more likely) once income rises
above $1,000 (PPP) per capita. When per capita income goes above $4,000
(PPP), the likelihood of democratic transitions increases more dramatically.
Few authoritarian regimes, unless they rule in oil-producing countries, can
survive once per capita income hits more than $6,000 (PPP). If we apply this
observation and take into account the probable efect of inflation (although
1
the above PPP figures were calculated in constant terms), we will find that
China is well into this zone of democratic transition because its per capita
income is around $9,100 (PPP) today, comparable to the income level of
South Korea and Taiwan in the mid-1980s on the eve of their democratic
transitions. In another 10-15 years, its per capita income could exceed
$15,000 and its urbanization rate will have risen to 60-65 percent. If the CCP
has such a tough time today (in terms of deploying its manpower and
financial resources) to maintain its rule, just imagine how impossible the task
will become in 10-15 years time. If this analysis is convincing enough for us
to entertain the strong possibility of a democratic transition in China in the
coming 10-15 years, the more interesting follow-up question is definitely
how will such a transition happen? Again, based on the rich experience of
democratic transitions since the 1970s, there are five ways China could
become democratic: Happy ending would be the most preferable mode of
democratic transition for China. Typically, a peaceful exit from power
managed by the ruling elites of the old regime goes through several stages. It
starts with the emergence of a legitimacy crisis, which may be caused by
many factors (such as poor economic performance, military defeat, rising
popular resistance, unbearable costs of repression, and endemic corruption).
Recognition of such a crisis convinces some leaders of the regime that the
days of authoritarian rule are numbered and they should start managing a
graceful withdrawal from power. If such leaders gain political dominance
inside the regime, they start a process of liberalization by freeing the media
and loosening control over civil society. Then they negotiate with opposition
leaders to set the rules of the post-transition political system. Most critically,
such negotiations center on the protection of the ruling elites of the old
regime who have committed human rights abuses and the preservation of
the privileges of the state institutions that have supported the old regime
(such as the military and the secret police). Once such negotiations are
concluded, elections are held. In most cases (Taiwan and Spain being the
exceptions), parties representing the old regime lose such elections, thus
ushering in a new democratic era. At the moment, the transition in Burma is
unfolding according to this script.
2NC/1NR Democracy #3
Countries Model the US
They say __________________________________________________, but

facts)
to be true)
their argument)

______________________________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________________________
1
2 African and third world countries model us
democracy
The Washington Times, 2011 [ African nations look to U.S. for model of
democracy, July 28,
http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2011/jul/28/african-nations-look-to-us-
for-model-of-democracy/]
While many see the political crisis over the debt ceiling as yet another
example of Washingtons dysfunction, at least one African leader has a
diferent take. This is very instructive for Africa, says Mahmadou Issoufou,
president of Niger. This is a system where a single man cannot decide
everything alone. This is very important for all African countries to see. Mr.
Issoufou made the comments during a panel discussion at the U.S. Institute
of Peace with three other West African presidents: Guineas Alpha Conde,
Benins Boni Yayi, The four men, who will visit the White House tomorrow, are
being held up as exemplars of progress in a continent where democracy was
once an exception. Sub-Sahran Africa has quintupled its number of
electoral democracies over the past two decades, according to Freedom
House. But the leaders said that preserving democracy will remain the
greatest challenge. Your president said when he was in Accra [Ghanas
capital], Africa doesnt needs strongmen, it needs strong institutions, and
we agree with President Obama, said Mr. Issoufou. All four men
acknowledged the challenges of democratization in a region plagued by
ethnic divisions, economic deprivation and persistent security threats. Mr.
Conde, who survived an assassination attempt in July, said that African
leaders need to attack the problem of security without weakening human
rights,adding that economic growth also is key. Theres no magic wand, he
said, so its very important that we understand that if democracy doesnt
advance living conditions, democracy itself cant advance. Mr. Yayi agreed:
Democracy needs to feed itself, it needs sustenance. People must know that
its via democracy that were moving toward prosperity. If people believe that
misery will continue, we will not have democracy, so that is why democracy
must be accompanied by economic renewal. Mr Ouattara, who assumed
office this year after a violent, five-month standof with his predecessor,
crowed that voter turnout rates in his countrys recent elections exceeded
those of post-apartheid South Africa, but he insisted that democracy is about
more than just a ballot box. Its not just about organizing democratic
elections, its about behaving democratically afterwards, about respecting the
rule of law, he said, adding that democracy means the protection of
minorities. He said that America, with its array of ethnic groups, provides a
good model for his fractious country. Whatever your color, whatever your
1
religion, youre an American, and this is what I tell my people: We need to be
Ivorians first, he said. Americans have a sacred idea of citizenship, and
thats what I want to achieve in my country. The wave of democratization is
part of a rare spate of good news out of sub-Saharan Africa, which now
boasts 10 of the worlds 20 fastest-growing economies, as well as its newest
nation South Sudan.

1. Human rights appeals fail
Christenson, 2009 [Thomas, professor of politics and international

afairs and the director of the China and the World Program,
which is a joint venture between Princeton and Harvard
Universities. He also served as the deputy assistant secretary of
state for East Asian and Pacific Afairs from 2006/2008.,
Shaping the Choices of a Rising China: Recent Lessons for the
Obama Administration, July,
The discussions that the United States and other actors have had with China
in recent years on these issues are worthwhile and have produced some
limited, but notable results. For example, China created new, more liberal
regulations for journalists in the lead/-up to the Olympics in the summer of
2008, and following international pressure to do so, extended those
regulations indefinitely. In the past three years, China also accepted
international advice that its supreme court should review all death penalty
cases. According to Chinese government claims and some independent
observers, the number of executions, while still high, dropped markedly in
2007/2008 as a result.7 Still, the overall record of engagement on human
rights and religious freedom has not been very encouraging and the
environment for dissidents and the boldest reporters, lawyers, and religious
leaders remains very poor. Perhaps there is a better approach than the one
adopted by the Bush administration in 2008 on issues of human rights and
religious freedom, but I am not aware of one. Linking human rights issues
to other areas of cooperation, such as trade and investment, simply
has not worked in the past and there is no reason to believe it will
begin working now. Similarly, principled refusal to discuss human rights
issues with Beijing prior to concrete improvements have only reduced
Shaping the Choices of a Rising China the number of venues in which the
United States has been able to express its legitimate concerns to Beijing in a
systematic way.
2. Solvency Turn: Imperialism

A. Human Rights confrontation is Western cultural
imperialism and guarantees backlash
1
Callahan, 2010 [William, professor of international relations at the
London School of Economics and Political Science, A new
approach to human rights (and China), February,
https://www.opendemocracy.net/william-callahan/new-approach-
to-human-rights-and-china]
Human rights is a subject conspicuously absent from these discussions -

except when it is framed as a problem of western cultural imperialism that a
Chinese world order would solve. Why isnt human-rights discourse popular in
the Peoples Republic of China? Most people in the west take the meaning of
human rights for granted; this is not the case in China. While in the PRC
human-rights advocates like Liu Xiaobo are routinely censored, there also
needs to appreciation among outside observers of Chinas active debates
about human rights and identity. A common criticism voiced in them is that
human rights are not universal moral laws, but merely a parochial product of
European political and cultural history. Chinese leaders thus describe
global politics as a battle between nationalist state sovereignty and
interventionist human rights. Sovereignty here is not only territorial, but
also cultural. Chinese intellectuals talk at length about Chinas national
character, especially how it difers from the west: diferent civilisation;
diferent national conditions; and even a unique Chinese DNA-line. The party-
state thus has been able to reframe human rights from universal rights that
are held by everyone, to be another example of western meddling in Chinas
internal afairs, as imperialist powers did in the 19th century. This is how
Beijing understands the Dalai Lamas visit to the White House. A diferent
debate How can this division between China and the west be overcome? One
way is to shift the discussion away from 19th-century history - which the
Chinese call the century of national humiliation - towards addressing the
detailed mechanisms enshrined in the PRCs legal system. The Chinese
constitution actually enshrines all the human rights that western democracies
enjoy, and more: including the right to work and even the right to rest. While
the west should support Chinese dissidents, it is also necessary to do the less
glamorous task of working with Chinese judges and lawyers to hold the PRC
up to its own standards just as the US or European countries are challenged
to maintain theirs. But the law is not enough; the west needs to think about
human rights in a diferent way. The Universal Declaration of Human Rights
(1948) is based on a particular understanding of humans as rational animals
who have abstract moral obligations. Yet for many this argument is
unconvincing - as the Chinese critics say, human-rights discourse is a product
of a particular time and place: the European Enlightenment. The implication
is that rather than arguing about rights as part of some essential human
nature, the focus should shift towards asking questions such as: what sort
of world can we prepare for our great-grandchildren? This approach, guided
1
by the ideas of the American pragmatist philosopher Richard Rorty, would
involve moving from debates about universal rationality to understanding
human rights as a culture, a shared moral identity that extends sympathy to
others. Here the reason to support for human rights is not because they are
true, but because they are good - and more importantly, because violating
human rights is bad. This is a tough argument to make right now; with its
economic success, Beijing is promoting illiberal global norms. But rather than
get sucked into a clash of civilisations that pits China against the west, the
focus in the west should be on building interpersonal relations with Chinese
friends and colleagues. The goal here is not so much to create shared
understanding, but shared sympathy that is both critical and self-critical. This
is very diferent from the dominant legalistic approach to human rights; but
there are (as even the PRC constitution shows) enough human-rights laws. In
the effort to expand human-rights culture, it is not possible just to
rely on conversations among (for example) Hu Jintao, Barack Obama,
and the Dalai Lama. There must be more transnational conversations in all
sectors of society, including people who work in education, business, and
NGOs. Human rights used to be an issue of how the rich west could save
backward people in the poor world. But with the shift in global power to
Asia, China is increasingly exporting censorship and promoting illiberal global
norms. In any event, human-rights violations are no longer just the problem
of people over there; now those in the west too have to think about how to
protect their own human rights. A globally assertive China creates the
opportunity as well as the necessity for a rethink.
B. Imperialism causes global wars, terrorism, and

cultural violence
BANDOW, 2006 (Doug, a senior fellow at the Cato Institute A Foreign Policy
of Fools, http://www.antiwar.com/bandow/?articleid=8954 )
Today, however, this policy of global empire is madness. It is dangerous and

foolish. It is inexcusable and unforgivable. The costs of Americas policy of empire
have become obvious to everyone except those charged with selling and implementing it. The
most obvious is cash. Military spending is the price of ones foreign policy. And the bill is high: Next
year America will officially devote some $440 billion to the military.
Toss in the costs of the Iraq war (routinely funded by supplemental appropriations),
nuclear programs installed in the Energy Department, health care provided by the Department of Veterans
and the total climbs
Afairs, and aid payments to various foreign clients and dependents,
inexorably past the half-trillion mark. The policy of promiscuous
interference and intervention makes war, at least war with America, more likely.
If China attacks Taiwan, if Russia battles a former dependent, if Middle
1
Eastern neighbors tangle, Washington promises to be there.
Threatening war with America might discourage the parties from
risking a fight, but if conflict comes the U.S. will be in the middle.
Moreover, America makes often ancient quarrels harder to solve by
encouraging friendly parties to be more recalcitrant. After all, Washington always
inserts itself as an ally of one of the parties, never as a disinterested observer. And why deal if
you have a superpower at your side? Although America would be unlikely to lose any
such war, the consequences nevertheless would be horrendous. And as
9/11 demonstrated, the U.S. homeland no longer is sacrosanct. Americans
once presumed that they could bomb without consequence. In the cases of Serbia, Iraq, Haiti, Panama,
Somalia, Grenada, North Korea, Iraq again, Vietnam and even Germany and Japan (other than Pearl
Harbor, the Aleutians, and a few balloon bombs) the U.S. did the bombing. Other nations got bombed.
Which is what makes
Such a world made empire seemingly easy, if not cheap. But no longer.
the prospect of an Iranian bomb so frightening. Not that even the
mullahs are stupid, crazy, or addled enough to believe they could
attack America without being destroyed. They could pass of their
technology to groups more than willing to marry terrorism with WMD,
however, groups that are angry enough to use such weapons because of
U.S. policy. For despite the nonsense emanating from President George W. Bush, his neocon acolytes,
and what passes for Democratic foreign policy experts, terrorists seek to kill because they believe that
America is at war with them. They didnt fell the World Trade Center because they disliked the Bill of
Rights, attack the Pentagon because they detested Disneyland, or plot the destruction of the Capitol
they sent the simple message:
because they abhorred free elections in America. Rather,
you want to be an empire? Youll pay the price for attempting to
enforce your edicts on the rest of us. Finally, and perhaps most ironically,
attempting to be a democratic empire ensures that we will be less
democratic or certainly less free, to be more accurate at home. The Bush administrations
nomination as CIA head of Gen. Michael V. Hayden, former director of the National Security Agency and
Empire
responsible for the Bush administrations illegal warrantless spying program, is emblematic.
abroad can be sustained only by empire at home. The national security
state must grow, individual liberties must diminish. We spy on you, search your
bodies and cars, restrict what the media can tell you, and, of course, mislead you and lie to you. But its in
the cause of making the world democratic, so dont worry, be happy.
1
3. Solvency Turn: Sullivan Principles hurt Companies
theyll just return to the US
Hofman and McNulty, 2009 [Michael and Robert, PhD, is the executive director of the Center for
Business Ethics at Bentley University and the Hieken Professor of Business and Professional Ethics, the
director of programs at the Center for Business Ethics at Bentley University International Business, Human
Rights, and Moral Complicity: A Call for a Declaration on the Universal Rights and Duties of Business,
http://www.bentley.edu/sites/www.bentley.edu.centers/files/centers/cbe/cbe-articles/international-bus-
human-rights.pdf]
One of the difficulties companies face when moving overseas is recognizing

when corporate actions cross a line from respecting local customs and
traditions to participating in acts that are ethically unacceptable. This
distinction is particularly important now that globalization is the norm and
businesses often need to create policies that apply to employee comportment
in offices around the world. In this article, we will argue, that business ethics,
unlike compliance, requires a universality that links it closely to the principles
of universal human rights. And yet, while it is appropriate and laudable for
businesses to commit themselves to such principles, given the competitive
nature of capitalism, adherence to ethical policies can put a firm at a
disadvantage if others are not playing by the same rules. The price of ethical
behavior may be particularly high for firms that act according to policies that
are generally respectful of human rights at home, but are not feasible when
operating in countries with poor records of human rights. We may admire a
company that passes up a financial opportunity in order to avoid participation
in unacceptable actions. And yet, however laudable such actions may be,
they leave the problem intact. What is needed is a solution. Such a solution,
we will argue, may be found by formulating and adopting a Declaration on
the Universal Rights and Duties of Business (or the Declaration) that is
sufficiently robust to provide unambiguous guidance in policy formulation and
implementation to all companies wherever they may be operating. YAHOOS
CANARY IN CHINA In November, 2007, Rep. Tom Lantos, then the Chairman of
the House Foreign Afairs Committee, publicly excoriated Yahoos CEO, Jerry
Yang: While technologically and financially you are giants, morally you are
pygmies.1 The basis for Lantoss lashing was Yahoos role in cooperating
with the Chinese police against a local journalist, Shi Tao, who was jailed for
10 years for using the Internet to advance pro-democracy views. Yahoos
actions were not a violation of Chinese law. To the contrary, Yahoo conformed
to Chinese law and that is the problem. Yahoo was complicit in cooperating
with a legal system that clearly violates basic principles of human rights,
including those of free speech and the peaceful participation in the political
processes of ones community. Judging from the perspective of well-
established principles of human rights, such as those expressed in the
Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR),2 Shi Tao was a victim of an
1
unjust regime. As for Yahoo, the situation is not so straightforward: by Yahoos
own admissions, it was complicit in a serious injustice. And yet, Yahoo was, in
important respects, a victim as wellit was forced to comply with laws it
knew to be unjust, but to which it was bound if it were to continue operating
in one of the worlds most important markets. It was in a no-win situation: if it
complied with the Chinese authorities, it would be complicit in the injustice
perpetrated on Shi Tao. If it refused, its own employees and its business
operations would be put at risk. Yahoo chose the path of legal compliance and
its international reputation sufered as a result.
2NC/1NR Solvency
2NC/1NR Solvency #1Human

Rights Appeals Fail
They say The aff solves human rights problems, but
1. Extend our Christenson evidence.

Its much better than their Lee evidence because:
facts)
to be true)

The US engages China on human rights all of the time and nothing
changes. All diplomatic engagement over the last few decades
proves our point. Also, your author is professor of civics and
religion. He has no idea what will work when it comes to diplomacy
he just wants human rights to be protected.
This matters because: if the plan cannot solve, then their impacts
will happen. This is a reason to vote to prevent our impacts.
2 China resists human rights criticism and turns it on

the US
2NC/1NR Solvency
1
South China Morning Post, March 2016 [News outlet focused on
China, quotes major diplomats, China ramps up ofensive against US on
human rights record, accusing it of racism and fuelling terrorism, March 14,
http://www.scmp.com/news/china/diplomacy-defence/article/1924579/china-
ramps-ofensive-against-us-human-rights-record]
China hit back at the United States over its human rights record on Monday,
bringing out government-backed academics to accuse Washington of
everything from promoting Islamic State to being a racist plutocracy. China
was infuriated last week when the United States and 11 other countries at
the United Nations criticised Chinas crackdown on human rights and its
detentions of lawyers and activists. At a press conference arranged by the
Cabinets news department for mostly Chinese reporters, four academics at
government-run bodies lambasted the United States for what they said was
hypocritical criticism of China and others. Liu Hainian, director of the Human
Rights Institution under the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, blamed
Europes refugee wave on the United States military involvement in the
Middle East which was forcing people to leave their beautiful homes. Think
about it: certain extremist groups that now exist, including Islamic State,
wasnt it the Americans who first of promoted them from behind? Liu said.
Closer to home, the United States has a terrible problem with racism, with
police killing about 1,000 people last year, he added. Most of those were
people of colour, Liu said. Chang Jian, vice director of the human rights
research centre of Tianjin-based Nankai University, said the US electoral
system was increasingly controlled by Super PACs, committees well-funded
by corporate interests. There are fewer and fewer opportunities for ordinary
people to participate in elections, he said. Chang made no mention of
Chinas own tightly controlled political system, which has been run by the
Communist Party without interruption since the 1949 revolution. Asked about
Chinas record, Chang said he was not there to talk about his own country,
but to discuss the United States, although he said China did not shy away
from admitting its own problems. He and Liu avoided answering a question
about televised broadcasts of confessions by suspects, often those involved
in sensitive human rights cases, which have angered the United States and
Europe.
3 No Solvency: China uses US hypocrisy to not make

meaningful reforms
The Guardian, March 2016 China Attacks U.S. Hypocrisy in Human

Rights Council http://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/mar/10/china-attacks-
us-hypocrisy-un-human-rights-council
2NC/1NR Solvency
China has strongly rejected US-led criticism of its human rights record at the
UN Human Rights Council on Thursday, accusing the United States of
hypocrisy and crimes including the rape and murder of civilians. The US is
notorious for prison abuse at Guantnamo prison, its gun violence is rampant, racism is its deep-rooted
malaise, Chinese diplomat Fu Cong told the Council, using unusually blunt language. The United
States conducts large-scale extra-territorial eavesdropping, uses drones to
attack other countries innocent civilians, its troops on foreign soil commit
rape and murder of local people. It conducts kidnapping overseas and uses
black prisons. Fu was responding to a joint statement by the United States and 11 other countries,
who criticised Chinas crackdown on human rights and its detentions of lawyers and activists. These
actions are in contravention of Chinas own laws and international
commitments, said US Ambassador Keith Harper, who read out the
statement backed by Australia, Japan, and nine northern European countries .
These extra-territorial actions are unacceptable, out of step with the expectations of the international
community, and a challenge to the rule-based international order. Harper read the statement straight
He
after UN human rights chief Zeid Raad Al Hussein gave his main annual speech to the council.
recalled his message to China in mid-February, when he cited a very
worrying pattern of detentions. Fu said Zeid should refrain from making subjective comments
not backed up by real facts. Advertisement He also criticized Japans support for the joint statement,
saying Japan had refused to take responsibility for conscripting 100,000 comfort women in Asian
countries during the second world war. In China, police have detained about 250 human rights lawyers,
legal assistants, and activists since a nationwide crackdown began last July, although many have
Sophie Richardson, China director at Human Rights
subsequently been released.
Watch, said the message delivered by Harper was the first collective joint
statement on China in the 10 history of the council . The statement shows that while
President Xi may think he can eradicate dissent at home, the world stands with embattled human rights
defenders across China, she said in a statement.
2NC/1NR Solvency
2NC/1NR Solvency #2
Imperialism
They say Theyre not imperialist, but
1. Extend our Callahan evidence.

facts)
to be true)
their argument)

The West has historically dominated China. It is impossible to
separate that fact. Now, the West demands that China change their
ways even though the US and Britain have similar human rights
abuses. This is just a cultural difference.
and this reason matters because: our imperialism impact is
extinction. Once countries dominate otherswar and international
violence become inevitable.
2NC/1NR Solvency
1
2 Human rights appeals are just Western Imperialism
used to justify wars
The Guardian, 2009 [Beware human rights imperialism, June 23,

http://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2009/jun/23/human-rights-imperialism-western-values]
In his new book on the Darfur crisis, Mahmood Mamdani lambasts those
"human rights fundamentalists" who, he claims, "argue for an international
legal standard regardless of the political content of the country in question".
Although I agree with most of his criticisms of the way in which the ICC has
handled two of its first cases in Darfur and northern Uganda, I would argue
that the problem is the opposite. Human rights organisations are in danger of
allowing themselves to be co-opted into strategies that compromise their
independence and impartiality. The concept of "rights-based development",
for example, holds that there is a universal set of standards, located in
international human rights law, that are applicable in all countries throughout
the world. Western donors and international aid organisations are spending
increasing amounts of time drawing up guidelines and developing monitoring
mechanisms to impose these on poor countries. "Poverty is a human rights
violation" has become the latest rallying cry for a growing number of western
NGOs. Yet it does not require that much thought to realise that people in
diferent countries may have diferent views about what policies would be
most appropriate for achieving economic growth or that attitudes towards
certain human rights are quite socially and culturally specific. No one should
ever be tortured, arbitrarily executed or held in slavery, but notions such as
freedom of expression, religion and sexual relations do vary in
different parts of the world. The right to private property is basically
a western concept, which may be politically sensitive in societies
where it is associated with capitalism and colonialism.
2NC/1NR Solvency
2NC/1NR Solvency #3Sullivan

Principles Bad for the Economy
They say __________________________________________________, but

facts)
to be true)
their argument)

______________________________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________________________
1NC Harms (US Credibility) Frontline
1NC- U.S. Credibility Frontline

1. No solvency: private companies will side step
regulations
Barboza, 2006 David, China Drafts Law to Boost Unions and End Abuse<
October 13
http://www.nytimes.com/2006/10/13/business/worldbusiness/13sweat.html?
_r=3&%27&
The move, which underscores the governments growing concern about the widening income gap and
threats of social unrest, is setting of a battle with American and other foreign corporations that have
lobbied against it by hinting that they may build fewer factories here. The proposed rules are being
considered after the Chinese Communist Party endorsed a new doctrine that will put greater emphasis on
Whether the foreign
tackling the severe side efects of the countrys remarkable growth.
corporations will follow through on their warnings is unclear because of the
many advantages of being in China even with restrictions and higher costs
that may stem from the new law. It could go into efect as early as next May. It would apply to
all companies in China, but its emphasis is on foreign-owned companies and the suppliers to those
The conflict with the foreign corporations is significant partly
companies.
because it comes at a time when labor, energy and land costs are rising in
this country, all indications that doing business in China is likely to get much
more expensive in the coming years. But it is not clear how efectively such a new labor law
would be carried out through this vast land because local officials have tended to ignore directives from
the central government or seek ways around them. Chinas economy has become one of the most robust
in the world since the emphasis on free markets in the 80s encouraged millions of young workers to labor
for low wages at companies that made cheap exports. As a result, foreign investment has poured into
China.
Some of the worlds big companies have expressed concern
that the new rules would revive some aspects of socialism and
borrow too heavily from labor laws in union-friendly countries like
France and Germany. The Chinese government proposal, for example, would make it more
difficult to lay of workers, a condition that some companies contend would be so onerous that they might
slow their investments in China. This is really two steps backward after three steps forward, said Kenneth
Tung, Asia-Pacific director of legal afairs at the Goodyear Tire and Rubber Company in Hong Kong and a
legal adviser to the American Chamber of Commerce here.
The proposed law is being
debated after Wal-Mart Stores, the worlds biggest retailer, was forced to
accept unions in its Chinese outlets . State-controlled unions here have not wielded much
power in the past, but after years of reports of worker abuse, the government seems determined to give its
union new powers to negotiate worker contracts, safety protection and workplace ground rules. Hoping to
head of some of the rules, representatives of some American companies are waging an intense lobbying
The skirmish
campaign to persuade the Chinese government to revise or abandon the proposed law.
has pitted the American Chamber of Commerce which represents
corporations including Dell, Ford, General Electric, Microsoft and Nike
against labor activists and the All-China Federation of Trade Unions, the
Communist Partys official union organization. The workers advocates say that the
proposed labor rules and more important, enforcement powers are long overdue, and they accuse the
American businesses of favoring a system that has led to widespread labor abuse. On Friday, Global Labor
1
Strategies, a group that supports labor rights policies, is expected to release a report in New York and
Boston denouncing American corporations for opposing legislation that would give Chinese workers
stronger rights. You have big corporations opposing basically modest reforms, said Tim Costello, an
official of the group and a longtime labor union advocate. This flies in the face of the idea that
globalization and corporations will raise standards around the world. Chinas Labor Ministry declined to
comment Thursday, saying the law is still in the drafting stages. Several American corporations also
declined to comment on the case, saying it was a delicate matter and referring calls to the American
But Andreas Laufs, a Hong Kong-based lawyer who runs the
Chamber of Commerce.
China employment-law practice at the international law firm of Baker &
McKenzie, said some American companies considered the proposed
rules too costly and restrictive. Mr. Laufs said the new rules would give
unions collective-bargaining power and control over certain factory rules, and
they would also make it difficult to fire employees for poor performance.
2. No impact: Global warming will not cause extinction.
Contescu, 2012 Professor Emeritus of Geology and Geography at Roosevelt University, Ph.D. (Lorin,
"600 MILION YEARS OF CLIMATE CHANGE; A CRITIQUE OF THE ANTHROPOGENIC GLOBAL WARMING
HYPOTESIS FROM A TIME-SPACE PERSPECTIVE, Geo-Eco-Marina, 2012, Issue 18, pgs. 5-25)
climate warming has also important favorable

The other side of the coin shows that
effects, mostly on plants and indirectly on animals that feed on the plants. Studies
concluded that the most feared doubling of the atmospheric CO2 will increase the
productivity of herbs by 30%-50% and of trees by 50%-80% . Many plants
will grow faster and healthier during a warmer climate (Idso et al., 2003), and
produce more offsprings. It also appears that plants can survive quite well when
climatic conditions change, even when change is rapid. For instance, cold-
adapted trees can still grow to maturity (though slower) even 100-150 km north of their
natural range, and they also grow as well as much as 1,000 km south of their southern boundaries.
Shifting climate boundaries will also generate competition among species
of grasses and trees, leading to the selection of those most adaptable to
changing conditions. The conclusion that can be drawn from the above considerations is that both
the vegetal and animal kingdoms are far more resilient and adaptable
even for relatively quickly environmental modifications . If a species becomes extinct,
a biological niche becoming thus empty, it will be quickly occupied by another
species better adapted to the new eco logical conditions, as bio-ecological history of
the planet has demonstrated time and again .
1
3. No solvency: China does not see the U.S. as credible
on human rights
NBC, 2014 China on U.S. Criticism on Human Rights: 'Hold Up a Mirror'
http://www.nbcnews.com/news/china/china-u-s-criticism-human-rights-hold-mirror-n555826
China condemned America's human-rights record on Thursday , alluding to the

White House campaign and suggesting that "money politics and family politics went
from bad to worse." The broadside came amid heightening tensions in the South China Sea where
the U.S. is conducting war games with the Philippines to counter China's maritime claims. China's
It
document was prepared by a Cabinet office and was released by the state-run Xinhua News Agency.
was a response to a global human-rights survey issued Wednesday by the
State Department which criticized China and other countries. The U.S. report cited
China's "particularly severe" crackdown on the legal community and "extralegal measures" of enforced
disappearances and house arrest against government critics. Related: Disappearances Raise Fears of China
"The United States made comments on the human-rights situation in
Crackdown
many countries while being tight-lipped about its own terrible human-rights
record and showing not a bit of intention to reflect on it," Xinhua said . "Since
the U.S. government refused to hold up a mirror to look at itself, it
has to be done with other people's help." China alleged the "wanton infringement"
of civil rights and "rampant gun-related crimes" in the United States, citing a toll of 13,136 killed and
26,493 injured by gun violence last year. Xinhua said 965 people had shot dead by U.S. police. " The
frequent occurrence of shooting incidents was the deepest impression left to
the world concerning the United States in 2015," the news agency said.
PlayHow Guns Stack Up to Other Causes of Death in America Facebook Twitter Google Plus Embed How
It added that 560,000 people
Guns Stack Up to Other Causes of Death in America 1:10
were homeless and said that 33 million Americans didn't have health
insurance. The report has tallied more than 6,000 airstrikes in Syria and Iraq, allegedly causing
"between 1,695 and 2,239" civilian deaths. Xinhua's report attracted attention on China's Twitter-like
Weibo social network. "China and the U.S. quarrel about human rights every year which makes them look
"If America has no human rights, why are rich Chinese
like little kids," one user wrote.
going there?" another asked.
1
4. Solvency Turn- U.S. efforts to enforce labor rights
have actually increased abuses
International Business Times, 2015 International Business Times, Trans-

Pacific Partnership: Are Free Trade Agreements Like TPP Really A Tool For
Fixing Labor Rights Abuses?, http://www.ibtimes.com/trans-pacific-
partnership-are-free-trade-agreements-tpp-really-tool-fixing-labor-2041003
The recent history of trade deals suggests they dont to hold trade partners
to high human rights standards. As a member of the ten-year-old Dominican Republic-Central America Free Trade
Agreement (CAFTA-DR) with the United States, Guatemala fell under labor rights side agreements aimed at protecting Guatemalas workers.
But more than seven years after the AFL-CIO labor union filed a complaint over Guatemalas unwillingness to protect union activity and to
Guatemalan
improve working conditions in Guatemalas apparel, agriculture and shipping sectors, problems endure.
authorities have managed to use CAFTA-DRs toothless enforcement

mechanisms to keep disputes locked in a seemingly perpetual state of
consultations between U.S. Department of Labor officials and their Central
American counterparts. The experience lobbying the US government to
enforce CAFTA in Guatemalaalong with the US governments failure to
enforce trade deals with other countries like Honduras and Colombia calls
into question whether the US government will fully enforce the labor
provisions in the TPP, Sean Savett, AFL-CIO spokesman said in an email in April ahead of a June dispute settlement
hearing on Guatemala. The hearing led to no enforcement action as Guatemalan
authorities fought back on allegations of labor violations brought forth by the

U.S. Labor Department. Similar foot-dragging and lack of enforcement
mechanisms have led to protracted labor rights consultations with
free-trade counterparts in Honduras, Colombia and Peru. Labor rights activists
argue that side-agreements on labor protections in each of these counties
have not improved conditions for workers in these countries. For example, despite a labor
action plan under the U.S.-Colombia Trade Agreement that went into efect in 2012, workers continue to be threatened especially in the
countrys shipping industry and more than 100 union activists have been killed, according to a 2015 report on the status of labor rights in the
South American country commissioned by Colombias National Union School. Still, pro-business interests and libertarian free-traders say trade
liberalization delivers economic empowerment to workers over timeand with it greater freedom and less oppression. Others argue the free
trade deals arent the venue for improving human rights, and that side-agreements act as a distraction to the ultimate goal of these
transactions: the removal of tarifs and investment rules that impede global trade activities. Its easy to point to bad examples, like the
Thailand slavery issue , but its unfair to paint a countrys entire industry with the same brush. There are a lot of people in Thailand that
depend on seafood harvesting and theres a real economy there, says Bill Watson, trade policy analyst, trade policy analyst at the libertarian
Cato Institute. There are other ways for the United States to engage countries on these issues, but we shouldnt use these issues to keep
Jagdish N. Bhagwati agrees. As a free-trade purist, the professor

trade barriers in place.
of economics at Columbia University says trade pacts are more likely to lure
countries like India into future deals if they arent weighed down with side-
agreements. If we do regional trade agreements like the TPP we cant
overload them with side demands, like intellectual property requirements, or
labor and environmental conditions, he says. India which is a democracy, by the way doesnt want trade
pacts weighted down with side conditions. The Indian position is that these issues are important,
but linking them to free trade agreements doesnt work.

1
1
5. No impact: Global warming is reducing by itself
Li and Brown, 2015 [Wenhong, Assistant Professor of Climate at Duke University, Patrick, PhD
student in the Division of Earth and Ocean Sciences under the Nicholas School of the Environment at Duke
University, Global Warming More Moderate Than Worst-Case Models, Duke Environment, Apr 21 2015,
https://nicholas.duke.edu/news/global-warming-more-moderate-worst-case-models]
DURHAM, N.C. A new study based on 1,000 years of temperature records

suggests global warming is not progressing as fast as it would under the most severe
emissions scenarios outlined by the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change
(IPCC). Based on our analysis, a middle-of-the-road warming scenario is more likely ,
at least for now, said Patrick T. Brown, a doctoral student in climatology at Duke Universitys Nicholas
School of the Environment. But this could change. The Duke-led study shows that natural
variability in surface temperatures -- caused by interactions between the
ocean and atmosphere, and other natural factors -- can account for observed
changes in the recent rates of warming from decade to decade. The
researchers say these climate wiggles can slow or speed the rate of
warming from decade to decade, and accentuate or ofset the efects of
increases in greenhouse gas concentrations. If not properly explained and
accounted for, they may skew the reliability of climate models and lead to
over-interpretation of short-term temperature trends. The research, published
today in the peer-reviewed journal Scientific Reports, uses empirical data, rather than the
more commonly used climate models, to estimate decade-to-decade
variability. At any given time, we could start warming at a faster rate if greenhouse gas
concentrations in the atmosphere increase without any ofsetting changes in aerosol concentrations or
natural variability, said Wenhong Li, assistant professor of climate at Duke, who conducted the study with
Brown. The team examined whether climate models, such as those used by the
IPCC, accurately account for natural chaotic variability that can occur in the
rate of global warming as a result of interactions between the ocean and
atmosphere, and other natural factors. To test how accurate climate models
are at accounting for variations in the rate of warming, Brown and Li , along with
colleagues from San Jose State University and the USDA, created a new statistical model
based on reconstructed empirical records of surface temperatures over the
last 1,000 years. By comparing our model against theirs, we found that climate models
largely get the big picture right but seem to underestimate the magnitude of
natural decade-to-decade climate wiggles, Brown said. Our model shows
these wiggles can be big enough that they could have accounted for a
reasonable portion of the accelerated warming we experienced from 1975 to
2000, as well as the reduced rate in warming that occurred from 2002 to
2013. Further comparative analysis of the models revealed another intriguing insight. Statistically,
its pretty unlikely that an 11-year hiatus in warming, like the one we saw at
the start of this century, would occur if the underlying human-caused
warming was progressing at a rate as fast as the most severe IPCC
projections, Brown said. Hiatus periods of 11 years or longer are more likely to occur under a middle-
of-the-road scenario.
1NC Harms (China Stability) Frontline
1NC- Harms (CCP Stability)

Frontline
1. Solvency Turn- the affirmative is actually bad for the
Chinese economy. Increased regulations on labor
rights will decrease foreign investment
Global Policy Forum, 2007 an independent policy watchdog that monitors the
work of the United Nations and scrutinizes global policymaking. We promote
accountability and citizen participation in decisions on peace and security,
social justice and international law, https://www.globalpolicy.org/social-and-
economic-policy/46721-multinationals-to-china-no-new-labor-rights.html
While the extraordinarily rapid growth of the Chinese economy has often
been noted, it is less often realized how much of that growth actually reflects
the role of foreign corporations. According to Morgan Stanley's chief economist Stephen Roach,
65 percent of the tripling of Chinese exports - from $121 billion in 1994 to $365
billion in mid-2003 - is "traceable to outsourcing by Chinese
subsidiaries of multinational corporations and joint ventures ." The
obvious motive for such foreign corporations to oppose the law protecting
Chinese workers is their fear that it may eliminate the cheap labor costs they
now enjoy. Even if the law itself is poorly enforced or does little to improve
Chinese wages and employment conditions, it may set the stage for more
organized demands from Chinese workers . Historical experience in the United States and
around the world has shown that when workers realize that they are entitled by law to certain rights, they
may well create the institutions needed to access and enforce those rights. Experience in many countries
indicates that labor laws are often unenforced unless workers exercise the right to organize, bargain
For that reason, corporations have reason to fear that even
collectively, and strike.
a limited guarantee of rights to Chinese workers will encourage their further
eforts to form independent unions, elect their own leaders, and utilize their
potential bargaining power. They fear, in short, that the proposed labor bill
may be but one step in a new long march for Chinese workers as they fight
for the legal rights due them and the institutional supports to enforce those
rights.
1
2. No impact: The CCP is becoming stronger
Foreign Policy, 2011 3/5- 5 Myths about the Chinese Communist Party
http://foreignpolicy.com/2011/01/03/5-myths-about-the-chinese-communist-
party/
Unlike in Taiwan and South Korea, Chinas

Yes it can. Or at least for the foreseeable future.
middle class has not emerged with any clear demand for Western-style
democracy. There are some obvious reasons why. All three of Chinas close Asian neighbors, including
Japan, became democracies at diferent times and in diferent circumstances. But all were efectively U.S.
protectorates, and Washington was crucial in forcing through democratic change or institutionalizing it.
South Koreas decision to announce elections ahead of the 1988 Seoul Olympics, for example, was made
under direct U.S. pressure. Japan and South Korea are also smaller and more homogeneous societies,
lacking the vast continental reach of China and its multitude of clashing nationalities and ethnic groups.
And needless to say, none underwent a communist revolution whose
founding principle was driving foreign imperialists out of the country . Chinas
urban middle class may wish for more political freedom, but it hasnt
dared rise up en masse against the state because it has so much to
lose. Over the last three decades, the party has enacted a broad array of economic reforms, even as it
has clamped down hard on dissent. The freedom to consume be it in the form of cars, real estate, or
well-stocked supermarkets is much more attractive than vague notions of democracy, especially when
individuals pushing for political reform could lose their livelihoods and even their freedom. The cost of
Hence the hotbeds of unrest in recent years
opposing the party is prohibitively high.
have mostly been rural areas, where Chinas poorest, who are least invested
in the countrys economic miracle, reside. Workers of the world unite! You
have nothing to lose except your mortgages doesnt quite cut it as a
revolutionary slogan. All this is why some analysts see splits within the party as a more likely
vehicle for political change. Like any large political organization, the Chinese
Communist Party is factionalized along multiple lines, ranging from local fiefdoms
(exemplified on the national stage by the Shanghai Gang under former President Jiang Zemin) to internal
party networks (like the senior cadres tied to the Communist Youth League through Jiangs successor Hu
There are also clear policy disputes over everything from the proper
Jintao).
pace of political liberalization to the extent of the private sectors role in the
economy. But highlighting these diferences can obscure the larger reality.
Since 1989, when the party split at the top and almost came asunder, the cardinal rule has been no public
divisions in the Politburo. Today, top-level cooperation is as much the norm as debilitating factional
competition. Xi Jinping, the heir apparent, is set to take over at the next party congress in 2012.
Assuming his likely deputy, Li Keqiang, follows with the usual five-
year term, Chinas top leadership seems set until 2022. For the Chinese, the
United States looks increasingly like a banana republic by comparison. The idea that China would one day
become a democracy was always a Western notion, born of our theories about how political systems
Yet all evidence so far suggests these theories are wrong. The party
evolve.
means what it says: It doesnt want China to be a Western democracy and
it seems to have all the tools it needs to ensure that it doesnt become one.
1
1
3 No impact: The Communist Party will transition
peacefully out of power
Bremmer, 2013 Ian president of Eurasia Group, 7/19, Will Chinas slowing
growth lead to unrest?, Reuters, http://blogs.reuters.com/ian-
bremmer/2013/07/19/will-chinas-slowing-growth-lead-to-unrest/
Recently, it seems no developing country is safe from sudden, unexpected protests. In Brazil and Turkey, empowered middle classes pushed
back against perceived governmental injustice; protests erupted, and leaders approval ratings dropped precipitously. In Egypt, the economic
picture was as ugly as the political one, and the militarys ouster of President Mursi has fomented conflict and instability.
China may look like a candidate for the type of protests currently sweeping the
developing world. Not only is a newly empowered middle class demanding better
services and more accountability from government growth has also tapered of in recent
quarters. Dont hold your breath. At least for the time being, China is well-
positioned to navigate such challenges far better than its emerging market competitors.Lets
start with the economy. For years pundits, and many Chinese government officials,
thought that if Chinas GDP growth rate ever fell below 8 percent, it would set of
an unemployment crisis that would raise the risk of social and political instability in the country.
Well, Chinas finance minister was in Washington last week and said that the Chinese
economy could handle 7 percent or even 6.5 percent growth a lower rate than China has
experienced in 23 years. But unlike many other emerging markets, China views slower growth as
a manageable challenge. The government actually recognizes that a slowdown is
necessary to meet its reform and rebalancing goals, and is working now to score political
points among the population by arguing that its doing so. In particular, Beijing hopes that the
slowdown will force industrial consolidation and less resource consumption , which
could slow environmental degradation which has been a major point of political vulnerability for the
government. Slower growth should also calm the real estate sector, where rising prices
have been a major sore point for urban Chinese. Chinas new leadership is betting that progress on these
fronts will outweigh the downside risks theyll face as job losses tick up in the face of slower growth. From a
global perspective, there is a strong case to be made that Chinas slowing growth rate is
actually a good sign. The fact that Beijing hasnt just reflexively pumped capital into the system to keep growth
rates up shows that it is willing to begin undertaking modest economic reforms; it is, in efect,
letting bubbles shrink rather than grow until they pop. This approach is characteristic of the new leadership that
took charge in March of this year: they are less risk averse and they have a more long-sighted
handle on the necessary economic changes that China will have to undertake.The
new president himself is a cause for optimism. Xi Jinping has a more assertive, of-the-
cuf style; he is a more spontaneous, charismatic leader than his predecessors, and early reviews in Chinas
blogosphere suggest a favorable first impression. Xi is using this boldness to work to consolidate his
support within the Communist Party. And the extent to which he is successful will mean even more
capacity for even more reform over time. All of this doesnt mean that Chinas stability should be taken for
granted, or that there arent looming problems on the horizon. The very fact that China doesnt face
significant near-term instability could lead to complacency and give it wiggle room to delay necessary
reforms. China still needs long-term and significant economic and political transformations to get it from
developing to developed. It has too many changes coming to its demographics, manufacturing costs,
and environmental needs to get away with ignoring them in perpetuity. (The U.S. can sympathize.) While
its a good sign that the current leadership is allowing lower growth rates in order to implement some
1
economic reform, thus far, all changes are happening inside the system, not to the system itself. Easy
growth was the low-hanging fruit for China over the past thirty years. Now the government is reaching a bit
further up the tree. But they still have a very long way to go to get to the upper branches. Chinas other
major threat is the stratification that any developing country has to navigate. As Ive written about in the
past, the growth of the Chinese economy has created a new middle
class that has diferent
demands from the largely rural population that China is still trying to lift out of poverty.
In the near term the new governments tolerance for slower growth is actually
positive for helping to address some of these concerns. But eventually, Beijing will have to
reconcile two increasingly divergent populations. This, again, is a long-term issue. But as these issues go unaddressed, and as more Chinese
Dont believe the idea

become rich enough to prioritize new sorts of rights and privileges, the chances of unrest will rise.
that China is a ripe victim for this wave of developing world protests, or that Chinas
slowing growth rate is a sign of an imminent hard landing. Chinas near-term
picture looks surprisingly bright. But after that, the larger question still looms: Can Xi Jinping and his
government handle the looming storm clouds while they are still a good way of?
1NC Harms (US Trade
Competitiveness)
1
1NC- Harms (U.S. Trade Competitiveness)
Frontline
1. No solvency: China manipulates their currency
Trump, 2015 11/9, Donald Trump, presidential candidate/ businessman

http://www.wsj.com/articles/ending-chinas-currency-manipulation-
1447115601
But the worst of Chinas sins is not its theft of intellectual property. It is the
wanton manipulation of Chinas currency, robbing Americans of billions of
dollars of capital and millions of jobs. Again, special interests and crony capitalism have
weakened the resolve of the Obama administration in confronting China over its currency ploys.
Economists estimate that the yuan is undervalued anywhere from 15% to
40%. Through manipulation of the yuan, the Chinese government has been
able to tip the trade balance in their direction by imposing a de facto tarif on
all imported goods. Imagine the impact these practices have had on our weakened manufacturing
base, our agriculture industry and every small business unable to compete internationally. By watching the
Obama administration, you might think that nothing can be done about all this. What is most alarming is
that much can and should be done, but the White House chooses to do nothing to protect American
workers and companies.
2. No impact: US trade credibility has been low for

years
Maher, 2010 Richard, Ph.D. candidate in the Political Science department at
Brown University, 12/10/10, The Paradox of American Unipolarity: Why the
United States May Be Better Of in a Post-Unipolar World, Orbis, Volume 55,
Issue 1, http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0030438710000633
Preeminent states have a tendency to seek to shape world politics in

Distraction.
fundamental ways, which can lead to conflicting priorities and unnecessary diversions. As resources,
attention, and prestige are devoted to one issue or set of issues, others are necessarily disregarded or
given reduced importance. There are always trade-ofs and opportunity costs in international politics, even
for a state as powerful as the United States. Most states are required to define their priorities in highly
it feels the
specific terms. Because the preeminent state has such a large stake in world politics,
need to be vigilant against any changes that could impact its short-,
medium-, or long-term interests. The result is taking on commitments on an
expansive number of issues all over the globe. The United States has been very active in
its ambition to shape the post-Cold War world. It has expanded NATO to Russia's doorstep;
waged war in Bosnia, Kosovo, Iraq, and Afghanistan; sought to export its own
democratic principles and institutions around the world; assembled an
1NC Harms (US Trade
Competitiveness)
1
international coalition against transnational terrorism; imposed sanctions on
North Korea and Iran for their nuclear programs; undertaken nation building
in Iraq and Afghanistan; announced plans for a missile defense system to be
stationed in Poland and the Czech Republic; and, with the United Kingdom,
led the response to the recent global financial and economic crisis. By being
so involved in so many parts of the world, there often emerges ambiguity
over priorities. The United States defines its interests and obligations in
global terms, and defending all of them simultaneously is beyond the pale
even for a superpower like the United States. Issues that may have received benign
neglect during the Cold War, for example, when U.S. attention and resources were almost exclusively
devoted to its strategic competition with the Soviet Union, are now viewed as central to U.S. interests.
CDL Core Files 2016-2017 North Korea Af
North Korea AFFIRMATIVE

Vocabulary
Six Party Talks: Diplomatic talks with the purpose of ending
North Koreas nuclear program. These started in 2003 and have
only had moderate success. The six parties are China, the United
States, North South Korea, Japan, and Russia.
Sanctions: A penalty for not following a rule. In the case of the
Af, these are economic or trade sanctions. This means that
countries ask North Korea to change its policy with nuclear
weapons or human rights and if they refuse then countries will
not trade. Think of this as the lunch table diplomacy. If
someone is being a jerk, then everyone will not trade lunch with
them. If they change their ways, then they can come back to the
negotiating table and see what they can get for that PB & J.
1
Military Concessions: To remove military presence or make
military promises to other countries. For the Af, North Korea
wants less US military in the area because they are worried the
US will destroy them. The Affirmative agrees with North Korean
demands and reduces weapons, troops, threats toward North
Korea.
Pyongyang (Pee-yong-yang): Capital of North Korea. It can be
used to describe what the government wants. For example,
Pyongyang wants the US to do ___ really means that the North
Korean government wants the US to do ____.
Kim Jung-Un: Current leader of North Koreason of Kim Jung-Il.
He is described by many as a dictator or authoritarian leader who
oppresses his people. He has ultimate authority and is North
Koreas Supreme Leader.
Kim Jung-Il: Former leader of North Korea and father of Kim
Jung-Un. Established a corrupt dictatorship where the government
has ultimate authority.
Democratic Peoples Republic of Korea (DPRK): The full,
exact name for North Korea. If you see this name or the
abbreviation, theyre talking about North Korea.
Terminal High Altitude Air Defense (THAAD): A missile
system that was put in and over South Korea in July to protect
them from North Korea. The US, South Korea, and Japan like this
idea because it will better protect these countries from North
Korean weapons. China and North Korea dont like it because they
feel like this is an excuse for the US to put their military in the
area.
1
1
1
might erupt.
president of China.
AT=Answers To
1AC
North Korea 1AC

First, the PLAN: the United
should make military
concessions to Peoples
Republic of China in
exchange for collaborative
sanctions against the
Democratic Peoples
Republic of Korea.
1AC
Contention One: Inherency

1. Current diplomacy is failingemboldening North
Korea and hurting the US-Chinese relationship
Council on Foreign Relations, February 2016 [major international

relations journal with multiple authors, The China-North Korea
Relationship, February 8, http://www.cfr.org/china/china-north-
korea-relationship/p11097]
The United States has pushed North Korea to irreversibly give up its nuclear
weapons program in return for aid, diplomatic benefits, and normalization of
relations. But experts say Washington and Beijing, while sharing the goal of
denuclearizing North Korea, have diferent views on how to reach it.
Washington believes in using pressure to influence North Korea to change its
behavior, while Chinese diplomats and scholars have a much more negative
view of sanctions and pressure tactics, says the International Crisis Groups
Daniel Pinkston (PDF). They tend to see public measures as humiliating and
counterproductive. The United States has also tried to pressure China to
lean more heavily on North Korea. U.S. presidential executive orders (PDF)
and congressional moves impose sanctions on countries, firms, or individuals
contributing to North Koreas ability to finance nuclear and missile
development; some measures passed in 2005 targeted North Korean funds in
Chinese banks, while more recent ones focus on its mineral and metal export
industries, which make up an important part of trade with China. Washington
has also been in talks with Seoul to deploy a missile defense system
(Terminal High Altitude Area Defense, also known as THAAD) to boost regional
security, though Beijing strongly condemns its potential deployment and sees
it as a threat to Chinese national security. Theres an increasing
understanding that North Korea does not provide the kind of stable neighbor
and element of the neighborhood that China likes.former U.S. ambassador
to South Korea and Six Party Talk negotiator Christopher R. Hill There were
expectations in the United States at the start of Obamas first term in 2009
that it might pursue direct talks with North Korea, but Pyongyangs
subsequent rocket tests dimmed such hopes. Washington later settled on an
approach that U.S. diplomats described as strategic patience (PDF). A 2016
report by the nonpartisan U.S. Congressional Research Service described the
policy as designed to pressure the regime in Pyongyang while insisting that
[it] commit to steps toward denuclearization as previously promised in the
Six-Party Talks; closely coordinating with treaty allies Japan and South Korea;
1AC
1
attempting to convince China to take a tougher line on North Korea; and
applying pressure on Pyongyang through arms interdictions and sanctions.
Despite pursuing rounds of dialogue either bilaterally or under the
auspices of the Six Party Talks, such efforts have been fruitless. After
international powers reached an agreement on Irans nuclear program in July
2015, there was speculation over whether a similar deal could be brokered
with North Korea. However, a number of regional experts have pointed to
major diferences between Pyongyang and Tehran, such as regime
characteristics, the status of weapon development, and connections to the
world economy as reasons why such a deal could not be replicated. Others
claim that the Kim regimes use of nuclear development to sustain its survival
rules out the possibility of an efective deal.
1AC
Contention Two: Harms (North

Korean War)
1. A US-North Korean war is comingUS military
posture escalates the conflict to nuclear war
International Business Times, 2016 [Global news outlet quoting military

officials, North Korea Wants Nuclear War Right Now After United
States Held Military Exercises With Seoul, Foreign Minister
Warns]
North Korea is poised to start a war with the United States right now after
Washington held joint military exercises with South Korea, North Korean
Foreign Minister Ri Su-yong warned Monday. He said Pyongyang could not sit
idle in the face of the U.S. threat. At present, a situation has developed on
the Korean peninsula that a war can start right now due to the activities of
the United States, which conducts military drills in real conditions envisaging
all methods of performing sudden military raids on the Democratic Peoples
Republic of North Korea and views a pre-emptive strike as a fait accompli,
the North Korean foreign minister said in a lengthy interview with Tass, a
Russian state media outlet. We have a powerful military might that can
conduct a war with any means, he added. The United States has made North
Korea its top target and organized the military exercises as a strike against
the nation, he said. The warnings mark the latest threat from North Korea,
which has complained that the U.S. is preparing to invade the impoverished
and unstable nation. The joint military exercises earlier this month between
Washington and Seoul involved 300,000 South Korean troops and at least
17,000 from the U.S. The United Nations Command called the annual
exercises nonprovocative in nature. The current military maneuvers where
a huge military contingent numbering several hundred thousand servicemen
is involved and all possible strategic nuclear armaments whose number is
twice as much as in the previous years are being held in conditions maximally
close to real combat, the North Korean foreign minister said. He dismissed
complaints from global leaders in recent months over North Koreas nuclear
weapon development. North Korea claims it conducted a successful H-bomb
test, put a satellite into space orbit and is capable of carrying out a missile
strike against Washington. State-run media reported in early March that
leader Kim Jong Un had ordered a nuclear warhead explosion test and test
firings of several kinds of ballistic rockets able to carry nuclear warheads.
1AC
1
It was the United States that pushed us towards possessing nuclear
weapons while a nuclear threat and blackmail from the U.S. have
been the causes that have led to North Koreas nuclear status, the
North Korean foreign minister told Tass. In response to the U.S. frenzied
hysteria for unleashing a nuclear war, we have fully transferred our army
from the form of military response to the form of delivering a pre-emptive
strike and state resolutely about the readiness to deliver a pre-emptive
nuclear strike. North Korea will continue to focus its military readiness on
nuclear defenses, he said. In a word, the Korean peninsula faces the
dilemma: a thermonuclear war or peace, he said.
2. Promising military concessions for stronger sanctions

can bring North Korea to the negotiating table
solving lash out
Feng, February 2016 [Zhu, Executive Director of the China Center for Collaborative Studies of the
South China Sea and a Professor of International Relations at Nanjing University, What New Approach
Should the U.S. and China Take to North Korea?, February 10,
https://www.chinafile.com/conversation/what-new-approach-should-us-and-china-take-north-korea]
John Delurys article is spot on to reveal the policy inconsistency of the United
States in the handling of North Korea in the past decades. It has varied
remarkably from the Bill Clinton Administration to the Obama Administration,
switching course explicitly between engagement doves and sanction
hawks. Thus Delury calls for a Nixon in China momentan historic
diplomatic episode echoing the 1972 visit that successfully reopened the
door for U.S.-China cooperation and dramatically left behind decades of
animosity and hostility between the two powers. Delurys call is worth a try
as no one can deny the reality that the lingering standof of denuclearization
on the Korea Peninsula actually urges Pyongyang to scale up its nuclear and
missile programs to desperately uphold its regimes survival. The apathetic
and inert strategic patience approach of the Obama Administration has
failedNorth Korea exploded its fourth nuclear test on January 6, 2016, and
launched its sixth long-range missile test on February 8. The engagement
doves seem unable to alter North Korean behaviors and unlikely to dissolve
Kim Jong-uns motive to pursue nuclear weapons. Pyongyangs
imperviousness to diplomatic pressures and economic sanctions stems
largely from its regime typea vicious combination of personality cult,
totalitarianism, and a military first domestic power structure. Kim Jong-un
cares little about the sufering of his people, and instead attempts, as usual,
to maintain his grip on power through nuclear desperation. There is little
hope that North Korea will abandon its nuclear capability as long as the
1AC
1
regime type remains unchanged. In addition, Kim Jong-un asks for
international recognition of North Korea as a nuclear status power, a status
few other powers in the world are willing to concede. Engagement doves
are confident their path will alter North Koreas regime type. Perhaps. But
how patient are we as Pyongyangs nuclear weapons pose a serious threat to
the region? Furthermore, a calling for Nixon in China moment seems less
desirable and applicable given domestic and security imperatives in the
United States. A leading driver behind the call for a Nixon in China moment
around North Korea is the modern day equivalent of Nixons balancing the
Soviet Union-based security policy. Nixon acutely realized the value of the
China card vis--vis Moscow early in the 1970s, while Mao also saw
rapprochement with Washington could greatly beef up his anti-Soviet policy.
Might the presidents of America and China now acknowledge a
common enemy and seek together to turn North Korea with a
smiling offense against Kim Jong-un? A new approach is absolutely
needed between China and the U.S. when confronting Pyongyangs nuclear
and missile paranoids. An essential option is to conduct tougher
sanctions to wither away North Koreas potential to develop nuclear
weapons in internationally coordinated and assured ways.
Washington should stop scapegoating China for its failed North
Korea policy and respect Chinas wide-ranging security concerns in
the Asia-Pacific. For the moment, suspending THAAD deployment
talks between Washington and Seoul would be helpful. Beijing, equally
stuck in North Korean purgatory for two decades, needs to end its indecision
and think about completely cutting-of the supply of oil it sends to
Pyongyang, following the mandate of a new United Nations Security Council
resolution. When China and the U.S. decide together to adopt such a big
stick, the international community should simultaneously take tougher
sanctions more seriously. Washington needs to lower the threshold of
diplomatic engagement, and even promise security guarantees to the
Pyongyang regime as North Korea simply agrees to suspend the development
of the nations nuclear capability. Smothering North Korea for its nuclear
capability seems the only workable alternative. China and the United States
should not line up to meet North Koreas exorbitant demands, and instead
should jointly make clear that keeping nuclear weapons would be deadly
costly.
1AC
Contention Three: Harms (Regime

Change)
1. North Korea is literally the worst place on Earth
hundreds of thousands are murdered, enslaved, and
abused
Human Rights Watch, 2015 [Human Rights Watch is a nonprofit, nongovernmental human rights
organization made up of roughly 400 staf members around the globe. Its staf consists of human rights
professionals including country experts, lawyers, journalists, and academics of diverse backgrounds and
nationalities, World Report 2015: North Korea, https://www.hrw.org/world-report/2015/country-
chapters/north-korea]
The human rights situation in the Democratic Peoples Republic of Korea

(DPRK or North Korea) has remained dire under the control of Kim Jong-Un.
The government is controlled by a one-party monopoly and dynastic
leadership that do not tolerate pluralism and systematically denies basic
freedoms. Tight controls on North Koreas border with China continued in
2014, further reducing the number of North Koreans able to flee and seek
refuge in third countries. A Commission of Inquiry (COI) established by the
United Nations Human Rights Council (HRC), chaired by retired Australian
judge Michael Kirby, published a devastating report in February 2014 that
concluded that the North Korea government has committed
systematic human right abuses at a scale without parallel in the
contemporary worldincluding extermination, murder, enslavement,
torture, imprisonment, rape, forced abortions, and other sexual
violence. On March 28, the HRC adopted a resolution supporting the COIs
findings and calling for accountability. In October, heavy pressure on North
Korea at the UN General Assembly in New York and North Koreas concern
over the possibility of a referral to the International Criminal Court (ICC)
prompted a first-ever meeting between North Korean diplomats and Marzuki
Darusman, the HRC special rapporteur on human rights in North Korea. On
November 18, the third committee of the UN General Assembly, rejecting an
amendment by Cuba that would have stripped accountability from the text,
adopted the resolution by a 111 to 19 vote, with 55 states abstaining. The
resolution endorsed the COIs conclusions and called on the UN Security
Council to consider referring North Koreas leadership to the ICC for crimes
against humanity committed against the people of North Korea. Surprisingly,
North Korea has ratified four key international human rights treaties and
signed, but not yet ratified, another, and has a constitution that provides a
1AC
1
number of rights protections on paper. But in practice, the government is
among the most rights-repressing in the world. Political and civil rights are
nonexistent since the government quashes all forms of disfavored expression
and opinion and totally prohibits any organized political opposition,
independent media, free trade unions, or civil society organizations. Religious
freedom is systematically repressed. North Koreans who seek to assert their
rights are perceived to show insufficient reverence for supreme leader Kim
Jong-Un or the ruling Korean Workers Party. Those who act in ways viewed as
contrary to state interests face arbitrary arrest, torture, and ill-treatment,
detention without trial, or trial by state-controlled courts. North Koreans also
face severe penalties for possessing unauthorized videos of foreign TV
programs and movies or communicating with persons outside the country.
The government also practices collective punishment for supposed anti-state
ofenses, efectively enslaving hundreds of thousands of citizens, including
children, in prison camps and other detention facilities where they face
deplorable conditions and forced labor.
2. Human rights must be protected in all instancesits

a moral and legal obligation
Gibney, 2008 [Mark, he Belk Distinguished Professor at the

University of North Carolina-Asheville. His latest book is
International Human Rights Law: Returning to Universal
Principles, Responsibilities for Protecting Human Rights,
February, https://global-ejournal.org/2008/02/15/gibney/]
Human rights are universal, meaning that each person possesses certain
human rights by the mere fact of this persons humanity. What does not
matter or at least what should not matter is where a person lives, how
much money a person has (or does not have), whether that persons country
has (or has not) became a party to any particular international human rights
treaties, and so on. Who has the responsibility for meeting these universal
rights? The (universal) response of states has been that each country is
responsible for protecting human rights within its own borders but that no
state has human rights obligations that extend outside of its own territorial
jurisdiction. But what if a country is not able or is not willing to protect the
human rights of its citizens? Or what if human rights are being violated, in
large part due to the actions of outside states? It is here that the silence of
the international community has been deafening. Thus, notwithstanding near-
universal declarations of the universality of human rights, the responsibility
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1
for protecting human rights has been based almost exclusively on territorial
considerations. What has this territorial approach to human rights given us?
Unfortunately, not nearly enough. Looking at violations of economic rights
alone, we live in a world where an average of 50,000 people die every
single day due to preventable causes. Yet, notwithstanding this
incredible level of human rights atrocities, the territorial approach to human
rights has essentially gone unchallenged. However, this has started to
change and it has come from the most unlikely of sources: the war on
terror. To state matters bluntly, the reason why enemy combatants are
being held at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba and not in some location in this country
is that American government officials are of the mind that U.S. obligations
under international law do not extend outside the territorial boundaries of the
United States. Under this (territorial) approach to human rights, the U.S.
government is not bound by the Torture Convention and the Covenant on
International Civil and Political Rights (both of which the U.S. is a party to)
when it is operating outside the territorial borders of the United States. This
same kind of rationale is behind the policy of extraordinary rendition. The
idea is that the U.S. has not done anything wrong or unlawful when
individuals outside the United States are being kidnapped and sent to some
third country for interrogation purposes albeit at the behest of, and under
the direction and control of, American authorities. Again, the argument is that
American obligations under international law are only applicable to actions
within the United States. Fortunately, most people have been able to see
behind this faade. That is, they have recognized that territorial
considerations should not be used in this manner to demarcate where a
countrys human rights obligations begin but, more importantly, where they
end. Most people seem to believe that torture is illegal whether it takes place
in Fort Benning, Georgia, or Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, or at the Abu Ghraib
prison in Iraq. In that way, the war on terror has helped us see that
territorial considerations oftentimes make little sense in the context of
protecting human rights. This is not to suggest that territory does not
matter at all or that states have the same human rights obligations outside
their borders as they do domestically. Neither of these propositions happens
to be true. Rather, each state has the primary responsibility for protecting
human rights within its own domestic borders. However, what we have
completely failed to recognize are the secondary responsibilities that the rest
of the international community has when the territorial state has not been
willing or able to ofer human rights protection. And what also has to be said
is that this is not simply a moral obligation wouldnt it be a nice
gesture if we provided some assistance to starving children in some
other land rather, it is a legal obligation. This is most clearly seen in
the language of the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural
Rights, one of the so-called International Bill of Rights, whereby each state
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1
party to the Covenant has (legally) obligated itself to protect the economic
rights of everyone by means of international assistance and cooperation.
What does international assistance and cooperation mean? What it means
is that when children in a particular country are being denied an education
(to choose one example), this not only constitutes a violation of human rights
by the territorial state but this also constitutes a human rights
violation on the part of the rest of the international community,
which has pledged to protect those rights. The point is that human
rights are universal, but so are the duties and responsibilities to
meet those rights. This is what the framers of the International Bill of
Rights, and all of the other international human rights treaties, sought to
achieve. This is the only way that the notion of human rights makes any
sense. If human rights protection were something that individual states could
(and would) do individually, there would be no need for any international
conventions. Stripped to their barest essentials, what each one of these
treaties represents is nothing less than this: that everyone has an ethical as
well as a legal obligation to protect the human rights of all other people.
Sadly enough, our inability to recognize the extent of our own human rights
obligations has constituted the greatest human rights failure of all.
1AC
Contention Four: Solvency

1. Solvency: strong sanctions and Six Party Talks cause
North Korean shift away from human rights abuses
and nuclear ambitions
Global Times, March 2016 [Founded in April 2009, the paper is one of
the most dynamic players among Chinese media, and has rapidly
become the major English newspaper in the nation., March 24,
http://www.globaltimes.cn/about-us/]
The fact that China, the US and Russia all voted in favor of the new sanction resolution reflects a united
The three countries have consistent
stance in opposition to North Korea's nuclear tests.
interests in opposing nuclear proliferation in Northeast Asia, but they diverge
on how to reach this goal. For example, China and Russia stand firmly against
the planned US deployment of the Terminal High Altitude Area Defense
missile defense system in South Korea. North Korea's nuclear test should
be condemned, and so should the US' attempt to take advantage of
the occasion to expand its military presence in the region. While China
shows support for the new sanctions, it also emphasizes that they are just a
way to persuade the North back to the negotiation table . Dialogue is the best
course to resolve the North Korea conundrum. China and Russia must enhance
coordination while interacting more with North Korea. Moscow, in particular, given its growing ties with
Pyongyang, should play a bigger role in getting Pyongyang to realize that its current approach is leading to
a dead end. There are multiple plans of how to resume negotiations under discussion in China. One
Washington and Seoul suspend joint military drills
suggests a three-step road map: First,
in return for Pyongyang halting nuclear tests ; second, should talks over a
replacement of the Korean Armistice Agreement with a peace treaty
commence, Pyongyang freezes its nuclear programs; and finally, after the
normalization of the US-North Korea ties and the opening-up of North Korea,
the North totally abandons its nuclear programs . Many other plans are also being
debated in China. The underlying principle is that the problem should be resolved through negotiations. It's
noticeable that the US has its own bottom line over the North Korean nuclear issue. The US currently
deems the North Korea nuclear abilities no harmful to its interests. But once the North crosses the nuclear
threshold by arming a warhead, the US will not hesitate to take military actions to sabotage its nuclear
capabilities. There are three possibilities on the peninsula. The first one is what I expect most. That is, the
North will soften its attitude and return to talks six months later. It's estimated that as long as China and
Russia take seriously suspending exports of oil, especially aviation fuel, to North Korea, the North will be
Resolution 2270 is the toughest set of sanctions yet
hard hit in four or six months.
and if it is well implemented, it will inflict unbearable pain on North Korea and
force it back to the negotiation table. The second possibility is that the North will continue its
tough gestures. The belligerent gestures of the North may be a show driven by domestic political pressure.
In that case, it's a political game, but if it becomes too vehement, a military conflict
1AC
1
may be inevitable. The last one is that the impasse will last five to six years and finally the North
crosses the nuclear threshold. It must be brought back to the negotiation table before the worst-case
scenario happens.
1AC
1
2. Engaging China tips the balance in talksthey tame
North Korea
Chanlett-Avery, et al, January 2016 [Emma, Coordinator Specialist in Asian

Afairs, Ian Rinehart, Analyst in Asian Afairs, Mary Beth D. Nikitin, Specialist
in Nonproliferation, Congressional Research Service Report, North Korea:
U.S. Relations, Nuclear Diplomacy, and Internal Situation, January 15,
https://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/nuke/R41259.pdf]
U.S. policy to pressure North Korea depends heavily on Chinas influence. In

addition to being North Koreas largest trading partner by faraccounting for
about 70% of North Koreas total tradeChina also provides food and energy
aid that is an essential lifeline for the regime in Pyongyang. Chinas
overriding priority appears to be to prevent the collapse of North Korea.
Analysts assess that Beijing fears the destabilizing efects of a humanitarian
crisis, significant refugee flows over its borders, and the uncertainty of how
other nations, particularly the United States, would assert themselves on the
peninsula in the event of a power vacuum. Beijing is supporting joint
industrial projects between Chinas northeastern provinces and North Koreas
northern border region. Some Chinese leaders also may see strategic value in
having North Korea as a bufer between China and democratic, U.S.-allied
South Korea. However, since 2010 an increasing number of Chinese
academics have called for a reappraisal of Chinas friendly ties with North
Korea, citing the material and reputational costs to China of maintaining such
ties. The rhetorical emphasis Chinese leaders now place on denuclearization
of the Korean Peninsulareportedly even in meetings with North Korean
officialsmay suggest that Beijings patience could be waning. In what is
viewed by many observers as a diplomatic snub, Chinese President Xi Jinping
has had several summits with South Korean President Park Geun-hye but has
yet to meet with the North Korean leader Kim Jong-un. Despite this apparent
cooling in relations, Beijing remains an obstacle to many U.S. policy goals.
Imposing harsher punishments on North Korea in international fora, such as
the United Nations, is hindered by Chinas seat on the UNSC. However,
Chinese trade with and aid to North Korea is presumed to be a
fraction of what it might be if Beijing decided to fully support Kim
Jong-un. This assumption is a key factor driving the U.S. and South
Korean approach, which seeks to avoid pushing China to a place
where it feels compelled to provide more diplomatic and economic
assistance to North Korea.
2AC Harms (North Korean War)
2AC Harms (North Korean War) AT

#1No Nuclear Ability/Backlash
They say North Korea has no nuclear abilities and if we try anything
theyll backlash, but
1. Extend our International Business Times and Feng evidence.
Its much better than their Info Wars evidence because:
more facts)
to be true)

Our evidence talks about how all of the countries see North Korea.
Even if they dont have weapons, other countries are freaking out
and thats enough to cause conflict. Also, our evidence talks about
multiple weapons tests that show North Korea has nuclear weapons.
Finally, their evidence is talking about US sanctions and we dont do
that. Our new military and China sanction strategy will work.

1
This matters because: North Koreas weapons are a threat and can
cause a world war. We can solve that problem with our new
approach.
2 North Korea goes nuclear
The Bulletin of Atomic Scientists, 2015 [organization of scientists dedicated to

understanding nuclear threats, William J. Perry on nuclear war and nuclear terrorism, December 8,
http://thebulletin.org/william-j-perry-nuclear-war-and-nuclear-terrorism8961]
During 1990s I worked very hard for a non-nuclear North Korea. I failed, and
those who followed me also failed. North Korea is now building a nuclear arsenal
and has threatened to use this arsenal, engaging in outrageous and provocative
rhetoric. North Korea now has an arsenal of medium-range ballistic missiles that
can reach South Korea and Japan. They could develop ICBMs, which would
threaten the US. My Stanford colleague Sig Hecker has proposed a 3 no's policy
(no more nuclear weapons, no better weapons, and no transfer of nuclear
material). This represents a potential way forward, but has not been adopted by
either President Bush or Obama. I expect more acting out within a few months,
with long-range missile tests, probably followed by more nuclear tests to prove
out the nuclear warheads for these missiles. We are not on a path to solution
our relations with North Korea continue to be a festering sore. If this dangerous
situation erupts, it will very likely entail use of nuclear weapons. That is
my third nuclear nightmare.
3 Stronger nuclear weapons are being developed
Chanlett-Avery, Rinehart, and Nikitin, January 2016 [Emma, Coordinator Specialist in

Asian Afairs, Ian, Analyst in Asian Afairs, Mary Beth D. Specialist in Nonproliferation, Congressional
Research Service Report, North Korea: U.S. Relations, Nuclear Diplomacy, and Internal Situation, January
15, https://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/nuke/R41259.pdf]
North Korea has active nuclear, biological and chemical weapons programs. The
2015 Director of National Intelligence (DNI) Worldwide Threat Assessment stated,
Because of deficiencies in their conventional military forces, North Korean
leaders are focused on developing missile and WMD capabilities, particularly
building nuclear weapons.24 The sections below describe what is known from
open sources about these programs; for more information, see CRS Report
RL34256, North Koreas Nuclear Weapons: Technical Issues, by Mary Beth D.
Nikitin. Nuclear U.S. analysts remain concerned about the pace and success of
North Koreas nuclear weapons development. The DNI assesses that North
Korea views its nuclear capabilities as intended for deterrence,
international prestige, and coercive diplomacy. North Korea has said that
1
it will not get rid of its nuclear weapons until all the other nuclear weapons states
do so. North Korea announced on January 6, 2016, that it successfully tested a
hydrogen bomb (its fourth nuclear weapon test since 2006 and first since
February 2013). The U.S. government confirmed that the underground explosion
was a nuclear test, but a White House spokesman said that initial data was not
consistent with North Korean claims of detonating a full-fledged thermonuclear
hydrogen bomb. North Koreas first three nuclear weapons tests were of fission
devices.25 Generally, countries would test a boosted fission weapon as the next
step after testing fission weapons, on the path to developing a hydrogen bomb.
This type of device would be lighter in weight and smaller in size than a fission
weapon with comparable yield. The U.S. intelligence community has said that the
prime objective of North Koreas nuclear weapons program is to develop a
nuclear warhead that is miniaturized or sufficiently small to be mounted on
long- range ballistic missiles, but assessments of progress have difered. The
official position of the DNI is that North Korea has not yet demonstrated the full
range of capabilities necessary for a nuclear armed missile.26 Miniaturization
likely would require additional nuclear and missile tests. Perhaps the most acute
near-term threat to other nations is from the medium-range Nodong missile,
which could reach all of the Korean Peninsula and some of mainland Japan. Some
experts assess that North Korea likely has the capability to mount a nuclear
warhead on the Nodong missile.27
4 And North Korea will sell weapons to Syria and

Libya

Critics claim that the strategic patience approach has allowed Pyongyang
to control the situation and steadily improve its missile and nuclear programs.
North Korea has flagrantly violated UNSC resolutions with rocket launches
and nuclear tests. The policy not only depends on China showing greater
willingness to pressure North Korea, but it also depends on U.S. allies
maintaining unity, an approach that might falter if allies take divergent
approaches. The collapse of the denuclearization talks has intensified
concerns about proliferation as cash-strapped North Korea may turn to other
sources of income. Because of North Koreas poor economic performance,
there is a strong fear that it will sell its nuclear technology or fissile material
to another country or a nonstate actor.11 Evidence of nuclear cooperation
with Syria and Libya has alarmed national security experts.12

#2No North Korea War
They say There will be no North Korean War, but

facts)
to be true)
their argument)

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2 North Korea has the worlds largest stockpile of
chemical weapons and will use them
Chanlett-Avery, Rinehart, and Nikitin, January 2016 [Emma, Coordinator

Specialist in Asian Afairs, Ian, Analyst in Asian Afairs, Mary Beth D. Specialist
According to congressional testimony by Curtis Scaparrotti, Commander of

U.S. Forces Korea, North Korea has one of the worlds largest
chemical weapons stockpiles.30 North Korea is widely reported to
possess a large arsenal of chemical weapons, including mustard, phosgene,
and sarin gas. Open source reporting estimates that North Korea has
approximately 12 facilities where raw chemicals, precursors, and weapon
agents are produced and/or stored, as well as six major storage depots for
chemical weapons.31 North Korea is estimated to have a chemical weapon
production capability up to 4,500 metric tons during a typical year and
12,000 tons during a period of crisis, with a current inventory of 2,500 to
5,000 tons, according to the South Korean Ministry of National Defense.32 A
RAND analysis says that 1 ton of the chemical weapon sarin could
cause tens of thousands of fatalities and that if North Korea at some
point decides to attack one or more of its neighbors, South Korea and Japan
would be the most likely targets.33 North Korea is not a signatory to the
Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) which bans the use and stockpiling of
chemical weapons. North Korea is suspected of maintaining an ongoing
biological weapons production capability. The United States intelligence
community continues to judge that North Korea has a biotechnology
infrastructure to support such a capability, and has a munitions production
capacity that could be used to weaponize biological agents.34 South Koreas
Ministry of National Defense estimated in 2012 that the DPRK possesses
anthrax and smallpox, among other weapons agents.35
3 Missiles would rain down on South Korea in the first

hour of war
Chanlett-Avery, Rinehart, and Nikitin, 2016 [Emma, Coordinator Specialist in Asian Afairs,
Ian, Analyst in Asian Afairs, Mary Beth D. Specialist in Nonproliferation, Congressional Research Service
Report, North Korea: U.S. Relations, Nuclear Diplomacy, and Internal Situation, January 15,
1
North Koreas conventional military capabilities have atrophied significantly
since 1990, due to antiquated weapons systems and inadequate training, but
North Korea could still inflict enormous damage on Seoul with artillery and
rocket attacks.59 Security experts agree that, if there were a war on the
Korean Peninsula, the United States and South Korea would prevail, but at
great cost.60 To compensate for its obsolete traditional forces, in recent years
North Korea has sought to improve its asymmetric capabilities, such as
unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs), ofensive cyber operations, and special
operations forces. North Korea fields one of the largest militaries in the world,
estimated at 1.2 million personnel in uniform, with another 600,000 in
reserves.61 Defense spending may account for as much as 24% of the
DPRKs national income, on a purchasing power parity basis.62 The North
Korean military has deployed approximately 70% of its ground forces and
50% of its air and naval forces within 100 kilometers of the de-militarized
zone (DMZ) border, allowing it to rapidly prepare for full- scale conflict with
South Korea.63 Analysts estimate that North Korean artillery forces, fortified
in thousands of underground facilities, could fire thousands of artillery
rounds at metropolitan Seoul in the first hour of a war.64 Most North
Korean major combat equipment, however, is old and inferior to the modern
systems of the U.S. and ROK militaries. With few exceptions, North Korean
tanks, fighter aircraft, armored personnel carriers, and some ships are based
on Soviet designs from the 1950s-1970s. Although North Korea does not have
the resources to modernize its entire military, it has selectively invested in
asymmetric capabilities to mitigate the qualitative advantage of U.S. and ROK
forces. As described in other sections, North Korea has made the
development of nuclear weapons and long-range ballistic missiles a top
priority. North Korea has a large stockpile of chemical weapons and may have
biological weapons as well. Analysts assess that in recent years Pyongyang
has developed the ability to conduct ofensive cyber operations but its cyber
warfare capabilities lag behind the most advanced nations.65 Open-source
intelligence reports indicate that North Korea may have developed an anti-
ship cruise missile (ASCM) based on Russian technology and UAVs that can
deliver a precision strike similar to a cruise missile.66 In the maritime
domain, North Korea constructed two new helicopter-carrier corvettes and
may be developing a new, larger model of submarine (perhaps to launch
ballistic missiles).
4 Many different ballistic missiles are being developed

too

1
Official reports indicate that North Korea has also been developing a road-
mobile ICBM, dubbed the KN-08, although this missile has never been flight-
tested.44 Analysts examining commercial satellite imagery believe that North
Korea has conducted multiple tests of KN-08 rocket engines, but the system
should it function successfullyis likely more than a year away from even an
initial deployment.45 In a military parade in October 2015, North Korea
displayed what appears to be a modified version of the KN-08. An analysis by
missile experts outside the U.S. government concluded that the modifications
to the missile will likely delay its entry into service until 2020 or beyond.46
The potential ability of North Korea to miniaturize a nuclear warhead and
mate it to a ballistic missile, especially an ICBM, is a key concern of the
United States. The DNI stated in April 2013, North Korea has not yet
demonstrated the full range of capabilities necessary for a nuclear armed
missile.47 Yet experts at the Institute for Science and International Security
assessed in February 2013 that North Korea likely has the capability to
mount a plutonium-based nuclear warhead on the shorter range [800-mile]
Nodong missile.48 General Curtis Scaparrotti, the commander of U.S. Forces
Korea, stated in October 2014, I dont know that [North Korea has a
functioning, miniaturized nuclear device].... What Im saying is, is that I think
given their technological capabilities, the time that they been working on
this, that they probably have the capabilities to put this together.49 And in
April 2015, Admiral William Gortney, the commander of U.S. Northern
Command, seemingly veered from the official U.S. intelligence community
assessment when he said that it was his assessment that North Korea has
the ability to put a nuclear weapon on a KN-08 and shoot it at the
homeland.50 Until North Korea tests such a device, the outside world will
remain uncertain about North Korean nuclear capabilities. In 2015, North
Korea revealed that it has been developing a submarine-launched ballistic
missile (SLBM) capability, announcing the first test launch (apparently, an
ejection test) in May 2015. The second reported SLBM test, in December
2015, was a failure, according to outside analyses of footage released by
North Korean media.51 SLBM technology is extremely difficult to develop, and
the reports of testing do not indicate that North Koreas prototype ballistic
missile submarines represent an imminent threat. One expert on North
Korean military matters concluded in May 2015 that ... under optimal
conditions this [SLBM capability is] an emerging regional threat rather than
an imminent threat. It does not represent an emerging intercontinental
threat.52

#3North Korea Wont Give up
the Bomb
They say __________________________________________________, but

facts)
to be true)
their argument)

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2 Talks convince North Korea to end the nuclear
program
KO, 2012 [Sangtu, Student at Yonsei Unversity in South Korea,

https://www.psa.ac.uk/sites/default/files/conference/papers/2014/six%20party
%20talks(edited).pdf
Despite the failure of the Six-Party Talks, most of the concerned

countries still consider the talks the only way to address the long-
standing nuclear crisis on the Korean Peninsula. China and Russia have
consistently demanded that all concerned parties resume negotiations
without any preconditions.2 The former North Korean leader, Kim Jong-il,
showed his readiness to rejoin the Six-Party Talks.3 The US wants to maintain
dialogue with North Korea because there seems to be no other option for
dissuading North Korea from pursuing a nuclear weapons program without
the Six-Party Talks. The US, Japan, and South Korea want to return to the
negotiating table once North Korea takes the key steps agreed upon.4
Because the Six-Party Talks have not lost their practical usefulness, it is worth
finding the cause of the failure and elaborating on ways to improve the talks.
The Six-Party Talks are a multilateral arrangement and a kind of international
institution, specifically, an international security regime. In this context, this
article aims to examine the reason why the talks failed from the perspective
of regime theory. The existing literature deals mostly with the Six-Party Talks
from the perspective of the actors, and attributes their failure to Chinas
support of North Korea or the fact that North Korea insists on sticking to its
nuclear weapons development program. In contrast to the actor approach,
this article tries to find the root causes of the failure of the Six-Party Talks
from the institutional approach. The logical ground for selecting this approach
lies in the fact that the Six-Party Talks represent an institutional attempt to
solve the North Korean nuclear problem. International problems can
hardly be solved by a single country. Even a super power often
resorts to a multilateral institution to increase the effectiveness of
its problem-solving capability.5 In this context, the United States started
the Six-Party Talks to secure the collaboration of the Northeast Asian
countries. This means the US sought a multilateral approach after the Geneva
Framework had failed as a bilateral approach. The United States realized it
alone could not tackle the North Korean nuclear problem and tried to gain the
greatest possible assistance from the concerned countries.
1
3 All countries have reachable objectives including
ending the nuclear weapons program
Council on Foreign Relations, 2013 [Major international political journal,

The Six Party Talks on North Korea's Nuclear Program,
September 13, http://www.cfr.org/proliferation/six-party-talks-
north-koreas-nuclear-program/p13593]
United States: For Washington, the Six Party Talks serve as a platform for the
multilateral mediation of North Korea's nuclear program. The chief U.S.
concern remains Pyongyang's nuclear program and the possible sale of
nuclear materials and technology to hostile states and terrorist groups. As
part of any agreement, Washington wants the reclusive state to consent to
visits from IAEA monitors. North Korea: The regime seeks a
nonaggression security pledge from the United States, which deploys
28,500 troops in South Korea and maintains a heavy naval presence in the
Pacific. Pyongyang also wants normalized relations with Washington and
access to economic aid from other Six Party countries. South Korea: Frozen in
an unresolved conflict with North Korea, Seoul's ultimate goal is the
denuclearization and reunification of the Korean peninsula. The South also
wishes to liberalize North Korea's decrepit economy (PDF) through greater
financial engagement aimed at mitigating the potential cost of future
reunification. China: Beijing serves as Pyongyang's long-standing ally
and main trade partner and has used its influence to bring North
Korea to the negotiating table. Although this leverage has boosted its
relations with Washington, Beijing also fears a rush of refugees across its
border and has thus provided the North with energy and food assistance. In
March 2013, China finally agreed to sponsor UN sanctions alongside the
United States, and it has since then increased its rhetoric for the resumption
of talks. Russia: Moscow's position at the table allows it to reassert its
influence in Northeast Asia. Although it has traditionally joined China in
warning against harsh sanctions, North Korea's recent provocations have
driven it to issue condemnations against the regime's nuclear testing. Russia
ultimately backed renewed UN sanctions against Pyongyang over its third
nuclear test, and it has consistently expressed concerns about the North's
activities. Japan: Tokyo worries that North Korea's missile tests could
potentially reach Japan. But it also views the Six Party Talks as a forum for
negotiating a resolution to the abduction of Japanese citizens by North Korean
spies in the 1970s and 1980s. The issue remains a divisive point in U.S.-Japan
1
relations, as Tokyo had not wanted Washington to remove North Korea from
its State Sponsors of Terrorism list until the issue was resolved.
2AC Harms (Regime Change)
2AC Harms (Regime Change) AT

#1Regime Change Coming Now
They say North Korean regime change will happen naturally, but
1. Extend our Human Rights Watch evidence.

facts)
to be true)
their argument)

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#2--No Moral Obligation
They say Theres no moral obligation to improve human rights , but
Its much better than their analytic evidence because:
more facts)
their argument)

First, our author is a professor and ethical expert at the college
level. We should trust his logical argument. Second, their argument
does not make sense. We should always try to protect human rights
even if we cant fix all violations. If people thought that way, we
wouldnt try to fix any of the worlds problems.
This matters because: this frames the debate. The judge should
always vote to protect human rights and we do that best.
2 US human rights protections are modeled globally

its ethical and practical to protect them
1
Human Rights First, 2012 [nonprofit, nonpartisan international human rights organization based
in New York and Washington D.C., How to Integrate Human Rights into U.S.-China Relations, December,
On human rights, the United States must be a beacon. Activists fighting for
freedom around the globe continue to look to us for inspiration and count on us
for support. Upholding human rights is not only a moral obligation; its a vital
national interest. America is strongest when our policies and actions match our
values. Human Rights First is an independent advocacy and action organization
that challenges America to live up to its ideals. We believe American leadership is
essential in the struggle for human rights so we press the U.S. government and
private companies to respect human rights and the rule of law. When they dont,
we step in to demand reform, accountability and justice. Around the world, we
work where we can best harness American influence to secure core freedoms. We
know that it is not enough to expose and protest injustice, so we create the
political environment and policy solutions necessary to ensure consistent respect
for human rights. Whether we are protecting refugees, combating torture, or
defending persecuted minorities, we focus not on making a point, but on making
a diference. For over 30 years, weve built bipartisan coalitions and teamed up
with frontline activists and lawyers to tackle issues that demand American
leadership.

#3High Magnitude Impacts
Outweigh
They say Large wars outweigh human rights, but

Its much better than their Ochs evidence because:
facts)
to be true)
( Probability is more important than magnitude) (their evidence
supports our argument)

Our Gibney evidence discusses the point that their Ochs evidence
makes. Gibney argues that logic is wrong because it lets thousands
die daily. Furthermore, the more probable impact should be
preferred because, while their impact is bad, theres an infinitely
small chance it will happen.
This matters because: if human rights protections come first, the
judge must vote for the aff. We outweigh all of their impacts.
2 Low risk, high magnitude impacts are extremely

flawedits propaganda and causes war
PARRY, 2012 [Robert, broke many of the Iran-Contra stories in the 1980s
for the Associated Press and Newsweek, Return of Cheneys One Percent
Doctrine, Feb. 4, https://consortiumnews.com/2012/02/04/return-of-cheneys-
one-percent-doctrine/]
One Percent Doctrine But it should be clear what the game is. Israeli
hardliners and American neocons want a return to former Vice President Dick
Cheneys one percent doctrine, as described by author Ron Suskind. That
is, if there is even a one percent chance that a terrorist attack might be
launched against the United States, it must be treated as a certainty, thus
justifying any preemptive military action that U.S. officials deem warranted.
That was the mad-hatter policy that governed the U.S. run-up to the Iraq War,
when even the most dubious and dishonest claims by self-interested Iraqi
exiles and their neocon friends were treated as requiring a bloody invasion of
a country then at peace. In those days, not only was there a flood of
disinformation from outside the U.S. government, there also was a readiness
inside George W. Bushs administration to channel those exaggerations and
lies into a powerful torrent of propaganda aimed at the American people, still
shaken from the barbarity of the 9/11 attacks. So, the American people heard
how Iraq might dispatch small remote-controlled planes to spray the United
States with chemical or biological weapons, although Iraq was on the other
side of the globe. The New York Times hyped bogus claims about aluminum
tubes for nuclear centrifuges. Other news outlets spread false stories about
Iraq seeking uranium from Niger and about supposed Iraqi links to al-Qaeda
terrorists. There was a stampede of one-upsmanship in the U.S. news media
as everyone competed to land the latest big scoop about Iraqs nefarious
intentions and capabilities. Even experienced journalists were sucked in . In
explaining one of these misguided articles, New York Times correspondent
Chris Hedges told the Columbia Journalism Review that We tried to vet the
defectors and we didnt get anything out of Washington that said, these guys
are full of shit. Based in Paris, Hedges said he would get periodic calls from
his editors asking that he check out defector stories originating from Ahmed
Chalabis pro-invasion Iraqi National Congress. I thought he was unreliable
and corrupt, but just because someone is a sleazebag doesnt mean he might
not know something or that everything he says is wrong, Hedges said. More
Scary Talk Even after the U.S. invasion of Iraq in 2003 and the eventual
1
realization that the fear-mongering was based on falsehoods, President Bush
kept up the scary talk with claims about Iraq as the central front in the war
on terror and al-Qaeda building a caliphate stretching from Indonesia to
Spain and thus threatening the United States. Fear seemed to be the
great motivator for getting the American people to line up behind
actions that, on balance, often created greater dangers for the
United States. Beyond the illegality and immorality of attacking other
countries based on such fabrications, there was the practical issue of
unintended consequences. Which is the core logical fallacy of Cheneys one
percent doctrine. Overreacting to an extremely unlikely threat can
create additional risks that also exceed the one percent threshold,
which, in turn, require more violent responses, thus cascading
outward until the country essentially destroys itself in pursuit of the
illusion of perfect security. The one percent doctrine is like the
scene in The Sorcerers Apprentice as the lazy helper enchants a
splintering broom to carry water for him but then cannot control the
ensuing chaos of a disastrous flood. The rational approach to national
security is not running around screaming about imaginary dangers but
evaluating the facts carefully and making judgments as to how the threats
can be managed without making matters worse.
1
3 Failure to prevent human rights abuses risks nuclear
war
Mawdsley, 2008 (Christy, Texas A&M U. An Interest in Intervention: A Moral Argument for Darfur.
http://asq.africa.ufl.edu/files/Mawdsley-Vol10Issue1.pdf)
Scholars and policymakers who propose that international stability is not relevant
to U.S. national interests misunderstand the very nature of a globalized world . A
globalized world, by definition, is one that entails aggregated systems of all types: economic,
communications, transportation, ecological, and others. International stability levels have the
potential to feed in to each one of these systems , thereby afecting American quality of
life either positively or negatively (albeit to varying degrees). Genocide and similar atr ocities have
historically shown to have destabilizing efects. Because of globalization, this may have
an (indirect or direct) negative efect on the American national interest. In the Darfur genocide, for
instance, millions of refugees have fled over the SudaneseChadian border into Chad, contributing to higher
monetary and resource costs for the already poor government of Chad. The humanitarian crisis that has
ensued in both Chad and Sudan divert resources from important areas in need of funding such as
education, the fight against the HIV/AIDS epidemic, and economic development. In a world of independent
nations, U.S. policymakers could write this of as irrelevant to the national interest. But in a globalized
world, airplanes cross borders thousands of times a day, and the U.S. imports goods and resources from
nuclear weapons can be launched from one continent and
hundreds of nations, and
hit another. Though these impacts might be irrelevant in the Darfur genocide, they might
become far more relevant in a future genocide in a more strategically-
relevant location. Ideas and products flow freely in this age, and it is certainly in the U.S. national
interest to prevent the spread of the instability caused by genocide in our globalized world. What makes an
activist approach when faced with genocide or similar events far more compelling is the argument that
action is not only consistent with U.S. interests but also with U.S. values. Values are important because, in
a multi-cultural, multi-lingual, multi-ethnic country such as the United States, they are precisely what bring
American citizens together as a nation. The values upheld in the U.S. Declaration of Independence and
Constitution are the glue that gives American people a shared identity. They are thus of immense weight in
U.S. survival as a nation. Our values should be upheld consistently both in domestic and foreign policy. An
inconsistent application of our values in the broadest sense will lead to an erosion of the strength of the
United States as a common nation as values are indeed the foundation.
2AC Harms (Regime Change) -

North Korea Oppression
Extensions
1. North Korea has prison camps where people are
worked to death and thousands of children go hungry

Although the nuclear issue has dominated negotiations with Pyongyang, U.S.
officials regularly voice concerns about North Koreas abysmal human rights
record.70 Congress has passed bills and held hearings to draw attention to
this problem and seek a resolution. The plight of most North Koreans is dire.
The State Departments annual human rights reports and reports from private
organizations have portrayed a little-changing pattern of extreme human
rights abuses by the North Korean regime over many years.71 The reports
stress a total denial of political, civil, and religious liberties and say that no
dissent or criticism of leadership is allowed. Freedoms of speech, the press,
and assembly do not exist. There is no independent judiciary, and citizens do
not have the right to choose their own government. Reports also document
the extensive ideological indoctrination of North Korean citizens. Severe
physical abuse is meted out to citizens who violate laws and restrictions.
Multiple reports have described a system of prison camps (kwanliso) that
house roughly 100,000 political prisoners, including family members who are
considered guilty by association.72 Reports from survivors and escapees from
the camps indicate that conditions are extremely harsh and that many do not
survive. Reports cite starvation, disease, executions, and torture of prisoners
as a frequent practice. (Conditions for nonpolitical prisoners in local-level
collection centers and labor training centers are hardly better.) The
number of political prisoners in North Korea appears to have declined in
recent years, likely as a result of high mortality rates in the camps.73 In
addition to the extreme curtailment of rights, many North Koreans face
limited access to health care and significant food shortages. UNICEF has
reported that each year some 40,000 North Korean children under five
1
became acutely malnourished, with 25,000 needing hospital treatment.
Food security is a constant problem for North Koreans, many of whom
reportedly sufer from stunting due to poor nutrition. Many of these health
and social problems are rooted in political decisions; access to resources in
North Korea generally often is highly dependent upon geographic location,
and the government decides where families can live depending on the degree
of loyalty to the state.
1
2. North Korea is a totalitarian state that abuses its
citizens
CNN, 2014 ['Abundant evidence' of crimes against humanity in

North Korea, panel says, February 18,
http://www.cnn.com/2014/02/17/world/asia/north-korea-un-
report/]
A stunning catalog of torture and the widespread abuse of even the

weakest of North Koreans reveal a portrait of a brutal state "that
does not have any parallel in the contemporary world," a United
Nations panel reported Monday. North Korean leaders employ murder,
torture, slavery, sexual violence, mass starvation and other abuses as tools to
prop up the state and terrorize "the population into submission," the United
Nations Commission of Inquiry on Human Rights (COI) in North Korea said in
its report The commission said it would refer its findings to the International
Criminal Court (ICC) for possible prosecution. It also sent a letter warning
North Korean leader Kim Jong Un that he could face prosecution for crimes
against humanity, and said other options include establishing of an ad hoc
tribunal by the United Nations. Even before the report's release, China, a
permanent member of the U.N. Security Council and staunch ally of North
Korea, has said it would not to allow human rights charges to proceed to the
ICC. The almost yearlong investigation traced the abuses directly to the
highest levels of the North Korean government while simultaneously blaming
world leaders for sitting on their hands amid untold agony. The U.N. panel
released its 400-page report after hearing from more than 320 witnesses in
public hearings and private interviews. North Korea is a state, it concluded,
"that does not content itself with ensuring the authoritarian rule of a small
group of people, but seeks to dominate every aspect of its citizens' lives and
terrorizes them from within." "The sufering and tears of the people of North
Korea demand action," commission Chairman Michael Kirby told reporters.
2AC Solvency
2AC Solvency AT #1China Cant

Solve
They say China cant contain North Korea , but
1. Extend our Chanlett-Avery, Rinehart, and Nikitin

evidence.
Its much better than their Lord evidence because:
facts)
to be true)

Their evidence just assumes that there will be no agreement or way
to control North Korea. They just say it has never happened before.
Our concessions will draw in North Korea to agree and China is the
only economic support to North Korea left.
This matters because: if we can fix the problem effectively, then our
Aff solves human right abuses and major war scenarios.
2AC Solvency
1
2 China is the lone standout protecting the regime
theyre economically propping up North Korea

ChinaNorth Korea trade has also steadily increased in recent years: in 2014
trade between the two countries hit $6.86 billion, up from about $500 million
in 2000, according to figures from the Seoul-based Korea Trade-Investment
Promotion Agency. Recent reports indicate that bilateral trade dropped by
almost 15 percent in 2015, though it is unclear whether the dip is a result of
chilled ties between Beijing and Pyongyang or Chinas economic slowdown.
Nevertheless, there is no reason to think that political risks emanating from
North Korea will lead China to withdraw its economic safety net for North
Korea any time soon, writes CFR Senior Fellow Scott Snyder. Aid and Trade
for Pyongyang China provides North Korea with most of its food and energy
supplies and accounts for more than 70 percent of North Korea's total
trade volume (PDF). China is currently North Koreas only economic
backer of any importance, writes Nicholas Eberstadt, senior fellow at the
American Enterprise Institute. In September 2015, the two countries opened
a bulk cargo and container shipping route to boost North Koreas export of
coal to China and China established a high-speed rail route between the
Chinese border city of Dandong and Shenyang, the provincial capital of
Chinas northeastern Liaoning province. In October 2015, the Guomenwan
border trade zone opened in Dandong with the intention of boosting bilateral
economic linkages, much like the Rason economic zone and the Sinujiu
special administrative zone established in North Korea in the early 1990s and
2002, respectively. Dandong is a critical hub for trade, investment, and
tourism for the two neighborsexchanges with North Korea make up 40
percent of the citys total trade. Due to North Koreas increasing
isolation, its dependence on China continues to grow, as indicated
by the significant trade imbalance between the two countries. Some
experts see the trade deficit as an indirect Chinese subsidy, given that North
Korea cannot finance its trade deficit through borrowing. Beijing also provides
aid (PDF) directly to Pyongyang, primarily in food and energy assistance.
China, Japan, South Korea, and the United States have provided more than 75
percent of food aid to North Korea since 1995, but donations from all
countries except for China have shrunk significantly since the collapse of the
2AC Solvency
1
Six Party Talks in 2009. North Korea, whose famine in the 1990s killed
between 800,000 to 2.4 million people, reported its worst drought in decades
in June 2015, with harvests sustaining serious damage. UN agencies
designated up to 70 percent of the population as food insecure. There is also
concern about the distribution of aid in North Korea, particularly since China
has no system (PDF) to monitor shipments. Recently, however, Beijing has
been trying to wean Pyongyang of pure aid in favor of more commercially
viable ties, University of Sydneys James Reilly writes.
2AC Solvency
1
3 China is the lynchpin for North Korea economically
and diplomaticallynow is a key time for the US to
shift the relationship.
Council on Foreign Relations, February 2016 [major international relations

journal with multiple authors, The China-North Korea Relationship, February
8, http://www.cfr.org/china/china-north-korea-relationship/p11097]
China is North Koreas most important ally, biggest trading partner, and main
source of food, arms, and energy. It has helped sustain Kim Jong-uns regime,
and has historically opposed harsh international sanctions on North Korea in
the hope of avoiding regime collapse and a refugee influx across their 870-
mile border. Pyongyangs fourth nuclear test as well as a ballistic missile
launch in early 2016 have complicated its relationship with Beijing, which has
continued to advocate for the resumption of the Six Party Talks, the
multilateral framework aimed at denuclearizing North Korea. A purge of top
North Korean officials since its young leader came to power also spurred
renewed concern from China about the stability and direction of North Korean
leadership. Furthermore, some experts say that an anticipated thawing of
relations between China and South Korea could shift the geopolitical dynamic
in East Asia and undermine China-North Korea ties. Yet despite North Koreas
successive nuclear tests, Chinas policies toward its neighbor have hardly
shifted. China's support for North Korea dates back to the Korean War (1950-
1953), when its troops flooded the Korean Peninsula to aid its northern ally.
Since the war, China has lent political and economic backing to North Korea's
leaders: Kim Il-sung (estimated 1948-1994), Kim Jong-il (roughly 1994-2011),
and Kim Jong-un (2011-). But strains in the relationship began to surface
when Pyongyang tested a nuclear weapon in October 2006 and Beijing
supported UN Security Council Resolution 1718, which imposed sanctions on
Pyongyang. With this resolution and others (UNSC Resolution 1874 (PDF) and
2094 (PDF)), Beijing signaled a shift in tone from diplomacy to punishment.
Following North Koreas third nuclear test in February 2013, China summoned
the North Korean ambassador, implemented new trade sanctions, reduced
energy supplies to North Korea, and called for denuclearization talks.
However, Beijing has continued to have wide-ranging ties with Pyongyang,
including economic exchanges and high-level state trips such as senior
Chinese Communisty Party member Li Yunshan's visit to attend the
seventieth anniversary of North Koreas ruling party in October 2015.
Separately, China has stymied international punitive action against North
Korea over human rights violations. China criticized a February 2014 UN
2AC Solvency
1
report that detailed human rights abuses in North Korea, including torture,
forced starvation, and crimes against humanity, and attempted to block UN
Security Council sessions held in December 2014 and 2015 on the countrys
human rights status. In March 2010, China refused to take a stance against
North Korea, despite conclusive evidence that showed Pyongyangs
involvement in sinking a South Korean naval vessel. Even Chinas punitive
steps have been restrained. Beijing only agreed to UN Resolution 1718 after
revisions removed requirements for tough economic sanctions beyond those
targeting luxury goods. It did agree to further sanctions, some of which called
for inspections of suspected nuclear or missile trade, but Western officials
and experts doubt how committed China is to implementing trade
restrictions.
2AC Solvency
1
4 China sees North Korea as their sphere of influence

China regards stability on the Korean peninsula as its primary interest . Its
support for North Korea ensures a friendly nation on its northeastern border and provides a bufer between
China and the democratic South, which is home to around 29,000 U.S. troops and marines. For the
the avoidance of war are the top priorities , says Daniel Sneider of
Chinese, stability and
PeninsulaThe specter of
Stanfords Asia-Pacific Research Center. Crisis Guide: The Korean
hundreds of thousands of North Korean refugees flooding into China is a huge
worry for Beijing. China would prefer to avoid a calamity on its border
especially since North Koreas collapse would destroy Chinas strategic bufer
and probably bring U.S. troops too close to comfort , write Yonsei Universitys John
Delury and Moon Chung-in. Beijing has consistently urged world powers not to push Pyongyang too hard,
for fear of precipitating a regime collapse. Sanctions
are not an end in themselves, said
Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi in January 2016. The refugee issue is already a
problem: Beijings promise to repatriate North Koreans escaping across the border has consistently
triggered condemnation from human rights groups. Beijng began constructing a barbed-wire fence a
decade ago to prevent migrants from crossing, but the International Rescue Committee estimates thirty to
sixty thousand North Koreans refugees live in China, though some non-governmental organizations believe
the total to be more than 200,000. (Some experts say significant trafficking risks exist for North Korean
girls and women (PDF) who have either escaped to China or been kidnapped.) The majority of refugees
first make their way to China before moving to other parts of Asia, including South Korea. However,
strengthened border controls under Kim Jong-un have vastly decreased the outflow of refugees.
2AC Solvency
2AC Solvency AT #2Sanctions

Fail
They say sanctions wont work, but

facts)
to be true)
their argument)

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2AC Solvency
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2AC Solvency
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2 Reducing military aggression will bring North Korea
to the negotiating table
Zhe, February 2016 [Sun, Sun Zhe is currently an adjunct senior

research scholar and co-director of the China Initiative at School
of International and Public Afairs of Columbia University, What
New Approach Should the U.S. and China Take to North Korea?,
February 10, https://www.chinafile.com/conversation/what-new-
approach-should-us-and-china-take-north-korea]
North Koreas continued bomb tests have apparently infuriated China, so why
is Beijing still reluctant to react with harsh sanctions? Chinas policy on North
Korea reflects both its regional interests and global aspirations. There are two
main aspects: first, China does not want to hurt or is not ready to abandon
the traditional relationship and turn itself into an enemy of the DPRK. As a
matter of fact, China has tried very hard to push a three- step dialogue,
beginning with a consensus between the North and South, extending to a
North Korea-U.S. dialogue, and then ending with a peaceful solution found in
the Six Party Talks. Chinas logic is that the DPRK will not give up its
provocative acts unless it obtains a minimum security guarantee
from the U.S. If all these positive steps cannot be achieved, then at least
the head-on blow against the DPRK should not come from China directly.
Secondly, any change of Chinas North Korea policy should not be seen as a
product of U.S.-China cooperation to put pressure on North Korea. Indeed,
despite serious debates in China over whether North Korea is a strategic
liability or an asset, many Chinese commentators are deeply concerned
with military reactions by the U.S. and its allies in the region. The
general perception that the U.S. spares no eforts to keep China, rather than
North Korea, down is real among Chinese citizens and government officials.
For instance, the U.S. overreacted by sending B-2s and B52s to participate in
repeated military drills in the past. North Korea should be free of nuclear
weapons but launching any regime-change strike against Pyongyang should
not be the policy choice. Even a THAAD system in the region, in Chinas view,
might compose a bigger challenge to regional security than did North Koreas
latest launch. The contest of will between North Korea and international
community will continue but it is necessary for the U.S. and China to better
comprehend each others policy limits and fashion some joint actions to help
avoid conflicts and confrontations that neither side wants on the Korean
Peninsula. It will not be easy to do it, since the U.S. seems to lose strategic
2AC Solvency
1
patience on China as well. Without Chinas cooperation, will the U.S.
mobilize its allies and take unilateral military actions such as a surgical strike
against the DPRK? Its highly unlikely at this time. The question left for us to
consider then is this: If relations between China and the U.S. over the last two
decades can generally be characterized as a mix of broad contact, substantial
cooperation, deep competition, and occasional confrontation, can these two
countries launch another round of dialogue on the Korean issue to find a way
of turning black clouds into silver linings? Perhaps neither side is ready yet.
But without these two countries working together, a forced choice strategy
putting new pressure for North Korea will not work alone.
2AC Solvency
1
3 Sanctions solve
Freeman, February 2016 [Carla, Executive Director of the Foreign Policy Institute at Johns Hopkins
School of Advanced International Studies (SAIS), where she is concurrently Associate Director of the China
Studies program and an Associate Research Professor, What New Approach Should the U.S. and China
Take to North Korea?, February 10, https://www.chinafile.com/conversation/what-new-approach-should-us-
and-china-take-north-korea]
The United States current policy toward North Korea is a

reflection of frustration with past failures and fantasies born of
misplaced hope. Frustration and exhaustion are the yield of years
of fruitless negotiations with Pyongyang after the Bush
Administrations retrospectively disastrous trashing of Clintons
eforts referred to by John Delury. Misplaced hope relates to this
frustration and exhaustion and is reflected in the decision to let North Korea
Chinas ally and territorial neighbor, after allbe Chinas problem:
the policy characterized as strategic patience of the Obama Administration.
The assumption is that the Sino-North Korean Mutual Aid and
Cooperation Friendship Treaty mirrors U.S.-style alliance
relationships. Misplaced hope weaves our secret dream that the
North Korean state will collapse amid cries for democracy or that
somehow the real western-educated Kim Jong-un will emerge
and lead his country down a path of reform and opening despite
the brutal evidence to the contrary. Kim Jong-un assumed the title
of marshal, signaling the formal consolidation of his leadership
after the country enshrined its nuclear status in its Constitution
making the threat of an existential threat to the regime from the
U.S. and its allies existential. The Six Party Talks as a
denuclearization process is among the growing stack of corpses
of those executed for their failure to serve the interests of the
state. It is clearer than ever before that neither change from within North
Korea nor old modes of engaging the regime will achieve the US goal of
denuclearization. For a brief moment, it seemed as if South Korea
under President Parks determined leadership could carve a new
path toward peace and security on the peninsula by focusing on
reunification, a trustpolitik in which through her good offices both
China and the U.S. could also be engaged. However, in response
2AC Solvency
1
to North Koreas recent provocations, for the first time since the
South Korea-North Korea joint industrial park at Kaesong was
opened, Seoul unilaterally closed the symbolic facility. Since
Parks ambitious vision is stalled and neither Chinas calls to get
back to the Six Party table, nor American strategic patience or
pleas to Beijing to get Pyongyang in line are working, what should
the U.S. do? Sanctions offer a punitive response but not a strategy
they can help create conditions for negotiations or can contribute to
but rarely cause internally-driven policy change on the part of the
targeted state. One response beyond sanctions seems to be to
move toward deploying THAAD, which has a defensive logic but is
akin to putting a gated community in a crime-ridden
neighborhood. It doesnt solve the reasons the neighborhood is
tough and it makes it harder to work with everyone outside the
gates. The U.S. now finds itself in a position where it needs to be
both bolder and even more patient, developing a strategy that
will have to rest on several factors that the U.S. has so far found
difficult to fully accept. First, the U.S. should see North Korea as operating
from a position of pathological insecurity and attendant mistrust . Now,
however, North Korea is also like the suicidal person on the roof
but instead of a gun to the head it is armed with nuclear material
it is in command of the situation. Second, the U.S. should act
from the understanding that for many reasons a surgical strike on
North Koreas nuclear facilities carries potential costs that are far
too high to rationally entertain. Third, U.S. policy must proceed
from the view that achieving the goal of denuclearization given
the development of North Koreas nuclear program is more
difficult than ever. These factors add up to the conclusion that,
unless we are so committed to waiting for Godot that we are
willing to risk more threats to the security of ourselves and our
allies, diplomacy is the only option. The U.S. must open bilateral
talks with North Korea, while working intimately with South Korea
and consulting with China, as well as other stakeholders in the
region. Tighter, tougher sanctions and moving toward the deployment of
greater strategic assets in the South can generate an environment more
conducive to talks. With denuclearization as the goal, negotiations
will assuredly be long and tortuous. They may enhance stability
2AC Solvency
1
and help build trust, and perhaps even help to slow weapons
development, but to have any chance of achieving greater
outcomes will require putting something Pyongyang wants on the
table.
4 Exchanging security assurances for strong economic

sanctions resolves North Korean aggression
Kleine-Ahlbrandt, 2014 [Stephanie, joined the U.S. Institute of Peace as Director of the Asia-Pacific
Program in August 2013. Previously, she set up and ran the Beijing office of the International Crisis Group
for five years, engaging in research, analysis and promotion of policy prescriptions on the role of China in
conflict areas around the world and its relations with neighboring countries. U.S.-China Cooperation on
North Korea: What are the Options? June 9,
United States policy towards North Korea aims at achieving verifiable steps
toward denuclearization -- which China says it wants, too. The U.S. believes
that the best way to accomplish this is through targeted financial measures
and conditional engagement. Beijing disagrees. It argues that Pyongyang
needs security assurances and encouragement for economic reform, and that
this might produce a willingness in the long term on Pyongyangs part to
revisit its nuclear weapons program. Meanwhile, Pyongyangs nuclear
stockpile continues to expand, missile delivery systems are being improved,
the danger grows of spreading nuclear weapons technology, and the threat to
U.S. allies increases. Clearly the U.S. tactic of trying to persuade China to
come over to its approach isnt having the desired efect. The idea that China
can and will compel Pyongyang to give up its nuclear weapons cannot be the
basis of sound U.S. policy. Following North Koreas 3rd nuclear test [in
February 2013], Western officials and analysts interpreted President Xi
Jinpings stronger emphasis on denuclearization as a sign of a policy shift and
greater convergence between U.S. and Chinese national interests. But this
shift in rhetoric did not translate into any measures to press North Korea to
denuclearize or in any sense change Chinese priorities on the [Korean]
Peninsula. While China does not want a nuclear North Korea, what it wants
even less are scenarios such as war, the collapse of the regime, or a reunited
Peninsula [that] allows a U.S. presence on [Chinas] border . Even when
Chinese analysts believe North Koreas weapons buildup damages Chinas
strategic interests, they think that North Korea is simply trying to guarantee
its security in the face of existential threats from the United States. In this
regard, they cite examples such as Iraq, the NATO operation in Libya and now
Ukraine as evidence that renunciation of weapons of mass destruction would
2AC Solvency
1
only result in regime change. Beijing arguably maintains an interest in the
survival of the North Korean regime for its own domestic legitimacy. At a time
when President Xi is working to bolster his [Chinese Communist] Partys
standing through ambitious anti-corruption measures and a bold economic
reform program, the last thing he needs is the failure or collapse of a
communist regime next door. And these fears are [exacerbated] by the fact
that the Chinese see the fall of Myanmar to western values as a country on
Chinas border that is now falling into the western camp. China sees the
nuclear issue as just one component of its broader bilateral relationship with
North Korea, which is based on a policy of sustaining the country to integrate
it more fully into the international economy. Chinese officials see economic
engagement as part of a long-term process that will ultimately change North
Koreas strategic calculations with regard to nuclear weapons. To be sure,
there is not much afection left between China and North Korea. But Chinese
mistrust of the U.S. remains the primary obstacle to meaningful U.S.
cooperation on the Peninsula. When China looks at North Korea, it does
so through a geopolitical strategic lens featuring U.S.-China competition at its
core. Consensus amongst analysts in Beijing is that the U.S.-led bloc is using
North Korea as a pretext to deepen its Asia rebalance, to strengthen regional
alliances, move missile defense and military assets to the region and expand
military exercises. As a result of this mismatch [of] strategic views between
the U.S. and China, the very tools being used by both sides are arguably
contradictory. Whereas Washington sees diplomatic isolation as essential,
China sees diplomatic engagement and dialogue as necessary. Where
Washington sees economic sanctions as the best way to deal with the
Peninsula, China sees economic cooperation and support as the best way to
move forward. And finally, where the U.S sees deterrence as important, China
sees security assurances as necessary. So in this situation, what can actually
be done? Well, there are no good options, only a series of trade-ofs. The
basic choice for U.S. policymakers is [among]: trying to change Chinas
perception of its self interest, which is highly unlikely; applying more pressure
on China in return for its [reacting] more strongly to things like any new long-
range missile launches or nuclear tests -- Beijing could agree, conceivably, to
some new increment of punishment after any nuclear test, ballistic missile
flight-test or space launch; or attempting to find a more collaborative
approach that draws on Chinas interest in engaging North Korea alongside
continued U.S.-led multilateral pressure.
2AC Solvency
2AC Solvency AT #3Six Party

Talks Fail
They say __________________________________________________, but

facts)
to be true)
their argument)

______________________________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________________________
2AC Solvency
1
2 Talks solve human rights abuses

During the past decade, the United Nations has been an important forum to
recognize human rights violations in North Korea. Since 2004, the U.N.
Human Rights Council has annually renewed the mandate of the Special
Rapporteur on the human rights situation in North Korea. Member states have
also addressed the issue through annual resolutions in the U.N. General
Assembly. Led by Japan and the European Union, the U.N. Human Rights
Council established for the first time in March 2013 a commission to
investigate the systematic, widespread and grave violations of human rights
in the Democratic Peoples Republic of Korea ... with a view to ensuring full
accountability, in particular where these violations may amount to crimes
against humanity. The Commission of Inquiry (COI) conducted public
hearings in South Korea, Japan, and the United States to collect information
and shed light on the inhumane conditions in North Korea. The COI concluded
in February 2014 that North Korea had committed crimes against humanity
and the individuals responsible should face charges at the ICC. In November
2014, U.N. member states voted overwhelmingly (111 yes; 19 no; 55
abstaining) to recommend that the UNSC refer the human rights situation in
North Korea to the ICC. Although it appears likely that either Russia or China
(or both) will use their veto at the UNSC to prevent the ICC from taking up
this case, the United Nations has become a central forum for pressuring
North Korea to respect the human rights of its citizens. Commentators have
credited the U.N. process for pushing the regime to engage on the human
rights issue, although official North Korean news outlets and public
statements continue to accuse hostile forces of politicizing the human
rights issue in order to bring down the regime. Pyongyang officials have
appeared more concerned than in the past about international condemnation
of North Koreas human rights record. When the COI results were announced,
North Koreas U.N. diplomats tried unsuccessfully to change the language in a
draft resolution. They sought to drop the ICC reference in exchange for an
official visit by the U.N. Special Rapporteur on human rights in North Korea.
This unusually strong resistance by North Korea may indicate a genuine fear
of the consequences of an ICC investigation into crimes against humanity.
In October 2014, North Korean officials gave a briefing at the United Nations
that mentioned for the first time North Koreas detention centers and reform
through labor policies, though stopped short of acknowledging the harsher
2AC Solvency
1
political prison camps (kwanliso). North Korea also announced that it had
ratified a U.N. protocol on child protection in an apparent attempt to push
back against the scathing U.N. report. It remains to be seen whether this
round of U.N.-centered diplomacy leads to sustained dialogue on human
rights issues with North Korea, or whether it causes North Korea to further
isolate itself from the international community.
3 Sanctions are historically effective if done correctly
Council on Foreign Relations, 2013 [Major international political journal, The Six Party Talks
on North Korea's Nuclear Program, September 13, http://www.cfr.org/proliferation/six-party-talks-north-
koreas-nuclear-program/p13593]
The September 2005 pact saw Pyongyang agree to abandon its nuclear
program, rejoin the NPT, and allow the reentry of IAEA monitors in exchange
for food and energy assistance. The accord also paved the way for Pyongyang
to normalize relations with both the United States and Japan and negotiate a
peace agreement for the Korean peninsula. Talks hit a roadblock just one
month later, however, when the U.S. Treasury Department placed restrictions
on Macao-based Banco Delta Asia, which Washington suspected was
laundering millions for North Korea. The Macau government subsequently
froze roughly fifty accounts held by Pyongyang. As the talks fell apart, North
Korea stepped up its provocations, testing a long-range rocket and holding its
first underground nuclear explosion in the latter half of 2006. Beijing pressed
North Korea to rejoin the multilateral framework after the nuclear crisis came
to a head. During the sixth round of talks in February 2007, members
hammered out a denuclearization plan involving a sixty-day deadline for
Pyongyang to freeze its nuclear program in exchange for aid and the release
of the Banco Delta Asia funds. The process gained momentum in the second
half of 2007, when Pyongyang began disabling its Yongbyon plant, removing
thousands of fuel rods under the guidance of U.S. experts. Progress continued
in mid-2008 after Pyongyang made more concessions, providing the United
States with extensive details of its nuclear program and further dismantling
the Yongbyon facility. The Bush administration responded by easing sanctions
on the regime and removing it from the State Sponsors of Terrorism list. But
Pyongyang failed to agree to a verification protocol for its nuclear program by
the end of Bush's term, straining U.S.-North Korea relations. By the end of
2008, the regime had restarted its program and barred nuclear inspectors in
an efort to pressure U.S. negotiators.
2AC Solvency
1
4 Exchanging security assurances for strong economic
sanctions bring resolves North Korean aggression
Kleine-Ahlbrandt, 2014 [Stephanie, U.S. Institute of Peace Director of the Asia-Pacific Program
U.S.-China Cooperation on North Korea: What are the Options? June 9,
United States policy towards North Korea aims at achieving verifiable steps toward
denuclearization -- which China says it wants, too. The U.S. believes that the best way to
accomplish this is through targeted financial measures and conditional engagement.
Beijing disagrees. It argues that Pyongyang needs security assurances and
encouragement for economic reform, and that this might produce a willingness in the long
term on Pyongyangs part to revisit its nuclear weapons program. Meanwhile,
Pyongyangs nuclear stockpile continues to expand, missile delivery systems are being
improved, the danger grows of spreading nuclear weapons technology, and the threat to
U.S. allies increases. Clearly the U.S. tactic of trying to persuade China to come over to its
approach isnt having the desired efect. The idea that China can and will compel
Pyongyang to give up its nuclear weapons cannot be the basis of sound U.S. policy.
Following North Koreas 3rd nuclear test [in February 2013], Western officials and analysts
interpreted President Xi Jinpings stronger emphasis on denuclearization as a sign of a
policy shift and greater convergence between U.S. and Chinese national interests. But this
shift in rhetoric did not translate into any measures to press North Korea to denuclearize
or in any sense change Chinese priorities on the [Korean] Peninsula. While China does not
want a nuclear North Korea, what it wants even less are scenarios such as war, the
collapse of the regime, or a reunited Peninsula [that] allows a U.S. presence on [Chinas]
border . Even when Chinese analysts believe North Koreas weapons buildup damages
Chinas strategic interests, they think that North Korea is simply trying to guarantee its
security in the face of existential threats from the United States. In this regard, they cite
examples such as Iraq, the NATO operation in Libya and now Ukraine as evidence that
renunciation of weapons of mass destruction would only result in regime change. Beijing
arguably maintains an interest in the survival of the North Korean regime for its own
domestic legitimacy. At a time when President Xi is working to bolster his [Chinese
Communist] Partys standing through ambitious anti-corruption measures and a bold
economic reform program, the last thing he needs is the failure or collapse of a
communist regime next door. And these fears are [exacerbated] by the fact that the
Chinese see the fall of Myanmar to western values as a country on Chinas border that is
now falling into the western camp. China sees the nuclear issue as just one component of
its broader bilateral relationship with North Korea, which is based on a policy of sustaining
the country to integrate it more fully into the international economy. Chinese officials see
economic engagement as part of a long-term process that will ultimately change North
Koreas strategic calculations with regard to nuclear weapons. To be sure, there is not
much afection left between China and North Korea. But Chinese mistrust of the U.S.
remains the primary obstacle to meaningful U.S. cooperation on the Peninsula.
When China looks at North Korea, it does so through a geopolitical strategic lens featuring
U.S.-China competition at its core. Consensus amongst analysts in Beijing is that the U.S.-
led bloc is using North Korea as a pretext to deepen its Asia rebalance, to strengthen
regional alliances, move missile defense and military assets to the region and expand
military exercises. As a result of this mismatch [of] strategic views between the U.S. and
2AC Solvency
1
China, the very tools being used by both sides are arguably contradictory. Whereas
Washington sees diplomatic isolation as essential, China sees diplomatic engagement and
dialogue as necessary. Where Washington sees economic sanctions as the best way to
deal with the Peninsula, China sees economic cooperation and support as the best way to
move forward. And finally, where the U.S sees deterrence as important, China sees
security assurances as necessary. So in this situation, what can actually be done? Well,
there are no good options, only a series of trade-ofs. The basic choice for U.S.
policymakers is [among]: trying to change Chinas perception of its self interest, which is
highly unlikely; applying more pressure on China in return for its [reacting] more strongly
to things like any new long-range missile launches or nuclear tests -- Beijing could agree,
conceivably, to some new increment of punishment after any nuclear test, ballistic missile
flight-test or space launch; or attempting to find a more collaborative approach that
draws on Chinas interest in engaging North Korea alongside continued U.S.-led
multilateral pressure.
2AC Solvency
2AC Solvency Extensions

1. Reducing military aggression will bring North Korea
to the negotiating table
Zhe, February 2016 [Sun, Sun Zhe is currently an adjunct senior

research scholar and co-director of the China Initiative at School
of International and Public Afairs of Columbia University, What
New Approach Should the U.S. and China Take to North Korea?,
February 10, https://www.chinafile.com/conversation/what-new-
approach-should-us-and-china-take-north-korea]
North Koreas continued bomb tests have apparently infuriated China, so why
is Beijing still reluctant to react with harsh sanctions? Chinas policy on North
Korea reflects both its regional interests and global aspirations. There are two
main aspects: first, China does not want to hurt or is not ready to abandon
the traditional relationship and turn itself into an enemy of the DPRK. As a
matter of fact, China has tried very hard to push a three- step dialogue,
beginning with a consensus between the North and South, extending to a
North Korea-U.S. dialogue, and then ending with a peaceful solution found in
the Six Party Talks. Chinas logic is that the DPRK will not give up its
provocative acts unless it obtains a minimum security guarantee
from the U.S. If all these positive steps cannot be achieved, then at least
the head-on blow against the DPRK should not come from China directly.
Secondly, any change of Chinas North Korea policy should not be seen as a
product of U.S.-China cooperation to put pressure on North Korea. Indeed,
despite serious debates in China over whether North Korea is a strategic
liability or an asset, many Chinese commentators are deeply concerned
with military reactions by the U.S. and its allies in the region. The
general perception that the U.S. spares no eforts to keep China, rather than
North Korea, down is real among Chinese citizens and government officials.
For instance, the U.S. overreacted by sending B-2s and B52s to participate in
repeated military drills in the past. North Korea should be free of nuclear
weapons but launching any regime-change strike against Pyongyang should
not be the policy choice. Even a THAAD system in the region, in Chinas view,
might compose a bigger challenge to regional security than did North Koreas
latest launch. The contest of will between North Korea and international
community will continue but it is necessary for the U.S. and China to better
comprehend each others policy limits and fashion some joint actions to help
2AC Solvency
1
avoid conflicts and confrontations that neither side wants on the Korean
Peninsula. It will not be easy to do it, since the U.S. seems to lose strategic
patience on China as well. Without Chinas cooperation, will the U.S.
mobilize its allies and take unilateral military actions such as a surgical strike
against the DPRK? Its highly unlikely at this time. The question left for us to
consider then is this: If relations between China and the U.S. over the last two
decades can generally be characterized as a mix of broad contact, substantial
cooperation, deep competition, and occasional confrontation, can these two
countries launch another round of dialogue on the Korean issue to find a way
of turning black clouds into silver linings? Perhaps neither side is ready yet.
But without these two countries working together, a forced choice strategy
putting new pressure for North Korea will not work alone.
2. Security guarantees bring China to our side
The Huffington Post, March 2016 [How to Convince China to

Cooperate Against North Korea, March 27,
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/doug-bandow/how-to-convince-
china-to_b_9554496.html]
Washington must make a compelling case to the PRC. The U.S. should begin
by pointing out how unstable the current situation is, with an unpredictable,
uncontrollable regime dedicated to creating a nuclear arsenal of
undetermined size bolstered by intercontinental missiles and submarine-
launched missiles. The Kim dynasty has been ostentatiously brutal in ways
suggesting paranoia and insecurity. All this makes South Korea and its
American patron ever more nervous. Much could go wrong to Chinas
detriment. At the same time, the U.S., along with its allies, the ROK and
Japan, should put together a serious ofer for the North in return for
denuclearization. The PRC has repeatedly insisted that Americas hostile
policy underlies the DPRK nuclear program. Beijing responded acerbically to
Washingtons latest criticism: The origin and crux of the nuclear issue on the
Korean Peninsula has never been China, said a Ministry of Foreign Afairs
spokeswoman: The key to solving the problem is not China. Washington
and its allies should offer a peace treaty, diplomatic recognition,
membership in international organizations, the end of economic
sanctions, suspension of joint military exercises, and discussions
over a continued American troop presence. This should be presented
to the PRC for its advice and to demonstrate that the allies are
2AC Solvency
1
serious about engaging Pyongyang, reducing the threats which
Beijing contends are driving the North Korean nuclear program.
Washington then should ask for Chinas backing. At the same time, the
U.S., South Korea, and Tokyo should promise to share the cost of caring for
North Koreans and restoring order in the case of regime collapse. The U.S.
and South should indicate their willingness to accept temporary Chinese
military intervention in the event of bloody chaos. The ROK should promise to
respect Beijings economic interests while pointing to the far greater
opportunities that would exist in a unified Korea. Finally, Washington should
pledge to withdraw U.S. troops in the event of unification. The reason for
Americas presence would have expired and the PRCs assistance would not
be turned against China. Getting Beijings cooperation still would be a long-
shot. Its certainly not going to happen in response to imperious demands
from Washington. The U.S. will need to practice the art of diplomacy and
make a seemingly bad deal attractive to a skeptical adversary. But the efort
is worth a try. The U.S. and its allies have run out of serious options to
forestall a nuclear North Korea.
CDL Core Files 2016-2017 North Korea Neg
North Korea NEGATIVE

1NC Harms (North Korea War) Frontline
1NC Harms (North Korean War)

Frontline
1. Solvency Turn: North Korea has no nuclear capability
and aggression causes backlash
Infowars, April 2016 [News outlet directly quoting North Korean and American
officials, UNITED STATES PLANS FIRST USE OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS AGAINST
NORTH KOREA, April 26, http://www.infowars.com/united-states-plans-first-
use-of-nuclear-weapons-against-north-korea/]
Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Afairs Danny Russel
said last week the United States and Japan may take unspecified defense-
related measures if North Korea conducts a fifth nuclear test. U.S. officials
claim North Korea has exaggerated its nuclear potential. A reported
underground nuclear test on January 6 produced a 5.1-magnitude quake,
indicating the yield was around 6 kilotons. Data indicates the bomb was a
standard fission device. After the test, the North Korea government claimed it
had successfully tested a hydrogen bomb. The yield of a thermonuclear
device is between 15,000 and 50,000 kilotons. It was much more modest
than they claimed, said James Clapper on Monday. Its hard to say what
they are trying. Clapper is the Director of National Intelligence. The right to
make a preemptive nuclear strike is by no means a monopoly of the U.S.,
the Korean Central News Agency said last month, paraphrasing Kim during a
visit with engineers working on a miniature warhead project. If the U.S.
imperialists infringe upon the Democratic Peoples Republic of Koreas
sovereignty and right to existence with nuclear weapons, it will never
hesitate to make a preemptive nuclear strike at them.
2. No North Korea WarThree reasons
Vox World, March 2016 [Internet news website, Why North Korea
loves to threaten nuclear war (but will never actually do it),
March 4, http://www.vox.com/2016/3/4/11160314/north-korea-
nuclear-threat]
1
There are, broadly speaking, three main reasons for North Korea's perennial
threat-making and why he never seems to actually follow through. In any
given provocation, the motivation is usually some combination of these three;
the degree to which one or another is more important varies, but ultimately
these three make the country's behavior what it is. 1) It's about maintaining
the big lie that keeps North Korea running An awful lot of North Korea's
behavior can be traced back to a problem it faced in the early 1990s, and
how then-leader Kim Jong Il solved it. The problem was this: For decades, the
small and isolated country had been propped up by the Soviet Union as a
bulwark against Western, capitalist influence in northeast Asia. When the
Soviet Union collapsed, the subsidies went away, and North Korea sank into
an economic catastrophe so terrible that as much as one-tenth of the
population starved to death. During this 1990s crisis, it looked to much of the
world like North Korea was about to collapse, and not just because the society
itself was crumbling. Its official state ideology had told North Koreans they
lived in the freest and most prosperous society on Earth, and it placed North
Koreans under a near-total information cordon to make this lie seem more
believable. The famine undermined that lie in two ways. First, no amount of
propaganda could convince North Koreans, who were living of tree bark and
grass, that their society was prosperous. And second, North Korea had no choice but
to ease its border with China, allowing food to enter through the black market, even though
this meant a number of North Koreans would glimpse the outside world, either by visiting
neighboring northeastern China or through the foreign books and videos that were inevitably
smuggled in. The Soviet Union's collapse presented North Korea with another existential
problem: It no longer had a superpower patron to protect it. Sure, China had an interest in
keeping the Korean peninsula divided, but by the 1990s it had little love for North Korea, and
would only do so much to protect it from a Western-dominated world that was openly hostile to
the Kim regime. Kim Jong Il's solution was something called the Songun or "military first"
policy. This policy tells North Koreans that the reason they are hungry and impoverished and
locked in a police state is because this is all necessary to fund the military and protect the
country from enemies internal and external, so as to keep them safe from the imperialist
Americans who are always just on the verge of invading and, if able, would surely
overwhelm them and do unspeakable things. The Songun policy rallies North Koreans behind
the regime not despite but because of their poverty, which is said to be a necessary function of
the never-ending war against the imperialist American dogs. But keeping this lie alive requires
the occasional provocation, just enough to make it look like North Koreans are indeed in a state
of quasi-war, and also that the North Korean leaders are bravely and boldly lashing out against
their enemies. In that sense, it's all a show for the North Korean people, meant to maintain the
big lie that keeps the country running a terrifying, never-ending, low-boil war with the evil
Americans and other enemies. These provocations, since the mid-1990s when
Songun began, have often been conducted in some form of nuclear weapons
work, and Kim Jong Il's son, now-leader Kim Jong Un, has carried on this
tradition. It's far from the only reason the country works with nuclear
weapons, but it's an important one for understanding the threats. 2) It's
about countering enemies that Kim knows are more powerful The immediate
context is helpful here: This week, the United Nations Security Council passed
1
some of the toughest North Korea sanctions in years. Even China supported
the sanctions, which it had helped to draft, and which punish North Korea's
nuclear test from this January and a missile test from February. When
punished like this, North Korea often responds with provocations much like
Thursday's nuclear threat. It's not that Kim Jong Un actually desires a war
with his enemies. His military, he knows, is antiquated and inferior and would
certainly lose. Rather, what he likely wants to do, at least in part, is to raise
tensions in the region knowing that the US and North Korea's neighbors will
then look to ratchet them down. At the risk of insulting Kim Jong Un, it helps
to think of North Korea's provocations as somewhat akin to a child throwing a
temper tantrum. He might do lots of shouting, make some over-the-top
declarations ("I'm never going back to school again") and even throw a punch
or two. Still, you give the child the attention he craves and maybe even a toy,
not because you think the threats are real or because he deserves it, but
because you want the tantrum to stop. The big problem here is not that North
Korea will intentionally start a nuclear war, but rather that its threats,
however empty, significantly raise the risk of unwanted conflict. It's
disruptive and dangerous. When North Korea fired six missiles into the sea
this week, for example, no one thought South Korea was at danger of
annihilation. But it does carry some real risks to have missiles crashing of
your coast. Kim knows that his neighbors are more sensitive to this danger
and disruption than he is. It falls to North Korea's neighbors and to the US,
then, to keep the Korean peninsula from spiraling out of control. Even if they
don't ultimately ofer Kim concessions to calm him down, as they have in the
past, they've still got an interest in preventing future outbursts. Like parents
straining to manage a child's tantrum, it's a power dynamic that oddly favors
the weak and misbehaving. 3) Provocations play well in North Korean internal
politics Imagine being in your late 20s and suddenly taking control of a small
country, one whose government is dominated by a small and ruthless coterie
of more experienced military and party officials. Probably one of your biggest
concerns would be making sure that those officials took you seriously that
they followed your orders and didn't remove you outright. This has been Kim
Jong Un's challenge since taking over from his father in early 2012: how to
consolidate power among the country's governing elites. And he seems to
have gone about this in two ways. First, he has launched one of North Korea's
most violent political purges in decades, exiling or executing a number of
high-level officials, most infamously carving some up with anti-aircraft gun
fire. (This has been apparently confirmed with satellite imagery, unlike the
almost certainly false story of Kim feeding his uncle to wild dogs.) And,
second, Kim has conducted a steady series of military provocations: nuclear
development, weapons tests, and a series of threats, in early 2013, to start
World War III. A common theory among North Korea analysts is that this
allows Kim to prove to military officials that he's a capable leader, and also
1
that it rallies officials and citizens alike around him. It seems unlikely that
internal politics are the primary motivator in this case, though they're
important for understanding Kim Jong Un's tendency for big provocations.
Given that the nuclear threat came in response to UN Security Council
sanctions, it's probably aimed mostly in response to that, both as a message
to North Korea's enemies and to reassure its citizenry.
3. North Korea wont give up the Bomb

After years of observing North Koreas negotiating behavior, many analysts

believe that such demands are simply tactical moves by Pyongyang and that
North Korea has no intention of giving up its nuclear weapons in exchange for
aid and recognition.14 The multinational military intervention in 2011 in
Libya, which abandoned its nuclear weapon program in exchange for the
removal of sanctions, may have had the undesirable side efect of reinforcing
the perceived value of nuclear arms for regime security. North Korean leaders
may believe that, without the security guarantee of nuclear weapons, they
are vulnerable to overthrow by a rebellious uprising aided by outside military
intervention. In April 2010, North Korea reiterated its demand to be
recognized as an official nuclear weapons state and said it would increase
and modernize its nuclear deterrent. On April 13, 2012, the same day as the
failed rocket launch, the North Korean constitution was revised to describe
the country as a nuclear-armed nation. In March 2013, North Korea
declared that its nuclear weapons are not a bargaining chip and
would not be relinquished even for billions of dollars.15 North Korea
has also suggested that it will not relinquish its nuclear stockpile until all
nuclear weapons are eliminated worldwide.16 The apparent intention of
Pyongyang to retain its nascent nuclear arsenal raises difficult questions for
Washington about the methods and purpose of diplomatic negotiations to
denuclearize North Korea. Debate continues on the proper strategic response.
Options range from trying to squeeze the dictatorship to the point of collapse,
to buying time and trying to prevent proliferation and other severely
destabilizing events.
2NC/1NR Harms (North Korea War)

Extensions
2NC/1NR Harms (North Korean

War) #1No Nukes and Backlash
They say North Korea will develop weapons, but
1. Extend our InfoWars evidence.

Its much better than their International Business Times
evidence because: [PUT IN THEIR
AUTHORS NAME]
facts)
to be true)

Most of their authors write from the perspective of the West. They
exaggerate how strong North Koreas weapons are to justify military
strength. North Kore also exaggerates their weapons to scare the
world and protect themselves. They are a long way away from
powerful weapons.

This matters because: the problem is not very urgent. North Korea
will not develop stronger weapons or it will at least take a long time.
This means the judge should look to our impacts first.

Extensions
1

Extensions
1
2 Countries actually know little about the nuclear
program and even if it has weapons, its only a few
The National Interest, 2015 [Realist foreign afairs magazine,

Welcome to North Korean Nuclear Weapons 101, September 26,
http://nationalinterest.org/feature/welcome-north-korean-nuclear-
weapons-101-13940?page=2]
2. The number of North Korean nuclear weapons is unknown We know the

North has had at least three nuclear weapons the three it tested. We dont
know how many more it has stockpiled. North Korea has not stated how many
nuclear weapons it has, and nobody outside of Pyongyang knows for sure.
Estimating North Koreas nuclear arsenal is made even more difficult because
its early weapons may have been inefficient designs with a relatively low
explosive yield. In 2008, North Korea declared it had 38.5 kilograms of
weapons-grade plutonium. It also has highly enriched uranium (HEU) that it
can use to build a nuclear weapon, but the DPRK has not declared how much
of the material it has. North Korea also claims it restarted the Yongbyon
nuclear plant in 2013, meaning it has been producing fissionable material for
the last two years. In 2012, analyst David Albright estimated North Korea had
enough material to build up to eleven nuclear weapons. In 2015, the US-
Korea Institute at SAIS estimated it had between ten and sixteen devices, of
those between six and eight were made of plutonium and another four to
eight made out of HEU. Further, the institute claimed that under the projected
worst case scenario, North Korea could have 100 weapons by 2020. 2.
Current methods of delivery for the Norths nukes are unknown There are a
limited number of ways to deliver a nuclear weapon to a target. Bombs,
artillery shells, and missiles based on aircraft, ships or ground vehicles are all
possible delivery systems. Most, but not all, require miniaturization and
ruggedization to allow them to survive the journey to the target. North Korea
may have mastered none of these systems, or it may have mastered all of
them. North Korea has worked for decades to improve its missile force,
turning intermediate-range ballistic missiles into something that can hit the
United States. It has also been working on making a weapon small and
durable enough to arm a missile. North Korea claimed that its 2013 nuclear
test involved miniaturizing a weapon. In its 2014 defense white paper, South
Korea stated the North Korean regime has the ability to place a nuclear
weapon atop a ballistic missile. Joel Wit and Sun Young Ahn of the U.S.-Korea
Institute assess the North as being able to fit a nuclear weapon on a Nodong
medium range nuclear missile or Taepodong-2 long-range ballistic missile.

Extensions
2NC/1NR Harms (North Korean

War) #2No War
They say There will be war , but
1. Extend our Vox World evidence.

Its much better than their International Business Times
AUTHORS NAME]
more facts)
to be true)
their argument)

North Korea will never start a war. 1. Its all talk intended to keep
the people in line. 2. It protects North Korea from external enemies
and results diplomatic benefits like the plan. 3. Its popular
politically with the elite. North Korea knows the cost and would not
start a war.
This matters because: clearly, no war will happen. This means that
our impact is larger and more likely.

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1
2 Multiple reasons a North Korean war will never
happen
Foreign Policy, January 2016 [Internationally focused magazine,

Despite Threats and Extreme Rhetoric, War with North Korea
Remains Unlikely, January 17, http://ivn.us/2016/01/07/despite-
threats-extreme-rhetoric-war-north-korea-remains-unlikely/]
War with North Korea Means War with China Considering its imperialist past,
Southeast Asia has often been at the whim of foreign influencefrom the
wave of 19th century European colonialism to the Russian-American proxy
war that never officially ended. Any conflict between North Korea and its
regional foesmostly, South Korea and Japanwould only serve as a proxy
for the two major actors in this equation: China and the United States.
Though the relationship between these two superpowers is tenuous, war is
unlikely for a number of reasons. First, despite the rhetoric of some of our
more hawkish public figures, China does not want war with the United States
for purely economic reasons. If China hypothetically backed a North Korean
attack on Seoul or any other American ally, that would spell out events that
would be detrimental to Chinas primary interest: ensuring its place as the
worlds number one economic force. China does not want war with the United
States for purely economic reasons. Currently, the Chinese and the United
States have developed a new financial spin on the Cold War theory of
mutually assured destruction (or MAD for you history wonks). The
Chinese dont shy away from the fact that they artificially devalue their
currency by buying up American treasuries. This way, they can keep prices of
their exports well below that of their competitors. In continuation of an ever
widening trade imbalance, $521 billion in Chinese exports have been gobbled
up by consumers in the United States, making our country Chinas largest
customer. Meanwhile, as much as it pains American exceptionalists to think
that they are beholden to the Chinese government, Chinese ownership of
American treasuries is the result of our refusal to solve the debt problem.
Considering the trillions of dollars of debt and international trade that is at
stake, conflictwhether through military action or economic sanctionsis a
recipe for disaster for both sides of the yuan. Second, even though North
Korea gives the Chinese the occasional diplomatic headache, they put up
with their neighbors erratic behavior for the sake of preserving the 38th
Parallel. As long as the United States remains a military ally of South Korea,
China would prefer to keep North Korea as both a bufer and a distraction.
Even if this geopolitical configuration is a relic of Cold War politics, China has

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1
a vested interest in the status quo of the region. Furthermore, a collapse of
North Korea would create a flood of refugees into Chinathe likes of which
would dwarf the recent Syrian episode. Third, even if North Korea were to go
rogue, the Chinese could rein in the situation quickly, because they control
the purse strings for North Korea. As Kim Jong-uns proverbial piggy bank,
China is responsible for the majority of the countrys international commerce
and foreign aid. Despite engaging in trade sanctions with the North Koreans,
China has doubled its foreign aid to the country. In 2014, North Korea
received close to $7 billion in aid from Chinaroughly 20% of North Koreas
GDP. If anything, China possesses the capacity to be an influential arbitrator
of peace by simply cutting of Kim Jong-uns allowance. Irrational is the New
Rational If you need a hint at the economic vitality of North Korea, simply
Google satellite images of North Korea at night. Suffice it to say, North
Korea sufers from a tremendous lack of resources. Regardless of this
scarcity, this country has cornered the market with one specific product:
propaganda. Following 1953, North Koreas war with the world has been
predominately a rhetorical one. Lacking any full-scale capability to follow
through on its threats, North Korea will continue to troll the international
community because, well, thats all they can do. North Korea is a toothless
dog who incessantly barks but has no ability to bite. China possesses the
capacity to be an influential arbitrator of peace by simply cutting of Kim
Jong-uns allowance. There have been numerous events throughout the
contentious history of the Korean peninsula that the North has been the
aggressor. Ranging from assassination attempts against South Korean leaders
and naval skirmishes in the Yellow Sea, North Korea has actively engaged in
asymmetric acts of aggression against its neighbors, often times without
provocation. But its precisely this history of lopsided aggression that
highlights the true hollowness of North Koreas rhetoric: If North Korea was
actually going to launch a full-scale attack, they would have done so
by now. North Korea is engaging in what is commonly known as madman
diplomacy. (Interestingly enough, this was a practice perfected by Richard
Nixon.) This particular strategy involves the erratic behavior of one political
actor as a means of encouraging other political actors not to provoke the
madman out of fear of escalation. Its a reheated version of deterrence
theory that permeated the Cold War. As strange as it sounds, North Koreas
irrational behavior is actually a very rational diplomatic action. North Korea
holds few cards when it comes to international diplomacy. Its not an
economic superpower. It doesnt produce some highly-valued commodity. It
does not extract any precious minerals or fossil fuels. The only card that
North Korea holds right now is the assumption that they arefor a lack of a
better termcrazy. Furthermore, if we push the wrong button, they might go
of at any given moment. On top of that, this image is further reinforced by
the fact that North Koreas politically immature leader will do something rash

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as a means to prove himself. This fearmongering is designed to have a
coercive efect, and is probably being leveraged as a means to negotiate a
comparable deal to the one Iran was able to achieve. The North Korean
Military: All Bark and No Bite The one thing that North Korea has in its
possession is a very large military: one million plus troops, close to seven
million reserves, and a plethora of Soviet-grade armored vehicles and
artillery. At least on paper, they seem mighty. North Korea remains reliant on
a predominately obsolescent equipment inventory, states the International
Institute for Strategic Studies. Prior to its fall, the Soviet Union was the largest
military supplier to North Korea. The majority of North Korean tanks, artillery,
vehicles, and military weapons originated in the former Soviet Union. Not only
is the North Korean military stock old, but its not even paid for. It wasnt until
2014 that Russia wrote of nearly $10 billion in debt owned by North Koreans
for its military acquisitions made during the Cold War. North Koreas ability to
fight in a prolonged conflict are minimal at best. North Korea cant access
enough fuel to power all of their tanks, planes, and helicopters at the same
time. North Korea possesses no aircraft carrier, so foreign projection of power
is limited. Also, with their own drought issues, food shortages, and
crippling international sanctions, North Korea wouldnt have enough
food rations for its troops. Do we need to take North Korea seriously? Yes
and no. For reasons of regional stability, the international community must
keep all diplomatic lines of communication open, and mitigate any possible
conflict. However, with a proper historical and political context, we need to
understand that North Korea is not a direct threat to the United States, nor
will it be given its current trajectory. All North Korea is doing now is trying to
negotiate with what little political leverage it possesses. The end result will
most likely be a cessation of tension and the continued isolation of North
Korea. That is until Kim Jong-un decides to play madman again in the near
future.
1NC Harms (Regime Change) Frontline
1NC Harms (Regime Change)

Frontline
1. Regime shift will happen without the plan
Duetsche Welle, April 2016 [Germanys international broadcaster.

Peter Limbourg has been Director General since 2013., Is North
Korea finally close to collapse?, April 13,
http://www.dw.com/en/is-north-korea-finally-close-to-collapse/a-
19183141]
And there have been hints that Pyongyang is already feeling the pinch.
Earlier this month, state media called on the international community to do
away with the sanctions and return to discussions about security concerns in
northeast Asia. More ominously, it has also called on the citizens to prepare
for a new "arduous march." Four-year famine The term was first coined by the
North Korean leadership in 1993 as a metaphor for the four-year famine that
decimated the nation from 1994. The famine - in which as many as 3.5
million of the nation's 22 million people died - was brought on by economic
mismanagement, natural disasters, the collapse of the Soviet bloc, and the
consequent loss of aid, combined with the regime's insistence on putting the
military first. If international sanctions are to work, much will depend on
China, which has traditionally been North Korea's closest ally and has in the
past been less-than-rigorous in ensuring that its borders are closed to items
that have been banned by previous UN sanctions resolutions. The signs this
time, however, are encouraging. Earlier this month, Beijing indicated its own
growing displeasure with Kim Jong-un's continued defiance of international
eforts to convince him to halt nuclear and missile tests by announcing that it
would ban all imports of coal, iron, iron ore, gold, titanium and rare earth
minerals. Those lucrative exports account for the bulk of North Korea's
overseas earnings, and losing them will put a sizeable dent in Pyongyang's
income. At the same time, China announced that it would halt exports of oil
into the North, which will quickly limit the military's ability to operate.
"Everything depends on China and, to a certain extent Russia, but I do
believe we are seeing the start of a crisis for the North Korean
state," said Ken Kato, director of Human Rights in Asia, and a member of the
International Coalition to Stop Crimes Against Humanity in North Korea. "The
defections tell me that there is a deep malaise in North Korean society that is
only going to get worse as sanctions bite harder," he said. "That, in turn, will
1
encourage more to defect and, thanks to technology, stay in touch with their
friends and relatives they left behind." A North Korean soldier patrols along a
river bank in Sinuiju, North Korea, as seen from Dandong in northeastern
China's Liaoning province, Friday, Feb. 26, 2016 (Photo: Chinatopix via AP)
The sanctions imposed by the United Nations Security Council in March are
apparently working Ultimately, a vicious cycle of less money for the state,
less money and food for the public and a consequent rise in defections will be
impossible to sustain, Kato believes. Young and inexperienced There are
some who believe that Kim Jong-un - young and inexperienced in his role -
has made too many mistakes since he inherited the nation in December
2011, and alienated too many of the people close to the regime that he
should have looked to for support and advice. If international sanctions are to
work, much will depend on China Equally, his people are growing increasingly
aware of life beyond North Korea's borders, thanks to mobile communications
and movies from South Korea and the West that are smuggled into the
country. And in trying to be the "strong man" of northeast Asia, and
demanding respect through tests of nuclear weapons and ballistic missiles,
Kim has even forced former allies to reassess their relationships with
Pyongyang. On April 9, the South Korean government announced that 13
employees of a North Korean restaurant in China had defected to Seoul. Rah
Jong-yil, a former head of South Korean intelligence, said 13 defectors might
not appear significant, but he believes it is an indicator of things to come.
"This is a very revealing development and, I believe, shows us the state of
the morale of people in Pyongyang," he told DW. Trusted citizens The North
Korean state only permits its most trusted citizens to go abroad, where they
are expected to earn hard currency, Rah said. If these people - the elite - are
defecting, then the situation in Pyongyang is dire, he believes. "In the past,
North Korea has managed to keep everything from the outside world at arms'
length, but because of the international sanctions, it has to send more
workers abroad to earn money," he said. "So now they are seeing how other
people live, they are watching television dramas about life in South Korea,
and they are realizing that their government has lied to them. "I believe we
will see more defections of these elite members of North Korean society," he
added. Yet with sanctions imposed by the United Nations Security Council in
March apparently biting, the communist country is running out of ways to
make the money it needs to continue to develop weapons of mass
destruction and to keep its leaders living in the luxury they have come to
expect.
1
2. No moral obligationhuman rights violations happen
daily. Their own evidence says that thousands die
from preventable diseases. We arent responsible for
everything wrong in the world.
3. Existence before human rights. We need to be alive

to protect human rights
Ochs, 2002 (Richard- MA in Natural Resource Management from Rutgers

University and Naturalist at Grand Teton National Park, BIOLOGICAL
WEAPONS MUST BE ABOLISHED IMMEDIATELY, Jun 9,
http://www.freefromterror.net/other_...s/abolish.html)
Against this tendency can be posed a rational alternative policy. To preclude possibilities of human
Even
extinction, "patriotism" needs to be redefined to make humanitys survival primary and absolute.
if we lose our cherished freedom, our sovereignty, our government
or our Constitution, where there is life, there is hope . What good is
anything else if humanity is extinguished? This concept should be promoted
to the center of national debate. For example, for sake of argument, suppose the ancient
Israelites developed defensive bioweapons of mass destruction when they were enslaved by Egypt. Then
As bad as
suppose these weapons were released by design or accident and wiped everybody out?
slavery is, extinction is worse. Our generation, our century, our epoch needs to take the
long view. We truly hold in our hands the precious gift of all future life. Empires may come and go, but who
are the honored custodians of life on earth? Temporal politicians? Corporate competitors? Strategic
How can any sane person
brinksmen? Military gamers? Inflated egos dripping with testosterone?
believe that national sovereignty is more important than survival of the
species? Now that extinction is possible, our slogan should be "Where there is
life, there is hope." No government, no economic system, no national pride, no religion, no political
system can be placed above human survival. The egos of leaders must not blind us. The adrenaline and
vengeance of a fight must not blind us. The game is over. If patriotism would extinguish humanity, then
patriotism is the highest of all crimes.
2NC/1NR Harms (Regime Change)

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#1Change Inevitable
They say __________________________________________________, but
facts)
to be true)
their argument)

______________________________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________________________
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1
2 The North Korean regime will collapse on its own
CNN, 2015 [North Korean defector: Kim Jong Un's days are numbered, September 9,
http://www.cnn.com/2015/09/07/asia/kyung-lah-north-korean-defector-predictions/]
We've agreed that I can say he worked among the elites in Pyongyang. He is
by far, the most recent defector I've ever interviewed; he's only been in the
free world for a year. CNN found him through university researchers, working
in conjunction with the South Korean government, who verified his status as a
North Korean defector. He stresses that revealing much more than these few
details could endanger his family, still trapped in the Hermit Kingdom. He also
fears North Korea could manage to hunt him down in his new life. But he's
talking to me to get a message to the West out. He believes that among
North Korea's dictators, the dynasty of Kim Il Sung, Kim Jong Il and now Kim
Jong Un, "It is Kim Jong Un's regime that is the most unstable. And it is going
to be the shortest." 'False image' The defector begins to explain why he feels
that way. In 2011, Kim Jong Un's father, Kim Jong Il, died. Kim Jong Un took
over and "tried his best," says the defector. He gave gifts, and in a public
appearance, allowed his voice to be broadcast on North Korean state run
television. The perception among the people was that life was about to
improve inside North Korea. "It was a false image," he says. In December
2013, the regime announced the second most powerful man in North Korea,
Jang Song Thaek, was being expelled from the ruling Workers' Party of Korea.
Jang was accused of a litany of crimes, from obstructing the nation's
economic afairs to anti-party acts. The allegations stunned for several
reasons, primarily for who the regime fingered -- Jang is Kim's uncle. "Kim
Jong Un revealed his true side," says the defector. Jang's arrest was broadcast
on state television, followed by a statement calling him "despicable human
scum, worse than a dog." State media then announced he was executed.
Murderous rampage The current Kim's father, Kim Jong Il, may have tossed
his people into political prisons or allowed them to starve. But he didn't go on
a murderous rampage of his own inner circle, says the defector. Kim Jong Un
took the opposite approach with his elites. Jang was just one of a number of
the ruling class Kim Jong Un began to purge, as the young leader flexed his
dictatorial muscles. The outside world waited to see any fallout or any
reaction among North Korea's people. There was nothing. But within North
Korea's upper echelons, the defector says the reaction was silent but
sweeping. "I can tell you for sure the North Koreans who are in the upper
middle class don't trust Kim Jong Un. I was thinking about leaving North Korea
for a long time. After seeing the execution of Jang, I thought, 'I need to hurry
up and leave this hell on earth.' That's why I defected." Tired of conflict: Life

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1
near the Korean demilitarized zone Risky escape He made a risky, harrowing
escape, telling no one he knew that he would attempt to defect. I've agreed
not to reveal how he escaped, again for his safety. Suffice it to say, the
chance of his capture or death was extraordinarily high. But fear of death
trying to escape paled in comparison to remaining under Kim Jong Un's
power, says the defector. After Kim's purge of his inner circle, the defector
says he witnessed a change among Pyongyang's upper class. "They are
terrified. The fear grows more intense every day." But across North Korea,
support for the regime remains high, according to a survey by the Institute
for Peace and Unification Studies at Seoul National University. Since 2008, the
institute has surveyed more than 100 defectors each year, the most
comprehensive year-on-year examination of recent defectors. In 2012, just as
Kim Jong Un took control of the regime, defectors in the survey perceived
support at more than 70%. In 2014, their latest survey of 146 defectors
shows that while they perceive support of Kim Jong Un remains high, it has
dropped to 58%. The institute's senior researcher, Chang Yong Seok, says the
results should not be read as generalized facts due to the small pool of
respondents. But they do also give a year-on-year snapshot of what internal
support of the regime looks like. Growing confidence Chang believes the
purging of the elites shows that "Kim Jong Un is showing confidence. It shows
that Kim Jong Un is gaining confidence in his power." He believes the
executions show Kim Jong Un is feeling more stable than the outside world
perceives. But the defectors' opinions reveal that the dictator is at risk of
losing the trust and support of his power base. "The issue is with the future.
How much trust Kim Jong Un can gain from his elites after the purges. The
elites could be feeling anxious. There is a possibility that their loyalty and
support will weaken." The defector I'm interviewing is confident in his opinion
that the elites' loyalty has deteriorated and will continue along that path. He
says that conviction is how he was able to leave his family behind, because
he believes he will reunite with them one day. "I can tell you for sure, the
North Korean regime will collapse within 10 years," he says without
hesitation. "Kim Jong Un is mistaken that he can control his people and
maintain his regime by executing his enemies. There's fear among high
officials that at any time, they can be targets. The general public will continue
to lose their trust in him as a leader by witnessing him being willing to kill his
own uncle." The defector is guessing, of course -- the same way he's guessing
someone in Kim Jong Un's inner circle may be driven to assassinate the
dictator, or that a provocation with the U.S. or South Korea will backfire on
the regime.

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#2No Obligation
They say We have a moral obligation, but
1. Extend our Analytic evidence.

Its much better than their Gibney evidence because:
facts)
their argument)

Their own evidence says that thousands die every day from
preventable diseases. This means that we shouldnt do the aff, but
instead stop those diseases. Their argument is illogical and would
mean we would bounce around trying to fix every problem.

This matters because: were not obligated to do the Aff. That means
their impact is actually very small.

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1
2 The Democratic Republic of Congo is a much worse
human rights problemtheres no brink
Council on Foreign Relations, June 2016 [Peer reviewed journal,

Violence in the Democratic Republic of Congo, June 10,
http://www.cfr.org/global/global-conflict-
tracker/p32137#!/conflict/violence-in-the-democratic-republic-of-
congo]
At least seventy armed groups are believed to be currently operating in the

eastern region of the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC). Despite the
stabilizing presence of nineteen thousand UN peacekeepers, the stronger
militant groups in the region, like the Democratic Forces for the Liberation of
Rwanda (FDLR) and the Ugandan Allied Democratic Forces (ADF), continue to
terrorize communities and control weakly governed areas of the country,
financing their activities by exploiting the countrys rich natural resources.
Millions of civilians have been forced to flee the fighting: the United Nations
estimates that currently there are at least 2.7 million internally displaced
persons in the DRC, and approximately 450,000 DRC refugees in other
nations. In addition to the violence caused by armed groups, President Joseph
Kabila has caused further political instability by indicating a possible desire to
delay the upcoming 2016 election and to stay in power after his term ends. In
December 2015, Kabila called for political dialogue with opposition parties,
but the police have violently cracked down on internal dissent. This includes
the November 2015 use of tear gas against student protesters and the
breakup of a January 2015 protest, in which police fired shots and killed over
forty people. Moise Katumbi, a popular opposition leader who was governor of
the mineral-rich Katanga province, declared his candidacy for the presidential
election in early May 2015. Since his announcement, mass protests and
clashes between the police and civilians have become increasingly tense and
common.

Extensions

#3--Extinction/War First
Extensions
They say __________________________________________________, but

facts)
to be true)
their argument)

______________________________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________________________

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1
2 We massively outweigh on magnitudeExtinction
includes the 500 trillion people who are yet to be
born
Matheny, 2007 [Jason G., Department of Health Policy and Management,

Bloomberg School of Public Health, Johns Hopkins University, Reducing the
Risk of Human Extinction, Risk Analysis Vol. 27 Issue 5 Pgs. 1335-1344]
Discussing the risks of "nuclear winter," Carl Sagan (1983) wrote: Some have
argued that the diference between the deaths of several hundred million
people in a nuclear war (as has been thought until recently to be a
reasonable upper limit) and the death of every person on Earth (as now
seems possible) is only a matter of one order of magnitude. For me, the
diference is considerably greater. Restricting our attention only to those who
die as a consequence of the war conceals its full impact. If we are required to
calibrate extinction in numerical terms, I would be sure to include the number
of people in future generations who would not be born. A nuclear war
imperils all of our descendants, for as long as there will be humans.
Even if the population remains static, with an average lifetime of the order of
100 years, over a typical time period for the biological evolution of a
successful species (roughly ten million years), we are talking about some
500 trillion people yet to come. By this criterion, the stakes are one
million times greater for extinction than for the more modest nuclear wars
that kill "only" hundreds of millions of people. There are many other possible
measures of the potential lossincluding culture and science, the
evolutionary history of the planet, and the significance of the lives of all of
our ancestors who contributed to the future of their descendants. Extinction
is the undoing of the human enterprise.

1. China fails to contain North Korea, enough is being
done already, and the US should negotiate with other
states
Lord, February 2016 [Winston, U.S. Ambassador to China from 1985 to 1989. He was sworn in as
Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Afairs in 1993, What New Approach Should the U.S.
and China Take to North Korea?, February 10, https://www.chinafile.com/conversation/what-new-approach-
should-us-and-china-take-north-korea]
I think we can all agree on a few points: U.S. policies under successive
Administrations of both parties have not worked. We cannot rely on China. We need a
radically diferent approach. We should rule out a military attack (unless provoked
militarily). We must reach consensus with South Korea and Japan, and at least keep in
touch with China and Russia. Any proposed course will be very difficult and risky, but
should be measured against the mounting dangers of North Koreas nuclear and
proliferation threats to the U.S. and allies and, I would add, the continuing crushing of
the North Korean people. In this context, the implied recommendations that we
engage North Korea with comprehensive ofers deserve a respectful hearing,
assuming they are coupled with serious threats, the fork in the road approach, and
our allies are on board. But the arguments rest on some distorted history and flawed
assumptionsI only have space to cover a few. We have not completely outsourced
our policy. We have already ofered continually to Pyongyang to negotiate all that it
seeks, e.g. security guarantees, economic engagement, diplomatic relations, etc. We
have done this bilaterally and multilaterally, in grand bargains and interim steps.
Nothing has succeeded because the Kims will never denuclearize, sticks
dont work because of Chinese sabotage, carrots dont work because of Kim
fears of losing political control. China is not the solution. It is a major part of
the problem. It is wrong to say that sanctions have not worked. We have not really
tested this approach. The one time we got semi-serious, a la Banco Delta, etc., we
got the attention of North Korea (and China). Current sanctions fall far short of those
on Iran, and in some respects those on Burma and Zimbabwe. And North Korea has
always counted on China to bail it out. So what should we do? I am not John Bolton or
seeking the GOP nomination. I was an enthusiastic, supporting member of the Clinton
Administration team which negotiated the 1994 Accord. I would be willing today to
see a verifiable cap on North Koreas nuclear, missile, and proliferation capabilities if
achievable at a acceptable price. But the only way to solve not only the nuclear
challenge and the most horrific human rights problem in the world, is through a
defacto policy of regime change, or perhaps as one observer put it, systems
change. Of course, the Kim regime is resilient, but we have never tried very hard,
and no one saw the Berlin Wall coming down. And if our pressures dont topple the
regime, perhaps they would induce it to genuinely negotiate. And we would bring
home the costs to Beijing of its policy, not only American and allied military moves
1
but vastly increased economic expenses. Briefly, the major components of this policy
(some of these steps are already underway): Increased U.S. military presence and
joint exercises. Rapid deployment of THAAD and any other relevant missile defense
systems. More vigorous eforts to stop North Korean proliferation, including intense
pressure on China. Disproportionate retaliation against any North Korea cyber
attacks. Truly serious and comprehensive sanctions, including bank moves, a terrorist
and any other relevant list, impact on third country business, etc., no matter what
strains this causes with Beijing (indeed it might finally get its attention). Major eforts
to flood North Korea with information, including greatly increased funding for Radio
Free Asia, social media, cassettes, etc. In close concert with our allies, candid talks
with the Chinese about the possible fallout of reunification (we must use verbal
camouflage). I dont know whether the Chinese have been willing to engage on this
taboo topic. In any event, we should seek to allay their concerns: Loose nukes would
be secured by the United Nations, not the Peoples Liberation Army or the U.S. Armys
82nd Airborne.
2. Sanctions are high now The US and other countries

already sanction North Korea heavily and have been
doing so for decades. Theres no reason China will
make the difference.
3. Diplomatic talks fail
Council on Foreign Relations, 2013 [Major international political journal, The Six Party Talks
on North Korea's Nuclear Program, September 13, http://www.cfr.org/proliferation/six-party-talks-north-
koreas-nuclear-program/p13593]
Obstacles to the Talks An unpredictable North Korean regime. The United States has
found North Korea to be erratic in negotiations and actions. "They know that we have
a tough time figuring out what really motivates them," says Christopher Hill,
Washington's former chief envoy to the talks. Difering approaches by Six Party
governments. CFR's Snyder says the Six Party Talks and other regional eforts
preceding it failed because the participating states "placed their own immediate
priorities and concerns above the collective need to halt North Korea's nuclear
program." While Japan and the United States have consistently pushed for strong
sanctions, China, South Korea, and Russia have settled for less stringent actions from
fear that a sudden toppling of the regime would trigger major refugee influxes.
Pyonyang's most recent provocations have pushed boundaries, however, and all
three countries ultimately backed the March 2013 UN sanctions. North Korea's own
approach exhibits an openness to separate dialogues with both the United States and
Japan, but not with Seoul. "The North Koreans may be interested in moving forward
with the United States and/or Japan while not addressing inter-Korean tensions,"
Snyder says. U.S. resistance to bilateral negotiations. For much of the Bush
administration, Washington resisted direct dialogue with Pyongyang so that any
compromise with the Kim regime would be framed as a multilateral decision. Yet
1
North Korea repeatedly demanded dialogue as a condition to halting its nuclear
program. In June 2007, former envoy Hill made a surprise visit to Pyongyang to
advance the February deal, marking a reversal in the U.S. stance. The two countries
have since held bilateral talks on several occasions. It has also been reported that an
Obama administration official made secret visits to North Korea in April and August
2012 in an unsuccessful bid to engage the new leadership and moderate its foreign
policy. Solving the Policy Puzzle So far, the Six Party Talks have yielded little progress
in denuclearizing North Korea, and some experts think that the country is determined
to be recognized as a nuclear weapon state. In 2012, its leadership included a new
preamble to the constitution that describes the country as a "nuclear state and a
militarily powerful state that is indomitable." Former secretary of state Henry A.
Kissinger wrote in the Washington Post in June 2009 that "the issue for diplomacy has
become whether the goal should be to manage North Korea's nuclear arsenal or to
eliminate it." He argued that any policy that does not eliminate the North's nuclear
military capability "in efect acquiesces in its continuation." Experts say that the
Obama administration's diplomatic channels for dialogue quickly evaporated with
Pyongyang's exit from the Six Party Talks in 2009. In testimony before the House
Foreign Afairs Committee in April 2012, CFR's Snyder said that the "United States
should redouble its eforts to shape North Korea's strategic environment rather than
[try] to identify the right combination of carrots and sticks to be used in a negotiation
with Pyongyang." However, some experts say that although a multilateral approach
may be the best option, it has borne little fruit. Charles Pritchard, former ambassador
and special envoy for negotiations with North Korea from 2001 to 2003, writes that "it
is a bilateral approach between the United States and North Korea that has worked
the best, that has produced the most results in the shortest period of time." In the
end, however, few analysts believe that North Korea has any intention of giving up its
nuclear program, and they argue that Pyongyang makes concessions to gain the aid
it needs to survive. Other analysts say that the world has "run out of ideas" about
how to disarm North Korea, and that the West's hopes now hinge on China to rein in
its ally. "North Korea, we now know, will probably never truly and fully disarm of its
own volition," wrote Max Fisher in the Atlantic in February 2012. Despite the
stalemate, some view the cooperation between the United States and China on the
drafting of the most recent UN sanctions as an efort that could move the needle.
2NC/1NR Solvency Extensions
2NC/1NR Solvency #1China Fails

They say China can influence North Korea, but
1. Extend our Lord evidence.

Its much better than their Chanlett-Avery, Rinehart, and
Nikitin evidence because: [PUT
IN THEIR AUTHORS NAME]
facts)
to be true)
their argument)
(Many different arguments) (their evidence supports our argument)

The Lord evidence says that we need to get South Korea and Japan
on board first because they directly influence North Korea. The
evidence also argues that China historically backs off North Korea
because they fear the outcome. Also, the regime is resilient and
needs their weapons to protect themselves.
This matters because: for all of these reasons, North Korea will not
change. That means the Aff solves nothing and their impacts will
happen.
1
2 North Korea and Chinese relations are very lowKim
is calling to use nuclear weapons against Beijing
The Diplomat, April 2016 [Website focused on Asian international afairs, Is

North Korea Fed up With China?, April 1, http://thediplomat.com/2016/04/is-
north-korea-fed-up-with-china/
North Koreas ruling party recently called on citizens to stand up to its patron
Chinas hostile schemes in a blistering attack that invoked nuclear war with
Beijing, a report has claimed. In a document distributed to provincial
committees, the Workers Party of Korea implored party members and
workers to soundly crush Chinas pressuring schemes with the force of a
nuclear storm for its betrayal of socialism, reported The Daily NK. The
document, dated March 10, lambastes Chinas decision to join sweeping U.N.
sanctions against Pyongyang over its latest nuclear and rocket tests. Daily
NK, a North Korea-focused news site, said it obtained the document via Sino-
North Korea relations expert Lee Young Hwa, a professor at Kansai University
in Osaka, Japan. If genuine, the broadside would be a striking indication of
how uneasy relations have become between Pyongyang and Beijing, whose
relationship Mao Zedong famously described as being as close as lips and
teeth. North Korea analysts that spoke to The Diplomat, however, expressed
skepticism about the documents authenticity. If this document is authentic,
we can look forward to a travel ban from the North Korean side against
Chinese tourists, more nationalization of Chinese assets in the Democratic
Peoples Republic of Korea along the lines of the 2012 Xiyang fiasco (in which
the mining firm reportedly lost tens of millions of dollars), preparation to lose
Chinas protective human rights veto at the United Nations, the possible
ouster of Chinese journalists from Pyongyang, and a military build-up on the
Chinese-North Korean border, said Adam Cathcart, a lecturer at the
University of Leeds. However, since this document is likely a forgery, I dont
expect any of those things to happen. Another North Korea scholar, who did
not want to be named but said he was familiar with the documents
acquisition, also questioned its authenticity, pointing to it being handwritten
and how it reached the media. Lee, the reported source of the document,
could not be reached for comment. Even if fake, however, the document
echoes real North Korean frustration with China, said Daniel Pinkston, an
international relations professor at Troy University. I think the underlying
sentiments have been present in North Korea for a long time, said Pinkston,
who was a Korean linguist in the U.S. Air Force. But I think the level of
resentment that the North Koreans feel for the Chinese is only becoming clear
to outsiders now.
2NC/1NR Solvency #2Sanctions

High
They say __________________________________________________, but

facts)
to be true)
their argument)

______________________________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________________________
1
1
2 Recent international sanctions are incredibly strong
CNN, March 2016 [U.N. Security Council approves tough sanctions on North
Korea, March 3, http://www.cnn.com/2016/03/02/world/un-north-korea-
sanctions-vote/]
United Nations (CNN)The United Nations Security Council voted Wednesday

morning to impose a broad array of sanctions against North Korea because of
that nation's recent nuclear test and missile launch -- both of which defied
current international sanctions. The resolution aims to cripple parts of the
North Korean economy that fuel its nuclear and ballistic missile programs. For
example, member nations have agreed to inspect all planes and ships
carrying North Korean imports and exports and to stop selling aviation fuel to
North Korea. U.S. President Barack Obama immediately praised the action,
saying, "Today, the international community, speaking with one voice, has
sent Pyongyang a simple message: North Korea must abandon these
dangerous programs and choose a better path for its people." Samantha
Power, U.S. ambassador to the U.N., told the Security Council that North
Korea not only treated its population with cruelty, it was the only nation to
conduct a nuclear test in the 21st century. "With each nuclear test and launch
using ballistic missile technology, the DPRK improves its capability to carry
out a ballistic missile attack not only in the region but a continent away," she
said. "That means having the ability to strike most of the countries sitting on
this council. Think about that." Power said the sanctions will: -- Require all
North Korean planes and ships carrying cargo to be inspected. Previously,
nations only inspected planes and ships when they had "reasonable grounds,"
which enabled North Korea to hide tools and parts for missiles and the
nuclear program in inconspicuous packages, Power said. "This is hugely
significant," she said. -- Ban Pyongyang from exporting most of the country's
natural resources. Coal alone accounted for about $1 billion in annual income,
she said. -- Ask U.N. member states to ban North Korea from opening banks,
and to close any banks believed to be associated with North Korea's nuclear
and missile programs. -- Direct member states to expel North Korean
diplomats and foreign nationals engaged in illicit activities. -- Prohibit nations
from providing training to North Korean nationals in fields that could advance
the nation's missile and nuclear programs, such as aerospace engineering
and advanced computer simulation. -- Ban member states from allowing
North Korea to charter foreign vessels or aircraft, and ban all nations from
operating any vessels that use North Korean flags. -- Prohibit the supply of
aviation fuel -- including rocket fuel -- and the sale of small arms to North
Korea.
1
2NC/1NR Solvency #3Talks Fail

They say __________________________________________________, but

facts)
to be true)
their argument)

______________________________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________________________
1
2 Six Party Talks fail and give North Korea time to
develop weapons
Buszynski, 2013 [Leszek, Visiting Fellow at the Strategic and Defence Studies Centre, Australian
National University. The Six-Party Talks have had their day: time for an expanded dialogue, August 9,
http://www.eastasiaforum.org/2013/08/09/the-six-party-talks-have-had-their-day-time-for-an-expanded-
dialogue/]
The talks made sense when they were first convened in August 2003 to
prevent North Korea from developing nuclear weapons. The Hu Jintao
government was concerned that the Bush administration would resort to
force as it had done in Iraq and Afghanistan. Beijing also feared that the
Norths nuclear program would push Japan and South Korea closer to forming
an anti-China grouping with the US, and release the constraints preventing
Japan from rearming and developing nuclear weapons of its own. This
considerations meant that China was willing to work with other parties and
assume the pivotal role of a mediator in the talks, while being constrained by
its special relationship with the North. As the key player in the talks China
ensured the participation of a reluctant North and made it possible for parties
to reach the September 2005 agreement (which is still regarded as the basis
of a possible solution). But Beijings actions also gave North Korea ample
opportunity to play upon rivalries and tensions between the US and China,
and to string out negotiations indefinitely. During the negotiations, China,
Russia and South Koreas shared concerns about the Bush administrations
forceful approach saw them form an alignment bloc that thwarted Americas
insistence on dismantling the Norths nuclear program up front under the
Complete, Verifiable and Irreversible Dismantlement approach. North Korea
used this time to develop its ballistic missile and nuclear weapons
programs, testing its first nuclear device on 9 October 2006, its
second on 25 May 2009 and its third on 12 February 2013. The US lost faith in
the Six-Party Talks and doubted Chinas willingness to press the North over
the issue. The Americans were eventually obliged to move to bilateral talks
with North Korea in the Berlin Talks of January 2007. But by that time the
North had already tested its first nuclear device and demanded to be treated
as a nuclear power. The US would not recognise the Norths nuclear status so
Pyongyang finally withdrew from the talks in April 2009. During this process,
Chinas and Russias actions encouraged the North in its provocations. When
Beijing and Moscow watered down UN Security Council resolutions which
were intended to condemn the Norths nuclear and ballistic missile tests, the
North understood that it could resort to ballistic missile and nuclear tests
without losing Chinas support. As China began to take a harder line against
1
the US and its territorial disputes with Japan in the South China Sea North
Korea became more important to it as an ally. Beijing lost its position as
mediator in the talks as it reassessed the Norths importance as an ally
against Americas alliances with Japan and South Korea and its military
deployments in Northeast Asia. China has often called for a revival of the Six-
Party Talks and regularly pressed the North into agreement. But little
progress can be expected if the Six-Party Talks are re-convened.
China would line up again with North Korea and Russia, creating an alignment
against the US, South Korea and Japan. China would feign anger against
North Korea for the purpose of persuading the Americans that it would
support it in the negotiations but it would still attempt to obtain their
tolerance of North Koreas nuclear status, if only to promote a long-term
solution to the issue. A Chinese solution would demand long term economic
support to encourage the regime to reform and open up, a risky approach to
nuclear non-proliferation because it would also suspend pressure upon the
North to surrender its nuclear weapons program.
CDL Core Files 2016-2017 Currency Manipulation AFF
Currency Manipulation
AFFIRMATIVE
Vocabulary
Currency Manipulation: This is when the government, in this
case China, buys or sells their currency to influence the value. For
example, China can reduce the value of the Yuan Renminbi to
draw more companies to their country, make goods cheaper, etc.
Essentially, China is controlling the value of their money and that
is not a free-market approach where companies trade, but
government manipulation.
1
1
Inflation: when money comes to be worth less than it did before.
This naturally happens slowly in the global economy. It can be a
serious problem when it happens quickly because individuals
money loses buying power. For example, a dollar would buy much
more fifty years ago than it does today.
World Trade Organization (WTO): An organization with many
countries represented whose goal is to promote free and fair
trade rules. They want to increase cooperation and trade
between nations. However, they may do so through being a
middle person between countries who have unfair trade rules.
Trade Deficit: When imports are larger than exports. Basically,
the US has a large trade deficit with China because we buy much
more from them than they do from us which means there is a
deficit in our trade with them.
1
1
president of China.
the GDP the better.
Foreign Direct Investment (FDI): When a foreign company

owns a business in another country. It also includes general
investment from one country to another. For example, US
companies invest and own companies in China.
AT=Answers To
1AC
Currency Manipulation 1AC
First, the PLAN: The United

States Federal Government
should file a complaint with the
World Trade Organization
regarding currency
manipulation by the Peoples
Republic of China
1AC
Contention One: Inherency

1. The U.S. has lost hundreds of billions of dollars in global
trade and millions of jobs because of Chinas currency
practices, but neither the US nor the WTO have taken
action. If this manipulation continues, it will severely
impact our economic competitiveness
Bergsten, 2015 February 25, Mr. Bergsten is a senior fellow and director
emeritus at the Peterson Institute for International Economics,
http://www.forbes.com/sites/realspin/2015/02/25/currency-
manipulation-why-something-must-be-done/#4ad6505a31c8
Currency manipulation occurs when countries sell their own currencies

in the foreign exchange markets, usually against dollars, to keep their
exchange rates weak and the dollar strong. These countries thereby subsidize their
exports and raise the price of their imports, sometimes by as much as 30-40%. They strengthen their
international competitive positions, increase their trade surpluses and generate domestic production and
About 20 countries, most notably
employment at the expense of the United States and others.
China, have engaged in such practices over the past decade at an annual rate that
has averaged $1 trillion in recent years. The U.S. trade deficit has been
several hundred billion dollars a year higher as a result and we lost
several million additional jobs during the Great Recession . Currency
manipulation is, by far, the worlds most protectionist
international economic policy in the 21st century, but neither the
U.S. government nor the responsible international institutions, the
International Monetary Fund and the World Trade Organization, have
mounted efective responses. Congress has therefore been expressing great
concern over the issue and wants to take the occasion of the forthcoming legislation
on new U.S. trade agreements, most notably the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP), to
promote decisive counteraction. Dan Ikensons critique of my views on implementing efective new
constraints on such competitive devaluation policies (Currency Manipulation and the TransPacific
Partnership: What Art Lafer, Fred Bergsten and Other Hawks Get Wrong, January 26) contains several
egregious errors that negate his rejection of my policy recommendations. Ikenson writes in the current
context of whether the TPP and other pending U.S. trade agreements should include enforceable currency
disciplines, but he opposes any action to deal with manipulation of any type so I will respond to his broader
arguments. First, Ikenson excuses the foreign manipulation on the grounds that
currency changes do not have much impact on trade flows, citing the continued
growth of Chinas bilateral surplus with the U.S. But he ignores the fact that the 40%
rise of the RMB over the past ten years, along with Chinas rapid economic growth,
has reduced Chinas global current account surplus from 10% of its GDP in 2007 to
less than 3% today (which is still much too large as China has continued to
1AC
1
Currency changes matter hugely for trade balances
manipulate).
and the manipulators know itthat is why they manipulate.
1AC
1
Contention Two: Harms - Economy
1. Currently, China is severely devaluing their currency. That
hurts the US economy through trade imbalance and
millions of lost jobs
Washington Times, 2015 11/13, Madison Gesiotto, The negative efects of Chinas currency
manipulation explained, http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2015/nov/13/madison-gesiotto-negative-
efects-chinas-currency-/
For years, China has devalued its currency in order to manipulate both
the Chinese economy as well as the global economy. By devaluing its
currency, China has caused its exports to become cheaper for other
nations and has enabled itself to undercut its competitors. Chinas
actions have also afected the price of imports from other countries,
causing them to become more expensive. These high-priced
imports have made it hard for other nations to compete in
China, which has ultimately stimulated business for local
Chinese companies and negatively impacted countries like the
United States of America. In fact, there has been a dramatic
increase in trade imbalance between China and the U.S. for the last 15
years. In 2001, the U.S. imported approximately $102 billion from
China and exported about $19 billion, leaving a trade deficit of about
$83 billion, which at the time was extremely alarming when compared
to the 1985 deficit of just $6 million. PROMOTED CONTENT For Faster
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Recommended by Unfortunately, the trade deficit rise did not stop
there. In fact, it rose almost every single year since 2001, resulting in a
trade deficit of over $343 billion at the end of 2014. And 2015 has
proven to be no better, with about $357 billion in imports from China
calculated at the end of September and only $83 billion in exports,
leaving an over $273 billion trade deficit with three months remaining
in the year. Furthermore, Chinas currency manipulation has had
a serious negative impact on the American workforce. The
Economic Policy Institute estimated the cost in American jobs
of the Chinese currency devaluation to be 3.2 million between
2001 and 2013. Others have estimated this number to be even
higher. And with fewer Americans working, the U.S. government
generates less income tax revenue and is forced to payout
1AC
1
higher amounts to help the unemployed, both of which worsen
the already ridiculously high U.S. debt. It is clear that America
has suffered alarming consequences as a result of Chinas
currency manipulation and will continue to stomach these
costs if something is not done to stop China from continuing to
devalue its currency. Its time for America to wake up and fight back
against China to lower the trade deficit and save American jobs and
businesses.
2. Manufacturing jobs are critical for a strong and

prosperous U.S. economy
U.S. Department of Commerce, 2012 5/7, Economics & Statistics

Administration United States Department of Commerce
http://www.esa.doc.gov/reports/benefits-manufacturing-jobs
The role of the manufacturing sector in the U.S. economy is more prominent
than is suggested solely by its output or number of workers. It is a
cornerstone of innovation in our economy: manufacturing firms fund
most domestic corporate research and development (R&D), and the resulting
innovations and productivity growth improve our standard of living.
Manufacturing also drives U.S. exports and is crucial for a strong national
defense. The current economic recovery has witnessed a welcome return in
manufacturing job growth. Since its January 2010 low to April 2012,
manufacturing employment has expanded by 489,000 jobs or 4 percent1
the strongest cyclical rebound since the dual recessions in the early 1980s.
From mid-2009 through the end of February 2012, the number of job
openings surged by over 200 percent, to 253,000 openings. 2 Coupled with
attrition in the coming years from Baby Boomer retirements, this bodes well
for continued hiring opportunities in the manufacturing sector.3 The rebound
in manufacturing is important, not only as a sign of renewed strength, but
also because manufacturing jobs are often cited as good jobs: they pay
well, provide good benefits, and manufacturing workers are less likely to quit
than workers in other private sector industries.4 In fact, our analysis finds
evidence in support of these claims. Specifically, this report shows that: On
average, hourly wages and salaries for manufacturing jobs were $29.75 an
hour in 2010 compared to $27.47 an hour for non-manufacturing jobs. Total
hourly compensation, which includes employer-provided benefits, was $38.27
for workers in manufacturing jobs and $32.84 for workers in non-
manufacturing jobs, a 17 percent premium. After controlling for demographic,
1AC
1
geographic, and job characteristics, manufacturing jobs experienced a
significant 7 percent manufacturing wage premium. In other words, all else
being equal, workers in manufacturing tend to earn 7 percent more per hour
than their counterparts in other private industries. Like manufacturing
workers, science, technology, engineering and mathematics (STEM) workers
are catalysts for innovation in the economy. Not surprisingly, there is
considerable overlap between the STEM and manufacturing workforces, with
nearly one-third of college educated manufacturing workers holding a STEM
job. The educational attainment of the manufacturing workforce is rising
steadily. Today, more than half of manufacturing jobs are held by persons
with at least some college education. Manufacturing workers are more likely
than other workers to have significant, highly-valued employer-provided
benefits, including medical insurance and retirement benefits. Taking these
into account increases the manufacturing compensation premium to 15
percent. The size of the premium, including or excluding benefits, increases
consistently with educational attainment of a worker. Furthermore, the
compensation premium has risen over the past decade across all levels of
educational attainment. In sum, manufacturing jobs provide benefits to
workers with higher overall compensation than other sectors, and to
the economy through innovation that boosts our nations standard
of living.
1AC
1
3. A strong U.S. economy with good jobs is key to global
economic stability
Washington Times, 2010 [ Erica Werner-Associated Press

http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2010/nov/10/obama-strong-us-economy-key-global-recovery/
SEOUL (AP) President Obama said a strong, job-creating economy in

the United States would be the countrys most important
contribution to a global recovery as he pleaded with world leaders to
work together despite sharp diferences. Arriving in South Korea on
Wednesday for the G-20 summit, Mr. Obama is expected to find himself on
the defensive because of plans by the Federal Reserve to buy $600 billion in
long-term government bonds to try to drive down interest rates, spur lending
and boost the U.S. economy. Some other nations complain that the move will
give American goods an unfair advantage. In a letter sent Tuesday to leaders
of the Group of 20 major economic powers, Mr. Obama defended the steps
his administration and Congress have taken to help the economy. The
United States will do its part to restore strong growth, reduce
economic imbalances and calm markets, he wrote. A strong
recovery that creates jobs, income and spending is the most
important contribution the United States can make to the global
recovery. Mr. Obama outlined the work he had done to repair the nations
financial system and enact reforms after the worst recession in decades. He
implored the G-20 leaders to seize the opportunity to ensure a strong and
durable recovery. The summit gets under way on Thursday. When all nations
do their part emerging no less than advanced, surplus no less than deficit
we all benefit from higher growth, the president said in the letter. The
divisions between the economic powers was evident when Chinas leading
credit rating agency lowered its view of the United States, a response to the
Federal Reserves decision to buy more Treasury bonds. Major exporting
countries such as China and Germany are complaining that the Federal
Reserves action drives down the dollars value and gives U.S. goods an edge
in world markets.
1AC
1
4. Foreign debt causes global economic decline and nuclear
World War III
Hamer, 2010 3/6 Dr. Eberhard Hamer, retired Professor of Economics at Fachhochschule Bielefeld
Germany
Increasing Indications for a Third World War, http://www.currentconcerns.ch/index.php?id=1012
Due to the fact that the US has assumed the bank debts and added them to the
national budget and their already extreme increase in national debts one billion
dollars worth foreign credits is needed per day , the biggest financial crisis
since World War II has arrived. If the cash flow from abroad ceased or foreign
countries decided to escape the dollar, the US would be bankrupt. Nevertheless,
the US is not making sufficient eforts to reduce their growing national debts with
cost-cutting measures. Neither do their raise taxes to generate more income, nor
do they try to cut their budget, especially not their enormously grown military
budget. The US has employed 200 000 soldiers in combat missions worldwide.
Therefore nobody understood when the biggest warlord in the world, despite
increased force levels, obtained the Nobel Peace Prize. A possible explanation: he
received the prize as a precaution, because it depends mainly on him if there is a
war in Iran or not. In history, politicians who were economically at an end have
often opted for war as a last resort to maintain power. This has even be truer for
a country in a crisis, which sees war as a way out of an economic crisis. This is
how the US surmounted the biggest depression of the 20th century by entering
World War I, as well as the Great Depression by entering World War II, and now
they could try to solve their third crisis in the same way. We should not forget
that both world wars enabled the US not only to overcome their enormous
national debts, but they also developed into the leading economic power of the
world. The temptation to go the same way a third time is big. Furthermore, Israel
has positioned the atomic submarines delivered from Germany with
nuclear missiles in front of Iran, and in Georgia they not only rebuilt a nuclear
missile position which was destroyed by Russia one and a half years ago, and
which faces Iran, but fortified them with 90 US missile experts. Military
preparations are already advanced. Although the US military has not yet
succeeded in pacifying the two neighbouring states Iraq and Afghanistan, they
have practiced their biggest military concentration in the world in combat
mission. The Nobel Peace Prize Committee have assessed the situation correctly,
namely that a war against Iran cannot happen without the US presidents
approval, the least without the approval of a Nobel peace prize winner. However,
the pressure from banks, the oil billionaires, the arms industry, the military and
the Israel lobby could force the US to come into war when Israel carried out the
first strike against Iran and the above mentioned powers wanted to secure their
interests. The US is not only the country with the highest debts in the world but
along with their currency their empire decays. The worlds allegedly only
superpower is at the moment imploding in the same manner the Russian did 20
1AC
1
years ago. With some kicks the Chinese have already told the US president quite
clearly that they do not acknowledge their leadership any longer. Therefore, if
Israel decided to strike, the US president would face the terrible choice between
sinking further into the quagmire of financial-, economic and social crisis or
seeking the solution of a world war, which has made the US a winner twice
already. The danger of a world war has never been greater since World War II.
Therefore, increasing warnings to the US mostly from a group of European
intellectuals for more than a year have been justified. However, we cannot
prevent it . A war in Iran would not remain a local event even if it was only led
with missiles at the beginning. On Irans side the Chinese would intervene
directly or indirectly and the Russians possibly as well to prevent the
US from approaching their borders and becoming too dominant. On the
side of Israel and the US the NATO states would be obliged to help, especially
when they had sworn Nibelung loyalty before. Therefore, we in Europe have to
brace ourselves for a participation in a war. Merkels government might find a
war as the last political way out of their mess after the bailouts, public
insolvency, the looming financial collapse of the social systems, and social unrest
as a result of missing genuine corrections. War is coming up. The next few
months will decide if we will be drawn into a Third World War or if we can escape
this danger.
1AC
1
1. The U.S. has lost close to 5 million manufacturing jobs
due to Chinese currency manipulation. If we prevent
China from continuing this practice through a WTO
complaint it will restore our global competitiveness and
prevent an economic decline
PIIE, 2012 C. Fred Bergsten, senior fellow and director emeritus, was the
founding director of the Peterson Institute for International Economics
(formerly the Institute for International Economics) from 1981 through
2012, Peterson Institute for International Economics,
https://piie.com/publications/policy-briefs/currency-manipulation-us-
economy-and-global-economic-order
More than 20 countries have increased their aggregate foreign exchange

reserves and other official foreign assets by an annual average of nearly $1
trillion in recent years. This buildupmainly through intervention in the foreign exchange markets
keeps the currencies of the interveners substantially undervalued, thus boosting their international
competitiveness and trade surpluses.
The corresponding trade deficits are
spread around the world, but the largest share of the loss
centers on the United States, whose trade deficit has increased by $200 billion to $500
billion per year. The United States has lost 1 million to 5 million jobs
as a result of this foreign currency manipulation. The United
States must eliminate or at least sharply reduce its large trade
deficit to accelerate growth and restore full employment. The
way to do so, at no cost to the US budget, is to insist that
other countries stop manipulating their currencies and permit
the dollar to regain a competitive level. A US strategy to
terminate currency manipulation, especially if undertaken together with some of
the other countries that are adversely afected by the practice (including Australia, Canada, the euro area,
Brazil, India, Mexico, and numerous developing countries), would be fully
compatible with its international obligations. The proposed coalition should first seek
voluntary agreement from the manipulators to sharply reduce or eliminate their intervention. If they do not
do so, however, the United States should adopt four new policy measures against their currency
activities: (1) undertake countervailing currency intervention (CCI) against countries with convertible
currencies by buying amounts of their currencies equal to the amounts of dollars they are buying
themselves, to neutralize the impact on exchange rates, (2) tax the earnings on, or restrict further
purchases of, dollar assets acquired by intervening countries with inconvertible currencies (where CCI
could therefore not be fully efective) to penalize them for building up these positions, (3) treat
manipulated exchange rates as export subsidies for purposes of levying countervailing import duties, and
(4) hopefully with other adversely affected countries, bring a
1AC
1
case against the manipulators in the World Trade Organization
that would authorize more wide-ranging trade retaliation.
2AC Inherency Extensions
2AC Inherency AT #1US Acting

Now
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1
2AC Inherency AT #2China Not

Manipulating
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1
2 China is manipulating their currency to get ahead of
the US
Tonelson, June 2016 6/1, Alan, has testified before several Congressional committees, as well as
the U.S. Trade Deficit Review Commission, the U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission, and
the Maine Fair Trade Commission, Signs that Chinese Currency Manipulation is Back
https://www.equities.com/news/signs-that-chinese-currency-manipulation-is-back
For several years, China has been the gift that has kept on giving to
cheerleaders for current American trade policies, as its currency policies
allowed President Obama and his trade supporters to all but declare mission
accomplished for the decision to address Beijings predatory approach to
globalization through quiet diplomacy, not punitive tarifs. Now after letting
its currency strengthen versus the U.S. dollar, Beijing, is permitting the tightly
controlled yuan weaken once again. So as during most of the previous
decade, Chinese goods are once again getting major price
advantages over competing products in all global markets for
reasons having nothing to do with free markets or free trade. Lets
see if Mr. Obama and his backers will be as quick to admit failure as they
were to claim success. Chinas currency policies have had their ups and
downs for the last 15 years or so, and throughout the cheerleaders
consistently have mis-represented the idea of proper currency valuation.
Moreover, some impressive evidence indicates that the yuan has been much
more undervalued and therefore distorting trade flows to a much greater
extent than the standard exchange rate figures (from the Federal Reserve)
show. Nonetheless, its still important to note that those standard figures
have reported a 20.39 percent increase in the yuans value against the dollar
since July, 2005. Its just as important to note that, during this period, the
dollar is up versus a broad Fed measure of world currencies by about 7.70
percent, so by this key measure, China has been a big outlier in ways that
work to its disadvantage. And even though the yuan has fallen in value since
it hit its peak versus the dollar, in mid-January, 2014, its fallen much less
than that basket of other currencies 8.63 percent for the yuan, as of the
Federal Reserves latest (May 27) figures, versus 19.04 percent. But the key
baseline date Washington and everyone else should be looking at is last
August 11. Thats the day the Chinese government clearly decided it
had had enough of a stronger yuan, and devalued the currency by a
stunning 1.83 percent in one day. And from last August 10 though May
27, the yuan has dropped by 5.67 percent versus the dollar. But that group of
major currencies is down only 2.86 percent against the greenback. Moreover,
since May 27, the yuan has been permitted to sink another 0.42 percent. (I
couldnt find a comparably recent number for that broad dollar index.) With
1
the American economy still mired in an historically sluggish recovery, and
manufacturing output still faltering, expect all the remaining presidential
candidates to start decrying Chinese currency manipulation again. If it
continues, Beijings apparent gambit could also further diminish the chances
that Congress will approve Mr. Obamas Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP)
agreement, since a U.S. failure to respond adequately coupled with
the deals own lack of currency disciplines with teeth would arguably
turn Congressional approval into a green light for other would-be
foreign manipulators. Pity the lawmaker whod have to answer for that
vote.
2AC Harms (US Economy) Extensions
2AC Harms (US Economy) AT #1

Manipulation Doesnt Hurt US
Economy
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1
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Economy is Resilient
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1
2 Economic decline causes warthree warrants
ROYAL, 2010 [DOD COOPERATIVE THREAT REDUCTION DIRECTOR Jedediah Royal, Director of
Cooperative Threat Reduction at the U.S. Department of Defense, 2010, Economic Integration, Economic
Signaling and the Problem of Economic Crises, in Economics of War and Peace: Economic, Legal and
Political Perspectives, ed. Goldsmith and Brauer, p. 213-215
Less intuitive is how periods of economic decline may increase the likelihood of
external conflict. Political science literature has contributed a moderate degree of
attention to the impact of economic decline and the security and defense behavior of
interdependent states. Research in this vein has been considered at systemic, dyadic
and national levels. Several notable contributions follow. First, on the systemic level,
Pollins (2008) advances Modelski and Thompsons (1996) work on leadership cycle
theory, finding that rhythms in the global economy are associated with the rise and
fall of a pre-eminent power and the often bloody transition from one pre-eminent
leader to the next. As such, exogenous shocks such as economic crisis could usher in
a redistribution of relative power (see also Gilpin, 1981) that leads to uncertainty
about power balances, increasing the risk of miscalculation (Fearon, 1995).
Alternatively, even a relatively certain redistribution of power could lead to a
permissive environment for conflict as a rising power may seek to challenge a
declining power (Werner, 1999). Seperately, Pollins (1996) also shows
that global economic cycles combined with parallel leadership cycles impact the
likelihood of conflict among major, medium and small powers, although he suggests
that the causes and connections between global economic conditions and security
conditions remain unknown. Second, on a dyadic level, Copelands (1996, 2000)
theory of trade expectations suggests that future expectation of trade is a
significant variable in understanding economic conditions and security behaviours of
states. He argues that interdependent states are likely to gain specific benefits from
trade so long as they have an optimistic view of future trade relations, However, if
the expectations of future trade decline, particularly for difficult to replace items such
as energy resources, the likelihood for conflict increases, as states will be inclined to
use force to gain access to those resources. Crisis could potentially be the trigger for
decreased trade expectations either on its own or because it triggers protectionist
moves by interdependent states. Third, others have considered the link between
economic decline and external armed conflict at a national level. Blomberg and Hess
(2002) find a strong correlation between internal conflict and external conflict,
particularly during periods of economic downturn. They write, The linkages between
internal and external conflict and prosperity are strong and mutually
reinforcing. Economic conflict tends to spawn internal conflict, which in turn returns
the favor. Moreover, the presence of a recession tends to amplify the extent to which
international and external conflict self-reinforce each other. (Blomberg & Hess, 2002.
P. 89) Economic decline has been linked with an increase in the likelihood of
terrorism (Blomberg, Hess, & Weerapana, 2004), which has the capacity to spill
across borders and lead to external tensions. Furthermore, crises generally reduce
the popularity of a sitting government. Diversionary theory suggests that, when
facing unpopularity arising from economic decline, sitting governments have
1
increased incentives to fabricate external military conflicts to create a rally around
the flag efect. Wang (1996), DeRouen (1995), and Blomberg, Hess, and Thacker
(2006) find supporting evidence showing that economic decline and use of force are
at least indirectly correlated. Gelpi (1997), Miller (1999), and Kisangani and Pickering
(2009) suggest that the tendency towards diversionary tactics are greater for
democratic states than autocratic states, due to the fact that democratic leaders are
generally more susceptible to being removed from office due to lack of domestic
support. DeRouen (2000) has provided evidence showing that periods of weak
economic performance in the United States, and thus weak Presidential
popularity, are statistically linked to an increase in the use of force. In
summary, recent economic scholarship positively correlated economic integration
with an increase in the frequency of economic crises, whereas political science
scholarship links economic decline with external conflict at systemic, dyadic and
national levels. This implied connection between integration, crisis and armed conflict
has not featured prominently in the economic-security debate and deserves more
attention.

Domestic Matters More
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1

Deficit Good
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2AC Solvency AT #1Other

Countries Manipulate
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2AC Solvency AT #2China Wont

Follow WTO
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1
2 The WTO was set up to prevent unfair trade practices
such as Chinas currency manipulation. They will rule in
favor of the aff.
Mattoo and Subramanian, 2008 Aaditya Mattoo is lead economist with the International Trade
Group of the Development Research Group in the World Bank, Arvind Subramanian has been a senior
fellow at the Peterson Institute for International Economics since April 2007. He also holds a joint
appointment at the Center for Global Development and is senior research professor at Johns Hopkins
University. January, Currency Undervaluation and Sovereign Wealth Funds: A New Role for the World Trade
Organization https://www.ciaonet.org/attachments/4495/uploads
There are compelling reasons for the WTO to address exchange rate
undervaluation. The genius of the General Agreement on Tarifs and
Trade (GATT) was to recognize that the politics of trade policy is
unavoidably mercantilist and then to harness this very mercantilism to
avoid protectionist outcomes. Two types of goods trade policies that
the WTO regulates are import protectionthrough tarifs and quotas
and export supportthrough subsidies. An undervalued exchange rate
is both an import tax and an export subsidy and is hence the most
mercantilist policy imaginable. Yet, exchange rate manipulation
remains mostly unregulated in the WTO. The WTO rules on tarifs
prohibit the taxation of imports above certain negotiated and legally
bound levels. A country is, however, free to impose an implicit import
tax by maintaining an undervalued exchange ratein fact, such a
measure is not even considered a tax. Similarly, the WTO rules on
export subsidies exclude exchange rates from their scope because of
the notion of specificityi.e., policies that afect a few products are
prohibited whereas subsidies that have economywide efects are not.
This is like having disarmament negotiations where howitzers are
haggled over while nuclear weapons remain beyond the scope of
negotiations.4 Moreover, as described earlier, undervalued exchange
rates could have important negative trade consequences for partner
countries. Undervalued exchange rates are the classic example of
beggar-thyneighbor policies that both the IMF and WTO were set up to
prevent. That objective was arguably the raison dtre of these
institutions.
1
3 WTO is the best mechanism for fighting currency
manipulation
Mattoo and Subramanian, 2008 Aaditya Mattoo is lead economist with the International Trade
Group of the Development Research Group in the World Bank, Arvind Subramanian has been a senior
fellow at the Peterson Institute for International Economics since April 2007. He also holds a joint
appointment at the Center for Global Development and is senior research professor at Johns Hopkins
University. January, Currency Undervaluation and Sovereign Wealth Funds: A New Role for the World Trade
Organization https://www.ciaonet.org/attachments/4495/uploads
But one important concern arises from our advocacy of the WTO as an
efective dispute settlement forum. This might be called the too big to
litigate problem. Since exchange rate undervaluation is potentially an
issue of major macroeconomic significance, would it be possible to
bring countries to dispute settlement on such an issue and reasonably
expect rulings to be implemented? After all, it can be argued the WTO
has not entirely been successful in relation to the big disputes:
subsidies to Airbus and Boeing, import restrictions on beef containing
hormones, and the EU system of preferences for its former colonies.
Our reading of WTO dispute settlement is more nuanced. While some
big disputes have not been resolved, others have been: for example,
the US Foreign Sales Corporation tax, the Byrd amendment, US
subsidies on cotton (a major aspect of US agricultural policy), European
export subsidies on sugar, US safeguard action on steel, and European
rules on geographical indications. Even small countries have had a
modicum of success when litigating against their larger trading
partners: Costa Rica successfully challenged US restrictions on
underwear; and tiny Antigua brought a high-profile and successful case
against the United States on online gamblingwhile the United States
has not completely removed the ofending action, it is modifying its
commitments and compensating trading partners. What determines
whether disputes can be successfully litigated and implemented is not
necessarily whether they are big or important but whether countries
perceive that these policies were part of a previous bargain that was
considered fair and mutually beneficial. For our purposes, it is not
necessary that WTO dispute settlement be perfect. It is enough if it is
an improvement on virtually nonexistent enforcement in the IMF.
2AC Solvency AT #3Plan Takes

Years
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2 Our Plan only takes a few months
Wall Street Journal, 2011 November 16, Debate on Yuan Manipulation Moves to WTO
http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB10001424052970203503204577040133923921786
Brazil's government said Monday that the WTO had agreed to discuss the matter.
The WTO on Tuesday confirmed that its 153 government members have agreed
to hold a meeting on the topic, probably in the first half of next year, according to
WTO spokesman Keith Rockwell. Governments are also likely to discuss the issue
at a meeting next month of trade ministers in Geneva, Mr. Rockwell said. Brazil,
which first raised the issue with the WTO in September, alleges the yuan's
undervaluation is gravely damaging Brazil's industrial base. Though Brazil's
economy is growing relatively quickly overall, the country's industrial production
is now falling, partly due to a tide of cheaper Chinese goods. "Exchange-rate
factors are devastating the productive structure of Latin American countries,"
Brazilian trade and industry minister Fernando Pimentel told reporters this week.
Many countries, including the U.S., have long complained that China's weak
currency gives it an unfair advantage in selling its goods around the world. Many
economists say China's currency policy has contributed to its large trade
surpluses by keeping the yuan undervalued. But the question of whether the
policy violates WTO rules will hinge on the minutiae of international trade law,
experts say.
CDL Core Files 2016-2017 Currency Manipulation NEG
Currency Manipulation
NEGATIVE
1NC Inherency Frontline

1. The affirmative is the status quo. We are already taking
steps to resolve Chinas manipulation of their currency.
Cox, May 2016 Jef, finance editor CNBC, The US just dropped the
hammer on currency manipulation
http://www.cnbc.com/2016/05/02/the-us-just-dropped-the-hammer-on-
currency-manipulation.html
The U.S. government is sending a message to countries it

believes are manipulating their currencies: We're watching
you. A Treasury report targets five countries in particular: China, Japan,
Korea, Taiwan and Germany. Each meets at least two of the three
criteria that "determine whether an economy may be pursuing foreign
exchange policies that could give it an unfair competitive advantage
against the United States." At a time when currency devaluation has
become a major tool used by multiple countries to stimulate growth,
the U.S. is looking to protect its own interests. The report is an
outgrowth of the Trade Facilitation and Trade Enforcement Act
of 2015, a bipartisan effort aimed at stemming the global race
to the bottom. The criteria to determine whether a country should be
on the "Monitoring List" of countries using unfair currency practices
are: a trade surplus of larger than $20 billion, or 0.1 percent of U.S.
GDP; a trade surplus with the U.S. that is more than 3 percent of that
country's GDP; "persistent one-sided intervention," defined as
purchases of foreign currency amounting to more than 2 percent of the
country's GDP in a one-year period. No country meets all three criteria,
according to the report, though the five on the list meet at least two.
The act directs the president to engage each individual
country on the list and tell it "to adopt appropriate policies to
correct its undervaluation and external surpluses." If the
countries in question do not act, the president can enact a variety of
penalties, including cutting of the ofending countries from Overseas
Private Investment Corp. funding; asking the International Monetary
Fund, which is charged with preventing currency manipulation, to step
in; or reconsider whether the ofending country should be engaged in
trade agreements. China came under harsh criticism when it devalued
1
in August. The Treasury report notes China has "intervened heavily" in
forex markets, and the issue has become political as well, with
Republican presidential front-runner Donald Trump frequently
bemoaning China's undercutting of the U.S. dollar
1
2. China is not manipulating their currency. Countries
routinely inflate and deflate the value of their currency.
Slaughter, January 2016 Matthew, Paul Danos Dean of the Tuck School
and the Earl C. Daum 1924 Professor of International Business at
Dartmouth College, Jan. 8, The Myths of Chinas Currency
Manipulation http://www.wsj.com/articles/the-myths-of-chinas-
currency-manipulation-1452296887
Global equity markets have experienced steep declines since the new
year, and many assert the devaluation of the yuan by the Peoples
Bank of China is a major cause of this weeks turmoil. These
devaluations have fueled long-standing outcries that China is playing
dirty. Presidential hopeful Donald Trump, for example, recently claimed
on these pages that the wanton manipulation of Chinas currency is
robbing Americans of billions of dollars of capital and millions of jobs.
To cut through all the hyperbole, the mechanics and consequences of
Chinas exchange-rate regime need to be understoodnot only for this
week but also for the coming year, when the yuan will be debated in
the context of other issues such as the Trans-Pacific Partnership. Here
are three essential points. First: The legal monopoly power to create
money that each central bank enjoys allows it to fix one nominal price
which can legitimately be an exchange rateto achieve policy goals
such as price stability or full employment. Today many central banks
choose to fix a nominal interest rate. The U.S. Federal Reserve targets
the federal-funds rate, the interest banks charge each other for
overnight loans. The European Central Bank targets the rate on the
marginal lending facility, its version of that overnight market. Other
central banks fix a nominal exchange rate; Chinas central bank, for
example, for years fixed the yuan-U.S. dollar rate and since last month
fixes the yuan price of a basket of 13 currencies (in which the dollar
still figures prominently). Opinion Journal Video Business World
Columnist Holman Jenkins Jr. analyzes the economic factors, from
Chinas debt to the oil price, influencing market moves. Currency
devaluation or revaluation is a common exercise of sovereign
monetary policy. During the post-World War II Bretton Woods regime,
dozens of countries pegged their currencies to the dollar while, in turn,
the Fed pegged $35 to an ounce of gold. Reasonable people can and
1
do disagree about how countries conduct their monetary policies: what
price should the central bank fix, or at what pace should that fix
evolve. But to label as manipulation the conduct of monetary
policy itself betrays a fundamental confusion about the
operation and goals of central banks. If Zhou Xiaochuan, governor
of the Peoples Bank of China, is a currency manipulator, then Janet
Yellen is an interest-rate manipulator.
2NC/1NR Inherency Extensions
2NC/1NR Inherency #1US Taking

Steps to Solve Currency
Manipulation
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2NC/1NR Inherency #2China not

Manipulating
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1NC Harms (US Economy) Frontline
1NC Harms (US Economy)

Frontline
1. Chinas currency manipulation has not negatively
affected U.S. trade or unemployment.
Slaughter, January 2016 Matthew, Paul Danos Dean of the Tuck School
and the Earl C. Daum 1924 Professor of International Business at
Dartmouth College, Jan. 8, The Myths of Chinas Currency
Manipulation http://www.wsj.com/articles/the-myths-of-chinas-
currency-manipulation-1452296887
Second: Movements in the nominal yuan exchange rate have

almost no long-term impact on global flows of exports and
imports or on broader considerations such as average wages.
The exchange rate that matters for trade flows is the real exchange
rate, i.e., the nominal exchange rate adjusted for local-currency prices
in both countries. The real exchange rate, in turn, reflects the deep
forces of comparative advantage such as technology and endowments
of labor and capital. These forces drive trade regardless of monetary
policy. Think about the companies involved in trade. Yuan depreciation
tends to be partly ofset by Chinese companies raising their yuan
prices. A large academic literature has repeatedly found that profit
competition among a countrys exporting companies typically undoes
about half of that countrys nominal exchange-rate swings. Today more
companies operate in global supply networksin which trade and
investment link diferent stages of production across diferent
countries. Because these networked companies incur both revenues
and costs in many currencies, their trade competitiveness tends to
vary little with the movement of any one currency. Long-term
movements in nominal exchange rates often have nothing to
do with the evolution of global trade flows. In the generation
after the Bretton Woods system dissolved, the dollar steadily
depreciated against the Japanese yen, from its fix of 360 yen per dollar
to an average of just 94 in 1995. Over that time did the U.S. swing into
a massive trade surplus with Japan? No. From $1.2 billion in 1970 the
U.S. trade deficit with Japan rose by a factor of 50, to $59.1 billion in
1995. From 2004 to 2014 the dollar similarly depreciatednote, not
1
appreciatedagainst the yuan by about 25%. Over that decade the
U.S. trade deficit with China soarednot fellfrom $161.9 billion to
$342.6 billion.
1
2. No Impact: The U.S. and global economy are resilient.
Behravesh, 2006 Nariman, most accurate economist tracked by USA Today and chief global
economist and executive vice president for Global Insight, The Great Shock Absorber; Good
macroeconomic policies and improved microeconomic flexibility have strengthened the global
economy's 'immune system.' 10-15, http://www.newsweek.com/id/47483
The U.S. and global economies were able to withstand three body blows in
2005--one of the worst tsunamis on record (which struck at the very end of
2004), one of the worst hurricanes on record and the highest energy prices
after Hurricane Katrina--without missing a beat. This resilience was
especially remarkable in the case of the United States, which since
2000 has been able to shrug off the biggest stock-market drop
since the 1930s, a major terrorist attack, corporate scandals and
war. Does this mean that recessions are a relic of the past? No, but recent
events do suggest that the global economy's "immune system" is now
strong enough to absorb shocks that 25 years ago would probably have
triggered a downturn. In fact, over the past two decades, recessions have
not disappeared, but have become considerably milder in many parts of
the world. What explains this enhanced recession resistance? The answer:
a combination of good macroeconomic policies and improved
microeconomic flexibility. Since the mid-1980s, central banks worldwide
have had great success in taming inflation. This has meant that long-term
interest rates are at levels not seen in more than 40 years. A low-inflation
and low-interest-rate environment is especially conducive to sustained,
robust growth. Moreover, central bankers have avoided some of the policy
mistakes of the earlier oil shocks (in the mid-1970s and early 1980s),
during which they typically did too much too late, and exacerbated the
ensuing recessions. Even more important, in recent years the Fed has been
particularly adept at crisis management , aggressively cutting interest
rates in response to stock-market crashes, terrorist attacks and weakness
in the economy. The benign inflationary picture has also benefited from
increasing competitive pressures, both worldwide (thanks to globalization
and the rise of Asia as a manufacturing juggernaut) and domestically
(thanks to technology and deregulation). Since the late 1970s, the United
States, the United Kingdom and a handful of other countries have been
especially aggressive in deregulating their financial and industrial sectors.
This has greatly increased the flexibility of their economies and reduced
their vulnerability to inflationary shocks. Looking ahead, what all this
means is that a global or U.S. recession will likely be avoided in 2006, and
probably in 2007 as well. Whether the current expansion will be able to
break the record set in the 1990s for longevity will depend on the ability of
1
central banks to keep the inflation dragon at bay and to avoid policy
mistakes. The prospects look good. Inflation is likely to remain a low-level
threat for some time, and Ben Bernanke, the incoming chairman of the
Federal Reserve Board, spent much of his academic career studying the
past mistakes of the Fed and has vowed not to repeat them. At the same
time, no single shock will likely be big enough to derail the expansion.
What if oil prices rise to $80 or $90 a barrel? Most estimates suggest that
growth would be cut by about 1 percent--not good, but no recession. What
if U.S. house prices fall by 5 percent in 2006 (an extreme assumption,
given that house prices haven't fallen nationally in any given year during
the past four decades)? Economic growth would slow by about 0.5 percent
to 1 percent. What about another terrorist attack? Here the scenarios can
be pretty scary, but an attack on the order of 9/11 or the Madrid or London
bombings would probably have an even smaller impact on overall GDP
growth.
3. Domestic consumer practices have a bigger impact on the

health of our economy.
Suranovic, 2012 Steve, Ph.D., faculty member at the George Washington

University since 1988. He has served several terms as the current
Director of the International Trade and Investment Policy M.A. program
at the Elliott School of International Afairs, The Institute for
International Economic Policy, Should the US Retaliate against Chinas
Currency Manipulation?
http://www.internationaleconpolicy.com/international-finance/should-
the-us-retaliate-against-chinas-currency-manipulation/
For starters, China has not actively lowered its currency value. Like
many other U.S. trading partners, China has adhered to a fixed
currency regime for over two decades. To maintain that fixed rate,
and because of high demand for the yuan during the past decade,
Chinas central bank has purchased over a trillion dollars of currency
reserves that are invested mostly in U.S. treasuries. These actions by
Chinas central bank are what Romney and others refer to as currency
manipulation. However, this characterization overlooks three
important things: first, a fixed currency regime is not unique to China;
second, the yuan has been appreciating against the dollar for
almost a decade; and third, currency appreciation does not
automatically eliminate trade deficits. According to the International
1
Monetary Fund (IMF), over 100 countries have some form of a fixed
exchange regime. Thus, it is misleading to single out China as a
currency manipulator when other U.S. trading partners engage in the
same practice. Regardless, China has adopted a crawling peg system,
which permits the central bank to periodically adjust the yuan with
respect to the dollar. Since 2005, the yuan has appreciated by 23
percent in nominal terms. Taking into account inflation, that number
increases to almost 50 percent. To put a nearly 50 percent appreciation
into context, as well as provide a historical touchstone, Congress
proposed legislation back in 2005 that would slap a 27.5 percent tarif
on all Chinese imports. Why 27.5 percent? At the time, this was
estimated to be the amount the yuan was undervalued. Fast-forward to
today, the Chinese yuan has appreciated by almost twice that amount
and the U.S. still has a trade deficit with China! One might argue that a
50 percent increase in the value of the yuan simply wasnt enough to
do the job. In this case, consider the 1980s when the U.S. faced
worrisome trade deficits with Japan. Since the 1980s the yen has
appreciated by 220 percent to the dollar and yet this has not
prevented a sizeable US trade deficit with Japan in every year since.
This evidence alone should give hesitation to anyone who
thinks a simple currency adjustment will eliminate the trade
deficit and create U.S. jobs. Trade deficits are influenced by
much more than just the currency value; notably low U.S.
savings and high consumption levels.
1
4. Solvency Turn- a trade deficit with China will actually
improve long-term economic growth.
Lincicome, 2012 Scott is an international trade attorney, adjunct scholar

at the Cato Institute and Visiting Lecturer at Duke University, January
20, Almost Everything Donald Trump Says About Trade With China Is
Wrong http://thefederalist.com/2016/01/20/almost-everything-donald-
trump-says-about-trade-with-china-is-wrong/
However, as I explained in The Federalist last fall, the U.S.

manufacturing sector has been (until the last month or so) setting
production (and export!) records, and almost 90 percent of the
decline in U.S. manufacturing jobs between 2000 and 2010 was
caused by productivity gains (robots and computers), rather
than import competition. In fact, a recent Ball State study found
that, Had we kept 2000-levels of productivity and applied them
to 2010-levels of production, we would have required 20.9
million manufacturing workers. Instead, we employed only
12.1 million. So unless Trump wants to destroy all the robots, those
jobs just arent coming back, tarif or not. Furthermore, the idea that
the U.S.-China trade balance proves that were losing at
trade is the height of economic ignorance. For one thing,
theres actually a strong correlation between U.S. economic
growth and an expanding U.S. trade deficit. As Catos Dan
Griswold wrote: An examination of the past 30 years of U.S.
economic performance offers no evidence that a rising level of
imports or growing trade deficits have negatively affected the
U.S. economy. In fact, since 1980, the U.S. economy has grown more
than three times faster during periods when the trade deficit was
expanding as a share of GDP compared to periods when it was
contracting. Stock market appreciation, manufacturing output,
and job growth were all significantly more robust during
periods of expanding imports and trade deficits. Moreover, basic
economics teaches us that trade balances reflect national savings,
consumption and investment, not trade policy. Thus, every dollar
traveling overseas to buy imports (in excess of our exports) eventually
comes back to the United States in the form of investment, and our
trade deficit is matched by a capital account surplus. In other
1
words, we buy goods and services from foreigners, and they buy an
equal amount of our exports plus our financial assets (aka foreign
investment in the United States).
2NC/1NR Harms (US Economy)
Extensions
2NC/1NR Harms (US Economy) #1

Manipulation Doesnt Hurt the
US
They say __________________________________________________, but

facts)
to be true)
their argument)

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Extensions
1
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Extensions

The Economy is Resilient
They say __________________________________________________, but

facts)
to be true)
their argument)

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Extensions
1
Extensions
1
2 And, a decline in U.S. hegemony does not cause great
power war
Posen, 2014 Ford International Professor of Political Science at MIT and the director of MIT's Security
Studies Program (Barry, Restraint: A New Foundation for U.S. Grand Strategy, Cornell University Press, p.
60-62, June 24)
Partisans of Liberal Hegemony might accept some of the factual

statements above but would argue that the good the strategy has
achieved far outweighs the bad. As noted in the introduction, partisans
assume that liberal democracy, human rights, market economies, free
trade, nuclear nonproliferation, middle and great powers that do not take
responsibility for their own security, and U.S. political and military
hegemony are all mutually causative, and all lead ineluctably to a vast
improvement in the security and welfare of others, and hence to the U.S.
security position. 124 They also posit that the world is fragile; damage to
one of these good things will lead to damage to other good things, so the
United States must defend all. The fragile and interconnected argument
is politically efective. By accident or design, the argument derives an
inherent plausibility due to the inevitable limits of our substantive
knowledge, fear, uncertainty, liberal ideology, and U.S. national pride.
Most targets of the argument do not know enough about the
world to argue with experts who claim these connections; the chain of
posited connections always leads to danger for the United States, and
fear is a powerful selling tool. Once fear is involved, even low-
probability chains of causation can be made to seem frightening enough
to do something about, especially if you believe your country has
overwhelming power. It is pleasant to believe that the spread of U.S.
values such as liberty and democracy depend on U.S. power and
leadership. The argument does not stand close scrutiny. First, it
obscures the inherently strong security position of the United States,
which I have already reviewed. The economic, geographic, demographic,
and technological facts supporting this point are seldom discussed,
precisely because they are facts. It takes very large events abroad to
significantly threaten the United States, and more moderate
strategies can address these possibilities at lower costs. Typical
Liberal Hegemony arguments for any new project take the form of domino
theory. One small untended problem is expected easily and quickly to
produce another and another until the small problems become big ones,
or the collection of problems becomes overwhelming. Whether these
Extensions
1
connections are valid in any particular case will always be open to debate.
Even if the connections are plausible, however, it is unlikely given the
inherent U.S. security position that the United States need prop up
the first domino. It has the luxury of waiting for information and
choosing the dominos it wishes to shore up, if any. Second,
proponents of Liberal Hegemony often elide the diference between those
benefits of the strategy that flow to others, and those that flow to the
United States. Individually, it is surely true that cheap-riders and reckless-
drivers like the current situation because of the welfare, security, or power
gains that accrue to them. United States commitments may make the
international politics of some regions less exciting than would otherwise
be the case. The United States, however, pays a significant price and
assumes significant risks to provide these benefits to others, while the
gains to the United States are exaggerated because the United States
is inherently quite secure. Third, Liberal Hegemonists argue that U.S.
commitments reduce the intensity of regional security competitions, limit
the spread of nuclear weaponry, and lower the general odds of conflict,
and that this helps keep the United States out of wars that would emerge
in these unstable regions. This chain of interconnected benefits is not
self-evident. United States activism does change the nature of regional
competitions; it does not necessarily suppress them. For example,
where U.S. commitments encourage free-riding, this attracts
coercion, which the United States must then do more to deter.
Where the United States encourages reckless driving, it produces
regional instability. United States activism probably helps cause some
nuclear proliferation, because some states will want nuclear weapons to
deter an activist United States. When the United States makes extended
deterrence commitments to discourage proliferation, the U.S. military is
encouraged to adopt conventional and nuclear military strategies
that are themselves destabilizing. Finally, as is clear from the evidence
of the last twenty years, the United States ends up in regional wars in
any case. Fourth, one key set of interconnections posited by Liberal
Hegemonists is that between U.S. security provision, free trade, and U.S.
prosperity. This is a prescriptive extension of hegemonic stability theory,
developed by economist Charles Kindleberger from a close study of the
collapse of global liquidity in 1931 and the ensuing great depression. 125
Professor Kindleberger concluded from this one case that a global system
of free trade and finance would more easily survive crises if there was a
leader, a hegemon with sufficient economic power such that its policies
could save a system in crisis, which would also have the interest and
the will to do so, precisely because it was so strong. 126 Subsequent
theorists, such as Robert Gilpin, extended this to the idea that a global
Extensions
1
economic and security hegemon would be even better. 127 Robert
Keohane, and later John Ikenberry, added to this theory the notion that a
liberal hegemon would be still better, because it would graft transparent
and legitimate rules onto the hegemonic system, which would make it
more acceptable to the subjects and hence less costly to run. 128 A
comprehensive rebuttal of hegemonic stability theory is beyond the scope
of this book. But this theory has fallen into desuetude in the study of
international politics in the last twenty years. Proponents did not produce
a clear, consolidated version of the theory that integrated economics,
security, and institutional variables in a systematic way that gives us a
sense of their relative importance and interdependence, and how they
work in practice. The theory is difficult to test because there are only
two cases: nineteenth- and early twentieth-century Britain, and post
World War II United States, and they operated in very diferent ways under
very diferent conditions. Finally, testing of narrow versions of the
theory did not show compelling results. 129 These problems should
make us somewhat skeptical about making the theory the basis for U.S.
grand strategy.
Extensions
1
3 Economic Decline does not cause warhistory proves
it
FERGUSON, 2006 [Niall, MA, D.Phil., is Laurence A. Tisch Professor of History at

Harvard University and William Ziegler Professor of Business Administration at
Harvard Business School. He is also a Senior Research Fellow at Jesus College, Oxford
University, and a Senior Fellow at the Hoover Institution, Stanford University, Foreign
Afairs, Sept/Oct, The Next War of the World]
Nor can economic crises explain the bloodshed. What may be the
most familiar causal chain in modern historiography links the Great
Depression to the rise of fascism and the outbreak of World War II. But that
simple story leaves too much out. Nazi Germany started the war in
Europe only after its economy had recovered. Not all the countries
afected by the Great Depression were taken over by fascist regimes, nor did
all such regimes start wars of aggression. In fact, no general
relationship between economics and conflict is
discernible for the century as a whole. Some wars came after
periods of growth, others were the causes rather than the
consequences of economic catastrophe, and some severe economic
crises were not followed by wars.
Extensions

Domestic Economy More
Important
They say __________________________________________________, but

facts)
to be true)
their argument)

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Extensions
1
______________________________________________________________________________
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Extensions

Deficit Good
They say __________________________________________________, but

facts)
to be true)
their argument)

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1. South Korea, Japan, and Germany also manipulate their
currencies at the expense of the U.S. economy.
Financial Times, April 2016 Financial Times- US adds China, Germany

and Japan to new currency watchlist, 4/29
https://next.ft.com/content/9d8533f4-0e3c-11e6-9cd4-2be898308be3
The US Treasury has placed China, Germany and Japan on a new

currency watchlist, warning that all three faced extra scrutiny and
potential retaliation by Washington as a result of concerns over
growing imbalances in their trade relationship with the US. Fridays
move by the US Treasury to put out a new monitoring list and take
the potentially provocative step of including Germany alongside China
and Japan on it comes amid continuing political pressure in the US
for the government to take a stronger stand against currency
manipulation. It also follows a new strengthening in the yen on the
back of the Bank of Japans lack of policy action this week as well as
fresh US gross domestic product data that showed a strong
dollar continued to be a drag on US growth. None of the USs big
trading partners had engaged in currency manipulation in the past
year, the Treasury said in its twice yearly foreign exchange market
report to Congress. But it made clear that it was concerned about
rising imbalances with some of its big trading partners and the impact
of that on the global economy. It said the material current account
and significant bilateral trade surpluses China, Germany, Japan and
South Korea had with the US resulted in those economies joining the
new list, which the Treasury is required to compile as a result of trade
legislation passed last year. Taiwan was also included on the list
because of its current account surplus and its persistent, one-sided
intervention in foreign exchange markets.
1
2. China wont admit any fault to the WTO so nothing will
change
Morrison and Labonte, 2008 Wayne M. Morrison, Specialist in

International Trade and Finance; Marc Labonte, Specialist in
Macroeconomics Government and Finance 6/9 Chinas Currency:
Economic Issues and Options for U.S. Trade Policy
https://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/RL32165.pdf
Chinese officials argue that its currency policy is not meant to promote
exports or discourage imports. They claim that China adopted its
currency peg to the dollar in order to foster economic stability and
investor confidence, a policy that is practiced by a variety of
developing countries. Chinese officials have expressed concern that
abandoning the current currency policy could spark an economic crisis
in China and would especially be damaging to its export industries at a
time when painful economic reforms (such as closing down inefficient
state-owned enterprises and laying of millions of workers) are being
implemented.12 In addition, Chinese officials also appear to be worried
about the rising level of unrest in the rural areas, where incomes have
failed to keep up with those in urban areas and public anger has
spread over government land seizures and corruption. Chinese officials
contend that appreciating the currency could reduce domestic food
prices (because of increased imports) and agricultural exports (by
raising prices in overseas markets), thus lowering the income of
farmers and further raising tensions. They further contend that the
Chinese banking system is too underdeveloped and burdened with
heavy debt to be able to deal efectively with possible speculative
pressures that could occur with a fully convertible currency, which
typically accompanies a floating exchange rate.13
3 The plan takes until after 2018the impacts happen first
Wall Street Journal, 2015 May 14, Worried About Currency Manipulation?
Worry About the WTO
http://blogs.wsj.com/economics/2015/05/14/worried-about-currency-
manipulation-worry-about-the-wto/
But such a case wouldnt end there. Chinaor whoever was hit with a
U.S. subsidy tarifwould be sure to challenge the judgment at the
World Trade Organization, said Peterson Institute for International
Economics trade expert Gary Hufbauer, a free trader. Its far from clear
how the WTO would rule. But he says one thing is certain: The WTO
would take a long time to decideand by that time, the ofending
currency practices may have changed. If the U.S. Congress enacts
currency legislation in 2015, the final appellate body decision
(by the WTO) might well wait until 2018 or beyond, he and
Cathleen Cimino, another PIIE researcher, warn in an upcoming
Peterson Institute blog post. Mr. Paul, who backs the currency
provision, says he wants TPP to have separate currency provisions, so
the U.S. has another tool to deal with trading partners
2NC/1NR Solvency #1Other

Countries Manipulate
They say __________________________________________________, but

facts)
to be true)
their argument)

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2NC/1NR Solvency #2China

Wont Change
They say __________________________________________________, but
facts)
to be true)
their argument)

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1
2 The WTO will not take up Chinas currency manipulation.
This means the plan will not solve
Brainard, 2007 Lael was a Brookings senior fellow from 2001 to 2009, and served as the vice
president and director of the Global Economy and Development program from June 2006 to March 16,
2009, 6/14, Global Views: Currency Exchange Rate Oversight Reform Act of 2007
http://www.brookings.edu/research/opinions/2007/06/14globaleconomics-brainard
Following on the heels of Hunter-Ruan and Dodd-Shelby, the biggest

takeaway from the Baucus-Grassley-Schumer-Graham bill is that Congress
has run out of patience with China and wants to see the administration,
the IMF, and the WTO deliver results after years of inaction. Compared
with some of the measures that have been proposed in previous
legislation, this bill is relatively surgical and relies primarily on the existing
framework of international rules and institutions. The message to China is
clear: participation in global markets is not a one-way menu; you cannot
reap the rewards without taking on responsibilities, even when these carry
risks. The question now is whether the WTO and the especially the
IMF are up to the task of grappling with China's undervalued
yuan. So far, the answer has been a clear no.
2NC/1NR Solvency #3Plan Takes

Years
They say __________________________________________________, but

facts)
to be true)
their argument)

______________________________________________________________________________
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______________________________________________________________________________
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CDL Core Files 2016-2017 China Nationalism Disadvantage
China Nationalism
Disadvantage
Vocabulary
Chinese Communist Party (CCP): Main political party of China.
1
president of China.
Nationalism: Love of ones country. This can include small things
like saluting a flag or singing the national anthem. However, it
can sometimes mean loving ones country and not respecting
other people. This happened during Nazi Germany, for example.
In China, Xi needs to have nationalists on his side to keep the
country stable.
1
Taiwan, Republic of China (ROC), Taipei: Island of the coast
of China. In the 1940s, a Chinese political party fled mainland
China and started a government there. Since then, China has
claimed Taiwan as their own country while Taiwan (generally)
wants independence.
AT=Answers To
1NC Shell
1NC China Nationalism

Disadvantage Shell
A. Uniqueness: China acts independently of the US and
only cooperates sparinglytheyre frenemies. Xi
maintains his strong, nationalist image now
Council on Foreign Relations, February 2016 [International, bipartisan

Policy Under a Powerful but Exposed Leader"]
The U.S.-China bilateral relationship is the most important in the

world. No other two countries under foreseeable circumstances could
disrupt the international system. Thus, Xi Jinpings rise, his dominance of
Chinas policymaking process, and the increasing influence of his domestic
political concerns will have crucial consequences for the United States and for
American policies in Asia and beyond. Although Chinas relationship with the
United States has long been a priority for Chinese leaders, Xi has increasingly
been willing to test it and it occupies less of his attention than it did of his
predecessors. He has not only criticized U.S. alliances, questioned the role of
non- Asian powers in Asian afairs, and built alternative institutional
structures excluding the United States, but has also continued Chinas rapid
military modernization even as the Chinese economy slows. As China asserts
its vital national interests, one of which is limiting the U.S. role in Asian afairs
and related power projection capabilities, Beijings positions on matters
ranging from the U.S. alliance system in Asia, to freedom of navigation, to
human rights, to the territorial integrity of Japan, to the rise of India, to the
future of Taiwan will come into sustained tension with U.S. national interests,
policies, commitments, and values.
1NC Shell
1
B. Link and Internal Link: Compromise makes Xi look
weakhe will respond with aggressive military action
in the South China Seas and Taiwan

Economic growth and nationalism have for decades been the two founts of
legitimacy for the Communist Party, and as the former wanes, Xi will likely
rely increasingly on the latter. Since 1989, the party has deliberately and
carefully laid the foundation for such a strategy through patriotic education,
censorship, government-backed protests against Japan, and relentless news
and popular media that have reinforced a nationalist victimization narrative.
As a powerful but exposed leader, Xi will tap into this potent nationalist vein
through foreign policy, burnishing his nationalist credentials and securing his
domestic position from elite and popular criticism, all while pursuing various
Chinese national interests. For example, an emphasis on territorial disputes
and historical grievances could partially divert attention from the countrys
economic woes and arrest a potential decline in his public approval; in
contrast, a visible setback or controversial concession on such issues
could undermine his standing with Chinese citizens and party elites.
On economic matters, concerns over growth and employment may lead China
to become increasingly recalcitrant and self-interested. In the future, Xi
could become more hostile to the West, using it as a foil to boost his
approval ratings the way Putin has in Russia. Already, major Chinese
newspapers are running articles blaming the countrys economic slump on
eforts undertaken by insidious foreign forces that seek to sabotage the
countrys rise. Even if Xi does not seek more combative relations with the
West, he will nonetheless find it difficult to negotiate publicly on a variety of
issues, especially when nationalist sentiment runs high. On territorial
matters, Xi will be unwilling or unable to make concessions that
could harm his domestic position, and may even seek to escalate
territorial disputes against Japan or South China Sea claimants as a
way of redirecting domestic attention away from the economic
situation and burnishing his nationalist record. A dangerous but
unlikely possibility is that Xi may even be tempted to use military force to
instigate limited conflicts against the Philippines, Vietnam, or Japan. Given
that Japan is a prominent target of Chinas propaganda and media, and that
memories of Japans brutal occupation are still influential, ties between China
and Japan may continue to worsen. Xi entered office suggesting that he
1NC Shell
1
would not alter Chinas policies toward Taiwan, but that may change following
the election of Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) candidate Tsai Ing-wen in
January 2016. The DPP has historically been distant toward China, and though
it has moderated its pro-independence stance, its leaders remain opponents
of current President Ma Ying-jeous e orts to strengthen economic links with
China, skeptics of the 1992 consensus, and critical of the historic meeting
between Presidents Xi and Ma in November 2015. Xis unbending stance on
sovereignty and territorial integrity, combined with the real domestic political
costs he will face if Taiwan makes moves toward independence, may lead him
to react strongly and decisively to any Taiwanese policy under the DPP that is
designed to increase separation between Beijing and Taipei.46
C. Impact: South China Sea conflict leads to nuclear war
Tikhonova, 2015 [Polina, writer, journalist and a certified translator.

Over the past 7 years, she has worked for a wide variety of top
European, American, Russian, and Ukrainian media outlets. Polina
holds a Master's Degree in English Philology from the University
of Oxford and a Bachelor's Degree in Journalism from the Saint
Petersburg State University, US Faces Nuclear War Threat Over
South China Sea Chinese Professor, November 28,
http://www.valuewalk.com/2015/11/us-nuclear-war-south-china-
sea/]
Beijings rhetoric after an incident with a U.S. warship sailed to the South
China Sea suggests that Chinese decision-makers could resort to more
concrete and forceful measures to counter the U.S. Navy, according to
Zhang Baohui, Professor of Political Science and Director of the Centre for
Asian Pacific Studies at Lingnan University in Hong Kong. If so, a face-of
between the two navies becomes inevitable. Even worse, the face-of may
trigger an escalation towards military conflicts, the professor wrote in a
piece for RSIS Commentary. But, according to Baohui, the U.S. military is
oblivious to this scenario, since Washington decision-makers think
Americas conventional military superiority discourages China from
responding to such provocations in the South China Sea militarily. However,
this U.S. expectation is flawed, as China is a major nuclear power, the
professor wrote. When cornered, nuclear-armed states can threaten
asymmetric escalation to deter an adversary from harming its key interests,
he added. Baohui then refers to the military parade in Beijing that took place
1NC Shell
1
on Sept. 3 and revealed that Chinas new generation of tactical missiles
such as the DF-26 are capable of being armed with nuclear warheads.
Moreover, according to the latest reports, Chinas air-launched long-range
cruise missiles can also carry tactical nuclear warheads. U.S. could provoke
nuclear war with China And while the U.S. does not have its core interests in
the South China Sea, the disputed islands present Chinas strategic interests,
which is why this kind of asymmetry in stakes would certainly give Beijing an
advantage in the balance of resolve over Washington, according to the
professor. And if the South China Sea situation escalates and starts spiraling
into a nuclear confrontation between the U.S. and China, Washington will face
a choice of either backing down first or fighting a nuclear-armed power and
the worlds largest military force with a strength of approximately 2.285
million personnel. Neither option is attractive and both exact high costs,
either in reputation or human lives, for the U.S., Baohui wrote. So it would be
unwise for the U.S. to further provoke China in the disputed area, since
Chinas willingness to defend its interests, reputation and deterrence
credibility could easily escalate the conflict into a military confrontation that
would ultimately harm U.S. interests, according to the professor.
2NC/1NR Extensions
2NC/1NR AT #1China already in

SCS
They say China is already expanding militarily, but
1. Extend our Council on Foreign Relations evidence.

Its much better than their Krepinevich evidence because:
more facts)
to be true)
their argument)

Their author is the head of some budgetary committee while our
author is a whole group of international relations experts. The more
experts involved the better the ideas. Also, the economy and
budgets dont have to do with the military.

Our qualified author knows more about Chinas military policy. That
means our uniqueness is true and thus the whole DA.
2NC/1NR Extensions
1
2 Theres restraint now, but more expansion could
prompt a major war
Glaser, 2012 [Bonnie, senior fellow with Freeman Chair in China Studies and senior associate with
Pacific Forum, Center for Strategic and International Studies. http://www.cfr.org/world/armed-clash-south-
china-sea/p27883]
Of the many conceivable contingencies involving an armed clash in the South

China Sea, three especially threaten U.S. interests and could potentially
prompt the United States to use force. The most likely and dangerous
contingency is a clash stemming from U.S. military operations within China's
EEZ that provokes an armed Chinese response. The United States holds that
nothing in the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) or
state practice negates the right of military forces of all nations to conduct
military activities in EEZs without coastal state notice or consent. China
insists that reconnaissance activities undertaken without prior notification
and without permission of the coastal state violate Chinese domestic law and
international law. China routinely intercepts U.S. reconnaissance flights
conducted in its EEZ and periodically does so in aggressive ways that
increase the risk of an accident similar to the April 2001 collision of a U.S. EP-
3 reconnaissance plane and a Chinese F-8 fighter jet near Hainan Island. A
comparable maritime incident could be triggered by Chinese vessels
harassing a U.S. Navy surveillance ship operating in its EEZ, such as occurred
in the 2009 incidents involving the USNS Impeccable and the USNS
Victorious. The large growth of Chinese submarines has also increased the
danger of an incident, such as when a Chinese submarine collided with a U.S.
destroyer's towed sonar array in June 2009. Since neither U.S.
reconnaissance aircraft nor ocean surveillance vessels are armed, the United
States might respond to dangerous behavior by Chinese planes or ships by
dispatching armed escorts. A miscalculation or misunderstanding could
then result in a deadly exchange of fire, leading to further military
escalation and precipitating a major political crisis. Rising U.S.-China
mistrust and intensifying bilateral strategic competition would likely make
managing such a crisis more difficult.
3 Chinas interest is mostly economicrising tension

would start a major war though
CNBC, May 2016 [5/19, http://www.cnbc.com/2016/05/19/china-says-its-ready-if-us-stirs-up-any-conflict-in-south-

china-sea.html]
2NC/1NR Extensions
1
"We rely heavily on the South China Sea [for] transportation of resources and
energy and the South China Sea is an important trading group for us. We
attach great importance to peace and stability in the South China Sea," said
Liu, who warned the United States that it "cannot circle China by building
military bases we cannot do so 30 years ago, or even now." "Chinese
people and the government feel like we haven't been treated fairly because
the U.S. is blaming China for rising tensions in the South China Sea," said Liu,
who added that "what matters is that the U.S. government has recognized
that times have changed, [and the U.S.] can gain much more through
cooperation than going to war." China is party to the U.N. Convention on the
Law of the Sea, and that framework provides "no legal basis" for China to
claim its "nine-dash" area, said Alessio Patalano, senior lecturer in Naval
History and East Asian Security at King's College London. But beyond that,
Patalano said, China's actions have no historical precedent. "There is not a
precedent of this kind, and this is for two reasons," Patalano told CNBC. "First
until recently, technology didn't allow nation states to project power over the
oceans as it is possible today. Second, today's degree of interdependence has
no precedent in history, therefore issues over the ability of shipping to move
through this basin has potential impact on the international system in a way
that was not possible previously." The South China Sea for years has been a
point of contention for bordering nations besides China, including Vietnam,
Malaysia and the Philippines, but in recent years has become a larger nexus
of disagreement as China has unilaterally declared the region its own. China's
fishing fleet, the world's biggest, operates increasingly within the legally
exclusive zones of Vietnam, Indonesia, Thailand and other countries. A
tribunal at the Permanent Court of Arbitration in The Hague is expected to
rule in the next couple months on China's expansive territorial claims, though
China has already rejected those proceedings. As the dispute festers, experts
see a higher chance of an unintended conflict between U.S. and Chinese
vessels or aircraft, something that was witnessed in 2001 when a Chinese
and a U.S. plane collided. China watchers say if a collision were to happen in
2016, a strong response from both sides could be possible. "China attaches
far greater importance to peace in the South China Sea much greater than
the U.S. and Japan. No one should doubt our sincerity in this subject," Liu
said. "The Chinese government will uphold peace in Southeast Asia even for
the sake of our own survival. In this sense we are actively against any moves
that will jeopardize peace in the South China Sea." Liu warned that a conflict
between China and the United States would have wide repercussions for the
global economy. "No country would want to see confrontations between [the]
U.S. and China," he said, "because [the] Chinese and U.S. economy will be
hurt, and impacts will be felt across the world."
2NC/1NR Extensions
2NC/1NR AT #2Cooperation is
Popular
They say Cooperation with the US is popular with nationalists, but
1. Extend our Council on Foreign Relations evidence.

Its much better than their Council on Foreign Relations
AUTHORS NAME]
facts)
to be true)
their argument)
(Our evidence has a faster timeframe) (their evidence supports our
argument)

Their evidence says XI will help the economy with the aff and that
will improve his image. However, it will take months if not years for
the aff to help the economy. In the short term, our Council on
Foreign Relations evidence says that Xi looks weak and caving to
Western demands.

This matters because: Our link happens and Xi starts war. We have a
large DA impact that outweighs the AFF advantages.
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2 The plan makes Xi look weak on foreign policy and
emboldens nationalists

Today, Chinas thirty-year era of 10 percent annual growth appears to have

ended, with official statistics placing gross domestic product (GDP) growth
below 7 percent, the government reducing its growth target to 6.5 percent,
and a number of major banks and respected forecasters arguing the true
growth rate is far lowerand will remain below 5 percent for years.3 In light
of this deepening economic slowdown, the future trajectory of Xis external
policy is in question. Some elements, including Chinas geoeconomic policies,
will endure; nevertheless, Chinas foreign policy may well be driven
increasingly by the risk of domestic political instability. For this
reason, Xi will most probably stimulate and intensify Chinese nationalism
long a pillar of the states legitimacyto compensate for the political harm of
a slower economy, to distract the public, to halt rivals who might use
nationalist criticisms against him, and to burnish his own image. Chinese
nationalism has long been tied to foreign afairs, especially memories of
foreign domination and territorial loss. For example, Xi may be less able or
willing to compromise in public, especially on territorial issues or other
matters that are rooted in national sentiment, for fear that it would harm his
political position. He may provoke disputes with neighbors, use increasingly
strident rhetoric in defense of Chinas national interests, and take a tougher
line in relations with the United States and its allies to shift public focus away
from economic troubles. He may also turn to greater economic protectionism.
These changes come at a time when Xis tight control of the decision- making
process has made it harder for U.S. policymakers to anticipate Chinas next
moves. Familiar interlocutors at the State Council and Foreign Ministry, who
once provided much-needed insight into an often mysterious policymaking
process, are no longer central within it. As the shroud of secrecy surrounding
Chinese decision-making thickens, what remains clear is that dealing with
China will require a more nuanced understanding of the man with singular
control over the countrys foreign policy future. It will also necessitate an
appreciation of the interaction between his internal political
requirements and his foreign policy agenda. Finally, it will demand a
clear-eyed acceptance of the fact that Xi has ushered in a new era of Chinese
regional and global diplomacy, one that will push the West to evaluate its
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overall approach to the Peoples Republic of China (PRC) and to the powerful
but exposed leader who makes its foreign policy.
3 If Xi looks weak toward the US, he will use nationalist

wars to protect his image
US News and World Report, March 2016

[http://www.usnews.com/news/world/articles/2016-03-16/taiwan-
korea-challenges-could-push-chinas-nationalism]
NEXT UP: NATIONALISM? The need to burnish his own image, deter rivals and
divert attention from slower growth could prompt Xi to intensify Chinese
nationalism through the use of jingoistic rhetoric and by taking a hard line
with the U.S. and others, U.S. analysts Robert D. Blackwill and Kurt M.
Campbell wrote in a recent report. "Economic growth and nationalism have
for decades been the two founts of legitimacy for the Communist Party, and
as the former wanes, Xi will likely rely increasingly on the latter," the two
wrote. Nationalism has proven efective before in mobilizing support, as in
the 1990s when the party deflected criticism over the bloody suppression of
the 1989 pro-democracy movement by stirring pride in China's achievements
and resentment against its rivals, especially the U.S. But such a strategy can
also spin out of control, as with recurring violent anti-Japanese protests that
have forced the government to quickly reassert control.
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2NC/1NR AT #3Case Outweighs

A. Magnitude: Our impact is bigger than their impact because:
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B. Timeframe: Our impact is faster than their impact because:
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C. Probability: Our impact is more likely to happen because:

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D. Turns Case: Our impact causes their impact because:
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2NC/1NR AT #4Xi Looks Weak

They say Xi looks weak now, but

facts)
to be true)
their argument)

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2 Xi has great authority and respect with Chinese
Nationalists
Crossley, March 2016 [Pamela, Professor of History, Dartmouth

College, Cracks in Xi Jinpings Fortress?, 3/21,
https://www.chinafile.com/conversation/cracks-xi-jinpings-
fortress]
The emergence of an executive office as aggressive as Xi's presents China's

ruling class with a test of whether it can or cannot remain intact. The CCP
network of families and enterprises has retained its position through a series
of rapid-fire external challengesfrequent public disorder, a bubble-and-burst
economy, and escapes from predicaments in managing the currency and
mounting environmental disasters. But whether it can survive an internal
challenge from an executive bent upon wresting power from it is a question.
That is an elementary historical theme. Ambitious rulers had to pursue
control of their civil and military elites apace with tightening their grips on
society and economy. The winners in those struggles are big in the history
booksin China, they include Han Wudi, Tang Taizong, the Kangxi and
Yongzheng emperors of the QIng but are a tiny minority in the string of
historical executives. Most emperors knew better than to challenge
entrenched elite power. Of those who tried the most spectacular losers are
also always good for a paragraph in the textbooks too, since the struggles
they precipitated led to fatal rupture of their empires. The PRC is not an
empire and the General Secretary is not an emperor. But the Party elite has
some resemblance to traditional ruling classes. One is that it shows little or
no collective awareness of the toll of its own excesses upon its ability to
remain coherent and dominant. Xi planned carefully for his assault on elite
complacency, putting his loyalists in place even before he assumed office. He
has used campaigns against corruption to target some of his potential
challengers and has imposed sobering penalties upon them. He is reducing
state subsidies to inefficient industries that do nothing but channel public
wealth into the cofers of the elite. These documents more than suggest that
those threatened intend to strike back. Will Xi Jinping join the winnerslike
Mao Zedong and Deng Xiaopingwho increased their control at the expense
of the elite? Or will he join the list of hapless state leaders who attempted a
coup against immovable elites and ended not only losing his personal battle
but also destabilizing the government? I agree with Andy that Xi has gone too
far to back down now. Xi has invoked nationalism to legitimate his
aggrandizement and to discredit critics at home and abroad. Rivals within the
party, lawyers, journalists, and academics are accused of sedition if they
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criticize Xi and with contemning some mythical Chinese essence if they
discuss democracy. Party elites who wish for their own reasons to discredit Xi
will champion free speech as a necessary part of their counter-attack. We
should expect that their enthusiasm for dissent will wane quickly if they
succeed in curtailing Xis powerthe way Deng Xiaopings invocation of the
Democracy Wall movement in 1978 preceded his persecution of Wei
Jingsheng in 1979. I agree with Rana that a struggle against repression does
not in itself produce liberalization.
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3 Xis centralized authority has stabilized the country,
but he takes the heat for any problems

Xi Jinping is the most powerful Chinese leader since Deng Xiaoping, and with
his sweeping actions and ambitious directives he has fundamentally altered
the process by which Chinas domestic and foreign policy is formulated and
implemented. Xis popular anticorruption campaign has cowed senior party
and military officials and allowed him to amass dominating power in a short
span of time. With this transcending authority, Xi has ended Chinas carefully
evolved collective and consensual leadership structure, marginalized the
bureaucracy, and put himself at the center of decision-making on all
consequential matters. This report discusses Xis transformation of Chinas
domestic politics, his background and beliefs, the challenges he faces from
Chinas slowing economy, and the implications of his foreign policy for the
United States. One downside to Xis breathtaking success in consolidating
power is that it has left him with near total responsibility for his governments
policy missteps on matters ranging from the stock market slowdown to labor
market unrest. His visibility on these issues and his dominance of the
decision-making process have made him a powerful but potentially exposed
leader. With Xis image and political position vulnerable to Chinas economic
downturn, his countrys external behavior may increasingly be guided by his
own domestic political imperatives. For the last three years, with Chinas
economy still producing robust growth numbers, such concerns have not
fundamentally influenced Xis foreign policy. Xi has been able to be
continuously proactive, and he has used his power to take Chinas foreign
policy in a new direction. He has boldly departed from Dengs injunction to
keep a low profile and has reclaimed islands, created international
institutions, pressured neighbors, and deployed military assets to disputed
regions. Xis foreign policy has been assertive, confident, and, importantly, a
diversied mix of both hard and soft elements. Even as China has taken from
steps on territorial issues, it has used geoeconomic instruments to ofer
generous loans and investments, and even created new organizations such
as the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB).1 By combining
inducements with intimidation, Xi has demonstrated the benefits of
cooperating with China as well as the economic and military costs of
opposing it, especially on issues important to Beijing.2
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4 Strong Chinese Nationalism now
Wang, May 2016 [Zheng, Director of the Center for Peace and
Conflict Studies in the School of Diplomacy and International
Relations at Seton Hall University in New Jersey. He is also a
Carnegie Fellow at New America, The New Nationalism: 'Make
My Country Great Again', 5/10,
http://thediplomat.com/2016/05/the-new-nationalism-make-my-
country-great-again/]
While speaking with a Chinese journalist recently about the American

presidential election, he asked me what the best way was to translate Donald
Trumps election slogan, Make America Great Again! The two of us
discussed several Chinese wordings that might be a suitable translation of
this saying, and I suddenly realized this slogan is actually the exact same as
Chinese president Xi Jinpings slogan of realizing the great rejuvenation of
the Chinese nation. Rejuvenation, of course, means the same as to make
great again or to revive past greatness. Then I also realized make my
country great again is actually a popular political slogan globally. Japans
Shinzo Abe, Indias Narendra Modi, and Russias Vladimir Putin all frequently
mention something similar to this. What we are actually experiencing is a
make my country great again nationalism that exists in several major
powers of the world. Around the world people always speak of Chinas rise,
but the Chinese like to use a diferent word: rejuvenation . Xi called it the
greatest dream of the Chinese nation. This slogan, referred to as the China
Dream, has become the political manifesto and signature ideology of Xis
administration since he came into power three years ago. The use of this
word rejuvenation underscores a very important point: the Chinese see
themselves as returning to greatness or past glory, rather than rising from
nothing. I believe this is also the same reason that Trump says
make America great again rather than make America great.
In the last few decades China has been developing at a
tremendous speed. For example, Chinas economy now is 24 times
larger than it was in 1989. However, the Chinese are still unsatisfied with this
progress and still believe they are on the way to restoring their past
greatness. And for many Americans, including Donald Trump, Make America
Great Again is to signify the end of Americas decline in power, and to make
eforts in restoring the United States past greatness. Xis China Dream
is often labeled as Chinese nationalism, and to some extent Donald
Trumps campaign represents a rise of new American nationalism. The Trump
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campaign indeed emphasizes a strong U.S. first and protectionist policy, and
underscores an us versus them mentality. However, it should be noted that
while the term nationalism is often associated negatively, it can actually play
a positive role. Positive nationalism has driven many good social changes in
the world. And in fact we can see the banners of nationalism are currently
flying highly in many major powers. Abe is working hard trying to stop Japans
stagnation and to jump-start Japans economy to return to its former might of
the 1970s and 80s. In New Delhi, Modi is also calling for a national campaign
to push India on to a faster track of development. And in Moscow, Putin has
been trying for many years to mobilize his people in the wake of the Soviet
Unions fall and to restore the luster and strength associated with the czarist
era of the Russian Empire and Peter the Great. Its a global wave of
nationalism associated with the rise and fall of the great powers.
5 Xis Nationalism is strong

Xis arrest of senior officials is risky, and is sustained in no small part by

public opinion supportive of the anticorruption campaign and of Xi more
broadly. Unlike recent Chinese leaders, Xi appears to have an intuitive grasp
of public sentiment and has sustained a nascent cult of personality around his
image as a brash and assertive strongman, reportedly telling Russian
President Vladimir Putin in 2013, We are similar in character.12 This image
is buttressed by a relentless propaganda campaign waged through traditional
and social media that portrays Xi as an incorruptible and self-sacrificial mix
of everyman and superman.13 That efort has been successful in making
public opinion a pillar of Xis power, with a Harvard study finding that Xi had
a higher approval rating domestically than any other world leader in 2014.14
2NC/1NR Extensions
2NC/1NR AT #5Nationalists
Dont Matter
They say Xi doesnt care about the nationalists, but

facts)
to be true)
their argument)

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2 Nationalists and Xi are sensitive to foreign policy
Weiss, 2014 [Jessica Chen, associate professor of government at Cornell University, Chinese
Nationalism: The CCP's 'Double-Edged Sword', November 25, http://thediplomat.com/2014/11/chinese-
nationalism-the-ccps-double-edged-sword/]
Going all the way back to the May Fourth protests in 1919, theres a long
history of nationalist protests targeting foreign forces and the Chinese
government simultaneously. Do you see a similar bifurcation of nationalist
sentiment in China today? As in the past, nationalist sentiments today often
target the Chinese government for being too weak, soft, or corrupt to defend
the national interest. This is one of the greatest risks that China faces
in sharpening the double-edged sword of popular nationalism. It can
easily wound the one who wields it. So far, the Chinese government has
been able to retain the upper hand, mobilizing all levels of government to
preserve social stability and promote rational patriotism when nationalist
fervor begins to get out of hand. But the often heavy-handed orchestration of
protests and propaganda fosters resentment and feelings of alienation among
liberals and nationalists alike. How has the advent of social media
complicated Beijings ability to control or at least stage manage large-scale
demonstrations? The growth of the Internet and social media has made it
more difficult for the Chinese government to repress nationalist
demonstrations and made it easier for citizens to express views that diverge
from the party line. As a senior Chinese diplomat told me, Im worried. Public
opinion is more and more influential. There are many irrational voices. So
far, the government has been successful in restraining the scope and scale of
nationalist protests, including after the 2010 collision between a Chinese
fishing trawler and Japanese coast guard vessels. But the uneven curtailment
of nationalist protests has made it more difficult for foreign governments to
discern Chinas intentions. Chinese authorities have been especially vigilant
in first-tier cities like Beijing and Shanghai, so foreign observers should be
cautious when drawing conclusions from a handful of cities where protests
may be highly scripted or conspicuously absent. Although state propaganda
is partially responsible for inflaming popular anger, there is also a grassroots
component to nationalist anger in China that is often overlooked. In fact, the
stage-management of protests is often intended to minimize the risk that
demonstrations spin out of control or stray of-message. You point out that we
havent seen large demonstrations in China on two subjects of great interest
to nationalists: the Taiwan issue and the territorial disputes in the South
China Sea. Why do you think these subjects are more or less taboo when it
comes to protests? On the issue of Taiwan, the Chinese government has used
other tactics to show resolve rather than risk belligerent protests that might
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further alienate Taiwan voters and force the Chinese government to take
military action. Ever since Chinese saber rattling during the 1995-96 Taiwan
Strait crisis was judged counterproductive in Beijing, the Chinese government
has tried somewhat softer tactics to dissuade Taiwan voters from supporting
independence. The Chinese government prevented protests over Taiwan
despite the election of Chen Shui-bian in March 2000 and his re-election and
referendum on independence in March 2004. So far, the Chinese government
appears to have determined that tolerating street protests over Taiwan
independence is not worth the risk, particularly since political developments
on Taiwan since 2008 have given China more confidence that diplomatic and
economic trends are favorable. Still, foreign support for Taiwan has continued
to spark nationalist anger, including an online petition against U.S. arms sales
to Taiwan in 2010 that disappeared shortly after netizens called for street
protests. Territorial disputes in the South China Sea are another important
space to watch. So far, nationalist anger at Vietnam and the Philippines has
been largely confined to the Internet in China. Even the relatively nationalist
Global Times has cautioned that indulging anger and fantasizing
confrontation is not the right way to manage disputes in the South China
Sea. After Vietnamese protests against Chinas deep-water oil rig escalated to
violence in May 2014, killing several Chinese workers, state-run and
commercial media in China were conspicuously restrained in covering the
riots, emphasizing Vietnamese eforts to arrest the troublemakers and
characterizing the violence as more anti-foreign than specifically anti-
Chinese. I suspect that Chinese calls for protests against Vietnam were shut
down because China already controls the Paracel Islands and has no need to
show further resolve. Allowing protests against Vietnam would have added
fuel to the fire of Vietnamese anger and might have provoked further attacks
on Chinese citizens in Vietnam.
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3 Xi gets blamed for all mistakesespecially in a
declining Chinese economy

Xi is exposed precisely because he sits at the center of all decision- making

and is visible to the public. He must address countless domestic challenges
for which he is now explicitly accountable, and a major misstep on any of
them could be costly to his political popularity and position. Without question,
the largest problem looming over Xis tenure is Chinas economic slowdown
and its related manifestations, including unemployment and stock market
volatility. As noted, Chinas economy, which had expanded at an annual rate
of 10 percent for three decades, is entering a new era of slow growth that has
forced the government to reduce its growth target to a record-low 6.5
percent. Xis challenge is to smoothly reorient the economy toward
consumption and away from exports and investment even as growth
continues to fall. Chinas economic woes began years before Xi entered the
presidency and ow from the countrys inability to find a sustainable
alternative to the growth model upon which it has long relied. That model,
which catapulted the country into the ranks of great powers, was based on a
simple premise: weak-productivity agricultural laborers would move into low-
wage but high-productivity manufacturing jobs, producing goods for foreign
markets. Nearly every component of that model has been subject to
mounting strain. China has fewer agricultural workers that it can shift into
industry. Its workforce peaked in 2013 and is now shrinking in size.18 Its
wages often exceed those of regional competitors even as productivity
growth slows.19 Finally, Chinas export markets can no longer soak up its
surplus production.
2NC/1NR Extensions
2NC/1NR AT #6Cooperation
Solves Conflict
They say economic cooperation solves conflict, but

facts)
to be true)
their argument)

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2 Cooperation with the US causes nationalist backlash
and drains Xis political capital

Policy Under a Powerful but Exposed Leader]
The foundations for a turn to nationalism have been laid for decades. After
Tiananmen Square, the party inculcated nationalist sentiment through
relentless propaganda, a barrage of chauvinistic television shows and movies,
and a patriotic education campaign in the countrys schools.31 According to
the governments nationalist narrative, which downplays the partys failures
and communist ideology, China is a country whose century of humiliation
began with the Opium Wars and ended with the partys assumption of power
in 1949. The partys primary mission has not been to bring about a
communist utopia but to extricate China from the predations of Western and
Japanese imperialists and to put it on a path to becoming the worlds largest
economy. Chinas territorial disputes with its neighbors and Taiwans
ambiguous status are seen as wounds from this humiliating past
that only the party can heal. This slanted view of history has been
successful in building a deep reserve of grievance and victimhood among
ordinary Chinese citizens that dominates their worldview and can be
harnessed by the leadership. It was no accident that Xi, when he assumed
power, declared that his main objective was to bring about the great
rejuvenation of the Chinese nation. That slogan was an attempt to position
Xis leadership within the arc of a larger narrative that portrays the party as
responsible for restoring Chinas historic place in the world. In December
2015, the Communist Party Central Committee held a group study of Chinese
patriotism and Xi himself called for further promoting patriotism to achieve
the great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation.32 By connecting patriotism to
Xis mission to restore Chinese greatness, that link is being made even more
concrete. Although these themes have long been an important part of
Chinese politics, Xi will choose to strengthen them in coming years. By
stoking Chinese nationalism, Xi will seek to protect himself and the party
from the worst of the economic downturn. His control over policymaking will
be an advantage in that efort, and his policies will respect and support his
domestic political agenda.
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Specific Links
2NC/1NR Human Rights Link

1. Human rights discourse has significant potential to
alter domestic politics in China. Threats from the U.S.
will make the leadership look weak
Kirk, April 2016 4/14 Jessica, assessed as part of a university degree,

University of Queensland The Shadows of Tiananmen: Chinese Foreign Policy
and Human Rights
http://www.polis.leeds.ac.uk/assets/files/students/student-journal/ug-summer-
12/matthew-hall.pdf
The choice made by the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) to authorise the
Peoples Liberation Army (PLA) to fire upon pro-democracy protestors in
Beijing, June 1989 widely referred to as the Tiananmen Square incident has had a lasting
yet complex impact upon foreign policy in China. At its core, it placed China at the
centre of a conundrum. How much should outside yet widely circulated
discourses affect domestic matters? Should states actions within their sovereign
territory afect their international standing? Tiananmen demanded answers to both of these questions. In
it demanded that China, as well as the rest of the world, ask
particular,
themselves how closely meshed their foreign policy and ideas of universal
human rights are. This essay will argue that, for China, the international reaction to
Tiananmen signified that the human rights discourse holds
significant but contingent productive power (Barnett and Duvall 2005). In other
words, the human rights discourse can afect the behaviour of states by
defining their realities and encouraging particular behaviours . Yet it is, in itself, an
expression of power and is thus ultimately reliant upon the coherent performance of those major players
(notably the US) who are in the unique position to construct discourses and establish their dominance. An
understanding of these factors has driven Chinas foreign policy, leading to two seemingly contradictory
sets of behaviours since 1989: compliance and resistance The reactions that led from this discursive
construction of the event as a human rights violation impacted China significantly. The US suspended
weapons sales, communication between high level officials, and civilian nuclear cooperation, as well as
implementing sanctions and demanding the postponement of new loans to China from the Asian
Development Bank and the World Bank. Outside of the United States, Japan and the European Union as
well as individual European states announced sanctions and Australia and New Zealand cancelled visits of
high ranking officials. Ultimately, over four years following Tiananmen, China was denied US$11 billion in
Moreover, China was publically humiliated; its
bilateral aid (Foot 2012: 337-339).
international image and bargaining power damaged. Humiliation is apparent
from the fervent attempts undertaken by Chinese diplomats and leaders to
minimise public criticism. From 1990 through to 1997, China had to defend itself
against numerous condemnatory resolutions presented before the UN Human
Rights Commission, the Subcommission on Prevention of Discrimination and
Protection of Minorities, and the Working Group on Arbitrary Detention among
others through extensive diplomacy, lobbying, and even aid projects from the
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developing state to others (Nathan 2010: 212-3). Even states such as
Malaysia and Brazil who typically adhered to a position of non-intervention
issued expressions of regret (Foot 2012: 339).
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2. The affirmatives insistence on pressuring China to
adopt human rights policies backfires- leads to
increased hostility and collapses the CCP
Wyne, 2013 Ali, contributing analyst at Wikistrat and a global fellow at the
Project for the Study of the 21st Century. Some Thoughts on the Ethics of
Chinas Rise. 08/14
http://www.carnegiecouncil.org/publications/ethics_online/0084
The more contentious topic, of course, is the role that human rights should
play in U.S.-China relations. While the United States should neither hesitate to
articulate its diferences with China on issues of human rights, nor refrain
from encouraging those trends within China that are promoting greater
citizen empowerment, it should not urge China to democratize or condition its
interactions with China on the leadership's acceptance of core American
values. A country that is not yet 250 years old should appreciate the
possibility that a country several millennia old may have its own strain of
exceptionalism. Furthermore, attempts to democratize China could backfire.
One of the foremost China watchers, former prime minister of Singapore Lee
Kuan Yew, declares that it will not "become a liberal democracy; if it did, it
would collapse." While the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) is willing to
experiment with democratic reforms in "villages and small towns," he
explains, it fears that large-scale democratization "would lead to a loss of
control by the center over the provinces, like [during] the warlord years of the
1920s and '30s.3 Whatever challenges an increasingly capable and assertive
China might pose, a weak China in the throes of chaos would be even more
problematic, especially now that its growth is vital to the health of the global
economy. It is China's ongoing integration into the international system and
attendant exposure to information technology that hold the greatest promise
for improvements to its human rights climate. Since the late 1970s, the CCP
has implicitly conditioned its delivery of rapid growth to the Chinese people
on their acquiescence to its rule. The problem is that citizens' priorities
become more sophisticated as their day-to-day situations grow less exigent.
Those in dire poverty are quite likely to censor themselves in exchange for
food, shelter, and other necessities. As they enter the middle class, however,
and become less preoccupied with the demands of survival, they naturally
think more about critiquing government policy. Within this transition lies a
fundamental challenge for the CCP: the very bargain that it implemented to
forestall challenges to its rule is enabling greater numbers of Chinese to pose
such challenges. There were only 20 million Internet users in China in 2000;
today, there are more than 560 million.4
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3. By helping religious minorities in China, the
affirmative is directly undermining CCP authority.
Dillon, 2011 Michael, Senior Lecturer in Modern Chinese History and Director
of the Centre for Contemporary Chinese Studies at the University of Durham
in the UK, Religious Minorities and China http://minorityrights.org/wp-
content/uploads/old-site-downloads/download-140-Religious-Minorities-and-
China.pdf
The Peoples Republic of China (PRC), created by the Chinese Communist

Party (CCP) in 1949, is officially an atheist state .1 Religious belief and worship have been
tolerated to some extent, although the degree of toleration has varied considerably with the political
climate.The CCP has always been concerned about the threat to its
authority posed by religious organizations. Sects of the traditional
Chinese religions, Buddhism or Daoism, have a long history of
involvement with underground secret societies and were frequently
implicated in the overthrow of governments in the 2,000 years of the Chinese
Empire. With religions of foreign origin, particularly Christianity, there is the
added dimension that they are perceived to be undermining both the
authority of the state and traditional Chinese values, and patriotic fervour has
from time to time been mobilized against them.
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2NC/1NR Currency Manipulation

Link
1. The affirmative is bad for internal stability within
China- Without a strong economy, the CCP cannot
justify communist rule
Hall, 2012 Matthew, What part does democracy play in the future of China?
POLIS Journal Vol. 7, Summer
http://www.polis.leeds.ac.uk/assets/files/students/student-journal/ug-summer-
12/matthew-hall.pdf
However, as previously mentioned, there is a cyclical nature to this power

and the CCP are aware of it and fear losing its grip on it above all else. This is
why social stability and unanimity is vital, and a guiding ideological
component of the success of communism , as well as a defining factor to the triumphant
legacy of Mao Zedong (Peerenboom 2006). This creation of a hybrid between communist
communitarianism and Confucian obedience to authority wasnt modified for over 30 years. It wasnt until
the arrival of the next iconic leader that China truly woke up and shook the world as Napoleon had
prophesised centuries before (Hays 2008f). It was the arrival and subtle economic revolution of Deng POLIS
Journal Vol. 7, Summer 2012 ISSN 2047-7651 214 Xiaoping. If Chairman Mao was the architect of an
assertive, socialist China, Deng pulled of the even tougher feat of reversing most of what Mao had done
Deng Xiaoping introduced capitalist
and calling it socialism (The Economist 2011a: 100).
principles through economic reform in the late 1970s. These principles
changed the status quo from state planning to state direction . For example, the
within and without production plan allowed businesses to pursue their own aims after they met their
It encouraged enterprise and factories to keep profits, use merit
state-set quotas.
pay and ofer bonuses and other incentives (Hays 2008b). Such economic
liberalisations resulted in Dengs era being labelled the Period of Opening
Up, a time where the people were invited to a world of opportunity and
diversity never before seen (He 2010). How Deng managed to apply these reforms is not clear,
but what is obvious is why he applied them; there was growing civil unrest in China with a stagnant
economy and after the passing of Maos rule, people were beginning to be disillusioned with the CCP.
This brings forward a defining pillar of modern state China; that
these reforms were made to liberalise consumer behaviour in
exchange for leaving politics to the Communist party (Anderlini 2011a). It was
the only way Deng could have put through such anti-communist, anti-Maoist policies successfully past the
hard-liners of the party. He himself even remarks that without such reforms, the CCP would have been
Thus, a new social contract was drawn where the
toppled (Hays 2008b).
legitimacy of the Chinese Communist Party was based less upon
ideological correctness, and more upon economic performance
(Weiss 2003: 39).
2NC/1NR Extensions
1
2NC/1NR Extensions
2NC/1NR AT: China Already Trades

with the US
1. Recently, China has been blocking US diplomatic
outreachXis nationalism is at an all-time high

Aside from developing stronger ties with other states, an important element
of Xis multifaceted strategy has been to energetically create and participate
in multilateral institutions. Some of these, such as AIIB, will be useful for
dispensing geoeconomically oriented loans to neighbors. Even though AIIB is
a multilateral lending institution rather than a Chinese government agency,
such organizations can still be used for geoeconomic statecraft, especially
given that Beijing will retain significant influence in AIIBs management and
operation as well as a veto. For example, China sought to use the Asian
Development Bank to deny loans to Arunachal Pradesh, an Indian state
claimed by China. The misguided refusal of the United States to participate in
the AIIBs creation, and Washingtons failed attempt to persuade friends and
allies not to join, denied the United States an opportunity to influence the
banks rules, development trajectory, and Chinas potential use of the bank
as a geopolitical instrument. Other organizations in which China has been
dominant have served to exclude the United States from regional discussions
or provided China a forum that parallels and circumvents global institutions,
allowing it to pursue its national interests and attempt to reshape global
governance. Chinas elevation of the Conference on Interaction and
Confidence- Building Measures in Asia (CICA), a forum that does not include
the United States, gave Xi the opportunity to advocate an Asia for Asians
and amplify long-standing criticism of U.S. bilateral alliances. Its creation of
the New Development Bank (formerly the BRICSBrazil, Russia, India, China,
and South AfricaDevelopment Bank) and the Regional Comprehensive
Economic Partnership (RCEP) parallels the World Bank and the Trans-Pacific
Partnership (TPP) and ofers it the ability to wield geoeconomic influence over
others. Although many of these initiatives were conceived under Hu, they
were given life by Xi. Because China has historically been hesitant to create
and lead multilateral initiatives, this self-assured and multidirectional Chinese
behavior is yet another example of increased activism related to Xis rise. Xis
decisive leadership style, his unmatched power within the political system,
2NC/1NR Extensions
1
and his strong desire for vigorous Chinese diplomacy have produced a foreign
policy that is assertive, coordinated, and diversified across the instruments
and targets of statecraft.
AFF 2AC Answers
2AC Affirmative Answers to

China Nationalism
Disadvantage
1. Non-Unique: China is expanding into the South China
Sea already
Krepinevich, 2015 [Andrew, President of the Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments ,
How to Deter China The Case for Archipelagic Defense March/April,
https://www.foreignafairs.com/articles/china/2015-02-16/how-deter-china]
China claims that its rise is intended to be peaceful, but its actions tell
a diferent story: that of a revisionist power seeking to dominate the
western Pacific. Beijing has claimed sovereignty over not only Taiwan
but also Japans Senkaku Islands (known in China as the Diaoyu
Islands) and most of the 1.7 million square miles that make up the East
China and South China Seas, where six other countries maintain
various territorial and maritime claims. And it has been unapologetic
about pursuing those goals. In 2010, for example, Chinas then foreign
minister, Yang Jiechi, dismissed concerns over Beijings expansionism
in a single breath, saying, China is a big country, and other countries
are small countries, and that is just a fact. Consider Beijings recent
bullying in the South China Sea. In March 2014, Chinese coast guard
boats blocked the Philippines from accessing its outposts on the
Spratly Islands. Two months later, China moved an oil rig into
Vietnams exclusive economic zone, clashing with Vietnamese fishing
boats. The moves echoed earlier incidents in the East China Sea. In
September 2010, as punishment for detaining a Chinese fishing boat
captain who had rammed two Japanese coast guard vessels, China
temporarily cut of its exports to Japan of rare-earth elements, which
are essential for manufacturing cell phones and computers. And in
November 2013, China unilaterally declared an air defense
identification zone, subject to its own air traffic regulations, over the
disputed Senkaku Islands and other areas of the East China Sea,
warning that it would take military action against aircraft that refused
to comply. Some have suggested that as its military grows stronger
and its leaders feel more secure, China will moderate such behavior.
But the opposite seems far more likely. Indeed, Beijings
AFF 2AC Answers
1
provocations have coincided with the dramatic growth of its
military muscle. China is now investing in a number of new
capabilities that pose a direct challenge to regional stability. For
example, Chinas Peoples Liberation Army is bolstering its so-called
anti-access/area-denial capabilities, which aim to prevent other
militaries from occupying or crossing vast stretches of territory, with
the express goal of making the western Pacific a no-go zone for the
U.S. military. That includes developing the means to target the
Pentagons command-and-control systems, which rely heavily on
satellites and the Internet to coordinate operations and logistics. The
PLA has made substantial progress on this front in recent years, testing
an antisatellite missile, using lasers to blind U.S. satellites, and waging
sophisticated cyberattacks on U.S. defense networks. China is also
enhancing its capacity to target critical U.S. military assets and limit
the U.S. Navys ability to maneuver in international waters. The PLA
already has conventional ballistic and cruise missiles that can strike
major U.S. facilities in the region, such as the Kadena Air Base, in
Okinawa, Japan, and is developing stealth combat aircraft capable of
striking many targets along the first island chain. To detect and target
naval vessels at greater distances, the PLA has deployed powerful
radars and reconnaissance satellites, along with unmanned aerial
vehicles that can conduct long-range scouting missions. And to stalk
U.S. aircraft carriers, as well as the surface warships that protect them,
the Chinese navy is acquiring submarines armed with advanced
torpedoes and high-speed cruise missiles designed to strike ships at
long distances. Beijings actions cannot be explained away as a
response to a U.S. arms buildup. For the last decade, Washington
has focused its energy and resources primarily on supporting its
ground troops in Afghanistan and Iraq. The U.S. defense budget, which
until recently stood at above four percent of the countrys GDP, is
projected to decline to less than three percent by the end of the
decade. Simply put, the Pentagon is shedding military
capabilities while the PLA is amassing them. Yet if the past is
prologue, China will not seek to resolve its expansionist aims through
overt aggression. Consistent with its strategic culture, it wants to
slowly but inexorably shift the regional military balance in its favor,
leaving the rest of the region with little choice but to submit to Chinese
coercion. For the most part, Chinas maritime neighbors are convinced
that diplomatic and economic engagement will do little to alter this
basic fact. Several of them, including Japan, the Philippines, and
Vietnam, are increasingly focusing their militaries on the task
of resisting Chinese ambitions. They know full well, however, that
individual action will be insufficient to prevent Beijing from carrying its
AFF 2AC Answers
1
vision forward. Only with U.S. material support can they form a
collective front that deters China from acts of aggression or coercion.
2. Link Turn: Economic reforms are popular among

nationalists
Council on Foreign Relations, February 2016 [International, bipartisan organization, Xi

Jinping on the Global Stage Chinese Foreign Policy Under a Powerful but Exposed Leader"]
The impact of this situation on Xis political position is evolving. For now, Xi remains
strong, his opposition is divided, and nothing indicates that his leadership is in
jeopardy. Media reports suggest, however, that senior party members were alarmed
by the gyrations of the stock market in the summer of 2015 and the countrys
sputtering growth and are holding Xi accountable. They are encouraging him to focus
more on the economic situation than the anticorruption campaign, which some
contend slows growth by paralyzing rank-and-file officials who fear that action on
new projects could land them in jail.30 If the economy continues to weaken, party
elites who have sufered under the anticorruption campaign may seek to exploit the
situation to undermine Xi, who now has the dubious distinction of presiding over the
slowest growth in thirty years and whose agenda and image are underwritten by
public support that could wane. Xi will need to take clear steps to strengthen his
position against rival elites, fortify his public image, and shield the party from the
economic downturn. To that end, he will probably intensify his personality cult, crack
down even harder on dissent, and grow bolder in using the anti- corruption campaign
against elites who oppose him. Above all, he will almost certainly choose to
intensify and stimulate Chinese nationalism in response to slower growth.
Ever since Deng dispatched communist ideology in favor of pragmatic capitalist
reforms, the partys legitimacy has been built on two pillars: economic
growth and nationalist ideology. Because the former is fading, the latter
may be the primary tool to support the office of the party and Xis
strongman image.
3. Impact Calculus:
________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________
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AFF 2AC Answers
1
D. Turns DA: Our impact causes their impact because:
________________________________________________________________________
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________________________________________________________________________
4. Non-Unique: Xi looks weak now
Time, April 2016 [Xi Jinpings Thin Skin Makes Him Look Weak, 4/7 http://time.com/4284795/panama-
papers-xi-jinping/]
The President has also faced criticism inside China. Last month, an
anonymous letter calling for his resignation was somehow published on a
government-affiliated website. Official media have complained openly of
censorship. Recently, stories have emerged of disappearing journalists and
their intimidated families. This is all at a time when critics warn that Xi has
amassed too much power and is building a cult of personality. Chinas latest
embarrassment comes as other emerging world leaders are fending of
corruption charges and fighting for their political lives. Fallout from a massive
bribery scandal will probably force Brazils Dilma Roussef from power.
Malaysias Najib Razak has tried to explain that hundreds of millions
deposited into his bank account by a Saudi royal were merely a gift. South
Africas Jacob Zuma says a swimming pool and millions of dollars in other
upgrades to his home were intended to enhance its security. The Panama
Papers appear to show that current and former members of Britains
Conservative Party, including Prime Minister David Camerons late father,
have shielded wealth in ofshore accounts. They also suggest that some of
Vladimir Putins closest friends have become filthy rich in murky ways. But
China is diferent because of its growing importance for the entire global
economy. Any public blow to Xis authority will make it more difficult for him
to sweep away corruption and advance much-needed economic reforms.
Draconian retaliation against unflattering press or internal critics, however,
doesnt project self-confidence. Attempts to exempt top leaders from
criticism make the regime look brittle. Chinas growth and the partys
grip are strong enough that it wont matter in 2016, but a sharper slowdown
in the future will test Xis authority as never before
AFF 2AC Answers
1
5. No Internal Link: Xi doesnt care about nationalists
Weiss, 2014 [Jessica Chen, associate professor of government at Cornell University, Chinese
Nationalism: The CCP's 'Double-Edged Sword', 11/25, http://thediplomat.com/2014/11/chinese-
nationalism-the-ccps-double-edged-sword/]
In your book, you challenge the commonly held belief that nationalistic protests in
China (and, by extension, nationalism in general) are simply drummed up by the
Chinese government. How would you describe the relationship between the central
government and public nationalism? The Chinese government has selectively
tolerated displays of popular nationalism, recognizing that it is both a potential
liability and source of strength for the Chinese Communist Party. Demonstrations of
nationalist anger can be helpful when the Chinese government wants to show resolve
but can also make diplomatic compromise and flexibility more difficult. On the other
hand, when street protests might have jeopardized efforts to improve
diplomatic relations and defuse potential crises, Chinese authorities have
repeatedly stifled grassroots nationalist protests often at great cost to the
Chinese governments patriotic credentials and domestic legitimacy. As I note in
Powerful Patriots, nationalist activists are often quietly cynical about the role they
play. One activist told me: To speak plainly, the government uses us when it
suits their purpose. When it doesnt suit them, it suppresses us. This way the
government can play the public opinion card. After all, Japan is a democracy and
respects public opinion. Even in a non-democratic country like China, the government
can still point to the publics feelings. In the book, you argue that the decision to
encourage or discourage protests is often a form of foreign policy signaling. How can
other governments (particularly Japan, one of the most popular targets for such
protests) use this information to better respond to crises in their relationships with
China? Other governments can learn a lot about Chinese foreign policy intentions by
observing whether China restricts or permits popular mobilization over a particular
issue, including online petitions, street protests, and other symbolic attempts to
defend Chinese sovereignty, including voyages to disputed islands and waters. After
the 2001 EP-3 incident, for example, China prevented anti-American street
demonstrations. These eforts helped China send a signal of reassurance to the Bush
administration as both sides negotiated a face-saving compromise over the release of
the American crew. As John Keefe, special assistant to Ambassador Prueher, later
recounted: University students wanted to hold demonstrations to vent their anger.
The government forbade them from taking such action [and] repeatedly stressed
that this event should not be seen as a major afair in U.S.-China relations.
6. Link Turn: Economic cooperation builds US-China

relationship and prevents conflict
Council on Foreign Relations, February 2016 [International, bipartisan organization, Xi

Jinping on the Global Stage Chinese Foreign Policy Under a Powerful but Exposed Leader"]
AFF 2AC Answers
Nevertheless, Chinas growing geopolitical ambitions are tempered by the reality

of its economic relationship with the United States and a variety of shared
international interests between the two countries. China will continue to seek to
expand its influence and in some instances will compete directly with the United
States, and Xi may criticize Washington to score points at home, but
bilateral economic interdependence will, in most cases, provide a floor
for the relationship. This is, of course, diferent from the longtime U.S.
objective of constraining and ultimately moderating Chinese behavior by broadly
integrating China into the international system, a strategy that appears not to
have substantially shaped Chinas more assertive external policies. In sum, Xi
does not want to trigger a confrontation with the United States, especially during
a period of economic uncertainty in China.
CDL Core Files 2016-2017 China Politics Disadvantage
China Politics Disadvantage

Vocabulary
president of China.
Political Capital: Power to influence members of a political
party. It is also the ability to progress a particular issue/agenda.
The DA argues that there is a limited amount that politicians can
spend.
Economic and Political Reforms: These are changes to the
political and economic system to make them better. In the case of
China, these reforms are to make the country more open.
Economic reforms might include reducing government
involvement in businesses, reducing taxes, and increasing free
trade. Political reforms might include more free speech, freedom
of religion, freedom of press, gender and sexual identity
freedoms, and military freedoms.
Corruption: dishonesty in a political figure. This is where
someone in power takes bribes, hires friends, or simply does not
try at their job. There are high-levels of corruption in China that Xi
is trying to eliminate.
AT=Answers To
1NC Shell
1NC China Politics Disadvantage

Shell
A. Uniqueness: Xi pushing for economic and political
reforms. These require significant political capital
Naughton, 2015 [Barry, So Kwanlok Chair of Chinese International Afairs at the Graduate School of
International Relations and Pacific Studies at the University of California, San Diego, Is There a Xi Model
of Economic Reform? Acceleration of Economic Reform since Fall 2014, Winter,
http://www.hoover.org/sites/default/files/research/docs/clm46bn.pdf]
In fact, within the jumble of disparate policy elements in the Xi agenda, in the
latter part of 2014 there was a substantial shift in relative importance. The
importance of economic reforms increased palpably as, for the first time, Xi
began to put considerable political muscle behind specific strands of
the economic reform agenda. The economic reform program has now
moved out of the earlier stages of preparation and the creation of specialized
institutions to manage the reform process (as described in earlier CLMs).
Earlier assessments, even when positive, have inevitably been cautious,
because implementation has been slow, relative to the bold and broad
declarations of the November 2013 Third Plenum.1 Today, however, we can
start to see important areas where economic reforms have moved
beyond rhetoric into important efforts of practical implementation.
This does not necessarily mean that Xi has found an efective or reasonable
model of reform, but it certainly changes the terms of the conversation we
should be having about economic policy. Xis economic reforms are now
serious and real, and deserve serious and careful attention.2 Oddly, so far the
important measures discussed here have been presented in a somewhat
understated way in the Chinese press, and have received very little press
attention outside China. This shortcoming should be rectified as soon as
possible. In the following, I survey three key elements of economic reform
that moved into serious implementation in the OctoberNovember 2014 time
frame. Each of these three is complex, and a full analysis, or even a complete
description, cannot really be achieved in this short format. The first section
lists all three policy areas. Sections two through four describe the policy
content for each of the measures. In Section five, I present an extremely
preliminary set of observations about the nature of the emerging Xi model
of economic reform. Three Policy Measures In the space of a few months, and
with little fanfare, Beijing policy-makers introduced the following three
economic reform policy packages: a) A program was adopted to divorce local
government finances from the corporate local government funding vehicles
1NC Shell
1
that have been piling up debt since the global financial crisis. This policy
includes capping local debt and reclassifying and restructuring debt into
public debt (essentially municipal bonds) and corporate debt (including for
companies that produce public services). This is a bold and aggressive
program that seeks to fundamentally shift the relationship between local
governments and debt markets. At the same time, it will lead to a major
short-term reduction in local government financial resources. b) A new
system of property rights was introduced for agricultural land that provides
protection to farmers and a clear system to support renting, leasing, and
mortgaging land. c) At the APEC Leaders Summit in Beijing (November 912,
2014), China undertook new commitments in a range of international
negotiations, substantively completing free- trade agreements with Korea and
Australia, and moved forward in agreements with the United States. While
no individual step was a game-changer, cumulatively these moves
amounted to an important shift toward a more open economic
regime, particularly since complementary domestic policy steps
were also taken. Each of these policy initiatives addresses fundamental
aspects of the economic system. In some casessuch as land rightsthe
new measures address contentious political or theoretical issues that have
defeated eforts at resolution for a decade or more. Each of the policy
initiatives has opposition, so the top political leadership must have expended
political capital, either in overwhelming the opponents, or in working out
political deals that would bring them on board. Let us consider each of these
initiatives in turn.
B. Link: The plan spends Xis political capitalIts

controversial to work with the US
Lieberthal and Jisi, 2012 [Kenneth and Wang, Senior Fellow in Foreign
Policy and in Global Economy and Development and is Director of
the John L. Thornton China Center at the Brookings Institution.
Director of the Center for International and Strategic Studies and
Dean of the School of International Studies at Peking University,
Addressing U.S.-China Strategic Distrust, March,
http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/research/files/papers/2012/3/3
0-us-china-lieberthal/0330_china_lieberthal.pdf]
In a major policy address in Washington on February 15, 2012, Chinese Vice

President Xi Jinping placed the need to enhance mutual trust at the top of the
list of challenges that the two sides must address more successfully.5 He was
1NC Shell
1
right to give the issue such priority. His papers coauthors have spent many
years deeply engaged in U.S.-China relations, and they feel that mutual
understanding is critical to achieving the outcomes that are in the interests of
each country. But they also worry that at a time of far reaching change, each
side is increasingly uncertain about the other sides real perceptions
and long-term intentions in this relationship. Does the other side seek
and expect to develop a normal, pragmatic major power relationship, where
the two countries cooperate where they can and seek to limit disagreements
where their interests difer? Or does the other side see its success as
necessitating concerted actions to constrict and reduce its opponents long-
term capabilities and influence? Will the top leadership of the other side
be willing and able to spend enough political capital to overcome
domestic obstacles to establishing a more cooperative relationship?
is paper terms distrust of ultimate intentions in the bilateral relationship
strategic distrust. Here, strategic means expectations about the nature of
the bilateral relationship over the long run; it is not a synonym for military.
Strategic distrust therefore means a perception that the other side
will seek to achieve its key long term goals at concerted cost to your
own sides core prospects and interests. A major concern is that it
appears as of 2012 that strategic distrust is growing on both sides and that
this perception can, if it festers, create a self- fulfilling prophecy of overall
mutual antagonism.
C. Internal Link: These political and economic reforms

prevent country collapse
Zhiyue, 2015 [Bo, Director of New Zealand Contemporary China Research Centre (NZCCRC) and
Professor of Political Science at Victoria University of Wellington, 3/30, http://thediplomat.com/2015/03/the-
end-of-ccp-rule-and-the-collapse-of-china/]
By world communist standards, the CCP has indeed entered its endgame. After
70 years, for instance, communist rule in the Soviet Union ended on December
26, 1991. In six months, the Chinese Communist Party will have ruled the
Peoples Republic of China for 66 years. With rampant corruption at all levels of
the party and the government where a typist has taken bribes in the amount
of four million yuan and a vice chairman of the Central Military Commission
took cash bribes weighing more than one ton the CCP seems unlikely to
outlive its Soviet counterpart by a large margin. Nevertheless, by Chinese
dynastic standards, the CCPs rule is not in its endgame. Instead, it might very
well be in its beginning. The last dynasty, the Qing, lasted for 267 years; by that
standard, CCP rule is still in its infancy. In 1710, 66 years into the Qing Dynastys
rule in China, the country was at its peak as a prosperous and powerful nation
under the wise leadership of Emperor Kangxi. The dynasty would last another
1NC Shell
1
200 years. As a ruling dynasty, the CCP has had a mixed record so far. While it is
true that the CCP under Mao Zedong unified most of the country, Maos policies
did not make China more prosperous and stronger. Tens of millions perished in
the aftermath of the Great Leap Forward, and the entire population sufered
during the decade-long power struggles of the Cultural Revolution. Deng
Xiaoping heralded a new era of economic prosperity, but his GDP-oriented
policies have severely strained Chinas environmental capacities. China
witnessed the best performance in terms of economic growth in the decade from
2002 to 2012 under the leadership of Hu Jintao. Yet corruption and environmental
degradation worsened in the same period, in spite of Hus signature slogan of a
scientific outlook on development. In the past two and a half years, Xi
Jinpings leadership has been long on anti-corruption campaigns but
short on anti-pollution eforts. One hundred officials at the rank of vice minister
and above have been investigated for corruption, but there is no sign that the
central leadership is taking environmental issues more seriously. A series of new
leading small groups have been created to manage national security, internet
issues, reforms, and military modernization, but no central leading small group
on environmental protection has been set up. Given these mixed results, Xi
Jinping could very likely be the last ruler in China as a communist. Yet he could
also start another new era of prosperity and strength as a new emperor
of the CCP Dynasty. Whether the Peoples Republic of China will end up
like the Soviet Union or follow the footsteps of Manchus on its way to
international prominence will depend on what this new leadership will do
(or will not do) in the next seven years.
1NC Shell
1
D. Impact: Country collapse sparks nuclear lash out
Rexing, 2005 (San Epoch Times International 8/3 http://www.theepocht...8-

3/30931.html)
Since the Partys life is above all else it would not be surprising if the
CCP resorts to the use of biological, chemical, and nuclear weapons
in its attempt to postpone its life. The CCP, that disregards human life,
would not hesitate to kill two hundred million Americans, coupled
with seven or eight hundred million Chinese, to achieve its ends. The
speech free of all disguises, lets the public see the CCP for what it really is:
with evil filling its every cell, the CCP intends to fight all of mankind in its
desperate attempt to cling to life. And that is the theme of the speech. The
theme is murderous and utterly evil. We did witness in China beggars who
demanded money from people by threatening to stab themselves with knives
or prick their throats on long nails. But we have never, until now, seen a
rogue who blackmails the world to die with it by wielding biological, chemical,
and nuclear weapons. Anyhow, the bloody confession affirmed the CCPs
bloodiness: a monstrous murderer, who has killed 80 million
2NC/1NR Extensions
2NC/1NR Diplomatic Engagement

Link Extensions
1. The plan makes Xi look weak on foreign policy and
drains his political capital

Today, Chinas thirty-year era of 10 percent annual growth appears to have

ended, with official statistics placing gross domestic product (GDP) growth
below 7 percent, the government reducing its growth target to 6.5 percent,
and a number of major banks and respected forecasters arguing the true
growth rate is far lowerand will remain below 5 percent for years.3 In light
of this deepening economic slowdown, the future trajectory of Xis external
policy is in question. Some elements, including Chinas geoeconomic policies,
will endure; nevertheless, Chinas foreign policy may well be driven
increasingly by the risk of domestic political instability. For this
reason, Xi will most probably stimulate and intensify Chinese nationalism
long a pillar of the states legitimacyto compensate for the political harm of
a slower economy, to distract the public, to halt rivals who might use
nationalist criticisms against him, and to burnish his own image. Chinese
nationalism has long been tied to foreign afairs, especially memories of
foreign domination and territorial loss. For example, Xi may be less able or
willing to compromise in public, especially on territorial issues or other
matters that are rooted in national sentiment, for fear that it would harm his
political position. He may provoke disputes with neighbors, use increasingly
strident rhetoric in defense of Chinas national interests, and take a tougher
line in relations with the United States and its allies to shift public focus away
from economic troubles. He may also turn to greater economic protectionism.
These changes come at a time when Xis tight control of the decision- making
process has made it harder for U.S. policymakers to anticipate Chinas next
moves. Familiar interlocutors at the State Council and Foreign Ministry, who
once provided much-needed insight into an often mysterious policymaking
process, are no longer central within it. As the shroud of secrecy surrounding
Chinese decision-making thickens, what remains clear is that dealing with
China will require a more nuanced understanding of the man with singular
control over the countrys foreign policy future. It will also necessitate an
appreciation of the interaction between his internal political
2NC/1NR Extensions
1
requirements and his foreign policy agenda. Finally, it will demand a
clear-eyed acceptance of the fact that Xi has ushered in a new era of Chinese
regional and global diplomacy, one that will push the West to evaluate its
overall approach to the Peoples Republic of China (PRC) and to the powerful
but exposed leader who makes its foreign policy.
2. Cooperation with the US causes nationalist backlash

and drains Xis political capital

The foundations for a turn to nationalism have been laid for decades. After
Tiananmen Square, the party inculcated nationalist sentiment through
relentless propaganda, a barrage of chauvinistic television shows and movies,
and a patriotic education campaign in the countrys schools.31 According to
the governments nationalist narrative, which downplays the partys failures
and communist ideology, China is a country whose century of humiliation
began with the Opium Wars and ended with the partys assumption of power
in 1949. The partys primary mission has not been to bring about a
communist utopia but to extricate China from the predations of Western and
Japanese imperialists and to put it on a path to becoming the worlds largest
economy. Chinas territorial disputes with its neighbors and Taiwans
ambiguous status are seen as wounds from this humiliating past
that only the party can heal. This slanted view of history has been
successful in building a deep reserve of grievance and victimhood among
ordinary Chinese citizens that dominates their worldview and can be
harnessed by the leadership. It was no accident that Xi, when he assumed
power, declared that his main objective was to bring about the great
rejuvenation of the Chinese nation. That slogan was an attempt to position
Xis leadership within the arc of a larger narrative that portrays the party as
responsible for restoring Chinas historic place in the world. In December
2015, the Communist Party Central Committee held a group study of Chinese
patriotism and Xi himself called for further promoting patriotism to achieve
the great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation.32 By connecting patriotism to
Xis mission to restore Chinese greatness, that link is being made even more
2NC/1NR Extensions
1
concrete. Although these themes have long been an important part of
Chinese politics, Xi will choose to strengthen them in coming years. By
stoking Chinese nationalism, Xi will seek to protect himself and the party
from the worst of the economic downturn. His control over policymaking will
be an advantage in that efort, and his policies will respect and support his
domestic political agenda.
Specific Links
1
Specific Links
2NC/1NR BIT Link

1. Economic engagement makes Xi look suspicious
compromise may seem good, but its costly to
convince his peers
Lieberthal and Jisi, 2012 [Kenneth and Wang, Senior Fellow in Foreign Policy
and in Global Economy and Development and is Director of the John L.
Thornton China Center at the Brookings Institution. Director of the Center for
International and Strategic Studies and Dean of the School of International
Studies at Peking University, Addressing U.S.-China Strategic Distrust,
March, http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/research/files/papers/2012/3/30-
us-china-lieberthal/0330_china_lieberthal.pdf]
Not surprisingly, these various shifts are raising questions throughout Asia
about respective U.S. and Chinese roles. Such questions inevitably increase
the potential for suspicions about U.S. and Chinese motives and intentions.
Domestically, both the U.S. and China are confronting the need in the coming
few years to change basic dimensions of the distinctive growth model each
has pursued for decades. In the U.S. the major issue is how to deal with a
scale deficit that threatens to spin out of control within a decade if serious
measures are not taken on both the expenditure and revenue sides of the
equation. In China, the 12th Five Year Plan articulates a new development
model because the resource, environmental, social, and international costs of
the model pursued in recent decades have become too great. Prospects for
the future thus must take into account expectations about how successful the
U.S. and China respectively will be in efecting the economic transition that
each now confronts. At present, many commentators and politicians on
each side attribute their own countrys economic deficiencies to
actions by the other side and propose various penalties in response.
Therefore, to the extent that reforms in the two development models fall
short, the bilateral relationship is more likely to deteriorate. It introduces
additional uncertainty surrounding each sides future posture and capabilities.
Specific Links
2NC/1NR Currency Manipulation,

North Korea and Human Rights
Link
1. Xi will burn his political capital by cooperating with
the UShistory makes even diplomacy seem like a
trick
Lieberthal and Jisi, 2012 [Kenneth and Wang, Senior Fellow in Foreign Policy and in Global
Economy and Development and is Director of the John L. Thornton China Center at the Brookings
Institution. Director of the Center for International and Strategic Studies and Dean of the School of
International Studies at Peking University, Addressing U.S.-China Strategic Distrust, March,
http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/research/files/papers/2012/3/30-us-china-
lieberthal/0330_china_lieberthal.pdf]
Since the end of the Cold War, the PRC leadership has consistently
demonstrated the desire to increase trust, reduce trouble, develop
cooperation, and refrain from confrontation in U.S.-China relations. Beijing
realizes that China-U.S. cooperation must be based on mutual strategic trust.
Meanwhile, in Beijings view, it is U.S. policies, attitude, and misperceptions
that cause the lack of mutual trust between the two countries. Chinese
strategic distrust of the United States is deeply rooted in history.
Four sentiments rejecting recent structural changes in the international
system contribute to this distrust: the feeling in China that since 2008 the
PRC has ascended to be a first-class global power; the assessment that the
United States, despite ongoing great strength, is heading for decline; the
observation that emerging powers like India, Brazil, Russia and South Africa
are increasingly challenging Western dominance and are working more with
each other and with China in doing so; and the notion that China's
development model of a strong political leadership that efectively manages
social and economic afairs provides an alternative to Western democracy
and market economies for other developing countries to learn from. In
combination, these views make many Chinese political elites suspect that it is
the United States that is on the wrong side of history. Because they
believe that the ultimate goal of the U.S. in view of these factors is
to maintain its global hegemony, they conclude that America will
seek to constrain or even upset China's rise. America's democracy
promotion agenda is understood in China as designed to sabotage
the Communist Partys leadership. The leadership therefore actively
promotes eforts to guard against the influence of American ideology and U.S.
thinking about democracy, human rights, and related issues. is perceived
Specific Links
1
American efort to divide and weaken China has been met by building
increasingly powerful and sophisticated political and technological devices to
safeguard domestic stability. U.S. arms sales to Taiwan despite vastly
improved cross-Strait relationsand close-in surveillance activities of China's
coastscontribute to Beijing's deepening distrust of U.S. strategic intentions
in the national security arena. Washingtons recent rebalancing toward Asia
further contributes to this sense of threat. American diplomatic positions
spanning North Korea, Iran, and countries in Southeast Asia are discomforting
and increase Chinese suspicions of U.S. intentions. China also views the U.S.
as taking advantage of the dollar as a reserve currency and adopting various
protectionist measures to disadvantage the PRC economically. Chinas
criticisms of, and resistance to, some of Americas international policies and
actions toward the Korean Peninsula, Iran, Syria, and elsewhere reflect the
suspicion that they are based on injustice and narrow U.S. self-interest that
will directly or indirectly afect Chinas interests.
2NC/1NR Extensions
1
2NC/1NR Extensions
2NC/1NR Impact Extensions

1. China collapse causes lash out and multiple wars
Carpenter, 2015 [Ted, senior fellow at the Cato Institute and a contributing editor at The National
Interest, 9/6, http://nationalinterest.org/feature/could-chinas-economic-troubles-spark-war-13784?page=2]
Beijing might refrain from deliberately provoking a major foreign policy crisis,
since the Chinese economy depends heavily on export markets, and access to
those markets would be jeopardized by war. However, the need to preserve and
strengthen national unity and distract the public from mounting economic
troubles is likely to impel Chinese leaders to adopt very hardline policies in at
least three areas. And all of those situations entail the danger of miscalculations
that could lead to war. One issue is the South China Sea. Beijing has made
extraordinarily broad territorial claims that encompass some 90 percent of that
body of water. China is pressing its claims with air and naval patrols and the
building of artificial islands. Those policies have brought Beijing into acrimonious
disputes with neighbors such as Vietnam and the Philippines, which have rival
territorial claims, and with the worlds leading maritime power, the United States,
which resists any manifestation of Chinese control over the South China Sea and
the crucial commercial lanes that pass through it. The conditions are in place for
a nasty confrontation. Chinese leaders have already stressed the countrys
alleged historical claims to the area, and made it clear that it will not tolerate
being subjected to humiliation by outside powers. Such arguments are designed
to gain domestic support by reminding the Chinese people of the countrys long
period of weakness and humiliation in the 1800s and early 1900s. A second issue
is Taiwan. Beijing has long argued that Taiwan is rightfully part of China and was
stolen from the country in the Sino-Japanese war in 1895. Although Chinese
leaders have exhibited patience regarding the issue of reunification, relying in
large measure on growing cross-strait economic ties to entice Taiwan to
eventually accept that outcome, Beijing has also reacted very sharply whenever
Taiwanese officials have pushed an agenda of independence, as during the
administration of Chen Shui-bian from 2000 to 2008. The danger or renewed
confrontation is rising, since public opinion polls indicate that the nominee of
Chens old party, the pro-independence Democratic Progressive Party, will be
Taiwans next leader. A new crisis in the Taiwan Strait would be extremely
serious, since the United States has obligated itself to consider any Chinese
eforts at coercion as a grave breach of the peace of East Asia. Yet there is little
doubt that there would be widespread domestic support on the mainland for a
stern response by the Beijing government to a Taiwanese attempt to enhance its
de-facto independence. Indeed, there might be more political danger to the
regime if it did not take a strong stance on that issue. The third possible arena for
crisis is the East China Sea. China is increasingly adamant about its claims to the
Diaoyu/Senkaku islands, which are under Japanese control. From Chinas
2NC/1NR Extensions
1
perspective, those islands were stolen by Imperial Japan at the same time that
Tokyo took possession of Taiwan following the 1895 war. And ginning up public
anger against Japan is never difficult. China just finished celebrating the 70th
anniversary of the end of World War II, which is touted in China as the Chinese
Peoples War of Resistance Against Japanese Aggression and the World Anti-
Fascist War. Recalling Japans invasion of China, and the resulting atrocities, was
a prominent theme of the various commemorative events. But the animosity is
not based solely on historical grievances. Anger at Japan over the ongoing East
China Sea dispute and other matters has already produced anti-Japanese riots in
Chinese cities, characterized by attacks on Japanese businesses and
automobiles. There is a powerful incentive for Chinese leaders to take an
uncompromising stance on the Diaoyu/Senkaku feud, confident that the Chinese
people will back such a stance.
2. CCP collapse results in nuclear weapons use
Yee and Storey, 2002 (Herbert Yee, Professor of Politics and International
Relations at the Hong Kong Baptist University, and Ian Storey, Lecturer in
Defence Studies at Deakin University, 2002, The China Threat: Perceptions,
Myths and Reality, p. 5.)
The fourth factor contributing to the perception of a China threat is the fear of
political and economic collapse in the PRC , resulting in territorial fragmentation, civil war
and we of refugees pouring into neighbouring countries. Naturally, any or all of these scenarios would have
a profoundly negative impact on regional stability.Today the Chinese leadership faces a raft
of internal problems, including the increasing political demands of its citizens,
a growing population, a shortage of natural resources and a deterioration in
the natural environment caused by rapid industrialisation and pollution . There
problems are putting a strain on the central government's ability to govern efectively. Political
disintegration or a Chinese civil war might result in millions of Chinese
refugees seeking asylum in neighbouring countries . Such an unprecedented exodus of
refugees from a collapsed PRC would no doubt put a severe strain on the limited resources of China's
neighbours.
A fragmented China could also result in another nightmare
scenario nuclear weapons falling into the hands of irresponsible
local provincial leaders or warlords.. From this perspective, a
disintegrating China would also pose a threat to its neighbours and the world.
3 Regime collapse destabilizes the region and causes a

laundry list of impacts
2NC/1NR Extensions
1
The Huffington Post, 2016 [How to Convince China to Cooperate
Against North Korea, 3/27, http://www.huffingtonpost.com/doug-
bandow/how-to-convince-china-to_b_9554496.html]
Or the North Korean regime might collapse, bringing to mind the old warning
about getting what you wish for. The consequences could be violent conflict,
social chaos, loose nukes, and mass refugee flows. Hundreds of thousands of
North Koreans already have crossed the Yalu; starvation highlighted by
combat among armed factions could create a human tsunami. The
PRC might feel forced to intervene militarily to stabilize the North and
Chinese forces might not be able to leave quickly. Indeed, Beijing might
decide to maintain its Korea under diferent leadership rather than accept a
unified Western-leaning state on its border. After all, a united Republic of
Korea would be more rival than supplicant. Chinas political influence would
ebb. PRC business investments would be swept away as South Korean money
flooded the North. Worse, a reunited Korea allied with America would put U.S.
troops on the Yalu and aid Washingtons ill-disguised attempt at military
containment.
2NC/1NR Extensions
2NC/1NR AT #1Xi Not Pushing

Reforms
They say Xi cant pass reforms, but
1. Extend our Naughton evidence.

Its much better than their Weekly Standard evidence
NAME]
more facts)
to be true)

Our Naughton evidence has three examples about how Xi is
reforming the economy. He changed debt laws, agriculture, and
increased free trade. Their Weekly Standard evidence just says Xi
cant change the economy with little to no reasons.

This matters because: we have more facts to support our point and
thus our uniqueness must be true. That means we can weigh the DA
against the Aff.
2NC/1NR Extensions
1
2 Xi is pushing political reforms to end corruption in
the government
Li, 2015 [Cheng, writer for the Brookings Institution,

Understanding Xis contradictions,
http://www.brookings.edu/blogs/order-from-
chaos/posts/2015/09/17-president-xi-chinese-leadership-li]
The most astonishing political achievement of the Xi leadership is its bold and
broad anti-corruption campaign. In 2013 alone, the Chinese authorities
investigated 182,000 officialsthe highest annual number of cases in 30
years. By September 2015, the authorities had purged about 120 vice-
ministerial and provincial level leaders on corruption charges. But Xi has
never linked rampant official corruption with the fundamental flaws in the
Chinese political system. Instead, he asserts that the Chinese should have
confidence in Chinas political system. Under Xis initiative, the fourth plenum
of the 18th Party Central Committee held in the fall of 2014 was devoted to
legal reform. This was the first plenum in party history that concentrated on
law. Xi, more than any previous leader, is interested in making the nations
judicial development part of his legacy. Yet, in 2015, Chinese authorities
arrested or persecuted several hundred human rights lawyers and legal
professionals on charges of endangering national security.
3 Now is the brinkXi has extensive political capital

and can either become a great reformer or a dictator
Li, 2015 [Cheng, writer for the Brookings Institution,

Understanding Xis contradictions,
chaos/posts/2015/09/17-president-xi-chinese-leadership-li]
As the leader of a rapidly changing country with contrasting views and

values, as well as conflicting interests, Xi Jinping is wise to strike a delicate
balance between various constituencies and socioeconomic forces. Arguably,
it is Xis contradictions that make him a well-rounded efective leader. The
increasingly complicated international environment that China confronts also
leads Xi to be deliberately ambiguous about his stances and strategies.
2NC/1NR Extensions
1
Arguably, it is Xis contradictions that make him a well-rounded efective
leader. Self-contradictions also suggest that Xi Jinping is not a dogmatic
leader, but that he can be flexible. Of course, some of Xis contradictions may
only be temporary. If Xi hopes to be a great leader in Chinese history,
sooner or later he should present a clearly articulated and coherent
vision for the countrys political trajectory. It is reasonable for Xi to
spend the first few years of his leadership searching for the right
sequence for implementing his agenda, maximizing public support,
and accumulating political capital. But when the next Party Congress
convenes in the fall of 2017, Xi will have to reveal his stance on Chinas
political institutionalization. A comprehensive understanding of Xis
contradictions is instrumental for foreign observers. We should not overstate
any one dimension of Xis leadership while ignoring others. It is still
premature to make a definitive judgment about his intentions, capacity, and
historical legacy. It would be a huge mistake to conclude that Xis policy
decisionseither domestic or foreignare predetermined.
2NC/1NR Extensions
1
4 Political reform efforts are successful, but they
require all of Xis political capital
Pei, 2015 [Minxin, professor of government at Claremont McKenna College, 4/11,

http://www.chinausfocus.com/political-social-development/xi-jinpings-anti-corruption-campaign-enters-a-
crucial-phase/]
Since he became the general secretary of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) in
November 2012, Xi Jinping has invested much of his newly acquired political
capital in two initiatives. One was an ambitious and far-reaching economic reform
agenda, which was unveiled at the 3rd plenum of the Central Committee last
November. The other was an intense drive against corruption, which was
launched almost immediately after Xi settled into his office. Minxin Pei Minxin Pei
Although the two initiatives are, strictly speaking, separate. In reality they are
closely linked. Without market-oriented reforms that reduce opportunities for
abuse of power, it is impossible to root out corruption. Similarly, a sustained
campaign against corruption is a political precondition for successful economic
reforms. To date, Xis government has made greater progress on the anti-
corruption front. This fight has lasted longer while the drive for reform has barely
started. Most importantly, Xis campaign on graft is a centralized, top-down
efort. It is comparatively easy to use the power of the CCPs in-house anti-
corruption agency, the Central Discipline and Inspection Committee, to
investigate and punish officials who have committed misdeeds. By contrast,
economic reforms require negotiations among stakeholders with competing
interests and implementations by local governments and various bureaucracies
a far more complicated, slow, and uncertain process. That is why Xis war on
corruption has achieved initial success. Figures released by the CCPs own anti-
corruption committee show that that more than 182,000 party members,
including 17 high-ranking officials at levels of vice-minister and above, were
punished for various misdeeds in 2013. The sustained intensity of Xis campaign
has caught most observers by surprise. Initially, many suspected that, like his
predecessors, Xi would simply use a brief crackdown on corruption to purge
political rivals and gain popular support. But today, 18 months into his
administration, hardly a day passes without the fall of a tiger (a high-ranking
official) or several flies (mid-level or junior officials). It is becoming clear that
Xis fight against corruption is quite diferent from that of his predecessors.
Among many things, the most critical decision Xi has made on this issue is the
appointment of a very capable senior official Wang Qishan to the head of the
Discipline and Inspection Committee. Known in China as a fire-fighter for his
proven ability to handle crisis and deliver results, Wang, a close political ally of
Xi, has not disappointed. In the past year, Wang instituted two changes that
significantly enhanced the partys ability to uncover criminal acts perpetrated by
local officials. One is to dispatch a large number of roving inspection teams to
provinces and large state-owned enterprises. Although the practice of sending
2NC/1NR Extensions
1
inspection teams to local governments and bureaucracies was established more
than a decade ago, Beijing had not sent out a large numbers in the past.
However, things are diferent this time. The roving inspection teams sent by
Wang are headed by recently retired senior officials who report directly to Wangs
committee. During their tours, these teams privately interview local officials to
gather information on the misconduct of their colleagues. Thus, it has become
much harder for local officials to conceal their crimes or protect each other
because some of their colleagues, out of fear or spite, have incentives to
denounce them to the roving inspection teams. A second important initiative
credited to Wang was the requirement that any corruption investigation
conducted in a jurisdiction must be reported to the anti-corruption agency at a
superior level. In the past, local officials could cover up the wrongdoings of their
colleagues with relative ease because they did not have to report to their
superiors such investigations. Now it will be much more difficult to do so because
of the reporting requirement, which was formally endorsed by the party at the
3rd plenum last November.
2NC/1NR Extensions

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2NC/1NR Extensions
2NC/1NR AT #3US-China Meet

Regularly
They say The US and China meet regularly and our DA should have
happened, but
1. Extend our Lieberthal and Jisi evidence.

Its much better than their Lieberthal and Jisi evidence
NAME]
facts)
to be true)
their argument)
( ) (their evidence supports our
argument)

While their evidence says there are regular meetings, they do not
say there are many agreements. This proves our point that achieving
a plan like the aff would require substantial political capital from Xi
to get anything passedmeetings and agreements are very
different.
This matters because: our link still make senseXi loses political
capital and our DA impact is accessed.
2NC/1NR Extensions
1
2 Recently, China has been blocking US diplomatic
outreach

Aside from developing stronger ties with other states, an important element
of Xis multifaceted strategy has been to energetically create and participate
in multilateral institutions. Some of these, such as AIIB, will be useful for
dispensing geoeconomically oriented loans to neighbors. Even though AIIB is
a multilateral lending institution rather than a Chinese government agency,
such organizations can still be used for geoeconomic statecraft, especially
given that Beijing will retain significant influence in AIIBs management and
operation as well as a veto. For example, China sought to use the Asian
Development Bank to deny loans to Arunachal Pradesh, an Indian state
claimed by China. The misguided refusal of the United States to participate in
the AIIBs creation, and Washingtons failed attempt to persuade friends and
allies not to join, denied the United States an opportunity to influence the
banks rules, development trajectory, and Chinas potential use of the bank
as a geopolitical instrument. Other organizations in which China has been
dominant have served to exclude the United States from regional discussions
or provided China a forum that parallels and circumvents global institutions,
allowing it to pursue its national interests and attempt to reshape global
governance. Chinas elevation of the Conference on Interaction and
Confidence- Building Measures in Asia (CICA), a forum that does not include
the United States, gave Xi the opportunity to advocate an Asia for Asians
and amplify long-standing criticism of U.S. bilateral alliances. Its creation of
the New Development Bank (formerly the BRICSBrazil, Russia, India, China,
and South AfricaDevelopment Bank) and the Regional Comprehensive
Economic Partnership (RCEP) parallels the World Bank and the Trans-Pacific
Partnership (TPP) and ofers it the ability to wield geoeconomic influence over
others. Although many of these initiatives were conceived under Hu, they
were given life by Xi. Because China has historically been hesitant to create
and lead multilateral initiatives, this self-assured and multidirectional Chinese
behavior is yet another example of increased activism related to Xis rise. Xis
decisive leadership style, his unmatched power within the political system,
and his strong desire for vigorous Chinese diplomacy have produced a foreign
policy that is assertive, coordinated, and diversified across the instruments
and targets of statecraft
2NC/1NR Extensions
2NC/1NR AT #4Reforms Cause

Collapse
They say the reforms cause country collapse, but

facts)
to be true)
their argument)

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2NC/1NR Extensions
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2 Reforms prevent country collapse
Tao, March 2016 [Xie, Writer for The Diplomat, professor of political science at the School of English
and International Studies, Beijing Foreign Studies University, 3/20, http://thediplomat.com/2015/03/why-do-
people-keep-predicting-chinas-collapse/]
Gordon Chang may be dismissed as an opportunist who tries to make a

fortune political and/or economic out of sensational rhetoric about
China. But not so with David Shambaugh, a well-respected China scholar at
George Washington University who heretofore has been rather cautious in his
assessment of China. In a March 6 Wall Street Journal article, he portrayed
the Chinese party-state as struggling for its last breath. The endgame of
Chinese communist rule has now begun, I believe, and it has progressed
further than many think, he wrote. We cannot predict when Chinese
communism will collapse, but it is hard not to conclude that we are
witnessing its final phase. Shambaughs article was nothing less than a
supersize bombshell in the China field, especially in light of the fact that the
Chinese Communist Party under Xi Jinpings leadership seems to be
revitalizing itself through a series of important measures. And these
measures particularly the anti-corruption campaign and the drive for the
rule of law appear to have significantly bolstered popular support for the
new leadership. Shambaugh actually published a book in 2008 that ofers a
rather favorable assessment of the party-states abilities to adapt to new
challenges in the first decade of the 21st century. It is unclear what caused
Shambaughs sudden about-face. Some speculate that he was merely trying
to get a foreign policy position in the post-Barack Obama administration.
Others contend that he is the Chinese version of a mugged liberal
converted to a conservative, that Shambaugh is deeply upset by Chinese
leaders intransigence on fundamental reforms. Whatever the motives behind
Shambaughs nirvana, there is no denying that China is facing myriad
daunting challenges. China is sick but so is every other country in the
world, though each country is sick with diferent symptoms, for diferent
reasons, and of diferent degrees. Take the United State as an example. The
worlds oldest democracy may also strike one as terminally ill: appalling
inequality, dilapidated infrastructure, declining public education, astronomical
deficits, rising political apathy, and a government that can hardly get
anything done. In his bestseller Political Order and Political Decay, Francis
Fukuyama described the American body politic as being repatrimonialized,
ruled by courts and political parties, and gridlocked by too many veto points.
Across the Atlantic, many European democracies are facing similar problems,
particularly financial insolvency. Yet nobody has declared the coming collapse
of American democracy or European democracy. Why? Because many
2NC/1NR Extensions
1
Western analysts (dating back at least to Seymour Martin Lipset) subscribe to
the view that as long as political institutions are viewed as legitimate,
a crisis in effectiveness (e.g., economic performance) does not pose
fatal threat to a regime. Thus even in the darkest days of the Great
Depression, according to this view, Americas democratic institutions
remained unchallenged. By contrast, if a regime is already deficient in
political legitimacy, a crisis of efectiveness (such as an economic slowdown,
rising inequality, or rampant corruption) would only exacerbate the
legitimacy crisis. China is widely believed to be a prominent case that fits into
this line argument. China might be facing a performance crisis, but whether it
is also facing a legitimacy crisis is debatable. Beauty is in the eyes of
beholder; so is legitimacy. If the Chinese party-state could survive the riotous
years of the Cultural Revolution and the existential crisis of 1989, why
couldnt it manage to survival another crisis? In fact, a more important
question for Western observers is why the Chinese Communist Party has
managed to stay in power for so long and to produce an indisputably
impressive record of economic development. In 2003, Andrew Nathan from
Columbia University put forward a theory of authoritarian resilience to explain
why the Chinese Communist Party didnt follow in the steps of the former
Soviet Union. In a January 2015 article, he argued that instead of showing
signs of an embattled regime, Beijing is actually on a path of authoritarian
resurgence, supporting similar regimes and seeking to roll back democratic
changes both at home and abroad. One of his central messages is that
authoritarian resurgence reflects democratic decline. Because the appeal of
authoritarianism grows when the prestige of democracy declines, he wrote,
the most important answer to Chinas challenge is for the democracies to do
a better job of managing themselves than they are doing today. All
societies, authoritarian and democratic, are subject to decay over time,
wrote Francis Fukuyama. The real issue is their ability to adapt and
eventually fix themselves. The Chinese party-state is certainly undergoing
policy decay just like most Western democracies but it is too early to call
the Chinese patient terminally ill.
3 Xi must be strong and follow through on his reforms

otherwise China will collapse and go to war

This Council Special Report by Robert D. Blackwill and Kurt M. Campbell, two
experienced practitioners and long-time observers of American foreign policy,
2NC/1NR Extensions
1
is based on a straightforward premise: Xi Jinping is the most powerful Chinese
leader since Deng Xiaoping, one who has taken a number of steps to limit
collective leadership and the political clout of the army. But the authors also
argue that this same concentration of power is a double-edged sword, one
that leaves President Xi exposed and potentially vulnerable to internal
political challenge. The vulnerability comes from several sources, but none is
more critical than a slowing economy. The trajectory of the Chinese economy
is the subject of active debate among outside experts, but there is consensus
that China is experiencing a substantial slowdown and will not be able to
regain the high rates of growth that characterized the last several decades.
The report suggests the possibility of greater political repression at
home if there are signs the economic slowdown is triggering political
instability. But the authors go on to note that Xi may as well be tempted to
turn to foreign policy to redirect domestic attention away from a lagging
economy, in the process burnishing his nationalist credentials. They
anticipate continued Chinese pressure on neighbors in the East and South
China Seas and are skeptical China will use the leverage it has over North
Korea or assume more than a limited role in global governance. They do,
however, expect China to continue to engage in selective institution building.
Overall, they foresee a Chinese foreign policy that is assertive,
coordinated, and diversified, one that constitutes a significant
challenge to U.S. interests.
2NC/1NR Extensions
2NC/1NR AT #5No Political

Capital Loss
They say __________________________________________________, but

facts)
to be true)
their argument)

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2 Xis political capital is key to reforms Perception of
international strength is critical to holding off
nationalist challenges to his domestic agenda
Lieberthal, 2013 (Kenneth Lieberthal, 3/14, Director of the John L. Thornton China Center and senior fellow in
Foreign Policy and Global Economy and Development on PBS News Hour, interview with Judy Woodruf,
http://www.pbs.org/newshour/bb/asia/jan-june13/china_03-14.html)
KENNETH LIEBERTHAL: Well, he's already tried to change the style by being
much more of a kind of lively politician than his predecessor was. But I think
Gordon is right. We have to look to see whether he can forge the kind of
consensus to make deep structural reforms in China that the country deeply
needs if it's going to move forward. JUDY WOODRUFF: For example? KENNETH
LIEBERTHAL: For example, they need to shift from an export-oriented and
investment-focused economy to one that's much more focused on domestic
consumption as a driver of economic development, which requires expanding
the services sector, increasing incomes and so forth. That runs against huge
vested interests in China. So the question is whether he's going to be able to
really rework incentives through this system so that he can build the services
sector, build incomes, reduce huge capital-intensive infrastructure projects
and reduce dependence on exports. JUDY WOODRUFF: So, looking at him,
Gordon Chang, from the United States, what will we see that looks diferent,
do you think? GORDON CHANG: I think the one thing we have been
concerned about is all that, although he's been in power for only a few
months, since last November, when he became general-secretary of the
party, China has engaged on some very provocative maneuvers against the
Japanese, because the Chinese claim sovereignty over the Senkaku islands in
the East China Sea. People say that Xi Jinping is actually leading China's
foreign policy on this issue, and if so, we're in trouble, because this is a very
troubled area. JUDY WOODRUFF: And do you believe, Ken Lieberthal, that
that's a primary priority of his? KENNETH LIEBERTHAL: I think his real priority
is domestic. What he needs is stability abroad in order to undertake reform
domestically. But his big problem is that he -- that the Communist Party has
really nurtured very ardent nationalism domestically, and he can't allow
himself to get on the wrong side of that or he won't have the political capital
to carry out reforms. So he's trying to walk a tightrope. He has to be seen as
strong in international afairs. But I don't think he's looking for trouble
internationally. He'd rather avoid if it if he can.
3 Xi must use all of his political capital to fix corruption

2NC/1NR Extensions
1
Foreign Policy, 2012 [Major international news organization, Xi Jinpings Challenge Why China's
new president has a much tougher job than Barack Obama. November 8,
http://foreignpolicy.com/2012/11/08/xi-jinpings-challenge/
A key obstacle is that the old way of doing business is now built into the DNA of
the leaders of the roughly 40,000 political jurisdictions outside of Beijing, from
the province to the city to the county to the township level. These officials,
rewarded primarily on the basis of producing rapid GDP growth while keeping a
lid on social unrest, have used their political power to nurture infrastructure
building and other capital-intensive projects. This in turn has generated short-
term GDP growth and employment, along with massive flows of bank loans and
other funds from which they can skim. The results have been clear: breakneck
growth, huge infrastructure and manufacturing development, enormous
corruption, massive environmental devastation, growing inequality of wealth, and
rising social tensions. If they wish to change the behavior of these local leaders,
Xi and his colleagues must expend enormous political capital to do so. And local
officials are hardly the only impediments to reform. Beijing has fostered "national
champions" state-owned corporate behemoths, many of which are seen as key
to the partys grip on power and are closely tied to elite political families. This
marriage of wealth and political power presents major obstacles to efective
changes in economic strategy. Corruption at all levels, moreover, makes reforms
even more difficult to implement through Chinas massive bureaucracy. And the
fear that reform itself can generate expectations that may get out of hand adds
to the hurdles to making necessary changes. Thus, there are no simple solutions
to Chinas challenges, almost all of which are more difficult than those
confronting the United States. In the United States, the core issue is one of
gaining a political consensus on federal revenues and expenditures. For China,
the challenges require major structural overhaul of the economy and wide-
ranging changes in the political system. The complexity of both the problem and
the necessary corrective measures are massively more daunting in Beijing than
in Washington. The reforms China knows it should undertake are very much in
Americas interests reducing Beijings need to resort to unfair trade practices,
while at the same time further opening its economy, increasing the role of the
market, and allowing greater opportunities for U.S. investments in sectors (such
as financial services) in which the United States is highly competitive. In addition,
putting China on a path of more sustainable, less environmentally damaging
growth increases the chances that its government will be more confident,
outward-looking, and constructive internationally. China, in turn, has a major
interest in U.S. success in getting its deficit under control, given how heavily
Beijing has invested in the health of the U.S. dollar and the American economy.
U.S.-China relations, in short, will almost certainly experience less strain if both
Beijing and Washington deal more efectively with their need to undertake
significant reforms. If each falls short, the opposite is true. Leaders on both sides
should keep this fundamental reality in mind over the coming years.
2NC/1NR Extensions
2NC/1NR ATXi has no Political

Capital
1. Xi has the political capital to get things done
Huffington Post, 2015 [What You Need To Know About Chinas

Strongman President, October 5,
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/entry/chinese-president-xi-
jinping_us_55fed862e4b08820d918f14]
Xi has quickly emerged as maybe the most powerful Chinese leader since
Mao Zedong. Chinas previous leaders largely shunned the spotlight,
portraying themselves as part of a group ruling by consensus. Xi has instead
built a huge personal brand by employing strongman tactics at home and
abroad. In China, Xi has consolidated enormous personal power through a
blistering crackdown on both corrupt officials and civil society activists. The
prosecution of powerful officials (many who happen to be Xis political rivals)
and the detention of civil rights lawyers have shocked China-watchers in their
audacity and depth. Some scholars argue that the twin crackdowns reveal
Xis vision for Chinas future: not a liberal, electoral democracy, but an
efficient authoritarian state with a strong leader at the helm.
2AC AFF Answers

China Politics Disadvantage
1. Non-unique: Xi not pushing for reforms
The Weekly Standard, 2013 [International afairs magazine, Beijings

New Slogan, July 1, http://www.weeklystandard.com/beijings-
new-slogan/article/736881]
Nonetheless, the prospects for domestic political reform are next to nil. There
is little evidence that any of the senior leaders, from Xi on down, will use their
limited political capital to push for democratization. A useful index is the
latest budget, which allocates more for domestic security than national
defense. Other problems that Hu bequeathed to Xi include a degraded
natural environment and rising ethnic tensions, with increasing numbers of
Tibetan self-immolations and Uighur riots in Xinjiang. On the regional front,
Xis references to the countrys glorious past and aspirations to return to it
will likely set the neighbors teeth on edge, no matter how much he tries to
round the hard edges of Chinese nationalism. Throughout the history of
imperial China, surrounding states, all of whose ways were believed to be
inferior to those of the Middle Kingdom, were expected to pay tribute. The
recent report claiming that Okinawa and the Ryukyu Islands were traditionally
Chinese vassals is an unpleasant echo of this pastwhile it also indirectly
challenges the United States, which has military bases on Okinawa. China has
also pushed Malaysia, the Philippines, and India on territorial issues.
2. Impact Calculus:
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3. The US and China cooperate on other issues happen

all of the time! This should have triggered the DA
Lieberthal and Jisi, 2012 [Kenneth and Wang, Senior Fellow in Foreign Policy
and in Global Economy and Development and is Director of the John L.
Thornton China Center at the Brookings Institution. Director of the Center for
International and Strategic Studies and Dean of the School of International
Studies at Peking University, Addressing U.S.-China Strategic Distrust,
March, http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/research/files/papers/2012/3/30-
us-china-lieberthal/0330_china_lieberthal.pdf]
The issue of mutual distrust of long-term intentions termed here strategic

distrusthas become a central concern in US-China relations. Vice President
Xi Jinping recognized this reality in giving this issue first place in his review of
key problems in U.S.-China relations during his major policy address in
Washington, DC on February 15, 2012. Both Beijing and Washington seek to
build a constructive partnership for the long run. U.S.-China relations are,
moreover, mature. The two sides understand well each others position on all
major issues and deal with each other extensively. The highest level leaders
meet relatively frequently, and there are more than sixty regular
government-to-government dialogues between agencies in the two
governments each year.
4. Impact Turn:
A. Reforms are political violence, hurt the economy, and
destabilizes the country
Ignatius, January 2016 [David, Writer for the Washington Post, Xis reforms may backfire on
Chinese leader, http://www.heraldnet.com/article/20160117/OPINION04/160119241]
But Xi is of to a bad new year. The Chinese economy is slowing sharply, with
actual GDP growth last year now estimated by U.S. analysts at several points
below the official rate of 6.5 percent. The Chinese stock market has fallen 15
2AC AFF Answers
1
percent this year, and the value of its currency has slipped. Capital flight
continues, probably at the $1 trillion annual rate estimated for the second
half of last year. But China's economic woes are manageable compared with
its domestic political difficulties. Xi's anti-corruption drive has
accelerated into a full-blown purge. The campaign has rocked the
Chinese intelligence service, toppled some senior military
commanders and frightened Communist Party leaders around the
country. Jittery party officials are lying low, avoiding decisions that might get
them in trouble; the resulting paralysis makes other problems worse. Xi is in
an unprecedentedly powerful position. But because he has dismantled the
tools of collective leadership that had been built up over decades, he owns
this crisis, says Kurt Campbell, who was the Obama administration's top Asia
expert until 2013. He worries that Xi will double down on his nationalistic
push for greater power in Asia, which is one of the few themes that can unite
the country. To scale back shows weakness, which Xi can ill aford now, says
Campbell. Chinese sometimes use historical parables to explain current
domestic political issues. The talk recently among some members of the
Chinese elite has been a comparison between Xi's tenure and that of
Yongzheng, the emperor who ruled China from 1722 to 1735. Yongzheng
waged a harsh campaign against bribery, but he came to be seen by many
Chinese as a despot who had gained power illegitimately. A lot of historical
events of that period are repeating in China today, from power conspiracy to
corruption, from a deteriorating economy to an external hostility threat,
comments one Chinese observer in an email. Xi's political troubles illustrate
the difficulty of trying to reform a one-party system from within. Much as
Mikhail Gorbachev hoped in the 1980s that reforms could revitalize a
decaying Soviet Communist Party, Xi began his presidency in 2013 by
attacking Chinese party barons who had grown rich and comfortable on the
spoils of China's economic boom. Many of Xi's rivals were proteges of former
President Jiang Zemin, which meant that Xi made some powerful enemies.
David Shambaugh, a China scholar at George Washington University, was an
outlier when he argued last March that Xi's reform campaign would backfire.
Despite appearances, China's political system is badly broken, and nobody
knows it better than the Communist Party itself, he wrote in The Wall Street
Journal. The endgame of Chinese communist rule has now begun. This
political obituary may prove premature. But there's growing agreement
among China analysts that Xi's crackdown has fueled dissent within the party
and beyond, leading to further repression. Xi is a decisive strongman, so he
may fare better than Gorbachev, but the structure underneath him is fragile.
China's recent economic turmoil may be an inevitable result of the transition
Xi is trying to steer. He wants to move China away from a debt-laden bubble
economy, which depended on ever-growing exports, toward a more
sustainable, consumer-driven model. His problem is that the Chinese system
is bloated by inefficient, state-owned enterprises that survive on debt and
subsidies. Xi has found it impossible, so far, to cut them loose. It's no easy
2AC AFF Answers
1
thing to reboot a $10 trillion economy, says a former American official who
knows the top Chinese leaders well. Xi is trying to do it all himself, at a time
when everything is changing at once. This month's financial rout showed
the dangers for a China caught between a truly free market and continuing
government control. An ill-conceived circuit-breaker that kicked in when the
stock market fell 7 percent, and government orders to big investors not to
sell, probably accelerated the sell-of and the flight of capital. Conflicting
signals on whether the central bank wanted a stronger or weaker currency
shook the market's confidence. Xi has been pressing the free-market
accelerator at the same time he pumps the political brake. For a
China halfway pregnant with reform, the past month's turbulence
showed that these fundamental contradictions may not be
sustainable.
B. Instability causes their impacts: All of these bad

policy decisions hurt the country and make it more
likely to collapse. If there are riots and no jobs, the
country will falter and their impacts will happen.
2AC AFF Answers
1
5. No Internal-Link: Xi does not have to use political
capitalthe communist party controls all politics
Lawrence and Martin, 2013 [Susan and Michael, specialists in Asian

Afairs, writers for Congressional Research Service,
Understanding Chinas Political System, March 20,
https://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/R41007.pdf]
The report opens with a brief overview of Chinas leading political institutions.
They include the Communist Party and its military, the Peoples Liberation
Army; the State, led by the State Council, to which the Party delegates day-
to-day administration of the country; and the National Peoples Congress
(NPC), Chinas unicameral legislature. On paper, the NPC has broad powers.
In practice, the legislature is controlled by the Communist Party and
is able to exercise little of its constitutionally mandated oversight
over the state and the judiciary. Following its 18th Congress in November
2012, the Communist Party ushered in a new Party leadership. New State and
NPC leaders took office following the opening session of the 12th NPC in
March 2013. Following the overview, this report introduces a number of
distinct features of Chinas formal political culture and discusses some of
their implications for U.S.-China relations. Those features include the fact that
China is led not by one leader, but by a committee of seven; that the military
is not a national army, but rather an armed wing of the Communist Party;
that provincial leaders are powerful players in the system; and that ideology
continues to matter in China, with the Communist Party facing vocal criticism
from its left flank each time it moves even further away from its Marxist roots.
Other themes include the role of meritocracy as a form of legitimization for
one-party rule, and ways in which meritocracy is being undermined; the
introduction of an element of predictability into elite Chinese politics through
the enforcement of term and age limits for holders of public office; the
Chinese systems penchant for long-term planning; and the systems heavy
emphasis on maintaining political stability. The next section of the report
discusses governance challenges in the Chinese political system, from stove-
piping and bureaucratic competition, to the distorting influence of
bureaucratic rank, to factionalism, corruption, and weak rule of law.
2AC AFF Answers
Taiwan Relations
Disadvantage
2AC AFF Answers
Vocabulary
Taiwan, Republic of China (ROC), Taipei: Island of the coast
of China. In the 1940s, a Chinese political party fled mainland
China and started a government there. Since then, China has
claimed Taiwan as their own country while Taiwan (generally)
wants independence.
2AC AFF Answers
1
Ma Ying-jeou (Ma Ying Joe): President of Taiwan from 2008-
2016. Generally, a pretty moderate leader of the country. He had
many policies that brought Taiwan closer to the PRC and received
heavy criticism. He was the head of the Kuomintang (KMT) party.
Kuomintang (KMT) (Co-Min-Tahng): Taiwanese political party
which influences Taiwan toward the PRC. They eventually want
Taiwan reunified with China. They just lost huge in the recent
election to the DPP.
Tsai Ing-wen (Ty eng-When): Current president of Taiwan and
their first female president. She has just become president May
20th so its hard to say exactly what she will do. However, she is a
member of the Democratic Peoples Party (DPP) so many believe
she will strongly push back against the PRC.
2AC AFF Answers
1
Democratic Peoples Party (DPP): Taiwanese political party
which wants Taiwan to remain independent from China. They just
received a huge lead in the legislature and won the presidency so
they will decide policy until the next election.
2AC AFF Answers
1
Appease: To give in usually militarily. This is connected to
political leaders who gave Hitler what he wanted in the late
1930s because they believed that would make Hitler happy and
he would stop being horrible. Instead, just like giving in to a bully,
they only made him stronger and gain more power.
Zero-Sum: Direct trade-of. There is a limited amount of
something and so when one person/group/country takes,
everyone else has less. When relationships are zero-sum that
means that when one gains, the other loses.
Terminal High Altitude Air Defense (THAAD): A missile
system that may be put in South Korea to protect them from
North Korea. The US, South Korea, and Japan like this idea
because it will better protect these countries from North Korean
weapons. China and North Korea dont like it because they feel
like this is an excuse for the US to put their military in the area.
AT=Answers To
CDL Core Files 2016-2017 Taiwan Relations Disadvantage
1NC Shell
1NC Taiwan Relations

Disadvantage
A. Uniqueness: US military position is aggressive and
containing
Krepinevich, 2015 [Andrew, President of the Center for Strategic and

Budgetary Assessments, March/April,
https://www.foreignafairs.com/articles/china/2015-02-16/how-
deter-china]
In the U.S. military, at least, the pivot to Asia has begun. By 2020, the
navy and the air force plan to base 60 percent of their forces in the
Asia-Pacific region. The Pentagon, meanwhile, is investing a growing share
of its shrinking resources in new long-range bombers and nuclear-powered
submarines designed to operate in high-threat environments. These
changes are clearly meant to check an increasingly assertive China.
And with good reason: Beijings expanding territorial claims threaten virtually
every country along what is commonly known as the first island chain,
encompassing parts of Japan, the Philippines, and Taiwanall of which
Washington is obligated to protect. But to reliably deter Chinese aggression,
the Pentagon will have to go even further. Emerging Chinese capabilities are
intended to blunt Washingtons ability to provide military support to its allies
and partners. Although deterrence through the prospect of punishment, in
the form of air strikes and naval blockades, has a role to play in discouraging
Chinese adventurism, Washingtons goal, and that of its allies and partners,
should be to achieve deterrence through denialto convince Beijing that it
simply cannot achieve its objectives with force. Leveraging the latent
potential of U.S., allied, and partner ground forces, Washington can best
achieve this objective by establishing a series of linked defenses along the
first island chainan Archipelagic Defenseand, in so doing, deny Beijing
the ability to achieve its revisionist aims through aggression or coercion.
B. Link and Internal-Link: US-China cooperation makes

Taiwan more vulnerable and leads to war
Brookings Institution, 2010 [Chinas Growing Strength, Taiwan's

Diminishing Options,
1NC Shell
1
http://www.brookings.edu/research/papers/2010/11/china-taiwan-
wang]
The shifting cross-Strait military balance in Chinas favor has

negative consequences for Taiwans security. First, though unlikely at
present, should Beijing decide to use military coercion in the future, Taiwan
could be forced to sacrifice its interests and accommodate Beijing's demands.
Second, China's increased anti-access and area-denial capabilities could
delay or frustrate U.S. attempts to support Taiwan in case of conflict, raising
the costs of U.S. intervention. Taiwan's heightened sense of vulnerability and
the increased uncertainty of U.S. support have the efect of reducing the
islands bargaining power with the mainland. In addition, China's overall
military rise might lead Taiwans allies to question the necessity of support.
For instance, U.S. Senator Arlen Specter, describing Taiwan as an irritant to
mainland China, suggested that Washington should revise its arms sale
policy to Taiwan because even a reasonable increase in armaments sold to
Taiwan would not be sufficient to stem the tide if China decided to invade
the island.[4] The rising difficulty of defending against a mainland attack is
likely to raise doubt about the utility of coming to Taiwan's defense.
Compounding the problem is the decline in Taiwans defense budget as a
percentage of GDP over the years, leading some analysts to question
Taiwan's determination to defend itself. A reassessment of U.S. arms sales to
Taiwan, however, would have tremendous implications for Taiwans security.
Over the decades, U.S. support has been the indispensible factor for the
survival of the island. The U.S.-ROC Mutual Defense Treaty, in efect from
1954 to 1980, provided an alliance that guaranteed Taiwans security. U.S.-
Taiwan security relations continued after Washington switched diplomatic
recognition to Beijing, and sustained arms sales to Taiwan helped strengthen
the island's defense. The Taiwan Relations Act, enacted by U.S. Congress in
1979, stipulates that the United States will make available to Taiwan such
defense articles and defense services in such quantity as may be necessary
to enable Taiwan to maintain a sufficient self-defense capability. The arms
sales, in addition to strengthening Taiwans defense, also indicate the level of
political support from Washington. Beijing sought to restrict U.S. arms sale to
Taiwan in the August 17, 1982 Communiqu. But before he formally agreed to
the communiqu, President Reagan secretly sent an envoy to deliver what
became known as the Six Assurances to Taipei affirming that Washington
would not set a date for ending arms sales to Taiwan.[5] The pledge not to
set a termination date, however, may be meaningless if Washington does not
sell Taiwan the equipment that it needs.
1NC Shell
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C. China-Taiwan conflict becomes nuclear WWIII
White, 2015 [Hugh, professor of strategic studies at the Australian

National University in Canberra, Would America Risk a Nuclear
War with China over Taiwan?, May 5,
http://nationalinterest.org/blog/the-buzz/would-america-risk-
nuclear-war-china-over-taiwan-12808]
Things are diferent today. China's economy is now so big and so central to
global trade and capital flows that the consequences of any disruption would
be just as serious for America as for China. Militarily, America can no longer
expect a swift and certain victory in a war over Taiwan. China's anti-
access/area-denial capabilities would preclude direct US intervention unless
those capabilities had first been degraded by a sustained and wide-ranging
strike campaign against Chinese bases and forces. China would very likely
respond to such a campaign with attacks on US and allied bases throughout
Asia. The US has no evident means to cap the resulting escalation
spiral, and no one could be sure it would stop below the nuclear
threshold. The possibility of nuclear attacks on US cities would have to be
considered These new realities of power mean that today a US-China conflict
would impose equal risks and costs on both sides. And where costs and risks
are equal, the advantage lies with those who have more at stake, and hence
greater resolve. China's leaders today seem to think they hold this
advantage, and they are probably right. It is therefore a big mistake to keep
assuming, as many people seem to do, that China would be sure to back of
before a crisis over Taiwan became a conflict.
2NC/1NR Extensions
2NC/1NR AT #1China Taiwan War

Now
They say China Taiwan war coming now, but
1. Extend our Krepinevich evidence.

Its much better than their Schreer evidence because:
facts)
to be true)
(Its predictive/talks about the future) (their evidence supports our
argument)

Our evidence talks about the future of the US, China, and Taiwan
relationship, especially in terms of the military. It says that the US
will based 60% of its troops by 2020. Also, our evidence assumes
that there will be disagreements, but military strength will check
China and assure Taiwan.

This matters because: the status quo is safe now. If we do not do the
plan, then now war will erupt killing millions.
2 China-Taiwan relations high now

2NC/1NR Extensions
1
Brookings Institution, 2010 [International afairs journal, Chinas
Growing Strength, Taiwan's Diminishing Options,
wang]
The Taiwan Strait, often considered one of the most dangerous flashpoints in
international politics, appears stable at present . The last crisis took place
some fifteen years ago in 1995-96, when China launched missiles which
landed of Taiwan's coast in an attempt to intimidate politicians and voters
and sway the islands presidential election. Cross-strait relations have
improved significantly since President Ma Ying-jeou took office in 2008. The
two sides have signed a series of agreements on direct flights, financial
cooperation, crime fighting, tourism promotion, and reduction of trade
barriers. People-to-people contacts have intensified and economic links have
strengthened. Beijing ceased to actively oppose Taiwans participation in
some international organizations that do not require statehood for
membership, such as the World Health Assembly. The infamous checkbook
diplomacy in which each side tried to outbid the other in stealing diplomatic
partners has been put on hold, replaced by a tacit diplomatic truce. In
Beijing, the Hu Jintao leadership has shown remarkable skill in dealing with
Taiwan. Hu and other Chinese officials seemed to realize that the hardball
tactics and harsh rhetoric of the past had driven Taiwan further away from
China. To remedy this, they embarked upon a hearts and minds strategy
aiming to win over Taiwan's voters. The focus of this new strategy was on
preventing Taiwan from drifting toward independence. Beijing muted the
unpopular one country, two systems formula for unification and avoided
reminding Taiwan that the use of force to deter independence or compel
unification was still an option. To bring the island closer, Chinese leaders
promised the benefits of closer economic, cultural, educational, and other ties
for the Taiwanese people. For instance, Beijing opened the mainland market
to agricultural products from southern Taiwan, an area traditionally unfriendly
toward China; mainland universities meted out preferential treatment to
Taiwanese students; academic scholars from both sides regularly held joint
conferences; Taiwanese businesses received low-cost loans for investing on
the mainland; daily direct cross-Strait flights helped revitalize Taiwans ailing
airline industry and airports; and the influx of mainland tourists provided
tangible gains to Taiwan's domestic economy.
3 US military presence contains China and North Korea

2NC/1NR Extensions
1
Hao, April 2016 [Su, director of the Center for Strategic and Peace
studies, China Foreign Afairs University, and president of Beijing
Geopolitical Strategy and Development Association, Six-Party
Talks most rational choice to solve Pyongyang nuclear
conundrum, April 4,
http://www.globaltimes.cn/content/977138.shtml]
It's true that conditions and timing to restart the talks are still immature. The
planned US deployment of the THAAD missile defense system despite firm
opposition from China and Russia further complicates the North Korean
nuclear conundrum. Washington has its own strategic calculations. Taking
North Korea's provocations including nuclear tests and satellite launch as
pretexts, Washington is aimed at strengthening its military presence on the
Korean Peninsula and consolidating its military alliances in Northeast Asia.
The US is advancing its "rebalancing to the Asia Pacific" strategy with the
explicit strategic purposes of forming a military system combining defensive
and ofensive operations in the West Pacific region, especially in East Asia.
Despite being a US military ally, South Korea hasn't been fully integrated into
this potential system. Therefore, Washington needs to sustain Seoul's reliance
on the US by manipulating external pressures and draw the country into its
military system. Due to China's opposition, the US and South Korea had
misgivings about openly discussing the deployment of the THAAD system in
the past. But now, North Korea's nuclear activities ofer them an excuse,
creating conditions for the US to advance its military deployment in Northeast
Asia. North Korea's recent acts are ostensibly directed against the US;
however, they to some extent tally with the US military strategic demands,
helping the US get the efects it wants. The US wants to maintain its
dominant position in the Asia-Pacific region, which poses great
challenges to China and Russia. The nuclear ambitions of Pyongyang
directly threaten the security of the two countries. Yet a graver challenge is
that the US is taking the chance to constitute a pan-Pacific military system
and build strategic superiority to press Russia and China.
2NC/1NR Extensions
1
4 Military containment is working

The United States, Japan, and (to a lesser extent) South Korea have deployed
ballistic missile defense (BMD) systems to protect their territory and military
forces from the threat of North Korean attacks. During the 2009 and 2012
North Korean long-range missile tests, U.S. and allied forces reportedly made
ready and available a number of BMD systems, in addition to the intelligence
gathering capabilities sent into the region. Japan deployed Patriot interceptor
batteries around Tokyo and on its southwestern islands, in the event of an
errant missile or debris headed toward Japanese territory.57 Aegis BMD ships
deployed to the area as well. In response to the heightened tensions in spring
2013, the U.S. military accelerated deployment of a ground-based Terminal
High Altitude Air Defense (THAAD) BMD system to Guam, two years ahead of
schedule. As part of the eforts by the United States and its allies to change
Chinas strategic thinking about North Korea, the BMD deployments may
have an impact. Chinese media made the Patriot deployments a major part of
their coverage of the April 2012 launch.58 A subtext to those reports was that
North Koreas actions are feeding military developments in Asia that are not
in Chinas interests. Many observers, particularly in the United States and
Japan, argue that continued North Korean ballistic missile development
increases the need to bolster regional BMD capabilities and cooperation. For
more information, see CRS Report R43116, Ballistic Missile Defense in the
Asia-Pacific Region: Cooperation and Opposition, by Ian E. Rinehart, Steven A.
Hildreth, and Susan V. Lawrence.
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2NC/1NR AT #3Diplomacy Solves

War
They say Diplomacy solves war, but

facts)
to be true)
their argument)

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2. [INSERT 1-3 LINKS SPECIFIC TO THE AFF DEPENDING ON
IF ITS DIPLOMATIC OR ECONOMIC ENGAGEMENT]
2NC/1NR Extensions
2NC/1NR AT #4No Link/No Trade

Off
They say Increased cooperation with China will not upset Taiwan, but
1. Extend our Brookings evidence.

Its much better than their Global Ethics Network evidence
NAME]
more facts)
to be true)
their argument)
(More realistic) (their evidence supports our argument)

Our Brookings evidence talks about how China will use US diplomatic
and economic ties to hurt Taiwan. It will use that relationship as
blackmail so the US wont protect Taiwan. Also, Taiwan will fear that
the US will not protect it and build up its military. Its unrealistic to
argue that cooperation between your largest ally and largest enemy
would not make Taiwan uneasy.
This matters because: if we win the link, then we also access the
impact. The large war scenario would be horrible and outweigh the
aff.
2NC/1NR Extensions
1
2. [INSERT 1-3 LINKS SPECIFIC TO THE AFF DEPENDING ON
IF ITS DIPLOMATIC OR ECONOMIC ENGAGEMENT OR
CROSS APPLY FROM THE OTHER LINK DEBATE]
2NC/1NR Extensions
2NC/1NR AT #5No Brink

They say theres no brink because the US and China meet all the
time, but
1. Extend our Brookings evidence.

Its much better than their Analytic evidence because:
facts)

While the US and China meet all the time, they dont usually come to
an agreement. The plan is especially a large agreement bringing the
US and China closer than ever as shown by the 1ac. This means that
Taiwan and China would react more strongly than previous lunch
meetings.

This matters because: we have won the direction of link. They cause
a China-Taiwan freak out that results in conflict and war.
2NC/1NR Extensions
1
2 Taiwan must keep the US close diplomatically
otherwise China will attack
Brookings Institution, 2010 [International afairs journal, Chinas

Growing Strength, Taiwan's Diminishing Options, November,
wang]
Implications for Taiwan-U.S. relations Recently, China has struck a more

assertive tone in its foreign policy. The call to replace the dollar as the
international reserve currency, Chinese resistance to a tougher climate
change accord in Copenhagen, the reassertion of Chinese sovereignty in the
South China Sea, and the hardball tactics against Japan in the East China Sea
are all indications of an increasingly assertive China on the world stage. China
had kept a low profile when it needed a stable international environment to
accumulate economic and military power. Now, with the world's second
largest economy and increased military capabilities, China is in a better
position to pursue its foreign policy interests. Chinas growing military,
economic, and political capabilities make it ever more important for
Taiwan to strengthen its relations with the United States. As the
weaker power in cross-Strait relations, it makes good strategic
sense for Taiwan to have the support of Washington in case Beijing
changes its intentions. In truth, Taiwan cannot rest its security on the
goodwill of China. Taiwan needs allies. To deter China and to preserve
Taiwans political autonomy and survival, Taiwan must strengthen its self-
defense capabilities. In the midst of cross-Strait dialogues, Taiwan should
negotiate from a position of strength rather than from a position of weakness.
With strengthened defense capabilities, Taiwan would more likely get
favorable terms in cross-Strait negotiations and not be forced to
accommodate Beijings demands. In early 2010, the Obama administration
authorized a $6.4 billion arms sale to Taiwan. As the cross-Strait military
balance continues to shift in Beijing's favor, the arms sale can help Taiwan
beef up its defense and boost confidence on the island. There is still room for
growth in Taiwan-U.S. military exchanges and defense cooperation. Building
strong military to military ties with the United States is the best hedge
against a change in Chinese intentions in the future.
2NC/1NR Extensions
2NC/1NR AT #6No Impact

They say __________________________________________________, but

facts)
to be true)
their argument)

______________________________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________________________
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2NC/1NR Extensions
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2 China-Taiwan war goes nuclear
White, 2015 [Hugh, professor of strategic studies at the Australian National

University in Canberra, April 15, http://www.straitstimes.com/opinion/the-
harsh-reality-that-taiwan-faces]
Then late last year, Mr Ma's policy of ever-closer economic relations sufered
further repudiation by voters in a crucial round of municipal elections. It is
now widely expected that when Mr Ma's term as president ends next year, he
will be replaced by a new leader who will be less accommodating to Beijing.
While few expect that any future leader from either the Kuomintang or the
Democratic Progressive Party will return to policies as provocative to China as
those of Mr Lee or Mr Chen, the new leader will almost certainly be more
assertive than Mr Ma has been. That naturally alarms Beijing, and there is a
risk that it will respond by taking a tougher line, looking for new ways to
pressure Taipei into accepting the mainland's authority. China's new
leadership under President Xi Jinping seems increasingly impatient to resolve
what it sees as the last vestige of China's centuries of humiliation and
increasingly confident of its growing power to act with impunity. Already
there are signs that its stance on Taiwan is hardening. That, in turn,
poses a huge potential problem to the rest of the region and especially to
Washington. The US has always declared its commitment to support Taiwan if
China tries to compel reunification. The credibility of this commitment has
now grown even more important because it is seen as a crucial test of
America's ability to preserve the old US-led order in Asia in the face of China's
relentless push for a bigger role. But the stark reality is that these days, there
is not much the US can realistically do to help Taipei stand up to serious
pressure from Beijing. Back in 1996 when they last went toe-to-toe over
Taiwan, the US could simply send a couple of aircraft carriers into the area to
force China to back of. Today the balance of power is vastly diferent: China
can sink the carriers, and their economies are so intertwined that trade
sanctions of the kind the US used against Russia recently are simply
unthinkable. This reality does not yet seem to have been understood in
Taiwan. The overwhelming desire on the island is to preserve its democracy
and avoid reunification by preserving the status quo. But it understands that
China's patience is not inexhaustible - eventually China wants to get Taiwan
back. Taiwan also understands that it cannot stand up to the mainland by
itself, but it hopes that by slowly expanding its international status and profile
within the status quo - without seeking independence - it can build support
among regional countries as well as from the US, which will help it resist
Beijing's ambitions for eventual reunification. Alas, this seems an illusion.
There is a real danger that the Taiwanese overestimate the international
support they can rely on if Beijing decides to get tough. No one visiting Taipei
2NC/1NR Extensions
1
can fail to be impressed by what the Taiwanese have achieved in recent
decades, not just economically but also politically, socially and culturally. But
the harsh reality is that no country is going to sacrifice its relations with China
in order to help Taiwan preserve the status quo. China is simply too important
economically, and too powerful militarily, for anyone to confront it on
Taiwan's behalf, especially when everyone knows how determined China is to
achieve reunification eventually. Even more worryingly, this reality does not
yet seem to have sunk in in Washington, where leaders still talk boldly about
their willingness to stand by Taiwan without seriously considering what that
might mean in practice. Any US effort to support Taiwan militarily
against China would be almost certain to escalate into a full-scale
US-China war and quite possibly a nuclear exchange. That would be a
disaster for everyone, including, of course, the people of Taiwan itself - far
worse than reunification, in fact.
3 Historically, diplomacy and economic ties are not

enough to prevent war
Newsham, 2014 [Grant, Senior Research Fellow at the Japan Forum for
Strategic Studies., China, America and the "Appeasement" Question,
September 8, http://nationalinterest.org/blog/the-buzz/china-america-the-
appeasement-question-11226?page=2]
In February 2014, Philippine President Benigno Aquino warned that failure to

challenge the Peoples Republic of Chinas (PRC) territorial seizures in the
South China Sea would be repeating the 1930s era appeasement of Hitlers
Germany. The Chinese were predictably outraged while the rest of the world
mostly ignored President Aquino. Appeasement is still a dirty word. But in
the 1930s, until the Nazis invaded Poland in September, 1939, European
and American elites considered appeasement to be a sophisticated, nuanced
approach to dealing with increasingly powerful authoritarian regimes. To
these elites, appeasement was more than simply disarming and letting
unpleasant people have their way. Appeasement actually had a coherent
logic. The elites believed that aggressive, authoritarian regimes act the way
they do out of fear, insecurity, and at least partly legitimate grievances
such as German resentment of the harsh Treaty of Versailles. Understand and
address these issue, remove their fears, and the regimes will become less
aggressive and transform into responsible members of the international
community and operate under international norms. Or so the elites argued.
Challenging these regimes could dangerously isolate them and even
needlessly provoke them into miscalculations. The elites thought
engagement and transparency were beneficial in their own right, as only
good things could come from familiarity with one another. In the 1930s, the
2NC/1NR Extensions
1
major Western powers all attended each others war games. The US Marine
Corps even took the German World War I fighter ace, Ernst Udet on a ride in a
USMC dive bomber. This engagement and transparency did not make the
Nazis nicer, but perhaps gave them some ideas about dive bombing and
Blitzkreig. Even the Soviets and Germans had close ties with joint training,
military technology development, and raw material shipments to Germany.
There was also extensive political and diplomatic interaction. Close economic
ties were believed to be a further hedge against conflict breaking out, and
companies such as Ford, IBM, and many others did profitable business in
Germany. The elites believed anything was better than war. Preserving peace,
even if sacrificing principles and certain small nations was considered wise
and statesmanlike. People who criticized appeasement policy in the 1930s,
most notably Winston Churchill, were ridiculed as dolts and war mongers. We
know how this turned out.
Specific Links
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Specific Links
2NC/1NR Diplomacy Links

1. China uses diplomatic relations to isolate Taiwan
Brookings Institution, 2010 [International afairs journal, Chinas Growing

Strength, Taiwan's Diminishing Options, November,
http://www.brookings.edu/research/papers/2010/11/china-taiwan-wang]
Increased diplomatic leverage As a rising great power, China enjoys

considerable diplomatic leverage in the world and is sought after as a partner
in conflict management, climate change mitigation, economic cooperation,
and other world afairs. On the Korean peninsula, China, the largest supplier
of North Korea's energy, was the host and a crucial actor in the Six-Party Talks
attempting to denuclearize the country. In the Middle East, China is a key
player in the international efort to monitor and to impose sanctions on Iran
for its nuclear program. China is now an active participant in the G-20 summit
meetings of leading economies. In the 2009 Copenhagen summit on global
climate change, China illustrated how it can use its clout to counter initiatives
of the U.S. and other countries as it helped derail a tougher accord to limit
greenhouse gas emissions. On the Taiwan issue, Beijing has successfully
made most countries accept, recognize, or acknowledge its one-China
position. Today only 23 out of the 194 countries in the world recognize the
Republic of China on Taiwan. China is a permanent member of the UN
Security Council and in the past Beijing has used its veto power to block, or
threaten to block, UN peacekeeping operations in Haiti (1996), Guatemala
(1997), and Macedonia (1999), ostensibly because of their diplomatic
relations with Taiwan (Macedonia severed diplomatic ties with Taipei in 2000).
Pressures and threats from Beijing force many countries not to have
official contact with Taiwan and to oppose the islands participation
in international institutions. At one point, European officials commented
that they would welcome Taiwan's participation in international organizations
once Beijing dropped its opposition.[6] This international deference to
Beijing's position on cross-strait issues reflects the power asymmetry
between China and Taiwan: in most cases, the benefits of deferring to
Beijing far outweigh the costs of shunning Taiwan. As a result, there is
a high correlation between Chinese acquiescence and Taiwans
international space. When the DPP was in power from 2000 to 2008,
disagreement over the One China position prevented both sides from
negotiating, and China blocked Taiwans international activities. When the
KMT came to power in 2008, the spirit of the 1992 Consensus allowed
China and Taiwan to resume dialogue, based on the tacit understanding that
neither side would publicly challenge the others interpretation of what One
Specific Links
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China means. To maintain the momentum of reconciliation, Beijing relaxed
its opposition to Taiwans participation in some international organizations
that do not require statehood for membership. The risk for Taiwan, however,
is that because of the cross-Strait power asymmetry, Beijing can easily take
back what it gives out. Intentions can change.
Specific Links
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2. Diplomatic Engagement emboldens Chinas military
Newsham, 2014 [Grant, Senior Research Fellow at the Japan Forum for
Strategic Studies., China, America and the "Appeasement" Question,
September 8, http://nationalinterest.org/blog/the-buzz/china-america-the-
appeasement-question-11226?page=2]
US policy towards China over the last 30 years, and particularly in recent
times, seems familiar. The United States does its best to understand the
PRCs concerns and its resentments going back to the Opium Wars and the
century of humiliation, to accommodate these resentments, and to ensure
China does not feel threatened. Defense and State Department officials
enthusiastically seek greater transparency and openness especially in the
military realm as such openness is perceived as inherently good. In return,
the PRC is expected to change, to show more respect for human rights and
international law and to become a responsible stakeholder in the
international community. We now have several decades of empirical evidence
to assess this concessionary approach. It has not resulted in improved, less
aggressive PRC behavior in the South China Sea or the East China Sea, or
even in outer space. Indeed, it seems to have encouraged Chinese
assertiveness as manifest in threatening language and behavior
towards its neighbors. Nor has the PRC regime shown more respect for
human rights, rule of law, consensual government or freedom of expression
for its citizens. Serial intellectual property theft continues unabated, as does
support for unsavory dictators. Nonetheless, we invite the PRC to military
exercises and repeat the engagement mantra expecting that one day
things will magically improve. Some argue that letting the PRC see US
military power will dissuade it from challenging us. Perhaps, but we are just
as likely to be seen as nave or weak. From the Chinese perspective, there is
no reason to change since they have done very well without transforming and
the PRC has never been stronger. Indeed, the PRC frequently claims that
human rights, democracy, and the like are outmoded Western values having
nothing to do with China. This is also demoralizing our allies, who at some
point may wonder if they should cut their own deals with the PRC. Some
revisionist historians argue that Neville Chamberlains 1930s era
appeasement was in fact a wise stratagem to buy time to rearm. This
overlooks that even as late as 1939 when Hitler seized all of Czechoslovakia,
the Western democracies still had the military advantage. One can appease
oneself into a corner. And the beneficiary of the appeasement usually
strengthens to the point it is too hard to restrain without great sacrifice. One
worries that the Chinese seizure of Philippine territory at Scarborough Shoal
in 2012 and the US Governments unwillingness to even verbally challenge
the PRC - might turn out to be this generations Rhineland. Had the West
Specific Links
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resisted Hitler in 1936 when he made this first major demand, there
would have been no World War II, no Holocaust, and no Cold War.
Our choice about how to deal with the PRC is not simply between
either appeasement or treating China as an enemy. Our policy must
accommodate options ranging from engagement to forceful confrontation.
Who would not be delighted with a China that stopped threatening its
neighbors and followed the civilized worlds rules? While ensuring we and our
allies have a resolute defense both in terms of military capability and the
willingness to employ it it is important to maintain ties and dialogue with
the PRC and to provide encouragement and support when it shows clear signs
of transforming to a freer, less repressive society.
3. Diplomacy provides no benefits on Taiwan and only

appeases China
Roy, 2014 [Denny, Writer for The Diplomat and Senior Fellow at the
East-West Center, Taiwan: A Status Upgrade Is Now Afordable,
October 3, http://thediplomat.com/2014/10/taiwan-a-status-
upgrade-is-now-afordable/
In order to establish and maintain a constructive relationship with the

Peoples Republic of China beginning in 1979, it was necessary for
Washington to sever official diplomatic relations with Taipei. In accordance
with Beijings demand, the U.S. government does not officially recognize
Taiwan as an independent country and denies Taiwan some of the main
symbols of statehood. Although unfair to Taiwan, this is a necessary part of
the U.S. deal with China. In some instances, however, Washington has taken
this policy too far. It is not necessary to proscribe every prospective
connection with Taiwan simply because Beijing might interpret it as implying
statehood. While it is advisable to avoid gratuitously antagonizing the PRC
where possible, overindulging Chinese sensitivities will never be a sound
basis for U.S. policymaking. It is enough that Washington has accommodated
the Chinese on several large issues involving Taiwan, such as the one China
policy. China should not have veto power over every aspect of U.S.-Taiwan
relations. One wonders if U.S. policy has tried too hard to please
Beijing, with the cost paid by Taiwans people not only in the
countless indignities of not being treated as a real country, but also
in economic opportunities, health, safety, and military security. If
these restrictions have bought goodwill from China, that is not apparent in
current U.S.-China relations. After decades of U.S. attempts to minimize
hurting the feelings of the Chinese Communist Party leadership, here is where
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we find ourselves today. The Chinese president publicly calls for an end to
U.S. military alliances and the start of a new arrangement in which Asia
manages its own security. Beijing shelters rogue state North Korea from
international pressure because China prefers a nuclear DPRK to a collapse of
that odious regime. China makes an expansive and illegal claim over most of
the South China Sea and attempts to enforce it by ramming, detaining and
sabotaging foreign vessels. The Chinese government demands that Japan
recognize Chinas claim over the disputed Senkaku Islands and increases
tensions by flooding the area with ships and aircraft, while simultaneously
Beijing ignores Vietnams claim over the Paracel Islands, which the Chinese
seized by military force. Despite overwhelming evidence to the contrary, the
Chinese government denies complicity in a massive cyber theft campaign
that goes beyond strategic intelligence gathering to include industrial
espionage. Finally, China continues to insist that Taiwan must submit to rule
by the authoritarian government in Beijing, regardless of the will of the
people of Taiwan, and backs up that insistence with a standing threat to
unleash war. Clearly, despite U.S. attempts to not treat China as an
adversary, China is in important ways behaving as an adversary anyway.
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4. Diplomatic and military concessions only make China
stronger
Forbes, February 2016 [Sanction China For Its Support Of North

Korea...And So Much More, February 13,
http://www.forbes.com/sites/anderscorr/2016/02/13/sanction-
china-for-its-support-of-north-korea-and-so-much-
more/#45c625fd316a]
Its time to stop excusing Chinas aggression (including against its own
people, and those of North Korea) with yet more diplomacy and talk. A dual
strategy of military and economic sanctions that impose real costs on not
only North Korea, but also its sponsor China, will work if we have the political
will. These costs should continue until the end of: 1) North Koreas nuclear
program, 2) Chinas cyber-attacks on the U.S., and 3) Chinas territorial
destabilization of Asia. Anything less threatens quickened nuclear
proliferation in Asia and continued weakening of the U.S. in the Pacific and
generally. Intercontinental ballistic missile technology, and terrorists seeking
weapons of mass destruction, mean nuclearization of Asia threatens the
entire world, including cities in North America and Europe. China doesnt care
whether North American or European cities get destroyed by terrorists. China
might lose some markets in the U.S. as a result, but the absence of the U.S.
could help China expand its military and diplomatic influence, and global
market share. We are at an inflection point in history. Do we allow dictators
like Xi Jinping of China and Kim Jong Un of North Korea to unilaterally promote
territorial and nuclear destabilization, and thereby incent neighbors to go
nuclear as well? Should we accept the attendant dangers to urban areas
around the world, and our global ecosystem? Or, do we bite the bullet and
put a stop to it? If we want to stop nuclear proliferation, we need to take
tough action, including against the sponsors of proliferation and dictatorship,
like China. The good news is that the military pivot to Asia is happening. U.S.
troops have mostly pulled out of Iraq and Afghanistan, and troops, hardware,
and new military development are reorienting to protect democracies from
China. The U.S. and South Korea have already quickened talks on putting
advanced Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) anti-missile defense
systems on the peninsula. This is a logical military cost the U.S. and South
Korea can impose on China and North Korea for their irresponsible missile
launches. A South Korean THAAD deployment can be integrated into existing
systems in Japan and on U.S. naval ships to plug holes in our defense. Those
holes could be traversed by a Chinese or North Korean ballistic missile on its
way to Los Angeles, Chicago, or New York. North Korea, Russia and China will
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complain about a THAAD deployment, but they have no leg to stand on for
threatening us in the first place, and any additional threats will be nothing but
baseless cheap talk. Deployment of THAAD demonstrates our lack of fear in
the face of their threats, and shows that we will match their moves. We must
defend ourselves to retain ground, by at the very least matching the
military pressure emanating from China and its allies, Russia and
North Korea. Demonstration of military force is essential to stop Chinas
threat, but Chinas main pressure point is its massive $10 trillion gross
domestic product second only to the U.S. economy of $17 trillion. Chinas
economy depends on about $3.8 trillion of annual exports and imports, much
of which is with developed democracies and therefore vulnerable to
sanctions. China knows this, and has been trying to convert its trade from
dollars to renminbi, and to create new international bank transfer systems
that dont rely on the U.S. or E.U. They havent fully succeeded yet. Most of
Chinas non Hong Kong international trade is still in dollars. Money will still
move China. Economic sanctions are justified, and we have a window of
opportunity in which they will still work.
Specific Links
2NC/1NR Economic Links

1. Economic engagement is zero-sum: Chinas economy
becomes stronger and Taiwans becomes weaker
this causes military expansion by China
Brookings Institution, 2010 [Chinas Growing Strength, Taiwan's Diminishing Options,

http://www.brookings.edu/research/papers/2010/11/china-taiwan-wang]
Rising economic might In 2010, China officially surpassed Japan as the world's second
largest economy, after the United States. China has become the largest trading
partner of many countries in the world; in South Korea, trade with China is larger than
the country's trade with Japan and the United States combined. China is now ASEANs
largest trading partner, bolstered by a free trade agreement. Chinese investments in
Africa, Latin America and other parts of the world are gradually changing the
international landscape. The Chinese model of developmenteconomic liberalization
with tight political controlhas a certain appeal to autocrats of the world, as it
provides an alternative to the Western model. The size of the Chinese economy has
made it one of the key economic locomotives in the world. China quickly emerged
from the economic slump following the 2008 global financial crisis, growing at 8.7
percent in 2009, and played a pivotal role in pulling the world economy out of the
recession. As Taiwans economy faced rising employment and sluggish growth in
much of the first decade of the 21st century, the economic opportunity presented by
China had a magnet efect on the island. Taiwanese businesses have invested heavily
in China, and more than half a million Taiwanese people now live there permanently.
Nonetheless, as East Asian countries pursued free trade agreements with
each other, there were concerns that Taiwan risked being marginalized in
the movement toward the region's economic integration. The China-ASEAN
Free Trade Agreement, which went into efect on January 1, 2010, expedited Taiwan's
decision to negotiate the Economic Cooperation Framework Agreement (ECFA) with
China. For its part, Beijing hoped to use the lure of economic benefits to tie
the island closer to the mainland. In the agreement signed on June 29, 2010 in
the Chinese city of Chongqing, the early harvest list of tarif concessions covered
539 Taiwanese products, valued at $13.8 billion, and 267 mainland Chinese products,
valued at $2.9 billion. Taipei hopes that the ECFA will help Taiwan negotiate free trade
agreements with other countries. Of late, Singapore has shown interest in such an
agreement. Beijings strategy for engaging Taiwans leaders is to start with the
supposedly easier area of economic issues, hoping that the benefits of economic
integration will lead to political negotiation on the future status of Taiwan. The
dynamics of Taiwans domestic politics, however, complicates the matter. The
opposition Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) views the ECFA with suspicion,
worrying that the trade deal will push Taiwan into China's orbit and make the island
vulnerable to economic coercion. The ruling KMT party, on the other hand, argues
that the ECFA will help revitalize Taiwan's sluggish economy and avoid being
marginalized in the economic activities of East Asia. The dynamics of Blue and
Green politics will likely create gridlock and constrain any movement toward cross-
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Strait political talks. Today, no leader in Taiwan can start political negotiations with
China without first forming a consensus among the Taiwanese voters. Chinas rising
economic capabilities also give Beijing extra leverage in its dealings with other
countries, though it is not always used wisely. The recent fracas over the
Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands, where a Chinese fishing trawler collided with a Japanese
patrol boat, is a case in point. Beijing reacted angrily to the arrest of the Chinese
captain, issuing a series of official denunciations. More importantly, China suspended
shipment of rare earth minerals to Japan. Even when the Japanese government
appeared to back down and released the captain, Beijing upped the ante by
demanding an apology. Beijings hard-line tactics sent shockwaves throughout the
region, prompting a rethinking of China's role in Asia.
AFF 2AC Answers

Taiwan Relations
Disadvantage
1. Non-Unique: China-Taiwan War coming nowmilitary
presence encourages conflict
Schreer , March 2016 [Ben, Senior Analyst for defence strategy at the Australian Strategic Policy
Institute, with Sheryn Lee, Time to Start Worrying Again? Cross-Strait Stability after the 2016 Taiwanese
Elections, March 22, http://www.isn.ethz.ch/Digital-Library/Articles/Detail/?lng=en&id=196375
Yet, many voters had also become concerned about greater dependence on
mainland China and the associated dangers to Taiwans democracy. Misgivings
over President Mas China-friendly policies had led to mass protests by students
and civil activists (the Sunflower Movement) in March and April 2014 after the
KMT tried to pass the Cross-Strait Service Trade Agreement. The KMTs disregard
for public opposition to getting too close to China led to its biggest electoral
defeat since 1949 in the November 2014 local nine-in-one elections, when the
DPP managed to win 13 of the 22 cities and counties, while the KMT dropped
from 15 to 6. Moreover, the DPP secured 47.6% of the popular vote and the KMT
only 40.7%. As a result, President Ma had to resign as chairman of the KMT and
the party didnt recover in time before the presidential elections. In this context,
the 2016 election provided an opportunity for many voters to reassert their
distinct Taiwanese identity and reinforce the democratic political system. Indeed,
long-term socio-political trends demonstrate that a wide majority of citizens now
identify as solely Taiwanese and that theres hardly any support for reunification
with China.4 Moreover, the incompatibility between the political systems across
the Taiwan Strait has grown. The 2016 election was the third peaceful transfer of
power in Taiwan and a reaffirmation of the vitality of its democratic system. Not
only did Taiwan elect a female president for the first time, but 38.1% of its
legislators will be women, ranking the Republic of China (ROC) 10th in the world
on the issue of female parliamentary participation. The 2016 election therefore
reflects a fundamental shift in Taiwanese political attitudes and goes beyond
mere dissatisfaction with President Mas pro-China policies. The result was
consistent with a generational shift among Taiwanese voters who have little or no
cultural affinity for the mainland.5 This shift is likely to change the balance
of power within Taiwan and will make it very difficult for any future
party to advocate policies seen as too China-friendly and as undermining
Taiwans identity and democracy. It also means that Chinas goal of peaceful
unification on its terms (that is, the reintegration of the renegade province)
AFF 2AC Answers
1
becomes a very distant prospect. Since Chinas strategy rests on the expectation
that Taiwan must become part of the mainland, the election outcome could
contribute to renewed tensions across the strait. A return to instability? While the
2016 election introduces a new dynamic in cross-strait relations, its too early to
predict how things will evolve. A case can be made that despite the DPPs victory
the relationship between the ROC and the Peoples Republic of China (PRC) will
remain manageable and stable. Theres some evidence that the President-elect
will seek a pragmatic course that refrains from steps consistent with a move
towards a declaration of independence, such as the development of a new
Taiwanese constitution. During her election campaign, Tsai promised a
consistent, predictable, and sustainable cross-strait relationship, a pledge she
repeated in her victory speech. She also emphasised that both sides of the strait
have a responsibility to find mutually acceptable means of interaction that are
based on dignity and reciprocity. We must ensure that no provocations or
accidents take place.6 Tsai has very good reasons to maintain the status quo
across the strait. The mainland is Taiwans most important trading partner, and
most of its outbound foreign direct investment flows to China. Given its
struggling economy, Taipei needs stable relations with Beijing. Moreover, Tsai
very likely remembers that during the previous DPP government of President
Chen Shui-bian (20002008) his pro-independence rhetoric not only angered both
Beijing and Washington, Taipeis principal security partner, but also raised fears
among many Taiwanese voters about increasing the risk of war with the
mainland. In other words, the new Taiwanese government wouldnt want to
cross a clear red line set by Beijing, possibly triggering a war that the island
nation is unlikely to win. The strong expectation that the US would withdraw its
support in such a scenario should act as an additional deterrent. At the same
time, however, Tsai is likely to seek a diferent foundation for the cross-strait
relationship. In her victory speech, she stressed the importance of protecting
this countrys sovereignty and emphasised the need for China to recognise
Taiwans democratic political system. She also stated that the future cross-strait
relationship had to be based on: the Republic of China constitutional order, the
results of cross-strait negotiations, interactions and exchanges, and democratic
principles and the will of the Taiwanese people ... The results of todays election
showcase the will of the Taiwanese people. It is the shared resolve of Taiwans 23
million people that the Republic of China is a democratic country. Our democratic
system, national identity, and international space must be respected. Any forms
of suppression will harm the stability of cross-strait relations.7 In a signal to
Beijing, Tsai stated after the election that she understands and respects the
historical fact that Taiwan and China held talks in 1992known as the 1992
Consensus between the KMT and the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) on the
One China formula. Following the DPP win, Beijing had urged strongly that the
1992 Consensus needed to remain the political foundation underpinning the
relationship. Tsai also stated that the accords reached during President Mas
government should be continued. At the same time, however, she insisted that
Taiwans democratic constitution and the will of the people had to be an integral
part of the cross-strait political relationship.8 In sum, Tsai seems prepared to
reach a new accommodation between Taipei and Beijing that recognises both
AFF 2AC Answers
1
sides interests but that impresses upon her Chinese interlocutors that a new
Taiwan consensus must guide the relationship. That is, even interim steps such
as a semi-autonomous status for Taiwan (similar to Hong Kongs situation) wont
be acceptable for the DPP leadership and, indeed, the vast majority of Taiwanese
people. Therefore, the big question is whether the communist leadership in
Beijing can accept that the political landscape in Taiwan has fundamentally
changed and that this requires a more flexible approach. At present, Chinas
leadership seems yet to figure out how to respond to the DPPs win. Chinas first
official response to Taiwans election results predictably reiterated the position
that the 1992 Consensus must be the basis for the cross-strait relationship. It
also warned Taiwan of any move towards formal independence, referring to
Chinas 2005 Anti-Secessionist Law, which makes clear that such a
development would lead to war.9 A few days after the election, Chinas
Peoples Liberation Army (PLA) also staged a live-fire exercise close to islands
controlled by the ROC, most likely as a reminder about Chinas willingness to use
force if required. The ROC Special Forces responded by holding a small-scale
military drill.10 At the same time, in early February 2016 the mainlands annual
Taiwan Afairs Work Conference recommended the further promotion of cross-
strait economic integration, strengthening the protection of Taiwan business
peoples rights and interests, and increasing people-to-people exchanges and
exchanges with parties and groups in Taiwan that uphold the One China
principle.11 However, its far from guaranteed that this positive momentum will
be maintained and there are reasons to caution against too much optimism.
President Xi Jinping has taken a strong stance on the issue of sovereignty and
stressed on one occasion that he doesnt wish the issue of unification to be
passed on generation after generation. This statement was widely interpreted
as a signal to Taiwans leadership that under his leadership Beijing would press
for a political dialogue that focused on concrete steps towards unification, a
direction which met with strong opposition in Taipei.12 Moreover, like his
predecessors, Xi would wish to avoid domestic criticism for going so on Taiwan.
For the CCP, Taiwan remains a symbol of enormous national prestige and its
future status as an integral part of the Mainland is one of Chinas declared core
interests. Furthermore, in the context of increased tensions over maritime
disputes in the East China Sea and SCS, the political stakes for Beijing when it
comes to unification with Taiwan are even higher. Upholding and, if necessary,
enforcing its territorial sovereignty claims is fundamental to protecting
the CCPs political legitimacy, and Taiwanese independence would be an
existential threat to its survival. In more recent times, a more nationalistic
public has only added pressure for the leadership to remain firm on Taiwan.
Therefore, the Chinese leadership could adopt a tougher approach towards
Taiwan, guided by the belief that long-term political trends in Taipei and the
closeness of USTaiwan relations will be against its interests and that a military
attack could alter the trajectory of those trends.13 One indication of this
direction would be if Beijing suspends official exchanges or tries to
steal some of the ROCs remaining 22 diplomatic allies. In that case, the
DPP government would face domestic pressure to retaliate, creating a negative
spiral in cross-strait relations that could be very difficult to reverse.14 Therefore,
AFF 2AC Answers
1
while alarmist assessments of future cross-strait relations should be avoided,
theres no reason to become complacent about the possibility of serious
conflict. Indeed, aside from the potentially complicating political dynamics
between the ROC and the PRC, additional strategic factors could contribute to a
worsening of the situation.
2. Impact Calculus:
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AFF 2AC Answers
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3. Link Turn: Increased military focus causes war
between China and Taiwannew diplomatic
conversations solve miscalculation
Gons, 2011 [Eric Stephen, former RAND-U.S. Air Force Academy

Superintendents Fellow, current consultant at the Boston Consulting Group,
Access Challenges and Implications for Airpower in the Western Pacific,
http://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/rgs_dissertations/2011/RAND_RG
SD267.pdf]
Despite this impasse, it seems for now that both China and Taiwan realize
that they have more to gain by cooperation than confrontation. However,
bumps in this relationship will occur. Managing their diferences requires open
communication and a willingness to engage. Unfortunately, these attributes
are largely absent in the relationship. China and Taiwan have limited formal
communications channels, and thus no formal mechanism to resolve crises.
This means that there is the very real and ongoing potential that a small
problem could quickly become a big problem. In crises of the past, both
governments have tended to use the United States as an
intermediary, but this method is far from perfect. First, the United States is
not up to the role of impartial mediator it too has much at stake in any
Taiwan-China crisis. Second, the United States has only limited sway with
either side. Third, the PRC government tends to close itself of in the midst of
crises. The communication problems are very worrisome, and hold the
greatest potential that the PRC and Taiwan will be in conflict with each
other.93 Bad decisions may result from bad information, miscalculation of
costs and benefits, a mis-estimation of the likelihood of success, or just plain
old irrationality. Unfortunately, there are many opportunities for
misperceptions to complicate the decision chain in a Taiwan crisis. The
inherent U.S. participation in any cross-strait dialog is both calming and
concerning. It is calming because the United States can act as an unofficial
communication channel between two parties who tend to communicate
poorly, if at all. It is concerning because the existence of a crisis triangle
compounds the opportunities for bad information now each actor must not
only understand his own capabilities and likely reactions, he must know the
capabilities and reactions of two other actors, and must know that they know
the capabilities and reactions of the other two actors, and so forth. Beyond
the simple volume of information that each actor needs to process, we can
identify some characteristics of the Taiwan situation that make perfect
information hard to obtain. Some potential areas of misunderstanding
include: Taiwan may overestimate the probability that the United States will
intervene in a crisis, skewing their decision calculus towards crossing a
AFF 2AC Answers
1
Chinese red line,94 assuming China will be deterred by the prospect of U.S.
intervention. China may not understand U.S. commitment or the conditions
under which the United States will intervene. An estimate of Taiwans will to
fight is also critical to Chinas decision calculus. The United States may
underestimate PLA capabilities or Taiwans will to fight.95 Decreased
ambiguity would aid the decisionmaking of all parties. U.S. policy should
encourage cross-strait dialog, including establishing permanent
communications channels. Any intentional ambiguity in policy necessarily
raises the risks involved in a crisis management chain. Most notably, the
intentional American strategic ambiguity regarding its commitment to Taiwan
carries with it serious risks should the Taiwan situation devolve into crisis. The
U.S. position is intentionally ambiguous intending to deter China from
aggressive action while avoiding giving Taiwan free reign to declare
independence.96 It thus serves a useful diplomatic purpose, carefully
balancing competing commitments. However, the United States must be
prepared to clarify its strategic ambiguity quickly should an emergency arise.
Failure to do so would obfuscate the decisionmaking of China and Taiwan, and
increase the risk of an unintentional war which the United States may be
compelled to enter. Other measures may further increase information
available to other actors for example through increased military-military
contacts, open communication channels, etc. U.S. policymakers must be
realistic about PLA capabilities, and the prospects for victory in a war over
Taiwan. While it is evident that the United States possesses the most
advanced military in the world, the PLA has advanced systems as well, many
of which specifically exploit U.S. weaknesses. Given PLA strategic depth and
the enormous access challenges the United States faces in the western
Pacific, many typical U.S. advantages may be nullified. Further, pursuing a
deterrent strategy like deploying large concentrations of aircraft to
forward bases may actually have an effect the opposite of intended
deterrence. A large concentration of USAF assets within easy range of PLA
ballistic missiles may be too tempting a target to pass up. If Chinese
decisionmakers feel the situation is deteriorating anyway, preemptive action
may be their best option to achieving their goals. In this way, U.S.
misunderstanding of PLA capabilities would be disastrous to crisis stability.
This prospect should motivate U.S. policymakers to either take steps to
address weaknesses, or change foreign policy to accomplish the feasible.
4. No Link: Cooperating with China does not throw off

US-Taiwan relations
Global Ethics Network, 2015 [Carnegie Council group focused on international relations
publications, The Future of Taipei- Washington Relations: The Wire Dancer and the Wire, April 29,
AFF 2AC Answers
1
http://www.globalethicsnetwork.org/profiles/blogs/the-future-of-taipei-washington-relations-the-wire-
dancer-and-the]
However, we have to note that profound economic and political changes have
taken place both in China and Taiwan and probably in the nature of the
relationship between them, so the cross strait relations is no longer a
zero-sum game and there are many elements involved and now both
countries seek to cooperate economically. US, China and Taiwan relation
forms a strategic triangle. US announced pivot to Asia or rebalancing
while China put forward a new model for relations between great powers.
Taiwan has always been a loyal ally, welcomed and affirmed USs Asia-Pacific
strategic because we all know US- Taiwan relation has been Taiwans lifeline.
Nowadays Taiwan has been a wire dancer. The US is the wire, once it falls of
the wire, it may lose its life. Taiwan is looking to strike a balance between
them while at the same time seeks to get its own voice. The interaction
between the two superpowers shows that they are both try to keep order;
China hopes to keep domestic order while the US wants to maintain
international order. In the foreseeable future, America will remain the number
one superpower, Chinas priority will be continue to create a favorable
environment for its economic development and to focus on keeping domestic
order, Taiwan, on the other hand, is searching for international space, which
means the right to survive legally and the right to participate in global afairs
5. No BrinkThe US and China cooperate on many

issues every year. This would have already triggered
their DA and caused all of their impacts.
6. No Impact: A China-Taiwan war would remain regional
the cost of escalation is too high
White, 2015 [Hugh, professor of strategic studies at the

Australian National University in Canberra, Would America Risk a
Nuclear War with China over Taiwan?, May 5,
http://nationalinterest.org/blog/the-buzz/would-america-risk-
nuclear-war-china-over-taiwan-12808]
These are the questions America's leaders would have to confront in

considering military action to defend Taiwan, and their answer would very
likely be that the status of Taiwan is not worth risking nuclear war or
economic collapse over. And that means American leaders and policy
analysts must confront these questions now, as they decide whether to
maintain the old commitments to defend Taiwan. The promises that America
AFF 2AC Answers
1
was willing and able to keep in 1979 might not be ones it is willing or able to
keep now. What about America's allies and friends in Asia? Wouldn't they
help America defend Taiwan, if only because they are so worried themselves
about China? Many Americans seem to assume they would. But even
Australia, America's most reliable ally in Asia, is uncertain about this. And if
Australia is uncertain, it is pure wishful thinking to expect the likes of India,
Singapore, Vietnam or even the Philippines to ofer anything more than mild
diplomatic support to America over Taiwan. The exception is Japan, which
under Shinzo Abe might be expected to join the fight, especially after last
week's visit to Washington. But does Mr. Abe really speak for Japan? Will
future Japanese leaders take the same view? And even if they did, how
exactly would that help America? How would Japan's support change the
answers to the hard questions posed above, and increase the chances that
America would indeed come to Taiwan's aid? So no one should lightly
assert that America or its allies would help defend Taiwan from
China. But should they? This is a big subject. Suffice to say here that the
question is not answered simply by using the word appeasement to invoke
the memory of Munich.
CDL Core Files 2016-2017 Topicality
Topicality
Vocabulary
Quid pro quoMeans this for that in Latin. Basically, there
must be an exchange of favors. Think when you negotiate with
your family and you exchange a week of chores for money. You
may be able to convince your parents to let you go to a concert in
exchange for finishing your homework.
Limits: The amount of arguments that can be run. This is usually
about how many affirmatives are topical under a certain
interpretation. If there are many, many afsthink 50that would
make it super hard to be negative. On the other hand, if there
were only 2 afs, then that would make it too hard for the af.
When people talk about limits, this is the discussion.
Ground: Which arguments that can be run depending on the
interpretation. Basically, which Disadvantages, Counterplans,
Kritiks, and Case arguments can you read. If you couldnt read
ANYTHING in the core files against an af, that would make it
challenging to be negative.
1NC BIT Violation (Engagement)
1NC Bilateral Investment Treaty

Topicality
A. Economic Engagement is unconditionalThe US
should do it without waiting on China
elik, 2011 Arda Can, Masters Degree in Politics and International Studies
from Uppsala University, Economic Sanctions and Engagement Policies, p. 11
Economic engagement policies are strategic integration behaviour

which involves with the target state. Engagement policies difer from
other tools in Economic Diplomacy. They target to deepen the economic
relations to create economic intersection, interconnectness, and mutual
dependence and finally seeks economic interdependence. This
interdependence serves the sender stale to change the political
behaviour of target stale. However they cannot be counted as carrots or
inducement tools, they focus on long term strategic goals and they are not
restricted with short term policy changes.(Kahler&Kastner,2006) They
can be unconditional and focus on creating greater economic
benefits for both parties. Economic engagement targets to seek
deeper economic linkages via promoting institutionalized mutual trade
thus mentioned interdependence creates two major concepts. Firstly it
builds strong trade partnership to avoid possible militarized and non
militarized conflicts. Secondly it gives a leeway lo perceive the
international political atmosphere from the same and harmonized
perspective. Kahler and Kastner define the engagement policies as
follows "It is a policy of deliberate expanding economic ties with an
adversary in order to change the behaviour of target state and
improve bilateral relations ".(p523-abstract). It is an intentional
economic strategy that expects bigger benefits such as long term
economic gains and more importantly; political gains. The main idea
behind the engagement motivation is stated by Rosecrance (1977) in a
way that " the direct and positive linkage of interests of stales where a
change in the position of one state affects the position of others in the
same direction.
1NC BIT Violation (Engagement)
1
B. Violation: The plan involves negotiations and
agreements before the treaty is authorized by the
Senate and President
Duke Law, 2005 [10/5, U.S. Treaties & Agreements - The Process,
https://law.duke.edu/ilrt/treaties_3.htm]
Outline of the Treaty Making Process

Secretary of State authorizes negotiation. U.S. representatives negotiate.
Agree on terms, and upon authorization of Secretary of State, sign treaty.
President submits treaty to Senate. Senate Foreign Relations Committee
considers treaty and reports to Senate. Senate considers and approves by 2/3
majority. President proclaims entry into force.
C. Topicality is a voting issue for fairness and

education:
1. Fairnessall of our pre-round preparation is based

on the plan text. However, they cant prove their
solvency based on that alone. They need to prove
China will agree, how they will agree, and how that
affects relations. They get an unfair advantage.
2. Ground: Our Disadvantages are based on how the US

does the plan. If it can change or alter based on
China policy that makes it hard to make a link. They
also get unpredictable advantages based on how
China engages the plan.
2NC/1NR BIT Violation (Engagement)

Extensions
1
2NC/1NR Bilateral Investment

Treaty Topicality - AT #1We Meet
1. You dont meetextend our Celik evidence that
economic engagement must be unconditional. The
goal must be to change the relationship between the
two countries with a one-sided gesture without a
certain benefit.
2. Treaties are ConditionalExtend our Duke evidence.

It explains that treaties are negotiated between the
two countries before they are sent to the president
and signed by the senate. Their Aff would take
months of cooperation between the US and China
hamming out a quid pro quo deal.

Extensions
1

Treaty Topicality AT #2Counter
Interpretation
1. Extend our Celik evidence. Our interpretation is
preferable for debate because of limits, ground,
fairness, and education.
2. Theres a topical version of the Affthey should just

have the us lower trade barriers and increase
investment in China. This would increase economic
ties and solve war. Also, China would probably lower
its trade barriers after the US did it. This would allow
us to learn about their Harms - we just argue they
should have used a different Plan thats Topical.
3. Limitsthey allow impossible to predicts Affs

because the US-China negotiation process could
change the Aff hundreds of ways. The negative list
includes hundreds of industries that could be
protected. This is totally unpredictable and reason to
vote Neg.
4. Theyve abused us in the debate round because they

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Extensions
1

Treaty Topicality AT--#3AContext
1. We are in the topicour evidence is about economic
engagement between countries. It doesnt matter if
its specific to China. Its predictable enough.
2. Case list answers context: our interpretation includes

the North Korea Aff, the T version of this Aff, the
human rights Aff, and any one-sided action. That
means there are plenty of Affs to be read and were
being fair in the topic.
3. They explode the number of cases that can be read

that destroys education and makes it impossible to
gain depth
Resnick, 2001 [Evan, Assistant Professor and coordinator of the United States
Programme at RSIS, Defining Engagement, Journal of International Afairs,
Spring, Vol. 54, Issue 2,]
A second problem associated with various scholarly treatments of engagement is the

tendency to define the concept too broadly to be of much help to the analyst.
For instance, Cha's definition of engagement as any policy whose means are
"non-coercive and non-punitive" is so vague that essentially any positive
sanction could be considered engagement. The definition put forth by Alastair lain
Johnston and Robert Ross in their edited volume, Engaging China, is equally nebulous. According to
Johnston and Ross, engagement constitutes "the use of non-coercive methods to ameliorate the non-status
quo elements of a rising power's behavior."(n14) Likewise, in his work, Rogue States and US Foreign Policy,
Robert Litwak defines engagement as "positive sanctions."( n15) Moreover, in their
edited volume, Honey and Vinegar: Incentives, Sanctions, and Foreign Policy, Richard Haass and Meghan
O'Sullivan define engagement as "a foreign policy strategy that depends to a significant degree on positive
As policymakers possess a highly
incentives to achieve its objectives."(n16)
diferentiated typology of alternative options in the realm of negative
sanctions from which to choose--including covert action, deterrence, coercive
diplomacy, containment, limited war and total war--it is only reasonable to
expect that they should have a similar menu of options in the realm of
positive sanctions than simply engagement. Equating engagement with
positive sanctions risks lumping together a variety of discrete actions that

Extensions
1
could be analyzed by distinguishing among them and comparing them as
separate policies.

Extensions
1

Treaty Topicality AT #3BGround
1. We give fair groundthe US action is enough to give
the neg ground on all us action. In fact, their
conditional interpretation would mean that us action
would be uncertain and we would lose core Das like
elections, Taiwan, and diplomatic capital.
2. Not predictable groundyes, China must interact for

their interpretation. However, who knows what the
plan will look like after months of negotiation. This
means the Aff could always link turn the DA because
our links will be way too generic.

Extensions
1

Treaty Topicality AT #3CReal
World Education
1. We give real world educationtheres still a debate
about how government policy works with China. We
just argue that the US must commit first.
2. Debate Educationwe need a fair round now. Its

great in the abstract to learn about negotiation, but
its more important to have a fair and educational
debate round now. If too many teams lose, theyll
give up on researching and learn nothing.

Extensions
1

Treaty Topicality AT #4
Reasonability
1. Reasonability is subjectiveits impossible to tell
how fair is fair enough. Some people may think its
fair for me to play my grandma in basketball, but I
sure dont.
2. Judge intervention: The term reasonable is vague,

and open to interpretation. Instead of having the
judge decide which definition they find reasonable,
the debaters should debate the merits of each
definition.
3. Education: Competing interpretations is better for

cost benefit analysis and decision making skills. The
process of weighing the pros and cons of each
definition develops these skills.
4. Look to the best interpretationwhichever

interpretation is best for education and fairness
should win. The Aff should have to defend their
counter interpretation and win that its educational
and fair.
5. Err neg on Ttheres an aff bias because the topic is

enormous with diplomatic and economic
engagement. Also, its a challenging international
topic. We need to protect the limits and ground of
the Neg.
1NC Currency Manipulation Violation

(Engagement = Quid Pro Quo)
1NC Currency Manipulation

Topicality - Engagement is Quid
Pro Quo (Conditional
Engagement)
A. Interpretation- Economic Engagement requires a quid
pro quo exchange of benefits with China with
conditions
Shinn, 1996 [James Shinn, C.V. Starr Senior Fellow for Asia at the CFR in New York City and director of the
councils multi-year Asia Project, worked on economic afairs in the East Asia Bureau of the US Dept of
State, Weaving the Net: Conditional Engagement with China, pp. 9 and 11]
In sum, conditional engagement consists of a set of objectives, a strategy for

attaining those objectives, and tactics (specific policies) for implementing
that strategy. The objectives of conditional engagement are the ten
principles, which were selected to preserve American vital interests in
Asia while accommodating Chinas emergence as a major power. The
overall strategy of conditional engagement follows two parallel lines:
economic engagement, to promote the integration of China into the global
trading and financial systems; and security engagement, to encourage
compliance with the ten principles by diplomatic and military means when
economic incentives do not suffice, in order to hedge against the risk of the
emergence of a belligerent China. The tactics of economic engagement
should promote Chinas economic integration through negotiations on trade
liberalization, institution building, and educational exchanges. While a
carrots-and-sticks approach may be appropriate within the economic arena,
the use of trade sanction to achieve short-term political goals is discouraged.
The tactics of security engagement should reduce the risks posed by Chinas
rapid military expansion, its lack of transparency, the proliferation of weapons
of mass destruction, and transnational problems such as crime and illegal
migration, by engaging in arms control negotiations, multilateral eforts, and
a loosely-structured defensive military arrangement in Asia.8 8. Conditional
engagements recommended tactics of tit-for-tat responses are
equivalent to using carrots and sticks in response to foreign policy
actions by China. Economic engagement calls for what is described
as symmetric tit-for-tat and security engagement for asymmetric tit-for- tat. A
symmetric response is one that counters a move by China in the same place, time, and
manner; an asymmetric response might occur in another place at another time, and perhaps in
another manner. A symmetric tit-for-tat would be for Washington to counter a

Chinese tarif of 10 percent on imports for the United States with a tarif of 10
percent on imports from China. An asymmetric tit-for-tat would be for the United States
to counter a Chines shipment of missiles to Iran with an American shipment of F-16s to
Vietnam (John Lewis Gaddis, Strategies of Containment: A critical Appraisal of Postwar
American National Security Policy. New York: Oxford University Press, (1982). This is also cited
in Fareed Zakaria, The Reagan Strategy of Containment, Political Science Quarterly 105, no.
3 (1990), pp. 383-88).
B. Violation- the plan only files a complaint with the WTO. To

be Topical, engagement must directly give positive
incentives in order to expect something in return from
China. The plan offers only threats of sanctions, which are
not engagement.
Borer, 2004 [Dr. Douglas A. Borer, PhD, Visiting Professor of Political Science at the US Army War
College, Problems of Economic Statecraft: Rethinking Engagement, Chapter 12, U.S. Army War College
Guide to National Security Policy and Strategy, http://www.au.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/army-
usawc/strategy2004/12borer.pdf
The policy of engagement refers to the use of non-coercive means, or

positive incentives, by one state to alter the elements of another state s
behavior. As such, some scholars have categorized engagement as a form of
appeasement. 21 However, I concur with the view articulated by Randall
Schweller that, while engagement can be classified in generic terms as a
form of appeasement, an important qualitative diference exists between the
two: Engagement is more than appeasement, he says: It encompasses
any attempt to socialize the dissatisfied power into acceptance of the
established order. In practice engagement may be distinguished from other
policies not so much by its goals but by its means: it relies on the promise of
rewards rather than the threat of punishment to influence the target s
behavior. . . . The policy succeeds if such concessions convert the
revolutionary state into a status quo power with a stake in the stability of the
system. . . . Engagement is most likely to succeed when the established
powers are strong enough to mix concessions with credible threats, to use
sticks as well as carrots. . . . Otherwise, concessions will signal weakness
that emboldens the aggressor to demand more. 22
C. Topicality is voting issue for fairness and education:


1. Limits - If the affirmative were not required to condition

the plan, any small action would be topical. In order for
us to gain the most topic education, we need to make
only a small number of affirmatives topical. A small
number of affirmatives means the negative can do more
in depth research on those cases.
2. Ground- making the affirmative offer an incentive

guarantees the negative arguments against these
incentive mechanisms of the affirmative, ensuring we
have a stable set of arguments against all cases and
strong links to Disadvantages
2NC/1NR Currency Manipulation Violation (Engagement = Quid

Pro Quo) Extensions

Quid Pro Quo Topicality - AT #1
We Meet
1. You dont meetextend our Shinn evidence that
economic engagement must be quid pro quo. The
goal must be to change the relationship between the
two countries by conditioning our policies so both
countries benefit. This has to be symmetrical and
intended to integrate China into the world economy
theyre the opposite. They take an asymmetrical
hostile action meant to isolate China from the world
economy.
2. Sanctions must be positive with the intention of
getting something in return Extend our Borer
evidence. Filing a claim with the WTO is a NEGATIVE
sanction and has no explicit policy return from China
theres no quid pro quo because the Aff never gives
China anything it wants.
3. Theyre the opposite of engagement they reduce
our economic ties with China rather than offering
positive engagement
Resnick, 2001 [Evan, Assistant Professor and coordinator of the United States Programme at RSIS,
Defining Engagement, Journal of International Afairs, Spring, Vol. 54, Issue 2,]
The proposed definition of engagement helps clarify the distinctions between

alternative foreign policy approaches that rely on positive sanctions and also
makes understandable distinctions among some frequently mentioned
alternative approaches that rely on negative sanctions. In current discussions
on US foreign policy toward rogue states, and especially on US foreign policy
toward China, engagement and containment are paired as antipodal policies.
In fact, one recent scholarly article addressing US-P.R.C. relations decries the
fact that "the media and many pundits have constructed US choices as
limited to 'engagement' and 'containment.'"(n35) However, in light of the
distinction I posit between engagement and appeasement, one could more
intuitively construe containment to be the opposite of appeasement rather

Pro Quo) Extensions
than engagement. Containment has been traditionally construed as the

attempt to prevent the geopolitical expansion of a target state. If
appeasement constitutes the cession of territory and/or spheres of influence
to a target state, containment might more appropriately be considered the
policy of preventing a target state from expanding its territorial scope and/or
sphere of geopolitical influence. Thus, whereas a sender state can expand
contacts across multiple issue areas with a target state while simultaneously
deterring it from committing aggression and/or expanding its geopolitical
influence by allying with its neighbors (engagement plus containment), it
would be impossible for a sender state to cede territory and/or a sphere of
influence to a target state while simultaneously preventing that same state
from expanding its territory or sphere of geopolitical influence (appeasement
plus containment). The opposite of a policy of engagement would be one in
which a state comprehensively diminishes and withdraws contacts across
multiple issue areas with another state. Although such a policy would be
considered a negative sanction, it does not attempt to do so through direct
geopolitical means, as does a containment policy. One could label such a
policy as disengagement or isolation. Thus, whereas a state can yield another
state territory or an enlarged sphere of influence while simultaneously
abrogating contacts with that state (appeasement plus disengagement), it is
impossible for a state to expand and diminish contacts with another state
across multiple issue-areas (engagement plus disengagement). The
distinctions drawn between engagement, appeasement, containment and
isolation allow for a more focused and coherent discussion of some of the
options available for dealing with rival states. For example, current US policy
toward China can be depicted as engagement plus containment. Eforts in
recent years to liberalize trade with China, integrate the P.R.C. into
international institutions and regimes, facilitate numerous diplomatic visits
and summit meetings, and conduct bilateral exchanges of senior military
personnel and academics are representative of engagement. However, at the
same time, the US has elected to contain rather than appease China by
taking steps to prevent the P.R.C. from expanding its territory or sphere of
influence in East Asia. Most important, the US has signaled that it would not
stand aside if Beijing tries to absorb Taiwan by force. Toward this end, the US
has continued to sell large quantities of arms to the Taiwanese government,
and, in 1995 and 1996, it played high stakes gunboat diplomacy with China in
the Taiwan Straits. In addition, the United States has retained its Cold War
military alliances with both South Korea and Japan and has maintained a
strong troop presence in both countries. The US has also expressed grave
concern about "Chinese intrusions" into disputed island territories in the
South China Sea. Taken together, these steps exemplify Columbia University
Professor A. Doak Barnett's 1966 injunction to the Senate Foreign Relations
Committee that American policy toward China should constitute
"containment but not isolation."

Pro Quo) Extensions

Pro Quo) Extensions

Quid Pro Quo Topicality AT #2
Counter Interpretation
1. Extend our Shinn evidence. Our interpretation is
preferable for debate because of limits, ground,
fairness, and education.
2. Theres a topical version of the Affthey should just

have the US increase investment or foreign aid in
China in exchange for China cooperating in its
currency valuation. This would allow us to learn
about their US economy Harms - we just argue they
should have used a different Plan thats Topical.
3. Limitsthey allow impossible-to-predict Affs because

the US could come up with countless policies that
might affect China in some way. This is totally
unpredictable and reason to vote Neg.

____________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________
___

Pro Quo) Extensions

Quid Pro Quo Topicality AT--#3A
Context
1. We are in the topicour evidence is about the only
way we really do economic engagement between
countries. Its predictable.
2. Case list answers context: our interpretation includes

the North Korea Aff, the BIT aff, and the Topical
version of this Aff. That means there are plenty of
Affs to be read and were being fair in the topic.
3. They explode the number of cases that can be read

that destroys education and makes it impossible to
gain depth
0022197X, Spring2001, Vol. 54, Issue 2,]


Pro Quo) Extensions

separate policies.

Pro Quo) Extensions

Quid Pro Quo Topicality AT #3B
Ground
1. We give fair groundquid pro quo creates
predictable Negative strategies against incentive
mechanisms the Aff could use. In fact, their
interpretation that engagement is unconditional
hurts our links to Politics, China Nationalism, China
Politics, and Taiwan Relations Disadvantages.
2. Not predictable groundtheres always predictable

ground against negotiating a quid pro quo. The Affs
interpretation denies us the ability to have these
debates about the mechanisms of engagement the
process is key to the outcome in foreign policy. The
entire history of our foreign policy with China since
Nixon and Kissinger demonstrates that making deals
is more important than doing our own policies no
matter what China thinks, pretending that we arent
interdependent and deeply tied to China.

Pro Quo) Extensions

Quid Pro Quo Topicality AT #3C
Real World Education
1. We give real world educationtheres still a debate
about how government policy works with China. We
just argue that the US must offer China a quid pro
quo. This is MORE real world and the way foreign
policy actually works.
2. Debate Educationwe need a fair round now. Its
great in the abstract to learn about all the different
policies that might affect China, but its more
important to have a fair and educational debate
round now about policies that are already part of our
negotiations with China. If too many teams lose,
theyll give up on researching and learn nothing.

Pro Quo) Extensions

Quid Pro Quo Topicality AT #4
Reasonability
sure dont.

definition.


and fair.

the Neg.
1NC Human Rights Violation

(Engagement = Govt to Govt)
1NC Human Rights Topicality

Engagement = Government to
Government
A. Interpretation: Economic engagement must be
government to government
Daga, 2013 director of research at Politicas Publicas para la Libertad, in

Bolivia, and a visiting senior policy analyst at the Heritage Foundation
(Sergio, Economics of the 2013-2014 Debate Topic: U.S. Economic
Engagement Toward Cuba, Mexico or Venezuela, National Center for Policy
Analysis, 5/15, http://www.ncpa.org/pdfs/Message_to_Debaters_6-7-13.pdf)
Economic engagement between or among countries can take many forms,

but this document will focus on government-to-government engagement
through 1) international trade agreements designed to lower barriers to
trade; and 2) government foreign aid; next, we will contrast government-to-
government economic engagement with private economic engagement
through 3) international investment, called foreign direct investment; and 4)
remittances and migration by individuals. All of these areas are important
with respect to the countries mentioned in the debate resolution; however,
when discussing economic engagement by the U.S. federal government,
some issues are more important with respect to some countries than to
others.
B. Violation: The Sullivan Principles, as per the Lee

evidence, only apply rules to US companies in China.
The plan does not do any economic engagement
government to government.
1NC Human Rights Violation

(Engagement = Govt to Govt)

1. Limits: There are thousands of organizations
outside the U.S. government including companies,
other governments, individuals, and NGOs. They
explode the topic leading to a much larger case
list. The negative would not be able to research
effectively and would lose.
2. Ground: The AFF gets to claim advantages based

off company to company engagement and boosting
the economy. Also, our links wont apply to
company to company action, only the federal
government. Without these core Disadvantages,
we wont be able to compete. We also lose the
ability to use strategies like the EU Counterplan
because they act on American companies, not
China.
2NC/1NR Human Rights Violation (Engagement =

Govt to Govt) Extensions
2NC/1NR Human Rights Topicality

AT #1We Meet
1. Extend our Daga evidence. Its refers to the U.S.
and so economic engagement with countries must be
between governments.
2. They dont meettheir Lee evidence is very clear

that they change policy for MNCs. There is no direct
government to government interaction, only the US
changing a policy that affects companies in China.


AT #2Counter Interpretation
1. Extend our interpretation that economic and
diplomatic engagement must be between
governments. Daga lists multiple cases that would be
topical including lowering trade barriers,
remittances, and foreign direct investment. Their
Haas evidence defines cultural or civil society
engagement, not economic or diplomatic
engagement.
2. Topical Version of the Aff: They could withhold US

direct investments or US foreign aid until China
changes its human rights policy or have direct
diplomacy about Human Rights. This would allow us
to learn about their Human Rights Harms - we just
argue they should have used a different Plan thats
Topical.
3. Grammar: They violate the sentence structure of the

resolution. The antecedent of its is the federal
government. Without understanding the grammar of
the resolution, its impossible to predict any Aff and
we also become worse at reading/grammar.

____________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________
___


AT #3A Overlimiting
1. We have Fair Limits--Cross apply our topical version
of the Affwe dont even limit out the 1ac. The BIT
and North Korea Affs are both topical because
theyre government to government actions. There
are enough Affs that we allow.
2. They absolutely explode the limits debate because

anybody can be the target of the plan. That means a
private company, an individual, a not-for-profit or
any other country. This means that there are literally
thousands of affs.
3. Clear limits are key to education and fairness they

explode the topic and that destroys education and
makes it impossible to gain depth
0022197X, Spring2001, Vol. 54, Issue 2,]



separate policies.


AT #3BGround
1. Cross apply the limits debatetheyre right that
theres more ground, but it will be unpredictable and
our links will be weaker. While there may be many
actors, its much harder to research a strong link to
an NGO or private company. This explodes our
research burden.
2. Theres enough groundthis topic already has two of

the worlds largest super powers and you get to
debate about all the things they do toward each
other. You dont need to add all the things America
does domestically to that mix as well.
3. We lose key Negative ground like the EU Counterplan
we cant have a debate about their harms because
they take the non-Topical action of having a policy
toward American companies, not China itself.


AT #3CEducation
1. Again, limits outweighWe will learn more about
different topics, but those topics will be
unpredictable and the debate will be shallow. Its
very hard to debate against different, unpredictable
Affs. Its more important that we have clash and a
testing of ideas than learn new, random facts.
2. Fairness outweighs educationits more important

that we have a balance debate. There should be a
balance of Aff and Neg arguments that allows us to
really disagree. If one side continually loses, then
people will give up on researching or be so upset
they will learn nothing.


AT #4Reasonability
sure dont.

definition.


and fair.

the Neg.
1NC North Korea Violation

(Engagement Military)
1NC North Korea Topicality

Engagement Military
A. Interpretation: Diplomatic engagement is
recognition, talks, or targeted sanctions. Military
engagement is distinctly different
Haas, 2000 [Richard, Dir. Foreign Policy Studies, Brookings Institution),

SURVIVAL, SUMMER, 115]
Similarly, political engagement can involve the lure of diplomatic recognition,

access to regional or international institutions, the scheduling of summits
between leaders or the termination of these benefits. Military engagement
could involve the extension of international military-educational training in
order both to strengthen respect for civilian authority and human rights
among a countrys armed forces and, more feasibly, to establish relationships
between Americans and young foreign military officers.
B. Violation: The Plans main positive incentive is the

removal of US troops, weapons, and security
guarantees for North Korea.
1. Limits: The definition of diplomatic engagement must

remain centered in direct diplomatic talks,
recognition or sanctions. Anything outside would
explode the topic leading to a much larger case list.
The negative would not be able to research
effectively and would lose.
1NC North Korea Violation

(Engagement Military)
2. Ground: Including military engagement means the

AFF will get distinct military advantagestheir first
advantage is a perfect example. They will beat our
Disadvantages with this unfair ground. Also, military
engagement should be our ground since its outside
of diplomatic engagement.
2NC/1NR North Korea Violation (Engagement

Military) Extensions
2NC/1NR North Korea Topicality

Engagement Military AT #1We
Meet
1. They Dont Meetour interpretation is that
engagement must be diplomatic through recognition,
sanctions, or economic cooperationthats our Haas
evidence.
2. Military Engagement is differentHaas makes it clear

that removing the military or joint exercises is
military engagement. These are very different and
their first advantage shows theyre military
engagement.


Engagement Military AT #2
Counter Interpretation
1. Extend our Haas evidencehe distinguishes between
economic and diplomatic engagement, which is about
meetings and economic cooperation, versus military
to military relations.
2. Topical Version of the Affthey could just cooperate

with China to increase sanctions on North Korea.
There is no need for the military withdrawal. This
means that they can still read their Aff all they
should done is read a Topical plan without the non-
Topical military withdrawal.
3. BrightlineOur evidence is not only comparative

between the two, but makes it super clear if youre
topical or not. Either the Aff does military
engagement or it doesnt. This is good for T debates
because it removes judge uncertainty and choice
making.

____________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________
___


Engagement Military AT #3A
Core of the Topic
1. No its notthe topic calls for economic and
diplomatic cooperation. In fact, diplomacy is almost
the opposite of military engagement. This means
they move the conversation far away from the
economic and diplomatic debates were supposed to
have.
2. We allow some military conversationsthere can still

be South China Sea and North Korea Affs, the plan
just cant be directly about the military. For example,
the BIT Aff is OK because it uses the economy to
solve military problems.
3. Extra-TopicalEven if most of your aff is topical, you

still include part that is military. You leverage that
untopical part of your Aff to abuse us which means
the Aff should lose. It doesnt matter that the other
part of the Aff is topical.


Engagement Military AT #3B
Ground
1. You destroy our Disadvantagesyou have an unfair
advantage related to the military. This is a huge
advantage and it will outweigh our Disadvantages
and our case arguments wont apply as well because
the advantage is unpredictable.
2. Thats our Counter Plan or Case groundwe should

be able to make military arguments and compare
that to diplomacy. Thats a central conversation we
should have and you have taken our ground. We
cant make the strongest arguments now and we lose
out on education and fairness.


Engagement Military AT #3C
Reasonable Limits
1. You destroy limitsnow that economic and
diplomatic engagement do not limit the topic there
are no boundaries. There can be hundreds of military
Affs, immigration Affs, agriculture Affs, or
Environment Affs. You allow hundreds of different
types of engagement Affs destroying predictable
education and fairness.
2. Fair Case List: BIT and Human Rights are both topical
along with the topical version of the Aff. The topic is
already large because of the economic and
diplomatic options and a huge international topic.
We need to keep the number of cases low.
3. Clear limits are key to education and fairness they

explode the topic and that destroys education and
makes it impossible to gain depth
Resnick, 2001 [Evan, Assistant Professor and coordinator of the United
States Programme at RSIS, Defining Engagement, Journal of International
Afairs, 0022197X, Spring2001, Vol. 54, Issue 2,]



separate policies.


Engagement Military AT #4
Reasonability
sure dont.

definition.


and fair.

the Neg.
AFF 2AC Answers
2AC Affirmative Topicality

Answers
BIT AFF 2AC Answers
2AC Bilateral Investment Treaty

Topicality Answers
1. We Meet: The US signs the treaty regardless of what
China does. Its unconditional on the US side.
2. Counter-Interpretation: Economic Engagement
requires an exchange of benefits or quid pro quo
(this for that), its conditional on Chinas agreement
Shinn, 1996 [James Shinn, C.V. Starr Senior Fellow for Asia at the CFR in New York City and director of the
councils multi-year Asia Project, worked on economic afairs in the East Asia Bureau of the US Dept of
State, Weaving the Net: Conditional Engagement with China, pp. 9 and 11]
In sum, conditional engagement consists of a set of objectives, a strategy for

attaining those objectives, and tactics (specific policies) for implementing
that strategy. The objectives of conditional engagement are the ten
principles, which were selected to preserve American vital interests in
Asia while accommodating Chinas emergence as a major power. The
overall strategy of conditional engagement follows two parallel lines:
economic engagement, to promote the integration of China into the global
trading and financial systems; and security engagement, to encourage
compliance with the ten principles by diplomatic and military means when
economic incentives do not suffice, in order to hedge against the risk of the
emergence of a belligerent China. The tactics of economic engagement
should promote Chinas economic integration through negotiations on trade
liberalization, institution building, and educational exchanges. While a
carrots-and-sticks approach may be appropriate within the economic arena,
the use of trade sanction to achieve short-term political goals is discouraged.
The tactics of security engagement should reduce the risks posed by Chinas
rapid military expansion, its lack of transparency, the proliferation of weapons
of mass destruction, and transnational problems such as crime and illegal
migration, by engaging in arms control negotiations, multilateral eforts, and
a loosely-structured defensive military arrangement in Asia.8 8. Conditional
engagements recommended tactics of tit-for-tat responses are
equivalent to using carrots and sticks in response to foreign policy
actions by China. Economic engagement calls for what is described
as symmetric tit-for-tat and security engagement for asymmetric tit-for- tat. A
symmetric response is one that counters a move by China in the same place, time, and
manner; an asymmetric response might occur in another place at another time, and perhaps in
another manner. A symmetric tit-for-tat would be for Washington to counter a
Chinese tarif of 10 percent on imports for the United States with a tarif of 10
percent on imports from China. An asymmetric tit-for-tat would be for the United States
to counter a Chines shipment of missiles to Iran with an American shipment of F-16s to
Vietnam (John Lewis Gaddis, Strategies of Containment: A critical Appraisal of Postwar
American National Security Policy. New York: Oxford University Press, (1982). This is also cited
BIT AFF 2AC Answers
in Fareed Zakaria, The Reagan Strategy of Containment, Political Science Quarterly 105, no.
3 (1990), pp. 383-88).
3. Counter-Standards:
A. Context: Our evidence is written directly about US-
Chinese engagement. Since this is directly rooted in
the topic, this is the most predictable interpretation.
Anything about engagement overall should not be
evaluated.
B. Ground: Many of our Disadvantages are based on

cooperating with China. The AFF plan does not
ensure that China will react. We will lose our core
Disadvantages like China Nationalism and Politics,
making it impossible to be negative.
C. Real World Education: Very few things in life are free

while much of it is negotiation and compromise. Our
counter interpretation includes education about how
to broker deals between countries and individuals.
4. Reasonability: We are having a fair debate. They

have enough things to say against our AFF. Unless
the judge is certain we have abused the neg, lets
focus on the substance of the debate.
BIT AFF 1AR

Extensions
1AR Bilateral Investment Treaty

Topicality Extensions
1. Engagement includes trade agreements. Their
definition overlimits.
Resnick, 2001 (Evan, Ph.D. Candidate in Political Science at Columbia University, Defining
Engagement, Journal of International Afairs, 54(2), 551-566)
The third trap that has ensnared numerous scholars is the tendency to needlessly
circumscribe the parameters of engagement. This results from attempts to: define
engagement as ends rather than means; stipulate the types of states that can engage or
be engaged; restrict the types of behaviors that comprise engagement; and limit
the types of behaviors that can be modified through engagement . Each of
these restrictions hampers the task of evaluating the utility of engagement relative
to other policies objectively accurately. Some scholars have excessively narrowed the
definition of engagement by defining it according to the ends sought rather than the means
employed. For example, Schweller and Wohlforth assert that if any distinction can be drawn between
engagement and appeasement, "it is that the goal of engagement is not simply tension-reduction and the
avoidance of war but also an attempt to socialize [a] dissatisfied power into acceptance of the established
order."(n17) Such ends-based definitions hinder the study of engagement in two ways. First, because the
act of policymaking consists of selecting from a variety of alternative means in the pursuit of a given
end(s), it stands to reason that policy instruments are more efectively conceptualized in terms of means
rather than ends. When defined as diferent means, policies can be more easily compared with one
another across a whole spectrum of discrete ends, in order to gauge more accurately the circumstances
under which each policy is relatively more or less efective. Second, scholars who define engagement as
the end of peaceful socialization inevitably create a bias for future empirical research on engagement
outcomes. This is because it is difficult to imagine a more ambitious foreign policy objective than the
peaceable transformation of a revisionist state that rejects the dominant norms and practices of the
international system into a status-quo state that embodies those same norms and practices. The equation
of engagement with socialization alone forecloses the possibility that engagement could be employed to
accomplish more modest goals such as tension-reduction. Therefore, all else being equal, scholars using
this loaded definition will be predisposed to conclude from examination only of the hardest cases of
attempted socialization that the policy is inefective. Considering engagement as a set of means would
enable analysts to more fairly assess the efectiveness of engagement relative to other policies in
achieving an array of ends. Scholars have also inappropriately narrowed the scope of engagement by
unnecessarily limiting the types of states that can pursue engagement or the types of target states that
can be engaged. Cha's conceptualization posits that only powerful states can engage and that only weak
ones can be engaged. This forecloses alternative examples of weak states' initiating engagement and
strong states' being engaged. As a result, Cha's interpretation risks biasing subsequent empirical studies of
engagement, as one would typically expect powerful states to engage more successfully than weak states,
and for weak states to be engaged more successfully than strong states. On the other side of the coin,
Johnston and Ross define engagement as the efort to ameliorate the revisionist elements of "a rising
major power's behavior." This conceptualization is equally biased; rising great powers are probably the
hardest types of states to socialize as opposed to declining great powers or smaller regional powers.(n20)
Scholars have limited the concept of engagement in a third way by unnecessarily restricting the scope of
the policy. In their evaluation of post-Cold War US engagement of China, Paul Papayoanou and Scott
Kastner define engagement as the attempt to integrate a target country into the international order
through promoting "increased trade and financial transactions."(n21) However, limiting engagement policy
to the increasing of economic interdependence leaves out many other issue areas that were an integral
part of the Clinton administration's China policy, including those in the diplomatic, military and cultural
BIT AFF 1AR

Extensions
arenas. Similarly, the US engagement of North Korea, as epitomized by the 1994 Agreed Framework pact,
promises eventual normalization of economic relations and the gradual normalization of diplomatic
relations.(n22) Equating engagement with economic contacts alone risks neglecting the importance and
potential efectiveness of contacts in noneconomic issue areas. Finally, some scholars risk gleaning only a
partial and distorted insight into engagement by restrictively evaluating its efectiveness in achieving only
some of its professed objectives. Papayoanou and Kastner deny that they seek merely to examine the
"security implications" of the US engagement of China, though in a footnote, they admit that "[m]uch of
the debate [over US policy toward the PRC] centers around the efects of engagement versus containment
on human rights in China."(n23) This approach violates a cardinal tenet of statecraft analysis: the need to
acknowledge multiple objectives in virtually all attempts to exercise inter-state influence.(n24) Absent a
comprehensive survey of the multiplicity of goals involved in any such attempt, it would be naive to accept
any verdict rendered concerning its overall merits. In order to establish a more efective framework for
I propose that we define engagement as the attempt
dealing with unsavory regimes,
to influence the political behavior of a target state through the
comprehensive establishment and enhancement of contacts with that state
across multiple issue-areas (i.e. diplomatic, military, economic, cultural). The following is a brief list of the
specific forms that such contacts might include:
DIPLOMATIC CONTACTS
Extension of diplomatic recognition; normalization of diplomatic relations Promotion of target-state

membership in international institutions and regimes Summit meetings and other visits by the head of
state and other senior government officials of sender state to target state and vice-versa
MILITARY CONTACTS
Visits of senior military officials of the sender state to the target state and vice-versa Arms transfers
Military aid and cooperation Military exchange and training programs Confidence and security-building
measures Intelligence sharing
ECONOMIC CONTACTS
Trade agreements and promotion Foreign economic and humanitarian aid in the form of
loans and/or grants
CULTURAL CONTACTS
Cultural treaties Inauguration of travel and tourism links Sport, artistic and academic exchanges(n25)
2. Economic engagement is defined by trade

liberalization
Resnick, 2001 (Evan, Ph.D. Candidate in Political Science at Columbia University, Defining
Engagement, Journal of International Afairs, 54(2), 551-566)
The proposed definition of engagement helps clarify the distinctions between alternative foreign policy
approaches that rely on positive sanctions and also makes understandable distinctions among some
frequently mentioned alternative approaches that rely on negative sanctions. In current discussions on US
foreign policy toward rogue states, and especially on US foreign policy toward China, engagement and
containment are paired as antipodal policies. In fact, one recent scholarly article addressing US-P.R.C.
relations decries the fact that "the media and many pundits have constructed US choices as limited to
'engagement' and 'containment.'"(n35) However, in light of the distinction I posit between engagement
and appeasement, one could more intuitively construe containment to be the opposite of appeasement
rather than engagement. Containment has been traditionally construed as the attempt to prevent the
BIT AFF 1AR

Extensions
geopolitical expansion of a target state. If appeasement constitutes the cession of territory and/or spheres
of influence to a target state, containment might more appropriately be considered the policy of
preventing a target state from expanding its territorial scope and/or sphere of geopolitical influence. Thus,
whereas a sender state can expand contacts across multiple issue areas with a target state while
simultaneously deterring it from committing aggression and/or expanding its geopolitical influence by
allying with its neighbors (engagement plus containment), it would be impossible for a sender state to
cede territory and/or a sphere of influence to a target state while simultaneously preventing that same
state from expanding its territory or sphere of geopolitical influence (appeasement plus containment).
The opposite of a policy of engagement would be one in which a state
comprehensively diminishes and withdraws contacts across multiple issue areas with
another state. Although such a policy would be considered a negative sanction, it does not attempt to do
so through direct geopolitical means, as does a containment policy. One could label such a policy as
disengagement or isolation. Thus, whereas a state can yield another state territory or an enlarged sphere
of influence while simultaneously abrogating contacts with that state (appeasement plus disengagement),
it is impossible for a state to expand and diminish contacts with another state across multiple issue-areas
(engagement plus disengagement). The distinctions drawn between engagement, appeasement,
containment and isolation allow for a more focused and coherent discussion of some of the options
US policy toward China can be
available for dealing with rival states. For example, current
depicted as engagement plus containment. Eforts in recent years to liberalize
trade with China, integrate the P.R.C. into international institutions and
regimes, facilitate numerous diplomatic visits and summit meetings, and conduct
bilateral exchanges of senior military personnel and academics are representative of
engagement. However, at the same time, the US has elected to contain rather than appease China by
taking steps to prevent the P.R.C. from expanding its territory or sphere of influence in East Asia. Most
important, the US has signaled that it would not stand aside if Beijing tries to absorb Taiwan by force.
Toward this end, the US has continued to sell large quantities of arms to the Taiwanese government, and,
in 1995 and 1996, it played high stakes gunboat diplomacy with China in the Taiwan Straits. In addition,
the United States has retained its Cold War military alliances with both South Korea and Japan and has
maintained a strong troop presence in both countries. The US has also expressed grave concern about
"Chinese intrusions" into disputed island territories in the South China Sea. Taken together, these steps
exemplify Columbia University Professor A. Doak Barnett's 1966 injunction to the Senate Foreign Relations
Committee that American policy toward China should constitute "containment but not isolation."
BIT AFF 1AR

Extensions
3. No brightline for their interpretation engagement is
not unconditional and government engagement is
generally conditional
Haass and OSullivan, 2000 Richard N. Haass, diplomat, and Meghan L. OSullivan,
eane Kirkpatrick Professor of the Practice of International Afairs and Director of the
Geopolitics of Energy Project at Harvard Universitys Kennedy School ,Terms of
Engagement: Alternatives to Punitive Policies Survival vol. 42, no. 2, Summer The
International Institute for Strategic Studies
Many diferent types of engagement strategies exist, depending on who is engaged,

the kind of incentives employed and the sorts of objectives pursued. Engagement
may be conditional when it entails a negotiated series of exchanges, such as where
the US extends positive inducements for changes undertaken by the target country.
Or engagement may be unconditional if it ofers modifications in US policy towards
a country without the explicit expectation that a reciprocal act will follow. Generally,
conditional engagement is geared towards a government; unconditional
engagement works with a countrys civil society or private sector in the hopes of
promoting forces that will eventually facilitate cooperation
Human Rights AFF 2AC Answers
2AC Human Rights Topicality

Answers
1. We Meet: The government makes the policy of
economic engagement with China, then the
companies use that policythats our Lee evidence.
2. Counter-Interpretation: Engagement includes non-
government actors
Haas, 2000 [Richard, Dir., Foreign Policy Studies, Brookings Institution),

SURVIVAL, SUMMER 2000, 115.]
While these areas of engagement are likely to involve working with state
institutions, cultural or civil society engagement entails building people-to-
people contacts. Funding non-governmental organizations, facilitating the
flow of remittances and promoting the exchange of students, tourists and
other non-governmental people between countries are just some of the
possible incentives used in this form of engagement.
3. Counter-Standards
A. Overlimiting: Government to government
engagement is too limiting - these would only include
direct investment of money or foreign aid. Almost
every case includes companies that invest in China,
with the help of the government. Having only a few
Topical cases will make the debate round stale and
neg biased. No case meets their interpretation.
B. Ground: We increase Neg ground by having different

actors. There are more Disadvantage links to
changing how we regulate multinational corporations
like Politics and the Neg has great ground like the
Pressure Counterplan or Conditions Counterplan.

C. Education: Our interpretation increases education
about economic engagement outside the
government. Corporations are among the key
violators of human rights in China. Its best we learn
about realistic ways to curb human rights abuses
than just the process of diplomacy.

North Korea AFF 2AC Answers
2AC North Korea Topicality

Engagement Military Answers
1. We MeetWe cooperate with China to increase
sanctions on North Koreathats our Feng evidence.
We fit under your interpretation.
2. Counter Interpretation: Diplomatic Engagement

includes civil-military action
Association for Diplomatic Studies and Training, 2014 [an independent

nonprofit organization founded in 1986. Located at the State Departments
George P. Shultz National Foreign Afairs Training Center, Ten Principles of
Operational Diplomacy: A Framework, http://adst.org/the-stump/ten-
principles-of-operational-diplomacy-a-framework/, 9/14)
The complex arenas of American diplomatic engagement since 2001 often

in unstable, nontraditional environments resulted in several new eforts to
describe principles for specialized civil-military interaction. Principles have
been developed for counterinsurgency and post-conflict stabilization, but
relatively few proposals addresses the challenges of traditional diplomatic
operations. The defense field, with a well-institutionalized system of doctrine
and training, recognizes nine core Principles of War, and an expanded list of
12 principles of joint operations, to aid U.S. military planners conceptualize
full-spectrum military operations. In the course of the U.S.-led
counterinsurgency in Iraq, Australian military officer and analyst David
Kilcullens Twenty-eight Articles: Fundamentals of Company-level
Counterinsurgency proposed steps tactical military leaders can take to
understand and interact with their security environment to achieve local
political success. In Nine Principles of Reconstruction and Development,
USAID Director Andrew Natsios linked the development of civilian stabilization
principles directly to the Defense Departments nine principles of war and
described development-focused guidelines. Traditional diplomacy, however,
may seem too difuse, too situational, or arcane, to match to a set of guiding
principles. Until recently, diplomacy has occupied a place at the margins of
international theory, and social theory in general. Academics have noted the
resistance of diplomacy to being theorized, notes a recent comprehensive
survey. A few publications from American practitioners have sketched out
ideas for principles active in diplomacy. Retired American diplomat Marc
Grossman summarized four principles of diplomacy guiding his personal

career philosophy: optimism, a commitment to justice, truth in dealing, and
realism tempered by a commitment to pluralism.
3. Counter Standards:
A. Core of the Topic: Military conversations are the core
of the topic. Its the main focus of the South China
Seas, North Korea, and Taiwan. These are the most
educational conversations we can have.
B. Ground: We give even more ground to the neg with

this aff. They can argue that reducing the military
triggers bigger Disadvantages. Limited diplomatic
talks would not be enough for a link.
C. Reasonable Limits: There are only a few forms of

military engagement that would fit under the topic.
They would have to be directed toward China, come
from the US, and be substantial. This means were
predictable.

North Korea AFF 1AR Extensions
1AR North Korea Topicality

Engagement Military
Extensions
1. They are wrong military to military contact is
diplomatic engagement
Reveron, 2007 [Derek S., U.S. Naval War College, Shaping and Military
Diplomacy, Prepared for delivery at 2007 Annual Meeting of the American
Political Science Association, 8/30 9/2
Abstract: While the Department of State is the lead foreign policy

organization within the U.S. government, the Department of Defense plays an
increasingly important role in diplomacy largely through its a long tradition of
international engagement through shaping the security environment. With a
forward presence, large planning stafs, and various engagement tools,
geographic combatant commanders pursue regional-level engagement by
hosting international security conferences, promoting transparency through
military-to-military contacts, and providing American military training and
equipment. Throughout history, officers, such as Commodore Matthew Perry,
General Tony Zinni, and Admiral Joseph Prueher, have played critical roles in
U.S. foreign policy formulation and implementation. Officers like these
provide ready evidence that the military does much more than fight the
nations wars. This paper considers military diplomatic engagement
activities as a part of U.S. grand strategy and explores the legal and policy
implications of an increasingly militarized foreign policy
2. Engagement with China includes the military
Brown et al, 2013 Dean, Elliott School of International Afairs, The George
Washington University [Robert G. Sutter, Michael E. Brown, and Timothy J. A.
Adamson, with Mike M. Mochizuki and Deepa Ollapally, Balancing Acts: The
U.S. Rebalance and Asia-Pacific Stability, August 2013,
http://www2.gwu.edu/~sigur/assets/docs/BalancingActs_Compiled1.pdf]
U.S. engagement with China: At the same, the Obama administration has
continued to engage Beijing at the highest levels. In the first months of his
North Korea AFF 1AR Extensions

second term, President Obama sent the secretaries of Treasury and State to
China, along with the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staf and the National
Security Adviser. Beijing has welcomed these initiatives and the continuation
of more than 90 formal dialogues with the United States, including the annual
Strategic and Economic Dialogue chaired by the U.S. Treasury and State
secretaries and their Chinese counterparts. As noted earlier, military-to-
military exchanges also have improved. Chinese officials and non-official
commentators have been more inclined to emphasize the positive, following
the announcement in spring 2013 of the presidential summit in California in
June.
Currency
Manipulation AFF 2AC Answers
2AC Currency Manipulation -

Topicality Engagement = Quid
Pro Quo Answers
1. We Meet: Plan is a quid pro quo. We file a WTO
complaint with the result being that China stops
manipulating its currency. We get fairer trade and
China gets greater access to trade and cooperation
with us. Their Kane definition also lists other kinds of
engagement other than quid pro quo.
2. Counter-Interpretation: Economic engagement is
unconditional and focused on long term goals to
change the behavior of another state
elik, 2011 Arda Can, Masters Degree in Politics and International Studies
from Uppsala University, Economic Sanctions and Engagement Policies, p. 11
Economic engagement policies are strategic integration behaviour which involves with the
target state. Engagement policies differ from other tools in Economic Diplomacy.
They target to deepen the economic relations to create economic
intersection, interconnectness, and mutual dependence and finally seeks
economic interdependence. This interdependence serves the sender state to
change the political behaviour of target state. However they cannot be
counted as carrots or inducement tools, they focus on long term
strategic goals and they are not restricted with short term policy
changes. (Kahler&Kastner, 2006) They can be unconditional and focus on creating
greater economic benefits for both parties. Economic engagement targets to seek deeper economic
linkages via promoting institutionalized mutual trade thus mentioned interdependence creates two major
concepts. Firstly it builds strong trade partnership to avoid possible militarized and non militarized
conflicts. Secondly it gives a leeway to perceive the international political atmosphere from the same and
It is a policy
harmonized perspective. Kahler and Kastner define the engagement policies as follows
of deliberate expanding economic ties with an adversary in order to change
the behaviour of target state and improve bilateral relations. (p523-abstact). It is an
intentional economic strategy that expects bigger benefits such as long term economic gains and more
importantly; political gains. The main idea behind the engagement motivation is stated by Rosecrance
(1977) in a way that the direct and positive linkage of interests of states where a change in the position of
one state afects the position of others in the same direction.
Currency
Manipulation AFF 2AC Answers
3. Counter-Standards
A. Overlimiting: Quid pro quo is too limiting there are
very few areas where we can have actual research on
China and the US exchanging policies through
conditions. Having only a few topical cases will make
the debate round stale and neg biased. No case
meets their interpretation.
B. Ground: We increase Neg ground by having more

stable links to more engagement policies. There are
more predictable Disadvantage links to definite,
unconditional economic policies with ground like
Politics, China Relations and China Politics
Disadvantages the Neg also gets more ground with
the Conditions Counterplan.
C. Education: Our interpretation increases education

about a broader range of engagement policies. Their
interpretation focuses 2/3rds of our attention on
Chinas policies and the conditions themselves rather
than the best foreign policy toward China. This is
irrelevant to the core of the topic and distracts us
with the process of making deals in foreign policy
rather than actual foreign policy. It makes research
infinitely harder because we have to research not
only a US policy, but also Chinas policies and
whether theyre tied to an existing deal.

CDL Core Files 2016-2017 European Union Counterplan
European Union Counterplan

Vocabulary
European Union (EU): Economic and political grouping of 28
states in Europe. They work together to solve problems that go
across borders such as climate change, refugee crises, and
economic relationships. An analogy is that these countries are
like the US statesthey both go under the larger authority of the
organization, but are together in that union.
One Belt One Road (OBOR): Enormous trade route following

the path of the original Silk Roada path for goods and people to
pass across all of Asia. Xi Jinping suggested a similar trade
system today spanning all of Asia to Europe. This would include
infrastructure like train and road development, but also cultural
exchanges between diferent countries. OBOR would run through
multiple ocean and sea routes along with the land ones.
Multi-National Corporations (MNCs): A corporation that has
factories or offices in a foreign country. For example, a US
company that has a factory in China is an MNC. These include
Ford, Apple, Nike, and Gap to name a few.
Sullivan Principles/Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR):
These are guidelines for MNCs in foreign countries. These rules
must be followed if the company or the government makes them
law. These rules/principles protect basic workplace rights
including discrimination, unionization, pay, environmental, and
safety. These difer from country-to-country and company-to-
company.
Bilateral Investment Treaty (BIT): A BIT is an agreement

between two countries that sets up rules of the road for foreign
investment in each others countries. BITs give US investors
better access to foreign marketsand on fairer terms. The United
States currently has BITs with 42 countries. A high-quality US-
China BIT would give American companies better access to
Chinas market, and equal rights as Chinese firms.

might erupt.
president of China.
the GDP the better.
Foreign Direct Investment: When a foreign company owns a
business in another country. It also includes general investment
from one country to another. For example, US companies invest
and own companies in China.
State Owned Enterprise (SOE): a business that is partially or
entirely owned by the state or the government. The US is
worried about these in China because they are worried that the
Chinese government will give better treatment to their
companies than US ones.
AT=Answers To
1NC BIT NEG Shell
1NC Bilateral Investment Treaty

European Union Counterplan
COUNTERPLAN TEXT: The
European Union should ratify
the bilateral investment treaty
with the Peoples Republic of
China.
A. Solvency: The Counter Plan is identical to the AFF
and would solve
Xiaotong, 2015 [Zhang, Writer for Wuhan Center for Economic

Diplomacy, The EU-China Bilateral Investment Treaty: Pros and
Cons, January 16, http://www.whuced.com/show/?
id=170&siteid=3]
To ensure the smooth negotiation process and avoid new tensions, China and
the EU should work jointly in following aspects: 1. China and the EU need to
exchange views on negative list more frequently and timely. Market access
and relevant rule requirements need to be clear and explicit. The industry
standards, regulatory standards and process of national security review of the
two are in need of coordination. 2. Both sides need to avoid the politicization
during the process of negotiation. China is diferent from the west in many
ways including ideology, society and corporate culture. Moreover, Chinas rise
is a game changer. All these led to high vigilance of other countries to Chinas
state-owned enterprises, which are symbolic of Chinas economic strength.
China, however, complains about the so-called China Threat theory and
many discriminatory policies impeding Chinas international trade and
economic activities. To ensure the success of such a significant treaty
negotiation, it is advisable to keep a low profile. 3. Both sides need to be
patient and strategic. Although the negotiation will have a promising future
and create win-win results, it might take a long time to reach a final
agreement. The interesting part of the EU-China BIT negotiation is
that it goes in parallel with the US-China BIT negotiation. It is always a
1NC BIT NEG Shell
tricky issue about who arrives at the destination first. The US is ambitious in
terms of market opening whereas the EU is no less ambitious. However, given
the USs hegemony in the world, it is fascinating in watching how the EU
would prevail over, or at least match the US in terms of negotiated results
vis--vis China. Again, the economic negotiations such as the EU-China BIT
are much more than pure economic exercise. Instead, it involves politics and
power.
2NC/1NR BIT NEG Extensions

Treaty EU CP Solvency Extensions
They say __________________________________________________, but

facts)
to be true)
their argument)

______________________________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________________________
2 The Counter Plan is modeled after the UStheres no

difference

id=170&siteid=3]
In the Sino-US Investment Treaty negotiation, China and the US will soon
finish the negotiations on the text of the treaty, based on which, detailed
discussions on the negative list will be followed. [2]This negotiation has
marched a bit ahead than the Sino-EU one. Both these two negotiations have
put the coordination between two markets (on market access and negative
list) at the top of the agenda, while traditionally bilateral investment treaty
focused on investment protection. Since the US-China and the EU-China
BIT share similarities to certain degree, we can get some ideas
about the specific demands on the EU side, which are similar to the
US demands on China. First, the EUs interests and safety of investment
should be protected; second, China should apply the negative list model
(including pre-established national treatment and negative list). Following
this, China needs to raise its standards of labor rights and environmental
protection. [3]Lastly, the EU and China need to reach agreement on a dispute
settlement system. According to the EUs previous practices, its possible that
the investor-state dispute settlement could be included. To sum up, it is
expected that the EU would raise requirements concerning four aspects:
utilizing negative list model to manage foreign investment; setting
restrictions to monopoly of Chinas state-owned enterprises; raising
standards of laborers right and environmental protection; establishing a
suitable trade dispute settlement system.
3 The EU already has ties and a way to deal with trade

disputes, but they have low bilateral trade now
EUROPEAN COMMISSION, 2016 [Organization responsible for EU good

exchange and policy, China, http://ec.europa.eu/trade/policy/countries-and-
regions/countries/china/, 4/29]
The European Union and China are two of the biggest traders in the world.
China is now the EU's 2nd trading partner behind the United States and the
EU is China's biggest trading partner. The EU is committed to open trading
relations with China. However, the EU wants to ensure that China trades
fairly, respects intellectual property rights and meets its WTO obligations. At
the 16th EU-China Summit held on 21 November 2013 both sides announced
the launch of negotiations of a comprehensive EU-China Investment
Agreement. The Agreement will provide for progressive liberalisation of
investment and the elimination of restrictions for investors to each other's
market. It will provide a simpler and more secure legal framework to
investors of both sides by securing predictable long-term access to EU and
Chinese markets respectively and providing for strong protection to investors
and their investments. EU-China trade has increased dramatically in recent
years. China is the EU's biggest source of imports by far, and has also
become one of the EU's fastest growing export markets. The EU has also
become Chinas biggest source of imports. China and Europe now trade well
over 1 billion a day. EU imports from China are dominated by industrial and
consumer goods: machinery and equipment, footwear and clothing, furniture
and lamps, and toys. EU exports to China are concentrated on machinery and
equipment, motor vehicles, aircraft, and chemicals. Bilateral trade in
services, however, only amounts to 1/10 of total trade in goods, and the EU's
exports of services only amount to 20% of EU's exports of goods. As a result,
the EU records a significant trade deficit with China. This is in part a reflection
of global and Asian value chains, but in part also due to remaining market
access barriers in China. Investment flows also show vast untapped potential,
especially when taking into account the size of our respective economies.
China accounts for just 2-3% of overall European investments abroad,
whereas Chinese investments in Europe are rising, but from an even lower
base.
4 A BIT would be identical to that of the planthe

demands for transparency, cooperation, and funding
are very similar
EUROPEAN COMMISSION, 2016 [Organization responsible for EU good

exchange and policy, China, http://ec.europa.eu/trade/policy/countries-and-
regions/countries/china/, 4/29]
China is one of the world's largest economies and an important trading

partner for the EU. China is also an increasingly important political power.
China's accession to the WTO in December 2001 was a major step. It required
China to take bold reforms and liberalise important parts of its economy.
Both China and the wider WTO membership have benefited greatly
from China's integration into the global economic order. Yet while
China has made good progress in implementing its WTO commitments, there
are still outstanding problems. EU Ambassador Pangratis' statement of 1 July
2014 at China's WTO TPRM peer review The EU's concerns include: lack of
transparency industrial policies and non-tarif measures in China which may
discriminate against foreign companies a strong degree of government
intervention in the economy, resulting in a dominant position of state-owned
enterprises, and unequal access to subsidies and cheap financing inadequate
protection and enforcement of intellectual property rights in China However,
while there are many challenges, China's market and rapid
development also continues to offer huge opportunities, with
significant potential for further expanding trade and investment and
strengthening of the relations. The launch of the negotiations on a
bilateral investment agreement is an important forward-looking
initiative that aims to promote bilateral investment by providing
transparency, legal certainty, and market access to investors from
both sides. Moreover, the EU-China 2020 Strategic Agenda for Cooperation
places this agreement at the heart of our bilateral relation with China stating
that "Negotiating and concluding such a comprehensive EU-China Investment
Agreement will convey both sides' joint commitment towards stronger
cooperation as well as their willingness to envisage broader ambitions
including, once the conditions are right, towards a deep and comprehensive
FTA, as a longer term perspective".
5 China-EU BIT brings the countries closer and results

in massive economic benefits

id=170&siteid=3]
For China, this agreement would help to streamline the over 20 bilateral
investment treaties China signed respectively with most of EU member
states. Firstly, uniform rules on market access are to be established and
market barriers are to be significantly removed, helping both Chinese and
European companies enter into each others market. Chinese companies
want advanced European technologies and management expertise, which
Chinese companies are lack of. Equally, Chinese companies want to learn the
rules played by the West. Secondly, the EU-China BIT would help the reform-
minded Chinese leaders to overturn the old examination-and-approval system
on foreign investment and introduce a liberal FDI system. It would help China
move towards a more open economy and a new way of development. More
specifically, Chinese companies would have to increase their environment
awareness and a sense of social responsibility. As more and more foreign
companies establish themselves in the Chinese market, the intensifying
competition would improve the management and technologies of Chinese
counterparts, thus improving their competitiveness. Thirdly, investments
between Europe and China will be better protected under the agreement. For
the EU, the Chinese capital could ease the pressure on Europes economy.
Furthermore, this BIT could serve as a stepping stone for a potential EU-China
free trade agreement. China, however, wants to start the FTA negotiations
with the EU at an earlier date by way of proposing a joint FTA feasibility study.
For China, an ideal scenario is that the negotiations on the FTA and the BIT
can go hand in hand. In a broader sense, this investment treaty contributes to
a gradual unification of international investment rules, and it will promote the
liberalization of international investment and trade.
1NC North Korea NEG Shell
1NC North Korea European Union

CP
COUNTERPLAN TEXT: The European Union
should substantially increase diplomatic
engagement with the Democratic Peoples
Republic of Korea over their nuclear weapons
program.
A. Solvency: Increased talks with EU solve
Lee, 2010 [Jae-Seung, Associate Professor of International Studies, Korea University Between
Confrontation and Cooperation Is there a security role for the European Union on the Korean Peninsula?
May, https://dgap.org/en/article/getFullPDF/15406]
The European Union should continue to be an important dialogue

partner and aid donor to North Korea. North Korea has leveraged its
diplomatic relations with the European Union to promote its inclusion in the
international community and has also acknowledged the increasing
importance of the European Union as a major donor of economic and
technical assistance. The European Union, with its long experience in
preventive diplomacy, could play a valuable role as a peace-builder
at this critical juncture. As the North Korean economy showed an even
further downturn after the failure of recent currency reform, the possibility of
a contingent humanitarian crisis stemming from economic dysfunction has
been increased, making the European Unions humanitarian presence all the
more crucial. At the same time, the continued dialogue process could
prevent North Koreas extreme choice of confrontation. The
increased presence of European Union on the Korean Peninsula
would provide an important test bed for the its approach of soft and
preventive diplomacy, and could enable a more realistic and
pragmatic choice for North Korea between the two main scenarios of
confrontation and cooperation. Furthermore, the European Union could
also play the crucial role of enforcing international norms on North Korea. This
role of norm-enforcer became even more important in the aftermath of the
Cheonan incident. The E.U.s High Representative for Foreign Afairs and
Security Policy, Catherine Ashton, mentioned that she has taken note with
great concern of the results of the investigation of the sinking of the Cheonan
and called on all countries concerned to step up eforts to promote lasting
peace and security on the Korean Peninsula. Nonetheless, during the process
of investigation and the adoption of the UN Security Council Presidential

Statement on the Cheonan, China Global Issues The European Union should
play a more active role of enforcing international norms on North Korea. and
Russia strongly backed up North Korea mainly for their political interests in
maintaining the status quo in this region. While the clock has been turning
back to the Cold War confrontations on the Korean Peninsula, the principles
and norms of international society are in danger of being ignored.
Considering the image of Europe as a superpower of rules and norms, a
stronger E.U. influence in this volatile region could make a meaningful
contribution to global security.
2NC/1NR North Korea NEG Extensions
2NC/1NR North Korea EU CP

Solvency Extensions
1. EU humanitarian aid is the leveragethe relationship
is also very strong
Since the mid-1990s, the European Union has increased its political and
economic engagement with North Korea. Rapid improvements in E.U.- North
Korea relations made in 2000 and 2001 were spurred by a series of political
breakthroughs such as the inter-Korean summit and a visit to North Korea by
Swedish Prime Minister Goran Persson. While official relations reached a
stalemate in the post 9/11 security environment and the intensification of
North Koreas nuclear activity, the European Union has been continuously
providing assistance to North Korea. The European Union has become one of
the largest international donors to North Korea in development and
humanitarian aid. As of October 2009, humanitarian assistance provided by
the European Commission totaled 380 million, and many European NGOs re-
main active in North Korea. The European Unions foreign policy toward North
Korea has proceeded on two tracks. It has employed a firm stance regarding
the Norths weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and human rights issues,
while taking a moderate approach to developmental and humanitarian
assistance.2 The European Union has emphasized that there should be no
direct linkage between politics and humanitarian issues. The European
Unions continued provision of humanitarian aid and technical assistance did
not signal a softening of its stance on the WMD and nonproliferation issues.
The Union denounced the North Korean nuclear program and
emphasized the importance of inter-Korean dialogue and Six-Party
talks for its continued political and economic support. Regarding the
nonproliferation issues, the European Union has maintained an embargo on
arms, nuclear and ballistic missile-related materials from North Korea since its
adoption of the Common Position of the Council in 2006. In June 2009, the
E.U. Heads of Government strongly condemned the second nuclear test
carried out by North Korea. The following month, the European Union passed
an internal regulation that made the sanctions under the resolution directly
applicable in the domestic law of all member countries. At the same time, the
European Union has been vocal in pointing out the human rights issues in
North Korea at the UN General Assembly and the UN Human Rights Council.
The European Parliament has adopted several resolutions on North Korean
human rights issues since 2003.
2NC/1NR North Korea EU CP

Answer to Perm: US-EU
Cooperation
1. EU security action restarts negotiationsUS
sanctions derail the process
With the Six-Party Talks at a stalemate, the European Union may need to step
in with soft diplomacy. As the security environment on the Korean Peninsula
deteriorates, more active engagement from the European Union could
contribute to the long-term stability of the peninsula. The security
environment on the Korean Peninsula is once again highly volatile. North
Korea conducted an underground nuclear explosion and test-fired a series of
missiles in spring 2009 that significantly escalated tension on the peninsula.
With a series of confrontational statements and actions directed at the United
States, South Korea, and the United Nations, North Korea has toughened its
stance regarding its nuclear program and security negotiations. The sinking
of a South Korean military vessel, the Cheonan, in March 2010, has further
complicated the peaceful resolution of the North Korean crisis. The prospects
for making progress on the North Korean nuclear issue in the Six-Party Talks
are not encouraging, at least not in the short run. Understanding the North
Korean nuclear stance requires examining a longer time frame to grasp the
key trends in inter-Korean relations. The European Unions security
engagement on the peninsula should be reconsidered in this long-term view.
2. US participation destroys talkstoo many cooks in

the kitchen
As a result, the Six-Party Talks have often faced deadlock because of the
diferent underlying interests of the participating countries. In this structure,
the six states focused on sufficiency rather than completeness in
examining and responding to issues. Many times, the Six-Party Talks did
not play the role of an oven to devise a solution to dismantle
North Koreas nuclear program, but rather played the role of a
refrigerator that prevented worsening of the problem. The United
States has been preoccupied with Afghanistan, Iraq, Iran, and other parts of
the Middle East, and often put the North Korean negotiations in the
refrigerator, which resulted in minimal progress. Meanwhile, a majority of
North Korean diplomatic messages were directly targeted at the U.S.
administration. A more active engagement of the European Union in
this stalemate may have the potential to disentangle the puzzle of
peacebuilding on the Korean Peninsula.
1NC Human Rights NEG Shell
1NC Human Rights European

Union CP
COUNTERPLAN TEXT: The
European Union should pass
legislation mandating multi-
national corporations located in
the Peoples Republic of China to
follow the Sullivan Principles
outlined in the Lee evidence.
A. Solvency: EU has historically used Corporate Social
Responsibility which is the same thing as the Sullivan
Principlesthey can easily solve in China
EU-Human Rights Network, 2004 [Human rights organization funded

by the European Union, Working Paper on Corporate Social
Responsibility, June 28]
There is a broad set of regional CSR guidelines and regulation. The European
Union and the North American Free Trade Area both set out well established
principles for conduct within their jurisdictions. The European Union has
enacted plenty of legislation governing the conduct of MNCs within its
territory. Such initiatives include the Maastricht Agreement on Social Policy of
1991, the Treaty of Amsterdam of 1997, as well as the initiatives taken by
the European Parliament. The Council of Europe has been active in this field
as well, with plenty of updates to the European Social Charter of 1961. North
America is also covered by such an agreement, with the North American Free
Trade Agreement that includes a Labour Side Agreement of 1993 which
ensures the promotion of domestic laws within NAFTA. However, European
business is also guided by the EUs standards for operation in the developing
world. International Trade and Aid Agreements have begun to adopt social
clauses. They become standard features in many bilateral and multilateral
agreements and almost all EU agreements.
2NC/1NR Human Rights NEG
Extensions
2NC/1NR Human Rights EU CP

Solvency Extensions
1. There are more EU MNCs than the UStheres more
money to be lost if China does not reform
Forbes, 2013 [In China, European Companies Investing More Than

Americans, May 16,
http://www.forbes.com/sites/kenrapoza/2013/05/16/in-china-
european-companies-investing-more-than-
americans/#176cd0a71723]
Foreign direct investment rose for the third month in a row in April
with more money coming from European countries for the first time
this year rather than the United States, the Ministry of Commerce said
on Thursday. Foreign firms pumped $8.43 billion into China last month, up
0.4% from a year earlier, according to the ministry. While the pace slowed
from the gain of 5.65% in March and 6.32% in February, it was much better
than Januarys fall of 7.3%. What do investors like? They like wage growth
and the rise of the Chinese middle class. According to a report by consulting
firm KPMG, China has become the top destination for sourcing among
multinational companies outside their home country with these companies
moving more of their research units close to production bases. This year, the
U.S. China Business Council conducted a survey of multinationals who have a
presence in China and each one said that China was their number one
investment choice. All told, European companies are the most enamored with
China. During the January-April period, investment from European Union
companies rose 29.7% to $2.5 billion, while corporate investments from the
United States rose 33.2% to $1.4 billion. From January to March there were
4,822 foreign investment projects approved in China, down from 5,379 in the
first quarter of 2012.
Extensions
2. China trades more with the EUone billion euros
daily!
Brookings Institution, 2015 [Major international research journal,

Why China goes to Europe, July 29,
chaos/posts/2015/07/29-europe-engagement-china-pollack-
lecorre]
Recent international attention has focused on Chinas destabilizing activities

in the South China Sea, but ongoing economic developments between China
and its major European trading and investment partners tell a diferent, more
subtle story. Chinese Premier Li Keqiangs visit to Europe in June and July was
a reminder to the worldand to the United States in particularthat China
has more ways to advance its interests than precipitating security crises in its
region. In Brussels, Lis call for Greece to remain in the eurozone
demonstrated that China is now willing to present its case even on distant,
economic issues. It is highly mindful of the potential risks if the Greek crisis
were to undermine the EUs force in global commerce and finance. Chinas
economic presence in Europe began to increase in the early 2000s, but
accelerated markedly following the 2008 financial crisis. China started
diversifying its bond portfolio, buying European bonds instead of
concentrating solely on U.S. treasury bonds. The China Ocean Shipping
Company also won a 35-year concession for two terminals of Athenss Piraeus
Harbor, thus becoming a key investor in Greece. As Li Keqiang made clear,
China sees its relationship with the European Union as vital to its
long-term interests, but primarily in economic terms. China sees
growing ties to Europe as an alternative to dependence on the United States.
It also seeks to convey to European states the potential for much deeper links
between the EU and an economically emergent China. The perils and promise
of trading with China Premier Li visited Brussels to attend the annual EU-
China summit and celebrate the 40th anniversary of EU-China diplomatic
relations. Trade between China and the EU now exceeds 1 billion
euros every day. But how should Europe pursue these possibilities? The
strategic issue facing all member states is to ensure that EU-China relations
accord fully with the norms and practices that Europe has long fostered. No
matter the potential allure of China-Europe relations that Beijing appears to
ofer, an economic future insufficiently moored to existing norms would be no
bargain at all.
Extensions
2NC/1NR Human Rights EU CP AT:

the EU already regulates
1. Currently, the EU does not institute strong limits to
their MNCs across the globe
Goelzer, 2014 [Daniel, strategic role in the Baker & McKenzie's

global corporate, securities, and banking compliance practices.
He has more than 35 years of securities law experience, including
service in senior positions at both the Securities and Exchange
Commission (SEC) and the Public Company Accounting Oversight
Board, Mandated Corporate Social Responsibility Reporting:
Coming Soon to a Country Regulating You, September 9,
http://globalcompliancenews.com/mandated-corporate-social-
responsibility-reporting-20140909/]
The EU Directive is expected to afect roughly 6,000 public companies who

file in Europe. According to the EU, only 10 percent of those
companies currently report information required to be disclosed in
the EU Directive, so the EU Directive will dramatically increase the number
of EU companies reporting environmental and social information. Further, the
Directive obligates the EU Commission to evaluate the implementation of the
Directive and provide a report within four years, including recommendations
for further legislation. The EU Directive must now be adopted by the EU
Member States in the Council and then be implemented into national laws by
Member States within two years after the Directive enters into force. The
Directive does not displace individual member country CSR reporting
requirements such as those in France, leaving open for multinationals
operating throughout the region complicated questions regarding whether to
file one or multiple reports within Europe. Further, while the Directive
provides for the issuance of nonbinding CSR performance guidelines and
indicators, if such guidelines are developed, they could become functionally
definitional in multiple markets as the applicable standard or methodology.
For that reason, even for those who do not file in Europe, the progression of
the EU CSR reporting requirements merits careful monitoring due to its
potential major global market impact.
1NC Currency Manipulation NEG Shell

European Union CP
Counterplan text: The European Union
should substantially increase its
economic engagement with China
over issues of currency manipulation
A. Solvency: The EU has the diplomatic capital and

economic tools to challenge Chinas devaluation of
its currency- Now is the key time for the EU to stand
up to China and reverse this trend
European Council on Foreign Relations, February 2016 [Think tank committed to

gathering information about the EU, Chinas slowdown and Europes leverage, Feb. 12,
http://www.ecfr.eu/article/commentary_chinas_slowdown_and_europes_leverage5098]
The Commissioner is right, of course. But how far back must one go to find an
instance of the European weakling talking so bluntly to the rising Chinese
giant? Evaluations of Chinas real level of public or government backed
indebtedness are mounting because in an unfavourable global climate,
monetary creation and credit must be expanded to soften the shock of
domestic economic transition. Only two years ago, most member states were
falling over themselves to prevent the EU from sanctioning China over solar
panel dumpings. Today, seven member states including France, Germany
and the UK have asked the Commission to be tougher on Chinas steel
exports to Europe. There is no Western, global or speculative conspiracy
against China. But the country, which has for so long depended on the
diplomatic leverage granted by its economic power, finds it is on its own. The
need to rekindle growth and to carry forward massive debts implies that
developed economies read the West plus Japan will keep a lax monetary
policy for the foreseeable future. It means that they are unlikely to
accommodate Chinas need for a lower renminbi. It is therefore Chinese
market players and outside speculators who are doing the job betting on
Chinas downturn and lessened competitiveness by short selling the Chinese
currency. There is no Western, global or speculative conspiracy against China.
But the country, which has for so long depended on the leverage granted by
its economic power, may suddenly find itself on its own. For Europeans, this is
a moment which should be seized. The debate on whether to go ahead with

market economy status for China is taking place at the European Parliament.
At the same time, China has for years stalled on negotiations on a bilateral
investment treaty with Europe, and still has not moved forward with tangible
concessions. On these twin issues, there are two mistakes to avoid. One
would be to repeat what David Cameron and, to a lesser degree, Angela
Merkel have already done: call loudly for a free trade pact that de facto
implies market economy status. Unconditional support for China instead of
for European negotiators simply weakens Europes hand. The other mistake is
to be taken in by special interest groups of manufacturers and to exclude
market economy status for mercantilist reasons or perhaps simply just
because Chinas hand is weakening. Commissioner Malmstroms approach
mixing a strong call to China for reforms with an acceptance in principle of
market economy status is the right one A long term and strategic approach
matters in the relationship with China. What Europe should look for is a
quid pro quo with China, for mutual concessions and a winning
compromise. China should understand that market economy status is not its
birthright, and that it will fail including in the European Parliament and in
the court of public opinion if it does not cooperate on Europes other
demands regarding access to Chinas markets. Commissioner Malmstroms
approach mixing a strong call to China for reforms with an acceptance in
principle of market economy status is the right one. EU member states,
should not pre-empt the Commissions mandate by making their own
unconditional statements, or by trying to gain individual advantage through
lobbying for China. They should get in line, and reinforce the European
Commissions dual message to China: we are open for business, but you must
deal with our requests instead of stonewalling us and counting on our internal
divisions. For nearly a decade, Europes leverage with China has steadily
declined because of its own internal issues. Now there is a chance to
rebalance the relationship, not by rejecting China, but by making it
understand the need to show more goodwill in negotiations that it had been
indefinitely delaying or stalling.
2NC/1NR Currency Manipulation NEG
Extensions

EU CP Solvency Extensions
1. The EU can compel China to reverse its economic
policies. Like the U.S., the EU is negatively impacted
by Chinese currency manipulation
Kong, 2009 Qingjiang, Professor of Law of Zhejiang Gongshang University, China. Apr/Jun Trade
Disputes between China and the EU
http://www.eai.nus.edu.sg/publications/files/Vol1No2_KongQingjiang.pdf
While China has made commendable progress in implementing its WTO commitments,
there are still outstanding problems. Barriers to trade in China are estimated to cost EU
businesses 20 billion in lost trade opportunities annually. This amount is
equivalent to New Zealands total imports, or Bulgarias total GDP. It is one third of the
current EU exports to China. Market impediments are regarded as a general cause of the
trade deficit that the EU has against China. The surging trade deficit also highlights the
acuteness of the issue of renminbi evaluation. The renminbi has, since July 2005,
appreciated 21% in value against the dollar. To the dismay of the EU, during this same
period, the renminbi has weakened some 10% against the euro, further reducing the
competitiveness of European products vis--vis the Chinese market. It is natural for a
high-cost developed economy to run a deficit with a low-cost efficient economy, but it is
the size of the deficit, and a rising one, that causes concern. In the eyes of protectionists,
the deficit reflects considerable access problems EU businesses have in the Chinese
market. Given this state of afairs, the EU wants to either reduce Chinese imports or
increase European exports to China. While the former is tantamount to a protectionist
response, which will most certainly invite retaliatory measures from China, the latter
requires unfettered market access in China. This again is a bone of contention as Beijing
insists that market access exists while European companies insist otherwise. Renminbi
Revaluation. It has long been argued that the renminbi was undervalued against the US
dollar by between 25 and 40 percent. There has been a growing chorus that the peg was
unfairly helping China gain shares in global markets and the value of the renminbi should
either be raised or immediately floated to let market forces decide its value. In the eyes of
the critics, Chinas exchange rate policy allows Chinese firms to export goods to
the EU at artificially low prices, resulting in EU job losses. However, Chinese
processing industries are unhappy to see a sharp rise in the renminbi value, which would
eat into a substantial part of their thin profits from the 86 east asian policy export market.
China fears that an abrupt move to a freely floating exchange rate, particularly if
accompanied by an abolition of its controls on financial outflows, could trigger capital
flight and jeopardise its economy in view of the fragility of its banking system.
Accordingly, the mounting EU and US pressure has induced only slight changes in the
Chinese exchange rate regime. Since July 2005, the renminbi has appreciated in value
against the dollar while it has weakened some 10% against the euro. Economists have
argued that the problem lies with the weak dollar and not the strong renminbi.
Protagonists for tougher action against China contend that the undervalued renminbi
violates Article XV(4) of the General Agreement on Tarifs and Trade (GATT) and the WTO
Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures. To force a substantial
revaluation, interested US groups are looking to advance a case against China
Extensions
in the WTO. It is likely that the EU will join hands with the US on this again.
However, the chances of a US (and EU) legal victory in the WTO are modest as the WTO
Dispute Settlement Body (DSB) would most likely reject the claims. Similarly, a policy
case against the renminbi value can be made with the International Monetary Fund, but a
legal case has no supporting precedent and faces an uphill battle. Trade imbalance, in
conjunction with lesser market access opportunity underscores EUs concerns
over its trade relations with China. If these grievances are not properly addressed,
they may give rise to further disputes that could damage trade relations between China
and EU
Extensions

EU CP Solvency Extensions
1. Empirically, China has responded to EU threats on
their trading and investment practices. The
counterplan solves
Kong, 2009 Qingjiang KONG, Qingjiang is Professor of Law of Zhejiang Gongshang University, China.
Apr/Jun 2009 Trade Disputes between China and the EU
http://www.eai.nus.edu.sg/publications/files/Vol1No2_KongQingjiang.pdf
China is the major target of EUs trade defence

Major target of Antidumping.
investigations covering areas such as antidumping, countervailing, safeguard
measures and other trade remedies. The EU has accused China of overproduction and
dumping key sensitive products like steel and textiles, and has responded with anti-dumping measures
under both EC regulations and WTO Antidumping Agreements. In fact, China is the biggest target of EC
The EU even extends its antidumping duty against
antidumping investigations.
Chinese products produced in other customs territory such as Macau . Although
covering less than two percent of Chinese trade, the 41 EC antidumping measures currently in place
Moreover, under existing EC
against Chinese imports have greatly impacted Chinese exporters.
regulations on antidumping, Chinese imports are in an even more
disadvantaged position, since the built-in mechanism in the EC regulations is
likely to be manipulated. The method of analogy country, for example, is
widely used by the EC to calculate the dumping margin in antidumping cases .
This practice is discriminative in nature and denies the comparative advantage of the Chinese enterprises.
China is concerned with the EC using the analogy country methodology. Chinese enterprises pleas
against the choice of the methodology are usually not accepted by the EC. It is not clear whether the
criteria for determining analogy country relates to the level of development of the countries concerned,
or the respective production processes, or the comparability of the products, or the comparability of the
The fact that China remains the primary
respective east asian policy 87 industries.
target, together with the manipulative practices in antidumping, has caused
great concerns among Chinese companies.
2NC/1NR NEG Frontlines
2NC/1NR EU CP AT #1CP Takes a

Long Time
1. Identical to the AffOur EU CP goes through the
same process as the Aff so theres no reason it would
take longer for the EU to do it. If there are delays,
that would delay the aff the same amount. The
barriers to the AFF prove our point.
2. The EU could do the aff faster than the US because
____________________________________________________________
3. No impacttheres no problem with the CP taking a

few more months. None of their impacts are going to
happen in that period of time. It worth it to have our
net benefits to do the CP later if you buy their
argument.
2NC/1NR EU CP AT #2 and #3
Perm
Group arguments 2 and 3 or the perm and net-benefit:
1. Our Disadvantages still linkEven if the EU, China

and the US could do the plan, should they? Just
because I can drive a car blindfolded doesnt mean I
should. If you vote for the perm, then all of our
Disadvantages based on the US will happen. Its
better to do the CP alone.
2. Turn: US and EU cooperation isolates China and tanks
relations between all three countries
Yi, 2013 [Wang, associate research fellow with China Institute of International
Studies, Sino-European-U.S. Relations and the Possibilities of Trilateral
Cooperation, http://www.ciis.org.cn/english/2013-
08/19/content_6223055_2.htm]
With the China-Europe, China-U.S. and Europe-U.S. strategic

dialogue mechanisms established, the third-party factor has become
increasingly important in each of their bilateral strategic relations, either
serving as a driving force to promote bilateral relations or becoming a
backstage manipulator that obstructs and destroys developments in
bilateral relations. Because China is politically, economically, institutionally
and culturally diferent from Europe and the United States, and because the
rise of China has strongly impacted the vested interests of Europe and the
United States and the current global structure, China often has been the
victim of European-U.S. strategic consultations. In the wake of the
U.S. invasion of Iraq in 2003, France, Germany and other major EU countries
proposed to lift their ban on arms sales to China in order to strengthen the
containment of U.S. unilateralism. The heightened intimacy between China
and Europe during this period concerned the United States, which feared that
it may signal the arrival of a Sino-European Axis. The goals of China and
Europe in developing a strategic partnership were not originally
concerned with the third party, but the United States nonetheless
became a disturbing factor in Sino-European relations. This was
largely due to the United States strong opposition in 2005 to the EU lifting its
ban on arms sales to China and the Sino-European plan to cooperate on the
Galileo satellite navigation system. The European-U.S. dispute surrounding
the ban on arms sales to China served two objectives for the United States: it
expressed U.S. discontentment over the EUs improving ties with China and it
sought to further strengthen trans-Atlantic relations by launching strategic
consultations and dialogues with the EU over global issues. Although
European views are not necessarily shared in Washington, Europe has had a
more mature position that will help lay a broad basis for the future handling
of relations with Beijing.[5]Sino-U.S. dialogues once prompted the EU to
resent the formation of a so-called G2, but it then became more concerned
with the instability caused by the United States due to its constant meddling
in the Asia-Pacific region. Unabated frictions between China and the United
States in the Asia-Pacific region essentially provide the adhesive for close
cooperation between the EU, which remains trapped in its debt crisis, and
China, which is trapped in U.S. encirclement. There are several factors that
are fueling positive energy in Sino-European relations. First, because the EUs
foreign policy has been frustrated by its debt crisis and it is marginalized in
the U.S. global strategy, the EU is not willing to participate in the United
States strategic rebalancing toward the Asia-Pacific region. Second, there is
no consistent element of strategic antagonism in Sino-European relations;
China has always supported the European integration process and the
stability of the euro and the euro zone. Third, China has provided support and
assistance to Europe within its means, including its continued investment in
euro zone debt markets and capital increases in the IMF. In addition, the two
sides have enhanced financial cooperation and eased pressures from the
European debt crisis. The EU praised China for its propping up of the
beleaguered union. As Van Rompuy and President of the European
Commission Jos Manuel Barroso remarked in a joint article, Chinas
remarkable development speed has had an enormous impact on Europe and
the rest of the world. The EU and China are prepared to push their bilateral
strategic partnership to new heights.[6]
3. DelayAgreeing to a treaty between three countries

would take foreverthe TPP is a perfect example. It
would take years to do any part of the plan which
means the impacts would happen before the perm
could solve them.
4. No net benefitThe US would get all of the credit
and the EU and China would not boost relations. The
US is always placing itself at the center of the
conversation and will crowd out the EU.
2NC/1NR EU CP AT #4No
Solvency
They say We dont solve their af, but

facts)
to be true)
their argument)

______________________________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________________________
2 [Insert 1-3 pieces of specific solvency evidence

depending on the Aff]
2NC/1NR EU CP AT #5Hegemony
Add On
1. Our OBOR DA outweighs their hegemony impact
because
____________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________
___
2. Hegemony is high now
Jones, 2014 Senior Fellow, Foreign Policy Director, Project on International

Order and Strategy @ Brookings (Bruce, American Leadership in a World in
Flux, March 10, 2014,
http://www.brookings.edu/research/opinions/2014/03/10-american-leadership-
flux-jones?rssid=LatestFromBrookings
There's never been a more important time to understand American power,

and leadership. We need only look to Russian special forces in Crimea,
Chinese warships in the East China Sea, and an ever-deeper crisis in Syria to
see the stakes. In every region, and at home, critics decry the lack of
American leadership, and American withdrawal from the world stage. The
narrative of American decline and withdrawal is becoming the conventional
wisdom. But is it right? What we're really seeing is a mounting gap between
the fundamentals, on the one hand, and perceptions and policy on the other.
The fundamentals of American power are still strong. We spend more on our
military than the next 15 countries combined, 10 of whom are close allies,
and we have a huge advantage in high-tech weaponry, training, a global
network of bases, a dominant intelligence capacity. (That doesn't necessarily
translate into easy military answers to crises, of course.) We dominate the
league tables in higher education. The shale and tight oil revolution give us
an increasingly strong position in global energy markets, and demonstrate
the technological dynamism of our economy. Our population is young, and
growing. And no leading power in modern history has had anything
like the suite of alliances that America enjoys.
3. Turn: Diplomacy destroys hegemony and causes

war
Selden, 2013 director of the Defence and Security Committee of the NATO
Parliamentary Assembly AND an Assistant Professor of Political Science at the
University of Florida (ZACHARY, Balancing Against or Balancing With? The
Spectrum of Alignment and the Endurance of American Hegemony, Security
Studies Journal, 08 May,
http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/09636412.2013.786918#.U8b7V
I1dVe8
The purpose of this article is to develop an understanding of why many

second-tier states expanded their security cooperation with the United States
from 20012009 when American foreign policy was internationally unpopular
and viewed as highly unilateral, as well as the implications of this trend for
the endurance of American hegemony. T. V. Paul and Robert Pape argue that
American unilateralism drove second-tier states to frustrate American actions
through soft balancing, thus weakening the endurance of US hegemony.1 Yet,
William Wohlforth and others counter that second-tier states would continue
to align with the United States out of fear of rising regional powers and the
desire to avoid running afoul of what is still the most powerful state in the
international system.2 Understanding which of these choicessoft balancing
against the hegemon or alignment with the hegemonis more prevalent
among second-tier states has significant ramifications for the endurance of
American hegemony. The record of the 20012009 period indicates that a
wide range of second- tier states not only aligned with the United States, they
strengthened their security cooperation in a manner that extended the reach
of the US military at a time when American foreign policy was widely seen as
unilateral.3 In addition, they did so by incurring certain costs that helped to
spread the burden of maintaining the American hegemonic system. This
pattern of alignment with the United States has implications for the
endurance of American hegemony because states aligned with the United
States may have more at stake in the maintenance of American hegemony
than the United States itself. A smaller American naval presence in the Asia
Pacific region, for example, may be seen as a relatively minor shift in the
United States with some beneficial budgetary savings. In Vietnam, Australia,
or the Philippines, however, such a shift could prompt a wholesale
reevaluation of national defense policy and have costly implications.
Therefore, second-tier states have an incentive to participate in activities that
extend the endurance of American hegemony, even if they do not receive a
formal security guarantee for their eforts. This may have implications for
American foreign policy. There are distinct policy recommendations flowing
from the logic of those scholars and policy professionals who argue that a
more proactive and unilateral foreign policy speeds the decline of American
hegemony. The most important of these is that the United States should
practice a policy of self-restraint that defers to international organizations,
which would alleviate concerns about the current preponderance of the
United States in the international system.4 A policy of self-restraint would
signal that the United States is not a threat to other major powers and
preclude attempts at balancing. This policy would also help to set a norm for
the behavior of future great powers and recognize the emerging reality of a
multipolar world. Another policy implication from this line of reasoning is that
the United States should reduce its global military presence that both
encourages balancing behavior by other states and speeds hegemonic
decline by draining financial resources.6 Yet, this policy of restraint may be
precisely what would cause second- tier states to question the utility of their
security relationship with the United States and move away from policies that
help to maintain American hegemony. This could at least partially explain
the trend of states moving to establish closer security relationships with the
United States in the 20012009 period, when it was at its most proactive and
least deferential to international organizations. States may logically
conclude that a hegemon willing to project power regardless of international
opinion will be likely to use its power in the defense of the hegemony that is
in the interest of second-tier states. Second-tier states might be far less
willing to contribute to the maintenance of American hegemony if the
United States behaves in a manner that raises doubts as to the durability of
its commitments or its willingness to use its power in the international arena.
Thus, what would trigger a serious decline in the cooperation that helps to
sustain American hegemony would be a self-imposed reduction in the ability
of the United States to project power and an increased reluctance to use its
power in support of its national interests. As Keir Lieber and Gerard Alexander
note, the United States is threatening to a relatively small number of
states.7 Regional powers such as Russia and China, however, present a
security challenge to many of the states on their borders. Russia has used its
energy resources to pressure Ukraine during its elections, has repeatedly violated the
airspace of the Baltic states, and has taken a range of actions against Georgia.8 In 2007 alone,
a cyber attack emanating from Russia temporarily crippled internet connectivity in Estonia,
Russia cut of the flow of energy to Lithuania when that country decided to sell its main oil
refinery to a Polish rather than Russian company, and Rus- sian aircraft fired missiles into
Georgian territory.9 In the summer of 2008, Russia launched an invasion of Georgia that
demonstrated its willingness to use military force to resolve issues in its near abroad. China
as well has sought to expand its influence in the Asia-Pacific region and South Asia. Its military
buildup, establishment of military facilities in Burma and islands of the coast of India, and
major assistance to Pakistans nuclear program are all viewed with varying levels of concern by
Chinas neighbors. Defense spending is difficult to gauge given the opacity of the Chinese
budgeting system, but most estimates show double-digit increases since the early 1990s with
an average increase of 16.5 percent annually since 2001.10 A 2006 review of the countrys
foreign and defense policy signaled a decision to make a break with Dengs cautious axioms
and instead, embark on a path of high-profile force projection.11 Although many scholars of
Asian security note the success of Chinas charm ofensive using trade, diplomacy, and other
tools of persuasion to bolster its position in the region, there is a debate within the field as to
Chinas intentions and how other states in the region are reacting.12 These actions push
second-tier states to align with the United States and, despite much
discussion of the emergence of a multipolar world and the end of American
hegemony, the emerging pattern of alignment with the United States means
that its hegemony may be far longer-lasting than some assume. This article
first proposes an explanation of the expansion of security cooperation with
the United States between 2001 and 2009. It then examines the increasingly
broad range of alignment with the United States demonstrated by second-tier
states in the same period and ofers a means to measure alignment. It then
examines the changes in the relationship between the United States and
three states in the 20012009 period that span the range from soft alignment
to hard alliance. Lastly, it concludes with a consideration of the implications
of this pattern for the future of American hegemony.
1NC OBOR Net Benefit Shell
1NC European Union CP OBOR

Internal Net Benefit Shell
A. Uniqueness and Internal Link: One Belt One Road is
not connected between China and the EUimproved
relations tie them together
RSIS, March 2016 [S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies a professional graduate school of
international afairs at the Nanyang Technological University, Singapore. RSIS mission is to develop a
community of scholars and policy analysts at the forefront of security studies and international afairs,
https://www.rsis.edu.sg/wp-content/uploads/2016/03/PR160307_China-One-Belt-One-Road.pdf]
This Policy Report focuses on the overland routes that connect China to
Europe via Central Asia and it aims to answer the question whether the
European Union (EU) should engage China in the One Belt One Road (OBOR)
initiative. The expansion of the OBOR initiative is forcing Chinas
economic diplomacy to embrace a broader political and security
engagement. While Russia and the United States are revising their
roles in South and Central Asia, the EU has lost momentum. This
Policy Report addresses the need for the EU to: adopt a common voice to
engage Chinas OBOR initiative; promote stakeholder participation;
coordinate crisis prevention; and avoid focusing only on short-term
economic gains to attract Chinas outbound direct investments. The EU
involvement with the OBOR initiative is a defining moment for Sino-European
relations. In this respect, China has to: communicate a detailed road map
on the OBOR initiative; allow local economic actors to access the bids for
infrastructural projects; increase the role of private Chinese SMEs; and
avoid relying on the OBOR initiative to export industrial overcapacity. In this
regard, the utilisation of the EU social and environmental best
practices by Beijing and a renewed EU stance towards a flexible
engagement with China could be mutually beneficial for fostering
regional stabilisation and structural reforms in South and Central
Asia.
B. Link: Economic and diplomatic engagement improves

relationsspills over into more cooperation
Balossi-Restelli, 2011 [Ludovica, professor at Cambridge University, An EU Innovative External

Action?]
This diferent historical experience also led the Europeans and the Chinese to
adopt diferent trajectories of national-building. The need to prevent war and to
expand their domestic markets motivated the European states to found the
European community/Union where national sovereignty is transferred in part
from member states to the community/union. The major European states have
passed the stage of industrialization and entered into a post-industrial era. In the
words of Robert Cooper, the European states are postmodern states which are
characterized by the breaking down of the distinction between domestic and
foreign afairs and mutual interference in (traditional) domestic afairs and
mutual surveillance (Cooper 2002, 13). In contrast, China is still in the process
of industrialization. Currently China is regarded as the worlds factory. In
Chinas external relations, sovereignty is stressed as a primary principle. It is
difficult to imagine that China will agree with others on mutual interference in
domestic afairsthis is in direct contradiction with Chinas Five Principles of
Peaceful coexistence. In the same vein, the distinction between domestic and
foreign afairs is also to be maintained by Beijing in the coming decades.
Composed of 27 member states, the EU is well recognized as a normative power.
According to the Treaty of the European Union, the Union if founded on the
principles of liberty, democracy, respect for human rights and the fundamental
freedoms, and the rule of law, principles that are common to the member states
(Treaty of the European Union, Art. 6). These principles, advocated by the EU, are
not only applied to its member states, but also promoted widely to the other
parts of the world. Since 2001, in the field of the EUs external relations, political
dialogue has been explicitly clarified by the Council to cover human rights and
democratization. In addition, the EU has established human rights dialogues with
about 40 countries. Among them, the EU established the first such human rights
dialogue with China in 1995 (Devuyst and Men 2011). China is known for its
pragmatism, which it has practiced since the reform policy was implement at the
end of the 1970s. What Deng Xiaoping, the general designer of Chinese reform,
said in the 1980s vividly summarises Beijings pragmatism: It doesnt matter if a
cat is black or white, so long as it catches mice. The principle ambition behind
Chinas state building process is to achieve power and prosperity (Men 2007, 7-
39(. In order to realise this goal, China has taken on board the successful
experience from the Western world so as to reform its economic and
social system, improves relations with its neighbours, and push aside
value and ideological differences in order to develop close cooperation
with major Western countries in regional and global affairs. The first
cooperative agreement on trade relations was reached between the EU and
China in 1978three years after the European Economic Community and the
Peoples Republic of China (PRC) established diplomatic relations. The
agreement on Trade and Economic Cooperation, agreed to in 1985, still

serves as the legal basis for bilateral cooperation. In 2007, negotiations for
a new agreement, The Partnership and Cooperation Agreement (PCA) were
launched and as of yet there is still no clear idea of when the deal is likely to be
concluded. Until now, economic and trade relations remain as a
cornerstone of the EU-China partnership. In contrast, cooperation in the
field of norms remains limited. Nevertheless, dialogue and
programmes/projects are maintained and regularly developed between
Brussels and Beijing in order to keep open different channels for
bilateral communication on the matter.
C. Impact: OBOR solves many impacts including the

global drug trade, terrorism, economic decline, and
Asian war
Ntousas, March 2016 [Vassilis, FEPS International Relations Policy Advisor, http://www.feps-
europe.eu/assets/6b12aa95-9d47-466f-a791-fa02a5d5c7d3/backtothefuture-feps-policybriefpdf.pdf]
Take infrastructure for example. Many countries clearly lacking the resources today to set up their own
competitive networks and to fund much required infrastructure projects will resort to OBOR and Chinese-
Intent
led investment to help them improve their connectivity to major markets and resource supplies.
to use its large financial leverage in this way, China has expressed the
willingness to fund these projects inter alia in order to improve its own market
linkages and find additional outlets for its construction industry . By doing so, and
so as to secure the safe and orderly conduct of its investment (and the commerce continuity that the
business model behind such investment is based upon), Beijing will inevitably (try to) secure a higher level
of support within each respective country. Therein lies the core of the argument about how OBOR could be
China is bound to gradually
politically beneficial to Beijing at the international level. Indeed,
enlarge its footprint on the ground in large swathes of Eurasia as it uses its
massive economic firepower to underpin the ambitious physical networks of
OBOR. As the initiative unfolds, and as mentioned above, this will inevitably mean that
Beijing will find itself increasingly involved in a wide variety of
regional matters, ranging from political or social instability and
regional disputes, to non-traditional threats such as terrorism, sea-
born crime and piracy, insurgencies and drug trade. In all of these matters,
Chinas involvement in OBOR will provide both an opening and an
active interest in diffusing tensions and settling the situation , if it wants
to preserve the status quo, in doing so, it will inevitably utilize the increasing leverage it
will have in the region, as a consequence of its increasing leverage over the
trading routes (and therefore the transit countries). whether intentionally or not, Beijings
amassed economic clout will most likely translate into political clout, not least
due to the fact that, though its involvement with OBOR, China will become an
agenda-setter. According to many international commentators, this signifies that OBOR reveals a
marked shift to Beijings hitherto low-profile international involvement. For these critics, the noticeable
change that OBOR represents lies in what they see as Chinas ambition to become a principal diplomatic
force in the region in addition to the inevitable primary economic role it will want to secure for itself if the
they also interpret OBOR, for example,
OBOR initiative succeeds; viewed as such,
as a strategic move by Beijing to counter the United States (US)
pivot to Asia and/or the also US-led Trans-Pacific Partnership . For obvious
reasons, China has routinely attempted to fend of any such allegations that it wishes to use OBOR for
political purposes internationally in the classical sphere of influence expansion sense. Indeed, Chinese
officials have gone to great lengths to convey this message during their many visits in countries abroad,
portraying OBOR as an initiative that is by no means a tool for any country to seek geopolitical advantages
but one that is based on complementarity, joint consultations and mutual benefit. President Xi Jinping, for
example, has stated that OBOR should be jointly built through consultation to meet the interests of all,
and eforts should be made to integrate the development strategies of the countries along the routes. It is
not closed but open and inclusive; it is not a solo by China but a chorus of all countries along the
routes.19This also explains why Chinese leaders and party operatives have vehemently rejected the
comparison that many observers have made that the OBOR is a Chinese scheme that resembles the U.S.
Marshall Plan. Indeed, unlike the Marshall Plan, that is, the US-led and US-funded programme aimed at
revitalising Western Europe after the end of the Second World War, which came hand in hand with strict
there is not set of preconditions
conditions, Beijing has emphasised time and time again that
attached to OBOR. In this context, Beijing's insistence on the 'win-win', no-strings-attached
character of OBOR should not be seen as a simple slogan, but is rather embedded in the traditional
For Beijing, the indivisibility of
Chinese ethos in its international modus operandi.
connectivity, stability, security, and development is an important
component in explaining what is for them the real long-term added
value of OBOR for the region: serving as a confidence-building
exercise, OBOR and the greater connectivity it will bring with it can
foster regional stability and development, which could in turn assist
countries in transcending geopolitics and their geopolitical sources
of antipathy. Put more simply, the intention here is for neighbouring countries to feel like
stakeholders of the project, reap the benefits of what China has to ofer through OBOR, and therefore
gradually align their interest amongst them (and with Beijing) without feeling threatened by its increasing
OBOR does not constitute an initiative targeted at
influence. Viewed in this context, the
converting economic influence into geostrategic might, but a gradual exercise
in seed-planting of sorts, which if it succeeds, can strengthen the stability of
the wider region. Regardless of the intentions of Beijing, the way(s) in which the confluence of all of
the above factors will be perceived internationally relies heavily on how the OBOR initiative will be
implemented. Indeed, as OBOR is expected to shape the countrys economic development strategy and
international activities in the upcoming years, the ways in which the initiative will be implemented will
ultimately decide the projects reputation. For the moment, Beijing has shown that it almost exclusively
focuses on the economic drivers of the initiative and that it places a great emphasis on the inclusiveness
of the programme. Evidently, this can change over time, and in this sense, it is important to underline that
the balance between the two will have to be continuously reassessed along the trajectory of OBORs
development. Yet, in spite of whether OBOR intentionally or unintentionally manages to extend the pulling
the initiative itself can only be ostensibly
radius of Chinas international gravitational field,
regarded as a way to promote trade routes ; the centrality of the initiative within Chinas
foreign and domestic policy announcements and discourse points elsewhere. Indeed, much like its added
OBOR can
value in providing a framework of common reference and action in the domestic realm,
also act both as a springboard and a lynchpin for the intensification of Chinas
engagement internationally. As such, it can be seen as the policy embodiment of the intention
for China to become a less dependent, more active strategic player in the international arena. Whether or
not this exercise succeeds remains to be seen, but its potential consequences for China and world will be
very significant nonetheless.
2NC/1NR OBOR Net Benefit Extensions
2NC/1NR EU CP Internal Net

Benefit AT #1No OBOR Funding
They say OBOR wont be funded, but
1. Extend our RSIS evidence.

Its much better than their Financial Express evidence
NAME]
(its newer) (the author is more qualified) (it
has more facts)
to be true)
their argument)

Our RSIS evidence is from a peer reviewed, graduate school journal.
The authors are from the countries that the OBOR would run through
in Southeast Asia. Their evidence is from a business magazine that
knows nothing about the politics of the area. Also, our evidence lays
our exactly how it would be done step by step, their evidence just
says it wont happen.
This matters because: improved relations with the EU lead to OBOR
passing. The policy solves multiple impacts that outweigh the aff.
2 Improved relations guarantee the passage of the

One Belt, One Road policy
Le Corre, 2015 [Phillippe, visiting fellow in the Center on the United States and Europe at Brookings.
His research focuses on Asia-Europe political and economic relations, Chinas foreign policy, and France.,
EU-China Summit: What happens when the U.S. isnt watching, June 26,
http://www.brookings.edu/blogs/order-from-chaos/posts/2015/06/26-china-europe-summit-lecorre]
Perhaps the most interesting aspect of the summit will be a statement on

Chinas potential role in Junckers newly created European Fund for Strategic
Investments (EFSI), which totals 315 billion. The funds aims include
relaunching growth and job creation in sectors ranging from innovation to
research, education, and transport infrastructure. At Brussels request, EU
countries have already submitted an initial list of about 2,000 investment
projects. In the run-up to the summit, Chinese officials have highlighted
complementarity between the Juncker plan and their One Belt, One Road
initiative. That project would build infrastructure across China, Central Asia,
and the Middle East through an 11,000 kilometer new Silk Road. Could it go
as far as Europe? Chinese leaders say yes, though there are few details as of
yet.

Benefit AT #2Case outweighs
the DA
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D. Turns the case: Our impact causes their impact because:
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Benefit AT #3EU/China Relations
High
They say EU-China Relations are high, but
1. Extend our RSIS evidence.

Its much better than their Yanyi evidence because:
facts)
to be true)
their argument)

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2 Low relations prevent passage of One Belt One Road

connecting China and Europe
RSIS, March 2016 [S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies a professional graduate school of
international afairs at the Nanyang Technological University, Singapore. RSIS mission is to develop a
community of scholars and policy analysts at the forefront of security studies and international afairs,
https://www.rsis.edu.sg/wp-content/uploads/2016/03/PR160307_China-One-Belt-One-Road.pdf]
However, beyond the trade statistics and new rail connections, the role of
the OBOR initiative is still not entirely understood in Europe.33
During the launch of the OBOR initiative, China witnessed a timid reaction
among EU officials. A limited number of EU member states pledged support
for the initiative. Several EU member states subsequently boasted in the
media their respective exclusive roles in the OBOR initiative ranging from
German and Polish railway links and Italian historical connections in the
ancient Silk Road through Venice and Marco Polo to the Chinese plan under
the OBOR to have Greece as the receiving line of the 21st century Maritime
Silk Road in Europe at the Piraeus port. EU think tanks and universities have
increased the frequency of workshops and seminars on subjects such as
Opportunities and Challenges of the One Belt, One Road: The New Silk Road
of the 21st century and China in the eyes of the EU, the EU in the eyes of
China. In this regard, the OBOR is considered good for business, along with
a common critique on its lack of specific projects for European participation.
The orientation of the EU think tanks towards the OBOR initiative is still
evolving as researchers and scholars study its impact on the EUs external
relations, particularly the EU Neighbourhood Policy and the EUs role in
Central Asia. The Eurasian corridor has to be seen not only as a mechanism
for enabling the flow of high-value and low-volume products from Europe to
China, but also as a means of promoting a broader Eurasian socio-economic
integration. Besides the programs delineated by the EU in the High Level
Security Dialogue (HLSD) with Central Asian states, Brussels could promote
important regional programs to foster human resource education, the rule of
law and environmental protection via a more flexible stance towards
cooperation with Beijing. At the same time, as China has gradually subtracted
Central Asia from the Russian economic sphere of influence, it is slowly but
inexorably reaching countries and markets closer to the EU. The 16+1
cooperation framework between China and the CEE countries has clearly
shown the potential of Chinese influence creating a significant lobby of pro-
China sentiments in the EU and its immediate neighbourhood. In fact, China
and the EU also need to address how to operate a relationship which touches
on regional security concerns arising from terrorism, drugs and human
trafficking as well as other transnational crime. The EU population is still
not well aware of the OBOR initiative. They still perceive the Chinese ODI
with mixed feelings as there are lingering suspicions that China has broader
strategic intent and not just commercial calculations in putting such financial
resources across the Eurasian region.34 Furthermore, the EU media narrative
is still centred on Chinese mergers and acquisitions (M&A) in the EU rather
than a broader socio-political analysis of the OBOR initiative and possible
cooperation patterns to shape a long-term relationship between the EU and
China based on a better understanding of reciprocal values and interests. To a
large degree, EUs approach has remained rooted in a democratisation and
human rights paradigm. The focus on purely economic motives and the lack
of clarity by China exacerbates the situation. In actual fact, the OBOR
initiative can be a platform for both sides to develop a new basis of
promoting mutual trust and mutual benefit, even though the EU decision-
making process among its institutions and member states can be
complicated for the Chinese side.
1. EU-Chinese relations are low because EU

engagement is unconditional and limited
European Council on Foreign Relations, 2009 [April, http://www.ecfr.eu/page/-/ECFR12_-

_A_POWER_AUDIT_OF_EU-CHINA_RELATIONS.pdf]
The EUs China strategy is based on an anachronistic belief that China, under
the influence of European engagement, will liberalise its economy, improve
the rule of law and democratise its politics. The underlying idea is that
engagement with China is positive in itself and should not be conditional on
any specific Chinese behaviour. This strategy has produced a web of bilateral
agreements, joint communiqus, memoranda of understanding, summits,
ministerial visits and sector-specific dialogues, all designed to draw China
towards EU-friendly policies. As one senior EU diplomat puts it: We need
China to want what we want.1 Yet, as this report shows, Chinas
foreign and domestic policy has evolved in a way that has paid little
heed to European values, and today Beijing regularly contravenes or
even undermines them. The EUs heroic ambition to act as a catalyst for
change in China completely ignores the countrys economic and political
strength and disregards its determination to resist foreign influence.
Furthermore, the EU frequently changes its objectives and seldom follows
through on them. The already modest leverage that EU Member States have
over China, collectively and individually, is weakened further by the disunity
in their individual approaches. The result is an EU policy towards China that
can be described as unconditional engagement: a policy that gives
China access to all the economic and other benefits of cooperation
with Europe while asking for little in return. Most EU Member States are
aware that this strategy, enshrined in a trade and cooperation agreement
concluded back in 1985, is showing its age. They acknowledge its existence,
largely ignore it in practice, and pursue their own, often conflicting national
approaches towards China. Some challenge China on trade, others on politics,

some on both, and some on neither.
3 China exploits country differences in the EU

comprehensive cooperation is low

China has learned to exploit the divisions among EU Member States. It treats
its relationship with the EU as a game of chess, with 27 opponents crowding
the other side of the board and squabbling about which piece to move. As
irritating as Beijing finds this at times, there is no question about who is in a
position to play the better game. As a neo-authoritarian Chinese academic,
Pan Wei, puts it, the EU is weak, politically divided and militarily non-
influential. Economically, its a giant, but we no longer fear it because we
know that the EU needs China more than China needs the EU.2 China knows
its strength and no longer bothers to hide it. Its new readiness to treat
the EU with something akin to diplomatic contemp t became apparent
last December with the short-term cancellation of the EU-China summit in
Lyon, a harsh reaction to French president Nicolas Sarkozys plans to meet
the Dalai Lama.

Benefit AT #4One Issue Isnt
Enough
They say One cooperation on the CP is not enough to improve relations, but

facts)
to be true)
their argument)

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2 Tough economic and Diplomatic cooperation improve

China-EU relations

For the four Rs of reciprocal engagement to work, the Ideological Free-

Traders must accept that their fundamentalist refusal to use market access as
a political tool makes it nearly impossible to counter Chinese policies
designed to exploit Europe. The Accommodating Mercantilists should
acknowledge that their support for industrial national champions will bear
little fruit if the result is to weaken the EU in the face of formidable
Japanese and American competition, while their refusal to stand up
to China on politics exposes the EU to a future of increasing global
irrelevance. The Assertive Industrialists must accept the need for a coherent
EU strategy. And the European Followers should understand that it
undermines the EUs China policy as a whole when so many Member
States act as if the relationship with China is not important enough
for them to bother with it. Reciprocal engagement is not code for an
aggressive strategy to contain China. The EU has no choice but to engage
China as a global partner and to accept its historic rise. Rather, the EU must
make it in Chinas best interests to deliver what Europeans are asking for.
Reciprocal engagement means forming up the EU approach and
driving a harder bargain in negotiations with China, with the aim of
coming to mutually beneficial deals that result in greater openness
on both sides. For the new strategy to be efective, the EU should
streamline its channels of communication with China, improve the ways
Member States coordinate their China policies and make European
institutions work more efectively. It should also increase its expertise on
China by funding training for European officials and managers in Chinese
language, politics and economics. It should press Beijing to grant EU officials
increased access to the Chinese government machinery, and explain that it
might reduce access to Chinese officials in Europe if this is not forthcoming.
Access to Chinese institutions across the country should be improved by
opening sub-delegation of offices in major cities.
3 Cooperation on single issues spills over
European Parliament, 2015 [Parliament calls for closer EU-China cooperation

on global challenges, December 16,
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/news/en/news-
room/20151210IPR06858/Parliament-calls-for-closer-EU-China-cooperation-
on-global-challenges]
The EU and China must work more closely together to tackle global
challenges and threats, such as terrorism, illegal migration, security, climate
change and global financial and market governance, Parliament says in a
resolution passed on Wednesday. It calls for talks to be accelerated on a new
partnership and cooperation agreement "based on trust, transparency and
respect for human rights." "The great importance of solid relations
between the EU and China is evident. This report adopted by 554 votes
to 50, with 99 abstentions explains that in detail. To keep a clear view of the
rapid developments in our mutual relations I plead for an annual EP-report in
response to a similar report by the High Representative," said the rapporteur,
Bas Belder (ECR, NL). "For years I have followed the excellent articles and
analyses of European correspondents in China with pleasure and profit. They
should, which is not now the case, enjoy the same level of media freedom as
their Chinese colleagues in Europe," he said. Parliament hails the 40th
anniversary of diplomatic relations between the EU and China and says that
the 17th EU-China Summit of 29 June 2015 sent out a signal for "closer
political cooperation going beyond mere trade relations and towards a
coordinated strategic approach to tackling common global challenges and
threats". Though concerned at the current financial crisis in China, the EP
calls on EU countries to make better use of the opportunities ofered by the
growth of the Chinese economy in the past 20 years. It points to the
importance of the Bilateral Investment Agreement currently under
negotiation in paving the way for fair treatment of companies in both Europe
and China. It also calls for measures to boost people-to-people exchanges,
particularly between experts and students in the EU and in China.

Benefit AT #5OBOR Bad Impact
Turn
They say OBOR is actually bad and causes many problems, but
1. Extend our Ntousas evidence.

Its much better than their Lu evidence because:
facts)
to be true)
their argument)

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2 OBOR has counter measures to prevent problems
Lu, April 2016 [Miao, PhD Executive Secretary General of the Center for China and Globalization, April
28, http://www.brinknews.com/one-belt-one-road-risks-and-countermeasures-for-chinese-companies/]
Outsourcing experts to conduct risk analysis Chinese enterprises need to be

business-like and realistic in factoring potential risks into the cost of
investment projects. They need to make the best use of top-flight foreign risk
analysis firms, while also employing the expertise of leading Chinese think
tanks doing risk analysis, such as the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences.
Let think tanks play a big role in risk management of One Belt, One Road
initiatives Think tanks, particularly those run independently, are in a better
position to evaluate development risk. Firms investing in One Belt, One Road
should involve such organizations in planning for such projects and
attempting to balance the interests of the stakeholders involved in them.
Setting a network of cooperative the One Belt, One Road zone think tanks
should promote in-depth and comprehensive discussion of the problems and
concerns of the relevant parties. Set up a security mechanism to address
security concerns In the short term, Chinese companies ought to beef up
their internal security by making use of good private security contractors. In
the long term, however, they need to establish trust and build durable
partnerships with local stakeholders in the One Belt, One Road countries
targeted for investment. Attach more importance to corporate social
responsibility Chinese companies investing abroad should be more concerned
about corporate social responsibility, which can be a key element in
enhancing Chinas soft power in the One Belt, One Road area. Firms should
pay especially close attention to their treatment of local workers and the
environmental impact of investment projects (both issues in Myanmar).
Efective corporate social responsibility can go a long way in reducing the
internal security risks faced by firms seeking to invest in One Belt, One Road
countries. Capacity building in nurturing partnership with NGOs and the civil
society Chinese enterprises with outbound investments need to pay more
attention to local nongovernmental organizations and work with civil society
actors in One Belt, One Road countries. One road countries where NGOs are
very active are becoming important spokesmen for civil society. While doing
projects, NGOs should be invited to express their concerns and interests.
Recruiting and nurturing talent with an international mindset To better
understand conditions in diverse and complex foreign environments, Chinese
companies investing in One Belt, One Road must efectively integrate
knowledgeable foreign talent into the management of overseas investment
operations. Equally important, two-way educational and cultural exchange
between Chinese and local people in One Belt, One Road areas should be
promoted. This can play a crucial role in promoting cross-cultural awareness
between China and One Belt, One Road countries. To this end, a One Belt,
One Road scholarship fund ought to be established to enable students from

these countries to study in China, and likewise, Chinese to live and learn
about places like Kazakhstan, which have very diferent and unique cultures
and social norms.
3 OBOR dramatically improves the global economy

while making countries more interconnected
Financial Express, February 2016 [Reviving the Silk Route via One
Belt, One Road, February 29,
http://www.financialexpress.com/article/fe-columnist/reviving-the-
silk-route-via-one-belt-one-road/217271/]
Chinas pioneering One Belt, One Road (OBOR) plan, initiated by President Xi
Jinping in 2013, is now steadily gathering momentum, by way of projects
ranging from airports to deepwater ports, canals to railway lines, all
fortuitously spread across several geostrategic points on the map. In fact,
OBOR is now starting to become a reality. While the Chinese hail OBOR
some 900 projects worth $890 billion lined upas a vindication of Chinese
prowess and lead in global connectivity and communication serving global
needs, observers see more in it than just a benign Chinese benediction.
Consider why. OBOR has two componentsSilk Road Economic Belt and 21st
Century Maritime Silk Road. Both, naturally, in measures of national interest
and global connectivity, envisage Chinas footprints on the high seas,
channels and ports, as well as highlands and lowlands of the continental
massthe strategy being an updated version of the ancient Silk Route, the
circuitous jumble of trading routes of the past undertaken by caravans, sea-
junks and dhows touching Central Asia and circumnavigating to far corners.
The updated version, OBOR, envisages a more comprehensive mesh,
envisaging connective infrastructureroad plus seadesigned to link,
smoothen, lubricate wheels of Chinas trade and exchange. The karmic
reincarnation of the former Silk Route as OBOR is backed by Chinas largesse
of foreign exchange reserves of $4 trillion, and its dramatic rise, showing little
dent of its faltering economy and slowdown to 6.9% in 2015, lower than the
anticipated 7% growth. OBOR seeks to place China at the centre of an axis of
connectivity, creating a seamless interface of physical infrastructure (ports,
roads), trade (with East and West) and finance (connecting China with the
rest of the world). Overland roads, highways, expressways, maritime ports
and harbours are geared to ease economic connections. One of the biggest
dividends, China claims, is connecting peoples minds. OBOR
touches more than 60 countries and over 4 billion people, enabling
an outlet for Chinese construction companies, goods and labour, and
in return, offer many primary products in exchange. OBOR is motivated
by its own geographic compulsionslarge parts of western and southern
China constitute the land-locked interior. Chinas excessive dependence on
the sea route for exports and energy security (almost 80% of Chinas oil from
the Middle East and Africa) passes through the narrow and busy Strait of
Malacca, which posits the quintessential Malacca Dilemma. Both the road
and sea infrastructure are poised to help the land-locked interior

and address the excessive reliance on the notorious Malacca choke-
point. The ambition of OBOR is partly captured by a professor of
international relations at Seoul National University, Jae Ho Chung, who
contends that OBOR footprints 55% of the world gross national
product, 70% of the worlds population, and 75% of its energy
reserves, and translates as Chinese presence from the Middle East
to Africa to as far as the European backyard.

Benefit - OBOR Solves
Terrorism/Drug Trade Extensions
1. Improved relations lead to passage of OBORthats
key to ending Afghanistans drug trade, improving
relations, and stabilizing Central Asia
RSIS, March 2016 [S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies a

professional graduate school of international afairs at the Nanyang
Technological University, Singapore. RSIS mission is to develop a community
of scholars and policy analysts at the forefront of security studies and
international afairs, https://www.rsis.edu.sg/wp-
content/uploads/2016/03/PR160307_China-One-Belt-One-Road.pdf]
The EU should focus on long-term priorities to engage China, taking into

consideration not only Brussels present lack of available resources but also
the high costs to be borne by the EU in the event of a new crisis in South and
Central Asia. Although the priority of relations for Russia and the EU are
related to the unfolding of the Ukrainian crisis, the Russian influence on its
neighbours is going to endure. While the Central Asian republics are enacting
a multi-vector foreign policy, balancing Chinas economic might with Russias
military power, the EU flexible engagement with the One Belt
initiative could promote cooperation, combining the EU know-how,
regional domestic needs with the affluence of Chinese investors.
Chinese interests in Afghanistan could benefit from EU mechanisms
that counter the spread of drug trade and illegal economies all over
Eurasia. The first thing to do is for the EU to project a single voice to China
and avoid representing diferent policies and priorities between Brussels and
the EU member states. The key point to deliver to China is that strengthening
of cross-regional Chinese- made infrastructure has to be balanced by an
equitable access to construction projects by non- Chinese corporations.
Moreover, transparency and access to the bidding process will also enhance
Chinese SOEs competitiveness and facilitate the SOE reform in the long run.
The OBOR initiative has already interconnected with other multilateral
platforms such as the EEU and the EU active engagement could guarantee
European companies the same level of access to the Chinese market that the
Chinese companies are already enjoying in the European market. While China
is in dire need of an update in its public diplomacy communication attempts
to keep pace with increasing confidence in its own ODI process, it is critical to
stress the long-term geopolitical consequences of its economic assertiveness.
The EU involvement with the OBOR initiative will be a defining moment for
Sino-European relations. As the EU needs to ofer China a unified and
confident approach on the OBOR initiative, China needs to provide a
coordinated strategic plan that streamlines the plethora of institutional actors
into an easily recognisable interlocutor. There is still time for the EU to catch
the train if its policy and timeline are clear, sustainable and understood by all
the parties concerned.

Benefit - OBOR Solves EU
Economy
1. OBOR solves the EU and Chinese economiess
RSIS, March 2016 [S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies a

professional graduate school of international afairs at the Nanyang
Technological University, Singapore. RSIS mission is to develop a community
of scholars and policy analysts at the forefront of security studies and
international afairs, https://www.rsis.edu.sg/wp-
content/uploads/2016/03/PR160307_China-One-Belt-One-Road.pdf]
The Europe-China transport links promoted by China encompass several

projects along diferent corridors, including high-speed rail connections,
trans-national highways and pipelines. In Xis vision, the geostrategic land-
locked position and economic development potential of the Central Asian
states ofer an opportunity for bridging trade flows between Asia and the EU.
The envisaged Eurasian Land Bridge will benefit China with faster access to
the EU market (less than three weeks compared to an average of five weeks
by container shipping), while EU companies will not only have a cost-efective
route for exports, but also an efficient way to import their own China-based
production. Following the demise of the Soviet Union, the Eurasian rail
network has become an efficient trade route. Besides, from the Chinese
geopolitical point of view, this route is safer than the maritime one because it
avoids the choke point of the Straits of Malacca. The main trade routes
include the following:
AFF 2AC Answers
2AC European Union

Counterplan Answers
1. No Solvency: Disagreements cause delay in EU-China
cooperation

id=170&siteid=3]
Despite the fact that China and EU have had made their minds, setting the
scope and substances of the lists would be a difficult mission. There would
surely be domestic resistances on both sides as the substantive discussions
on new market openings move along. Moreover, the gaps in terms of
development stage and economic structures between the two players result
in very diferent development needs, which might create new tensions. The
EU, leading in many fields, such as service, industrial design and high-end
manufacturing, attaches great importance to labor rights and environmental
protection, whereas China, ranking top in manufacturing, hopes to remove
investment barriers in the EU market. Its foreseeable that China and EU will
present two very diferent negative lists so as to protect their own industries
and achieving their own demands. Such diferences remain the biggest
obstacle in the negotiation.
2. Permutation: The US, EU, and China should cooperate

on the plan. The EU will get the same amount of
credit for improving China relations and the OBOR
policy will still be built.
AFF 2AC Answers
3. Cooperation between all three countries solve a ton

of different impactsthe perm is best
Yi, 2013 [Wang, associate research fellow with China Institute of International
Studies, Sino-European-U.S. Relations and the Possibilities of Trilateral
Cooperation, August 13, http://www.ciis.org.cn/english/2013-
08/19/content_6223055_2.htm]
Competition between the three sides in terms of geopolitics, trade and

hotspot issues is intensifying, and structural conflicts are inevitable. That
being said, the common interests shared by the three sides are steadily
growing, and positive interactions are increasing instead of decreasing. Mired
in long-term difficulties, the United States and European economies need to
maintain and strengthen cooperation with China for their own interests. The
diferences between China on the one hand and Europe and the United States
on the other hand in terms of economic development and macroeconomic
industrial structure make it both possible and necessary for them to develop
complementary and mutually beneficial relations. China, Europe and the
United States are already key and indispensable players on an array
of issues, from the reform of the UN and the international financial
system, nuclear disarmament, non-proliferation of weapons of mass
destruction, immigration, economics, trade, global governance,
climate change, energy and food security and other important
issues. The three sides policies and positions are interlinked, interactive and
mutually influenced. Chinas idea of G3 Co-governance and Western
scholars conception of a tripartite coexistence of the RMB, the euro and
the U.S. dollar have indirectly proved the eagerness of Europe and the United
States to cooperate with China. The main reason for this eagerness is that
China, Europe and the United States are already the most prominent actors
on the international stage, comprising the key stakeholders in global strategic
issues. This dynamic determines that trilateral relations between the three
parties are a combination of cooperation and competition. On the one hand,
the three sides have a strong incentive to cooperate: if they work together,
they can mutually benefit and better cope with various challenges. China,
Europe and the United States, along with all other countries, are facing an
array of global issues, and it is in the interest of all countries to get together
to efectively cope with these challenges. On the other hand, there is
competition among the three parties in their attempts to meet these
challenges. The core of their competition rests on how the three sides can
fairly and justly share and allocate responsibilities and obligations in the
international community. The essence of their competition is the struggle for
space and the rights of national development in sum, it involves an
AFF 2AC Answers
optimization and change of responsibilities, rights and returns in the

international system.
4. No Solvency: The US has unique relationship with

China. Our AFF outlines how the US is necessary to
cooperate either because of its military, economy, or
human rights stance. Our ______ evidence or ______
advantage explains why the US can only do the plan.
AFF 2AC Answers
5. Hegemony:
A. US-China cooperation strengthen declining US
hegemony
Mendis and Wang, May 2016 [Patrick and Joey, Mendis is a Rajawali senior fellow of the
Kennedy School of Governments Ash Center for Democratic Governance and Innovation at Harvard
University and Wang is a defense analyst and a graduate of the Naval War College, the National Defense
University, and the Harvard Kennedy School, Who Can Contain China When U.S. Policy Fails?, 5/1,
http://www.theglobalist.com/who-can-contain-china-when-united-states-policy-fails/]
Throughout these intervening 20th century years, the meager trading

relationship went through fits and starts. Nonetheless, when Deng Xiaoping
took Chinas helm and embarked on a path toward trade liberalization and
modernization, Chinas significance to the world economy began to emerge.
Eventually this led to its accession to the WTO in 2001. With U.S. assistance,
via trade policy, China has crossed the economic Rubicon where there is no
return. According to a September 2015 Congressional Research Service
report, total U.S. trade has risen from $2 million in 1979 to $591 billion in
2014: China is currently the United States second-largest trading partner,
its third largest export market, and its biggest source of imports. Chinas
fixation with security in the South China Sea, Indian Ocean and other sea
lines of communication (SLOCs) is not without cause. Seven of the worlds top
ten container ports are in China. Chinas export economy survives by these
trade routes. Any disruption to these routes would be a significant impact not
only to its economy but also to the American and global economies. The
latter has been demonstrated by the ripple efects of recent stock exchange
plunges in Shanghai and Shenzhen. Autonomous but Interdependent. Indeed,
Chinas rise could easily be viewed as an existential threat. Beijings ability to
project power today has never been greater, both economically and militarily.
And the signs of aspiring hegemony are underscored by that ability. Yet,
Chinas rising power could also be welcomed as another global force capable
of burden-sharing. One that can contribute to fighting a myriad of threats,
such as participating with multinational forces in maintaining the security of
SLOCs, counterpiracy, humanitarian assistance, disaster relief, and a variety
of other global missions. These are the threats that China and the rest of the
world really face. In other words, with great power comes great responsibility.
Recognizing that any disruption to Chinas economy would mean a disruption
to the U.S. economy, the United States should support China in maintaining a
healthy trade relationship. It should also continue to focus on building a much
needed trust, promoting fair competition and engaging China to join rule-
based institutions and paving the road toward a MAP doctrine.
AFF 2AC Answers
B. US hegemony solves global warfare between the US

and Chinastrong diplomacy solves
THAYER, 2007 [Bradley. A is an Associate Professor in the Dept. of Defense

and Strategic Studies at Missouri State University, American Empire: A
Debate, Taylor and Francis Group, 2007]
So it is with the United States today. Peace and stability are major benefits of the
American Empire. The fact that America is so powerful actually reduces
the likelihood of major war. Scholars of international politics have found that the
presence of a dominant state in international politics actually reduces the likelihood of
war because weaker states, including even great powers, know that it is
unlikely that they could challenge the dominant state and win . They may
resort to other mechanisms or tactics to challenge the dominant country, but
are unlikely to do so directly. This means that there will be no wars between great
powers. At least, not until a challenger (certainly China) thinks it can
overthrow the dominant state (the United States). But there will be
intense security competitionboth China and the United States will watch
each other closely, with their intelligence communities increasingly focused
on each other, their diplomats striving to ensure that countries around
the world do not align with the other, and their militaries seeing the
other as their principal threat. This is not unusual in international politics but, in
fact, is its normal condition. Americans may not pay much attention to it until a crisis
occurs. But right now states are competing with one another. This is because international
politics does not sleep; it never takes a rest.
AFF 2AC OBOR Internal Net Benefit
Answers
2AC EU CP OBOR Net Benefit

Answers
1. No Internal Link: OBOR will be divided and
underfunded
Financial Express, February 2016 [2/29, http://www.financialexpress.com/article/fe-

columnist/reviving-the-silk-route-via-one-belt-one-road/217271/]
The challenge lies in implementation over disparate socio-political terrains,

often with non-traditional threats such as insurgencies and drug trade.
Chinas ASEAN backyard is simmering with disputes over South China Sea
and East China Sea. Despite Chinas burgeoning trade with ASEAN (bilateral
trade is expected to reach $500 billion), ASEAN stands divided over
increasing Chinese stridency in neighbouring seas. Central Asia, a huge
stakeholder in the strategy, is marked by a dominant Russian presence, with
potentially unstable states such as Belarus which could prove to be the
hurdles in the smooth running of the economic corridors. Some projects
have already run into rough weatherKra Canal has acrimoniously
divided the Thai public, and is ruffling Singapores feathers (the canal will
diminish Singapores maritime standing which contributes 7% to its GDP). In
Indonesia, the Jakarta-Bandung Railway shows teething troubles, with
newspapers churning out paeans about safety issues. As for the CPEC, given
the security environment and opposition to Chinese workers in Pakistan, a
12,000-strong security force stands guard over Chinese workers. According
to the American Enterprise Institute (AEI), a quarter of
investments/projects undertaken by the Chinese from 2005 to 2014
worth $246 billion have stalled due to various reasons. OBOR may
inadvertently drive rivalry in Asia. The China-led AIIB challenges existing
financial institutions such as the Word Bank and the IMF, and also Japans
Asian Development Bank (ADB) which has chosen to keep away from AIIB.
Re-balancing China may yet take other hues.
2. Impact Calculus:
________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________
Answers
________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________
D. Turns the DA: Our impact causes their impact because:
________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________
3. Non-Unique: EU-China relations are at an all-time

high
Yanyi, 2015 [Yang, head of the Mission of the People's Republic of

China to the European Union, China-EU Relations: Broader,
Higher and Stronger, February, 4,
https://euobserver.com/stakeholders/127497
It was a year of new vision for China-EU relations. During his historic visit to
the EU last spring, President Xi Jinping proposed to build a China-EU
partnership for peace, growth, reform and civilisation and thus
bridge the Chinese Dream and the European one. In his meeting and
phone conversation with the new EU leadership, President Xi reiterated the
direction and vision for China-EU relations, which were well received by the
EU side. Trade relations It was a year of increased cooperation on a higher
level. The two sides launched over 70% of the initiatives identified in the
China-EU 2020 Strategic Agenda for Cooperation. Trade between China
and the EU exceeded US$615 billion, an increase of 9.9% year-on-
year. Chinese investment in the EU reached US$9.41 billion in the first 11
months of 2014, a nearly three-fold increase. China-EU cooperation has
moved further ahead not just in quantitative but also qualitative terms. The
partnership for civilization has begun to take root in peoples mind. Thanks to
the second meeting of the China-EU High-Level People-to-People Dialogue,
cultural and people-to-people exchanges have become ever more vibrant,
with 6 million people travelling between China and EU countries last year.
China and the EU had a good track record of communication and coordination
on the Iranian nuclear issue, climate change, international trade negotiations
and other important global and regional afairs. Human rights It was also a
year witnessing fresh progress in resolving diferences between China and
the EU. In 2014, we resolved trade frictions properly, signalling to the
international community our determination against trade protectionism and
our commitment to settling disputes via dialogue and consultation. China has
Answers
engaged in in-depth dialogue with the EU on human rights in a spirit of
equality and seeking common ground while shelving diference. This has
helped the EU understand and appreciate Chinas views on human rights, its
achievements as well as its commitment to the rule of law. We have
increasingly come to a consensus on the need to take a long-term
and holistic approach, increase mutual trust through candid dialogue
and remove impediments as we work together to develop bilateral
relations.
4. No Link: One IssueDiplomacy on a single issue will

not be enough to convince China and the EU to spend
billions of dollars. One single cooperation on
diplomacy will not completely change Chinas mind
theyre either going to do OBOR or not.
Answers
5. Impact Turn: OBOR causes economic decline, water
wars, and terrorism
Lu, April 2016 [Miao, PhD Executive Secretary General of the Center
for China and Globalization, 4/28, http://www.brinknews.com/one-
belt-one-road-risks-and-countermeasures-for-chinese-companies/]
Political risks One set of risks stems from the complicated political situation
prevailing across large stretches of overland and maritime covered by One
Belt, One Road. Myanmar is a case in point. Chinese investment in the
country fell from $407 million in the 2012 fiscal year to just $46 million in the
2013 fiscal year, a drop of nearly 90 percent. This plunge was caused by
rising anti-Chinese sentiment and opposition to key projects in Myanmar,
notably the $3.6 billion Myitsone dam in the northern part of the country. Big
power rivalry in ASEAN countries, South Asia and Central Asia may also
threaten Chinese investment activities in these areas. China and Japan are
competing to raise their influence in South Asian countries. At the beginning
of 2016, Japan secured Dhakas approval to begin building an 60-footdeep
port in Matarbari, on the southeast coast of Bangladesh. Meanwhile, China
and Bangladesh were continuing to negotiate approval for the Sonadia deep
water port, which is located about 15 miles away from Matarbari. Potential
risks also exist in the One Belt, One Road Central Asian countries. Conflicts
exist between Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan. For example, Uzbekistan
strongly opposes Chinas hydropower project in, as the proposed dam is
located upstream on the Amu Darya River in Tajikistan. This investment
could therefore adversely affect Uzbekistans access to water, a
scarce resource in Central Asia. Security risks Chinese investment in
countries along One Belt, One Road may be exposed to regional turmoil and
conflicts, terrorism and religious conflicts. It is worth noting that Chinese
enterprises investing overseas have yet to devise a comprehensive security
strategy for dealing with such risks. They currently rely mainly on
Chinese consular and diplomatic protection, which are certainly
inadequate safeguards against major threats such as terrorism and
ethnic and sectarian religious violence. For its part, China has repeatedly
stated that One Belt, One Road is for promoting economic and cultural
exchange, as opposed to being a Trojan horse for extending Chinese
geopolitical influence. But China still seems to have problems establishing the
credibility of this message. Economic risk Chinese enterprises with
investments in One Belt, One Road countries face economic risks. One major
risk is the potential of these countries defaulting on foreign lending and
investment projects. Many of the One Belt, One Road countries, especially
those in Central Asia, are among the poorest economies in the world and
have dysfunctional and corrupt governments. This lack of creditworthiness
Answers
makes them poor bets for investment on the part of Chinas government and
Chinese financial institutions and businesses. Another source of risk lies
within the Chinese companies themselves doing business in One Belt, One
Road countries. A great deal remains to be done with respect to engineering
safety and management issues. At times, firms also have difficulties
obtaining sufficient intelligence and financing to efectively carry out
investment projects. When these fail to properly gather information and
conduct due diligence, they are more prone to engage in speculative, bubble-
like investment behavior. Chinese companies planning to go global by
undertaking One Belt, One Road projects need to up their game when it
comes to corporate governance and investment decision-making.
CDL Core Files 2016-2017 Pressure Counterplan
Pressure Counterplan
Vocabulary
Pressure: Placing force on a country. The CP argues that instead
of using diplomacy and cooperation, the US should just tell China
to do the plan. Every Af would involve some compromise, but the
CP says that the US should be strong/hardline and force China to
do the Af.
Hegemony/Primacy: The USs military and diplomatic power.
The Neg argues that compromise and cooperation make the US
look weakespecially when other countries ignore us. This power
is essential to keeping the world safe through threats, protecting
our allies, and the general fear of US force.
Beijing: Capital of China. When a piece of evidence says
Beijing, it means the government and political officials
representing China.
AT=Answers To
1NC Human Rights NEG Shell
1NC Human Rights Pressure CP

Counterplan Text: The United States Federal
Government should pressure China on
human rights issues
A. Solvency: The U.S. needs to adopt a hardline stance

on human rights issues with China- historically, China
has responded to threats, not soft diplomatic
approaches
Inboden and Chen, 2012 [Rana Siu Rana Siu Inboden is a doctoral candidate
in the Department of Politics and International Relations at the University of
Oxford, UK and Titus C. Chen is an Assistant Research Fellow at the Institute
of International Relations, National Chengchi University, Taiwan. Chinas
Response to International Normative Pressure: The Case of Human Rights,
July https://www.ciaonet.org/attachments/21049/uploads]
The 1989 Tiananmen Square protests and the resulting international

condemnation was a turning point that significantly altered Beijings
relationship with the human rights regime. China faced unprecedented
international pressure, including UN censure, Western government sanctions,
the suspension of high-level bilateral meetings, a freeze on World Bank and
Asian Development Bank loans, and the cancellation of bilateral cooperation
in a number of areas.18 The passage of a resolution on China by UN Sub-
Commission on Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of Minorities in
August 1989 marked the first time a permanent member of the Security
Council was censured by this body.19 China continued to experience greater
human rights scrutiny and normative pressure as the SubCommission passed
another resolution in 1991 and UNCHR member states attempted to adopt
resolutions condemning PRC human rights abuses.20 Although China
defeated the passage of UNCHR resolutions by using no-action motions, the
mere threat of censure in the Commission and the annual fight over the
resolutions were embarrassing to Beijing. As a result, Beijing began to seek to
lessen normative pressure.
Extensions
2NC/1NR Solvency Human Rights

Extensions
1. The Counterplan solves better than the aff. Attempts
to merely engage China on human rights issues
failed, but historically, sustained pressure has
worked.
PBS, 2012 Public Broadcasting Service, NewsHour, Should U.S. Pressure China More on Human
Rights? http://www.pbs.org/newshour/bb/world-jan-june12-humanrights_05-01/
GWEN IFILL: As Secretary of State Clinton arrives in China for a previously scheduled visit, the Obama
administrations human rights policy is back in the spotlight. Judy Woodruf has the story. JUDY WOODRUFF:
the images from the 1989 crackdown in Tiananmen Square remain
For many,
the most vivid example of human rights violations in China . In 1992, then candidate
Bill Clinton denounced those he called the butchers of Beijing. Eight years later, nearing the end of his time
in office, President Clinton signed legislation creating permanent normal trade relations with China.
FORMER PRESIDENT BILL CLINTON: The more China opens its markets, the more it unleashes the power of
economic freedom, the more likely it will be to more fully liberate the human potential of its people.
(APPLAUSE) JUDY WOODRUFF: In August of 2008, President George W. Bush criticized Chinas human rights
record during a speech in Thailand. FORMER PRESIDENT GEORGE W. BUSH: America stands in firm
opposition to Chinas detention of political dissidents and human rights advocates and religious activists.
JUDY WOODRUFF: The next day, Mr. Bush attended the opening ceremonies at the Summer Olympics in
Beijing. And in 2009, China was one of the stops on Hillary Clintons first trip as secretary of state. At the
time, she said, Pressing on those human rights issues cant interfere with the global economic crisis, the
global climate change crisis, and the security crisis. But now escaped dissident Chen Guangcheng is
human rights is back at
apparently under the protection of American diplomats in Beijing, and
the forefront of U.S.-Chinese relations . Secretary Clinton acknowledged as much on Monday
before leaving for a long-scheduled trip to China. SECRETARY OF STATE HILLARY RODHAM CLINTON: I can
certainly guarantee that we will be discussing every matter, including human rights, that is pending
between us. JUDY WOODRUFF: Thats on top of an agenda that includes the nuclear programs in Iran and
North Korea and a longstanding dispute over Chinas currency valuation. Two views now on how the Obama
administration has handled human rights, among the many issues on the U.S.-China agenda. Kenneth
Lieberthal directs the China Center at the Brookings Institution. He served on the National Security Council
staf during the Clinton administration. And Sophie Richardson is the advocacy director for the Asia
Division of Human Rights Watch. And we thank you both for being with us. Sophie Richardson, do you first.
And briefly tell us what is the state of human rights right now in China, and has it improved at all in the last
Well, look, were at a point in
few years? SOPHIE RICHARDSON, Human Rights Watch:
time where the Chinese government has made numerous
commitments to uphold and protect rights on paper, and indeed the
constitution was amended to that efect in 2004. And yet very few of those
laws are actually upheld in the breach with respect to the use of the death
penalty, the lack of due process, enforced disappearances, arbitrary
detention, really garden variety difficulties in people accessing justice . So, I think
the gaps between whats on paper and what happens in reality is quite significant still. JUDY WOODRUFF:
So how do you size up how the Obama administration has done in dealing with this? SOPHIE RICHARDSON:
Well, the administration, I think, got of to quite a wobbly start in the first
year-and-a-half, but sort of I think found its voice and found some
Extensions
greater confidence to talk about these issues and engage in some of
the more established diplomatic practices. I dont know that they really
kept up necessarily as the situation has deteriorated over the last year-and-a-
half. And what we would really like to see them do is not just
integrate human rights concerns across a much broader and more
complicated bilateral relationship than what the U.S. and China had 10 or 15 years ago,
but to also do a better job of not just welcoming the Chinese governments rise, as is mentioned in
almost every speech, but to also welcome the rise of people like Chen Guangcheng
and the work that theyre trying to do to hold their own government
accountable, largely because thats consistent with what the administration
has said it wants.
Extensions
2NC/1NR AT: Human Rights Pressure Destabilizes China
1. They say human rights pressure destabilizes China,

but the best way to ensure a smooth transition to
democracy in China is through pressuring China to
integrate into the global economy
Guangcheng and McMillan-Scott, 2013 Chen; Civil rights activists, Edward;

Liberal Democrat MEP for Yorkshire & Humber and vice-president of the
European Parliament for Democracy & Human Rights, and Transatlantic
Relations, "China: The West Needs to Promote Both Trade and Human Rights
", Huffington Post, http://www.huffingtonpost.com/chen-guangcheng/china-
trade-human-rights_b_3443081.html, June 14, 2013
The historic meeting between Chinese President Xi Jinping and President

Obama last week, billed as a chance to improve relations between the two
superpowers, revolved largely around sensitive economic issues such as
industrial cyber-espionage. Meanwhile, the news that the European Union has
just lodged a complaint at the World Trade Organization against China is just
the latest development in a rapidly escalating trade dispute. This growing
preoccupation with trade threatens to sideline the wider issue of how best to
promote human rights and democratic reform in China, a country whose
political future is set to determine the course of the 21st century. The Chinese
leadership tends to stress its economic achievements in order to justify the
continued oppression of its people, pointing to the millions who have been
lifted out of poverty through three decades of rapid economic growth. But
while it is important to recognize this progress, it in no way excuses the
ongoing imprisonment and torture of political dissidents or the complete
suppression of freedom of speech. It is completely disingenuous to suggest
that China must choose between economic prosperity and political freedom.
It can and must have both. A handful of high-profile dissidents, including one
of the authors of this piece, have come to embody the voice of Chinese
protest in the West. But we are merely the tip of the iceberg. The brutal
imposition of the one-child policy, endemic corruption and relentless political
repression are all causing widespread anger with the Chinese authorities,
from the victims of illegal land grabs to the growing numbers in the educated
middle class who find themselves locked out of a decent career through lack
of political connections. Whether it is through traditional rural demonstrations
or new, modern forms of online protest, the Chinese people are increasingly
expressing their frustration with the ruling Communist Party. Their voices
cannot be ignored forever. As economic growth begins to slow and China
faces up to its momentous social, environmental and demographic problems,
Extensions
calls for political reform will become impossible to ignore. For the West, the
question arises of how best to aid this process of reform. Some, both in
Europe and the U.S., are demanding a much tougher approach towards
China, including the imposition of punitive sanctions and high import tarifs.
But this is undeniably motivated more by a desire to protect vested domestic
economic interests, rather than as a way to put political pressure on the
Chinese government. Crucially, such an approach risks fueling the perception
that the voicing of human rights concerns is only used as a means of criticism
in order to justify protectionist measures against China. This would play into
the hands of the Chinese Communist Party, which is keen to portray any
Western interference as an attempt to contain Chinas growing global
economic power. Moreover, putting up greater trade barriers would punish
ordinary Chinese citizens and threaten the process of economic engagement
that is bringing them into closer contact with the outside world. Finally,
indiscriminate China-bashing risks unwittingly bolstering support for the
current regime - by stoking the flames of nationalism and provoking
resentment towards the West. Instead, a targeted approach is needed which
clearly distinguishes between the Chinese people and their government. Last
months decision by the US government to impose sanctions on 18 individual
Russians accused of human rights violations is a good example. Another case
in point is Germany, which has seen an explosive growth in trade with China
over the last decade but has also taken a robust approach to human rights.
Angela Merkel has led the way in trying to defuse the recent trade row
between the EU and China. But since coming to power she has also been
vocal in criticizing Chinas human rights record. This shows that the
promotion of trade and human rights need not be mutually exclusive. Close
engagement with China over economic issues should be combined with a
strong and consistent line on human rights. Last month, we launched a
transatlantic pact between the EU and US to highlight individual human rights
abuses in China and around the world. We believe that a strong and
coordinated approach will prevent China from playing a divide and rule
strategy, and that the combined economic and political clout of the EU and
U.S. will draw more attention to the plight of political prisoners and help to
secure their release. Furthermore, such an approach should amplify the
voices of Chinese political activists and civil society groups and embolden
their calls for bottom-up political reform. However, such eforts will be
undermined if the U.S. and EU member states are perceived to criticize the
Chinese government solely for their own self-interested economic reasons.
Western governments must also guard against hypocrisy by addressing their
own human rights problems. The recent revelations over U.S. online
surveillance, as well as longstanding issues such as Guantanamo Bay and
drone strikes, all give ammunition to the Chinese regime, which now
publishes its own highly critical annual human rights reports on the United
States. The failure of Western countries to condemn the human rights abuses
of close allies such as Saudi Arabia and Bahrain also gives rise to accusations
of double standards. Such hypocrisy must be addressed if the West is to be
Extensions
truly credible in its eforts to promote human rights abroad. Ultimately, the
Chinese government will not be able to resist the growing internal
pressure for political reform. Throughout history, there has been no
authoritarian regime which has not eventually crumbled before the inherent
human desire for justice and freedom. But by showing solidarity with political
dissidents while promoting Chinas ongoing integration into the global
economy, the U.S. and Europe can strengthen progressive social and political
forces and encourage a stable, democratic transition. Combining economic
engagement with consistent political pressure over human rights is
the best way to promote Chinas emergence as a peaceful global power,
and ensure that the Chinese people are given the government they deserve.

Pressure CP
Counterplan Text: The United
States Federal Government
should pressure China to end
the manipulation of their
currency
A. Solvency: The counterplan solves better than the
affirmative- China will only listen to concrete threats
Council on Foreign Relations, 2013 [Large, international relations

journal, Confronting U.S.-China Economic Imbalances,
November 2, http://www.cfr.org/china/confronting-us-china-economic-
imbalances/p20758#p3]
In August 2011, credit rating agency Standard and Poor's downgraded U.S.
debt by one notch for the first time in history, igniting a debate over whether
U.S. treasuries will still remain the safest asset in the world. Following the
unprecedented move, China sold $36.5 billion in U.S. treasuries, bringing it to
$1.137 trillion, its lowest level in a year. Still, experts say there are few other
choices besides the United States in which China can safely invest its large
foreign reserve holdings. "The alternatives," says Carnegie's Dadush, "are
European government bonds and Japanese government bonds, neither of
which are very appetizing." U.S. Policy Implications Many U.S. policymakers
have called for China to wean itself of export dependence and build up
domestic consumption to correct the "global imbalances" that drew so many
U.S. dollars to China in the first place. The Obama administration and G20
leaders, including Chinese President Hu Jintao, pledged at September 2009's
Pittsburgh summit (PDF) to develop a program to address these imbalances
and undertake "monetary policies consistent with price stability in the
context of market-oriented exchange rates." In addition to the recent U.S.
Senate legislation targeting China, U.S. congressional leaders have also
proposed ways to act against China through international bodies, including
the International Monetary Fund and the WTO. "The IMF has never labeled a
country a currency manipulator, but it's something they need to think about,
because if there's no pressure, there's no change," says Dunaway, a former
IMF official on Asia. He says China returned to a largely fixed exchange rate in
2008 in part because "the issue dropped of the agenda" globally. Other
experts question the efficacy of appeals to international institutions. In a
December 2008 paper (PDF), Stanford University's Robert Staiger and Alan
Sykes write that proving China's violation of WTO commitments vis--vis its
currency policies would be difficult. They dispute the notion that currency
devaluation alters trade balances in the long run.
Extensions

Solvency Extensions
1. Economic engagement with China in the WTO is
ineffective. The US must confront China
Navarro, 2012 Peter Navarro is a professor at the Paul Merage School of

Business, University of California-Irvine. Chinas Currency
Manipulation: A Policy Debate September/October
http://www.worldafairsjournal.org/article/china%E2%80%99s-currency-
manipulation-policy-debate
One obvious result is a US debt to China, now approaching three trillion

dollars. This debt has exposed the US to significant political pressure.
Chinas fixed peg also makes it impossible for the US to ever
balance its trade through the normal kind of currency
adjustments that are the hallmark of mutually beneficial free
and fair trade. Patrick Mulloy, of the US-China Commission, observes: Its like having a tarif on
goods coming from the United States of forty or fifty percent by the amount that theyre underpricing their
currency. It also gives their exports to the United States a subsidy of forty or fifty percent to capture our
market and knock out domestic industries that might be competing with them. Still a third major weapon
of job destruction wielded by Chinas largely state-owned enterprises is that of blatant counterfeiting and
piracy. As economist Ian Fletcher explains, its not just about pirating Hollywood movies anymore: Whats
more important is the theft of the blueprints for high technologies. I hear all the time about American
companies who find themselves competing in the marketplace with a Chinese product, and they take it
apart, and they find themselves looking in the mirror because the Chinese have just stolen the plans of
their own product. Of course, when a Chinese enterprise steals intellectual property that an American
rival had to pay significant R&D monies to discover and develop, that Chinese enterprise gains an
additional production cost edgeas much as fifteen to thirty percent in R&D-intensive industries like
automobiles and pharmaceuticals. Rounding out Chinas mercantilist advantages are some of the laxest
environmental and worker health and safety standards in the world. If a company like Bao Steel in China
is allowed to dump pollution into the Yangtze River when, say, a US steel company is not allowed to do the
same in the Ohio River, says Fletcher, thats going to be a source of competitive advantage for the
Chinese because pollution control costs money. China is also a country where, as Congressman Chris
Smith, a New Jersey Republican, laments, You go to prison if you try to form a labor union. AFL-CIO
President Richard Trumka echoes this complaint: They dont comply with their own child labor laws, prison
labor laws, health and safety laws, minimum wage laws. Within this context, says former Canadian MP
and Nobel Peace Prize nominee David Kilgour, every American consumer should be asking this question on
their way to the checkout line: How can Walmart, or anyone else in the United States, allow production
facilities in China to sell garments, chopsticks, Christmas decorations that are made in forced labor
Chinas unfair trade practices have indeed taken a very
camps?
heavy toll on the American economy. Consider that for the second half of the
twentieth century, the US gross domestic product grew at a healthy rate of about 3.5 percent annually.
Since China joined the WTO in 2001, however, that rate has
fallen to an average of only 1.6 percent. While the loss of almost two
percentage points of GDP growth a year may not seem like much, it translates into a failure to create two
million jobs a year and cumulatively more than twenty million jobs lost to slow growth since 2001. Not
coincidentally, thats almost the exact number of jobs America now needs to get its people fully back to
Extensions
work. These startling statistics raise two questions :
Why do our political leaders in
the United States put up with Chinas unfair trade practices; and
why havent our politicians realized, as businessman and philanthropist Leo Hindery has frequently
observed, that the best jobs program is not more fiscal stimulus or easy money from the Federal Reserve
but rather trade reform with China. At least one reason is that Americas biggest multinational
companies, like Apple, Boeing, Caterpillar, and GE, are now benefitting from of-shoring their
manufacturing to China. As think tank analyst Alan Tonelson notes: We can never forget that when China
manipulates currency, when China provides illegal subsidies of all sortsfor manufacturing, for the act of
exporting itselfthese US-owned companies benefit. They like the status quo, they want to protect it, and
As bad as Americas economic
they have paid a lot of [lobbying] money for it.
engagement with China has been for American workers, its
been even worse for Chinas huddled masses. As the economist Ian Fletcher
has pointed out, Economic growth in China has not led to its becoming more democratic. It has led to a
more sophisticated, better-financed form of authoritarianism. Manufacturing & Technology News editor
Richard McCormack adds that China is less free today than it was when they entered the WTO. And yet
Secretary of State Hillary Clinton remains adamant in her posture that human rights and trade with China
What is to be done in the face of the severe
should not be linked.
consequences of Americas economic engagement with China?
Perhaps we should take a page out of Ronald Reagans playbook; he believed that even though we might
By analogy, the
want to trust the Soviet Union to abide by treaties we should also verify.
White House and Congress may want to continue to engage
Beijing on economic issues, but for a number of reasonsincluding
Chinas blatantly unfair trade practices, its horrific human rights abuses, and its aggressive military buildup
that increasingly threatens our friends and allies in the Pacific a confrontation is long
overdue.
1NC North Korea Pressure CP

Counterplan text: The United States
Federal Government should pressure
the Peoples Republic of China to
impose collaborative sanctions
against the Democratic Peoples
Republic of Korea.
A. Solvency: The counterplan solves better than the
affirmative. Only direct pressure on the PRC will lead
to sanctions that solve the threat posed by North
Korea.
Wall Street Journal, June 2016 6/3, U.S. to Urge China to Put More Pressure
on North Korea http://www.wsj.com/articles/u-s-to-urge-china-to-put-more-
pressure-on-north-korea-1464956251
The U.S. will urge China to put further pressure on North Korea to give up its
nuclear program during meetings in Beijing next week, a senior U.S. Treasury
official said on Friday, days after Washington took fresh action to cut North
Korea of from global finance. China has the ability to both create pressure
and use that as a leverage that is a very important part of global eforts to
isolate North Korea and get North Korea to change its policies , said the official,
speaking to journalists during a visit to Seoul by Treasury Secretary Jacob Lew. U.S. officials, including
Secretary of State John Kerry and Mr. Lew, will head to Beijing early next week for the U.S.-China Strategic
and Economic Dialogue, an annual meeting on economic and security issues. ADVERTISEMENT The
U.S. earlier this week designated North Korea a primary money laundering concern, under the Patriot
Act, which could see non-U. S. banks and entities face sanctions or fines for processing dollar transactions
on behalf of Pyongyang, which would inevitably afect Chinese-North Korea business ties. In Seoul, Mr. Lew
said the U.S. move builds on Congress legislation from earlier this year as well as Chinese-backed United
Nations sanctions put in place in March to put the brakes on Pyongyangs nuclear ambitions after the
country conducted a fourth nuclear test in January. It reflects the fact that the global community will not
just tolerate North Koreas actions of developing nuclear weapons, Mr. Lew said, while declining to
elaborate on what specific steps will follow to sever global banking relationships with Pyongyang. Eforts to
curtail North Koreas external financial dealings could hit firms in China, which is Pyongyangs largest
China is a major donor of aid and energy for North Korea,
trading partner.
whose external trade has heavily relied on the worlds-second
largest economy because of sparse economic ties with other
countries. Despite backing the U.N. sanctions, China continues to
regard Pyongyang as a socialist ally. The U.S. in 2005 used its Patriot Act powers in a
similar but more limited fashion, listing a Macau-based bank, Banco Delta Asia, as a primary money
laundering concern after finding North Korea was using the bank to launder illicit funds for the leadership
in Pyongyang. The action triggered a bank run at BDA, and other banks elsewhere refused to do banking
transactions for North Korea. The U.N. sanctions already target North Koreas finance, mining and shipping
industriesa major source of funding of its nuclear and ballistic missile development. But the official said
that given North Koreas limited economic ties, it will take consistent pressure to see results. North Korea
is so isolated from the global economy that cutting it of from the global economy will not have the same
impact that it would have if there were a healthy flow of trade and a flow of economic activity, the senior
It will take a lot of continued, focused attention to
U.S. Treasury official said.
make an impact, he said.
2NC/1NR Pressure CP- North

Korea Affirmative- Solvency
Overview
1. Extend our 1NC Wall Street Journal 2015 evidence. It
indicates that China has been unwilling to openly
condemn North Korea in international forums. Only
the counterplan, which is unequivocal on its stance
regarding whether China should impose sanctions on
North Korea, has a chance of compelling China.
2. Heres more evidence. The counterplan solves best.
China will only respond to pressure, not the quid pro
quo of the affirmative
Al Jazeera, February 2016 2/25, US, China call for tougher sanctions on North
Korea http://www.aljazeera.com/news/2016/02/china-call-tougher-sanctions-
north-korea-160226035314377.html
"We are opposed to any nuclear testing and the launch testing of ballistic missile technology and we hope
this resolution will help to prevent further occurrences of this nature," China's Ambassador Liu Jieyi said,
However, China did not want to exhort too much
following the meeting.
pressure because a collapse of the North Korean system could lead
to "an expanded South Korea on China's border with its US allies
there as well," Al Jazeera's Harry Fawcett, reporting from Seoul,
said. "The question is, as always, whether North Korea will get around these
sanctions and also the level of enforcement of such sanctions. That has
been extremely difficult to pin down on that border between China
and North Korea," he said. "What is significant, though, is that we have had reports from the
northern side of that border saying that things have changed, at least in the short term. North Korean ships
not coming into port, Chinese trucks coming back from North Korea empty ." Troy
Stangarone, a senior director for congressional afairs and trade at the Korean Economic Institute, told Al
Jazeera that Pyongyang was likely to strike back. " We should expect North Korea to try to
respond with some kind of provocation. Most likely this will be something in terms of cyber
warfare or some other area where it is hard to identify North Korea as an actual perpetrator," he said,
speaking from Washington DC. Draft details According to Power, the sanctions would prohibit the sale of
small arms and other conventional weapons to North Korea, closing a loophole in earlier resolutions. Power
said the sanctions would also limit and in some cases ban exports of coal, iron, gold, titanium and rare
earth minerals from North Korea, and would ban countries from supplying aviation fuel, including rocket
fuel, to the country. The resolution also imposes financial sanctions targeting North Korean banks and
assets, and bans all dual-use nuclear and missile-related items. Items such as luxury watches,
snowmobiles, recreational water vehicles and lead crystal were also added to a long list of luxury goods
that North Korea is not allowed to import. North Korea started of the new year with what it claims was its
first hydrogen bomb test on January 6 and followed that up with the launch of a satellite on a rocket on
February 7 that was condemned by much of the world as a test of banned missile technology. Over the
past 20 years, North Korea has conducted four nuclear tests and launched six long-range rockets - all in
violation of Security Council resolutions.
1NC BIT NEG Shell
1NC BIT Pressure CP

Counterplan Text: The United States Federal
Government should pressure the Peoples
Republic of China to ratify the Bilateral
Investment Treaty with the United States.
A. Solvency: The U.S. must exert pressure on China in
order for them to ratify the treaty. Historically, China
has been foreign direct investment difficult within
China, and they have made little progress on opening
up their country
The Diplomat, March 2016 3/24, http://thediplomat.com/2016/03/are-china-

and-the-us-close-to-sealing-an-investment-treaty/
Currently, United States (and other foreign firms) are blocked from investing
in a laundry list of industries in China, from genetically-modified agricultural
products and domestic parcel delivery services to news outlets, publishing
houses, and television stations. Other sectors are restricted and may
require foreign investment to come as part of a Chinese majority-owned joint
venture. Even the Shanghai Free Trade Zone, which is supposed to be
an experimental zone with fewer restrictions than the country at
large, comes with a lengthy negative list of off-limits industries,
including automobile manufacturing, telecommunications, and
banks.And to many business leaders, it seems China is getting less
not more receptive to foreign investment; witness, for example, a
new rule that bans any company with foreign investment from
publishing content online. According to the U.S.-China Business Councils 2015 China
Business Environment Survey, China has made little progress on the issue over
the past few years, despite repeated commitments to opening its
markets. Even in sectors where foreign investment is allowed, USCBC also found that 80 percent of
American companies believe their Chinese competitors receive preferential treatment and thats just for
private enterprises. When it comes to Chinas state-owned firms, 97 percent of respondents said SOEs are
receiving a competitive boost from the government.USCBC, however, has been a vocal advocate for the
conclusion of a BIT, arguing (in an open letter to Obama and Xi from 94 U.S. CEOs), that a high-standard
BIT with clear provisions providing equal treatment to each countrys investors and a short list of
exceptions is one of the key items that could make an immediate and tangible impact for both of our
The question, of course, is how high the standards will be, given
economies.
Chinas neuralgia regarding foreign investment and its stated goal of
promoting Chinese domestic firms as international superstars which to
date has involved shielding them from domestic competition. Chinas current
commerce minister, Gao Hucheng, previously said that China and the United States have basically
completed text negotiation on the BIT, a claim echoed by Chen this week. However, Gao was speaking in
1NC BIT NEG Shell
March of last year and he noted at the time that agreeing on the actual negative lists the areas that
Whether the U.S. and
will remained closed to foreign investment would be a challenge.
China have made any progress since exchanging their latest negatives lists in
September remains to be seen
2NC/1NR Pressure CP- BIT -

Solvency Overview
1. Extend our 1NC Diplomat 2016 evidence. It indicates that
China does not see it in their best interests to open up their
country to Foreign Direct Investment. The affirmative can fiat
US, but they cannot fiat that the PRC signs the treaty. Our
evidence indicates there is not willpower to do so, and that
only pressuring China, not engaging them, will lead to them
signing the treaty.
2. Heres more evidence, China will not budge on foreign direct
investment unless the USFG pressures them to do so. The
counterplan solves best.
The Hill, 2015 Derek Scissors, resident scholar at American Enterprise Institute, Bilateral investment
treaty with China more than a 'BIT' of trouble
Another problem is far worse. China's policies with regard to its SOEs (state-owned
enterprises) are antithetical to a core principle of the BIT that foreign firms should
receive the same treatment as domestic (national treatment). Multinationals may
receive the same treatment as private Chinese firms but they are nowhere close to
receiving the same treatment as SOEs. SOEs are protected from competition in two
dozen sectors. They are not allowed to fail for commercial reasons. They receive
huge sums of what are essentially costless loans. These are established Chinese
policies and the fall 2013 Communist Party meeting was supposed to inaugurate a
new era of pro-market reform. But the principal corporate reform was allowing private
firms to take minority stakes in SOEs. This is the exact opposite of what needs to
occur, which is more competition between SOEs and the private sector. The SOE
reform guidelines issued last month affirm this harmful notion of "reform."
Remarkably, this failure was so blatant as to be recognized in the official
press. It is odd that the U.S. is even negotiating with a country with such
policies. A possible explanation is that the China BIT can be connected to an even
bigger international economic initiative, the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP). Not
coincidentally, BIT negotiations with China quickly turned serious after Japan joined
the TPP. There is a chapter in the TPP concerning SOEs this could provide a
template for how to blunt bad policies. Unfortunately, it appears as if the opposite is
true with regard to China: The TPP leaves the door wide open to more predatory
behavior. Final TPP text is not yet available, but a New Zealand government fact
sheet indicates a number of flaws that will be exploited by governments committed
to using SOEs as core economic actors. For example, under the TPP, monopolies can
(apparently) behave in non-commercial fashion when fulfilling the terms of their
designation, as assigned by their government. This is acceptable for countries that
have no desire to hand out mandate after mandate to SOEs, but there should be no
doubt that China will do exactly that. In addition, services supplied by SOEs in their
own territories are (apparently) allowed to be subsidized. This could block access to
the Chinese market for American services firms. Another vital issue that cannot be
evaluated at present is that of nonconforming measures, the exceptions granted in

specific areas. The nonconforming measures of a China BIT must be extremely
limited. With countries such as Singapore and Vietnam boasting large SOEs, this
weakness is a drawback for the TPP. However, it would undermine the point of any
agreement with China certainly including a BIT. With few efective restrictions on
what is by far the world's largest state sector in absolute size, the opportunities truly
unlocked by a China BIT would turn out to be minimal. Beijing's behavior over the
past two years with regard to SOEs and treatment of multinationals makes
it an undesirable partner. The TPP does not appear to provide anything close to a
sufficient framework to restrict Chinese SOEs. The Obama administration will
need to deliver an improbably strong BIT for it to deserve consideration.
2NC/1NR Pressure CP AT # --CP

Doesnt Solve
They say __________________________________________________, but

facts)
to be true)
their argument)

______________________________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________________________
2 [Insert 1-3 pieces of specific solvency evidence

depending on the Aff]
2NC/1NR Pressure CP Human

Rights AT: Perm Do Both
1. The permutation still links to the net benefit. Extend
our 1NC Singh evidence. When the U.S. engages
China through bilateral negotiations, it seldom
works, and the U.S. is left looking weak and unable
to curtail Chinas rise. This will lead to U.S. losing our
global dominance.
2. Heres more evidence. China will not implement
human rights reforms despite bilateral efforts. In
fact, they will point out the hypocrisy of U.S. claims
on human rights, further undermining our global
credibility
Xinhua News Agency, 2014 April 14, China issues report on U.S. human
rights http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/2016-04/14/c_135278381.htm
China's report says that the United States made comments on the human
rights situation in many countries while being tight-lipped about its own
terrible human rights record and showing not a bit of intention to reflect on it.
In 2015, the United States saw no improvement in its existent human rights
issues, but reported numerous new problems, according to the report. "Since
the U.S. government refuses to hold up a mirror to look at itself, it has to be
done with other people's help," it says. The report states money politics and family politics
went from bad to worse in the United States where voters found it hard to express their real volition.
Figures cited in the report shows that civil rights were wantonly infringed upon in the United States in 2015
There were a total of
with rampant gun-related crimes and excessive use of force by police.
51,675 gun violence incidents in the United States in 2015 as of December
28, leaving 13,136 killed and 26,493 injured. U.S. police shot dead 965
people last year as of December 24. No substantial progress concerning the
economic and social rights of U.S. citizens were made, the report says. In 2015,
more than 560,000 people nationwide were homeless, and there were still 33 million people in the United
It also quotes figures to show that the
States with no healthcare insurance.
United States continued to trample on human rights in other
countries, causing tremendous civilian casualties. From August 2014 to
December 2015, the United States launched 3,965 air strikes in Iraq and
2,823 in Syria, causing an estimated number of civilian deaths between 1,695
and 2,239. The report says that the United States' overseas
monitoring projects infringed on the privacy of citizens of other
countries. The United States had bugged the phones of three French presidents and many other
Though the United States repeatedly

senior French officials, according to the report.
vowed to defend "human rights," it still has not ratified core human rights
conventions of the UN, and took an uncooperative attitude towards
international human rights issues, says the report.
2NC/1NR- Pressure CP- Currency

Manipulation- AT: Permutation do
Both
1. They say the plan and the counterplan are effectively
the same. However, the plan and the counterplan are
conceptually different. Engagement involves a quid
pro quo, while the counterplan pressures China to
reverse a current monetary policy without expecting
anything in return. Hold the affirmative to this
definition. Allowing engagement without expecting
something in return limits negative ground since it
prohibits us from reading CPs that do the opposite of
engagement. Further, a quid pro quo interpretation
limits the number of affirmatives that can be read on
the topic, ensuring more in depth and educational
discussions. Either the counterplan is competitive, or
the affirmative is not topical. They cannot be both.
Kane, 2008 Major Brian H. Kane, USMC AY 2007-08 ,FUTURE WAR

PAPER Comprehensive Engagement: A Winning Strategy, SUBMITTED
IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE OF
MASTER OF OPERATIONAL STUDIES
http://www.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/a504901.pdf
Engagement strategies are not new. Since the end of the Cold War, engagement
strategy has been called comprehensive containment, conditional containment,
conditional engagement, limited engagement, quid pro quo engagement, congagement,
unconditional engagement, and comprehensive engagement.8 As a result, engagement strategy
represents a conceptual fog in todays environment.9 However, the Clinton Administration attempted to
dissipate this fog with the first post-Cold War, multi-faceted definition proposed in its NSS, which stated
that engagement strategy is:
1NC Hegemony Net Benefit Shell

A. Uniqueness and Link: Continued cooperation with
China signals global weakness and destroys US
hegemony
Singh, 2012 [Robert, Professor of Political Science at the University
of London, Barack Obamas Post-American Foreign Policy. ]
But almost as rapidly as it was crafted, this policy of strategic reassurance

efectively collapsed by early 2010. Several setbacks illustrated the
seemingly intractable limits of American engagement with Beijing. Despite
warnings and implicit threats from Washington, China was perceived to
bluntly resist pressure to cease manipulating its currency, one cause of the
major financial imbalances with the US. Obama's historic visit to China was
more tightly controlled by Beijing than prior presidential ones, ending with
few tangible accomplishments and the palpable impression among China's
politburo that Obama was weak. China's hard-line at the Copenhagen
climate-change summit in December 2009 not only snubbed Obama in a
remarkable act of diplomatic humiliation the president having physically to
muscle into a room where China's premier was stitching-up a deal without the
US but also conspired to leave Washington with the lion's share of the
blame for the negotiations' failure. In January 2010 Google declared its
intention to withdraw from China amid allegations of cyber attacks from
Chinese nationals. By early 2010 the Obama administration had concluded
that the financial crisis and subsequent Great Recession had convinced
Beijing of America's accelerating decline and the cost-free option of greater
assertiveness. The administration thus shifted tack, efectively abandoning
the very premise of the strategic engagement approach that underpinned
Obama's post-American foreign policy: that China had the same interest as
America in addressing shared challenges to the global order. In January 2010
Clinton made a major speech defending Internet freedom. In February,
Obama met the Dalai Lama. The US also agreed to imposing punitive tarifs
on all Chinese car and light-truck tyre imports and to sell defensive weapons
to Taiwan. Ironically, these less emollient approaches induced some shifts in
Beijing, with President Hu Jintao attending the Washington nuclear security
summit in April 2010 and the Chinese agreeing to the new round of UN
sanctions on Iran in June 2010. But the bilateral relationship remained
beset by mutual mistrust, suspicion of the other's motives, and a
competitive dynamic to assert long-term primacy in the Asia-Pacific
region.
B. Internal Link and Impact: U.S. hegemony is key to

prevent major wars
Bresler, 2015 [Robert J. Bresler, Penn State Harrisburg professor emeritus of public policy, 6-24
http://lancasteronline.com/opinion/columnists/obama-led-us-withdrawal-has-destabilized-the-
world/article_1c73c828-19d4-11e5-ab00-d32898937e9a.html]
American leadership need not mean involvement in endless wars. Past history gives
us examples. The Marshall Plan allowed worn-torn allied governments to provide their
people with political stability and economic development. NATO was an efort to build
Western European unity, end the quarrels that had produced two world wars, and
deter Soviet aggression. The United Nations, disappointing in many ways, was a
vehicle for broad international eforts against disease, illiteracy and regional wars.
The International Monetary Fund, World Bank and the General Agreement on Trade
and Tarifs were designed to facilitate international trade, prevent currency wars and
assist in economic development. These initiatives prevented another great power
war, achieved a large degree of European reconciliation, and eased the transition for
post-colonial countries in Africa and Asia. None would have happened without strong
and persistent American leadership. The U.S. negotiated a series of defense treaties
with more than 35 nations, designed to deter aggression, that also eased their
burden of self-defense and allowed them to place more resources into the
reconstruction of their economies. In the Middle East, the Arab States and Israel saw
the U.S. as an honest broker, assisting in the negotiation of peace treaties between
Israel and Egypt and Israel and Jordan. During the Obama administration there
has been a steady American retreat from world leadership. NATO is far less
efective. Allies such as Israel, Poland, Saudi Arabia, Pakistan, Egypt, the Baltic States
and Iraq are no longer confident of American support. Hence, China, Russia and
Iran are asserting hegemonic claims. The world is now torn by devolution and
fractionalization. The forces of global and regional cooperation are in disrepair. The
United Nations stands helpless against Russian aggression, civil war in Syria and
Libya and atrocities by the Islamic State across the Middle East and North Africa; the
European Union is facing possible revolts and threats of secession by the United
Kingdom and Greece and waning allegiance in much of Europe; and NATO ofers
Ukraine no more than its good wishes as Russian President Vladimir Putins military
swallows the country bit by bit. Our allies are far from steadfast. Their governments
are weaker, and vivid world leaders are hard to find among them. Putin, the insane
leaders of the Islamic State and the Iranian mullahs have put fear in the hearts of our
allies. Why are these second- and third-rate powers able to intimidate their neighbors
far more efectively than did the far more powerful Soviet Union? Our democratic
allies in Europe, lacking a clear sense of direction, are ruled by unstable coalitions.
Even Germany, perhaps the strongest of our European allies, refuses to confront
Putin in his eforts to destabilize Ukraine. When the Obama administration made
concession after concession to the Iranians over its nuclear program, our negotiating
partners in Europe lost any interest in taking serious steps to keep Iran out of the
nuclear club. In the Middle East tribalism and religious fanaticism have left Iraq, Syria,
Libya and Yemen virtually ungovernable. Iraq, left to its won devices by Obamas
withdrawal after American troops sacrificed so much to establish a nascent
democracy, is now falling apart. In Egypt, a military regime is trying to forcibly
contain the boiling pot that is the Muslim Brotherhood. Saudi Arabia and the Persian
Gulf States, feeling abandoned by Obamas rush to a nuclear agreement with Iran,
are sensing the quicksand beneath their feet. Warlordism and radical Islam plague
the economically depressed countries of sub-Saharan Africa. A combination of
devolution and chaos becomes normal state of affairs absent a strong
centripetal leadership. In the last half of the 20th century, America
provided that force with persuasion, assistance, assurance and trust. As
the Obama administration allows the U.S. to slip into the shadows world
politics, the danger of war increases.
2NC/1NR Hegemony Net Benefit
Extensions
2NC/1NR- Pressure CP- Hegemony

Net Benefit AT: Non-Unique
1. They say the DA is not unique. However, it is. Chinas
rise has been curtailed in the status quo, and the
U.S. is the global hegemon.
Ikenberry, 2014 -- PhD, Albert G. Milbank Professor of Politics and

International Afairs at Princeton University in the Department of Politics and
the Woodrow Wilson School of Public and International
https://www.foreignafairs.org/articles/china/2014-04-17/illusion-geopolitics)
Ultimately, even if China and Russia do attempt to contest the basic

terms of the current global order, the adventure will be daunting and
self-defeating. These powers arent just up against the United States; they
would also have to contend with the most globally organized and deeply
entrenched order the world has ever seen, one that is dominated by states
that are liberal, capitalist, and democratic . This order is backed by a U.S.-
led network of alliances, institutions, geopolitical bargains, client
states, and democratic partnerships. It has proved dynamic and
expansive, easily integrating rising states, beginning with Japan and Germany
after World War II. It has shown a capacity for shared leadership, as exemplified by such forums as
the G-8 and the G-20. It has allowed rising non-Western countries to trade and grow,
sharing the dividends of modernization. It has accommodated a surprisingly
wide variety of political and economic models -- social democratic (western
Europe), neoliberal (the United Kingdom and the United States), and state
capitalist (East Asia). The prosperity of nearly every country -- and the
stability of its government -- fundamentally depends on this order. In the age
of liberal order, revisionist struggles are a fools erran d. Indeed, China and
Russia know this. They do not have grand visions of an alternative
order. For them, international relations are mainly about the search for
commerce and resources, the protection of their sovereignty, and, where
possible, regional domination. They have shown no interest in building their
own orders or even taking full responsibility for the current one and have
ofered no alternative visions of global economic or political progress . Thats a
critical shortcoming, since international orders rise and fall not simply with the power
of the leading state; their success also hinges on whether they are seen as
legitimate and whether their actual operation solves problems that both weak
and powerful states care about. In the struggle for world order, China and
Russia (and certainly Iran) are simply not in the game. Under these circumstances, the
United States should not give up its eforts to strengthen the liberal order . The
world that Washington inhabits today is one it should welcome. And the grand
Extensions
strategy it should pursue is the one it has followed for decades: deep global
engagement. It is a strategy in which the United States ties itself to the
regions of the world through trade, alliances, multilateral institutions, and
diplomacy. It is a strategy in which the United States establishes leadership
not simply through the exercise of power but also through sustained eforts at
global problem solving and rule making. It created a world that is friendly to
American interests, and it is made friendly because, as President John F.
Kennedy once said, it is a world where the weak are safe and the strong are
just.
Extensions
2NC/1NR Pressure CP- Hegemony

Net Benefit AT: No Link
1. They say that engagement with China does not
hinder U.S. hegemony, but it does. U.S. hegemony
exists in the status quo, but China is attempting to
challenge it. By engaging with China, the U.S.
recognizes a sort of mutual and equal international
status. This undermines U.S. hegemony
Kupchan, 2014 (Charles A. Kupchan, Professor of International Afairs in the

School of Foreign Service and Government Department at Georgetown
University and former Director for European Afairs on the National Security
Council, The Normative Foundations of Hegemony and the Coming
Challenge to Pax Americana, 5/16)
It is of important geopolitical consequence that hegemony has normative

dimensions and that power transitions entail clashes among competing
norms. The world is entering a period of transformation as power shifts from
the West to the rising rest. One school of thoughtwhich dominates in
Washingtonholds that emerging powers are poised to embrace the existing
international order; Western norms are universal norms, and the dictates of
globalization are ensuring their worldwide spread. According to Ikenberry,
The United States global position may be weakening, but the international
system the United States leads can remain the dominant order of the twenty-
first century. The West should sink the roots of this order as deeply as
possible to ensure that the world continues to play by its rules even as its
material preponderance wanes. China and other emerging great powers, he
concludes, do not want to contest the basic rules and principles of the liberal
international order; they wish to gain more authority and leadership within
it.82 The analysis in this article suggests that such conventional
wisdom is illusory; emerging powers will not readily embrace the
order on offer from the West. Regardless of the presumed functionality of
the current order from a liberal, transactional perspective, emerging powers
China, India, Brazil, Turkey, to name a feware following their own paths to
modernity based on their own cultural, ideological, and socioeconomic
trajectories. Their normative and social orientations will produce quite
disparate approaches to building and managing international order. Unlike
during earlier periods of multipolarity, when diferent hegemonies often
operated independently of each other, in todays globalized world, multiple
hegemonic zones will intensely and continuously interact with each other. In
Extensions
light of its growing economic and military power, China is likely to pose
the most significant challenge to the ordering norms of Pax
Americana. It is true that China for now is not challenging many of the rules
associated with the Western liberal order, particularly when it comes to
commerce. But as all great powers have done throughout history, China will
likely seek to recast that order when it has the power to do so. Indeed, China
is set to become the worlds leading economy by the end of the next
decade.83 Drawing on its historical, cultural, and socioeconomic trajectory,
Beijing is poised to bring to the fore a set of ordering norms that contrast
sharply with those of Pax Americana. The normative orientation of Chinas
past approach to exercising hegemony is hardly a reliable predictor of the
ordering norms that might shape a Chinese sphere of influence in the future.
Nonetheless, the historical record provides a basis for informed
speculation.84 China may well aspire to resurrect in East Asia a sphere of
influence that is arrayed in concentric circles around a Sinicized core.
Through this tiered structure, China might attempt to exercise a brand of
regional hegemony modeled on the tributary system. Chinas material
primacy would serve as the foundation for its economic, strategic, and
cultural centrality. Its neighbors would demonstrate deference to Beijing
through both policy and ritual, but they would maintain their autonomy and
their independent relations with each other. Nonetheless, China would
become the regions strategic and economic hub, playing a role similar
to that of the United States in the Americas. Beijing could well unfurl its own
version of the Monroe Doctrine, laying claim to primacy in Northeast Asia and
guardianship of the regions sea lanes. Indeed, Beijing has already ramped up
maritime activities in the East China Sea and South China Sea and rejected
Washingtons call for addressing the areas territorial disputes through
multilateral negotiation. Such a Sinocentric brand of hegemony in East Asia is
of course incompatible with the current security architecture in which the
United States continues to serve as the regions geopolitical hub. Accordingly,
the United States and China have strong incentives to turn to diplomacy to
tame their relationship over the course of this decadebefore the naval
balance in the western Pacific becomes more equal. On the table will have to
be both the material and the normative dimensions of order. If Beijing and
Washington succeed in reaching a meeting of the minds, a peaceful power
transition in East Asia may be in the offing. If not, a historic confrontation
may well loom. Should diplomacy fail to avert rivalry, Sino-American
competition may nonetheless fall short of the bipolar enmity of the Cold War.
China and the United States are economically interdependent
whereas the Soviet Union and the United States carved out separate
economic blocs. Moreover, Chinas geopolitical ambition, at least for the
foreseeable future, seems focused primarily on East Asia, suggesting that
rivalry with the United States could be more contained than the global
competition that ensued between the United States and the Soviet Union.
Chinas regional ambitions are, however, poised to clash head-on with
Americas determination to maintain strategic primacy in Northeast Asia.
Extensions
Even if it does not match the hostility of the Cold War, the resulting
confrontation could well resemble the naval race between Great Britain and
Germany that commenced at the turn of the twentieth century.
AFF 2AC Answers

Pressure Counterplan
2AC- Pressure CP- Human Rights

Affirmative
1. Permutation: do both- The U.S. must sustain dialogue
with China in order to be credible- This means the CP
cannot solve. Additionally, dialogue with China gives us
global credibility, which resolves the hegemony link on
the net benefit.
Lum, 2011 Thomas, Specialist in Asian Afairs, July 18 Human Rights in

China and U.S. Policy https://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/RL34729.pdf
The U.S.-China human rights dialogue was established in 1990. It is

one of eight government-to- government dialogues between China and
other countries on human rights. Beijing formally suspended the process in 2004 after the
Bush Administration sponsored an unsuccessful U.N. resolution criticizing Chinas human rights record.
The talks were resumed in May 2008, the first round in six years. The
Obama Administration has participated in two rounds, the fourteenth
round held in May 2010 in Washington and the fifteenth round in May
2011 in Beijing. Both were co-chaired by U.S. Assistant Secretary of State for Democracy, Human
Rights, and Labor Michael Posner and PRC Ministry of Foreign Afairs, Department of International
Organizations Director General Chen Xu. In the 2010 meetings, topics included Chinese political prisoners,
freedom of religion and expression, labor rights, the rule of law, and conditions in Tibet and Xinjiang. The
Chinese delegation also visited the U.S. Supreme Court and were briefed on ways in which human rights
issues are handled in the United States. During the 2011 talks, Assistant Secretary Posner raised the
Obama Administrations deep concerns about the PRC crackdown on rights defenders and government
Discussions of Chinas backsliding on human rights reportedly
critics.
dominated the talks, which the U.S. side described as tough and
Chinese officials portrayed as frank and thorough. Posner
characterized the dialogue process,however, as a forum for candid
discussion, not negotiation. Although no breakthroughs or concrete
outcomes were reported during the latest rounds, Administration
officials have continued to perceive the dialogue as an important
means by which to emphasize and reiterate U.S. positions on
human rights issues. They have suggested that, given the deep
disagreements on human rights and other contentious issues, the
holding of the dialogue and the agreement to continue them represent
positive steps. Furthermore, some observers have contended, the
absence of the dialogue would undermine other U.S. efforts to
promote human rights in China.
2. China will not compromise on human rights with a

hardline stance. Engagement such as the affirmatives is
critical to solve our advantages
The Atlantic, 2013 June 13, Can the U.S. Help Advance Human Rights in
China? http://www.theatlantic.com/china/archive/2013/06/can-the-us-
help-advance-human-rights-in-china/276841/
Second, the U.S. government needs to be consistent in the way it

raises its concerns on human rights, and not be shy to use vocal
diplomacy when private diplomacy yields no result. Too often, the U.S. is sending
conflicting messages, one day stressing its attachment to universal human
rights norms, and the next stating that the U.S. and China "agree to
disagree" on a range of issues, including human rights. This
undermines the universality of human rights. Third, the U.S. must
mainstream human rights perspectives across the full spectrum of its
engagement with China. The compartmentalization of human rights as
a minor rubric of diplomacy is bound to fail, because the Chinese side
knows human rights have no bearings on other aspects of the bilateral
relationship. The business environment for U.S. companies
operating in China is directly linked to issues intimately
connected to human rights, such as the elastic character of China's state secrecy laws
or the introduction of provisions in the criminal law that allows for secret detention by the police.
Fourth, the U.S. must forge partnerships and coordinate more
efectively with other rights-respecting countries in their efort to press
China on specific issues and cases. There has been very little said by any head of state
about the fact that China is the only country in the world that holds a Nobel Peace Laureate in prison (while
his wife is imprisoned at her home outside of any legal procedure.) Finally, the U.S. must be ready to take
steps when the situation demands it. For instance, given China's absolute refusal to engage on any issue
related to the situation in Tibetan areas, the U.S. must be ready to upgrade its contacts with the Dalai
Lama, and encourage other countries to do so. The Democracy Report The
United States does
more to raise human rights issues with China than any other country,
but it often conveys the implicit message that it does so out of moral
convictions, not out of well-understood national interest and
concern for human rights globally, and that greatly diminishes
the effectiveness of such statements.
3. Pressure doesnt solve and will lead to domestic

instability in China.
Deng, 2000 (Yong, professor in the Department of Political Science at the United States
Naval Academy, In the Eyes of the Dragon: China Views the World, p. 98-99)
The concluding section highlights the implications of this discussion for Sino-American relations. Given the
views held by ordinary Chinese and the current relationship between the government and society,
human rights has become largely a foreign policy issue for a majority of
Chinese. Human rights in China will remain an issue in the United States due
to American political traditions and domestic politics, a fact of life
acknowledged and increasingly understood by China . But if the U.S.
government goes beyond a baseline of just speaking up about human rights
issues and instead imposes severe pressure on China over human rights or makes
explicit linkage with other issues, such policies now find an unresponsive Chinese
audience and invite nationalist reactions . An interventionist policy works only when the
society of the target nation seeks and appreciates such intervention. But there does not exist a
broad support base in China at this historical moment for U.S. human rights intervention
and pressure.
Currency Manipulation AFF 2AC
Answers
2AC- Pressure CP- Currency

Manipulation Affirmative
1. Permutation: do both - filing a complaint in the WTO
about Chinese currency manipulation is tantamount to
pressuring China to change their currency practices. The
CP and the plan are the same
2. The plan is net better for hegemony than the CP alone-
Our 1ac evidence indicates that economic engagement
not only compels China to change its policies on currency
manipulation, but that it sends a global signal that the
U.S. is a credible, but steadfast trading partner. This also
resolves the link to the hegemony net benefit because
the US takes on China through the WTO.
3. Pressure alone wont resolve currency manipulation- the
plans approach, which uses engagement, is the most
promising strategy to get China to change its practices
Gupta, June 2016 Sourabh Gupta is a Resident Senior Fellow at the

Institute for ChinaAmerica Studies (ICAS) in Washington, DC.
Currency cooperation, not finger-pointing, is the way forward
http://www.eastasiaforum.org/2016/06/13/currency-cooperation-not-
finger-pointing-is-the-way-forward/
There is a better way forward. The Obama administration should sit

down with China and re-write multilateral rules that significantly patch
up the currently porous global financial safety net. This would need to be done as
part of a global efort, else it would not be politically salable. But the target would be to lock the United
This would give confidence to China
States and China into a mutual protection deal.
and other emerging economies to continue with their domestic
financial deepening, capital account liberalisation and currency
internationalisation policies. In time, this would lead to an augmented and diversified supply
of globally traded safe assets. A broader supply of such assets would improve global capital allocation and
risk-sharing, help reduce global imbalances and enhance the international monetary systems resilience to
shocks. At the same time, the United States should sit down with its advanced economy counterparts and
prepare the ground for a coordinated fiscalmonetary injection in the event that the global economy tips
Self-regarding currency rules that do little more than
into a recession.
invite blame-thy-neighbour finger pointing should be swept
off the table.
2AC- Pressure CP- North Korea

Affirmative
1. Permutation: do both having the US pressure China
diplomatically while offering military withdrawal as a
concession means the perm solves our Harms better
than the Counterplan does and also solves their
Hegemony Net Benefit the perception that were
still tough on them means no less of hegemony.
2. Solvency deficit Extend our 1AC Chanlett-Avery and
Council on Foreign Relations evidence. The CP is the
failed status quo were trying to pressure China
now and theyre not cooperating on North Korea. We
need to engage them with a concession like the plan
to make China support sanctions on North Korea.
3. The CP is counter-productive. Pressure leads to China

opposing us we cannot apply pressure instead of
making military concessions
Shambaugh, 2011 (David, Professor of Political Science & International Afairs and Director of the
China Policy Program at George Washington University, Coping with a Conflicted China, The Washington
Quarterly, 34(1), p. 24 25)
What the world has seen from China since 2009 is an increasingly realist,
narrowly self-interested nation, seeking to maximize its own comprehensive
power. Chinas rapid recovery from the global financial crisis, growing energy
consumption needs, rising nationalism, a looming leadership transition, and
distrust of the Obama administration following President Obamas 2010
decisions to receive the Dalai Lama in the White House and to sell a $6 billion
arms package to Taiwan have all fueled this tendency. This external behavior
is mirrored in the countrys domestic discourse. Chinas realist posture plays
directly into the realist and conservative camps in the United States, which
tend to view China as a rising military power, a mercantilist economic power,
a more assertive regional power, and a less cooperative global partner. Even
those U.S. analysts who have tended to view China in a more benign fashion,
and hope that a more cooperative and internationalist nation would mature
on the world stage, are growing disillusioned by Beijings recent behavior. But
China specialists should not be entirely surprised by such behavior, as it just
reflects the six-decade long single-minded mission of the Chinese Communist
Party, government, military, Since 2009, China has been an increasingly
realist, narrowly selfinterested nation. 24 THE WASHINGTON QUARTERLY j
WINTER 2011 David Shambaugh and society to strengthen itself
comprehensively and become a major world power. This would suggest,
prima facie, that the United States must respond to a realist China with realist
methods: by forward-deploying a strong military in the Western Pacific,
strategic hedging with strengthened alliances and security partnerships all
around Chinas periphery, levying tough economic and trade policies,
leveraging U.S. power and instruments of diplomacy, and reducing
expectations of Chinese cooperation on global issues. There is some logic and
much temptation to counter China in these ways. But a realist response will
only contribute to an inexorable action-reaction cycle, fueling the already
extant security dilemma in U.S.China relations, and could produce an
adversarial relationship that neither side needs or seeks. Tough U.S. policies
will only bolster Chinese nationalism, rigidify Chinese obstinance, focus
Beijing to build up its hard power even more, and make it increasingly difficult
to cooperate with China internationally. Some elements, such as maintaining
strong U.S. alliances and partnerships in Asia, are prudent, but if strategic
hedging takes on too much of a military cast, it could be counterproductive.
Tough economic policies also make some sense, especially as the U.S.
government has bent over backwards to try to coax Beijing to appreciate its
currency and reduce its trade and investment barriers. But strong U.S actions
will be met by Chinese counteractions, and both sides could inadvertently slip
into a trade war very easily. Rather than fall into a default realist response
to China, Washington needs to be more sophisticated and devise a more
complex strategy.40 Chinas intense discourse on the nations international
roles will continue to evolve. As it does so, it is likely to become less diverse
and more polarized, as Realist/Nativist views may well harden. An incident
could also shape the debate, such as if a Chinese embassy were seized or
workers were killed in large numbers, or a Chinese naval vessel were
attacked. For the foreseeable future, however, the international community
should anticipate a multiplicity of voices and policy advocates, while Chinese
behavior appears inconsistent and sends conflicting signals, but with a
predominant realist, and troubling, character.
BIT AFF 2AC Answers
2AC- Pressure CP- BIT Affirmative

1. Permutation: do both. Pressuring China
diplomatically while ratifying the BIT here works -
theres no reason we cant do both to solve.
2. Solvency deficit nothing in the plan text passes BIT
here. We need to take definite action in order to get
China to comply.
3. Weve already begun negotiating BIT with China
only continued negotiation and our support gets
China on board. Pressure is a 180 degree change that
risks this process and alienates Chinese reform
moderates that support BIT.
Morrison, 2015 [Wayne, Specialist in Asian Trade and Finance, China-U.S. Trade Issues, December
15, https://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/RL33536.pdf]
The United States and China have held negotiations on reaching a bilateral investment
treaty (BIT) with the goal of expanding bilateral investment opportunities. U.S. negotiators
hope such a treaty would improve the investment climate for U.S. firms in China by
enhancing legal protections and dispute resolution procedures, and by obtaining a
commitment from the Chinese government that it would treat U.S. investors no less
favorably than Chinese investors. In April 2012, the Obama Administration released a
Model Bilateral Investment Treaty that was developed to enhance U.S. objectives in the
negotiation of new BITs.102 The new BIT model establishes mechanisms to promote
greater transparency, labor and environment requirements, disciplines to prevent parties
from imposing domestic technology requirements, and measures to boost the ability of
investors to participate in the development of standards and technical regulations on a
nondiscriminatory basis.103 During the July 10-11, 2013, session of the S&ED, China
indicated its intention to negotiate a high-standard BIT with the United States that would
include all stages of investment and all sectors, a commitment U.S. official described as
a significant breakthrough, and the first time China has agreed to do so with another
country.104 A press release by the Chinese Ministry of Commerce stated that China was
willing to negotiate a BIT on the basis of nondiscrimination and a negative list, meaning
the agreement would identify only those sectors not open to foreign investment on a
nondiscriminatory basis (as opposed to a BIT with a positive list which would only list
sectors open to foreign investment). During the July 9-10, 2014, S&ED session, the two
sides agreed to a broad timetable for reaching agreement on core issues and major
articles of the treaty text and committed to initiate the negative list negotiation early in
2015.105 During BIT negotiations held in June 2015, each side submitted their first
negative list proposals, and later agreed to submit a revised list in September 2015. While
some progress was reportedly made in September 2015, a breakthrough was not
achieved in time for Presidents Xis summit visit to the United States. Many analysts
contend the negotiation of a U.S.-China BIT could have significant implications
for bilateral commercial relations and the Chinese economy. According to USTR,
Michael Froman, such an agreement ofer a major opportunity to engage on Chinas
BIT AFF 2AC Answers
domestic economic reforms and to pursue greater market access, a more level playing
field, and a substantially improved investment environment for U.S. firms in China.106
For China, a high-standard BIT could help facilitate greater competition in China and result
in more efficient use of resources, factors which economists contend could boost
economic growth. Some observers contend that Chinas pursuit of a BIT with the United
States represents a strategy that is being used by reformers in China to jumpstart
widespread economic reforms (which appear to have been stalled in recent years). This
strategy, it is argued, is similar to that used by Chinese reformers in their eforts to get
China into the WTO in 2001. Such international agreements may give political cover to
economic reformers because they can argue that the agreements build on Chinas eforts
to become a leader in global afairs. This may make it harder for vested interests in China
who benefit from the status quo to resist change.
AFF 2AC Hegemony Internal Net
Benefit Answers

Pressure CP- Hegemony Net-
Benefit
1. The Net Benefit Disadvantage is not unique. The
global order is already shifting towards multipolarity.
Posen, 2014 Ford International Professor of Political Science at MIT and the
director of MIT's Security Studies Program (Barry, Restraint: A New
Foundation for U.S. Grand Strategy, Cornell University Press, p. 60-62, June
24
Partisans of Liberal Hegemony might accept some of the factual statements above but would
argue that the good the strategy has achieved far outweighs the bad. As noted
in the introduction, partisans assume that liberal democracy, human rights, market economies,
free trade, nuclear nonproliferation, middle and great powers that do not take responsibility for their own
U.S. political and military hegemony are all mutually causative, and
security, and
all lead ineluctably to a vast improvement in the security and welfare of
others, and hence to the U.S. security position. 124 They also posit that the
world is fragile; damage to one of these good things will lead to damage to other good things, so
the United States must defend all. The fragile and interconnected argument is
politically efective. By accident or design, the argument derives an inherent plausibility due to
the inevitable limits of our substantive knowledge, fear, uncertainty, liberal
ideology, and U.S. national pride. Most targets of the argument do not
know enough about the world to argue with experts who claim these
connections; the chain of posited connections always leads to danger for the United States, and
fear is a powerful selling tool. Once fear is involved, even low-probability chains of
causation can be made to seem frightening enough to do something about, especially if you believe your
It is pleasant to believe that the spread of U.S.
country has overwhelming power.
values such as liberty and democracy depend on U.S. power and leadership.
The argument does not stand close scrutiny. First, it obscures the
inherently strong security position of the United States, which I have already
reviewed. The economic, geographic, demographic, and technological facts
supporting this point are seldom discussed , precisely because they are facts. It
takes very large events abroad to significantly threaten the U nited
States, and more moderate strategies can address these possibilities at
lower costs. Typical Liberal Hegemony arguments for any new project take the form
of domino theory. One small untended problem is expected easily and quickly to
produce another and another until the small problems become big ones, or
the collection of problems becomes overwhelming. Whether these
connections are valid in any particular case will always be open to debate. Even if the
connections are plausible, however, it is unlikely given the inherent U.S.
Benefit Answers
security position that the United States need prop up the first domino. It has
the luxury of waiting for information and choosing the dominos it
wishes to shore up, if any. Second, proponents of Liberal Hegemony often elide the
diference between those benefits of the strategy that flow to others, and
those that flow to the United States. Individually, it is surely true that cheap-riders and
reckless-drivers like the current situation because of the welfare, security, or
power gains that accrue to them. United States commitments may make the international
politics of some regions less exciting than would otherwise be the case. The United States, however,
pays a significant price and assumes significant risks to provide these
benefits to others, while the gains to the United States are exaggerated
because the United States is inherently quite secure. Third, Liberal Hegemonists
argue that U.S. commitments reduce the intensity of regional security
competitions, limit the spread of nuclear weaponry, and lower the general odds
of conflict, and that this helps keep the United States out of wars that would
emerge in these unstable regions. This chain of interconnected benefits is
not self-evident. United States activism does change the nature of regional
competitions; it does not necessarily suppress them. For example, where
U.S. commitments encourage free-riding, this attracts coercion,
which the United States must then do more to deter. Where the United States
encourages reckless driving, it produces regional instability. United States
activism probably helps cause some nuclear proliferation, because some states will
want nuclear weapons to deter an activist United States. When the United States makes
extended deterrence commitments to discourage prolif eration, the U.S. military
is encouraged to adopt conventional and nuclear military strategies that are
themselves destabilizing. Finally, as is clear from the evidence of the last twenty
years, the United States ends up in regional wars in any case. Fourth, one
key set of interconnections posited by Liberal Hegemonists is that between
U.S. security provision, free trade, and U.S. prosperity. This is a prescriptive
extension of hegemonic stability theory, developed by economist Charles
Kindleberger from a close study of the collapse of global liquidity in 1931 and the ensuing
great depression. 125 Professor Kindleberger concluded from this one case that a global system of free
trade and finance would more easily survive crises if there was a leader, a hegemon with sufficient
economic power such that its policies could save a system in crisis, which would also have the interest
and the will to do so, precisely because it was so strong. 126 Subsequent theorists, such as Robert Gilpin,
extended this to the idea that a global economic and security hegemon would be even better. 127 Robert
Keohane, and later John Ikenberry, added to this theory the notion that a liberal hegemon would be still
better, because it would graft transparent and legitimate rules onto the hegemonic system, which would
make it more acceptable to the subjects and hence less costly to run. 128 A comprehensive rebuttal of
hegemonic stability theory is beyond the scope of this book. Butthis theory has fallen into
desuetude in the study of international politics in the last twenty years. Proponents did not
produce a clear, consolidated version of the theory that integrated economics,
security, and institutional variables in a systematic way that gives us a sense
of their relative importance and interdependence , and how they work in
practice. The theory is difficult to test because there are only two cases :
nineteenth- and early twentieth-century Britain, and postWorld War II United States, and they
operated in very diferent ways under very diferent conditions. Finally, testing
of narrow versions of the theory did not show compelling results. 129 These
Benefit Answers
problems should make us somewhat skeptical about making the theory the
basis for U.S. grand strategy.
Benefit Answers
2. There is no link. Engagement with China will not
make us look weak. The perception of international
credibility is not zero sum.
Chen, 2015 Dingding Chen ,Assistant professor of Government and Public

Administration at the University of Macau, Non-Resident Fellow at the Global
Public Policy Institute, 1-14-15, http://thediplomat.com/2015/01/relax-china-
wont-challenge-us-hegemony/
Needless to say, the Sino-U.S. relationship is one of the most important yet
complicated bilateral relationships in the world today . This explains why Chinese Vice
Premier Wang Yangs recent comments on Sino-U.S. relations have stirred up a debate online ( here and
here). Wang Yang stated that China [has] neither the ability nor the intent to
challenge the United States. Partly because it is rare for a senior Chinese leader to make such
soft remarks with regard to Sino-U.S. relations and partly because Wangs remarks are seemingly
inconsistent with Chinas recent assertive foreign policies, there has been a fierce debate about the true
meaning of Wangs remarks in the United States. Most American analysts, however, are skeptical toward
Wangs conciliatory remarks and continue to believe that Chinas ultimate aim is to establish a China-
centric order in Asia at the expense of the U.S. influence in Asia. In other words, China seeks to replace the
U.S. as the new global hegemon. The reactions from the U.S. side, again, reveal the deep mistrust with
regard to Chinas long term goals. But such skepticism is misguided and even dangerous to Asias peace
and stability if left uncorrected. Why? Because Wang Yang was sincere when he said that China does not
The evidence of his sincerity is
have the capabilities and desires to challenge the United States.
apparent. First let us look at Chinas capabilities, which need to be especially formidable
if China wants to challenge the United States . Although Chinas
comprehensive capabilities have been growing rapidly for the past three
decades, almost all analysts inside and outside of China agree that there is
still a huge gap between China and the U .S. in terms of comprehensive
capabilities, particularly when the U.S. is far ahead of China in military and
technological realms. Chinas economy might have already passed the U.S.
economy as the largest one in 2014, but the quality of Chinas economy still
remains a major weakness for Beijing. Thus, it would be a serious mistake for China to
challenge the U.S. directly given the wide gap of capabilities between the two. Even if one day Chinas
comprehensive capabilities catch up with the United States, it would still be a huge mistake for China to
challenge the U.S. because by then the two economies would be much more closely interconnected,
creating a situation of mutual dependence benefiting both countries. Besides limited capabilities, China
It is true
also has limited ambitions which have not been properly understood by many U.S. analysts.
that Chinas grand strategy is to realize the China dream a dream that
will bring wealth, glory, and power to China again but this, by no means,
suggests that China wants to become a hegemon in Asia , or to create a Sino-centric
tributary system around which all smaller states must obey Chinas orders. Perhaps these
perceptions exist in the United States because many U .S. analysts have unconsciously
let ultra-realist thinking slip into their minds, thereby believing that states are constantly
engaged in the ruthless pursuit of power and influence . But the structure of
international politics has fundamentally changed since the end of the Cold
War, thus rendering any serious possibility of world hegemony inefective or
even impossible. In essence, the costs of hegemony outweigh the benefits of
Benefit Answers
hegemony in this new era of international politics , thanks to rising
nationalism, nuclear weapons, and increasing economic interdependence between major powers.
The Chinese leaders understand this new and changed structure of
international politics and based on their assessments, they have
decided not to seek hegemony, which is a losing business in this new
era.
CDL Core Files 2016-2017 China Securitization Kritik
China Securitization Kritik

Vocabulary
Link: Something the af has said in a card, cross-ex, or analytic
that is flawed. Just like a DA link, it connects the negative
argument to something the af has done. In the case of the K, this
is using security language.
Impact: The same as a DAsomething very bad that happens
because of the Afs actions. With the K, its a little diferent
though because it makes a root cause argument that the ideas
that the Af has makes their own impacts happen.
Alternative: Think similar to a Counterplan text, but more about
what happens in the debate round instead of a government actor
doing it. The alternative is what we should do in the debate round
to try to fix the problem laid out by the K. These are usually
rethinking or rejecting bad ideas.
Securitization: Language intended to protect one country from
another and usually a criticism of the countrys use of the
military. The K argues that security language is bad because it is
usually wrong. Think about a time you had an argument with
someone and you said, Its all their fault! Thats probably not
fair, right? You probably did something. Similarly, when the US
says that China is coming for us, building weapons, or trying
to attack the US thats making things too simple. Basically,
saying bad things about a country or their military causes knee-
jerk responses or war.
Representations: Language or how things are said. This is
diferent from a policy because representations are the words we
use, the text of the cards, and how we frame arguments. The K
argues that the way we talk about things impacts how we act or
see the world.
Epistemology: Epiteme=thought, ology=study ofthe study of
how we think. How do you know what you know? Who told you to
think that? Did you come up with that on your own? Generally
speaking, this is a reflection on how we think and how we have
come by knowledge. We do this all the time! For example, when
you think about what study habits are most efective; youre
thinking about how you learn best. When you consider the
honesty of a news source, youre thinking about how you get your
knowledge.
Ontology: The study of being or existence. Simply put, the

main question is Who are you? Thats a really tough question
that most adults dont even know, so dont stress if youre not
sure. When ontology is used in these cards, they are related to
security. Basically, if your identity becomes tied up in fear, anger,
and insecurity toward another race/country, then you are more
likely to react with violence.
Cede the Political: Cede means to leave or give up and the
political refers to voting and the government. Therefore, to cede
the political means to give up on working through the
government and trying to change it, but instead to try to work
outside this political system.
Permutation (Perm): A Perm is arguing that the CP or
Alternative can actually work with the plan together. A perm must
include all of the plan and all or part of the CP/Alternative.
Severance: An argument against a perm. Severance is when the
AFF does not include part of the plan in the permutationthey
sever or remove part of the 1ac.
Basically the accumulation of all the Chinese military.
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1NC China Securitization Kritik

Shell
A. Link--The AFFs framing of China as a threat is
unrealistic and is grounded in circular logic.
Everything China does seems like a threat because
they appear threatening and different already. In
reality, these are just racist stereotypes.
Pan, 2004School of International and Political Studies @ Deakin University

(Chengxin, 2004, Alternatives: Global, Local, Political Vol. 29, No. 3, The
"China Threat" in American Self-Imagination: The Discursive Construction of
Other as Power Politics,
Having examined how the "China threat" literature is enabled by and serves
the purpose of a particular U.S. self-construction, I want to turn now to the
issue of how this literature represents a discursive construction of
other, instead of an "objective" account of Chinese reality. This, I
argue, has less to do with its portrayal of China as a threat per se than with
its essentialization and totalization of China as an externally
knowable object, independent of historically contingent contexts or
dynamic international interactions. In this sense, the discursive construction
of China as a threatening other cannot be detached from (neo)realism, a
positivist.ahistorical framework of analysis within which global life is reduced
to endless interstate rivalry for power and survival. As many critical IR
scholars have noted, (neo) realism is not a transcendent description of global
reality but is predicated on the modernist Western identity, which, in the
quest for scientific certainty, has come to define itself essentially as the
sovereign territorial nation-state. This realist self-identity of Western
states leads to the constitution of anarchy as the sphere of
insecurity, disorder, and war. In an anarchical system, as (neo) realists
argue, "the gain of one side is often considered to be the loss of the other,"''5
and "All other states are potential threats."'^ In order to survive in such a
system, states inevitably pursue power or capability. In doing so, these realist
claims represent what R. B. J. Walker calls "a specific historical articulation of
relations of universality/particularity and self/Other."^^ The (neo) realist
paradigm has dominated the U.S. IR discipline in general and the
U.S. China studies field in particular. As Kurt Campbell notes, after the
end of the Cold War, a whole new crop of China experts "are much more
likely to have a background in strategic studies or international
relations than China itself. ""^^ As a result, for those experts to know
China is nothing more or less than to undertake a geopolitical analysis of
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it, often by asking only a few questions such as how China will
"behave" in a strategic sense and how it may afect the regional or global
balance of power, with a particular emphasis on China's military power or
capabilities. As Thomas J. Christensen notes, "Although many have focused
on intentions as well as capabilities, the most prevalent component of the
[China threat] debate is the assessment of China's overall future military
power compared with that of the United States and other East Asian regional
powers."''^ Consequently, almost by default, China emerges as an
absolute other and a threat thanks to this (neo) realist prism. The
(neo) realist emphasis on survival and security in international relations
dovetails perfectly with the U.S. self-imagination, because for the United
States to define itself as the indispensable nation in a world of anarchy is
often to demand absolute security. As James Chace and Caleb Carr note, "for
over two centuries the aspiration toward an eventual condition of absolute
security has been viewed as central to an efective American foreign
policy."50 And this self-identification in turn leads to the definition of not only
"tangible" foreign powers but global contingency and uncertainty per se as
threats. For example, former U.S. President George H. W. Bush repeatedly
said that "the enemy [of America] is unpredictability. The enemy is instability.
"5' Similarly, arguing for the continuation of U.S. Cold War alliances, a high-
ranking Pentagon official asked, "if we pull out, who knows what nervousness
will result? "^2 Thus understood, by its very uncertain character,
China would now automatically constitute a threat to the United
States. For example, Bernstein and Munro believe that "China's political
unpredictability, the always-present possibility that it will fall into a state of
domestic disunion and factional fighting," constitutes a source of danger.s^
In like manner, Richard Betts and Thomas Christensen write: If the PLA
[People's Liberation Army] remains second-rate, should the world breathe a
sigh of relief? Not entirely. . . . Drawing China into the web of global
interdependence may do more to encourage peace than war, but it cannot
guarantee that the pursuit of heartfelt political interests will be blocked by a
fear of economic consequences. . . . U.S. eforts to create a stable balance
across the Taiwan Strait might deter the use of force under certain
circumstances, but certainly not all.54 The upshot, therefore, is that since
China displays no absolute certainty for peace, it must be, by
definition, an uncertainty, and hence, a threat.
B. Impact: These threats become self-fulfilling. The US

threatens China and they threaten the US. Trust is
broken and both countries learn to fear each other.
Both militaries expand and war becomes inevitable.
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Turner, 2013 Research Associate at the Brooks World Poverty Institute at the
University of Manchester (Oliver, Review of International Studies,
Threatening China and US security: the international politics of identity,
In addition, and just as they did throughout the mid-to-late nineteenth

century and the early Cold War period, acts of US China policy continue
to protect the identity from which the threat is produced . This is
most evident in the sustained commitment to the defence of Taiwan, by
which Chinas identity is affirmed as foreign to that of the United States and a
threat to the core values of capitalism and democracy. This policy strategy
constitutes a neocontainment approach designed to manage and control
Chinas apparently threatening behaviour.117 Indeed, as Washington
announced its intention in late 2011 to station an additional 2,500 American
troops on the north coast of Australia, Beijing interpreted the move as part a
wider policy of hostile encirclement.118 To paraphrase Campbell, the
presence of an opposing identity which challenges understandings about the
self can be enough to produce assumptions of a threat.119 Today, Chinas
(particularly nondemocratic) identity continues to be dislocated from that of
the United States, so that almost by its mere geographical existence China
has been qualified as an absolute strategic other [of the United
States], a discursive construct from which it cannot escape.120 Once
again, these are the processes which explain how particular courses of
American foreign policy are enabled, towards a particular type of
manufactured China threat. During the mid-to-late nineteenth century and
the early Cold War period China had the potential to endanger US security.
However, in both cases the threats perceived were products of American
imaginations. For the most part they were produced with the intention
of legitimising policy strategies which could protect the socially
constructed (white and democratic-capitalist) American identity. Material
forces, while not insignificant, were insufficient to explain both the extent to
which China was perceived as a danger and the policy procedures
implemented in response. Todays China threat does not yet pose a
comparable crisis to American identity. However, assessments of material
forces alone remain inadequate explanatory factors of the dangers it is
understood to present. China remains the subject of an American lens,
interpreted by many as a threat through representations of its status as a
necessarily dangerous foreign other. The modern day China threat to the
United States is not an unproblematic, neutrally verifiable phenomenon. It is
an imagined construction of American design and the product of
societal representations which, to a significant extent, have established
the truth that a rising China endangers US security. This is an increasingly
acknowledged, but still relatively under-developed, concept within the
literature.121 The purpose of this article has been to expose how threats
from China towards the United States have always been contingent upon
subjective interpretation. The three case studies chosen represent those
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moments across the lifetime of Sino-US relations at which China has been
perceived as most threatening to American security. The threats emerged in
highly contrasting eras. The nature of each was very diferent and they
emerged from varying sources (broadly speaking, from immigration in the
nineteenth century and from great power rivalry in the twentieth and
twenty-first centuries). Yet in this way they most efectively demonstrate how
China threats have repeatedly existed as socially constructed phenomenon.
Collectively they reveal the consistent centrality of understandings about the
United States in perceptions of external danger. They demonstrate that,
regardless of Chinas ability to assert material force or of the manner
in which it has been seen to impose itself upon the United States, the reality
of danger can be manufactured and made real. China threats have
always been threats to American identity so that the individual sources of
danger whether a nuclear capability or an influx of (relatively few) foreign
immigrants have never been the sole determining factors. As James Der
Derian notes, danger can be ascribed to otherness wherever it may be
found.122 During the mid-to-late nineteenth century and throughout the
early Cold War, perceptions of China threats provoked crises of
American identity. The twenty-first-century China threat is yet to be
understood in this way but it remains inexplicable in simple material terms.
As ever, the physical realities of China are important but they are
interpreted in such a way to make them threatening, regardless of
Beijings intentions.
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C. Alternative: The judge should vote for the negative
team to question the flawed stereotypes about
China. Only by seeing the country as a genuine
partner and not a conflict-region with scary people
can we produce real change.
Turner, 2013 Research Associate at the Brooks World Poverty Institute at the
University of Manchester (Oliver, Review of International Studies,
Most importantly, this article has shown how processes of representation

have been complicit at every stage of the formulation, enactment, and
justification of US China policy. Their primary purpose has been to dislocate
Chinas identity from that of the United States and introduce opportunities for
action. Further, those policies themselves have reaffirmed the discourses of
separation and diference which make China foreign from the United States,
protecting American identity from the imagined threat. Ultimately, this
analysis has sought to expose the inadequacy of approaches to the study of
US China policy which privilege and centralise material forces to the extent
that ideas are subordinated or even excluded. Joseph Nye argues that the
China Threat Theory has the potential to become a self-fulfilling prophecy.
Based upon a crude hypothetical assumption that there exists a 50 per cent
chance of China becoming aggressive and a 50 per cent chance of it not, Nye
explains, to treat China as an enemy now efectively discounts 50 per cent of
the future.123 In such way he emphasises the ideational constitution of
material forces and the power of discourse to create selected truths about
the world so that certain courses of action are enabled while others are
precluded. Assessments such as those of Director of National Intelligence
James Clapper in March 2011 should therefore not only be considered
misguided, but also potentially dangerous. For while they appear to represent
authoritative statements of fact they actually rely upon subjective
assumptions about China and the material capabilities he describes. In late
2010 President Obama informed Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao that the
American people [want] to continue to build a growing friendship and strong
relationship between the peoples of China and the United States.124 The
hope, of course, is that a peaceful and cooperative future can be secured.
Following the announcement that the Asia Pacific is to constitute the primary
focus of Washingtons early twenty-first-century foreign policy strategy,
American interpretations of China must be acknowledged as a
central force within an increasingly pertinent relationship. The basis
of their relations will always be fundamentally constituted by ideas and
history informs us that particular American discourses of China have
repeatedly served to construct vivid and sometimes regrettable realities
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about that country and its people. Crucially, it tells us that they have always
been inextricable from the potentialities of US China policy. As Sino-US
relations become increasingly consequential the intention must be for
American representations of the PRC and indeed Chinese
representations of the United States to become the focus of more
concerted scholarly attention. Only in this way can the contours of
those relations be more satisfactorily understood, so that the types of
historical episodes explored in this analysis might somehow be
avoided in the future.
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Economic Link
1. The AFFs realist understanding of the economic
power shift to the East is a reductionist approach
that escalates tensions, making conflict inevitable.
Pan, 2014School of International and Political Studies @ Deakin University (Chengxin, 2014, Asian
Perspective, Vol. 38, No. 3, Rethinking Chinese Power: A Conceptual Corrective to the Power Shift
Narrative,
China may be the most complex and paradoxical rising power in modern
international history, as reflected in various paradigms and lenses employed to try to
make sense of it (Pan 2012). The powershift narrative is one such lens; it provides
a seemingly convincing identity statement about a China that, while still lacking in
superpower status, no longer quite fits into the category of developing countries. This
narrative also allows us to reduce the many complex transnational issues and
challenges that do not have a single national origin to the familiar problems
associated with international power transition. Overall it reflects a particular
spatial mindset and geopolitical imagination that keeps recycling the age-old
metanarrative of a realist world where power struggle is a constant reality and where
the rise and fall of great powers not only unset-tles the balance of power but more
often than not results in the tragedy of great power politics (Mearsheimer 2001). In
doing so, the power-shift narrative betrays the lack of serious
reconceptualization of power. Given the inherently social and relational nature of
power itself as well as the changing global political, economic, and normative
structures, we must understand the alleged power shift from the United States to
China through a more complex and nuanced perspective of power. By assuming that
power continues to be attached to the state as measurable capabilities, and that
todays power shift necessarily resembles shifts of the past, we risk employing old
tools to tackle new problems. Here it is appropriate to invoke Chinese history and
recent US foreign policy to illustrate how a failure to reconceptualize power can lead
to grave strategic calamities. For more than a millennium, Chinese rulers closely
watched their interior continental frontiers for signs of a challenge to their power. The
fact that such a challenge could come from a new direction (the coast) and in a
diferent form (naval power) never occurred to them. Yet when that new form of
power arrived on its shores, the Qing dynasty found itself vastly ill-equipped to cope
with it. The rest is history. The recent example is the false unipolar moment
assessment of US power and its attendant neoconservative policy during the George
W. Bush period (Reus-Smit 2004). If the neoconservative faith in the unipolar
moment of US power is misguided, the US decline and power-shift
discourses may be equally mistaken. Yet, to the extent that power is socially
constructed, the powerful conventional discourse of a classic power transition from
the United States to China could have profound practical implications for this
important relationship. As Breslin (2009, 818) notes, A key source of Chinese power
is the assumption by others that it either has it . . . or, maybe more correctly, that it
will have this power and influence some time soon. Whether this discursively
constructed Chinese power matches reality is beside the point, for China and other
powers both may act on the basis of such a projected power shift (Hagstrom 2012). In
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China, it might well play into popular nationalism or encourage arrogance and
assertiveness in its foreign policy, or both. In the West, it would justify a policy
of hedging against an ostensibly rising Chinese power, a policy that in turn
could harden Chinas resolve to further amass power. In this sense, the
conventional construction of Chinese power could well create a dangerous
self-fulfilling prophecy
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Bilateral Investment Treaty/South China Sea
Link
1. US intervention in South China Sea affairs intensifies
tensions and makes conflict more likely.

(Chengxin, 5/24/11, East Asia Forum, Is the South China Sea a new
Dangerous Ground for US-China rivalry?,
http://www.eastasiaforum.org/2011/05/24/is-the-south-china-sea-a-new-
dangerous-ground-for-us-china-rivalry/
Now boasting some of the busiest shipping lanes in the world, this region
dubbed by some as a new Persian Gulf and a hydrocarbons Eldorado is a
focal point of ongoing sovereignty disputes among its adjacent countries. This
vast sea may have shaken of its Dangerous Ground reputation in a
navigational sense, but it seems to be shaping up as precisely that
strategically: a volatile flashpoint characterised by recurring tensions with
profound geopolitical implications. Such tensions are visible in recent flare-
ups between China and the Philippines over the latters oil exploration in
disputed waters, as well as in Taiwans recent move, for the first time since
2000, to strengthen the defence capability of its coastguard troops stationed
in the Spratly Islands. All this came after US Secretary of State Hillary
Clinton declared last July that the US had a national interest in the
South China Sea issue, followed by US-Vietnam naval exercises in the Sea
one month later. This new stance from Washington marked not only
the internationalisation of the South China Sea disputes, but also
the opening of a potential new front in US-China rivalry. The
Philippines more assertive moves in the Spratly Islands earlier this year
cannot be divorced from this great power dynamic. Without some measure of
US support, the Philippines would have been less likely to ofend China, a
country that has just overtaken the US as its second largest trading partner.
That Washington has stepped in has created much alarm and
trepidation within China. A quick glance at the Chinese press reveals the
widespread sentiment warning against foreign intervention in the South
China Sea. Immediately following Clintons remarks, an editorial from Global
Times (a subsidiary of the official Peoples Daily) asserted that Chinas long-
term strategic plan should never be taken as a weak stand [and] China will
never waive its right to protect its core interest with military means. To some
degree, Beijing has itself to blame for this new turn. For a long time it insisted
on a bilateral approach to the South China Sea issue. Southeast Asian
countries with direct stakes in the disputes and fearing being outgunned
by their powerful neighbour understandably want to hedge their bets by
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looking to the US for support. But that is not the only factor. China and other
claimants have adopted the 2002 Declaration on the Code of Conduct in the
region and vowed to follow the formula of shelving disagreement and joint
development, but thus far little progress has been made with these
multilateral initiatives. Underlying the intractability of this problem are some
more structural dilemmas faced by China and the US as well as other
stakeholders in the region. For its part, China needs to constantly reassure its
southern neighbours of its peaceful rise intention; the ASEAN-China Free
Trade Area was designed in part for this purpose through win-win economic
cooperation. But, on the other hand, securing control in the South China Sea
is Chinas best hope to become a great naval power a goal which has
become increasingly crucial in protecting its expanding economic and
security interests. Eighty per cent of Chinas energy imports pass through the
South China Sea, and Beijing has agonised over its so-called Malacca
Dilemma a term referring to the busy Malacca Strait: at one end of which
is an American naval presence at the Changi naval base in Singapore and, at
the other end, a US fleet (operating from Diego Garcia in the Indian Ocean).
Yet, few countries appreciate this strategic vulnerability, and most are all too
ready to view any Chinese ascendancy in the region with suspicion.
Meanwhile, the US faces its so-called China Dilemma. While it needs Beijing
to take more responsibility in jointly tackling common challenges like
nuclear non-proliferation, terrorism, climate change and global economic
stability Washington is fundamentally wary of Chinas strategic intentions.
Unsettled by Chinas charm ofensive and the waning American influence in
East Asia over the years, the Obama administration has made re-engaging
Asia one of its foreign policy priorities. To that end, the South China Sea
seems to be a perfect stepping stone. Whether by accident or design,
these great power dilemmas have now converged on the South China Sea.
This is of course not to predict a full-scale Cold War-style rivalry between the
US and China. Unprecedented economic and strategic interdependence
between the two will militate against such a trend. Moreover, the fear of
further US involvement might well spur Beijing to recalibrate its approach to
the South China Sea issue. Just last December China hosted a three-day
meeting with ASEAN member states in Kunming to hammer out a more
binding code of conduct in the region. Still, the apparently increasing
commercial, strategic and symbolic value of the South China Sea to each of
its claimants makes a lasting solution unlikely any time soon, and the
structural dilemmas seem to run deep on both sides of the Pacific, with
countries in the region, including Australia, potentially caught in the middle.
Last month, US Pacific Commander Adm. Robert Willard told Congress that US
access to the South China Sea might require increased levels of US military
activities in Australia. Given the enormously high stakes, more far-sighted
leadership and more creative thinking and diplomacy are urgently needed in
order to prevent this Dangerous Ground from sliding into a self-fulfilling
prophecy.
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Nuclear Weapon/North Korea Link
1. Claiming that other countries should not have nuclear
weapons is unfairit assumes they wont use them
correctly even though the US has thousands
BondGraham & Parrish, 2009 (Darwin, sociologist, and Will, anti-imperialist scholar. 1/12
http://fpif.org/anti-nuclear_nuclearism/
The Obama administration is likely to continue a policy that we call anti-nuclear

nuclearism. Anti-nuclear nuclearism is a foreign and military policy that relies
upon overwhelming U.S. power, including the nuclear arsenal, but makes
rhetorical and even some substantive commitments to disarmament,
however vaguely defined. Anti-nuclear nuclearism thrives as a school of thought in
several think tanks that have long influenced foreign policy choices related to global
nuclear forces. Even the national nuclear weapons development labs in New Mexico
and California have been avid supporters and crafters of it. As a policy, anti-nuclear
nuclearism is designed to ensure U.S. nuclear and military dominance by
rhetorically calling for what has long been derided as a nave ideal: global
nuclear disarmament. Unlike past forms of nuclearism, it de-emphasizes the
offensive nature of the U.S. arsenal. Instead of promoting the U.S. stockpile as a
strategic deterrence or umbrella for U.S. and allied forces, it prioritizes an aggressive
diplomatic and military campaign of nonproliferation. Nonproliferation efforts are
aimed entirely at other states, especially non-nuclear nations with
suspected weapons programs, or states that can be coerced and attacked under
the pretense that they possess nuclear weapons or a development program (e.g. Iraq
in 2003). Efectively pursuing this kind of belligerent nonproliferation regime requires
half-steps toward cutting the U.S. arsenal further, and at least rhetorically
recommitting the United States to international treaties such as the Nuclear Non-
Proliferation Treaty (NPT). It requires a fig leaf that the United States isnt
developing new nuclear weapons, and that it is slowly disarming and de-
emphasizing its nuclear arsenal. By these means the United States has tried to avoid
the charge of hypocrisy, even though it has designed and built newly modified
weapons with qualitatively new capacities over the last decade and a half.
Meanwhile, U.S. leaders have allowed for and even promoted a mass proliferation of
nuclear energy and material, albeit under the firm control of the nuclear weapons
states, with the United States at the top of this pile. Many disarmament proponents
were elated last year when four extremely prominent cold warriors George P.
Shultz, William Perry, Henry Kissinger, and Sam Nunn announced in a series of op-
eds their commitment to "a world free of nuclear weapons." Strange bedfellows
indeed for the cause. Yet the fine print of their plan, published by the Hoover Institute
and others since then, represents the anti-nuclear nuclearist platform to a tee. Its a
conspicuous yet merely rhetorical commitment to a world without nuclear weapons.
These four elder statesmen have said what many U.S. elites have rarely uttered: that
abolition is both possible and desirable. However, the anti-nuclear posture in
their policy proposal comes to bear only on preventing non-nuclear states
from going nuclear, or else preventing international criminal conspiracies from
proliferating weapons technologies and nuclear materials for use as instruments of
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non-state terror. In other words, its about other people's nuclear weapons, not the
99% of materials and arms possessed by the United States and other established
nuclear powers. This position emphasizes an anti-nuclear politics entirely for
what it means for the rest of the world securing nuclear materials and
preventing other states from going nuclear or further developing their existing
arsenals. U.S. responsibility to disarm remains in the distant future, unaddressed as a
present imperative. Exclusive Route around the CTBT Concerns about the nuclear
programs of other states mostly Islamic, East and South Asian nations (i.e.,
Iran, North Korea, etc.) conveniently work to reinforce existing power
relations embodied in U.S. military supremacy and neocolonial relationships
of technological inequality and dependence. By invoking their commitment to a
"world free of nuclear weapons," the ideologues behind the anti-nuclear nuclearist
platform justify invasions, military strikes, economic sanctions, and perhaps
even the use of nuclear weapons themselves against the "rogue states" and
"terrorists" whose possession of weapons technologies vastly less advanced than
those perpetually stockpiled by the United States is deemed by the anti-nuclear
nuclearists the first and foremost problem of the nuclear age.
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Democracy Link
1. Democracy is only a justification for cultural
imperialism ending in war
Ivie and Giner, 2004

[ROBERT L. IVIE professor emeritus of communications and culture &
American studies at Indiana University, OSCAR GINER Professor in the
Theater department at Arizona State University, December 2004, Hunting
the Devil: Democracys Rhetorical Impulse to War, Presidential Studies
Quarterly 37, no. 4 pg 594-595
presidential war rhetoric functioned as

Overall, then, the diabolical incantations of
an inducement to evacuate the political content of democracy,
leaving a largely empty signifier in its place. Although officially promoted, a narrowly
circumscribed, truncated, distorted, and otherwise substantially purged simulacrum of democracy
suspended ad infinitum was the diminished extent of its troubled symbolic import. Shriveled, shrunken,
and emptied of meaning, democracy was relegated to the degraded role of a
political ciphera ready and reliable but badly disfigured vehicle for sublimating
a heavy burden of anxious self-loathing and transferring that
unwanted load to an external object of terror. Diluted democracy in
the heroic guise of world liberator and protector and under the firm control of
presidential order substituted for robust democratic deliberation and a full
contestation of opinions. A failure to contain democracy implied a risk of
chaos, an outbreak of violence, a loss of civilization, a reign of terror. Killing terrorists
substituted for acknowledging and confronting the suppressed dark
side of Americas political identity. The primal appeal of presidential
war rhetoric, its patriarchal inducement to rescue a feminized and
infantilized victim from the evil savagery of faceless tyranny, was to
prove the nations virtue and virility. This was the essence of a rhetorical
diabolism that purged democratic anxiety by channeling it into an
impulse to war.
If Americans have inherited the Christian worldview from their ancestors, they have also inherited a nave
susceptibility to believe in medieval villains, a language derived from an agonic cosmology which casts the
devil as an eternal, ontological adversary, and a superstitious conviction in the power of scapegoating as a
ritual means of cleansing ones sins. The length of influence of old fears and the perpetuity of mental
Salem in its infancy
constructs are highlighted by the fact that the nation that chased devils in
grows up to declare war on terror and darkness. President Bush is not an
exception or even an extreme example of war mongering. What he is, as president, is the leading voice
national shadow onto terrorist enemiesa shadow
articulating the projection of a
created in the image of their fears and anxieties
forged by Americans and
about democracy. Even the president himself is subject to becoming the target of
such anxious projections, as in the case of Newsweeks February 19, 2007, issue, which merged
into a single, front-cover image the left half of Bushs face with the right half of the demonized Iranian
President Mahmoud Ahmadinejads face, noting in an accompanying story that the two
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countries are now led by men who deeply mistrust the intentions
and indeed doubt the sanity of the other (Hirsh and Bahari 2007, 30).
As long as these projections go unrecognized, they distort the nations vision, delude it into making
mistakes, and create an imaginary landscape that serves as a hideout for Americas enemies: The efect
projection is to isolate the subject from his environment, since instead of a
of
This fanciful terrain
real relation to it there is now only an illusory one ( Jung 1951, 146).
provides camouflage for the actual threat and is even a source of
mistakes in battle. At the turn of the century, arguing for a more complex understanding of the
social phenomenon of Russian anarchist terrorists, George Bernard Shaw (1952, 214) warned, If a man
cannot look evil in the face without illusion, he will not know what it really is, or combat it efectively.
unexamined
The true danger to the nation that is posed by unexamined projections is twofold: first,
projections leave us weak and vulnerable. Having cast our vital energy on others,
we are left small and terrified before imagined external dragons (like in
those dreams in which we are chased by our own monsters). Second, by branding others as
evilcruel and inhumane though they may bewe position ourselves as good, leaving
our evil spirit, in the words of Robert Johnson, free to catch a Greyhound bus and ride ( Johnson 1990,
46).Because we are good, we believe ourselves justified in Abu Ghraib, in
Guantanamo, in violating the rights of American citizens and disregarding the Constitution. Also
somewhat inconsistently but nevertheless devilishly captivating we are left free to deny
that these events occur, that they are wrong (How could good people perpetrate wrongful
acts?), and that we are complicitous in them. Thus the practical need, as well as the moral responsibility,
we gain the means and
to remove the beam from the nations collective eyes. Perhaps, if
the moxie first to recognize and eventually to reclaim democracys
projected shadow, we might then dare to move forward toward a
less dehumanizing and more democratic future with a diminishing
incentive for war.
Specific Links
Human Rights Link
1. Human rights are only used to attack those that have

different beliefs
Kaplan, 2003 [Amy, Violent belongings and the question of empire today presidential
address to the American studies Association American Quarterly, vol. 56, no.1,
march 2004, muse, pg 4-5]
Another dominant narrative about empire today, told by liberal

interventionists, is that of the "reluctant imperialist."10 In this version,
the United States never sought an empire and may even be
constitutionally unsuited to rule one, but it had the burden thrust upon it
by the fall of earlier empires and the failures of modern states, which
abuse the human rights of their own people and spawn terrorism.
The United States is the only power in the world with the capacity and
the moral authority to act as military policeman and economic manager to
bring order to the world. Benevolence and self-interest merge in this
narrative; backed by unparalleled force, the United States can save the
people of the world from their own anarchy, their descent into an uncivilized
state. As Robert Kaplan writes-not reluctantly at all-in "Supremacy by Stealth:
Ten Rules for Managing the World": "The purpose of power is not power itself;
it is a fundamentally liberal purpose of sustaining the key characteristics of
an orderly world. Those characteristics include basic political stability, the
idea of liberty, pragmatically conceived; respect for property; economic
freedom; and representative government, culturally understood. At this
moment in time it is American power, and American power only, that can
serve as an organizing principle for the worldwide expansion of liberal civil
society."" This narrative does imagine limits to empire, yet primarily in the
selfish refusal of U.S. citizens to sacrifice and shoulder the burden
for others, as though sacrifices have not already been imposed on
them by the state. The temporal dimension of this narrative entails
the aborted effort of other nations and peoples to enter modernity,
and its view of the future projects the end of empire only when the
world is remade in our image.
2NC/1NR War Impact Extensions

1. Security politics makes escalation of war inevitable
BURKE, 2007 (Prof on Intl Relations, University of New South Wales)

(Anthony, Ontologies of War: Violence, Existence and Reason, Theory and Event,
10:2, MUSE)
This closed circle of existential and strategic reason generates a number of

dangers. Firstly, the emergence of conflict can generate military
action almost automatically simply because the world is conceived
in terms of the distinction between friend and enemy; because the
very existence of the other constitutes an unacceptable threat,
rather than a chain of actions, judgements and decisions. (As the
Israelis insisted of Hezbollah, they 'deny our right to exist'.) This efaces
agency, causality and responsibility from policy and political
discourse: our actions can be conceived as independent of the
conflict or quarantined from critical enquiry, as necessities that
achieve an instrumental purpose but do not contribute to a new
and unpredictable causal chain. Similarly the Clausewitzian idea of force --
which, by transporting a Newtonian category from the natural into the social
sciences, assumes the very efect it seeks -- further encourages the resort to
military violence. We ignore the complex history of a conflict, and thus
the alternative paths to its resolution that such historical analysis
might provide, by portraying conflict as fundamental and existential
in nature; as possibly containable or exploitable, but always
irresolvable. Dominant portrayals of the war on terror, and the Israeli-Arab
conflict, are arguably examples of such ontologies in action.

2. Personal fear of different people causes insecurity and
violence on a global scale

10:2, MUSE)
This essay develops a theory about the causes of war -- and thus aims to
generate lines of action and critique for peace -- that cuts beneath analyses
based either on a given sequence of events, threats, insecurities and political
manipulation, or the play of institutional, economic or political interests (the
'military-industrial complex'). Such factors are important to be sure, and
should not be discounted, but they flow over a deeper bedrock of modern
reason that has not only come to form a powerful structure of common sense
but the apparently solid ground of the real itself. In this light, the two
'existential' and 'rationalist' discourses of war-making and justification
mobilised in the Lebanon war are more than merely arguments, rhetorics or
even discourses. Certainly they mobilise forms of knowledge and power
together; providing political leaderships, media, citizens, bureaucracies and
military forces with organising systems of belief, action, analysis and
rationale. But they run deeper than that. They are truth-systems of the most
powerful and fundamental kind that we have in modernity: ontologies,
statements about truth and being which claim a rarefied privilege to state
what is and how it must be maintained as it is. I am thinking of ontology in
both its senses: ontology as both a statement about the nature and ideality of
being (in this case political being, that of the nation-state), and as a
statement of epistemological truth and certainty, of methods and processes
of arriving at certainty (in this case, the development and application of
strategic knowledge for the use of armed force, and the creation and
maintenance of geopolitical order, security and national survival). These
derive from the classical idea of ontology as a speculative or positivistic
inquiry into the fundamental nature of truth, of being, or of some
phenomenon; the desire for a solid metaphysical account of things
inaugurated by Aristotle, an account of 'being qua being and its essential
attributes'.17 In contrast, drawing on Foucauldian theorising about truth and
power, I see ontology as a particularly powerful claim to truth itself: a claim
to the status of an underlying systemic foundation for truth, identity,
existence and action; one that is not essential or timeless, but is thoroughly
historical and contingent, that is deployed and mobilised in a fraught and
conflictual socio-political context of some kind. In short, ontology is the
'politics of truth'18 in its most sweeping and powerful form. I see such a drive
for ontological certainty and completion as particularly problematic for a
number of reasons. Firstly, when it takes the form of the existential and
rationalist ontologies of war, it amounts to a hard and exclusivist claim: a
drive for ideational hegemony and closure that limits debate and questioning,

that confines it within the boundaries of a particular, closed system of logic,
one that is grounded in the truth of being, in the truth of truth as such. The
second is its intimate relation with violence: the dual ontologies represent a
simultaneously social and conceptual structure that generates violence. Here
we are witness to an epistemology of violence (strategy) joined to an
ontology of violence (the national security state). When we consider their
relation to war, the two ontologies are especially dangerous because each
alone (and doubly in combination) tends both to quicken the resort to war
and to lead to its escalation either in scale and duration, or in unintended
efects. In such a context violence is not so much a tool that can be picked
up and used on occasion, at limited cost and with limited impact -- it
permeates being.
3 Their mode of security politics makes both escalation

and global structural violence inevitable
Burke, 2007 Anthony, Senior Lecturer @ School of Politics & IR @ Univ. of New South
Wales [Beyond Security, Ethics and Violence, p. 231-2]
Yet the first act in America's 'forward strategy of freedom' was to invade
and attempt to subjugate Iraq, suggesting that, if 'peace' is its object, its
means is war: the engine of history is violence, on an enormous and tragic
scale, and violence is ultimately its only meaning. This we can glimpse in 'Toward
a Pacific Union', a deeply disingenuous chapter of Fukuyama's The End of History
and the Last Man. This text divides the earth between a 'post-historical' world of
affluent developed democracies where 'the old rules of power-politics have
decreasing relevance', and a world still 'stuck in history' and 'riven with a variety
of religious, national and ideological conflicts'. The two worlds will maintain
'parallel but separate existences' and interact only along axes of threat,
disturbance and crucial strategic interest: oil, immigration, terrorism and the
proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. Because 'the relationship between
democracies and nondemocracies will still be characterised by mutual distrust
and fear', writes Fukuyama, the 'post-historical half must still make use of realist
methods when dealing with the part still in history ... force will still be the ultima
ratio in their relations'. For all the book's Kantian pretensions, Fukuyama
naturalises war and coercion as the dominant mode of
dealing with billions of people defined only through their lack of
'development' and 'freedom'. Furthermore, in his advocacy of the 'traditional
moralism of American foreign policy' and his dismissal of the United Nations in
favour of a NATO-style 'league of truly free states ... capable of much more
forceful action to protect its collective security against threats arising from the
non-democratic part of the world' we can see an early premonition of the
historicist unilateralism of the Bush administration. 72 In this light, we can see
the invasion of Iraq as continuing a long process of 'world-historical'
violence that stretches back to Columbus' discovery of the Americas, and
the subsequent politics of genocide, warfare and dispossession
through which the modem United States was created and then
expanded - initially with the colonisation of the Philippines and coercive trade

relationships with China and Japan, and eventually to the self-declared role Luce
had argued so forcefully for : guarantor of global economic and strategic
order after 1945. This role involved the hideous destruction of
Vietnam and Cambodia, 'interventions' in Chile, El Salvador,
Panama, Nicaragua and Afghanistan (or an ever more destructive
'strategic' involvement in the Persian Gulf that saw the United States first
building up Iraq as a formidable regional military power, and then punishing its
people with a 14-year sanctions regime that caused the deaths of at least
200,000 people), all of which we are meant to accept as proof of America's
benign intentions, of America putting its 'power at the service of
principle'. They are merely history working itself out, the 'design of nature'
writing its bliss on the world.73 The bliss 'freedom' ofers us, however, is
the bliss of the graveyard, stretching endlessly into a world
marked not by historical perfection or democratic peace, but by the
eternal recurrence of tragedy, as ends endlessly disappear in
the means of permanent war and permanent terror . This is how
we must understand both the prolonged trauma visited on the people of Iraq
since 1990, and the inflammatory impact the US invasion will have on the new
phenomenon of global antiWestern terrorism. American exceptionalism has
deluded US policymakers into believing that they are the only actors who write
history, who know where it is heading, and how it will play out, and that in its
service it is they (and no-one else) who assume an unlimited freedom to act. As a
senior adviser to Bush told a journalist in 2002: 'We're an empire now, and when
we act, we create our own reality . . We're history's actors."
2NC/1NR Alternative Extensions

1. Our Alternative solves by analyzing the racist
stereotypes of the AFF. After that, we can engage the
political realm with a positive stance
Neoclous, 2008 Mark, Prof. of Government @ Brunel, 2008 [Critique of

Security, 185-6]
The only way out of such a dilemma, to escape the fetish, is perhaps to eschew the
logic of security altogether - to reject it as so ideologically loaded in favour of the state that
any real political thought other than the authoritarian and reactionary should be pressed to give it up. That
is clearly something that can not be achieved within the limits of bourgeois thought and thus could never
even begin to be imagined by the security intellectual. It is also something that the constant
iteration of the refrain 'this is an insecure world' and reiteration of one fear, anxiety and
insecurity after another will also make it hard to do. But it is something that the critique of
security suggests we may have to consider if we want a political way out of the impasse of security. This
security has now become so all-encompassing that it
impasse exists because
marginalises all else, most notably the constructive conflicts, debates and
discussions that animate political life. The constant prioritising of a mythical security as a
political end - as the political end constitutes a rejection of politics in any meaningful sense of the term.
That is, as a mode of action in which diferences can be articulated, in which the conflicts and struggles
that arise from such diferences can be fought for and negotiated, in which people might come to believe
that another world is possible - that they might transform the world and in turn be transformed. Security
it
politics simply removes this; worse, it remoeves it while purportedly addressing it. In so doing
suppresses all issues of power and turns political questions into debates
about the most efficient way to achieve 'security', despite the fact that we are never
quite told - never could be told - what might count as having achieved it. Security politics is, in this sense,
an anti-politics,"' dominating political discourse in much the same manner as the security state tries to
dominate human beings, reinforcing security fetishism and the monopolistic character of security on the
political imagination. We therefore need to get beyond security politics, not add yet more 'sectors' to it in a
way that simply expands the scope of the state and legitimises state intervention in yet more and more
areas of our lives. Simon Dalby reports a personal communication with Michael Williams, co-editor of the
if you take away security, what
important text Critical Security Studies, in which the latter asks:
do you put in the hole that's left behind? But I'm inclined to agree with Dalby: maybe
there is no hole."' The mistake has been to think that there is a hole and that this hole needs to be
filled with a new vision or revision of security in which it is re-mapped or civilised or gendered or
humanised or expanded or whatever. All of these ultimately remain within the statist political imaginary,
and consequently end up reaffirming the state as the terrain of modern politics, the grounds of security.
The real task is not to fill the supposed hole with yet another vision of security, but to fight for
an alternative political language which takes us beyond the narrow horizon of bourgeois
security and which therefore does not constantly throw us into the arms of the state.
That's the point of critical politics: to develop a new political language more adequate to the kind of
society we want. Thus while much of what I have said here has been of a negative order, part of the
the negative may be as significant as the positive in
tradition of critical theory is that
setting thought on new paths. For if security really is the supreme concept of bourgeois society
and the fundamental thematic of liberalism, then to keep harping on about insecurity and to
keep demanding 'more security' (while meekly hoping that this increased security doesn't damage our
liberty) is to blind ourselves to the possibility of building real alternatives to the

authoritarian tendencies in contemporary politics. To situate ourselves against security
politics would allow us to circumvent the debilitating efect achieved through the constant
securitising of social and political issues, debilitating in the sense that 'security' helps consolidate the
power of the existing forms of social domination and justifies the short-circuiting of even the most
allow us to forge another kind of politics centred on a
democratic forms. It would also
different conception of the good. We need a new way of thinking and talking about social
being and politics that moves us beyond security. This would perhaps be emancipatory in the true sense of
the word. What this might mean, precisely, must be open to debate. But it certainly requires recognising
that security is an illusion that has forgotten it is an illusion; it requires recognising that security is not the
same as solidarity; it requires accepting that insecurity is part of the human
condition, and thus giving up the search for the certainty of security and instead learning to
tolerate the uncertainties, ambiguities and 'insecurities' that come with being human;
it requires accepting that 'securitizing' an issue does not mean dealing with it
politically, but bracketing it out and handing it to the state; it requires us
to be brave enough to return the gift."'
2 The alternative breaks free of small-minded, false

choices. We instead view the world with many
different options preventing war

10:2, MUSE)
What I am trying to describe in this essay is a complex relation between, and

interweaving of, epistemology and ontology. But it is not my view that these
are distinct modes of knowledge or levels of truth, because in the social field
named by security, statecraft and violence they are made to blur together,
continually referring back on each other, like charges darting between
electrodes. Rather they are related systems of knowledge with particular
systemic roles and intensities of claim about truth, political being and political
necessity. Positivistic or scientific claims to epistemological truth supply an
air of predictability and reliability to policy and political action, which in turn
support larger ontological claims to national being and purpose, drawing
them into a common horizon of certainty that is one of the central features of
past-Cartesian modernity. Here it may be useful to see ontology as a more
totalising and metaphysical set of claims about truth, and epistemology as
more pragmatic and instrumental; but while a distinction between
epistemology (knowledge as technique) and ontology (knowledge as being)
has analytical value, it tends to break down in action. The epistemology of
violence I describe here (strategic science and foreign policy doctrine) claims
positivistic clarity about techniques of military and geopolitical action which
use force and coercion to achieve a desired end, an end that is supplied by
the ontological claim to national existence, security, or order. However in
practice, technique quickly passes into ontology. This it does in two ways.
First, instrumental violence is married to an ontology of insecure national
existence which itself admits no questioning. The nation and its identity are

known and essential, prior to any conflict, and the resort to violence becomes
an equally essential predicate of its perpetuation. In this way knowledge-as-
strategy claims, in a positivistic fashion, to achieve a calculability of efects
(power) for an ultimate purpose (securing being) that it must always assume.
Second, strategy as a technique not merely becomes an instrument of state
power but ontologises itself in a technological image of 'man' as a maker and
user of things, including other humans, which have no essence or integrity
ou0tside their value as objects. In Heidegger's terms, technology becomes
being; epistemology immediately becomes technique, immediately being.
This combination could be seen in the aftermath of the 2006 Lebanon war,
whose obvious strategic failure for Israelis generated fierce attacks on the
army and political leadership and forced the resignation of the IDF chief of
staf. Yet in its wake neither ontology was rethought. Consider how a reserve
soldier, while on brigade-sized manoeuvres in the Golan Heights in early
2007, was quoted as saying: 'we are ready for the next war'. Uri Avnery
quoted Israeli commentators explaining the rationale for such a war as being
to 'eradicate the shame and restore to the army the "deterrent power" that
was lost on the battlefields of that unfortunate war'. In 'Israeli public
discourse', he remarked, 'the next war is seen as a natural phenomenon, like
tomorrow's sunrise.' 22 The danger obviously raised here is that these dual
ontologies of war link being, means, events and decisions into a single,
unbroken chain whose very process of construction cannot be examined. As
is clear in the work of Carl Schmitt, being implies action, the action that is
war. This chain is also obviously at work in the U.S. neoconservative
doctrine that argues, as Bush did in his 2002 West Point speech, that 'the
only path to safety is the path of action', which begs the question of whether
strategic practice and theory can be detached from strong ontologies of the
insecure nation-state.23 This is the direction taken by much realist analysis
critical of Israel and the Bush administration's 'war on terror'.24 Reframing
such concerns in Foucauldian terms, we could argue that obsessive
ontological commitments have led to especially disturbing 'problematizations'
of truth.25 However such rationalist critiques rely on a one-sided
interpretation of Clausewitz that seeks to disentangle strategic from
existential reason, and to open up choice in that way. However without
interrogating more deeply how they form a conceptual harmony in
Clausewitz's thought -- and thus in our dominant understandings of
politics and war -- tragically violent 'choices' will continue to be
made. The essay concludes by pondering a normative problem that arises
out of its analysis: if the divisive ontology of the national security state and
the violent and instrumental vision of 'enframing' have, as Heidegger
suggests, come to define being and drive 'out every other possibility of
revealing being', how can they be escaped?26 How can other choices and
alternatives be found and enacted? How is there any scope for agency and
resistance in the face of them? Their social and discursive power -- one that
aims to take up the entire space of the political -- needs to be respected and
understood. However, we are far from powerless in the face of them.

The need is to critique dominant images of political being and dominant ways
of securing that being at the same time, and to act and choose such that we
bring into the world a more sustainable, peaceful and non-violent global rule
of the political.

3 Self-reflection and critique of security politics can
solve
Dillon, 1999 (Michael, The Scandal of the Refugee: Some Reflections on the
Inter of International Relations and Continental Thought, in Moral Spaces:
Rethinking Ethics and World Politics, eds. David Campbell and Michael Shapiro
(Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1999) pg. 97-99}
As Heideggerhimself an especially revealing figure of the deep and mutual

implication of the philosophical and the politicalnever tired of pointing out,
the relevance of ontology to all other kinds of thinking is fundamental and
inescapable. For one cannot say anything about anything that is, without
always already having made assumptions about the is as such. Any mode of
thought, in short, always already carries an ontology sequestered within it-
What this ontological turn does to otherregionalmodes of thought is to
challenge the ontology within which they operate. The implications of that
review reverberate throughout the entire mode of thought, demanding a
reappraisal as fundamental as the reappraisal ontology has demanded of
philosophy. With ontology at issue, the entire foundations or underpinnings of
any mode of thought are rendered problematic. This applies as much to any
modern discipline of thought as it does to the question of modernity as such,
with the exception, it seems, of science, which, having long ago given up the
ontological questioning of when it called itself natural philosophy, appears
now, in its industrialized and corporatized form, to be invulnerable to
ontological perturbation. With its foundations at issue, the very authority of a
mode of thought and the ways in which it characterizes the critical issues of
freedom and judgment (of what kind of universe human beings inhabit, how
they inhabit it, and what counts as reliable knowledge for them in it) is also
put in question. The very ways in which Nietzsche, Heidegger, and other
continental philosophers challenged Western ontology, simultaneously,
therefore reposed the fundamental and inescapable difficulty, or aporia, for
human being of decision and judgment. In other words, whatever ontology
you subscribe to, knowingly or unknowingly, as a human being you still have
to act. Whether or not you know or acknowledge it, the ontology you
subscribe to will construe the problem of action for you in one way rather
than another. You may think ontology is some arcane question of philosophy,
but Nietzsche and Heidegger showed that it intimately shapes not only a way
of thinking, but a way of being, a form of life. Decision, a fortiori political
decision, in short, is no mere technique. It is instead a way of being that
bears an understanding of Being, and of the fundaments of the
human way of being within it. This applies, indeed applies most, to those
mock-innocent political slaves who claim only to be technocrats of decision
making.
2NC/1NR Extensions
2NC/1NR ATChina is a Threat

1. Their supposedly objective portrayal of China
translates threat into reality, legitimizing US power
politics.
Pan, 2004School of International and Political Studies @ Deakin University (Chengxin, 2004,
Alternatives: Global, Local, Political Vol. 29, No. 3, The "China Threat" in American Self-Imagination: The
Discursive Construction of Other as Power Politics,
While U.S. China scholars argue fiercely over "what China precisely is," their
debates have been underpinned by some common ground, especially in
terms of a positivist epistemology. Firstly, they believe that China is
ultimately a knowable object, whose reality can be, and ought to be,
empirically revealed by scientific means. For example, after expressing his
dissatisfaction with often conflicting Western perceptions of China, David M.
Lampton, former president of the National Committee on U.S.-China
Relations, suggests that "it is time to step back and look at where China is
today, where it might be going, and what consequences that direction will
hold for the rest of the world."2 Like many other China scholars, Lampton
views his object of study as essentially "something we can stand
back from and observe with clinical detachment."3 Secondly,
associated with the first assumption, it is commonly believed that China
scholars merely serve as "disinterested observers" and that their
studies of China are neutral, passive descriptions of reality. And thirdly, in
pondering whether China poses a threat or ofers an opportunity to the
United States, they rarely raise the question of "what the United States is."
That is, the meaning of the United States is believed to be certain and
beyond doubt. I do not dismiss altogether the conventional ways of debating
China. It is not the purpose of this article to venture my own "observation" of
"where China is today," nor to join the "containment" versus "engagement"
debate per se. Rather, I want to contribute to a novel dimension of the China
debate by questioning the seemingly unproblematic assumptions
shared by most China scholars in the mainstream IR community in
the United States. To perform this task, I will focus attention on a
particularly significant component of the China debate; namely, the "China
threat" literature. More specifically, I want to argue that U.S. conceptions of
China as a threatening other are always intrinsically linked to how
U.S. policymakers/mainstream China specialists see themselves (as
representatives of the indispensable, security-conscious nation, for example).
As such, they are not value-free, objective descriptions of an
independent, preexisting Chinese reality out there, but are better
understood as a kind of normative, meaning-giving practice that
often legitimates power politics in U.S.-China relations and helps
2NC/1NR Extensions
transform the "China threat" into social reality. In other words, it is
self-fulfilling in practice, and is always part of the "China threat" problem
it purports merely to describe. In doing so, I seek to bring to the fore two
interconnected themes of self/other constructions and of theory as practice
inherent in the "China threat" literature - themes that have been overridden
and rendered largely invisible by those common positivist assumptions
2NC/1NR Extensions
2NC/1NR Your Authors are Biased

Extensions
1. Their impact is constructedthe fact that threat
perception has changed over time and that countries
with similar political and economic profiles are not
considered threats proves.
Turner, 2013Research Associate at the Brooks World Poverty Institute at the

University of Manchester (Oliver, 2013, Review of International Studies,
Chinas military and economic strengths are far greater today than at any
point in the history of Sino-US relations. Yet, the threat it presents to
American security is no less a social construction than in the past. The
modern day proliferation of popular and academic China threat literatures in
particular is reflective of the increasingly widespread conviction that a rising
China inevitably constitutes a real or potential danger.97 Robert Kaplan
explains that the American military contest with China in the Pacific will
define the twenty first century.98 He does not question if or even when
China might become a threat. He emphasises its inevitability. Babbin and
Timperlake provide a fictional narrative of future Sino-American tensions in
which, among other things, China uses cyber warfare to shut down American
defence systems. The hostile scenario they present, it is argued, could easily
become fact . . . The Verdict: China means war.99 Certainly, and as has been
the case throughout history, China is not uniformly perceived in these terms.
Among a significant proportion of the American population, however, the
China threat is an accepted and relatively unproblematic phenomenon.
China now has the worlds largest population, the fastest growing
economy, the largest army, the largest middle class, a permanent seat on
the UN Security Council, a manned space program and a nuclear
arsenal.100 Yet, all of these things do not necessarily make China a
threat. Countries which share variations of these, notably the possession of
nuclear weapons, a permanent presence in the Security Council and
significant standing armies are not perceived in this way. Indeed, and as
Director Clapper revealed in the Senate in early 2011, states like Russia with
far greater stockpiles of nuclear weapons and significant additional military
hardware can be viewed in less threatening terms, even when capability is
cited as the critical factor.101 Furthermore, the PRC has had a large
population and a substantial army since its founding in 1949, nuclear
weapons since 1964 and a seat on the Security Council since 1971 without
consistently being interpreted as a threat. Accordingly, forces additional to
2NC/1NR Extensions
those of Chinas capabilities must still be implicated in
understandings about the dangers it is said to present.
2NC/1NR Extensions
2. Be skeptical of their authorsarguing that China is a
real threat is what legitimizes their claims in the
first place.

(Chengxin, 2004, Alternatives: Global, Local, Political Vol. 29, No. 3, The
"China Threat" in American Self-Imagination: The Discursive Construction of
Other as Power Politics,
Certainly, I do not deny China's potential for strategic misbehavior in the

global context, nor do I claim the "essential peacefulness" of Chinese
culture.40 Having said that, my main point here is that there is no such thing
as "Chinese reality" that can automatically speak for itself, for example, as a
"threat." Rather, the "China threat" is essentially a specifically social
meaning given to China by its U.S. observers, a meaning that cannot
be disconnected from the dominant U.S. self-construction. Thus, to
fully understand the U.S. "China threat" argument, it is essential to recognize
its autobiographical nature. Indeed, the construction of other is not only a
product of U.S. self-imagination, but often a necessary foil to it. For example,
by taking this particular representation of China as Chinese reality
per se, those scholars are able to assert their self-identity as
"mature," "rational" realists capable of knowing the "hard facts" of
international politics, in distinction from those "idealists" whose
views are said to be grounded more in "an article of faith" than in
"historical experience."41 On the other hand, given that history is
apparently not "progressively" linear, the invocation of a certain other not
only helps explain away such historical uncertainties or "anomalies" and
maintain the credibility of the allegedly universal path trodden by the United
States, but also serves to highlight U.S. "indispensability." As Samuel
Huntington puts it, "If being an American means being committed to the
principles of liberty, democracy, individualism, and private property, and if
there is no evil empire out there threatening those principles, what indeed
does it mean to be an American, and what becomes of American national
interests?"42 In this way, it seems that the constructions of the
particular U.S. self and its other are always intertwined and mutually
reinforcing. Some may suggest that there is nothing particularly wrong with
this since psychologists generally agree that "individuals and groups define
their identity by diferentiating themselves from and placing themselves in
opposition to others."43 This is perhaps true. As the Swiss linguist Ferdinand
de Saussure tells us, meaning itself depends on diference and
diferentiation.44 Yet, to understand the U.S. dichotomized
constructions of self/other in this light is to normalize them and
render them unproblematic, because it is also apparent that not all
2NC/1NR Extensions
identity-defining practices necessarily perceive others in terms of either
universal sameness or absolute otherness and that diference need not
equate to threat.
2NC/1NR Extensions
2NC/1NR China Securitization

Kritik Overview
1. The aff is using security representations and
exaggerating the threat of Chinathats Pan. If we
make everything and everyone seem threatening,
then the US will just attack everywhere. We will see
threats where they dont even exist, leading to
endless warthats Turner. Our alternative is to
reject the Aff and examine our security
representations for a better political systemthats
also Turner.
2. If that wasnt enough, security representations
destroy value to life because people become afraid of
everything
DER DERIAN, 1993

(James, The value of security: Hobbes, Marx, Nietzsche, and Baudrillard, in The Political Subject of
Violence, pp. 102-105)
The desire for security is manifested as a collective resentment of

diference that which is not us, not certain, not predictable. Complicit
with a negative will to power is the fear-driven desire for protection from
the unknown. Unlike the positive will to power which produces an
aesthetic affirmation of diference, the search for truth produces a
truncated life which conforms to the rationally knowable, to the
causally sustainable. In The Gay Science Nietzsche asks of the reader:
Look, isn't our need for knowledge precisely this need for the familiar, the
will to uncover everything strange, unusual, and questionable, something
that no longer disturbs us? Is it not the instinct of fear that bids us to
know? And is the jubilation of those who obtain knowledge not the
jubilation over the restoration of a sense of security?" The fear of the
unknown and the desire for certainty combine to produce a
domesticated life , in which causality and rationality become the
highest sign of a sovereign self, the surest protection against
contingent forces. The fear of fate assures a belief that everything
reasonable is true, and everything true reasonable. In short, the security
imperative produces and is sustained by the strategies of knowledge
which seek to explain it. Nietzsche elucidates the nature of this
generative relationship in The Twilight of the Idols: A safe life requires
safe truths. The strange and the alien remain unexamined, the unknown
becomes identified as evil, and evil provokes hostility - recycling the
desire for security. The 'influence of timidity,' as Nietzsche puts it,
creates a people who are willing to subordinate affirmative values
2NC/1NR Extensions
to the 'necessities' of security: 'they fear change, transitoriness: this
expresses a straitened soul, full of mistrust and evil experiences'." The
point of Nietzsche's critical genealogy is to show the perilous conditions
which created the security imperative - and the western metaphysics
which perpetuate it - have diminished if not disappeared; yet the fear of
life persists: 'Our century denies this perilousness, and does so with a
good conscience: and yet it continues to drag along with it the old habits
of Christian security, Christian enjoyment, recreation and evaluation."
Nietzsche's worry is that the collective reaction against older, more
primal fears has created an even worse danger: the tyranny of the herd,
the lowering of man, the apathy of the last man which controls through
conformity and rules through passivity. The security of the sovereign,
rational self and state comes at the cost of ambiguity, uncertainty,
paradox - all that makes life worthwhile.
2NC/1NR Extensions
2NC/1NR AT #1Framework
1. Counter-Interpretation: The aff must defend their
language or representations before they can have
any of their case. Representations come first!
2. Representations shape policy-making by altering the
way we perceive threats. The way we talk about
things impacts how we try to fix them
Jourde, 2006 (Ph.D., Political Science, University of Wisconsin-Madison, M.A.,

Political Science, University of Wisconsin-Madison, B.Sc., Political Science,
Universit de Montral (Cedric, 2006, 1995 Hegemony or Empire?: The
redefinition of US Power under George W Bush, Ed. David and Grondin p.
182-3)
Relations between states are, at least in part, constructed upon

representations. Representations are interpretative prisms through which
decision-makers make sense of a political reality, through which they define
and assign a subjective value to the other states and non-state actors of the
international system, and through which they determine what are significant
international political issues.2 For instance, officials of a given state will
represent other states as 'allies', 'rivals', or simply 'insignificant', thus
assigning a subjective value to these states. Such subjective categorizations
often derive from representations of these states' domestic politics, which
can for instance be perceived as 'unstable*, 'prosperous', or 'ethnically
divided'. It must be clear that representations are not objective or truthful
depictions of reality; rather they are subjective and political ways of seeing
the world, making certain things 'seen' by and significant for an actor while
making other things 'unseen' and 'insignificant'.3 In other words, they are
founded on each actor's and group of actors' cognitive, cultural-social, and
emotional standpoints. Being fundamentally political, representations are the
object of tense struggles and tensions, as some actors or groups of actors
can impose on others their own representations of the world, of what they
consider to be appropriate political orders, or appropriate economic relations,
while others may in turn accept, subvert or contest these representations.
Representations of a foreign political reality influence how decision-making
actors will act upon that reality. In other words, as subjective and politically
infused interpretations of reality, representations constrain and enable the
policies that decision-makers will adopt vis-a-vis other states; they limit the
courses of action that are politically thinkable and imaginable,
making certain policies conceivable while relegating other policies to
the realm of the unthinkable.4 Accordingly, identifying how a state
2NC/1NR Extensions
represents another state or non-state actor helps to understand how and why
certain foreign policies have been adopted while other policies have been
excluded. To take a now famous example, if a transnational organization is
represented as a group of 'freedom fighters', such as the multi-national
mujahideen in Afghanistan in the 1980s, then military cooperation is
conceivable with that organization; if on the other hand the same
organization is represented as a 'terrorist network', such as Al-Qaida, then
military cooperation as a policy is simply not an option. In sum. the way in
which one sees, interprets and imagines the 'other* delineates the course of
action one will adopt in order to deal with this 'other'.
3. Their limits education argument is a lietheyre just

trying to exclude our conversation to control how
people learn about security
BLEIKER AND LEET, 2006 (Roland, prof of International Relations @ U of

Queensland, Brisbane, and Martin, Senior Research Officer with the Brisbane
Institute, Millennium: Journal of International Studies, 34(3), p. 733-734)
A subliminal orientation is attentive to what is bubbling along under the surface. It is

mindful of how conscious attempts to understand conceal more than they reveal,
and purposeful eforts of progressive change may engender more violence than they
erase. For these reasons, Connolly emphasises that ethical artistry has an element of
navet and innocence. One is not quite sure what one is doing. Such navet need not
lead us back to the idealism of the romantic period. One should not be nave about
navet, Simon Critchley would say.56 Rather, the challenge of change is an
experiment. It is not locked up in a predetermined conception of where one is
going. It involves tentatively exploring the limits of ones being in the world, to see
if different interpretations are possible, how those interpretations might impact
upon the affects below the level of conscious thought, and vice versa. This
approach entails drawing upon multiple levels of thinking and being, searching for
changes in sensibilities that could give more weight to minor feelings or to
arguments that were previously ignored.57 Wonder needs to be at the heart of
such experiments, in contrast to the resentment of an intellect angry with its own
limitations. The ingre d i e n t of wonder is necessary to disrupt and suspend the
normal pre s s u res of returning to conscious habit and control. This exploration
beyond the conscious implies the need for an ethos of theorising and acting that is quite
dif e rent from the mode directed towards the cognitive justification of ideas and
concepts. Stephen White talks about circ u i t s of reflection, afect and arg
umentation.58 Ideas and principles provide an orientation to practice, the
implications of that practice feed back into our affective outlook, and processes
of argumentation introduce other ideas and affects. The shift, here, is from the
vertical search for foundations in skyhooks above or foundations below, to a
horizontal movement into the unknown.
2NC/1NR Extensions
4. Fairness and EducationKritiks are a common
discussion that happens frequently. Theres no abuse
here and the Aff should be prepared. This is
especially true because this Kritik is specific to the
China topic.
2NC/1NR Extensions
2NC/1NR AT #2Perm: Do Both

1. The permutation is severancethey used their
offensive security language in the 1aclook at our
link evidence. They cant take that back in the 2ac.
Severance is a voting issue and reason to reject the
perm because shifting their position in the 2ac
makes it impossible to be neg.
2. Masking: the perm is an attempt to cover up the
mistake they had in the 1actheyre just trying to
absorb our Kritik
Burke, 2007 (Anthony, Associate Professor of Politics and International

Relations in the University of New South Wales, Beyond Security, Ethics and
Violence, p. 3-4
These frameworks are interrogated at the level both of their theoretical conceptualisation and
their practice: in their influence and implementation in specific policy contexts and
conflicts in East and Central Asia, the Middle East and the 'war on terror', where their meaning and impact
powerful political
take on greater clarity. This approach is based on a conviction that the meaning of
concepts cannot be abstract or easily universalised: they all have histories, often complex
and conflictual; their forms and meanings change over time; and they are developed, refined and deployed
in concrete struggles over power, wealth and societal form. While this should not preclude normative
debate over how political or ethical concepts should be defined and used, and thus be beneficial or
destructive to humanity, it embodies a caution that the meaning of concepts can never be stabilised or
normative potential must always be considered in
unproblematic in practice. Their
relation to their utilisation in systems of political, social and economic power
and their consequent worldly efects. Hence this book embodies a caution by Michel Foucault, who warned
us about the 'politics of truth . . the battle about the status of truth and the economic and political role it
plays', and it is inspired by his call to 'detach the power of truth from the forms of hegemony, social,
economic and cultural, within which it operates at the present time'.1 It is clear that traditionally coercive
and violent approaches to security and strategy are both still culturally dominant, and politically and
ethically suspect. However, the reasons for pursuing a critical analysis relate not only to
the most destructive or controversial approaches, such as the war in Iraq, but also to their available
(and generally preferable) alternatives. There is a necessity to question not merely
extremist versions such as the Bush doctrine, Indonesian militarism or Israeli expansionism, but also their
mainstream critiques - whether they take the form of liberal policy
approaches in international relations (IR), just war theory, US realism, optimistic accounts
of globalisation, rhetorics of sensitivity to cultural diference, or centrist Israeli security discourses based
on territorial compromise with the Palestinians. The surface appearance of lively (and often significant)
debate masks a deeper agreement about major concepts, forms of political identity and the imperative to
secure them.Debates about when and how it may be efective and legitimate to use military force in
tandem with other policy options, for example, mask a more fundamental discursive
consensus about the meaning of security, the efectiveness of strategic power, the nature
of progress, the value of freedom or the promises of national and cultural identity. As a result, political and
intellectual debate about insecurity, violent conflict and global injustice can become hostage
2NC/1NR Extensions
to a claustrophic structure of political and ethical possibility that
systematically wards of critique.
3. Still linksthe Aff advantages, cross-ex, and impacts

are all security rhetoric. Just because theyre trying
to cooperate now, doesnt mean that they still dont
support security representations. Reject the perm.
2NC/1NR Extensions
2NC/1NR AT #3Engagement Link

Turn
They say cooperation actually solves security reps, but
1. Extend our Pan evidence.

Its much better than their Etzioni evidence because:
facts)
to be true)

Our Pan evidence assumes their author. Pan says that writers
pretend like theyre being objective, but really are using security
representations. They frame China as bad and act like theyre being
fair. Also, their impact evidence uses security representations!

This matters because: If we win the link, then the af causes endless wars.
This impact is the root cause of future violence and the neg should win.
2NC/1NR Extensions
2. They link through language--In Cross-ex or a card they
said:
__________________________________________________________________
__________________________________________________________________
____________
________________________________________________________________________
[INSERT A SPECIFIC LINE FROM CROSS EX OR AN AFF CARD THAT HAS
SECURITY REPRESENTATIONS]
3. [INSERT A SPECIFIC LINK TO THE AFF FROM THIS FILE]

2NC/1NR Extensions
2NC/1NR AT #4Cede the Political

They say We Cede the political but,
1. Only the round matterswere not policy makers and

most of us wont be able to vote in this November
election. What matters is what is said in this debate
round. If we win that security language is bad, vote
neg to stop it.
2. Our impacts outweigh. Endless war is a bigger impact
than their cede the political argument because:
____________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________
___
2NC/1NR Extensions
3. Working in the system causes constant policy
failurestheres a chance the alternative could solve
Dillon and Reid, 2000 (Michael, Professor of Politics University of Lancaster,

and Julian, Lecturer in International Relations Kings College, Global
Governance, Liberal Peace, and Complex Emergency, Alternatives: Global,
Local, Political, January / March, 25(1))
More specifically, where there is a policy problematic there is expertise, and where there is expertise there,
too, a policy problematic will emerge. Such problematics are detailed and elaborated in terms of discrete
Policy domains reify the
forms of knowledge as well as interlocking policy domains.
problematization of life in certain ways by turning these epistemically and politically
contestable orderings of life into "problems" that require the continuous
attention of policy science and the continuous resolutions of policymakers .
Policy "actors" develop and compete on the basis of the expertise that grows up
around such problems or clusters of problems and their client populations. Here, too, we may also discover
what might be called "epistemic entrepreneurs." Albeit the market for discourse is
prescribed and policed in ways that Foucault indicated, bidding to formulate novel
problematizations they seek to "sell" these, or otherwise have them officially adopted. In principle, there is
no limit to the ways in which the management of population may be problematized. All aspects of human
conduct, any encounter with life, is problematizable.Any problematization is capable of
becoming a policy problem. Governmentality thereby creates a market for
policy, for science and for policy science, in which problematizations go looking
for policy sponsors while policy sponsors fiercely compete on behalf of their favored
problematizations. Reproblematization of problems is constrained by the institutional
and ideological investments surrounding accepted "problems," and by the
sheer difficulty of challenging the inescapable ontological and
epistemological assumptions that go into their very formation. There is
nothing so fiercely contested as an epistemological or ontological assumption. And there is nothing
so fiercely ridiculed as the suggestion that the real problem with
problematizations exists precisely at the level of such assumptions. Such
"paralysis of analysis" is precisely what policymakers seek to avoid since they
are compelled constantly to respond to circumstances over which they
ordinarily have in fact both more and less control than they proclaim. What
they do not have is precisely the control that they want. Yet serial policy
failure--the fate and the fuel of all policy--compels them into a continuous
search for the new analysis that will extract them from the aporias in which
they constantly find themselves enmeshed.[ 35] Serial policy failure is no
simple shortcoming that science and policy --and policy science--will ultimately
overcome. Serial policy failure is rooted in the ontological and epistemological
assumptions that fashion the ways in which global governance encounters
and problematizes life as a process of emergence through fitness landscapes that constantly
adaptive and changing ensembles have continuously to negotiate. As a particular kind of intervention into
life, global governance promotes the very changes and unintended outcomes that it then serially
reproblematizes in terms of policy failure. Thus, global liberal governance is not a linear
2NC/1NR Extensions
problem-solving process committed to the resolution of objective policy
problems simply by bringing better information and knowledge to bear upon
them. A nonlinear economy of power/knowledge, it deliberately installs
socially specific and radically inequitable distributions of wealth, opportunity,
and mortal danger both locally and globally through the very detailed ways in
which life is variously (policy) problematized by it.
4. Alternative SolvesExtend our Turner evidence. It

says that by changing our mindset we can adapt our
politics. If we include China and change our
understanding of them, we can make positive
politics.
2NC/1NR Extensions
2NC/1NR AT #5Impact Calculus

They say that they outweigh, but
________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________

________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________
2NC/1NR Extensions
2NC/1NR AT #6No
Impact/Security Inevitable
They say Countries use security representations all the
time, but
1. Only this roundagain, only evaluate this debate

round. If we fix 1% of security, then thats better than
doing nothing. Their logic is like saying we should litter
because we cant stop all global warming. Do the right
thing in this round.
2 Everything they say is a liesecurity authors make
up facts to justify war
Pieterse, 2007 (Jan, Professor of Sociology University of Illinois (Urbana),

Political and Economic Brinkmanship, Review of International Political
Economy, 14(3), p. 473)
Brinkmanship and producing instability carry several meanings. The American

military spends 48% of world military spending (2005) and represents a vast,
virtually continuously growing establishment that is a world in itself with its
own lingo, its own reasons, internecine battles and projects. That this large
security establishment is a bipartisan project makes it politically relatively
immune. That for security reasons it is an insular world shelters it from
scrutiny. For reasons of deniability the president is insulated from certain
operations (Risen, 2006). That it is a completely hierarchical world onto itself
makes it relatively unaccountable. Hence, to quote Rumsfeld, stuf happens.
In part this is the familiar theme of the Praetorian Guard and the shadow
state (Stockwell, 1991). It includes a military on the go, a military that seeks
career advancement through role expansion, seeks expansion through threat
inflation, and in inflated threats finds rationales for ruthless action and is thus
subject to feedback from its own echo chambers. Misinformation broadcast
by part of the intelligence apparatus blows back to other security circles
where it may be taken for real (Johnson, 2000). Inhabiting a hall of mirrors
this apparatus operates in a perpetual state of self hypnosis with, since it
concerns classified information and covert ops, limited checks on its
functioning.
2NC/1NR Extensions
3. Alternative Solves: Our Turner evidence says that once

we can fix our representations, then we can fix our
politics. We can change how we work between
governments, but we must fix our language first.
Basically, we agree with the aff, we just have to do the
alternative first.
AFF 2AC Answers

China Securitization Kritik
1. Framework
Our interpretation is that the impacts of the Aff should be
evaluated.
A. GroundIf we cant weigh the Aff impacts, they will
have destroyed the entire 1ac. They will be one
speech ahead and we will always lose. Weigh our
impacts for fariness.
B. Policy EducationWe should be talking about the
policy of the plan. This is the best way to discuss the
topic and learn about what we can do to help in the
future. If we only talk about representations, then
we cant fix the bad US-China policy.
2. Focus on representations leads to inaction and bad
education
Nye, 2009 (Joseph - Professor and former dean of the Harvard Kennedy School. , BA suma cum laude
Princeton, PhD Harvard, Former Chair National Intelligence Council, Former Asst. Secretary of Defense for
International Security Afairs, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-
dyn/content/article/2009/04/12/AR2009041202260_pf.html 4-13
President Obama has appointed some distinguished academic economists and lawyers
to his administration, but few high-ranking political scientists have been named. In fact, the
editors of a recent poll of more than 2,700 international relations experts
declared that "the walls surrounding the ivory tower have never seemed so
high." While important American scholars such as Henry Kissinger and Zbigniew
Brzezinski took high-level foreign policy positions in the past, that path has
tended to be a one-way street. Not many top-ranked scholars of international
relations are going into government, and even fewer return to contribute to academic
theory. The 2008 Teaching, Research and International Policy (TRIP) poll, by the Institute for Theory and
Practice in International Relations, showed that of the 25 scholars rated as producing the most interesting
scholarship during the past five years, only three had ever held policy positions (two in the U.S.
fault for this growing gap lies not with the
government and one in the United Nations). The
with the academics. Scholars are paying less attention to questions
government but
about how their work relates to the policy world , and in many departments a focus on
policy can hurt one's career. Advancement comes faster for those who develop mathematical models,
new methodologies or theories expressed in jargon that is unintelligible to
policymakers. A survey of articles published over the lifetime of the American Political Science Review
AFF 2AC Answers

found that about one in five dealt with policy prescription or criticism in the first half of the century, while
only a handful did so after 1967. Editor Lee Sigelman observed in the journal's centennial issue that " if
'speaking truth to power' and contributing directly to public dialogue about
the merits and demerits of various courses of action were still numbered
among the functions of the profession, one would not have known it from
leafing through its leading journal ." As citizens, academics might be
considered to have an obligation to help improve on policy ideas when they can.
Moreover, such engagement can enhance and enrich academic work, and thus
the ability of academics to teach the next generatio n. As former
undersecretary of state David Newsom argued a decade ago, "the growing
withdrawal of university scholars behind curtains of theory and modeling
would not have wider significance if this trend did not raise questions
regarding the preparation of new generations and the future influence of the
academic community on public and official perceptions of international issues and events.
Teachers plant seeds that shape the thinking of each new generation; this is
probably the academic world's most lasting contribution ." Yet too often
scholars teach theory and methods that are relevant to other academics but
not to the majority of the students sitting in the classroom before them. Some academics say
that while the growing gap between theory and policy may have costs for policy, it has produced better
social science theory, and that this is more important than whether such scholarship is relevant. Also, to
some extent, the gap is an inevitable result of the growth and specialization of knowledge. Few people can
academic
keep up with their subfields, much less all of social science. But the danger is that
theorizing will say more and more about less and less . Even when academics
supplement their usual trickle-down approach to policy by writing in journals, newspapers or blogs, or by
More than
consulting for candidates or public officials, they face many competitors for attention.
1,200 think tanks in the United States provide not only ideas but also experts
ready to comment or consult at a moment's notice. Some of these new transmission
belts serve as translators and additional outlets for academic ideas, but many add a bias
provided by their founders and funders . As a group, think tanks are heterogeneous in scope,
funding, ideology and location, but universities generally ofer a more neutral viewpoint.
While pluralism of institutional pathways is good for democracy, the policy process is
diminished by the withdrawal of the academic community . The solutions must come
via a reappraisal within the academy itself. Departments should give greater weight to
real-world relevance and impact in hiring and promoting young scholars. Journals could
place greater weight on relevance in evaluating submissions. Studies of specific regions deserve more
attention. Universities could facilitate interest in the world by giving junior faculty members greater
That should include greater toleration of unpopular
incentives to participate in it.
policy positions. One could multiply such useful suggestions, but young people should not hold their
breath waiting for them to be implemented. If anything, the trends in academic life seem to be headed in
the opposite direction.
3. Permutation: Do both Reform solves
Loader and Walker, 2007 [Ian Loader (Professor of Criminology at Oxford University) and Neil
Walker (Professor of Public Law and the Law of Nature and Nations at the University of Edinburgh) Civilizing
Security Chapter 1: Uncivil Society?page 7]
AFF 2AC Answers

Our argument in this book is that security is a valuable public good, a
constitutive ingredient of the good society, and that the democratic state has a
necessary and virtuous role to play in the production of this good. The state, and
in particular the forms of public policing governed by it, is, we shall argue,
indispensable to the task of fostering and sustaining liveable political
communities in the contemporary world. It is, in the words of our title, pivotal to
the project of civilizing security. By invoking this phrase we have in mind two
ideas, both of which we develop in the course of the book. The first, which is
relatively familiar if not uncontroversial, is that security needs civilizing. States
even those that claim with some justification to be liberal or democratic have
a capacity when self-consciously pursuing a condition called security to act in a
fashion injurious to it. So too do non-state security actors, a point we return to
below and throughout the book. They proceed in ways that trample over the
basic liberties of citizens; that forge security for some groups while imposing
illegitimate burdens of insecurity upon others, or that extend the coercive reach
of the state and security discourse over social and political life. As monopoly
holders of the means of legitimate physical and symbolic violence, modern states
possess a built-in, paradoxical tendency to undermine the very liberties and
security they are constituted to protect. Under conditions of fear, such as obtain
across many parts of the globe today, states and their police forces are prone to
deploying their power in precisely such uncivil, insecurity instilling ways. If the
state is to perform the ordering and solidarity nourishing work that we argue is
vital to the production of secure political communities then it must,
consequently, be connected to forms of discursive contestation, democratic
scrutiny and constitutional control. The state is a great civilizing force, a
necessary and virtuous component of the good society. But if it is to take on this
role, the state must itself be civilized made safe by and for democracy.
4. Link Turn: Engagement. Cooperation between the US

and China will reduce tension and security rhetoric
Etzioni, 2004 -- professor of International Relations at the George Washington University (Amitai,
2004, "The Emerging Global Normative Synthesis," The Journal of Political Philosophy, 12(2),
http://www.gwu.edu/~ccps/etzioni/A318.pdf)
Both those who favor isolating authoritarian regimes (North Korea, Cuba, etc.) and
those who favor engaging them have similar goals--changing these regimes to make
more room for autonomy, especially for human rights, although typically other policy
goals are also involved, for instance, eforts to stem the proliferation of weapons of
mass desecration. (The term engagement is used to refer to fostering travel, trade,
cultural exchanges, visits from leaders, and diplomatic relations, while isolation
entails curtailing all of these.) Although neither camp sets out to advance the
normative synthesis laid out in this essay, the efect of increasing autonomy in these
societies would be to move them in the said direction. Both camps argue for the
policy approach they favor in the name of normative principles. For instance, those
who favor engagement argue that it is more conducive to peace; those who favor
AFF 2AC Answers

isolation claim that it 'generates the needed pressures to advance human rights. The
debate would benefit by a greater reliance on empirical evidence, which
strongly suggests that under most conditions engagement is much more efective
than isolation. It is almost enough to list the regimes that have been isolated and
those that have been engaged (or compare the periods they were isolated versus
engaged) to document the point, even though there are significant diferences
among the various societies involved.36 The United States isolated Castro's Cuba for
four decades, banning trade with and travel to and from Cuba, as well as exerting
pressure on other societies to follow the same course. However, Cuba resisted for
more than a generation, granting its people more rights, democratic reforms, and
opening markets. Saddam's Iraq and North Korea are two other authoritarian regimes
that were isolated; still they persisted for decades. China was first isolated and
yielded little, but following Nixon's "opening", the country gradually changed, making
much more room for economic autonomy, as well as for some political autonomy. The
same holds for North Vietnam. The fifteen Soviet Republics changed even more,
including on the political front, largely after they were engaged rather than when
they were isolated. The dramatic .change in South Africa from apartheid, in which the
overwhelming majority was denied most measures of autonomy, to the current
regime also followed a shift from isolation to engagement. However, those who
oppose engagement have argued that after years of engagement China is no closer
to valuing the freedoms Americans do and that isolation has been efective in
wresting concessions out of Beijing.3? Senator Jesse Helms, a strong supporter of the
isolation tactic, lists Switzerland, Nigeria, the former Soviet Union, Poland and
Guatemala among the countries that have modified their behavior in response to
actual or threatened United States sanctions.38 However, a detailed examination of
these situations will show that in most cases the isolation measures, and their
efects, were limited (for example, getting Switzerland to change its banking laws),
while engagement had much more encompassing efects. Moreover, engagement
does not mean that no sanctions can be imposed; sanctions are imposed, for
instance, by the World Trade Organization when trade agreements are violated. The
reasons engagement is often so much more efective, and that it entails neither a
violation of principles (for example, our commitments to human rights) nor
endangers our security (as we learn to screen those we let in much better), need not
be explored here. The only key point relevant to the present analysis is that
engagement has, and one must expect will continue to do so, encouraged
authoritarian societies to introduce more autonomy-and thus move them toward the
global synthesis. The proper measure of progress, though, is not whether they
become exact or even close copies of the American regime, but whether they find
their own balanced combination of a strong autonomy with social order, largely based
on soft power.
5. Turn: Abandoning politics cedes it to the elites

causes war, slavery, and authoritarianism
BOGGS, 2000 (CAROL BOGGS, Professor of POLITICAL SCIENCE SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA, 00, THE
END OF POLITICS, 250-1)
AFF 2AC Answers

But it is a very deceptive and misleading minimalism. While Oakeshott
debunks political mechanisms and rational planning, as either useless or
dangerous, the actually existing power structure-replete with its own
centralized state apparatus, institutional hierarchies, conscious designs, and
indeed, rational plans-remains fully intact, insulated from the
minimalist critique. In other words, ideologies and plans are perfectly
acceptable for elites who preside over established governing systems, but not
for ordinary citizens or groups anxious to challenge the status quo. Such one-
sided minimalism gives carte blanche to elites who naturally desire as
much space to maneuver as possible. The flight from abstract principles
rules out ethical attacks on injustices that may pervade the status quo
(slavery or imperialist wars, for example) insofar as those injustices
might be seen as too deeply embedded in the social and institutional
matrix of the time to be the target of oppositional political action. If
politics is reduced to nothing other than a process of everyday
muddling-through, then people are condemned to accept the harsh
realities of an exploitative and authoritarian system, with no choice
but to yield to the dictates of conventional wisdom. Systematic attempts
to ameliorate oppressive conditions would, in Oakeshotts view, turn
into a political nightmare. A belief that totalitarianism might results from
extreme attempts to put society in order is one thing; to argue that all
politicized eforts to change the world are necessary doomed either to
impotence or totalitarianism requires a completely diferent (and
indefensible) set of premises. Oakeshotts minimalism poses yet another, but
still related, range of problems: the shrinkage of politics hardly suggests
that corporate colonization, social hierarchies, or centralized state
and military institutions will magically disappear from peoples lives.
Far from it: the public space vacated by ordinary citizens, well informed
and ready to fight for their interests, simply gives elites more room to
consolidate their own power and privilege. Beyond that, the
fragmentation and chaos of a Hobbesian civil society, not too far
removed from the excessive individualism, social Darwinism and urban
violence of the American landscape could open the door to a modern
Leviathan intent on restoring order and unity in the face of social
disintegration. Viewed in this light, the contemporary drift towards
antipolitics might set the stage for a reassertion of politics in more
authoritarian and reactionary guise-or it could simply end up reinforcing
the dominant state-corporate system. In either case, the state would
probably become what Hobbes anticipated: the embodiment of those
universal, collective interests that had vanished from civil society.16 And
either outcome would run counter to the facile antirationalism of Oakeshotts
Burkean muddling-through theories.
AFF 2AC Answers

6. Impact Calculus:

________________________________________________________________________
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D. Turns the K: Our impact causes their impact because:
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7. No impact and no solvency: Government officials,

news outlets, and think tanks in China and the US
frequently use security rhetoricthe plan solves
military fears
The Atlantic, 2015 [Major news organization, Just How Great a

Threat Is China?, 6/4,
http://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2015/06/about-
the-china-threat-on-the-the-35th-of-may/394988/]
That is, statements of this sort matter. But what matters much more, for
China and the United States and Israel and Iran, is whether governments act
on these beliefs. And in looking at Liu Mingfus book as a guide to Chinese
policy, bear these points in mind as well: The extent to which the PLA feels
circled-in and outgunned by the U.S. military is almost impossible for most
Americans to imagine. In the United States, everyone assumes that China is
ever-ascendant, while America is overcommitted, war-weary, and generally
played-out. For reasons Ive laid out many times (e.g. here and in our recent
American Futures reports), I think the declinist view of U.S. prospects is wrong
or at least premature, and not inevitable. But for very diferent reasons, the
U.S. situation can look simultaneously overextended and highly aggressive
from the Chinese point of view. At Chinese think tanks and government
AFF 2AC Answers

offices, Ive seen maps like the one belowshowing U.S. forces, allies, or non-
enemies, all around the Chinese homeland. I came to know by heart the
speech that would go along with the map: How would you Americans feel if
China had forces staged in Canada and Mexico? [By which they mean the
encampments in Japan, South Korea, and elsewhere.] How would you react if
we sold attack aircraft to a regime committed to your destruction? [By which
they mean Taiwan.] The point is not that PLA hawks have an accurate or
balanced worldview. They dont. It is to remind Americans of how diferent
things look from the PLAs perspective, and why they might be itching to say
that American rules were unfair.
CDL Core Files 2016-2017 Positive Peace (Human Rights) Kritik
Positive Peace Kritik (Human

Rights)
1NC Shell
1NC Positive Peace Kritik - Human

Rights Affirmative
A. Link: The affirmative would like us to believe that
torture and unfair imprisonment are practices that
exist under repressive regimes such as the Chinese
Communist Party. In reality, the U.S. is just as guilty.
Many of these abuses are happening in our own
backyards in Chicago, yet the affirmative wants to
focus on global hotspots.
We Charge Genocide, 2014 [Organization focused on challenging human rights abuses in the
US, Summary of We Charge Genocide Trip to United Nations Committee Against Torture, Dec. 15,
http://wechargegenocide.org/tag/united-nations/]
On November 12-14, 2014, We Charge Genocide (WCG) sent a delegation of eight

youth to Geneva, Switzerland to present evidence of police violence at the 53rd
session of the United Nations Committee Against Torture. The delegation was
following up on the submission of the shadow report Police Violence Against Youth of
Color, which WCG had published after a period of documentation, research, and
collecting testimony, which took place during summer 2014. The goal of
addressing the United Nations, in following with the WCG mission, was to
increase visibility of police violence in Chicago and call out the continued
impunity of police officers who abuse, harass, and kill youth of color in
Chicago every year. The WCG youth delegation documented their trip to Geneva
on social media. The delegation also made the decision to walkout during the second
day of the proceeding and initiated a historic protest inside the United Nations during
the presentation of U.S. Government representatives. From the beginning, WCG
hoped for an official statement from the international body of UNCAT calling out the
Chicago Police Department by name as a source of torture in the United States. This
happened on November 28th, 2014, when the United Nations Committee Against
Torture (UNCAT) released concluding remarks in review of United States
governments implementation of Convention Against Torture. Police shootings and
fatal pursuit of unarmed black individuals, lack of statistical data on
police brutality, and failure to show investigations addressing the issue are all
mentioned in the UNCAT remarks. The Chicago Police Department is called out
by name. The death of Dominique Franklin Jr. by a police tasering is cited
specifically. These are the issues that the WCG youth delegation traveled all the
way to Geneva to speak about during the 53rd session of the Committee Against
Torture. The Committee is particularly concerned at the reported current police
violence in Chicago, especially against African-American and Latino young people
who are allegedly being consistently profiled, harassed and subjected to excessive
force by Chicago Police Department (CPD) officers. -Concluding observations on the
third to fifth periodic reports of United States of America, Committee Against Torture,
November 28th, 2014 We Charge Genocide was not the only group with Chicago
connections that presented evidence at the UNCAT on police torture, but was the
1NC Shell
main group focused on violence against youth of color. Here are some of the other
group that presented on key issues: Martinez Sutton address UNCAT regarding the
death of his sister Rekia Boyd, who was killed by an of duty Chicago police detective
in 2012. Shubra Ohri from Peoples Law Office followed up on the Burge torture cases,
which CAT condemed in past reviews, and pushed CAT to support the reparations
Ordinance in Chicago. Nikki Patin of Black Womens Blueprint (organization based in
NYC but she lives in Chicago) addressed police rape as torture against Black women.
Monica James from Transformative Justice Law Project testified on the profiling and
abuse of transgender women of color by the state (including law enforcement) and
isolation of transgender women in prison.
B. Impact: The affirmative claims to resolve global

nuclear wars and create the conditions for peace.
Yet, militarism also pervades the lives of many
Chicagoans, and will continue even if the judge votes
affirmative. This narrow understanding of peace, as
just the absence of wars, glosses over systemic
violence, and makes it more difficult to address local
issues such as police brutality.
Cuomo, 1996 Chris J. Professor of Philosophy at the University of Cincinnati,

(War Is Not Just an Event: Reflections on the Significance of Everyday
Violence, Hypatia, Volume 11, Number 4, Fall, Available Online to
Subscribing Institutions via JSTOR, p. 31-32)
Ethical approaches that do not attend to the ways in which warfare and military
practices are woven into the very fabric of life in twenty-first century
technological states lead to crisis-based politics and analyses. For any feminism
that aims to resist oppression and create alternative social and political options, crisis-
based ethics and politics are problematic because they distract attention from
the need for sustained resistance to the enmeshed, omnipresent systems of
domination and oppression that so often function as givens in most people's
lives. Neglecting the omnipresence of militarism allows the false belief
that the absence of declared armed conflicts is peace, the polar
opposite of war. It is particularly easy for those whose lives are shaped by the
safety of privilege, and who do not regularly encounter the realities of
militarism, to maintain this false belief. The belief that militarism is an ethical,
political concern only regarding armed conflict, creates forms of resistance to
militarism that are merely exercises in crisis control. Antiwar resistance is then
mobilized when the "real" violence finally occurs, or when the stability of privilege is
directly threatened, and at that point it is difficult not to respond in ways that
make resisters drop all other political priorities. Crisis-driven attention to
declarations of war might actually keep resisters complacent about and
1NC Shell
complicitous in the general presence of global militarism. Seeing war as

necessarily embedded in constant military presence draws attention to the fact
that horrific, state-sponsored violence is happening nearly all over, all of the
time, and that it is perpetrated by military institutions and other militaristic
agents of the state. Moving away from crisis-driven politics and ontologies
concerning war and military violence also enables consideration of
relationships among seemingly disparate phenomena, and therefore can shape
more nuanced theoretical and practical forms of resistance. For example,
investigating the ways in which war is part of a presence allows consideration of the
relationships among the events of war and the following: how militarism is a foundational
trope in the social and political imagination; how the pervasive presence and symbolism
of soldiers/warriors/patriots shape meanings of gender; the ways in which threats of
state-sponsored violence are a sometimes invisible/sometimes bold agent of
racism, nationalism, and corporate interests; the fact that vast numbers of
communities, cities, and nations are currently in the midst of excruciatingly violent
circumstances. It also provides a lens for considering the relationships among
the various kinds of violence that get labeled "war." Given current American
obsessions with nationalism, guns, and militias, and growing hunger for the death
penalty, prisons, and a more powerful police state, one cannot underestimate the
need for philosophical and political attention to connections among phenomena
like the "war on drugs," the "war on crime," and other state-funded militaristic
campaigns.
C. Alternative: Critically analyze the meaning of the term

peace. What conditions need to be in place for us to
truly call ourselves at peace? And who, ultimately is
allowed to live in peace, and what sorts of populations
continue to live under a militarized police presence?
Absent this critical intervention, systematic violence such
as police brutality will continue in the status quo, and it
will be ignored.
Richmond, 2007 Oliver P., Professor of International Relations at the University of St. Andrews,
(Critical Research Agendas for Peace: The Missing Link in the Study of International Relations,
Alternatives: Global, Local, Political, Volume 32, Issue 2, April-June, Available Online to Subscribing
Institutions via Political Science Complete, p. 250-251)
Though there are many diferent terms for war in the English language, peace remains a
sole denominator.17 Though it may be subject to multiple interpretations, these are rarely
made explicit even beyond orthodox approaches to IR. Though critical versions of peace
research, conflict studies, development studies, cultural studies, other related areas, and
IR are now implicitly converging on a disparate notion of emancipation as a prerequisite
for peace, only peace research really entails an explicit conception of peace as being
1NC Shell
either negative or positive in character as a focus for its research and normative agendas.
One of the problems that soon becomes apparent in any discussion of peace is the
concepts tendency to slip into either a universal and/or idealistic form, or to collapse
under the weight of its own ontological subjectivity. For this reason, a historical narrative
of peace is fraught with difficulty and orthodox approaches to IR are forced to retreat
behind rational problem-solving approaches to order, albeit self-interested and
unashamedly rooted in a specific context, which are then projected globally on the basis
of a claimed universalism. As a consequence what has emerged has been an orthodox
assumption that first the management of war must be achieved before the institutions of
peace can operate, at a global, regional, state, and local level. Peace has, in Western
political thought in particular, been enshrined first in the belief that only a limited peace is
possible, even despite more utopian leanings, and recently that peace can now be built
according to a certain epistemology. Militarization, force, or coercion have normally been
the key mechanisms for its attainment, and it has been imbued with a hegemonic
understanding of universal norms, now increasingly instilled through institutions of
governance. It is generally assumed by most theorists, most policymakers, and
practitioners, that peace has an ontological stability enabling it to be understood, defined,
and thus created. Indeed, the implication of the void of debate about peace indicates that
it is generally thought that peace as a concept is so ontologically solid that no debate is
required. There is clearly a resistance to examining the [end page 250] concept of peace
as a subjective ontology, as well as a subjective political and ideological framework.
Indeed, this might be said to be indicative of orientalism, in impeding a discussion of a
positive peace or of alternative concepts and contexts of peace.18 Indeed, Saids
humanism indicates the dangers of assuming that peace is universal, a Platonic ideal
form, or extremely limited. An emerging critical conceptualization of peace rests upon a
genealogy that illustrates its contested discourses and multiple concepts. This allows for
an understanding of the many actors, contexts, and dynamics of peace, and enables a
reprioritization of what, for whom, and why, peace is valued. Peace from this perspective
is a rich, varied, and fluid tapestry, which can be contextualized, rather than a sterile,
extremely limited, and probably unobtainable product of a secular or nonsecular
imagination. It represents a discursive framework in which the many problems that are
replicated by the linear and rational project of a universal peace (efectively camouflaged
by a lack of attention within IR) can be properly interrogated in order to prevent the
discursive replication of violence.19 This allows for an understanding of how the
multiple and competing versions of peace may even give rise to conflict, and
also how this might be overcome. One area of consensus from within this more
radical literature appears to be that peace is discussed, interpreted, and referred to in a
way that nearly always disguises the fact that it is essentially contested. This is often an
act of hegemony thinly disguised as benevolence, assertiveness, or wisdom. Indeed,
many assertions about peace depend upon actors who know peace then creating it for
those that do not, either through their acts or through the implicit peace discourses that
are employed to describe conflict and war in opposition to peace. Where there should
be research agendas there are often silences. Even contemporary approaches in
conflict analysis and peace studies rarely stop to imagine the kind of peace they may
actually create. IR has reproduced a science of peace based upon political, social,
economic, cultural, and legal governance frameworks, by which conflict in the
world is judged. This has led to the liberal peace framework, which masks a
hegemonic collusion over the discourses of, and creation of, peace.20 A critical
interrogation of peace indicates it should be qualified as a specific type among
many.
Specific Link
1NC Positive Peace Kritik -

Economy Link
1. The negatives characterization of economic growth
as a remedy to all of our problems follows a similar
logic to their claim that the absence of armed conflict
guarantees peace. In this instance, their
understanding of growth is limited to certain
populations, those who already have wealth and
capital. However, global economic growth does not
impact those who live in poverty in the inner city.
Failure to conceptualize growth outside of macro-
economic terms, ignores the plight of Americas poor
and risks perpetuating their conditions
Irwin, 2014 Neil, senior economics correspondent, New York Times, June 24, Growth Has Been Good
for Decades. So Why Hasnt Poverty Declined? http://www.nytimes.com/2014/06/05/upshot/growth-has-
been-good-for-decades-so-why-hasnt-poverty-declined.html?_r=0
The surest way to fight poverty is to achieve stronger economic growth. That,
anyway, is a view embedded in the thinking of a lot of politicians and
economists. The federal government, Paul Ryan, the House Budget Committee chairman, wrote in
The Wall Street Journal, needs to remember that the best anti-poverty program is economic growth,
which is not so diferent from the argument put forth by John F. Kennedy (in a somewhat diferent context)
that a rising tide lifts all boats. In Kennedys era, that had the benefit of being true. From 1959 to 1973,
the nations economy per person grew 82 percent, and that was enough to drive the proportion of the poor
But over the last generation in the United
population from 22 percent to 11 percent.
States, that simply hasnt happened. Growth has been pretty good,
up 147 percent per capita. But rather than decline further, the
poverty rate has bounced around in the 12 to 15 percent range
higher than it was even in the early 1970s. The mystery of why and how to
change that is one of the most fundamental challenges in the nations fight against poverty. The
disconnect between growth and poverty reduction is a key finding of a
sweeping new study of wages from the Economic Policy Institute. The liberal-
leaning groups policy prescriptions are open to debate, but this piece of data
the researchers find is hard to dispute: From 1959 to 1973, a more robust United States
economy and fewer people living below the poverty line went hand-in-hand. That relationship broke apart
If the old relationship between growth and poverty had held up,
in the mid-1970s.
the E.P.I. researchers find, the poverty rate in the United States would have
fallen to zero by 1986 and stayed there ever since. Economic Growth Isn't Leading to
Less Poverty From 1959 to 1973, growth in per capita gross domestic product translated directly into fewer
Americans living in poverty. If that relationship had continued, there would have been
Specific Link
no poverty in the United States since the mid-1980s; instead, the poverty
rate has held steady in recent decades despite overall economic growth .
Simulated poverty rate is the prediction of what the poverty rate would be based on G.D.P. per capita,
using the statistical relationship that prevailed between them between 1959 and 1973. It used to be that
as G.D.P. per capita grew, poverty declined in lock step, said Heidi Shierholz, an economist at E.P.I. and an
author of the study. There was a very tight relationship between overall growth and fewer and fewer
Americans living in poverty. Starting in the 70s, that link broke. Now, one shouldnt interpret that too
literally. The 1959 to 1973 period might be an unfair benchmark. The Great Society social safety net
programs were being put in place, and they may have had a poverty-lowering efect separate from that of
the overall economic trends. In other words, it may be simply that during that time, strong growth and a
falling poverty rate happened to take place simultaneously for unrelated reasons. And there presumably is
some level of poverty below which the official poverty rate will never fall, driven by people whose problems
But the facts still cast doubt on the notion
run much deeper than economics.
that growth alone will solve Americas poverty problem . If you are
committed to the idea that poor families need to work to earn a living, this has been a great three
decades. For households in the bottom 20 percent of earnings in the United States in 2012, that meant
less than $14,687 a year the share of income from wages, benefits and tax credits has risen from 57.5
percent of their total income in 1979 to 69.7 percent in 2010. The percentage of their income from public
benefits, including Medicaid, food stamps, Social Security and unemployment insurance, has fallen in that
time. The fact that more of poor families income is coming from wages doesnt necessarily mean that
theyre getting paid more, though. In fact, based on the E.P.I.'s analysis of data from the Census Bureau, it
appears that what income gains they are seeing are coming from working more hours, not from higher
hourly pay. Indeed, if you adjust for the higher number of hours worked, over the 1979 to 2007 period
(selected to avoid the efects of the steep recession that began in 2008), hourly pay for the bottom 20
percent of households rose only 3.2 percent. Total, not per year. In other words, in nearly three decades,
these lower-income workers saw no meaningful gain in what they were paid for an hour of labor. Their
The
overall inflation-adjusted income rose a bit, but mainly because they put in more hours of work.
researchers at E.P.I. also looked at demographic factors that contribute to
poverty, including race, education levels and changes in family structure
(such as the number of one-parent versus two-parent households). This look
at the data also shows rising inequality as the biggest factor in contributing
to the poverty rate, dwarfing those other shifts. Debates over what kind of social welfare
system the United States ought to have are always polarizing, from the creation of the Great Society in the
1960s to the Clinton welfare reforms of the 1990s to the Paul Ryan budgets of this era. Conservatives tend
to attribute the persistence of poverty, even amid economic growth, to the perverse incentives that a
But the reality is that low-income workers are
welfare state creates against working.
putting in more hours on the job than they did a generation ago and the
financial rewards for doing so just havent increased. T hats the real lesson of the
data: If you want to address poverty in the United States, its not enough to say that you need to create
You also have to devise strategies that
better incentives for lower-income people to work.
make the benefits of a stronger economy show up in the wages of the people
on the edge of poverty, who need it most desperately.
2NC/1NR Extensions
2NC/1NR Positive Peace K- Human

Rights Affirmative- Overview
1. Extend our 1NC We Charge Genocide in 2014
evidence. The U.S. routinely engages in human rights
violations against its own citizens. The killing of
unarmed African Americans at the hands of police,
and the high rate of incarceration for small crimes
are just a few of the abuses outlined in our evidence.
Instead of calling our attention to these domestic
abuses, the affirmative focuses on the human rights
violations of the Peoples Republic of China. We must
critically analyze our own actions before criticizing
others. In fact, activists are already challenging the
notion that the U.S. is a bastion of freedom and
justice by testifying about police brutality in
multilateral forums.
2. Extend our 1NC Cuomo evidence. The affirmative has

a narrow and self-serving definition of militarism and
peace that allows for the continuation of everyday
militarism. That is, when peace is defined as just the
absence of armed conflict between states, we are
lulled into the false belief that everyone is at peace.
Our 1NC Richmond evidence indicates that this
understanding of peace glosses over instances of
structural violence such as poverty and police
brutality, ensuring their perpetuation.
2NC/1NR Extensions
2NC/1NR- Positive Peace K-

Human Rights Affirmative- AT:
Permutation do Both
1. They say we can focus on systemic violence and
nuclear war. However, there is a tradeoff. Extend our
1NC Richmond and Cuomo evidence. Their definition
of peace is problematic. At numerous points in the
1AC, the affirmative asserts that if we adopt the plan
we no longer have to worry about conflict. However,
this framing of war glosses over systemic violence,
ensuring that it will continue. They cannot backtrack
on the claims they made in the 1AC regarding
nuclear war, that is severance, which is a reason to
reject the argument. The negative cannot generate
links to off-case positions if the affirmative can
change their plan in the 2AC.
2. They say systemic violence exists in China. However,
they only care about human rights as a means to
perpetuate U.S. credibility and prevent global
nuclear war. This is still problematic. Yes, people may
also be suffering in China. However, the affirmative
instrumentalizes their plight to further their own
version of U.S. dominated-global peace. Framing the
situation in this way not only ignores micro-level
violence, it also fails to interrogate the true
conditions for structural violence in China, turning
the case.
FERNANDO, 2003 Dr. Laksiri, Director of the Centre for Democracy and Development,
(Transforming negative peace to positive peace, http://www.dailynews.lk/2002/04/02/fea01.html
Positive peace in its broadest sense means many more things than even the above
measures. No one should be asking all these overnight. But there should be a vision
and a direction towards achieving positive peace in its fullest possible meaning
in the future. Otherwise, there will be no future for our society. There is
endemic violence in our society - violence at home, work place, university and
elections. Societal violence undoubtedly breeds into ethnic violence and war.
2NC/1NR Extensions
Curtailing violence at micro level obviously is necessary to curtail violence at

macro level and vise versa. Positive peace in its ultimate objective means not
only the absence of direct violence, but also the structural violence in its all
forms. It means a full measure of justice, equality and social harmony in all
respects. The negative peace is like "negative healthiness," the mere absence
of sickness. But healthiness should be a positive one. Not only the absence of
sickness, but also the physical fitness and good muscle tone. Peace should be like
that, a positive one. Johan Galtung is the person who made the distinction between what
we normally call violence (physical violence) and structural violence. Structural
violence might not harm the victims directly. But the people are harmed,
victimized and violated through institutional means and structures.
Discrimination, inequality and social marginalization are some forms of structural violence
on the ethnic front. Poverty, malnutrition, and economic marginalization are several forms
of structural violence on the social front. If peace is the absence of violence, it
should mean the absence of violence including structural violence as well.
Peace means not only the absence of war and violence but also the absence of
causes of war and violence.
3. They say nuclear war increases structural violence.

Even if this is true, the conceptualization of war
under the affirmative makes us unable to address
structural violence at all. Everyday forms of violence
go unnoticed when we think of war as a global event.
The permutation is not net-beneficial.

Subscribing Institutions via JSTOR, p. 36)
3) Following several influential moves in feminist philosophy, Peach rejects just-war

theory's reliance on abstraction--of the realities, or "horrors," of war; of enemies as one-
dimensional evil, killable Others; and of the ethical responses needed to address the
morality of war, such as a privileging of justice and rights over love and caring. Following
Elshtain, she believes that feminist just-war principles should be more particularized,
contextualized, and individualized. But the abstraction of the particularities
of war depends on an abstraction of war itself. The distance of such
abstraction is created in part by willingness to think of war without
considering the presence of war in "peaceful" times. Wars becomes
conceptual entitiesobjects for considerationrather than diverse,
historically loaded exemplifications of the contexts in which they
occur. In order to notice the particular and individual realities of war,
attention must be given to the particular, individual, and
2NC/1NR Extensions
contextualized causes and effects of pervasive militarism, as well as

the patterns and connections among them.
2NC/1NR Extensions
2NC/1NR Positive Peace K- Human

Rights Link Extension
1. There is a direct tradeoff between protecting the
labor and human rights of those in the U.S. and the
affirmative. By pointing fingers at China, U.S.
policymakers can distract us from the pressing
humanitarian issues in the U.S.
Ruiz, 2012 Alberto, a long-time unionist, peace activist and associate

member of the left-wing World Federation of Trade Unions (WFTU),
April 27, The US Labor Movement and China
http://www.counterpunch.org/2012/04/27/the-us-labor-movement-and-
china/
The statistics are chilling. In a country where workers have no real right to organize a union,
they face an ever falling standard of living. The workers attempts to organize
independent unions are faced with repression 25% of the companies
illegally fire workers who try to organize; active union supporters
indeed have a 1 in 5 chance of being fired; over half of the companies
threaten to have undocumented, foreign laborers deported during
organizing campaigns; over half of the companies threaten to close the
plant if it is organized; and nearly half of companies that are unionized
never reach a labor contract with the union. Of course, this country
is not China, but rather, is, according to the AFL-CIO, the
United States. Notwithstanding this dismal situation for labor rights in this country, the U.S.
labor movement is fixated on vilifying China and its human and labor
rights situation as a cover for protecting U.S. workers from
competition from albeit much lower paid Chinese workers . Of course, U.S.
labor has every right, and indeed a duty, to protect the workers it represents . However, the
obsession with China as an economic rival an obsession which
sometimes devolves into a racist stigmatization of the Chinese
people themselves is a distraction from the real and most
pressing problems of U.S. workers: the ever growing economic and
power disparity between capital and workers in this country, and a
legal regime in the U.S. which only encourages this disparity.
2NC/1NR Extensions
2NC- Positive Peace K- Human

Rights Affirmative- AT: Alternative
Cant Solve
1. The alternative does solve for structural violence.
Recognition of a globalized world does not preclude
the recognition of everyday violence. By shifting the
definition of militarism and peace, the negative is
able to account for the ethical responsibility we have
towards those living under repressive regimes.

Subscribing Institutions via JSTOR, p. 36)
It is of course crucial that the analysis I recommend here notice similarities, patterns, and
connections without collapsing all forms and instances of militarism or of state-sponsored
violence into one neat picture. It is also important to emphasize that an expanded
conception of war is meant to disrupt crisis-based politics that
distract attention from mundane, everyday violence that is rooted in
injustice. Seeing the constant presence of militarism does not
require that middle-class and other privileged Americans suddenly
see themselves as constantly under siege. It does require the
development of abilities to notice the extent to which people and
ecosystems can be severely under siege by military institutions and
values, even when peace seems present.

Positive Peace Kritik (Human
Rights Affirmative)
1. Permutation: do both
A. The plan and the alternative are not mutually
exclusive. One can acknowledge systemic violence
that occurs domestically and also focus on foreign
policy initiatives that could stave off a nuclear
crisis.
Liden, 2009 Coordinator at the Research School in Peace and Conflict

[Kristofer, working paper prepared for the ISA convention, New York, Peace,
Self-Governance and International Engagement: A Postcolonial Ethic of Liberal
Peacebuilding,
http://citation.allacademic.com//meta/p_mla_apa_research_citation/3/1/2/0/6/
pages312060/p312060-1.php,
The postcolonial condition is not native, indigenous, traditional, pre-modern

or pre-colonial. It is an irreversible state of hybridity; heterogeneous
mixtures of the modern and a-modern, liberal and a-liberal, indigenous
and foreign, local and global. The political response to the critique
of liberal peacebuilding should therefore not be the denial of
international agency but engagement based on a better conception
of the conditions of legitimate and efficient action that furthers
rather than compromises local autonomy. In this connection, the conceptualization
of local autonomy makes a political diference. First, the presence of the global in the
local ought to be recognized in postcolonial contexts (Dirlik, 1997). This
is the key to the dependence of local autonomy upon
international engagement. The extent and character of this presence is obviously an
empirical matter, but the theoretical point that local and global should not be
treated as mutually exclusive terms is not. To quote Roland Robertson ...we should consider
the local as a micro manifestation of the global in opposition, inter alia, to the implication that the local
Nor should the local
indicates enclaves of cultural, ethnic, or racial homogeneity (Robertson, 2006: 480).
be defined exclusively as the sphere of the traditional, as has already
been argued. If international policy is framed as supporting traditional
culture, it will be an example of the very orientalism that Edward Said
criticizes (Said, 1978). An orientalism based on the idea of the non-Western

other. The implications of oriental peacebuilding would probably be worse
than continuing on the occidental governance track . Imposing the same models
everywhere at least leaves room for local interpretation and resistance. Furthermore, one should not
equate the global with domination and the local with resistance. There
is actually such a tendency of romanticizing the local in some postcolonial
theory as well as in literature on indigenous peacemaking . The local
is no less a source of repression and exclusion than the
global, and locally constituted hegemonies are no more
acceptable than their global counterparts from a postcolonial
perspective. Furthermore, the global can be a sphere of resistance as
well as the local. For instance, mass media and globalized networks of
communication and political organization can be used to promote
resistance as well as exploitation (Darby, 2004: 10).
B. Our 1AC evidence indicates that numerous human

rights abuses occur in China. Poor working
conditions, the imprisonment of activists, and the
oppression of ethnic and religious minorities are
just a few of the many forms of systemic violence
in the Peoples Republic of China. The negative
cannot claim that these matter any more or less
than the violence that they outline exists in the
status quo in the U.S. This means you should
prefer the permutation.
C. The permutation is net beneficial. The threat of
nuclear conflict would exacerbate structural
violence.
MALLAVARAPU, 2013 (Siddharth Mallavarapu, Mallavarapu is an associate

professor in, and chairperson of, the Department of International Relations at
South Asian University in New Delhi, Monumental failure in an
interconnected world, Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, September 4,
http://thebulletin.org/nuclear-detonations-contemplating-
catastrophe/monumental-failure-interconnected-world
Dire circumstances. But given all that , how would a nuclear detonation
affect poor and middle-income nations and their development goals?
To begin with, nations situated well beyond the blast site would feel the efects. The world
today is deeply interconnected and events can no longer be confined
to the areas where they occur. The United Nations Development

Programme underscores this reality in its 2013 Human Development Report,
which argues that "as global development challenges become more complex
and transboundary in nature, coordinated action on the most pressing
challenges of our era, whether they be poverty eradication, climate change,
or peace and security, is essential." And efforts to contend with the four
areas of development upon which the report focuses"enhancing
equity, including on the gender dimension; enabling greater voice and
participation of citizens, including youth; confronting environmental
pressures; and managing demographic change"would in every case
be seriously complicated by a nuclear detonation. Indeed, as argued
succinctly by Ray Acheson of the disarmament organization Reaching Critical
Will, a detonation would seriously compromise eforts to achieve all the
Millennium Development Goals. It would undermine poverty alleviation
initiatives as well as cooperative eforts to foster development; limit
agricultural productivity; undermine women's and children's well-being;
damage national infrastructures; and reduce the planet's biodiversity.

2. Their alternative cannot solve for structural violence.
The plans shift towards a global ethical
responsibility prevents genocide and other large-
scale atrocities.
Garrigues, 2007 Juan Garrigues Researcher, Peace and Security Programme,

FRIDE December The responsibility to protect: from an ethical principle to an
efective policy
http://www.responsibilitytoprotect.org/files/responsibilidad.proteger.pdf
The responsibility to protect stems from a fundamental concept:

when a government does not fulfill the basic principle of the modern
state of providing protection to its citizens, the international
community must assume this responsibility. That is to say, that the
principles of sovereignty and non-intervention that for hundreds of
years served as a carte blanche for the behaviour of state
governments at a domestic level are no longer sacred. Sovereignty
becomes a conditional right. If a state does not fulfill its obligation of
guaranteeing the security of its citizens, especially if it does so consciously, it
looses its right to invoke sovereignty as the basis for preventing an
international intervention which intends to exercise this responsibility. With
regards to the international community, the principle represents an
advance from the right to responsibility. The debate on interventions on
the grounds of genocide or massive violations of human rights gained force at
the end of the Cold War.3 The violent crises that took place in Somalia,
Rwanda, the Great Lakes region, the former Yugoslavia and Haiti led
to heated discussions, slow reactions, and controversial actions.
From the point of view of the so-called liberal intervention, the right to
protection was exercised in Kosovo in 1999, where the North Atlantic Treaty
Organisation (NATO) intervened against the Serbian forces that committed
acts of ethnic cleansing against the Albanian-Kosovar population. This action
was justified on the grounds of the right to humanitarian intervention. NATOs
action was controversial, especially due to the lack of support from the UN
Security Council due to Russias opposition. From the start, the right to
humanitarian intervention raised many doubts, in particular amongst
governments and analysts from Southern countries. Suspicious of the
interests of some Northern states, several questions arose: Who defines when
it is right to intervene? Why intervene in Kosovo and not in other similar
situations? What type of interventions is legitimate? In the case 2
International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty, The
Responsibility to Protect, Ottawa: International Development Research
Centre, December 2001. 3 The UN Convention for the Prevention and
Sanction of the Crime of Genocide of 1948 defines genocide as the acts

committed with intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnical,
racial or religious group, http://www.ohchr.org/english/law/genocide.htm 3
The responsibility to protect stems from a fundamental concept:
when a government does not fulfi l the basic principle of the modern
state of providing protection to its citizens, the international
community must assume this responsibility. That is to say, that the
principles of sovereignty and non-intervention that for hundreds of years
served as a carte blanche for the behaviour of state governments at a
domestic level are no longer sacred. Sovereignty becomes a conditional right.
If a state does not fulfill its obligation of guaranteeing the security of its
citizens, especially if it does so consciously, it looses its right to invoke
sovereignty as the basis for preventing an international intervention which
intends to exercise this responsibility. With regards to the international
community, the principle represents an advance from the right to
responsibility. The debate on interventions on the grounds of
genocide or massive violations of human rights gained force at the
end of the Cold War.3 The violent crises that took place in Somalia,
Rwanda, the Great Lakes region, the former Yugoslavia and Haiti led to
heated discussions, slow reactions, and controversial actions. From the point
of view of the so-called liberal intervention, the right to protection was
exercised in Kosovo in 1999, where the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation
(NATO) intervened against the Serbian forces that committed acts of ethnic
cleansing against the Albanian-Kosovar population. This action was justifi ed
on the grounds of the right to humanitarian intervention. NATOs action was
controversial, especially due to the lack of support from the UN Security
Council due to Russias opposition. From the start, the right to humanitarian
intervention raised many doubts, in particular amongst governments and
analysts from Southern countries. Suspicious of the interests of some
Northern states, several questions arose: Who defines when it is right to
intervene? Why intervene in Kosovo and not in other similar situations? What
type of interventions is legitimate? In the case 2 International Commission on
Intervention and State Sovereignty, 3 The UN Convention for the Prevention
and Sanction of the Crime of Genocide of 1948 defi nes genocide as the acts
committed with intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnical,
racial or religious group, http://www.ohchr.org/english/law/genocide.htm 3
Comment, November 2007 of Kosovo, several analysts, from the North and
South, argued that intervention was carried out too early and too forcibly, or
in colloquial Anglo-Saxon terms, too much, too early. In fact, the experience
of the interventions of the 1990s led to something of a quagmire: there was
no intervention when it was indispensable (Rwanda); intervention was too
late (Bosnia, the Great Lakes); conducted under confusing mandates (all
cases); prepared with the objective of trying to get out as soon as possible
(the United States in Haiti) and justified by a mix of political and humanitarian
reasons (Kosovo). There was a shift from the first universal impulse to
intervene for humanitarian reasons towards the pragmatic caution of
intervening when possible and with limited objectives. Moreover, the multiple

actors involved - from the states directly afected to the United Nations and
regional security organisations, to NGOs and academics, as well as journalists
- went from enthusiasm with regards to interventions to disenchantment due
to their failure. Against this background, it was necessary to clarify the
concept in order to advance towards the useful practises that combined what
was morally necessary with what was politically possible, and to place the
protection horizon as far as possible, or in other words, to make it widely
inclusive. In this sense, the responsibility to protect implies a
significant empirical and normative progress. Not only is there a
shift from the right to the responsibility of states, but some
principles with regards to humanitarian intervention, such as
proportional means and that military intervention should be the
last resort, are also specified. Furthermore, the principle is not limited
to interventionist measures, but it also stresses how conflict prevention
should be the priority of international organisations, states and NGOs.
CDL Core Files 2016-2017 Diplomatic Capital Disadvantage (Jan
2017 Update)
Diplomatic Capital
Disadvantage (January 2017
Update)
2017 Update)
Vocabulary
Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS, ISIL)Sunni Muslim
extremist group that believes in the spread of Islam across the
world. They are a militant and spread their power through
violence, kidnapping, and torture.
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1
Diplomatic Capital: Power to influence other countries through
negotiations, incentives, or bargaining chips. The DA argues that
Obama only has so much, so he has to spend it wisely.
Syria: A country in the Middle East where was has broken out
between Assad, ISIS, and opposition groups. There are many
diferent religious and political groups fighting for survival and
power in the country. The death tolls are high and it is a serious
crisis.
Bashar Al-Assad: (Bah-shar all-awss awd): President of Syria
fighting for control of the country. He is described as authoritarian
kind of like a dictator. He has used violence against those that
oppose him.
Diplomatic Talks: These are conversations between countries to
try to find peace in Syria. These include the US, Russia, Syria,
Iran, and Turkey. However, each country has diferent opinions on
how and what should be done.
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might erupt.
president of China.
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AT=Answers To
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1NC Diplomatic Capital

Disadvantage Shell
A. UNIQUENESS: President-elect Trump is focusing
diplomatic relations on Russia instead of China.
BEAUCHAMP & ALEEM, DECEMBER 18TH, 2016 [Zach Beauchamp, international

writer for Vox and previously edited a section on political thought at ThinkProgress and contributed to The
Dish, Zeeshan Aleem, Vox writer covering economics and energy for the foreign afairs team, Obama
cozied up to China and battled Putin. Trump is doing the exact opposite.
http://www.vox.com/world/2016/12/18/13921962/trump-obama-china-russia-policy]
President Barack Obama has spent his two terms in office working to build closer ties
with China while seeking to isolate and punish Vladimir Putins Russia.
Eight years later, Moscow is subject to painful US sanctions and continued public
criticism from Obama and his aides. Beijing is a key economic partner that has at
times served as a conduit to the rogue regime in North Korea.
To a large extent, thats because the two countries have acted fairly diferently in
recent years. Russias 2014 invasion of Ukraine, 2015 bombing campaign in Syria,
and 2016 hack of the US election convinced the administration that Russia was a
threat to the international order a power unwilling to play by the rules. Despite its
aggressive moves in the East and South China Seas, Beijing has been far less
confrontational, and far more willing to negotiate with the West in good faith on long-
range issues like climate change.
Team Trump sees things totally diferently.
President-elect Donald Trump sees Putin not as a threat to Western norms but as a
tough and capable leader and potential partner in fighting radical Islam. China, in his
eyes, is a threat to the US economy responsible for the loss of massive numbers of
American jobs and a country that US presidents have been far too soft on for
decades. By this analysis, Russia is the potential partner, and China the potential
enemy worth confronting.
China is the biggest state adversary in Trumps mind, Patrick Cronin, the senior
director of the Asia-Pacific Security Program at the left-leaning Center for a New
American Security, tells Vox. It's not Russia. It's China.
The difering worldviews have been on public display in recent days. Obama used his
press conference at the White House on Friday to suggest Putin was connected to his
countrys cyberattacks against the US and belittled Russia. "They are a smaller
country, they are a weaker country, their economy doesn't produce anything that
people want to buy except for oil and gas and arms, they don't innovate, he said. On
China, he recommended respect for diplomatic tradition, cautioning against Trumps
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indications that he would consider dropping Washingtons One China policy, the
diplomatic understanding on the status of Taiwan that has underpinned US-Chinese
relations for decades.
Trump, by contrast, has publicly castigated the CIA for its assertion that Russia ran a
sustained hacking campaign designed to boost his chances of winning the
presidency. And hes been unrepentant about his tradition-breaking phone call with
the president of Taiwan and language on revisiting One China. Beijing has responded
by saying that the countries would have nothing to discuss on other issues if Trump
tries to deviate from One China. And after China agreed to return an unmanned US
Navy drone it seized on Friday an act that led to a striking uptick in maritime
tensions between the two countries Trump tweeted: We should tell China that we
dont want the drone they stole back.- let them keep it!
What this suggests though, knowing Trump, we cant be sure is that were about
to see a massive about-face in great power politics. Obamas basic policy work
with China, isolate Russia is about to be flipped on its head. The US is going to
start working with Russia on a raft of issues, and start challenging China on a lot
more. That could mean US policy reversals on a whole host of issues, from Syria to
climate change to the US economy, with potentially major consequences for people
around the world.
B. LINK: Russia views US-China engagement like the

plan as a zero sum tradeoff with productive US-
Russian diplomacy
THE HILL, DECEMBER 7TH, 2016 [Prominent political news website, EDWARD GOLDBERG,
THE HILL CONTRIBUTOR http://thehill.com/blogs/pundits-blog/international-afairs/309244-trump-is-playing-
a-risky-political-game-with-china]
If the Chinese leadership perceive that their legitimacy is threatened by Trumps

willingness to break historic protocol and publicly interact with Taiwan, then the
possibilities of a rivalry between the United States and China similar to the pre-World
War I analogy of the United Kingdom and Germany could become acute.
Abetting this potential rivalry is Russia, the true declining power with a gross
domestic product now about the size of that of Spain. Russia is the major country that
is threatened by the global order and threatening to the global order.
Russia has nothing to lose by trying to reshuffle the deck. What makes the Russian
situation more complicated is that on account of its political culture and history, the
Moscow perceives the world diferently. It sees it in 19th century great game terms.
Russia is the major economy that, beyond a collapsing energy market, has no skin in
the globalized game. Just look at this in terms of the United States. Of all the major
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economic players in the world, the United States has by far the smallest and almost
nonexistent trade relationship with Russia.
In 2015, the United States exported approximately $116 billion worth of products to
China and imported approximately $482 billion. Although the import numbers from
China greatly outweigh the export numbers, they only tell part of the story.
Whether it is Walmart, Apple, Nike, or warehousing Chinese steel in Long Beach,

California, there is a vast amount of Americans whose jobs are dependent on China.
In addition, General Motors (GM) and its joint-ventured Chinese factories

manufactured and sold more than 3.6 million vehicles in China in 2015, making it
GMs largest market. China is Apples second largest market. Even Hershey
Chocolates is now producing in China for the Chinese market.
In terms of U.S. exports to China, the products range from the approximately 12.3
million bales of cotton exported annually primarily from Texas to Mercedes cars
manufactured in Indiana for the Chinese market.
U.S. exports to Russia last year, however, were only $7.1 billion, less than one
percent of our total exports. Imports in 2015 from Russia were approximately $16.6
billion. In terms of customers for U.S. products, Russia is about the same size as
Thailand.
Russias need of spheres of influence and bufer states is in direct conflict with
globalization. If a country is economically interlinked around the globe, it does not
need spheres of influence for protection.
It is very doubtful that interlinked markets will attack interlinked markets. What
Russian leadership doesn't understand is that the chess game of realpolitik, of pawns
in the name of bufer states protecting the queen, is no longer necessary.
The problem, however, is that the United States can now be easily trapped into
playing the Russian game. Holding a very weak economic hand, not wanting to
change its system from a kleptocracy to a modern economic nation and believing
that the projected power of the state is a substitute for democratic legitimacy, Russia
sees itself caught between America and China.
In this situation, Putins best strategy is to follow the Nixon and Kissinger model, but
in reverse. Nixon and Kissinger saw the need to re-establish relations with China; that
is, to play the China card as a way to pressure the Soviet Union.
Putin, by placating the new Trump administration, which campaigned on a

confrontational relationship with China, could be in a position to play the American
card against his economic giant to the east. But for America, this is a fools game.
C. INTERNAL LINK: Russia is key to negotiating a ceasefire

in Syria and to defeat ISIS
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COUNCIL ON FOREIGN RELATIONS, 2015 [Philip H. Gordon, Senior Fellow, Syria: The
Need for Diplomacy and De-escalation Policy Innovation Memorandum No. 55, December 2015]
The current policygradually escalating the war in the hope of forcing a

comprehensive political transitionis unlikely to succeed. As opposed to regimes in
Tunisia, Egypt, and Yemen, where unpopular leaders quickly fell to opposition
protests, Assad is backed not only by sizeable military forces and a considerable
portion of his population but alsoand perhaps most importantlyby major outside
powers determined to prevent the collapse of his regime. Tehran sees its position in
Syria as critical to its regional leverage and has thus supplied the regime with money,
weapons, and direct military assistance, particularly through its proxies in Hezbollah.
Russia is also determined to keep the regime in place. Moscow vehemently opposes
the principle of regime change and worries that Assad's fall could lead to even
greater chaos with no one in charge or extremists taking power.
This explains why outside support for Assad's opposition, provided by the United
States and others, has not accomplished its stated goals. Rather than forcing the
regime to the tableessentially to negotiate its own demiseit has led only to a
military stalemate that is benefiting the extreme elements of the opposition,
including the Islamic State. The result has been a growing, open-ended conflict, with
devastating humanitarian, strategic, and geopolitical consequences.
Diplomacy and De-escalation
To end the conflict in Syria, the United States should pursue a course of action
consisting of the following steps:
Institutionalize a diplomatic process with all parties involved. The October 30 and
November 14 multilateral meetings in Vienna, for the first time including Iran and
Saudi Arabia, were a useful first step. Participants agreed on basic principles,
including preserving Syria's unity, independence, and territorial integrity, and on the
need for a political process that would ultimately lead to a new constitution and
elections. While influential countries remain deeply divided on the question of
whether, how, or when to require Assad's departure, only by hammering out issues
collectively and realizing the high costs of maximalist positions can the gaps be
narrowed. When the Bosnia "Contact Group" was created as the war there raged in
the early 1990s, the United States, Europe, and Russia were all far apart on key
issues. They ultimately compromised, imposed a solution on recalcitrant local parties,
and agreed on a settlement that has kept the peace in Bosnia for two decades.
Initiate a bilateral U.S. back-channel process with Russia. Because no agreement on

the most sensitive issues can be reached with nearly twenty participants around a
table, the United States should pursue back-channel discussions with Russia at the
highest levels. The objective would be a quid pro quo that assures Moscow that the
Assad regime will not collapse in exchange for a cease-fire between the regime and
the opposition, and joint focus on the Islamic State. If Russia continues to insist on
propping up the regime and indiscriminately bombing all elements of the opposition,
the United States and others will maintain their support for opposition fighters, the
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war will go on, and Russia will alienate the Sunni world and become a growing target
for terrorists. The October 31 bombing of a Russian airliner over the Sinai and the
November 24 downing of a Russian fighter jet by Turkey underscore the risks for
Russia in the absence of a settlement. But if Moscow is willing to press for policy
changes from Damascusincluding support for a cease-fire, recognition of opposition
autonomy in parts of the country, and a process for longer-term leadership changes
a diplomatic agreement might be possible.
Pursue a cease-fire between the regime and the opposition. The goals of an
agreement would include an end to both sides' ofensive operations, including regime
aerial attacks; devolution of power so that regions currently held by the opposition
can govern themselves; the uninhibited provision of humanitarian assistance to both
sides; and the adoption of a political process to determine political leaders and
structures to govern an ultimately unified Syria. Given the extremely fragmented
nature of the opposition, with no single authority in control and even moderate
groups now fighting alongside extremists, it will be nearly impossible to prevent some
violations of a cease-fire even if an agreement is reached. But if Russia and Iran were
able to guarantee an end to the regime's attacks on the opposition and the provision
of humanitarian aid, supporters of the opposition would be well placed to press their
clients to accept a cease-fire by threatening to cut of assistance for those who
refuse. The Islamic State would not be party to the cease-fire and would continue to
be targeted. International peacekeepers might be required to police the agreement,
but the risks of deploying them would be significantly reduced if all the external
powers were committed to the deal.
Defer the question of Assad. There is no doubt that Assad is a brutal dictator who
deserves to face justice. The question, however, is whether the pursuit of that elusive
goal is worth the costs of an unending war or the consequences of the military
escalation that would be necessary to end the war. The United States and others do
not have to abandon their position that Assad has lost legitimacy and that Syria will
not be fully stableor accepted by the international communityas long as he is in
place. And they could condition support for a cease-fire on a political process that
would determine the country's eventual political structure and leadership. But they
should not allow disagreement over Assad's fate to be the obstacle to reducing the
violence, if other elements of an agreement could be reached. Those countries most
determined to see Assad's departuresuch as Saudi Arabia and Turkeywill resist
such an outcome, but a clear U.S. position and clarity that the United States will not
support military escalation could help bring about their acquiescence. Many weary
Syrians, and a growing number of countries, even in the Arab world, would welcome
an end to the fighting even if it was not accompanied by immediate regime change in
Damascus.
Continue the fight against the Islamic State. Even as they pursue a diplomatic
agreement to de-escalate the conflict between the opposition and the regime, the
United States and its partners should intensify the war on the Islamic State. This
should include eforts to empower the Sunnis of Iraq, maintenance of the coalition's
bombing campaign, greater intelligence sharing in Europe, the deployment of U.S.
and other special forces, and the provision of military assistance to groups willing to
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target the Islamic State. If the regime and the opposition forces accepted cease-fires
vis--vis each other on the basis of the current lines of control, they and their outside
backers could focus their eforts on the common enemythe Islamic State.
D. Impact: ISIS will use nuclear weapons
MACDONALD, MARCH 2016 [Cheyenne, Writer for DailyMail, cites Harvard Study, March 30,
http://www.dailymail.co.uk/sciencetech/article-3516207/Harvard-researcher-warns-ISIS-brink-using-nuclear-
weapons.html]
The possibility of a nuclear-armed ISIS may not be as far-off as many

experts suggest, a Harvard researcher has warned. In a recent report for Project on
Managing the Atom from Harvards Belfer Center, Matthew Bunn explains how the
threat of nuclear terrorism is rising as extremist groups continue to evolve. While
there has not been any concrete indication that ISIS is pursuing nuclear materials,
the researcher says that the actions and rhetoric of the group suggest its need for
such powerful weapons. In recent years, there have been numerous occasions of
suspicious events relating to nuclear facilities in Belgium, Defense One points out.
While it would be difficult to ISIS or other terror groups to obtain the knowledge of
security features and access nuclear materials, Bunn explains that the evidence of
such intentions are growing. The report precedes the 2016 Nuclear Security Summit,
which will take place between March 31 and April 1. According to the authors, the
summit will help to determine the feasibility of terrorist groups getting their hands on
nuclear materials. The threats come from the possibility of three types of nuclear or
radiological terrorism, the authors write: detonation of an actual nuclear bomb,
sabotage of a nuclear facility, or use of a dirty bomb to spread radioactive
material. Each of these comes at a diferent level of risk, and the authors focus for
the most part on the potential danger from the use of an actual nuclear
bomb, as these results would be most catastrophic. Still, the other types of
threats do not come without consequences. The radiation from a dirty bomb, by
contrast, might not kill anyoneat least in the near termbut could impose billions
of dollars in economic disruption and cleanup costs, the authors write. The efects of
sabotage of a nuclear facility would depend heavily on the specific nature of the
attack, but would likely range between the other two types of attack in severity. 'The
difficulty of achieving a successful sabotage is also intermediate between the other
two.
CDL Core Files 2016-2017 Diplomatic Capital Disadvantage
Specific Links
Chinese Diplomacy Link

1. Historically, Chinese cooperation drains diplomatic
because military tensions are so high
PANDA, APRIL 2016 [Ankit, Writer for the Diplomat, major

international news source focused on Asia, April 27,
http://thediplomat.com/2016/04/the-us-cancelled-a-scheduled-
fonop-in-the-south-china-sea-what-now/]
The United States canceled a scheduled maritime freedom of navigation

operation (FONOP) in the South China Sea, a government source told the Wall
Street Journal. According to a report published in the Journal Tuesday evening,
in a bid to lower the temperature in the South China Sea while still
demonstrating resolve to China over possibly intensifying activities near
Scarborough Shoal, the United States chose not to hold a freedom of
navigation operation this month and instead carried out air patrols near
Scarborough Shoal. As I discussed earlier this month, the reported freedom of
navigation operation in April would have been the third since the United
States began challenging excessive maritime claims in the Spratly and
Paracel Islands. One operation was held in October 2015, in the Spratly
Islands, and another in January 2016, in the Paracels. The circumstances
surrounding the cancellation of the operation arent fully known, but
it is likely that the United States wanted to manage the diplomatic
fallout with China in the South China Sea. Instead of another FONOP,
which would have drawn a negative reaction from the Chinese foreign
ministry, as previous operations in the South China Sea have, the Obama
administration chose to signal its support for the Philippines. U.S. Defense
Secretary Ashton Carter was in the Philippines earlier this month. As my
colleague Prashanth Parameswaran discussed in some detail, among other
things, Carters visit was the first high-level U.S. official visit to the countrya
U.S. allysince the activation of the Enhanced Defense Cooperation
Agreement (EDCA), which will allow U.S. forces rotational access to
Philippines bases. Additionally, Carter became the first defense secretary to
observe the bilateral U.S.-Philippine Balikatan exercises. The other bit of
context here is the growing concern in the United States that China could
begin land reclamation activities at Scarborough Shoal in earnest soon.
Scarborough Shoal was famously seized by China in 2012, after a highly
publicized stand-of with the Philippines, which previously administered the
waters around the feature. (See a more detailed discussion of the history and
circumstances of possible Scaraborough Shoal reclamation in my post earlier
this week.) With the cancellation of the FONOP, Washington diverted its
energies toward three diferent air patrols near Scarborough in recent days,
according to the Journals report. U.S. A-10 Thunderbolt fighters and HH-60
Pave Hawk helicopters were deployed from Clark Air Force base in the
Philippines. The U.S. Navys freedom of navigation program includes airspace
Specific Links
1
assertions. The cancellation of a scheduled freedom of navigation operation
undermines earlier pledges by senior U.S. officials, including Defense
Secretary Ashton Carter, that the patrols would become a regular occurrence
in the South China Sea. The move also suggests that tensions between
the Pentagon and the White House continue to persist over just how
much of a cost the United States is willing to bear in the South China
Sea with regard to its broader bilateral relationship with China. No
doubt, the Scarborough Shoal overflights shortly after the Balikatan exercise
with the Philippines had a desirable efect for the United States: They showed
Washingtons resolve to Manila. (The two allies recently revealed the
commencement of joint patrols in the South China Sea.) A reaction from the
Chinese foreign ministry earlier this week to the flights near Scarborough
Shoal was surprisingly muted. Hua Chunying, a spokesperson for the Chinese
foreign ministry, noted that It is nothing strange for relevant planes to fly
outside airspace adjacent to Huangyan Dao, using the Chinese name for
Scarborough Shoal. Yet there is something unnatural with the high-profile
hyping up of such a flight, and the reason why they did this is questionable,
she added. The Chinese foreign ministry hasnt issued any further statements
as of this writing; Huas reaction to the Scarborough fly-overs can be
juxtaposed with the reactions from Beijing to the October 2015 and January
2016 FONOPs. The Chinese defense ministrys statement was more forthright,
using language similar to what wed seen in the aftermath of FONOPs in the
Spratlys and Paracels. The Huangyan island is Chinas inherent territory and
the Chinese military will take all necessary measures to safeguard national
sovereignty and security, it said. The ministry added that China opposes
such actions by the U.S. which threaten sovereignty and security of
countries around the South China Sea and undermine regional peace and
stability. Echoing what has become a refrain in recent Chinese statements
on U.S. activities in the South China Sea, the defense ministry said the U.S.
is promoting militarization of the South China Sea in the name of Freedom of
Navigation. From Washingtons perspective, cancelling the FONOP might not
have been all that bad. After all, the post-Balikatan air patrols near
Scarborough have a similar signaling efect toward China, all while reassuring
the Philippines, an important U.S. ally. Moreover, Chinas response to the
Scarborough fly-overs suggests that Beijing is treating them as it would a
FONOP. The defense ministrys statement, in particular, uses language seen
previously in the aftermath of both the October 2015 and January 2016
FONOPs. For an administration thats highly sensitive to expending too much
bilateral diplomatic capital too quickly in the South China Sea, focusing on
Scarborough may have been a more appealing option given the
circumstances. I do worry, however, that Washingtons cancellation of a
scheduled FONOP may be more deleterious in the long run than the Obama
administration may think. The administration has claimedcorrectlythat the
U.S. Navys freedom of navigation program is a fairly mundane, regular, and
universal activity. It isnt something directed at China; indeed, previous
FONOPs have protested excessive claims by other South China Sea claimants
as well. Calling of an operation undermines this narrative and imbues
FONOPs with a special sort of signaling value.
Specific Links
North Korea Specific Link

Diplomacy with China over North Korea destroys
diplomatic capital
Cohen, March 2016 [Michael, Senior Lecturer in the Department of Security

Studies and Criminology at Macquarie University, China: Between U.S.
Sanctions and North Korea, march 21, http://nationalinterest.org/blog/the-
buzz/china-between-us-sanctions-north-korea-15551]
The U.S. Ambassador to the United Nations, Samantha Power, lauded China
last week for joining Washington in what is probably the toughest response
North Korea has faced in twenty years. But such praise may well have been
premature. Last week, Chinese foreign ministry spokesman Lu Kang said
Beijing opposed any unilateral punishments against North Korea. Indeed,
some evidence suggests that Pyongyang siphoned of tens of millions of
dollars through a Singaporean branch of China's biggest bank to evade the
sanctions and conceal payments for arms and luxury goods for the regime.
The grim reality is that Kim Jong-il and Kim Jong-un decided that North Korea
must have nuclear weapons, and that China has thus far decided that, as far
as Beijing is concerned, the benefits of that program outweigh the costs.
China has made many pledges on North Korean sanctions in the past, but has
always failed to honor them and to systematically enforce its commitments.
On the benefit side of the ledger, a nuclear North Korea increases the cost
and improbability of any U.S.-South Korean move against North Korea, and
keeps a regime friendly to Beijing on its doorstep. Perhaps just as
importantly, a nuclear North Korea impedes U.S. power projection on
the Korean peninsula and saps U.S. diplomatic and political
resources that cannot be directed to other areas such as the South
China Sea. Beijing deeply opposes the sanctioning of anybody using North
Korean slave labor. China may be keeping the regime afloat through its
provision of economic and military resourcesbetter after all to feed North
Koreans in North Korea than risk a massive refugee exodus into China if the
regime collapsesand can rationally justify this as a good investment on
these grounds.
2NC/1NR Extensions
2NC/1NR AT #1Cant Speculate

on Trumps Agenda
They say We dont know what Trumps Foreign Policy plans are yet,
but
1. Extend our Beauchamp & Aleem- Dec 18th evidence.
Its much better than their _____________evidence because:
facts)
to be true)
their argument)

The Beauchamps &Aleem evidence says that Trump sees China as a
threat and as a result has become friendly with Putin in order to
align himself with an ally to help lessen Chinas dominance in the
region.
______________________________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________
2. Trumps recent appointments show his agenda is geared

toward diplomacy with Russia
2NC/1NR Extensions
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FOREIGN POLICY ASSOCIATION, DECEMBER 15TH, 2016 [James Nadeau, European afairs
advisor and foreign policy analyst currently based in Brussels, Belgium and has been featured in The Kyiv
Post and the Hill, http://foreignpolicyblogs.com/2016/12/15/trump-courting-russia-contain-china/]
On December 13, Donald Trump nominated ExxonMobil CEO Rex Tillerson for
Secretary of State. Tillersons nomination raised questions on whether the top
executive of one of the worlds largest corporations (5th largest by market
cap, to be exact) can put the American national interest above business
interests. Questions of incompatibility aside, what weighs even heavier are
the accusations of Tillersons connections to Russian President Vladimir Putin.
Trumps pick is the most recent of many controversial choices for top jobs in
his administration. The President-elects inner circle has long been accused of
harboring pro-Putin and pro-Russian attitudes reflected in their cabinet picks
and associates.
For example, former Trump campaign manager Paul Manafort has
been investigated by the FBI over connections to a high-ranking pro-Russian
politician in Ukraine, from whom he allegedly received a $12.7 million cash
payment. Future Trump national security advisor General Michael
Flynn attended a dinner in Moscow in 2015 and was seated at Putins
table, while long-time Trump supporter Roger Stone admitted to having had
back channel communication with Wikileaks head Julian Assange.
Stone boasted on Twitter that Hillary campaign chairman John Podesta would
have some time in the barrel, and Podestas emails were hacked by Russian
groups and then posted on Wikileaks. Trump himself has on multiple
occasions showered Putin with praise, a favor that was reciprocated by the
Russian President.
At the same time Trump is cozying up to Russia, he is taking an increasingly
rougher tone with China. As he has made abundantly clear while on the
campaign trail, he considers China a seriousif not the most seriousthreat
to the United States.
3. Trump is pushing for less diplomatic engagement with China

and more with Russia. Involvement with China directly trades-
off with Russia.
KOHLMANN, DECEMBER 29TH, 2016 [Thomas Kohlmann, writer for Deutsche

Welle newspaper, interviewing Thomas Jger, Professor of international and
foreign politics at the University of Cologne http://www.dw.com/en/can-trump-
contain-china-with-russias-help/a-36935856]
2NC/1NR Extensions
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DW: By picking hawkish China critic Peter Navarro to lead the newly
established White House National Trade Council, what is Donald Trump trying
to achieve?
Thomas Jger: Navarro's nomination proves that Trump wants to reshape and
redesign policies rather than adapting to the changing situations. The
incoming US administration says it wants to take a new path in foreign policy.
The president-elect's team won't be as cautious in its business with China as
the Obama administration. Trump believes that the US governments have
emboldened Beijing, which now dominates international trade policies.
Will Trump start a trade war with China?
What we can say for sure is the US won't remain passive anymore. The US
under Trump will redefine its relationship with Russia and try to contain China
with Moscow's help. Trump will also strengthen ties with China's neighboring
countries in the Pacific. This would be an enormous economic and political
containment of China.
Are you saying that rapprochement with Russia and aggression toward China
is part of the same US foreign policy?
I think so. If Trump succeeds in reshaping US relations with Russia, China will
come under pressure. Then Beijing is likely to negotiate and could give up its
claims on the South China Sea or ofer trade concessions. We should keep in
mind that an aggressive economic policy played a big role in the US' "victory"
over the Soviet Union.
Are we in for a complete paradigm shift?
It looks possible. Maybe, it won't come to this. It also depends on how
Moscow and Beijing react to Trump's policies. But it is pretty obvious that
Trump and his team are pursuing a policy of being tough with China and easy
with Russia at this point.
2NC/1NR Extensions
2NC/1NR AT #2Trump wont be

Distracted
They say Trump wont be de-railed from solving the Syrian conflict
with Russia, but
1 Extend our Hill 16 evidence.
Its much better than their Macleod evidence because:
facts)
to be true)
( ) (their evidence supports our
argument)

If the US works with China, Russia will not see US as a strategic
partner anymore because of their diplomatic engagement with
China. Russia will only work with the US because they see the US as
a strategic partner to help increase their economy and regional
presence. If the US works with China, Russia will not see diplomacy
with the US as beneficial.
Their MacLeod card says that the Status Quo involvement with
Russia solves the Syrian conflict because current Russian-US
approach to diplomatic solutions are working. The affirmatives plan
causes a shift in current Trump diplomatic engagement, causing the
impacts.
2NC/1NR Extensions
2 Link: Trumps current strategy of getting close to Russia gets

derailed if he turns toward China
NADEAU, DECEMBER 15TH, 2016 [James Nadeau, European afairs advisor and foreign policy
analyst and has been featured in The Kyiv Post and the Hill,
http://foreignpolicyblogs.com/2016/12/15/trump-courting-russia-contain-china/]
Stone boasted on Twitter that Hillary campaign chairman John Podesta would
have some time in the barrel, and Podestas emails were hacked by Russian
groups and then posted on Wikileaks. Trump himself has on multiple
occasions showered Putin with praise, a favor that was reciprocated by the
Russian President.
At the same time Trump is cozying up to Russia, he is taking an increasingly
rougher tone with China. As he has made abundantly clear while on the
campaign trail, he considers China a seriousif not the most seriousthreat
to the United States.
First and foremost, he identified China as an economic threat, bent on
undermining Americas global economic pre-eminence by inventing the
concept of global warming in order to reduce the competitiveness of U.S.
manufacturing. He also repeatedly blasted China for taking our jobs
and accused the Middle Kingdom of illegal dumping. Add to that the fact
that Trump reversed in early December decades of established U.S. policy
towards China by accepting a congratulatory call from Taiwanese leader Tsai
Ing-wen. After the call, he openly called into question Americas adherence to
Chinas One China policy.
If Trump advisors are indeed right, and the phone call with Taiwan was long
planned, then the President-elects reasoning behind staffing the White House
with pro-Russian hacks becomes quite clear: breaking apart the budding
Moscow-Beijing alliance.
Seen in this light, aligning with Russia is not an expression of subservience to
Vladimir Putin, but instead a strategic calculus of the Trump administration
meant to contain China. Due to geographical proximity and historical
animosity, Russia and China are acutely aware of the threat they pose to
each other. In Trumps view, faced with a revisionist Beijing, Moscow and
Washington are natural allies.
China has always been suspicious of Russias intentions, because Moscow
remains firmly anchored in the West. In the words of a Chinese academic, If
the next U.S. president shows more respect to Russia and is less tough
2NC/1NR Extensions
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toward Moscow, the Kremlins turn to the East will very likely swing to the
West.
It seems that time has come. While Trump has indicated that he is hoping for
more engagement against China from regional allies, especially Japan, some
of Americas allies no longer seem to be inclined to follow Washingtons lead.
When the Australian government declined to comment on Trumps overtures
to Taiwan, citing national interest as justification, eyebrows were raised in
astonishment. But when looking at the economic data it makes sense:
Australia is the developed worlds most-China dependent economy, owing
much of its 25 years of uninterrupted economic growth to Beijings booming
demand for commodities.
This helps to explain a string of pro-Chinese decisions taken by Malcolm
Turnbull, from agreeing to a 99-year Chinese lease of parts of the Port of
Darwin to rejecting a $40 billion Japanese bid to build Australias new
submarine fleet. With China being the most important trading partner for
Australia, it appears that Beijing has made its influence in Australia stick. For
incoming Secretary of State Rex Tillerson, Chinas growing clout in Australia
and across the Asia-Pacific will make strengthening U.S. alliances with trusted
allies like Japan a priority.
For both the U.S. and Russia, strategic alignment is a way to keep the
looming China threat in check. While Trump will likely disengage from Europe,
he is likely to continue to focus on the Asia-Pacific and Chinas containment.
Thus, the strategic encirclement that China suspected the U.S. would pursue
under Obamas pivot to Asia will continue, albeit in an altered form not
primarily via the control of Pacific island chains by the U.S. and its allies, but
through Beijings immediate neighbor, Russia.
2NC/1NR Extensions
2NC/1NR AT #3Diplomacy Fails

They say Diplomatic talks fail , but
1. Extend our evidence from THE HILL.

Its much better than their Foreign Policy evidence because:

facts)
(their evidence is not logical/contradicts itself) (history proves it to be true)
(their evidence has no facts) (Their author is biased) (it takes into account their
argument)
Their Foreign Policy evidence says that diplomacy will fail because Russia
isnt fighting ISIS enough now. However, their evidence doesnt account for
Trumps new diplomatic capital with Russia, which will bring them to the
negotiating table.
This matters because: If we continue focusing on Russia, theyll work

toward a ceasefire in Syria and help us beat ISIS. Our internal link is true
and we can prevent ISIS from using nuclear weapons.
2 Trump and Putin will work together to solve the Syrian conflict.
NEW YORK TIMES, NOVEMBER 14TH, 2016 [Javier C. Hernndez,

https://www.bostonglobe.com/news/world/2016/11/14/trump-makes-first-overtures-china-
russia/FvvDconeMnMZ36KsPEPI0M/story.html]
2NC/1NR Extensions
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Russian President Vladimir Putin called Trump Monday to ofer congratulations.
Trumps transition office said the president-elect is very much looking forward to
having a strong and enduring relationship with Russia and the people of Russia.
The Kremlin said Putin also expressed Russias readiness to establish a partner-like
dialogue with the new administration on the basis of equality, mutual respect, and
noninterference in domestic relations, the Associated Press reported.
During the call, the two leaders discussed a range of issues including the threats
and challenges facing the United States and Russia, strategic economic issues, and
the historical US-Russia relationship that dates back over 200 years, it said.
In its statement on the phone call, the Kremlin added that both Putin and Trump
agreed that the US-Russian ties are in extremely unsatisfactory condition now.
They spoke for active joint work to normalize ties and engage in constructive
cooperation on a broad range of issues, it said, adding that Putin and Trump
emphasized the need to develop trade and economic cooperation to give a strong
basis to US-Russia relations.
Putin and Trump also agreed on the need to combine eforts in the fight against their
No. 1 enemy international terrorism and extremism and discussed the
settlement of the Syrian crisis in that context, according to the Kremlin.
It said that Putin and Trump agreed to continue phone contacts and to plan a
personal meeting in the future.
Trump said during the presidential campaign that he wants to be friends with Russia
and join forces in the fight against the Islamic State, yet he outlined few specifics as
to how he would go about it.
3 Thousands are dying in Syria and diplomacy is the

only answerit has historically worked in Europe
CHOMSKY, MAY 2016 [Noam, American linguist, philosopher, cognitive scientist, historian,
logician, social critic, and political activist, M.I.T. professor, Noam Chomsky's Simple 2-Step Solution to
Minimize the Atrocities in Syria, May 19, http://www.alternet.org/world/noam-chomsky-syria-conflict-cut-
flow-arms-stop-bombing-stem-atrocities]
NOAM CHOMSKY: Syria is spiraling into real disaster, a virtual suicide.

And the only sensible approach, the only slim hope, for Syria is eforts to
reduce the violence and destruction, to establish small regional ceasefire
zones and to move toward some kind of diplomatic settlement. There are
steps in that direction. Also, its necessary to cut of the flow of arms, as
much as possible, to everyone. That means to the vicious and brutal Assad
regime, primarily Russia and Iran, to the monstrous ISIS, which has been
getting support tacitly through Turkey, throughto the al-Nusra Front, which
is hardly diferent, has just thethe al-Qaeda affiliate, technically broke from
it, but actually the al-Qaeda affiliate, which is now planning its ownsome
sort of emirate, getting arms from our allies, Qatar and Saudi Arabia. Our own
the CIA is arming them. We dont know at what level; its clandestine. As
much as possible, cut back the flow of arms, the level of violence, try to save
2NC/1NR Extensions
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people from destruction. There should be far more support going simply for
humanitarian aid. Those who are building some sort of a society in Syria
notably, the Kurdsshould be supported in that efort. These eforts should
be made to cut of the flow of jihadis from the places where theyre coming
from. And that means understanding why its happening. Its not enough just
to say, "OK, lets bomb them to oblivion." This is happening for reasons.
Some of the reasons, unfortunately, arewe cant reverse. The U.S. invasion
of Iraq was a major reason in the development, a primary reason in the
incitement of sectarian conflicts, which have now exploded into these
monstrosities. Thats water under the bridge, unfortunately, though we can
make sure not to do thatnot to continue with that. But we may like it or not,
but ISIS, the ISIL, whatever you want to call it, does have popular support
even among people who hate it. The Sunnimuch of the Sunni population of
Iraq and Syria evidently regards it as better than the alternative, something
which at least defends them from the alternative. From the Western
countries, the flow of jihadis is primarily from young people who arewho
live in conditions of humiliation, degradation, repression, and want something
decentwant some dignity in their lives, want something idealistic. Theyre
picking the wrong horse, by a large margin, but you can understand what
theyre aiming for. And theres plenty of research and studiesScott Atran
and others have worked on this and have plenty of evidence about it. And
thosealleviating and dealing with those real problems can be a way to
reduce the level of violence and destruction. Its much more dramatic to say,
"Lets carpet bomb them," or "Lets bomb them to oblivion," or "Lets send in
troops." But that simply makes the situation far worse. Actually, weve seen it
for 15 years. Just take a look at the so-called war on terror, which George W.
Bush declaredactually, redeclared; Reagan had declared itbut redeclared
in 2001. At that point, jihadi terrorism was located in a tiny tribal area near
the Afghan-Pakistan border. Where isand since then, weve been hitting one
or another center of what we call terrorism with a sledgehammer. Whats
happened? Each time, it spreads. By now, its all over the world. Its all over
Africa, Southeast Asia, South Asia, everywhere you look. Take the bombing of
Libya, which Hillary Clinton was strongly in favor of, one of the leaders of,
smashed up Libya, destroyed a functioning society. The bombing sharply
escalated the level of atrocities by a large factor, devastated the country, left
it in the hands of warring militias, opened the door for ISIS to establish a
base, spread jihadis and heavy weapons all through Africa, in fact, into the
Middle East. Last year, theaccording to U.N. statistics, the worst terror in
the world was in West Africa, Boko Haram and others, to a considerable
extent an ofshoot of the bombing of Libya. Thats what happens when you
hit vulnerable systems with a sledgehammer, not knowing what youre doing
and not looking at the roots of where these movements are developing from.
So you have to understand theunderstand where its coming from, where
the appeal lies, what the roots arethere are often quite genuine grievances
at the same time try to cut back the level of violence. And, you know, weve
had experience where things like this worked. Take, say, IRA terrorism. It was
pretty severe. Now, they practically murdered the whole British Cabinet at
one point. As long as Britain responded to IRA terrorism with more terror and
2NC/1NR Extensions
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violence, it simply escalated. As soon as Britain finally beganincidentally,
with some helpful U.S. assistance at this pointin paying some attention to
the actual grievances of Northern Irish Catholics, as soon as they started with
that, violence subsided, reduced. People who had been called leading
terrorists showed up on negotiating teams, even, finally, in the government. I
happened to be in Belfast in 1993. It was a war zone, literally. I was there
again a couple of years ago. It looks like any other city. You can see ethnic
antagonisms, but nothing terribly out of the ordinary. Thats the way to deal
with these issues. Incidentally, whats happening in Syria right now is
horrendous, but we shouldntuseful to remember that its not the first time.
If you go back a century, almost exactly a century, the end of the First World
War, there were hundreds of thousands of people starving to death in Syria.
Proportionally, proportional to the population, its likely that more Syrians
died in the First World War than any other belligerent. Syria did revive, and it
can revive again.
4 Iran is a major player and they support the talks
TASNIM NEWS AGENCY, MAY 2016 [Major Iranian news outlet, Diplomacy Only
Solution to Syria Crisis: Irans Deputy FM,
http://www.tasnimnews.com/en/news/2016/05/07/1068234/diplomacy-only-solution-to-syria-crisis-iran-s-
deputy-fm]
TEHRAN (Tasnim) Iranian Deputy Foreign Minister for Arab and African
Afairs Hossein Amir Abdollahian stressed that the Syrian crisis should be
resolved only through a political approach. "We believe it is necessary to push
forward the political process, and the Geneva talks are the only way to
resolve the Syrian issue," Amir Abdollahian told Sputnik recently after a
meeting with Russias Deputy Foreign Minister Mikhail Bogdanov in Moscow.
He further reaffirmed Irans support for the Syrian government and nation in
their fight against terrorist groups. "We will continue to support Assad and the
Syrian people in their struggle against terrorism, and we will make eforts to
ensure that political negotiations are successful," Amir Abdollahian said.
2NC/1NR Extensions
2NC/1NR AT #4Fix Tough Issues

First
They say __________________________________________________, but

facts)
to be true)
their argument)

______________________________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________________________
2NC/1NR Extensions
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2 Diplomatic Capital is limitedadding other issues
makes doing both impossible
ANDERSON AND GREWELL, 2001 [Terry, Senior fellow at Hoover Institute; and Bishop,
Research associate @ Political Economy Research Center; It Isn't Easy Being Green: Environmental Policy
Implications for Foreign Policy, International Law, and Sovereignty," Chicago Journal of International Law,
Fall 2001, 2 Chi. J. Int'l L. 427, Nexis]
Foreign policy is a bag of goods that includes issues from free trade to arms
trading to human rights. Each new issue in the bag weighs it down, lessening
the focus on other issues and even creating conflicts between issues.
Increased environmental regulations could cause countries to lessen their
focus on international threats of violence, such as the sale of ballistic missiles
or border conflicts between nations. As countries must watch over more and
more issues arising in the international policy arena, they will stretch the
resources necessary to deal with traditional international issues. As Schaefer
writes, "Because diplomatic currency is finite... it is critically
important that the United States focus its diplomatic efforts on
issues of paramount importance to the nation. Traditionally, these
priorities have been opposing hostile domination of key geographic regions,
supporting our allies, securing vital resources, and ensuring access to foreign
economies."40
2NC/1NR Extensions
2NC/1NR AT #5 ISIS Threat

Exaggerated
They say the ISIS threat is exaggerated, but

facts)
to be true)
their argument)

______________________________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________________________
2NC/1NR Extensions
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2 ISIS can get access to nuclear material and make
havoc
Tucker, March 2016 [Patrick, deputy editor for The Futurist. Tucker has written
about emerging technology in Slate, The Sun, MIT Technology Review, Wilson
Quarterly, The American Legion Magazine, BBC News Magazine, Utne Reader,
3/29, http://www.defenseone.com/technology/2016/03/nuclear-armed-isis-its-
not-farfetched-expert-say/127039/?oref=d-river]
The murder of a security guard at a Belgian nuclear facility just two days after
the Brussels attacks, coupled with evidence that Islamic State operatives had
been watching researchers there, has re-ignited fears about ISIS and nuclear
terrorism. Some experts, including ones cited by the New York Times and
others, dismiss the possibility that ISIS could make even a crude nuclear
bomb. But Matthew Bunn, the co-principal investigator at the Project on
Managing the Atom at Harvards Belfer Center, says that the threat is quite
real. Belgium has seen numerous suspicious events related to nuclear
material and facilities. In August 2014, a worker at the Doel-4 nuclear power
reactor opened a valve and drained a turbine of lubricant. The valve wasnt
near any nuclear material, but the act caused at least $100 million in damage
and perhaps twice that. Later, Belgian authorities discovered that a man
named Ilyass Boughalab had left his job at Doel-4 to join the Islamic State in
Syria. (His last background check was 2009.) In November, shortly after the
Paris attacks, Belgian authorities arrested a man named Mohammed Bakkali
and discovered that he had video surveillance footage of an expert at
Belgians SCK-CEN nuclear research facility in Mol. It now seems that the
footage was collected by Ibrahim and Khalid el-Bakraoui, two of the suicide
bombers in the recent Brussels attacks. Then on March 24, a guard was found
shot at Belgiums national radioactive elements institute at Fleurus. A Belgian
prosecutor declared the death unrelated to terrorism and denied reports that
the guards security pass had been stolen and hastily de-activated. No matter
what happened at Fleurus, mounting evidence points to ISISs intention
to cause nuclear havoc, whether by damaging a nuclear facility,
spiking a conventional bomb with radioactive materials, or even
building a fission bomb with highly enriched uranium. The first concern
is that sabotage could create a Fukushima-like environment in central Europe.
But to pull that of, Bunn writes in a blog post obtained prior to publication by
Defense One, militants, criminals or terrorists would need a lot of specialized
knowledge of the plants security features and measures and how to defeat
them. ust before the most recent attack in Belgium, SCK-CEN deployed armed
troops to Belgiums four nuclear sites. Dirty Bombs But beefing up security at
explicitly nuclear sites still leaves a lot of radioactive material less well
protected. Radiological materials are available in many locations where they
2NC/1NR Extensions
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would be much easier to steal, in hospitals, industrial sites, and more, than
at the SCK-CEN center, Bunn wrote Such materials can allow a terrorist to
turn a regular-size blast into a catastrophe that renders an entire area
essentially poisonous, greatly increasing the costs of cleanup and the long-
term danger to survivors, first responders, etc. In 1987, four people died in
the Brazilian city of Goinia from exposure to cesium salt, derived from
junked medical equipment. Bunn points to a recent report from the Nuclear
Threat Initiative, which notes that the material to make a dirty bomb exists in
tens of thousands of radiological sources located in more than 100 countries
around the world. In 2013 and 2014, there were 325 incidents of radioactive
materials being lost, stolen, or in some way unregulated or uncontrolled,
according to the report, which cites estimates from the James Martin Center
for Nonproliferation. One material of particular concern is Cesium-137, or Cs-
137. A byproduct of fission thats commonly used in radiation cancer
therapy,it exists in many places much less well protected than SCK-CEN,
Bunn writes. The ultimate nightmare takes the form of a nuclear bomb
composed of highly enriched uranium. Bunn wrote that stealing highly
enriched uranium from SCK-CEN would have been very difficult for the
Brussels suicide bombers. And yet, he wrote, The Times story largely
dismissed wrongly, in my view the idea that the HEU at SCK-CEN might
have been the terrorists ultimate objective, saying that the idea that
terrorists could get such material and make a crude nuclear bomb seems far-
fetched to many experts. Citing a recent Belfer Center report, he wrote,
repeated government studies, in the United States and elsewhere, have
concluded that this is not far-fetched. One key passage in the report ofered
this insight, that according to the International Atomic Energy Agency, 13
incidents of the illegal possession, sale, or movement of highly enriched
uranium occurred between 1993-2014. None of those involved material over
a kilogram, not nearly enough to build a nuclear bomb. But Incidents
involving attempts to sell nuclear or other radioactive material indicate that
there is a perceived demand for such material. The number of successful
transactions is not known and therefore it is difficult to accurately
characterize an illicit nuclear market. Its hard to tell how successful an
assault on a facility like SCK-CEN would be if attempted by two lone gunmen,
even if they had kidnapped an expert. But ISISs attraction to nuclear
material, and perhaps even a nuclear bomb, seems to be growing.
3 Even if ISIS cant get nuclear weapons the Syrian

conflict kills 440 people a daythis humanitarian
crisis 100% probable and must be stopped
2NC/1NR Extensions
1
Vox World News, February 2016 [Major global news outlet, Syria's
ceasefire: what it means and doesn't, February 11,
http://www.vox.com/2016/2/11/10975722/syria-ceasefire-munich]
The Syrian war, it is important to remember, primarily matters for the vast
and terrible human sufering it causes. The violence has killed an estimated
470,000 people, or 2 percent of the population. That number just a year and
a half ago was 250,000, meaning about 440 people die every day. Beyond
that, Syrians sufer mass displacement and face extreme poverty, disease
outbreaks, and hunger. The city of Aleppo is facing potential mass starvation
under a siege by Assad regime forces. This is not going to end the world's
worst ongoing war, substantially alleviate the word's worst humanitarian
crisis, or change the fundamental calculus by which the war is a stalemate
likely doomed to last years. But just a single day of expanded humanitarian
access or of ceasefire is thus a welcome reprieve for Syrians. It is not peace,
and it is not justice, but it's something.
2NC/1NR Extensions

________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________

________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________
D. Turns the Case: Our impact causes their impact because:
________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________
2NC/1NR Extensions
2NC/1NR AT #7 Diplomats Fill In

They say No trade-off and the US can hire more diplomats, but
1. Extend our evidence from The Hill
Its much better than their GAO evidence because:
facts)
their argument)

Our evidence from The Hill is over a decade newer than their
evidence. We have no idea how diplomatic hiring has changed since
then. Also, it would take time to hire diplomats and we need to do
diplomatic talks against ISIS now!
This matters because: the judge should defer to us on the most
logical and newest evidence. We are winning that China policy would
trade off with Russian diplomacy and cause our impact which would
result in a large death toll.
2 US diplomacy cant have more than one primary priority
SCHAEFFER, 2000 [Brett, Fellow in the Center for International Trade at

Heritage Foundation; The Greening of U.S. Foreign Policy; p.46]
Diplomacy is the first option in addressing potential threats to U.S. national

interests and expressing U.S. concerns and priorities to foreign nations. The
daily conduct of diplomacy through U.S. missions and representatives is
essential in articulating U.S. interests and eliciting cooperation and support
for those interests abroad. Because diplomatic currency is finiteclearly,
foreign countries and officials cannot be expected to endlessly
support and promote U.S. concernsit is critically important that the
United States focus its diplomatic efforts on issues of paramount
importance to the nation. Traditionally, these priorities had been opposing
2NC/1NR Extensions
1
hostile domination of key geographic regions, supporting our allies, securing
vital resources, and ensuring access to foreign economies (Holmes and Moore
1996, xi-xvii).
CDL Core Files 2016-2017 Diplomatic Capital (Jan 2017 Update)
2AC AFF Answers

Diplomatic Capital
Update)
2AC AFF Answers
2AC Diplomatic Capital

Disadvantage Answers
1 NO INTERNAL LINK: WE CANT PREDICT ANYTHING ABOUT
TRUMPS FOREIGN POLICY BECAUSE HIS CABINET IS DIVIDED
AND TRUMP HAS NO KNOWLEDGE TO DIRECT DIPLOMACY
SLATE, DECEMBER 23RD, 2016 (prominent online news magazine, Fred Kaplan,
http://www.slate.com/articles/news_and_politics/war_stories/2016/12/trump_s_inexperience_and_a_squabbl
ing_cabinet_could_leave_u_s_foreign_policy.html)
Judging from Donald Trumps Cabinet picks, the president-elects foreign policy is
likely to be in shamblesthe product more of internecine squabbles (and who wins
which ones) than of any thought-through strategy.
For this reason, many of his actual policies, or even the way theyre formed, are at
this point unpredictable. Because his national security team seems ill-suited to
settling squabbles, many decisionsprobably more than the president-elect imagines
will have to be made by Trump himself. And because Trump has no grounding
whatsoever in these sorts of issues, that makes the course of the coming years more
unpredictable still.
Most administrations, especially in the beginning, are racked with internecine

disputes, reflecting the institutional interests of the departments of State, Defense,
Treasury, and so forth. But the likely disputes in the Trump administration will be
rooted less in bureaucratic politics than in the strong personalities of the Cabinet
secretaries, based on their well-rewarded life-experiences.
Trumps secretaries have no allegiances to the departments theyll be running. (His

pick as secretary of state, Rex Tillerson, has contempt for the Foggy Bottom
pinstripes who tried to block his grand schemes as Exxon Mobils CEO.) Global
moguls, three- and four-star generals, hedge-fund billionairesquite apart from their
respective merits or lack thereof, these personality types are not accustomed to
deference on matters in which they have strong interest or the slightest pretense of
knowledge.
2. NO LINK China will not distract Trump from focusing

on the Middle East with Russia and he will defer to
Russian diplomacy in Syria.
MACLEOD, DEC 15TH, 2016 [Alasdair, stockbroker since 1970, consultant at many ofshore
institutions, and was an Executive Director at an ofshore bank in Guernsey and Jersey, Even before he
2AC AFF Answers
takes office, President-elect Trump is turning the world upside down,

https://wealth.goldmoney.com/research/goldmoney-insights/trump-russia-and-china]
Rather like super-tankers that need seven miles to stop, regional powers are also
finding it hard to adjust to these new realities, but adjust they surely will. European
governments and NATO members will have had background briefings, but the normal
channels for this, the CIA, the US Military advisers and American diplomats are not on
Trumps page, so confusion still reigns. But one thing is becoming clear: Trump will
not be diverted from a general policy of dtente and de-escalation of military
presence in both Europe and the Middle East.
The process of dtente is reasonably predictable. A summit with Russia to agree

strategic arms limitations (called SALT3 perhaps?) is a proven path to follow. It should
be a step-by-step process scheduled over five or ten years, with pre-agreed
conditions designed to satisfy concerns in the Baltic States and Poland that Russia
might attempt border-creep. For their part the Russians must agree Ukraines
independence (excepting the Crimea, Donetsk and Luhansk, which should be formally
ceded to Russia). Ukraine and Belorussia will be independent bufer states between
Russia and the European Union. Under a SALT3 both NATO and Russia will agree to a
phased withdraw of all military hardware other than limited ground troops and their
associated equipment.
In the Middle East, America will concede that Syria remains in the Russian sphere of
influence, and will withdraw all support for rebel organisations. This is no more than
reality. China, doubtless, will help in the physical reconstruction of Syria in due
course. Agreement will be sought as to the means of destroying Daesh. Beyond that,
a reduced American presence in the region will continue to ensure security for Israel
and the Gulf states. Already, the British have announced they will step up their
presence in the region, which should also contribute to regional stability.
Iran should be persuaded by Russia to take a more constructive approach to peace

with Sunni states, such as Saudi Arabia, and towards Israel. This could be difficult, but
should be possible, given Iran has become considerably more moderate since the
days of Ahmadinejad, particularly if the right tone from America is forthcoming. Irans
days of hiding from western sanctions behind Russia will be over, and should be
replaced with an emphasis on trade. And Saudi Arabia can no longer aford to wage
wars, such as that in the Yemen, contributing to a less belligerent outcome.
All this is practical, possible and predictable. Behind the change in geopolitical reality
for the Middle East is the fact that Peak Oil is being pushed further into the future.
Not only are large new oil fields still being discovered (such as the Kashagan Field in
the north of the Caspian Sea), but modern technology is bringing other forms of
ecologically-friendly energy supplies on stream and higher prices will unlock shale oil
supplies. The strategic importance of the Middle East has therefore declined,
particularly since insignificant quantities of oil from the region go to America. And
with that decline goes less need for geostrategic intervention by the US.
For the first time since the Six Day War in 1967 there is a realistic possibility of
stability in the area, assuming the super-powers take a constructive approach to
dtente, and are willing to jointly police the region.
2AC AFF Answers
3. DIPLOMACY FAILS - THE US CANT RELY ON RUSSIA AS A

PARTNER IN FIGHTING ISIS IN SYRIA
FOREIGN POLICY, NOVEMBER 17TH, 2016 (prominent publication on foreign

afairs,
http://foreignpolicy.com/2016/11/17/trumps-syria-strategy-would-be-a-disaster)
Meanwhile, Trumps suggestion to partner with Russia in smashing the Islamic State
is little more than a non sequitur, given Russias near-consistent focus on everything
but the jihadi group. According to recent data monitoring airstrikes across Syria, only
8 percent of areas targeted by Russian airstrikes between Oct. 12 and Nov. 8
belonged to the Islamic State. With only one brief exception the capture of Palmyra
from the jihadi group during an internationally imposed cessation of hostilities the
Kremlins focus has unequivocally and consistently been on fighting Syrias
mainstream opposition, not the Islamic State.
4 Link Turn: Vegetables First! If China is so

challenging, Obama needs to get that off his plate
first. This will be seen as a huge victory and he can
now directly focus on the Middle East.
5. No impact: the ISIS threat is exaggeratedMANY
reasons
Mueller, 2015 [John, senior fellow at the Cato Institute think tank, Why the ISIS threat is totally
overblown, July 23, http://theweek.com/articles/567674/why-isis-threat-totally-overblown]
Outrage at the tactics of ISIS is certainly justified. But fears that it presents a
worldwide security threat are not. Its numbers are small, and it has diferentiated
itself from al Qaeda in that it does not seek primarily to target the "far enemy,"
preferring instead to carve out a state in the Middle East for itself, mostly killing
fellow Muslims who stand in its way. In the process, it has alienated virtually all
outside support and, by holding territory, presents an obvious and clear target to
military opponents. A year ago, the main fear was that foreign militants who had
gone to fight with ISIS would be trained and then sent back to do damage in their
own countries. However, there has been scarcely any of that. In part, this is because,
as Daniel Byman and Jeremy Shapiro have detailed in a Brookings Institution report,
foreign fighters tend to be killed early (they are common picks for suicide missions);
often become disillusioned, especially by in-fighting in the ranks; and do not receive
much in the way of useful training for terrorist exercises back home. It might also be
added that ISIS videos exultantly show foreign fighters burning their passports to
demonstrate their terminal commitment to the cause hardly a good idea if they
want to return. In May 2015, an audio message apparently from the leader of ISIS
exhorted Muslims either to join the ISIS ranks in the Middle East or to fight at home
"wherever that may be." There was nothing about training people to return home to
2AC AFF Answers
wreak havoc. More recently, the focus of fear has shifted from potential returnees to
potential homegrown terrorists who might be inspired by ISIS's propaganda or
example. However, ISIS could continue to be an inspiration even if it was weakened
or destroyed. And, as terrorism specialist Max Abrahms notes, "lone wolves have
carried out just two of the 1,900 most deadly terrorist incidents over the last four
decades." There has also been a trendy concern about the way ISIS uses social
media. However, as Byman and Shapiro and others have pointed out, the foolish
willingness of would-be terrorists to spill their aspirations and their often childish
fantasies on social media has been, on balance, much to the advantage of the police
seeking to track them. However, ISIS's savvy use of social media and its brutality
have had a major impact on two important American groups: public officials and the
media. Sen. Dianne Feinstein has insisted, "The threat ISIS poses cannot be
overstated" efectively proclaiming hyperbole on the subject to be impossible, as
columnist Dan Froomkin observes. Equally inspired, Sen. Jim Inhofe, born before
World War II, has extravagantly claimed that "we're in the most dangerous position
we've ever been in" and that ISIS is "rapidly developing a method of blowing up a
major U.S. city." And on Michael Smerconish's CNN program last weekend, former
Homeland Security chief Tom Ridge issued the evidence-free suggestion that the
recent tragic killings in Chattanooga followed a "directive" from ISIS. The media have
generally been more careful and responsible about such extrapolations, and
sometimes articles appear noting that some American and foreign intelligence
officials think that "the actual danger posed by ISIS has been distorted in hours of
television punditry and alarmist statements by politicians." But the media remain
canny about weaving audience-grabbing references about the arrestingly diabolical
ISIS into any story about terrorism.
6. Impact Calculus:
________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________

________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________
D. Turns the DA: Our impact causes their impact because:
________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________
2AC AFF Answers
7. No Link: There are thousands of diplomats and the US

can hire more
GAO, 2003 (Government Accountability Office, U.S. Public Diplomacy:

State Department Expands Eforts but Faces Significant Challenges: GAO-
03-951., 4 September, GAO-03-951, EBSCO)
To improve the planning, coordination, execution, and assessment of

U.S. public diplomacy eforts, we recommend that the Secretary
of State develop and widely disseminate throughout the department
a strategy that considers the techniques of private sector public
relations firms in integrating all of States public diplomacy eforts and
directing them toward achieving common and measurable objectives;
consider ways to collaborate with the private sector to employ best
practices for measuring eforts to inform and influence target audiences,
including expanded use of opinion research and better use of existing
research; designate more administrative positions to
overseas public afairs sections to reduce the administrative
burden; strengthen eforts to train Foreign Service officers
in foreign languages; and program adequate time for public
diplomacy training into States assignment process.
1AR AFF Extensions
1AR Extensions to 2AC #1: Cant

Predict Trump Foreign Policy
1. EXTEND OUR SLATE EVIDENCE TRUMPS CABINET IS DIVIDED
AND TRUMPS ADMINISTRATION HAS NO FOREIGN POLICY TO SPEAK
OF. PREDICTIONS ARE USELESS.
2. NO INTERNAL LINK: TRUMP HAS NO DIPLOMATIC CAPITAL AND
HIS DEAL-MAKER APPROACH TO FOREIGN POLICY REQUIRES
BUILDING MANY NEW RELATIONSHIPS HIS INEXPERIENCED TEAM
DOESNT HAVE
SLATE, DECEMBER 23RD, 2016 (Fred Kaplan, prominent online news magazine,
http://www.slate.com/articles/news_and_politics/war_stories/2016/12/trump_s_inexperience_and_a_squabbl
ing_cabinet_could_leave_u_s_foreign_policy.html)
Trumps foreign policy team has no such clear orders or direction. Even
Trumps bold slogans dont easily translate into action. For instance, Bomb
the shit out of ISIS! Military officers can produce plans and charts consistent
with that orderbut they will also ask questions (as will Mattis, who is far
more sophisticated than his Mad Dog nickname suggests): What are the
goals of this operation (to destroy ISIS or to degrade it, over how long a
period of time)? What are acceptable risks of civilian damage? What is the
long-term plan after the bombing? The stafs can quantify the risks; Mattis
and the others can ofer recommendations. But Trump will have to decide.
The same is true with his mandate for foreign economic policy: Bring factory
jobs back home! Renegotiate trade deals that hurt American jobs! Penalize
countries that refuse to do so! Again, there will be questions: What kinds of
factory jobs? At what cost in, say, consumer prices? (Apple could build
iPhones in America, but how much more will customers pay for them?) In
these new trade deals, what are we willing to give the other sides in
exchange for their giving us more? These are matters for trade negotiators to
fine-tuneand lets stipulate that Trump hires really skilled negotiators. But
the bottom lines of these bargaining sessions have to be decided, ahead of
time, by Trump.
1AR AFF Extensions
1
Trumps whole approach to deal-making (and Tillersons too) is bilateral
nation to nation, leader to leader, one nation and leader at a time. This may
be fine for real-estate transactions and oil-drilling contracts, but its usually
not fine for deals concerning the broad interests of American security or the
American economy. Given our position as a maritime power with global
interests, we usually do better negotiating multilateral treaties with allies
which requires an entirely diferent approach that seeks consensus more than
profit-maximizing. Some people in Trumps Cabinet understand this as second
nature (for instance, Mattis); others dont (for instance, Tillerson, though he
could learnthe question is whether hell want to).
1AR AFF Extensions
1AR Extensions to 2AC #3:

Diplomacy Fails
1. Extend our 2AC Foreign Policy evidence. Russia has
done nothing to fight ISIS and doesnt want to it only
wants to prop up Syrias government to maintain
influence.
2. NO INTERNAL LINK: ITS IMPOSSIBLE TO PREDICT SECRETARY
OF STATE NOMINEE TILLERSONS ABILITY TO NEGOTIATE WITH RUSSIA
ON SYRIA FOR TWO REASONS FIRST, HE MIGHT NOT EVEN BE
APPROVED BY CONGRESS. SECOND, HE HAS NO EXPERIENCE AND
DOESNT SHARE TRUMPS VISION
SLATE, DECEMBER 13TH, 2016 (prominent online news magazine, Fred Kaplan,
http://www.slate.com/articles/news_and_politics/war_stories/2016/12/rex_tillerson_secretary_of_state_what
_s_good_for_exxon_is_bad_for_the_country.html)
Tillersons unbridled internationalism may serve as a counter to the nativist

protectionism of Trumps rhetoric, but it may go too far the other way. Cultivating
a feel for national interests would require not only an extraordinarily agile mind
but alsoas a first stepsome notion of what national interests are, a concept
that has rarely weighed on the mind of Tillersons boss-to-be, either.
Tillerson is a dealmaker, and Trump likes dealmakers. But the key questions are:
What kind of dealsand made in whose interest? Tillerson has made big deals
with dozens of leaders around the world, and Trump has said hes impressed that
Tillerson knows all the players. But its a fallacy to think that knowing the
players gets you the deal, much less the right kind of deal.
Trump also recently said that his son-in-law, Jared Kushner, could negotiate peace
between Israel and the Palestinians because he knows the players in the
region. I suspect Trump really believes theres a connection (leaving aside the
fact that Kushner is an unknown in the region), but this reveals only how little
Trump knows about Middle Eastern politics, where everybody knows everybody,
yet no peace is in sight. Its true that knowing the playersknowing the right
person to call and knowing something about that person, having done business
with that personcan open doors and get talks going. But familiarity doesnt
1AR AFF Extensions
1
breed the deal. No two diplomats on the planet have a closer personal
relationship than Secretary of State John Kerry and Russian Foreign Minister
Sergei Lavrov. Yet the two of them cant make a deal on Syria because their two
countries, much less the other countries in the region, have conflicting interests.
Even in successes, their friendship was only part of the story: It probably did help
smooth things in the prolonged talks that led to the Iran nuclear deal, but it did
so only because the United States and Russia shared a long-standing interest in
nuclear nonproliferation.
Trump now faces a real challenge in getting this nomination through. The Senate
Foreign Relations Committee, which must confirm the appointment by majority
vote before it even goes to the floor, is stacked with Russia hawks who are very
suspicious of Tillersons close ties to Putin and his opposition to sanctions
especially now, in the aftermath of the CIAs assessment that Russias senior-
most officials coordinated the hacking and leaking of the Democratic National
Committees email in order to help hand the election to Trump, whose own fond
views of Putin are well-known and disturbing.
CDL Core Files 2016-2017 Taiwan Relations Disadvantage (Jan
2017 Update)
Taiwan Relations
Update)
2017 Update)
Taiwan Relations Disadvantage

(January 2017 Update) NEG
UNIQUENESS
Uniqueness: Trump plans to contain China and
display our strength
BOOT, DECEMBER 27TH, 2016 (Max Boot is the Jeane J. Kirkpatrick senior fellow for national
security studies at the Council on Foreign Relations. http://foreignpolicy.com/2016/12/27/the-pivot-to-asia-
obama-trump/)
Donald Trump appears determined to curb Chinas growing power

symbolized for him by the U.S. trade deficit with China even as he also
prepares an opening to Moscow. Hence Trumps call with Taiwanese President
Tsai Ing-wen on Dec. 2, the first time that a U.S. president or president-elect
has spoken to a Taiwan president since 1979; this was clearly intended as a
shot across Beijings bow. Yes, thats right: Trump also wants to reset
relations with Russia and pivot to the Pacific, just as Obama once hoped to
do. Is there any reason to expect that this policy will be any more successful
the second time around? When it comes to dealing with China, Trump has two
points in his favor his air of menacing unpredictability and his commitment
to raise defense spending although both come with major asterisks
attached. Many commentators have suggested that Trump will seek to
emulate Nixons madman act in order to pressure China and other
adversaries into making concessions. Admittedly, the madman theory did not
work for Nixon he failed to spook Hanoi into ending the Vietnam War in
1969 as he had hoped. But Trump might be able to do a more convincing
impression of a war-mongering lunatic; in his case the act, in fact, might be
all too authentic. Certainly China will be more worried about tangling with
Trump than with No Drama Obama. Trumps call with Tsai Ing-wen suggests
that he has a penchant for brinkmanship that his predecessor, for better or
worse, lacks. Trump could thus bludgeon China into making concessions or
blunder into a war that no one wants. Trumps other trump card, so to speak,
is his advocacy of expanding the U.S. armed forces. He has called for
increasing the Army from 450,000 active-duty soldiers to 540,000, the Marine
Corps from 182,000 Marines to 200,000, the Navy from 272 deployable ships
to 350, and the Air Force from 1,141 combat aircraft to 1,200. The increases
to the Navy and Air Force are particularly significant in the context of the
Pacific, where Chinas expanding arsenal of missiles and submarines has
been tilting the balance of power against the U.S. 7th Fleet. The problem is
2017 Update)
1
that Trump has given no hint of how he will pay for this buildup, which will
cost a minimum of $363 billion over four years. Given that Trump has also
announced plans for massive infrastructure spending and tax cuts, it is far
from obvious that congressional budget hawks will allow him to ramp up
defense spending. Against these uncertain advantages must be balanced the
many problems Trump will confront in trying to change the balance of power
in Asia. Its not simply a matter of his lack of knowledge of the region or his
lack of experience in diplomacy or national security afairs. Or his taste for
intemperate rhetoric and his habit of firing of late-night tweets. There is also
his long-standing hostility to American allies, whom he sees as ungrateful
freeloaders, and to free trade, which he sees as a rip-of.
2017 Update)
AFF Answer Updates
Taiwan Relations Disadvantage

AFF Answers (January 2017
Update)
CDL Core Files 2016-2017 China Relations Disadvantage (Jan
2017 Update)
LINK TURN: Trump cant contain china only engagement leads

to security in Asia
STRABONE, DECEMBER 21ST, 2016
[Matthew Strabone (attorney and partner of Truman National Security Project) Trump's Boardroom Diplomacy.
US News & World Report http://www.usnews.com/opinion/world-report/articles/2016-12-21/china-retaliated-due-to-
donald-trumps-foreign-policy-bargaining MYY]
The incoming Trump administration should recognize that U.S. foreign policy in Asia
largely hinges upon relationships with regional partners, and those partners count on
American involvement to ensure regional stability. In the absence of sensible
diplomacy and a firm commitment to the region, the U.S. may see its
relationships suffer and its clout reduced. For instance, the Philippines, a U.S. treaty
ally, has already expressed a desire to reorient its foreign policy towards Beijing at the
expense of Washington. Now is therefore the time for Trump to work towards maintaining
confidence in American leadership and upholding the U.S. commitment to stability in Asia
rather than needlessly provoke China. The U.S. simply cannot aford to pretend that real
diplomacy takes place in a boardroom.
NON-UNIQUE: China and Taiwan are already in conflict due to
US policy
WALL STREET JOURNAL, DECEMBER 31ST, 2016 (William Kazer, Senior Correspondent
http://www.wsj.com/articles/taiwans-leader-says-planned-u-s-stops-on-trip-will-be-unofficial-routine-
1483181381)
Taiwanese President Tsai Ing-wen played down the significance of a planned U.S. stopover
in January en route to Central America amid warnings from Beijing and speculation that
she might meet with President-elect Donald Trumps transition team. Speaking to
reporters Saturday, the president of the self-ruled island said she wouldnt be on an
official visit to the U.S. and would make routine transit stops. A transit stop is just a
transit stop, she said. While Ms. Tsai and her predecessors made similar stopovers in the
past, her plan to transit through Houston and San Francisco follows a groundbreaking
telephone conversation with Mr. Trump in early December. That call set aside nearly 40
years of protocol that has left contacts between the two sides to lower-level officials at the
insistence of Beijing, which claims Taiwan as its territory. Under Washingtons agreement
to open full diplomatic relations with Beijing in 1979, the U.S. downgraded its relations
with Taiwan. The two, however, maintain close political, economic and military ties on an
unofficial basis. Beijing, while tolerating the arrangement, is wary that Washingtons
support may stifen Taiwans resistance to Chinas goal of reunification. The phone call
between Mr. Trump and Ms. Tsai irked Beijing. The anger was amplified after Mr. Trump
questioned the usefulness of the one China policy under which the U.S. keeps its ties
with Taiwan unofficial. Chinas foreign ministry spokesman this week called on the U.S. to
prevent a stopover by Taiwans president and avoid sending the wrong signals to
elements on the island pushing for formal independence. The phone call may have also
played a role in the recent announcement by the small African nation of So Tom and
Prncipe that it was dropping its formal recognition of Taiwan in favor of China. In past
years, China and Taiwan have engaged in a bidding war as they competed diplomatic
allies. They reached a truce under President Tsais predecessor, who adopted a more pro-
engagement policy with Beijing. Taiwan has accused China of using dollar diplomacy to
lure away So Tom. Ms. Tsais visit to Honduras, Nicaragua, Guatemala and El Salvador
from Jan. 7 to 15 was arranged previously but has taken on new significance as the island
seeks to shore up support among its remaining diplomatic partners. Taiwan now has
official ties with only 21 countries, most of them small Central American and Caribbean
2017 Update)
1
countries as well as Pacific islands. Beijing has tightened diplomatic and economic
pressure against the island since President Tsai took office in May. Her Democratic
Progressive Party nominally supports formal independence from China though the
president has been cautious in her dealings with Beijing, vowing to maintain the status
quo. That hasnt been enough for China, which has cut a formal communications channel
and discouraged Chinese tourists from visiting the island. Beijing has also tried to limit
Taiwans presence on the global stage, blocking it from attending global health, security
and aviation meetings. More recently, China has flexed its military muscles by sending
jets and warships, including its only operational aircraft carrier, near the island but
outside of Taiwans airspace and territorial waters. Ms. Tsai reiterated Saturday that her
administration wanted to maintain peace and stability but wouldnt bow to pressure from
China
2017 Update)
China Relations
Update)
2017 Update)
Vocabulary
Relations: Think relationship. This DA is based on the US and
China being cooperative. If relations are high, that means that the
US and China will work together on pressing problems. If they are
low, then the countries are less likely to fix issues.
Nuclear Proliferation: Proliferation means to spread so nuclear
proliferation is the spread of nuclear weapons. This means that
more countries get access to full weapons and nuclear materials
thus increasing the risk of nuclear use.
2017 Update)
1
2017 Update)
1
2017 Update)
1
might erupt.
president of China.
AT=Answers To
2017 Update)
1NC Shells
1NC- China Relations

Disadvantage Shell
A. UNIQUENESS: China is giving Trump a grace period now, but its
short-lived: we are at a key point in relations
NEW YORK TIMES, DECEMBER 19TH, 2016

http://www.nytimes.com/2016/12/19/world/asia/-china-donald-trump-
power.html
Pressures on Mr. Xi are likely to grow if Mr. Trump continues publicly

excoriating China, especially on territorial issues, like Taiwan and the South
China Sea, where public sentiment often favors a tough response.
China tends to give the new leader a grace period to settle in, Ms. Weiss
said, citing her research about Chinas response to elections and new leaders.
Trump has moved more quickly to challenge and defy China than other
president-elects, however, so the grace period could end quickly.
B. <Insert plan-specific link>

2017 Update)
1NC Shells
1
C. Internal-Link: Maintaining good relations with China
is critical to resolve almost every status quo impact
including nuclear proliferation
GROSS, 2013 (Donald senior associate at the Pacific Forum of the Center for Strategic and International
Studies (CSIS), former State Department official), 3/19 http://www.huffingtonpost.com/donald-gross/us-
china-relations_b_2891183.html?view=print&comm_ref=false)
Better relations with China would support wide-reaching political reform and
liberalization. They would undercut the repressive internal forces that legitimize one-
party authoritarian rule as a means of protecting the country against foreign military
threats, particularly from the United States. In the field of national security, through
an ongoing process of mutual threat reduction, the United States can ensure that
China is a future partner and not a danger to the interests of America and its allies.
The greatest benefit is that the U.S. would avoid a military conflict for the
foreseeable future with a country it now considers a major potential adversary.
Other critical security benefits to the United States and its allies include:
Significantly reducing China's current and potential military threat to Taiwan, thus
securing Taiwan's democracy; Utilizing China's considerable influence with North
Korea to curb Pyongyang's nuclear weapon and missile development programs;
Increasing security cooperation with China on both regional and global issues,
allowing the United States to leverage Chinese capabilities for meeting common
transnational threats such as climate change, energy insecurity, pandemic disease,
cyberterrorism and nuclear proliferation; Curtailing cyberattacks by the Chinese
military on U.S.-based targets as well as enforcing stringent measures against private
individuals and groups in China that engage in cyber-hacking; Having China submit
its maritime disputes in the South and East China Seas to an independent
international judicial body to prevent festering conflicts over uninhabited islands and
energy resources from escalating to armed conflict; and Reducing the scope, scale,
and tempo of China's military modernization programs by discrediting the rationale
for conducting a focused anti-U.S. buildup, especially since the country has so many
other pressing material needs. In his second term, President Obama should seize the
opportunity created by the emergence of China's new leadership to stabilize U.S.-
China relations -- by pursuing a diplomatic strategy that minimizes conflict, achieves
greater mutually beneficial Sino-American cooperation, and significantly expands
trade and investment between the two countries. This approach would enable the
United States to maintain an efective military presence in the Asia Pacific in coming
years, despite defense budget cuts, while also rebalancing economic and political
resources to the region to ensure stability and mutual prosperity.
2017 Update)
1NC Shells

Disadvantage Human Rights Link
The affirmatives insistence on pressuring China to adopt
human rights policies backfires- leads to increased
hostility and collapses the CCP
WYNE, 2013 Ali, contributing analyst at Wikistrat and a global fellow at the Project for the Study of the
21st Century. Some Thoughts on the Ethics of Chinas Rise. 8/14
http://www.carnegiecouncil.org/publications/ethics_online/0084
The more contentious topic, of course, is the role that human rights should
play in U.S.-China relations. While the United States should neither hesitate to
articulate its diferences with China on issues of human rights, nor refrain
from encouraging those trends within China that are promoting greater
citizen empowerment, it should not urge China to democratize or condition its
interactions with China on the leadership's acceptance of core American
values. A country that is not yet 250 years old should appreciate the
possibility that a country several millennia old may have its own strain of
exceptionalism. Furthermore, attempts to democratize China could backfire.
One of the foremost China watchers, former prime minister of Singapore Lee
Kuan Yew, declares that it will not "become a liberal democracy; if it did, it
would collapse." While the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) is willing to
experiment with democratic reforms in "villages and small towns," he
explains, it fears that large-scale democratization "would lead to a loss of
control by the center over the provinces, like [during] the warlord years of the
1920s and '30s.3 Whatever challenges an increasingly capable and assertive
China might pose, a weak China in the throes of chaos would be even more
problematic, especially now that its growth is vital to the health of the global
economy. It is China's ongoing integration into the international system and
attendant exposure to information technology that hold the greatest promise
for improvements to its human rights climate. Since the late 1970s, the CCP
has implicitly conditioned its delivery of rapid growth to the Chinese people
on their acquiescence to its rule. The problem is that citizens' priorities
become more sophisticated as their day-to-day situations grow less exigent.
Those in dire poverty are quite likely to censor themselves in exchange for
food, shelter, and other necessities. As they enter the middle class, however,
and become less preoccupied with the demands of survival, they naturally
think more about critiquing government policy. Within this transition lies a
fundamental challenge for the CCP: the very bargain that it implemented to
forestall challenges to its rule is enabling greater numbers of Chinese to pose
2017 Update)
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1
such challenges. There were only 20 million Internet users in China in 2000;
today, there are more than 560 million.
2017 Update)
1NC Shells

Disadvantage - North Korea Link
China and North Korea are still major trading partners and
allies. The shared border between them, means China will
always have ties with North Korea. If the U.S. pressures
China to change this relationship, it will appear coercive
CNN, MARCH 2016 March 31, North Korea sanctions: Is China enforcing
them? http://edition.cnn.com/2016/03/31/asia/china-north-korea-border-
dandong/
The caravan of trucks rumbles across the narrow bridge, inching along as
they wait their turn to enter North Korea. This is the scene every morning
from the banks of the Yalu River, in the Chinese border city of Dandong. The
trucks, and more specifically the goods within them, represent North Korea's
economic lifeline. China is the only country left that is willing to do significant
trade with Kim Jong Un's regime. And that relationship is under more scrutiny
than ever, since new sanctions on the regime were implemented by the U.N.
Security Council in March. The sanctions are aimed at curbing North Korea's
nuclear program following an international uproar after North Korea claimed
to have tested a hydrogen bomb and long-range missiles. The sanctions
include universal inspections of all cargo to and from North Korea, and a ban
on buying North Korean coal and raw mineral exports if any profits might go
to sanctioned programs. China helped draft the tougher new guidelines, and
says it will vigorously implement them. But China has been criticized in the
past for not enforcing previous sanctions. Experts agree that if the sanctions
are to be at all efective, China must uphold them stringently. China is North
Korea's only major ally, and accounts for more than 70% of the
country's total trade volume. It's in border cities like Dandong that these
sanctions will be enforced. On the Chinese side of the border, you can see the
small customs area situated just before the only bridge that goes in and out,
called the "Friendship Bridge." All truck traffic passes through there, but it's
difficult to see if inspections are taking place. CNN contacted the Ministry of
Foreign Afairs and provincial officials in Liaoning, where Dandong is located,
to ask how inspections were being conducted. Both declined to provide
details. CNN followed the trucks to a loading yard, and watched as Chinese
goods were placed on board, ready to be shipped back across the river. No
one at the yard would speak with us, and a security guard blocked us from
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1
filming. The Chinese say inspections are efective, but CNN couldn't
independently verify that.
2017 Update)
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1NC China Relations Disadvantage

- Currency Manipulation Link
China wants to be perceived as a fair trader the plan
puts them on blast and makes them fear sanctions
VOICE OF AMERICA NEWS, SEPTEMBER 2016 9/3 Saibal Dasgupta

http://www.voanews.com/a/g20-china-trade/3492531.html
China is spearheading the campaign for openness because it fears that

Chinese exporters would face stifer resistance in Western countries due to of
the rise of protectionist sentiments. Support for protectionism was evident
during the Brexit debate in Britain, and in the ongoing presidential race in the
United States. Parts of Europe, including Germany, have seen protests by
jobless steel workers, blaming China for their plight.
"China is worried about growing resistance to its goods in foreign markets.

But its own protectionism is politically too costly for President Xi Jinping to
alter," David Kelly, head of consulting firm China Policy told VOA.
China is anxious to strengthen its image as a fair trader because of

accusations that the government subsidies local industries to give Chinese
exporters a price advantage on international markets. It is this impression
that leads to many countries imposing anti-dumping sanctions on Chinese
goods, which is a major hurdle for exporters in China.
"Chinese leaders are more interested in consolidating Chinas image as a

country which is credible, stable and well-resourced financially," Kelly said.
Beijing wants Western nations to lift anti-dumping sanctions against Chinese

goods but would do little to create a level playing field for foreign investors,
analysts said.
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2NC/1NR Extensions
2NC/1NR- China Relations

Disadvantage - North Korea Link
Extensions
China is economically dependent on North Korea. This means the plan would
be viewed as comprising Chinas economic growth, straining relations
COUNCIL ON FOREIGN RELATIONS, FEBRUARY 2016 2/18, http://www.cfr.org/china/china-north-

korea-relationship/p11097
China provides North Korea with most of its food and energy supplies and
accounts for more than 70 percent of North Korea's total trade volume (PDF).
China is currently North Koreas only economic backer of any importance,
writes Nicholas Eberstadt, senior fellow at the American Enterprise Institute.
In September 2015, the two countries opened a bulk cargo and container
shipping route to boost North Koreas export of coal to China and China
established a high-speed rail route between the Chinese border city of
Dandong and Shenyang, the provincial capital of Chinas northeastern
Liaoning province. In October 2015, the Guomenwan border trade zone
opened in Dandong with the intention of boosting bilateral economic
linkages, much like the Rason economic zone and the Sinujiu special
administrative zone established in North Korea in the early 1990s and 2002,
respectively. Dandong is a critical hub for trade, investment, and tourism for
the two neighborsexchanges with North Korea make up 40 percent of the
citys total trade. Due to North Koreas increasing isolation, its dependence on
China continues to grow, as indicated by the significant trade imbalance
between the two countries. Some experts see the trade deficit as an indirect
Chinese subsidy, given that North Korea cannot finance its trade deficit
through borrowing.
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2NC/1NR Extensions
2NC/1NR China Relations

Disadvantage AT: #1 Non-Unique:
Relations Bad Now
They say Relations are bad already, but
1. Extend our NEW YORK TIMES evidence.
facts)
to be true)
their argument)

___Its most recent, from December 19th, and accounts for their
Taiwan argument.__________

__It says that China is still giving a grace period even after the
Taiwan phone call, but the plan pushes them too far, causing our
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Impact, a collapse of all cooperation with China on issues like non-
proliferation_______________________________________________________________
4. [Choose what YOU feel are the BEST 1 or 2 pieces of UNIQUENESS

evidence in the next three pages to read in the 2NC or 1NR to extend
this argument efectively]
Trump made other positive moves that keep relations

vulnerable but stable until China sees what his policy will be all
eyes are on the AFF PLAN
EDWARDS AND LAVINDER, DECEMBER 16TH, 2016

[Will Edwards (an international producer at The Cipher Brief) & Kaitlin Lavinder (a reporter at The Cipher
Brief). https://www.thecipherbrief.com/article/trump-russia-and-cia-allies-and-adversaries-confused-1091
MYY]
Relations with China, the United States largest geopolitical competitor, are
already on shaky grounds, following Trumps phone conversation with the
President of Taiwan, his questioning of the One China policy, and his criticism of
Chinas economic system. But on the other hand, Trump appointed China-friendly
Terry Branstad, the Governor of Iowa, as U.S. Ambassador to China. This mixture
of positive and negative developments in the U.S.-China relationship fuels
uncertainty about future relations. With Trump showing little faith in his
Intelligence Community, China may find it best to wait and see how official U.S.
policy unfolds.
Trumps Taiwan phone call was bad, but Chinas going to give
him chance to make a next move. The AFF PLAN is the WRONG move
WEISBROT, DECEMBER 23RD, 2016

[Mark Weisbrot (a co-director of the Center for Economic and Policy Research. Seattle Times
http://www.seattletimes.com/opinion/even-before-taking-office-trump-has-made-a-mess-with-china/ MYY]
PRESIDENT-elect Donald Trumps phone call earlier this month with President
Tsai Ing-wen of Taiwan sent shock waves throughout China and much of the
world. For nearly four decades, it has been Washingtons official policy to
diplomatically recognize only China and not Taiwan, an island the mainland
considers a breakaway province. In reality, though, the call will be
remembered as one of the worst diplomatic miscalculations of all time.
Trumps team also deserves blame, as apparently the long-distance chat
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wasnt just another foot-in-mouth Trump moment but was in fact a deliberate
strategy shaped with lobbyist influence. Trump has indicated that by
abandoning this policy and, in efect, threatening China, hell be able to
bargain for concessions from the Asian power. And while the Chinese
government responded with stern messaging, its actions have been relatively
subdued. But dont be fooled: Chinese leaders are giving Trump a chance to
chart a diferent course before he takes office Jan. 20. Bullying may have
helped Trump in his real estate career but it is not going to move China. The
Chinese economy is now bigger than ours on a purchasing power parity basis,
which is what matters when we are talking about such things as military
expenditures. The cost of a Chinese-made plane or a Chinese pilot is
considerably less than its U.S. dollar equivalent at current exchange rates in
America. Trumps ostensible reason for the hard line against China is that he
wants to negotiate a better deal for U.S. manufacturing, including for workers
stateside.
Dont believe Insider hype. Relations were already so bad

under Obama that conflict was inevitable. Trump can only do better
with a fresh approach
PROFESSOR XIANG, DECEMBER 27TH, 2016

[Lanxin Xiang (a professor of international history and politics at the Graduate Institute of International
and Development Studies Geneva, Switzerland, and director of the Centre of One Belt and One Road
Security Studies, at the China National Institute for SCO International Exchange and Judicial Cooperation,
Shanghai). South China Morning Post http://www.scmp.com/comment/insight-opinion/article/2056841/why-
trumps-blunt-approach-will-put-us-relations-china-surer MYY]
The control and management approach may imply at least two things: first, the
realisation that conflict with the US can no longer be avoided within the current
framework of engagement; the so-called Strategic and Economic Dialogue has
contributed little to building mutual trust at summit meetings. Beijing cannot
continue dealing with the inside-the-beltway US foreign policy establishment
Second, Chinas focus will have to shift towards maintaining a true strategic
balance, as if during a cold war stalemate, with the single purpose of avoiding
full-fledged confrontation. Leaderships on both sides need a new approach, new
type of analysts and policymakers to engage. Beijing cannot continue dealing
with the inside-the-beltway US foreign policy establishment, whose utter failure
in engaging China in the past eight years has pushed bilateral ties to the
dangerous brink of naval confrontation. Enter Donald Trump. Now that the
Washington foreign policy establishment has been dealt a big blow by Trumps
election, we could see that the new administration, with its mostly non-insider
members, despite its callous style and brutish rhetoric, may actually turn out to
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1
be an efective team for engaging China. It may thus be good news for Sino-US
relations in the medium and long run.
Chinese President Xi and Trump are already establishing goals

together
REUTERS, NOVEMBER 9TH, 2016 http://fortune.com/2016/11/09/donald-trump-win-china/
Chinese President Xi Jinping congratulated Donald Trump on winning the U.S.

presidency, state TV reported on Wednesday, telling him the two biggest economies
in the world shared responsibility for promoting global development and prosperity."I
place great importance on the China-U.S. relationship, and look forward to working
with you to uphold the principles of non-conflict, non-confrontation, mutual respect
and win-win cooperation," Xi told Trump by phone.
Their authors are exaggerating Trumps call with Taiwan fits

our past pattern of relations
POMFRET, DECEMBER 9TH, 2016

[John Pomfret (a former Washington Post bureau chief in Beijing, Washington Post,
https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/five-myths-about-us-china-relations/2016/12/09/beedb888-bccc-
11e6-91ee-1adddfe36cbe_story.html?utm_term=.275e52436568 MYY]
When Trump took Taiwans call, the U.S. foreign policy establishment had a minor
nervous breakdown. Vox warned of disarray in U.S.-China relations. New York
magazine raised the specter of a diplomatic disaster. Lets take a deep breath and
realize that the status quo between Taiwan and the United States has been
evolving for decades. In exchange for Chinese promises to help ease the United
States out of Vietnam and counter the Soviet Union, officials from the Nixon and
Carter administrations promised China that America would walk away from Taiwan,
allowing China to absorb the island of 23 million people, which Beijing views as a
renegade province. Since then, however, especially as U.S. presidents have come to
understand that Chinas political system has not moved in a positive direction,
successive administrations have worked to better ties with Taiwan. Weapons sales to
the island remain robust despite a promise to China in 1982 to slow them. Diplomatic
contact has been upgraded. Washington now supports granting Taiwan observer
status at a variety of international organizations. Most Taiwanese can come to the
United States without a visa. In that sense, Trumps call was a logical continuation of
a slowly evolving process of improved relations. The big concern, however, is that
China will use the call as an excuse to further bully Taiwan and that Trump will stand
by.
2017 Update)
2NC/1NR Extensions

Disadvantage AT: #2 Plan Helps
China Relations
They say They improve relations with China, but

facts)
to be true)
their argument)

______________________________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________________________
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______________________________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________________________
2017 Update)
2NC/1NR Extensions

Disadvantage AT: #3 LINK TURN
Plan is a Win-Win
They say Their PLAN is the kind of win-win China is looking for, but

facts)
to be true)
their argument)

______________________________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________________________
2017 Update)
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1
______________________________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________________________
2. The AFFs claim of a win-win is the exact kind of deal-

making that China hates about Trump and would damage
relations worse than ever before
TIME MAGAZINE, DECEMBER 15TH, 2016

[Charlie Campbell (Beijing Correspondent) Why Donald Trump Really Shouldnt Play Games With China
Over Taiwan. http://time.com/4603128/china-taiwan-russia-vladimir-putin-xi-jinping-donald-trump-
realpolitik/ MYY]
Trumps taking a more realpolitik approach, saying there are no sacred cows, we
wont be pushed around and everything is on the table, says Professor Nick Bisley,
an Asia expert at Australias La Trobe University. But Trump should be wary of
wielding realpolitik in this land of fictions. Beijing regularly cites the Taiwan
question as one of its core interests, and the topic is toxic even among otherwise
politically inert Chinese. On Wednesday, An Fengshan, a spokesman for Chinas
policymaking Taiwan Afairs Office, said that peace and stability in the Taiwan Strait
will be seriously impacted if the U.S. wavers on one China. For Taiwan, the one
China policy is partly a millstone, precluding the island from a seat at the U.N. or
from joining potentially lucrative free trade groupings. But conversely, the agreement
otherwise known as the 1992 Consensus has allowed peaceful ties to flourish
across a previously truculent Strait. Today, tourists and exchange students flock in
both directions and 40% of Taiwans exports go to the mainland. Taiwan has a lot to
gain from official recognition but even more to lose. In the short term the [Taiwan]
government seems to be very excited about [Trump addressing one China], says
Professor Tang Shaocheng, an international-relations expert at Taiwans National
Chengchi University. But the consequences the reaction from Beijing is still
unpredictable. Taiwan would bear the brunt of a metastasizing Sino-U.S.
relationship, though Trump has never mentioned what the islands citizens desire
during his bating of the Chinese leadership. Instead, the President-elect has treated
the case like a business deal, jostling for the smallest advantage, while needling the
worlds second largest economy over trade tarifs and alleged currency manipulation.
Trump is trying to get some more bargaining chips to use later with Beijing , adds
Tang. Taiwan is just a leverage point for Trump. And Trumps actions elsewhere are
recasting the rules of the game and further imperiling the islands people. The other
headline of Trumps nascent foreign policy is warming ties with Russia. Trump
repeatedly praised President Vladmir Putin during his presidential campaign, flying in
the face of the international condemnation prompted by Moscows 2014 annexing of
the Crimea, not to mention its steadfast support for Syrian President Bashar Assad.
On Wednesday, Trump named his candidate for Secretary of State: Rex Tillerson, the
ExxonMobil chief with a long history of deals with the Kremlin, and who was awarded
the Russian Order of Friendship in 2013. The nod raised eyebrows even within
Trumps own party. I dont know what Mr. Tillersons relationship with Vladimir Putin
2017 Update)
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1
was, Senator John McCain told Fox News on Saturday. But Ill tell you it is a matter
of concern to me. What exactly Trump hopes to gain from courting Putin is unclear.
The real estate mogul may have been elected on promises to put America first, but
Putin is a Russian nationalist of the deepest dye and unlikely to yield much of
consequence to Washington. One theory is that Trump is maneuvering for a reverse
Nixon strategy: teaming up with Moscow to isolate Beijing, in a mirror of U.S. policy
to counter the Soviet Union in the 1970s. However, that is unlikely to bear fruit.
According to Dmitri Trenin, director of the Carnegie Moscow Center think tank, Beijing
and Moscow have never been as close as they are today. I would call them a
dtente state of relations, says Trenin. Thats somewhere between a strategic
partnership and a full-fledged alliance. Chinese President Xi Jinpings seminal One
Belt, One Road economic strategy a rekindling of the iconic land and maritime Silk
Road though infrastructure and development projects is dependent on rosy
relations with Russia and particularly Central Asia, which is largely beholden to the
Kremlin. Today, Russia is the worlds top oil exporter accounting for 70% of all
national exports and its top customer is China, which bought 22 million tons in the
first half of this year. Squabbles over disputed territory in Central Asia have been
solved with surprising prudence and a raft of pipeline and other infrastructure deals
have been struck. Relations are robust and I can only see them getting stronger,
says Trenin. By contrast, the U.S. has little to ofer Russia. But Trumps fawning of
Putin does have an efect. Trump announced Tillersons appointment just as Assads
Russian-backed troops retook Aleppo, displacing thousands and reportedly
slaughtering scores of innocents. But Beijing is most acutely aware that the Kremlin
sufered few repercussion from its seizing of Crimea, other than economic sanctions it
shrugged aside (and Trump could soon lift them at a stoke of his pen). If Trump wants
to put ethics aside and talk realpolitik: What would the U.S. do if China decided to
retake Taiwan? To rephrase: What could it do? The U.S. military is stronger that
Chinas overall, though a war in Chinas coastal waters would be bloody and
impossible to win. The Philippines, traditionally Americas staunchest ally, has
become antagonistic with Washington and chummy with China since President
Rodrigo Duterte took office this year. There are also resurgent calls to remove U.S.
troops from bases in South Korea and Japan, who both list China as their largest
trading partners. Beijing has built islands dubbed unsinkable aircraft carriers in
the South China Sea, which new satellite images indicate contain significant
weaponry. Not to forget that Trump campaigned on drawing down commitments on
costly wars overseas. Xi is a tough guy and has shown unprecedented tolerance for
Trumps arrogance, says Professor Shi Yinhong, director of the Center on American
Studies at Beijings Renmin University. But if Trump still wants to mess with Chinas
core interests after he becomes President, Sino-U.S. ties will sufer the greatest
damage since [the resumption of diplomatic relations]. China will not compromise.
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2NC/1NR Extensions

Disadvantage AT: #4 NO LINK:
Trump is a loose cannon
They say China will inevitably be mad at Trump because hes a loose
cannon, but
1. Extend our NEW YORK TIMES evidence.
Its much better than their Asia News Network evidence
because:
more facts)
to be true)

__The New York Times is a much more respected journalism source than the
Asia News Network and our argument says China is giving Trump a grace
period. Their evidence says were frenemies now, but only speculates about
why Trump would change that.____________

2017 Update)
2NC/1NR Extensions
1
____It means China doesnt think Trump is a madman now, at least until after
the PLAN. Bad relations arent inevitable the AFF uniquely causes our
impacts of collapsing relations___
3 [Choose one or two of the following pieces of evidence from the next 3
pages that YOU think are BEST to extend the argument, if you have
time.]
China is cautiously optimistic about Trump being practical
REUTERS, NOVEMBER 9TH, 2016 http://fortune.com/2016/11/09/donald-trump-win-china/
Certainly, a Trump White House presents China with a range of new opportunities.
Decades of Hillary Clinton's criticism of China's human rights record and her
insistence on U.S. interests in the South China Sea have made her a well-known, and
not well-liked figure among Beijing's ruling elite.
Chinese experts say some in Beijing believe Trump will prove a pragmatic
businessman, willing to deal with China.
"Any type of protectionist policy pursued will be a double-edged sword," said Ruan
Zongze, a former Chinese diplomat now with the China Institute of International
Studies, a think-tank affiliated with the Foreign Ministry. "I think he will be very
careful about this,"
Moreover, Trump's criticism of U.S. allies, including Japan, for free-riding on U.S.
security guarantees, has ofered China the tantalizing prospect of an American
retrenchment from Asia.
"From a long-term perspective, this gives China more space to prove itself and it
takes of some of the pressure on China," said Wang Yiwei, Director of the Institute of
International Afairs at China's Renmin University.
History proves China will take a wait and see approach

toward Trumps unpredictable WORDS, but will react strongly to
POLICIES like the AFF PLAN that they dislike
MIURA AND PROFESSOR CHEN WEISS, 2017

[Kacie Miura (a PhD candidate in political science at MIT) Jessica Chen Weiss (Associate Professor of
Government at Cornell). Will China Test Trump? Lessons from Past Campaigns and Elections. Washington
Quarterly (Winter 2017) p 8-9
Drawing on Chinas recent behavior toward newly elected leaders in the

United States, Japan, and Taiwan, we expect China to adopt a wait-and-see
stance toward the incoming Trump administration. During the campaign,
Trump harshly criticized the current terms of U.S. trade and security
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commitments. However, his rhetoric was often inconsistent with that of his
advisors and out of step with the views of much of the Republican
establishment. Given this inconsistency, we expect Beijing to take a cautious
approach toward the new administration, just as it has toward other national
leaders whose campaign rhetoric conflicted with other indicators of likely
policy. Although the past is hardly an infallible guide to the future, we do not
expect China to probe the new administration, as there is little evidence that
China has sought to test or take advantage of newly elected leaders in the
recent past. Chinese Perceptions of Campaign Rhetoric: Consistency and
Change When evaluating the likelihood that a leader will follow through on
campaign promises, we find that China sees a candidates campaign rhetoric
as more credible when it is consistent with his or her past foreign policy
statements and the reputation of his or her party and policy advisors.
Candidates whose campaign remarks contradict their past record, the
reputation of their party, and the views of their advisors are more often
expected to renege on campaign pledges when confronted with the complex
realities of governing.11 When a candidates campaign rhetoric is
inconsistent with other indicators, China typically takes a wait-and-see
approach, delaying judgment until after the candidate takes office and
reveals intentions through subsequent actions. China adopted such an
approach toward Taiwans Chen Shui-bian (20002008) and Japans Junichiro
Koizumi (20012006), leaders whose campaign rhetoric on China appeared
opportunistic and contrasted sharply with their past behavior and actions.
Observers in Beijing expressed deep skepticism toward Chen, whose
moderate campaign stance contradicted his staunch, pro-independence
reputation.12 Conversely, Koizumi, who had a record of moderate statements
toward China, adopted a tougher position on the campaign trail, which
Chinese observers characterized as an attempt to cater to his partys
conservative right wing.13 Beijing used specific issues as litmus tests to
assess whether these new leaders acknowledged cherished principlessuch
as the existence of One China with Taiwanand avoided taking
symbolically provocative actions, such as visits to Yasukuni Shrine, which
commemorates Japanese war criminals along with ordinary war dead. In both
cases, Beijings wait-and-see stance lasted for more than a year. Ultimately
dissatisfied with the results of its eforts to influence these new leaders
statements and actions on key issues, Beijings ensuing treatment was quite
harsh. Conversely, when there is consistency between a candidates
campaign rhetoric and their past statements, actions, and the reputation of
the party and policy advisors, a second important factor that appears to
influence Beijings treatment of a new leader is whether he or she promised
to change the China policy of the preceding administration. U.S. presidential
candidates often seek to distinguish themselves from the incumbent, finding
it difficult to resist the siren song of tough promises to reverse their
predecessors soft approach toward China, as noted by former Assistant
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Secretary of State for East Asian Afairs Kurt Campbell and former Deputy
Secretary of State James Steinberg.14
They LINK. We agree with the NEG that China has

uncertainty about Trump. The AFF PLAN causes escalation
when China views it as the start of a back-and-forth
rivalry
STRABONE, DECEMBER 12TH, 2016

[Matthew Strabone (an attorney and a partner of the Truman National Security Project) Trump's
Boardroom Diplomacy. US News & World Report http://www.usnews.com/opinion/world-
report/articles/2016-12-21/china-retaliated-due-to-donald-trumps-foreign-policy-bargaining MYY]
Trump has made significant hay of his experience as a businessman, and

poking at Beijing in perhaps its most sensitive area appears to be a move
taken from the business world. Specifically, Trump seems to want to treat
China as a rival business that has no choice but to eventually come to the
table and make a deal with him. In this context, Trump may think that
attempting to put Taiwan in play as a negotiable asset will provide him with a
bargaining chip a chip that can be traded for concessions in other areas of
U.S.-China ties, perhaps regarding trade policy, North Korea or some other
area where he wishes to make progress. Such an approach may work in the
business world, but nation states are not businesses, and core national
interests can rarely be bargained away for lower tarifs. In fact, this approach
may only exacerbate one critical ongoing issue in U.S.-China relations: a lack
of understanding on the part of each nation as to how the other makes
foreign policy. Confused by Trump's highly unorthodox moves, Beijing wasted
little time in launching a provocation of its own with its vehicle seizure in the
South China Sea. Whereas China had reached some semblance of
understanding regarding the rules of engagement with the Obama
administration, Beijing may now feel that it is flying blind and thus may
engage in further tit-for-tat activities simply to get a sense of where Trump
will draw the line. This sort of retaliatory approach to bilateral ties carries a
significant risk of escalation, and when it is the two most powerful nations in
the world involved, escalation is not a good outcome for anyone. Additionally,
this potential danger only adds to the preexisting uncertainty in the Western
Pacific, and other countries in the region are predictably becoming
increasingly nervous about rising tensions between the world's two premiere
powers.
2017 Update)
2NC/1NR Extensions
1
2017 Update)
2NC/1NR Extensions

Disadvantage AT: #5 No Nuclear
Proliferation
They say Theres no nuclear proliferation now, but


facts)
to be true)
their argument)

______________________________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________________________
2017 Update)
2NC/1NR Extensions
1
______________________________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________________________
2017 Update)
AFF 2AC Answers
2 2AC Affirmative Answers to

China Relations Disadvantage
(January 2017 Update)
1. NON-UNIQUE- Relations are bad already. Trump has
already undone 35 years of diplomacy with China in one
phone call with Taiwan
SYDNEY MORNING HERALD, DECEMBER 3RD, 2016

http://www.smh.com.au/world/donald-trump-blunders-into-conflict-over-
taiwan-knowing-little-and-caring-less-20161203-gt39j5.html
The following day the president-elect's transition team issued a jaunty statement
confirming that Donald Trump had arbitrarily upended 35 years of careful
American diplomacy by speaking on the phone with the President of Taiwan ,
Tsai Ing-wen, conceivably putting the United States on a path that ends in
direct confrontation with China over one of the most explosive geopolitical
flashpoints on earth.
It is difficult to exaggerate how significant - and how provocative - this action
was. China considers Taiwan to be a rogue province and has declared that it
would go as far as using military force to prevent Taiwanese independence.
The US has for a generation danced a careful dance in support of Taiwan. It is
the de facto guarantor of Taiwanese defence, but it does not recognise Taiwan
as an independent state. No US leader has officially spoken with a Taiwanese
president in decades.
2. LINK TURN: <insert analysis as to why plan actually

improves relations with China and refer to 1AC evidence>
2017 Update)
AFF 2AC Answers
1
3. Our LINK TURN is UNIQUE because after Trumps
initial provoking of China, theyre looking for win-win
policies like our plan to increase relations
SOUTH CHINA MORNING POST, DECEMBER 22ND, 2016

[Liu Zhen (writer). Chinas foreign minister urges Trump to respect Beijings core interests, major
concerns. http://www.scmp.com/news/china/diplomacy-defence/article/2056576/chinas-foreign-minister-
urges-trump-respect-beijings MYY]
Beijing and Washington should respect each others core interests and
major concerns so that the two countries can work together for win-win
results, Chinas Foreign Minister Wang Yi said in an interview with the
Peoples Daily. China and the US will have respect and take care of each
others core interests and major concerns to ensure long and stable
cooperation and realise mutual benefits and a win-win situation, Wang told
the governing Communist Partys mouthpiece. The comments came after US
president-elect Donald Trump has made provocative gestures towards Beijing,
including the threat of disregarding the one-China principle to govern future
policy towards Taiwan. Trumps nomination of Peter Navarro to head a newly-
created White House council on trade has also raised eyebrows this week.
4. NO LINK: Their Disadvantage is inevitable whether or

not we make China angry with the plan, Trump is a loose
cannon and theyll be angry anyway regardless
ASIA NEWS NETWORK, DECEMBER 22ND, 2016

[http://annx.asianews.network/content/editorial-trump-and-china-bumpy-ride-has-begun-35776 MYY]
The rest of the world will have to fasten its seatbelts while the current,
worrying clash of superpowers China and the United States plays itself out.
Although the saga of the underwater drone ended peaceably earlier this
week, the drama signalled that the competition between the two has entered
a new era. With help from the ubiquitous social media, their diplomatic
engagement is taking place in real time swiftly, unpredictably and amid
considerable tension. The inauguration of President Donald Trump on January
20 is expected to see US-China ties transformed into a guarded quasi-
friendship requiring day-to-day reassessment. The stability that prevailed
during the eight years of the Obama administration is unlikely to survive.
2017 Update)
AFF 2AC Answers
1
Trump is given to knee-jerk reactions and ill-considered grandstanding for the
sake of quick gain and publicity, as well as for his brash pursuit of the art of
the deal, none of which bodes well for Americas relations with Beijing. Still a
month from taking office, Trump has already endangered his countrys long-
standing recognition of the One China Policy by accepting a phone call from
Taiwanese leader Tsai Ing-wan, a breach of protocol adopted after Washington
formally recognised communist China in the early 1970s. President Barack
Obama immediately warned that any shift from this policy would have a
serious impact on American dealings with Beijing, an important trading
partner and backer of the US economy. Aiming to renegotiate extant overseas
deals, Trump does not appear to care, and seems ready to test Chinese
mettle on every issue.
2017 Update)
AFF 2AC Answers
1
5 NO IMPACT: Nuclear proliferation is slowing in the
status quo
Van der Meer, 2011 [Sico, Research Fellow at the Netherlands Institute of International Relations
Clingendael and a PhD Candidate at the Erasmus University Rotterdam; his PhD project on nuclear
proliferation dynamics is financially supported by the Dutch non-governmental organisation IKV Pax Christi.
Not that bad: Looking back on 65 years of nuclear non-proliferation eforts Security and Human Rights
2011 no.1]
Since the invention and first use of nuclear weapons, predictions on the
spread of these weapons have been traditionally pessimistic. Especially
during the Cold War, from 1945 to 1991, the persistent pessimism among
experts and policymakers is with the knowledge of looking backwards
surprising. During the first decades of the Cold War it was generally expected
that far more countries would acquire a nuclear weapons arsenal rather soon.
This pessimism was not that strange, considering that nuclear weapons were
generally seen as acceptable, desirable and even necessary among political
and military elites in many nations during the 1950s and early 1960s.2
Nuclear weapons are considered as the ultimate weapon that would deter
any enemy from attacking. Moreover, nuclear weapons ofer not only military
power: they are also considered to increase a states political power
internationally. Having nuclear weapons grants a state and its leadership
international prestige, and a nuclear weapon state will automatically be
considered and treated as a (regional) superpower. Based on this positive
attitude towards nuclear weapons, forecasts in these years were therefore
easily predicting that 20 to 25 states would become nuclear weapon powers
within the next few decades; countries like Sweden, West Germany and Japan
are examples of countries that were often considered would soon cross the
nuclear threshold, but they never did. One of the reasons for the alarming
forecasts during much of the Cold War period was the failure of many
estimates to distinguish between the capacity of states to develop nuclear
weapons and the desire of these states to do so.3 Even nowadays, however,
political and academic forecasts often tend to be rather pessimistic,
predicting nuclear domino efects, or chain reactions, when new nuclear
weapon powers (for example, Iran) will emerge and cause other states to
develop nuclear weapons too. Despite all the pessimistic forecasts, however,
only nine states nowadays possess nuclear weapons. Although more states
have employed nuclear weapons programmes at some point in the past 65
years, most of them have sooner or later ended their ambition to acquire
these weapons. Some states even destroyed their nuclear arsenal (South
Africa) or gave up inherited arsenals (Ukraine, Belarus and Kazakhstan).
2017 Update)
AFF 2AC Answers
1
Especially since the second half of the 1980s the number of states with
nuclear weapons-related activities has become very marginal
2017 Update)
1AR AFF Extensions
1AR Extension to 2AC #1: NON-

UNIQUE: Relations Bad Now
Extend the 2AC SYDNEY MORNING HERALD evidence. It
says that Trumps phone call to Taiwan was the worst
thing thats happened to relations with China in 35 years
and could cause conflict by itself. Group their responses.
1. Their New York Times evidence says China will give Trump a
grace period, but it concedes that Taiwan is a key issue.
After 35 years of conflict over Taiwan, theres no grace
period when it comes to Taiwan.
2. [Choose one of the two following extension cards on the

next 3 pages that YOU like BEST and read if you have time.]
TRUMP IS VIEWED BY CHINA AS DESTABILIZING RELATIONS
REUTERS, NOVEMBER 9TH, 2016 http://fortune.com/2016/11/09/donald-trump-win-

china/
Donald Trump's upset election victory cracks open pressing strategic and
economic questions in U.S.-China ties, and has likely surprised and worried
Chinese leaders, who prize stability in relations between the two powers.
Trump had lambasted China throughout the campaign, drumming up
headlines with his pledges to slap 45% tarifs on imported Chinese goods and
label the country a currency manipulator his first day in office.
He has also questioned U.S. security commitments to allies and undercut
long-held bipartisan U.S. foreign policy norms, such as suggesting that Japan
develop nuclear weapons, all stances that if he follows through on could
upset the regional security balance in Asia.
That unpredictability is not an ideal election outcome for China's stability-
obsessed Communist Party, especially as it seeks smooth U.S. relations at a
time of daunting reform challenges at home, a slowing economy, and a
leadership reshuffle of its own that will put a new party elite around President
Xi Jinping in late 2017.
2017 Update)
1AR AFF Extensions
1
Trump phone call with Taiwan is historically bad for
China relations
THE DIPLOMAT, DECEMBER 3RD, 2016 http://thediplomat.com/2016/12/donald-

trump-just-complicated-us-taiwan-relations-big-time/
On Friday, the Financial Times confirmed that U.S. President-elect Donald J.

Trump had moved forward on a planned phone call with President Tsai Ing-
wen of Taiwan. The call represents the first contact between a U.S. president-
elect (or president, for that matter) and a Taiwanese head of state since U.S.
President Jimmy Carter acknowledged the Communist Party of China
government in Beijing under the one China policy. The call could spark the
first major foreign policy crisis for the incoming Trump administration with
China, which will see the call as suggestive of an epochal change in U.S.
policy toward Taiwan. The government of China had not reacted to the call as
of this writing.
Somewhat distressingly, the FT notes that it is not clear if the Trump

transition team intended the conversation to signal a broader change in U.S.
policy toward Taiwan, suggesting that this could simply have been borne of a
misunderstanding about existing U.S. policy toward China and Taiwan within
Trumps transition team. (Earlier in November, there were reports that Trump
was seeking to pursue development projects in Taiwan, imbuing the whole
episode with a conflict-of-interest angle as well.)
Taiwan and China maintain diplomatic ties with a mutually exclusive set of
countries, with each bilateral partner recognizing either Taipei or Beijing as
the exclusive host to the government of China. The United States maintains
no official diplomatic ties with Taiwan, but unofficially, Washingtons relations
with the island which China sees as a rightful part of its territory are
governed by the Taiwan Relations Act. Most contacts are carried out through
the semi-official American Institute in Taiwan, which functions as a de facto
U.S. embassy; direct high-level political contacts are a clear red line for
Beijing. The ambiguity governing U.S. interaction with Taiwan has been
carefully balanced since 1979 and Trumps one phone call represents the
greatest jolt to the tightrope that previous U.S. presidents have walked.
Its entirely unclear how China will choose to react to Trumps provocative
phone call. Beijing is already disappointed by Tsais Democratic Progressive
2017 Update)
1AR AFF Extensions
1
Party government, given the partys pro-independence leanings. One
possibility is that the domestic reaction in Taiwan to the phone call could
govern the extent to which China expresses its displeasure. The Taipei Times,
reporting on the call, already suggested it could be a step toward
institutionalizing channels of communication between Taipei and
Washingtons top leaders.
If Trumps outreach is widely read in Taiwan as a signal that the United States
will throw its full military might behind the island in the case of a unilateral
declaration of independence, Beijing could take drastic action, including
putting a freeze to high-level diplomacy with Washington or cutting of
relations altogether. The situation is complicated, however, by the fact that
the president-elect not the current Obama administration took the step
of reaching out to Tsai, meaning retaliation might have to wait until Trumps
inauguration in January to avoid mixed messages.
Relations between Taiwan and China have noticeably entered a cooler period
since Tsais inauguration. Beijing suspended cross-strait collaboration with
Taipei after it was unsatisfied with Tsais treatment of the so-called 1992
consensus, which had governed cross-strait relations under previous
Taiwanese president Ma Ying-jeou. Within Taiwan, a surge of civic nationalism,
spurred on by youth activism, led to a decisive victory for the independence-
leaning DPP and a repudiation of Mas Nationalist Party or KMT, which enjoyed
better cross-strait ties.
Despite the FTs lack of information on the extent to which the call was
planned, it is possible that Trump was egged on here by his Asia advisers. For
example, Peter Navarro, a Trump adviser on Asia, penned an op-ed in the
National Interest advocating for muscular U.S. backing for Taiwan following
Tsais victory and the surge in Taiwanese nationalism.
In the op-ed Navarrao bemoans Bill Clintons decision to renounce U.S.

backing for Taiwanese independence in 1998, describing a throw-Taiwan-
under-the-bus move. U.S. policy, delivered through carefully calculated
ambiguity, has been to prevent a change in the status quo across the Taiwan
Strait that means equal opposition to Taiwan unilaterally declaring
independence as well as China moving to forcibly unite the two. (For
Chinas Peoples Liberation Army, a Taiwan strait contingency remains the
primary war-fighting scenario.)
2017 Update)
1AR AFF Extensions
Fridays call with Tsai represents Trumps second phone call-related mishap
this week after Pakistan released an unusually candid readout of the
president-elects comments this week in a chat with Prime Minister Nawaz
Sharif. (I wrote on that for The Diplomat earlier.) Between the two incidents,
we see a distressing possibility for early foreign policy crises in the Asia-
Pacific in a Trump administration.
As I noted on election night, the Taiwan Strait is one of the geopolitical

Flashpoints likeliest to see a major conflagration under a Trump presidency.
Fridays phone call makes the 21st centurys first Taiwan crisis all the more
likely.
Update: The Trump campaign has posted its readout of the call between Tsai
and Trump:
President-elect Trump spoke with President Tsai Ing-wen of Taiwan, who

ofered her congratulations. During the discussion, they noted the close
economic, political, and security ties exist between Taiwan and the United
States. President-elect Trump also congratulated President Tsai on becoming
President of Taiwan earlier this year.
As Patrick Chovanec observed on Twitter, whatever the impression of the call

may be from the Taiwanese side, the mere fact that Trump called Tsai the
president of Taiwan in an official readout will cause a conniption in China.
CDL Core Files 2016-2017 China Nationalism Disadvantage (Jan
2017 Update)
China Nationalism
Update)
2017 Update)
AFF Answer Updates
1
China Nationalism
Update) AFF Answer
Updates
NO LINK and NON-UNIQUE: No risk of nationalist backlash
to the PLAN Xi has undisputed control and Trump is
perceived positively by the Chinese, even after his Taiwan
actions
THE ECONOMIST, DECEMBER 17TH, 2016

[Taiwan fears becoming Donald Trumps bargaining chip. Leading news source
http://www.economist.com/news/china/21711955-china-worries-about-president-elect-too-taiwan-fears-
becoming-donald-trumps-bargaining-chip MYY]
Mr Trumps remarks would have riled the Chinese leadership at any time. But
they are particularly unwelcome at this juncture for Chinas leader, Xi Jinping.
He is absorbed by preparations for crucial meetings due to be held late in
2017 at which sweeping reshuffles of the Politburo and other Communist
Party bodies will be announced. Those trying to block his appointments would
be quick to seize on any sign that he is being soft on America over such a
sensitive matter as Taiwan. Should Mr Trump persist in challenging the one-
China idea, the risk of escalation will be even greater than usual in the build-
up to the conclavesall the more so, perhaps, given Mr Xis insistence that
diferences between China and Taiwan cannot be passed on from generation
to generation. Hawkish colleagues may say that it is time to settle the issue
by force. Street protests in China against America or Taiwan would also make
it more difficult for Mr Xi to compromise: he would fear becoming a target
himself of Chinese nationalists wrath. But the risk of this may be low. Since
Mr Xi took over in 2012 there have been no major outbreaks of nationalist
unrest, partly thanks to his tightening of social and political controls
(including locking up ever more dissidents). Sun Zhe of Tsinghua University
says people are unlikely to demonstrate over Taiwan because they
understand the new rules, the new emphasis on political discipline in the last
few years. He says a lot of people in China still admire Mr Trump for his
wealth and his unexpected political success. They think that he wants to
make a deal with China.
2017 Update)
AFF Answer Updates
1
2017 Update)
NEG Updates
1
China Nationalism Disadvantage

(Jan 2017 Update) NEG BRINK
Chinas hardline nationalists are already pushing Xi about Trump theyre
watching now but will come down hard against any further sign of weakness
NEW YORK TIMES, DECEMBER 19TH, 2016 http://www.nytimes.com/2016/12/19/world/asia/-china-

donald-trump-power.html
So far, Mr. Xi has not reacted publicly to Mr. Trumps warnings. The two men
had a brief but cordial call after Mr. Trump won the election. Chinese leaders
rarely wade openly into disputes, leaving that to junior officials. But pressure
for a tougher reaction to Mr. Trump could build in China if he keeps lobbing
out warnings, especially after he becomes president.
Experts disagreed over whether Chinas seizure of the submersible drone was
intended as a signal to Mr. Trump, or even authorized by Mr. Xi. But Chinese
decision makers probably took into account that Mr. Trumps team would read
it as a test and a warning, said Ni Lexiong, a naval afairs researcher at the
Shanghai University of Political Science and Law.
It would be impossible for China not to react to his provocations, Mr. Ni said
by telephone. Trump seems to want a foreign policy that keeps the other
side guessing. But that way of working can easily lead to trouble.
On Monday, an editorial in a prominent Communist Party newspaper said that

Mr. Xis government needed to be ready for rockier relations.
Trump hits out with a hammer to the east and a club to the west, and his
real thinking is very difficult to fathom, said the editorial in the overseas
edition of the paper, Peoples Daily, using a Chinese saying that means to
speak or act without rhyme or reason. China, it said, should stay steady on
its feet, keep a good grasp of developments, calmly respond, and thats it.
But even Chinas calls for calm have barbs and caveats that could rile a
Trump administration.
2017 Update)
NEG Updates
1
When the Chinese defense ministry said it would return the submersible
drone, it also said the Chinese ship showed a professional and responsible
attitude by seizing the device, although the drone appeared to be outside
even an extremely expansive view of Chinas rightful reach in the South
China Sea.
Chinese hard-liners are already urging a harsher response to Mr. Trump. On

Saturday, Global Times, a newspaper often dominated by anti-American
rhetoric, held a forum in Beijing where speakers urged tough retaliation if Mr.
Trump moved closer to Taiwan, and praised the seizure of the underwater
drone.
China isnt afraid of confrontation with America, Dai Xu, a former Chinese
Air Force senior colonel and outspoken hawk, said at the meeting. Without
Chinas cooperation, Trump will achieve nothing. I dare say that if he opts for
confrontation with China, he wont stay in office for more than four years.
Another speaker, Jin Canrong, a professor of international relations at Renmin

University in Beijing, told Global Times: China is a dragon. America is an
eagle. Britain is a lion. When the dragon wakes up, the others are all snacks.
Such tough talk does not set Chinese foreign policy, but Mr. Xi and other
leaders are sensitive to nationalist ire that they themselves have nurtured.
Mr. Xi has summed up his vision of national rejuvenation and strength as the
Chinese Dream, a theme he has promoted since taking office.

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CDL Core Files 2016-2017

CDL Core Files

2NC/1NR Global Economy #3BIT Hurts the Economy..............................52

2AC Answers to: China Relations DA.........................................................124

2AC Harms (Regime Change) AT #1Regime Change Coming Now........184

2AC Harms (US Economy) AT #1Manipulation Doesnt Hurt US Economy

2NC/1NR AT #6Cooperation Solves Conflict...........................................292

2NC/1NR Economic Links..........................................................................385

2NC/1NR Human Rights Topicality AT #3CEducation.............................433

2NC/1NR Human Rights EU CP AT: the EU already regulates....................468

2NC/1NR Pressure CP- BIT - Solvency Overview........................................515

2NC/1NR AT #3Engagement Link Turn...................................................564

1AR Extensions to 2AC #1: Cant Predict Trump Foreign Policy...............619

Bilateral Investment Treaty

Communist Party of China (CCP): Main political party of China.

Bilateral Investment Treaty 1AC

Council on Foreign Relations, February 2016 [International bipartisan

2. The global economy is headed for a recession

Whitefoot, April 2016 [John, editor at Lombardi Financial, specializing

3. Economic decline causes nuclear war

TIME, February 2016 [Mark Thompson, U.S.-China Showdown Keeps

2. South China Sea conflict causes nuclear war

The Diplomat, March 2016 [Shannon Tiezzi, premier

Chens announcement came as something of a surprise, because the BIT has

Mendis and Wang, May 2016 [Joey and Patrick, Mendis is

Throughout these intervening 20th century years, the meager trading

2AC AT Global Economy #1China

1. Extend our Diplomat evidence.

[EXPLAIN HOW YOUR OPTION IS TRUE BELOW]

Morrison, 2015 [Wayne, Specialist in Asian Trade and Finance,

3 US-China economic cooperation limitedUS is

Morrison, 2015 [Wayne, Specialist in Asian Trade and Finance,

Despite growing commercial ties, the bilateral economic relationship has

2AC AT Global Economy #2

1. Extend our Mead evidence.

[CIRCLE ONE OR MORE OF THE FOLLOWING OPTIONS]:

[EXPLAIN HOW YOUR OPTION IS TRUE BELOW]

[EXPLAIN WHY YOUR OPTION MATTERS BELOW]

2 Economic decline causes warthree warrants

2AC AT Global Economy #3BIT

1. Extend our evidence.

[EXPLAIN HOW YOUR OPTION IS TRUE BELOW]

[EXPLAIN WHY YOUR OPTION MATTERS BELOW]

Morrison, 2015 [Wayne, Specialist in Asian Trade and Finance,

3 China is a HUGE growing market for goodsBIT gives

Morrison, 2015 [Wayne, Specialist in Asian Trade and Finance,

Peterson Institute for International Economics, 2015 [private, nonprofit

2AC AT Global Economy #4

1. Extend our evidence.

[EXPLAIN HOW YOUR OPTION IS TRUE BELOW]

Profit Confidential, May 2016 [financial news and opinion

Council on Foreign Relations, February 2016 [International,

2AC AT US-China War #1No

1. Extend our TIME evidence.

[EXPLAIN HOW YOUR OPTION IS TRUE BELOW]

2AC AT US-China War #2China

1. Extend our TIME and Tikhonova evidence.

[EXPLAIN HOW YOUR OPTION IS TRUE BELOW]

Mendis and Wang, May 2016 [Patrick and Joey, Mendis is a

2AC AT US-China War #3Brink

1. Extend our evidence.

[EXPLAIN HOW YOUR OPTION IS TRUE BELOW]

2AC AT US-China War #4Chinas

[EXPLAIN HOW YOUR OPTION IS TRUE BELOW]