Marcos v.

Manglapus
GR 88211, Sept. 15, 1989, 177 SCRA 668

FACTS:
The non-violent people power revolution forced into exile the former
president Ferdinand E. Marcos on February of 1986. In his stead, Corazon C.
Aquino was declared President of the Republic under a revolutionary
government.

Marcos petitioned the court to order the Secretary of Foreign Affairs to issue
a travel documents to enjoin the implementation of President Aquinos
decision to bar their return into the Philippines, citing that Pres. Aquino is
without power to impair the Marcos liberty of abode. They further assert that
the right of the Marcos to return in the Philippines is guaranteed by the Bill of
Rights, specifically Sections 1 and 6.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the president decision to prohibit the return of Marcos into
the Philippines constitute a powers granted by the Constitution,

HELD:
The power involved is the Presidents Residual Power to protect the general
welfare of the people. It must be treated as a matter that is appropriately
addressed to those unstated Residual Powers of the President which are
implicit in and correlative to the paramount duty residing in that office to
safeguard and protect general welfare.
The return of the Marcos is a serious threat. The instant petition is hereby
DISMISSED.
Springer v. Government of the Philippine Islands
277 U.S. 189 (1928)

FACTS:
Certiorari, 275 U.S. 519, the two judgments of ouster rendered by the
Supreme Court of the Philippine Islands in proceedings in the nature of quo
warranto, which were brought in that court by the Philippine government
against the present petitioners to test their right to be directors in certain
corporations described in the opinion.

Acts of the Philippine Legislature creating a coal company and a bank, the
stock of which is largely owned by the Philippine government, provide that
the power to vote the stock shall be vested in a "Committee," in the one
case, and in a "Board of Control," in the other, each consisting of the
Governor-General, the President of the Senate, and the Speaker of the House
of Representatives.

In the Philippine Organic Act, which divides the government into three
departments -- legislative, executive, and judicial -- the principle is implicit,
as it is in state and federal constitutions, that these three powers shall be
forever separate and distinct from each other.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the members of the "board" or "committee" are public
officers in the strict sense, they are at least public agents charged with
executive functions, and therefore beyond the appointing power of the
legislature.

HELD:
The voting of the stock in the election of directors and managing agents of
the corporations is an executive function, and that the attempt to repose it in
the legislative officers named violates the Philippine Organic Act.

Where a statute contains a grant of power enumerating certain things which

may be done, and also a general grant of power which, standing alone,
would include those things and more, the general grant may be given full
effect if the context shows that the enumeration was not intended to be
exclusive.

In 22 of the Organic Act, the clause in the form of a proviso placing all the
executive functions directly under the Governor-General or in one of the
executive departments under his direction and control, and the proviso
preceding it which grant certain powers to the legislature, are both to be
construed as independent and substantive provisions.

An inference that Congress has approved an Act of the Philippine Legislature

reported to it under 10 of the Organic Act cannot be drawn from the failure
of Congress to exercise its power to annul, reserved in that section, where
the Act reported contravenes the Organic Act, and is therefore clearly void.
AFFIRMED

Planas v. Gil
67 PHIL 62

FACTS:
Carmen Planas (then a municipal board member of Manila) statement
criticizing the acts of certain government officials including Pres. Quezon was
published in la vanguardia. The following morning, she received a letter from
Vargas (Secretary to the President) by order of the president containing the
following: In the above statement, you appear to make the following
charges: (1) That the President of the Philippines has violated the
Constitution in that he has taken part in politics, expressing his preference
for the candidates of the Nacionalista Party; (2) That the whole government
machinery has been put in action to prevent the election to the National
Assembly of the candidates of the people; (3) That the candidates of the NP
and of the administration have won the election through frauds and
violations of the civil service rules; (4) That the administration does not
permit the people to freely elect the candidates of their choice. Planas was
then ordered to appear before the CSC for investigation and to prove her
allegations against the administration. She appeared before the CSC but she
questioned the jurisdiction of the CSC over the matter. She said that as an
elective official, she is accountable for her political acts to her constituency
alone, unless such acts constitute offenses punishable under our penal laws
and not to executive officials belonging to a party opposed to that to which
petitioner is affiliated.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the SC has jurisdiction to review orders issued by the
President

HELD:
The acts of the Chief Executive performed within the limits of his jurisdiction
are his official acts and courts will neither direct nor restrain executive action
in such cases. The rule is non-interference. But from this legal premise, it
does not necessarily follow that the SC is precluded from making an inquiry
into the validity or constitutionality of his acts when these are properly
challenged in an appropriate legal proceeding. The classical separation of
governmental powers viewed in the light of political philosophy is a relative
theory of government. There is more truism and actuality in interdependence
than in independence and separation of powers. In the present case, the
President is not a party to the proceeding. He is neither compelled nor
restrained to act in a particular way. The CSC is the party respondent and the
theory is advanced by the Sol-Gen that because an investigation undertaken
by him is directed by authority of the President of the Philippines, the SC has
no jurisdiction over the present proceedings instituted by Planas. The
argument is farfetched. A mere plea that a subordinate officer of the
government is acting under orders from the Chief Executive may be an
important averment, but is neither decisive nor conclusive upon this court.
like the dignity of his high office, the relative immunity of the Chief Executive
from judicial interference is not in the nature of a sovereign passport for all
the subordinate official and employees of the executive Department.
Nevertheless, SC ruled that CSC can take cognizance of the case. Planas was
not denied the right to voice out her opinion but since she made allegations
against the administration it is but right for her to prove those allegations.
The CSC has the right to elicit the truth.
Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer (STEEL SEIZURE CASE)
343 U.S. 579

FACTS:
The Korean War effort increased the demand for steel. Disputes arose
between steel industry management and laborer that culminated in an
announcement of a strike by the union. President Truman authorized
Secretary of Commerce Sawyer to take possession of the steel industry and
keep the mills operating.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the President of the United States have executive power
under the war powers clause of the U.S. Constitution, or any implied powers
gleaned therefrom to authorize the Secretary of Commerce to seize the
nations steel mills?

HELD:
No. The President does not have implicit or explicit executive power under
the war powers clause of the U.S. Constitution, or any implied powers
gleaned therefrom to authorize the Secretary of Commerce to seize the
nations steel mills.

The court held that there was no explicit statute or act of Congress which
authorized the President to act in such a manner. The only two statutes
which authorized the acquisition of personal and real property were not met
here. Not only were such acts unauthorized, Congress specifically refused to
grant such authorization.
The court held that in order for the President to have this authority, it must
be found somewhere explicitly in the Constitution, or implicitly in some
historical context or foundation. The President cannot order policy; he can
only suggest it.

Congress can approve any proposal for regulation, policy, and settlement of
disputes, wages, and working conditions. None of this is delegated to the
President. Under a textual approach to interpreting the Constitution the
Presidents powers are curbed in this extension

Myers v. United States

272 U.S. 52, 47

FACTS:
Under an 1876 rule, the President had to get the Senates permission to
remove the postmaster of Portland, Oregon. That individual had been
appointed with the Senates advice and consent. The President asked for the
individuals resignation without consulting the Senate first, and the Senate
refused the President permission to do so.

ISSUE:
Whether or not, under the Constitution the President has the exclusive power
of removing executive officers of the United States whom he has appointed
by and with the advice and consent of the Senate

HELD:
The Constitution granted the President the executive power of the
government. The general administrative control of those executing the laws,
including the power of appointment and removal of executive officers, a
conclusion confirmed by his obligation to take care that the laws be faithfully
executed; that article 2 excludes the exercise of legislative power by
Congress to provide for appointments and removals, except only as granted
therein to Congress in the matter of inferior offices; that Congress is only
given power to provide for appointments and removals of inferior officers
after it has vested, and on condition that it does vest, their appointment in
other authority than the President with the Senates consent; that the
provisions of the second section of article 2, which blend action by the
legislative branch, or by part of it, in the work of the executive, are
limitations to be strictly construed, and not to be extended by implication;
that the Presidents power of removal is further established as an incident to
his specifically enumerated function of appointment by and with the advice
of the Senate, but that such incident does not by implication extend to the
Senates power of checking appointments.

Forbes v. Chuoco Tiaco

16 Phil 534

FACTS:
There was a prayer for an injunction and damages. The defendants
demurred, but the demurrer was overruled and a temporary injunction
granted. Thereupon Forbes, Harding, and Trowbridge sued for writs of
prohibition against the judge and the respective plaintiffs, alleging that the
expulsion was carried out in the public interest and at the request of the
proper representative of the Chinese government in the Philippines, and was
immediately reported to the Secretary of War.

The three plaintiffs in error severally sued the defendants in error, alleging
that Mr. Forbes was the governor general of the Philippines, Trowbridge chief
of the Secret Service of Manila, and Harding chief of police of the same; that
the plaintiff was a Chinese person, lawfully resident in the Philippines, and
that the defendants forcibly deported the plaintiff to China, and forcibly
prevented his return for some months; that the plaintiff returned on March
29, 1910, and that the defendants threatened and were trying to expel the
plaintiff again,Trowbridge and Harding acting throughout under the order of
the defendant.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the prohibition is technically the proper remedy, historically
speaking, we need not inquire. On such a matter we should not interfere with
local practice except for good cause shown.

HELD:
It is held in England that an act of state is a matter not cognizable in any
municipal court. And that was the purport of the Philippine act declaring the
deportation not subject to question or review. As the Bill of Rights did not
stand in the way, and the implied powers of the government sanctioned by
Congress permitted it, there is no reason why the statute should not have full
effect. It protected the subordinates as well as the governor general, and
took jurisdiction from the court that attempted to try the case.

Soliven v. Makasiar
167 SCRA 393, 399 (1988)

FACTS:
Beltran is among the petitioners in this case. He together with others was
charged for libel by the president. Cory herself filed a complaint-affidavit
against him and others. Makasiar averred that Cory cannot file a complaint
affidavit because this would defeat her immunity from suit. He grounded his
contention on the principle that a president cannot be sued. However, if a
president would sue then the president would allow herself to be placed
under the courts jurisdiction and conversely she would be consenting to be
sued back. Also, considering the functions of a president, the president may
not be able to appear in court to be a witness for herself thus she may be
liable for contempt.

ISSUE:
Whether or not such immunity can be invoked by Beltran, a person other
than the president

HELD:
The rationale for the grant to the President of the privilege of immunity from
suit is to assure the exercise of Presidential duties and functions free from
any hindrance or distraction, considering that being the Chief Executive of
the Government is a job that, aside from requiring all of the office-holders
time, also demands undivided attention.

But this privilege of immunity from suit pertains to the President by virtue of
the office and may be invoked only by the holder of the office; not by any
other person in the Presidents behalf.

Thus, an accused like Beltran et al, in a criminal case in which the President
is complainant cannot raise the presidential privilege as a defense to prevent
the case from proceeding against such accused.

Moreover, there is nothing in our laws that would prevent the President from
waiving the privilege. Thus, if so minded the President may shed the
protection afforded by the privilege and submit to the courts jurisdiction.
The choice of whether to exercise the privilege or to waive it is solely the
Presidents prerogative. It is a decision that cannot be assumed and imposed
by any other person.

Estrada v. Desierto
G.R. 146710-15 and 146738, March 2, 2001

FACTS:
On January 20, 2001, after respondent Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo took her oath
as President of the Philippines, Petitioner Joseph Ejercito Estrada left
Malacaang Palace. Petitioner claims that he did not resign as President and
that therefore respondent is merely the acting President Joseph Ejercito
Estrada claims that even with the oath taking of Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo as
President, he is merely unable to perform temporarily the duties of his office
and hence, he is a President on leave and Arroyo is only acting President
Petitioner argued that he could not be criminally prosecuted, because his
absolute immunity from suit as President covers his entire term.

ISSUES:
Whether or not respondent Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo is acting President or
the President
Whether or not Petitioner is immune from suit for being the President of the
Republic of the Philippines

HELD:
Despite receipt of the letter from the President he is merely on leave, the
House of Representatives passed on 24 January 2001, the House resolution
No. 176 which expresses support for the assumption into the office of
President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo. Later, both Houses confirmed the
nomination of Teofisto Guingona as Vice-President. Bills were then sent to the
President by Congress which she had signed. Congress, as co-equal branch
of government has recognized Arroyo as the de jure President and not
merely as acting President. In the face of this determination by a co-equal
branch, the court is without authority to review. It is political question which
cannot be decided by the court without transgressing the principle of
separation of powers.

From the deliberations of constitutional Commissions, the intent of the

framers is clear that the immunity of the President from suit is concurrent
only during his tenure and not his term.

Petitioner himself made the submission that congress has the ultimate
authority under the Constitution to determine whether the President is
incapable of performing his functions in the manner provided for in Sec. 11,
Art. VII.

The power is conceded by petitioner to be with Congress and its alleged

erroneous exercise cannot be corrected by the Supreme Court. The
recognition of the President Arroyo as de jure President made by congress is
unquestionably a political question.

United States v. Nixon

418 U.S. 683 (1974)

FACTS:
The special prosecutor in the Watergate scandal subpoenaed the tape
recordings of conversations involving the President and his advisers
regarding the scandal. The Presidents counsel moved to quash the
subpoena citing Article II of the United States Constitution and its grant of
privilege to the President. The Presidents counsel also argued it was a non-
justiciable question because it was a disagreement between parts of the
executive branch.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the Presidents Article II constitutional privilege absolute

HELD:
Although a President deserves great deference regarding his Article II
constitutional privilege, that privilege is not absolute and must be balanced
against other constitutional interests.

A. Ernest Fitzgerald v. Richard Nixon

457 U.S. 731 (1982)

FACTS:
Ernest Fitzgerald, was fired from his job with the Air Force as cost-
management analyst because he embarrassed his superiors by testifying
about certain cost-overruns. The Air Force said he was fired because of
reorganization and a reduction in force. An internal memo was passed
through White House staff saying the plaintiff was a top notch cost expert
but with very low marks of loyalty and recommended that they let him
bleed. At a press conference, the defendant said he personally made the
decision to fire the plaintiff. The White House later retracted the statement
saying that the defendant had confused the plaintiff with another employee.
The plaintiff brought suit and the defendant moved for summary judgment
on the ground of absolute immunity from suit.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the President have absolute immunity from suit for actions
taken in his official capacity

HELD:
The President of the United States is shielded by absolute immunity from civil
damages for acts done in his official capacity as President.

Clinton v. Jones
520 U.S. 681 (1997)

FACTS:
The respondent filed a complaint against the petitioner alleging that the
petitioner made unwanted sexual advances towards her when he was the
Governor of Arkansas. The petitioner filed motions asking the district court to
dismiss the case on grounds of presidential immunity and to prohibit the
respondent from re-filing the suit until after the end of his presidency. The
district court rejected the presidential immunity argument, but held that no
trial would take place until the petitioner was no longer president. Both
parties appealed to the United States Supreme Court which granted
certiorari.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the President can be involved in a lawsuit during his
presidency for actions that occurred before the tenure of his presidency and
that were not related to official duties of the presidency.

HELD:
The United States Constitution does not automatically grant the President of
the United States immunity from civil lawsuits based upon his private
conduct unrelated to his official duties as President.

In Re: Saturnino Bermudez

145 SCRA 160 (1986)
FACTS:
Bermudez being a lawyer, quotes the first paragraph of Section 5 (not
Section 7 as erroneously stated) of Article XVIII of the proposed 1986
Constitution, which provides in full as follows:
Sec.5 The six-year term of the incumbent President and Vice-President
elected in the February 7, 1986 election is, for purposes of synchronization of
elections, hereby extended to noon of June 30, 1992.
The first regular elections for the President and Vice-President under this
Constitution shall be held on the second Monday of May, 1992.
Bermudez claims that the said provision is not clear as to whom it refers,
he then asks the Court to declare and answer the question of the
construction and definiteness as to who, among the present incumbent
President Corazon Aquino and Vice President Salvador Laurel and the elected
President Ferdinand E. Marcos and Vice President Arturo M. Tolentino being
referred to under the said Section 7 (sic) of ARTICLE XVIII of the TRANSITORY
PROVISIONS of the proposed 1986 Constitution refers to, . . .

ISSUE:
Whether or not said provision is ambiguous.

HELD:
No. petitioners allegation of ambiguity or vagueness of the aforementioned
provision is manifestly gratuitous, it being a matter of public record and
public knowledge that the Constitutional Commission refers therein to
incumbent President Aquino and Vice-President Laurel, and to no other
persons, and provides for the extension of their term to noon of June 30,
1992 for purposes of synchronization of elections. Hence, the second
paragraph of the cited section provides for the holding on the second
Monday of May, 1992 of the first regular elections for the President and Vice-
President under said 1986 Constitution. In previous cases, the legitimacy of
the government of President Aquino was likewise sought to be questioned
with the claim that it was not established pursuant to the 1973 Constitution.
The said cases were dismissed outright by this court which held that:
petitioners have no personality to sue and their petitions state no cause of
action. For the legitimacy of the Aquino government is not a justiciable
matter. It belongs to the realm of politics where only the people of the
Philippines are the judge. And the people have made the judgment; they
have accepted the government of President Corazon C. Aquino which is in
effective control of the entire country so that it is not merely a de facto
government but in fact and in law a de jure government. Moreover, the
community of nations has recognized the legitimacy of the present
government.
Senate of the Philippines v. Ermita
G.R. No. 169777, April 20, 2006

FACTS:
Invitations issued to various officials to be presented in a public hearing for
investigation. Where those being invited either requested for the
postponement of the hearing or communicated their inability to attend, due
to lack of clearance from the President, in pursuance of Executive Order No.
464. Thus, petitioners filed petitions for certiorari and prohibition that the
President has abused such power by issuing EO 464 and pray for its
declaration as null and void for being unconstitutional.

ISSUES:
Whether or not EO 464 violates the constitution
Whether or not respondents committed a grave abuse of discretion in
implementing EO 464 prior to its publication in a newspaper of general
circulation

HELD:
Congress undoubtedly has a right to information from the executive branch.
The infirm provisions of EO 464, however allow the executive branch to
evade congressional requests for information without need for clearly
asserting a right to do so and/ or preferring its reasons therefore, by mere
expedient of invoking said provisions, the power of Congress to conduct
inquiries in aid of legislation is frustrated. That is impermissible. For what
republican theory did accomplish was to reverse the old presumption in
favour of secrecy based on the divine right of kings and nobles and replace it
with a presumption in favour of publicity, based on the doctrine of popular
sovereignty.
The power of inquiry is co-extensive with the power to legislate. The matters
which may be a proper subject of legislation and those which may be a
proper subject of investigation are one. It follows that the operation of
government, being a legitimate subject for legislation, is a proper subject for
investigation.
Even where the inquiry is in aids of legislation there are still recognized
exemptions to the power of inquiry, which exemptions fall under the rubric of
executive privilege.
It is defined as the right of the President to withhold information from
Congress, the courts, and ultimately the public.
Executive privilege, whether asserted against Congress, the courts, or the
public, is recognized only in relation to certain types of information of a
sensitive character.
While Congress exercises its power of inquiry, the only way for department
heads to exempt themselves there from is by a valid claim of privilege. They
are not exempts by t5he mere fact that they are department heads. Only one
executive official may be exempted from this power- the President on whom
the executive power is vested.
With respect to the publication, EO 464 is a statute that has a direct effect on
the right of the people to information that logic dictates that the same must
be covered by the publication requirement.

Neri v. Senate Committee on Accountability of Public Officers and

Investigations, et al
G.R. No.180643, March 25, 2008

FACTS:
The department of Transportation and Communications (DOTC) entered into
a contract for the supply of equipment and services for the National
Broadband Network (NBN) Project with Zhong Xing Telecommunications
Equipment (ZTE). In connection with the NBN project, several resolutions
were introduced in the Senate. Later, the respondent Committees
commenced an investigation. Petitioner Neri was amongst those summoned
to appear and testify at the Senate. In the hearing held in September 2007, it
was discovered that the project was initially Built-Operate-Transfer (BOT)
project but was converted into government to-government project, to be
financed through loan from the Chinese Government. On same month of
2007, Neri testified before the Senate for II hours. In the course of the
inquiry, Neri refused to answer certain questions invoking executive
privilege. Respondent Committee issued subpoena ad testificandum
requiring Neri to appear and testify on 20 November 2007. When preceded
by the Senate to elaborate further on his conversation with the President,
Secretary Neri asked time to consult with his superiors in line with the ruling
in Senate v. Ermita as executive privilege

ISSUE:
Whether or not the communications elicited by the three (3) subject
questions are covered by the executive privilege

HELD:
The oversight function of Congress may be facilitated by compulsory process
only to the extent that it is performed in pursuit of legislation.
The communications elicited by the three (3) questions are covered by the
presidential communications privilege.

1st - The communications relate to a quintessential and non-delegable

power of the President, i.e. the power to enter into an executive agreement
with other countries. This authority of the President to enter into executive
agreements without the concurrence of the Legislature has traditionally been
recognized in Philippine jurisprudence;
2nd - The communications are received by a close advisor of the President.
Under the operational proximity test, petitioner can be considered a close
advisor, being a member of President Arroyos cabinet; and
3rd - There is no adequate showing of a compelling need that would justify
the limitation of the privilege and of the unavailability of the information
elsewhere by an appropriate investigating authority.

Tecson v. Comelec
G.R. No. 161434, March 3, 2004

FACTS:
The case at bar is a consolidated case filed by petitioners questioning the
Certificate Of Candidacy (COC) of herein private respondent Ronald Allan
Kelly Poe, also known as Fernando Poe Jr.(FPJ), who was born on 20 August
1939. The latter filed his COC for the position of President of the Philippines,
under the Koalisyon ng Nagkakaisang Pilipino (KNP). He represented himself
in said certificate as a natural-born citizen of the Philippine, which reason
that petitioners filed a petition before the Comelec to disqualify private
respondent
Fernando Poe Jr. and to deny due course or to cancel his COC on the ground
that the latter made a material misrepresentation in his COC by claiming to
be a natural-born Filipino, when in truth his parents were foreigners; his
father, Allan Poe Sr., was a Spanish National, being the son of Lorenzo Poe, a
Spanish subject and his mother, Blessie Kelly Poe, was an American and that
he is an illegitimate child.

ISSUE:
Whether or not Fernando Poe Jr., is a natural-born citizen of the Philippines

HELD:
Fernando Poe Jr. was born on 20 August 1939, when the applicable law was
the 1935 Constitution. The issue on private respondents citizenship is so
essential in view of the Constitutional provision that No person may be
elected President unless he is a natural-born citizen of the Philippines, a
registered voter, able to read and write, at least forty-five years of age on
the day of the election and a resident of the Philippines for at least ten years
immediately preceding such election. Natural-born citizens are those who
are citizens of the Philippines from birth without having to perform any act to
acquire or perfect their Philippine Citizenship.
Based on the evidence presented which the Supreme Court considered as
viable is the fact that the death certificate of Lorenzo Poe, father of Allan Poe,
who in turn the father of FPJ indicates that he died on 11 September 1954 at
the age of eighty-four (84) years old, in San Carlos, Pangasinan in the
absence to the contrary, it is sound to conclude, or at least to presume, that
the place of residence of a person at the time of his death was also his
residence before death. Considering that the allegations of Petitioners are
not substantiated with proof and since Lorenzo Poe may have been benefited
from the en masse Filipinization that the Philippine Bill had effected in
1902, there is no doubt that Allan Poe, father of FPJ was a Filipino citizen and
since the latter is governed by the provisions of the 1935 Constitution which
considers as citizens of the Philippines, those whose fathers are citizens of
the Philippines, FPJ was in fact a natural-born citizen of the Philippine
regardless of whether or not he is an illegitimate or legitimate child.

Gallego v. Vera
73 PHIL 453,455-6 (1941)

FACTS:
This is a petition for certiorari to review the decision of the CA affirming the
decision of the CFI of Leyte declaring illegal the petitioners election to the
office of the municipal mayor of Abuyog, Leyte on the ground that he did not
meet the residence qualification. Gallego is a native of Abuyog, Leyte, after
studies, hes been was employed as a school teacher in Catarman Samar, as
well as in some municipalities in Leyte, In 1937 as municipal mayor in
Abuyog Leyte but lost. In June 1938, he worked in Malaybalay, Bukidnon in a
plantation of the Bureau of Forestry to make up for the financial drawback
caused by his loss in the previous election, and stayed there until he
resigned in Sept. 1940.Gallego registered himself as an elector in Bukidnon
and voted there in the election for assemblymen held in Dec. 1938, and in
Jan. 1940,
He obtained and paid for his residence cert. from the municipal treasurer of
Malaybalay, in which certificate it was stated that he had resided in the said
municipality for 1.5 yrs. The CA declared that Gallego lost his domicile in
Abuyog Leyte at the time he was elected mayor there on the grounds that
(1) He registered as a voter in Malaybalay, Bukidnon (2) He voted in
Malaybalay in the 1938 election for assemblymen (3) He obtained a
residence cert from the municipality of Malaybalay

ISSUES:
Whether or not Gallego lost his domicile of origin in Abuyog, Leyte and
acquired anew domicile in Malaybalay, Bukidnon
HELD:
Gallego did not lose his domicile in Abuyog by working in Malaybalay as an
employee, registering as voter there and securing his residence certificate
there for1940. The decision of the CA is reversed.
In the definition of residence in the election law under the 1935
Constitution, it states that in order to acquire a domicile by choice, there
must concur: 1. Residence or a bodily presence in the new locality2.An
intention to remain there3.An intention to abandon the old domicile The
purpose to remain in the domicile should be for an indefinite period of
time. The court believed that Gallego had no intention to stay in Malaybalay
indefinitely because: When he was employed as a teacher in Samar, he
always returned in Abuyog and even resigned when he ran for office in 1937,
His departure was only for the purpose of making up for the financial
drawback caused by his loss in the election3.He did not take his wife and
children to Malaybalay with him4.He bought a piece of land in Abuyog and
did not avail of the land in the plantation offered to him by the
government5.He visited his family no less than three times despite the great
distance between Abuyog, Leyte and Malaybalay Bukidnon The court said
that the manifest intent of the law in fixing a residence qualification is to:
exclude a stranger or a newcomer, unacquainted with the conditions
and needs of a community and not identified with the latter, from an elective
office to serve that community. And the petitioner was a native there, had
run for the same office before, and was now elected with a majority of 800
votes in a 3rd class municipality.
Perfecto Faypon v. Eliseo Quirino

FACTS:
The Petitioner claimed that the respondent's ineligibility for the office of Provincial
Governor of Ilocos Sur to which he was proclaimed elected by the provincial board
of canvassers in the elections held on 13 November 1951. It is alleged that he lacks
the residence in the province, as required in section 2071 of the Revised
Administrative Code. The second point raised is the irregular constitution in the
Court of Appeals of the division of five members that rendered the judgment in the
case. It is claimed that when the unanimous concurrence of the division of three
could not be had, the Presiding Justice chose or designated two additional Associate
Justices in violation of the resolution of the Court en banc promulgated on 15
September 1952 which required that it be by rotation in the order of seniority. The
alleged violation of the resolution of the Court en banc promulgated on 15
September 1952 which required that it be by rotation in the order of seniority, the
third point is the alleged respondent's lack of residence as required by law
section 2071 of the Revised Administrative Code. The Court of Appeals found the
following facts: That respondent-appellee was born in Caoayan, Ilocos Sur, in June,
1895; that he went to the United States in 1919 to study and returned to the
Philippines in 1923; that on his return, he taught as professor in the University of
the Philippines for four years. He became owner and editor of the Intelligence, a
newspaper publish in Manila. He went to Iloilo as editor of the Iloilo Times. He
became executive secretary and general manager of the NEPA (National Economic
Protectionism Association) from 1936 until December 31, 1951 (Exhibits G, G-1 to G-
3). He was editor of Commerce, an official organ of the Chamber of Commerce in
Manila (Exhibits F, F-1 to F-11). He registered as a voter in Pasay City in 1946-1947
(Exhibit A). He owns a house and resides at 55-11th Street, Quezon City (Exhibits H-
H-1).The court determined that the Respondent has not lost his residence of origin
because The rule laid down in the foregoing cases is not devoid of reason and
justification. A citizen may leave the place of his birth to look for "greener pastures,"
as the saying goes, to improve his lot, and that, of course, includes study in other
places, practice of his avocation, or engaging in business. When election is to be
held, the citizen who left his birthplace to improve his lot may desire to return to his
native town to cast his ballot but for professional or business reasons, or for any
other reason, he may not be absent himself from the place of his professional or
business activities; so there he registers as voter as he has the qualifications to be
one and is not willing to give up or lose the opportunity to choose the officials who
are to run the government especially in national elections. Despite such
registration, the animus revertendi to his home, to his domicile or residence of
origin, he has not forsaken him. This may be the explanation why the registration of
a voter in a place other than his residence of origin has not been deemed sufficient
to constitute abandonment or loss of such residence.

ISSUE:
1. Did the respondent's registration as voter in Pasay City in 1946 and 1947
constitute abandonment or loss of his residence of origin?
2. Whether or not can the Respondent assumed to his office as a Governor?

HELD:
The judgment under review is affirmed, without pronouncement as to costs. The
respondent has not lost his residence of origin. A petition for quo warranto under
section 173 of Republic Act No. 180, as amended, was dismissed by the Court of
First Instance of Ilocos Sur. The Court of Appeals affirmed the dismissal. By a
petition for a writ of certiorari under Rule 46

Fernando Lopez v. Gerardo Roxas

17 SCRA 756 (1966)

FACTS:
Lopez and Roxas were the candidates for VP in the 1965 elections. Lopez
won the election. Roxas appealed his lost before the PET. The PET was
created by RA 1793. It is provided in the law that There shall be on
independent Presidential Electoral Tribunal . . . which shall be the sole judge
of all contests relating to the election, returns, and qualifications of the
president-elect and the Vice-president elect of the Philippines. In effect, a
losing candidate would have the right to appeal his loss. Lopez assailed the
law and he sought to enjoin Roxas and the PET from proceeding with the
case. Lopez averred that the PET is unconstitutional for it was not provided
for in the constitution. Also, since the PET is composed of the Chief Justice
and the other ten members of the SC any decision of the PET cannot be
validly appealed before the SC or that there may be conflict that may arise
once a PET decision is appealed before the SC.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the Presidential Electoral Tribunal is a valid body

HELD:
Pursuant to the Constitution, the judicial power shall be vested in one SC
and in such inferior courts as may be established by law

This provision vested in the judicial branch of the government, not merely
some specified or limited judicial power, but the judicial power under our
political system, and, accordingly, the entirety or all of said power, except,
only, so much as the Constitution confers upon some other agency, such as
the power to judge all contests relating to the election, returns and
qualifications of members of the Senate and those of the House of
Representatives, which is vested by the fundamental law solely in the Senate
Electoral Tribunal and the House Electoral Tribunal, respectively.

Judicial power is the authority to settle justiciable controversies or disputes

involving rights that are enforceable and demandable before the courts of
justice or the redress of wrongs for violations of such rights. The proper
exercise of said authority requires legislative action: (1) defining such
enforceable and demandable rights and/or prescribing remedies for
violations thereof; and (2) determining the court with jurisdiction to hear and
decide said controversies or disputes, in the first instance and/or on appeal.
For this reason, the Constitution ordains that Congress shall have the power
to define, prescribe, and apportion the jurisdiction of the various courts,
subject to the limitations set forth in the fundamental law.

The SC ruled that the PET is not in conflict with the constitution. RA 1793
merely added the courts jurisdiction and such can be validly legislated by
Congress. It merely conferred upon the SC additional functions i.e., the
functions of the PET. This is valid because the determining of election
contests is essentially judicial.
Macalintal v. Comelec
G.R. No. 157013, July 10, 2003

FACTS:
Petitioners questioned the constitutionality of Section 5 (D) of the overseas
absentee voting act, which allowed an immigrant or permanent resident of a
foreign country to register as a voter if he executes an affidavit that
declaring that he will resume actual physical permanent residence in the
Philippines bot later than three years from approval of his registration, on the
ground that the Constitution requires a voter to be a resident of the
philipp9ines for at least one year and in the place where he proposes to vote
for at least one year and in the place where he proposes to vote for at least
six months immediately preceding an election.

ISSUE:
Whether or not Section 5 (d) of the overseas absentee voting act is
constitutional and sections 19 and 20 were not in violation of the principle of
separation of powers.

HELD:
Section 2, Article V of the Constitution, which required Congress to provide a
system for absentee voting by qualified Filipinos abroad, came into being to
remove any doubt as to the in applicability of the residency requirement in
Sec. 1. The location of Sec. 2 immediately after the residency requirement of
Sec. 1 indicates that the Constitutional Commission provided for an
exception to the actual residency requirement of Section 1. If actual physical
residence in the Philippines is required, there is no sense for the framers of
the Constitution to mandate Congress to establish a system for absentee
voting. The affidavit required in Sec. 5 (d) serves as an explicit expression
that the immigrant has not in fact abandoned his domicile of origin. The
affidavit is required in Sec. 5 (d) of immigrants and permanent residents
abroad, because by their status in their host countries, they are presumed to
have relinquished their intent to return to the country. The qualified Filipinos
who execute the affidavit is presumed not to have lost his domicile by his
physical absence from his country. Section 2 of Article V of the Constitution
did not dispense with the residency requirement provided in Sec. 1. The
majority theorizes that the affidavit constitutes an express waiver of his
status as an immigrant or permanent resident abroad. There can be no
change of domicile without the concurrence of act and intent.

As to Sections 19 and 25 of the Overseas Absentee Voting Act, both

provisions brazenly violate the mandate on the independence of the
Commission on Elections under Sec. 1 of Art. IX-A of the Constitution

Pimentel v. Joint Canvassing Committee

G.R. No. 163783. June 22, 2004

FACTS:
By a petition for prohibition, Senator Aquilino Q. Pimentel Jr., seeks a
judgement declaring null and void the continued existence of the Joint
Committee of Congress to determine the authenticity and due execution of
the certificates of canvass and preliminary canvass the votes cast for
Presidential and Vice-Presidential candidates in May 10, 2004 election
following the adjournment of Congress on June 11, 2004.

The petition corollary prays for the issuance of a writ of prohibition directing
the Joint Committee to cease and desist from conducting any further
proceedings pursuant to the Rules of the Joint Public Session of Congress on
Canvassing.

ISSUE:
Whether or not legislative procedure, precedent or practice as borne out by
the rules of both Houses of Congress is directly contradicted by Section 42 of
Rule XIV of the Rules adopted by the Senate, of which he is an incumbent
member.

HELD:
The legislative functions of the Twelfth Congress may have come to a close
upon the final adjournment of its regular sessions on June 11, 2004, but this
does not affect its non-legislative functions, such as that of being the
National Board of Canvassers. In fact, the joint public session of both Houses
of Congress convened by express directive of Section 4, Article VII of the
Constitution to canvass the votes for and to proclaim the newly elected
President and Vice-President has not, and cannot, adjourn sine die until it has
accomplished its constitutionally mandated tasks. For only when a board of
canvassers has completed its functions is it rendered functus officio. Its
membership may change, but it retains its authority as a board until it has
accomplished its purposes.

Since the Twelfth Congress has not yet completed its non-legislative duty to
canvass the votes and proclaim the duly elected President and Vice-
President, its existence as the National Board of Canvassers, as well as that
of the Joint Committee to which it referred the preliminary tasks of
authenticating and canvassing the certificates of canvass, has not become
functus officio.

In sum, despite the adjournment sine die of Congress, there is no legal

impediment to the Joint Committee completing the tasks assigned to it and
transmitting its report for the approval of the joint public session of both
Houses of Congress, which may reconvene without need of call by the
President to a special session.
Ronald Allan Poe a.k.a. Fernando Poe, Jr, v. Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo
P.E.T. Case No. 002. March 29, 2005

FACTS:
In the 2004 election, Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo was proclaimed President and takes
her oath of Office before the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court. Refusing to
concede defeat, the second-placer in the elections, Mr. FPJ, filed seasonably an
election protest before this Electoral Tribunal on July 23, 2004. Mrs. GMA, through
counsel, filed her Answer with Counter Protest on August 5, 2004. As counsels for
the parties exchanged lively motions to rush the presentation of their respective
positions on the controversy, an act of God intervened. On December 14, 2004, the
Protestant died in the course of his medical treatment at St. Lukes Hospital. The
medical certificate, filed by counsel as part of the Notice of Death of the Protestant,
showed that he died of cardio-pulmonary arrest, secondary to cerebral infarction.
However, neither the Protestees proclamation by Congress nor the death of her
main rival as a fortuitous intervening event appears to abate the present
controversy in the public arena. Instead, notice may be taken of periodic mass
actions, demonstrations, and rallies raising an outcry for this Tribunal to decide the
electoral protest of Mr. FPJ against Mrs. GMA once and for all. The oracular function
of this Tribunal, it would appear, needs to be fully exercised to make manifest here
and abroad who is the duly elected leader of the Filipino nation. All these, despite
the fact that the submissions by the parties on their respective sides in the protest
and the counter-protest are thus far, far from completed

ISSUE:
Whether or not may the widow substitute/intervene for the protestant who died
during the pendency of the latters protest case?

HELD:
The fundamental rule applicable in a presidential election protest is Rule 14 of the
PET Rules. It provides,
Rule 14. Election Protest.Only the registered candidate for President or for Vice-
President of the Philippines who received the second or third highest number of
votes may contest the election of the President or the Vice-President, as the case
may be, by filing a verified petition with the Clerk of the Presidential Electoral
Tribunal within thirty (30) days after the proclamation of the winner.
But herein movant/ intervenor Mrs. FPJ, has overly stressed that it is with the
paramount public interest in mind that she desires to pursue the process
commenced by her late husband. She avers that she is pursuing the process to
determine who truly won the election, as a service to the Filipino people. We laud
her noble intention and her interest to find out the true will of the electorate.
However, nobility of intention is not the point of reference in determining whether a
person may intervene in an election protest. Rule 19, Section 1 of the Rules of
Court the applicable rule on intervention in the absence of such a rule in the PET
Rules. In such intervention, the interest which allows a person to intervene in a suit
must be in the matter of litigation and of such direct and immediate character that
the intervenor will either gain or lose by the effect of the judgment. In this protest, It
is far more prudent to abide by the existing strict limitations on intervention and
substitution under the law and the rules.
Conformably then with the law, the rules and prevailing jurisprudence, this Tribunal
finds no justifiable reason to grant the petition/motion for intervention and
substitution.

Legarda v. De Castro
PET Case No. 003, January 18, 2008

FACTS:
January 18, 2005, the Presidential Electoral Tribunal (PET) confirmed the
jurisdiction over the protest of Loren B. Legarda and denied the motion of
protestee Noli L. de Castro for its outright dismissal. The Tribunal further
ordered concerned officials to undertake measures for the protection and
preservation of the ballot boxes and election documents subject of the
protest.

Protestee contends that the Tribunal cannot correct the manifest errors on
the statements of votes (SOV) and certificates of canvass (COC). But it is not
suggested by any of the parties that questions on the validity, authenticity
and correctness of the SOVs and COCs are outside the Tribunals jurisdiction.
The constitutional function as well as the power and the duty to be the sole
judge of all contests relating to the election, returns and qualification of the
President and Vice-President is expressly vested in the PET, in Section 4,
Article VII of the Constitution. Included therein is the duty to correct
manifest errors in the SOVs and COCs. There is no necessity, in our view, to
amend the PET Rules to perform this function within the ambit of its
constitutional function.
ISSUE:
1.) Whether or not the honorable tribunal erred in ruling that it can re-
canvass documents despite the availability of the ballots
2.) Whether or not the honorable tribunal erred in ruling that it has the
power to correct manifest error in the election returns or certificates of
canvass
3.) Whether or not the honorable tribunal erred in transforming itself into a
canvassing body
4.) Whether or not the honorable tribunal erred in ruling that the instant
petition/ protest alleged a cause of action sufficient to contest
protestees victory in 10 May 2004 Vice-presidential elections.

HELD:
Considering that we find the protest sufficient in form and substance, we
must again stress that nothing as yet has been proved as to the veracity of
the allegations. The protest is only sufficient for the Tribunal to proceed and
give the protestant the opportunity to prove her case pursuant to Rule 61 of
the PET Rules. Although said rule only pertains to revision of ballots, nothing
herein prevents the Tribunal from allowing or including the correction of
manifest errors, pursuant to the Tribunals rule-making power under Section
4, Article VII of the Constitution.

On a related matter, the protestant in her reiterating motion prays for ocular
inspection and inventory-taking of ballot boxes, and appointment of
watchers. However, the Tribunal has already ordered the protection and
safeguarding of the subject ballot boxes; and it has issued also the
appropriate directives to officials concerned. At this point, we find no
showing of an imperative need for the relief prayed for, since protective and
safeguard measures are already being undertaken by the custodians of the
subject ballot boxes.
Estrada v. Arroyo
G.R. No. 146738

FACTS:
Estrada alleges that he is the President on leave while respondent Gloria
Macapagal-Arroyo claims she is the President. From the beginning of Eraps
term, he was plagued by problems that slowly but surely eroded his
popularity. His sharp descent from power started on October 4, 2000.
Singson, a long-time friend of the Estrada, went on air and accused the
Estrada, his family and friends of receiving millions of pesos from jueteng
lords. The expos immediately ignited reactions of rage. On January 19, the
fall from power of the petitioner appeared inevitable. At 1:20 p.m., the
petitioner informed Executive Secretary Edgardo Angara that General Angelo
Reyes, Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces of the Philippines, had defected.
January 20 turned to be the day of surrender. On January 22, the Monday
after taking her oath, respondent Arroyo immediately discharged the powers
and duties of the Presidency. After his fall from the pedestal of power, the
Eraps legal problems appeared in clusters. Several cases previously filed
against him in the Office of the Ombudsman were set in motion.

ISSUE:
Whether or not Arroyo is a legitimate (de jure) president

HELD:
The SC holds that the resignation of Estrada cannot be doubted. It was
confirmed by his leaving Malacaang. In the press release containing his
final statement, (1) he acknowledged the oath-taking of the respondent as
President of the Republic albeit with the reservation about its legality; (2) he
emphasized he was leaving the Palace, the seat of the presidency, for the
sake of peace and in order to begin the healing process of our nation. He did
not say he was leaving the Palace due to any kind of inability and that he
was going to re-assume the presidency as soon as the disability disappears;
(3) he expressed his gratitude to the people for the opportunity to serve
them. Without doubt, he was referring to the past opportunity given him to
serve the people as President; (4) he assured that he will not shirk from any
future challenge that may come ahead in the same service of our country.
Estradas reference is to a future challenge after occupying the office of the
president which he has given up; and (5) he called on his supporters to join
him in the promotion of a constructive national spirit of reconciliation and
solidarity. Certainly, the national spirit of reconciliation and solidarity could
not be attained if he did not give up the presidency. The press release was
petitioners valedictory, his final act of farewell. His presidency is now in the
past tense. Even if Erap can prove that he did not resign, still, he cannot
successfully claim that he is a President on leave on the ground that he is
merely unable to govern temporarily. That claim has been laid to rest by
Congress and the decision that respondent Arroyo is the de jure President
made by a co-equal branch of government cannot be reviewed by this Court.

Taada and Diosdado Macapagal v. Cuenco

103 PHIL 1051 (1957)

FACTS:
After the 1955 elections, members of the Senate were chosen. The Senate
was overwhelmingly occupied by the Nacionalista Party. The lone opposition
senator was Lorenzo. Diosdado on the other hand was a senatorial candidate
who lost the bid but was contesting it before the SET. But prior to a decision
the SET would have to choose its members. It is provided that the SET should
be composed of 9 members; 3 justices, 3 senators from the majority party
and 3 senators from the minority party. But since there is only one minority
senator the other two SET members supposed to come from the minority
were filled in by the NP. Lorenzo assailed this process. So did Diosdado
because he deemed that if the SET would be dominated by NP senators then
he, as a member of the Liberalista will not have any chance in his election
contest. Cuenco et al (members of the NP) averred that the SC cannot take
cognizance of the issue because it is a political question. Cuenco argued that
the power to choose the members of the SET is vested in the Senate alone
and the remedy for Lorenzo and Diosdado is not to raise the issue before
judicial courts but rather to leave it before the bar of public opinion.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the issue is a political question

HELD:
The SC took cognizance of the case and ruled in favor of Lorenzo and
Diosdado. The term Political Question connotes what it means in ordinary
parlance, namely, a question of policy. It refers to those questions which,
under the Constitution, are to be decided by the people in their sovereign
capacity; or in regard to which full discretionary authority has been
delegated to the legislative or executive branch of the government. It is
concerned with issues dependent upon the wisdom, not legality, of a
particular measure.

Baker v. Carr
369 U.S. 186

FACTS:
Charles Baker, petitioner was a resident of Shelby County, Tennessee. Baker
filed suit against Joe Carr, the Secretary of State of Tennessee. Bakers
complaint alleged that the Tennessee legislature had not redrawn its
legislative districts since 1901, in violation of the Tennessee State
Constitution which required redistricting according to the federal census
every 10 years. Baker, who lived in an urban part of the state, asserted that
the demographics of the state had changed shifting a greater proportion of
the population to the cities, thereby diluting his vote in violation of the Equal
Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
Baker sought an injunction prohibiting further elections, and sought the
remedy of reapportionment or at-large elections. The district court denied
relief on the grounds that the issue of redistricting posed a political question
and would therefore not be heard by the court.

ISSUE:
Whether or not federal courts have jurisdiction to hear a constitutional
challenge to a legislative apportionment?
Whether or not the test for resolving whether a case presents a political
question.

HELD:
Federal courts have jurisdiction to hear a constitutional challenge to a
legislative apportionment.
The political question doctrine is based in the separation of powers and
whether a case is justiciable is determined on a case by cases basis. In
regards to foreign relations, if there has been no conclusive governmental
action regarding an issue then a court can construe a treaty and decide a
case. Regarding the dates of the duration of hostilities, when there needs to
be definable clarification for a decision, the court may be able to decide the
case.
The court held that this case was justiciable and did not present a political
question. The case did not present an issue to be decided by another branch
of the government. The court noted that judicial standards under the Equal
Protection Clause were well developed and familiar, and it had been open to
courts since the enactment of the Fourteenth Amendment to determine if an
act is arbitrary and capricious and reflects no policy. When a question is
enmeshed with any of the other two branches of the government, it presents
a political question and the Court will not answer it without further
clarification from the other branches.

Civil Liberties Union v. The Executive Secretary

194 SCRA 317 (1991)

FACTS:
Petitioners: Ignacio P. Lacsina, Luis R. Mauricio, Antonio R. Quintos and Juan T. David
for petitioners in 83896 and Juan T. David for petitioners in 83815. Both petitions
were consolidated and are being resolved jointly as both seek a declaration of the
unconstitutionality of Executive Order No. 284 issued by President Corazon C.
Aquino on 25 July1987.
Executive Order No. 284, according to the petitioners allows members of the
Cabinet, their undersecretaries and assistant secretaries to hold other than
government offices or positions in addition to their primary positions. The pertinent
provisions of EO 284 is as follows:
Section 1: A cabinet member, undersecretary or assistant secretary or other
appointive officials of the Executive Department may in addition to his primary
position, hold not more than two positions in the government and government
corporations and receive the corresponding compensation therefor.
Section 2: If they hold more positions more than what is required in section 1, they
must relinquish the excess position in favor of the subordinate official who is next in
rank, but in no case shall any official hold more than two positions other than his
primary position.
Section 3: AT least 1/3 of the members of the boards of such corporation should
either be a secretary, or undersecretary, or assistant secretary.
The petitioners are challenging EO 284s constitutionality because it adds
exceptions to Section 13 of Article VII other than those provided in the constitution.
According to the petitioners, the only exceptions against holding any other office or
employment in government are those provided in the Constitution namely: 1. The
Vice President may be appointed as a Member of the Cabinet under Section 3 par.2
of Article VII. 2. The secretary of justice is an ex-officio member of the Judicial and
Bar Council by virtue of Sec. 8 of article VIII.

ISSUE:
Whether or not Executive Order No. 284 is constitutional

HELD:
No. It is unconstitutional. Petition granted. Executive Order No. 284 was declared
null and void.
In the light of the construction given to Section 13 of Article VII, Executive Order No.
284 is unconstitutional. By restricting the number of positions that Cabinet
members, undersecretaries or assistant secretaries may hold in addition their
primary position to not more than two positions in the government and government
corporations, EO 284 actually allows them to hold multiple offices or employment in
direct contravention of the express mandate of Sec. 13 of Article VII of the 1987
Constitution prohibiting them from doing so, unless otherwise provided in the 1987
Constitution itself.
The phrase unless otherwise provided in this constitution must be given a literal
interpretation to refer only to those particular instances cited in the constitution
itself: Sec. 3 Art VII and Sec. 8 Art. VIII.

Cecilio Rafael vs Embroidery and Apparel Control & Inspection Board

21 SCRA 336 (Sept. 29, 1967)

FACTS:
In 1961, RA 3137 was passed. This law created EACIB. Sec 2 thereof also
provided that it shall be composed of (1) A representative from the Bureau of
Customs to act as Chairman, to be designated by the Secretary of Finance;
(2) A representative from the Central Bank to be designated by its Governor;
(3) A representative from the Department of Commerce and Industry to be
designated by the Secretary of Commerce and Industry; (4) A representative
from the National Economic Council to be designated by its Chairman; and
(5) A representative from the private sector coming from the Association of
Embroidery and Apparel Exporters of the Philippines. Rafael, whose company
is a member of another Chamber, averred that the law is unconstitutional for
while Congress may create an office it cannot specify who shall be appointed
therein; that the members of the EACIB can only be appointed by the
President in accordance with Article 7, Sec. 10 2 of the Constitution; that
since the Act prescribes that the chairman and members of the EACIB should
come from specified offices, it is equivalent to a declaration by Congress as
to who should be appointed, thereby infringing the constitutional power of
the President to make appointments.

ISSUE:
Whether or not RA 3137 bypassed the appointing power of the president

HELD:
The SC ruled that the appointing power is the exclusive prerogative of the
President, upon which no limitations maybe imposed by Congress, except
those resulting from the need of securing the concurrence of the Commission
on Appointments and from the exercise of the limited power to prescribe the
qualifications to the given appointive office. In the case at bar, it must be
noted that Congress took care to specify that the representatives should
come from the Bureau of Customs, Central Bank, Department of Commerce
and Industry and the National Economic Council. The obvious reason must be
because these departments and/or bureaus perform functions which have a
direct relation to the importation of raw materials, the manufacture thereof
into embroidery and apparel products and their subsequent exportation
abroad. There is no attempt in RA 3137 to deprive the President of his power
to make appointments. The law is not unconstitutional.

Benedicto Ernesto R. Bionio JR. v. COA and Celso D. Gangan, Chair,

COA
G.R. No. 147392. March 12, 2004

FACTS:
In 1994, petitioner Benedicto Ernesto R. Bitonio, Jr. was appointed Director IV of the
Bureau of Labor Relations in the Department of Labor and Employment. As
representative of the Secretary of Labor to the PEZA Board, he was receiving a per
diem for every board meeting he attended during the years 1995 to 1997.
After a post audit of the PEZAs disbursement transactions, the COA disallowed the
payment of per diems to Mr. Bitonio pursuant to the Supreme Court ruling declaring
unconstitutional the holding of other offices by the cabinet members, their deputies
and assistants in addition to their primary office and the receipt of compensation
therefore, and, to COA Memorandum No. 97-038 dated September 19, 1997,
implementing Senate Committee Reports No. 509.
In his motion for reconsideration to the COA, he contended that the Supreme Court
modified its earlier ruling in the Civil Liberties Union case which limits the
prohibition to Cabinet Secretaries, Undersecretaries and their Assistants. Officials
given the rank equivalent to a Secretary, Undersecretary or Assistant Secretary and
other appointive officials below the rank of Assistant Secretary are not covered by
the prohibition. He further stated that the PEZA Charter (RA 7916), enacted four
years after the Civil Liberties Union case became final, authorized the payment of
per diems; in expressly authorizing per diems, Congress should be conclusively
presumed to have been aware of the parameters of the constitutional prohibition as
interpreted in the Civil Liberties Union case. COA rendered the assailed decision
denying petitioners motion for reconsideration.

ISSUE:
Whether or not COA correctly disallowed the per diems received by the petitioner
for his attendance in the PEZA Board of Directors meetings as representative of the
Secretary of Labor.

HELD:
The petitioner is, indeed, not entitled to receive per diem for his board meetings
sitting as representative of the Secretary of Labor in the Board of Directors of the
PEZA The petitioners presence in the PEZA Board meetings is solely by virtue of his
capacity as representative of the Secretary of Labor. Since the Secretary of Labor is
prohibited from receiving compensation for his additional office or employment,
such prohibition likewise applies to the petitioner who sat in the Board only in behalf
of the Secretary of Labor. The Supreme Court cannot allow the petitioner who sat as
representative of the Secretary of Labor in the PEZA Board to have a better right as
his principal. Moreover, it is a basic tenet that any legislative enactment must not
be repugnant to the Constitution. No law can render it nugatory because the
Constitution is more superior to a statute. The framers of R.A. No. 7916 must have
realized the flaw in the law which is the reason why the law was later amended by
R.A. No. 8748 to cure such defect. The option of designating representative to the
Board by the different Cabinet Secretaries was deleted. Likewise, the paragraph as
to payment of per diems to the members of the Board of Directors was also deleted,
considering that such stipulation was clearly in conflict with the proscription set by
the Constitution.

Doromal v. Sandiganbayan
GR No. 85468, September 07, 1989

FACTS:
Quintin S. Doromal, a former Commissioner of the Presidential Commission on Good
Government (PCGG), for violation of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act (RA 3019), Sec.
3(h), in connection with his shareholdings and position as president and director of the
Doromal International Trading Corporation (DITC) which submitted bids to supply P61 million
worth of electronic, electrical, automotive, mechanical and air conditioning equipment to the
Department of Education, Culture and Sports (or DECS) and the National Manpower and
Youth Council (or NMYC).
Information was then filed by the Tanod bayan against Doromal for the said violation and a
preliminary investigation was conducted. The petitioner then filed a petition for certiorari
and prohibition questioning the jurisdiction of the Tanod bayan to file the information
without the approval of the Ombudsman. The Supreme Court held that the incumbent Tanod
bayan (called Special Prosecutor under the 1987 Constitution and who is supposed to retain
powers and duties NOT GIVEN to the Ombudsman) is clearly without authority to conduct
preliminary investigations and to direct the filing of criminal cases with the Sandiganbayan,
except upon orders of the Ombudsman. Subsequently annulling the information filed by the
Tanod bayan. A new information, duly approved by the Ombudsman, was filed in the
Sandiganbayan, alleging that the Doromal, a public officer, being then a Commissioner of
the Presidential Commission on Good Government, did then and there wilfully and
unlawfully, participate in a business through the Doromal International Trading Corporation,
a family corporation of which he is the President, and which company participated in the
biddings conducted by the Department of Education, Culture and Sports and the National
Manpower & Youth Council, which act or participation is prohibited by law and the
constitution. The petitioner filed a motion to quash the information on the ground that it was
invalid since there had been no preliminary investigation for the new information that was
filed against him. The motion was denied by Sandiganbayan claiming that another
preliminary investigation is unnecessary because both old and new informations involve the
same subject matter.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the act of Doromal would constitute a violation of the Constitution
Whether or not preliminary investigation is necessary even if both information involve the
same subject matter
Whether or not the information shall be effected as invalid due to the absence of preliminary
investigation

HELD:
Yes, as to the first and second issues. No, as to the third issue. Petition was granted by the
Supreme Court.
(1) The presence of a signed document bearing the signature of Doromal as part of the
application to bid shows that he can rightfully be charged with having participated in a
business which act is absolutely prohibited by Section 13 of Article VII of the Constitution"
because "the DITC remained a family corporation in which Doromal has at least an indirect
interest."
Section 13, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution provides that "the President, Vice-President,
the members of the Cabinet and their deputies or assistants shall not... during (their) tenure,
directly or indirectly... participate in any business.
(2) The right of the accused to a preliminary investigation is "a substantial one." Its denial
over his opposition is a "prejudicial error, in that it subjects the accused to the loss of life,
liberty, or property without due process of law" provided by the Constitution.
Since the first information was annulled, the preliminary investigation conducted at that
time shall also be considered as void. Due to that fact, a new preliminary investigation must
be conducted.
(3) The absence of preliminary investigation does not affect the court's jurisdiction over the
case. Nor do they impair the validity of the information or otherwise render it defective; but,
if there were no preliminary investigations and the defendants, before entering their plea,
invite the attention of the court to their absence, the court, instead of dismissing the
information should conduct such investigation, order the fiscal to conduct it or remand the
case to the inferior court so that the preliminary investigation may be conducted.
WHEREFORE, the petition for certiorari and prohibition is granted. The Sandiganbayan shall
immediately remand Criminal Case No. 12893 to the Office of the Ombudsman for
preliminary investigation and shall hold in abeyance the proceedings before it pending the
result of such investigation.
PUBLIC INTEREST GROUP v. ELMA
G.R. No. 138965, June 30, 2006

FACTS:
On 30 June 2006 (2) the clarification of the dispositive part of the Decision;
and (3) the elevation of the case to the Court en banc. The Solicitor General,
in behalf of the respondents, filed an Omnibus Motion, dated 11 August
2006, with substantially the same allegations.
Respondent Elma was appointed as Chairman of the Presidential Commission
on Good Government (PCGG) on 30 October 1998. Thereafter, during his
tenure as PCGG Chairman, he was appointed as Chief Presidential Legal
Counsel (CPLC). He accepted the second appointment, but waived any
remuneration that he may receive as CPLC. Petitioners sought to have both
appointments declared as unconstitutional and, therefore, null and void.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the respondents appointment is constitutional

HELD:
In its Decision, the Court declared that the concurrent appointments of the
respondent as PCGG Chairman and CPLC were unconstitutional. It ruled that
the concurrent appointment to these offices is in violation of Section 7, par.
2, Article IX-B of the 1987 Constitution, since these are incompatible offices.
The duties of the CPLC include giving independent and impartial legal advice
on the actions of the heads of various executive departments and agencies
and reviewing investigations involving heads of executive departments.
Since the actions of the PCGG Chairman, a head of an executive agency, are
subject to the review of the CPLC, such appointments would be incompatible.
The Court also decreed that the strict prohibition under Section 13 Article VII
of the 1987 Constitution would not apply to the present case, since neither
the PCGG Chairman nor the CPLC is a secretary, undersecretary, or assistant
secretary. However, had the rule thereunder been applicable to the case, the
defect of these two incompatible offices would be made more glaring. The
said section allows the concurrent holding of positions only when the second
post is required by the primary functions of the first appointment and is
exercised in an ex-officio capacity. Although respondent Elma waived
receiving renumeration for the second appointment, the primary functions of
the PCGG Chairman do not require his appointment as CPLC.
The mere application of constitutional provisions does not require the case to
be heard and decided en banc. Contrary to the allegations of the respondent,
the decision of the Court in this case does not modify the ruling in Civil
Liberties Union v. Executive Secretary. It should also be noted that Section 3
of Supreme Court Circular No. 2-89, dated 7 February 1989 clearly provides
that the Court en banc is not an Appellate Court to which decisions or
resolutions of a Division may be appealed.

In Re Appointments of Hon. Mateo Valenzuela and Hon. Placido

Vallarta AM No. 98-5-01-SC | November 9, 1998

FACTS:
On March 30, 1998, The President signed appointments of Hon. Mateo
Valenzuela and Hon. Placido Vallarta as Judges of RTC-Bago City and
Cabanatuan City, respectively. These appointments were deliberated, as it
seemed to be expressly prohibited by Art 7 Sec 15 of the Constitution:
Two months immediately before the next presidential elections and up to the
end of his term, a President or Acting President shall not make appointments,
except temporary appointments to executive positions when
continued vacancies therein will prejudice public service or endanger public
safety." A meeting was held on March 9, 1998 by the Judicial and Bar Council
to discuss the constitutionality of appointments to the Court of Appeals (CA)
in light of the forthcoming 1998 Presidential elections. Senior Associate
Justice Florenz Regalado, Consultant of the Council and Member of the 1986
Constitutional Commission, was in the position that election ban had no
application to the CA based on the Commissions records. This hypothesis
was then submitted to the President for consideration together with the
Councils nominations for 8 vacancies in the CA. The Chief Justice (CJ)
received on April 6, 1998, an official communication from the Executive
Secretary transmitting the appointments of 8 Associate Justices of CA duly
signed onMarch11, 1998(day immediately before the commencement of the
ban on appointments), which implies that the Presidents Office did not agree
with the hypothesis.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the President can fill vacancies in the judiciary pursuant to
Article 8 Sec 4 and9, during the appointment ban period stated in Article 7
Sec 15.

HELD:
The Supreme Court, in an en banc decision, declared the appointments
signed by the President on March 30, 1998 of Hon. Valenzuela and Hon.
Vallarta VOID. They are ordered to cease and desist from discharging the
office of Judge of the Courts to which they were respectively appointed on
the said date. They come within the operation of the prohibition on
appointments. While the filling of judiciary vacancies is in the public interest,
there is no compelling reason to justify such appointment within the 2
months appointment ban. In view of Valenzuelas oath taking, the
authenticity of the letter of which was not verified from the Office of the
Court Administrator, SC reiterated the standing practice and procedures in
appointments to the Judiciary that originals of all appointments are to be
sent by the Office of the President to the Office of the Chief Justice. The Clerk
of Court of the SC, in the Chief Justices behalf, will advise the appointee of
their appointments as well as the date of commencement of the pre-requisite
orientation seminar to be conducted by the Philippine Judicial Academy for
new judges.

De Rama v. Court of appeals

G.R. No. 131136, Feb. 28, 2001

FACTS:
Petitioner de Rama justified his recall request on the allegation that the
appointments of the said employees were midnight appointments of the
former mayor, Ma. Evelyn S. Abeja, done in violation of Article VII, Section 15
of the 1987 Constitution, which provides:
Section 15 Two months immediately before the next presidential elections
and up to the end of his term, a President or Acting President shall not make
appointments, except temporary appointments to executive positions when
continued vacancies therein will prejudice public service or endanger public
safety. (Underscoring supplied). While the matter was pending before the
CSC, three of the above-named employees, namely: Elsa Marino, Morell
Ayala, and Flordeliza Oriazel, filed with the CSC a claim for payment of their
salaries, alleging that although their appointments were declared permanent
by Conrado Gulim, Director II of the CSC Field Office based in Quezon,
petitioner de Rama withheld the payment of their salaries and benefits
pursuant to Office Order No. 95-01, which was issued on June 30, 1995,
wherein the appointments of the said fourteen (14) employees were recalled.
Based on the documents submitted by Marino, Ayala and Oriazel, the Legal
and Quasi-Judicial Division of the CSC issued an Orderfinding that since the
claimants-employees had assumed their respective positions and performed
their duties pursuant to their appointments, they are therefore entitled to
receive the salaries and benefits appurtenant to their positions. Citing Rule
V, Section 10 of the Omnibus Rules which provides, in part, that if the
appointee has assumed the duties of the position, he shall be entitled to
receive his salary at once without awaiting the approval of his appointment
by the Commission, the CSC Legal and Quasi-Judicial Division ruled that the
said employees cannot be deprived of their salaries and benefits by the
unilateral act of the newly-assumed mayor.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the grounds for recall of the appointments on the violation of
laws and regulations on issuance.

HELD:
Appointments of the private respondents may only be recalled on the above-
cited grounds. And yet, the only reason advanced by the petitioner to justify
the recall was that these were midnight appointments. The CSC correctly
ruled, however, that the constitutional prohibition on so-called midnight
appointments, specifically those made within two (2) months immediately
prior to the next presidential elections, applies only to the President or Acting
President.
If ever there were other procedural or legal requirements that were violated
in implementing the appointments of the private respondents, the same
were not seasonably brought before the Civil Service Commission. These
cannot be raised for the first time on appeal.

Jose Mondano v. Governor Silvosa

97 PHIL 143 (1955)
FACTS:
Mondano was the mayor of Mainit, Surigao. A complaint was filed against him for rape and
concubinage. The information reached the Assistant Executive Secretary who ordered the
governor to investigate the matter. Silvosa then summoned Mondano and the latter
appeared before him. Thereafter Silvosa suspended Mondano. Mondano filed a petition for
prohibition enjoining the governor from further proceeding. Silvosa invoked the RAC which
provided that he, as part of the executive and by virtue o the order given by the Asst Exec
Sec, is with direct control, direction, and supervision over all bureaus and offices under his
jurisdiction . . . and to that end may order the investigation of any act or conduct of any
person in the service of any bureau or office under his Department and in connection
therewith may appoint a committee or designate an official or person who shall conduct
such investigations.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the Governor can exercise the power of control

HELD:
The executive departments of the Government created and organized before the approval of
the Constitution continued to exist as authorized by law until the Congress shall provide
otherwise. The Constitution provides: The President shall have control of all the executive
departments, bureaus, or offices, exercise general supervision over all local governments as
may be provided by law, and take care that the laws be faithfully executed. Under this
constitutional provision the President has been invested with the power of control of all the
executive departments, bureaus, or offices, but not of all local governments over which he
has been granted only the power of general supervision as may be provided by law. The
Department head as agent of the President has direct control and supervision over all
bureaus and offices under his jurisdiction as provided for in section 79(c) of the Revised
Administrative Code, but he does not have the same control of local governments as that
exercised by him over bureaus and offices under his jurisdiction. Likewise, his authority to
order the investigation of any act or conduct of any person in the service of any bureau or
office under his department is confined to bureaus or offices under his jurisdiction and does
not extend to local governments over which, as already stated, the President exercises only
general supervision as may be provided by law. If the provisions of section 79 (c) of the
Revised Administrative Code are to be construed as conferring upon the corresponding
department head direct control, direction, and supervision over all local governments and
that for that reason he may order the investigation of an official of a local government for
malfeasance in office, such interpretation would be contrary to the provisions of par 1, sec
10, Article 7, of the 1935 Constitution. If general supervision over all local governments is
to be construed as the same power granted to the Department Head in sec 79 (c) of the
RAC, then there would no longer be a distinction or difference between the power of control
and that of supervision. In administrative law supervision means overseeing or the power or
authority of an officer to see that subordinate officers perform their duties, if the latter fail or
neglect to fulfilled them the former may take such action or step as prescribed by law to
make them perform their duties. Control, on the other hand, means the power of an officer
to alter or modify or nullify or set aside what a subordinate officer had done in the
performance of his duties and to substitute the judgment of the former for that of the latter.
Such is the import of the provisions of sec 79 (c) of the RAC. The Congress has expressly and
specifically lodged the provincial supervision over municipal officials in the provincial
governor who is authorized to receive and investigate complaints made under oath against
municipal officers for neglect of duty, oppression, corruption or other form of
maladministration of office, and conviction by final judgment of any crime involving moral
turpitude. And if the charges are serious, he shall submit written charges touching the
matter to the provincial board, furnishing a copy of such charges to the accused either
personally or by registered mail, and he may in such case suspend the officer (not being the
municipal treasurer) pending action by the board, if in his opinion the charge be one
affecting the official integrity of the officer in question. Sec 86 of the Revised Administrative
Code adds nothing to the power of supervision to be exercised by the Department Head over
the administration of . . . municipalities . . . If it be construed that it does and such additional
power is the same authority as that vested in the Department Head by sec 79 (c) of the RAC,
then such additional power must be deemed to have been abrogated by sec10 (1), Article 7,
of the Constitution.
Calo v. Fuertes
5 SCRA 29 June 1962

FACTS:

This is an administrative land case. The Director of Lands rendered an opinion

denying and dismissing formers claim and contest against the homestead
application of Delfin C. Fuertes and ordered him to vacate the premises
within 60 days from receipt of a copy of the opinion and stating that, upon
finality thereof, the homestead patent would be issued to Fuertes. His
request for reconsideration having been denied by the Director of
Lands,Francisco C. Calo brought to the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural
Resources the case, who modified the opinion of the Director of Lands,
ordering Fuertes to reimburse Calo of the difference between the value of the
improvements that the latter introduced on the land in controversy and the
value of the consequential benefits derived by him therefrom. Still
dissatisfied with the opinion, Calo appealed to the President of the
Philippines, but withdrew it before the President could act thereon and
instead went to the Court of First Instance of Agusan to file a petition for
writs of certiorari. The Court denied the petition. Thus, he submitted a
petition to the Supreme Court.

ISSUE:
Whether the appeal to the President is a condition precedent to the appeal to
the Courts of Justice

HELD:

Yes. The appellants contention that, as the Secretary of Agriculture and

Natural Resources is the alter ego of the President and his acts or decisions
are also those of the latter, he need not appeal from the decision or opinion
of the former to the latter, and that, such being the case, after he had
appealed to the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources from the
decision or opinion of the Director of Lands, he had exhausted all the
administrative remedies, is untenable. The withdrawal of the appeal taken to
the President of the Philippines is tantamount to not appealing at all thereto.
Such withdrawal is fatal because the appeal to the President is the last step
he should take in an administrative case. Furthermore, a special civil action
for certiorari and prohibition under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court lies only
when "there is no appeal or any plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the
ordinary course of law." In the case at bar, appeal from an opinion or order
by the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources to the President of the
Philippines is the plain, speedy and adequate remedy available to the
petitioner. Therefore, the judgment appealed from had already become final
and cannot be reviewed. The appeal is dismissed, with costs against the
petitioner-appellant.

Lacson-Magallanes Co., Inc. v. Jose Pao, Hn. Juan Pajo, in his

capacity as Executive Secretary, and Hn. Juan De G. Rodriguez, in
his capacity as Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources

FACTS:
In 1932, Plaintiff Jose Magallanes was a permitee and actual occupant of a 1,103-
hectare pasture land situated in Tamlangon, Municipality of Bansalan, Province of
Davao. Magallanes ceded his rights and interests to a portion (392,7569 hectares)
of the above public land to plaintiff. The portion Magallanes ceded was officially
released from the forest zone as pasture land and declared agricultural land. On
January 26, 1955, Jose Pao and nineteen other claimants2 applied for the purchase
of ninety hectares of the released area. On March 29, 1955, Plaintiff Corporation in
turn filed its own sales application covering the entire released area. This was
protested by Jose Pao and his nineteen companions upon the averment that they
are actual occupants of the part thereof covered by their own sales application.
The Director of Lands, following an investigation of the conflict, rendered a decision
on July 31, 1956 giving due course to the application of plaintiff corporation, and
dismissing the claim of Jose Pao and his companions. A move to reconsider failed.
On July 5, 1957, the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources on appeal by
Jose Pao for himself and his companions held that the appeal was without merit
and dismissed the same. The case was elevated to the President of the Philippines.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the decision of the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources
has full force and effect
Whether or not the decision of the Executive Secretary is contrary to law and of no
legal force and effect

HELD:
The decision of the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources as to question of
facts shall be conclusive and approved. The President's duty to execute the law is of
constitutional origin.3 He has control of all executive departments. Thus it is, that
department heads are men of his confidence. His is the power to appoint them; his,
too, is the privilege to dismiss them at pleasure. Naturally, he controls and directs
their acts. Implicit then is his authority to go over, confirm, modify or reverse the
action taken by his department secretaries. In this context, it may not be said that
the President cannot rule on the correctness of a decision of a department
secretary. This Court has recognized this practice in several cases. In one, the
decision of the Lands Director as approved by the Secretary was considered
superseded by that of the President's appeal.
The Executive Secretary is equal in rank to the other department heads, no higher
than anyone of them. From this, plaintiff carves the argument that one department
head, on the pretext that he is an alter ego of the President, cannot intrude into the
zone of action allocated to another department secretary. This argument betrays
lack of appreciation of the fact that where, as in this case, the Executive Secretary
acts "by authority of the President," his decision is that of the President's. Such
decision is to be given full faith and credit by our courts. The assumed authority of
the Executive Secretary is to be accepted. For, only the President may rightfully say
that the Executive Secretary is not authorized to do so. Therefore, unless the action
taken is "disapproved or reprobated by the Chief Executive,"13 that remains the act
of the Chief Executive, and cannot be successfully assailed.14 No such disapproval
or reprobation is even intimated in the record of this case.
For the reasons given, the judgment under review is hereby affirmed. Costs against
plaintiff, So ordered.
Namarco v. Arca
9 SCRA 648 (1969)

FACTS:
Juan T. Arive held a position in National Marketers Corporation (NAMARCO),
which is a government owned corporation. The President of the Philippines
reversed the decision of the NAMARCO Board of Directors. The president
reinstated Juan T. Arive.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the president had the authority to reverse the decision of the
Board of Directors of NAMARCO?

HELD:
Yes, the president can reverse the decision. The President shall have control
of all executive department, bureaus, or offices, exercise general supervision
over all local government as may be provided by law, and take care that laws
be faithfully executed.
Corporation owned or controlled by the government, such as
NAMARCO, partake of the nature of government bureaus or offices, which are
administratively supervised by the Administrator of the Office of Economic
Department.

The administrator, whose rank is like that of a Head of an Executive

Department, is directly under the President. Thus, the action of the President
to reverse the decision of a subordinate is justified.

Anak Mindanao Party-List Group v. Executive Secretary

G.R. No. 166052, August 29, 2007

FACTS:
Petitioners Anak Mindanao Party-List Group (AMIN) and Mamalo Descendants
Organization, Inc. (MDOI) assail the constitutionality of Executive Order (E.O.) Nos.
364 and 379, both issued in 2004, via the present Petition for Certiorari and
Prohibition with prayer for injunctive relief. The issue on the transformation of the
Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR) into the Department of Land Reform (DLR)
became moot and academic, however, the department having reverted to its former
name by virtue of E.O. No. 456,it has been held that a party who assails the
constitutionality of a statute must have a direct and personal interest. It must show
not only that the law or any governmental act is invalid, but also that it sustained or
is in immediate danger of sustaining some direct injury as a result of its
enforcement, and not merely that it suffers thereby in some indefinite way. It must
show that it has been or is about to be denied some right or privilege to which it is
lawfully entitled or that it is about to be subjected to some burdens or penalties by
reason of the statute or act complained of.

ISSUE:
Whether or not Executive Order Nos. 364 and 371 were unconstitutional due to
transgression of the principle of separation of powers

HELD:
In carrying out the laws into practical operation, the President is best equipped to
assess whether an executive agency ought to continue operating in accordance with
its charter or the law creating it. This is not to say that the legislature is incapable
of making a similar assessment and appropriate action within its plenary power.
The Administrative Code of 1987 merely underscores the need to provide the
President with suitable solutions to situations on hand to meet the exigencies of the
service that may call for the exercise of the power of control.
x xx The law grants the President this power in recognition of the recurring
need of every President to reorganize his office to achieve simplicity, economy and
efficiency. The Office of the President is the nerve center of the Executive Branch.
To remain effective and efficient, the Office of the President must be capable of
being shaped and reshaped by the President in the manner he deems fit to carry
out his directives and policies.
After all, the Office of the President is the command post of the President. This is the
rationale behind the Presidents continuing authority to reorganize the
administrative structure of the Office of the President. In the present case, AMIN
glaringly failed to show how the reorganization by executive fiat would hamper the
exercise of citizens rights and privileges. It rested on the ambiguous conclusion
that the reorganization jeopardizes economic, social and cultural rights. It
intimated, without expounding, that the agendum behind the issuances is to
weaken the indigenous peoples rights in favor of the mining industry. And it raised
concerns about the possible retrogression in DARs performance as the added
workload may impede the implementation of the comprehensive agrarian reform
program. AMIN has not shown, however, that by placing the NCIP as an attached
agency of the DAR, the President altered the nature and dynamics of the jurisdiction
and adjudicatory functions of the NCIP concerning all claims and disputes involving
rights of indigenous cultural communities and indigenous peoples. Nor has it been
shown, nay alleged, that the reorganization was made in bad faith.

Villena v. Secretary of the Interior

67 PHIL 451 (1939)
FACTS:
Villena was the then mayor of Makati. After investigation, the Secretary of
Interior recommended the suspension of Villena with the Office of the
president who approved the same. The Secretary then suspended Villena.
Villena averred claiming that the Secretary has no jurisdiction over the
matter. The power or jurisdiction is lodged in the local government [the
governor] pursuant to sec 2188 of the Administrative Code. Further, even if
the respondent Secretary of the Interior has power of supervision over local
governments, that power, according to the constitution, must be exercised in
accordance with the provisions of law and the provisions of law governing
trials of charges against elective municipal officials are those contained in
sec 2188 of the Administrative Code as amended. In other words, the
Secretary of the Interior must exercise his supervision over local
governments, if he has that power under existing law, in accordance with sec
2188 of the Administrative Code, as amended, as the latter provisions
govern the procedure to be followed in suspending and punishing elective
local officials while sec 79 (C) of the Administrative Code is the genera law
which must yield to the special law.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the Secretary of Interior can suspend an LGU official under
investigation

HELD:
There is no clear and express grant of power to the secretary to suspend a
mayor of a municipality who is under investigation. On the contrary, the
power appears lodged in the provincial governor by sec 2188 of the
Administrative Code which provides that The provincial governor shall
receive and investigate complaints made under oath against municipal
officers for neglect of duty, oppression, corruption or other form of
maladministration of office, and conviction by final judgment of any crime
involving moral turpitude. The fact, however, that the power of suspension is
expressly granted by sec 2188 of the Administrative Code to the provincial
governor does not mean that the grant is necessarily exclusive and
precludes the Secretary of the Interior from exercising a similar power. For
instance, counsel for the petitioner admitted in the oral argument that the
President of the Philippines may himself suspend the petitioner from office in
virtue of his greater power of removal (sec. 2191, as amended,
Administrative Code) to be exercised conformably to law. Indeed, if the
President could, in the manner prescribed by law, remove a municipal
official; it would be a legal incongruity if he were to be devoid of the lesser
power of suspension. And the incongruity would be more patent if, possessed
of the power both to suspend and to remove a provincial official (sec. 2078,
Administrative Code), the President were to be without the power to suspend
a municipal official. The power to suspend a municipal official is not
exclusive. Preventive suspension may be issued to give way for an impartial
investigation.

Free Telephone Workers Union v. Minister of Labor

108 SCRA 757 (1981)
Facts:
On September 14, 1981, there was a notice of strike with the Ministry of Labor for unfair
labor practices stating the following grounds: "1) Unilateral and arbitrary implementation of
a Code of Conduct; 2) Illegal terminations and suspensions of our officers and members as a
result of the implementation of said Code of Conduct; and 3) Unconfirmation of call sick
leaves and its automatic treatment as Absence Without Official Leave of Absence (AWOL)
with corresponding suspensions, in violation of our Collective Bargaining Agreement." After
which came, on September 15, 1981, the notification to the Ministry that there was
compliance with the two-thirds strike vote and other formal requirements of the law and
Implementing Rules Several conciliation meetings called by the Ministry followed, with the
petitioner manifesting its willingness to have a revised Code of Conduct that would be fair to
all concerned but with a plea that in the meanwhile the Code of Conduct being imposed be
suspended-a position that failed to meet the approval of private respondent. Subsequently,
on September 25, 1981, the respondent certified the labor dispute to the National Labor
Relations Commission for compulsory arbitration and enjoined any strike at the private
respondent's establishment. The labor dispute was set for hearing by respondent National
Labor Relations Commission on September 28, 1981. There was in the main an admission of
the above relevant facts by public respondents. Private respondent, following the lead of
petitioner labor union, explained its side on the controversy regarding the Code of Conduct,
the provisions of which as alleged in the petition were quite harsh, resulting in what it
deemed indefinite preventive suspension-apparently the principal cause of the labor dispute.
The very next day after the filing of the petition, this Court issued the following resolution:
"Considering the allegations contained, the issues raised and the arguments adduced in the
petition for Certiorari with prayer for a restraining order, the Court Resolved to (a) require
the respondents to file an [answer], not a motion to dismiss, on or before Wednesday,
October 7, 1981; and (b) [Set] this case for hearing on Thursday, October 8, 1981 at 11:00
o'clock in the morning." After the parties were duly heard, Solicitor General Estelito P.
Mendoza appearing for the public respondents, the case was considered ripe for decision.

ISSUE:
Whether or not there is undue delegation to the MOLE.

HELD:
No. The Delegation to the MOLE of the power to assume jurisdiction in the labor dispute was
likely to affect the national interest or to certify the same to the NLRC for arbitration does
not constitute an undue delegation of legislative powers.

The allegation that there is undue delegation of legislative powers cannot stand the test of
scrutiny. The power which he would deny the Minister of Labor by virtue of such principle is
for petitioner labor union within the competence of the President, who in its opinion can best
determine national interests, but only when a strike is in progress. Such admission is
qualified by the assumption that the President "can make law," an assertion which need not
be passed upon in this petition. What possesses significance for the purpose of this litigation
is that it is the President who "shall have control of the ministries." It may happen, therefore,
that a single person may occupy a dual position of Minister and Assemblyman. To the extent,
however, that what is involved is the execution or enforcement of legislation, the Minister is
an official of the executive branch of the government. The adoption of certain aspects of a
parliamentary system in the amended Constitution does not alter its essentially presidential
character. Article VII on the presidency starts with this provision: "The President shall be the
head of state and chief executive of the Republic of the Philippines." Its last section is an
even more emphatic affirmation that it is a presidential system that obtains in our
government.

Dept of Environment and Natl Resources v. DENR Region 12

Employees
G.R. No. 149724. August 19, 2003

FACTS:
On November 15, 1999, Regional Executive Director of the Department of Environment and
Natural Resources for Region XII, Israel C. Gaddi, issued a Memorandum directing the
immediate transfer of the DENR XII Regional Offices from Cotabato City to Koronadal
(formerly Marbel), South Cotabato. The Memorandum was issued pursuant to DENR
Administrative Order No. 99-14, issued by then DENR Secretary Antonio H. Cerilles, which
reads in part:Subject: Providing for the Redefinition of Functions and Realignment of
Administrative Units in the Regional and Field Offices: Pursuant to Executive Order No. 192,
dated June 10, 1987 and as an interim administrative arrangement to improve the efficiency
and effectiveness of the Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR) in
delivering its services pending approval of the government-wide reorganization by Congress,
the following redefinition of functions and realignment of administrative units in the regional
and field offices are hereby promulgated: Section 1. Realignment of Administrative Units:
The DENR hereby adopts a policy to establish at least one Community Environment and
Natural Resources Office (CENRO) or Administrative Unit per Congressional District except in
the Autonomous Region of Muslim Mindanao (ARMM) and the National Capital Region (NCR).
Judgment was rendered on January 14, 2000, ordering respondents to cease and desist from
enforcing the said Memorandum for being bereft of legal basis and issued with grave abuse
of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, and are further ordered to return
back the seat of DENR Regional Offices 12 to Cotabato City. Petitioners Motion for
Reconsideration was denied. Further, a petition for certiorari filed with the Court of Appeals
was dismissed outright because of procedural flaws. Hence, the petition with the Supreme
Court.

ISSUE(S):
Whether or not DAO-99-14 and the Memorandum implementing the same were valid?
Whether or not the DENR Secretary has the authority to reorganize the DENR?

HELD:
Petition for review is GRANTED. Previous resolutions of the Court of Appeals and Regional
Trial Court are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The permanent injunction enjoining the petitioner
from enforcing the Memorandum Order of the DENR XII Regional Executive Director is
LIFTED. In said ruling, the court looked into the elementary doctrine of qualified political
agency. Under this doctrine, which recognizes the establishment of a single executive, all
executive and administrative organizations are adjuncts of the Executive Department, the
heads of the various executive departments are assistants and agents of the Chief
Executive, and, except in cases where the Chief Executive is required by the Constitution or
law to act in person or the exigencies of the situation demand that he act personally, the
multifarious executive and administrative functions of the Chief Executive are performed by
and through the executive departments, and the acts of the Secretaries of such
departments, performed and promulgated in the regular course of business, are, unless
disapproved or reprobated by the Chief Executive, presumptively the acts of the Chief
Executive. This doctrine is corollary to the control power of the President as provided for
under Article VII, Section17 of the 1987 Constitution, which reads: Sec. 17. The President
shall have control of all the executive departments, bureaus, and offices. He shall ensure
that the laws be faithfully executed.However, as head of the Executive Department, the
President cannot be expected to exercise his control (and supervisory) powers personally all
the time. He may delegate some of his powers to the Cabinet members except when he is
required by the Constitution to act in person or the exigencies of the situation demand that
he acts personally. Applying the doctrine of qualified political agency, the power of the
President to reorganize the National Government may validly be delegated to his cabinet
members exercising control over a particular executive department. In the case at bar, the
DENR Secretary can validly reorganize the DENR by ordering the transfer of the DENR XII
Regional Offices from Cotabato City to Koronadal, South Cotabato. The exercise of this
authority by the DENR Secretary, as an alter ego, is presumed to be the acts of the President
for the latter had not expressly repudiated the same.

TONDO MEDICAL CENTER EMPLOYEES V. CA

G.R. No. 167324, July 17, 2007

FACTS:
President Estrada issued Executive Order No. 102, entitledRedirecting the
Functions and Operations of the Department of Health, which provided for the
changes in the roles, functions,and organizational processes of the DOH. Under the
assailedexecutive order, the DOH refocused its mandate from being thesole
provider of health services to being a provider of specifichealth services and
technical assistance, as a result of thedevolution of basic services to local
government units

ISSUE:
Whether or not EO102 is constitutional

HELD:
YES. Petitioners allege that the HSRA should be declaredvoid, since it runs counter
to the aspiration and ideals of the Filipino people as embodied in the Constitution.
They claim that the HSRAs policies of fiscal autonomy, income generation,
andrevenue enhancement violate Sections 5, 9, 10, 11, 13, 15 and18 of Article II,
Section 1 of Article III; Sections 11 and 14 of Article XIII; and Sections 1 and 3 of
Article XV of the 1987Constitution. Such policies allegedly resulted in
makinginaccessible free medicine and free medical services. Thiscontention is
unfounded.As a general rule, the provisions of the Constitution areconsidered self-
executing, and do not require future legislationfor their enforcement. For if they are
not treated as self-executing, the mandate of the fundamental law can be
easilynullified by the inaction of Congress. However, some provisionshave already
been categorically declared by this Court as nonself-executing.In Basco v. Philippine
Amusement and Gaming Corporation,this Court declared that Sections 11, 12, and
13 of Article II;Section 13 of Article XIII; and Section 2 of Article XIV of the1987
Constitution are not self-executing provisions. In Tolentinov. Secretary of Finance,
the Court referred to Section 1 of ArticleXIII and Section 2 of Article XIV of the
Constitution as moralincentives to legislation, not as judicially enforceable
rights.These provisions, which merely lay down a general principle,are distinguished
from other constitutional provisions as non-self-executing and, therefore, cannot
give rise to a cause of action in the courts; they do not embody judicially
enforceableconstitutional rights.Some of the constitutional provisions invoked in the
presentcase were taken from Article II of the Constitution -- specifically,Sections 5,
9, 10, 11, 13, 15 and 18 -- the provisions of whichthe Court categorically ruled to be
non-self-executing in theaforecited case of Taada v. Angara.Moreover, the records
are devoid of any explanation of how theHSRA supposedly violated the equal
protection and dueprocess clauses that are embodied in Section 1 of Article III of the
Constitution. There were no allegations of discrimination or of the lack of due
process in connection with the HSRA. Sincethey failed to substantiate how these
constitutional guaranteeswere breached, petitioners are unsuccessful in
establishing therelevance of this provision to the petition, and consequently,
inannulling the HSRA.In the remaining provisions, Sections 11 and 14 of Article XIII
and Sections 1 and 3 of Article XV, the State accords recognition to the protection of
working women and theprovision for safe and healthful working conditions; to
theadoption of an integrated and comprehensive approach tohealth; to the Filipino
family; and to the right of children to assistance and special protection, including
proper care andnutrition. Like the provisions that were declared as non-self-
executory in the cases of Basco v. Philippine Amusement andGaming Corporation
and Tolentino v. Secretary of Finance, theyare mere statements of principles and
policies. As such, theyare mere directives addressed to the executive and the
legislative departments. If unheeded, the remedy will not lie with the courts; but
rather, the electorates displeasure may be manifested in their votes.

MALARIA EMPLOYEES v. EXECUTIVE SECRETARY

G.R. No. 160093, July 31, 2007

FACTS:
At bar is a Petition for Review on Certiorari of the Decision of the Court of Appeals in
CA-G.R. SP No. 65475 dated September 12, 2003 which upheld the validity of
Executive Order (E.O.) No. 102, 1 the law Redirecting the Functions and Operations of
the Department of Health. Then President Joseph E. Estrada issued E.O. No. 102 on
May 24, 1999 pursuant to Section 20, Chapter 7, Title I, Book III of E.O. No. 292,
otherwise known as the Administrative Code of 1987, and Sections 78 and 80 of
Republic Act (R.A.) No. 8522, also known as the General Appropriations Act (GAA) of
1998. E.O. No. 102 provided for structural changes and redirected the functions and
operations of the Department of Health.
On October 19, 1999, the President issued E.O. No. 165 "Directing the Formulation
of an Institutional Strengthening and Streamlining Program for the Executive
Branch" which created the Presidential Committee on Executive Governance (PCEG)
composed of the Executive Secretary as chair and the Secretary of the Department
of Budget and Management (DBM) as co-chair.

ISSUE(s):
1. Whether or not Sections 78 and 80 of the General Provision of Republic Act No.
8522, otherwise known as the General Appropriation[s] Act of 1998[,] empower
former President Joseph E. Estrada to reorganize structurally and functionally the
Department of Health.
2. Whether or not Section 20, Chapter I, title i, Book III of the Administrative Code of
1987 provides legal basis in reorganizing the Department of Health.
(A) Whether Presidential Decree No. 1416, as amended by Presidential Decree No.
1772, has been repealed.
3. Whether or not the President has authority under Section 17, Article VIII of the
Constitution to effect a reorganization of a department under the executive branch.
4. Whether or not there has been abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction on the part of former President Joseph E. Estrada in issuing Executive
Order No. 102, Redirecting the functions and operations of the Department of
Health.
5. Whether or not Executive Order No. 102 is null and void.

HELD:
Petitioners contend that Section 78 refers only to changes in "organizational units"
or "key positions" in any department or agency, while Section 80 refers merely to
scaling down and phasing out of "activities" within the executive department. They
argue that neither section authorizes reorganization. Thus, the realignment of the
appropriations to implement the reorganization of the Department of Health under
E.O. No. 102 is illegal.
We agree with the ruling of the Court of Appeals that the President did not commit
bad faith in the questioned reorganization, viz.:
In this particular case, there is no showing that the reorganization undertaking in
the [Department of Health] had violated this requirement, nor [are] there adequate
allegations to that effect. It is only alleged that the petitioners were directly affected
by the reorganization ordered under E.O. [No.] 102. Absent is any showing that bad
faith attended the actual implementation of the said presidential issuance.

Ang-Angco v. Castillo
No.L-17169

FACTS:
The Pepsi-Cola Co. requested for the withdrawal of pepsi-cola
concentrates which were
Not covered by any Central Bank release certificate. Its counsels
approached Collector of Customs to wrote a letter to Ang-Angcowhich
stated that his office had no objection to the release of the
concentrates but could not take action on the request as it was not in
their jurisdiction. Ang-Angco of said certificate. Collector Ang-Angco finally
released the concentrates. When Commissioner of Customs learned of
the release he filed an administrative complaint against Collector of
Customs then, the petitioner. Secretary Castillo asserted that the
President virtue of his power of control over all executive departments,
subordinate officers of the executive branch of the government.
ISSUE
Whether the President is empowered to remove officers and employees
in the classified Civilservice.

HELD:
The President does not have the power to remove officers or
employees in the classified Civilservice.Reasoning: It comes under the
exclusive jurisdiction of the Commissioner of Civil Service, and having
beendeprived of the procedure laid down in connection with the
investigation and disposition of his case, itmay be said that he has
been deprived of due process as guaranteed by said law.The Power of
control of the President may extend to the Power to investigate,
suspend or removeofficers and employees who belong to the executive
department if they are presidential appointees for as to them that
inherentpower cannot be exercised.This is in line with the provision of
our Constitution which says that "the Congress may by lawvest the
appointment of the inferior officers, in the President alone, in the
courts, or in heads of department" (Article VII, Section 10 [3],
Constitution). With regard to these officers whose appointments are
vested on heads of departments, this Significance: It well established in
this case that it is contrary to law to take direct action on the administrative
case of an employee under classified service even with the authority
of the President without submitting the case to the Commissioner of Civil
Service.

DEMAISIP v. Court of Appeals

25 September 1959 :: G.R. No. L-13000

FACTS:
The late Geronimo Destacamento filed his application for a fishpond permit
on 01 April 1927. Before his death, Destacamento, without the knowledge
and consent of the Director of Forestry, executed a deed of sale covering the
lots in question in gavor of Seragin Villanueva an act which was illegal and
contrary to the rules of the permit granted him. Nevertheless, the Director of
Forestry requested Villanueva to apply for a fishpond permit over the same
lots, but the latter neglected and failed to do so.
Gaudencio Demaisip then filed with the Fish and Game Administration a
fishpond permit application for the same lots. He complied with all the
prerequisites necessary for the issuance of a fishpond permit, namely,
payment of annual rental of P21 and posting a surety bond in the sum of
P350. When said fishpond permit was ready to be issued to Demaisip,
Villanueva executed a deed of sale covering the lots in question in favour of
Luis Buenaflor who started to occupy the land and introduced improvements
thereon consisting of a big dam.
The Director of Fish and Game Administration decided that Demaisip be
given due course upon payment of an additional rental of P16 which is 1% of
the value of improvements assessed at P1,600. However, the Secretary of
Agriculture and Natural Resources reversed the said decision. Demaisip then
appealed to the Court of Appeals.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the Court of Appeals lacks jurisdiction over the said case, due
to the fact that Demaisip had not exhausted all administrative remedies
before approaching the judiciary

HELD:
It is true that plaintiff did not appeal from the decision of the Secretary of
Agriculture and Natural Resources to the President, but such failure cannot
preclude the plaintiff from taking court action in view of the theory that the
Secretary of a department is merely an alter-ego of the President. The
presumption is that the action of the Secretary bears the implied sanction of
the President, unless disapproved by the latter. It is therefore incorrect to
say that plaintiffs action should not be entertained.
Furthermore, it cannot be said that there is interference of the courts with
the acts of executive officers for such defense might only be valid in special
civil actions this is not one wherein the petitioner must allege and prove
that he has no other speedy and adequate remedy.

LANSANG v. BRIGADIER-GENERAL EDUARDO M. GARCIA,.

G.R. No. L-33964 December 11, 1971

FACTS:
On August 21, 1972, two (2) grenades exploded at Plaza Miranda in the city
of Manila during a public meeting for the presentation of its candidates in the
general elections scheduled for November 8, 1971ofActing on such an event, on
August 23, 1972, President Ferdinand Marcos announced the issuance of
Proclamation No. 889, dated August 21, 1971 suspending the privilege of the
writ of habeas corpus on the entire country. Petitions for writ of habeas corpus
were filed by the persons, who, having been arrested without a warrant well as that
of their detention. Proclamation No. 889 was contested upon the ground that it did
not comply with the pertinent constitutional provisions, namely, paragraph (14) of
section 1, Article III of our Constitution and paragraph (2), section 10, Article VII of
the same instrument.
Respondent alleges, that the petitioners had been detained "on reasonable
belief" that they
had "participated in the crime of insurrection or rebellion;" that "their
continued detention
is justified due to the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas
corpus pursuant to
Proclamation No. 889 of the President of the Philippines

ISSUE:
1) Whether or not the issuance of Proclamation 889, as amended is
unconstitutional.
2) Whether or not petitioners are covered by the said Proclamation, as amended.
3) Whether or not the Supreme Court has the power to inquire into the factual basis
of such suspension.

HELD:
And declaring that the President did not act arbitrarily in issuing Proclamation
No. 889, asamended, and that, accordingly, the same is not unconstitutional. For
the valid suspension of the
privilege of the writ: (a) there must be "invasion, insurrection or rebellion" or
pursuant to paragraph (2), section 10 of Art. VII of the Constitution
"imminent danger thereof"; and (b) public No. 889, as amended, that both
conditions are present.
Dismissing the petitions, the acts imputed to the defendants herein constitute
rebellion and
subversion, of in the language of the proclamation "other overt acts
committed ... in
furtherance" of said rebellion, both of which are covered by the proclamation
suspending the privilege of the writ. It is clear, therefore, that the crime for which
the detained petitioners are held
and deprived of their liberty are among those for which the privilege of the
writ of habeas corpus has been suspended.
The Supreme Court, ruled that the suspension of the privilege of the writ of
habeas corpus
was proper for having factual and legal basis clearly provided forth by the
government. But the
Supreme Court, reversing the Barcelon and Montenegro cases, declared that
the Judiciary has the authority to inquire into the factual basis of such suspension,
and that the suspension is to be annulled if no legal ground would be established.
Thus, such action is now considered justiciable to be the privilegeif the writ of
habeas corpus under specified conditions. Pursuant to the principle
of separation of powers and in the system of checks and balances, the
authority to determine whether or not the Executive so acted is vested in the
Judicial Department, which, in this respect, is, in turn, constitutionally supreme.

New Orleans v. The Steamship Company

87 U.S. (20 Wall.) 387

FACTS:
A lease made July 8, 1865, during the military occupation of New Orleans in
the late rebellion by the array of the United States, by the mayor of New
Orleans (appointed by the general commanding the department), pursuant
to a resolution of the boards of finance and of street landings (both boards
appointed in the same mariner), by which it lease of certain waterfront
property in the said city for ten years -- which lease called for large outlays
by the lessee, and was deemed by this Court otherwise a fair one --
sustained for its whole term, although in less than one year afterwards (that
is to say, on the 18th of March, 1866), the, government of the city was
handed back to the proper city authorities.

ISSUE:
Whether or not The City of New Orleans was the part of the United States to
put down an insurrection and restore the supremacy of the National
Government in the Confederate States.

HELD:
The fact that the sovereign State continues to claim over sovereignty and to
exercise powers as such does not prevent it from exercising at the same time
all the rights of a belligerent. This was conclusively determined in the Prize
cases. In that case, as will be remembered, it was held that there lies within
the discretion not reviewable by the courts, to determine when an
insurrection or civil war has assumed such proportions as to warrant him in
declaring it to be public war, and the insurrectionists to be belligerents.
When this is done, the war becomes a territorial one, and all inhabitants of
the revolting district become ipso facto public enemies.

This Court has no power to reverse, on appeal, the imposition of a fine

decreed by the circuit court for contempt of it.
a "general order" from the Military Department of Louisiana forbidding the
several bureaus of the municipal government of the city, created by military
authority, from disposing of any of the city property for a term extending
beyond a period when the civil government of the city might be reorganized
and re-established in conformity to the constitution and laws of the state
held not to have altered the case.
AQUINO vs. COMELEC
(248 SCRA 400)

FACTS:
On 20 March 1995, Agapito A. Aquino filed his Certificate of Candidacy for
the position of Representative for the new Second Legislative District of
Makati City. In his certificate of candidacy, Aquino stated that he was a
resident of the aforementioned district for 10 months. Faced with a petition
for disqualification, he amended the entry on his residency in his certificate
of candidacy to 1 year and 13 days. The Commission on Elections dismissed
the petition on 6 May and allowed Aquino to run in the election of 8 May.
Aquino won. Acting on a motion for reconsideration of the above dismissal,
the
Commission on Election later issued an order suspending the proclamation of
Aquino until the Commission resolved the issue. On 2 June, the Commission
on Elections found Aquino ineligible and disqualified for the elective office for
lack of constitutional qualification of residence.

ISSUE:
Whether residency in the certificate of candidacy actually connotes
domicile to warrant the disqualification of Aquino from the position in the
electoral district

HELD:
The place where a party actually or constructively has his permanent
home, where he, no matter where he may be found at any given time,
eventually intends to return and remain, i.e., his domicile, is that to which
the Constitution refers when it speaks of residence for the purposes of
election law. The purpose is to exclude strangers or newcomers unfamiliar
with the conditions and needs of the community from taking advantage of
favourable circumstances existing in that community for electoral gain.
Aquinos certificate of candidacy in a previous (1992) election indicates that
he was a resident and a registered voter of San Jose Concepcion, Tarlac for
more than 52 years prior to that election. Aquinos connection to the Second
District of Makati City is an alleged lease agreement of a condominium unit
in the area. The intention not to establish a permanent home in Makati City is
evident in his leasing a condominium unit instead of buying one. The short
length of time he claims to be a resident of Makati (and the fact of his stated
domicile in Tarlac and his claims of other residences in Metro Manila) indicate
that his sole purpose in transferring his physical residence is not to acquire a
new, residence or domicile but only to qualify as a candidate for
Representative of the Second District of Makati City. Aquino was thus
rightfully disqualified by the Commission on Elections.

Javellana v. COMELEC
50 SCRA 30
FACTS:
Marcos declared the Philippines under martial law on September 21, 1972. Upon its
declaration,
Congress was padlocked, and full legislative authority was vested upon Marcos via
rule of
decree. It was also during that time that the proceedings of the 1971 Constitutional
Convention
were still continuing despite the declaration of martial law. Eventually, on November
29, 1972,
the Convention approved the new constitution. The next day, Marcos issued
Presidential Decree
73, "submitting to the Filipino people for ratification or rejection the Constitution of
the Republic
of the Philippines proposed by the 1971 Constitutional Convention, and
appropriating funds
therefore," as well as setting the plebiscite for said ratification or rejection of the
Proposed
Constitution on January 15, 1973.
On January 15, 1973, while the Plebiscite Cases were being heard in the Supreme
Court,
the president signed Proclamation 1102, which states that the 1973 Constitution
was
supposedly "ratified by an overwhelming majority of all the votes cast by the
members of all the
Barangays (Citizens Assemblies) throughout the Philippines..."
By virtue of the said decree, the Supreme Court dismissed the case of Charito
Planas for
being moot and academic, without prejudice to the filing of a case questioning the
validity of
Proclamation 1102. Thus, the Ratification cases came into being for the purpose of
questioning
such Proclamation.
On January 20, 1973, Josue Javellana initially filed the case questioning the said
Proclamation.
Similar petitions followed suit. Alejandro Roces National Press Club of the Philippines
Raul
M. Gonzalez Likewise, on January 23, 1973, several senators filed a case against the
Executive
Secretary, as well as Senate President Gil J. Puyat and Senate President Pro Tempore
Jose Roy,
alleging that Congress must still hold session, and that they are being prevented to
do so by
agents of the Government, invoking Proclamation 1102, and that said Proclamation
has a shadow
of doubt as to its validity.

ISSUE(s):
1. Is the issue of the validity of Proclamation No. 1102 a (political) question?
2. Has the 1973 Constitution been ratified validly?
3. Has the aforementioned proposed Constitution been acquiesced in (with or
without valid
ratification) by the people?
4. Are petitioners entitled to relief? And
5. Is the aforementioned proposed Constitution in force?

HELD:
The Ratification Cases erased any doubt as to the legality of the Marcos regime,
thus he had
absolute power as President of the Philippines until he was forced out of power in
1986. It also
showed that his acts cannot be questioned, proof of such absolute power is shown
by a rubber-
stamp legislature and a Supreme Court, which virtually under his thumb, is there to
affirm or
consent any government act being questioned.

Lacson v. Secretary Perez,

G.R. No. 147780, May 10, 2001.(Enbanc) J. Melo

FACTS:
On May 1, 2001, President Macapagal-Arroyo, faced by an angry and violent mob
armed with explosives, firearms, bladed weapons, clubs, stones and other deadly
weapons assaulting the and attempting to break into Malacanang, issued
proclamation no. 38 declaring that there was a state of
rebellion in the National Capital Region. She likewise issued General Order no. 1
directing the Armed
Forces of the Philippines and the Philippine National Police to suppress the rebellion
in the National
Capital Region. Warrantless arrests of several alleged leaders and promoters of the
rebellion were
thereafter affected.

ISSUE:
1. Is President Macapagal-Arroyos declaration of a state of rebellion constitutional?
2. Was the implementation of warrantless arrests on the basis of the declaration of
state of
rebellion constitutional?
3. Did the rallyist commit rebellion at the vicinity of Malacanang palace on May 1,
2001?

HELD:
1.) Nowhere in the constitution can be found a provision which grants the executive
the power
to declare a state of rebellion much more to exercise on the basis of such
declaration the prerogatives
which a president may validly do under the a state of martial law. President
Macapagal-Arroyo
committed a constitutional shortcut; she disregarded the clear provisions of the
constitution which
particularly article VII, sec 18.

2.) The implementation of warrantless arrest premised on the declaration of a state

of rebellion
is unconstitutional and contrary to the existing laws. The constitution provides that
the right of the
people to be secure of their persons, houses and effects against unreasonable
searches and seizures of
whatever nature and for any purpose shall be inviolable, and no search warrant of
arrest shall be issue
except upon probable cause to be determined personally by the judge after
examination under oath or
affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly
describing the place
to be searched and the persons or things to be seized.

3.) The rallyist did not commit rebellion at the vicinity of Malacanang palace on May
1, 2001.
The elements of the crime rebellion may be deduced thus: First, that there must be
(a) Public uprising
and (b) taking arms against the government. Second, that the purpose of the
uprising or movement is
either (a) to remove from the allegiance to said government or its laws (1) the
territory of the
Philippines or any part thereof; (2) anybody of land, naval or other armed forces; (b)
to deprived the
chief executive or the congress, wholly or partially of any of their powers or
prerogatives.
Looking at the elements of the magnified scale, the two of the crime of rebellion are
lacking.

DUNCAN v. KAHANAMOKO
327 U.S. 304 (1946)

FACTS:
Duncan, the petitioner was a civilian ship fitter employed in the Navy Yard at
Honolulu. On February 24th, 1944, more than two years and two months after the
Pearl Harbor attack, he engaged in a brawl with two armed Marine sentries at the
yard. He was arrested by the military authorities. By the time of his arrest, the
military had to some extent eased the stringency of military rule. Schools, bars, and
motion picture theatres had been reopened. Courts had been authorized to
"exercise their normal functions." They were once more summoning jurors and
witnesses and conducting criminal trials. There were important exceptions, however.
One of these was that only military tribunals were to try "Criminal Prosecutions for
violations of military orders. As the record shows, these military orders still covered
a wide range of day-to-day civilian conduct. Duncan was charged with violating one
of these orders, paragraph 8.01, Title 8, of General Order No. 2, which prohibited
assault on military or naval personnel with intent to resist or hinder them in the
discharge of their duty. He was therefore tried by a military tribunal, rather than the
Territorial Court, although the general laws of Hawaii made assault a crime. A
conviction followed, and Duncan was sentenced to six months' imprisonment. Both
White and Duncan challenged the power of the military tribunals to try them by
petitions for writs of habeas corpus filed in the District Court for Hawaii on March 14
and April 14, 1944, respectively. Their petitions urged both statutory and
Constitutional grounds. The court issued orders to show cause. Returns to these
orders contended that Hawaii had become part of an active theatre of war
constantly threatened by invasion from without; that the writ of habeas corpus had
therefore properly been suspended and martial law had validly been established in
accordance with the provisions of the Organic Act; that, consequently, the District
Court did not have jurisdiction to issue the writ, and that the trials of petitioners by
military tribunals pursuant to orders by the Military Governor issued because of
military necessity were valid. Each petitioner filed a traverse to the returns, which
traverse challenged, among other things, the suspension of habeas corpus, the
establishment of martial law, and the validity of the Military Governor's orders,
asserting that such action could not be taken except when required by military
necessity due to actual or threatened invasion, which, even if it did exist on
December 7, 1941, did not exist when the petitioners were tried, and that, whatever
the necessity for martial law, there was no justification for trying them in military
tribunals, rather than the regular courts of law.

ISSUE:
Whether or not that the trial in military tribunals over the Duncan case was valid
and constitutional, while, Hawaii was not yet a state and was being administered
under the Hawaiian Organic Act which effectively instituted martial law on the
island.
HELD:
The Supreme Court, after separate trials, found in each case, among other things,
that the courts had always been able to function but for the military orders closing
them, and that, consequently, there was no military necessity for the trial of
petitioners by military tribunals, rather than regular courts. It accordingly held the
trials void, and ordered the release of the petitioners.

Sanlakas v. Executive Secretary

G.R. 159085, Feb. 3, 2004

FACTS:
July 27, 2003 Some three hundred junior officers and enlisted men of the
Armed Forces of the Philippines stormed into the Oakwood Premiere
apartments in Makati City. The soldiers complained about the corruption in
the AFP and demanded the resignation of the President, the Secretary of
Defense and the Chief of the Philippine National Police. Later in the day, the
President issued Proclamation No. 427 and General Order No. 4, both
declaring a state of rebellion and calling out the Armed Forces to suppress
the rebellion.certain elements of the Armed Forces of the Philippines,
armed with high-powered firearms and explosiveshave seized a building in
Makati City, put bombs in the area, publicly declared withdrawal of support
for, and took arms against the duly constituted Governmentfor the purpose
of removing allegiance to the Government certain bodies of the Armed
Forces of the Philippines and the Philippine National Police, and depriving the
President of the Republic of the Philippinesof her powers and prerogatives
which constituted the crime of rebellion punishable under Article 134 of the
Revised Penal CodeNow, therefore, I, Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo, by virtue
of the powers vested in me by law, hereby confirm the existence of an actual
and on-going rebellion, compelling me to declare a state of rebellion.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the proclamation calling the state of rebellion is
constitutional

HELD:
Section 18, Article 7 of the Constitution grants the President, as Commander-
in-Chief, a
"Sequence" of "graduated power[s]" which are: the calling out power, the
power to suspend the
privilege of the writ of habeas corpus, and the power to declare martial law.
This, however, does not prohibit the President from declaring a state of
rebellion. As a conclusion, the Court finds that the declaration is devoid of
any legal significance and that the declaration is deemed not written.
Furthermore, as long as the state of martial law does not suspend the
operation of the Constitution, it is only a mere declaration that cannot violate
constitutionally protected rights.

David v. Ermita
G.R. 171409, May 3, 2006

FACTS:
In February 2006, due to the escape of some Magdalo members and the
discovery of a plan (Oplan Hackle I) to assassinate GMA she declared PP
1017 and is to be implemented by GO 5. The said law was aimed to suppress
lawlessness and the connivance of extremists to bring down the government.
Pursuant to such PP, GMA cancelled all plans to celebrate EDSA I and at the
same time revoked all permits issued for rallies and other public
organization/meeting. Notwithstanding the cancellation of their rally permit,
KMU head Randolph David proceeded to rally which led to his arrest. Later
that day, the Daily Tribune, which Cacho-Olivares is the editor, was raided by
the CIDG and they seized and confiscated anti-GMA articles and write ups.
Later still, another known anti-GMA news agency (Malaya) was raided and
seized. On the same day, Beltran of Anakpawis was also arrested. His arrest
was however grounded on a warrant of arrest issued way back in 1985 for his
actions against Marcos. His supporters cannot visit him in jail because of the
current imposition of PP 1017 and GO 5. In March, GMA issued PP 1021 w/c
declared that the state of national emergency ceased to exist. David and
some opposition Congressmen averred that PP1017 is unconstitutional for it
has no factual basis and it cannot be validly declared by the president for
such power is reposed in Congress. Also such declaration is actually a
declaration of martial law. Olivares-Cacho also averred that the emergency
contemplated in the Constitution are those of natural calamities and that
such is an overbreadth. Petitioners claim that PP 1017 is an overbreadth
because it encroaches upon protected and unprotected rights. The Sol-Gen
argued that the issue has become moot and academic by reason of the
lifting of PP 1017 by virtue of the declaration of PP 1021. The Sol-Gen
averred that PP 1017 is within the presidents calling out power, take care
power and take over power.

ISSUE:
Whether or not Proclamation 1017 is valid and constitutional pursuant to the
power of the President to declare a state of National emergency

HELD:
The issue cannot be considered as moot and academic by reason of the
lifting of the questioned PP. It is still in fact operative because there are
parties still affected due to the alleged violation of the said PP. Hence, the SC
can take cognition of the case at bar. The SC ruled that PP 1017 is
constitutional in part and at the same time some provisions of which are
unconstitutional.

The SC ruled that PP 1017 is not a Martial Law declaration and is not
tantamount to it. It is a valid exercise of the calling out power of the
president by the president.

IBP v. Zamora
G.R. No. 141284, August 8, 2001

FACTS:
In view of the alarming increase in violent crimes in Metropolitan Manila, the
President ordered the PNP and the Phil. Marines to conduct joint visibility
patrols for crime prevention and suppression. The IBP questioned validity of
the order invoking its responsibility to uphold the rule of law. Petitioners
seeks to nullify the order grounded on the fear that once the armed forces
are deployed, the military will gain ascendancy, and thus place in peril our
cherished liberties.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the act of the president is an act within the ambit of his
executive power

HELD:
The mere invocation by the IBP of its duty to preserve the rule of law is not
sufficient to clothe it with standing in this case. This is too general an
interest which is shared by the whole citizenry. The IBP has failed to show
any specific injury it has suffered or may suffer by virtue of the questioned
order. The presumed possible injury is highly speculative.
The deployment of the Marines does not constitute a breach of the civilian
supremacy clause. The calling of the Marines in this case constitutes
permissible use of military assets for civilian law enforcement. The
participation of the Marines in the conduct of joint visibility patrols is
appropriately circumscribed. Since the institution of the joint visibility patrol
in January, 2000, not a single citizen has complained that this political or civil
rights have been violated as a result of the deployment of the Marines.

It was precisely to safeguard peace, tranquillity and the civil liberties of the
people that the joint visibility patrol was conceived. Freedom and democracy
will be in full bloom only when people feel secure in their homes and in the
streets, not when the shadows of violence and anarchy constantly lurk in
their midst.

GUDANI v. SENGA
G.R. No. 170165

FACTS:
On Sept. 22, 2005, Sen. Biazon invited several senior officers of the AFP,
including Gen. Gudani, to appear at a public hearing before the Senate
Committee on National Defense and Security concerning the conduct of the
2004 elections wherein allegations of massive cheating and the Hello Garci
tapes emerged. AFP Chief of Staff Gen. Senga issued a Memorandum,
prohibiting Gen. Gudani, Col. Balutan and company from appearing before
the Senate Committee without Presidential approval. Nevertheless, Gen.
Gudani and Col. Balutan testified before said Committee, prompting Gen.
Senga to order them subjected to General Court Martial proceedings for
willfully violating an order of a superior officer. In the meantime, President
Arroyo issued EO 464, which was subsequently declared unconstitutional.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the violation of directive of the President could lead to any
investigation for court martial of Petitioners
HELD:
SC holds that the President has constitutional authority to do so, by virtue of
her power as commander-in-chief, and that as a consequence a military
officer who defies such injunction is liable under military justice. At the same
time, we also hold that any chamber of Congress which seeks to appear
before it a military officer against the consent of the President has adequate
remedies under law to compel such attendance. Any military official whom
Congress summons to testify before it may be compelled to do so by the
President. If the President is not so inclined, the President may be
commanded by judicial order to compel the attendance of the military officer.
Final judicial orders have the force of the law of the land which the President
has the duty to faithfully execute.

E.O. 464 compelled officials of the executive branch to seek prior presidential
approval before appearing before Congress, the notion of executive control
also comes into consideration. The impression is wrong. The ability of the
President to require a military official to secure prior consent before
appearing in Congress pertains to wholly different and independent specie of
presidential authoritythe commander-in-chief powers of the President. By
tradition and jurisprudence, the commander-in-chief powers of the President
are not encumbered by the same degree of restriction as that which may
attach to executive privilege or executive control.

Benigno Aquino Jr. v. Military Commission No. 2, et al.

63 SCRA 546, May 9, 1975

FACTS:
In September 1972, after the declaration of Martial Law, Ninoy was arrested
and was placed under custody. He was brought Fort Bonifacio. He filed for the
issuance of the Writ of Habeas Corpus which was denied by the SC. Ninoy
then questioned the validity of such denial and the declaration of martial
law; at the same time he questioned the authority of the military court [No.
2] created [pursuant to GO 2-A] to try him and his other companions. He was
being charged for illegal possession of firearms, ammunition and explosives.
He was also being charged for violation of the Anti-Subversion Act and for
murder. All were filed before the military court. Ninoy argued that the
military court has no jurisdiction or civilian courts are still operational.

ISSUE:
Whether or not Ninoy can be validly charged before the military court

HELD:
The SC upheld the power of the president to create military tribunals or
military courts which are authorized to try not only military personnel but
also civilians even at that time civil courts were open and functioning. The SC
basically rejected the open court theory observed in the USA.

U.S. Supreme Court Ex Parte Milligan

71 U.S. 2 (4 Wall.)
(1866)

FACTS:

Lambdin P. Milligan in his petition to the Circuit Court of the United States for
the District of Indiana prayed to be discharged from an alleged unlawful
imprisonment. He insists that said military commission had no jurisdiction to
try him upon any charges because he was a citizen of the
United States and the State of Indiana, and had not been, since the
commencement of the late
Rebellion, a resident of any of the States whose citizens were arrayed against
the government, and that the right of trial by jury was guaranteed to him by
the Constitution of the United States.

ISSUE:

1) Whether or not the military commission has jurisdiction over the

conviction of the petitioner.
2) Whether or not the President has the authority to suspend the privilege of
the writ of habeas corpus

HELD:

The Court ruled that military tribunal lack jurisdiction over civilians who are
not connected with or engaged in armed conflict. No part of judicial power of
the country was conferred on them because the Constitution expressly vests
it "in one supreme court and such inferior courts as the
Congress may from time to time ordain and establish," and it is not
pretended that the commission was a court ordained and established by
Congress. They cannot justify on the mandate of the President, because he is
controlled by law, and has his appropriate sphere of duty, which is to
execute, not to make, the laws, and there is "no unwritten criminal code to
which resort can be had as a source of jurisdiction.

The President was authorized by it to suspend the privilege of the writ of

habeas corpus whenever, in his judgment, the public safety required, and he
did, by proclamation, bearing date the 15th of
September, 1863, reciting, among other things, the authority of this statute,
suspends it. The suspension of the writ does not authorize the arrest of
anyone, but simply denies to one arrested the privilege of this writ in order to
obtain his liberty.

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. ANTONIO GUILLERMO .

.
FACT:
The perpetration of the seven murders at the time and place above indicated
is not disputed. The main issue raised in this case is the identity of the
executioner. One of the distinguishing features of the executioner, according
to the witnesses for the prosecution, was that he wore heard and mustache
in those days. The appellant tried to prove, and insists before this Court, that
on the tragic night in question he was in the barrio of Liptong, Bacarra, and
that the brute who executed the seven victims was Lt. Alejandro Bumatnong
alias Sagad who, according to appellant, was the one who wore beard and
mustache in those days, but who, according to evidence, had since passed to
the other world. His Honor B. Quitoriano, trial judge, rejected this pretension
(1) because it was easy and convenient to pass the buck to a dead man who
could not defend himself; (2) because the witness Iluminada Foronda,
common-law wife of Alejandro Bumatnong, swore: "He (Alejandro) had no
beard or mustache since the time I met him. He had a long hair, but he had
no beard and no mustache"; and (3) because all the witnesses for the
prosecution, who knew the appellant and saw him on the night in question,
he having investigated them also as suspected followers of Captain Bueno,
testified positively that the appellant was the one who wore beard and
mustache at that time and that it was he who beheaded the victims.

ISSUE:

Whether he is entitled to the benefits of Guerrilla Amnesty Proclamation No.8

HELD:
The insincerity and weakness of this last-ditch plea is manifest. Appellant
does not claim that he killed the seven victims because he had proof and
believed that they were spies for the Japanese. He merely says they were
charged (by Sagad) with being spies for the Japanese.

In the case of Villa vs. Allen (2 Phil. 436), this Court held that "where the
offense charged is a common crime, such as murder, if the defendant desires
to obtain the benefits of the amnesty proclamation, he must plead it in
defense and the evidence must disclose facts showing that his particular
case falls within its scope."

It is rank inconsistency for appellant to justify an act, or seek forgiveness for

an act,which according to him he has not committed. Amnesty presupposes
the commission of a crime, and when an accused maintains that he has not
committed a crime, he cannot have any use for amnesty. Where an amnesty
proclamation imposes certain conditions, as in this case, it is incumbent
upon the accused to prove the existence of such conditions. The invocation
of amnesty is in the nature of a plea of confession and avoidance, which
means that the pleader admits the allegations against him but disclaims
liability therefor on account of intervening facts which, if proved, would bring
the crime charged within the scope of the amnesty proclamation.

RODOLFO D. LLAMASv. EXECUTIVE SECRETARY OSCAR ORBOS

G.R. No. 99031 October 15, 1991

FACTS:

Petitioner Rodolfo D. Llamas is the incumbent Vice-Governor of the Province

of
Tarlac and, on March 1, 1991 he assumed, by virtue of a decision of the
Office of the
President, the governorship (p. 1, Petition). Private respondent Mariano
UnOcampo III
is the incumbent Governor of the Province of Tarlac and was suspended from
office for
a period of 90 days. Public respondent Oscar Orbos was the Executive
Secretary at the
time of the filing of this petition and is being impleaded herein in that official
capacity for
having issued, by authority of the President, the assailed Resolution granting
executive
clemency to respondent governor.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the President of the Philippines has the power to grant
executive
clemency in administrative cases and whether or not the questioned act was
characterized by grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction.

HELD:

WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered: (1) DECLARING that the

President
did not act arbitrarily or with abuse, much less grave abuse of discretion in
issuing
the May 15, 1991 Resolution granting on the grounds mentioned therein,
executive
clemency to respondent governor and that, accordingly, the same is not
unconstitutional
(without prejudice to criminal proceedings which have been filed or may be
filed against
respondent governor), and (2) DENYING the rest of the prayers in the petition
for being
unmeritorious, moot and academic. No costs.
LORETO BARRIOQUINTO v. ENRIQUE A. FERNANDEZ,
EN BANC G.R. No. L-1278

FACTS:
Barrioquinto and Jimenez were charged with murder. jimenez was sentenced
with life imprisonment while Barrioquinto was yet to be apprehended.
jimenez, before the expiration of the period to appeal, applied for amnesty.
When barrioquinto was apprehended, he also applied for amnesty. The
Amnesty Commission ordered the return f case to the CFI without ruling on
the amnesty on the ground that inasmuch as neither Barrioquinto nor
Jimenez have admitted having committed the offense, because Barrioquinto
alleged that it was Hipolito Tolentino who shot and killed the victim, they
cannot invoke the benefits of amnesty.

ISSUE
Whether or not confession to the crime is necessary to be entitled to the
benefits of Proclamation No. 8. (grant of amnesty).

HELD:
The Court is of the opinion that in order to entitle a person to the benefits of the
Amnesty Proclamation of September 7, 1946, it is not necessary that he should
admit having committed the criminal act or offense with which he is charged and
allege the amnesty as a defense.
It is sufficient that the evidence either of the complainant or the accused, shows
that the offense committed comes within the terms of said Amnesty Proclamation.
The plea of not having committed the offense made by an accused simply means
that he cannot be convicted of the offense charged because he is not guilty thereof,
and, even if the evidence would show that he is guilty, it may be because he has
committed it in furtherance of the resistance to the enemy or against persons
aiding in the war efforts of the enemy, and not for purely political motives.
Wherefore, the respondents are hereby ordered to immediately proceed to hear and
decide the application for amnesty of petitioners Barrioquinto and Jimenez, unless
the courts have already decided, the question whether or not they are entitled to
the benefits of the Amnesty Proclamation No. 8 of September 7, 1946.
Amnesty must be distinguished from pardon.
Pardon is granted by the Chief Executive and as such it is a private act which must
be pleaded and proved by the person pardoned, because the courts take no notice
thereof; while amnesty by Proclamation of the Chief Executive with the concurrence
of Congress, and it is a public act of which the courts should take judicial notice.
Pardon is granted to one after conviction; while amnesty is granted to classes of
persons or communities who may be guilty of political offenses, generally before or
after the institution of the criminal prosecution and sometimes after conviction.
Pardon looks forward and relieves the offender from the consequences of an offense
of which he has been convicted, that is, it abolished or forgives the punishment, and
for that reason it does ""nor work the restoration of the rights to hold public office,
or the right of suffrage, unless such rights be expressly restored by the terms of the
pardon," and it "in no case exempts the culprit from the payment of the civil
indemnity imposed upon him by the sentence" article 36, Revised Penal Code).
While amnesty looks backward and abolishes and puts into oblivion the offense
itself, it so overlooks and obliterates the offense with which he is charged that the
person released by amnesty stands before the law precisely as though he had
committed no offense.

In Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Botelho Shipping Corp.

[G.R. Nos. L-21633-34, June 29, 1967, 20 SCRA 487] stated:

FACTS:

Under R.A. No. 1789 reparations goods obtained by private parties were
subject to compensating tax since Section 14 exempted them only from
customs duties, consular fees and special import tax. With its amendment by
R.A. No. 3079, which took effect on June 17, 1961, reparations goods
obtained by private parties, were also exempted from compensating tax. An
end-user who obtained reparations goods before the effectivity of R.A. No.
3079 may avail of the exemption if his utilization contract is renovated and
he voluntarily assumes all the new obligations provided for in said law.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the retroactive effect of this exemption, R.A. 3079 is

constitutional

HELD:

It is true that Republic Act No. 3079 does not explicitly declare that those
who purchased reparations goods prior to June 17, 1961 (the effectivity date
of R.A. No.3079), are exempt from the compensating tax. It does not say so,
because they do not really enjoy such exemption, unless they comply with
the proviso in Section 20 of said Act, by applying for the renovation of the
respective utilization contracts, "in order to avail of any provision of the
amendatory Act which is more favorable" to the applicant. In other words, it
is manifest, from the language of said Section 20,thatthe same intended to
give such buyers the opportunity to be treated "in like manner and to the
same extent as an end-user filing his application after the approval of this
amendatory Act." Like the "most-favored nation clause" in international
agreements, the aforementioned Section 20 thus seeks, not to discriminate
or to create an exemption or exception, but to abolish the discrimination,
exemption or exception that would otherwise result, in favor of the end-user
who bought after June 17, 1961 and against one who bought prior thereto.
Indeed, it is difficult to find a substantial justification for the distinction
between the one and the other. . . .

Pelobello v. Palatino
72 Phil 441

FACTS:
In 1912, Gregorio Palatino was convicted of a crime for which he was
convictedof final judgment and sentenced to imprisonment for 2 years, four
months and one dayof prision correccional, disqualified from voting and
being voted upon.
In 1915, however, he was granted a conditional pardon by the Governor
Generaland on Dec 25, 1940, an absolute pardon by the President. Pellobello
instituted quowarranto proceedings questioning his right to hold office as
mayor elect of Torrijos,
Marinduqueprovince. It was based on sec 94 (a) of the Election Code.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the absolute pardon had the effect of removing the
disqualification incident to criminal conviction?

HELD:
WHEREFORE, this court finds that Gregorio Palatino restored his civiland
political rights. Under these circumstances, it is evident that the purpose in
grantinghim absolute pardon was to enable him to assume the position in
deference to thepopular will; and the pardon was thus extended on the date
mentioned herein aboveand before the date fixed in section 4 of the Election
Code for assuming office. No reason for defeating this wholesome purpose by
a restrictive judicial interpretation of the constitutional grant to the Chief
Executive. The judgment of the lower court is affirmed, with

costs against the petitioner-appellant. So ordered.

BIDDLE v. PEROVICH, 2
74 U.S. 480 (1927)

FACTS:

The Circuit Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit has certified questions of
law to this Court
upon facts of which we give an abridged statement. Perovich was convicted
in Alaska of murder; the verdict being that he was 'guilty of murder in the
first degree and that he suffer death.' On September 15, 1905, he was
sentenced to be hanged and the judgment was affirmed by this Court.
Perovich v. United States, 205 U.S. 86 , 27 S. Ct. 456. Respites were granted
from time to time, and on June 5, 1909, President Taft executed a document
by which he purported to 'commute the sentence of the said VucoPerovich ...
to imprisonment for life in a penitentiary to be designated by the Attorney
General of the United States.' Thereupon Perovich was transferred from jail in
Alaska to a penitentiary in Washington and some years later to one in
Leavenworth, Kansas. In November, 1918, Perovich, reciting that his
sentence had been commuted to life imprisonment, applied for a pardon-and
did the same thing again on December 10, 1921. On February 20, 1925, he
filed in the District Court for the District of Kansas an application for a writ of
habeascorpus on the ground that his removal from jail to a penitentiary and
the order of the President were without his consent and without legal
authority. The District Judge adopted this view and
thereupon ordered the prisoner to be set at large. (9 F.(2d) 124). We pass
over the difficulties in the way of this conclusion and confine ourselves to the
questions pro- [274 U.S. 480, 486] posed.

ISSUE:
'Did the President have authority to commute the sentence of Perovich from
death to life
imprisonment?'

HELD:

'The President ... shall have Power to grant Reprieves and Pardons for
Offences against the United States, except in Cases of Impeachment.'

MIGUEL CRISTOBALv. ALEJO LABRADOR

FACTS:
On March 15, 1930, the Court of First Instance of Rizal found Teofilo C.
Santos, respondent herein, guilty of the crime of estafa and sentenced him
to six months of arresto mayor and the accessories provided by law and to
pay the amount taken. Teofilo C. Santos continued to be a registered elector
in the municipality of Malabon, Rizal, and was, for the period comprised
between 1934 and 1937, seated as the municipal president of that
municipality. On August 22, 1938, Commonwealth Act No. 357, otherwise
known as the Election Code, was approved by the National Assembly, section
94, paragraph (b) of which disqualifies the respondent from voting for having
been declared by final judgment guilty of any crime against property. In
view of this provision, the respondent forthwith applied to the President for
an absolute pardon. The said petition was granted restoring to the
respondent his full civil and political rights, except that with respect to the
right to hold public office or employment, he will be eligible for appointment
only to positions which are clerical or manual in nature and involving no
money or property responsibility.
On November 16, 1940, petitioner, Miguel Cristobal, filed a petition for the
exclusion of the name of Teofilo C. Santos from the list of voters in precinct
No. 11 of Malabon, Rizal, on the ground that the latter is disqualified under
paragraph (b) of section 94 of Commonwealth Act No. 357. The lower court
ruled that the pardon given Santos excluded him from the disqualification
created by the New Election Code.
Cristobal appealed, arguing that the pardoning power does not extend to the
enjoyment of political rights.

ISSUE:
Whether or not Santos should not be excluded as an elector.

HELD:
Saying that paragraph b of section 94 of Commonwealth Act no 357 does not fall
within the purview of the pardoning power of the Chief Executive would lead to the
impairment of this power.
It should be observed that there are two limitations upon the exercise of this
constitutional prerogative by the Chief Executive, namely: (a) that the power be
exercised after conviction; and (b) that such power does not extend cases of
impeachment. Subject to the limitations imposed by the Constitution, the pardoning
power cannot be restricted or controlled by legislative action. It must remain where
the sovereign authority has placed it and must be exercised by the highest authority
to whom it is entrusted. An absolute pardon not only blots out the crime committed,
but removes all disabilities resulting from the conviction. In the present case, the
disability is the result of conviction without which there would be no basis for
disqualification from voting. Imprisonment is not the only punishment which the law
imposes upon those who violate its command. There are accessory and resultant
disabilities, and the pardoning power likewise extends to such disabilities. When
granted after the term of imprisonment has expired, absolute pardon removes all
that is left of the consequences of conviction. In the present case, while the pardon
extended to respondent Santos is conditional in the sense that he will be eligible
for appointment only to positions which a e clerical or manual in nature involving no
money or property responsibility, it is absolute insofar as it restores the
respondent to full civil and political rights.

People of the Philippines v. Eugenio Pasilan

14 SCRA 694

Amnesty when cannot be invoked new trial

FACTS:
Pasilan was a former guerilla fighting against the Japanese. In 1944, while
cleaning his gun outside the house of one Justina Miguel, a certain Ciriaco
Abarra passed by. Pasilan ordered Abarra to wait for him. Abarra waited and
after cleaning his gun, Pasilan interrogated Abarra. Abarra was alleged to be
supporting the Japanese cause and he was one of the persons who
accompanied the Japanese troops in raiding the barrio where Pasilan lived.
After interrogating, Pasilan inflicted upon Abarra 2 stab wounds on Abarras
chest. Abarra run away towards the river. Ten days later, the decaying body
of Abarra was found. About 10 years after the incident, Morales, an agent,
was sent to the barrio to investigate crimes committed during the war. He
conducted some investigation and was also able to have Miguel testify
against Pasilan and he later found Pasilan to be guilty for the murder of
Abarra.
On July 29, 1964, Pasilan moved for a new trial on the ground of newly
discovered evidence which allegedly would reverse the decision of the lower
court. Alleged as newly discovered evidence areswornstatements attesting to
Justina Miguels recantation. Pasilan likewise seeks to avail of Proclamation
No. 8by President Roxas granting amnesty to persons who during the war
committed any act penalized underthe RPC in furtherance of the resistance
against the enemy or against person aiding in the war efforts ofthe enemy.

ISSUE:
Whether or not Pasilan is eligible to be admitted for amnesty.

HELD:
Not every recantation of a witness entitles the accused to a new trial.
Otherwise, the power to grant a new trial would rest not in the courts but in
the witnesses who have testified against the accused. Recanting testimony,
furthermore, is exceedingly unreliable. Since Justina Miguels alleged
recantation has already been passed upon by the trial court, new trial is
uncalled for.

Neither can the additional ground of amnesty entitle appellant to a new trial.
In the first place,
Proclamation No. 8 of President Roxas is not newly discovered evidence, for it
was already known when the case was tried. Secondly, availing of the
benefits granted by the amnesty proclamation would be inconsistent with the
plea of not guilty which appellant entered upon his arraignment. Amnesty
presupposes the commission of a crime, and when the accused maintains
that he has not committed a crime, he cannot avail of amnesty.

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS and HSBCv.JOSE O. VERA,

Judge of the Court of First Instance of Manila, and MARIANO CU
UNJIENG

FACTS:
This is an original action instituted in this court on August 19, 1937, for the
issuance of the writ of certiorariand of prohibition to the Court of First
Instance of Manila so that this court may review the actuations of the
aforesaid Court of First Instance in criminal case No. 42649 entitled "The
People of the Philippine Islands vs. Mariano Cu Unjieng, et al.", more
particularly the application of the defendant Mariano Cu Unjieng therein for
probation under the provisions of Act No. 4221, and thereafter prohibit the
said Court of First Instance from taking any further action or entertaining
further the aforementioned application for probation, to the end that the
defendant Mariano Cu Unjieng may be forthwith committed to prison in
accordance with the final judgment of conviction rendered by this court.
Where in respondents rendered a judgment of conviction from five years and
six months of prision correccional and to prision mayor. Mariano filed a
motion for new trial and even final judgment which was unfortunately denied
the petition for certiorari.

ISSUE:
1. Whether or not the constitutionality of Act No. 4221 has been properly raised in
these proceedings and in the affirmative,
2. Whether or not, said Act is constitutional. Considerations of these issues will
involve a discussion of certain incidental questions raised by the parties.

HELD:
The constitutionality of an act of the legislature will not be determined by the
courts unless that question is properly raised and presented inappropriate
cases and is necessary to a determination of the case. The constitutionality
of Act No. 2972, popularly known as the Chinese Bookkeeping Law, was there
challenged by the petitioners, and the constitutional issue was not met
squarely by the respondent in a demurrer. A point was raised "relating to the
propriety of the constitutional question being decided in original proceedings
in prohibition." This court decided to take up the constitutional question and,
with two justices dissenting, held that Act No. 2972 was constitutional. The
case was elevated on writ of certiorari to the Supreme Court of the United
States which reversed the judgment of this court and held that the Act was
invalid.
Both parties were presented different aspects, as well in their memorandums
as in their oral argument. We have examined the cases brought to our
attention, and others we have been able to reach in the short time at our
command for the study and deliberation of this case. In the examination of
the cases and in then analysis of the legal principles involved we have
inclined to adopt the line of action which in our opinion, is supported better
reasoned authorities and is more conducive to the general welfare. Realizing
the conflict of authorities, we have declined to be bound by certain
adjudicated cases brought to our attention, except where the point or
principle is settled directly or by clear implication by the more authoritative
pronouncements of the Supreme Court of the United States. This line of
approach is justified and Act No. 4221 is hereby declared unconstitutional
and void and the writ of prohibition is, accordingly, granted. Without any
pronouncement regarding costs. So ordered.
Vera v. People
7 SCRA 152 (1963)
FACTS:
Teofilo Santos (resp) was found guilty of estafa and sentenced to six (6) months of
arresto mayor and the accessories provided by law. He was imprisoned from March
14 to August 18, 1932 and paid the corresponding costs of trial. Despitehis
conviction and imprisonment, Santos continued to be a registered voter in his
municipality and was, between 1934 and1937, the municipal president of that
municipality. He applied for pardon in view of a newly promulgated Election
Codewhich disqualifies the respondentfrom voting for having been declared by
final judgment guilty of any crime against property. He was granted pardon
onDecember 24, 1939. Miguel Cristobal (pet) filed an action on November 16, 1940
to exclude the name of Santos from thelist of voters in their municipality.Effect of
pardon granted to SantosRestored his full civil and political rights, except that with
respect to the right to hold public office or employment, he will be eligible for
appointment only to positions which are clerical or manual in nature and involving
no money or propertyresponsibility.Contention c/o CristobalThe pardon extended
by the President to Santos did not restore the full enjoyment of respondents
political rights because:(a) the pardoning power of the President does not apply to
legislative prohibitions; (b) the pardoning power here wouldamount to an unlawful
exercise by the President of a legislative function, and; (c) the respondent having
served his sentenceand all the accessory penalties imposed by law, there was
nothing to pardon.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the Nature and extent of absolute pardonIt not only blots out the
crime committed, but removes all disabilities resulting from the conviction.

HELD:
The President shall be the Commander-in-Chief of all armed forces of the Philippines
and whenever it becomes necessary,he may call out such armed forces to prevent
or suppress lawless violence, invasion or rebellion. In case of invasion or rebellion,
when the public safety requires it, he may, for a period not exceeding sixty days,
suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus or place the Philippines or any
part thereof under martial law. Within forty-eight hours from the proclamation of
martial law or the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus, the
President shall submit areport in person or in writing to the Congress. The Congress,
voting jointly, by a vote of at least a majority of all itsMembers in regular or special
session, may revoke such proclamation or suspension, which revocation shall not be
set aside by the President. Upon the initiative of the President, the Congress may, in
the same manner, extend such proclamation or suspension for a period to be
determined by the Congress, if the invasion or rebellion shall persist and public
safety requires it.The Congress, if not in session, shall, within twenty-four hours
following such proclamation or suspension, convene inaccordance with its rules
without need of a call.he Supreme Court may review, in an appropriate proceeding
filed by any citizen, the sufficiency of the factual basis of the proclamation of
martial law or the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus or the
extension thereof, and must promulgate its decision thereon within thirty days from
its filing. A state of martial law does not suspend the operation of the Constitution,
nor supplant the functioning of the civil courts or legislative assemblies, nor
authorize the conferment of jurisdiction on military courts and agencies over
civilians wherecivil courts are able to function, nor automatically suspend the
privilege of the writ of habeas corpus.The suspension of the privilege of the writ of
habeas corpus shall apply only to persons judicially charged for rebellion or offenses
inherent in, or directly connected with, invasion.

SPOUSES CONSTANTINO v. CUISIA

G.R. No. 106064, October 13, 2005

FACTS:
During the Aquino regime, her administration came up w/ a scheme to reduce the
countrys
external debt. The solution resorted to was to incur foreign debts. Three
restructuring programs
were sought to initiate the program for foreign debts they are basically buyback
programs & bond-
conversion programs). Constantino as a taxpayer and in behalf of his minor children
who are Filipino
citizens, together w/ FFDC averred that the buyback and bond-conversion schemes
are onerous
and they do not constitute the loan contract or guarantee contemplated in Sec.
20, Art. 7 of the
Constitution. And assuming that the President has such power unlike other powers
which may be validly
delegated by the President, the power to incur foreign debts is expressly reserved
by the Constitution
in the person of the President. They argue that the gravity by which the exercise of
the power will
affect the Filipino nation requires that the President alone must exercise this power.
They argue that
the requirement of prior concurrence of an entity specifically named by the
Constitutionthe Monetary
Boardreinforces the submission that not respondents but the President alone and
personally can
validly bind the country. Hence, they would like Cuisia et al to stop acting pursuant
to the scheme.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the president can validly delegate her debt power to the
respondents.

HELD:
There is no question that the president has borrowing powers and that the
president may contract or guarantee foreign loans in behalf of this country
w/ prior concurrence of the Monetary Board. It makes no distinction
whatsoever and the fact that a debt or a loan may be onerous is irrelevant.
On the other hand, the president can delegate this power to her direct
subordinates. The evident exigency of having the Secretary of Finance
implement the decision of the President to execute the debt-relief contracts
is made manifest by the fact that the process of establishing and executing a
strategy for managing the governments debt is deep within the realm of the
expertise of the Department of Finance, primed as it is to raise the required
amount of funding, achieve its risk and cost objectives, and meet any other
sovereign debt management goals. If the President were to personally
exercise every aspect of the foreign borrowing power, he/she would have to
pause from running the country long enough to focus on a welter of time-
consuming detailed activitiesthe propriety of incurring/guaranteeing loans,
studying and choosing among the many methods that may be taken toward
this end, meeting countless times with creditor representatives to negotiate,
obtaining the concurrence of the Monetary Board, explaining and defending
the negotiated deal to the public, and more often than not, flying to the
agreed place of execution to sign the documents. This sort of constitutional
interpretation would negate the very existence of cabinet positions and the
respective expertise which the holders thereof are accorded and would
unduly hamper the Presidents effectively in running the government. The
acts of the respondents are not unconstitutional.

World Health Organization v. Aquino

48 SCRA 243

FACTS
Herein petitioner, in behalf of Dr. Verstuyft, was allegedly suspected by the
Constabulary Offshore Action Center (COSAC) officers of carrying dutiable
goods under the Customs and Tariff Code of the Philippines. Respondent
Judge then issued a search warrant at the instance of the COSAC officers for
the search and seizure of the personal effects of Dr. Verstuyft
notwithstanding his being entitled to diplomatic immunity, as duly
recognized by the Executive branch of the government.

The Secretary of Foreign Affairs Carlos P. Romulo advised the respondent

judge that Dr. Verstuyft is entitled to immunity from search in respect for his
personal baggage as accorded to members of diplomatic missions pursuant
to the Host Agreement and further requested for the suspension of the
search warrant. The Solicitor General accordingly joined the petitioner for the
quashal of the search warrant but respondent judge nevertheless summarily
denied the quashal.

ISSUE:
Whether or not personal effect of WHO Officer Dr. Verstuyft can be exempted
from search and seizure under the diplomatic immunity.

HELD:
The executive branch of the Phils. has expressly recognized that Verstuyft is
entitled to diplomatic immunity, pursuant to the provisions of the Host
Agreement. The DFA formally advised respondent judge of the Philippine
Government's official position. The Solicitor General, as principal law officer
of the government, likewise expressly affirmed said petitioner's right to
diplomatic immunity and asked for the quashal of the search warrant.

It recognized principle of international law and under our system of

separation of powers that diplomatic immunity is essentially a political
question and courts should refuse to look beyond a determination by the
executive branch of government, and where the plea of diplomatic immunity
is recognized by the executive branch of the government as in the case at
bar, it is then the duty of the courts to accept the claim of immunity upon
appropriate suggestion by the principal law officer of the government, the
Solicitor General in this case, or other officer acting under his discretion.
Courts may not so exercise their jurisdiction by seizure and detention of
property, as to embarrass the executive arm of the government in
conducting foreign relations.

The Court, therefore, holds the respondent judge acted without jurisdiction
and with grave abuse of discretion in not ordering the quashal of the search
warrant issued by him in disregard of the diplomatic immunity of petitioner
Verstuyft.

Commissioner of Customs v. Eastern Sea Trading

G.R. No. L-14279, October 31, 1961

FACTS:
This is a petition for review of a judgement of the Court of Tax Appeals
reversing the decision of Commissioner of Customs. Eastern Sea Trading is a
consignee of several shipments of onion and garlic from different countries
and which arrived at the port of Manila. However, none of the shipments had
the certificate required by Central Bank Circulars Nos. 44 and 45, particularly
those shipments from Japan and Hongkong. The goods as imported were
seized and subject to forfeiture for violating Sec 1363 of the Revised
Administrative Code.

ISSUE:
1. Whether or not the Central Bank has an authority since shipments are in
no dollar imports thus do not involve foreign exchange.
2. Whether or not the Central Bank Circulars Nos. 44 and 45 are null and
void.
3. Whether or not there is a justification for the seizure and forfeiture of
goods due to Executive Order No. 328 (executive agreement and no
governmental agency authorized to issue import license).

HELD:
An Executive Order No. 328 is a patent, and as an executive agreement,
there is no need for the occurrence of the ratification from the Senate. It is
an international agreement embodying adjustments of detail carrying out
well-established national policies and traditions and more or less, temporary
in nature, contrary to the nature oftreaties, which is permanent in nature.
Hence, the decision made by the Court of Tax Appeals was reversed with cost
against the respondent-defendant Eastern Sea Trading.

Bayan v. Zamora
G. R. No. 138570, October 10, 2000

FACTS:
The Republic of the Philippines and the United States of America entered into
an agreement called the Visiting Forces Agreement (VFA). The agreement
was treated as a treaty by the Philippine government and was ratified by
then-President Joseph Estrada with the concurrence of 2/3 of the total
membership of the Philippine Senate.

The VFA defines the treatment of U.S. troops and personnel visiting the
Philippines. It provides for the guidelines to govern such visits, and further
defines the rights of the U.S. and the Philippine governments in the matter of
criminal jurisdiction, movement of vessel and aircraft, importation and
exportation of equipment, materials and supplies.

Petitioners argued, inter alia, that the VFA violates 25, Article XVIII of the
1987 Constitution, which provides that foreign military bases, troops, or
facilities shall not be allowed in the Philippines except under a treaty duly
concurred in by the Senate . . . and recognized as a treaty by the other
contracting State.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the Visiting Forces Agreement is Unconstitutional

HELD:
NO, the VFA is not unconstitutional.
Section 25, Article XVIII disallows foreign military bases, troops, or facilities in the
country, unless the following conditions are sufficiently met, viz: (a) it must be
under a treaty; (b) the treaty must be duly concurred in by the Senate and, when so
required by congress, ratified by a majority of the votes cast by the people in a
national referendum; and (c) recognized as a treaty by the other contracting state.
There is no dispute as to the presence of the first two requisites in the case of the
VFA. The concurrence handed by the Senate through Resolution No. 18 is in
accordance with the provisions of the Constitution the provision in [in 25, Article
XVIII] requiring ratification by a majority of the votes cast in a national referendum
being unnecessary since Congress has not required it.
This Court is of the firm view that the phrase recognized as a treaty means that
the other contracting party accepts or acknowledges the agreement as a treaty. To
require the other contracting state, the United States of America in this case, to
submit the VFA to the United States Senate for concurrence pursuant to its
Constitution, is to accord strict meaning to the phrase.
Well-entrenched is the principle that the words used in the Constitution are to be
given their ordinary meaning except where technical terms are employed, in which
case the significance thus attached to them prevails. Its language should be
understood in the sense they have in common use.
Moreover, it is inconsequential whether the United States treats the VFA only as an
executive agreement because, under international law, an executive agreement is
as binding as a treaty. To be sure, as long as the VFA possesses the elements of an
agreement under international law, the said agreement is to be taken equally as a
treaty.

Qua CheeGan v. Deportation Board

9 SCRA 27 (1963)

FACTS:
The Court of First Instance denied the petition for writs of habeas corpus,
mandamus and certiorari bythe petitioners.
On May 12, 1952, Special ProsecutorEmilio L. Galang charged petitioner
before theDeportation Board.
The crimes:
Purchasing $130,000 with license from Central Bank and remitted it to
Hong Kong
attempted bribery of Phil and US officials
In effect, Deportation Board issued a warrant of arrest for petitioner (E.O. No
398, series of 1951). Upon fixing of bonds, petitioner was temporarily set
free.

ISSUE:
1. Whether or not the President has authority to deport aliens.
2. Whether or not the Deportation Board also has authorityto file warrants of
arrest.

HELD:
1. Yes. Section 69 of Act No. 2711 of RAC:No alien can be deported by prexy
EXCEPT upon prior investigation, conducted by said executive or his
authorized agent, of the ground upon which such action is contemplated

2. Yes, but only after investigation has resulted to the actual order of
deportation. Arrest would have been necessary for deportation to take effect.
However, in the case at bar, investigations were still
On-going and no order for deportation was yet made. Decision: E.O. No 398,
series of 1951: declared illegal.

GONZALES v. HECHANOVA
G.R. No. L-21897

FACTS:

Respondent Executive Secretary authorized the importation of 67,000

tons of foreign rice and entered into two (2) contracts for the purchase of
rice, one with the Republic of Vietnam, and another with the Government of
Burma; that these contracts constitute valid executive
agreements under international law; and the importation of the rice in
question by the Armed Forces of the Philippines is for military
stockpiling authorized by the President pursuant to his inherent power
as commander-in-chief and as a measure of military preparedness
demanded by a real and actual threat of emergency in the South East Asian
countries. October 22, 1963 The herein petitioner, Ramon A. Gonzales a
rice planter, and president of the Iloilo Palay and rice and corn filed the
petition herein, averring that, in making or attempting to make said
importation of foreign rice, the aforementioned respondents "are acting
without jurisdiction or in excess of jurisdiction", because Republic Act
No. 3452 which allegedly repeals or amends Republic Act No. 220
explicitly prohibits the importation of rice and corn "the Rice and Corn
Administration or any other government agency;"; that a writ of preliminary
injunction be forthwith issued restraining respondent their agents or
representatives from implementing rice; and that, after due hearing,
judgment be rendered making said injunction permanent.

ISSUE:
Whether or not an international agreement may be invalidated by our court?

HELD:

Constitution of the Philippines has clearly settled it in the affirmative, by

providing, in Section 2 of
Article VIII thereof, that the Supreme Court may not be deprived "of
its jurisdiction to review, revise, reverse, modify, or affirm on appeal,
certiorari, or writ of error as the law or
the rules of court may provide, final judgments and decrees of inferior
courts in (1) All cases in which the constitutionality or validity of any
treaty, law, ordinance, or executive order or regulation is in question".
In other words, our Constitution authorizes the nullification of a treaty,
not only when it conflicts with the fundamental law, but, also, whens it
runs counter to an act of Congress

WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered declaring that respondent

Executive Secretary had and has no power to authorize the importation in
question; that he exceeded his jurisdiction in
granting said authority; said importation is not sanctioned by law and
is contrary to its provisions; is, accordingly denied. It is so ordered.
USAFFE VETERANS ASSOCIATION, INC. v. THE TREASURER OF THE
PHILIPPINES, ET AL.
G.R. No. L-10500, June 30, 1959

FACTS:
In October 1954, the USAFFE Veterans Associations Inc. Prayed in its complaint
before the
Manila court of first instance that the Romulo-Snyder Agreement (1950)
whereby the
Philippine Government undertook to return to the United States Government
in ten annual installments, a total of about 35-million dollars advanced by the
United States, to be annulled, that payments thereunder be declared illegal and
that defendants as officers of the Philippine Republic be restrained from
disbursing any funds in the National Treasury in pursuance of said
Agreement. Said Usaffe Veterans further asked that the moneys available,
instead of being remitted to the United States, should be turned over to the
Finance Service of the Armed Forces of the Philippines for the payment of all
pending claims of the veterans represented by plaintiff. Of the millions so
transferred, there remained unexpended and uncommitted in the possession of
the Philippine Armed Forces as of December 31, 1949 about 35 million
dollars. President Quirino, through Governor Miguel Cuaderno of the Central
Bank proposed to the corresponding officials of the U.S. Government the retention
of the 35-million dollars as a loan, and for its repayment in ten annual installments.
After protracted negotiations theon November 6, 1950, by the then Philippine
Secretary of Foreign Affairs, Carlos P. Romulo, and the then American Secretary
of the Treasury, John W. Snyder.

In this appeal, the Usaffe Veterans insists: first, the money delivered to the
U.S. to the
Armed Forces of the Philippine Island were straight payments for military
services;
Ownership there was nothing to return, nothing to consider as a loan; and
second, the Romulo-
Snyder .lack

ISSUE:
Whether or not Romulo-Synder Agreement is unconstitutional.

HELD:
Executive Agreements fall into two classes: (1) agreements made purely as
executive acts affecting may be termed as presidential agreements and (2)
agreements entered into in pursuants
of acts of Congress, which have been designated as Congressional-Executive
Agreements. Validly entered into to conform to the second category, namely,
"agreements entered into purely as executive acts without legislative
authorization." This second category usually
includes money agreements relating to the settlement of pecuniary claims of
citizens.
Senate Resolution No. 15 practically admits the validity and binding force of such
Agreement. Furthermore, the acts of Congress Appropriating funds for the
yearly
Installments necessary to comply with such Agreements constitute ratification
thereof,
which places the question the validity out of the Court's reach, no constitutional
principle having loan.

In conclusion, plaintiff, to say the least, failed to make a clear case for the
relief demanded; its petition was therefore, properly denied.

Cong. Ruy Elias C. Lopez, v. Senate of the Philippines (represented

by Franklin Drilon, President of the Senate], House of
Representatives, et al.

FACTS:
The joint Public Session of Congress adopted the Rules on canvassing on the
Pres. And VP on May 10, 2004 election. The Joint session constituted a Joint
Committee of both houses to conduct a preliminary canvass on the votes for
Pres. And VP, andsubmit the final report to the Joint Public Session for
approval.

ISSUE:

Whether or not CONGRESS MAY DELEGATE THE PRELIMINARY COUNT OF

VOTES FOR PRES AND VP TO A JOINT COMMITTEE?

HELD:

SEC. 4 Art. 7 of the 1987 Constitution expressly empower congress to

promulgate its rules for the canvassing of COC for Pres. and VP. The Congress
may delegate the preliminary canvassing to a joint committee provided that
the committee will submit Committee Report for the approval of Congress as
a body.

Quintos-Deles v. Commission on Appointments

GR No. 83216, September 4, 1989

FACTS:
This is a special civil action for prohibition and mandamus with injuction to
cempel Commission on Appointments to allow Teresita Quintos-Deles to
perform and discharge her duties as a member of HR representing the
Womens Sector.
Quintos-Deles, Lopez (Youth), Arteche (Peasant) and Teves (Urban Poor) have
not taken their oaths due to the opposition of some congressmen members
of Commission on Appointments.
1. Sectoral representatives must be first confirmed by Commission on
Appointments.Since the President included a letter to the Commission on
Appointments upon submission of the four sectoral representatives, thus
confirmation is required.
2. The appointment was acted during session

ISSUE:
1. Sec 7, Article XVIII does not require confirmation
2. its nowhere in the constitution nor in EO No. 198 is mention the need for
confirmation

HELD:

1. Sectoral representatives are referred to the first sentence of Sec 16 Art

VII
2. Provisions of EO No. 198 do not deal with the manner of appointment of
sectoral representatives. It just specify the sectors to be presented.
3. Deles appointment was issued not by virtue of EO No. 198 but pursuant
to Art VII Sec 16 par 2 and Art XVIII Sec 7.

Bautista v. Salonga
FACTS:
In Annex 3 of Commission's same comment, dated 3 February 1989, is a
news itemappearing in the 3 February 1989 issue of the "Manila Standard"
reporting that the President haddesignated PCHR Commissioner Hesiquio R.
Mallillin as "Acting Chairman of the Commission"pending the resolution of
Bautista's case which had been elevated to the Supreme Court.On 20
January 1989, or even before the respondent Commission on Appointments
hadacted on her "ad interim appointment as Chairman of the Commission on
Human Rights"Bautista filed with this Court the present petition for certiorari
with a prayer for the immediateissuance of a restraining order, to declare "as
unlawful and unconstitutional and without anylegal force and effect any
action of the Commission on Appointments as well as of theCommittee on
Justice, Judicial and Bar Council and Human Rights, on the lawfully
extendedappointment of the Bautista as Chairman of the Commission on
Human Rights, on the groundthat they have no lawful and constitutional
authority to confirm and to review her appointment."

ISSUE:
Whether the President, subsequent to her act of 17 December 1988, and
after Bautistahad qualified for the office to which she had been appointed, by
taking the oath of office andactually assuming and discharging the functions
and duties thereof, could extend anotherappointment to Bautista on 14
January 1989

HELD:
When Her Excellency, the President converted Bautista's designation as
Acting Chairmanto a permanent appointment as Chairman of the
Commission on Human Rights on 17 December1988, significantly she
advised Bautista (in the same appointment letter) that, by virtue of
suchappointment, she could qualify and enter upon the performance of the
duties of the office (of Chairman of the Commission on Human Rights). All
that remained for Bautista to do was to reject or accept the appointment.
Obviously, she accepted the appointment by taking her oath of officebefore
the Chief Justice Fernan and assuming immediately thereafter the functions
and duties of the Chairman of the Commission on Human Rights. Bautista's
appointment therefore on 17December 1988 as Chairman of the Commission
on Human Rights was a completed act on thepart of the
President.Constitutional Law, to begin with, is concerned with power not
political convenience,wisdom, exigency, or even necessity. Neither the
Executive nor the Legislative (Commission onAppointments) can create
power where the Constitution confers none. The evident constitutionalintent
is to strike a careful and delicate balance, in the matter of appointments to
public office,between the President and Congress (the latter acting through
the Commission on Appointments). To tilt one side or the other of the scale is
to disrupt or alter such balance of power. In other words, to the extent that
the Constitution has blocked off certain appointmentsfor the President to
make with the participation of the Commission on Appointments, so also
hasthe Constitution mandated that the President can confer no power of
participation in theCommission on Appointments over other appointments
exclusively reserved for her by theConstitution.

PEOPLE v. Gacott Jr.

G.R. No. 116049, July 13, 1995

FACTS:
For failure to check the citations of the prosecution, the order of respondent
RTC Judge Eustaquio Gacott, Jr. dismissing a criminal case was annulled by
the SC. The respondent judge was also sanctioned with a reprimand and a
fine of P10, 000.00 for gross ignorance of the law. The judgment was made
by the SecondDivision of the SC.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the Second Division of the SC has the competence to
administratively discipline respondent judge

HELD:
To support the Courts ruling, Justice Regalado relied on his recollection of a
conversation with former Chief Justice Roberto Concepcion who was the
Chairman of the Committee on the Judiciary of the 1986 Constitutional
Commission of which Regalado was also a member.

The very text of the present Sec. 11, Art. VIII of the Constitution clearly
shows that there are actually two situations envisaged therein. The first
clause which states that the SC en banc shall have the power to discipline
judges of lower courts, is a declaration of the grant of that disciplinary
power to, and the determination of the procedure in the exercise thereof by,
the Court en banc. It was not therein intended that all administrative
disciplinary cases should be heard and decided by the whole Court since it
would result in an absurdity.

The second clause, which refers to the second situation contemplated

therein and is intentionally separated from the first by a comma, declares on
the other hand that the Court en banc can order their dismissal by a vote of
a majority of the Members who actually took part in the deliberations on the
issues in the case and voted therein. In this instance, the administrative
case must be deliberated upon and decided by the full Court itself.

Pursuant to the first clause which confers administrative disciplinary power

to the Court en banc, a decision en banc is needed only where the penalty to
be imposed is the dismissal of a judge, officer or employee of the Judiciary,
disbarment of a lawyer, or either the suspension of any of them for a period
of more than 1 year or a fine exceeding P10, 000.00 or both.

Indeed, to require the entire Court to deliberate upon and participate in all
administrative matters or cases regardless of the sanctions, imposable or
imposed, would result in a congested docket and undue delay in the
adjudication of cases in the Court, especially in administrative matters, since
even cases involving the penalty of reprimand would require action by the
Court en banc.
MATIBAG v. BENIPAYO
G.R. No. 149036, April 2, 2002
FACTS:
On February 1999, petitioner Matibag was appointed Acting Director IV of the
ComelecsEID by then Comelec Chairperson Harriet Demetriou in a
temporary capacity. OnMarch 2001, respondent Benipayo was appointed
Comelec Chairman together withother commissioners in an ad interim
appointment. While on such ad interimappointment, respondent Benipayo in
his capacity as Chairman issued a Memorandumaddress transferring
petitioner to the Law Department. Petitioner requested Benipayo
toreconsider her relief as Director IV of the EID and her reassignment to the
LawDepartment. She cited Civil Service Commission Memorandum Circular
No. 7 dated April 10, 2001, reminding heads of government offices that
"transfer and detail of employees are prohibited during the election period.
Benipayo denied her request for reconsideration on April 18, 2001, citing
COMELEC Resolution No. 3300 dated November 6, 2000, exempting Comelec
from the coverage of the said Memo Circular.Petitioner appealed the denial of
her request for reconsideration to the COMELECenbanc. She also filed an
administrative and criminal complaint16 with the LawDepartment17against
Benipayo, alleging that her reassignment violated Section 261 (h)of the
Omnibus Election Code, COMELEC Resolution No. 3258, Civil
ServiceMemorandum Circular No. 07, s. 001, and other pertinent
administrative and civil servicelaws, rules and regulations.During the
pendency of her complaint before the Law Department, petitioner filed
theinstant petition questioning the appointment and the right to remain in
office of Benipayo,Borra and Tuason, as Chairman and Commissioners of the
COMELEC, respectively.Petitioner claims that thead interimappointments of
Benipayo, Borra and Tuason violatethe constitutional provisions on the
independence of the COMELEC.

ISSUES:
Whether or not the assumption of office by Benipayo, Borra and Tuason on
the basis of the
ad interimappointments issued by the President amounts to a
temporaryappointment prohibited by Section 1 (2), Article IX-C of the
Constitution.
HELD:
We find petitioners argument without merit. Anad interimappointment is a
permanent appointment because it takes effectimmediately and can no longer be
withdrawn by the President once the appointee hasqualified into office. The fact that
it is subject to confirmation by the Commission on Appointments does not alter its
permanent character. The Constitution itself makesanad interimappointment
permanent in character by making it effective untildisapproved by the Commission
on Appointments or until the next adjournment of Congress.

In the instant case, the President did in fact appoint permanent Commissioners to
fill thevacancies in the COMELEC, subject only to confirmation by the Commission
on Appointments. Benipayo, Borra and Tuason were extended permanent
appointmentsduring the recess of Congress. They were not appointed or designated
in a temporary or acting capacity, unlike Commissioner Haydee Yoracin Brillantes
vs. Yorac 34andSolicitor General Felix Bautista inNacionalista Party vs.
Bautista.35Thead interimappointments of Benipayo, Borra and Tuason are expressly
allowed by theConstitution which authorizes the President, during the recess of
Congress, to makeappointments that take effect immediately.

PASEI v. DRILON
[163 SCRA 386; L-81958; 30 JUN 1988]

FACTS:

Petitioner, Phil association of Service Exporters, Inc., is engaged principally in

the recruitment of Filipino workers, male and female of overseas
employment. It challenges the constitutional validity of Dept. Order No. 1
(1998) of DOLE entitled Guidelines Governing the Temporary Suspension of
Deployment of Filipino Domestic and Household Workers. It claims that such
order is a discrimination against males and females. The Order does not
apply to all Filipino workers but only to domestic helpers and females with
similar skills, and that it is in violation of the right to travel, it also being an
invalid exercise of the lawmaking power. Further, PASEI invokes Sec 3 of Art
13 of the Constitution, providing for worker participation in policy and
decision-making processes affecting their rights and benefits as may be
provided by law. Thereafter the Solicitor General on behalf of DOLE
submitting to the validity of the challenged guidelines involving the police
power of the State and informed the court that the respondent have lifted
the deployment ban in some states where there exists bilateral agreement
with the Philippines and existing mechanism providing for sufficient
safeguards to ensure the welfare and protection of the Filipino workers.

ISSUE:
Whether or not there has been a valid classification in the challenged
Department Order No.

HELD:
SC in dismissing the petition ruled that there has been valid classification; the
Filipino female domestics working abroad were in a class by themselves, because of
the special risk to which their class was exposed. There is no question that Order
No.1 applies only to female contract workers but it does not thereby make an undue
discrimination between sexes. It is well settled hat equality before the law under the
constitution does not import a perfect identity of rights among all men and women.
It admits of classification, provided that:
1. Such classification rests on substantial distinctions
2. That they are germane to the purpose of the law
3. They are not confined to existing conditions
4. They apply equally to al members of the same class
In the case at bar, the classifications made, rest on substantial distinctions.
Dept. Order No. 1 does not impair the right to travel. The consequence of the
deployment ban has on the right to travel does not impair the right, as the right to
travel is subjects among other things, to the requirements of public safety as may
be provided by law. Deployment ban of female domestic helper is a valid exercise of
police power. Police power has been defined as the state authority to enact
legislation that may interfere with personal liberty or property in order to promote
general welfare. Neither is there merit in the contention that Department Order No.
1 constitutes an invalid exercise of legislative power as the labor code vest the
DOLE with rule making powers.

Summers v. Ozaeta
1 PHIL 754 (1948)

FACTS:
On December 7, 1937, one year and six months after the project of partition of the
estate of the deceased Ignacio UyQuimco had been approved by the court, the
latter granted the petition of the administrator MonicoUyYt for authority to withdraw
from the China Banking Corporation the sum of P600 and to pay the same to his
attorney, Mr. Jose G. Macatagay, for services rendered by him to the estate
covering the period from November 6, 1934, up to that date. The estate consisted
of real property valued at P13,390 and credits amounting to P15,673.73. The said
sum of P600 was the only money remaining undistributed with which to pay the
services of the attorney for the administrator. Pursuant to said authority the
administrator withdrew the said sum from the bank and out of it paid P350 to
Attorney Macatagay, retaining the balance of P250 in his hands pending the result
on the motion for reconsideration filed by the attorney for Quirina Rios on behalf of
her two minor children who are heirs of the estate. Said motion for reconsideration,
wherein the movants contended that one-half of the P600 should be paid to them,
was denied by the Court of Appeals from the order of December 7, 1937,
authorizing the withdrawal of the said sum of P600 from the bank and its payment
to Attorney Jose G. Macatangay. The Court of Appeals, in its decision promulgated
on February 27, 1941, affirmed the order appealed from. Thus the authority of the
administrator to withdraw the sum of P600 and pay all of it to his attorney was
definitely established. In the meantime the appeal of two of the heirs, Benito Uy and
Maria Uy, from the approval of the project of partition was decided in their favor
with costs against the appellee administrator. The costs amounted to P141.60. And
on August 15, 1939, pending the appeal of Quirina Rios and her children from the
order authorizing the payment of P600, her attorney filed a petition with the court to
order the administrator to pay the said costs. That petition was granted on August
30, 1939, and inasmuch as the property of the deceased had been distributed
among his heirs, the court (Judge Gervasio Diaz presiding) ordered all of the heirs to
pay the said costs amounting to P141.60. The attorney for Quirina Rios and her
children moved for the reconsideration of that order on the ground that his clients,
the minors Benito Uy and Maria Uy, who were among the heirs of the deceased,
should not be made to bear any apart of the costs which were awarded in their
favor against the appellee administrator. The court granted the motion for
reconsideration and amended its previous order in the sense that the costs of
P141.60 be paid by the appellee administrator.

ISSUE
Whether or not The costs of P141.60 should be paid out of the sum of P250
remaining in the hands of the administrator, which, by a previous order of
the probate court subsequently affirmed by the Court of Appeals, had been
authorized to be paid to the attorney for the administrator as his fees for his
services, or whether said costs should be paid by the heirs and distributees
of the estate out of the property they had received.

HELD:
The order of Judge QuiricoAbeto dated October 7, 1940. requiring the
administrator to pay the sum of P141.60 out of the sum of P250 remaining in
his hands is hereby set aside, and the order originally issued by Judge
Garvasio Diaz dated August 30, 1939, requiring the heirs to pay the said sum
of P141.60 out of the properties they had received from the estate is hereby
reinstated, with costs against the appellees.

Pacete v. Secretary of the Commission on Appointments

40 SCRA 58
FACTS:
Petitioner Felizardo S. Pacete alleged that he was appointed by the then
President of the Philippines on August 31, 1964 as Municipal Judge of
Pigcawayan, Cotabato.
He assumed office on September 11, 1964 and discharged his duties as
such. As his appointment, was made during the recess of Congress, it was
submitted to the Commission on Appointments at its next session in 1965.
On February 7, 1966, the then Secretary of Justice, whom he likewise
included in his petition, through the Judicial Superintendent, advised
petitioner to vacate his position as municipal judge, the ground being that
his appointment had been by-passed.
Senator Rodolfo Ganzon, wrote to its Chairman stating that he was filing a
motion for the reconsideration of the confirmation of the appointment of
petitioner as municipal judge of Pigcawayan, Cotabato, in view of derogatory
information which he had received.
Respondent Secretary of the Commission on Appointments thus was led to
notify the then Secretary of Justice accordingly, following what he considered
to be the prevailing practice of such body that the mere presentation of such
letter "automatically vacated the confirmation of the appointment in
question . . ." Respondent Secretary of Justice through the Judicial
Superintendent then advised petitioner that he should vacate his position as
municipal judge, as he had not been duly confirmed. The Disbursing Officer
of the Department of Justice was likewise named respondent as he had, as a
consequence, withheld petitioner's salaries.

ISSUE:
1.) Whether or not the confirmation of his appointment had become final
and executory upon the adjournment of the fourth regular session of
the Fifth Congress at midnight of May 21, 1965;
2.) Whether or not the petitioner's appointment was not duly confirmed;
and
3.) Whether or not the Court has jurisdiction over the case.

HELD:

WHEREFORE, petitioner is entitled to the writ of mandamus and the

Secretary of the Commission on Appointments is commanded to issue the
certificate of confirmation prayed for by petitioner.
The right of petitioner to perform his functions as municipal judge of
Pigcawayan, Cotabato is in accordance with law, his confirmation having
been duly confirmed. No pronouncement as to costs.

FELIPE GANOB, ET AL v. REMEDIOS RAMAS, ET AL

G.R. No. L-23282

FACTS:
Felipe Ganob appealing from a decision of the Court of First Instance of Lanao del
Norte dismissing the petition for certiorari, praying for the annulment of the
decision rendered by the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources in DANR
Case No. 670-A. On July 29, 1930 Ireneo Quidato filed Sales Application No. 14185
(E-265) for Lot No. 47, PLS-35, Kapatagan Subdivision located in Kapatagan, Lanao.
On February 13, 1933 the land applied for was awarded to him as a result of a
public auction held on October 28 of the previous year. However, his application was
cancelled on October 31, 1935 for nonpayment of the first to the fourth installments
due under the award. Leodegario Ramas now deceased and substituted by his
heirs, Remedios Ramas and others having become interested in the acquisition of
the same lot No. 47, inquired from the Bureau of Lands whether or not he could
acquire whatever rights Quidato had thereon, to which the Bureau, on September
13, 1937, replied that the sales application of Quidato may be reinstated upon
payment of the first to the fourth installments plus the interest due thereon.
Thereafter, or more specifically, on August 2, 1937, a deed of transfer of rights was
executed by Quidato in favor of Ramas. On the 12th of the same month Ramas paid
the total amount of P937.82 to the Bureau of Lands. On January 6, 1938 the Director
of Lands reinstated the sales application of Quidato and an order was issued on the
same date directing the District Land Officer concerned to conduct an investigation
in connection with the transfer of rights aforesaid. Pursuant thereto, Public Land
Inspector Benito M. Napoles conducted the corresponding investigation and
subsequently submitted his report dated June 29, 1939 wherein he stated, among
other things, that Ireneo Quidato had already complied with the cultivation
requirements of the lot and that his application was free from adverse claims and
conflicts. On September 14, 1939, the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural
Resources approved said transfer of rights. Immediately after the transfer of rights,
Ramas occupied the land and introduced improvements thereon. In the Cadastral
Survey of Lands located in Kapatagan, the land in question was surveyed and
designated as Lot No. 47, and the only survey claimant thereto was Leodegario
Ramas As a result of his occupation, at the outbreak of the Second World War more
than fifty hectares of the area of the land had already been cultivated by him and
on June 26, 1941, he paid the Bureau of Lands the amount of P432.12 to complete
the payment of the purchase price. During the war years, due to the prevailing
confusion and disorder, Ramas' possession of the land was not complete. This
enabled petitioners to enter and, take possession thereof. After the war, however, as
Leodegario Ramas had already died, his heirs went to the land in question to
resume its occupation and cultivation, but they found petitioners in occupancy.
ISSUES:
If either that the Director of the Bureau of Lands and the Secretary of Agriculture
and Natural Resources had no jurisdiction over the subject matter of the decisions
or orders sought to be annulled, or that, in rendering or issuing them, they acted in
excess of their jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion.
HELD:
Supreme Court ruled that the lot in question was applied for and subsequently
awarded in accordance with law to Ireneo Quidato, and that thereafter he entered
into possession thereof and had already cultivated an area of more than fifty
hectares when the last World War broke out, is a finding of fact made by the
respondent officials, and this is fully supported by the evidence. That for non-
payment of the first four installments which Quidato was under obligation to pay to
the Government, his application was cancelled on October 31, 1935.

ROQUE vs. THE DIRECTOR OF LANDS

G.R. No. L-25373 July 1, 1976

FACTS:
The appealed decision of the lower court, dismissing a certiorari petition
against the Assistant Executive Secretary of the President for sustaining the
award by the Director of Lands of a homestead application and thus
overruling the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources.
Petitioner, herein Ireneo Roque seek to add to his holding by a sales
application, while the prevailing party, private respondent Jose Facun, on the
other hand, had applied for the disputed lot as a homesteader. "The object
and purpose of the homestead law, is to encourage residence upon and the
cultivation and improvement of the public domain."

The nature of the case was set forth in the decision thus a special civil action
for certiorari filed by Ireneo Roque, as petitioner against the Honorable
Director of Lands, the Honorable Assistant Executive Secretary to the
President and Jose Facun, as respondents, praying that, after due hearing,
the order of the respondent Honorable Director of Lands and the decision of
the respondent Honorable Assistant Executive Secretary, be set aside on the
alleged ground that the said order of the Director of Lands was issued with
grave abuse of discretion, consisting of unqualified reliance and the biased
report and recommendation of the Assistant Public Land Inspector Andres
Arias. The factual allegation that the said decision of the Honorable
Executive Secretary exceeded his jurisdiction and committed a grave abuse
of discretion, arbitrarily disregarding the sales award of the land in question
in favor of the herein petitioner having already paid is for the price of the
same, and praying further that the decision of the Honorable Secretary of
Agriculture and Natural Resources be sustained.
It would be a plain defiance of the settled policy of the law if the homestead
application of private respondent Facun would not be honored and the sales
application of petitioner Roque sustained.

ISSUE:

Whether or not decision of the Honorable Executive Secretary exceeded his

jurisdiction and committed a grave abuse of discretion, arbitrarily
disregarding the sales award of the land in question in favor of the herein
petitioner.

HELD:

The Executive Secretary, or even an Assistant Executive Secretary, when

acting " by authority of the President," may reverse the decision of a
department head.

WHEREFORE, the appealed decision is affirmed. This decision is immediately

executory. Costs against petitioner Ireneo Roque.
JOSE LUIS ANGEL B. OROSA v. ALBERTO C. ROA
G.R. No. 140423, July 14, 2006

FACTS:
On November 27, 1996, petitioner, a dentist by profession, filed with the
Pasig City Prosecution Office a complaint-affidavit charging respondent
Alberto C. Roa, likewise a dentist, with the crime of libel. The complaint,
docketed in said office as I.S. No. 96-5442, stemmed from an article entitled
"Truth vs. Rumors: Questions against Dr. Orosa" written by respondent and
published in the March-April 1996 issue of the Dental Trading Post, a bi-
monthly publication of the Dental Exchange Co., Inc. In gist, the article
delved into the possibility of a father, who happened to be an examiner in a
licensure examination for dentistry where his sons were examinees,
manipulating the examinations or the results thereof to enable his children to
top the same.
Petitioner appealed to the Department of Justice (DOJ). Acting on the appeal,
Chief State Prosecutor Jovencito Zuo issued a Resolution (Zuo Resolution),
setting aside the findings of the City Prosecutor and directing the latter to file
an Information for libel against respondent. Accordingly, in the Regional Trial
Court (RTC) of Pasig City, information for libel was filed against respondent,
thereat docketed as Criminal Case No. 114517.
Adversely affected, respondent appealed to the Secretary of Justice. On
October 28, 1998, then Justice Secretary Serafin Cuevas reversed the Zuo
Resolution and directed the City Prosecutor of Pasig to withdraw the
Information earlier filed with the RTC. In compliance therewith, a "Motion to
Withdraw Information" was accordingly filed in court by the Pasig City
Prosecution Office.

ISSUE:
Whether or not a petition for review under Rule 43 of the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure is a proper mode of appeal from a resolution of the Secretary of
Justice directing the prosecutor to withdraw information in a criminal case.

HELD:
The petition is premature. The Information charging respondent with the
crime of libel, docketed as Criminal Case No. 114517, is now with Branch 155
of the Regional Trial Court in Pasig City. Thus understood, the said trial court
has now the control of the case. The remedy of petitioner is to reiterate the
reasons or grounds alleged in his present petition by way of an appropriate
opposition to the Pasig City Prosecution Office's "Motion to Withdraw
Information" dated November 5, 1998, filed in compliance with the assailed
directive of the Secretary of Justice. Having control of the case, the trial court
can look into the claim of petitioner. This will enable the trial court to rule on
the matter first without the precipitate intervention of this Court. In other
words, this is a prerequisite to the elevation of the case to this Court.
THE PHILIPPINE AMERICAN MANAGEMENT COMPANY, INC., and
PHILIPPINE AMERICAN LIFE INSURANCE COMPANY v. THE PHILIPPINE
AMERICAN MANAGEMENT EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION (PAMEA-FFW)
COURT OF INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS
G.R. No. L-35254 May 25, 1973

FACTS:
In our decision promulgated last January, we ruled that where a labor dispute
concerning a minimum wage question results in a strike, the Secretary of
Labor in the events his effort at conciliation fails, may endorse the matter to
the Court of Industrial Relations, which under its arbitral power could issue a
return-to-work order pending the final outcome of the controversy before it.
Petitioner would pursue the matter further in a motion for reconsideration
filed with us on March 1, 1973, supplemented by a rejoinder filed on April 18,
1973 to the comments previously submitted be respondent Labor Union on
their motion for reconsideration. Even a cursory glance at such pleadings
yield the impression, not that it is unexpected, that they have less than full
sympathy for Laski's observation that in the interpretation of an enactment
providing for a statutory minimum as to wages, the judiciary is called upon to
display solicitate for the plight of those afflicted with the tragedies of
existence consequent upon the meager pittance that is their share, not
infrequently hardly enough to keep body and soul together, haunting them
with the perpetual fear that the morrow may bring. Nor is this the reason
why their plea is not to be heeded. As will be subsequently shown, their
continued reliance on what for them is thebasic foundation of the Industrial
Peace Act.

ISSUE:
Whether or not conditions of labor and their attempt to erode the doctrine of
an act of a department head being attributed to the President, do not help
their cause at all.

HELD:
There is to be sure no thought of deviating from the basic concept that the
area of free play of bargaining between management and labor is not to be
constricted. What cannot be denied, however, is that neither party in this
particular case is at liberty to agree to an amount lower than that the law
requires as to the wages to be paid. To that extent, there is no room for offer
and counter offer. The employer has an obligation to meet. His duty is plain.
He must pay what he has to. Petitioners, with an obduracy worthy of a better
cause, would argue that the Industrial Peace Act which manifests adherence
to the principle of contracts freely arrived at, stands in the way of the
respondent Court having the power to issue return-to-work order. Such is not
the case. What do they have to accomplish? Has not the amount as to the
bottom scale of payment been legislatively determined? What good then
their reiteration of fealty to the regime of collective bargaining? Nor is this to
set at naught what is implied industrial democracy. A more intense effort at a
serious inquiry into the background and doctrines of American federal labor
law, to which the ancestry of the Industrial Peace could be traced, could have
resulted in the realization that even in the United States, there is room for
direct state action excluding participation by management and labor with
giving rise to any question that thereby the integrity of collective bargaining
process has been impaired.
REMEDIOS T. BLAQUERA, et al v. HON. ANGEL C. ALCALA
G.R. No. 109406 September 11, 1998
FACTS:
These are cases for certiorari and prohibition, challenging the
constitutionality and validity of Administrative Order Nos. 29 and 268 on
various grounds.On January 19, 1993, then President Fidel V. Ramos
("President Ramos") issued:
a) Administrative Order No. 29 ("AO 29") authorizing the grant of productivity
incentive benefits for the year 1992 in the maximum amount of
P1,000.00 and b.) reiterating the prohibition under Section 7 of
Administrative Order No. 268 ("AO 268"), enjoining the grant of productivity
incentive benefits without prior approval of the President. Section 4 of AO 29
directed "[a]ll departments, offices and agencies which authorized payment
of CY 1992 Productivity Incentive Bonus in excess of the amount authorized
under Section 1 hereof [are hereby directed] to immediately cause the
return/refund of the excess within a period of six months to commence
fifteen (15) days after the issuance of this Order."In G.R. No.
119597,petitioner, Association of Dedicated Employees of the Philippine
Tourism Authority ("ADEPT"), who were granted productivity incentive bonus
for calendar year 1992 pursuant to Republic Act No. 6971 ("RA 6971"),
otherwise known as the Productivity Incentives Act of 1990. Subject bonus
was, however, disallowed by the Corporate Auditor on the ground that it was
"prohibited under Administrative Order No. 29 dated January 19, 1993.To
prevent the respondents from making further deductions from their salaries
or allowances, the petitioners have come before this Court to seek relief.
ISSUE:
1.) Whether or not RA 6971 is applicable to petitioner ADEPT.
2.) Whether or not the issuance of AO 29 and AO 268 valid or
unconstitutional.
HELD:
Court finds no reversible error in the finding by respondent Commission that PTA
(Philippine Tourism Authority) is not within the purview of RA 6971. As regards the
promulgation of implementing rules and regulations, it bears stressing that the
"power of administrative officials to promulgate rules in the implementation of the
statute is necessarily limited to what is provided for in the legislative enactment."
In the case under scrutiny, the Supplementary Rules Implementing RA 6971 issued
by the Secretary of Labor and Employment and the Secretary of Finance accord with
the intendment and provisions of RA 6971. Consequently, not being covered by RA
6971, AO 29 applies to the petitioner.
When the President issued AO 29 limiting the amount of incentive benefits,
enjoining heads of government agencies from granting incentive benefits without
prior approval from him, and directing the refund of the excess over the prescribed
amount, the President was just exercising his power of control over executive
departments.
Neither can it be said that the President encroached upon the authority of the
Commission on Civil Service to grant benefits to government personnel. AO 29 and
AO 268 did not revoke the privilege of employees to receive incentive benefits. The
same merely regulated the grant and amount thereof.
Untenable is petitioners' contention that the herein respondents be held personally
liable for the refund in question. Absent a showing of bad faith or malice, public
officers are not personally liable for damage resulting from the performance of
official duties.
In upholding the constitutionality of AO 268 and AO 29, the Court reiterates the
well-entrenched doctrine that "in interpreting statutes, that which will avoid a
finding of unconstitutionality is to be preferred."
Ruben VillaluzvsCalixtoZaldivar
15 SCRA 710

FACTS:
Villaluz was appointed as the Administrator of the Motor VehiclesOffice in
1958. In 1960, Congressman Roces alleged that Villaluz was an ineffective
leader and had caused losses to the government. He indorsed the removal of
Villaluz. The Exec Sec suspended Villaluz and ordered a committee to
investigate the matter. After investigation, it was recommended that she be
removed. The president then issued an AO removing Villaluz from his post.
Villaluz averred that the president has no jurisdiction to remove him.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Villaluz is under the jurisdiction of the President to be
removed considering that he is an appointee of the president.
HELD:
The President of the Philippines has jurisdiction to investigate and remove
him since he is a presidential appointee who belongs to the non-competitive
or unclassified service under Sec 5 of RA 2260; being a presidential
appointee, Villaluz belongs to the non-competitive or unclassified service of
the government and as such he can only be investigated and removed from
office after due hearing by the President of the Philippines under the
principle that the power to remove is inherent in the power to appoint .
There is some point in the argument that the power of control of the
President may extend to the power to investigate, suspend or remove
officers and employees who belong to the executive department if they are
presidential appointees or do not belong to the classified service for such can
be justified under the principle that the power to remove is inherent in the
power to appoint but not with regard to those officers or employees who
belong to the classified service for as to them that inherent power cannot be
exercised. This is in line with the provision of our Constitution which says that
`the Congress may by law vest the appointment of the inferior officers, in the
President alone, in the courts, or in heads of department.

LACSON v. ROMERO
84 PHIL 740

FACTS:
The facts necessary for the decision in this case may be stated as follows: Petitioner
Lacson was on July 25, 1946, appointed by the President of the Philippines,
provincial fiscal of Negros Oriental. The appointment was confirmed by the
Commission on Appointment on August 6, 1946. He took his oath of office on
August 10, 1946, and thereafter performed the duties of that office.Lacson neither
accepted the appointment nor assumed the office of fiscal of Tarlac. But respondent
Romero took his oath of office (the post of fiscal of Negros Oriental) in Manila on
June 16, 1949, notified the Solicitor General of the fact, and thereafter proceeded to
his station. Upon arrival at Dumaguete City, capital of Negros Oriental, he notified
Lacson of his intention to take over the office the following day, but Lacson
objected. On June 24, 1949, Romero appeared in criminal case No. 4433 before
Judge Gregorio S. Narvasa. In said appearance, petitioner Lacson filed his objection
and asked that Romero's appearance be stricken from the record. After Romero had
exhibited his credentials as required by the court, Judge Narvasa on the same day
denied the petition of Lacson and recognized respondent Romero as the provincial
fiscal of Negros Oriental. On June 27, 1949, Romero appeared in Special Proceedings
No. 630 before Judge FelicisimoOcampo. Lacson again objected to said appearance
but the court overruled his objection. This will explain why Judges Narvasa and
Ocampo were made respondents in these quo warranto proceedings.

ISSUE:
1.) Whether or not the Commission on Appointments alone, without his
acceptance nomination of Lacson to Tarlac and its confirmation by the thereof
 create a vacancy in the post of provincial fiscal of Negros Oriental so that
Romero could be lawfully appointed to said vacancy.
2.) Whether or not the nomination of Lacson to Tarlac and its confirmation by the
Commission on Appointments serve as and is equivalent to a removal of
Lacson as fiscal of Negros Oriental? If in the affirmative, was that removal and
lawful.
3.) Whether or not he President who appointed Lacson as provincial fiscal of
Negros Oriental remove him at will and without cause, or did the post of
provincial fiscal in general have attached to it a tenure of office during which
the incumbent may not be removed except for cause
HELD:
But in justice to the President and the Commission on Appointments, let it be stated
once again that it would seem that the transfer of the petitioner to Tarlac was not
meant and intended as a punishment, a disciplinary measure or demotion. It was
really a promotion, at least at the time the appointment was made. Only, that later,
due to a change in the category of Oriental Negros as a province, the transfer was
no longer a promotion in salary. And yet the respondent and the Solicitor General
insisted in the transfer despite the refusal of the petitioner to accept his new
appointment.In conclusion, we find and declare the petitioner to be the provincial
fiscal of Negros Oriental, and the respondent not being entitled to said post, is
hereby ordered to surrender to the petitioner all the records or papers appertaining
to said office that may have come into his possession. The respondent provincial
auditor and provincial treasurer, are hereby ordered to pay to the herein petitioner
his salary from June 16, 1949, and as long as said petitioner continues to be the
legal incumbent to the office in question. Considering that the respondent appears
to have acted in good faith and relied upon his nomination by the President and the
confirmation thereof by the Commission on Appointments, as well as the position
taken by the Solicitor-General, who sustained his appointment, we make no
pronouncement as to costs.
US v. PERKINS
116 U.S. 483
FACTS:
A naval cadet-engineer, not found deficient at examination, not dismissed for
misconduct under the provisions of Rev.Stat. 1525 or upon and in
pursuance of a sentence of a court-martial, but honorably discharged by the
Secretary of the Navy against his will remains in the service notwithstanding
the discharge, and is entitled to recover in the Court of Claims the pay
attached to the position.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the naval- engineer is entitled for recovery in the Court of
claims the attached to the position.

HELD:
When Congress by law vests the appointment of inferior officers in the heads
of departments, it may limit and restrict the power of removal as it deems
best for the public interests.
In Re: Neagle
135 U.S. 1 (1890)

FACTS:
Suspecting a plot against Justice Stephen J. Field's life, the U.S. Attorney
General appointed Neagle, a U.S. Marshall, to protect him. Acting as Field's
bodyguard, Neagle shot and killed a man who appeared about to attack the
justice. After California officials arrested and jailed Neagle, the U.S. sought
his release by a writ of habeas corpus.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the state obligated to obey the writ even though no national
statute empowered the Attorney General to provide judges with bodyguards.

HELD:
Yes. The Court held that the Attorney General acted appropriately since
assigning Neagle as Field's bodyguard assured that the nation's laws would
be faithfully executed. Furthermore, Neagle's actions were consistent with a
congressional statute which provided U.S. Marshalls with "the same powers,
in executing the laws" as state sheriffs and deputies (who would have been
allowed to deter an attack on Field's life).

Aquino Jr. v. Enrile

59 SCRA 183

FACTS

Petitioners were arrested pursuant to General Order No. 2 for being

participants in
The conspiracy to seize political and state power in the country and to take
over the
Government by force

Because Marcos had declared Martial Law, he now had the power to order
the arrest of people at his pleasure. He had suspended the writ of habeas
corpus.

Looking at the proclamation, the 1935 Constitution states that the

President shall be the Commander-in-Chief of the all armed forces and
whenever it becomes necessary, he may call out such armed forces to
prevent or suppress lawless violence, invasion, insurrection or rebellion. He
may also suspend the writ of habeas corpus or place the Philippines under
Martial Law.

ISSUES :

Whether or not the Proclamation No. 1081 valid and maybe subject to
judicial inquiry?

HELD:
Yes, the Court should dismiss.The power to detain persons even without
charges for acts related to
Thesituation which justifies the proclamation of martial law, such as the
existence of a state of rebellion, necessarily implies the power (subject, in
the opinion of the Justices who consider Lansang applicable, to the same test
of arbitrariness laid down therein), to impose upon the released detainees
conditions or restrictions which are germane to and necessary to carry out
the purposes of the proclamation. Justice Fernando, however, "is for easing
the restrictions on the right to travelof petitioner Rodrigo" and others
similarly situated and so to thisExtentdissents from the ruling of the majority;
while Justice Teehankeebelieves that those restrictions do not constitute
deprivation of physical liberty within the meaning of the constitutional
provision on the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus. Justice Makalintal
states that it is only RIGHT that those who were detained were arrested
because it was pursuant to the objective in declaring Martial Law which is to
suppress invasion, insurrection, rebellion and safeguard the public from
imminent danger. The preservation of society and national survival take
precedence. The Court UNANIMOUSLY AGREED on this point that those who
were detained should have their privilege of habeas corpus suspended

FLEMING v. PAGE
50 U.S. 603

FACTS:
This was an action brought by Fleming and Marshall against Page, collector
of the port of Philadelphia, in one of the state courts of Pennsylvania in 1847
to recover back certain duties on goods, wares, and merchandise imported
into the port of Philadelphia from Tampico, in Mexico, in March and June of
that year. The case was afterwards, in 1848, taken into the Circuit Court of
the United States for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania and was tried May
term, 1849, when the jury found for the plaintiffs. A motion was thereafter
made on behalf of the United States to set aside the verdict and for a new
trial on the grounds.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the goods so imported by the Catharine were liable to duty. If
the court are of opinion that they were not so liable, then judgment is to be
entered for the plaintiffs, for the sum of $1,529, with interest from 14 June,
1847.

HELD:
Whether Tampico, in the year 1847, while in the military occupation of the
forces of the United States, ceased to be a foreign country within the
meaning of the first section of the Act of Congress passed 30 July, 1846,
entitled, 'An act reducing the duty on imports, and for other purposes,' so
that goods, wares, and merchandise of the produce, growth, and
manufacture of Mexico, or any part thereof, imported into the port of
Philadelphia from Tampico during said military occupation were not subject
to the payment of the duties prescribed by the said act, but entitled to be
entered free of duty as from a domestic port.
That from and after the first day of December next, in lieu of the duties
heretofore imposed by law on the articles hereinafter mentioned, and on
such as may now be exempt from duty, there shall be levied, collected, and
paid, on the goods, wares, and merchandise herein enumerated and
provided for, imported from foreign countries, the following rates of duty.

MARTIN v. MOTT
25 U.S. 19
FACTS:
This was an action of replevin, originally brought in the supreme court of New York
by the defendant in error Mott against the plaintiff in error Martin to which an
avowry was filed, containing substantially the following allegations:
That on 18 June, 1812, and from thence until 25 December, 1814, there was public
and open war between the United States of America and the United kingdom of
Great Britain and Ireland and its dependencies and the citizens and subjects of the
said countries respectively, and that during the continuance of the said war, to-wit,
on 4 August, 1814, and also on the 29th day of the same month, in the same year,
at the City of New York, to-wit, at Poughkeepsie, in the County of Dutchess, his
Excellency Daniel D. Tompkins, Esq., was then and there Governor of the State of
New York and Commander-in-Chief of the militia thereof, and being so governor and
commander-in-chief, he, the said Daniel D. Tompkins, as such governor and
Commander in Chief, on the several days last aforesaid, and in the year aforesaid,
and at the place aforesaid, upon the previous requisitions of the President of the
United States, for that purpose made, and to him directed, as such governor and
commander-in-chief, did issue two several general orders, bearing date respectively
on the said 4 and 29 August in the year aforesaid, in and by which said two general
orders, among other things, the said Daniel D. Tompkins, as governor and
commander-in-chief as aforesaid, pursuant to such requisitions, and in compliance
therewith, did detail certain parts and portions of the militia of the state, as he was
required to do in and by the requisitions of the President of the United States, as
aforesaid, and did order the militia so detailed into the service of the United States
of America, at the City of New York, within the Third Military District of the said
United States, as in and by the said two general orders may more fully appear. That
the said Jacob E. Mott, on the several days and in the year aforesaid and until 25
December in the same year, being a white citizen of the said State of New York,
inhabiting and residing within the same, and between the ages of eighteen and
forty-five years, was liable to do military duty in the militia of the said state and was
a private in the militia of the said state that was so detailed and ordered into the
service of the United States aforesaid.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the exigencies contemplated in the Constitution of the United
States and the Act of Congress of 1795, ch. 101, in which the President has
authority to call forth the militia, "to execute the laws of the union, suppress
insurrections, and repel invasions" have arisen is exclusively vested in the
President, and his decision is conclusive upon all other persons

HELD:
It was contended in that case, that notwithstanding the judgment of the
President is conclusive as to the existence of the exigency and may be given
in evidence as conclusive proof thereof, yet that the avowry is fatally
defective, because it omits to aver that the fact did exist. The argument is
that the power confided to the President is a limited power, and can be
exercised only in the cases pointed out in the statute, and therefore it is
necessary to aver the facts which bring the exercise within the purview of
the statute. In short, the same principles are sought to be applied to the
delegation and exercise of this power entrusted to the Executive of the
nation for great political purposes as might be applied to the humblest officer
in the government, acting upon the most narrow and special authority. It is
the opinion of the Court that this objection cannot be maintained. When the
President exercises an authority confided to him by law, the presumptionis
that it is exercised in pursuance of law.
SANIDAD v. COMELEC
73 SCRA 333

FACTS:
COMELEC Resolution No. 2167 was promulgated due to the enacted RA No.
6766 (An Act Providing for an Organic Act for the Cordillera Autonomous
Region) last October 23, 1989, which paved for a call of a plebiscite for its
ratification (original schedule was reset from December 27, 1989 to January
30, 1990.
Unconstitutional as it violates the constitutional guarantees of the freedom
of expression and of the press constitutes a prior restraint on his
constitutionally-guaranteed freedom of the press abuse of its penal
provisions in case of violation.

ISSUE:
Whether or not Section 19 of COMELEC Resolution No. 2167 is constitutional
or not.

HELD:
Petition is GRANTED- Section 19 of COMELEC Resolution No. 2167 is declared
null and void and unconstitutional. TRO made permanent due to the
following reasons:
1. It has no statutory basis
2. Form of regulation is tantamount to a restriction of petitioner's freedom of
expression for no justifiable reason
3. Affected by the issues presented in a plebiscite should not be unduly
burdened by restrictions on the forum where the right to expression may be
exercised.

-Not violative of the constitutional guarantees of the freedom of expression

and of the press but only a valid implementation of the power of the Comelec
to supervise and regulate media during election or plebiscite periods as
enunciated in Article IX-C, Section 4 of the 1987 Constitution and Section 11
of RA 6646

-Does Not absolutely bar petitioner from expressing his views and/or from
campaigning for or against the Organic Act. He may still express his views or
campaign for or against the act through the Comelec space and airtime
(magazine/periodical in the province)
OCAMPO v. MILITARY COMMISSION
109 SCRA 22, November 6, 1981

FACTS:
The case against the herein petitioners was initially set for arraignment and
hearing on January 24, 1979, but in view of the motion of the accused for
deferment on the ground that they had no sufficient time to prepare their
case, the respondent Military Commission reset the hearing to February 23,
1979. At the hearing of February 23, 1979, the herein petitioners filed a (1)
Motion to Quash, on the grounds of alleged denial of equal protection of the
laws in that letter of Instruction No. 772, dated November 27, 1978, which
directed the filing henceforth of all criminal cases with the civil courts, was
not applied in their case; alleged ex post facto application of Presidential
Decree No. 885; and alleged duplicity of charges with respect to
SaturninoOcampo who had been accused of rebellion in another case : 2)
Motion for Bill of Particulars; and (3) Motion for Discover.
The said motions were opposed by the prosecution and thereafter the
respondent Commission, in closed session, with the members consulting
with one another, after giving due consideration to the arguments in support
of the three motions of the defense, as well as the arguments in opposition
thereto, denied the said three motions. 4
Subsequently, the herein petitioners and their co-accused were ordered
arraigned. But, the said petitioners refused to plead so that a plea of Not
Guilty was ordered entered for each of them by the Commission. The trial of
the case, however, was postponed to a later date to afford the accused
therein the opportunity to challenge the rulings of the respondent military
commission before this Honorable Court.

ISSUE:
1. Whether or not petitioners are entitled to be released on account of the public
statements made by the President of the Philippines on three separate occasions;
2. Whether or not petitioner SaturninoOcampo has been denied the right to speedy
trial;
3. Whether or not the non-application in the case of petitioners of letter of
Instruction No. 772 constitutes a denial of their right to equal protection of the law;
4. Whether or not the charge sheet in the case of petitioners amount to an ex post
facto application of Presidential Decree No. 885 which amended the Anti-Subversion
Act on February 3, 1976;
5. Whether or not petitioners are entitled to a bill of particulars; and
6. Whether or not petitioners have been denied their right to counsel during the
custodial investigation conducted after their arrest. 6
HELD:
The jurisdiction of military commissions to hear and determine the cases of
rebellion and subversion of petitioners is now indubitable, in the light of the
existing rulings of this Court. The mere fact that civil courts are open and are
functioning normally is of no consequence in this respect, as We shall explain
later.General Order No. 8, is also hereby revoked and the military tribunals
created pursuant thereto are hereby dissolved upon final determination of
cases pending therein which may not be transferred to the civil courts
without irreparable prejudice to the state in view of the rules on double-
jeopardy, or other circumstances which render further prosecution of the
cases difficult, if not impossible.

BUSCAYNO v. MILITARY COMMISSION

109 SCRA 273

FACTS:
On October 2, 1981, Buscayno and the Sison spouses filed the instant
omnibus catchall petition for habeas corpus, prohibition and mandamus
couched in repetitious, involuted and obfuscatory verbiage
They prayed that the decision of Military Commission No. 2 dated May -1.
1981, convicting Buscayno of subversion and murder and sentencing him to
death by firing squad, be declared void because he was denied his
constitutional right to present evidence and that he be released from
detention.
They also prayed that the charges of rebellion and subversion be dismissed
for being in contravention of the rule on double jeopardy, that Military
Commissions Nos. 1, 6 and 25 be enjoined from proceeding with the trial of
the petitioners and that the petitioners be released. They also prayed that
they be granted bail.
The petitioners also asked for the issuance of a temporary restraining order,
enjoining the three Commissions from trying the petitioners, enjoining
Military Commission No. 1 from continuing with the perpetuation of
testimonies and from requiring the petitioners to attend the perpetuation
proceedings and enjoining the Review Board-AFP from reviewing the decision
in the subversion and murder cases.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the plea of double jeopardy can be sustained.

HELD:
In the instant case, the rebellion charge against the petitioners embraced the
acts committed by them on or about February 4, 1972 and during the period
from August, 1973 to February, 1974. The subversion charge against
Buscayno involved his acts committed in 1965, 1967, 1969, 1970 and 1971.
The subversion charge against the Sison spouses referred to their acts
committed in 1968 and for sometime prior and subsequent thereto. The
common denominator of the rebellion and subversion charges is that the
petitioners committed overt acts as alleged communists or leftists. The overt
acts in the two charges are different.
Rebellion is an offense that has existed in the Penal Code for a long time. It
may be committed by non-communists without collaborating with the agents
of an alien power. In contrast, the crime of subversion came into existence
when the communists sought to dominate the world in order to establish a
new social economic and political order.
The constitutionality of the Anti-Subversion Law was upheld in People vs.
Ferrer, L-32613-14, December 27, 1972, 48 SCRA 382 and 56 SCRA 793.
Long before the passage of the Anti-Subversion Law membership in illegal
associations has been penalized (Art. 146, Revised Penal Code).
The unavoidable conclusion is that in the present posture of the pending
cases against the petitioners their plea of double jeopardy cannot be
sustained.

OLAGUER v. MILITARY COMMISSION

G.R. No. 54558, May 22, 1987
FACTS:
On December 24, 1979, the herein petitioners Eduardo B. Olaguer, Othoniel
V. Jimenez, Ester Misa-Jimenez, Carlos Lazaro, Reynaldo Maclang, Magdalena
De Los Santos Maclang, Teodorico N. Diesmos, Rene J. Marciano, Danilo R. De
Ocampo and Victoriano C. Amado were arrested by the military authorities.
They were all initially detained at Camp Crame in Quezon City. They were
subsequently transferred to the detention center at Camp BagongDiwa in
Bicutan except for petitioner Olaguer who remained in detention at Camp
Crame. Petitioner Mac Aceron voluntarily surrendered to the authorities
sometime in June, 1980 and was, thereafter, also incarcerated at Camp
BagongDiwa. All of the petitioners are civilians.
On May 30, 1980, the petitioners were charged for subversion upon the
recommendation of the respondent Judge Advocate General and the approval
of the respondent Minister of National Defense. The case was designated as
Criminal Case No. MC-34-1.
On June 13. 1980, the respondent Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces of the
Philippines created the respondent Military Commission No 34 to try tile
criminal case filed against the petitioners. On July 30, 1980, an amended
charge sheet was filed for seven (7) offenses, namely: (1) unlawful
possession of explosives and incendiary devices; (2) conspiracy to
assassinate President, and Mrs. Marcos; (3) conspiracy to assassinate cabinet
members Juan Ponce Enrile, Francisco Tatad and Vicente Paterno; (4)
conspiracy to assassinate Messrs. Arturo Tangco, Jose Roo and Onofre
Corpus; (5) arson of nine buildings; (6) attempted murder of Messrs.
Leonardo Perez, Teodoro Valencia and Generals Romeo Espino and FabianVer;
and (7) conspiracy and proposal to commit rebellion, and inciting to
rebellion. Sometime thereafter, trial ensued.

ISSUE:
Whether or not a military tribunal has the jurisdiction to try civilians while the
civil courts are open and functioning.

HELD:
Judicial power is vested by the Constitution exclusively in the Supreme Court
and in such inferior courts as are duly established by law. Judicial power
exists only in the courts, which have exclusive power to hear and determine
those matters which affect the life or liberty or property of a citizen.

The SC nullified for lack of jurisdiction all decisions rendered by the military
courts or tribunals during the period of martial law in all cases involving
civilian defendants. A military commission or tribunal cannot try and exercise
jurisdiction, even during the period of martial law, over civilians for offenses
allegedly committed by them as long as the civil courts are open and
functioning, and that any judgment rendered by such body relating to a
civilian is null and void for lack of jurisdiction on the part of the military
tribunal concerned.

GUMAUA v. ESPINO,
96 SCRA 402 (2/29/80)

FACTS:
In 1972, a Chinaman was kidnapped by allegedly the group of a certain Sgt.
Cordova.
Gumaua, an ex PC aided Cordova as he even sheltered them in his sari-sari
store. After
urveillance, Gumauas house was raided and he was arrested. Since martial
law is being imposed at that time, Gumaua was held under the custody and
trial of the military court [No. 2].
Gumaua then petitioned for prohibition and mandamus with restraining order
and preliminary injunction against Major General Romeo Espino as Chief of
Staff of the AFP and Military
Commission No. 2, challenging the validity of the creation and jurisdiction
over him as a civilian of respondent Military Commission No. 2. He filed for
habeas corpus and averred that (a) military tribunals cannot try civilians if
civil courts are open; (b) the President cannot deprive the civil courts of their
jurisdiction to try criminal cases involving civilians; (c) as a civilian, he is
entitled even during Martial Law to his constitutional right to counsel during
the preliminary investigation, to be subject to the jurisdiction of the courts
only upon his arrest or voluntary submission.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Gumaua can be validly tried before the military court.

HELD:
The SC first and foremost affirmed that the declaration of martial law is valid. The
1973 Constitution has been validly ratified by the sovereign people and is now in full
force and effect. Proclamation No. 1081 placing the entire country under martial law
is valid. That the proclamation of martial law automatically suspends the privileges
of the writ of habeas corpus.
That the President of the Philippines, as Commander-in-Chief and as enforcer or
administrator of martial law, . . . can promulgate proclamations, orders and decrees
during the period of martial law essential to the security and preservation of the
Republic, to the defense of the political and social liberties of the people, and to the
institution of reforms to prevent the resurgence of rebellion or insurrection or
secession or the threat thereof as well as to meet the impact of a worldwide
recession, inflation or economic crisis which presently threatens all nations including
highly developed countries . . . . That the President of the Philippines, as legislator
during the period of martial law, can legally create military commissions or courts
martial to try, not only members of the armed forces, but also civilian offenders, for
specified offenses including kidnapping. And finally, there is likewise ample proof
that Sgt. Aguinaldo Cordova and Sgt.Barbelonio
Casipi, co-accused of petitioners in the kidnapping charge, belonged to the armed
forces at the time of the commission of the crime, in much the same way that the
evidence demonstrates that petitioner Gumaua himself is a retired PC non-
commissioned officer. Consequently, the trial of petitioners Gumaua and Halasan
before the respondent Military Commission No. 2, along with the two other accused
who are members of the Armed Forces is valid under General Orders Nos.8.

LEGASPI v. MINISTER OF FINANCE

24 July 1982

FACTS:

Valentino L. Legaspi, incumbent member of the interim Batasang Pambansa,

praying that the SC declare PD 1840 unconstitutional. The said PD was
issued in accordance with the legislative powers granted on the President in
Amendment No. 6 of the Constitution pursuant to Proclamation No. 1595.
Petitioner claims that the said amendment is not one of the powers granted
the President by the Constitution as amended in the plebiscite of April 7,
1981.

ISSUE(s):

1. Whether or not PD 1840 is unconstitutional?

 2. Whether or not Amendment No. 6 of the 1973 Constitution is
unaffected or repealed by theApril 7, 1981 amendment.
3. Whether or not the term incumbent President, as seen in all other
Amendments and whichonly refers to Marcos, is the person referred to
as President in Amendment No. 6?
4. Whether or not the phrase President (Prime Minister) means that
since the position is nolonger held by one person, neither the President
nor the Prime Minister can have the power vested in Amendment No.
6?
5. Whether or not Amendment No. 2 which refers to the legislative
assembly simply as BatasangPambansa, intends to convert or upgrade
the present existing assembly (interim Batasang Pambansa) into the
regular Batasang Pambansa.

HELD

1. PD 1840
2. Amendment No. 6 is unaffected
Constitutional, The 1981 plebiscite does not repeal Amendment No. 6 by omission.
Since it was not voted on, it would be unfair to the people to repeal it just because it
was not included as one of the questions in the plebiscite.
3. The term incumbent President does not Amendment No. 6 uses the term
President and apply to Amendment No. 6 not incumbent President. Therefore, it
refers to all future presidents.
4. The phrase President (Prime Minister) When the two offices are separated and
held does not limit Amendment No. 6 by separate people, the power originally for
the Prime Minister is transferred to the President. The power in Amendment No. 6
was meant for the executive official, which in this case is the President.
5. Amendment No. 2 did not mean to the only change made by the 1981
amendment convert or upgrade the present assembly to Amendment No. 2 is the
non-inclusion of the incumbent President to the assembly. The reference to the
legislative body as Batasang Pambansa (as opposed to interim Batasang Pambansa)
is a non-essential issue since the present existing assembly is still the interim
Batasang Pambansa.

Tranquilino Rovero v. Rafael Amparo

G.R. No. L-5482 (May 5, 1952)

FACTS:
The petitioner Tranquilino Rovero in the evening of April 25, 1947, arrived at
the Makati Air Port on board a PAL plane which came from Bangkok, Siam. He
brought with him several pieces of baggage, among which was a Chinese
vase which he declared and valued at P15. In the course of the examination
of said Chinese vase, it was found that it had a false bottom which upon
being broken open was seen to hold a tin can containing 259 pieces of
jewelry with precious stones, which the Customs officials appraised at P23,
736. Rovero never mentioned to said Customs officials the presence of said
pieces of jewelry in the Chinese vase. The jewelry was, therefore, seized as
property subject to forfeiture under section 1363 (m-2) in relation to section
1292 of the Revised Administrative Code.

Rovero admitted that the pieces of jewelry belonged to him, he having

bought them in Bangkok for
$4,353, U.S. currency, and that he purposely concealed them in the false
bottom of the Chinese vase. Among the reasons given by him for not
declaring were that he was afraid that he might be robbed by hold-up men,
and that he did not then have enough cash with which to pay the duties and
taxes which he figured to amount to about P6,000. Evidently, the Customs
officials were not impressed by his explanation.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the decision for the original petition should be dismissed and
that its resolution for dismissal should still stand.

HELD:
It was held that when the Commissioner of Customs or his subordinate
orders the seizure of goods fraudulently brought in, have them appraised
and then in lieu of forfeiture imposes on the importer a fine based on said
appraisal, and the importer appeals from that decision to the Court of First
Instance, the amount of appraisal is necessarily involved and is in issue in
the appeal, for the reason that if the decision appealed from is affirmed, the
action of the Commissioner in making the seizure and imposing the fine, is
given legal sanction. Once the court decision becomes final, neither the
Secretary of Finance nor the Commissioner of Customs may have the goods
reappraised for the purpose of reducing the amount of the fine. The
jurisdiction of Customs officials over administrative cases involving seizures,
appraisals forfeitures, and fines imposed ends with the appeal of their
decisions to the courts, and the final judgments of said courts. And the
supervision and control over judicial proceedings given by Section 1368 of
the Revised
Administrative Code to the Commissioner of Customs, does not extend to
modifying final decisions of the Court, in the sense that he may accept on
behalf of the Government anything different or less than what is awarded to
said Government in the decision.

In view of all the foregoing, the motion for reconsideration is denied.

UNITED STATES v. WILSON
7 PET 150 (1833)
FACTS:
The defendant was indicted for robbing the mail of the United States, and
putting the life of the driver in jeopardy, and the conviction and judgment
pronounced upon it extended to both offenses. After this judgment no
prosecution could be maintained for the same offense, or for any part of it,
provided the former conviction was pleaded.The power of pardon in criminal
cases had been exercised from time immemorial by the executive of that
nation whose language is our language, and to whose judicial institutions
ours bear a close resemblance. We adopt their principles respecting the
operation and effect of a pardon, and look into their books for the rules
prescribing the manner in which it is to be used by the person who would
avail himself of it. A pardon is an act of grace, proceeding from the power
entrusted with the execution of the laws, which exempts the individual on
whom it is bestowed from the punishment the law inflicts for a crime he has
committed. It is the private though official act of the executive magistrate,
delivered to the individual for whose benefit it is intended and not
communicated officially to the court.It is a constituent part of the judicial
system that the judge sees only with judicial eyes, and knows nothing
respecting any particular case of which he is not informed judicially. A private
deed not communicated to him, whatever may be its character, whether a
pardon or release, is totally unknown and cannotbe acted upon. The
looseness which would be introduced into judicial proceedings would prove
fatal to the great principles of justice if the judge might notice and act upon
facts not brought regularly into the cause. Such a proceeding, in ordinary
cases, would subvert the best established principles and would overturn
those rules which have been settled by the wisdom of ages.
There is nothing peculiar in a pardon which ought to distinguish it in this
respect from other facts; no legal principle known to the court will sustain
such a distinction. A pardon is a deed to the validity of which delivery is
essential, and delivery is not complete without acceptance. It may then be
rejected by the person to whom it is tendered, and if it be rejected, we have
discovered no power in a court to force it on him.It may be supposed that no
being condemned to death would reject a pardon, but the rule must be the
same in capital cases and in misdemeanours. A pardon may be conditional,
and the condition may be more objectionable than the punishment inflicted
by the judgment.
The pardon may possibly apply to a different person or a different crime.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the terms of the pardon could restrain the court from pronouncing
the judgment of law on the conviction before it.
HELD:
This Court is of opinion that the pardon in the proceedings mentioned, not having
been brought judicially before the court by plea, motion, or otherwise, cannot be
noticed by the judges.
This cause came on to be heard on the transcript of the record from the Circuit
Court of the United States for the Third Circuit and Eastern District of Pennsylvania
and on the question on which the judges of that court were divided in opinion, and
was argued by the Attorney General on the part of the United States, on
consideration whereof this Court is of opinion that the pardon alluded to in the
proceedings, not having been brought judicially before the court by plea, motion, or
otherwise, ought not to be noticed by the judges, or in any manner to affect the
judgment of the law. All which is directed and adjudged to be certified to the judges
of the said Circuit Court of the United States for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania.
DE LEON v. DIRECTOR OF PRISONS
31 PHIL 60 (1915)

FACTS:
This is petition for the writ of habeas corpus originally presented in the Court
of First Instance of the city of Manila and there denied, and an appeal by the
plaintiff to this court.Marcelo de Leon, was transferred to the Iwahig Penal
Colony, but for some reason or other was later transferred again to Bilibid; 5.
That on the 17th day of November, 1913, the Honorable Francis Burton
Harrison, Governor-General, issued a conditional pardon to the plaintiff, the
condition being that he should not be guilty of any crime or infraction of the
law, the punishment for which should be a year or more of imprisonment,
during the rest of the unexpired time of his sentence of imprisonment
already imposed; 6. On the 15th day of June, 1914, by a letter from the
Honorable Ignacio Villamor, Executive Secretary, to the Director of Prisons, it
appears that the Governor-General, by reason of representations made to
him by the prison authorities, directed the cancellation of the conditional
pardon signed by him under date of November 17, 1913; 7. The said
conditional pardon of His Excellency the Governor-General of the 17th of
November, 1913, had never been delivered nor communicated to the
plaintiff, neither had the same been accepted by him.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the writ of habeas corpus is granted.

HELD:
In U.S. vs. Wilson (7 Peters [32 U.S.], 150), the Chief Justice says:
"A pardon is an act of grace, proceeding from the power intrusted with
execution of the laws, which exempts the individual on whom it is bestowed,
from the punishment the law inflicts for a crime he has committed. It is the
private, though official, act of the executive magistrate, delivered to the
individual for whose benefit it is intended. ... A pardon is a deed, to the
validity of which delivery is essential, and delivery is not complete without
acceptance."

Upon the ground that there was no delivery of the pardon in this case to the
petitioner, or to any one for him, or to the warden of the prison, who, by Act
of Congress, had exclusive control and custody of the petitioner, I hold that
the petitioner is not entitled to be discharged, and that he must be
remanded to the custody of the warden of the penitentiary.
In the present case the pardon was neither delivered nor accepted before it
was cancelled by the order of the Governor-General. The same being
cancelled before delivery or acceptance, it was without force or effect and
the petition for the writ of habeas corpus based upon the same must be
denied.

Burdick v. United States

236 U.S. 79 (1915)

FACTS:
The facts, which involve the effect of a pardon of the President of the United
States tendered to one who has not been convicted of a crime nor admitted
the commission thereof, and also the necessity of acceptance of a pardon in
order to make it effective, are stated in the opinion.Burdick first appeared
before the grand jury and refused to answer questions as to the directions he
gave and the sources of his information concerning certain articles in the
New York Tribune regarding the frauds under investigation. He is the city
editor of that paper. He declined to answer, claiming upon his oath that his
answers might tend to criminate him. Thereupon he was remanded to appear
at a later day, and upon so appearing he was handed a pardon which he was
told had been obtained for him upon the strength of his testimony before the
other grand jury. The following is a copy of it:
"Woodrow Wilson, President of the United States of America, to all to whom
these presents shall come, Greeting:"
"Whereas George Burdick, an editor of the New York Tribune, has declined to
testify before a federal grand jury now in session in the Southern District of
New York in a proceeding entitled, 'United States v. John Doe and Richard
Roe,' as to the sources of the information which he had in the New York
Tribune office, or in his possession, or under his control at the time he sent
Henry D. Kingsbury, a reporter on the said New York Tribune to write an
article which appeared in the said New York Tribune in its issue of December
31st, 1913, headed, 'Glove Makers' Gems May Be Customs Size,' on the
ground that it would tend to incriminate him to answer the questions

ISSUE:
(1)Whether or not that the President has power to pardon an offense before
admission or conviction of it,
(2) Whether or not the acceptance of the pardon is not necessary to its complete
exculpating effect.

HELD:
"A pardon is a deed, to the validity of which delivery is essential, and delivery is not
complete without acceptance. It may then be rejected by the person to whom it is
tendered, and if it be rejected, we have discovered no power in a court to force it on
him."
That a pardon, by its mere issue, has automatic effect resistless by him to whom it
is tendered, forcing upon him by mere executive power whatever consequences it
may have or however he may regard it, which seems to be the contention of the
government in the case at bar, was rejected by the Court with particularity and
emphasis. The decision is unmistakable. A pardon was denominated as the "private"
act, the "private deed," of the executive magistrate, and the denomination was
advisedly selected to mark the incompleteness of the act or deed without its
acceptance.
Indeed, the grace of a pardon, though good its intention, may be only in pretense or
seeming; in pretense, as having purpose not moving from the individual to whom it
is offered; in seeming, as involving consequences of even greater disgrace than
those from which it purports to relieve. Circumstances may be made to bring
innocence under the penalties of the law. If so brought, escape by confession of
guilt implied in the acceptance of a pardon may be rejected, preferring to be the
victim of the law rather than its acknowledged transgressor, preferring death even
to such certain infamy. This, at least theoretically, is a right, and a right is often best
tested in its extreme.
CABANTAG v. WOLFE
6 PHIL 273 (1906)

FACTS:
In August, 1901 NarciscoCabantag, a civilian, was tried and convicted of
murder before a military commission. His conviction was duly confirmed
December 10, 1901, and his execution by hanging directed to take place on
January 12, 1902. He escaped December 26, 1901, and surrendered himself
on July 18, 1902. Thereafter, acting on petition of the accused for pardon
presented to the President of the United States, the Civil Governor, on
December 2, 1903, commuted his sentence to twenty years imprisonment,
which was approved by the Secretary of War by direction of the President on
January 23, 1904. The petitioner, who has since been confined under the
commuted sentence, seeks his release by habeas corpus.
General Orders, No. 8, August 22, 1898, while recognizing for certain
purposes the local civil courts, created not only provost courts for the trial of
minor offenses, but also military commissions with jurisdiction over murder,
manslaughter, . . . and such other crimes, offenses, or violations of the laws
of was as may be referred to it for trial by the commanding general, and
authorized punishments therefor to conform to those in use under the laws
of the United States

ISSUE:
Whether or not the prisoner thus being properly held under a judgment
capable of enforcement, was it competent for the executive, on his petition
for pardon, to commute his sentence and direct his further detention for a
term of twenty years.
HELD:
In the exercise of the pardoning power the executive may not only annex a
condition to a pardon but may appear commute the punishment. Such
appears to have been the opinion of the majority of the Supreme Court in Ex
parte Wells (18 How., 307) and is also of high authority among the courts of
the Several States. (McDowell vs. Couch, 6 La. Annual, 365; Perkins vs.
Stevens, 24 Pick, 277.) Such also has long been the established executive
practice. The authorities cited show that in the prevailing doctrine in
American law commutations is regarded rather as a reduction of penalty
than as the substitution of a different punishment, even in the case of a
change, as in this instance, from death to imprisonment. As sentence to
death for murder may be rendered to the penalty of any lesser degree of
manslaughter.
Were we disposed to hold the exercise of the pardoning power in this case for
any reason invalid, it is not perceived that the result would benefit the
petitioner. He would then stand unpardoned under his original conviction by
the military commission, which the Court of First Instance are, by Act No.
865, empowered to order carried out. There appears to be reason to doubt
the efficacy of this act. It is sustained on the principles discussed in the
Leitensdorfer case, which arose out of the Mexican conquest, and again laid
down after the civil war in The Grapeshot (9 Wallace, 132) and Mechanics
Bank vs. Union Bank (22 Wallace, 276.)
The prisoner should be remanded to the custody of the sheriff. So ordered.

Torres v Gonzales
G.r. No. 76872, 1987 Jul 23
FACTS:
Sometime before 1979, the petitioner, Wilfredo S. Torres was convicted of the
crime of estafa.
On April 18, 1979, a conditional pardon was granted on condition that any of
the penal laws will not be violated. In 1982, petitioner had been charged with
twenty counts of estafa. In 1986, Gonzales resolved to recommend to the
president the cancellation of the conditional pardon. Hence, the president
cancelled the conditional pardon of the petitioner. An Order of Arrest and

Recommitment was issued against the petitioner, who claims that he did not
violate his conditional pardon since he has not been convicted by final
judgment. Petitioner also contends that he was not given an opportunity to
be heard before he was arrested and recommitted to prison, and accordingly
claims he has been deprived of his rights under the due process clause of the
Constitution.

ISSUE:
Whether or not conviction of a crime by final judgment of a court is
necessary before the petitioner can be validly rearrested and recommitted
for violation of the terms of his conditional pardon and accordingly to serve
the balance of his original sentence

HELD:
1. The grant of pardon and the determination of the terms and conditions of a
conditional pardon are purely executive acts which are not subject to judicial
scrutiny.
2. The determination of the occurrence of a breach of a condition of a pardon, and
the proper consequences ofsuch breach, may be either a purely executive act, not
subject to judicial scrutiny under Section 64 (i) of the RevisedAdministrative Code;
or it may be a judicial act consisting of trial for and conviction of violation of a
conditionalpardon under Article 159 of the Revised Penal Code. Where the President
opts to proceed under Section 64 (i) ofthe Revised Administrative Code, no judicial
pronouncement of guilt of a subsequent crime is necessary, much lessconviction
therefor by final judgment of a court, in order that a convict may be recommended
for the violation of hisconditional pardon.
3. Because due process is not semper et ubique judicial process, and because the
conditionally pardoned convict had already been accorded judicial due process in
his trial and conviction for the offense for which he wasconditionally pardoned,
Section 64 (i) of the Revised Administrative Code is not afflicted with a
constitutional vice. In proceeding against a convict who has been conditionally
pardoned and who is alleged to have breached the conditions of his pardon, the
Executive Department has two options: (i) to proceed against him under Section 64
(i) of the Revised Administrative Code; or (ii) to proceed against him under Article
159 of the Revised Penal Code which imposes the penalty of prision correccional,
minimum period, upon a convict who having been granted conditional pardon by
the Chief Executive, shall violate any of the conditions of such pardon. Here, the
President has chosen to proceed against the petitioner under Section 64 (i) of the
Revised Administrative Code. That choice is an exercise of the Presidents executive
prerogative and is not subject to judicial scrutiny.

Wherefore, the petition is dismissed without pronouncement as to costs.

United States v. Klein

13 Wall. 128
FACTS:
The Supreme Court of the United States (Supreme Court) had ruled that a
presidential pardon had the effect of proof one did not support the rebellion.
This allowed pardoned individuals to petition for return of property or
compensation from the federal government. In response to the decision,
Congress passed a statute stating that a pardon was inadmissible as
evidence in a claim for seized property. Congress went further and required
that if a court finds that a pardon was secured without an express disclaimer
of guilt (of aiding the rebellion), such finding was to act as a bar to
jurisdiction. The estate of the Respondent who was pardoned had received a
judgment granting recovery from the Court of Claims. The United States now
appeals, arguing that the statute requires dismissal of the case for want of
jurisdiction.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the statute in question a valid exercise of congressional
authority under the Exceptions and Regulations Clause of the United States
Constitution

HELD:
Although Congress has power to limit the appellate jurisdiction of the federal
courts, it may not use this power to effectively prescribe a rule for the
decision of cases before the courts.

Knote v. United States

95 U.S. 149
FACTS:
The petition of the claimant alleged that he was the owner of certain
described personal property in West Virginia, which was seized and libelled
by the authorities of the United States on the alleged ground of his treason
and rebellion; that, by a decree of the District Court for that district, the
property was condemned and forfeited to the United States, and sold; and
the net proceeds of the sale, amounting to the sum of $11,000, were paid
into the treasury of the United States, the proceedings for its condemnation
and sale having been taken under the confiscation act of July 17, 1862; that
subsequently, byvirtue of the amnesty proclamation of the President, of Dec.
25, 1868, the claimant was pardoned and relieved of all disabilities and
penalties attaching to the offence of treason and rebellion, for which his
property was confiscated, and was restored to all his rights, privileges, and
immunities under the Constitution and the laws made in pursuance thereof,
and thus became entitled to receive the said proceeds of sale; but that the
United States, disregarding his rights in the premises, had refused to pay
them over to him, and therefore he prayed judgment against them. Upon
demurrer for insufficiency of the facts thus alleged to constitute a cause of
action the petition was dismissed, and hence the present appeal.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the effect of a pardon upon the condition and rights of its
recipient have been the subject of frequent consideration by this court.

HELD:
There is another view of this case, which must lead to an affirmance of the
judgment of the Court of Claims. The jurisdiction of that court is limited to
claims founded upon a law of Congress, or upon a regulation of an executive
department, or upon a contract, express or implied, with the government.
The claim here presented rests upon a supposed implied contract to pay to
the claimant the money received as the proceeds of the forfeited property. To
constitute such a contract, there must have been some consideration moving
to the United States; or they must have received the money, charged with a
duty to [95 U.S. 149, 157] pay it over; or the claimant must have had a
lawful right to it when it was received, as in the case of money paid by
mistake. But here there was no consideration moving to the United States;
they were charged with no duty in respect to the money; there was no legal
claim by any one to it when received into the treasury; and no law since has
required it to be paid to the claimant. There can be, therefore, no implied
contract in the case.

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES v. INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT

G.R. No. 71176 May 21, 1990
FACTS:
The government, in the exercise of its power of eminent domain,
expropriated property owned by Amerex Electronics, Phils. Corporation. The
amount of just compensation for such property is now the subject of this
petition for review on certiorari.In a motion praying that the plaintiff be
authorized to take immediate possession of the property, the then Acting
Solicitor General Hugo E. Gutierrez, Jr., invoking Presidential Decree No. 42,
informed the court that said assessed value of the property for taxation
purposes had been deposited with the Philippine National Bank (PNB) in
Escolta, Manila on September 30, 1975.Amerex filed a motion to dismiss the
complaint stating that while it was not contesting the merits of the
complaint, the same failed to categorically state the amount of just
compensation for the property. It therefore prayed that in consonance with
P.D. No. 794, the just compensation be fixed at P2,432,042, the market value
of the property determined by the assessor which was lower than Amerex's
own declaration.
The motion to dismiss was opposed by the plaintiff reasoning that while
indeed the market value as determined by the assessor was lower than that
declared by Amerex, the plaintiff intended to present evidence of a much
lower market value.

ISSUE:
1. Whether or not respondent Court erred in not disqualifying Commissioner Aurelio
B. Aquino from membership in the Committee of Appraisal.
2. Whether or not respondent Court erred in not totally disregarding the audited
statement by the defendant, which is hearsay in nature and was not formally
offered in evidence.
3. Whether or not respondent Court erred in totally disregarding petitioner's
evidence showing that the award of just compensation should be only
P1,800,000.00 and not P2,258.018.57 as awarded by said respondent Court.

HELD:
In this case, the issuance of the condemnation order and the actual taking of the
property both occurred in October, 1975. Accordingly, the appraisal made by Ampil
Realty and Appraisal Co., Inc. on June 5, 1975, which date is nearest to that of the
actual taking of the property, should be the basis for the determination of just
compensation the record being bereft of any indications of anomaly appertaining
thereto. It should be added that Wenceslao Ampil, the president of said appraisal
firm, testified at the trial and therefore petitioner had the opportunity to confront
him and to question his report. The reasonableness of the June 5,1975 appraisal
fixing at P2,400,000 the fair market value of the property, is bolstered by the fact
that on June 4, 1975, Traders Commodities Corporation, through its lawyer, Sedfrey
A. Ordoez offered to buy the property at P2,750,000. It must be emphasized,
however, that legal interest on the balance of the just compensation of P2,400,000
after deducting the amount of P1,303,470 which had been delivered to Amerex,
should be paid by petitioner from the time the government actually took over the
property.
Much as we realize the need of the government, under these trying times, to get the
best possible price for the expropriated property considering the ceaseless and
continuing necessity for schools, we cannot agree with the petitioner that the just
compensation for the property should be the price it commanded when it was first
offered for sale to the City School Board of Manila. Petitioner failed to substantiate
its claim that the property is worth the lower amount of P1, 800,000. In contrast,
Amerex submitted evidence consisting of the aforesaid June 5, 1975 appraisal
report which fixed the fair market value of the property at P2, 400,000.
Salvacion Monsanto vs Deputy Exec Sec FulgencioFactoran
170 SCRA 190
FACTS:
Monsanto was the Asst Treasurer of Calbayug City. She was charged for the
crime of Estafa through Falsification of PublicDocuments. She was found
guilty and was sentenced to jail. She was however granted pardon by
Marcos. She then wrote a letter to the Minister of Finance for her to be
reinstated to her former position since it was still vacant. She was also
requesting for back pays. The Minister of Finance referred the issue to the
Office of the President and Factoran denied Monsantos request averring that
Monsanto must first seek appointment and that the pardon does not
reinstate her former position. Also, Monsanto avers that by reason of the
pardon, she should no longer be compelled to answer for the civil liabilities
brought about by her acts.

ISSUE:
Whether or not Monsanto should be reinstated to her former post.

HELD:
A pardon looks to the future. It is not retrospective. It makes no amends for
the past. It affords no relief for what has been suffered by the offender. It
does not impose upon the government any obligation to make reparation for
what has been suffered. Since the offense has been established by judicial
proceedings, that which has been done or suffered while they were in force is
presumed to have been rightfully done and justly suffered, and no
satisfaction for it can be required. This would explain why petitioner, though
pardoned, cannot be entitled to receive backpay for lost earnings and
benefits. On the other hand, civil liability arising from crime is governed by
the RPC. It subsists notwithstanding service of sentence, or for any reason
the sentence is not served by pardon, amnesty or commutation of sentence.
Petitioners civil liability may only be extinguished by the same causes
recognized in the Civil Code, namely: payment, loss of the thing due,
remission of the debt, merger of the rights of creditor and debtor,
compensation and novation.
VICENTE GARCIA v. THE HONORABLE CHAIRMAN COMMISSION ON
AUDIT
G.R. NO. 75025. September 14, 1993.

FACTS:
Herein petitioner Vicente Garcia was employed as a Supervising lineman at
the Bureau of Telecommunications. He was accused of stealing some
materials in their company. Thus, public respondents filed a criminal case
against him for qualified theft before a court and on the same ground
respondents also filed an administrative case in which petitioner was found
guilty and was later dismissed from the service. With respect to the criminal
offense, petitioner was acquitted by the court due to insufficiency of
evidence. Petitioner was then reinstated from his work and is now claiming
before the COA for his back salaries from the time of his dismissal up to
present. But COA on the other hand reluctantly denied his pleadings.
Meanwhile, petitioner was extended an executive clemency (absolute
pardon) by the President. Still, respondent COA strongly refused to give due
course to petitioners claim.

ISSUE:
Whether or not respondent is entitled to the payment of back wages after
having been reinstated pursuant to the grant of executive clemency.

HELD:
The Court ruled initially by explaining the mandate of Sec 19 Article VII of the
Constitution and further articulates that the bestowal of executive clemency
on petitioner in effect completely obliterated the adverse effects of the
administrative decision which found him guilty of dishonesty and ordered his
separation from the service. This can be inferred from the executive
clemency itself exculpating petitioner from the administrative charge and
thereby directing his reinstatement, which is rendered automatic by the
grant of the pardon. This signifies that petitioner need no longer apply to be
reinstated to his former employment; he is restored to his office ipso facto
upon the issuance of the clemency.
AMADO E. DE VERA v. HONORABLE PEDRO SAMSON C. ANIMAS and
THE PROVINCIAL WARDEN of South Cotabato
G.R. No. L-48176 August 14, 1978
FACTS:
The merit of this habeas corpus application filed by petitioner Amado E. de
Vera is not readily apparent. He admitted that his conviction for the crime of
Falsification of Public Documents, more specifically, in connection with the
tampering of some election returns in the November elections of 1967, held
in the municipality of Polomolok, South Cotabato, had reached the stage of
finality. On its face, it hardly presents a case of illegal deprivation of liberty. It
is not then easy to assail the validity of the order of commitment of
respondent Judge Pedro Samson C. Animas, who denied petitioner's motion
for the suspension of the promulgation of judgment. The only basis for such a
move was his application for amnesty under Presidential Decree No. 95,
granting what was referred to in said application as a general amnesty. It was
his contention therefore that under the circumstances, his confinement is
tainted with illegality.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the benefits of amnesty under P.D. No. 433, as amended by
P.D. No. 598, and to the transmittal of the record of Criminal Case No. 2015
be granted.

HELD:
The case is thus ripe for resolution As noted at the outset, the petition hardly
suffices for the grant of the liberty sought. Respondent Judge was not ousted
of jurisdiction. He acted in accordance with law. This is a case appropriate for
the exercise of executive clemency. There is no question therefore that
petitioner could avail himself of the amnesty issued by the President if he
should fall within its terms and in accordance with the procedure prescribed.
At any rate, it is undoubted that it is the Commission on Elections which is
the appropriate agency designated by the President to pass upon the
application for amnesty. While this petition is not thus the appropriate
vehicle for granting the plea to be released from detention, it nonetheless
served a useful purpose. It is a confirmation of the "latitudinarian scope" of
this protean writ to assure judicial inquiry into the legality of a detention or
restraint.
FRANKLIN DRILON v. THE HON. COURT OF APPEALS
G.R. No. 91626 October 3, 1991
FACTS:

The Department of Justice has brought suit to annul the Decision of the Court
of Appeals promulgated on October 25, 1989, prohibiting the Government
from pursuing criminal actions against the private respondents for the death
of Ireneo Longno and Lonely Chavez during early martial law.
Sometime in 1973, the private respondents were charged with double
murder before
Military Commission No. 34. On July 27, 1973, the military promulgated a
decision acquitting Raul Paredes but sentencing Rodolfo Ganzon to life
imprisonment with hard labor.
Paredes was thereupon released from custody while Ganzon was made to
serve sentence until he was released on March 25, 1978 and placed under
house arrest under guard.
When the administration change Secretary of Justice SedfreyOrdoez
directed State Prosecutor Aurelio Trampe to conduct a preliminary
investigation against the private respondents for the above murders.
The private respondents moved for dismissal, in Ganzon's case, on the
ground that he, Ganzon, had been extended an absolute pardon by the
President Ferdinand Marcos. Trampe, however, denied both requests and
reconsideration having been likewise denied, the private respondents went
to the Court of Appeals on prohibition. The Court of Appeals granted
prohibition.

ISSUES:

The petitioners allege that the Court of Appeals, in granting prohibition,

committed a grave abuse of discretion: (1) Rodolfo Ganzon has not
adequately proved the fact of presidential pardon; (2) there exists no
evidence in the files of the Government to prove pardon; (3) Ganzon's copy
is a bare machine copy and Ganzonhas failed to adequately establish the
loss of the original; (4) the alleged pardon (or copy of it) had not been
properly sealed and authenticated, or executed in official
Malacaang stationery; and (5) the disposition of the murder cases by the
military does not preclude the filing of new informations by the civilian
government.

HELD:
The Court therefore need not consider whether or not Rodolfo Ganzon had
been pardoned, and whatever "pardon" the former President may have
extended to him did not erase the fact that as early as 1978, he was a free
man. Of course, he was supposed to have remained under house arrest but
as we said, not as a continuation of his sentence, but pursuant to Marcos'
vast arrest and commitment powers during martial rule. The question of
whether or not he should continue to remain under house arrest is also a
moot question as we noted, 28 and arrests except upon lawful judicial orders
are no longer possible. The Court's disposition, it is true, leaves Ganzon to all
intents and purposes "scot-free", yet whatever liberal treatment he may
have received is not his fault either, and in the second place, "worse" people
have been better rewarded in this regime.
COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE v. GOTANCO & SONS, INC.
AND CA

FACTS:
World Health Organization (WHO) as an international organization, it enjoys
privileges and immunities which are defined morespecifically in the Host
Agreement entered into between the Republic of the Philippines and the said
Organization on July 22, 1951.Section 11 of that Agreement provides,inter
alia,that "the Organization, its assets, income and other properties shall be:
(a) exemptfrom all direct and indirect taxes. It is understood, however, that
the Organization will not claim exemption from taxes which are, I fact, no
more than charges for public utility services;Sometime in May 1958, the
WHO received an opinion from the Commissioner of the Bureau of Internal
Revenue stating that "as the3% contractor's tax is an indirect tax on the
assets and income of the Organization, the gross receipts derived by
contractors fromtheir contracts with the WHO for the construction of its new
building, are exempt from tax in accordance with . . . the HostAgreement."
Subsequently, however, on June 3, 1958, the Commissioner of Internal
Revenue reversed his opinion and stated that "asthe 3% contractor's tax is
not a direct nor an indirect tax on the WHO, but a tax that is primarily due
from the contractor, the same isnot covered by . . . the Host Agreement.

ISSUE:
Whether respondent John Gotanco & Sons, Inc. should pay the 3%
contractor's tax under Section 191 of the National InternalRevenue Code on
the gross receipts it realized from the construction of the World Health
Organization office building in Manila.
HELD
In context, direct taxes are those that are demanded from the very person
who, it is intended or desired, should pay them;while indirect taxes are those
that are demanded in the first instance from one person in the expectation
and intention that he canshift the burden to someone else. (Pollock vs.
Farmers, L & T Co., 1957 US 429, 15 S. Ct. 673, 39 Law.Ed. 759.) The
contractor's taxis of course payable by the contractor but in the last analysis
it is the owner of the building that shoulders the burden of the taxbecause
the same is shifted by the contractor to the owner as a matter of self-
preservation. Thus, it is an indirect tax. And it is anindirect tax on the WHO
because, although it is payable by the petitioner, the latter can shift its
burden on the WHO. In the lastanalysis it is the WHO that will pay the tax
indirectly through the contractor and it certainly cannot be said that 'this tax
has nobearing upon the World Health Organization.

United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp

299 U.S. 304,
FACTS:
Congress passed a Joint Resolution authorizing the President to ban the sales
of arms to countries involved in the border dispute between Bolivia and
Paraguay. The President immediately made an Executive Order banning such
sales. The Defendant was indicted for conspiracy to sell fifteen machine guns
to Bolivia in violation of the Joint Resolution and the Executive Order.

ISSUE:
Whether or not Congress delegate law-making authority to the President in
matters of foreign affairs

HELD:
The non-delegation doctrine does not bar Congress from delegating great
authority and discretion to the President of the United States (the President)
in the conduct of foreign affairs.
Summary of Goldwater v. Carter
S. Ct. 1979

FACTS:
President Carter terminated a defense treaty with Taiwan. Neither the
Senate nor the
House have taken action to prevent or contest the action. Several members
brought this claim alleging the President has deprived them of their
Constitutional role.

ISSUE:
Whether the President, in terminating at treaty with another country, needs
the approval of Congress, and if so does it involve a political question?

HELD:
The President is authorized to make treaties with the advise and consent of
the Senate.
Treaties shall be a part of the supreme law of the land.

Judicial action is barred where there is an unusual need for unquestioning

adherence to a political decision already made. Issues affecting allocation of
power are unreviewable. Constitutional text which grants exclusive
responsibility to a particular governmental function to one of the branches,
and thereby eliminating the courts interference in the business of those
other branches.

Guingona, Jr. vs. Carague

G.R. No. 94571. April 22, 1991

FACTS:

The 1990 budget consists of P98.4 Billion in automatic appropriation (with

P86.8 Billion for debt service) and P155.3 Billion appropriated under RA 6831,
otherwise known as the General Approriations Act, or a total of P233.5
Billion, while the appropriations for the DECS amount to P27,017,813,000.00.

The said automatic appropriation for debt service is authorized by PD No. 18,
entitled Amending Certain Provisions of Republic Act Numbered Four
Thousand Eight Hundred Sixty, as Amended (Re: Foreign Borrowing Act), by
PD No. 1177, entitled Revising the Budget Process in Order to
Institutionalize the Budgetary Innovations of the New Society, and by PD
No.1967, entitled An Act Strengthening the Guarantee and Payment
Positions of the Republic of the Philippines on its Contingent Liabilities Arising
out of Relent and Guaranteed Loans by Appropriating Funds For The
Purpose.

The petitioners were questioning the constitutionality of the automatic

appropriation for debt service, it being higher than the budget for education,
therefore it is against Section 5(5), Article XIV of the Constitution which
mandates to assign the highest budgetary priority to education.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the automatic appropriation for debt service is

unconstitutional; it being higher than the budget for education.

HELD:

No. While it is true that under Section 5(5), Article XIV of the Constitution
Congress is mandated to assign the highest budgetary priority to
education, it does not thereby follow that the hands of Congress are so
hamstrung as to deprive it the power to respond to the imperatives of the
national interest and for the attainment of other state policies or objectives.

Congress is certainly not without any power, guided only by its good
judgment, to provide an appropriation, that can reasonably service our
enormous debtIt is not only a matter of honor and to protect the credit
standing of the country. More especially, the very survival of our economy is
at stake. Thus, if in the process Congress appropriated an amount for debt
service bigger than the share allocated to education, the Court finds and so
holds that said appropriation cannot be thereby assailed as unconstitutional

Government v. Springer
80 Phil. 283

FACTS:
The petitioners were elected as directors of National Coal Company by a vote
of the government-owned shares cast by the Senate President and the
Speaker of the House in accordance with Act 2814 or the National Coal
Company Act, stating that the voting of directors is exclusively vested in a
board. The Governor General challenged the validity of the legislation, that
the election of directors and managing agents by a vote of the government-
owned stock was an executive function entrusted by the Organic Act of the
Philippine Islands to the Governor General, and that the acts of the
Legislature divesting him of that power and vesting it, in the one case, in a
'board,' and, in the other, in a 'committee,' the majority of which in each
instance consisted of officers and members of the Legislature, were invalid
as being in conflict with the Organic Act.

ISSUE:

Whether or not voting of directors of National Coal Company is vested

in the Governor General.

HELD:

It may finally be inferred from the books that the appointment of public
officials is generally looked upon as properly an executive function. The
power of appointment can hardly be considered a legislative power.
Appointments may be made by the Legislature of the courts, but when so
made be taken as an incident to the discharge of functions properly within
their respective spheres.
The right to appoint to office has been confided, with certain well
defined exceptions, by the Government of the United States to the executive
branch of the government which it has set up in the Philippines. Let the
Organic Law speak upon this proposition.

Section 22 of the Organic Act,

"That all executive functions of the government must be directly under the
Governor-General or within one of the executive departments under the
supervision and control of the Governor-General.

At the very least, the performance of duties appurtenant to membership in

the voting committee is an executive function on the Government, which the
Organic Act requires must be subject to the unhampered control of the
Government-General. The administrative domination of a governmentally
organized and controlled corporation is clearly not a duty germane to the
law-making power.

Concepcion v. Paredes
42 Phil. 599

FACTS:
The Philippine Legislature passed a law (Act No. 2941) stating that

Unless otherwise provided, on March fifteenth, nineteen hundred and twenty-

one, and every five years thereafter, the judges of first instance with the
same salaries shall exchange judicial districts, and the same shall be done by
the auxiliary judges as to the respective groups of judicial districts in which
they shall serve during the ensuing five-year period. The exchange of
districts or groups of judicial districts shall be determined by lot between the
judges affected, observing the following rule, which shall be mandatory: no
judge shall continue to serve in the district or group in which he has been
serving during the last five years.

The petitioner filed a petition before the Supreme Court to halt the
holding of the judicial lottery, and to challenge the validity of Act No. 2941.

ISSUE:

Whether or not Act No. 2941 creating an appointment to the judiciary

by draw lots valid

HELD:

The law before us would require a drawing of lots for judicial positions,
while the organic law would require selection for judicial positions by the
Governor-General with the assent of the Philippine Senate. Chance has been
substituted for executive judgment. Appointment by lot is not appointment
by the Governor-General. Appointment by lot is not appointment with the
advice and consent of the Philippine Senate. To leave the selection of a
person for a given judicial office to lot is not to appoint, but is to gamble with
the office. To such a method we cannot give the seal of our approval.
It is not within the power of the Philippine Legislature to enact laws
which either expressly or impliedly diminish the authority conferred by an Act
of Congress on the Chief Executive and a branch of the Legislature.
Deliberately considered solely as a question of constitutional law, and
putting to one side all irrelevant questions of expediency and of motive, we
conclude that the power of appointment and confirmation vested by the
Organic Act in the Governor-General and the Philippine Senate is usurped by
a lottery of judicial offices every five years. An independent and self-
respecting judiciary must continue to exist in the Philippine. The orderly
course of constitutional government must be maintained.

Manalang v. Quitoriano
94 Phil. 903

FACTS:

The respondent Quitoriano, by virtue of a designation made, in his

favor, assumed as Acting Commissioner of the National Employment Service,
by the Office of the President of the Philippines.
 The petitioner, Luis Manalang, was Director of the Placement Bureau,
an office created by Executive Order No. 392, dated December 31, 1950,
avowedly pursuant to the powers vested in the President by Republic Act No.
422. On June 20, 1952, Republic Act No. 761 entitled "An Act to Provide for
the Organization of a National Employment Service.
On June 1, 1953, the then Secretary of Labor, Jose Figueras,
recommended the appointment of petitioner Luis Manalang as Commissioner
of the Service. On June 29, 1953, respondent Aurelio Quitoriano, then Acting
Secretary of Labor, made a similar recommendation in favor of Manalang,
upon the ground that "he is best qualified" and "loyal to service and
administration." Said Acting Secretary of Labor even informed Manalang that
he would probably be appointed to the office in question. However, on July 1,
1953, Quitoriano was the one designated, and sworn in, as Acting
Commissioner of the Service. Such designation of Quitoriano like the
subsequent designation, first, of Emiliano Morabe, and the, of Mohamad de
Venancio is now assailed by Manalang as "illegal" and equivalent to
removal of the petitioner from office without cause.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the petitioner is entitled to the office of Acting Commissioner

of NES despite the express abolition of Placement Bureau and transferring all
all the files, records, supplies, equipment, qualified personnel and
unexpended balances of appropriations of said Bureau and Commission
pertaining to said bureau or office shall thereupon be transferred to the
Service

HELD:

This pretense cannot be sustained. To begin with, petitioner has never been
Commissioner of the National Employment Service and, hence, he could not have
been, and has not been removed therefrom. Secondly, to remove an officer is to
oust him from office before the expiration of his term. As removal implies that the
office exists after the ouster. Such is not the case of petitioner herein, for Republic
Act No. 761 expressly abolished the Placement Bureau, and, by implication, the
office of director thereof, which, obviously, cannot exist without said Bureau. By the
abolition of the latter and of said office, the right thereto of its incumbent, petitioner
herein, was necessarily extinguished thereby. Accordingly, the constitutional
mandate to the effect that "no officer or employee in the civil service shall be
removed or suspended except for cause as provided by law" (Art. XII, Sec. 4, Phil.
Const.), is not in point, for there has been neither a removal nor a suspension of
petitioner Manalang, but an abolition of his former office of Director of the
Placement Bureau, which, admittedly, is within the power of Congress to undertake
by legislation.

Pineda v. Claudio
28 SCRA 34
FACTS:

Upon the death of Col. Mariano Tumaliuan, the position of Chief of Police of
Pasay City became vacant. To fill the vacancy, the respondent Mayor Claudio
appointed Francisco Villa, a state prosecutor of the Department of Justice.
The petitioner Basilio Pineda filed a petition for mandamus questioning the
appointment of Villa because he must be the one who is appointed as Chief
of Police of Pasay being the next-in-rank in the list of nominees to the
position recommended by the Civil Service Commission. He anchored his
contention on Section 23 of the Civil Service Law.
The respondent Claudio opposed the petition on the ground that the
appointment is valid in accordance with Section 17 of the Police Act of 1966
wherein if there is a vacancy in the position of Chief of Police, the mayor shall
fill the vacancy as provided in this Act.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the appointment of Chief of Police of any city be to be

regulated by Section 8 of the Police Act of 1966, or by Section 4 of the
Decentralization Act and the third paragraph of Section 23 of the Civil
Service Law

HELD:

Resolving the issue squarely presented, we hold that it is neither mandatory

nor ministerial for the mayor of Pasay City to promote to the vacant position
of chief of police the incumbent deputy chief of police Pineda, and that the
appointment to said position of the respondent Villa, who has been certified
as qualified and eligible, although an "outsider" and not the next-in-rank
employee, is valid, in the same manner that the appointment of Pineda,
although an "outsider" and not the next-in-rank, to the position of deputy
chief of police was valid.
The Civil Service Act does not peremptorily require the mayor to promote the
officer next in rank. Section 23 thereof does not require that
vacancies must be filled by promotion, transfer, reinstatement,
reemployment or certification, in that order. That would be to construe the
provision not merely as a legislative prescription of qualifications but as a
legislative appointment, repugnant to the Constitution. What it does purport
to say is that as far as practicable the person next in rank should be
promoted, otherwise the vacancy may be filled by transfer, reinstatement,
reemployment or certification, as the appointing power sees fit, provided the
appointee is certified to be qualified and eligible which is the basic
requirement of the Civil Service Act, as well as of the Police Act and the
Decentralization Law.

Oliveros -Torre v. Bayot

58 SCRA 272

FACTS:
The Secretary of Health appointed Virginia Barros as Chief Drug Inspector of
the Food and Drug Administration. The petitioner filed a Petition for
Reconsideration before the Civil Service Commissioner. The Commissioner
granted the petition of the petitioner. Barros appealed before the Civil
Service Commission Board of Appeals but it was denied. Barros appealed
before the Office of the President and the latter reversed the decision of the
Civil Service Board. The petitioner filed a petition before the Supreme Court
questioning the decision of the Office of the President on the ground that the
latter has no power to review the decision of the Civil Service Commission.

ISSUE:
Whether the Office of the President has jurisdiction to review the decisions of
the Commissioner of Civil Service on contested appointments

HELD:
The appellate jurisdiction of the President on disputed appointments is also
expressly affirmed by Section 693 of the Revised Administrative Code which
provides that "A disbursing officer, the head of any department, bureau, or
office, or the Auditor General, may apply for, and the Commissioner of Civil
Service shall render, a decision upon any question as to whether a position is
in the classified or in the unclassified civil service, or whether the
appointment of any person to a classified position has been made in
accordance with law, which decision, when rendered, shall be
final unless reversed by the President of the Philippines on appeal."
But even without such express statutory conferment of appellate jurisdiction
on the President, he can at any time by virtue of his power of control over
executive departments, bureaus and offices, expressly vested in him by
Section 10(i) of Article VII of the 1935 Constitution, review, modify, alter or
nullify any action, or decision of his subordinate in the executive
departments, bureaus or offices under him. (Mondano vs. Silvosa, 97 Phil.
143, 148). He can exercise this power motu propio without need of any
appeal from any party (Negado vs. Castro, 104 Phil. 103, 107). This power of
control of the President under the 1935 Constitution is also expressly
conferred on the Prime Minister by Section 11 of Article IX of the 1973
Constitution.
Bermudez v. Executive Secretary
G.R. No. 131429, August 4, 1999

FACTS:
Petitioner Bermudez, the First Assistant Provincial Prosecutor of Tarlac and
Officer-In-Charge of the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor, was a
recommendee of then Justice Secretary Teofisto Guingona, Jr., for the position
of Provincial Prosecutor. Quiaoit, on the other hand, would appear to have
had the support of then Representative Jose Yap of the Second Legislative
District of Tarlac.On 30 June 1997, Quiaoit emerged the victor when he was
appointed by President Ramos to the coveted office. Quiaoit received a
certified xerox copy of his appointment and, on 21 July 1997, took his oath of
office before Executive Judge Angel Parazo of the Regional Trial Court (Branch
65) of Tarlac, Tarlac. On 23 July 1997, Quiaoit assumed office and
immediately informed the President, as well as the Secretary of Justice and
the Civil Service Commission, of that assumption. Bermudez refused to
vacate the Office of Provincial Prosecutor claiming that the original copy of
Quiaoits appointment had not yet been released by the Secretary of Justice.
Quiaoit, nonetheless, performed the functions and duties of the Office of
Provincial Prosecutor by issuing office orders and memoranda, signing
resolutions on preliminary investigations, and filing several informations
before the courts. Quiaoit had since been regularly receiving the salary,
RATA and other emoluments of the office.
The petitioner filed with the Regional Trial Court of Tarlac, a petition for
prohibition and/or injunction, and mandamus, with a prayer for the issuance
of a writ of injunction/temporary restraining order, against herein
respondents, challenging the appointment of Quiaoit primarily on the ground
that the appointment lacks the recommendation of the Secretary of Justice
prescribed under the Revised Administrative Code of 1987. After hearing,
the trial court considered the petition submitted for resolution and, in due
time, issued its now assailed order dismissing the petition. The subsequent
move by petitioners to have the order reconsidered met with a denial.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the absence of a recommendation of the Secretary of Justice to the

President can be held fatal to the appointment of respondent Conrado Quiaoit
HELD:

It is the considered view of the Court, given the above disquisition, that the phrase
upon recommendation of the Secretary, found in Section 9, Chapter II, Title III,
Book IV, of the Revised Administrative Code, should be interpreted, as it is normally
so understood, to be a mere advise, exhortation or indorsement, which is essentially
persuasive in character and not binding or obligatory upon the party to whom it is
made. The recommendation is here nothing really more than advisory in nature. The
President, being the head of the Executive Department, could very well disregard or
do away with the action of the departments, bureaus or offices even in the exercise
of discretionary authority, and in so opting, he cannot be said as having acted
beyond the scope of his authority.

Pimentel Jr. v. Ermita

G.R No. 164978, October 13, 2005

FACTS:

The Congress commenced their regular session on July 24, 2004. President
Arroyo issued appointments on acting capacity on eight department
secretaries.
The Congress adjourned on September 22, 2004. President Arroyo issued ad-
interim appointments to the same 8 department secretaries.
The petitioners, in their capacity as Senators filed a petition before the
Supreme Court questioning the appointment of 8 department secretaries in
acting capacity.

ISSUE:

Whether or not President Arroyos appointment of respondents as acting

secretaries without the consent of the Commission on Appointments while
Congress is in session is unconstitutional

HELD:

The essence of an appointment in an acting capacity is its temporary

nature. It is a stop-gap measure intended to fill an office for a limited time
until the appointment of a permanent occupant to the office. In case of
vacancy in an office occupied by an alter ego of the President, such as the
office of a department secretary, the President must necessarily appoint
an alter ego of her choice as acting secretary before the permanent
appointee of her choice could assume office.
Congress, through a law, cannot impose on the President the obligation to
appoint automatically the undersecretary as her temporary alter ego.
An alter ego, whether temporary or permanent, holds a position of great
trust and confidence. Congress, in the guise of prescribing qualifications to
an office, cannot impose on the President who her alter ego should be.
The office of a department secretary may become vacant while Congress is
in session. Since a department secretary is the alter ego of the President,
the acting appointee to the office must necessarily have the Presidents
confidence. Thus, by the very nature of the office of a department secretary,
the President must appoint in an acting capacity a person of her choice even
while Congress is in session. That person may or may not be the permanent
appointee, but practical reasons may make it expedient that the acting
appointee will also be the permanent appointee.
The law expressly allows the President to make such acting
appointment. Section 17, Chapter 5, Title I, Book III of EO 292 states that
[t]he President may temporarily designate an officer already in the
government service or any other competent personto perform the functions
of an office in the executive branch. Thus, the President may even appoint
in an acting capacity a person not yet in the government service, as long as
the President deems that person competent.

Aytona v. Castillo
4 SCRA 1

FACTS:

Outgoing President Carlos Garcia issued 350 midnight ad interim

appointments. President Diosdado Macapagal issued an administrative order
cancelling all ad interim appointments made by President Garcia.
The petitioner filed a petition before the Court questioning the order of Pres.
Macapagal on the ground that his (petitioner) appointment is valid and he is
qualified to be the Governor of the Central Bank. The appointment made by
Pres. Macapagal to the position of Central Bank Governor is void.

ISSUE:

Whether President Diosdado Macapagal had power to issue the order of

cancellation of the ad interim appointments made by President Carlos P.
Garcia even after the appointees had already qualified.

HELD:

Of course, nobody will assert that President Garcia ceased to be such earlier
than at noon of December 30, 1961. But it is common sense to believe that
after the proclamation of the election of President Macapagal, his was no
more than a "care-taker" administration. He was duty bound to prepare for
the orderly transfer of authority the incoming President, and he should not
do acts which he ought to know, would embarrass or obstruct the policies of
his successor. The time for debate had passed; the electorate had spoken. It
was not for him to use powers as incumbent President to continue the
political warfare that had ended or to avail himself of presidential
prerogatives to serve partisan purposes. The filling up vacancies in important
positions, if few, and so spaced to afford some assurance of deliberate action
and careful consideration of the need for the appointment and the
appointee's qualifications may undoubtedly be permitted. But the issuance
of 350 appointments in one night and planned induction of almost all of them
a few hours before the inauguration of the new President may, with some
reason, be regarded by the latter as an abuse Presidential prerogatives, the
steps taken being apparently a mere partisan effort to fill all vacant
positions1 irrespective of fitness and other conditions, and thereby deprive
the new administration of an opportunity to make the corresponding
appointments.
Under the circumstances above described, what with the separation of
powers, this Court resolves that it must decline to disregard the Presidential
Administrative Order No. 2, cancelling such "midnight" or "last-minute"
appointments.

Sarmiento v. Mison
156 SCRA 549

FACTS:

The petitioners filed a petition for prohibition before the Supreme Court
enjoining the respondent Mison to perform his powers and duties as
Commissioner of the Bureau of Customs on the ground that the appointment
of Mison is unconstitutional because his appointment is not been confirmed
by the Commission on Appointments. The respondent opposed the petition
on the ground that his position of Commissioner of Customs needs no
confirmation by the Commission on Appointments.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the appointment of Mison as Commissioner of Customs needs

confirmation by the Commission on Appointments

HELD:

The position of Commissioner of the Bureau of Customs (a bureau head) is

not one of those within the first group of appointments where the consent of
the Commission on Appointments is required. As a matter of fact, as already
pointed out, while the 1935 Constitution includes "heads of bureaus" among
those officers whose appointments need the consent of the Commission on
Appointments, the 1987 Constitution on the other hand, deliberately
excluded the position of "heads of bureaus" from appointments that need the
consent (confirmation) of the Commission on Appointments.
Sec. 601 of Republic Act No. 1937, was amended on 27 October 1972 by
Presidential Decree No. 34, amending the Tariff and Customs Code of the
Philippines. Sec. 601, as thus amended, now reads as follows:
Sec. 601.Chief Officials of the Bureau of Customs.-The Bureau of
Customs shall have one chief and one assistant chief, to be known
respectively as the Commissioner (hereinafter known as Commissioner) and
Deputy Commissioner of Customs, who shall each receive an annual
compensation in accordance with the rates prescribed by existing law. The
Commissioner and the Deputy Commissioner of Customs shall be appointed
by the President of the Philippines (Emphasis supplied.)
Of course, these laws (Rep. Act No. 1937 and PD No. 34) were approved
during the effectivity of the 1935 Constitution, under which the President
may nominate and, with the consent of the Commission on Appointments,
appoint the heads of bureaus, like the Commissioner of the Bureau of
Customs.
After the effectivity of the 1987 Constitution, however, Rep. Act No. 1937 and
PD No. 34 have to be read in harmony with Sec. 16, Art. VII, with the result
that, while the appointment of the Commissioner of the Bureau of Customs is
one that devolves on the President, as an appointment he is authorized by
law to make, such appointment, however, no longer needs the confirmation
of the Commission on Appointments.

Bautista v. Salonga
172 SCRA 160

FACTS:

On 27 Aug 1987, President Cory designated Bautista as

the Acting Chairwoman of CHR. In December of the same year, Cory made
the designation of Bautista permanent. The CoA, ignoring the decision in the
Mison case, averred that Bautista cannot take her seat w/o their
confirmation. The President, through the Exec Sec, filed with the CoA
communications about Bautistas appointment on 14 Jan 1989. Bautista
refused to be placed under the CoAs review hence she filed a petition before
the SC. On the other hand, Mallillin invoked EO 163-A stating that since CoA
refused Bautistas appointment, Bautista should be removed. EO 163-A
provides that the tenure of the Chairman and the Commissioners of the CHR
should be at the pleasure of the President.

ISSUE
Whether or not the appointment of Bautista is subject to confirmation by the
Commission on Appointments

HELD:

Since the position of Chairman of the CHR is not among

the positions mentioned in the first sentence of Sec. 16, Art. 7 of the
1987 Constitution, appointments to which are to be made with the
confirmation of the CoA it follows that the appointment by the President of
the Chairman of the CHR is to be made without the review or participation of
the CoA. To be more precise, the appointment of the Chairman and Members
of the CHR is not specifically provided for in the Constitution itself, unlike the
Chairmen and Members of the CSC, the COMELEC and the COA, whose
appointments are expressly vested by the Constitution in the President with
the consent of the CoA. The President appoints the Chairman and Members
of the CHR pursuant to the second sentence in Sec 16, Art. 7, that is, without
the confirmation of the CoA because they are among the officers of
government whom he (the President) may be authorized by law to appoint.
And Sec 2(c), EO 163 authorizes the President to appoint the Chairman and
Members of the CHR.

Manalo v. Sistoza
G.R No. 107369, August 11, 1999

FACTS:

Petitioner, Jesulito Sistoza questioned the constitutionality and legality of the

appointments issued by former Pres. Corazon Aquino to the respondent
senior officers of the PNP who were promoted to the rank of Chief
Superintendent and Director without their appointments submitted to the
Commission on Appointments for confirmation. The said police officers tool
their Oath of Offices and assumed their respective positions. Thereafter the
Department of Budget and Management, authorized disbursements of their
salaries and other emoluments. The petitioner brought before this petition
for prohibition, as a tax payer suit to the SC to assail the legality of subject
appointment and disbursement thereof.
ISSUE:

Whether or not the appointment of the senior officers of the PNP

is valid even without the confirmation of the Commission on Appointments

HELD:

It is petitioners submission that the Philippine National Police is akin to the Armed
Forces of the Philippines and therefore, the appointments of police officers whose
rank is equal to that of colonel or naval captain require confirmation by the
Commission on Appointments.
This contention is equally untenable. The Philippine National Police is separate and
distinct from the Armed Forces of the Philippines. The Constitution, no less, sets
forth the distinction. Under Section 4 of Article XVI of the 1987 Constitution,

The Armed Forces of the Philippines shall be composed of a citizen armed force
which shall undergo military training and service, as may be provided by law. It
shall keep a regular force necessary for the security of the State.
On the other hand, Section 6 of the same Article of the Constitution ordains that:

The State shall establish and maintain one police force, which shall be national in
scope and civilian in character to be administered and controlled by a national
police commission. The authority of local executives over the police units in their
jurisdiction shall be provided by law.
To so distinguish the police force from the armed forces, Congress enacted Republic
Act 6975 which states in part:
Section 2. Declaration of policy - It is hereby declared to be the policy of the State
to promote peace and order, ensure public safety and further strengthen local
government capability aimed towards the effective delivery of the basic services to
the citizenry through the establishment of a highly efficient and competent police
force that is national in scope and civilian in character. xxx.
Thereunder, the police force is different from and independent of the armed forces
and the ranks in the military are not similar to those in the Philippine National
Police. Thus, directors and chief superintendents of the PNP, such as the herein
respondent police officers, do not fall under the first category of presidential
appointees requiring the confirmation of CoA.

Soriano v. Lista
447 Phil. 566

FACTS:

The petitioner filed a petition for prohibition before the Supreme Court
challenging the validity of the appointments of the respondents to the
Philippine Coast Guard. He contended that appointments to the PCG need a
confirmation from the Commission on Appointments.
ISSUE:

Whether or not appointments to the Philippine Coast Guard need a

confirmation from the Commission on Appointments

HELD:
Section 16, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution provides:
Section 16. The President shall nominate and, with the consent of the
Commission on Appointments, appoint the heads of the executive
departments, ambassadors, other public ministers and consuls, or officers of
the armed forces from the rank of colonel or naval captain, and other officers
whose appointments are vested in him in this Constitution. He shall also
appoint all other officers of the Government whose appointments are not
otherwise provided for by law, and those whom he may be authorized by law
to appoint. The Congress may, by law, vest the appointment of other officers
lower in rank in the President alone, in the courts, or in the heads of
departments, agencies, commissions, or boards.
It is clear from the foregoing provision of the Constitution that only appointed
officers from the rank of colonel or naval captain in the armed forces require
confirmation by the CA. The rule is that the plain, clear and unambiguous
language of the Constitution should be construed as such and should not be
given a construction that changes its meaning.
The enumeration of appointments subject to confirmation by the CA under
Section 16, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution is exclusive. The clause
officers of the armed forces from the rank of colonel or naval captain refers
to military officers alone. This is clear from the deliberations of the
Constitutional Commission on the proposed text of said Section 16, Article VII
of the Constitution. Since the promotions and appointments of respondent
officers are not covered by the above-cited provision of the Constitution, the
same need not be confirmed by the CA.

Niere v. CFI
54 SCRA 165

FACTS:
 The petitioner was appointed as City Engineer of La Carlota City,
Negros Occidental by the then Mayor Jaime Marino, by virtue of Republic Act
No. 4585.
Upon the enactment of Republic Act No. 5185 or the Decentralization
Act, the President appointed Jose Quiambao as City Engineer of La Carlota
with the confirmation by the Commission on Appointments.
The petitioner challenged the appointment of Quiambao.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the appointment of Quiambao as City Engineer of La

Carlota is valid

HELD:

Since the city mayor under Section 21 is without authority to appoint the city
engineer, this prerogative can only be exercised by the President of the
Philippines, who, under Section 10(3) of Article VII of the 1935 Constitution,
shall nominate with the consent of the Commission on Appointments "all
other officers of the government whose appointments are not herein
otherwise provided for"; because We ruled in Ramos vs. Alvarez (97 Phil.
844, 849) that when a statute does not specify how an officer is to be
appointed, the appointment must be made by the President with the consent
of the Commission on Appointments.
The appointing power is essentially the exclusive prerogative of the
President. Consequently, any diminution in its scope must be clear and
unequivocal. This test is not met by Section 21 of Republic Act No. 4585 so
as to remove the power to appoint the city engineer of La Carlota City from
the residual power of appointment vested in the President by Section 10(3)
of Article VII of the 1935 Constitution.
Hence, the appointment of petitioner as city engineer by then city mayor of
La Carlota City is illegal and therefore null and void. However, as conceded
by respondents, petitioner was a de facto city engineer during the period of
time that he performed the functions of the position until he was displaced
by respondent Quiambao who was validly nominated by the President of the
Philippines and confirmed by the Commission on Appointments (Cordilla vs.
Martinez, 110 Phil. 24, 25; Rodriguez vs. Tan, 91 Phil. 724, 728; Luna vs.
Rodriguez, 37 Phil. 866)
Rufino v. Endriga
G.R No. 139554, July 21, 2006

FACTS:

President Joseph Estrada appointed seven trustees to the Cultural

Center of the Philippines. The respondent filed a quo warranto case before
the Supreme Court on the ground that under the CCP Charter, CCP has the
autonomy of policy and operation and it is not subject to the power of control
by the President. but the latter referred it to the Court of Appeals.
The Appellate Court granted the quo warranto case filed by the
respondent. The petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration on the ground
that Sec. 16 of the CCP Charter with regards to the appointment of trustees
by their fellow trustees is unconstitutional and repugnant to the provision of
Art. VII, Sec. 16 of the 1987 Constitution. The Court of Appeals denied the
motion.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the CCP Charter denies to the President its

constitutional power of control and supervision over CCP

HELD:

Section 6(b) and (c) of PD 15, which authorizes the trustees of the CCP Board
to fill vacancies in the Board, runs afoul with the President's power of control
under Section 17, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution. The intent of Section
6(b) and (c) of PD 15 is to insulate the CCP from political influence and
pressure, specifically from the President. Section 6(b) and (c) of PD 15 makes
the CCP a self-perpetuating entity, virtually outside the control of the
President. Such a public office or board cannot legally exist under the 1987
Constitution.
Section 3 of PD 15, as amended, states that the CCP "shall enjoy autonomy
of policy and operation x x x." This provision does not free the CCP from the
President's control, for if it does, then it would be unconstitutional. This
provision may give the CCP Board a free hand in initiating and formulating
policies and undertaking activities, but ultimately these policies and
activities are all subject to the President's power of control.
The CCP is part of the Executive branch. No law can cut off the President's
control over the CCP in the guise of insulating the CCP from the President's
influence. By stating that the "President shall have control of all the
executive x x x offices," the 1987 Constitution empowers the President not
only to influence but even to control all offices in the Executive branch,
including the CCP. Control is far greater than, and subsumes, influence.
Calderon v. Carale
208 SCRA 254

FACTS:

In 1989, RA 6715 was passed. This law amended PD 442 or the Labor Code.
RA 6715 provides that the Chairman, the Division Presiding Commissioners
and other Commissioners [of the NLRC] shall all be appointed by
the President, subject to confirmation by the CoA. Appointments to any
vacancy shall come from the nominees of the sector which nominated the
predecessor. Pursuant to the law, the President assigned Carale et al as the
Chairman and the Commissioners respectively of the NLRC; the appointment
was not submitted to the CoA for its confirmation. Calderon questioned the
appointment saying that w/o the confirmation by the CoA, such an
appointment is in violation of RA 6715. Calderon asserted that RA 6715 is not
an encroachment on the appointing power of the executive contained in
Sec16, Art. 7, of the Constitution, as Congress may, by law, require
confirmation by the Commission on Appointments of other officers appointed
by the President additional to those mentioned in the first sentence of Sec 16
of Article 7 of the Constitution.

ISSUE:

Whether or not Congress may, by law, require confirmation by the CoA of

appointments extended by the President to government officers additional to
those expressly mentioned in the first sentence of Sec. 16, Art. 7 of the
Constitution whose appointments require confirmation by the CoA

HELD:

Indubitably, the NLRC Chairman and Commissioners fall within the

second sentence of Section 16, Article VII of the Constitution, more
specifically under the "third groups" of appointees referred to in Mison, i.e.
those whom the President may be authorized by law to appoint. Undeniably,
the Chairman and Members of the NLRC are not among the officers
mentioned in the first sentence of Section 16, Article VII whose appointments
requires confirmation by the Commission on Appointments. To the extent
that RA 6715 requires confirmation by the Commission on Appointments of
the appointments of respondents Chairman and Members of the National
Labor Relations Commission, it is unconstitutional because:
1) It amends by legislation, the first sentence of Sec. 16, Art. VII of the
Constitution by adding thereto appointments requiring confirmation by the
Commission on Appointments; and
2) It amends by legislation the second sentence of Sec. 16, Art. VII of the
Constitution, by imposing the confirmation of the Commission on
Appointments on appointments which are otherwise entrusted only with the
President

Tarrosa v. Singson
232 SCRA 553

FACTS:

Singson was appointed as the Governor of the Bangko Sentral by then

president Ramos. Tarrosa, as a taxpayer, opposed the said appointment and
he argued that Singson cannot perform such position w/o confirmation from
the CoA. Tarrosa invoked Sec 6 of RA 7653 which provides that the Governor
if appointed is subject to the confirmation of the CoA.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the Governor of the BSP is subject to CoAs

confirmation

HELD:

The Supreme Court ruled that Congress exceeded its legislative powers
in requiring the confirmation by the CoA of the appointment of the Governor
of the BSP. An appointment to the said position is not among the
appointments which have to be confirmed by the CoA cited in Sec 16 of Art 7
of the Constitution. Congress cannot by law expand the confirmation powers
of the Commission on Appointments and require confirmation of appointment
of other government officials not expressly mentioned in the first sentence of
Sec 16 of Article 7 of the Constitution.
Guevara v. Inocentes
16 SCRA 379

FACTS:

The petitioner, Onofre Guevara was extended an ad interim

appointment as Undersecretary of Labor by the former Executive on
November 18, 1965. Took his oath of office on November 25th same year.
The incumbent Executive issued Memorandum Circular No. 8 dated January
23, 1966 declaring that all ad interim appointments made by the former
Executive lapsed with the adjournment of the special session of Congress at
about midnight of January 22, 1966. The respondent, Raoul Inocentes was
extended an ad interim appointment for the same position by the incumbent
Executive on January 23, 1966. Guevara filed before the court an instant
petition for Quo Warranto seeking to be declared person legally entitled to
the said Officer of the Undersecretary of Labor under Art. VII Sec. 10 (4) of
the 1935 Constitution. which states that:
The president shall have the power to make appointments during the recess
of the Congress, but such appointments shall be effective only until
disapproval by the Commission on Appointments or until the next
adjournment of Congress.
Since there was no Commission on Appointments organized during the
special session which commenced on January 17, 1966, the respondent
contended that the petitioners ad interim appointment as well as other
made under similar conditions must have lapsed when the Congress
adjourned its last special session. But the petitioner stated that (1) the
specific provision in the Constitution which states that: until the next
adjournment of Congress means adjournment of a regular session of
Congress and not by a special session and (2) only the Senate adjourned sine
die at midnight of January 22, 1966 and the House of the Representative
merely suspended its session and to be resumed on January 24, 1966 at
10:00 AM. The petitioner therefore concludes that Congress has been in
continuous session without interruption since January 17.

ISSUE:
 Whether or not, the petitioners contention regarding the next
adjournment of Congress specifically provides for regular session only

HELD:

The phrase until the next adjournment of Congress does not make
any reference to specific session of Congress, whether regular or special. But
a well-know Latin maxim is statutory construction stated that when the law
does not distinguish we should not distinguish. Ubi lex non distinguit nec nos
distinguere debemus. It is safe to conclude that the authors of the 1935
Constitution used the word adjournment had in mind either regular or
special and not simply the regular one as the petitioner contended.

Cunanan v. Tan
5 SCRA 1

FACTS:

Petitioner sought to nullify the ad interim appointment of Jorge Tan Jr as

acting Deputy Administrator of the Reforestation Administration. Cunanan
was formerly appointed in the same position but was later on rejected by the
Commission of Appointment prompting the President to replace him with
Jorge Tan Jr immediately without his consent. Filing the quo warranto
proceeding to the Supreme Court, Cunanan questions the validity of the
convened Commission of Appointments citing irregularities as to
the numbers of members comprising the same.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the appointment of Tan is valid

HELD:

With the reorganization of the Commission of Appointment, it was ruled

that such is a power vested in the Congress as they deem it proper taking
into consideration the proportionate numbers of the members of the
Commission of Appointment members as to their political affiliations.
However, with their reorganization, this affected a third party's right which
they rejected as its result. To correct this, the Supreme Court declared the
reinstatement of the petitioner and ordered respondent to vacate and turn
over the office in contention.