Perceptual Experience and Concepts in

Classical Indian Philosophy

First published Thu Dec 2, 2010; substantive revision Mon Jun 22, 2015

Classical Indian Philosophy accepts perception (pratyaka), or perceptual experience, as the

primary means of knowledge (prama). Perception (pratyaka) is etymologically rooted in
the sense-faculty or the sense-organ (aka) and can be translated as sensory awareness, while
prama, on the other hand, is derived from knowledge (pram) and, literally means the
instrument in the act of knowing. However, the standard interpretation of perception
accepted by classical Indian philosophers, barring the Buddhists and the Vedntins, is that it
is a cognition arising within the selfthe knowing subjectfrom mental operations
following a sense-object contact. It, therefore, is neither an instrument in the act of knowing,
nor a mere sensory awareness. Definitions of perception from various classical Indian
philosophy schools are given in section 2 below.

The same is true of concepts. There is no one agreed notion or definition of concept
understood as the meaning of a general term in Classical Indian Philosophy. Rather, we have
a variety of views ranging from robust realism about concepts as real properties, essences or
universals to extreme nominalism which admits only of unique particulars with versions of
conceptualism in between. The robust realist position is defended by the Nyya-Vaieika
and Mms schools, the nominalist by the Buddhist schools and the conceptualist by the
Vedntins and Jainas. I will not be discussing the conceptualist position or their arguments
here because ultimately this position ends up collapsing into a version of realism or
nominalism.

1. Introduction
2. Perspectives on Perception
o 2.1 Buddhist nominalism
o 2.2 Nyya realism
o 2.3 Mms realism
o 2.4 Skhya definition
o 2.5 Advaita Vednta: direct knowledge
3. Nirvikalpaka and Savikalpaka Pratyaka
o 3.1 The basis of Buddhist nominalism
o 3.2 The development of Hindu realism: the Nyya mission
o 3.3 The Mms advance in realism
o 3.4 The bdika (Grammarian) nominalism and realist objections
o 3.5 The Advaita Vednta: a compromise on Hindu realism
4. Constructing Concepts or Knowing Universals?
5. Perceptual Illusion
Bibliography
o Texts in English translation
o General works
Academic Tools
Other Internet Resources
Related Entries
1. Introduction
The etymology of perception in Sanskrit underlines a major and, perhaps the most
controversial, issue in classical Indian epistemology, viz. is the sensory core all there is to the
content of a perceptual experience? Put differently, it is asked whether the content of a
perceptual experience is restricted to being unconceptualized (nirvikalpaka), or can any part
of it be conceptualized (savikalpaka) as well? The Naiyyikas generally take perception to be
a two-staged process: first there arises a non-conceptual (nirvikalpaka) perception of the
object and then a conceptual (savikalpaka) perception, both being valid cognitions. For
Buddhists, non-conceptual perceptions alone are valid, while Grammarians (bdikas) deny
their validity altogether. Skhya and Mms agree with the Nyya position. These two
realist schools, Nyya and Mms, contest the Grammarian as well as the Buddhist
positions. Advaita Vednta position on perception seems to agree, in spirit, with the
Buddhists, but their reasons for supporting non-conceptual perceptions alone as ultimately
valid (paramrthika satta) are very different. This debate, on the role of concepts in
perception, is discussed in detail in section 3.

Yet another debate about the nature of universals and concepts looms in the background of
this debate. How do we know universals or concepts? The Buddhist introduce the doctrine of
apoha to provide the resources for constructing concepts from sensory content to further the
nominalist project of explaining thought and language in a world of particulars. In response
to Buddhist nominalism, Nyya philosophers present a defense of realism in the course of
which they argue for a theory of real perceivable universals. This debate will be the focus of
secion 4.

A very critical question germane to these epistemological issues is raised by the Buddhist
philosopher Vasubandhu (c. 4th century CE): how do we distinguish veridical perceptions
from the non-veridical ones? This is taken up in the last section.

Before we start out with the definitions, the following observation may be noted. It is true
that the classical Indian philosophers were seriously concerned with the notions of
enlightenment, the highest good, freedom from the cycle of rebirth and the attainment of
ultimate bliss, etc. Therefore, some even question whether they were concerned with any
epistemological questions at all, much less the ones raised here? But they were! For
Naiyyikas, in particular, this was a major focus: the reason offered in the early Nyya
tradition, in Vtsyyana's (c. 450500 CE) commentary on the Nyya-stra, is that without
knowledge of objects there is no success in practical response to them. Not very enlightening,
perhaps. However, a much sharper justification comes from Gagea (c. 12th century CE),
the founder of the Navya-Nyya school, in the introduction to his great work, Jewel Of
Reflection On The Truth (Tattvacintmai):

In order that discerning persons may have interest in studying the work, Akapda Gautama
(c. 2nd century CE) laid down the stra: Attainment of the highest good comes from right
knowledge..

It should not then be surprising that one of the most sophisticated classical Indian treatises
dealing with perception, Kumrila's (c. 7th century CE) Pratyakapariccheda (a portion of
lokavrttika pertaining to the fourth stra of Mms-stra), discusses the nature and
validity of perception without any consideration of its role in the ascertainment of religious
and moral truth; in fact, the Mms-stra itself characterizes perception as not being a
means of knowing righteousness (Dharma). It is true that epistemological debates in classical
Indian philosophy arose in the religio-philosophical context; however, there is plenty of
evidence on record to show that classical Indian philosophers were haunted by the very same
epistemological concerns that have troubled the minds of Western philosophers through the
ages. The controversial classical Indian epistemology issuewhether perception is
conceptualized or not?continues to be debated in the Western and Indian philosophy
journals even today. That said, what makes this historical inquiry significant is that the
epistemological issues in classical Indian philosophy are introduced against the backdrop of
radically different metaphysical and ethical presuppositions.

2. Perspectives on Perception
Most classical Indian philosophical schools accept perception as the primary means of
knowledge, but differ on the nature, kinds and objects of perceptual knowledge. Here we first
survey Buddhist and orthodox Hindu schools' definitions of perception (excluding Vaieika
and Yoga schools since they simply take on board Nyya and Skhya ideas, respectively)
and note the issues raised by these definitions. As mentioned above, the orthodox schools
generally accept both non-conceptualized (indeterminate) and conceptualized (determinate)
perceptual states in sharp contrast to the Buddhist view that perception is always non-
conceptualized or indeterminate awareness.

2.1 Buddhist nominalism

The oldest preserved definition of perception in the Buddhist tradition is the one by
Vasubandhu (c. 4th century CE), Perception is a cognition [that arises] from that object
[which is represented therein] (Frauwallner, 1957, p. 120). However, the more influential
and much discussed view is that of later Buddhist Yogcra philosopher Dinga (c. 480540
CE) for whom perception is simply a cognition devoid of conceptual construction
(kalpanpodha). Taber (2005, p. 8) notes two important implications of this definition.
First, perception is non-conceptual in nature; no seeing is seeing-as, because that necessarily
involves intervention of conceptual constructs, which contaminate the pristine given.
Perception is mere awareness of bare particulars without any identification or association
with words for, according to Dinga, such association always results in falsification of the
object. Referents of the words are universals which, for the Buddhist, are not real features of
the world. Second, Dinga's definition only indicates a phenomenological feature of
perception; it says nothing about its origin and does not imply that it arises from the contact
of a sense faculty with the object. Therefore, for the Buddhist idealist, the object that appears
in perceptual cognition need not be an external physical object, but a form that arises within
consciousness itself. Both these ideas led to vigorous debates in classical Indian philosophy
between the Hindus and the Buddhists. The first of these ideas relates to the notion of non-
conceptual perception, the second to idealism. Dinga's philosophy is idealist-nominalist in
spirit and his epistemological position is in sync with the Buddhist metaphysical doctrines of
no-self and evanescence of all that exists which, expectedly, evoke strong reaction from the
realist Nyya-Vaieika and Mms schools.
In recent literature, there has been a scholarly debate on whether the Indian Yogcra
philosophy is a form of idealism or not. This debate is murky because there are various
versions of idealism discussed in the literature in Buddhist philosophy. At least three versions
have been discussed in recent literature in Buddhist philosophy: subjective idealism (the view
that there are no mind-independent objects); metaphysical idealism (the view that external
objects do not exist); and, epistemic idealism (the view that what we are immediately aware
of is intrinsic to cognition). Lusthaus (2002) and Coseru (2012) have argued, respectively, for
a "phenomenological" and "phenomenalist naturalist" interpretation of Yogcra in
opposition to the standard idealist interpretation. The main argument for the
phenomenological reading is that the epistemic claims made by the Yogcra philosophers do
not commit them to ontological claims. This would avoid the charge of metaphysical idealism
but is still open to being interpreted as offering an epistemic or subjective idealism. Lusthaus
sees Yogcra philosophers' denial of solipsism and affirmation of other minds as a fatal
blow to the idealist interpretation of Yogcra. Idealism does not necessitate solipsism as is
made clear in Berkeley's version of subjective idealism and Hegel's absolute idealism which
explicitly requires other minds. Thus, there is reason to think that the idealist interpretation of
Yogcra is not threatened by its commitment to other minds. It is not entirely clear whether
Coseru's phenomenalist view involves a denial of idealism or he thinks that it is compatible
with an idealist reading of Yogcra.

More recently, Kellner and Taber (2014) have presented a new reason for the revival of the
standard idealist reading of Yogcra. Their argument for this reading is based on
Vasubandhu's argumentative strategy rather than the logical structure of individual proofs.
They claim that in the Viik Vasubandhu uses the argument from ignorance, according to
which, the absence of external objects is derived from the absence of evidence for their
existence. They also note that Vasubandhu uses the same strategy to refute the existence of
the self in the Abhidharmakoabhya IX. The argument from ignorance seems like a bad
strategy. It is often listed as a logical fallacy of the general form: since statement P is not
known or proved to be true, P is false. But because the general form of the argument is bad, it
does not necessarily follow that every argument of that form is unsuccessful. It may well
succeed because of other features, for example the semantic meanings of the terms or when
the arguments are arguments to the best explanation. Kellner and Taber emphasise that some
arguments from ignorance are successful when they function as arguments to the best
explanation especially in contexts where there are agreed-upon standards of verification. For
example, the medical community agrees that the most accurate and sensitive test for typhoid
is testing the bone marrow for Salmonella typhi bacteria. If it turns out that it cannot be
proven that one has typhoid (because of the lack of Salmonella typhi bacteria in one's bone
marrow), then it is false that one has typhoid. No matter how suggestive the symptoms are, if
the specific bacteria do not show up in the bone marrow within a specific time period, then
one does not have typhoid. So, then, the question is: Is Vasubandhu's argument from
ignorance successful for establishing idealism? I fear not. That is because there are no
universally agreed-upon criteria among Classical Indian philosophers (not even among
fellow-Buddhists) as to what counts as evidence for the existence of external things.

2.2 Nyya realism

The most comprehensive, and the most influential, definition of perception in classical Indian
philosophy is offered in Gautama's Nyya-stra 1.1.4:
Perception is a cognition which arises from the contact of the sense organ and object and is
not impregnated by words, is unerring, and well-ascertained.

Expectedly, each part of this definition has raised controversy and criticism. If perception is a
cognition (and non-erroneous), then it is a state of knowledge, rather than a means to
knowing! How does that constitute a primary means of knowledge? Some Naiyyika
commentators, Vcaspati Mira (c. 900980 CE) and Jayanta Bhaa (c. 9th century CE)
among them, suggest that the stra is to be understood by adding to it the term from which
(yata), since the preceding stra-s indicates that Gautama's formulation of this stra was
intended to define the instrument of a valid perceptual cognition. Another issue has been the
interpretation of the word contact. In what sense are the eye and the ear, the sense organs
for vision and auditory perception, respectively, in contact with their objects? Here a careful
look at the term sannikara, generally translated as contact, helps resolve the issue;
Sannikara literally means drawing near, and can be interpreted as being in close
connection with or in the vicinity of. Thus perception is that which arises out of a close
connection between the sense organ and its object.

More substantial debates on the nature of perception focus on the adjectives in the latter part
of the stra, viz., non-verbal (avyapadeyam), non-erroneous or non-deviating
(avyabhichri), and well-ascertained or free from doubt (vyavasytmaka). There is some
disagreement among the Naiyyika commentators about the interpretations of the adjectives
non-verbal and well-ascertained. Vtsyyana, in his commentary on the Nyya-stra, argues
that the adjectives non-verbal and well-ascertained are really part of the definition; non-
verbal to point out that perceptual knowledge is not associated with words (Bharthari, the
famous Grammarian, on the other hand, holds that awareness is necessarily constituted by
words and apprehended through them) and well-ascertained to affirm that perceptual
knowledge is only of a definite particular and specifically excludes situations in which the
perceiver may be in doubt whether a perceived object a is an F or a G. Vcaspati Mira,
argues that the adjective well-ascertained need not be used to exclude the so-called
perception in the form of doubt, as doubtful knowledge, being invalid, is already excluded by
the adjective non-erroneous. Rather, the term vyavasytmaka stands for determinate
perceptual judgment. Thus understood, the adjectives non-verbal and determinate seem to be
complementary; a piece of non-verbal perceptual knowledge cannot be said to be, at the same
time, determinate. Vcaspati Mira posits that these two adjectives indicate two different
forms of perceptual cognition and are not to be regarded as its defining characteristics.
According to him, Gautama included these adjectives to identify two kinds of perceptual
knowledge: avyapadeyam indicates non-conceptual or non-verbal perception and
vyavasytmaka indicates conceptual or determinate perceptions. He contends that by the
term non-verbal, Gautama refutes the Grammarian view and includes non-conceptual
perception and, by the term well-ascertained, he refutes the Buddhist view and includes
conceptual or judgemental perceptions as valid. Pradyot Mondal (1982) traces the history of
this controversy among Naiyyikas. He offers overwhelming scholarly evidence in favor of
the view that Naiyyikas mostly regard the adjectives as part of the definition of perception
and do not agree with Vcaspati's interpretation. For most Naiyyikas non-verbal is
included to deny the causal role of words in origination of perceptual cognition and,
therefore, it applies to non-conceptual and conceptual perceptions both, the difference being
that the former is inexpressible in language, while the latter is not. Thus Mondal claims that
the adjective non-verbal is sufficient on its own to reject the Grammarian and the Buddhist
views of perception. Non-verbal has raised a most contentious debate, for over a
millennium, between Nyya and Buddhist philosophers, and it is still alive today. The role of
concepts in perceptionin dispute in this debatewill be discussed in the next section.

The Navya-Naiyyika Gagea objects to the notion sensory connection in the classical
Nyya definition of perception, arguing that this makes the definition too wide and too
narrow at the same time: too wide because it implies that every awareness is perceptual being
produced by virtue of a connection with the inner sense faculty or mind (manas); too
narrow because it fails to include divine perception, which involves no sensory connection.
Gagea offers a simpler definition of perception as an awareness which has no other
awareness as its chief instrumental cause. Being concerned that his definition may be
interpreted as ruling out conceptualized or determinate perception that may have non-
conceptual or indeterminate perception as one of it causes, he argues that indeterminate
perception can never be the chief instrumental cause of determinate perception, although it is
a cause, since it supplies the qualifier or the concept for determinate perception.

2.3 Mms realism

The Purva Mms-stra (MS) were originally composed by Jamini around 200 BCE. The
fourth MS 1.1.4 says:

The arising of a cognition when there is a connection of the sense faculties of a person with
an existing (sat) objectthat (tat) is perception; it is not the basis of the knowledge of
Dharma, because it is the apprehension of that which is present. (Taber, 2005:44)

There is no consensus among Mms commentators on whether this is intended as a

definition of perception, even while an initial reading of it suggests that it may be. Kumrila,
the noted Mms commentator argues that the first part of the stra is not intended as a
definition because of the context in which it figures; the stra-s preceding it are concerned
with an inquiry into righteousness (Dharma). Moreover, the stra construed as a definition of
perception, results in too wide, and not too accurate, a definition, because it only says that
perception arises from a connection between the sense faculty and an existing object and does
not exclude perceptual error or inferential cognition. Taber (2005, 16), on the other hand,
suggests that it is possible to construe MS 1.1.4 as a valid definition, and indeed such a
construal was proposed by an earlier commentator, the so-called Vttikra quoted at length by
bara in his barabhyam. This, the most extensive commentary on the Mms-stra,
suggests that the words of the stra (tat = that and sat = existing) be switched around for a
different reading for the first part of the stra, which would then state that, a cognition that
results from connection of the sense faculties of a person with that (tat) [same object that
appears in the cognition] is true (sat) perception. This switch rules out perceptual error and
inference; both these present objects other than those that are the cause of the perception.

2.4 Skhya definition

In the oldest Skhya tradition, perception is the functioning of a sense organ. This is clearly
inadequate, as the ancient skeptic Jayari Bhaa (c. 8th century CE) is quick to point out.
Perception in this sense cannot be a means of knowledge (prama) as it does not distinguish
between proper and improper functioning of sense organs and, therefore, between valid and
erroneous perceptions. A more sophisticated definition is later devised wherein perception is
an ascertainment [of buddhi or intellect] in regard to a sense faculty (Skhyakrik 5 in
Yuktdipik). This implies that perception is a modification of the intellect in the form of
selective ascertainment of an object, brought about by the activity or functioning of a sense
faculty. In some respects, this characterization of perception as an ascertainment of the
intellect neatly captures the idea that perception, being an instrument of knowledge, is the
primary means of knowledge. Ascertainment residing in the intellect is regarded as the
instrument of perception, while residing in the self it is regarded as the result of the process of
perception. Furthermore, the Skhyakrik states that the function of the senses with regard
to the objects is a mere seeing (Skhyakrik, 28b), and the function of the intellect,
referred to as ascertainment, can be thought of as identification of the object as in this is a
cow, etc. (Skhyakrik 5ab). This suggests a two-stage process: first the functioning of
the sense faculty results in mere seeing of the object (non-conceptualized awareness) and,
later this mere seeing is acted upon by the intellect or mind and results in a conceptual
identification of the object. This two-stage process is very similar to the detailed account of
conceptual (savikalpaka) perception offered by the Mmsakas and the Naiyyikas.

2.5 Advaita Vednta: direct knowledge

According to Advaita Vednta the defining characteristic of perception is the directness of

knowledge acquired through perception (Bilimoria, 1980:35). In highlighting the directness
of the perceptual process, the Advaitin differs from Nyya and Mms proponents for
whom the contact of the sense faculty with its object is central to the perceptual process.
Vednta Paribh (ed. 1972: 30) cites pleasure and pain as instances of perception that are
directly intuited without any sense object contact. For the Advaitin perception is simply the
immediacy of consciousness; knowledge not mediated by any instrument (Gupta et. al., 1991,
p. 40). It is worth noting that this definition is very close to that accepted by Navya-
Naiyyikas. Like the latter, the Advaitins regard the role of the sensory connection as
accidental, rather than essential, to the perceptual process. The Neo-Advaitins accept the
distinction between conceptual or determinate perception (they refer to it as viayagata
pratyaka) and non-conceptual or indeterminate perception (nirvikaplapka pratyaka), but do
not think of non-conceptual perception as simply a prior stage of conceptualized perception,
as other Hindu schools do.

3. Nirvikalpaka and Savikalpaka Pratyaka

The Sanskrit term kalpan is variously translated as imagination or conceptual construction
and is meant to be the source of vikalpa, roughly translated as concepts, but which may
stand for anything that the mind adds to the given. The time-honored differentiation of
perception into conception-free perception (nir-vikalpa pratyaka) and conception-loaded
perception (sa-vikalpa pratyaka) is made on the basis of concepts (vikalpa) (Matilal, 1986:
313).

3.1 The basis of Buddhist nominalism

The distinction between non-conceptual and conceptual was first drawn by Dinga who
contended that all perception is non-conceptual because what constitutes seeing things as they
really are must be free from any conceptual construction. The claim is that a verbal report of
proper perception is strictly impossible, for such a report requires conceptualization, which is
not perceptual in character; the objects of conceptual awareness are spontaneous
constructions of our mind and are essentially linguistic in character. On the other hand, what
is seen, the given, does not carry a word or a name as its label and neither is such a label
grasped along with the object, nor inherent in it, nor even produced by it; objects-as-such, the
real particulars (svalakaas), do not, as Quine would say, wear their names on their sleeves.
Furthermore, the sense faculty cannot grasp a concept or a name; if I have never smelt garlic
before I first encounter it, I cannot smell it as garlic, though I can smell IT; an olfactory
awareness can only grasp a smell present in the olfactory field. The Buddhists argue that a
perceiver apprehends only the real particulars, arbitrarily imposes concepts/words on them
and believes, mistakenly, that these are really there in the objects and integral to them. The
conceptual awareness conceals its own imaginative quality and, because it results directly
from experience, the perceiver takes it to be a perceptual experience. The perceiver fails to
notice that imagination is involved and mistakenly thinks that he really perceives the
constructed world. From the Buddhists standpoint, therefore, a perceiver can only perceive
real particulars so that any perceptual experience is always and only at the non-conceptual
level.

3.2 The development of Hindu realism: the Nyya mission

The Nyya view evolves in response to Buddhist account of perception. They regard
perception as a cognitive episode triggered by causal interaction between a sense faculty and
an object. This interaction first results in a sensory impression, nothing more than mere
physiological change. This preliminary awareness, non-conceptual perception, is a necessary
first step in the process of perception and is invariably followed by a structured awareness
leading to conceptual perception. A cognition that is independent of preliminary sensory
awareness cannot result in a perceptual judgment. The first awareness does not destroy the
perceptual character of the second; rather, it facilitates this subsequent awareness. Non-
conceptual perception is an indispensable causal factor for generation of conceptual
perception, although memory, concepts and collateral information may also be required. It is
important to note that the Nyya notion of vikalpa (in their distinction of nir-vikalpa and sa-
vikalpa) is different from that of the Buddhists. Unlike the latter, the Naiyyikas do not think
of vikalpa-s as mental creations or imaginative constructions but as objectively real properties
and features of objects. Vikalpa in this sense indicates the operation of judging and
synthesizing rather than imagining or constructing. Thus conceptual perceptions truly
represent the structure of reality. Of the five types of concepts (vikalpa-s) recognized by the
Buddhists, viz. nma (word), jti (universal), gua (quality), kriy (action) and dravya
(substance), the Naiyyikas, regard all but the first vikalpa as categories of reality (Mondal,
1982, p. 364). Unlike the Grammarians, the Nyya schools do not accept the objective reality
of words; words are not inherent to the object presented in perception. Rather, the Naiyyikas
hold that the relation between word and object is created by convention in a linguistic
community. Although a concept is associated with a word (nma-vikalpa) by means of a
convention, it is not merely a fabrication. For example, when someone brings garlic clove
near my nose and teaches me by pointing to it that it is called garlic, then subsequently
confronted with the garlicky odor and a similar clove, I can see it and smell it as garlic. Thus
perceptual awareness includes knowledge of words but, insofar as it is perceptual awareness,
it is brought about by sensory contact with the object and, its properties which exists
independently of words.

The Buddhists reject this argument on the basis that the conventional meaning of a word
relates the word with the concept or the universal. Universals or concepts cannot be objects of
our perception; they cannot be sensed. Universals, attributes and concepts are theoretical
constructs for the Buddhists; what is sensed is the actual object, the exclusive particular, the
ultimate existent. The Buddhists offer two arguments in favor of the claim that only
particulars are real. First, knowledge by means of words or verbal testimony is very different
from perceptual knowledge, for what we are aware of when we hear the words garlic is
pungent is very different from what we are phenomenologically aware of when we smell
garlic; words do not denote or stand-in for actual objects and can be uttered in the absence of
any objects, but perception cannot arise in the absence of objects. Second, the particulars are
real or existent because they have causal efficacy (arthakriysmarthya). Only particular real
garlic can flavor one's food or ruin it, but the universal garlichood cannot do any of these; in
this sense, only the particulars are real for they fulfill the purposes (artha) of humans.

The foregoing discussion shows that the epistemological debate between the Buddhists and
the Naiyyikas regarding the nature of perception rests on, and brings to the fore, their
metaphysical disagreement about the nature of universals. The Naiyyikas are realists about
universals; universals are objective features of the world that impress themselves upon minds;
they are not mere figments of our imagination. The Naiyyikas hold that particulars are
qualified propertied wholes and we directly perceive them as they are, without any kind of
manipulation or imposition; we do not impose universals on property-less real particulars,
rather we find stable, durable, relational wholes in reality that do not require any imposition
or manipulation. They argue that there is no evidence of a world of bare particulars, as
claimed by the Buddhists. Therefore conceptual or determinate perception does not involve
distortion of reality; rather it presents things as they really are. To see a piece of sandalwood
as it really is, we do not need to see the sandalwood as a colorless, odorless pure particular;
indeed, since the piece of sandalwood is really brown and really fragrant, to see it as a
propertied whole is to see it as it really is.

The idea that the world consists of propertied particulars seems to put pressure on the notion
of non-conceptual perception. If there are no indeterminate particulars, what is the object of
indeterminate perception? Indeed some Navya-Nyya thinkers hold that the raw data of
perception (real particulars in the Buddhists sense) is too inchoate and elusive to count as
objects of knowledge. Recently, Arindam Chakrabarti (2000), a prominent contemporary
Navya-Nyya thinker offered seven reasons for altogether eliminating non-conceptual, or
immaculate perceptions as he calls them, from Nyya epistemology in an attempt to
understand the deeper relation between direct realism and concept-enriched perception.
Chakrabarti's skepticism about non-conceptual perception as a cognitive state stems from the
fact that we cannot assign an intentional role to the object of indeterminate perception
because the object of non-conceptual perception is incapable of being apperceived or directly
intuited in any fashion. Chakrabarti's gauntlet has been picked by several Nyya enthusiasts
(Phillips, 2001 and 2004; Chadha, 2001, 2004 and 2006) and defenders of Buddhist doctrine
(Siderits, 2004). This debate brings to the fore an important feature of non-conceptual
perception first highlighted by Gagea, suggesting that while there is no direct, apperceptive
evidence for non-conceptual perception, it is posited as the best explanation for the
availability of the qualifier (property, feature), since the cognizing subject is not immediately
aware of the object of non-conceptual perception. Phillips (2001, p.105) presents Gagea's
argument for the inclusion of non-conceptual perception as an essential part of Nyya
epistemology:

it [nirvikalpa pratyaka] is posited by the force of the following inference as the first step
of a two step argument. The perceptual cognition A cow (for example) is generated by a
cognition of the qualifier, since it is a cognition of an entity as qualified (by that qualifier
appearing) like an inference. The second step takes a person's first perception of an
individual (Bessie, let us say) as a cow (i.e., as having some such property) as the perceptual
cognition figuring as the inference's subject (paka) such that the cognizer's memory not
informed by previous cow experience could not possibly provide the qualifier cowhood. The
qualifier has to be available, and the best candidate seems to be its perception in the raw, a
qualifier (cowhood), that is to say, not (as some are wont to misinterpret the point) as
divorced from its qualificandum (Bessie) but rather as neither divorced nor joined, and,
furthermore, not as qualified by another qualifier (such as being-a-heifer) but rather just the
plain, unadorned entity. In the particular example, the entity is the universal, cowhood, or
being-a-cow, although, again, it would not be grasped as a universal. Or as anything except
itself.

The Navya-Nyya notion of non-conceptual perception differs from that of the Buddhists in
many respects, two of which are very important. First, according to Navya-Naiyyikas, there
is no apperceptive evidence for non-conceptual perception, unlike the Buddhists who contend
that conception-free awareness is necessarily self-aware. The Navya-Naiyyikas, as is
obvious from the quote above, emphasize that the evidence for a non-conceptual sensory
grasp of universals comes in the form of an inference. Second, according to Navya-Nyya,
the object of non-conceptual perception is a qualifier (concept), although not given as that in
the first instance, but not a bare particular as the Buddhists hypothesize. It is, as the above
quote explains, posited by the force of an inference; the bare object of non-conceptual
perception becomes the qualifier in a resultant determinate perception. While this does not
satisfactorily address Chakrabarti's concern that lack of apperceptive evidence implies that
the subject cannot assign an intentional role to the object of non-conceptual perception,
Chadha (2006) argues that the subject's not being in a position to assign an intentional role to
the object of non-conceptual perception is no hindrance to the intentionality of non-
conceptual perception itself. Non-conceptual perception is awareness of a non-particular
individual (Chakrabarti, 1995) and can be assigned the intentional role of a qualifier in
virtue of the recognitional abilities acquired by the subject on the basis of the perceptual
episode. The subject sees a non-particular individual but, since there is no apperceptive or
conscious awareness, the subject does not see it as an instance of a universal or a qualifier.
Chadha explicates Gagea's insight that a qualifier is given as a non-particular individual,
neither divorced from nor joined to the qualificandum and, therefore it is wrong to suggest
that lack of apperceptive evidence implies that non-conceptual perception is not an
intentional perceptual state.

3.3 The Mms advance in realism

Kumrila argued against the Buddhist position to show that perception is not always devoid
of concepts. In Pratyakapariccheda, he principally targets Dinga's theory, while
simultaneously addressing some of Dharmakrti's ideas and arguments. Kumrila, like
Naiyyikas, holds both the two kinds of perception as valid. For him the initial non-
conceptualized perception is borne of the undifferentiated pure object (uddhavastu) and is
comparable to the perception of an infant and others who lack a language. The pure object
is the substratum for the generic and specific features of the object, but the subject is not
distinctly aware of any of these and simply cognizes the object as an indeterminate particular,
as this or something. Although Kumrila agrees with the Buddhists that the object of
immediate perception is inexpressible in language, he maintains that it is different, in at least
one respect, from the real particular (svalakaa) of the Buddhists; the latter being a
structure-less unitary whole, whereas the former is non-unitary and grasps both the particular
and the universal aspects of the object. Otherwise, Kumrila argues, it could not give rise to
conceptual awareness, which explicitly identifies such features. Dinga's counterpoint to
this is that conceptual awareness at second stage cannot be a perception, since it involves
application of concepts and words which, in turn, requires memory. If we admit conceptual
awareness as perception, we are forced to accept that a sense faculty is capable of
remembering (since perception is a cognition brought about by the functioning of the sense
faculty) but that cannot be the case because a sense faculty, being a mere instrument of
cognition, is in itself unconscious and cannot remember anything. Kumrila admits that
conceptual awareness is aided by memory and concepts, but argues that that does not rob it of
its perceptual character for the sense faculty is still functioning while in contact with the very
same object. He further suggests that we should not expect a perceptual cognition to arise as
soon as there is contact between a sense faculty and its object. He uses the analogy of
entering a dimly lit room after walking in the blazing sun; even though the contents of the
room are directly available to the sense faculties of the subject who has just walked in, he
does not immediately apprehend the objects in front of him. However, the subject may
become distinctly aware of the objects in the room and their features in the following
moments. The perceptual character of the latter awareness is maintained so long as the
connection between the sense faculty and the object is intact, even when other conceptual
awarenesses or memories intervene between the initial contact with the object and the
subsequent awareness. A conceptual awareness can be referred to as a perception even
though the mind, qua memory, is involved because the functioning of the sense faculty is the
factor responsible for arising of the awareness. Furthermore, he insists that the mind must be
involved in all perceptions since it functions as a link between the sense faculty and the self;
the sense faculty is turned on or activated by a connection with the self and, the self as the
subject of knowledge is involved in all cognitions. He points out that even Buddhists do not
deny this, since they hold that self-reflexive awareness accompanies every cognition. He
contends that the Buddhists are wrong to insist that only a cognition arising directly from the
functioning of a sense faculty is perception; they agree that we perceive inner states, e.g.,
pleasure and pain, and if the mind is accepted as the operative sense faculty in the self-
reflexive awareness of such cognitions, it follows that they should admit that the mind is also
the sense faculty that gives rise to conceptualized cognitions. He, however, clarifies that not
every cognition that follows a contact between a sense faculty and an object is a perception,
for if one were to open one's eyes momentarily (in the above analogy) and construct a
judgment such as that was table with eyes closed again, it would not be a perceptual
cognition since it solely depends on the memory of a fleeting sensory contact.

Later, Dharmakrti, using a methodology very different (and akin to proof by contradiction)
from his predecessor Dinga, raises new problems for the Nyya-Mms view.
Assuming, he says, for the sake of the argument, that universals are real. Then the judgments
This is a cow, It is an animal, relate two distinct entities, namely a particular (or object)
and a universal (or concept) arguably via a non-relational tie as in being substratum and
superstratum, with the proviso that the substratum object has the power to let the universal
reside in it. This leads to all the universals (such as cowness, animalhood, etc) then being tied
to the object by this simple and single power. In such a scenario, any perceptual judgment
involving the universal cowhood as in the case of This is a cow makes subsequent
judgments This is an animal, This is a substance, etc., superfluous. For, if one perceives
an object along with its power to let any one universal reside in it, one must be able to
perceive its power to attract all other universals that reside in it. Thus, there would be no
distinction between This is a cow and This is a substance; clearly an unacceptable thesis.
Matilal (1986, p.326) notes two points in connection with this argument. First, Dharmakrti
assumes that an object, or a unique particular, is perceived in its entirety and no part of it is
left unperceived. Second, the realist has objectified all the universals including the relation-
universal. If, as the realist believes, the object of perceptionthe particularhas the power
to accommodate all universals in it, then the onus is on him to show why only a single
universal manifests itself in a perceptual judgment. This concern is pertinent, especially
against the Nyya philosophers who admit only one single relation-universal: inherence,
which supposedly unites all nesting universals with the object. The Naiyyikas readily
respond to this argument by pointing out that the redundancy objection rests on Dharmakirti's
assumption that an object is grasped in its entirety in perception. This assumption is false;
perception is perspectival, we never see all sides of an ordinary three-dimensional object, but
we still see it.

Furthermore, Dharmakrti's argues that conceptual or judgmental awareness is

phenomenologically distinct from non-conceptual awareness. In the latter we are confronted
with the object of perception which is vivid and immediate, while in the former no object is
present. In the judgment this is a cow, even the subject of the judgment does not refer to
the object of perception, since words do not refer to perceived particulars but to universals
which extend across space and time. Dharmakrti admits that the words we apply to things
have some objective basis in those things; we call something a cow because it has a certain
effect, it gives milk, is gentle, or it calls forth a certain cognition, etc. This effect, in turn,
inclines us to associate the word cow with other things that have the same effect and we do
that by jointly dissociating them from things that lack that effect. Universals, according to the
Buddhists are arbitrarily constructed exclusions (apoha); words serve the purpose of
separating things off from other objects. For example, the word cow singles out a class of
things by excluding them from things they are not, all things assembled together under the
concept cow are distinct from each other and do not share a single nature that the word
cow names. A conceptual awareness insofar as it imputes a word to a particular object and,
therefore a universal nature it shares with all others of the same universal-kind, essentially
falsifies the object. Kumrila objects to the Buddhists theory of universals (apoha) on the
grounds that it is counterintuitive and circular. The theory of universals (apoha) contradicts
our intuition that meaning of a positive word is positive; there is nothing negative about the
word cow. A negative entity can be the meaning of a word only where something is
negated. Moreover, if we accept that understanding x requires eliminating non-x, then in turn
we presuppose knowledge of non-x, which entails an understanding of non-non-x, and so on
(Drefyus, 1997, p.215). The Mmsakas also take on board the concerns raised by the
Naiyyika philosopher Uddyotakara (c. 7th century CE), who questions the theory of
exclusions on the specific grounds that it fails to offer an adequate theory of reference and
relation between concepts and reality. He argues if the word cow primarily designates a
negative entity, either this entity is a cow in disguise or is different from a cow. If it is a cow
in disguise then the Buddhist view of universals is no different from the Nyya common
sense realism that words are used to single out phenomena in the world. If the negative entity
is different from a cow, then the word cow does not refer to real cows, making it difficult to
explain how any word can refer to real objects or classes thereof. This last point begs the
question because the Buddhist denies that words refer to the objects in the real world. For
him words refer to universals, and that is precisely what the world does not contain. The onus
is put back on the realists to show that universals, which serve as meanings of words, are real
properties of objects rather than imagined or mentally constructed features. This challenge is
taken up by the Naiyyikas and their position against the nominalist stand of both the
Buddhists and the Grammarians is presented later below.

3.4 The bdika (Grammarian) nominalism and realist objections

Bharthari, the most notable Grammarian, highlights the intimate relation between language,
thought, and knowledge. Two aspects of his theory have important implications for the nature
of perceptual experience. First, there is no non-linguistic cognition in the world; all
knowledge appears permeated by words. Though Bharthari's theory may leave room for
extraordinary, or other-worldly, cognitions, there is no scope for pure non-conceptualized
perception in this world. The essence of his theory is: words do not designate objects in the
external world directly, but through the intervention of universals, which are inherent in
words. Thus universals constitute the basis of our knowledge of the external world, since they
are intimately connected with language and mind on the one hand, and the world on the other.
Given this, the Grammarians question the very possibility of non-conceptual perception? The
second aspect is underscored by Kumrila who ascribes the so-called Superimposition
Theory to Bharthari (Taber, 2005, p.27), according to which, a word has its own form
superimposed upon its meaning. This has implications for determinate conceptual perception,
which (for the pluralists and direct realists of Mms and Nyya persuasions) arises purely
out of the object itself and involves discrimination and determination of its nature.

Bharthari's argument can be thought of as an attack, on the adjective non-verbal

(avyapadeyam) in the Nyya definition of perception, aimed at their belief that for cognitive
comprehension language is an inessential detail. For him, bare sense-impressions cannot
count as awarenesses because they are nor effective enough, nothing is accomplished by them
and, they do not result in appreciable mental activity. Bharthari gives an example: a man
walking along a village path to approach his house would invariably touch some grass on the
road, and in some sense this would be tactile awareness at a pre-linguistic level
(Vkyapadya, Ch.1, verse 123). But this would not count as an awareness unless combined
with the further ability to sort it out or verbalize it; consciousness cannot reveal an object to
us unless we discriminate it, and the process of discrimination requires verbalization. What
about a baby's awareness, or that of a mute person, asks Vtsyyana? Bharthari points out
that a baby's sensations or a mute person's awarenesses may still count as cognitive because
they are linguistically potent. A pre-linguistic state of an infant can be cognitive if and only if
it has speech potency, which is the cause of verbal language. So also, in the non-conceptual
perceptual awareness (in adults and even some animals) speech-potency is latent; it is an
essential trait of human consciousness and the defining characteristic of cognitive awareness
(Vkyapadya, Ch.1, verse 126). All knowledge of what is to be done in this world depends
on speech-potential; even an infant has such knowledge due to residual traces from previous
births (Vkyapadya, Ch.1, verse 121). The initial sensory awareness of external objects
which does not grasp any special features of them, nonetheless illuminates them in a non-
specific manner as mere things by such expressions as this or that (Bharthari; 123 and
124). Thus, insofar as the initial sensation is an awareness, it can be verbalized. The
following analogy is offered as an argument for positing the presence of speech-seed (verbal
disposition, as some modern philosophers call it) in pre-linguistic awareness: think about the
experience of trying, but failing, to remember a verse heard before. Bharthari claims that the
entire verse exists in the cognitive faculty as speech-potency but because of lack of other
contributory factors there is no verbalization. Similarly, a non-linguistic experience of a
mute-person is an awareness because of the presence of verbal disposition or speech-seed
even though there is no actualization of speech. There are no non-conceptual perceptions,
because ordinary objects are not given to us without a concept (vikalpa) or some mode of
presentation; verbalization makes the concept explicit. There are infinite concepts associated
with an object, none integral to it. However, we always perceive an object in a concept as an
instantiation of a universal; it is a cow, white, bovine, four-legged, etc. The point to note is
that concepts or universals (vikalpa-s) are word-generated and superimposed on the objects;
there are no thing-universals or real universals over and above these. Bharthari's defends
linguistic nominalism, according to which, words are the only universals that exist; thing-
universals are word-generated illusions. As Matilal remarks, for Bharthari there is not much
of a distinction between words and concepts, they are two sides of the same coin (Matilal,
1986, 396).

Naiyyikas and Mmsakas, the common sense realists, raise specific objections to the
Grammarian view on the grounds that it is not borne by experience. We have separate
awarenesses of words and universals. While we may not perceive something as a cow prior to
acquiring the word cow, we are surely aware of cowness before we acquire the linguistic
expression, just as we are aware of and can discriminate shades of red even before we acquire
the names of some of those shades. A non-conceptual awareness of the object is implied by
the subsequent occurrence of a conceptual awareness with determinate content. Kumrila also
points to other phenomena which indicate that the awareness of the meaning of a word (the
object) is independent and distinct from the word itself. Furthermore, awareness of the
meaning and that of the word are usually different kinds of representations; there is no
possibility of confusing or conflating these. Kumrila brings to attention linguistic
phenomena that reinforce the point that words and meanings must be distinct representations,
e.g., homonymy, synonymy, categorizing and recognizing grammatical parts of speech, etc.
The ability to distinguish and discriminate types is perhaps enhanced by knowledge of
language and concepts, but is not completely dependent on it. Those who are not trained in
music can certainly hear the difference between distinct notes, even though they are unable to
identify them by name. Vtsyyana also appeals to the ordinary experience of people who are
conversant with words. Ordinarily, words are apprehended as names of objects. The
knowledge of the word-object association comes after the perceptual knowledge derived
through sense-object contact. Such contact results in a perceptual awareness which, in turn,
provides the occasion for recalling the appropriate word, if indeed the appropriate word exists
in the experiencer's linguistic repertoire. Perceptual knowledge is antecedent to verbal
knowledge and cannot owe its existence to words. Vcaspati Mira specifically objects to
Bharthari's claim that infants and adults who lack a language perceive objects by memory
impressions of their names from previous births. Objects are vividly and clearly given to us in
perception, but the memory-impressions of previous births are at best vague and indistinct.
Vcaspati Mira asks, How can such a vague and unclear thing be identified with a clear and
distinct perception? (Nyyavrttikattparyak, p. 127). His other argument against
Bharthari is the obvious point that words do not necessarily refer to their objects, for
example words in quotation marks do not refer to objects, only to themselves. Moreover, if
the word and its denotation were identical, a blind man would grasp red or redness when he
grasps the word red and a deaf person would grasp the word red when he grasps a red
thing (Nyyavrttikattparyak, p. 129).

The Naiyyikas also have a general response to nominalistsBuddhists as well as

Grammarians. They posit monadic universals that correspond to natural and metaphysical
kinds and one dyadic universal, viz. inherence. The main nominalist objection is that once we
accept real universals in our ontology we risk overpopulating the world with entities
corresponding to every expression that designates a property. For example, if we accept
horsehood and cowhood as universals, we also need to accept universalhood as another
universal. The Naiyyikas propose that not every expression which designates a property
generates an objective universal (jti); some property-expressions correspond to subjectively
constructed categories (updhi), which though useful for analysis, are not ontologically real.
Uddyotakara argues that to correspond to a real universal a general term must meet two
conditions: (i) a general term should be based on a ground, which accounts for the common
awareness of a number of different objects, that makes the application of the term possible,
and (ii) that ground should be a simple (non-compound), unitary property or entity that
cannot be analyzed or explained away otherwise (Commentary on Nyya-stra, 2.2.65).
Universalhood is a bogus universal; it violates the second condition. There is no simple basis
or ground for universalhood as opposed to universals such as cowhood and horsehood; the
ground of being one-in-many can be analyzed in terms of inherence. The same applies to
universals like barefooted, cook, reader etc.; the basis for their application is presence of
compound features such as bare feet, etc. However, this stratagem forces the Naiyyikas to
admit that many general terms designate bogus universals and, consequently, they start
succumbing to the nominalist pressure. Matilal (1986, p. 420421) notes that there is another
way in which it happens to Navya-Nyya: A real universal must partake of the nature of one-
in-many. The Navya-Naiyyika, Udayana (c. 10th century CE), lists a third necessary
condition for disqualifying a property from being regarded as a real universal. Under this
condition, an abstract property that belongs only to one individual is also a bogus universal
even though it is simple and unanalyzable; skyness in the sky is bogus because it is only a
nominal attribute. However, since both cowhood and skyness are simple properties, they are
grasped as such in perception without further qualification. In this sense, Naiyyikas maintain
that some real universals are directly perceptible. When we see a cow, we do not necessarily
see it as a cow, the cow and the cowness are not given as separate entities in our
awareness, rather they appear fused. This leads to the peculiar Nyya view that real
universals and basic properties are grasped in our awareness as epistemic firsts or ultimates
(Matilal, 1986, p.421). Gagea calls such perception, in which universals are grasped as
such, non-conceptual (nirvikalpaka) perception.

3.5 The Advaita Vednta: a compromise on Hindu realism

The Advaita Vednta theory compromises on the realism of earlier classical Hindu
philosophy. Their early view on perception is akin to the Buddhists, although arrived at from
a different perspective. Maana Mira says:

Perception is first, without mental construction, and has for its object the bare thing. The
constructive cognitions which follow it plunge into particulars. (Brahma-Siddhi, 71.1-2)

He draws a distinction between perceptual cognition and constructive cognition, but is careful
to use vikalpa-buddhi, rather than savikalpaka pratyaka, for the latter cognition. For him
perception is always non-conceptual (nirvikalpaka) perception and it is of a universal, indeed
of the highest universal, Being (sat). According to early Vedntins, the real is bereft of all
character since its nature is non-differentiated consciousness or Brahman. Therefore,
perceptual cognition, which presents the real, must be non-conceptual or indeterminate for it
is the knowledge of the existence of a thing without any qualifications or predications.
Maana Mira also denies the thesis that non-conceptual (nirvikalpaka) perception is non-
verbal. This surprising claim is clearly owed to Bharthari's influence, as is evidenced by the
example used by Maana Mira in the argument. Confronted by an opponent with the claim
that verbal knowledge involves duality and relation, and therefore must involve concepts,
Maana Mira replies that verbal knowledge is not necessarily relational: a baby's non-
verbal knowledge of its mother's breast, grasps it merely as this (of course we do not
assume that the baby articulates the word this; the word, as in Bharthari's account, has a
more subtle form in the baby's mind) and, therefore, the highest knowledge of the Ultimate
reality (Brahman) in which there is no duality, no relations, no concepts, may still be verbal.
Neo Advaita-Vedntins, however, accept a distinction between non-conceptual (nirvikalpaka)
perception and conceptual (nirvikalpaka) perceptions from empirical or practical
(vyvahrika) standpoint; from ultimate (paramrthika) standpoint such distinction is
untenable. A brief description of conceptual (viayagata, Advaita-Vednta term for
savikalpaka) perception will help put in perspective Applebaum's (1982) reconstruction of
their notion of non-conceptual (nirvikalpaka) perception later. Determinate perception is the
result of the activity of mind (manas) or antakaraa (literally translated as inner
vehicle)the terms are frequently used interchangeably. Advaitins maintain that the mind
(antakaraa) goes out through the respective sense organ (the eye, say) and pervades the
object of attention. As a result of this contact, the object presents itself as data to the receptive
mind (antakaraa) which, in turn, transforms into mental state (vtti) (Bilimoria, 1980,
p.38). As soon as the data are presented to inner faculty, there is an identification of
consciousness associated with the mental state (antakaraa-vtti) with the consciousness
associated with the object. To say that vtti and data are identified is to say that the form of
the mental state, if all goes well, corresponds one-to-one with the form of the object; the
mental state is a reflection of the object of perception, and as such is non-different from the
object. Thus results a determinate judgment (vttijna) of the form this is a jar.
Furthermore, according to them, we do not perceive our mental states; we directly perceive
the objects themselves. Bilimora explains,

The vtti in the form of the object impresses itself as it were in the mode of the subject itself,
and thereby comes to be apprehended, but as a predicateand not as the pure subject-content
which is the I-notionin the subject's apperception. (Bilimoria, 1980, p.41)

The initial mental state subsides and the subject becomes directly aware of the object itself;
the cognition is self-evident to the subject, just like the cognition of pleasure and pain. In this
reflective stage, the mind (antakaraa) integrates the mental contents corresponding to the
object with familiar or recognized percepts. Determinate perception of the totality of the
object occurs with the completion of the assimilative process.

David Applebaum (1982) notes that Bilimoria's discussion of the Advaitin's notion of
perception focuses on the necessary conditions or criteria for valid or veridical perceptions.
According to him, this approach while justified in the light of perception's inclusion among
the means of knowledge (prama-s) is mistaken because it only focuses on sensation as a
species of mental state (vtti). For the Advaitin, sensation is not a mode exhausted by the
judgmental content of a mental state (vtti), it has epistemic value independently of its role in
judgmental perception. Applebaum quotes from the Upanisadic texts to support this view:

Manas is for men a means of bondage or liberation of bondage if it clings to objects of

perception (visayasangi), and of liberation if not directed towards these objects (nirviayam).
(Applebaum, 1982, p.203)

Non-conceptual perception furnishes us with knowledge of pure existence (sanmtra) rather

than with protodata to construct imagined particulars. Therefore, it is not simply a prior stage
of conceptual perception and so also not necessarily a mental state produced in cooperation
with the object. Applebaum (1982, p.204) suggests that non-conceptual perception in this
sense focuses attention on sensing, in which consciousness turns its attention inwards to the
activity of the sense-organs resulting in deepening and broadening their proprioceptive
content. Proprioception, he claims, points the way to the soul or self (tman); mind
(antakaraa) returns to its presentational activity, its function of monitoring and unfolding
the sensory manifold to create conditions for the emergence of self (tman), which according
to the Advaitin, is identical with the Ultimate reality (Brahman). In non-conceptual
(nirvikalpaka) perception, consciousness is returned to itself and opens up the possibility of
manifesting or seeing the Seer (tman) or knowing the Ultimate reality (Brahman).

4. Constructing Concepts or Knowing Universals?

The problem of universals, as we have seen, is at the epicentre of the debate between Hindu
philosophers and their Buddhist opponents. The doctrine of exclusion (apoha) is the Buddhist
attempt to account for the relation between concepts and sensory content. The doctrine of
apoha basically claims that the term "cow" does not refer to the universal "cowness" or
"cowhood" because there is no such general entity; rather, the term refers to every individual
that is not a non-cow. In a recent paper Tillemans (2011) draws a useful distinction between
two versions of the apoha doctrine: the top-down approach and the bottom-up approach. The
former is presented by Dinga who is also credited with introducing the doctrine of apoha.
According to the top-down version, the negation operator in the exclusion, the apoha
somehow manages pick out real particulars in the world while avoiding any commitment to
universals. Apoha, in this sense functions like a sense or meaning, a not-non X expressed by
the word X, which enables us to pick out real particulars while at the same time avoiding a
commitment to real universals in virtue of the special features of double negation. The latter
is presented by Dharmakrti who uses the causal approach to link language and the world.
According to this version of the doctrine, apoha provides a way to bridge the gap between
sensory perception of particulars and expressions of belief and judgement in thought and
language. The top-down version of the apoha doctrine was subjected to various criticisms
from the Hindu realists, especially by Kumrila who criticised the doctrine on grounds of
circularity. The thought is that in order to understand the exclusion class of non-cows, we
have to first have an idea that some particulars are cows. In other words, one must be able to
refer to cows before one can refer to non-cows. The bottom-up approach developed by
Dharmakrti was basically a response to this circularity worry. His version of the apoha
doctrine is developed as a strategy to bridge the gap between non-conceptual perceptual
content and conceptual content. Dreyfus (2011) develops Dharmakrti's naturalized account
of concept formation by elucidating the mediating role of representations that link reality to
conceptuality. Representations, in this sense, stand for agreed-upon fictional commonalties
and are projected on to discrete individuals (Dreyfus, 2011, 216).

The top-down approach is promising but there is a concern that a bottom-up account might
not succeed in offering a completely reductive story about concepts. In response to this
concern, Ganeri (2011) develops a hybrid account that combines the resources of the top-
down and bottom-up approaches. The idea is that we work up from basic sentience and down
from the language of reference and predication to meet at the middle-ground of feature-
placing in the formation of proto-concepts (Ganeri, 2011, 244). These proto-concepts show
that sense experience can normatively constrain belief and judgement, though it does not give
us a full-blown reductive account of concepts in non-conceptual terms.

The doctrine of apoha and Ganeri's hybrid version may well be ingenious, but it is a far cry
from what would satisfy the Hindu realist. According to Nyya-Vaieika, universals exist in
this very world of ours. We do not need to construct concepts from sensory content, rather
universals are part and parcel of this sensory content. Chadha (2014, 289) explains that
according to Nyya, for a universal to exist all that is required is that it be exemplified; in a
Quinean twist to be is to be exemplified. There is no further requirement that it exist
independently as an abstract entity or in Platos heaven; universals are given directly in
perception insofar as their loci are perceived.

It is useful to think of a universal in this sense as a non-particular individual (Chakrabarti,

1995). Examples abound: Dusky is what many particulars are, though they may be
spatiotemporally separated by many miles and years; rainy is what several days of the year
can be at the same time in different places and at different times in the same place. If we are
not thinking of universals as abstract entities in Platonic heaven or in the mind, but as
individuals out there in the world, it is easier to grasp the idea that they can be perceived. The
Nyya equation of universals and properties might tempt one to think that Nyya conceives
of universals as natural properties in David Lewis sense of the term (Lewis, 1983), but such
is not the case. Nyya universals are as robust as Armstrongs universals: they capture facts
of resemblance and the causal powers of things. Naiyyikas will happily endorse
Armstrongs One over Many argument as the main reason for including universals in their
ontology (Armstrong, 1978). Udayana puts the point thus: Causality is regulated by
universals, so is effect-hood. It is a natural universal if there is no obstruction [in establishing
it]; it is a conditional [nominal] universal when we have to establish it through effort
[construction?] (Kiravl, in Praastapda 1971, p. 23).

Although Gautama mentions universals in the Nyyastras as the meaning of general

terms,there is no explanation in these original stras as to how they might be known.
Praastapda was the first to argue that universals are sensorily given. He argues that
universals, when they inhere in perceptible loci (e.g., cowness in an individual cow), are
perceived by the same sense organs that also perceive those loci (Padrthadharmasagraha,
99). This thesis is explicated in detail by Jayanta Bhaa in Nyyamajar where he argues
against the Buddhist nominalists as well as the holistic monist pan-linguist Bharthari and his
followers. Jayanta makes an allusion to the view that universals are given in indeterminate
perception, a view later developed in detail by Gagea in Tattvacintmai (the chapter on
Perception, the section on Indeterminate Perception). Most of Jayanta's arguments
against the Buddhist nominalist are discussed in detail in Chakrabarti (2006), however, he
does not discuss the issue about universals being given in indeterminate perception. This is,
as we have mentioned in the above sections, because Chakrabarti is sceptical about the
coherence of the notion of indeterminate perception. Chadha (2014) argues that Gagea
makes a unique contribution to this debate in proposing the idea that universals or qualifiers
are given as objects in indeterminate perception. He spells out his argument in terms of
qualifiers rather than real universals, because the logical and epistemological role of a real
universal is the same as that of a simple nominal property. Gagea is concerned with basic,
unanalyzable properties that can be grasped as such in our awareness. Basic properties in this
sense are simple; they can be grasped without further qualification. They are, according to
Nyya, the epistemic firsts comparable to non-conceptual perception in Buddhist
epistemology. Gageas argument is presented by Bhattacharya (1993, pp. 10-11) using a
specific form of inference (parrthnumna) developed in Nyya for convincing others. It
has a five-proposition structure:

1. Proposition: The determinate perception of the form a cow (or thats a cow) is
produced by the cognition of the qualifier.
2. Reason: Because this is a qualificative cognition.
3. Pervasion with an example: Every qualificative cognition is produced by a prior
cognition of the qualifier, for example, inference.
4. Application: The perception of the form a cow is a qualificative cognition.
 5. Conclusion: Hence, it is produced by the cognition of the qualifier.

The weight of the argument rests on the third sentence. Gagea supports it offering various
examples of qualificative cognition, namely inference, recognition, analogy, verbal
testimony, and so on. The point is that unless some awareness of dung is present in a person,
(s)he cannot infer that there is dung on the hill on the basis of seeing some animals grazing on
the hill. Universals like fireness and dungness are given directly in indeterminate perception.
Gageas argument maintains a causal uniformity among pramna-generated cognitions of
an entity as qualified (Phillips and Tatacharya 2004, p. 398). However, there is a problem: if
anything that is known through a qualifier requires a prior cognition of the qualifier, there
will be a regress of cognitions. Gageas answer is that an indeterminate perception blocks
the threat of such a regress, because the qualifier is then grasped directly rather than through
another qualifier. In other words, the object is perceived through the property, but the
property itself is perceived directly rather than through another property. The indeterminate
perception, which precedes the determinate perception of an object through a mode, that is, as
possessing a certain property, is not itself a perception through a mode. Simply put, we need
to grasp the universal cowness in order to have an awareness of a particular as qualified by
cowness. Chadha (2014) argues that Gageas argument thus shows that the postulate of
indeterminate perception of universals is a necessary requirement for realism.

5. Perceptual Illusion
The skeptics challenge strikes at the claim made by the Naiyyikas that perception should be
non-erroneous (avyabhichri) and well-ascertained or free from doubt (vyavasytmaka).
They ask: how do we distinguish between veridical perceptions and the non-veridical ones?
In case of a perceptual doubt, say, seeing something at a distance which looks like a pole or
an old tree-trunk, we are uncertain which it is but are a priori sure it cannot be both. In case
of perceptual illusion, I see a snake but I misperceive as there is only a rope in front of me.
Illusoriness of the experience (seeing a snake) is exposed with reference to another veridical
experience (seeing a rope), but again, we are a priori sure that both cannot be true together.
Then, the Buddhist skeptic, Vasubandhu, raises the ante with the question: could they not
both be false simultaneously? The skeptical argument is premised on a denial of the realist
thesis that experiences refer to a mind-independent reality. Vasubandhu's argument for
idealism appears right at the beginning of Vimatik, when he states:

This [the external world] is consciousness only, because there is appearance of non-existent
things, just as a person with cataracts sees non-existent hairs, moons et cetera. (Feldman,
2005, p. 529).

Vasubandhu offers many other examples of dreams, delusions, hallucinations, etc., where we
are aware of non-existent objects that are products of our imagination and not objects external
to the mind. If it is possible for awareness to create its own object and then grasp it (as in a
dream) then, Vasubandhu argues, everything that we seem to be aware of could be a making
of awareness.

The standard reply to this view appeals to the intuition that illusory experience is parasitic on
veridical experience. The Naiyyika, Vtsyyana explains that an erroneous cognition
depends on a principal cognition as its basis. This is a man for a tree-trunk, which is not a
man, has for its basis a principal cognition of a man. If a man has never been perceived in the
past, an erroneous cognition of a man, in what is not a man, can never be produced (Nyya-
Stra-Bhya, 4.2.35). A similar argument is put forth by the Advaita-Vedanta founder
ankara. He challenges Vasubandhu's view on the ground that it is incoherent; when the
Buddhists say that which is the content of an internal awareness appears as though
external, they are

assuming the existence of an external thing even while they deny it For they use the
phrase as though because they become aware of a cognition appearing externally For
nobody speaks thus: Vinumitra appears like the son of a barren woman. (Brahma-Stra-
Bhya, 2.2.28)

Feldman (2005, p. 534) argues that this does not suffice to defeat Vasubandhu's idealism. The
illusory experience of x, no doubt requires a memory impression which can be produced by a
previous cognition, but there is no further requirement that the previous experience be
veridical, because such impressions can be produced by illusory experiences. Feldman uses
the case of someone who has only experienced snakes in dreams. He can mistake a rope for a
snake, because the previous dream experience provides the necessary memory impression.
Feldman's argument ignores the gravity of the concern raised by Vtsyyana and ankara,
however. They reject Vasubandhu's argument on the grounds that we cannot imagine (dream,
hallucinate, etc) an absolutely unreal thing, like a barren woman's son. The Nyya theory of
imagination, working in the background here, says that to imagine something is to
superimpose or attribute properties belonging to one kind of thing to a thing of different kind,
provided that there is some resemblance between the two kinds of objects (Uddyotakara's
Nyya-Stra-Bhya, 3.1.1). For example, to imagine a centaur is to attribute a property
belonging to the human-kind to a thing of the horse-kind. There is some general resemblance
between the two kinds: both are animals and have legs. However, an absolutely unreal thing
can have no properties, and hence a fortiori no properties in common with an existing thing.
They, therefore, cannot be an object of imagination.

Uddyotakara presents an even stronger argument against the skeptics. In his Nyya-Vrttika
he turns Vasubandhu's own argument against him. Uddyotakara asks: how do we know that
the object of a dream experience is non-existent? Vasubandhu accepts that the dreamer does
not know that he is dreaming; the knowledge that the object is non-existent occurs only when
he awakens and no longer apprehends the object. If non-apprehension of an object in the
waking state is required to support the claim that the objects of dream experience do not
really exist out there, then apprehension in the waking state must be an indicator of their
existence, otherwise there would be no contrast between what is apprehended and what is not
(Nyya-Vrttika, 4.2.33). If there is no such contrast, then Vasubandhu's argument fails
because there is no support for the claim that objects of dream experiences do not exist in the
external world. And, if there is such a contrast between apprehension and non-apprehension,
then at least some external objects must exist. Clearly, Vasubandhu's argument for thesis of
universal delusion (or idealism) does not succeed completely, nor are the realists totally
defeated.

We close this entry on the note that Stra-s were primarily composed in the seven centuries
from 5th BCE to 2nd CE and, thereafter, for the next millennium and more, the philosophical
work was carried forward by Stra commentators (tikkr-s) from respective schools. This
latter period saw these epistemological debates rage among scholars from these schools. Note
also that there is no consensus on the dates given here; most Western scholars accept these,
while Indian schools place them further back in antiquity.
Bibliography
Texts in English translation

Aksapada Gautama, Nyya-Stra, with Vatsyayana's Nyayabhasya, Uddyotakara's

Nyayavartikka, and Udayana'a Parisuddhi, A. Thakur (ed. and trans.), vol. 1, Mithila,
1967.
Bhartrhari, Vkyapadya, Abhyankar K.V. and Limaye V.P. (eds.), Poona University,
1965.
Gagea, Tattvacintmai, Epistemology Of Perception: Gagea's Tattvacintmai,
Jewel Of Reflection On The Truth (About Epistemology): The Perception Chapter
(Pratyaka-khaa), Transliterated Text, Translation, And Philosophical
Commentary, by Stephen H. Phillips and N.S. Ramanuja Tatacharya. Treasury of the
Indic Sciences. New York: American Institute of Buddhist Studies, 2004.
Jayanta Bhatta Nyayamanjari: The Buddhist Refutation of jati. A Critical Edition
(trans.) Kei Kataoka in The Memoirs of Institute for Advanced Studies on Asia, 160:
636(1)594(43), 2011.
Uddyotakara, Nyaya-Vartika, in The Nyya-Stras of Gauama: With the Nyya-
stra-Bhya of Vtsyyana and the Nyaya-Vartika of Uddyotakara, Gangnha Jh
(trans.), Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass, 1984.
Uddyotakara, Nyya-Stra-Bhya, Translations from the introductory commentary
on Nyya-Stra-Bhya, Arindam Chakrabarti (trans.), published as an appendix to A.
Chakrabarti, The Nyya Proofs for the Existence of the Soul, Journal of Indian
Philosophy, 10: 211238, (1982).
Vcaspati Mira, Nyyavrttikattparyak, Anantlal Thaur (ed.), Indian Council of
Philosophical Research, 1996.
Vasubandhu, Viatik-Vtti, Triatika, and Tri-Svabhva-Nirdea, Thomas
Kochumuttom (trans.), in A Buddhist Doctrine of Experience: A New Translation and
Interpretation of the Works of Vasubandhu the Yogcrin, Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass,
1982.
Kumarila Bhatta, The Determination of Perception Chapter of Slokavarttika, A
Hindu Critique of Buddhist Epistemology: The Determination of Perception Chapter
of Kumarila Bhatta's Slokavarttika commentary by Taber, J. (trans.), Routledge
Curzon Hindu Studies Series, New York: Routledge Curzon, 2005.

General works

Armstrong, D. M., 1978, ,Universals and Scientific Realism (Volumes I and II),
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Appelbaum, D., 1982, A Note on Pratyaka in Advaita Vednta, Philosophy East
and West 32:2, pp. 201205.
Bhatt, Govardhan P., 1989, The Basic Ways of Knowing, Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass.
Bhattacharyya, Sibajiban, 1987, Gangesa's Theory of Indeterminate Perception Part
2: Containing the text of Gangesa's Nirvikalpakavada with an English translation and
explanatory notes. Indian Council of Philosophical Research, New Delhi.
Bilimoria, P., 1980, Perception (Pratyaka) in Advaita Vednta, Philosophy East
and West, 30(1): 3544.
Chadha, M., 2014, On Knowing Universals: The Nyya Way, Philosophy East and
West, 64(3): 287-303.
 , 2001, Perceptual Cognition: A Nyya-Kantian Approach, Philosophy East and
West, 51(2): 197209
, 2004, Perceiving Particulars-as-Such Is Incoherent: A Reply to Mark Siderits,
Philosophy East and West, 54(3): 382389
, 2006, Yet Another Attempt to Salvage Pristine Perceptions!, Philosophy East
and West, 56(2): 333342
Chakrabarti, A., 2000, Against Immaculate Perception: Seven Reasons for
Eliminating Nirvikalpaka Perceptions from Nyya, Philosophy East and West, 50(1):
18.
, 2006, On Perceiving Properties, in P.F. Strawson, and A. Chakrabarti (eds.),
Universals, Concepts and Qualities: New Essays on the Meaning of Predicates,
Aldershot: Ashgate, pp. 309-319.
, 2001, Reply to Stephen Phillips, Philosophy East and West, 51(1): 114115.
, 2004, Seeing Without Recognizing? More on Denuding Perceptual Content,
Philosophy East and West, 54(3): 365367
, 1995, Non-Particular Individuals, in P. K. Sen and R. R. Verma (eds.), The
Philosophy of P. F. Strawson, New Delhi: Indian Council of Philosophical Research,
pp. 124144.
Chakrabarti K., 1975, The Nyya-Vaieika theory of universals, Journal of Indian
Philosophy, 3: 363382.
Coseru, C., 2012, Perceiving Reality: Consciousness, Intentionality, and Cognition in
Buddhist Philosophy, New York: Oxford University Press.
Dreyfus, G. B. J., 2011, Apoha as a Naturalized account of Concept Formation, in
M. Siderits, T. Tillemans, and A. Chakrabarti (eds.), Apoha: Buddhist Nominalism
and Human Cognition, New York: Columbia University Press, pp. 207-228.
, 1997, Recognizing reality: Dharmakrti's philosophy and its Tibetan
interpretations, New York: State University of New York Press.
Feldman, J., 2005, Vasubandhu's Illusion Argument and the Parasitism of Illusion
upon Veridical Experience, Philosophy East and West, 55(4): 529541.
Ganeri, J., 2011, Apoha, Feature Placing and Sensory Content, in M. Siderits, T.
Tillemans, and A. Chakrabarti (eds.), Apoha: Buddhist Nominalism and Human
Cognition, New York: Columbia University Press, pp. 228-46.
Gupta, B., Dharmarajadhvarindra, and Anantakrishna Sastri, N. S., 1991, Perceiving
in Advaita Vedanta: Ppistemological Analysis and Interpretation, London: Associated
University Presses.
Kellner, B. and Taber, J., 2014, Studies in Yogcra-Vijnavda idealism I: The
interpretation of Vasubandhu's Viik, Asiatische Studien tudes Asiatiques,
68(3): 709-756, DOI: 10.1515/asia-2014-0060.
Lewis, D., 1983, New Work for a Theory of Universals, Australasian Journal of
Philosophy, 61: 34377.
Lusthaus, D., 2002, Buddhist Phenomenology: A Philosophical Investigation of
Yogacara Buddhism and the Ch'eng Wei-shih Lun (Curzon Critical Studies in
Buddhism Series), London: Routledge.
Matilal, B. K., 1986, Perception: An Essay on Classical Indian Theories of
Knowledge, Oxford: Clarendon Press.
Mohanty, J.N., 2000, Classical Indian Philosophy, Lanham, MD: Rowman and
Littlefield.
Mondal, P. K., 1982, Some aspects of perception in old Nyaya, Journal of Indian
Philosophy, 10(4): 357376.
 Phillips, S. H., 2001, There's Nothing Wrong with Raw Perception: A Response to
Chakrabarti's Attack on Nyya's Nirvikalpaka Pratyaka, Philosophy East and
West, 51(1): 104113
, 2004, Perceiving Particulars Blindly: Remarks on a Nyya-Buddhist
Controversy, Philosophy East and West, 54(3): 389403
Siderits, M., 2004, Perceiving Particulars: A Buddhist Defense, Philosophy East
and West, 54(3): 367382
Thrasher, A. W., 1993, The Advaita Vedanta of Brahma-Siddhi, Delhi: Motilal
Banarsidas.
Wezler, A. and Motegi, S., 1998, (eds.) Yuktidipika: The Most Significant
Commentary on the Samkhyakarika, Volume 1 (Alt und Neu-Indische Studien, No.
41), Stuttgart: Franz Steiner Verlag.

Other Internet Resources

Encyclopedia of Indian Philosophies
Gttingen Register of Electronic Texts in Indian Languages

Related Entries
Early Modern India, analytic philosophy in | mental content: nonconceptual | mental
representation | mind: in Indian Buddhist Philosophy | Ngrjuna | perception:
epistemological problems of | perception: the contents of

Copyright 2015 by
Monima Chadha <Monima.Chadha@arts.monash.edu.au>